[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
PROTECTING THE U.S. HOMELAND: FIGHTING THE FLOW OF FENTANYL
FROM THE SOUTHWEST BORDER
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
BORDER SECURITY
AND ENFORCEMENT
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JULY 12, 2023
__________
Serial No. 118-21
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-231 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
Stephen Siao, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON BORDER SECURITY AND ENFORCEMENT
Clay Higgins, Louisiana, Chairman
Michael Guest, Mississippi J. Luis Correa, California,
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Ranking Member
Tony Gonzales, Texas Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Robert Garcia, California
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
officio) (ex officio)
Natasha Eby, Subcommittee Staff Director
Brieana Marticorena, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable Clay Higgins, a Representative in Congress From the
State of Louisiana, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Border
Security and Enforcement:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable J. Luis Correa, a Representative in Congress From
the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Border Security and Enforcement:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Mr. Kemp L. Chester, Senior Advisor to the Director of National
Drug Control Policy, Office of National Drug Control Policy,
Executive Office of The President:
Oral Statement................................................. 11
Prepared Statement............................................. 13
Mr. Steven W. Cagen, Assistant Director, Homeland Security
Investigations, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Mr. James Mandryck, Deputy Assistant Commissioner, Office of
Intelligence, U.S. Customs and Border Protection, U.S.
Department of Homeland Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 24
Prepared Statement............................................. 26
Mr. George Papadopoulos, Acting Chief of Operations, Drug
Enforcement Administration, U.S. Department of Justice:
Oral Statement................................................. 30
Prepared Statement............................................. 32
Mr. Tyrone Durham, Director, Nation-State Threats Center, Office
of Intelligence and Analysis, U.S. Department of Homeland
Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 37
For the Record
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Bill........................................................... 54
Article........................................................ 65
PROTECTING THE U.S. HOMELAND: FIGHTING THE FLOW OF FENTANYL
FROM THE SOUTHWEST BORDER
----------
Wednesday, July 12, 2023
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:21 p.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Clay Higgins
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Higgins, Gonzales, Luttrell,
Brecheen, Correa, Jackson Lee, Thanedar, Garcia, and Ramirez.
Also present: Representatives D'Esposito, Ivey, and
Goldman.
Mr. Higgins. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement will come to
order.
Without objection, the subcommittee may recess at any
point.
The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from
Government experts on the elaborate drug operations conducted
by the transnational criminal organizations along the United
States-Mexico border which threaten the safety and security of
American communities.
From the importation of precursor chemicals for production
from China to the distribution of fentanyl in the United
States, transnational criminal organizations are wreaking havoc
on American communities, and the Committee on Homeland Security
seeks answers.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good afternoon, gentlemen. Thank you for being here, and
welcome to the Subcommittee on Border Security and Enforcement
hearing on fighting the flow of fentanyl from the Southwest
Border.
The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the Biden
administration's failures and perhaps to examine some areas of
shared success with previous administrations.
We welcome our witnesses from the Office of the National
Drug Control Policy, the Department of Homeland Security, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, and I thank you all for being
here today.
I'd like to begin by thanking our Customs and Border
Protection front-line agents and officers who work tirelessly
every day to protect our country despite the negligent policies
that they're subject to and the lack of support that they have
reported from the Biden administration.
Every day, transnational criminal organizations use
America's complex highway systems to smuggle illicit drugs,
such as deadly fentanyl, and human beings into our country.
These criminal organizations pose an enormous threat to the
United States, as they undermine our public safety and flood
our streets with drugs.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, the CDC,
cites drug poisoning as the leading cause of mortality due to
injury in the United States. Over 150 people die in our Nation
every day from overdoses related to synthetic opioids like
fentanyl.
Fentanyl has poured across our borders and into the streets
of America while the Biden administration continues to
implement policies that have, in fact, emboldened and enriched
these transnational criminal organizations.
It would be impossible to discuss the free flow of fentanyl
at our borders without mentioning China's significant role in
the shipping of precursor chemicals to the Mexican cartels. The
cartels and China have a complicated money- and drug-laundering
operation. This operation kills Americans every day. In fact,
according to the CDC, fentanyl is the leading cause of death of
Americans age 18 to 45.
As the flow of illegal immigrants continues to overwhelm
Customs and Border Protection, it's inevitable that more and
more drugs will slip through our defenses and into our country.
As long as the Biden administration continues to fail
enforcement of our immigration laws, the cartels will continue
to reap the benefits.
Secretary Mayorkas has been derelict in his duties and has
failed this country. He's continuously refused to enforce
immigration law. He refused to prosecute illegal entries and
refused to utilize previous immigration tools that had been
proven effective. These actions have increased the flow of
illegal aliens into this country, enriched the Mexican cartels,
and overwhelmed our front-line agents and officers, which has
led, of course, to more and more drugs flowing into the United
States.
There's quantifiable impact of this destruction on our
country. As drugs have poured into the United States, overdose
deaths have increased every year, from 92,000 in 2020 to
109,680 in 2022. These are our brothers, our sisters, our
family, our friends and neighbors. The Biden administration
must reconcile with this devastation, and it's our job in
Congress to hold the administration accountable.
The cartels have quickly learned to outmaneuver the system
we had in place. With the help of the Chinese Communist Party
and the Biden administration's ineffectiveness, they've
smuggled an unprecedented amount of fentanyl and trafficked
these dangerous and deadly drugs into our country, have taken a
record number of American lives, and brought in regular
billion-dollar profits. They've torn countless scores of
thousands of American families apart.
This subcommittee will not allow the Biden administration,
nor Secretary Mayorkas, to sweep their failures under the rug.
Today, this hearing will expose the arterial bleed at our
Southern Border and the ensuing fight against synthetic opioids
that has made its way to the forefront of all of our lives.
I yield back the balance of my time, and I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses.
[The statement of Chairman Higgins follows:]
Statement of Chairman Clay Higgins
July 12, 2023
Good afternoon and welcome to the Subcommittee on Border Security
and Enforcement hearing on fighting the flow of fentanyl from the
Southwest Border. The purpose of today's hearing is to examine the
Biden administration's haphazard fight to disrupt the flow of fentanyl
into the United States. I would like to welcome our witnesses from the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, Department of Homeland
Security, and the Drug Enforcement Administration for being here today.
Most recently, I was appointed by Speaker McCarthy to serve on the
Task Force to Combat Mexican Drug Cartels. The purpose of the task
force is to examine cartel operations, educate the American people on
the impacts of cartel violence, provide legislative recommendations,
and most importantly help save lives. I look forward to working with my
colleagues in this crucial endeavor.
Every day, Transnational Criminal Organizations uses America's
complex highway systems to smuggle illicit drugs, such as deadly
fentanyl, and humans into our country. These criminal organizations
pose an enormous threat to the United States as they undermine our
public safety and flood our streets with drugs.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) cites drug
poisoning as the leading cause of mortality due to injury in the United
States. Of the more than 105,000 drug poisoning overdose deaths in
2022, more than 75 percent involved opioids including fentanyl.
Under the Biden administration, America has been suffering from
wave upon wave of misery flooding across our Southwest Border. Fentanyl
has poured across our borders and into the streets of America while the
Biden administration continues to implement policies that embolden and
enrich these Transnational Criminal Organizations.
Mexican cartels rely on China for the precursor chemicals used to
make synthetic opioids. The Sinaloa and Cartel de Jalisco Nueva
Generacion (CJNG) are the two biggest importers of synthetic opioids
into the United States, and both rely on a complex system with partners
in China to import fentanyl precursors. The precursors are then
processed in labs in Mexico and then smuggled into the United States.
We would be mistaken not to mention China's significant role in the
shipping of precursors and laundering of money. It is vital that the
Biden administration recognize China's role in providing the vital
ingredients used in illicit products that are killing United States
youth. In fact, according to the CDC, fentanyl is the leading cause of
death of Americans ages 18-45.
As the flow of illegal immigrants continues to overwhelm Customs
and Border Protection, it is inevitable that more and more drugs will
slip through our defenses and into our country.
Secretary Mayorkas has been derelict in his duties to this country
and has continuously refused to enforce immigration law, refused to
prosecute illegal entries, and refused to utilize previous immigration
tools at his disposal. These actions have increased the flow of illegal
aliens into this country, enriched Mexican cartels, and overwhelmed our
front-line agents and officers, which has led to more and more drugs
flowing into the United States.
The reckless open-border policies set by President Biden and
Mayorkas have greatly benefited the Mexican cartels. The cartels
quickly learned to outmaneuver the system, and with the help of the
Chinese Communist Party, they have smuggled an unprecedented amount of
fentanyl, taken a record number of American lives, brought in billion-
dollar profits, and have torn families apart.
Secretary Mayorkas' blatant disregard for the security and sanctity
of the American people has wounded our great nation deeply. This
subcommittee intends to hold Secretary Mayorkas and the Biden
administration accountable for their actions.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time and look forward to
hearing from our witnesses.
Mr. Higgins. Without objection, I'd like to waive on the
gentleman from New York, Mr. D'Esposito.
Mr. D'Esposito will be permitted to sit on the dais for
this subcommittee hearing and ask questions of the witnesses.
I recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, thank you very much for holding this most important
hearing on transnational criminal organizations and, of course,
fentanyl.
Mr. Chairman, I want to ask also unanimous consent that Mr.
Ivey and Mr. Goldman be permitted to sit with the subcommittee
and question today's witnesses.
Mr. Higgins. Without objection.
Mr. Correa. Again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this
most important hearing.
We also need to dismantle fentanyl supply lines. The
surging resources to conduct inbound inspections are badly
needed. We need to work collaboratively to make sure that these
seizures lead to arrests and prosecutions of those engaged in
these illegal, dangerous businesses.
That's why I'm glad to hear about the Department's recent
successes in operations like Blue Lotus, the Four Horsemen--
both of these that have seized nearly 10,000 pounds of fentanyl
that were destined to go to our communities. Of course, these
operations also resulted in almost 300 arrests. I understand
the Department has used the intel from these successes to move
to the next phase, which is to target and prevent other
fentanyl from entering the United States.
I hope our witnesses today will share about--a little bit
of information about the two new operations being moved ahead,
which are Operation Artemis and Operation Rolling Wave.
For today's witnesses from the White House, DEA, CBP, and
Homeland Security Investigations, or HSI, I want to hear in
your testimony about how the administration has been working to
mitigate these threats to our country as well as to Main
Street.
We know transnational criminal organizations and the
illicit supply of fentanyl are not new challenges. In fact, the
number of fentanyl seizures began to increase in the summer of
2020 under the previous administration. As you know, the threat
of fentanyl does not begin or end at our Southern Border.
We need to also improve our public health care response to
this crisis and address the addiction plaguing our communities,
while providing support for those that are trying to recover
from drug addiction.
Of course, to tackle transnational criminal organizations
and fentanyl, we can't just focus on seizures alone. We also
need to go after their profits and supply chains. Again, let me
repeat: We also need to go after their profits and supply
chains.
I'm glad to hear that, under this administration, Homeland
Security Investigation has continued Operation Pelican Bones,
which seeks to disrupt the financial tools used by
transnational criminal organizations to launder money; as well
as Operation Hydra that goes after the precursors needed to
create fentanyl; and, of course, Operation Chain Breaker that
targets the equipment needed to manufacture pills.
Initiatives like these, gentlemen, to dismantle illicit
networks and limit TCOs' financial accesses are needed. Yet we
also need to recognize that this is a global threat, a world-
wide threat. Strong and collaborative partnerships with
international partners are critical to dismantling
transnational criminal organizations.
That's why this morning the Chairman and I introduced the
bipartisan Cooperation on Combating Human Smuggling and
Trafficking Act, which would direct Homeland Security
Investigations to expand its Transnational Criminal
Investigative Units. These vetted and trained units of foreign
law enforcement work with HSI to investigate transnational
criminal organizations. They need to stop human smuggling and
the flow of dangerous drugs before they reach our borders.
I hope my colleagues across the aisle will continue to join
me in calling for responsible action, like expanding these
transnational criminal investigative units and putting more
resources toward our ports of entry, instead of throwing around
harmful rhetoric about invading Mexico, our second-largest
trading partner and, of course, a critical partner in fighting
transnational crime.
While I have focused primarily on the law enforcement
action we can take to dismantle transnational criminal
organizations, we must also recognize that this isn't the only
border issue. It's also a public health care challenge. These
criminals across the world seek to make record profits at the
cost of lives--American lives on Main Street. There is wide-
spread, untreated drug addiction in our streets, leading some
individuals to consume dangerous substances that may be laced
with fentanyl.
Hope our witnesses today from the Office of National Drug
Control Policy can speak also to the administration's strategy
to reduce the demand for illicit drugs on our streets.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses for taking time from
your very busy schedules to talk to us today. I welcome your
suggestions how we in Congress can help you better accomplish
your job.
Thank you very much, and I now turn it back to Chairman
Higgins for today's proceedings.
[The statement of Ranking Member Correa follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member J. Luis Correa
July 12, 2023
I would like to start by thanking Chairman Higgins for holding
today's hearing on transnational criminal organizations and fentanyl.
For today's witnesses from the White House, DEA, CBP, and Homeland
Security Investigations (HSI), I look forward to hearing your testimony
about the administration's actions to mitigate these threats.
We know transnational criminal organizations and the illicit supply
of fentanyl are not new challenges. In fact, the number of fentanyl
seizures began to increase in the summer of 2020 under the previous
administration. But the threat of fentanyl does not begin or end at the
Southern Border.
We need to improve our public health response to this crisis and
address the addiction plaguing our communities while providing support
to those recovering. We also need to dismantle fentanyl supply chains,
surging resources to conduct inbound inspections, and working to
indict, arrest, and prosecute those engaged in this illegal business.
That's why I was glad to hear about the Department's recent successes
in Operations Blue Lotus and Four Horsemen, which seized nearly 10,000
pounds of fentanyl headed for our communities and resulted in 284
arrests.
I understand that the Department has used the insights gained from
these two operations to launch the next phase of its campaign to target
and prevent fentanyl from entering the United States. I hope our
witnesses will share more about the two new operations, Operation
Artemis and Operation Rolling Wave. To tackle transnational criminal
organizations and fentanyl, we can't just focus on seizures. We also
need to go after their profits and supply chains.
I am glad that, under this administration, Homeland Security
Investigations has continued Operation Pelican Bones--which seeks to
disrupt the financial tools used by transnational criminal
organizations to launder money--as well as Operation Hydra, which goes
after the precursor chemicals needed to create fentanyl, and Operation
Chain Breaker, which targets the equipment needed to manufacture pills.
Initiatives like these are critical to dismantle illicit networks and
limit TCOs' financial access. But we also need to recognize that this
is a global threat, and strong, collaborative partnerships with
international partners are critical to dismantling transnational
criminal organizations.
That's why this morning the Chairman and I introduced the
bipartisan Cooperation on Combatting Human Smuggling and Trafficking
Act, which would direct Homeland Security Investigations to expand its
Transnational Criminal Investigative Units. These vetted and trained
units of foreign law enforcement work with HSI to investigate
transnational criminal organizations, aiming to stop human smuggling
and the flow of dangerous drugs before they reach our borders.
I hope my colleagues across the aisle will continue to join me in
calling for responsible action, like expanding these transnational
criminal investigative units and putting more resources toward our
ports of entry, instead of throwing around harmful rhetoric about
invading Mexico--one of our closest trading partners and a critical
partner in the fight against transnational crime.
While I have focused primarily on the law enforcement actions we
can take to dismantle transnational criminal organizations, we must
recognize that this isn't only a border security challenge or law
enforcement challenge. It's a public health challenge, as transnational
criminal organizations seek to make record profits at the cost of
American lives. There is wide-spread untreated addiction for drugs,
leading some individuals to consume dangerous substances that may be
laced with fentanyl. I hope our witness from the Office of National
Drug Control Policy can speak to the administration's strategy to
reduce the demand for illicit drugs in our communities.
Again, I appreciate all of witnesses' willingness to appear today
to discuss how we can increase our efforts to combat this serious
threat. I welcome any suggestions about how Congress can help you
accomplish your missions.
Mr. Higgins. I thank Ranking Member Correa.
All the Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statements of Ranking Member Thompson and Hon. Jackson
Lee follow:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
July 12, 2023
Let me start by saying that tackling the drug crisis is one of our
most pressing national security, law enforcement, and public health
challenges, and we must do more to protect American lives. Fentanyl
presents the newest iteration of a drug problem that America has had
for decades.
One way Congress can help protect Americans is to allocate
resources to aggressively target the source of drug trafficking--
Transnational Criminal Organizations or TCOs. We must understand that
these organizations, including cartels south of our border, operate as
a business. They are profit-driven. They are violent and criminal. But
they are not political or ideological. Transnational criminal
organizations profit from the demand for illicit drugs and at the
expense of American lives.
The Biden administration, through the agencies testifying today
among others, are working tirelessly to combat the TCOs and drug
traffickers. Rather than waste resources building a wall or using
migrants as scapegoats, the Biden administration has made historic
investments in border security and in fighting the scourge of fentanyl.
The administration has directed resources to the places where the drugs
are actually entering this country.
We know that about 90 percent of fentanyl is trafficked in cars and
trucks through ports of entry, not between them. Even the fentanyl
caught between ports of entry is mostly seized in vehicles at
checkpoints or out at sea--not on the backs of migrants. In addition,
it's important to recognize that U.S. citizens, not undocumented
migrants, represent more than 85 percent of convictions for fentanyl
trafficking.
The Biden administration has invested in technology at the ports of
entry to scan travelers, vehicles, and cargo entering the United States
with the intent to distribute illicit drugs. With these investments,
seizures are now at a record high. Unfortunately, CBP is only able to
scan about 2 percent of passenger vehicles and just 15 percent of
commercial vehicles. Imagine the amount of drugs we could stop from
coming into the country if we invested as much in non-intrusive
inspection technology as Republicans want to spend on more border wall.
This whole-of-Government approach led to the administration to
establish Operations Blue Lotus and Four Horsemen this spring. Under
these initiatives, CBP, HSI and State and local partners stopped nearly
10,000 pounds of fentanyl from entering our communities and conducted
284 arrests for fentanyl-related charges in just 2 months. These
operations are just a couple measures in the Biden administration's
multi-pronged strategy to combat TCOs and curtail the flow of illicit
fentanyl.
I want to commend Customs and Border Protection and other agencies
for their coordinated efforts to increase the number of seizures and
related investigations. I can't help but note that just a few years ago
my Republican colleagues touted drug seizures as a measure of success
under the Trump administration.
Now that the Biden administration has record seizures due to its
investments and its commitment to detection and interdiction efforts,
my Republican colleagues are criticizing the administration. This is
the height of hypocrisy.
While I appreciate the administration's efforts to stop fentanyl
and other drugs from entering our communities, it's important to
recognize that this is just one part of the solution. Law enforcement
and border security alone will never be enough. We must also tackle
this crisis with treatment and recovery options to restore people's
health and break the devastating cycle of addiction.
I urge my Republican colleagues to work together to provide the
necessary resources to Federal agencies to combat TCOs and prevent
fentanyl trafficking.
______
Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
July 12, 2023
Thank you, Chairman Higgins and Ranking Member Correa, for the
opportunity to speak today and thank you to the witnesses who are here.
My thanks to our hearing witnesses:
Mr. Kemp Chester, senior advisor of National Drug Control
Policy
Mr. Steven Cagen, assistant director of Homeland Security
Investigations
Mr. James Mandryck, deputy assistant commissioner, Office of
Intelligence, CBP
Mr. George Papadopoulos, acting chief of operations, DEA
Mr. Tyrone Durham, director, Nation-State Threat Center.
As a member of the House Judiciary and Homeland Security Committees
I have a unique view on the threat that fentanyl poses to our children,
families, communities, and our Nation.
As the Ranking Member of the Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on
Crime and Federal Government Surveillance I introduced The Stop
Fentanyl Now Act of 2023.
The Stop Fentanyl Now Act, a is important bill that will protect
children and youth from fentanyl, fentanyl-related synthetics, and
fentanyl-laced substances.
As illicit fentanyl floods our communities, fentanyl-related deaths
continue to increase at a devastating rate--claiming nearly 200 lives
each day in every corner of the country.
No community is safe from this public health crisis.
As illicit fentanyl floods our communities, fentanyl-related deaths
continue to increase at a devastating rate--claiming nearly 200 lives
each day in every corner of the country.
texas statistics
In my home State of Texas, fentanyl was linked to more than 1,600
fatal overdoses in 2021 while the CDC reports that there were more than
70,000 fentanyl-related deaths in the United States in that same year,
including roughly 1,500 individuals under the age of 20.
In 2022, more than 2,000 people died from fentanyl in Texas,
killing more than 5 Texans aged 18-45 per day.
I want to again reiterate unintentional fentanyl use, given that 97
percent of the 870 unintentional synthetic opioid deaths in Texas in
2022 were fentanyl-related.
national statistics
Fentanyl is now the leading cause of accidental death for young
Americans, killing more people than suicide, car accidents, or gun
violence.
No community is safe from this public health crisis.
It is found in every part of the United States.
Every drug purchased on the internet, on the street, or from people
can contain fentanyl regardless of the form (powders, capsules, pills,
and more).
The U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration found that 1 in 3
counterfeit pills on the market contained a potentially lethal dose of
fentanyl.
Kids of color have been the hardest hit by the fentanyl crisis,
with the highest increase in deaths among Native American, Latinx, and
Black youth.
More than 5,000 children and teens have died from overdoses
involving fentanyl in the past two decades, according to data published
in the Journal of American Medical Association (JAMA) Pediatrics (on
May 8, 2023).
More than half of those deaths occurred in the first 2 years of the
COVID-19 pandemic.
Fentanyl was involved in 1,557 adolescent deaths in 2021, a thirty-
fold increase since 2013; when the wave of overdose deaths involving
synthetic opioids started in the United States.
A surge that began in 2018 led to a nearly three-fold increase in
deaths among older adolescents and a nearly six-fold increase among
children younger than 5.
In 2021, 40 infants and 93 children ages 1 to 4 died from a
fentanyl overdose.
Specifically, fentanyl has been mistaken by children as candy and
chalk.
According to the DEA, bright-colored fentanyl pills designed to
hook children have been spotted in nearly two dozen States.
The DEA also suggested cartels are coloring blocks of the drug so
that it resembles sidewalk chalk.
These fatal pediatric overdoses involving fentanyl mirror trends
seen in adults.
In 2021, nearly 70,000 U.S. adults fatally overdosed on fentanyl,
the biggest spike in overdose deaths in the country's history.
Since 1999, however, the vast majority of pediatric deaths from
fentanyl have been among older teens ages 15 to 19 (89.6 percent).
