[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                    PIPELINE SAFETY: REVIEWING IMPLEMENTATION 
                     OF THE PIPES ACT OF 2020 AND EXAMINING 
                     FUTURE SAFETY NEEDS

=======================================================================

                                (118-4)

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                 SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES,
                        AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 8, 2023

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             
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     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation
                             
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                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
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             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
Rick Larsen, Washington,             Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, 
  Ranking Member                     Arkansas
Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Daniel Webster, Florida
  District of Columbia               Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Grace F. Napolitano, California      Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Brian Babin, Texas
John Garamendi, California           Garret Graves, Louisiana
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr.,      Georgiavid Rouzer, North Carolina
Andre Carson, Indiana                Mike Bost, Illinois
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Doug LaMalfa, California
Jared Huffman, California            Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Julia Brownley, California           Brian J. Mast, Florida
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey       Puerto Rico
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Salud O. Carbajal, California        Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Greg Stanton, Arizona,               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
  Vice Ranking Member                Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Colin Z. Allred, Texas                 Vice Chairman
Sharice Davids, Kansas               Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Lance Gooden, Texas
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire          Tracey Mann, Kansas
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Burgess Owens, Utah
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts      Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            Chuck Edwards, North Carolina
Patrick Ryan, New York               Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska         Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Eric Burlison, Missouri
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 John James, Michigan
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio            Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
                                     Mike Collins, Georgia
                                     Mike Ezell, Mississippi
                                     John S. Duarte, California
                                     Aaron Bean, Florida

     Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

  Troy E. Nehls, Texas, Chairman
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey,    Brian Babin, Texas
  Ranking Member                     David Rouzer, North Carolina
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Mike Bost, Illinois
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Doug LaMalfa, California
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Andre Carson, Indiana                Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina,  Lance Gooden, Texas
  Vice Ranking Member                Tracey Mann, Kansas
Grace F. Napolitano, California      Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaic Burlison, Missouri
Jared Huffman, California            Brandon Williams, New York,
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois     Vice Chairman
Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) John S. Duarte, California
                                     Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................   vii

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Troy E. Nehls, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, 
  and Hazardous Materials, opening statement.....................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     2
Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, opening 
  statement......................................................    13
    Prepared statement...........................................    14
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................    15
    Prepared statement...........................................    17

                               WITNESSES

Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous 
  Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), oral statement........    19
    Prepared statement...........................................    21
Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive Officer, Liquid 
  Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA), oral statement.............    28
    Prepared statement...........................................    30
Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer, Natural Gas Pipelines, 
  Kinder Morgan, Inc., on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas 
  Association of America (INGAA), oral statement.................    36
    Prepared statement...........................................    38
Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust, oral 
  statement......................................................    41
    Prepared statement...........................................    43

                       SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

Submissions for the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls:
    Letter of March 8, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and 
      Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
      Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, from Stuart 
      Saulters, Vice President of Government Relations, American 
      Public Gas Association.....................................     4
    Statement of the American Petroleum Institute................     5
    Press Release of March 8, 2023, from the Distribution 
      Contractors Association and the United Association of Union 
      Plumbers and Pipefitters...................................    12
    Letter of March 22, 2023, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and 
      Hon. Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on 
      Transportation and Infrastructure, from Geoff Moody, Senior 
      Vice President, Government Relations and Policy, American 
      Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers.......................    87
Letter of March 7, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and 
  Donald M. Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, and Hon. Sam 
  Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, from Edwin H. 
  ``Skip'' Williams, Bellingham City Council (Washington State), 
  Submitted for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen...................    16

                                APPENDIX

Questions to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and 
  Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), from:
    Hon. Troy E. Nehls...........................................    89
    Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr.....................................   107
    Hon. Mike Bost...............................................   109
Questions to Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive 
  Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA), from Hon. 
  Donald M. Payne, Jr............................................   110
Questions to Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer, Natural 
  Gas Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc., on behalf of the Interstate 
  Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), from Hon. Donald M. 
  Payne, Jr......................................................   110
Questions to Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety 
  Trust, from:
    Hon. Troy E. Nehls...........................................   112
    Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr.....................................   112
    Hon. Mike Bost...............................................   113

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                             March 3, 2023

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, 
and Hazardous Materials
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and 
Hazardous Materials
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Pipeline Safety: 
Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining 
Future Safety Needs.''
_______________________________________________________________________


                               I. PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous 
Materials will meet on March 8, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. ET in 2167 
Rayburn House Office Building to hold a hearing titled 
``Pipeline Safety: Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act of 
2020 and Examining Future Safety Needs.'' The purpose of this 
hearing is to examine the progress of the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in 
implementing the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and 
Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-260, PIPES Act of 2020) 
and examining future needs in pipeline safety.

                             II. BACKGROUND

ABOUT THE AGENCY

    The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
(PHMSA) was created under the Norman Y. Mineta Research and 
Special Programs Improvement Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-426, ``2004 
Act''). Prior to enactment of the 2004 Act, the Department of 
Transportation's (DOT) Research and Special Programs 
Administration administered the DOT's pipeline and hazardous 
materials safety programs.\1\ PHMSA's mission is to protect 
people and the environment by advancing the safe transportation 
of energy through 3.4 million miles of natural gas and 
hazardous liquid pipelines, which account for the 
transportation of 65 percent of the energy commodities consumed 
in the United States. PHMSA also is charged with the safe and 
secure movement of over one million daily shipments of 
hazardous materials by all modes of transportation.\2\
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    \1\ Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act 
of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-426 [hereinafter the 2004 Act].
    \2\ See Pub. L. No.117-58; see also PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Program 
Budget and Grants Presentation (Jan. 25, 2023) (on file with Comm.) 
[hereinafter PHMSA Budget and Grants Presentation].
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    The first statute regulating pipeline safety was the 
Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, which Congress amended 
in 1976.\3\ Congress added hazardous liquid pipelines to the 
statute in the Pipeline Safety Act of 1970.\4\ Recent enacted 
legislation regulating the safety of natural gas and hazardous 
liquid pipeline facilities for which mandates remain 
outstanding include the Protecting our Infrastructure of 
Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2016, and the Protecting 
our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES) 
Act of 2020.\5\ The current authorization expires at the end of 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 on September 30, 2023.\6\
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    \3\ Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-481 
(amended by the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976, 
Pub. L. No. 94-477, 90 Stat. 2073).
    \4\ Pipeline Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 96-129.
    \5\ Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
561, 102 Stat. 2805; Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-508, 
106 Stat. 3289; Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104-304, 110 Stat. 3793; Pipeline Safety Improvement 
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355, 116 Stat. 1757; The 2004 Act; 
Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement and Safety Act of 2006, 
Pub. L. No. 109-468, 120 Stat. 3486; Pipelines Safety, Regulatory 
Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, 125 Stat. 
1904; the Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing 
Safety Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-183, 130 Stat. 514; Protecting Our 
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020, Pub. L. 
No. 116-260 [hereinafter PIPES Act of 2020].
    \6\ PIPES Act of 2020, Sec.  101.
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PIPELINE SAFETY FRAMEWORK

    Safety regulations differ depending on the nature of the 
pipeline and the commodity that is moving through it. PHMSA's 
regulations govern pipelines and facilities that transport 
natural gas separately from those that transport hazardous 
liquid.\7\ Additionally, the pipelines and facilities used to 
transport natural gas and hazardous liquids vary in operating 
pressures, diameter size, intended purpose, and proximity to 
populated areas.\8\ This infrastructure includes:
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    \7\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec.  192, 195 (2023).
    \8\ Id.
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     LDistribution pipelines: These pipelines transport 
natural gas to commercial and residential end-users. Gas 
distribution pipelines tend to be smaller in diameter and 
operate at lower pressures.\9\ PHMSA estimates there are 2.3 
million miles of gas distribution lines, much of which are 
intrastate pipelines.\10\ There are no hazardous liquid 
distribution pipelines.\11\
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    \9\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Distribution Pipelines, available at https:/
/primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/FSDistributionPipelines.htm (last 
updated Feb. 26, 2018).
    \10\ PHMSA Budget and Grants Presentation supra note 2.
    \11\ GAO, GAO-12-388, Pipeline Safety, Collecting Data And Sharing 
Information on Federally Unregulated Gathering Pipelines Could Help 
Enhance Safety 3 (2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-
12-388.pdf.
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     LTransmission pipelines: These pipelines transport 
energy products from treatment and processing facilities to 
bulk customers, storage facilities, and local distribution 
networks.\12\ The products transported can include natural gas 
and hazardous liquids \13\ Transmission pipelines can range in 
size from several inches to several feet in diameter and are 
designed to operate from relatively low pressures to high 
pressures.\14\ These lines can operate within a single State or 
span hundreds of miles, crossing one or more State lines.\15\ 
PHMSA estimates there are 301,484 miles of gas interstate 
transmission lines.\16\
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    \12\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Transmission Pipelines, available at 
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/
FSTransmissionPipelines.htm (last updated Jan. 2018).
    \13\ PHMSA, Pipeline Miles and Facilities 2010+, available at 
https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/
analytics/
saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2Fshared%2FPDM%20Public%20Website%2F_
portal%2FPublic%20Reports&Page=Infrastructure (last updated Jan. 28, 
2022) [hereinafter Pipeline Miles].
    \14\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Transmission Pipelines, available at 
https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/
FSTransmissionPipelines.htm (last updated Jan. 11, 2018).
    \15\ PHMSA, State Programs Overview, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/working-phmsa/state-programs/state-programs-overview 
(last updated Sep. 16, 2022) [hereinafter State Programs Overview].
    \16\ PHMSA Budget and Grants Presentation supra note 2.
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     LGathering lines: These lines transport natural 
gas from the production site to a central collection point. 
PHMSA currently regulates 488,064 miles of gas gathering 
lines.\17\ Historically, gathering lines were built in lower 
populated areas, had smaller diameters than transmission lines, 
and operated at pressures and flow lower than transmission 
lines.\18\ However, as new gas development occurs around the 
country, regulators are considering the impacts of producers 
building larger diameter and higher pressure gathering lines 
and a growing national population.\19\
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    \17\ PHMSA, Safety of Gas Gathering Pipelines (Jan. 8, 2019), 
available at https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/meetings/FilGet.mtg?fil=1029.
    \18\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Gathering Pipelines, available at https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/factsheets/fsgatheringpipelines.htm (Jan. 12, 
2018).
    \19\ See PHSMA, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Pipeline Safety: 
Safety of Gas Transmission and Gathering Pipelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,830 
(Apr 8, 2016.) available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
2016-05-13/pdf/2016-11240.pdf.
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     LHazardous liquid pipelines: These pipelines 
transport liquid petroleum and other types of liquid energy 
from sources of origin to refineries and chemical plants, and 
in some cases to storage or distribution facilities.\20\ 
According to PHMSA, hazardous liquids traverse the United 
States through approximately 260,000 miles of hazardous liquid 
pipelines.\21\ Hazardous liquids can include energy sources 
such as crude oil, refined petroleum products, highly volatile 
liquids, and anhydrous ammonia, and carbon dioxide in the 
supercritical (fluid or vapor) state.\22\ Hazardous liquids can 
be transported by transmission and gathering lines.\23\
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    \20\ Pipeline Safety Trust, Hazardous Liquid Pipelines--Basics and 
Issues, available at https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
2015-PST-Briefing-Paper-03-HazLiquidBasics.pdf (last updated Sept. 
2015) [hereinafter Hazardous Liquid Pipelines--Basics and Issues].
    \21\ PHMSA, PHMSA Presentation: Pipeline Safety Program Budget and 
Grants, (Jan. 25, 2023) (on file with Comm.); see also Pipeline Miles, 
supra note 13.
    \22\ Hazardous Liquid Pipelines--Basics and Issues, supra note 20.
    \23\ Id.
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     LLiquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities: These 
facilities are used for converting, transporting, or storing 
LNG. There are several Federal agencies involved in the 
regulation of LNG.\24\ Historically, PHMSA has regulated peak 
shaving facilities and satellite facilities where LNG has been 
used to manage capacity during times of peak demand. PHMSA also 
regulates import terminals.\25\ Market changes led to a rapid 
growth in export terminals; however, PHMSA regulations 
governing LNG facilities predate such expansion.\26\ In 2022, 
the United States became the world's top LNG exporter tied with 
Qatar.\27\ To address these changes, the PIPES Act of 2016 and 
the PIPES Act of 2020 mandated that PHMSA update its safety 
regulations for LNG facilities. PHMSA estimates it will 
complete this regulation by September 2023.\28\
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    \24\ PHMSA, Jurisdiction of LNG Plants, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/jurisdiction-lng-
plants (last updated Jan. 31, 2018); see also 49 C.F.R. Sec.  193.2001 
(2023).
    \25\ See PHMSA, LNG Facility Siting, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/lng-facility-siting.
    \26\ 49 C.F.R. Sec.  193.
    \27\ Stephen Stapczynski, U.S. Surges to Top of LNG Exporter Ranks 
on Breakneck Growth, Bloomberg, (Jan. 2, 2023), available at https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-03/us-surges-to-top-of-lng-
exporter-ranks-on-breakneck-growth.
    \28\ PHMSA, PIPES Act Web Chart, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/legislative-mandates/pipes-act-web-chart (last 
updated Jan. 24, 2023) [hereinafter Pipes Act Web Chart].
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PHMSA'S PIPELINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT

