[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]



      PROTECTING THE U.S. HOMELAND: FIGHTING THE FLOW OF FENTANYL
                      FROM THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                            BORDER SECURITY
                            AND ENFORCEMENT

                                 of the

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             JULY 12, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-21

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     




                 [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]



                                     

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________
                              

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

54-231 PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023











                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman

Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona

                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk

                                 ------                                


            SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT

                   Clay Higgins, Louisiana, Chairman

Michael Guest, Mississippi           J. Luis Correa, California, 
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia          Ranking Member
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Garcia, California
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
    officio)                             (ex officio)

                Natasha Eby, Subcommittee Staff Director
       Brieana Marticorena, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director









                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Clay Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the 
  State of Louisiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border 
  Security and Enforcement:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     3
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Border Security and Enforcement:
  Oral Statement.................................................     3
  Prepared Statement.............................................     5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     6
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Texas:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     7

                               Witnesses

Mr. Kemp L. Chester, Senior Advisor to the Director of National 
  Drug Control Policy, Office of National Drug Control Policy, 
  Executive Office of The President:
  Oral Statement.................................................    11
  Prepared Statement.............................................    13
Mr. Steven W. Cagen, Assistant Director, Homeland Security 
  Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S. 
  Department of Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    18
  Prepared Statement.............................................    19
Mr. James Mandryck, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of 
  Intelligence, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S. 
  Department of Homeland Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    24
  Prepared Statement.............................................    26
Mr. George Papadopoulos, Acting Chief of Operations, Drug 
  Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice:
  Oral Statement.................................................    30
  Prepared Statement.............................................    32
Mr. Tyrone Durham, Director, Nation-State Threats Center, Office 
  of Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland 
  Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................    37

                             For the Record

The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Texas:
  Bill...........................................................    54
  Article........................................................    65








 
      PROTECTING THE U.S. HOMELAND: FIGHTING THE FLOW OF FENTANYL
                      FROM THE SOUTHWEST BORDER

                              ----------                              


                        Wednesday, July 12, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
           Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:21 p.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Clay Higgins 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Present: Representatives Higgins, Gonzales, Luttrell, 
Brecheen, Correa, Jackson Lee, Thanedar, Garcia, and Ramirez.
    Also present: Representatives D'Esposito, Ivey, and 
Goldman.
    Mr. Higgins. The Committee on Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement will come to 
order.
    Without objection, the subcommittee may recess at any 
point.
    The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from 
Government experts on the elaborate drug operations conducted 
by the transnational criminal organizations along the United 
States-Mexico border which threaten the safety and security of 
American communities.
    From the importation of precursor chemicals for production 
from China to the distribution of fentanyl in the United 
States, transnational criminal organizations are wreaking havoc 
on American communities, and the Committee on Homeland Security 
seeks answers.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Good afternoon, gentlemen. Thank you for being here, and 
welcome to the Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement 
hearing on fighting the flow of fentanyl from the Southwest 
Border.
    The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the Biden 
administration's failures and perhaps to examine some areas of 
shared success with previous administrations.
    We welcome our witnesses from the Office of the National 
Drug Control Policy, the Department of Homeland Security, the 
Drug Enforcement Administration, and I thank you all for being 
here today.
    I'd like to begin by thanking our Customs and Border 
Protection front-line agents and officers who work tirelessly 
every day to protect our country despite the negligent policies 
that they're subject to and the lack of support that they have 
reported from the Biden administration.
    Every day, transnational criminal organizations use 
America's complex highway systems to smuggle illicit drugs, 
such as deadly fentanyl, and human beings into our country. 
These criminal organizations pose an enormous threat to the 
United States, as they undermine our public safety and flood 
our streets with drugs.
    The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the CDC, 
cites drug poisoning as the leading cause of mortality due to 
injury in the United States. Over 150 people die in our Nation 
every day from overdoses related to synthetic opioids like 
fentanyl.
    Fentanyl has poured across our borders and into the streets 
of America while the Biden administration continues to 
implement policies that have, in fact, emboldened and enriched 
these transnational criminal organizations.
    It would be impossible to discuss the free flow of fentanyl 
at our borders without mentioning China's significant role in 
the shipping of precursor chemicals to the Mexican cartels. The 
cartels and China have a complicated money- and drug-laundering 
operation. This operation kills Americans every day. In fact, 
according to the CDC, fentanyl is the leading cause of death of 
Americans age 18 to 45.
    As the flow of illegal immigrants continues to overwhelm 
Customs and Border Protection, it's inevitable that more and 
more drugs will slip through our defenses and into our country. 
As long as the Biden administration continues to fail 
enforcement of our immigration laws, the cartels will continue 
to reap the benefits.
    Secretary Mayorkas has been derelict in his duties and has 
failed this country. He's continuously refused to enforce 
immigration law. He refused to prosecute illegal entries and 
refused to utilize previous immigration tools that had been 
proven effective. These actions have increased the flow of 
illegal aliens into this country, enriched the Mexican cartels, 
and overwhelmed our front-line agents and officers, which has 
led, of course, to more and more drugs flowing into the United 
States.
    There's quantifiable impact of this destruction on our 
country. As drugs have poured into the United States, overdose 
deaths have increased every year, from 92,000 in 2020 to 
109,680 in 2022. These are our brothers, our sisters, our 
family, our friends and neighbors. The Biden administration 
must reconcile with this devastation, and it's our job in 
Congress to hold the administration accountable.
    The cartels have quickly learned to outmaneuver the system 
we had in place. With the help of the Chinese Communist Party 
and the Biden administration's ineffectiveness, they've 
smuggled an unprecedented amount of fentanyl and trafficked 
these dangerous and deadly drugs into our country, have taken a 
record number of American lives, and brought in regular 
billion-dollar profits. They've torn countless scores of 
thousands of American families apart.
    This subcommittee will not allow the Biden administration, 
nor Secretary Mayorkas, to sweep their failures under the rug.
    Today, this hearing will expose the arterial bleed at our 
Southern Border and the ensuing fight against synthetic opioids 
that has made its way to the forefront of all of our lives.
    I yield back the balance of my time, and I look forward to 
hearing from our witnesses.
    [The statement of Chairman Higgins follows:]

                   Statement of Chairman Clay Higgins
                             July 12, 2023
    Good afternoon and welcome to the Subcommittee on Border Security 
and Enforcement hearing on fighting the flow of fentanyl from the 
Southwest Border. The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the 
Biden administration's haphazard fight to disrupt the flow of fentanyl 
into the United States. I would like to welcome our witnesses from the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, Department of Homeland 
Security, and the Drug Enforcement Administration for being here today.
    Most recently, I was appointed by Speaker McCarthy to serve on the 
Task Force to Combat Mexican Drug Cartels. The purpose of the task 
force is to examine cartel operations, educate the American people on 
the impacts of cartel violence, provide legislative recommendations, 
and most importantly help save lives. I look forward to working with my 
colleagues in this crucial endeavor.
    Every day, Transnational Criminal Organizations uses America's 
complex highway systems to smuggle illicit drugs, such as deadly 
fentanyl, and humans into our country. These criminal organizations 
pose an enormous threat to the United States as they undermine our 
public safety and flood our streets with drugs.
    The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) cites drug 
poisoning as the leading cause of mortality due to injury in the United 
States. Of the more than 105,000 drug poisoning overdose deaths in 
2022, more than 75 percent involved opioids including fentanyl.
    Under the Biden administration, America has been suffering from 
wave upon wave of misery flooding across our Southwest Border. Fentanyl 
has poured across our borders and into the streets of America while the 
Biden administration continues to implement policies that embolden and 
enrich these Transnational Criminal Organizations.
    Mexican cartels rely on China for the precursor chemicals used to 
make synthetic opioids. The Sinaloa and Cartel de Jalisco Nueva 
Generacion (CJNG) are the two biggest importers of synthetic opioids 
into the United States, and both rely on a complex system with partners 
in China to import fentanyl precursors. The precursors are then 
processed in labs in Mexico and then smuggled into the United States.
    We would be mistaken not to mention China's significant role in the 
shipping of precursors and laundering of money. It is vital that the 
Biden administration recognize China's role in providing the vital 
ingredients used in illicit products that are killing United States 
youth. In fact, according to the CDC, fentanyl is the leading cause of 
death of Americans ages 18-45.
    As the flow of illegal immigrants continues to overwhelm Customs 
and Border Protection, it is inevitable that more and more drugs will 
slip through our defenses and into our country.
    Secretary Mayorkas has been derelict in his duties to this country 
and has continuously refused to enforce immigration law, refused to 
prosecute illegal entries, and refused to utilize previous immigration 
tools at his disposal. These actions have increased the flow of illegal 
aliens into this country, enriched Mexican cartels, and overwhelmed our 
front-line agents and officers, which has led to more and more drugs 
flowing into the United States.
    The reckless open-border policies set by President Biden and 
Mayorkas have greatly benefited the Mexican cartels. The cartels 
quickly learned to outmaneuver the system, and with the help of the 
Chinese Communist Party, they have smuggled an unprecedented amount of 
fentanyl, taken a record number of American lives, brought in billion-
dollar profits, and have torn families apart.
    Secretary Mayorkas' blatant disregard for the security and sanctity 
of the American people has wounded our great nation deeply. This 
subcommittee intends to hold Secretary Mayorkas and the Biden 
administration accountable for their actions.
    With that, I yield back the balance of my time and look forward to 
hearing from our witnesses.

    Mr. Higgins. Without objection, I'd like to waive on the 
gentleman from New York, Mr. D'Esposito.
    Mr. D'Esposito will be permitted to sit on the dais for 
this subcommittee hearing and ask questions of the witnesses.
    I recognize the Ranking Member.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, thank you very much for holding this most important 
hearing on transnational criminal organizations and, of course, 
fentanyl.
    Mr. Chairman, I want to ask also unanimous consent that Mr. 
Ivey and Mr. Goldman be permitted to sit with the subcommittee 
and question today's witnesses.
    Mr. Higgins. Without objection.
    Mr. Correa. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this 
most important hearing.
    We also need to dismantle fentanyl supply lines. The 
surging resources to conduct inbound inspections are badly 
needed. We need to work collaboratively to make sure that these 
seizures lead to arrests and prosecutions of those engaged in 
these illegal, dangerous businesses.
    That's why I'm glad to hear about the Department's recent 
successes in operations like Blue Lotus, the Four Horsemen--
both of these that have seized nearly 10,000 pounds of fentanyl 
that were destined to go to our communities. Of course, these 
operations also resulted in almost 300 arrests. I understand 
the Department has used the intel from these successes to move 
to the next phase, which is to target and prevent other 
fentanyl from entering the United States.
    I hope our witnesses today will share about--a little bit 
of information about the two new operations being moved ahead, 
which are Operation Artemis and Operation Rolling Wave.
    For today's witnesses from the White House, DEA, CBP, and 
Homeland Security Investigations, or HSI, I want to hear in 
your testimony about how the administration has been working to 
mitigate these threats to our country as well as to Main 
Street.
    We know transnational criminal organizations and the 
illicit supply of fentanyl are not new challenges. In fact, the 
number of fentanyl seizures began to increase in the summer of 
2020 under the previous administration. As you know, the threat 
of fentanyl does not begin or end at our Southern Border.
    We need to also improve our public health care response to 
this crisis and address the addiction plaguing our communities, 
while providing support for those that are trying to recover 
from drug addiction.
    Of course, to tackle transnational criminal organizations 
and fentanyl, we can't just focus on seizures alone. We also 
need to go after their profits and supply chains. Again, let me 
repeat: We also need to go after their profits and supply 
chains.
    I'm glad to hear that, under this administration, Homeland 
Security Investigation has continued Operation Pelican Bones, 
which seeks to disrupt the financial tools used by 
transnational criminal organizations to launder money; as well 
as Operation Hydra that goes after the precursors needed to 
create fentanyl; and, of course, Operation Chain Breaker that 
targets the equipment needed to manufacture pills.
    Initiatives like these, gentlemen, to dismantle illicit 
networks and limit TCOs' financial accesses are needed. Yet we 
also need to recognize that this is a global threat, a world-
wide threat. Strong and collaborative partnerships with 
international partners are critical to dismantling 
transnational criminal organizations.
    That's why this morning the Chairman and I introduced the 
bipartisan Cooperation on Combating Human Smuggling and 
Trafficking Act, which would direct Homeland Security 
Investigations to expand its Transnational Criminal 
Investigative Units. These vetted and trained units of foreign 
law enforcement work with HSI to investigate transnational 
criminal organizations. They need to stop human smuggling and 
the flow of dangerous drugs before they reach our borders.
    I hope my colleagues across the aisle will continue to join 
me in calling for responsible action, like expanding these 
transnational criminal investigative units and putting more 
resources toward our ports of entry, instead of throwing around 
harmful rhetoric about invading Mexico, our second-largest 
trading partner and, of course, a critical partner in fighting 
transnational crime.
    While I have focused primarily on the law enforcement 
action we can take to dismantle transnational criminal 
organizations, we must also recognize that this isn't the only 
border issue. It's also a public health care challenge. These 
criminals across the world seek to make record profits at the 
cost of lives--American lives on Main Street. There is wide-
spread, untreated drug addiction in our streets, leading some 
individuals to consume dangerous substances that may be laced 
with fentanyl.
    Hope our witnesses today from the Office of National Drug 
Control Policy can speak also to the administration's strategy 
to reduce the demand for illicit drugs on our streets.
    Again, I want to thank the witnesses for taking time from 
your very busy schedules to talk to us today. I welcome your 
suggestions how we in Congress can help you better accomplish 
your job.
    Thank you very much, and I now turn it back to Chairman 
Higgins for today's proceedings.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Correa follows:]

               Statement of Ranking Member J. Luis Correa
                             July 12, 2023
    I would like to start by thanking Chairman Higgins for holding 
today's hearing on transnational criminal organizations and fentanyl. 
For today's witnesses from the White House, DEA, CBP, and Homeland 
Security Investigations (HSI), I look forward to hearing your testimony 
about the administration's actions to mitigate these threats.
    We know transnational criminal organizations and the illicit supply 
of fentanyl are not new challenges. In fact, the number of fentanyl 
seizures began to increase in the summer of 2020 under the previous 
administration. But the threat of fentanyl does not begin or end at the 
Southern Border.
    We need to improve our public health response to this crisis and 
address the addiction plaguing our communities while providing support 
to those recovering. We also need to dismantle fentanyl supply chains, 
surging resources to conduct inbound inspections, and working to 
indict, arrest, and prosecute those engaged in this illegal business. 
That's why I was glad to hear about the Department's recent successes 
in Operations Blue Lotus and Four Horsemen, which seized nearly 10,000 
pounds of fentanyl headed for our communities and resulted in 284 
arrests.
    I understand that the Department has used the insights gained from 
these two operations to launch the next phase of its campaign to target 
and prevent fentanyl from entering the United States. I hope our 
witnesses will share more about the two new operations, Operation 
Artemis and Operation Rolling Wave. To tackle transnational criminal 
organizations and fentanyl, we can't just focus on seizures. We also 
need to go after their profits and supply chains.
    I am glad that, under this administration, Homeland Security 
Investigations has continued Operation Pelican Bones--which seeks to 
disrupt the financial tools used by transnational criminal 
organizations to launder money--as well as Operation Hydra, which goes 
after the precursor chemicals needed to create fentanyl, and Operation 
Chain Breaker, which targets the equipment needed to manufacture pills. 
Initiatives like these are critical to dismantle illicit networks and 
limit TCOs' financial access. But we also need to recognize that this 
is a global threat, and strong, collaborative partnerships with 
international partners are critical to dismantling transnational 
criminal organizations.
    That's why this morning the Chairman and I introduced the 
bipartisan Cooperation on Combatting Human Smuggling and Trafficking 
Act, which would direct Homeland Security Investigations to expand its 
Transnational Criminal Investigative Units. These vetted and trained 
units of foreign law enforcement work with HSI to investigate 
transnational criminal organizations, aiming to stop human smuggling 
and the flow of dangerous drugs before they reach our borders.
    I hope my colleagues across the aisle will continue to join me in 
calling for responsible action, like expanding these transnational 
criminal investigative units and putting more resources toward our 
ports of entry, instead of throwing around harmful rhetoric about 
invading Mexico--one of our closest trading partners and a critical 
partner in the fight against transnational crime.
    While I have focused primarily on the law enforcement actions we 
can take to dismantle transnational criminal organizations, we must 
recognize that this isn't only a border security challenge or law 
enforcement challenge. It's a public health challenge, as transnational 
criminal organizations seek to make record profits at the cost of 
American lives. There is wide-spread untreated addiction for drugs, 
leading some individuals to consume dangerous substances that may be 
laced with fentanyl. I hope our witness from the Office of National 
Drug Control Policy can speak to the administration's strategy to 
reduce the demand for illicit drugs in our communities.
    Again, I appreciate all of witnesses' willingness to appear today 
to discuss how we can increase our efforts to combat this serious 
threat. I welcome any suggestions about how Congress can help you 
accomplish your missions.

    Mr. Higgins. I thank Ranking Member Correa.
    All the Members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    [The statements of Ranking Member Thompson and Hon. Jackson 
Lee follow:]
             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                             July 12, 2023
    Let me start by saying that tackling the drug crisis is one of our 
most pressing national security, law enforcement, and public health 
challenges, and we must do more to protect American lives. Fentanyl 
presents the newest iteration of a drug problem that America has had 
for decades.
    One way Congress can help protect Americans is to allocate 
resources to aggressively target the source of drug trafficking--
Transnational Criminal Organizations or TCOs. We must understand that 
these organizations, including cartels south of our border, operate as 
a business. They are profit-driven. They are violent and criminal. But 
they are not political or ideological. Transnational criminal 
organizations profit from the demand for illicit drugs and at the 
expense of American lives.
    The Biden administration, through the agencies testifying today 
among others, are working tirelessly to combat the TCOs and drug 
traffickers. Rather than waste resources building a wall or using 
migrants as scapegoats, the Biden administration has made historic 
investments in border security and in fighting the scourge of fentanyl. 
The administration has directed resources to the places where the drugs 
are actually entering this country.
    We know that about 90 percent of fentanyl is trafficked in cars and 
trucks through ports of entry, not between them. Even the fentanyl 
caught between ports of entry is mostly seized in vehicles at 
checkpoints or out at sea--not on the backs of migrants. In addition, 
it's important to recognize that U.S. citizens, not undocumented 
migrants, represent more than 85 percent of convictions for fentanyl 
trafficking.
    The Biden administration has invested in technology at the ports of 
entry to scan travelers, vehicles, and cargo entering the United States 
with the intent to distribute illicit drugs. With these investments, 
seizures are now at a record high. Unfortunately, CBP is only able to 
scan about 2 percent of passenger vehicles and just 15 percent of 
commercial vehicles. Imagine the amount of drugs we could stop from 
coming into the country if we invested as much in non-intrusive 
inspection technology as Republicans want to spend on more border wall.
    This whole-of-Government approach led to the administration to 
establish Operations Blue Lotus and Four Horsemen this spring. Under 
these initiatives, CBP, HSI and State and local partners stopped nearly 
10,000 pounds of fentanyl from entering our communities and conducted 
284 arrests for fentanyl-related charges in just 2 months. These 
operations are just a couple measures in the Biden administration's 
multi-pronged strategy to combat TCOs and curtail the flow of illicit 
fentanyl.
    I want to commend Customs and Border Protection and other agencies 
for their coordinated efforts to increase the number of seizures and 
related investigations. I can't help but note that just a few years ago 
my Republican colleagues touted drug seizures as a measure of success 
under the Trump administration.
    Now that the Biden administration has record seizures due to its 
investments and its commitment to detection and interdiction efforts, 
my Republican colleagues are criticizing the administration. This is 
the height of hypocrisy.
    While I appreciate the administration's efforts to stop fentanyl 
and other drugs from entering our communities, it's important to 
recognize that this is just one part of the solution. Law enforcement 
and border security alone will never be enough. We must also tackle 
this crisis with treatment and recovery options to restore people's 
health and break the devastating cycle of addiction.
    I urge my Republican colleagues to work together to provide the 
necessary resources to Federal agencies to combat TCOs and prevent 
fentanyl trafficking.
                                 ______
                                 
               Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
                             July 12, 2023
    Thank you, Chairman Higgins and Ranking Member Correa, for the 
opportunity to speak today and thank you to the witnesses who are here.
    My thanks to our hearing witnesses:
   Mr. Kemp Chester, senior advisor of National Drug Control 
        Policy
   Mr. Steven Cagen, assistant director of Homeland Security 
        Investigations
   Mr. James Mandryck, deputy assistant commissioner, Office of 
        Intelligence, CBP
   Mr. George Papadopoulos, acting chief of operations, DEA
   Mr. Tyrone Durham, director, Nation-State Threat Center.
    As a member of the House Judiciary and Homeland Security Committees 
I have a unique view on the threat that fentanyl poses to our children, 
families, communities, and our Nation.
    As the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on 
Crime and Federal Government Surveillance I introduced The Stop 
Fentanyl Now Act of 2023.
    The Stop Fentanyl Now Act, a is important bill that will protect 
children and youth from fentanyl, fentanyl-related synthetics, and 
fentanyl-laced substances.
    As illicit fentanyl floods our communities, fentanyl-related deaths 
continue to increase at a devastating rate--claiming nearly 200 lives 
each day in every corner of the country.
    No community is safe from this public health crisis.
    As illicit fentanyl floods our communities, fentanyl-related deaths 
continue to increase at a devastating rate--claiming nearly 200 lives 
each day in every corner of the country.
                            texas statistics
    In my home State of Texas, fentanyl was linked to more than 1,600 
fatal overdoses in 2021 while the CDC reports that there were more than 
70,000 fentanyl-related deaths in the United States in that same year, 
including roughly 1,500 individuals under the age of 20.
    In 2022, more than 2,000 people died from fentanyl in Texas, 
killing more than 5 Texans aged 18-45 per day.
    I want to again reiterate unintentional fentanyl use, given that 97 
percent of the 870 unintentional synthetic opioid deaths in Texas in 
2022 were fentanyl-related.
                          national statistics
    Fentanyl is now the leading cause of accidental death for young 
Americans, killing more people than suicide, car accidents, or gun 
violence.
    No community is safe from this public health crisis.
    It is found in every part of the United States.
    Every drug purchased on the internet, on the street, or from people 
can contain fentanyl regardless of the form (powders, capsules, pills, 
and more).
    The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration found that 1 in 3 
counterfeit pills on the market contained a potentially lethal dose of 
fentanyl.
    Kids of color have been the hardest hit by the fentanyl crisis, 
with the highest increase in deaths among Native American, Latinx, and 
Black youth.
    More than 5,000 children and teens have died from overdoses 
involving fentanyl in the past two decades, according to data published 
in the Journal of American Medical Association (JAMA) Pediatrics (on 
May 8, 2023).
    More than half of those deaths occurred in the first 2 years of the 
COVID-19 pandemic.
    Fentanyl was involved in 1,557 adolescent deaths in 2021, a thirty-
fold increase since 2013; when the wave of overdose deaths involving 
synthetic opioids started in the United States.
    A surge that began in 2018 led to a nearly three-fold increase in 
deaths among older adolescents and a nearly six-fold increase among 
children younger than 5.
    In 2021, 40 infants and 93 children ages 1 to 4 died from a 
fentanyl overdose.
    Specifically, fentanyl has been mistaken by children as candy and 
chalk.
    According to the DEA, bright-colored fentanyl pills designed to 
hook children have been spotted in nearly two dozen States.
    The DEA also suggested cartels are coloring blocks of the drug so 
that it resembles sidewalk chalk.
    These fatal pediatric overdoses involving fentanyl mirror trends 
seen in adults.
    In 2021, nearly 70,000 U.S. adults fatally overdosed on fentanyl, 
the biggest spike in overdose deaths in the country's history.
    Since 1999, however, the vast majority of pediatric deaths from 
fentanyl have been among older teens ages 15 to 19 (89.6 percent).
    Teen deaths from fentanyl have surged overthe past few years--
tripling overall and increasing 5 times for Black teens--according to 
provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control.
    In 2021, 77 percent of all teen overdose deaths involved fentanyl.
    The FDA also recently warned of ``rainbow fentanyl'' manufactured 
to look like candy to appeal to children.
    Experts agree the surge of fentanyl deaths is overwhelmingly 
traceable to social media, where children can easily buy prescription 
and other drugs, many of which are counterfeit and contain lethal doses 
of fentanyl.
    For all ages, 43.8 percent of deaths occurred at home, and 87.5 
percent were unintentional.
    And the drug is now the primary agent noted in the pediatric opioid 
crisis.
    In particular, accidental exposures to fentanyl patches continue to 
be deadly to children.
    According tothe FDA, children can overdose on new and used fentanyl 
patches by putting them in their mouth or sticking the patches on their 
skin.
    This can cause death by slowing the child's breathing and 
decreasing the levels of oxygen in their blood.
              h.r. 4272, the stop fentanyl now act of 2023
    The Stop Fentanyl Now Act of 2023 is a necessary response to the 
recent surge in overdoses and death that is claiming thousands of young 
lives each year.
    My bill would:
   Provide training and resources to ensure schools and 
        teachers can administer opioid overdose reversal drugs or 
        devices;
   Stop the on-line sale of little pink pills and other 
        brightly-colored pills that have been used to target and drive 
        addiction among youth--and have contributed to the recent surge 
        in fentanyl-related overdoses and deaths;
   Require HHS and DOJ to develop and implement a national 
        strategy to educate the public about fentanyl, fentanyl-related 
        synthetics, and fentanyl-laced substances;
   Provide grants to States to develop and implement treatment 
        programs for individuals addicted to these substances;
   Decriminalize fentanyl test strips and provide grants to 
        States that adopt similar legislation;
   Encourage DOJ to increase resources available to law 
        enforcement agencies to combat the trafficking of these 
        substances;
   Require DOJ to establish an interagency task force to 
        coordinate Federal, State, and local efforts to combat the 
        trafficking of these substances;
   Require HHS to conduct research to better understand the 
        effects of these substances, develop new treatments for 
        individuals addicted to them, and determine best practices for 
        prevention; and
   Enhance penalties for offenses involving the distribution or 
        manufacture of adulterated or misbranded drugs, doing so with 
        the intent to defraud or mislead, as well as promotion or sale 
        of adulterated or misbranded drugs on-line.
    The Stop Fentanyl Now Act of 2023 is comprehensive legislation that 
broadly covers distribution of fentanyl-related synthetics and 
fentanyl-laced substances by seeking to break the supply chain that is 
now on-line and more available to our youth while punishing those who 
are criminally engaged in such activity that is aimed at destroying 
young Americans.
    The bill also addresses demand for these drugs by educating the 
public, including parents, teachers, and teens, and providing treatment 
to those who suffer from substance use disorders.
    The Stop Fentanyl Now Act of 2023 rejects the urge to criminalize 
drug usage in order to address the problems caused by fentanyl and 
recognizes that non-illicit fentanyl has medical uses.
    And while we must stop the criminal production and distribution of 
fentanyl and fentanyl-related synthetics, we must also recognize that 
mass criminalization and incarceration will never solve the problems 
associated with drugs of any kind.
    We cannot incarcerate our way out of the country's latest epidemic 
of drug abuse, especially when they involve mandatory minimum 
sentencing schemes that fall hardest on low-level offenders and do 
nothing to promote public safety or get drugs off the street.
    While we must be committed to securing our border, if we want to 
protect our children and stop the senseless loss of life caused by 
fentanyl, fentanyl-related substances, and fentanyl-laced substances, 
the Federal response must focus on prevention and education, treatment, 
interdiction, and enforcement.
    We must pass this legislation to truly protect Americans from the 
scourge of fentanyl-related deaths.
    This multi-disciplinary, whole-of-Government approach is doable and 
should be done.
    Failure to do so could be the cost of saving more lives.
    Thank you, I yield back the remainder of my time.
                                 ______
                                 
 Attachment.--DEA Trafficker-Quantities of ``Rainbow Fentanyl'' Arrive 
                              in New York
October 04, 2022
https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2022/10/04/trafficker-quantities-
        rainbow-fentanyl-arrive-new-york
    One person was arrested and approximately 15,000 fentanyl pills 
were seized as part of an ongoing investigation into a fentanyl 
trafficking organization. The fentanyl pills, in various colors, were 
destined for distribution throughout New York City and had been 
concealed in a LEGO box to deter law enforcement attention. The 
fentanyl pills were also imprinted with ``M'' and ``30'' to resemble 
``30 M'', Oxycodone Hydrochloride 30 mg pills.
    This significant seizure, the largest to date in New York City, 
signals more widespread distribution of these dangerous colorful pills. 
The case highlights Mexican cartels' most recent tactics to attract the 
public while deceiving them about the lethal drugs. The Sinaloa Cartel 
and Jalisco New Generation Cartel are mass-producing fentanyl pills in 
rainbow colors to not only brand their products, but use colors and 
dyes to mimic candy and/or legitimate prescription drugs.
    Frank A. Tarentino III, Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration's New York Division, Bridget G. Brennan, New 
York City's Special Narcotics Prosecutor, New York City Police 
Commissioner Keechant L. Sewell and New York State Police 
Superintendent Kevin P. Bruen announced the seizure and arrest 
following the arraignment of Latesha Bush.
    ``Rainbow fentanyl is a clear and present danger, and it is here in 
New York City,'' said DEA Special Agent in Charge Frank Tarentino. 
``Approximately forty percent of the pills we analyze in our lab 
contain a lethal dose; and in a recent 15-week enforcement operation, 
DEA New York seized half a million lethal pills. These staggering 
statistics underscore the importance of reminding the public that just 
one pill can kill; and this operation alone removed the equivalent of 
500,000 lethal doses of fentanyl from circulation in the Empire State. 
In the same reporting period, DEA seized the equivalent of over 36 
million lethal doses nationally.''
    NYC Special Narcotics Prosecutor Bridget G. Brennan said, ``Using 
happy colors to make a deadly drug seem fun and harmless is a new low, 
even for the Mexican cartels. Fentanyl is already involved in more than 
80 percent of overdose deaths in the city. If you take any drug sold on 
the street or through the internet, regardless of its medicinal 
markings or festive appearance, you risk your life. My office and our 
partners are committed to intercepting lethal fentanyl and ensuring 
that these rainbow-colored pills don't lead more people down a sad path 
of substance use and overdose death.''
    ``Disguising fentanyl as candy--and concealing it in children's 
toys--will never hide the fact that fentanyl is a deadly poison that 
harms our communities, our families, and our city,'' said Police 
Commissioner Keechant L. Sewell. ``The criminal complaint unsealed 
today is another example of the NYPD's relentless commitment to never 
stop working to rid New York city of illegal drugs and I want to thank 
the Special Narcotics Prosecutor for the city of New York, the DEA New 
York Division, the New York State Police, and everyone else involved in 
this case for their exceptional work.''
    New York State Police Superintendent Kevin P. Bruen said, ``I want 
to thank our members and law enforcement partners for their unwavering 
work in stopping the flow of illegal drugs throughout our State. The 
arrest of Latesha Bush and the seizure of these lethal drugs are the 
direct result of a commitment to aggressively target and pursue 
criminals who perpetuate the distribution of these narcotics. Together, 
we will continue to eliminate these operations and those who seek to 
destroy the quality of life within our communities.''
    A criminal complaint filed by the Office of the Special Narcotics 
Prosecutor (SNP) charges Bush, of Trenton, N.J., with Criminal 
Possession of a Controlled Substance in the First and Third Degrees.
    Bush was arraigned in Manhattan Criminal Court on Friday, September 
30, 2022. Bail was set at $25,000 cash/$150,000 insurance company bond/
$100,000 partially secured surety bond.
    The investigation was conducted by DEA's New York Drug Enforcement 
Task Force (NYDETF) Group T-12, which is comprised of agents and 
officers with DEA New York Division and the New York City Police 
Department. SNP's Investigators Unit assisted in the investigation.
    On Wednesday, September 28, 2022, at approximately 7:11 p.m., 
members of NYDETF Group T-12 were conducting surveillance as part of an 
ongoing investigation into narcotics trafficking when they allegedly 
observed Bush carrying what-appeared to be a black tote bag wrapped 
around a large object as she entered a vehicle in front of 475 10th 
Avenue in Manhattan.
    Upon stopping the vehicle, agents and officers allegedly found Bush 
in the rear seat, with two black tote bags and a yellow LEGO container 
also in the rear seat. Inside the LEGO container were several brick-
shaped packages covered in black tape lying next to LEGO blocks. The 
black tape covering one of the packages had been partially opened, 
exposing multi-colored pills inside. A subsequent examination of the 
packages revealed they contained approximately 15,000 pills.
    During the investigation, agents and officers learned that just 
prior to the arrest, Bush had travelled from New Jersey to the vicinity 
of 475 10th Avenue in a rental car. Agents and officers also learned 
that the multi-colored fentanyl pills allegedly originated in Mexico.
    DEA laboratory analysis of the narcotics seized in New York is 
pending. Preliminary testing indicated the presence of fentanyl.
    Last week the DEA announced the results of the third phase of the 
One Pill Can Kill initiative focused on combatting the fake pill threat 
which led to the seizure of more than 10.2 million fentanyl pills and 
approximately 980 pounds of fentanyl powder during the period of May 23 
through Sept. 8, 2022. The amount of fentanyl taken off the streets 
during this surge is equivalent to more than 36 million lethal doses 
removed from the illegal drug supply. Additionally, 338 weapons were 
seized, including rifles, shotguns, pistols, and hand grenades. There 
were 390 cases investigated during this period, 51 cases are linked to 
overdose poisonings and 35 cases link directly to one or both of the 
primary Mexican cartels responsible for the majority of fentanyl in the 
United States--the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel 
(CJNG). In addition, 129 investigations are linked to social media 
platforms, including Snapchat, Facebook Messenger, Instagram, and 
TikTok.
    Special Agent in Charge Frank A. Tarentino thanked the New York 
City Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor, the New York City 
Police Department, the New York State Police, SNP's Special 
Investigations Bureau and Investigators Unit and Group T-12 of the New 
York Drug Enforcement Task Force.

    Mr. Higgins. I'm very pleased to have a distinguished panel 
of witnesses before us today on this very important topic, and 
I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise your right 
hands.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Mr. Higgins. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have 
answered in the affirmative.
    Thank you, gentlemen. Please be seated.
    I'd now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
    Mr. Kemp Chester is a senior advisor to the director of 
National Drug Control Policy. Previously, Mr. Chester served 
for 27 years as a United States Army officer, serving in a 
number of command and staff positions within the United States 
and abroad. In his current role, Mr. Chester directs policy 
focused on addressing the production and trafficking of illicit 
drugs, including the United States counternarcotics 
relationships with China and India.
    Our witness seated at the table next to Mr. Chester is Mr. 
Steven Cagen. He serves as the assistant director of the 
Countering Transnational Organized Crime Division for Homeland 
Security Investigations, where he leads a wide array of 
operations investigating TCOs and narcotics trafficking. Mr. 
Cagen comes with 25 years of Federal law enforcement 
experience, including combating drugs and arms trafficking in 
Mexico City and working his way through the ranks of Senior 
Executive Service.
    Thank you for being here, sir.
    Mr. James Mandryck is deputy assistant commissioner in the 
Office of Intelligence at the United States Customs and Border 
Protection. In his role, Mr. Mandryck supports the day-to-day 
operations of CBP's intelligence enterprise, including the 
tactical and operational analysis that drives law enforcement 
operational activities. Mr. Mandryck previously served as a 
senior executive overseeing the National Border Security 
Intelligence Watch.
    Thank you for being here, good sir.
    Our next witness is Mr. George S. Papadopoulos, who was 
most recently appointed as United States Drug Enforcement 
Administration's principal deputy administrator. That's quite a 
title. Prior to this role, Mr. Papadopoulos served as the 
agency's acting chief of operations, where he oversaw all 
operational and enforcement matters for the DEA.
    Thank you for being here today, good sir.
    Mr. Tyrone Durham is the acting director of the Nation-
State Threat Center in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis 
at the Department of Homeland Security.
    I thank you, Mr. Durham, for joining us today.
    I thank all the witnesses for joining us.
    I now recognize Mr. Chester for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

STATEMENT OF KEMP L. CHESTER, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE DIRECTOR OF 
 NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL 
           POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

    Mr. Chester. Chairman Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify today on the very real challenge we confront from the 
production and trafficking of deadly synthetic opioids across 
our borders and into our communities.
    I know I don't need to remind anyone here that someone in 
America dies from a drug overdose or poisoning about every 5 
minutes of every hour of every day. That is why the President 
made ending the opioid epidemic a key pillar in his unity 
agenda, challenging us to change the trajectory of this crisis 
and save American lives.
    Not long ago, the dominant model of drug trafficking 
involved plant-based drugs like cocaine or heroin or 
methamphetamine made from crude chemicals, moved through a 
hierarchical drug-trafficking organization and eventually sold 
in a face-to-face cash transaction somewhere in the United 
States. While that structure still exists, it has been joined 
by a synthetic opioid production and supply chain that operates 
as a global business and exploits the structure of legitimate 
commerce to obtain precursor chemicals, move funds, and make 
internet-based sales of raw materials and finished drugs using 
both fiat and cryptocurrency.
    Today, the ability of an American teenager to find illicit 
drugs is literally in the palm of their hand and as simple as 
opening a social media app.
    We are in the midst of a strategic transition between two 
eras, where the cultivation and production of large volumes of 
plant-based drugs has not ended, but the era of small-volume, 
high-potency synthetic opioid production has clearly begun.
    This problem does not start at our border and it will not 
end at our border. It is a national security and economic 
prosperity problem, as much as it is a law enforcement and 
public health one.
    In April of this year, the administration announced its 
strategic approach to disrupt the global illicit fentanyl 
supply chain. We call this approach commercial disruption, 
which focuses and synchronizes all the tools of national power 
to simultaneously attack four key vulnerabilities in the supply 
chain: precursor chemicals; the pill presses, dye molds, and 
encapsulating machines used to create counterfeit pills; the 
commercial shipping that moves these items around the world; 
and the flow of financial benefits and operating capital to 
those involved in the illicit drug industry.
    As part of this, we maintain close and mutually-beneficial 
partnerships with key countries, such as Mexico and India, who 
play a role in preventing the proliferation of these dangerous 
synthetic drugs and in advancing our efforts to disrupt their 
supply chain.
    So for an issue in which United States and PRC interests 
align, we are disappointed that they have chosen not to 
substantively engage with the United States on counternarcotics 
for more than a year. But this is a global problem, and the 
United States leadership is essential.
    Under our leadership, the international community has 
scheduled nearly a dozen precursor chemicals, and we've raised 
global awareness of the illicit synthetic drug supply chain.
    Last week, Director Gupta joined Secretary of State Blinken 
for the first meeting of the global coalition against synthetic 
drugs. More than 80 countries convened at the ministerial level 
to accelerate efforts against synthetic drugs.
    Our efforts to reduce the presence of these drugs in our 
communities must be closely linked with our equally strong 
efforts to decrease their use. The administration is committing 
a historic level of resources to lower the demand for these 
drugs and keep Americans safe from their harms. The simple 
truth is it cannot be easier to get illicit drugs in America 
than it is to get treatment.
    We are seeing some signs of progress. Just today, the CDC 
released new data on provisional drug overdose deaths, showing 
a continued flattening of drug overdose deaths through early 
2023, halting a period of rapid increase from 2019 to 2021.
    But that is not enough. Now is the time to redouble our 
efforts, accelerate our work, and move this Nation and the 
world beyond a crisis that has vexed us for the better part of 
a decade. People in the throes of addiction are in a fight 
every day, and they should expect nothing less from us as well.
    On behalf of Dr. Gupta and the hard-working people at the 
Office of National Drug Control Policy, I would like to thank 
this subcommittee and your Congressional colleagues for your 
leadership and bipartisanship on this incredibly difficult 
issue. Ending the opioid and overdose epidemic demands the best 
efforts of us all, and we look forward to continuing our work 
with you.
    Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Chester follows:]

