[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
LOOKING AHEAD SERIES: OVERSIGHT OF THE
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
ADMINISTRATION
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 16, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on House Administration
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
www.govinfo.gov
www.cha.house.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-610 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
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Committee on House Administration
BRYAN STEIL, Wisconsin, Chairman
BARRY LOUDERMILK, Georgia JOSEPH MORELLE, New York,
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia Ranking Member
GREG MURPHY, North Carolina TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
STEPHANIE BICE, Oklahoma DEREK KILMER, Washington
MIKE CAREY, Ohio NORMA TORRES, California
ANTHONY D'ESPOSITO, New York
LAUREL LEE, Florida
Tim Monahan, Staff Director
Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Opening Statements
Chairman Bryan Steil, Representative from the State of Wisconsin. 1
Prepared statement of Chairman Bryan Steil................... 3
Ranking Member Joseph Morelle, Representative from the State of
New York....................................................... 9
Prepared statement of Ranking Member Joseph Morelle.......... 12
Statements
The Honorable Barry Loudermilk, Representative from the State of
Georgia........................................................ 4
Prepared statement of Barry Loudermilk....................... 8
Witness
J. Thomas Manger................................................. 14
Prepared statement of J. Thomas Manger....................... 17
Submissions for the Record
Tarik Johnson transcript......................................... 5
Rolling Stone article............................................ 26
McFarland record questions from April 18, 2023, hearing.......... 45
Tampa Free Press article......................................... 78
The Hill article................................................. 80
Roll Call article................................................ 82
Capitol Police General Counsel U.S. v. Pope affidavit............ 85
Capitol Police General Counsel U.S. v. McCaughey and Stevens
affidavit...................................................... 92
Capitol Police Chief Thomas Manger memorandum.................... 98
Washington Post article.......................................... 99
Appendix 2 of the January 6 Select Committee report.............. 105
Chief Pittman article............................................ 164
Questions for the Record
Thomas Manger answers............................................ 180
LOOKING AHEAD SERIES: OVERSIGHT OF THE
UNITED STATES CAPITOL POLICE
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Tuesday, May 16, 2023
Committee on House Administration,
House of Representatives,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:21 a.m., in
room 1310, Longworth House Office Building, Hon. Bryan Steil
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Steil, Loudermilk, Griffith,
Murphy, Bice, Carey, D'Esposito, Lee, Morelle, Torres, and
Kilmer.
Staff present: Hillary Lassiter, Clerk; Caleb Hays, Deputy
Staff Director, General Counsel, Acting Parliamentarian; Tim
Monahan, Majority Full Committee Staff Director; Jordan Wilson,
Director of Member Services; Elliot Smith, Deputy Director of
Oversight; Elliott Tomlinson, Deputy General Counsel; Andrea
Porwoll, Communications Director; Eddie Flaherty, Minority
Chief Clerk; Khalil Abboud, Minority Deputy Staff Director,
Chief Counsel; Jamie Fleet, Minority Staff Director; and
Matthew Schlesinger, Minority Oversight Counsel.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BRYAN STEIL, CHAIRMAN OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WISCONSIN
Chairman Steil. The Committee on House Administration will
come to order.
I note that a quorum is present.
Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any
time.
Also without objection, the meeting record will remain open
for 5 legislative days so Members may submit any materials they
wish to be included therein.
Thank you, Ranking Member Morelle and Members of the
Committee, for joining us for one of our most important
oversight hearings this Congress.
Chief Manger, it is good to see you again. Thank you for
joining us as well.
Every day, the men and women of the United States Capitol
Police safeguard the Capitol--not just the buildings but the
visitors, staff, and Members inside. This protection also
extends to district offices and Members' homes across the
country.
Just yesterday, staff in Congressman Gerry Connolly's
Virginia office were attacked by a person with a baseball bat.
This is abhorrent, and there is no room for political violence
in our country. I am grateful to local law enforcement, who
responded within 5 minutes, and the Capitol Police for their
constant coordination with local law enforcement.
During a time when threats against Members and staff remain
at record highs, I personally want to say thank you to the men
and women of Capitol Police for all that you do. In doing your
job, the Capitol Police ensures Congress can do ours.
This week is National Police Week. As we honor law
enforcement across the country, I can think of no better way to
say thank you to the rank-and-file men and women who serve the
United States Capitol Police than having a conversation with
the department leadership about how we can equip them with
better tools and training and ultimately work to de-politicize
Capitol security.
Following the January 6th attacks on the Capitol, Capitol
Police was placed under scrutiny by Congress and the general
public. Since that time, the department has seen numerous
reviews from Federal oversight entities. Over 100
recommendations resulted from these reviews, with trends
focusing on failures in intelligence gathering and sharing,
communication breakdowns, equipment training, leadership, and
accountability.
Much of the department's focus over the last couple of
years has been on closing these recommendations. I am concerned
that the department is not making the necessary changes with
speed or efficiency, despite the department's budget being at
historic highs and one of the largest in the country.
As Chairman, my goal is to de-politicize Capitol security.
To do so, we must bring greater transparency into the
operations and decision making of the department. Today's
hearing will focus on increasing accountability, transparency,
professionalism, and resiliency within the United States
Capitol Police through proper oversight.
I recognize the Capitol Police has multiple oversight
entities, sometimes with different views, and can often
hamstring decision making. I have had the opportunity to speak
with many of our frontline officers and share their concerns,
including inconsistent training, outdated equipment, forced
overtime.
I look forward to today's hearing as we bring
accountability and transparency to the department. We must also
transform the department from a traditional police force to a
protective force, while ensuring our officers have the tools
needed to protect this institution now and in the future.
[The statement of Chairman Steil follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
ADMINISTRATION BRYAN STEIL
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
I would now like to yield 2 minutes of my time to the
Chairman of the Oversight Subcommittee, Barry Loudermilk.
STATEMENT OF HON. BARRY LOUDERMILK, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
THE STATE OF GEORGIA
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Too many buttons
up here now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief, thank you for being here.
As Chairman of the Subcommittee on Oversight, I am focused
on identifying the security failures leading up to and on
January 6, 2021. I am concerned that, to date, those failures
have not been sufficiently addressed and that the department is
not fully prepared to handle threats to the Capitol in the
future.
As I have reviewed the records from the former January 6th
Select Committee, I have more questions than answers related to
Capitol security.
For example, in a recent court filing, several Federal law
enforcement agencies, including the FBI and DHS, stated that
they had plain-clothed officers at the Capitol that day, as did
Metro Police Department.
Today, I am sending a letter to the Metro Police Department
asking for more information about the officers that they had at
the Capitol that day. They were wearing plain clothes, as would
be expected during a major event.
If they had prior threat intelligence to send officers to
the Capitol that day, did they share that with Capitol Police?
If Capitol Police was aware of serious threats, why weren't
they prepared?
The many post-January 6th after-action reports made clear,
we did have the intelligence, but there was a clear failure by
U.S. Capitol Police leadership, specifically at the
Intelligence Division, to disseminate that information. Instead
of our frontline officers--instead, our frontline officers were
left unprepared.
This is not a political issue, and I am sure my Democratic
friends are willing to engage in a fair and factual assessment
of the leadership failures at the U.S. Capitol Police during
January 6th.
I would like to submit for the record a transcript from a
recent FOX News interview with former Capitol Police Lieutenant
Tarik Johnson, who had repeatedly pleaded for help from the
department leadership over Capitol Police radio frequencies,
yet he was met with silence every time.
Chairman Steil. Without objection.
[The transcript referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Loudermilk. His fellow officers heard the radio, so
where was U.S. Capitol leadership when officers pleaded for
orders, direction, and assistance?
After taking action into his own hands and getting Members
of Congress to safety, instead of receiving recognition, he was
demoted.
Meanwhile, other officers and employees of the Capitol
Police have been allowed to write books, make media
appearances, and work with Members of Congress to influence
legislative activity.
It is clear our officers were failed by some in leadership
that day. There must be accountability so it never happens
again.
Thank you, and I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Loudermilk follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE BARRY LOUDERMILK
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OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOSEPH MORELLE, RANKING MEMBER OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOUSE ADMINISTRATION, A U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM
NEW YORK
Chairman Steil. I now recognize Ranking Member Mr. Morelle
for 5 minutes for the purposes of providing an opening
statement.
Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, both for giving me an
opportunity and for convening this hearing.
Thank you, Chief Manger, both for your service and for
appearing before us this morning.
The women and men of the Capitol Police are heroes. Their
actions on January 6th saved our lives and may well have saved
our democracy.
To every one of the nearly 2,000 sworn members of the
Capitol Police, thank you.
During this National Police Week, I also want to thank all
law enforcement across my district back home in New York and
across the country for their extraordinary service to our
fellow citizens.
I look forward to discussing how we can best support the
department and hearing about the progress made implementing the
Capitol Police Inspector General's reform recommendations.
First, I would like to set the record straight on a few
things, because some of my colleagues have a habit of saying
one thing while doing another.
House Republicans started this Congress talking frequently
about how Capitol security needed to be de-politicized. Despite
this, they have spent much of this Congress inserting politics
into Capitol security.
For example, earlier this year, the Secret Service asked
the Capitol Police Board to authorize a temporary security
fence around the Capitol for the State of the Union Address, a
designated National Special Security Event that brings
virtually the entire leadership of the United States Federal
Government into one room. The Senate Sergeant at Arms and the
Architect of the Capitol voted to grant the Secret Service's
request, but Speaker McCarthy pushed to decline the service.
Next, the Speaker provided unfettered access to sensitive
Capitol security footage to Tucker Carlson, an entertainer who
said the January 6th attack was a ``false flag operation'' and
that the rioters were ``peaceful.''
The Speaker of the House contributed to an attempt at
whitewashing of a day one Capitol Police Officer described as
``like something from a medieval battlefield,'' where he fought
hand to hand and inch by inch to prevent an invasion of the
Capitol by a violent mob intent on subverting our democratic
process.
Two Capitol Police Officers died from the events of that
day; 140 law enforcement officers were assaulted; more than
1,000 rioters have been arrested, including more than 200 who
were charged with assaulting a law enforcement officer. For the
first time in decades, we have seen convictions for seditious
conspiracy.
Providing that security footage to Tucker Carlson over the
strenuous objections of the Capitol Police was an insult to the
grievously injured and to the families of the American heroes
who died because they fought to protect us all sitting on this
dais today.
To me, ``backing the blue'' includes listening to the
Capitol Police when they tell us that releasing sensitive
Capitol security footage makes everyone who sets foot in the
Capitol, including the officers themselves, less safe.
It also includes listening to nonpartisan security
officials when they tell us what resources they need to protect
us and themselves. The original Capitol security supplemental
appropriations bill that met the needs identified by
nonpartisan Capitol security officials did not receive a single
Republican vote.
I frequently hear from my Republican colleagues that they
are the party of law enforcement. It was a Republican Chairman
of the House Judiciary Committee who suggested he would defund
the FBI, and House Republicans introduced the Abolish the ATF
Act.
Last week, the Judiciary Committee could not even report a
resolution expressing support for law enforcement unless
support for Federal law enforcement was removed from the
resolution. Just last night, Democrats on the Rules Committee
tried to amend the resolution to add support for the Capitol
Republicans voted it down on party lines. Not a single
Republican was prepared to say thank you to the Capitol Police.
It is not just here in Washington; it is in Florida. The
Hillsborough County Republican Party formally requested the
Governor remove the Capitol Police from their Tampa field
office and kick them out of the State of Florida.
With that in mind, I am anxiously looking forward to
hearing from Chief Manger about how we best support the brave
officers that protect us.