Teen deaths from fentanyl have surged overthe past few years--
tripling overall and increasing 5 times for Black teens--according to
provisional data from the Centers for Disease Control.
In 2021, 77 percent of all teen overdose deaths involved fentanyl.
The FDA also recently warned of ``rainbow fentanyl'' manufactured
to look like candy to appeal to children.
Experts agree the surge of fentanyl deaths is overwhelmingly
traceable to social media, where children can easily buy prescription
and other drugs, many of which are counterfeit and contain lethal doses
of fentanyl.
For all ages, 43.8 percent of deaths occurred at home, and 87.5
percent were unintentional.
And the drug is now the primary agent noted in the pediatric opioid
crisis.
In particular, accidental exposures to fentanyl patches continue to
be deadly to children.
According tothe FDA, children can overdose on new and used fentanyl
patches by putting them in their mouth or sticking the patches on their
skin.
This can cause death by slowing the child's breathing and
decreasing the levels of oxygen in their blood.
h.r. 4272, the stop fentanyl now act of 2023
The Stop Fentanyl Now Act of 2023 is a necessary response to the
recent surge in overdoses and death that is claiming thousands of young
lives each year.
My bill would:
Provide training and resources to ensure schools and
teachers can administer opioid overdose reversal drugs or
devices;
Stop the on-line sale of little pink pills and other
brightly-colored pills that have been used to target and drive
addiction among youth--and have contributed to the recent surge
in fentanyl-related overdoses and deaths;
Require HHS and DOJ to develop and implement a national
strategy to educate the public about fentanyl, fentanyl-related
synthetics, and fentanyl-laced substances;
Provide grants to States to develop and implement treatment
programs for individuals addicted to these substances;
Decriminalize fentanyl test strips and provide grants to
States that adopt similar legislation;
Encourage DOJ to increase resources available to law
enforcement agencies to combat the trafficking of these
substances;
Require DOJ to establish an interagency task force to
coordinate Federal, State, and local efforts to combat the
trafficking of these substances;
Require HHS to conduct research to better understand the
effects of these substances, develop new treatments for
individuals addicted to them, and determine best practices for
prevention; and
Enhance penalties for offenses involving the distribution or
manufacture of adulterated or misbranded drugs, doing so with
the intent to defraud or mislead, as well as promotion or sale
of adulterated or misbranded drugs on-line.
The Stop Fentanyl Now Act of 2023 is comprehensive legislation that
broadly covers distribution of fentanyl-related synthetics and
fentanyl-laced substances by seeking to break the supply chain that is
now on-line and more available to our youth while punishing those who
are criminally engaged in such activity that is aimed at destroying
young Americans.
The bill also addresses demand for these drugs by educating the
public, including parents, teachers, and teens, and providing treatment
to those who suffer from substance use disorders.
The Stop Fentanyl Now Act of 2023 rejects the urge to criminalize
drug usage in order to address the problems caused by fentanyl and
recognizes that non-illicit fentanyl has medical uses.
And while we must stop the criminal production and distribution of
fentanyl and fentanyl-related synthetics, we must also recognize that
mass criminalization and incarceration will never solve the problems
associated with drugs of any kind.
We cannot incarcerate our way out of the country's latest epidemic
of drug abuse, especially when they involve mandatory minimum
sentencing schemes that fall hardest on low-level offenders and do
nothing to promote public safety or get drugs off the street.
While we must be committed to securing our border, if we want to
protect our children and stop the senseless loss of life caused by
fentanyl, fentanyl-related substances, and fentanyl-laced substances,
the Federal response must focus on prevention and education, treatment,
interdiction, and enforcement.
We must pass this legislation to truly protect Americans from the
scourge of fentanyl-related deaths.
This multi-disciplinary, whole-of-Government approach is doable and
should be done.
Failure to do so could be the cost of saving more lives.
Thank you, I yield back the remainder of my time.
______
Attachment.--DEA Trafficker-Quantities of ``Rainbow Fentanyl'' Arrive
in New York
October 04, 2022
https://www.dea.gov/press-releases/2022/10/04/trafficker-quantities-
rainbow-fentanyl-arrive-new-york
One person was arrested and approximately 15,000 fentanyl pills
were seized as part of an ongoing investigation into a fentanyl
trafficking organization. The fentanyl pills, in various colors, were
destined for distribution throughout New York City and had been
concealed in a LEGO box to deter law enforcement attention. The
fentanyl pills were also imprinted with ``M'' and ``30'' to resemble
``30 M'', Oxycodone Hydrochloride 30 mg pills.
This significant seizure, the largest to date in New York City,
signals more widespread distribution of these dangerous colorful pills.
The case highlights Mexican cartels' most recent tactics to attract the
public while deceiving them about the lethal drugs. The Sinaloa Cartel
and Jalisco New Generation Cartel are mass-producing fentanyl pills in
rainbow colors to not only brand their products, but use colors and
dyes to mimic candy and/or legitimate prescription drugs.
Frank A. Tarentino III, Special Agent in Charge of the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration's New York Division, Bridget G. Brennan, New
York City's Special Narcotics Prosecutor, New York City Police
Commissioner Keechant L. Sewell and New York State Police
Superintendent Kevin P. Bruen announced the seizure and arrest
following the arraignment of Latesha Bush.
``Rainbow fentanyl is a clear and present danger, and it is here in
New York City,'' said DEA Special Agent in Charge Frank Tarentino.
``Approximately forty percent of the pills we analyze in our lab
contain a lethal dose; and in a recent 15-week enforcement operation,
DEA New York seized half a million lethal pills. These staggering
statistics underscore the importance of reminding the public that just
one pill can kill; and this operation alone removed the equivalent of
500,000 lethal doses of fentanyl from circulation in the Empire State.
In the same reporting period, DEA seized the equivalent of over 36
million lethal doses nationally.''
NYC Special Narcotics Prosecutor Bridget G. Brennan said, ``Using
happy colors to make a deadly drug seem fun and harmless is a new low,
even for the Mexican cartels. Fentanyl is already involved in more than
80 percent of overdose deaths in the city. If you take any drug sold on
the street or through the internet, regardless of its medicinal
markings or festive appearance, you risk your life. My office and our
partners are committed to intercepting lethal fentanyl and ensuring
that these rainbow-colored pills don't lead more people down a sad path
of substance use and overdose death.''
``Disguising fentanyl as candy--and concealing it in children's
toys--will never hide the fact that fentanyl is a deadly poison that
harms our communities, our families, and our city,'' said Police
Commissioner Keechant L. Sewell. ``The criminal complaint unsealed
today is another example of the NYPD's relentless commitment to never
stop working to rid New York city of illegal drugs and I want to thank
the Special Narcotics Prosecutor for the city of New York, the DEA New
York Division, the New York State Police, and everyone else involved in
this case for their exceptional work.''
New York State Police Superintendent Kevin P. Bruen said, ``I want
to thank our members and law enforcement partners for their unwavering
work in stopping the flow of illegal drugs throughout our State. The
arrest of Latesha Bush and the seizure of these lethal drugs are the
direct result of a commitment to aggressively target and pursue
criminals who perpetuate the distribution of these narcotics. Together,
we will continue to eliminate these operations and those who seek to
destroy the quality of life within our communities.''
A criminal complaint filed by the Office of the Special Narcotics
Prosecutor (SNP) charges Bush, of Trenton, N.J., with Criminal
Possession of a Controlled Substance in the First and Third Degrees.
Bush was arraigned in Manhattan Criminal Court on Friday, September
30, 2022. Bail was set at $25,000 cash/$150,000 insurance company bond/
$100,000 partially secured surety bond.
The investigation was conducted by DEA's New York Drug Enforcement
Task Force (NYDETF) Group T-12, which is comprised of agents and
officers with DEA New York Division and the New York City Police
Department. SNP's Investigators Unit assisted in the investigation.
On Wednesday, September 28, 2022, at approximately 7:11 p.m.,
members of NYDETF Group T-12 were conducting surveillance as part of an
ongoing investigation into narcotics trafficking when they allegedly
observed Bush carrying what-appeared to be a black tote bag wrapped
around a large object as she entered a vehicle in front of 475 10th
Avenue in Manhattan.
Upon stopping the vehicle, agents and officers allegedly found Bush
in the rear seat, with two black tote bags and a yellow LEGO container
also in the rear seat. Inside the LEGO container were several brick-
shaped packages covered in black tape lying next to LEGO blocks. The
black tape covering one of the packages had been partially opened,
exposing multi-colored pills inside. A subsequent examination of the
packages revealed they contained approximately 15,000 pills.
During the investigation, agents and officers learned that just
prior to the arrest, Bush had travelled from New Jersey to the vicinity
of 475 10th Avenue in a rental car. Agents and officers also learned
that the multi-colored fentanyl pills allegedly originated in Mexico.
DEA laboratory analysis of the narcotics seized in New York is
pending. Preliminary testing indicated the presence of fentanyl.
Last week the DEA announced the results of the third phase of the
One Pill Can Kill initiative focused on combatting the fake pill threat
which led to the seizure of more than 10.2 million fentanyl pills and
approximately 980 pounds of fentanyl powder during the period of May 23
through Sept. 8, 2022. The amount of fentanyl taken off the streets
during this surge is equivalent to more than 36 million lethal doses
removed from the illegal drug supply. Additionally, 338 weapons were
seized, including rifles, shotguns, pistols, and hand grenades. There
were 390 cases investigated during this period, 51 cases are linked to
overdose poisonings and 35 cases link directly to one or both of the
primary Mexican cartels responsible for the majority of fentanyl in the
United States--the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel
(CJNG). In addition, 129 investigations are linked to social media
platforms, including Snapchat, Facebook Messenger, Instagram, and
TikTok.
Special Agent in Charge Frank A. Tarentino thanked the New York
City Office of the Special Narcotics Prosecutor, the New York City
Police Department, the New York State Police, SNP's Special
Investigations Bureau and Investigators Unit and Group T-12 of the New
York Drug Enforcement Task Force.
Mr. Higgins. I'm very pleased to have a distinguished panel
of witnesses before us today on this very important topic, and
I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise your right
hands.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Mr. Higgins. Let the record reflect that the witnesses have
answered in the affirmative.
Thank you, gentlemen. Please be seated.
I'd now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
Mr. Kemp Chester is a senior advisor to the director of
National Drug Control Policy. Previously, Mr. Chester served
for 27 years as a United States Army officer, serving in a
number of command and staff positions within the United States
and abroad. In his current role, Mr. Chester directs policy
focused on addressing the production and trafficking of illicit
drugs, including the United States counternarcotics
relationships with China and India.
Our witness seated at the table next to Mr. Chester is Mr.
Steven Cagen. He serves as the assistant director of the
Countering Transnational Organized Crime Division for Homeland
Security Investigations, where he leads a wide array of
operations investigating TCOs and narcotics trafficking. Mr.
Cagen comes with 25 years of Federal law enforcement
experience, including combating drugs and arms trafficking in
Mexico City and working his way through the ranks of Senior
Executive Service.
Thank you for being here, sir.
Mr. James Mandryck is deputy assistant commissioner in the
Office of Intelligence at the United States Customs and Border
Protection. In his role, Mr. Mandryck supports the day-to-day
operations of CBP's intelligence enterprise, including the
tactical and operational analysis that drives law enforcement
operational activities. Mr. Mandryck previously served as a
senior executive overseeing the National Border Security
Intelligence Watch.
Thank you for being here, good sir.
Our next witness is Mr. George S. Papadopoulos, who was
most recently appointed as United States Drug Enforcement
Administration's principal deputy administrator. That's quite a
title. Prior to this role, Mr. Papadopoulos served as the
agency's acting chief of operations, where he oversaw all
operational and enforcement matters for the DEA.
Thank you for being here today, good sir.
Mr. Tyrone Durham is the acting director of the Nation-
State Threat Center in the Office of Intelligence and Analysis
at the Department of Homeland Security.
I thank you, Mr. Durham, for joining us today.
I thank all the witnesses for joining us.
I now recognize Mr. Chester for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF KEMP L. CHESTER, SENIOR ADVISOR TO THE DIRECTOR OF
NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POLICY, OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL
POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
Mr. Chester. Chairman Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today on the very real challenge we confront from the
production and trafficking of deadly synthetic opioids across
our borders and into our communities.
I know I don't need to remind anyone here that someone in
America dies from a drug overdose or poisoning about every 5
minutes of every hour of every day. That is why the President
made ending the opioid epidemic a key pillar in his unity
agenda, challenging us to change the trajectory of this crisis
and save American lives.
Not long ago, the dominant model of drug trafficking
involved plant-based drugs like cocaine or heroin or
methamphetamine made from crude chemicals, moved through a
hierarchical drug-trafficking organization and eventually sold
in a face-to-face cash transaction somewhere in the United
States. While that structure still exists, it has been joined
by a synthetic opioid production and supply chain that operates
as a global business and exploits the structure of legitimate
commerce to obtain precursor chemicals, move funds, and make
internet-based sales of raw materials and finished drugs using
both fiat and cryptocurrency.
Today, the ability of an American teenager to find illicit
drugs is literally in the palm of their hand and as simple as
opening a social media app.
We are in the midst of a strategic transition between two
eras, where the cultivation and production of large volumes of
plant-based drugs has not ended, but the era of small-volume,
high-potency synthetic opioid production has clearly begun.
This problem does not start at our border and it will not
end at our border. It is a national security and economic
prosperity problem, as much as it is a law enforcement and
public health one.
In April of this year, the administration announced its
strategic approach to disrupt the global illicit fentanyl
supply chain. We call this approach commercial disruption,
which focuses and synchronizes all the tools of national power
to simultaneously attack four key vulnerabilities in the supply
chain: precursor chemicals; the pill presses, dye molds, and
encapsulating machines used to create counterfeit pills; the
commercial shipping that moves these items around the world;
and the flow of financial benefits and operating capital to
those involved in the illicit drug industry.
As part of this, we maintain close and mutually-beneficial
partnerships with key countries, such as Mexico and India, who
play a role in preventing the proliferation of these dangerous
synthetic drugs and in advancing our efforts to disrupt their
supply chain.
So for an issue in which United States and PRC interests
align, we are disappointed that they have chosen not to
substantively engage with the United States on counternarcotics
for more than a year. But this is a global problem, and the
United States leadership is essential.
Under our leadership, the international community has
scheduled nearly a dozen precursor chemicals, and we've raised
global awareness of the illicit synthetic drug supply chain.
Last week, Director Gupta joined Secretary of State Blinken
for the first meeting of the global coalition against synthetic
drugs. More than 80 countries convened at the ministerial level
to accelerate efforts against synthetic drugs.
Our efforts to reduce the presence of these drugs in our
communities must be closely linked with our equally strong
efforts to decrease their use. The administration is committing
a historic level of resources to lower the demand for these
drugs and keep Americans safe from their harms. The simple
truth is it cannot be easier to get illicit drugs in America
than it is to get treatment.
We are seeing some signs of progress. Just today, the CDC
released new data on provisional drug overdose deaths, showing
a continued flattening of drug overdose deaths through early
2023, halting a period of rapid increase from 2019 to 2021.
But that is not enough. Now is the time to redouble our
efforts, accelerate our work, and move this Nation and the
world beyond a crisis that has vexed us for the better part of
a decade. People in the throes of addiction are in a fight
every day, and they should expect nothing less from us as well.
On behalf of Dr. Gupta and the hard-working people at the
Office of National Drug Control Policy, I would like to thank
this subcommittee and your Congressional colleagues for your
leadership and bipartisanship on this incredibly difficult
issue. Ending the opioid and overdose epidemic demands the best
efforts of us all, and we look forward to continuing our work
with you.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Chester follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kemp L. Chester
Wednesday, July 12, 2023
Chairman Higgins, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Correa, Ranking
Member Magaziner and Members of the Subcommittees, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today on the very real challenge we confront
from the production and trafficking of deadly synthetic opioids across
our borders and into our communities. I am honored to join my
colleagues from the Departments of Homeland Security and Justice, who
are vital partners in implementing the National Drug Control Strategy,
and in keeping our country and our communities safe.
introduction
I am sure I do not need to remind anyone in this room that over a
1-year period we have lost more than 109,000 Americans to a drug
overdose or poisoning, more than 69 percent of which can be attributed
to a synthetic opioid like illicit fentanyl and other substances that
are structurally similar to fentanyl. That is someone in America dying
from a drug overdose or poisoning about every 5 minutes, every hour, of
every day.
Alongside those we have lost are those who have suffered a non-
fatal overdose. It is estimated that for every fatal overdose there are
14 non-fatal overdoses--more than 1.5 million in 2022 alone.
Additionally, 46 million people in America, almost 14 percent of the
population, are currently suffering from substance use disorder. Too
many Americans--those we have lost to overdoses, those who have
overdosed but did not lose their lives, and those living with a
substance use disorder--have either succumbed to drug use or carry the
burden of it in some way.
This is why the President made ending the opioid and overdose
epidemic a key pillar of his Unity Agenda, challenging us to reduce the
number of drug overdose deaths, put quality public health services
within reach for people with substance use disorder, and strengthen
public safety by disrupting the drug production and trafficking
pipeline that profits by harming Americans.
the environment of drug production and trafficking
There was a time, not very long ago, that drug production was
limited to processing poppy, or harvesting coca, or manipulating over-
the-counter pharmaceuticals with crude chemicals to make
methamphetamine. Those finished drugs were moved through a hierarchical
drug trafficking organization to a street-level retailer, and
eventually sold in a face-to-face cash transaction on a street corner
somewhere in the United States. That was the dominant model of drug
trafficking we saw for decades.
While that drug production and trafficking structure still exists,
it has been joined by a synthetic opioid production and supply chain
that is, in essence, a global business enterprise that demonstrates
access to huge capital resources, conducts routine collaboration among
raw material suppliers across international borders, uses advanced
technology to fund and conduct business, and possesses the capacity for
product innovation and strategies to expand markets.
These synthetic opioid producers and traffickers operate as free-
riders on the back of the 21st Century global economy that moves
products, ideas, and money across borders with incredible speed, and
they exploit that legitimate economic structure to sustain and enhance
their illicit business. This includes key activities such as the
provision of precursor chemicals, some of which are unregulated, and
their finished products that can be shipped in plain sight around the
world; physically dislocated payments that include the movement of
funds across borders; and the internet-based sales of raw materials and
finished drugs using both fiat and cryptocurrency.
And these synthetic opioids--principally fentanyl and its
analogues, though there are others--that are killing Americans are
manufactured outside of the United States and brought across our
borders and into our communities by a variety of means. Today, an
American teenager can find illicit drugs in the palm of their hand, and
simply by opening a social media app.
We find ourselves in the midst of a strategic transition between
two eras, where the cultivation and production of large volumes of
plant-based drugs like heroin and cocaine has not ended, but the era of
small volume, high-potency, synthetic drug production has clearly
begun.
While we need to address the on-going plant-based drug problem that
continues to harm our citizens, we must simultaneously develop and
implement the means necessary to confront the emerging synthetic opioid
production and trafficking environment that is defined by complexity,
dynamism, and resiliency. This requires increased effort, a more
sophisticated approach, better use of the tools available to us, and
the application of new tools we have not traditionally employed against
the illicit drug problem. We cannot simply charge into the future by
doing the exact same things we have been doing, but just trying to do
them better, and we cannot address the most dynamic and complex drug
production and trafficking environment in history with the same
strategies that may have served us well in the past but are
insufficient for the challenges we face today.
While the administration is aggressively pursuing investments in
non-intrusive inspection equipment, artificial intelligence, machine
learning, and more, to prevent these drugs from crossing our geographic
borders, we must bear in mind that this problem does not start at our
border and it will not end at our border. It starts with the illicit
synthetic opioid production in another country and ends in an emergency
department or morgue somewhere in America. For the United States, it is
a national security and economic prosperity problem as much as it is a
public safety and public health one, and we must face it head-on with
the bold, comprehensive, and determined strategic approach it deserves.
Doing so requires strong leadership from the White House providing
unity of both purpose and effort across the Federal Government; strong
bilateral relationships with key countries that share responsibility to
address the problem and must be part of the solution; and perhaps, most
importantly, the United States' global leadership.
the administration's strategic approach
The President has declared ``that international drug trafficking,
including the illicit production, global sale, and widespread
distribution of illegal . . . fentanyl and other synthetic opioids . .
. constitutes an unusual and extraordinary threat to the national
security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States.'' In April
of this year, the administration announced its Strengthened Approach to
Crack Down on Illicit Fentanyl Supply Chains, a whole-of-Government
approach to save lives by disrupting the trafficking of illicit
fentanyl and its precursors into American communities. We call this
approach Commercial Disruption, and it focuses and synchronizes our
national security and public safety capabilities, including innovative
approaches, against criminal facilitators and enablers, and attacks
four key vulnerabilities in the illicit fentanyl supply chain to
maximize our impact across the drug producers' and traffickers'
spectrum of capabilities:
The precursor chemicals, including unregulated chemicals
that can be used to create immediate precursors.
The pill presses, die molds, and encapsulating machines used
to create the pills that are killing far too many Americans.
The drug producers' ability to move raw materials like
precursors and manufacturing machinery around the world via
commercial shipping.
The flow of financial benefits and operating capital to
individuals and groups directly and indirectly involved in the
illicit drug industry.
Targeting those four critical elements will allow us to remove the
advantages fentanyl producers and traffickers currently enjoy, disrupt
their production and supply chains, and reduce the availability of
these dangerous substances in America's communities.
As part of this approach, we are also working much more closely
with our private-sector partners. The vast majority of the physical and
virtual terrain on which drug traffickers operate such as the dark web,
e-commerce sites, mail and express consignment shippers and freight
forwarders, banks, cryptocurrency vendors, legitimate chemical
suppliers, and pill press and die manufacturers, are private-sector
entities. And some of them likely have no idea they are a constituent
part of an illicit business enterprise.
We must raise a sophisticated awareness of this environment with
the commercial sector around the world, and engage with them in a full
partnership, so we can sift out the unwitting from the knowing and
intentional actors here in the United States and abroad, and then focus
our efforts on the latter in a more precise way.
bilateral relationships with key countries
A second significant aspect of addressing this challenge is
maintaining close and mutually beneficial partnerships with key
countries who not only play a role in preventing the global
proliferation of these dangerous synthetic drugs, but will also play a
role in advancing our global efforts to disrupt the global supply
chain.
Mexico.--We have redoubled our efforts with the government of
Mexico, working alongside it as it does more to address fentanyl
production and trafficking. President Biden has stressed the importance
he places on this issue with President Lopez Obrador, and our two
governments are working more closely than ever on the fentanyl problem
to establish tangible goals, assess progress, and follow-through on
mutual commitments.
