[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                   
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 118-30]




                         

                   U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL  
                     SECURITY CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

                               __________ 
                               

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             APRIL 26, 2023 
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             


                                     
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                  U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 

54-720                   WASHINGTON : 2024 

















                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 
                      
                    One Hundred Eighteenth Congress

                     MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    Chair                            RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MATT GAETZ, Florida                  ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
DON BACON, Nebraska                  MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
JIM BANKS, Indiana                   VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan               JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               SARA JACOBS, California
MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana              MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan            PATRICK RYAN, New York
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
PAT FALLON, Texas                    GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO, 
NANCY MACE, South Carolina               Pennsylvania
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota              JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia        TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
NICK LaLOTA, New York                STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JIMMY PANETTA, California
MARK ALFORD, Missouri                MARC VEASEY, Texas
CORY MILLS, Florida
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia

                      Chris Vieson, Staff Director
                 Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
              Phil MacNaughton, Professional Staff Member
                    Owen McGeary, Research Assistant 
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                    
                            C O N T E N T S

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                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking 
  Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     2

                               WITNESSES

Cavoli, GEN Christopher G., USA, Commander, U.S. European Command     6
Wallander, Hon. Celeste A., Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  International Security Affairs, Office of the Secretary of 
  Defense........................................................     4

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Cavoli, GEN Christopher G....................................    55
    Wallander, Hon. Celeste A....................................    47

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Moulton..................................................    83

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. LaLota...................................................    95
    Ms. Mace.....................................................    93
    Dr. McCormick................................................    96
    Mr. Scott....................................................    88
    Ms. Tokuda...................................................    95
    Mr. Turner...................................................    87
 
               U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY 
                         CHALLENGES IN EUROPE

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                         Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 26, 2023.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:32 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
         ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. Committee will come to order.
    I want to thank our witnesses for being here today and 
their service to our Nation. It's been over a year since 
Vladimir Putin launched his illegal and brutal invasion into 
Ukraine.
    The cost of the war has been staggering. Tens of thousands 
dead, including over 8,000 innocent civilians. Over 13 million 
Ukrainians driven from their homes. Nearly 72,000 alleged 
Russian war crimes including indiscriminate killings, torture, 
kidnappings, and sexual assaults. Tens of billions of civilian 
infrastructure are destroyed, including half of Ukraine's 
energy supply.
    But despite the relentless and appalling attacks against 
them, the Ukrainian people have held strong. Through innovation 
and grit, they've driven Putin's war machine back, reclaiming 
much of the territory lost in the early days of the invasion.
    The American taxpayer has been a key enabler to that 
success. We have approved over $100 billion in military, 
economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine and our NATO 
[North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies.
    This unprecedented level of support requires an 
unprecedented level of oversight. As we move toward the markup 
of the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], this 
committee will ensure that oversight is in place and is robust.
    This war has lasted longer than many of us thought it 
would, but that's because many of us thought the Ukrainians 
were no match for Putin's forces. We couldn't have been more 
wrong.
    I'm hopeful the coming counteroffensive will provide a 
final, stinging defeat for Putin. But that will require the 
President to stop being so reluctant to provide Ukraine with 
the capabilities it needs to be successful.
    His hesitation over being too escalatory has only prolonged 
the war and driven up cost in terms of dollars and lives. 
Continued reluctance and indecision only empowers Vladimir 
Putin and it sends all the wrong signals to [President] Xi and 
the Chinese Communist Party [CCP].
    Xi is watching how America responds to this conflict very 
closely. If America loses its resolve in Ukraine, it sends a 
clear message that we won't be there to defend Taiwan. That is 
not the message we should be sending the CCP.
    Finally, the war in Ukraine has opened Europe's eyes to the 
threats they face. Some countries like Poland, Romania, 
Finland, and the Balts are stepping up to meet that threat. 
Others are not.
    The awakening in Germany that so many thought was coming 
has yet to materialize and in France the denial runs even 
deeper. France has not met the minimum levels of NATO spending 
and it ranks at the very bottom of countries providing military 
assistance to Ukraine. And President Macron's recent knee 
bending before President Xi has been shameful.
    Old Europe needs to learn the lessons of Nord Stream 2 and 
not become dependent on adversaries, especially those that 
commit genocide and look to remake global borders through 
force.
    I believe the time has come for U.S. forces in Europe to 
move further east into the countries that are investing more 
heavily into their own security. Poland, Romania, and the 
Baltics truly understand the threat from Putin.
    Unlike others, they've invested in their own defense and 
are real partners in our collective security. It's also where 
our troops will be the most useful and have the largest impact 
on deterrence.
    I look forward to our discussion today and hearing more 
from our witnesses about the best way we can adjust our posture 
in Europe, and with that I yield to the ranking member for any 
opening statement he may have.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is just over 1 year 
since Putin's illegal invasion of Ukraine. I think that the 
message from the Biden administration and the message from the 
alliance has been incredibly strong in that year and that is 
that we will stand together, we will stand up against Russian 
aggression, and we will make sure that a sovereign democratic 
Ukraine remains.
    I think it's important to think back to where we were in 
January of 2022, and as the chairman alluded to, pretty much 
everyone thought that Ukraine was toast. Most everyone thought 
that there's no way that NATO would come together. You know, it 
was a bickering, divisive--I think, you know, President Macron 
just a year before had said that it was basically brain dead.
    The overall assumption was that we would fail in Ukraine 
and the alliance would be weakened. As we stand here today, I 
think everybody has to say that the alliance has been 
unbelievably successful in preserving Ukraine and turning back 
Russia, not only stopping the invasion but recapturing 
territory in Ukraine, and NATO has never been stronger in terms 
of standing together as an alliance.
    Not just on Ukraine, but throughout Eastern Europe we have 
rallied. We are working with our partners across that portion 
of Europe to make sure that they have a strong defense to deter 
Russia. We have added Finland to NATO. We're close on Sweden, 
not quite then.
    So I think it's important for all of us to have the proper 
perspective on this. We are being successful because of the 
leadership of the Biden administration, the leadership of NATO, 
and most importantly because of the courage of the Ukrainian 
people in standing up to Russia.
    So what we need to do is build on that success and continue 
to support it and not threaten to cut it off for any of a 
variety of different reasons, and there's a lot of different 
reasons for that threat to be floated around.
    One of them is the accountability issue, but we have talked 
about that in this committee before. Clearly, the Ukrainians 
are using the aid and the weapons that we are giving them to 
maximum effect. If they weren't they would have lost by now.
    There is oversight, and to challenge the existence of that 
oversight is, (A), to undermine the overall effort and, (B), 
not to be, you know, unsubtle here but it is to restate Russian 
propaganda, because the one thing that the Russians have 
continued to be very good at in this whole process is to spread 
every story that they can imagine to divide our alliance. That 
is their mission--is to get us to back down from the united 
front that we have shown on Ukraine by sowing seeds of discord.
    So we have to be really careful about which stories that we 
go ahead and spread. China, by the way, is very aggressive 
about that as well.
    China is one of the main places that is spreading the story 
that this aid is somehow not being used properly or is being--
you know, fostering corruption, none of which is true, all of 
which advances their interests and undermines ours.
    So, first of all, let's recognize the success we have had 
and continue to build on it and be very careful about doing 
anything to undermine it. The next few months are going to be 
incredibly important.
    I think that alliance has stepped up incredibly well in the 
last couple of months as Ukraine prepares to try and retake 
even more territory, providing more weapons, more training, the 
systems that they need.
    I think we're in a strong position and we need to build on 
that. But we will want to hear from our two witnesses about 
what we need to do--not just in the next couple of months but, 
certainly, in those next couple of months and beyond--in order 
to make sure that we continue to build on those successes.
    What we want is we want a sovereign democratic Ukraine and 
we want peace. We want to force President Putin to the 
bargaining table to show him that he is not going to succeed. 
He must make peace. That is the plan and I know our two 
witnesses before us today have had a lot to do with making sure 
that that plan has gotten as far as it has and I thank them for 
that.
    And then just two more issues, more broadly, European 
security going forward. This is a huge opportunity in that the 
NATO alliance has been strengthened, as I just described. How 
do we take advantage of that opportunity? How do we resource 
it?
    How do we strike our balance working with our partners in 
Europe to make sure that we have a strong defense posture 
across Eastern Europe and that we're as close to on the same 
page as possible?
    It would be great if we could, you know, finally get Sweden 
into NATO. Curious about your thoughts about how we can 
negotiate through that.
    So how do we strengthen Europe, and then to the Chairman's 
last point on China, the role that China is playing. And I 
think it was very clear from President Macron's visit and 
discussion after his visit with President Xi that this is a 
tough question.
    Europe wants to figure out how to sort of have, you know, a 
decent relationship with China while at the same time is aware 
of the challenges. But how do we strike that? How do we work 
with our European partners to make sure that we're on the same 
page in trying to deal with the threat that China presents?
    So I look forward to your testimony. Again, I thank you for 
where we're at and where we're going forward. It has been 
remarkable. I think it's 54 nations that have come together 
that are providing support to Ukraine.
    And, again, let us remind ourselves that if we'd been 
having this conversation in January of 2022, how many people in 
this room would have predicted that Ukraine would have been as 
successful as they have been or that the alliance would have 
held together as strongly as it has?
    And with that, I yield back and I look forward to the 
testimony.
    The Chairman. And the Ranking Member makes a great point 
and I would remind everybody that one of the reasons Ukraine 
has been so successful is we have been over there with our NATO 
allies since 2014 training their military how to be a 
professional military and those dividends we are seeing today.
    Now I'd like to recognize our witnesses. The Honorable 
Celeste Wallander is Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs. General Christopher Cavoli is 
the Commander of U.S. European Command and the Supreme Allied 
Commander Europe.
    Ms. Wallander, we'll start with you.

STATEMENT OF HON. CELESTE A. WALLANDER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
   DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE 
                      SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Wallander. Thank you.
    Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished 
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me to testify.
    I would like to express my appreciation for the continued 
support from Congress and this committee in informing and 
enabling the Department of Defense's work in this region. It is 
an honor to appear alongside General Cavoli, who is an 
outstanding colleague.
    Russia's unprovoked war of aggression has created the worst 
security crisis in Europe since the end of the Second World 
War. For over a year this war has threatened Ukraine, the 
security of Europe, the global economy, and the rules-based 
international order.
    Yet, thanks to the courage of the Ukrainian people, 
supported by the United States and a broad coalition of allies 
and partners from around the world, Russia has failed to 
achieve its objectives. An independent Ukraine endures.
    In Europe, NATO is more unified than ever. Just this month, 
Finland joined the alliance as its 31st member. We hope Sweden 
will follow soon.
    Our goal is a free, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine able 
to defend its sovereignty and deter further aggression. The 
substantial commitment of the U.S. military assistance to 
Ukraine reflects the American interests and values at stake.
    As Secretary Austin has said, our support for Ukraine's 
self-defense is an investment in our own security and 
prosperity. And the United States is not alone. The Secretary's 
Ukraine Defense Contact Group has rallied over 50 allies and 
partners to commit more than $20 billion in security assistance 
to Ukraine, including in the critical areas of air defense, 
armor, and artillery.
    Ukraine has leveraged this assistance to deal Russia 
significant blows on the battlefield. Although Russia's 
conventional military capabilities are diminished, Russia 
continues to present serious risk as it retains capabilities in 
nuclear, cyber, information operations, counterspace, and 
undersea warfare, among others.
    These capabilities, combined with Russia's intent to 
undermine the independence of its neighbors and will to use 
force, mean that Russia remains an acute threat. The Department 
remains focused on deterring Russian attacks on the United 
States and our NATO allies.
    But it is not the United States alone strengthening defense 
in Europe. European allies and partners have responded to 
Russia's invasion by investing in their defense capabilities at 
an accelerated pace.
    We are working with our NATO allies to ensure that the 
alliance is prepared for modern challenges and can deter 
aggression from any adversary. Allies have deployed land and 
air defense forces in the eastern part of the alliance and 
maritime assets across the NATO area.
    For the first time in history NATO has activated its 
defense plans and deployed portions of the NATO Response Force. 
Even as we focus on deterring the primary threat of Russian 
aggression, we remain vigilant and attuned to other threats to 
EUCOM [U.S. European Command].
    The PRC [People's Republic of China] and China--the PRC, 
China, and Russia collaborate across a variety of arenas to 
undermine the international rules-based order. We recognize the 
PRC is taking lessons from our support for Ukraine and we 
continue to monitor their cooperation with Russia.
    It is clear that the PRC's influence in Europe has waned in 
recent years, in part due to its close alignment with Russia. 
We also advance work with allies and partners to address the 
interconnected challenges in Europe and beyond, which the 
United States cannot address alone.
    These include complications posed by climate change, cyber 
and hybrid threats, and terrorism. To address both these 
challenges and threats the Department will continue to pursue 
novel approaches for deterrence and defense that create 
advantages for ourselves and our allies and partners and pose 
dilemmas for our competitors.
    Congressional support for U.S. forces deployed in the U.S. 
European Command area of responsibility, as well as funding for 
defense initiatives across Europe and Ukraine's security 
assistance, have been and will remain critical to achieving 
U.S. national security objectives.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Wallander can be found in 
the Appendix on page 47.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Wallander.
    I now recognize General Cavoli for 5 minutes.

          STATEMENT OF GEN CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, USA,  
               COMMANDER, U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND

    General Cavoli. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 
Smith, distinguished members of the committee. It's a privilege 
to testify before you today.
    First of all, on behalf of the men, women, and the families 
of U.S. European Command, I thank you for your steadfast 
support to their mission, to their safety, and to their well-
being.
    I'd also like to personally thank members for supporting 
the rescheduling of today's session so that I can remain 
focused on my area of responsibility during a time of 
operational significance. I thank you very much for that. It's 
a very busy spring.
    It's a pleasure to appear next to Dr. Wallander, whose 
professionalism and expertise is well known to this committee 
and, indeed, to this whole city.
    So this is an unprecedented time in the Euro-Atlantic area. 
Fourteen months ago, Russia's illegal unprovoked invasion of 
Ukraine dramatically shifted perceptions of European stability 
and broader global security and galvanized European 
governments' resolve.
    Last year's NATO summit in Madrid was a turning point for 
the alliance. Nations committed to a new strategic concept that 
put collective territorial defense at the top of the alliance's 
task list and, for the first time since the end of the Cold 
War, set into motion a series of efforts that will profoundly 
change the military structure and the activity of NATO.
    We have been creating new plans for the general defense of 
the alliance and these will drive higher levels of readiness 
and more targeted national defense investments. Nations agreed 
to accelerate defense spending increases, to establish enhanced 
force posture on the eastern flank of NATO, to take an 
unprecedented number of troops and weapons and turn them over 
to NATO command, and, critically, to bring two new members into 
the alliance, and I'm happy, as Dr. Wallander noted, that one 
of them, Finland, has already joined.
    Over time, these efforts will lead to significantly 
increased European military capabilities and will continue to 
deter Russian aggression against the alliance. That deterrent 
posture has allowed us to work intensively in the past year to 
assist Ukraine.
    In the past year, thanks to your support, U.S. donations of 
arms, ammunition, equipment, vehicles, and supplies have 
enabled Ukraine to halt Russia's invasion. We have not been 
alone in this effort. The DOD [U.S. Department of Defense] and 
USEUCOM lead an international effort to identify, transport, 
and deliver equipment and ammunition to Ukraine, along with the 
training to use that equipment in combat.
    The material support and training provided by international 
donors--over 50 of them--has been huge and fundamental to the 
Ukrainian military success. Over the winter, our coalition has 
enabled the Ukrainian military to generate capabilities 
necessary to defend and to regain parts of their sovereign 
territory.
    We're confident our Ukrainian partners are good stewards of 
donated aid. Our embassy team in Kyiv and the Security 
Assistance Group in Wiesbaden, Germany, work diligently to 
monitor and to keep a close eye on all lethal aid and to ensure 
that it's getting to and staying in the right hands.
    Although we remain optimistic for Ukraine's future, this 
war is far from over. Russia will remain an acute threat to 
Euro-Atlantic security and the National Defense Strategy 
rightly calls our attention to that.
    Russia, of course, is not the only problem in Europe. The 
People's Republic of China continues to increase its access and 
influence in our theater and its activities pose risk to U.S., 
allied, and partner interests.
    The PRC uses foreign direct investment, government-backed 
business ventures, and loans to gain access to technology and 
to get control over vital European infrastructure and 
transportation routes.
    Finally, Europe continues to face transnational challenges 
such as violent extremist organizations, uncontrolled 
migration, organized crime, climate change. EUCOM, of course, 
trains and cooperates with allies and partners to help counter 
those challenges as well.
    Our strategic approach fortifies our allies and our 
partners. It strengthens alliance interoperability and enhances 
our collective combat credibility, which deters our 
adversaries.
    And of course, as always, should deterrence fail, USEUCOM, 
alongside our allies and partners, is ready to fight and win.
    Congress, your continued support for numerous funding 
initiatives remains absolutely critical to our strategy. These 
authorities and fundings strengthen the U.S. and NATO ability 
to rapidly respond in crisis or conflict and your support 
demonstrates our Nation's continued commitment to defend the 
homeland and to protect the peace for 1 billion people living 
in the Euro-Atlantic area.
    Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, on behalf of the 
entire U.S. European Command thank you again for the 
opportunity to speak with you today. I very much look forward 
to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Cavoli can be found in 
the Appendix on page 55.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, General Cavoli. I now recognize 
myself for 5 minutes of questions.
    General Cavoli, it appears that the Putin-Xi bromance has 
blossomed into a full-blown alliance. Earlier this month, 
President Xi traveled to Moscow where they reached agreements 
on expanded military cooperation with Russia.
    We know that Russia is providing China with highly enriched 
uranium that China is turning into plutonium for a strategic 
nuclear breakout.
    Can you please explain how you see the China-Russia 
alliance evolving and why defeating Russia in Ukraine has 
ramifications for China in Taiwan?
    General Cavoli. Yes, Mr. Chairman. Thanks for the question, 
which is one of the big questions of the current situation in 
the globe.
    Clearly, during this conflict Russia and China have grown 
closer together. China's diplomatic and political and moral 
support for Russia's illegal invasion has been notable and has 
assisted the Russians in their position and their domestic 
political position as well.
    It appears increasingly to be an uneven bromance, as you 
put it, in which Russia could become the junior partner. But it 
is nevertheless a dangerous development, or development of 
significant concern.
    We see military cooperation. We see economic cooperation. 
We see political cooperation. There are bright spots in this, 
though, Mr. Chairman.
    Our European allies have spotted this, have noticed this, 
and with the encouragement of the United States, and their own 
observations, are taking significant actions to limit the 
increasing influence, and malign influence where it exists, of 
the PRC inside Europe.
    The Chairman. General, I spoke in my opening statement 
about the administration not giving Ukraine the weapons it 
needs to win. Chief among them are the cluster munitions. The 
U.S. military has over 3 million cluster munitions that can be 
fired from 155 [millimeter] currently--current howitzers in 
Ukraine's possession.
    We are going to spend millions of dollars destroying this 
if we don't use them and Russia is using these munitions right 
now against the Ukrainians. Can you please explain the 
battlefield military utility that giving the Ukraine the DPICMs 
[dual-purpose improved conventional munitions] that we have 
would have in particular in places like Bakhmut?
    General Cavoli. Yes, Chairman Rogers. So the munition in 
question here is dual purpose improved conventional munitions.
    We call it dual-purpose because it releases bomblets, some 
of which are antipersonnel fragmentation grenades and some of 
which are shaped charges that attack vehicles from above. It's 
a very effective munition. It's very effective against mixed 
targets of personnel and equipment, especially when those 
targets are gathered into dense formations.
    The Chairman. And that's what's happening in Bakhmut, as I 
understand it?
    General Cavoli. It is happening in Bakhmut.
    The Chairman. The Russians are sending waves of troops.
    General Cavoli. It is happening in Bakhmut, sir, and it 
happens on most battlefields when one force goes into the 
offense. So as a strictly military matter it is a useful and 
very effective munition.
    The Chairman. Okay. Chair yields to the ranking member for 
any questions he may have.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you.
    Looking forward as we're looking at our posture in Europe 
in light of the changes, the--you know, certainly the addition 
of Finland to NATO, hopefully the addition of Sweden, and the 
new threat that Russia poses, you know, given their invasion of 
Ukraine, what should our posture be in Eastern Europe and how 
do we have the budget to support that?
    How do we coordinate with our allies? You know, what does 
the new force posture look like, going forward? Either one of 
you can take a stab at that.
    General Cavoli. Sir, I can start that from the military 
perspective and where we stand right now and perhaps defer to 
Dr. Wallander for her additional comments.
    So we have changed both allied and U.S. force posture 
significantly during this conflict. In fact, even before the 
conflict began, we began to flow forces from inside Europe 
eastward and from the U.S. into Europe. Fairly significant 
uplift right now.
    We have about just shy of 20,000 deployed service personnel 
who are not normally stationed in Europe, forward in Europe. 
For the most part, those organizations we now have in the 
ground domain. We have all of the V Corps headquarters forward.
    We have two division headquarters and we have five brigade 
combat teams forward. The vast majority of that force is 
postured forward specifically in Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, a 
limited amount in Slovakia, a large amount in Poland and each 
of the three Baltic countries.
    We move them around for a certain amount of training 
purpose.
    Mr. Smith. [Inaudible]
    General Cavoli. I'm sorry?
    Mr. Smith. Are you satisfied that we're adequately 
resourced to meet the needs?
    General Cavoli. Right now in the ground domain, yes, 
absolutely. We're resourced against the requirement we have 
right now. Should the situation change we're prepared to 
recommend different levels of posture.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you.
    Dr. Wallander.
    Dr. Wallander. I would--in addition I would highlight that 
the United States is leading under General Cavoli's leadership 
at EUCOM but we are not alone, that allies have reinforced 
their forward posture.
    There are eight battle groups, one in each of the front-
line eastern flank countries and each one of those battle 
groups is led by a different framework nation. The United 
States is the framework nation for Poland, but other allies 
have taken up leadership to ensure that there is the right mix 
of capabilities across the entire eastern flank.
    So this is a whole-of-alliance achievement and what we will 
be doing at the Vilnius summit is reinforcing further that 
enhanced posture and the multinational nature of that 
commitment, which is enhancing the credibility in the eyes of 
the Russian leadership. It is not only the United States alone. 
It is the alliance of 31, soon to be 32 members.
    Mr. Smith. And on that alliance, you know, there are ranges 
of concerns about, you know, the degree to which particularly 
Germany and France, you know, that early on were, you know, 
traditionally trying to get along with Russia or would they 
step up.
    You know, what--sort of both of your assessments as to 
where that alliance is at in terms of adequately understanding 
the threat from Russia and from China as well and actually 
stepping up to help us in meeting those challenges?
    Dr. Wallander. Well, Germany has stepped up to lead--to be 
the framework nation of the battle group in Lithuania, and 
France has stood up to be the lead of the battle group in 
Romania. I believe I've got that right.
    So they are--they are leading and supporting the forward 
posture, and on the--on reliance on Russia it was unwelcome, a 
cold shower of recognition, that vulnerability to Russian 
coercion and influence had left some countries in Europe at 
risk.
    But Europe as a whole has responded quickly and has reduced 
dependence on both Russian gas and Russian oil, has imposed 
strict sanctions on Russian banking, on individuals of 
influence in Putin's Russia.
    And so Russia has--Europe has responded both militarily 
and----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Smith. So I've just got a few seconds left here. I want 
to give General Cavoli a quick chance to comment on that as 
well.
    General Cavoli. So their initial moves were extremely 
positive, sir. France was first out of the gate to form a new 
battle group, is prepared to raise it up to brigade size if 
necessary.
    The Germans had already been running the battle group in 
Lithuania and immediately put a brigade command element there 
to facilitate further reinforcement of it.
    Both nations have contributed significantly to Ukraine with 
lethal aid, and I should note that the French, in their return 
to large-scale operational capability, have just staged the 
largest exercise, Exercise Orion, that they've done in over 30 
years.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South 
Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank both of you 
for being here today and, General Cavoli, I want to 
particularly commend you. A proficiency in Italian very 
appropriate but add to that French and Russian, and I 
particularly identify.
    My number-two son was a Navy doctor serving under your 
command at Naples, Italy, and now I've got three grandchildren 
who speak perfect Italian. So they'd be happy to be with you.
    But, no, what you all are doing is so important and then, 
General, I particularly appreciate you raising the issue with 
Chairman Mike Rogers about the cluster bombs. Those should be 
provided with the--with war criminal Putin sacrificing young 
Russians for his personal aggrandizement of oil, money, power--
the human-wave tactics, this could help stop that and certainly 
would deter their effectiveness.
    And so I hope every effort will be made to look into 
providing the cluster bombs. That we have 2 million available. 
I mean, that's just inconceivable that we don't do more, Madam 
Secretary. So please look into that.
    The European Command, General, under your command has been 
outstanding, increasing our readiness along with increasing 
support of our allies and partners, and NATO has stepped up, 
bolstered in its forward defenses and enhanced posture to the 
border countries of Ukraine to deter war criminal Putin's 
regime.
    And then it's really significant that NATO is growing, and 
an unintended consequence of war criminal Putin and his mass 
murder is for Finland and Sweden to join NATO and so they're 
how--and what that means to the Baltic republics. I mean, 
just--it's just inconceivable how positive some things are.
    But what is your summary of the combined forces and 
capabilities and foreign military sales, specialized training 
opportunities? What more can we do to assist the people of 
Ukraine?
    General Cavoli. Thank you, sir.
    First of all, I'd like to underline your comments about the 
reaction of the alliance on this. It's been--it's been very, 
very significant. The alliance has reacted very, very quickly. 
I have about--in my NATO role I have over 40,000 troops turned 
over to my command right now and nations are prepared to add 
more.
    With regard to what else we can do to help Ukraine, I think 
staying the course that we're on right now is very important. 
We are in a position where we're moving into a period where the 
Ukrainians will conduct offensive operations. We have good 
solid plans to continue to support them but we'll need to 
continue with those plans, sir.
    Mr. Wilson. And we must. Chairman Mike Rogers is correct 
again, pointing out the danger of the Chinese Communist Party, 
the relationship of the military aid being provided by Xi, and 
then we have seen the pictures of Iran providing the weaponry 
to be provided across the Caspian Sea to war criminal Putin.
    It's really clear to me that we have--what we're--what 
you're doing is so important to deter the Chinese Communist 
Party from threats to Taiwan and then to deter the regime in 
Tehran from its plans of death to Israel, death to America. And 
so what you're doing is so critical.
    And then to Madam Secretary, the Ukraine invasion by war 
criminal Putin continues that we must expedite foreign military 
sales and to our allies and it's so incredible--I don't think 
the American people know that 10 countries actually exceed the 
United States in terms of military equipment being provided to 
Ukraine based on per capita GDP [gross domestic product], 
including a wonderful country called Bulgaria.
    And so it's--but we need to backfill foreign military sales 
to our allies, but in addition I'd also--we need to look into 
what happened--it's not in your--it's in your purview, 
providing aid that's already been paid for by Taiwan.
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
    Thank you for the opportunity to thank Congress for 
providing heightened amounts of foreign military financing 
authorities and appropriations in order for us to do exactly 
what you rightly point to, which is so many allies and partners 
have been so quick and so generous in contributing capabilities 
to Ukraine, that flexibility and higher amounts you have given 
us will allow us to backfill those allies and partners.
    Mr. Wilson. Well, I want to thank Chairman Mike Rogers and 
Chairman Mike McCaul. They have been working with the Ranking 
Members, too. It's been--hey, this is bipartisan. Amazing. And 
so let's work together.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Connecticut, Mr. Courtney, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to 
both witnesses for your outstanding work at this time of, 
again, the biggest security challenge since the end of World 
War II.
    I'd like to actually, General, shift the topic a little bit 
to not the--well, out of the eastern flank and more to the 
western flank. You know, in light of--even in the midst of all 
of Russia's degradation of its military force because of the 
conflict, its navy continues to operate and we heard from 
General VanHerck, your colleague, when he testified that the 
patrols in the Atlantic which used to be sort of sporadic by 
the--their submarine patrols are now becoming persistent and I 
wonder if you could just sort of talk about that as much as you 
can in terms of, you know, what we're doing in terms of anti-
submarine warfare to track this and address this because, 
again, despite everything that's going on in your other 
portfolio, this is different than it was even, you know, 5 or 6 
years ago.
    General Cavoli. Yes, sir. Thanks for the opportunity, and 
this is very much inside my portfolio. I share it with Glen 
VanHerck, of course. Defense of the homeland starts forward.
    First of all, sir, if I could, I'd like to underline your 
comment about the specificity of the degradation of the Russian 
forces. Much of the Russian military has not been affected 
negatively by this conflict.
    One of those forces is their undersea forces. It's hard to 
talk in public as you well know, sir, about undersea warfare 
and our efforts in that regard. But I can say that the Russians 
are more active than we have seen them in years and their 
patrols into the Atlantic and throughout the Atlantic are at a 
high level most of the time--at a higher level than we have 
seen in years and this is, as you pointed out, despite all of 
the efforts that they're undertaking inside Ukraine.
    Mr. Courtney. So one development which, again, maybe you 
could comment on is just, again, with the admission of Finland 
to NATO and, hopefully, you know, shortly after with Sweden, 
that, you know, that brings to the table or to the sea another 
sort of, you know, valuable ally and you mentioned some of the 
naval exercises--I think it was on page 15 of your testimony--
that have been ongoing despite, again, in the midst of the 
Ukraine war.
    Again, can you talk about where you see, you know, what 
they will add to those efforts to, again, strengthen the 
western flank?
    General Cavoli. Yes, sir. Absolutely.
    So the accession of Finland is very important to us. 
Finland brings a large army at full mobilization, 280,000 
ground troops. Brings a very competent navy. Brings a large and 
growing air force.
    They're in the process of acquiring 64 F-35s, which will 
create 250 fifth-generation fighters across the northern three 
Scandinavian countries. So the accession of Finland is very 
strong. The future, we hope, accession of Sweden brings much of 
the same.
    The Swedish navy is very active, very confident, and very 
powerful in the Baltic Sea area, and this will give us a huge 
additional capability to control all three domains--classical 
domains in the High North.
    And finally, I would point out that just the geography 
alone in a military sense of bringing those two huge borders of 
the Baltic Sea into the alliance while we're adding 1,300 
kilometers of NATO border to the Russian Federation, those are 
very powerful in and of themselves, sir.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Well, again, your point about in 
answer to the first question regarding the increased patrols, I 
mean, it's a team sport in terms of all our allies working 
together to sort of--you know--hopefully manage that and keep 
it under control.
    So and, again, as you pointed out, these are two countries 
with very advanced capability. So I think it is going to be a 
force multiplier.
