[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
USE AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS AND EXPERIMENTAL MARITIME TECHNOLOGIES
=======================================================================
(118-28)
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 19, 2023
__________
Printed for the use of the
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
transportation
_________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-409 PDF WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
Rick Larsen, Washington, Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,
Ranking Member Arkansas
Eleanor Holmes Norton, Daniel Webster, Florida
District of Columbia Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Grace F. Napolitano, California Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Steve Cohen, Tennessee Brian Babin, Texas
John Garamendi, California Garret Graves, Louisiana
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiavid Rouzer, North Carolina
Andre Carson, Indiana Mike Bost, Illinois
Dina Titus, Nevada Doug LaMalfa, California
Jared Huffman, California Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Julia Brownley, California Brian J. Mast, Florida
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey Puerto Rico
Mark DeSaulnier, California Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Salud O. Carbajal, California Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Greg Stanton, Arizona, Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Vice Ranking Member Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Colin Z. Allred, Texas Vice Chairman
Sharice Davids, Kansas Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois Lance Gooden, Texas
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire Tracey Mann, Kansas
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts Burgess Owens, Utah
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Marilyn Strickland, Washington Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana Chuck Edwards, North Carolina
Patrick Ryan, New York Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Robert Menendez, New Jersey Eric Burlison, Missouri
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon John James, Michigan
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Mike Collins, Georgia
Mike Ezell, Mississippi
John S. Duarte, California
Aaron Bean, Florida
------
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
Daniel Webster, Florida, Chairman
Brian Babin, Texas Salud O. Carbajal, California,
Brian J. Mast, Florida Ranking Member
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon, John Garamendi, California
Puerto Rico Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts
Mike Ezell, Mississippi, Vice Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska
Chairman Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan,
Aaron Bean, Florida Vice Ranking Member
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio) Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex
Officio)
CONTENTS
Page
Summary of Subject Matter........................................ v
STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee
on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation..................... 53
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure................. 54
Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in
Congress from the State of California, and Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation........ 55
WITNESSES
Panel 1
Rear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin, Assistant Commandant for Prevention
Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement....................... 2
Rear Admiral Todd C. Wiemers, Assistant Commandant for
Capabilities, U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement................. 4
Joint prepared statement of Rear Admirals Arguin and Wiemers. 5
Panel 2
Sean T. Pribyl, Esq., Member, Committee on Coast Guard Maritime
Domain Awareness, National Academies Report, ``Leveraging
Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions: A Strategic
Imperative,'' oral statement................................... 21
Prepared statement........................................... 22
Michael Gordon Johnson, Marine Engineer, and Founder and Chief
Executive Officer, Sea Machines Robotics, Inc., oral statement. 29
Prepared statement........................................... 31
Patrick Lahey, Cofounder and Chief Executive Officer, Triton
Submarines, oral statement..................................... 36
Prepared statement........................................... 37
T. Christian Spain, Vice President of Government Relations,
American Maritime Officers, oral statement..................... 40
Prepared statement........................................... 41
APPENDIX
Questions to Rear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin, Assistant Commandant
for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Salud O.
Carbajal....................................................... 57
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
September 15, 2023
SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER
TO: LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation
FROM: LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation
RE: LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Use and Regulation of
Autonomous and Experimental Maritime Technologies''
_______________________________________________________________________
I. PURPOSE
The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will hold
a hearing on Tuesday, September 19, 2023, at 2:00 p.m. ET in
2253 Rayburn House Office Building to receive testimony on
``Use and Regulation of Autonomous and Experimental Maritime
Technologies.'' Focusing on increasingly automated and
experimental technologies in the maritime industry, the hearing
will examine commercial and United States Coast Guard (Coast
Guard or Service) uses of these technologies and the regulatory
changes necessary to assure their safe use. Members will
receive testimony from two panels of witnesses. The first panel
will include representatives from the Coast Guard. The second
panel will include representatives from the National Academy of
Sciences, Triton Submarines, Sea Machines Robotics, Inc, and
American Maritime Officers.
II. BACKGROUND
The maritime industry is currently experiencing significant
innovations as the use of autonomous and experimental
technologies increases in frequency. The global market size for
autonomous ships alone was valued at $5.21 billion in 2022 and
is projected to grow to $9.87 billion by 2030.\1\ In response
to this growing industry, Congress has enacted several
legislative provisions to support the Coast Guard's efforts to
leverage and regulate these developing technologies. The Frank
LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-282)
required an assessment of available unmanned, autonomous, or
remotely controlled maritime domain awareness technologies for
use by the Coast Guard.\2\ The Don Young Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-263) established the
unmanned system program and autonomous control and computer
vision technology project as well as an at-sea recovery
operations pilot program.\3\ Most recently, the Coast Guard
Authorization Act of 2023, reported out of the Committee on
Transportation and Infrastructure on April 26, 2023, includes a
requirement for the Coast Guard to detail the establishment of
an Unmanned Systems Capabilities Office and creates a National
Advisory Committee on Autonomous Maritime Systems.\4\
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\1\ Autonomous Ships Market Size, Share: Forecast Report [2030],
(Aug. 2023), available at https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/
industry-reports/autonomous-ship-market-101797.
\2\ Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018, Pub. L.
No. 115-282, 132 Stat. 4303.
\3\ Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No.
117-263, 136 Stat. 4024 & 4131.
\4\ Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, H.R. 2741, 118th Cong.
(2023).
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III. USE WITHIN THE COAST GUARD
The 2020 National Academies of Sciences Report, Leveraging
Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions, recommended a major
realignment of the Coast Guard's unmanned systems approach to
better focus on a pacing mechanism that proactively identifies,
investigates, and integrates potential systems.\5\ The Coast
Guard currently employs unmanned systems mostly for platform-
centric missions, such as onboard National Security Cutters to
increase surveillance capabilities.\6\ However, the Service has
identified various missions that the technology would greatly
increase mission capabilities, including Arctic ice cover
research, inspections of vessels and aids to navigation,
oversight of fishing vessel operations, and criminal
interdiction programs.\7\ The Coast Guard's Blue Technology
Center of Expertise (Center) is responsible for the
identification of maritime technologies the Service can
leverage to improve the execution of National security and
humanitarian missions.\8\ Additionally, the Center develops
partnerships with industry, academia, and government agencies
to best facilitate adoption of these technologies.\9\ Coast
Guard research and development pursuits currently focus on
maritime unmanned systems technology, the conversion of Coast
Guard boats to optionally crewed assets, evaluating and
improving unmanned surface vehicle collision avoidance
technology, and enabling reduced-cost sensor deployment
capabilities.\10\
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\5\ Nat'l Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine,
Leveraging Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions, (2020), available
at https://doi.org/10.17226/25987.
\6\ United States Coast Guard Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan,
(March 2023), available at https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/2023%20Unmanned%20Systems
%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf.
\7\ Id.
\8\ Blue Technology Center of Expertise, (last accessed Sept. 12,
2023), available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Blue-Tech-COE/.
\9\ Id.
\10\ United States Coast Guard Report to Congress: Research and
Development on Unmanned Surface Vehicles, (2023), (on file with Comm.).
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IV. REGULATION BY THE COAST GUARD AND INTERNATIONAL MARITIME
ORGANIZATION
As the principal Federal maritime regulatory and law
enforcement agency, the Coast Guard is working to craft
regulations to monitor activities like the use of unmanned
barges and spaceport drone ships for commercial space
companies, autonomous navigation, and fully autonomous shipping
vehicles.\11\ Additionally, the Service must determine how best
to counter small unmanned submarines moving illicit drugs.\12\
While the use of autonomous and experimental systems are not
yet common place, their expected future use raises a host of
regulatory issues including manning, testing, safety, security,
mariner credentialing, and pilotage.\13\ The Coast Guard will
likely need to develop comprehensive guidance or other
regulatory standards for surface, subsurface, and aerial spaces
similar to efforts underway at the Federal Aviation
Administration.\14\ The Coast Guard's broad range of statutory
authorities will likely allow it to address most regulatory
requirements, but it must continuously reassess and update
future regulatory frameworks to account for evolving
technologies.\15\ However, the Coast Guard's authorities may be
deficient in areas such as safety regulations, where
international conventions are built around the assumption that
humans will be physically on-board vessels at all times.\16\
United States' Federal law currently makes similar assumptions.
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\11\ Nat'l Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, Coast
Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and Statutory
Needs 1, (2023), available at https://nap.nationalacademies.org/
catalog/27059/the-coast-guards-next-decade-an-assessment-of-emerging-
challenges-and-statutory-needs [hereinafter Assessment].
\12\ Id.
\13\ Id.
\14\ Id.
\15\ Id.
\16\ Id.
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Moreover, the Coast Guard and Congress may need to consider
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) efforts to
establish a regulatory framework for the operation of Maritime
Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS).\17\ The IMO created a joint
working group on MASS to consider high-priority safety, legal,
and facilitation issues following regulatory scoping exercises
that looked at how existing regulatory instruments can apply to
MASS and what regulatory gaps exist.\18\ The joint working
group has so far agreed on the need for a human master to be
responsible for autonomous vessels, also determining that the
master does not need to be present on board during operation,
but must have the ability to intervene as needed and a single
remote operations center must be responsible for an autonomous
vessel at any point.\19\ As the IMO joint working group
continues to consider further matters pertaining to MASS
operations, the Coast Guard can leverage lessons learned to
align future United States regulatory regimes with best
practices identified by the IMO.
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\17\ IMO, Developing a regulatory framework for autonomous
shipping, (Apr. 27, 2023), available at https://www.imo.org/en/
MediaCentre/Pages/WhatsNew-1872.aspx.
\18\ Id.
\19\ Id.
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V. AUTONOMOUS AND EXPERIMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES
The rapid introduction of autonomous systems within the
maritime industry has the potential to increase efficiency and
reduce operational risk. Autonomous systems can act as
technology integration platforms linking vessel navigation,
sensing, propulsion, and reporting capabilities with the
potential to accomplish a variety of missions and
operations.\20\ The degree of autonomy in systems can vary. The
IMO identifies four varying degrees of automation which
include:
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\20\ Assessment, supra note 11.
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LDegree 1--Ships with automated processes and
decision support where some operations are automated, but
seafarers are onboard and can intervene as needed;
LDegree 2--Ships that can be remotely controlled
from a separate location, but seafarers are onboard and can
intervene as needed;
LDegree 3--Remotely controlled ships without
seafarers onboard in which the ship is controlled from a
separate location; and
LDegree 4--Fully autonomous ships with operating
systems capable of making decisions and taking actions without
any human intervention.\21\
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\21\ Argyro Kepesedi, Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships: A critical
`MASS' for Legislative Review, UNCTAD, (Dec.13, 2022), available at
https://unctad.org/news/transport-newsletter-article-no-97-fourth-
quarter-2022.
Uncrewed Maritime Vehicles (UMV) constitute a range of
maritime technologies currently being manufactured in the
United States and elsewhere.\22\ Common types of UMVs include:
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\22\ AUVSI, The 2023 Quarterly Insight--Q2, (2023), available at
https://www.auvsi.org/sites/default/files/AUVSI-Quarterly-Insight-
Q2.pdf.
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LRemotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) that operate
remotely underwater through the use of an umbilical or tether
connected to a surface control system;
LAutonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) that operate
independently underwater without any direct control from an
operator;
LUnmanned Service Vehicles (USV) that operate on
the water's surface either autonomously or remotely through
air-based communication systems; and
LHybrid UMVs that utilize a combination of
technologies from these categories to provide varying mission
capabilities.\23\
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\23\ Id.
Each of these platforms have varying sizes, weights, and
capabilities that can be utilized in the commercial sector or
by the military.\24\
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\24\ Id.
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The testing and proliferation of uses for these
technologies is growing as the industry continues to expand.
SpaceX, a commercial space launch company, has utilized
unmanned commercial barges for the recovery of booster rockets
at sea, as the company promotes the barge's capability to
navigate itself to and from port, without crew or tow.\25\ The
Mayflower Autonomous Ship, a project led by the non-profit
maritime research organization ProMare with partners such as
IBM, completed a trans-Atlantic crossing between England and
the United States.\26\ The Mayflower Autonomous Ship arrived in
Plymouth, Massachusetts, in June 2022, and is the largest
uncrewed vessel to complete that journey.\27\ Utilizing six
Artificial Intelligence (AI) powered cameras along with over 30
sensors and 15 edge devices, the vessel's ``AI Captain''
adhered to maritime law and rerouted itself around hazards and
marine animals, while optimizing decisions and mitigating risk
based on data it collected.\28\ Meanwhile, the Yara Birkeland,
a fully electric and autonomous container vessel, has been
sailing partially crewed in Southern Norway carrying up to 100
containers along a short fixed route.\29\ Yara, the fertilizer
company based in Norway that owns the vessel, plans to
gradually reduce the crew onboard until operations can occur
completely unmanned, with the bridge eventually being
removed.\30\
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\25\ SpaceX May Have the Largest Unmanned Merchant Vessel in
Operation, Maritime Exec., (July 13, 2021), available at https://
maritime-executive.com/article/spacex-may-have-the-largest-unmanned-
merchant-vessel-in-operation.
\26\ Mayflower Autonomous Ship Completes Historic Atlantic
Crossing, Maritime Exec., (July 1, 2022), available at https://
maritime-executive.com/article/mayflower-autonomous-ship-completes-
historic-atlantic-crossing.
\27\ Id.
\28\ Id.
\29\ Adrienne Murray, Crewless container ships appear on the
horizon, BBC, (Mar. 24, 2023), available at https://www.bbc.com/news/
business-64875319.
\30\ Id.
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These and other experimental crafts that operate both
uncrewed or with passengers onboard continue to be developed
and will require concrete regulatory frameworks to govern
operations.
VI. THE TITAN SUBMERSIBLE
On June 18, 2023, five souls onboard perished when the
OceanGate submersible vessel ``Titan'' imploded. As the first
time someone died piloting or riding in a submersible in nearly
a century, the extended search for the Titan garnered
international headlines and launched a renewed interest in
experimental craft. The Coast Guard coordinated the search and
rescue efforts that spanned multiple days, cost millions of
dollars, and utilized assets from the United States, France,
and Canada.\31\ Ultimately, the Coast Guard convened a Marine
Board of Investigation to examine the loss of the Titan
submersible.\32\ The Transportation Safety Board of Canada is
also investigating the case.
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\31\ United States Coast Guard Will Lead Investigation of Titan
implosion with help from Canada, France, UK, CNBC, (June 25, 2023),
available at https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/25/
us-coast-guard-will-lead-investigation-of-titan-implosion-with-help-
from-canada-france-uk.html?
&qsearchterm=U.S.%20coast%20guard%20will%20lead%20investigation%20of%20t
itan%20sub.
\32\ Id.
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Titan fell outside a single country's jurisdiction or
regulation. It was American made, operated in international
waters by a Bahamian registered company, launched from a
Canadian-flagged support vessel, and was not registered under
the United States flag, or the flag of any other nation.\33\
Titan also had several cost-saving departures from proven
submersible designs. Specifically, Titan had a pill shaped hull
to accommodate more passengers, which was constructed from a
combination of carbon-fiber and titanium.\34\ Unlike other
deep-sea submersibles, Titan was not inspected by any reputable
marine organizations, nor did it undergo a classification
process.\35\ While the Passenger Vessel Safety Act of 1993
(P.L. 103-206) increased safety standards for passenger
vessels, including submersibles, OceanGate was able to
circumvent these requirements by neither flying a United States
flag nor setting off from a United States port.\36\ In the days
following the Titan implosion, underwater explorers and
industry professionals claimed they had longstanding concerns
about Titan's use of novel materials and designs, as well as
Titan's failure to undergo an independent certification process
that ensures safety standards.\37\
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\33\ Tom Porter, Stockton Rush deliberately structured OceanGate's
Titanic Operations to be outside United States jurisdiction, says
former employee: report, Insider, (July 3, 2023), available at https://
www.insider.com/oceangate-structured-titan-operations-to-fall-outside-
us-law-report-2023-7 [hereinafter OceanGate].
\34\ Helmuth Rosales, et al., The Maverick Design Choices that May
Have Doomed Titan, N.Y. Times, (July 14, 2023), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/07/14/us/titan-submersible-implode-
design.html.
\35\ Id.
\36\ See Pub. L. No. 103-206, 107 Stat. 2439.
\37\ OceanGate, supra note 33.
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VII. WITNESSES
PANEL I
LRear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin Jr., Assistant
Commandant for Prevention Policy (CG-5P), United States Coast
Guard
LRear Admiral Todd Wiemers, Assistant Commandant
for Capability (CG-7), United States Coast Guard
PANEL II
LMr. Sean Pribyl, Committee Member, Committee on
Coast Guard Maritime Domain Awareness, National Academy of
Sciences Report, ``Leveraging Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard
Missions''
LMr. Michael Johnson, Chief Executive Officer, Sea
Machines Robotics Inc.
LMr. Patrick Lahey, Co-Founder and Chief Executive
Officer, Triton Submarines
LMr. T. Christian Spain, Vice President of
Government Relations, American Maritime Officers
USE AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS AND EXPERIMENTAL MARITIME TECHNOLOGIES
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2023
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
Transportation,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m. in
room 2253 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Webster
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation will come to order.
I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to
declare a recess--which might happen here any minute--during
the hearing.
Without objection, show that adopted.
I also would ask unanimous consent for the subcommittee to
permit those not on the subcommittee to ask questions and be a
part of the hearing.
Without objection, show that ordered.
As a reminder, Members who wish to insert a document into
the record, please also email it to [email protected].
Before we begin, I want to take a moment just to send my
deepest condolences to our colleague, Mrs. Peltola, and her
entire family, on the loss of her husband, Buzz Peltola, Jr.
And we are saddened by that, yet we reach out to them. We hope
that they will have comfort in being together and having the
time together.
So, I recognize the ranking member, Mr. Larsen, for remarks
that he would like to provide for Mrs. Peltola.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, sir.
I also want to extend condolences to Mary and her family on
the loss of Buzzy. And I had a chance to meet him a few times
over the last couple years. He was a great gentleman, a fun one
to hang around with. And I know they are a large blended
family, and there is a lot of sorrow in the Peltola family and
the Bethel community, as well.
So, I want to extend my condolences, as well, to Mary. And
we look forward to having her back, but she should be back on
her own timeline, her family's timeline, as well.
So, thank you.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
I now recognize myself for the purposes of an opening
statement for 5 minutes.
Due to time constraints we face today with the scheduling
on the floor, I am going to forgo my opening remarks and
statement and, for the sake of time, allow our first
panelists--our witnesses--to give their testimony.
Thank you both for being here. We really appreciate it.
So, now, I recognize Mr. Carbajal for an opening statement,
5 minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chairman Webster. I, too, am going
to forgo my statement and submit it for the record, my opening
remarks.
But I wanted to also extend my deepest condolences to the
Peltola family and our colleague, Mary, on the passing of her
husband, Buzzy. Certainly, this was tragic, and they are
going--the family and our colleague are going through a lot.
And I just want to extend my deepest, deepest condolences and
sympathy, and I look forward to her coming back when she feels
ready to come back.
But certainly, anytime we have something like this occur,
it reminds us of the work we have and the challenges that we
have and the fact that anything can happen to us or our
families at any one time and the importance that we need to
cherish them. So, again, my condolences to the Peltola family.
With that, I will yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Webster of Florida. So, I would like to welcome our
witnesses and thank them for being here today. Today's hearing
has noted two panels, and so, we will begin with the first
panel.
Briefly, I would like to take a moment to explain the
lighting system that we have. Green means go. Yellow means
about over. Red means stop. That's it.
I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements
be included in the record.
Without objection, show that ordered.
As your written testimony has been made part of the record,
I ask you to limit your remarks to 5 minutes.
With that, Rear Admiral Arguin, you are recognized for 5
minutes for your testimony.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE R. ARGUIN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
FOR PREVENTION POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND REAR ADMIRAL TODD
C. WIEMERS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR CAPABILITIES, U.S. COAST
GUARD
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE R. ARGUIN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
FOR PREVENTION POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Arguin. Good afternoon, Chairman Webster, Ranking
Member Carbajal, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
I am honored to appear before you today to update you on the
autonomous and experimental maritime technology within the
Marine Transportation System, or MTS.
I, too, would also like to express my deepest condolences
to Representative Peltola and her family and friends. Our
thoughts and prayers are with her and her family.
Our national security and economic prosperity are
inextricably linked to a safe, efficient Marine Transportation
System. Across the MTS, innovation is accelerating, creating
new opportunities and benefits for the marine industry and the
Nation.
Exciting new innovations, including remote-controlled and
autonomous technologies, are being developed to improve the
efficiency of various aspects of the Marine Transportation
System that will transform the use of our waterways.
Additionally, the needs of the maritime industry are driving
future ship propulsion fuel solutions, including liquefied
natural gas, methanol, fuel cells, lithium-ion batteries,
hydrogen, ammonia, and nuclear energy sources.
While the potential benefits of these technologies could be
significant, it is imperative to understand the potential risks
and implement mitigation strategies to ensure the safety and
security of our waterways. This responsibility is shared
amongst all Marine Transportation System stakeholders.
As the lead agency for safeguarding the MTS, the Coast
Guard is committed to taking a commonsense approach, founded on
our prevention and response frameworks, to evaluate and
facilitate the use of emerging technologies to preserve the
safe and efficient MTS.
We must also ensure that mariners' training programs keep
pace with this advancing technology. To achieve this, the
Service must continue to invest in our ability to attract and
retain the talent necessary to meet these challenges in an
increasingly complex Marine Transportation System.
The workforce is the heartbeat of our Service and is the
reason we succeed at our missions. I am committing to
supporting our workforce and field commanders, and we must
think differently about how we deliver those services to the
marine industry.
We are investing in our national centers of expertise to
augment and support our field commanders to meet this highly
technical workload associated with this technology. We rely
heavily on key partnerships throughout all levels of Government
and industry in the United States and across the globe.
Collaboration with the maritime industry is vital as we develop
commonsense governance standards to rapidly employ these
technologies safely and securely.
With congressional support, the Service is taking full
advantage of newly authorized opportunities, such as the at-sea
recovery operations pilot program for space rocket recovery, to
work with early adopters and evaluate new autonomous
technologies that will inform the development of new standards.
Internationally, the Coast Guard is leading U.S. efforts
within the International Maritime Organization to develop
standards for the safe, secure, and sustainable operation of
maritime autonomous surface ships. The domestic and global
focus on developing reimagined standards for these novel
technologies will buy down risk inherent in an increasingly
interconnected and cyber-dependent supply chain.
