[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                  STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN THE ARCTIC

=======================================================================

                                 HEARING

                               BEFORE  THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                  TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             JULY 18, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-23

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

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                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
                                 ------                                

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                  Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Shri Thanedar, Michigan, Ranking 
Nick LaLota, New York                    Member
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Robert Garcia, California
    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
                                         (ex officio)
                  Vacancy, Subcommittee Staff Director
           Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     2
The Honorable Shri Thanedar, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     3
  Prepared Statement.............................................     4
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     5

                               Witnesses

Mr. Ronald O'Rourke, Specialist in Naval Affairs, Congressional 
  Research Service:
  Oral Statement.................................................     6
  Prepared Statement.............................................     8
Mr. Luke Coffey, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute:
  Oral Statement.................................................    16
  Prepared Statement.............................................    17
Ms. Esther D. Brimmer, James H. Binger Senior Fellow in Global 
  Governance, Council on Foreign Relations:
  Oral Statement.................................................    23
  Prepared Statement.............................................    25

 
                  STRATEGIC COMPETITION IN THE ARCTIC

                              ----------                              


                         Tuesday, July 18, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                        Subcommittee on Transportation and 
                                         Maritime Security,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:58 a.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos Gimenez 
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Gimenez, Higgins, LaLota, Lee, 
Thanedar, Payne, and Garcia.
    Also present: Representatives Green and Thompson.
    Chairman Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security will 
come to order.
    Without objection, the Chair may declare the subcommittee 
in recess at any point.
    The purpose of this hearing is to discuss the existing and 
future security threats resulting from strategic competition in 
the Arctic region and how the United States Coast Guard and 
Department of Homeland Security can effectively respond to and 
address these threats.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    I want to thank our three witnesses that are appearing 
before our subcommittee this morning.
    Today, our subcommittee will discuss strategic competition 
in the Arctic region and its impact on U.S. homeland and 
national security interests.
    The Arctic is critically important to the United States' 
strategic interests. The United States is one of only 8 
countries globally with territory above the Arctic Circle. So, 
what happens in the Arctic directly impacts the United States 
and its citizens.
    Historically, our adversaries have targeted the United 
States in the High North to undermine our national security. 
During World War II, the forces of Imperial Japan saw strategic 
value in occupying the Aleutian Islands off the coast of 
Alaska, going so far as to seize some islands within the chain.
    During the Cold War, Soviet aircraft and submarines 
regularly attempted to breach U.S. sovereignty, air space, 
sovereign air space, and territorial waters in Alaska. The 
United States' early warning missile defense capabilities 
focused on the Arctic as a potential entry point for Soviet 
nuclear missiles into the North American air space.
    Today, we face a growing number of challenges from near-
peer competitors. Over the last decade, Russia has been 
building up its military capabilities in the Arctic, including 
its fleet of heavy icebreakers. Vladimir Putin has repeatedly 
stated his vision for the Northern Sea Route to become an 
alternative to the Suez Canal to facilitate faster trade 
between Europe and Asia.
    More recently, Russia is foregoing cooperation on Arctic 
issues with other Arctic states as it continues its illegal and 
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, thus breaking decades of 
precedent, in which the 8 Arctic states collaborated closely on 
scientific research, environmental protection, and maritime 
safety.
    Additionally, the People's Republic of China, despite 
having no sovereign territory within the Arctic region, are 
attempting to stake out interests in the Arctic affairs.
    In 2018, the CCP declared the PRC to be a so-called near-
Arctic nation. The CCP and state-owned entities own and operate 
icebreakers and other polar-capable ships. During the last 
decade, these entities showed an increased willingness to 
transit their vessels through Arctic waters. The United States 
cannot afford to ignore this increased interest in the Arctic 
from near-peer competitors.
    As sea ice recedes and technology improves, traffic in the 
Arctic's maritime channels will continue to increase. This will 
lead to greater scientific research, natural resources 
exploration, fishing, and tourism taking place in the Arctic 
region.
    Additionally, our military relies upon the flight routes 
through the Arctic to deploy personnel, equipment, and other 
material to theaters around the world.
    The United States Coast Guard is an active presence in the 
Arctic for decades, providing invaluable search-and-rescue 
capabilities, patrolling U.S. waters, and upholding U.S. 
sovereignty at sea. Their presence enforces U.S. customs and 
laws concerning trade and fishing and supports the military's 
sustained presence at bases around Alaska.
    Coast Guard's icebreakers have long been an integral 
component of the U.S. Government's presence in the Arctic. 
However, I am concerned with the delays the Coast Guard is 
experiencing with the new development and deployment of new 
Polar Security Cutters that will negatively impact the Coast 
Guard's ability to carry out its diverse mission set and 
protect the homeland in the Arctic.
    Going forward, this subcommittee needs to play an active 
role in ensuring that the United States can effectively respond 
to threats in the Arctic.
    I am grateful to have our three witnesses to share with us 
their perspective on the geopolitical situation in the Arctic 
and ways in which the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland 
Security, and the wider U.S. Government can deter threats and 
protect our homeland in the Arctic. Thank you again. I look 
forward to your testimonies.
    [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
                Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
    Thank you to our three witnesses for appearing before our 
subcommittee this morning.
    Today, our subcommittee will discuss strategic competition in the 
Arctic region and its impact on U.S. homeland and national security 
interests.
    The Arctic is critically important to the United States' strategic 
interests.
    The United States is 1 of only 8 countries globally with territory 
above the Arctic Circle, so what happens in the Arctic directly impacts 
U.S. citizens.
    Historically, our adversaries have targeted the United States in 
the High North to undermine our national security.
    During World War II, the forces of Imperial Japan saw strategic 
value in occupying the Aleutian Islands off the coast of Alaska, going 
so far as to seize some islands within the Chain.
    During the Cold War, Soviet aircraft and submarines regularly 
attempted to breach U.S. sovereign air space and territorial waters in 
Alaska. The United States early warning missile defense capabilities 
focused on the Arctic as a potential entry point for Soviet nuclear 
missiles into North American air space.
    Today, we face a growing number of challenges from near-peer 
competitors.
    For last decade, Russia has been building up its military 
capabilities in the Arctic, including its fleet of heavy icebreakers.
    Vladimir Putin has repeatedly stated his vision for the Northern 
Sea Route to become an alternative to the Suez Canal to facilitate 
faster trade between Europe and Asia.
    More recently, Russia is foregoing cooperation on Arctic issues 
with other Arctic states as it continues its illegal and unprovoked 
invasion of Ukraine, thus breaking decades of precedent in which the 8 
Arctic states collaborated closely on scientific research, 
environmental protection, and maritime safety.
    Additionally, the People's Republic of China, despite having no 
sovereign territory within the Arctic region, is attempting to stake 
out interests in Arctic affairs.
    In 2018, the CCP declared the PRC to be a so-called ``Near-Arctic 
nation.''
    The CCP and state-owned entities own and operate icebreakers and 
other polar capable ships, and during the last decade, these entities 
showed an increased willingness to transit their vessels through Arctic 
waters.
    The United States cannot afford to ignore this increased interest 
in the Arctic from near-peer competitors.
    As sea ice recedes and technology improves, traffic in the Arctic's 
maritime channels will continue to increase.
    This will lead to greater scientific research, natural resource 
exploration, fishing, and tourism taking place in the Arctic region.
    Additionally, our military relies upon the flight routes through 
the Arctic to deploy personnel, equipment, and other materiel to 
theaters around the world.
    The United States Coast Guard has had an active presence in the 
Arctic for decades, providing invaluable search-and-rescue 
capabilities, patrolling U.S. waters, and upholding U.S. sovereignty at 
sea.
    The Coast Guard also supports the military's sustained presence at 
bases around Alaska and helps enforce U.S. customs and laws concerning 
trade and fishing in Arctic waters.
    The Coast Guard's icebreakers have long been an integral component 
of the U.S. Government's presence in the Arctic.
    However, I am concerned that the delays the Coast Guard is 
experiencing with the development and deployment of the new Polar 
Security Cutters will negatively impact the Coast Guard's ability to 
carry out its diverse mission set and protect the homeland in the 
Arctic.
    Going forward, this subcommittee needs to play an active role in 
ensuring that the United States can effectively respond to threats in 
the Arctic.
    I am grateful to our three witnesses to share with us their 
perspective on the geopolitical situation in the Arctic and ways in 
which the Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
wider U.S. Government can deter threats and protect our homeland in the 
Arctic.
    Thank you again, and I look forward to your testimonies.


    Chairman Gimenez. Now, I now recognize the Ranking Member, 
the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Thanedar, for his opening 
statement.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for calling 
today's hearing.
    I thank all of our witnesses for being here today. Good 
morning to all of you.
    With a dramatic change in climate and growing aggression 
from other nations, the Arctic has never been more central to 
America's national security. Temperatures in the Arctic are 
rising at three times the global average. Ice levels have began 
to recede dramatically, creating both environmental catastrophe 
and conflict over trade routes, natural resources, fishing 
rights, and global power.
    I am eager to learn more about how the melting ice in the 
Arctic will affect our national security, as well as global 
economics and competition.
    The region also provides tremendous opportunity for 
cooperation, from scientific discovery to international trade. 
The Arctic is home to almost 4 million people, including 
enduring indigenous populations whose continued safety, 
sovereignty, cultures, and livelihoods must be protected.
    The U.S. Coast Guard plays an essential role in 
safeguarding a rules-based order in Far North. Investing in a 
resilient Arctic community through disaster relief, scientific 
mission support, search and rescue, law enforcement, and 
community relations, the Coast Guard bridges the gap between 
the United States' military presence and our humanitarian 
efforts.
    Unfortunately, the Coast Guard's ice-breaking capabilities 
are outmatched by our enemies. Rising threats from China and 
Russia pose a serious risk to American prosperity and security.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today on how 
our Nation can invest in the infrastructure and capabilities 
needed to maintain a powerful presence in the harsh conditions 
of the Arctic.
    The Arctic does not belong to one nation. It is essential 
that the United States support robust international 
organizations to foster cooperation in the region. This work 
has been hampered by non-Arctic nations, like China, seeking to 
profit from illegal fishing and other harmful activities, as 
well as Russian aggression against Ukraine that has shattered 
the fragile trust needed to bring diverse nations together on 
issues in the Far North.
    I look forward to learning more today about the mechanisms 
for cooperation in the Arctic, including international 
organizations and how this has been hampered by the growing 
threats we face. I am glad to see the committee continuing our 
work on this subject. It is essential that Congress continues 
to invest in the Coast Guard's capabilities in the Arctic, 
including through robust funding for new Polar Security 
Cutters.
    Thank you again to Chairman Gimenez for calling this 
hearing and to all of our witnesses. I am excited. I am looking 
forward to your testimony.
    With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thanedar follows:]
               Statement of Ranking Member Shri Thanedar
                             July 18, 2023
    With a dramatically-changing climate and growing aggression from 
other nations, the Arctic has never been more central to America's 
national security. Temperatures in the Arctic are rising at three times 
the global average. Ice levels have begun to recede drastically, 
creating both environmental catastrophe and conflict over trade routes, 
natural resources, fishing rights, and global power. I am eager to 
learn more about how the melting ice in the Arctic will affect our 
national security, as well as global economics and competition. The 
region also provides tremendous opportunity for cooperation, from 
scientific discovery to international trade.
    The Arctic is home to almost 4 million people, including enduring 
indigenous populations, whose continued safety, sovereignty, cultures, 
and livelihoods must be protected. The U.S. Coast Guard plays an 
essential role in safeguarding a rules-based order in the Far North. 
Investing in a resilient Arctic community, through disaster relief, 
scientific mission support, search and rescue, law enforcement, and 
community relations, the Coast Guard bridges the gap between the United 
States's military presence and our humanitarian efforts.
    Unfortunately, the Coast Guard's icebreaking capabilities are 
outmatched by our enemies, and rising threats from China and Russia 
pose a serious risk to American prosperity and security. I look forward 
to hearing from our witnesses today on how our Nation can invest in the 
infrastructure and capabilities needed to maintain a powerful presence 
in the harsh conditions of the Arctic.
    The Arctic does not belong to one nation, and it is essential that 
the United States support robust international organizations to foster 
cooperation in the region. This work has been hampered by non-Arctic 
nations, like China, seeking to profit from illegal fishing and other 
harmful activities, as well as Russian aggression against Ukraine, that 
has shattered the fragile trust needed to bring diverse nations 
together on issues in the Far North.
    I look forward to learning more today about the mechanisms for 
cooperation in the Arctic, including international organizations, and 
how this has been hampered by the growing threats we face. I am glad to 
see the committee continuing our work on this subject, and it is 
essential that Congress continues to invest in the Coast Guard's 
capabilities in the Arctic, including through robust funding for new 
Polar Security Cutters.

    Chairman Gimenez. Thank you to the Ranking Member, Mr. 
Thanedar.
    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                             July 18, 2023
    The Arctic is a region of increasing importance to our efforts to 
protect the homeland. Democrats on the Homeland Security Committee held 
multiple hearings and briefings on security challenges in the Arctic 
when we were in the Majority, and I am glad to see the current Majority 
continuing that focus.
    We must continue to come together in a bipartisan fashion to ensure 
the challenges facing our Nation at our northernmost border receive the 
attention they deserve. Climate change and melting sea ice are opening 
Arctic waters to increased maritime activity, from shipping to fishing 
to tourism to offshore energy exploration. Global competitors including 
Russia and China are making significant investments to take full 
advantage of the changing circumstances in the region, and the United 
States must be ready to respond.
    The Coast Guard's efforts to secure and protect the maritime domain 
are central to U.S. interests in the Arctic and demand Congress' 
attention. The Coast Guard's icebreaking capabilities are sorely 
lacking, making it difficult for the Coast Guard to maintain necessary 
presence in the region. With Congress' support, the Coast Guard has 
begun making historic investments in the Polar Security Cutter program 
to help make up for decades of negligence. This will be a long-term 
effort, so Congress must continue making such investments and ensure 
shipbuilding efforts stay on budget and meet critical deadlines.
    The United States must also strategize for the coming years and 
decades in the Arctic, since we know that changes in the region will 
only continue to accelerate. To that end, the Biden-Harris 
administration's National Strategy for the Arctic Region, published 
last October, is a huge step in the right direction. The Strategy 
places appropriate focus on climate change and environmental 
protection, as well as on security. Plans for the Arctic must account 
for the severity of changes to sea ice and warming temperatures, which 
can only be understood by following the science on climate change. 
Importantly, the Strategy also highlights the need for consultation and 
coordination with indigenous communities, as well as the need for 
international cooperation and governance.
    The Coast Guard cannot address the challenges in the Arctic on its 
own and must work hand-in-hand with Alaskan native tribes and 
communities and international allies and partners. I thank today's 
witnesses for sharing their expertise about homeland security 
priorities in the Arctic and what Congress can do to support the Coast 
Guard and the rest of the Federal Government in their efforts.

