[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]








USE AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS AND EXPERIMENTAL MARITIME TECHNOLOGIES

=======================================================================

                                (118-28)

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           SEPTEMBER 19, 2023

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure






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                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                 
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             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
Rick Larsen, Washington,             Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, 
  Ranking Member                     Arkansas
Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Daniel Webster, Florida
  District of Columbia               Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Grace F. Napolitano, California      Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Brian Babin, Texas
John Garamendi, California           Garret Graves, Louisiana
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiavid Rouzer, North Carolina
Andre Carson, Indiana                Mike Bost, Illinois
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Doug LaMalfa, California
Jared Huffman, California            Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Julia Brownley, California           Brian J. Mast, Florida
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey       Puerto Rico
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Salud O. Carbajal, California        Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Greg Stanton, Arizona,               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
  Vice Ranking Member                Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Colin Z. Allred, Texas                 Vice Chairman
Sharice Davids, Kansas               Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Lance Gooden, Texas
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire          Tracey Mann, Kansas
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Burgess Owens, Utah
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts      Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            Chuck Edwards, North Carolina
Patrick Ryan, New York               Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska         Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Eric Burlison, Missouri
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 John James, Michigan
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio            Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
                                     Mike Collins, Georgia
                                     Mike Ezell, Mississippi
                                     John S. Duarte, California
                                     Aaron Bean, Florida
                                ------                                 

        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                   Daniel Webster, Florida, Chairman
Brian Babin, Texas                   Salud O. Carbajal, California,
Brian J. Mast, Florida                 Ranking Member
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,            John Garamendi, California
  Puerto Rico                        Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey       Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts
Mike Ezell, Mississippi, Vice        Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska
    Chairman                         Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan,
Aaron Bean, Florida                    Vice Ranking Member
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)    Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex 
                                         Officio)






























                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in 
  Congress from the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee 
  on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation.....................    53
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in 
  Congress from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.................    54
Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in 
  Congress from the State of California, and Ranking Member, 
  Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation........    55

                               WITNESSES
                                Panel 1

Rear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin, Assistant Commandant for Prevention 
  Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement.......................     2
Rear Admiral Todd C. Wiemers, Assistant Commandant for 
  Capabilities, U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement.................     4
    Joint prepared statement of Rear Admirals Arguin and Wiemers.     5

                                Panel 2

Sean T. Pribyl, Esq., Member, Committee on Coast Guard Maritime 
  Domain Awareness, National Academies Report, ``Leveraging 
  Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions: A Strategic 
  Imperative,'' oral statement...................................    21
    Prepared statement...........................................    22
Michael Gordon Johnson, Marine Engineer, and Founder and Chief 
  Executive Officer, Sea Machines Robotics, Inc., oral statement.    29
    Prepared statement...........................................    31
Patrick Lahey, Cofounder and Chief Executive Officer, Triton 
  Submarines, oral statement.....................................    36
    Prepared statement...........................................    37
T. Christian Spain, Vice President of Government Relations, 
  American Maritime Officers, oral statement.....................    40
    Prepared statement...........................................    41

                                APPENDIX

Questions to Rear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin, Assistant Commandant 
  for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Salud O. 
  Carbajal.......................................................    57

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                           September 15, 2023

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Use and Regulation of 
Autonomous and Experimental Maritime Technologies''
_______________________________________________________________________


                               I. PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will hold 
a hearing on Tuesday, September 19, 2023, at 2:00 p.m. ET in 
2253 Rayburn House Office Building to receive testimony on 
``Use and Regulation of Autonomous and Experimental Maritime 
Technologies.'' Focusing on increasingly automated and 
experimental technologies in the maritime industry, the hearing 
will examine commercial and United States Coast Guard (Coast 
Guard or Service) uses of these technologies and the regulatory 
changes necessary to assure their safe use. Members will 
receive testimony from two panels of witnesses. The first panel 
will include representatives from the Coast Guard. The second 
panel will include representatives from the National Academy of 
Sciences, Triton Submarines, Sea Machines Robotics, Inc, and 
American Maritime Officers.

                             II. BACKGROUND

    The maritime industry is currently experiencing significant 
innovations as the use of autonomous and experimental 
technologies increases in frequency. The global market size for 
autonomous ships alone was valued at $5.21 billion in 2022 and 
is projected to grow to $9.87 billion by 2030.\1\ In response 
to this growing industry, Congress has enacted several 
legislative provisions to support the Coast Guard's efforts to 
leverage and regulate these developing technologies. The Frank 
LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (P.L. 115-282) 
required an assessment of available unmanned, autonomous, or 
remotely controlled maritime domain awareness technologies for 
use by the Coast Guard.\2\ The Don Young Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 2022 (P.L. 117-263) established the 
unmanned system program and autonomous control and computer 
vision technology project as well as an at-sea recovery 
operations pilot program.\3\ Most recently, the Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 2023, reported out of the Committee on 
Transportation and Infrastructure on April 26, 2023, includes a 
requirement for the Coast Guard to detail the establishment of 
an Unmanned Systems Capabilities Office and creates a National 
Advisory Committee on Autonomous Maritime Systems.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Autonomous Ships Market Size, Share: Forecast Report [2030], 
(Aug. 2023), available at https://www.fortunebusinessinsights.com/
industry-reports/autonomous-ship-market-101797.
    \2\ Frank LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. 
No. 115-282, 132 Stat. 4303.
    \3\ Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2022, Pub. L. No. 
117-263, 136 Stat. 4024 & 4131.
    \4\ Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, H.R. 2741, 118th Cong. 
(2023).
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                    III. USE WITHIN THE COAST GUARD

    The 2020 National Academies of Sciences Report, Leveraging 
Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions, recommended a major 
realignment of the Coast Guard's unmanned systems approach to 
better focus on a pacing mechanism that proactively identifies, 
investigates, and integrates potential systems.\5\ The Coast 
Guard currently employs unmanned systems mostly for platform-
centric missions, such as onboard National Security Cutters to 
increase surveillance capabilities.\6\ However, the Service has 
identified various missions that the technology would greatly 
increase mission capabilities, including Arctic ice cover 
research, inspections of vessels and aids to navigation, 
oversight of fishing vessel operations, and criminal 
interdiction programs.\7\ The Coast Guard's Blue Technology 
Center of Expertise (Center) is responsible for the 
identification of maritime technologies the Service can 
leverage to improve the execution of National security and 
humanitarian missions.\8\ Additionally, the Center develops 
partnerships with industry, academia, and government agencies 
to best facilitate adoption of these technologies.\9\ Coast 
Guard research and development pursuits currently focus on 
maritime unmanned systems technology, the conversion of Coast 
Guard boats to optionally crewed assets, evaluating and 
improving unmanned surface vehicle collision avoidance 
technology, and enabling reduced-cost sensor deployment 
capabilities.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Nat'l Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, 
Leveraging Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions, (2020), available 
at https://doi.org/10.17226/25987.
    \6\ United States Coast Guard Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan, 
(March 2023), available at https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/
DCO%20Documents/2023%20Unmanned%20Systems
%20Strategic%20Plan.pdf.
    \7\ Id.
    \8\ Blue Technology Center of Expertise, (last accessed Sept. 12, 
2023), available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Blue-Tech-COE/.
    \9\ Id.
    \10\ United States Coast Guard Report to Congress: Research and 
Development on Unmanned Surface Vehicles, (2023), (on file with Comm.).
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     IV. REGULATION BY THE COAST GUARD AND INTERNATIONAL MARITIME 
                              ORGANIZATION

    As the principal Federal maritime regulatory and law 
enforcement agency, the Coast Guard is working to craft 
regulations to monitor activities like the use of unmanned 
barges and spaceport drone ships for commercial space 
companies, autonomous navigation, and fully autonomous shipping 
vehicles.\11\ Additionally, the Service must determine how best 
to counter small unmanned submarines moving illicit drugs.\12\ 
While the use of autonomous and experimental systems are not 
yet common place, their expected future use raises a host of 
regulatory issues including manning, testing, safety, security, 
mariner credentialing, and pilotage.\13\ The Coast Guard will 
likely need to develop comprehensive guidance or other 
regulatory standards for surface, subsurface, and aerial spaces 
similar to efforts underway at the Federal Aviation 
Administration.\14\ The Coast Guard's broad range of statutory 
authorities will likely allow it to address most regulatory 
requirements, but it must continuously reassess and update 
future regulatory frameworks to account for evolving 
technologies.\15\ However, the Coast Guard's authorities may be 
deficient in areas such as safety regulations, where 
international conventions are built around the assumption that 
humans will be physically on-board vessels at all times.\16\ 
United States' Federal law currently makes similar assumptions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Nat'l Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, Coast 
Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and Statutory 
Needs 1, (2023), available at https://nap.nationalacademies.org/
catalog/27059/the-coast-guards-next-decade-an-assessment-of-emerging-
challenges-and-statutory-needs [hereinafter Assessment].
    \12\ Id.
    \13\ Id.
    \14\ Id.
    \15\ Id.
    \16\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Moreover, the Coast Guard and Congress may need to consider 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) efforts to 
establish a regulatory framework for the operation of Maritime 
Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS).\17\ The IMO created a joint 
working group on MASS to consider high-priority safety, legal, 
and facilitation issues following regulatory scoping exercises 
that looked at how existing regulatory instruments can apply to 
MASS and what regulatory gaps exist.\18\ The joint working 
group has so far agreed on the need for a human master to be 
responsible for autonomous vessels, also determining that the 
master does not need to be present on board during operation, 
but must have the ability to intervene as needed and a single 
remote operations center must be responsible for an autonomous 
vessel at any point.\19\ As the IMO joint working group 
continues to consider further matters pertaining to MASS 
operations, the Coast Guard can leverage lessons learned to 
align future United States regulatory regimes with best 
practices identified by the IMO.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ IMO, Developing a regulatory framework for autonomous 
shipping, (Apr. 27, 2023), available at https://www.imo.org/en/
MediaCentre/Pages/WhatsNew-1872.aspx.
    \18\ Id.
    \19\ Id.
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              V. AUTONOMOUS AND EXPERIMENTAL TECHNOLOGIES

    The rapid introduction of autonomous systems within the 
maritime industry has the potential to increase efficiency and 
reduce operational risk. Autonomous systems can act as 
technology integration platforms linking vessel navigation, 
sensing, propulsion, and reporting capabilities with the 
potential to accomplish a variety of missions and 
operations.\20\ The degree of autonomy in systems can vary. The 
IMO identifies four varying degrees of automation which 
include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Assessment, supra note 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LDegree 1--Ships with automated processes and 
decision support where some operations are automated, but 
seafarers are onboard and can intervene as needed;
     LDegree 2--Ships that can be remotely controlled 
from a separate location, but seafarers are onboard and can 
intervene as needed;
     LDegree 3--Remotely controlled ships without 
seafarers onboard in which the ship is controlled from a 
separate location; and
     LDegree 4--Fully autonomous ships with operating 
systems capable of making decisions and taking actions without 
any human intervention.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Argyro Kepesedi, Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships: A critical 
`MASS' for Legislative Review, UNCTAD, (Dec.13, 2022), available at 
https://unctad.org/news/transport-newsletter-article-no-97-fourth-
quarter-2022.

    Uncrewed Maritime Vehicles (UMV) constitute a range of 
maritime technologies currently being manufactured in the 
United States and elsewhere.\22\ Common types of UMVs include:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ AUVSI, The 2023 Quarterly Insight--Q2, (2023), available at 
https://www.auvsi.org/sites/default/files/AUVSI-Quarterly-Insight-
Q2.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LRemotely Operated Vehicles (ROV) that operate 
remotely underwater through the use of an umbilical or tether 
connected to a surface control system;
     LAutonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUV) that operate 
independently underwater without any direct control from an 
operator;
     LUnmanned Service Vehicles (USV) that operate on 
the water's surface either autonomously or remotely through 
air-based communication systems; and
     LHybrid UMVs that utilize a combination of 
technologies from these categories to provide varying mission 
capabilities.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Id.

    Each of these platforms have varying sizes, weights, and 
capabilities that can be utilized in the commercial sector or 
by the military.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The testing and proliferation of uses for these 
technologies is growing as the industry continues to expand. 
SpaceX, a commercial space launch company, has utilized 
unmanned commercial barges for the recovery of booster rockets 
at sea, as the company promotes the barge's capability to 
navigate itself to and from port, without crew or tow.\25\ The 
Mayflower Autonomous Ship, a project led by the non-profit 
maritime research organization ProMare with partners such as 
IBM, completed a trans-Atlantic crossing between England and 
the United States.\26\ The Mayflower Autonomous Ship arrived in 
Plymouth, Massachusetts, in June 2022, and is the largest 
uncrewed vessel to complete that journey.\27\ Utilizing six 
Artificial Intelligence (AI) powered cameras along with over 30 
sensors and 15 edge devices, the vessel's ``AI Captain'' 
adhered to maritime law and rerouted itself around hazards and 
marine animals, while optimizing decisions and mitigating risk 
based on data it collected.\28\ Meanwhile, the Yara Birkeland, 
a fully electric and autonomous container vessel, has been 
sailing partially crewed in Southern Norway carrying up to 100 
containers along a short fixed route.\29\ Yara, the fertilizer 
company based in Norway that owns the vessel, plans to 
gradually reduce the crew onboard until operations can occur 
completely unmanned, with the bridge eventually being 
removed.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ SpaceX May Have the Largest Unmanned Merchant Vessel in 
Operation, Maritime Exec., (July 13, 2021), available at https://
maritime-executive.com/article/spacex-may-have-the-largest-unmanned-
merchant-vessel-in-operation.
    \26\ Mayflower Autonomous Ship Completes Historic Atlantic 
Crossing, Maritime Exec., (July 1, 2022), available at https://
maritime-executive.com/article/mayflower-autonomous-ship-completes-
historic-atlantic-crossing.
    \27\ Id.
    \28\ Id.
    \29\ Adrienne Murray, Crewless container ships appear on the 
horizon, BBC, (Mar. 24, 2023), available at https://www.bbc.com/news/
business-64875319.
    \30\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These and other experimental crafts that operate both 
uncrewed or with passengers onboard continue to be developed 
and will require concrete regulatory frameworks to govern 
operations.

                       VI. THE TITAN SUBMERSIBLE

    On June 18, 2023, five souls onboard perished when the 
OceanGate submersible vessel ``Titan'' imploded. As the first 
time someone died piloting or riding in a submersible in nearly 
a century, the extended search for the Titan garnered 
international headlines and launched a renewed interest in 
experimental craft. The Coast Guard coordinated the search and 
rescue efforts that spanned multiple days, cost millions of 
dollars, and utilized assets from the United States, France, 
and Canada.\31\ Ultimately, the Coast Guard convened a Marine 
Board of Investigation to examine the loss of the Titan 
submersible.\32\ The Transportation Safety Board of Canada is 
also investigating the case.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ United States Coast Guard Will Lead Investigation of Titan 
implosion with help from Canada, France, UK, CNBC, (June 25, 2023), 
available at https://www.cnbc.com/2023/06/25/
us-coast-guard-will-lead-investigation-of-titan-implosion-with-help-
from-canada-france-uk.html?
&qsearchterm=U.S.%20coast%20guard%20will%20lead%20investigation%20of%20t
itan%20sub.
    \32\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Titan fell outside a single country's jurisdiction or 
regulation. It was American made, operated in international 
waters by a Bahamian registered company, launched from a 
Canadian-flagged support vessel, and was not registered under 
the United States flag, or the flag of any other nation.\33\ 
Titan also had several cost-saving departures from proven 
submersible designs. Specifically, Titan had a pill shaped hull 
to accommodate more passengers, which was constructed from a 
combination of carbon-fiber and titanium.\34\ Unlike other 
deep-sea submersibles, Titan was not inspected by any reputable 
marine organizations, nor did it undergo a classification 
process.\35\ While the Passenger Vessel Safety Act of 1993 
(P.L. 103-206) increased safety standards for passenger 
vessels, including submersibles, OceanGate was able to 
circumvent these requirements by neither flying a United States 
flag nor setting off from a United States port.\36\ In the days 
following the Titan implosion, underwater explorers and 
industry professionals claimed they had longstanding concerns 
about Titan's use of novel materials and designs, as well as 
Titan's failure to undergo an independent certification process 
that ensures safety standards.\37\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Tom Porter, Stockton Rush deliberately structured OceanGate's 
Titanic Operations to be outside United States jurisdiction, says 
former employee: report, Insider, (July 3, 2023), available at https://
www.insider.com/oceangate-structured-titan-operations-to-fall-outside-
us-law-report-2023-7 [hereinafter OceanGate].
    \34\ Helmuth Rosales, et al., The Maverick Design Choices that May 
Have Doomed Titan, N.Y. Times, (July 14, 2023), available at https://
www.nytimes.com/interactive/2023/07/14/us/titan-submersible-implode-
design.html.
    \35\ Id.
    \36\ See Pub. L. No. 103-206, 107 Stat. 2439.
    \37\ OceanGate, supra note 33.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             VII. WITNESSES

PANEL I

     LRear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin Jr., Assistant 
Commandant for Prevention Policy (CG-5P), United States Coast 
Guard
     LRear Admiral Todd Wiemers, Assistant Commandant 
for Capability (CG-7), United States Coast Guard

PANEL II

     LMr. Sean Pribyl, Committee Member, Committee on 
Coast Guard Maritime Domain Awareness, National Academy of 
Sciences Report, ``Leveraging Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard 
Missions''
     LMr. Michael Johnson, Chief Executive Officer, Sea 
Machines Robotics Inc.
     LMr. Patrick Lahey, Co-Founder and Chief Executive 
Officer, Triton Submarines
     LMr. T. Christian Spain, Vice President of 
Government Relations, American Maritime Officers


 
USE AND REGULATION OF AUTONOMOUS AND EXPERIMENTAL MARITIME TECHNOLOGIES

                              ----------                              


                      TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 19, 2023

                  House of Representatives,
          Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
                                    Transportation,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:02 p.m. in 
room 2253 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Webster 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chair be authorized to 
declare a recess--which might happen here any minute--during 
the hearing.
    Without objection, show that adopted.
    I also would ask unanimous consent for the subcommittee to 
permit those not on the subcommittee to ask questions and be a 
part of the hearing.
    Without objection, show that ordered.
    As a reminder, Members who wish to insert a document into 
the record, please also email it to [email protected].
    Before we begin, I want to take a moment just to send my 
deepest condolences to our colleague, Mrs. Peltola, and her 
entire family, on the loss of her husband, Buzz Peltola, Jr. 
And we are saddened by that, yet we reach out to them. We hope 
that they will have comfort in being together and having the 
time together.
    So, I recognize the ranking member, Mr. Larsen, for remarks 
that he would like to provide for Mrs. Peltola.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, sir.
    I also want to extend condolences to Mary and her family on 
the loss of Buzzy. And I had a chance to meet him a few times 
over the last couple years. He was a great gentleman, a fun one 
to hang around with. And I know they are a large blended 
family, and there is a lot of sorrow in the Peltola family and 
the Bethel community, as well.
    So, I want to extend my condolences, as well, to Mary. And 
we look forward to having her back, but she should be back on 
her own timeline, her family's timeline, as well.
    So, thank you.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    I now recognize myself for the purposes of an opening 
statement for 5 minutes.
    Due to time constraints we face today with the scheduling 
on the floor, I am going to forgo my opening remarks and 
statement and, for the sake of time, allow our first 
panelists--our witnesses--to give their testimony.
    Thank you both for being here. We really appreciate it.
    So, now, I recognize Mr. Carbajal for an opening statement, 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chairman Webster. I, too, am going 
to forgo my statement and submit it for the record, my opening 
remarks.
    But I wanted to also extend my deepest condolences to the 
Peltola family and our colleague, Mary, on the passing of her 
husband, Buzzy. Certainly, this was tragic, and they are 
going--the family and our colleague are going through a lot. 
And I just want to extend my deepest, deepest condolences and 
sympathy, and I look forward to her coming back when she feels 
ready to come back.
    But certainly, anytime we have something like this occur, 
it reminds us of the work we have and the challenges that we 
have and the fact that anything can happen to us or our 
families at any one time and the importance that we need to 
cherish them. So, again, my condolences to the Peltola family.
    With that, I will yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, I would like to welcome our 
witnesses and thank them for being here today. Today's hearing 
has noted two panels, and so, we will begin with the first 
panel.
    Briefly, I would like to take a moment to explain the 
lighting system that we have. Green means go. Yellow means 
about over. Red means stop. That's it.
    I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements 
be included in the record.
    Without objection, show that ordered.
    As your written testimony has been made part of the record, 
I ask you to limit your remarks to 5 minutes.
    With that, Rear Admiral Arguin, you are recognized for 5 
minutes for your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE R. ARGUIN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 
FOR PREVENTION POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND REAR ADMIRAL TODD 
 C. WIEMERS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT FOR CAPABILITIES, U.S. COAST 
                             GUARD

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL WAYNE R. ARGUIN, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 
            FOR PREVENTION POLICY, U.S. COAST GUARD

    Admiral Arguin. Good afternoon, Chairman Webster, Ranking 
Member Carbajal, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
I am honored to appear before you today to update you on the 
autonomous and experimental maritime technology within the 
Marine Transportation System, or MTS.
    I, too, would also like to express my deepest condolences 
to Representative Peltola and her family and friends. Our 
thoughts and prayers are with her and her family.
    Our national security and economic prosperity are 
inextricably linked to a safe, efficient Marine Transportation 
System. Across the MTS, innovation is accelerating, creating 
new opportunities and benefits for the marine industry and the 
Nation.
    Exciting new innovations, including remote-controlled and 
autonomous technologies, are being developed to improve the 
efficiency of various aspects of the Marine Transportation 
System that will transform the use of our waterways. 
Additionally, the needs of the maritime industry are driving 
future ship propulsion fuel solutions, including liquefied 
natural gas, methanol, fuel cells, lithium-ion batteries, 
hydrogen, ammonia, and nuclear energy sources.
    While the potential benefits of these technologies could be 
significant, it is imperative to understand the potential risks 
and implement mitigation strategies to ensure the safety and 
security of our waterways. This responsibility is shared 
amongst all Marine Transportation System stakeholders.
    As the lead agency for safeguarding the MTS, the Coast 
Guard is committed to taking a commonsense approach, founded on 
our prevention and response frameworks, to evaluate and 
facilitate the use of emerging technologies to preserve the 
safe and efficient MTS.
    We must also ensure that mariners' training programs keep 
pace with this advancing technology. To achieve this, the 
Service must continue to invest in our ability to attract and 
retain the talent necessary to meet these challenges in an 
increasingly complex Marine Transportation System.
    The workforce is the heartbeat of our Service and is the 
reason we succeed at our missions. I am committing to 
supporting our workforce and field commanders, and we must 
think differently about how we deliver those services to the 
marine industry.
    We are investing in our national centers of expertise to 
augment and support our field commanders to meet this highly 
technical workload associated with this technology. We rely 
heavily on key partnerships throughout all levels of Government 
and industry in the United States and across the globe. 
Collaboration with the maritime industry is vital as we develop 
commonsense governance standards to rapidly employ these 
technologies safely and securely.
    With congressional support, the Service is taking full 
advantage of newly authorized opportunities, such as the at-sea 
recovery operations pilot program for space rocket recovery, to 
work with early adopters and evaluate new autonomous 
technologies that will inform the development of new standards.
    Internationally, the Coast Guard is leading U.S. efforts 
within the International Maritime Organization to develop 
standards for the safe, secure, and sustainable operation of 
maritime autonomous surface ships. The domestic and global 
focus on developing reimagined standards for these novel 
technologies will buy down risk inherent in an increasingly 
interconnected and cyber-dependent supply chain.
    The Service stands ready to support the maritime industry 
to address these risks to the MTS to ensure the safety of life 
at sea, the security of our waterways, the protection of the 
marine environment, and the efficient movement of goods 
throughout the Nation's waterways around the world.
    As the Coast Guard continues to evolve its oversight of 
these emerging technologies, we thank you for your essential 
and continued support on this important issue.
    I appreciate the opportunity to testify before you and look 
forward to your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Rear Admirals Arguin and 
Wiemers is on page 5.]
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    Next we will have Rear Admiral Wiemers, and you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF REAR ADMIRAL TODD C. WIEMERS, ASSISTANT COMMANDANT 
               FOR CAPABILITIES, U.S. COAST GUARD