The Service stands ready to support the maritime industry
to address these risks to the MTS to ensure the safety of life
at sea, the security of our waterways, the protection of the
marine environment, and the efficient movement of goods
throughout the Nation's waterways around the world.
As the Coast Guard continues to evolve its oversight of
these emerging technologies, we thank you for your essential
and continued support on this important issue.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you and look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Rear Admirals Arguin and
Wiemers is on page 5.]
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
Next we will have Rear Admiral Wiemers, and you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL TODD C. WIEMERS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT
FOR CAPABILITIES, U.S. COAST GUARD
Admiral Wiemers. Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for your
oversight and strong support of the Coast Guard. I am honored
to be here today to update you on autonomous and experimental
maritime technology.
I, too, would like to send thoughts and prayers out to the
Peltola family. Buzzy Peltola, as a father of two Coast Guard
members, will forever be part of the Coast Guard family.
The Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations, Vice
Admiral Peter Gautier, released the Coast Guard's ``Unmanned
Systems Strategic Plan'' in March. That plan outlines a vision
for how the Service will respond to and embrace emergence of
unmanned technology in the Maritime Domain.
The vision for the future is one where the Coast Guard
effectively employs, defends against, and regulates unmanned
systems in the maritime environment. We are moving toward a
future where the Coast Guard employs unmanned systems in an
interconnected data network integrated with artificial
intelligence to deliver actionable information to Coast Guard
operators.
Unmanned systems will be critical to the Coast Guard's
ability to meet the challenges of an increasingly dynamic
operating environment. Unmanned systems can help find mariners
in distress; detect drug and migrant trafficking at sea;
monitor illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the
Indo-Pacific; track icebergs in the North Atlantic; and gain
awareness of activity in the Arctic.
Currently, the Coast Guard employs three types of unmanned
aircraft systems. First, long-range systems are part of a joint
program with the Customs and Border Protection. Second, medium-
range are used on our National Security Cutters. And third, we
have domestic-made, legally compliant, short-range systems that
are used as force multipliers across the country.
The Coast Guard recently deployed unmanned surface
capabilities. We deployed contractor-owned, contractor-
operated, uncrewed surface assets in the Caribbean Sea and off
the coast of southern California to study the assets' impact on
illegal migration and drug trafficking. Additionally, the Coast
Guard sees future opportunities to use underwater vehicles and
commercial space assets to meet current and future demands. A
constellation of unmanned systems may expand our Maritime
Domain Awareness, support command and control of our forces,
and enhance our mission execution.
Finally, the widespread use and low cost of unmanned
systems mean these tools are available to those who might seek
harm to the United States or interrupt the flow of commerce. As
a result, the Coast Guard fields capabilities to counter
threats from unmanned aircraft systems, also called counter-
UAS.
The Department of Homeland Security's existing authority
that enables the Coast Guard counter-UAS operations expires on
September 30. It is critical that this authority be
reauthorized to allow the Coast Guard to continue this mission
in defense of the maritime transportation system.
I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. I look
forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Rear Admirals Arguin and
Wiemers follows:]
Joint Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin, Assistant
Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, and Rear Admiral
Todd C. Wiemers, Assistant Commandant for Capabilities, U.S. Coast
Guard
Introduction
Good morning, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for your continued
oversight and strong support of the Coast Guard. We are honored to
appear before you today to update you on Coast Guard activity related
to autonomous and experimental maritime technology.
Across the maritime domain, the pace of innovation is accelerating.
The opportunities presented by emerging technology could significantly
benefit the Marine Transportation System (MTS). Technological
advancements--such as autonomous systems--can evolve global
transportation systems and provide novel solutions for ongoing and
future challenges, including growing cybersecurity vulnerabilities,
supply chain disruptions, navigational challenges, and interference
with communication, information, and operational technology systems.
With these advancements comes the potential for new and different
vulnerabilities which should also be carefully considered. The Coast
Guard will closely evaluate the emergence of autonomous and
experimental technology, and encourage the growth of technology by
updating standards, policies, and regulations.
Coast Guard Autonomous and Experimental Maritime Technology
The Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations, VADM Peter
Gautier, released the U.S. Coast Guard Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan
in March of this year. That plan outlines a vision for how the Service
will respond to and embrace the emergence of unmanned technology in the
maritime domain. The Coast Guard's vision for the future is to not only
establish a regulatory framework to ensure a safe and efficient MTS but
to also actively defend against nefarious use of unmanned systems and
to use unmanned systems to improve execution of the Service's 11
statutory missions.
Currently, the Coast Guard employs unmanned capabilities in the air
domain in three ways. First, as part of a joint program office with
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard uses long-range
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for land and maritime border security.
Second, medium-range UAS on Coast Guard National Security Cutters
provide tactical aerial surveillance and reconnaissance capability by
leveraging a contractor-owned, contractor-operated (COCO) model.
Finally, the Service utilizes short-range UAS as force multipliers in
myriad operations, including post-storm assessments, law enforcement,
pollution response, port and facility inspections, aids to navigation,
and near-shore maritime domain awareness (MDA).
While the Coast Guard does not possess organic unmanned surface
capabilities, the Service is learning how these capabilities can
enhance mission execution. The Coast Guard recently utilized data from
COCO unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) in the Caribbean and in Southern
California. These assets provided data-as-a-service collected from a
variety of sensors, including radar, cameras, and automatic
identification system receivers. Contracted deployments offer the
opportunity to enhance MDA while avoiding prolonged acquisition
processes and preserving the ability to quickly pivot to new
technologies as they emerge. The Service is evaluating the USVs'
performance for potential future use.
The rapid commercialization of these technologies--including COCO
business models within industry--will likely provide greater access for
affordable experimentation and deployments in the near future. The
Coast Guard Research and Development Center and Blue Technology Center
of Excellence continue to advise the Service regarding technological
feasibility and best implementation strategies. This organizational
insight enables the Service to continually integrate the platforms and
sensors that will best serve the American public.
To maximize platform and sensor potential, the Coast Guard must
effectively store, process, analyze, and visualize the data, converting
it into information for better decision making to act more quickly and
decisively. The Coast Guard created an Office of Data and Analytics to
improve data governance and analysis and to reframe the organization's
approach to data so that operators at all levels may leverage data to
their strategic advantage. Furthermore, to avoid processing data in a
vacuum, the Service is working with Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) partners to share data and improve Department-wide operational
outcomes.
The widespread availability and low cost of unmanned systems means
nefarious actors may see opportunities to use UAS to disrupt Coast
Guard operations, conduct illicit activities, or jeopardize the flow of
commerce while avoiding detection or attribution. In response, the
Coast Guard has rapidly acquired counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities.
These capabilities are deployable ashore and afloat. The Service would
welcome the chance to discuss these capabilities further in a
classified setting.
Commercial Autonomous and Experimental Maritime Technology
The Coast Guard is monitoring and assessing novel uses of
autonomous and experimental maritime technology across the MTS. For
example, data collection platforms are being increasingly used within
the MTS by companies leveraging autonomous technologies to conduct
unmanned surveying operations. While many of these survey platforms are
relatively small, some companies are exploring using larger platforms
that may present greater potential risks to other waterway users.
The Coast Guard is focused on effectively managing the increasing
use of these platforms on our waterways. In addition to survey
platforms, the maritime industry is also considering remote-control
operations on smaller commercial vessels (e.g., tugs) to improve
maritime commerce efficiency.
As current statutory and regulatory regimes for commercial maritime
operations are predicated on mariners being onboard vessels, the Coast
Guard is working to develop suitable international and domestic
governance frameworks to integrate autonomous and remote-control
technologies safely and properly into the maritime domain.
Internationally, the Coast Guard is leading U.S. efforts in ongoing
discussions within the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to
develop a code for safe, secure, and environmentally sound operation of
maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS) within existing IMO
instruments. Domestically, the Coast Guard-chartered Automated and
Autonomous Vessel Policy Council is identifying gaps within U.S. laws,
regulations, and policies and developing clear and consistent guidance
regarding autonomous and remote-controlled technology for the maritime
industry and marine inspectors.
With the maritime industry continuing to incorporate these
technologies, the Coast Guard appreciates the authority provided in the
Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 to conduct
a pilot program to better understand the potential use of remotely
controlled or unmanned autonomous spaceflight recovery vessels. Within
this pilot program, the Coast Guard is working extensively with
commercial space interests to further the development of safe and
secure operations for recovering rockets at sea using unmanned,
autonomous vessels. As a result, the Coast Guard approved unmanned
operations by recovery vessels while accompanying support vessels
recover rocket fairings. Based on lessons learned from this proof of
concept, the Coast Guard will be poised to facilitate greater use of
autonomous systems to support maritime operations.
Alternative Fuels
The Coast Guard is also committed to working with the maritime
industry to facilitate the increased use of alternative fuels and
technologies for shipboard propulsion. While the use of liquefied
natural gas (LNG) is currently a leading alternative to traditional
petroleum-based fuels to meet current domestic and international air
emission requirements, the maritime industry continues to explore other
alternatives including methanol, fuel cells, lithium-ion battery,
hydrogen, ammonia, and even nuclear energy sources.
The needs of the maritime industry will drive future ship
propulsion fuel solutions, and the Coast Guard is positioned to
consider the results of testing of the various alternative fuel
options. For both regulators and industry, these alternative fuel
options must be carefully considered and appropriate safeguards must be
in place. Consideration must also be given to the infrastructure
necessary for the development, delivery, and use of alternative fuels,
which further increase the complexity of already busy maritime ports.
To this end, the Coast Guard is heavily engaged in ongoing efforts
at the IMO to develop suitable requirements for these alternative fuel
options. Leveraging the recent International Code of Safety for Ships
Using Gases or Other Low Flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code), which was
developed for the use of LNG, the IMO provided additional guidance on
the use of methanol and fuel cells and is now developing guidelines for
hydrogen, ammonia, and low flashpoint diesel. While these alternative
fuels share many similarities, each has its own unique risks and
challenges that must specifically be addressed to ensure safe use as a
maritime fuel.
With limited exceptions, current domestic regulations do not
address safe use of alternative fuels. However, they authorize the
Coast Guard to consider equivalents to regulatory design standards to
evaluate proposals for the use of new technologies and alternative
fuels onboard ships. The Service utilizes that authority to facilitate
industry efforts to innovate in safe and responsible ways.
In addition to engineering considerations, the Coast Guard is
mindful of the need to ensure industry has the proper training and
qualifications to operate these systems and that Coast Guard marine
inspectors have the necessary competencies to inspect them. The
challenges associated with learning to design, operate, maintain, and
inspect multiple fuel systems at the same time cannot be understated,
but the Coast Guard is committed to working with industry to ensure it
is done safely.
Other Novel Technology
In addition to the technologies and fuels described above, the
maritime industry continues to seek innovative and emergent
technologies for use in the MTS. Submersibles are increasingly employed
in commercial maritime operations for activities such as underwater
exploration, offshore structure maintenance, and underwater salvage.
Their versatility and advanced technology make them a valuable
capability which also pose unique governance challenges. These
challenges can be overcome through transparency and collaboration to
develop necessary and timely standards to meet the needs of the public.
The Coast Guard continuously evaluates our ability to assess new
technologies and novel uses and is committed to working with industry
leaders to develop new standards and leverage existing standards to
ensure the safety of these vessels and the individuals that operate
them.
Recent advancements in technology have given rise to the
development of the next generation of Wing-In-Ground (WIG) crafts. A
WIG craft looks and flies like an aircraft but operates at a low
altitude above the water surface to take advantage of enhanced
aerodynamic lift within the ground effect layer. While the use of WIG
craft presents potential opportunities, WIG craft technology is novel
and there are few Coast Guard and no Federal Aviation Administration
regulations or other industry standards specifically pertaining to
their design, construction, or operation, though FAA regulations
governing aircraft would still apply to WIGs that operate within FAA's
statutory jurisdiction.
WIG craft are, in essence, high-speed craft operating at low
altitude over the water. There will be significant challenges
integrating WIG operations with existing maritime traffic schemes.
Further, due to the unique blend of maritime and aviation principles on
which they rely for operation, the design, construction, pilotage,
operation, maintenance, and inspection of WIG craft are beyond the
Coast Guard's expertise. Successfully addressing the challenges
associated with this technology will require the Coast Guard to rely on
interagency partners who have the requisite experience, competency, and
regulatory authority to evaluate the aviation aspects associated with
WIG craft.
Cyber Connectivity
In close coordination with DHS and other DHS components, the Coast
Guard is leading several initiatives to meet the growing demand of the
modern maritime industry and MTS for updated cybersecurity policy and
guidance. The modern maritime industry and MTS rely heavily on
interconnected information and operational technologies to provide the
most effective and efficient transportation system possible.
We must be cognizant of the fact that every new capability that
leverages cyberspace, also presents additional risk of cyberattacks by
malicious actors which could threaten the MTS.
The Coast Guard stands ready to support the maritime industry in
the implementation and acceleration of new technologies and will
continue to address increasing cyber challenges and risks to the MTS to
ensure the safety of life at sea, the security of our waterways, and
the protection of the marine environment.
Conclusion
The novel technologies being introduced into the maritime
environment today are just the next step of maritime evolution. The
Coast Guard stands ready to provide regulatory guidance and oversight
to maintain safe and secure waterways, and the Service will continue to
look for ways to leverage emerging technologies to enhance mission
performance. We look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you so much for your presence
here. I really appreciate it. Thank you for your testimony.
It's great.
So, we will begin by having questions.
I am going to skip mine, I guess, and call Mr. Carbajal.
You are recognized for questions.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Again, I defer to the ranking member, if that is OK with
you.
Mr. Webster of Florida. I am going to remember that.
Mr. Carbajal. I am always trying to suck up to him.
Mr. Webster of Florida. I don't blame you.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Well, I am not deferring to
anyone.
Thanks for coming. So, my first set of questions, I am not
sure who is in charge of answering them. But I know a lot of
the testimony is focused on autonomous vehicles and so on, but
I want to step away a little bit--step back from that a little
bit to talk a little about remote sensing, data collecting, and
analytics, and then how you use that information so that it is
actionable.
You mentioned, Admiral, creating actionable data so you can
go do something with it.
So, with regards to--as a for instance, IUU fishing, are
you working with other agencies, like the Navy or anyone else,
on the use of satellites to track movements of potential
targets of IUU fishing and then using, then, that information
for interdiction? And if not, how are you using the various
technologies to deal with IUU fishing?
Admiral Wiemers. So, sir, yes, we are working very closely
with the Navy and other partners in order to really expand our
Maritime Domain Awareness capability through different systems,
especially leveraging those that DoD has at their advantage.
We are on a journey to really increase our Maritime Domain
Awareness. There are some program of records that the Navy has
put that we are working with them to expand sea vision, which
is a capability that allows for Maritime Domain Awareness, that
we are sharing with different partners around the world to
really understand what is out there and be able to address it.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. You have an Office of Data and
Analytics. Is that designed just to--not just to--but is that
designed to just collect the data, or do you have the capacity
to analyze the data you are getting for actual use?
Admiral Wiemers. So, sir, we are on a beginning stage. That
office has been in existence now for a couple of years, and we
are going through all the data architecture that we need to put
in place before we can really make it actionable for all
enhanced.
We have got some use cases that we are using by pulling
data out of our databases and being able to run some analysis
on it, but for the most part, that office is working on setting
up the data governance for our Service.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. So, as you are moving forward on
that, are you also training up the folks who you will depend
upon to analyze that data? And I would include not just the
folks who will put physical eyes on, but any of the algorithms
that you will need to develop to help you sift through the
data.
Admiral Wiemers. Yes. The training of our workforce moving
out in the future is going to be really important, and we are
partnering with others to help us on that journey. We are
partnering--for one example, we have got an object detection
joint group that we are working with DoD to be able to use
their algorithms and partner in those algorithms to be able to
use it, for example.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Maybe for Admiral Arguin, you are
responsible for answering this one. How is all that work then
integrated? So, in the use of, say, either crewed vehicles or
uncrewed vehicles.
Admiral Arguin. Congressman, we hope to take advantage of
the work that the Office of Data and Analytics will be able to
combine to evaluate risk-based regulatory projects. So, rather
than moving forward with a prescriptive-based regulatory
framework, being able to use data-informed risk analyses to
help drive where we want to drive our resources and where we
need to focus our efforts to reduce challenges with safety.
So, right now, we have got use cases to take a look at all
the information that we capture with respect to the Marine
Transportation System and be able to evaluate where we should
be putting our resources to drive safety improvements.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. OK. Sorry. That is on the
safety side. I appreciate that.
I think my questions maybe are more along the lines of the
enforcement, interdiction use cases for not just collecting the
data, but analyzing the data, and then turning that into
something that we can use, and then the tools--like artificial
intelligence algorithms--that, frankly, you need people to do.
And we shouldn't forget. It's--I always tell people that
artificial intelligence--the artificial is the software part,
the intelligence is the human part. It's not just some random
algorithm that drops from the sky and then we get to use it. We
actually need people to do this.
So, I will leave it at that. I do want to follow up,
though, and I will follow up with some more specific questions,
and maybe have you come in for a brief on a few of these
issues. I appreciate that. Thanks.
Admiral Wiemers. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen of Washington. I yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. So, Mr. Carbajal and I have agreed
to ask our questions when we come back after the voting break.
Maybe we can squeeze in Mr. Babin. You are recognized.
Mr. Carbajal. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to be able to
come back. I am sorry. I might have----
Mr. Webster of Florida [interrupting]. Oh, you're not.
Dr. Babin. You have already called on me.
Mr. Carbajal. But you're not ranking member or chairman,
so, you are out of luck.
[Laughter.]
Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. All right.
Mr. Carbajal, you are recognized for your questions.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
I should reconsider deferring to the ranking member because
he asked one of my questions. So, the good news is I am going
to be short, Mr. Chairman.
Admiral Arguin, oceangoing vessels routinely carry
dangerous explosive cargoes, while U.S. flight vessels carry
cargo for the Department of Defense. Who should be responsible
for regulating the cybersecurity of fully autonomous vessels?
Is the Coast Guard currently capable of doing that?
Admiral Arguin. Ranking Member Carbajal, we do have that
responsibility, both within the prevention policy
responsibilities we have as cyber. Underneath our Marine
Transportation Security Act authorities, we have the authority
to manage and oversee cyber responsibilities. We are currently
in the process of issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking that
would raise the bar with respect to cyber responsibilities for
both vessels and facilities.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Admiral.
Admiral Arguin, regarding submersibles, Navigation and
Vessel Inspection Circular, NVIC No. 5-93 states, ``Because of
the unique design and operating characteristics, as well as the
inherent hazards of underwater operation, an uninspected
submersible may be permitted in U.S. passenger operations only
if it is designed and constructed to a recognized industry
standard.''
Does the Coast Guard stand by this statement? Is more
needed?
Admiral Arguin. Congressman Carbajal, yes, sir, the
requirement for a submersible, if you carry one passenger for
hire, you need to meet the inspection requirements under
subchapter T.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. And sorry, Admiral. The
ranking member took my question.
So, with that, I will yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Babin, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Dr. Babin. Yes sir, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank you, Admirals, for being here today.
I represent both Coast Guard Sector Houston-Galveston and
Air Station Houston, each housed at Ellington Field in
southeast Texas in my district.
My questions today are for our Coast Guard panel members,
both of you. In the recent 2022 Coast Guard reauthorization,
there was a provision, section 11225, titled, ``Establishment
of Unmanned System Program and Autonomous Control and Computer
Vision Technology Project.'' It's a mouthful.
The goal of this project is to bring commercial autonomy
and computer vision solutions directly to the operational
components of the Coast Guard to use this technology in an
operational environment for maritime interdiction, search and
rescue, and ISR, just to name a few.
What is the Coast Guard's plan to execute this technology
project in an operational setting through the Coast Guard
Research and Development Center?
One of you.
Admiral Wiemers. So, sir, the R&D Center is obviously doing
a lot of research in the world of unmanned systems and
improving Maritime Domain Awareness, and we are working hand-
in-hand with them on a number of different activities.
We recently just finished the Saildrone deployment, as one
example, where we were trying to use unmanned systems to really
understand that capability and how we can best leverage that
information to meet our mission.
That study that you specifically mentioned is still
ongoing, and we are waiting for the results for it.
Dr. Babin. OK. Thank you. All right. I will go to the next
one.
The Department of Homeland Security's counter-UAS, or C-
UAS, authority is expiring in September. Does that mean the
Coast Guard will not be able to conduct counter-UAS operations
if it is not reauthorized, or will the Coast Guard authorities
allow you to continue C-UAS activities?
Admiral Wiemers. Our authority is embedded with the act
that brought that on. So, when it sunsets, our ability to
conduct those operations will also sunset.
Dr. Babin. OK. Good to know. Good to know.
I recently heard some great feedback from down in south
Texas about the joint Coast Guard-CBP balloon monitoring
project, the Argos surveillance balloon or tethered aerostat,
as it is officially called.
In addition to supporting our border security in combating
illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and smuggling, I am told
that the aerostat is also playing a huge role in deterring
illegal fishing in the region. This sort of partnership is
vital, and I encourage you to keep working with agency and
military partners to share this innovative technology.
For example, to my earlier point, Joint Base Ellington in
my district also houses the Texas Air National Guard's 147th
Attack Wing. They operate MQ-9 Reapers, a UAS platform with
state-of-the-art sensor capabilities. I know the CBP has MQ-9s
as well, and the Coast Guard has partnered with them in the
past to share UAS assets.
What has the partnership looked like with the Air National
Guard, and what can be done to enhance the shared technology
utilization?
Admiral Wiemers. Sir, we are working very closely with
Customs and Border Protection. We are working jointly on
requirements on what we need to have persistent Maritime Domain
Awareness out to 200 miles. And CBP has got its sensors, we
have our sensors, and we are committed to integrating them and
sharing the data and working together in those areas.
As far as the MQ-9 Guardians that we fly with the joint
program with CBP, we have flown over 3,100 maritime-hours since
2018, and we have been able to result in 26,000 kilograms of
cocaine being seized specifically because of those assets. It
is a very good partnership for us.
Dr. Babin. Absolutely. Thank you. Proud of you.
I yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Auchincloss, you are recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
It seems that one of the core issues that the Coast Guard
is facing from a regulatory perspective is this distinction
between vessel and vehicle. And a lot rides on that
distinction. The Coast Guard has previously promulgated a
definition of vessel but has also said at the same time that
that definition does not apply across all types that they may
encounter.