    With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Wallander, General Cavoli, thanks so much for joining 
us.
    Listen, I think we're all very, very steadfastly in support 
of Ukraine and their effort to maintain independence from this 
unprovoked and inhumane and barbaric invasion by Russia.
    I'm very focused on making sure that every weapon, every 
round of ammunition that we send to Ukraine, is tracked and 
that we are accountable for every bit of that. The challenges 
we face today in the United States are many.
    Our constituents look at us very carefully and say, what 
are you doing to make sure that we are on track with that, and 
we know we're sending a number of items over there from tanks 
to HIMARS to Javelins and Stingers, small arms, ammunition, 
across the whole spectrum.
    Can you give us an idea about what are we doing in making 
sure the tracking and accountability of every bit of what we 
send over there is very focused, making sure too we track any 
potential for waste, fraud, and abuse as well as do we gather 
intelligence to understand who might be trying to intercept 
those weapons, whether it's in Ukraine or even somehow on 
tracks and in transportation in Ukraine?
    General Cavoli. Thank you, sir. Yeah, of course. So 
starting with the monitoring of where the--where the equipment 
goes, we perform a variety of things. First of all, we 
inventory everything that comes through U.S. hands on the way 
into Ukraine and we do that in a couple of different locations 
that you're already familiar with, sir.
    So we believe we have a very, very solid understanding of 
what goes into Ukraine, first of all.
    Second, we, over the last few months, have fielded to 
Ukraine a NATO standard logistics tracking system and they give 
us access to their networks to monitor that. So as we inventory 
stuff we ingest it into LOGFAS [Logistics Functional Area 
Services] and then they track it as it goes forward. This is 
their system of tracking and we watch over their shoulder.
    Of course, that's not enough so we do inspections, enhanced 
end use monitoring. In fact, those are done by the Defense 
Attache Office in Kyiv under Brigadier General Garrick Harmon.
    There's an--today's Wednesday--there's an on-site 
inspection going on in Odessa right now today. There's another 
one scheduled next Thursday. Those go based on the security 
situation, however, sir.
    So sometimes we don't get those off. When we're unable to 
get to a location we have barcoded the critical pieces of 
equipment and issued handheld scanners that project onto a 
network that we control and the Ukrainians will inventory by a 
handheld scanner.
    So that's how we look at things inside Ukraine. As far as 
our efforts outside of Ukraine to make sure that we're doing a 
good job we have had in our security assistance enterprise I 
believe it's nine DOD IG [Inspector General] evaluations for 
audits and numerous visits. So I'm pretty confident we're doing 
the best we can there.
    And then, finally, yes, of course, we do gather intel on it 
and I'd be delighted to talk to you about it in closed session, 
sir.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
    Let me ask questions about munition stockpiles. As we know, 
we are at incredible burn rates on munitions that we are 
sending to Ukraine, many times having to ask our friends around 
the world if they can help with that.
    Give me your perspective on where we are today with burn 
rates on critical munitions, especially those that hold utility 
in the INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command], and what are we 
doing to address when those stockpiles, those magazine depths, 
are at critical rates in regenerating that and then modernizing 
some of those weapons systems that--many of those like Stinger 
are circa-1960s weapon systems?
    Dr. Wallander. Well, let me start with when we work on a 
package of security assistance to Ukraine there is a cross-
department working group that includes the services. It 
includes input from other COCOMs [combatant commands] to 
address exactly the issue you raise that our contributions to 
Ukraine are done in light of our own readiness requirements and 
priorities to support other allies and partners, not least 
Taiwan.
    So that is baked into our process as we decide how we are 
best able to supply Ukraine with its requirements.
    Mr. Wittman. Are we calling upon our friends and allies to 
help in that effort, especially when we are critically low on 
some of those munitions?
    Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman, we are, and the main 
structure for that is the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which 
meets monthly.
    But in between those meetings we are in constant contact 
with allies and partners, not just in Europe but globally, to 
source those capabilities and they really have stepped up. A 
lot of the artillery ammunition is coming from other countries 
at this point, not directly from the United States, to support 
Ukraine.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Kelly [presiding]. I now recognize Mr. Gallego.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Kelly.
    Dr. Wallander, in your written remarks I was pleased to see 
you highlight the Baltic states and the important work that 
they're doing to enhance security in the face of an 
increasingly aggressive Russia.
    In fact, one of my proudest moments in Congress was 
introducing the Baltic Security Initiative, which provides 
targeted security assistance to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, 
three of our most critical and crucial allies.
    Could you describe any particular areas where you would 
like to see the United States deepen cooperation with the 
Baltic states and do you think there's more that we can do and 
should be doing to support our Baltic allies?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman, and I share your 
support for assisting the Baltic countries, given their 
position and given how forward leaning they have been on 
security assistance to Ukraine.
    I think that one of the most important aspects of the 
Baltic Security Initiative has been the resources to build 
infrastructure for the three countries because now we have 
commitments from NATO allies and we have an American persistent 
rotational presence in all three of the Baltic countries.
    But in order to support those troop presences and in order 
to make sure that they are at a high readiness, the Baltic 
countries need to have training ranges, they need to have 
storage facilities.
    They need to have the infrastructure to support the 
substantial number of allied forces as well as their own, and 
they have been focused on spending their own national defense 
resources to build that infrastructure.
    But the fact that the United States has been willing to put 
money to that requirement and also there is NATO money on that 
requirement is--helps them to plan but it also then helps 
General Cavoli when he is planning those rotational presences, 
when he's planning the exercises, to know that U.S. troops will 
remain at a high level of readiness and really interoperable 
with our allies.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you.
    Speaking of Lithuania, we're a few months away from the 
NATO summit that will take place in Vilnius this summer. The 
administration has done an impressive job to further strengthen 
our alliance cohesion, and I also look forward eventually for 
Sweden to joining Finland and other allies.
    Could you share your expectations going into that upcoming 
summit and what in your mind would signal a successful summit?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
    I think the most--the most important aspect of the summit 
that I want to point to is something that General Cavoli 
referred to, which is that the work that's going on building 
into the summit is our NATO plans, which will then enforce the 
new--the new plans, given the new security environment, will be 
approved in the run-up to the summit and then defense ministers 
and foreign ministers ahead of the summit will agree on what 
kinds of resources, what kinds of capabilities, and what kinds 
of defense spending are required to make sure that all of the 
NATO allies have the capabilities to resource those plans and 
it is at the Vilnius summit that heads of state and government 
will endorse those appropriate resources in order to make those 
plans real and make them credible. That's number one.
    Number two is that what will be important is a NATO 
statement on the importance of Ukraine as a European country 
and its right to exist within its internationally recognized 
borders as a sovereign and independent state, and a NATO 
commitment to help in the areas of defense institution building 
and sort of the host of activities that NATO has invested in 
Ukraine over the past 30 years, which has contributed to 
Ukraine's ability to defend itself and remain an independent 
country.
    So I would point to those two. From a defense point of 
view, those would be the two highlights that we need to focus 
on for Vilnius.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Doctor.
    General Cavoli, thanks for your testimony. I want to ask 
about Russia's actions in the gray zone. I remain deeply 
concerned by this threat and believe that irregular warfare 
training with allies and partners is crucial to counter that.
    Recognizing that we're in this setting, what insights can 
you share about how EUCOM is approaching this challenge?
    General Cavoli. Thank you, Congressman.
    Yeah, I share your concern in that regard and the--our 
cooperation with our allies and our partners, I should point 
out, in terms of irregular warfare training and preparation is 
an important part of our overall defense plans both in EUCOM 
and through NATO.
    We have NATO Special Operations Headquarters and we have 
U.S. Special Operations Command Europe. Both of them work 
intensively on a bilateral basis and multilateral bases to 
prepare countries for resilience, resistance, and irregular 
warfare in general.
    There are some real, real great cases that I'd love to talk 
to you about in closed session, of course. But in general, it's 
a big success story and it, importantly, includes nonallied 
partners.
    Mr. Gallego. Yeah. Irregular warfare, I think, is something 
that we have not recognized as being a very important approach 
to Ukraine's resiliency against Russia.
    Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    Mr. Kelly. The gentleman's time has expired. I now 
recognize the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
    General Cavoli, throughout this conflict we have had the 
specter of tactical nuclear weapons looming over us by the 
Russians and, frankly, Putin has put these threats to effective 
use in restraining our policymakers and leaders from involving 
themselves more thoroughly in this conflict on the Ukrainians' 
behalf.
    In my opinion, the Russians know they're overmatched when 
it comes to the big guns in our respective nuclear arsenals. 
However, it seems to me that they feel they have an advantage 
when it comes to the low-yield tactical nuclear weapons.
    So first, do you believe that there is a gap in our nuclear 
deterrent at present, and also knowing that Chairman Milley, 
General Cotton, and your predecessor, General Wolters, 
supported the continued development of the Nuclear Sea-Launched 
Cruise Missile [SLCM-N], do you share their position that this 
system would fill a key deterrence in that gap?
    General Cavoli. First to your second question, sir.
    Yes, I think that the SLCM-N is an important weapon.
    To your first question, I don't think we have significant 
gaps in our nuclear deterrent capability. I'm very confident in 
our nuclear deterrence as well as our extended nuclear 
deterrence.
    Dr. DesJarlais. In an open setting, can you give us an 
estimate of how many tactical or nuclear low-yield weapons 
Russia has?
    General Cavoli. Not in an open setting, sir, but I'd be 
delighted to in a classified----
    Dr. DesJarlais. I've seen unclassified estimates around 
2,000 warheads. Does that sound about correct?
    General Cavoli. I haven't seen those, sir. So----
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Dr. Wallander, one area that I think 
the administration has kind of failed the American people is 
its communication surrounding the conflict in Ukraine.
    I don't think they've done a satisfactory job in 
communicating the reason why we are supporting Ukraine or what 
our desired end goal in this conflict is.
    So I'd like to give you a minute to communicate why you 
believe it's imperative that we take the fight to Russia at 
this moment, what interest does the United States have in this 
conflict and, you know, how are we doing and how do we expect 
to do? What's the end game?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
    First of all, the stakes are European security. Of course, 
our values and our interests are connected to Ukraine as a 
sovereign independent country. But European security in the 
21st century is built on a foundation of respect for 
international law and the resilience of the U.N. [United 
Nations] Charter. And Russia's assault in Ukraine is an attempt 
to change that rules-based international order, which is to say 
that sovereignty is contingent, borders can be changed through 
the use of force, and big countries get to decide what the 
foreign and security policies of their neighbors are.
    So the stakes are larger than Ukraine. But they go beyond 
Europe as well because China is engaging in similar kinds of 
probes and attempts to erode that same rules-based 
international order in the Indo-Pacific. And China we know is 
watching very closely to see if the international community 
will allow Russia to get away with this and would take the 
wrong lessons from our failure to ensure Russia's strategic 
failure in Ukraine.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Yeah, and I think that's a good 
explanation. I wish we could get it out to the American people 
in a more effective manner.
    General Cavoli, less than about a third of our NATO allies 
remain compliant with their commitment to maintain defense 
spending at a minimum of 2 percent GDP. With this going on 
literally in the European backyard, what is it going to take to 
get them to step up?
    General Cavoli. Sir, I think this is one of the things it's 
taken to get them to step up. So in 2014 the average 
expenditure per GDP inside NATO was 1.4 percent. Today, it's 
1.8 percent. Not yet at the target but closing in on it.
    We have come up to nine nations meeting the--meeting the 2 
percent goal to include one nation, Poland, which spends more 
per GDP as of this year than the United States does.
    With the accession of Finland that number has grown to 10 
that spend 2 percent or more and there are 11 more nations that 
are on a very definite glide path to get to 2 percent by 2024, 
which was the Wales summit pledge.
    That's not all the nations in NATO, however, sir, and so we 
continue to have work to do to get all our--all our allies 
sharing the burden equally.
    Dr. DesJarlais. I think that's really important considering 
our looming debt crisis, our exponential debt we have in this 
country.
    I think Americans are definitely wanting to see other 
countries step up and do their fair share and it's extremely 
important that we build these alliances, strengthen these 
alliances, especially with the looming threats, as we have 
mentioned, with China and Taiwan.
    So I thank you both for being here today. I yield back.
    The Chairman [presiding]. Chair now recognizes the 
gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you both for being here.
    Your statements both discussed the practice of the People's 
Republic of China in creating agreements with individual 
European nations that ostensibly are for improving trade but 
create dependencies on China, and we have seen this same 
strategy in Africa.
    It's been much maligned by us because we say these are bad 
deals. But even if they are bad deals for the host nations they 
work well for China because they create this dependency.
    Have you seen any change in this trend in light of the war 
in Ukraine, Dr. Wallander?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman.
    Yes, we have seen a change. Three of the countries who've 
been members of the 17+1 arrangement by which China was seeking 
to build those kinds of dependencies through trade, investment, 
have actually--and it's not surprisingly the three Baltic 
countries--have quit that structure, recognizing the challenge 
that China poses and the vulnerabilities that it seeks to 
create and successfully often creates through technology, 
through problematic investment contracts, through acquisition 
of companies, of ports.
    And so there is a greater awareness among European 
countries that even as they trade with China, that they need to 
not allow themselves to become vulnerable to coercion and----
    Mr. Moulton. Well, we certainly hope that that trend 
expands and continues.
    General Cavoli, we are very much anticipating the Ukrainian 
counteroffensive, anticipating it will be much more successful 
than the Russian offensive of the past several months. But are 
the Ukrainians going to get all the weapons they need in time 
for this offensive?
    General Cavoli. Congressman, thank you.
    Yes. So we sat down with the Ukrainians--with our Ukrainian 
colleagues and we calculated the amount of materiel they would 
need for this offensive.
    We checked it a couple of times and we gathered it from our 
allies, who were very generous especially with regard to tanks 
and armored fighting vehicles, and we have been shipping it 
into the country.
    We are--over 98 percent of the combat vehicles are already 
there and I'd hesitate to describe too much more in an open 
setting. But I am very confident that we have delivered the 
materiel that they need and will continue a pipeline to sustain 
their operations as well.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, that's good to hear and I certainly hope 
that we hear from the Ukrainians that they agree with you.
    Dr. Wallander, someday, hopefully sooner than later, this 
war is going to end and we can all imagine that Russia will go 
back home, assess their truly dramatic losses, and then start 
to rebuild their military.
    How do we think about deterrence in the future--5, 10 years 
from now--where we don't want Russia to simply get back to 
where they were before this war started and start another war 
in Europe?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. Well, first, I would 
note that Russia will--I share your assessment that Russia will 
seek to rebuild and will be able to rebuild to some extent.
    But the international community has imposed export 
restrictions, technology restrictions, and sanctions on Russia 
and those restrictions will likely make it very difficult--make 
it very difficult for Russia to achieve all of the objectives 
that the leadership might have in the military sphere.
    That said, they will rebuild.
    Mr. Moulton. And so how do you structure those sanctions so 
that the allies who put them together are willing to continue 
them, to your point, to prevent them from rebuilding while also 
showing Russia that if they're to change their behavior they 
have an off-ramp and can be welcomed back into the world 
community if they significantly change their approach?
    Dr. Wallander. Well, many of the most important 
restrictions are American export control restrictions; and 
while it is good to do them in concert with allies, we have the 
lead on many of the technologies that Russia seeks and has 
benefitted from.
    But it is our close alliance relationship and our 
constructive relationship with the European Union, because it 
is the European Union that is the organization that agrees upon 
and enforces sanctions on Russia in cooperation with us, that 
will enable us to maintain that unity. And awareness of the 
threat that Russia poses to Europe remains high and I believe--
--
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Moulton. And I hope we have a way of communicating to 
the Russian people that there is a choice here when they get to 
their next leader.
    General Cavoli, what do we need to do for Ukraine on this 
front post-war?
    General Cavoli. I'm sorry. On what front post-war? On their 
future force?
    Mr. Moulton. Yes, their future force.
    General Cavoli. We are working hard on the question of what 
their future force needs to be look like. One thing we know 
right up front, Congressman, is that the----
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 83.]
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, Mr. 
Kelly.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield my time to 
the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Alford.
    Mr. Alford. Thank you for ceding your time, Chairman Kelly. 
Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Smith and our 
witnesses here today. I appreciate you being here.
    The war in Ukraine has exposed some big gaps in our defense 
industrial base and I, along with Mr. Wittman, have some deep 
concerns about our ability to replenish and keep up with our 
weapon stockpiles. We must accelerate munitions productions 
capacity to be prepared for a potential conflict with China.
    We all know Xi is watching what's happening in Ukraine, 
supporting Russia through its no limits partnership with Putin, 
and I also want to make sure that our European allies are 
carrying their weight through burden sharing.
    General Cavoli, as you mentioned, the majority of our 
allies are not meeting NATO's 2 percent GDP defense spending 
target. In fact, as you said, only 9 of our NATO 30 member 
states met its 2 percent in 2022.
