[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]




          ACHIEVING PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH IN THE INDO-PACIFIC:
            EXAMINING THE FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET PRIORITIES

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                       SUBCOMMITTEE INDO-PACIFIC

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             July 18, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-32

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs






                [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                




  Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov, 
                        or http://www.govinfo.gov

                               ______
                                 

                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

54-166PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2023









                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     GREGORY MEEKS, New York, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	     BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California	     GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri		     WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida		     AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado		     JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee		     DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee	     TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky		     SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas		     DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California		     COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida	     ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan		     SARA JACOBS, California
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADEWAGEN, 	     KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
    American Samoa		     SHEILA CHERFILUS-McCORMICK, Florida
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas		     GREG STANTON, Arizona    
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio		     MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
JIM BAIRD, Indiana		     JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida		     JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey	     SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York	     JIM COSTA, California
CORY MILLS, Florida		     JASON CROW, Colorado
RICH McCORMICK, Georgia		     BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas		     
JOHN JAMES, Michigan
KEITH SELF, Texas

                    Brendan Shields, Staff Director

                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director


                                 ------                                

                      Subcommittee on Indo-Pacific

                      YOUNG KIM, California, Chair

ANN WAGNER, Missouri                 AMI BERA, California, Ranking Member 
KEN BUCK, Colorado                   ANDY KIM, New Jersey    
MARK GREEN, Tennessee		     BRAD SHERMAN, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky		     GERALD CONNOLLY, Virginia
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN RADAWAGEN, 	     WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    American Samoa		     JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida

                     Daniel Markus, Staff Director









                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Kritenbrink, Honorable Daniel, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
  East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State.......     8
Ronning, Michael, Acting Deputy Assistant Administrator, Asia 
  Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development..............    14

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    45
Hearing Minutes..................................................    47
Hearing Attendance...............................................    48

    STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..    49

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    51





 
          ACHIEVING PEACE THROUGH STRENGTH IN THE INDO-PACIFIC:
            EXAMINING THE FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET PRIORITIES

                         Tuesday, July 18, 2023

                          House of Representatives,
                  Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in 
room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. Young Kim (chair of the 
subcommittee) presiding.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Good morning, everyone. The 
Subcommittee on the Indo-Pacific of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee will come to order. The purpose of this hearing to 
examine the Fiscal Year 2024 budget requests for the State 
Department's Bureau of East Asian Pacific Affairs.
    Let me now recognize myself for an opening statements. The 
hearing is important for the U.S. Congress to shape the United 
States approach, resourcing, and goals in East Asia and the 
Pacific Islands. The Biden Administration has correctly 
identified the People's Republic of China as the only 
competitor with both the intent to reshape the international 
order and the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological 
power to do it.
    The October 2022 National Security Strategy further says 
that Beijing has ambitions to create an enhanced sphere of 
influence in the Indo-Pacific. Yet despite this recognition, we 
are still woefully underperforming in the Indo-Pacific and we 
are not competing with the PRC from a position of strength. 
East Asia and the Pacific Islands are on the front lines of our 
competition with China.
    And yet, EAP remains a small fraction of the State 
Department's overall budget and programming. And instead of 
pursuing competitive actions against the PRC, we are chasing 
Chinese Community Party Officials with fruitless engagements. 
The PRC presents a significant threat to the well-being and 
prosperity of key U.S. allies and partners in the Pacific.
    None understand this reality better than Taiwan. While 
Congress has signed off on multiple arms sales to support 
Taiwan and enhance its defense, there still remains 
approximately 19 billion dollars backlogged in weapons 
deliveries. So my Arms Exports Delivery Solutions Act was 
passed in last year's NDAA.
    Yet the report we received from your department earlier 
this year did not clearly lay out a description of the actions 
the United States is taking to expedite deliveries of defense 
articles and services to Taiwan, including whether we will 
provide interim capability or solution which I explicitly asked 
for in that bill. We must ensure we're doing all that we can 
now to bolster Taiwan's defense against an increasingly 
aggressive PRC. It is clear our allies in the Indo-Pacific 
share our concern about the PRC's growing aggression toward 
Taiwan.
    When I travel with Chairman McCaul to Northeast Asia 
earlier this year, we heard the same thing from all of our 
allies, that Ukraine today could be Taiwan tomorrow and that 
U.S. leadership is key to bringing democratic countries 
together in the fight against authoritarianism. Our allies and 
partners are also worried about the growing use of economic 
coercion. Last month, I held a roundtable with the Ambassadors 
from South Korea and Japan where we discussed how we could work 
together to combat economic coercion.
    The United States in the Pacific economic framework is not 
enough to meet the growing trade and investment needs in the 
region. And I was disappointed to hear that the Biden 
Administration was not interested in pursuing free trade or 
investment deals with our partners. We must have a concrete 
economic agenda in Asia to be competitive in the region.
    Nowhere is this more true than in Southeast Asia which has 
immense economic potential. So I look forward to traveling to 
the region next month to discuss security, economic energy, and 
human rights cooperation. Finally, we all agree that we are in 
an era of strategic competition with China and that this 
competition requires a whole of government approach.
    Yet I am worried about the growing trend of the State 
Department not being forthcoming with information about its 
engagement with the PRC or actions taken by the PRC that 
directly affect United States national security such as the spy 
balloon and the spy base in Cuba. In June, I sent a letter 
noting concern about your trip to Beijing on the anniversary of 
Tiananmen. I am also disappointed that this hearing originally 
scheduled for June was pushed due to Secretary Blinken's travel 
to Beijing which the Department itself admitted would not be a 
game changer.
    I have also send letters about getting briefings about the 
spy balloon and spy base in Cuba. We cannot pull together a 
whole of government approach to combat growing PRC aggression 
if the State Department refuses to engage with Congress and the 
American people in a timely manner. In short, the Indo-Pacific 
region is critical to U.S. national security and competition 
with PRC.
    So we must do more with our allies and partners, especially 
economically to maintain U.S. leadership in the region. And to 
properly deal with China, the U.S. Government must be in 
lockstep in communicating openly across bridges about the 
threat that PRC presents rather than prioritizing fruitless 
engagement with our counterparts in Beijing. I look forward to 
hearing from our witnesses and members of the subcommittee on 
these important issues. So I now recognize the ranking member, 
the gentleman from California, Mr. Bera, for your opening 
statements.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Chairwoman Kim, for hosting today's 
hearing. I would also like to thank our witnesses for 
participating in this important hearing and express 
appreciation for this Administration's consistent engagement 
with Congress. Today's hearing focuses on the Biden-Harris 
Administration's proposed budget for East Asia and the Pacific.
    Successive Administration, Democratic and Republican, have 
underscored the economic and strategic importance of the Indo-
Pacific and express an commitment to prioritizing the region. 
However, the Indo-Pacific region has remained under resourced 
when considering its strategic importance, economic heft, and 
staggering population. That's why last year I introduced the 
Indo-Pacific Engagement Act which passed into law in Fiscal 
Year 3's NDAA.
    This bipartisan legislation directed the assistant 
secretaries for East Asian and Pacific Affairs and South and 
Central Asian Affairs at the State Department along with the 
assistant administrative for the Asia Bureau at USAID to 
provide an independent assessment of the resources they need to 
fulfill the Indo-Pacific strategy. Last week, the 
Administration submitted the first Indo-Pacific Engagement Act 
report to Congress. And I'd like to thank EAP and SCA as well 
as the Asia Bureau at USAID for putting together this 
comprehensive and insightful report.
    Noting the strategic competition with the PRC is the pacing 
geopolitical challenge of our era, the report found that 41.3 
billion over the next five fiscal years is needed to implement 
our objectives in the Indo-Pacific of which 8.1 billion is for 
diplomatic engagement, 1 billion is for USAID operating 
expenses, and 32.2 billion is for foreign assistance. 
Unfortunately, last week, the House Appropriations Committee, 
Republicans passed their Fiscal Year 2024 State, Foreign 
Operations and Related Programs appropriations bill with a 15 
percent cut in funding from Fiscal Year 2023 levels. While the 
Republicans' SFOPs bill fully funds the President's budget 
request for the Indo-Pacific strategy, it underfunds the 
operations and staffing of the State Department and USAID.
    If the U.S. is going successfully outcompete Beijing in the 
Indo-Pacific and around the world, we cannot take a step 
backward and cut resources from key national security agencies. 
In addition to the appropriated funds, Congress must also 
authorize the Fiscal Year 2024 President's budget request for 
mandatory funding that includes 7.1 billion over 20 years to 
extend assistance related to the compacts free association with 
the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, and Palau. I welcome the news 
of renewed COFA pacts signed with Micronesia and Palau, and I 
hope there will be a final agreement with the Marshall Islands 
soon.
    The COFA agreements signal the United States sustained 
commitment to our partners in the Pacific. With some provisions 
set to expire at the end of this fiscal year, it is critical 
that Congress approve these agreements through implementing 
legislation as soon as possible. While competing vigorously 
with the PRC is central to the U.S. interest in the Indo-
Pacific, it is also important for Washington to maintain open 
channels of communication with Beijing to reduce the risk of 
miscalculation.
    With that, I applaud the Administration's continued use of 
diplomacy to raise areas of concern with the PRC so that the 
relationship does not veer into conflict. I look forward to 
hearing from Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink on his engagements 
with the PRC, including last month's trip to Beijing with 
Secretary Blinken. With that, I look forward to work with the--
continuing to work with the Administration and continuing to 
work with the full committee and the subcommittee in a partisan 
way, and I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Ranking Member. Our 
subcommittee is honored to have the presence of our full 
committee chairman, Michael McCaul. So now I would like to 
recognize him for any opening statement you have.
    Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair, for holding this 
important hearing. Secretary, welcome to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee. And I think every member of this Congress and the 
Administration should be deeply concerned about the growing 
aggression of the Chinese Communist Party.
    As I have said before their tentacles reach every corner of 
the globe. And we are facing a generational threat, a great 
powers competition. And we must address this issue with a 
seriousness it deserves.
    And I agree with Secretary Blinken that China is the only 
country with both the intent and power to reshape the global 
balance of power. And while diplomacy and negotiation should 
always be a priority, effective diplomacy should shape the 
adversary rather than the other way around. Recently, I think 
our recent diplomacy toward the CCP has demonstrated weakness 
and weakness only invites aggression and emboldens dictators 
such as Chairman Xi.
    So let me provide some context as to what I am talking 
about. In mid-January, several media outlets reported that 
Secretary Blinken planned to visit Beijing in early February, 
aiming to set a floor for their relationship. On January 28, 
the Administration identifies a CCP spy balloon over the United 
States, surveilling some of our most sensitive military sites.
    Shockingly, it took a full 7 days for Secretary Blinken to 
cancel the trip following significant congressional pressure. 
Fast forward to the spring when the CCP raids multiple American 
businesses. Then on May 10 and 11, Jake Sullivan meets with his 
counterpart in Vienna.
    It appears the Biden Administration is extending an olive 
branch to China. But how does China respond? On May 15, the CCP 
State Intelligence begin hacking senior level officials at 
State and Commerce Department, including Secretary Raimondo and 
as I have been told, sir, your account as well, Mr. Secretary.
    One week later on May 22, the CCP effectively banned Micron 
from selling its chips to China or in China. On June 2, 
Secretary of Defense Austin requested a meeting with the CCP 
counterpart of the Shangri-La dialog. That request was rejected 
and Secretary Austin settled for a mere handshake.
    On June the 4th, the anniversary of Tiananmen Square 
Massacre, you, Mr. Secretary, arrived in Beijing to negotiate 
Secretary Blinken's trip later that month. This was an 
astonishing display of appeasement and indifference to the 
brutality and human rights violations of the CCP by this 
Administration. Then on June 8, media reports surfaced about 
the CCP establishing a spy base in Cuba.
    On June 16, the State Department, including the Secretary, 
Defense Secretary, and all hacked officials learned that their 
emails have been compromised by the CCP. We understand this 
attacked targeted at least nine officials from the bureau that 
you oversee. And it's possible that your own email has been 
hacked.
    All told, it appears that tens of thousands of emails were 
stolen. Despite being aware on this hacking, on June 18, 
Secretary Blinken still traveled to Beijing. And in early July, 
I learned that the State pulled down a congressional 
notification that included defense services for Taiwan.
    I am deeply concerned that the price we paid to secure 
Secretary Yellen's trip to China and just the price we paid to 
just merely get a meeting with Chairman Xi may have been too 
much. Moreover, last year I gave you all through my legislation 
Presidential drawdown authority to get weapons to Taiwan 
immediately. That has not been used to this day.
    I've signed off on weapon sales, 23 weapons sales as far 
back as 5 years ago, none of which have been delivered. As 
we've learned in Ukraine, we need to provide these weapon 
systems before a conflict erupts, not after. That is the goal 
of deterrence.
    I recently went to Taiwan with both the chair and ranking 
member of the subcommittee. And the first question President 
Tsai asked me was, where are my weapons that I paid for? This 
Administration appears indifferent to CCP hostility, appeasing 
rather than simply to facilitate talks.
    Don't get me wrong. I think diplomacy is important. I agree 
that the Secretary and you, sir, need to talk. It's unfortunate 
we cannot have a military to military communication between the 
CCP and the United States.
    In sum, I think this Administration finds itself trapped in 
a cycle where the CCP dictates the terms, the timing, and 
conditions of our meetings rather than the other way around. 
This is precisely why I made it a point to be here today. You 
should be at the table out of strength and leverage, not out of 
weakness and appeasement.
    Approximately 7 months ago, multiple Commerce officials 
assured me that an update to the Huawei export control 
licensing policy was done. Seven months later, the rule has yet 
to be released. In May, Reuters reports that the State 
Department is delaying not only Huawei controls but other 
sanction packages as well. congressionally mandated sanctions 
under the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act have been repeatedly 
killed by the State Department as well. Then on May 19, I sent 
a letter requesting documents to understand the situation 
better. But I've been stonewalled.
    On June 13th, I sent a second letter requesting a narrower 
set of documents, specifically the competitive action calendar. 
This is one document. While State agreed to provide--Madam 
Chair, I would really like to finish this statement.
    While State agreed to provide the documents, they asked for 
some time to gather them saying they believe they could produce 
them in several weeks, and I agreed to them. However, in early 
July, State informed us that they could no longer provide a 
timeframe. On July 11, I was forced to serve a subpoena for 
these documents, yet the deadline came and went.
    Last night, we received a response from State with respect 
to the subpoena. But it's insufficient. Mr. Secretary, your 
Department is in violation today of a congressional subpoena. 
This is unacceptable and I will have to prepared for further 
action.
    I hope you will work with us and this committee. We must 
acknowledge China for what it is and respond to it with 
strength. With that, I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you very much. Other members 
of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be 
submitted for the record. And we're now pleased to have a 
distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this 
important topic.
    First the Honorable Daniel Kritenbrink is the Assistant 
Secretary of State for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. And Mr. Michael 
Ronning is the Acting Deputy Administrator for the Asia Bureau 
at the U.S. Agency for International Development. Thank you for 
being here today.
    Your full statements will be made part of the record. And I 
will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to 5 minutes 
in order to allow time for member questions. Let me now 
recognize Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink for his opening 
statement.

   STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL KRITENBRINK, ASSISTANT 
   SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. 
                      DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman, Chairwoman 
Kim and Ranking Member Bera, Chairman McCaul, members of the 
committee and subcommittee. Thank you very much for the 
opportunity to appear before you today to testify regarding the 
President's Fiscal Year 2024 budget request for East Asia and 
the Pacific. As President Biden Stated in our National Security 
Strategy, U.S. leadership in the Indo-Pacific which, of course, 
includes the EAP region, is critical because the Indo-Pacific 
fuels much of the world's economic growth and will be the 
epicenter of 21st century geopolitics.
    As an Indo-Pacific nation, we are committed to building the 
collective capacity of our allies, partners, and friends to 
sustain a region that is free and open, connected, prosperous, 
secure, and resilient. The EPA Bureau holds a key 
responsibility to advance the Administration's priorities in 
the Indo-Pacific. Our Indo-Pacific strategy includes our 
approach to the PRC but is not defined by it.
    In other words, we have an Indo-Pacific strategy of which 
China is a part and not the other way around. That said, while 
strategic competition with the PRC remains a global challenge, 
competition is most pronounced in the Indo-Pacific.
    The Administration's approach to the PRC is to invest, 
align, and compete. We are, one, investing in the foundations 
of our strength at home, two, aligning with allies and partners 
on our approach abroad, and three, competing with the PRC to 
defend our interests. Our objective is not to change the PRC 
but rather to shape the strategic environment in which it 
operates, building a balance of influence that is favorable to 
the United States, our allies and partners, and the interest 
and values that we share.
    In support of the Administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, 
the President's Fiscal Year 2024 budget request for EAP 
includes a diplomatic engagement budget of 533 million dollars 
and a foreign assistance budget of 1.36 billion dollars. In 
addition, the President's budget request includes 2 billion 
dollars in mandatory funding to support the Indo-Pacific 
strategy and 7.1 billion dollars in mandatory funding to 
support the compacts of free association. Further, the Fiscal 
Year 2024 budget includes 2 billion dollars in mandatory 
funding to support international infrastructure globally, which 
would include projects in our region.
    Here I would not like to provide a brief overview of how 
the President's budget for EAP directly supports the five 
objectives of the Indo-Pacific strategy. First, we are 
advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific. The Fiscal Year 2024 
budget supports our commitment to maintain sovereignty and 
territorial integrity, unimpeded lawful commerce, the peaceful 
resolution of disputes, and the freedom of navigation and 
overflight in the maritime domain.
    These efforts complement our expanded diplomatic presence 
across the Indo-Pacific, including opening embassies in the 
Solomon Islands and Tonga and planning for new embassies in 
Kirabati and Vanuatu. The Fiscal Year 2024 also supports our 
continued investment in democratic institutions. Second, we are 
building connections in the Indo-Pacific and beyond.
    President's request supports our bilateral relationships as 
well as engagement with a host of regional groupings and 
institutions, including ASEAN, AUKUS, the Quad, the Pacific 
Islands Forum, the Pacific community, and the Mekong-U.S. 
partnership to build capacity and address shared challenges. 
Third, we are driving Indo-Pacific prosperity. With the 
continued negotiations for the Indo-Pacific economic framework 
for prosperity, our hosting of APEC in 2023, and the launch of 
the partnership for global infrastructure and investment, the 
President's budget will promote a connected, resilient, and 
fair Indo-Pacific economy. Fourth, we are bolstering Indo-
Pacific Security.
    Recognizing that security is a necessary condition for 
prosperity, our budget request will build the capacity of our 
partners to respond to and resolve both domestic and 
transnational security threats. We also remain committed to 
maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait. Our 
One China Policy which has remained consistent has helped to 
maintain cross-strait peace and stability for the past 40 
years.
    In line with the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States 
will continue to assist Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient 
self-defense capability. Fifth, we are building regional 
resilience. U.S. security depends on our collaboration with our 
allies and partners to address shared challenges to build 
resilience to transnational threats.
    In summary, the United States' role in the region must be 
more enduring than ever. Our allies and partners are looking to 
our ability to deliver resources as a sign of our commitment. 
Building on existing efforts, the President's Fiscal Year 2024 
budget request will allow us to do just that.
    Finally, I also want to sincerely thank the chairwoman and 
her staff for agreeing to reschedule this hearing so that I 
could testify upon return from the Secretary's recent trip to 
Beijing. Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Assistant Secretary Kritenbrink 
follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I now recognize Mr. 
Ronning for his opening statement.