You have put together the Automated and Autonomous Vessel
Policy Council recently. What is the status of that, and is one
of the mandates for that council to make that distinction
between vessel and vehicle more clear?
Admiral Arguin. Congressman, yes, sir. The Autonomous
Vessel Policy Council, AutoPoCo for short, is really focused on
evaluating not only the regulatory framework that exists today
to identify gaps where autonomous operations may impact the
existing framework, but also looking at training requirements,
evaluating that technology to determine how that technology can
be brought to bear within the MTS in a safe and secure manner.
Mr. Auchincloss. So, is AutoPoCo going to produce
recommendations for regulatory changes for the Commandant as
well as legal changes for Congress for this new era?
Admiral Arguin. Yes, sir. They are working to evaluate not
only with the international community as we evaluate where the
international community wants to go, but making recommendations
on not only policy changes, but law changes that may be
necessary to support the expansion of that technology.
Mr. Auchincloss. And when can we expect those
recommendations?
Admiral Arguin. I don't have a timeframe on those
recommendations. They are continuing to evaluate not only the
international standard, but also the domestic standard. And as
those recommendations come forward, we will move forward with
making recommendations for changes.
Mr. Auchincloss. And who is the flag officer who is
responsible for timeline and for efficacy of AutoPoCo?
Admiral Arguin. I am.
Mr. Auchincloss. OK. Because that was one of the
recommendations that came up in the National Academy of
Sciences report on this issue, was that there needs to be
accountability.
And so, you are the gentleman who Congress can turn to for
these recommendations?
Admiral Arguin. Yes, sir.
Mr. Auchincloss. Great.
Is part of these recommendations going to be about which
procurement authority the Coast Guard uses for these? I know
there is a whole slew of ones that you could use. Are you going
to be talking about how best to procure?
Admiral Arguin. No, sir. So, the AutoPoCo team is really
focused on the external, so, non-Coast Guard-related activities
with respect to autonomous operations. There is a different
division that is working on the internal acquisition and how
Coast Guard would use that technology within Coast Guard
operations.
Mr. Auchincloss. And is there one program officer or flag
officer who is in charge of that, is accountable to the
Commandant and Congress on deciding whether it is going to be
FARs or nonmajor acquisition programs, et cetera?
Admiral Wiemers. Yes, sir. If I can jump in.
Our Assistant Commandant for Acquisition is in charge for
all acquisition, including all contracting, which includes the
other transactional authority that you are talking about.
Mr. Auchincloss. OK. But that is a whole portfolio. Is
there one individual at the Coast Guard who is talking just
about how to procure for this technology?
Admiral Wiemers. So, the way we have it set up is I set the
requirements for what we need, and I set those--that capability
needs. I then turn it over to the contracting officer within
the Assistant Commandant for Acquisition to actually acquire
the goods.
Mr. Auchincloss. That sounds to me like a no. And my
concern is that if the commercial sector--and I represent a
State, Massachusetts, that has a tremendous ferment of
innovation in marine science and technology. They want to know
who is going to buy this stuff, and they want to be able to
have sit-down conversations about that.
Are you the person?
Admiral Wiemers. I am the person----
Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. All right. I am going to
give them your cell phone.
Admiral Wiemers. Yes, sir. I am the one who decides what to
buy.
Mr. Auchincloss. OK. And then, on this point, you all have
the Blue Tech Center of Excellence. It is in San Diego. My
colleague, Mr. Garamendi, was instrumental in getting that
instituted. How many people do you have working there?
Admiral Wiemers. Sir, I will have to get back on the record
with you for the exact numbers that we have there.
Mr. Auchincloss. Does two sound right?
Admiral Wiemers. It is very possible, sir.
Mr. Auchincloss. And they are civilians?
Admiral Wiemers. I am not sure what the makeup is.
Mr. Auchincloss. And what authority do they have?
Admiral Wiemers. Sir, they are responsible to inform
industry on Coast Guard requirements so that the industry can
understand what the Coast Guard's--our need and what
technologies will help us into the future.
Mr. Auchincloss. So, they are like sensors out there in the
commercial ecosystem to bring back information to the Coast
Guard, but they can't procure, they can't make investments?
Admiral Wiemers. They would need to come back to us to make
the procurements.
Mr. Auchincloss. We are not going to keep pace with
innovation unless Blue Tech Center of Excellence has the
dedicated funding and the staffing that it needs, and I would
like the Coast Guard to come back with a plan to do that.
I will yield back, Chairman.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
OK. So, the Chair declares that we are going to recess here
for some votes, and then we will come back.
Be sure to come back, all the witnesses, both current and
the future panel, and then all of the Members that can come
back. And we will start again as soon as we are done.
[Recess.]
Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
Maritime Transportation is called to order from the previous
recess we just had.
And I recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask questions, and
then we will move to the Members' questions.
Thank you all for coming back. It's great. Seems like we
just left.
Admiral Arguin, earlier this year, the Coast Guard
supported the search for the Titan, the submarine that
ultimately caused five people to perish. The Titan was not
registered, wasn't classified or inspected.
What processes does the Coast Guard need to implement to
ensure vessels like the Titan do not evade regulation,
particularly when such vessels are carrying passengers?
Admiral Arguin. Chairman Webster, we have initiated a
Marine Board of Investigation, that is the highest level of
investigative body within the Coast Guard, to evaluate the
evidence in connection with that case. The Marine Board of
Investigation will make recommendations to us with respect to
either policy changes or regulatory changes that need to be
made as a result of that investigation.
And so, in the meantime, we are evaluating our own existing
policies to determine whether or not there are loopholes that
can be closed in advance of the finalization of that
investigation.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Is there a timeframe for that?
Admiral Arguin. We want to make sure the investigations and
the investigators have all the time they need to gather the
evidence. We want to expedite the completion of that, but I
want to make sure that the investigative team has all the time
necessary to truly evaluate and pull up all the evidence that
would be--now, if they do determine that there is something
that needs to be acted on before the end, they will advise me,
and then we can take action on those cases outside of the
completion of the investigation.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Admiral Wiemers, the Coast Guard
intercepts about 10 percent of the cocaine flowing into the
United States. It is constrained by limited assets covering a
large area.
How is the Coast Guard using new technologies as a force
multiplier to increase Maritime Domain Awareness?
Admiral Wiemers. Chairman Webster, indeed, a lot of the
conversation we have been having on trying to field unmanned
systems is specifically to be able to target our resources more
effectively in order to get at the threats that are coming into
our country.
Mr. Webster of Florida. What factors, if any, are hindering
the Coast Guard's adoption of new technologies that can improve
Maritime Domain Awareness?
Admiral Wiemers. Chairman, so, just a couple of thoughts on
that. One, we talked earlier about managing data. Putting out
more unmanned systems collects a lot of data, and we need to be
able to manage that data to really turn it into information
that we can then use to target threats coming toward us.
And the other item I would say that would help us is having
other transactional authority, similar to what DoD has, in
order to be able to procure new technology in a more effective
way.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Admiral Arguin, a recent National
Academy of Sciences report noted that one of the Coast Guard's
challenges will be recruiting personnel qualified to oversee
new maritime technologies.
How will the Coast Guard ensure it has the necessary
expertise?
Admiral Arguin. Chairman Webster, to be sure, the
challenges associated with increasing technology will put an
additional strain on our ability to recruit and ultimately
retain the talent necessary to meet that demand. We have got an
all-hands-on-deck effort to find that talent, to be competitive
to bring that talent into the Service, and then be able to
employ them in the most effective way.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Are there any areas where the Coast
Guard currently falls short in regulation expertise for new
technologies?
Admiral Arguin. Chairman, I think the regulatory framework
is just not flexible and nimble enough to keep pace with
emerging technology. We are working through a variety of
different design basis agreements, which are essentially an
equivalency determination against the current standard to
ensure that that technology can be brought to bear and then be
able to update the regulations, sort of, downstream.
And so, we have the ability to evaluate equivalencies, but
the current regulatory framework just does not afford us the
opportunity to keep pace based on the current standard.
Mr. Webster of Florida. So, there are gaps?
Admiral Arguin. Sir, I wouldn't necessarily call them gaps,
because if we identify that there is a challenge, we do have
the ability to evaluate alternatives to that standard. Yes,
sir.
Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. I yield back my time.
And, Ms. Scholten, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Ms.
Scholten.
Ms. Scholten. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
And thank you both for coming today, for your testimony,
and for your concern and thoughtfulness over this critically
important issue.
In my home State of Michigan, water is a way of life, from
recreation to supporting the larger Great Lakes economy. The
future of carbon-neutral fuels and autonomous vessels is of
critical importance to the people in Michigan's Third
Congressional District.
As you know, establishing these regulations is the province
of the International Maritime Organization, but the Coast
Guard, of course, can develop regulations and take their own
step to build out processes, even in advance of a global
standard.
My first question is for Rear Admiral Arguin. Given the
speed at which the IMO produces regulations, what is the Coast
Guard doing to ensure a more rapid but safe deployment of
carbon-neutral fuels?
Admiral Arguin. Congresswoman, so, we have an Autonomous
Vessel Policy Council that focuses on autonomy. We are also
evaluating those new technologies as they are brought to bear.
And so, in the event that we end up seeing that a particular
alternative fuel becomes more mainstream, we will be able to
develop more national regulations.
And so--but we also need to be mindful that we need to keep
pace or at least be mindful of the International Maritime
Organization's efforts, because shipping is global. And so, to
ensure that we do have alignment with international
requirements--we are all on the same journey trying to figure
out how to make sure that these operations and these
alternative fuels can be incorporated safely. And so, we are in
partnership and working directly with IMO to help inform our
own domestic standards as well.
Ms. Scholten. OK. Can you talk a little bit about
specifically any of the processes or test sites or pilot
projects or anything that might be happening right now?
Admiral Arguin. So, I am not aware of any particular test
sites or pilot projects other than individual. For example,
there are certain ships that are dual-fueled LNG models. They
are being built. They are operating today.
And so, we work through those equivalency determinations to
compare them against the existing standard, determine if new
requirements need to be put in place based on those risks, and
then that establishes a framework for that particular design.
As those designs become more mainstream, then we will be able
to essentially put together a national policy that will
standardize and set a framework for future development.
Ms. Scholten. OK. How would you assess the competitiveness
of the United States among other countries developing these
technologies?
Admiral Arguin. I don't know that I would be in a position
to compare and contrast other countries and sort of from a
competitiveness perspective, but I think at least our domestic
oversight of those new technologies and being a very deliberate
standard to ensure that we have evaluated each of the risks and
very confidently understand how those mitigation strategies are
going to ensure an equivalent or better operation, I think,
gives us a bit of an advantage.
Ms. Scholten. OK. This question of regulation is truly one
of the key questions that we are facing right now moving
forward and considering the nimbleness and, I believe,
competitiveness of the United States military.
Currently, autonomous vehicles pose something of a loophole
in Coast Guard regulations being classified as recreational
vehicles, which are largely uninspected. Can you talk about the
plan that we have, even more specifically regulating around
this emerging class of vehicles? And either of you, please feel
free to weigh in on this.
Admiral Arguin. Congresswoman, so, just the discussion of
autonomous operations, automated systems have been incorporated
into shipping for years. The difference is now we are seeing
more and more autonomous operations that are replacing what
would typically be credentialed mariners or humans on board.
And so, I think the challenge is to ensure that the new
systems, those computers that are driving operations, have the
ability to meet or exceed what we would expect of a crew, and
then be mindful that the crew that still remains on board needs
to be trained and equipped to be able to continue to operate
those vessels in an increasingly complex way.
Ms. Scholten. Rear Admiral Wiemers, do you have anything to
add to that?
Admiral Wiemers. No, ma'am. My colleague is the expert on
regulations.
Ms. Scholten. Waiting for--I see my time is running out,
but if you have anything additionally to submit for the record.
Waiting for technology to become more mainstream allows for
certain gaps in the regulations. Does that give you any safety
concerns?
Admiral Arguin. If we are aware of a technology that poses
a threat, safety or otherwise, we have the ability, through our
captain of the port authorities, to cease that operation. And
so, if there are perceived gaps or real gaps, we would be able
to take some action to prevent that from impacting the Marine
Transportation System.
Ms. Scholten. Thank you.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentlelady yields back.
Mr. Van Drew, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman.
And good afternoon, and thank you for being here today.
Southern New Jersey, as you probably know, is my home, and
it is my district as well, and it is synonymous with the Coast
Guard.
Training Center Cape May is one of the largest bases in the
Coast Guard and the sole accession point for the entire
enlisted workforce. It is a fundamental part of the culture and
part of the economy in South Jersey. In turn, the push for more
and more unmanned technology, while potentially beneficial,
could greatly alter the functions of our training center.
Rear Admiral Arguin and Wiemers, will this technology be
taught at the Coast Guard Training Center? Will there be a
difference in the way we train the recruits as this moves
forward, if it moves forward? Either one or both.
Admiral Wiemers. So, Cape May is our primary accession
source. A lot of the technical training that we give is follow-
on training in, say, a sea school that we have, which is
technical-based on what our people need to actually do the
mission activities that we perform. So, the training that you
are discussing would be performed at those locations.
Dr. Van Drew. OK. So, the basic training would be the
same--would be pretty much the same as we now have?
Admiral Wiemers. We are constantly looking and leveraging
technology to improve the delivery of our services, but the
accession training would predominantly remain the same.
Dr. Van Drew. Would there be any change just to teach
people these skills, or, again, that would be done at the other
location?
Admiral Wiemers. So, the training specifically is not in
either one of our portfolios. And there is a lot of looking
going on right now within our Service on how we develop our
folks. I am not aware of anything specifically at Cape May. But
that is our main accession source, and it will remain that
accession part.
Dr. Van Drew. OK. Technology is good and advancement is
good, but there are certainly concerns with safety at main sea,
especially when these vessels--the autonomous vessels, such as
fishing and private boats, are encountering them and the
impacts of marine life.
Do you have any thoughts on that?
Admiral Arguin. Congressman, I think we need to be mindful
that, while maybe in a laboratory, autonomous systems may be
able to work properly operating within the entirety of the--and
the complexity and diversity of the Marine Transportation
System is a different sort of problem set. And so, we need to
be deliberate about how we understand how those computer
systems will operate and integrate and interact with all of the
users of the waterway.
Dr. Van Drew. I agree with you. And then, I am a very plain
and basic guy. So, plain English, you don't want to rush into
something that ends up being stupid and dangerous. So, I think
you are right in your priorities there.
On top of these concerns, to me, is offshore wind, if it
happens. And it has been delayed along our coast for another 2
years, and it may not happen at all. But if it did happen, will
the wind turbines be a difficulty? For tourists, we know that
already. For marine life and fishermen, we know that already.
But the Coast Guard, I am interested in your viewpoint on the
wind turbines. Is this developing as you hear more about it?
Particularly concerned with autonomous vehicles and how
they are going to deal with them. I have a lot of fishermen in
my district. A lot going on in the water, as you know. And they
have concerns without autonomous vehicles. So, it particularly
concerns me.
Two-part question. So, one, the concern with navigation.
The second concern is--which has been expressed by some
individuals in the military, including the Pentagon--concern
with our national security. Concern these things are going to
be thousands of them over millions of acres. They are 1,000
feet high, and there is concern about radar.
Any thoughts on that? From either one or both of you.
Admiral Arguin. Congressman, so, I will try to answer both
of your questions maybe at the same time.
So, first and foremost, Coast Guard is responsible for
safety and navigation and preserving the sea shipping lanes
that support our $5.4 trillion economy. And so, as we work with
BOEM and BSEE, specifically BOEM on the leasing areas, we want
to make sure that the lease offerings have a minimal impact or
minimize the impact to existing shipping lanes so that we can
continue to move ships in a safe manner.
With respect to potential challenges with new structures in
the ocean, we are evaluating that, again, with BOEM and BSEE,
to understand not only the impact that it may have on our
existing missions--search and rescue, oilspill response, and
others--but understand what the impact of that system might be,
even from a cyber perspective. So, we are taking a
comprehensive review of how that particular footprint changes
the dynamics of the Marine Transportation System.
Dr. Van Drew. And I am glad you are doing that. And I think
it needs a good, solid, objective evaluation, regardless of
political pressure on either side, just to make sure we stay
safe.
I will take the other--my last question, I think, the other
viewpoint. How do you think autonomous vehicles could increase
safety? Or do you? And do we really need this technology?
Admiral Arguin. Congressman, I think that the opportunity
to take advantage of technology, to minimize errors, to
understand what that technology can bring in the way of better
information, more efficient movement of commerce, is something
we should certainly take advantage of. But we need to do that
deliberately and make sure that those--as we are transitioning
from what we currently have today into something that is a
little bit more futuristic, that we understand the inherent and
maybe even hidden risks that are----
Dr. Van Drew [interrupting]. I think you are right. And I
thank you for your good work. And I just want you to know I am
always very proud of the Coast Guard and the presence it has
not only along all our coast and in New Jersey, but
particularly in South Jersey. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Ezell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Rear Admiral Arguin and Wiemers, thank you both for being
here today. We really appreciate your staff and all the hard
work that everybody puts into it.
I am proud of the work that has taken place in south
Mississippi at the Roger F. Wicker Center for Ocean Enterprise,
which includes numerous R&D partnership programs focused on
uncrewed maritime systems in the broader blue economy.
My district is also home to many startup companies that are
rapidly innovating in the unmanned maritime vehicle industry.
To ensure their continued success, these companies must have a
clear understanding of the legal requirements for lawful
operation under relevant authorities.
Rear Admiral Arguin, what work is the Coast Guard doing to
establish a regulatory framework for unmanned and autonomous
systems to operate in the U.S. maritime transportation system?
Admiral Arguin. Congressman, so, I have established an
Autonomous Vessel Policy Council that is taking a look not only
at the gaps or the seams in areas where existing laws and
regulations may be impacted by autonomous operations, and then
making recommendations to those areas that may need to be
improved so that that emerging technology can be incorporated.
They are also looking at how we train and equip our own
inspectors and investigators to make sure that we are aware of
that technology and that that technology can be brought to bear
so that it can be done in a safe and effective way.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
I understand the International Maritime Organization has
set up a working group to consider what a regulatory framework
will look like for autonomous systems. Has the Coast Guard been
involved in that?
Admiral Arguin. Yes, sir. The same lead that I have for my
Autonomous Vessel Policy Council is also our representative to
the MASS Working Group, the joint working group that is looking
at the same thing but from an international perspective.
Mr. Ezell. Very good. All right.
Admiral Wiemers, could you tell us about the experience and
expertise of the employees at the Coast Guard Research and
Development Center?
Admiral Wiemers. Yes, sir. Thanks for that question. We
have got a fabulous group of folks that work in New London,
Connecticut, at the Research and Development Center. They do a
lot of different research for us. And as we get into technology
and needing to stay up with the latest and greatest, doing the
market research, and having that group be able to really work
on the integration on how we use it is extremely important.
Mr. Ezell. Very good. Has the feedback from the industry
taken into considerations the efforts of the entity? How has
the feedback----
Admiral Wiemers [interrupting]. So, the R&D Center, they do
their reports. They do their experimentation. They work hand-
in-hand and partner with industry to make sure we are
understanding the latest that the market has to offer.
Mr. Ezell. Well, the Coast Guard has been a part of my life
on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, and we fully support you, want
to help you and be a part of all your success. So, thank you
very much for being here today.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields.
So, I would like to thank the witnesses for coming today
and for your testimony, but you can be excused if you want to
be.
Dr. Van Drew. Unless you want to stay.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Yes.
Mr. Webster of Florida. I would like to welcome our second
panel of witnesses and ask them to take their seats.
[Pause as second witness panel takes their seats.]
Our second panel today consists of industry experts leading
the development of autonomous and experimental maritime
technologies and representatives of the mariners that will be
operating these technologies. Their insights will be vital to
developing an appropriate regulatory framework to ensure safe
operation of these technologies in our maritime transportation
system.
Thank you all for being here today. I really appreciate it.
I will take a moment to explain our lighting system, which
I have already explained. G, green. Green is go. Yellow is slow
up. Red is stop. That's it.
I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements
on the second panel will also be included in the record.
Without objection, show that ordered.
And as your written testimony has been made part of the
record, the subcommittee asks you to limit your oral remarks to
5 minutes.
With that, Mr. Pribyl, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF SEAN T. PRIBYL, ESQ., MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON COAST
GUARD MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT,
``LEVERAGING UNMANNED SYSTEMS FOR COAST GUARD MISSIONS: A
STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE''; MICHAEL GORDON JOHNSON, MARINE
ENGINEER, AND FOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SEA MACHINES
ROBOTICS, INC.; PATRICK LAHEY, COFOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, TRITON SUBMARINES; AND T. CHRISTIAN SPAIN, VICE
PRESIDENT OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AMERICAN MARITIME OFFICERS
TESTIMONY OF SEAN T. PRIBYL, ESQ., MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON COAST
GUARD MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT,
``LEVERAGING UNMANNED SYSTEMS FOR COAST GUARD MISSIONS: A
STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE''
Mr. Pribyl. Thank you.
Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Scholten, and members of
this subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear
before you today to testify about the National Academies of
Sciences consensus study report on ``Leveraging Unmanned
Systems for Coast Guard Missions: A Strategic Imperative,'' on
which I served as a committee member.
This subcommittee also invited me to offer my comments on
notable developments in the Coast Guard's use and regulation of
maritime technologies since that report's publication in 2020.
My testimony today is as a committee member of that report.
Briefly, Congress requested a study of the Coast Guard's
existing and prospective use of unmanned systems to fulfill its
many critical missions. Through the course of that study, the
committee recognized the value that such technologies could
offer the Coast Guard.
The committee made five recommendations related to unmanned
systems. First was to issue a high-level strategy. Second was
to designate a senior champion. Third was to stand up a program
office. Fourth was to expand and normalize experimentation. And
fifth was to get a fix on funding needs.
Through the study committee's understanding and as
discussed in greater detail in my written testimony, several of
those recommendations have been addressed by the Coast Guard.
The study committee also recognized the complex policy and
legal questions raised with such technologies, in particular,
as the Coast Guard is not only a potential user but also a
regulator of unmanned systems.
Generally, statutes, regulations, and conventions did not
contemplate vessels without humans on board when they were
drafted.
Thus, traditional legal principles are being challenged.
However, there is a great deal of ongoing effort to understand
how these technologies fit in legal frameworks as they exist
now, which was also part of the work conducted by the study
committee.
Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions.