We are serving at a time of unprecedented threats of
political violence. Just yesterday, as the Chairman mentioned,
a few miles from here, an individual entered the district
office of Congressman Gerry Connolly with a baseball bat and,
after asking about the Congressman's whereabouts, attacked two
members of his staff.
I know we are all thinking of those staffers today, and I
pray they make a swift and full recovery. The incident
underscores how important it is that Capitol Police have the
resources they need to protect us.
Last Congress, the Committee convened more hearings on the
preparations for and response to the January 6th attack than
any other standing Committee in Congress. I am looking forward
to hearing about the progress made in implementing the
Inspector General's recommendations discussed at those
hearings.
I am also eager to hear the chief's view on what this
Committee can do to help improve recruitment and retention and
minimize officer burnout.
Finally, I hope to hear the chief's thoughts on how the
department may begin to operate more like a protective agency,
as was mentioned earlier, than a traditional law enforcement
agency.
With that, again, thank you, Chief, for being here.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ranking Member Morelle follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER OF THE COMMITTEE ON HOUSE
ADMINISTRATION JOSEPH MORELLE
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
Without objection, all other Members' opening statements
will be made part of the hearing record if they are submitted
to the Committee clerk by 5 p.m. today.
Chairman Steil. Pursuant to paragraph B of Committee Rule
6, the witness will please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witness sworn.]
Chairman Steil. Let the record show the witness answered in
the affirmative and may be seated.
I will now introduce our witness, Chief Thomas Manger.
Chief Manger was sworn in as chief of police for the United
States Capitol Police on July 23, 2021. Chief Manger has served
over 42 years in the policing profession, including more than
two decades as chief of police for two of the largest police
agencies in the national capital region.
I would also like to acknowledge that Chief Manger came out
of retirement to take on the difficult job of rebuilding the
department following January 6th.
Chief Manger, we appreciate you being here today and look
forward to your testimony.
As a reminder, we have read your written statement, and it
will appear in full in the hearing record. Under Committee Rule
9, you are to limit your oral presentation to a brief summary
of your written statement.
I now recognize you, Chief Manger, for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF J. THOMAS MANGER, CHIEF OF POLICE, UNITED STATES
CAPITOL POLICE
Chief Manger. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Morelle, and Members of the Committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to provide you with the current state of the
Capitol Police.
I am joined here by my Chairman of the FOP, Gus
Papathanasiou.
The improvements that have occurred as a result of
challenges that the department continues to address, the
transition that the department is making to become a more
protective agency, Congress's support has been invaluable as we
meet the dramatic workload increases and increasingly volatile
threat environment.
United States Capitol Police is unique among Federal law
enforcement agencies. We patrol a campus that is completely
open. Now that the campus is fully reopened, we will again host
millions of visitors.
Over the past 3 years, the department has faced numerous
challenges. We have had to manage through delayed recruitment
efforts due to COVID-related closure of the Federal Law
Enforcement Training Center that essentially brought our sworn
hiring to a halt for nearly a year. Also, low morale and the
public's declining confidence in law enforcement have put a
further strain on the organization. Since the start of the
pandemic, approximately 429 officers have left the department,
of which 358 left after January 6th.
After FLETC reopened, we committed to onboarding 288
officers per year in order to get ahead of attrition. So far,
we have been successful in getting ahead of that attrition,
bringing on 484 officers over the past 2 years. The current
number of sworn employees on the department is 1,994 officers.
That includes everyone from the chief down to the officers that
are in recruit training.
While still below the department's authorized level, it has
allowed us to reopen the campus and provide critical training
for our officers, such as CDU training, active-shooter training
within the congressional buildings. We continue to work to
increase our sworn uniformed staffing to address those
shortages that still plague our department.
The department has implemented a number of strategies to
retain officers, such as bolstering salaries to be more
competitive, offering retention bonuses, the Student Loan
Repayment Program, and specialty pay to attract and retain
officers. I would like to thank the Congress for its assistance
and support in providing that funding. It has made a
difference.
January 6th exposed weaknesses within the organization. The
more than a dozen after-action reports from the Inspector
General resulted in 103 recommendations for the department. Of
those 103 recommendations by the IG, 89 of those
recommendations have been closed, leaving only 14 to be
completed.
I fully recognize the department's budget is significant,
but equally significant, the department's growing
responsibilities--are the department's growing
responsibilities. The fact is, we engage in a no-fail mission
every day, recognizing that there will be no tolerance for
leadership or organizational failures.
One of the biggest challenges we face today is dealing with
the sheer increase in the number of threats against the Members
of Congress. It has gone up over 400 percent over the last 6
years. We have had a Member of Congress brutally assaulted.
Another Member was attacked on the campaign trial, and the
husband of a former House Speaker was critically wounded in a
politically motivated attack.
These events demonstrate how the Capitol Police need to
transform into a more protective agency, one that concentrates
on protecting Members and their families throughout the
country, not merely in Washington, D.C. Upcoming conventions,
upcoming elections, and the increasingly heated political
rhetoric further heighten the prospect of future security risks
and challenges that the department will need to be prepared to
meet.
The department has struggled to retain personnel in our
Dignitary Protection Division and our Criminal Investigations
Division. DPD is staffed at approximately 70 percent of the
level from what it was prior to January 6th. This is due to
retirements, resignations, and transfers. The Uniformed
Services Division is strained as well. We have moved some
officers from the Uniformed Services Division over to DPD to
address those staffing shortages.
The department recognizes that new and evolving challenges
will continue to emerge. Strategic planning, forward thinking,
proactive versus reactive policing--that is the new operational
model that is best suited to confront the operational
challenges facing the department today and in the future. The
old approach of Member protection has been replaced by the need
to protect the Member's environment as well as the Member's
family. Keeping you and your family safe must be a top
priority.
While the USCP has made significant strides toward right-
sizing our department-wide staffing and pivoting toward a more
protectional--a more protection model, more work needs to be
done.
I thank the Committee for its support and greatly
appreciate our continued partnership with Congress.
[The prepared statement of Chief Manger follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF J. THOMAS MANGER
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Steil. Thank you very much, Chief Manger.
In consultation with the Ranking Member Morelle, Members
will have two opportunities to ask questions of our witness
today.
I will begin by recognizing Mr. Loudermilk for 5 minutes
for the purpose of asking questions.
Mr. Loudermilk. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chief, thank you for being here today and making yourself
available for this.
I want to make it clear to everyone as we go forward:
Chief, you were not in the Capitol Police or in leadership
during the events of January 6th. Questions are not directed at
you personally, but our questions are going to be directed to
your position and your ability to look back and help us get
more understanding of what took place, where the failures were,
and of your position to help correct things going--in the
future.
I just want to make sure everyone and the press
understands: These are not directed at you, since you were not
here.
My first question is regarding after-action reports.
Now, during the congressional baseball shooting--which, I
was there, I was on the field--the Capitol Police after-action
report of that event was nearly 40 pages long, and it involved
only two Capitol Police officers. The after-action report
following January 6th was less than 30 pages and involved
virtually every officer in the Capitol Police.
Do you--can you explain how--the disparity there? I mean,
it would seem to me that we would have volumes of after-action
report.
Chief Manger. I--in a word, I cannot.
However, what I can say is that there were over a dozen
after-action reports related to January 6th, and they
specifically talked about intelligence failures, leadership
failures, equipment failures, training failures, planning
failures.
You had reports that sort of looked at a--sort of a very
narrow piece of the failures of January 6th, and I think that
is the reason----
Mr. Loudermilk. Now----
Chief Manger [continuing]. there were so many of them.
Mr. Loudermilk. Were these Capitol Police-originated
reports, or are you talking about the reports from the Senate
investigation and the Republican investigation?
I know that Mr. ``Papalasu''--is that close enough? I know
some of his folks submitted reports. Are there other reports
that--which reports are you referring to?
Chief Manger. Well, I am actually referring to the
Inspector General reports and the other after-action reports
that were done. You are talking about the internal after-action
reports?
Mr. Loudermilk. Yes. I mean, the only after-action report
that I have seen from the Capitol Police was a 28-page report.
It was very vague.
Chief Manger. Yes. I really cannot----
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay.
Chief Manger [continuing]. speak to that.
Mr. Loudermilk. I mean, I just want to make sure that we
are not missing something that we are looking into.
Also, I want to thank you for working with our Subcommittee
and providing us with the radio recordings from that day. I
think that will be helpful in us--in getting a better handle on
where things are going.
Were these recordings--and these are the radio
transmissions from that day--were they provided to any other
congressional Committee, Federal agency, or any other entity,
to your knowledge?
Chief Manger. I would have to check to make sure, but I
think that they were provided to the Department of Justice for
the prosecution of cases, and they may have been provided to
the defense attorneys as well. I would have to check to verify
that. I know that the video was provided to those folks for
the--related to the criminal----
Mr. Loudermilk. Right.
Chief Manger [continuing]. prosecutions of cases.
Mr. Loudermilk. Yes. If you could follow up with us in
writing, that would be fine. I appreciate that.
Does the Capitol Police have a media policy and are you
aware that one of your officers wrote a book about January 6th
and a civilian employee is currently advertising on their
Twitter page that they will be releasing a book soon, after her
experience on January 6th? I do not know if you were aware of
those.
Chief Manger. I am aware of all the--yes, we do have a
media policy, and I am aware of both of those books.
Mr. Loudermilk. Is there any type of action being--I mean,
are they in violation of your media policy, I guess, is the
first question?
Chief Manger. In a word, I do not believe they are. Now, we
are looking at both of those books to ensure that they do not
run afoul of any ethics violations or any other policies that
we have.
There--it is--for folks that--personnel that are over--at a
certain level, at an executive level, there is a different set
of rules----
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay.
Chief Manger [continuing]. that are more stringent than
folks that are not in the executive leadership.
Mr. Loudermilk. Would it be possible you could provide
those guidelines and rules----
Chief Manger. Yes.
Mr. Loudermilk [continuing]. to our Committee? I appreciate
that.
Another question: Are officers and employees required to
report outside income earned from the book sales or any other
employment they may have?
Chief Manger. They are required to get any outside
employment approved by the department. I do not believe that we
look at the money that they make from the outside employment.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay. If somebody does have other
employment, they have to report that or get----
Chief Manger. They have to report that, and it has to be
approved by the department, yes.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay.
I see my time is up. The other questions I will pick up on
round two.
Thank you, Chief. Appreciate it.
Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
Ranking Member Morelle is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I am going to use my two different times. First, I want to
use it to talk a little bit about access to security footage of
January 6th.
As you know, several months ago, the Speaker directed the
Committee's majority to provide unfettered access to tens of
thousands of hours of sensitive and confidential Capitol
security footage to Tucker Carlson, despite the fact that the
Capitol Police did not approve the release of the footage,
which had been the process used in the January 6th Committee in
the previous Congress.
Before he was fired, Mr. Carlson was a FOX News personality
who has regularly spread conspiracy theories involving January
6th, including saying that the attack was a ``false flag
operation'' supposedly organized and orchestrated by the law
enforcement.
First of all, Chief, was the January 6th attack a false
flag operation orchestrated by law enforcement, in your
opinion?
Chief Manger. Not in my--no, in my opinion, it was not.
Mr. Morelle. Were the rioters on January 6th peaceful?
Chief Manger. No.
Mr. Morelle. The--on March 6th of this year, I would just
also note, Mr. Carlson aired misleading, out-of-context footage
from the recordings provided to him by the Speaker and made a
number of vile statements, said that the rioters were peaceful.
I appreciate you clearing that up.
The Capitol Police's General Counsel said in a court filing
that release of unvetted Capitol security footage ``will result
in the layout, vulnerabilities, and security weaknesses of the
U.S. Capitol being collected, exposed, and passed on to those
who might wish to attack the Capitol again.''