    PHMSA sets Federal minimum safety standards for pipeline 
safety functions, including developing, issuing, and enforcing 
regulations for the safe transportation of natural gas 
(including liquefied natural gas) and hazardous liquids by 
pipeline through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS).\29\ The 
Agency's regulatory programs are focused on the design, 
construction, operation, and maintenance or abandonment of 
pipeline facilities, and in the construction, operation, and 
maintenance of LNG facilities.\30\ The Agency has jurisdiction 
over transportation-related facilities; not drilling, siting, 
or production facilities.\31\
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    \29\ PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/offices/office-pipeline-safety (last 
updated Dec. 13, 2018).
    \30\ PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Regulations, available at https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/SafetyStandards.htm?nocache=8847.
    \31\ See PHMSA, PHMSA Regulations, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulations (last updated May 5, 2021); see also 
FERC, Natural Gas Pipelines, available at https://www.ferc.gov/
industries-data/natural-gas/overview/natural-gas-pipelines (last 
updated Feb. 10, 2021); see also Library of Cong., Oil and Gas 
Industry: A Research Guide, available at https://guides.loc.gov/oil-
and-gas-industry/laws/agencies.
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    PHMSA has long-experienced difficulty in recruiting and 
maintaining an inspection workforce capable of meeting PHMSA's 
oversight needs, as it often competes with industry for 
personnel.\32\ As with previous reauthorization laws, the PIPES 
Act of 2020 required PHMSA to ensure the number of pipeline 
inspection and enforcement personnel did not fall below certain 
levels (224 in FY 21, 235 in FY 22, and 247 in FY 23).\33\ It 
also directed PHMSA to hire eight fulltime employees to 
finalize outstanding and new congressional mandates, and to 
seek OPM authority to use recruitment and retention incentives, 
such as special pay rates, coupled with continued service 
agreements, that similarly situated agencies have found 
effective at hiring and retaining staff.\34\
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    \32\ DOT Inspector General, PHMSA Has Improved Its Workforce 
Management but Planning, Hiring, and Retention Challenges Remain 2 
(2017), available at https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/
PHMSA%20Workforce%20Final%20Report%20112117-ST2018010.pdf [hereinafter 
PHMSA Workforce Report].
    \33\ PIPES Act of 2020, supra note 5 Sec.  102.
    \34\ Id.; see also PHMSA Workforce Report, supra note 32.
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    When violations of PHMSA's regulations occur, the Agency 
has several enforcement mechanisms it can use. These include 
the issuance of a warning letter, a notice of probable 
violation, or a corrective action order.\35\ The Agency may 
also issue fines for non-compliance.\36\ In 2022, PHMSA closed 
227 enforcement cases.\37\
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    \35\ See 49 C.F.R. Sec.  190.205 (2023) (allowing for letter 
notifying an operator of alleged violations and directs them to correct 
the violation or be subject to additional enforcement action); 49 
C.F.R. Sec.  190.207 (2023) (providing for a Regional Director to serve 
a notice--commonly issued after routine inspections, incident 
investigations, and other activity--alleging specific regulatory 
violations and proposing remedial action or civil penalties); 49 C.F.R. 
Sec.  190.233 (2023) (providing for the Associate Administrator to 
issue an order finding a particular situation represents a serious 
hazard to life, property, or the environment and directing certain 
actions to be taken, up to and including shutdown of the pipeline 
system).
    \36\ See PHMSA, Civil Penalty Summary, available at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulatory-compliance/pipeline/enforcement/civil-
penalty-summary (last updated Jan. 25, 2023).
    \37\ See PHMSA, Listing of Cases Initiated, available at https://
primis.phmsa.dot.gov/
comm/reports/enforce/CasesOpen_opid_0.html?nocache=745#_TP_1_tab_2.
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STATES' PIPELINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT

    PHMSA supports states' oversight work by authorizing states 
to assume certain aspects of pipeline safety for intrastate gas 
pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines, and underground natural 
gas storage through certifications and agreements with PHMSA 
under 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  60105 and 60106(a). The Agency also 
authorizes states with certifications to participate in the 
oversight of interstate pipeline transportation through 
agreements under 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60106(b). States with 
certified pipeline safety programs may impose additional 
standards for intrastate pipelines and facilities so long as 
they are compatible with the minimum Federal standards issued 
by PHMSA.\38\
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    \38\ State Programs Overview, supra note 16.
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CYBERSECURITY

    Regarding cybersecurity, PHMSA signed an annex to its 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Transportation 
Security Administration (TSA) that identifies TSA as the lead 
entity for pipeline security, which has included cybersecurity 
threats.\39\ In May 2021, the Colonial Pipeline sustained a 
ransomware attack, causing the operator to shut down the 
pipeline for six days.\40\ PHMSA issued a Notice of Probable 
Violation (NOPV) and Proposed Compliance Order, and proposed 
civil penalties of $986,400. The NOPV alleges that failures to 
adequately plan and prepare for a manual restart and shutdown 
operation contributed to the national impacts when the pipeline 
remained out of service after the May 2021 cyberattack.\41\
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    \39\ PHSMA, Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding Between the 
Department of Homeland Security and DOT Concerning TSA and PHMSA 
Cooperation on Pipeline Transportation Security and Safety (Feb. 2020), 
available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/
regulatory-compliance/phmsa-guidance/73466/phmsa-tsa-mou-
annexexecuted.pdf.
    \40\ Vanessa Romo, Panic Drives Gas Shortages After Colonial 
Pipeline Ransomware Attack, NPR, (May 11, 2021), available at https://
www.npr.org/2021/05/11/996044288/panic-drives-gas-shortages-after-
colonial-pipeline-ransomware-attack.
    \41\ Letter from Gregory Alan Ochs, Dir., Central Region, Off. of 
Pipeline Safety, PHMSA to Joseph A. Blount, President and Chief 
Executive Officer, Colonial Pipeline Company (May 5, 2022) (notifying 
of probable violation, proposed civil penalty, and proposed compliance 
order), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/
files/2022-05/32022026_Colonial_Pipeline_
NOPV_PCP_PCO_05052022.pdf.
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                    III. PIPELINE SAFETY LEGISLATION

    In 2021 and 2022, PHMSA finalized seven mandates, including 
four from the PIPES Act of 2011: Safety of Gas Transmission 
Pipelines; Discretionary Integrity Management Improvements; 
Safety of Gas Gathering Pipelines; Amendments to Parts 192 and 
195 to require Valve Installation and Minimum Rupture Detection 
Standards.\42\ These final rules completed congressional 
responses to catastrophic pipeline failures, such as the fatal 
explosion of a gas transmission pipeline in San Bruno, 
California in 2010 and the release of one million barrels of 
crude oil near Marshall, Michigan in 2010.\43\ PHMSA also 
issued an interim final rule on Coastal Ecological Unusually 
Sensitive Areas, a mandate from the PIPES Act of 2016 and the 
PIPES Act of 2020.\44\ One mandate from the PIPES Act of 2016 
is outstanding: finalizing updates to regulations governing LNG 
facilities.\45\
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    \42\ Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines: Repair 
Criteria, Integrity Management Improvements, Cathodic Protection, 
Management of Change, and Other Related Amendments, 87 Fed. Reg. 52,224 
(Aug. 24, 2022), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2022/08/24/2022-17031/pipeline-safety-safety-of-gas-
transmission-pipelines-repair-criteria-integrity-management; Pipeline 
Safety: Safety of Gas Gathering Pipelines: Extension of Reporting 
Requirements, Regulation of Large, High-Pressure Lines, and Other 
Related Amendments: Response to a Petition for Reconsideration; 
Technical Corrections; Issuance of Limited Enforcement Discretion, 87 
Fed. Reg. 26,296, available at https://www.federalregister.gov/
documents/2022/05/04/2022-09474/pipeline-safety-safety-of-gas-
gathering-pipelines-extension-of-reporting-requirements-regulation-of; 
Pipeline Safety: Requirement of Valve Installation and Minimum Rupture 
Detection Standards, 87 Fed. Reg. 20,940 (Apr. 8, 2022), available at 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/04/08/2022-07133/
pipeline-safety-requirement-of-valve-installation-and-minimum-rupture-
detection-standards.
    \43\ Id.
    \44\ Pipes Act Web Chart, supra note 28.
    \45\ PIPES Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-183, Sec.  27, 130 Stat. 
514; PIPES Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-260, Sec.  110, 134 Stat. 620; 
See Off. of Info. and Regulatory Affairs, PHMSA, DOT, Pipeline Safety: 
Amendment to Liquefied Natural Gas facilities (2018), available at 
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201810&RIN=2137-AF45.
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    In 2020, Congress enacted the PIPES Act of 2020, which 
directed PHMSA to:
     LDetermine whether to issue a notice of proposed 
rulemaking on class location change requirements and to advance 
the rulemaking process if it makes a positive determination; 
\46\
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    \46\ PIPES Act of 2020, supra note 5, Sec.  115.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LFrequently report publicly on progress made 
toward completing outstanding mandates; \47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \47\ Id. Sec.  106.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LUpdate distribution pipeline safety regulations 
in response to the September 2018 distribution pipeline 
explosions in the Merrimack Valley region of Massachusetts; 
\48\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Id. at Title II.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LPrioritize completion of a final rulemaking on 
gas gathering lines and direct GAO to study capabilities of 
mapping gathering lines; \49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \49\ Id. Sec.  112.
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     LStrengthen whistleblower protections; \50\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ Id. Sec.  116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LUpdate its current regulations for large-scale 
LNG facilities and allowing it to establish an LNG Center of 
Excellence; \51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \51\ Id. Sec. Sec.  110, 111.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LIssue regulations prescribing the applicability 
of pipeline safety requirements to certain idled pipelines; 
\52\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Id. Sec.  109.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LCreate a technology pilot program, which allows 
pipeline operators to test and evaluate innovative technologies 
or practices on their systems that improve pipeline safety; 
\53\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \53\ Id. Sec.  104.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LEnter into agreement with the National Academies 
of Science to study potential methods or standards for 
installing automatic or remote-controlled shut-off valves on 
pipelines located in certain sensitive areas; \54\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \54\ Id. Sec.  119.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LIssue regulations directing distribution, 
transmission, and gathering pipeline operators to conduct leak 
detection and repair programs that protect the environment and 
pipeline safety, requiring use of advanced leak detection 
technologies; \55\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \55\ Id. Sec. Sec.  113, 114.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LRequire broader transmission of safety-related 
condition reports to include state authorities, Tribes, and 
emergency response and planning entities; \56\ and
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ Id. Sec.  121.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     LPrioritize a rulemaking to protect unusually 
sensitive areas and require operators of certain hazardous 
liquid pipelines to use internal inspection technology at least 
once every 12 months and establish procedures for assessing 
potential impacts by marine vessels.\57\
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    \57\ Id. Sec.  120.
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                  IV. FUTURE NEEDS IN PIPELINE SAFETY

PIPELINE SAFETY INCIDENTS

    PHMSA reports that in 2022, 631 pipeline incidents 
occurred, from which 10 individuals died, 24 were injured, and 
property damages totaled more than $685 million.\58\ Of these 
incidents, 17 were classified as serious and 267 were 
significant.\59\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \58\ PHMSA, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration 
Pipeline Safety Incidents 20 Year Trends, available at https://
portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&Portal
Path=%2Fshared%2FPDM%20Public%20Website%2F_portal%2FSC%20Incident
%20Trend&Page=All%20Reported [hereinafter PHMSA 20 Year Trends].
    \59\ Id. (explaining Serious incidents involve a fatality or injury 
requiring in-patient hospitalization and that significant incidents 
involve a fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization, 
$50,000 or more in total costs, highly volatile liquid releases of five 
barrels or more or other liquid release of 50 barrels or more, or 
liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion).
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CARBON DIOXIDE PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION

    There are approximately 5,000 miles of pipeline 
transporting CO2 primarily for enhanced oil 
recovery.\60\ Carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration 
(CCUS) is a process that captures CO2 emissions from 
sources, such as power plants, and either reuses or stores it 
so it will not enter the atmosphere.\61\ The Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58) establishes a Carbon 
Dioxide Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation 
(CIFIA) program for CO2 pipelines and authorizes 
$2.1 billion over five years for low-interest CIFIA loans and 
grants through the Department of Energy (DOE).\62\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \60\ Paul W. Parfomak, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IN11944, Carbon Dioxide 
Pipelines: Safety Issues, (2022), available at https://
crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11944.
    \61\ DOE, Carbon Capture, Utilization & Storage, available at 
https://www.energy.gov/carbon-capture-utilization-storage.
    \62\ Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58, 
Division D, 135 Stat. 429, 923.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CO2 can be transported in various states. 
Currently, nearly all CO2 is transported in a 
supercritical state (a dense fluid or vapor phase between a 
liquid and gas) and is regulated under 49 CFR Part 195.\63\ 
Future carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) pipeline projects 
may be transported in a subcritical state (a liquid) or a 
gas.\64\ PHMSA hazardous liquid regulations address 
CO2 that is transported as a fluid compressed to a 
supercritical state and is 90% pure CO2.\65\ The 
potential future use of CO2 with higher levels of 
impurities which may be transported as a liquid or gas are not 
regulated by PHMSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \63\ DOE, Meeting the Dual Challenge, a Roadmap to At-Scale 
Deployment of Carbon Capture, Use, and Storage 6-4 (2019), available at 
https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/
files/2021-06/2019%20-%20Meeting%20the%20Dual%20Challenge%20Vol%20III
%20Chapter%206.pdf.
    \64\ Richard B. Kuprewicz, Accufacts' Perspectives on the State of 
Federal Carbon Dioxide Transmission Pipeline Safety Regulations as It 
Relates to Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration Within the 
U.S., Prepared for Pipeline Safety Trust 4 (2022), available at https:/
/pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/3-23-22-Final-Accufacts-CO2-
Pipeline-Report2.pdf [hereinafter Accufacts Perspectives].
    \65\ 49 C.F.R. Sec.  195.2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CO2 is colorless and odorless and in 
concentrations is an asphyxiant, displacing the oxygen in air 
and causing negative health impacts.\66\ On February 22, 2020, 
in Satartia, Mississippi, Denbury's 24-inch Delhi Pipeline 
ruptured, releasing liquid CO2 that immediately 
began to vaporize.\67\ 200 people surrounding the rupture 
location were evacuated, and 45 people were taken to the 
hospital.\68\ PHMSA's investigation identified contributing 
factors to the accident, including lack of assessment of 
geohazards in plans and procedures, underestimating the 
potential affected areas that could be impacted by a release in 
its CO2 dispersion model, and not notifying local 
responders to advise them of a potential failure.\69\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \66\ Accufacts Perspectives, supra note 64.
    \67\ PHSMA Failure Investigation Report, Denbury Gulf Coast 
Pipelines, LLC, available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/
phmsa.dot.gov/files/2022-05/Failure%20Investigation
%20Report%20-%20Denbury%20Gulf%20Coast%20Pipeline.pdf.
    \68\ Id.
    \69\ Id.
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HYDROGEN PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION

    As of December 2020, there were 1,608 miles of hydrogen 
pipeline in the United States, primarily on the Gulf Coast.\70\ 
Today, almost all hydrogen is consumed by the oil industry or 
chemical industry; however, hydrogen pipeline expansion may 
occur to coincide with emerging hydrogen hubs that offer 
hydrogen to end users for purposes such as mobility, goods 
movement, heat for manufacturing processes, and other 
services.\71\ Some United States pipeline operators have 
initiated projects to blend hydrogen and methane in natural gas 
pipelines.\72\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \70\ Paul W. Parfomak, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46700, Pipeline 
Transportation of Hydrogen: Regulation, Research, and Policy (2021), 
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46700.
    \71\ Martin C. Offutt, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47289, Hydrogen Hubs and 
Demonstrating the Hydrogen Energy Value Chain, (2022), available at 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47289.
    \72\ Id.
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                              V. WITNESSES

     LTristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
     LAndrew Black, President and CEO, Liquid Energy 
Pipeline Association (LEPA)
     LKenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer--Gas 
Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc.
     LBill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety 
Trust

 
PIPELINE SAFETY: REVIEWING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PIPES ACT OF 2020 AND 
                     EXAMINING FUTURE SAFETY NEEDS

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 2023

                  House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous 
                                         Materials,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m. in 
room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Troy E. Nehls 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Nehls. The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and 
Hazardous Materials will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the 
subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at 
today's hearing and ask questions.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement for 5 
minutes.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TROY E. NEHLS OF TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, 
 SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

    Mr. Nehls. Today's hearing will examine implementation of 
the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing 
Safety Act of 2020, or PIPES 2020 Act, as well as future needs 
and pipeline safety.
    The United States has the largest pipeline network in the 
world, consisting of about 3.4 million miles of pipeline. The 
oil and natural gas industry generates about 11.3 million 
American jobs and accounts for nearly 8 percent of the United 
States gross domestic product, which is an economic impact of 
about $1.7 trillion--with a T--per year. The United States is 
now a leading exporter of energy to the rest of the world, and 
investments made by the energy sector will continue to provide 
high-paying jobs for a diversifying workforce and promote 
domestic energy security.
    Pipelines are critical infrastructure for supporting our 
energy sector and represent the safest, most efficient, most 
environmentally friendly mode of transporting energy. Pipelines 
are an essential part of the energy supply chain and ensure 
communities across the country and our allies abroad have 
access to affordable and reliable American energy. The recent 
supply chain crisis and rising inflation, coupled with the war 
in Ukraine, demonstrate the importance of having reliable, easy 
access to energy and the negative consequences of restricting 
or cutting off our energy supply.
    The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, 
or PHMSA, is the Federal agency responsible for overseeing the 
safe and reliable operation of the United States pipeline 
network. Promoting pipeline safety has been a priority for 
Congress, which enacted several bipartisan laws in recent years 
to reauthorize crucial pipeline safety programs at PHMSA and 
direct the agency to initiate actions that advance pipeline 
safety.
    The 2020 pipeline safety reauthorization made advances in 
safety through some commonsense policy and a balanced, not 
overly burdensome, regulatory approach. And it is essential 
that Congress ensure PHMSA is prioritizing and implementing 
prior congressional mandates and does not impermissibly favor 
administration priorities over these mandates. PHMSA must 
prioritize hiring competent pipeline safety inspectors, not 
more lawyers, and must keep its focus on protecting people and 
the environment by advancing the safety and reliability of 
pipelines.
    Today, we will hear from PHMSA on progress made towards 
implementing the PIPES 2020 Act and how it is working to meet 
the requirements set by Congress. Pipeline safety is a 
collaborative effort between PHMSA, State governments, 
industry, and the public. We must continue to promote 
cooperation between stakeholders and regulators to find a 
balanced approach that fosters innovation in technology and 
implementation of best safety practices.
    I am looking forward to hearing from industry and public 
safety representatives today about some of these practices and 
new technologies that can help us improve safety. This includes 
how we can support the development of infrastructure to 
transport new and emerging fuels such as carbon dioxide and 
hydrogen and how innovative technology and operations are being 
used to improve inspections, leak detection, leak prevention, 
and the overall safety of pipeline networks.
    As Congress looks to the next pipeline safety 
reauthorization, we must embrace ways in which the industry and 
regulators can work together to achieve our goal of zero 
pipeline incidents. I hope to renew the tradition of passing a 
bipartisan pipeline safety bill from this committee, and I look 
forward to working with the ranking member, my colleagues on 
both sides of the aisle, and the Senate to accomplish this 
important goal.
    [Mr. Nehls' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Hon. Troy E. Nehls, a Representative in Congress 
   from the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads, 
                   Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
    The United States has the largest pipeline network in the world, 
consisting of about 3.4 million miles of pipeline. The oil and natural 
gas industry generates about 11.3 million American jobs and accounts 
for nearly 8 percent of the United States' gross domestic product, 
which is an economic impact of about $1.7 trillion per year. The United 
States is now a leading exporter of energy to the rest of the world. 
Investments by the energy sector will continue to provide high paying 
jobs for a diversifying workforce and promote domestic energy security.
    Pipelines are critical infrastructure for supporting our energy 
sector and represent the safest, most efficient, most environmentally 
friendly mode of transporting energy. Pipelines are an essential part 
of the energy supply chain and ensure communities across the country, 
and our allies abroad, have access to affordable and reliable American 
energy. The recent supply chain crisis and rising inflation, coupled 
with the war in Ukraine, demonstrate the importance of having reliable, 
easy access to energy and the negative consequences of restricting or 
cutting off our energy supply.
    The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
is the Federal agency responsible for overseeing the safe and reliable 
operation of the United States pipeline network. Promoting pipeline 
safety has been a priority for Congress, which enacted several 
bipartisan laws in recent years to reauthorize crucial pipeline safety 
programs at PHMSA and direct the agency to initiate actions that 
advance pipeline safety.
    The 2020 pipeline safety reauthorization made advances in safety 
through some commonsense policy and a balanced, not overly burdensome, 
regulatory approach. It is essential that Congress ensure PHMSA is 
prioritizing and implementing prior congressional mandates and does not 
impermissibly favor Administration priorities over these mandates. 
PHMSA must prioritize hiring competent pipeline safety inspectors, not 
more lawyers, and must keep its focus on protecting people and the 
environment by advancing the safety and reliability of pipelines.
    Today, we will hear from PHMSA on progress made towards 
implementing the PIPES 2020 Act and how it is working to meet the 
requirements set by Congress. Pipeline safety is a collaborative effort 
between PHMSA, state governments, industry, and the public. We must 
continue to promote cooperation between stakeholders and regulators to 
find a balanced approach that fosters innovation in technology and 
implementation of best safety practices.
    I am looking forward to hearing from industry and public safety 
representatives today about some of these practices and new 
technologies that can help us improve safety. This includes how we can 
support the development of infrastructure to transport new and emerging 
fuels such as carbon dioxide and hydrogen, and how innovative 
technology and operations are being used to improve inspections, leak 
detection, leak prevention, and the overall safety of pipeline 
networks.
    As Congress looks to the next pipeline safety reauthorization, we 
must embrace ways in which industry and regulators can work together to 
achieve our goal of zero pipeline incidents. I hope to renew the 
tradition of passing a bipartisan pipeline safety bill from this 
Committee, and I look forward to working with the Ranking Member, my 
colleagues on both sides of the aisle, and the Senate to accomplish 
this important goal.

    Mr. Nehls. I have a few documents to enter into the record. 
I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the following 
items: a March 8, 2023, letter from the American Public Gas 
Association; a March 8, 2023, statement from the American 
Petroleum Institute; and a March 8, 2023, press release from 
the Distribution Contractors Association and the United 
Association of Union Plumbers and Pipefitters.
    And without objection, so ordered.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
  Letter of March 8, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and Hon. 
   Donald M. Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, 
    Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, from Stuart Saulters, Vice 
  President of Government Relations, American Public Gas Association, 
             Submitted for the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
                                                     March 8, 2023.
The Honorable Troy Nehls,
Chairman,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, 
        Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2164 Rayburn 
        House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr.,
Ranking Member,
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, 
        Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2165 Rayburn 
        House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.

Re:  Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials 
(Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure) Hearing: Pipeline 
Safety: Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining 
Future Safety Needs.

    The American Public Gas Association (``APGA'') is the trade 
association representing more than 730 communities across the U.S. that 
own and operate their retail natural gas distribution entities. These 
include not-for-profit gas distribution systems owned by municipalities 
and other local government entities, all accountable to the citizens 
they serve. As such, APGA's members are critical stakeholders impacted 
by reauthorization of pipeline safety programs at the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (``PHMSA'') within the United 
States Department of Transportation (``DOT''). With reauthorization 
needed in the 118th Congress, we appreciate your holding a hearing on 
the implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and examining future safety 
needs.
    Public gas utilities focus on safe operations, and effective 
pipeline safety programs implemented by our federal regulator supports 
our member's ability to deliver energy to Americans. Following are 
APGA's legislative priorities for consideration during reauthorization 
discussions.
   1. Consider extending the Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure 
              Safety and Modernization (``NGDISM'') Grants
    The grant program is set to expire after five years, Fiscal Year 
(``FY'') 2026. However, grant award winners can still access awarded 
money for ten years. This allows reimbursements even after PHMSA stops 
awarding new funding.
    APGA's members have demonstrated tremendous demand for the program. 
More money was requested in the first funding cycle, about $1.25 
billion, than is available for the program in its entirety, $1 billion 
over 5 years.
    PHMSA needed more time than originally anticipated to stand up the 
program, and as of March 3rd, PHMSA still has not announced the 
utilities provisionally selected for FY 2022. As well, the grant 
agreements won't be fully executed until the National Environmental 
Policy Act (``NEPA'') Tier 2 Environmental Review process is completed 
later in 2023.
    PHMSA and Congress seemed to want to target smaller systems with 
fewer resources through the NGDISM grant program. But many of them were 
not able to participate in the first funding cycle because they lack 
the staff and time to devote to grant writing. As well, APGA 
understands these smaller utilities are interested in learning from 
successful first round grant recipients to use their resources more 
efficiently in future funding cycles. The second funding cycle may open 
before awards are made for the first, which may discourage the smallest 
systems from applying until year three. Of note, only 179 of the 999 
systems eligible applied in 2022.
   2. Consider Language Strengthening the Advisory Committee Process
    In recent years, PHMSA has occasionally disregarded the 
recommendations it receives from its Advisory Committees. While it is 
rare, the impacts are significant. As legislation to reauthorize 
pipeline safety programs is drafted, APGA would be very interested in 
engaging with the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on 
establishing a more formal requirement for how often the Advisory 
Committees should be meeting and how PHMSA should treat recommendations 
from these groups.
         3. Maintain PHMSA's Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirement
    PHMSA must meet a unique cost-benefit analysis requirement before 
promulgating a new rule. The pipeline safety regulator must ensure its 
justification for any rulemaking is appropriate prior to sending it to 
the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') for review. APGA believes 
this step results in effective, transparent, and comprehensive 
regulations and should be maintained.
         4. Adequate Funding for PHMSA and their State Partners
    APGA believes that a strong pipeline safety regulator ultimately 
leads to effective regulations and enhanced pipeline safety. APGA 
supports PHMSA's full funding and encourages allocation of resources to 
their state pipeline safety partners. These state partners are 
responsible for ensuring natural gas distribution operators comply with 
federal and state, if applicable, pipeline safety regulations.

    APGA hopes the above input will be helpful to the Committee. Please 
do not hesitate to contact me with any additional questions.
        Respectfully submitted,
                                           Stuart Saulters,
       Vice President of Government Relations, American Public Gas 
                                                       Association.