                 Prepared Statement of Kemp L. Chester
                        Wednesday, July 12, 2023
    Chairman Higgins, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Correa, Ranking 
Member Magaziner and Members of the Subcommittees, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today on the very real challenge we confront 
from the production and trafficking of deadly synthetic opioids across 
our borders and into our communities. I am honored to join my 
colleagues from the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, who 
are vital partners in implementing the National Drug Control Strategy, 
and in keeping our country and our communities safe.
                              introduction
    I am sure I do not need to remind anyone in this room that over a 
1-year period we have lost more than 109,000 Americans to a drug 
overdose or poisoning, more than 69 percent of which can be attributed 
to a synthetic opioid like illicit fentanyl and other substances that 
are structurally similar to fentanyl. That is someone in America dying 
from a drug overdose or poisoning about every 5 minutes, every hour, of 
every day.
    Alongside those we have lost are those who have suffered a non-
fatal overdose. It is estimated that for every fatal overdose there are 
14 non-fatal overdoses--more than 1.5 million in 2022 alone. 
Additionally, 46 million people in America, almost 14 percent of the 
population, are currently suffering from substance use disorder. Too 
many Americans--those we have lost to overdoses, those who have 
overdosed but did not lose their lives, and those living with a 
substance use disorder--have either succumbed to drug use or carry the 
burden of it in some way.
    This is why the President made ending the opioid and overdose 
epidemic a key pillar of his Unity Agenda, challenging us to reduce the 
number of drug overdose deaths, put quality public health services 
within reach for people with substance use disorder, and strengthen 
public safety by disrupting the drug production and trafficking 
pipeline that profits by harming Americans.
           the environment of drug production and trafficking
    There was a time, not very long ago, that drug production was 
limited to processing poppy, or harvesting coca, or manipulating over-
the-counter pharmaceuticals with crude chemicals to make 
methamphetamine. Those finished drugs were moved through a hierarchical 
drug trafficking organization to a street-level retailer, and 
eventually sold in a face-to-face cash transaction on a street corner 
somewhere in the United States. That was the dominant model of drug 
trafficking we saw for decades.
    While that drug production and trafficking structure still exists, 
it has been joined by a synthetic opioid production and supply chain 
that is, in essence, a global business enterprise that demonstrates 
access to huge capital resources, conducts routine collaboration among 
raw material suppliers across international borders, uses advanced 
technology to fund and conduct business, and possesses the capacity for 
product innovation and strategies to expand markets.
    These synthetic opioid producers and traffickers operate as free-
riders on the back of the 21st Century global economy that moves 
products, ideas, and money across borders with incredible speed, and 
they exploit that legitimate economic structure to sustain and enhance 
their illicit business. This includes key activities such as the 
provision of precursor chemicals, some of which are unregulated, and 
their finished products that can be shipped in plain sight around the 
world; physically dislocated payments that include the movement of 
funds across borders; and the internet-based sales of raw materials and 
finished drugs using both fiat and cryptocurrency.
    And these synthetic opioids--principally fentanyl and its 
analogues, though there are others--that are killing Americans are 
manufactured outside of the United States and brought across our 
borders and into our communities by a variety of means. Today, an 
American teenager can find illicit drugs in the palm of their hand, and 
simply by opening a social media app.
    We find ourselves in the midst of a strategic transition between 
two eras, where the cultivation and production of large volumes of 
plant-based drugs like heroin and cocaine has not ended, but the era of 
small volume, high-potency, synthetic drug production has clearly 
begun.
    While we need to address the on-going plant-based drug problem that 
continues to harm our citizens, we must simultaneously develop and 
implement the means necessary to confront the emerging synthetic opioid 
production and trafficking environment that is defined by complexity, 
dynamism, and resiliency. This requires increased effort, a more 
sophisticated approach, better use of the tools available to us, and 
the application of new tools we have not traditionally employed against 
the illicit drug problem. We cannot simply charge into the future by 
doing the exact same things we have been doing, but just trying to do 
them better, and we cannot address the most dynamic and complex drug 
production and trafficking environment in history with the same 
strategies that may have served us well in the past but are 
insufficient for the challenges we face today.
    While the administration is aggressively pursuing investments in 
non-intrusive inspection equipment, artificial intelligence, machine 
learning, and more, to prevent these drugs from crossing our geographic 
borders, we must bear in mind that this problem does not start at our 
border and it will not end at our border. It starts with the illicit 
synthetic opioid production in another country and ends in an emergency 
department or morgue somewhere in America. For the United States, it is 
a national security and economic prosperity problem as much as it is a 
public safety and public health one, and we must face it head-on with 
the bold, comprehensive, and determined strategic approach it deserves.
    Doing so requires strong leadership from the White House providing 
unity of both purpose and effort across the Federal Government; strong 
bilateral relationships with key countries that share responsibility to 
address the problem and must be part of the solution; and perhaps, most 
importantly, the United States' global leadership.
                the administration's strategic approach
    The President has declared ``that international drug trafficking, 
including the illicit production, global sale, and widespread 
distribution of illegal . . . fentanyl and other synthetic opioids . . 
. constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national 
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.'' In April 
of this year, the administration announced its Strengthened Approach to 
Crack Down on Illicit Fentanyl Supply Chains, a whole-of-Government 
approach to save lives by disrupting the trafficking of illicit 
fentanyl and its precursors into American communities. We call this 
approach Commercial Disruption, and it focuses and synchronizes our 
national security and public safety capabilities, including innovative 
approaches, against criminal facilitators and enablers, and attacks 
four key vulnerabilities in the illicit fentanyl supply chain to 
maximize our impact across the drug producers' and traffickers' 
spectrum of capabilities:
   The precursor chemicals, including unregulated chemicals 
        that can be used to create immediate precursors.
   The pill presses, die molds, and encapsulating machines used 
        to create the pills that are killing far too many Americans.
   The drug producers' ability to move raw materials like 
        precursors and manufacturing machinery around the world via 
        commercial shipping.
   The flow of financial benefits and operating capital to 
        individuals and groups directly and indirectly involved in the 
        illicit drug industry.
    Targeting those four critical elements will allow us to remove the 
advantages fentanyl producers and traffickers currently enjoy, disrupt 
their production and supply chains, and reduce the availability of 
these dangerous substances in America's communities.
    As part of this approach, we are also working much more closely 
with our private-sector partners. The vast majority of the physical and 
virtual terrain on which drug traffickers operate such as the dark web, 
e-commerce sites, mail and express consignment shippers and freight 
forwarders, banks, cryptocurrency vendors, legitimate chemical 
suppliers, and pill press and die manufacturers, are private-sector 
entities. And some of them likely have no idea they are a constituent 
part of an illicit business enterprise.
    We must raise a sophisticated awareness of this environment with 
the commercial sector around the world, and engage with them in a full 
partnership, so we can sift out the unwitting from the knowing and 
intentional actors here in the United States and abroad, and then focus 
our efforts on the latter in a more precise way.
               bilateral relationships with key countries
    A second significant aspect of addressing this challenge is 
maintaining close and mutually beneficial partnerships with key 
countries who not only play a role in preventing the global 
proliferation of these dangerous synthetic drugs, but will also play a 
role in advancing our global efforts to disrupt the global supply 
chain.
    Mexico.--We have redoubled our efforts with the government of 
Mexico, working alongside it as it does more to address fentanyl 
production and trafficking. President Biden has stressed the importance 
he places on this issue with President Lopez Obrador, and our two 
governments are working more closely than ever on the fentanyl problem 
to establish tangible goals, assess progress, and follow-through on 
mutual commitments.
    Given the combination of our shared border, our two-hundred-year 
bilateral relationship, and the negative effects that drug producers 
and traffickers in Mexico have on both sides of the border, it is 
vitally important that our bilateral relationship be characterized by 
mutual respect, and a sense of the shared responsibility we have to 
address the shared threat of drug trafficking and its associated 
criminality. Further, we have strengthened all of North America in our 
work with Mexico and Canada through the trilateral North American Drug 
Dialogue.
    Just as the United States does not have to lose 109,000 people to 
drug overdoses or poisonings every year, the people of Mexico can have 
a future free from an expectation of unaccountable criminality and the 
scourge of drug production that corrupts their towns, victimizes their 
families, and pollutes their natural spaces.
    The People's Republic of China.--As we are leading the global 
effort to disrupt the production and trafficking of these drugs, we 
look forward to the People's Republic of China (PRC) joining us in that 
effort.
    However, no one should mistake our willingness to engage for an 
acceptance of the status quo, especially on an issue felt so acutely in 
the United States and when so many lives have been impacted. Years of 
seizure and law enforcement data show that unscrupulous elements within 
the PRC have been a major source for precursor chemical shipments, pill 
presses, and die molds entering the Western Hemisphere.
    This is also an issue in which the interests of the United States 
and China align, and our past engagement on the counternarcotics issue 
has brought some impressive results, including the domestic scheduling 
of fentanyl as a class, which had an immediate impact on reducing the 
flow of fentanyl and its analogues directly from the PRC. The United 
States will work with the PRC whenever possible to fully address the 
grave and growing problem of illicit synthetic drug production and 
trafficking at the global level.
    Given the gravity of this issue, it is disappointing that the PRC 
has chosen to not take substantive steps to counter illicit synthetic 
drug production and trafficking for more than a year. With leadership 
comes accountability, and while the PRC plays a major role in this 
global problem, it has thus far declined to play a constructive role in 
helping to solve it. Last week, as nearly 100 countries and 
international organizations gathered in a demonstration of deep concern 
and a desire for tangible solutions to the grave and growing problem of 
illicit synthetic drug production and trafficking, the PRC declined its 
invitation to participate in the virtual ministerial meeting to launch 
the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drugs. We sincerely hope that 
the PRC can find the political will to address this problem 
commensurate with its capability to do so.
    India.--The United States and India have been growing our 
counternarcotics relationship since 2020 through a bilateral 
counternarcotics Working Group, addressing the law enforcement, 
multilateral, regulatory, and drug demand reduction dimensions of this 
problem with a focus on tangible results and mutually beneficial 
outcomes.
    During Prime Minister Modi's recent visit to the White House, the 
two leaders committed to work toward a broader and deeper bilateral 
Drug Policy Framework for the 21st Century. Under this new framework, 
we will look to expand cooperation and collaboration to disrupt the 
illicit production and international trafficking of illicit drugs, 
including synthetic drugs, such as fentanyl and amphetamine-type 
stimulants, and the illicit diversion of their precursors within 
India's chemical industry. They also committed to a holistic public 
health partnership to prevent and treat illicit drug use, address 
workforce shortages and skilling requirements across both countries, 
and showcase a secure, resilient, reliable, and growing pharmaceutical 
supply chain as a model for the world.
    The world's oldest democracy, working in close partnership with the 
world's largest, cannot only achieve tangible and positive results, but 
will model for the rest of the world how great nations can work 
together to counter threats, seize opportunities, and demonstrate 
sincere partnership in addressing one of the most significant global 
issues we face.
                 strong united states global leadership
    Finally, as important as our bilateral relationships are, this is a 
global problem, and global problems require global solutions. The 
United States has learned a great deal from its opioid epidemic, and no 
other country has the depth of experience, expertise, or political 
wherewithal to lead on this issue. And that leadership involves not 
only sharing every single lesson we have learned the hard way over the 
past several years with our partners, but also serving as an example of 
how we are navigating this complex problem with care for those 
suffering from the disease of addiction, while systematically 
dismantling the global infrastructure of those who continue to reap 
obscene profits through the suffering and death of Americans.
    The international community has successfully scheduled nearly a 
dozen precursor chemicals with global partners through the United 
Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, including 5 fentanyl precursors 
at the request of the United States.
    We have led in raising global awareness of the nature of the global 
illicit synthetic drug supply chain, and are working to make common-
sense and responsible measures to disrupt the exploitation of 
legitimate commerce a global norm.
    And we have led by example, by committing billions of dollars, more 
than half our Federal drug control budget, to public health measures to 
prevent our youth from falling into the cycle of drug use and 
addiction, reduce the harms caused by these drugs and save lives, 
extend treatment services to everyone who needs and wants them, and 
making our communities and workplaces recovery-ready.
    It is an unfortunate fact that there are three kinds of countries 
in the world: those who have a synthetic opioid problem and are dealing 
with it; those who have the problem but do not yet know it; and those 
who will have a problem with fentanyl or another synthetic opioid in 
the coming years. Too much illicit fentanyl production occurs, 
generating too much money, and absent decisive action this illicit 
market will expand exponentially around the world. It is important for 
all nations to put into place, now, the protective measures that will 
prevent this expansion and protect their people.
    On July 7, Director Gupta joined Secretary of State Blinken for the 
first meeting of the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug 
Threats. This ministerial-level meeting, hosted by the United States, 
brought together nearly 100 countries and international organizations 
to accelerate efforts against illicit synthetic drugs by: (1) 
Preventing the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs, 
(2) detecting emerging drug threats and drug use patterns, and (3) 
promoting public health interventions and services to prevent and 
reduce drug use, overdose, and other related harms. This first-of-its-
kind global coalition will develop concrete solutions, drive national 
actions, and leverage the collective effort of like-minded countries 
who agree that countering illicit synthetic drugs must be a global 
policy priority.
  complementing our public safety efforts with a strong public health 
                                response
    Because there is a complex interplay between the availability of 
drugs in the United States and their use, our public safety efforts to 
reduce their presence in our communities must be closely linked with 
our equally strong public health efforts to reduce their use. 
Traffickers are not going to import products no one wants, and 
individuals cannot overdose on drugs that are not available for them to 
purchase.
    Therefore, disrupting the flow of drugs into the United States is 
not only vital to keep drugs from harming our citizens, but is 
especially important as the means to relieve the pressure of the steady 
flow of drugs into our communities and to allow our historic 
investments in public health interventions to take hold. The simple 
truth is that if it is easier to get illicit drugs in America than it 
is to get treatment, we will never bend the curve.
    The administration has been working to greatly expand access to 
addiction treatment, harm reduction interventions, youth substance use 
prevention programs, and recovery support services. Much of this work 
is being done in partnership with Congress, and I want to thank the 
Members of this committee and the Congress at large for your support of 
numerous pieces of legislation in helping to address this crisis. These 
include the bipartisan omnibus Government funding bill, which included 
key provisions to help lower barriers to treatment and deliver 
necessary tools and resources to our communities to address the 
overdose crisis, such as the bipartisan Mainstreaming Addiction 
Treatment Act and the Medication Access and Training Expansion Act. 
Thanks to these provisions, prescribers across the country will be able 
to treat their patients who have opioid use disorder with 
buprenorphine, a medication proven to help people achieve recovery, 
without obtaining additional Federal licensing.
    The Office of National Drug Control Policy has also funded the 
development of a number of model State laws to help local jurisdictions 
across the country expand access to naloxone, improve treatment in 
jails and prisons, and deploy settlement funds from the various opioid 
lawsuits effectively, among others. Similarly, ONDCP has worked with 
its partners across the Government to make permanent the COVID-19-
related flexibilities that expanded access to treatment, and support 
people in recovery.
    We are seeing signs of progress. The latest report on 12-month 
rolling data shows the number of drug poisoning deaths in the United 
States flattened in 2022 after a period of sharp increase from 2019 to 
2021, and the number of fatal drug overdoses has decreased from its 
peak of 110,378 projected for the 12-month period ending March 2022.
    But that is not enough. Now is the time to redouble our efforts, 
accelerate our work, and move this Nation, and the world, beyond a 
crisis that has vexed us for the better part of a decade. People in the 
throes of addiction are in a fight every day, and they should expect 
nothing less from us as well.
                               conclusion
    The administration's leadership on this critical issue, the close 
collaboration among partners within the United States and around the 
world, and the work of the Members of this committee and your 
colleagues in Congress have kept this issue at the forefront of our 
national consciousness and are changing the trajectory of this 
particularly complex national security, public safety, and public 
health challenge. We have much work ahead of us, and your partnership 
will be as critical in the months ahead as it has been thus far.
    On behalf of Dr. Gupta and the hard-working people at the Office of 
National Drug Control Policy, I would like to thank the committee and 
your Congressional colleagues for your foresight and leadership on this 
incredibly difficult issue. Ending the opioid and overdose epidemic 
demands the best efforts of us all: The entirety of the Federal 
Government; States, Tribes, and local communities; private-sector 
partners and stakeholders; and the Congress, which has time and again 
demonstrated a strong spirit of bipartisanship on this issue.
    The Office of National Drug Control Policy looks forward to 
continuing its work with this committee, the Congress, and our other 
partners to disrupt the production and trafficking of these dangerous 
drugs, prevent drug overdoses and poisonings, and save American lives.

    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chester.
    I now recognize Mr. Cagen for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF STEVEN W. CAGEN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, HOMELAND 
     SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
       ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Cagen. Thank you, Chairman.
    Chairman Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished 
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be 
here today to discuss Homeland Security Investigations' efforts 
to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations 
and combat the flow of illicit fentanyl into the United States.
    As a principal investigative component of Department of 
Homeland Security, HSI combats transnational criminal 
organizations at every critical location within an illicit 
supply chain: internationally, where TCOs operate and 
manufacture illicit narcotics; at our Nation's physical 
borders, where smugglers attempt to exploit America's 
legitimate trade, travel, and financial systems; and 
domestically, where the criminal organizations earn substantial 
profits from selling this poison to our friends, neighbors, and 
family members.
    The threat posed by TCOs is pervasive. These organizations 
do not limit themselves to a single criminal enterprise and 
have evolved beyond narcotics smuggling into poly criminal 
organizations involved in weapons trafficking, cyber crime, 
human smuggling, money laundering, and more, all of which HSI 
investigates.
    HSI combats TCOs by using its unique, broad investigative 
authorities to enforce over 400 Federal laws and target TCOs 
from multiple investigative angles. Simply put, HSI attacks the 
entire illicit network.
    Mexican cartels have taken over fentanyl production and 
operate on an industrial scale, where they obtain precursor 
chemicals from China and synthesize these chemicals in Mexico 
to produce the deadly poison.
    Chinese criminal organizations further facilitate the 
trafficking and distribution of fentanyl pills through the sale 
of industrial pill press equipment to Mexican cartels.
    The Mexican cartels' ability to traffic deadly fentanyl 
into the United States is greatly enhanced by Chinese money-
laundering organizations. Chinese money-laundering 
organizations have developed sophisticated networks in the 
United States, Mexico, China, and throughout Asia to facilitate 
their money-laundering schemes. These organizations have a vast 
global infrastructure to clean illicit proceeds for various 
criminal organizations, mostly including Mexican cartels.
    HSI's counter-TCO efforts begin abroad, where we have the 
largest international investigative presence within DHS, 
comprised of hundreds of HSI special agents, strategically 
assigned in 93 offices in 56 countries. This includes offices 
located in Mexico, where the vast majority of fentanyl is 
produced; and throughout the Asian-Pacific region, where the 
precursor chemicals originate.
    HSI's international efforts are greatly enhanced by our 
Transnational Criminal Investigative Units, or TCIUs, comprised 
of vetted foreign law enforcement officials and prosecutors, 
who lead some of HSI's most significant and mutually beneficial 
extraterritorial investigations and prosecutions targeting 
TCOs.
    At our Nation's physical borders, HSI works with our DHS 
partners to combat TCO movements of illicit goods. HSI's Border 
Enforcement Security Task Force, or BEST task forces, represent 
one of the agency's premiere tools for turning border seizures 
into TCO-toppling investigations.
    HSI's partnerships, including task force officers from CBP 
and DEA, are integral to the whole-of-Government approach in 
countering TCOs that traffic narcotics that threaten public 
safety of the United States.
    There are currently 90 BESTs comprised of law enforcement 
officers from more than 200 agencies and National Guard units.
    HSI is simultaneously attacking the illicit narcotic supply 
chain through an intelligence-based counternarcotics operation 
that blends traditional investigative and analytical techniques 
with interagency collaboration, industry partners, and 
computer-based tools to disrupt and dismantle the chemical 
supply chain. The interdiction of precursor shipments plays a 
key role in disrupting the TCOs' ability to produce a finished 
product before it even gets to our borders.
    HSI's Operation Hydra has seized or disrupted the delivery 
of more than 3 million pounds of precursor chemicals that were 
destined for narcotics production in labs in Mexico.
    HSI has also launched a targeted enforcement campaign to 
combat fentanyl. This year, HSI and CBP initiated Operation 
Blue Lotus, which surge resources to key locations, both 
domestically and internationally, to target fentanyl and 
develop criminal cases along the Southwest Border. Operation 
Blue Lotus resulted in the seizure of more than 8,200 pounds of 
fentanyl, thereby decreasing the flow of illicit fentanyl 
smuggled into the United States from Mexico, while 
simultaneously illuminating TCO networks.
    Working alongside our partners here today, HSI remains 
dedicated to stemming the flow of illicit narcotics at every 
critical location within the supply chain.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you 
today and your continued support for HSI in our enduring effort 
to attack the flow of illicit fentanyl into the United States.
    I look forward to your questions today.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Cagen follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Steven W. Cagen
                        Wednesday, July 12, 2023
    Chairman Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members: 
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss 
Homeland Security Investigations' (HSI) efforts to disrupt and 
dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and combat the 
flow of illicit fentanyl into the United States. With more than 6,800 
special agents located in hundreds of offices throughout the United 
States and the world, HSI investigates, disrupts, and dismantles 
terrorist, transnational, and other criminal organizations that 
threaten our Nation's security. My statement today will focus on the 
broad spectrum of illicit activities perpetrated by TCOs, HSI's 
collaborative efforts to combat TCOs, and the resources needed to 
ensure continued success in the disruption and dismantlement of TCOs 
domestically and internationally.
    As the principal investigative component of the Department of 
Homeland Security (DHS), HSI is responsible for investigating 
transnational crime. In collaboration with its partners in the United 
States and abroad, HSI special agents develop evidence to identify and 
advance criminal cases against TCOs, terrorist networks and 
facilitators, and other criminal elements that threaten the homeland. 
HSI works with prosecutors to arrest and indict violators, execute 
criminal search warrants, seize criminally-derived money and assets, 
and take other actions with the goal of disrupting and dismantling TCOs 
operating throughout the world. These efforts help protect the national 
security and public safety of the United States.
    TCOs flood the United States with deadly drugs, including illicit 
fentanyl and other opioids. HSI conducts Federal criminal 
investigations at every phase of the illicit drug supply chain: 
internationally, where TCOs operate and manufacture illicit drugs; at 
our Nation's borders and ports of entry (POEs), where smuggling cells 
attempt to exploit America's legitimate trade, travel, and 
transportation systems; and in communities throughout the United 
States. HSI combats TCOs through multiple avenues of criminal 
enforcement. Not only does HSI target the narcotics smuggling 
activities of the TCOs, it also targets the financial networks they 
utilize to fund and profit from their illegal activity. HSI also 
targets the various other illegal activities the TCOs employ to fuel 
their criminal organizations, including human smuggling and 
trafficking, cyber crime, intellectual property rights violations, and 
fraud.
           evolution of transnational criminal organizations
    Criminal organizations in the 21st Century do not limit themselves 
to a single criminal enterprise. These criminal organizations have 
expanded beyond narcotics smuggling and have morphed into poly criminal 
TCOs involved in the associated crimes of weapons trafficking, human 
trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and other crimes--all 
of which HSI investigates. Rather than narrowly focusing on a single 
element of the TCOs, HSI combats TCOs by using its unique and broad 
investigative authorities to enforce over 400 Federal laws. 
Investigative efforts must be broad in scope to fully dismantle 
enterprises that transcend borders.
    TCOs have also evolved beyond insular entities and have sought out 
partnerships with competing TCOs in furtherance of their criminal 
activities. For example, the illicit collaboration between Chinese TCOs 
and Mexican cartels has created a complex criminal ecosystem that is 
fueling money laundering and narcotics trafficking operations, 
specifically illicit fentanyl, into and within the United States. 
Chinese money-laundering organizations have developed sophisticated 
networks in the United States, Mexico, China, and throughout Asia to 
facilitate money-laundering schemes. These organizations utilize their 
vast global infrastructure to clean illicit proceeds for various 
criminal organizations, including Mexican cartels. Moreover, as Mexican 
cartels have taken over fentanyl production and operate on an 
industrial scale, they are obtaining precursor chemicals from China and 
synthesizing these chemicals in Mexico to produce fentanyl. Mexican 
cartels then smuggle the fentanyl into the United States in either 
powder or pill form for distribution. HSI is attacking this illicit 
narcotics supply chain through an intelligence-based counternarcotics 
operation that blends traditional investigative and analytical 
techniques with interagency collaboration, industry partnerships, and 
computer-based tools.
    Chinese TCOs also facilitate the trafficking and distribution of 
illicit fentanyl pills by providing the Mexican cartels with the pill 
press equipment to make the fake oxycodone pills. They are made to look 
identical to prescription oxycodone but are laced with deadly fentanyl. 
These fake pills are the most common type of illicit fentanyl pill, and 
are responsible for thousands of overdose fatalities, as the user 
believes they are taking a real oxycodone pill. In order to manufacture 
these pills, Mexican cartels require industrial pill press equipment to 
turn powdered fentanyl into pill form. The Mexican cartels are 
purchasing these pill presses directly from Chinese manufacturers that 
are producing the equipment specifically for illicit activity. HSI is 
actively disrupting the pill press supply chain, and to date has seized 
over 1,500 pill presses and parts used to make deadly fentanyl-laced 
pills.
                       hsi international efforts
    HSI's efforts to combat TCOs and illicit fentanyl begin abroad. HSI 
has the largest international investigative presence within DHS, 
comprising hundreds of HSI special agents assigned to 93 offices in 56 
countries. These include offices in Mexico, where the vast majority of 
illicit fentanyl is produced, and throughout the Asia-Pacific region, 
where synthetic drug precursor chemicals often originate.
    HSI special agents abroad develop and foster relationships with 
host Government law enforcement partners to exchange information, 
coordinate and support investigations, and facilitate enforcement 
actions and prosecutions to disrupt and dismantle TCOs. HSI and its 
counterparts in other countries identify and disrupt sources of illicit 
drugs, transportation and smuggling networks, and money-laundering 
operations. These efforts by HSI and its partners aim to prevent 
dangerous narcotics and other illicit goods from reaching our borders 
and also stop illicit outbound flows of illegally derived currency and 
weapons.
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit Program
    The effectiveness of our international counternarcotics efforts is 
greatly enhanced by HSI's Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit 
(TCIU) Program. TCIUs are comprised of vetted foreign law enforcement 
officials and prosecutors who support some of HSI's most significant 
extraterritorial investigations and prosecutions targeting TCOs. HSI 
has established 15 TCIUs around the world. These consist of more than 
600 vetted and trained law enforcement officers across North, Central, 
and South America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Asia. In fiscal 
year 2022, TCIU efforts world-wide resulted in 3,800 criminal arrests 
and the seizure of nearly $18.6 million and over 350,000 pounds of 
narcotics and precursor chemicals.
    Targeting the fentanyl precursor chemical supply chain is an 
integral element of HSI's approach to stopping the production of 
illicit drugs. HSI blends interagency and foreign collaboration, 
industry partnerships, financial intelligence, and computer-based tools 
to identify, target, and interdict precursor chemical shipments 
destined for Mexican cartels. Disruptions to the procurement phase can 
have an outsized impact on the narcotics production supply chain. 
Mexican cartels operate on an industrial scale when procuring precursor 
chemicals, and many interdiction efforts are led by investigators and 
prosecutors in the Mexican Attorney General's office who comprise the 
HSI Mexico City TCIU. In fiscal year 2022, efforts by the TCIU resulted 
in more than 120 criminal arrests and the seizure of approximately $1.1 
million and 18,200 pounds of precursor chemicals. The TCIU also leads 
investigations targeting the labs where the chemicals are synthesized 
into illicit drugs.
National Targeting Center--Investigations
    HSI's National Targeting Center--Investigations (NTC-I) was 
established in 2013 in collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection's (CBP) National Targeting Center to further our shared 
border security mission. NTC-I supports the entire border security 
continuum, from CBP interdictions and HSI investigations, to the joint 
exploitation of intelligence. Through NTC-I, HSI supports all of DHS's 
domestic and international offices by targeting illicit precursor 
chemical movements within the commercial air and maritime 
transportation systems.
    The combination of NTC-I targeting and foreign action through HSI's 
TCIUs is critical to stopping the flow of illicit drugs and dismantling 
TCOs. Using these resources, HSI targets the supply chains responsible 
for foreign origin shipments of precursor chemicals destined for 
Mexico. Thus far, this methodology has resulted in the seizure of 
approximately 3.3 million pounds of dual-use precursor chemicals 
intended for making illicit fentanyl and methamphetamine.
                          hsi domestic efforts
    HSI's ability to conduct complex large-scale investigations 
represents one of DHS's best weapons for dismantling TCOs. Part of 
HSI's mandate is to turn individual border seizures and arrests into 
multi-jurisdictional, multi-defendant investigations to disrupt, 
dismantle, and prosecute high-level members of TCOs. HSI special agents 
work every day with CBP officers and in coordination with other 
Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement partners to identify 
and investigate drug-smuggling organizations attempting to introduce 
illicit contraband into the United States.
    CBP's expansion of non-intrusive inspection (NII) scanning at 
Southwest Border POEs is poised to increase the number of CBP-origin 
seizures, which HSI special agents are required to investigate. To keep 
pace, HSI will require additional staffing to support the investigation 
and prosecution of individuals associated with POE seizures. Recent HSI 
Congressional appropriations tied to NII expansion represent an 
important initial step. HSI is moving quickly to deploy these new 
resources to Southwest Border POEs receiving NII augmentation. Given 
the required NII expansion to all land border POEs, additional staffing 
will be essential to ensure HSI retains adequate personnel to respond 
to these seizures and to conduct the complex investigations intended to 
degrade and remove TCO threats to the homeland.
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces
    The Jaime Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) Act 
was signed into law in December 2012. The Act was named in honor of 
Jaime Zapata, an HSI special agent who, while working to combat violent 
drug cartels, was killed in the line of duty in Mexico. This law 
amended the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to formally establish the 
BEST program, with the primary mission of combating emerging and 
existing transnational organized crime by employing a threat-based/risk 
mitigation investigative task force model that recognizes the unique 
resources and capabilities of all participating law enforcement 
partners. In June 2022, the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act provided 
HSI with statutory authority to reimburse the salaries for State and 
local law enforcement task force officers who participate in BESTs.
    BESTs eliminate the barriers between Federal and local 
investigations, close the gap with international partners in 
multinational criminal investigations, and create an environment that 
minimizes the vulnerabilities in our operations that TCOs have 
traditionally capitalized on to exploit our Nation's borders. There are 
currently 90 BESTs located across the United States, including Puerto 
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, comprising approximately 1,000 law 
enforcement officers and personnel representing Federal, State, local, 
Tribal, and international law enforcement agencies, as well as National 
Guard units. In fiscal year 2022, BESTs initiated more than 5,300 
investigations resulting in more than 6,000 criminal arrests and 
seizures of more than 317,000 pounds of narcotics, more than 480,000 
pounds of precursor chemicals, and more than $206 million of illicit 
proceeds and assets.
Operation Blue Lotus
    HSI has also launched targeted enforcement campaigns to combat 
illicit narcotics, particularly fentanyl. Between March 13, 2023 and 
May 10, 2023, CBP and HSI launched Operation Blue Lotus to facilitate 
and increase fentanyl interdictions at and between the POEs and develop 
criminal cases along the Southwest Border. Focusing operations at the 
ports of San Ysidro and Otay Mesa, California, and Nogales, Arizona, 
Operation Blue Lotus aimed to curtail the flow of illicit fentanyl 
smuggled into the United States from Mexico, while simultaneously 
illuminating TCOs networks. Operation Blue Lotus successfully resulted 
in the combined seizures of over 8,200 pounds of fentanyl.
    Building upon the success of Operation Blue Lotus, on June 12, 
2023, HSI launched Operation Blue Lotus 2.0 to strategically leverage 
its administrative, civil, and criminal law enforcement authorities to 
attack fentanyl distribution. Operation Blue Lotus 2.0 focuses 
operations along the border and interior facilities, including express 
consignment and international mail locations, to combat fentanyl 
trafficking nodes and target the smuggling of fentanyl and other 
illicit narcotics in the United States.
                         cyber-related efforts
    TCOs have become increasingly tech-savvy. For example, many have 
adopted anonymous cryptocurrency transactions through darknet 
marketplaces. These transactions may involve foreign vendors, but the 
result is the shipment of illicit drugs to or within our country.
Cyber Crimes Center
    To keep pace with rapidly-evolving criminal techniques, HSI created 
the Cyber Crimes Center (C3) to provide investigative assistance, 
training, and equipment to support domestic and international 
investigations of cyber-related crimes for DHS. C3 supports HSI's 
mission through the programmatic oversight and coordination of 
investigations of cyber-related criminal activity and provides a range 
of forensic, intelligence, and investigative support services across 
all HSI programmatic areas.
    C3's cyber investigators and analysts support HSI on-line 
undercover investigations targeting market site operators, vendors, and 
prolific buyers of opioids and other contraband on the darknet. C3 also 
supports tracing and identifying illicit proceeds derived from criminal 
activity on the dark web and investigating the subsequent money-
laundering activities. Digital forensics play an ever-increasing role 
in investigating complex multinational narcotics organizations, and 
C3's Computer Forensics Unit and the HSI Computer Forensic Program are 
critical tools in combating the flow of drugs into the United States. 
C3's Computer Forensics Unit also provides forensic training and 
support to our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international law 
enforcement partners.
    A top priority for HSI is to improve collective law enforcement 
capabilities by providing training to partner law enforcement agencies. 
For example, C3 developed a cyber-training curriculum with a focus on 
darknet investigations and illicit payment networks associated with 
opioid smuggling and distribution. Since 2017, HSI has delivered this 
training course to more than 12,000 Federal, State, local, and 
international law enforcement personnel in over 70 locations world-
wide.
                  illicit finance--following the money
    One of the most effective methods for dismantling TCOs engaged in 
narcotics trafficking is to attack the criminal financial networks that 
are the lifeblood of their operations. HSI special agents work to 
identify and seize the illicit proceeds and instrumentalities of crime 
and target financial networks that transport, launder, and hide such 
proceeds. As a customs agency with significant access to financial and 
trade data, HSI is uniquely positioned to identify TCO schemes to hide 
illicit drug proceeds within legitimate commerce. HSI's financial 
efforts in fiscal year 2022 resulted in 2,607 arrests, 1,600 criminal 
indictments, 1,028 convictions, and the seizure of more than $4.2 
billion in illicit currency and other assets (as valued at the time of 
seizure).
National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center
    Despite the rise of alternative stores of value, such as virtual 
assets, bulk cash smuggling remains a key mechanism for TCO 
repatriation of drug proceeds. Criminal actors often avoid traditional 
financial institutions, which must comply with Bank Secrecy Act 
reporting requirements--instead repatriating their illicit proceeds 
through conveyances such as commercial and private aircraft, passenger 
and commercial vehicles, and maritime vessels, as well as via 
pedestrian crossings at our land borders.
    Established in 2009, HSI's National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center 
(BCSC) is a critical component of the agency's and overall U.S. 
Government's efforts to combat bulk cash smuggling by TCOs. The BCSC 
operates strategic programs that leverage advanced data analytics, 
interagency partnerships, and law enforcement technology systems to 
identify complex money-laundering networks and provide support for HSI 
financial investigations. The criminal intelligence functions of the 
BCSC provide operational analysis in support of HSI-led interdiction 
efforts, including port profiles highlighting cash-flow activity at 
targeted POEs and corridor analyses to assist in planning the timing, 
location, and strategy for interdiction operations. The BCSC also 
administers a targeted, investigation-focused license plate reader 
program to identify larger criminal networks and a warrant-based GPS 
tracking program that provides valuable intelligence on the behaviors 
of criminal groups engaged in bulk cash smuggling. Since its inception 
through fiscal year 2022, the BCSC has initiated or substantially 
contributed to the seizure of bulk cash totaling over $1.73 billion.
    TCOs are increasingly augmenting bulk currency smuggling with use 
of alternate value platforms in response to financial regulations and 
law enforcement efforts to identify money-laundering networks. A single 
movement of TCO proceeds may involve bulk cash, stored value cards, 
money orders, cryptocurrency, wire transfers, funnel accounts, and 
trade-based money laundering (TBML). HSI adapts to evolving criminal 
methodologies by leveraging new law enforcement technologies to 
identify money-laundering activity through these emerging alternate 
value platforms and seize criminal assets.
Trade-Based Money Laundering
    TBML is the process of disguising criminal proceeds through 
international trade to hide their illicit origins. As the U.S. 
Government's primary law enforcement agency that investigates TBML, HSI 
utilizes data resources--maintained by DHS encompassing trade, travel, 
and financial information--to identify TBML schemes. HSI has 
established several national initiatives that target specific TBML 
schemes and provides subject-matter expertise, analytical support, and 
enforcement-related support to HSI special agents. Specifically, HSI 
has the ability to intercept and interdict trade and individuals 
associated with TBML that have a nexus to the borders of the United 
States and provide the necessary information to initiate criminal 
investigations targeting this activity.
    Integral to these efforts are HSI-established Trade Transparency 
Units (TTUs), which combat the growing threat of international money 
laundering by TCOs via trade-based money laundering. The TTUs 
accomplish this mission using partner country data-sharing programs and 
the Data Analysis & Research for Trade Transparency Systems program. 
Through established partnerships, the TTUs have access to foreign 
trade, travel, and financial information used to support on-going 
criminal investigations and to address TBML on a global scale. These 
partnerships are based on bilateral agreements between the United 
States and 19 partner countries for the sharing of trade and financial 
information. Through the TTUs, HSI field offices can request 
information pertaining to companies and individuals that would 
otherwise be unavailable without the bilateral agreements.
Cryptocurrency
    Cryptocurrencies are increasingly used to facilitate domestic and 
cross-border crime. They can be exploited by any criminal organization, 
and this is especially true as it pertains to on-line distribution of 
fentanyl, methamphetamine, and other illicit drugs.
    Cryptocurrencies are attractive to TCOs because they offer a 
relatively fast, inexpensive, and pseudonymous system of transactions. 
HSI investigations related to cryptocurrency have risen from one 
criminal investigation in 2011 to over 530 criminal investigations in 
fiscal year 2023 to date. In fiscal year 2022, HSI seized nearly $4 
billion (valued at the time of seizure) in cryptocurrency. This 
substantial increase signifies growing confidence in cryptocurrency use 
by criminals and criminal networks.
                               conclusion
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and 
for your continued support of HSI and our efforts to use our unique 
authorities and global footprint to dismantle TCOs and combat the flow 
of illicit fentanyl into the United States. I look forward to your 
questions.