Given the combination of our shared border, our two-hundred-year
bilateral relationship, and the negative effects that drug producers
and traffickers in Mexico have on both sides of the border, it is
vitally important that our bilateral relationship be characterized by
mutual respect, and a sense of the shared responsibility we have to
address the shared threat of drug trafficking and its associated
criminality. Further, we have strengthened all of North America in our
work with Mexico and Canada through the trilateral North American Drug
Dialogue.
Just as the United States does not have to lose 109,000 people to
drug overdoses or poisonings every year, the people of Mexico can have
a future free from an expectation of unaccountable criminality and the
scourge of drug production that corrupts their towns, victimizes their
families, and pollutes their natural spaces.
The People's Republic of China.--As we are leading the global
effort to disrupt the production and trafficking of these drugs, we
look forward to the People's Republic of China (PRC) joining us in that
effort.
However, no one should mistake our willingness to engage for an
acceptance of the status quo, especially on an issue felt so acutely in
the United States and when so many lives have been impacted. Years of
seizure and law enforcement data show that unscrupulous elements within
the PRC have been a major source for precursor chemical shipments, pill
presses, and die molds entering the Western Hemisphere.
This is also an issue in which the interests of the United States
and China align, and our past engagement on the counternarcotics issue
has brought some impressive results, including the domestic scheduling
of fentanyl as a class, which had an immediate impact on reducing the
flow of fentanyl and its analogues directly from the PRC. The United
States will work with the PRC whenever possible to fully address the
grave and growing problem of illicit synthetic drug production and
trafficking at the global level.
Given the gravity of this issue, it is disappointing that the PRC
has chosen to not take substantive steps to counter illicit synthetic
drug production and trafficking for more than a year. With leadership
comes accountability, and while the PRC plays a major role in this
global problem, it has thus far declined to play a constructive role in
helping to solve it. Last week, as nearly 100 countries and
international organizations gathered in a demonstration of deep concern
and a desire for tangible solutions to the grave and growing problem of
illicit synthetic drug production and trafficking, the PRC declined its
invitation to participate in the virtual ministerial meeting to launch
the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drugs. We sincerely hope that
the PRC can find the political will to address this problem
commensurate with its capability to do so.
India.--The United States and India have been growing our
counternarcotics relationship since 2020 through a bilateral
counternarcotics Working Group, addressing the law enforcement,
multilateral, regulatory, and drug demand reduction dimensions of this
problem with a focus on tangible results and mutually beneficial
outcomes.
During Prime Minister Modi's recent visit to the White House, the
two leaders committed to work toward a broader and deeper bilateral
Drug Policy Framework for the 21st Century. Under this new framework,
we will look to expand cooperation and collaboration to disrupt the
illicit production and international trafficking of illicit drugs,
including synthetic drugs, such as fentanyl and amphetamine-type
stimulants, and the illicit diversion of their precursors within
India's chemical industry. They also committed to a holistic public
health partnership to prevent and treat illicit drug use, address
workforce shortages and skilling requirements across both countries,
and showcase a secure, resilient, reliable, and growing pharmaceutical
supply chain as a model for the world.
The world's oldest democracy, working in close partnership with the
world's largest, cannot only achieve tangible and positive results, but
will model for the rest of the world how great nations can work
together to counter threats, seize opportunities, and demonstrate
sincere partnership in addressing one of the most significant global
issues we face.
strong united states global leadership
Finally, as important as our bilateral relationships are, this is a
global problem, and global problems require global solutions. The
United States has learned a great deal from its opioid epidemic, and no
other country has the depth of experience, expertise, or political
wherewithal to lead on this issue. And that leadership involves not
only sharing every single lesson we have learned the hard way over the
past several years with our partners, but also serving as an example of
how we are navigating this complex problem with care for those
suffering from the disease of addiction, while systematically
dismantling the global infrastructure of those who continue to reap
obscene profits through the suffering and death of Americans.
The international community has successfully scheduled nearly a
dozen precursor chemicals with global partners through the United
Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs, including 5 fentanyl precursors
at the request of the United States.
We have led in raising global awareness of the nature of the global
illicit synthetic drug supply chain, and are working to make common-
sense and responsible measures to disrupt the exploitation of
legitimate commerce a global norm.
And we have led by example, by committing billions of dollars, more
than half our Federal drug control budget, to public health measures to
prevent our youth from falling into the cycle of drug use and
addiction, reduce the harms caused by these drugs and save lives,
extend treatment services to everyone who needs and wants them, and
making our communities and workplaces recovery-ready.
It is an unfortunate fact that there are three kinds of countries
in the world: those who have a synthetic opioid problem and are dealing
with it; those who have the problem but do not yet know it; and those
who will have a problem with fentanyl or another synthetic opioid in
the coming years. Too much illicit fentanyl production occurs,
generating too much money, and absent decisive action this illicit
market will expand exponentially around the world. It is important for
all nations to put into place, now, the protective measures that will
prevent this expansion and protect their people.
On July 7, Director Gupta joined Secretary of State Blinken for the
first meeting of the Global Coalition to Address Synthetic Drug
Threats. This ministerial-level meeting, hosted by the United States,
brought together nearly 100 countries and international organizations
to accelerate efforts against illicit synthetic drugs by: (1)
Preventing the illicit manufacture and trafficking of synthetic drugs,
(2) detecting emerging drug threats and drug use patterns, and (3)
promoting public health interventions and services to prevent and
reduce drug use, overdose, and other related harms. This first-of-its-
kind global coalition will develop concrete solutions, drive national
actions, and leverage the collective effort of like-minded countries
who agree that countering illicit synthetic drugs must be a global
policy priority.
complementing our public safety efforts with a strong public health
response
Because there is a complex interplay between the availability of
drugs in the United States and their use, our public safety efforts to
reduce their presence in our communities must be closely linked with
our equally strong public health efforts to reduce their use.
Traffickers are not going to import products no one wants, and
individuals cannot overdose on drugs that are not available for them to
purchase.
Therefore, disrupting the flow of drugs into the United States is
not only vital to keep drugs from harming our citizens, but is
especially important as the means to relieve the pressure of the steady
flow of drugs into our communities and to allow our historic
investments in public health interventions to take hold. The simple
truth is that if it is easier to get illicit drugs in America than it
is to get treatment, we will never bend the curve.
The administration has been working to greatly expand access to
addiction treatment, harm reduction interventions, youth substance use
prevention programs, and recovery support services. Much of this work
is being done in partnership with Congress, and I want to thank the
Members of this committee and the Congress at large for your support of
numerous pieces of legislation in helping to address this crisis. These
include the bipartisan omnibus Government funding bill, which included
key provisions to help lower barriers to treatment and deliver
necessary tools and resources to our communities to address the
overdose crisis, such as the bipartisan Mainstreaming Addiction
Treatment Act and the Medication Access and Training Expansion Act.
Thanks to these provisions, prescribers across the country will be able
to treat their patients who have opioid use disorder with
buprenorphine, a medication proven to help people achieve recovery,
without obtaining additional Federal licensing.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy has also funded the
development of a number of model State laws to help local jurisdictions
across the country expand access to naloxone, improve treatment in
jails and prisons, and deploy settlement funds from the various opioid
lawsuits effectively, among others. Similarly, ONDCP has worked with
its partners across the Government to make permanent the COVID-19-
related flexibilities that expanded access to treatment, and support
people in recovery.
We are seeing signs of progress. The latest report on 12-month
rolling data shows the number of drug poisoning deaths in the United
States flattened in 2022 after a period of sharp increase from 2019 to
2021, and the number of fatal drug overdoses has decreased from its
peak of 110,378 projected for the 12-month period ending March 2022.
But that is not enough. Now is the time to redouble our efforts,
accelerate our work, and move this Nation, and the world, beyond a
crisis that has vexed us for the better part of a decade. People in the
throes of addiction are in a fight every day, and they should expect
nothing less from us as well.
conclusion
The administration's leadership on this critical issue, the close
collaboration among partners within the United States and around the
world, and the work of the Members of this committee and your
colleagues in Congress have kept this issue at the forefront of our
national consciousness and are changing the trajectory of this
particularly complex national security, public safety, and public
health challenge. We have much work ahead of us, and your partnership
will be as critical in the months ahead as it has been thus far.
On behalf of Dr. Gupta and the hard-working people at the Office of
National Drug Control Policy, I would like to thank the committee and
your Congressional colleagues for your foresight and leadership on this
incredibly difficult issue. Ending the opioid and overdose epidemic
demands the best efforts of us all: The entirety of the Federal
Government; States, Tribes, and local communities; private-sector
partners and stakeholders; and the Congress, which has time and again
demonstrated a strong spirit of bipartisanship on this issue.
The Office of National Drug Control Policy looks forward to
continuing its work with this committee, the Congress, and our other
partners to disrupt the production and trafficking of these dangerous
drugs, prevent drug overdoses and poisonings, and save American lives.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chester.
I now recognize Mr. Cagen for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF STEVEN W. CAGEN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, HOMELAND
SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS, U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Cagen. Thank you, Chairman.
Chairman Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to be
here today to discuss Homeland Security Investigations' efforts
to disrupt and dismantle transnational criminal organizations
and combat the flow of illicit fentanyl into the United States.
As a principal investigative component of Department of
Homeland Security, HSI combats transnational criminal
organizations at every critical location within an illicit
supply chain: internationally, where TCOs operate and
manufacture illicit narcotics; at our Nation's physical
borders, where smugglers attempt to exploit America's
legitimate trade, travel, and financial systems; and
domestically, where the criminal organizations earn substantial
profits from selling this poison to our friends, neighbors, and
family members.
The threat posed by TCOs is pervasive. These organizations
do not limit themselves to a single criminal enterprise and
have evolved beyond narcotics smuggling into poly criminal
organizations involved in weapons trafficking, cyber crime,
human smuggling, money laundering, and more, all of which HSI
investigates.
HSI combats TCOs by using its unique, broad investigative
authorities to enforce over 400 Federal laws and target TCOs
from multiple investigative angles. Simply put, HSI attacks the
entire illicit network.
Mexican cartels have taken over fentanyl production and
operate on an industrial scale, where they obtain precursor
chemicals from China and synthesize these chemicals in Mexico
to produce the deadly poison.
Chinese criminal organizations further facilitate the
trafficking and distribution of fentanyl pills through the sale
of industrial pill press equipment to Mexican cartels.
The Mexican cartels' ability to traffic deadly fentanyl
into the United States is greatly enhanced by Chinese money-
laundering organizations. Chinese money-laundering
organizations have developed sophisticated networks in the
United States, Mexico, China, and throughout Asia to facilitate
their money-laundering schemes. These organizations have a vast
global infrastructure to clean illicit proceeds for various
criminal organizations, mostly including Mexican cartels.
HSI's counter-TCO efforts begin abroad, where we have the
largest international investigative presence within DHS,
comprised of hundreds of HSI special agents, strategically
assigned in 93 offices in 56 countries. This includes offices
located in Mexico, where the vast majority of fentanyl is
produced; and throughout the Asian-Pacific region, where the
precursor chemicals originate.
HSI's international efforts are greatly enhanced by our
Transnational Criminal Investigative Units, or TCIUs, comprised
of vetted foreign law enforcement officials and prosecutors,
who lead some of HSI's most significant and mutually beneficial
extraterritorial investigations and prosecutions targeting
TCOs.
At our Nation's physical borders, HSI works with our DHS
partners to combat TCO movements of illicit goods. HSI's Border
Enforcement Security Task Force, or BEST task forces, represent
one of the agency's premiere tools for turning border seizures
into TCO-toppling investigations.
HSI's partnerships, including task force officers from CBP
and DEA, are integral to the whole-of-Government approach in
countering TCOs that traffic narcotics that threaten public
safety of the United States.
There are currently 90 BESTs comprised of law enforcement
officers from more than 200 agencies and National Guard units.
HSI is simultaneously attacking the illicit narcotic supply
chain through an intelligence-based counternarcotics operation
that blends traditional investigative and analytical techniques
with interagency collaboration, industry partners, and
computer-based tools to disrupt and dismantle the chemical
supply chain. The interdiction of precursor shipments plays a
key role in disrupting the TCOs' ability to produce a finished
product before it even gets to our borders.
HSI's Operation Hydra has seized or disrupted the delivery
of more than 3 million pounds of precursor chemicals that were
destined for narcotics production in labs in Mexico.
HSI has also launched a targeted enforcement campaign to
combat fentanyl. This year, HSI and CBP initiated Operation
Blue Lotus, which surge resources to key locations, both
domestically and internationally, to target fentanyl and
develop criminal cases along the Southwest Border. Operation
Blue Lotus resulted in the seizure of more than 8,200 pounds of
fentanyl, thereby decreasing the flow of illicit fentanyl
smuggled into the United States from Mexico, while
simultaneously illuminating TCO networks.
Working alongside our partners here today, HSI remains
dedicated to stemming the flow of illicit narcotics at every
critical location within the supply chain.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today and your continued support for HSI in our enduring effort
to attack the flow of illicit fentanyl into the United States.
I look forward to your questions today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cagen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Steven W. Cagen
Wednesday, July 12, 2023
Chairman Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members:
Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss
Homeland Security Investigations' (HSI) efforts to disrupt and
dismantle transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and combat the
flow of illicit fentanyl into the United States. With more than 6,800
special agents located in hundreds of offices throughout the United
States and the world, HSI investigates, disrupts, and dismantles
terrorist, transnational, and other criminal organizations that
threaten our Nation's security. My statement today will focus on the
broad spectrum of illicit activities perpetrated by TCOs, HSI's
collaborative efforts to combat TCOs, and the resources needed to
ensure continued success in the disruption and dismantlement of TCOs
domestically and internationally.
As the principal investigative component of the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), HSI is responsible for investigating
transnational crime. In collaboration with its partners in the United
States and abroad, HSI special agents develop evidence to identify and
advance criminal cases against TCOs, terrorist networks and
facilitators, and other criminal elements that threaten the homeland.
HSI works with prosecutors to arrest and indict violators, execute
criminal search warrants, seize criminally-derived money and assets,
and take other actions with the goal of disrupting and dismantling TCOs
operating throughout the world. These efforts help protect the national
security and public safety of the United States.
TCOs flood the United States with deadly drugs, including illicit
fentanyl and other opioids. HSI conducts Federal criminal
investigations at every phase of the illicit drug supply chain:
internationally, where TCOs operate and manufacture illicit drugs; at
our Nation's borders and ports of entry (POEs), where smuggling cells
attempt to exploit America's legitimate trade, travel, and
transportation systems; and in communities throughout the United
States. HSI combats TCOs through multiple avenues of criminal
enforcement. Not only does HSI target the narcotics smuggling
activities of the TCOs, it also targets the financial networks they
utilize to fund and profit from their illegal activity. HSI also
targets the various other illegal activities the TCOs employ to fuel
their criminal organizations, including human smuggling and
trafficking, cyber crime, intellectual property rights violations, and
fraud.
evolution of transnational criminal organizations
Criminal organizations in the 21st Century do not limit themselves
to a single criminal enterprise. These criminal organizations have
expanded beyond narcotics smuggling and have morphed into poly criminal
TCOs involved in the associated crimes of weapons trafficking, human
trafficking, human smuggling, money laundering, and other crimes--all
of which HSI investigates. Rather than narrowly focusing on a single
element of the TCOs, HSI combats TCOs by using its unique and broad
investigative authorities to enforce over 400 Federal laws.
Investigative efforts must be broad in scope to fully dismantle
enterprises that transcend borders.
TCOs have also evolved beyond insular entities and have sought out
partnerships with competing TCOs in furtherance of their criminal
activities. For example, the illicit collaboration between Chinese TCOs
and Mexican cartels has created a complex criminal ecosystem that is
fueling money laundering and narcotics trafficking operations,
specifically illicit fentanyl, into and within the United States.
Chinese money-laundering organizations have developed sophisticated
networks in the United States, Mexico, China, and throughout Asia to
facilitate money-laundering schemes. These organizations utilize their
vast global infrastructure to clean illicit proceeds for various
criminal organizations, including Mexican cartels. Moreover, as Mexican
cartels have taken over fentanyl production and operate on an
industrial scale, they are obtaining precursor chemicals from China and
synthesizing these chemicals in Mexico to produce fentanyl. Mexican
cartels then smuggle the fentanyl into the United States in either
powder or pill form for distribution. HSI is attacking this illicit
narcotics supply chain through an intelligence-based counternarcotics
operation that blends traditional investigative and analytical
techniques with interagency collaboration, industry partnerships, and
computer-based tools.
Chinese TCOs also facilitate the trafficking and distribution of
illicit fentanyl pills by providing the Mexican cartels with the pill
press equipment to make the fake oxycodone pills. They are made to look
identical to prescription oxycodone but are laced with deadly fentanyl.
These fake pills are the most common type of illicit fentanyl pill, and
are responsible for thousands of overdose fatalities, as the user
believes they are taking a real oxycodone pill. In order to manufacture
these pills, Mexican cartels require industrial pill press equipment to
turn powdered fentanyl into pill form. The Mexican cartels are
purchasing these pill presses directly from Chinese manufacturers that
are producing the equipment specifically for illicit activity. HSI is
actively disrupting the pill press supply chain, and to date has seized
over 1,500 pill presses and parts used to make deadly fentanyl-laced
pills.
hsi international efforts
HSI's efforts to combat TCOs and illicit fentanyl begin abroad. HSI
has the largest international investigative presence within DHS,
comprising hundreds of HSI special agents assigned to 93 offices in 56
countries. These include offices in Mexico, where the vast majority of
illicit fentanyl is produced, and throughout the Asia-Pacific region,
where synthetic drug precursor chemicals often originate.
HSI special agents abroad develop and foster relationships with
host Government law enforcement partners to exchange information,
coordinate and support investigations, and facilitate enforcement
actions and prosecutions to disrupt and dismantle TCOs. HSI and its
counterparts in other countries identify and disrupt sources of illicit
drugs, transportation and smuggling networks, and money-laundering
operations. These efforts by HSI and its partners aim to prevent
dangerous narcotics and other illicit goods from reaching our borders
and also stop illicit outbound flows of illegally derived currency and
weapons.
Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit Program
The effectiveness of our international counternarcotics efforts is
greatly enhanced by HSI's Transnational Criminal Investigative Unit
(TCIU) Program. TCIUs are comprised of vetted foreign law enforcement
officials and prosecutors who support some of HSI's most significant
extraterritorial investigations and prosecutions targeting TCOs. HSI
has established 15 TCIUs around the world. These consist of more than
600 vetted and trained law enforcement officers across North, Central,
and South America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Asia. In fiscal
year 2022, TCIU efforts world-wide resulted in 3,800 criminal arrests
and the seizure of nearly $18.6 million and over 350,000 pounds of
narcotics and precursor chemicals.
Targeting the fentanyl precursor chemical supply chain is an
integral element of HSI's approach to stopping the production of
illicit drugs. HSI blends interagency and foreign collaboration,
industry partnerships, financial intelligence, and computer-based tools
to identify, target, and interdict precursor chemical shipments
destined for Mexican cartels. Disruptions to the procurement phase can
have an outsized impact on the narcotics production supply chain.
Mexican cartels operate on an industrial scale when procuring precursor
chemicals, and many interdiction efforts are led by investigators and
prosecutors in the Mexican Attorney General's office who comprise the
HSI Mexico City TCIU. In fiscal year 2022, efforts by the TCIU resulted
in more than 120 criminal arrests and the seizure of approximately $1.1
million and 18,200 pounds of precursor chemicals. The TCIU also leads
investigations targeting the labs where the chemicals are synthesized
into illicit drugs.
National Targeting Center--Investigations
HSI's National Targeting Center--Investigations (NTC-I) was
established in 2013 in collaboration with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection's (CBP) National Targeting Center to further our shared
border security mission. NTC-I supports the entire border security
continuum, from CBP interdictions and HSI investigations, to the joint
exploitation of intelligence. Through NTC-I, HSI supports all of DHS's
domestic and international offices by targeting illicit precursor
chemical movements within the commercial air and maritime
transportation systems.
The combination of NTC-I targeting and foreign action through HSI's
TCIUs is critical to stopping the flow of illicit drugs and dismantling
TCOs. Using these resources, HSI targets the supply chains responsible
for foreign origin shipments of precursor chemicals destined for
Mexico. Thus far, this methodology has resulted in the seizure of
approximately 3.3 million pounds of dual-use precursor chemicals
intended for making illicit fentanyl and methamphetamine.
hsi domestic efforts
HSI's ability to conduct complex large-scale investigations
represents one of DHS's best weapons for dismantling TCOs. Part of
HSI's mandate is to turn individual border seizures and arrests into
multi-jurisdictional, multi-defendant investigations to disrupt,
dismantle, and prosecute high-level members of TCOs. HSI special agents
work every day with CBP officers and in coordination with other
Federal, State, local, and Tribal law enforcement partners to identify
and investigate drug-smuggling organizations attempting to introduce
illicit contraband into the United States.
CBP's expansion of non-intrusive inspection (NII) scanning at
Southwest Border POEs is poised to increase the number of CBP-origin
seizures, which HSI special agents are required to investigate. To keep
pace, HSI will require additional staffing to support the investigation
and prosecution of individuals associated with POE seizures. Recent HSI
Congressional appropriations tied to NII expansion represent an
important initial step. HSI is moving quickly to deploy these new
resources to Southwest Border POEs receiving NII augmentation. Given
the required NII expansion to all land border POEs, additional staffing
will be essential to ensure HSI retains adequate personnel to respond
to these seizures and to conduct the complex investigations intended to
degrade and remove TCO threats to the homeland.
Border Enforcement Security Task Forces
The Jaime Zapata Border Enforcement Security Task Force (BEST) Act
was signed into law in December 2012. The Act was named in honor of
Jaime Zapata, an HSI special agent who, while working to combat violent
drug cartels, was killed in the line of duty in Mexico. This law
amended the Homeland Security Act of 2002 to formally establish the
BEST program, with the primary mission of combating emerging and
existing transnational organized crime by employing a threat-based/risk
mitigation investigative task force model that recognizes the unique
resources and capabilities of all participating law enforcement
partners. In June 2022, the Bipartisan Safer Communities Act provided
HSI with statutory authority to reimburse the salaries for State and
local law enforcement task force officers who participate in BESTs.
BESTs eliminate the barriers between Federal and local
investigations, close the gap with international partners in
multinational criminal investigations, and create an environment that
minimizes the vulnerabilities in our operations that TCOs have
traditionally capitalized on to exploit our Nation's borders. There are
currently 90 BESTs located across the United States, including Puerto
Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands, comprising approximately 1,000 law
enforcement officers and personnel representing Federal, State, local,
Tribal, and international law enforcement agencies, as well as National
Guard units. In fiscal year 2022, BESTs initiated more than 5,300
investigations resulting in more than 6,000 criminal arrests and
seizures of more than 317,000 pounds of narcotics, more than 480,000
pounds of precursor chemicals, and more than $206 million of illicit
proceeds and assets.