    Admiral Wiemers. Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for your 
oversight and strong support of the Coast Guard. I am honored 
to be here today to update you on autonomous and experimental 
maritime technology.
    I, too, would like to send thoughts and prayers out to the 
Peltola family. Buzzy Peltola, as a father of two Coast Guard 
members, will forever be part of the Coast Guard family.
    The Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations, Vice 
Admiral Peter Gautier, released the Coast Guard's ``Unmanned 
Systems Strategic Plan'' in March. That plan outlines a vision 
for how the Service will respond to and embrace emergence of 
unmanned technology in the Maritime Domain.
    The vision for the future is one where the Coast Guard 
effectively employs, defends against, and regulates unmanned 
systems in the maritime environment. We are moving toward a 
future where the Coast Guard employs unmanned systems in an 
interconnected data network integrated with artificial 
intelligence to deliver actionable information to Coast Guard 
operators.
    Unmanned systems will be critical to the Coast Guard's 
ability to meet the challenges of an increasingly dynamic 
operating environment. Unmanned systems can help find mariners 
in distress; detect drug and migrant trafficking at sea; 
monitor illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing in the 
Indo-Pacific; track icebergs in the North Atlantic; and gain 
awareness of activity in the Arctic.
    Currently, the Coast Guard employs three types of unmanned 
aircraft systems. First, long-range systems are part of a joint 
program with the Customs and Border Protection. Second, medium-
range are used on our National Security Cutters. And third, we 
have domestic-made, legally compliant, short-range systems that 
are used as force multipliers across the country.
    The Coast Guard recently deployed unmanned surface 
capabilities. We deployed contractor-owned, contractor-
operated, uncrewed surface assets in the Caribbean Sea and off 
the coast of southern California to study the assets' impact on 
illegal migration and drug trafficking. Additionally, the Coast 
Guard sees future opportunities to use underwater vehicles and 
commercial space assets to meet current and future demands. A 
constellation of unmanned systems may expand our Maritime 
Domain Awareness, support command and control of our forces, 
and enhance our mission execution.
    Finally, the widespread use and low cost of unmanned 
systems mean these tools are available to those who might seek 
harm to the United States or interrupt the flow of commerce. As 
a result, the Coast Guard fields capabilities to counter 
threats from unmanned aircraft systems, also called counter-
UAS.
    The Department of Homeland Security's existing authority 
that enables the Coast Guard counter-UAS operations expires on 
September 30. It is critical that this authority be 
reauthorized to allow the Coast Guard to continue this mission 
in defense of the maritime transportation system.
    I appreciate the opportunity to testify today. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Rear Admirals Arguin and 
Wiemers follows:]