    Dr. Wallander, considering the recent NATO report that 
these nations just are not living up to their obligations, what 
is the administration doing to put pressure on these nations to 
pay their fair share?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, the first--the most important 
is that we are making meeting the 2 percent commitment a 
deliverable of the Vilnius summit.
    In other words, we are not letting up on the focus on the 
requirement of meeting 2 percent and, as I suggested, going 
beyond 2 percent if that is required to actively and correctly 
build the capabilities required by the NATO regional plans.
    So we are--we are pressuring and working with allies to 
take seriously the capabilities requirements to make those 
plans more than just plans on paper but actual real 
capabilities and that's going to require defense spending--
increased defense spending by many, if not all, NATO allies.
    Mr. Alford. In particular, Germany only contributed 1.44 
percent. That's a big disappointment. What type of pressure 
specifically are you putting on Germany?
    Dr. Wallander. We are expecting Germany to live up to this 
government's commitment to meet 2 percent. They have already 
increased their defense spending over a 5-year period, which 
should get them to near 2 percent if not above, but we continue 
to emphasize to German leadership the importance of Germany to 
fulfill its commitment.
    Mr. Alford. Are there any real consequences if they do not 
meet that and meet it soon?
    Dr. Wallander. I think the consequences for European 
countries that don't meet that commitment is that they--their 
standing as leaders in Europe is predicated on the--in part on 
the seriousness with which they undertake to fulfill the 
commitments they've made to other allies and we hold them 
accountable for that.
    Mr. Alford. Thank you. General Cavoli, I have a very simple 
question for you. What happens if Russia wins and Ukraine 
loses?
    General Cavoli. Well, sir, from a military perspective it 
depends on what wins means, where the force ends up--where the 
Russian force ends up geographically, what its composition is, 
what capabilities they have left.
    But it would certainly mean that we have to change our 
deterrent posture if they ended up significantly farther west 
than they've managed to get so far.
    Mr. Alford. Who would be next?
    General Cavoli. Sir, that's a--that's a great question. We 
think about that a lot and we work with the nations that we 
think would be vulnerable.
    Clearly, geographically speaking, the ones on their 
immediate periphery of the Russian Federation would be the 
first but they wouldn't be the only ones. The Russians are 
active globally, very, very active in Africa, for example. So I 
think it would depend on a lot of things.
    We do spend quite a bit of time working with partners and 
allies who are in the immediate periphery of Russia to make 
them resilient and defensible.
    Mr. Alford. I've got a minute left. I wanted to talk about 
the CCP and their investments in Europe right now. What are 
some of the projects that they are doing that you can talk 
about in this setting and how are we countering those measures?
    Dr. Wallander. I think the areas of our greatest concern 
are when China is, largely through technology companies--Huawei 
is the kind of poster child for that--and so we work closely in 
sharing intelligence and our information about the risks that 
that creates for countries in Europe and, more broadly, 
globally, for them to be able to control their infrastructure, 
to control their communications. So that is one major line of 
effort.
    But the other major concern is when we see China seeking 
majority control of ports, and while there were some instances 
in Europe some time ago where countries did not take that 
seriously, they are now very much attuned to that and have 
taken steps to make sure that even if there is investment it 
does not allow----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. 
Keating.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The greatest strength that the U.S. Government has 
securitywise, militarywise, is something that Russia doesn't 
have, something that China doesn't have. That's our coalition 
of allies.
    That's our strength, and foremost among our allies are our 
transatlantic allies. They've had, however, a soft underbelly 
in terms of their own security, surrounding an issue that is of 
concern to us too domestically here and that's the energy 
issue.
    Energy and our security, energy and the security of our 
allies, you can't separate them. They're intertwined and 
they're important, and we see how important it is with Saudi 
Arabia's recent change in the position with Iran. We see 
Russia's influence in OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries].
    We have seen Putin use it as a weapon of war and the 
strength of the Ukrainian people to withstand this winter. But 
the targeting of the energy infrastructure and how important 
that is strategically.
    So given everything that's happening, one of the things 
that's not, I don't think, fully appreciated that we should be 
looking at very much in terms of our own U.S. self-interest is 
the miscalculation of Putin when he thought the using weapon--
the weapon of energy with Europe and our allies how that would 
be a strategic advantage and the changes that have occurred, 
changes that would have taken decades to get to where they are 
now.
    Can you comment on--because it's so important to our 
security--can you comment on those changes and how Putin's 
miscalculation has dramatically changed the energy posture of 
our allies that have--that has such a dramatic effect 
domestically here in the U.S. as well?
    General Cavoli. If I could start, Dr. Wallander, because 
there's a military quotient to this and a legal equity that's 
important, Congressman.
    First of all, the change has been dramatic. So, in general, 
Europe's dependence on Russian gas has gone from 40 percent to 
just under 10 percent overnight in a year. It wasn't without 
pain and some of the pain was shared by U.S. service men and 
women because the prices increased by several fold.
    In Germany, the gas prices increased 600 percent for a 
period there. They've leveled back out now. But, nevertheless, 
it was not without pain that they did this. Why is that 
important for us?
    As you know, there's legislation that requires us not to--
us, the U.S. military--not to depend on Russian gas and oil and 
in the operational energy field that was easy for us. That's 
the gas and petroleum that we buy to fuel ships, to drive 
tanks, and things like that.
    We could control where we got that from. But our 
installations overseas were dependent on the local systems and 
so we were unable to comply. But in Germany where we have 
39,000 Americans and their families, we actually went from 
being 40 percent dependent to zero percent dependent on Russian 
gas.
    The only exceptions would be countries where we really 
don't have a lot of people so countries that still receive gas 
from Russia would include Hungary. We have very limited 
presence----
    Mr. Keating. Dr. Wallander, if I could, looking at the 
future, this is a tremendous shift and it's advantageous to our 
own security interests and defense interests in this country. 
Can you just comment also along with the General Cavoli?
    Dr. Wallander. Absolutely, and it's not just the 
dependence. It's the fact that Russia has a longstanding track 
record of using dependence for political coercion and that was 
the vulnerability that was created by investing or accepting 
Russian investment particularly in gas pipelines.
    By diversifying to LNG [liquified natural gas], by 
diversifying to new sources, by moving away from carbon-based 
fuels, Europe is reducing that vulnerability that Russia could 
use the turning off or the metering of energy for political 
effects and that is a very welcome development.
    Mr. Keating. And getting back to my primary point, that 
makes this coalition stronger because Putin had thought that 
this would be a wedge.
    So, looking forward, how important has it been in the 
decades to come to our greatest strength that this is something 
that's being dealt with so dramatically, as the general said?
    Dr. Wallander. I will just point--I fully agree and I'll 
point to another element, which is in 2014 when we first looked 
at sanctioning Russia for its initial invasion of Ukraine, one 
of the limitations on strong sanctions was exactly that energy 
dependence.
    Going forward, sustaining sanctions, tightening them when 
necessary, will be easier for Europe because they are not 
dependent and that will be a long-term disadvantage for the 
Putin leadership.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you. Thank you for your work.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Wisconsin, Mr. Gallagher.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The phrase lessons learned from the war in Ukraine has 
become one of the most popular or perhaps overused phrases and 
in sort of the DC national security community.
    I guess in simplest terms, Dr. Wallander, what lessons do 
you believe the Department of Defense has learned from the war 
in Ukraine?
    Dr. Wallander. Three lessons. One is needing to pay close 
attention to readiness and supply chains. We neglected that as 
a country in the last 30 years and we have learned that lesson 
and we're taking action to remedy those--that neglect.
    Number two is the importance of allies and partners, a 
global network of allies and partners. It's not just NATO, 
although it's importantly NATO. It is the G-7 [Group of Seven]. 
It is other like-minded countries who care about that 
international rules-based order.
    And I think the third lesson is that we need to make 
investments in partners that we did make in a country like 
Ukraine to build basic defense institution capabilities, to 
build relationships, because all of the work that EUCOM has 
been able to do to surge support to Ukraine would not have been 
possible without those relationships that were built over 
several decades.
    Mr. Gallagher. And when it comes to our sort of initial 
inability to deter Russia from invading and miscalculation 
therein, what lessons are to be derived from that?
    Dr. Wallander. Well, I think there the lessons are the 
positive lessons of how we successfully deter Russia every 
single day because Russia, despite potential incentives to, 
have not threatened NATO, have not threatened the U.S. 
homeland.
    We know how to create credible deterrence that works and 
that's a lesson I know that EUCOM is taking and that the 
Defense Department wants to continue forward as we think about 
the importance of the Vilnius summit and making sure we have a 
credible deterrent for NATO.
    Mr. Gallagher. But as a matter of fact, on February 24th we 
obviously did not have a credible deterrent or we failed to 
deter, notwithstanding what's happened afterwards and that's 
sort of not a positive development anytime you have, you know, 
hundreds of billions of dollars and tens of thousands of lives 
lost.
    I guess I'm sort of honing in on that failure of 
deterrence. Is it mirror imaging? Is there something about 
Putin we fail to understand?
    Dr. Wallander. I think tactically we underestimated the 
stakes that the Russian leadership--well, I don't know if it's 
tactically but we miscalculated and believed that Russia--this 
Russian leadership would be daunted by the international costs 
that it would pay.
    But I think the other lesson learned is one we are--we are 
already implementing, which is to take seriously the actual 
defense capabilities of partners like Ukraine so that they can 
mount a credible deterrent.
    And while work was done--bipartisan work was done on that 
in the last decade, clearly we didn't do enough, and that we 
have definitely learned that lesson and are carrying it 
forward.
    Mr. Gallagher. General Cavoli, same question on sort of 
Putin and deterrence failure, what was our central 
miscalculation, and then an added question about, you know, a 
lot of people refer to Ukraine as a sort of test bed for 
technology in modern warfare. How are we capturing that 
innovation on the battlefield and importing it into DOD?
    General Cavoli. So, sir, starting with your second 
question, while we have a ton of different initiatives and 
activities to observe from the technical level to the 
operational level and to the institutional level what's working 
in Ukraine, what's not working in Ukraine, and we're importing 
those.
    We have at all echelons talks with the services about what 
we're seeing. They have questions for us. We talk with the 
Ukrainians. They are evolving very quickly because, you know, 
they're under selective pressure, as it were.
    So they're developing new techniques. Sometimes we develop 
them together in consultation with each other. But all of this 
is permeating back into the services as they generate future 
forces.
    Just as important we're in consultation constantly with the 
other combatant commands. Admiral Aquilino in U.S. INDOPACOM is 
paying great attention to this, has had many teams come out and 
visit.
    Mr. Gallagher. I have 18 seconds. Is there, like, an 
obvious battlefield innovation in Ukraine that could be 
exported to the Indo-Pacific for Aquilino?
    General Cavoli. Yes. I think our method of equipping and 
advising from afar.
    Mr. Gallagher. My time has expired.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 
Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you both for 
your testimony both here and in the closed setting as well.
    I have a couple of questions and I want to pull on a couple 
of threads. One is we spoke about the addition of Finland to 
NATO and the power of their capabilities, and one of the things 
you spoke about was their air power and their plans to have I 
think 60 F-35s at least. Is that correct? Or around then?
    General Cavoli. Sixty-four, Congresswoman.
    Ms. Houlahan. Sixty-four. And then we have also spent a lot 
of time, of course, talking about Ukraine and what we would 
expect would be offensive operations that are forthcoming and 
you, sir, General, talked about staying the course. Good solid 
plans that are outlined.
    But I and a number of other people bipartisan-ly have been 
asking of you all whether or not it would be appropriate to 
allow for Ukraine to have access to aircraft as well, whether 
they're A-10s or F-16s or MiGs. I think the Polish have been in 
the press recently talking about that.
    What is the latest thought on that? Why is that not 
something that we would want in an active war zone to be 
providing for an ally of ours?
    Dr. Wallander. Our focus has been on--with its generous 
support of the American people through Congress--focused on 
Ukrainian priorities for the fight and aircraft while on the 
list--Western modern aircraft is about eighth on the list. And 
so we have focused with resources on the highest priority 
capabilities and that has been air defense, artillery, and 
armor.
    I think General Cavoli can speak to this better than I. 
There's also a timing issue--what do they require right now, 
which is what we have been focused on for the battles they are 
facing, what can we deliver that will be timely and effective. 
And in that regard, the contributions that some NATO allies 
have made of legacy Soviet aircraft have been helpful to the 
Ukrainians because their pilots are trained on those aircraft. 
They know how to use them. They know how to maintain them.
    General Cavoli. Thanks, Celeste.
    Ma'am, in the near term and into the midterm what Ukraine 
really needs to do is control the airspace over its country and 
over its forces, right, and they've been doing that very 
effectively with ground-based air defense and we spoke a little 
bit about our efforts to introduce more ground-based air 
defense recently.
    So that's, like, the thing that's most imperative right now 
and it's being very well served by ground-based air defense. 
They've also got some capabilities that we have married to 
their Soviet-era airframes for offensive operations that I'd 
best talk about in closed session.
    And finally, I would note that there are countries that 
have given airframes, and Slovakia and Poland specifically have 
given a significant number just in the past couple of weeks and 
they were readily integrated into operations.
    Ms. Houlahan. Yes, and I've been following that and I 
appreciate that.
    I'm just going to leave that part of my questioning with 
saying that what--I'm curious to know if there is any point in 
time where it makes sense to continue that conversation because 
the Congress has at least been asking that question officially 
since last April.
    So it's been more than a year, and I understand that these 
timelines are long and it's very expensive and prioritization. 
But we have no indication necessarily that this is going to 
abate anytime soon and so it just feels as though it's still an 
appropriate conversation to continue to ask and to continue to 
have.
    With what remains of my time I would like to follow up on 
what Mr.--I think it was Keating was asking about our efforts 
in the DOD within EUCOM to make sure that we are helping our 
allies be less reliable on Russian energy sources and I was 
wondering if you could specifically comment on the Energy 
Resilience and Conservation Investment Program and whether or 
not any of those funds have been particularly useful in being 
less dependent, as you mentioned, sir, in our own use of energy 
or our allies being less dependent?
    Dr. Wallander. Congresswoman, I would have to take that 
question for a response in the record. I would--I have not been 
tracking whether we have been able to use that funding for--
specifically for allies. It's a great question and I would like 
to get you a good answer.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate it. I'm going to go 
ahead and yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
    Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, General 
Bacon, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bacon. Chairman Rogers, thank you, and I thank, Dr. 
Wallander, for you being here and, General Cavoli, appreciate 
your perspective.
    I have a series of questions on the Baltics. Then I also 
want to talk a little about energy to our own bases in Europe. 
So if we could be concise I'd be very grateful. So I'm on the 
Baltic Security chair--I'm the co-chair for the Baltic Security 
Caucus. I also served in NATO for a few years.
    You know, the Baltics deserve a lot of our focus. They are 
on the front lines. They've embraced democracy, our free 
markets, and they are shining bright. They're prosperous. But 
they're on the front lines and, I think, very vulnerable.
    So, first of all, Dr. Wallander, are we doing enough to 
create deterrence in the three Baltic states?
    Dr. Wallander. I think that we are--we have really stepped 
up, the United States and allies, and have heard their concerns 
and in particular one of the achievements there was the Madrid 
summit decision to focus on credible defense, forward defense, 
and you've seen that then materialized through the battle 
groups but also with persistent U.S. rotational presence, 
persistent air policing, and we have prioritized all three 
countries in some of their FMS [foreign military sales] cases 
and FMF [foreign military financing].
    Mr. Bacon. I appreciate that. We have dedicated about $250 
million a year for the Baltic Security Initiative and we're 
going to try to--at least I'm proposing to raise it this 
following year but we'll see how well we do.
    General Cavoli, I know that at the last NATO conference 
there was talk about putting a ground division in the Baltics. 
Not necessarily all American. Could be a blend of various 
countries.
    What's your opinion of that? I mean, I personally think 
it's needed for deterrence. But where do you lie and what's 
the--where are we going with us?
    General Cavoli. Thank you, Congressman. So the new plans 
that we have put together--the regional plans that we put 
together are a pretty big advance in a number of ways. One of 
the ways is that they incorporate for the first time in years 
national defense forces and national defense planning.
    When you put the Baltics' national forces together and when 
you put the multinational forces, those three battle groups 
that can come up to brigade level, and when you put the U.S. 
unilateral contributions of special enablers together and then 
you put the multinational division northeast on top of that, 
which is a NATO force that I control, you have well over a NATO 
division in the Baltics right now and this is all baked into 
the plans that I was discussing earlier, sir.
    Mr. Bacon. I think that's a big step forward for 
deterrence. Russia needs to know they're fighting with us when 
they pick on the Baltics. It doesn't appear to me that the 
Baltics have a very modern air defense capability.
    I know we have fighters that move in and out. But surface-
to-air missiles, what can we do about that?
    General Cavoli. Sir, so we are in year three of a 5-year 
special security cooperation initiative for integrated air and 
missile defense [IAMD] in the Baltics. I know you're familiar 
with it already, sir. And so the first phase of that was to lay 
down the communications networks and the secure communications 
necessary. That's been done.
    We're now in the phase where we lay out more sensors and, 
importantly, integrate those sensors. We're doing pretty well 
with that. Phase three will be the last year of the 5-year plan 
and that is to put actual weapon systems in.
    Separately from that, sir, I would say that those battle 
groups that NATO has put out there do come with ground-based 
