[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     
 
                        [H.A.S.C. No. 118-15]

                   U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL

                       SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE

                     GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 23, 2023


                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 




                           ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 54-668             WASHINGTON : 2024
 






                                     
                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    One Hundred Eighteenth Congress

                     MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    Chair                            RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MATT GAETZ, Florida                  ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
DON BACON, Nebraska                  MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
JIM BANKS, Indiana                   VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan               JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               SARA JACOBS, California
MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana              MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan            PATRICK RYAN, New York
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
PAT FALLON, Texas                    GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO, 
NANCY MACE, South Carolina               Pennsylvania
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota              JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia        TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
NICK LaLOTA, New York                STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                JIMMY PANETTA, California
MARK ALFORD, Missouri                MARC VEASEY, Texas
CORY MILLS, Florida
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia

                      Chris Vieson, Staff Director
               Michael Kirlin, Professional Staff Member
               William Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                    Brooke Alred, Research Assistant
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking 
  Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     2

                               WITNESSES

Kurilla, GEN Michael ``Erik,'' USA, Commander, U.S. Central 
  Command........................................................     5
Langley, Gen Michael E., USMC, Commander, U.S. Africa Command....     8
Wallander, Celeste, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
  International Security Affairs, Department of Defense..........     3

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Kurilla, GEN Michael ``Erik''................................    83
    Langley, Gen Michael E.......................................   108
    Wallander, Celeste...........................................    65

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    Documents submitted by Mr. Gaetz.............................   131

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Dr. DesJarlais...............................................   151

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Gallagher................................................   163
    Mr. Kim......................................................   162
    Mrs. McClain.................................................   165
    Mr. Scott....................................................   159
    Ms. Sherrill.................................................   164
    Ms. Tokuda...................................................   166
    Mr. Turner...................................................   155
    Mr. Wittman..................................................   155
    
              U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

            CHALLENGES IN THE GREATER MIDDLE EAST AND AFRICA

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                          Washington, DC, Thursday, March 23, 2023.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:00 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 
of the committee)esiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
         ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. The committee will come to order.
    Before we begin, I have one housekeeping matter. In 
consultation with the ranking member, I plan to adjourn the 
public portion of this hearing at 1:00 p.m. and immediately 
move upstairs for the classified portion.
    Today we continue our posture hearings with AFRICOM [U.S. 
Africa Command] and CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command]. I want to 
thank our witnesses for being here and their service to our 
Nation and the time it took to prepare for this hearing. These 
are very helpful to us as policymakers.
    Earlier this month we heard from the commanders of NORTHCOM 
[U.S. Northern Command] and SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command] 
about the growing presence of the Chinese Communist Party in 
North and South America. The situation in AFRICOM and CENTCOM 
is even more concerning. Most countries in Africa and the 
Middle East are now members of the CCP's [Chinese Communist 
Party's] Belt and Road Initiative.
    The CCP built their first overseas military base in 
Djibouti at a strategic point on the Horn of Africa. This base 
can accommodate the CCP's aircraft carriers and sits only 6 
miles from our own outpost. Now they are actively looking to 
the Atlantic coast of Africa for a new military basing 
opportunity.
    Across the Middle East, the CCP is building ports, 
providing Huawei telecommunications, conducting joint military 
exercises, and delivering military equipment. But what worries 
me most is Xi's growing friendship with the Ayatollah. In the 
last few years, the CCP signed valuable trade deals with Iran, 
bought Iranian oil in defiance of international sanctions, and 
joined Russia in conducting joint drills with the Iranian navy. 
Last week they played peacemaker between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
    These actions provide a lifeline to Iran at a very 
dangerous time. The Ayatollah continues to fund and equip 
terrorists targeting American troops, he is providing Putin 
with advanced weapons to prosecute the brutal invasion of 
Ukraine, and his regime is aggressively pursuing nuclear 
weapons. We absolutely cannot allow that to happen.
    Finally, both General Langley and General Kurilla continue 
to face tremendous challenges snuffing out hardened terrorists 
in their AORs [areas of responsibility]. In Africa, lack of 
adequate resourcing has led to worsening security situations, 
especially in the west where the terrorist havens are 
expanding.
    In CENTCOM, President Biden's decision to unilaterally and 
unconditionally withdraw from--U.S. forces from Afghanistan has 
undermined our national security. It has left a security vacuum 
with--the Taliban, al-Qaida, and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq 
and Syria] are all filling that vacuum.
    The assessment is that some of these terrorists could 
attack the U.S. within as little as 6 months. I remain very 
concerned that we are no longer positioned to detect an 
imminent attack and stop it. That is because the President's 
so-called ``over-the-horizon'' counterterrorism strategy is a 
farce. Without persistent ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance], reliable partners on the ground, and nearby 
facilities to launch assets, our ability to strike these 
terrorists is severely limited.
    I look forward to this afternoon's classified discussion on 
the capabilities we have lost and how we can help restore them. 
We cannot allow for blind spots, especially in these two AORs.
    With that, I yield to my friend and colleague, the ranking 
member, for any comments he may have.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. I 
appreciate Dr. Wallander, General Kurilla, and General Langley 
joining us today, and I appreciate your leadership on these 
issues.
    And I think the chairman started in the place where I think 
most members are going to be most interested, and that is the 
role of China and Russia in both of your AORs. As we know, it 
is growing, and I think the chairman did a pretty good job of 
describing it and the challenge that we face to balance against 
this.
    And I think it is important to understand, you know, why 
that matters, and actually it is one aspect of General 
Langley's AOR that sort of drives home that point, and that is 
West Africa where the Wagner Group has been so active in taking 
over a security role. And we have seen the coups and the 
violence and the chaos that has followed.
    Certainly, we continue to have the challenge of the violent 
extremist organizations operating there, but Russia and China's 
presence is making that worse. So we need to make sure that we 
figure out how to effectively counter that, and that is what I 
am most interested in hearing.
    As we are working with all of the countries spread out 
throughout AFRICOM and CENTCOM, they are working with China and 
Russia for reasons. There are things that they see to their 
individual country's advantage. It is not enough for the U.S. 
to show up and say, ``We are better than them. You have to be 
with us.'' We have to understand in great detail why these 
countries are working with China. Why are they working with 
Russia? What is being offered by China and Russia that we 
aren't offering?
    How can we effectively counter that, work with partners 
globally as well, to make sure that China and Russia don't 
begin to have dominant control in those parts of the world? 
Without question, that is the number one biggest challenge in 
these is to understand how we balance that out.
    And then very specifically, within Africa, we do continue 
to be concerned about the terrorist groups that are present 
there. I mentioned West Africa briefly, but we would love to 
have an update also on what is going on with Somalia. Al-
Shabaab continues to be the most well-organized and effective 
arm of al-Qaida. How is that fight going?
    And speaking of unilateral decisions, President Trump's 
unilateral decision in the dying days of his administration to 
simply pull out of Somalia without any sort of plan to follow 
up also had consequences, and would be curious to see what we 
are doing in that part of the world to deal with that.
    And then, in the Middle East, Iran was mentioned, but the 
other thing that I think we need to really think about is in 
Iraq. We have had a presence there now since 2003. That 
presence has varied in terms of its purpose. Certainly, in the 
2015-2016 timeframe, it was very focused. ISIS had risen and 
was a profound threat, and we showed up to help our partners in 
that region to quell that threat.
    What is our presence in Iraq right now doing? How is our 
partnership with Iraq? As the chairman noted, we are clearly 
targets for what Iran and their proxies are doing. What is our 
mission there? Who are our partners? And going forward, what 
should be our mission in that part of the world?
    These are two very interesting commands. We look forward to 
your testimony to help enlighten us as to the challenges there, 
and most importantly how we can be helpful in making sure that 
we meet the national security needs of our country in those 
regions, and help all of you do your jobs in that region.
    With that, I yield back and look forward to your testimony.
    The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
    We will now introduce the witnesses. We have the Honorable 
Celeste Wallander, is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
International Security Affairs; Dr.--I mean, General Erik 
Kurilla is the Commander, United States Central Command; and 
General Michael Langley is the Commander, United States Africa 
Command.
    I want to welcome our witnesses. And, Dr. Wallander, we 
will start with you for 5 minutes to give us your opening 
statement.

STATEMENT OF CELESTE WALLANDER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
   FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Wallander. Thank you. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member 
Smith, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for 
inviting me to testify.
    As the Department of Defense articulated in the 2022 
National Defense Strategy, a strong, principled, adaptive U.S. 
military is a central pillar of U.S. leadership. This strategy 
sets out how the U.S. military will address growing threats to 
vital national security interests and a stable and open 
international system. It is focused on combining our strengths 
to maximum effect through integrated deterrence by campaigning 
to disrupt destabilizing activities and push back against 
competitors' course of actions, and by undertaking reforms and 
making investments to build enduring advantages.
    The Department remains committed to using our instruments 
to further U.S. interests in the Middle East and Africa. We 
will continue to stand with our partners and allies to win what 
we view as the competition of coalitions that is becoming 
increasingly critical to our common security.
    The Department's priorities in the Middle East are to 
promote stability and security; maintain credible military 
options to deny Iran a nuclear weapon, counter Iran's 
destabilizing activities; disrupt violent extremist 
organizations, or VEOs; safeguard freedom of navigation 
throughout global waterways; and work with Israel to ensure its 
security.
    The Department maintains readiness to unilaterally respond 
to any crisis or contingency, but our preference is to work 
alongside interoperable and capable partners within coalitions. 
This emphasis on consultation and cooperation is the U.S. 
competitive advantage in the Middle East. Though others seek to 
strategically compete, there is no combat-credible, willing 
alternative prepared to share cutting-edge capabilities and 
invest vital national resources in support of regional security 
and defense of others within the rules-based international 
order.
    Iran is a persistent threat across a range of domains, most 
notably its nuclear program, support for Iran-aligned militia 
groups in Iraq, and the proliferation of advanced conventional 
weapons and attack drones. In Iraq and Syria, the Department 
remains committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS, both through 
military activities and by working with interagency partners to 
support comprehensive, whole-of-government approaches to 
deliver security and stability.
    In Yemen, U.S. policy objectives remain focused on creating 
the conditions to implement a durable resolution under U.N. 
[United Nations] auspices that will end the now 8-year 
conflict.
    Within the Middle East, U.S.-Israeli military exercises 
demonstrate our ongoing work to improve our interoperability 
and increase military cooperation. And as Israel's alignment to 
U.S. CENTCOM's AOR matures, there will also be increased focus 
on working multilaterally with other partners throughout the 
region, including strategic partners in the Gulf.
    Africa's geopolitical importance to U.S. national security 
must not be overlooked. Many of the world's most pressing 
challenges and global solutions will emanate from this 
continent as it continues to grow in political and economic 
power. Africa's extraordinary potential is threatened by 
episodes of political instability, democratic backsliding, 
transnational threats, the entrenched and growing presence of 
VEOs, and the impact of climate in a complex operating 
environment.
    The Department takes an African-led, U.S-enabled approach, 
in close coordination with allies and partners to address 
security challenges. The Department prioritizes disrupting VEOs 
that threaten the homeland and vital U.S. national security 
interests and supports a holistic approach to the security 
challenges in Africa through robust cooperation.
    This approach ensures that U.S. security and governance 
initiatives mutually reinforce each other to address the 
transnational nature of threats.
    In East Africa, we remain steadfast in our support of 
regional initiatives to counter the threat from Al-Shabaab in 
Somalia. In West Africa, we remain focused on countering ISIS 
and JNIM [Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin] in the Sahel by 
investing in and supporting our security partners.
    The security situation continues to deteriorate in the 
Sahel and coastal West Africa. Growing threats presented by 
VEOs, governance challenges, and a lack of development 
opportunities have exacerbated conflicts in the region. Recent 
political transitions challenge U.S. military assistance as 
well as access and influence to help counter advances by malign 
actors; namely, Russia and the PRC [People's Republic of 
China].
    The PRC is the only country with the intent, and 
increasingly the capability, to fundamentally reshape the 
rules-based international order, and Africa is key to U.S. 
strategy to prevent the PRC from achieving its objectives.
    With the support of Congress, the Department of Defense 
remains positioned to support our allies and partners, compete 
with Russia and the PRC, and deter and defeat our adversaries 
across the Middle East and Africa.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Wallander can be found in 
the Appendix on page 65.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Wallander.
    General Kurilla, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF GEN MICHAEL ``ERIK'' KURILLA, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. 
                        CENTRAL COMMAND

    General Kurilla. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, 
ladies and gentlemen of the committee, I am joined by Command 
Master Chief Fleet Derrick Walters, the command senior enlisted 
leader of U.S. Central Command.
    On behalf of the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines, 
coastguardsmen, and guardians, who serve this command, the 
central region, and the Nation every day, thank you for 
allowing me to testify regarding the posture of U.S. Central 
Command.
    This year is the 40th in our CENTCOM history. In January of 
1983, the United States Congress authorized the establishment 
of CENTCOM to serve as the security guarantor in the Middle 
East, the Levant, and the Central Asian States. Today we rely 
heavily on partnerships the command has developed, and CENTCOM 
serves as the security integrator of the world's central 
region.
    The story of this command between 1983 and today is one 
that parallels the threats and opportunities of the region it 
supports for the past four decades. Central Command was formed 
to counter the influence of the revolutionary regime that had 
seized power in Tehran, and to compete strategically with the 
Soviet Union.
    The organization's original charter was to direct and 
enable military operations and activities with partners to 
increase regional stability in support of American interests. 
That mission remains essentially unchanged to this day. Iran 
remains the focus. We now battle violent extremist groups who 
threaten the United States or interests in the region. The 
Soviet Union has been replaced with China and Russia as 
strategic competitors.
    The region remains vitally important to the Nation and the 
world. Ours is an area of responsibility that encompasses 21 
nations, 600 million people, and serves as the strategic nexus 
of the world's most important corridors of trade.
    Today CENTCOM's priorities are to deter Iran, counter 
violent extremist organizations, and compete strategically with 
China and Russia. That is what we do. Four decades after 
CENTCOM's formation, Iran remains the primary destabilizing 
element in the region. We have seen rapid advances in Iranian 
military capability over time. The Iran of 2023 is not the Iran 
of 1983. In fact, Iran today is exponentially more militarily 
capable than it was even 5 years ago.
    Today Iran possesses the largest and most diverse missile 
arsenal in the Middle East with thousands of ballistic and 
cruise missiles. Iran also maintains the largest and most 
capable UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] force. Iran's vast and 
deeply resourced proxy forces spread instability throughout the 
region and threaten our regional partners. Iran continues to 
enrich uranium far above what is needed for commercial use. 
Iran can enrich uranium far faster than it could even 2 years 
ago. An Iran with a nuclear weapon would change the Middle East 
overnight and forever. As Iran continues to destabilize the 
region, we continue to fight violent extremist organizations.
    Four years ago today, March 23, 2019, was a historic day in 
CENTCOM's 40-year life span. In Baghuz, Syria, the global 
coalition eliminated the last so-called ISIS territorial 
caliph. This historical achievement did not come without loss. 
During the fight against ISIS in Iraq and Syria, tens of 
thousands of our partner forces were wounded or killed.
    Our partners were fully in the lead. Twenty American 
service members were killed and dozens were wounded. They will 
always be remembered throughout U.S. Central Command by their 
countrymen for their sacrifice in defense of stability in the 
region.
    Today we continue the fight against ISIS in Syria, 
alongside our Syrian Democratic Force partners, to ensure the 
enduring defeat of ISIS. And we remain in Iraq to advise, 
assist, and enable the Iraqi Security Forces in the fight 
against ISIS. In Afghanistan, ISIS-Khorasan seeks to expand its 
ranks and develop the capability to inspire, enable, or direct 
attacks in the region and beyond with the group's ultimate goal 
to attack the U.S. homeland.
    Amidst these challenges, strategic competition is deeply 
manifest in the region. The People's Republic of China 
aggressively expands its informational, military, and economic 
instruments of national power across the region. And now 
Beijing seeks to establish its diplomatic influence.
    China, dependent on the region for over half of its 
imported crude oil, and more than a third of all of its natural 
gas, is also moving beyond energy-based investments to 
encompass physical and telecommunications infrastructure that 
advances its Belt and Road Initiatives. Nineteen of 21 CENTCOM 
countries have signed a Belt and Road agreement with China. We 
are in a race to integrate with our partners before China can 
penetrate the region.
    Russia, on the other hand, seeks to expand its influence in 
Syria, seeking a permanent basing there and undermining our 
efforts towards stability and security. Putin seeks a foothold 
of influence in the Central Asian States leveraging historical 
relations and a perceived decline in U.S. engagement to 
challenge our influence in this area of the world.
    With these challenges, the CENTCOM region holds the 
greatest risk of derailing the National Defense Strategy with a 
flashpoint international incident that may demand a response 
using unplanned resources or attention. That is why we require 
a sufficient and sustainable force posture to accomplish these 
missions without relying on additional forces.
    And to accomplish these strategic priorities, CENTCOM 
focuses on a strategic approach centered on people, partners, 
and innovation. People are our greatest asset and our most 
critical resource. Our partners are the Nation's comparative 
advantage against competitors like China and Russia. And across 
CENTCOM we cultivate deep, abiding partnerships that can serve 
as a hedge against threats in the region, while deterring Iran 
from its most destructive behavior, and China views our 
partners as merely customers and clients.
    Innovation of thought, innovation of process, innovation of 
concept and technology, extends the value of our partnerships, 
and innovation allows us to move faster, operate more 
efficiently, and increase progress across all operational 
efforts.
    So, deter Iran, counter violent extremist organizations, 
and compete strategically, are what we do. People, partners, 
and innovation, that is how we do them.
    In closing, let me thank you again for the support of our 
service members, civilians, and their families for 40 years, 
much of that time in sustained combat in CENTCOM area of 
responsibility. The United States and the region relied on the 
American service member for the security and stability of the 
region and to advance American interests. Those men and women 
have fulfilled the original promise of this command and in some 
of the toughest circumstances, and we owe them a debt of 
gratitude. It is the greatest honor of my lifetime to be their 
commander.
    [The prepared statement of General Kurilla can be found in 
the Appendix on page 83.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, sir.
    General Langley, you are recognized.