                                 
  Joint Prepared Statement of Rear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin, Assistant 
 Commandant for Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, and Rear Admiral 
  Todd C. Wiemers, Assistant Commandant for Capabilities, U.S. Coast 
                                 Guard
                              Introduction
    Good morning, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and 
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for your continued 
oversight and strong support of the Coast Guard. We are honored to 
appear before you today to update you on Coast Guard activity related 
to autonomous and experimental maritime technology.
    Across the maritime domain, the pace of innovation is accelerating. 
The opportunities presented by emerging technology could significantly 
benefit the Marine Transportation System (MTS). Technological 
advancements--such as autonomous systems--can evolve global 
transportation systems and provide novel solutions for ongoing and 
future challenges, including growing cybersecurity vulnerabilities, 
supply chain disruptions, navigational challenges, and interference 
with communication, information, and operational technology systems. 
With these advancements comes the potential for new and different 
vulnerabilities which should also be carefully considered. The Coast 
Guard will closely evaluate the emergence of autonomous and 
experimental technology, and encourage the growth of technology by 
updating standards, policies, and regulations.
Coast Guard Autonomous and Experimental Maritime Technology
    The Coast Guard Deputy Commandant for Operations, VADM Peter 
Gautier, released the U.S. Coast Guard Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan 
in March of this year. That plan outlines a vision for how the Service 
will respond to and embrace the emergence of unmanned technology in the 
maritime domain. The Coast Guard's vision for the future is to not only 
establish a regulatory framework to ensure a safe and efficient MTS but 
to also actively defend against nefarious use of unmanned systems and 
to use unmanned systems to improve execution of the Service's 11 
statutory missions.
    Currently, the Coast Guard employs unmanned capabilities in the air 
domain in three ways. First, as part of a joint program office with 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard uses long-range 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) for land and maritime border security. 
Second, medium-range UAS on Coast Guard National Security Cutters 
provide tactical aerial surveillance and reconnaissance capability by 
leveraging a contractor-owned, contractor-operated (COCO) model. 
Finally, the Service utilizes short-range UAS as force multipliers in 
myriad operations, including post-storm assessments, law enforcement, 
pollution response, port and facility inspections, aids to navigation, 
and near-shore maritime domain awareness (MDA).
    While the Coast Guard does not possess organic unmanned surface 
capabilities, the Service is learning how these capabilities can 
enhance mission execution. The Coast Guard recently utilized data from 
COCO unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) in the Caribbean and in Southern 
California. These assets provided data-as-a-service collected from a 
variety of sensors, including radar, cameras, and automatic 
identification system receivers. Contracted deployments offer the 
opportunity to enhance MDA while avoiding prolonged acquisition 
processes and preserving the ability to quickly pivot to new 
technologies as they emerge. The Service is evaluating the USVs' 
performance for potential future use.
    The rapid commercialization of these technologies--including COCO 
business models within industry--will likely provide greater access for 
affordable experimentation and deployments in the near future. The 
Coast Guard Research and Development Center and Blue Technology Center 
of Excellence continue to advise the Service regarding technological 
feasibility and best implementation strategies. This organizational 
insight enables the Service to continually integrate the platforms and 
sensors that will best serve the American public.
    To maximize platform and sensor potential, the Coast Guard must 
effectively store, process, analyze, and visualize the data, converting 
it into information for better decision making to act more quickly and 
decisively. The Coast Guard created an Office of Data and Analytics to 
improve data governance and analysis and to reframe the organization's 
approach to data so that operators at all levels may leverage data to 
their strategic advantage. Furthermore, to avoid processing data in a 
vacuum, the Service is working with Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS) partners to share data and improve Department-wide operational 
outcomes.
    The widespread availability and low cost of unmanned systems means 
nefarious actors may see opportunities to use UAS to disrupt Coast 
Guard operations, conduct illicit activities, or jeopardize the flow of 
commerce while avoiding detection or attribution. In response, the 
Coast Guard has rapidly acquired counter-UAS (C-UAS) capabilities. 
These capabilities are deployable ashore and afloat. The Service would 
welcome the chance to discuss these capabilities further in a 
classified setting.
Commercial Autonomous and Experimental Maritime Technology
    The Coast Guard is monitoring and assessing novel uses of 
autonomous and experimental maritime technology across the MTS. For 
example, data collection platforms are being increasingly used within 
the MTS by companies leveraging autonomous technologies to conduct 
unmanned surveying operations. While many of these survey platforms are 
relatively small, some companies are exploring using larger platforms 
that may present greater potential risks to other waterway users.
    The Coast Guard is focused on effectively managing the increasing 
use of these platforms on our waterways. In addition to survey 
platforms, the maritime industry is also considering remote-control 
operations on smaller commercial vessels (e.g., tugs) to improve 
maritime commerce efficiency.
    As current statutory and regulatory regimes for commercial maritime 
operations are predicated on mariners being onboard vessels, the Coast 
Guard is working to develop suitable international and domestic 
governance frameworks to integrate autonomous and remote-control 
technologies safely and properly into the maritime domain. 
Internationally, the Coast Guard is leading U.S. efforts in ongoing 
discussions within the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to 
develop a code for safe, secure, and environmentally sound operation of 
maritime autonomous surface ships (MASS) within existing IMO 
instruments. Domestically, the Coast Guard-chartered Automated and 
Autonomous Vessel Policy Council is identifying gaps within U.S. laws, 
regulations, and policies and developing clear and consistent guidance 
regarding autonomous and remote-controlled technology for the maritime 
industry and marine inspectors.
    With the maritime industry continuing to incorporate these 
technologies, the Coast Guard appreciates the authority provided in the 
Don Young Coast Guard Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 to conduct 
a pilot program to better understand the potential use of remotely 
controlled or unmanned autonomous spaceflight recovery vessels. Within 
this pilot program, the Coast Guard is working extensively with 
commercial space interests to further the development of safe and 
secure operations for recovering rockets at sea using unmanned, 
autonomous vessels. As a result, the Coast Guard approved unmanned 
operations by recovery vessels while accompanying support vessels 
recover rocket fairings. Based on lessons learned from this proof of 
concept, the Coast Guard will be poised to facilitate greater use of 
autonomous systems to support maritime operations.
Alternative Fuels
    The Coast Guard is also committed to working with the maritime 
industry to facilitate the increased use of alternative fuels and 
technologies for shipboard propulsion. While the use of liquefied 
natural gas (LNG) is currently a leading alternative to traditional 
petroleum-based fuels to meet current domestic and international air 
emission requirements, the maritime industry continues to explore other 
alternatives including methanol, fuel cells, lithium-ion battery, 
hydrogen, ammonia, and even nuclear energy sources.
    The needs of the maritime industry will drive future ship 
propulsion fuel solutions, and the Coast Guard is positioned to 
consider the results of testing of the various alternative fuel 
options. For both regulators and industry, these alternative fuel 
options must be carefully considered and appropriate safeguards must be 
in place. Consideration must also be given to the infrastructure 
necessary for the development, delivery, and use of alternative fuels, 
which further increase the complexity of already busy maritime ports.
    To this end, the Coast Guard is heavily engaged in ongoing efforts 
at the IMO to develop suitable requirements for these alternative fuel 
options. Leveraging the recent International Code of Safety for Ships 
Using Gases or Other Low Flashpoint Fuels (IGF Code), which was 
developed for the use of LNG, the IMO provided additional guidance on 
the use of methanol and fuel cells and is now developing guidelines for 
hydrogen, ammonia, and low flashpoint diesel. While these alternative 
fuels share many similarities, each has its own unique risks and 
challenges that must specifically be addressed to ensure safe use as a 
maritime fuel.
    With limited exceptions, current domestic regulations do not 
address safe use of alternative fuels. However, they authorize the 
Coast Guard to consider equivalents to regulatory design standards to 
evaluate proposals for the use of new technologies and alternative 
fuels onboard ships. The Service utilizes that authority to facilitate 
industry efforts to innovate in safe and responsible ways.
    In addition to engineering considerations, the Coast Guard is 
mindful of the need to ensure industry has the proper training and 
qualifications to operate these systems and that Coast Guard marine 
inspectors have the necessary competencies to inspect them. The 
challenges associated with learning to design, operate, maintain, and 
inspect multiple fuel systems at the same time cannot be understated, 
but the Coast Guard is committed to working with industry to ensure it 
is done safely.
Other Novel Technology
    In addition to the technologies and fuels described above, the 
maritime industry continues to seek innovative and emergent 
technologies for use in the MTS. Submersibles are increasingly employed 
in commercial maritime operations for activities such as underwater 
exploration, offshore structure maintenance, and underwater salvage. 
Their versatility and advanced technology make them a valuable 
capability which also pose unique governance challenges. These 
challenges can be overcome through transparency and collaboration to 
develop necessary and timely standards to meet the needs of the public. 
The Coast Guard continuously evaluates our ability to assess new 
technologies and novel uses and is committed to working with industry 
leaders to develop new standards and leverage existing standards to 
ensure the safety of these vessels and the individuals that operate 
them.
    Recent advancements in technology have given rise to the 
development of the next generation of Wing-In-Ground (WIG) crafts. A 
WIG craft looks and flies like an aircraft but operates at a low 
altitude above the water surface to take advantage of enhanced 
aerodynamic lift within the ground effect layer. While the use of WIG 
craft presents potential opportunities, WIG craft technology is novel 
and there are few Coast Guard and no Federal Aviation Administration 
regulations or other industry standards specifically pertaining to 
their design, construction, or operation, though FAA regulations 
governing aircraft would still apply to WIGs that operate within FAA's 
statutory jurisdiction.
    WIG craft are, in essence, high-speed craft operating at low 
altitude over the water. There will be significant challenges 
integrating WIG operations with existing maritime traffic schemes. 
Further, due to the unique blend of maritime and aviation principles on 
which they rely for operation, the design, construction, pilotage, 
operation, maintenance, and inspection of WIG craft are beyond the 
Coast Guard's expertise. Successfully addressing the challenges 
associated with this technology will require the Coast Guard to rely on 
interagency partners who have the requisite experience, competency, and 
regulatory authority to evaluate the aviation aspects associated with 
WIG craft.
Cyber Connectivity
    In close coordination with DHS and other DHS components, the Coast 
Guard is leading several initiatives to meet the growing demand of the 
modern maritime industry and MTS for updated cybersecurity policy and 
guidance. The modern maritime industry and MTS rely heavily on 
interconnected information and operational technologies to provide the 
most effective and efficient transportation system possible.
    We must be cognizant of the fact that every new capability that 
leverages cyberspace, also presents additional risk of cyberattacks by 
malicious actors which could threaten the MTS.
    The Coast Guard stands ready to support the maritime industry in 
the implementation and acceleration of new technologies and will 
continue to address increasing cyber challenges and risks to the MTS to 
ensure the safety of life at sea, the security of our waterways, and 
the protection of the marine environment.
Conclusion
    The novel technologies being introduced into the maritime 
environment today are just the next step of maritime evolution. The 
Coast Guard stands ready to provide regulatory guidance and oversight 
to maintain safe and secure waterways, and the Service will continue to 
look for ways to leverage emerging technologies to enhance mission 
performance. We look forward to answering your questions.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you so much for your presence 
here. I really appreciate it. Thank you for your testimony. 
It's great.
    So, we will begin by having questions.
    I am going to skip mine, I guess, and call Mr. Carbajal. 
You are recognized for questions.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Again, I defer to the ranking member, if that is OK with 
you.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. I am going to remember that.
    Mr. Carbajal. I am always trying to suck up to him.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. I don't blame you.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Well, I am not deferring to 
anyone.
    Thanks for coming. So, my first set of questions, I am not 
sure who is in charge of answering them. But I know a lot of 
the testimony is focused on autonomous vehicles and so on, but 
I want to step away a little bit--step back from that a little 
bit to talk a little about remote sensing, data collecting, and 
analytics, and then how you use that information so that it is 
actionable.
    You mentioned, Admiral, creating actionable data so you can 
go do something with it.
    So, with regards to--as a for instance, IUU fishing, are 
you working with other agencies, like the Navy or anyone else, 
on the use of satellites to track movements of potential 
targets of IUU fishing and then using, then, that information 
for interdiction? And if not, how are you using the various 
technologies to deal with IUU fishing?
    Admiral Wiemers. So, sir, yes, we are working very closely 
with the Navy and other partners in order to really expand our 
Maritime Domain Awareness capability through different systems, 
especially leveraging those that DoD has at their advantage.
    We are on a journey to really increase our Maritime Domain 
Awareness. There are some program of records that the Navy has 
put that we are working with them to expand sea vision, which 
is a capability that allows for Maritime Domain Awareness, that 
we are sharing with different partners around the world to 
really understand what is out there and be able to address it.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. You have an Office of Data and 
Analytics. Is that designed just to--not just to--but is that 
designed to just collect the data, or do you have the capacity 
to analyze the data you are getting for actual use?
    Admiral Wiemers. So, sir, we are on a beginning stage. That 
office has been in existence now for a couple of years, and we 
are going through all the data architecture that we need to put 
in place before we can really make it actionable for all 
enhanced.
    We have got some use cases that we are using by pulling 
data out of our databases and being able to run some analysis 
on it, but for the most part, that office is working on setting 
up the data governance for our Service.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. So, as you are moving forward on 
that, are you also training up the folks who you will depend 
upon to analyze that data? And I would include not just the 
folks who will put physical eyes on, but any of the algorithms 
that you will need to develop to help you sift through the 
data.
    Admiral Wiemers. Yes. The training of our workforce moving 
out in the future is going to be really important, and we are 
partnering with others to help us on that journey. We are 
partnering--for one example, we have got an object detection 
joint group that we are working with DoD to be able to use 
their algorithms and partner in those algorithms to be able to 
use it, for example.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Maybe for Admiral Arguin, you are 
responsible for answering this one. How is all that work then 
integrated? So, in the use of, say, either crewed vehicles or 
uncrewed vehicles.
    Admiral Arguin. Congressman, we hope to take advantage of 
the work that the Office of Data and Analytics will be able to 
combine to evaluate risk-based regulatory projects. So, rather 
than moving forward with a prescriptive-based regulatory 
framework, being able to use data-informed risk analyses to 
help drive where we want to drive our resources and where we 
need to focus our efforts to reduce challenges with safety.
    So, right now, we have got use cases to take a look at all 
the information that we capture with respect to the Marine 
Transportation System and be able to evaluate where we should 
be putting our resources to drive safety improvements.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. OK. Sorry. That is on the 
safety side. I appreciate that.
    I think my questions maybe are more along the lines of the 
enforcement, interdiction use cases for not just collecting the 
data, but analyzing the data, and then turning that into 
something that we can use, and then the tools--like artificial 
intelligence algorithms--that, frankly, you need people to do.
    And we shouldn't forget. It's--I always tell people that 
artificial intelligence--the artificial is the software part, 
the intelligence is the human part. It's not just some random 
algorithm that drops from the sky and then we get to use it. We 
actually need people to do this.
    So, I will leave it at that. I do want to follow up, 
though, and I will follow up with some more specific questions, 
and maybe have you come in for a brief on a few of these 
issues. I appreciate that. Thanks.
    Admiral Wiemers. Thank you.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, Mr. Carbajal and I have agreed 
to ask our questions when we come back after the voting break.
    Maybe we can squeeze in Mr. Babin. You are recognized.
    Mr. Carbajal. Mr. Chairman, I am not going to be able to 
come back. I am sorry. I might have----
    Mr. Webster of Florida [interrupting]. Oh, you're not.
    Dr. Babin. You have already called on me.
    Mr. Carbajal. But you're not ranking member or chairman, 
so, you are out of luck.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. All right.
    Mr. Carbajal, you are recognized for your questions.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    I should reconsider deferring to the ranking member because 
he asked one of my questions. So, the good news is I am going 
to be short, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Arguin, oceangoing vessels routinely carry 
dangerous explosive cargoes, while U.S. flight vessels carry 
cargo for the Department of Defense. Who should be responsible 
for regulating the cybersecurity of fully autonomous vessels? 
Is the Coast Guard currently capable of doing that?
    Admiral Arguin. Ranking Member Carbajal, we do have that 
responsibility, both within the prevention policy 
responsibilities we have as cyber. Underneath our Marine 
Transportation Security Act authorities, we have the authority 
to manage and oversee cyber responsibilities. We are currently 
in the process of issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking that 
would raise the bar with respect to cyber responsibilities for 
both vessels and facilities.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Admiral.
    Admiral Arguin, regarding submersibles, Navigation and 
Vessel Inspection Circular, NVIC No. 5-93 states, ``Because of 
the unique design and operating characteristics, as well as the 
inherent hazards of underwater operation, an uninspected 
submersible may be permitted in U.S. passenger operations only 
if it is designed and constructed to a recognized industry 
standard.''
    Does the Coast Guard stand by this statement? Is more 
needed?
    Admiral Arguin. Congressman Carbajal, yes, sir, the 
requirement for a submersible, if you carry one passenger for 
hire, you need to meet the inspection requirements under 
subchapter T.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you very much. And sorry, Admiral. The 
ranking member took my question.
    So, with that, I will yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Babin, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Dr. Babin. Yes sir, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you, Admirals, for being here today.
    I represent both Coast Guard Sector Houston-Galveston and 
Air Station Houston, each housed at Ellington Field in 
southeast Texas in my district.
    My questions today are for our Coast Guard panel members, 
both of you. In the recent 2022 Coast Guard reauthorization, 
there was a provision, section 11225, titled, ``Establishment 
of Unmanned System Program and Autonomous Control and Computer 
Vision Technology Project.'' It's a mouthful.
    The goal of this project is to bring commercial autonomy 
and computer vision solutions directly to the operational 
components of the Coast Guard to use this technology in an 
operational environment for maritime interdiction, search and 
rescue, and ISR, just to name a few.
    What is the Coast Guard's plan to execute this technology 
project in an operational setting through the Coast Guard 
Research and Development Center?
    One of you.
    Admiral Wiemers. So, sir, the R&D Center is obviously doing 
a lot of research in the world of unmanned systems and 
improving Maritime Domain Awareness, and we are working hand-
in-hand with them on a number of different activities.
    We recently just finished the Saildrone deployment, as one 
example, where we were trying to use unmanned systems to really 
understand that capability and how we can best leverage that 
information to meet our mission.
    That study that you specifically mentioned is still 
ongoing, and we are waiting for the results for it.
    Dr. Babin. OK. Thank you. All right. I will go to the next 
one.
    The Department of Homeland Security's counter-UAS, or C-
UAS, authority is expiring in September. Does that mean the 
Coast Guard will not be able to conduct counter-UAS operations 
if it is not reauthorized, or will the Coast Guard authorities 
allow you to continue C-UAS activities?
    Admiral Wiemers. Our authority is embedded with the act 
that brought that on. So, when it sunsets, our ability to 
conduct those operations will also sunset.
    Dr. Babin. OK. Good to know. Good to know.
    I recently heard some great feedback from down in south 
Texas about the joint Coast Guard-CBP balloon monitoring 
project, the Argos surveillance balloon or tethered aerostat, 
as it is officially called.
    In addition to supporting our border security in combating 
illegal immigration, drug trafficking, and smuggling, I am told 
that the aerostat is also playing a huge role in deterring 
illegal fishing in the region. This sort of partnership is 
vital, and I encourage you to keep working with agency and 
military partners to share this innovative technology.
    For example, to my earlier point, Joint Base Ellington in 
my district also houses the Texas Air National Guard's 147th 
Attack Wing. They operate MQ-9 Reapers, a UAS platform with 
state-of-the-art sensor capabilities. I know the CBP has MQ-9s 
as well, and the Coast Guard has partnered with them in the 
past to share UAS assets.
    What has the partnership looked like with the Air National 
Guard, and what can be done to enhance the shared technology 
utilization?
    Admiral Wiemers. Sir, we are working very closely with 
Customs and Border Protection. We are working jointly on 
requirements on what we need to have persistent Maritime Domain 
Awareness out to 200 miles. And CBP has got its sensors, we 
have our sensors, and we are committed to integrating them and 
sharing the data and working together in those areas.
    As far as the MQ-9 Guardians that we fly with the joint 
program with CBP, we have flown over 3,100 maritime-hours since 
2018, and we have been able to result in 26,000 kilograms of 
cocaine being seized specifically because of those assets. It 
is a very good partnership for us.
    Dr. Babin. Absolutely. Thank you. Proud of you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Auchincloss, you are recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
    It seems that one of the core issues that the Coast Guard 
is facing from a regulatory perspective is this distinction 
between vessel and vehicle. And a lot rides on that 
distinction. The Coast Guard has previously promulgated a 
definition of vessel but has also said at the same time that 
that definition does not apply across all types that they may 
encounter.
    You have put together the Automated and Autonomous Vessel 
Policy Council recently. What is the status of that, and is one 
of the mandates for that council to make that distinction 
between vessel and vehicle more clear?
    Admiral Arguin. Congressman, yes, sir. The Autonomous 
Vessel Policy Council, AutoPoCo for short, is really focused on 
evaluating not only the regulatory framework that exists today 
to identify gaps where autonomous operations may impact the 
existing framework, but also looking at training requirements, 
evaluating that technology to determine how that technology can 
be brought to bear within the MTS in a safe and secure manner.
    Mr. Auchincloss. So, is AutoPoCo going to produce 
recommendations for regulatory changes for the Commandant as 
well as legal changes for Congress for this new era?
    Admiral Arguin. Yes, sir. They are working to evaluate not 
only with the international community as we evaluate where the 
international community wants to go, but making recommendations 
on not only policy changes, but law changes that may be 
necessary to support the expansion of that technology.
    Mr. Auchincloss. And when can we expect those 
recommendations?
    Admiral Arguin. I don't have a timeframe on those 
recommendations. They are continuing to evaluate not only the 
international standard, but also the domestic standard. And as 
those recommendations come forward, we will move forward with 
making recommendations for changes.
    Mr. Auchincloss. And who is the flag officer who is 
responsible for timeline and for efficacy of AutoPoCo?
    Admiral Arguin. I am.
    Mr. Auchincloss. OK. Because that was one of the 
recommendations that came up in the National Academy of 
Sciences report on this issue, was that there needs to be 
accountability.
    And so, you are the gentleman who Congress can turn to for 
these recommendations?
    Admiral Arguin. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Great.
    Is part of these recommendations going to be about which 
procurement authority the Coast Guard uses for these? I know 
there is a whole slew of ones that you could use. Are you going 
to be talking about how best to procure?
    Admiral Arguin. No, sir. So, the AutoPoCo team is really 
focused on the external, so, non-Coast Guard-related activities 
with respect to autonomous operations. There is a different 
division that is working on the internal acquisition and how 
Coast Guard would use that technology within Coast Guard 
operations.
    Mr. Auchincloss. And is there one program officer or flag 
officer who is in charge of that, is accountable to the 
Commandant and Congress on deciding whether it is going to be 
FARs or nonmajor acquisition programs, et cetera?
    Admiral Wiemers. Yes, sir. If I can jump in.
    Our Assistant Commandant for Acquisition is in charge for 
all acquisition, including all contracting, which includes the 
other transactional authority that you are talking about.
    Mr. Auchincloss. OK. But that is a whole portfolio. Is 
there one individual at the Coast Guard who is talking just 
about how to procure for this technology?
    Admiral Wiemers. So, the way we have it set up is I set the 
requirements for what we need, and I set those--that capability 
needs. I then turn it over to the contracting officer within 
the Assistant Commandant for Acquisition to actually acquire 
the goods.
    Mr. Auchincloss. That sounds to me like a no. And my 
concern is that if the commercial sector--and I represent a 
State, Massachusetts, that has a tremendous ferment of 
innovation in marine science and technology. They want to know 
who is going to buy this stuff, and they want to be able to 
have sit-down conversations about that.
    Are you the person?
    Admiral Wiemers. I am the person----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. All right. I am going to 
give them your cell phone.
    Admiral Wiemers. Yes, sir. I am the one who decides what to 
buy.
    Mr. Auchincloss. OK. And then, on this point, you all have 
the Blue Tech Center of Excellence. It is in San Diego. My 
colleague, Mr. Garamendi, was instrumental in getting that 
instituted. How many people do you have working there?
    Admiral Wiemers. Sir, I will have to get back on the record 
with you for the exact numbers that we have there.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Does two sound right?
    Admiral Wiemers. It is very possible, sir.
    Mr. Auchincloss. And they are civilians?
    Admiral Wiemers. I am not sure what the makeup is.
    Mr. Auchincloss. And what authority do they have?
    Admiral Wiemers. Sir, they are responsible to inform 
industry on Coast Guard requirements so that the industry can 
understand what the Coast Guard's--our need and what 
technologies will help us into the future.
    Mr. Auchincloss. So, they are like sensors out there in the 
commercial ecosystem to bring back information to the Coast 
Guard, but they can't procure, they can't make investments?
    Admiral Wiemers. They would need to come back to us to make 
the procurements.
    Mr. Auchincloss. We are not going to keep pace with 
innovation unless Blue Tech Center of Excellence has the 
dedicated funding and the staffing that it needs, and I would 
like the Coast Guard to come back with a plan to do that.
    I will yield back, Chairman.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    OK. So, the Chair declares that we are going to recess here 
for some votes, and then we will come back.
    Be sure to come back, all the witnesses, both current and 
the future panel, and then all of the Members that can come 
back. And we will start again as soon as we are done.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation is called to order from the previous 
recess we just had.
    And I recognize myself for 5 minutes to ask questions, and 
then we will move to the Members' questions.
    Thank you all for coming back. It's great. Seems like we 
just left.
    Admiral Arguin, earlier this year, the Coast Guard 
supported the search for the Titan, the submarine that 
ultimately caused five people to perish. The Titan was not 
registered, wasn't classified or inspected.
    What processes does the Coast Guard need to implement to 
ensure vessels like the Titan do not evade regulation, 
particularly when such vessels are carrying passengers?
    Admiral Arguin. Chairman Webster, we have initiated a 
Marine Board of Investigation, that is the highest level of 
investigative body within the Coast Guard, to evaluate the 
evidence in connection with that case. The Marine Board of 
Investigation will make recommendations to us with respect to 
either policy changes or regulatory changes that need to be 
made as a result of that investigation.
    And so, in the meantime, we are evaluating our own existing 
policies to determine whether or not there are loopholes that 
can be closed in advance of the finalization of that 
investigation.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Is there a timeframe for that?
    Admiral Arguin. We want to make sure the investigations and 
the investigators have all the time they need to gather the 
evidence. We want to expedite the completion of that, but I 
want to make sure that the investigative team has all the time 
necessary to truly evaluate and pull up all the evidence that 
would be--now, if they do determine that there is something 
that needs to be acted on before the end, they will advise me, 
and then we can take action on those cases outside of the 
completion of the investigation.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Admiral Wiemers, the Coast Guard 
intercepts about 10 percent of the cocaine flowing into the 
United States. It is constrained by limited assets covering a 
large area.
    How is the Coast Guard using new technologies as a force 
multiplier to increase Maritime Domain Awareness?
    Admiral Wiemers. Chairman Webster, indeed, a lot of the 
conversation we have been having on trying to field unmanned 
systems is specifically to be able to target our resources more 
effectively in order to get at the threats that are coming into 
our country.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. What factors, if any, are hindering 
the Coast Guard's adoption of new technologies that can improve 
Maritime Domain Awareness?
    Admiral Wiemers. Chairman, so, just a couple of thoughts on 
that. One, we talked earlier about managing data. Putting out 
more unmanned systems collects a lot of data, and we need to be 
able to manage that data to really turn it into information 
that we can then use to target threats coming toward us.
    And the other item I would say that would help us is having 
other transactional authority, similar to what DoD has, in 
order to be able to procure new technology in a more effective 
way.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Admiral Arguin, a recent National 
Academy of Sciences report noted that one of the Coast Guard's 
challenges will be recruiting personnel qualified to oversee 
new maritime technologies.
    How will the Coast Guard ensure it has the necessary 
expertise?
    Admiral Arguin. Chairman Webster, to be sure, the 
challenges associated with increasing technology will put an 
additional strain on our ability to recruit and ultimately 
retain the talent necessary to meet that demand. We have got an 
all-hands-on-deck effort to find that talent, to be competitive 
to bring that talent into the Service, and then be able to 
employ them in the most effective way.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Are there any areas where the Coast 
Guard currently falls short in regulation expertise for new 
technologies?
    Admiral Arguin. Chairman, I think the regulatory framework 
is just not flexible and nimble enough to keep pace with 
emerging technology. We are working through a variety of 
different design basis agreements, which are essentially an 
equivalency determination against the current standard to 
ensure that that technology can be brought to bear and then be 
able to update the regulations, sort of, downstream.
    And so, we have the ability to evaluate equivalencies, but 
the current regulatory framework just does not afford us the 
opportunity to keep pace based on the current standard.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, there are gaps?
    Admiral Arguin. Sir, I wouldn't necessarily call them gaps, 
because if we identify that there is a challenge, we do have 
the ability to evaluate alternatives to that standard. Yes, 
sir.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. I yield back my time.
    And, Ms. Scholten, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. 
Scholten.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thank you both for coming today, for your testimony, 
and for your concern and thoughtfulness over this critically 
important issue.
    In my home State of Michigan, water is a way of life, from 
recreation to supporting the larger Great Lakes economy. The 
future of carbon-neutral fuels and autonomous vessels is of 
critical importance to the people in Michigan's Third 
Congressional District.
    As you know, establishing these regulations is the province 
of the International Maritime Organization, but the Coast 
Guard, of course, can develop regulations and take their own 
step to build out processes, even in advance of a global 
standard.
    My first question is for Rear Admiral Arguin. Given the 
speed at which the IMO produces regulations, what is the Coast 
Guard doing to ensure a more rapid but safe deployment of 
carbon-neutral fuels?
    Admiral Arguin. Congresswoman, so, we have an Autonomous 
Vessel Policy Council that focuses on autonomy. We are also 
evaluating those new technologies as they are brought to bear. 
And so, in the event that we end up seeing that a particular 
alternative fuel becomes more mainstream, we will be able to 
develop more national regulations.
    And so--but we also need to be mindful that we need to keep 
pace or at least be mindful of the International Maritime 
Organization's efforts, because shipping is global. And so, to 
ensure that we do have alignment with international 
requirements--we are all on the same journey trying to figure 
out how to make sure that these operations and these 
alternative fuels can be incorporated safely. And so, we are in 
partnership and working directly with IMO to help inform our 
own domestic standards as well.
    Ms. Scholten. OK. Can you talk a little bit about 
specifically any of the processes or test sites or pilot 
projects or anything that might be happening right now?
    Admiral Arguin. So, I am not aware of any particular test 
sites or pilot projects other than individual. For example, 
there are certain ships that are dual-fueled LNG models. They 
are being built. They are operating today.
    And so, we work through those equivalency determinations to 
compare them against the existing standard, determine if new 
requirements need to be put in place based on those risks, and 
then that establishes a framework for that particular design. 
As those designs become more mainstream, then we will be able 
to essentially put together a national policy that will 
standardize and set a framework for future development.
    Ms. Scholten. OK. How would you assess the competitiveness 
of the United States among other countries developing these 
technologies?
    Admiral Arguin. I don't know that I would be in a position 
to compare and contrast other countries and sort of from a 
competitiveness perspective, but I think at least our domestic 
oversight of those new technologies and being a very deliberate 
standard to ensure that we have evaluated each of the risks and 
very confidently understand how those mitigation strategies are 
going to ensure an equivalent or better operation, I think, 
gives us a bit of an advantage.
    Ms. Scholten. OK. This question of regulation is truly one 
of the key questions that we are facing right now moving 
forward and considering the nimbleness and, I believe, 
competitiveness of the United States military.
    Currently, autonomous vehicles pose something of a loophole 
in Coast Guard regulations being classified as recreational 
vehicles, which are largely uninspected. Can you talk about the 
plan that we have, even more specifically regulating around 
this emerging class of vehicles? And either of you, please feel 
free to weigh in on this.
    Admiral Arguin. Congresswoman, so, just the discussion of 
autonomous operations, automated systems have been incorporated 
into shipping for years. The difference is now we are seeing 
more and more autonomous operations that are replacing what 
would typically be credentialed mariners or humans on board.
    And so, I think the challenge is to ensure that the new 
systems, those computers that are driving operations, have the 
ability to meet or exceed what we would expect of a crew, and 
then be mindful that the crew that still remains on board needs 
to be trained and equipped to be able to continue to operate 
those vessels in an increasingly complex way.
    Ms. Scholten. Rear Admiral Wiemers, do you have anything to 
add to that?
    Admiral Wiemers. No, ma'am. My colleague is the expert on 
regulations.
    Ms. Scholten. Waiting for--I see my time is running out, 
but if you have anything additionally to submit for the record.
    Waiting for technology to become more mainstream allows for 
certain gaps in the regulations. Does that give you any safety 
concerns?
    Admiral Arguin. If we are aware of a technology that poses 
a threat, safety or otherwise, we have the ability, through our 
captain of the port authorities, to cease that operation. And 
so, if there are perceived gaps or real gaps, we would be able 
to take some action to prevent that from impacting the Marine 
Transportation System.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentlelady yields back.
    Mr. Van Drew, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman.
    And good afternoon, and thank you for being here today.
    Southern New Jersey, as you probably know, is my home, and 
it is my district as well, and it is synonymous with the Coast 
Guard.
    Training Center Cape May is one of the largest bases in the 
Coast Guard and the sole accession point for the entire 
enlisted workforce. It is a fundamental part of the culture and 
part of the economy in South Jersey. In turn, the push for more 
and more unmanned technology, while potentially beneficial, 
could greatly alter the functions of our training center.
    Rear Admiral Arguin and Wiemers, will this technology be 
taught at the Coast Guard Training Center? Will there be a 
difference in the way we train the recruits as this moves 
forward, if it moves forward? Either one or both.
    Admiral Wiemers. So, Cape May is our primary accession 
source. A lot of the technical training that we give is follow-
on training in, say, a sea school that we have, which is 
technical-based on what our people need to actually do the 
mission activities that we perform. So, the training that you 
are discussing would be performed at those locations.
    Dr. Van Drew. OK. So, the basic training would be the 
same--would be pretty much the same as we now have?
    Admiral Wiemers. We are constantly looking and leveraging 
technology to improve the delivery of our services, but the 
accession training would predominantly remain the same.
    Dr. Van Drew. Would there be any change just to teach 
people these skills, or, again, that would be done at the other 
location?
    Admiral Wiemers. So, the training specifically is not in 
either one of our portfolios. And there is a lot of looking 
going on right now within our Service on how we develop our 
folks. I am not aware of anything specifically at Cape May. But 
that is our main accession source, and it will remain that 
accession part.
    Dr. Van Drew. OK. Technology is good and advancement is 
good, but there are certainly concerns with safety at main sea, 
especially when these vessels--the autonomous vessels, such as 
fishing and private boats, are encountering them and the 
impacts of marine life.
    Do you have any thoughts on that?
    Admiral Arguin. Congressman, I think we need to be mindful 
that, while maybe in a laboratory, autonomous systems may be 
able to work properly operating within the entirety of the--and 
the complexity and diversity of the Marine Transportation 
System is a different sort of problem set. And so, we need to 
be deliberate about how we understand how those computer 
systems will operate and integrate and interact with all of the 
users of the waterway.
    Dr. Van Drew. I agree with you. And then, I am a very plain 
and basic guy. So, plain English, you don't want to rush into 
something that ends up being stupid and dangerous. So, I think 
you are right in your priorities there.
    On top of these concerns, to me, is offshore wind, if it 
happens. And it has been delayed along our coast for another 2 
years, and it may not happen at all. But if it did happen, will 
the wind turbines be a difficulty? For tourists, we know that 
already. For marine life and fishermen, we know that already. 
But the Coast Guard, I am interested in your viewpoint on the 
wind turbines. Is this developing as you hear more about it?
    Particularly concerned with autonomous vehicles and how 
they are going to deal with them. I have a lot of fishermen in 
my district. A lot going on in the water, as you know. And they 
have concerns without autonomous vehicles. So, it particularly 
concerns me.
    Two-part question. So, one, the concern with navigation. 
The second concern is--which has been expressed by some 
individuals in the military, including the Pentagon--concern 
with our national security. Concern these things are going to 
be thousands of them over millions of acres. They are 1,000 
feet high, and there is concern about radar.
    Any thoughts on that? From either one or both of you.
    Admiral Arguin. Congressman, so, I will try to answer both 
of your questions maybe at the same time.
    So, first and foremost, Coast Guard is responsible for 
safety and navigation and preserving the sea shipping lanes 
that support our $5.4 trillion economy. And so, as we work with 
BOEM and BSEE, specifically BOEM on the leasing areas, we want 
to make sure that the lease offerings have a minimal impact or 
minimize the impact to existing shipping lanes so that we can 
continue to move ships in a safe manner.
    With respect to potential challenges with new structures in 
the ocean, we are evaluating that, again, with BOEM and BSEE, 
to understand not only the impact that it may have on our 
existing missions--search and rescue, oilspill response, and 
others--but understand what the impact of that system might be, 
even from a cyber perspective. So, we are taking a 
comprehensive review of how that particular footprint changes 
the dynamics of the Marine Transportation System.
    Dr. Van Drew. And I am glad you are doing that. And I think 
it needs a good, solid, objective evaluation, regardless of 
political pressure on either side, just to make sure we stay 
safe.
    I will take the other--my last question, I think, the other 
viewpoint. How do you think autonomous vehicles could increase 
safety? Or do you? And do we really need this technology?
    Admiral Arguin. Congressman, I think that the opportunity 
to take advantage of technology, to minimize errors, to 
understand what that technology can bring in the way of better 
information, more efficient movement of commerce, is something 
we should certainly take advantage of. But we need to do that 
deliberately and make sure that those--as we are transitioning 
from what we currently have today into something that is a 
little bit more futuristic, that we understand the inherent and 
maybe even hidden risks that are----
    Dr. Van Drew [interrupting]. I think you are right. And I 
thank you for your good work. And I just want you to know I am 
always very proud of the Coast Guard and the presence it has 
not only along all our coast and in New Jersey, but 
particularly in South Jersey. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Ezell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Rear Admiral Arguin and Wiemers, thank you both for being 
here today. We really appreciate your staff and all the hard 
work that everybody puts into it.
    I am proud of the work that has taken place in south 
Mississippi at the Roger F. Wicker Center for Ocean Enterprise, 
which includes numerous R&D partnership programs focused on 
uncrewed maritime systems in the broader blue economy.
    My district is also home to many startup companies that are 
rapidly innovating in the unmanned maritime vehicle industry. 
To ensure their continued success, these companies must have a 
clear understanding of the legal requirements for lawful 
operation under relevant authorities.
    Rear Admiral Arguin, what work is the Coast Guard doing to 
establish a regulatory framework for unmanned and autonomous 
systems to operate in the U.S. maritime transportation system?
    Admiral Arguin. Congressman, so, I have established an 
Autonomous Vessel Policy Council that is taking a look not only 
at the gaps or the seams in areas where existing laws and 
regulations may be impacted by autonomous operations, and then 
making recommendations to those areas that may need to be 
improved so that that emerging technology can be incorporated.
    They are also looking at how we train and equip our own 
inspectors and investigators to make sure that we are aware of 
that technology and that that technology can be brought to bear 
so that it can be done in a safe and effective way.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
    I understand the International Maritime Organization has 
set up a working group to consider what a regulatory framework 
will look like for autonomous systems. Has the Coast Guard been 
involved in that?
    Admiral Arguin. Yes, sir. The same lead that I have for my 
Autonomous Vessel Policy Council is also our representative to 
the MASS Working Group, the joint working group that is looking 
at the same thing but from an international perspective.
    Mr. Ezell. Very good. All right.
    Admiral Wiemers, could you tell us about the experience and 
expertise of the employees at the Coast Guard Research and 
Development Center?
    Admiral Wiemers. Yes, sir. Thanks for that question. We 
have got a fabulous group of folks that work in New London, 
Connecticut, at the Research and Development Center. They do a 
lot of different research for us. And as we get into technology 
and needing to stay up with the latest and greatest, doing the 
market research, and having that group be able to really work 
on the integration on how we use it is extremely important.
    Mr. Ezell. Very good. Has the feedback from the industry 
taken into considerations the efforts of the entity? How has 
the feedback----
    Admiral Wiemers [interrupting]. So, the R&D Center, they do 
their reports. They do their experimentation. They work hand-
in-hand and partner with industry to make sure we are 
understanding the latest that the market has to offer.
    Mr. Ezell. Well, the Coast Guard has been a part of my life 
on the Mississippi Gulf Coast, and we fully support you, want 
to help you and be a part of all your success. So, thank you 
very much for being here today.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields.
    So, I would like to thank the witnesses for coming today 
and for your testimony, but you can be excused if you want to 
be.
    Dr. Van Drew. Unless you want to stay.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Yes.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. I would like to welcome our second 
panel of witnesses and ask them to take their seats.
    [Pause as second witness panel takes their seats.]
    Our second panel today consists of industry experts leading 
the development of autonomous and experimental maritime 
technologies and representatives of the mariners that will be 
operating these technologies. Their insights will be vital to 
developing an appropriate regulatory framework to ensure safe 
operation of these technologies in our maritime transportation 
system.
    Thank you all for being here today. I really appreciate it.
    I will take a moment to explain our lighting system, which 
I have already explained. G, green. Green is go. Yellow is slow 
up. Red is stop. That's it.
    I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements 
on the second panel will also be included in the record.
    Without objection, show that ordered.
    And as your written testimony has been made part of the 
record, the subcommittee asks you to limit your oral remarks to 
5 minutes.
    With that, Mr. Pribyl, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

 TESTIMONY OF SEAN T. PRIBYL, ESQ., MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON COAST 
  GUARD MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT, 
   ``LEVERAGING UNMANNED SYSTEMS FOR COAST GUARD MISSIONS: A 
    STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE''; MICHAEL GORDON JOHNSON, MARINE 
ENGINEER, AND FOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SEA MACHINES 
 ROBOTICS, INC.; PATRICK LAHEY, COFOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
   OFFICER, TRITON SUBMARINES; AND T. CHRISTIAN SPAIN, VICE 
 PRESIDENT OF GOVERNMENT RELATIONS, AMERICAN MARITIME OFFICERS

 TESTIMONY OF SEAN T. PRIBYL, ESQ., MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON COAST 
  GUARD MARITIME DOMAIN AWARENESS, NATIONAL ACADEMIES REPORT, 
   ``LEVERAGING UNMANNED SYSTEMS FOR COAST GUARD MISSIONS: A 
                     STRATEGIC IMPERATIVE''