    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Cagen.
    I now recognize Mr. Mandryck for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statements.

  STATEMENT OF JAMES MANDRYCK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER, 
  OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION, 
              U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Mandryck. Chairman Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify here today about the fentanyl threat and 
CBP's intelligence and data-driven response and approach to 
combating this proliferation of this dangerous drug.
    CBP uses multifaceted approaches to counter fentanyl. Our 
approach includes advanced detection capabilities, such as 
specialized canines and nonintrusive inspection equipment; 
intelligence collection; research and analysis; laboratory 
testing and scientific analysis; domestic and foreign 
partnerships; and most importantly, the experience, expertise, 
and dedication of the CBP work force.
    This enforcement posture has led to record-level seizures, 
including over 22,000 pounds of fentanyl so far this fiscal 
year, the equivalent of over 90 million doses and over a 
billion dollars in cartel profits.
    Today I'd like to provide a little more information about 
the composition of the fentanyl seized by CBP, current 
production and smuggling trends, and the significance of our 
enforcement efforts within this threat landscape.
    When it comes to composition, this fiscal year, 88 percent 
of the fentanyl seized by CBP has been in pill form, continuing 
the trending shift away from powder. The concerning shift 
indicates an increased sophistication of the transnational 
criminal organizations to control production and mimic 
legitimate pharmaceuticals that ultimately target unsuspecting 
end-users.
    Another growing trend we've witnessed is the expanded use 
of xylazine as an adulterant in fentanyl to extend the user's 
high. Xylazine, a central nervous system depressant, is not an 
opioid, so naloxone does not reverse its effects, making this 
dangerous synthetic combination even more deadly.
    The production of illicit fentanyl entering the United 
States shifted back in 2020. At that time, fentanyl was 
produced as a finished product in China, then smuggled into 
Mexico, and then onward to the United States. Over the past 3 
years, production has shifted to Mexico-based TCOs that 
infiltrate supply chains to import precursor and pre-precursor 
chemicals, primarily from China, and then recruit or coerce 
scientists to produce metric tons of finished fentanyl.
    Through intelligence-led operations such as Operation 
Artemis, CBP has identified previously unknown logistical 
supply chains, some of whom that transship to the United States 
before arriving in Mexico, discoveries that have led to changes 
in cargo inspections and processing and resulted in significant 
seizures of precursors, pill presses, and dye molds, as well as 
the identification of unknown criminal actors.
    Within Mexico, we continue to see elevated levels of 
violence between cartels along lucrative smuggling corridors, 
especially in Mexico's northern border states.
    TCOs involved in trafficking synthetics have begun to 
expand from historic strongholds in western Mexico to access 
additional smuggling corridors in eastern Mexico through 
newfound alliances. These types of alliances have always been 
driven by monetary gain. What has changed is how profits from 
these illicit activities are transferred and distributed.
    Historically, CBP saw a major portion of illicit proceeds 
depart the United States as bulk cash currency. However, TCOs 
are increasingly taking advantage of technologies like 
cryptocurrency and informal value transfer systems, such as the 
Chinese underground banking system, to reduce their risk of 
cross-border interdiction.
    Exploitation of these systems allows for immediate 
transfers of illicit profits into the--from the United States 
to the TCO hierarchy in Mexico. In many cases, these money 
transfers are done cheaper than historic laundering options 
and, in most cases, with guaranteed success for the customer.
    Furthermore, TCOs continue to seek opportunities to move 
their illicit profits from the United States without currency 
or monetary instruments, including trade-based money laundering 
and the acquisition of firearms in the United States that are 
smuggled into Mexico to help control those corridors.
    The complex challenges require strong and deliberate 
partnerships across the Government at all levels, as well as 
with our international partners.
    Exemplified by the success of recent intelligence and data-
driven operations such as Operation Blue Lotus, Four Horsemen, 
Rolling Wave, and Operation Artemis are CBP's hand-in-hand work 
with our investigative partners becoming critical disrupting 
and dismantling the networks behind fentanyl synthesis. In just 
2 months, Operation Blue Lotus and Operation Four Horsemen 
resulted in the seizure of nearly 10,000 pounds of fentanyl and 
almost 300 arrests.
    CBP is currently executing Operation Artemis and Operation 
Rolling Wave, which target the illicit procurement, 
manufacturing, and trafficking of fentanyl and precursor 
chemicals by leveraging investigative, prosecutorial, and 
regulatory resources, and enhancing law enforcement information 
sharing and coordination.
    In addition to our close work with U.S. partners, CBP has 
strong relationships with foreign and industry partners across 
the globe to further detect, disrupt, and dismantle criminal 
organizations. The consistent evolution of technology and the 
adaptability of transnational criminal groups requires us to 
become more adaptable and combat these challenges.
    I thank you for your continued support for CBP and the 
opportunity to testify in this important topic today. I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Mandryck follows:]

                  Prepared Statement of James Mandryck
                             July 12, 2023
                              introduction
    Chairman Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members 
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) efforts to combat the dynamic 
threat of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and prevent the 
entry of dangerous illicit drugs, including fentanyl, into the United 
States.
    The reach and influence of TCOs continues to expand across and 
beyond the Southwest and Northern Borders. These criminal organizations 
are sophisticated and operate with immense capability, capacity, and 
nearly unlimited resources. TCOs increasingly demonstrate the intent 
and ability to produce and modify synthetic drugs, making detection and 
identification difficult. They also continually adjust their tactics, 
techniques, and operational procedures to circumvent detection and 
interdiction by law enforcement, including transporting smaller 
quantities of drugs and improving concealment techniques.
    As others have testified,\1\ synthetic opioids like fentanyl--a 
synthetic opioid that is 80-100 times stronger than morphine--and its 
analogues are produced using precursor chemicals made available by 
criminal elements, often in the People's Republic of China. The 
precursor chemicals are shipped to Mexico where TCOs use these 
precursors to finish production. This fentanyl is either sold in powder 
form or pressed into pills. These drugs are then smuggled across the 
Southwest Border, most often through ports of entry (POEs).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See, e.g., Written testimony, Kemp Chester, Senior Advisor, 
International Relations and Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug 
Control Policy, for a February 1, 2023, House Energy and Commerce 
Committee Hearing. https://d1dth6e84htgma.cloudfront.net/Wit- 
ness_Testimony_Chester_HE_02_01_2023_487130aade.pdf?updated_at=2023-02-
01T14:- 37:29.433Z.
    \2\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Because there is no single tool or capability that can detect all 
suspected threats in all situations and environments, CBP uses a 
multifaceted, intelligence-driven approach that combines advance 
targeting, sophisticated detection capabilities, specialized canines, 
non-intrusive inspection technology (NII), laboratory testing, 
scientific analysis, domestic and foreign partnerships, and information 
sharing. Most importantly, we also have dedicated, highly-trained 
officers, agents, and intelligence research specialists whose 
experience and expertise are essential components of all CBP's efforts 
to combat transnational threats and prevent the entry of illegal drugs 
into U.S. communities.
    Our enforcement approach enables the agency to nimbly shift 
resources and swiftly respond to emerging threats, such as the deadly 
threat posed by illicit fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, other synthetic 
opioids, and methamphetamine, as well as the precursors and other 
chemicals used in illicit drug production.
                     drug trends and interdictions
    As noted above, most illicit drugs, including fentanyl, enter the 
United States through our Southwest Border POEs, hidden in passenger 
vehicles or belongings, concealed in commercial trucks, and carried by 
pedestrians. In fiscal year 2022, for example, nearly 66 percent of 
illicit drugs seized by weight by CBP at the Southwest Border were 
seized at POEs.\3\
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    \3\ Of the 288,287 pounds of drugs CBP seized at the Southwest 
Border in fiscal year 2022, 189,682 pounds were seized at POEs. 
Excluding marijuana, CBP seized 202,631 pounds of illicit drugs at the 
Southwest Border, of which 179,317 pounds (88.5 percent) were seized at 
POEs. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics. CBP 
Air and Marine Operations also contributed to drug seizure events with 
other agencies. These operations resulted in the seizure of 
approximately 270,000 pounds of drugs in fiscal year 2022. https://
www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/air-and-marine-
operations-statistics.
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    CBP seizures of fentanyl have been escalating for several years.\4\ 
In fiscal year 2022, CBP seized nearly 15,000 pounds of fentanyl 
Nation-wide, with the majority--12,500 pounds--seized at POEs. We have 
already exceeded that amount this fiscal year. At our POEs alone, 
fentanyl seizures increased more than 200 percent in fiscal year 2022 
compared to fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 totals combined. In 
fiscal year 2023 to date, CBP seizures at POEs already exceed more than 
17,600 pounds of fentanyl.\5\ These seizures permanently removed these 
drugs from the illicit supply chain, kept them out of our communities, 
and denied drug trafficking organizations profits and operating 
capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics.
    \5\ As of May 31, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine remain the top-
seized drugs by weight but shifting trends over recent years produced 
significant increases in synthetic drugs like fentanyl. Fentanyl is the 
most frequently seized illicit synthetic opioid, but CBP has also 
encountered 31 substances that are chemically similar to fentanyl, as 
well as 44 unique synthetic opioids that are not from the fentanyl 
class.\6\
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    \6\ A complete list can be made available by CBP Laboratories and 
Scientific Services.
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    Although our statistics measure drug seizures by weight, CBP 
estimates it interdicted 1.1 billion potential doses of illicit 
fentanyl in fiscal year 2022. By the measure of potential doses, CBP 
fentanyl seizures were only second to methamphetamine, of which an 
estimated 16 billion doses in fiscal year 2022 were seized.\7\ For 
reference, Earth's population is approximately 8 billion people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ CBP would be happy to brief the subcommittee on its illicit 
drug dose estimation tool and how it derived these estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CBP's enforcement efforts focus on detecting and interdicting 
suspected illicit drugs; quickly anticipating and adapting to changing 
tactics and techniques used by cartels, traffickers, smugglers, and 
their networks; enhancing collaboration among key partners; producing 
actionable intelligence to target the illicit opioid supply chain; and 
protecting our personnel from exposure to opioids.
                        detection and inspection
    CBP, with the support of Congress, continues to make significant 
investments and improvements in our drug detection capabilities and 
interdiction technology. Our highly-trained officers use narcotic 
detection canines and a variety of technologies to detect the presence 
of illicit drugs, including illicit opioids, in all operating 
environments.
    CBP's canine program continues to demonstrate its significant 
contribution to our efforts to intercept dangerous illicit drugs and 
disrupt TCO activity. In fiscal year 2022, CBP canine teams assigned to 
the Office of Field Operations and U.S. Border Patrol assisted in the 
seizure of more than $19 million in undeclared or illicit drug-related 
currency, more than 400 firearms, and nearly 290,000 pounds of drugs, 
including nearly 13,000 pounds of fentanyl--approximately 87 percent of 
CBP's fentanyl seizures--valued at more than $2.5 billion. The 
effectiveness of our canine teams is demonstrated daily. For example, 
in a single event on April 18, 2023, a canine team in Otay Mesa, 
California, aided in the seizure of 776 pounds of fentanyl pills valued 
at more than $21 million.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/we-re-
spilling-beans-211-million-worth-fentanyl-pills-concealed-within.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CBP canine teams often work alongside officers conducting other 
inspection activities. CBP has deployed more than 350 large-scale and 
4,500 small-scale NII X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems to detect the 
presence of illicit substances, including synthetic drugs such as 
fentanyl. This technology enables detection of these illicit substances 
hidden within passenger belongings, cargo containers, commercial 
trucks, rail cars, and privately-owned vehicles, as well as express 
consignment carrier and international mail parcels. In fiscal year 
2022, CBP officers used large-scale NII systems to scan more than 7.6 
million conveyances, which resulted in the interdiction of more than 
100,000 pounds of narcotics and approximately $2 million of undeclared 
U.S. currency.
    Canine teams and NII technology are complementary detection and 
inspection capabilities that are critical to the continued success of 
CBP's interdiction operations at the POEs. At the core of these efforts 
are specially-trained officers and specialists using their expertise 
and experience to maximize technological capabilities and resources. 
Every seizure we make at the border is important. It stops the flow of 
drugs into our communities, contributes to investigations, and 
increases our awareness of emerging trends and illicit networks.
                   advance information and targeting
    CBP's interdiction efforts begin well before a conveyance or 
shipment arrives at a POE. Advance electronic shipping information,\9\ 
actionable intelligence, and information-sharing partnerships are 
critical components of CBP's ability to quickly identify, target, and 
deter the entry of dangerous illicit drugs in all operational 
environments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ See section 343 of the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-210), as 
amended; the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act or SAFE 
Port Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-347); and the Synthetics Trafficking and 
Overdose Prevention (STOP) Act (Pub. L. 107-210) of 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    All advance shipment information is automatically fed into the 
National Targeting Center's (NTC) Automated Targeting System (ATS), an 
enforcement and decision support system. At CBP's NTC, advance data 
converges with law enforcement and intelligence records to facilitate 
the targeting of persons, conveyances, and items of cargo that pose the 
highest risk to our security in all modes of transportation. Advance 
information is a critical and effective component of CBP's targeting 
and interdiction efforts. We continue to pursue solutions to expand 
advance information opportunities to the land POEs, where--unlike 
travel processes over air and sea--CBP often receives no advance 
traveler information, limiting traveler vetting conducted before an 
individual arrives at a land POE.
    In addition to targeting illicit substances directly, CBP and 
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) target precursor chemicals 
shipped through the United States to destinations in Mexico and other 
countries. While many of the precursor chemicals used to synthesize 
methamphetamines and synthetic illicit opioids such as fentanyl have 
legitimate uses, CBP and HSI coordinate with the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) to intercept and seize precursors if they can be 
identified as having been brought into the United States in violation 
of U.S. law, such as Title 21 of the U.S. Code. CBP also targets 
production-related equipment such as pill presses and tableting 
machines. The DEA regulates pill press/tableting machines, and the HSI 
diversion coordinator works on behalf of DHS to coordinate the 
investigations of pill press/tableting machine imports being diverted 
for illicit uses. The HSI diversion coordinator works closely with the 
NTC to identify and target individuals importing and diverting pill 
press/tableting machines to produce illicit fentanyl and other 
synthetic drugs.
    The increasing ability of TCOs to produce sophisticated forms of 
synthetic drugs and develop new ways to smuggle is a challenge to CBP's 
counter-narcotic efforts. In addition to CBP's advance detection and 
targeting efforts, CBP's laboratory testing and analysis capabilities 
are invaluable to the timely identification of suspect substances and 
the disruption of drug-trafficking networks. These capabilities not 
only contribute to our targeting and interdiction success, but also aid 
our intelligence and investigative partners in their criminal 
prosecution efforts.
                       analysis and intelligence
    Just as TCOs rapidly evolve their illicit production and smuggling 
operations, CBP must advance its capabilities to quickly and reliably 
identify the dangerous substances it encounters and provide analysis 
for targeting and other enforcement and investigative actions.
    Sound analytical methodology centers on providing timely and 
actionable intelligence to our front-line officers and agents, decision 
makers, and partners. To strengthen our intelligence posture in 
responding to this complex threat environment, CBP's Intelligence 
Enterprise (IE) was established in 2017 as a cohesive, threat-based, 
data-driven, and operationally-focused effort to leverage the 
collective intelligence capabilities and expertise across CBP's 
operational components.
    To enhance its intelligence capacity, CBP IE established investment 
priorities that support a whole-of-agency approach to countering 
various border threats, such as the use of a common reporting platform 
to timely share and disseminate threat information to disparate 
offices. CBP's IE was also responsible for launching the CBP Watch, a 
situational awareness facility that provides trend analysis and real-
time feedback to better support the agency's operational front line 24 
hours a day, 7 days a week.
Laboratory Testing
    CBP's ability to swiftly and accurately identify suspect substances 
is a critical part of our ability to determine new production trends 
and seize illicit drugs, but also a critical tool for partner 
investigative agencies, such as HSI, to make law enforcement-controlled 
deliveries that could lead to arrests and the shutting down of criminal 
networks. CBP officers use various field-testing devices and leverage 
CBP's 24/7 Narcotic Reachback program to obtain a swift, presumptive 
identification of a suspect substance from a CBP Laboratories and 
Scientific Services (LSS) scientist. CBP has also positioned Forward 
Operating Labs (FOL) at strategic locations where new or emerging 
substances enter the United States. At the FOLs, LSS can triage quickly 
if a potentially new analogue of an illicit substance or designer drug 
is encountered and send it to the LSS INTERDICT Science Center for 
comprehensive testing. These newly-encountered substances, particularly 
synthetic opioids or other significant chemicals of interest, are added 
to the user libraries of the handheld field-testing devices used by CBP 
officers and agents to rapidly screen suspected substances. Since 
January 2022, 170 new spectra have been added to the equipment's 
factory library. Since the start of the designer drug wave in 2009, LSS 
has identified over 550 new substances.
    CBP scientists participate in weekly operational roundtable 
discussions with intelligence personnel and law enforcement partners 
from Federal, State, and local agencies to share information on the 
latest analysis on encountered substances. Based on pollen analysis and 
suspected controlled substance analysis results, CBP develops 
intelligence products to share with CBP officers and agents, 
intelligence analysts, policy makers, and relevant external partners at 
Federal, State, local, and international organizations to maintain a 
consistent understanding of the fentanyl threat picture nationally, not 
just at the borders.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ https://www.cbp.gov/document/fact-sheets/cbp-fentanyl-
factsheet.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                 collaboration and information sharing
    Shifting trends and sophisticated TCO tactics mean that now, more 
than ever, efforts to counter TCO activity require coordination and 
cooperation across the law enforcement community. CBP leverages 
collaboration with our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international 
partners to address drug trafficking and other transnational threats 
across all our operational environments. This includes working closely 
with the Office of National Drug Control Policy's High-Intensity Drug 
Trafficking Area program and continuous work with other laboratories 
and the medical community, including coroners and medical examiners, to 
identify emerging drug threats.
    CBP works closely with key partners, including HSI, DEA, the United 
States Postal Inspection Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 
and other Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners, to 
share information, coordinate enforcement actions, and facilitate 
investigations regarding intelligence and seizures. For seizures that 
do not meet a Federal threshold, intelligence and information derived 
from these seizures are provided to local, State, and regional task 
forces for situational awareness and further investigative and 
prosecutorial actions.
    CBP regularly hosts briefings with Federal, State, local, 
territorial, and Tribal partners regarding the current State of the 
border, providing a cross-component, multi-agency venue for discussing 
trends and threats. Engagements focus on interdictions and arrests at 
both the border and interior areas within the United States. These 
briefings also include participants from the governments of Canada and 
Mexico.
    Strong international partnerships are a critical part of CBP's 
ability to respond to the global challenges that affect our border 
operations. CBP works closely with our foreign partners and contributes 
to multilateral forums by sharing information and leveraging partner 
capabilities to combat transnational threats and advance our national 
security.
    CBP also participates in joint operations and multi-agency 
enforcement teams composed of representatives from international and 
Federal law enforcement agencies. Working together with State, local, 
and Tribal agencies, these operations target drug and transnational 
criminal activity, and often contribute to investigations involving 
national security and organized crime.
    Our partnerships are also invaluable to our enforcement efforts. 
For example, CBP and HSI recently concluded Operation Blue Lotus, a 2-
month, multi-agency effort led by CBP and HSI focused on narcotics 
smuggling attempts at POEs in Arizona and California. Through targeted 
inspections at border crossings, cross-border investigations, and the 
leveraging of advanced analytics and intelligence capabilities, 
approximately 8,000 pounds of fentanyl, more than 4,600 pounds of 
methamphetamine, more than 1,050 pounds of cocaine, and more than 72 
pounds of heroin were seized--leading to more than 250 arrests by CBP 
and HSI. U.S. Border Patrol ran a complementary operation between POEs 
and at checkpoints near the border, leading to additional seizures of 
approximately 2,500 pounds of fentanyl, 6,500 pounds of 
methamphetamine, 330 pounds of marijuana, 620 pounds of cocaine, and 60 
pounds of heroin.
    Following the success of these enforcement efforts, DHS recently 
announced the next special operations of its surge campaign to target 
and prevent fentanyl from entering the United States.\11\ Operation 
Artemis, led by CBP and supported by HSI, will leverage intelligence 
and investigative information derived from Operation Blue Lotus to 
focus on critical junctures in the illicit production and international 
trafficking of fentanyl and other synthetic drugs by targeting 
precursor chemicals, pill presses and parts, movement of finished 
substances, and illicit proceeds. Concurrently, Operation Rolling Wave 
will surge inspections at U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints along the 
Southwest Border, covering every sector and leveraging predictive 
analysis and intelligence sharing. CBP will run a parallel intelligence 
and analysis operation, Operation Argus, to provide trade-focused 
analysis in support of Artemis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/06/22/next-phase-dhs-campaign-
stop-fentanyl-will-focus-interdiction-and-supply-chain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In collaboration with multiple Department of Justice components, in 
particular the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives, 
CBP and HSI also lead Operation Without a Trace, a joint platform for 
our personnel to target and investigate smuggling networks to disrupt 
and dismantle their illegal gun trafficking operations. Since the 
initiative's inception in fiscal year 2020, Operation Without a Trace 
has achieved significant success preventing Mexico-bound gun 
trafficking, resulting in the initiation of 803 investigations, the 
execution of 555 arrests, and the seizure of 1,213 firearms, more than 
723,203 rounds of ammunition, and $16.5 million in illicit 
currency.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ As of March 28, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, CBP established the Southern Border Intelligence Center in 
April 2023. The Southern Border Intelligence Center, located in Tucson, 
Arizona, will integrate CBP's Southwest Border Intelligence Enterprise 
through collaboration within CBP and with the interagency into a single 
intelligence focal point. The Southern Border Intelligence Center will 
build and maintain a trans-regional intelligence understanding of the 
entire Southern Border by integrating CBP's intelligence efforts and 
collaborating with the interagency.
                               conclusion
    With continued support from Congress, CBP, in coordination with our 
partners, will continue to deploy critical resources to our Nation's 
borders to refine the effectiveness of our detection, interdiction, and 
identification capabilities and combat transnational threats and the 
entry of illegal drugs into the United States.
    CBP will continue investing in our front-line and intelligence 
capabilities, which are vital to all our law enforcement efforts. CBP 
will also pursue new partnerships and innovative technology to aid in 
our layered enforcement strategy to support our fight against this 
ever-evolving threat.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to 
your questions.