    Chairman Gimenez. Again, I am pleased to have a 
distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this 
critical topic.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Chairman Gimenez. Let the record reflect that the witnesses 
have answered in the affirmative. Thank you and please be 
seated.
    I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
    Mr. Ronald O'Rourke is a specialist in naval affairs at the 
Congressional Research Service. Since starting at CRS in 1984, 
Mr. O'Rourke has written many reports for Congress on various 
issues relating to the Navy, the Coast Guard, defense 
acquisition, China's naval forces and maritime territorial 
disputes, the Arctic, and the international security 
environment. He is one of the most respected authorities on 
naval issues and of special interest to this subcommittee, the 
Coast Guard's icebreaker fleet.
    Mr. Luke Coffey is a senior fellow at the Hudson Institute. 
His work focuses on national security issues in Europe, 
Eurasia, and the Arctic. As a decorated veteran of the United 
States Army and former senior special advisor to United Kingdom 
defence secretary, Liam Fox, Mr. Coffey brings a unique 
perspective to this field. Mr. Coffey previously testified 
before the subcommittee in his prior role as director of The 
Allison Center for Foreign Policy Studies at The Heritage 
Foundation and we are glad to have him back.
    Dr. Esther Brimmer is the James H. Binger senior fellow in 
global governance at the Council on Foreign Relations. Dr. 
Brimmer's work focuses on international organizations and 
transatlantic relations. During her time at the Council, Dr. 
Brimmer served as the project director for the 2017 Counsel 
Task Force report ``Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. 
Strategy on America's Fourth Coast''. In addition to posts in 
academia, the private sector, and with the large nonprofit 
organizations, Dr. Brimmer previously served as the assistant 
secretary of state for international organization affairs and 
worked on the Department of State's policy planning staff.
    I thank each of you distinguished witnesses for being here 
today.
    I now recognize Mr. O'Rourke for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF RONALD O'ROURKE, SPECIALIST IN NAVAL AFFAIRS, 
                 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

    Mr. O'Rourke. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss strategic 
competition in the Arctic. With your permission, I'll submit my 
written statement for the record and, as you requested, 
summarize it here briefly.
    In the CRS report on the Arctic, I'm the author of the 
section on strategic competition in the region and I'll be 
happy to discuss various aspects of that topic during the Q&A.
    The subcommittee asked me to focus my prepared testimony on 
the Coast Guard's polar icebreakers, which I have been covering 
in detail since 2008 when I initiated my CRS report on the 
topic.
    In connection with strategic competition, it can be noted 
that the Coast Guard's polar icebreakers don't simply break 
ice. They are multi-mission cutters that conduct a variety of 
operations in polar waters. U.S. polar ice operations conducted 
in large part by the icebreakers support 9 of the Coast Guard's 
11 statutory missions.
    In general, the icebreakers conduct and support scientific 
research in the polar regions. They defend U.S. sovereignty in 
the Arctic by helping to maintain a U.S. presence in 
territorial waters in the region. They defend other U.S. 
interests in the polar regions, including economic interests in 
waters that are within the U.S. exclusive economic zone north 
of Alaska. They monitor sea traffic in the Arctic, including 
ships bound for the United States. They conduct other Coast 
Guard missions, such as search and rescue, law enforcement, and 
protection of marine resources in Arctic waters, including U.S. 
territorial waters north of Alaska.
    Discussions of U.S. Arctic capabilities often note the lack 
of infrastructure in the region. With their built-in 
capabilities, the Coast Guard's polar icebreakers act as a form 
of mobile infrastructure, something that can be seen when the 
icebreaker, Healy, for example, uses its built-in science 
support facilities to support embarked contingents of Arctic 
researchers.
    The Coast Guard testified in April and June that it had 
recently signed out a new fleet mix analysis that concluded 
that the Coast Guard will require a total of 8 to 9 polar 
icebreakers. Prior to that, Coast Guard officials had stated 
that the service would need at least 6 icebreakers, including 3 
capable of breaking heavy polar ice.
    The Coast Guard initiated the Polar Security Cutter, or 
PSC, program for procuring new heavy polar icebreakers in its 
fiscal year 2013 budget. From fiscal year 2013 to 2016, the 
program received only minor funding. Starting in fiscal year 
2017, the program has received significant funding and the 
first 2 PSCs are now fully funded.
    The Coast Guard originally aimed to have the first PSC 
delivered in 2024, but the ship's estimated delivery date has 
been delayed repeatedly. Given the degree of design completion 
that GAO has reported, construction of the ship might begin no 
earlier than 2024. If so, and if the ship takes at least 4 
years to build, which might be a reasonable estimate for a lead 
ship of this size and complexity, then the first PSC might be 
delivered no earlier than 2028. Admiral Fagan reportedly 
provided a similar estimate in testimony on the Senate side 
last week. If the first ship is delivered in 2028, that will be 
20 years after I initiated the icebreaker report.
    Recent substantial cost growth on other Navy and Coast 
Guard ship-building programs raises a question regarding the 
potential for a possibly comparable amount of cost growth to 
occur on the PSC program. If there's substantial cost growth in 
the PSC program, that could raise a question about whether to 
grant some form of contract relief to the shipbuilder, as 
occurred in the Coast Guard's Offshore Patrol Cutter program.
    One option for Congress would be to ask CBO to conduct a 
more refined analysis of the potential for cost growth in the 
PSC program. In addition to the PSC program, the Coast Guard is 
requesting funding to purchase an existing commercially 
available polar icebreaker that would be modified to become a 
Coast Guard polar icebreaker, so as to help augment the Coast 
Guard's polar icebreaking capability. I'll be happy to discuss 
that in the Q&A.
    As important as icebreakers are, improving the Coast 
Guard's capabilities in the region would include making 
investments in other things as well, including manned aircraft, 
UAVs, communications, and shore facilities. The current project 
to make improvements at the Port of Nome promises to improve 
the Coast Guard's ability to maintain a presence in operations 
in the Arctic by eliminating the need for polar icebreakers to 
steam all the way down to Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands 
to be resupplied before returning to the Arctic Ocean.
    Chairman Gimenez, this concludes my opening statement. I'll 
be happy to respond to any questions the subcommittee may have.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. O'Rourke follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Ronald O'Rourke
                             July 18, 2023
                              introduction
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, distinguished Members of 
the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you 
today to discuss strategic competition in the Arctic.
    As part of my work as the CRS specialist for naval affairs, I am 
the head of the CRS Arctic team, the coordinator of the CRS overview 
report on the Arctic,\1\ and the author of the CRS report on the Coast 
Guard's Polar Security Cutter (PSC) program.\2\ The Arctic and PSC 
reports were initiated in 2010 and 2008, respectively, and have been 
updated periodically since then, most recently on July 5 and July 10, 
2023, respectively. My other periodically updated CRS reports include 
the CRS report on the defense implications of great power competition, 
which was initiated in 2014,\3\ and the CRS report on U.S.-China 
strategic competition in the South and East China Seas, which was 
initiated in 2012.\4\ My biography is in the Appendix at the end of 
this statement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ CRS Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues 
for Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke.
    \2\ CRS Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar 
Icebreaker) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald 
O'Rourke.
    \3\ CRS Report R43838, Great Power Competition: Implications for 
Defense--Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
    \4\ CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South 
and East China Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald 
O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As requested by the subcommittee, my statement focuses primarily on 
the Coast Guard, and particularly on the PSC program. Portions of this 
statement are adapted from the PSC and Artic overview reports.
                    arctic geopolitical environment
    The CRS Arctic overview report's discussion of the Arctic 
geopolitical environment covers the evolution of the Arctic 
geopolitical environment since the end of the Cold War, the emergence 
of great power competition (i.e., strategic competition) in the Arctic, 
the impact on the Arctic of Russia's war in Ukraine, Russian and 
Chinese activities in the Arctic, and military (including U.S. Coast 
Guard) operations in the Arctic.\5\ The discussion in that report 
provides a geopolitical context for the material presented below, which 
focuses on Coast Guard polar icebreakers, Arctic search and rescue 
(SAR), and a U.S. Arctic strategic seaport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ See pages 20-44 of the current (July 5, 2023) version of CRS 
Report R41153, Changes in the Arctic: Background and Issues for 
Congress, coordinated by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     coast guard polar icebreakers
Multiple Polar Missions (Not Just Icebreaking)
    Within the U.S. Government, the Coast Guard is the U.S. agency 
responsible for polar icebreaking. The Coast Guard's polar icebreakers, 
however, do not simply break ice--they are multi-mission cutters that 
conduct a variety of operations in polar waters. U.S. polar ice 
operations conducted in large part by the Coast Guard's polar 
icebreakers support 9 of the Coast Guard's 11 statutory missions.\6\ 
The roles of U.S. polar icebreakers can be summarized as follows:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ The 11 missions are marine safety; search and rescue; aids to 
navigation; living marine resources (fisheries law enforcement); marine 
environmental protection; ice operations; ports, waterways and coastal 
security; drug interdiction; migrant interdiction; defense readiness; 
other law enforcement. The two statutory missions not supported by 
polar ice operations are illegal drug interdiction and undocumented 
migrant interdiction. (Department of Homeland Security, Polar 
Icebreaking Recapitalization Project Mission Need Statement, Version 
1.0, approved by DHS June 28, 2013, p. 10.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   conducting and supporting scientific research in the Arctic 
        and Antarctic;
   defending U.S. sovereignty in the Arctic by helping to 
        maintain a U.S. presence in U.S. territorial waters in the 
        region;
   defending other U.S. interests in polar regions, including 
        economic interests in waters that are within the U.S. exclusive 
        economic zone (EEZ) north of Alaska;
   monitoring sea traffic in the Arctic, including ships bound 
        for the United States; and
   conducting other typical Coast Guard missions (such as 
        search and rescue, law enforcement, and protection of marine 
        resources) in Arctic waters, including U.S. territorial waters 
        north of Alaska.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ This passage, beginning with ``The roles of  . . . ,'' 
originated in CRS Report RL34391 on polar icebreakers and was later 
transferred by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) with minor 
changes to Government Accountability Office, Coast Guard[:]Efforts to 
Identify Arctic Requirements Are Ongoing, but More Communication about 
Agency Planning Efforts Would Be Beneficial, GAO-10-870, September 
2010, p. 53.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Polar (Not Just Arctic) Operations
    The Coast Guard's large icebreakers are called polar icebreakers 
rather than Arctic icebreakers because they perform missions in both 
the Arctic and Antarctic. Operations to support National Science 
Foundation (NSF) research activities in both polar regions account for 
a significant portion of U.S. polar icebreaker operations.
    Supporting NSF research in the Antarctic focuses on performing an 
annual mission, called Operation Deep Freeze (ODF), to break through 
Antarctic sea ice so as to reach and resupply McMurdo Station, the 
large U.S. Antarctic research station located on the shore of McMurdo 
Sound, near the Ross Ice Shelf. The Coast Guard states that Polar Star, 
the Coast Guard's only currently-operational heavy polar icebreaker, 
``spends the [northern hemisphere] winter [i.e., the southern 
hemisphere summer] breaking ice near Antarctica in order to refuel and 
resupply McMurdo Station. When the mission is complete, the Polar Star 
returns to dry dock [in Seattle] in order to complete critical 
maintenance and prepare it for the next ODF mission. Once out of dry 
dock, it's back to Antarctica, and the cycle repeats itself.''\8\ The 
Coast Guard's medium polar icebreaker, Healy, spends most of its 
operational time in the Arctic supporting NSF research activities and 
performing other operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Visual Information 
Distribution System (DVIDS), ``Coast Guard Icebreaker Crew Completes 
Second Arctic Mission; U.S. Interests in Arctic Domain Depends [sic] on 
Fleet Recapitalization,'' press release, October 19, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Required Numbers of Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers
    The Coast Guard testified in April and June 2023 that it had 
recently completed a new fleet mix analysis that concluded that the 
Coast Guard will require a total of 8 to 9 polar icebreakers to perform 
its various polar (i.e., Arctic and Antarctic) missions in coming 
years:
   At an April 18, 2023, hearing on the Coast Guard's proposed 
        fiscal year 2024 budget before the Coast Guard and Maritime 
        Transportation subcommittee of the House Transportation and 
        Infrastructure Committee, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, 
        Admiral Linda L. Fagan, stated: ``We recently--I recently 
        signed out a fleet mix analysis that indicates we need eight to 
        nine icebreakers.''\9\ Admiral Fagan's testimony did not 
        otherwise characterize the results of the fleet mix 
        analysis.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ CQ transcript of hearing.
    \10\ Congressional offices seeking further information on the fleet 
mix analysis may contact the author of this CRS report.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   At a June 21, 2023, hearing before the same subcommittee on 
        the Coast Guard's emerging challenges and statutory needs, the 
        Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, Admiral Steven D. Poulin, 
        similarly stated: ``We were on a trajectory to build the polar 
        security cutters, but we recently delivered to this committee 
        and other committees our fleet mix analysis, and in that fleet 
        mix analysis we concluded that we likely need eight to nine new 
        icebreakers. Some of those will be heavy icebreakers like the 
        polar security cutter that's being built at Bollinger, 
        Mississippi. Others may be Arctic security cutters [ASCs, i.e., 
        medium polar icebreakers].''\11\ Admiral Poulin's testimony, 
        like Admiral Fagan's, did not otherwise characterize the 
        results of the fleet mix analysis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ CQ transcript of hearing. The Coast Guard in late 2020 began 
referring to its envisioned new medium polar icebreakers as Arctic 
Security Cutters, or ASCs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Prior to this new fleet mix analysis, Coast Guard officials had 
stated that the service in coming years would need at least 6 polar 
icebreakers, including 3 capable of breaking heavy polar ice.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ The Coast Guard testified in February 2020, for example, that:

    The 2010 High Latitude Mission Analysis Report (HL MAR) identified 
the need for 6 new polar icebreakers (at least 3 of which must be 
heavy) under the assumption that, in the future, the Coast Guard would 
be required to perform 9 of its 11 statutory missions year-round in the 
Arctic, and meet all icebreaking needs in support of the United States 
Antarctic Program.
    In 2017, the Coast Guard's Center for Arctic Study and Policy 
completed an addendum to the HL MAR. The objectives were to provide a 
broad overview of changes in the polar regions over the last 7 years 
and to provide specific information for use in determining potential 
impacts on mission areas in the polar regions. This addendum provides 
confidence in the original findings and encourages the sustained 
reliance on its initial recommendations on the Nation's need for 6 
icebreakers, 3 of which must be heavy icebreakers.
    (Testimony of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Coast Guard Vice Commandant, 
on ``Arctic Security Issues,'' before the House Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Transportation & Maritime Security, February 5, 2020, 
p. 9.)