    Mr. Pribyl. Thank you.
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Scholten, and members of 
this subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear 
before you today to testify about the National Academies of 
Sciences consensus study report on ``Leveraging Unmanned 
Systems for Coast Guard Missions: A Strategic Imperative,'' on 
which I served as a committee member.
    This subcommittee also invited me to offer my comments on 
notable developments in the Coast Guard's use and regulation of 
maritime technologies since that report's publication in 2020. 
My testimony today is as a committee member of that report.
    Briefly, Congress requested a study of the Coast Guard's 
existing and prospective use of unmanned systems to fulfill its 
many critical missions. Through the course of that study, the 
committee recognized the value that such technologies could 
offer the Coast Guard.
    The committee made five recommendations related to unmanned 
systems. First was to issue a high-level strategy. Second was 
to designate a senior champion. Third was to stand up a program 
office. Fourth was to expand and normalize experimentation. And 
fifth was to get a fix on funding needs.
    Through the study committee's understanding and as 
discussed in greater detail in my written testimony, several of 
those recommendations have been addressed by the Coast Guard.
    The study committee also recognized the complex policy and 
legal questions raised with such technologies, in particular, 
as the Coast Guard is not only a potential user but also a 
regulator of unmanned systems.
    Generally, statutes, regulations, and conventions did not 
contemplate vessels without humans on board when they were 
drafted.
    Thus, traditional legal principles are being challenged. 
However, there is a great deal of ongoing effort to understand 
how these technologies fit in legal frameworks as they exist 
now, which was also part of the work conducted by the study 
committee.
    Thank you again, and I look forward to your questions.
    [Mr. Pribyl's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Sean T. Pribyl, Esq., Member, Committee on Coast 
      Guard Maritime Domain Awareness, National Academies Report, 
  ``Leveraging Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions: A Strategic 
                              Imperative''
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today 
to testify about the Transportation Research Board's (TRB) consensus 
study report on ``Leveraging Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions: 
A Strategic Imperative'' (2020) \1\ (the ``Report'' or ``Study'') and 
issues of regulation of autonomous and experimental maritime 
technologies germane to that Report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 
2020. Leveraging Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions. Washington, 
DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/25987.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I served on the study committee that developed the TRB report, 
although I was also invited by this Subcommittee to offer my comments 
on notable developments in the Coast Guard's use and regulation of 
autonomous and experimental maritime technologies since that Report's 
publication in 2020. By way of additional background, I am a business 
attorney and Partner at the law firm of Holland & Knight LLP in 
Washington, DC where I practice within our Transportation and 
Infrastructure Group and International Trade Practice and support our 
Autonomous Transportation Team. The focus of my practice is on maritime 
regulatory matters, international trade, coastwise trade (the Jones 
Act), autonomous transportation, civil litigation, and maritime 
environmental compliance. I have a background with more than 25 years 
of combined experience as an international maritime and trade attorney, 
international Protection and Indemnity (P&I) Club lawyer in Norway, 
U.S. Coast Guard officer and attorney (JAG), U.S. Department of Justice 
Special U.S. Attorney, and merchant mariner deck officer with the 
American Maritime Officers union following graduation from the U.S. 
Merchant Marine Academy (Kings Point). I am also a widely published 
author in treatises and publications on matters related to maritime law 
and autonomy, as well as a regular speaker at international legal and 
industry conferences and seminars. Outside my law practice I am, inter 
alia, a Member of the National Academies of Sciences Marine Board and 
serve as Chair of the Autonomous Ships and Smart Marine Technology 
Committee in the U.S. Maritime Law Association (``MLA''), where I am a 
Proctor in Admiralty. My testimony today is on behalf of the TRB and in 
my personal capacity and thus any views and opinions expressed are my 
own and do not necessarily represent the views or positions of Holland 
& Knight LLP.
                        Study Scope and Process
    Congress requested the TRB report in Section 812 of the Frank 
LoBiondo Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2018 (the ``Act'') which 
called on the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine 
(the National Academies) to ``prepare an assessment of available 
unmanned, autonomous, or remotely controlled maritime domain awareness 
technologies for use by the U.S. Coast Guard.'' The Act called for a 
study of the U.S. Coast Guard's existing and prospective use of 
unmanned systems (UxS) \2\ to fulfill its many critical and often 
unique missions. The Act implied an interest in a range of technology-
based concepts, from aerial, surface, and underwater vehicles that have 
no human occupants or controllers to vehicles that may have a crew but 
have some level of remote, automated, or autonomous control, as well as 
systems that are not vehicles such as intelligent decision aids. The 
legislative request further called for a review of the then-current and 
emerging capabilities of these systems; their affordability, 
reliability, and versatility; and any realignments in Coast Guard 
policies, procedures, and protocols that may be necessary to exploit 
them more fully and effectively.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The Report used the term ``unmanned'' systems, although since 
2020, nomenclature has moved to adopt the term ``uncrewed'' or 
``optionally crewed.'' Notably the Coast Guard still uses the 
description ``Manning Requirements'' in 46 CFR Part 15, and thus there 
is not uniform acceptance of gender neutral ``crew'' in lieu of 
``manning.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To conduct the study, which was undertaken under the auspices of 
the TRB and its Marine Board, the National Academies appointed a 
committee of 10 experts in the fields of automation and control; 
systems research, acquisitions, and integration; Coast Guard operations 
and mission support; naval engineering and architecture, cybersecurity, 
field applications of unmanned systems; and relevant legal, regulatory, 
and policy issues. Overall, the study committee recognized that the 
Coast Guard has many important, complex, varied, and demanding 
missions, although its fleet and operational forces are being 
increasingly taxed. However, unmanned systems are being used today--and 
increasingly since the Report's publication in 2020--with high utility 
across the public and private sectors. Therefore, recognizing that the 
technologies that enable and underpin these systems are advancing 
rapidly, the study committee was struck by the magnitude and breadth of 
opportunity that lies ahead for the Coast Guard to pursue UxS in its 
multiple operational domains and across its many missions. To reach 
that potential, the study committee determined that a major realignment 
of the Coast Guard's UxS approach was warranted and concluded that to 
remain responsive and fully relevant to its many missions, it was 
imperative that the Coast Guard take a more strategic and accelerated 
approach to exploit the capabilities of existing and future unmanned 
systems. Moreover, legal and policy considerations remain critical to 
the Coast Guard's missions as a user of emerging technologies and 
notably, as a regulator of unmanned systems aboard commercial vessels.
    Informed by the input from experts and collective knowledge of its 
members, the study committee made five critical recommendations to the 
Coast Guard, provided here in kind, along with relevant updates given 
the passage of time since the publication of the Report.
1. Issue a High-Level UxS Strategy
    The study committee recommended that the Commandant issue a high-
level UxS strategy that would articulate a compelling rationale for 
UxSs, set forth agency-critical goals that these systems should 
further, and outline the Coast Guard's approach for achieving them. The 
strategy would articulate a vision for the use of these systems across 
mission areas, setting strategic goals and objectives for achieving 
that vision, and establishing appropriate organizational structures and 
lines of authority to introduce and integrate UxSs across the force 
structure.
    Since the Report's publication, in March 2023 the Coast Guard 
promulgated its Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan \3\ which appears to 
have addressed this recommendation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ US Coast Guard Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan (2023), 
available at https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/
2023%20Unmanned%20Systems%20Strategic
%20Plan.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
2. Designate a Senior UxS Champion
    In light of the institutional responsiveness required to support 
the strategic commitment to UxSs and given the attendant scope and 
scale of the requisite responses that will be required, the study 
committee recommended that the Commandant designate a top Coast Guard 
official, at the Flag Officer or Senior Executive Service levels, to 
advocate for and advance the Service's UxS strategy. This top official 
would be responsible for identifying, promoting, pushing for, 
coordinating, and facilitating the changes that will be needed across 
the organization to further the Commandant's strategic goals and 
objectives for UxSs.
    To date, and to my knowledge, the Coast Guard has not designated 
that level of senior official for that purpose, however, they have 
appointed CAPT Thom Remmers, P.E. as Unmanned Systems Lead, which 
should be viewed as a positive step that meets the intent of this 
recommendation. This is all the more relevant given the promulgation of 
the Unmanned Systems Strategic Plan by Deputy Commandant for 
Operations, VADM Peter W. Gautier while CAPT Remmers served in that 
role as Unmanned Systems Lead.
3. Stand Up a UxS Program Office
    Given the many changes in Coast Guard priorities, practices, and 
procedures that will be required to more fully exploit UxSs--from 
systems acquisition to personnel hiring and training--the study 
committee recognized that no single directorate or subunit could be 
expected to initiate and implement them all. However, the committee 
concluded that a dedicated program office, in concert with a high-level 
UxS advocate, could play a vital leadership and coordinating role in 
sustaining and expanding the use of UxSs across Coast Guard operational 
forces. The study committee therefore recommended that the Commandant 
establish a UxS program office that will work in concert with the top 
official charged with advancing the Service's UxS strategy to plan out, 
coordinate, assess, and promote UxS activities across the Service and 
to leverage relevant activities and capabilities from outside the 
Service. The committee advised that an early initiative of the program 
office should be to develop a ``roadmap'' that translates the high-
level UxS strategic goals and objectives into an actionable plan to 
accomplish them, which should specify tasks needing priority attention, 
time frames for completion, and performance metrics and milestones.
    To my knowledge, the Coast Guard has not established a UxS program 
office. The Coast Guard has, however, formulated a multi-program office 
autonomous policy committee referred to as the ``AutoPoCo'' which meets 
at certain intervals to discuss the prevailing issues and attempt to 
offer a unified view. The AutoPoCo, however, is not an avenue to which 
the public has direct access, and thus commercial entities are still 
expected to approach a multitude of offices to understand the 
parameters of lawful operations, ranging from Sector, District, and 
Headquarters offices.
4. Expand and Normalize UxS Experimentation
    Experimentation with UxS capabilities on a limited basis, in 
partnership with other military services and DHS agencies, is vital to 
expanding and transitioning UxSs across the Coast Guard and to meet its 
diverse and demanding missions in the face of resource constraints. 
Budgetary limits are a crucial factor in the Coast Guard's need to be a 
``fast follower'' that leverages and adapts technologies developed by 
others. Therefore, the Coast Guard must be attuned to, and experiment 
with, technology developments elsewhere in the military and government 
and in the commercial sector.
    To build on and reinforce its naturally innovative culture, the 
study committee recommended the Coast Guard expand and normalize 
efforts to ensure ample and systematic operations-related 
experimentation with low-cost UxSs. The committee concluded that 
encouraging experimentation with low-cost UxS technologies will not 
only help to identify beneficial uses, but also nurture a technology-
curious and -proficient workforce across the ranks.
    Since the Report's publication, the Coast Guard appears to have 
taken some steps in this regard. Indeed, U.S. Navy has continued to 
aggressively experiment with unmanned vessels and has aims for a future 
fleet that incorporates unmanned surface vessels (USV) (Mariner; 
Ranger; Sea Hunter; and Seahawk) and systems, and the Coast Guard has 
participated in joint exercises like the Rim of the Pacific Exercise 
(RIMPAC) with such USVs which are purportedly able to comply with the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea 1972 
(COLREGS). The Coast Guard has also used Saildrone uncrewed vessels or 
vehicles in support of research and development, although it is less 
clear if these are vessels that are required to comply with the 
COLREGS, and if so, whether those capabilities are met. This is an 
important distinction discussed later as the COLREGS apply to all 
vessels, and thus are critical to the Coast Guard as both a user and 
regulator of unmanned vessels.
5. Get a Fix on UxS Funding Needs
    The committee made its recommendations intent on expanding and 
accelerating the Coast Guard's investigation and implementation of UxSs 
for new concepts of operation. The committee recognized, however, that 
for the Coast Guard to act on these recommendations would require ample 
and sustained funding, and a commitment to continually increasing 
funding over time. To incorporate UxSs into the fleet and force 
structure, the Coast Guard will need to invest in R&D, acquisitions, 
field experimentation, strategic planning, systems integration, 
evaluation, cybersecurity, legal analyses, personnel recruitment and 
training, and many other field and mission support functions and 
requirements. While the committee was not able to estimate and advise 
on how much additional funding would be required for these investments, 
it recommended the development of a detailed assessment of investment 
needs.
 Legal and Policy Considerations with Respect to UxS Use and Regulation
    While the Report assessed all domains for UxS--air, surface, and 
subsurface/underwater--the advent of emerging unmanned vessel (UMV) 
technology has raised the most pressing legal and operational 
questions, in particular as the U.S. Coast Guard is both a user and 
regulator of UMVs. Indeed, while the Coast Guard possesses extensive 
statutory authorities to execute its regulatory mission and can be 
expected to rely and build on these authorities, continued 
technological capabilities are offering new UMV use opportunities that 
are outpacing existing legal frameworks.
    In support, the Report provided analysis of prevailing legal 
authorities and policy issues to serve as guidance and a primer upon 
which the Coast Guard can rely to fully assess UMV capabilities and 
develop next steps for its legal framework, to include a survey of 
relevant precedent, guidance, and resources to support legal and policy 
assessments and decision making. The Report notes that the Coast 
Guard's legal and policy program offices will need to determine whether 
existing laws, regulations, and policies allow for the safe and 
effective use of UMVs across the full range of envisaged operations. If 
they do not, the Coast Guard will need to identify the additional 
authorities and processes that can fill the gaps, and if appropriate, 
work to bring them about. In the near term, this effort may require the 
drafting of legal and policy memoranda. The Report cited the Coast 
Guard's August 11, 2020 ``Request for Information on Integration of 
Automated and Autonomous Commercial Vessels and Vessel Technologies 
into the Maritime Transportation System,'' \4\ although I am unaware of 
any further developments that resulted from the RFI.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Docket No. USCG-2019-0698 (85 Fed. Reg. 48548, Aug. 11, 2020): 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-2020-08-11/pdf/2020-17496.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Essentially, UMV technology has outpaced the relevant regulations 
because existing legal regimes generally contemplated manned ship 
operations, or at least with a ``human in the loop,'' when they were 
initially developed, such as the COLREGS, Inland Navigation Rules, and 
United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). This legal 
conundrum is compounded by the dearth of current precedent related to 
UMV operations on which operators could otherwise rely for guidance. 
Consequently, stakeholders and scholars continue to assess the use of 
UMV operations under the existing regulations, laws, treaties, and 
conventions, and they have yet to reach universal consensus, although 
collegial dialogue is ongoing.
                  ``Vessel'' Determination and Status
    Indeed, one of the most prevalent operational considerations is 
whether an envisaged platform or watercraft will be deemed a ``vessel'' 
because such determination involves questions of fact, law, and policy. 
Therefore, a threshold matter is determining a respective UMV 
platform's ``legal status'' because there are numerous types of 
platforms that vary in size and capabilities with different 
designations. Furthermore, whether a given UMV is deemed a ``vessel'' 
also depends on a review of the context of the purpose, classification, 
design, and operating characteristics of a respective UMV.
    Of the relevant international conventions, the most formative ones 
appear to be the COLREGS that apply ``to all vessels upon the high seas 
and in all waters connected therewith navigable by seagoing vessels,'' 
including warships. Notably, while the COLREGS do not specifically 
preclude operation of UMVs, a Coast Guard UMV would be expected to the 
general maritime law requiring the exercise of good seamanship in all 
respects. In other words, the COLREGS need to be translated into 
programming code when integrated into a UMV. Such programming could 
conceivably achieve compliance with certain COLREGS, perhaps through a 
method which factors in both the strict conformity with the obligatory 
decision making and historical dependency on human common sense in 
executing rules in all circumstances. In fact, the study committee was 
aware of several technological developers who take the position that 
compliance with the COLREGS is indeed achievable through programming 
that allows a UMV to understand and act on a codified set of 
navigational requirements.
    In order to determine legal rights and obligations when operating a 
particular UMV, a threshold issue will be how to characterize the UMV 
given the language in key domestic statutes, regulations, and 
international laws, which primarily govern operations by ``vessels'' or 
``ships.'' Efforts toward compliance with governing legal authorities 
has invariably raised issues of fact, policy, and law, including the 
critical question of ``is it a vessel?'' Thus, to best assess risk and 
make well-informed decisions, the Coast Guard could develop legal and 
policy opinions contemplating the legal parameters for each prospective 
UMV, including how the Coast Guard will ensure legal compliance and 
whether provisions may be available for exemptions and equivalencies 
under mandatory instruments, taking into account the applicability and 
processes related to making, amending, and interpreting treaties. Such 
determinations remain a case-by-case threshold ``legal status'' 
determination of the respective platform to address the ``is it a 
vessel?'' conundrum that considers the size and type of platform, how 
the platform is utilized, and where the platform is utilized. Of 
critical importance to such an analysis is an assessment of whether a 
UMV can navigate in a demonstrably safe and prudent manner and whether 
technical noncompliance is deemed a reasonable legal risk.
    The issue of ``what is a vessel'' is not a novel matter for the 
Coast Guard. In fact, in its Legal Determination on Vessel Status of 
Paddleboard (Oct. 3, 2003), the Coast Guard Boating Safety Division 
(CG-5422) promulgated a determination on whether the Coast Guard 
considers a ``paddleboard'' to be a vessel. In that determination, the 
Coast Guard established a five-pronged test for determining whether any 
given watercraft is capable of being classified as a ``vessel,'' 
provided here in relevant part:
    1.  Whether the watercraft is ``practically capable'' of carrying 
persons or property,
    2.  Whether the useful operating range of the device is limited by 
the physical endurance of its operator,
    3.  Whether the device presents a substantial hazard to navigation 
or safety not already present,
    4.  Whether the normal objectives sought to be accomplished by the 
regulation of a device as a ``vessel'' are present, and
    5.  Whether the operator and/or cargo would no longer be safe in 
the water if the device became disabled.

    As the Coast Guard acknowledged in that determination, the criteria 
outlined above will not be applicable to every watercraft for which 
there is a question of status, and there is no set formula for making 
vessel determinations--each determination must be made on an individual 
basis. Adding to the complexity of this legal status determination, 
industry and military services alike have been developing a range of 
terminology used in describing UMVs, often depending on the degree of 
autonomy the vehicle has, whether it is used in combat, and whether it 
is below, on, or above the surface of the water. To illustrate, the 
literature supporting this report has revealed there is no universally 
accepted name for an UMV, and the general position in the governmental, 
scientific, legal, and technical communities has yet-to-be aligned. To 
this end, a key legal consideration will be whether the Coast Guard 
procures and operates a platform characterized or classified as a 
vessel, vehicle, or system, taking into account the level of autonomy 
(or advanced automation) at which the UxS intends to operate since this 
will be relevant to how a respective platform fits into the prevailing 
legal framework. Observations on the ``legal challenge involved'' are 
illustrated in the Report, Annex E, Figure E-4:

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Besides international law and conventions, the Coast Guard may rely 
on domestic statute, regulation, and policy in formulating 
determinations as to the legal status of a respective asset or 
platform. For example, under U.S. statute, the word ``vessel'' includes 
every description of watercraft or other artificial contrivance used, 
or capable of being used, as a means of transportation on water. (1 
U.S.C. Sec.  3). This definition does not distinguish between manned 
and unmanned watercraft. The Supreme Court has further established 
``reasonable observer test'' in that a watercraft does not fall within 
the 1 U.S.C. Sec.  3 definition of a ``vessel'' unless a ``reasonable 
observer,'' looking to the structure or watercraft's physical 
characteristics and activities, would consider it designed to a 
practical degree for carrying people or things over water.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Lozman v. City of Riviera Beach, 568 U.S. 115 (2013).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, the study committee recognized the disparities that may 
develop in a respective assessment of whether a watercraft is a 
``vessel''--and thus subject to Coast Guard jurisdiction and 
authority--or not, and by example cited to a pilot program for marine 
domain awareness that was being undertaken with Saildrone unmanned 
surface vehicles (USVs) in footnote 12 \6\ of the Report. The Report 
referred to a Saildrone vehicle that:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Saildrone. ``Eyes and Ears at Sea: US Coast Guard to Test 
Saildrone Autonomous MDA Capabilities.'' https://www.saildrone.com/
news/uscg-test-maritime-domain-awareness-solution. (``Congress has 
tasked the United States Coast Guard (USCG) with examining the 
feasibility, costs, and benefits of improving maritime domain awareness 
in the remote Pacific Ocean using a low-cost unmanned surface 
system.'')

        `` . . . weighs 750 kg and has a narrow 7 meters long hull, 5 
        meters tall wing, and a keel with a 2.5 meters draft. The 
        system combines wind-powered propulsion technology that enables 
        mission durations of up to 12 months (sailing on average 100 km 
        per day) and solar-powered meteorological . . . It operates 
        either under the constant supervision of a human pilot via 
        satellite or can navigate autonomously from prescribed 
        beginning and end points within a user-defined safety 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        corridor.''

    By way of comparison, the study committee understood that the Coast 
Guard had generally accepted the classification of a Saildrone as a 
``vehicle'' (and thus outside the COLREGS and other vessel 
requirements) while previously determining a paddleboard to be a 
``vessel'' subject to the COLREGS and certain regulatory requirements. 
Also, the cited article in the Report indicated that the Saildrone can 
``navigate autonomously,'' although the study committee did not receive 
any clarification as to how such navigation capability assessments were 
conducted.
    To my knowledge, the Coast Guard has not promulgated any formal 
public guidance on their process for making a ``vessel'' determination. 
However, relevant to the study committee's recommendation to expand and 
normalize UxS experimentation, it is notable that on February 16, 2022 
the Coast Guard promulgated CG-CVC Policy Letter 22-01 (Guidelines for 
Human-Supervised Testing of Remote Controlled and Autonomous Systems on 
Vessels).\7\ CG-CVC Policy Letter 22-01 provides useful guidelines for 
testing, under human supervision, of remote controlled and autonomous 
systems on vessels, although that Policy Letter does not allow for 
reduction of vessel manning prescribed by law or regulations, including 
manning that is less than the minimums in 46 U.S.C. Sec.  8301 and 46 
CFR part 15, and pursuant to the COLREGS, at all times must maintain a 
proper look-out by sight and hearing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ https://www.dco.uscg.mil/Portals/9/DCO%20Documents/5p/CG-5PC/
CG-CVC/Policy%20
Letters/2022/CVC%20PL%2022-
01%20Testing%20of%20remote%20and%20autonomous
%20systems.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Notably, since the Report was issued, the Coast Guard, Navy, and 
Marine Corps in March 2022 published the Commander's Handbook on the 
Law of Naval Operations (COMDTPUB P5800.7A) (the ``Handbook''),\8\ 
approved by Rear Admiral Melissa Bert, USCG (Judge Advocate General and 
Chief Counsel), which determined that ``unmanned systems constituting 
vessels will be governed by the COLREGS,'' and that unmanned systems 
may be under the commanded ``by remote or other means.'' Thus, that 
Handbook seemed to affirm that an unmanned ``vessel'' will be subject 
to the COLREGS, hence the critical importance of the aforementioned 
``vessel or vehicle'' distinction. The Handbook also determined that 
unmanned vessels and aircraft owned or operated by a State only on 
government, noncommercial service are entitled to sovereign immunity 
and may be used by States to exercise belligerent rights at sea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ https://usnwc.libguides.com/ld.php?content_id=66281931.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                         International Efforts
    Such legal questions on whether shipping regulations can keep pace 
with developing technology served as the basis for the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) 
Regulatory Scoping Exercise (RSE) and legal surveys promulgated by the 
Comite Maritime International (CMI) to several national maritime law 
associations, through which the IMO and the CMI sought assessments on 
the applicability of MASS to certain conventions and domestic laws, and 
more generally. Since the Report's publication in 2020, the Maritime 
Safety Committee (MSC) of the IMO, at its 103rd session in May 2021, 
completed the RSE to analyze relevant ship safety treaties, in order to 
assess how MASS could be regulated,\9\ and agreed to develop a goal-
based MASS instrument in the form of a voluntary ``MASS Code,'' due to 
take effect in 2025, to address the various gaps and themes identified 
by the RSE. The CMI national maritime law association for the United 
States, the US MLA, has since established a standing committee on 
Autonomous Ships and Smart Marine Technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ IMO MSC Circular.1/1638, Outcome of the Regulatory Scoping 
Exercise for the Use of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                           Testing and Comity
    In its Report, the study committee also recognized that the Coast 
Guard could utilize testing opportunities to clarify to what extent 
UMVs are subject to and comply with the COLREGS, how legal risk and 
allocation of responsibilities for gaining relevant use permissions is 
being obtained, what privileges and immunities are afforded the UMV and 
operator (e.g., ``public vessel''), and which party is responsible for 
the handling of the data collected. To this end, the Report suggested 
that the U.S. Navy could be a useful indicator of these issues given 
their continued growth in the testing of UMVs, and since the Navy has 
also granted exemptions from regulatory and certification requirements 
for a discrete number of unmanned surface vehicles under 33 U.S.C. 
Sec.  1605 ``with respect to the number, position, range, or arc of 
visibility of lights, with respect to shapes, or with respect to the 
disposition and characteristics of sound-signaling appliances.''
    The Report had also recognized that ``legal questions and 
challenges linked to autonomous shipping, as well as the solutions 
needed to resolve them, will differ depending on what choices are made 
in relation to manning, crew location, and autonomy level.'' \10\ 
Generally, the Coast Guard has considered the statutes that govern the 
manning requirements for vessels to require a human onboard and that 
the Coast Guard cannot independently waive statutory manning 
requirements or the COLREGS absent Congressional authorization. This 
was addressed in more detail in the more recent National Academies' 
study on ``New Coast Guard Authorities'' \11\, recently briefed to this 
Subcommittee and on which I served as a committee member, in which it 
was recognized that Congress authorized an ``at-sea recovery operations 
pilot program'' that expressly permits the Secretary (e.g., Coast 
Guard) ``to allow remotely controlled or autonomous vessel operations 
to proceed . . . including navigation and manning laws and 
regulations'' and ``modify or waive applicable regulations . . . to 
allow remote and autonomous vessel at-sea operations.'' \12\ Subject to 
certain considerations, this otherwise seems to answer the question in 
the affirmative of whether Congress can indeed waive the manning 
requirements and the navigation laws (i.e., COLREGS), and that waiver 
authority presents an important precedent for the Coast Guard as a user 
and regulator of UxS.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Annex E, fn. 3, citing Henrik Ringbom. 2019. Regulating 
Autonomous Ships--Concepts, Challenges and Precedents, Ocean 
Development & International Law. DOI: 10.1080/00908320.2019.1582593.
    \11\ National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 
2023. The Coast Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging 
Challenges and Statutory Needs. Washington, DC: The National Academies 
Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/27059.
    \12\ James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2023, Pub. L. 117-263, div. K, title CXV, Sec. 11504, Dec. 23, 
2022, 136 Stat. 4131; see At-Sea Recovery Operations Pilot Program 
Sec.  11504(d)(1)-(2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
           Unmanned Underwater Vehicles and Aircraft Systems
    Lastly, and as addressed in the Report, subsurface operations 
generally fall outside the purview of the COLREGS, and thus the study 
committee found few perceived legal impediments to such operations. 
However, the Coast Guard could still conduct an operational assessment 
for such types of subsurface and tethered remotely operated vehicle 
operations to review the varying levels of risk. And, as the U.S. Navy 
and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) are 
currently utilizing prototype unmanned underwater vessels/vehicles 
(UUVs), maintaining a collaborative approach and close communications 
with these entities could benefit the Coast Guard as a way to leverage 
lessons learned and best practices in development of the means to meet 
legal compliance. Similarly, in the case of unmanned aircraft systems 
(UAS), the use of UAS generally falls under Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) authorities and in parity with Department of 
Defense instructions. In all cases, however, the issue of budget and 
acquisition authority remains of vital consideration as the Coast Guard 
lags other services in the ability to rapidly acquire and deploy 
unmanned systems.
             Coast Guard Acquisition Authorities and Models
    The study committee assessed the challenges the Coast Guard faces 
when selecting the most timely and cost-effective acquisition authority 
and model. Although some acquisition authorities and models will be 
better suited to UxSs than others, the rapid pace of UxS advancements 
could require even more streamlined and nimble options to quickly 
respond to available opportunities and partnerships. The committee 
suggested that perhaps the most efficient way to acquire and accelerate 
the transition of UxS platforms and payloads to desired operations 
would be to identify and prioritize tested and proven technologies, and 
then adapt those systems for specific requirements. For example, mature 
technologies that are relatively inexpensive to operate, outfitted with 
operator-friendly control systems, and readily configured for multiple 
missions and payloads could be the primary focus of early transitions.
    Several acquisition authorities are available to the Coast Guard, 
and selection of the most appropriate procurement mechanism for UxS is 
dependent on the scale and scope of the asset to be acquired:
      Federal Acquisition Regulation
      Level 3--Non-Major Acquisition Program
      Coast Guard Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation 
(RDT&E) Program
      Memoranda of Understanding
      DHS Cooperative Research and Development Agreements 
(CRADAs)
      Other Transaction Authority (OTA) (Research OTAs and 
Prototype OTAs)
      Silicon Valley Innovation Program
      DHS S&T Small Business Innovation Research Program
      Unsolicited Proposals
      Defense Innovation Unit (DIU)