[Mr. Pribyl's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sean T. Pribyl, Esq., Member, Committee on Coast
Guard Maritime Domain Awareness, National Academies Report,
``Leveraging Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions: A Strategic
Imperative''
Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the
Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today
to testify about the Transportation Research Board's (TRB) consensus
study report on ``Leveraging Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions:
A Strategic Imperative'' (2020) \1\ (the ``Report'' or ``Study'') and
issues of regulation of autonomous and experimental maritime
technologies germane to that Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
2020. Leveraging Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions. Washington,
DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/25987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I served on the study committee that developed the TRB report,
although I was also invited by this Subcommittee to offer my comments
on notable developments in the Coast Guard's use and regulation of
autonomous and experimental maritime technologies since that Report's
publication in 2020. By way of additional background, I am a business
attorney and Partner at the law firm of Holland & Knight LLP in
Washington, DC where I practice within our Transportation and
Infrastructure Group and International Trade Practice and support our
Autonomous Transportation Team. The focus of my practice is on maritime
regulatory matters, international trade, coastwise trade (the Jones
Act), autonomous transportation, civil litigation, and maritime
environmental compliance. I have a background with more than 25 years
of combined experience as an international maritime and trade attorney,
international Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club lawyer in Norway,
U.S. Coast Guard officer and attorney (JAG), U.S. Department of Justice
Special U.S. Attorney, and merchant mariner deck officer with the
American Maritime Officers union following graduation from the U.S.
Merchant Marine Academy (Kings Point). I am also a widely published
author in treatises and publications on matters related to maritime law
and autonomy, as well as a regular speaker at international legal and
industry conferences and seminars. Outside my law practice I am, inter
alia, a Member of the National Academies of Sciences Marine Board and
serve as Chair of the Autonomous Ships and Smart Marine Technology
Committee in the U.S. Maritime Law Association (``MLA''), where I am a
Proctor in Admiralty. My testimony today is on behalf of the TRB and in
my personal capacity and thus any views and opinions expressed are my
own and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Holland
& Knight LLP.
Study Scope and Process
Congress requested the TRB report in Section 812 of the Frank
LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (the ``Act'') which
called on the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
(the National Academies) to ``prepare an assessment of available
unmanned, autonomous, or remotely controlled maritime domain awareness
technologies for use by the U.S. Coast Guard.'' The Act called for a
study of the U.S. Coast Guard's existing and prospective use of
unmanned systems (UxS) \2\ to fulfill its many critical and often
unique missions. The Act implied an interest in a range of technology-
based concepts, from aerial, surface, and underwater vehicles that have
no human occupants or controllers to vehicles that may have a crew but
have some level of remote, automated, or autonomous control, as well as
systems that are not vehicles such as intelligent decision aids. The
legislative request further called for a review of the then-current and
emerging capabilities of these systems; their affordability,
reliability, and versatility; and any realignments in Coast Guard
policies, procedures, and protocols that may be necessary to exploit
them more fully and effectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Report used the term ``unmanned'' systems, although since
2020, nomenclature has moved to adopt the term ``uncrewed'' or
``optionally crewed.'' Notably the Coast Guard still uses the
description ``Manning Requirements'' in 46 CFR Part 15, and thus there
is not uniform acceptance of gender neutral ``crew'' in lieu of
``manning.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To conduct the study, which was undertaken under the auspices of
the TRB and its Marine Board, the National Academies appointed a
committee of 10 experts in the fields of automation and control;
systems research, acquisitions, and integration; Coast Guard operations
and mission support; naval engineering and architecture, cybersecurity,
field applications of unmanned systems; and relevant legal, regulatory,
and policy issues. Overall, the study committee recognized that the
Coast Guard has many important, complex, varied, and demanding
missions, although its fleet and operational forces are being
increasingly taxed. However, unmanned systems are being used today--and
increasingly since the Report's publication in 2020--with high utility
across the public and private sectors. Therefore, recognizing that the
technologies that enable and underpin these systems are advancing
rapidly, the study committee was struck by the magnitude and breadth of
opportunity that lies ahead for the Coast Guard to pursue UxS in its
multiple operational domains and across its many missions. To reach
that potential, the study committee determined that a major realignment
of the Coast Guard's UxS approach was warranted and concluded that to
remain responsive and fully relevant to its many missions, it was
imperative that the Coast Guard take a more strategic and accelerated
approach to exploit the capabilities of existing and future unmanned
systems. Moreover, legal and policy considerations remain critical to
the Coast Guard's missions as a user of emerging technologies and
notably, as a regulator of unmanned systems aboard commercial vessels.
Informed by the input from experts and collective knowledge of its
members, the study committee made five critical recommendations to the
Coast Guard, provided here in kind, along with relevant updates given
the passage of time since the publication of the Report.
1. Issue a High-Level UxS Strategy
The study committee recommended that the Commandant issue a high-
level UxS strategy that would articulate a compelling rationale for
UxSs, set forth agency-critical goals that these systems should
further, and outline the Coast Guard's approach for achieving them. The
strategy would articulate a vision for the use of these systems across
mission areas, setting strategic goals and objectives for achieving
that vision, and establishing appropriate organizational structures and
lines of authority to introduce and integrate UxSs across the force
structure.
Since the Report's publication, in March 2023 the Coast Guard
promulgated its Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan \3\ which appears to
have addressed this recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ US Coast Guard Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan (2023),
available at https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/
2023%20Unmanned%20Systems%20Strategic
%20Plan.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Designate a Senior UxS Champion
In light of the institutional responsiveness required to support
the strategic commitment to UxSs and given the attendant scope and
scale of the requisite responses that will be required, the study
committee recommended that the Commandant designate a top Coast Guard
official, at the Flag Officer or Senior Executive Service levels, to
advocate for and advance the Service's UxS strategy. This top official
would be responsible for identifying, promoting, pushing for,
coordinating, and facilitating the changes that will be needed across
the organization to further the Commandant's strategic goals and
objectives for UxSs.
To date, and to my knowledge, the Coast Guard has not designated
that level of senior official for that purpose, however, they have
appointed CAPT Thom Remmers, P.E. as Unmanned Systems Lead, which
should be viewed as a positive step that meets the intent of this
recommendation. This is all the more relevant given the promulgation of
the Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan by Deputy Commandant for
Operations, VADM Peter W. Gautier while CAPT Remmers served in that
role as Unmanned Systems Lead.
3. Stand Up a UxS Program Office
Given the many changes in Coast Guard priorities, practices, and
procedures that will be required to more fully exploit UxSs--from
systems acquisition to personnel hiring and training--the study
committee recognized that no single directorate or subunit could be
expected to initiate and implement them all. However, the committee
concluded that a dedicated program office, in concert with a high-level
UxS advocate, could play a vital leadership and coordinating role in
sustaining and expanding the use of UxSs across Coast Guard operational
forces. The study committee therefore recommended that the Commandant
establish a UxS program office that will work in concert with the top
official charged with advancing the Service's UxS strategy to plan out,
coordinate, assess, and promote UxS activities across the Service and
to leverage relevant activities and capabilities from outside the
Service. The committee advised that an early initiative of the program
office should be to develop a ``roadmap'' that translates the high-
level UxS strategic goals and objectives into an actionable plan to
accomplish them, which should specify tasks needing priority attention,
time frames for completion, and performance metrics and milestones.
To my knowledge, the Coast Guard has not established a UxS program
office. The Coast Guard has, however, formulated a multi-program office
autonomous policy committee referred to as the ``AutoPoCo'' which meets
at certain intervals to discuss the prevailing issues and attempt to
offer a unified view. The AutoPoCo, however, is not an avenue to which
the public has direct access, and thus commercial entities are still
expected to approach a multitude of offices to understand the
parameters of lawful operations, ranging from Sector, District, and
Headquarters offices.
4. Expand and Normalize UxS Experimentation
Experimentation with UxS capabilities on a limited basis, in
partnership with other military services and DHS agencies, is vital to
expanding and transitioning UxSs across the Coast Guard and to meet its
diverse and demanding missions in the face of resource constraints.
Budgetary limits are a crucial factor in the Coast Guard's need to be a
``fast follower'' that leverages and adapts technologies developed by
others. Therefore, the Coast Guard must be attuned to, and experiment
with, technology developments elsewhere in the military and government
and in the commercial sector.
To build on and reinforce its naturally innovative culture, the
study committee recommended the Coast Guard expand and normalize
efforts to ensure ample and systematic operations-related
experimentation with low-cost UxSs. The committee concluded that
encouraging experimentation with low-cost UxS technologies will not
only help to identify beneficial uses, but also nurture a technology-
curious and -proficient workforce across the ranks.
Since the Report's publication, the Coast Guard appears to have
taken some steps in this regard. Indeed, U.S. Navy has continued to
aggressively experiment with unmanned vessels and has aims for a future
fleet that incorporates unmanned surface vessels (USV) (Mariner;
Ranger; Sea Hunter; and Seahawk) and systems, and the Coast Guard has
participated in joint exercises like the Rim of the Pacific Exercise
(RIMPAC) with such USVs which are purportedly able to comply with the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972
(COLREGS). The Coast Guard has also used Saildrone uncrewed vessels or
vehicles in support of research and development, although it is less
clear if these are vessels that are required to comply with the
COLREGS, and if so, whether those capabilities are met. This is an
important distinction discussed later as the COLREGS apply to all
vessels, and thus are critical to the Coast Guard as both a user and
regulator of unmanned vessels.
5. Get a Fix on UxS Funding Needs
The committee made its recommendations intent on expanding and
accelerating the Coast Guard's investigation and implementation of UxSs
for new concepts of operation. The committee recognized, however, that
for the Coast Guard to act on these recommendations would require ample
and sustained funding, and a commitment to continually increasing
funding over time. To incorporate UxSs into the fleet and force
structure, the Coast Guard will need to invest in R&D, acquisitions,
field experimentation, strategic planning, systems integration,
evaluation, cybersecurity, legal analyses, personnel recruitment and
training, and many other field and mission support functions and
requirements. While the committee was not able to estimate and advise
on how much additional funding would be required for these investments,
it recommended the development of a detailed assessment of investment
needs.
Legal and Policy Considerations with Respect to UxS Use and Regulation
While the Report assessed all domains for UxS--air, surface, and
subsurface/underwater--the advent of emerging unmanned vessel (UMV)
technology has raised the most pressing legal and operational
questions, in particular as the U.S. Coast Guard is both a user and
regulator of UMVs. Indeed, while the Coast Guard possesses extensive
statutory authorities to execute its regulatory mission and can be
expected to rely and build on these authorities, continued
technological capabilities are offering new UMV use opportunities that
are outpacing existing legal frameworks.
In support, the Report provided analysis of prevailing legal
authorities and policy issues to serve as guidance and a primer upon
which the Coast Guard can rely to fully assess UMV capabilities and
develop next steps for its legal framework, to include a survey of
relevant precedent, guidance, and resources to support legal and policy
assessments and decision making. The Report notes that the Coast
Guard's legal and policy program offices will need to determine whether
existing laws, regulations, and policies allow for the safe and
effective use of UMVs across the full range of envisaged operations. If
they do not, the Coast Guard will need to identify the additional
authorities and processes that can fill the gaps, and if appropriate,
work to bring them about. In the near term, this effort may require the
drafting of legal and policy memoranda. The Report cited the Coast
Guard's August 11, 2020 ``Request for Information on Integration of
Automated and Autonomous Commercial Vessels and Vessel Technologies
into the Maritime Transportation System,'' \4\ although I am unaware of
any further developments that resulted from the RFI.
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\4\ Docket No. USCG-2019-0698 (85 Fed. Reg. 48548, Aug. 11, 2020):
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-11/pdf/2020-17496.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Essentially, UMV technology has outpaced the relevant regulations
because existing legal regimes generally contemplated manned ship
operations, or at least with a ``human in the loop,'' when they were
initially developed, such as the COLREGS, Inland Navigation Rules, and
United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This legal
conundrum is compounded by the dearth of current precedent related to
UMV operations on which operators could otherwise rely for guidance.
Consequently, stakeholders and scholars continue to assess the use of
UMV operations under the existing regulations, laws, treaties, and
conventions, and they have yet to reach universal consensus, although
collegial dialogue is ongoing.
``Vessel'' Determination and Status
Indeed, one of the most prevalent operational considerations is
whether an envisaged platform or watercraft will be deemed a ``vessel''
because such determination involves questions of fact, law, and policy.
Therefore, a threshold matter is determining a respective UMV
platform's ``legal status'' because there are numerous types of
platforms that vary in size and capabilities with different
designations. Furthermore, whether a given UMV is deemed a ``vessel''
also depends on a review of the context of the purpose, classification,
design, and operating characteristics of a respective UMV.
Of the relevant international conventions, the most formative ones
appear to be the COLREGS that apply ``to all vessels upon the high seas
and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels,''
including warships. Notably, while the COLREGS do not specifically
preclude operation of UMVs, a Coast Guard UMV would be expected to the
general maritime law requiring the exercise of good seamanship in all
respects. In other words, the COLREGS need to be translated into
programming code when integrated into a UMV. Such programming could
conceivably achieve compliance with certain COLREGS, perhaps through a
method which factors in both the strict conformity with the obligatory
decision making and historical dependency on human common sense in
executing rules in all circumstances. In fact, the study committee was
aware of several technological developers who take the position that
compliance with the COLREGS is indeed achievable through programming
that allows a UMV to understand and act on a codified set of
navigational requirements.
In order to determine legal rights and obligations when operating a
particular UMV, a threshold issue will be how to characterize the UMV
given the language in key domestic statutes, regulations, and
international laws, which primarily govern operations by ``vessels'' or
``ships.'' Efforts toward compliance with governing legal authorities
has invariably raised issues of fact, policy, and law, including the
critical question of ``is it a vessel?'' Thus, to best assess risk and
make well-informed decisions, the Coast Guard could develop legal and
policy opinions contemplating the legal parameters for each prospective
UMV, including how the Coast Guard will ensure legal compliance and
whether provisions may be available for exemptions and equivalencies
under mandatory instruments, taking into account the applicability and
processes related to making, amending, and interpreting treaties. Such
determinations remain a case-by-case threshold ``legal status''
determination of the respective platform to address the ``is it a
vessel?'' conundrum that considers the size and type of platform, how
the platform is utilized, and where the platform is utilized. Of
critical importance to such an analysis is an assessment of whether a
UMV can navigate in a demonstrably safe and prudent manner and whether
technical noncompliance is deemed a reasonable legal risk.
The issue of ``what is a vessel'' is not a novel matter for the
Coast Guard. In fact, in its Legal Determination on Vessel Status of
Paddleboard (Oct. 3, 2003), the Coast Guard Boating Safety Division
(CG-5422) promulgated a determination on whether the Coast Guard
considers a ``paddleboard'' to be a vessel. In that determination, the
Coast Guard established a five-pronged test for determining whether any
given watercraft is capable of being classified as a ``vessel,''
provided here in relevant part:
1. Whether the watercraft is ``practically capable'' of carrying
persons or property,
2. Whether the useful operating range of the device is limited by
the physical endurance of its operator,
3. Whether the device presents a substantial hazard to navigation
or safety not already present,
4. Whether the normal objectives sought to be accomplished by the
regulation of a device as a ``vessel'' are present, and
5. Whether the operator and/or cargo would no longer be safe in
the water if the device became disabled.
As the Coast Guard acknowledged in that determination, the criteria
outlined above will not be applicable to every watercraft for which
there is a question of status, and there is no set formula for making
vessel determinations--each determination must be made on an individual
basis. Adding to the complexity of this legal status determination,
industry and military services alike have been developing a range of
terminology used in describing UMVs, often depending on the degree of
autonomy the vehicle has, whether it is used in combat, and whether it
is below, on, or above the surface of the water. To illustrate, the
literature supporting this report has revealed there is no universally
accepted name for an UMV, and the general position in the governmental,
scientific, legal, and technical communities has yet-to-be aligned. To
this end, a key legal consideration will be whether the Coast Guard
procures and operates a platform characterized or classified as a
vessel, vehicle, or system, taking into account the level of autonomy
(or advanced automation) at which the UxS intends to operate since this
will be relevant to how a respective platform fits into the prevailing
legal framework. Observations on the ``legal challenge involved'' are
illustrated in the Report, Annex E, Figure E-4:
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Besides international law and conventions, the Coast Guard may rely
on domestic statute, regulation, and policy in formulating
determinations as to the legal status of a respective asset or
platform. For example, under U.S. statute, the word ``vessel'' includes
every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used,
or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water. (1
U.S.C. Sec. 3). This definition does not distinguish between manned
and unmanned watercraft. The Supreme Court has further established
``reasonable observer test'' in that a watercraft does not fall within
the 1 U.S.C. Sec. 3 definition of a ``vessel'' unless a ``reasonable
observer,'' looking to the structure or watercraft's physical
characteristics and activities, would consider it designed to a
practical degree for carrying people or things over water.\5\
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\5\ Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115 (2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the study committee recognized the disparities that may
develop in a respective assessment of whether a watercraft is a
``vessel''--and thus subject to Coast Guard jurisdiction and
authority--or not, and by example cited to a pilot program for marine
domain awareness that was being undertaken with Saildrone unmanned
surface vehicles (USVs) in footnote 12 \6\ of the Report. The Report
referred to a Saildrone vehicle that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Saildrone. ``Eyes and Ears at Sea: US Coast Guard to Test
Saildrone Autonomous MDA Capabilities.'' https://www.saildrone.com/
news/uscg-test-maritime-domain-awareness-solution. (``Congress has
tasked the United States Coast Guard (USCG) with examining the
feasibility, costs, and benefits of improving maritime domain awareness
in the remote Pacific Ocean using a low-cost unmanned surface
system.'')
`` . . . weighs 750 kg and has a narrow 7 meters long hull, 5
meters tall wing, and a keel with a 2.5 meters draft. The
system combines wind-powered propulsion technology that enables
mission durations of up to 12 months (sailing on average 100 km
per day) and solar-powered meteorological . . . It operates
either under the constant supervision of a human pilot via
satellite or can navigate autonomously from prescribed
beginning and end points within a user-defined safety
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
corridor.''
By way of comparison, the study committee understood that the Coast
Guard had generally accepted the classification of a Saildrone as a
``vehicle'' (and thus outside the COLREGS and other vessel
requirements) while previously determining a paddleboard to be a
``vessel'' subject to the COLREGS and certain regulatory requirements.
Also, the cited article in the Report indicated that the Saildrone can
``navigate autonomously,'' although the study committee did not receive
any clarification as to how such navigation capability assessments were
conducted.
To my knowledge, the Coast Guard has not promulgated any formal
public guidance on their process for making a ``vessel'' determination.
However, relevant to the study committee's recommendation to expand and
normalize UxS experimentation, it is notable that on February 16, 2022
the Coast Guard promulgated CG-CVC Policy Letter 22-01 (Guidelines for
Human-Supervised Testing of Remote Controlled and Autonomous Systems on
Vessels).\7\ CG-CVC Policy Letter 22-01 provides useful guidelines for
testing, under human supervision, of remote controlled and autonomous
systems on vessels, although that Policy Letter does not allow for
reduction of vessel manning prescribed by law or regulations, including
manning that is less than the minimums in 46 U.S.C. Sec. 8301 and 46
CFR part 15, and pursuant to the COLREGS, at all times must maintain a
proper look-out by sight and hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/
CG-CVC/Policy%20
Letters/2022/CVC%20PL%2022-
01%20Testing%20of%20remote%20and%20autonomous
%20systems.pdf.
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Notably, since the Report was issued, the Coast Guard, Navy, and
Marine Corps in March 2022 published the Commander's Handbook on the
Law of Naval Operations (COMDTPUB P5800.7A) (the ``Handbook''),\8\
approved by Rear Admiral Melissa Bert, USCG (Judge Advocate General and
Chief Counsel), which determined that ``unmanned systems constituting
vessels will be governed by the COLREGS,'' and that unmanned systems
may be under the commanded ``by remote or other means.'' Thus, that
Handbook seemed to affirm that an unmanned ``vessel'' will be subject
to the COLREGS, hence the critical importance of the aforementioned
``vessel or vehicle'' distinction. The Handbook also determined that
unmanned vessels and aircraft owned or operated by a State only on
government, noncommercial service are entitled to sovereign immunity
and may be used by States to exercise belligerent rights at sea.
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\8\ https://usnwc.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=66281931.
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International Efforts
Such legal questions on whether shipping regulations can keep pace
with developing technology served as the basis for the International
Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS)
Regulatory Scoping Exercise (RSE) and legal surveys promulgated by the
Comite Maritime International (CMI) to several national maritime law
associations, through which the IMO and the CMI sought assessments on
the applicability of MASS to certain conventions and domestic laws, and
more generally. Since the Report's publication in 2020, the Maritime
Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO, at its 103rd session in May 2021,
completed the RSE to analyze relevant ship safety treaties, in order to
assess how MASS could be regulated,\9\ and agreed to develop a goal-
based MASS instrument in the form of a voluntary ``MASS Code,'' due to
take effect in 2025, to address the various gaps and themes identified
by the RSE. The CMI national maritime law association for the United
States, the US MLA, has since established a standing committee on
Autonomous Ships and Smart Marine Technology.
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\9\ IMO MSC Circular.1/1638, Outcome of the Regulatory Scoping
Exercise for the Use of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Testing and Comity
In its Report, the study committee also recognized that the Coast
Guard could utilize testing opportunities to clarify to what extent
UMVs are subject to and comply with the COLREGS, how legal risk and
allocation of responsibilities for gaining relevant use permissions is
being obtained, what privileges and immunities are afforded the UMV and
operator (e.g., ``public vessel''), and which party is responsible for
the handling of the data collected. To this end, the Report suggested
that the U.S. Navy could be a useful indicator of these issues given
their continued growth in the testing of UMVs, and since the Navy has
also granted exemptions from regulatory and certification requirements
for a discrete number of unmanned surface vehicles under 33 U.S.C.
Sec. 1605 ``with respect to the number, position, range, or arc of
visibility of lights, with respect to shapes, or with respect to the
disposition and characteristics of sound-signaling appliances.''