Do you agree with that statement?
Chief Manger. I do, but--and I think it is important to
mention that I had expressed that sentiment to the Committee
and was told by the Committee staff that, before any footage
would be released outside the Committee, that we would have the
opportunity to review if it was security-sensitive.
Mr. Morelle. Well--and, to your point, was information
released to Tucker Carlson without your signoff, without the
review that had been done during the January 6th Committee
hearings?
Chief Manger. The--as far as I know, we expressed to the
Committee that, if there was anything that was going to be
released, we wanted to make sure that it was reviewed. We also
had a list of what we believed was security-sensitive footage.
We also, I think, had footage that had been released in
conjunction with the criminal prosecution of some of the
January 6th cases that was determined not to be security-
sensitive.
Mr. Morelle. Yes, but, to be clear, Speaker McCarthy
claimed that he worked with the Capitol Police to identify any
security-sensitive footage, make sure it was not released. Your
General Counsel said that only one clip from dozens sent to
Tucker Carlson was provided to the Capitol Police for review.
The counsel also wrote in a court filing that ``at no time
was I, nor anyone else from the Capitol Police, informed that
anyone other than personnel from the Committee on House
Administration would be reviewing the camera footage.''
Can you confirm that you were not informed that anyone
other than Committee Members and staff would have access to the
footage?
Chief Manger. I can confirm that the General Counsel would
have the accurate information on that.
Mr. Morelle. Do you know who has the footage? Do you know
whether it is Tucker Carlson or FOX News?
Chief Manger. I do not--I--I think the Committee retains
the footage.
Mr. Morelle. Mr. Carlson's not in possession of the
footage?
Chief Manger. I do not know.
Mr. Morelle. You do not know that. You have not been
advised as to whether or not FOX News has it, Tucker Carlson
has it, or the Committee has it?
Chief Manger. Everything that was released to--outside of
the Committee, we were aware of what was released.
Mr. Morelle. To the Committee. You are aware of what was
released to the Committee?
Chief Manger. Well, we gave everything to the Committee,
but we were informed of what was being released outside the
Committee.
Mr. Morelle. I understand.
Some of it was released, so some of it is in the possession
of people outside the Committee, because you just acknowledged
that you knew they were giving footage to other people.
Correct? Is that what you just testified to?
Chief Manger. Repeat that.
Mr. Morelle. The Committee gave footage outside the
Committee. You were aware of that, then, that they gave----
Chief Manger. Eventually, yes, I was--we were told--yes. I
learned it by actually reading about it in the paper.
Mr. Morelle. I see. Gotcha. I may come back to this when I
have additional minutes.
With that, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Griffith is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
First, if I might ask for introduction into the record of
the Committee an article from Rolling Stone, dated June 8,
2022, entitled ``Inside the Capitol Cops' Jan. 6 Blame Game.''
Chairman Steil. Without objection.
[The Rolling Stone article referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Griffith. Chief Manger, as you know, the Capitol Police
Board is responsible for hiring the U.S. Capitol Police
Inspector General.
As a nonvoting member of the Capitol Police Board, did you
have any role officially or any conversations with other
Capitol Police Board members when selecting the current IG--
Inspector General--Mr. Russo, yes or no?
Chief Manger. I did not. No.
Mr. Griffith. Do you know--or, to your knowledge, did
anyone else at the U.S. Capitol Police have communication with
Mr. Russo prior to the start of the hiring process by the
Capitol Police Board, yes or no?
Chief Manger. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Griffith. Not to your knowledge.
Will you make any communications--if you learn of it later,
will you make any of those communications available to the--
that anyone at the U.S. Police--Capitol Police had--to us, if
you learn of that conversation later that happened with Mr.
Russo prior to his appointment?
Chief Manger. If I learn of any, yes, I would certainly
share that with the Committee.
Mr. Griffith. We have received reports that, after January
6th, some U.S. Capitol Police officers made reports to the
Inspector General related to leadership failures on that day.
Many of these officers were highly critical of the Intelligence
and Interagency Coordination Division's leadership.
Are you aware of these complaints?
Chief Manger. I am.
Mr. Griffith. Claims have been made that, after making
their criticisms of the Intelligence and Interagency
Coordination Division's leadership known, the former IG turned
over the officers' testimonies and names to the U.S. Capitol
Police leadership. Shortly after, these individuals were placed
on performance improvement plans, and then they were either
fired or forced to retire.
Are you aware of the previous leadership of the U.S.
Capitol Police taking these actions?
Chief Manger. I am aware that the complaints were made and
that those complaints were investigated by the Inspector
General.
Mr. Griffith. According to reports made to this Committee,
an employee in the General Counsel's Office contacted the
officers who spoke to the IG.
Do you agree it would be entirely unacceptable for the U.S.
Capitol Police's General Counsel to take information from the
U.S. Capitol Police's Inspector General and then retaliate
against officers who spoke to the Inspector General?
Chief Manger. Well, anybody who was retaliated against for
speaking to the Inspector General is--that should not happen. I
know that the Inspector General and our Office of General
Counsel do work together on certain complaints that are made.
Mr. Griffith. That would be complaints made by members of
the U.S. Capitol Police?
Chief Manger. Once the--they are investigated and any
action that is going to be taken as a result of the
investigation, we--the IG and the Office of the General Counsel
have a role to play in that.
Mr. Griffith. Prior to the Inspector General having done
their investigation, you would agree it would be improper for
the General Counsel to have any input into the complaints--or,
into the investigation of those complaints?
Chief Manger. I think, not knowing more specifically what
action that would be, it is difficult to say that they
absolutely would not have some role if they were providing
information, you know, helpful to the investigation.
Mr. Griffith. Alright. The General Counsel's job is to be a
counsel, not a witness, correct?
Chief Manger. That is correct.
Mr. Griffith. They are a counsel to the United States
Capitol Police leadership team, correct?
Chief Manger. Correct.
Mr. Griffith. If they are counsel for the United States
Police--Capitol Police leadership team, isn't it just
inappropriate on its face for them to be involved with the
Inspector General on an investigation prior to the Inspector
General completing that investigation into conduct that has
been raised as a complaint by a member of the United States
Capitol Police?
Chief Manger. I do not know why they would have any input
prior to the investigation being completed. Once it is
completed, I understand, but prior----
Mr. Griffith. I understand.
Chief Manger [continuing]. I do not know what involvement
they would have.
Mr. Griffith. You would agree with me that would be
inappropriate behavior?
Chief Manger. Again, not knowing specifically what the
issue is----
Mr. Griffith. I am talking specifically----
Chief Manger [continuing]. but, in general, in general,
yes.
Mr. Griffith. I mean, I cannot imagine any situation--can
you imagine a situation where that would be proper? I cannot.
Chief Manger. Depending on the investigation and what the
question was, I would never say ``never,'' but I am agreeing
that, generally, it would not be appropriate.
Mr. Griffith. Alright.
Under your leadership, would you--would you ever allow that
to happen in your department? You have indicated you did not
think so but you might.
Chief Manger. No. No. That is not what I said. What I am
saying is that I would ensure the integrity of every
investigation, whether it is by the Inspector General or
whether it is done by my Office of Professional Responsibility.
Those investigations have to be done fairly, accurately, and
with integrity.
Mr. Griffith. Alright.
I see my time is up. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
Mrs. Torres is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Torres. Chief, thank you for being with us today, and
thank you for your leadership during these very difficult
times. As I told you when we met last week, for some reason I
thought you were here a short few months, but it has been 2
years--almost 2 years. Thank you for the leadership that you
have provided to this campus, to our officers during the time
that you have been here.
Over the last few months, I have had an opportunity to meet
with police departments across the U.S., some of them very
large police departments, such as the LAPD and the New York
Police Department, to hear from them how they respond to large
demonstrations and civil unrest, to hear from them how they put
together an after-an-incident report, who gets those copies,
and how they go back and either train, provide follow-up
training to officers--you know, they always take an after-
action measure of their skills and then reassess from there.
You and I talked about this last week.
Last Congress, this Committee held hearings on the
department's preparation and response to the January 6th
attack. A main concern was that the department's inadequate
training of its officers. Particularly, the Civil Disturbance
Unit training stood out as ineffective.
According to the Inspector General, the department did not
authorize the Civil Disturbance Unit to use all available less-
than-lethal munitions, like grenade launchers and sting-ball
grenades, because the department did not have the sufficient
personnel trained to deploy those types of weapons.
Additionally, the IG also found that 22 of the 29
Containment Emergency Response Team officers, known as CERT,
were not qualified on their handguns--I mean, a basic
training--and 21 of the 29 were not qualified on their rifles
on the day of the January 6th attack.
We have come a long way since then, thanks to your
leadership. Can you walk us through some of the processes and
some of the training?
As I told you, I am not opposed to simulator-type training,
but that type of training does not take the place of real-life
training for officers, you know, face-to-face with either an
angry crowd or people that, you know, may not be having a great
day that day.
Chief Manger. We have invested a great deal into ensuring
that we got not only the training done but--some of the
failures that you are talking about were equipment failures.
The fact that we did not have the equipment for all of our
officers--we sent some officers out there that did not have
helmets, did not have shields. That is just unacceptable.
We have fixed the equipment problems. We have gotten--I
think, if it is not 100 percent, it is about 98 percent of our
officers have all brand-new equipment. They have been trained
with the equipment.
With regard to the training that we are doing, we brought
in outside experts to teach the leadership of our Civil
Disturbance Unit to ensure that we are using best practices
from, you know, the departments that you talk about--I mean,
L.A., NYPD, who have a great deal of experience with that.
We have increased the training, and we have ensured that
every officer gets the CDU training. In fact, what we do is,
when an officer graduates from the academy, they spend a week
right after that getting their first CDU training and they get
issued their equipment, and so that we will have gotten to a
point where all of our officers are getting the training.
In addition to that, I agree with you, I mean, virtual
training's great and it gives us great opportunities to do--but
you also have seen that we have done--we have started the
active-shooter training. The best practice is to do the
training where you will actually be performing----
Mrs. Torres. For that, I am grateful for the alerts that I
get every single day, every single week, about trainings,
simulations that officers are doing while we are here and while
we are working out of our districts.
It is unconscionable to me, the quality of performance from
the previous chief. It is surprising to me that he was allowed
to stay on even a day after, you know, January 6th. I think
that he should have been arrested and tried for his crimes
against--committed against Capitol Police officers for failing
to provide the proper training to them. I thank the change and
thank you for your leadership.
I yield back.
Chairman Steil. The gentlewoman yields back.
Mrs. Bice is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Bice. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Chief, for being with us this morning.
Chief, do you agree that there was a intelligence failure
on January the 6th?
Chief Manger. Absolutely.
Mrs. Bice. United States Capitol Police had a dedicated
Intelligence Division on January 6th, referred to as the IICD,
correct?
Chief Manger. That is correct.
Mrs. Bice. Who was the assistant chief of police for the
Capitol--for USCP in charge of intelligence on January 6th?
Chief Manger. The assistant chief was Yogananda Pittman.
Mrs. Bice. Was Ms. Pittman promoted to chief of police?
Chief Manger. She was made the acting chief after the chief
was fired.
Mrs. Bice. You mentioned to Mr. Griffith that you are aware
of the serious allegations that were made about--by officers
about the failures of the IICD leadership and the potential
subsequent retaliation that was taken against those officers.
Is that correct?
Chief Manger. Well, I did not agree that there was
retaliation against the officers, but I am aware of the
complaints, yes.
Mrs. Bice. Okay. Fair enough.