    In January 2021, then-Commandant of the Coast Guard Admiral Karl 
Schultz stated publicly that the Coast Guard would ideally like to have 
a fleet of 6 PSCs and 3 new ASCs, for a total fleet of 9 PSCs and ASCs. 
(See Jon Harper, ``SNA News: Coast Guard Wants Budget `Booster Shot,' 
'' National Defense, January 13, 2021; Mallory Shelbourne, ``Schultz: 
Nuclear Icebreakers Are Not An Option for Coast Guard,'' USNI News, 
January 14, 2021; Cal Biesecker, ``With More Resources, Coast Guard 
Sees Need For Nine Polar Icebreakers,'' Defense Daily, January 14, 
2021. See also Stew Magnuson, ``Coast Guard Ship Modernization Under 
Full Steam,'' National Defense, March 3, 2021.)
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Current Coast Guard Polar Icebreakers
    The operational U.S. polar icebreaking fleet currently consists of 
one heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Star, and one medium polar 
icebreaker, Healy.\13\ In addition to Polar Star, the Coast Guard has a 
second heavy polar icebreaker, Polar Sea. Polar Sea, however, suffered 
an engine failure in June 2010 and has been nonoperational since then.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ A heavy polar icebreaker generally has more capability for 
breaking through polar ice than a medium polar icebreaker, which in 
turn generally has more capability for breaking through polar ice than 
a light polar icebreaker. In the International Association of 
Classification Societies (IASC) classifications for polar-class ships, 
heavy polar icebreakers are equivalent to Polar Class 1 or 2 (PC1 or 
PC2) class ships, medium polar icebreakers are equivalent to PC3 or PC4 
class ships, and light polar icebreakers are equivalent to PC5 or PC6 
class ships. PC1 through PC5 are ships capable of year-round operation 
in all polar waters (PC1); moderate multi-year ice conditions (PC2); 
second-year ice, which may include multi-year ice inclusions (PC3); 
thick first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions (PC4); or 
medium first-year ice, which may include old ice inclusions (PC5). PC6 
are ships capable of summer/autumn operation in medium first-year ice, 
which may include old ice inclusions. (Source: Requirements concerning 
Polar Class, International Association of Classification Societies, 
undated, including Revision 4 of December 2019, Table 1, entitled Polar 
Class descriptions, p. I1-2.) For a table showing major polar 
icebreakers of the world organized by PC class, see Table B-1 in CRS 
Report RL34391, Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter (Polar Icebreaker) 
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Polar Star and Polar Sea entered service in 1976 and 1978, 
respectively, and are now well beyond their originally intended 30-year 
service lives. The Coast Guard in recent years has invested millions of 
dollars to overhaul, repair, and extend the service life of Polar Star, 
but as a result of its advancing age, the ship's material condition has 
nevertheless become increasingly fragile, if not precarious. During its 
annual deployments to McMurdo Station in Antarctica, shipboard 
equipment frequently breaks, and shipboard fires have occurred.\14\ 
Replacements for many of the ship's components are no longer 
commercially available. To help keep Polar Star operational, the Coast 
Guard is using Polar Sea as a source of replacement parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ See, for example, Richard Read, ``Meet the Neglected 43-Year-
Old Stepchild of the U.S. Military-Industrial Complex,'' Los Angeles 
Times, August 2, 2019; Melody Schreiber, ``The Only Working US Heavy 
Icebreaker Catches Fire Returning from Antarctica,'' Arctic Today, 
March 2, 2019; Calvin Biesecker, ``Fire Breaks Out On Coast Guard's 
Aging, and Only, Heavy Icebreaker,'' Defense Daily, March 1, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
PSC Program
    The PSC program was initiated in the Coast Guard's fiscal year 2013 
budget submission, and envisages the acquisition of at least 3 new PSCs 
(i.e., heavy polar icebreakers), to be followed years from now by the 
acquisition of additional new ASCs (i.e., medium polar icebreakers). 
The PSC program was previously known as the polar icebreaker (PIB) 
program. Changing the program's name to the PSC program is intended to 
call attention to the fact that the Coast Guard's polar icebreakers 
perform a variety of missions relating to national security, not just 
icebreaking.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ See, for example, Ben Werner and Sam LaGrone, ``Coast Guard 
Renames New Icebreaker Program `Polar Security Cutter,' '' USNI News, 
September 27, 2018. See also Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., ``With Funding In 
Peril, Coast Guard Pushes Icebreaker As `Polar Security Cutter,' '' 
Breaking Defense, October 29, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PSC program is managed by a Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program 
Office (IPO).\16\ The Navy and Coast Guard in 2020 estimated the total 
procurement costs of the first 3 PSCs in then-year dollars as $1,038 
million (i.e., about $1.0 billion) for the first ship, $794 million for 
the second ship, and $841 million for the third ship, for a combined 
estimated cost of $2,673 million (i.e., about $2.7 billion). A 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report that was released on 
April 20, 2023, and which reports on the status of major DHS 
acquisition programs as of September 30, 2022, states that as of June 
2022, the combined estimated procurement cost of the 3 PSCs was $2,789 
million,\17\ which is $116 million (about 4.3 percent) more than the 
figure of $2,673 million.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ A key aim in establishing the IPO was to permit the Navy to 
share its ship-procurement best practices with the Coast Guard so as to 
help the Coast Guard reduce the time and cost needed to design and 
procure the PSCs.
    \17\ Government Accountability Office, DHS Annual Assessment[:] 
Major Acquisition Programs Are Generally Meeting Goals, but 
Cybersecurity Policy Needs Clarification, GAO-23-106701, April 2023, p. 
50.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On April 23, 2019, the Coast Guard-Navy Integrated Program Office 
for the PSC program awarded a fixed-price, incentive-firm contract for 
the detail design and construction (DD&C) of the first PSC to Halter 
Marine Inc. of Pascagoula, MS, a shipyard that was owned at the time by 
Singapore Technologies (ST) Engineering. The DD&C contract includes 
options for building the second and third PSCs. On December 29, 2021, 
the Coast Guard exercised a fixed price incentive option to its 
contract with Halter Marine Inc. for the second PSC. In November 2022, 
ST Engineering sold Halter Marine to Louisiana-based Bollinger 
Shipyards. The former Halter Marine is now called Bollinger Mississippi 
Shipbuilding.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ See, for example, Sam LaGrone, ``Bollinger Closes $15M 
Acquisition of Halter Marine, New Name: `Bollinger Mississippi 
Shipbuilding,' '' USNI News, November 14, 2022; Cal Biesecker, 
``Bollinger Completes Acquisition Of Halter Marine,'' Defense Daily, 
November 14, 2022; Justin Katz, ``Why a Small Shipyard Merger Could 
Signal Bigger Problems for the US Military,'' Breaking Defense, 
November 14, 2022; Sam LaGrone, ``Updated: Bollinger to Buy Halter 
Marine Shipyard, Oversee Coast Guard Polar Security Cutter Program,'' 
USNI News, November 6, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PSC program is using the parent design approach, meaning that 
the design of the PSC (Figure 1) is based on an existing icebreaker 
design. A key aim in using the parent design approach is to reduce 
cost, schedule, and technical risk in the PSC program. The parent 
design is German design for Polar Stern II (also spelled Polarstern 
II), a ship that is to be built as the replacement for Polarstern, 
Germany's current polar research and supply icebreaker.



    The PSC program has received a total of $1,881.8 million in 
procurement funding through fiscal year 2023, including $300 million 
provided through the Navy's shipbuilding account ($150 million each in 
fiscal year 2017 and fiscal year 2018), and the remainder provided 
through the Coast Guard's Procurement, Construction, and Improvements 
(PC&I) account. The procurement of the first two PSCs is fully funded, 
and the Coast Guard has started to fund the third PSC. The Coast 
Guard's proposed fiscal year 2024 budget requests $170.0 million in 
continued procurement funding for the PSC program.
    The Coast Guard originally aimed to have the first PSC delivered in 
2024, but the ship's estimated delivery date has subsequently been 
delayed repeatedly. An April 2023 GAO report states that as of August 
2022, about 41 percent of the ship's overall design had been 
completed,\19\ raising a question as to how much time the use of the 
German parent design has in practice saved in designing the PSC. Given 
the degree of design completion as of August 2022, construction of the 
ship might begin no earlier than 2024. If so, and if the ship takes at 
least 4 years to build, which might be a reasonable estimate for 
building a lead ship (i.e., first ship in the class) of the PSC's size 
and complexity, then the first PSC might be delivered no earlier than 
2028. Admiral Fagan reportedly provided a similar estimate in testimony 
at a July 13, 2023, hearing on the Coast Guard's budget before the 
Oceans, Fisheries, Climate Change, and Manufacturing subcommittee of 
the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Government Accountability Office, DHS Annual Assessment[:] 
Major Acquisition Programs Are Generally Meeting Goals, but 
Cybersecurity Policy Needs Clarification, GAO-23-106701, April 2023, p. 
51.
    \20\ Cal Biesecker, ``Fagan Suggests Further Delay In Polar 
Security Cutter,'' Defense Daily, July 13, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Cost growth in other Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding programs 
reported in the Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget submission and a June 
2023 GAO report includes the following:
   About 10 percent cost growth since the Navy's fiscal year 
        2023 budget submission in estimated unit procurement costs for 
        Navy Virginia-class attack submarines;\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ The estimated unit procurement cost of Virginia-class attack 
submarines to be procured in fiscal year 2025-fiscal year 2027 is about 
10 percent higher in the Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget submission than 
in the Navy's fiscal year 2023 budget submission. For more on the 
Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) 
Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, 
by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   About 40 percent cost growth between 2012 and 2022 in the 
        estimated the total program acquisition cost of the Coast 
        Guard's Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) program;\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ A June 2023 GAO report on the OPC program states: ``The OPC's 
total acquisition cost estimate increased from $12.5 billion to $17.6 
billion between 2012 and 2022. The program attributes the 40 percent 
increase to many factors, including restructuring the stage 1 contract 
[for OPCs 1 through 4] and recompeting the stage 2 requirement [for 
OPCs 5 through 15] in response to a disruption caused by Hurricane 
Michael, and increased infrastructure costs for homeports and 
facilities, among other things.'' (Government Accountability Office, 
Coast Guard Acquisitions[:] Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs to 
Mature Technology and Design, GAO 23-105805, June 2023, highlights 
page.) For more on the OPC program, see CRS Report R42567, Coast Guard 
Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald 
O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   About 51 percent cost growth since the Navy's fiscal year 
        2021 budget submission in estimated unit procurement costs for 
        Navy John Lewis (TAO-205) class oilers;\23\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ In the Navy's fiscal year 2021 budget submission, the 4 TAO-
205s programmed for procurement during the 5-year period fiscal year 
2021-fiscal year 2025 had an average estimated procurement cost of 
$556.9 million per ship, while in the Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget 
submission, the 6 TAO-205s programmed for procurement during the 5-year 
period fiscal year 2024-fiscal year 2028 have an average estimated 
procurement cost of $843.4 million, a figure that is 51 percent 
greater. For more on the TAO-205 program, see CRS Report R43546, Navy 
John Lewis (TAO-205) Class Oiler Shipbuilding Program: Background and 
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   About 82 percent cost growth since fiscal year 2022 in the 
        estimated unit procurement cost of the Navy's first TAGOS-25 
        class ocean surveillance ship.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ The Navy in fiscal year 2022 procured the first of a planned 
class of 7 new TAGOS-25 class ocean surveillance ships at a cost of 
$434.4 million. The Navy's fiscal year 2024 budget submission shows 
that the ship's estimated procurement cost has since grown to $789.6 
million--an increase of $355.2 million, or 81.8 percent. For more on 
the TAGOS-25 program, see CRS In Focus IF11838, Navy TAGOS-25 
(Previously TAGOS[X]) Ocean Surveillance Shipbuilding Program: 
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some of the cost growth shown above may be due to inflation 
resulting from disruptions to supply chains related to the COVID-19 
pandemic, some may be due to optimistic initial estimates of the 
intrinsic costs for building these ships, and some may be due to other 
causes. Cost growth in these Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding programs 
raises a question regarding the potential for a possibly comparable 
amount of cost growth to occur in the PSC program due to inflation, 
underestimation of intrinsic building costs, or other causes. If a 
substantial degree of cost growth occurs in the PSC program, it could 
raise a question regarding whether to grant some form of contract 
relief to the PSC shipbuilder, as occurred in the OPC program.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ For more on the contract relief granted in the OPC program, 
which was done under the authority provided by Pub. L. 85-804 (50 
U.S.C. 1431-1435), see CRS Report R42567, Coast Guard Cutter 
Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One option for Congress would be to ask the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) to conduct a more-refined analysis of the potential for 
cost growth in the PSC program. Something similar occurred with the 
Navy's Constellation (FFG-62) class frigate program: A preliminary CRS 
analysis suggested that if FFG-62s were to cost about the same to 
construct per thousand tons of displacement as other recent U.S. 
military surface combatants, then the third and subsequent FFG-62s 
could cost 17 percent to 56 percent more than the budgeted estimates 
for those ships in the Navy's fiscal year 2021 budget submission. 
Following that preliminary CRS analysis, CBO was asked to conduct a 
more-refined analysis, which estimated that the first 10 FFG-62s will 
cost 40 percent more to build than the Navy estimates.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ For additional discussion, see CRS Report R44972, Navy 
Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program: Background and Issues for 
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The April 2023 GAO report mentioned earlier provides additional 
information regarding cost, technical, and schedule risk in the PSC 
program.\27\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Government Accountability Office, DHS Annual Assessment[:] 
Major Acquisition Programs Are Generally Meeting Goals, but 
Cybersecurity Policy Needs Clarification, GAO-23-106701, April 2023, 
pp. 50-51.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Existing Commercially Available Polar Icebreaker (CAPI)
    The Coast Guard's proposed fiscal year 2024 budget, in addition to 
requesting continued procurement funding for the PSC program, also 
requests $125.0 million in procurement funding for the purchase of an 
existing commercially available polar icebreaker (CAPI) that would be 
modified to become a Coast Guard polar icebreaker, so as to help 
augment the Coast Guard's current polar icebreaking capacity until the 
new PSCs enter service, and to continue augmenting the Coast Guard's 
polar icebreaking capacity after the PSCs enter service. Under the 
Coast Guard's proposal, the Coast Guard would conduct a full and open 
competition for the purchase, the commercially-available icebreaker 
that the Coast Guard selects for acquisition would be modified for 
Coast Guard operations following its acquisition, and the ship would 
enter service 18 to 24 months after being acquired. The total cost to 
purchase the ship and then modify it to meet Coast Guard mission needs 
is uncertain.
    Prior to 2021, Coast Guard plans did not include the acquisition of 
such a ship. The Coast Guard's fiscal year 2022 unfunded priorities 
list (UPL), dated June 29, 2021, however, included a $150.0 million 
item for the lease or purchase of a commercially-available vessel to 
provide polar icebreaking capability until the future delivery of 
PSCs.\28\ The following year, the Coast Guard as part of its proposed 
fiscal year 2023 budget requested $125.0 million in procurement funding 
for the purchase of an existing commercially-available polar 
icebreaker. Congress, in acting on the Coast Guard's proposed fiscal 
year 2023 budget, denied the request. The Coast Guard is once again 
requesting the $125.0 million as part of its proposed fiscal year 2024 
budget.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ U.S. Coast Guard, FY 2022 Unfunded Priorities List, Report to 
Congress, June 29, 2021, p. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Service Life Extension for Polar Star
    The Coast Guard plans to extend the service life of Polar Star 
until the delivery of at least the second PSC.\29\ The Coast Guard 
estimated the cost of Polar Star's service life extension work at $75 
million, a sum that was funded at a rate of $15 million per year for 5 
years, with the final $15-million increment being provided in fiscal 
year 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ In February 2020, for example, the Coast Guard testified that:

    The Coast Guard also understands that we must maintain our existing 
heavy and medium icebreaking capability while proceeding with 
recapitalization . . . Maintenance of POLAR STAR will be critical to 
sustaining this capability until the new PSCs are delivered. Robust 
planning efforts for a service life extension project on POLAR STAR are 
already under way and initial work for this project will begin in 2020, 
with phased industrial work occurring annually from 2021 through 2023. 
The end goal of this process will be to extend the vessel's service 
life until delivery of at least the second new PSC.

    (Testimony of Admiral Charles W. Ray, Coast Guard Vice Commandant, 
on ``Arctic Security Issues,'' before the House Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Transportation & Maritime Security, February 5, 2020, 
p. 9.)
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        search and rescue (sar)
    Increasing sea and air traffic through Arctic waters has increased 
concerns regarding Arctic-area search-and-rescue (SAR) capabilities. 
Given the location of current U.S. Coast Guard operating bases, it 
could take Coast Guard aircraft several hours, and Coast Guard cutters 
days or even weeks, to reach a ship in distress or a downed aircraft in 
Arctic waters. The Coast Guard states that ``the closest Coast Guard 
Air Station to the Arctic is located in Kodiak, AK, approximately 820 
nautical miles south of Utqiagvik, AK, which is nearly the same 
distance as from Boston, MA, to Miami, FL.''\30\ In addition to such 
long distances, the harsh climate complicates SAR operations in the 
region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Coast Guard, Arctic Strategic Outlook, April 2019, p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Particular concern has been expressed about cruise ships carrying 
large numbers of civilian passengers that may experience problems and 
need assistance. There have been incidents of this kind with cruise 
ships in waters off Antarctica, and a Russian-flagged passenger ship 
with 162 people on board ran aground on Canada's Northwest Passage on 
August 24, 2018.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Malte Humpert, ``A Cruise Ship Runs Aground in Canada's Arctic 
Waters; The Akademik Ioffe's Sister Ship Was Nearby, and Together with 
Canadian Coast Guard Ships, Was Able to Rescue All Passengers,'' 
ArcticToday, August 28, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Coast Guard is participating in exercises focused on improving 
Arctic SAR capabilities. Further increasing U.S. Coast Guard SAR 
capabilities for the Arctic could require one or more of the following: 
enhancing or creating new Coast Guard operating bases in the region; 
procuring additional Arctic-capable aircraft, cutters, and rescue boats 
for the Coast Guard; and adding systems to improve Arctic maritime 
communications, navigation, and domain awareness. It may also entail 
enhanced forms of cooperation with navies and coast guards of other 
Arctic countries.
    On May 12, 2011, representatives from the member states of the 
Arctic Council, meeting in Nuuk, Greenland, signed an agreement on 
cooperation on aeronautical and maritime SAR in the Arctic.\32\ The 
agreement divides the Arctic into SAR areas within which each party has 
primary responsibility for conducting SAR operations. Figure 2 shows a 
map of the national areas of SAR responsibility based on the geographic 
coordinates listed in the Annex to the agreement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ For a State Department fact sheet on the agreement, see 
``Secretary Clinton Signs the Arctic Search and Rescue Agreement with 
Other Arctic Nations,'' May 12, 2011, accessed July 11, 2023, at 
https://2009-2017.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163285.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     u.s. arctic strategic seaport
    Some observers have expressed concern about whether the United 
States is doing enough militarily to defend its interests in the 
Arctic, and in some cases have offered recommendations for doing more, 
such as building ice-hardened Navy or Coast Guard surface ships other 
than icebreakers, or establishing a strategic seaport in Alaska's north 
to better support DOD and Coast Guard operations in the Arctic. 
(Anchorage, in the southern part of Alaska's mainland, was designated a 
U.S. strategic seaport for supporting DOD operations in 2004.) A June 
2023 press report stated that a $600 million project to expand port 
facilities at Nome, Alaska, will make Nome ``the nation's first deep-
water Arctic port. The expansion, expected to be operational by the end 
of the decade, will accommodate not just larger cruise ships of up to 
4,000 passengers, but cargo ships to deliver additional goods for the 
60 Alaska Native villages in the region, and military vessels to 
counter the presence of Russian and Chinese ships in the Arctic.''\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Mark Thiessen, ``Cruising to Nome: The First U.S. Deep Water 
Port for the Arctic to Host Cruise Ships, Military,'' Associated Press, 
June 18, 2023.