     STATEMENT OF MICHAEL RONNING, ACTING DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
   ADMINISTRATOR, ASIA BUREAU, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 
                          DEVELOPMENT

    Mr. Ronning. Chairman McCaul, Chairwoman Kim, Ranking 
Member Bera, and distinguished members of the committee, thank 
you for inviting me to testify on USAID's role in advancing 
U.S. foreign policy priorities in East Asia and the Pacific. We 
are all well aware that the East Asia and Pacific region is 
home to the majority of humanity, the world's fastest growing 
economies, and busiest maritime trade routes. These countries 
are essential partners in creating a free and open Indo-Pacific 
and improves lives in Asia, underwrites regional stability and 
security, and helps generate prosperity here at home.
    At USAID, we approach development in the region with the 
understanding that the People's Republic of China is trying to 
rewrite existing regional rules and norms for its own narrow 
advantage. However, our development approach starts not with 
the question what we are against but rather what we are for. 
USAID embodies what the United States can offer the region as a 
partner and friend in development to communities and families 
who are seeking to transform their lives and more broadly as a 
leader in U.S. efforts to advance a free and open, connected, 
prosperous, secure and resilient Indo-Pacific.
    That is what the region wants, and that is what we strive 
to provide. I've had the privilege to work on USAID's 
development in humanitarian efforts in East Asia and Pacific 
region for much of the past decade. A recurring theme in our 
discussion throughout the region, be in the Pacific Islands or 
the Mekong is the importance of showing up and following 
through on America's commitments.
    Countries in the region count on the United States to be a 
bulwark of stability in a rapidly changing region. And this 
Fiscal Year 2024 request is an opportunity to cement a 
reputation as a reliable partner. USAID will work in lockstep 
with Congress to achieve these ambitious objectives.
    The President's Fiscal Year 2024 budget request for USAID 
includes 964.4 million dollars for East Asia and the Pacific 
which is a 194 million dollar increase or a 25 percent increase 
over the Fiscal Year 2023 request. We believe that this 
increase is merited by the scope and scale and the urgency of 
the challenges we face in the region. In line with the 
Administration's priorities, USAID's request prioritizes key 
sectors to advance U.S. national security and prosperity 
alongside that of our partners and allies in Asia and the 
Pacific.
    First, to boost inclusive economic growth, USAID will 
promote trade and investment, private sector productivity, and 
digital connectivity. Second, our demand driven climate change 
activities will reduce emissions, protect critical ecosystems, 
implement regulatory forums, mitigate resource conflicts, and 
help partners transition to renewable energy. Third, we will 
work to reverse democratic backsliding and strengthen 
democratic institutions and norms.
    Fourth, to bolster women's economic empowerment, gender 
equity, human rights, USAID will work to increase women's 
political, civic, and economic engagement, address gender 
inequality, and combat gender-based violence. Finally, 
strengthen health systems to detect and respond to emerging 
threats, USAID will continue to bolster the resilience of 
partner countries and their economies to prevent, detect, and 
respond to pandemic threats, increase their ability to 
withstand future shocks. With your continued support, this 
budget request will allow USAID to deliver on our commitments 
across East Asia and the Pacific.
    As Administrator Power has noted, it is in America's best 
interest to feed the world, to help protect fellow democracies, 
to advocate for the dignity of all people, not only to reflect 
an America that is generous, compassionate, and moral, but also 
to protect the safety and the prosperity of the American 
people. With your continued support and on behalf of the 
American people, USAID will continue our central role in 
realizing this vision while increasing partner countries' 
resilience and advancing sustainable prosperity and security 
for communities across the Indo-Pacific. I look forward to your 
counsel and your questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Michael Ronning follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    
    Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Mr. Ronning. I now recognize myself 
for questions. As I Stated in my opening statement, we traveled 
to Asia and we were in Taiwan, and we're greeted by 10 
battleships, 70 fighter jets, and live fire action drills.
    It was a display of bravado. But it's also a demonstration 
of how hostile and aggressive the Chinese Communist Party is 
becoming. And I was notified that I was sanctioned on the day I 
left.
    As I mentioned in my opening statement, we had several 
requests regarding the competitive actions calendar. We were 
very patient with several letters. I finally served a subpoena. 
The due date was yesterday, and we still have not received 
anything. We were told by staff that this is a simple document 
that could be pulled and produced in a very short period of 
time. Mr. Secretary, can you tell this committee when you will 
be able to comply with the subpoena?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, thank you again for the 
privilege of being here today, and thank you for your question. 
I want to assure you that the Department is committed to 
working with Congress and with you and that we have responded 
in writing to your letters on this issue, first on June 16 and 
then again yesterday when we provided further information about 
the competitive actions that we have taken under the Biden 
Administration. This is part, as you know, of an ongoing 
accommodations process with the committee, and we are very much 
committed to working with you on that.
    We are committed to responding to your and committee's 
request in a timely manner. We are balancing a growing number 
of congressional inquiries involving priorities. Again, this is 
part of an ongoing accommodations process with the committee. 
And we are committed to engaging with you, sir.
    Mr. McCaul. I appreciate that. I'm just trying to be 
patient with it. It's disturbing when I find out about this 
when I read the newspaper and Reuters is reporting this and 
someone on your staff has leaked this information. And yet this 
committee, Congress does not have it. And quite honestly, that 
is not the way we should be doing business.
    And so I am going to ask you three questions about some of 
the issues that have been raised by the press. One is that the 
State Department is no longer enforcing human rights sanctions, 
including those against Uyghur Muslims under the Uyghur Muslim 
Policy Rights Act. Do you have any information on that?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir. First of all, Mr. Chairman, it 
is absolutely not true that we are pulling our punches in any 
way. And in fact, U.S. Government and the State Department have 
taken an unprecedented number of steps against the Chinese in a 
broad range of areas. That has continued from the beginning of 
this Administration. It has continued up until today. 
Specifically we are committed to holding China and Chinese 
officials to account for the ongoing egregious abuses against 
Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
    Mr. McCaul. My time has expired. But I take it your answer 
is you have not delayed or you are still enforcing the 
sanctions?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We are absolutely enforcing. And in fact--
--
    Mr. McCaul. That is your testimony?
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. We've carried out--we've 
sanctioned four PRC officials under Treasury GloMag Sanctions, 
31 entities under the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, 
another 26 entities under the Commerce Bureau of Industry and 
Security list, and 8 PRC firms tied to----
    Mr. McCaul. OK, great. And if you just produce this 
competitive actions calendar, it would solve this whole 
problem. I would not even have to ask these questions. Second, 
export controls on Huawei, have those been delayed or pulled 
down?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Again, sir, we do not pull our punches. 
And as you know, this Administration has already taken steps 
against Huawei.
    Mr. McCaul. They did. They did. I thought Estevez did a 
pretty good job earlier on, and now we have not seen anything 
in the timeframe that this sort of charmed offensive is taking 
place with respect to Beijing.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, I would say, Mr. Chairman, some 
people have described what the Chinese are doing as a charm 
offensive. That is absolutely not what I would describe what we 
are doing.
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. McCaul. So your answer is that you have not delayed or 
pulled down exports to licenses from the United States to 
Huawei?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. That is correct. I cannot comment on 
ongoing processes in the end user review committee. But we are 
committed as we've demonstrated, steps we have taken in the 
technology space, including I think most significantly the 
October 7 Advanced Computing Rule. We are committed to 
defending our national interest. We are committed to preventing 
advanced U.S. technologies from falling into the hands of the 
Chinese----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. McCaul. Let me ask you this question. Why did State 
recently pull down DDTC 22-087 which included a license to 
provide defense services to Taiwan?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, I'll have to check if that's 
the specific case that you're referring to. And I will check on 
that. But if it the one I think you're referring to, my 
understanding is a direct commercial sale was notified by 
mistake.
    It was pulled back. But my understanding it has since been 
formally notified I believe just yesterday. It may have been 
the day before.
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. McCaul. And I have to refer to it--I know it is very 
cryptic. I am obligated to refer to it in that manner.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir. But I just want to State, sir, 
and I'd be happy to work with your team as well. But we have 
taken an extraordinary number of actions over the course of 
this Administration. And we have done it in advance of every 
one of these engagements that you have mentioned. We've done it 
after every one of these engagements. We do not pull our 
punches. That is not what we are about. We believe----
    Mr. McCaul. OK.
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. That we are engaging the 
People's Republic of China from a position of confidence, 
confidence based on I think the extraordinary success of our 
diplomacy in the region to shape the external environment, 
confidence based on our investments and our strength at home. 
And I think with that in mind, we approach the Chinese in a 
very realistic, clear-eyed way and I think from a position of 
strength.
    Mr. McCaul. And look, I appreciate both of you all's 
service. I mean, this is the top threat I think to our national 
security. Last question, why is State not using the 
Presidential drawdown authority that Congress gave you to get 
weapons to Taiwan now?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir. We are absolutely committed to 
using all tools at our disposal to make sure that we meet our 
obligations----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. McCaul. But why aren't you using that drawdown 
authority that Congress gave you?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Here is what I would say, Mr. Chairman. 
Secretary Austin spoke to this in May. I do not have anything 
further to add to his commentary.
    I do not have anything to announce today. But I will 
reiterate. We are committed to using all means at our disposal. 
We are grateful to you, Congress, and this Committee for those 
tools. And we will----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. McCaul. Well, if we need to get in a classified setting 
for you to answer that question. Congress passed--it was my 
bill. We passed it. It's law.
    And I was told the President would use that drawdown 
authority to get half a billion dollars of weapons into Taiwan. 
And now we are not seeing that authority exercised. So if I'm 
not correct, I need the information. And if you prefer that in 
another setting, that is fine----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Mr. McCaul [continuing]. With this committee.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Sir, I would be delighted----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. McCaul. But certainly I need a better answer than we're 