Ms. Pittman was the head of the IICD on January 6th and
then was made interim chief of police shortly after. She was
both the person rank-and-fellow officers went to the IG about,
thinking that their identity would be protected, and she was
the chief of police when those officers were subsequently
retaliated against for blowing the whistle about the failures.
Would you agree with that?
Chief Manger. Yes.
Mrs. Bice. Are you aware that Federal law prohibits the
United States Capitol Police IG from disclosing the identity of
an employee without their written consent?
Chief Manger. I am not aware of that, no.
Mrs. Bice. Okay.
Is Ms. Pittman still an employee of the United States
Capitol Police?
Chief Manger. She is on leave without pay and has been
since February 1st.
Mrs. Bice. Is she expected to return?
Chief Manger. No. She--pursuant to a negotiated separation
agreement, she left the department February 1st. My--she has
not been--she has no police powers. She has not been paid.
There has been no double-dipping. She had a----
Mrs. Bice. She has not been paid? Is that--you said that
she----
Chief Manger. That is correct, since February 1st.
Mrs. Bice [continuing]. has not been paid since February
1st?
Chief Manger. Yes.
Mrs. Bice. Why a leave of absence without pay, knowing
that--typically, a leave of absence, in my mind, would be
grounds for returning to the position after an extended leave.
Why is it that Ms. Pittman is being allowed to leave, knowing
that she will not be returning?
Chief Manger. Pursuant to a negotiated separation
agreement, she was allowed to go on leave without pay. I--she
was--her intent is to file her application for retirement in
about 30 days.
Mrs. Bice. Is Capitol Police salaries--are those made
public?
Chief Manger. I know that those that are statutorily set
are. I am not sure if they are or not.
Mrs. Bice. No problem.
Would you be willing to provide the comment in writing
about the separation of Ms. Pittman to this Committee?
Chief Manger. I mean, I can give you the details of it,
yes.
Mrs. Bice. Okay. That would be great.
That is actually the last question I have, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you for your service. Thank you for your time this
morning.
With that, I yield back.
Chairman Steil. The gentlewoman yields back.
Mr. Kilmer is recognized 5 minutes.
Mr. Kilmer. Thanks, Chairman.
Thanks for being with us.
You know, one of the things I think is top of mind for a
lot of us is just the safety and security of our colleagues and
of our staff. You know, obviously, the events of yesterday are
horrifying. Making sure that you all have the resources you
need to do your jobs is important.
This week and next, the Appropriations Committee is going
to be marking up Fiscal Year 2024 spending bills, including the
Leg. Branch bill, which funds your agency.
In your testimony, you mentioned the number of threats
against Members of Congress have increased 400 percent.
I was just hoping you could speak to three issues.
One, I am just curious if you have any thoughts on what you
would attribute that increase in threats to.
Two, you know, any comment you have about how the increased
funding that was included in the omnibus at the end of last
year, which included some new funds specifically to enhance
Member security--if you have a sense of how that is being used.
Three, what cuts to your agency would mean.
Chief Manger. What was the last thing?
Mr. Kilmer. What would cuts to your agency mean?
Chief Manger. Alright.
With regard to your question about the threats, I think
that the proliferation of use of social media and the--just the
increasingly--the increasing divide in our country
politically----
Mr. Kilmer. Yes.
Chief Manger [continuing]. has a lot to do with it, a lot
to do with the increase in threats.
The cuts. Cuts to our budget would be devastating. If--I
think we are still at a point where, if you talk about morale,
if you talk about just our ability to meet the workload demands
that we have, we continue to have a great need to increase our
staffing.
I talked about our Dignitary Protection, which is operating
at 70 percent of what it was prior to January 6th. With the
increasing enhancements to protection for leadership--which
should have happened years ago, especially with the two
positions that are in the line of succession for the
Presidency--that they were woefully understaffed, and we have
got them to a point where I think is more appropriate for our
leadership. In addition, we have more need to stand up ad-hoc
protection details for, you know, serious threats against
certain Members.
Tell me--remind me what the second thing was that you
wanted.
Mr. Kilmer. How you used the funding from the omnibus.
Chief Manger. We actually used it to address a lot of the
equipment needs. We used it to get the training that needed
doing.
We did, in fact, increase our uniformed services, which--
you know, we have additional posts that did not exist before
January 6th. We have increasing demand--you know, expectations
and demands from Members of Congress to, you know, put folks at
different garage entrances and to get back to opening doors,
you know, around these----
Mr. Kilmer. Yes.
Chief Manger [continuing]. office buildings to get folks in
more quickly.
We have used it for staffing and training and equipment and
a host of other things.
They were really--when you looked at the recommendations
that came out of the Inspector General reports, a lot of it was
just to address those. They--you know, so many of them talked
about we needed more resources, more staffing, and to make
improvements. A lot of it was used to accomplish those
recollections.
Mr. Kilmer. I am not sure I am looking for you to comment
on how I am going to close out here, but I will just share with
you and I guess with my colleagues too: I chaired the
Modernization Committee in the last Congress. To me, one of the
things that we came up short on--you mentioned succession
planning--for us, was issues related to continuity. You know,
the only way to replace us on the House side is through special
election, which, according to the Association of Secretaries of
State, takes about 4 months.
You know, it is awful for us to think about worst-case
scenarios, but there are some, right? An event at a caucus
retreat could flip a majority. A mass-casualty event. Under the
rules, as the House currently exists, is, the House consists of
whoever is left. Which, you could be in the midst of a national
crisis and have a body with no institutional legitimacy.
I and my office and hopefully working with the Chairman and
others, you know, we are going to take a look at that. Because
I think this a--this is not a problem that is a daily problem,
but when it becomes a problem, it is going to be a really big
problem.
Chief Manger. Mr. Kilmer, if I could just react to that?
Mr. Kilmer. Yes.
Chief Manger. I said in my comments that we are undertaking
a no-fail mission. This is exactly the kind of situation where,
when we--you know, with the upcoming conventions coming up,
with all of the events that Members of Congress do in their
home districts, we can no longer just say, ``Well, boy, I hope
that goes Okay.'' We have got to make sure that we are doing
everything we can to ensure the safety and security of Members
while they are not just here in D.C. but when they are at home.
Mr. Kilmer. Yes.
Chief Manger. This is where the transition to this being a
more protective agency really becomes meaningful.
We cannot do that without resources. Now, I will tell you
that we have gotten funding--in this supplemental, we got
funding to ask for help and to pay for help from State and
local agencies. That has been a great resource to have, and we
have gotten a lot of cooperation. That needs to continue, and
it needs to actually increase.
Mr. Kilmer. Yes, I am with you. Thank you.
Thank you, Chairman, for letting me go over a little.
Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
Dr. Murphy is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Murphy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Chief, for coming. It is hard coming into a
place of, you know, where there has been turmoil and where
there has been----
[Turns on microphone.]
Dr. Murphy. Oh, thank you. I will reserve that time back,
that 4 seconds.
Thank you, Chief.
Just to go ahead and get started, in the way--in the
thinking back just on January 6th--I know you were not in
charge then--obviously, there was a clear failure of the
leadership of the U.S. Capitol Police. It was a--that day was a
shameful day on this country, on all grounds, but there was a
clear failure in the ability to protect the Members of Congress
and the Capitol.
It has been clearly documented, while leadership failed,
they failed also to share intelligence information beforehand
and did not work with rank-and-file officers once the rioting
commenced.
Furthermore, the Democratic leadership turned down requests
for additional resources and reinforcements in the days
preceding January 6th. I do not understand why. It was
conjecture.
Let me ask you a few questions.
When reviewing what transpired on January 6th, did the U.S.
Capitol Police have a distinct chain of command in place for
such a catastrophic event?
Chief Manger. There--you said there were leadership
failures. There were absolutely leadership failures. There were
communication failures. There were failures of operational
planning. Intelligence failures. There is plenty of blame to go
around in terms of the failures.
I think that when we talk about the leadership failures,
you cannot just say, ``Oh, the chief.'' Now, the chief was
ultimately responsible----
Dr. Murphy. I am just trying to--there were chain-of-
command, there were rank-and-file, there was just was a
complete leader---complete, entire programic--programmatic,
rather, failure of what happened on that day.
Chief Manger. There were--there were numerous failures on
that day.
Dr. Murphy. Alright. Well, let me--thanks.
Let me just ask, if, God forbid, there were to be a
hijacked plane coming to the Capitol or a major security
threat, is there a chain of command in place for that?
Chief Manger. Yes, sir.
Dr. Murphy. Alright. It is enacted, and everybody, rank and
file, understands that chain of command?
Chief Manger. There is certainly--plans are communicated.
Intelligence is communicated. Everybody in the organization is
aware of----
Dr. Murphy. Actions to be taken.
Chief Manger [continuing]. the planning that we are doing--
--
Dr. Murphy. Alright. Thank you.
Chief Manger [continuing]. and would be--the information
would be shared with them. Yes.
Dr. Murphy. Was there ever a command on January 6th given
to fall back?
Chief Manger. I do not know the answer to that question.
Dr. Murphy. Okay. Alright. Hopefully, we can just maybe
find that out 1 day.
There is a lot of conjecture as to the actual Federal
presence on the Capitol on January 6th--you know, reports of
Federal law enforcement officers being embedded in the crowd.
It is known that various Federal departments and agencies
responded to the events of January 6th in a variety of ways.
To your understanding, were there any Federal officers
authorized by the U.S. Capitol Police to be operating on the
grounds that day?
Chief Manger. I have no knowledge of that.
Dr. Murphy. Alright. Can you find that out?
Chief Manger. I will do my best to find that out.
Dr. Murphy. Okay. That is all I am asking for.
Chief Manger. Yes.
Dr. Murphy. And----
Chief Manger. My focus has been looking ahead and fixing
what was wrong, not rehashing what was----
Dr. Murphy. I know, but to do that--to do that, we have to
look back and analyze and see what went wrong----
Chief Manger. I think you need to look at the mistakes that
were made and where there were failures, absolutely.
Dr. Murphy. Absolutely. Absolutely.
Let me just--let me follow up on one other thing.
The day before January 6th, there were a couple of live
pipe bombs that were planted outside both Republican and
Democratic National Headquarters. The individual responsible
has remained at large and has eluded law enforcement.
Have you or others at U.S. Capitol Police been briefed on
the current status of the FBI--I hesitate to even say the FBI
today, given what happened yesterday--and ATF investigation
into the attempted bombings on January 6th?
Chief Manger. I am aware that it is still an active
investigation. When new information is determined, I--it is
shared with us, yes.
Dr. Murphy. Have you received any update recently?
Chief Manger. Not recently, no.
Dr. Murphy. Not recently.
To your knowledge, any idea on who the targets of those
bombs were?
Chief Manger. I do not know.
Dr. Murphy. You do not know. Okay.
Mr. Chairman, I think I am good. I will yield back.
Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
Ms. Lee is now recognized for 5 minutes.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chief, thank you for being here today and for your
testimony.
As chief of police, you serve as an ex officio member of
the Capitol Police Board. I want to discuss with you today the
police board's efforts in promoting both transparency and
accountability.
In 2017, the Government Accountability Office was asked to
review the police board's operations, including the board's
accountability and level of communication. The GAO report
recommended that the police board revise its manual of
procedures to fully incorporate leading practices including
evaluating its performance and engaging with stakeholders to
incorporate their views, as appropriate, on any changes.
Stakeholder management and attention have been a recognized
issue for the police board since 2017. Recommendations included
linear tasks like notifying stakeholders that certain
information on the board's decisions and operations is
available to them.
There has previously been mention that the police board
routinely up-classifies matters as well, which is problematic
because the police board should not have authority to do that,
and it also undermines transparency and accountability for
those stakeholders and oversight.