                               conclusion
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, thank you again for the 
opportunity to appear before you today, and I will be pleased to 
respond to any questions the subcommittee may have.

    Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke.
    I recognize Mr. Coffey for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statements.

   STATEMENT OF LUKE COFFEY, SENIOR FELLOW, HUDSON INSTITUTE

    Mr. Coffey. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, I am honored to 
speak before the subcommittee on strategic competition in the 
Arctic.
    With your permission, Mr. Chairman, I will summarize my 
prepared statement that has been submitted for the record.
    The United States became an Arctic power on October 18, 
1867, at a ceremony transferring the control of Alaska to the 
United States. With the stroke of a pen, Secretary of State 
William Seward ended Russian influence on North America. In his 
retirement, Seward was asked what his greatest achievement was. 
He replied, ``The purchase of Alaska. It'll take another 
generation to find it out.'' I think it's safe to say that it's 
probably taken more than a generation to figure that one out.
    In the context of strategic competition, the United States 
has four primary interests in the Arctic. First, ensuring the 
territorial defense of the United States. This is what makes 
our relationship with Canada so important. It also makes 
Greenland and Iceland the foreign operating bases of the North 
American continent.
    Second, enforcing U.S. sovereignty in the region. In the 
Arctic sovereignty equals security and stability. Respecting 
other sovereignty while maintaining the ability to enforce 
one's own sovereignty will ensure that the chances of armed 
conflict in the region remains low. This is why the Coast Guard 
has such an important role to play.
    Third, meeting America's treaty obligations in the Arctic 
through NATO.
    Finally, ensuring the free flow of shipping and other 
economic activities in the region in line with international 
law and norms.
    In terms of strategic competition, the United States faces 
two competitors in the Arctic: Russia and China. Going back to 
Peter the Great's two Kamchatka expeditions, the Arctic region 
has always held a special place in the minds and the identity 
of the Russian people. Therefore, focus on the Arctic serves as 
a low-risk and useful distraction for Russia's other 
geopolitical shortcomings like we've seen in Ukraine.
    President Putin is acutely aware of the economic potential 
of the region. It is estimated that Russia's Arctic region 
already accounts for 20 percent of the country's GDP and could 
grow in the future.
    Russia also sees the region as vital to its security. Up 
until Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine last year, it 
invested heavily in militarizing its Arctic region.
    In the simplest terms, China sees the Arctic region as 
another place in the world where it can expand its diplomatic 
and economic influence and interests. China's 2018 Arctic 
strategy offers a useful glimpse in how Beijing views its role 
in the region. Running 5,500 words in its English language 
translated version, the strategy's littered with all of the 
Arctic buzzwords that we in the West just love to hear, like 
``common interests for all countries,'' ``law-based 
governance,'' ``climate change,'' and ``sustainable 
development''.
    The irony, though, is not lost on observers of the South 
China Sea, where China has shunned international norms to exert 
dubious claims of sovereignty or by the fact that China is the 
world's largest emitter of greenhouse gases.
    Even though China's closest point to the Arctic Circle is 
more than 800 miles away, Beijing refers to itself as a near-
Arctic state, a term that is completely made up. In fact, 
extending Beijing's logic to other countries would mean that 
Kazakhstan, Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and Ireland are 
also near-Arctic states. These are hardly countries one thinks 
of when we think of the Arctic.
    Mr. Chairman, there's been many unintended consequences 
resulting from Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the Arctic is 
no exception. When it comes to strategic competition, there are 
five areas that have been impacted.
    The first is the Arctic Council. Since Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine, the Arctic Council has all but ceased from 
functioning.
    Second, there are new opportunities for China in the 
Arctic. As Western sanctions begin to bite Russia, there are 
new opportunities for Chinese firms to fill in the gap. But on 
the other hand, as an observer of the Arctic Council, and with 
the Arctic Council not functioning, China loses its voice in 
that international organization.
    Third is Russia's ambitions for the Northern Sea Route. 
These are being curtailed by international sanctions. Last 
year, not a single foreign cargo ship used the route, not even 
one from China. Not a single ship transited the full route from 
Asia to Europe.
    Fourth, Russia's aggression has convinced Arctic states 
Finland and Sweden to abandon decades-old policies of military 
nonalignment to join NATO.
    Finally, there's been an impact on Russia's overall 
conventional military capability in the Arctic. Open-source 
intelligence reporting tells us that Russia has suffered severe 
consequences and losses in terms of personnel and equipment in 
Ukraine by Russian units based in the Arctic.
    In conclusion, Mr. Chairman, the United States needs to 
champion an agenda that advances our national interests and 
devotes the required resources to the region. America's 
interests in the Arctic will only increase in the years to 
come. As other nations devote resources and assets to the 
region to secure their interests, America cannot afford to fall 
behind. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Coffey follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of Luke Coffey
                             July 18, 2023
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and distinguished 
Members of the committee. I am honored to speak before this esteemed 
committee about strategic competition in the Arctic.
    My name is Luke Coffey. I am a senior fellow at Hudson Institute. 
The views I express in this testimony are my own and should not be 
construed as representing any official position of Hudson Institute.
    The Arctic region, commonly referred to as the High North, is 
becoming more contested than ever before. The Arctic encompasses the 
lands and territorial waters of 8 countries on 3 continents. Unlike the 
Antarctic, the Arctic has no land mass covering its pole (the North 
Pole), just ocean. The region is home to some of the roughest terrain 
and harshest weather on the planet.
    The region is also one of the least populated areas in the world, 
with sparse nomadic communities and a few large cities and towns. 
Regions are often very remote and lack basic transport infrastructure. 
In Greenland, no two population centers are connected by a road. 
Norway's Ny Alesund, located on the Svalbard archipelago, is the 
world's most northerly permanently-inhabited place with a population of 
only 40. Although official population figures are non-existent, the 
Arctic Council estimates the figure is ``almost four million'',\1\ 
making the Arctic's global population about the size of Los Angeles. 
Approximately half of the Arctic population lives in Russia.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``Arctic Peoples'', Arctic Council, 2023, https://arctic-
council.org/explore/topics/arctic-peoples/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The region is rich in minerals, wildlife, fish, and other natural 
resources. Although exact figures difficult to know, in 2008 the U.S. 
Geological Survey estimated that up to 13 percent of the world's 
undiscovered oil reserves and almost one-third of the world's 
undiscovered natural gas reserves are located in the Arctic.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ The USGS has not updated its estimate since 2008 and these 
figures remain the most widely quoted. See: U.S. Geological Survey, 
``Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered Oil and 
Gas North of the Arctic Circle,'' July 23, 2008, http://pubs.usgs.gov/
fs/2008/3049.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The melting of some Arctic ice during the summer months creates 
security challenges, but also new opportunities for economic 
development. Reduced ice will mean new shipping lanes opening, 
increased tourism, and further natural resource exploration. However, 
it will also mean a larger military presence with more actors than ever 
before. This is not because there is a heightened threat of conflict in 
the region. Instead, it is because many capabilities needed in the 
Arctic, such as search and rescue, are more immediately, and at least 
for now, more effectively, provided by the military and coast guard.
    Operating in the Arctic is no easy task for the military or coast 
guard. Equipment must be hardened for extreme cold weather. High-
frequency radio signals can be degraded due to magnetic and solar 
phenomena. GPS can be degraded due to poor satellite geometry. The 
United States has no deep-water port above the Arctic Circle. The first 
deep-water port planned for Nome, Alaska will not be completed until 
2030--and that is if the project remains on schedule. Some of Alaska's 
shipping lanes have not been surveyed properly since Captain James Cook 
sailed through in 1778. All of this is complicated by underinvestment 
in the U.S. Coast Guard in recent years.
                     u.s. arctic security interests
    The United States became an Arctic power on October 18, 1867, at 
the ceremony transferring Alaska from Russia to the United States. At 
the time this purchase was ridiculed and was known as ``Seward's 
Folly''--named after the then-Secretary of State William Seward. 
However, with a stroke of a pen, Seward ended Russian influence in 
North America, gave the United States direct access to the northern 
Pacific Ocean, and added territory nearly twice the size of Texas for 
about 2 cents an acre along with 33,000 miles of new coastline. In his 
retirement Seward was asked what his greatest achievement was. He said: 
``The purchase of Alaska. But it will take another generation to find 
it out.''\3\
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    \3\ Frederick W. Seward, ``Seward's Folly: A Son's View,'' 
University of Rochester Library Bulletin, Spring 1967, https://
rbscp.lib.rochester.edu/487.
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    In the context of strategic competition, the United States has four 
primary geo-political interests in the Arctic region:
    (1) Ensuring the territorial defense of the United States.--This is 
        particularly true as it pertains to the growing ballistic 
        missile threat. In this regard our relationship with Canada is 
        key. This is also why it is important for the United States to 
        deepen its relations with Iceland and Greenland--both serving 
        essentially the forward operating bases of the North American 
        continent.
    (2) Enforcing U.S. sovereignty in the region.--In the Arctic, 
        sovereignty equals security and stability. Respecting the 
        national sovereignty of others in the Arctic while maintaining 
        the ability to enforce one's own sovereignty will ensure that 
        the chances of armed conflict in the region remains low. This 
        is why investment in the U.S. Coast Guard is vital to America's 
        Arctic interest.
    (3) Meeting treaty obligations in the Arctic region through the 
        North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).--Six of the world's 
        8 Arctic countries belong to NATO. Later this year, this will 
        increase to 7 after Sweden joins. However, NATO has no agreed 
        common position or policy on its role in the Arctic region. 
        This needs to change.
    (4) Ensuring the free flow of shipping and other economic 
        activities in the region.--Economic freedom leads to prosperity 
        and security. With melting ice creating new economic and 
        shipping opportunities in the region it is in America's 
        interests that shipping lanes remain open in line with 
        international norms.
                u.s. strategic challenges in the arctic
    While the military threat in the Arctic remains low, U.S. policy 
makers cannot ignore Russia's recent activities to militarize the 
Arctic region or China's increasing diplomatic and economic role in the 
region. Both directly impact America's ability to meet the 4 
aforementioned geo-political interests.
Russia's Militarization
    Russia is motivated to play an active role in the Arctic region for 
three reasons:
    (1) Low-risk promotion of Russian nationalism.--Going back to Peter 
        the Great's two Kamchatka Expeditions, the Arctic region has 
        held a special place in hearts and identities of the Russian 
        people. With nationalism on the rise in Russia, President 
        Putin's Arctic strategy is popular among the population. Focus 
        on the Arctic can also serve as a useful distraction for 
        Russia's other geo-political shortcomings, like in Ukraine. For 
        President Putin, the Arctic is an area that allows Russia to 
        flex its muscles without incurring any significant geopolitical 
        risk.
    (2) The economic potential of the region.--Russia is also eager to 
        promote its economic interests in the region. Half of the 
        world's Arctic territory and half of the Arctic region's 
        population is located in Russia. It is well-known that the 
        Arctic is home to large stockpiles of proven, yet unexploited, 
        oil and gas reserves. The majority of these reserves is thought 
        to be located in Russia. In particular, Russia hopes the 
        Northern Sea Route (NSR) will become one of the world's most 
        important shipping lanes.
    (3) Russia's security in the region.--Up until Russia's large-scale 
        invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, it invested heavily in 
        militarizing its Arctic region. In the past 15 years more than 
        20 military installations above the Arctic Circle have been 
        established or re-opened after being closed in the 1990's. 
        NATO's most recent Strategic Concept dated 2022 stated: ``In 
        the High North, its [Russia's] capability to disrupt Allied 
        reinforcements and freedom of navigation across the North 
        Atlantic is a strategic challenge to the Alliance.''\4\ 
        According to the 2023 NATO Summit communique: ``Russia . . . 
        maintains significant military capabilities in the Arctic.''\5\
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    \4\ ``NATO 2022 Strategic Concept,'' The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, June 2022, p. 4 https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/.
    \5\ ``Vilnius Summit Communique,'' The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization, July 11, 2023, https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/
official_texts_217320.htm?utm_source=multichannel- 
&utm_medium=smc&utm_campaign=230711%26vilnius%26summit%26declaration.
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China's Increasing Role
    With the focus on what China is doing in the South China Sea, its 
massive and questionable infrastructure investments in Africa, its 
threatening actions against Taiwan, and its cover-up of the origins of 
the COVID-19 virus, it is easy to overlook another aspect of Beijing's 
foreign policy: the Arctic.
    In the simplest terms, China sees the Arctic region as another 
place in the world to advance its economic interests and expand its 
diplomatic influence. As a non-Arctic country, China is mindful that 
its Arctic ambitions in international Arctic institutions are naturally 
limited--but this has not stopped Beijing from increasing its economic 
presence in the region.
    China's 2018 Arctic strategy offers a useful glimpse into how 
Beijing views its role in the region.\6\ Running 5,500 words long in 
the English language version, the strategy is littered with all the 
Arctic buzzwords like ``common interests of all countries,'' ``law-
based governance,'' ``climate change,'' and ``sustainable 
development.'' The irony is not lost on observers of the South China 
Sea where China has shunned international norms to exert dubious claims 
of sovereignty, or the fact that China is the world's largest emitter 
of greenhouse gases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ The State Council Information Office of the People's Republic 
of China, ``China's Arctic Policy,'' White Paper, January 26, 2018, 
http://english.www.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/
content_281476026660336.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even though China's closest point to the Arctic Circle is more than 
800 miles away, Beijing refers to itself as a ``near-Arctic 
state''\7\--a term made up by Beijing and not found in the lexicon of 
Arctic discourse. In fact, extending Beijing's logic to other countries 
would mean that Belarus, Estonia, Germany, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Latvia, 
Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, and the United Kingdom are also 
``near-Arctic states.'' These are hardly the countries that one 
imagines when thinking about the Arctic. As my Hudson Institute 
colleague and former U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo has said: 
``There are Arctic states, and non-Arctic states. No third category 
exists. China claiming otherwise entitles them to exactly nothing.''\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Ibid.
    \8\ Radio Canada International, ``U.S. Stuns Audience by Tongue-
Lashing China, Russia on Eve of Arctic Council Ministerial,'' May 6, 
2019, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/arctic/2019/05/us-stuns-
audience-tongue-lashing-china-russia-eve-arctic-council-ministerial.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    China is motivated be an Arctic actor for five primary reasons:
    (1) New Shipping Routes.--China is unique in modern times in being 
        a continental power that is almost entirely dependent on the 
        sea for food and energy.\9\ New sea-lanes in the Arctic have 
        the potential to play an important role when it comes to 
        diversifying China's import dependencies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Dean Cheng, ``The Importance of Maritime Domain Awareness for 
the Indo-Pacific Quad Countries,'' Heritage Foundation Backgrounder No. 
3392, March 6, 2019, https://www.heritage.org/global-politics/report/
the-importance-maritime-domain-awareness-the-indo-pacific-quad-
countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (2) Economic Influence.--China sees itself as a global power, and 
        the Arctic is just another region in which to engage. China 
        hopes to complement its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)--a vast 
        trading network being constructed by China on the Eurasian 
        landmass and beyond--by investing in and constructing major 