doing everything possible.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Mr. McCaul. I'm just not seeing it happening.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Chairman, respectfully, I do just want 
to underscore we are committed using all tools at our disposal.
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. McCaul. Well, then use them. We gave you the tools.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. And again, we've taken an extraordinary 
number of steps. The reason why----
    Mr. McCaul. Use the tools and authority Congress gave you 
because Taiwan does not have any weapons, period. My time has 
expired.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. McCaul. Chair now recognizes the ranking member.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate working 
with you, Mr. Chairman and with the chairwoman of the 
subcommittee and all of Congress in a bipartisan way because I 
think we recognize the competition that we're in with the PRC 
and the importance of maintain as I think we all say a free and 
open Indo-Pacific, a rules-based order. The ability for all the 
people in the region to thrive, prosper, and experience the 
freedoms that we have all been able to experience.
    I also appreciate the hard work that this Administration 
has done. I look back at the last two and a half years. 
Elevating the Quad Coalition to the leader's level and really 
giving it significant importance.
    Working together with our allies in Japan and Korea, to 
really get the trilateral relationship to a place that I would 
not have expected it to be just two or 3 years ago. And I 
applaud the Moon and Kishida Administrations as well for the 
hard work and moving that alliance to a place where continues 
to move forward. I applaud the engagement of both State and 
USAID in the Pacific Islands, super important allies.
    They're very close to us and again applaud getting the COFA 
Agreement to where it is. We've got a little bit of work and 
Congress has to do its work as well, passing the implementing 
language and getting that to the President's desk. So again, 
none of these are easy.
    We are in a competition. And I guess I should also add that 
no one wants a direct confrontation with China. That's not our 
intent. I do not think that's the intent of the countries in 
the region.
    And while it is very difficult to practice diplomacy with 
the PRC, I do think it's incredibly important to maintain and 
look for lines of communication where they're possible and take 
advantage of those, even if they are not always productive and 
fruitful. I think it is important for us to maintain that 
engagement and dialog where we can because the challenge is 
that not just the region but the planet face are paramount. We 
saw this with the pandemic but we also see those every day 
right now, both in our country but also across the world with 
climate change.
    And it will take cooperation, participation, and working 
together to address these challenges, particularly with the two 
biggest powers in the world, the United States and the PRC. 
Secretary Kritenbrink, let me turn to the COFA Agreement again 
which I think is incredibly important. It has served us fairly 
well.
    I will meet with representatives of the Republic of 
Marshall Islands later on. And I think it's important for us to 
get their acceptance of it. But can you give me an update on 
the current State of negotiations with the Republic of Marshall 
Islands?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Mr. Ranking Member, thank you very much 
for your comments and for your question. Let me just State 
specifically on your question regarding the COFA. We are 
absolutely committed to getting the COFA done.
    I think as you know, this is really, I would argue, central 
to our entire position in the Pacific, including particularly 
in the Northern Pacific. It is really the foundation of our 
engagement there. As you know, we've already concluded MOUs 
with Federated States of Micronesia and Palau.
    The outstanding negotiations are with the Marshall Islands. 
I do not want to get into all of the details of the 
negotiations. And I know that our Special Envoy Joe Yun has 
been up here to brief you and others.
    But we're committed to getting this done. I am confident we 
will get there with RMI. Every one of our partners, sovereign 
partners in the Pacific, they have their own needs, desires, 
their own politics. We're working through that right now.
    But I'm confident that we will get there. And I think as 
you know as part of the President's Fiscal Year 2024 budget 
requests, it includes 7.1 billion dollars mandatory funding 
over 20 years to fund the compacts. And it does include what 
we've agreed on, at least to date, the top lines for RMI.
    Mr. Bera. And as I mentioned previously, we really do 
appreciate that mandatory funding and the 20-year funding to 
give assurances to the States in this region.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Bera. I do not have much time left. But you've got 
Congress' support and we will continue to work to get this 
done. So with that, let me----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Mr. Ranking Member.
    Mr. Bera [continuing]. Yield to the chairwoman.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I now recognize myself 
for 5 minutes. Secretary Kritenbrink, you accompanied Secretary 
Blinken on his recent trip to Beijing just recently in June. 
And shortly after that meeting, Secretary Blinken said that the 
spy balloon chapter should be closed.
    Well, this was a spy balloon which is a product of an 
adversary's military that flew across the continental United 
States. And the Administration believes we should simply move 
on? And at one point, President Biden even characterized this 
national security threat as, quote, ``silly.'' Do you agree or 
disagree with President Biden's characterization that the spy 
balloon incident as silly? I just need a simple yes or no from 
you.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Madam Chairwoman, thank you. I think----
    Mrs. Kim of California. A simple yes or no. I mean, we can 
continue the dialog.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, ma'am, what I would say is I agree 
with the President's assessment from the beginning. We took 
this extremely seriously. This was an outrageous violation of 
American sovereignty.
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mrs. Kim of California. Yet he called it silly, right? So 
the State Department----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. And the President shot the balloon down.
    Mrs. Kim of California. My time. I'm going----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Sorry.
    Mrs. Kim of California [continuing]. To reclaim my time 
back. State Department, did you demarche the Chinese Embassy 
with respect to the balloon?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, we did.
    Mrs. Kim of California. And what date did that occur?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I do not have all of the details in front 
of me. I did not come with a timeline, ma'am. But my 
recollection it was immediately after we found out about it.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Do you recall which----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. And I believe that was February 1.
    Mrs. Kim of California [continuing]. U.S. officials were in 
the meeting?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I do.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Could you tell me?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I will say we do not normally divulge all 
of the details of our----
    Mrs. Kim of California. You can at least tell me which 
officials were there in the meeting, right?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. But I can tell the Secretary of State and 
the Deputy Secretary of States. We took this incredibly 
seriously, and we wanted to send a message this was an 
outrageous violation of our sovereignty.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Then can you----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We demanded it be removed, that it never 
happen again. And then we shot it down.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. Thank you. Let reclaim 
my time.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. So respectfully, Madam Chairwoman, this is 
very serious. Yes, ma'am.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Will you commit to sharing any 
technical analysis of the balloon with the committee?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. What I will commit to is I'll refer you to 
Department of Justice and the FBI which are in charge of this. 
And we support whatever decisions they make.
    Mrs. Kim of California. All right. So you see we're having 
this continue dialog. So the chapter on the spy balloon is not 
closed. The American people still have so many unanswered 
questions about this flagrant violation of the American 
airspace. And given that it flew across the entirety of the 
continental United States, we're questioning this 
Administration's ability to respond to provocation from the PRC 
in the future.
    So since the spy balloon incident in February, the PRC had 
raided American companies, namely it banned Micron from its 
market. And it threatened restrictions on critical minerals and 
cyberattacked our top officials as was mentioned in Chairman 
McCaul's statements. So since February, can you name one 
substantial action the PRC has taken to improve relations with 
the United States other than taking our meetings on their 
terms?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, Madam Chairwoman, a couple of 
things. First, I would completely disagree with the 
characterization that we took meetings on their terms. In fact, 
just the opposite is true. The meetings happened on our terms 
and our timeline that we insisted on and that we stuck to.
    And Madam Chairwoman, I fully agree with your assessment 
that some of the steps that China has taken against Micron, 
against other American firms on the ground absolutely 
contradict their supposed statement that China is open for 
business and that they need foreign investment whereas when 
they take these steps that obviously contradict that statement 
and then undermine the business environment, that is not in 
their interest and it certainly increases tension in the 
relationship. And these are issues that Secretary Blinken 
raised directly when he was in China. And also, there's steps 
to both threaten and actually restrict----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. Let me reclaim my time 
back.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. If I could just finish on the last one, 
Madam Chairwoman.
    Mrs. Kim of California. I do not completely agree with your 
assessment that the meetings were taken on your terms or on our 
terms because it is my understanding we insisted our travel to 
Beijing despite--I mean, even canceling your appearance before 
my subcommittee hearing. So anyway, in your meetings with PRC 
officials, was the PRC's actions against Micron subject? And if 
so, what message was communicated by your delegation? And were 
there any countermeasures threatened?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Madam Chairwoman, we absolutely raised the 
Micron case and the other cases that I referred to, the 
unacceptable steps that China has taken against our firms while 
in Beijing. Secretary Blinken also underscored how unacceptable 
it is that China has taken these steps against our firms. And 
again, it undermines, absolutely contradicts their claim that 
they are open for business.
    And we'll continue to fight and advocate for our 
businesses. Secretary also met with the American business 
community there. And what he heard from them was that, one, 
yes, this trading relationship and the presence of our 
businesses in China remain very important. But No. 2, they have 
a range of concerns including these actions. And we are 
committed to defending them and advocating for them.
    Mrs. Kim of California. My time is up. But I look forward 
to continuing this dialog, especially as we have an upcoming 
meeting coming up. Thank you.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, ma'am. I look forward to that. Thank 
you.
    Mrs. Kim of California. All right. Let me now recognize 
Representative Andy Kim for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Kim of New Jersey. Thank you. I really appreciate the 
two of you coming out here to chat with us here about some of 
these important issues. Secretary Kritenbrink, I want to just 
start with you. I guess I wanted to just ask you, how critical 
is it to the ability of us to be successful in the Indo-Pacific 
for us to be able to build strong coalitions throughout the 
Indo-Pacific as well as globally focus on the issues that we 