The Report had also recognized that ``legal questions and
challenges linked to autonomous shipping, as well as the solutions
needed to resolve them, will differ depending on what choices are made
in relation to manning, crew location, and autonomy level.'' \10\
Generally, the Coast Guard has considered the statutes that govern the
manning requirements for vessels to require a human onboard and that
the Coast Guard cannot independently waive statutory manning
requirements or the COLREGS absent Congressional authorization. This
was addressed in more detail in the more recent National Academies'
study on ``New Coast Guard Authorities'' \11\, recently briefed to this
Subcommittee and on which I served as a committee member, in which it
was recognized that Congress authorized an ``at-sea recovery operations
pilot program'' that expressly permits the Secretary (e.g., Coast
Guard) ``to allow remotely controlled or autonomous vessel operations
to proceed . . . including navigation and manning laws and
regulations'' and ``modify or waive applicable regulations . . . to
allow remote and autonomous vessel at-sea operations.'' \12\ Subject to
certain considerations, this otherwise seems to answer the question in
the affirmative of whether Congress can indeed waive the manning
requirements and the navigation laws (i.e., COLREGS), and that waiver
authority presents an important precedent for the Coast Guard as a user
and regulator of UxS.
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\10\ Annex E, fn. 3, citing Henrik Ringbom. 2019. Regulating
Autonomous Ships--Concepts, Challenges and Precedents, Ocean
Development & International Law. DOI: 10.1080/00908320.2019.1582593.
\11\ National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine.
2023. The Coast Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging
Challenges and Statutory Needs. Washington, DC: The National Academies
Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27059.
\12\ James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2023, Pub. L. 117-263, div. K, title CXV, Sec. 11504, Dec. 23,
2022, 136 Stat. 4131; see At-Sea Recovery Operations Pilot Program
Sec. 11504(d)(1)-(2).
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Unmanned Underwater Vehicles and Aircraft Systems
Lastly, and as addressed in the Report, subsurface operations
generally fall outside the purview of the COLREGS, and thus the study
committee found few perceived legal impediments to such operations.
However, the Coast Guard could still conduct an operational assessment
for such types of subsurface and tethered remotely operated vehicle
operations to review the varying levels of risk. And, as the U.S. Navy
and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are
currently utilizing prototype unmanned underwater vessels/vehicles
(UUVs), maintaining a collaborative approach and close communications
with these entities could benefit the Coast Guard as a way to leverage
lessons learned and best practices in development of the means to meet
legal compliance. Similarly, in the case of unmanned aircraft systems
(UAS), the use of UAS generally falls under Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) authorities and in parity with Department of
Defense instructions. In all cases, however, the issue of budget and
acquisition authority remains of vital consideration as the Coast Guard
lags other services in the ability to rapidly acquire and deploy
unmanned systems.
Coast Guard Acquisition Authorities and Models
The study committee assessed the challenges the Coast Guard faces
when selecting the most timely and cost-effective acquisition authority
and model. Although some acquisition authorities and models will be
better suited to UxSs than others, the rapid pace of UxS advancements
could require even more streamlined and nimble options to quickly
respond to available opportunities and partnerships. The committee
suggested that perhaps the most efficient way to acquire and accelerate
the transition of UxS platforms and payloads to desired operations
would be to identify and prioritize tested and proven technologies, and
then adapt those systems for specific requirements. For example, mature
technologies that are relatively inexpensive to operate, outfitted with
operator-friendly control systems, and readily configured for multiple
missions and payloads could be the primary focus of early transitions.
Several acquisition authorities are available to the Coast Guard,
and selection of the most appropriate procurement mechanism for UxS is
dependent on the scale and scope of the asset to be acquired:
Federal Acquisition Regulation
Level 3--Non-Major Acquisition Program
Coast Guard Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation
(RDT&E) Program
Memoranda of Understanding
DHS Cooperative Research and Development Agreements
(CRADAs)
Other Transaction Authority (OTA) (Research OTAs and
Prototype OTAs)
Silicon Valley Innovation Program
DHS S&T Small Business Innovation Research Program
Unsolicited Proposals
Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)
As referenced in the Report, programmatic and technical
specifications need to be addressed as part of the procurement decision
making. Successful identification of acquisition programs requires a
coordinated effort between the sponsor, resource, acquisition, and
other stakeholders within the Coast Guard.
* * *
In conclusion, I want to thank you--Chairman Webster, Ranking
Member Carbajal, and this Subcommittee--for the opportunity to testify.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GORDON JOHNSON, MARINE ENGINEER, AND
FOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SEA MACHINES ROBOTICS,
INC.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Chairman Webster, Vice Ranking
Member Scholten, and other Members, for inviting me to speak on
this important topic of innovation in the maritime space and
specifically, marine autonomous technology.
So, yesterday, my wife and I navigated to one of the only
two memorials on the National Mall that is dedicated to a
technology innovator. Just south of the Lincoln Memorial is a
beautiful Milford granite, 20-foot edifice dedicated by
President Coolidge and the Crown Prince of Sweden in full
regalia in 1926. And it honors a Mr. John Ericsson. And he,
like me, was a marine engineer. And in large bold Deco font, it
says: ``He invented the screw propeller.'' And above him are
towering figures representing our national belief in adventure,
labor, and vision.
Now, John Ericsson was, indeed, Swedish. And with his
propeller design, he attempted to gain traction in Europe. And
in the 1830s, he landed a pilot program with a marquee customer
of that era, the British Royal Navy, who then passed on it
because they comfortably believed in the continuing dominance
of sailing vessels.
So, then in 1839, a bold and connected citizen of the
United States invited John to our Nation and gained funding to
build the U.S. Navy test vessel Princeton, which proved
capabilities that began a major transformation of the world's
fleets, along with the world order.
Within 20 years, 70 years after we penned our Constitution,
the United States had the world's second largest merchant
marine, just behind Britain, and today, 180 years later, it is
all still moving by the screw propeller.
And so, this story is very important to me, because it's a
clear example of our young country and a very lean Federal
Government at that time investing with focus and disruptive
innovation to build national value.
And today, just like then, the marine industry does
everything on the water-covered surface of our planet,
operating the largest machines made by humankind and connecting
the world with trade. And licensed mariners, some of the best
trained professionals of any industrial space, maintain these
powerful machines and pilot them in the earth's most dynamic
and forceful environment.
So, what is autonomous technology? It is the innate
technical progression after 20th-century automation. Yet the
power and capability of it is an exponential step. Where
automation is a singular process, like a ``if this, then
that,'' autonomy is a comprehensive compute engine that
prioritizes sensor data, weighs decisions to complete larger
complex processes, like a full voyage.
So, that's valuable, because the industry and its mariners
today are handicapped by the continued use of last century's
technology and methods, resulting in accident rates that
eclipse other comparable vehicle industries. As well, we have
dismal on-time arrival rates and unoptimized operation of the
world's cargo fleet that emits 3 percent of humanity's annual
greenhouse gas.
So, autonomy will transform fleet operations and bring
forward the reliability, productivity, and precision of
advanced robotics, empowering mariners to do more, do it better
and safer with less effort and less cost.
So, today, autonomy systems are being deployed by early
adopters, both commercial and for national security. Task-
driven workboats use it for open water surveying and data
collection, as well as heavy dangerous work, like oilspill
response and domain awareness. And it's beginning to be trialed
in larger vessels that move cargo and people. So, maritime is a
major contributor to our Nation's economy, accounting for 1.9
percent of our GDP and 2.3 million jobs, but the United States
no longer holds a leading nor an influential position, and the
global presence of the U.S.-flag fleet is continually
shrinking.
In global cargo fleet ownership value, the U.S. now ranks
number 14, well below China at number 1. So, autonomy is an
emerging space, but it is advancing quickly and other
determined nations that value its potential are investing
heavily to take that commanding position.
The United States should not pass on this opportunity. We
should focus our national lens on this technical field, or we
are handing the keys of the seas to others and further risk our
position as a global super economy-driven superpower.
We must do the things today to shape where we want to be in
the decades ahead. Thank you for this opportunity, and I am
here at your service to answer any questions.
[Mr. Johnson's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of Michael Gordon Johnson, Marine Engineer, and
Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Sea Machines Robotics, Inc.
Opening
Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the
Subcommittee, it's with sincere gratitude that I've been invited to
submit testimony with my perspectives on the purposes and value of
innovation in the maritime industry and specifically marine autonomous
technology as it applies to surface operating vessels.
By way of additional background, I am a degreed marine engineer,
and I held an engineering officer's license in the United States
Merchant Marine before moving into ship repair and shipbuilding. I've
managed vessel projects in many nations and was a Vice President of
Project Management at Crowley Maritime and Vice President of Operations
at Crowley's affiliate Titan Salvage. I have extensive experience in
designing solutions for and leading teams in complex marine projects.
After owning a marine project management company which mostly focused
on offshore installations, I founded Sea Machines Robotics Inc. (Sea
Machines) in 2017 to build autonomous technology for the marine
sectors. Sea Machines sells products to domestic and international
customers and has served multiple U.S. Government departments and
agencies.
Introduction
The 21st century is the era of self-sensing and self-determining
advanced automation, also known as autonomy. It's taking robotics and
non-mechanical machines beyond the low-level and prescriptive tasks of
the last century, enabling exponentially higher productivity and
machine value to society. Autonomy is already active and growing in
capability in general computer processing systems, data processing,
medical diagnostics, aircraft and spacecraft control systems,
agriculture, and warehouse logistics and now emerging in automobiles,
trucking, and maritime.
Industry Facts
The maritime industry does everything on the water-covered surface
of the Earth, and that's almost three-quarters of it. It operates the
largest machines built by humankind and facilitates most global trade.
And licensed mariners, notably some of the best trained professionals
of any industrial space, maintain these powerful machines and pilot
them in the Earth's most dynamic and forceful environment. The industry
is a leading contributor to our nation's economy and according to the
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and NOAA the marine economy accounted
for 1.9% of our nation's GPD in 2021 or $432 billion. To put that in
perspective, that's 2.5 times the reported output of America's farms in
the same year. They further report that the marine sector provides 2.3
million jobs with an average annual salary of $81,000 which is 13%
above the U.S. national average in the same year. Leading subsectors
include marine tourism and recreation, national defense & public
administration, offshore minerals, and marine transportation &
warehousing.
Even though the marine industry contributes more to the U.S.
economy than arts and entertainment, or utilities, or even modern data
processing, it seemingly operates under the radar of most and receives
comparatively little public attention.
Problem from the Macro Economic Perspective
The United States no longer holds the leading or influential
position in the global maritime industry, the exceptions being the
shrinking global presence of the US Navy and Coast Guard and some
financing centered in New York City.
As the world's largest economy and the only world superpower, the
United States has many reasons to maintain an influential stake in all
industries that are key to global progress, economic value, and
international politics.
The United States emerged mostly unscathed from the last global
war. And as a capital-driven nation eager to rebuild the global markets
and hence customers, while pushing back against a new potential foe, we
spread our capabilities, our products, and our values across most of
the world's nations, and built a castle of confidence in our strength
that upholds the U.S. dollar as a current leading standard of world
trade and leading reserve currency. This ensures the value of the
dollar, giving our citizens at home a quality of life and security that
we've come to expect. But leading positions are always subject to
erosion, especially in a world that has seen continuous development for
almost 80 years enabling a near leveling of lifestyles and quality of
competitive capabilities and products across the world.
There are other nations, growing potential superpowers, that as
competitors can surpass and displace the United States, which if this
happens may critically impact the value of the dollar and risk
shrinking our economy and our internal standard of living. In the last
century we've seen such collapses of global position and national
economy in the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union among others. Absent
of major wars that can reorder global positions, the key to competitive
economic fortune and global leadership comes from the combination of
four elements.
1) Security, Order, and Trust
2) Culture that Encourages Merit and Elevation of Position
3) Open Market Economy
4) Technology Innovation
The United States does well against primary competitors in the
combined value of the elements 1-3, but as we've transitioned into
generations of leadership, both in business and government, that are
guided less by long-term developmentalism and more through a lens of
short-term finance, our nation has taken the eye off the strategic
innovation ball. And because of that, competitors that, frankly, have
learned from the United States, have a focused innovation strategy of
such determined force that they seem to overcome their weakness in
elements 1-3.
Natural Progression of Technology
It's easy for most Americans to overlook the fact that we live on a
water-world. For over 3,500 years, the leading intercontinental
nations, societies, and empires of each period were also dominant on
the seas. Across 95% of that time, up until the mid-19th century, the
highest technology was always in ships. But the 2nd Industrial
Revolution (Industry 2.0) brought new fields such as electricity and
assembly line manufacturing that cultivated immense economic value that
by the time of Industry 3.0 maritime had become relegated to a lower
return commodity driven sector.
And now today, autonomous technology is a key aspect of the 4th
Industrial Revolution, which is continuing an ever-growing shift of
both manual and cognitive effort from human to machine. Technologies in
Industry 4.0 also include networked data-driven systems, Internet of
Things (IoT), machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI).
However, it's difficult to see ways that these technologies can be
applied generically across key industries. Meaning that one can
innovate and build autonomy or AI for the automotive sector without
much of it being applicable to aerospace or maritime.
Advancements from Autonomous Control
Advanced control systems have already been deployed in other
vehicle sectors. From advanced flight control fly-by-wire systems in
aircraft that began to enter the market in the 1980s to active driver
assistance systems in cars and trucks that started to emerge in the
early 2000s. And while there are many different capabilities to these
technologies, the primary purpose is to increase safety by eliminating
human operator errors and improve productivity and efficiency through
precise data-driven control.
Marine autonomy is the innate technical progression after 20th
century automation, yet the power and capability of it is an
exponential step. Where automation is a singular process, often if-
this-then-that control, autonomy is a comprehensive compute engine
completing a larger complex process, like a full voyage, by
prioritizing sensor data and weighing decisions to provide a desired
outcome.
And that's valuable because the industry and its mariners today are
handicapped by continued use of last century's technology and
methodologies. Accident rates, both in commercial and recreational
vessels eclipse most other moving vehicle industries, on time arrival
rates that match airlines of the 1970s, and unoptimized operation of
the world's cargo ships which are said to emit 3% of humanity's annual
greenhouse gas.
Sector Challenges
Accidents
According to Allianz and other sources such as the Japan P&I Club,
on average approximately 2% of the global commercial fleet (vessels of
100 gross tons on greater) is involved in a non-machinery related major
navigation incident or accident annually. In 2022, Allianz/Lloyds List
reports 1,554 non-machinery related incidents and accidents in their
tracked 58,000 vessels, of which 280 were vessel-to-vessel collisions
and 209 were groundings. Japan P&I, latest data being 2016, tracks a
fleet of 2,333 ocean going vessels reported 53 collisions and
groundings, or a 2.2% rate.
2.2% is around the same rate as automobile accidents in the United
States (2.4% of U.S. car fleet is calculated to have been involved in
an accident in 2017) but a more appropriate comparison would be to
airliners due to that sector being a professionally operated. Airlines
in 2022 reported 39 accidents from a global fleet of 23,513 active
aircraft or 0.17% rate; therefore, commercial maritime has an incident
and accident rate 13 times commercial airlines.
Efficiency & Resource Use
Cargo ships are already around 2 times more fuel efficient per
cargo ton compared to trains and 20 times versus average trailer-trucks
but this is all due to size and quantity of cargo being moved by one
vessel.
The approximately 58,000 commercial ships of the world burn around
350 million tons of fuel per year, which is equivalent to 115 days of
all oil consumption of the United States. These vessels are said to
emit 3% of society's global greenhouse gas emissions, which if the
sector was a nation would rank No. 6 as an emitter.
It's believed that after power plants and aviation, cargo ships are
the 3rd most concentrated source of greenhouse gas emissions, and
therefore improvements that reduce fuel burn, can make a significant
impact in reducing emissions in a short period of time when deployed
across the fleets.
New technology brings great opportunity for improvement. Autonomous
control systems, due to their more precise data-driven control and real
time route optimization have the capability to reduce fuel usage, with
presumed reductions up to 25% or more. Along with reducing emissions,
this reduces operational costs and the U.S. Government is one of, if
not the largest, buyer of petroleum products with the Department of
Defense spending over $9 billion annually on fuel.
Maritime Applications
Autonomy transforms operations and brings forward the reliability,
productivity, and precision of advanced robotics, empowering mariners
to do more, do it better, with less effort and less cost. Autonomous
control systems of various levels of faculty are being deployed by
early adopters for both commercial and national security. And now,
fueled by the prospect of opportunity and enhanced productivity,
autonomy is beginning to be trialed in larger vessels that move cargo
and people.
Workboats
Task driven workboats are using it for open water surveying, data
collection, as well as heavy dangerous work like oil spill skimming and
naval operations survey, security.
Response Boats
To improve response availability and response time autonomy systems
are starting to be adopted by fireboats, lifesaving boats, and other
response vessels; the technology being focused on routine or dangerous
aspects of the work can enable the human crew to focus on specific
complicated tasks.
Unmanned Naval and Security Vessels
Autonomy enables unmanned vessels which can provide new
capabilities of persistent domain awareness or security; for example,
providing a persistently patrolling sea-level sentry on watch for drug
smugglers and complementing other common domain sensors or creating
distributed networks of smaller naval vessels that extend the reach and
support the power of the capital fleet.
Autonomous Pilot Assistance for all Vessels
The most significant benefit and uses of autonomous systems will be
as advanced pilot assistance, bringing the value of onboard inherent
control like that found in airliners and the ADAS systems emerging in
road vehicles. It increases safety, performance, and overall efficiency
of the operations. Within the next three years early adopters in
sectors such as cargo ships, ferries, and yachts will begin
deployments.
Infrastructure
Infrastructure provides the foundation and common tools for our
economy and society to grow and thrive. And over the years the federal
government has taken numerous measures to promote our maritime sectors,
from incentives to protectionism; however, both the scale and type of
incentives are not aligned with the potential that can be unlocked.
Along with maintenance and operational budgets for locks, navigation
markers, dredging, and U.S. Coast Guard, the government has also spent
about $100 million since 2010 in promotion of the U.S. Marine Highways
System, or an average of $8.4 million per year, also around $20 million
annually on grants to the shipbuilding sector. Most of these funds go
to traditional physical assets, such as forklifts, cranes, welding
machines. This type of spending, while helpful at the micro-level, does
very little to unlock the next era of maritime. The nation needs to be
looking forward and invest in the digital infrastructure to stay ahead,
inflate the value of the resulting products and services, and advance
worker salaries.
Marine Highway System
The Marine Highway System consists of 29 marine routes, along all
coasts, major interior waterways, and around Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and
other Pacific Islands. The intended reasoning behind establishing this
system is well described by the Maritime Administration (MARAD),
including reduction of traffic and local land air pollution within the
nations roadways and land corridors, shifting hazardous cargo transit
away from living areas, reducing road wear and maintenance costs, and
improving transportation resiliency through alternatives. MARAD also
presents the need to improve economic competitiveness by adding new
freight and passenger capacities. These are all very important reasons
to put focus and funding for the expanded promotion of the marine
highways, but these trade lanes and passenger avenues also provide the
venues to launch a new autonomy-enabled generation of technology.
Competition
Looking at competition from the national perspective, we see
development from each of the following nations, ranked by a combination
of focus, maturity in development, funding, and momentum.
1) China: Deployment of many small autonomous collaborative boats,
and now autonomous 300TEU containership, the ZHI FEI, commenced regular
commercial short sea operations in 2022, as well a 200-ton trimaran
unmanned naval patrol vessel.
2) Israel: Deploying and testing unmanned patrol vessels for over
15 years.
3) United States: Deploying naval test boats and larger vessels,
often one-off for over 15 years. Venture-backed small businesses with
commercially available products. Over 20 years of underwater autonomy
development and commercial business.
4) Singapore: Deploying unmanned vessels for testing and military
patrols for over 10 years; providing R&D funding to bring forward
autonomous harbor tugs.
5) UK: Deploying and testing multi-unit unmanned mine counter
measure (MCM) & patrol vessels for over 5 years.
6) France: Many R&D projects including MCM vessels, patrol boats,
survey craft, and oil field support vessels.
7) European Union: Horizon 2020 technology funding track for
autonomous vessel R&D, as well as funding for remote control cargo
barging on inland waterways.
8) Norway: Government-funded development of autonomy associated
with electrical cargo short sea shipping demonstrator.
9) Japan: Government funded R&D programs launched 4 years ago to
developed autonomous cargo ships with multiple cohort collaborations.
10) Sweden: Deep commercial experience in underwater and direct
remote control for naval vessels.
11) Netherlands: Multiple leading commercial marine operating
companies that are deploying autonomy in survey and dredging projects.
12) Turkey: Multiple speculative commercially funded patrol vessel
developments.
Comprehensive Maritime Network
This paper has been referring to marine autonomy mainly from a
vessel or fleet perspective, but the opportunity is much bigger than
the operational level. Autonomy is an enabling technology that can
deliver the 1+2=10 systems of systems; when fully built out it will
bring forth a global connected platform, much like the internet, that
ties new software applications and artificial intelligence to a major
world-moving industry. For the same reasons that marine autonomy saw
rapid initial adoption around the world, the domain being vast and open
and suitable for even immature technology, makes an optimal environment
for a fully connected active network to take shape. And whoever builds
and dominates this network may take all value in a zero-sum
competition.
It's Time to Act
When looking at global fleet ownership, the United States now ranks
No. 14, between Taiwan and Bermuda, well below China at No. 1 with a
cargo fleet value that is nearly 5x that of the U.S. And China is
pushing further ahead with government and government-backed investments
both in the physical and digital infrastructure.
And while autonomy is a nascent space it's advancing quickly and
other determined nations, such as China, that value its power and
potential are investing heavily to take that commanding position. The
United States shouldn't pass on this.
The federal government has a record of acting pro-actively to
ensure new high value society-moving technologies are built and
centered within our nation, from the internet to oil, from drugs to
electric cars, it was members of Congress that used their voice and
their legislation to bring focused attention, research budgets, steer
federal agencies, or foster adoption through incentives.
Consider the example of the internet. In the 1980s, select members
were actively bringing focus on the opportunities that can be had from
the envisioned supercomputing network. Then in 1991 Congress delivered
The High-Performance Computing and Information Act to President Bush
which allocated $600 million to accelerate the development of the
super-information highway. Almost immediately new companies were
forming around the nation and by 2020, less than 30 years since the
bill was signed, the internet directly contributed over 10% ($2.45
trillion) to our nation's annual GDP. A return on that 1991 investment
like no other.
But there are also examples of new technical fields where our
nation showed indifference or even stifled, from advanced high-tech and
digital equipment manufacturing to aerial drones, allowing competitors
to take the space.
And right now, the signal flags are snapping in the wind because
marine autonomy is that next opportunity to capture immense future
value for our nation and our citizens, bringing forth a digitally
connected, network to machine autonomy that powers the next generations
of marine fleets.