        infrastructure projects along the emerging sea-lanes in the 
        Arctic.
    (3) Scientific Research.--Whether it is for China's sea-based 
        nuclear deterrent, natural resource extraction, or commercial 
        shipping, research on polar high-altitude atmospheric physics, 
        glacial oceans, bioecology, and meteorological geology, 
        scientific research in the Arctic is important for China's 
        strategic interests. As a signatory of the 1920 Svalbard 
        Treaty, China is allowed to conduct scientific research on 
        Norway's Svalbard archipelago and has done so since 2004 at its 
        Arctic Yellow River Station located in Ny Alesund.
    (4) Laying the Groundwork for Future Military Activity in the 
        Region.--Currently, China's military involvement in the Arctic 
        is limited. According to open-source reporting, the U.S. Coast 
        Guard has spotted the People's Liberation Army Navy in 
        international waters off the coast of Alaska in recent years. 
        However, there is no publicly-available evidence that the PLA 
        Navy has never sailed into waters above the Arctic Circle. The 
        Pentagon has warned ``that China could use its civilian 
        research presence in the Arctic to strengthen its military 
        presence, including by deploying submarines to the region as a 
        deterrent against nuclear attacks.''\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Phil Stewart and Idrees Ali, ``Pentagon Warns of Risk of 
Chinese Submarines in Arctic,'' Reuters, May 2, 2019, https://
www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-china-military-arctic/pentagon-warns-on-
risk-of-chinese-submarines-in-arctic-idUSKCN1S829H.
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    (5) Access to Minerals, Fishing, and Other Natural Resources.--
        China also sees the Arctic region as a way to satisfy its 
        growing demands for energy and food. China is a significant 
        investor in Russian natural gas projects. There are on-going 
        talks between Moscow and Beijing for the construction of the 
        Power of Siberia 2 natural gas pipeline to complement the 
        existing Power of Siberia line. The dietary needs of China's 
        population can be met partly by increased fishing in the Arctic 
        region.
                            a role for nato?
    The U.S. ability to meet national security objectives in the Arctic 
is made possible (and easier) by the close collaboration with partner 
nations in the region. Luckily for the United States, 6 of the other 7 
Arctic countries are either treaty allies through NATO (Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Norway) or, in the case of Sweden, will 
soon be in NATO.
    Considering that most of the world's Arctic countries are in NATO, 
one would expect that the Alliance would place a strong focus on the 
region. This has not been the case. While there are training exercises 
that take partially take place in Norway's Arctic region, NATO has no 
agreed common position or policy on its role in the Arctic region. 
Until recently, no official document from NATO even contained the word 
``Arctic''. This began to change in 2022 when NATO's Strategic Concept 
published that summer mentioned the ``High North''--a first for the 
Alliance. The recent communique from the 2023 Vilnius Summit makes one 
brief mention of the Arctic--the first time the Arctic was mentioned in 
a summit communique in recent memory.
    NATO has been internally divided on the role that the Alliance 
should play in the Arctic. Norway has traditionally been the leading 
voice inside the Alliance for promoting NATO's role in the Arctic. It 
is the only country in the world that has its permanent military 
headquarters above the Arctic Circle, and it has invested extensively 
in Arctic defense capabilities.
    Canada has likewise invested heavily in Arctic defense 
capabilities. However, unlike Norway, Canada has stymied past efforts 
by NATO to take on a larger role in the region. Generally speaking, 
Canada is concerned that an Alliance role in the Arctic would afford 
non-Arctic NATO countries influence in an area where they otherwise 
would have none. As a sovereign nation-state, Canada has a prerogative 
to determine what role, if any, NATO should play in Canada's Arctic 
region. However, as a collective security alliance, NATO cannot ignore 
the Arctic altogether, and the Alliance should not remain divided on 
the issue. With Sweden's pending membership, this will mean that 7 out 
of the 8 Arctic powers will be part of the same security alliance. From 
a practical point of view, NATO now has no choice but to develop and 
implement a policy in the region. This probably explains why recent 
official NATO documents are starting to mention the region explicitly.
           russia's invasion of ukraine impacting the arctic
    There have been many unintended consequences resulting from 
Russia's large-scale invasion of Ukraine last year. For example, the 
war has threatened Ukraine's global grain exports leaving some 
countries in Africa and the Middle East with the threat of food 
insecurity. Russia is now reliant on Iran for weapons imports--
something unimaginable before the war. Global energy markets have been 
impacted because of the war too. However, one area that has been 
affected by the war but doesn't get much attention is the Arctic 
region. There are four areas that have been impacted:
    (1) The functioning of the Arctic Council.--The Arctic Council was 
        founded in 1994 by the 8 Arctic states (Canada, Denmark, 
        Finland, Iceland, Norway, Russia, Sweden, and the United 
        States) to cooperate in the region on non-military related 
        issues. Over the years, cooperation has taken place on search-
        and-rescue operations, oil spill cleanup, and other 
        environmental issues.
    Even after Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014, cooperation 
        continued inside the council. But since Russia's invasion of 
        Ukraine last year the Arctic Council has stopped functioning. 
        No meetings take place and day-to-day operations have stopped. 
        In May, Russia's 2-year-long chairmanship of the Arctic Council 
        transferred to Norway. Normally, there's a big summit and a lot 
        of diplomatic fanfare when a transfer takes place. Not this 
        time. Instead, Russia handed over the chair of the Arctic 
        Council to Norway during a low-key virtual meeting.
    (2) New opportunities for China in the Arctic.--The impact of the 
        war in Ukraine on China's Arctic ambitions are two-fold. On one 
        hand, Western economic sanctions have created new opportunities 
        for Chinese firms. No doubt China will try stepping in to help 
        Russia. This will mean more cooperation between Moscow and 
        Beijing in the Arctic region. For example, in April, Russia and 
        China signed an agreement to increase coast guard cooperation 
        in the Arctic.\11\ There is also a lot of ambition regarding 
        energy cooperation between the two.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Thomas Nilsen, ``Russia's Coast Guard cooperation with China 
is a big step, Arctic security expert says,'' The Barents Observer, 
April 28, 2023, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/security/2023/04/
russias-arctic-coast-guard-cooperation-china-big-step-expert.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On the other hand, with the Arctic Council no longer functioning, 
        Beijing has lost one of its most important tools for influence 
        in the Arctic. Since 2013, China has been an observer member of 
        the Arctic Council and it uses this position to fund research 
        projects and exert influence in the Arctic region. Until the 
        Arctic Council resumes normal operations, China will have to 
        find other ways to play an active diplomatic role in the 
        region.
    (3) Russia's ambitious plans for its Northern Sea Route are being 
        curtailed.--The Northern Sea Route runs from the Barents Sea to 
        the Bering Strait along the northern coast of Russia connecting 
        European with Asian markets. There are some who suggest that 
        the route could become a viable alternative--even a rival--to 
        the Suez Canal because it cuts transit time and distance from 
        Europe to East Asia considerably.
    In some cases, this is true. Using Northern Sea Route certainly 
        makes a trip between northern European ports to northern Asian 
        ports considerably shorter than using the Suez Canal route. It 
        must be pointed out that this is not the case for southern 
        European ports like Genoa, Trieste, or Barcelona.
    The Northern Sea Route is far from competing with the Suez Canal. 
        In 2021, the year before Russia's large-scale invasion of 
        Ukraine and the implementation of Western economic sanctions, 
        only 35 million tons of goods transited along that route. Of 
        this, only 2.75 million tons made the full journey between 
        Europe to Asia.\12\ This is .02 percent of the volume of goods 
        that transited through the Suez Canal during the same year. 
        During this period 86 ships transited the full Northern Sea 
        Route between Europe and Asia--equal to the number of ships 
        that pass through the Suez Canal every 36 hours.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Malte Humpert, ``Cargo Volume on Northern Sea Route Reaches 
35m Tons, Record Number of Transits,'' High North News, January 26, 
2022, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/cargo-volume-northern-sea-route-
reaches-35m-tons-record-number-transits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    International sanctions against Russia have discouraged the use of 
        the route even more. Last year, not a single foreign ship used 
        the route to transport cargo--not even from China.\13\ Only 34 
        million tons of goods were shipped using the route and there 
        were no full transits linking Europe with Asia.\14\ Even with 
        the Russian government continuing to invest in the Northern Sea 
        Route, the possibility of it replacing Suez, or even 
        drastically increasing the volume of trade transported along 
        the route, seems remote.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Atle Staalesen, ``No foreign vessels in sight, but shipping on 
Northern Sea Route still vibrant, Russian authorities say,'' December 
21, 2022, The Barents Observer, https://thebarentsobserver.com/en/
industry-and-energy/2022/12/no-foreign-vessels-sight-shipping-northern-
sea-route-still-vibrant.
    \14\ Malte Humpert, ``Northern Sea Route Sees Lots of Russian 
Traffic, But No International Transits in 2022,'' June 14, 2023, High 
North News, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/northern-sea-route-sees-
lots-russian-traffic-no-international-transits-2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    (4) An impact on Russia's overall military readiness in the 
        Arctic.--While Russia has not let the war against Ukraine stop 
        it from investing and its nuclear weapons modernization program 
        and infrastructure projects above the Arctic Circle, the 
        invasion has taken a toll on Russia's conventional armed forces 
        based in the Arctic region.
    A good example of this is the 200th Separate Motor Rifle Brigade 
        stationed in Pechenga only miles for the border with Norway in 
        the Russian Arctic. This unit, specially trained and equipped 
        to fight in Arctic conditions, participated in the initial 
        large-scale invasion of Ukraine last year. According to media 
        reports, of the initial 1,400 troops it entered Ukraine with 
        only 900 survived.\15\ The loss of Russian armored vehicles, 
        main battle tanks, and other associated military hardware is 
        well-documented through open-source intelligence gathering. 
        Undoubtedly, this loss of equipment and personnel in Ukraine 
        will impact Russia's conventional military readiness in the 
        Arctic is ways not yet completely understood. With the main 
        focus of Russia's conventional armed forces being on the war in 
        Ukraine there is less focus and fewer resources available for 
        Russia's military in the Arctic region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Greg Miller, et al., `` `Wiped out': War in Ukraine has 
decimated a once feared Russian brigade,'' The Washington Post, 
December 16, 2022, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2022/12/16/
russia-200th-brigade-decimated-ukraine/.
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                            recommendations
    Russia is reverting to its imperial ways, and China is expanding 
its economic influence across much of the world. As new economic 
opportunities and security challenges continue to manifest in the 
Arctic, the United States must be prepared. The United States should:
   Continue to invest in the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Navy 
        Arctic situational awareness capabilities.--The remote and 
        harsh conditions of the Arctic region make unmanned systems 
        particularly appealing for providing additional situational 
        awareness, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
   Conduct Freedom of Navigation operations in the Arctic.--
        Russia's dubious claim that the Northern Sea Route is an 
        internal waterway goes against international law and norms. The 
        United States should follow the lead of the French navy and 
        conduct Freedom of Navigation operations in the region in a way 
        that is in line with U.S. national interest and in accordance 
        with international law and norms.
   Work with allies to develop a NATO Arctic strategy.--The 
        Alliance should agree to develop a comprehensive Arctic policy 
        to address security challenges in the region. This is 
        particularly important considering the entry of Finland and 
        Sweden into the Alliance.
   Call for a NATO summit to be held above the Arctic Circle.--
        This would bring immediate awareness of Arctic issues to the 
        Alliance. Perhaps the Norwegian city of Troms would be most 
        appropriate, since few cities above the Arctic Circle have the 
        required infrastructure to hold a major international gathering 
        like a NATO Summit.
   Continue to raise awareness of China's questionable 
        ambitions.--China has declared itself a ``near-Arctic state''--
        a made-up term that previously did not exist in Arctic 
        discourse. The United States should work with like-minded 
        partners in the Arctic to raise legitimate concerns about 
        China's ambitions in the region. So far, China's motivation in 
        the Arctic seems to be more about economics and less about 
        security but considering China's predatory economic behavior in 
        places like Africa, it is only reasonable to question China's 
        motivations in the Arctic.
   Deepen relations with Iceland.--Not only is Iceland an 
        important NATO member, but it is also home to a very important 
        air base in the Arctic region. The Trump administration ended 
        the diplomatic sanctions that applied to Reykjavik by the Obama 
        administration over Icelandic whaling. The Biden administration 
        should continue to improve U.S.-Icelandic relations.
   Deepen relations with Greenland.--Greenland is an autonomous 
        constituent country of the Kingdom of Denmark. Greenland has 
        competency over most policy areas, with the big exceptions 
        being foreign affairs, defense, and monetary policy--all of 
        which are still controlled by Copenhagen. The United States has 
        operated an important military base in Greenland since 1943. In 
        2020, the United States re-established a diplomatic presence in 
        the capital Nuuk--the first such presence on the island since 
        1953. The United States should ensure that it invests 
        adequately in the military infrastructure in Greenland and 
        deepen relations with Nuuk.
   Consider establishing a U.S. diplomatic presence in the 
        Faroe Islands.--The Faroe Islands is an autonomous constituent 
        country of the Kingdom of Denmark located in the north Atlantic 
        about halfway between the United Kingdom and Iceland. Like 
        Greenland, the Faroe Islands has competency over most policy 
        areas, with the big exceptions being foreign affairs, defense, 
        and monetary policy--all of which are still controlled by 
        Copenhagen. While the United States does not maintain a 
        military base in the Faroe Islands, the country's geopolitical 
        significance is increasing. For example, in June, a nuclear-
        powered U.S. submarine (the USS Delaware) visited the islands 
        for a port call--the first such visit by the U.S. Navy in the 
        Faroe Islands. With a population comparable to Greenland's, and 
        with growing geo-political importance, the United States should 
        consider establishing a diplomatic presence in the Faroe 
        Islands too.
   Consider the use of Svalbard for any required scientific 
        needs under the terms of the 1920 Svalbard Treaty.--Due to its 
        location in the Arctic region and its particular environmental 
        conditions, Svalbard is very attractive for scientific 
        research. In the past, the Department of Defense has conducted 
        research there and it should consider doing so in the future if 
        the need arises. This is an excellent way for the United States 
        to ``fly the flag'' in a region with significant geo-political 
        importance.
   Preparing for the future of the Arctic Council and 
        multilateral cooperation in the Arctic.--It is inconceivable 
        that the Arctic Council in its current form will function in 
        any meaningful way as long as Russia continues its aggression 
        against Ukraine. The 7 other Arctic states need to start 
        thinking about alternative structures and new ways of 
        cooperating in the Arctic region. The goal would not be to 
        replace the Arctic Council but instead to ensure that a 
        framework is created allowing important work to continue 
        without Russia. The United States should lead this effort.
                               conclusion
    America's interests in the Arctic region will only increase in the 
years to come. As other nations devote resources and assets in the 
region to secure their national interests, America cannot afford to 
fall behind. The United States needs to champion an agenda that 
advances the U.S. national interest and devotes the required national 
resources to the region. With the Arctic becoming increasingly 
important in an era of strategic competition, now is not the time for 
the United States to turn away from its own backyard.

    Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Coffey.
    I now recognize Dr. Brimmer for 5 minutes to summarize her 
opening statements.