face there? How important is that coalition building?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, vitally important, essential 
to everything that we do. It animates really everything that we 
do. Whether you come at it from the perspective of building the 
kind of region that we want to see, a free an open, prosperous 
region that we want to see or if you come at from the 
perspective of our China strategy.
    It's that aligned pillar that is most important. Whatever 
perspective you come at it from which you come at this 
challenge, our building coalitions with our like-minded allies, 
partners, and friends, building their collective capacity to 
counter common threats and to seize shared advantages. That's 
central to everything that we do, sir.
    Mr. Kim of New Jersey. And I appreciate you framed that 
within your testimony as well, talking through those five 
different pillars of which one of them was certainly about 
building those connections throughout the Indo-Pacific and 
beyond. I wanted to ask you. We're talking about the recent 
diplomatic engagements between the United States and China.
    I guess I wanted to ask you what have been the reactions of 
different countries and partners in the region to our 
diplomatic efforts? Has that been well received? Do they 
appreciate that or do they have concerns? I'd be interested in 
hearing a little bit more color in that.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, Congressman. I'd say two 
things. First of all, I think the unprecedented steps that 
we've taken to strengthen our allied and partner relationships 
across the entire region, as the ranking member mentioned a 
moment ago, with our five treaty allies, with AUKUS, with 
ASEAN, with the Quad and others.
    This has been greatly appreciated by the region. And they 
have told us repeatedly how important it is for our shared 
security and prosperity. I have never seen a stronger demand 
signal from the region for American engagement, Congressman.
    And I would also say our partners are also very gratified 
for our approach to the People's Republic of China. They know 
that we've been clear eyed and resolved. And as you know, many 
of the steps we've taken together with our partners have been 
explicitly designed to counter the threats and challenges posed 
by the PRC.
    But at the same time, I would argue that our allies and 
partners absolutely agree it is in no one's interest to have an 
unintended conflict, to have a miscalculation that could veer 
into conflict. And so therefore, I think our partners to a 
person in our conversations have said they are reassured by our 
resolute approach to the PRC and simultaneously they're 
reassured that at the same time we are committed to keeping 
channels of communication open so that we do not have a 
miscalculation.
    Mr. Kim of New Jersey. The last time I was out in the 
region, I heard something similar. I guess I wanted to just 
kind of flesh this out a little bit more. I was told by some 
counterparts in the region last time I visited that, yes, there 
are very legitimate, incredible challenges that we face with 
China.
    But when it comes to the U.S. and China and that 
relationship, they said that it was very important that the 
United States act as the responsible actor, that they not be 
seen as the provocateur, they not be seen as the aggressor. And 
otherwise, that would potentially make it harder for some of 
our partners in the region to actually partner with us and 
build coalitions. That was something that I heard. Is that 
something that you would hear as well from some of your 
counterparts?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I hear it on a daily basis. We make sure 
that our allies and partners know that they are intrinsically 
valuable to us, that they are the central animating feature of 
our foreign policy, not just in the China context but within 
the China context. You're absolutely right. If we're going to 
build a coalition of like-minded nations committed to 
protecting and preserving the world's basic international order 
and countering all challenges to it, they have to be confident 
that, in fact, we are responsibility, that we're clear eyed and 
levelheaded.
    Mr. Kim of New Jersey. One sentence that you said in your 
testimony, that was just very illustrative of this. And I want 
to just raise it. You said our Indo-Pacific strategy include 
our approach to the PRC but is not defined by it.
    And then this next sentence, in other words, we have an 
Indo-Pacific strategy of which China is a part, not the other 
way around. And I just want to highlight that. I think it's 
very well structured to look at that bigger picture. And I 
applaud you for thinking about that because it allows us not to 
be reactionary, just simply reaction which I find oftentimes we 
feel like we are on these issues.
    The last thing I just want to point out is that some of my 
colleagues here have been pushing back and calling for major 
cuts to State Foreign Ops. I worry about that in terms of our 
ability to implement this strategy that you're talking to us 
about. How would those types of cuts impact the ability to 
deliver the kind of success that we need in the Indo-Pacific?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, Congressman, I would say two things. 
First of all, I agree that it's our approach to allies and 
partners is where we spend the bulk of our time. Again, it is 
important to the region. It is important to our China strategy.
    We are, of course, grateful to Congress for the support 
that we receive. But some of the discussions that I have heard 
about, massive cuts to the State Department budget would be 
devastating to what we are trying to achieve, would be 
devastating to our ability to compete and outcompete with the 
People's Republic of China which is both a regional----
    Mrs. Kim of California. The gentleman's time is up.
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. And a global challenge. Thank 
you, sir.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. Let me now recognize 
Representative Davidson for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Davidson. I thank the chairwoman. I thank my 
colleagues. I thank you all for coming in today to provide your 
testimony. And hopefully we'll make some progress here on 
policy.
    The previous Administration put Huawei on the Department of 
Commerce entity list back in 2019. Our committee discovered 
that during a 6-month period in 2020, 2021 less than 1 percent 
of licenses were denied and more than 60 billion worth of 
licenses were approved, licensing America's sensitive 
technology to Huawei. Last week, it was reported that Huawei is 
poised to return to the 5G smartphone industry.
    And it's also been reported that Huawei has had active 
involvement in the Chinese spy base in Cuba. The State 
Department is an active and voting member of the dual use 
export controls process that Commerce oversees. Mr. Kritenberg, 
do you--Kritenbrink, do you--sorry for mispronouncing your 
name.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. It is my life's burden, Congressman. It's 
Kritenbrink.
    Mr. Davidson. Kritenbrink, sorry about that. I get some 
mispronunciations of Warren from time to time as well. My 
apologies. Do you believe Huawei should be given licenses on 
any U.S. origin technology? Where is that line?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, Congressman, thanks for raising this 
very important question. I want to maybe just reiterate a 
couple of points that I made to Chairman McCaul. We're 
absolutely committed to taking the steps we need to protect 
American national security, particularly in these high 
technology areas. Somewhat difficult for me to speak to the 
details of the licensing decisions on Huawei given that's a 
Commerce department decision.
    Mr. Davidson. You are a voting member. Do you have a 
position? Is 1 percent the right amount to restrict 60 billion 
is good?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. The position that we take is we should do 
whatever we need to do to defend American national security. 
And we're committed----
    Mr. Davidson. Are you doing it?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We have done that and, yes, we are, sir.
    Mr. Davidson. Doing well? Sixty billion is the right 
number? Things are going great?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I would say we've taken an unprecedented 
number of actions against China including the----
    Mr. Davidson. Huawei's growth is doing fine, supports what 
State Department is trying to achieve there?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. No, I would not say that, sir. I'll 
reiterate. We are committed to doing whatever it takes to 
defend American----
    Mr. Davidson. I suggest----
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. National security.
    Mr. Davidson [continuing]. You might not be doing it. So I 
just want to highlight that. So even when the United States has 
gotten commitments from the People's Republic of China, the 
level of adherence to their commitments isn't great. So I'd 
like to just get your views briefly, sir, on whether China is 
keeping its commitment. Is China adhering to its commitments 
under the World Trade Organization?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. That's a very broad question, Congressman.
    Mr. Davidson. The answer is no.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I could not say--I absolutely could not 
say they are.
    Mr. Davidson. It takes a long time to list all of them that 
they're not keeping. But the answer is no. Did China adhere to 
its commitments under the World Health Organization during 
COVID on reporting and transparency?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. No, we have deep concerns about----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Davidson. God bless you.
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. The lack of transparency.
    Mr. Davidson. A simple no answer. Thank you. Did China 
adhere to its commitment to not militarize the South China 
Seas?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Sir, obviously, the militarization and 
land reclamation, much of what's illegal is a deep concern to 
the United States.
    Mr. Davidson. So no. Did China adhere to its commitment not 
to engage in cybertheft of intellectual property?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Obviously, sir, we have a range of 
concerns on the cyber front as well.
    Mr. Davidson. No, they're not doing that either. Can you 
name one commitment that China is complying with?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Look, Congressman, I did not come here 
today to defend the People's Republic of China. I'll let 
counterparts in Beijing do that. What I did was come to defend 
what this Administration has done. We have a clear eyed, tough, 
realistic approach to the PRC. And particularly in this realm, 
we've been talking about competitive actions.
    Mr. Davidson. Well, look, I think that----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. It's pretty extraordinary.
    Mr. Davidson. I think you need to get your focus a little 
bit because they're not coming closer to complying. They're 
coming further away from complying.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Could I just add----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Davidson. Maybe part of the approach is NATO. Now 
here's my problem. NATO is a defensive alliance that's supposed 
to protect European countries from invasion.
    Originally it was structured obviously to stop the Soviet 
Union and in the aftermath, the Soviet Union, it's grown quite 
a lot. But it's a defensive alliance. The charter is defensive, 
yet there's power projection efforts underway from NATO in the 
Pacific. What's the objective there?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, look, what we are focused on 
and what I've tried to indicate in my testimony, we are focused 
on the region. We're trying to shape the region----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Davidson. What's the role for NATO in the Pacific?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. What I would say is if you read the NATO 
summit documents, our partners in NATO recognize what we 
recognize, that the Indo-Pacific is central to our future 
security and prosperity and that many of China's actions 
challenge the rules-based order.
    Mr. Davidson. I would ask that you give me a written 
response because I think it deserves more than that. What is 
the strategy with power projection of NATO in the Pacific. And 
I yield back.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I'm happy to----
    Mrs. Kim of California. The gentleman's time is up. I now 
recognize Representative Mills for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you so much, Madam Chair. Assistant 
Secretary, you're very good at eating up time and playing 
politics. So I'd really love if you can just try and give me 