Going back to that 2017 GAO report, what steps, if any, has
the Capitol Police Board taken to announce its regular board
meetings to stakeholders, including the public, to ensure that
there is notice and an opportunity for the public to be aware
that the police board is meeting?
Chief Manger. I do know that the manual of regulations has
been updated, and I know that we have begun doing regular
meetings with stakeholders. In fact, we have one coming up here
shortly, another one coming up shortly.
I know that there have been things that we have put into
place to try and increase that transparency.
Ms. Lee. Could you tell us a little bit more about those
stakeholder meetings and who is being included and the level of
participation they are having?
Chief Manger. The Capitol Police Board invites staff and--
members and staff to these meetings, and anyone can attend.
Ms. Lee. Okay.
Do you know the last time Congress had an Oversight hearing
for the Capitol Police Board?
Chief Manger. I do not.
Ms. Lee. Would you support this Committee conducting an
Oversight hearing for that board?
Chief Manger. I would have no objection to it.
Ms. Lee. Okay.
What steps, if any, has the Capitol Police Board taken to
routinely release minutes of its proceedings or summaries of
proceedings or actions taken there, again, so that the public,
so that we, can have better information about what is going on
within those meetings?
Chief Manger. I know that the minutes are taken. I get
copies of the minutes. The board decisions that are made at
those meetings are--they are documented in those minutes. I do
not know who that is distributed to.
Ms. Lee. Alright.
Going back to the 2017 GAO report, there was mention in
that report that decisions of the police board are--once a
decision is reached, it is unanimous.
Do you have any insight about that practice and whether it
is still operationally expected, that decisions of the board
will be made on a unanimous basis?
The concern is that such a practice might stifle the
opinion or perspective of members of the board during the
hearing itself.
Chief Manger. I can tell you for a fact that not all
decisions are--we have had two-to-one decisions made. Now, as
you know, I am a nonvoting member, so I do not get a vote. We
have had--but, again, it is--typically, most of the decisions
are unanimous, but there have been some that were not.
Ms. Lee. Okay.
Then, of course, you know, as a legislative-branch entity,
the Capitol Police is not subject to FOIA requests like other
policing and protective agencies and does not publish its
Office of Inspector General reports probably like other
inspectors general.
What steps do you believe the Capitol Police could take to
become more transparent to the congressional community and to
the public on your current and ongoing future needs with
respect to your budget, your resources, the things that you
need from us?
Chief Manger. I come from a background of a local municipal
police department, where everything was FOIA-able, and it was
routine--we routinely released reports to the public.
The Feds--the Federal Government has a different system.
I--there have been times when I have been told, well, we do not
release this or that information, and I am sort of surprised,
because I am used to releasing that sort of information.
I think that--I have had no objection in terms of releasing
information to the public. I believe it is the way it should
be, you know, with the caveat that there are certain things--
active investigations and other security-sensitive
information--that you may want redacted. In general, I have no
objection to reports being released. I am used----
Ms. Lee. Thank you.
Chief Manger [continuing]. to that.
Ms. Lee. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Steil. The gentlewoman yields back.
The gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Carey, is now recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Carey. Thank you, Chief. I appreciate you being here
today. I will tell you that I think you probably--you know, a
lot of people think I have a hard job in Washington, but I
think your job is probably the hardest.
You know, I look at my colleagues across the aisle. There
is nothing more important to me than the safety of the Members
and their staff. I appreciate everything that you do.
Let me--I am going to go into a couple questions that I
have, and--has the Capitol Police Board given the Inspector
General the green light to proceed with publishing all the IG
reports?
Chief Manger. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Carey. Okay. Is there a reason?
Chief Manger. I do not know.
Mr. Carey. Okay.
Well, can you describe the nature of the conversations
between you and the members of the board or with the IG
regarding the publication of the IG reports?
Chief Manger. One of the things that--the IG reports do not
belong to me. They belong to----
Mr. Carey. Right.
Chief Manger [continuing]. the IG.
Mr. Carey. Yes.
Chief Manger. When people say, well, Chief, why aren't you
releasing the report, I do not release--I cannot and will not
release reports that are not mine to release.
Mr. Carey. Okay.
What additional steps beyond the Appropriations Committee's
direction are necessary, if any, to allow the IG to publish
those types of reports, in your opinion?
Chief Manger. I think, whether it is through board
regulation or statute, that there would need to be a change
there.
Mr. Carey. Can you describe what the change needs to be?
Chief Manger. Well, that those reports would be made
public.
Mr. Carey. Right. Which you support?
Chief Manger. I have no objection to it.
Mr. Carey. Okay. Alright.
In light of your service on the Capitol Police Board, which
oversees the IG, can you provide us a timeline of when the IG
will begin publishing the reports online? Do you have any idea?
Chief Manger. I do not.
Mr. Carey. No idea?
Chief Manger. Again, that would be up to the IG.
Mr. Carey. Okay. Okay.
Finally, would you support expanding the scope of the
Inspector General to cover the Capitol Police Board, which is
currently excluded from the oversight of that office?
Chief Manger. Yes, I--I would have to think through that a
little bit more in terms of----
Mr. Carey. Well, we have got about 2 minutes and 51
seconds. Think through it right now. Can you do it?
Chief Manger. Well, the IG is an independent entity, and--
--
Mr. Carey. Right.
Chief Manger [continuing]. I do not have any control over
the IG, and nor should I.
Mr. Carey. Right.
Chief Manger. The Capitol Police Board oversees the IG, so
there is the conflict. If they oversee the person that is doing
the--that is investigating them, that is a conflict, as far as
I am concerned.
Mr. Carey. Okay. Alright. Well----
Chief Manger. You would have to just find a way to resolve
that.
Mr. Carey. What is your ideas on how we can resolve it?
Chief Manger. Well, you--look, any entity that--if you
wanted to have an inspector general, you know, oversee a
particular entity, then create the position. You know, if you
wanted an IG for the board, who does the board report to? Well,
congressional leadership. The----
Mr. Carey. Okay.
Chief Manger [continuing]. Congressional leadership would
have to appoint that IG, versus the----
Mr. Carey. Okay.
Chief Manger [continuing]. board.
Again, that is--that is 20 seconds of thinking through it,
so I am not sure my reasoning's perfect.
Mr. Carey. Yes. Well, I think you did a very good job.
Chief, again, I want to say on behalf of the Members of
Congress, we appreciate what you do every day. The safety of
every Member, my colleagues on the right, my colleagues across
the aisle--we really do appreciate what do you. Your team are
really amazing individuals. Thank you for everything.
I really appreciate you coming here and testifying before
this Committee today. I know it is not easy. I have done it a
few times myself. Thank you.
Chief Manger. Thank you.
Mr. Carey. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Steil. The gentleman yields back.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes for the purpose of
asking questions.
Chief Manger, once again, thanks a lot for being here. I
think we have had some good dialog.
I was hoping to use a little bit more of our time today to
be looking forward about how we take the Capitol Police force
into the years in front of us and de-politicize the force. I
have questions on that, but I want to just take a moment to set
the record straight on a handful of comments that came up
earlier, in particular regarding Speaker McCarthy's decision to
publicly release some video clips from January 6th.
There is one--there is only one video clip that was on the
U.S. Capitol Police's sensitive list, and it was cleared
beforehand. Is that correct?
Chief Manger. I believe so.
Chairman Steil. I believe it was after it was pointed out
that some of the same footage was previously released during
the impeachment hearing by House Democrats.
According to the U.S. Capitol Police's own declaration in
Federal court--I can pull it out--page 5, footnote 2, quote:
``There was a series of clips from Capitol Police cameras that
were shown during the second impeachment trial of President
Donald J. Trump in February 2023. None of those approximately
15 clips, some from the sensitive list, were shown to the
Capitol Police beforehand. The impeachment managers simply
requested the clips, and they were provided,'' end quote.
Meaning that Democrats in the House took the clips,
provided them, and did not have them be reviewed prior to
release by Capitol Police.
I would also like to correct the record on a claim made,
that Speaker McCarthy and Acting House Sergeant at Arms Bill
McFarland are politicizing Capitol security. Specifically,
there was a mention of the fencing around the Capitol ahead of
the State of the Union.
I would like to submit for the record questions for the
record from Mr. McFarland at his recent hearing in front of
this Committee.
Without objection, so ordered.
[The questions for the record from Mr. McFarland referred
to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Steil. In response to the minority questions, he
said he did not support the fence because the Secret Service
and Capitol Police did not have any specific or credible
threats to the Capitol campus ahead of the State of the Union
and asked for alternatives consistent with dozens of previous
State of the Union Addresses.
I think this stands in sharp contrast to requests from the
former chief ahead of the January 6, 2021, where actionable
intelligence existed, yet his request for assistance was
rejected under the previous majority.
I will park that. I will just come to, kind of, one
question. I think it gets in maybe a little bit into the fence
around the Capitol. In particular, as we look at the structure
of the Capitol Police Board--you report to the Capitol Police
Board.
The Capitol Police Board is made up of three individuals:
the Architect of the Capitol, which is now in a point of
transition and we have an Acting Architect of the Capitol, the
House Sergeant at Arms, the Senate Sergeant at Arms, both of
whom are new to their positions since the January 6th incident.
Do you think that is the best structure? Do you think there
should--we should consider a review of the Capitol Police
Board?
I know one of the challenges we may face is, there are lots
of oversight entities over you and the Capitol Police. That is,
in some ways, good. In some ways, that is challenging, because
many of the oversight entities have lots of views.
Do you have any thoughts as to what a--the most productive
form of the Capitol Police Board might be?
Chief Manger. I do, but I will tell you that the--I will
say this: that, since I have been the chief here--and I heard
all the horror stories about how dysfunctional it can be--the
board's----
Chairman Steil. Congress or the Capitol Police Board?
Chief Manger. The Capitol Police Board.
Chairman Steil. Okay. Because Congress can also be
dysfunctional.
Chief Manger. I am--I am----
Chairman Steil. Continue on, sir.
Chief Manger. I am speaking about the Capitol Police Board.
I will tell you that I have not generally experienced the
kind of dysfunction that previous chiefs--some of whom are
friends of mine who gave me an earful before I took this job
about what I could expect.
We have talked about, it was mentioned earlier, about the
politicization of security and that sort of thing. Look, all I
ask is that I do not want to have to be, you know, squeezed by
political--partisan political issues. If the board can buffer
the police chief to allow the police chief to run the police
department in the best interests of the Members of Congress and
our mission, that is what I am asking for.
Typically, that is what--this police board--this Capitol
Police Board has been very good about that, not--but there are
still times when I am getting squeezed.
Chairman Steil. Thank you very much.
Let me just reiterate how appreciative we are of all of the
men and women who serve in the Capitol Police Department for
the service that they provide protecting this institution, as
well as police officers across the country during National
Police Week.
I will now recognize Mr. D'Esposito for 5 minutes for the
purpose of asking questions.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, sir, for being here today. Thank you for all
your work in not only keeping the people's House safe but all
our visitors and, of course, us safe each and every day.
As you know, we have had conversations. I spent a career in
the New York City Police Department, retired as a detective, so
understand very well, sort of, the balancing act between law
enforcement administration, dealing with the rank-and-file.
I think the purpose, at least for me, here today is to ask
questions, to get answers, and to really continuing the dialog
so that we can work together in making not only the Capitol
safer but making your job a little bit easier and making the
lives of the men and women of the Capitol Police safer.
I want to first focus on something that has sort of been
brought to some of our attention over the last couple weeks,
and that is that we have heard that a Capitol Police protective
agent struck an officer while driving a vehicle.
Can you confirm this?