  STATEMENT OF GEN MICHAEL E. LANGLEY, USMC, COMMANDER, U.S. 
                         AFRICA COMMAND

    General Langley. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, 
distinguished committee members, it is an honor to appear 
before you today to testify on the state of affairs of United 
States Africa Command.
    I am proud to testify alongside my dedicated colleagues, 
General Kurilla and Assistant Secretary Wallander.
    Now I assumed command last August, and since then I have 
embarked upon a campaign of learning, and over the last 7 
months, all to inform this discussion today. Now I undertook 
this campaign of learning to fulfill my commitment to this 
Congress and complete a holistic assessment upon confirmation. 
Now I made that assessment, and I will continue it throughout 
my tenure in command.
    Up front, I want to make one thing crystal clear. The team 
of service members and civilians at AFRICOM is a talented and 
dedicated body. I am honored to serve among them. I am joined 
today by my State Department foreign policy adviser, Mr. Phil 
Nelson, who represents the exceptionally skilled diplomatic 
team embedded at our headquarters.
    Our entire team is laser-focused on implementing our whole-
of-government approach with our partners from the Department of 
State, USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], the 
intelligence community, and other U.S. Government 
organizations. We campaign with our allies and partners to 
advance mutual interests and promote stability and prosperity 
on the African continent. You should be proud of their efforts. 
I know I certainly am.
    Africa is a vast and dynamic continent of sovereign 
nations. Collectively and individually, these nations are 
increasingly important players on the global stage. And, as 
such, AFRICOM's contribution to American security must be 
viewed through a global lens. Threats once contained on the 
continent are transforming into worldwide threats.
    Terrorism, poverty, food insecurity, climate change, and 
mass migration shatter African lives. They sow the seeds of 
violent extremists and Russian exploitation. The Kremlin's 
invasion of Ukraine has aggravated the food insecurity crisis 
in Africa by blocking vital food shipments to the same nations 
that feel the deepest impacts of climate change.
    Russia's Wagner mercenaries turn chaos into cash and 
destabilize entire regions across the African continent, and it 
cuts at American interests worldwide.
    The expansion of Middle East-based violent extremist 
groups, such as ISIS and al-Qaida, including the biggest 
franchise of Al-Shabaab, threatens American lives.
    Solutions to these colossal problems must be a shared 
burden. African nations need to be at the helm of the concerted 
international efforts to produce sustainable outcomes. 
Assisting African nations in achieving their goals, while 
advancing American interests, can only be accomplished through 
a synchronized whole-of-government strategy.
    We call it the 3D [three dimensional] approach, which is 
the toolkit of diplomacy, development, and defense; but one 
tool does not succeed without the whole kit. So I will advocate 
for State Department and USAID partners to receive the 
resources they need to succeed.
    Now Africa faces many challenges. However, putting Africa's 
needs at the forefront of our campaign reinforced by 
multilateral and whole-of-government engagement will help 
AFRICOM and our partners work towards a sustainable peace, 
stability, and prosperity.
    Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished 
members of this committee, thank you for giving me the 
opportunity to be here today. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Langley can be found in 
the Appendix on page 108.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, General. Thank all of you for your 
opening statements and for your service.
    I now recognize myself for questions. General Kurilla, you 
assess that ISIS-K [Islamic State of Khorasan Province] can 
conduct an attack on the U.S. or Western interests abroad in 6 
months or less. What could we do as Congress to help you best 
be prepared to thwart that or at least detect it?
    General Kurilla. Thanks, Chairman. And when I say be able 
to--capable of conducting attack in under 6 months, there is 
three types that we look at. An inspired attack that is 
inspired by their vile ideology. They can do that today; they 
can do that tomorrow. There is an enabled attack where they are 
providing funding and some direction to be able to do that. And 
then there is a directed attack where it is command-and-
controlled from the region to do that.
    Really, what we see right now as their ability to do that 
in under 6 months is the enabled attack against U.S. or Western 
interests abroad; obviously much harder to do against the 
homeland.
    So part of that is our ability to increase our intelligence 
and collection efforts inside of Afghanistan. We are working 
right now with the Department. We have received funding to 
increase our alternative airborne ISR, and we should have some 
systems coming online that is a 400 percent increase in the 
ability to collect over the top. We are trying to increase our 
other forms of intelligence--SIGINT [signals intelligence], 
HUMINT [human intelligence]--to enable us to penetrate those 
networks to target better.
    The Chairman. Great. General Langley, the CCP has built a 
base in Djibouti. They have announced they are building a space 
port there, and they are looking to build a naval base on the 
Atlantic coast of Africa. Could you tell us the impact of those 
plans and what we can do to help you best thwart those?
    General Langley. Chairman, what I am concerned about is the 
strategic implications. I am concerned about that these 
aspirations, space-based or any other technologies that can be 
dual use into military uses, that the PRC or the CCP will 
establish a platform for power projection. That changes 
America's strategic calculus going forward. We need to be 
concerned, and what I have at my disposal is become and 
maintain the partner of choice as we engage with our Afghan 
nations.
    In my travels across the--Chairman, in my travels across 
the continent, our partners don't want to be militarized in a 
strategic sense. That is what I need to be able to articulate 
to them in my engagements.
    The Chairman. Great. I am curious, there is a concern that 
we may not be able to get appropriations bills passed on time. 
If we were not to be able to get a defense authorization bill 
passed on time, what would the implications of a CR [continuing 
resolution] be to you in your AOR? And I will start with you, 
General Langley.
    General Langley. Chairman, first of all, it affects 
readiness. As we do a calculus of risk to force, risk to 
mission, the readiness of our forces as the violent extremist 
organizations, and the layered threat of the PRC, and also 
Wagner's actions, it increases risk. We need new starts to be 
able to address these challenges. A delayed budget will hamper 
our new starts to address those issues.
    The Chairman. Okay. General Kurilla.
    General Kurilla. Chairman, thank you. We require a 
sufficient, timely, and predictable funding. Bottom line, it 
affects readiness. As Mike Langley said, one of the key issues, 
we can't have new starts, and we will see that affect readiness 
for forces coming forward in our allocated forces.
    The Chairman. Okay. General Langley, I am curious. You 
know, you made reference to Russian activity in the African 
continent. Have you seen any diminution of that activity, given 
their focus on Ukraine and their devotion of resources there? 
Or has it been uninterrupted?
    General Langley. Chairman, first and foremost, let me state 
that Wagner--Wagner, Yevgeny Prigozhin, they are about power 
and profit, and they do this and engage and they fill a void of 
where we are not--where we have backed off because of one 
reason or another. They are the vanguard for the Russian 
Federation, and they are a cash for profit agency. And there is 
a revenue stream of what they garner on--through their illicit 
activities on the African continent goes up to Putin.
    The Chairman. Great. I am interested, General Kurilla, you 
know, one of my frustrations about the way we left Afghanistan 
was we did not maintain a base anywhere in Afghanistan from 
which we could conduct ISR. Can you tell me how adequate, or if 
it is adequate, what you are receiving now in the way of ISR?
    I know we are going to talk more about this in the 
classified section, but can you in a public way talk about how 
adequate it is, or inadequate?
    General Kurilla. So I have validated requirements right now 
for ISR. We are not filled completely to our validated 
requirement. One of the challenges I have is the time I spend 
in transit--about 80 percent of the time is spent in transit--
to get to Afghanistan, but we are working with some alternative 
airborne ISR, like I said, high-duration stuff that can stay up 
for days, and we are working towards programs and platforms 
that can stay up for weeks.
    The Chairman. Great. I recognize the ranking member.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you. So focusing on China--well, and to 
some degree Russia's role--but the treaty that--not treaty, the 
reopening of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia that China 
just recently negotiated, part of that is that Iran says 
publicly that they are going to stop sending arms to Yemen, to 
the Houthis in Yemen, which would be, you know, a significantly 
positive step.
    So I guess the first question is, do you believe that? Do 
you see that coming out? Do you see some positive aspects of 
Iran and Saudi Arabia reestablishing diplomatic ties?
    General Kurilla. Thank you, Chairman--or Ranking Member 
Smith. So I think there is goodness anytime tensions can be 
lowered. An agreement is not implementation. While they were 
negotiating this over the last 90 days, we stopped five major 
shipments of Iranian arms that were going to the Houthis, and 
some of those were advanced components like inertial navigation 
systems for short-range ballistic missiles.
    And I think that what we should be concerned about in this 
is that China is the one that mediated this. It was being done 
by two countries in the Middle East over the last 2 years, but 
what it shows is that China, not only do they have their 
economic information and military instruments of national power 
being--coming into the region, we are now seeing really for the 
first time their diplomatic instrument of national power.
    Mr. Smith. Yeah. And, Dr. Wallander, just to sort of follow 
up on that from a policy standpoint, because this room is kind 
of conditioned to not be fond of China, and that is where the 
conversation goes, and that is fine. But looking at the broader 
world, we are talking about Chinese involvement. We will leave 
the Russians out of it for the moment.
    You know, they are doing a huge development initiative 
throughout Africa, and now they are negotiating, you know--
well, peace treaty is the wrong word, but they are negotiating 
between Iran and Saudi Arabia. If you are in Africa, if you are 
in the Middle East, you know, what is our argument for why 
China is a problem? And, frankly, how do we balance?
    And I understand the nefarious aspects of what China is up 
to, but how do we effectively make that case to these countries 
that we are trying to make our partners as opposed to--I mean, 
everyone in this room is going to be there, but we are not the 
ones we are trying to persuade. We are trying to persuade the 
countries out there that they need to be careful about their 
relationships with China and Russia. How do we do that in light 
of those facts?
    Dr. Wallander. Well, thank you, Congressman. I share your 
assessment and what General Kurilla laid out as his concerns. I 
think that what--our duty and our argument to countries in the 
Middle East and Africa is that we want to work with them on 
common interests to improve their capabilities for national 
security and stability, whereas the track record of China and 
Russia in the form of Wagner actually comes in for their narrow 
national interest, often, as we have seen, the track record of 
China going in with what sounds like very tempting deals, which 
end up on the back end costing countries quite a lot and 
providing a lot less capability.
    So the track record is something we can point to, and we 
are beginning to see that effect. In Africa, Wagner is 
beginning to not have the stellar reputation that the Russian 
government would like to claim that it has.
    Mr. Smith. And what I would strongly suggest is that we 
need to make that case, and we need to make it better. I think 
there is a tendency, at least in the pronouncements that I 
hear, just like, we are the U.S., we are good. They are China, 
they are bad. Therefore, you have to agree with us.
    I can assure you and everyone at this table that the rest 
of the world doesn't look at it that way. They look at a mixed 
record coming from us. They look at their needs. I think we are 
right. I think our role in the world is incredibly important. I 
think the alliance that we put together and the idea of a 
rules-based international order is vastly better than China's 
debt traps and China's desire to come in and extract resources. 
China's autocratic approach crucially--you know, if you say 
anything, I mean literally anything, that China doesn't like, 
they will cut you off at the knees. Okay? That is the argument 
we need to be making.
    I mean, South Africa is out there doing joint exercises 
with Russia and China, and we are going ``Don't do that.'' We 
need a better argument. It is really crucial that we do that.
    Just in the last couple of minutes, on my question I raised 
in the first part, what are we doing in Iraq right now? What is 
our plan? Why are we there? What is the mission?
    General Kurilla. So Iraq is a strategic partner, 
Congressman, and what we are doing there is for the enduring 
defeat of ISIS. We are partnered with the Iraqis, and, 
obviously, the Syrian Democratic Forces. We did 313 partnered 
operations last year. We have done 129 this year to date. And 
those are Iraqis in the lead or Syrian Democratic Forces in the 
lead.
    The Iraqis just did a major large-scale operation where we 
are providing some of the intelligence and the fires aspect of 
that to go after the enduring defeat of ISIS. There is about 
20,000 ISIS detainees inside of Iraq. And when we can get to 
them, where they can do this on their own, that is when we will 
know when we see the enduring defeat of ISIS.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much. Thank you, all.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn [presiding]. Good morning, everybody. I will 
now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    General Kurilla, I am extremely concerned about the rapid 
progress Iran has made on its nuclear program. Earlier this 
month the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency] said that 
Iran has produced uranium particles that were enriched up to 
83.7 percent. Last week you testified before the Senate Armed 
Services Committee that Tehran can now produce sufficient 
fissile material for a nuclear weapon in less than 14 days.
    Iran is on the brink of being a nuclear weapon state, which 
would change the security layout of the Middle East in 
unpredictable ways.
    So, General, what activities or plans are you engaged in to 
reinforce U.S. deterrence and convey to Iran that acquiring 
nuclear weapons will not be in its best interest?
    General Kurilla. Thank you, Congressman. I mean, the U.S. 
policy is Iran will not have a nuclear weapon. I think anything 
about plans that we have against any nuclear program would be 
best in a classified setting.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And we will bring it--bring that 
topic up in the classified setting.
    And, Dr. Wallander, do you have anything to add to that 
here in this public setting?
    Dr. Wallander. Just to endorse or support your assessment 
of the challenge and to reiterate that the role of the 
Department of Defense is to provide the Secretary of Defense 
and the President with military options for the prevention of 
Iran's acquisition of nuclear weapons.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Well, thank you, both. Further on Iran, 
they are posturing to be more than just a regional challenge. 
Over the course of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Iran has 
increasingly provided military support to Russia, specifically 
drones. Russia is planning to provide Iran with advanced 
capabilities, including military fighter jets, helicopters, and 
air defense systems.
    So, and they are also planning to jointly build a drone 
factory inside Russia that would produce thousands of drones 
per year. This has more than just regional impact for Iran. So 
how is CENTCOM posturing to respond to this increasing 
collaboration between Iran and Russia? And what do you assess 
the implications to be for the region?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, it is very concerning with 
this relationship that Iran and Russia have. We are seeing them 
move the UAVs to Russia, be able to use them in Ukraine, and 
these are the very same UAVs that they use to attack our forces 
in Iraq and Syria, and they are improving upon them. And we are 
seeing--we saw Iranian state media publicly announce that they 
will be getting S-35, which is a fourth gen-plus fighter 
aircraft. They will be providing those. We think that will 
happen at some point this year.
    And it is this closer collaboration between two adversaries 
that is concerning. What we are doing is building the regional 
partnerships in the region to be able to counter that.
    Mr. Lamborn. And what about the--I think it is called the 
S-400 air defense system that Russia is saying it will provide 
to Iran?
    General Kurilla. We have not seen the S-400 be provided to 
Iran, but Iran also produces very capable indigenous air 
defense systems as well.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And, Dr. Wallander, do you have 
anything to add to what General Kurilla just said?
    Dr. Wallander. I just want to especially note the 
importance of the work of CENTCOM in creating regional 
constructs for integrating and improving the capabilities of 
partners in the region to push back and defend against the 
growing threat of Iran.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And lastly, General Kurilla, there 
are numerous efforts underway in Congress this year to enhance 
U.S. and Israeli collaboration on future warfare technologies. 
I have a lengthy amendment in the NDAA [National Defense 
Authorization Act] on this, for instance. This would include 
working together on directed energy, quantum computing, 
artificial intelligence, missile defense, space, and other 
cutting-edge programs.
    Do you support efforts to provide Israel with additional 
capabilities to ensure that it can effectively respond to 
enhanced Iranian threats that we have been already talking 
about?
    General Kurilla. Thank you, Congressman. We are committed 
to the defense of Israel. We work very, very closely with them 
in a lot of their new technologies. I have been to the country 
multiple times and looked at everything from their ballistic 
missile defense, their counter UAS [unmanned aircraft systems], 
and a lot of their advanced technologies like their Iron Beam 
that they are coming out with. And we also are coming out with 
our own directed energy systems as well.
    Mr. Lamborn. Excellent. And, Dr. Wallander, anything to add 
to that?
    Dr. Wallander. You know, the United States is--has an iron-
clad commitment to the defense of Israel, manifested most 
recently in the extraordinarily successful exercise Juniper 
Oak, which exercised and demonstrated the level of 
interoperability and capability and the ability of the United 
States, CENTCOM in particular, to surge that capability and 
work closely with Israel to exercise and also demonstrate that 
capability.
    Mr. Lamborn. Very good. Thank you all for being here.
    I now recognize Representative Courtney for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Lamborn. Thank you to the 
witnesses for being here today.
    General Langley, it was striking to me in your testimony, 
sort of, where you contrasted sort of Russia's entry into 
particularly countries like the Central African Republic using 
basically the Wagner Group as the sort of enticement to get 
into that country and other countries like it, whereas China is 
using more of an economic investment sort of approach in terms 
of trying to, again, ingratiate itself to these countries as 
well.
    So going back to the Wagner Group sort of enterprise, can 
you just sort of describe, what is--what does Wager Group and 
Russia get out of that? Are they getting sort of--and there has 
been reporting that they basically get paid or reimbursed or 
compensated by gold, diamonds, other materials and minerals 
that obviously are valuable.
    General Langley. Congressman, absolutely Wagner has ill 
intentions. Their destabilizing activity. They have a history 
of it on the continent. And then, as we can see in the Central 
African Republic, and there are no good stories in their 
entrenchment in Libya as well, and now Mali.
    I am concerned about that. That is a layered threat that we 
are really concerned that they are the vanguard of the Russian 
Federation, because they have a thinly veiled false value 
proposition that says we are going to provide security for you, 
especially nations that have been affected by a coup. That is 
what happened in Mali. And then they come with their invoice. 
And, whereas, the only security they actually provide is the 
bubble around the elite or those that were--that initiated the 
coup in the first place.
    And there is also a roadmap to rare earth minerals or 
diamonds or gold. There is all of--Yevgeny Prigozhin is all 
about power for profit. What we are doing, Congressman, is 
initiating a campaign plan with our OAIs [operations, 
activities, and investments] across the whole-of-government 
approach to suppress this. And I can get more specific on what 
we are doing in the closed session.
    Mr. Courtney. And, again, China's approach is, again, using 
its sort of economic muscle to, again--and I think it was 
described, I mean, it is a bait-and-switch, you know, type of 
plan. But so 4 days ago, 5 days ago, there was an incident in 
the Central African Republic where 9 Chinese nationals were 
gunned down in broad daylight at a gold mine. Again, the 
initial claim by the government was that it was rebel forces 
that were responsible for that mass shooting.
    Last night there was actually reporting that eyewitnesses 
described that the perpetrators were actually Wagner Group, 
which is kind of an interesting colliding autocracies playing 
itself out in that continent.
    Xi Jinping actually stopped and interrupted the summit he 
had a few days ago with Putin to condemn the shooting, and, you 
know, promised that there would be a full investigation to get 
to the bottom of it. But, again, it was kind of a--you know, it 
is hard to get your head around the way that, you know, again, 
these two exploitative autocracies are now basically almost 
like scorpions in a bottle where their approach to this part of 
the world is now even possibly creating, you know, conflict 
amongst themselves.
    So, you know, Dr. Wallander, I don't know if you want to 
comment on that--that, you know, that actually, going back to 
Mr. Smith's comments, is maybe an opportunity for us to really 
show that, you know, neither one of these players are really 
going to create stability or prosperity in this part of the 
world, and there is a better way to proceed.
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. Yes. We are very 
clear with partners in--particularly in West Africa in the 
evidence that Wagner brings not security and stability for 
their countries, but in fact is an entry point for economic 
exploitation, for instability, actually extraordinary and 
horrifying assaults on civilians in these countries, because 
what Wagner offers is regime security, not national security, 
to these countries.
    I would say on this China-Russia issue, that is an 
interesting incident, and we will have to track it more 
closely. I am more struck by the consonance and the alignment 
of strategic interests at the level of Xi and Putin, and that 
is the real challenge we have going forward, that they share an 
interest in undermining global security and the rules-based 
international order and use one another to advance their 
national goals, but often those goals aren't very 
complementary.
    Mr. Courtney. I yield back.
    The Chairman [presiding]. I thank the gentleman. The Chair 
now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Dr. Wallander and 
General Kurilla, General Langley, thank you all so much for 
joining us.
    General Kurilla, General Langley, I want to begin with you. 
If we look at where we are today as necessarily focused on this 
era of great power competition with China and Russia, I believe 
that potentially opens up a door for an opportunity for a black 
swan event.
    And my question is, based on your testimony, General 
Kurilla, beginning with you, where you said a flashpoint with 
Iran, a crisis in the region, a successful large-scale attack 
on a partner country, or an attack on the homeland by a VEO, 
would necessarily redirect resources away from Central Command 
or, excuse me, away from other areas to Central Command. I 
think that is meaningful.
    General Langley, you said an underinvestment in African 
security raises the risk of an unexpected crisis that would 
abruptly strip U.S. resources away from our top national 
security challenges in that arena of great power competition.
    Gentlemen, in your professional military judgment, do you 
assess that the shift in great power competition and resources 
and focus by the United States increases the risk of a black 
swan event? And do you believe, though, that our military 
building capability to address great power competition in any 
way would deter a black swan event?
    And, thirdly, do you believe that efforts by either Russia 
or China are adding to the potential of any actors out there 
that may be interested in perpetrating a black swan event?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, thanks for that question. 
Interesting question. So when I took command in the first 
month, at the end of the first month, we had a commanders' 
conference, and one of it--we had to come up with, each group 
had to come up with two black swan events that they could see 
happening. We had 12 of them. At the end of this, we briefed 
them all. We found that 11 of the 12 are actually highly likely 
or at least probable that could occur, and by definition they 
are no longer a black swan event.
    But I think to your question about preparing for 
strategic--or doing strategic competition, does that take away 
from not being able to see a black swan event? I don't think 
so, because I think when you are preparing and you are doing 
strategic competition you are increasing the capability of your 
military force, and that includes the intelligence-gathering 
apparatus and I think, if anything, it helps us be able to see 
some of those things that we might not otherwise be able to 
see.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. General Langley.
    General Langley. Congressman, the NDS, our National Defense 
Strategy, tells me to--specified and implied--to monitor and 
respond. I need to be able to identify indications and 
warnings.
    One capability in a posture-limited and economy of force 
command is a decrement of our ISR capabilities. That is the 
foundational piece that I need, and it is also on my unfunded 
priority list of being able to bolster that capability, so I 
can see those black swans, so I can provide indications and 
warnings, and so we can reposition assets, or I can go to my 
colleague, General Kurilla, to have--to assist, and we can 
aggregate some of our forces to do that.
    But at this point now that is what pressurizes our efforts 
of exploitation. It is a layered threat here. So, yes, in 
answer to your last question, any exploitation by the violent 
extremist organization I say yes, that is why I need increased 
ISR to address all of those issues.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you.
    Gentlemen, let me ask, too, you laid out that you have 
assessed this particular situation, those risks. In your 
assessment, where do you believe the greatest risk exists? And, 
General Langley, you talk about maybe needing more ISR to be 
able to even further define that risk. But from both your 
professional judgments about what you see today, what is the 
greatest risk?
    And what do you have currently that you are using to 
mitigate that risk? And what might you need in order to do 
everything possible to make sure that we deter those actors 
that may be wanting to perpetrate a black swan event?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, for us, our greatest risk is 
with Iran right now. That is why it is our number one priority 
to deter them. And then I would tell you it is the violent 
extremist organizations that we are seeing the ISIS-Khorasan 
group in Afghanistan.
    And what we are doing is we are applying our resources to 
both of those efforts. We look at those also through our 
partners to be the regional constructs to deter Iran, and, 
again, it is increasing our capability and intelligence inside 
of Afghanistan.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. General Langley.
    General Langley. Congressman, again, on the African 
continent it is a layered risk, it is a layered threat. So my 
first and immediate, as I engage with our partners, because it 
is going to be partner led, U.S. enabled, it is violent 
extremist organizations, and how do we address that.
    So that segues into how we address that through our 
programs and our portfolios, the security force assistance. As 
we look at 333, title 10, to train and equip or build 
institutional capacity in a 332, that is what we need to 
address this.
    But we do have a pacing threat, and we do have that 
immediate threat as well. And that is where it is going to be a 
whole-of-government approach, collectively all of the OAIs 
coming together and putting together a value proposition to our 
African partners to deter them becoming the partner of choice.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you to our witnesses.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Garamendi from California.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary 
Wallander, General Kurilla, and General Langley, thank you very 
much for the testimony today and your insight into the issues.
    I would like to focus on Africa here, and specifically, 
General Langley and Dr. Wallander, you mentioned the whole of 
government. It is rather obvious that it is not within our 
current military capability to deal with all of Africa. So, Dr. 
Wallander, if you could talk to us about what you see the State 
Department, USAID, and U.S. private investment could and should 
be doing in Africa to address the problems that have been 
discussed here.
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. It is an excellent 
question, and I would point to, as a signature sign--a 
signature element of that whole-of-government approach, 
including the private sector, the African Leaders Summit that 
was so successful in December of last year. There were elements 
of that summit that were focused on defense and security, on 
diplomacy, on development, and there was a significant private 
sector involvement in the discussions about how to advance 
security, stability, and prosperity in Africa.
    The Department of Defense works closely with USAID to 
support their programs when they--when they need assistance and 
when they need AFRICOM support, and we work very closely with 
Department of State in advancing governance, rule of law, 
institution building.
    When we talk about security assistance, a lot of our 
security assistance is focused not merely on train and equip, 
but also on building civil-military relations, resilience, and 
capacity of our partner governments, so that they have that 
strong governance structure to be able to advance policies for 
their countries across the board.
    Mr. Garamendi. Well, thank you. General Langley, same 
subject area.
    General Langley. Thanks for the question, Congressman, 
because the whole of government conceptually will work, can 
work, but we need to address some issues. As I look at USAID, 
and I talk to some of the administrators over there, and even 
administrative power, says that their non-humanitarian efforts 
to put the full throes or horsepower into the whole-of-
government approach, most of that funding is earmarked.
    So they can't do in-stride adjudication. They can't do in-
stride reallocation, I should say, to the problems brought to 
bear in some African countries, whether it be famine relief or 
any other thing of development across their governance.
    These African partners say that, holistically, the enduring 
solution to violent extremist organizations is good governance. 
To bolster the capacity in their governance, USAID and State 
Department need flexible funding to address these current near-
term issues.
    And just one point. As far as the military perspective, we 
add to that within our 333 programs, and we just want that to 
be more responsive as well.
    Mr. Garamendi. 333. Explain, please.
    General Langley. I am sorry. That is our--the 333, title 10 
authorities is authority that I have as they--as the African 
countries are embarking upon the violent extremist organization 
fight, they need training and they need assistance within that. 
The 332 builds ministerial capacity, so they can have--so they 
can embark upon the whole-of-government approach to address 
these issues.
    Mr. Garamendi. I would note that the Peace Corps is 
returning to Africa. At least I am pleased about that.
    I want to deal with the violent extremist organizations, 
the relationship between the U.S. military and French in Mali 
and other Sahel areas. If General Langley and Dr. Wallander, if 
you could speak to that issue, and where the French are and 
where they are not, and where we are and where we are not.
    General Langley. Yes. Congressman, I talk to the French 
weekly. And as their president came out with a new strategy, 
more of advise and assist and institution across, they are just 
moving some piece on the chessboard. We still have the same 
strategy that is in line with each other to be able to help and 
enable partner-led, but U.S.-enabled, to be able to ensure that 
they achieve their objectives.
    So I work with the French all the time, and our operational 
plans and campaigning are in line.
    Mr. Garamendi. I will yield back. Thank you very much.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman. The Air Force is moving 
assets from EUCOM [U.S. European Command] to INDOPACOM [U.S. 
Indo-Pacific Command], and it just seems kind of strange that 
we would be moving those assets right now with everything going 
on in Ukraine.
    Do you--do both of you have a need for additional air 
assets, or do you have the air assets that you currently need 
in CENTCOM and in AFRICOM?
    General Kurilla. I have a requirement for additional air 
assets, Congressman.
    Mr. Scott. Do you need A-10s in CENTCOM?
    General Kurilla. We have been given A-10s or have been 
approved to come to CENTCOM.
    Mr. Scott. Okay. Are you being given what you have 
requested, or are you being shorted on your request?
    General Kurilla. So we have--you know, four of the five NDS 
priorities are in the CENTCOM area. Every day I am looking at 
the missions I have, the resources I have been allocated, and I 
am dynamically balancing risk against those. In the closed 
session, I can talk about specifically what some of those 
shortcomings are.
    Mr. Scott. Okay. General Langley, thank you for your help 
when Congressman Panetta and I got to go to a couple of 
countries in Africa. We couldn't have done it without your 
assistance.
    The thing that sticks in my mind on that trip is Wagner and 
how effective they have been with social media. It is open 
source that the French ISR picked up mass graves where Wagner 
had killed a lot of people. By the time it made it to the 
public what had happened, Wagner had already hijacked the 
pictures and convinced the public that it was the French that 
had carried out the atrocities.
    I am concerned about the speed at which we are handling 
unconventional warfare and how we are able to increase our pace 
to deal with what I consider to be a terrorist organization 
like Wagner. What discussions are happening about how we 
increase the pace of our unconventional warfare to compete with 
Wagner and others who don't have to operate by the rules?
    General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question 
because that is one of my concerns. We need to be able to 
operate at the speed of relevance, and as we consider in the 
military, as we all know, the OODA loop, to be able to observe, 
orient, decide, and act, and once Wagner does something like 
that, through our military information support operations, we 
need to be able to go at that cadence, faster cadence that 
interdicts their illicit activities, especially their malign 
information activities. So we are working whole of government 
as well. State Department does have some programs in place as 
well to deter the ill effects of the information spate that 
Wagner is espousing.
    Mr. Scott. I mean, speed is the key to it. Once people have 
already made up their mind, then it is hard to--hard to unmake 
it, especially in those countries. And I am very concerned, and 
we met with the current leadership of Chad and some other 
countries about what is happening with the French. And there 
seems to be--an ``attitude'' might not be the right word, but 
kind of the belief that if they kick the French out of the 
country that the U.S. is going to build an enduring mission.
    But it was the French Mirages that saved us in Tongo Tongo. 
My assessment is we would have lost everybody in Tongo Tongo 
had the French not had Mirages. Is that yours as well?
    General Langley. Congressman, I have read the Tongo Tongo 
report, and as every time we come around to matching 
capabilities and readiness assessment, we ask for more vertical 
lift, and we thank this Congress for the warfighting recovery 
network. We bolster that.
    But I am still going to be asking for more as we--as we 
look at our reposture and as we are starting to expand our 
activities to address the violent extremist organizations going 
into the Gulf of Guinea states as well. So that is going to be 
comparable to what I ask for in this coming budget. Over.
    Mr. Scott. I appreciate both of you. I will have more 
questions when we get to the other meeting. Look forward to 
coming back to Africa this year, General Langley, and seeing 
you over there again. Thank you.
    Thank you, Dr. Wallander. Sorry I didn't have any 
questions.
    The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Houlahan for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being 
here today.
    General Kurilla, I thank you as well for your testimony, 
and I was really excited to hear about CENTCOM's Innovation 
Oasis competition. And I think that you probably do think as 
well that some of the best ideas for innovation and best 
practices come from people who are on the front lines rather 
than not necessarily the leadership.
    So I was hoping you might be able to share a little bit 
more about the genesis of that idea. Are there any projects in 
particular that have come from that idea? And is there anything 
further that we can do here in Congress to be supportive of 