Action today is critical because competitors are clearly showing
their desire, and without focusing our national lens we risk handing
over the keys of the seas. The subject of marine autonomy is well known
in many government departments and agencies that operate on water and
some have developed strategic plans, supported by specific budget line
items, that mostly include experimental roadmaps, knowledge and
experience building, and industry partnering. These are all positive
steps, but the reality is that leading competitors are fielding more
autonomous vessels into determined active daily operations to force-
forward a rate of development that cannot be achieved with a paced
approach. We ask our Congress and other agencies to take the time to
understand this opportunity in marine autonomous technology and
proactively do things today to shape where we want to be in decades
ahead.
Conclusion
The United States marine industry is at a crossroads of opportunity
on the ever-important sea lanes and open oceans.
We, as Americans, are very aware of the value that industry brings
to our society through products, jobs, wages, tax base, security, and
happiness. Yet the value of each form of industrial technology normally
decreases with time on the market as it becomes conventional, and
therefore it's paramount to maintain a continuous re-inflation of our
economic value through innovation of new technologies. And I believe
it's the responsibility of leaders in the United States, from
government to business, from labor to social, to purposely promote and
foster this.
We have a workforce and knowledge base in maritime, software,
robotics and a marine infrastructure that is ripe for improvement. With
the right motivations through Government focus, voice, and funding and
a permissive regulatory attitude, we can release a spirit into the
veins of our commercial marine industry that breaks the molds of
complacency and builds new technologies that bring U.S. maritime back
to the tip of the spear on all fronts. Opportunity is knocking, let us
answer before it is too late.
Thank you. I wish to thank you Chairman Webster, Ranking Member
Carbajal, and Members of the Subcommittee for this chance to testify
before you on the subject and I will make myself available for any
further needed information.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back.
Now, Mr. Lahey, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF PATRICK LAHEY, COFOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, TRITON SUBMARINES
Mr. Lahey. Thank you very much.
I am on a starkly different topic here, ladies and
gentlemen. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Chairman,
distinguished members of the committee. I greatly appreciate
the opportunity to address all of you today.
My name is Patrick Lahey. I am the cofounder and CEO of
Triton Submarines. I started Triton Submarines 17 years ago
with the sole objective of creating the most advanced human-
occupied vehicles, HOVs, in the world today that will allow our
clients, along with their friends, family members, and guests,
to safely explore the wonder and beauty of the deep sea.
Every sub built by Triton is still in class and in service,
certified to the original depth and in the care and in the
control of a client we enjoy a mutually beneficial
relationship.
Every Triton is certified and accredited by an independent
third-party classification society, which should be a
requirement for all human-occupied vehicles. Triton created the
deepest diving sub in the world today, the Triton 36000/2,
which is the only classed and certified HOV with an unlimited
diving depth.
Triton delivered this revolutionary new sub in 2018. In
addition to completing dives to the deepest point in each of
the world's five oceans during the historic and unprecedented
Five Deeps Expedition, this extraordinary machine has made 16
dives to full ocean depth, the Challenger Deep in the Mariana
Trench, and more than 100 dives to the hadal zone, an area of
the ocean that lies between 20,000 and 36,000 feet.
I had the privilege of making five dives in the Mariana
Trench, including the certification dive in 2019 with a DNV
surveyor, which also turned into the deepest ever salvage at
35,865 feet. Classed and certified human-occupied vehicles
still have a perfect track record of safety spanning more than
50 years.
During this time, tens of millions of people have enjoyed
the wonderfully sublime experience of diving in the comfort and
safety of an HOV without a single fatality. The OceanGate sub
was an aberration, a mistake, and this experimental craft,
which was not subjected to any type of peer review, should
never have carried human beings.
The message is, the OceanGate tragedy was entirely
avoidable. It should have never happened. There is no place in
the human-occupied exploration of the deep sea for experimental
subs.
Certification, accreditation, and independent
classification society compliance is essential to avoiding a
repeat of the OceanGate tragedy. HOVs must be independently
peer-reviewed and validated to ensure they are safe for human
occupancy. Any craft carrying human cargo should be required to
meet or exceed the high bar of certification. No exceptions.
In addition to the tragic loss of life caused by the
OceanGate disaster is the fear it has indirectly created or
reinforced about subs, and the collateral damage it has done to
legitimate builders of classed HOVs in our small industry, like
Triton and so many others.
We willingly and enthusiastically embrace the need and
importance of the accreditation process, which is necessarily
arduous, thorough, time-consuming and expensive, but results in
a machine that is fit for purpose and safe for people to use
within the limits stipulated by the certification agencies and
the manufacturer.
Continued human-occupied exploration of the deep sea is
essential to furthering our knowledge and understanding of
these largely unexplored areas of our own planet.
HOVs, or human-occupied vehicles, are magical machines that
I have had the privilege to work with for more than 40 years. I
have devoted my professional life to the development and the
safe operation of these vehicles.
Classed and certified HOVs safely transport you to the most
fascinating place on our planet and help us to better
understand and appreciate and begin to care about the
importance of the ocean's health and well-being and the
undeniable connection it has to our own continued survival.
We will only protect what we love, and properly designed
and engineered subs allow you to connect viscerally and
emotionally to a place most people never get the privilege and
opportunity to visit.
But I can assure you that if you ever have a dive in a
human-occupied vehicle, it will change your perception of the
ocean forever. The experience will leave an indelible
impression on you, just as it did to me more than 40 years ago.
Just make sure the craft you are diving in is certified. The
deep ocean is no place for compromise.
Thank you.
[Mr. Lahey's prepared testimony follows:]
Prepared Statement of Patrick Lahey, Cofounder and Chief Executive
Officer, Triton Submarines
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear
before you today and address concerns regarding the safety of human
occupied vehicles (HOVs) or submersibles (subs) and to highlight the
stark difference between the thoughtfully designed and carefully
engineered machines created by Triton and other legitimate builders of
certified HOVs in our small industry and the experimental craft built
by OceanGate (OG), which should have never carried people.
My name is Patrick Lahey, and I am co-founder and CEO of Triton
Submarines (Triton), a company with manufacturing facilities in
Sebastian, Florida and Barcelona, Spain. During a career spanning 42
years in the underwater business, I have participated in the design,
manufacturing, testing and operation of more than 60 HOVs. At Triton, I
have overseen the development of our entire range of subs, including
the Triton 36000/2 (36K/2), which is the first and only full ocean
depth (FOD) rated HOV certified by an internationally recognized, and
independent third-party classification society (DNV formerly DNV/GL).
This remarkable craft provides safe daily access to the most extreme
and least understood area of our ocean (the hadal zone, which lies
between 6,000 and 11,000 meters or 20,000-36,000 feet), for the first
time in history.
The Triton 36K2 was created during the same time frame as OG built
Cyclops II (later renamed Titan). However, at Triton, we embrace
certification as an essential deliverable for all our subs and we
insisted on it as a requirement for the Triton 36K/2 too, despite the
fact it made the project more difficult, time consuming and expensive.
Certification is a key reason this unique craft was able to set records
and accomplish more in the deepest and most remote areas of our oceans
than any vehicle before it. Our goal at Triton was to create a new
paradigm in ocean exploration and deliver an HOV that made it possible
for people to safely make repeated dives to any place in the ocean and
accomplish meaningful work, even at the most extreme depths.
I have had the privilege and good fortune to complete five dives in
the Mariana Trench, including a certification dive in 2019 with DNV
surveyor, Jonathan Struwe, during which we successfully completed the
world's deepest ever salvage at 10,932 meters or 35,865 feet. The
Triton 36K/2 has made 18 dives to FOD and more than 100 dives to depths
below 6,000 meters since we delivered the sub in late 2018. For
context, the deepest point in the Mariana Trench is almost three times
the depth of RMS Titanic, which lies in 3,800 meters or 12,500 feet.
The Triton 36K/2 is a great validation of the accreditation process
and underscores the critical importance of subjecting a HOV to a peer
review. Rather than stifle innovation, the DNV principal engineer,
Jonathan Struwe together with the considerable resources, capabilities
and insights of the Underwater Technology Team at DNV were essential to
our success.
Certification is the crucible in which responsible innovation in
extreme environments is possible. Certification is not an impediment to
innovation (as OG publicly stated) and the success of the Triton 36K/2
and development of this revolutionary HOV, is a direct result of our
relationship with a classification society and clearly demonstrated the
benefits of the accreditation process.
Unfortunately, HOVs have been the subject of a lot of negative
press since the OG tragedy, which is unwarranted, particularly if
people understood the facts. This tragic incident has brought into
sharp focus the vast difference between an experimental craft such as
the one built by OG, and the carefully designed, thoughtfully
engineered, and thoroughly vetted machines created by legitimate
builders in the HOV industry, which are subjected to an arduous, time
consuming, necessarily thorough, and expensive accreditation process,
implemented and overseen by internationally recognized and independent
third-party classification societies, to ensure a HOV is safe and
suitable for carrying human cargo.
The OG tragedy captivated public attention because of the notoriety
of the dive site and of course the loss of human life, which play into
people's worst fears about the sea and this type of craft. Most people
mistakenly believe HOVs are wildly dangerous and unnecessary. At
Triton, we have been pushing back against these myths and stereotypes
for nearly two decades because they bear no resemblance to reality. The
OG tragedy was an anomaly, an aberration and would never have happened
if this ill-fated craft had been subjected to the certification
process.
In fact, accredited or certified HOVs enjoy a 50+ year track record
of perfect safety, making them the safest mode of transport in the
world. People have no hesitation in jumping in a car and going for a
drive or flying in an aircraft where the potential for an accident is
thousands of times greater. In fact, in the last 50 years, tens of
millions of people have safely enjoyed the thrilling experience of
diving in a certified HOV, without a single fatality.
Many found the failure mode of the OG craft particularly shocking
because it was without precedent but to those of us in the HOV
business, the OG hull collapse was not a surprise. It was a predictable
result of the pressure hull being made of a capricious material, which
was not suitable for the intended application. The filament wound
carbon fiber cylinder in the OG craft was degrading from the exposure
to pressure associated with each dive or cyclic use.
OG created an `acoustic monitoring system' for Cyclops II, which
they described as innovative and a system all HOVs should use, but the
requirement for such a system was an acknowledgement their filament
wound carbon fiber cylinder was weakening on each successive dive and
its capacity to resist the crushing pressure at 3,800 meters or 12,500
feet was diminishing over time and would continue to degrade until it
failed, catastrophically and without warning. A properly designed and
engineered HOV doesn't require an acoustic monitoring system because
the health of the hull is fundamental and beyond question.
A capricious material that degrades in performance and efficacy
from normal use, is unacceptable as a pressure boundary for an HOV. If
the OG sub had been subjected to any kind of peer review, this fact
alone would have disqualified it from certification. OG dismissed
certification because they claimed their craft was so cutting edge and
innovative the classification societies wouldn't understand it, but the
reality is the OG craft could not be classed and there were many other
design features, which would not have complied with the classification
society requirements.
Triton and every legitimate manufacturer in our small industry
would not endorse the use of an `experimental' HOV. Instead, these
companies exclusively manufacture HOVs, which are fully certified and
accredited by independent third-party classification societies.
Certification begins with a review of our initial design
assumptions and ideas, which includes Finite Element Analysis (FEA),
calculations, etc. The process continues through to the selection,
independent analysis, and approval of all materials, which must be
procured from qualified vendors, and the conformance of these materials
to the dimensional tolerances stipulated in our reviewed and approved
drawings. Approved and tested materials are then fashioned into
assemblies, which are subjected to additional testing and validation
requirements as stipulated by the class society.
Certification requires the involvement of a surveyor during the
commissioning process of a HOV, which includes witnessing factory,
harbor, and sea acceptance trials and continues through to delivery and
the qualification of all personnel who are responsible for operating
and maintaining it. Certification is required for the lifetime of the
sub and is an on-going process where continued compliance is validated
by regularly scheduled surveys, inspections of paperwork and testing as
required and witnessed by an attending surveyor representing the
classification society.
Every Triton sub is designed, manufactured, tested, and operated in
compliance with the rules of an internationally recognized
classification society (DNV, ABS, etc.). These rules have evolved over
many decades and been influenced by the experiences gleaned from a wide
variety of operating environments (industrial, recreational, scientific
etc.).
The accreditation of a HOV is like that undertaken by the FAA for
an aircraft. There are hundreds of pages of safety compliance criteria.
Triton subs meet the requirements of numerous other authorities,
including Flag State Registries, Pressure Vehicles for Human Occupancy
(PVHO) rules, and International Maritime Organization (IMO) Guidelines
for the Design, Construction and Operation of Passenger Submersible
Craft.
There must be a simple requirement applied to all HOVs. Either they
are certified and can carry people safely, or they are not. Either a
HOV complies with the rigorous design, engineering, validation, testing
protocols, annual and special periodical survey, and inspection
requirements of a third-party and independent classification society
(such as DNV and ABS), or it does not. If it does not, it should not
carry people, period. If we stick to this simple rule, tragedies like
the OG disaster can and will be prevented.
I have spent most of my adult life going to sea and diving in
certified and accredited HOVs. The ocean is a magnificent but
unforgiving environment. Being at sea and diving in subs requires an
understanding and an awareness of the extreme forces at work and
demands the humility and respect of anyone who intends to work and play
in this space while ensuring the occupants of a HOV remain safe.
To date, Triton has designed, manufactured, and sold dozens of
subs. Every Triton remains in class, certified to the original depth
and in the hands of a client with whom we enjoy a mutually beneficial
and on-going relationship. The after sales service and technical
support relationship is essential to ensuring a HOV performs as
expected and is being operated and maintained in accordance with both
the classification society requirements and those of the manufacturer.
We are fortunate indeed to have inherited the wisdom and collective
experience of generations of engineers, designers, and operations
personnel who preceded us. The cornerstone of any product intended to
carry people into the deep sea is that it must be simple to operate,
easy to maintain, reliable and most of all safe.
At Triton, the culture of safety is foundational. In contrast to
the OG approach of ostracizing those who called attention to safety
concerns, we adhere to the ``see something, say something'' model,
where anyone can and should raise a safety concern at any time and for
any reason. Everyone knows we look out for each other and take the
responsibility of building equipment capable of safely transporting
people thousands of feet into the deep sea personally. Everyone
benefits when everyone contributes towards a shared culture of safety.
If a person wants to dive beneath the surface in a HOV, they have a
reasonable expectation the craft they are in meets some type of
recognized standard of safety. The predatory and unscrupulous practice
of selling unsuspecting people a seat in an experimental HOV and
calling them ``mission specialists'' or ``crew'' to skirt the rules or
avoid regulations is unacceptable and must be stopped. If certification
with a recognized classification society is made a requirement for any
HOV being used for these types of commercial operations, future
tragedies can be avoided.
At Triton, we're proud to create magical machines that allow people
to explore the most beautiful but least understood area of our planet.
Our clients undertake ambitious and inspiring science, film making and
exploration missions in the deep sea. Their notable achievements are a
great source of pride and further validation of the importance of
continued exploration of the deep sea with HOVs.
I conclude with the simple wisdom that sunlight is the best
disinfectant. Transparency in all facets of safety is critical to
building confidence and maintaining the enviable and unprecedented
track record of safety classed HOVs still enjoy today. The role of the
certification agencies is paramount to the development of safe HOVs.
These agencies grade our work. They demand a design be proven, not just
postulated, and rigorously tested before any people ever dive in it. I
have every reason to believe that adherence to this simple rule will
permit exploration of our ocean for decades to come, safely. At Triton
we recognize the deep sea is no place for compromise.
Thank you.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields.
Mr. Spain, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
TESTIMONY OF T. CHRISTIAN SPAIN, VICE PRESIDENT OF GOVERNMENT
RELATIONS, AMERICAN MARITIME OFFICERS
Mr. Spain. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the
committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to
testify for American Maritime Officers; Marine Engineers'
Beneficial Association; Masters, Mates & Pilots; and the
Seafarers International Union here today.
I hope everyone will take the time to read my written
testimony, which is quite technical. I would like to share with
you my 30 years of experience as a U.S. seafarer in the
international maritime industry.
I am Captain Christian Spain, and I am proud to represent
the 3,400 officers at American Maritime Officers as their vice
president of government relations. I have been working for AMO
in Washington for about a decade. And prior to that, I sailed
aboard AMO-contracted vessels as a master and deck officer for
nearly 20 years.
Maritime autonomous surface ships, or MASS, are called by
different names, such as autonomous vessels, drone vessels, or
unmanned surface ships. I will just refer to them as MASS. For
the safety of all seafarers, MASS must adhere to the existing
maritime regulations, such as the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea, often referred to in the maritime
industry as ColRegs or the rules of the road.
Instituting separate parallel regulations for MASS should
be given little consideration. For instance, vessels have a
duty to render assistance by providing manpower, equipment and/
or shelter to survivors in the event of a maritime emergency.
This duty goes back a millennium and cannot be shirked because
it is inconvenient for innovative technology.
MASS must be able to use both spoken and written language,
as safe communication is vital for the safety of the seafarers,
passengers, and the marine environment, but also for the
efficiency of daily tasks and the ship's integrity. MASS, like
traditional vessels, should be equipped with VHF radios to
exchange information with nearby vessels, ports, and maritime
authorities. This includes communication for collision
avoidance, navigation updates, and emergency situations as
required by current domestic and international maritime laws
and regulation.
The upfront cost of retrofitting existing vessels or
purchasing new autonomous ships are substantial. Shipowners
have reservations about making such significant investments,
especially if the benefits are not immediately realized.
While proponents of MASS argue that the autonomous vessels
can reduce OpEx over time, shipowners worry about the ongoing
expense related to maintenance, software updates, and
cybersecurity measures.
Ships generally are only making money for an owner when
they are underway. Without seafarers aboard, preventive
maintenance would have to be exceptionally well-tailored and
timed to occur in geographically advantageous areas to see cost
savings over the life of a vessel, based on labor arbitrage.
When considering an unplanned maintenance and repair, it would
seem very unlikely to save money when there are no seafarers
aboard your vessel to repair it.
Use of MASS will not eliminate or prevent the risk of
maritime accidents, including collisions, allisions, and
groundings, which can lead to oilspills and significant
environmental damage. The absence of onboard seafarers may
hinder the rapid response to oilspills, exacerbating the
environmental impact.
MARPOL and OPA 90 are complementary and critical
instruments for regulating the discharge of pollutants from
vessels, including oilspills. Crewmembers must be trained to
take immediate steps to minimize spillage, such as deploying
oilspill containment equipment, and regularly drilling in the
use of such equipment so that crewmembers are well-versed in
emergency procedures.
Seafarers play a pivotal role in mitigating the
environmental impact of oilspills from vessels. Crewmembers on
board are integral to the effective implementation of MARPOL
and OPA 90 regulations in response to oilspills.
Digitization in the maritime sector allows the further
automation of some functions and better control of processes as
a whole. It can enable an increased use of remote-control
technology. Many of these technologies could be used to the
benefit of seafarers and improve the safety conditions while
providing more efficient operations. Other than in niche
markets, this technology should be used as a tool and not a
complete replacement for seafarers.
In closing, I want to emphasize that there is a substantial
difference between commercial international shipping and the
mission of the U.S. Coast Guard and other Government agencies.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee for your
attention on this pivotal matter.
[Mr. Spain's prepared statement follows:]
Prepared Statement of T. Christian Spain, Vice President of Government
Relations, American Maritime Officers
Mr. Chairman, Ranking member, and members of the committee, I would
like to thank you for the opportunity to take this seat representing
American Maritime Officers, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association,
Masters, Mates & Pilots and Seafarers International Union for today's
hearing. Maritime Labor would like to express our gratitude for the
chance to appear before this distinguished congressional committee to
provide testimony on the critical issue of ensuring safety in the
Marine environment with the introduction of Autonomous vessels.
My name is Christian Spain I am proud to represent the 3400
officers at American Maritime Officers as their Vice President of
Government Relations. I have been working for AMO in Washington for
about a decade. Prior to that I sailed aboard AMO contracted vessels as
a Master and Deck Officer for nearly 20 years. As a collateral duty I
currently serve as the Vice-Chair of the International Transport
Workers Federation--Maritime Safety Committee. As a member of this
committee, I have the honor of representing the world's 1.9 million
seafarers at the International Maritime Organization where we have been
discussing policy and regulation surrounding Maritime Autonomous
Surface Ships or MASS for nearly 8 years. I have found that MASS are
called by different names such as autonomous vessels, Drone vessels or
unmanned surface ships. For the purposes of this hearing, I will just
refer to these vessels as Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships or MASS.
Discussion of the MASS can quickly devolve into a discussion of Classes
or variations of autonomy such as the IMO's 4 Classes of Autonomy
ranging from MASS with Manual Control to Fully Autonomous vessels. For
this limited discussion unless otherwise noted I will assume that we
are talking primarily about fully autonomous vessels.
With 33 years in the industry, addressing the safety concerns
associated with this transformative technology, I stand here not only
as a representative of the seafaring community but as a concerned
citizen eager to contribute to the development of policies that
prioritize the well-being of the world's 1.9 million seafarers. My
testimony today will focus on the imperative of safety of the
seafarers, the challenges and risks associated with MASS vessels, and
the steps that both policymakers and industry stakeholders must take to
mitigate these risks effectively. In doing so, I aim to shed light on a
few of the complex issues surrounding MASS safety and offer insights
that can guide the development of legislation and regulations that
safeguard the interests of our citizens while fostering innovation.
In my brief time here, I would like to cover three broad areas of
what I feel are the most important issues that the committee should
take into consideration. First and foremost, safety for seafarers,
passengers, the public and the marine environment. Those regulations
most recognizable in the maritime industry such as the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs) and
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL) all deal with almost exclusively the safety of humans and the
marine environment. Secondarily, commercial shipowners are not
clamoring for MASS technology. The Capital Expenditure and Operational
Expenditure savings for a MASS vessel seem uncertain at best. Many of
the largest ship owners are partnered with companies working on MASS
development which on the face of it appears they are advocates for MASS
technology. However, when talking to the largest shipowners you would
be hard-pressed to find more than a few who see their ships operating
in the coming decades without seafarers aboard. Shipowners are
involving themselves in MASS to keep apprised of what is going on; but
just because you can do something does not mean you should. There is a
niche market for MASS but on the commercial side it is small in grand
scheme of things. Lastly, concern regarding the inability of MASS to
mitigate marine environmental damage after a collision, allision,
grounding or oil spill should be considered.