                                 
Statement of the American Petroleum Institute, Submitted for the Record 
                         by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
    On behalf of the American Petroleum Institute (API) \1\, we 
appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony as part of this 
important hearing addressing pipeline safety, and the reauthorization 
of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) 
and the pipeline safety program in 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ API represents all segments of America's oil and natural gas 
industry, which supports more than 11 million U.S. jobs and is backed 
by a growing grassroots movement of millions of Americans. Our nearly 
600 members produce, process, and distribute the majority of the 
nation's energy, and participate in the API Energy Excellence program, 
which is accelerating environmental and safety progress by fostering 
new technologies and transparent reporting. API was formed in 1919 as a 
standards-setting organization and has developed more than 700 
standards to enhance operational and environmental safety, efficiency, 
and sustainability. Through the API Climate Action Framework and 
related initiatives such as The Environmental Partnership, significant 
efforts are being conducted by the oil and natural gas industry to 
balance the increasing demand for affordable and reliable energy 
products with environmental performance and stewardship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The need for sound energy policy has never been more critical. A 
modern U.S. infrastructure system, including robust pipeline 
infrastructure, is crucial to providing a reliable energy supply to 
every community in America. Every day, a vast network of pipeline 
infrastructure serves Americans across the country, with more than 
530,000 miles of transmission pipelines--the majority underground--
safely delivering crude oil, petroleum products, natural gas, natural 
gas liquids, low carbon energy products and ethanol to consumers. With 
abundant energy resources, America continues to chart a reliable path 
that directly addresses today's domestic and global energy challenges 
by strengthening our country's energy security while helping allies 
around the world.
    These US energy resources have spurred community growth and 
security, and we have developed them while protecting the environment. 
The pipeline industry is developing new technologies and innovations 
every day to safely deliver affordable, reliable energy to consumers 
while reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As our industry 
continues to advance a lower carbon future, it is imperative that the 
regulatory environment and PHMSA are responsive to both current and 
potential future safety challenges faced by operators.
    As Congress considers the reauthorization of PHMSA and safety 
programs over the coming year, we urge policymakers to enact policies 
that capitalize on the power of American oil, natural gas, and 
liquified natural gas (LNG) operators by maximizing our investment in 
state-of-the-art technology and sustainable operations while 
recognizing the important role our communities play in advancing 
safety.
                            Energy Security
    American energy leadership is vital, perhaps more than ever, for 
American prosperity and security in uncertain times, and for the world. 
A global energy crisis--driven by surging post-pandemic demand 
outstripping supply and exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine--
has shown that the world needs more natural gas and oil, not less. 
America can and should lead the world out of this crisis. The U.S. is 
the world's leading producer of natural gas and oil and, with the right 
regulations and policies, must champion a reliable path forward that 
directly addresses today's energy challenges.
    Europe's energy struggles show what can happen when countries lean 
too much, too soon on still-developing energy sources and energy from 
unstable regions while turning away from reliable natural gas and oil 
resources. Natural gas and oil are projected to provide nearly 50% of 
the world's energy in 2050 \2\. Abundant American natural gas and oil 
should be prioritized as a long-term strategic asset and a foundation 
for economic growth and strengthened energy security, today and 
tomorrow. Our energy resources also will provide opportunity, for 
decades to come, for other energy sources to mature and take on more 
significant roles.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/consumption/sub-topic-01.php
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Although oil and natural gas companies increased production this 
year to meet rising energy demand \3\, more is required as populations 
and energy needs grow. America lacks sufficient infrastructure for the 
future--including new natural gas and oil pipelines as well as 
investment in maintaining existing infrastructure--to move energy from 
production areas to refineries and processing facilities and then to 
places where it is needed by American families and businesses. Our 
energy infrastructure is a critical component of the oil and natural 
gas supply chain, consisting of terminals, underground and above ground 
storage facilities, pipelines, railcars, trucks, ships, and marine 
vessels. Ensuring we have a robust energy infrastructure system that 
keeps pace with growing production and demand is essential to helping 
provide American families and businesses with reliable access to 
affordable energy. Additionally, export infrastructure is needed so 
that America can aid allies abroad and project leadership in global 
markets, while also supporting domestic production and economic 
benefits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ https://www.api.org/-/media/Files/misc/Rystad-Energy-APIs-10-
in-2022-Policy-Plan-Quantification-of-Policy-Impacts
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We need not return to growing dependence on foreign suppliers. 
Quite the opposite: American energy must lead in this space, through 
more domestic production and modernized infrastructure. If America 
doesn't lead, others will. We have the resources, yet sound energy 
infrastructure policymaking is critical to ensure America and other 
nations alike can have access to reliable US energy sources.
                     Commitment to Pipeline Safety
    Industry's commitment to safe operations is evident by the strong 
safety record of the pipeline system that delivers oil, natural gas, 
and petroleum products. Protecting the public and the environment is 
the top priority for pipeline operators and a central component to 
pipeline design, construction, and maintenance. Ultimately, the 
development of a comprehensive pipeline safety system is the product of 
a shared commitment from key entities in the stakeholder community. The 
first element involves the federal and state governments, which provide 
the safety regulations for the industry. Next is the contribution of 
the industry trade associations that, with the help of other 
stakeholders including the public, help to develop industry standards, 
guidance, recommendations, and leading practices. The third key entity 
is individual companies who make the commitment to develop and 
implement effective safety programs. While each of these functions are 
critically important to advancing safety in the pipeline industry, the 
true effectiveness of the pipeline safety program exists because these 
functions complement one another through the coordination and 
collaboration of all three of these entities.
    API, our allied oil and natural gas trades, and our members are 
fully committed to maintaining the highest standards and establishing a 
strong foundation with the public by continually endeavoring for 
improvement through enhanced safety operations. And while greater than 
99 percent of oil, natural gas and their products reach their 
destination without incident, pipeline companies are striving to 
continuously improve performance and address the remaining fraction of 
a percent to reach our shared industry-wide goal of zero incidents. The 
industry's ability to continually advance the safety of oil and natural 
gas pipeline operations is based on three critical elements: (1) 
people, (2) technology, and (3) safety culture. Each of these is 
intertwined with the others to create a comprehensive and cohesive 
safety program. Education and training are constantly provided to 
industry employees to ensure they can operate using the latest and most 
advanced technologies. Similarly, employees are committed to developing 
a culture of safety that is continually assessed and improved. This 
three-pronged approach is designed first and foremost to prevent an 
incident from ever happening, but also ensures that the industry is 
prepared for any incident and can effectively respond in the rare 
instance that an incident occurs.
                      Effective Regulatory Process
    API and its members appreciate the emphasis PHMSA has placed on 
addressing congressional mandates from prior pipeline safety 
reauthorizations. However, we ask PHMSA to continue to advance 
important industry rulemakings mandated by Congress in the PIPES Act of 
2020, specifically leak detection and repair, LNG facility safety, 
class location changes, and pipeline operating status for ``idle'' 
pipe. In doing so we ask PHMSA to maintain sight of the importance of a 
holistic, performance-based regulatory approach that maximizes the 
industry's ability to use the latest advances in new technologies and 
leading engineering practices to manage pipeline safety risk. 
Furthermore, as part of that process, we support the collaborative 
approach to reviewing regulations carried out by PHMSA's Technical 
Advisory Committees (Advisory Committee). The Advisory Committee 
process is a transparent and balanced forum that has demonstrated the 
ability to build consensus around complex regulatory issues. To that 
end, we have concern with the limited number of Advisory Committee 
meetings held over the last several years and the number of Advisory 
Committee recommendations that have not been incorporated into final 
regulations despite consensus within the groups. As such, we encourage 
Congress to consider the inclusion of some accountability measures 
within reauthorization, including a set number of meetings required 
each year and reporting by the Secretary on those Advisory Committee 
recommendations that are not being considered by PHMSA in rulemaking.
    Additionally, performing a reasoned cost-benefit analysis before 
making significant regulatory changes must continue to be a part of the 
regulatory process. PHMSA's cost-benefit analyses provide valuable 
input to the public comment and advisory committee review processes. 
Since there are usually multiple practical alternatives to achieve any 
particular pipeline safety objective, the cost-benefit analysis helps 
PHMSA, and industry and public stakeholders, compare and contrast the 
alternatives and identify the best option.
    A statutory requirement to consider costs and benefits in health, 
safety, and environmental regulations is not unique to PHMSA. Congress 
has similarly required the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA), the Mine Safety and Health Administration 
(MSHA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to analyze costs 
and benefits during rulemaking. An excellent example of the important 
role cost-benefit plays in the regulatory process is PHMSA's 
consideration of class location changes for natural gas transmission 
pipelines through rulemaking. With today's processes and technologies, 
pipeline safety can be managed effectively and at an equivalent level 
of safety through data-driven inspection and maintenance, instead of 
costly, unnecessary, and arbitrary pipe replacements required by the 
current class location change regulations.
                  Well Trained and Efficient Regulator
    As PHMSA and the energy industry together continue to drive toward 
our shared goal of zero pipeline incidents, a modernized regulator with 
the necessary tools, well-trained staff, streamlined programs and data 
transparency can bring needed certainty and consistency into the 
regulatory and oversight process. The oil and natural gas industry 
believes that PHMSA pipeline inspectors must be well trained and 
qualified to effectively fulfill the obligations placed upon them and 
the agency. However, pipeline inspectors frequently come into PHMSA 
with limited pipeline safety experience, and those that already have or 
gain experience often depart the agency to pursue more lucrative 
opportunities. As such, similar to other agency hiring authority for 
specialty positions, the ability to compensate pipeline inspectors at 
market rates through PHMSA's use of Schedule A employees with 
streamlined hiring and flexible pay levels would enhance PHMSA's 
ability to attract and retain expert pipeline inspectors.
    Lastly, multiple repetitive and redundant inspections of operator 
procedures and programs are conducted by PHMSA regional offices, state 
pipeline regulatory agencies, and local authorities (e.g., state 
utility boards, public utility commissions) that evaluate a consistent 
set of company procedures regardless of jurisdiction. As an industry, 
we have concerns with how this multitude of agencies collaborates and 
communicates and the impact it can have on pipeline operators who are 
focusing resources on improving safety programs. As such, Congress 
should consider an independent review and evaluation of PHMSA and State 
inspection programs' interaction to identify opportunities for improved 
collaboration and to reduce redundant inspection activities.
                The Importance of API Pipeline Standards
    Safety is a core value of the oil and natural gas industry. 
Pipeline operating companies are committed to enhancing the safety of 
our workers and protecting the communities and environments where we 
are present. At API, we establish and disseminate standards and best 
practices across the industry to ensure the highest level of safety and 
achieve our collective goal of operating with zero incidents. Since 
1924, API has been the leader in developing voluntary, consensus-based, 
and internationally recognized industry standards that promote safety 
and reliability. Our standards program is accredited by the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI), the same organization that 
accredits similar programs at several national laboratories. In 
creating these industry consensus standards and recommended practices 
(RPs), API partners with technical experts from government, academia, 
and industry. This work supports the fulfillment of the National 
Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA), which mandates that 
federal agencies use technical standards developed and adopted by 
voluntary consensus standards bodies, as opposed to using government-
unique standards. Currently, API has more than 800 standards that are 
used globally by oil and natural gas operators, as well as referenced 
by the international regulatory community. They are key to the global 
energy sector, streamlining regulation across borders, improving 
safety, and minimizing economic inefficiencies. Here in the US, these 
standards are referenced more than 650 times in federal regulations, 
covering multiple government agencies, including PHMSA. Additionally, 
API's standards are the most widely cited petroleum industry standards 
by state regulators, with 240 API standards cited over 4,130 times in 
state-based regulations. Finally, API's standards are also the most 
widely cited standards by international regulators in the 14 major 
producing regions.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ OGP Report No. 426, Regulators' Use of Standards, March 2010
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Despite the current lack of certainty in the regulatory process, 
the industry continues to proactively advance safety through the 
development of standards and best practices. API continues to develop 
and revise critical standards and recommended practices for prevention, 
mitigation, and response activities to address pipeline safety. 
Specifically, API has developed a number of standards in close 
coordination with subject matter experts from government, academia and 
industry. API RP 1173, Pipeline Safety Management Systems (Pipeline 
SMS), provides the framework for managing complex operations with 
safety as the top priority. It provides established guidelines for 
pipeline operating companies and contractors to manage risk, promote 
best practices, and build a strong safety culture throughout an 
organization. Safety culture must be organically strengthened from 
within an organization, which is why a voluntary regime is so important 
for the industry's implementation of SMS.
    Recognizing the role of stakeholder input and public engagement as 
critical elements in addressing pipeline safety challenges, industry 
has partnered with government representatives and public advocates to 
develop API RP 1185, Pipeline Public Engagement. The document follows 
the same ``Plan-Do-Check-Act'' cycle of continuous improvement as in 
API RP 1173 to regularly assess and improve public engagement in the 
communities where pipelines operate, including environmental justice 
populations. As U.S. production continues to grow and pipeline capacity 