air defense that we have been integrating with the overall air 
picture.
    And then, finally, for the Vilnius summit we have created a 
special air defense plan that will help us drive forward the 
rest of the Baltic IAMD program.
    Mr. Bacon. I think that's good news for the Baltic states 
and the more we can build on that is great because they are 
very vulnerable.
    Switching gears a little bit, I served at Ramstein. I'm 
very familiar with the Landstuhl hospital. I was part of 
putting that together as a base commander years ago. But the 
one thing I was told, Ramstein and Landstuhl were always 
reliant on Russian gas.
    You know, I've tried to chip away at that over the last few 
years but last NDAA we finally said no ands or buts--you cannot 
be using Russian gas. How are we doing on this, to either one, 
if you have the information?
    General Cavoli. Sir, we're doing great on that right now 
and it's because of the conversation that we were having 
earlier with a couple of other Representatives. So we were 
unable to comply because we were dependent on German 
infrastructure and German energy infrastructure.
    That has changed dramatically over the last 14 months. The 
Germans went from 39.6 percent of their energy use coming from 
Russia to zero. I mean, I think it's .1 [0.1] percent and I 
can't even figure out what that is.
    So we're no longer reliant on Russian gas in those 
locations.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you very much. I thank you both. Mr. 
Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 
Texas, Ms. Escobar.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, and many 
thanks to our witnesses. Thank you for your service and for the 
incredible work that you've done.
    I think context is so important and I wanted to share with 
you all when I attended the 2019 Munich Security Conference the 
conversations at that conference were alarming and jarring when 
it came to Western unity, when it came to our commitment to 
NATO.
    I was at this year's conference and it was radically 
different, and I am so proud of the work that our country and 
that our administration has done in order to shore up those 
alliances and to ensure that we are together, especially in 
this very important fight to support Ukraine.
    So I want to focus a little bit on lessons that we have 
learned, actually, General Cavoli, from Russian readiness 
failures. What readiness lessons, particularly regarding 
sustainment, supplies, and logistics, have you learned thus far 
from Russian operational failures?
    Where have Russian forces vastly improved on their early 
failures and what problems continue to plague them? How are our 
support efforts preventing Ukrainian forces from making similar 
mistakes?
    General Cavoli. Thank you, ma'am. And, first of all, I was 
at both of those security conferences also and I share your 
observations and the sense of gratification that you have about 
that.
    I think the theme of the 2019 one was ``Westlessness''----
    Ms. Escobar. That's right.
    General Cavoli [continuing]. If I remember correctly. That 
was not the theme this year.
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    General Cavoli. Two lessons learned specifically with 
regard to logistics--first, stockpiles and consumption rates. 
They are just off the charts and I think that we in the DOD 
have taken note of that.
    I know that we in NATO have taken note of that and have 
incorporated that lesson into our new plans and that will be 
part of driving defense spending higher in Europe and among our 
allies.
    Second, logistics is an end-to-end system, and the Russians 
have proven extremely adept at operational level logistics. 
They can move large amounts of stuff long distances quickly.
    But once it gets off the train, that last mile, as it were, 
that is part of the system too and they were not ready for that 
and that is shown over the days. Part of the system also is the 
operational design of your operation.
    One of the key weaknesses of the initial Russian plan was 
the fact that it attacked from five different directions at 
once converging.
    So the Russian army was operating on what we call exterior 
lines, that is, from outside and you had to really work hard to 
shift an effort from one access to another. So those are three 
or four lessons, I think, that we could draw from their 
logistic experience.
    On the other hand, our logistic experience has been 
extremely successful. Jackie Van Ovost in USTRANSCOM's [U.S. 
Transportation Command's] ability to move things, huge amounts 
of stuff, strategically overnight is unmatched on the globe.
    Ms. Escobar. Excellent. Thank you.
    Dr. Wallander, I have a follow-up question for you. I want 
to pick up on some of the concerns that Mr. Wittman and Alford 
raised regarding munition stockpiles. I've urged integrating 
additive manufacturing into this process in the past.
    I think it is where we can have tremendous success and we 
can really capitalize on the innovation and brilliance of it. 
You referenced the cross-department working group to oversee 
munition expenditures and backfill efforts. Is this group also 
tasked with exploring innovative ways to meet those backfill 
requirements?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    The main focus of work on those issues is led by the 
acquisition and sustainment part of OSD [Office of the 
Secretary of Defense] and is led by Under Secretary Bill 
LaPlante. And he is so busy, so focused, so active in finding 
ways to solve bottlenecks, to use exactly the kind of 
creativity and innovation advantages that U.S.--the U.S. 
economy and U.S. companies have. And they've already solved 
some of the creative solutions that--they've already come up 
with some creative solutions that we can't talk about in public 
for Ukraine but also have managed to go far beyond what we 
expected a year ago in now being able to count on enhanced 
artillery ammunition production over the coming years.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you both so much.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Indiana, Mr. Banks, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Wallander, since the war began in Ukraine the DOD has 
deployed or extended the deployment over 20,000 additional U.S. 
troops to Europe.
    This surge included--includes additional air, land, and 
naval capabilities and now we have 100,000 U.S. service members 
who are stationed in Europe.
    Given the depleted state of the Russian military and the 
increasing defense spending of our NATO allies, does the United 
States need those surge forces in the EUCOM area of operation 
after the war passes?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I believe that the DOD, in 
close support with the Joint Staff and EUCOM, will take exactly 
that assessment when the time comes. It's premature to make 
that assessment right now because we do not know precisely how 
the conflict ends, how the battles over the next couple of 
months will resolve. But I assure you we will look carefully at 
exactly that issue.
    Mr. Banks. So you don't know. The surge forces might be 
permanent?
    Dr. Wallander. We don't know what the requirements will be 
for credible defense and deterrence after the next couple of 
months because we're still in the middle of this hot war and a 
high level of Russian activity in Ukraine.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. So do you think the Department should 
redeploy temporary surge forces to other theaters like the 
Indo-Pacific or back to the continental United States based on 
other priorities?
    Dr. Wallander. My support is for----
    Mr. Banks. It sounds like a surge is permanent, a permanent 
surge.
    Dr. Wallander. Let me be clear. The surge is by no means 
assumed to be permanent. There is a process for sourcing global 
employment of the force and at this point the surge was--is 
assessed to be sustainable and to not come at the cost of 
forces elsewhere on the globe.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. Let me move on.
    According to a recent study conducted by CSIS [Center for 
Strategic and International Studies], the U.S. military would 
run out of certain munitions in a potential conflict with China 
in less than a week, in part because of what we have sent of 
our stockpile to Ukraine.
    Is it possible for the DOD to replenish crucial U.S. weapon 
stockpiles for items like Javelins, Stingers, 155-millimeter 
artillery shells to what they were a year ago while maintaining 
security assistance to Ukraine at the current rate?
    Dr. Wallander. I'm not aware of that study but I will 
reinforce something I spoke to earlier, which is all decisions 
to provide security assistance to Ukraine are taken in light of 
U.S. readiness requirements and that input includes all COCOMs, 
including INDOPACOM.
    Mr. Banks. So even given the surge in munitions funding and 
the expansion of production lines, what's the soonest that it 
would take to replace our stocks of Javelins, Stingers, and 
155-millimeter?
    Dr. Wallander. I would have to take that question for the 
record. I don't know a date, sir.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Banks. Does the DOD consider the strength of U.S. 
stockpiles when deciding which munitions that we provide to 
Ukraine?
    Dr. Wallander. Yes, sir. That is part of the readiness 
assessment.
    Mr. Banks. And does the DOD consider the need for Taiwan to 
receive some of these weapons to defend themselves before we 
supply aid to Ukraine?
    Dr. Wallander. Assessing Taiwan's requirements is part of 
that process in making decisions.
    Mr. Banks. And if the DOD considers the danger that 
supplying particular munitions to Ukraine poses to U.S. 
stockpiles, as you said, why did it take the Department so long 
to ink deals to boost the production of these systems after the 
war in Ukraine began?
    Dr. Wallander. I don't believe that it--we might disagree 
about what was a quick response to the requirement. Those new 
contracts and those new advances on supply lines and defense 
industrial base came within months.
    Mr. Banks. Is that quick enough? You just told us that we 
haven't replaced the stockpile. Studies prove it. So is it 
quick--can we replace them quick enough?
    Dr. Wallander. We can replace stockpiles as required by 
readiness input from the services and the COCOMs.
    Mr. Banks. All right.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 
California, Ms. Jacobs.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you both for 
being here and for testifying. As you may know, even well 
before the war in Ukraine I was focused a lot on adequate end-
use monitoring of our weapons around the world and I want to 
commend the administration for the admirable work you all have 
done to do end-use monitoring and enhanced end-use monitoring 
in Ukraine.
    I saw it for myself firsthand when I was out there in 
December and I know it's incredibly hard to do end-use 
monitoring in a place like Ukraine that has active conflict 
where we rightly do not have boots on the ground. But we also 
know even outside of war zones, as the GAO [U.S. Government 
Accountability Office] has recently detailed in two different 
reports this year, that end-use monitoring can be challenging 
and that we have had challenges with it.
    So, Assistant Secretary Wallander, I was hoping you could 
speak to, one, the challenges of conducting enhanced end-use 
monitoring in a context like Ukraine or an active war zone and 
how what we're doing in Ukraine compares to other previous and 
current conflict-affected countries, and how we're thinking 
about end-use monitoring, moving forward, given what we're 
learning in the context of Ukraine.
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    I want to reinforce General Cavoli's presentation of the 
processes as being innovative, comprehensive, and providing a 
high level of confidence that we know how much we've--what has 
happened to all of the capabilities that we have provided to 
the Ukrainians, that the Ukrainians have been very forward 
leaning and cooperative and provide a lot of transparency. That 
leads to the high confidence of our reports about end-use 
monitoring and that we can--we have not detected diversion of 
capabilities that we have provided.
    In particular, it's extraordinary what EUCOM has been able 
to do, given that it is a combat environment and U.S. military 
forces cannot be towards the front lines to do the end-use 
monitoring or American citizens, and the innovations using 
technology that General Cavoli provided is something 
extraordinary.
    And to your question about how does that compare to 
previous instances, I don't believe we had those in place and 
this is going to be one of the lessons learned. We can now do 
this in other areas where we're assisting partners in ways that 
we didn't think we could do before.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. Thanks for all of your 
innovative work on that and please let us know what you need 
from our end to be able to continue improving our end-use 
monitoring of weapons not only in Ukraine but all over the 
world and particularly as we're looking at sort of moving 
forward, further equipping partner forces.
    Assistant Secretary Wallander, I wanted to also ask you a 
question about war powers. As you know, Congress is who the 
Constitution gives the power to declare war and fund and 
regulate the military.
    Are you aware of any legal analysis produced within the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, or any other 
part of government that would allow the President to use force 
against Russia without congressional authorization, and that 
includes force applied through foreign surrogates?
    Dr. Wallander. Being clear, I am not a lawyer and not 
speaking from a legal perspective. I am not aware of such 
discussions because our--in supporting Ukraine because we are 
not at war or involved in combat or hostilities with Russia.
    We are supporting Ukraine and providing capabilities to 
Ukraine. The Russia contingency from an American point of view 
would be inherent right of self-defense were Russia to attack 
the United States or our allies.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I ask because there was a concerning 
article in The Washington Post that said that DOD was working 
on plans to potentially do kinetic strikes against Wagner Group 
outside the EUCOM AOR [area of responsibility], and so I just 
hope that you will notify Congress and this committee if ever 
there is--starts to be discussion about, you know, directly 
attacking Russia or its proxies with us or one of our surrogate 
forces.
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman. I will--I will be 
mindful of your question and take that back.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Florida, Mr. Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you both for 
coming today.
    I just wanted to add to some other members' questions and 
conversations about burden sharing. And I just wanted to draw 
your attention to where we are at this point in terms of the 
United States and the taxpayer providing military assistance 
compared with our allies.
    Notably there, you have Germany at $2.5 billion--these are 
pledges--compared to the United States at 46. You have the 
United Kingdom a little over 5. Poland, despite having an 
economy a fourth the size of France, has contributed more.
    Secretary Wallander, would you call this burden sharing? Do 
you think this is fair to the American people and taxpayer?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I think your chart illustrates 
American leadership and we are very concerned about burden 
sharing. I will note that there are eight countries that 
contribute a larger percentage of their GDP and security 
assistance to Ukraine than the United States, Poland among 
them.
    Mr. Waltz. No, absolutely, and I don't want to take away 
from what our Eastern European allies are doing and 
contributing. But Germany, France, Italy, Spain, some of the 
largest economies in Europe, this is--have contributed a 
pittance compared to the United States even though the EU 
[European Union] economy is the same as the United States, 
collectively.
    So one of my other colleagues asked what are the 
consequences. I mean, listen, the American people--and this is 
what I need you to take away and I made this same point to 
Secretary Austin.
    The American people are sick and tired of this. If I had 
$100 for every speech that a Defense Secretary has written in 
the last 20 years begging our European allies to step up, I'd 
be a very rich man. But they haven't. I mean, they just 
haven't.
    The United States has subsidized European security and 
social programs for the last 20 years. So when does this end? 
When do they actually get to the point and what are the 
consequences if they don't?
    Dr. Wallander. We continually push NATO allies to do their 
part, both in the NATO context and in support of Ukraine.
    Mr. Waltz. But Madam Secretary, we have been pushing for 
decades across multiple administrations, and sending strongly 
worded memos over tea and crumpets in Europe isn't getting the 
job done.
    So here's what I need you to take away. This continued 
support is at risk domestically, politically, here if we don't 
see the administration getting results--not asking forcefully, 
getting results in terms of this pathetic contribution here. 
And you need to understand that there is a domestic issue here 
with continued support to Ukraine, given everything that we 
have done.
    That said, we have done a lot and we have been very 
effective post facto after deterrence failed and after 
thousands and thousands of Ukrainians are dead and suffering. 
But you agree and you've testified the Russian military is 
devastated, correct?
    Dr. Wallander. Its conventional forces, ground forces, that 
are in Ukraine has been devastated.
    Mr. Waltz. Unlikely for them to take the entire country of 
Ukraine at this point. Fair to say?
    Dr. Wallander. Very unlikely.
    Mr. Waltz. I think fair to say that the 31 most modern 
militaries in the world and a strengthened NATO alliance that 
many people in this room have celebrated, could handle the 
remnants of the Russian military should it decide to take 
action in a NATO country or be aggressive in a NATO country.
    Fair to say? I mean, they can't--they can't take all of 
Ukraine. I don't see how they could take a modern European 
military.
    Dr. Wallander. I don't think I would agree with you, with 
respect, Congressman, because Russia still retains strategic 
capabilities, an air force, cyber, underwater----
    Mr. Waltz. Its air force can't establish air superiority in 
Ukraine. I can't imagine it establishing air superiority in 
Poland. Fair?
    Dr. Wallander. I think we have to take--we should not----
    Mr. Waltz. So I think----
    Dr. Wallander [continuing]. We should not make the mistake 
of underestimating Russia's military capabilities because the 
stakes of getting it wrong are too high.
    Mr. Waltz. But I think at the end of the day we have a very 
serious threat in Western--in the Western Pacific and the 
INDOPACOM theater, and I noted that you would not commit to the 
surge being permanent.
    Yet we have taken assets from the Indo-Pacific. We have 
taken Air Force and other assets to put them in Europe. Yet, we 
have 31 NATO nations that are able to stand their own ground 
against a diminished Russian military.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 
Virginia, Ms. McClellan.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Madam 
Secretary and General.
    My staff recently had the opportunity to meet with members 
of the Ukraine's national emergency services, which is their 
equivalent of FEMA [U.S. Federal Emergency Management Agency], 
and they mentioned that one of the tools that would be most 
helpful for them is the provision of remotely controlled mine 
protection and removal equipment such as MV-4s and MV-10s to 
decontaminate areas heavily mined with unexploded ordnances.
    There are currently only two of these machines in the 
Ukraine, despite multiple cities being littered with unexploded 
ordnances. Is EUCOM working to ensure that more of this life-
saving technology is being provided?
    General Cavoli. Yes, absolutely. A lot of it's being 
provided by allies, ma'am, and a lot of it's being provided by 
other international organizations that are--go beyond a single 
country.
    The whole question of demining and demilitarizing the 
landscape at the end of this is a big one. The Ukrainians have 
been doing it as they go along when they recapture territory. 
But it is a large task that's going to--that's going to have a 
lot to do with Ukraine's recovery from this.
    Ms. McClellan. One of--sorry, I didn't know if you----
    Dr. Wallander. I was just going to point exactly to the 
fact that that is actually a major focus of a number--there's a 
consortium of European countries contributing to that 
capability.
    Ms. McClellan. I'm glad to hear that because one of the key 
takeaways we took was the number of people lost in the 
emergency services through these unexploded ordnances. At least 
53 have been injured and 13 dead as of March 24th, and so I 
think doing all we can to assist in that endeavor would 
definitely be appreciated by them.
    Assistant Secretary Wallander, Russia has targeted several 
of our allies using irregular warfare tactics such as 
strengthening separatist sentiments and planning coup attempts 
in nations like Montenegro and Moldova.
    Can you all talk about what EUCOM is doing to help partner 
nations to thwart these efforts?
    Dr. Wallander. Well, I'll start. From a from a whole-of-
government approach the United States has focused on combating 
corruption, improving transparency, rule of law, good 