that initiative?
    General Kurilla. Thanks, Congresswoman. So Innovation Oasis 
is our Shark Tank-like idea where what we do is we find some of 
the best ideas are trapped inside of a hangar, on a ship, in a 
cubicle, or down in a squad, and we use it as a way to elevate 
those ideas and then use the resources at CENTCOM to then 
promote those ideas. And we have received a lot of really good 
ideas.
    One of them was a counter-UAS trainer. We had a bunch of 
proprietary systems out of there, and we created one, and one 
of our sergeants, an E-5 from the Massachusetts National Guard, 
programmed it himself on the weekends and came up with a 
counter-UAS trainer that we are able to use, and we are in the 
process of trying to advance that idea, putting the resources 
and energy of CENTCOM behind it.
    We have another one coming up in the end of May from each 
of the different components within CENTCOM. They will pick 
their best person and send them up. It is a chance, really, to 
elevate great ideas that are otherwise trapped inside a squad 
or a ship, et cetera. You know, it was Staff Sergeant Cahill 
from the New Jersey National Guard who figured out a way to 
break through the hedgerows at France. A staff sergeant figured 
that out.
    Ms. Houlahan. And is there any kind of way that you guys 
are tracking those successes, so that we can kind of continue 
to elevate them and encourage that sort of innovative thinking 
in what is otherwise sort of a stodgy kind of an organization? 
I say that as a former Air Force person myself.
    General Kurilla. Ma'am, we do have an open portal website 
where people submit their ideas and people can see those.
    Ms. Houlahan. Excellent. Thank you.
    And, General Langley, as well, thank you for being here 
today. U.S. Africa Command is a relatively new combatant 
command, and it was designed from the start to lead with 
diplomacy, with development and defense in a supporting role, 
and that is fascinating.
    Until this last Congress I was able to serve both on the 
Armed Services and the Foreign Affairs Committee, which I 
really enjoyed that kind of combination of defense as well as 
diplomacy. So as part of the combatant commander in part--part 
combatant commander and part diplomat, how can you balance 
those roles? How are you able to balance those roles? As you 
are working with the Department of State or USAID to offer a 
whole-of-government support for our African partners, how are 
you finding that?
    General Langley. Congresswoman, thanks for asking that 
question, because, yes, all my engagements on the continent, 
and these countries, they know that their solution to their 
immediate threats, this is violent extremist organizations. And 
they know that they need to create a holistic approach in their 
whole-of-government approach.
    So I always engage with assistant secretaries over at 
State, or administrators over at USAID, to ensure that we can 
build that capacity. And they asked me to advocate for their 
need for more flexible funding or increased funding and the 
number of programs.
    But also, on the back of that, Prosper Africa, these are 
the initiatives that this conference--this Congress has 
legislated. We need to get after that, especially the GFA 
[Global Fragility Act], you know, formerly--well, actually, now 
known as Prevent Conflict Promote Stability.
    So, holistically, that is what I--that is what I have in 
discussions with the leadership of the countries that I engage 
with, being able to add more to that, more capacity to those 
programs. Full funding will be helpful in----
    Ms. Houlahan. If you would let us know if there are any 
further authorities or help and support that we can provide to 
allow that to be easier for you, that would be terrific.
    And with the last minute of my time, I wanted to talk a 
little bit about the threat posed by infectious diseases. I had 
a chance to go on a bicameral delegation with Senator Coons and 
Senator Portman this past summer, and particularly struck by 
the Kibera slums that I was able to visit and how dangerous an 
outbreak in those slums could be, or, frankly, a rural outbreak 
as well; that is, a zoonotic one.
    Can you all speak a little bit more in half a minute about 
what CENTCOM is doing on this issue and what we think we should 
be doing or how Congress can be more helpful on that?
    General Kurilla. Congresswoman, I think it is by working 
with our partners on this to make sure that we identify the 
threat, and we are working with them as they help identify the 
needs.
    General Langley. I concur with what Erik is saying. We 
bring this up with our partners and have that discussion, and 
it is going to be partner led on these initiatives, and--but we 
will enable.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I have run out of time, and I 
yield back, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. 
DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you, panel, 
for being here today.
    I am going to start with General Kurilla and Dr. Wallander. 
As mentioned earlier in today's hearings, over the last few 
years Iran and its proxies across the region have escalated 
their use of projectiles, particularly drones, to attack U.S. 
forces and U.S. allies.
    Can you give us an idea of how we are defending ourselves 
against these threats? And what does the data show about the 
performance of counter-UAS systems deployed in the region?
    General Kurilla. Thanks, Congressman. So what we do see is 
advanced capabilities that Iran is using. I do think the 
services providing the counter-UAS capabilities that we do have 
in reason--in the region, it is a layered defense. No one 
system is effective against all. And so what we do is we look 
at the performance of the systems and look at ways to help 
improve them.
    We just finished a counter-UAS experimentation and live 
fire down in Saudi Arabia in our Red Sands Integrated 
Experimentation Center that we have down there. We finished 
that last week against complex threats to identify weakness and 
other areas that we can improve the tactics, techniques, and 
procedures of those counter-UAS systems.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Can you share any numbers on performance 
percentage-wise of how we are doing against those assets?
    General Kurilla. I would have to take that for the record, 
give you the exact performance parameters.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 151.]
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Dr. Wallander, did you have anything 
to add?
    Dr. Wallander. I would just emphasize, in addition to the 
partnerships with countries in the region, that the focus of 
CENTCOM, and also policy and support, has been to emphasize the 
opportunities for integrated approaches where regional 
partners, especially in the Gulf, can work together to more 
comprehensively address the threats that you have identified.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And we also talked earlier about the 
Iran nuclear deal, and, Dr. Wallander, does it remain the 
policy of the United States to ensure that Iran will never 
acquire or develop a nuclear weapon?
    Dr. Wallander. Yes, Congressman. President Biden has made 
that clear.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Given the strides that the Iranian 
nuclear program has made, I am not sure we should be confident 
we won't be witnessing a rise of nuclear Iran in the near 
future. So how do you assess CENTCOM's ability to respond to an 
Iranian nuclear breakout?
    General Kurilla. Again, Congressman, I will be happy to 
talk about the Iranian nuclear program in a closed session.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Fair enough. There is probably no 
bigger threat to one of our greatest allies--Israel--than the 
Iranian nuclear program. Do you believe that if it became 
necessary the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] has the capabilities 
today to defend themselves against the rising threat of nuclear 
Iran?
    General Kurilla. I think Israel has the capability to 
defend itself against ballistic missiles. I think any 
discussion other than that on a nuclear program is best in a 
closed session, Congressman.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Do we have contingency plans being 
prepared to defend U.S. personnel and assets in CENTCOM's AOR 
against Iranian retaliation in the event of an Israel strike on 
Iran's nuclear program?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, we are always prepared to 
defend our forces that are in the region.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Just one final question, shifting to 
what impact the Ukraine war has had on Russia's posture in the 
Middle East. For instance, have we seen a reduced footprint in 
Syria?
    General Kurilla. A very small reduction in the footprint. 
We have seen some reduction in terms of munitions, but for the 
most part they have maintained their force posture because it 
is very important to them. It shows the importance that they 
place on Syria. And you saw that Assad just went to Moscow, and 
he welcomed a permanent Russian basing in the region.
    Dr. DesJarlais. We continue to observe Iran and its proxy 
shipping weapons to Russia for use against Ukraine. General, if 
you see such a shipment, say Iranian drones headed to Russia 
through your AOR, do you have the authority to interdict these 
shipments?
    General Kurilla. We have the authority to stop things that 
we can see inside of certain countries, but I think that is 
best in a closed session, Congressman.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And I will save a few more questions 
for the closed setting. Thank you all for being here.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, 
Mr. Moulton, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moulton. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank 
you all for being here. I think it is incredibly important that 
we don't take our eye off the ball in the Middle East, even as 
we rightly focus on the rising threat of China and the 
necessary deterrence initiatives in the Pacific.
    Dr. Wallander, back to this deal that the PRC was able to 
broker between Iran and Saudi Arabia, what do you think that 
this could mean for the region in the medium term? And what 
lessons should we learn from it with respect to how we compete 
with China outside the Indo-Pacific region?
    Dr. Wallander. So, thank you, Congressman. I want to 
emphasize two points about the--what looks like a deal. As 
General Kurilla pointed out, it is an agreement. We will see 
about implementation. One is that these were quiet talks that 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and Iran were having for some time 
about reestablishing embassies, exchanging diplomats.
    So China came in on the back end, played a role, but this 
is something that was in the works for a while.
    Second of all, if this contributes to greater security and 
stabilization in the region, if this does--and, again, we are 
waiting to see--lead to an end to Iranian provision of 
capabilities and fueling of the conflict in Yemen and the 
threat that that has posed to other Gulf countries, that would 
be a welcome development.
    So we are, you know, watch-and-wait posture. But I also 
want to emphasize we are concerned about China's increased 
activity on the diplomatic front to present itself as a problem 
solver, and we will make clear to our partners, such as the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, with which we have broad, deep, 
longstanding security, economic, and political ties, that we 
are a strategic partner of choice.
    And just because China came in at the end here and maybe 
helped seal the deal does not mean that the reliability and the 
longstanding partnership between the United States and the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is something to discount.
    Mr. Moulton. So you are saying that China swooped in here 
at the last minute and took credit for the whole deal, which I 
think is something that we are all quite familiar with in the 
realm of politics and world affairs. If we get wind of the 
Chinese about to do something similar with perhaps another 
country in the Middle East and Iran, would it be wise for us to 
be the ones who swoop in and seal the deal, as you said?
    Dr. Wallander. We remain closely engaged with all of our 
partners in the region and are attuned to their security 
concerns, support their diplomatic efforts that are consistent 
with international law, and advance stabilization and security. 
So we need to be forward-leaning, as you are suggesting, in 
working with our partners in the region, so that they know the 
United States have their best interests at heart and they can 
count on us.
    Mr. Moulton. So if that is what we should do in the future, 
why didn't we do it in this case?
    Dr. Wallander. We have a close relationship with the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and I can't speak to the details of 
diplomatic discussions between countries that we were not privy 
to.
    Mr. Moulton. Okay. Well, I hope we go into this more in the 
classified session, because if we knew this was happening, I 
don't know why we wouldn't be the ones to get diplomatic credit 
here, especially when the alternative choice is the PRC.
    General Kurilla, we are tracking that, in Syria, Russian 
military forces have been behaving unprofessionally towards 
U.S. forces and have repeatedly harassed our troops with low-
flying aircraft. Could you please describe Russia's behavior in 
Syria towards our troops and how that has changed over the 
course of the conflict in Ukraine?
    General Kurilla. Thanks, Congressman. So what we see is 
their behavior is unprofessional and unsafe. Since 1 March, it 
is the highest number of tactical air flights over U.S. forces 
in areas since the beginning of the--since Russia was in the 
AOR. Really starting on 1 March, it has--when I talk tactical 
flights, that is fighter aircraft or air-to-ground aircraft 
flying over our area.
    We always have--our own fighters will intercept them, so we 
always have the ability to protect ourselves, but, really, we 
are there for D-ISIS [defeat ISIS]. They are under the guise of 
being there under D-ISIS. We do not see them doing a defeat 
ISIS role. When they are doing that, it is unnecessary, unsafe, 
and unprofessional.
    Mr. Moulton. Dr. Wallander, do you think there is an 
escalation risk here?
    Dr. Wallander. There is always a risk when Russian forces 
are behaving unprofessionally. And making sure to maintain 
American presence and appropriate responses is something we 
count upon from our military commanders, but escalation 
management is something that we know that they take--they are 
mindful of as well.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, my time is up, but I would just say that 
if there is always a risk when Russian soldiers are behaving 
unprofessionally, it also seems that Russian soldiers always 
behave unprofessionally. So we really have to manage this risk.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Mississippi, 
General Kelly, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And my first question is for you, General Langley. Have you 
seen a shift in the Wagner forces available in Africa with the 
shift to Ukraine, or has it pretty much stayed consistent since 
they got more deeply involved in Ukraine?
    General Langley. Congressman, that is a great question. I 
have not seen a shift, but here is what my analysis would tell 
me, though. That they wouldn't have--what you have on the 
African continent is a false value proposition of security. So 
I don't think they are going to have their experts on the 
continent of Africa for that purpose. They are going to have 
the businessmen that are trying to make their way to the mines 
for profit.
    Mr. Kelly. And I am going to follow up on Seth Moulton, 
because I agree with him. We need to be forward-leaning in 
diplomacy. And right now the partner of choice around the 
world, whether that is South America or CENTCOM or AFRICOM, is 
the United States military. However, our State Department 
sometimes makes that very, very difficult.
    So we have Jackson-Vanik and a lot of things that we punish 
people wholly when we see their policies don't align with U.S. 
policies, and that is not a bad thing. There is a purpose for 
that.
    But do you guys see any way that we can do that on a 
sliding scale and a reward-punishment basis as opposed to a 
wholesale you acted bad, so, therefore, we are not going to do 
any IMET [International Military Education and Training] with 
your country anymore. We are not going to provide U.S. aid to 
your country anymore. We are not going to do anything, we 
completely cut them out and create a vacuum in those countries 
where they have to choose China or Russia because we are not 
available because of our State Department.
    And I will use a prime example. I visited five countries in 
Africa last July, May or July, somewhere around that timeframe. 
And I went to Tunisia, Burkina Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, and 
Djibouti. And in all of those we had State Department 
restrictions that were preventing us from being effective as a 
military as we can.
    What is the solution to this, so that we can build those 
future leaders in those countries, instead of just saying no? 
We can do an incentive-based program as opposed to just saying 
no? Any ideas?
    General Langley. Congressman, the 7008 sanctions on that 
country, but restrictions for me--I have to look at the whole-
of-government approach. For example, Burkina Faso, 7008 was 
imposed, but I had to--thank you for--I just really want to 
thank you for the language within 8823 that says 
``notwithstanding authorities.'' There are still some 
notwithstanding authorities, and that is why at Flintlock that 
we had last week, major exercise in West Africa, the Burkinamis 
were there. They were there.
    So until they--this is a message to them that they need to 
set the stage to return back to democratic norms. But across 
the whole of government, I met with State Department last week, 
so they also have some activities and investments that they can 
do to be able to employ in Ouagadougou, because Ambassador 
Clark, she is looking for what CT [counterterrorism] mechanism 
we can do to still engage with Burkina Faso, so they can embark 
upon the fight against violent extremist organizations.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you. Let me kind of get--I have got one 
more question. But I think you are 100 percent right, and I 
just think we really have to work this problem set, because 
there is a lot of opportunities that we are missing, and we are 
giving opportunities to our competitors by not using a reward 
system to modify behavior to our culture.
    The final thing, and General Kurilla, you have done an 
outstanding job, and your predecessors--the State Partnership 
Programs--and we need to get stronger in Africa, General 
Langley, but you have done an outstanding job of using that 
resource, which is a low-resource dollar-wise programs, which 
can be very, very effective. But it also takes at your levels 
engaging with those State partnership adjutant generals to make 
sure that their priorities align with your priorities in those 
countries that they represent.
    And so I think there is a lot of opportunity, and just if 
you can comment on those.
    General Kurilla. Congressman, thanks. If I could just back 
up one. On the IMET program, I think that the highest return on 
investment for every dollar we spend, because I will tell you 
in the CENTCOM region many of our chiefs of defense went to 
school at our military--School of Professional Military 
Education back in the States.
    I thank you for what Mississippi does with Uzbekistan. I 
think we do have great alignment, and the return on investment 
we get from our State Partnership Program is significant, and 
it is one of the highest requested things from a lot of our 
countries in the region.
    Mr. Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New Jersey, 
Ms. Sherrill, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And thank you all for being here 
today and for all of your service to our country, not just now 
but over many years.
    As you may know, Picatinny Arsenal in my district does a 
lot of work on our supply chain, especially with some of the 
minerals that we need in our supply chain. And so, General 
Langley, as you know, the African continent is full of rare 
earth mineral deposits, and I am wondering what you are doing 
in that area to increase the stability of our supply chains, 
especially with the incursions of China into the African 
continent and the relationships they have there.
    Is there an ability for us to stabilize our partnerships 
there to better protect our supply chains, or do we really need 
to be thinking about moving our supply chains out of rare earth 
minerals coming from Africa?
    General Langley. Congresswoman, that is a great question, 
because here is--here is another opportunity for me to 
illuminate the illicit activities and the shady deals that the 
PRC has started to embark upon with some of our partners, just 
illuminate and amplify their activities.
    And we do that through the whole-of-government approach and 
through these country teams to give the cautionary tales, 
because as we look at these rare earth minerals, we do know 
that that is--some of those rare earth materials are--from a 
military sense will go into our future weapons, our high-tech 
weapons. But in the holistic sense, as far as the society, it 
is--a lot of these are clean energy type--necessary items that 
need to be able to be harvested for that particular capability.
    So just engaging with our partners, giving the cautionary 
tale in the information space of the negative effects in the 
long run.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And then also, with--back to 
Picatinny Arsenal, we have the Joint Center of Excellence for 
Guns and Ammunition. And, we're working on a new gun-based 
counter to small, unmanned aircraft systems. I know there are 
different ways we are approaching unmanned systems.
    But, General Kurilla, how would a gun-based system, which 
would potentially be cheaper and easier for partners especially 
to train on, be beneficial to supporting your organization's 
efforts to combat threats to our allies in the region?
    General Kurilla. Congresswoman, so counter-UAS systems, 
it's a layered defense. Generally, the gun-type systems, and we 
have them employed right now with our counter-rocket and mortar 
systems, a lot of our partners use a gun-type system. Ukraine 
uses gun-type systems.
    It's generally the last line of defense, just based on the 
range of the munitions of the guns that they use, where we're 
using the rockets, or sorry, a missile that would go out and 
then do the interception or electronic warfare.
    But, there is a need for a gun-type system as part of a 
layered defense.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And, General Kurilla as well, 
during the last year's CENTCOM posture hearing, I discussed 
with your predecessor my concerns about the 2019 bombing in 
Baghuz, Syria, which led to the deaths of over 60 civilians.
    The FY23 [fiscal year 2023] NDAA authorized $25 million 
towards operationalizing Secretary Austin's Civilian Harm 
Mitigation and Response Action Plan. Can you elaborate on what 
your team is doing to fully support the harm mitigation plan, 
and what actions you've taken to eliminate civilian casualties 
in the AOR?
    General Kurilla. So ma'am, we were involved in the civilian 
harm mitigation process in that, and the implementation. And 
so, what it's done, we're in the process of implementing now. 
There will be a Center of Excellence at OSD [Office of the 
Secretary of Defense].
    And, then we have been authorized individuals both at the 
CENTCOM headquarters and each of our components, to hire 
experts on that.
    Ms. Sherrill. And, do you need additional resources for 
that mission?
    General Kurilla. I think those resources that were provided 
with that is what's going to help us in our ability, the 
authorization to hire those individuals.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. And I yield back.
    Mr. Scott [presiding]. The Chair recognizes General Bacon 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Scott. Thank you, Dr. Wallander, 
General Kurilla, General Langley for being here. Most of my 
questions are with the CENTCOM AOR.
    General Kurilla, is it true that we have with this recent 
report that we have $7.1 billion in weapons that were left 
behind in Afghanistan when we withdrew?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, I have seen the list of 
items. It is exhaustive. I can't give you the exact amount. But 
I do know that $7 billion is a number that I've seen out there.
    Mr. Bacon. Are there particular weapons that you're most 
concerned with falling in the hands of the Taliban or ISIS or 
al-Qaida?
    General Kurilla. I think there is a wide variety of 
munitions that would be concern that would be used outside of 
the country by individuals if they got their hands on them.
    Mr. Bacon. Now $7 billion of weapons is a grave concern to 
many of us here. A second line of questioning, how often are 
you under attack from Iran with the unmanned aerial vehicles?
    Is it weekly? Monthly? Can you give us a feel for how often 
you're being attacked?
    General Kurilla. It is periodic. We see periods where they 
will do more. There has been a number since 1 January 2021, the 
number is about 78 times that we have been attacked.
    Mr. Bacon. Seventy-eight times you've been attacked out 
of--and, are these UAVs flying out of Iran and striking us?
    Or, are they being used by militias controlled by Iran?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, so what Iran does to hide its 
hand, is they use Iranian proxies. That's either UAVs or 
rockets to be able to attack our forces in either Iraq or 
Syria.
    Mr. Bacon. Are these considered acts of war by Iran?
    General Kurilla. They are being done by the Iranian proxies 
is what I would tell you, Congressman.
    Mr. Bacon. Do we have the right level of investment and 
fielding for counter-UAV? I know you talked a little bit about 
it.
    But, just are we, should we be doing more? Or are we about 
right?
    General Kurilla. We are doing more right now in terms of 
getting additional capability to the field. We'll be bringing 
some directed energy systems online. That is--you know, 
everything is a layered defense.
    I think when we bring some new capabilities online, you 
want to be able to then test these systems and make sure they 
have the right probability of kill based on different systems 
and the techniques that the enemy is using to be able to attack 
you.
    So, I think this will be an area we'll continue to invest 
in. I know that there's other organizations like SOCOM [U.S. 
Special Operations Command] that are doing some to bring 
additional capability to it.
    But, all of it is a part of a layered defense.
    Mr. Bacon. Well, thank you, General Kurilla. I appreciate 
your inputs there. The number 78, to me, that's a big number 
and we should be focusing more on that, that Iran's doing this.
    Dr. Wallander, is the Iranian/Saudi Arabian re-approchement 
a positive or a negative thing when it comes to the United 
States national security interests?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, if it contributes to security 
and stability in the region, if it contributes to an end to 
Iran's provision of military capabilities to the Houthi regime 
in Yemen, if it contributes to an end to the offensive attack 
from Yemen to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, it would be a 
positive development.
    But, if is the important word. And, we will have to monitor 
that closely.
    Mr. Bacon. I believe that's a very valid point with the 
effects on Yemen. But, does this take some pressure off Iran on 
its nuclear program?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, we do not see any signs that 
any of the countries in the region, our partners in the region, 
are complacent about the dangers that an Iranian nuclear 
weapons capability would pose to their very direct security. 
So, I do not believe so.
    Mr. Bacon. Is there a potential for the Abraham Accords 
expanding to other countries? Are we seeing a potential there?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I won't speak for the state of 
Israel and its regional relationships. But I will say that we 
know that there are opportunities, and there are discussions 
with other countries in the region. And the United States 
supports those discussions and would welcome that development.
    Mr. Bacon. It's one of the best developments we've had, I 
think, in recent years there. And, my final question, and I'll 
go back to General Kurilla.
    What is the impact if we turn off the 2002 AUMF 
[Authorization for Use of Military Force]? What's the impact to 
you?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, right now we do not use the 
2002 for any of our operational activities.
    Mr. Bacon. Does it have any impact in responding to the 
Shia militias that have Iran fingerprints on them?
    General Kurilla. So, right now, if there's an Iranian 
fingerprint on that, we can use the article 2 from the 
President.
    Mr. Bacon. Okay. Thank you very much. I appreciate the 
concise answers. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Scott. The Chair now recognizes Congressman Carbajal 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, thank you 
Secretary Wallander, General Kurilla, and General Langley for 
being here today. I'm nursing a cold, as you can tell.
    General Kurilla, last year Secretary Austin was focused on 
improving civilian harm mitigation and response, and last 
August signed the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action 
Plan.
    How is the implementation of this plan going? And, how is 
it impacting operations in the AOR? Are we seeing positive 
effects?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, we were involved in the 
development of the overall plan. And, the implementation 
aspect, what it will do is create a Center of Excellence up at 
the OSD level.
    And, it has authorized each of the combatant commands to 
have higher experts at the combatant command level and each of 
the components. And, we're in the process right now of going 
through the hiring process to be able to get those experts 
online and in the headquarters.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. General Langley, I just returned 
from a delegation to Morocco, which was very informative.
    African nations are increasingly influential in the United 
Nations and other international forums. There continues to be a 
misunderstanding about the AOR.
    You've been commander of AFRICOM now for about 6 months. 
What are some of the misconceptions you hear about from both 
American officials and the American public about the AOR? And, 
how can we approach the AOR in a more productive and effective 
manner?
    General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question, 
because I wanted to just echo what in my visit to Morocco that 
they want us to be a partner of choice. But also, to talk about 
how, what capabilities they have to export security.
    African nations want to solve African problems themselves. 
They want to own it. They just need us to enable us--enable 
them in various title 10 authorities that I have in 333, which 
is train and equip.
    What Morocco is right now, they are a microcosm of what we 
have in the IMET program. They bring other African, Sub-Saharan 
African nations to--onto their ground to be able to train with 
them.
    And, we have African Lion getting ready to kick off. 
Exercises like that is sharing of ideas and sharing of norms, 
supporting democratic ideals, and also a full-fledged fight 
against violent extremist organization capability and capacity 
building.
    Mr. Carbajal. African Lion exercises started in May or 
June?
    General Langley. Yes, we just got, we just finished out the 
second phase. It's going to extend through June.
    Mr. Carbajal. Great. General Langley, violent extremism has 
been a very difficult problem to address, particularly in the 
AFRICOM AOR. There continues to be an alarming rate in violent 
events by militant Islamic groups, including Al Shabaab and al-
Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.
    What is the biggest impediment to being able to better 
address these threats? Do you think the U.S. needs to amend our 
strategy in the AOR to do so?
    General Langley. Congressman, I'll state that the countries 
that I've been to, as we see this threat starting to 
metastasize West Africa, which I characterize that's the 
tipping point. These countries recognize that.
    And, they think that the regional players are going to 
address this issue. Regional players such as Niger, Ghana in 
the Accra Initiative.
    The ECOWAS [Economic Community of West African States] 
economic construct are trying to enable some of these countries 
to be able to form a regional coalition to address this issue. 
They just need help in the various authorities that I have.
    And--but what we need is more responsive authority so they 
don't go over to Wagner. And so, in the 333 area of train and 
equip, you know, 332 and building ministerial capacity, that's 
what needs to be more responsive as we collectively work with 
State Department and this Congress to be more responsive so 
they won't select Wagner, which is a threat and destabilizing 
action.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield 
back.
    Mr. Scott. The Chair recognizes Congressman Gallagher for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you. General Kurilla, I appreciate 
your commitment to fostering technological innovation through 
Task Force 59, 99, and 39. I think these task forces are very--
an important test of innovative technologies.
    But, how would you assess the Department of Defense's 
effectiveness in actually operationalizing new technological 
outputs, particularly adopting commercial technology and 
integrating it into what you need as a warfighter?
    General Kurilla. So thanks, Congressman. If I could talk 
about using just 59 as an example. We're using commercial off-
the-shelf to be able to increase maritime domain awareness.
    We are using a lot of commercial technology that was used 
for the tuna industry. And, in that industry they don't go out 
to find fish, they go out to catch fish.
    So, we're using a lot of these systems right now, whether 
that's a Saildrone or an unmanned surface vessel or an undersea 
vessel, that can have a lot of wide variety of commercial use 
as well. We're operationalizing that and putting it toward this 
maritime domain awareness, which allows us to more effectively 
use our manned assets.
    So, a destroyer right now patrolling in the Red Sea, is the 
equivalent of one police car patrolling the State of 
California. We take these unmanned systems and we put them out 
there, and they act as indications and warnings and early 
sensors to then more effectively use.
    An unmanned system can go up and find anomalies and look at 
behavior, is that normal, is that not normal? We run that 
through a structured database, run algorithms against it, and 
then it can say hey, you need to take a look at this, this is 
an abnormal behavior. And then, more effectively use that 
manned asset.
    We've done this, we've also gone to the INDOPACOM, and 
we've gone to EUCOM, and shown them this capability. We've 
exercised with those countries. We just finished an exercise 
last week, 7,000 participants, 42 countries, 35 ships, and 30 
unmanned systems. That was 42 countries participating in that.
    And, if you saw Admiral Gilday, the CNO [Chief of Naval 
Operations] of the Navy, he was just on 60 Minutes. He sees 
that 40 percent of the Navy in the future is some type of 
unmanned system. We think we are helping inform that in a way 
that we can test out in our region as well.
    Mr. Gallagher. So, you're taking commercial technology, 
unmanned technology in this case, you are then using it and 
adapting it to meet a warfighting need to enhance your maritime 
domain awareness.
    What then, okay, having proved the concept in this task 
force, what then are the barriers to scaling that or applying 
that in other areas from your perspective?
    General Kurilla. Funding would be one.
    Mr. Gallagher. Um-hum.
    General Kurilla. And, I think taking systems that we're 
using right now and then converting them to programs of record. 
But, I'd really defer to the services on that to what would be 
the barriers to do that.
    Mr. Gallagher. Talk a little bit about, have allies in the 
region, allies and partners in the region, been receptive to 
this?
    Have you been able to integrate them in any cases? Talk 
about the ally and partner piece if you would.
    General Kurilla. Congressman, that is probably the strength 
of it. So, our goal by the end of this year is to have 100 
unmanned surface and subsurface vessels. Right now, we're on 
path. We're getting close to 50.
    But, we can see right now our way forward to 85, 75 percent 
of them through our partners. And, we just did an exercise with 
Bahrain and we did an exercise in the Gulf of--up in Aqaba, 
where we took partners and everybody was able to see the same 
feed.
    It didn't go back through NAVCENT, Naval Command Central. 
It didn't go back through them; it went directly to our partner 
nations. That's what they find so useful about it.
    And, candidly, it's because it's not foreign military sales 
and some of the bureaucracy that's associated with that to be 
able to get it, and the timelines to get it, because they can 
go directly to the vendor and purchase.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you for that. Quickly, General 
Langley, I know I only have a little bit over a minute.
    Can you talk a little bit about the threat as you see it, 
posed by the Chinese Communist Party's infrastructure 
investments in the AFRICOM AOR?
    General Langley. Yes, Congressman. Some of their 
infrastructure investment, such as Smart Cities, have possibly 
dual use or infringe upon the privacy of the African citizens 
at large.
    So, there's some ill intentions by their actions. And we 
can, you know, show that and talk to it with our partners and 
tell the cautionary tales that some of their infrastructure on 
the face of it may serve them, serve their purposes.
    But, in the end, through the financing realm, it can have 
some ill effects on their society.
    Mr. Gallagher. I appreciate that. I probably don't have 
enough time for another question. Maybe just quickly back to 
General Kurilla.
    Within your AOR, going back to allies and partners, what do 
you think is the country that doesn't get enough focus or 
attention that we need to be paying a little bit closer 
attention to?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, that's a hard question. I 
mean, I spend about 50 percent of my time in the region. I've 
been to every country except Iran, Afghanistan, and 
Turkmenistan right now.
    Mr. Gallagher. Interesting. Okay. I guess we'll answer 
another time. It wouldn't be offensive to the other, the 
countries that you leave out. But, appreciate it.
    Mr. Scott. The Chair now recognizes Congresswoman Escobar 
for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And many thanks to 
our witnesses for your time today before our committee, but 
also, of course, most especially for your service to our 
country. I represent El Paso, Texas, home to Fort Bliss, a key 
military installation in our country.
    General Kurilla, as you've taken command of a COCOM 
[combatant command] that has seen a very significant 
redirection of resources over the last decade as the United 