    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Mandryck.
    I now recognize Mr. Papadopoulos for 5 minutes to summarize 
his opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS, ACTING CHIEF OF OPERATIONS, 
  DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

    Mr. Papadopoulos. Good afternoon, Chairman Higgins, Ranking 
Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
    On behalf of the Department of Justice and, in particular, 
the more than 9,000 employees of the Drug Enforcement 
Administration, it's my honor to appear before you today.
    Today's hearing comes at a critical moment in our country's 
history, and I thank the committee for bringing attention to 
this important topic.
    Our Nation is in the midst of a devastating drug poisoning 
epidemic that claimed the lives of nearly 110,000 people in 
2022. That's about one death every 5 minutes, or more than 300 
mothers and fathers, sisters, and brothers, and most 
tragically, children dying every day, with countless more 
nonfatal drug poisonings.
    I've had the privilege of being a DEA special agent for 27 
years, and have served in locations as diverse as Detroit, 
Michigan and Athens, Greece. I worked at the DEA Special 
Operations Division and, most recently, was deputy chief for 
operations, responsible for all foreign offices. I can assure 
you that the drug poisoning epidemic that our country is facing 
today is unprecedented.
    In 2022, DEA seized more than 58 million fentanyl-laced 
pills and 13,000 pounds of fentanyl powder. That's nearly 400 
million deadly doses that didn't reach American streets and 
more than enough to kill everyone in the United States.
    The men and women of the DEA are relentlessly focused day 
in and day out on saving lives by combating the deadly drug 
poisoning epidemic and bringing those responsible to justice.
    As the primary U.S. Government agency responsible for 
investigating drug trafficking, the DEA leads and coordinates 
the whole-of-Government law enforcement response to defeat the 
two cartels responsible for flooding the United States with 
fentanyl: the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels.
    This is our top operational priority, because these cartels 
pose the greatest criminal drug threat that the United States 
has ever faced. They are ruthless and violent global criminal 
enterprises with members, associates, facilitators, and brokers 
in all 50 States and in at least 100 countries throughout the 
world.
    The cartels use treachery and deceit to drive addiction and 
deaths in our country. They mix fentanyl with other drugs, like 
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, and press it into pills 
that look like legitimate prescription medication. But the 
pills that look safe and familiar do not contain any 
prescription medication. Instead, they contain deadly fentanyl. 
Many people that died didn't even know they were taking 
fentanyl. Instead, they believed they were taking a different 
drug or a real prescription pill.
    To save lives and defeat these cartels, the DEA created two 
counterthreat teams, one for the Sinaloa Cartel and one for the 
Jalisco Cartel. These teams synthesized DEA intelligence for a 
data-driven approach to mapping and strategically targeting the 
cartels' entire network and infrastructure, and to identify key 
nodes that can be exploited. Our counter-threat teams regularly 
send target packages to DEA offices across the country and 
around the world that are used to initiate or enhance 
investigations.
    Along with our interagency partners, we've had some recent 
success against the cartels. In April, we announced the results 
of an 18-month undercover investigation, Operation Royal Flush, 
which resulted in the indictment of 28 members of Sinaloa 
Cartel, including Chapo Guzman's sons.
    The indictment describes the cartel's entire network and 
supply chain from China to Mexico to Main Street. During this 
investigation, which included 32 DEA offices around the world 
and operational activities in 10 countries, we seized more than 
22 million potentially deadly doses of fentanyl.
    In May, we announced the results of Operation Last Mile, 
which focused on the cartel's U.S. distributors. During this 
year-long effort, we arrested more than 3,300 people in the 
United States, seized more than $104 million in cash and 
assets, and took nearly 8,500 guns off the street. Most 
importantly, we stopped more than 193 million potentially 
deadly doses of fentanyl before they reached U.S. communities.
    Just last month, we announced the results of Operation 
Killer Chemicals, which focused on the precursor chemicals 
needed to manufacture fentanyl. We charged 8 Chinese nationals 
and, for the first time, 4 Chinese companies with conspiracy to 
manufacture and import fentanyl into the United States. These 
individuals and companies sold enough precursor chemicals to 
produce millions of potentially deadly doses of fentanyl.
    While we've had some success, there is clearly more work to 
do. The men and women of the DEA are committed to saving lives 
and defeating the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels and will 
relentlessly pursue cartel leaders, members, associates, and 
facilitators to ensure that they face justice for their crimes.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today 
on this important topic. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Papadopoulos follows:]

               Prepared Statement of George Papadopoulos
                             July 12, 2023
    Chair Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members of 
the committee: On behalf of the Department of Justice (Department), and 
in particular the over 9,000 employees working at the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA), thank you for the opportunity to appear before 
you today to discuss DEA's work to save lives and to combat the deadly 
drug poisoning epidemic in our country.
    Americans today are experiencing the most devastating drug crisis 
in our Nation's history. This is because one drug--fentanyl--has 
transformed the criminal landscape. Fentanyl is exceptionally cheap to 
make, exceptionally easy to disguise, and exceptionally deadly to those 
who take it. It is the leading cause of death for Americans between the 
ages of 18 to 45, and it kills Americans from all walks of life, in 
every State and community in this country. The criminal organizations 
responsible for bringing fentanyl into this country are modern, 
sophisticated, and extremely violent enterprises that rely on a global 
supply chain to manufacture, transport, and sell fentanyl, and rely on 
a global illicit financial network to pocket the billions of dollars in 
revenue from those sales.
    DEA has been hard at work to undertake a transformation of its own 
to meet this moment. DEA has acted with urgency to set a new vision, 
target the global criminal networks most responsible for the influx of 
fentanyl into the United States, and raise public awareness about how 
just one pill can kill. We have transformed our vision by focusing on 
fentanyl--the drug killing the most Americans--and the criminal 
organizations responsible for flooding fentanyl into our communities--
the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation (Jalisco) Cartel. We 
have transformed our plan by building an entirely new strategic layer--
our counter-threat teams for the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco 
Cartel--that map the cartels, analyze their networks, and develop 
targeting information on the members of those networks wherever they 
operate around the globe. We have transformed our execution by 
providing that targeting information to our 334 offices world-wide, 
drawing from our global intelligence and law enforcement teams here and 
abroad, and working as One DEA to take the networks down. And we are 
seeing results--as demonstrated earlier this year with the indictment 
of 28 members and associates of the Chapitos network of the Sinaloa 
Cartel; the arrest of 3,337 associates of the Sinaloa and Jalisco 
Cartels in the United States who were responsible for the last mile of 
fentanyl and methamphetamine distribution on our streets and through 
social media; and the indictment of 4 chemical companies and 8 
individuals in the People's Republic of China (PRC) for providing 
criminal actors in the United States and Mexico with the precursor 
chemicals and scientific know-how necessary to make fentanyl.
                      the drug poisoning epidemic
    In 2022, nearly 110,000 people in the United States lost their 
lives to drug poisonings. Countless more people are poisoned and 
survive. These drug poisonings are a national crisis.
    A majority of the drug poisoning deaths in the United States 
involve synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl, that are being distributed 
in new forms. Fentanyl is being hidden in and being mixed with other 
illicit drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. Drug 
traffickers are also flooding our communities with fentanyl disguised 
in the form of fake prescription pills. These fake pills often are made 
to appear legitimate using pill presses and marketed by drug 
traffickers to deceive Americans into thinking that they are real, 
diverted prescription medications. In reality, these pills are not made 
by pharmaceutical companies, but drug trafficking organizations; they 
are highly addictive and are often deadly. DEA lab testing reveals that 
6 out of 10 of these fentanyl-laced fake prescription pills contain a 
potentially lethal dose.
    The availability of fentanyl throughout the United States has 
reached unprecedented heights. In 2022, DEA seized more than 58 million 
fake pills containing fentanyl, and 13,000 pounds of fentanyl powder, 
equating to nearly 400 million deadly doses of fentanyl. This is enough 
fentanyl to supply a potentially lethal dose to every member of the 
U.S. population. These seizures occurred in every State in the country.
                  the drug enforcement administration
    As the single mission agency tasked with enforcing our Nation's 
drug laws, DEA's top operational priority is to relentlessly pursue and 
defeat the two Mexican drug cartels--the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco 
Cartel--that are primarily responsible for driving the current fentanyl 
and drug poisoning epidemic in the United States.
    In April of this year, the administration announced its 
Strengthened Approach to Crack Down on Illicit Fentanyl Supply Chains, 
a whole-of-Government approach to save lives by disrupting the 
trafficking of illicit fentanyl and its precursors into American 
communities. This approach synchronizes all the tools of national power 
to use more effectively against criminal facilitators and enablers. The 
administration has also increased its collaboration with key 
international partners to address security concerns that impact North 
America. For example, under the Bicentennial Framework for Security, 
Public Health, and Safe Communities between the United States and 
Mexico, the administration established a cooperative, comprehensive, 
and long-term approach with specific actions to promote the safety and 
security of our societies.
    DEA is the lead agency on the law enforcement elements in the 
administration's whole-of-Government response to defeat the cartels and 
combat the drug poisoning epidemic in our communities. DEA's role in 
leading the law enforcement response to the fentanyl epidemic protects 
the safety of agents, officers, and sources. Importantly, a unified 
response to the fentanyl epidemic ensures that the whole-of-Government 
is moving in one direction that protects the safety and health of 
Americans.
    DEA operates 30 field divisions with 241 domestic offices, 93 
foreign offices in 69 countries, and 9 forensic labs. DEA's robust 
domestic and international presence allows it to map and target the 
entire Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel networks.
    In addition, DEA has launched two cross-agency, counter-threat 
teams to execute a network-focused operational strategy to defeat the 
Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels. The two teams are mapping, analyzing, and 
targeting the cartels' entire criminal networks. The teams are composed 
of special agents, intelligence analysts, targeters, program analysts, 
data scientists, and digital specialists. This network-focused strategy 
is critical to defeating the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels.
    We already are starting to see results from our new strategy. As 
part of the network-focused strategy, DEA investigations recently 
resulted in charges against 28 members and associates of the Sinaloa 
Cartel, including leaders, suppliers, brokers, smugglers, and money 
launderers in multiple countries, for operating the global criminal 
enterprise that manufactures and traffics most of the fentanyl that 
comes into the United States.
    DEA is simultaneously focused on American communities. We are 
targeting the drug trafficking organizations and violent gangs located 
in the United States that are responsible for the greatest number of 
drug-related deaths and violence. DEA's Operation Overdrive uses a 
data-driven, intelligence-led approach to identify and dismantle 
criminal drug networks operating in areas with the highest rates of 
violence and drug poisoning deaths. In each of these locations, DEA is 
working with local and State law enforcement officials to conduct 
threat assessments identifying the criminal networks and individuals 
that are causing the most harm. DEA works with State, local, Tribal, 
and Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial partners to pursue 
investigations and prosecutions that will reduce drug-related violence 
and drug poisonings. Phase one of Operation Overdrive took place in 34 
locations across the United States, and phase two is currently 
occurring in 57 locations. So far in Operation Overdrive, DEA and its 
partners have made over 1,700 arrests, seized over 1,300 firearms, and 
seized over 13 million potentially deadly doses of fentanyl.
    In 2021, DEA launched the ``One Pill Can Kill'' enforcement effort 
and public awareness campaign. Through that, DEA and our law 
enforcement partners have seized millions of fake fentanyl-laced 
prescription pills and hundreds of pounds of fentanyl powder--equating 
to millions of potentially lethal doses of fentanyl, which could have 
entered our communities. Hundreds of these cases were linked to social 
media platforms, including Snapchat, Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok.
    DEA is combating the sale of fentanyl on social media. Drug 
traffickers are using social media platforms to recruit associates, 
find customers, and sell fentanyl and other deadly drugs. In 
particular, drug traffickers use social media to deceptively advertise 
fake prescription pills--pills that look like Xanax, Percocet, or 
Oxycodone but actually contain fentanyl--directly to young people and 
teenagers. DEA has investigated more than 150 cases directly linked to 
the sale of fake pills containing fentanyl on social media.
    DEA also works closely with families who have lost loved ones to 
drug poisonings. These families are often brave advocates for change, 
and help ensure that people in their communities are aware of the 
dangers of fentanyl and fake pills.
    DEA is working closely with our local, State, Tribal, territorial, 
Federal, and international counterparts to target every part of the 
illegal drug supply chain and every level of the drug trafficking 
organizations that threaten the health and safety of our communities. 
To succeed, we must use every tool to combat this substantial threat 
that is being driven by the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels, as well as the 
Chinese-sourced precursor chemicals and global money-laundering 
operations that facilitate the cartels' operations.
                  mexican cartels and drug trafficking
    The Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels pose the greatest criminal drug 
threat the United States has ever faced. These ruthless, violent, 
criminal organizations have associates, facilitators, and brokers in 
all 50 States in the United States, as well as in more than 100 
countries around the world.
    The Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco Cartel and their affiliates 
control the vast majority of the fentanyl global supply chain, from 
manufacture to distribution. The cartels are buying precursor chemicals 
in the PRC; transporting the precursor chemicals from the PRC to 
Mexico; using the precursor chemicals to mass produce fentanyl; using 
pill presses to process the fentanyl into fake prescription pills; and 
using cars, trucks, and other routes to transport the drugs from Mexico 
into the United States for distribution. It costs the cartels as little 
as 10 cents to produce a fentanyl-laced fake prescription pill that is 
sold in the United States for as much as $10 to $30 per pill. As a 
result, the cartels make billions of dollars from trafficking fentanyl 
into the United States.
    The business model used by the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels is to 
grow at all costs, no matter how many people die in the process. The 
cartels are engaging in deliberate, calculated treachery to deceive 
Americans and drive addiction to achieve higher profits.
The Sinaloa Cartel
    The Sinaloa Cartel, based in the Mexican state of Sinaloa, is one 
of the oldest drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico. The Sinaloa 
Cartel controls drug-trafficking activity in various regions in Mexico, 
particularly along the Pacific Coast. Additionally, it maintains the 
most expansive international footprint of the Mexican cartels. The 
Sinaloa Cartel exports and distributes wholesale amounts of fentanyl, 
methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine in the United States by 
maintaining distribution hubs in cities that include Phoenix, Los 
Angeles, Denver, and Chicago. Illicit drugs distributed by the Sinaloa 
Cartel are primarily smuggled into the United States through crossing 
points located along Mexico's border with California, Arizona, New 
Mexico, and Texas. The Sinaloa Cartel reportedly has a presence in 19 
of the 32 Mexican states. It has been identified that there are 
currently more than 26,000 members, associates, facilitators, and 
brokers affiliated with the Cartel in more than 100 countries.
The Jalisco Cartel
    The Jalisco Cartel is based in the city of Guadalajara in the 
Mexican state of Jalisco, and was originally formed as a spin off from 
the Milenio Cartel, a subordinate to the Sinaloa Cartel. The Jalisco 
Cartel maintains illicit drug distribution hubs in Los Angeles, 
Seattle, Charlotte, Chicago, and Atlanta. Internationally, the Jalisco 
Cartel has a presence and influence through associates, facilitators, 
and brokers on every continent except Antarctica. The Jalisco Cartel 
smuggles illicit drugs such as fentanyl, methamphetamine, heroin, and 
cocaine into the United States by accessing various trafficking 
corridors along the Southwest Border that include Tijuana, Mexicali, 
Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros, and Nuevo Laredo. The Jalisco Cartel's rapid 
expansion of its drug-trafficking activities is characterized by the 
organization's willingness to engage in violent confrontations with 
Mexican government security forces and rival cartels. The Jalisco 
Cartel reportedly has a presence in 21 of the 32 Mexican states. It has 
been identified that there are currently more than 18,800 members, 
associates, facilitators, and brokers affiliated with the Cartel in 
more than 100 countries.
           people's republic of china and precursor chemicals
    Chemical companies within the PRC produce and sell the majority of 
precursor chemicals that are used today by the Sinaloa and Jalisco 
Cartels to manufacture fentanyl and methamphetamine. These precursor 
chemicals from companies within the PRC are the foundation of the 
fentanyl and methamphetamine that are manufactured and transported from 
Mexico into the United States and that are causing tens of thousands of 
drug-related deaths in our country.
    According to the State Department's 2023 International Narcotics 
Control Strategy Report, there are at least 160,000 chemical companies 
in the PRC. Chemical companies within the PRC distribute and sell 
precursor chemicals that are used in fentanyl and methamphetamine 
production around the world. Some companies within the PRC, for 
example, engage in false cargo labeling and ship chemicals to Mexico 
without tracking the customers purchasing the chemicals from the PRC 
and elsewhere.
    In recent weeks, DEA has had productive engagements with Chinese 
counterparts in Beijing and Washington, DC focused on increasing 
cooperation between our countries. DEA remains ready to work with the 
PRC and all willing partners to reduce the flow of precursor chemicals 
and the deadly synthetic drugs they produce.
          chinese money-laundering operations and the cartels
    The Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels utilize Chinese Money-Laundering 
Organizations (CMLOs) in the United States and around the world to 
facilitate laundering drug proceeds. CMLOs use mirror transfers, trade-
based money laundering, and bulk cash movement to facilitate the 
exchange of foreign currency. The use of CMLOs by the cartels 
simplifies the money-laundering process and streamlines the purchase of 
precursor chemicals utilized in manufacturing drugs.
    These money-laundering schemes are designed to remedy two separate 
issues: (1) the desire of Mexican cartels to repatriate drug proceeds 
into the Mexican banking system, and (2) wealthy Chinese nationals who 
are restricted by the PRC's capital flight laws from transferring large 
sums of money held in Chinese bank accounts for use abroad. To address 
these issues, CMLOs acquire U.S. dollars held by Mexican cartels as a 
means to supply their customers in the PRC.
recent enforcement actions against the sinaloa and jalisco cartels and 
                      prc-based chemical suppliers
The Chapitos Network of the Sinaloa Cartel
    On April 14, 2023, DEA announced indictments against the Chapitos--
the leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel--and their criminal network.
    The Sinaloa Cartel supplies the majority of the fentanyl trafficked 
into the United States, which has resulted in the United States' 
unprecedented fentanyl epidemic. The Chapitos, the sons of the cartel's 
notorious former leader Joaquin ``El Chapo'' Guzman, currently lead the 
most violent faction of the Sinaloa Cartel. El Chapo was once the 
world's most dangerous and prolific drug trafficker. Now his sons have 
stepped in to fill their father's void by flooding the United States 
with deadly fentanyl and leaving a wake of destruction across families 
and communities throughout the United States.
    Following their father's arrest and subsequent extradition and 
conviction, we allege that the Chapitos expanded their enterprise with 
sophisticated fentanyl laboratories in Culiacan, Mexico. We allege that 
the Chapitos now run the largest, most violent, and most prolific 
fentanyl trafficking operation in the world. The cartel is highly 
organized and sophisticated, employing military-grade weapons and 
vehicles and hundreds of people who protect the cartel and its 
leadership at all costs. In addition, we allege that the Chapitos use 
extreme violence and intimidation, including murder, torture, and 
kidnapping, to ensure dominance and expand their territory.
    The Chapitos pioneered the manufacture and trafficking of fentanyl, 
and are responsible for the massive influx of fentanyl into the United 
States over the past 8 years. The Chapitos oversee and control every 
step in their fentanyl trafficking process and will stop at nothing to 
ensure the expansion of their operations and the flow of fentanyl into 
the United States. From procuring fentanyl precursors from illicit 
sources of supply in the PRC; to distribution in the United States, 
and, ultimately, reaching the hands of Americans; to the surreptitious 
repatriation of massive proceeds through money launderers to avoid 
detection, the cartel has direct involvement--and culpability. 
Investigations found that even when test subjects died as a result of 
high-potency fentanyl, the cartel sent the deadly batch to the United 
States anyway--knowingly poisoning Americans for their own profit.
    The indictments charged 28 members of the Chapitos network. These 
include suppliers of fentanyl precursor chemicals based in the PRC, a 
broker based in Guatemala assisting with the transport of those 
chemicals from the PRC to Mexico, managers of clandestine fentanyl 
laboratories based in Mexico converting the precursor chemicals into 
fentanyl pills and powder, weapons traffickers and assassins 
perpetuating extreme violence in Mexico to protect and expand the 
fentanyl production operation, smugglers transporting the fentanyl from 
Mexico into the United States, and illicit financiers laundering the 
proceeds of fentanyl sales from the United States back to Mexico 
through bulk cash smuggling, trade-based money laundering, and 
cryptocurrency.
    These indictments reflect the work of 32 DEA offices in the United 
States and abroad, as well as our law enforcement partners and other 
Department of Justice components, such as the U.S. Attorney's Office. 
As part of the investigation, the DEA conducted operations in ten 
countries and seized staggering amounts of illicit materials, including 
2,557,000 fentanyl-laced pills, 105 kilograms of fentanyl powder, and 
37 kilograms of fentanyl precursor chemicals, amounting to 22,747,441 
potentially lethal doses of fentanyl.
    Seven of the charged defendants were arrested pursuant to the 
investigation--in Colombia, Greece, Guatemala, and the United States--
with the assistance of DEA's law enforcement partners in the United 
States and abroad. Ovidio Guzman-Lopez was arrested earlier this year 
by military officials in Mexico.
    Simultaneously with the announcement of these indictments, the 
Department of State has announced up to nearly $50 million in monetary 
rewards for information leading to the capture of the defendants who 
remain at large, and the Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign 
Assets Control announced sanctions against 2 chemical companies that 
operate in the PRC, and 5 individuals associated with those companies, 
for supplying precursor chemicals to drug cartels in Mexico for the 
production of illicit fentanyl intended for U.S. markets.
Operation Last Mile
    On May 5, 2023, DEA announced the results of Operation Last Mile, a 
year-long national operation targeting operatives, associates, and 
distributors affiliated with the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels who were 
located in the United States and responsible for the last mile of 
fentanyl and methamphetamine distribution on our streets and on social 
media.
    In Operation Last Mile, DEA tracked down distribution networks 
across the United States that are connected to the Sinaloa and Jalisco 
Cartels. The Operation shows that the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels use 
violent local street gangs and criminal groups and individuals across 
the United States to flood American communities with huge amounts of 
fentanyl and methamphetamine, which drives addiction and violence and 
kills Americans. It also shows that the Cartels, their members, and 
their associates use social media applications--like Facebook, 
Instagram, TikTok, and Snapchat--and encrypted platforms--like 
WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Wire, and Wickr--to coordinate logistics 
and reach out to victims.
    Operation Last Mile comprised 1,436 investigations conducted from 
May 1, 2022 through May 1, 2023, in collaboration with Federal, State 
and local law enforcement partners, and resulted in 3,337 arrests and 
the seizure of nearly 44 million fentanyl pills, more than 6,500 pounds 
of fentanyl powder, more than 91,000 pounds of methamphetamine, 8,497 
firearms, and more than $100 million. The fentanyl powder and pill 
seizures equate to nearly 193 million deadly doses of fentanyl removed 
from communities across the United States, which have prevented 
countless potential drug poisoning deaths. Among these investigations, 
more than 1,100 cases involved social media applications and encrypted 
communications platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, TikTok, 
Snapchat, WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Wire, and Wickr.
Operation Killer Chemicals
    On June 23, 2023, DEA announced Operation Killer Chemicals and the 
indictments of 4 chemical companies and 8 individuals--all based in the 
PRC--for knowingly providing customers in the United States and Mexico 
with the precursor chemicals and scientific know-how to manufacture 
fentanyl. These indictments are the first-ever charges against fentanyl 
precursor chemical companies. Two PRC nationals were taken into custody 
pursuant to the investigation. DEA also seized more than 200 kilograms 
of precursors in these investigations alone, enough to make millions of 
deadly doses of fentanyl.
    As alleged, these Chinese chemical companies, and the individuals 
working for them, not only provided customers with the ingredients for 
fentanyl, they also gave advice on how to mix and substitute 
ingredients to more efficiently make fentanyl, and employed chemists to 
troubleshoot and provide expert advice when customers had questions. 
The individuals also spoke freely about having clients in the United 
States and Mexico and, specifically, in Sinaloa, Mexico, where the 
Sinaloa Cartel is based.
    The companies went to great lengths to conceal the chemicals during 
transport. They falsified shipping labels and customs paperwork, 
claiming the shipments were ``dog food'' or ``raw cosmetic materials'' 
rather than fentanyl precursors. They even disguised the chemicals at a 
molecular level--adding a molecule to ``mask'' the precursors so they 
would not be detected as banned substances during transport, and 
teaching their customers how to remove that molecule after receipt.
    Operation Killer Chemicals made clear that fentanyl precursors are 
exceptionally cheap. Fentanyl precursors cost less than one cent per 
deadly dose of fentanyl. In just one example, a defendant sold two 
kilograms of fentanyl precursors for approximately $1,000, which can 
make 1.75 million lethal doses of fentanyl. The amount of fentanyl that 
can be made depends only on the amount of chemicals that can be 
purchased.
    The Operation also showed that fentanyl precursors are easily 
bought on-line. Although based in the PRC, the chemical companies and 
individuals reached customers across the world because they advertised 
fentanyl precursors on social media (on Facebook and LinkedIn), used 
encrypted applications like WhatsApp to speak with customers and 
coordinate shipments, and took payment in Bitcoin and other 
cryptocurrencies.
                               conclusion
    DEA will continue our relentless pursuit of the Sinaloa and Jalisco 
Cartels--the criminal networks most responsible for fentanyl-related 
deaths in our country--and we will continue to work tirelessly to 
defeat these cartels and dismantle every part of their global supply 
chain, in order to protect the American people. Thank you again for the 
opportunity to appear before the committee today. I look forward to 
answering your questions.