increases to keep pace, operators are motivated to develop a management 
system that ensures new pipelines are built to the appropriate 
specifications, keeping safety as the top priority. API RP 1177, Steel 
Pipeline Construction Quality Management Systems, outlines the steps 
needed for constructing safe steel pipelines, from purchasing the 
correct material to completing the safety and integrity inspections 
prior to initiating operation. Additionally, API continues to develop 
new standards and revise and update current standards that are focused 
on maintaining the integrity of pipeline infrastructure and ensuring 
continued safe operation of pipeline systems. Examples include RP 1176 
(Assessment and Management of Cracking in Pipelines), RP 1181 (Pipeline 
Operating Status), RP 1183 (Assessment and Management of Dents in 
Pipelines), and an RP under development for geohazard integrity 
management (RP 1187).
    While pipeline operators are taking significant steps to meet the 
goal of zero incidents, they must have a comprehensive mitigation 
strategy to reduce the impact should a release occur. Developed with 
industry, regulator, and broader stakeholder input, API RP 1175, 
Pipeline Leak Detection--Program Management, outlines how to use 
multiple leak detection tools--such as aerial overflights, ground 
patrols, and computational pipeline monitoring--to create a robust and 
holistic program to identify a leak as soon as it occurs. In addition, 
the RP encourages senior leaders within pipeline operating companies to 
instill a leak detection culture that promotes safety and ensures 
employees are properly trained to aid in mitigating incidents. Pipeline 
companies have robust operator qualification (OQ) programs that ensure 
their personnel and contractor personnel are competent to perform 
pipeline operations and maintenance duties, and continuous training and 
testing to verify the skills of qualified employees is an ongoing and 
critical effort of operators. API has also developed RP 1161, Pipeline 
Operator Qualification, to give operators direction on ensuring those 
individuals performing important tasks that relate to pipeline 
operations and safety are appropriately trained and competent.
    Should an incident occur, pipeline operators are ready to respond. 
Through coordinated emergency response programs with federal, state and 
local first responders and agencies, operators ensure timely, seamless, 
and effective responses. API RP 1174, Onshore Hazardous Liquid Pipeline 
Emergency Preparedness and Response, which was developed with input 
from operators, regulators, and first responders, seeks to improve 
emergency response capabilities by providing a management system and 
framework for operators to ensure they are prepared to respond to any 
event and coordinate response actions with both our government and 
first responder partners in an efficient manner. RPs 1161 and 1174 are 
just a few of the available documents developed in collaboration with 
federal and state regulators, academics and other interested 
stakeholders, which through effective implementation and training will 
help improve safety across the industry.
               Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Priorities
    As stated earlier, to improve upon our strong safety record and 
reach our goal of zero pipeline incidents, it is imperative that the 
regulatory environment and PHMSA be positioned to meet current and 
future safety challenges. As such, there are three priority areas where 
PHMSA reauthorization can support the shared objective of industry and 
the regulating agency in advancing pipeline safety.
1. Recognizing Role of Technology, Innovation, and Leading Practices in 
        Reaching Zero
    As an industry dependent on technology and leading engineering 
practices, pipeline operators want flexibility to implement and utilize 
the latest tools, methodologies and industry standards to appropriately 
manage safety risks on their facilities. However, companies are, in 
many instances, unable to utilize the latest technology and leading 
engineering practices because of the requirements associated with 
outdated regulations coupled with the burdensome approval process in 
the use of alternative safety technology. To facilitate the 
demonstration of an operator's effective use of state-of-the-art 
technology and risk-based approaches, the PIPES Act of 2020 included a 
provision that established a technology pilot program. Although a step 
in the right direction, the onerous nature of the program application 
requirements imposed by PHMSA proved to be an impediment to operators 
pursuing opportunities for testing new technology, and counter to the 
intent of the Congressional mandate. However, we believe the program 
still has merit and should be reauthorized in 2023 but more importantly 
modified to include more streamlined parameters that encourage, rather 
than discourage, an operator to participate.
    For decades, a strong culture of sharing and learning has been at 
the center of our industry's efforts to advance pipeline safety. This 
includes individual company and peer to peer shares as well as annual 
industry wide events to openly share information and lessons learned 
across a broad range of topic areas, including pipeline system 
incidents, near misses, industry best practices, and improvements made 
to pipeline safety programs through practical experiences. This 
commitment and willingness to proactively share information on the part 
of our operators has been an effective tool to drive continuous 
improvement across the industry. That said, over time, the industry has 
evolved to recognize that there are even greater opportunities to learn 
from one another. As such, we continue to support the establishment of 
a more formal voluntary information sharing framework with the right 
protections, similar in nature and function to the successful Federal 
Aviation Administration and airline industry's voluntary information 
sharing framework. This multi-stakeholder center of excellence for the 
energy pipeline sector based on the proposed framework from the PHMSA 
Voluntary Information Sharing (VIS) effort from the PIPES Act of 2016, 
is a starting point. Congress should consider including language that 
encourages the use of academic institutions to house or play a role in 
the new Center location, in particular, institutions that have strong 
energy programs.
    The PHMSA National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) represents the 
system of record upon which pipeline operators determine whether a 
pipeline segment directly intersects or ``could affect'' a High 
Consequence Area (HCA) and, as a result, which segments of a pipeline 
system require an Integrity Management Program (IMP). Recent experience 
of pipeline operators in updating HCA analysis for their systems has 
shown errors in the NPMS data layers for certain HCA categories, and 
questions have been raised about the sources of scientific studies and 
frequency of updating the information used to develop the data layers. 
Transparency and improvements in the process followed by PHMSA need to 
be provided, and industry review and participation in the process 
should be considered.
    Lastly, there are more than 650 API standards referenced in Federal 
regulation. As these standards are improved through the American 
National Standards Institute (ANSI)-accredited process at a minimum of 
every 5 years, Federal regulations where standards were deemed 
appropriate for incorporation by reference, often are unable to be 
updated in a timely manner. As such, they do not keep pace with 
advances in pipeline safety technology and modern engineering practices 
incorporated into leading industry standards. Currently, approximately 
50 percent of the instances where PHMSA cites API standards are not 
referencing the most recent version of those standards. For those API 
standards incorporated by reference that are updated, PHMSA should 
execute a more frequent review that can use the existing rulemaking 
process to incorporate the latest edition. We ask that Congress 
consider a requirement for PHMSA to ensure regulations are updated to 
reflect the latest edition of incorporated by reference standards 
within two years of completion.
2. Proactively Advancing a Safe and Sustainable Energy Future
    Pipeline operators continue to address the challenge of climate 
change while providing affordable, safe and reliable energy. The oil 
and natural gas industry is also committed to building tools and 
implementing practices to enhance sustainability throughout its 
operations, and advancing a lower carbon future while reliably 
delivering energy products to meet increasing demand in the US, and 
low-carbon solutions are critical to achieving this goal. As the 
industry continues to invest in energy innovations like hydrogen 
(H2) and renewable natural gas (RNG) that will fuel the low-
carbon future, a robust carbon dioxide (CO2) infrastructure 
system, including pipelines, is vital to meeting environmental 
commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
    As we embrace a low carbon energy future, it is imperative that 
pipeline safety regulations reflect current safety risks, consider 
existing industry standards pertaining to CO2 and hydrogen 
pipeline construction and operation, and incorporate the latest 
findings from PHMSA-sponsored and industry funded research and 
development for new pipeline systems and repurposing of existing energy 
pipeline infrastructure. Regulatory updates should consider an 
assessment of the adequacy of Parts of 49 CFR that specifically address 
CO2 pipeline safety for all phases of CO2 in 
pipeline transportation (i.e., supercritical, liquid, gas). As industry 
continues to develop new standards and Recommended Practices for 
CO2 pipeline safety, it will also be important for PHMSA to 
consider and ensure timely incorporation by reference into regulations. 
As a standard setting organization, API strongly supports the 
development of updates to CO2 pipeline safety regulations to 
address transporting CO2 in a gas phase based on existing 
standards developed through API, the American Society of Mechanical 
Engineers (ASME), the Association for Materials Protection and 
Performance (AMPP), and the International Standards Organization (ISO). 
The update to these regulations will require close coordination with 
Department of Energy (DOE), PHMSA, and Pipeline Research Council 
International (PRCI) to ensure incorporation of research and technology 
development programs that address design, construction, operations, and 
inspection and maintenance, and to defer development of new regulations 
until the research is completed and results from that work are 
available.
    Also, in carrying out its responsibility to provide safe, reliable, 
and affordable energy, our industry is committed to sustainable 
operations and risk-based inspection programs that focus on reducing 
harmful emissions. Specifically, as it relates to the inspection of 
above ground storage tanks, operators look to the latest technologies 
and leading engineering practices based on industry standards to 
identify risks without taking tanks out of service. As a result, by 
decreasing the frequency of visual inspections, operators are able to 
reduce unnecessary releases of VOCs associated with preparing tanks for 
inspection. However, as previously discussed, approximately 50 percent 
of the API standards that are cited by PHMSA in federal pipeline safety 
regulations are not referencing the most recent edition of those 
standards which includes API Standard 653, Standards for Tank 
Inspection, Repair, Alteration and Reconstruction and as such do not 
reflect current leading industry approaches for tank inspections. This 
includes risk-based approaches similar to what has been accepted by 
other federal and state agencies, including the EPA's Spill Prevention, 
Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) program. Thus, operators are required 
to take their aboveground storage tanks out of service at predetermined 
intervals with no added benefit to safety, which unnecessarily 
increases VOC emissions. PHMSA should acknowledge the value of 
technology and leading engineering practices, and we are asking 
Congress to require PHMSA through rulemaking to help reduce 
environmental impacts by allowing more proactive operator use of risk-
based tank inspection protocols through the incorporation of the latest 
edition of API Standard 653 by reference.
    Lastly, pipeline safety can be managed effectively through data-
driven inspection and maintenance, instead of the arbitrary pipe 
replacements required by the current class location change regulations. 
Class location regulations result in unnecessary replacement projects 
that can disrupt natural gas service and release up to 800 million 
standard cubic feet of natural gas every year, which is equivalent to 
the annual natural gas use of over 12,000 homes. Each year the class 
location changes regulations and diverts hundreds of millions of 
dollars towards replacing less than 75 miles of pipe. There are many 
more productive ways to expend these substantial resources. For 
example, for the same cost of replacing 75 miles of pipe, we could 
instead assess 25,000 miles of pipelines with in-line inspection tools 
that would reduce the risk of potential incidents that could impact 
people or the environment. As such, as mandated by Congress in the 2020 
PIPES Act, PHMSA needs to publish a final rule on class location 
changes.
3. Embracing and Recognizing Communities as Partners in Safety
    As the industry expands oil and natural gas infrastructure, it is 
incumbent on pipeline operators to establish local relationships, 
address performance issues and engage community stakeholders. The 
industry's commitment to being a good neighbor throughout the lifecycle 
of a pipeline requires ongoing dialogue with local communities and 
other key stakeholders. API continues to spearhead efforts on public 
and community engagement initiatives to reinforce industry's social 
license to operate. The center of API's stakeholder and public 
engagement strategic goal continues to be the development of 
Recommended Practice (RP) 1185, Pipeline Public Engagement, which 
addresses critical topics such as environmental justice, engagement 
with landowners and tenants, and other issues concerning effective 
community engagement throughout the entire lifecycle of a pipeline.
    Additionally, API recently published the third edition of RP 1162, 
Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators and is in the process 
of developing an implementation guidance website. The 3rd edition 
includes significant updates that reflect more forward leaning industry 
approaches to engaging with and raising public and stakeholder 
awareness of pipeline operations and important safety programs along 
pipeline right of ways that protect the public and environment. 
Specifically, this provision expands the current requirements of 
pipeline operator public awareness programs, incorporating the latest 
mechanism for sharing information, expanding risk communications, and 
establishing processes for evaluating the effectiveness of programs. 
API strongly encourages PHMSA to initiate a rulemaking to consider the 
inclusion of the latest edition of RP 1162 (3rd edition).
    Lastly, API remains committed to building tools and platforms to 
help the industry enhance and expand a culture of safety and 
sustainability across all operations. As such, API published 
conservation guidelines for right of way (ROW) ecological and habitat 
management and is working with member companies in partnership with 
NGOs, such as Pheasants Forever, in implementing conservation projects 
throughout the United States. Built upon adaptive management 
principles, the API Conservation Program takes an integrated and 
systematic approach in sustaining ROW land management that is value-
driven and enhances safety, community benefits, operational 
efficiencies, and a healthier ecosystem while maintaining state and 
federal regulatory compliance and considering associated risk and cost. 
As pipeline operators continue to advance conservation programs, it is 
important that the regulations recognize these alternative approaches 
and allow pipeline operators to maintain right of ways using non-
traditional methods including conservation, habitat management and 
other related programs while ensuring pipelines can be effectively 
monitored through required surveys. Conservation and habitat management 
programs may require alternatives to existing requirements for line 
markers and leak detection methodologies, etc. As such, API would like 
changes to statute and ultimately regulations that recognize the 
importance of approaching right of way maintenance in non-traditional 
ways, while still meeting regulatory requirements for safety.
                               Conclusion
    Safety of the public and the environment is our industry's top 
priority, and collaboration with PHMSA only strengthens our ability to 
transport our products across America with the fewest possible number 
of incidents. We are committed to promoting safety in all our 
operations, helping to ensure that American families and businesses can 
efficiently access affordable and reliable energy. Thank you for the 
opportunity to provide comments in advance of the hearing and 
deliberations on pipeline safety reauthorization.