Operation Blue Lotus
HSI has also launched targeted enforcement campaigns to combat
illicit narcotics, particularly fentanyl. Between March 13, 2023 and
May 10, 2023, CBP and HSI launched Operation Blue Lotus to facilitate
and increase fentanyl interdictions at and between the POEs and develop
criminal cases along the Southwest Border. Focusing operations at the
ports of San Ysidro and Otay Mesa, California, and Nogales, Arizona,
Operation Blue Lotus aimed to curtail the flow of illicit fentanyl
smuggled into the United States from Mexico, while simultaneously
illuminating TCOs networks. Operation Blue Lotus successfully resulted
in the combined seizures of over 8,200 pounds of fentanyl.
Building upon the success of Operation Blue Lotus, on June 12,
2023, HSI launched Operation Blue Lotus 2.0 to strategically leverage
its administrative, civil, and criminal law enforcement authorities to
attack fentanyl distribution. Operation Blue Lotus 2.0 focuses
operations along the border and interior facilities, including express
consignment and international mail locations, to combat fentanyl
trafficking nodes and target the smuggling of fentanyl and other
illicit narcotics in the United States.
cyber-related efforts
TCOs have become increasingly tech-savvy. For example, many have
adopted anonymous cryptocurrency transactions through darknet
marketplaces. These transactions may involve foreign vendors, but the
result is the shipment of illicit drugs to or within our country.
Cyber Crimes Center
To keep pace with rapidly-evolving criminal techniques, HSI created
the Cyber Crimes Center (C3) to provide investigative assistance,
training, and equipment to support domestic and international
investigations of cyber-related crimes for DHS. C3 supports HSI's
mission through the programmatic oversight and coordination of
investigations of cyber-related criminal activity and provides a range
of forensic, intelligence, and investigative support services across
all HSI programmatic areas.
C3's cyber investigators and analysts support HSI on-line
undercover investigations targeting market site operators, vendors, and
prolific buyers of opioids and other contraband on the darknet. C3 also
supports tracing and identifying illicit proceeds derived from criminal
activity on the dark web and investigating the subsequent money-
laundering activities. Digital forensics play an ever-increasing role
in investigating complex multinational narcotics organizations, and
C3's Computer Forensics Unit and the HSI Computer Forensic Program are
critical tools in combating the flow of drugs into the United States.
C3's Computer Forensics Unit also provides forensic training and
support to our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international law
enforcement partners.
A top priority for HSI is to improve collective law enforcement
capabilities by providing training to partner law enforcement agencies.
For example, C3 developed a cyber-training curriculum with a focus on
darknet investigations and illicit payment networks associated with
opioid smuggling and distribution. Since 2017, HSI has delivered this
training course to more than 12,000 Federal, State, local, and
international law enforcement personnel in over 70 locations world-
wide.
illicit finance--following the money
One of the most effective methods for dismantling TCOs engaged in
narcotics trafficking is to attack the criminal financial networks that
are the lifeblood of their operations. HSI special agents work to
identify and seize the illicit proceeds and instrumentalities of crime
and target financial networks that transport, launder, and hide such
proceeds. As a customs agency with significant access to financial and
trade data, HSI is uniquely positioned to identify TCO schemes to hide
illicit drug proceeds within legitimate commerce. HSI's financial
efforts in fiscal year 2022 resulted in 2,607 arrests, 1,600 criminal
indictments, 1,028 convictions, and the seizure of more than $4.2
billion in illicit currency and other assets (as valued at the time of
seizure).
National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center
Despite the rise of alternative stores of value, such as virtual
assets, bulk cash smuggling remains a key mechanism for TCO
repatriation of drug proceeds. Criminal actors often avoid traditional
financial institutions, which must comply with Bank Secrecy Act
reporting requirements--instead repatriating their illicit proceeds
through conveyances such as commercial and private aircraft, passenger
and commercial vehicles, and maritime vessels, as well as via
pedestrian crossings at our land borders.
Established in 2009, HSI's National Bulk Cash Smuggling Center
(BCSC) is a critical component of the agency's and overall U.S.
Government's efforts to combat bulk cash smuggling by TCOs. The BCSC
operates strategic programs that leverage advanced data analytics,
interagency partnerships, and law enforcement technology systems to
identify complex money-laundering networks and provide support for HSI
financial investigations. The criminal intelligence functions of the
BCSC provide operational analysis in support of HSI-led interdiction
efforts, including port profiles highlighting cash-flow activity at
targeted POEs and corridor analyses to assist in planning the timing,
location, and strategy for interdiction operations. The BCSC also
administers a targeted, investigation-focused license plate reader
program to identify larger criminal networks and a warrant-based GPS
tracking program that provides valuable intelligence on the behaviors
of criminal groups engaged in bulk cash smuggling. Since its inception
through fiscal year 2022, the BCSC has initiated or substantially
contributed to the seizure of bulk cash totaling over $1.73 billion.
TCOs are increasingly augmenting bulk currency smuggling with use
of alternate value platforms in response to financial regulations and
law enforcement efforts to identify money-laundering networks. A single
movement of TCO proceeds may involve bulk cash, stored value cards,
money orders, cryptocurrency, wire transfers, funnel accounts, and
trade-based money laundering (TBML). HSI adapts to evolving criminal
methodologies by leveraging new law enforcement technologies to
identify money-laundering activity through these emerging alternate
value platforms and seize criminal assets.
Trade-Based Money Laundering
TBML is the process of disguising criminal proceeds through
international trade to hide their illicit origins. As the U.S.
Government's primary law enforcement agency that investigates TBML, HSI
utilizes data resources--maintained by DHS encompassing trade, travel,
and financial information--to identify TBML schemes. HSI has
established several national initiatives that target specific TBML
schemes and provides subject-matter expertise, analytical support, and
enforcement-related support to HSI special agents. Specifically, HSI
has the ability to intercept and interdict trade and individuals
associated with TBML that have a nexus to the borders of the United
States and provide the necessary information to initiate criminal
investigations targeting this activity.
Integral to these efforts are HSI-established Trade Transparency
Units (TTUs), which combat the growing threat of international money
laundering by TCOs via trade-based money laundering. The TTUs
accomplish this mission using partner country data-sharing programs and
the Data Analysis & Research for Trade Transparency Systems program.
Through established partnerships, the TTUs have access to foreign
trade, travel, and financial information used to support on-going
criminal investigations and to address TBML on a global scale. These
partnerships are based on bilateral agreements between the United
States and 19 partner countries for the sharing of trade and financial
information. Through the TTUs, HSI field offices can request
information pertaining to companies and individuals that would
otherwise be unavailable without the bilateral agreements.
Cryptocurrency
Cryptocurrencies are increasingly used to facilitate domestic and
cross-border crime. They can be exploited by any criminal organization,
and this is especially true as it pertains to on-line distribution of
fentanyl, methamphetamine, and other illicit drugs.
Cryptocurrencies are attractive to TCOs because they offer a
relatively fast, inexpensive, and pseudonymous system of transactions.
HSI investigations related to cryptocurrency have risen from one
criminal investigation in 2011 to over 530 criminal investigations in
fiscal year 2023 to date. In fiscal year 2022, HSI seized nearly $4
billion (valued at the time of seizure) in cryptocurrency. This
substantial increase signifies growing confidence in cryptocurrency use
by criminals and criminal networks.
conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today and
for your continued support of HSI and our efforts to use our unique
authorities and global footprint to dismantle TCOs and combat the flow
of illicit fentanyl into the United States. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Cagen.
I now recognize Mr. Mandryck for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statements.
STATEMENT OF JAMES MANDRYCK, DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER,
OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER PROTECTION,
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Mandryck. Chairman Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify here today about the fentanyl threat and
CBP's intelligence and data-driven response and approach to
combating this proliferation of this dangerous drug.
CBP uses multifaceted approaches to counter fentanyl. Our
approach includes advanced detection capabilities, such as
specialized canines and nonintrusive inspection equipment;
intelligence collection; research and analysis; laboratory
testing and scientific analysis; domestic and foreign
partnerships; and most importantly, the experience, expertise,
and dedication of the CBP work force.
This enforcement posture has led to record-level seizures,
including over 22,000 pounds of fentanyl so far this fiscal
year, the equivalent of over 90 million doses and over a
billion dollars in cartel profits.
Today I'd like to provide a little more information about
the composition of the fentanyl seized by CBP, current
production and smuggling trends, and the significance of our
enforcement efforts within this threat landscape.
When it comes to composition, this fiscal year, 88 percent
of the fentanyl seized by CBP has been in pill form, continuing
the trending shift away from powder. The concerning shift
indicates an increased sophistication of the transnational
criminal organizations to control production and mimic
legitimate pharmaceuticals that ultimately target unsuspecting
end-users.
Another growing trend we've witnessed is the expanded use
of xylazine as an adulterant in fentanyl to extend the user's
high. Xylazine, a central nervous system depressant, is not an
opioid, so naloxone does not reverse its effects, making this
dangerous synthetic combination even more deadly.
The production of illicit fentanyl entering the United
States shifted back in 2020. At that time, fentanyl was
produced as a finished product in China, then smuggled into
Mexico, and then onward to the United States. Over the past 3
years, production has shifted to Mexico-based TCOs that
infiltrate supply chains to import precursor and pre-precursor
chemicals, primarily from China, and then recruit or coerce
scientists to produce metric tons of finished fentanyl.
Through intelligence-led operations such as Operation
Artemis, CBP has identified previously unknown logistical
supply chains, some of whom that transship to the United States
before arriving in Mexico, discoveries that have led to changes
in cargo inspections and processing and resulted in significant
seizures of precursors, pill presses, and dye molds, as well as
the identification of unknown criminal actors.
Within Mexico, we continue to see elevated levels of
violence between cartels along lucrative smuggling corridors,
especially in Mexico's northern border states.
TCOs involved in trafficking synthetics have begun to
expand from historic strongholds in western Mexico to access
additional smuggling corridors in eastern Mexico through
newfound alliances. These types of alliances have always been
driven by monetary gain. What has changed is how profits from
these illicit activities are transferred and distributed.
Historically, CBP saw a major portion of illicit proceeds
depart the United States as bulk cash currency. However, TCOs
are increasingly taking advantage of technologies like
cryptocurrency and informal value transfer systems, such as the
Chinese underground banking system, to reduce their risk of
cross-border interdiction.
Exploitation of these systems allows for immediate
transfers of illicit profits into the--from the United States
to the TCO hierarchy in Mexico. In many cases, these money
transfers are done cheaper than historic laundering options
and, in most cases, with guaranteed success for the customer.
Furthermore, TCOs continue to seek opportunities to move
their illicit profits from the United States without currency
or monetary instruments, including trade-based money laundering
and the acquisition of firearms in the United States that are
smuggled into Mexico to help control those corridors.
The complex challenges require strong and deliberate
partnerships across the Government at all levels, as well as
with our international partners.
Exemplified by the success of recent intelligence and data-
driven operations such as Operation Blue Lotus, Four Horsemen,
Rolling Wave, and Operation Artemis are CBP's hand-in-hand work
with our investigative partners becoming critical disrupting
and dismantling the networks behind fentanyl synthesis. In just
2 months, Operation Blue Lotus and Operation Four Horsemen
resulted in the seizure of nearly 10,000 pounds of fentanyl and
almost 300 arrests.
CBP is currently executing Operation Artemis and Operation
Rolling Wave, which target the illicit procurement,
manufacturing, and trafficking of fentanyl and precursor
chemicals by leveraging investigative, prosecutorial, and
regulatory resources, and enhancing law enforcement information
sharing and coordination.
In addition to our close work with U.S. partners, CBP has
strong relationships with foreign and industry partners across
the globe to further detect, disrupt, and dismantle criminal
organizations. The consistent evolution of technology and the
adaptability of transnational criminal groups requires us to
become more adaptable and combat these challenges.
I thank you for your continued support for CBP and the
opportunity to testify in this important topic today. I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Mandryck follows:]
Prepared Statement of James Mandryck
July 12, 2023
introduction
Chairman Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members
of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to discuss U.S.
Customs and Border Protection's (CBP) efforts to combat the dynamic
threat of transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and prevent the
entry of dangerous illicit drugs, including fentanyl, into the United
States.
The reach and influence of TCOs continues to expand across and
beyond the Southwest and Northern Borders. These criminal organizations
are sophisticated and operate with immense capability, capacity, and
nearly unlimited resources. TCOs increasingly demonstrate the intent
and ability to produce and modify synthetic drugs, making detection and
identification difficult. They also continually adjust their tactics,
techniques, and operational procedures to circumvent detection and
interdiction by law enforcement, including transporting smaller
quantities of drugs and improving concealment techniques.
As others have testified,\1\ synthetic opioids like fentanyl--a
synthetic opioid that is 80-100 times stronger than morphine--and its
analogues are produced using precursor chemicals made available by
criminal elements, often in the People's Republic of China. The
precursor chemicals are shipped to Mexico where TCOs use these
precursors to finish production. This fentanyl is either sold in powder
form or pressed into pills. These drugs are then smuggled across the
Southwest Border, most often through ports of entry (POEs).\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See, e.g., Written testimony, Kemp Chester, Senior Advisor,
International Relations and Supply Reduction, Office of National Drug
Control Policy, for a February 1, 2023, House Energy and Commerce
Committee Hearing. https://d1dth6e84htgma.cloudfront.net/Wit-
ness_Testimony_Chester_HE_02_01_2023_487130aade.pdf?updated_at=2023-02-
01T14:- 37:29.433Z.
\2\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Because there is no single tool or capability that can detect all
suspected threats in all situations and environments, CBP uses a
multifaceted, intelligence-driven approach that combines advance
targeting, sophisticated detection capabilities, specialized canines,
non-intrusive inspection technology (NII), laboratory testing,
scientific analysis, domestic and foreign partnerships, and information
sharing. Most importantly, we also have dedicated, highly-trained
officers, agents, and intelligence research specialists whose
experience and expertise are essential components of all CBP's efforts
to combat transnational threats and prevent the entry of illegal drugs
into U.S. communities.
Our enforcement approach enables the agency to nimbly shift
resources and swiftly respond to emerging threats, such as the deadly
threat posed by illicit fentanyl, fentanyl analogues, other synthetic
opioids, and methamphetamine, as well as the precursors and other
chemicals used in illicit drug production.
drug trends and interdictions
As noted above, most illicit drugs, including fentanyl, enter the
United States through our Southwest Border POEs, hidden in passenger
vehicles or belongings, concealed in commercial trucks, and carried by
pedestrians. In fiscal year 2022, for example, nearly 66 percent of
illicit drugs seized by weight by CBP at the Southwest Border were
seized at POEs.\3\
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\3\ Of the 288,287 pounds of drugs CBP seized at the Southwest
Border in fiscal year 2022, 189,682 pounds were seized at POEs.
Excluding marijuana, CBP seized 202,631 pounds of illicit drugs at the
Southwest Border, of which 179,317 pounds (88.5 percent) were seized at
POEs. https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics. CBP
Air and Marine Operations also contributed to drug seizure events with
other agencies. These operations resulted in the seizure of
approximately 270,000 pounds of drugs in fiscal year 2022. https://
www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/cbp-enforcement-statistics/air-and-marine-
operations-statistics.
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CBP seizures of fentanyl have been escalating for several years.\4\
In fiscal year 2022, CBP seized nearly 15,000 pounds of fentanyl
Nation-wide, with the majority--12,500 pounds--seized at POEs. We have
already exceeded that amount this fiscal year. At our POEs alone,
fentanyl seizures increased more than 200 percent in fiscal year 2022
compared to fiscal year 2019 and fiscal year 2020 totals combined. In
fiscal year 2023 to date, CBP seizures at POEs already exceed more than
17,600 pounds of fentanyl.\5\ These seizures permanently removed these
drugs from the illicit supply chain, kept them out of our communities,
and denied drug trafficking organizations profits and operating
capital.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/drug-seizure-statistics.
\5\ As of May 31, 2023.
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Marijuana, methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine remain the top-
seized drugs by weight but shifting trends over recent years produced
significant increases in synthetic drugs like fentanyl. Fentanyl is the
most frequently seized illicit synthetic opioid, but CBP has also
encountered 31 substances that are chemically similar to fentanyl, as
well as 44 unique synthetic opioids that are not from the fentanyl
class.\6\
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\6\ A complete list can be made available by CBP Laboratories and
Scientific Services.
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Although our statistics measure drug seizures by weight, CBP
estimates it interdicted 1.1 billion potential doses of illicit
fentanyl in fiscal year 2022. By the measure of potential doses, CBP
fentanyl seizures were only second to methamphetamine, of which an
estimated 16 billion doses in fiscal year 2022 were seized.\7\ For
reference, Earth's population is approximately 8 billion people.
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\7\ CBP would be happy to brief the subcommittee on its illicit
drug dose estimation tool and how it derived these estimates.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP's enforcement efforts focus on detecting and interdicting
suspected illicit drugs; quickly anticipating and adapting to changing
tactics and techniques used by cartels, traffickers, smugglers, and
their networks; enhancing collaboration among key partners; producing
actionable intelligence to target the illicit opioid supply chain; and
protecting our personnel from exposure to opioids.
detection and inspection
CBP, with the support of Congress, continues to make significant
investments and improvements in our drug detection capabilities and
interdiction technology. Our highly-trained officers use narcotic
detection canines and a variety of technologies to detect the presence
of illicit drugs, including illicit opioids, in all operating
environments.
CBP's canine program continues to demonstrate its significant
contribution to our efforts to intercept dangerous illicit drugs and
disrupt TCO activity. In fiscal year 2022, CBP canine teams assigned to
the Office of Field Operations and U.S. Border Patrol assisted in the
seizure of more than $19 million in undeclared or illicit drug-related
currency, more than 400 firearms, and nearly 290,000 pounds of drugs,
including nearly 13,000 pounds of fentanyl--approximately 87 percent of
CBP's fentanyl seizures--valued at more than $2.5 billion. The
effectiveness of our canine teams is demonstrated daily. For example,
in a single event on April 18, 2023, a canine team in Otay Mesa,
California, aided in the seizure of 776 pounds of fentanyl pills valued
at more than $21 million.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/we-re-
spilling-beans-211-million-worth-fentanyl-pills-concealed-within.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CBP canine teams often work alongside officers conducting other
inspection activities. CBP has deployed more than 350 large-scale and
4,500 small-scale NII X-ray and gamma-ray imaging systems to detect the
presence of illicit substances, including synthetic drugs such as
fentanyl. This technology enables detection of these illicit substances
hidden within passenger belongings, cargo containers, commercial
trucks, rail cars, and privately-owned vehicles, as well as express
consignment carrier and international mail parcels. In fiscal year
2022, CBP officers used large-scale NII systems to scan more than 7.6
million conveyances, which resulted in the interdiction of more than
100,000 pounds of narcotics and approximately $2 million of undeclared
U.S. currency.
Canine teams and NII technology are complementary detection and
inspection capabilities that are critical to the continued success of
CBP's interdiction operations at the POEs. At the core of these efforts
are specially-trained officers and specialists using their expertise
and experience to maximize technological capabilities and resources.
Every seizure we make at the border is important. It stops the flow of
drugs into our communities, contributes to investigations, and
increases our awareness of emerging trends and illicit networks.
advance information and targeting
CBP's interdiction efforts begin well before a conveyance or
shipment arrives at a POE. Advance electronic shipping information,\9\
actionable intelligence, and information-sharing partnerships are
critical components of CBP's ability to quickly identify, target, and
deter the entry of dangerous illicit drugs in all operational
environments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See section 343 of the Trade Act of 2002 (Pub. L. 107-210), as
amended; the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act or SAFE
Port Act of 2006 (Pub. L. 109-347); and the Synthetics Trafficking and
Overdose Prevention (STOP) Act (Pub. L. 107-210) of 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
All advance shipment information is automatically fed into the
National Targeting Center's (NTC) Automated Targeting System (ATS), an
enforcement and decision support system. At CBP's NTC, advance data
converges with law enforcement and intelligence records to facilitate
the targeting of persons, conveyances, and items of cargo that pose the
highest risk to our security in all modes of transportation. Advance
information is a critical and effective component of CBP's targeting
and interdiction efforts. We continue to pursue solutions to expand
advance information opportunities to the land POEs, where--unlike
travel processes over air and sea--CBP often receives no advance
traveler information, limiting traveler vetting conducted before an
individual arrives at a land POE.
In addition to targeting illicit substances directly, CBP and
Homeland Security Investigations (HSI) target precursor chemicals
shipped through the United States to destinations in Mexico and other
countries. While many of the precursor chemicals used to synthesize
methamphetamines and synthetic illicit opioids such as fentanyl have
legitimate uses, CBP and HSI coordinate with the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) to intercept and seize precursors if they can be
identified as having been brought into the United States in violation
of U.S. law, such as Title 21 of the U.S. Code. CBP also targets
production-related equipment such as pill presses and tableting
machines. The DEA regulates pill press/tableting machines, and the HSI
diversion coordinator works on behalf of DHS to coordinate the
investigations of pill press/tableting machine imports being diverted
for illicit uses. The HSI diversion coordinator works closely with the
NTC to identify and target individuals importing and diverting pill
press/tableting machines to produce illicit fentanyl and other
synthetic drugs.
The increasing ability of TCOs to produce sophisticated forms of
synthetic drugs and develop new ways to smuggle is a challenge to CBP's
counter-narcotic efforts. In addition to CBP's advance detection and
targeting efforts, CBP's laboratory testing and analysis capabilities
are invaluable to the timely identification of suspect substances and
the disruption of drug-trafficking networks. These capabilities not
only contribute to our targeting and interdiction success, but also aid
our intelligence and investigative partners in their criminal
prosecution efforts.
analysis and intelligence
Just as TCOs rapidly evolve their illicit production and smuggling
operations, CBP must advance its capabilities to quickly and reliably
identify the dangerous substances it encounters and provide analysis
for targeting and other enforcement and investigative actions.
Sound analytical methodology centers on providing timely and
actionable intelligence to our front-line officers and agents, decision
makers, and partners. To strengthen our intelligence posture in
responding to this complex threat environment, CBP's Intelligence
Enterprise (IE) was established in 2017 as a cohesive, threat-based,
data-driven, and operationally-focused effort to leverage the
collective intelligence capabilities and expertise across CBP's
operational components.
To enhance its intelligence capacity, CBP IE established investment
priorities that support a whole-of-agency approach to countering
various border threats, such as the use of a common reporting platform
to timely share and disseminate threat information to disparate
offices. CBP's IE was also responsible for launching the CBP Watch, a
situational awareness facility that provides trend analysis and real-
time feedback to better support the agency's operational front line 24
hours a day, 7 days a week.