    As referenced in the Report, programmatic and technical 
specifications need to be addressed as part of the procurement decision 
making. Successful identification of acquisition programs requires a 
coordinated effort between the sponsor, resource, acquisition, and 
other stakeholders within the Coast Guard.

                                 * * *

    In conclusion, I want to thank you--Chairman Webster, Ranking 
Member Carbajal, and this Subcommittee--for the opportunity to testify.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    Mr. Johnson, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

   TESTIMONY OF MICHAEL GORDON JOHNSON, MARINE ENGINEER, AND 
  FOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, SEA MACHINES ROBOTICS, 
                              INC.

    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Chairman Webster, Vice Ranking 
Member Scholten, and other Members, for inviting me to speak on 
this important topic of innovation in the maritime space and 
specifically, marine autonomous technology.
    So, yesterday, my wife and I navigated to one of the only 
two memorials on the National Mall that is dedicated to a 
technology innovator. Just south of the Lincoln Memorial is a 
beautiful Milford granite, 20-foot edifice dedicated by 
President Coolidge and the Crown Prince of Sweden in full 
regalia in 1926. And it honors a Mr. John Ericsson. And he, 
like me, was a marine engineer. And in large bold Deco font, it 
says: ``He invented the screw propeller.'' And above him are 
towering figures representing our national belief in adventure, 
labor, and vision.
    Now, John Ericsson was, indeed, Swedish. And with his 
propeller design, he attempted to gain traction in Europe. And 
in the 1830s, he landed a pilot program with a marquee customer 
of that era, the British Royal Navy, who then passed on it 
because they comfortably believed in the continuing dominance 
of sailing vessels.
    So, then in 1839, a bold and connected citizen of the 
United States invited John to our Nation and gained funding to 
build the U.S. Navy test vessel Princeton, which proved 
capabilities that began a major transformation of the world's 
fleets, along with the world order.
    Within 20 years, 70 years after we penned our Constitution, 
the United States had the world's second largest merchant 
marine, just behind Britain, and today, 180 years later, it is 
all still moving by the screw propeller.
    And so, this story is very important to me, because it's a 
clear example of our young country and a very lean Federal 
Government at that time investing with focus and disruptive 
innovation to build national value.
    And today, just like then, the marine industry does 
everything on the water-covered surface of our planet, 
operating the largest machines made by humankind and connecting 
the world with trade. And licensed mariners, some of the best 
trained professionals of any industrial space, maintain these 
powerful machines and pilot them in the earth's most dynamic 
and forceful environment.
    So, what is autonomous technology? It is the innate 
technical progression after 20th-century automation. Yet the 
power and capability of it is an exponential step. Where 
automation is a singular process, like a ``if this, then 
that,'' autonomy is a comprehensive compute engine that 
prioritizes sensor data, weighs decisions to complete larger 
complex processes, like a full voyage.
    So, that's valuable, because the industry and its mariners 
today are handicapped by the continued use of last century's 
technology and methods, resulting in accident rates that 
eclipse other comparable vehicle industries. As well, we have 
dismal on-time arrival rates and unoptimized operation of the 
world's cargo fleet that emits 3 percent of humanity's annual 
greenhouse gas.
    So, autonomy will transform fleet operations and bring 
forward the reliability, productivity, and precision of 
advanced robotics, empowering mariners to do more, do it better 
and safer with less effort and less cost.
    So, today, autonomy systems are being deployed by early 
adopters, both commercial and for national security. Task-
driven workboats use it for open water surveying and data 
collection, as well as heavy dangerous work, like oilspill 
response and domain awareness. And it's beginning to be trialed 
in larger vessels that move cargo and people. So, maritime is a 
major contributor to our Nation's economy, accounting for 1.9 
percent of our GDP and 2.3 million jobs, but the United States 
no longer holds a leading nor an influential position, and the 
global presence of the U.S.-flag fleet is continually 
shrinking.
    In global cargo fleet ownership value, the U.S. now ranks 
number 14, well below China at number 1. So, autonomy is an 
emerging space, but it is advancing quickly and other 
determined nations that value its potential are investing 
heavily to take that commanding position.
    The United States should not pass on this opportunity. We 
should focus our national lens on this technical field, or we 
are handing the keys of the seas to others and further risk our 
position as a global super economy-driven superpower.
    We must do the things today to shape where we want to be in 
the decades ahead. Thank you for this opportunity, and I am 
here at your service to answer any questions.
    [Mr. Johnson's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Michael Gordon Johnson, Marine Engineer, and 
    Founder and Chief Executive Officer, Sea Machines Robotics, Inc.
                                Opening
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, it's with sincere gratitude that I've been invited to 
submit testimony with my perspectives on the purposes and value of 
innovation in the maritime industry and specifically marine autonomous 
technology as it applies to surface operating vessels.
    By way of additional background, I am a degreed marine engineer, 
and I held an engineering officer's license in the United States 
Merchant Marine before moving into ship repair and shipbuilding. I've 
managed vessel projects in many nations and was a Vice President of 
Project Management at Crowley Maritime and Vice President of Operations 
at Crowley's affiliate Titan Salvage. I have extensive experience in 
designing solutions for and leading teams in complex marine projects. 
After owning a marine project management company which mostly focused 
on offshore installations, I founded Sea Machines Robotics Inc. (Sea 
Machines) in 2017 to build autonomous technology for the marine 
sectors. Sea Machines sells products to domestic and international 
customers and has served multiple U.S. Government departments and 
agencies.
                              Introduction
    The 21st century is the era of self-sensing and self-determining 
advanced automation, also known as autonomy. It's taking robotics and 
non-mechanical machines beyond the low-level and prescriptive tasks of 
the last century, enabling exponentially higher productivity and 
machine value to society. Autonomy is already active and growing in 
capability in general computer processing systems, data processing, 
medical diagnostics, aircraft and spacecraft control systems, 
agriculture, and warehouse logistics and now emerging in automobiles, 
trucking, and maritime.
                             Industry Facts
    The maritime industry does everything on the water-covered surface 
of the Earth, and that's almost three-quarters of it. It operates the 
largest machines built by humankind and facilitates most global trade. 
And licensed mariners, notably some of the best trained professionals 
of any industrial space, maintain these powerful machines and pilot 
them in the Earth's most dynamic and forceful environment. The industry 
is a leading contributor to our nation's economy and according to the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis and NOAA the marine economy accounted 
for 1.9% of our nation's GPD in 2021 or $432 billion. To put that in 
perspective, that's 2.5 times the reported output of America's farms in 
the same year. They further report that the marine sector provides 2.3 
million jobs with an average annual salary of $81,000 which is 13% 
above the U.S. national average in the same year. Leading subsectors 
include marine tourism and recreation, national defense & public 
administration, offshore minerals, and marine transportation & 
warehousing.
    Even though the marine industry contributes more to the U.S. 
economy than arts and entertainment, or utilities, or even modern data 
processing, it seemingly operates under the radar of most and receives 
comparatively little public attention.
              Problem from the Macro Economic Perspective
    The United States no longer holds the leading or influential 
position in the global maritime industry, the exceptions being the 
shrinking global presence of the US Navy and Coast Guard and some 
financing centered in New York City.
    As the world's largest economy and the only world superpower, the 
United States has many reasons to maintain an influential stake in all 
industries that are key to global progress, economic value, and 
international politics.
    The United States emerged mostly unscathed from the last global 
war. And as a capital-driven nation eager to rebuild the global markets 
and hence customers, while pushing back against a new potential foe, we 
spread our capabilities, our products, and our values across most of 
the world's nations, and built a castle of confidence in our strength 
that upholds the U.S. dollar as a current leading standard of world 
trade and leading reserve currency. This ensures the value of the 
dollar, giving our citizens at home a quality of life and security that 
we've come to expect. But leading positions are always subject to 
erosion, especially in a world that has seen continuous development for 
almost 80 years enabling a near leveling of lifestyles and quality of 
competitive capabilities and products across the world.
    There are other nations, growing potential superpowers, that as 
competitors can surpass and displace the United States, which if this 
happens may critically impact the value of the dollar and risk 
shrinking our economy and our internal standard of living. In the last 
century we've seen such collapses of global position and national 
economy in the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union among others. Absent 
of major wars that can reorder global positions, the key to competitive 
economic fortune and global leadership comes from the combination of 
four elements.
    1)  Security, Order, and Trust
    2)  Culture that Encourages Merit and Elevation of Position
    3)  Open Market Economy
    4)  Technology Innovation

    The United States does well against primary competitors in the 
combined value of the elements 1-3, but as we've transitioned into 
generations of leadership, both in business and government, that are 
guided less by long-term developmentalism and more through a lens of 
short-term finance, our nation has taken the eye off the strategic 
innovation ball. And because of that, competitors that, frankly, have 
learned from the United States, have a focused innovation strategy of 
such determined force that they seem to overcome their weakness in 
elements 1-3.
                   Natural Progression of Technology
    It's easy for most Americans to overlook the fact that we live on a 
water-world. For over 3,500 years, the leading intercontinental 
nations, societies, and empires of each period were also dominant on 
the seas. Across 95% of that time, up until the mid-19th century, the 
highest technology was always in ships. But the 2nd Industrial 
Revolution (Industry 2.0) brought new fields such as electricity and 
assembly line manufacturing that cultivated immense economic value that 
by the time of Industry 3.0 maritime had become relegated to a lower 
return commodity driven sector.
    And now today, autonomous technology is a key aspect of the 4th 
Industrial Revolution, which is continuing an ever-growing shift of 
both manual and cognitive effort from human to machine. Technologies in 
Industry 4.0 also include networked data-driven systems, Internet of 
Things (IoT), machine learning, and artificial intelligence (AI). 
However, it's difficult to see ways that these technologies can be 
applied generically across key industries. Meaning that one can 
innovate and build autonomy or AI for the automotive sector without 
much of it being applicable to aerospace or maritime.
                  Advancements from Autonomous Control
    Advanced control systems have already been deployed in other 
vehicle sectors. From advanced flight control fly-by-wire systems in 
aircraft that began to enter the market in the 1980s to active driver 
assistance systems in cars and trucks that started to emerge in the 
early 2000s. And while there are many different capabilities to these 
technologies, the primary purpose is to increase safety by eliminating 
human operator errors and improve productivity and efficiency through 
precise data-driven control.
    Marine autonomy is the innate technical progression after 20th 
century automation, yet the power and capability of it is an 
exponential step. Where automation is a singular process, often if-
this-then-that control, autonomy is a comprehensive compute engine 
completing a larger complex process, like a full voyage, by 
prioritizing sensor data and weighing decisions to provide a desired 
outcome.
    And that's valuable because the industry and its mariners today are 
handicapped by continued use of last century's technology and 
methodologies. Accident rates, both in commercial and recreational 
vessels eclipse most other moving vehicle industries, on time arrival 
rates that match airlines of the 1970s, and unoptimized operation of 
the world's cargo ships which are said to emit 3% of humanity's annual 
greenhouse gas.
                           Sector Challenges
Accidents
    According to Allianz and other sources such as the Japan P&I Club, 
on average approximately 2% of the global commercial fleet (vessels of 
100 gross tons on greater) is involved in a non-machinery related major 
navigation incident or accident annually. In 2022, Allianz/Lloyds List 
reports 1,554 non-machinery related incidents and accidents in their 
tracked 58,000 vessels, of which 280 were vessel-to-vessel collisions 
and 209 were groundings. Japan P&I, latest data being 2016, tracks a 
fleet of 2,333 ocean going vessels reported 53 collisions and 
groundings, or a 2.2% rate.
    2.2% is around the same rate as automobile accidents in the United 
States (2.4% of U.S. car fleet is calculated to have been involved in 
an accident in 2017) but a more appropriate comparison would be to 
airliners due to that sector being a professionally operated. Airlines 
in 2022 reported 39 accidents from a global fleet of 23,513 active 
aircraft or 0.17% rate; therefore, commercial maritime has an incident 
and accident rate 13 times commercial airlines.
Efficiency & Resource Use
    Cargo ships are already around 2 times more fuel efficient per 
cargo ton compared to trains and 20 times versus average trailer-trucks 
but this is all due to size and quantity of cargo being moved by one 
vessel.
    The approximately 58,000 commercial ships of the world burn around 
350 million tons of fuel per year, which is equivalent to 115 days of 
all oil consumption of the United States. These vessels are said to 
emit 3% of society's global greenhouse gas emissions, which if the 
sector was a nation would rank No. 6 as an emitter.
    It's believed that after power plants and aviation, cargo ships are 
the 3rd most concentrated source of greenhouse gas emissions, and 
therefore improvements that reduce fuel burn, can make a significant 
impact in reducing emissions in a short period of time when deployed 
across the fleets.
    New technology brings great opportunity for improvement. Autonomous 
control systems, due to their more precise data-driven control and real 
time route optimization have the capability to reduce fuel usage, with 
presumed reductions up to 25% or more. Along with reducing emissions, 
this reduces operational costs and the U.S. Government is one of, if 
not the largest, buyer of petroleum products with the Department of 
Defense spending over $9 billion annually on fuel.
                         Maritime Applications
    Autonomy transforms operations and brings forward the reliability, 
productivity, and precision of advanced robotics, empowering mariners 
to do more, do it better, with less effort and less cost. Autonomous 
control systems of various levels of faculty are being deployed by 
early adopters for both commercial and national security. And now, 
fueled by the prospect of opportunity and enhanced productivity, 
autonomy is beginning to be trialed in larger vessels that move cargo 
and people.
Workboats
    Task driven workboats are using it for open water surveying, data 
collection, as well as heavy dangerous work like oil spill skimming and 
naval operations survey, security.
Response Boats
    To improve response availability and response time autonomy systems 
are starting to be adopted by fireboats, lifesaving boats, and other 
response vessels; the technology being focused on routine or dangerous 
aspects of the work can enable the human crew to focus on specific 
complicated tasks.
Unmanned Naval and Security Vessels
    Autonomy enables unmanned vessels which can provide new 
capabilities of persistent domain awareness or security; for example, 
providing a persistently patrolling sea-level sentry on watch for drug 
smugglers and complementing other common domain sensors or creating 
distributed networks of smaller naval vessels that extend the reach and 
support the power of the capital fleet.
Autonomous Pilot Assistance for all Vessels
    The most significant benefit and uses of autonomous systems will be 
as advanced pilot assistance, bringing the value of onboard inherent 
control like that found in airliners and the ADAS systems emerging in 
road vehicles. It increases safety, performance, and overall efficiency 
of the operations. Within the next three years early adopters in 
sectors such as cargo ships, ferries, and yachts will begin 
deployments.
                             Infrastructure
    Infrastructure provides the foundation and common tools for our 
economy and society to grow and thrive. And over the years the federal 
government has taken numerous measures to promote our maritime sectors, 
from incentives to protectionism; however, both the scale and type of 
incentives are not aligned with the potential that can be unlocked. 
Along with maintenance and operational budgets for locks, navigation 
markers, dredging, and U.S. Coast Guard, the government has also spent 
about $100 million since 2010 in promotion of the U.S. Marine Highways 
System, or an average of $8.4 million per year, also around $20 million 
annually on grants to the shipbuilding sector. Most of these funds go 
to traditional physical assets, such as forklifts, cranes, welding 
machines. This type of spending, while helpful at the micro-level, does 
very little to unlock the next era of maritime. The nation needs to be 
looking forward and invest in the digital infrastructure to stay ahead, 
inflate the value of the resulting products and services, and advance 
worker salaries.
Marine Highway System
    The Marine Highway System consists of 29 marine routes, along all 
coasts, major interior waterways, and around Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and 
other Pacific Islands. The intended reasoning behind establishing this 
system is well described by the Maritime Administration (MARAD), 
including reduction of traffic and local land air pollution within the 
nations roadways and land corridors, shifting hazardous cargo transit 
away from living areas, reducing road wear and maintenance costs, and 
improving transportation resiliency through alternatives. MARAD also 
presents the need to improve economic competitiveness by adding new 
freight and passenger capacities. These are all very important reasons 
to put focus and funding for the expanded promotion of the marine 
highways, but these trade lanes and passenger avenues also provide the 
venues to launch a new autonomy-enabled generation of technology.
                              Competition
    Looking at competition from the national perspective, we see 
development from each of the following nations, ranked by a combination 
of focus, maturity in development, funding, and momentum.
    1)  China: Deployment of many small autonomous collaborative boats, 
and now autonomous 300TEU containership, the ZHI FEI, commenced regular 
commercial short sea operations in 2022, as well a 200-ton trimaran 
unmanned naval patrol vessel.
    2)  Israel: Deploying and testing unmanned patrol vessels for over 
15 years.
    3)  United States: Deploying naval test boats and larger vessels, 
often one-off for over 15 years. Venture-backed small businesses with 
commercially available products. Over 20 years of underwater autonomy 
development and commercial business.
    4)  Singapore: Deploying unmanned vessels for testing and military 
patrols for over 10 years; providing R&D funding to bring forward 
autonomous harbor tugs.
    5)  UK: Deploying and testing multi-unit unmanned mine counter 
measure (MCM) & patrol vessels for over 5 years.
    6)  France: Many R&D projects including MCM vessels, patrol boats, 
survey craft, and oil field support vessels.
    7)  European Union: Horizon 2020 technology funding track for 
autonomous vessel R&D, as well as funding for remote control cargo 
barging on inland waterways.
    8)  Norway: Government-funded development of autonomy associated 
with electrical cargo short sea shipping demonstrator.
    9)  Japan: Government funded R&D programs launched 4 years ago to 
developed autonomous cargo ships with multiple cohort collaborations.
    10)  Sweden: Deep commercial experience in underwater and direct 
remote control for naval vessels.
    11)  Netherlands: Multiple leading commercial marine operating 
companies that are deploying autonomy in survey and dredging projects.
    12)  Turkey: Multiple speculative commercially funded patrol vessel 
developments.
                     Comprehensive Maritime Network
    This paper has been referring to marine autonomy mainly from a 
vessel or fleet perspective, but the opportunity is much bigger than 
the operational level. Autonomy is an enabling technology that can 
deliver the 1+2=10 systems of systems; when fully built out it will 
bring forth a global connected platform, much like the internet, that 
ties new software applications and artificial intelligence to a major 
world-moving industry. For the same reasons that marine autonomy saw 
rapid initial adoption around the world, the domain being vast and open 
and suitable for even immature technology, makes an optimal environment 
for a fully connected active network to take shape. And whoever builds 
and dominates this network may take all value in a zero-sum 
competition.
                            It's Time to Act
    When looking at global fleet ownership, the United States now ranks 
No. 14, between Taiwan and Bermuda, well below China at No. 1 with a 
cargo fleet value that is nearly 5x that of the U.S. And China is 
pushing further ahead with government and government-backed investments 
both in the physical and digital infrastructure.
    And while autonomy is a nascent space it's advancing quickly and 
other determined nations, such as China, that value its power and 
potential are investing heavily to take that commanding position. The 
United States shouldn't pass on this.
    The federal government has a record of acting pro-actively to 
ensure new high value society-moving technologies are built and 
centered within our nation, from the internet to oil, from drugs to 
electric cars, it was members of Congress that used their voice and 
their legislation to bring focused attention, research budgets, steer 
federal agencies, or foster adoption through incentives.
    Consider the example of the internet. In the 1980s, select members 
were actively bringing focus on the opportunities that can be had from 
the envisioned supercomputing network. Then in 1991 Congress delivered 
The High-Performance Computing and Information Act to President Bush 
which allocated $600 million to accelerate the development of the 
super-information highway. Almost immediately new companies were 
forming around the nation and by 2020, less than 30 years since the 
bill was signed, the internet directly contributed over 10% ($2.45 
trillion) to our nation's annual GDP. A return on that 1991 investment 
like no other.
    But there are also examples of new technical fields where our 
nation showed indifference or even stifled, from advanced high-tech and 
digital equipment manufacturing to aerial drones, allowing competitors 
to take the space.
    And right now, the signal flags are snapping in the wind because 
marine autonomy is that next opportunity to capture immense future 
value for our nation and our citizens, bringing forth a digitally 
connected, network to machine autonomy that powers the next generations 
of marine fleets.
    Action today is critical because competitors are clearly showing 
their desire, and without focusing our national lens we risk handing 
over the keys of the seas. The subject of marine autonomy is well known 
in many government departments and agencies that operate on water and 
some have developed strategic plans, supported by specific budget line 
items, that mostly include experimental roadmaps, knowledge and 
experience building, and industry partnering. These are all positive 
steps, but the reality is that leading competitors are fielding more 
autonomous vessels into determined active daily operations to force-
forward a rate of development that cannot be achieved with a paced 
approach. We ask our Congress and other agencies to take the time to 
understand this opportunity in marine autonomous technology and 
proactively do things today to shape where we want to be in decades 
ahead.
                               Conclusion
    The United States marine industry is at a crossroads of opportunity 
on the ever-important sea lanes and open oceans.
    We, as Americans, are very aware of the value that industry brings 
to our society through products, jobs, wages, tax base, security, and 
happiness. Yet the value of each form of industrial technology normally 
decreases with time on the market as it becomes conventional, and 
therefore it's paramount to maintain a continuous re-inflation of our 
economic value through innovation of new technologies. And I believe 
it's the responsibility of leaders in the United States, from 
government to business, from labor to social, to purposely promote and 
foster this.
    We have a workforce and knowledge base in maritime, software, 
robotics and a marine infrastructure that is ripe for improvement. With 
the right motivations through Government focus, voice, and funding and 
a permissive regulatory attitude, we can release a spirit into the 
veins of our commercial marine industry that breaks the molds of 
complacency and builds new technologies that bring U.S. maritime back 
to the tip of the spear on all fronts. Opportunity is knocking, let us 
answer before it is too late.
    Thank you. I wish to thank you Chairman Webster, Ranking Member 
Carbajal, and Members of the Subcommittee for this chance to testify 
before you on the subject and I will make myself available for any 
further needed information.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back.
    Now, Mr. Lahey, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