 STATEMENT OF ESTHER D. BRIMMER, JAMES H. BINGER SENIOR FELLOW 
       IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

    Ms. Brimmer. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez and the Ranking 
Member Thanedar and the distinguished Members of the 
subcommittee for inviting me to testify today about strategic 
competition in the Arctic.
    With your permission, I will summarize my remarks that have 
been submitted for the record.
    The Arctic stands at the confluence of three phenomena: 
shifting geopolitics, climate change, and the far-reaching 
implications of Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
    The Arctic is geographical, but is also conceptual. Just as 
the words ``Indo-Pacific'' or the ``South China Sea'' connotes 
strategic concepts, so too the Arctic takes on renewed 
strategic importance. The Arctic is America's fourth coast, 
meaning increased attention needs to be paid to the 
interlocking strategic, economic, environmental, and social 
concerns in the region.
    I will begin by commenting on the geopolitics and the 
changing institutions in the Arctic. As we've already noted in 
this hearing, the geopolitics of the Arctic was dramatically 
altered by the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Both 
Finland and Sweden abandoned in Sweden's case 200 years of 
neutrality to join America's most important in military 
alliance and we hope they'll be members soon.
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine not only enhanced NATO, it 
also inadvertently stalled competition in one of the Arctic's 
most distinctive multilateral organizations, the Arctic 
Council. Founded in 1996 in the afterglow of the end of the 
Cold War, the Arctic Council embodied the spirit of 
cooperation. Decisions were made by consensus and the forum 
focused on sustainable development and environmental issues. By 
design, it did not focus on security.
    Unusual for an intergovernmental body, the Arctic Council 
also includes 6 permanent participant organizations 
representing Arctic indigenous peoples. This special facility 
for interaction is distinctive and should be preserved. 
Cultural ties span current national borders.
    At the time of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine by Russia, 
unfortunately Russia happened to be holding the chair of the 
Arctic Council. Obviously the other 7 paused relationships with 
the Arctic Council. Norway is now chair and seeks to revitalize 
cooperation in this body.
    This strategic realignment in the Arctic builds on 
political shifts that were already evident before the invasion. 
Recent years witnessed the resurgence of great power 
competition. The United States faces a rising power, China, and 
the Russian Federation. Increasingly, countries outside the 
Arctic have been active in the region. The one of greatest 
concern, of course, is China. But that said, there are numerous 
observers at the Arctic Council, including Japan, India, Italy, 
the Republic of Korea, and Singapore, although they just joined 
in 2013 a longer list of members of the observer group at the 
Arctic Council.
    But even before the war in Ukraine, Russia needed partners 
for economic development. Indeed, the--Russia's need for 
economic partners creates and opening for China. China invested 
$90 billion in energy resources and most of those projects are 
in Russia.
    An increased activity by China and Russia in the Arctic is 
a manifestation of another trend: great power competition in 
global spaces. In many parts of the world, great powers and 
assertive middle powers seek access to resources. Access to 
areas beyond or at the edge of national jurisdiction is crucial 
for success in this era of strategic and commercial rivalry. 
Therefore, the protection of coastlines, waterways, safe 
commercial transit, and management of marine resources is 
increasingly important, placing greater demands on the Coast 
Guard.
    Fundamental to understanding the geopolitical and economic 
issues in the Arctic is the phenomenon of climate change. 
Global warming is occurring quickly in the Arctic. Climate 
change is important to the geopolitics of the Arctic because it 
changes access to oceans. Climate change also changes 
livelihoods. Around 60 percent of Alaska Natives are challenged 
by climate change.
    In conclusion, to advance maritime security in an era of 
strategic competition in the Arctic, the United States must 
continue to deepen its commitment to make progress on building 
a deepwater port in Nome, Alaska, continue the Polar Security 
Cutter program, and work with the current chair of the Arctic 
Council of Norway to sustain mechanisms that are value to 
Americans who live in Alaska.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Brimmer follows:]
                Prepared Statement of Esther D. Brimmer
                             July 18, 2023
    Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members 
of the subcommittee, for inviting me to testify today about ``Strategic 
Competition in the Arctic.''
    The Arctic sits at the confluence of three phenomena: shifting 
geopolitics, changing climate, and the far-ranging implications of 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine. The Arctic is geographical, the home of 
almost 4 million people facing the impact of climate change that will 
alter lives and livelihoods.\1\ It is also conceptual. Just as the 
words ``Indo-Pacific'' or the ``South China Sea'' connote strategic 
concepts, so too the ``Arctic'' takes on renewed strategic meaning. The 
Arctic is ``America's Fourth Coast'' meriting increased attention to 
the interlocking strategic, economic, environmental, and social 
concerns in this region.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``Arctic Peoples,'' Arctic Council, accessed July 13, 2023, 
https://arctic-council.org/explore/topics/arctic-peoples/
#:?:text=Topics,Arctic%20Peoples&text=The%20Arctic%20is%20home- 
%20to,peoples%20distinct%20to%20the%20Arctic.
    \2\ Thad W. Allen, Christine Todd Whitman (Chairs), and Esther 
Brimmer (Project Director), Arctic Imperatives: Reinforcing U.S. 
Strategy on America's Fourth Coast (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 
2017).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Arctic Circle begins at 66.5N (north of the equator). Eight 
countries have territory in the Arctic Circle: Canada, Finland, 
Denmark, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden, and the 
United States. The end of the Cold War reduced political pressures in 
the Arctic region. The spirit of the Norwegian concept, ``High North, 
Low Tension'' prevailed. The strategic situation has mutated into a new 
configuration. By 2023, renewed great power competition around the 
world is manifest in the Arctic region.
    The Arctic intensifies the effects of decisions made elsewhere. The 
geopolitics of the Arctic were dramatically altered by the Russian 
Federation's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Russia's invasion of Ukraine 
fundamentally transformed the security calculations of two longtime-
neutral countries. As a result of Russia's actions, Nordic states 
Finland and Sweden applied for membership in the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Finland had been neutral since 1948 and Sweden had 
been neutral since the Napoleonic era two centuries ago. Both abandoned 
neutrality to seek the security of the world's most powerful military 
alliance.
    This expansion recalibrates politics within NATO. With the 
accession of Finland, 6 (and with Sweden 7) of the Arctic countries are 
formal allies. Finland was admitted in April 2023, bringing NATO an 
832-mile land border with Russia. The upshot for the Arctic is that the 
region transmutes from a region with 5 NATO allies, 2 strategically 
neutral states, and the Russian Federation to a zone with potentially 7 
NATO allies and the Russian Federation.
    NATO is a defensive military alliance, but it is also a framework 
for deep cooperation among the national security communities of the 
member states. Henceforth, the Arctic will play a larger role in the 
strategic operations, calculations, and exercises of America's most 
important military alliance. The North Atlantic and Arctic would be 
important for North American supplies flowing to European allies in a 
crisis. The institutions of the alliance will increasingly embed Arctic 
and High North topics into their work. For example, Allied Command 
Transformation states, `` . . . the High North is an important priority 
for NATO'' when explaining the addition of Arctic activities to its 
projects preparing NATO members for future challenges.\3\ Presidential 
time is valuable. The importance of the High North was exemplified by 
President Joe Biden's trip to Helsinki for the United States-Nordic 
Leaders' Summit after the July 11-13, 2023, NATO summit.\4\ 
Furthermore, Finland and Sweden are both members of the European Union, 
making 2 more E.U. members also NATO members, which could alter E.U. 
security discussions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ ``The Future of the High North,'' Allied Command 
Transformation, NATO, May 12, 2023, https://www.act.nato.int/article/
the-future-of-the-high-north/.
    \4\ ``Readout of the Third United States--Nordic Leaders' Summit,'' 
The White House, July 13, 2023, https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/statements-releases/2023/07/13/readout-of-the-third-united-states-
nordic-leaders-summit/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine not only enhanced NATO, it also 
inadvertently stalled cooperation in one of the Arctic's most 
distinctive multilateral organizations: the Arctic Council. Founded in 
1996 in the afterglow following the end of the Cold War, the Arctic 
Council embodies the spirit of cooperation; decisions are made by 
consensus. The forum focuses on ``sustainable development and 
environmental protection in the Arctic.''\5\ By design, the Arctic 
Council does not address security issues. The Council has adopted 3 
legally binding agreements: the Agreement on Cooperation on 
Aeronautical and Maritime Search and Rescue in the Arctic (2011), the 
Agreement on Cooperation on Marine Oil Pollution Preparedness and 
Response in the Arctic (2013), and the Agreement on Enhancing 
International Arctic Scientific Cooperation (2017).\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ ``About the Arctic Council,'' Arctic Council, accessed July 12, 
2023, https://arctic-council.org/about/.
    \6\ ``About the Arctic Council.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Unusual for an intergovernmental body, the Arctic Council also 
includes 6 Permanent Participants representing Arctic Indigenous 
Peoples. This special facility for interaction is distinctive and 
should be preserved. Cultural ties span current national borders. 
Indigenous peoples have lived in the harsh climate of the Arctic for 
over a thousand years; their expertise and perspectives can be relevant 
as countries seek to understand climate change.
    At the time of the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, Russia happened to 
hold the rotating chairmanship of the Arctic Council. As part of the 
international response to the invasion, the other 7 members of the 
Arctic Council paused cooperation with Russia in that body. Upon 
assuming the 2-year chairmanship in May 2023, Norway sought to 
revitalize cooperation in the Arctic Council articulating 4 priorities: 
``the oceans; climate and environment; sustainable economic 
development; and people in the north.''\7\ Another venue for 
cooperation, the Arctic Coast Guard Forum remains dormant with Russia 
holding the chairmanship through 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Hilde-Gunn Bye, ``Upcoming Arctic Council Chairship: Important 
to Have Some Cooperation With Russia on Climate,'' High North News, 
last modified April 11, 2023. https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/
upcoming-arctic-council-chairship-important-have-some-cooperation-
russia-climate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This strategic realignment in the Arctic builds on political shifts 
that were already evident before the invasion. Recent years witnessed a 
resurgence of great power competition. The United States faces a rising 
power, China, and the Russian Federation. Increasingly, countries 
outside the Arctic have become more active in the region. China called 
itself a ``near-Arctic'' state in its 2018 Arctic Policy White 
Paper.\8\ In 2013, China, Japan, India, Italy, the Republic of Korea, 
and Singapore became Arctic Council Observers, joining France, Germany, 
The Netherlands, Poland, Spain, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ ``Full Text: China's Arctic Policy,'' University of Alaska 
Fairbanks, The State Council, the People's Republic of China, January 
26, 2018, https://www.uaf.edu/caps/resources/policy-documents/china-
arctic-policy-2018.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many countries and companies are interested in access to resources. 
The Arctic is home to living and mineral resources. Managing access in 
the fragile Arctic environment is challenging. Yet, agreements are 
possible. Arctic countries share a concern about illegal, unreported, 
and unregulated fishing that depletes delicate natural resources and 
vulnerable wildlife. Canada, China, the Kingdom of Denmark (in respect 
of the Faroe Islands and Greenland), Iceland, Japan, the Republic of 
Korea, Norway, the Russian Federation, the United States, and the 
European Union are parties to the Agreement to Prevent Unregulated High 
Seas Fisheries in the central Arctic Ocean, which entered into force in 
2021 and initially will be in force until 2037. The agreement would be 
automatically extended for another 5 years as long as none of the 
Parties object.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ ``Arctic: Agreement to prevent unregulated fishing enters into 
force,'' European Commission, June 25, 2021, https://oceans-and-
fisheries.ec.europa.eu/news/arctic-agreement-prevent-unregulated-
fishing-enters-force-2021-06-25_en. Accessed July 13, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In 2008, the U.S. Geological Survey estimated that 13 percent, or 
90 billion barrels, of the world's undiscovered conventional oil 
resources were in the Arctic.\10\ Most of these resources are in Alaska 
and the Russian Federation. The Arctic plays an important role in the 
Russian economy. About half of the Arctic area is Russian coastline. 
Twenty percent of Russia's land mass is in the Arctic Circle and 
includes large cities. Russia wants others to use (and pay to use) the 
Northern Sea Route.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ ``Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of Undiscovered 
Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle,'' USGS Fact Sheet No. 2008-
3049, U.S. Geological Survey, 2008, https://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/
fs2008-3049.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Even before the war in Ukraine, Russia needed partners for economic 
development. Economic sanctions promulgated as part of the 
international response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine foreclose 
options for Russia.
    Russia's need for investment opens a gateway for China to be more 
involved in Arctic issues. High North News notes that China has 
invested $90 billion in energy and resource projects in the Arctic over 
the past decade, largely in Russia.\11\ China is Russia's leading trade 
partner, as China is for 120 countries.\12\ China's investments in the 
Arctic are related to its Belt and Road Initiative. Yet, patterns of 
Chinese shipping were different in 2022. High North News reports that 
whereas China's COSCO shipping company had been the largest non-Russian 
operator along the Northern Sea Route (NSR), it did not send any ships 
along the NSR in 2022. In 2022, of the 314 ships sailing along the 
Northern Sea Route, only 36 were non-Russian-flagged vessels.\13\ 
Nevertheless, Chinese investment in Russia continues to grow. Chinese-
Russian trade rose to a ``record $190 billion'' in 2022.\14\ There are 
European countries that still have economic links with Russia. European 
Union countries' consumption of Russian LNG increased 50 percent since 
sanctions started, mostly going to Belgium, France, and Spain.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Malte Humpert, ``Putin and Xi Discuss Further Deepening of 
Arctic Partnership,'' High North News, last modified March 24, 2023, 
https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/putin-and-xi-discuss-further-
deepening-arctic-
partnership#:?:text=Over%20the%20past%20decade%20China,- 
figure%20to%20'surpass%20%24200bn.
    \12\ Mark Green, ``China Is the Top Trading Partner to More Than 
120 Countries,'' Stubborn Things, Wilson Center, January 17, 2023, 
https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/china-top-trading-partner-more-
120-countries.
    \13\ Malte Humpert, ``Northern Sea Route Sees Lots of Russian 
Traffic, But No International Transits in 2022,'' High North News, June 
14, 2023, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/northern-sea-route-sees-
lots-russian-traffic-no-international-transits-2022.
    \14\ Mikhail Korostikov, ``Is Russia Really Becoming China's 
Vassal?'' Carnegie Politika, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, June 7, 2023, https://carnegieendowment.org/politika/90135.
    \15\ Malte Humpert, ``EU Proposes Measures to Block Import of 
Russian Arctic LNG,'' April 3, 2023, https://www.highnorthnews.com/en/
eu-proposes-measures-block-import-russian-arctic-lng.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Increased activity by China and Russia in the Arctic is a 
manifestation of another trend: great power competition in global 
spaces. For over a century the United States has enjoyed command of the 
seas and more recently air space and outer space. Access to sea routes, 
airwaves, cyber space, and satellite information are all necessary for 
modern economies to function, but also require using shared 
international spaces that may be beyond or at the edges of national 
jurisdiction. In many parts of the world great power and assertive 
middle powers seek access to resources, some of which may be in or 
under these global spaces. Access to the global commons and areas 
beyond national jurisdiction is crucial for success in an era of 
strategic and commercial rivalry. Therefore, protection of coastlines, 
waterways, safe commercial transit, and management of marine resources 
place extra demands on the United States Coast Guard.
    Oceans are especially sensitive. At the center of the Arctic region 
is the Arctic Ocean, which is beyond the jurisdiction of any country. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea creates the 
international legal regime for oceans, including the Arctic Ocean. Each 
Arctic country, including the United States, claims its 200-mile 
exclusive economic zone. The United States is at a disadvantage because 
it is not a party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, which provides mechanisms for countries to claim more rights. 
Canada, Russia, and Denmark (on behalf of Greenland) turned to one of 
those mechanisms, the United Nations Commission on the Limit of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS) regarding their overlapping claims to the 
Lomonosov Ridge under the Arctic Ocean. The CLCS made non-binding 
recommendations in February 2023 about the extent of Russia's claim. 
Further diplomatic or legal work will need to occur to settle the 
borders.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Bjrn Kunoy, ``Recommendations on the Russian Federation's 
Proposed Outer Continental Shelf in the Arctic Area,'' EJIL: Talk! Blog 
of the European Journal of International Law, March 3, 2023, https://
www.ejiltalk.org/recommendations-on-the-russian-federations-proposed-
outer-continental-shelf-in-the-arctic-area/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Arctic, like other regions of the world, benefits from layers 
of global governance. Even in an era of geopolitical upheaval, 
cooperation on technical standards facilitates commercial, social, and 
environmental interactions. The International Maritime Organization's 
International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters (Polar Code), 
which entered into force in 2017, provides important standards for 
shippers operating in the Arctic and Antarctic regions. The terms of 
the Polar Code are mandatory under both the International Convention 
for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention 
for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ ``International Code for Ships Operating in Polar Waters 
(Polar Code),'' International Maritime Organization, accessed July 13, 
2023, https://www.imo.org/en/ourwork/safety/pages/polar-code.aspx.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Fundamental to understanding the geopolitical and economic issues 
in the Arctic is the phenomenon of climate change. Global warming is 
occurring in the Arctic possibly 3 times as fast as in the rest of the 
world.\18\ Sea ice is frozen seawater. With less Arctic sea ice to 
reflect sunshine away from the Earth, the planet will continue to heat 
up. Furthermore, the Greenland ice sheet (which is frozen freshwater) 
has lost ice for the past 25 years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Rebecca Hersher, ``The Arctic is heating up nearly four times 
faster than the whole planet, study finds,'' National Public Radio, 
August 11, 2022, https://www.npr.org/2022/08/11/1116608415/the-arctic-
is-heating-up-nearly-four-times-faster-than-the-rest-of-earth-study-f.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The on-going geopolitical shifts occurring before the invasion of 
Ukraine were premised on climate change. Climate change is important to 
the geopolitics of the Arctic because it changes access to the oceans. 
The warming climate means that more areas of the Arctic are ice-free in 
the summer, possibly opening opportunities for navigation. There could 
be ice-free summers in the Arctic Ocean in the 2030's. Companies and 
countries watch to see if navigation through the Arctic would be 
viable, thereby shortening shipping routes and times between Asia and 
Europe. Other observers counter that even with less ice, Arctic 
navigation would still be difficult.
    Climate change challenges livelihoods. Around 4 million people live 
in the Arctic, and about 2 million of them are Russian; about 500,000 
are Indigenous people. Around 60 percent of Alaska Native communities 
are ``environmentally threatened'' by climate change. Conditions are 
especially acute for Indigenous people who still hunt for sustenance. 
Thin ice and altered animal migrations mean hunters must travel farther 
for food. Migration patterns of birds and fish, and also caribou, 
walruses, and whales have shifted, requiring people to extend the 
hunting season. Warmer waters may entice fish usually found in lower 
latitudes to move farther north. The changing climate also affects 
companies' calculations. Shell ended offshore exploration in Alaska in 
2015.
    The Biden administration's October 2022 National Strategy for the 
Arctic Region includes investments in the Arctic. To advance maritime 
security in an era of strategic competition in the Arctic, the United 
States must continue to deepen its commitment to:
   Make progress on building a deep-water port in Nome, Alaska.
   Continue the Polar Security Cutter program.
   Work with the current chair of the Arctic Council, Norway, 
        to sustain mechanisms that promote human and environmental 
        well-being, including connections among Indigenous Peoples in 
        the Arctic region.

    Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Dr. Brimmer.
    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their 
5 minutes of questioning. I recognize myself for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Mr. O'Rourke, how important are these icebreakers to 
protect America's interests in the Arctic?
    Mr. O'Rourke. I think most people would say that they are 
central to the Coast Guard's ability to perform its missions in 
the Arctic. The Coast Guard would not be able to do most of its 
statutory missions in the Arctic without them. They aren't the 
only thing that the Coast Guard would need to perform its 
missions, and I mentioned some of the other things, the 
aircraft, possible UAVs, improved shore facilities and 
communications, but the icebreakers are central to that. As I 
mentioned in my opening statement, they can be considered a 
form of mobile infrastructure. So, when we talk about improving 
U.S. infrastructure in the Arctic, the icebreakers can be 
considered to be part of that.
    Chairman Gimenez. Well, how many icebreakers does the 
United States operate up there in the Arctic?
    Mr. O'Rourke. The U.S. operational polar icebreaker fleet 
is currently two ships: the heavy icebreaker, Polar Star, and 
medium polar icebreaker, Healy.
    Chairman Gimenez. So, one medium and one heavy?
    Mr. O'Rourke. That's right.
    Chairman Gimenez. How many does Russia operate?
    Mr. O'Rourke. They have about 36 government-operated 
icebreakers, including 6 heavys, 22 mediums, and 8 lights. 
Those are the government-operated ones. They also have private-
sector polar icebreakers, 9 medium and 6 light.
    Chairman Gimenez. I would think that----
    Mr. O'Rourke. If you add all those together, that's 51.
    Chairman Gimenez. Fifty-one. But I would figure that they 
have a much bigger footprint on the other side of the Arctic in 
terms of the miles that they have on the Arctic. Is that 
correct or am I incorrect?
    Mr. O'Rourke. That's right. They----
    Chairman Gimenez. But not to this level, right? Not this 
difference?
    Mr. O'Rourke. Russia has about one-half of the Arctic 
coastline. They also have 2 million people living above the 
Arctic Circle. They have many Arctic towns and communities. 
They use portions of the Northern Sea Route that runs along the 
Russian coast as a marine highway to connect those towns to one 
another. So, they have quite a lot of people and economic 
activity. That's reflected in their icebreaker fleet.
    Chairman Gimenez. How many of those icebreakers kind-of 
operate in our sphere of influence, in our area, of theirs?
    Mr. O'Rourke. Well, their icebreakers operate primarily in 
their own Arctic waters, although they will occasionally send 
icebreakers into the central Arctic, for example, in support of 
taking measurements for their extended continental shelf 
claims.
    Chairman Gimenez. How many icebreakers do the Chinese have?
    Mr. O'Rourke. The Chinese currently have 2 polar 
icebreakers, one that they purchased from Ukraine, if I 
remember right, the second one was indigenously built. A third 
one is currently under construction. The 2 that are operational 
have already made numerous cruises to the Arctic. In fact, one 
of them, the new one, the Xue Long, has just started its most 
recent cruise into Arctic waters.
    Chairman Gimenez. What do you think that the PRC's aims in 
the Arctic are? What are they after?
    Mr. O'Rourke. That is a subject of conversation and 
curiosity and concern among numerous observers. Part of it is 
economic. Some of it may relate to mining and fishing. Some of 
it is geopolitical. Some of it may reflect their desire to be a 
world power and their view that world powers need to be active 
in the polar regions, including both the Arctic and the 
Antarctic. The exact mix of China's motivations for its 
activities in the Arctic and what their end goals may be are a 
matter of discussion. Those may have shifted as a consequence 
of Russia's war in Ukraine and the impact that has had on the 
Arctic in terms of what Mr. Coffey mentioned, for example, and 
providing more opportunity for China to cooperate with Russia, 
as Russia seeks to respond to its diplomatic isolation in the 
Arctic from the other 7 Arctic states.
    Chairman Gimenez. In order for the Coast Guard to conduct 
its mission, how many icebreakers does the Coast Guard need? 
What kind of mix is it that you----
    Mr. O'Rourke. The Coast Guard has testified that their new 
fleet mix analysis indicates a need for a total of 8 to 9. 
That's an increase over the previously envisaged total of 6 
that included 3 heavys. So, now we're looking at 8 to 9, 
presumably still including 3 heavys.
    Chairman Gimenez. Fair enough. Final one observation is 
that the Chinese, the PRC, has fishing fleets around the world. 
I said also on the Select Committee on China we are going to be 
looking at those activities. Apparently they are raping the 
oceans, OK. So, my concern would be the same, they would try to 
do the same thing in the Arctic region. So, maybe that is part 
of the reason, too, why they want access to those fisheries up 
in the Arctic region.
    Mr. O'Rourke. Yes. China's world-wide fishing activities 
are a growing concern, including what is referred to as IUU 
fishing, illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing. As 
conditions in the Arctic change, fish stocks may be migrating 
further north. So, we have a dynamic situation of China 
possibly being interested in northern fish stocks and the exact 
locations of those fish stocks moving further northward in 
response to warming waters.
    Chairman Gimenez. Thank you. My time is up.
    I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Garcia.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our 
witnesses. Thank you all for being here.
    I just wanted to note that as our planet warms, obviously, 
and sea levels rise due to climate change, the Arctic is also 
melting at an unprecedented rate. The Arctic we know is 
warming, melting several times faster than other regions across 
the world. We know that this change is opening up new 
challenges for all, particularly here in the United States, and 
certainly opportunities for our adversaries to capitalize on.
    The Arctic is also a case study in not only how climate 
change impacts us globally--it certainly impacts our way of 
life--but also impacts our national security. It is also, of 
course, an economic issue. I represented the Ports of Long 
Beach when I was mayor for 8 years, representing the ports 
right now, largest container seaport in the United States, the 
Ports of Long Beach and Los Angeles. So, I know that there is 
also trade implications when it comes to the Arctic and the 
dangers around national security and economic security.
    Now, 40 percent of our Nation's cargo go through the Ports 
of Long Beach and Los Angeles. Our Nation's economic prosperity 
depends on our ability to remain adaptive in this changing 
maritime environment.
    Dr. Brimmer, I wanted just to ask from an economic growth 
standpoint, do you agree that the Arctic is also critical to 
U.S. economic interests, both in terms of new commerce and 
trade?
    Ms. Brimmer. Thank you very much for your question, if I 
may follow up on, particularly that indeed recognizing the 
importance of port facilities is crucial to the economic health 
of the United States, as you mentioned, particularly the Ports 
of Los Angeles and Long Beach. Indeed, as we look at changing 
dynamics, we see the importance of other regions, and I would 
note particularly the Arctic.
    Although we commented on the size of the coastline to the 
Russian Federation, we know that there are significant 
resources in the Arctic. The management of those will require 
careful planning for years in the future. Managing future fish 
stocks, managing other natural resources will be important. 
Indeed, because of the rapid pace of climate change, we will 
see increasing pressures for greater navigation through the 
Arctic. But that will still be difficult even if we have 
important resources that we all support in order to make it 
possible to travel in that area. There will continue to be a 
challenge and that will be important for the United States.
    Mr. Garcia. Great. Thank you. So, we also have, of course, 
national security issues here. So, the world is rapidly 
changing. Our adversaries are quickly evolving with that 
change. It is certainly essential to our national interests and 
our security of our allies in the United States that we are 
meeting this important moment.
    Now, we have concerns that our operational capacity and our 
competitiveness in the Arctic is falling behind both Russia and 
China. I think that has been mentioned already here today. So, 
the Coast Guard obviously needs the tools to operate in this 
new landscape. As it has been mentioned, it has been discussed 
also here, Russia has upwards of 40 operational icebreakers 
while China is mobilizing their commercial shipping capacity. 
You just obviously mentioned also the increasing that is 
happening around fishing as well around the Arctic. The United 
States, however, is still operating with just two polar 
icebreakers. It is the same two icebreakers that we know that 
we roughly had about 60 years ago.
    Also, Dr. Brimmer, from a NATO perspective, with Finland 
and Sweden's ascension to NATO, am I correct that the Arctic 
presents a unique opportunity for us to strengthen our global 
alliances with the other 6 Arctic NATO nations, particularly 
around global civility and economic prosperity?
    Ms. Brimmer. Yes, sir, indeed, this is a remarkable moment 
for NATO, America's most important military alliance. Indeed, 
the arrival of Finland brings with us a highly competent 
country with expertise in the High North, which will be 
extremely important. Of course, it also brings a land border 
with the Russian Federation and Finland of over 800 miles. But 
it also brings us expertise in the High North.
    This will be increasingly important. Ironically, we're 
having to go back to look at maps that were so familiar during 
the Cold War. We're talking again about the Greenland-Iceland-
UK gap, that area in the North Atlantic which would be 
important if there ever had to be resupply for Europe from 
North America.
    So, indeed, there's both importance strategically, yet this 
is an opportunity for NATO to deepen its cooperation, drawing 
on the expertise of its existing and new members in the defense 
of our democracies.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. I wanted with the time we have left, 
Dr. Brimmer, in 2017, there was a bipartisan task force on 
Arctic imperatives that of course you helped lead. You made it 
clear, and I want to quote: ``that the U.S. needs to increase 
its strategic commitment to the region or risk leaving its 
interests unprotected.'' Now, the task force identified several 
key goals around the Arctic. How do you think we are doing as a 
country meeting these goals with the remaining time that we 
have?
    Ms. Brimmer. Sir, I would say our grade is only about a C+ 
at this point. We have made important developments since that 
report in that now there is funding for the Polar Security 
Cutters, which is extremely important, as my colleagues have 
pointed out, that the United States has interests in the Arctic 
and the Antarctic. However, we will need increased investment 
in infrastructure and in diplomatic support for these new 
obligations.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. Thank you very much.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired. I now 
recognize the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ma'am, gentlemen, 
thank you for appearing before us today.
    I had the great honor of sitting next to Don Young for 6 
years, the Congressman that represented Alaska for so long, so 
many decades. When I came to Congress in 2017, Don favored me, 
sort-of put his arm around me and helped me navigate through 
the complexities of this bizarre realm. I came to call him 
friend. I have always respected my elder and Don shared great 
wisdoms from his decades of serving the American people and the 
people of Alaska.
    So, I would like to jump into, Mr. O'Rourke, I am going to 
discuss during my time of questioning the significance of the 
Polar Security Cutter program and building icebreakers because 
Don told me on several occasions that it was one of the most 
important tasks that we could complete. He considered it legacy 
stuff to get that done. It was so important that America had 
presence and dominance in that technology and we were very much 
falling behind our potential adversaries in the Arctic 
regarding navigation.
    We discussed climate change. Don made it clear. Don had 
been a tugboat captain during the course of his life. He 
understood the waters. He said there is always going to be ice. 
So, regardless of climate change, it is not going to become the 
Caribbean up there. So, you need icebreakers. The nature of the 
ice may change, but we need vessels that can navigate 
effectively with 21st Century technologies through Arctic 
waters.
    Mr. Chairman, I am going to be citing from, and therefore I 
would like to submit for the record, the Congressional Research 
Service report entitled ``Coast Guard Polar Cutter Security 
Cutter Program Background and Issues,'' updated July 10, 2023, 
to be submitted for the record, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Gimenez. So ordered.*
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    * The document has been retained in committee files and is 
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL34391/
246.
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    Mr. Higgins. Thank you. Regarding the fiscal year 2024 
procurement request, I fully support it. Mr. O'Rourke, I want 
to clarify that because the significance of this program has 
been made clear to me for 7 years now. I have very high 
confidence in the Louisiana shipbuilder, Bollinger, who has 
inherited that program with the purchase of the originally 
contracted shipbuilder.
    So, let's jump into the 2023 GAO report. May I do that with 
you, Mr. O'Rourke? You are familiar with that report?
    Mr. O'Rourke. My testimony was the June report from this 
year that reported on the design completion for the ship.
    Mr. Higgins. OK. They are related. I am referencing a 
report from April of this year, which studied the development 
of the program through September 30 of last year.
    Mr. O'Rourke. Right. Mm-hmm.
    Mr. Higgins. As of last year in September, here are some 
quotes from the GAO reported. They stated that, ``Design 
immaturity and the shipbuilder's inexperience working with the 
specialized steel needed for hull construction remained the 
program's top risk.'' They stated that, ``Oversight of the 
program was hampered due to some shipbuilder's deficiencies.'' 
This was the nature of the program, I am just trying to 
clarify, before the current shipbuilding contractor purchased 
the program and the responsibility of completing it. Is that 
correct?
    Mr. O'Rourke. That's right 'cause their data was prior to 
the shipyard sale.
    Mr. Higgins. Roger that. So, in my remaining little bit 
less than a minute, Mr. O'Rourke, please explain to America and 
the committee just how important this program is and how 
significant Congress' support for that program is for the 
future stability of our Nation and indeed peace and prosperity 
throughout the Western Hemisphere and beyond.
    Mr. O'Rourke. Mm-hmm. Yes, I'd be happy to do that. I will 
say that I attended any number of hearings over the year where 
Representative Young was up on the dais, so I remember him very 
well as well.
    The Coast Guard will tell you that the PSC program is one 
of its top two acquisition priorities, along with the Offshore 
Patrol Cutter program. So, it doesn't get any higher than that. 
Although two of the PSCs are now fully funded, we are in the 
process of funding the third. The program of record includes at 
least three PSCs. So, this year's funding request supports the 
continued funding for that third ship.
    As I mentioned earlier with the Chairman, these polar 
icebreakers are central to the Coast Guard's ability to perform 
its various statutory missions up in the Arctic, not just 
icebreaking, although icebreaking clearly is quite important, 
but the other 8 missions as well that are on the books for the 
Coast Guard to perform up there.
    Mr. Higgins. Roger that. Thank you, Mr. O'Rourke.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired. Do you 
require additional time?
    Mr. Higgins. I have an additional question, Mr. Chairman. 
Go to a second round.
    Chairman Gimenez. Now, we are going through a second round. 
I recognize myself for a second round. I yield my time to the 
gentleman from Louisiana.
    Mr. Higgins. Sir, if I could, Mr. Chairman, I would like to 
shift to Russia. I think it is important that we acknowledge 
the presence of Russia in the Arctic is historically reflective 
of their Arctic territory that they hold. I believe there is on 
the line of 4 million residents, human beings living in the 
Arctic area, the designated area, and over half of those are 
citizens of Russia. Their landmass, I believe they have over 
1,500 miles of coastland or I don't exactly recall, but it is a 
lot, much more, maybe 15,000 miles of coastland.
    So, when you consider the entire weave of coast, the point 
is that Russia has a right to a presence in the Arctic as 
opposed to China. I think it is important, and I would like you 
all to potentially address this, I think it is important that 
the United States work with Russia regarding securing trade 
routes and navigation routes that are emerging, as technology 
for vessels emerge, and as the nature of Arctic ice changes. We 
do not want Russia to partner with China, which we are 
beginning to witness. This is a concern to me.
