[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-30]
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 26, 2023
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
--------
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-720 WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eighteenth Congress
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
Chair RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MATT GAETZ, Florida ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
DON BACON, Nebraska MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
JIM BANKS, Indiana VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida SARA JACOBS, California
MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan PATRICK RYAN, New York
RONNY JACKSON, Texas JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
PAT FALLON, Texas GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
NANCY MACE, South Carolina Pennsylvania
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
NICK LaLOTA, New York STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JIMMY PANETTA, California
MARK ALFORD, Missouri MARC VEASEY, Texas
CORY MILLS, Florida
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia
Chris Vieson, Staff Director
Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
Owen McGeary, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Cavoli, GEN Christopher G., USA, Commander, U.S. European Command 6
Wallander, Hon. Celeste A., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of
Defense........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cavoli, GEN Christopher G.................................... 55
Wallander, Hon. Celeste A.................................... 47
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Moulton.................................................. 83
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. LaLota................................................... 95
Ms. Mace..................................................... 93
Dr. McCormick................................................ 96
Mr. Scott.................................................... 88
Ms. Tokuda................................................... 95
Mr. Turner................................................... 87
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY
CHALLENGES IN EUROPE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 26, 2023.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. Committee will come to order.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and
their service to our Nation. It's been over a year since
Vladimir Putin launched his illegal and brutal invasion into
Ukraine.
The cost of the war has been staggering. Tens of thousands
dead, including over 8,000 innocent civilians. Over 13 million
Ukrainians driven from their homes. Nearly 72,000 alleged
Russian war crimes including indiscriminate killings, torture,
kidnappings, and sexual assaults. Tens of billions of civilian
infrastructure are destroyed, including half of Ukraine's
energy supply.
But despite the relentless and appalling attacks against
them, the Ukrainian people have held strong. Through innovation
and grit, they've driven Putin's war machine back, reclaiming
much of the territory lost in the early days of the invasion.
The American taxpayer has been a key enabler to that
success. We have approved over $100 billion in military,
economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and our NATO
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies.
This unprecedented level of support requires an
unprecedented level of oversight. As we move toward the markup
of the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], this
committee will ensure that oversight is in place and is robust.
This war has lasted longer than many of us thought it
would, but that's because many of us thought the Ukrainians
were no match for Putin's forces. We couldn't have been more
wrong.
I'm hopeful the coming counteroffensive will provide a
final, stinging defeat for Putin. But that will require the
President to stop being so reluctant to provide Ukraine with
the capabilities it needs to be successful.
His hesitation over being too escalatory has only prolonged
the war and driven up cost in terms of dollars and lives.
Continued reluctance and indecision only empowers Vladimir
Putin and it sends all the wrong signals to [President] Xi and
the Chinese Communist Party [CCP].
Xi is watching how America responds to this conflict very
closely. If America loses its resolve in Ukraine, it sends a
clear message that we won't be there to defend Taiwan. That is
not the message we should be sending the CCP.
Finally, the war in Ukraine has opened Europe's eyes to the
threats they face. Some countries like Poland, Romania,
Finland, and the Balts are stepping up to meet that threat.
Others are not.
The awakening in Germany that so many thought was coming
has yet to materialize and in France the denial runs even
deeper. France has not met the minimum levels of NATO spending
and it ranks at the very bottom of countries providing military
assistance to Ukraine. And President Macron's recent knee
bending before President Xi has been shameful.
Old Europe needs to learn the lessons of Nord Stream 2 and
not become dependent on adversaries, especially those that
commit genocide and look to remake global borders through
force.
I believe the time has come for U.S. forces in Europe to
move further east into the countries that are investing more
heavily into their own security. Poland, Romania, and the
Baltics truly understand the threat from Putin.
Unlike others, they've invested in their own defense and
are real partners in our collective security. It's also where
our troops will be the most useful and have the largest impact
on deterrence.
I look forward to our discussion today and hearing more
from our witnesses about the best way we can adjust our posture
in Europe, and with that I yield to the ranking member for any
opening statement he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is just over 1 year
since Putin's illegal invasion of Ukraine. I think that the
message from the Biden administration and the message from the
alliance has been incredibly strong in that year and that is
that we will stand together, we will stand up against Russian
aggression, and we will make sure that a sovereign democratic
Ukraine remains.
I think it's important to think back to where we were in
January of 2022, and as the chairman alluded to, pretty much
everyone thought that Ukraine was toast. Most everyone thought
that there's no way that NATO would come together. You know, it
was a bickering, divisive--I think, you know, President Macron
just a year before had said that it was basically brain dead.
The overall assumption was that we would fail in Ukraine
and the alliance would be weakened. As we stand here today, I
think everybody has to say that the alliance has been
unbelievably successful in preserving Ukraine and turning back
Russia, not only stopping the invasion but recapturing
territory in Ukraine, and NATO has never been stronger in terms
of standing together as an alliance.
Not just on Ukraine, but throughout Eastern Europe we have
rallied. We are working with our partners across that portion
of Europe to make sure that they have a strong defense to deter
Russia. We have added Finland to NATO. We're close on Sweden,
not quite then.
So I think it's important for all of us to have the proper
perspective on this. We are being successful because of the
leadership of the Biden administration, the leadership of NATO,
and most importantly because of the courage of the Ukrainian
people in standing up to Russia.
So what we need to do is build on that success and continue
to support it and not threaten to cut it off for any of a
variety of different reasons, and there's a lot of different
reasons for that threat to be floated around.
One of them is the accountability issue, but we have talked
about that in this committee before. Clearly, the Ukrainians
are using the aid and the weapons that we are giving them to
maximum effect. If they weren't they would have lost by now.
There is oversight, and to challenge the existence of that
oversight is, (A), to undermine the overall effort and, (B),
not to be, you know, unsubtle here but it is to restate Russian
propaganda, because the one thing that the Russians have
continued to be very good at in this whole process is to spread
every story that they can imagine to divide our alliance. That
is their mission--is to get us to back down from the united
front that we have shown on Ukraine by sowing seeds of discord.
So we have to be really careful about which stories that we
go ahead and spread. China, by the way, is very aggressive
about that as well.
China is one of the main places that is spreading the story
that this aid is somehow not being used properly or is being--
you know, fostering corruption, none of which is true, all of
which advances their interests and undermines ours.
So, first of all, let's recognize the success we have had
and continue to build on it and be very careful about doing
anything to undermine it. The next few months are going to be
incredibly important.
I think that alliance has stepped up incredibly well in the
last couple of months as Ukraine prepares to try and retake
even more territory, providing more weapons, more training, the
systems that they need.
I think we're in a strong position and we need to build on
that. But we will want to hear from our two witnesses about
what we need to do--not just in the next couple of months but,
certainly, in those next couple of months and beyond--in order
to make sure that we continue to build on those successes.
What we want is we want a sovereign democratic Ukraine and
we want peace. We want to force President Putin to the
bargaining table to show him that he is not going to succeed.
He must make peace. That is the plan and I know our two
witnesses before us today have had a lot to do with making sure
that that plan has gotten as far as it has and I thank them for
that.
And then just two more issues, more broadly, European
security going forward. This is a huge opportunity in that the
NATO alliance has been strengthened, as I just described. How
do we take advantage of that opportunity? How do we resource
it?
How do we strike our balance working with our partners in
Europe to make sure that we have a strong defense posture
across Eastern Europe and that we're as close to on the same
page as possible?
It would be great if we could, you know, finally get Sweden
into NATO. Curious about your thoughts about how we can
negotiate through that.
So how do we strengthen Europe, and then to the Chairman's
last point on China, the role that China is playing. And I
think it was very clear from President Macron's visit and
discussion after his visit with President Xi that this is a
tough question.
Europe wants to figure out how to sort of have, you know, a
decent relationship with China while at the same time is aware
of the challenges. But how do we strike that? How do we work
with our European partners to make sure that we're on the same
page in trying to deal with the threat that China presents?
So I look forward to your testimony. Again, I thank you for
where we're at and where we're going forward. It has been
remarkable. I think it's 54 nations that have come together
that are providing support to Ukraine.
And, again, let us remind ourselves that if we'd been
having this conversation in January of 2022, how many people in
this room would have predicted that Ukraine would have been as
successful as they have been or that the alliance would have
held together as strongly as it has?
And with that, I yield back and I look forward to the
testimony.
The Chairman. And the Ranking Member makes a great point
and I would remind everybody that one of the reasons Ukraine
has been so successful is we have been over there with our NATO
allies since 2014 training their military how to be a
professional military and those dividends we are seeing today.
Now I'd like to recognize our witnesses. The Honorable
Celeste Wallander is Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs. General Christopher Cavoli is
the Commander of U.S. European Command and the Supreme Allied
Commander Europe.
Ms. Wallander, we'll start with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. CELESTE A. WALLANDER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Dr. Wallander. Thank you.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify.
I would like to express my appreciation for the continued
support from Congress and this committee in informing and
enabling the Department of Defense's work in this region. It is
an honor to appear alongside General Cavoli, who is an
outstanding colleague.
Russia's unprovoked war of aggression has created the worst
security crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World
War. For over a year this war has threatened Ukraine, the
security of Europe, the global economy, and the rules-based
international order.
Yet, thanks to the courage of the Ukrainian people,
supported by the United States and a broad coalition of allies
and partners from around the world, Russia has failed to
achieve its objectives. An independent Ukraine endures.
In Europe, NATO is more unified than ever. Just this month,
Finland joined the alliance as its 31st member. We hope Sweden
will follow soon.
Our goal is a free, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine able
to defend its sovereignty and deter further aggression. The
substantial commitment of the U.S. military assistance to
Ukraine reflects the American interests and values at stake.
As Secretary Austin has said, our support for Ukraine's
self-defense is an investment in our own security and
prosperity. And the United States is not alone. The Secretary's
Ukraine Defense Contact Group has rallied over 50 allies and
partners to commit more than $20 billion in security assistance
to Ukraine, including in the critical areas of air defense,
armor, and artillery.
Ukraine has leveraged this assistance to deal Russia
significant blows on the battlefield. Although Russia's
conventional military capabilities are diminished, Russia
continues to present serious risk as it retains capabilities in
nuclear, cyber, information operations, counterspace, and
undersea warfare, among others.
These capabilities, combined with Russia's intent to
undermine the independence of its neighbors and will to use
force, mean that Russia remains an acute threat. The Department
remains focused on deterring Russian attacks on the United
States and our NATO allies.
But it is not the United States alone strengthening defense
in Europe. European allies and partners have responded to
Russia's invasion by investing in their defense capabilities at
an accelerated pace.
We are working with our NATO allies to ensure that the
alliance is prepared for modern challenges and can deter
aggression from any adversary. Allies have deployed land and
air defense forces in the eastern part of the alliance and
maritime assets across the NATO area.
For the first time in history NATO has activated its
defense plans and deployed portions of the NATO Response Force.
Even as we focus on deterring the primary threat of Russian
aggression, we remain vigilant and attuned to other threats to
EUCOM [U.S. European Command].
The PRC [People's Republic of China] and China--the PRC,
China, and Russia collaborate across a variety of arenas to
undermine the international rules-based order. We recognize the
PRC is taking lessons from our support for Ukraine and we
continue to monitor their cooperation with Russia.
It is clear that the PRC's influence in Europe has waned in
recent years, in part due to its close alignment with Russia.
We also advance work with allies and partners to address the
interconnected challenges in Europe and beyond, which the
United States cannot address alone.
These include complications posed by climate change, cyber
and hybrid threats, and terrorism. To address both these
challenges and threats the Department will continue to pursue
novel approaches for deterrence and defense that create
advantages for ourselves and our allies and partners and pose
dilemmas for our competitors.
Congressional support for U.S. forces deployed in the U.S.
European Command area of responsibility, as well as funding for
defense initiatives across Europe and Ukraine's security
assistance, have been and will remain critical to achieving
U.S. national security objectives.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Wallander can be found in
the Appendix on page 47.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Wallander.
I now recognize General Cavoli for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GEN CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, USA,
COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND
General Cavoli. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member
Smith, distinguished members of the committee. It's a privilege
to testify before you today.
First of all, on behalf of the men, women, and the families
of U.S. European Command, I thank you for your steadfast
support to their mission, to their safety, and to their well-
being.
I'd also like to personally thank members for supporting
the rescheduling of today's session so that I can remain
focused on my area of responsibility during a time of
operational significance. I thank you very much for that. It's
a very busy spring.
It's a pleasure to appear next to Dr. Wallander, whose
professionalism and expertise is well known to this committee
and, indeed, to this whole city.
So this is an unprecedented time in the Euro-Atlantic area.
Fourteen months ago, Russia's illegal unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine dramatically shifted perceptions of European stability
and broader global security and galvanized European
governments' resolve.
Last year's NATO summit in Madrid was a turning point for
the alliance. Nations committed to a new strategic concept that
put collective territorial defense at the top of the alliance's
task list and, for the first time since the end of the Cold
War, set into motion a series of efforts that will profoundly
change the military structure and the activity of NATO.
We have been creating new plans for the general defense of
the alliance and these will drive higher levels of readiness
and more targeted national defense investments. Nations agreed
to accelerate defense spending increases, to establish enhanced
force posture on the eastern flank of NATO, to take an
unprecedented number of troops and weapons and turn them over
to NATO command, and, critically, to bring two new members into
the alliance, and I'm happy, as Dr. Wallander noted, that one
of them, Finland, has already joined.
Over time, these efforts will lead to significantly
increased European military capabilities and will continue to
deter Russian aggression against the alliance. That deterrent
posture has allowed us to work intensively in the past year to
assist Ukraine.
In the past year, thanks to your support, U.S. donations of
arms, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, and supplies have
enabled Ukraine to halt Russia's invasion. We have not been
alone in this effort. The DOD [U.S. Department of Defense] and
USEUCOM lead an international effort to identify, transport,
and deliver equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, along with the
training to use that equipment in combat.
The material support and training provided by international
donors--over 50 of them--has been huge and fundamental to the
Ukrainian military success. Over the winter, our coalition has
enabled the Ukrainian military to generate capabilities
necessary to defend and to regain parts of their sovereign
territory.
We're confident our Ukrainian partners are good stewards of
donated aid. Our embassy team in Kyiv and the Security
Assistance Group in Wiesbaden, Germany, work diligently to
monitor and to keep a close eye on all lethal aid and to ensure
that it's getting to and staying in the right hands.
Although we remain optimistic for Ukraine's future, this
war is far from over. Russia will remain an acute threat to
Euro-Atlantic security and the National Defense Strategy
rightly calls our attention to that.
Russia, of course, is not the only problem in Europe. The
People's Republic of China continues to increase its access and
influence in our theater and its activities pose risk to U.S.,
allied, and partner interests.
The PRC uses foreign direct investment, government-backed
business ventures, and loans to gain access to technology and
to get control over vital European infrastructure and
transportation routes.
Finally, Europe continues to face transnational challenges
such as violent extremist organizations, uncontrolled
migration, organized crime, climate change. EUCOM, of course,
trains and cooperates with allies and partners to help counter
those challenges as well.
Our strategic approach fortifies our allies and our
partners. It strengthens alliance interoperability and enhances
our collective combat credibility, which deters our
adversaries.
And of course, as always, should deterrence fail, USEUCOM,
alongside our allies and partners, is ready to fight and win.
Congress, your continued support for numerous funding
initiatives remains absolutely critical to our strategy. These
authorities and fundings strengthen the U.S. and NATO ability
to rapidly respond in crisis or conflict and your support
demonstrates our Nation's continued commitment to defend the
homeland and to protect the peace for 1 billion people living
in the Euro-Atlantic area.
Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, on behalf of the
entire U.S. European Command thank you again for the
opportunity to speak with you today. I very much look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Cavoli can be found in
the Appendix on page 55.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General Cavoli. I now recognize
myself for 5 minutes of questions.
General Cavoli, it appears that the Putin-Xi bromance has
blossomed into a full-blown alliance. Earlier this month,
President Xi traveled to Moscow where they reached agreements
on expanded military cooperation with Russia.
We know that Russia is providing China with highly enriched
uranium that China is turning into plutonium for a strategic
nuclear breakout.
Can you please explain how you see the China-Russia
alliance evolving and why defeating Russia in Ukraine has
ramifications for China in Taiwan?
General Cavoli. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the question,
which is one of the big questions of the current situation in
the globe.
Clearly, during this conflict Russia and China have grown
closer together. China's diplomatic and political and moral
support for Russia's illegal invasion has been notable and has
assisted the Russians in their position and their domestic
political position as well.
It appears increasingly to be an uneven bromance, as you
put it, in which Russia could become the junior partner. But it
is nevertheless a dangerous development, or development of
significant concern.
We see military cooperation. We see economic cooperation.
We see political cooperation. There are bright spots in this,
though, Mr. Chairman.