direct answers.
    It's been a lot of skirting around. I've heard you talk 
about America not pulling punches multiple times. That's 
because we're not throwing any.
    I want to talk about something that Chair McCaul brought up 
which is failure of compliance. You keep talking about how the 
State Department has been very compliant. But we've had to sign 
multiple subpoenas in an effort to try and get things to 
include the 23 members who signed the dissent cables that 
you're very aware of.
    So it's disingenuous to even make such a comment. And I 
just want to go ahead and point that out for the record. I want 
to ask about competitor versus adversary. Can you describe what 
the difference between competition and adversary is?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Your question is what's the difference 
between an adversary and a competitor?
    Mr. Mills. Yes, I appreciate you eating up 30 seconds to 
try and do that, yes.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, Congressman, that's not what I'm 
trying to do. We spend every day on these issues. I spend----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Mills. Sir, I'm asking for the definition, please.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I did not come prepared to give you a 
formal definition. But I'm happy to----
    Mr. Mills. Do you consider China a competitor or an 
adversary?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I would argue that they're both.
    Mr. Mills. OK. And I would agree that they are an adversary 
more than anything, especially if you look at the geopolitical 
alignment between China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, and the 
economic resource of sovereign-based warfare that's been 
launched for 20-plus years against the west. I think we look at 
the expansion, the Belt and Road Initiative. I think that we 
look at the domination of rare earth mineral mines throughout 
the continent of Africa.
    I think that we recognize that China's adversarial actions 
has led to a disruption of supply chain capability which is the 
intent. That's why they want to expand Eurasian borders, take 
Africa, take Oceania. Recreate Maritime Silk Route, if you 
will, to choke off Westerners' supply chain.
    But they're also utilizing economic coercion in our own 
western hemisphere as we're seeing with Honduras and Panama 
where they're trying to take over the canal for tariffs and 
trade and other types of warfare. And then utilize that 
marriage of convenience with Russia for the Chavez in Venezuela 
and Pedro in Colombia, now building spy and joint training 
bases 92 miles off of my State, the State of Florida, right 
there in Cuba.
    So I think that's adversarial actions more so than 
competitive actions. I will go, though, and say that the day 
after Secretary Blinken's trip to China, President Biden 
referred to General Secretary Xi as a dictator. Do you agree 
that General Xi is a dictator?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, I do not have anything 
further to add. I think the President's words speak for 
themselves.
    Mr. Mills. So do you agree with the President's words?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I think the White House spokesperson and 
the Secretary have already spoken to that. The President----
    Mr. Mills. So do you agree with the President?
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. Speaks plainly. He speaks for 
the American people.
    Mr. Mills. Sir, do you agree with President Biden's 
comments?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I stand by what I said, Congressman. I do 
not have anything to add.
    Mr. Mills. No, yes, no, no?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I do not have anything to add.
    Mr. Mills. OK. Thanks so much for your non-answer.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I think, Congressman----
    Mr. Mills. We're going to move on. Reclaiming my time, sir. 
Secretary Blinken also Stated recently that the U.S. seeks to 
coexist peacefully with China. Was it U.S. policy during the 
cold war to seek peaceful coexistence with the Soviet Union who 
we declared as having a dictator? Was it U.S. policy during 
World War II to seek peaceful coexistence with Nazi Germany 
which we called Hitler a dictator? Because both Soviet Union 
and Nazi Germany were run by dictators, correct?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, I tried to lay out we have a 
really consequential and complex relationship with China. We 
have a long list of concerns, many of which you've already 
outlined. We approached those in a resolute and realistic 
manner. And we're absolutely committed to doing everything 
possible to defend our interest and those of our allies. And--
--
    Mr. Mills. Well, I can tell you one of those----
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. We're proud of what we've 
done and we're confident in what we've done.
    Mr. Mills. Secretary, I'd say that one of those would be to 
recognize also the WHO and WEF is being weaponized and utilized 
in an effort to also try to gain further, I guess, ingratiating 
behaviors by China to try and create this hegemony, not to 
mention the fact that they're cozying up to OPEC to try and 
utilize that as an energy warfare against this. And meanwhile, 
we just had Secretary--or sorry, former Secretary Kerry come in 
here and talk about how the greatest existential threat is 
climate change, not what we actually really are seeing which is 
China as our greatest existential threat. I'm going to ask one 
more thing which is in regards to Taiwan.
    I just came back from the first and second chain of islands 
a few weeks ago. And I can tell you that the over 19 billion 
dollars that's being held up by the Director of Defense Trade 
Control which does exist under the CivMil Poll for State 
Department is still yet to actually approve and send the 
materials that are necessary for Taiwan. Is there a reason for 
this?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, I think it's realistic to 
talk about holding up 19 billion dollars' worth of arms sales. 
I think as you know this is a complicated process. It takes 
time. We do recognize----
    Mr. Mills. I'm very aware of----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We do recognize----
    Mr. Mills [continuing]. Form 5, Form 2, DSP 83s, DSP 5s. I 
understand the defense process mechanism. I've also seen where 
companies like Northrop Grumman, Lockheed, and others have 
gotten within 90 days an approval for the DSP 5 export 
approvals to send to Iraq and Ukraine and other countries.
    And yet this has been months and months and months of being 
held up. And so, no, you obviously do not know the process for 
the DSP 83 and DSP 5. If you did, then you'd also know the ATF 
Form 2, Form 5, Form 9 process as well. This is something I'm 
aware of.
    Mrs. Kim of California. The gentleman's time is up.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, I'll just reiterate. We're 
doing everything within our means to meet our commitments under 
the Taiwan Relations Act. We've taken extraordinary steps. 
We're also taking extraordinary steps to reduce some of the 
delays that you've referred to.
    Mrs. Kim of California. The gentleman's time is up. Let me 
now recognize Representative Castro for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairwoman. Mr. Kritenbrink, I 
strongly support U.S. engagement with ASEAN and was glad to see 
Secretary Blinken visit Southeast Asia last week and meet with 
our ASEAN partners. I've been working with the Administration 
to extend diplomatic privileges and immunities to ASEAN which 
requires an act of Congress.
    I'm hopeful that we can--or actually the House voted on the 
Partner with ASEAN Act earlier this year. And Senator Menendez 
introduced the bipartisan Senate counterpart. I'm hopeful that 
we can get this legislation enacted before President Biden goes 
to the ASEAN summit this September so he can announce this 
important recognition of U.S. ASEAN ties.
    So I wanted to ask, what would it mean for the United 
States to extend diplomatic privileges and immunities to ASEAN? 
And do you agree that'd be helpful if we can get this enacted 
in time for the President to make an announcement at the ASEAN 
summit this September?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, it would, Congressman. Very grateful 
to you and other Members of Congress for your support of this 
Partner with ASEAN Act. As I think you recognized, ASEAN is 
really central to our interests as well.
    Collectively the ten countries of ASEAN form the world's 
fifth largest economy. They're our fourth largest trading 
partner. They're central to peace and stability and prosperity 
in the region. And again, we support the act. And we would also 
support under that act ASEAN sending a representative to 
Washington.
    Mr. Castro. Wonderful. I hope you'll work with us on 
getting this done in time for that summit.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you. And after the May 2022 ASEAN Special 
Summit, the White House announced that the Administration will 
double the Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative within 3 
years. I led legislation in the House to strengthen and expand 
this program.
    And this announcement, of course, was welcome news. Yet the 
Fiscal Year 2024 budget request for the State Department did 
not include a request for additional funds in line with the 
President's announcement in May 2022. How is the State 
Department going to find funds to double the YSEALI program?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, maybe two comments. I think 
I'll need to take back the specifics of exactly what moneys are 
being used to fund YSEALI. But we're absolutely committed to 
meeting that target, No. 1.
    No. 2, again, having just traveled with the Secretary to 
Jakarta for the ASEAN summit and having participated in a 
YSEALI event there, this is one of the most effective programs 
that we have in the world. As you know, ten countries of 
Southeast Asia represent the youngest region in the world, the 
fastest growing, most dynamic region in the world. More than 
155,000 of these amazing young people are alumni of the YSEALI 
program. It's really central to what we're achieving. But I'll 
come back to you on the details----
    Mr. Castro. Sure.
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. Of our funding.
    Mr. Castro. Well, thank you for your work on that. Thank 
you to the State Department for really deepening our engagement 
with Southeast Asia. Ann Wagner, Republican from Missouri, and 
I co-founded the U.S. ASEAN caucus in 2017 to deepen the 
relationship between Members of Congress and members of the 
legislative bodies of the ten Southeast Asian nations. So thank 
you from the executive branch on the work that you're doing.
    And then finally, the Administration has recently stepped 
up efforts to engage with Pacific Island countries where the 
PRC has been incredibly active. And that means that we need to 
step up. I believe it's important for us to be good partners 
with these countries and be responsive to their needs. So when 
you engage with Pacific Island countries, how highly do you 
think they rank the need for climate action?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, I think it's existential. 
Again, we have worked very hard to step up our game across the 
Pacific Islands. Again, we're a member of the Pacific community 
there.
    These are longstanding historical partners, incredibly 
like-minded. And our whole approach is to meet them where they 
live so to speak. If you look at our strategy for the Pacific 
Islands, the work we've done on partners in the Blue Pacific, 
it's all focused on meeting their top priorities. Climate is 
probably No. 1. Illegal fishing, investment development, and 
people-to-people ties, those would be a short list of their top 
interests.
    Mr. Castro. And so if we pursued almost 30 percent cuts to 
the International Affairs budget that the current proposal in 
the House calls for, how would that affect the United States' 
ability to be responsive to the needs of Pacific Island 
countries in combating climate change? And what does that mean 
for U.S. China competition in the region?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, Congressman, I would just say as I 
mentioned earlier, obviously dramatic cuts to what we're trying 
to do in the region would undermine significantly our entire 
approach to the region and to China and particularly in air of 
strategic competition. I would argue this is not a time for 
pulling back. It's a time for stepping forward and increasing 
our investments.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony today.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Castro. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. I now recognize 
Representative Barr for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you, Madam Chair. And Assistant Secretary 