   TESTIMONY OF PATRICK LAHEY, COFOUNDER AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
                   OFFICER, TRITON SUBMARINES

    Mr. Lahey. Thank you very much.
    I am on a starkly different topic here, ladies and 
gentlemen. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen, Mr. Chairman, 
distinguished members of the committee. I greatly appreciate 
the opportunity to address all of you today.
    My name is Patrick Lahey. I am the cofounder and CEO of 
Triton Submarines. I started Triton Submarines 17 years ago 
with the sole objective of creating the most advanced human-
occupied vehicles, HOVs, in the world today that will allow our 
clients, along with their friends, family members, and guests, 
to safely explore the wonder and beauty of the deep sea.
    Every sub built by Triton is still in class and in service, 
certified to the original depth and in the care and in the 
control of a client we enjoy a mutually beneficial 
relationship.
    Every Triton is certified and accredited by an independent 
third-party classification society, which should be a 
requirement for all human-occupied vehicles. Triton created the 
deepest diving sub in the world today, the Triton 36000/2, 
which is the only classed and certified HOV with an unlimited 
diving depth.
    Triton delivered this revolutionary new sub in 2018. In 
addition to completing dives to the deepest point in each of 
the world's five oceans during the historic and unprecedented 
Five Deeps Expedition, this extraordinary machine has made 16 
dives to full ocean depth, the Challenger Deep in the Mariana 
Trench, and more than 100 dives to the hadal zone, an area of 
the ocean that lies between 20,000 and 36,000 feet.
    I had the privilege of making five dives in the Mariana 
Trench, including the certification dive in 2019 with a DNV 
surveyor, which also turned into the deepest ever salvage at 
35,865 feet. Classed and certified human-occupied vehicles 
still have a perfect track record of safety spanning more than 
50 years.
    During this time, tens of millions of people have enjoyed 
the wonderfully sublime experience of diving in the comfort and 
safety of an HOV without a single fatality. The OceanGate sub 
was an aberration, a mistake, and this experimental craft, 
which was not subjected to any type of peer review, should 
never have carried human beings.
    The message is, the OceanGate tragedy was entirely 
avoidable. It should have never happened. There is no place in 
the human-occupied exploration of the deep sea for experimental 
subs.
    Certification, accreditation, and independent 
classification society compliance is essential to avoiding a 
repeat of the OceanGate tragedy. HOVs must be independently 
peer-reviewed and validated to ensure they are safe for human 
occupancy. Any craft carrying human cargo should be required to 
meet or exceed the high bar of certification. No exceptions.
    In addition to the tragic loss of life caused by the 
OceanGate disaster is the fear it has indirectly created or 
reinforced about subs, and the collateral damage it has done to 
legitimate builders of classed HOVs in our small industry, like 
Triton and so many others.
    We willingly and enthusiastically embrace the need and 
importance of the accreditation process, which is necessarily 
arduous, thorough, time-consuming and expensive, but results in 
a machine that is fit for purpose and safe for people to use 
within the limits stipulated by the certification agencies and 
the manufacturer.
    Continued human-occupied exploration of the deep sea is 
essential to furthering our knowledge and understanding of 
these largely unexplored areas of our own planet.
    HOVs, or human-occupied vehicles, are magical machines that 
I have had the privilege to work with for more than 40 years. I 
have devoted my professional life to the development and the 
safe operation of these vehicles.
    Classed and certified HOVs safely transport you to the most 
fascinating place on our planet and help us to better 
understand and appreciate and begin to care about the 
importance of the ocean's health and well-being and the 
undeniable connection it has to our own continued survival.
    We will only protect what we love, and properly designed 
and engineered subs allow you to connect viscerally and 
emotionally to a place most people never get the privilege and 
opportunity to visit.
    But I can assure you that if you ever have a dive in a 
human-occupied vehicle, it will change your perception of the 
ocean forever. The experience will leave an indelible 
impression on you, just as it did to me more than 40 years ago. 
Just make sure the craft you are diving in is certified. The 
deep ocean is no place for compromise.
    Thank you.
    [Mr. Lahey's prepared testimony follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Patrick Lahey, Cofounder and Chief Executive 
                       Officer, Triton Submarines
    Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, it is an honor to appear 
before you today and address concerns regarding the safety of human 
occupied vehicles (HOVs) or submersibles (subs) and to highlight the 
stark difference between the thoughtfully designed and carefully 
engineered machines created by Triton and other legitimate builders of 
certified HOVs in our small industry and the experimental craft built 
by OceanGate (OG), which should have never carried people.
    My name is Patrick Lahey, and I am co-founder and CEO of Triton 
Submarines (Triton), a company with manufacturing facilities in 
Sebastian, Florida and Barcelona, Spain. During a career spanning 42 
years in the underwater business, I have participated in the design, 
manufacturing, testing and operation of more than 60 HOVs. At Triton, I 
have overseen the development of our entire range of subs, including 
the Triton 36000/2 (36K/2), which is the first and only full ocean 
depth (FOD) rated HOV certified by an internationally recognized, and 
independent third-party classification society (DNV formerly DNV/GL). 
This remarkable craft provides safe daily access to the most extreme 
and least understood area of our ocean (the hadal zone, which lies 
between 6,000 and 11,000 meters or 20,000-36,000 feet), for the first 
time in history.
    The Triton 36K2 was created during the same time frame as OG built 
Cyclops II (later renamed Titan). However, at Triton, we embrace 
certification as an essential deliverable for all our subs and we 
insisted on it as a requirement for the Triton 36K/2 too, despite the 
fact it made the project more difficult, time consuming and expensive. 
Certification is a key reason this unique craft was able to set records 
and accomplish more in the deepest and most remote areas of our oceans 
than any vehicle before it. Our goal at Triton was to create a new 
paradigm in ocean exploration and deliver an HOV that made it possible 
for people to safely make repeated dives to any place in the ocean and 
accomplish meaningful work, even at the most extreme depths.
    I have had the privilege and good fortune to complete five dives in 
the Mariana Trench, including a certification dive in 2019 with DNV 
surveyor, Jonathan Struwe, during which we successfully completed the 
world's deepest ever salvage at 10,932 meters or 35,865 feet. The 
Triton 36K/2 has made 18 dives to FOD and more than 100 dives to depths 
below 6,000 meters since we delivered the sub in late 2018. For 
context, the deepest point in the Mariana Trench is almost three times 
the depth of RMS Titanic, which lies in 3,800 meters or 12,500 feet.
    The Triton 36K/2 is a great validation of the accreditation process 
and underscores the critical importance of subjecting a HOV to a peer 
review. Rather than stifle innovation, the DNV principal engineer, 
Jonathan Struwe together with the considerable resources, capabilities 
and insights of the Underwater Technology Team at DNV were essential to 
our success.
    Certification is the crucible in which responsible innovation in 
extreme environments is possible. Certification is not an impediment to 
innovation (as OG publicly stated) and the success of the Triton 36K/2 
and development of this revolutionary HOV, is a direct result of our 
relationship with a classification society and clearly demonstrated the 
benefits of the accreditation process.
    Unfortunately, HOVs have been the subject of a lot of negative 
press since the OG tragedy, which is unwarranted, particularly if 
people understood the facts. This tragic incident has brought into 
sharp focus the vast difference between an experimental craft such as 
the one built by OG, and the carefully designed, thoughtfully 
engineered, and thoroughly vetted machines created by legitimate 
builders in the HOV industry, which are subjected to an arduous, time 
consuming, necessarily thorough, and expensive accreditation process, 
implemented and overseen by internationally recognized and independent 
third-party classification societies, to ensure a HOV is safe and 
suitable for carrying human cargo.
    The OG tragedy captivated public attention because of the notoriety 
of the dive site and of course the loss of human life, which play into 
people's worst fears about the sea and this type of craft. Most people 
mistakenly believe HOVs are wildly dangerous and unnecessary. At 
Triton, we have been pushing back against these myths and stereotypes 
for nearly two decades because they bear no resemblance to reality. The 
OG tragedy was an anomaly, an aberration and would never have happened 
if this ill-fated craft had been subjected to the certification 
process.
    In fact, accredited or certified HOVs enjoy a 50+ year track record 
of perfect safety, making them the safest mode of transport in the 
world. People have no hesitation in jumping in a car and going for a 
drive or flying in an aircraft where the potential for an accident is 
thousands of times greater. In fact, in the last 50 years, tens of 
millions of people have safely enjoyed the thrilling experience of 
diving in a certified HOV, without a single fatality.
    Many found the failure mode of the OG craft particularly shocking 
because it was without precedent but to those of us in the HOV 
business, the OG hull collapse was not a surprise. It was a predictable 
result of the pressure hull being made of a capricious material, which 
was not suitable for the intended application. The filament wound 
carbon fiber cylinder in the OG craft was degrading from the exposure 
to pressure associated with each dive or cyclic use.
    OG created an `acoustic monitoring system' for Cyclops II, which 
they described as innovative and a system all HOVs should use, but the 
requirement for such a system was an acknowledgement their filament 
wound carbon fiber cylinder was weakening on each successive dive and 
its capacity to resist the crushing pressure at 3,800 meters or 12,500 
feet was diminishing over time and would continue to degrade until it 
failed, catastrophically and without warning. A properly designed and 
engineered HOV doesn't require an acoustic monitoring system because 
the health of the hull is fundamental and beyond question.
    A capricious material that degrades in performance and efficacy 
from normal use, is unacceptable as a pressure boundary for an HOV. If 
the OG sub had been subjected to any kind of peer review, this fact 
alone would have disqualified it from certification. OG dismissed 
certification because they claimed their craft was so cutting edge and 
innovative the classification societies wouldn't understand it, but the 
reality is the OG craft could not be classed and there were many other 
design features, which would not have complied with the classification 
society requirements.
    Triton and every legitimate manufacturer in our small industry 
would not endorse the use of an `experimental' HOV. Instead, these 
companies exclusively manufacture HOVs, which are fully certified and 
accredited by independent third-party classification societies.
    Certification begins with a review of our initial design 
assumptions and ideas, which includes Finite Element Analysis (FEA), 
calculations, etc. The process continues through to the selection, 
independent analysis, and approval of all materials, which must be 
procured from qualified vendors, and the conformance of these materials 
to the dimensional tolerances stipulated in our reviewed and approved 
drawings. Approved and tested materials are then fashioned into 
assemblies, which are subjected to additional testing and validation 
requirements as stipulated by the class society.
    Certification requires the involvement of a surveyor during the 
commissioning process of a HOV, which includes witnessing factory, 
harbor, and sea acceptance trials and continues through to delivery and 
the qualification of all personnel who are responsible for operating 
and maintaining it. Certification is required for the lifetime of the 
sub and is an on-going process where continued compliance is validated 
by regularly scheduled surveys, inspections of paperwork and testing as 
required and witnessed by an attending surveyor representing the 
classification society.
    Every Triton sub is designed, manufactured, tested, and operated in 
compliance with the rules of an internationally recognized 
classification society (DNV, ABS, etc.). These rules have evolved over 
many decades and been influenced by the experiences gleaned from a wide 
variety of operating environments (industrial, recreational, scientific 
etc.).
    The accreditation of a HOV is like that undertaken by the FAA for 
an aircraft. There are hundreds of pages of safety compliance criteria. 
Triton subs meet the requirements of numerous other authorities, 
including Flag State Registries, Pressure Vehicles for Human Occupancy 
(PVHO) rules, and International Maritime Organization (IMO) Guidelines 
for the Design, Construction and Operation of Passenger Submersible 
Craft.
    There must be a simple requirement applied to all HOVs. Either they 
are certified and can carry people safely, or they are not. Either a 
HOV complies with the rigorous design, engineering, validation, testing 
protocols, annual and special periodical survey, and inspection 
requirements of a third-party and independent classification society 
(such as DNV and ABS), or it does not. If it does not, it should not 
carry people, period. If we stick to this simple rule, tragedies like 
the OG disaster can and will be prevented.
    I have spent most of my adult life going to sea and diving in 
certified and accredited HOVs. The ocean is a magnificent but 
unforgiving environment. Being at sea and diving in subs requires an 
understanding and an awareness of the extreme forces at work and 
demands the humility and respect of anyone who intends to work and play 
in this space while ensuring the occupants of a HOV remain safe.
    To date, Triton has designed, manufactured, and sold dozens of 
subs. Every Triton remains in class, certified to the original depth 
and in the hands of a client with whom we enjoy a mutually beneficial 
and on-going relationship. The after sales service and technical 
support relationship is essential to ensuring a HOV performs as 
expected and is being operated and maintained in accordance with both 
the classification society requirements and those of the manufacturer.
    We are fortunate indeed to have inherited the wisdom and collective 
experience of generations of engineers, designers, and operations 
personnel who preceded us. The cornerstone of any product intended to 
carry people into the deep sea is that it must be simple to operate, 
easy to maintain, reliable and most of all safe.
    At Triton, the culture of safety is foundational. In contrast to 
the OG approach of ostracizing those who called attention to safety 
concerns, we adhere to the ``see something, say something'' model, 
where anyone can and should raise a safety concern at any time and for 
any reason. Everyone knows we look out for each other and take the 
responsibility of building equipment capable of safely transporting 
people thousands of feet into the deep sea personally. Everyone 
benefits when everyone contributes towards a shared culture of safety.
    If a person wants to dive beneath the surface in a HOV, they have a 
reasonable expectation the craft they are in meets some type of 
recognized standard of safety. The predatory and unscrupulous practice 
of selling unsuspecting people a seat in an experimental HOV and 
calling them ``mission specialists'' or ``crew'' to skirt the rules or 
avoid regulations is unacceptable and must be stopped. If certification 
with a recognized classification society is made a requirement for any 
HOV being used for these types of commercial operations, future 
tragedies can be avoided.
    At Triton, we're proud to create magical machines that allow people 
to explore the most beautiful but least understood area of our planet. 
Our clients undertake ambitious and inspiring science, film making and 
exploration missions in the deep sea. Their notable achievements are a 
great source of pride and further validation of the importance of 
continued exploration of the deep sea with HOVs.
    I conclude with the simple wisdom that sunlight is the best 
disinfectant. Transparency in all facets of safety is critical to 
building confidence and maintaining the enviable and unprecedented 
track record of safety classed HOVs still enjoy today. The role of the 
certification agencies is paramount to the development of safe HOVs. 
These agencies grade our work. They demand a design be proven, not just 
postulated, and rigorously tested before any people ever dive in it. I 
have every reason to believe that adherence to this simple rule will 
permit exploration of our ocean for decades to come, safely. At Triton 
we recognize the deep sea is no place for compromise.
    Thank you.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields.
    Mr. Spain, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