Our European allies have spotted this, have noticed this,
and with the encouragement of the United States, and their own
observations, are taking significant actions to limit the
increasing influence, and malign influence where it exists, of
the PRC inside Europe.
The Chairman. General, I spoke in my opening statement
about the administration not giving Ukraine the weapons it
needs to win. Chief among them are the cluster munitions. The
U.S. military has over 3 million cluster munitions that can be
fired from 155 [millimeter] currently--current howitzers in
Ukraine's possession.
We are going to spend millions of dollars destroying this
if we don't use them and Russia is using these munitions right
now against the Ukrainians. Can you please explain the
battlefield military utility that giving the Ukraine the DPICMs
[dual-purpose improved conventional munitions] that we have
would have in particular in places like Bakhmut?
General Cavoli. Yes, Chairman Rogers. So the munition in
question here is dual purpose improved conventional munitions.
We call it dual-purpose because it releases bomblets, some
of which are antipersonnel fragmentation grenades and some of
which are shaped charges that attack vehicles from above. It's
a very effective munition. It's very effective against mixed
targets of personnel and equipment, especially when those
targets are gathered into dense formations.
The Chairman. And that's what's happening in Bakhmut, as I
understand it?
General Cavoli. It is happening in Bakhmut.
The Chairman. The Russians are sending waves of troops.
General Cavoli. It is happening in Bakhmut, sir, and it
happens on most battlefields when one force goes into the
offense. So as a strictly military matter it is a useful and
very effective munition.
The Chairman. Okay. Chair yields to the ranking member for
any questions he may have.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Looking forward as we're looking at our posture in Europe
in light of the changes, the--you know, certainly the addition
of Finland to NATO, hopefully the addition of Sweden, and the
new threat that Russia poses, you know, given their invasion of
Ukraine, what should our posture be in Eastern Europe and how
do we have the budget to support that?
How do we coordinate with our allies? You know, what does
the new force posture look like, going forward? Either one of
you can take a stab at that.
General Cavoli. Sir, I can start that from the military
perspective and where we stand right now and perhaps defer to
Dr. Wallander for her additional comments.
So we have changed both allied and U.S. force posture
significantly during this conflict. In fact, even before the
conflict began, we began to flow forces from inside Europe
eastward and from the U.S. into Europe. Fairly significant
uplift right now.
We have about just shy of 20,000 deployed service personnel
who are not normally stationed in Europe, forward in Europe.
For the most part, those organizations we now have in the
ground domain. We have all of the V Corps headquarters forward.
We have two division headquarters and we have five brigade
combat teams forward. The vast majority of that force is
postured forward specifically in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, a
limited amount in Slovakia, a large amount in Poland and each
of the three Baltic countries.
We move them around for a certain amount of training
purpose.
Mr. Smith. [Inaudible]
General Cavoli. I'm sorry?
Mr. Smith. Are you satisfied that we're adequately
resourced to meet the needs?
General Cavoli. Right now in the ground domain, yes,
absolutely. We're resourced against the requirement we have
right now. Should the situation change we're prepared to
recommend different levels of posture.
Mr. Smith. Thank you.
Dr. Wallander.
Dr. Wallander. I would--in addition I would highlight that
the United States is leading under General Cavoli's leadership
at EUCOM but we are not alone, that allies have reinforced
their forward posture.
There are eight battle groups, one in each of the front-
line eastern flank countries and each one of those battle
groups is led by a different framework nation. The United
States is the framework nation for Poland, but other allies
have taken up leadership to ensure that there is the right mix
of capabilities across the entire eastern flank.
So this is a whole-of-alliance achievement and what we will
be doing at the Vilnius summit is reinforcing further that
enhanced posture and the multinational nature of that
commitment, which is enhancing the credibility in the eyes of
the Russian leadership. It is not only the United States alone.
It is the alliance of 31, soon to be 32 members.
Mr. Smith. And on that alliance, you know, there are ranges
of concerns about, you know, the degree to which particularly
Germany and France, you know, that early on were, you know,
traditionally trying to get along with Russia or would they
step up.
You know, what--sort of both of your assessments as to
where that alliance is at in terms of adequately understanding
the threat from Russia and from China as well and actually
stepping up to help us in meeting those challenges?
Dr. Wallander. Well, Germany has stepped up to lead--to be
the framework nation of the battle group in Lithuania, and
France has stood up to be the lead of the battle group in
Romania. I believe I've got that right.
So they are--they are leading and supporting the forward
posture, and on the--on reliance on Russia it was unwelcome, a
cold shower of recognition, that vulnerability to Russian
coercion and influence had left some countries in Europe at
risk.
But Europe as a whole has responded quickly and has reduced
dependence on both Russian gas and Russian oil, has imposed
strict sanctions on Russian banking, on individuals of
influence in Putin's Russia.
And so Russia has--Europe has responded both militarily
and----
[Simultaneous speaking.]
Mr. Smith. So I've just got a few seconds left here. I want
to give General Cavoli a quick chance to comment on that as
well.
General Cavoli. So their initial moves were extremely
positive, sir. France was first out of the gate to form a new
battle group, is prepared to raise it up to brigade size if
necessary.
The Germans had already been running the battle group in
Lithuania and immediately put a brigade command element there
to facilitate further reinforcement of it.
Both nations have contributed significantly to Ukraine with
lethal aid, and I should note that the French, in their return
to large-scale operational capability, have just staged the
largest exercise, Exercise Orion, that they've done in over 30
years.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South
Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank both of you
for being here today and, General Cavoli, I want to
particularly commend you. A proficiency in Italian very
appropriate but add to that French and Russian, and I
particularly identify.
My number-two son was a Navy doctor serving under your
command at Naples, Italy, and now I've got three grandchildren
who speak perfect Italian. So they'd be happy to be with you.
But, no, what you all are doing is so important and then,
General, I particularly appreciate you raising the issue with
Chairman Mike Rogers about the cluster bombs. Those should be
provided with the--with war criminal Putin sacrificing young
Russians for his personal aggrandizement of oil, money, power--
the human-wave tactics, this could help stop that and certainly
would deter their effectiveness.
And so I hope every effort will be made to look into
providing the cluster bombs. That we have 2 million available.
I mean, that's just inconceivable that we don't do more, Madam
Secretary. So please look into that.
The European Command, General, under your command has been
outstanding, increasing our readiness along with increasing
support of our allies and partners, and NATO has stepped up,
bolstered in its forward defenses and enhanced posture to the
border countries of Ukraine to deter war criminal Putin's
regime.
And then it's really significant that NATO is growing, and
an unintended consequence of war criminal Putin and his mass
murder is for Finland and Sweden to join NATO and so they're
how--and what that means to the Baltic republics. I mean,
just--it's just inconceivable how positive some things are.
But what is your summary of the combined forces and
capabilities and foreign military sales, specialized training
opportunities? What more can we do to assist the people of
Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Thank you, sir.
First of all, I'd like to underline your comments about the
reaction of the alliance on this. It's been--it's been very,
very significant. The alliance has reacted very, very quickly.
I have about--in my NATO role I have over 40,000 troops turned
over to my command right now and nations are prepared to add
more.
With regard to what else we can do to help Ukraine, I think
staying the course that we're on right now is very important.
We are in a position where we're moving into a period where the
Ukrainians will conduct offensive operations. We have good
solid plans to continue to support them but we'll need to
continue with those plans, sir.
Mr. Wilson. And we must. Chairman Mike Rogers is correct
again, pointing out the danger of the Chinese Communist Party,
the relationship of the military aid being provided by Xi, and
then we have seen the pictures of Iran providing the weaponry
to be provided across the Caspian Sea to war criminal Putin.
It's really clear to me that we have--what we're--what
you're doing is so important to deter the Chinese Communist
Party from threats to Taiwan and then to deter the regime in
Tehran from its plans of death to Israel, death to America. And
so what you're doing is so critical.
And then to Madam Secretary, the Ukraine invasion by war
criminal Putin continues that we must expedite foreign military
sales and to our allies and it's so incredible--I don't think
the American people know that 10 countries actually exceed the
United States in terms of military equipment being provided to
Ukraine based on per capita GDP [gross domestic product],
including a wonderful country called Bulgaria.
And so it's--but we need to backfill foreign military sales
to our allies, but in addition I'd also--we need to look into
what happened--it's not in your--it's in your purview,
providing aid that's already been paid for by Taiwan.
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
Thank you for the opportunity to thank Congress for
providing heightened amounts of foreign military financing
authorities and appropriations in order for us to do exactly
what you rightly point to, which is so many allies and partners
have been so quick and so generous in contributing capabilities
to Ukraine, that flexibility and higher amounts you have given
us will allow us to backfill those allies and partners.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I want to thank Chairman Mike Rogers and
Chairman Mike McCaul. They have been working with the Ranking
Members, too. It's been--hey, this is bipartisan. Amazing. And
so let's work together.
Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
both witnesses for your outstanding work at this time of,
again, the biggest security challenge since the end of World
War II.
I'd like to actually, General, shift the topic a little bit
to not the--well, out of the eastern flank and more to the
western flank. You know, in light of--even in the midst of all
of Russia's degradation of its military force because of the
conflict, its navy continues to operate and we heard from
General VanHerck, your colleague, when he testified that the
patrols in the Atlantic which used to be sort of sporadic by
the--their submarine patrols are now becoming persistent and I
wonder if you could just sort of talk about that as much as you
can in terms of, you know, what we're doing in terms of anti-
submarine warfare to track this and address this because,
again, despite everything that's going on in your other
portfolio, this is different than it was even, you know, 5 or 6
years ago.
General Cavoli. Yes, sir. Thanks for the opportunity, and
this is very much inside my portfolio. I share it with Glen
VanHerck, of course. Defense of the homeland starts forward.
First of all, sir, if I could, I'd like to underline your
comment about the specificity of the degradation of the Russian
forces. Much of the Russian military has not been affected
negatively by this conflict.
One of those forces is their undersea forces. It's hard to
talk in public as you well know, sir, about undersea warfare
and our efforts in that regard. But I can say that the Russians
are more active than we have seen them in years and their
patrols into the Atlantic and throughout the Atlantic are at a
high level most of the time--at a higher level than we have
seen in years and this is, as you pointed out, despite all of
the efforts that they're undertaking inside Ukraine.
Mr. Courtney. So one development which, again, maybe you
could comment on is just, again, with the admission of Finland
to NATO and, hopefully, you know, shortly after with Sweden,
that, you know, that brings to the table or to the sea another
sort of, you know, valuable ally and you mentioned some of the
naval exercises--I think it was on page 15 of your testimony--
that have been ongoing despite, again, in the midst of the
Ukraine war.
Again, can you talk about where you see, you know, what
they will add to those efforts to, again, strengthen the
western flank?
General Cavoli. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
So the accession of Finland is very important to us.
Finland brings a large army at full mobilization, 280,000
ground troops. Brings a very competent navy. Brings a large and
growing air force.
They're in the process of acquiring 64 F-35s, which will
create 250 fifth-generation fighters across the northern three
Scandinavian countries. So the accession of Finland is very
strong. The future, we hope, accession of Sweden brings much of
the same.
The Swedish navy is very active, very confident, and very
powerful in the Baltic Sea area, and this will give us a huge
additional capability to control all three domains--classical
domains in the High North.
And finally, I would point out that just the geography
alone in a military sense of bringing those two huge borders of
the Baltic Sea into the alliance while we're adding 1,300
kilometers of NATO border to the Russian Federation, those are
very powerful in and of themselves, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Well, again, your point about in
answer to the first question regarding the increased patrols, I
mean, it's a team sport in terms of all our allies working
together to sort of--you know--hopefully manage that and keep
it under control.
So and, again, as you pointed out, these are two countries
with very advanced capability. So I think it is going to be a
force multiplier.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wallander, General Cavoli, thanks so much for joining
us.
Listen, I think we're all very, very steadfastly in support
of Ukraine and their effort to maintain independence from this
unprovoked and inhumane and barbaric invasion by Russia.
I'm very focused on making sure that every weapon, every
round of ammunition that we send to Ukraine, is tracked and
that we are accountable for every bit of that. The challenges
we face today in the United States are many.
Our constituents look at us very carefully and say, what
are you doing to make sure that we are on track with that, and
we know we're sending a number of items over there from tanks
to HIMARS to Javelins and Stingers, small arms, ammunition,
across the whole spectrum.
Can you give us an idea about what are we doing in making
sure the tracking and accountability of every bit of what we
send over there is very focused, making sure too we track any
potential for waste, fraud, and abuse as well as do we gather
intelligence to understand who might be trying to intercept
those weapons, whether it's in Ukraine or even somehow on
tracks and in transportation in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Thank you, sir. Yeah, of course. So
starting with the monitoring of where the--where the equipment
goes, we perform a variety of things. First of all, we
inventory everything that comes through U.S. hands on the way
into Ukraine and we do that in a couple of different locations
that you're already familiar with, sir.
So we believe we have a very, very solid understanding of
what goes into Ukraine, first of all.
Second, we, over the last few months, have fielded to
Ukraine a NATO standard logistics tracking system and they give
us access to their networks to monitor that. So as we inventory
stuff we ingest it into LOGFAS [Logistics Functional Area
Services] and then they track it as it goes forward. This is
their system of tracking and we watch over their shoulder.
Of course, that's not enough so we do inspections, enhanced
end use monitoring. In fact, those are done by the Defense
Attache Office in Kyiv under Brigadier General Garrick Harmon.
There's an--today's Wednesday--there's an on-site
inspection going on in Odessa right now today. There's another
one scheduled next Thursday. Those go based on the security
situation, however, sir.
So sometimes we don't get those off. When we're unable to
get to a location we have barcoded the critical pieces of
equipment and issued handheld scanners that project onto a
network that we control and the Ukrainians will inventory by a
handheld scanner.
So that's how we look at things inside Ukraine. As far as
our efforts outside of Ukraine to make sure that we're doing a
good job we have had in our security assistance enterprise I
believe it's nine DOD IG [Inspector General] evaluations for
audits and numerous visits. So I'm pretty confident we're doing
the best we can there.
And then, finally, yes, of course, we do gather intel on it
and I'd be delighted to talk to you about it in closed session,
sir.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
Let me ask questions about munition stockpiles. As we know,
we are at incredible burn rates on munitions that we are
sending to Ukraine, many times having to ask our friends around
the world if they can help with that.
Give me your perspective on where we are today with burn
rates on critical munitions, especially those that hold utility
in the INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command], and what are we
doing to address when those stockpiles, those magazine depths,
are at critical rates in regenerating that and then modernizing
some of those weapons systems that--many of those like Stinger
are circa-1960s weapon systems?
Dr. Wallander. Well, let me start with when we work on a
package of security assistance to Ukraine there is a cross-
department working group that includes the services. It
includes input from other COCOMs [combatant commands] to
address exactly the issue you raise that our contributions to
Ukraine are done in light of our own readiness requirements and
priorities to support other allies and partners, not least
Taiwan.
So that is baked into our process as we decide how we are
best able to supply Ukraine with its requirements.
Mr. Wittman. Are we calling upon our friends and allies to
help in that effort, especially when we are critically low on
some of those munitions?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman, we are, and the main
structure for that is the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which
meets monthly.
But in between those meetings we are in constant contact
with allies and partners, not just in Europe but globally, to
source those capabilities and they really have stepped up. A
lot of the artillery ammunition is coming from other countries
at this point, not directly from the United States, to support
Ukraine.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Kelly [presiding]. I now recognize Mr. Gallego.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.
Dr. Wallander, in your written remarks I was pleased to see
you highlight the Baltic states and the important work that
they're doing to enhance security in the face of an
increasingly aggressive Russia.
In fact, one of my proudest moments in Congress was
introducing the Baltic Security Initiative, which provides
targeted security assistance to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania,
three of our most critical and crucial allies.
Could you describe any particular areas where you would
like to see the United States deepen cooperation with the
Baltic states and do you think there's more that we can do and
should be doing to support our Baltic allies?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman, and I share your
support for assisting the Baltic countries, given their
position and given how forward leaning they have been on
security assistance to Ukraine.
I think that one of the most important aspects of the
Baltic Security Initiative has been the resources to build
infrastructure for the three countries because now we have
commitments from NATO allies and we have an American persistent
rotational presence in all three of the Baltic countries.
But in order to support those troop presences and in order
to make sure that they are at a high readiness, the Baltic
countries need to have training ranges, they need to have
storage facilities.
They need to have the infrastructure to support the
substantial number of allied forces as well as their own, and
they have been focused on spending their own national defense
resources to build that infrastructure.
But the fact that the United States has been willing to put
money to that requirement and also there is NATO money on that
requirement is--helps them to plan but it also then helps
General Cavoli when he is planning those rotational presences,
when he's planning the exercises, to know that U.S. troops will
remain at a high level of readiness and really interoperable
with our allies.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
Speaking of Lithuania, we're a few months away from the
NATO summit that will take place in Vilnius this summer. The
administration has done an impressive job to further strengthen
our alliance cohesion, and I also look forward eventually for
Sweden to joining Finland and other allies.