    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Papadopoulos.
    I now recognize Mr. Durham for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF TYRONE DURHAM, DIRECTOR, NATION-STATE THREATS 
CENTER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
                       HOMELAND SECURITY

    Mr. Durham. Good afternoon. Chairman Higgins, Ranking 
Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, 
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    I'm honored to be here representing the Department of 
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the 
dedicated intelligence professionals working diligently to keep 
the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.
    As previously stated, the fentanyl drug overdose crisis in 
the United States, which is fueled by Mexican transnational 
criminal organizations and their Chinese suppliers of precursor 
chemicals, continues at epidemic proportions.
    As you know, the drug overdose deaths rose from 2019 to 
2021, with more than 100,000-plus deaths reported in 2021. 
Those deaths specifically involving synthetic opioids, 
primarily fentanyl, continued to rise during the same time 
period with more than 70,000 overdose deaths reported at that 
same time period.
    So let's talk about who's responsible. You previously heard 
about the two Mexican cartels responsible for the activity, the 
Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. These 
cartels supply U.S.-based affiliates with fentanyl for further 
distribution and retail-level sale. U.S.-based traffickers then 
sell fentanyl to users seeking the synthetic opioid. They mix 
fentanyl with other controlled substances, and they distribute 
it in the form of counterfeit prescription pills to drive 
addiction.
    China's role in the global fentanyl trade is also a serious 
concern. China is the source of most of the precursor chemicals 
required for fentanyl production. A cartel associate brokers 
the sale and shipment of fentanyl precursor chemicals from 
China to clandestine labs in Mexico, where the fentanyl is 
manufactured.
    Moreover, as law enforcement scrutiny or legal restrictions 
increase, suppliers adapt by modifying or changing chemical 
compounds of precursors, subsequently falling outside the 
purview of existing controls, to mimic the desired effect. Some 
Chinese chemists have focused on precursors to precursors, many 
of which have legitimate uses and are therefore hard to 
regulate.
    There are several reasons why China is such a major source 
of fentanyl production. First, China has a large and 
sophisticated chemical and pharmaceutical industry that can 
produce its precursor chemicals at will and at scale. Second, 
China has a lax regulatory environment for chemicals, making it 
easy for traffickers to acquire the precursors they need for 
fentanyl manufacturing. Third, China's borders are porous, 
making it easy for fentanyl precursors to be smuggled out of 
the country, ultimately making their way to Mexico.
    The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is producing 
finished intelligence on drug trafficking and other transborder 
threats to strengthen engagement between U.S. officials and 
foreign partners. Specific to drug trafficking threats, our 
analysis is aimed at identifying key transnational criminal 
organized crime leadership figures, organizational networks, 
logistical supply chains, smuggling routes, and the efforts of 
corruption that stand in the way of dismantling these organized 
crime groups.
    Intelligence products draw upon national-level reporting 
from the intelligence community fused with DHS-unique data from 
components, as well as information from our law enforcement 
partners across all levels of government. This finished 
intelligence product related to TCOs are written at the widest 
possible dissemination level for distribution to our Federal, 
State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners and, when 
appropriate, shared with our foreign partners in Mexico.
    I&A has deployed intelligence personnel, worked closely 
with DHS components, State and major urban area fusion centers, 
and other law enforcement agencies to gather, analyze, and 
report information that is uniquely available from these 
partners.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you 
today to discuss this critical threat and for your continued 
support of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
    We remain committed to keeping the homeland safe, secure, 
and resilient, and will continue our efforts at home and abroad 
to uphold the national security and public safety of the United 
States.
    I look forward to your questions.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Durham.
    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their 
5 minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning 
may be called after all Members have been recognized.
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Papadopoulos, I'd like to ask you: In your opening 
statement, you cited that you've identified major distribution 
hubs in cities, including Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver, and 
Chicago. Is that in your opening statement?
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Higgins. OK. So a general question would be: Obviously 
without revealing on-going law enforcement investigations and 
operations, if you've identified the major hubs of narcotics 
distributions in these cities--Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver, 
and Chicago--can we look forward to major arrests in Phoenix, 
Los Angeles, Denver, and Chicago?
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes, sir. As you know, the DEA is 
constantly working these investigations. I mentioned Operation 
Last Mile, which was announced in May, which is a year-long 
effort focusing on the U.S. distributors of these cartels, 
where we arrested over 3,300 people, seized $104 million in 
cash and assets, and took about 8,500 guns across--off the 
street. That was across the entire United States.
    Mr. Higgins. Understood. The American citizenry asked 
common-sense questions, and we're sworn by our oath to convey 
those questions, and it's a good question. If you've identified 
a narcotics hub and you--that means you're watching it. So we 
expect those people to be arrested.
    The volume of drugs seized and the arrests made is 
reflective of the realities of effective law enforcement, but 
also the overwhelming amount of trafficking that we're dealing 
with and the criminal activity. It's at a level we've not seen 
in America, and we expect--we expect large numbers of arrests. 
If we identify these guys, we've got to break their back, make 
them hate each other. It's just fine with me.
    Director Cagen, last Congress, I introduced the Homeland 
Security Fentanyl Enforcement Act. You're familiar, sir, this 
bill is written to expand Homeland Security Investigations' 
authority to investigate narcotics cases under Title 21. Can 
you explain why HSI is currently unable to conduct independent 
narcotics investigations?
    This gets into some jurisdictional authority that Congress 
should be involved in, so I--I ask you to clarify.
    Mr. Cagen. Mr. Higgins, thank you for the support on this 
topic.
    HSI enjoys a great, long history and long relationship with 
the DEA, 25 years-plus, and we look forward to the next 25 
years.
    Right now, our authority is derived from DEA's designation, 
which allows us to work together, us to focus on our foreign 
counterparts, our foreign customs authorities, working with our 
TCIUs overseas, and to continue to work--actually, Mr. 
Papadopoulos and I worked in the same fusion center building 
together here in the District of Columbia a long time ago and 
had a great relationship. So we'd just look forward to having 
that continued relationship moving forward.
    Mr. Higgins. We--we understand and we appreciate the fact 
that long-standing relationships have been developed between 
the law enforcement agencies and working on the ground. But we 
must ensure that you have the legal pathway--statutory pathway 
to conduct your investigations, sometimes in cooperation with 
other agencies but with an independent capability that we must 
ensure.
    So I look forward to speaking with my colleagues more about 
the Homeland Security Fentanyl Enforcement Act.
    Mr. Chester, China is the main country of origin for 
precursor chemicals for synthetic opioids. These chemicals are 
then taken by the cartels, who make drugs like fentanyl. We all 
understand that. You've made that clear.
    Can you characterize the coordinated effort between the 
cartels and China to create and distribute illicit drugs like 
fentanyl, and how is that changing as we speak?
    Mr. Chester. Thank you for the question, Congressman. So 
the first major change happened in 2019, when China scheduled--
at the United States' request, scheduled fentanyl as a class. 
What that did was it had the effect of reducing finished 
fentanyl from China to the United States to almost zero, and 
the traffickers got into the precursor business selling those 
to Mexican cartels for production.
    The coordination happens on a couple of different levels. 
The first one is there's--there is a broker, usually located in 
Mexico, that works with a broker in the PRC in order to order 
the chemicals, often from a legitimate chemical company, who 
fills the bill. Those chemicals are transported and shipped, 
usually on an unwitting carrier, to one of the ports in Mexico 
or via air where at the port of entry it is delivered--diverted 
and then delivered to the drug manufacturers. That's the raw 
materials.
    Then the payment for that is usually done through--through 
illicit finance enablers and brokers located in the PRC and in 
Mexico. It is this network of brokers between the drug 
producers and the raw material suppliers that gives this entire 
global illicit supply chain its life.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chester. It's a massive 
network. We intend to break it.
    My time has expired.
    I recognize the Ranking Member, my friend and colleague, 
Mr. Correa, the gentleman from California.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I wanted to follow up on the Chairman's last comment on 
China, their role.
    Their cooperation, has it been better in the past? Two-
thousand-nineteen, they helped us, classified fentanyl, stopped 
it. Now you've got the issue of precursors, precursors to 
precursors, harder to regulate.
    Has China helped us over the last year or two? Have you 
seen that level of cooperation maybe not as good as it's been 
in the past?
    Mr. Chester. Thank you for your question. Your question is 
very prescient, and the answer is cooperation in the past 
actually has brought results. In fact, in the--in the words of 
Chinese diplomats, counternarcotics cooperation between the 
United States and the PRC has been a bright spot.
    We were able to do--there was routine law enforcement 
cooperation. We were able to get fentanyl scheduled as a class. 
As of late, over more than a year, for a variety of reasons, 
the PRC has decided not to engage with the United States on--on 
counternarcotics and a number of other issues.
    The United States would like that level of cooperation 
again, and we have made it clear to the PRC a few things. The 
first one is we're not blaming the PRC government for this. 
There are criminal elements within China and Mexico and the 
United States who keep this global illicit supply chain alive. 
That's the first thing.
    The second thing is our cooperation is absolutely essential 
in order to help us with that, and we have made some very 
specific asks of the Chinese government that they could 
implement very easily in order to be able to help us to do 
that.
    Mr. Correa. Gentlemen, I just want to say thank you for 
your good work. You've done a stellar job of doing what you're 
paid to do.
    We talk about commercial disruption, precursors, pills, 
shipping. It's as though every time you stop one place, 
something else explodes. I've heard lately that--there is intel 
now a lot of the precursors are coming in through our ports of 
entry, pill presses coming into the United States. So every 
time you bottle something up, another source, another supply 
seems to emerge.
    The one issue that I think probably holds everything 
together is the finances, the laundering of this money. What 
can we do to better enable you to stop the flow of these 
profits?
    HSI, you talked about--you know, the Chairman asked you 
about maybe some other tools you may need. But I would ask all 
of you: What else can we do as Members of Congress to 
strengthen your hand to stop the flow of the profits? Because, 
you know, you dry up the money and the whole machine comes to a 
stop.
    You know, right now, what we are witnessing in this country 
is a massive transfer of wealth from American pocketbooks to 
somewhere around the country--excuse me--around the world.
    Please, open it up for comments.
    Mr. Cagen. Since you mentioned HSI, I'll--I'll take that.
    You know, money is moved in multiple ways, and they're 
ever-evolving. You just mentioned the fact that--you know, that 
we stop one thing that the Chinese are doing, and they move in 
a different way. The same thing happens with money laundering. 
It's bulk cash, it's trade-based money laundering, it's 
cryptocurrency movement of money right now.
    One thing--and I come back to, you know, begin and end in 
China. China has taken over. Chinese money-laundering 
organizations have taken over the network, the money movement 
network, which we're all focused on as--you know, everybody 
sitting up here is focused on that. They're able to charge much 
lower percentages than other people have in the past because of 
their vast network around the world.
    But we are--HSI is--that's what we do. We like to go after 
their money. We like to go after their toys. Because when you 
take their money away, then they can't flourish. So we're 
continuing to----
    Mr. Correa. I asked you directly--I called you out because 
I've seen you work, and I've seen some of your results. When 
I've been down to San Isidro, I've taken a tour of your 
operations.
    Mr. Cagen. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Correa. All of you are doing a stellar job. In the half 
minute that I have left, I would just ask you all as a 
challenge to let us know what we can do as Congress to 
strengthen your hand when it comes to money laundering. It's 
not an easy solution.
    You've got 20 seconds. You're not going to give me the 
answer. But I'd love all of you to go back and give us some, 
you know, wish lists, legislatively what tools and what 
resources you need to stop the flow of drug money.
    In my opinion, that's the best punch you can give these 
folks when it comes to fentanyl.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Time is up. I turn it over back to 
you.
    Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
    The gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Brecheen, is recognized 
for 5 minutes for questioning.
    Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I appreciate you all being here today. There is no doubt 
this is a crisis. Just in Oklahoma alone, the State that I'm a 
Representative for, we've seen a 735 percent increase in 
fentanyl deaths, and that has occurred from 2018 to 2022: 326 
deaths in 2022 in Oklahoma. In 2018, it was 39.
    I think probably every Member of this committee has some 
personal point of contact with somebody that they know of who 
has lost their life or has a direct connection. It's really 
sad.
    I guess what I want to zero in on--and I'll open this up to 
anyone--if you--if 6 out of the 10 pills that you all are 
looking at--one of your testimonies a minute ago--are 
containing lethal overdose elements to the point that you take 
it unsuspectingly, it can kill you, why are they doing that?
    There's an addictive element, right. You're trying to use 
the addictive element, 10 cents to make, and $30--10 to $30 
sold, massive increase in profit.
    So can you--I'd be interested in some comments if you--if 
you can help bring about why they are enabling such a lethal 
concoction in their pills?
    Mr. Chester. Congressman, I can start, and then I can turn 
it over to my colleagues.
    I think--I think the first thing is that--that our image of 
these drug producers and traffickers, I think, traditionally 
has been that they're evildoers who are out to hurt people when 
in reality they are disinterested businesspeople who really 
only want a few things. They want to lower their production 
costs. They want to lower their risk of detection and 
interdiction. They want to increase their customer base and 
increase their profits.
    By--and--and a mechanism to do that is to provide the drug 
user an experience that they did not expect. This is what we 
saw back in 2015 when we started to see synthetic opioids like 
fentanyl introduced into the heroin supply chain. This is--this 
was the door that opened this up for the United States. What it 
did, it provided the individual a qualitative effect that they 
did not expect, and it was used as kind-of a branding.
    Because these things are so potent and because they are so 
potentially lethal, a milligram in the wrong direction will 
take you from having a qualitative experience that you didn't 
expect to an overdose death. In a lot of cases, these things 
are not uniformly mixed, and they're not done well, and it's a 
lot of cross-contamination that actually leads to the overdose 
deaths.
    The last thing I'll tell you is, in a lot of cases, the 
unwitting user who may not have an active substance use 
disorder or does not intend to take fentanyl gets it in another 
counterfeit pill that they did not expect, like Xanax or 
Adderall or something like that. This is done in the interest 
of making money with a casual disinterest as to whether people 
are harmed or not.
    Mr. Brecheen. So I want to pivot, because I think somebody 
else maybe on the panel can answer this. Are you seeing it 
utilized as a revenge element to--so you're saying, you know, 
that there's nothing that's in this more than profit margin, 
but there's a--an evil intent that can lead to murder 
purposefully.
    In your investigations, are you seeing that?
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Sir, I can jump in.
    So the answer is yes. We have evidence in some of the char-
--previous cases I mentioned where the cartels knew that there 
was deadly fentanyl. The amount of fentanyl that they were 
sending to United States was deadly, because they tested it on 
human beings in Mexico, and they still sent it anyway.
    As Mr. Chester was saying, these are not mixed in labs. 
They're not sterile situations. We've seen pills with less than 
a milligram of fentanyl all the way up to 8 milligrams of 
fentanyl. The average dose is 2.4 milligrams, and 1 milligrams 
is considered a potentially deadly dose.
    Mr. Brecheen. In regards to human trafficking, ``Sound of 
Freedom'' is a movie that's, you know, getting a lot of 
attention right now nationally, and you can sell a drug one 
time, common--commonly being discussed is--as the human 
trafficking element, that you can sell an individual multiple 
times.
    What are you seeing with the human traffic--in all of your 
investigations, where are you seeing the overlap with those 
that are engaged in human trafficking, prostitution, also 
alongside the fentanyl trade?
    Mr. Mandryck. Thank you for the question, sir. So, 
historically, we had seen the transnational criminal groups 
focus on narcotics, were solely focused on narcotics. They 
would charge a piso, or a tax, for migrants to cross.
    At the beginning of COVID, where we started to see some of 
the closures at the ports of entry for nonessential travel, we 
started to see those criminal groups become more involved in 
the process holistically. So it wasn't just a couple-hundred-
dollar tax; it was a multi-thousand-dollar program to move them 
throughout the whole chain.
    That's what we've continued to see, is that control of the 
plazas along the border and that full-scale facilitation from 
start to finish.
    Mr. Brecheen. Mr. Chairman, would you allow--would you 
allow if anybody else has any--I know my time has expired. Does 
anybody else have any--any comments on that?
    Mr. Cagen. I can draw a distinction a little bit between 
the human smuggling and human trafficking aspect, which I think 
is where your question was going.
    We don't see a direct link between your large-scale 
criminal organizations that are operating and moving people 
trafficking-wise, human trafficking-wise, across the border 
like the transnational criminal organizations. A lot of those 
folks are already here. People are smuggled into the United 
States. Then, once in the United States, transnational--or 
organizations prey on vulnerable populations, and that's when 
they're turned into trafficking victims.
    Mr. Brecheen. Thank you.
    Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
    Mr. Thanedar is recognized for 5 minutes for questioning.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman Higgins. Thank you, 
gentlemen, for your testimony.
    I have heard from both sides of the aisle that 
transnational criminal organizations and the smuggling of 
illicit drugs like fentanyl is not just a U.S. problem; it is a 
global issue. There are bad actors all over the world looking 
to profit from these deadly drugs. That's why it is important 
to foster relationships with law enforcement partners and 
international governments to disrupt and dismantle 
transnational criminal organizations.
    Mr. Cagen, you mentioned this point in your testimony. So 
my question is for you, Mr. Cagen, and also for Mr. 
Papadopoulos. Can you--and, in fact, I have three questions. 
Let me just state those and allow you, either of you, to 
comment on.
    Can you discuss how HSI and the DEA are working and sharing 
information across the Federal Government, as well as State and 
local law enforcement partners, to investigate and prosecute 
these criminal organizations?
    No. 2, can you discuss how HSI and DEA are fostering 
relationships internationally to prevent these deadly drugs 
from reaching our borders?
    No. 3, in April 2023, the Justice Department announced 
charges against Federal leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel. What 
role did this partnership play in these critical 
investigations?
    Mr. Cagen. Thank you very much for the question. I think 
it's a fantastic question.
    I've mentioned it in my opening statement and in a 
statement already before, HSI and DEA have a long history of 
working together. I mentioned that we both worked together in 
the same building, which is actually a fusion center, where we 
bring in information, intelligence, and 30-plus Federal 
agencies sit in this building where we share information and 
ensure that we're taking a whole-of-Government approach toward 
attacking the cartels and the transnational criminal 
organizations.
    We both have very similar tactics as well when we're 
working with our international partners. Both have 
investigative units. Ours is called a Transnational Criminal 
Investigative Unit. Very different but the same structure. 
Ours, we've got the ability to work with the Mexican Customs, 
where we can stop things that are coming over the ports, like 
precursor chemicals that are shipped from China over the sea, 
things like that.
    I think that we have a very good international relationship 
with Mexico and other countries on the working level, which is 
how we all get our job done to go after transnational criminal 
organizations.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you.
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Thank you for the question, sir. So as 
far as information sharing, we are in, as I mentioned, 
unprecedented times right now, which I think calls for 
unprecedented collaboration across the Federal, State, and 
local governments. We are committed to that. We are using every 
tool that we have available, including sanctions and rewards 
for justice, to get the word out.
    As far as our international relationships, we have a big 
international presence also, and that's because we want to be 
proactive. Most drugs are manufactured outside of the United 
States, and then they need to be transported here through other 
countries. So when we're outside of the United States working 
with our international counterparts, we are being proactive, 
instead of reactive, waiting for the drugs to get here.
    As far as the case that you mentioned, we did work closely 
on that investigation with other districts and other agencies 
to put that case together.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Chairman, my time is up, so I yield back.
    Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
    My colleague from Texas, Mr. Gonzales, is recognized for 5 
minutes for questioning.
    Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for 
holding this hearing.
    I want to talk--I want to use my time to talk about 
fentanyl as it relates to drones. I think this is an area that 
the landscape is changing.
    If you're watching the war in Ukraine, you're seeing that 
drones are the future of conflict, and that's no different from 