governance, because one of the main vectors by which Russia is 
able to undermine allies, undermine countries in Europe, and 
try and influence their political leadership is through 
corruption, poor governance.
    And so that is a major focus of our efforts as well as the 
European Union's efforts as well to build that resilience 
against that kind of Russian influence.
    Ms. McClellan. General.
    General Cavoli. Ma'am, we also take a number of efforts in 
the information space. We work with our allies and our partners 
very carefully to identify misinformation and then rapidly to 
counter it.
    Critically, we help to train the governmental organs of our 
allies how to do that as well so that they can go into the 
future. And then, finally, we work with them on cyber defense 
quite a bit so they maintain an awareness of some of the 
various ways that Russia can manipulate the public conversation 
on things. We do all of those under authorities from the 
Department of Defense.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you. You anticipated my next question 
on disinformation and propaganda. In February of this year 
Russia suspended its participation in New START, one of the few 
remaining nuclear arms control treaties that remain following 
the disastrous foreign policy of the previous administration in 
this area.
    Does this make nuclear weapons a more prescient threat 
should Russia seek to escalate its illegal war in Ukraine 
further?
    Dr. Wallander. Congresswoman, we share your concern that 
Russia is no longer implementing and in compliance with the New 
START Treaty.
    The immediate loss is a loss of transparency and sharing 
data, which helps to create reassurance and stability and is a 
main function of arms control, and it's something that we would 
want to prioritize in discussions with Russia about them coming 
back into compliance.
    At this point, they've shown no interest or willingness and 
that is a matter of concern. It's less of a concern in the near 
term because we have a pretty good understanding of Russian 
strategic nuclear forces and capabilities. But it becomes a 
greater concern over time and it's something we're going to 
have to work on.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield 
back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
    Chair now recognizes another great member from Virginia, 
Mrs. Kiggans, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
    I just wanted to kind of piggyback off of my Republican 
colleagues, some of their comments today that have been about 
accountability and spending in Ukraine. And I will say that I 
was definitely very much with them at the beginning of this 
process and I'm new to Congress, but over the course of the 
past 100 or so days and listening to some of these briefings 
that we have received, I am understanding more the importance 
of the U.S. involvement in the Ukraine fight.
    So I guess, Dr. Wallander, I'd just ask that maybe you go 
back to Secretary Austin and administration, and I think it's 
really messaging. You know, we are privy to a lot of 
information in this committee that the general public is not.
    So when we talk about, you know, our constituents that care 
about how much we're spending compared to how much the rest of 
the world is spending, I just think we're not doing a great job 
of informing them about the importance of what might happen if 
Russia was to succeed and was to be victorious in that fight--
what would then happen with China and Taiwan.
    You know, these are important issues that I think we have 
just not done a great job with messaging of the importance of 
our role in the Russia-Ukraine fight and of Ukraine coming out 
on the right side and winning.
    So because of that, you know, I'm a supporter of what we 
are doing there. You know, you talked earlier about trying to 
increasing access and interest in Russia and then you mentioned 
that we have seen the PRC diminishing ties with some of our 
NATO allies in Europe in favor of strengthening ties with 
Russia.
    Can you expand on that a little bit and just in what ways 
is the PRC diminishing those ties with allies?
    Dr. Wallander. As the EU as a structure has got--has become 
more attuned to the risk of being dependent on China, the EU 
has taken a more active role in implementing its oversight over 
contracts, over investments, and sometimes pushing against 
individual countries, which maybe don't prioritize that as 
much.
    But the EU has played a--as a structure has played a 
constructive role. But mostly it's happened at the level of 
individual countries that have decided they are not willing to 
take the risk and I mentioned some of them.
    But we--it is something we need to continue to work on as 
Americans in talking to our European allies and partners so 
that they understand the risks they create when they make 
themselves vulnerable to coercion and influence.
    Mrs. Kiggans. Very much so, and along those lines we talked 
a little bit about the French president--you know, Macron's 
visit to the--visit, you know, with the PRC and his comments, 
and I'm concerned that our European allies are not taking the 
threat of the PRC as seriously as they should.
    So do you believe that European leaders understand and 
appreciate the significant threat posed by the PRC and their 
aggressive posture towards Taiwan?
    Dr. Wallander. Europe has come a long way. NATO, for 
example, now has in its strategic concept a recognition of the 
dangers that the PRC poses to global security and, therefore, 
to European security.
    But it is something we need to continue to work on and make 
sure that that--as that challenge evolves, as it remains acute, 
as it maybe changes shape in different aspects of China's 
activities, that we share that information with our allies and 
partners.
    Mrs. Kiggans. And I guess, General Cavoli, along those 
lines are we doing--on the military side are we working on 
those relationships?
    General Cavoli. Yes, ma'am. Absolutely. The--an example 
would be the way we use ports. So it's not a surprise to you 
that China has been investing heavily in an effort to gain 
control of critical transportation infrastructure, 
transportation infrastructure that we, both the U.S. and the 
alliance, rely on.
    So the way we run our exercises and the ports we choose to 
exercise is a very strategic choice. It allows us to see 
things, and when we reveal limitations in our port usage, for 
example, countries take action very quickly. They spot it.
    We have opened new ports. We have worked with countries to 
establish new port capabilities and that's just one example. 
Earlier Dr. Wallander talked about 5G capabilities and other 
things. So we are able to use the military instrument to open 
eyes.
    Mrs. Kiggans. Good. Those are all good things. And then 
just thinking about that relationship between China--between 
the PRC and Russia and they're meeting more and, you know, 
there's a part of me that thinks they are more aligned than we 
know.
    But do you feel like Russia will fall in line behind China? 
Because it kind of seems like China is leading the way and kind 
of dictating, you know, or that they're certainly more of a 
world power, in my mind, than Russia. But do you think that 
Russia would fall in behind China or is there some just 
controversy between the two?
    General Cavoli. I'll say one thing quickly and then give it 
to Celeste.
    I think they're in danger of that just happening whether 
they choose it or not, ma'am.
    Dr. Wallander. I just share that concern. I think that's 
exactly right. Russia's weakness is actually going to be a 
strength----
    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Panetta, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    General Cavoli, a Ukrainian counteroffensive, as we're 
hearing, is due in weeks, I guess, is what they're saying. And 
while an ample supply and replenishment of artillery will 
clearly be instrumental for the Ukrainian forces to be 
successful, I would also think that you got to have sort of a 
surprise attack as well and a successful surprise attack would 
just be the first half.
    If Ukraine can manage this and preserve its command and 
control, their forces will have to break through Russia's 
defensive line and quickly mobilize troops forward.
    So what capabilities do our Ukrainian partners still need 
to be successful in this breakthrough, in this surprise attack, 
including air defense capabilities?
    General Cavoli. Congressman, obviously, any force can 
always use more of everything. But according to the modeling 
that we have very carefully done with them the Ukrainians are 
in a good position.
    The Ukrainians are in a good position. They have some 
weaknesses that I'd prefer not to talk about in public. If I 
could talk to you in private about those I'd be happy to. But 
we are confident.
    In terms of their surprise and things like that, of course, 
we have worked on all that with them and, of course, it 
wouldn't be surprise if we talked about it in public also, sir. 
So I'd be delighted to have the chance to talk to you in more 
detail in private.
    Mr. Panetta. I appreciate that. And, obviously, Poland has 
come up a little bit here in this hearing and, obviously, it 
provides critical security for the eastern flank of NATO and 
it's deepened.
    Poland has done a good job deepening their defense 
relationship with the United States, I would say, in response 
to the growing security challenges across EUCOM including 
management of prepositioned equipment.
    Now, the U.S. leads the Enhanced Forward Presence battle 
group in Poland and deploys a rotational armored brigade combat 
team under Operation Atlantic Resolve.
    And at the June 2022 NATO summit in Madrid, Biden announced 
the first--President Biden announced the first permanently 
stationed U.S. forces on the eastern flank. As NATO continues 
to assess the distribution of forces along that flank, can you 
describe the benefits of stationing a permanent brigade-sized 
team in Poland?
    General Cavoli. Sir, the benefit is to have a permanent 
presence of a team forward whether it's permanently assigned or 
not. There are other service equities that go into that that 
really General McConville would be better to talk about stress 
on the force from rotation and things like that.
    But it's very important and the U.S. Government has found 
it very important for us to have an armored brigade combat team 
forward deployed there. It saves a lot of time.
    The second thing is the prepositioned stocks that you 
mentioned, Congressman. Those have been absolutely critical to 
our ability to respond quickly to the events of the last year-
and-a-half and it was all enabled with EDI [European Deterrence 
Initiative] funding thanks to the U.S. Congress.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. And, Secretary Wallander, what might 
that type of permanent, if there was permanent stationing, 
provide us from a policy standpoint as we continue to work 
closely with our Polish partners?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. Well, Poland has 
been--is an extraordinary ally, reliable, a wonderful host to 
these American forces.
    Poland has also been incredibly stalwart and helpful in our 
ability to provide security assistance to Ukraine, to support 
the training of Ukrainian forces so that they can effectively 
use those capabilities.
    And so, you know, Poland has really emerged as a leader 
among NATO allies in Europe and we're--actually I consider us 
very lucky that we are the framework nation for the battle 
group in Poland and have these capabilities because we can 
count on them.
    Mr. Panetta. Great. Thanks to both of you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman and I wholeheartedly 
agree with Mr. Panetta on this. I've been very up front about 
this. We need to be moving more of our troop presence into 
Poland, Romania, the Baltics, and out of Germany where the real 
threat is.
    With that, Mr. Davis of North Carolina is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair, and to our 
witnesses who are here today thank you for your service and 
thank you for your timely presence today.
    Russia continues to remain a persistent threat to European 
security by employing a range of tools to coerce its neighbors 
and divide the alliance. Could you elaborate on how Russia uses 
cyber operations and energy supply manipulation to coerce our 
allies and partners?
    General Cavoli. Thanks, Congressman. First of all, the 
energy manipulation; it is reduced dramatically over the last 
year because of the--our allies' desire to come off of Russian 
gas. So it's moving in a good trajectory.
    Some of our partners, however, have not had the luxury of 
being able to adjust their economies yet and Russia continues 
to turn on and off contracts, switches, gas flow, et cetera. 
Moldova has been a victim of this recently in the last winter. 
So it remains important.
    Cyber--cyber is hard to talk about in public but they use 
cyber to create disinformation and they also use cyber to 
delete information, data, and to attack infrastructure and we 
have to work quite hard across the alliance and with our 
partners to defend against that.
    And, finally, I would say some of the work that Russia does 
still is with its conventional force. So the Russian air--the 
Russian ground force has been--has been degenerated somewhat by 
this conflict, although it is bigger today than it was at the 
beginning of the conflict. The air force has lost very little. 
They've lost 80 planes. They have another thousand fighters and 
fighter-bombers. The navy has lost one ship. So they still use 
all of that conventional power as well and they mix them all 
together, sir.
    Mr. Davis. According to the Department of Defense, since 
February 2022 the United States has deployed or extended about 
20,000 additional Armed Forces to Europe, bringing the total 
U.S. force posture in Europe, including permanently stationed 
forces, to approximately 100,000 military personnel or so.
    Do you see additional changes to force posture to 
approximately stand against Russia?
    General Cavoli. Sir, let me just start with current force 
posture. The figure 100,000 includes Department of Defense 
civilians as well. The uniformed force posture is about 82,000 
this afternoon as we sit here. But, nevertheless, it's all 
Department of Defense, as you point out.
    Force posture is going to depend, from my perspective as a 
military matter, largely on the outcome of this conflict, sir, 
and we just don't know where it's going to go.
    We don't know what the size, the composition, and the 
disposition geographically of the Russian military is going to 
be and that's going to drive a lot of this.
    Some of it will be our policies as well and I'll defer to 
Dr. Wallander for those.
    Dr. Wallander. Yeah. Decisions about posture will, first 
and foremost, depend upon military advice and assessments.
    They will also, I want to emphasize--this came up earlier--
they will be based upon EUCOM's advice, EUCOM's assessments of 
what's required, but balanced across the global force because 
the United States has global responsibilities and the Defense 
Department will make sure that all of the COCOMs are resourced 
appropriate to the challenges and threats that we face.
    Mr. Davis. Okay. And can you talk about how the People's 
Republic of China is threatening U.S. and allied interests in 
Europe, including how their technology-related activities are 
advancing their military capabilities?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, there's, first, the 
vulnerability that reliant--that for those countries in Europe 
but also globally create for themselves when they rely 
exclusively on Chinese technologies, which come in the 
appearance of private investment but, in fact, have close ties 
to the PRC and to the government. So that is one vulnerability.
    There is also--there are active efforts by different 
elements of the Chinese government or influencers in the 
Chinese economy and trade and investment community to seek 
relationships for--to exploit access to sensitive technology.
    It's information that we share constantly with European 
allies so they can be aware of the need to be careful and to 
not get bought into those kinds of vulnerabilities.
    Mr. Davis. Thank you so much. And Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
    Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon.
    Mr. Fallon. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Just a 
couple of questions.
    We see the largest land invasion, General, since World War 
II in Europe and, you know, NATO allies agreed many years ago 
to spend at minimum 2 percent of our GDP on defense, and some 
of us do that and some don't.
    I'm a big supporter of NATO. Always have. Many people, in 
fact, the vast majority of this committee is as well. I 
remember, you know, former President Trump getting on our 
allies about spending their fair share, and after this invasion 
what--why is Germany delaying?
    You know, have they made a concrete commitment to that 2 
percent threshold? Because I haven't seen it and I don't know 
if I've missed anything. So I wanted to ask you about that.
    General Cavoli. Sure. Thanks, Congressman. Yeah, Germany's 
made a fairly significant shift. Previously, there was not a 
roadmap that got them to 2 percent not only by 20--there wasn't 
one by 2024. There wasn't one. There is now. They have a plan 
to get to 2 percent by 2024.
    Second thing I would point out, the German ministry of 
defense and the armed forces have new leadership. The 
leadership is very focused on achieving those goals and on 
spending the special fund on real capabilities. So I think we 
see a very different Germany today than we did 14 months ago 
when it comes to defense.
    Mr. Fallon. So maybe one of those silver linings in a 
pretty awful cloud as far as commitments like from Spain, 
Italy, Canada, other countries like that and, of course, the 
small, very wealthy countries like Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark, come to mind because they weren't hitting that 2 
percent either. Do you agree--are they all on a roadmap to it 
now?
    General Cavoli. Yes. So we have 10 allies today spend more 
than 2 percent or 2 percent or greater to include one ally, 
Poland, which spends more per GDP than the United States does.
    We have 11 allies that now have credible plans, detailed, 
some of them laid out in law, to get to 2 percent by 2024. We 
do have 20 more allies, however, and we have work to do.
    Mr. Fallon. Yeah, and I want to laud Romania, too. When 
we--I visited them--we had a CODEL [congressional delegation]--
they were at, I believe, 2 percent then and they have committed 
to 2.5, a developing country that's not quite--you know, has 
the strong economies of some of their Western allies.
    General Cavoli. I agree, sir. Romania is a wonderful ally. 
Romania is modernizing very quickly and Romania is extremely 
supportive both of the United States and NATO.
    Mr. Fallon. And, General, what are your thoughts on the 
posture--the force posture of, roughly, 81,000, 82,000 right 
now as far as moving east?
    When we went on--moving east, moving more toward Eastern 
Europe--we talked and visited with the prime minister of 
Romania as well and I said that, boy, I think we probably need 
to ensure that the troops we have there now remain and make it 
permanent, and his response was very telling. One sentence--he 
said, I don't think you all have any choice.
    So I just wanted to visit with you on that as well.
    General Cavoli. Absolutely. Prime Minister Ciuca and I have 
known each other for a few years and he's made that point clear 
to me frequently.
    I hope he pointed out to you, however, that there's a U.S. 
division headquarters in Romania right now. There's a U.S. 
brigade combat team in Romania. There's a U.S. helicopter 
battalion in Romania right now and there are periodically U.S. 
fighters.
    With regard to the rest of our posture, we have moved east 
significantly since just before the beginning of this conflict 
and throughout it. That's a lot of the surge forces that have 
come forward.
    Some of it's a little bit limited by capacity to house and 
to train all those forces [if] we go forward and we're working 
closely with our allies on that, sir.
    Mr. Fallon. Yeah. I think it would be great to have a plan 
in place where we can continue that and moving east.
    Madam Secretary, myself and Representative Panetta have 
introduced the Ukrainian Human Rights Policy Act and we want to 
shed light on the war atrocities.
    I mean, there's been mass killings, deportations, et 
cetera. You know the drill. And as the war rages on what do you 
think we can do to better hold Russia accountable for these 
actions today and in the future?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. We--the Defense 
Department fully supports holding Russia accountable. In 
February of 2023 Vice President Harris spoke out and made clear 
that U.S. policy is that what Russia is doing in Ukraine 
constitute crimes against humanity.
    So we will support--there are multiple proposals for 
developing international fora for supporting Ukraine's domestic 
capability to hold Russians accountable. But the first step is 
the kind of work that so many have done to publicize these 
actions and document them publicly and the U.S. Government has 
supported those.
    Mr. Fallon. Well, I want to thank you all and my time has 
expired. Thank you for coming and, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. I thank the witnesses 
for their testimony today.
    And with that, we are adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:39 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

