Could you share your expectations going into that upcoming
summit and what in your mind would signal a successful summit?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
I think the most--the most important aspect of the summit
that I want to point to is something that General Cavoli
referred to, which is that the work that's going on building
into the summit is our NATO plans, which will then enforce the
new--the new plans, given the new security environment, will be
approved in the run-up to the summit and then defense ministers
and foreign ministers ahead of the summit will agree on what
kinds of resources, what kinds of capabilities, and what kinds
of defense spending are required to make sure that all of the
NATO allies have the capabilities to resource those plans and
it is at the Vilnius summit that heads of state and government
will endorse those appropriate resources in order to make those
plans real and make them credible. That's number one.
Number two is that what will be important is a NATO
statement on the importance of Ukraine as a European country
and its right to exist within its internationally recognized
borders as a sovereign and independent state, and a NATO
commitment to help in the areas of defense institution building
and sort of the host of activities that NATO has invested in
Ukraine over the past 30 years, which has contributed to
Ukraine's ability to defend itself and remain an independent
country.
So I would point to those two. From a defense point of
view, those would be the two highlights that we need to focus
on for Vilnius.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Doctor.
General Cavoli, thanks for your testimony. I want to ask
about Russia's actions in the gray zone. I remain deeply
concerned by this threat and believe that irregular warfare
training with allies and partners is crucial to counter that.
Recognizing that we're in this setting, what insights can
you share about how EUCOM is approaching this challenge?
General Cavoli. Thank you, Congressman.
Yeah, I share your concern in that regard and the--our
cooperation with our allies and our partners, I should point
out, in terms of irregular warfare training and preparation is
an important part of our overall defense plans both in EUCOM
and through NATO.
We have NATO Special Operations Headquarters and we have
U.S. Special Operations Command Europe. Both of them work
intensively on a bilateral basis and multilateral bases to
prepare countries for resilience, resistance, and irregular
warfare in general.
There are some real, real great cases that I'd love to talk
to you about in closed session, of course. But in general, it's
a big success story and it, importantly, includes nonallied
partners.
Mr. Gallego. Yeah. Irregular warfare, I think, is something
that we have not recognized as being a very important approach
to Ukraine's resiliency against Russia.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
Mr. Kelly. The gentleman's time has expired. I now
recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
General Cavoli, throughout this conflict we have had the
specter of tactical nuclear weapons looming over us by the
Russians and, frankly, Putin has put these threats to effective
use in restraining our policymakers and leaders from involving
themselves more thoroughly in this conflict on the Ukrainians'
behalf.
In my opinion, the Russians know they're overmatched when
it comes to the big guns in our respective nuclear arsenals.
However, it seems to me that they feel they have an advantage
when it comes to the low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
So first, do you believe that there is a gap in our nuclear
deterrent at present, and also knowing that Chairman Milley,
General Cotton, and your predecessor, General Wolters,
supported the continued development of the Nuclear Sea-Launched
Cruise Missile [SLCM-N], do you share their position that this
system would fill a key deterrence in that gap?
General Cavoli. First to your second question, sir.
Yes, I think that the SLCM-N is an important weapon.
To your first question, I don't think we have significant
gaps in our nuclear deterrent capability. I'm very confident in
our nuclear deterrence as well as our extended nuclear
deterrence.
Dr. DesJarlais. In an open setting, can you give us an
estimate of how many tactical or nuclear low-yield weapons
Russia has?
General Cavoli. Not in an open setting, sir, but I'd be
delighted to in a classified----
Dr. DesJarlais. I've seen unclassified estimates around
2,000 warheads. Does that sound about correct?
General Cavoli. I haven't seen those, sir. So----
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Dr. Wallander, one area that I think
the administration has kind of failed the American people is
its communication surrounding the conflict in Ukraine.
I don't think they've done a satisfactory job in
communicating the reason why we are supporting Ukraine or what
our desired end goal in this conflict is.
So I'd like to give you a minute to communicate why you
believe it's imperative that we take the fight to Russia at
this moment, what interest does the United States have in this
conflict and, you know, how are we doing and how do we expect
to do? What's the end game?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
First of all, the stakes are European security. Of course,
our values and our interests are connected to Ukraine as a
sovereign independent country. But European security in the
21st century is built on a foundation of respect for
international law and the resilience of the U.N. [United
Nations] Charter. And Russia's assault in Ukraine is an attempt
to change that rules-based international order, which is to say
that sovereignty is contingent, borders can be changed through
the use of force, and big countries get to decide what the
foreign and security policies of their neighbors are.
So the stakes are larger than Ukraine. But they go beyond
Europe as well because China is engaging in similar kinds of
probes and attempts to erode that same rules-based
international order in the Indo-Pacific. And China we know is
watching very closely to see if the international community
will allow Russia to get away with this and would take the
wrong lessons from our failure to ensure Russia's strategic
failure in Ukraine.
Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah, and I think that's a good
explanation. I wish we could get it out to the American people
in a more effective manner.
General Cavoli, less than about a third of our NATO allies
remain compliant with their commitment to maintain defense
spending at a minimum of 2 percent GDP. With this going on
literally in the European backyard, what is it going to take to
get them to step up?
General Cavoli. Sir, I think this is one of the things it's
taken to get them to step up. So in 2014 the average
expenditure per GDP inside NATO was 1.4 percent. Today, it's
1.8 percent. Not yet at the target but closing in on it.
We have come up to nine nations meeting the--meeting the 2
percent goal to include one nation, Poland, which spends more
per GDP as of this year than the United States does.
With the accession of Finland that number has grown to 10
that spend 2 percent or more and there are 11 more nations that
are on a very definite glide path to get to 2 percent by 2024,
which was the Wales summit pledge.
That's not all the nations in NATO, however, sir, and so we
continue to have work to do to get all our--all our allies
sharing the burden equally.
Dr. DesJarlais. I think that's really important considering
our looming debt crisis, our exponential debt we have in this
country.
I think Americans are definitely wanting to see other
countries step up and do their fair share and it's extremely
important that we build these alliances, strengthen these
alliances, especially with the looming threats, as we have
mentioned, with China and Taiwan.
So I thank you both for being here today. I yield back.
The Chairman [presiding]. Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you both for being here.
Your statements both discussed the practice of the People's
Republic of China in creating agreements with individual
European nations that ostensibly are for improving trade but
create dependencies on China, and we have seen this same
strategy in Africa.
It's been much maligned by us because we say these are bad
deals. But even if they are bad deals for the host nations they
work well for China because they create this dependency.
Have you seen any change in this trend in light of the war
in Ukraine, Dr. Wallander?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
Yes, we have seen a change. Three of the countries who've
been members of the 17+1 arrangement by which China was seeking
to build those kinds of dependencies through trade, investment,
have actually--and it's not surprisingly the three Baltic
countries--have quit that structure, recognizing the challenge
that China poses and the vulnerabilities that it seeks to
create and successfully often creates through technology,
through problematic investment contracts, through acquisition
of companies, of ports.
And so there is a greater awareness among European
countries that even as they trade with China, that they need to
not allow themselves to become vulnerable to coercion and----
Mr. Moulton. Well, we certainly hope that that trend
expands and continues.
General Cavoli, we are very much anticipating the Ukrainian
counteroffensive, anticipating it will be much more successful
than the Russian offensive of the past several months. But are
the Ukrainians going to get all the weapons they need in time
for this offensive?
General Cavoli. Congressman, thank you.
Yes. So we sat down with the Ukrainians--with our Ukrainian
colleagues and we calculated the amount of materiel they would
need for this offensive.
We checked it a couple of times and we gathered it from our
allies, who were very generous especially with regard to tanks
and armored fighting vehicles, and we have been shipping it
into the country.
We are--over 98 percent of the combat vehicles are already
there and I'd hesitate to describe too much more in an open
setting. But I am very confident that we have delivered the
materiel that they need and will continue a pipeline to sustain
their operations as well.
Mr. Moulton. Well, that's good to hear and I certainly hope
that we hear from the Ukrainians that they agree with you.
Dr. Wallander, someday, hopefully sooner than later, this
war is going to end and we can all imagine that Russia will go
back home, assess their truly dramatic losses, and then start
to rebuild their military.
How do we think about deterrence in the future--5, 10 years
from now--where we don't want Russia to simply get back to
where they were before this war started and start another war
in Europe?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. Well, first, I would
note that Russia will--I share your assessment that Russia will
seek to rebuild and will be able to rebuild to some extent.
But the international community has imposed export
restrictions, technology restrictions, and sanctions on Russia
and those restrictions will likely make it very difficult--make
it very difficult for Russia to achieve all of the objectives
that the leadership might have in the military sphere.
That said, they will rebuild.
Mr. Moulton. And so how do you structure those sanctions so
that the allies who put them together are willing to continue
them, to your point, to prevent them from rebuilding while also
showing Russia that if they're to change their behavior they
have an off-ramp and can be welcomed back into the world
community if they significantly change their approach?
Dr. Wallander. Well, many of the most important
restrictions are American export control restrictions; and
while it is good to do them in concert with allies, we have the
lead on many of the technologies that Russia seeks and has
benefitted from.
But it is our close alliance relationship and our
constructive relationship with the European Union, because it
is the European Union that is the organization that agrees upon
and enforces sanctions on Russia in cooperation with us, that
will enable us to maintain that unity. And awareness of the
threat that Russia poses to Europe remains high and I believe--
--
[Simultaneous speaking.]
Mr. Moulton. And I hope we have a way of communicating to
the Russian people that there is a choice here when they get to
their next leader.
General Cavoli, what do we need to do for Ukraine on this
front post-war?
General Cavoli. I'm sorry. On what front post-war? On their
future force?
Mr. Moulton. Yes, their future force.
General Cavoli. We are working hard on the question of what
their future force needs to be look like. One thing we know
right up front, Congressman, is that the----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 83.]
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr.
Kelly.
Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield my time to
the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Alford.
Mr. Alford. Thank you for ceding your time, Chairman Kelly.
Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Smith and our
witnesses here today. I appreciate you being here.
The war in Ukraine has exposed some big gaps in our defense
industrial base and I, along with Mr. Wittman, have some deep
concerns about our ability to replenish and keep up with our
weapon stockpiles. We must accelerate munitions productions
capacity to be prepared for a potential conflict with China.
We all know Xi is watching what's happening in Ukraine,
supporting Russia through its no limits partnership with Putin,
and I also want to make sure that our European allies are
carrying their weight through burden sharing.
General Cavoli, as you mentioned, the majority of our
allies are not meeting NATO's 2 percent GDP defense spending
target. In fact, as you said, only 9 of our NATO 30 member
states met its 2 percent in 2022.
Dr. Wallander, considering the recent NATO report that
these nations just are not living up to their obligations, what
is the administration doing to put pressure on these nations to
pay their fair share?
Dr. Wallander. Congressman, the first--the most important
is that we are making meeting the 2 percent commitment a
deliverable of the Vilnius summit.
In other words, we are not letting up on the focus on the
requirement of meeting 2 percent and, as I suggested, going
beyond 2 percent if that is required to actively and correctly
build the capabilities required by the NATO regional plans.
So we are--we are pressuring and working with allies to
take seriously the capabilities requirements to make those
plans more than just plans on paper but actual real
capabilities and that's going to require defense spending--
increased defense spending by many, if not all, NATO allies.
Mr. Alford. In particular, Germany only contributed 1.44
percent. That's a big disappointment. What type of pressure
specifically are you putting on Germany?
Dr. Wallander. We are expecting Germany to live up to this
government's commitment to meet 2 percent. They have already
increased their defense spending over a 5-year period, which
should get them to near 2 percent if not above, but we continue
to emphasize to German leadership the importance of Germany to
fulfill its commitment.
Mr. Alford. Are there any real consequences if they do not
meet that and meet it soon?
Dr. Wallander. I think the consequences for European
countries that don't meet that commitment is that they--their
standing as leaders in Europe is predicated on the--in part on
the seriousness with which they undertake to fulfill the
commitments they've made to other allies and we hold them
accountable for that.
Mr. Alford. Thank you. General Cavoli, I have a very simple
question for you. What happens if Russia wins and Ukraine
loses?
General Cavoli. Well, sir, from a military perspective it
depends on what wins means, where the force ends up--where the
Russian force ends up geographically, what its composition is,
what capabilities they have left.
But it would certainly mean that we have to change our
deterrent posture if they ended up significantly farther west
than they've managed to get so far.
Mr. Alford. Who would be next?
General Cavoli. Sir, that's a--that's a great question. We
think about that a lot and we work with the nations that we
think would be vulnerable.
Clearly, geographically speaking, the ones on their
immediate periphery of the Russian Federation would be the
first but they wouldn't be the only ones. The Russians are
active globally, very, very active in Africa, for example. So I
think it would depend on a lot of things.
We do spend quite a bit of time working with partners and
allies who are in the immediate periphery of Russia to make
them resilient and defensible.
Mr. Alford. I've got a minute left. I wanted to talk about
the CCP and their investments in Europe right now. What are
some of the projects that they are doing that you can talk
about in this setting and how are we countering those measures?
Dr. Wallander. I think the areas of our greatest concern
are when China is, largely through technology companies--Huawei
is the kind of poster child for that--and so we work closely in
sharing intelligence and our information about the risks that
that creates for countries in Europe and, more broadly,
globally, for them to be able to control their infrastructure,
to control their communications. So that is one major line of
effort.
But the other major concern is when we see China seeking
majority control of ports, and while there were some instances
in Europe some time ago where countries did not take that
seriously, they are now very much attuned to that and have
taken steps to make sure that even if there is investment it
does not allow----
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr.
Keating.
Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The greatest strength that the U.S. Government has
securitywise, militarywise, is something that Russia doesn't
have, something that China doesn't have. That's our coalition
of allies.
That's our strength, and foremost among our allies are our
transatlantic allies. They've had, however, a soft underbelly
in terms of their own security, surrounding an issue that is of
concern to us too domestically here and that's the energy
issue.
Energy and our security, energy and the security of our
allies, you can't separate them. They're intertwined and
they're important, and we see how important it is with Saudi
Arabia's recent change in the position with Iran. We see
Russia's influence in OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum
Exporting Countries].
We have seen Putin use it as a weapon of war and the
strength of the Ukrainian people to withstand this winter. But
the targeting of the energy infrastructure and how important
that is strategically.
So given everything that's happening, one of the things
that's not, I don't think, fully appreciated that we should be
looking at very much in terms of our own U.S. self-interest is
the miscalculation of Putin when he thought the using weapon--
the weapon of energy with Europe and our allies how that would
be a strategic advantage and the changes that have occurred,
changes that would have taken decades to get to where they are
now.
Can you comment on--because it's so important to our
security--can you comment on those changes and how Putin's
miscalculation has dramatically changed the energy posture of
our allies that have--that has such a dramatic effect
domestically here in the U.S. as well?
General Cavoli. If I could start, Dr. Wallander, because
there's a military quotient to this and a legal equity that's
important, Congressman.
First of all, the change has been dramatic. So, in general,
Europe's dependence on Russian gas has gone from 40 percent to
just under 10 percent overnight in a year. It wasn't without
pain and some of the pain was shared by U.S. service men and
women because the prices increased by several fold.
In Germany, the gas prices increased 600 percent for a
period there. They've leveled back out now. But, nevertheless,
it was not without pain that they did this. Why is that
important for us?
As you know, there's legislation that requires us not to--
us, the U.S. military--not to depend on Russian gas and oil and
in the operational energy field that was easy for us. That's
the gas and petroleum that we buy to fuel ships, to drive
tanks, and things like that.
We could control where we got that from. But our
installations overseas were dependent on the local systems and
so we were unable to comply. But in Germany where we have
39,000 Americans and their families, we actually went from
being 40 percent dependent to zero percent dependent on Russian
gas.
The only exceptions would be countries where we really
don't have a lot of people so countries that still receive gas
from Russia would include Hungary. We have very limited
presence----
Mr. Keating. Dr. Wallander, if I could, looking at the
future, this is a tremendous shift and it's advantageous to our
own security interests and defense interests in this country.
Can you just comment also along with the General Cavoli?
Dr. Wallander. Absolutely, and it's not just the
dependence. It's the fact that Russia has a longstanding track
record of using dependence for political coercion and that was
the vulnerability that was created by investing or accepting
Russian investment particularly in gas pipelines.
By diversifying to LNG [liquified natural gas], by
diversifying to new sources, by moving away from carbon-based
fuels, Europe is reducing that vulnerability that Russia could
use the turning off or the metering of energy for political
effects and that is a very welcome development.
Mr. Keating. And getting back to my primary point, that
makes this coalition stronger because Putin had thought that
this would be a wedge.