 TESTIMONY OF T. CHRISTIAN SPAIN, VICE PRESIDENT OF GOVERNMENT 
             RELATIONS, AMERICAN MARITIME OFFICERS

    Mr. Spain. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and members of the 
committee, I would like to thank you for the opportunity to 
testify for American Maritime Officers; Marine Engineers' 
Beneficial Association; Masters, Mates & Pilots; and the 
Seafarers International Union here today.
    I hope everyone will take the time to read my written 
testimony, which is quite technical. I would like to share with 
you my 30 years of experience as a U.S. seafarer in the 
international maritime industry.
    I am Captain Christian Spain, and I am proud to represent 
the 3,400 officers at American Maritime Officers as their vice 
president of government relations. I have been working for AMO 
in Washington for about a decade. And prior to that, I sailed 
aboard AMO-contracted vessels as a master and deck officer for 
nearly 20 years.
    Maritime autonomous surface ships, or MASS, are called by 
different names, such as autonomous vessels, drone vessels, or 
unmanned surface ships. I will just refer to them as MASS. For 
the safety of all seafarers, MASS must adhere to the existing 
maritime regulations, such as the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea, often referred to in the maritime 
industry as ColRegs or the rules of the road.
    Instituting separate parallel regulations for MASS should 
be given little consideration. For instance, vessels have a 
duty to render assistance by providing manpower, equipment and/
or shelter to survivors in the event of a maritime emergency. 
This duty goes back a millennium and cannot be shirked because 
it is inconvenient for innovative technology.
    MASS must be able to use both spoken and written language, 
as safe communication is vital for the safety of the seafarers, 
passengers, and the marine environment, but also for the 
efficiency of daily tasks and the ship's integrity. MASS, like 
traditional vessels, should be equipped with VHF radios to 
exchange information with nearby vessels, ports, and maritime 
authorities. This includes communication for collision 
avoidance, navigation updates, and emergency situations as 
required by current domestic and international maritime laws 
and regulation.
    The upfront cost of retrofitting existing vessels or 
purchasing new autonomous ships are substantial. Shipowners 
have reservations about making such significant investments, 
especially if the benefits are not immediately realized.
    While proponents of MASS argue that the autonomous vessels 
can reduce OpEx over time, shipowners worry about the ongoing 
expense related to maintenance, software updates, and 
cybersecurity measures.
    Ships generally are only making money for an owner when 
they are underway. Without seafarers aboard, preventive 
maintenance would have to be exceptionally well-tailored and 
timed to occur in geographically advantageous areas to see cost 
savings over the life of a vessel, based on labor arbitrage. 
When considering an unplanned maintenance and repair, it would 
seem very unlikely to save money when there are no seafarers 
aboard your vessel to repair it.
    Use of MASS will not eliminate or prevent the risk of 
maritime accidents, including collisions, allisions, and 
groundings, which can lead to oilspills and significant 
environmental damage. The absence of onboard seafarers may 
hinder the rapid response to oilspills, exacerbating the 
environmental impact.
    MARPOL and OPA 90 are complementary and critical 
instruments for regulating the discharge of pollutants from 
vessels, including oilspills. Crewmembers must be trained to 
take immediate steps to minimize spillage, such as deploying 
oilspill containment equipment, and regularly drilling in the 
use of such equipment so that crewmembers are well-versed in 
emergency procedures.
    Seafarers play a pivotal role in mitigating the 
environmental impact of oilspills from vessels. Crewmembers on 
board are integral to the effective implementation of MARPOL 
and OPA 90 regulations in response to oilspills.
    Digitization in the maritime sector allows the further 
automation of some functions and better control of processes as 
a whole. It can enable an increased use of remote-control 
technology. Many of these technologies could be used to the 
benefit of seafarers and improve the safety conditions while 
providing more efficient operations. Other than in niche 
markets, this technology should be used as a tool and not a 
complete replacement for seafarers.
    In closing, I want to emphasize that there is a substantial 
difference between commercial international shipping and the 
mission of the U.S. Coast Guard and other Government agencies.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and the committee for your 
attention on this pivotal matter.
    [Mr. Spain's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of T. Christian Spain, Vice President of Government 
                 Relations, American Maritime Officers
    Mr. Chairman, Ranking member, and members of the committee, I would 
like to thank you for the opportunity to take this seat representing 
American Maritime Officers, Marine Engineers Beneficial Association, 
Masters, Mates & Pilots and Seafarers International Union for today's 
hearing. Maritime Labor would like to express our gratitude for the 
chance to appear before this distinguished congressional committee to 
provide testimony on the critical issue of ensuring safety in the 
Marine environment with the introduction of Autonomous vessels.
    My name is Christian Spain I am proud to represent the 3400 
officers at American Maritime Officers as their Vice President of 
Government Relations. I have been working for AMO in Washington for 
about a decade. Prior to that I sailed aboard AMO contracted vessels as 
a Master and Deck Officer for nearly 20 years. As a collateral duty I 
currently serve as the Vice-Chair of the International Transport 
Workers Federation--Maritime Safety Committee. As a member of this 
committee, I have the honor of representing the world's 1.9 million 
seafarers at the International Maritime Organization where we have been 
discussing policy and regulation surrounding Maritime Autonomous 
Surface Ships or MASS for nearly 8 years. I have found that MASS are 
called by different names such as autonomous vessels, Drone vessels or 
unmanned surface ships. For the purposes of this hearing, I will just 
refer to these vessels as Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships or MASS. 
Discussion of the MASS can quickly devolve into a discussion of Classes 
or variations of autonomy such as the IMO's 4 Classes of Autonomy 
ranging from MASS with Manual Control to Fully Autonomous vessels. For 
this limited discussion unless otherwise noted I will assume that we 
are talking primarily about fully autonomous vessels.
    With 33 years in the industry, addressing the safety concerns 
associated with this transformative technology, I stand here not only 
as a representative of the seafaring community but as a concerned 
citizen eager to contribute to the development of policies that 
prioritize the well-being of the world's 1.9 million seafarers. My 
testimony today will focus on the imperative of safety of the 
seafarers, the challenges and risks associated with MASS vessels, and 
the steps that both policymakers and industry stakeholders must take to 
mitigate these risks effectively. In doing so, I aim to shed light on a 
few of the complex issues surrounding MASS safety and offer insights 
that can guide the development of legislation and regulations that 
safeguard the interests of our citizens while fostering innovation.
    In my brief time here, I would like to cover three broad areas of 
what I feel are the most important issues that the committee should 
take into consideration. First and foremost, safety for seafarers, 
passengers, the public and the marine environment. Those regulations 
most recognizable in the maritime industry such as the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs) and 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL) all deal with almost exclusively the safety of humans and the 
marine environment. Secondarily, commercial shipowners are not 
clamoring for MASS technology. The Capital Expenditure and Operational 
Expenditure savings for a MASS vessel seem uncertain at best. Many of 
the largest ship owners are partnered with companies working on MASS 
development which on the face of it appears they are advocates for MASS 
technology. However, when talking to the largest shipowners you would 
be hard-pressed to find more than a few who see their ships operating 
in the coming decades without seafarers aboard. Shipowners are 
involving themselves in MASS to keep apprised of what is going on; but 
just because you can do something does not mean you should. There is a 
niche market for MASS but on the commercial side it is small in grand 
scheme of things. Lastly, concern regarding the inability of MASS to 
mitigate marine environmental damage after a collision, allision, 
grounding or oil spill should be considered.
    For the safety of all seafarers MASS must adhere to the existing 
maritime regulations such as the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea often referred to in the maritime industry 
as the ColRegs or ``Rules of the Road''. Instituting separate parallel 
regulations for MASS should be given little consideration. For 
instance, vessels have a duty to render assistance by providing 
manpower, equipment, and/or shelter to survivors in the event of a 
maritime emergency. This duty goes back a millennium and cannot be 
shirked because it is inconvenient for MASS deployment. Additionally, 
effective communication between MASS and other vessels in the vicinity, 
maritime authorities and ports is important to the smooth operation in 
the maritime environment.
    The emergence of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) has 
raised significant questions regarding the adaptation of nearly all 
existing maritime regulations, particularly the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs). There is a 
complex debate surrounding whether the ColRegs should be altered to 
accommodate MASS or if MASS should be required to adhere to existing 
regulations. The central argument presented herein is that altering the 
ColRegs to accommodate MASS is not only unnecessary but also fraught 
with risks, and that it is imperative for MASS to adapt to the 
established ColRegs framework. Safety is paramount in the maritime 
domain, and this testimony underscores the importance of maintaining a 
uniform set of rules to ensure the safe integration of MASS into our 
oceans. It explores the challenges and opportunities presented by MASS, 
the key arguments against modifying ColRegs, and the ways in which MASS 
can seamlessly align with existing regulations.
    Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS), also known as autonomous 
ships or unmanned surface vessels, represent a transformative 
development in the maritime industry. These vessels are equipped with 
advanced technologies such as artificial intelligence, automation, and 
machine learning systems, allowing them to operate without direct human 
intervention. The potential benefits of MASS are numerous, including 
increased operational efficiency, reduced operating costs, and enhanced 
environmental sustainability. However, the integration of MASS into the 
global maritime ecosystem raises critical questions about safety and 
regulatory compliance.
    At the heart of this debate is the International Regulations for 
Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs), a set of rules established by 
the International Maritime Organization (IMO) to prevent collisions 
between vessels and ensure the safety of navigation at sea. ColRegs, 
also known as the ``Rules of the Road,'' serve as the foundation of 
safe maritime navigation. They provide a standardized set of 
regulations that govern the conduct of vessels, including right-of-way, 
navigation lights, sound signals, and more.
    As the maritime industry stands on the cusp of a technological 
revolution with the advent of MASS, the question arises: Should the 
ColRegs be modified to accommodate these autonomous vessels, or should 
MASS be required to adapt to the existing regulatory framework? I would 
assert that altering the ColRegs to accommodate MASS is not only 
unnecessary but also counterproductive to the goal of ensuring safety 
at sea. Instead, MASS should be expected to conform to the established 
ColRegs. Integration while maintaining safety is the paramount 
objective.
    MASS are equipped with advanced sensor systems, such as radar, 
lidar, and cameras, coupled with sophisticated artificial intelligence 
algorithms. These systems can detect and respond to potential collision 
threats with a speed and precision that may surpass human capabilities. 
While these advantages are compelling, they must be carefully weighed 
against the potential risks and challenges associated with the 
integration of MASS into existing maritime operations. Safety remains 
the paramount concern, and the question of how to ensure the safe 
coexistence of autonomous vessels with manned vessels and traditional 
maritime practices cannot be overstated.
    The maritime industry has a long history of regulating navigation 
and ensuring the safety of vessels at sea. The development of 
international maritime regulations, including the ColRegs, has been 
driven by a fundamental need for standardized rules and practices. The 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs) 
were first established in 1889 at the International Maritime Conference 
held in Washington, D.C. The goal was to reduce the risk of collisions 
between vessels and establish a consistent set of rules for mariners 
worldwide.
    One key principle underlying the ColRegs is the concept of ``common 
practice.'' This principle dictates that mariners should be able to 
rely on consistent behaviors and responses from other vessels based on 
the ColRegs' rules. In other words, vessels navigating international 
waters should adhere to a shared set of standards and expectations, 
regardless of their flag state or technological sophistication.
    Mariners can anticipate the actions of other vessels based on the 
ColRegs, enhancing overall safety, and reducing the risk of collisions. 
This predictability is vital for safe navigation, especially in 
congested waterways and under adverse weather conditions. A common 
regulatory framework allows vessels from different countries and 
operators with diverse backgrounds to navigate safely together. This 
interoperability is essential for international trade, commerce, and 
cooperation on the high seas.
    The ColRegs assign responsibilities to vessels in various 
situations, making it clear who is at fault in the event of a collision 
or navigational error. This accountability is essential for legal and 
insurance purposes.
    Given the historical importance of uniform regulations and the 
fundamental principles of predictability, interoperability, historical 
continuity, and accountability, any proposed changes to the ColRegs 
must be carefully considered in the context of their potential impact 
on safety and the global maritime ecosystem.
    The question of whether the ColRegs should be modified to 
accommodate Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) has generated 
significant debate within the maritime community. While proponents of 
modification argue that it is necessary to accommodate the unique 
characteristics and capabilities of MASS, several compelling arguments 
suggest that altering the ColRegs is neither prudent nor in the best 
interest of safety. Safety is the paramount concern in maritime 
operations. The ColRegs are designed to ensure the safety of vessels 
and mariners at sea by providing a common set of rules that govern 
navigation and the prevention of collisions. Any modification to these 
regulations must be rigorously evaluated to determine whether it 
enhances or diminishes safety.
    One of the primary safety concerns associated with modifying the 
ColRegs for MASS is the potential for confusion and uncertainty. If 
MASS were subject to a different set of rules than manned vessels, 
mariners navigating near these autonomous vessels might struggle to 
predict their actions and respond effectively. This unpredictability 
could lead to an increased risk of collisions and accidents and a 
threat to our marine environment. Moreover, MASS, like all vessels, are 
susceptible to technical malfunctions, system failures, and 
cyberattacks. In the event of such incidents, it is crucial that MASS 
adhere to the same rules as manned vessels to ensure a consistent and 
coordinated response. Deviating from the established ColRegs framework 
for MASS could create legal and operational challenges in emergency 
situations.
    In a maritime emergency, a coordinated effort involving various 
parties is essential to ensure a swift and effective response that 
maximizes safety and minimizes harm. The specific parties involved can 
vary depending on the nature and severity of the emergency, but here 
are some key stakeholders who typically play a crucial role in lending 
a hand during maritime emergencies are the crew of the distressed 
vessel, Maritime Authorities and Nearby vessels, especially those in 
the vicinity of the distressed vessel, may be called upon to aid a 
vessel in distress. This is a fundamental principle of maritime law 
known as the ``duty to render assistance.'' Vessels in the vicinity are 
required to offer support by providing manpower, equipment, or shelter 
to survivors.
    Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) represent a cutting-edge 
development in the maritime industry, with the potential to transform 
various aspects of shipping, including safety and emergency response. 
However, when it comes to referring assistance in a maritime emergency, 
MASS systems must be equipped to handle such situations in a manner 
that ensures the safety of human life, property, and the marine 
environment. The duty to render assistance at sea is a longstanding 
maritime tradition that has evolved over centuries. It is deeply rooted 
in the principles of maritime ethics and human solidarity. While it 
does not have a specific age or date of origin, this duty has been 
recognized and practiced for as long as humans have been engaged in 
maritime activities. It can be traced back to ancient seafaring 
civilizations, such as the Greeks and Romans. These ancient mariners 
often came to the aid of shipwrecked sailors out of a sense of duty and 
honor.
    MASS must be able to use both spoken and written language as safe 
communication is vital for the safety of crew, passengers, industrial 
personnel or special personnel, ship, and external environment, but 
also for the efficiency of daily tasks and the ship's integrity. Very 
High-Frequency (VHF) radio communication is a standard method for ship-
to-ship and ship-to-shore communication. MASS like traditional vessels 
should be equipped with VHF radios to exchange information with nearby 
vessels, ports, and maritime authorities. This includes communication 
for collision avoidance, navigation updates, and emergency situations 
as required by current maritime laws and regulation.
    Safe and correct communication is particularly important for ships 
that cross national borders, especially in connection with radio 
communication between ships and other actors (land bases, various 
suppliers, shipping companies, authorities etc.). MASS communication 
should include acknowledgment of correct receipt and understanding. 
This applies both to normal operations as well as in maritime 
emergencies.
    It is important that law makers and regulators insist for the 
safety of seafarers and the public that Maritime Autonomous Surface 
Ships be held to the same regulatory standards as manned vessels for 
they are working in and around manned vessels who should be able to 
rely on consistent behaviors and responses from other vessels 
regardless of their level of Autonomy. This includes MASS adherence to 
the ColRegs, MASS ability to comply with a ``duty to render 
assistance'' and MASS ability to communicate with manned vessels and 
other entities for day-to-day operations as well as maritime 
emergencies.
    Maritime labor has been in close communication with many of the 
largest shipowners since MASS started to be discussed in earnest around 
2016. While many of the largest Shipowners work with companies 
developing MASS technologies the owners continue to worry about the 
reliability and redundancy requirements of the technology. Unlike 
traditional ships, which have experienced crews capable of handling 
unforeseen technical failures, MASS relies heavily on complex systems. 
A malfunction or cyberattack could lead to catastrophic consequences, 
including collisions, grounding, or environmental disasters. All the 
largest shipowners we continue to discuss MASS with do not see a future 
of commercial shipping that does not include some crewmembers based on 
these concerns and probably more importantly the costs of not having 
crew aboard when needed.
    The upfront costs of retrofitting existing vessels or purchasing 
new autonomous ships are substantial. Shipowners have reservations 
about making such significant investments, especially if the benefits 
are not immediately realized. While proponents argue that autonomous 
vessels can reduce operational costs over time, shipowners worry about 
the ongoing expenses related to maintenance, software updates, and 
cybersecurity measures. Ships generally are only making money for an 
owner when they are underway. Without seafarers aboard preventive 
maintenance would have to be exceptionally well-tailored and timed to 
occur in geographically advantageous areas to see cost savings over the 
life of a vessel based on labor arbitrage. When considering unplanned 
maintenance and repair it would seem very unlikely to save money when 
there are no seafarers aboard to repair your vessel. Shipowners 
question whether the promised cost savings will materialize in 
practice.
    With increased reliance on digital systems and connectivity, 
shipowners are also concerned about the vulnerability of MASS to 
cyberattacks. The potential for hackers to gain control of autonomous 
vessels or disrupt their operations poses a significant safety risk to 
seafarers and the marine environment.
    Determining liability in the event of accidents or incidents 
involving MASS is a complex and evolving issue. Under current maritime 
custom operators (Masters), owners and equipment manufacturers 
typically take the brunt of liability in this order, both civil and 
criminal. Without an operator the logical replacement would be the 
``creator'' of AI or machine learning for the MASS in question. This 
leads to the next question of who has jurisdiction over the 
``creator''? Currently the Master and/or seafarers are held criminally 
liable and imprisoned. In a situation where a MASS is found criminally 
liable will the ``creator'' or the shipowner be imprisoned? How does 
one obtain jurisdiction over these people or for that matter a remote 
operator if there is no extradition treaty with their country of 
residence? Shipowners worry about the potential legal disputes and the 
associated financial burdens that may arise from unclear liability 
scenarios. The uncertainty surrounding the safety and liability aspects 
of MASS can lead to increased insurance premiums which are viewed as an 
additional financial burden.
    The adoption of Maritime Autonomous Surface Ships (MASS) has 
garnered significant attention in the maritime industry due to its 
potential benefits, including improved efficiency. However, it is 
crucial to acknowledge the potential dangers that MASS poses to the 
environment. The environmental risks associated with MASS technology, 
including issues related to energy sources, pollution, navigational 
challenges, and the broader ecological impact. It underscores the 
importance of addressing these concerns to ensure that the transition 
to MASS aligns with the goal of minimizing oil pollution.
    The use of MASS does not eliminate the risk of maritime accidents, 
including collisions, allisions and groundings, which can lead to oil 
spills and significant environmental damage. The absence of onboard 
seafarers may hinder the rapid response to oil spills, exacerbating the 
environmental impact. The International Convention for the Prevention 
of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL) and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA 
90) are complimentary and crucial instruments for regulating the 
discharge of pollutants from vessels, including oil spills. The crew 
requirements in response to oil spills, emphasize the importance of 
crew preparedness, vigilant reporting, and effective response measures. 
Crew members are required to be familiar with spill response equipment, 
such as oil booms which are essential for effective response. Crew 
members must be trained to take immediate steps to minimize spillage, 
such as deploying oil spill containment equipment. Regular oil spill 
response drills should be conducted to ensure that crew members are 
well-versed in emergency procedures. Seafarers play a pivotal role in 
mitigating the environmental impact of oil spills from vessels. Crew 
members on board are integral to the effective implementation of MARPOL 
and OPA 90 regulations and the response to oil spills.
    In this testimony I have highlighted three overarching areas that 
warrant the committee's careful consideration. Firstly, paramount 
importance must be placed on ensuring safety and well-established 
regulations in the maritime industry, such as the International 
Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS), International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (ColRegs), and 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 
(MARPOL), predominantly address the safety of human lives and the 
protection of our precious marine ecosystems.
    Secondly, I have delved into the fact that commercial shipowners 
are not fervently advocating for the widespread adoption of Maritime 
Autonomous Surface Ship (MASS) technology. This advocacy is coming from 
the developers of MASS. The anticipated cost savings in terms of 
Capital Expenditure and Operational Expenditure for MASS vessels remain 
uncertain, with many of the industry's major shipowners maintaining 
reservations about transitioning away from crewed vessels. It is a 
reminder that just because we have the capability to pursue a 
particular path does not necessarily mean it is the most prudent course 
of action. The commercial applicability of MASS, while promising in 
niche markets, may not have a significant impact in the broader context 
of the maritime industry for many decades.
    Lastly, it is crucial to consider the concerns surrounding the 
capacity of MASS to effectively mitigate environmental damage in the 
aftermath of maritime incidents such as collisions, allisions, 
groundings, or oil spills. Ensuring that our technological advancements 
align with environmental protection measures is imperative.
    In light of these considerations, the committee should prioritize 
safety, remain cognizant of the evolving landscape of commercial 
shipowners concerns and underscore the importance of environmental 
responsibility when deliberating on the future of MASS technology in 
the maritime industry. The development of better software, smaller 
sensors and better communications is leading to the increasing 
digitalization throughout the global economy. Digitalization in the 
maritime sector allows the further automation of some functions and 
better control of processes as a whole. It can enable the increased use 
of remote-control technology. Many of these technologies could be used 
to benefit seafarers and improve safety conditions while providing more 
efficient operations. Other than in niche markets, this technology 
should be used as a tool and not a complete replacement of seafarers.
    Again, thank you Mr. Chairman and the committee for your attention 
to the pivotal matter.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back.
    I now will turn our attention to the questions for the 
panel. I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Pribyl, in your opinion, where can the Coast Guard 
immediately leverage existing commercial unmanned technologies 
to support its missions?
    Mr. Pribyl. We looked at this in the report, and we laid 
forth what we felt were the areas, the mission areas where the 
use of unmanned systems could provide the most immediate value. 
I think that it is a combination of some that were mentioned on 
the first panel, things like search and rescue and pollution 
response.
    The issue, in terms of the commercial access to that that 
we found in the report, was the acquisition process, that it 
wasn't moving quickly enough, that they didn't have the 
mechanisms in place to avail themselves of that technology. And 
in the United States, most of this technology is being 
developed on the commercial side.
    So, we had made some recommendations related to that. And I 
think if you look in combination with the recommendations as to 
the areas of missions that are of value and then see if they 
can make improvements as to the acquisition side, I think that 
is where they would have the most value.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Johnson, what are the biggest 
regulatory hurdles that you have encountered in development of 
systems built by your company?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes. Thank you for the question, Chairman. We 
have not seen many regulatory hurdles. We are mariners. I came 
from the marine industry. The reason for what we are building 
is because of challenges that I saw in my work up in Alaska and 
in the salvage industry as well, where we dealt with many 
marine accidents.
    And so, we operate within the Maritime Domain and from the 
beginning have built our technology to work within the current 
regulatory structure.
    So, we are a technology company, and then we support our 
customers, operators, to ensure that they gain the approval of 
U.S. Coast Guard, Danish Maritime Authority, and other places. 
Plus, we work closely with the class societies as well, who 
have worked to certify our technology and also type approve it 
to be able to be installed across fleets.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Lahey, if OceanGate had 
submitted the Titan to appropriate regulatory oversight, 
including a class inspection, what do you think would have been 
the likely result?
    Mr. Lahey. Well, thank you for the question. I think the 
end result of them subjecting that vehicle to the accreditation 
process is it would have failed miserably. It was a craft that 
would have never been able to meet the high bar of 
certification.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Spain, how would you, in your 
role as a mariner, change aboard vessels with increased 
automated capabilities?
    Mr. Spain. I could see the need for upscaling, depending on 
what the systems are the systems being installed. There are so 
many different systems out there in development right now, I 
wouldn't comment other than to say that.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Well, what needs to be done to 
ensure that mariners are adequately trained in these new 
technologies?
    Mr. Spain. Well, each system is different and requires 
unique training, I believe, at least in its current iteration. 
I would say that I believe going forward, we will see different 
sectors develop different training needs.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much. All right. I 
know you may think this is a small group, but it is a powerful 
group. It is an awesome group of people, and we are ready to 
change the world. So, anyway, you just stay with us.
    So, anyway, I would recognize Ms.--well, you are kind of 
the ranking member now.
    Ms. Scholten. I would be happy to, but I defer to you as 
well. OK.
    Thank you all so much for your critically important 
testimony today. I have got a number of different questions, 
so, bear with me.
    Mr. Johnson, in your testimony, you talk about how the U.S. 
lags in the development of new tech behind other countries, 
like China.
    What can we be doing now in the U.S. to position us as a 
leader in maritime technology and innovation?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes, thank you for the question. We listened 
this morning to the testimony of the admirals and the questions 
around that. And a lot of it was around regulation and from 
that standpoint.
    And so, I look at our Nation kind of from two hands. You 
have the Hamiltonian, which was on developmentalism, about 
being the coach and using the Government to coach industry and 
bring it forward. Then you have the Jeffersonian, which was 
about being the umpire and controlling.
    And so, I think we have been doing really well on the 
umpiring side of it and the refereeing of it. And I think, as 
Government, we need to be doing much more on the coaching and 
promotion of innovation to continue to build our GDP.
    Marine autonomous technology is a significant opportunity. 
The way that I look at it is similar to what we did and what 
the Government did--Congress did--with the internet going back 
to 1991, with the High-Performance Computing Act. That act, 
which then also put $600 million out there, sparked that whole 
development. And that whole industry now puts $2.5 trillion 
into our GDP.
    And so, that was a really good investment. And so, from our 
side, or looking at autonomous technology, I see the scale of 
the space. Our industry moves, I think it's $17 trillion of 
world trade. And it's a great place to be on the leading edge 
of technology for the future ahead.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you. That is incredibly helpful.
    Staying on this but switching gears a little bit, this 
question is for Mr. Spain.
    I would like you to expound a little bit on the point in 
your testimony regarding liability. And currently, liability 
rests with the master.
    On a fully autonomous vessel, who would be responsible for 
a maritime casualty?
    Mr. Spain. Thank you, Congresswoman. That is the question 
and why I put it in the testimony. I do do a lot of work at the 
IMO. I have been working there for 10 years, and I have been 
involved with the MASS discussions for the last 8.
    This has not been worked out. The criminal liability part 
is a real stickler there, because if you don't have 
jurisdiction over the person, then where are you? Some people 
have suggested that if a vessel is operating in your space, 
such as the U.S., if you want to have jurisdiction over them, 
then you have got to ensure that the remote operation center is 
within your jurisdiction in the U.S.
    There is a tradition in our industry, at least with regard 
to flagging vessels out, or flagging vessels and flags of 
convenience in order to skirt jurisdictions for other reasons. 
And I foresee this as being one of the biggest issues, 
determining how this lays out, who is responsible and who 
somebody can put hands on, really. Thank you.
    Ms. Scholten. It is, indeed, an important question not only 
in maritime vessels but in autonomous vehicles as well. We are 
grappling with it across industries.
    What guides do you look to to make these decisions, or what 
do you think that we can look to to come to some sort of 
conclusion here?
    Mr. Spain. I am no expert on this. Initially, I would have 
thought before being involved with this that I would go with 
the owner, but the issue is that if you have a manufacturer of 
a unit and say it has got 15 different safety options and 5 of 
them are required and somebody buys one with 6, and then you 
find after an accident that, hey, if you would have had another 
6 of these options that this likely wouldn't have happened, 
well, is it the owner's responsibility? Probably.
    But if that is not the issue, and the issue is about the 
actual unit and which portion of it fails to operate, then it's 
probably on the manufacturer.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you.
    I will yield back at this point.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentlelady yields back.
    Mr. Ezell, you are recognized.
    Mr. Ezell. That was quick.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Well, you have been made part of a 
team. It is a very powerful team, and now it has gotten even 
more powerful. So, welcome aboard.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Pribyl, I can't even spell it, I am interested to learn 
more about your role on the study committee that helped author 
the TRB report and the advancement in technologies and the 
programs since then.
    Can you expand on what the Coast Guard can do to develop 
autonomous maritime system programs as rapidly as the Navy and 
the Marine Corps?
    Mr. Pribyl. Yes. Thank you for the question. And the report 
itself is 3 years old now, so, part of what I was invited to do 
today was to give our understanding of where we had seen the 
progression with that.
    Certainly, the U.S. Navy is leading in this space, 
especially in the U.S., very forward-leaning in the use of the 
technology. My understanding is that the Coast Guard has been 
involved in joint exercises with the Navy, trying to understand 
how the Navy is using that technology and see how it could be 
implemented into the Coast Guard missions. We didn't get a full 
briefing from the Coast Guard on exactly how that is playing 
out, but that is our understanding.
    The other issue, again, is different acquisition streams. 
So, the Navy and special forces and other DoD services and 
branches, they have different acquisition opportunities that 
the Coast Guard is not able to avail themselves of.
    So, in terms of what the Coast Guard can be doing, we had 
listed a number of different acquisition streams and processes. 
So, I would say just to continue to evaluate those 
opportunities.
    And again, in the U.S., it is still going to continue to 
come from the commercial sector, the academic sector as well. 
Southern Mississippi is obviously doing quite a bit down there 
with NOAA and others.
    So, continuing to leverage those opportunities from the 
commercial and academic sectors.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Johnson, I would like to talk more about the current 
market. How do you compare the Coast Guard and the Navy as a 
customer in this market? Do you believe the Coast Guard has 
made the necessary investments in their force structure to 
support unmanned maritime systems?
    Mr. Johnson. So, yes, thank you for the question, sir.
    The Coast Guard has made some investments, and we have been 
able to serve them with technology as well. What we would like 
to see is innovation moving quickly. And today, a lot of the 
Coast Guard work and innovation stays in the lab.
    When it comes to comprehensive technology like this, you've 
got to get it out of the lab and get it out into its operating 
domain. So, just like we do internally, we have a test fleet 
with captains on staff. And so, daily, we are running that 
technology, like you see with autonomous car companies as well.
    And so, we encourage the Coast Guard to request, obtain the 
budget to get the systems out into operations and go out with a 
real plan on what they are trying to achieve with it as well, 
not just trialing technology.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you. Some companies in my district tell me 
about their limited resources to focus on business development 
activities.
    In your opinion, what could the Coast Guard do to be more 
effective and a probable customer for companies such as yours 
and the ones that have operations in my district?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes. So, thank you for the question. The Coast 
Guard has 11 missions. They do a lot with a relatively small 
budget. Plus, they have, probably, one of the most diverse 
responsibilities of missions across the Government.
    We feel that, as I said, that if we could help them in 
being able to help craft the applications--and we build 
autonomous technology that enables the increased productivity 
and efficiency as well as precision of operation of vessels. We 
also build computer vision systems as well. And so, we needed 
that to enable our technology to see more and understand a 
domain, but we know that like within the Coast Guard's roles 
and responsibilities, they also need to be able to see more and 
have more domain awareness.
    So, our team is regularly working to interface with the 
Coast Guard, and I guess the more time we can get with them, 
the better.
    Mr. Ezell. Mr. Chairman, I am about out of time, so, I 
yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back.
    Mr. Auchincloss, you are recognized.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
    Mr. Johnson, your testimony, written testimony was 
striking. The word that was coming to mind as I read it was 
``leapfrogging,'' in the sense that it seemed like in the 19th 
and 20th centuries, the United States built up an advantage. 
Navy and merchant marine have since lost it, at least in the 
merchant marine, increasingly maybe even in the Navy. And that 
autonomy can be one way to regain that edge.
    And then you have talked about coaching as a way to get 
there. And so, I want to build on previous questions from both 
sides of the aisle. It sounds like you want the Coast Guard to 
be better at procurement practices and how they interface with 
the private sector. Is that correct?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes. And then I am just also speaking to 
leadership as a whole within the Nation and in a business 
environment to really set goals around innovation, around the 
value that it can bring that future value.
    Mr. Auchincloss. I hear that, but it is helpful for us here 
in Congress to have more specific things. I mean, I have been 
hearing testimony for 3 years from entrepreneurs, and I have 
never had somebody say that they are fine with all the 
regulations that exist. I mean, there is really nothing that 
you would want to change around MARAD or----
    Mr. Johnson [interrupting]. It's a good question. We work 
to navigate it, but, of course, speed is our friend. And, in 
fact, we are working with one U.S.-flag company now that has 
our technology on a harbor tug, and we have been going through 
the approval process with the Coast Guard. And that's 1\1/2\ 
years into it now.
    And so, if there is a way to speed those approvals up, but 
at the same time, we also want to ensure that this technology 
is safely deployed. We understand when there is an accident 
maybe in some part of a sector that might be close to us, maybe 
not even us, it could also impact us.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Do you have an opinion about the method of 
procurement that the Coast Guard uses, the Federal acquisition 
regulation, their RDT&E program? Is there any one that has been 
best to work with and that should be built upon?
    Mr. Johnson. Somebody on my team will for sure. I am not 
close enough to be able to answer that question.
    Mr. Auchincloss. You mentioned in your written testimony 
also digital infrastructure and the importance of investing in 
that alongside the Marine Highway Program that we have had over 
the last decade.
    Can you expound upon that? What does digital infrastructure 
for MASS look like?
    Mr. Johnson. So, actually, it kind of starts at the Coast 
Guard level when you look at the GAO's review of the Coast 
Guard and how they are implementing or executing their work.
    Almost all the things where they point out gaps is around 
data and being able to do their inspections better with data 
and be able to track the industry better with data.
    But from a digital infrastructure, I mean, this is the 21st 
century. The 20th century, as I mentioned, was automation but a 
lot of separate systems working together. The digital 
infrastructure centralizes and brings a leap in productivity 
and value.
    You see it, say, like, in an Amazon warehouse. An example I 
would just give you real quick is Amazon back in 2014, 2015, 
the quickest they could get their click-to-ship with their 
manual processes was 60 to 75 minutes. Then they brought in the 
Kiva robots into their warehouses, connected it digitally from 
their logistics system to the robot fleets, and were able to 
get it down to 15 minutes to click-and-ship. And, of course, 
now you see what they do for our economy.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Switching gears, Mr. Pribyl, do you think 
that the ColRegs should be modified to accommodate MASS?
    Mr. Pribyl. It is an interesting question, and it is 
something that has been ongoing in legal and academic circles 
for several years now.
    And I think what is interesting and what has happened since 
the report's publication in 2020, where we had explained some 
of these issues with the ColRegs in one of the appendix. We had 
laid out what we thought could be issues, because the Coast 
Guard as a user of the----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. We have 45 seconds, so, 
just give me the quick answer.
    Mr. Pribyl. It is being evaluated at the IMO.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Could they have--I mean, because right now 
there is a duty to render care, as Mr. Spain laid out in his 
written testimony. Could they fulfill that duty?
    Mr. Pribyl. Yes. There are interpretations that say that 
there could be a way by which that could be successfully 
rendered, even remotely, but that's all legal and the 
interpretations of it are varied.
    The issue, though, with the ColRegs that I want to point 
out was that, as a user, the Coast Guard has said that the 
ColRegs can be complied with without anyone on board or with 
remote operations by promulgation of the Naval Commanders 
Handbook. And in that publication, that is clearly made as a 
position of DoD's and Navy's----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. There could be a human in 
the loop, even remotely, to step in.
    Mr. Pribyl. That's the Naval Commanders--that has been 
published since 2020, and that's the interpretation there. So, 
the bottom line is these are all subject to interpretation 
right now.
    Mr. Auchincloss. I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back.
    That pretty much concludes where we are going. Thank you 
for the people that came, testified; it was very informative, 
and we really appreciate it.
    I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing 
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided 
answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in 
writing.
    Without objection, show that ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 
for 15 days for any additional comments and information 
submitted by the Members or witnesses to be included in the 
record of today's hearing.
    And with that, this powerful subcommittee is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]