fentanyl. What I'm seeing is I'm seeing on a regular basis 
cartels are using drones to penetrate the United States air 
space, and they're dropping off packages of fentanyl. Remember, 
you don't need large quantities in order to make a lot of money 
off of this. Then they're taking that and they're moving it 
around.
    Well, let me just set the tone. Imagine if you're in a 
soccer field and all of a sudden there's a drone that flies 
over with fentanyl and it doesn't drop it to get picked up and 
get sold somewhere, it just drops it in the stadium. Could we 
live in that world? Well, guess what? We already live in that 
world.
    So I'm very concerned with the drones that are happening, 
in particular in the cartels and how it's all related to 
fentanyl.
    My first question is for Mr. Mandryck. Can you speak to any 
trends or observations you have seen with the recent rise in 
the use of drones to smuggle drugs across the border?
    Mr. Mandryck. Thank you, sir. Historically, we have seen 
drones almost entirely used for surveillance along the border, 
whether that's at a port of entry or between ports of entry, 
where scouts located on the Mexican side would monitor the 
movements and then facilitate cross-border movement from there.
    We have started to see an increased number of sUAS 
incursions crossing the border, some of which are for 
surveillance purposes, but we have seen increased use of 
smuggling of some narcotics, primarily hard narcotics, those 
that, as you mentioned, don't require larger quantities for 
movement. We have in place a very strong counter-UAS program 
with our U.S. Border Patrol and our Air and Marine Operations 
Center that we would love to give you a more in-depth briefing 
on the specific capabilities of that.
    Mr. Gonzales. Great. Thank you.
    I was just in El Paso a few weeks ago, and I visited two 
areas. One, I visited the Clint Station, Border Patrol station. 
This is an area in the El Paso Sector, but it's not the main 
one. It's not what you see on TV. It's one of the sectors that 
is in the Lower Valley, and it is historically known that this 
is the area that is most trafficked.
    So I was asking the agents there, I was like, How many 
agents do you have on duty at one time? The answer was two 
agents. OK.
    My next question was, How much contraband have you 
apprehended this year? Guess what the answer was? Zero. OK.
    So the most trafficked area in El Paso County, you only 
have two agents on duty, and they've apprehended nothing. OK.
    Go a little further. You know, outside the city limits of 
El Paso is a brand-new soft-sided facility. It's like going to 
the Dallas Cowboys Stadium. OK. It's like Disneyland: 360,000 
square feet, larger than six football fields. It's costing 
taxpayers $400 million a year. Guess how many agents were in 
that facility? Two hundred eight.
    What I'm getting at is we're putting all our resources into 
the humanitarian piece of it, and there's nobody on the field 
to actually stop some of the traffic that's happening.
    One of the agents told me, Hey, look, I see drones--Tony, I 
see drones coming back and forth all the time, and I feel 
powerless. There is nothing I can do as a field agent down on 
the ground.
    What I'm also seeing too is all these procedures--you have 
to go through all these procedurals to be able to go all the 
way up the chain in order to get a response back.
    Once again, we are living in a different environment where 
things are tactical. You've got to be able to give the agent 
the tools that they need to succeed in a real-time environment 
if we're going to save lives.
    I've got 1 minute left. Let me ask one more question. Once 
again for you, Mr. Mandryck. What can the committee do to 
ensure that CBP and other appropriate agencies have what they 
need to combat drones that are illegally crossing our border?
    Mr. Mandryck. Sir, what a lot of it comes down to is just 
the adaptability of where we are with the technology, the speed 
at which that grows. They're very cheap to collect, to produce, 
so it's kind of a twofold effort. So it's actually attacking 
logistical supply chains behind those to prevent those being 
moved into the hands of TCOs to use for facilitation, but also 
support in the technology to, not just detect, but also safely 
bring down those pieces of aircraft, and then the exploitation 
after that significant investment from a technology and an 
expertise standpoint.
    Mr. Gonzales. Well, I'd love to take you up on your offer 
and sit down and walk through this, in particular to these UAS 
vehicles that we can defeat, and talk about it, not only in 
regards to the Homeland Security Committee, but I also sit on 
the Appropriations Committee. How can we give real money to 
real programs that work? I'm very interested in that. Would 
love to follow up with you.
    Mr. Chairman, I'm out of time. I yield back.
    Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
    The gentlewoman, Mrs. Ramirez, is recognized for 5 minutes 
for questioning.
    Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman Higgins and Ranking 
Member Correa, of the Border Subcommittee for convening today's 
hearing.
    However, I do wish that we could be focused on addressing 
the root causes of migration rather than having to debunk myths 
and respond to Republican fearmongering. I sincerely hope we 
can look beyond the politics and work together to achieve 
comprehensive immigration reform and address the causes and the 
concerns we have around this opioid crisis.
    We know that nearly 90 percent of hard drugs, such as 
fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamines, are seized by CBP at 
our ports of entry rather than between them. Even when hard 
drugs are seized between ports of entry, the vast majority are 
seized at vehicle checkpoints.
    Mr. Mandryck, can you confirm that nearly 90 percent of 
hard drugs seized are at ports of entry? Is that a yes or no?
    Mr. Mandryck. Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you. Mr. Mandryck, is it true that the 
vast majority of opioids seized between ports of entry are 
seized at vehicular checkpoints?
    Mr. Mandryck. That's correct, ma'am.
    Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you.
    Mr. Mandryck and Mr.--I'm going to do my best because 
pronunciation is important to me--Mr. Papadopoulos--
Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos. Did I get it right? My 
understanding is that more than 85 percent of the people 
convicted for smuggling fentanyl are U.S. citizens. Is that 
accurate?
    Mr. Mandryck. So, ma'am, I can talk about the seizures and 
the turnover for the actual prosecutions. When we look at those 
encounters at the ports of entry, so Office of Field 
Operations, there's two ways to look at that. That's by weight 
and by number of events. If we look at it from events, so 
individual encounters, this fiscal year we're at 73.1 percent 
are U.S. citizens, the balance being Mexican nationals. If we 
look at that by weight, we're looking at about 56 percent U.S. 
citizens. The delta between those two is a lot of the U.S. 
citizens we see are very small quantity personal use.
    Mrs. Ramirez. What about convicted for smuggling fentanyl? 
Is it U.S. citizens, the majority?
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Ma'am, I'm going to have to get back to 
you on that. I don't know the answer to that, but I'll be happy 
to get back with you.
    Mrs. Ramirez. Yes, I appreciate it. Thank you.
    So, Mr. Mandryck, would it be fair to say that the majority 
of seizures in between ports of entry, because even with the 
percentages you gave me, are also from U.S. citizens and U.S. 
persons more so than from Mexican nationals?
    Mr. Mandryck. It's a fairly close breakdown. We will have 
to get back with you on specifics.
    Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you. Mr. Mandryck, can you also share 
the percentage of opioids CPB seized on migrants not in 
vehicles during the fiscal year? Do you have that information?
    Mr. Mandryck. It's a very small percentage of those who 
were actually on migrants for opioids. We don't have the firm 
percentage. We can get back to you.
    Mrs. Ramirez. So a very small percentage, correct?
    Mr. Mandryck. Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Ramirez. That's what I thought.
    So just to clarify, Mr. Mandryck, would you agree that 
undocumented persons traveling on foot between ports of entry 
represent a very small fraction of the people trafficking 
opioids across our borders?
    Mr. Mandryck. Yes, ma'am. There's a variety of reasons 
behind that: the ability to exploit illegal travel with, you 
know, millions of people each day back and forth, easy 
concealment techniques, operational security with a 
countersurveillance of individuals.
    Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you. Thank you.
    We know the alarming number of fentanyl overdoses is 
emblematic of a larger drug abuse public health crisis that our 
country is experiencing and has been for decades. I deeply 
sympathize with the losses that many families, including in the 
Third Illinois District, are facing. But this issue is broader 
than one of border security. In the words of Mr. Chester, and I 
quote, you said that the--hold on 1 second. I want to get it 
right. Ending the opioid crisis doesn't start at the border and 
it won't end in the border.
    We need--and so I think we need to treat the demand driving 
this epidemic, and we need comprehensive health care and access 
to education, treatment for everyone.
    Mr. Chester, knowing that, what initiatives is this 
administration pursuing to prevent substance abuse in our 
communities and support these in recovery?
    Mr. Chester. Thank you very much. You stated it correctly, 
right, the efforts that we take to keep these drugs out of our 
country have got to be complemented by strong public health 
efforts in order to be able to reduce their demand. It really 
starts with prevention, particularly youth prevention. We out 
of ONDCP manage the drug-free communities program, which is 
enormously successful, more than 700 coalitions funded around 
the country, focused at the local level in order to prevent 
drug use.
    The second thing is reducing barriers to treatment, whether 
those barriers are monetary or regulatory, ensuring that 
everyone who needs treatment is able to get it. Sadly, about 8 
out of 10 Americans who need treatment don't have access to it.
    Then the final thing is to create communities and 
workplaces that are recovery ready, so that individuals in 
recovery can continue their sustained recovery, stay with their 
families, get a good job, and not tragically enter back into 
the population of those using drugs.
    Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you for your time.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Higgins. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
    Mr. D'Esposito, my colleague from New York, is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 
you for allowing me to waive on to the subcommittee this 
afternoon.
    To all of you, thank you for being here.
    Prior to serving as a Member of Congress, I was even 
prouder, I think, to be a Member of the New York City Police 
Department, retiring there as a detective. I know that just 
working in the five boroughs of New York City you get to see 
different district attorneys and what their priorities are, 
their prosecutorial priorities.
    So I guess this is really a question for Mr. Papadopoulos, 
but it's really open to all of you. Do you see that the people 
that you're arresting and hopefully eventually prosecuted, are 
you dealing with different prosecutors with different 
priorities, and is that hindering your ability to take illegal 
narcotics?
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Sir, thank you for the question. As you 
know as former law enforcement, you know, we collect the 
evidence, we gather the evidence, and present it to a grand 
jury or to a prosecutor's office, and they decide the most 
appropriate charges. So we don't factor into that, other than 
collecting the evidence.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Right. But what I'm asking is, have you 
seen it become more difficult with different prosecutors, the 
effective--really the prosecution of drug arrests? Has it 
become more difficult as we see different prosecutors having 
different priorities?
    I mean, we see it throughout the United States of America, 
whether it's in cities like New York or places like California 
where, you know, crime is rampant, because we see over and over 
again repeat offenders, people that are--they're being 
arrested, they're being sometimes prosecuted, and then they are 
let out to commit more crimes. One of the biggest things that 
we've seen is repeat offenders.
    So have we seen--and the issues on our Southwest Border 
when we're dealing with, specifically in this hearing, the 
trafficking of narcotics and fentanyl, have we seen repeat 
offenders, and has the ability of prosecutors and perhaps their 
priorities had an effect on the way that you guys are able to 
really take criminals off the street, and I think most 
important, keep them off the street?
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes, sir. So for the border, I'll defer 
to DHS on what they're seeing there. I will say that, you know, 
DEA strives to prosecute Federally, not at the local level.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Of course.
    Mr. Papadopoulos. What we see when we do that is that--more 
of an impact in terms of crime reduction and sentencing.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Right. But even Federal prosecutors, 
different offices have different priorities, and sometimes we 
see things headed in a different direction.
    So I guess for the border, I'll hand it over to you guys.
    Mr. Cagen. I don't oversee our domestic operations branch, 
but I will tell you that I don't believe that we have seen much 
of a change. There's a consistent cadre who works day in and 
day out on the law enforcement, either CBP or HSI side, that 
works continuously with U.S. attorneys to take cases to the 
Federal level.
    I can take that as a get-back. If there's something 
different, I can let you know.
    Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Perfect.
    Mr. Mandryck. Sir, I'd have to go with our DEA and HSI 
colleagues. When we get seizures, they're turned over to them 
for the prosecution.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Great.
    I yield back. Thank you, Chairman.
    Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
    My colleague, Mr. Ivey, is recognized for 5 minutes for 
questions.
    Mr. Ivey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Before I start asking questions, I'd like to commend the 
Chair for putting this hearing together. I waived in to the 
committee today and had just come over from another hearing, so 
I just picked up the witness testimony. I came in and asked--I 
looked at the list, and I asked staff, Well, who are their 
witnesses and who are our witnesses? They said, Well, this 
looks like it's pretty much straight down the middle.
    I must agree. I appreciate the fact that you put together a 
balanced hearing that's been very informative. It's the first 
one I've had like this since I got to Congress.
    Mr. Higgins. You're always welcome.
    Mr. Ivey. Thank you, sir.
    I did want to follow up on Mr. Gonzales' questions about 
the drones issue. Because when we went down to--I guess it was 
in Brownsville, and we were talking with some of the Border 
Patrol agents, they were echoing what he said. They said 
there's a lot of drones, that it's increased a lot, that more 
of them are being used to now ship the drugs, and that they 
were outnumbered. The ratio of 17:1 sticks out in my mind for 
some reason.
    I think, Mr. Correa, we were trying to get some--and I 
don't know if it happened or not--but some language in the bill 
that we passed to try and see if we could get additional 
funding to increase your capability to get drones to try and 
respond to the amount that they're using. I know they're very 
well-funded, they're keeping up with technology, and we have to 
hustle to keep up with them.
    But I did want to make sure that that's something that 
would be helpful to you. We--you know, resources are short, but 
if you need additional help with the drone counter push on our 
part, you know, I would like to hear what your position is on 
that.
    Mr. Mandryck. Absolutely, sir. Drones are something that's 
not going away. We're going to continue to see those, whether 
it's surveillance or narcotics movement.
    We also support the vast majority of seer activities that 
take place, so Super Bowl, large-scale events with the counter-
UAS approach. So it's a holistically beneficial program.
    Mr. Ivey. Yes. I think there's legislation that's coming 
through the House, but it's got multiple committees because 
there's multiple types of jurisdiction. So that means it's got 
a hard path to travel, but hopefully we can get there. With 
your push, it might help to move it forward. So thank you for 
that.
    I wanted to ask you too about China and some of their 
activities. I think one of you said that they have porous 
borders, and so it's easy for, you know, bad actors to ship 
precursors and the drugs out. Then I believe it was Mr. Chester 
who mentioned that, to the extent China is being cooperative, 
it can really enhance our efforts to reduce the drug flow.
    What kinds of additional steps can we take, in your view? I 
know this is ticklish. You're not State Department necessarily. 
But what can we do to help to address that? Because if we can 
help to cut it off at the source, that would really help our 
issues here.
    Mr. Chester. You know, thanks very much. I work with my 
State Department colleagues on this literally every day, and 
they do a remarkable job, help managing this relationship.
    I think the first thing is we need dialog with the PRC 
government, routine collaboration like we've had in the past. 
That's the first thing.
    The second thing that we've specifically asked them to do 
is we've presented them with what we call the three asks. The 
first one is implement quality know-your-customer standards, so 
that the shippers of precursors, pill presses, dye molds, 
encapsulating machines know that they're going to go to a 
legitimate business and they're just not filling every single 
order. The second one is to properly label those items in 
accordance with World Trade Organization standards, so that 
pill press parts are labeled as pill press parts, so that they 
can be inspected, and motorcycle parts are labeled as 
motorcycle parts. The third thing is to agree with the United 
States and other countries on the--and it's a finite list, of 
legitimate uncontrollable chemicals because they have so many 
legitimate uses that can be combined and turned into precursor 
chemicals for making synthetic opioids or other synthetic 
drugs.
    Three things that are really just due diligence on the part 
of any responsible country that not only the PRC but all 
countries--and we've talked to all countries about doing this--
in order to be able to help dry up this permissive environment 
in which these items can move around in plain sight.
    The last thing is the PRC needs to join with us in 
partnership at the global level, and this is particularly true 
in light of the establishment of this global coalition. They 
hold a major role in this problem, and they should, as any 
great nation, hold a major role in its solution as well. We 
look forward to them engaging with us and doing that.
    Mr. Ivey. I thank you for that.
    I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you again, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
    My colleague from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized for 
5 minutes for questioning.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairman and Ranking 
Member. I was just in Judiciary, so I'm somewhat delayed and 
may be asking questions that have already been asked.
    But let me start with the principal deputy administrator of 
the DEA, Mr. Papadopoulos, and really hone in on the DEA's work 
with respect to opioids and the fact that fentanyl, which is 
synthetic, is found in drugs for medical use, and it is 
sometimes used to lace other drugs, and as well sold on-line, 
come in pink pills, multicolored pills.
    How difficult is the fight for fentanyl, and what are the 
elements the DEA uses? I know there's some on the criminal 
side. You deal with scheduling of drugs, not yet scheduled 
fentanyl. But how difficult is this fight?
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes. Thank you, ma'am. So we are using 
all the tools that we have available and the authorities that 
we have been given to battle this unprecedented epidemic that 
we're facing right now. As you mentioned, we are having 
millions of pills come into the United States. Six out of 10 
have a potentially lethal dose. That's up from 4 out of 10 last 
year. So we are committed to doing everything we can to prevent 
the overdose deaths that are happening throughout the country.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, what is your--let me get you to be 
more extensive. Everything you can. But what are the--are you 
targeting certain areas? How do you incorporate the fact that 
there's medical uses? You know, are you seeing a criminal 
element that is separate and apart from the cartels? Because 
fentanyl is everywhere. Can you comment on that, please?
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes. So we are--domestically, I mentioned 
Operation Last Mile, which resulted in the distributors--cartel 
distributors arrests in the United States. Also, we have 
Operation Overdrive, which is data-driven, and it focuses on 
areas of the country that have high number of overdose deaths 
and drug-related violence. We're working with our State and 
local partners to identify those areas.
    Most recently, we are in 57 cities in 36 States. Phase 1, 
which ended last year, resulted in significant decreases in 
fatal shootings and homicides in Philadelphia in the Kensington 
area. Phase 2 is on-going, and phase 3 is coming soon. So we're 
doing that.
    We also have Operation Overdose Justice, which focuses on 
deaths resulting from fentanyl, where we partner with local 
counter--State and local counterparts to bring the most 
appropriate charges when somebody does die either through a 
fake prescription pill or if it's fentanyl that's mixed with 
another drug.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you very much. I am in the 
business of stopping fentanyl and particularly the impact that 
it's had on our children. I want to ask Mr. Chester what is 
being done as relates to research or treatments on opioid 
addiction, but particularly the impact on school children.
    At this time, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to introduce into the 
legislation--my legislation, which is Stop Fentanyl Now Act of 
2023. I hope that there will be an opportunity for this 
legislation to be reviewed in this committee, Judiciary, and I 
know that there's an Energy and Commerce component. But 
included in here is the ability for more institutions to use 
the strips. Some States outlawed them as being a criminal 
element.
    So, Mr. Chester, you want to comment particularly focused 
on school children and the crisis we have?
    Mr. Chester. Yes, Congresswoman. Thank you very much. The 
first thing is our strong emphasis, and particularly in the 
National Drug Control Strategy, on youth prevention. This is 
not only preventing at the individual level but looking at the 
environmental factors that may lead to eventual substance use. 
That's the first thing.
    The second thing, as you mentioned, fentanyl test strips. I 
would also like to mention naloxone and increasing the 
availability of naloxone to get it in the hands of everyone who 
needs it so that anyone who suffers an opioid overdose, who 
doesn't need to die, that overdose can be reversed with the use 
of naloxone. Those are two important components of harm 
reduction. In the National Drug Control Strategy, this is the 
first time that harm reduction has been mentioned in a National 
Drug Control Strategy.
    The last thing, when you talk about treatment, we have 
wonderful professionals at the National Institutes of Drug 
Addiction, at NIDA, who do research on this. I think the most 
important thing that we can do now is reduce barriers to 
treatment, particularly medication treatment for opioid use 
disorder, to ensure that everyone who needs treatment has 
access to it. That's probably the most critical important thing 
that we can do in order to take the oxygen out of this illicit 
supply that's being pulled across our borders.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chester, thank you. But I wanted to 
end on your testimony, because if we can cut the desire, then 
the supply has nowhere to go. It is in our schools. My 
legislation, Stop Fentanyl Now Act, does naloxone, does the 
strips, and you have indicated it is a holistic approach.
    I just want to end, Mr. Chairman, by--I'm not sure if I did 
get a answer, but I'm asking unanimous consent to introduce in 
the record the Stop Fentanyl Now Act.
    Mr. Higgins. Without objection.
    [The information follows:]