Kritenbrink, I am perplexed by the Biden Administration's 
obsession with high level dialog with the CCP when Beijing is 
clearly ramping up its hostility despite these talks. Did any 
Chinese official ever condition or imply that rescheduling the 
Secretary's trip to Beijing was conditioned on the FBI not 
releasing its findings of the spy balloon report, yes or no?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Representative Barr, we never accepted any 
conditions on the Secretary traveling to Beijing. And we made 
clear that only after the Secretary visited would there be 
other senior----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Barr. Does the Secretary understand and do you 
understand that the American people were very dismayed when the 
Secretary said that this chapter is simply closed?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, Representative Barr, I would say as 
I mentioned to Chairman Kim a moment ago the flight of the 
Chinese spy balloon over the United States was an outrageous 
and unacceptable violation of our sovereignty----
    Mr. Barr. Yes, but if I could interject.
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. And territorial integrity. We 
took resolute steps and then we shot it down.
    Mr. Barr. Assistant Secretary, though, when you say the 
chapter is closed and there's no ramifications for the CCP for 
them spying on our most sensitive military sites, the American 
people are outraged by that.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Could I make one comment, sir?
    Mr. Barr. What tangible--let me ask you this question, 
Assistant Secretary. What tangible win did Secretary Blinken 
come away with from Beijing? And do not give us maintaining 
open channels of communication.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We're not chasing the Chinese, sir. We are 
focused----
    Mr. Barr. You look like you are.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We are absolutely not doing that.
    Mr. Barr. I can tell you, you look like you are. My 
constituents say you are. They say you are.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, sir, I'm sorry, but that view is 
mistaken. We went to Beijing very confident in our approach to 
the region and to China from a position of strength. We should 
not underestimate the importance of trying to prevent----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Barr. Secretary, let's assess that, negotiating from a 
position of strength. The last Congress, I authorized the AXIS 
Act that required State to report on the PRC's assistance to 
Russia with the invasion of Ukraine. The relationship between 
General Secretary Xi and Putin is said to have no limits. But 
we know China has supplied Russia with satellite imagery, gun 
powder, body armor, rifles. Would you assess that the level of 
PRC support or transactions to sanction Russian entities has 
been significant?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, a couple of things. Again, 
we're pursuing a realistic----
    Mr. Barr. Is it significant or not?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. When it comes to Chinese support for 
Russia----
    Mr. Barr. Yes.
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. We've expressed our deep 
concern over the range of areas where they've provided support. 
We've taken actions to sanction Chinese entities when they have 
provided support to Russia. And we've continued to warn them 
not to provide lethal assistance----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Barr. OK. There is consequences, warning them, tough 
talk. Where's the action? Where's the sanctions----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We've taken----
    Mr. Barr [continuing]. For material and lethal support by 
China to Russia? Where is the action?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Sir, our assessment is they have not 
provided lethal assistance to the Russian military. And we have 
warned them----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Barr. And the media says you're wrong about that. There 
are customs records. Just look at the Wall Street Journal. They 
do a better job of uncovering material lethal assistance than 
the State Department.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. So we're confident----
    Mr. Barr. Taiwan, Taiwan, Secretary.
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. In our assessment. And we've 
taken steps against a number of Chinese entities already.
    Mr. Barr. We need sanctions. On July 3----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We've already done that, sir.
    Mr. Barr [continuing]. State Department pulled down a 
proposed license for the export of defense articles to Taiwan. 
The State Department pulled down a proposed license for the 
export of defense articles to Taiwan. This happened the same 
day Secretary Yellen's trip to Beijing was announced. Is the 
State Department limiting arms sales and defense exports to 
Taiwan in the hopes of placating Beijing?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Absolutely not, sir. And I spoke to this 
earlier, and I'll need to take it back just to make sure we're 
talking about the same case. But I'm aware of a case 2 weeks 
ago, direct commercial sales case that was mistakenly notified.
    It since been formally--it was withdrawn and then it's 
already been notified. And it had nothing to do with anything 
else. We do not pull our punches.
    We've already provided more than five billion dollars' 
worth of arms to our Taiwan partners in this Administration. 
We're taking a range of other steps to meet our commitments. 
Last year, I believe we approved 13 arms sales which is a 
record in 1 year.
    Mr. Barr. OK.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. But we do not pull our punches----
    Mr. Barr. Well----
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. And we will not.
    Mr. Barr. OK. Has the State Department returned to its 
policy of bundling arms in defense exports to Taiwan to not 
anger China?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Absolutely not, sir. And I think the 13 
arms sales last year prove that.
    Mr. Barr. OK. Well, I think the State Department should be 
less focused on pulling down licenses and more focused on 
getting arms to Taiwan immediately. Let me ask you about the 
competitive actions calendar in my remaining time. Since the 
beginning of this year, multiple high level Biden 
Administration officials have met with PRC officials or visited 
the PRC itself, including yourself.
    Through the course of this, the PRC has continued to commit 
genocide, intimidate Taiwan, hack U.S. Government email 
accounts. But there's reporting that the State Department is 
intervening with other agencies to delay implementation of 
sanctions and export controls. Have you or anyone at State 
encouraged any other agency to delay implementation of a 
sanction or export control, yes or no?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We do not pull our punches, and we are 
committed to taking whatever steps we need to.
    Mr. Barr. My time is expired. I do not think the Assistant 
Secretary answered that question. I'd invite my colleagues to 
followup. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. Let me now recognize 
Representative Sherman for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Sherman. Thank you. As we confront China and as we have 
a budget hearing on the very bureaus that confront China in its 
own area should point out that we cannot beat China on the 
cheap. I wish it were true.
    I wish we could brush them aside at no cost. But budgetary 
proposals reflect values. And some budgetary proposals show 
that they value the idea of losing because if we cut USAID 
substantially, if we cut our diplomacy substantially, and if we 
cut our public diplomacy substantially, we will lose.
    We had the spy balloon, and we had another couple of other 
possible balloons. Some people said that would just be a blip. 
Now that we've had several months to examine the apparatus, has 
your bureau received a classified briefing on what the major 
spy balloon actually had on it?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, I have not. I'll just 
reiterate what we said earlier. We took this very seriously.
    Mr. Sherman. And I will point out that I have not and our 
colleagues have not. And they have had months to figure out. We 
deliberately did not shoot down the balloon over Alaska or 
Montana because we wanted to see everything that was on it.
    And we allowed the balloon to go over military bases. We 
made sure to the best of our ability it did not gather any more 
information, all in an effort to find out what was on the 
balloon. And they have not told you and they have not told me 
what was on the balloon. So I look forward to working with the 
subcommittee and full committee to get a classified briefing on 
that.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir. And I'll be happy to take that 
back.
    Mr. Sherman. This one is marked the 70th anniversary of the 
armistice concluded by President Eisenhower to end the war, 
1953 in Korea. But we still do not have a peace treaty. Now I'm 
not in favor of making unilateral concessions to the government 
of Pyongyang. On the other hand, a confidence building measure 
that does not do anything more for them than it does for us 
would seem to be a step toward dealing with more difficult 
issues. Does the Administration want to see a peace treaty 
ending the war of 1953?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, thank you for your question. 
I think candidly speaking rather than focusing on history, I 
think we would rather focus on the immediate----
    Mr. Sherman. You got a lot of people working. You can focus 
on a lot of things.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Obviously, sir, we've Stated what our 
long-term aspirations might be. But the immediate threat is the 
growing threat from North Korea's missile and nuclear program 
and their unprecedented number of launches. And we're focused 
on two things. We continue----
    Mr. Sherman. You do not think that taking some steps on 
some other issues would build a framework or be a step forward 
on dealing with the more significant issues?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Candidly speaking, right now, I do not, 
sir. I think our focus right now is twofold. It's demonstrating 
the strength of our deterrent capabilities, the strength of our 
security treaty commitments to our Korean and Japanese allies 
and/or resolve to make sure we----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Sherman. I would just point out your bureau is 
relatively well funded. You can walk, chew gum, and shop on 
Amazon all at the same time.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Sherman. And to have the 70th anniversary of a war come 
up without concluding a formal peace treaty is just one of the 
many irritants. Finally, and also focusing on the budget, are 
you aware that--we're all concerned about immigration. But 
we're particularly concerned about when the nuclear family is 
separated.
    It's one thing to say you cannot bring your adult brother 
in. You cannot bring your cousin in. But when spouses are 
separated, when minor children are separated from one or their 
other parent, if any other country did that deliberate and for 
months and years we would--DRL would write them up in the human 
rights report. Do we sometimes have circumstances where the 
spouse of an American citizen is not given a chance to come to 
the United States for a period of over a year or even over 5 
years?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, I'm not--so this is an 
immigration policy question. I'm not----
    Mr. Sherman. No, this is a State Department staffing 
question. You've got your visa officers funded by the budget 
you're here to testify.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I understand.
    Mr. Sherman. Do we have enough people--and I realize it's 
much more fun to talk about----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. No, I understand.
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. The great issues.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Yes.
    Mr. Sherman. But you're the bees office.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. No, I----
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Sherman. Do you have enough people to get it done 
within a reasonable amount of time?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I think the responsible thing for me to do 
is take that back to my colleague, Rena Bitter. This is the 
Secretary for Consulate Affairs and come back to you----
    Mr. Sherman. I would hope your budget----
    Mr. Kritenbrink [continuing]. With a reasoned answer.
    Mr. Sherman [continuing]. Request in the future would 
adequately staff things so that spouses can be unified in 