So, looking forward, how important has it been in the
decades to come to our greatest strength that this is something
that's being dealt with so dramatically, as the general said?
Dr. Wallander. I will just point--I fully agree and I'll
point to another element, which is in 2014 when we first looked
at sanctioning Russia for its initial invasion of Ukraine, one
of the limitations on strong sanctions was exactly that energy
dependence.
Going forward, sustaining sanctions, tightening them when
necessary, will be easier for Europe because they are not
dependent and that will be a long-term disadvantage for the
Putin leadership.
Mr. Keating. Thank you. Thank you for your work.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Wisconsin, Mr. Gallagher.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The phrase lessons learned from the war in Ukraine has
become one of the most popular or perhaps overused phrases and
in sort of the DC national security community.
I guess in simplest terms, Dr. Wallander, what lessons do
you believe the Department of Defense has learned from the war
in Ukraine?
Dr. Wallander. Three lessons. One is needing to pay close
attention to readiness and supply chains. We neglected that as
a country in the last 30 years and we have learned that lesson
and we're taking action to remedy those--that neglect.
Number two is the importance of allies and partners, a
global network of allies and partners. It's not just NATO,
although it's importantly NATO. It is the G-7 [Group of Seven].
It is other like-minded countries who care about that
international rules-based order.
And I think the third lesson is that we need to make
investments in partners that we did make in a country like
Ukraine to build basic defense institution capabilities, to
build relationships, because all of the work that EUCOM has
been able to do to surge support to Ukraine would not have been
possible without those relationships that were built over
several decades.
Mr. Gallagher. And when it comes to our sort of initial
inability to deter Russia from invading and miscalculation
therein, what lessons are to be derived from that?
Dr. Wallander. Well, I think there the lessons are the
positive lessons of how we successfully deter Russia every
single day because Russia, despite potential incentives to,
have not threatened NATO, have not threatened the U.S.
homeland.
We know how to create credible deterrence that works and
that's a lesson I know that EUCOM is taking and that the
Defense Department wants to continue forward as we think about
the importance of the Vilnius summit and making sure we have a
credible deterrent for NATO.
Mr. Gallagher. But as a matter of fact, on February 24th we
obviously did not have a credible deterrent or we failed to
deter, notwithstanding what's happened afterwards and that's
sort of not a positive development anytime you have, you know,
hundreds of billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives
lost.
I guess I'm sort of honing in on that failure of
deterrence. Is it mirror imaging? Is there something about
Putin we fail to understand?
Dr. Wallander. I think tactically we underestimated the
stakes that the Russian leadership--well, I don't know if it's
tactically but we miscalculated and believed that Russia--this
Russian leadership would be daunted by the international costs
that it would pay.
But I think the other lesson learned is one we are--we are
already implementing, which is to take seriously the actual
defense capabilities of partners like Ukraine so that they can
mount a credible deterrent.
And while work was done--bipartisan work was done on that
in the last decade, clearly we didn't do enough, and that we
have definitely learned that lesson and are carrying it
forward.
Mr. Gallagher. General Cavoli, same question on sort of
Putin and deterrence failure, what was our central
miscalculation, and then an added question about, you know, a
lot of people refer to Ukraine as a sort of test bed for
technology in modern warfare. How are we capturing that
innovation on the battlefield and importing it into DOD?
General Cavoli. So, sir, starting with your second
question, while we have a ton of different initiatives and
activities to observe from the technical level to the
operational level and to the institutional level what's working
in Ukraine, what's not working in Ukraine, and we're importing
those.
We have at all echelons talks with the services about what
we're seeing. They have questions for us. We talk with the
Ukrainians. They are evolving very quickly because, you know,
they're under selective pressure, as it were.
So they're developing new techniques. Sometimes we develop
them together in consultation with each other. But all of this
is permeating back into the services as they generate future
forces.
Just as important we're in consultation constantly with the
other combatant commands. Admiral Aquilino in U.S. INDOPACOM is
paying great attention to this, has had many teams come out and
visit.
Mr. Gallagher. I have 18 seconds. Is there, like, an
obvious battlefield innovation in Ukraine that could be
exported to the Indo-Pacific for Aquilino?
General Cavoli. Yes. I think our method of equipping and
advising from afar.
Mr. Gallagher. My time has expired.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from
Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you both for
your testimony both here and in the closed setting as well.
I have a couple of questions and I want to pull on a couple
of threads. One is we spoke about the addition of Finland to
NATO and the power of their capabilities, and one of the things
you spoke about was their air power and their plans to have I
think 60 F-35s at least. Is that correct? Or around then?
General Cavoli. Sixty-four, Congresswoman.
Ms. Houlahan. Sixty-four. And then we have also spent a lot
of time, of course, talking about Ukraine and what we would
expect would be offensive operations that are forthcoming and
you, sir, General, talked about staying the course. Good solid
plans that are outlined.
But I and a number of other people bipartisan-ly have been
asking of you all whether or not it would be appropriate to
allow for Ukraine to have access to aircraft as well, whether
they're A-10s or F-16s or MiGs. I think the Polish have been in
the press recently talking about that.
What is the latest thought on that? Why is that not
something that we would want in an active war zone to be
providing for an ally of ours?
Dr. Wallander. Our focus has been on--with its generous
support of the American people through Congress--focused on
Ukrainian priorities for the fight and aircraft while on the
list--Western modern aircraft is about eighth on the list. And
so we have focused with resources on the highest priority
capabilities and that has been air defense, artillery, and
armor.
I think General Cavoli can speak to this better than I.
There's also a timing issue--what do they require right now,
which is what we have been focused on for the battles they are
facing, what can we deliver that will be timely and effective.
And in that regard, the contributions that some NATO allies
have made of legacy Soviet aircraft have been helpful to the
Ukrainians because their pilots are trained on those aircraft.
They know how to use them. They know how to maintain them.
General Cavoli. Thanks, Celeste.
Ma'am, in the near term and into the midterm what Ukraine
really needs to do is control the airspace over its country and
over its forces, right, and they've been doing that very
effectively with ground-based air defense and we spoke a little
bit about our efforts to introduce more ground-based air
defense recently.
So that's, like, the thing that's most imperative right now
and it's being very well served by ground-based air defense.
They've also got some capabilities that we have married to
their Soviet-era airframes for offensive operations that I'd
best talk about in closed session.
And finally, I would note that there are countries that
have given airframes, and Slovakia and Poland specifically have
given a significant number just in the past couple of weeks and
they were readily integrated into operations.
Ms. Houlahan. Yes, and I've been following that and I
appreciate that.
I'm just going to leave that part of my questioning with
saying that what--I'm curious to know if there is any point in
time where it makes sense to continue that conversation because
the Congress has at least been asking that question officially
since last April.
So it's been more than a year, and I understand that these
timelines are long and it's very expensive and prioritization.
But we have no indication necessarily that this is going to
abate anytime soon and so it just feels as though it's still an
appropriate conversation to continue to ask and to continue to
have.
With what remains of my time I would like to follow up on
what Mr.--I think it was Keating was asking about our efforts
in the DOD within EUCOM to make sure that we are helping our
allies be less reliable on Russian energy sources and I was
wondering if you could specifically comment on the Energy
Resilience and Conservation Investment Program and whether or
not any of those funds have been particularly useful in being
less dependent, as you mentioned, sir, in our own use of energy
or our allies being less dependent?
Dr. Wallander. Congresswoman, I would have to take that
question for a response in the record. I would--I have not been
tracking whether we have been able to use that funding for--
specifically for allies. It's a great question and I would like
to get you a good answer.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate it. I'm going to go
ahead and yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, General
Bacon, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bacon. Chairman Rogers, thank you, and I thank, Dr.
Wallander, for you being here and, General Cavoli, appreciate
your perspective.
I have a series of questions on the Baltics. Then I also
want to talk a little about energy to our own bases in Europe.
So if we could be concise I'd be very grateful. So I'm on the
Baltic Security chair--I'm the co-chair for the Baltic Security
Caucus. I also served in NATO for a few years.
You know, the Baltics deserve a lot of our focus. They are
on the front lines. They've embraced democracy, our free
markets, and they are shining bright. They're prosperous. But
they're on the front lines and, I think, very vulnerable.
So, first of all, Dr. Wallander, are we doing enough to
create deterrence in the three Baltic states?
Dr. Wallander. I think that we are--we have really stepped
up, the United States and allies, and have heard their concerns
and in particular one of the achievements there was the Madrid
summit decision to focus on credible defense, forward defense,
and you've seen that then materialized through the battle
groups but also with persistent U.S. rotational presence,
persistent air policing, and we have prioritized all three
countries in some of their FMS [foreign military sales] cases
and FMF [foreign military financing].
Mr. Bacon. I appreciate that. We have dedicated about $250
million a year for the Baltic Security Initiative and we're
going to try to--at least I'm proposing to raise it this
following year but we'll see how well we do.
General Cavoli, I know that at the last NATO conference
there was talk about putting a ground division in the Baltics.
Not necessarily all American. Could be a blend of various
countries.
What's your opinion of that? I mean, I personally think
it's needed for deterrence. But where do you lie and what's
the--where are we going with us?
General Cavoli. Thank you, Congressman. So the new plans
that we have put together--the regional plans that we put
together are a pretty big advance in a number of ways. One of
the ways is that they incorporate for the first time in years
national defense forces and national defense planning.
When you put the Baltics' national forces together and when
you put the multinational forces, those three battle groups
that can come up to brigade level, and when you put the U.S.
unilateral contributions of special enablers together and then
you put the multinational division northeast on top of that,
which is a NATO force that I control, you have well over a NATO
division in the Baltics right now and this is all baked into
the plans that I was discussing earlier, sir.
Mr. Bacon. I think that's a big step forward for
deterrence. Russia needs to know they're fighting with us when
they pick on the Baltics. It doesn't appear to me that the
Baltics have a very modern air defense capability.
I know we have fighters that move in and out. But surface-
to-air missiles, what can we do about that?
General Cavoli. Sir, so we are in year three of a 5-year
special security cooperation initiative for integrated air and
missile defense [IAMD] in the Baltics. I know you're familiar
with it already, sir. And so the first phase of that was to lay
down the communications networks and the secure communications
necessary. That's been done.
We're now in the phase where we lay out more sensors and,
importantly, integrate those sensors. We're doing pretty well
with that. Phase three will be the last year of the 5-year plan
and that is to put actual weapon systems in.
Separately from that, sir, I would say that those battle
groups that NATO has put out there do come with ground-based
air defense that we have been integrating with the overall air
picture.
And then, finally, for the Vilnius summit we have created a
special air defense plan that will help us drive forward the
rest of the Baltic IAMD program.
Mr. Bacon. I think that's good news for the Baltic states
and the more we can build on that is great because they are
very vulnerable.
Switching gears a little bit, I served at Ramstein. I'm
very familiar with the Landstuhl hospital. I was part of
putting that together as a base commander years ago. But the
one thing I was told, Ramstein and Landstuhl were always
reliant on Russian gas.
You know, I've tried to chip away at that over the last few
years but last NDAA we finally said no ands or buts--you cannot
be using Russian gas. How are we doing on this, to either one,
if you have the information?
General Cavoli. Sir, we're doing great on that right now
and it's because of the conversation that we were having
earlier with a couple of other Representatives. So we were
unable to comply because we were dependent on German
infrastructure and German energy infrastructure.
That has changed dramatically over the last 14 months. The
Germans went from 39.6 percent of their energy use coming from
Russia to zero. I mean, I think it's .1 [0.1] percent and I
can't even figure out what that is.
So we're no longer reliant on Russian gas in those
locations.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much. I thank you both. Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from
Texas, Ms. Escobar.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and many
thanks to our witnesses. Thank you for your service and for the
incredible work that you've done.
I think context is so important and I wanted to share with
you all when I attended the 2019 Munich Security Conference the
conversations at that conference were alarming and jarring when
it came to Western unity, when it came to our commitment to
NATO.
I was at this year's conference and it was radically
different, and I am so proud of the work that our country and
that our administration has done in order to shore up those
alliances and to ensure that we are together, especially in
this very important fight to support Ukraine.
So I want to focus a little bit on lessons that we have
learned, actually, General Cavoli, from Russian readiness
failures. What readiness lessons, particularly regarding
sustainment, supplies, and logistics, have you learned thus far
from Russian operational failures?
Where have Russian forces vastly improved on their early
failures and what problems continue to plague them? How are our
support efforts preventing Ukrainian forces from making similar
mistakes?
General Cavoli. Thank you, ma'am. And, first of all, I was
at both of those security conferences also and I share your
observations and the sense of gratification that you have about
that.
I think the theme of the 2019 one was ``Westlessness''----
Ms. Escobar. That's right.
General Cavoli [continuing]. If I remember correctly. That
was not the theme this year.
[Simultaneous speaking.]
General Cavoli. Two lessons learned specifically with
regard to logistics--first, stockpiles and consumption rates.
They are just off the charts and I think that we in the DOD
have taken note of that.
I know that we in NATO have taken note of that and have
incorporated that lesson into our new plans and that will be
part of driving defense spending higher in Europe and among our
allies.
Second, logistics is an end-to-end system, and the Russians
have proven extremely adept at operational level logistics.
They can move large amounts of stuff long distances quickly.
But once it gets off the train, that last mile, as it were,
that is part of the system too and they were not ready for that
and that is shown over the days. Part of the system also is the
operational design of your operation.
One of the key weaknesses of the initial Russian plan was
the fact that it attacked from five different directions at
once converging.
So the Russian army was operating on what we call exterior
lines, that is, from outside and you had to really work hard to
shift an effort from one access to another. So those are three
or four lessons, I think, that we could draw from their
logistic experience.
On the other hand, our logistic experience has been
extremely successful. Jackie Van Ovost in USTRANSCOM's [U.S.
Transportation Command's] ability to move things, huge amounts
of stuff, strategically overnight is unmatched on the globe.
Ms. Escobar. Excellent. Thank you.
Dr. Wallander, I have a follow-up question for you. I want
to pick up on some of the concerns that Mr. Wittman and Alford
raised regarding munition stockpiles. I've urged integrating
additive manufacturing into this process in the past.
I think it is where we can have tremendous success and we
can really capitalize on the innovation and brilliance of it.
You referenced the cross-department working group to oversee
munition expenditures and backfill efforts. Is this group also
tasked with exploring innovative ways to meet those backfill
requirements?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman.
The main focus of work on those issues is led by the
acquisition and sustainment part of OSD [Office of the
Secretary of Defense] and is led by Under Secretary Bill
LaPlante. And he is so busy, so focused, so active in finding
ways to solve bottlenecks, to use exactly the kind of
creativity and innovation advantages that U.S.--the U.S.
economy and U.S. companies have. And they've already solved
some of the creative solutions that--they've already come up
with some creative solutions that we can't talk about in public
for Ukraine but also have managed to go far beyond what we
expected a year ago in now being able to count on enhanced
artillery ammunition production over the coming years.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you both so much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Indiana, Mr. Banks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Wallander, since the war began in Ukraine the DOD has
deployed or extended the deployment over 20,000 additional U.S.
troops to Europe.
This surge included--includes additional air, land, and
naval capabilities and now we have 100,000 U.S. service members
who are stationed in Europe.
Given the depleted state of the Russian military and the
increasing defense spending of our NATO allies, does the United
States need those surge forces in the EUCOM area of operation
after the war passes?
Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I believe that the DOD, in
close support with the Joint Staff and EUCOM, will take exactly
that assessment when the time comes. It's premature to make
that assessment right now because we do not know precisely how
the conflict ends, how the battles over the next couple of
months will resolve. But I assure you we will look carefully at
exactly that issue.
Mr. Banks. So you don't know. The surge forces might be
permanent?
Dr. Wallander. We don't know what the requirements will be
for credible defense and deterrence after the next couple of
months because we're still in the middle of this hot war and a
high level of Russian activity in Ukraine.
Mr. Banks. Okay. So do you think the Department should
redeploy temporary surge forces to other theaters like the
Indo-Pacific or back to the continental United States based on
other priorities?
Dr. Wallander. My support is for----
Mr. Banks. It sounds like a surge is permanent, a permanent
surge.
Dr. Wallander. Let me be clear. The surge is by no means
assumed to be permanent. There is a process for sourcing global
employment of the force and at this point the surge was--is
assessed to be sustainable and to not come at the cost of
forces elsewhere on the globe.
Mr. Banks. Okay. Let me move on.
According to a recent study conducted by CSIS [Center for
Strategic and International Studies], the U.S. military would
run out of certain munitions in a potential conflict with China
in less than a week, in part because of what we have sent of
our stockpile to Ukraine.
Is it possible for the DOD to replenish crucial U.S. weapon
stockpiles for items like Javelins, Stingers, 155-millimeter
artillery shells to what they were a year ago while maintaining
security assistance to Ukraine at the current rate?