      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 26, 2023 
                             
                             


                             

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 26, 2023 
                             
                             
                             
                                                         
                            
                             

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             April 26, 2023 
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             
                             

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             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON

    General Cavoli. The Department of Defense, supported by USEUCOM and 
in coordination with Ukraine, Allies, and partners, is working to 
identify Ukraine's future military requirements. Ukraine and Russia are 
still in an active war, and we do not yet know what war termination 
will look like. Ukraine's future force requirements will depend in part 
on how the war concludes. In the meantime, we are continuing with 
analysis of Ukraine's current military equipment and force structure, 
projected Ukrainian military capability gaps, and future sustainment 
requirements. Ultimately, we will need each donor nations' defense 
industrial base to focus on innovation and agility. Building Ukraine's 
future force will require a long-term commitment of resources from 
Ukraine, the U.S., Allies, and partners.   [See page 20.]






      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 26, 2023

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

    1) Mr. Turner. Since Russia launched its illegal invasion of 
Ukraine last February, there has been increased demand for state-of-
the-art American weapons and materiel from our European allies and 
partners. What can Congress do to facilitate meeting the demand through 
the Department's Foreign Military Sales program?
    Dr. Wallander. The U.S. Department of State supervises and directs 
the U.S. government's Foreign Military Sales (FMS), and U.S. Department 
of Defense administers the program through its Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency (DSCA). The Department is implementing a number of 
improvements to the processes, policies, and practices under its 
purview to the FMS system recommended by the FMS Tiger Team. The Tiger 
Team also identified a number of recommendations that may require 
Congressional support to implement, including a proposal to establish 
in law Defense Security Cooperation University (DSCU), as well as 
expanding unique and competitive financing mechanisms, addressing 
exportability and production capacity issues affecting foreign 
partners, and reduce bureaucratic burden, which will increase the 
efficiency of the FMS system.
    Mr. Turner. On 25 March 2023, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia 
would forward base tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, just to the 
north of Ukraine and to the east of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. The 
Romania and Poland Aegis Ashore sites are currently focused on a 
ballistic missile threat from Iran to the South. Would fully enabling 
the Aegis Ashore sites to their organic capability (at parity with 
Aegis ships afloat) improve U.S. and NATO security posture in EUCOM?
    Dr. Wallander. Fully enabling the Aegis Ashore sites to the same 
extent as an AEGIS ship--which has midcourse and terminal ballistic 
missile defenses, cruise missile defenses, air defenses, and offensive 
strike capabilities--would not make cost effective improvements to U.S. 
and NATO security posture in the USEUCOM AOR. Previous analysis 
provided to Congress in response to section 1677 of the National 
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2016 (Public Law 114-92) 
indicated that other alternatives could improve integrated air and 
missile defense (IAMD) at better value.
    The Department would welcome an opportunity to provide you with a 
classified briefing on its analysis and an update on the measures the 
United States is working with NATO to improve the Alliance's IAMD.
    3) Mr. Turner. The European Phased Adaptive Approach to Ballistic 
Missile Defense was established almost 15 years ago and focuses 
specifically on an ICMB threat from Iran. With our adversaries' 
development of exotic first-strike capabilities such as orbital and 
boost-glide hypersonic missiles, and with Russia's demonstrated 
aggression in Ukraine and nuclear saber-rattling rhetoric, isn't it 
time to work with NATO to establish an integrated missile defense 
architecture capable of sensing and defeating a full range of threats 
from any direction? What can Congress do to help accomplish this?
    Dr. Wallander. NATO Integrated Air and Missile Defense (NATO IAMD) 
is an essential and continuous mission in peacetime, crisis, and 
conflict, safeguarding and protecting Alliance territory, populations, 
and forces against any air or missile threat or attack from any 
direction. NATO fully recognizes the threat posed by Russia, and NATO 
IAMD accounts for Russia's growing and evolving array of missile 
capabilities and aggressive use of missiles throughout its brutal 
invasion of Ukraine. The Alliance has taken several significant steps 
in recent years to improve the NATO IAMD system (NATINAMDS)--a network 
of interconnected national and NATO systems comprised of sensors, 
command and control assets, and weapon systems--which is prepared to 
employ all necessary measures to deter any air and missile threat, or 
to nullify or reduce their effectiveness, in times of crisis or 
conflict.
    U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) is coordinating with NATO Allies to 
improve the NATINAMDS through data sharing, the fielding of new and 
improved detection and tracking sensors, and the deployment of terminal 
active defense systems such as PATRIOT alongside Ally air and missile 
defense systems to protect critical assets. The May 2023 USEUCOM-led 
Formidable Shield 2023 IAMD exercise was an important milestone for 
improving Alliance IAMD readiness and interoperability. The exercise 
involved 13 NATO Allied and partner nations, more than 20 ships and 35 
aircraft, eight ground units with radars, National Advanced Surface-to-
Air Missile Systems (NASAMS), High Mobility Artillery Rocket System 
(HIMARS), and approximately 4,000 personnel.
    The Department also supports Allies in the acquisition and upgrade 
of their own IAMD capabilities. Sweden, Romania, and Poland have 
acquired PATRIOT in recent years; Lithuania has acquired NASAMS; and 
Latvia and Estonia recently agreed to purchase the German IRIS-T 
medium-range air defense system. The UK, Finland, Italy, Norway, 
Denmark, Germany, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, and Poland have 
bought or are in the process of buying the F-35, which has unique 
sensor capabilities useful for IAMD.
    Through engagement with parliamentarians of all NATO nations, 
Congress has helped raise and sustain support for investment in NATO 
IAMD as a vital element of NATO's deterrence and defense. In this 
regard, the Department would welcome the opportunity to provide you 
with a classified briefing on the broader scope of ongoing activities 
to strengthen NATO IAMD.
    Mr. Turner. Since Russia launched its illegal invasion of Ukraine 
last February, there has been increased demand for state-of-the-art 
American weapons and materiel from our European allies and partners. 
What can Congress do to facilitate meeting the demand through the 
Department's Foreign Military Sales program?
    General Cavoli. To meet the demand for American weapons and 
materiel from Allies and partners, Congress could provide additional 
authorities and appropriations to increase the speed of the Foreign 
Military Sales program. Specifically, further capitalization of the 
Special Defense Acquisition Fund and reevaluation of out-of-date 
Congressional Notification thresholds would shorten overall timelines.
    The U.S. defense industry is clearly strained. The consolidation of 
our defense industrial base has limited competition and dis-
incentivized rapid response to emergent requirements. Congress could 
grant additional authorities, such as the expansion of multi-year U.S. 
procurements, which would provide greater predictability and stability 
to production lines. Additionally, a predictable, timely budgetary 
cycle would enable the DOD to plan across multiple fiscal years and 
provide more accurate U.S. demand signals that influence Allied and 
partner procurement decisions. Congress can also establish a 
legislative framework to ease restrictions and encourage industrial 
partnerships with key Allies and partners.
    Mr. Turner. On 25 March 2023, Vladimir Putin announced that Russia 
would forward base tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus, just to the 
north of Ukraine and to the east of Poland, Lithuania, and Latvia. The 
Romania and Poland Aegis Ashore sites are currently focused on a 
ballistic missile threat from Iran to the South. Would fully enabling 
the Aegis Ashore sites to their organic capability (at parity with 
Aegis ships afloat) improve U.S. and NATO security posture in USEUCOM?
    General Cavoli. No, altering the Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and 
Poland to enable full Aegis weapons system capability would not improve 
the overall security posture in the USEUCOM area of responsibility 
(AOR). Several critical hardware and software differences exist between 
Aegis afloat and ashore platforms. Both sites' sensor capabilities are 
limited by terrain, and rely on cueing from specifically placed sensors 
to improve early ballistic missile threat detection. We are actively 
encouraging Allies to develop an AOR-wide networked sensor architecture 
to improve radar coverage and provide cueing for U.S. and Allied 
Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) systems in Europe.
    The Aegis Ashore sites in Romania and Poland continue to be 
operationally relevant based on the original intent of the European 
Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) Phase III--to address ballistic missile 
threats originating outside the Euro-Atlantic region. The Department of 
Defense's plan remains to complete the Aegis Ashore in Poland as the 
final piece of the EPAA Phase III commitment to NATO.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. The Black Sea region is of critical importance to both 
European and global security as evidenced by Russia's full-scale war 
against Ukraine. How has the ongoing war affected the U.S. Defense 
Policy towards the Black Sea region? What is Georgia's role in this 
policy and are we doing enough and what else can be done in cooperation 
with Georgia to strengthen security and our involvement in the 
strategically important Black Sea region?
    Dr. Wallander. The United States has an enduring interest in a 
Black Sea region that is secure, prosperous, interconnected, and free 
from territorial integrity threats, economic coercion, and malign 
influence by Russia and the People's Republic of China (PRC). Russia's 
full-scale invasion of Ukraine highlights growing challenges in the 
Black Sea region and has deepened our resolve to ensure Putin's war is 
a strategic failure. The United States, our NATO Allies, and likeminded 
partners have responded with greater focus, more security and economic 
assistance, and additional forces for the Black Sea region. These 
actions must be part of a synchronized, whole-of-government approach, 
as our ability to reduce Russian influence and aggression is more 
effective when defense capabilities are aligned with diplomatic and 
economic efforts to advance regional cooperation and U.S. priorities.
    Georgia remains a significant partner and plays an important role 
in our Black Sea Strategy. The Department's premier bilateral security 
program with Georgia remains the Georgia Defense and Deterrence 
Enhancement Initiative (GDDEI), a five-year, $110 million program that 
supports defense reform as well as training and equipment modernization 
to strengthen the capacity of the Georgian Defense Forces to resist and 
repel Russian aggression. GDDEI complements regular, robust training 
and exercise activities such as Exercises Agile Spirit and Noble 
Partner. As with other Black Sea allies and partners, we work with 
Georgia to increase maritime domain awareness on a regional level. 
Georgia is one of four countries that receive Section 333, Title 10 
U.S. Code, security assistance as part of a 10-year Black Sea Maritime 
Domain Awareness initiative to support critical infrastructure 
capabilities and data sharing. We also maintain a resident Ministry of 
Defense Advisor in Tbilisi who specifically focuses on the maritime 
domain awareness mission
    Mr. Scott. Should we expect increased military assistance and 
deeper defense cooperation ties from the United States to Georgia and, 
if so, how will this be reflected in practical terms?
    General Cavoli. USEUCOM has enjoyed a long, close relationship with 
our partners in the Republic of Georgia. We have seen the benefit of 
strong military-to-military relations with Georgia over the years, and 
would like to strengthen this relationship. The centerpiece of our 
military relationship is the Georgia Defense and Deterrence Enhancement 
Initiative. This program is designed to enhance Georgia's capacity for 
deterrence, territorial defense, resistance, and resilience. It also 
aims to foster interoperability with NATO and accelerate modernization 
and institutional reform.
    We remain concerned that the pace of Georgia's Euro-Atlantic 
integration could inhibit deeper defense cooperation. USEUCOM fully 
supports a whole-of-government effort, led by the State Department, to 
showcase the benefits of transparent governance.
    Mr. Scott. Section 736 of the FY 23 NDAA established a partnership 
program between the United States and Ukraine for military trauma care 
and research. What is the status of this program and what are your 
expectations for this program in FY 24?
    General Cavoli. The acting Director of Research and Development for 
Health Readiness Policy and Oversight oversees the implementation of 
Section 736 in the FY23 NDAA. A Department of Defense contract was 
awarded to the Henry Jackson Foundation to research military trauma in 
Ukraine. The Henry M. Jackson Foundation (HJF) assembled a cadre of 
contracted subject matter experts (SME) to send into Ukraine to collect 
baseline information on existing trauma care capabilities within the 
Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Health, as they both manage 
war-injured soldiers. Although HJF has not been able to enter Ukraine 
yet due to the ongoing war, they continue to bring Ukrainian SMEs into 
Poland to interact with the team and complete surveys.
    The USEUCOM Command Surgeon collects information shared by the 
Ukraine Surgeon General, partner nations, and non-governmental 
organizations on the ground in Ukraine to inform the initial direction 
of this research. We will continue this collaboration in FY24. There 
are nine symposiums with Ukrainian SMEs scheduled in the coming fiscal 
year to enhance HJF's collection of casualty care assessment data and 
to further enable improvements to military trauma care.
    Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Coast Guard be better integrated with 
USEUCOM?
    General Cavoli. The U.S. Coast Guard provides USEUCOM with unique 
capabilities and authorities which increase the effectiveness of 
USEUCOM missions and strategic initiatives. U.S. Coast Guard units are 
particularly useful in Theater Security Cooperation activities with 
littoral nations working to improve maritime domain awareness in Allies 
and partners littoral and exclusive economic zones. The U.S. Coast 
Guard provides USEUCOM unique perspectives and is fully integrated into 
USEUCOM planning efforts, particularly through their humanitarian 
service capabilities and law enforcement, and as a member of the 
intelligence community.
    USEUCOM would welcome more routine deployments of Coast Guard 
capabilities in the EUCOM AOR, particularly in the Arctic. U.S. Coast 
Guard authorities provide options otherwise unavailable to DOD 
platforms.
    Mr. Scott. Would you like to see the admission of new countries in 
the National Guard's State Partnership Program be accelerated?
    General Cavoli. Accelerating the admission of new countries into 
this strategic program is in the best interest of the U.S. and our 
partners. The current admission process is deliberate and holistic. If 
the admissions process were to be accelerated, it is imperative that 
both adequate support and resources are dedicated to the program. In 
this regard, GEN Hokanson and his team are best suited to address the 
resource requirements provided to the National Guard for successful 
execution of the SPP mission.
    Mr. Scott. How best can Moldova deter Russian aggression?
    General Cavoli. Deepening integration with Euro-Atlantic 
institutions, reforming defense institutions, and modernizing military 
capabilities are the most important steps to increase Moldova's ability 
to deter Russian aggression. Chisinau's willingness to cooperate with 
Western institutions, in conjunction with internal anti-corruption and 
reform efforts, are essential to drive systemic change. Building 
resilient defense institutions helps Moldova to decouple from Russian 
malign influence. Continued investment in the Moldovan Ministry of 
Defense's institutional capacity building efforts, alongside NATO, 
remains Moldova's best path to build sustainable military capacity. 
Moldova's ambitious modernization effort within their National Army and 
continued investment in modern military capabilities to build 
territorial defense capacity are essential to deter Russian aggression. 
USEUCOM encourages continued Moldovan integration with Western defense 
institutions through the provision of timely and meaningful security 
assistance.
    Mr. Scott. What is the center of gravity of Russia's forces 
occupying Georgia?
    General Cavoli. Logistical lines of communication are likely the 
center of gravity for Russian forces within occupied Georgia. Access to 
Georgia's Russian-occupied territories of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali (de 
facto South Ossetia) is limited by the road and rail networks due to 
the terrain. Russian forces require continued sustainment and 
reinforcement to maintain their presence in Georgia.
    Mr. Scott. USEUCOM defines NATO's Eastern Flank as Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary. Why isn't Romania and 
Bulgaria included as part of NATO's Eastern Flank?
    General Cavoli. The NATO ``Eastern Flank'' is by definition 
comprised of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, 
Romania, and Bulgaria. USEUCOM acknowledges the inclusion of Romania 
and Bulgaria as part of NATO's defined ``Eastern Flank,'' and 
simultaneously includes both nations in a USEUCOM specific ``Black 
Sea'' regional focus area (e.g., Bulgaria, Moldova, Romania, Turkiye 
and Ukraine), which includes both NATO and non- NATO nations.
    Mr. Scott. Based on educational materials from various war 
colleges, NATO does not have an Eastern Flank. The East is its Front. 
It has a Northern and Southern Flank and the West is its rear. Why do 
you refer to NATO's Eastern Flank and not the Eastern Front in your 
testimony?
    General Cavoli. NATO adaptations to the nature of the Russian 
threat include a shift from out-of-area operations to collective 
territorial defense. This shift is captured in a new operational--
strategic level Concept for Deterrence & Defense of the Euro-Atlantic 
Area (DDA).
    Through this new concept, NATO is enhancing its ability to respond 
to multiple geographic, all-domain threats and malign influence from 
both the Russian Federation and Terrorist Groups throughout the Euro-
Atlantic Area, vice against any specific linear ``front.''
    The Russian Federation seeks to destabilize countries to NATO's 
East and South. In the Arctic, its capability to disrupt Allied 
reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North Atlantic is a 
strategic challenge to the Alliance. Moscow's military build-up and 
increased activities, including in the Baltic, North, Black, and 
Mediterranean Seas, Atlantic region, as well as continued influence in 
the Middle East/African continent produce a 360-degree, multi-domain, 
geographically dispersed challenge to NATO's security and interests.
    Mr.  Scott. Captain Lawson W. Brigham, U.S. Coast Guard (Retired), 
wrote an article in the May 2023 issue of Proceedings entitled ``Future 
Challenges for the Baltic Sea.'' According to Captain Brigham, ``The 
Baltic Sea is one of the world's most historic and important waterways 
for trade . . . Revised NATO doctrine should call for a credible naval 
presence in the Baltic Sea for deterrence and territorial defense. 
Large-scale naval and civil maritime exercises must continue, as well 
as joint training and intelligence sharing among the NATO Baltic Sea 
States.'' Should the United States Navy establish a Baltic Sea flotilla 
that is homeported in this important region? How else can NATO increase 
the alliance's maritime presence in the Baltic Sea?
    General Cavoli. A U.S. Baltic Sea flotilla is not necessary to 
provide the required maritime presence to deter and be postured to 
defend the U.S. and NATO's interests in the Baltic Sea. Since 2016, the 
U.S. and NATO have significantly increased our presence in the Baltic 
Sea with European homeported U.S., Standing NATO Maritime Group, and 
Standing NATO Mine Countermeasure Group warships operating and 
exercising throughout the Baltics. Today, the U.S., individual Allies 
and partners, and NATO operate a spectrum of aircraft and naval vessels 
on a near-persistent basis in the Baltic Sea to provide presence and 
signal a collective commitment to ensure the freedom of navigation and 
safe passage for international commerce.
    Mr. Scott. What additional investments in Littoral Warfare do 
Allied/Partner Baltic and Black Sea Navies need to make to protect sea 
lines of communication?
    General Cavoli. The most immediate needs for Ally and partner 
Navies in the Baltic and Black Seas are investments in maritime domain 
awareness, interoperable communications technology, and coastal defense 
systems toward a credible sea-denial capability. Some navies, 
specifically Romania, Estonia and Latvia, are on the path to acquiring 
coastal defense capabilities within the next five years. Romania has 
purchased coastal defense systems through the U.S. government, and we 
are exploring ways to accelerate the deliveries of these critical 
systems. Bulgaria and Lithuania are still considering coastal defense 
system acquisition.
    Freedom of navigation in the Baltic and Black Seas depend heavily 
on mine countermeasure capabilities. Although many NATO Allies maintain 
robust mine countermeasure capabilities organized and deployed as part 
of two Standing NATO Mine Countermeasure Groups, Romania and Bulgaria 
have very limited organic mine countermeasure capability. At such time 
when Russia's war against Ukraine permits warships to transit into the 
Black Sea through the Turkish Straits, NATO intends to re- establish 
mine countermeasure presence in the Black Sea and the Ukraine Armed 
Forces intends to homeport the mine countermeasure ships they have 
received from the United Kingdom (these ships train and exercise from 
Royal Navy bases in the UK).
    Mr. Scott. How would a U.S. Navy Black Sea Flotilla enhance 
credible deterrence?
    General Cavoli. As a non-Black Sea nation, the Montreux Convention 
does not permit the U.S. to maintain a flotilla in the Black Sea. 
Despite limitations on warship presence in the Black Sea, prior to the 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the U.S. and NATO 
deployed warships into the Black Sea on a near-persistent basis 
providing a combat credible deterrent force in this geo-strategic 
location in southeastern Europe. In consultation with our Black Sea 
Allies and partners, and when conditions are right, the Department of 
Defense intends to reestablish presence in international waters in the 
Black Sea.
    Mr. Scott. The 6 most critical regional capability gaps in the 
Baltic States are 1) integrated air and missile defense; 2) maritime 
situational awareness; 3) Baltic regional long range fires capability; 
4) ammunition; 5) C4ISR; and 6) Special Forces. What are the 7th, 8th, 
9th, and 10th regional capability gaps in the Baltic States?
    General Cavoli. Russia remains a persistent threat with a clear 
size advantage over its Baltic neighbors. Our ability to deter, and if 
necessary, defeat Russian aggression in the Baltic States is linked to 
the ability of U.S. and NATO forces to rapidly project power and 
preemptively mitigate Russia's size advantage. Investments in emerging 
counter mass systems, enhanced interoperability with our Allies and 
partners, our ability to conduct forward contested logistics, and 
multi-domain training in Europe provide the greatest benefit to closing 
capability gaps in the deterrence and defense posture in the Baltics.
    Mr. Scott. According to the Estonia's Ministry of Defence, 
``Unfortunately, NATO's decision-making, conceptualizing and planning 
processes take years, as do the exercises to train for these plans.'' 
Do you agree? If so, how can we shorten these timelines?
    General Cavoli. Since Russia's 2014 occupation of Crimea and the 
Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, NATO has significantly improved 
decision making timelines in Brussels. NATO Headquarters, Allied 
capitals, and SHAPE Headquarters practice the streamlined procedures in 
annual crisis management exercises (CMX). NATO last exercised improved 
Alliance Article III, Article IV, and Article V procedures in CMX-23 in 
March 2023.
    Stimulated by Russia's provoked Russia's February 2022 invasion of 