For the safety of all seafarers MASS must adhere to the existing
maritime regulations such as the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea often referred to in the maritime industry
as the ColRegs or ``Rules of the Road''. Instituting separate parallel
regulations for MASS should be given little consideration. For
instance, vessels have a duty to render assistance by providing
manpower, equipment, and/or shelter to survivors in the event of a
maritime emergency. This duty goes back a millennium and cannot be
shirked because it is inconvenient for MASS deployment. Additionally,
effective communication between MASS and other vessels in the vicinity,
maritime authorities and ports is important to the smooth operation in
the maritime environment.
The emergence of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) has
raised significant questions regarding the adaptation of nearly all
existing maritime regulations, particularly the International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs). There is a
complex debate surrounding whether the ColRegs should be altered to
accommodate MASS or if MASS should be required to adhere to existing
regulations. The central argument presented herein is that altering the
ColRegs to accommodate MASS is not only unnecessary but also fraught
with risks, and that it is imperative for MASS to adapt to the
established ColRegs framework. Safety is paramount in the maritime
domain, and this testimony underscores the importance of maintaining a
uniform set of rules to ensure the safe integration of MASS into our
oceans. It explores the challenges and opportunities presented by MASS,
the key arguments against modifying ColRegs, and the ways in which MASS
can seamlessly align with existing regulations.
Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS), also known as autonomous
ships or unmanned surface vessels, represent a transformative
development in the maritime industry. These vessels are equipped with
advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, automation, and
machine learning systems, allowing them to operate without direct human
intervention. The potential benefits of MASS are numerous, including
increased operational efficiency, reduced operating costs, and enhanced
environmental sustainability. However, the integration of MASS into the
global maritime ecosystem raises critical questions about safety and
regulatory compliance.
At the heart of this debate is the International Regulations for
Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs), a set of rules established by
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to prevent collisions
between vessels and ensure the safety of navigation at sea. ColRegs,
also known as the ``Rules of the Road,'' serve as the foundation of
safe maritime navigation. They provide a standardized set of
regulations that govern the conduct of vessels, including right-of-way,
navigation lights, sound signals, and more.
As the maritime industry stands on the cusp of a technological
revolution with the advent of MASS, the question arises: Should the
ColRegs be modified to accommodate these autonomous vessels, or should
MASS be required to adapt to the existing regulatory framework? I would
assert that altering the ColRegs to accommodate MASS is not only
unnecessary but also counterproductive to the goal of ensuring safety
at sea. Instead, MASS should be expected to conform to the established
ColRegs. Integration while maintaining safety is the paramount
objective.
MASS are equipped with advanced sensor systems, such as radar,
lidar, and cameras, coupled with sophisticated artificial intelligence
algorithms. These systems can detect and respond to potential collision
threats with a speed and precision that may surpass human capabilities.
While these advantages are compelling, they must be carefully weighed
against the potential risks and challenges associated with the
integration of MASS into existing maritime operations. Safety remains
the paramount concern, and the question of how to ensure the safe
coexistence of autonomous vessels with manned vessels and traditional
maritime practices cannot be overstated.
The maritime industry has a long history of regulating navigation
and ensuring the safety of vessels at sea. The development of
international maritime regulations, including the ColRegs, has been
driven by a fundamental need for standardized rules and practices. The
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs)
were first established in 1889 at the International Maritime Conference
held in Washington, D.C. The goal was to reduce the risk of collisions
between vessels and establish a consistent set of rules for mariners
worldwide.
One key principle underlying the ColRegs is the concept of ``common
practice.'' This principle dictates that mariners should be able to
rely on consistent behaviors and responses from other vessels based on
the ColRegs' rules. In other words, vessels navigating international
waters should adhere to a shared set of standards and expectations,
regardless of their flag state or technological sophistication.
Mariners can anticipate the actions of other vessels based on the
ColRegs, enhancing overall safety, and reducing the risk of collisions.
This predictability is vital for safe navigation, especially in
congested waterways and under adverse weather conditions. A common
regulatory framework allows vessels from different countries and
operators with diverse backgrounds to navigate safely together. This
interoperability is essential for international trade, commerce, and
cooperation on the high seas.
The ColRegs assign responsibilities to vessels in various
situations, making it clear who is at fault in the event of a collision
or navigational error. This accountability is essential for legal and
insurance purposes.
Given the historical importance of uniform regulations and the
fundamental principles of predictability, interoperability, historical
continuity, and accountability, any proposed changes to the ColRegs
must be carefully considered in the context of their potential impact
on safety and the global maritime ecosystem.
The question of whether the ColRegs should be modified to
accommodate Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) has generated
significant debate within the maritime community. While proponents of
modification argue that it is necessary to accommodate the unique
characteristics and capabilities of MASS, several compelling arguments
suggest that altering the ColRegs is neither prudent nor in the best
interest of safety. Safety is the paramount concern in maritime
operations. The ColRegs are designed to ensure the safety of vessels
and mariners at sea by providing a common set of rules that govern
navigation and the prevention of collisions. Any modification to these
regulations must be rigorously evaluated to determine whether it
enhances or diminishes safety.
One of the primary safety concerns associated with modifying the
ColRegs for MASS is the potential for confusion and uncertainty. If
MASS were subject to a different set of rules than manned vessels,
mariners navigating near these autonomous vessels might struggle to
predict their actions and respond effectively. This unpredictability
could lead to an increased risk of collisions and accidents and a
threat to our marine environment. Moreover, MASS, like all vessels, are
susceptible to technical malfunctions, system failures, and
cyberattacks. In the event of such incidents, it is crucial that MASS
adhere to the same rules as manned vessels to ensure a consistent and
coordinated response. Deviating from the established ColRegs framework
for MASS could create legal and operational challenges in emergency
situations.
In a maritime emergency, a coordinated effort involving various
parties is essential to ensure a swift and effective response that
maximizes safety and minimizes harm. The specific parties involved can
vary depending on the nature and severity of the emergency, but here
are some key stakeholders who typically play a crucial role in lending
a hand during maritime emergencies are the crew of the distressed
vessel, Maritime Authorities and Nearby vessels, especially those in
the vicinity of the distressed vessel, may be called upon to aid a
vessel in distress. This is a fundamental principle of maritime law
known as the ``duty to render assistance.'' Vessels in the vicinity are
required to offer support by providing manpower, equipment, or shelter
to survivors.
Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) represent a cutting-edge
development in the maritime industry, with the potential to transform
various aspects of shipping, including safety and emergency response.
However, when it comes to referring assistance in a maritime emergency,
MASS systems must be equipped to handle such situations in a manner
that ensures the safety of human life, property, and the marine
environment. The duty to render assistance at sea is a longstanding
maritime tradition that has evolved over centuries. It is deeply rooted
in the principles of maritime ethics and human solidarity. While it
does not have a specific age or date of origin, this duty has been
recognized and practiced for as long as humans have been engaged in
maritime activities. It can be traced back to ancient seafaring
civilizations, such as the Greeks and Romans. These ancient mariners
often came to the aid of shipwrecked sailors out of a sense of duty and
honor.
MASS must be able to use both spoken and written language as safe
communication is vital for the safety of crew, passengers, industrial
personnel or special personnel, ship, and external environment, but
also for the efficiency of daily tasks and the ship's integrity. Very
High-Frequency (VHF) radio communication is a standard method for ship-
to-ship and ship-to-shore communication. MASS like traditional vessels
should be equipped with VHF radios to exchange information with nearby
vessels, ports, and maritime authorities. This includes communication
for collision avoidance, navigation updates, and emergency situations
as required by current maritime laws and regulation.
Safe and correct communication is particularly important for ships
that cross national borders, especially in connection with radio
communication between ships and other actors (land bases, various
suppliers, shipping companies, authorities etc.). MASS communication
should include acknowledgment of correct receipt and understanding.
This applies both to normal operations as well as in maritime
emergencies.
It is important that law makers and regulators insist for the
safety of seafarers and the public that Maritime Autonomous Surface
Ships be held to the same regulatory standards as manned vessels for
they are working in and around manned vessels who should be able to
rely on consistent behaviors and responses from other vessels
regardless of their level of Autonomy. This includes MASS adherence to
the ColRegs, MASS ability to comply with a ``duty to render
assistance'' and MASS ability to communicate with manned vessels and
other entities for day-to-day operations as well as maritime
emergencies.
Maritime labor has been in close communication with many of the
largest shipowners since MASS started to be discussed in earnest around
2016. While many of the largest Shipowners work with companies
developing MASS technologies the owners continue to worry about the
reliability and redundancy requirements of the technology. Unlike
traditional ships, which have experienced crews capable of handling
unforeseen technical failures, MASS relies heavily on complex systems.
A malfunction or cyberattack could lead to catastrophic consequences,
including collisions, grounding, or environmental disasters. All the
largest shipowners we continue to discuss MASS with do not see a future
of commercial shipping that does not include some crewmembers based on
these concerns and probably more importantly the costs of not having
crew aboard when needed.
The upfront costs of retrofitting existing vessels or purchasing
new autonomous ships are substantial. Shipowners have reservations
about making such significant investments, especially if the benefits
are not immediately realized. While proponents argue that autonomous
vessels can reduce operational costs over time, shipowners worry about
the ongoing expenses related to maintenance, software updates, and
cybersecurity measures. Ships generally are only making money for an
owner when they are underway. Without seafarers aboard preventive
maintenance would have to be exceptionally well-tailored and timed to
occur in geographically advantageous areas to see cost savings over the
life of a vessel based on labor arbitrage. When considering unplanned
maintenance and repair it would seem very unlikely to save money when
there are no seafarers aboard to repair your vessel. Shipowners
question whether the promised cost savings will materialize in
practice.
With increased reliance on digital systems and connectivity,
shipowners are also concerned about the vulnerability of MASS to
cyberattacks. The potential for hackers to gain control of autonomous
vessels or disrupt their operations poses a significant safety risk to
seafarers and the marine environment.
Determining liability in the event of accidents or incidents
involving MASS is a complex and evolving issue. Under current maritime
custom operators (Masters), owners and equipment manufacturers
typically take the brunt of liability in this order, both civil and
criminal. Without an operator the logical replacement would be the
``creator'' of AI or machine learning for the MASS in question. This
leads to the next question of who has jurisdiction over the
``creator''? Currently the Master and/or seafarers are held criminally
liable and imprisoned. In a situation where a MASS is found criminally
liable will the ``creator'' or the shipowner be imprisoned? How does
one obtain jurisdiction over these people or for that matter a remote
operator if there is no extradition treaty with their country of
residence? Shipowners worry about the potential legal disputes and the
associated financial burdens that may arise from unclear liability
scenarios. The uncertainty surrounding the safety and liability aspects
of MASS can lead to increased insurance premiums which are viewed as an
additional financial burden.
The adoption of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) has
garnered significant attention in the maritime industry due to its
potential benefits, including improved efficiency. However, it is
crucial to acknowledge the potential dangers that MASS poses to the
environment. The environmental risks associated with MASS technology,
including issues related to energy sources, pollution, navigational
challenges, and the broader ecological impact. It underscores the
importance of addressing these concerns to ensure that the transition
to MASS aligns with the goal of minimizing oil pollution.
The use of MASS does not eliminate the risk of maritime accidents,
including collisions, allisions and groundings, which can lead to oil
spills and significant environmental damage. The absence of onboard
seafarers may hinder the rapid response to oil spills, exacerbating the
environmental impact. The International Convention for the Prevention
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA
90) are complimentary and crucial instruments for regulating the
discharge of pollutants from vessels, including oil spills. The crew
requirements in response to oil spills, emphasize the importance of
crew preparedness, vigilant reporting, and effective response measures.
Crew members are required to be familiar with spill response equipment,
such as oil booms which are essential for effective response. Crew
members must be trained to take immediate steps to minimize spillage,
such as deploying oil spill containment equipment. Regular oil spill
response drills should be conducted to ensure that crew members are
well-versed in emergency procedures. Seafarers play a pivotal role in
mitigating the environmental impact of oil spills from vessels. Crew
members on board are integral to the effective implementation of MARPOL
and OPA 90 regulations and the response to oil spills.
In this testimony I have highlighted three overarching areas that
warrant the committee's careful consideration. Firstly, paramount
importance must be placed on ensuring safety and well-established
regulations in the maritime industry, such as the International
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), International
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs), and
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships
(MARPOL), predominantly address the safety of human lives and the
protection of our precious marine ecosystems.
Secondly, I have delved into the fact that commercial shipowners
are not fervently advocating for the widespread adoption of Maritime
Autonomous Surface Ship (MASS) technology. This advocacy is coming from
the developers of MASS. The anticipated cost savings in terms of
Capital Expenditure and Operational Expenditure for MASS vessels remain
uncertain, with many of the industry's major shipowners maintaining
reservations about transitioning away from crewed vessels. It is a
reminder that just because we have the capability to pursue a
particular path does not necessarily mean it is the most prudent course
of action. The commercial applicability of MASS, while promising in
niche markets, may not have a significant impact in the broader context
of the maritime industry for many decades.
Lastly, it is crucial to consider the concerns surrounding the
capacity of MASS to effectively mitigate environmental damage in the
aftermath of maritime incidents such as collisions, allisions,
groundings, or oil spills. Ensuring that our technological advancements
align with environmental protection measures is imperative.
In light of these considerations, the committee should prioritize
safety, remain cognizant of the evolving landscape of commercial
shipowners concerns and underscore the importance of environmental
responsibility when deliberating on the future of MASS technology in
the maritime industry. The development of better software, smaller
sensors and better communications is leading to the increasing
digitalization throughout the global economy. Digitalization in the
maritime sector allows the further automation of some functions and
better control of processes as a whole. It can enable the increased use
of remote-control technology. Many of these technologies could be used
to benefit seafarers and improve safety conditions while providing more
efficient operations. Other than in niche markets, this technology
should be used as a tool and not a complete replacement of seafarers.
Again, thank you Mr. Chairman and the committee for your attention
to the pivotal matter.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back.
I now will turn our attention to the questions for the
panel. I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Pribyl, in your opinion, where can the Coast Guard
immediately leverage existing commercial unmanned technologies
to support its missions?
Mr. Pribyl. We looked at this in the report, and we laid
forth what we felt were the areas, the mission areas where the
use of unmanned systems could provide the most immediate value.
I think that it is a combination of some that were mentioned on
the first panel, things like search and rescue and pollution
response.
The issue, in terms of the commercial access to that that
we found in the report, was the acquisition process, that it
wasn't moving quickly enough, that they didn't have the
mechanisms in place to avail themselves of that technology. And
in the United States, most of this technology is being
developed on the commercial side.
So, we had made some recommendations related to that. And I
think if you look in combination with the recommendations as to
the areas of missions that are of value and then see if they
can make improvements as to the acquisition side, I think that
is where they would have the most value.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Johnson, what are the biggest
regulatory hurdles that you have encountered in development of
systems built by your company?
Mr. Johnson. Yes. Thank you for the question, Chairman. We
have not seen many regulatory hurdles. We are mariners. I came
from the marine industry. The reason for what we are building
is because of challenges that I saw in my work up in Alaska and
in the salvage industry as well, where we dealt with many
marine accidents.
And so, we operate within the Maritime Domain and from the
beginning have built our technology to work within the current
regulatory structure.
So, we are a technology company, and then we support our
customers, operators, to ensure that they gain the approval of
U.S. Coast Guard, Danish Maritime Authority, and other places.
Plus, we work closely with the class societies as well, who
have worked to certify our technology and also type approve it
to be able to be installed across fleets.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Lahey, if OceanGate had
submitted the Titan to appropriate regulatory oversight,
including a class inspection, what do you think would have been
the likely result?
Mr. Lahey. Well, thank you for the question. I think the
end result of them subjecting that vehicle to the accreditation
process is it would have failed miserably. It was a craft that
would have never been able to meet the high bar of
certification.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Spain, how would you, in your
role as a mariner, change aboard vessels with increased
automated capabilities?
Mr. Spain. I could see the need for upscaling, depending on
what the systems are the systems being installed. There are so
many different systems out there in development right now, I
wouldn't comment other than to say that.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Well, what needs to be done to
ensure that mariners are adequately trained in these new
technologies?
Mr. Spain. Well, each system is different and requires
unique training, I believe, at least in its current iteration.
I would say that I believe going forward, we will see different
sectors develop different training needs.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much. All right. I
know you may think this is a small group, but it is a powerful
group. It is an awesome group of people, and we are ready to
change the world. So, anyway, you just stay with us.
So, anyway, I would recognize Ms.--well, you are kind of
the ranking member now.
Ms. Scholten. I would be happy to, but I defer to you as
well. OK.
Thank you all so much for your critically important
testimony today. I have got a number of different questions,
so, bear with me.
Mr. Johnson, in your testimony, you talk about how the U.S.
lags in the development of new tech behind other countries,
like China.
What can we be doing now in the U.S. to position us as a
leader in maritime technology and innovation?
Mr. Johnson. Yes, thank you for the question. We listened
this morning to the testimony of the admirals and the questions
around that. And a lot of it was around regulation and from
that standpoint.
And so, I look at our Nation kind of from two hands. You
have the Hamiltonian, which was on developmentalism, about
being the coach and using the Government to coach industry and
bring it forward. Then you have the Jeffersonian, which was
about being the umpire and controlling.
And so, I think we have been doing really well on the
umpiring side of it and the refereeing of it. And I think, as
Government, we need to be doing much more on the coaching and
promotion of innovation to continue to build our GDP.
Marine autonomous technology is a significant opportunity.
The way that I look at it is similar to what we did and what
the Government did--Congress did--with the internet going back
to 1991, with the High-Performance Computing Act. That act,
which then also put $600 million out there, sparked that whole
development. And that whole industry now puts $2.5 trillion
into our GDP.
And so, that was a really good investment. And so, from our
side, or looking at autonomous technology, I see the scale of
the space. Our industry moves, I think it's $17 trillion of
world trade. And it's a great place to be on the leading edge
of technology for the future ahead.
Ms. Scholten. Thank you. That is incredibly helpful.
Staying on this but switching gears a little bit, this
question is for Mr. Spain.
I would like you to expound a little bit on the point in
your testimony regarding liability. And currently, liability
rests with the master.
On a fully autonomous vessel, who would be responsible for
a maritime casualty?
Mr. Spain. Thank you, Congresswoman. That is the question
and why I put it in the testimony. I do do a lot of work at the
IMO. I have been working there for 10 years, and I have been
involved with the MASS discussions for the last 8.
This has not been worked out. The criminal liability part
is a real stickler there, because if you don't have
jurisdiction over the person, then where are you? Some people
have suggested that if a vessel is operating in your space,
such as the U.S., if you want to have jurisdiction over them,
then you have got to ensure that the remote operation center is
within your jurisdiction in the U.S.
There is a tradition in our industry, at least with regard
to flagging vessels out, or flagging vessels and flags of
convenience in order to skirt jurisdictions for other reasons.
And I foresee this as being one of the biggest issues,
determining how this lays out, who is responsible and who
somebody can put hands on, really. Thank you.
Ms. Scholten. It is, indeed, an important question not only
in maritime vessels but in autonomous vehicles as well. We are
grappling with it across industries.
What guides do you look to to make these decisions, or what
do you think that we can look to to come to some sort of
conclusion here?
Mr. Spain. I am no expert on this. Initially, I would have
thought before being involved with this that I would go with
the owner, but the issue is that if you have a manufacturer of
a unit and say it has got 15 different safety options and 5 of
them are required and somebody buys one with 6, and then you
find after an accident that, hey, if you would have had another
6 of these options that this likely wouldn't have happened,
well, is it the owner's responsibility? Probably.
But if that is not the issue, and the issue is about the
actual unit and which portion of it fails to operate, then it's
probably on the manufacturer.
Ms. Scholten. Thank you.
I will yield back at this point.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentlelady yields back.
Mr. Ezell, you are recognized.
Mr. Ezell. That was quick.
Mr. Webster of Florida. Well, you have been made part of a
team. It is a very powerful team, and now it has gotten even
more powerful. So, welcome aboard.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Pribyl, I can't even spell it, I am interested to learn
more about your role on the study committee that helped author
the TRB report and the advancement in technologies and the
programs since then.
Can you expand on what the Coast Guard can do to develop
autonomous maritime system programs as rapidly as the Navy and
the Marine Corps?
Mr. Pribyl. Yes. Thank you for the question. And the report
itself is 3 years old now, so, part of what I was invited to do
today was to give our understanding of where we had seen the
progression with that.
Certainly, the U.S. Navy is leading in this space,
especially in the U.S., very forward-leaning in the use of the
technology. My understanding is that the Coast Guard has been
involved in joint exercises with the Navy, trying to understand
how the Navy is using that technology and see how it could be
implemented into the Coast Guard missions. We didn't get a full
briefing from the Coast Guard on exactly how that is playing
out, but that is our understanding.
The other issue, again, is different acquisition streams.
So, the Navy and special forces and other DoD services and
branches, they have different acquisition opportunities that
the Coast Guard is not able to avail themselves of.
So, in terms of what the Coast Guard can be doing, we had
listed a number of different acquisition streams and processes.
So, I would say just to continue to evaluate those
opportunities.
And again, in the U.S., it is still going to continue to
come from the commercial sector, the academic sector as well.
Southern Mississippi is obviously doing quite a bit down there
with NOAA and others.
So, continuing to leverage those opportunities from the
commercial and academic sectors.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you very much.
Mr. Johnson, I would like to talk more about the current
market. How do you compare the Coast Guard and the Navy as a
customer in this market? Do you believe the Coast Guard has
made the necessary investments in their force structure to
support unmanned maritime systems?
Mr. Johnson. So, yes, thank you for the question, sir.
The Coast Guard has made some investments, and we have been
able to serve them with technology as well. What we would like
to see is innovation moving quickly. And today, a lot of the
Coast Guard work and innovation stays in the lab.
When it comes to comprehensive technology like this, you've
got to get it out of the lab and get it out into its operating
domain. So, just like we do internally, we have a test fleet
with captains on staff. And so, daily, we are running that
technology, like you see with autonomous car companies as well.
And so, we encourage the Coast Guard to request, obtain the
budget to get the systems out into operations and go out with a
real plan on what they are trying to achieve with it as well,
not just trialing technology.
Mr. Ezell. Thank you. Some companies in my district tell me
about their limited resources to focus on business development
activities.
In your opinion, what could the Coast Guard do to be more
effective and a probable customer for companies such as yours
and the ones that have operations in my district?
Mr. Johnson. Yes. So, thank you for the question. The Coast
Guard has 11 missions. They do a lot with a relatively small
budget. Plus, they have, probably, one of the most diverse
responsibilities of missions across the Government.