                                 
   Press Release of March 8, 2023, from the Distribution Contractors 
     Association and the United Association of Union Plumbers and 
      Pipefitters, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
                                         Contact:                  
                                            Eben M. Wyman          
                                          (703) 740-6126           
                                           [email protected]
For Immediate Release

March 8, 2023
    Construction Entities Call for Punishment for Pipeline Attacks, 
              Improved Mapping in Pipeline Safety Hearing
    Richardson, TX--The Distribution Contractors Association (DCA) and 
the United Association of Union Plumbers and Pipefitters (UA) urge 
Congress to take action to address the enduring problem of physical 
attacks on critical energy infrastructure. In addition, Congress should 
include provisions to encourage the use of geographic information 
systems (GIS) mapping as part of these damage prevention programs. On 
Wednesday, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's 
Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials held a 
hearing on ``Pipeline Safety: Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act 
of 2020 and Examining Future Safety Needs.''
    The hearing was held to evaluate efforts to meet the mandates 
included in the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and 
Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act of 2020 at a time when the Committee 
intends to reauthorize the federal pipeline safety program this year. 
These organizations are advocating on a range of issues pending in this 
year's pipeline safety discussion, including suggested actions to curb 
physical attacks on energy infrastructure and to encourage the use of 
GIS mapping.
Protection of Critical Infrastructure from Physical Attacks
    ``While criminal attacks on pipeline infrastructure is not headline 
news anymore, sabotage on natural gas pipelines is an enduring problem 
and needs to be addressed,'' said Rob Darden, Executive Vice President 
of DCA. ``While DCA supports the right for peaceful activism, including 
peaceful protests, we strongly support legislative language that would 
hold those who engage in criminal activities during protests more 
accountable.''
    ``In addition, pipeline facilities under construction should be 
included within the scope of this provision. While interfering or 
tampering with the operation of a pipeline would clearly compromise 
pipeline safety, vandalism and destruction of nearby equipment used to 
build a pipeline can be just as dangerous,'' says Darden. ``For 
example, setting construction equipment on fire near a natural gas 
pipeline can be as dangerous as turning a valve.''
    ``United Association members are the best trained and most highly 
skilled craftspeople in the industry--and we work tirelessly to provide 
reliable and affordable energy to millions of Americans. Sadly, 
physical attacks on pipeline infrastructure itself and even our 
equipment and jobsites compromise our shared goals and put the safety 
of our members at risk,'' said Mark McManus, General President of the 
United Association. ``Strong bipartisan action to hold perpetrators 
accountable, and to curb future attacks, is essential to protecting our 
members on the jobsite and ensuring we can meet our shared energy 
goals.''
GIS Mapping
    The PIPES Act of 2020 include provisions to require operators of 
gas distribution pipelines to ``identify and manage traceable, 
reliable, and complete records, including maps and other drawings,'' 
and language that will ensure that this documentation is ``accessible 
to all personnel responsible for performing or overseeing relevant 
construction or engineering work.'' DCA and the UA believe increased 
use of GIS is the most effective method of mapping underground 
facilities, including natural gas pipelines.
    ``Accurate mapping of underground facilities is a fundamental part 
of accurate and timely locating,'' Darden said. ``Ensuring the use of 
GIS should be considered a priority as pipeline safety legislation is 
developed and considered.''
    GIS connects data to a map, integrating location data with a range 
of limiting information regarding the subsurface facilities in that 
area, and it allows for layering of data tied to geographic points. 
Rather than restricting the user to limited features on a static map, 
GIS mapping allows for viewing customizable combinations of data layers 
in a single dynamic tool.

                                 # # #

The Distribution Contractors Association represents contractors, 
suppliers and manufacturers who provide distribution construction 
services including installation, replacement and rehabilitation of gas 
pipelines and fiber optic, cable and duct systems in communities across 
the country.

Founded in 1889, the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices 
of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and 
Canada, AFL-CIO, CLC (UA) proudly represents more than 362,000 highly 
skilled journeymen and apprentice plumbers, pipefitters, pipeliners, 
sprinkler fitters, welders, and HVACR service techs in the US and 
Canada. The UA is an affiliate of the AFL-CIO, North America's Building 
Trades Unions (NABTU), and the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC).

    Mr. Nehls. In closing, I want to thank our witnesses for 
coming today. I appreciate you being here.
    I will now yield back and recognize Ranking Member Payne 
for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., OF NEW JERSEY, 
   RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND 
                      HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Chairman Nehls. It is an honor and a 
privilege to serve on this committee with you, and I am looking 
forward to your leadership and the bipartisan manner which you 
have already demonstrated. It is greatly appreciated.
    I would like to also thank Chairman Graves for his help, 
and also thank Ranking Member Larsen for being here, and all 
the witnesses that are with us today. Thank you.
    Before I get to the subject of today's hearing, I want to 
note that this is the first hearing of the Subcommittee on 
Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials this Congress, 
and the first following Norfolk Southern derailment in East 
Palestine, Ohio. This has been followed by additional Norfolk 
Southern derailments in southeast Michigan and Springfield, 
Ohio. Just this week, a Norfolk Southern employee lost his life 
in a collision in Cleveland.
    Chairman Nehls, thank you for visiting East Palestine 
immediately following the derailment. I look forward to working 
with you this Congress to tackle freight and rail safety.
    I am pleased that the Senate has put forth a bipartisan 
freight rail safety bill, and I am hopeful that we can do the 
same on this side.
    The safe operation of pipelines is vital to protect both 
our energy needs and the communities these pipelines run 
through.
    These are not just abstract concerns. Just last December, a 
pipeline operated by TC Energy ruptured in northeast Kansas, 
spilling over 14,000 barrels of crude oil. If you have a hard 
time visualizing 14,000 barrels, it's the same volume as 20 
rail tank cars.
    In Linden, New Jersey, in my district, a pipeline operated 
by Buckeye Partners ruptured and spilled 350 barrels adjacent 
to a fragile wetland in March 2021.
    We must learn lessons from these incidents as well as the 
Denbury incident in Satartia, Mississippi, the Beta Offshore 
incident in San Pedro Bay, California, and the Freeport LNG 
incident in Quintana Island.
    PHMSA reports that in 2022, 631 pipeline incidents 
occurred, from which 10 individuals died, 24 were injured, and 
property damages totaled more than $680 million. Of these 
incidents, 17 were serious and 267 were significant.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about 
their commitment to safety, if PHMSA has the resources 
necessary to hold bad actors accountable, and how can we make 
sure that what goes into pipelines stays in the pipes.
    I am also interested to hear about PHMSA's progress on 
carbon dioxide pipeline rulemaking.
    The safe transmission of carbon dioxide to sequester 
locations is vital to meeting our carbon reduction goals, and I 
want to make sure this can be implemented without delay.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time, and I yield back.
    [Mr. Payne's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in 
Congress from the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee 
            on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
    Thank you, Chairman Nehls, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen, 
and all our witnesses for being with us today.
    Before I get to the subject of today's hearing, I want to note that 
this is the first hearing of the Railroad Subcommittee this Congress 
and the first following the Norfolk Southern derailment in East 
Palestine, Ohio.
    This has been followed by additional Norfolk Southern derailments 
in Southeast Michigan and Springfield, Ohio
    Just this week a Norfolk Southern employee lost his life in a 
collision in Cleveland.
    Chairman Nehls, thank you for visiting East Palestine immediately 
following the derailment.
    I look forward to working with you this Congress to tackle freight 
rail safety.
    I'm pleased that the Senate has put forth a bipartisan freight rail 
safety bill and I'm hopeful that we can do the same over here.
    The safe operation of pipelines is vital to protecting both our 
energy needs and the communities these pipelines run through.
    These are not just abstract concerns.
    Just last December, a pipeline operated by TC Energy ruptured in 
northeast Kansas, spilling over 14,000 barrels of crude oil.
    If you have a hard time visualizing 14,000 barrels, it's the same 
volume as 20 rail tank cars.
    In Linden, New Jersey, in my district, a pipeline operated by 
Buckeye Partners ruptured and spilled 350 barrels adjacent to a fragile 
wetland in March 2021.
    We must learn lessons from these incidents as well as the Denbury 
incident in Satartia, Mississippi, the Beta Offshore incident in San 
Pedro Bay, California, and the Freeport LNG incident in Quintana 
Island.
    PHMSA reports that in 2022, 631 pipeline incidents occurred, from 
which 10 individuals died, 24 were injured, and property damages 
totaled more than 680 million dollars.
    Of these incidents, 17 were serious and 267 were significant.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about their 
commitment to safety, if PHMSA has the resources necessary to hold bad 
actors accountable, and how we can make sure that what goes into 
pipelines stays in the pipes.
    I'm also interested to hear about PHMSA's progress on carbon 
dioxide pipeline rulemaking.
    The safe transmission of carbon dioxide to sequester locations is 
vital to meeting our carbon reduction goals, and I want to make sure 
this can be implemented without delay.
    Thank you again Mr. Chairman, and I yield back my time.

    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Payne. I appreciate that. I now 
recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Larsen, 
for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING 
     MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. Thank you, Chair Nehls 
and Ranking Member Payne, for calling this hearing on pipeline 
safety.
    On June 10, 1999, a pipeline explosion in Bellingham, 
Washington, claimed the lives of two 10-year-old boys and a 
young man of 18 years. The explosion released 237,000 gallons 
of gasoline into Whatcom Creek that flowed through Whatcom 
Falls Park in Bellingham, Washington. The ensuing fireball 
caused millions of dollars of damage, shocked the community 
that day, and is still a seminal moment in the history of the 
town of Bellingham.
    It is that explosion that spurred my commitment, which has 
been steadfast over the last 20 years, to the highest level of 
pipeline safety. For my entire tenure in Congress, I have 
fought to reduce the risk of pipeline incidents, promote 
transparency of pipeline safety information for local 
communities, and increase accountability for pipeline 
operators.
    Mr. Chair, I ask unanimous consent to submit a letter for 
the record from a parent of one of the boys killed in the 
explosion in my district, Bellingham City Council Member Skip 
Williams. This letter outlines a number of recommendations to 
improve the safety and oversight of our pipeline system. So, I 
ask unanimous consent to enter that in the record.
    Mr. Nehls. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information follows:]

                                 
Letter of March 7, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and Donald M. 
 Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and 
   Hazardous Materials, and Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick 
Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
 from Edwin H. ``Skip'' Williams, Bellingham City Council (Washington 
          State), Submitted for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen
                                                     March 7, 2023.
The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials of 
    the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,

Representative Troy Nehls, Subcommittee Chair,
Representative Donald Payne, Subcommittee Ranking Member,
Representative Sam Graves, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee 
    Chair,
Representative Rick Larsen, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee 
    Ranking Member,

Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.

RE:  Reviewing implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining 
Future Pipeline Safety Needs

    Dear Subcommittee members,
    I am Edwin H ``Skip'' Williams, a 30-year resident of the city of 
Bellingham, Washington, currently serving as a member of the Bellingham 
City Council. Thank you for allowing me to address your subcommittee 
hearing voicing my support for the overall need of pipeline safety and, 
more specifically, the elements addressed in the implementation of the 
PIPES Act of 2020 and your examination of future pipeline needs.
    My family and I are victims of the Olympic Pipeline explosion that 
occurred in our city in 1999 where we lost one of our children. When 
the Olympic pipeline exploded there seemed to be very few regulations, 
industry practices, or oversight regarding pipeline safety. The 
elements that did exist did not seem to be enforced very consistently 
if at all. This event in our community highlighted the need for 
research, consistent industry safety standards regarding best 
practices, and oversight from all levels of government in order to 
enforce these safety standards.
    I strongly believe that there needs to be open communications 
between pipeline operators, local communities, and federal and state 
governmental agencies in order to avoid pipeline accidents such as the 
Olympic Pipeline explosion.
    As I read through the summary of the issues being considered by the 
committee for implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and the 
committee's examination of future safety needs, I see the following as 
priorities:
    1.  Providing greater resources at the state and local level to 
increase the number of pipeline inspectors.
    2.  Eliminating the backlog of rulemaking through greater 
congressional oversight and additional resources.
    3.  Minimizing leaks and releases into our environment by requiring 
updated inspection and maintenance plans of pipeline operators.
    4.  The study of methods to improve pipeline integrity in order to 
address risks posed by ageing cast iron pipes and low pressure systems.

    I feel strongly that these are all significant steps forward 
improving the oversight protections and maintaining the integrity of 
our pipeline system.
    I greatly appreciate the opportunity to share my perspective on 
pipeline safety with the subcommittee. If you would like to discuss 
these concerns with me further, please feel free to contact me.
        Sincerely,
                                Edwin H. ``Skip'' Williams,
                                           Bellingham City Council.

Per Washington state law RCW 42.56, my written communications are 
public records and are subject to public disclosure requirements.