Laboratory Testing
CBP's ability to swiftly and accurately identify suspect substances
is a critical part of our ability to determine new production trends
and seize illicit drugs, but also a critical tool for partner
investigative agencies, such as HSI, to make law enforcement-controlled
deliveries that could lead to arrests and the shutting down of criminal
networks. CBP officers use various field-testing devices and leverage
CBP's 24/7 Narcotic Reachback program to obtain a swift, presumptive
identification of a suspect substance from a CBP Laboratories and
Scientific Services (LSS) scientist. CBP has also positioned Forward
Operating Labs (FOL) at strategic locations where new or emerging
substances enter the United States. At the FOLs, LSS can triage quickly
if a potentially new analogue of an illicit substance or designer drug
is encountered and send it to the LSS INTERDICT Science Center for
comprehensive testing. These newly-encountered substances, particularly
synthetic opioids or other significant chemicals of interest, are added
to the user libraries of the handheld field-testing devices used by CBP
officers and agents to rapidly screen suspected substances. Since
January 2022, 170 new spectra have been added to the equipment's
factory library. Since the start of the designer drug wave in 2009, LSS
has identified over 550 new substances.
CBP scientists participate in weekly operational roundtable
discussions with intelligence personnel and law enforcement partners
from Federal, State, and local agencies to share information on the
latest analysis on encountered substances. Based on pollen analysis and
suspected controlled substance analysis results, CBP develops
intelligence products to share with CBP officers and agents,
intelligence analysts, policy makers, and relevant external partners at
Federal, State, local, and international organizations to maintain a
consistent understanding of the fentanyl threat picture nationally, not
just at the borders.\10\
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\10\ https://www.cbp.gov/document/fact-sheets/cbp-fentanyl-
factsheet.
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collaboration and information sharing
Shifting trends and sophisticated TCO tactics mean that now, more
than ever, efforts to counter TCO activity require coordination and
cooperation across the law enforcement community. CBP leverages
collaboration with our Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international
partners to address drug trafficking and other transnational threats
across all our operational environments. This includes working closely
with the Office of National Drug Control Policy's High-Intensity Drug
Trafficking Area program and continuous work with other laboratories
and the medical community, including coroners and medical examiners, to
identify emerging drug threats.
CBP works closely with key partners, including HSI, DEA, the United
States Postal Inspection Service, the Federal Bureau of Investigation,
and other Federal, State, local, Tribal, and international partners, to
share information, coordinate enforcement actions, and facilitate
investigations regarding intelligence and seizures. For seizures that
do not meet a Federal threshold, intelligence and information derived
from these seizures are provided to local, State, and regional task
forces for situational awareness and further investigative and
prosecutorial actions.
CBP regularly hosts briefings with Federal, State, local,
territorial, and Tribal partners regarding the current State of the
border, providing a cross-component, multi-agency venue for discussing
trends and threats. Engagements focus on interdictions and arrests at
both the border and interior areas within the United States. These
briefings also include participants from the governments of Canada and
Mexico.
Strong international partnerships are a critical part of CBP's
ability to respond to the global challenges that affect our border
operations. CBP works closely with our foreign partners and contributes
to multilateral forums by sharing information and leveraging partner
capabilities to combat transnational threats and advance our national
security.
CBP also participates in joint operations and multi-agency
enforcement teams composed of representatives from international and
Federal law enforcement agencies. Working together with State, local,
and Tribal agencies, these operations target drug and transnational
criminal activity, and often contribute to investigations involving
national security and organized crime.
Our partnerships are also invaluable to our enforcement efforts.
For example, CBP and HSI recently concluded Operation Blue Lotus, a 2-
month, multi-agency effort led by CBP and HSI focused on narcotics
smuggling attempts at POEs in Arizona and California. Through targeted
inspections at border crossings, cross-border investigations, and the
leveraging of advanced analytics and intelligence capabilities,
approximately 8,000 pounds of fentanyl, more than 4,600 pounds of
methamphetamine, more than 1,050 pounds of cocaine, and more than 72
pounds of heroin were seized--leading to more than 250 arrests by CBP
and HSI. U.S. Border Patrol ran a complementary operation between POEs
and at checkpoints near the border, leading to additional seizures of
approximately 2,500 pounds of fentanyl, 6,500 pounds of
methamphetamine, 330 pounds of marijuana, 620 pounds of cocaine, and 60
pounds of heroin.
Following the success of these enforcement efforts, DHS recently
announced the next special operations of its surge campaign to target
and prevent fentanyl from entering the United States.\11\ Operation
Artemis, led by CBP and supported by HSI, will leverage intelligence
and investigative information derived from Operation Blue Lotus to
focus on critical junctures in the illicit production and international
trafficking of fentanyl and other synthetic drugs by targeting
precursor chemicals, pill presses and parts, movement of finished
substances, and illicit proceeds. Concurrently, Operation Rolling Wave
will surge inspections at U.S. Border Patrol checkpoints along the
Southwest Border, covering every sector and leveraging predictive
analysis and intelligence sharing. CBP will run a parallel intelligence
and analysis operation, Operation Argus, to provide trade-focused
analysis in support of Artemis.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ https://www.dhs.gov/news/2023/06/22/next-phase-dhs-campaign-
stop-fentanyl-will-focus-interdiction-and-supply-chain.
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In collaboration with multiple Department of Justice components, in
particular the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives,
CBP and HSI also lead Operation Without a Trace, a joint platform for
our personnel to target and investigate smuggling networks to disrupt
and dismantle their illegal gun trafficking operations. Since the
initiative's inception in fiscal year 2020, Operation Without a Trace
has achieved significant success preventing Mexico-bound gun
trafficking, resulting in the initiation of 803 investigations, the
execution of 555 arrests, and the seizure of 1,213 firearms, more than
723,203 rounds of ammunition, and $16.5 million in illicit
currency.\12\
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\12\ As of March 28, 2023.
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Finally, CBP established the Southern Border Intelligence Center in
April 2023. The Southern Border Intelligence Center, located in Tucson,
Arizona, will integrate CBP's Southwest Border Intelligence Enterprise
through collaboration within CBP and with the interagency into a single
intelligence focal point. The Southern Border Intelligence Center will
build and maintain a trans-regional intelligence understanding of the
entire Southern Border by integrating CBP's intelligence efforts and
collaborating with the interagency.
conclusion
With continued support from Congress, CBP, in coordination with our
partners, will continue to deploy critical resources to our Nation's
borders to refine the effectiveness of our detection, interdiction, and
identification capabilities and combat transnational threats and the
entry of illegal drugs into the United States.
CBP will continue investing in our front-line and intelligence
capabilities, which are vital to all our law enforcement efforts. CBP
will also pursue new partnerships and innovative technology to aid in
our layered enforcement strategy to support our fight against this
ever-evolving threat.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today. I look forward to
your questions.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Mandryck.
I now recognize Mr. Papadopoulos for 5 minutes to summarize
his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF GEORGE PAPADOPOULOS, ACTING CHIEF OF OPERATIONS,
DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Mr. Papadopoulos. Good afternoon, Chairman Higgins, Ranking
Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee.
On behalf of the Department of Justice and, in particular,
the more than 9,000 employees of the Drug Enforcement
Administration, it's my honor to appear before you today.
Today's hearing comes at a critical moment in our country's
history, and I thank the committee for bringing attention to
this important topic.
Our Nation is in the midst of a devastating drug poisoning
epidemic that claimed the lives of nearly 110,000 people in
2022. That's about one death every 5 minutes, or more than 300
mothers and fathers, sisters, and brothers, and most
tragically, children dying every day, with countless more
nonfatal drug poisonings.
I've had the privilege of being a DEA special agent for 27
years, and have served in locations as diverse as Detroit,
Michigan and Athens, Greece. I worked at the DEA Special
Operations Division and, most recently, was deputy chief for
operations, responsible for all foreign offices. I can assure
you that the drug poisoning epidemic that our country is facing
today is unprecedented.
In 2022, DEA seized more than 58 million fentanyl-laced
pills and 13,000 pounds of fentanyl powder. That's nearly 400
million deadly doses that didn't reach American streets and
more than enough to kill everyone in the United States.
The men and women of the DEA are relentlessly focused day
in and day out on saving lives by combating the deadly drug
poisoning epidemic and bringing those responsible to justice.
As the primary U.S. Government agency responsible for
investigating drug trafficking, the DEA leads and coordinates
the whole-of-Government law enforcement response to defeat the
two cartels responsible for flooding the United States with
fentanyl: the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels.
This is our top operational priority, because these cartels
pose the greatest criminal drug threat that the United States
has ever faced. They are ruthless and violent global criminal
enterprises with members, associates, facilitators, and brokers
in all 50 States and in at least 100 countries throughout the
world.
The cartels use treachery and deceit to drive addiction and
deaths in our country. They mix fentanyl with other drugs, like
cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine, and press it into pills
that look like legitimate prescription medication. But the
pills that look safe and familiar do not contain any
prescription medication. Instead, they contain deadly fentanyl.
Many people that died didn't even know they were taking
fentanyl. Instead, they believed they were taking a different
drug or a real prescription pill.
To save lives and defeat these cartels, the DEA created two
counterthreat teams, one for the Sinaloa Cartel and one for the
Jalisco Cartel. These teams synthesized DEA intelligence for a
data-driven approach to mapping and strategically targeting the
cartels' entire network and infrastructure, and to identify key
nodes that can be exploited. Our counter-threat teams regularly
send target packages to DEA offices across the country and
around the world that are used to initiate or enhance
investigations.
Along with our interagency partners, we've had some recent
success against the cartels. In April, we announced the results
of an 18-month undercover investigation, Operation Royal Flush,
which resulted in the indictment of 28 members of Sinaloa
Cartel, including Chapo Guzman's sons.
The indictment describes the cartel's entire network and
supply chain from China to Mexico to Main Street. During this
investigation, which included 32 DEA offices around the world
and operational activities in 10 countries, we seized more than
22 million potentially deadly doses of fentanyl.
In May, we announced the results of Operation Last Mile,
which focused on the cartel's U.S. distributors. During this
year-long effort, we arrested more than 3,300 people in the
United States, seized more than $104 million in cash and
assets, and took nearly 8,500 guns off the street. Most
importantly, we stopped more than 193 million potentially
deadly doses of fentanyl before they reached U.S. communities.
Just last month, we announced the results of Operation
Killer Chemicals, which focused on the precursor chemicals
needed to manufacture fentanyl. We charged 8 Chinese nationals
and, for the first time, 4 Chinese companies with conspiracy to
manufacture and import fentanyl into the United States. These
individuals and companies sold enough precursor chemicals to
produce millions of potentially deadly doses of fentanyl.
While we've had some success, there is clearly more work to
do. The men and women of the DEA are committed to saving lives
and defeating the Sinaloa and Jalisco cartels and will
relentlessly pursue cartel leaders, members, associates, and
facilitators to ensure that they face justice for their crimes.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today
on this important topic. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Papadopoulos follows:]
Prepared Statement of George Papadopoulos
July 12, 2023
Chair Higgins, Ranking Member Correa, and distinguished Members of
the committee: On behalf of the Department of Justice (Department), and
in particular the over 9,000 employees working at the Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA), thank you for the opportunity to appear before
you today to discuss DEA's work to save lives and to combat the deadly
drug poisoning epidemic in our country.
Americans today are experiencing the most devastating drug crisis
in our Nation's history. This is because one drug--fentanyl--has
transformed the criminal landscape. Fentanyl is exceptionally cheap to
make, exceptionally easy to disguise, and exceptionally deadly to those
who take it. It is the leading cause of death for Americans between the
ages of 18 to 45, and it kills Americans from all walks of life, in
every State and community in this country. The criminal organizations
responsible for bringing fentanyl into this country are modern,
sophisticated, and extremely violent enterprises that rely on a global
supply chain to manufacture, transport, and sell fentanyl, and rely on
a global illicit financial network to pocket the billions of dollars in
revenue from those sales.
DEA has been hard at work to undertake a transformation of its own
to meet this moment. DEA has acted with urgency to set a new vision,
target the global criminal networks most responsible for the influx of
fentanyl into the United States, and raise public awareness about how
just one pill can kill. We have transformed our vision by focusing on
fentanyl--the drug killing the most Americans--and the criminal
organizations responsible for flooding fentanyl into our communities--
the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation (Jalisco) Cartel. We
have transformed our plan by building an entirely new strategic layer--
our counter-threat teams for the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco
Cartel--that map the cartels, analyze their networks, and develop
targeting information on the members of those networks wherever they
operate around the globe. We have transformed our execution by
providing that targeting information to our 334 offices world-wide,
drawing from our global intelligence and law enforcement teams here and
abroad, and working as One DEA to take the networks down. And we are
seeing results--as demonstrated earlier this year with the indictment
of 28 members and associates of the Chapitos network of the Sinaloa
Cartel; the arrest of 3,337 associates of the Sinaloa and Jalisco
Cartels in the United States who were responsible for the last mile of
fentanyl and methamphetamine distribution on our streets and through
social media; and the indictment of 4 chemical companies and 8
individuals in the People's Republic of China (PRC) for providing
criminal actors in the United States and Mexico with the precursor
chemicals and scientific know-how necessary to make fentanyl.
the drug poisoning epidemic
In 2022, nearly 110,000 people in the United States lost their
lives to drug poisonings. Countless more people are poisoned and
survive. These drug poisonings are a national crisis.
A majority of the drug poisoning deaths in the United States
involve synthetic opioids, such as fentanyl, that are being distributed
in new forms. Fentanyl is being hidden in and being mixed with other
illicit drugs such as cocaine, heroin, and methamphetamine. Drug
traffickers are also flooding our communities with fentanyl disguised
in the form of fake prescription pills. These fake pills often are made
to appear legitimate using pill presses and marketed by drug
traffickers to deceive Americans into thinking that they are real,
diverted prescription medications. In reality, these pills are not made
by pharmaceutical companies, but drug trafficking organizations; they
are highly addictive and are often deadly. DEA lab testing reveals that
6 out of 10 of these fentanyl-laced fake prescription pills contain a
potentially lethal dose.
The availability of fentanyl throughout the United States has
reached unprecedented heights. In 2022, DEA seized more than 58 million
fake pills containing fentanyl, and 13,000 pounds of fentanyl powder,
equating to nearly 400 million deadly doses of fentanyl. This is enough
fentanyl to supply a potentially lethal dose to every member of the
U.S. population. These seizures occurred in every State in the country.
the drug enforcement administration
As the single mission agency tasked with enforcing our Nation's
drug laws, DEA's top operational priority is to relentlessly pursue and
defeat the two Mexican drug cartels--the Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco
Cartel--that are primarily responsible for driving the current fentanyl
and drug poisoning epidemic in the United States.
In April of this year, the administration announced its
Strengthened Approach to Crack Down on Illicit Fentanyl Supply Chains,
a whole-of-Government approach to save lives by disrupting the
trafficking of illicit fentanyl and its precursors into American
communities. This approach synchronizes all the tools of national power
to use more effectively against criminal facilitators and enablers. The
administration has also increased its collaboration with key
international partners to address security concerns that impact North
America. For example, under the Bicentennial Framework for Security,
Public Health, and Safe Communities between the United States and
Mexico, the administration established a cooperative, comprehensive,
and long-term approach with specific actions to promote the safety and
security of our societies.
DEA is the lead agency on the law enforcement elements in the
administration's whole-of-Government response to defeat the cartels and
combat the drug poisoning epidemic in our communities. DEA's role in
leading the law enforcement response to the fentanyl epidemic protects
the safety of agents, officers, and sources. Importantly, a unified
response to the fentanyl epidemic ensures that the whole-of-Government
is moving in one direction that protects the safety and health of
Americans.
DEA operates 30 field divisions with 241 domestic offices, 93
foreign offices in 69 countries, and 9 forensic labs. DEA's robust
domestic and international presence allows it to map and target the
entire Sinaloa Cartel and Jalisco Cartel networks.
In addition, DEA has launched two cross-agency, counter-threat
teams to execute a network-focused operational strategy to defeat the
Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels. The two teams are mapping, analyzing, and
targeting the cartels' entire criminal networks. The teams are composed
of special agents, intelligence analysts, targeters, program analysts,
data scientists, and digital specialists. This network-focused strategy
is critical to defeating the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels.
We already are starting to see results from our new strategy. As
part of the network-focused strategy, DEA investigations recently
resulted in charges against 28 members and associates of the Sinaloa
Cartel, including leaders, suppliers, brokers, smugglers, and money
launderers in multiple countries, for operating the global criminal
enterprise that manufactures and traffics most of the fentanyl that
comes into the United States.
DEA is simultaneously focused on American communities. We are
targeting the drug trafficking organizations and violent gangs located
in the United States that are responsible for the greatest number of
drug-related deaths and violence. DEA's Operation Overdrive uses a
data-driven, intelligence-led approach to identify and dismantle
criminal drug networks operating in areas with the highest rates of
violence and drug poisoning deaths. In each of these locations, DEA is
working with local and State law enforcement officials to conduct
threat assessments identifying the criminal networks and individuals
that are causing the most harm. DEA works with State, local, Tribal,
and Federal law enforcement and prosecutorial partners to pursue
investigations and prosecutions that will reduce drug-related violence
and drug poisonings. Phase one of Operation Overdrive took place in 34
locations across the United States, and phase two is currently
occurring in 57 locations. So far in Operation Overdrive, DEA and its
partners have made over 1,700 arrests, seized over 1,300 firearms, and
seized over 13 million potentially deadly doses of fentanyl.
In 2021, DEA launched the ``One Pill Can Kill'' enforcement effort
and public awareness campaign. Through that, DEA and our law
enforcement partners have seized millions of fake fentanyl-laced
prescription pills and hundreds of pounds of fentanyl powder--equating
to millions of potentially lethal doses of fentanyl, which could have
entered our communities. Hundreds of these cases were linked to social
media platforms, including Snapchat, Facebook, Instagram, and TikTok.
DEA is combating the sale of fentanyl on social media. Drug
traffickers are using social media platforms to recruit associates,
find customers, and sell fentanyl and other deadly drugs. In
particular, drug traffickers use social media to deceptively advertise
fake prescription pills--pills that look like Xanax, Percocet, or
Oxycodone but actually contain fentanyl--directly to young people and
teenagers. DEA has investigated more than 150 cases directly linked to
the sale of fake pills containing fentanyl on social media.
DEA also works closely with families who have lost loved ones to
drug poisonings. These families are often brave advocates for change,
and help ensure that people in their communities are aware of the
dangers of fentanyl and fake pills.
DEA is working closely with our local, State, Tribal, territorial,
Federal, and international counterparts to target every part of the
illegal drug supply chain and every level of the drug trafficking
organizations that threaten the health and safety of our communities.
To succeed, we must use every tool to combat this substantial threat
that is being driven by the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels, as well as the
Chinese-sourced precursor chemicals and global money-laundering
operations that facilitate the cartels' operations.
mexican cartels and drug trafficking
The Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels pose the greatest criminal drug
threat the United States has ever faced. These ruthless, violent,
criminal organizations have associates, facilitators, and brokers in
all 50 States in the United States, as well as in more than 100
countries around the world.
The Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco Cartel and their affiliates
control the vast majority of the fentanyl global supply chain, from
manufacture to distribution. The cartels are buying precursor chemicals
in the PRC; transporting the precursor chemicals from the PRC to
Mexico; using the precursor chemicals to mass produce fentanyl; using
pill presses to process the fentanyl into fake prescription pills; and
using cars, trucks, and other routes to transport the drugs from Mexico
into the United States for distribution. It costs the cartels as little
as 10 cents to produce a fentanyl-laced fake prescription pill that is
sold in the United States for as much as $10 to $30 per pill. As a
result, the cartels make billions of dollars from trafficking fentanyl
into the United States.
The business model used by the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels is to
grow at all costs, no matter how many people die in the process. The
cartels are engaging in deliberate, calculated treachery to deceive
Americans and drive addiction to achieve higher profits.
The Sinaloa Cartel
The Sinaloa Cartel, based in the Mexican state of Sinaloa, is one
of the oldest drug-trafficking organizations in Mexico. The Sinaloa
Cartel controls drug-trafficking activity in various regions in Mexico,
particularly along the Pacific Coast. Additionally, it maintains the
most expansive international footprint of the Mexican cartels. The
Sinaloa Cartel exports and distributes wholesale amounts of fentanyl,
methamphetamine, heroin, and cocaine in the United States by
maintaining distribution hubs in cities that include Phoenix, Los
Angeles, Denver, and Chicago. Illicit drugs distributed by the Sinaloa
Cartel are primarily smuggled into the United States through crossing
points located along Mexico's border with California, Arizona, New
Mexico, and Texas. The Sinaloa Cartel reportedly has a presence in 19
of the 32 Mexican states. It has been identified that there are
currently more than 26,000 members, associates, facilitators, and
brokers affiliated with the Cartel in more than 100 countries.
The Jalisco Cartel
The Jalisco Cartel is based in the city of Guadalajara in the
Mexican state of Jalisco, and was originally formed as a spin off from
the Milenio Cartel, a subordinate to the Sinaloa Cartel. The Jalisco
Cartel maintains illicit drug distribution hubs in Los Angeles,
Seattle, Charlotte, Chicago, and Atlanta. Internationally, the Jalisco
Cartel has a presence and influence through associates, facilitators,
and brokers on every continent except Antarctica. The Jalisco Cartel
smuggles illicit drugs such as fentanyl, methamphetamine, heroin, and
cocaine into the United States by accessing various trafficking
corridors along the Southwest Border that include Tijuana, Mexicali,
Ciudad Juarez, Matamoros, and Nuevo Laredo. The Jalisco Cartel's rapid
expansion of its drug-trafficking activities is characterized by the
organization's willingness to engage in violent confrontations with
Mexican government security forces and rival cartels. The Jalisco
Cartel reportedly has a presence in 21 of the 32 Mexican states. It has
been identified that there are currently more than 18,800 members,
associates, facilitators, and brokers affiliated with the Cartel in
more than 100 countries.
people's republic of china and precursor chemicals
Chemical companies within the PRC produce and sell the majority of
precursor chemicals that are used today by the Sinaloa and Jalisco
Cartels to manufacture fentanyl and methamphetamine. These precursor
chemicals from companies within the PRC are the foundation of the
fentanyl and methamphetamine that are manufactured and transported from
Mexico into the United States and that are causing tens of thousands of
drug-related deaths in our country.
According to the State Department's 2023 International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report, there are at least 160,000 chemical companies
in the PRC. Chemical companies within the PRC distribute and sell
precursor chemicals that are used in fentanyl and methamphetamine
production around the world. Some companies within the PRC, for
example, engage in false cargo labeling and ship chemicals to Mexico
without tracking the customers purchasing the chemicals from the PRC
and elsewhere.