Chief Manger. Say--a Capitol Police officer struck----
Mr. D'Esposito. Yes. A protective agent struck an officer
while driving an official vehicle.
Chief Manger. I--if that is--it may have happened. I----
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay.
Chief Manger [continuing]. have not seen any investigation
on that yet.
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay.
I guess really the follow-up question to that is: What are
we--what are we seeing amongst the rank-and-file with work
hours, excessive work hours, working, you know, mandatory
overtime? Just trying to get a feel of what we are seeing
amongst the rank-and-file on a day-to-day basis.
Chief Manger. It is probably the issue that impacts morale
the most, in my opinion. Right after January 6th, there were a
host of issues that were impacting morale, but this is the one
that we have not been able to get our arms around yet.
Yes, we have increased staffing, and that has improved it,
and it is probably not quite as bad as it was. You still have
officers being held over, being forced to work overtime, having
their days off canceled. It still happens more often than it
should.
In my--and the only way we solve this is to continue to
increase our staffing so that we have enough folks that every--
if we have mandatory training, we are not, you know, having to
hold people over on overtime, that we have actually enough
people to train our folks and still have adequate staffing
without impacting these officers' family and their lives
outside the job.
Mr. D'Esposito. I do believe that there has been, you know,
resources allocated for wellness initiatives.
Chief Manger. That is correct.
Mr. D'Esposito. I guess the question I have is, what are
those resources being utilized for?
The second part of the question is, what else can we do to
help provide you with more of that? I know the top answer is
manpower, but what else?
Chief Manger. Our Wellness Division is--has--was created
after January 6th, and we--it is expanding. It does two things.
One, it provides comprehensive employee assistance services,
whether you are, you know, trying to lose weight, you are
trying to get well financially, you know, you have--whatever
your, you know, employee assistance needs are, they provide
them.
The unique thing, I think, that we are doing that most
departments are struggling with is addressing critical
incidents--stress and trauma.
Mr. D'Esposito. Right.
Chief Manger. We have got trauma-informed counselors that
we have employed so that when officers go through critical
incidents we are able to provide them with the kind of
assistance that they need and not just saying, ``Oh, you'll be
fine.''
Mr. D'Esposito. Now, what about the noncritical incidents?
Because, listen, we have both done this job for many, many
years, right, and I think that incidents are really debatable
upon the person's personality.
Chief Manger. Well, that is where you need somebody who is
a trauma-informed counselor to determine--you know, you and I
could be at the same incident and it impacts me very
differently----
Mr. D'Esposito. Absolutely.
Chief Manger [continuing]. than it impacts you. This is
where you need trauma-informed counselors to able to give us
the right help that we need.
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay.
Now, I know my time is ticking so I will get into some
command structure in the second round, but I want to focus
quickly on training.
Do you believe that members of the Capitol Police need--
should have more time for more training?
Chief Manger. Yes.
Mr. D'Esposito. How do we help you provide that?
Because I have spoken to members of the Capitol Police who
tell me that, you know, firearm training, I mean, it is--to use
the term ``minimal'' is probably, you know, being generous.
I really think that training is one of the best
opportunities that we have to prepare a police agency for
everything and anything that they could encounter.
Chief Manger. You have got to invest in training if you
want a good police department.
Two things, real quick.
One, we are doing active-shooter training in the House and
Senate office buildings, in the Capitol. That is a best
practice: Do the training where you are actually going to
perform the function.
We also have--we have invested in these virtual training
things that--not--it is not just shoot/do not shoot, but you
can do a host of training, whether it is, you know,
deescalation--just a host of training options.
We are going to have one at police headquarters, we are
trying to get one down at the loading dock of the Capitol, and
we have one in the Rayburn Building. That is better than having
to--when we have to send people to Cheltenham for training at
our academy, that is the whole day. They are done, but, here,
we can take somebody off a post for a couple hours, give them
that training, and then they can come back to their post.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, Chief. Listen----
Chief Manger. It is a really efficient way of doing it.
Mr. D'Esposito [continuing]. I am here to help. That is why
I am asking.
Chief Manger. Thank you.
Mr. D'Esposito. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Loudermilk. [Presiding.] The gentleman--the gentleman
yields.
We will now begin our second round of questionings for
Members who do want to ask additional questions.
I now recognize myself for the purpose of questioning our
witness.
First of all, Chief, thank you so much for indulging us
here.
I, too, am one who is forward-looking, and as we continue
out through this Congress, I am hoping to engage with you more
regularly on how we can work together to improve the U.S.
Capitol Police so we can deal with acts of violence, even at
our district offices, how we can prepare ourselves, how we can
secure this Capitol better. I am looking forward to working
with you on that.
As one who was here and who has custody of these 44,000
hours of videos, I can attest there were acts of violence.
There were acts of terrible violence that day. Even from what I
had seen with my own eyes and through the media, I have seen
acts of violence against police officers that I had not seen
before. It was brutal, and it was ugly. Our officers on the
line did what they needed to do at the time.
I also appreciate your leadership here, where we are now.
One of the reasons it is important that we look back is so that
we can identify where the failures were and move forward. It
is--our concern is, there has been a lack of looking back by
previous leadership at Capitol Police. Again, you were not
here. You have come on, taken the reins, and moving forward.
For us to move forward in the right direction, we have to
go back and look at history. Where did we fail? There was a
failure. There was a failure in being prepared, because this
Capitol was breached. Where did that failure occur? Why were
those officers not--they did not have what they needed; they
were not in the proper position.
I say that there appears that there has been a lack of
interest in going back by previous leadership. As we discussed,
the lack of after-action--what I would think would be an
appropriate after-action report done by Capitol Police. Yes,
there were other entities that did that, but, as someone who
served in the military in leadership positions, I would be the
first one who wanted to look at my own failures and see, where
did we go wrong?
There was--the fact the January 6th Committee, the Select
Committee on January 6th had a blue team that--they were
dedicated to looking back, finding the failures, and making
corrective action. We are in the custody of the January 6th
documents. We have very little information from the blue team.
It is as if any work that they did was suppressed or it is not
in existence or they did not do anything.
What I am getting at is, I do not think there has been a
real effort to really look at what happened, not to cast blame,
but to rebuild in a way that will never happen again. That is
our goal of the Oversight Subcommittee. It is not to cast
blame. It is not to point fingers. It is to find out what
really happened, look at that in a constructive way moving
forward.
With that, the only question I have in this second round
here would be: As we do this, as our Committee looks at this in
a bipartisan manner, there is information that we would need to
obtain. Are you willing to make officers available for
bipartisan interviews to help us gain the information that we
need for our report? Will you make that commitment?
Chief Manger. I would have no objection to that.
Mr. Loudermilk. I appreciate that.
Also, just because of what we have seen and there has been
some questions of this, will you commit to this Committee that
no employee at the Capitol Police will face retaliatory actions
for speaking to this Committee?
Chief Manger. I can guarantee you that will not happen
under my watch.
Mr. Loudermilk. I believe you, Chief, and I appreciate it.
Thank you for the job that you do.
I have no further questions at this time, and I will
recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Morelle.
Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I just want to just make note for the record, this
Committee held six hearings looking back at the shortcomings of
the Capitol Police during the last Congress, so it is not as
though this has not been looked at. It should continue to be
looked at.
The second point I want to make is, seems to me there is a
substantial difference between footage being used during
impeachment hearings of the President of the United States
following the January 6th attacks and footage being given to an
entertainer, Tucker Carlson. Those are dramatically different
things.
I do not need you to comment on it, Chief, but I just want
people to recognize--and I think any citizens viewing would
understand that those are two pretty dramatically different
things.
Finally, while much has been made of intelligence failures
and we need to do everything we can to improve intelligence, I
do not think all the intelligence in the world would have
prepared anyone for the President of the United States being in
the Ellipse on the day that we were about to certify the
electoral college and telling a crowd of supporters, some of
whom are armed, that they should march to the Capitol and that
he would be going with them.
All the intelligence in the world would not have protected
us from that. I want to just make sure we stay focused on some
of the important things that led up to the January 6th attack.
I do want to, though--one of the things that I found most
troubling about the Inspector General's findings related to
training of the Containment Emergency Response Team, the CERT
team. There was a contract for training with Northern Red, a
private company based in North Carolina, whose website
contained prominently displayed symbols from Nazi Germany that
had been appropriated by White supremacist groups in the United
States.
In 1918 and 1919 alone, 2018 and 1919 alone, the department
spent $100,000 for this training. Does Northern Red continue to
provide training for the department?
Chief Manger. I do not believe so, but I will confirm that
for you.
Mr. Morelle. Very good.
The facility for Northern Red is about 250 miles from
Washington. By comparison, FLETC's facility is in Cheltenham,
Maryland, about 16 miles from Capitol Hill; the Secret Service
training facility in Beltsville, Maryland, about 15 miles from
Capitol Hill; and the FBI Academy in Quantico is about 40
miles.
I know this predates your time at the department, but why
would officers have to travel a total of 500 miles to train
with a private entity when so many Federal law enforcement
training centers are located right here in the D.C. area? Do
you know, Chief?
Chief Manger. Well, I will tell you that we are working
with our partners, the ones you just mentioned, to--because I
think it is more efficient.
Mr. Morelle. I note that the training with Northern Red
must not have been very great, because on January 6, 2021, 22
of the 29 CERT officers were not qualified on their handguns;
21 of the 29 were not qualified on their rifles. That is a
substantial percentage of the CERT officers who were not
qualified.
Can you describe what the concept of being qualified on a
weapon is and can you give me some assurance that all officers
are now qualified on their weapons?
Chief Manger. I will--I will--I can tell you that my
understanding is they are.
You need to qualify with a numerical score that
demonstrates your proficiency, and if you do not meet that
proficiency, you do not carry the weapon.
Mr. Morelle. That is a significant percentage, then, of
those officers who were not qualified. I refer back to Mr.
D'Esposito's comments. Obviously, this is something that is
critically important to all of us, to make sure that training
is in place.
Can you describe the stuff--you mentioned it briefly--what
the department has done to centralize training and to make sure
that it meets the applicable standards?
Chief Manger. One of the problems was, we were so short-
staffed that we could not break officers out from their daily
duties to get the training. We have been able, with the
additional staffing, been able to do a better job at that.
We have also brought the training to them by bringing the
virtual training here to this campus, by doing the active-
shooter training on this campus. That has helped us get folks
trained that previously we would not have been able to get
trained.
Mr. Morelle. That applies certainly to new recruits but
also the established officers?
Chief Manger. In service as well as recruit training, yes.
Mr. Morelle. Gotcha.
The--I am just curious to the--well, let me--I am actually
out of time, but before I do that--and I appreciate you being
here, Chief, appreciate your service.
Before I close, I would like to ask unanimous consent to
enter into the record the following pieces of information:
First, an article from the Tampa Free Press dated May 6,
2023, entitled, ``Hillsboro GOP Seeks to Boot U.S. Capitol
Police Out of Tampa and All of Florida''; an article from The
Hill dated March 7th of this year entitled, ``Capitol Police
says it reviewed just one Jan. 6 clip Tucker Carlson showed'';
an article from Roll Call dated January 9, 2021, entitled,
``GOP bill for Capitol security cuts House version by two-
thirds.''
I would also like to ask unanimous consent to enter into
the record an affidavit from the Capitol Police General Counsel
in the case U.S. v. Pope.
I would ask unanimous consent to enter into the record an
affidavit from the Capitol Police General Counsel, case of U.S.
v. McCaughey and Stevens.
I would like to ask unanimous consent to enter into the
record a memorandum from Capitol Police Chief Tom Manger to the
department related to the Tucker Carlson disclosure.