States repositioned focus from the global war on terrorism to 
great power competition, you have mentioned in your testimony 
the threats in your AOR continue to evolve in complexity and 
risk, particularly in air domain.
    Can you elaborate on the cooperative efforts between 
industry and academia that are propelling the work of Task 
Force 99?
    I have long held a particular interest in making sure that 
we link as closely as possible to the brilliance within 
academia to our advantage.
    General Kurilla. Thank you, Congresswoman. So, Task Force 
99, that is our Air Domain Innovation Task Force. One of the 
things we're working with them is to shorten the kill chains.
    We're doing a lot of stuff with artificial intelligence and 
machine learning to be able to do dynamic targeting. But we are 
seeing, and our goal is by this January from a year ago, to be 
able to increase 700 percent our ability to target dynamic 
targets in a 24-hour period.
    Part of that comes from our work on being able to educate 
our force on how to use machine learning and artificial 
intelligence. When we look across the entire force, we look, 
one of them is our digital literacy. So, how do we improve the 
digital literacy of the force?
    A lot of our younger generation that comes in, they have 
this. But, then again, as our leaders are a little older, they 
may not have it. So, how do we educate them?
    And through academia is one of the methods that we do it.
    Ms. Escobar. Are there some key opportunities in that area, 
in terms of the education that you see where Congress can be 
helpful?
    General Kurilla. I think that as we identify these, we'll 
certainly come to Congress if we need the assistance. But, I 
think we have all the authorities that we need to be able to do 
that now, ma'am.
    Ms. Escobar. Great. Thank you. Dr. Wallander, General 
Kurilla, while Russia and the Chinese Communist Party look to 
meddle in CENTCOM and foster financial dependencies by other 
countries, the United States has, and will continue, to provide 
security assistance and weapons to strategic allies in the 
region, just as we are currently doing in Ukraine.
    However, shortfalls of our domestic industrial base have 
come to the forefront of conversations as we look to backfill 
our own stockpiles for our security and that of our allies. To 
this point, can you outline some of the broad FMS [foreign 
military sales] challenges that affect your ability to maintain 
commitments to our ally nations, and what risk do we incur when 
our domestic industrial base cannot meet those FMS 
requirements?
    And, we'll start with Dr. Wallander, please.
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congresswoman. As I believe you 
are aware, but allow me to emphasize, the Department recognizes 
the challenges in the defense industrial base in providing 
timely capabilities, for example, to Ukraine, backfilling 
ourselves and allies, and fulfilling a lot of those contracts.
    Deputy Secretary Hicks is leading a whole-of-department 
focus on identifying obstacles and opportunities in relations 
with the defense industrial base. One of the achievements was 
Congress authorizing and allowing us to do multiyear 
procurement contracts, because that's one of the things we have 
heard from industry.
    But, this is a major focus of the Department. And, we've 
already seen progress in some areas in procuring ammunition, 
producing and procuring ammunition more quickly.
    But, much remains to be done, including in fulfilling many 
of those partner contracts.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you. General Kurilla.
    General Kurilla. Congresswoman, specifically what specific 
munitions. We see it really on our high-end munitions, our 
Patriots, THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area Defense], and even 
the F-16, because we--but, the good news there is, we just had 
our very first F-16 Block 70 come off the South Carolina line.
    And, that's going to be going to Bahrain. And, we have 
orders for those for Bahrain and Jordan as well.
    Ms. Escobar. Great. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, I 
yield back.
    The Chairman [presiding]. The Chair now recognizes the 
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gaetz, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. General Langley, I have constituents that have 
been scattered across Africa on train-and-equip missions. So, 
just ballpark in the last decade, how many Africans has the 
United States military trained and equipped?
    General Langley. Congressman, I don't have that figure. I 
can get that figure for you.
    Mr. Gaetz. Just ballpark. Just, you know, how many?
    General Langley. Congressman, it would be a wild guess 
right now.
    Mr. Gaetz. It seems like something we should know, right?
    General Langley. Over the years we have trained a 
substantial number, especially in the Gulf of Guinea states. 
But, including----
    Mr. Gaetz. Is it more than 10,000?
    General Langley. It is more than 10,000.
    Mr. Gaetz. More than 50,000?
    General Langley. I'd say we're reaching around 50,000 at 
least.
    Mr. Gaetz. Okay. And, what percentage of the people we've 
trained end up participating in insurrections or coups against 
their own government?
    General Langley. A very small number, Congressman. A very 
small number.
    Mr. Gaetz. So, what percentage do you think?
    General Langley. I'd say probably less than 1 percent.
    Mr. Gaetz. But, it does happen, right?
    General Langley. The IMET program is in force, and we've 
pushed a number, a significant number through our schools 
across the military, so.
    Mr. Gaetz. Yeah. And, what data sets do you track to arrive 
at the conclusion that less than 1 percent of the roughly 
50,0000 that we've trained have participated in coups?
    Because it would be like about 500, about 1 percent of 
50,000.
    General Langley. Congressman, we may have that information. 
I don't at this time. But, I know there's----
    Mr. Gaetz. Well, I know there are some, right? Like in--go 
ahead and throw up that image. This is Colonel Mamady 
Doumbouya.
    And, this is a photo of him. Did we train and equip him in 
Guinea?
    General Langley. By name, I cannot identify that.
    Mr. Gaetz. Well, that guy in the middle with the big red 
hat, Colonel Mamady Doumbouya, that's him with a bunch of U.S. 
service members outside of our embassy.
    And, just months after this photo was taken in 2021, he led 
a coup in Guinea and threw out the leader. Does that concern 
you?
    General Langley. Congressman, core values is what we start 
off with in IMET programs. And, we stick with that.
    Mr. Gaetz. Do we share core values with Colonel Doumbouya?
    General Langley. Core values. I will repeat that, core 
values, respect for it matters.
    Mr. Gaetz. I know. But, do we--do we share those values 
with Colonel Doumbouya?
    General Langley. Absolutely. In our----
    Mr. Gaetz. We do?
    General Langley. In our curriculum.
    Mr. Gaetz. He led a coup.
    General Langley. We do.
    Mr. Gaetz. Okay. Like, that's a very telling answer. In, 
Burkina Faso, did we share core values with the leader that we 
trained there who led a coup?
    General Langley. It's in our curriculum. We stress core 
values.
    Mr. Gaetz. Leading a coup is part of our curriculum?
    General Langley. We request civilian-led governance. So,--
--
    Mr. Gaetz. Wait a minute. Hold on, hold on. Is leading 
coups in our curriculum?
    General Langley. Absolutely not.
    Mr. Gaetz. So,----
    General Langley. Civilian led----
    Mr. Gaetz. My question is----
    General Langley. Civilian led----
    Mr. Gaetz. My question is, do we share core values with the 
coup leader in Burkina Faso, who we trained?
    General Langley. Holistically we teach whole, you know, 
core values, with a respect for civilian governance, 
apolitical. And, that's what sticks across a very high 
percentage, in the 90----
    Mr. Gaetz. But, not everybody, right?
    General Langley. Over 99 percentile.
    Mr. Gaetz. But not everybody. And, when it--I wonder how 
many people it takes to plan a coup? I mean, initially you 
didn't know how many we trained and equipped.
    Then, you said it was 1 percent. You had no basis for that 
1 percent number, because there's no data set you track.
    Mr. Chairman, I seek unanimous consent to enter into the 
record ``Another U.S.-trained soldier stages a coup in West 
Africa'' by the Intercept.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 131.]
    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Gaetz. And, I further seek unanimous consent to enter 
into the record, ``U.S. Forces trained the Guinean colonel 
behind the recent coup in West African country.'' And, this is 
in regard to Guinea.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 140.]
    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Gaetz. So, I guess the question is, why should U.S. 
taxpayers be paying to train people who then lead coups in 
Africa?
    General Langley. Congressman, our curriculum harvests core 
values and also to be able to embolden these countries for a 
representative democracy.
    Mr. Gaetz. But General, that democracy isn't what emerges. 
The problem is, I know you may have great confidence in what 
you're teaching, but when two governments have been overthrown. 
I guess, how many governments have to be overthrown by people 
we train before you sort of get the message that our core 
values might not be sticking with everyone?
    Is it five countries? Ten?
    General Langley. We'll continue with our persistence in 
assuring----
    Mr. Gaetz. But, do you think it's a good----
    General Langley. That they harbor, that they harbor 
democratic norms and democratic values----
    Mr. Gaetz. Just a moment ago you said----
    General Langley. That are apolitical.
    Mr. Gaetz. You said we shared core values with Colonel 
Doumbouya. You said that just moments ago in response to my 
question. And, his core value seems to be leading a coup.
    So, I don't think it stuck. I think we should at least know 
how many countries we train the coup plotters in. How many is 
too many?
    Because clearly, two is not too many. And, I think we could 
use our resources far more effectively than doing this.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair 
now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ryan, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being 
here. In particular, I just want to thank General Langley and 
General Kurilla as we mark the 20th anniversary essentially of 
our tremendous sacrifice and service of all of our service 
members in Iraq.
    I know you both spent a significant amount of time there. 
And, I just want to thank you as someone who also spent some 
time there. And, thank everyone that has risked and sacrificed 
in those conflicts. And, just appreciate you all.
    I wanted to follow up, General Kurilla, I really 
appreciated your focus. And, my colleague, Mr. Gallagher, was 
talking about the innovation opportunities, just to build on 
that and follow on that, and also bring General Langley a 
little bit into the conversation.
    I think this is one of the most important and exciting 
things that you all are doing. I wanted to ask, between Task 
Force 59, 99, and 39, but also what you're both seeing and 
observing out of Ukraine?
    You know, our allied forces fighting, innovating, iterating 
rapidly, what are we learning there? What are you all observing 
there that we can carry to the threats in your AORs as well as 
threats in other AORs?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, thank you for that. I think 
you nailed it. We are watching what they're doing there.
    And again, I think the innovation is because they're in 
conflict, because they're in this operation right now, that's 
where we see the most learning and the best ideas coming 
forward.
    You're familiar with how they are using cell phones to be 
able to identify drones. And, they use, they basically 
operationalize the populace.
    Our Task Force 39, working with a vendor, we have created a 
very similar system, but that also uses artificial intelligence 
that they apply against it. That we think we can operationalize 
a lot of the population in the Middle East to help identify and 
track drones outside of just using a radar.
    We do find that the best ideas on how to operationalize 
things come from those at the pointy end of the spear.
    Mr. Ryan. And, just to follow up on that, how can we, of 
course, there's no substitute for being in direct combat, but 
how can we replicate, how can we create, how can we scale what 
you're doing in your task forces?
    General Langley, are you taking similar approaches? And, 
what authorities and tools can we give you all to, as close as 
we can, create those cycles of innovation?
    General Kurilla. So, Congressman, what I would tell you, 
that we are sharing with our other combatant command partners, 
and back with the services obviously. We get a lot of the 
funding from the service to do this.
    One of the ways we do this, is by training and exercises. I 
think that's where you really can flesh out the best ways.
    And, you put them through very difficult training where you 
stress the systems. We've had numerous exercises, like I said, 
we just finished one, 7,000 people, 42 countries, 35 ships, 30 
platforms, AI platforms and artificial intelligence platforms.
    By doing that, we learn from that. And then we say, how can 
we get better or what do we take from this to then apply it at 
scale?
    General Langley. Congressman, I have the same enthusiasm 
about what effects we're going to get from our joint exercise 
program. We just finished last month Obangame Express for 
Maritime Awareness. We also finished Flintlock, and also 
embarking on African Lion.
    This was where, a form where we collectively share ideas 
with our partners. And then they gain capacity and capability 
from, and also interoperability. So, to address some of the 
needs and whether it be in the maritime domain space or in 
counter-VEO type operations.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you. And, I think just as a follow-on to 
encourage us to think about, no need to answer, but how we can 
scale and keep, you know, these sorts of initiatives not 
personality-based and by exception but make them both 
institutionalized but still adaptive.
    So, I really appreciate that. A brief amount of time left, 
but I wanted to ask you both to expand a little bit more on 
your answer, General Kurilla, on the 1991 and 2002 AUMFs 
related to Iraq.
    We're obviously having this debate now in Congress, which I 
think is very necessary and healthy, and would ask again, just 
to expand on your brief answer, General Kurilla, you don't 
foresee significant or any operational risks were those to be 
repealed?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, I do not use the 2002 as the 
basis for our operations. We use the 2001 AUMF.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you. General Langley.
    General Langley. The same. We use the 2001 AUMF. And, if 
that was considered, we'll need to take another look at what 
would be in its place if that's addressed.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Indiana, Mr. Banks, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Kurilla, last 
week or 2 weeks ago, the House voted against a measure that 
would have tied the hands of the administration on our troop 
levels in Syria.
    I've been out of the room for a little bit, I don't know if 
you've already discussed this. But, can you talk about what 
we're doing in Syria? Why it's important? How many troops are 
there? Give us the full defense of our activities there.
    General Kurilla. Thanks Congressman. So, we are in Syria 
for the enduring defeat of ISIS. That is our daily mission. We 
are doing that through a partnered force called the Syrian 
Democratic Forces.
    And, if I can talk about ISIS in Syria, we put them into 
three categories. The first one is ISIS at large. Those are the 
individuals that we are going after every day through our 
partnered forces.
    Last year we did 313 partnered ops [operations] in Iraq and 
Syria. This year we've done 129. They're in the lead. That same 
Syrian Democratic Force that was in Syria going after ISIS, 
they took over 10,000 killed, over 20,000 wounded going after 
ISIS, basically from 2014 until today.
    That is the ISIS at large that we see. Most of the ISIS 
very senior leadership--the leader, the Caliph, Abu Bakr al-
Baghdadi, Abdul Qureshi, those are the ones--they were 
basically command-and-controlling the ISIS global enterprise 
from northwest Syria and areas inside of Syria. We think we 
have contained ISIS in Syria, but the ideology is uncontained 
and unconstrained.
    The next category is ISIS in detention. And, I call it an 
ISIS army in detention. There's over 10,000 ISIS detainees 
across 26 prisons that those are at-risk.
    When we do our targeting inside of Syria, we go after those 
that are doing external operations or those that are trying to 
break that army out of prison. If they were to get out, there's 
approximately 2,000 ISIS is our estimate in Syria, you would 
five times more the size of what they currently have.
    And lastly, it's the last, it's the potential for the next 
generation of ISIS in Al-Hol and Al-Roj camps. I was in these 
camps 2 weeks ago. I've been to Syria six times, and I've seen, 
I've been in--I was in that detention facility in Hasakah.
    That's why we are there, is to go after the enduring defeat 
of ISIS.
    Mr. Banks. So, can you, would you quantify the troops who 
are in Syria as special operations troops? What types of 
personnel do we have there?
    General Kurilla. Every kind, Congressman. We have special 
operations forces, we have National Guard, and we have Active 
Duty.
    Mr. Banks. Yeah, and can you quantify the troop level 
again, of approximately----
    General Kurilla. It's 900, but it goes plus or minus on 
that, based on if we have to bring up a temporary enabling 
force because of that. And, also when you do as we call a 
relief in place/transfer of authority, those numbers go up.
    So, when we bring in, based on a capability that we want to 
bring, that's called temporary enabling. Much like we brought 
Bradley fighting vehicles in, for a temporary period of time, 
you'll see those numbers will go up.
    And, I think it, for the return on investment you get for 
that very small force, what you are seeing is really the 
containment of ISIS in Syria right now.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. I appreciate the overview of why we're 
there. Tell us what would happen if we weren't there. And maybe 
perhaps Afghanistan as a parallel example, if you removed 
troops, then what happens if we leave Syria?
    General Kurilla. It is my commander's estimate, and my 
intel analysts, that if we were to leave Syria, and if the SDF 
[Syrian Democratic Forces] could not fight the ISIS by 
themselves, you could see a breakout of the prisons. You could 
see the radicalization inside Al-Hol. And, it is our estimate 
that ISIS would return in 1 to 2 years.
    Again, there's no military solution for Syria. It's going 
to take a whole-of-government approach. When you look at the 
detainees, when you look at the IDPs [internally displaced 
people] that are in Al-Hol, we need to repatriate them, 
rehabilitate, and reintegrate them back into their countries of 
origin.
    Mr. Banks. How important is it to protect the Omar 
oilfields? What would happen if we weren't there to the--would 
ISIS take over the oilfields?
    General Kurilla. I think if we weren't there, I mean, we're 
not there to protect the oilfields. We're there for the 
enduring defeat of ISIS.
    I think you would see either the Wagner forces that are 
along the Dahisar River, or you'd see Russian forces or Syrian 
forces go in there.
    If you remember back in 2018, Wagner, a very large force of 
Wagner tried to go and actually attack U.S. forces and our 
Syrian partners or the Syrian Democratic Forces, and they 
understood what American firepower can do, and we killed over 
300 of them.
    Mr. Banks. What about the ISIS threat to Israel? If we 
pulled out, what would that, what could potentially occur vis-
a-vis Israel from a threat from Syria?
    General Kurilla. What we see with ISIS in Syria, that is an 
area where they do try and do their external ops. That's why we 
target the external operations.
    ISIS-Sinai is probably a bigger threat, where they try and 
go across. And then, there's the ISIS really in the Levant. 
But, from a Syria standpoint, that's where they do their 
command and control from at the highest levels.
    Mr. Banks. Mr. Chairman, I'm glad I voted the way that I 
did a couple of weeks ago. With that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. McClellan, for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate this 
opportunity to discuss the priorities of AFRICOM and CENTCOM, 
especially into regions of the world where incredible 
instability and the widespread use of irregular warfare have 
largely defined the nature of the conflict.
    We are now approximately a year and a half removed from the 
withdrawal of American forces in Afghanistan. How is CENTCOM 
working to reposition resources following the withdrawal to 
continue addressing emerging threats in the region?
    General Kurilla. Thank you, Congresswoman. So, what we are 
doing, is we are trying to increase our intelligence collection 
capability inside of Afghanistan. It's not just about an ISR 
platform flying over the top, but, it's also increasing our 
SIGINT, our cyber, and most probably importantly, is our human 
intelligence collection inside of there.
    One of the things, a positive new story, is that we have 
been funded from alternative airborne ISR. This is something 
other than an MQ9. But we are trying to find things that can go 
up and have endurance that go for days and weeks, and still be 
able to have the appropriate sensor payload on them, whether 
that's IMINT or image intelligence, or full motion video, or 
signals intelligence.
    And, we should be bringing some of those capabilities 
online as early as this May.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you. And, General Langley, could you 
elaborate on what AFRICOM is doing to combat irregular warfare, 
particularly misinformation, to bolster stability within Africa 
partners and allies?
    General Langley. Yes, thanks for that question. Yes, a lot 
of misinformation and disinformation in the name of competition 
with our immediate and acute threat and also the pacing threat.
    And so, we address this with a whole-of-government 
approach. I do have some authorities to address this from our 
military information support operations.
    But then, it goes deeper than that across the whole of 
government. State Department has some authorities themselves as 
well as there are near-term authorities that are developing 
across the interagency as well so that we can apply 
collectively for cumulative effects.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Waltz, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you. General Kurilla, I just want to build 
on Mr. Banks' questions. I mean, you laid out a compelling case 
for why it's critical that we have partnership, we have 
presence, we have bases in and around Syria to maintain 
pressure on ISIS. Is that a correct characterization?
    General Kurilla. That is a correct characterization, 
Congressman.
    Mr. Waltz. Ms. Wallander, from a policy standpoint, why is 
it critical to have a presence and partnership in Syria to go 
after ISIS, but it's acceptable to not have it in Afghanistan?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, there was a decision made that 
the----
    Mr. Waltz. I'm familiar with the decision. I'm talking 
about now, going forward, the President of the United States 
said it was an extraordinary success, over-the-horizon 
capabilities, no problem. We do it in Syria. We do it in 
Somalia.
    Why do we, why is it not important to have a presence in 
Afghanistan from a counterterrorism standpoint?
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, as General Kurilla made clear, 
that the ability of CENTCOM to monitor and act against the 
coalescence and the effectiveness of an ISIS threat from 
Afghanistan, is something he believes he is able to build 
additional resources on, and is--remains a CENTCOM mission. 
And, policy fully supports CENTCOM in that mission.
    Mr. Waltz. Ms. Wallander, I think history is going to prove 
you very wrong, the President wrong. And, just as it proved 
many members of this committee and the national security 
committee, or the national security community in Washington 
wrong when we yanked out of Iraq in 2011, really had no follow-
on plan.
    We had the rise of ISIS by 2014. And, we now have more 
forces back in Iraq than we had in 2011 at a tremendous cost of 
lives and treasure.
    So, General Kurilla, do you think there's a likelihood if 
we have another attack, which you have stated is possible 
within the next 6 months, that we'll have to go back in some 
way, shape, or form, to Afghanistan?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, you know, when I stated that 
we have, that they could attack in under 6 months with little 
to no warning, I'm referring to an enabled attack where it is 
funded directly against interests abroad, U.S. interests 
abroad.
    Mr. Waltz. Yeah.
    General Kurilla. Going back into Afghanistan would 
obviously be a policy question, how we would address that. I 
would try and address that as best I could from the rise----
    Mr. Waltz. Is ISIS gaining in capability in Afghanistan? 
Gaining in capability--they certainly have the intent to hit 
our interests around the world.
    Are they gaining in capability?
    General Kurilla. ISIS is stronger today in Afghanistan.
    Mr. Waltz. Then they were last year?
    General Kurilla. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz. Are we seeing a cooperation with ISIS in 
Afghanistan and other elements, for example, in Syria and 
Europe?
    General Kurilla. So, much like there are regional combatant 
commands, ISIS is a global organization. They have an 
organization called the Al-Sadiq office that is responsible for 
all of ISIS from Kazakhstan, Afghanistan, Pakistan, India, all 
the way down to Indonesia.
    The Al-Karrar office is in----
    Mr. Waltz. No. I'm familiar with the broad organization. 
Are we seeing active cooperation with ISIS in Afghanistan with 
those other entities?
    General Kurilla. They do communicate back and forth with 
the head of ISIS, the global affiliate.
    Mr. Waltz. And, you're seeing--we've experienced an 80 
percent loss in what remaining ISR you have, which is less than 
you had, or less than CENTCOM had 2 years ago, right? And an 80 
percent degradation due to transit time, correct?
    General Kurilla. I'm spending 80 percent of my time in 
transit. It is actually a greater than 80 percent loss at this 
point.
    Mr. Waltz. Do we have any bases in any country surrounding 
Afghanistan with which we can use to launch ISR or any type of 
strike or assets?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, I think it would be great to 
talk about that in a closed session. And I can talk about the 
efforts that we're working.
    Mr. Waltz. Would it be helpful if you had a base in a 
neighboring country?
    General Kurilla. Proximity reduces transit time. So, what 
I'm trying to do is increase the time I am over the target. 
That's just airborne ISR. But there's a lot more than just 
other intelligence parameters.
    Mr. Waltz. Given our presence in Syria, did you agree with 
General McKenzie, your predecessor, that having a small 
footprint at Bagram in Afghanistan would be helpful for 
counter--ongoing counterterrorism efforts?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, I think that decision's 
already been made.
    Mr. Waltz. Right. But, do you agree that it would be 
helpful now, say that decision was reversed?
    General Kurilla. So, any time you have proximity to the 
target, you are more effective.
    Mr. Waltz. Do you know, General, how far Bagram is from the 
Chinese border?
    General Kurilla. I don't know the exact distance.
    Mr. Waltz. Several hundred miles. It's actually closer to 
the border of China where, by the way, they have a massive 
nuclear buildup, than Mexico City is to the Texas border.
    General Kurilla. I spent about 5 years on Bagram.
    Mr. Waltz. Yeah. It's close. Right? A 12,000-foot runway 
capable of holding strategic bombers. Just bear with me, 
hypothetical, do you think China, if China had that close of an 
airbase to the Texas border they would have just given it up?
    General Kurilla. I am not sure, Congressman.
    Mr. Waltz. I would bet not. I think we know the answer to 
that. Thank you, General. I yield.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. I now recognize the 
gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Davis, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Davis. All right. Thanks so much, Mr. Chair and to the 
ranking member. And, good afternoon to each and every one of 
you. Thanks so much for your leadership and your service to the 
Nation, in particular your command units at different times in 
your career at Fort Bragg and Lejeune, as a North Carolinian, 
so.
    My first question I want to direct to General Kurilla. 
Israel, realigned from the European Command to Central Command 
in late 2021. How has the inclusion of Israel strengthened the 
partnership between militaries and with the forces throughout 
the Middle East?
    General Kurilla. We view it as a net positive right now, 
Congressman. They bring tremendous capability. They have the 
ability to share some of their, the things that they are doing.
    We view it as a net positive across the board. And, when 
you look at the Abraham Accords, those aren't just military, 
those are also economic as well.
    Mr. Davis. Awesome. General Langley, I want to pivot, and 
speaking of the Abraham Accords, can you talk specifically 
about the impact of the Abraham Accords with African partner 
nations?
    General Langley. Congressman, Morocco, they were part of 
the Abraham Accords, and I would just go ahead and state that 
they are probably our top, or close to the top, non-NATO [North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies, them and Tunisia, that 
actually export security.
    So, we see that with African Lion coming up, you know, that 
their handshake with the Israelis is going forward. And, 
collectively for regional security across--well, the merge of 
EUCOM and AFRICOM's AORs, is going to just add capacity for 
that region in an agreement, a sharing of ideas and sharing of 
tactics that these exercises bring.
    So, I see it as a positive thing.
    Mr. Davis. All right. And, General Langley, General 
Richardson previously testified about the growing PRC space 
infrastructure, in particular, the footprint in the SOUTHCOM 
AOR. There's a concern with those developments and related 
advancements in Chinese space capabilities.
    Can you please discuss the PRC's growing space footprint 
with African nations and the security implications for the U.S. 
and our allies?
    General Langley. So Congressman, thanks for that question, 
because there are aspirations across a number of countries 
across the continent in which they have already established 
agreements for building space capacity in various countries.
    Just of late, there's Djibouti. But, they're coming with a 
thinly veiled proposition that is for goodwill. But I am 
concerned that it will maybe have some other sharing or dual 
use in a military sense, especially in tracking satellites.
    They're already down, Swakopmund is down in Namibia, in 
which they do that by one of their state-owned institutions. 
But, they have to share technology by law to the CCP. And, 
therein lies probably an indicator, a leading indicator that it 
will probably have some future military use.
    Mr. Davis. Okay. And, do you believe that any of the PRC 
space infrastructure projects are going to benefit those 
countries? Or, is this just more of a one-way relationship?
    General Langley. Congressman, that time's going to tell. 
That time's going to tell.
    Mr. Davis. And, General Kurilla, earlier this month Saudi 
Arabia and Iran announced an agreement brokered by China to 
normalize relations. Can you speak to the concerns you have 
about China mediating this agreement?
    General Kurilla. Yes, Congressman. So, I think the concern 
we should have is that we've seen China use its national 
instruments of power, their economic through their Belt and 
Road Initiative through the region, their informational, their 
military, through their quick fast FMS, and now, for the first 
time we're seeing their diplomatic.
    China has chosen to compete on a global scale. And, this is 
an area where they're choosing to compete.
    Mr. Davis. What does this mean as it pertains to our 
military relations with Saudi Arabia?
    General Kurilla. We have very strong military relations 
with Saudi Arabia. What we're talking about in this agreement 
is really about opening up diplomatic ties.
    They had it for 37 years until 2016, until Iran stormed 
their embassy and burned part of their embassy and they cut off 
their diplomatic ties. So, that was, they had it for 37 years 
prior to that. And, there was still high tension between both 
of them.
    And so, I think what this means really in the region is 
that this was going on for 2 years prior, but that China came 
in to swoop and try and take the credit for this mediation.
    Mr. Davis. Thanks again for being here today. And, I yield 
back, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Johnson, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all for 
being here. General Langley, there's been a lot of discussion 
today, and every day here, about the influence of China and the 
CCP. And, we're concerned about that in Africa as well as all 
over the globe.
    A couple of weeks ago when we had the NORTHCOM/SOUTHCOM 
posture hearing, I spoke with General Richardson about the 
tools that we have at our disposal to combat that growing 
influence.
    And, she mentioned that our partnerships with those 
countries are one of the biggest benefits in that endeavor. 
Would you say that's true of AFRICOM as well?
    General Langley. Yes, Congressman.
    Mr. Johnson. General Richardson also mentioned that there's 
probably more that we could be doing as a country to make our 
presence more visible. And, she indicated that, you know, 
defense partnerships and commercial endeavors and other things 
can help in that regard.
    Are there things that you're doing to increase that 
visibility and try to make the pitch that the United States is 
really the country to partner with and not China?
    General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question. 
Because holistically, if China had to look at our 3D approach, 
in a negative sense they would probably tell our partners that 
it's an empty suit.
    So, what I'm saying here Congressman, is we need to be able 
to respond at the speed of relevance in the quantity that the 
PRC's providing, across all fronts in my title 10 authorities.
    China will sell their wares, their military wares to a 
partner that is at the cusp of being subjugated by an extremist 
organization. They can provide the weaponry real quick.
    My title 10 authorities and 333, train and equip, or even 
our FMS-type program, it moves too slow. So, we want to--the 
panacea to this is to become the partner of choice.
    But we just need the authorities to move faster. And that 
goes across the whole of governments with USAID and the 
flexible funding and also State Department as well.
    And, lastly, I would say that China moves at the speed of 
relevance. And that's--and we're not forcing our partners to 
choose.
    But, we need--they do know that we do have a value 
proposition of quality equipment and they will hang in the 
balance waiting for us to respond.
    Mr. Johnson. It's disconcerting to us as Members of 
Congress to hear we might be regarded as an empty suit anywhere 
at any time, because we don't maintain the peace through 
strength if that's how we're regarded.
    In a perfect world, how would that title 10 authority be 
expanded? What would that look like?
    General Langley. So Congressman, first of all I would say 
just holistically, of all the whole portfolio, of State 
Partnership Programs and then the security force assistance 
brigade, they need persistent presence.
    So, as we, as our country teams make this request, we need 
to be able to affect this in less than 24 months. We need to 
shorten that, boots on the--from a request to boots on the 
ground real fast.
    Because these partners are saying, we don't need your boots 
on the ground, you know, we just need the training. And our 
partnership is affecting that through exercises.
    And then collectively, actually, just going outside the 
USGOV, thanks for the legislation of Prosper Africa, Digital 
Africa, and other types of legislation that causes, that 
affects our private sector to invest in Africa. Holistically, 
that will make a full suit.
    Mr. Johnson. Very good, thank you. Shifting gears quickly, 
General Kurilla, as we've entered this new era, I'm curious 
about how all of you process and prioritize competing mission 
sets, specifically with weighing strategic competition versus 
counterterrorism threats that have dominated us for the last 20 
years or so.
    Do you have any recommendations for us about the way that 
we should view this? The lens through which we should see these 
issues?
    General Kurilla. Thank you, Congressman. So, as I look at 
it, I prioritize deterring Iran, counter VEO, and strategic 
competition against China and Russia.
    I believe that CENTCOM is literally and figuratively 
central to competition with China and Russia. We have a six and 
a half times longer border with Russia than NATO. That's along 
the Kazakhstan border. We have a longer border with China then 
we have in the U.S./Mexican border.
    I think our strategic competition is our presence as well, 
and it's our partnership. What we bring is long, enduring 
partnerships. We've been there in the past; we were there for 
75 years; we are there today; and we'll be there in the future.
    China, everything China does is for its own self-interest. 
And, they view the partners in the region through a lens of 
customer or client.
    It's no real surprise that they try tried to negotiate the 
Iran/KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] deal, because they get 50 
percent of their energy comes through the Straits of Hormuz. It 
gets--one-third of their gas comes from the region.
    And so, when we look at that, they are trying to ensure 
that their interests are secure. But, it's only for their own 
self-interest.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you so much. I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair 
now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Veasey.
    Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. And I want 
to welcome everyone for coming to testify today. I would also 
like to give a special welcome to General Langley. We're both 
graduates of the Fort Worth Independent School District.
    This may be the first time that two Fort Worth Independent 
School District people have asked questions back and forth to 
each other. And so, welcome you.
    We know that the PRC has planted seeds all over the African 
continent. And in your statement, General Langley, you said 
that USA AFRICOM does not seek to block benefits that the PRC 
can bring to the continent's nations.
    Based on your overall threat assessment, and level of 
knowledge, is there a solution that can further contain Chinese 
influence in the AOR?
    General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question. 
Because on the forefront as engagement with our competitors, as 