                       Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              


    Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster of Florida, Chairman, 
        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    We meet today to discuss the use of autonomous and experimental 
maritime technologies by the Coast Guard and industry, and to consider 
the work that must be done to establish an appropriate regulatory 
framework for their safe operation.
    I'd like to welcome our distinguished witnesses joining us today. 
We will be hearing testimony from two panels. On our first panel, we 
have Rear Admiral Wayne Arguin Jr., Assistant Commandant for Prevention 
Policy; and Rear Admiral Todd Wiemers, Assistant Commandant for 
Capability.
    On our second panel, we will hear from Mr. Sean Pribyl, Committee 
Member for the National Academy of Sciences report on Leveraging 
Unmanned Systems for Coast Guard Missions; Mr. Michael Johnson, Chief 
Executive Officer and Founder of Sea Machines Robotics; Mr. Patrick 
Lahey, Chief Executive Officer and Co-Founder of Triton Submarines; and 
Mr. Christian Spain, Vice President of Government Relations for 
American Maritime Officers.
    Autonomous and experimental maritime technologies consist of a wide 
range of evolving systems that promise to revolutionize many processes 
while drastically changing the operations of our current marine 
transportation system. Industry has led the way in developing unmanned 
and autonomous technologies, which can greatly expand the capabilities 
of U.S. mariners to perform a variety of missions and tasks both safer 
and more efficiently.
    The Coast Guard is just beginning to leverage some of these 
technologies, such as the limited use of unmanned systems to expand 
domain awareness. However, Service-wide integration is still a ways 
off. Congress, meanwhile, has enacted several legislative measures to 
ensure the Coast Guard has comprehensive plans to successfully leverage 
these technologies.
    Given the ongoing drug and migrant crises that continue to strain 
already limited Coast Guard resources, it is crucial that the Service 
implements these technologies as soon as possible to improve 
surveillance and intelligence-gathering capabilities and allow manned 
resources to be more readily available for response and interdiction 
efforts. Adversaries and criminal networks are already using these 
technologies to their advantage, such as using unmanned submersibles to 
move illicit drugs, and we must counter with similar technologies to 
establish persistent maritime domain awareness.
    As the Coast Guard works to integrate these technologies throughout 
its missions, the commercial sector continues to increase its use of 
autonomous systems. Industry-led technological innovations have led to 
the development and testing of autonomous container vessels, the 
successful trans-Atlantic voyage of the Mayflower Autonomous Ship, and 
the use of autonomous barges by the commercial space industry for at-
sea recovery of rocket boosters.
    All of these examples underscore that it is imperative the Coast 
Guard develop a stable regulatory framework for the safe operation of 
these technologies. This is no longer in-the-future technology. The 
technology is here.
    As federal statutes currently assume that operators will be 
physically onboard vessels, we must also ensure our laws meet the 
changing nature of vessels in our waters. In addition to these 
autonomous technologies, other experimental technologies, such as Wing-
In-Ground Craft and manned submersibles, are also increasing in use, 
requiring the Coast Guard's regulation and oversight.
    In light of the totally preventable tragedy of the Titan 
submersible earlier this year, prompt attention to governing evolving 
maritime technologies is essential to avoid a similar disaster in the 
future.
    I'd like to thank all our witnesses for joining us here today and 
look forward to a great discussion.

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member, 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair Webster and Ranking Member Carbajal for holding 
this important hearing. Today we will hear from leaders in the Coast 
Guard and the maritime industry about exciting innovations in 
autonomous and experimental vessels.
Autonomous Vessels
    Automation will play an increasingly important role in both the 
commercial maritime industry and Coast Guard operations. Coast Guard 
UAVs, engine automation, use of uncrewed vessels, and the better 
collection and use of data will expand the reach of the Service without 
requiring more Coasties.
    To best leverage new technologies, the Coast Guard needs 
significant financial and human resources. Any cuts to the Coast 
Guard's funding will send us in the wrong direction.
    Autonomous vessels present some clear opportunities for the Coast 
Guard to expand its capacity, such as in completing dangerous missions 
in inhospitable climates like the Arctic, increasing surveillance 
capacity and enhancing oversight of fishing operations. However, I have 
concerns over the lack of a regulatory framework for new technologies 
and autonomous vessels. For example, the Titan submersible tragedy 
demonstrates a need for stronger rules and safety requirements for 
experimental vessels and emerging technologies.
    The international maritime industry, where ships are often owned by 
investors, built in one country, registered in a different country, and 
operated by mariners from all over the world, is defined by a 
complicated framework of regulations and oversight.
    Plus, current law assumes that vessels are crewed by people. 
Developing an effective regulatory framework for autonomous vessels 
will be a major undertaking--requiring coordination between Congress, 
the Coast Guard, and the International Maritime Organization.
Labor
    We must also consider automation's potential impact on maritime 
jobs. Maintaining the availability of well-paying jobs and minimizing 
the displacement of jobs from automation is a priority of mine.
    Innovation cannot come at the cost of American jobs. To this end, 
it is important to include labor organizations early in conversations 
around a regulatory framework.
Clean Vessels
    On the topic of innovation, the development of new vessel 
technology brings the opportunity to incorporate low- and zero-carbon 
emission technologies into vessel design.
    Many vessels in use today use heavy fuel oil, which emits carbon 
dioxide, sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxide when combusted. Carbon 
dioxide is a well-known greenhouse gas, and sulfur dioxide and nitrogen 
oxide are both air pollutants linked to respiratory disease.
    New vessels must be built to reduce and eventually eliminate 
emissions and makes our waterways and communities cleaner.
    I'm proud that, in my home state of Washington, we are in the 
process of building a fleet of hybrid-electric ferries. Washington 
State Ferries is the largest ferry system in the U.S. and is the 
biggest contributor of greenhouse gas emissions among Washington state 
agencies. This transition to hybrid-electric ferries will greatly 
reduce pollution.
    I see a similar opportunity for developing new, clean autonomous 
vessels and building them in U.S. shipyards.
Closing
    At their best, new technologies increase safety and efficiency, 
reduce emissions and create a better experience for workers. At their 
worst, new technologies introduce security vulnerabilities, decrease 
safety, increase the risk of accidents, and displace workers.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how we can 
ensure a smooth and safe transition to new technologies.

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal of California, Ranking 
    Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    I wanted to also extend my deepest condolences to the Peltola 
family and our colleague, Mary, on the passing of her husband Buzzy. 
The family has my deepest sympathy and I look forward to her coming 
back when she feels ready.
    On June 18th of this year, 5 lives were lost when the Titan 
submersible imploded descending to the depths of the ocean to visit the 
Titanic wreckage. I share my condolences to the families of the 
victims.
    Today, we will look at new and experimental maritime technology 
and, particularly in the shadow of this tragedy, I hope to hear from 
the Coast Guard and industry on how they plan to ensure safety.
    It is important to foster innovation while also protecting lives. 
The passengers onboard the Titan were not designated as passengers by 
Oceangate--the owners of the submersible. Rather, they were referred to 
as a crew, which allowed the company to subvert legal consequences.
    In addition, the submersible was not classed, was flagged to the 
Bahamas, and used materials and designs that had been rejected as 
unsafe by the rest of the industry.
    I am an advocate for passenger and crew safety and we should all 
demand the utmost regard for safety to apply to any new technology, 
submersible, or autonomous vessels.
    The maritime industry is innovating rapidly. For both the Coast 
Guard and the maritime industry, automation has the potential to reduce 
operational risk, increase safety for mariners and the environment, 
increase efficiency and transparency, reduce emissions and increase 
capacity. This is an exciting time and I look forward to hearing about 
new technological advancements.
    However, I have concerns about the removal or reduction of crew 
unless safety is taken into full consideration and the proper 
regulations are developed. Current applicable regulations are written 
with the assumption that crew are onboard the vessels. These 
regulations are not meant to apply to these new crewless vessels.
    We've seen instances in the past where a lack of a watchstander has 
cost lives. In many circumstances, you simply cannot replace a human 
presence. When automation is implemented, we must protect U.S. jobs and 
train the workforce to oversee those systems.
    It is imperative that the International Maritime Organization and 
the U.S. Coast Guard update regulations on autonomous vessels before 
they become widespread. The recreational vessel classification of the 
MAYFLOWER--an autonomous vessel that recently sailed across the ocean 
unmanned--is unacceptable and reduced safety oversight to practically 
zero.
    While I hold concerns, I recognize that technology is progressing 
and innovation should be embraced when done properly. The U.S. must 
position itself to be a leader in new maritime technology.
    My state of California is a leader in blue technology development 
such as autonomous or remote systems that allow the Coast Guard to 
expand their mission capabilities and improve maritime domain 
awareness.
    The Maritime Environmental and Technical Assistance program (META) 
is a small but important program for innovation within the Maritime 
Administration. This program assists the research, development, and 
demonstration of new technology in the maritime industry.
    META is incredibly underfunded at $10 million this year and without 
expansion, it will never reach the potential it could have in 
establishing the U.S. as a leader in maritime innovation. We must 
continue to fund this program and expand its reach.
    Climate change is the single largest threat of our time. I would be 
remiss not to advocate for the acceleration of alternative fuels and 
emissions reducing technology in maritime in a conversation about 
innovation. This year we've already seen extreme heatwaves, intense 
hurricanes, deadly floods, and historic wildfires. My own district saw 
devastating flooding and mudslides; events that will forever impact my 
constituents.
    Each one of these threats puts increased burdens on the U.S. Coast 
Guard and has the potential to disrupt the U.S. economy and the 
maritime supply chain.
    Innovation in maritime and Coast Guard assets is vital but we must 
proceed with caution. Safety is always paramount, and we must keep jobs 
and emissions in mind as we progress.
    Thank you and I yield back.






                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


  Questions to Rear Admiral Wayne R. Arguin, Assistant Commandant for 
    Prevention Policy, U.S. Coast Guard, from Hon. Salud O. Carbajal

1. Autonomous Ships
    Question 1.a. What risks do autonomous vessels pose to the U.S. 
Marine Transportation System (MTS)?
    Answer. The Coast Guard's priority is to effectively manage the 
risks associated with the increasing use of these platforms on our 
waterways. Depending on the level of autonomy, known risks include, but 
are not limited to, navigational safety concerns, cybersecurity 
vulnerabilities, and equipment and technology failures. The Coast Guard 
is committed to continuously evaluating the unique risks associated 
with autonomous and experimental maritime technology and is working, 
both internationally and domestically, to develop a suitable governance 
framework that safely and effectively integrates autonomous and remote-
control technologies into the maritime domain.

    Question 1.b. What is the USCG doing to prepare for those risks?
    Answer. The Coast Guard leverages its authorities to address novel 
designs and operations to facilitate innovation in the maritime domain. 
The Coast Guard partners with industry and other Federal agencies to 
institute best practices and safety management systems to ensure vessel 
designs and operations are executed safely while not being hampered by 
unnecessary regulations. Additionally, the Coast Guard is actively 
engaged with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) and 
interagency partners to develop an appropriate regulatory framework for 
autonomous cargo vessels, subject to the Safety of Life at Sea 
convention that will provide for safe, secure, and environmentally 
sound incorporation of these new technologies. The Coast Guard is 
committed to developing suitable international and domestic governance 
frameworks to integrate autonomous and remote-control technologies 
safely and properly into the maritime domain, and a workforce that is 
ready and capable to oversee these technologies.

    Question 1.c. Regarding autonomous ships, what safety features need 
to be legislated/regulated?
    Answer. The Coast Guard leverages its current authorities to 
support and oversee the safe implementation of these technologies and 
their operations in the U.S. Marine Transportation System (MTS). 
However, several current domestic statutory and regulatory regimes for 
commercial maritime operations are predicated on mariners being onboard 
vessels; therefore, there are design and operational aspects of 
autonomous vessels that are not contemplated by the existing statutory 
and regulatory regime. The Coast Guard, through its Automated and 
Autonomous Vessel Policy Council, consistently evaluates emerging 
system automation, remote operational capabilities, and vessel autonomy 
through various lines of effort, to include: review of laws, 
regulations, and policies; examination of manning and credentialing 
issues; assessment of risk associated with integrating automation and 
autonomous operations; and, improvement of project development and 
compliance tools. As the Coast Guard identifies definitive legislation 
needed to best ensure the safe and efficient incorporation of these new 
technologies, the Service will propose updates to current legislation 
through the legislative change proposal process.

    Question 1.d. Will autonomous vessels be more vulnerable to cyber 
threats?
    Answer. These new technologies rely heavily on interconnected 
information technology, operational technology, and cyber-connected 
systems. As these technologies are incorporated into vessels and 
maritime systems, maintaining sufficient safeguards to protect against 
cyber-attacks from malicious actors will be critical.

    Question 1.e. Will autonomous vessels be required to have a 
``person in charge''?
    Answer. At present, U.S. laws require all vessels to have a 
``person in charge'' or master.

    Question 1.f. With crewed and autonomous vessels operating 
together, how will collisions be avoided?
    Answer. All vessels, regardless of the number of crewmembers 
onboard, are currently required to comply with the Convention on the 
International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, 1972 
(COLREGs). If vessel owners or operators are seeking to reduce the 
number of crew onboard, due the use of autonomous technology, they must 
demonstrate that these technologies are able to comply with the 
requirements of the COLREGs.

    Question 1.g. Is the U.S. Coast Guard and other international 
bodies prepared to investigate an incident involving these vessels?
    Answer. The Coast Guard is prepared to investigate incidents 
involving vessels with increased levels of automation. As with any 
change in technology, the Coast Guard training programs for Marine 
Investigators are updated to ensure investigating officers are 
knowledgeable on the current technology used in the maritime domain.

    Question 1.h. What resources does the U.S. Coast Guard need to 
prepare for such investigations?
    Answer. The Coast Guard continuously evaluates the training 
resource needs to ensure the proficiency of our workforce. If new 
resources are needed to prepare for and conduct investigations into 
marine casualties involving automated vessels, the Coast Guard will 
evaluate these resource needs as part of the annual budget process.

    Question 1.i. What will be the role of Federal and State Maritime 
Pilots aboard an uncrewed vessel?
    Answer. The future role of Federal and State Maritime Pilots 
onboard autonomous vessels without a crew is currently being evaluated. 
A representative from the American Pilot Association is included within 
U.S. Delegations discussing this issue within the Maritime Autonomous 
Surface Ships (MASS) initiative at the IMO.

    Question 1.j. If autonomous vessels use AI, are there elevated 
risks associated with that?
    Answer. Similar to the incorporation of other new technologies, 
there are new risks that must be evaluated and accounted for to ensure 
the benefits are safely and efficiently incorporated into the MTS.

    Question 1.k. Could autonomous vessels still be used as vessels of 
opportunity in search and rescue operations, how would they impact SAR?
    Answer. The ongoing MASS discussions at the IMO include 
consideration of how search and rescue obligations apply to autonomous 
cargo vessels. The Coast Guard will consider how to best incorporate 
any outcomes from the IMO into our regulatory and operational 
frameworks.

    Question 1.l. Would hazardous materials be transported on 
autonomous ships?
    Answer. Presently, hazardous material cannot be transported on 
autonomous commercial vessels. In the future, the United States may 
consider allowing hazardous materials to be transported onboard 
autonomous commercial ships, if and only if the vessels meet equivalent 
level of safety of existing law or regulation.
2. Titan Investigation
    Question 2.a. What challenges does the TITAN sinking pose to Coast 
Guard investigators?
    Answer. The primary challenge thus far in the investigation was 
deconflicting and coordinating with the various nations that have 
jurisdiction to conduct a safety investigation into the incident. The 
United Kingdom, France, and Pakistan are considered substantially 
interested states (SISs) under the IMO marine casualty investigation 
protocols. The United Kingdom and France exercised their SIS status and 
are participating in the U.S. Coast Guard's Marine Board of 
Investigation (MBI). In addition, Canada has primary IMO jurisdiction 
as the flag administration of the vessel that towed the submersible 
TITAN to the accident site and provided operational oversight and 
support for the submersible operations. The Transportation Safety Board 
of Canada (TSB) is conducting an independent safety investigation on 
behalf Canada and the MBI is cooperating with TSB during the joint 
fact-finding and evidence collection phase of our concurrent safety 
investigations.

    Question 2.b. Did the U.S. Coast Guard get cooperation from other 
agencies? Countries?
    Answer. The cooperation, to the extent allowed by the domestic laws 
of the other involved countries, has been excellent between all 
international investigative entities. In September 2023, investigators 
from the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and TSB 
joined marine safety engineers from the MBI during a second salvage 
mission that successfully recovered the remaining submersible TITAN 
debris and other evidence from the accident site. The MBI leveraged an 
existing contract with Navy Supervisor of Salvage and Diving (SUPSALV) 
to conduct the second mission. Engineers from the U.K. Royal Navy also 
supported the salvage operations. The MBI is hosting a TITAN debris 
evidence review session next month with all the safety agencies to 
determine next steps for forensic testing of the debris.
    The post-salvage support from multiple U.S. agencies and the Navy 
has been superior. The Navy is providing secure storage of the debris 
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation Evidence Response Team assisted 
with all processing of presumed human remains from the accident. Those 
remains are now being forensically tested at the Armed Forces Medical 
Examiner's Office in Dover, DE.

    Question 2.c. Regarding the TITAN, how much did the evidence 
recovery cost and how can we better prepare for such needs in the 
future?
    Answer. The MBI coordinated two salvage missions through Navy 
SUPSALV and the total cost was $3.4 million. The NTSB covered salvage 
costs for past major marine casualties (e.g., the steamship EL FARO 
salvage operations to recover the vessel's voyage data recorder) 
because they were serving as the lead Federal agency. Between U.S. 
Coast Guard and NTSB resources, future salvage missions related to 
marine casualties are expected to be supported.

    Question 2.d. Is the operator of the TITAN cooperating in this 
investigation?
    Answer. Yes. To date, the operator of the TITAN is fully 
cooperating with all MBI and NTSB requests and subpoenas.

    Question 2.e. Do you anticipate similar submarine excursion 
operators and what, if any, laws or regulations are needed to address 
risk in this sector?
    Answer. There are seven submersible vessels that are United States 
flagged. Two of these vessels are uninspected Oceanographic Research 
Vessels (ORVs), as defined by 46 United States Code (USC) 2101(24) and 
are no longer in operation. Five vessels are small passenger vessels, 
as defined by 46 U.S.C. 2101(47), and are inspected under 46 Code of 
Federal Regulations Subchapter T. The Coast Guard has confirmed that 
there are no other active submersible ORVs operating in U.S. navigable 
waters or internationally under the U.S. flag. Further, the Coast Guard 
is unaware of non-U.S. registered submersible vessels operating in or 
intending to operate in U.S. navigable waters. The potential need for 
any changes to laws, regulations, or international convention remains 
under investigation by the Marine Board.

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