In recent weeks, DEA has had productive engagements with Chinese
counterparts in Beijing and Washington, DC focused on increasing
cooperation between our countries. DEA remains ready to work with the
PRC and all willing partners to reduce the flow of precursor chemicals
and the deadly synthetic drugs they produce.
chinese money-laundering operations and the cartels
The Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels utilize Chinese Money-Laundering
Organizations (CMLOs) in the United States and around the world to
facilitate laundering drug proceeds. CMLOs use mirror transfers, trade-
based money laundering, and bulk cash movement to facilitate the
exchange of foreign currency. The use of CMLOs by the cartels
simplifies the money-laundering process and streamlines the purchase of
precursor chemicals utilized in manufacturing drugs.
These money-laundering schemes are designed to remedy two separate
issues: (1) the desire of Mexican cartels to repatriate drug proceeds
into the Mexican banking system, and (2) wealthy Chinese nationals who
are restricted by the PRC's capital flight laws from transferring large
sums of money held in Chinese bank accounts for use abroad. To address
these issues, CMLOs acquire U.S. dollars held by Mexican cartels as a
means to supply their customers in the PRC.
recent enforcement actions against the sinaloa and jalisco cartels and
prc-based chemical suppliers
The Chapitos Network of the Sinaloa Cartel
On April 14, 2023, DEA announced indictments against the Chapitos--
the leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel--and their criminal network.
The Sinaloa Cartel supplies the majority of the fentanyl trafficked
into the United States, which has resulted in the United States'
unprecedented fentanyl epidemic. The Chapitos, the sons of the cartel's
notorious former leader Joaquin ``El Chapo'' Guzman, currently lead the
most violent faction of the Sinaloa Cartel. El Chapo was once the
world's most dangerous and prolific drug trafficker. Now his sons have
stepped in to fill their father's void by flooding the United States
with deadly fentanyl and leaving a wake of destruction across families
and communities throughout the United States.
Following their father's arrest and subsequent extradition and
conviction, we allege that the Chapitos expanded their enterprise with
sophisticated fentanyl laboratories in Culiacan, Mexico. We allege that
the Chapitos now run the largest, most violent, and most prolific
fentanyl trafficking operation in the world. The cartel is highly
organized and sophisticated, employing military-grade weapons and
vehicles and hundreds of people who protect the cartel and its
leadership at all costs. In addition, we allege that the Chapitos use
extreme violence and intimidation, including murder, torture, and
kidnapping, to ensure dominance and expand their territory.
The Chapitos pioneered the manufacture and trafficking of fentanyl,
and are responsible for the massive influx of fentanyl into the United
States over the past 8 years. The Chapitos oversee and control every
step in their fentanyl trafficking process and will stop at nothing to
ensure the expansion of their operations and the flow of fentanyl into
the United States. From procuring fentanyl precursors from illicit
sources of supply in the PRC; to distribution in the United States,
and, ultimately, reaching the hands of Americans; to the surreptitious
repatriation of massive proceeds through money launderers to avoid
detection, the cartel has direct involvement--and culpability.
Investigations found that even when test subjects died as a result of
high-potency fentanyl, the cartel sent the deadly batch to the United
States anyway--knowingly poisoning Americans for their own profit.
The indictments charged 28 members of the Chapitos network. These
include suppliers of fentanyl precursor chemicals based in the PRC, a
broker based in Guatemala assisting with the transport of those
chemicals from the PRC to Mexico, managers of clandestine fentanyl
laboratories based in Mexico converting the precursor chemicals into
fentanyl pills and powder, weapons traffickers and assassins
perpetuating extreme violence in Mexico to protect and expand the
fentanyl production operation, smugglers transporting the fentanyl from
Mexico into the United States, and illicit financiers laundering the
proceeds of fentanyl sales from the United States back to Mexico
through bulk cash smuggling, trade-based money laundering, and
cryptocurrency.
These indictments reflect the work of 32 DEA offices in the United
States and abroad, as well as our law enforcement partners and other
Department of Justice components, such as the U.S. Attorney's Office.
As part of the investigation, the DEA conducted operations in ten
countries and seized staggering amounts of illicit materials, including
2,557,000 fentanyl-laced pills, 105 kilograms of fentanyl powder, and
37 kilograms of fentanyl precursor chemicals, amounting to 22,747,441
potentially lethal doses of fentanyl.
Seven of the charged defendants were arrested pursuant to the
investigation--in Colombia, Greece, Guatemala, and the United States--
with the assistance of DEA's law enforcement partners in the United
States and abroad. Ovidio Guzman-Lopez was arrested earlier this year
by military officials in Mexico.
Simultaneously with the announcement of these indictments, the
Department of State has announced up to nearly $50 million in monetary
rewards for information leading to the capture of the defendants who
remain at large, and the Department of the Treasury Office of Foreign
Assets Control announced sanctions against 2 chemical companies that
operate in the PRC, and 5 individuals associated with those companies,
for supplying precursor chemicals to drug cartels in Mexico for the
production of illicit fentanyl intended for U.S. markets.
Operation Last Mile
On May 5, 2023, DEA announced the results of Operation Last Mile, a
year-long national operation targeting operatives, associates, and
distributors affiliated with the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels who were
located in the United States and responsible for the last mile of
fentanyl and methamphetamine distribution on our streets and on social
media.
In Operation Last Mile, DEA tracked down distribution networks
across the United States that are connected to the Sinaloa and Jalisco
Cartels. The Operation shows that the Sinaloa and Jalisco Cartels use
violent local street gangs and criminal groups and individuals across
the United States to flood American communities with huge amounts of
fentanyl and methamphetamine, which drives addiction and violence and
kills Americans. It also shows that the Cartels, their members, and
their associates use social media applications--like Facebook,
Instagram, TikTok, and Snapchat--and encrypted platforms--like
WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Wire, and Wickr--to coordinate logistics
and reach out to victims.
Operation Last Mile comprised 1,436 investigations conducted from
May 1, 2022 through May 1, 2023, in collaboration with Federal, State
and local law enforcement partners, and resulted in 3,337 arrests and
the seizure of nearly 44 million fentanyl pills, more than 6,500 pounds
of fentanyl powder, more than 91,000 pounds of methamphetamine, 8,497
firearms, and more than $100 million. The fentanyl powder and pill
seizures equate to nearly 193 million deadly doses of fentanyl removed
from communities across the United States, which have prevented
countless potential drug poisoning deaths. Among these investigations,
more than 1,100 cases involved social media applications and encrypted
communications platforms, including Facebook, Instagram, TikTok,
Snapchat, WhatsApp, Telegram, Signal, Wire, and Wickr.
Operation Killer Chemicals
On June 23, 2023, DEA announced Operation Killer Chemicals and the
indictments of 4 chemical companies and 8 individuals--all based in the
PRC--for knowingly providing customers in the United States and Mexico
with the precursor chemicals and scientific know-how to manufacture
fentanyl. These indictments are the first-ever charges against fentanyl
precursor chemical companies. Two PRC nationals were taken into custody
pursuant to the investigation. DEA also seized more than 200 kilograms
of precursors in these investigations alone, enough to make millions of
deadly doses of fentanyl.
As alleged, these Chinese chemical companies, and the individuals
working for them, not only provided customers with the ingredients for
fentanyl, they also gave advice on how to mix and substitute
ingredients to more efficiently make fentanyl, and employed chemists to
troubleshoot and provide expert advice when customers had questions.
The individuals also spoke freely about having clients in the United
States and Mexico and, specifically, in Sinaloa, Mexico, where the
Sinaloa Cartel is based.
The companies went to great lengths to conceal the chemicals during
transport. They falsified shipping labels and customs paperwork,
claiming the shipments were ``dog food'' or ``raw cosmetic materials''
rather than fentanyl precursors. They even disguised the chemicals at a
molecular level--adding a molecule to ``mask'' the precursors so they
would not be detected as banned substances during transport, and
teaching their customers how to remove that molecule after receipt.
Operation Killer Chemicals made clear that fentanyl precursors are
exceptionally cheap. Fentanyl precursors cost less than one cent per
deadly dose of fentanyl. In just one example, a defendant sold two
kilograms of fentanyl precursors for approximately $1,000, which can
make 1.75 million lethal doses of fentanyl. The amount of fentanyl that
can be made depends only on the amount of chemicals that can be
purchased.
The Operation also showed that fentanyl precursors are easily
bought on-line. Although based in the PRC, the chemical companies and
individuals reached customers across the world because they advertised
fentanyl precursors on social media (on Facebook and LinkedIn), used
encrypted applications like WhatsApp to speak with customers and
coordinate shipments, and took payment in Bitcoin and other
cryptocurrencies.
conclusion
DEA will continue our relentless pursuit of the Sinaloa and Jalisco
Cartels--the criminal networks most responsible for fentanyl-related
deaths in our country--and we will continue to work tirelessly to
defeat these cartels and dismantle every part of their global supply
chain, in order to protect the American people. Thank you again for the
opportunity to appear before the committee today. I look forward to
answering your questions.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Papadopoulos.
I now recognize Mr. Durham for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statement.
STATEMENT OF TYRONE DURHAM, DIRECTOR, NATION-STATE THREATS
CENTER, OFFICE OF INTELLIGENCE AND ANALYSIS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
HOMELAND SECURITY
Mr. Durham. Good afternoon. Chairman Higgins, Ranking
Member Correa, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
I'm honored to be here representing the Department of
Homeland Security's Office of Intelligence and Analysis and the
dedicated intelligence professionals working diligently to keep
the homeland safe, secure, and resilient.
As previously stated, the fentanyl drug overdose crisis in
the United States, which is fueled by Mexican transnational
criminal organizations and their Chinese suppliers of precursor
chemicals, continues at epidemic proportions.
As you know, the drug overdose deaths rose from 2019 to
2021, with more than 100,000-plus deaths reported in 2021.
Those deaths specifically involving synthetic opioids,
primarily fentanyl, continued to rise during the same time
period with more than 70,000 overdose deaths reported at that
same time period.
So let's talk about who's responsible. You previously heard
about the two Mexican cartels responsible for the activity, the
Sinaloa Cartel and the Jalisco New Generation Cartel. These
cartels supply U.S.-based affiliates with fentanyl for further
distribution and retail-level sale. U.S.-based traffickers then
sell fentanyl to users seeking the synthetic opioid. They mix
fentanyl with other controlled substances, and they distribute
it in the form of counterfeit prescription pills to drive
addiction.
China's role in the global fentanyl trade is also a serious
concern. China is the source of most of the precursor chemicals
required for fentanyl production. A cartel associate brokers
the sale and shipment of fentanyl precursor chemicals from
China to clandestine labs in Mexico, where the fentanyl is
manufactured.
Moreover, as law enforcement scrutiny or legal restrictions
increase, suppliers adapt by modifying or changing chemical
compounds of precursors, subsequently falling outside the
purview of existing controls, to mimic the desired effect. Some
Chinese chemists have focused on precursors to precursors, many
of which have legitimate uses and are therefore hard to
regulate.
There are several reasons why China is such a major source
of fentanyl production. First, China has a large and
sophisticated chemical and pharmaceutical industry that can
produce its precursor chemicals at will and at scale. Second,
China has a lax regulatory environment for chemicals, making it
easy for traffickers to acquire the precursors they need for
fentanyl manufacturing. Third, China's borders are porous,
making it easy for fentanyl precursors to be smuggled out of
the country, ultimately making their way to Mexico.
The Office of Intelligence and Analysis is producing
finished intelligence on drug trafficking and other transborder
threats to strengthen engagement between U.S. officials and
foreign partners. Specific to drug trafficking threats, our
analysis is aimed at identifying key transnational criminal
organized crime leadership figures, organizational networks,
logistical supply chains, smuggling routes, and the efforts of
corruption that stand in the way of dismantling these organized
crime groups.
Intelligence products draw upon national-level reporting
from the intelligence community fused with DHS-unique data from
components, as well as information from our law enforcement
partners across all levels of government. This finished
intelligence product related to TCOs are written at the widest
possible dissemination level for distribution to our Federal,
State, local, Tribal, and territorial partners and, when
appropriate, shared with our foreign partners in Mexico.
I&A has deployed intelligence personnel, worked closely
with DHS components, State and major urban area fusion centers,
and other law enforcement agencies to gather, analyze, and
report information that is uniquely available from these
partners.
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss this critical threat and for your continued
support of the Office of Intelligence and Analysis.
We remain committed to keeping the homeland safe, secure,
and resilient, and will continue our efforts at home and abroad
to uphold the national security and public safety of the United
States.
I look forward to your questions.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Durham.
Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their
5 minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning
may be called after all Members have been recognized.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
Mr. Papadopoulos, I'd like to ask you: In your opening
statement, you cited that you've identified major distribution
hubs in cities, including Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver, and
Chicago. Is that in your opening statement?
Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes, sir.
Mr. Higgins. OK. So a general question would be: Obviously
without revealing on-going law enforcement investigations and
operations, if you've identified the major hubs of narcotics
distributions in these cities--Phoenix, Los Angeles, Denver,
and Chicago--can we look forward to major arrests in Phoenix,
Los Angeles, Denver, and Chicago?
Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes, sir. As you know, the DEA is
constantly working these investigations. I mentioned Operation
Last Mile, which was announced in May, which is a year-long
effort focusing on the U.S. distributors of these cartels,
where we arrested over 3,300 people, seized $104 million in
cash and assets, and took about 8,500 guns across--off the
street. That was across the entire United States.
Mr. Higgins. Understood. The American citizenry asked
common-sense questions, and we're sworn by our oath to convey
those questions, and it's a good question. If you've identified
a narcotics hub and you--that means you're watching it. So we
expect those people to be arrested.
The volume of drugs seized and the arrests made is
reflective of the realities of effective law enforcement, but
also the overwhelming amount of trafficking that we're dealing
with and the criminal activity. It's at a level we've not seen
in America, and we expect--we expect large numbers of arrests.
If we identify these guys, we've got to break their back, make
them hate each other. It's just fine with me.
Director Cagen, last Congress, I introduced the Homeland
Security Fentanyl Enforcement Act. You're familiar, sir, this
bill is written to expand Homeland Security Investigations'
authority to investigate narcotics cases under Title 21. Can
you explain why HSI is currently unable to conduct independent
narcotics investigations?
This gets into some jurisdictional authority that Congress
should be involved in, so I--I ask you to clarify.
Mr. Cagen. Mr. Higgins, thank you for the support on this
topic.
HSI enjoys a great, long history and long relationship with
the DEA, 25 years-plus, and we look forward to the next 25
years.
Right now, our authority is derived from DEA's designation,
which allows us to work together, us to focus on our foreign
counterparts, our foreign customs authorities, working with our
TCIUs overseas, and to continue to work--actually, Mr.
Papadopoulos and I worked in the same fusion center building
together here in the District of Columbia a long time ago and
had a great relationship. So we'd just look forward to having
that continued relationship moving forward.
Mr. Higgins. We--we understand and we appreciate the fact
that long-standing relationships have been developed between
the law enforcement agencies and working on the ground. But we
must ensure that you have the legal pathway--statutory pathway
to conduct your investigations, sometimes in cooperation with
other agencies but with an independent capability that we must
ensure.
So I look forward to speaking with my colleagues more about
the Homeland Security Fentanyl Enforcement Act.
Mr. Chester, China is the main country of origin for
precursor chemicals for synthetic opioids. These chemicals are
then taken by the cartels, who make drugs like fentanyl. We all
understand that. You've made that clear.
Can you characterize the coordinated effort between the
cartels and China to create and distribute illicit drugs like
fentanyl, and how is that changing as we speak?
Mr. Chester. Thank you for the question, Congressman. So
the first major change happened in 2019, when China scheduled--
at the United States' request, scheduled fentanyl as a class.
What that did was it had the effect of reducing finished
fentanyl from China to the United States to almost zero, and
the traffickers got into the precursor business selling those
to Mexican cartels for production.
The coordination happens on a couple of different levels.
The first one is there's--there is a broker, usually located in
Mexico, that works with a broker in the PRC in order to order
the chemicals, often from a legitimate chemical company, who
fills the bill. Those chemicals are transported and shipped,
usually on an unwitting carrier, to one of the ports in Mexico
or via air where at the port of entry it is delivered--diverted
and then delivered to the drug manufacturers. That's the raw
materials.
Then the payment for that is usually done through--through
illicit finance enablers and brokers located in the PRC and in
Mexico. It is this network of brokers between the drug
producers and the raw material suppliers that gives this entire
global illicit supply chain its life.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chester. It's a massive
network. We intend to break it.
My time has expired.
I recognize the Ranking Member, my friend and colleague,
Mr. Correa, the gentleman from California.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to follow up on the Chairman's last comment on
China, their role.
Their cooperation, has it been better in the past? Two-
thousand-nineteen, they helped us, classified fentanyl, stopped
it. Now you've got the issue of precursors, precursors to
precursors, harder to regulate.
Has China helped us over the last year or two? Have you
seen that level of cooperation maybe not as good as it's been
in the past?
Mr. Chester. Thank you for your question. Your question is
very prescient, and the answer is cooperation in the past
actually has brought results. In fact, in the--in the words of
Chinese diplomats, counternarcotics cooperation between the
United States and the PRC has been a bright spot.
We were able to do--there was routine law enforcement
cooperation. We were able to get fentanyl scheduled as a class.
As of late, over more than a year, for a variety of reasons,
the PRC has decided not to engage with the United States on--on
counternarcotics and a number of other issues.
The United States would like that level of cooperation
again, and we have made it clear to the PRC a few things. The
first one is we're not blaming the PRC government for this.
There are criminal elements within China and Mexico and the
United States who keep this global illicit supply chain alive.
That's the first thing.
The second thing is our cooperation is absolutely essential
in order to help us with that, and we have made some very
specific asks of the Chinese government that they could
implement very easily in order to be able to help us to do
that.
Mr. Correa. Gentlemen, I just want to say thank you for
your good work. You've done a stellar job of doing what you're
paid to do.
We talk about commercial disruption, precursors, pills,
shipping. It's as though every time you stop one place,
something else explodes. I've heard lately that--there is intel
now a lot of the precursors are coming in through our ports of
entry, pill presses coming into the United States. So every
time you bottle something up, another source, another supply
seems to emerge.
The one issue that I think probably holds everything
together is the finances, the laundering of this money. What
can we do to better enable you to stop the flow of these
profits?
HSI, you talked about--you know, the Chairman asked you
about maybe some other tools you may need. But I would ask all
of you: What else can we do as Members of Congress to
strengthen your hand to stop the flow of the profits? Because,
you know, you dry up the money and the whole machine comes to a
stop.
You know, right now, what we are witnessing in this country
is a massive transfer of wealth from American pocketbooks to
somewhere around the country--excuse me--around the world.
Please, open it up for comments.
Mr. Cagen. Since you mentioned HSI, I'll--I'll take that.
You know, money is moved in multiple ways, and they're
ever-evolving. You just mentioned the fact that--you know, that
we stop one thing that the Chinese are doing, and they move in
a different way. The same thing happens with money laundering.
It's bulk cash, it's trade-based money laundering, it's
cryptocurrency movement of money right now.
One thing--and I come back to, you know, begin and end in
China. China has taken over. Chinese money-laundering
organizations have taken over the network, the money movement
network, which we're all focused on as--you know, everybody
sitting up here is focused on that. They're able to charge much
lower percentages than other people have in the past because of
their vast network around the world.
But we are--HSI is--that's what we do. We like to go after
their money. We like to go after their toys. Because when you
take their money away, then they can't flourish. So we're
continuing to----
Mr. Correa. I asked you directly--I called you out because
I've seen you work, and I've seen some of your results. When
I've been down to San Isidro, I've taken a tour of your
operations.
Mr. Cagen. Yes, sir.
Mr. Correa. All of you are doing a stellar job. In the half
minute that I have left, I would just ask you all as a
challenge to let us know what we can do as Congress to
strengthen your hand when it comes to money laundering. It's
not an easy solution.
You've got 20 seconds. You're not going to give me the
answer. But I'd love all of you to go back and give us some,
you know, wish lists, legislatively what tools and what
resources you need to stop the flow of drug money.
In my opinion, that's the best punch you can give these
folks when it comes to fentanyl.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Time is up. I turn it over back to
you.
Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
The gentleman from Oklahoma, Mr. Brecheen, is recognized
for 5 minutes for questioning.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate you all being here today. There is no doubt
this is a crisis. Just in Oklahoma alone, the State that I'm a
Representative for, we've seen a 735 percent increase in
fentanyl deaths, and that has occurred from 2018 to 2022: 326
deaths in 2022 in Oklahoma. In 2018, it was 39.
I think probably every Member of this committee has some
personal point of contact with somebody that they know of who
has lost their life or has a direct connection. It's really
sad.
I guess what I want to zero in on--and I'll open this up to
anyone--if you--if 6 out of the 10 pills that you all are
looking at--one of your testimonies a minute ago--are
containing lethal overdose elements to the point that you take
it unsuspectingly, it can kill you, why are they doing that?
There's an addictive element, right. You're trying to use
the addictive element, 10 cents to make, and $30--10 to $30
sold, massive increase in profit.
So can you--I'd be interested in some comments if you--if
you can help bring about why they are enabling such a lethal
concoction in their pills?
Mr. Chester. Congressman, I can start, and then I can turn
it over to my colleagues.
I think--I think the first thing is that--that our image of
these drug producers and traffickers, I think, traditionally
has been that they're evildoers who are out to hurt people when
in reality they are disinterested businesspeople who really
only want a few things. They want to lower their production
costs. They want to lower their risk of detection and
interdiction. They want to increase their customer base and
increase their profits.
By--and--and a mechanism to do that is to provide the drug
user an experience that they did not expect. This is what we
saw back in 2015 when we started to see synthetic opioids like
fentanyl introduced into the heroin supply chain. This is--this
was the door that opened this up for the United States. What it
did, it provided the individual a qualitative effect that they
did not expect, and it was used as kind-of a branding.
Because these things are so potent and because they are so
potentially lethal, a milligram in the wrong direction will
take you from having a qualitative experience that you didn't
expect to an overdose death. In a lot of cases, these things
are not uniformly mixed, and they're not done well, and it's a
lot of cross-contamination that actually leads to the overdose
deaths.
The last thing I'll tell you is, in a lot of cases, the
unwitting user who may not have an active substance use
disorder or does not intend to take fentanyl gets it in another
counterfeit pill that they did not expect, like Xanax or
Adderall or something like that. This is done in the interest
of making money with a casual disinterest as to whether people
are harmed or not.