we engage with our African partners that we want to become and 
stay the partner of choice for strategic access and strategic 
influence in some cases.
    China does have a proposition, I would say, the Belt and 
Road Initiative. But, they characterize it, the whole name is 
One Belt and One Road. That's a one-way road back to Beijing. 
Those are the cautionary tales that across the interagency and 
across the whole of government that we do tell them.
    We're not forcing our partners to choose, but we need to be 
able to represent our value proposition across the whole of 
government that builds capacity across their institutions as 
well as their governance as well. In the end, our partners 
realize that we are the partner of choice.
    Mr. Veasey. Yeah. Yeah, another question that I wanted to 
ask you is how does AFRICOM work with African countries to 
promote regional economic development and stability?
    And, what role does this play in advancing U.S. interests? 
I know that when, you know, myself and Mr. Panetta and Austin 
Scott went to Djibouti back in 2017, we saw the base that the 
Chinese were building there.
    You know, later learned through reports in the media that 
there was a secret base that they were building underneath the 
base that the Djibouti government probably didn't know anything 
about.
    So, we know that some of these economic development 
projects come with certain strings attached. Do you, can you 
talk a little bit about how we're doing that?
    And if you think that we're doing enough to advance the 
economic stability in Africa? Because we know especially with 
these mineral-rich areas that they have there, that actors like 
the Russians and the Chinese are certainly going to want to 
make long-term strategic partnerships with these African 
countries.
    General Langley. Congressman, there's a couple of things to 
address your question. What we are doing holistically across a 
whole-of-government approach, and various legislations in the 
last couple of years, Prosper Africa that will affect more 
investment through the private industry.
    And, a number of agencies in the Department are signatories 
of that. We just need to get it off the ground.
    And then for the fragile states, our Global Fragility Act, 
which is now characterized as the prevent conflict, promote 
civility, are other mechanisms that we share with our partners 
and the country teams to get this off the ground.
    From the PRC's persistence on going after rare earth 
minerals or mining, there is a mechanism where we illuminate 
and amplify some of the ill effects of those partnerships or 
those deals that were struck by the PRC. And, we pay attention 
to that. And we do that in the information space in direct 
conversations with our partners.
    Mr. Veasey. Yeah. Well, thank you. General Kurilla, I 
wanted to know about just the level of cooperation and 
coordination between AFRICOM, EUCOM, and other government 
agencies, particularly as we're trying to talk about the Wagner 
Group's activities in Africa.
    And, I was hoping that both of you could briefly touch on 
that.
    General Kurilla. So, what I would say, in terms of 
information sharing and even resource sharing, Mike and I share 
resources all the time, and include Chris Cavoli, who is the 
commander of EUCOM.
    So, we all make sure we see the same site picture on the 
intel, specifically for Wagner. I have Wagner in Syria. He has 
Wagner all over Africa. And, Chris Cavoli is dealing with 
Wagner up in the Ukraine.
    So, I think it's important that we're all talking and 
sharing about the intelligence as well as the resources.
    General Langley. So, absolutely, I concur what, you know, 
Erik was saying. You know, the global integrator construct, and 
especially the NDS, talked about integrated deterrence.
    Just processes like that, sharing of information, 
collaborating between our staffs, sews up those seams. So, 
collectively it is very affective in the overall global 
integrated construct.
    Mr. Veasey. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Ro Khanna.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chair. General Kurilla, I 
appreciated our conversation yesterday. I was hoping you could 
share with the committee some of the insights you shared with 
me about why the Strait of Hormuz is critical to our 
relationship with China.
    And why, if America wants to make sure that we're leading 
in the 21st century, your work and your troops' work is 
critical even vis-a-vis China?
    General Kurilla. So, thank you, Congressman. So, what we 
talked about yesterday, was the fact that China gets over 50 
percent of its oil and over one-third of its natural gas from 
the CENTCOM region.
    Ninety-eight percent plus goes through by ship. It will 
come through the Straits of Hormuz. That makes them vulnerable.
    Seventy-two percent of all Chinese oil is imported. They 
have, domestically produce about 28 percent. So, that could 
make them vulnerable.
    God forbid there's ever a conflict with China, but we could 
end up holding a lot of their economy at risk in the CENTCOM 
region.
    Mr. Khanna. So, our having a presence there, and dominance 
there, to keep it a free-flowing sea, is a strategic value even 
as we look at the competition and strategic threat that China 
poses.
    General Kurilla. Correct, Congressman. And it's not just 
the Straits of Hormuz. It's also global commerce. Thirty 
percent of all container traffic in the world goes through the 
Suez Canal.
    I think in 2021, about 22,000 ships went through there. So 
really, we saw what happened when the Ever Given was stuck in 
the Suez Canal. That stopped $10 billion of trade a day until 
that was unstuck.
    Mr. Khanna. And, our values, we keep the freedom of the 
seas for every nation. It's not just that we're doing it for 
our nation. So, we're upholding our values in these areas. Is 
that correct?
    General Kurilla. And so what we also have is the Combined 
Maritime Force. It's 38 countries that participate in CENTCOM. 
It's the largest maritime partnership in the world.
    They do everything from maritime security to anti-piracy 
and to counter-smuggling. And, that's how we keep the, you 
know, the international rules-based order in the maritime 
domain.
    Mr. Khanna. Now, I know you've spent a lot of your 
testimony also on Iran. And I have a lot of constituents of 
Iranian background who say that this time the protests are 
different. This time the regime really is not going to last.
    I don't know if you're in a position to have a comment from 
what you're hearing in the area about what the sentiment is 
towards the regime and the protests.
    General Kurilla. So Congressman, what we can see is that 
the regime can deal with the domestic situation, but also do 
their malign behavior externally. So, their foreign policy, if 
you will, while they still deal with their domestic policy.
    It is my assessment right now though that even though the 
protests have put stress on the regime, it is not, it has not 
put the regime at risk.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you. General Langley, I appreciated your 
focus on development in Africa beyond just the defense. I'll 
tell you briefly, and then I'd like you to respond, my own 
perspective.
    My grandfather was in jail with Gandhi as part of the 
independence movement. Which, of course, also inspired Mandela. 
And my first view is that Africa should have what Africa wants, 
not be a plaything for just great power competition.
    I'm concerned that China has used Africa not to see African 
self-determination, but to basically use it for their own self-
interest in a form of neocolonialism.
    I wonder how you think America can have a policy towards 
development and economic growth that respects what African 
nations and Africa wants, and respects their sovereignty?
    General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question. 
And, you know, I profess the whole-of-government approach. But 
also, it's more than that, that would actually put more 
horsepower of us being the partner of choice.
    So, outside of the 3D construct, and I thank this Congress 
again for legislation of the past, to get things off the ground 
for private investment and also various departments investing 
in Prosper Africa, Digital Africa. But I think we need more.
    I think, I really do think we need more, because not just 
me saying that, this is some of the things that are 
communicated to me as I make my travels across the continent 
engaging with these countries.
    The Global Fragility Act, formerly known as, but the 
strategy what this professes, is prevent conflict and promote 
stability. They think the enduring process to actually address 
their immediate threat, is good governance.
    Collectively, State Department, USAID, and DOD [Department 
of Defense] are working together to be able to build capacity 
and bolster their governance under democratic norms. But, we 
need more investment across the others, across the 
aforementioned legislations that have been passed.
    We just need to put more investment into it.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Panetta, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, gentlemen, ma'am. As 
I get to my notes, recently we heard about a hostage, a couple 
of hostages that were released. One of them, it's been his 
second time being a hostage, I guess, Mr. Woodke, that is.
    But, I guess my question is surrounding the circumstances 
around his release, in that JNIM supposedly released him 
without any ransom. And it's kind of unclear whether Niger had 
anything to give up in these, I guess negotiations as you may 
call them.
    If he was released without ransom, what's your assessment 
of JNIM's motivation for the kidnapping?
    General Langley. Congressman, I'll be able to speak to that 
fully in closed session. But I will tell you this, it's--this 
is an indication of, and we just want to commend and thank 
Niger and President Bazoum in his efforts to be able to release 
Mr. Woodke.
    And that's--but in closed session I'll be able to shed a 
little bit more light on what we think will unfold as he is 
interviewed.
    Mr. Panetta. Affirm on that. And, I think we actually have 
a lot to thank Niger for, considering as I call them, sort of 
the Alamo in the Sahel right now.
    In that you're seeing a lot of, be it our forces, be it our 
allies' forces, kind of gathering there and staying there and 
being able to operate in there and out of there in order to 
deal with many of the VEOs.
    On that note, talking about Burkina Faso, obviously, that's 
experienced two military coups since January of 2022. You've 
got these regional insurgencies that are linked to al-Qaida and 
the Islamic State. And then, you're starting to see a little 
overt outreach potentially, to the Wagner Group, which is 
active in neighboring Mali.
    Now, JNIM and ISGS obviously, the Islamic State Greater 
Sahel, they control much of Burkina Faso's national territory. 
In particular the northern and eastern regions have faced a 
surge in threats from Islamist VEOs since 2016. Now, 
unfortunately, you're seeing the French forces being expelled 
or actually removing themselves from that area.
    I've been working with my good friend Austin Scott, we've 
traveled to the region. We want to make sure that our service 
members, they understand the danger that they're in. But, we 
want to ensure that they're paid accordingly with imminent 
danger pay [IDP], something that your predecessor tried to push 
through last May.
    A couple of questions. Can you tell us whether service 
members in Burkina Faso should be afforded IDP?
    General Langley. Congressman, yes.
    Mr. Panetta. Thank you for that straightforward answer. 
Second, obviously I remember asking somebody, I think it was in 
this position about 2 years ago, dealing with QRFs and the 
potential for quick reaction forces, and the need for quick 
reaction forces, not just in West Africa, but throughout 
Africa, and realizing how important they are.
    And the question I posed to him is, what are we doing about 
QRFs? And, they said, we are relying on our allies. With the 
French removing themselves from most of Africa, do you feel we 
still can rely on our allies for a quick reaction force? And, 
if not, what's--who can we rely on?
    General Langley. First of all, Congressman, thanks for 
asking that question. Because what I have to do on a regular 
basis, is assess the risk. Assess the risk of being able to 
respond to crisis.
    A foundational piece of that, a foundational capability is 
intelligence, is surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities 
so that we can reposition our assets to be able to respond to 
the probability of consequence. Connected to that is also being 
able to identify indications and warnings that helps us do 
that.
    You know, I thank this Congress, in the last couple of 
years, the last couple of budgets, the Warfighting--the 
Warfighter Recovery Network has gained and bolstered capacity. 
But I need more.
    And, you're right, Congressman, yes, we still support the 
French. And, the French support us as well. But we're also 
building capacity into our African partners to be able to go 
into that calculus.
    And being able to respond to crisis accordingly and cover 
some of the 16 high-threat embassies that we have across the 
ground, and the men and women of AFRICOM that are doing their 
due diligence in the execution of their mission.
    Mr. Panetta. Gentlemen, Doctor, thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Keating, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you 
for your service to the country. So many of us are coming in 
and out because we have coinciding hearings, many of them 
related.
    So, I just have a couple of questions given everything 
you've been asked to this point this morning. One of them, I'm 
curious, you know, Russia is involved in Africa with at least 
20 countries for precious resources.
    That includes gold and many of the Russian oligarchs 
involved in gold mining and activities. And the reports that 
many of them are circumventing sanctions and money is ending up 
back in Russia that's helping to fuel their war effort against 
Ukraine.
    What do you know about the ability of Russia and the last 
analysis, getting some of those revenues to help fuel their 
efforts in defiance of the sanctions? General.
    General Langley. Congressman, I've been briefed. That's 
exactly what's going on. Yevgeny Prigozhin and head of his 
private military company that's, they are the vanguard back to 
the Russian Federation.
    And, they do it through profit. Cash and profit. So, they 
have a false value proposition, especially the fragile 
governments across West Africa, where I characterize at the 
tipping point, which are looking for assistance to be able to 
provide security in the face of violent extremist 
organizations.
    And, sometimes they select Wagner to do it. But Wagner has 
a hidden agenda, road-mapping into their closest mine, whether 
it be gold or diamonds.
    That's what I'm concerned about. There is a revenue stream 
back to the Russian Federation.
    Mr. Keating. Anyone like----
    Dr. Wallander. Congressman, I would just add two points. 
One is that with the designation of Wagner as a transnational 
criminal organization, we have new instruments to constrain its 
ability to move money freely. And, the Biden administration is 
focusing on those instruments.
    And secondly, in the realm of sanctions evasion and illicit 
moving of money and resources, similarly, we are focused on 
sanctions enforcement, working with countries to shut down 
banks that Russia is using to move money. And, we can talk more 
about it in a classified setting if you'd like.
    Mr. Keating. Great. Well, thank you for those efforts. You 
know, our effort is to try and choke off as much resourcing as 
we can to Russia during this period.
    Just even though General Kurilla, you know, you obviously 
said in terms of Bagram that that decision is made already. 
But, it keeps being asked all the time.
    So, could you tell me from the present standpoint, what 
would be a quote/unquote, small footprint in Bagram? I mean, 
you need support forces. You just can't have a small footprint 
there.
    Can you just give us an approximate idea? I mean, how many 
people would it take? Not just to have a quote/unquote, small 
footprint, but to be able to support it safely?
    General Kurilla. I mean, I couldn't give you an exact 
number right now, because it would all depend on the threat. If 
we were back in Bagram right now, you would be--that would, you 
have the Taliban trying to attack us as well, as well as ISIS-
K.
    Mr. Keating. That's what I mean, right now. So, it would 
be, it wouldn't just be a small footprint. You'd need support 
services in maybe the tens of thousands? Or, just in total, to 
make sure that you have the support?
    General Kurilla. It would be based on the threat and the 
size of the force there. And, what is the mission that they're 
there for?
    Mr. Keating. Yeah. Just a presence there in terms of, you 
know, intelligence. A presence to have----
    General Kurilla. Well, you'd have to secure the entire 
base. And, that would require, you know, a security force. And 
then, if you're bringing in the intelligence apparatus and all 
the support structure.
    Mr. Keating. Right. So, my inclination is, presently, what 
you do, there's no such thing as a small footprint in that 
regard.
    I'd just like to ask this. This is troubling. The situation 
in the Middle East is getting worse. We're approaching the 
coinciding holidays. Our efforts as a country, as well as 
Jordan, Egypt, and other countries, is just trying to get 
through the holidays. Just trying to keep calm through the 
holidays.
    But, the situation, and it was shared with this committee 
by people in the region prior to this, is how really fragile 
Palestine is right now. And how these threats of disruption 
even during the holidays could trigger a collapse even.
    What would happen, what would be the impact of that in the 
region? Hamas and other groups? And, can you just give us some 
of your feelings on what that would mean, because it's, we're 
being told it's very real at this point.
    And, that's why we're working so hard to keep it calm.
    General Kurilla. So Congressman, I think the concern right 
now is that there are--all the kindling and the tinder is there 
for a flashpoint. And, it can take just one incident that can 
cause that fire to start inside the West Bank.
    And I think it would be bad for the entire region.
    Mr. Keating. All right. Thank you. I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Horsford, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Chairman Rogers and to the ranking 
member for this important hearing. As this committee knows, 
Russia and China continue to challenge American influence in 
Africa and the Middle East.
    In 2021, trade between Africa and China surged to $254 
billion, up about 35 percent as Chinese exports increased to 
the continent. China has steadily increased its influence in 
Africa by promoting a political and economic model for 
countries on the continent, all while the United States has 
fallen behind on investment.
    Algeria, a global energy exporter, with Africa's largest 
defense budget, continues to be one of Russia's top arms export 
clients behind only India and China.
    So, I was glad to see that the conclusion of the 2021 
Global Posture Review directed under Secretary Austin, included 
ensuring that the Department of Defense appropriately monitors 
threats from regional extremist groups, supports our diplomatic 
activities, and enables our allies and partners in Africa.
    General Langley, it's good to see you again. This committee 
has heard from combatant commanders time and again that global 
competitors, specifically China, outcompete us by responding to 
partner nations faster than we can.
    Is that an accurate assessment of the problem from your 
perspective? And, if so, what additional authorities do you 
need to meet security challenges in a responsive way?
    General Langley. Congressman, thanks for that question. 
And, I'll answer it in just saying that we need to be the 
partner of choice, through various actions, and through the 
whole of governments, and from the military standpoint.
    And, when I engage with our partners on the continent, they 
said our near and present danger right now are violent 
extremist organizations. I have the portfolio available to be 
able to build partnership and capacity with them so they can 
professionalize their forces, train their forces in the face of 
the threat, their immediate threat.
    I don't think China does that. China will sell them weapon 
systems that will be in a weapon system graveyard within a 
couple years.
    So, that's that value proposition that I have the leverage, 
that I need to continue to leverage. But that system needs to 
work, be more responsive.
    Our title 10, 333 authorities, that process is kind of 
slow. Our foreign military sales, that process is very slow. 
Where China can operate at the speed of relevance. So, we need 
to get that back.
    Now, across the whole of governments, just in the 
developmental realm, as they start looking at their societies, 
and building their societies and for the citizens in the name 
of democracy, they want to be able to do that. So, the 
development programs in USAID, you need to have flexible 
funding as such in our State Department as they build capacity 
across the government.
    Mr. Horsford. Thank you. And General Kurilla, can you 
describe the threat China and Russia pose in your respective 
area of responsibility?
    General Kurilla. Thanks Congressman. Again, what we've 
seen, is them go in with their economic, and that's where we 
have 19 of 21 countries have signed a Belt and Road agreement 
with China.
    And what a lot of them don't understand is the predatory 
nature of the financing or how they are doing that when they 
come into the region. We've seen it with their informational.
    Their military, as I look at the military domain, which is 
my business, they come in very quickly. They bring out the 
whole catalog of equipment. They allow them to ship very 
quickly. They give them financing. And they have no end-user 
agreement.
    As Mike said, we do see a lot of their equipment ends up 
breaking. But, they are meet--our partners have real security 
needs based on the region. And what China is doing, is very 
quickly filling that for them.
    So, I think there are things that we can do to improve our 
foreign military sales. Because when you buy into the American 
system, you buy into the quality, you buy into the training, 
you buy into the upgrades, you buy into the sustainment. But 
you're also buying into the bureaucracy as well.
    In terms of Russia, we are seeing them in Syria. They want 
to undermine our efforts in the Middle East. And, they want a 
permanent basing to that warm-water port where they signed the 
Port of Tartus for a 49-year lease. And now, Assad is asking 
them to stay longer, is what it looks like.
    Mr. Horsford. Well, I am pleased to see the Biden 
administration's step up engagement with Africa as a 
counterweight to China's influence on the continent.
    And I am glad to see both the First Lady, Jill Biden, which 
focused on the United States commitment to the region. And I 
know I look forward to the Vice President's visit to the 
continent later this month, which will only strengthen that 
commitment.
    Now, I think it's the committee's job to follow suit. We 
must continue our investment in Africa's future and stability.
    And, I want to thank the panel for taking our questions 
today. And I look forward to working with you on this important 
issue. Thank you.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair 
now recognizes the gentlelady from California, Ms. Jacobs, for 
5 minutes.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to 
our briefers, it's great to see you here. I also want to thank 
you, General Langley, for your service, and all the important 
work on the African continent, and also for your thoughtfulness 
today.
    I want to especially thank you for your comments earlier 
about the need for a whole-of-government approach to addressing 
good governance on the continent and how that is a key pillar 
of our national security.
    And I couldn't agree more. And I'm very excited to see the 
Global Fragility Act plans which we should be imminently 
receiving here, and how you're going to put that into practice.
    So, earlier this month, General Fenton and Assistant 
Secretary Maier testified before the committee. And, I asked 
about what lessons SOCOM had learned from our decades of 
counterterrorism operations in Sub-Saharan Africa. And, General 
Fenton largely deferred to AFRICOM.
    So, I'm going to ask you the same question, General 
Langley. As you know, despite two decades of our investment in 
counterterrorism in Africa, and over $3 billion in equipment, 
training, and logistics, we've actually seen violent extremism 
increase threefold since 2013.
    And just in the last year we saw it increase by 22 percent 
and fatalities up by 50 percent. And just in the Sahel, we saw 
130 percent increase since 2020 in violence.
    So, I wanted to ask you, what lessons has AFRICOM learned 
from this, you know, apparent lack of success of our 
investments in the continent? And, how can we take that moving 
forward as we focus on the region?
    General Langley. Congresswoman, thanks for that. And thanks 
for your visits on the continent, especially with the CODEL 
[congressional delegation] that you went on. And that was a 
result of this blue map that's shown here, of our investments 
on the continent.
    But getting back to your question, as our engagements with 
our African partners, as I go from country to country, knowing 
that it is going to be a partner-led U.S.-enabled proposition 
or remedy to their fragile governance.
    And when they look at their immediate threat, and as you 
just said, that a number, it's really starting to metastasize 
across from the Lake Chad region violent extremist 
organizations are starting to encroach upon the Gulf of Guinea 
states.
    So, given that, what my discussions with them is, I ask the 
question. That's part of my campaign of learning. What is the 
solution? What is the panacea?
    And they said, responsible governance. Responsible 
governance is the enduring solution to violent extremist 
organizations. And they realize that.
    So, just as much as they are buying weapon systems, they 
want to be able to add--bolster capacity into their total 
governments, providing for the people.
    And, you know, as we look at Sheikh Mohamud, President 
Sheikh Mohamud in Somalia, what story is not really told is how 
he's turning a lot of the Al-Shabaab to laying down their 
weapons and repatriating them into the Somalia government. 
Those are the good news stories that aren't told enough.
    So, Congresswoman, that is, our African partners get what 
the solution is. We just need to help them across our whole-of-
government approach to get there.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, I appreciate that. I think getting 
governance right on the continent is going to be key. And, I 
look forward to working together both on this whole-of-
government approach and implementing the Global Fragility Act. 
And, making sure we're being very thoughtful about how all of 
DOD's activities on the continent feed into that good 
governance.
    I wanted to ask you about Somalia as well. We are 
increasing what we are doing there, increasing the tempo. We've 
recently put troops back in.
    I just wanted to ask, what is our theory of the case? Or, 
how does it end? When can we leave? What are we trying to get 
to so that we are able to actually not have troops stationed 
there anymore?
    General Langley. Congresswoman, I'll answer that from an 
operational perspective. What we're doing to enable President 
Hassan Sheikh Mohamud and the Somalia National Army, being able 
to take the fight to Al-Shabaab.
    And, turn to, and follow that up with, being able to bring 
in the rest of their governance to go out to the outer regions 
and to the clans that have been turned. And also preventing 
famine.
    Preventing effects from climate change. That is just a 
clear indicator that the campaign by President Hassan Sheikh 
Mohamud is working holistically.
    And so, given that, he is going to turn south and go into 
some of the regions where there's a stronghold by Al-Shabaab. 
And, I think he's going to be able to do that.
    But, we will be with them until our policy changes.
    The Chairman. Great. The gentlelady's time has expired. The 
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Kim, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Actually, I want to just 
kind of build off of that. So, you know, Dr. Wallander, I'd 
love to kind of hear your thoughts about the challenges that 
we're facing in Somalia.
    We are taking some new steps as the general just 
articulated on that front. But, you also kind of raised that 
this is in a broader context as we're seeing the African Union 
Transition Mission to Somalia's plan to draw it out over the 
next 2 years.
    And, you were really kind of talking about it as this 
critical 2-year period. So, could you elaborate on just, you 
know, how you're seeing this?
    And, kind of to the point of my colleagues, what is the end 
state that we're trying to get to here that will allow us to 
start to pull back some of our resources?
    Dr. Wallander. Thank you, Congressman. It's nice to see 
you. I would build on, or endorse, what General Langley just 
laid out. Which is the key to our support to Somalia in 
countering the--Al-Shabaab, is working with our partners and 
investing in our partner country.
    There is current operations, but, there's actually been a 
period of time of training and equipping, and working with the 
Somali armed forces, not only through AFRICOM, but also through 
State Department authorities, and developing the Danab Brigade.
    So, it's a great example of all-of-government, whole-of-
government work to build a security force, and to enable a 
security force that is trained in American standards, that has 
trust and good relationships with AFRICOM and leaders in 
AFRICOM.
    And, we're seeing the material benefits of that, because 
we're seeing an increasingly effective force that also is 
working constructively with other regional partners in Africa 
in African-led operations that are enabled by U.S. presence and 
AFRICOM's assets.
    But it really is a great example of an implementation of 
the approach that was laid out in the National Defense 
Strategy.
    Mr. Kim. I appreciate that context. Thank you. General 
Kurilla, I wanted to just turn to you. Some of my colleagues 
have asked you about ISIS-Khorasan. I've heard some of your 
comments on that front.
    I get it, we can talk about this in a SCIF [sensitive 
compartmented information facility] at a higher classification 
as well. But just to kind of situate for the American people 
what we're talking about here, what is the current that we can 
talk about in this forum right now, about how many fighters 
they have? What their general health is right now?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, thank you. So, the current 
strength of ISIS at the unclassified level is about 2,000 to 
2,500 in Afghanistan. And, that's ISIS-Khorasan, when we say 
that; that is specifically for Afghanistan.
    But we do see the threat really coming from the Al-Sadiq 
office. That's the region that sits above it. But, they're 
based out of Afghanistan as well.
    And, it's not so much the fighters as it is their ability 
to plan and enable operations from there.
    Mr. Kim. Um-hum.
    General Kurilla. We do know the Taliban and the ISIS-
Khorasan are fighting. But the Taliban is more of a blunt force 
to go after them, and doesn't have the intelligence and the 
precision to get after the real threats that we are seeing.
    Mr. Kim. So, there is, and that was something that I wanted 
to kind of pull on, because you did talk about it in your 
testimony as well, that ISIS-Khorasan and the Taliban, there 
continues to be challenges there.
    But what you're saying is that the Taliban is not able to 
kind of produce a, kind of precise enough pressure upon ISIS-
Khorasan such that some of the foreign threats are the ones 
that can be mitigated. Is that correct?
    General Kurilla. Yeah. Just to be clear, ISIS-Khorasan and 
the Taliban hate each other. And they are fighting and killing 
each other.
    Mr. Kim. Yeah.
    General Kurilla. But, the Taliban doesn't have the 
precision to go after the individuals. They will do large 
sweeping clearance operations. It can be disruptive to a point.
    But, they don't have, they're not doing the precision 
targeting of individuals.
    Mr. Kim. What is the current, again, in this setting, kind 
of connection or relationship between ISIS-Khorasan and sort of 
the core ISIS that we've engaged with in Iraq and Syria?
    General Kurilla. So, the ISIS, the core ISIS that's in 
Syria, they are in charge of the global enterprise. And the 
General Director of Provinces, he was killed about 2 weeks ago. 
He is the one that would provide guidance for external 
operations.
    ISIS-Khorasan falls underneath the Al-Sadiq office, which 
basically runs from the Stans all the way down to Indonesia. 
Mike has the Al-Karrar office. There's the Bilad Al-Rafidain 
office, which is in Iraq and Iran.
    So, they basically have this global enterprise. And, what 
we see right now the most prolific, is coming out of the Al-
Sadiq office.
    And, in closed session I'll give a very specific example of 
how we've disrupted a couple of threat streams. And, not all 
threat streams are kinetic in terms of our disruption.
    Mr. Kim. Yeah. Thank you. And, my time is going to run out 
here. But, I'd love to do a followup with you, General, and Dr. 
Wallander as well, just about what we can be doing to sort of 
increase cybersecurity efforts with our partners. And, that's 
certainly something General Langley as well, we can engage in.
    But, it feels like a place where we can really engage. I'm 
hearing a lot from these partner nations throughout the Middle 
East and North Africa and elsewhere. So, let's make sure we're 
engaging on that.
    General Kurilla. We're doing a lot with that, Congressman. 
Look forward to talking about that at some point.
    Mr. Kim. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Great. I thank the gentleman. I thank all of 
our witnesses. We will now adjourn this--oh, you need to, you 
want to talk, ask them questions?
    Go ahead. The gentleman from Georgia is recognized.
    Dr. McCormick. I know you've been waiting for this one 
moment, General Langley. I heard the testimony that you gave to 
Representative Gaetz.
    And I want to kind of give you a second go at this, just 
because I know you made four stars for a reason in the Marine 
Corps. That's not an easy thing to do. And AFRICOM is a very 
challenging environment.
    I know our intent is never to create bad guys who are in 
leadership positions. And yet, it has happened several times in 
our history. It's happened famously in Somalia. And you and I 
have suffered the consequences from that in our careers and the 
enemies that we've combatted with.
    My plea to you, and then I'll give you your ability to 
respond, is that we do--we revise our position on how we train 
and what kind of accountability we have. Because it is obvious 
to me that we have created some situations, especially in 
AFRICOM where we've gone against people we literally trained.
    And so, I do want you to kind of maybe just give us an 
insight on how you think you can approach this with the 
collaboration of Congress, and the President, and everybody 
else who's in our chain of command, to mitigate that for the 
future?
    General Langley. Congressman, thanks for the opportunity. 
So, just going forward as we look at our IMET program 
holistically, we probably need to add more capacity to it, 
because that's the last thing we want to do, or want to see, is 
some episodic event such as a coup by someone that we formerly 
had trained in the past.
    So, just broadening on that. And, focusing and broadening 
the curriculum that focuses on civilian-led militaries.
    Now, within that, we had that discussion over at National 
University amongst our partners at the African Leaders Summit. 
And where it was led by the Secretary of the Army and also 
representation from Senegal, General Sisi, and myself, and 
where we pounded the table on this is a must.
    There was over 43 countries in attendance to that. So, more 
of that. So, as we focus on civilian-led governance, excuse me, 
civilian-led militaries, that actually endorse, fully endorse 
democratic norms and democratic values, and holistically core 
values, just to prevent this from happening.
    Dr. McCormick. Okay. Do you feel like you have the 
intelligence that you, and I'm not talking about personal 
intelligence, I'm talking about military intelligence, that 
required to decipher who is the good guys and the bad guys?
    And, do you have the personnel that is required in this 
very robust dynamic AFRICOM scenario?
    General Langley. Yes, the lay-vetting process is in effect. 
And, we take that very seriously. And, we're very, very 
deliberate in our processes of vetting our African partners as 
they come into the IMET programs.
    Dr. McCormick. Okay. General Kurilla, just a real quick 
question. In looking, we talked about keeping Iran from having 
nuclear capabilities, as far as obviously they have nuclear 
capabilities for energy, but as far as weaponry.
    We know what Israel's opinion is on this. And you stated 
yourself that we want to make sure that we avoid that at all 
costs.
    What does that mean? And I'm not talking about from a 
classified standpoint. But what are we willing to engage? How 
militarily, and we know politically we're engaged, and we can 
only do so much when we talk about negotiations.
    But, how do we, from a military aspect, and maybe I'm going 
too far when I say unclassified, is there a way to posture that 
would create a scenario where they would back down?
    General Kurilla. Congressman, I really do recommend that 
that's in a classified setting if we talk about any of the 
Iranian nuclear program.
    Dr. McCormick. Fair enough. Doctor, do you have anything to 
add?
    Dr. Wallander. Not on that. But, if I may on the issue of 
military training?
    Dr. McCormick. Please.
    Dr. Wallander. I think it would be a real, not just a 
tragedy, but it would be a great loss to American national 
security if the very regrettable fact of instances of military 
abroad who have been trained by the United States in IMET and 
other programs, undermine what is an extraordinarily important 
program.
    There is no better way to build capacity and relationships 
among our foreign partner countries then the extraordinary 
examples of American military, professional American military, 
who fulfill their duties as American citizens.
    And you heard from the generals that they believe that this 
is a vital program. The civilian leadership in DOD fully 
supports the importance of these military education programs. 
And takes very, very seriously the need to make sure that we 
are training the right people as well.
    Dr. McCormick. Thank you. And I just want to add for the 
record that I believe that we also have to be very careful 
about an isolationist mentality because of a couple of bad 
apples that obviously had bad results.
    Thank you. With that I yield.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. And I thank the 
witnesses. We will now adjourn this portion of the hearing and 
reconvene in 5 minutes for the classified portion in room 2212.
    [Whereupon, at 12:57 p.m., the committee proceeded in 
closed session.]