Dr. Wallander. I'm not aware of that study but I will
reinforce something I spoke to earlier, which is all decisions
to provide security assistance to Ukraine are taken in light of
U.S. readiness requirements and that input includes all COCOMs,
including INDOPACOM.
Mr. Banks. So even given the surge in munitions funding and
the expansion of production lines, what's the soonest that it
would take to replace our stocks of Javelins, Stingers, and
155-millimeter?
Dr. Wallander. I would have to take that question for the
record. I don't know a date, sir.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Mr. Banks. Does the DOD consider the strength of U.S.
stockpiles when deciding which munitions that we provide to
Ukraine?
Dr. Wallander. Yes, sir. That is part of the readiness
assessment.
Mr. Banks. And does the DOD consider the need for Taiwan to
receive some of these weapons to defend themselves before we
supply aid to Ukraine?
Dr. Wallander. Assessing Taiwan's requirements is part of
that process in making decisions.
Mr. Banks. And if the DOD considers the danger that
supplying particular munitions to Ukraine poses to U.S.
stockpiles, as you said, why did it take the Department so long
to ink deals to boost the production of these systems after the
war in Ukraine began?
Dr. Wallander. I don't believe that it--we might disagree
about what was a quick response to the requirement. Those new
contracts and those new advances on supply lines and defense
industrial base came within months.
Mr. Banks. Is that quick enough? You just told us that we
haven't replaced the stockpile. Studies prove it. So is it
quick--can we replace them quick enough?
Dr. Wallander. We can replace stockpiles as required by
readiness input from the services and the COCOMs.
Mr. Banks. All right.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from
California, Ms. Jacobs.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you both for
being here and for testifying. As you may know, even well
before the war in Ukraine I was focused a lot on adequate end-
use monitoring of our weapons around the world and I want to
commend the administration for the admirable work you all have
done to do end-use monitoring and enhanced end-use monitoring
in Ukraine.
I saw it for myself firsthand when I was out there in
December and I know it's incredibly hard to do end-use
monitoring in a place like Ukraine that has active conflict
where we rightly do not have boots on the ground. But we also
know even outside of war zones, as the GAO [U.S. Government
Accountability Office] has recently detailed in two different
reports this year, that end-use monitoring can be challenging
and that we have had challenges with it.
So, Assistant Secretary Wallander, I was hoping you could
speak to, one, the challenges of conducting enhanced end-use
monitoring in a context like Ukraine or an active war zone and
how what we're doing in Ukraine compares to other previous and
current conflict-affected countries, and how we're thinking
about end-use monitoring, moving forward, given what we're
learning in the context of Ukraine.
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I want to reinforce General Cavoli's presentation of the
processes as being innovative, comprehensive, and providing a
high level of confidence that we know how much we've--what has
happened to all of the capabilities that we have provided to
the Ukrainians, that the Ukrainians have been very forward
leaning and cooperative and provide a lot of transparency. That
leads to the high confidence of our reports about end-use
monitoring and that we can--we have not detected diversion of
capabilities that we have provided.
In particular, it's extraordinary what EUCOM has been able
to do, given that it is a combat environment and U.S. military
forces cannot be towards the front lines to do the end-use
monitoring or American citizens, and the innovations using
technology that General Cavoli provided is something
extraordinary.
And to your question about how does that compare to
previous instances, I don't believe we had those in place and
this is going to be one of the lessons learned. We can now do
this in other areas where we're assisting partners in ways that
we didn't think we could do before.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. Thanks for all of your
innovative work on that and please let us know what you need
from our end to be able to continue improving our end-use
monitoring of weapons not only in Ukraine but all over the
world and particularly as we're looking at sort of moving
forward, further equipping partner forces.
Assistant Secretary Wallander, I wanted to also ask you a
question about war powers. As you know, Congress is who the
Constitution gives the power to declare war and fund and
regulate the military.
Are you aware of any legal analysis produced within the
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, or any other
part of government that would allow the President to use force
against Russia without congressional authorization, and that
includes force applied through foreign surrogates?
Dr. Wallander. Being clear, I am not a lawyer and not
speaking from a legal perspective. I am not aware of such
discussions because our--in supporting Ukraine because we are
not at war or involved in combat or hostilities with Russia.
We are supporting Ukraine and providing capabilities to
Ukraine. The Russia contingency from an American point of view
would be inherent right of self-defense were Russia to attack
the United States or our allies.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I ask because there was a concerning
article in The Washington Post that said that DOD was working
on plans to potentially do kinetic strikes against Wagner Group
outside the EUCOM AOR [area of responsibility], and so I just
hope that you will notify Congress and this committee if ever
there is--starts to be discussion about, you know, directly
attacking Russia or its proxies with us or one of our surrogate
forces.
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman. I will--I will be
mindful of your question and take that back.
[The information referred to was not available at the time
of printing.]
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Florida, Mr. Waltz.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for
coming today.
I just wanted to add to some other members' questions and
conversations about burden sharing. And I just wanted to draw
your attention to where we are at this point in terms of the
United States and the taxpayer providing military assistance
compared with our allies.
Notably there, you have Germany at $2.5 billion--these are
pledges--compared to the United States at 46. You have the
United Kingdom a little over 5. Poland, despite having an
economy a fourth the size of France, has contributed more.
Secretary Wallander, would you call this burden sharing? Do
you think this is fair to the American people and taxpayer?
Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I think your chart illustrates
American leadership and we are very concerned about burden
sharing. I will note that there are eight countries that
contribute a larger percentage of their GDP and security
assistance to Ukraine than the United States, Poland among
them.
Mr. Waltz. No, absolutely, and I don't want to take away
from what our Eastern European allies are doing and
contributing. But Germany, France, Italy, Spain, some of the
largest economies in Europe, this is--have contributed a
pittance compared to the United States even though the EU
[European Union] economy is the same as the United States,
collectively.
So one of my other colleagues asked what are the
consequences. I mean, listen, the American people--and this is
what I need you to take away and I made this same point to
Secretary Austin.
The American people are sick and tired of this. If I had
$100 for every speech that a Defense Secretary has written in
the last 20 years begging our European allies to step up, I'd
be a very rich man. But they haven't. I mean, they just
haven't.
The United States has subsidized European security and
social programs for the last 20 years. So when does this end?
When do they actually get to the point and what are the
consequences if they don't?
Dr. Wallander. We continually push NATO allies to do their
part, both in the NATO context and in support of Ukraine.
Mr. Waltz. But Madam Secretary, we have been pushing for
decades across multiple administrations, and sending strongly
worded memos over tea and crumpets in Europe isn't getting the
job done.
So here's what I need you to take away. This continued
support is at risk domestically, politically, here if we don't
see the administration getting results--not asking forcefully,
getting results in terms of this pathetic contribution here.
And you need to understand that there is a domestic issue here
with continued support to Ukraine, given everything that we
have done.
That said, we have done a lot and we have been very
effective post facto after deterrence failed and after
thousands and thousands of Ukrainians are dead and suffering.
But you agree and you've testified the Russian military is
devastated, correct?
Dr. Wallander. Its conventional forces, ground forces, that
are in Ukraine has been devastated.
Mr. Waltz. Unlikely for them to take the entire country of
Ukraine at this point. Fair to say?
Dr. Wallander. Very unlikely.
Mr. Waltz. I think fair to say that the 31 most modern
militaries in the world and a strengthened NATO alliance that
many people in this room have celebrated, could handle the
remnants of the Russian military should it decide to take
action in a NATO country or be aggressive in a NATO country.
Fair to say? I mean, they can't--they can't take all of
Ukraine. I don't see how they could take a modern European
military.
Dr. Wallander. I don't think I would agree with you, with
respect, Congressman, because Russia still retains strategic
capabilities, an air force, cyber, underwater----
Mr. Waltz. Its air force can't establish air superiority in
Ukraine. I can't imagine it establishing air superiority in
Poland. Fair?
Dr. Wallander. I think we have to take--we should not----
Mr. Waltz. So I think----
Dr. Wallander [continuing]. We should not make the mistake
of underestimating Russia's military capabilities because the
stakes of getting it wrong are too high.
Mr. Waltz. But I think at the end of the day we have a very
serious threat in Western--in the Western Pacific and the
INDOPACOM theater, and I noted that you would not commit to the
surge being permanent.
Yet we have taken assets from the Indo-Pacific. We have
taken Air Force and other assets to put them in Europe. Yet, we
have 31 NATO nations that are able to stand their own ground
against a diminished Russian military.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from
Virginia, Ms. McClellan.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam
Secretary and General.
My staff recently had the opportunity to meet with members
of the Ukraine's national emergency services, which is their
equivalent of FEMA [U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency],
and they mentioned that one of the tools that would be most
helpful for them is the provision of remotely controlled mine
protection and removal equipment such as MV-4s and MV-10s to
decontaminate areas heavily mined with unexploded ordnances.
There are currently only two of these machines in the
Ukraine, despite multiple cities being littered with unexploded
ordnances. Is EUCOM working to ensure that more of this life-
saving technology is being provided?
General Cavoli. Yes, absolutely. A lot of it's being
provided by allies, ma'am, and a lot of it's being provided by
other international organizations that are--go beyond a single
country.
The whole question of demining and demilitarizing the
landscape at the end of this is a big one. The Ukrainians have
been doing it as they go along when they recapture territory.
But it is a large task that's going to--that's going to have a
lot to do with Ukraine's recovery from this.
Ms. McClellan. One of--sorry, I didn't know if you----
Dr. Wallander. I was just going to point exactly to the
fact that that is actually a major focus of a number--there's a
consortium of European countries contributing to that
capability.
Ms. McClellan. I'm glad to hear that because one of the key
takeaways we took was the number of people lost in the
emergency services through these unexploded ordnances. At least
53 have been injured and 13 dead as of March 24th, and so I
think doing all we can to assist in that endeavor would
definitely be appreciated by them.
Assistant Secretary Wallander, Russia has targeted several
of our allies using irregular warfare tactics such as
strengthening separatist sentiments and planning coup attempts
in nations like Montenegro and Moldova.
Can you all talk about what EUCOM is doing to help partner
nations to thwart these efforts?
Dr. Wallander. Well, I'll start. From a from a whole-of-
government approach the United States has focused on combating
corruption, improving transparency, rule of law, good
governance, because one of the main vectors by which Russia is
able to undermine allies, undermine countries in Europe, and
try and influence their political leadership is through
corruption, poor governance.
And so that is a major focus of our efforts as well as the
European Union's efforts as well to build that resilience
against that kind of Russian influence.
Ms. McClellan. General.
General Cavoli. Ma'am, we also take a number of efforts in
the information space. We work with our allies and our partners
very carefully to identify misinformation and then rapidly to
counter it.
Critically, we help to train the governmental organs of our
allies how to do that as well so that they can go into the
future. And then, finally, we work with them on cyber defense
quite a bit so they maintain an awareness of some of the
various ways that Russia can manipulate the public conversation
on things. We do all of those under authorities from the
Department of Defense.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. You anticipated my next question
on disinformation and propaganda. In February of this year
Russia suspended its participation in New START, one of the few
remaining nuclear arms control treaties that remain following
the disastrous foreign policy of the previous administration in
this area.
Does this make nuclear weapons a more prescient threat
should Russia seek to escalate its illegal war in Ukraine
further?
Dr. Wallander. Congresswoman, we share your concern that
Russia is no longer implementing and in compliance with the New
START Treaty.
The immediate loss is a loss of transparency and sharing
data, which helps to create reassurance and stability and is a
main function of arms control, and it's something that we would
want to prioritize in discussions with Russia about them coming
back into compliance.
At this point, they've shown no interest or willingness and
that is a matter of concern. It's less of a concern in the near
term because we have a pretty good understanding of Russian
strategic nuclear forces and capabilities. But it becomes a
greater concern over time and it's something we're going to
have to work on.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield
back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
Chair now recognizes another great member from Virginia,
Mrs. Kiggans, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
I just wanted to kind of piggyback off of my Republican
colleagues, some of their comments today that have been about
accountability and spending in Ukraine. And I will say that I
was definitely very much with them at the beginning of this
process and I'm new to Congress, but over the course of the
past 100 or so days and listening to some of these briefings
that we have received, I am understanding more the importance
of the U.S. involvement in the Ukraine fight.
So I guess, Dr. Wallander, I'd just ask that maybe you go
back to Secretary Austin and administration, and I think it's
really messaging. You know, we are privy to a lot of
information in this committee that the general public is not.
So when we talk about, you know, our constituents that care
about how much we're spending compared to how much the rest of
the world is spending, I just think we're not doing a great job
of informing them about the importance of what might happen if
Russia was to succeed and was to be victorious in that fight--
what would then happen with China and Taiwan.
You know, these are important issues that I think we have
just not done a great job with messaging of the importance of
our role in the Russia-Ukraine fight and of Ukraine coming out
on the right side and winning.
So because of that, you know, I'm a supporter of what we
are doing there. You know, you talked earlier about trying to
increasing access and interest in Russia and then you mentioned
that we have seen the PRC diminishing ties with some of our
NATO allies in Europe in favor of strengthening ties with
Russia.
Can you expand on that a little bit and just in what ways
is the PRC diminishing those ties with allies?
Dr. Wallander. As the EU as a structure has got--has become
more attuned to the risk of being dependent on China, the EU
has taken a more active role in implementing its oversight over
contracts, over investments, and sometimes pushing against
individual countries, which maybe don't prioritize that as
much.
But the EU has played a--as a structure has played a
constructive role. But mostly it's happened at the level of
individual countries that have decided they are not willing to
take the risk and I mentioned some of them.
But we--it is something we need to continue to work on as
Americans in talking to our European allies and partners so
that they understand the risks they create when they make
themselves vulnerable to coercion and influence.
Mrs. Kiggans. Very much so, and along those lines we talked
a little bit about the French president--you know, Macron's
visit to the--visit, you know, with the PRC and his comments,
and I'm concerned that our European allies are not taking the
threat of the PRC as seriously as they should.
So do you believe that European leaders understand and
appreciate the significant threat posed by the PRC and their
aggressive posture towards Taiwan?
Dr. Wallander. Europe has come a long way. NATO, for
example, now has in its strategic concept a recognition of the
dangers that the PRC poses to global security and, therefore,
to European security.
But it is something we need to continue to work on and make
sure that that--as that challenge evolves, as it remains acute,
as it maybe changes shape in different aspects of China's
activities, that we share that information with our allies and
partners.
Mrs. Kiggans. And I guess, General Cavoli, along those
lines are we doing--on the military side are we working on
those relationships?
General Cavoli. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely. The--an example
would be the way we use ports. So it's not a surprise to you
that China has been investing heavily in an effort to gain
control of critical transportation infrastructure,
transportation infrastructure that we, both the U.S. and the
alliance, rely on.
So the way we run our exercises and the ports we choose to
exercise is a very strategic choice. It allows us to see
things, and when we reveal limitations in our port usage, for
example, countries take action very quickly. They spot it.
We have opened new ports. We have worked with countries to
establish new port capabilities and that's just one example.
Earlier Dr. Wallander talked about 5G capabilities and other
things. So we are able to use the military instrument to open
eyes.
Mrs. Kiggans. Good. Those are all good things. And then
just thinking about that relationship between China--between
the PRC and Russia and they're meeting more and, you know,
there's a part of me that thinks they are more aligned than we
know.
But do you feel like Russia will fall in line behind China?
Because it kind of seems like China is leading the way and kind
of dictating, you know, or that they're certainly more of a
world power, in my mind, than Russia. But do you think that
Russia would fall in behind China or is there some just
controversy between the two?
General Cavoli. I'll say one thing quickly and then give it
to Celeste.
I think they're in danger of that just happening whether
they choose it or not, ma'am.
Dr. Wallander. I just share that concern. I think that's
exactly right. Russia's weakness is actually going to be a
strength----
The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Panetta, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General Cavoli, a Ukrainian counteroffensive, as we're
hearing, is due in weeks, I guess, is what they're saying. And
while an ample supply and replenishment of artillery will
clearly be instrumental for the Ukrainian forces to be
successful, I would also think that you got to have sort of a
surprise attack as well and a successful surprise attack would
just be the first half.
If Ukraine can manage this and preserve its command and
control, their forces will have to break through Russia's
defensive line and quickly mobilize troops forward.
So what capabilities do our Ukrainian partners still need
to be successful in this breakthrough, in this surprise attack,
including air defense capabilities?
General Cavoli. Congressman, obviously, any force can
always use more of everything. But according to the modeling
that we have very carefully done with them the Ukrainians are
in a good position.
The Ukrainians are in a good position. They have some
weaknesses that I'd prefer not to talk about in public. If I
could talk to you in private about those I'd be happy to. But
we are confident.