Mr. Brecheen. So I want to pivot, because I think somebody
else maybe on the panel can answer this. Are you seeing it
utilized as a revenge element to--so you're saying, you know,
that there's nothing that's in this more than profit margin,
but there's a--an evil intent that can lead to murder
purposefully.
In your investigations, are you seeing that?
Mr. Papadopoulos. Sir, I can jump in.
So the answer is yes. We have evidence in some of the char-
--previous cases I mentioned where the cartels knew that there
was deadly fentanyl. The amount of fentanyl that they were
sending to United States was deadly, because they tested it on
human beings in Mexico, and they still sent it anyway.
As Mr. Chester was saying, these are not mixed in labs.
They're not sterile situations. We've seen pills with less than
a milligram of fentanyl all the way up to 8 milligrams of
fentanyl. The average dose is 2.4 milligrams, and 1 milligrams
is considered a potentially deadly dose.
Mr. Brecheen. In regards to human trafficking, ``Sound of
Freedom'' is a movie that's, you know, getting a lot of
attention right now nationally, and you can sell a drug one
time, common--commonly being discussed is--as the human
trafficking element, that you can sell an individual multiple
times.
What are you seeing with the human traffic--in all of your
investigations, where are you seeing the overlap with those
that are engaged in human trafficking, prostitution, also
alongside the fentanyl trade?
Mr. Mandryck. Thank you for the question, sir. So,
historically, we had seen the transnational criminal groups
focus on narcotics, were solely focused on narcotics. They
would charge a piso, or a tax, for migrants to cross.
At the beginning of COVID, where we started to see some of
the closures at the ports of entry for nonessential travel, we
started to see those criminal groups become more involved in
the process holistically. So it wasn't just a couple-hundred-
dollar tax; it was a multi-thousand-dollar program to move them
throughout the whole chain.
That's what we've continued to see, is that control of the
plazas along the border and that full-scale facilitation from
start to finish.
Mr. Brecheen. Mr. Chairman, would you allow--would you
allow if anybody else has any--I know my time has expired. Does
anybody else have any--any comments on that?
Mr. Cagen. I can draw a distinction a little bit between
the human smuggling and human trafficking aspect, which I think
is where your question was going.
We don't see a direct link between your large-scale
criminal organizations that are operating and moving people
trafficking-wise, human trafficking-wise, across the border
like the transnational criminal organizations. A lot of those
folks are already here. People are smuggled into the United
States. Then, once in the United States, transnational--or
organizations prey on vulnerable populations, and that's when
they're turned into trafficking victims.
Mr. Brecheen. Thank you.
Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
Mr. Thanedar is recognized for 5 minutes for questioning.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman Higgins. Thank you,
gentlemen, for your testimony.
I have heard from both sides of the aisle that
transnational criminal organizations and the smuggling of
illicit drugs like fentanyl is not just a U.S. problem; it is a
global issue. There are bad actors all over the world looking
to profit from these deadly drugs. That's why it is important
to foster relationships with law enforcement partners and
international governments to disrupt and dismantle
transnational criminal organizations.
Mr. Cagen, you mentioned this point in your testimony. So
my question is for you, Mr. Cagen, and also for Mr.
Papadopoulos. Can you--and, in fact, I have three questions.
Let me just state those and allow you, either of you, to
comment on.
Can you discuss how HSI and the DEA are working and sharing
information across the Federal Government, as well as State and
local law enforcement partners, to investigate and prosecute
these criminal organizations?
No. 2, can you discuss how HSI and DEA are fostering
relationships internationally to prevent these deadly drugs
from reaching our borders?
No. 3, in April 2023, the Justice Department announced
charges against Federal leaders of the Sinaloa Cartel. What
role did this partnership play in these critical
investigations?
Mr. Cagen. Thank you very much for the question. I think
it's a fantastic question.
I've mentioned it in my opening statement and in a
statement already before, HSI and DEA have a long history of
working together. I mentioned that we both worked together in
the same building, which is actually a fusion center, where we
bring in information, intelligence, and 30-plus Federal
agencies sit in this building where we share information and
ensure that we're taking a whole-of-Government approach toward
attacking the cartels and the transnational criminal
organizations.
We both have very similar tactics as well when we're
working with our international partners. Both have
investigative units. Ours is called a Transnational Criminal
Investigative Unit. Very different but the same structure.
Ours, we've got the ability to work with the Mexican Customs,
where we can stop things that are coming over the ports, like
precursor chemicals that are shipped from China over the sea,
things like that.
I think that we have a very good international relationship
with Mexico and other countries on the working level, which is
how we all get our job done to go after transnational criminal
organizations.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you.
Mr. Papadopoulos. Thank you for the question, sir. So as
far as information sharing, we are in, as I mentioned,
unprecedented times right now, which I think calls for
unprecedented collaboration across the Federal, State, and
local governments. We are committed to that. We are using every
tool that we have available, including sanctions and rewards
for justice, to get the word out.
As far as our international relationships, we have a big
international presence also, and that's because we want to be
proactive. Most drugs are manufactured outside of the United
States, and then they need to be transported here through other
countries. So when we're outside of the United States working
with our international counterparts, we are being proactive,
instead of reactive, waiting for the drugs to get here.
As far as the case that you mentioned, we did work closely
on that investigation with other districts and other agencies
to put that case together.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, my time is up, so I yield back.
Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
My colleague from Texas, Mr. Gonzales, is recognized for 5
minutes for questioning.
Mr. Gonzales. Thank you, Chairman, and thank you for
holding this hearing.
I want to talk--I want to use my time to talk about
fentanyl as it relates to drones. I think this is an area that
the landscape is changing.
If you're watching the war in Ukraine, you're seeing that
drones are the future of conflict, and that's no different from
fentanyl. What I'm seeing is I'm seeing on a regular basis
cartels are using drones to penetrate the United States air
space, and they're dropping off packages of fentanyl. Remember,
you don't need large quantities in order to make a lot of money
off of this. Then they're taking that and they're moving it
around.
Well, let me just set the tone. Imagine if you're in a
soccer field and all of a sudden there's a drone that flies
over with fentanyl and it doesn't drop it to get picked up and
get sold somewhere, it just drops it in the stadium. Could we
live in that world? Well, guess what? We already live in that
world.
So I'm very concerned with the drones that are happening,
in particular in the cartels and how it's all related to
fentanyl.
My first question is for Mr. Mandryck. Can you speak to any
trends or observations you have seen with the recent rise in
the use of drones to smuggle drugs across the border?
Mr. Mandryck. Thank you, sir. Historically, we have seen
drones almost entirely used for surveillance along the border,
whether that's at a port of entry or between ports of entry,
where scouts located on the Mexican side would monitor the
movements and then facilitate cross-border movement from there.
We have started to see an increased number of sUAS
incursions crossing the border, some of which are for
surveillance purposes, but we have seen increased use of
smuggling of some narcotics, primarily hard narcotics, those
that, as you mentioned, don't require larger quantities for
movement. We have in place a very strong counter-UAS program
with our U.S. Border Patrol and our Air and Marine Operations
Center that we would love to give you a more in-depth briefing
on the specific capabilities of that.
Mr. Gonzales. Great. Thank you.
I was just in El Paso a few weeks ago, and I visited two
areas. One, I visited the Clint Station, Border Patrol station.
This is an area in the El Paso Sector, but it's not the main
one. It's not what you see on TV. It's one of the sectors that
is in the Lower Valley, and it is historically known that this
is the area that is most trafficked.
So I was asking the agents there, I was like, How many
agents do you have on duty at one time? The answer was two
agents. OK.
My next question was, How much contraband have you
apprehended this year? Guess what the answer was? Zero. OK.
So the most trafficked area in El Paso County, you only
have two agents on duty, and they've apprehended nothing. OK.
Go a little further. You know, outside the city limits of
El Paso is a brand-new soft-sided facility. It's like going to
the Dallas Cowboys Stadium. OK. It's like Disneyland: 360,000
square feet, larger than six football fields. It's costing
taxpayers $400 million a year. Guess how many agents were in
that facility? Two hundred eight.
What I'm getting at is we're putting all our resources into
the humanitarian piece of it, and there's nobody on the field
to actually stop some of the traffic that's happening.
One of the agents told me, Hey, look, I see drones--Tony, I
see drones coming back and forth all the time, and I feel
powerless. There is nothing I can do as a field agent down on
the ground.
What I'm also seeing too is all these procedures--you have
to go through all these procedurals to be able to go all the
way up the chain in order to get a response back.
Once again, we are living in a different environment where
things are tactical. You've got to be able to give the agent
the tools that they need to succeed in a real-time environment
if we're going to save lives.
I've got 1 minute left. Let me ask one more question. Once
again for you, Mr. Mandryck. What can the committee do to
ensure that CBP and other appropriate agencies have what they
need to combat drones that are illegally crossing our border?
Mr. Mandryck. Sir, what a lot of it comes down to is just
the adaptability of where we are with the technology, the speed
at which that grows. They're very cheap to collect, to produce,
so it's kind of a twofold effort. So it's actually attacking
logistical supply chains behind those to prevent those being
moved into the hands of TCOs to use for facilitation, but also
support in the technology to, not just detect, but also safely
bring down those pieces of aircraft, and then the exploitation
after that significant investment from a technology and an
expertise standpoint.
Mr. Gonzales. Well, I'd love to take you up on your offer
and sit down and walk through this, in particular to these UAS
vehicles that we can defeat, and talk about it, not only in
regards to the Homeland Security Committee, but I also sit on
the Appropriations Committee. How can we give real money to
real programs that work? I'm very interested in that. Would
love to follow up with you.
Mr. Chairman, I'm out of time. I yield back.
Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
The gentlewoman, Mrs. Ramirez, is recognized for 5 minutes
for questioning.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you, Chairman Higgins and Ranking
Member Correa, of the Border Subcommittee for convening today's
hearing.
However, I do wish that we could be focused on addressing
the root causes of migration rather than having to debunk myths
and respond to Republican fearmongering. I sincerely hope we
can look beyond the politics and work together to achieve
comprehensive immigration reform and address the causes and the
concerns we have around this opioid crisis.
We know that nearly 90 percent of hard drugs, such as
fentanyl, heroin, and methamphetamines, are seized by CBP at
our ports of entry rather than between them. Even when hard
drugs are seized between ports of entry, the vast majority are
seized at vehicle checkpoints.
Mr. Mandryck, can you confirm that nearly 90 percent of
hard drugs seized are at ports of entry? Is that a yes or no?
Mr. Mandryck. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you. Mr. Mandryck, is it true that the
vast majority of opioids seized between ports of entry are
seized at vehicular checkpoints?
Mr. Mandryck. That's correct, ma'am.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you.
Mr. Mandryck and Mr.--I'm going to do my best because
pronunciation is important to me--Mr. Papadopoulos--
Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos. Did I get it right? My
understanding is that more than 85 percent of the people
convicted for smuggling fentanyl are U.S. citizens. Is that
accurate?
Mr. Mandryck. So, ma'am, I can talk about the seizures and
the turnover for the actual prosecutions. When we look at those
encounters at the ports of entry, so Office of Field
Operations, there's two ways to look at that. That's by weight
and by number of events. If we look at it from events, so
individual encounters, this fiscal year we're at 73.1 percent
are U.S. citizens, the balance being Mexican nationals. If we
look at that by weight, we're looking at about 56 percent U.S.
citizens. The delta between those two is a lot of the U.S.
citizens we see are very small quantity personal use.
Mrs. Ramirez. What about convicted for smuggling fentanyl?
Is it U.S. citizens, the majority?
Mr. Papadopoulos. Ma'am, I'm going to have to get back to
you on that. I don't know the answer to that, but I'll be happy
to get back with you.
Mrs. Ramirez. Yes, I appreciate it. Thank you.
So, Mr. Mandryck, would it be fair to say that the majority
of seizures in between ports of entry, because even with the
percentages you gave me, are also from U.S. citizens and U.S.
persons more so than from Mexican nationals?
Mr. Mandryck. It's a fairly close breakdown. We will have
to get back with you on specifics.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you. Mr. Mandryck, can you also share
the percentage of opioids CPB seized on migrants not in
vehicles during the fiscal year? Do you have that information?
Mr. Mandryck. It's a very small percentage of those who
were actually on migrants for opioids. We don't have the firm
percentage. We can get back to you.
Mrs. Ramirez. So a very small percentage, correct?
Mr. Mandryck. Yes, ma'am.
Mrs. Ramirez. That's what I thought.
So just to clarify, Mr. Mandryck, would you agree that
undocumented persons traveling on foot between ports of entry
represent a very small fraction of the people trafficking
opioids across our borders?
Mr. Mandryck. Yes, ma'am. There's a variety of reasons
behind that: the ability to exploit illegal travel with, you
know, millions of people each day back and forth, easy
concealment techniques, operational security with a
countersurveillance of individuals.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you. Thank you.
We know the alarming number of fentanyl overdoses is
emblematic of a larger drug abuse public health crisis that our
country is experiencing and has been for decades. I deeply
sympathize with the losses that many families, including in the
Third Illinois District, are facing. But this issue is broader
than one of border security. In the words of Mr. Chester, and I
quote, you said that the--hold on 1 second. I want to get it
right. Ending the opioid crisis doesn't start at the border and
it won't end in the border.
We need--and so I think we need to treat the demand driving
this epidemic, and we need comprehensive health care and access
to education, treatment for everyone.
Mr. Chester, knowing that, what initiatives is this
administration pursuing to prevent substance abuse in our
communities and support these in recovery?
Mr. Chester. Thank you very much. You stated it correctly,
right, the efforts that we take to keep these drugs out of our
country have got to be complemented by strong public health
efforts in order to be able to reduce their demand. It really
starts with prevention, particularly youth prevention. We out
of ONDCP manage the drug-free communities program, which is
enormously successful, more than 700 coalitions funded around
the country, focused at the local level in order to prevent
drug use.
The second thing is reducing barriers to treatment, whether
those barriers are monetary or regulatory, ensuring that
everyone who needs treatment is able to get it. Sadly, about 8
out of 10 Americans who need treatment don't have access to it.
Then the final thing is to create communities and
workplaces that are recovery ready, so that individuals in
recovery can continue their sustained recovery, stay with their
families, get a good job, and not tragically enter back into
the population of those using drugs.
Mrs. Ramirez. Thank you for your time.
I yield back.
Mr. Higgins. The gentlewoman's time has expired.
Mr. D'Esposito, my colleague from New York, is recognized
for 5 minutes.
Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank
you for allowing me to waive on to the subcommittee this
afternoon.
To all of you, thank you for being here.
Prior to serving as a Member of Congress, I was even
prouder, I think, to be a Member of the New York City Police
Department, retiring there as a detective. I know that just
working in the five boroughs of New York City you get to see
different district attorneys and what their priorities are,
their prosecutorial priorities.
So I guess this is really a question for Mr. Papadopoulos,
but it's really open to all of you. Do you see that the people
that you're arresting and hopefully eventually prosecuted, are
you dealing with different prosecutors with different
priorities, and is that hindering your ability to take illegal
narcotics?
Mr. Papadopoulos. Sir, thank you for the question. As you
know as former law enforcement, you know, we collect the
evidence, we gather the evidence, and present it to a grand
jury or to a prosecutor's office, and they decide the most
appropriate charges. So we don't factor into that, other than
collecting the evidence.
Mr. D'Esposito. Right. But what I'm asking is, have you
seen it become more difficult with different prosecutors, the
effective--really the prosecution of drug arrests? Has it
become more difficult as we see different prosecutors having
different priorities?
I mean, we see it throughout the United States of America,
whether it's in cities like New York or places like California
where, you know, crime is rampant, because we see over and over
again repeat offenders, people that are--they're being
arrested, they're being sometimes prosecuted, and then they are
let out to commit more crimes. One of the biggest things that
we've seen is repeat offenders.
So have we seen--and the issues on our Southwest Border
when we're dealing with, specifically in this hearing, the
trafficking of narcotics and fentanyl, have we seen repeat
offenders, and has the ability of prosecutors and perhaps their
priorities had an effect on the way that you guys are able to
really take criminals off the street, and I think most
important, keep them off the street?
Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes, sir. So for the border, I'll defer
to DHS on what they're seeing there. I will say that, you know,
DEA strives to prosecute Federally, not at the local level.
Mr. D'Esposito. Of course.
Mr. Papadopoulos. What we see when we do that is that--more
of an impact in terms of crime reduction and sentencing.
Mr. D'Esposito. Right. But even Federal prosecutors,
different offices have different priorities, and sometimes we
see things headed in a different direction.
So I guess for the border, I'll hand it over to you guys.
Mr. Cagen. I don't oversee our domestic operations branch,
but I will tell you that I don't believe that we have seen much
of a change. There's a consistent cadre who works day in and
day out on the law enforcement, either CBP or HSI side, that
works continuously with U.S. attorneys to take cases to the
Federal level.
I can take that as a get-back. If there's something
different, I can let you know.
Mr. D'Esposito. OK. Perfect.
Mr. Mandryck. Sir, I'd have to go with our DEA and HSI
colleagues. When we get seizures, they're turned over to them
for the prosecution.
Mr. D'Esposito. Great.
I yield back. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
My colleague, Mr. Ivey, is recognized for 5 minutes for
questions.
Mr. Ivey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I start asking questions, I'd like to commend the
Chair for putting this hearing together. I waived in to the
committee today and had just come over from another hearing, so
I just picked up the witness testimony. I came in and asked--I
looked at the list, and I asked staff, Well, who are their
witnesses and who are our witnesses? They said, Well, this
looks like it's pretty much straight down the middle.
I must agree. I appreciate the fact that you put together a
balanced hearing that's been very informative. It's the first
one I've had like this since I got to Congress.
Mr. Higgins. You're always welcome.
Mr. Ivey. Thank you, sir.
I did want to follow up on Mr. Gonzales' questions about
the drones issue. Because when we went down to--I guess it was
in Brownsville, and we were talking with some of the Border
Patrol agents, they were echoing what he said. They said
there's a lot of drones, that it's increased a lot, that more
of them are being used to now ship the drugs, and that they
were outnumbered. The ratio of 17:1 sticks out in my mind for
some reason.
I think, Mr. Correa, we were trying to get some--and I
don't know if it happened or not--but some language in the bill
that we passed to try and see if we could get additional
funding to increase your capability to get drones to try and
respond to the amount that they're using. I know they're very
well-funded, they're keeping up with technology, and we have to
hustle to keep up with them.
But I did want to make sure that that's something that
would be helpful to you. We--you know, resources are short, but
if you need additional help with the drone counter push on our
part, you know, I would like to hear what your position is on
that.
Mr. Mandryck. Absolutely, sir. Drones are something that's
not going away. We're going to continue to see those, whether
it's surveillance or narcotics movement.
We also support the vast majority of seer activities that
take place, so Super Bowl, large-scale events with the counter-
UAS approach. So it's a holistically beneficial program.
Mr. Ivey. Yes. I think there's legislation that's coming
through the House, but it's got multiple committees because
there's multiple types of jurisdiction. So that means it's got
a hard path to travel, but hopefully we can get there. With
your push, it might help to move it forward. So thank you for
that.
I wanted to ask you too about China and some of their
activities. I think one of you said that they have porous
borders, and so it's easy for, you know, bad actors to ship
precursors and the drugs out. Then I believe it was Mr. Chester
who mentioned that, to the extent China is being cooperative,
it can really enhance our efforts to reduce the drug flow.
What kinds of additional steps can we take, in your view? I
know this is ticklish. You're not State Department necessarily.
But what can we do to help to address that? Because if we can
help to cut it off at the source, that would really help our
issues here.
Mr. Chester. You know, thanks very much. I work with my
State Department colleagues on this literally every day, and
they do a remarkable job, help managing this relationship.
I think the first thing is we need dialog with the PRC
government, routine collaboration like we've had in the past.
That's the first thing.
The second thing that we've specifically asked them to do
is we've presented them with what we call the three asks. The
first one is implement quality know-your-customer standards, so
that the shippers of precursors, pill presses, dye molds,
encapsulating machines know that they're going to go to a
legitimate business and they're just not filling every single
order. The second one is to properly label those items in
accordance with World Trade Organization standards, so that
pill press parts are labeled as pill press parts, so that they
can be inspected, and motorcycle parts are labeled as
motorcycle parts. The third thing is to agree with the United
States and other countries on the--and it's a finite list, of
legitimate uncontrollable chemicals because they have so many
legitimate uses that can be combined and turned into precursor
chemicals for making synthetic opioids or other synthetic
drugs.
Three things that are really just due diligence on the part
of any responsible country that not only the PRC but all
countries--and we've talked to all countries about doing this--
in order to be able to help dry up this permissive environment
in which these items can move around in plain sight.
The last thing is the PRC needs to join with us in
partnership at the global level, and this is particularly true
in light of the establishment of this global coalition. They
hold a major role in this problem, and they should, as any
great nation, hold a major role in its solution as well. We
look forward to them engaging with us and doing that.
Mr. Ivey. I thank you for that.
I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you again, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
My colleague from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee, is recognized for
5 minutes for questioning.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chairman and Ranking
Member. I was just in Judiciary, so I'm somewhat delayed and
may be asking questions that have already been asked.
But let me start with the principal deputy administrator of
the DEA, Mr. Papadopoulos, and really hone in on the DEA's work
with respect to opioids and the fact that fentanyl, which is
synthetic, is found in drugs for medical use, and it is
sometimes used to lace other drugs, and as well sold on-line,
come in pink pills, multicolored pills.
How difficult is the fight for fentanyl, and what are the
elements the DEA uses? I know there's some on the criminal
side. You deal with scheduling of drugs, not yet scheduled
fentanyl. But how difficult is this fight?
Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes. Thank you, ma'am. So we are using
all the tools that we have available and the authorities that
we have been given to battle this unprecedented epidemic that
we're facing right now. As you mentioned, we are having
millions of pills come into the United States. Six out of 10
have a potentially lethal dose. That's up from 4 out of 10 last
year. So we are committed to doing everything we can to prevent
the overdose deaths that are happening throughout the country.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, what is your--let me get you to be
more extensive. Everything you can. But what are the--are you
targeting certain areas? How do you incorporate the fact that
there's medical uses? You know, are you seeing a criminal
element that is separate and apart from the cartels? Because
fentanyl is everywhere. Can you comment on that, please?
Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes. So we are--domestically, I mentioned
Operation Last Mile, which resulted in the distributors--cartel
distributors arrests in the United States. Also, we have
Operation Overdrive, which is data-driven, and it focuses on
areas of the country that have high number of overdose deaths
and drug-related violence. We're working with our State and
local partners to identify those areas.
Most recently, we are in 57 cities in 36 States. Phase 1,
which ended last year, resulted in significant decreases in
fatal shootings and homicides in Philadelphia in the Kensington
area. Phase 2 is on-going, and phase 3 is coming soon. So we're
doing that.