We feel that, as I said, that if we could help them in
being able to help craft the applications--and we build
autonomous technology that enables the increased productivity
and efficiency as well as precision of operation of vessels. We
also build computer vision systems as well. And so, we needed
that to enable our technology to see more and understand a
domain, but we know that like within the Coast Guard's roles
and responsibilities, they also need to be able to see more and
have more domain awareness.
So, our team is regularly working to interface with the
Coast Guard, and I guess the more time we can get with them,
the better.
Mr. Ezell. Mr. Chairman, I am about out of time, so, I
yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back.
Mr. Auchincloss, you are recognized.
Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Johnson, your testimony, written testimony was
striking. The word that was coming to mind as I read it was
``leapfrogging,'' in the sense that it seemed like in the 19th
and 20th centuries, the United States built up an advantage.
Navy and merchant marine have since lost it, at least in the
merchant marine, increasingly maybe even in the Navy. And that
autonomy can be one way to regain that edge.
And then you have talked about coaching as a way to get
there. And so, I want to build on previous questions from both
sides of the aisle. It sounds like you want the Coast Guard to
be better at procurement practices and how they interface with
the private sector. Is that correct?
Mr. Johnson. Yes. And then I am just also speaking to
leadership as a whole within the Nation and in a business
environment to really set goals around innovation, around the
value that it can bring that future value.
Mr. Auchincloss. I hear that, but it is helpful for us here
in Congress to have more specific things. I mean, I have been
hearing testimony for 3 years from entrepreneurs, and I have
never had somebody say that they are fine with all the
regulations that exist. I mean, there is really nothing that
you would want to change around MARAD or----
Mr. Johnson [interrupting]. It's a good question. We work
to navigate it, but, of course, speed is our friend. And, in
fact, we are working with one U.S.-flag company now that has
our technology on a harbor tug, and we have been going through
the approval process with the Coast Guard. And that's 1\1/2\
years into it now.
And so, if there is a way to speed those approvals up, but
at the same time, we also want to ensure that this technology
is safely deployed. We understand when there is an accident
maybe in some part of a sector that might be close to us, maybe
not even us, it could also impact us.
Mr. Auchincloss. Do you have an opinion about the method of
procurement that the Coast Guard uses, the Federal acquisition
regulation, their RDT&E program? Is there any one that has been
best to work with and that should be built upon?
Mr. Johnson. Somebody on my team will for sure. I am not
close enough to be able to answer that question.
Mr. Auchincloss. You mentioned in your written testimony
also digital infrastructure and the importance of investing in
that alongside the Marine Highway Program that we have had over
the last decade.
Can you expound upon that? What does digital infrastructure
for MASS look like?
Mr. Johnson. So, actually, it kind of starts at the Coast
Guard level when you look at the GAO's review of the Coast
Guard and how they are implementing or executing their work.
Almost all the things where they point out gaps is around
data and being able to do their inspections better with data
and be able to track the industry better with data.
But from a digital infrastructure, I mean, this is the 21st
century. The 20th century, as I mentioned, was automation but a
lot of separate systems working together. The digital
infrastructure centralizes and brings a leap in productivity
and value.
You see it, say, like, in an Amazon warehouse. An example I
would just give you real quick is Amazon back in 2014, 2015,
the quickest they could get their click-to-ship with their
manual processes was 60 to 75 minutes. Then they brought in the
Kiva robots into their warehouses, connected it digitally from
their logistics system to the robot fleets, and were able to
get it down to 15 minutes to click-and-ship. And, of course,
now you see what they do for our economy.
Mr. Auchincloss. Switching gears, Mr. Pribyl, do you think
that the ColRegs should be modified to accommodate MASS?
Mr. Pribyl. It is an interesting question, and it is
something that has been ongoing in legal and academic circles
for several years now.
And I think what is interesting and what has happened since
the report's publication in 2020, where we had explained some
of these issues with the ColRegs in one of the appendix. We had
laid out what we thought could be issues, because the Coast
Guard as a user of the----
Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. We have 45 seconds, so,
just give me the quick answer.
Mr. Pribyl. It is being evaluated at the IMO.
Mr. Auchincloss. Could they have--I mean, because right now
there is a duty to render care, as Mr. Spain laid out in his
written testimony. Could they fulfill that duty?
Mr. Pribyl. Yes. There are interpretations that say that
there could be a way by which that could be successfully
rendered, even remotely, but that's all legal and the
interpretations of it are varied.
The issue, though, with the ColRegs that I want to point
out was that, as a user, the Coast Guard has said that the
ColRegs can be complied with without anyone on board or with
remote operations by promulgation of the Naval Commanders
Handbook. And in that publication, that is clearly made as a
position of DoD's and Navy's----
Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. There could be a human in
the loop, even remotely, to step in.
Mr. Pribyl. That's the Naval Commanders--that has been
published since 2020, and that's the interpretation there. So,
the bottom line is these are all subject to interpretation
right now.
Mr. Auchincloss. I yield back.
Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back.
That pretty much concludes where we are going. Thank you
for the people that came, testified; it was very informative,
and we really appreciate it.
I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in
writing.
Without objection, show that ordered.
I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
for 15 days for any additional comments and information
submitted by the Members or witnesses to be included in the
record of today's hearing.
And with that, this powerful subcommittee is adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
Submissions for the Record
----------
Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster of Florida, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
We meet today to discuss the use of autonomous and experimental
maritime technologies by the Coast Guard and industry, and to consider
the work that must be done to establish an appropriate regulatory
framework for their safe operation.
I'd like to welcome our distinguished witnesses joining us today.
We will be hearing testimony from two panels. On our first panel, we
have Rear Admiral Wayne Arguin Jr., Assistant Commandant for Prevention
Policy; and Rear Admiral Todd Wiemers, Assistant Commandant for
Capability.
On our second panel, we will hear from Mr. Sean Pribyl, Committee
Member for the National Academy of Sciences report on Leveraging
Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions; Mr. Michael Johnson, Chief
Executive Officer and Founder of Sea Machines Robotics; Mr. Patrick
Lahey, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of Triton Submarines; and
Mr. Christian Spain, Vice President of Government Relations for
American Maritime Officers.
Autonomous and experimental maritime technologies consist of a wide
range of evolving systems that promise to revolutionize many processes
while drastically changing the operations of our current marine
transportation system. Industry has led the way in developing unmanned
and autonomous technologies, which can greatly expand the capabilities
of U.S. mariners to perform a variety of missions and tasks both safer
and more efficiently.
The Coast Guard is just beginning to leverage some of these
technologies, such as the limited use of unmanned systems to expand
domain awareness. However, Service-wide integration is still a ways
off. Congress, meanwhile, has enacted several legislative measures to
ensure the Coast Guard has comprehensive plans to successfully leverage
these technologies.
Given the ongoing drug and migrant crises that continue to strain
already limited Coast Guard resources, it is crucial that the Service
implements these technologies as soon as possible to improve
surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities and allow manned
resources to be more readily available for response and interdiction
efforts. Adversaries and criminal networks are already using these
technologies to their advantage, such as using unmanned submersibles to
move illicit drugs, and we must counter with similar technologies to
establish persistent maritime domain awareness.
As the Coast Guard works to integrate these technologies throughout
its missions, the commercial sector continues to increase its use of
autonomous systems. Industry-led technological innovations have led to
the development and testing of autonomous container vessels, the
successful trans-Atlantic voyage of the Mayflower Autonomous Ship, and
the use of autonomous barges by the commercial space industry for at-
sea recovery of rocket boosters.
All of these examples underscore that it is imperative the Coast
Guard develop a stable regulatory framework for the safe operation of
these technologies. This is no longer in-the-future technology. The
technology is here.
As federal statutes currently assume that operators will be
physically onboard vessels, we must also ensure our laws meet the
changing nature of vessels in our waters. In addition to these
autonomous technologies, other experimental technologies, such as Wing-
In-Ground Craft and manned submersibles, are also increasing in use,
requiring the Coast Guard's regulation and oversight.
In light of the totally preventable tragedy of the Titan
submersible earlier this year, prompt attention to governing evolving
maritime technologies is essential to avoid a similar disaster in the
future.
I'd like to thank all our witnesses for joining us here today and
look forward to a great discussion.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
Thank you, Chair Webster and Ranking Member Carbajal for holding
this important hearing. Today we will hear from leaders in the Coast
Guard and the maritime industry about exciting innovations in
autonomous and experimental vessels.
Autonomous Vessels
Automation will play an increasingly important role in both the
commercial maritime industry and Coast Guard operations. Coast Guard
UAVs, engine automation, use of uncrewed vessels, and the better
collection and use of data will expand the reach of the Service without
requiring more Coasties.
To best leverage new technologies, the Coast Guard needs
significant financial and human resources. Any cuts to the Coast
Guard's funding will send us in the wrong direction.
Autonomous vessels present some clear opportunities for the Coast
Guard to expand its capacity, such as in completing dangerous missions
in inhospitable climates like the Arctic, increasing surveillance
capacity and enhancing oversight of fishing operations. However, I have
concerns over the lack of a regulatory framework for new technologies
and autonomous vessels. For example, the Titan submersible tragedy
demonstrates a need for stronger rules and safety requirements for
experimental vessels and emerging technologies.
The international maritime industry, where ships are often owned by
investors, built in one country, registered in a different country, and
operated by mariners from all over the world, is defined by a
complicated framework of regulations and oversight.
Plus, current law assumes that vessels are crewed by people.
Developing an effective regulatory framework for autonomous vessels
will be a major undertaking--requiring coordination between Congress,
the Coast Guard, and the International Maritime Organization.
Labor
We must also consider automation's potential impact on maritime
jobs. Maintaining the availability of well-paying jobs and minimizing
the displacement of jobs from automation is a priority of mine.
Innovation cannot come at the cost of American jobs. To this end,
it is important to include labor organizations early in conversations
around a regulatory framework.
Clean Vessels
On the topic of innovation, the development of new vessel
technology brings the opportunity to incorporate low- and zero-carbon
emission technologies into vessel design.
Many vessels in use today use heavy fuel oil, which emits carbon
dioxide, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide when combusted. Carbon
dioxide is a well-known greenhouse gas, and sulfur dioxide and nitrogen
oxide are both air pollutants linked to respiratory disease.
New vessels must be built to reduce and eventually eliminate
emissions and makes our waterways and communities cleaner.
I'm proud that, in my home state of Washington, we are in the
process of building a fleet of hybrid-electric ferries. Washington
State Ferries is the largest ferry system in the U.S. and is the
biggest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions among Washington state
agencies. This transition to hybrid-electric ferries will greatly
reduce pollution.
I see a similar opportunity for developing new, clean autonomous
vessels and building them in U.S. shipyards.
Closing
At their best, new technologies increase safety and efficiency,
reduce emissions and create a better experience for workers. At their
worst, new technologies introduce security vulnerabilities, decrease
safety, increase the risk of accidents, and displace workers.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can
ensure a smooth and safe transition to new technologies.
Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal of California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
I wanted to also extend my deepest condolences to the Peltola
family and our colleague, Mary, on the passing of her husband Buzzy.
The family has my deepest sympathy and I look forward to her coming
back when she feels ready.
On June 18th of this year, 5 lives were lost when the Titan
submersible imploded descending to the depths of the ocean to visit the
Titanic wreckage. I share my condolences to the families of the
victims.
Today, we will look at new and experimental maritime technology
and, particularly in the shadow of this tragedy, I hope to hear from
the Coast Guard and industry on how they plan to ensure safety.
It is important to foster innovation while also protecting lives.
The passengers onboard the Titan were not designated as passengers by
Oceangate--the owners of the submersible. Rather, they were referred to
as a crew, which allowed the company to subvert legal consequences.
In addition, the submersible was not classed, was flagged to the
Bahamas, and used materials and designs that had been rejected as
unsafe by the rest of the industry.
I am an advocate for passenger and crew safety and we should all
demand the utmost regard for safety to apply to any new technology,
submersible, or autonomous vessels.
The maritime industry is innovating rapidly. For both the Coast
Guard and the maritime industry, automation has the potential to reduce
operational risk, increase safety for mariners and the environment,
increase efficiency and transparency, reduce emissions and increase
capacity. This is an exciting time and I look forward to hearing about
new technological advancements.
However, I have concerns about the removal or reduction of crew
unless safety is taken into full consideration and the proper
regulations are developed. Current applicable regulations are written
with the assumption that crew are onboard the vessels. These
regulations are not meant to apply to these new crewless vessels.
We've seen instances in the past where a lack of a watchstander has
cost lives. In many circumstances, you simply cannot replace a human
presence. When automation is implemented, we must protect U.S. jobs and
train the workforce to oversee those systems.
It is imperative that the International Maritime Organization and
the U.S. Coast Guard update regulations on autonomous vessels before
they become widespread. The recreational vessel classification of the
MAYFLOWER--an autonomous vessel that recently sailed across the ocean
unmanned--is unacceptable and reduced safety oversight to practically
zero.
While I hold concerns, I recognize that technology is progressing
and innovation should be embraced when done properly. The U.S. must
position itself to be a leader in new maritime technology.
My state of California is a leader in blue technology development
such as autonomous or remote systems that allow the Coast Guard to
expand their mission capabilities and improve maritime domain
awareness.
The Maritime Environmental and Technical Assistance program (META)
is a small but important program for innovation within the Maritime
Administration. This program assists the research, development, and
demonstration of new technology in the maritime industry.
META is incredibly underfunded at $10 million this year and without
expansion, it will never reach the potential it could have in
establishing the U.S. as a leader in maritime innovation. We must
continue to fund this program and expand its reach.
Climate change is the single largest threat of our time. I would be
remiss not to advocate for the acceleration of alternative fuels and
emissions reducing technology in maritime in a conversation about
innovation. This year we've already seen extreme heatwaves, intense
hurricanes, deadly floods, and historic wildfires. My own district saw
devastating flooding and mudslides; events that will forever impact my
constituents.
Each one of these threats puts increased burdens on the U.S. Coast
Guard and has the potential to disrupt the U.S. economy and the
maritime supply chain.
Innovation in maritime and Coast Guard assets is vital but we must
proceed with caution. Safety is always paramount, and we must keep jobs
and emissions in mind as we progress.
Thank you and I yield back.
Appendix
----------
Questions to Rear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin, Assistant Commandant for
Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Salud O. Carbajal
1. Autonomous Ships
Question 1.a. What risks do autonomous vessels pose to the U.S.
Marine Transportation System (MTS)?
Answer. The Coast Guard's priority is to effectively manage the
risks associated with the increasing use of these platforms on our
waterways. Depending on the level of autonomy, known risks include, but
are not limited to, navigational safety concerns, cybersecurity
vulnerabilities, and equipment and technology failures. The Coast Guard
is committed to continuously evaluating the unique risks associated
with autonomous and experimental maritime technology and is working,
both internationally and domestically, to develop a suitable governance
framework that safely and effectively integrates autonomous and remote-
control technologies into the maritime domain.
Question 1.b. What is the USCG doing to prepare for those risks?
Answer. The Coast Guard leverages its authorities to address novel
designs and operations to facilitate innovation in the maritime domain.
The Coast Guard partners with industry and other Federal agencies to
institute best practices and safety management systems to ensure vessel
designs and operations are executed safely while not being hampered by
unnecessary regulations. Additionally, the Coast Guard is actively
engaged with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and
interagency partners to develop an appropriate regulatory framework for
autonomous cargo vessels, subject to the Safety of Life at Sea
convention that will provide for safe, secure, and environmentally
sound incorporation of these new technologies. The Coast Guard is
committed to developing suitable international and domestic governance
frameworks to integrate autonomous and remote-control technologies
safely and properly into the maritime domain, and a workforce that is
ready and capable to oversee these technologies.
Question 1.c. Regarding autonomous ships, what safety features need
to be legislated/regulated?
Answer. The Coast Guard leverages its current authorities to
support and oversee the safe implementation of these technologies and
their operations in the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS).
However, several current domestic statutory and regulatory regimes for
commercial maritime operations are predicated on mariners being onboard
vessels; therefore, there are design and operational aspects of
autonomous vessels that are not contemplated by the existing statutory
and regulatory regime. The Coast Guard, through its Automated and
Autonomous Vessel Policy Council, consistently evaluates emerging
system automation, remote operational capabilities, and vessel autonomy
through various lines of effort, to include: review of laws,
regulations, and policies; examination of manning and credentialing
issues; assessment of risk associated with integrating automation and
autonomous operations; and, improvement of project development and
compliance tools. As the Coast Guard identifies definitive legislation
needed to best ensure the safe and efficient incorporation of these new
technologies, the Service will propose updates to current legislation
through the legislative change proposal process.
Question 1.d. Will autonomous vessels be more vulnerable to cyber
threats?
Answer. These new technologies rely heavily on interconnected
information technology, operational technology, and cyber-connected
systems. As these technologies are incorporated into vessels and
maritime systems, maintaining sufficient safeguards to protect against
cyber-attacks from malicious actors will be critical.
Question 1.e. Will autonomous vessels be required to have a
``person in charge''?
Answer. At present, U.S. laws require all vessels to have a
``person in charge'' or master.
Question 1.f. With crewed and autonomous vessels operating
together, how will collisions be avoided?
Answer. All vessels, regardless of the number of crewmembers
onboard, are currently required to comply with the Convention on the
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972
(COLREGs). If vessel owners or operators are seeking to reduce the
number of crew onboard, due the use of autonomous technology, they must
demonstrate that these technologies are able to comply with the
requirements of the COLREGs.
Question 1.g. Is the U.S. Coast Guard and other international
bodies prepared to investigate an incident involving these vessels?
Answer. The Coast Guard is prepared to investigate incidents
involving vessels with increased levels of automation. As with any
change in technology, the Coast Guard training programs for Marine
Investigators are updated to ensure investigating officers are
knowledgeable on the current technology used in the maritime domain.
Question 1.h. What resources does the U.S. Coast Guard need to
prepare for such investigations?
Answer. The Coast Guard continuously evaluates the training
resource needs to ensure the proficiency of our workforce. If new
resources are needed to prepare for and conduct investigations into
marine casualties involving automated vessels, the Coast Guard will
evaluate these resource needs as part of the annual budget process.
Question 1.i. What will be the role of Federal and State Maritime
Pilots aboard an uncrewed vessel?
Answer. The future role of Federal and State Maritime Pilots
onboard autonomous vessels without a crew is currently being evaluated.
A representative from the American Pilot Association is included within
U.S. Delegations discussing this issue within the Maritime Autonomous
Surface Ships (MASS) initiative at the IMO.
Question 1.j. If autonomous vessels use AI, are there elevated
risks associated with that?
Answer. Similar to the incorporation of other new technologies,
there are new risks that must be evaluated and accounted for to ensure
the benefits are safely and efficiently incorporated into the MTS.
Question 1.k. Could autonomous vessels still be used as vessels of
opportunity in search and rescue operations, how would they impact SAR?
Answer. The ongoing MASS discussions at the IMO include
consideration of how search and rescue obligations apply to autonomous
cargo vessels. The Coast Guard will consider how to best incorporate
any outcomes from the IMO into our regulatory and operational
frameworks.
Question 1.l. Would hazardous materials be transported on
autonomous ships?
Answer. Presently, hazardous material cannot be transported on
autonomous commercial vessels. In the future, the United States may
consider allowing hazardous materials to be transported onboard
autonomous commercial ships, if and only if the vessels meet equivalent
level of safety of existing law or regulation.
2. Titan Investigation
Question 2.a. What challenges does the TITAN sinking pose to Coast
Guard investigators?
Answer. The primary challenge thus far in the investigation was
deconflicting and coordinating with the various nations that have
jurisdiction to conduct a safety investigation into the incident. The
United Kingdom, France, and Pakistan are considered substantially
interested states (SISs) under the IMO marine casualty investigation
protocols. The United Kingdom and France exercised their SIS status and
are participating in the U.S. Coast Guard's Marine Board of
Investigation (MBI). In addition, Canada has primary IMO jurisdiction
as the flag administration of the vessel that towed the submersible
TITAN to the accident site and provided operational oversight and
support for the submersible operations. The Transportation Safety Board
of Canada (TSB) is conducting an independent safety investigation on
behalf Canada and the MBI is cooperating with TSB during the joint
fact-finding and evidence collection phase of our concurrent safety
investigations.
Question 2.b. Did the U.S. Coast Guard get cooperation from other
agencies? Countries?
Answer. The cooperation, to the extent allowed by the domestic laws
of the other involved countries, has been excellent between all
international investigative entities. In September 2023, investigators
from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and TSB
joined marine safety engineers from the MBI during a second salvage
mission that successfully recovered the remaining submersible TITAN
debris and other evidence from the accident site. The MBI leveraged an
existing contract with Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV)
to conduct the second mission. Engineers from the U.K. Royal Navy also
supported the salvage operations. The MBI is hosting a TITAN debris
evidence review session next month with all the safety agencies to
determine next steps for forensic testing of the debris.
The post-salvage support from multiple U.S. agencies and the Navy
has been superior. The Navy is providing secure storage of the debris
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation Evidence Response Team assisted
with all processing of presumed human remains from the accident. Those
remains are now being forensically tested at the Armed Forces Medical
Examiner's Office in Dover, DE.
Question 2.c. Regarding the TITAN, how much did the evidence
recovery cost and how can we better prepare for such needs in the
future?
Answer. The MBI coordinated two salvage missions through Navy
SUPSALV and the total cost was $3.4 million. The NTSB covered salvage
costs for past major marine casualties (e.g., the steamship EL FARO
salvage operations to recover the vessel's voyage data recorder)
because they were serving as the lead Federal agency. Between U.S.
Coast Guard and NTSB resources, future salvage missions related to
marine casualties are expected to be supported.
Question 2.d. Is the operator of the TITAN cooperating in this
investigation?
Answer. Yes. To date, the operator of the TITAN is fully
cooperating with all MBI and NTSB requests and subpoenas.
Question 2.e. Do you anticipate similar submarine excursion
operators and what, if any, laws or regulations are needed to address
risk in this sector?
Answer. There are seven submersible vessels that are United States
flagged. Two of these vessels are uninspected Oceanographic Research
Vessels (ORVs), as defined by 46 United States Code (USC) 2101(24) and
are no longer in operation. Five vessels are small passenger vessels,
as defined by 46 U.S.C. 2101(47), and are inspected under 46 Code of
Federal Regulations Subchapter T. The Coast Guard has confirmed that
there are no other active submersible ORVs operating in U.S. navigable
waters or internationally under the U.S. flag. Further, the Coast Guard
is unaware of non-U.S. registered submersible vessels operating in or
intending to operate in U.S. navigable waters. The potential need for
any changes to laws, regulations, or international convention remains
under investigation by the Marine Board.
[all]