    Mr. Larsen of Washington. I share many of Council Member 
Williams' views, and as ranking member, I will ensure that this 
committee's work to reauthorize the PIPES Act of 2020 puts 
safety at the forefront of every policy decision.
    Putting safety first means greater oversight and 
accountability of the activities of pipeline operators. It 
means greater transparency for local communities and the 
public. Reducing the risk of incidents means applying safety 
requirements, where appropriate, to existing pipeline 
infrastructure. PHMSA, the agency, cannot effectively do its 
job if the infrastructure already in the ground is off limits 
to safety regulation.
    Improving safety means preventing incidents. PHMSA needs to 
have the resources and staff to inspect pipelines, conduct 
investigations if incidents occur, and take appropriate 
enforcement action.
    I am especially pleased that we will hear detailed 
recommendations on what actions Congress can take to advance 
safety from a fellow Washingtonian and constituent from Whatcom 
County on today's panel, Bill Caram, executive director of the 
Pipeline Safety Trust. The Trust was formed following the 
deadly Olympic pipeline explosion in my district. I think you 
will hear from Bill that the Pipeline Safety Trust is both a 
watchdog and also can be a partner with communities and with 
industry to ensure long-term safety.
    I appreciate each of our witnesses, as well, being here 
today. I want to welcome PHMSA Deputy Administrator Tristan 
Brown, who visited the district to tour the Olympic pipeline 
site in Bellingham.
    PHMSA has a new charge, as well, since the enactment of the 
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, to distribute $1 billion over 5 
years under the first-ever Natural Gas Distribution 
Infrastructure Safety and Modernization grant program. The $200 
million available to municipalities and community-owned 
utilities in fiscal year 2022 is the first installment of this 
funding to repair or replace natural gas pipelines and help 
reduce incidents and improve safety. And this is just the 
beginning.
    All safety responsibility, though, must not fall to PHMSA. 
I encourage the involvement of communities and public interest 
organizations in pipeline safety, and I support ongoing grants 
to support the 400 State-based safety inspectors of intrastate 
pipelines and local distribution systems.
    Finally, as we convene the Subcommittee on Railroads, 
Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials for the first time in this 
Congress, I do want to call attention to the request from 
Members on my side of the aisle, led by Ranking Member Payne 
and Representative Sykes, that this committee hold a hearing on 
the Norfolk Southern derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. I 
endorse and support their efforts.
    Pipelines play a critical role in the Nation's 
infrastructure and the daily lives of Americans. And we are 
here today to make sure the national pipeline network safely 
delivers essential energy products across the country. I look 
forward to today's discussion.
    [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress 
    from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
                   Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chairman Graves, Chairman Nehls and Ranking Member Payne 
for calling this hearing on pipeline safety.
    On June 10, 1999, a pipeline explosion in Bellingham, WA claimed 
the lives of two 10-year-old boys and a young man of 18 years. The 
explosion also released 237,000 gallons of gasoline into Whatcom Creek 
that flowed through Whatcom Falls Park in Bellingham, Washington. The 
ensuing fireball caused millions of dollars of damage. It shocked the 
community that day and is still a seminal moment in the history of the 
town of Bellingham.
    This explosion spurred my commitment, which has been steadfast for 
over 20 years, to the highest level of pipeline safety. For my entire 
tenure in Congress, I have fought to reduce the risk of pipeline 
incidents, promote transparency of pipeline safety information for 
local communities and increase accountability for pipeline operators.
    I ask unanimous consent to submit a letter for the record from a 
parent of one of the boys killed in the explosion in my district, 
Bellingham City Council Member Skip Williams. This letter outlines a 
number of recommendations to improve the safety and oversight of our 
pipeline system.
    I share many of Councilmember Williams' views and as Ranking 
Member, I will ensure that this Committee's work to reauthorize the 
PIPES Act of 2020 puts safety at the forefront of every policy 
decision.
    Putting safety first means greater oversight and accountability of 
the activities of pipeline operators. It also means greater 
transparency for local communities and the public.
    Reducing the risk of incidents means applying safety requirements, 
where appropriate, to existing pipeline infrastructure. PHMSA cannot 
effectively do its job if infrastructure already in the ground is off 
limits to safety regulation.
    Improving safety means preventing incidents. PHMSA needs to have 
the resources and staff to inspect pipelines, conduct investigations if 
incidents occur, and take appropriate enforcement action.
    I am especially pleased that we will hear detailed recommendations 
on what actions Congress can take to advance safety from a fellow 
Washingtonian--and constituent from Whatcom County--on today's panel: 
Bill Caram, Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety Trust. The Trust 
was formed following the deadly Olympic Pipeline explosion in my 
district. I think you will hear from Bill that the Pipeline Safety 
Trust is both a watch dog and can also be a partner with communities 
and with industry to ensure long-term safety.
    I appreciate each of our witnesses being here today. I want to 
welcome PHMSA Deputy Administrator Tristan Brown, who visited 
Washington's Second District to tour the Olympic pipeline site in 
Bellingham.
    PHMSA has a new charge, since the enactment of the Bipartisan 
Infrastructure Law (BIL), to distribute $1 billion over five years 
under the first ever Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and 
Modernization grant program. The $200 million available to 
municipalities and community-owned utilities in FY 2022 is the first 
installment of this funding to repair or replace natural gas pipelines 
and help reduce incidents and improve safety. This is just the 
beginning.
    All safety responsibility must not fall to PHMSA. I encourage the 
involvement of communities and public interest organizations in 
pipeline safety. I support ongoing grants to support the 400 state-
based safety inspectors of intrastate pipelines and local distribution 
systems.
    Finally, as we convene the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, 
and Hazardous Materials for the first time in this Congress, I call to 
attention the request from Members on my side of the aisle, led by 
Ranking Member Payne and Rep. Sykes, that this Committee hold a hearing 
on the Norfolk Southern derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. I endorse 
and support their efforts.
    Pipelines play a critical role in the nation's infrastructure and 
the daily lives of Americans. We are here today to make sure the 
national pipeline network safely delivers essential energy products 
across the country. I look forward to today's discussion.

    Mr. Larsen of Washington. With that, I yield back. Thank 
you, Mr. Chair.
    Mr. Nehls. Mr. Larsen yields. Again, I would like to 
welcome our witnesses, and thank you for being here today.
    I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements 
be included in the record.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As your written testimony has been made part of the record, 
the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 5 
minutes.
    With that, Deputy Administrator Brown, you are recognized 
for 5 minutes for your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF TRISTAN BROWN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND 
 HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (PHMSA); ANDREW J. 
  BLACK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, LIQUID ENERGY 
PIPELINE ASSOCIATION (LEPA); KENNETH W. GRUBB, CHIEF OPERATING 
OFFICER, NATURAL GAS PIPELINES, KINDER MORGAN, INC., ON BEHALF 
 OF THE INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (INGAA); 
   AND BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST

TESTIMONY OF TRISTAN BROWN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND 
       HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (PHMSA)