In terms of their surprise and things like that, of course,
we have worked on all that with them and, of course, it
wouldn't be surprise if we talked about it in public also, sir.
So I'd be delighted to have the chance to talk to you in more
detail in private.
Mr. Panetta. I appreciate that. And, obviously, Poland has
come up a little bit here in this hearing and, obviously, it
provides critical security for the eastern flank of NATO and
it's deepened.
Poland has done a good job deepening their defense
relationship with the United States, I would say, in response
to the growing security challenges across EUCOM including
management of prepositioned equipment.
Now, the U.S. leads the Enhanced Forward Presence battle
group in Poland and deploys a rotational armored brigade combat
team under Operation Atlantic Resolve.
And at the June 2022 NATO summit in Madrid, Biden announced
the first--President Biden announced the first permanently
stationed U.S. forces on the eastern flank. As NATO continues
to assess the distribution of forces along that flank, can you
describe the benefits of stationing a permanent brigade-sized
team in Poland?
General Cavoli. Sir, the benefit is to have a permanent
presence of a team forward whether it's permanently assigned or
not. There are other service equities that go into that that
really General McConville would be better to talk about stress
on the force from rotation and things like that.
But it's very important and the U.S. Government has found
it very important for us to have an armored brigade combat team
forward deployed there. It saves a lot of time.
The second thing is the prepositioned stocks that you
mentioned, Congressman. Those have been absolutely critical to
our ability to respond quickly to the events of the last year-
and-a-half and it was all enabled with EDI [European Deterrence
Initiative] funding thanks to the U.S. Congress.
Mr. Panetta. Great. And, Secretary Wallander, what might
that type of permanent, if there was permanent stationing,
provide us from a policy standpoint as we continue to work
closely with our Polish partners?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. Well, Poland has
been--is an extraordinary ally, reliable, a wonderful host to
these American forces.
Poland has also been incredibly stalwart and helpful in our
ability to provide security assistance to Ukraine, to support
the training of Ukrainian forces so that they can effectively
use those capabilities.
And so, you know, Poland has really emerged as a leader
among NATO allies in Europe and we're--actually I consider us
very lucky that we are the framework nation for the battle
group in Poland and have these capabilities because we can
count on them.
Mr. Panetta. Great. Thanks to both of you.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman and I wholeheartedly
agree with Mr. Panetta on this. I've been very up front about
this. We need to be moving more of our troop presence into
Poland, Romania, the Baltics, and out of Germany where the real
threat is.
With that, Mr. Davis of North Carolina is recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair, and to our
witnesses who are here today thank you for your service and
thank you for your timely presence today.
Russia continues to remain a persistent threat to European
security by employing a range of tools to coerce its neighbors
and divide the alliance. Could you elaborate on how Russia uses
cyber operations and energy supply manipulation to coerce our
allies and partners?
General Cavoli. Thanks, Congressman. First of all, the
energy manipulation; it is reduced dramatically over the last
year because of the--our allies' desire to come off of Russian
gas. So it's moving in a good trajectory.
Some of our partners, however, have not had the luxury of
being able to adjust their economies yet and Russia continues
to turn on and off contracts, switches, gas flow, et cetera.
Moldova has been a victim of this recently in the last winter.
So it remains important.
Cyber--cyber is hard to talk about in public but they use
cyber to create disinformation and they also use cyber to
delete information, data, and to attack infrastructure and we
have to work quite hard across the alliance and with our
partners to defend against that.
And, finally, I would say some of the work that Russia does
still is with its conventional force. So the Russian air--the
Russian ground force has been--has been degenerated somewhat by
this conflict, although it is bigger today than it was at the
beginning of the conflict. The air force has lost very little.
They've lost 80 planes. They have another thousand fighters and
fighter-bombers. The navy has lost one ship. So they still use
all of that conventional power as well and they mix them all
together, sir.
Mr. Davis. According to the Department of Defense, since
February 2022 the United States has deployed or extended about
20,000 additional Armed Forces to Europe, bringing the total
U.S. force posture in Europe, including permanently stationed
forces, to approximately 100,000 military personnel or so.
Do you see additional changes to force posture to
approximately stand against Russia?
General Cavoli. Sir, let me just start with current force
posture. The figure 100,000 includes Department of Defense
civilians as well. The uniformed force posture is about 82,000
this afternoon as we sit here. But, nevertheless, it's all
Department of Defense, as you point out.
Force posture is going to depend, from my perspective as a
military matter, largely on the outcome of this conflict, sir,
and we just don't know where it's going to go.
We don't know what the size, the composition, and the
disposition geographically of the Russian military is going to
be and that's going to drive a lot of this.
Some of it will be our policies as well and I'll defer to
Dr. Wallander for those.
Dr. Wallander. Yeah. Decisions about posture will, first
and foremost, depend upon military advice and assessments.
They will also, I want to emphasize--this came up earlier--
they will be based upon EUCOM's advice, EUCOM's assessments of
what's required, but balanced across the global force because
the United States has global responsibilities and the Defense
Department will make sure that all of the COCOMs are resourced
appropriate to the challenges and threats that we face.
Mr. Davis. Okay. And can you talk about how the People's
Republic of China is threatening U.S. and allied interests in
Europe, including how their technology-related activities are
advancing their military capabilities?
Dr. Wallander. Congressman, there's, first, the
vulnerability that reliant--that for those countries in Europe
but also globally create for themselves when they rely
exclusively on Chinese technologies, which come in the
appearance of private investment but, in fact, have close ties
to the PRC and to the government. So that is one vulnerability.
There is also--there are active efforts by different
elements of the Chinese government or influencers in the
Chinese economy and trade and investment community to seek
relationships for--to exploit access to sensitive technology.
It's information that we share constantly with European
allies so they can be aware of the need to be careful and to
not get bought into those kinds of vulnerabilities.
Mr. Davis. Thank you so much. And Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon.
Mr. Fallon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Just a
couple of questions.
We see the largest land invasion, General, since World War
II in Europe and, you know, NATO allies agreed many years ago
to spend at minimum 2 percent of our GDP on defense, and some
of us do that and some don't.
I'm a big supporter of NATO. Always have. Many people, in
fact, the vast majority of this committee is as well. I
remember, you know, former President Trump getting on our
allies about spending their fair share, and after this invasion
what--why is Germany delaying?
You know, have they made a concrete commitment to that 2
percent threshold? Because I haven't seen it and I don't know
if I've missed anything. So I wanted to ask you about that.
General Cavoli. Sure. Thanks, Congressman. Yeah, Germany's
made a fairly significant shift. Previously, there was not a
roadmap that got them to 2 percent not only by 20--there wasn't
one by 2024. There wasn't one. There is now. They have a plan
to get to 2 percent by 2024.
Second thing I would point out, the German ministry of
defense and the armed forces have new leadership. The
leadership is very focused on achieving those goals and on
spending the special fund on real capabilities. So I think we
see a very different Germany today than we did 14 months ago
when it comes to defense.
Mr. Fallon. So maybe one of those silver linings in a
pretty awful cloud as far as commitments like from Spain,
Italy, Canada, other countries like that and, of course, the
small, very wealthy countries like Netherlands, Belgium,
Denmark, come to mind because they weren't hitting that 2
percent either. Do you agree--are they all on a roadmap to it
now?
General Cavoli. Yes. So we have 10 allies today spend more
than 2 percent or 2 percent or greater to include one ally,
Poland, which spends more per GDP than the United States does.
We have 11 allies that now have credible plans, detailed,
some of them laid out in law, to get to 2 percent by 2024. We
do have 20 more allies, however, and we have work to do.
Mr. Fallon. Yeah, and I want to laud Romania, too. When
we--I visited them--we had a CODEL [congressional delegation]--
they were at, I believe, 2 percent then and they have committed
to 2.5, a developing country that's not quite--you know, has
the strong economies of some of their Western allies.
General Cavoli. I agree, sir. Romania is a wonderful ally.
Romania is modernizing very quickly and Romania is extremely
supportive both of the United States and NATO.
Mr. Fallon. And, General, what are your thoughts on the
posture--the force posture of, roughly, 81,000, 82,000 right
now as far as moving east?
When we went on--moving east, moving more toward Eastern
Europe--we talked and visited with the prime minister of
Romania as well and I said that, boy, I think we probably need
to ensure that the troops we have there now remain and make it
permanent, and his response was very telling. One sentence--he
said, I don't think you all have any choice.
So I just wanted to visit with you on that as well.
General Cavoli. Absolutely. Prime Minister Ciuca and I have
known each other for a few years and he's made that point clear
to me frequently.
I hope he pointed out to you, however, that there's a U.S.
division headquarters in Romania right now. There's a U.S.
brigade combat team in Romania. There's a U.S. helicopter
battalion in Romania right now and there are periodically U.S.
fighters.
With regard to the rest of our posture, we have moved east
significantly since just before the beginning of this conflict
and throughout it. That's a lot of the surge forces that have
come forward.
Some of it's a little bit limited by capacity to house and
to train all those forces [if] we go forward and we're working
closely with our allies on that, sir.
Mr. Fallon. Yeah. I think it would be great to have a plan
in place where we can continue that and moving east.
Madam Secretary, myself and Representative Panetta have
introduced the Ukrainian Human Rights Policy Act and we want to
shed light on the war atrocities.
I mean, there's been mass killings, deportations, et
cetera. You know the drill. And as the war rages on what do you
think we can do to better hold Russia accountable for these
actions today and in the future?
Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. We--the Defense
Department fully supports holding Russia accountable. In
February of 2023 Vice President Harris spoke out and made clear
that U.S. policy is that what Russia is doing in Ukraine
constitute crimes against humanity.
So we will support--there are multiple proposals for
developing international fora for supporting Ukraine's domestic
capability to hold Russians accountable. But the first step is
the kind of work that so many have done to publicize these
actions and document them publicly and the U.S. Government has
supported those.
Mr. Fallon. Well, I want to thank you all and my time has
expired. Thank you for coming and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. I thank the witnesses
for their testimony today.
And with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
=======================================================================
A P P E N D I X
April 26, 2023
=======================================================================
=======================================================================
PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 26, 2023
=======================================================================
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 26, 2023
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON
General Cavoli. The Department of Defense, supported by USEUCOM and
in coordination with Ukraine, Allies, and partners, is working to
identify Ukraine's future military requirements. Ukraine and Russia are
still in an active war, and we do not yet know what war termination
will look like. Ukraine's future force requirements will depend in part
on how the war concludes. In the meantime, we are continuing with
analysis of Ukraine's current military equipment and force structure,
projected Ukrainian military capability gaps, and future sustainment
requirements. Ultimately, we will need each donor nations' defense
industrial base to focus on innovation and agility. Building Ukraine's
future force will require a long-term commitment of resources from
Ukraine, the U.S., Allies, and partners. [See page 20.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 26, 2023
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
1) Mr. Turner. Since Russia launched its illegal invasion of
Ukraine last February, there has been increased demand for state-of-
the-art American weapons and materiel from our European allies and
partners. What can Congress do to facilitate meeting the demand through
the Department's Foreign Military Sales program?
Dr. Wallander. The U.S. Department of State supervises and directs
the U.S. government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and U.S. Department
of Defense administers the program through its Defense Security
Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Department is implementing a number of
improvements to the processes, policies, and practices under its
purview to the FMS system recommended by the FMS Tiger Team. The Tiger
Team also identified a number of recommendations that may require
Congressional support to implement, including a proposal to establish
in law Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU), as well as
expanding unique and competitive financing mechanisms, addressing
exportability and production capacity issues affecting foreign
partners, and reduce bureaucratic burden, which will increase the
efficiency of the FMS system.
Mr. Turner. On 25 March 2023, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia
would forward base tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, just to the
north of Ukraine and to the east of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. The
Romania and Poland Aegis Ashore sites are currently focused on a
ballistic missile threat from Iran to the South. Would fully enabling
the Aegis Ashore sites to their organic capability (at parity with
Aegis ships afloat) improve U.S. and NATO security posture in EUCOM?
Dr. Wallander. Fully enabling the Aegis Ashore sites to the same
extent as an AEGIS ship--which has midcourse and terminal ballistic
missile defenses, cruise missile defenses, air defenses, and offensive
strike capabilities--would not make cost effective improvements to U.S.
and NATO security posture in the USEUCOM AOR. Previous analysis
provided to Congress in response to section 1677 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92)
indicated that other alternatives could improve integrated air and
missile defense (IAMD) at better value.
The Department would welcome an opportunity to provide you with a
classified briefing on its analysis and an update on the measures the
United States is working with NATO to improve the Alliance's IAMD.
3) Mr. Turner. The European Phased Adaptive Approach to Ballistic
Missile Defense was established almost 15 years ago and focuses
specifically on an ICMB threat from Iran. With our adversaries'
development of exotic first-strike capabilities such as orbital and
boost-glide hypersonic missiles, and with Russia's demonstrated
aggression in Ukraine and nuclear saber-rattling rhetoric, isn't it
time to work with NATO to establish an integrated missile defense
architecture capable of sensing and defeating a full range of threats
from any direction? What can Congress do to help accomplish this?
Dr. Wallander. NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense (NATO IAMD)
is an essential and continuous mission in peacetime, crisis, and
conflict, safeguarding and protecting Alliance territory, populations,
and forces against any air or missile threat or attack from any
direction. NATO fully recognizes the threat posed by Russia, and NATO
IAMD accounts for Russia's growing and evolving array of missile
capabilities and aggressive use of missiles throughout its brutal
invasion of Ukraine. The Alliance has taken several significant steps
in recent years to improve the NATO IAMD system (NATINAMDS)--a network
of interconnected national and NATO systems comprised of sensors,
command and control assets, and weapon systems--which is prepared to
employ all necessary measures to deter any air and missile threat, or
to nullify or reduce their effectiveness, in times of crisis or
conflict.
U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is coordinating with NATO Allies to
improve the NATINAMDS through data sharing, the fielding of new and
improved detection and tracking sensors, and the deployment of terminal
active defense systems such as PATRIOT alongside Ally air and missile
defense systems to protect critical assets. The May 2023 USEUCOM-led
Formidable Shield 2023 IAMD exercise was an important milestone for
improving Alliance IAMD readiness and interoperability. The exercise
involved 13 NATO Allied and partner nations, more than 20 ships and 35
aircraft, eight ground units with radars, National Advanced Surface-to-
Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), High Mobility Artillery Rocket System
(HIMARS), and approximately 4,000 personnel.
The Department also supports Allies in the acquisition and upgrade
of their own IAMD capabilities. Sweden, Romania, and Poland have
acquired PATRIOT in recent years; Lithuania has acquired NASAMS; and
Latvia and Estonia recently agreed to purchase the German IRIS-T
medium-range air defense system. The UK, Finland, Italy, Norway,
Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and Poland have
bought or are in the process of buying the F-35, which has unique
sensor capabilities useful for IAMD.
Through engagement with parliamentarians of all NATO nations,
Congress has helped raise and sustain support for investment in NATO
IAMD as a vital element of NATO's deterrence and defense. In this
regard, the Department would welcome the opportunity to provide you
with a classified briefing on the broader scope of ongoing activities
to strengthen NATO IAMD.
Mr. Turner. Since Russia launched its illegal invasion of Ukraine
last February, there has been increased demand for state-of-the-art
American weapons and materiel from our European allies and partners.
What can Congress do to facilitate meeting the demand through the
Department's Foreign Military Sales program?
General Cavoli. To meet the demand for American weapons and
materiel from Allies and partners, Congress could provide additional
authorities and appropriations to increase the speed of the Foreign
Military Sales program. Specifically, further capitalization of the
Special Defense Acquisition Fund and reevaluation of out-of-date
Congressional Notification thresholds would shorten overall timelines.
The U.S. defense industry is clearly strained. The consolidation of
our defense industrial base has limited competition and dis-
incentivized rapid response to emergent requirements. Congress could
grant additional authorities, such as the expansion of multi-year U.S.
procurements, which would provide greater predictability and stability
to production lines. Additionally, a predictable, timely budgetary
cycle would enable the DOD to plan across multiple fiscal years and
provide more accurate U.S. demand signals that influence Allied and
partner procurement decisions. Congress can also establish a
legislative framework to ease restrictions and encourage industrial
partnerships with key Allies and partners.
Mr. Turner. On 25 March 2023, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia
would forward base tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, just to the
north of Ukraine and to the east of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. The
Romania and Poland Aegis Ashore sites are currently focused on a
ballistic missile threat from Iran to the South. Would fully enabling
the Aegis Ashore sites to their organic capability (at parity with
Aegis ships afloat) improve U.S. and NATO security posture in USEUCOM?
General Cavoli. No, altering the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and
Poland to enable full Aegis weapons system capability would not improve
the overall security posture in the USEUCOM area of responsibility
(AOR). Several critical hardware and software differences exist between
Aegis afloat and ashore platforms. Both sites' sensor capabilities are
limited by terrain, and rely on cueing from specifically placed sensors
to improve early ballistic missile threat detection. We are actively
encouraging Allies to develop an AOR-wide networked sensor architecture
to improve radar coverage and provide cueing for U.S. and Allied
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) systems in Europe.
The Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland continue to be
operationally relevant based on the original intent of the European
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase III--to address ballistic missile
threats originating outside the Euro-Atlantic region. The Department of
Defense's plan remains to complete the Aegis Ashore in Poland as the
final piece of the EPAA Phase III commitment to NATO.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. The Black Sea region is of critical importance to both
European and global security as evidenced by Russia's full-scale war
against Ukraine. How has the ongoing war affected the U.S. Defense
Policy towards the Black Sea region? What is Georgia's role in this
policy and are we doing enough and what else can be done in cooperation
with Georgia to strengthen security and our involvement in the
strategically important Black Sea region?
Dr. Wallander. The United States has an enduring interest in a
Black Sea region that is secure, prosperous, interconnected, and free
from territorial integrity threats, economic coercion, and malign
influence by Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Russia's
full-scale invasion of Ukraine highlights growing challenges in the
Black Sea region and has deepened our resolve to ensure Putin's war is
a strategic failure. The United States, our NATO Allies, and likeminded
partners have responded with greater focus, more security and economic
assistance, and additional forces for the Black Sea region. These
actions must be part of a synchronized, whole-of-government approach,
as our ability to reduce Russian influence and aggression is more
effective when defense capabilities are aligned with diplomatic and
economic efforts to advance regional cooperation and U.S. priorities.
Georgia remains a significant partner and plays an important role
in our Black Sea Strategy. The Department's premier bilateral security
program with Georgia remains the Georgia Defense and Deterrence
Enhancement Initiative (GDDEI), a five-year, $110 million program that
supports defense reform as well as training and equipment modernization
to strengthen the capacity of the Georgian Defense Forces to resist and
repel Russian aggression. GDDEI complements regular, robust training
and exercise activities such as Exercises Agile Spirit and Noble
Partner. As with other Black Sea allies and partners, we work with
Georgia to increase maritime domain awareness on a regional level.
Georgia is one of four countries that receive Section 333, Title 10
U.S. Code, security assistance as part of a 10-year Black Sea Maritime
Domain Awareness initiative to support critical infrastructure
capabilities and data sharing. We also maintain a resident Ministry of
Defense Advisor in Tbilisi who specifically focuses on the maritime
domain awareness mission
Mr. Scott. Should we expect increased military assistance and
deeper defense cooperation ties from the United States to Georgia and,
if so, how will this be reflected in practical terms?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM has enjoyed a long, close relationship with
our partners in the Republic of Georgia. We have seen the benefit of
strong military-to-military relations with Georgia over the years, and
would like to strengthen this relationship. The centerpiece of our
military relationship is the Georgia Defense and Deterrence Enhancement
Initiative. This program is designed to enhance Georgia's capacity for
deterrence, territorial defense, resistance, and resilience. It also
aims to foster interoperability with NATO and accelerate modernization
and institutional reform.
We remain concerned that the pace of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic
integration could inhibit deeper defense cooperation. USEUCOM fully
supports a whole-of-government effort, led by the State Department, to
showcase the benefits of transparent governance.
Mr. Scott. Section 736 of the FY 23 NDAA established a partnership
program between the United States and Ukraine for military trauma care
and research. What is the status of this program and what are your
expectations for this program in FY 24?
General Cavoli. The acting Director of Research and Development for
Health Readiness Policy and Oversight oversees the implementation of
Section 736 in the FY23 NDAA. A Department of Defense contract was
awarded to the Henry Jackson Foundation to research military trauma in
Ukraine. The Henry M. Jackson Foundation (HJF) assembled a cadre of
contracted subject matter experts (SME) to send into Ukraine to collect
baseline information on existing trauma care capabilities within the
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Health, as they both manage
war-injured soldiers. Although HJF has not been able to enter Ukraine
yet due to the ongoing war, they continue to bring Ukrainian SMEs into
Poland to interact with the team and complete surveys.
The USEUCOM Command Surgeon collects information shared by the
Ukraine Surgeon General, partner nations, and non-governmental
organizations on the ground in Ukraine to inform the initial direction
of this research. We will continue this collaboration in FY24. There
are nine symposiums with Ukrainian SMEs scheduled in the coming fiscal
year to enhance HJF's collection of casualty care assessment data and
to further enable improvements to military trauma care.
Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Coast Guard be better integrated with
USEUCOM?
General Cavoli. The U.S. Coast Guard provides USEUCOM with unique
capabilities and authorities which increase the effectiveness of
USEUCOM missions and strategic initiatives. U.S. Coast Guard units are
particularly useful in Theater Security Cooperation activities with
littoral nations working to improve maritime domain awareness in Allies
and partners littoral and exclusive economic zones. The U.S. Coast
Guard provides USEUCOM unique perspectives and is fully integrated into
USEUCOM planning efforts, particularly through their humanitarian
service capabilities and law enforcement, and as a member of the
intelligence community.
USEUCOM would welcome more routine deployments of Coast Guard
capabilities in the EUCOM AOR, particularly in the Arctic. U.S. Coast
Guard authorities provide options otherwise unavailable to DOD
platforms.
Mr. Scott. Would you like to see the admission of new countries in
the National Guard's State Partnership Program be accelerated?
General Cavoli. Accelerating the admission of new countries into
this strategic program is in the best interest of the U.S. and our
partners. The current admission process is deliberate and holistic. If
the admissions process were to be accelerated, it is imperative that
both adequate support and resources are dedicated to the program. In
this regard, GEN Hokanson and his team are best suited to address the
resource requirements provided to the National Guard for successful
execution of the SPP mission.
Mr. Scott. How best can Moldova deter Russian aggression?
General Cavoli. Deepening integration with Euro-Atlantic
institutions, reforming defense institutions, and modernizing military
capabilities are the most important steps to increase Moldova's ability
to deter Russian aggression. Chisinau's willingness to cooperate with
Western institutions, in conjunction with internal anti-corruption and
reform efforts, are essential to drive systemic change. Building
resilient defense institutions helps Moldova to decouple from Russian
malign influence. Continued investment in the Moldovan Ministry of
Defense's institutional capacity building efforts, alongside NATO,
remains Moldova's best path to build sustainable military capacity.
Moldova's ambitious modernization effort within their National Army and
continued investment in modern military capabilities to build
territorial defense capacity are essential to deter Russian aggression.
USEUCOM encourages continued Moldovan integration with Western defense
institutions through the provision of timely and meaningful security
assistance.
Mr. Scott. What is the center of gravity of Russia's forces
occupying Georgia?
General Cavoli. Logistical lines of communication are likely the
center of gravity for Russian forces within occupied Georgia. Access to
Georgia's Russian-occupied territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (de
facto South Ossetia) is limited by the road and rail networks due to
the terrain. Russian forces require continued sustainment and
reinforcement to maintain their presence in Georgia.
Mr. Scott. USEUCOM defines NATO's Eastern Flank as Estonia, Latvia,
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. Why isn't Romania and
Bulgaria included as part of NATO's Eastern Flank?
General Cavoli. The NATO ``Eastern Flank'' is by definition
comprised of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary,
Romania, and Bulgaria. USEUCOM acknowledges the inclusion of Romania
and Bulgaria as part of NATO's defined ``Eastern Flank,'' and
simultaneously includes both nations in a USEUCOM specific ``Black
Sea'' regional focus area (e.g., Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Turkiye
and Ukraine), which includes both NATO and non- NATO nations.
Mr. Scott. Based on educational materials from various war
colleges, NATO does not have an Eastern Flank. The East is its Front.
It has a Northern and Southern Flank and the West is its rear. Why do
you refer to NATO's Eastern Flank and not the Eastern Front in your
testimony?
General Cavoli. NATO adaptations to the nature of the Russian
threat include a shift from out-of-area operations to collective
territorial defense. This shift is captured in a new operational--
strategic level Concept for Deterrence & Defense of the Euro-Atlantic
Area (DDA).
Through this new concept, NATO is enhancing its ability to respond
to multiple geographic, all-domain threats and malign influence from
both the Russian Federation and Terrorist Groups throughout the Euro-
Atlantic Area, vice against any specific linear ``front.''
The Russian Federation seeks to destabilize countries to NATO's
East and South. In the Arctic, its capability to disrupt Allied
reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a
strategic challenge to the Alliance. Moscow's military build-up and
increased activities, including in the Baltic, North, Black, and
Mediterranean Seas, Atlantic region, as well as continued influence in
the Middle East/African continent produce a 360-degree, multi-domain,
geographically dispersed challenge to NATO's security and interests.
Mr. Scott. Captain Lawson W. Brigham, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired),
wrote an article in the May 2023 issue of Proceedings entitled ``Future
Challenges for the Baltic Sea.'' According to Captain Brigham, ``The
Baltic Sea is one of the world's most historic and important waterways
for trade . . . Revised NATO doctrine should call for a credible naval
presence in the Baltic Sea for deterrence and territorial defense.
Large-scale naval and civil maritime exercises must continue, as well
as joint training and intelligence sharing among the NATO Baltic Sea
States.'' Should the United States Navy establish a Baltic Sea flotilla
that is homeported in this important region? How else can NATO increase
the alliance's maritime presence in the Baltic Sea?
General Cavoli. A U.S. Baltic Sea flotilla is not necessary to
provide the required maritime presence to deter and be postured to
defend the U.S. and NATO's interests in the Baltic Sea. Since 2016, the
U.S. and NATO have significantly increased our presence in the Baltic
Sea with European homeported U.S., Standing NATO Maritime Group, and
Standing NATO Mine Countermeasure Group warships operating and
exercising throughout the Baltics. Today, the U.S., individual Allies
and partners, and NATO operate a spectrum of aircraft and naval vessels
on a near-persistent basis in the Baltic Sea to provide presence and
signal a collective commitment to ensure the freedom of navigation and
safe passage for international commerce.
Mr. Scott. What additional investments in Littoral Warfare do
Allied/Partner Baltic and Black Sea Navies need to make to protect sea
lines of communication?
General Cavoli. The most immediate needs for Ally and partner
Navies in the Baltic and Black Seas are investments in maritime domain
awareness, interoperable communications technology, and coastal defense
systems toward a credible sea-denial capability. Some navies,
specifically Romania, Estonia and Latvia, are on the path to acquiring
coastal defense capabilities within the next five years. Romania has
purchased coastal defense systems through the U.S. government, and we
are exploring ways to accelerate the deliveries of these critical
systems. Bulgaria and Lithuania are still considering coastal defense
system acquisition.
Freedom of navigation in the Baltic and Black Seas depend heavily
on mine countermeasure capabilities. Although many NATO Allies maintain
robust mine countermeasure capabilities organized and deployed as part
of two Standing NATO Mine Countermeasure Groups, Romania and Bulgaria
have very limited organic mine countermeasure capability. At such time
when Russia's war against Ukraine permits warships to transit into the
Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, NATO intends to re- establish
mine countermeasure presence in the Black Sea and the Ukraine Armed
Forces intends to homeport the mine countermeasure ships they have
received from the United Kingdom (these ships train and exercise from
Royal Navy bases in the UK).
Mr. Scott. How would a U.S. Navy Black Sea Flotilla enhance
credible deterrence?
General Cavoli. As a non-Black Sea nation, the Montreux Convention
does not permit the U.S. to maintain a flotilla in the Black Sea.
Despite limitations on warship presence in the Black Sea, prior to the
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. and NATO
deployed warships into the Black Sea on a near-persistent basis
providing a combat credible deterrent force in this geo-strategic
location in southeastern Europe. In consultation with our Black Sea
Allies and partners, and when conditions are right, the Department of
Defense intends to reestablish presence in international waters in the
Black Sea.
Mr. Scott. The 6 most critical regional capability gaps in the
Baltic States are 1) integrated air and missile defense; 2) maritime
situational awareness; 3) Baltic regional long range fires capability;
4) ammunition; 5) C4ISR; and 6) Special Forces. What are the 7th, 8th,
9th, and 10th regional capability gaps in the Baltic States?
General Cavoli. Russia remains a persistent threat with a clear
size advantage over its Baltic neighbors. Our ability to deter, and if
necessary, defeat Russian aggression in the Baltic States is linked to
the ability of U.S. and NATO forces to rapidly project power and
preemptively mitigate Russia's size advantage. Investments in emerging
counter mass systems, enhanced interoperability with our Allies and
partners, our ability to conduct forward contested logistics, and
multi-domain training in Europe provide the greatest benefit to closing
capability gaps in the deterrence and defense posture in the Baltics.
Mr. Scott. According to the Estonia's Ministry of Defence,
``Unfortunately, NATO's decision-making, conceptualizing and planning
processes take years, as do the exercises to train for these plans.''
Do you agree? If so, how can we shorten these timelines?
General Cavoli. Since Russia's 2014 occupation of Crimea and the
Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, NATO has significantly improved
decision making timelines in Brussels. NATO Headquarters, Allied
capitals, and SHAPE Headquarters practice the streamlined procedures in
annual crisis management exercises (CMX). NATO last exercised improved
Alliance Article III, Article IV, and Article V procedures in CMX-23 in
March 2023.
Stimulated by Russia's provoked Russia's February 2022 invasion of
Ukraine, NATOs new Strategic Concept from the June 2022 NATO Summit
provided the rapid alignment with the 2021 Concept for the Deterrence
and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) and ongoing Allied Command
Operations development of a whole family of plans. In August 2022,
SHAPE provided Subordinate Strategic Plans for implementation. The
Regional Plans, approved in July 2023, are intended to replace the five
legacy Graduated Response Plans NATO currently has activated due to
Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine. These geographically oriented
regional plans describe the architecture, procedures, and arrangements
by which NATO conducts rapid, seamless, integrated joint operations.
The new subordinate strategic plans and regional plans have been
developed to optimize NATO's consensus decision making, advanced crisis
planning processes, authorities, rules of engagement, and speed of
deployment for Alliance forces allocated to support each of the plans.
This novel approach of identifying and allocating resources to threat
based plans has not been used by NATO since the end of the Cold War.
Estonian Minister of Defense Hanno Pevkur praised the new family of
plans in a July 11 press statement, saying, ``These new military plans
put in place the NATO collective defense actions across all domains--
land, air, water, space and cyber. They also delve into actions in
different phases of a conflict--in peacetime, in crisis and in war.''
At the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Allied
Command Transformation, we are altering our training and assessment
programs to synchronize with the new subordinate strategic plans and
regional plans to rapidly implement our new plans, C2, and expected
resources into NATOs annual exercise program. This fall, we will begin
exercising utilizing our new regional plans in NATOs Exercise STEADFAST
JAGUAR 23. Additionally, both SHAPE and USEUCOM are aligning the NATO
and U.S. bilateral/multi-lateral exercise programs to combine the
execution of joint headquarters- level exercises to better integrate
and validate the plans and streamline planning timelines.
Mr. Scott. Should NATO establish a Baltic Sea Air Defense Mission
as an upgrade from the present air policing mission?
General Cavoli. NATO is in the process of establishing a more
robust air defense capability to support the Integrated Air and Missile
Defense (IAMD) for the entire Alliance, including all Baltic Sea
Allies. In a modern defense architecture, IAMD capabilities are
integral to overall theater command and control in every phase of
warfare. As a result, the development of a theater-wide IAMD system is
a major NATO capability development objective.
Many Allies have already made substantive commitments to improve
IAMD. In October 2022, 15 Allies signed a Letter of Intent to
strengthen the European pillar in NATO's IAMD through the European Sky
Shield Initiative (ESSI). ESSI calls for all air and missile defense
systems to be integrated through national command and control systems
into the NATO IAMD systems architecture. It addresses short-, medium-,
and long-range defense layers, as well as upper layer ballistic missile
defense. Germany has taken the lead as a primary coordinator of ESSI
capability development.
At the July 11 NATO Summit in Vilnius, NATO Heads of State and
Government agreed to further improve the readiness, preparedness, and
interoperability of NATO's IAMD, in particular through regular training
and rotational presence of modern air defense systems and capabilities
across SACEUR's Area of Responsibility, with an initial focus on the
Eastern Flank. This new rotational model is meant to facilitate the
deployment of additional IAMD capabilities in areas including the
Baltic states, beyond NATO's existing Baltic Air Policing mission.
Mr. Scott. The Republic of Moldova has been a target of continuous
hybrid war attacks from Russia such as disinformation, propaganda and
cyber-attacks, corruption of politicians, as well as weaponization of
energy supplies. How can the United States assist Moldova build a
comprehensive security strategy and capability to withstand these
threats and strengthen their resilience and defense against the hybrid
war attacks?''