Ukraine, NATOs new Strategic Concept from the June 2022 NATO Summit 
provided the rapid alignment with the 2021 Concept for the Deterrence 
and Defense of the Euro-Atlantic Area (DDA) and ongoing Allied Command 
Operations development of a whole family of plans. In August 2022, 
SHAPE provided Subordinate Strategic Plans for implementation. The 
Regional Plans, approved in July 2023, are intended to replace the five 
legacy Graduated Response Plans NATO currently has activated due to 
Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine. These geographically oriented 
regional plans describe the architecture, procedures, and arrangements 
by which NATO conducts rapid, seamless, integrated joint operations. 
The new subordinate strategic plans and regional plans have been 
developed to optimize NATO's consensus decision making, advanced crisis 
planning processes, authorities, rules of engagement, and speed of 
deployment for Alliance forces allocated to support each of the plans. 
This novel approach of identifying and allocating resources to threat 
based plans has not been used by NATO since the end of the Cold War.
    Estonian Minister of Defense Hanno Pevkur praised the new family of 
plans in a July 11 press statement, saying, ``These new military plans 
put in place the NATO collective defense actions across all domains--
land, air, water, space and cyber. They also delve into actions in 
different phases of a conflict--in peacetime, in crisis and in war.''
    At the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) and Allied 
Command Transformation, we are altering our training and assessment 
programs to synchronize with the new subordinate strategic plans and 
regional plans to rapidly implement our new plans, C2, and expected 
resources into NATOs annual exercise program. This fall, we will begin 
exercising utilizing our new regional plans in NATOs Exercise STEADFAST 
JAGUAR 23. Additionally, both SHAPE and USEUCOM are aligning the NATO 
and U.S. bilateral/multi-lateral exercise programs to combine the 
execution of joint headquarters- level exercises to better integrate 
and validate the plans and streamline planning timelines.
    Mr. Scott. Should NATO establish a Baltic Sea Air Defense Mission 
as an upgrade from the present air policing mission?
    General Cavoli. NATO is in the process of establishing a more 
robust air defense capability to support the Integrated Air and Missile 
Defense (IAMD) for the entire Alliance, including all Baltic Sea 
Allies. In a modern defense architecture, IAMD capabilities are 
integral to overall theater command and control in every phase of 
warfare. As a result, the development of a theater-wide IAMD system is 
a major NATO capability development objective.
    Many Allies have already made substantive commitments to improve 
IAMD. In October 2022, 15 Allies signed a Letter of Intent to 
strengthen the European pillar in NATO's IAMD through the European Sky 
Shield Initiative (ESSI). ESSI calls for all air and missile defense 
systems to be integrated through national command and control systems 
into the NATO IAMD systems architecture. It addresses short-, medium-, 
and long-range defense layers, as well as upper layer ballistic missile 
defense. Germany has taken the lead as a primary coordinator of ESSI 
capability development.
    At the July 11 NATO Summit in Vilnius, NATO Heads of State and 
Government agreed to further improve the readiness, preparedness, and 
interoperability of NATO's IAMD, in particular through regular training 
and rotational presence of modern air defense systems and capabilities 
across SACEUR's Area of Responsibility, with an initial focus on the 
Eastern Flank. This new rotational model is meant to facilitate the 
deployment of additional IAMD capabilities in areas including the 
Baltic states, beyond NATO's existing Baltic Air Policing mission.
    Mr. Scott. The Republic of Moldova has been a target of continuous 
hybrid war attacks from Russia such as disinformation, propaganda and 
cyber-attacks, corruption of politicians, as well as weaponization of 
energy supplies. How can the United States assist Moldova build a 
comprehensive security strategy and capability to withstand these 
threats and strengthen their resilience and defense against the hybrid 
war attacks?''
    General Cavoli. The best approach for the U.S. to strengthen 
Moldova's resiliency against hybrid attacks is to help Moldovan leaders 
embrace the Western concept of civilian control of the military, and 
integrate a comprehensive threat assessment in the National Security 
Strategy with comprehensive defense plans to defend and deter against 
the stated threat. We have encouraged Moldova to invest in building 
robust and resilient governmental institutions, and the Department of 
Defense, through the George C. Marshall Center, is providing 
institutional-level advisory support to the Moldovan government for the 
development of their new National Security Strategy. USEUCOM also 
supports Moldova in the development of resilient military capabilities 
to address threats in cyberspace and countering Russian disinformation. 
These efforts are part of a broader U.S. approach to build robust 
capabilities and implement comprehensive national defense planning in 
support of broader societal resilience.
    Mr. Scott. Are NATO's contingency plans in the Baltic Sea region 
updated and modernized?
    General Cavoli. Yes. NATO's activated Graduated Response Plans 
covering the Baltic Sea region provide the day-to-day authorities 
necessary to adequately command and control NATO forces to deter and be 
postured to defend in the Baltics. Within the last year, Allied Command 
Operations (ACO) developed and approved seven domain- specific 
Subordinate Strategic Plans (SSPs) covering Land, Air, Maritime, Cyber, 
Space, SOF, and Reinforcement. Additionally, ACO developed and garnered 
approval of three geographically oriented Regional Plans. One of these 
focuses was specifically on a Baltic Sea regional threat from Russia. 
This recently approved Regional Plan incorporates existing national 
defense plans into a coherent, single strategic plan to defend a 
geographical region, and supersedes the legacy Graduated Response Plan 
in the Baltics region.
    Mr. Scott. What are the advantages of establishing a permanent U.S. 
military presence in the Baltic States?
    General Cavoli. President Biden announced in June 2022 that we will 
maintain a persistent, heel-to-toe presence in the Baltic region 
through enhanced rotational deployments and intensified training. The 
U.S. persistent rotational presence in the Baltic States demonstrates 
U.S. commitment to defending our Baltic Allies, and supports NATO's 
deterrence and collective defense posture in the Baltic Sea region. The 
recurring presence of U.S. forces is the most effective and efficient 
way to maintain a robust U.S. presence in the region and deter threats 
against the Baltic States. U.S. deployments to the Baltic States 
complement efforts by both host nation and Allied forces, enhance 
interoperability, and demonstrate the operational capability of combat 
credible forces to rapidly respond to threats in the region. The 
structure of these deployments allows the U.S. to flexibly respond to 
theater-wide requirements while still providing a credible deterrent in 
the Baltic Sea region.
    Mr. Scott. Do you support making large-scale reinforcement 
exercises in the Baltic Sea region the norm?
    General Cavoli. USEUCOM supports large-scale military exercises 
with our Allies and partners in order to integrate advanced 
capabilities, demonstrate freedom of maneuver, and increase our 
interoperability, all of which showcase the Alliance's strength. We 
also exercise transportation requirements through various Baltic Sea 
ports and ground transportation nodes, which support rotational force 
movements, increase our joint capabilities, ensure access, and maintain 
our freedom of maneuver.
    Mr. Scott. What are the areas of deeper defense and security 
cooperation in the Baltic Sea region that the United States could work 
with the United Kingdom to leverage this special relationship in the 
Baltic Sea Region?
    General Cavoli. The United States and United Kingdom work closely 
together in the planning and execution of force posture adjustments and 
exercises in the Baltic Sea region. Since its establishment in 2017, 
the U.K.-led NATO Battlegroup in Estonia has deepened this defense and 
security cooperation. U.S. forces participating in operations and 
exercises in Estonia are able to seamlessly integrate into existing 
U.K. and Estonian activities.
    Additionally, the U.K.'s investment in Joint Expeditionary Force 
activities and its leadership of the NATO Battlegroup in Estonia has 
enabled the U.S. to prioritize employment of U.S. forces elsewhere in 
theater and around the globe.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. MACE
    Ms. Mace. How are USSOF advancing partnerships and coordination in 
countries aligned on the side of the Ukrainians? How is the Combined 
Joint Special Operations Task Force (CJSOTF) creating asymmetric 
advantages and improving the capabilities of the Ukrainians to resist.
    Dr. Wallander. U.S. SOF operate alongside allies and partners 
throughout Europe to support whole-of- nation resilience efforts. Since 
2014, U.S. SOF have supported multinational training efforts with 
Ukrainian SOF forces. U.S. SOF in the U.S. European Command area of 
responsibility continue to actively support U.S. efforts to bolster 
Ukraine's defense following Russia's ongoing brutal and unprovoked 
invasion, working with Security Assistance Group-Ukraine to ensure 
these activities are fully aligned with training for Ukraine's 
conventional forces. DOD can provide additional information in a 
classified setting.
    Ms. Mace. Do you believe the DOD has the authorities it needs for 
USSOF to collaborate with allies and partners in Irregular Warfare and 
Information Operations, and where should EUCOM further deepen or expand 
irregular warfare programs with allied or partner forces in Europe?
    Dr. Wallander. USSOF has a long history of operating alongside 
allies and partners throughout Europe to bolster resilience and improve 
irregular warfare (IW) and information operations (IO) capabilities. We 
utilize a range of security cooperation, IO, and IW authorities, 
including Section 1202, to support these efforts. We continue to review 
those authorities to assess gaps and would welcome further discussion 
at the classified level. Details of individual programs or efforts, and 
recommendations for future programs, can also be provided in a 
classified briefing, if desired.
    Ms. Mace. General Cavoli: It's clear to me we're witnessing the 
future of warfare in Ukraine. The United States Army, SAG-U (Security 
Assistance Group-Ukraine), and Ukrainians have harnessed commercial 
technology and successfully integrated and deployed AI-powered software 
on the battlefield. Can you talk about the critical role software is 
playing in the current conflict and what lessons the U.S. should learn 
about adopting and deploying new technology at a pace required by the 
warfighter?
    General Cavoli. We are clearly at a turning point in the role 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) plays on the battlefield. The Ukrainian 
Armed Forces have incorporated new technology and AI applications with 
incredible speed and agility. They have employed AI applications to 
enhance battlefield intelligence and to improve weapons and tactics 
against Russian forces. At USEUCOM, we also learn new lessons every day 
and continue to increase our leverage of AI in multiple ways to support 
Ukraine.
    AI technology is advancing rapidly, and our culture must adapt in 
parallel. We must train our workforce to use these new tools and 
increase experimentation in order to test and refine new technologies 
with Allies and partners. Significant investments will likely be needed 
in the future to upgrade the digital infrastructure necessary to 
support and leverage these new AI capabilities.
    Ms. Mace. General Cavoli, as you know, in addition to the Stryker 
brigade, airborne brigade, and fires brigade, the EDI (European 
Deterrence Initiative) provides an armored brigade on rotation every 9 
months. With our increased presence of U.S. forces in Europe, I'm 
curious to know if you think it makes sense to go back to our 
organizational posture from 1971 and keep an entire armored division or 
at least brigade in Europe, rather than rotating a tank division from 
the U.S. to Europe every 9 months? From a strategic standpoint do you 
think this would contribute to deterrence of Russian aggression or only 
aggravate tensions?
    General Cavoli. All forces in theater, permanent or rotational, 
support our combat credible force requirements and contribute to our 
deterrence and defense posture. Force rotations offer units the 
opportunity to exercise their ability to deploy and integrate within 
the theater while remaining at their highest state of readiness. 
Permanently stationed units in Europe shorten deployment timelines to 
Europe, provide commitments to NATO in addition to our Allies and 
partners, and support NATO's deterrence and defense posture.
    Ms. Mace. How critical are USSOF contributions to the Ukraine 
effort? How critical are USSOF contributions to NATO Allies, especially 
in the Baltics?
    General Cavoli. Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR) provides 
support to Ukraine in coordination with the Security Assistance Group--
Ukraine. SOCEUR forces, along with Allied and partner SOF, coordinate 
and execute the training and equipping of the Ukrainian Special 
Operations Forces (UKR SOF) outside Ukraine. SOCEUR continues to 
strengthen interoperability with key Allies and partners through 
bilateral and multilateral exercises to build partner capacity and 
resilience and reinforce deterrence messaging.
    Forward presence of our SOCEUR forces with NATO Allies, especially 
in the Baltics, provide sensing capabilities in the operational 
environment, enhancing our ability to understand the battlespace 
through improved indications and warnings.
    Ms. Mace. As Congress considers the FY24 budget request and 
deliberates important regulatory considerations for the use of 
Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AIML), what do you 
believe are the most important emergent technologies that the U.S. 
requires in the USEUCOM theatre to not just counter but deter hostile 
aggression from Russia and other adversaries?
    General Cavoli. Artificial Intelligence (AI) is rapidly changing 
the way wars are fought and provides new options to deter and counter 
aggression. It is essential we adopt and deploy this new technology 
responsibly and faster than our adversaries in order to maintain 
operational and decision advantage. AI's significance and capabilities 
continue to be developed through increased situational awareness, 
improved target identification, enhanced cybersecurity and missile 
defense, and logistics support. AI is essential to support the 
synthesis of information required to command and control forces across 
the globe at a speed greater than our adversaries. It is also 
imperative that we continue to integrate Allies and partners in the 
development and delivery of AI to facilitate building a modern 
infrastructure capable of supporting AI applications.
    AI and any other emerging technology that assists us to ``sense'' 
and ``make sense'' of disparate U.S. and Allied data sources to achieve 
decision dominance and create simultaneous dilemmas (below armed 
conflict) significantly contribute to deterrence in this theater. Those 
same technological advances create competitive advantages during a 
conflict.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TOKUDA
    Ms. Tokuda. How is the Department of Defense working with our NATO 
allies to exploit innovative and green technologies in our joint 
capabilities and to sustain our forces and infrastructure in the face 
of climate threats in Europe?
    Dr. Wallander. For several years, the Department of Defense has 
been working with NATO Allies to share its climate resources, tools, 
and experts. The United States has worked alongside NATO Allies to 
incorporate a focus on climate change in NATO's 2010 Strategic Concept, 
adopt a Green Defense framework in 2014, and to highlight climate 
issues in every NATO Summit Statement since 2010. At NATO's 2022 Summit 
in Madrid, Allied Heads of State and Government approved the NATO 
Climate Change and Security Action Plan with the aim of increasing 
Allied awareness, adapting to climate change, contributing to the 
mitigation of climate change, and enhancing NATO outreach to partner 
countries, as well as other international and regional organizations. 
The first Climate Change and Security Progress Report will be delivered 
at the 2022 Summit in Vilnius. NATO Allies have also agreed to enhance 
the NATO-EU strategic partnership to also focus on the impact of 
climate change and security.
    Additionally, the Board of Directors of NATO's Defense Innovation 
Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA) agreed that energy 
resilience, among other issues, will be a priority area of focus for 
DIANA's work on emerging and disruptive technologies in 2023. This work 
will highlight the importance of energy available to sustain NATO's 
missions and operations. It will also help develop technological 
solutions to help Allies better prepare for, minimize, adapt to, and 
recover from anticipated and unanticipated energy disruptions.
    Ms. Tokuda. How do extreme weather events, especially heat waves 
and floods, affect military readiness for our troops and those of our 
allies? What about impacts to military infrastructure?
    General Cavoli. Extreme weather events, including heat waves and 
floods, affect military readiness through the creation of situations 
which create regional instability, such as the increase in migrant 
flows, state terrorism activities, and adversarial malign influence. 
Although Allies and partners continue to build resilience to resist and 
recover from extreme weather events, some nations lack the resources 
and training required to build mature emergency management programs. 
Additionally, extreme weather has the potential to affect U.S. 
installation energy infrastructure in Europe, to include the European 
power grid. Extreme weather events could cause power disruptions, 
energy supply shortages, and host nation security concerns that present 
challenges to the energy supply network. Finally, training ranges 
remain susceptible to erosion, flooding, and wildland fires due to 
limited or poor quality lands and high utilization from military 
forces.
    Ms. Tokuda. What additional steps can we take to enhance Baltic 
security, and how would you respond to the assessment made by some 
expert observers that additional American combat capability on the 
front lines of the Baltic States would be ideal for deterring Russian 
aggression?
    General Cavoli. USEUCOM's persistent combat credible rotational 
presence in the Baltic region contributes to NATO's eastern European 
deterrence and defense posture while directly reassuring individual 
Allies of the U.S. commitment to the region. These deployments, coupled 
with internal Baltic military modernization investments and
    U.S. security cooperation programs, establish the bedrock of our 
partnership with Baltic Allies and directly enhance Baltic security. 
Maintaining a persistent U.S. presence in the region, alongside NATO's 
multinational Battlegroups, and continued investment in Baltic security 
cooperation programs serves to build partner capacity in the Baltics 
and deter Russian aggression.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LaLOTA
    Mr. LaLota. To date, the United States has aided Ukraine with 
approximately $36.1 billion for security assistance. Meanwhile, our 
European allies have contributed almost less than half--around $19 
billion. Is the Administration concerned that the Europeans, relatively 
speaking, are not contributing as much as they should be?
    Dr. Wallander. Although some countries do need to do more, a close 
look at security assistance when measured as a share of GDP shows that 
many European allies and partners have provided an extraordinary amount 
of capability to Ukraine. European allies like Estonia and Latvia have 
donated aid equating to more than 1% of its GDP. Other frontline states 
such as Lithuania, Poland, and Finland provide a higher percentage of 
GDP than the United States, which is the 10th largest donor using this 
metric.
    Allies and partners have also provided unique capabilities to 
Ukraine the United States does not have in its own inventories. This 
has included Leopard tanks, various infantry fighting vehicles, 152mm 
ammunition, and certain types of multiple rocket launch systems.
    Further, when you consider humanitarian support, including taking 
in more than 8 million refugees, as well as the European costs of 
reducing or eliminating Russian supplied energy, our European allies 
and partners overall have definitely stepped up to support Ukraine.
    Mr. LaLota. To date, the United States has aided Ukraine with 
approximately $36.1 billion for security assistance. Meanwhile, our 
European allies have contributed almost less than half--around $19 
billion. What conversation have you had with our EU allies regarding 
them contributing more additional aid for Ukraine and what is being 
discussed regarding our allies increasing their assistance?
    Dr. Wallander. Since April 2022, Secretary Austin has led the 
coordination of international support for Ukraine through the Ukraine 
Defense Contact Group, which meets on almost a monthly basis. This 
forum continues to be critical in generating and synchronizing Ally and 
partner support for Ukraine, regularly bringing together some 50 
countries, including European Allies and partners, to coordinate 
assistance, sustainment efforts, and training. In addition, the 
Department is in regular contact with European counterparts at multiple 
levels--Ukraine is regularly the number one agenda topic with our 
European Allies and partners. When measured as a share of GDP, the 
United States is in the middle of the pack when it comes to levels of 
support for Ukraine. Allies and partners have provided the majority of 
counter-unmanned aerial systems given to Ukraine, as well as the 
majority of 155mm artillery systems, the majority of armored personnel 
carriers and infantry fighting vehicles, and roughly half the Stinger 
and Javelin missiles.
    We at the Department will continue to work with allies and partners 
to find ways to augment and expand the much need support for Ukraine as 
it continues to push back on Russia's unprovoked war of aggression.
    Mr. LaLota. To date, the United States has aided Ukraine with 
approximately $36.1 billion for security assistance. Meanwhile, our 
European allies have contributed almost less than half--around $19 
billion. What is the way forward to ensuring our EU allies can bolster 
up support for Ukraine, so it is not so heavily relied on by the U.S.?
    The Ukraine Defense Contact Group, or UDCG, continues to be the key 
forum to raise many of these issues in a collective setting. The UDCG 
has demonstrated results. As a share of GDP, many European allies 
provide a higher level of security assistance to Ukraine, with some 
allies like Estonia and Latvia providing more than 1 percent of GDP. 
Using this metric, the United States currently ranks as the 10th 
largest donor. The Department will continue to have regular bilateral 
consultations with European counterparts at multiple levels to 
encourage their support for Ukraine's pressing capability requirements.
    It's also important to note that our European allies and partners 
are contributing in ways the United States is not. For example, 
European countries have taken in more than 8 million refugees giving 
them a more peaceful life during the war in Ukraine. In addition, 
European countries bear the costs of reducing or eliminating Russian 
supplied energy. This hurts Russia directly and is yet another way in 
which our allies and partners in Europe support Ukraine.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. McCORMICK
    Dr. McCormick. Currently, there are over $300 billion in frozen 
Russian central bank assets in western nations, and I'm working with my 
colleagues to find a way to seize those assets and use them to fund our 
contributions to Ukraine's war effort so that Putin's the one paying 
for the war he started instead of the American taxpayer and our allies. 
Assuming we are able to access these resources, do you think this 
funding influx could fundamentally shift the conflict in Ukraine's 
favor?
    Dr. Wallander. I would defer to the Departments of Treasury and 
Justice on the mechanics and considerations related to freezing or 
seizing Russian sovereign assets. I can say though, that over the last 
year, the Russian Elites, Proxies, and Oligarchs (REPO) Task Force, a 
joint collaboration of nine countries and the European Commission, has 
successfully blocked or frozen more than $58 billion worth of 
sanctioned Russians' assets, tracked sanctioned Russian assets across 
the globe, and heavily restricted sanctioned Russians from the 
international financial system. Although it is difficult to say what 
the immediate impact of such a large influx of funds may be given 
procurement and production timelines for new capabilities, it would 
certainly help support Ukraine's longer-term requirements to build a 
force able to deter and defend against any future Russian aggression.
    Irrespective of whether these frozen assets may ultimately be used 
for Ukraine, the strong and consistent bipartisan support from the 
United States has enabled Ukraine to make key gains from Kyiv to 
Kharkiv to Kherson. Ukraine has time and time again demonstrated the 
results of this important investment with enormous resolve, grit, and 
ingenuity.

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