We also have Operation Overdose Justice, which focuses on
deaths resulting from fentanyl, where we partner with local
counter--State and local counterparts to bring the most
appropriate charges when somebody does die either through a
fake prescription pill or if it's fentanyl that's mixed with
another drug.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you very much. I am in the
business of stopping fentanyl and particularly the impact that
it's had on our children. I want to ask Mr. Chester what is
being done as relates to research or treatments on opioid
addiction, but particularly the impact on school children.
At this time, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to introduce into the
legislation--my legislation, which is Stop Fentanyl Now Act of
2023. I hope that there will be an opportunity for this
legislation to be reviewed in this committee, Judiciary, and I
know that there's an Energy and Commerce component. But
included in here is the ability for more institutions to use
the strips. Some States outlawed them as being a criminal
element.
So, Mr. Chester, you want to comment particularly focused
on school children and the crisis we have?
Mr. Chester. Yes, Congresswoman. Thank you very much. The
first thing is our strong emphasis, and particularly in the
National Drug Control Strategy, on youth prevention. This is
not only preventing at the individual level but looking at the
environmental factors that may lead to eventual substance use.
That's the first thing.
The second thing, as you mentioned, fentanyl test strips. I
would also like to mention naloxone and increasing the
availability of naloxone to get it in the hands of everyone who
needs it so that anyone who suffers an opioid overdose, who
doesn't need to die, that overdose can be reversed with the use
of naloxone. Those are two important components of harm
reduction. In the National Drug Control Strategy, this is the
first time that harm reduction has been mentioned in a National
Drug Control Strategy.
The last thing, when you talk about treatment, we have
wonderful professionals at the National Institutes of Drug
Addiction, at NIDA, who do research on this. I think the most
important thing that we can do now is reduce barriers to
treatment, particularly medication treatment for opioid use
disorder, to ensure that everyone who needs treatment has
access to it. That's probably the most critical important thing
that we can do in order to take the oxygen out of this illicit
supply that's being pulled across our borders.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chester, thank you. But I wanted to
end on your testimony, because if we can cut the desire, then
the supply has nowhere to go. It is in our schools. My
legislation, Stop Fentanyl Now Act, does naloxone, does the
strips, and you have indicated it is a holistic approach.
I just want to end, Mr. Chairman, by--I'm not sure if I did
get a answer, but I'm asking unanimous consent to introduce in
the record the Stop Fentanyl Now Act.
Mr. Higgins. Without objection.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Jackson Lee. Additionally, I want to introduce into the
record, ``Fentanyl is dominating headlines, but there's a more
comprehensive drug problem happening in Texas.'' It goes on to
talk about the broader crisis, synthetic opioids are not taken
alone, and so health care and law enforcement officials are
dealing with multiple deadly drugs at once. That means we must
cut into the desire. I use that term because it's desire
because you're addicted.
[The information follows:]
Submitted For the Record by Honorable Jackson Lee
fentanyl is dominating headlines, but there's a more comprehensive drug
problem happening in texas
Lawmakers are passing laws in an attempt to slow the rise in fentanyl
overdoses, but drug advocates warn the opioid is mostly a
booster for other illegal drugs.
by Stephen Simpson
June 19, 2023, 5 AM Central
Fentanyl has been in the headlines across Texas, grabbing the
attention of State leaders worried about the drug crossing over the
State's border with Mexico and overdose deaths among young people.
But often left out of the discussion is that the drug is one part
of a broader addiction crisis in the State. The synthetic opioid is
rarely taken alone, and health care and law enforcement officials are
dealing with multiple deadly drugs at once.
The illicit use of fentanyl began increasing in Texas around 2015,
quickly sparking a crisis. Obtained with a doctor's prescription, the
synthetic opioid can be an effective pain reliever. But there's been a
rise both in the illegal use of the drug and now the manufacture of
counterfeit prescription drugs that contain fentanyl but are packaged
to look like something else, in an effort to cause addiction and
generate repeat buyers.
``It's certainly, at this moment, the drug and the drug supply that
is the most dangerous,'' said Katharine Neill Harris, a drug policy
fellow at Rice University's Baker Institute for Public Policy.
Opioids, including heroin, prescription pills, and fentanyl, have
caused the most overdose deaths in Texas, according to a Texas Health
and Human Services report that studied death certificate data from 2010
to 2019.
And because opioids are often mixed with other drugs, there's been
a rise in deaths known as polysubstance overdoses. The most recent
state data shows those deaths reaching a rate of four per 100,000
people in 2019.
The most prevalent drug combinations were commonly prescribed
pills, like hydrocodone and oxycodone, mixed with depressants like
benzodiazepines and psychostimulants that include amphetamine and
methamphetamine.
``That is the reason I caution very much against focusing on one
drug,'' Neill Harris said. ``Fentanyl is certainly a big problem. But I
don't think it's necessarily the last drug crime crisis that we are
going to face.''
The role of methamphetamine in the illegal drug market has been
pushed aside in headlines as images of drug use in the South turned
from exploding meth labs to potentially deadly fentanyl pills. But drug
experts say meth has made an unwanted comeback as meth manufacturers
have begun making a stronger product.
``Meth is eating everybody's lunch and nobody's talking about it.
Meth is crawling up on everybody,'' said Peter Stout, president and
chief executive officer of the Houston Forensic Science Center. ``Meth
fatalities are way up even if you look at the Texas numbers.''
Experts say if Texas wants to solve the overdose problem, officials
here must fully realize the state has an overall drug issue that goes
beyond fentanyl. Here's a look at the broader drug situation across
Texas.
what are the drug trends?
When the University of Texas at Austin's Addiction Research
Institute studied calls made to poison control centers, admissions to
drug treatment programs and drug seizures in 2021, researchers found
the most common drugs flowing across the State's southern border from
Mexico were methamphetamine, heroin, cocaine, marijuana, fentanyl,
benzodiazepines like Xanax, and synthetic cannabinoids more commonly
known as ``spice'' or K2.
While marijuana is still popular in Texas, its role in the illegal
drug market has diminished greatly as 25 states across the country so
far have passed laws to legalize it. When Texas legalized hemp in 2019,
the prosecution of low-level pot cases declined due to the costly
testing needed to determine if a vape pen liquid or a gummy contains
marijuana or hemp because both come from the same plant species.
But hemp contains less than 0.3 percent of tetrahydrocannabinol, or
THC, the ingredient in marijuana that gets you high. Anything with less
THC is hemp.
Synthetic narcotics like fentanyl, meanwhile, have shot up the
ranks of causes of overdose deaths. In the past 5 years, deaths from
synthetics have surpassed deaths from other opioids, heroin and
depressants.
what is fentanyl?
Illegally manufactured fentanyl is a perilous chemical experiment,
a stew of synthetic opioids.
Opium derived from poppies has long been used as a painkiller and
recreational drug. Opioids like fentanyl or oxycodone are chemical
concoctions that duplicate those effects.
Fentanyl was created in 1960 and approved for use in America in
1968. It's most commonly used as a sedative and pain reliever for
patients. Legally obtained fentanyl is usually administered to patients
through pills, intravenous therapy, skin patches or nasal spray.
But it can also be distilled and blended to produce a fine powder
that can be easily added to other drugs.
Its potent molecules scurry straight to the brain, where thousands
of receptors, similar to tiny satellite dishes, pull in signals from
cells in the body. They have different jobs, some gathering information
to control organ functions, others emotions or moods.
Fentanyl latches on to the receptors that signal pain and shuts
them down. And when those receptors are turned off, the human body
reacts in ways that can be fatal, including shutting down lungs and
other vital organs.
The drug is considered 100 times more potent than morphine and 50
times more potent than heroin.
Fentanyl isn't the only drug mixture that has the Federal Drug
Enforcement Administration concerned as the growing threat of xylazine
is starting to make its way into Texas.
xylazine: a new threat
Xylazine is a tranquilizer, as opposed to a painkiller, doing its
work by numbing nerves rather than switching off receptors in the
brain. It targets the central nervous system, the nerve highways
running in and out of the spinal column that carries messages to the
rest of the body.
Developed in 1962, it's used by veterinarians to keep elephants and
horses calm enough to be examined or have their teeth cleaned. It
mostly comes in liquid form and is sold in vials or preloaded syringes.
When tranquilizers are used, the spinal column sends messages to
the brain to slow down a bit. This produces a sense of calm and
elation, which is why tranquilizers are also used to treat anxiety,
panic attacks and sleep disorders.
The Drug Enforcement Administration reported the first instances of
this tranquilizer being used in illegal drug activity in the early
2000's by drug dealers in Puerto Rico when they began mixing it with
other substances. The practice has now spread across the United States
and has been found recently in Texas mixed with fentanyl.
Xylazine has been found in a growing number of overdose deaths
across the country and is commonly encountered in combination with
fentanyl, cocaine, heroin and a variety of other drugs.
meth
Methamphetamine is a white, odorless, crystalline powder that was
developed early in the 20th century from its parent, amphetamine, and
was originally used in nasal decongestants and inhalers. It can come in
liquid form, which is easily made into a crystal form by drug
traffickers. The highly addictive stimulant outpaced all others in the
2021 UT study of Texas drug trends.
The drug targets the brain and the spinal cord to create a sense of
well-being or euphoria. Symptoms can include talkativeness, decreased
appetite and a pleasurable sense of well-being. Meth also speeds up the
body's systems to sometimes lethal levels by increasing blood pressure
and heart and respiratory rates.
Texas drug labs have recently started seeing meth being placed in
counterfeit Adderall pills, meaning a segment of meth users might be
unaware they are even addicted to the drug.
heroin
Heroin is made from morphine, a natural substance taken from the
seed pod of an opium poppy plant typically grown in Asia, Mexico and
Colombia. It's often portrayed in film and television as a needle drug,
but the substance can also be snorted or smoked. In the past, heroin
was often mixed with crack cocaine, but fentanyl has become the primary
substance being added to poppy plant extract. Dealers will often
``cut'' heroin with other substances to allow them to sell more of it
at a higher price.
The 2021 UT study of drug trends showed that Texas has avoided the
heroin overdose crisis seen in other states because Mexican black tar
heroin is the most common version of the drug found in the state. Black
tar heroin tends to have an average purity of 28 percent and cannot be
easily mixed with fentanyl.
``Tar'' heroin is usually sold in small balloons from which the
user extracts the sticky substance from the balloon by mixing it with
water over heat.
cocaine/crack
Cocaine, the highly addictive stimulant made from coca leaves, was
used more than a century ago to treat a wide variety of illnesses and
was often used by early surgeons to block pain before local anesthetics
were developed. Frequent use can alter brain structure and function.
Users can inject or snort the powdered version of cocaine. ``Crack'' is
the term often given to cocaine after it has been refined into a
smokable substance.
what can be done?
Lawmakers in Texas have recently tried to tackle the state's
overdose problem by aggressively attacking fentanyl distribution and
use by means of enforcement and awareness.
Last week, Gov. Greg Abbott signed four bills to combat the growing
fentanyl crisis, including House Bill 6, which classifies overdoses
from the synthetic opioid as ``poisonings,'' triggering murder charges
for those convicted of giving someone a fatal dose of the synthetic
opioid.
``These four laws will forever change Texas through new protections
that will help save lives,'' he said in a press release. ``In 2022,
more than 2,000 people died from fentanyl in Texas--more than five a
day. It is the No. 1 killer of Americans ages 18-45.''
Other measures signed by Abbott will establish a Fentanyl Poisoning
Awareness Month in October and require public schools to provide
students with staff to assist with fentanyl abuse prevention and drug
poisoning awareness. A fourth law will allow the distribution of Narcan
or other opioid antagonists to Texas colleges and universities.
However, bold substance abuse measures like legalizing test strips
were once again rejected by lawmakers.
Neill Harris, the drug policy fellow at Rice University's Baker
Institute for Public Policy, said to combat fentanyl and the next
impending drug crisis, the state must increase access to medical
substance abuse treatments over enforcement measures.
``Until we have policies that address the demand, we're going to
continue to have a problem with drug use,'' she said. ``Law enforcement
has always had problems with reducing the drug supply. We look back
over decades and it has never been effective at slowing down the
supply. Because there's always a demand. It's just simple economics.''
Michele Steeb, a senior fellow at the Texas Public Policy
Foundation, a conservative think tank, said their organization views
addiction as a complex brain disorder disease.
``Well-supported scientific evidence shows that brain disruptions
reduce brain function which inhibits the ability to make decisions and
regulate one's actions, emotions, and impulses,'' she said. `` . . .
Diseases require treatment.''
If the State can't control the supply, Neill Harris said, it's time
to focus on reducing the harm of drug use by legalizing testing strips,
making substitute drug treatment like methadone more available and
giving more substance use options to the uninsured.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I hope you
will consider--and the Ranking Member, your courtesies--but I
hope you will consider the legislation because we have to find
a multiple level of dealing this.
To the other witnesses, my time is gone, so I just want to
express my recognition of your presence here, Mr. Cagen, Mr.
Mandryck, Mr. Durham. I did not get a chance, but I'm well
aware of the work that you're doing and the challenges that we
all have.
I yield back.
Mr. Higgins. Yes, ma'am. The gentlewoman yields.
The Ranking Member and I and perhaps our colleague, Ms.
Lee, have other questions. So I'm going to open for a second
round of questioning and recognize myself.
Mr. Papadopoulos, some things are law and some percentages
and statistics are law enforcement-sensitive, so I recognize
that. But I'm going to ask you to share with America, to the
extent that you can, so that the citizenry can comprehend just
what an overwhelming challenge we face regarding the fentanyl
that's already in our country.
As we consider the volume seized, which is an unprecedented
amount. You guys are pretty much seizing everything you have
operational capability to seize, and it's an incredible job
that you're doing. But regarding the volumes seized, regardless
of at ports of entry or between ports of entry, can you share
with America what you would consider to be a number that the
public could consume and would not interfere with the
operations--what's the percentage of seizures versus the
totality of volume that has come into our country?
Mr. Papadopoulos. Sir, thanks for the question. I don't--I
think DEA strives to seize as much--as many drugs as possible.
We don't find any acceptable amount of drugs entering the
United States.
Mr. Higgins. Of course.
Mr. Papadopoulos. So we continue to do whatever we can.
Mr. Higgins. Of course. You're seizing all you--I would
imagine if you had twice the staff, you'd be seizing twice the
volume that you have right now. There's so much out there.
A drug dealer told me last year, he said, Cap, we have so
much fentanyl, we're giving it away. It's why people are dying.
They want their product to be more popular on the streets, so
they're making it heavier. This is a guy who's been in the game
for quite some time, is incarcerated. He said that they
essentially are giving volumes away, and when people start
dying, they reel it back. He said that they abandoned volumes
of fentanyl if they're going to cross State lines, if they're
moving an operation to another State, because it's so much
cheaper to replace the fentanyl than it is to risk the inter-
State trafficking.
So you're seizing unbelievable volumes of fentanyl. But how
does that volume compare with what, in your estimation, would
be the total? Are you seizing 25 percent, 50 percent, 15?
Mr. Papadopoulos. Sir, I'd like to consult our intelligence
division on that. I don't know that--I would want to give you a
more precise answer.
Mr. Higgins. Right next to you.
Mr. Papadopoulos. This is DHS, but yes.
Mr. Mandryck. Sir, so a little explanation first. The
challenge with something like fentanyl is being synthetic,
there's no agriculture-based place to get an initial estimate.
So unlike cocaine or marijuana where we can kind of do an
oversight to see general cultivation estimates, we can't do
that with synthetics like fentanyl or methamphetamine.
When we look at it holistically from an intelligence
perspective, it's probably within that 25 percent mark based
off demand.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you. I think that's an honest answer.
That's an honest answer, and this will paint the picture for
America of the challenge that we face.
I yield the balance of my time and recognize the Ranking
Member for additional questions.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to follow up on your question from a different
perspective. Ports of entry, Mr. Mandryck--and correct me if
I'm wrong here--but only 2 or 3 percent of our passenger cars
are actually inspected right now with nonintrusive technology.
Fifteen to 17 percent of our commercial vehicles are inspected,
and you have these record volumes of seizures. It's--the Biden
administration now is talking about going to 40 percent
inspection of vehicles coming through and maybe 70 percent of
commercial vehicles by 2026.
I'm going to ask you to straight line and speculate. What's
it going to do to the seizures at the border?
Mr. Mandryck. Sir, as part of the layered approach, the
nonintrusive inspection has become a key part of it. With that,
you know, 2 percent in the passenger vehicles, that's yielded a
significant volume of overall seizures. So that extrapolation
from that 2 percent to 40 percent, we'll have significant
increase in seizures. Once you layer in things like the officer
intuition, the canine capabilities, those seizure volumes are
going to continue to increase.
Mr. Correa. Again, if I heard you earlier, all of you, your
testimony, you're looking at drones now being a way, by the
way, of actually bringing in fentanyl into the United States.
Is that correct?
Mr. Mandryck. There certainly is that potential, yes, sir.
Mr. Correa. I mean, I don't know what a drone costs, and I
don't know what the value of a payload would be. But if we do a
cost-benefit analysis, I'd imagine you can just flood any part
of our border or borders to come up with a very profitable
situation.
Mr. Mandryck. Yes, sir. The majority of the drones we've
seen commercially available, things like the DJI, a couple
hundred dollars to a thousand dollars of payload capacity is,
you know, 5-ish kilograms, plus or minus, depending on what
you're willing to pay.
Mr. Correa. How much would that be in terms of value of
fentanyl?
Mr. Mandryck. Depending on if it's----
Mr. Correa. You've got a $200 drone. What's the value of
the payload?
Mr. Mandryck. You could easily have, you know, a million
dollars' worth per flight and continuous flights throughout the
day.
Mr. Correa. How much?
Mr. Mandryck. Easily have a million dollars per----
Mr. Correa. A million dollars. So that's a pretty good
return on your investment.
I know, this last week I was in my district, and I took a
tour of a contractor that's about to put out a manu- --
manufacturing really a system, not only of radar, but radar to
interfere with the controls of drones as they move forward. I
would imagine that's also in your horizon in terms of investing
for our national defense and border defense? Yes? No?
Mr. Mandryck. Yes, sir.
Mr. Correa. Again, gentlemen, I would just come back to my
earlier statement and challenge that I made, which is, let us
know what we, the Members of Congress, need to look at to help
you do a better job of defending our country against fentanyl
and other negative things that come in. You're the experts. You
know, we look at little patterns, little tidbits of what's
going on, but you're the experts, and you need to let us know
what it is that you need.
So thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield the rest of my time to
you.
Mr. Higgins. The gentleman yields.
The gentlewoman, Ms. Lee, is recognized for additional
questions.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the Chairman.
I want to just follow the line of questioning that I did
not get a chance, and it might be redundant, redundant,
redundant, but maybe asked in a different way.
Whether it's the DEA or whether it's CBP and others, can I
get--was it said--total amount in dollar value that's coming
into the United States? Second, is most of it coming through
the ports of entry, legal ports of entry?
Mr. Mandryck. Ma'am, I can begin to answer that question
for you. So, so far in fiscal year 2023, we're at just about
20,000 pounds of fentanyl seized by CBP along the border,
18,000 pounds of that with our Office of Field Operations at
our ports of entry, and a little over 2,000 pounds with the
U.S. Border Patrol.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Would you be able to capture what that
might be in street value or any value?
Mr. Mandryck. It's a little bit tougher, depending on the
purity levels, powder versus pill format. With Operation Blue
Lotus, as I had mentioned, alongside Four Horsemen, we've
seized about 10,000 pounds that had a street value of about $90
million.
Ms. Jackson Lee. DEA, do you have a different number of
what you've been able to deal with?
Thank you. Thank you very much.
Mr. Papadopoulos. Ma'am, we've seized, this fiscal year,
approximately 57 million pills, which is about the same amount
that we seized last year, and about 13,000 pounds of fentanyl
powder. Again, the amounts vary. Pills can run anywhere from a
few dollars if you're buying wholesale, all the way up, you
know, if you're just buying a single pill, $10 to $20 a pill.
So it's hard to estimate.
Ms. Jackson Lee. What have you found--how difficult is
the--first of all, to say what you've seen, if you're working
with collaborative agencies of on-line sales and how difficult
it is to catch the on-line sales. I give the example that is so
tragic and so difficult, loving parents, great athlete, middle
schooler, high schooler, A student, or average student, loved
by all. One moment they're going upstairs to go to bed, and the
next moment, in the morning hours, they are not with us. Pink
pills, the on-line sales, the sale to children.
Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes, ma'am. Social media and on-line
sales are an increasing problem that we are keeping a very
close eye on. The cartels are advertising and selling on social
media. In Operation Last Mile, which I mentioned earlier, which
was the U.S. distributors, it was over 1,400 cases. About 40
percent of them involved social media. So it is a certain issue
that we are keeping an eye on.
As you mentioned, all these deaths are tragedies, of
course. I would point out that we had family members last
summer come into DEA headquarters and tell us their stories,
and they shared stories similar to what you just mentioned. We
started the Faces of Fentanyl, which is in our lobby. It
started with a couple of hundred pictures. It is now up to
5,000 pictures. It covers 8 walls in the DEA headquarters lobby
that every DEA employee has to walk past to get to work that
works at headquarters. The youngest person on that wall is 17
months old and the oldest person is 70 years old. A lot of them
did buy the pills that ended up killing them over social media.
Ms. Jackson Lee. This--our approach to getting that--again,
my legislation deals with enhanced penalties that's on the back
side of it for those utilization on social media to sell pills.
So it's on the criminal end, it has the treatment end, as Mr.
Chester emphasized. But, anyhow, you know how do we do an eagle
eye on that, those sales on that phone or that iPad or when
you're alone and you order them and they come in whatever
package or you send it to somebody else and you have pink pills
and you take them?
Mr. Papadopoulos. Yes, ma'am. That goes back to getting the
word out. Public awareness is a big part of this, in addition
to enforcement. The social media companies, frankly, have to do
more.
When I was growing up, if you wanted to buy drugs, you
needed to know somebody that had them or where to go to get
them. Right now, everybody with a smartphone knows a drug
dealer, unfortunately, and that includes our kids. So getting
the word out is going to help with that.
I mentioned earlier, we're in an unprecedented crisis which
requires unprecedented collaboration, including with social
media companies, because with that collaboration we will save
lives.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you very much. I think you're
absolutely right. I am a rabid supporter of the First
Amendment, but we have a crisis of--you've got 5,000 and
growing. We have a crisis around children, and there is a level
of responsibility that we must demand. I thank you for these
numbers.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Higgins. The gentlewoman yields.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and
Members for their questioning.
Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses and we would ask that the witnesses
respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee rule VII(D),
the hearing record will be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
[all]