General Cavoli. The best approach for the U.S. to strengthen
Moldova's resiliency against hybrid attacks is to help Moldovan leaders
embrace the Western concept of civilian control of the military, and
integrate a comprehensive threat assessment in the National Security
Strategy with comprehensive defense plans to defend and deter against
the stated threat. We have encouraged Moldova to invest in building
robust and resilient governmental institutions, and the Department of
Defense, through the George C. Marshall Center, is providing
institutional-level advisory support to the Moldovan government for the
development of their new National Security Strategy. USEUCOM also
supports Moldova in the development of resilient military capabilities
to address threats in cyberspace and countering Russian disinformation.
These efforts are part of a broader U.S. approach to build robust
capabilities and implement comprehensive national defense planning in
support of broader societal resilience.
Mr. Scott. Are NATO's contingency plans in the Baltic Sea region
updated and modernized?
General Cavoli. Yes. NATO's activated Graduated Response Plans
covering the Baltic Sea region provide the day-to-day authorities
necessary to adequately command and control NATO forces to deter and be
postured to defend in the Baltics. Within the last year, Allied Command
Operations (ACO) developed and approved seven domain- specific
Subordinate Strategic Plans (SSPs) covering Land, Air, Maritime, Cyber,
Space, SOF, and Reinforcement. Additionally, ACO developed and garnered
approval of three geographically oriented Regional Plans. One of these
focuses was specifically on a Baltic Sea regional threat from Russia.
This recently approved Regional Plan incorporates existing national
defense plans into a coherent, single strategic plan to defend a
geographical region, and supersedes the legacy Graduated Response Plan
in the Baltics region.
Mr. Scott. What are the advantages of establishing a permanent U.S.
military presence in the Baltic States?
General Cavoli. President Biden announced in June 2022 that we will
maintain a persistent, heel-to-toe presence in the Baltic region
through enhanced rotational deployments and intensified training. The
U.S. persistent rotational presence in the Baltic States demonstrates
U.S. commitment to defending our Baltic Allies, and supports NATO's
deterrence and collective defense posture in the Baltic Sea region. The
recurring presence of U.S. forces is the most effective and efficient
way to maintain a robust U.S. presence in the region and deter threats
against the Baltic States. U.S. deployments to the Baltic States
complement efforts by both host nation and Allied forces, enhance
interoperability, and demonstrate the operational capability of combat
credible forces to rapidly respond to threats in the region. The
structure of these deployments allows the U.S. to flexibly respond to
theater-wide requirements while still providing a credible deterrent in
the Baltic Sea region.
Mr. Scott. Do you support making large-scale reinforcement
exercises in the Baltic Sea region the norm?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM supports large-scale military exercises
with our Allies and partners in order to integrate advanced
capabilities, demonstrate freedom of maneuver, and increase our
interoperability, all of which showcase the Alliance's strength. We
also exercise transportation requirements through various Baltic Sea
ports and ground transportation nodes, which support rotational force
movements, increase our joint capabilities, ensure access, and maintain
our freedom of maneuver.
Mr. Scott. What are the areas of deeper defense and security
cooperation in the Baltic Sea region that the United States could work
with the United Kingdom to leverage this special relationship in the
Baltic Sea Region?
General Cavoli. The United States and United Kingdom work closely
together in the planning and execution of force posture adjustments and
exercises in the Baltic Sea region. Since its establishment in 2017,
the U.K.-led NATO Battlegroup in Estonia has deepened this defense and
security cooperation. U.S. forces participating in operations and
exercises in Estonia are able to seamlessly integrate into existing
U.K. and Estonian activities.
Additionally, the U.K.'s investment in Joint Expeditionary Force
activities and its leadership of the NATO Battlegroup in Estonia has
enabled the U.S. to prioritize employment of U.S. forces elsewhere in
theater and around the globe.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. MACE
Ms. Mace. How are USSOF advancing partnerships and coordination in
countries aligned on the side of the Ukrainians? How is the Combined
Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) creating asymmetric
advantages and improving the capabilities of the Ukrainians to resist.
Dr. Wallander. U.S. SOF operate alongside allies and partners
throughout Europe to support whole-of- nation resilience efforts. Since
2014, U.S. SOF have supported multinational training efforts with
Ukrainian SOF forces. U.S. SOF in the U.S. European Command area of
responsibility continue to actively support U.S. efforts to bolster
Ukraine's defense following Russia's ongoing brutal and unprovoked
invasion, working with Security Assistance Group-Ukraine to ensure
these activities are fully aligned with training for Ukraine's
conventional forces. DOD can provide additional information in a
classified setting.
Ms. Mace. Do you believe the DOD has the authorities it needs for
USSOF to collaborate with allies and partners in Irregular Warfare and
Information Operations, and where should EUCOM further deepen or expand
irregular warfare programs with allied or partner forces in Europe?
Dr. Wallander. USSOF has a long history of operating alongside
allies and partners throughout Europe to bolster resilience and improve
irregular warfare (IW) and information operations (IO) capabilities. We
utilize a range of security cooperation, IO, and IW authorities,
including Section 1202, to support these efforts. We continue to review
those authorities to assess gaps and would welcome further discussion
at the classified level. Details of individual programs or efforts, and
recommendations for future programs, can also be provided in a
classified briefing, if desired.
Ms. Mace. General Cavoli: It's clear to me we're witnessing the
future of warfare in Ukraine. The United States Army, SAG-U (Security
Assistance Group-Ukraine), and Ukrainians have harnessed commercial
technology and successfully integrated and deployed AI-powered software
on the battlefield. Can you talk about the critical role software is
playing in the current conflict and what lessons the U.S. should learn
about adopting and deploying new technology at a pace required by the
warfighter?
General Cavoli. We are clearly at a turning point in the role
Artificial Intelligence (AI) plays on the battlefield. The Ukrainian
Armed Forces have incorporated new technology and AI applications with
incredible speed and agility. They have employed AI applications to
enhance battlefield intelligence and to improve weapons and tactics
against Russian forces. At USEUCOM, we also learn new lessons every day
and continue to increase our leverage of AI in multiple ways to support
Ukraine.
AI technology is advancing rapidly, and our culture must adapt in
parallel. We must train our workforce to use these new tools and
increase experimentation in order to test and refine new technologies
with Allies and partners. Significant investments will likely be needed
in the future to upgrade the digital infrastructure necessary to
support and leverage these new AI capabilities.
Ms. Mace. General Cavoli, as you know, in addition to the Stryker
brigade, airborne brigade, and fires brigade, the EDI (European
Deterrence Initiative) provides an armored brigade on rotation every 9
months. With our increased presence of U.S. forces in Europe, I'm
curious to know if you think it makes sense to go back to our
organizational posture from 1971 and keep an entire armored division or
at least brigade in Europe, rather than rotating a tank division from
the U.S. to Europe every 9 months? From a strategic standpoint do you
think this would contribute to deterrence of Russian aggression or only
aggravate tensions?
General Cavoli. All forces in theater, permanent or rotational,
support our combat credible force requirements and contribute to our
deterrence and defense posture. Force rotations offer units the
opportunity to exercise their ability to deploy and integrate within
the theater while remaining at their highest state of readiness.
Permanently stationed units in Europe shorten deployment timelines to
Europe, provide commitments to NATO in addition to our Allies and
partners, and support NATO's deterrence and defense posture.
Ms. Mace. How critical are USSOF contributions to the Ukraine
effort? How critical are USSOF contributions to NATO Allies, especially
in the Baltics?
General Cavoli. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) provides
support to Ukraine in coordination with the Security Assistance Group--
Ukraine. SOCEUR forces, along with Allied and partner SOF, coordinate
and execute the training and equipping of the Ukrainian Special
Operations Forces (UKR SOF) outside Ukraine. SOCEUR continues to
strengthen interoperability with key Allies and partners through
bilateral and multilateral exercises to build partner capacity and
resilience and reinforce deterrence messaging.
Forward presence of our SOCEUR forces with NATO Allies, especially
in the Baltics, provide sensing capabilities in the operational
environment, enhancing our ability to understand the battlespace
through improved indications and warnings.
Ms. Mace. As Congress considers the FY24 budget request and
deliberates important regulatory considerations for the use of
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AIML), what do you
believe are the most important emergent technologies that the U.S.
requires in the USEUCOM theatre to not just counter but deter hostile
aggression from Russia and other adversaries?
General Cavoli. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly changing
the way wars are fought and provides new options to deter and counter
aggression. It is essential we adopt and deploy this new technology
responsibly and faster than our adversaries in order to maintain
operational and decision advantage. AI's significance and capabilities
continue to be developed through increased situational awareness,
improved target identification, enhanced cybersecurity and missile
defense, and logistics support. AI is essential to support the
synthesis of information required to command and control forces across
the globe at a speed greater than our adversaries. It is also
imperative that we continue to integrate Allies and partners in the
development and delivery of AI to facilitate building a modern
infrastructure capable of supporting AI applications.
AI and any other emerging technology that assists us to ``sense''
and ``make sense'' of disparate U.S. and Allied data sources to achieve
decision dominance and create simultaneous dilemmas (below armed
conflict) significantly contribute to deterrence in this theater. Those
same technological advances create competitive advantages during a
conflict.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TOKUDA
Ms. Tokuda. How is the Department of Defense working with our NATO
allies to exploit innovative and green technologies in our joint
capabilities and to sustain our forces and infrastructure in the face
of climate threats in Europe?
Dr. Wallander. For several years, the Department of Defense has
been working with NATO Allies to share its climate resources, tools,
and experts. The United States has worked alongside NATO Allies to
incorporate a focus on climate change in NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept,
adopt a Green Defense framework in 2014, and to highlight climate
issues in every NATO Summit Statement since 2010. At NATO's 2022 Summit
in Madrid, Allied Heads of State and Government approved the NATO
Climate Change and Security Action Plan with the aim of increasing
Allied awareness, adapting to climate change, contributing to the
mitigation of climate change, and enhancing NATO outreach to partner
countries, as well as other international and regional organizations.
The first Climate Change and Security Progress Report will be delivered
at the 2022 Summit in Vilnius. NATO Allies have also agreed to enhance
the NATO-EU strategic partnership to also focus on the impact of
climate change and security.
Additionally, the Board of Directors of NATO's Defense Innovation
Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) agreed that energy
resilience, among other issues, will be a priority area of focus for
DIANA's work on emerging and disruptive technologies in 2023. This work
will highlight the importance of energy available to sustain NATO's
missions and operations. It will also help develop technological
solutions to help Allies better prepare for, minimize, adapt to, and
recover from anticipated and unanticipated energy disruptions.
Ms. Tokuda. How do extreme weather events, especially heat waves
and floods, affect military readiness for our troops and those of our
allies? What about impacts to military infrastructure?
General Cavoli. Extreme weather events, including heat waves and
floods, affect military readiness through the creation of situations
which create regional instability, such as the increase in migrant
flows, state terrorism activities, and adversarial malign influence.
Although Allies and partners continue to build resilience to resist and
recover from extreme weather events, some nations lack the resources
and training required to build mature emergency management programs.
Additionally, extreme weather has the potential to affect U.S.
installation energy infrastructure in Europe, to include the European
power grid. Extreme weather events could cause power disruptions,
energy supply shortages, and host nation security concerns that present
challenges to the energy supply network. Finally, training ranges
remain susceptible to erosion, flooding, and wildland fires due to
limited or poor quality lands and high utilization from military
forces.
Ms. Tokuda. What additional steps can we take to enhance Baltic
security, and how would you respond to the assessment made by some
expert observers that additional American combat capability on the
front lines of the Baltic States would be ideal for deterring Russian
aggression?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM's persistent combat credible rotational
presence in the Baltic region contributes to NATO's eastern European
deterrence and defense posture while directly reassuring individual
Allies of the U.S. commitment to the region. These deployments, coupled
with internal Baltic military modernization investments and
U.S. security cooperation programs, establish the bedrock of our
partnership with Baltic Allies and directly enhance Baltic security.
Maintaining a persistent U.S. presence in the region, alongside NATO's
multinational Battlegroups, and continued investment in Baltic security
cooperation programs serves to build partner capacity in the Baltics
and deter Russian aggression.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LaLOTA
Mr. LaLota. To date, the United States has aided Ukraine with
approximately $36.1 billion for security assistance. Meanwhile, our
European allies have contributed almost less than half--around $19
billion. Is the Administration concerned that the Europeans, relatively
speaking, are not contributing as much as they should be?
Dr. Wallander. Although some countries do need to do more, a close
look at security assistance when measured as a share of GDP shows that
many European allies and partners have provided an extraordinary amount
of capability to Ukraine. European allies like Estonia and Latvia have
donated aid equating to more than 1% of its GDP. Other frontline states
such as Lithuania, Poland, and Finland provide a higher percentage of
GDP than the United States, which is the 10th largest donor using this
metric.
Allies and partners have also provided unique capabilities to
Ukraine the United States does not have in its own inventories. This
has included Leopard tanks, various infantry fighting vehicles, 152mm
ammunition, and certain types of multiple rocket launch systems.
Further, when you consider humanitarian support, including taking
in more than 8 million refugees, as well as the European costs of
reducing or eliminating Russian supplied energy, our European allies
and partners overall have definitely stepped up to support Ukraine.
Mr. LaLota. To date, the United States has aided Ukraine with
approximately $36.1 billion for security assistance. Meanwhile, our
European allies have contributed almost less than half--around $19
billion. What conversation have you had with our EU allies regarding
them contributing more additional aid for Ukraine and what is being
discussed regarding our allies increasing their assistance?
Dr. Wallander. Since April 2022, Secretary Austin has led the
coordination of international support for Ukraine through the Ukraine
Defense Contact Group, which meets on almost a monthly basis. This
forum continues to be critical in generating and synchronizing Ally and
partner support for Ukraine, regularly bringing together some 50
countries, including European Allies and partners, to coordinate
assistance, sustainment efforts, and training. In addition, the
Department is in regular contact with European counterparts at multiple
levels--Ukraine is regularly the number one agenda topic with our
European Allies and partners. When measured as a share of GDP, the
United States is in the middle of the pack when it comes to levels of
support for Ukraine. Allies and partners have provided the majority of
counter-unmanned aerial systems given to Ukraine, as well as the
majority of 155mm artillery systems, the majority of armored personnel
carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and roughly half the Stinger
and Javelin missiles.
We at the Department will continue to work with allies and partners
to find ways to augment and expand the much need support for Ukraine as
it continues to push back on Russia's unprovoked war of aggression.
Mr. LaLota. To date, the United States has aided Ukraine with
approximately $36.1 billion for security assistance. Meanwhile, our
European allies have contributed almost less than half--around $19
billion. What is the way forward to ensuring our EU allies can bolster
up support for Ukraine, so it is not so heavily relied on by the U.S.?
The Ukraine Defense Contact Group, or UDCG, continues to be the key
forum to raise many of these issues in a collective setting. The UDCG
has demonstrated results. As a share of GDP, many European allies
provide a higher level of security assistance to Ukraine, with some
allies like Estonia and Latvia providing more than 1 percent of GDP.
Using this metric, the United States currently ranks as the 10th
largest donor. The Department will continue to have regular bilateral
consultations with European counterparts at multiple levels to
encourage their support for Ukraine's pressing capability requirements.
It's also important to note that our European allies and partners
are contributing in ways the United States is not. For example,
European countries have taken in more than 8 million refugees giving
them a more peaceful life during the war in Ukraine. In addition,
European countries bear the costs of reducing or eliminating Russian
supplied energy. This hurts Russia directly and is yet another way in
which our allies and partners in Europe support Ukraine.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. McCORMICK
Dr. McCormick. Currently, there are over $300 billion in frozen
Russian central bank assets in western nations, and I'm working with my
colleagues to find a way to seize those assets and use them to fund our
contributions to Ukraine's war effort so that Putin's the one paying
for the war he started instead of the American taxpayer and our allies.
Assuming we are able to access these resources, do you think this
funding influx could fundamentally shift the conflict in Ukraine's
favor?
Dr. Wallander. I would defer to the Departments of Treasury and
Justice on the mechanics and considerations related to freezing or
seizing Russian sovereign assets. I can say though, that over the last
year, the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force, a
joint collaboration of nine countries and the European Commission, has
successfully blocked or frozen more than $58 billion worth of
sanctioned Russians' assets, tracked sanctioned Russian assets across
the globe, and heavily restricted sanctioned Russians from the
international financial system. Although it is difficult to say what
the immediate impact of such a large influx of funds may be given
procurement and production timelines for new capabilities, it would
certainly help support Ukraine's longer-term requirements to build a
force able to deter and defend against any future Russian aggression.
Irrespective of whether these frozen assets may ultimately be used
for Ukraine, the strong and consistent bipartisan support from the
United States has enabled Ukraine to make key gains from Kyiv to
Kharkiv to Kherson. Ukraine has time and time again demonstrated the
results of this important investment with enormous resolve, grit, and
ingenuity.
[all]