    [GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    

    Ms. Jackson Lee. Additionally, I want to introduce into the 
record, ``Fentanyl is dominating headlines, but there's a more 
comprehensive drug problem happening in Texas.'' It goes on to 
talk about the broader crisis, synthetic opioids are not taken 
alone, and so health care and law enforcement officials are 
dealing with multiple deadly drugs at once. That means we must 
cut into the desire. I use that term because it's desire 
because you're addicted.
    [The information follows:]
           Submitted For the Record by Honorable Jackson Lee
fentanyl is dominating headlines, but there's a more comprehensive drug 
                       problem happening in texas
Lawmakers are passing laws in an attempt to slow the rise in fentanyl 
        overdoses, but drug advocates warn the opioid is mostly a 
        booster for other illegal drugs.
by Stephen Simpson
June 19, 2023, 5 AM Central
    Fentanyl has been in the headlines across Texas, grabbing the 
attention of State leaders worried about the drug crossing over the 
State's border with Mexico and overdose deaths among young people.
    But often left out of the discussion is that the drug is one part 
of a broader addiction crisis in the State. The synthetic opioid is 
rarely taken alone, and health care and law enforcement officials are 
dealing with multiple deadly drugs at once.
    The illicit use of fentanyl began increasing in Texas around 2015, 
quickly sparking a crisis. Obtained with a doctor's prescription, the 
synthetic opioid can be an effective pain reliever. But there's been a 
rise both in the illegal use of the drug and now the manufacture of 
counterfeit prescription drugs that contain fentanyl but are packaged 
to look like something else, in an effort to cause addiction and 
generate repeat buyers.
    ``It's certainly, at this moment, the drug and the drug supply that 
is the most dangerous,'' said Katharine Neill Harris, a drug policy 
fellow at Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy.
    Opioids, including heroin, prescription pills, and fentanyl, have 
caused the most overdose deaths in Texas, according to a Texas Health 
and Human Services report that studied death certificate data from 2010 
to 2019.
    And because opioids are often mixed with other drugs, there's been 
a rise in deaths known as polysubstance overdoses. The most recent 
state data shows those deaths reaching a rate of four per 100,000 
people in 2019.
    The most prevalent drug combinations were commonly prescribed 
pills, like hydrocodone and oxycodone, mixed with depressants like 
benzodiazepines and psychostimulants that include amphetamine and 
methamphetamine.
    ``That is the reason I caution very much against focusing on one 
drug,'' Neill Harris said. ``Fentanyl is certainly a big problem. But I 
don't think it's necessarily the last drug crime crisis that we are 
going to face.''
    The role of methamphetamine in the illegal drug market has been 
pushed aside in headlines as images of drug use in the South turned 
from exploding meth labs to potentially deadly fentanyl pills. But drug 
experts say meth has made an unwanted comeback as meth manufacturers 
have begun making a stronger product.
    ``Meth is eating everybody's lunch and nobody's talking about it. 
Meth is crawling up on everybody,'' said Peter Stout, president and 
chief executive officer of the Houston Forensic Science Center. ``Meth 
fatalities are way up even if you look at the Texas numbers.''
    Experts say if Texas wants to solve the overdose problem, officials 
here must fully realize the state has an overall drug issue that goes 
beyond fentanyl. Here's a look at the broader drug situation across 
Texas.
                       what are the drug trends?
    When the University of Texas at Austin's Addiction Research 
Institute studied calls made to poison control centers, admissions to 
drug treatment programs and drug seizures in 2021, researchers found 
the most common drugs flowing across the State's southern border from 
Mexico were methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, marijuana, fentanyl, 
benzodiazepines like Xanax, and synthetic cannabinoids more commonly 
known as ``spice'' or K2.
    While marijuana is still popular in Texas, its role in the illegal 
drug market has diminished greatly as 25 states across the country so 
far have passed laws to legalize it. When Texas legalized hemp in 2019, 
the prosecution of low-level pot cases declined due to the costly 
testing needed to determine if a vape pen liquid or a gummy contains 
marijuana or hemp because both come from the same plant species.
    But hemp contains less than 0.3 percent of tetrahydrocannabinol, or 
THC, the ingredient in marijuana that gets you high. Anything with less 
THC is hemp.
    Synthetic narcotics like fentanyl, meanwhile, have shot up the 
ranks of causes of overdose deaths. In the past 5 years, deaths from 
synthetics have surpassed deaths from other opioids, heroin and 
depressants.
                           what is fentanyl?
    Illegally manufactured fentanyl is a perilous chemical experiment, 
a stew of synthetic opioids.
    Opium derived from poppies has long been used as a painkiller and 
recreational drug. Opioids like fentanyl or oxycodone are chemical 
concoctions that duplicate those effects.
    Fentanyl was created in 1960 and approved for use in America in 
1968. It's most commonly used as a sedative and pain reliever for 
patients. Legally obtained fentanyl is usually administered to patients 
through pills, intravenous therapy, skin patches or nasal spray.
    But it can also be distilled and blended to produce a fine powder 
that can be easily added to other drugs.
    Its potent molecules scurry straight to the brain, where thousands 
of receptors, similar to tiny satellite dishes, pull in signals from 
cells in the body. They have different jobs, some gathering information 
to control organ functions, others emotions or moods.
    Fentanyl latches on to the receptors that signal pain and shuts 
them down. And when those receptors are turned off, the human body 
reacts in ways that can be fatal, including shutting down lungs and 
other vital organs.
    The drug is considered 100 times more potent than morphine and 50 
times more potent than heroin.
    Fentanyl isn't the only drug mixture that has the Federal Drug 
Enforcement Administration concerned as the growing threat of xylazine 
is starting to make its way into Texas.
                         xylazine: a new threat
    Xylazine is a tranquilizer, as opposed to a painkiller, doing its 
work by numbing nerves rather than switching off receptors in the 
brain. It targets the central nervous system, the nerve highways 
running in and out of the spinal column that carries messages to the 
rest of the body.
    Developed in 1962, it's used by veterinarians to keep elephants and 
horses calm enough to be examined or have their teeth cleaned. It 
mostly comes in liquid form and is sold in vials or preloaded syringes.
    When tranquilizers are used, the spinal column sends messages to 
the brain to slow down a bit. This produces a sense of calm and 
elation, which is why tranquilizers are also used to treat anxiety, 
panic attacks and sleep disorders.
    The Drug Enforcement Administration reported the first instances of 
this tranquilizer being used in illegal drug activity in the early 
2000's by drug dealers in Puerto Rico when they began mixing it with 
other substances. The practice has now spread across the United States 
and has been found recently in Texas mixed with fentanyl.
    Xylazine has been found in a growing number of overdose deaths 
across the country and is commonly encountered in combination with 
fentanyl, cocaine, heroin and a variety of other drugs.
                                  meth
    Methamphetamine is a white, odorless, crystalline powder that was 
developed early in the 20th century from its parent, amphetamine, and 
was originally used in nasal decongestants and inhalers. It can come in 
liquid form, which is easily made into a crystal form by drug 
traffickers. The highly addictive stimulant outpaced all others in the 
2021 UT study of Texas drug trends.
    The drug targets the brain and the spinal cord to create a sense of 
well-being or euphoria. Symptoms can include talkativeness, decreased 
appetite and a pleasurable sense of well-being. Meth also speeds up the 
body's systems to sometimes lethal levels by increasing blood pressure 
and heart and respiratory rates.
    Texas drug labs have recently started seeing meth being placed in 
counterfeit Adderall pills, meaning a segment of meth users might be 
unaware they are even addicted to the drug.
                                 heroin
    Heroin is made from morphine, a natural substance taken from the 
seed pod of an opium poppy plant typically grown in Asia, Mexico and 
Colombia. It's often portrayed in film and television as a needle drug, 
but the substance can also be snorted or smoked. In the past, heroin 
was often mixed with crack cocaine, but fentanyl has become the primary 
substance being added to poppy plant extract. Dealers will often 
``cut'' heroin with other substances to allow them to sell more of it 
at a higher price.
    The 2021 UT study of drug trends showed that Texas has avoided the 
heroin overdose crisis seen in other states because Mexican black tar 
heroin is the most common version of the drug found in the state. Black 
tar heroin tends to have an average purity of 28 percent and cannot be 
easily mixed with fentanyl.
    ``Tar'' heroin is usually sold in small balloons from which the 
user extracts the sticky substance from the balloon by mixing it with 
water over heat.
                             cocaine/crack
    Cocaine, the highly addictive stimulant made from coca leaves, was 
used more than a century ago to treat a wide variety of illnesses and 
was often used by early surgeons to block pain before local anesthetics 
were developed. Frequent use can alter brain structure and function. 
Users can inject or snort the powdered version of cocaine. ``Crack'' is 
the term often given to cocaine after it has been refined into a 
smokable substance.
                           what can be done?
    Lawmakers in Texas have recently tried to tackle the state's 
overdose problem by aggressively attacking fentanyl distribution and 
use by means of enforcement and awareness.
    Last week, Gov. Greg Abbott signed four bills to combat the growing 
fentanyl crisis, including House Bill 6, which classifies overdoses 
from the synthetic opioid as ``poisonings,'' triggering murder charges 
for those convicted of giving someone a fatal dose of the synthetic 
opioid.
    ``These four laws will forever change Texas through new protections 
that will help save lives,'' he said in a press release. ``In 2022, 
more than 2,000 people died from fentanyl in Texas--more than five a 
day. It is the No. 1 killer of Americans ages 18-45.''
    Other measures signed by Abbott will establish a Fentanyl Poisoning 
Awareness Month in October and require public schools to provide 
students with staff to assist with fentanyl abuse prevention and drug 
poisoning awareness. A fourth law will allow the distribution of Narcan 
or other opioid antagonists to Texas colleges and universities.
    However, bold substance abuse measures like legalizing test strips 
were once again rejected by lawmakers.
    Neill Harris, the drug policy fellow at Rice University's Baker 
Institute for Public Policy, said to combat fentanyl and the next 
impending drug crisis, the state must increase access to medical 
substance abuse treatments over enforcement measures.
    ``Until we have policies that address the demand, we're going to 
continue to have a problem with drug use,'' she said. ``Law enforcement 
has always had problems with reducing the drug supply. We look back 
over decades and it has never been effective at slowing down the 
supply. Because there's always a demand. It's just simple economics.''
    Michele Steeb, a senior fellow at the Texas Public Policy 
Foundation, a conservative think tank, said their organization views 
addiction as a complex brain disorder disease.
    ``Well-supported scientific evidence shows that brain disruptions 
reduce brain function which inhibits the ability to make decisions and 
regulate one's actions, emotions, and impulses,'' she said. `` . . . 
Diseases require treatment.''
    If the State can't control the supply, Neill Harris said, it's time 
to focus on reducing the harm of drug use by legalizing testing strips, 
making substitute drug treatment like methadone more available and 
giving more substance use options to the uninsured.

    Ms. Jackson Lee. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you 
will consider--and the Ranking Member, your courtesies--but I 
hope you will consider the legislation because we have to find 
a multiple level of dealing this.
    To the other witnesses, my time is gone, so I just want to 
express my recognition of your presence here, Mr. Cagen, Mr. 
Mandryck, Mr. Durham. I did not get a chance, but I'm well 
aware of the work that you're doing and the challenges that we 
all have.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Higgins. Yes, ma'am. The gentlewoman yields.
    The Ranking Member and I and perhaps our colleague, Ms. 
Lee, have other questions. So I'm going to open for a second 
round of questioning and recognize myself.
    Mr. Papadopoulos, some things are law and some percentages 
and statistics are law enforcement-sensitive, so I recognize 
that. But I'm going to ask you to share with America, to the 
extent that you can, so that the citizenry can comprehend just 
what an overwhelming challenge we face regarding the fentanyl 
that's already in our country.
    As we consider the volume seized, which is an unprecedented 
amount. You guys are pretty much seizing everything you have 
operational capability to seize, and it's an incredible job 
that you're doing. But regarding the volumes seized, regardless 
of at ports of entry or between ports of entry, can you share 
with America what you would consider to be a number that the 
public could consume and would not interfere with the 
operations--what's the percentage of seizures versus the 
totality of volume that has come into our country?
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Sir, thanks for the question. I don't--I 
think DEA strives to seize as much--as many drugs as possible. 
We don't find any acceptable amount of drugs entering the 
United States.
    Mr. Higgins. Of course.
    Mr. Papadopoulos. So we continue to do whatever we can.
    Mr. Higgins. Of course. You're seizing all you--I would 
imagine if you had twice the staff, you'd be seizing twice the 
volume that you have right now. There's so much out there.
    A drug dealer told me last year, he said, Cap, we have so 
much fentanyl, we're giving it away. It's why people are dying. 
They want their product to be more popular on the streets, so 
they're making it heavier. This is a guy who's been in the game 
for quite some time, is incarcerated. He said that they 
essentially are giving volumes away, and when people start 
dying, they reel it back. He said that they abandoned volumes 
of fentanyl if they're going to cross State lines, if they're 
moving an operation to another State, because it's so much 
cheaper to replace the fentanyl than it is to risk the inter-
State trafficking.
    So you're seizing unbelievable volumes of fentanyl. But how 
does that volume compare with what, in your estimation, would 
be the total? Are you seizing 25 percent, 50 percent, 15?
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Sir, I'd like to consult our intelligence 
division on that. I don't know that--I would want to give you a 
more precise answer.
    Mr. Higgins. Right next to you.
    Mr. Papadopoulos. This is DHS, but yes.
    Mr. Mandryck. Sir, so a little explanation first. The 
challenge with something like fentanyl is being synthetic, 
there's no agriculture-based place to get an initial estimate. 
So unlike cocaine or marijuana where we can kind of do an 
oversight to see general cultivation estimates, we can't do 
that with synthetics like fentanyl or methamphetamine.
    When we look at it holistically from an intelligence 
perspective, it's probably within that 25 percent mark based 
off demand.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you. I think that's an honest answer. 
That's an honest answer, and this will paint the picture for 
America of the challenge that we face.
    I yield the balance of my time and recognize the Ranking 
Member for additional questions.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I'm going to follow up on your question from a different 
perspective. Ports of entry, Mr. Mandryck--and correct me if 
I'm wrong here--but only 2 or 3 percent of our passenger cars 
are actually inspected right now with nonintrusive technology. 
Fifteen to 17 percent of our commercial vehicles are inspected, 
and you have these record volumes of seizures. It's--the Biden 
administration now is talking about going to 40 percent 
inspection of vehicles coming through and maybe 70 percent of 
commercial vehicles by 2026.
    I'm going to ask you to straight line and speculate. What's 
it going to do to the seizures at the border?
    Mr. Mandryck. Sir, as part of the layered approach, the 
nonintrusive inspection has become a key part of it. With that, 
you know, 2 percent in the passenger vehicles, that's yielded a 
significant volume of overall seizures. So that extrapolation 
from that 2 percent to 40 percent, we'll have significant 
increase in seizures. Once you layer in things like the officer 
intuition, the canine capabilities, those seizure volumes are 
going to continue to increase.
    Mr. Correa. Again, if I heard you earlier, all of you, your 
testimony, you're looking at drones now being a way, by the 
way, of actually bringing in fentanyl into the United States. 
Is that correct?
    Mr. Mandryck. There certainly is that potential, yes, sir.
    Mr. Correa. I mean, I don't know what a drone costs, and I 
don't know what the value of a payload would be. But if we do a 
cost-benefit analysis, I'd imagine you can just flood any part 
of our border or borders to come up with a very profitable 
situation.
    Mr. Mandryck. Yes, sir. The majority of the drones we've 
seen commercially available, things like the DJI, a couple 
hundred dollars to a thousand dollars of payload capacity is, 
you know, 5-ish kilograms, plus or minus, depending on what 
you're willing to pay.
    Mr. Correa. How much would that be in terms of value of 
fentanyl?
    Mr. Mandryck. Depending on if it's----
    Mr. Correa. You've got a $200 drone. What's the value of 
the payload?
    Mr. Mandryck. You could easily have, you know, a million 
dollars' worth per flight and continuous flights throughout the 
day.
    Mr. Correa. How much?
    Mr. Mandryck. Easily have a million dollars per----
    Mr. Correa. A million dollars. So that's a pretty good 
return on your investment.
    I know, this last week I was in my district, and I took a 
tour of a contractor that's about to put out a manu- --
manufacturing really a system, not only of radar, but radar to 
interfere with the controls of drones as they move forward. I 
would imagine that's also in your horizon in terms of investing 
for our national defense and border defense? Yes? No?
    Mr. Mandryck. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Correa. Again, gentlemen, I would just come back to my 
earlier statement and challenge that I made, which is, let us 
know what we, the Members of Congress, need to look at to help 
you do a better job of defending our country against fentanyl 
and other negative things that come in. You're the experts. You 
know, we look at little patterns, little tidbits of what's 
going on, but you're the experts, and you need to let us know 
what it is that you need.
    So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the rest of my time to 
you.
    Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
    The gentlewoman, Ms. Lee, is recognized for additional 
questions.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman.
    I want to just follow the line of questioning that I did 
not get a chance, and it might be redundant, redundant, 
redundant, but maybe asked in a different way.
    Whether it's the DEA or whether it's CBP and others, can I 
get--was it said--total amount in dollar value that's coming 
into the United States? Second, is most of it coming through 
the ports of entry, legal ports of entry?
    Mr. Mandryck. Ma'am, I can begin to answer that question 
for you. So, so far in fiscal year 2023, we're at just about 
20,000 pounds of fentanyl seized by CBP along the border, 
18,000 pounds of that with our Office of Field Operations at 
our ports of entry, and a little over 2,000 pounds with the 
U.S. Border Patrol.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you be able to capture what that 
might be in street value or any value?
    Mr. Mandryck. It's a little bit tougher, depending on the 
purity levels, powder versus pill format. With Operation Blue 
Lotus, as I had mentioned, alongside Four Horsemen, we've 
seized about 10,000 pounds that had a street value of about $90 
million.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. DEA, do you have a different number of 
what you've been able to deal with?
    Thank you. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Ma'am, we've seized, this fiscal year, 
approximately 57 million pills, which is about the same amount 
that we seized last year, and about 13,000 pounds of fentanyl 
powder. Again, the amounts vary. Pills can run anywhere from a 
few dollars if you're buying wholesale, all the way up, you 
know, if you're just buying a single pill, $10 to $20 a pill. 
So it's hard to estimate.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. What have you found--how difficult is 
the--first of all, to say what you've seen, if you're working 
with collaborative agencies of on-line sales and how difficult 
it is to catch the on-line sales. I give the example that is so 
tragic and so difficult, loving parents, great athlete, middle 
schooler, high schooler, A student, or average student, loved 
by all. One moment they're going upstairs to go to bed, and the 
next moment, in the morning hours, they are not with us. Pink 
pills, the on-line sales, the sale to children.
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes, ma'am. Social media and on-line 
sales are an increasing problem that we are keeping a very 
close eye on. The cartels are advertising and selling on social 
media. In Operation Last Mile, which I mentioned earlier, which 
was the U.S. distributors, it was over 1,400 cases. About 40 
percent of them involved social media. So it is a certain issue 
that we are keeping an eye on.
    As you mentioned, all these deaths are tragedies, of 
course. I would point out that we had family members last 
summer come into DEA headquarters and tell us their stories, 
and they shared stories similar to what you just mentioned. We 
started the Faces of Fentanyl, which is in our lobby. It 
started with a couple of hundred pictures. It is now up to 
5,000 pictures. It covers 8 walls in the DEA headquarters lobby 
that every DEA employee has to walk past to get to work that 
works at headquarters. The youngest person on that wall is 17 
months old and the oldest person is 70 years old. A lot of them 
did buy the pills that ended up killing them over social media.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. This--our approach to getting that--again, 
my legislation deals with enhanced penalties that's on the back 
side of it for those utilization on social media to sell pills. 
So it's on the criminal end, it has the treatment end, as Mr. 
Chester emphasized. But, anyhow, you know how do we do an eagle 
eye on that, those sales on that phone or that iPad or when 
you're alone and you order them and they come in whatever 
package or you send it to somebody else and you have pink pills 
and you take them?
    Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes, ma'am. That goes back to getting the 
word out. Public awareness is a big part of this, in addition 
to enforcement. The social media companies, frankly, have to do 
more.
    When I was growing up, if you wanted to buy drugs, you 
needed to know somebody that had them or where to go to get 
them. Right now, everybody with a smartphone knows a drug 
dealer, unfortunately, and that includes our kids. So getting 
the word out is going to help with that.
    I mentioned earlier, we're in an unprecedented crisis which 
requires unprecedented collaboration, including with social 
media companies, because with that collaboration we will save 
lives.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. I think you're 
absolutely right. I am a rabid supporter of the First 
Amendment, but we have a crisis of--you've got 5,000 and 
growing. We have a crisis around children, and there is a level 
of responsibility that we must demand. I thank you for these 
numbers.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Higgins. The gentlewoman yields.
    I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and 
Members for their questioning.
    Members of the subcommittee may have some additional 
questions for the witnesses and we would ask that the witnesses 
respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), 
the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                              [all]