      
=======================================================================




                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 23, 2023

=======================================================================

      



      
=======================================================================


              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 23, 2023

=======================================================================

      

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]   
    
    

      
=======================================================================


                   DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 23, 2023

=======================================================================

      

      
    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
    

      
=======================================================================


              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             March 23, 2023

=======================================================================

      

            RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. DESJARLAIS

    General Kurilla. As identified during the hearing, countering 
adversary Unmanned Aerial Systems is a top priority for CENTCOM. Across 
the region, we've developed a series of programs and exercises to 
advance this priority. I will provide the performance data on 
countering UAS systems in a classified document.
    For example, we've just established Red Sands, an experimentation 
center in Saudi Arabia for new tactics, techniques, procedures, 
processes, and technology to counter Unmanned Aerial Systems. Red Sands 
is our partnership with the Royal Saudi Armed Forces to test and 
experiment and ultimately improve tactics, techniques, and procedures 
to defeat Unmanned Aerial Systems. Our firm, longstanding military-to-
military relationship with the Royal Saudi Armed Forces allowed us to 
quickly develop and implement the program, which serves as a benefit to 
both military forces.
    We conducted our first Red Sands live fire exercise event in mid-
March in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the live fire, we executed 
a complex multiple Unmanned Aerial System threat against a layered 
defense that included both U.S. and Saudi systems.
    We will evolve the program in the coming months, with additional 
capabilities, systems, and technology. During the next iteration of Red 
Sands in September, we will defend against more complex drone attacks. 
While Red Sands is currently a bilateral event, both CENTCOM and the 
Saudis intend to expand the program to other regional partners in the 
future.
    We have also established Green Sands, a five-day program to certify 
every Base Defense Operations Center entering the CENTCOM region 
against complex theater specific threat-based Unmanned Aerial Systems--
prior to deployment into theater. Green Sands will ensure all sections 
are more capable of defeating complex, multi-drone attacks using 
multiple systems and platforms.
    In addition, Task Forces 39 and 99 constantly test and field new 
counter-Unmanned Aerial System capabilities, working closely with our 
partners to implement best practices. The aim is to develop an 
integrated air and missile defense system to defeat adversary drones, 
inclusive of electronic warfare, directed energy, traditional systems, 
AI-based systems, and increased sensors and data collection. For 
CENTCOM, this is about taking ideas, concepts, and systems from 
industry, from our partners, in practice in Ukraine, and applying them 
to the threat we face in the region. We seek an integrated air and 
missile defense architecture that is ubiquitous within the region, 
integrated with our partners, and capable of defending our forces and 
assets.   [See page 22.]