    So, beginning with Mr. O'Rourke, if you could comment, and 
then we will go to Mr. Coffey and Dr. Brimmer.
    Mr. O'Rourke. Yes. I'll just make two quick points. One 
would be to reinforce what I said earlier, that Russia's sense 
of being diplomatically isolated from the 7 other Arctic states 
as a consequence of the war in Ukraine has encouraged Russia to 
increase its cooperation with China in the Arctic. That is 
creating new opportunities for China in the Arctic that are 
above those that they were already pursuing.
    The other thing I'll note is that even though the war in 
Ukraine has disrupted the operations of the Arctic Council and 
has led to Russia's diplomatic isolation in other ways from the 
other 7 Arctic states, there are still forms of cooperation 
that continue, even in this situation. For example, the United 
States and Russia continue to cooperate in the regulation of 
sea traffic through the Bering Strait, in the performance of 
the agreement that the two countries reached about the 
regulation of that sea traffic in 2018. So, there is some 
limited degree of cooperation under way between us and Russia, 
even in this larger situation.
    Mr. Higgins. Mr. Coffey.
    Mr. Coffey. Thank you, Mr. Higgins. As a Arctic power, as 
an Arctic state, as you alluded to, Russia has every right, and 
it's Moscow's prerogative to deploy military forces, construct 
military bases wherever it so chooses to, as long as it's on 
the territory internationally recognized as being part of the 
Russian Federation.
    Where the concern lies is when you look at what Russia has 
done in other regions around the world on its periphery, 
whether it's in the Caucasus, South Caucasus in particular, in 
Syria, of course with Ukraine. That's when there's a concern 
that Russia might try something in the Arctic.
    In terms of the idea of----
    Mr. Higgins. Let me just interject. We concur that Russian 
military presence is a threat world-wide. We are specifically 
discussing the Arctic region. I ask you to stay focused on that 
because it is a unique international challenge, the Arctic 
region.
    Mr. Coffey. Yes. As long as Russia maintains its military 
forces inside the borders recognized as being part of the 
Russian Federation, it's their prerogative to do what they want 
with them. The concern will become when they decide to use 
these forces outside of the borders of the Russian Federation.
    In terms of the notion of cooperating with Russia, I don't 
think this is a--in any meaningful sense, in the Arctic or 
otherwise, I don't think that this is geopolitically possible 
right now. There is a growing relationship between Beijing and 
Moscow. But Beijing is very much the senior partner and Russia 
is the junior partner.
    I know, Mr. Higgins, you asked me to stay restricted to the 
Arctic, but often these geopolitical issues are interconnected. 
That is why a strong Ukraine will equal a safer and more secure 
Taiwan. As China's junior partner, anything we do to weaken 
Russia will indirectly weaken China. China is watching how we 
respond to Ukraine because they have their eye on Taiwan. A 
stronger Ukraine could perhaps deter China from doing something 
in Taiwan.
    Then, ultimately, this comes back to the Arctic----
    Chairman Gimenez. My time has expired. We need to move on. 
Sorry.
    Right now, I recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Garcia.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks again to our 
witnesses.
    I just wanted to also just follow up. The Arctic is--
obviously, we talked a little bit about the economic impacts, 
there is climate impacts. We also know obviously national 
security impacts, which we have discussed.
    The Arctic is also home, of course, to people. Four million 
people, as we know, inhabit the Arctic region today, many of 
them also indigenous groups.
    Dr. Brimmer, how does the U.S. Coast Guard and other 
organizations serve the safety and well-being of those that 
call the Arctic home?
    Ms. Brimmer. Thank you very much for the question because, 
indeed, out of the 4 million people who live in the Arctic, 
about 500,000 of them are indigenous peoples. Indeed, those 
include our fellow citizens in the great State of Alaska.
    I would like to say that, indeed, that the Coast Guard 
provides important search and rescue for people who are working 
on the coast lines. As the coast lines change, there is greater 
challenge for those, including those who are still subsistence 
hunters, that it is important to have the infrastructure to 
support the well-being of people who actually live in the 
Arctic.
    If I may combine this point with the earlier conversation 
about the role of international organizations that support 
people in the region, the Arctic in essence has layers of 
international organizations. I will note that whatever the 
future of the Arctic Council, the ability to bring together 
indigenous people, including those in Alaska, is an important 
support for those people. Whatever the venue is, that's an 
important structure to help with human well-being and human 
security.
    Mr. Garcia. Also, as far as the Arctic Council, what role 
does indigenous groups, indigenous peoples play in kind of the 
international cooperation, you know, within the Arctic Council? 
After Dr. Brimmer, if anyone else wants to also answer, that 
would be great.
    Ms. Brimmer. Indeed, the Arctic Council was unusual among 
international organizations, in that it actually has a 
structure for nongovernmental participation. There are 6 groups 
associated with indigenous peoples that are part of the Arctic 
Council. Four of those groups include people in Alaska. So, 
they actually have an opportunity to speak and participate in 
the activities of an international organization, which is 
unusual and something that is of value to Americans in the 
State of Alaska.
    Mr. Garcia. Mr. Coffey, do have any additional comments on 
that?
    Mr. Coffey. No, only that I concur that regardless of the 
future of the Arctic Council, there has to be some mechanism 
that can help address the legitimate concerns and needs of the 
indigenous peoples of the Arctic region.
    Mr. Garcia. Great. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.
    I recognize the gentleman from Louisiana again. Mr. 
Higgins, do you have any additional questions?
    Mr. Higgins. I would like to give Dr. Brimmer an 
opportunity to respond to my line of questioning regarding the 
significance of some level of cooperative engagement between 
the United States as a heavy presence in the Arctic with the 
geographically and population density-dominant international 
presence in the Arctic, which is Russia, as opposed to allowing 
Russia to develop a relationship in the Arctic with China. Dr. 
Brimmer, would you respond to that line of questioning?
    Ms. Brimmer. Thank you, sir, for the opportunity to respond 
to that important question. If I may, I will highlight 
particular points.
    The first is that, of course, the United States and the 
Russian Federation share important duties of search and rescue, 
particularly in the Bering Strait. Indeed, that is one of our 
oldest international principles, is search and rescue. So, both 
countries take that very seriously.
    Second, I will say that it is beneficial for the United 
States to work with Russia in international bodies, such as the 
International Maritime Organization, which is responsible for 
the Polar Code that actually governs the requirements for ships 
in the region. That's an important structure.
    The third is to say that the Arctic Ocean itself, the 
center, is the High Seas. So, in addition to the important 
activities we've talked about in terms of our territorial 
waters and our extended economic zone, there's actually a 
portion that is beyond all national jurisdiction. Again, we 
need to work with the Russian Federation and the other Arctic 
countries in bodies that manage the High Seas.
    Finally, to say that the expansion of NATO is extremely 
important in this area, where it'll be important that the 
United States works with its long-standing allies in the 
Arctic, such as Norway and our new allies, such as Finland and 
we hope Sweden. Because that work in the Arctic will 
increasingly take up planning and strategic time for NATO as a 
whole. Thank you.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Dr. Brimmer.
    Mr. Coffey, I am going to give you an opportunity to 
comment on the significance of the Coast Guard Polar Security 
Cutter program, if you would, good sir.
    Mr. Coffey. Yes. It is a key component of America's ability 
to enforce its own sovereignty in America's Arctic region and 
to protect our sovereignty from foreign adversaries. It is one 
component of many that the Coast Guard will use to complete its 
mandated missions, but it is important. Thank you.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, sir. Thank you all for being here 
today.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman yields.
    I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Garcia.
    Mr. Garcia. I yield back.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman yields.
    I now recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Lee.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding 
this important hearing.
    All of our witnesses, we appreciate you for being here 
today. The Arctic's growing strategic importance has made it 
imperative that America is prepared to confront the unique 
challenges and opportunities that this region presents. Your 
experience and expertise is appreciated here today.
    Mr. Coffey, I would like to begin with you and return to 
the questions that you were engaged in with Mr. Higgins. In 
particularly, you commented on some of the, I believe, common 
interests in Russia and China in that region. I was interested 
in your perspective on whether there is an area where the 
interests of Russia and China in the Arctic diverge.
    Mr. Coffey. Well, thank you for that question. As I alluded 
to, Russia is very much the junior partner in this 
relationship. One of the consequences of international economic 
sanctions against Russia is that Russia has looked for other 
markets and China has swooped in to take advantage of the 
situation. Much of the energy that was once exported to Europe 
is slowly finding its way to other places, including China, and 
at below-market rates. So, China understands that it's in a 
position to benefit in the maximum manner from its engagement 
with Russia right now.
    Right now, Russia is so dependent on China that I cannot 
see a situation in the near future where Russia would become a 
strategic competitor against China, certainly not one where 
Russia would align with us to counter China or try to go 
against China. In fact, I think it would be completely 
impossible for the United States to engineer such an outcome to 
the point that we shouldn't even try. We should acknowledge 
that China and Russia will be our main strategic competitors in 
the Arctic region, and we should develop and prepare our 
national security architecture under that assumption.
    Ms. Lee. Do you anticipate or foresee any scenario where 
Russia could attempt to impede our access to the Northern Sea 
Route, the United States or other countries?
    Mr. Coffey. Well, international sanctions has actually 
impeded the use of the Northern Sea Route. If you look at the 
data from last year, not a single cargo ship, foreign cargo 
ship, used the route. Not a single ship of any flag made the 
full journey from Asia to Europe.
    Russia has claimed that a lot of the Northern Sea Route is 
internal waterways and that certain fees must be paid in order 
to use this route. Then, of course, you are reliant on Russian 
search and rescue and Russia's icebreaking capabilities, and 
that also incurs cost.
    So, right now, I wouldn't say that, you know, Russia is, 
you know, preventing any internationally-flagged ship from 
using the route. They either make it difficult or the 
geopolitical circumstances, in this case economic sanctions, 
make it cost-prohibitive.
    The French have actually conducted freedom of navigation 
operations, the French Navy has, up along the Northern Sea 
Route. As far as I know, that is the only NATO country that has 
done such a thing. But certainly, the United States would be 
within its rights to do so. But whether or not right now would 
be the right time for that is a matter for policy makers.
    Ms. Lee. Mr. O'Rourke, I would like to bring you into this 
conversation. What additional insight or perspective would you 
add to what you have been hearing on this subject?
    Mr. O'Rourke. Well, one of your earlier questions was about 
a divergence of interests, if any, that exists between China 
and Russia in the Arctic. There is potentially a latent one, 
one in the background that may become more in the foreground at 
one point. That concerns the Arctic Council.
    China in the past has raised questions about the Arctic 
Council as the correct institution or forum for Arctic 
governance because they are more on the outside of that than 
Russia is. Russia is one of the 8 voting states of the Arctic 
Council. So, there's a potential for the two countries to 
develop different viewpoints regarding the continuation of the 
Arctic Council as the primary international forum for Arctic 
governance.
    The other thing I will mention is regarding the Northern 
Sea Route, the Russian legislature has been active. They have 
passed a new law regarding their regulation of the Northern Sea 
Route that may put Russia more directly at odds with the U.S. 
legal position regarding those claimed internal waters. Whereas 
in the past we may not even have had a basis for having a 
freedom of navigation operation because there was no excessive 
claim regarding government ships, that may have changed now 
with the passage of that new Russian law. So, that is another 
situation that is worth watching.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentlelady yields back.
    Does anybody have any other questions? I will now recognize 
the gentleman from California, Mr. Garcia.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I just wanted to go 
back. So, the Biden-Harris administration's national strategy 
for the Arctic region, which was published, of course, just 
last year, is a vital step in creating a cross-agency plan for 
the Arctic as it relates to the United States.
    I wanted to start off by asking, Mr. O'Rourke, several 
Arctic strategies have been developed in recent years by the 
White House, DOD, Homeland Security, and the Coast Guard. Not 
all have been fully implemented yet. So, how useful do you 
think these Arctic strategies are? How would you characterize 
the status of implementation?
    Mr. O'Rourke. I think they're useful as a statement of 
goals. They, in some cases, may be somewhat aspirational. If 
you say that a strategy is something that has to reconcile 
ends, ways, and means, then these documents, like many other 
strategy documents that come out of the Executive branch, may 
not actually pass the test of being a strategy in that regard, 
of reconciling ends, ways, and means and setting priorities. 
But they are useful in terms of identifying interests and 
identifying lists of goals to be pursued and lines of effort 
for attaining those goals.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. Dr. Brimmer, what steps do you think 
the Coast Guard should take to ensure that its Arctic 
strategies align with the national strategy for the Arctic 
region?
    Ms. Brimmer. Thank you very much for the question. I think 
it's important that in addition to the support for the 
investments we've been discussing for the Coast Guard that they 
continue an important relationship between the Coast Guard and 
the State Department and the Defense Department is also 
important. Indeed, the Coast Guard actually helps extend 
American diplomacy by the work that it does with other 
countries, both in the Arctic and around the world. So, I think 
that's important to continue.
    The types of structures that are important are interagency. 
I will say that back when I was heading the International 
Organizations Bureau, we used to say we were interagency before 
it was fashionable. One of the great strengths of the United 
States is the ability to integrate military, economic, 
diplomatic, and other forms of power. That has to have an 
interagency component, which means that resources such as the 
Coast Guard and the Department of Homeland Security needs to 
also work closely with our diplomatic community as part of 
projecting America's interests internationally.
    Mr. Garcia. Also, Dr. Brimmer, last, what key efforts and 
metrics should the Coast Guard include when planning for its 
own implementation of the national strategy?
    Ms. Brimmer. Some of the things that should be considered 
indeed are the types of challenges that the Coast Guard faces 
because America faces them. One of them is first, of course, 
defending sovereignty on our coastlines and other waterways. 
But also, it means economic defense, such as guarding against 
the illegal, underreported, and underregulated fishing as 
another example in our maritime resources. So, those types of 
considerations also need to be a part of planning for the Coast 
Guard on its mission. Thank you.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman yields back.
    Anybody else have any other questions?
    Seeing none, I want to thank the witnesses for their 
valuable testimony and for the Members for their questions.
    Members of the subcommittee may have some additional 
questions for the witnesses. We would ask the witnesses to 
respond to these in writing, pursuant to committee rule VII(D). 
The hearing record will be open for 10 days.
    Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:04 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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