Finally, two other pieces I would like to have unanimous
consent to enter in: a Washington Post article dated July 28,
2021, ``The false GOP claim that Pelosi turned down National
Guard before Jan. 6 attack''; and, finally, Appendix 2 of the
January 6 Select Committee report, ``D.C. National Guard
Preparation for and Response to January 6th.''
I would like all that entered into the record and ask
unanimous consent for that.
Mr. Loudermilk. Without objection.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Morelle. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
Mr. Loudermilk. The gentleman's time has expired.
Just one area--point of clarification, that regarding the
surveillance that was released to FOX News, or made available
to FOX News, that there was only one clip of all of that was on
the U.S. Capitol Police sensitive list, and it was cleared by
U.S. Capitol Police beforehand, after it was pointed out that
the same footage was previously released during impeachment
hearings by House Democrats without being cleared.
Is that correct?
Chief Manger. I believe so, yes, sir.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay.
Alright. At this point, I recognize the gentleman from New
York, Mr. D'Esposito, for 5 minutes.
Chief, I just wanted to--I regretted to not say it in the
beginning. Starting on Thursday with our bike ride from the
Capitol to the Memorial, the vigil on Saturday, events on
Sunday, on the lawn yesterday, you were present at events
throughout this weekend, and I just want to let you know that
it does not go unnoticed. I know that a lot of people are
appreciative of you taking the time to be there, so thank you.
Chief Manger. Thank you.
Mr. D'Esposito. I want to take a quick focus on command
structure. We would probably agree that, you ask individuals in
any departments throughout this Nation if there is a lack of
command structure and/or accountability, you are going to get a
lot of different answers, right? Being a chief of police, you
deal with a lot of different personalities each and every day.
Obviously, we are here today because we want to help you do
the best job that you can do.
How many command-level vacancies does Capitol Police
currently have?
Chief Manger. I know that we have a number--it is probably
less--less than five. If you are talking about at the ranks of
assistant chief, deputy chief, and inspector, which are the top
levels, probably three or four----
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay.
Chief Manger [continuing]. I think.
Mr. D'Esposito. You may be able to answer this; maybe you
cannot. Is there a reason why they are vacant?
Chief Manger. Yes.
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay.
Chief Manger. Because I made a conscious decision not to
fill the vacancies at the upper ranks because, with every--and
you know this--with every promotion I would make, there would
be one less officer on the line. We did not have that luxury of
being able to have one less officer than we had. We were short
enough as it is. I was not going to compound that by making
promotions to the upper ranks.
Mr. D'Esposito. If you had to give a number, which I am
sure you have, how many officers are you short? Not command-
level, not bosses; rank-and-file. If you had to--you know, if
you had a wishlist and you would say, this is the amount of
sworn uniformed officers I need to do the job, how many would
it be?
Chief Manger. I would need about 200 more officers----
Mr. D'Esposito. Two hundred more.
Chief Manger [continuing]. than we are authorized right
now.
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay. Got it.
Chief Manger. We are not at our authorized strength, so----
Mr. D'Esposito. Right.
You have under you two assistant chiefs.
Chief Manger. Yes.
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay. Are any of them in acting capacities?
Chief Manger. Both are.
Mr. D'Esposito. For any specific reason?
Chief Manger. Again, just--there is--I did not want to make
the promotions at the upper ranks because it would trickle down
to being less officers on the line.
Mr. D'Esposito. Got it.
You have--how many bureaus are under the Capitol Police?
Chief Manger. Well, there is--with the reorganization plan,
there will be a third assistant chief. Right under the rank of
chief, you would have--eventually we are going to have three
assistant chiefs and the chief administrative officer, which is
a civilian at the level of an assistant chief.
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay. Then so the other--the bureaus that
they lead are what?
Chief Manger. The administration--the chief administrative
officer has all the administrative functions.
Mr. D'Esposito. Right.
Chief Manger. The Uniformed Services Division, that is all
the uniformed officers.
Mr. D'Esposito. That would be like the chief of patrol?
Chief Manger. Correct.
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay.
Chief Manger. Then you would have, like, speaking of the
NYPD, chief of investigations----
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay.
Chief Manger [continuing]. and protection.
I have got--will have a chief which oversees basically
training, policy, inspections--those quality-control issues
that really speak directly to the culture of a department.
That is one of the recommendations that came out of the IG,
that I think we needed to elevate the person overseeing those
functions, so that it really did impact in a positive way the
culture of the department.
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay. You have the CAO and then three
others.
Chief Manger. Right now two, but we are creating and we are
going to fill a third.
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay. You would have full capacity at that
point?
Chief Manger. Yes, sir.
Mr. D'Esposito. Now, will the additional deputy chief----
Chief Manger. Assistant chief.
Mr. D'Esposito. Assistant chief, I am sorry. Will they also
be acting?
Chief Manger. Well, eventually I will--I am actually doing
the promotion processes for the ranks of inspector, deputy
chief, and assistant chief.
Mr. D'Esposito. Got it.
Chief Manger. My hope is that sometime this summer we get
to a point with the staffing that I am able to make those
promotions.
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay. You are somewhat confident that at
some point in the summer of 2023 the bureau--the chiefs that
oversee the bureaus will no longer be acting but be in full
capacity?
Chief Manger. That is correct.
Mr. D'Esposito. Okay.
Just to reaffirm the numbers that you gave, in order for
you to really be at full strength, you need 200 more officers
than you are currently allocated. We are not----
Chief Manger. Right.
Mr. D'Esposito [continuing].--talking about the individuals
who are in the academy, the individuals who are out sick, the
individuals who are on leaves of absences. We are talking about
200 more to your rank.
Chief Manger. We currently authorize somewhere around
2,100. I think we----
Mr. D'Esposito. You need 2,300.
Chief Manger. That is correct.
Mr. D'Esposito. Alright. Got it.
Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Loudermilk. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady
from California, Mrs. Torres, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Torres. Chief, one of the recommendations from the
Inspector General called for a standalone--or, the
establishment of a standalone countersurveillance entity. Have
you implemented that?
Chief Manger. I believe we had. I will confirm that, but
yes, I believe that is one of the ones----
Mrs. Torres. Okay.
Chief Manger [continuing]. we resolved.
Mrs. Torres. If you would follow up with us on that.
You know, the public safety of this campus, of the Members
that work here, of the people--millions of visitors that come
each year, should not be--should never be politicized. Thank
you for trying to walk that straight line, although you are
being pulled from every which way.
It is concerning to me that many of the officers who saved
our lives--their bravery, utilizing, you know, their own bodies
to protect us on that January 6th--many of them thought that
the people who were here at the Capitol, the insurrectionists,
the people who tried to hang Mike Pence, were people who had
been invited to the U.S. Capitol by the former President of the
United States, and they thought that the former President was
going to show up here.
Do the officers working today understand that, whether the
President of the United States orders his guests to come,
peacefully or not, to the U.S. Capitol, they are to do their
job to the best of their ability, regardless of who sends them
here?
Chief Manger. Yes, my officers understand that, yes.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you.
In 2021, the Howard C. ``Liedenburd''--``Lieden-''----
Chief Manger. Liebengood, yes.
Mrs. Torres [continuing]. Liebengood Center for Wellness
was established. Can you describe the services that they can
provide? Is there any reluctance from Capitol Police officers
to seek counseling?
Chief Manger. Right. They provide comprehensive employee
assistance, plus trauma-informed counseling. That is a broad
array of services.
In any police department there is always a stigma
associated with asking for help. That is just the nature of
being a cop. That is one of the things that we are working to
overcome, to really encourage people to feel like it will be
confidential, they can go to these things with confidence that
no one is gonna have any judgment about them asking for help.
Mrs. Torres. When I worked at LAPD, one of--you know, this
was a big problem for us, for civilians and sworn officers
equally. We developed at the 911 center a peer-to-peer
counseling program where you did not have to walk into, you
know, a building that said, ``Mental Health''; where you can go
to one of your peers and talk through the issues of the day.
Do we have such a program here?
Chief Manger. We do. That is really a good way to get some
folks started down the road to getting some help. If they feel
comfortable talking to a peer, the peer can either provide them
with help or they can share with them, ``Look, there is--we
have experts that can help you.'' Sometimes that is the
encouragement that they need to get the help they need.
Mrs. Torres. The way that I would describe the average
Capitol Police officer to the police departments that I met
with--I do not know why, but it was shocking to some of them
how I would describe officers, that were--treat, you know,
people with respect, that have a smile on their face, that
rather than pointing, you know, which way to go, they actually
walk--I have seen them walking people to meeting rooms where
they need to be, accommodating in many ways.
I want to make sure that, whatever training that we are
providing them to ensure that we also harden them, you know,
and help them push back on the lawlessness that sometimes shows
up to our campus, that they are also empowered to, you know, be
the good guys that they have always traditionally been.
Chief Manger. That is a part of our culture. I have been a
cop for 44 years, and this is my third police department, and
the culture here is very different than the two previous
departments that I was a part of.
It is a culture of service. The outlook and the training
that we get, I think, contributes to that culture, but really
it is the expectations that we have of each other, in terms of
being helpful and being--and completing our mission, that
contributes, I think, to the--your impression of these
officers.
I share your impression. They are consummate professionals.
Mrs. Torres. Thank you, Chief. Please thank your officers,
you know, for the great work that they do every single day.
I yield back.
Mr. Loudermilk. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr.
Griffith, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Chief Manger, let me pick up on a thread that Mrs. Bice was
asking about in her questions related to former Chief Pittman.
Are you aware of the U.S. Capitol Police leave policy in
Section 9, Subsection C, which says: As a basic condition of
approval of leave without pay, there must be a reasonable
assurance that the member or civilian employee will return to
duty at the end of the approved period?
Chief Manger. I am aware of that. This was a negotiated
separation agreement.
Mr. Griffith. Was that a decision that you made, or did
somebody else make that decision, to make that agreement?
Chief Manger. I signed off on the decision.
Mr. Griffith. Because you are responsible for the leave
policy?
Chief Manger. I am responsible for doing what is best for
the department.
Mr. Griffith. What benefits does Ms. Pittman get for being
on leave without pay?
Chief Manger. Well, she gets no benefits for being on leave
without pay.
Mr. Griffith. She does not get any enhanced retirement or
any other benefits?
Chief Manger. No. She will be able to file for--she will be
able to apply for retirement benefits in about a month.
Mr. Griffith. There was no enhancement--I mean, what does
she get out of leave without pay?
Chief Manger. The ability to apply for retirement benefits,
again, in about a month or so.
Mr. Griffith. She does benefit, even if it is indirect. I
mean, couldn't she have done that if she had just retired early
or if she had--I mean, so she is getting a benefit from having
been designated----
Chief Manger. She is eligible to retire in June, so she is
able to retire, yes.
Mr. Griffith. Would she have gotten a lower benefit if she
had retired at the end of January?
Chief Manger. I am not sure she would have been eligible at
that point.
Mr. Griffith. Well, if she left without being leave without
pay, would she get retirement in June for the years she served
here or not?
Chief Manger. I do not believe she would have.
Mr. Griffith. She is getting a substantial benefit by being
on leave without pay.
Chief Manger. She is eligible to retire in June, yes.
Mr. Griffith. That is a substantial benefit to her.
That is in violation of the Capitol Police Board
Regulations Prescribing Unified Leave System for Members and
Civilian Employees of the United States Capitol Police, is it
not?
Chief Manger. It is--not if it is a negotiated separation
agreement.
Mr. Griffith. Where does it say that in here?
Chief Manger. Well, it does not say that in there, but we
have done this--it has been done before.
Mr. Griffith. You are aware that she took another job
February 1st, are you not?