      
=======================================================================


              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 23, 2023

=======================================================================

      

                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

    Mr. Turner. As of March 2023, Iran has obtained uranium enrichment 
of 83.7% purity. Amid this news, U.S. Under Secretary of Defense for 
Policy Colin Kahl cited that Tehran could produce enough material for a 
nuclear bomb in 12 days.
    Given its demonstrated record of using military force to coerce its 
neighbors, how would a nuclearized Iran change the security environment 
of the Middle East?
    What should the U.S. and our allies do from a defense perspective 
to prepare for the reality of a nuclear threat from Iran?
    General Kurilla. a) Given its demonstrated record of using military 
force to coerce its neighbors, how would a nuclearized Iran change the 
security environment of the Middle East?
    A nuclear Iran would change the Middle East overnight and forever. 
A nuclear weapon would allow Iran to more actively intimidate its 
neighbors, hold the entire region at risk, and embolden Tehran to 
spread its malign influence more broadly and more violently across the 
region.
    A nuclear Iran would also introduce a regional nuclear arms race 
with several regional countries pursuing the capability in order to 
offset Iran's power. The ensuing proliferation of nuclear weapons would 
introduce greater instability.
    Further, nuclear weapon capability would instantly transform Iran 
from a regional concern to a global menace, capable of holding the 
Region and Western interests at risk. Regional partners may move closer 
to Russia and China in an attempt to mitigate the impact of a nuclear 
armed Iran.
    b) What should the U.S. and our allies do from a defense 
perspective to prepare for the reality of a nuclear threat from Iran?
    Accepting a nuclear Iran as a reality is inconsistent with this 
administration's policy. We must not allow a nuclear-armed Iran. I've 
been consistent on this point since my confirmation hearing in 
February, 2022. U.S. policy makes it clear that a nuclear Iran is 
unacceptable.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
    Mr. Wittman. In February 2021, CENTCOM published an article that 
discussed Russia's influence in the AFRICOM/CENTCOM AORs, including 
destabilizing arms sales and possible permanent bases in Syria and 
Sudan. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have they continued 
destabilizing efforts in the region? Are Russian arms being sold/
funneled into the country even though Russia is facing munition 
shortages in Ukraine? Moreover, what effect is foreign influence and/or 
military sales having on the geopolitical stability in South Sudan?
    General Kurilla. a) Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have they 
continued destabilizing efforts in the region?
    Yes, Russia's destabilizing and aggressive posturing in the region 
continues. In fact, amidst its war in Ukraine, Russia looks to 
aggressively expand its influence and undermine U.S. credibility in the 
Middle East, Levant, and Central and South Asian States. Right now, 
Russia has more than 2,500 troops in Syria, which Putin views as a base 
to project power throughout the region and into Europe and Africa. 
Russian maritime forces maintain a permanent presence in Syria's 
coastal city of Tartus. Moscow also seeks to assert itself as the 
security guarantor of the Central and South Asian States. All these 
actions place American influence and interests in the central region at 
risk.
    In Syria--already a complex battlespace with multiple state and 
nonstate actors and risk of miscalculation--Russia continues to violate 
established protocols for operations as they continue their support of 
the Assad Regime. These protocols were established in 2019 and agreed 
to by Moscow to avoid armed confrontation between our forces as they 
cross paths in the sky and on ground. These violations have grown 
increasingly bellicose over recent months. Such unsafe, unprofessional 
disregard for established protocols and deconfliction rules is 
inconsistent with the actions of a professional Air Force.
    b) Are Russian arms being sold/funneled into the country even 
though Russia is facing munition shortages in Ukraine?
    Russia continues to resupply its bases in Syria and provide limited 
arms to Syrian forces through air and sea routes. The quantity of 
weapons has decreased significantly since Russia invaded Ukraine. 
Russia concurrently seeks redeployment of some weapons systems to 
support its illegal invasion of Ukraine.
    Mr. Wittman. Over the past few months, there has been an uptick of 
reported UAS incidents. CENTCOM has stated that the region is facing 
daily threats from small quad-copter drones to larger Shaheds. Lt Gen 
Gregory Guillot has said that ``though CENTCOM has a lot of integrated 
defense capability in theater, the adversary is advancing very 
quickly.'' How has CENTCOM accelerated their process to fill this 
capability gap? What steps has CENTCOM taken to accelerate the 
acquisition process to meet this threat? Finally, in as much detail as 
possible, please describe how CENTCOM is viewing directed energy, 
specifically HPM technology, to fill this capability gap. Is CENTCOM 
working with a particular service to acquire and develop these 
capabilities?
    General Kurilla. a) How has CENTCOM accelerated their process to 
fill this capability gap?
    Defeating adversary Unmanned Aerial Systems is a top functional 
priority for CENTCOM. CENTCOM developed a series of integrated programs 
and exercises to work this priority.
    For example, we've just initiated Red Sands, an experimentation 
center in Saudi Arabia for new tactics, techniques, procedures, 
processes, and technology to counter Unmanned Aerial Systems. Red Sands 
is our partnership with the Royal Saudi Armed Forces to test and 
experiment and ultimately improve tactics, techniques, and procedures 
to defeat Unmanned Aerial Systems. Our firm, longstanding military-to-
military relationship with the Royal Saudi Armed Forces allowed us to 
quickly develop and implement the program, which serves as a benefit to 
both military forces.
    We conducted our first Red Sands live fire exercise event in mid-
March in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the live fire, we executed 
a complex multiple Unmanned Aerial System threat against a layered 
defense that included both U.S. and Saudi systems.
    We will evolve the program in the coming months, with additional 
capabilities, systems, and technology. During the next iteration of Red 
Sands in September, we will defend against more complex drone attacks. 
While Red Sands is currently a bilateral event, both CENTCOM and the 
Saudis intend to expand the program to other regional partners in the 
future.
    We have also established Green Sands, a five-day program to certify 
every Base Defense Operations Center entering the CENTCOM region 
against complex theater specific threat-based Unmanned Aerial Systems--
prior to deployment into theater. Green Sands will ensure all sections 
are more capable of defeating complex, multi-drone attacks using 
multiple systems and platforms.
    In addition, Task Forces 39 and 99 constantly test and field new 
counter-Unmanned Aerial System capabilities, working closely with our 
partners to implement best practices. The aim is to develop a layered 
system to defeat adversary drones, inclusive of electronic warfare, 
directed energy, traditional systems, AI-based systems, and increased 
sensors and data collection. For CENTCOM, this is about taking ideas, 
concepts, and systems from industry, from our partners, in practice in 
Ukraine, and applying them to the threat we face in the region. We seek 
a counter-Unmanned Aerial System program that is ubiquitous within the 
region, integrated with our partners, and capable of defending our 
forces and assets.
    b) What steps has CENTCOM taken to accelerate the acquisition 
process to meet this threat?
    We have submitted Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statements to 
address the capability gaps for detection and defeat of increasingly 
complex Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS). CENTCOM is actively working with 
the Army, Air Force and the Navy on potential solutions. CENTCOM is 
working with the Army PEO Missiles and Space on employment of munitions 
and weapons systems to meet the threat imposed by UAS in the region as 
well as providing feedback after UAS engagements to improve the 
performance of the counter-UAS we are currently employing in theater.
    c) Please describe how CENTCOM is viewing directed energy, 
specifically HPM technology, to fill this capability gap.
    High-Power Microwave technology will play a significant role in 
defeating multiple and swarm drone attacks. While High-Power Microwave 
systems are still very nascent and much more development is needed in 
this field, the technology has the capability to disrupt and shut down 
drone swarms in seconds without a kinetic requirement. Furthermore, 
once these systems are fully developed, a High-Power Microwave finish 
will cost a fraction of an interceptor missile.
    We are working with the Army to deploy their Maneuver Short Range 
Air Defense Directed Energy (MSHORAD-DE) system in the coming year. 
This will add a 50kw directed energy capability to our layered defense 
against UAS.
    Given the volume and diversity of Unmanned Aerial System threats 
against our troops and Coalition forces in the CENTCOM region, as well 
as the diverse mix of geographic and environmental conditions, I 
believe CENTCOM should serve as the experimentation center for High-
Power Microwave technology as well as an ``experimentation sandbox'' 
for all emerging technology to defeat adversary drones.
    d) Is CENTCOM working with a particular service to acquire and 
develop these capabilities?
    We have reached out to all military services in the development of 
these capabilities. In particular, we are working closely with the 
Army's Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office to deploy 
the next available High-Power Microwave system as well as the Maneuver 
Short Range Air Defense Direct Energy system. We are simultaneously 
working in coordination with the Air Force Research Lab to bring the 
next-generation THOR system to the CENTCOM region. I have offered to 
all the Services that given the volume and diversity of Unmanned Aerial 
System threats against our troops and Coalition forces in the CENTCOM 
region, as well as the diverse mix of geographic and environmental 
conditions, I believe CENTCOM should serve as the experimentation 
center for all emerging technology to defeat adversary drones.
    Mr. Wittman. In 2022, CENTCOM established Task Force 99 to leverage 
commercial, off the shelf drones to focus on several mission areas. How 
do you see this agile unit being utilized within CENTCOM missions? As 
the proliferation and threat of drones are speeding up, not only from 
our side but from VEOs and Iran, does CENTCOM plan on standing up 
another entity to focus on counter UAS solutions?
    General Kurilla. a) How do you see this agile unit being utilized 
within CENTCOM missions?
    Through implementation of commercial off-the-shelf technology and 
collaboration with industry and academia, Task Force 99, which is based 
in Qatar, creates a technology transition ecosystem that allows 
increased awareness and faster decision-making and places cutting-edge 
tools in the hands of warfighters and decision makers. Task Force 99 
has three lines of effort:
      Increasing awareness of the air domain;
      Accelerating the speed of the targeting cycle; and
      Imposing dilemmas on adversaries.
    Task Force 99 also focuses on aerial drones complete with tailored 
payloads and other capabilities operating together to observe, detect, 
and gather data that feeds into an operations center. This increases 
our air domain awareness and rapidly accelerates the speed of our 
decision making. The task force's fleet of unmanned aircraft will 
impose dilemmas on our adversaries and detect and defeat threats to our 
systems and to our partners.
    Task Force 99, our innovation task force focused on the aerial 
domain, complements Task Force 59, our innovation task force which 
operates at sea in the maritime domain, and Task Force 39, our 
innovation task force which operates on land. Through these three 
innovation Task Forces, CENTCOM seeks to serve as the experimentation 
center for new drone-defeat systems, ideas, and technology, to include 
directed energy. At CENTCOM, we consider opportunities for innovation 
as limitless. They are boundless and cross all realms of possibility.
    b) As the proliferation and threat of drones are speeding up, not 
only from our side but from VEOs and Iran, does CENTCOM plan on 
standing up another entity to focus on counter UAS solutions?
    Defeating adversary Unmanned Aerial Systems is a top functional 
priority for us. CENTCOM developed a series of integrated programs and 
exercises to work this priority.
    For example, we have just initiated Red Sands in Saudi Arabia, an 
experimentation center for new tactics, techniques, procedures, 
processes, and technology to counter Unmanned Aerial Systems. Red Sands 
is our partnership with the Royal Saudi Armed Forces to test and 
experiment and ultimately improve tactics, techniques, and procedures 
to defeat Unmanned Aerial Systems. Our firm, longstanding military-to-
military relationship with the Royal Saudi Armed Forces allowed us to 
quickly develop and implement the program, which serves as a benefit to 
both military forces.
    We conducted our first Red Sands live fire exercise event in mid-
March in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the live fire, we executed 
a complex multiple Unmanned Aerial System threat against a layered 
defense that included both U.S. and Saudi systems. We are incorporating 
more systems capabilities as well as even more complex threats 
including Land Attack Cruise Missiles.
    We will evolve the program in the coming months, with additional 
capabilities, systems, and technology. During the next iteration of Red 
Sands in September, we will defend against more complex drone attacks. 
While Red Sands is currently a bilateral event, both CENTCOM and the 
Saudis intend to expand the program to other regional partners in the 
future.
    We have also established Green Sands, a five-day program to certify 
every Base Defense Operations Center entering the CENTCOM region 
against complex theater specific threat-based Unmanned Aerial Systems--
prior to deployment into theater. Green Sands ensures all sections are 
more capable of defeating complex, multi-drone attacks using multiple 
systems and platforms.
    In addition, Task Forces 39 and 99 constantly test and field new 
counter-Unmanned Aerial Systems, working closely with our partners to 
implement best practices. The aim is to develop a layered system to 
defeat adversary drones, inclusive of electronic warfare, directed 
energy, traditional systems, AI-based systems, and increased sensors 
and data collection. For us, this is about taking ideas, concepts, and 
systems from industry, from our partners, in practice in Ukraine, and 
applying them to the threat we face in the region. We seek a counter-
Unmanned Aerial System program that is ubiquitous within the region, 
integrated with our partners, and capable of defending our forces and 
assets.
    Mr. Wittman. The U.S. State Department reported that over 50,000 
civilians were displaced in late 2022 after attacks killed scores of 
civilians in the Upper Nile and Jonglei areas of South Sudan. That is 
in addition to the already 2.2 million internally displaced civilians 
and 2 million refugees that have fled since major fighting broke out in 
2016. While other countries in the region confront their own 
humanitarian, security, and economic issues, how has the displacement 
of millions of South Sudanese people affected the security of the 
region? With already porous borders, how has this displacement allowed 
for extremist groups, including Al-Shabaab and the Islamic State, to 
move throughout the region? Has there been an increase in attacks in 
the last five years? Or ten years? Furthermore, can those attacks be 
connected back to the instability in South Sudan? Finally, could 
cultural or ethnic violence occur in neighboring countries where South 
Sudanese refugees are settling?
    General Langley. Most displaced Sudanese persons reside in Sudan 
and Uganda. Ethiopia, Kenya, and the Democratic Republic of Congo also 
host considerable refugee populations. Most of these host countries are 
experiencing, or have recently experienced, internal conflicts. All of 
them face domestic challenges that leaves few resources for assisting 
South Sudanese refugees. As a result, most of these refugees continue 
to experience humanitarian hardships even after they have left South 
Sudan. However, we have not observed cultural or ethnic violence 
occurring in these countries as a result of hosting South Sudanese 
refugees. Many South Sudanese share ethnic, linguistic, cultural, or 
historical ties with communities that straddle national borders. Cross-
border violence driven by criminality and banditry is common along 
South Sudan's poorly guarded borders, and we continue to monitor for 
any indications that the region's many armed groups might seek to 
exploit the refugee situation. We have not observed any movement or 
activity of violent extremist groups in the region connected with 
instability in South Sudan or South Sudanese refugees.
    Mr. Wittman. In February 2021, CENTCOM published an article that 
discussed Russia's influence in the AFRICOM/CENTCOM AORs, including 
destabilizing arms sales and possible permanent bases in Syria and 
Sudan. Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, have they continued 
destabilizing efforts in the region? Are Russian arms being sold/
funneled into the country even though Russia is facing munition 
shortages in Ukraine? Moreover, what effect is foreign influence and/or 
military sales having on the geopolitical stability in South Sudan?
    General Langley. Russia continues to express interest in a 
permanent base in Port Sudan. However, currently it is unknown how the 
recent fighting in Khartoum, Sudan has impacted Russia's interests. 
Delays by the Sudanese transitional government may have prompted Russia 
to approach Eritrea as an alternative location, though no formal 
announcements have been made. The conflict in Ukraine has had only 
minimal effects on Russia's posture in Africa, though some military 
equipment deliveries to African nations have been delayed. Completed 
arms transfers have been limited mostly to basic military capabilities 
that would not exacerbate current munition shortages in Ukraine, but 
that would demonstrate Russia's commitment to honoring existing 
agreements. Finally, though South Sudan's current political and 
security status renders it vulnerable to Russian influence, we have yet 
to observe any specific intent on behalf of Moscow.
    The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) placed an arms embargo 
on South Sudan in 2018 in response to the civil war and has extended 
the embargo until March 2024. South Sudan is awash with weapons, which 
have helped fuel chronic violence between government forces and an 
array of rebel groups, communal violence, and extensive abuses against 
civilians by both rebels and government forces. Juba looks to both 
Russia and China as potential diplomatic partners to undermine the UNSC 
arms embargo. China's investment in South Sudan's oil industry has 
likely facilitated corruption by South Sudanese elites, who have 
amassed considerable personal wealth despite the country's extensive 
poverty.
    South Sudanese officials have persistently lobbied to lift the 
embargo, and they have complained that the embargo impedes the arming 
of the Necessary Unified Forces (NUF)--a national military meant to 
merge government and rebel forces as part of the country's ongoing 
peace process. The embargo includes exceptions for arming the NUF 
suggesting Juba seeks access to weapons for use against its domestic 
rivals rather than to fulfill its obligations under the peace process. 
Furthermore, South Sudan has likely violated the arms embargo, 
illicitly importing small arms and armored vehicles that play no role 
in equipping the NUF.
    Mr. Wittman. As drone use increase in both conventional and 
unconventional warfare in AFRICOM's AOR, both as warfighting tools and 
geopolitical bargaining chips by China and Iran, how can the defense 
ecosystem better support COCOM in combatting this threat? What can 
Congress, the broader DOD, and the DIB do to ensure that AFRICOM has 
the tools necessary to address these threats?
    General Langley. Besides policies and authorities to mitigate drone 
threats, continued Congressional funding to assist adoption of 
commercial technology and defense innovation initiatives will assist 
USAFRICOM to acquire and field next level counter unmanned 
capabilities.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. Ambassador Herman J. Cohen wrote an article in the March 
2022 issue of Proceedings entitled, ``The Time is Right for a Pivot to 
Africa.'' Do you agree with Ambassador Cohen that, ``The United States 
must see African aid, development, and investment as worthy security 
projects in their own right''?
    Dr. Wallander. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. Do you agree with Ambassador Cohen that, ``The potential 
for security, sustainable agriculture, renewable energy, trade, and 
better governance is simply tremendous. The mutual benefits that could 
be realized under a more proactive approach are impossible to ignore. 
But officials and experts will need to believe it themselves first, and 
the continuation of great power competition narratives for U.S.-African 
relations is a worrying sign. The United States must not be stuck in 
this outmoded and colonial way of thinking''?
    Dr. Wallander. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Coast Guard be better integrated with 
USCENTCOM?
    General Kurilla. The US Coast Guard is a significant contributor to 
CENTCOM and our mission. For example, the Patrol Forces Southwest Asia 
in Bahrain and the Maritime Infrastructure Protection Force Training 
and Advisory Group in Saudi Arabia are integrated with our partnered 
naval forces in support of our mission sets. In fact, the missions of 
our partnere d maritime forces more closely resemble those of the US 
Coast Guard than the US Navy. Missions such as homeland defense, law 
enforcement, drug interdiction, and search and rescue--all critical to 
security and stability at sea across and the region--are routine to our 
Coast Guard forces.
    We greatly value the Coast Guardsmen who serve in the CENTCOM 
region alongside our partnered maritime forces every day.
    Mr. Scott. Can you talk about the importance of the National 
Guard's State Partnership Program to your respective AOR? Do you have 
any suggestions on how to improve this highly successful program?
    General Kurilla. The State Partnership Program in the CENTCOM 
region supports the National Defense Strategy priorities and CENTCOM 
campaign objectives through the establishment of enduring, abiding 
relations. These relations build partner defense capability and 
persistent engagement with our partners, both of which foster regional 
security and stability.
    CENTCOM currently has nine state partnerships supported by seven 
States:
      Egypt is partnered with Texas;
      Jordan is partnered with Colorado;
      Kazakhstan is partnered with Arizona;
      The Kyrgyz Republic is partnered with Montana;
      Oman is partnered with Arizona;
      Qatar is partnered with West Virginia;
      Tajikistan is partnered with Virginia;
      Turkmenistan is partnered with Montana; and
      Uzbekistan is partnered with Mississippi.
    Our state partnerships include all of the Central Asian states, 
where we compete with Russia and China and achieve a significant 
relational return from a very small investment. Just two months ago, we 
extended the program to include the Sultanate of Oman, which is now 
partnered with the Arizona National Guard. This represents a real 
opportunity for both Arizona and Oman, which already have strong ties: 
the majority of the Royal Air Force of Oman's F-16 Fighting Flacon 
multirole aircraft pilots trained in Arizona, and there is cooperation 
between universities.
    The State Partnership Program creates a foundation of readiness for 
both the state National Guard and the partnered country that will 
endure across time and distance. One reason for this is many Guardsmen 
remain in their positions far longer than their active duty 
contemporaries. Through the State Partnership Program, this translates 
into enduring relationships that foster trust at all levels. As a 
result, Guardsmen are force multipliers as we compete for influence in 
the region. America's participant Citizen Soldiers gain a better 
understanding of the global environment and CENTCOM's operating 
environment.
    To enhance this program, CENTCOM intends to expand our state 
partners to include the remainder of the Gulf states. Pursuant to that 
goal, we maintain a standing order of merit list of eligible countries 
and work closely each year with the National Guard Bureau to ensure our 
candidates are considered.
    Mr. Scott. What is the Wagner Group's center of gravity in Africa?
    General Langley. Wagner does not have a single center of gravity in 
Africa. Instead, they rely on flexible deployments of experienced 
fighters, information operations, funding from its resource extraction 
activities, and support from the Kremlin to execute its operations in 
Africa. Approximately 3,500-5,000 Wagner contractors are deployed 
across the Central African Republic, Libya, and Mali, where they 
conduct counterinsurgency operations and provide regime security in 
exchange for lucrative contracts to extract natural resources. Africa 
Politology--a Wagner-linked, U.S. sanctioned political strategy firm--
complements Wagner deployments with information operations that use 
affiliated news sites and local journalists to denigrate Western 
influence and exaggerate the benefits of Wagner and Russian military 
support. Kremlin backing bolsters Wagner's credentials with African 
leaders and ensures regular logistic support from the Russian Ministry 
of Defense. Please see a classified response for additional 
information.
    Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Coast Guard be better integrated with 
USAFRICOM?
    General Langley. U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) cutters and law 
enforcement detachments provide important skills and capabilities for 
our strategic plan to address maritime security and develop partner 
nation naval forces in Africa. We could better integrate the USCG if we 
had the fiscal authority and accompanying appropriation to fund USCG 
deployments to advise and assist African navies. We could also use 
clear fiscal and operational authority to fund African naval personnel 
to ride aboard US naval vessels or pay for fuel for African naval 
vessels when USCG personnel are attached to support their missions.
    Ultimately, these authorities would facilitate combined U.S and 
African partner operations for up to 179 days to support a 
multinational crew for integrated IUU fishing operations, counter-
piracy patrols, and other maritime security and law enforcement 
activities.
    Mr. Scott. The Western Hemisphere Institute for Security 
Cooperation, located at Fort Benning, GA, provides professional 
military education and training to eligible U.S. and Partner Nation 
Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) 
organization personnel to confront the uncertain and complex security 
challenges of the Western Hemisphere. Could USAFRICOM benefit from a 
similar institute geared towards Africa if properly resourced by 
Congress?
    General Langley. Such an institution would complement USAFRICOM's 
Joint Exercise Program, State Department's International Military 
Education and Training program, and our relationship with the Africa 
Center for Strategic Studies at the National Defense University. It 
could prove a beneficial venue for U.S. touchpoints to contribute to 
the professionalization of African partner military forces.
    Mr. Scott. Ambassador Herman J. Cohen wrote an article in the March 
2022 issue of Proceedings entitled, ``The Time is Right for a Pivot to 
Africa.'' Do you agree with Ambassador Cohen that, ``The United States 
must see African aid, development, and investment as worthy security 
projects in their own right''?
    General Langley. I agree that the United States must see African 
aid, development, and investment as worthy security projects. Africa is 
central to global development with its human potential, trade 
opportunities, and critical minerals that will fuel our future economy. 
It has some of the world's fastest growing populations, largest free 
trade areas, and most diverse ecosystems, and important regional voting 
power in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly. The threats that 
challenge Africa are challenging the global community, such as, 
terrorism, poverty, food insecurity, climate change, and mass 
migration. These threats contribute to a rise in violent extremism as 
well as state fragility, which global competitors exploit.
    Mr. Scott. Do you agree with Ambassador Cohen that, ``The potential 
for security, sustainable agriculture, renewable energy, trade, and 
better governance is simply tremendous. The mutual benefits that could 
be realized under a more proactive approach are impossible to ignore. 
But officials and experts will need to believe it themselves first, and 
the continuation of great power competition narratives for U.S.-African 
relations is a worrying sign. The United States must not be stuck in 
this outmoded and colonial way of thinking''?
    General Langley. I agree that Africa's potential for security, 
sustainable agriculture, renewable energy, trade, and better governance 
is tremendous. As I travel across the continent, I see opportunities 
for Africa to become safer, more stable, and more prosperous. Some of 
that progress can be achieved through partnerships with the U.S. 
government, civil society, diaspora, and private sector. We have heard 
loud and clear from African leaders that they value our partnership. At 
the same time, they want to maintain a diversity of partners, and do 
not want to be put in a position where they are forced to choose 
between partners. China and the United States have both convergent and 
divergent aims on the continent, and we need to recognize that China 
can play a positive role in the development of African countries, while 
at the same time shining a light on China's malign or coercive behavior 
and offering comparative advantages from partnership with the United 
States.
    Secretary Blinken articulated America's goals in his speech at 
George Washington University on May 26, 2022: ``We don't seek to block 
China from its role as a major power, nor to stop China--or any other 
country for the matter--from growing their economy or advancing the 
interests of their people. But we will defend and strengthen the 
international law, agreements, principles, and institutions that 
maintain peace and security, protect the rights of individuals and 
sovereign nations, and make it possible for all countries . . . to 
coexist and cooperate.''
    Mr. Scott. How much does USAFRICOM need to request in FY24 funding 
for a mixture of B-350 and MQ-9 contract ISR services, and additional 
bandwidth to enable USAFRICOM and USSOCOM to meet 100 percent of 
Departmental ISR High Risk requirements for the USAFRICOM area of 
responsibility?
    General Langley. To meet 100 percent of the Department's 
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) High Risk 
requirements, USAFRICOM will require an additional $430,124,355.74 in 
FY24. This is in addition to projected FY24 Global Force Management 
allocation. Additionally, the lack of documented personnel able to meet 
foreign language requirements in critical languages needed to support 
the additional ISR platforms is a concern.
    Mr. Scott. Can you talk about the importance of the National 
Guard's State Partnership Program to your respective AOR? Do you have 
any suggestions on how to improve this highly successful program?
    General Langley. As a posture-limited command, USAFRICOM relies 
heavily on the National Guard, which provides an outsized return on 
investment through the State Partnership Program (SPP). SPP is funding-
limited, not capacity limited. Predictable funding--even at current 
levels--through the Presidential Budget would stabilize planning and 
increase execution rates with the partner nations. Cross-fiscal year 
spending authority would allow the National Guard to complete a much 
higher percentage of our planned events, demonstrating our reliability 
as a partner. Properly staffing the SPP is critical to its overall 
success.
    Mr. Scott. Lieutenant Commander Stuart J. Ambrose, U.S. Coast Guard 
Reserve, wrote an article in the August 2019 issue of Proceedings 
entitled, ``Guard the African Coast.'' Do you agree with the author 
that, ``The Coast Guard should set to work immediately with the Navy's 
Fifth and Sixth Fleets to increase the periodicity of Coast Guard 
cutter operations off the coasts of Africa''? What is the ideal number 
of USCG cutter days in USAFRICOM?
    General Langley. The ideal number of U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) cutter 
days would consist of at least one cutter year-round in Africa, and 
similar Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) deployments, allowing 
USAFRICOM to make significant strides toward maritime security 
objectives in Africa. The USCG supports USAFRICOM capacity building 
programs with training teams and participates in USAFRICOM maritime 
security exercises and combined operations with cutters and LEDETs.
    USCG's unique maritime law enforcement authority and expertise 
fills a critical DOD gap, allowing USAFRICOM to maximize capacity-
building efforts among African navies, most of which have coastal 
defense and law enforcement missions. USAFRICOM lacks the fiscal and 
operational authority to fund USCG LEDET deployments to advise and 
assist African navies in the execution of their maritime security 
mission.
                                 ______
                                 