months and even weeks rather than years or decades. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Understood, sir. Thank you.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. Let me now recognize 
Representative Moran for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Moran. Thank you, Madam Chair. Secretary Kritenbrink, 
the last time you were before this committee, you refused to 
answer Representative Huizenga's question regarding whether you 
or Deputy Secretary Wendy Sherman ever delayed Uyghur Human 
Rights Policy Act sanctions. Months following that hearing, 
Reuters reported that the State Department was, in fact, 
delaying human rights sanctions. So I want to revisit that line 
of questions. Have Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act sanctions 
ever been on the competitive action calendar?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, I'll reiterate what I've said 
earlier. We've already taken a range of actions to hold Chinese 
officials to account on Xinjiang.
    Mr. Moran. But I'm not asking about a range of actions.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. And we'll continue to do so.
    Mr. Moran. I'm asking specifically about Uyghur Human 
Rights Policy Act sanctions. Have they ever been on the 
competitive action calendar?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. As a matter of policy, we do not talk 
about issues before they're decided. So issues that are pre-
decisional and deliberative are usually not matters that we 
would engage in.
    Mr. Moran. Well, how long does the competitive action 
calendar process take typically?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Sir, I think I mentioned earlier in 
response to the chairman's comment that this matter is now in 
the investigatory and oversight process.
    Mr. Moran. I'm not asking a substance----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. No.
    Mr. Moran [continuing]. Question. I'm asking a process 
question. Because you said you do not want to talk about it 
while it's ongoing. So I want to know how long does that 
competitive action calendar process normally take?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. We have an informal, deliberative, and 
pre-decisional compilation of actions under consideration. But 
we do not preview sanctions or share pre-decisional policy 
discussions. So----
    Mr. Moran. Well, I'm glad you read that answer. But I asked 
you a process question.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. No, that's the answer.
    Mr. Moran. It's a process question. How long does that 
calendar process take so that I know when I can come back and 
ask you about the substance of that issue?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. No, sir. What I would say is putting 
together informal deliberative pre-decisional compilations of 
ideas and pre-decisional potential actions that I cannot--
there's not a timeline. There's not a formal process.
    Mr. Moran. So let's talk about then Uyghur Sanctions Act, 
sanctions that have already been through the process. Do you 
know of any that have been through the process and ended, have 
completed that process? So it's not pre-decisional. It's post-
decisional.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Well, no, sir. What I would say here is 
when we take steps such as I mentioned a moment ago, the dozens 
of actions, the dozens of individuals and firms, I think it's 
more than 50, 51 Chinese entities, almost 60, and at least 4 
PRC----
    Mr. Moran. I heard you say that earlier. I'm talking 
about----
    Mr. Kritenbrink. My point, sir, is once----
    Mr. Moran [continuing]. The Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act 
sanctions. Have any of them completed the process and have any 
sanctions been issued? That's a post-decisional question, not a 
pre-decisional question.
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I want to make sure I understand. When we 
impose sanctions on a Chinese official, my understanding is 
those sanctions remain in place until in perpetuity or until we 
would decide to withdraw.
    Mr. Moran. True. But the decision has been made. Has a 
decision been made to sanction anybody under the Uyghur Human 
Rights Policy Act?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I do not believe that we have taken steps 
specifically under that act, sir.
    [Simultaneous speaking.]
    Mr. Moran. Has anyone in the Administration--has anyone in 
the Administration ever delayed any sanctions brought or 
sanctions brought before the--under the competitive action 
calendar through the Uyghur Human Rights Policy Act? Have 
delayed any of that before?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. I think I would say two things. Again, any 
matter that's pre-decisional, I cannot really comment on. What 
I would underscore and I did mention this last time I had the 
honor being before the committee, we're committed to continuing 
to carry out our responsibilities under U.S. law.
    We will continue to hold Chines officials who are carrying 
out these egregious policies to account. We will use all tools 
at our disposal. And we've used a range of GloMag and other----
    Mr. Moran. All right. So stepping outside of any specific 
action, has anyone told you from the White House to you that 
you should not move forward with any sanctions under the Uyghur 
Human Rights Policy Act?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Sir, I'll just reiterate. We do not 
comment on pre-decisional matters. But we are committed to 
using all tools at our disposal. And we do intend to use all 
tools including the act.
    Mr. Moran. In my remaining time, let me switch gears. 
Recently, Secretary Blinken went to the People's Republic of 
China. When he came back, he said, quote, ``he did not support 
Taiwan independence.''
    In fact, that seems to diverge from the Taiwanese Relations 
Act which takes no explicit position on the future of Taiwan 
other than, quote, ``the expectation of the future of Taiwan 
will be determined by peaceful means.'' It sounds like to me 
that Secretary Blinken is changing U.S. policy as it relates to 
the determination of Taiwan's future. Do you know why he would 
make such a statement?
    Mr. Kritenbrink. Congressman, respectfully, that's 
absolutely incorrect. It's long been a matter of U.S. policy 
for decades that we do not support Taiwan independence. And 
again, it has been for decades.
    Our One China Policy has not changed. It's based on the 
Taiwan Relations Act, the three joint communiques and six 
assurances to Taiwan. Again, we have Stated for decades that we 
do not support Taiwan independence. We also State that we 
absolutely oppose any attempts to change the cross-strait 
status quo. We are committed to maintaining peace and security 
and to deterring precipitous action by the PRC.
    Mr. Moran. Madam Chair, my time has expired.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    Mr. Moran. I yield back.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you very much. I would like 
to thank the witnesses for engaging the members and answering 
the questions. You can see we have a lot of concerns from the 
questions that we asked and the responses.
    Some of the responses, we did not get in full. So we hope 
that we can continue this dialog so we can get that full 
responses from you in a timely manner instead of saying that we 
will come back and give you the full response in a different 
setting. This is what the hearing is about.
    We all know and recognize that CCP is also an existential 
threat to the United States, to our partners, and the 
international rules-based system. And we've heard over and over 
the Biden Administration and the President himself and the 
State Department officials such as yourself have verbally 
recognized that sentiment. But we just do not feel that your 
actions and the objectives do not--they just do not meet the 
challenge at hand.
    And your recent travels to China since the last time we 
were supposed to have a hearing with you as a witness to the 
time that we're having this hearing today, there have been to 
my knowledge about four counts of high level officials from our 
State Department traveling to China to meet with our 
adversaries, your counterparts you would say. So I just wanted 
to echo that our U.S. leadership in the region is critically 
important to engage in the conversation to discuss the economic 
security and human rights concerns that we have. While we 
encourage diplomatic engagements with our allies, also with 
allies and adversaries alike, I think it's critically important 
and I hope you recognize that you need to engage Congress and 
especially before you travel to the region.
    I hope you will come and talk to us so you can carry our 
congressional concerns as you meet and have a dialog with our 
adversaries. In this case, we're talking about PRC. So we 
shouldn't be holding back on standing up for our values, and 
this is what you are trying to do as diplomats representing our 
country.
    So I look forward to getting more fulsome answers to our 
questions about Taiwan and I mentioned in my questions about 
the arms sales and competitive action calendar, in our 
classified meeting later this week. So with that, I would like 
to turn it over to my ranking member for closing comments you 
have.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. First off, I 
appreciate both the witnesses being here and being available to 
us on a regular basis. Mr. Ronning, you probably have to buy 
Mr. Kritenbrink lunch today since he took the bulk of the 
questions.
    We are in a strategic competition. The 75 years post-World 
War II, I think we can be proud of what we did as a country 
creating relative peace, stability, prosperity throughout the 
world, rebuilding Europe, creating prosperity in Asia, and 
lifting hundreds of thousands, millions out of poverty. It's 
something we can be proud of.
    But the world is different today. And I think we recognize 
what that world looks like. And again, as I said in some of my 
statements, I applaud the work that the Administration is doing 
and that we're trying to do in a bipartisan way here and 
Congress supporting that.
    It is creating new alliances. It's creating value-based 
alliances that value democracy, free markets, freedom of 
navigation, and a rules-based order. It's looking at 
modernizing mechanisms of conflict and dispute resolution.
    It is rebuilding our presence around the world and staying 
engaged in the world but in different ways with our allies. And 
again, it's not a given what the next decade or two decades 
look like. But I do think the foundational work in this region 
has been seminal.
    And again, I hope to continue to try to do this in a 
bipartisan way. And it does require engagement. It does require 
aid and development. It does not require presence with our 
partners and allies.
    So I am an optimist. It is not going to be easy work. It is 
going to require engagement both with our allies and 
adversaries. But I think the proof is in--when I hear the 
rhetoric coming out of Beijing, I do think they're very worried 
about the success that we're having creating these partnerships 
and the economic engagement, the strength of our own economy 
which is now the strongest in the world.
    The fact that inflation is coming down, the fact that I 
look at the economic indicators in China, and I think there are 
a lot of red lights going off. And I applaud Secretary Yellen 
for going there. We do not want China to go into the tank 
because that pulls all of us down and can probably pull the 
world into a global recession.
    So again, I think we are operating from a place of 
strength. I applaud where we are right now. It is going to take 
all of us working together not as Democrats or Republicans but 
as Americans and as folks that want to see a prosperous and 
fair and open 21st century.
    So again, Madam Chairwoman, thank you for holding this 
hearing. Thank you to the witnesses for being here. And again, 
I look forward to working together.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you. And I echo the ranking 
member's remarks for thanking you for being here. I do not know 
about buying each other lunch, but the members also had some 
quite good questions. But probably they would appreciate the 
full response in writing if you may be able to have the time to 
do so.
    And pursuant to committee rules, all members may have 5 
days to submit statements, questions, and extraneous materials 
for the record subject to the length limitation. So without 
objection, the committee now stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:39 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                                APPENDIX

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    STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

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            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

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