Chief Manger. I am.
Mr. Griffith. If we could submit for the record an article,
dated December 5, 2022, announcing that Ms. Pittman--Chief
Pittman is now the chief of the UC-Berkeley Police.
Mr. Loudermilk. Without objection.
[The article referred to follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Griffith. Thank you.
Did anybody else participate in that negotiation?
Chief Manger. Chief Pittman's attorney.
Mr. Griffith. You and the General Counsel?
Chief Manger. Correct.
Mr. Griffith. The Capitol Police Board was not involved?
Chief Manger. No.
Mr. Griffith. Alright.
Let me go back to my original line of questioning that I
was asking in regard to the officers who had raised concerns
and there was some issues, whether they were retaliated
against, if you will remember. I know it has been a while and
you have been asked a lot of questions since then.
The officers who had concerns with leadership and they
brought those to the attention of the IG, the Inspector
General, were any of those concerns incorporated by the
Inspector General for the U.S. Capitol Police in any of the
flash reports, yes or no?
Chief Manger. I do not believe they were, but I--I think
they came afterward.
If I could just ask a clarifying question. When you say
``officers,'' are you talking about sworn police officers, or
are you talking about just the--because my impression is
these----
Mr. Griffith. I am talking about----
Chief Manger [continuing]. are civilian employees.
Mr. Griffith [continuing]. rank-and-file members of the
United States Capitol Police.
Chief Manger. I am sorry. I missed----
Mr. Griffith. I am talking about rank-and-file members of
the United States Capitol Police.
Chief Manger. Okay.
Mr. Griffith. Okay?
Will you make available to this Committee by the end of
next week all communications between the previous Inspector
General and his staff and the U.S. Capitol Police?
Chief Manger. All previous communications between the
previous IG----
Mr. Griffith. Inspector General and his staff.
Chief Manger. With regard to what?
Mr. Griffith. With regard to complaints made by officers
about leadership on January 6th.
Chief Manger. If I have the authority to release those,
yes.
Mr. Griffith. Alright.
Can you also look into seeing whether or not you have
authority--and I know this is a little bit grayer area--that
would be the same question but including General Counsel's
Office? Because we are trying to see if the General Counsel was
involved in some of these issues when they ought not be, before
your watch.
Chief Manger. Again, you know, when--as you know, when we
are talking about General Counsel's Office, that is a
different----
Mr. Griffith. I understand.
Chief Manger [continuing]. standard.
Mr. Griffith. Can you assure me that you will give us
everything that you can?
Chief Manger. That I--that I am----
Mr. Griffith. That you are able to give.
Chief Manger [continuing]. legally permissible to do, yes.
Mr. Griffith. Alright. I appreciate that. We will probably
follow up with that in a written form so you know exactly what
I am asking for.
I appreciate your time.
I appreciate the time to question, and I yield back.
Mr. Loudermilk. The gentleman yields.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, or, as I
was told, the gentleman from Ohio State, Mr. Carey, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Carey. That is right, the Ohio State University.
Chief, again, you know, you have sat here and you have had
to answer a lot of questions from many of my colleagues, both
from the Democrat side and the Republican side. I just want to
say, again, what you do, what your officers do--you know, we
have a tendency to say that we support, you know, our men in
blue, and we do. We also have to make sure that we protect them
in terms of their healthcare and their pension and understand
that the work that they do on a daily basis is something that
many people across the country just do not do. It is very
important that we do that.
I am going to go into a line of questioning. You mentioned
in your testimony that the low officer morale and the public's
declining confidence in law enforcement have put a strain on
your organization--you did mention that--and that hiring
remains a challenge in the post-pandemic environment.
Can you maybe elaborate on that a little bit?
Chief Manger. We actually have not had as much trouble as
some other police departments around the country, but,
generally, when you talk to chiefs around the country, they
would tell you that they do not get the--they do not have the
interest, that when they advertise a position, they do not get
the numbers of people applying, and that it gets harder and
harder to recruit officers and get adequate--you know, they
cannot fill their academy classes.
We have the same challenges, but we have had some
advantages recently in the Congress approving our pay
regulations, Congress approving in our budget retention bonuses
and things like that, that have given us an advantage to
recruiting people and keeping people that are here, keeping
them here.
Mr. Carey. You know, Chief, I think one thing--and I have
not discussed this with the Members, you know, on either side,
but many of us, when we are in our districts, we do ride-alongs
with the police officers, whether it is, you know, in the
cities or sheriff's offices.
You know, I do think that if we could do an outreach
program with your officials, the people that you serve with, to
show us exactly what you have to go through every day, I think
that would help us to better understand, you know, what is
going on with the safety of the Capitol. I think it would be
something that--I know my office would like to work with you on
developing that.
Let me ask you a couple other things.
What are some of the most common complaints that you hear
from your officers?
Chief Manger. That they get held over on their shifts with
little to no notice. You know, they'll be working day-work and
a sergeant will come and say, ``Oh, we are short on evening, so
you have got to stay for another 4 hours,'' or 8 hours. That is
probably the primary complaint that I hear, just being held
over.
The folks that are working dignitary protection----
Mr. Carey. Yes.
Chief Manger [continuing]. I wonder when they ever see
their families, because they are--it seems like they are
working constantly and away from home constantly.
Mr. Carey. Yes.
Chief Manger. Again, that is part of the job, and I know
they understand that. If we had adequate staffing with the
dignitary protection, we would be able to, you know, allow
people to get some days off because we would have other folks
that can substitute for them.
Mr. Carey. Thank you, Chief.
Mr. Chairman, I would like to--I would like to yield 1
minute to you.
Mr. Loudermilk. Thank--I appreciate that.
Chief Manger, another point of clarification.
There has been some comments here, that the January 6th
footage being provided to news organizations. The implication
is that Speaker McCarthy providing it to news outlets is
somehow different than the impeachment managers making the same
video public.
However, those same impeachment managers actually posted
these on YouTube. It was publicly available, then used in other
news programming.
With that being said, I would like to pivot to one other
issue, and that is former Speaker Nancy Pelosi's daughter,
Alexandra Pelosi, who had filmed an HBO documentary with clips
showing the escape routes of congressional leaders on January
6th, including Fort McNair.
Did any of the footage in Alexandra Pelosi's documentary
show sensitive areas of the Capitol that you would say should
not be distributed publicly?
Chief Manger. Obviously, I had no control over what----
Mr. Loudermilk. I understand.
Chief Manger [continuing]. that. There were certainly
things in the documentary that I was surprised to see.
My feeling is that, you know, while that may have been
shown publicly, I still have a responsibility for the video and
camera video we have----
Mr. Loudermilk. Yes.
Chief Manger [continuing]. to ensure that the security-
sensitive information is not released.
Mr. Loudermilk. Do you know if, did she get prior
permission from the Capitol Police to film and release the
footage?
Chief Manger. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Loudermilk. Okay.
With that, I yield my time back to the gentleman from
Ohio--or, his time.
Mr. Carey. My time is 10 seconds over, so I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Loudermilk. I appreciate that.
I will now recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Lee,
for 5 minutes.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Chief.
I represent Florida's 15th Congressional District, which
includes the city of Tampa. The city of Tampa is one of the
places that the Capitol Police have established field offices
around the country. I have received some questions from the
community about the field office and what it does.
I think it would be very constructive if you would take a
moment, tell us about those field offices. Why were they
established, and what kind of work are they doing out in our
communities?
Chief Manger. We get thousands of threats against Members
of Congress every year. Our original model was, everybody's--
all of my investigators are in D.C. and they are just traveling
all over the country. We looked at, where do we get most of the
complaints? We have got a field office in San Francisco, we
have got a field office in Tampa, and we are going to--we would
like to establish field offices in a couple other cities around
the country so that we can more efficiently go to certain areas
to investigate those complaints.
There are two--two--Capitol Police officers at that--and
there is one attorney at that field office. It helps us in
terms of prosecuting criminal cases, because they investigate
criminal cases, the threats against Congress.
It is much more efficient to have folks posted around the
country because our responsibilities are nationwide in terms of
those investigative responsibilities.
Ms. Lee. To be clear, the type of cases that they are
investigating is active threats against Members of Congress?
Chief Manger. Criminal investigations.
Ms. Lee. Okay. Are there other types of criminal
investigations that they are commonly seeing or they are
bringing back up to you here in D.C.?
Chief Manger. We would--we only have primary responsibility
for investigating cases where a Member of Congress is a victim
or it involves a threat against a Member of Congress.
Ms. Lee. Okay. They are not out there in Tampa
investigating a broad array of criminal cases or things
involving citizens of the community. It is specifically focused
on your security, Capitol security, protecting-Members-of-
Congress mission?
Chief Manger. That is correct.
Ms. Lee. Alright. Thank you.
Has it been fruitful for you? Has it been a helpful thing
to establish those field offices?
Chief Manger. I believe it has been. I think that it will
continue to be even more fruitful when we can look at places,
you know, like Chicago or, you know, some places in Northeast,
you know, where we can--because when we look at where these
complaints originate, there are more in certain areas of the
country. That is why we have got one in California, one in
Florida. We want to continue to post people where they are most
needed. It will make things much more efficient for us.
Ms. Lee. Alright.
One of the department's improvements that you have
commended today was the distribution of iPhones to the
workforce to ensure that there is immediate and prompt
information dissemination when it is important to get that out
there to your team.
Can you provide examples for us or elaboration on how this
simple improvement has made your process more effective?
Chief Manger. We do daily intel briefings at the
department, and all of the information, all the intelligence
information, lookouts, any information about suspicious events
or anything that occurs on this campus is disseminated to every
single officer on their iPhone.
I will tell you that we will often have a photo of someone
who made a particular threat at a Member of Congress's office,
so we have got a cell phone photo of that person, and we say,
``We are looking for this person,'' because they have either
committed a violation or we want to maybe give them a trespass
notice that they are not allowed back to that office. When we
disseminate that photo, it is unusual if we do not find that
person in short order, because every officer has that photo.
It has been a very, very effective way to allow us to get
our job done much more efficiently with the officers having
that information at their--literally at their fingertips every
day.
Ms. Lee. Okay.
You also mentioned the establishment of the wellness center
as a resource for your officers. Can you speak in more detail
about the programs that are available at the wellness center
and how they are being utilized?
Chief Manger. Yes. I think that it is still a work in
progress. I mean, it is still relatively new, and we are still
hiring people--counselors and people that have expertise,
whether it is, you know, someone who wants to get in better
shape, you know, lose weight, get in better--become more fit,
someone who is having financial difficulty, someone who wants
to improve their nutrition. All of these are services that we
provide to our officers so that we can build their wellness,
build their resilience.
Then the trauma-informed counselors are really, I think,
the key. You know, we have comfort dogs there that we use. What
we did is looked at the best wellness centers that public
safety has stood up around the country, and we tried to not
reinvent the wheel but to see what those agencies are doing and
just replicate that.
Ms. Lee. Okay. Thank you, Chief.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Steil. [Presiding.] The gentlewoman yields back.
Chief Manger, we appreciate you being here today and for
participating with us.
To all the men and women that serve under your command in
the Capitol Police--I know many of them are watching--tell them
thanks for their service, for what they do to keep visitors
safe, staff safe, and Members safe here on Capitol Hill so we
can keep it open.
I appreciate you being here.
Members of the Committee may have some additional questions
for you, and we ask that you please respond to those questions
in writing.
[The questions for the record follow:]
QUESTIONS FOR THE RECORD
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Steil. Without objection, each Member will have 5
legislative days to insert additional materials into the record
or to revise and extend their remarks.
If there is no further business, I thank the Members of the
Committee for their participation.
Without objection, the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:14 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]
[all]