                     QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KIM
    Mr. Kim. In February 2023, CENTCOM and the IDF conducted joint air 
defense, cybersecurity, intelligence, and logistics exercises. What are 
some of the greatest challenges CENTCOM has experienced in conducting 
cyber exercises with our partners in the region and what resources do 
you need from Congress in order to build our regional allies' 
capabilities in cyberspace?
    General Kurilla. With support of U.S. Cyber Command, we conduct 
joint exercises with our allies and regional partners to improve our 
shared cyberspace defense posture. All such exercises focus on 
defensive, not offensive, cyber operations. The greatest challenge we 
face in conducting cyber exercises with our partners is the wide 
variety of partner cyber capability. Some of our partner forces have 
emerging cyber defense capability and some are more fully developed.
    We are often challenged to share cyber threat information due to 
security classification restrictions on much of this information. 
Sometimes we are simply unable to declassify some of the threat 
information.
    Legislation like the Cyber Regional Security Legislation proposed 
by the SASC last year, has the potential to assist in addressing both 
challenges, paving the way for cooperative bilateral and multilateral 
cyberspace defense initiatives. These may integrate our capabilities 
with our regional partners, building a layered defense posture. 
Additional opportunities are the sharing of cyber threat information 
and collaboration on best practices with our partners.
    The cyber domain will continue to experience a steady increase in 
priority and a need for commensurate resourcing.
    Mr. Kim. General Kurilla in your Senate Armed Services Committee 
(SASC) testimony on March 16, 2023 you stated that ``It is my 
commander's estimate that [ISIS-K] can do an external operation against 
U.S. or Western interests abroad in under 6 months with little to no 
warning''. In your House Armed Services Committee (HASC) testimony on 
March 23, 2023 you qualified this statement by saying it could be an 
ISIS-K inspired attack on the homeland within six months. Could you 
explain to the committee the intelligence you received that caused you 
to state that ISIS-K could conduct an attack on the homeland in six 
months? What lead to the apparent change/clarification between your 
testimony from the SASC to the HASC? Does the rest of the intelligence 
community (IC) draw the same conclusion from reporting on ISIS-K 
capabilities that you do? If ISIS-K can conduct an inspired attack 
within six months, what is the likely timeline for a directed attack, 
what is the mostly likely timeline, and does the IC agree with your 
assessment? Is it more likely that ISIS-K would direct an external 
attack closer to Afghanistan than the United States? Is ISIS-K in the 
position where it can begin to plan for external attacks, unless 
directed by the Siddiqui office, as it is still in a continual struggle 
with the Taliban? I request a classified response.
    General Kurilla. a) Could you explain to the committee the 
intelligence you received that caused you to state that ISIS-K could 
conduct an attack on the homeland in six months?
    On March 16th, I testified before the Senate Armed Services 
Committee that ISIS-K ``can conduct an external operation against 
American or Western interests abroad in under six months with little-
to-no warning.'' In response to a question on that statement, I further 
testified that an attack on the homeland would be ``much harder'' to 
execute. I reaffirmed both statements in open testimony before the 
House Armed Services Committee on March 23rd.
    ISIS-K is developing the ability to inspire, enable and direct 
attacks in the region and beyond.
    The group can inspire an attack by a lone actor outside the region 
through its propaganda and vile ideology right now, today--this 
includes the United States.
    We have seen ISIS-K enabled attacks abroad against western 
interests. Enabled attacks are those in which they provide funding and 
some direction for the attacks. As I stated in my testimony, enabling 
an attack against the homeland is much harder and I do not have a 
realistic estimate for that timeline.
    Directed attacks--those that are directed and command and 
controlled directly from ISIS-K are even more difficult; however, ISIS-
K is working to develop that capability.
    Our intelligence of ISIS-K planning and attack capabilities drives 
my commander's assessment that ISIS-K can conduct an external attack 
against American or Western targets abroad in under six months with 
little to no warning. These attacks will most likely be inspired or 
enabled but they are working on directed attacks as well.
    b) What lead to the apparent change/clarification between your 
testimony from the SASC to the HASC?
    My testimony did not change. On March 17th, I testified before the 
Senate Armed Services Committee that ISIS-K ``can conduct an external 
operation against American or Western interests abroad in under six 
months with little-to-no warning.'' I also testified that an attack 
against the homeland would be ``much harder''. On March 23rd, I 
testified before the House Armed Services Committee that ``Really what 
we see right now is their [ISIS-K] ability to do that in under six 
months is the enabled attack against U.S. or Western interests abroad. 
Obviously, much harder to do against the homeland.''
    c) Does the rest of the intelligence community (IC) draw the same 
conclusion from reporting on ISIS-K capabilities that you do?
    I represent US Central Command and do not speak for the US 
Intelligence Community which is why I stated in my comment that it was 
my commander's assessment.
    d) If ISIS-K can conduct an inspired attack within six months, what 
is the likely timeline for a directed attack, what is the mostly likely 
timeline, and does the IC agree with your assessment?
    On March 23rd, I testified before the House Armed Services 
Committee that ISIS-K can enable an attack against American or Western 
interests abroad within six months. An inspired attack, driven by an 
individual actor or group inspired by ISIS-K's vile ideology, could 
occur with little-to-no warning--it could happen today--to include in 
the United States or anywhere in the world. To clarify, my six-month 
timeline accounts for an inspired and/or an enabled attack. A directed 
attack, which would require more planning and logistical support is 
more difficult. I command US Central Command and do not speak for the 
Intelligence Community which is why I stated it was my commander's 
assessment.
    e) Is it more likely that ISIS-K would direct an external attack 
closer to Afghanistan than the United States?
    A directed attack by ISIS-K near the Afghan borders would certainly 
require significantly fewer resources and less intensive planning than 
an attack on the homeland. Proximity to its central networks and 
resources in Afghanistan increases the likelihood of ISIS-K attempting 
directed attacks in the region. Should ISIS-K attempt an attack further 
away from Afghanistan, the group would likely apply lessons learned to 
refine its processes for future attacks outside the region.
    f) Is ISIS-K in the position where it can begin to plan for 
external attacks, unless directed by the Siddiqui office, as it is 
still in a continual struggle with the Taliban?
    ISIS-K can enable an attack against American or Western interests 
abroad within six months through funding and resourcing and enabling 
its network. A directed attack, which would require more planning and 
logistical support, would take longer. ISIS-K remains in conflict with 
the Taliban, which limits its ability to resource and plan for a 
directed attack outside the region.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
    Mr. Gallagher. From docking warships in Brazil, to developing 
cutting-edge unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies, to moving 
ever-closer to a nuclear weapons program, it is clear that Iran is not 
just a destabilizing force in the region, but a malign actor with 
global ambitions. Is CENTCOM adequately resourced and postured to 
counter the threat of an increasingly aggressive Iran within the AOR? 
And what consequences do you foresee on a global scale if Iran's 
destabilizing actions are allowed to continue unchecked? How does the 
Administration plan on countering these actions?
    Dr. Wallander. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Gallagher. From docking warships in Brazil, to developing 
cutting-edge unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) technologies, to moving 
ever-closer to a nuclear weapons program, it is clear that Iran is not 
just a destabilizing force in the region, but a malign actor with 
global ambitions. Is CENTCOM adequately resourced and postured to 
counter the threat of an increasingly aggressive Iran within the AOR? 
And what consequences do you foresee on a global scale if Iran's 
destabilizing actions are allowed to continue unchecked? How does the 
Administration plan on countering these actions?
    General Kurilla. a) Is CENTCOM adequately resourced and postured to 
counter the threat of an increasingly aggressive Iran within the AOR?
    The resources I have currently assigned and allocated against my 
current missions place me at high risk to counter the threat of an 
increasingly aggressive Iran within the AOR.
    Iran is the single biggest malign actor in the region. I 
dynamically assess risk and assign resources against all of my assigned 
missions, not just deterring Iran. My mission set also includes 
countering violent extremist organizations and competing strategically 
with China and Russia--all while partnering and increasing partner 
capacity in the region.
    I have outlined to the Secretary and the Chairman the resources 
required for each mission and the risk associated with each mission 
based on the resources allocated.
    In the event of increased risk from Iran we always have the ability 
to request more resources on a time sensitive basis to lower the risk.
    b) And what consequences do you foresee on a global scale if Iran's 
destabilizing actions are allowed to continue unchecked?
    Iran perceives a minimal measure of risk of consequences in 
response to its strikes on American and Coalition forces in Syria and 
Iraq, attacks against partner nations, attacks against international 
maritime shipping, and its support to proxy forces throughout the 
region. Should its destabilizing actions expand with impunity and 
continue to build its ballistic missile and Unmanned Aerial Vehicle 
stockpile, it may force a reaction from Regional partners that may set 
a conflagration in motion that may impose risk beyond the Middle East. 
A nuclear-capable Iran would change the Middle East overnight and 
forever and present further global risk as countries in and around the 
region may seek to match nuclear weapons to counter the threat.
    c) How does the Administration plan on countering these actions?
    This question is best directed toward the National Security 
Council, which maintains a whole-of-government approach to deterring 
Iran.
    Mr. Gallagher. What investments on the part of the U.S. are 
necessary to counter the threat posed by the rapid development of 
Chinese dual-use space infrastructure and telecommunications 
architecture in places like Djibouti?
    General Langley. A whole of government approach, in concert with US 
Space Command, industry and our closest allies and partners, is 
required to develop competitive space and telecommunication 
alternatives. USAFRICOM appreciates the Congressional efforts to 
safeguard export-controlled U.S. advanced technology from supporting 
the PRC's space and telecommunications industry. The transfer of U.S. 
technologies to China's military-industrial complex poses a threat for 
U.S. industrial competitiveness, including in Djibouti and across 
Africa.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SHERRILL
    Ms. Sherrill. General Kurilla, I am very concerned about the 
ongoing tensions and unrest along the West Bank. What is your team 
doing to ensure stability in the region, especially as the region 
continues to face increased violence? What is CENTCOM doing to protect 
and strengthen our interests and reach in the region? What additional 
resources do you need to accomplish your mission?
    General Kurilla. a) What is your team doing to ensure stability in 
the region, especially as the region continues to face increased 
violence?
    I maintain, open, honest, and constant communication with my Israel 
Defense Forces counterparts on a wide range of issues including the 
West Bank and the Israeli Defense Force's role as the State of Israel's 
security guarantor. I just visited Israel on April 27th to 28th where I 
met with Defense Minister Gallant and Israel Defense Forces Chief of 
the General Staff, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi. We discussed the 
relationship between the Israel Defense Forces and the Palestinian 
Authority and conditions in the West Bank. I also maintain regular 
dialogue with US Army Lieutenant General Mike Fenzel, the US Security 
Coordinator of the Israel-Palestinian Authority, a neutral observer in 
the West Bank who seeks to moderate behavior on both sides.
    b) What is CENTCOM doing to protect and strengthen our interests 
and reach in the region?
    We protect and strengthen American interests in the region by 
serving as a security integrator: integrating our partners into a 
framework of operations, activities, investments, and initiatives that 
will ensure sufficient regional security to protect our vital national 
interests. It is through deep, abiding partnerships across the region 
that we can strengthen our influence and thereby secure American 
interests in the region.
    c) What additional resources do you need to accomplish your 
mission?
    I have outlined to the Secretary and the Chairman the resources 
required for each mission and the risk associated to each mission based 
on the resources allocated--this includes the resources required to 
lower risk to force and risk to mission.
    In the event of increased risk in any of our assigned missions, we 
always have the ability to request more resources on a time sensitive 
basis to lower the risk.
    Ms. Sherrill. General Langley, the African continent is full of 
vast and untapped rare earth mineral deposits, including bauxite, 
cobalt, copper, lithium, and nickel, that are vital to both the defense 
industry and the global energy transition. What are you doing to 
increase stability in the region and to increase partnerships between 
our African allies and our organic defense industrial base, allowing 
the U.S. to strengthen our presence in the area and improve our 
critical minerals posture? Specifically, how are we working with 
critical mineral rich developing African nations, such as Guinea, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, and Mozambique?
    General Langley. USAFRICOM supports U.S. government and private 
industry efforts to build partnerships in the mining, energy and 
mineral trade areas to support the U.S. Defense Industrial Base. This 
Command focuses on building the capacity and professionalism of 
militaries in these countries to enhance security so that their 
civilian administrations can focus on economic and natural resource 
protection and development.
    In Mozambique, the Southern African Development Community Mission 
in Mozambique (SAMIM) is supported by countries with which we have 
bilateral capacity-building activities through military-to-military 
exchanges, Security Forces Assistance Brigade (SFAB) engagements and 
training, Joint Combined Exchange Training engagements, exercise 
participation and building partner capacity activities. The 
proliferation of armed groups and extensive instability in eastern DRC 
limit the capacity of the government to protect natural resources 
across the DRC. In Madagascar, USAFRICOM efforts center on maritime 
domain awareness, supporting one aspect of Madagascar's efforts to 
protect natural resources. Lack of governance contributes to 
instability across these countries and limits legal access to minerals 
by industry. USAFRICOM also works with other DoD Agencies such as the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) to assist countries in 
preventing illegal trafficking of specific subsets of rare earth and 
critical minerals. USAFRICOM is interested in working with Guinea on 
developing its natural resources, but Section 7008 restrictions imposed 
after the September 2021 coup limit our bilateral relationship.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
    Mrs. McClain. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mark 
Milley and the Commander of US Central Command, General Michael Kurilla 
have both testified before the House Armed Services Committee and have 
given conflicting statements concerning US ISR capabilities over 
Afghanistan.
    General Kurilla testified that the United States is severely 
lacking in over-the-horizon ISR capabilities over Afghanistan in order 
to monitor and engage ISIS-K and other terror threats. He went as far 
as to say his ISR assets only spend 20% of the time on station.
    The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs testified to HASC that there has 
indeed been a degraded ISR capabilities due to the lack of boots on the 
ground, however our capabilities for over-the-horizon are strong and he 
has no concerns.
    Rep. McClain is demanding clarity as to:
      What were our over-the-horizon ISR capabilities in 
September 2021?
      What are our current over-the-horizon ISR capabilities 
today?
      Has General Kurilla briefed and voiced all his concerns 
with his perceived lack of ISR assets to the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense?
      What has caused these conflicting statements? Has 
Chairman Milley's staff been in constant communication with the command 
staff of CENTCOM?
      Does Secretary Austin agree with Chairman Milley's 
assessment? Or does he share General Kurilla's concerns?
    General Kurilla. a) What were our over-the-horizon ISR capabilities 
in September 2021?
    In September, 2021, after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, CENTCOM 
had eight MQ-9 airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
sorties flying to Afghanistan each day. These sorties provided 
approximately 32-40 hours on station per day based on target location--
this is approximately 20% of the total time the MQ-9s were flying based 
on the distance to target, i.e. approximately 80% of the time the MQ-9s 
are flying are spent in transit.
    b) What are our current over-the-horizon ISR capabilities today?
    There is no change to the Over-The-Horizon Intelligence, 
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance assets from September, 2021 to today; 
however, we are about to experiment with several long duration 
alternative airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
platforms in the next several months.
    c) Has General Kurilla briefed and voiced all his concerns with his 
perceived lack of ISR assets to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and 
the Secretary of Defense?
    I have shared in writing several times our need for improved ISR to 
maximize our collection in Afghanistan. My 4 Oct 2022 Joint Urgent 
Operational Needs Statement addressed this concern, which I submitted 
to the Chairman and Secretary. I've also submitted the findings from 
the CENTCOM Alternate Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and 
Reconnaissance Summit in November 2022.
    Also, last November 2022, I provided my FY24 Sourcing Assessment 
Memo to the Secretary of Defense, through the Chairman, laying out my 
concerns with Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance 
allocation. I also provided an assessment of impacts to Operation 
Enduring Sentinel and Operation Inherent Resolve of planned MQ-9 
reductions for Fiscal Year 2024.
    While I am concerned with resource allocations in CENTCOM, the 
Secretary and Chairman must balance these concerns with resourcing 
requirements across the entire globe and other priority theaters and 
missions. I am confident my concerns are heard.
    d) What has caused these conflicting statements?
    My concerns about our Intelligence, Reconnaissance, and 
Surveillance capabilities are covered in my previous responses. I 
continue to work with the Joint Staff, Intelligence Community, and 
regional partners on this dynamic problem set. I am confident my 
concerns are heard by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TOKUDA
    Ms. Tokuda. How significant of a security risk is IUU fishing and 
piracy in West African coastal waters? What specific measures by the 
United States and/or our partners in Africa is the Department and 
USAFRICOM supporting related to this issue? Which of these measures or 
lines of effort are most effective? Are the authorities and funding 
currently available to the Department and USAFRICOM to address IUU 
fishing and piracy in West Africa adequate? If not, what additional 
authorities and/or funding are required?
    Dr. Wallander. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Ms. Tokuda. How significant of a security risk is IUU fishing and 
piracy in West African coastal waters? What specific measures by the 
United States and/or our partners in Africa is the Department and 
USAFRICOM supporting related to this issue? Which of these measures or 
lines of effort are most effective? Are the authorities and funding 
currently available to the Department and USAFRICOM to address IUU 
fishing and piracy in West Africa adequate? If not, what additional 
authorities and/or funding are required?
    General Langley. Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing 
and piracy imposes significant security, economic, and societal risks 
for West African states. Fisheries are a key contributor to the food 
security of more than 200 million Africans and provide income for more 
than 10 million people. IUU fishing removes billions of dollars in 
economic benefit, eliminates employment opportunities, exacerbates food 
insecurity, and stokes political instability. All these factors 
contribute to an environment ripe for extremist groups and piracy to 
thrive.
    USAFRICOM draws from the Maritime SAFE ACT and the President's 
National Security Memorandum on Combatting IUU-Fishing and Related 
Labor Practices for guidance regarding the Department's role in 
countering IUU fishing.
    USAFRICOM is making progress on maritime domain awareness through 
the Department of Transportation's SeaVision common operating platform 
and related training during our annual Obangame Express maritime 
exercise. Additionally, we are seeking the resources to place maritime 
advisors in seven West African regional command and control centers 
under the Yaounde Architecture for Maritime Security.
    Surface vessel deployments (USN and USCG) conducting combined 
enforcement operations with African partners are the most effective 
means to address IUU-fishing and piracy in Africa. Currently, USAFRICOM 
has one full-time USN vessel to support African navies in addressing 
these maritime security challenges. We are working to leverage the 
presence of European navies--especially the European Union's 
Coordinated Maritime Presences Initiative--but we need greater U.S. 
surface vessel presence to deliver the optimal operational support 
Africans need.
    USAFRICOM lacks appropriate fiscal authorities to conduct combined 
enforcement operations with African partners. USAFRICOM is seeking the 
authorities to fund U.S. Coast Guard law enforcement detachments to 
advise and assist African partner nations and host international ship-
riders aboard U.S. vessels. Ideally, ship-rider operations would last 
for up to 179 days to support a multinational crew in the conduct of 
integrated IUU fishing, counter-piracy patrols, and other maritime 
security and law enforcement activities. Finally, USAFRICOM is seeking 
to utilize 10 USC 331 authorities to deliver needed logistics, 
supplies, support, and services to African partner nations to actively 
patrol their Exclusive Economic Zone, e.g., fuel costs for partner 
nation vessels during maritime operations.
    When USAFRICOM pursues bilateral agreements with African partners, 
the most important assessment of capability is the country's legal 
system. USAFRICOM's Office of Legal Counsel determines the country's 
ability to prosecute maritime crimes before conducting further 
agreements. Additionally, during each maritime exercise USAFRICOM 
provides training to all participants who attend the exercises to 
include evidence collection, chain of custody and case package 
preparation.