    Mr. Brown. Thank you, Chairman Nehls. Thank you, Ranking 
Member Payne. Thank you, Ranking Member Larsen. And to the rest 
of the committee, welcome to the new Members, and welcome back 
to the returning Members.
    At the Department of Transportation and within PHMSA, 
safety is the top priority of Secretary Buttigieg, Deputy 
Secretary Trottenberg, myself, and all of the employees at 
PHMSA. We all appreciate this subcommittee's interest and 
support for strengthening pipeline safety across our country.
    PHMSA is responsible for overseeing the safe transport of 
hazardous materials through pipelines and also via other modes 
of transportation, including planes, trains, trucks, 
automobiles, and vessels. On that note, although I am here with 
a panel of pipeline experts to discuss PHMSA's work in 
advancing pipeline safety, I want to take this chance to 
acknowledge that, as an agency, as a Department, and across the 
Federal Government, we remain focused on holding Norfolk 
Southern accountable for the terrible tragedy in East 
Palestine, Ohio. And we will continue to provide support to 
that community and to the National Transportation Safety 
Board's investigation.
    Over the years, despite oftentimes fierce opposition from 
the industries we regulate, PHMSA has worked to strengthen 
safety measures for transporting hazardous materials, and we 
look forward to working with Members on both sides of the aisle 
to continue those efforts by statute, by regulation, or any 
other means of achieving results for the people of East 
Palestine and many other communities that have suffered similar 
incidents in the past.
    PHMSA's oversight of hazardous materials via other modes 
includes nearly 1 in 10 goods that are transported in the 
United States, everything from nuclear waste to lithium-ion 
batteries to explosives used in excavation mining and energy 
production. In the United States, nearly two-thirds of the 
energy we consume is transported via a pipeline that we 
regulate.
    Over the past few decades, growth in energy production in 
the United States has increased to record levels over the last 
few years. Concurrently, U.S. transportation of these products 
has increased, and exports of energy have also reached record 
levels. This has placed new and heightened demands on our 
pipeline and refined product storage infrastructure, as well as 
export facilities such as LNG terminals, which PHMSA also 
regulates.
    Under Secretary Buttigieg's leadership, PHMSA has been 
focused on executing bipartisan congressional mandates in the 
PIPES Act of 2020, historic infrastructure investments that 
came from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law of 2021 that 
Ranking Member Larsen mentioned, strengthening our safety 
mission, and ensuring the U.S. maintains the most efficient and 
competitive transportation system in the world.
    The bipartisan PIPES Act of 2020 significantly strengthened 
PHMSA's jurisdiction related to the minimization of methane 
emissions across all of our regulated entities in an effort to 
improve public safety and protect our environment. Our efforts 
on this front include completing three major legacy pipeline 
safety rulemakings, each of which were more than a decade in 
the making, including new regulations on 400,000 miles of gas 
gathering pipelines, pipeline rupture detection and rupture 
mitigation valve installation, and Coastal Ecological Unusually 
Sensitive Areas, including the Great Lakes.
    Our regulatory agenda over the past 2 years has been 
exceptionally full. PHMSA has been hard at work closing out 
years' long--and in some cases, decades' long--efforts on final 
rules, as well as initiating important new rulemakings from the 
2020 PIPES Act.
    However, with all of the good work that is being done to 
advance pipeline safety by the promulgation of new rules, PHMSA 
has faced a new normal in terms of increased challenges to its 
rulemakings. This is resulting in longer development timelines 
and diversion of personnel resources to respond to legal 
challenges. That time could otherwise be utilized to advance 
the myriad congressional directives and regulatory priorities 
of the agency and stakeholders.
    Regardless of these challenges, PHMSA won't be swayed from 
its mission. PHMSA has initiated several priority rulemakings 
that look to address important PIPES Act mandates and emerging 
safety issues, including leak detection and leak repair, the 
safety of gas distribution pipelines, updated LNG facilities 
regulations, and an overhaul of the safety requirements for 
pipelines transporting carbon dioxide.
    As previously noted, PHMSA's oversight responsibilities 
continue to grow, both in terms of the types of facilities we 
regulate, as well as the number of facilities we regulate. And 
we have had to continuously operate relatively leaner, as 
compared to our expanded universe of regulated facilities. To 
meet congressional directives to improve efforts to attract and 
retain pipeline engineers and inspectors, PHMSA has undertaken 
new recruitment and retention efforts, has kept up with the 
hiring mandates included in the PIPES Act, both for inspectors 
as well as for regulatory personnel, that have helped lead the 
agency to some of its most important, productive years ever, in 
terms of both finalizing rulemakings, as well as enforcement 
actions, and has reduced the trend in hazardous materials 
pipeline incidents.
    In closing, thank you again for the opportunity to engage 
with you on the critical issues facing PHMSA and, in turn, 
facing a major component of the largest, most sophisticated 
energy transportation system in the world. We look forward to 
continuing to work with you to improve pipeline and hazardous 
materials safety, and to reduce associated environmental 
impacts. I look forward to your questions.
    [Mr. Brown's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and 
           Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
                              Introduction
    Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, Jr., and members of the 
Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the U.S. 
Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration's (PHMSA) pipeline safety program. I appreciate 
this subcommittee's support for strengthening pipeline safety across 
our country. I am here on a panel of pipeline safety experts to discuss 
PHMSA's work advancing pipeline safety, but I want to acknowledge that 
as an agency, as a department, and across the Federal Government, we 
also remain focused on holding Norfolk Southern accountable for the 
terrible tragedy in East Palestine, OH--and will continue to provide 
support to that community and to the National Transportation Safety 
Board, the independent lead investigator. Over the years, despite often 
fierce opposition from the industries we regulate, PHMSA has worked to 
strengthen safety measures for transporting hazardous materials via 
rail and other modes of transportation, We look forward to working with 
members on both sides of the aisle to continue those efforts by 
statute, by regulation, or any other means of achieving results for the 
people of East Palestine and many other communities that have suffered 
similar incidents in the past.
    At DOT, and within PHMSA, safety is the top priority for Secretary 
Buttigieg, Deputy Secretary Trottenberg, me, and all of the employees 
at PHMSA. Specifically, PHMSA is responsible for overseeing the safe 
transport of hazardous materials--through pipelines and also via other 
modes of transportation--including planes, trains, trucks, and vessels. 
PHMSA oversees the safe design, operation, and maintenance of the 
Nation's nearly 3.4 million miles of oil, gas, and other hazardous 
materials pipeline facilities for hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and other 
emerging fuels. Additionally, PHMSA's oversight of hazardous materials 
via other modes includes nearly 1 in 10 goods that are transported in 
the U.S., everything from nuclear waste to lithium-ion batteries, to 
explosives used in excavation, mining, and energy production. PHMSA 
also chairs the International Civil Aviation Organization's Dangerous 
Goods Panel, the international standards making body that sets the 
global framework for the safe and efficient transport of these 
materials across borders and around the world.
    Under Secretary Buttigieg's leadership, PHMSA has been focused on 
executing bipartisan congressional mandates in the Protecting our 
Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (PIPES Act 
of 2020), historic infrastructure investments from the Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, strengthening our safety mission, and 
ensuring that the U.S. has the safest, most efficient and competitive 
transportation system in the world.
    From the standpoint of the volume of work before us as an agency, 
the challenges in carrying out our safety mission have never been 
greater. We oversee an aging infrastructure that requires robust 
maintenance, and, when needed, replacement. Most of the cross-country 
pipeline infrastructure was built shortly after World War II--meaning 
many pipelines are over 80 years old--and there are even a few gas 
distribution segments that were installed during the Civil War era, 
more than 150 years ago.
    PHMSA has been integral to the whole-of-government approach to 
mitigating unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions--an essential component 
of operating the safest, most efficient and economically competitive 
transportation and energy system of the 21st century.
    Nearly two-thirds of the energy we consume in the U.S. is 
transported via pipeline. Over the past few decades, growth in energy 
production in the United States has increased to record levels. 
Concurrently, U.S. transportation of these products has necessarily 
increased, and exports of energy have--according to the Energy 
Information Administration--also reached record levels. This has placed 
new and heightened demands on our pipeline and refined products storage 
infrastructure, as well as export facilities, such as liquefied natural 
gas (LNG) terminals, which PHMSA also regulates.
    The bipartisan PIPES Act of 2020 significantly strengthened PHMSA's 
jurisdiction related to the minimization of methane emissions across 
all of our regulated entities in an effort to improve public safety and 
protect our environment. Our efforts on this front include completing 
three major legacy pipeline safety rulemakings, each of which was more 
than a decade in the making, including new regulations on 400,000 miles 
of ``gas gathering'' pipelines--significantly increased by the fracking 
boom that began in the 2000s but remained unregulated at the Federal 
level until this past year. Since the enactment of the PIPES Act of 
2020, Congress has added new incentives for infrastructure aimed at 
decarbonizing energy and industrial sectors. Both the Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act and the Inflation Reduction Act include 
significant incentives for the build-out of the hydrogen and carbon 
capture utilization and storage (CCUS) sectors. To address new risks--
both safety and environmental--related to this infrastructure, PHMSA 
has focused on strengthening its regulations and improving its research 
in these areas. On the other side of the agency, which focuses on 
hazardous materials transportation via other modes of transportation, 
the agency has focused on improving safety in the transportation of 
hydrogen and other cryogenic materials--via truck, train, plane, and 
vessel--which is seeing new technology development and investments from 
nearly every sector of the economy.
    Also, since the enactment of the PIPES Act of 2020, PHMSA has 
worked with Congress to advance its first-ever infrastructure grant 
program, via the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The Natural 
Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and Modernization (NGDISM) Grant 
Program provides $1 billion spread over five years to improve the 
safety of high-risk, leak-prone legacy natural gas distribution 
infrastructure with a specific emphasis on benefiting underserved rural 
and urban communities, among other considerations. Eligible entities 
are municipality- or community-owned utilities, and funds are available 
to these entities seeking assistance in repairing, rehabilitating, or 
replacing high-risk, leak-prone natural gas distribution 
infrastructure. Funds may also be used to acquire equipment to assist 
in identifying and reducing natural gas distribution pipeline incidents 
and fatalities. This grant funding will help communities of all sizes 
make their infrastructure safer, create good jobs, reduce heat-trapping 
methane from the atmosphere, and reduce the risks of fatality and 
serious injury for residents and businesses. As of this hearing, we 
expect to announce the first round of these grants imminently.
                               Rulemaking
    Our regulatory agenda over the past two years has been 
exceptionally full. PHMSA has been hard at work closing out years-long, 
and in some cases decade-long, efforts on final rules as well as 
initiating important new rulemakings from the 2020 PIPES Act.
    Some of PHMSA's recently completed final rules include the sibling 
rules to the Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines final rule that we 
published in 2019, including improved regulation of higher-risk gas 
gathering pipelines; the 400,000 miles of additional pipelines 
previously mentioned; required reporting of safety information for all 
gas gathering pipelines; improved repair criteria for gas transmission 
pipelines; and other enhanced safety requirements for gas transmission 
pipelines regarding corrosion control, management of change, and 
inspections following extreme weather events.
    Additionally, in April of 2022, PHMSA published the long-awaited 
final rule addressing rupture detection and rupture-mitigation valve 
installation for many gas transmission, hazardous liquid, and gas and 
hazardous liquid gathering pipelines, including carbon dioxide lines. 
Among other important provisions, this rule requires the installation 
of remote-control or automatic-shutoff valves, or equivalent 
technology, that can close within 30 minutes of an operator being 
notified of a potential rupture--saving lives and reducing methane 
emissions.
    In response to Congress' very stringent timeline for issuing a 
final rule for Coastal Ecological Unusually Sensitive Areas (90 days), 
PHMSA issued an Interim Final Rule to include additional coastal 
waters, the Great Lakes, and coastal beaches within the definition of 
an ``unusually sensitive area'' for the purposes of resilience and risk 
reduction through hazardous liquid pipeline integrity management--
strengthening protections for these treasured natural environments. 
PHMSA subsequently held a Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee meeting on 
the rulemaking and emerged from that meeting with recommendations to 
help finalize this rule while addressing stakeholder concerns.
    PHMSA has initiated several priority rulemakings that look to 
address important PIPES Act of 2020 mandates and emerging safety 
issues, including leak detection and leak repair, the safety of gas 
distribution pipelines (as directed in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline 
Safety Act), updated LNG facilities regulations, and an overhaul of the 
safety requirements for pipelines transporting carbon dioxide.
    As required by Congress, PHMSA continues to update the Federal 
pipeline safety regulations (PSRs) to reflect new and revised voluntary 
consensus standards developed and adopted by standards-setting bodies 
(see e.g., PHMSA's periodic standards update rulemakings). We 
understand how important updating and aligning standards can be to 
ensure the PSR include up-to-date standards that reflect current best 
practices and technologies--and to serve as a higher bar, from which 
the regulated community can continue to improve.
    Finally, PHMSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in 
October 2020 for Class Location Change Requirements. As you are aware, 
PHMSA is required by statute to hold advisory committee meetings on our 
proposed rules to solicit recommendations to ensure our rulemakings are 
reasonable, feasible, cost-effective, and practicable. These advisory 
committee meetings have helped derive consensus around highly technical 
regulatory policies. The PIPES Act of 2020 requires PHMSA to hold an 
advisory committee meeting on the NPRM for this rule. Based on the 
aggressive timelines and safety priorities included in the PIPES Act of 
2020, PHMSA is working to make efficient use of agency resources and 
advisory committee members' time and anticipates holding an advisory 
committee meeting on the NPRM in conjunction with publishing the most 
important safety agenda items identified by Congress.
    It is important to point out that rulemaking is designed to be an 
iterative process that encourages maximum participation by all 
stakeholders and rigorous analysis in support of decision making. This 
process helps ensure the promulgation of comprehensive rules that 
protect the public and the environment and meet our statutory 
requirement for rules with benefits that exceed their costs. PHMSA 
holds public meetings and workshops and conducts significant outreach 
prior to rulemakings, using the information gathered to establish a 
legal record and to strive to craft the most effective rules possible. 
Such collaboration, well in advance of the rulemaking process, allows 
PHMSA to identify concerns and potential solutions and to allocate its 
limited resources where they are needed most. In the past, these 
comprehensive efforts have also helped avoid expending additional 
resources on legal challenges.
    In addition to congressionally mandated rules, many of PHMSA's 
rulemakings underway address important recommendations from the 
National Transportation Safety Board, resulting from safety issues 
identified during investigations in the aftermath of some tragic 
accidents. PHMSA's rules also address recommendations from the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (GAO), the DOT Inspector General (DOT 
IG), and the agency's own safety findings. When PHMSA proceeds with 
such rulemakings identified by independent sources, it must make sure 
that its regulations account for known safety issues, technological 
feasibility, and cost-effectiveness.
                          Increased litigation
    With all the good work that is being done to advance pipeline 
safety by the promulgation of new rules, PHMSA also faces a new normal 
in terms of increased challenges to its rulemakings, resulting in 
longer development timelines and diversion of personnel resources to 
respond to legal challenges--which could otherwise be utilized to 
advance the myriad congressional directives and regulatory priorities 
of the agency and stakeholders.
    PHMSA has also seen a dramatic increase in interest in its 
rulemakings pertaining to energy resources. By way of example, PHMSA's 
LNG by Rail Suspension NPRM, issued in November 2021, has had over 
7,000 comments--including a coordinated letter-writing campaign by 
environmental advocacy organizations and a letter signed by over 20 
State Attorneys General, as well as many members of the House of 
Representatives on both sides of the aisle.
    Specifically, PHMSA has finalized four major rulemakings over the 
last year, and each of which has been the subject of judicial and/or 
administrative challenges. PHMSA currently faces pending litigation 
brought by pipeline industry trade groups on the Gas Gathering Final 
Rule, Valve Installation and Repair Final Rule, among others, from 
stakeholder groups and governments, across the spectrum.
    PHMSA rulemaking resources are consequently spread thin. The same 
subject matter experts, attorneys, and economists who develop new PHMSA 
rules are also the ones who must help develop the briefs and arguments 
to respond to legal challenges after issuance.
                       Enforcement and Compliance
    While PHMSA's enforcement cases have remained relatively steady, we 
have set records for our proposed civil penalties in 2021 and again in 
2022. These cases, many of which are still being adjudicated, include 
the worst carbon dioxide pipeline incident on record as well as a case 
related to the 2021 Colonial Pipeline cybersecurity incident. PHMSA 
continues to pursue 100% collections of the civil penalties it has 
imposed; however, some operators with smaller civil penalties have 
significantly delayed paying the penalties they owe.
    In terms of forward-looking, potential rulemakings, the PSRs 
currently include emergency planning, response, and timely notification 
requirements for pipeline operators. However, incidents involving, for 
example, carbon dioxide pipelines as well as LNG facilities, do not 
necessarily require communications to communities who rightfully have 
an increased fear of these facilities after a safety incident occurs. 
PHMSA will look to its rulemaking authorities to help address the lack 
of post-incident communications but we also welcome congressional ideas 
in this space.
    Another issue we're examining involves the safety and performance 
of pipes manufactured outside of the U.S. Many larger operators deploy 
their own inspectors when utilizing foreign-made pipe in their 
projects--in order to ensure maximum safety and performance. However, 
when those U.S. companies find non-spec pipe (pipe not meeting Federal 
or industry standards), they may simply refuse to purchase it--which 
may result in another U.S. pipeline construction company ultimately 
purchasing or utilizing the same non-spec piping. On the hazardous 
materials side of our agency, PHMSA deploys inspectors across the globe 
to ensure products that are moving hazardous materials in the U.S. are 
inspected by U.S. inspectors. PHMSA is conducting analysis to better 
understand if non-spec foreign made pipes are being utilized in the 
U.S.
                        Research and Innovation
    While PHMSA continues to advance pipeline safety by strengthening 
its regulations and enhancing its inspector training, inspections, and 
enforcement programs, many of the root causes of incidents are best 
addressed through research and technological innovation.
    PHMSA's Pipeline Safety Research Program works with academia, the 
regulated community, private research consortiums and federal partners 
to sponsor research and development (R&D) projects focused on providing 
near-term solutions for pipeline transportation infrastructure issues 
that will improve safety, reduce environmental impact, and enhance 
reliability.
Hydrogen/Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
    In FY 2022, PHMSA awarded approximately $6 million in research 
investments on hydrogen projects. Specifically, under the Competitive 
Academic Agreement Program, PHMSA awarded two projects on pipeline 
infrastructure and modernization for hydrogen networks to two 
universities. These research opportunities expose students to the 
pipeline safety sector to encourage them to join the federal or state 
pipeline safety workforce or the private sector after graduation. PHMSA 
also leverages the University Transportation Centers Program to meet 
its research needs.
    Also, in FY 2022, PHMSA awarded four projects related to hydrogen 
pipelines and storage, under our Core Research Program, totaling just 
over $2 million. These projects will research the safe transportation 
and storage of hydrogen via repurposing existing infrastructure used 
for natural gas transport and underground storage, improving hydrogen 
leak detection, and characterizing hydrogen-specific pipeline integrity 
threats.
    PHMSA is collaborating with the Department of Energy (DOE) and 
other DOT modes on developing a Memorandum of Understanding to 
establish collaborative partnerships on R&D and safety associated with 
the transport of carbon dioxide and hydrogen via pipelines, rail, 
barge, ship, and truck.
    Lastly, PHMSA announced last year new research topics to better 
determine impact areas for the safer operations of carbon dioxide 
pipelines. The results of this may help inform a current rulemaking 
related to carbon dioxide pipelines but congressional attention related 
to these issues is also welcome.
LNG
    Recent global fluctuations in natural gas supplies as well as a 
transition from more carbon-intensive energy sources continue to spark 
investments in LNG. Currently, there are eight LNG export terminals 
with a total LNG production capacity of approximately 14 billion 
standard cubic feet per day (bcf/d) in the United States. There are 
also five LNG projects under construction, which will add an estimated 
11.9 bcf/d in LNG production capacity. To that end PHMSA has funded 14 
R&D LNG-safety-related research projects since 2007; with nine 
completed/closed and five currently active, all totaling $5.7 million.
    Additionally, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023, 
Congress allocated up to $8.4 million to PHMSA for the creation of an 
LNG Center of Excellence aimed at positioning the United States as the 
leader and foremost expert in LNG operations--including safety and 
environmental performance. PHMSA has already initiated planning for the 
establishment of the Center which will enhance U.S. LNG operations and 
safety education and oversight and may result in LNG regulatory 
improvements. It will also serve as a repository of information and 
facilitate collaboration among stakeholders to enhance safety and 
environmental performance through research.
               Funding for State Pipeline Safety Programs
    Since 1970, when a national, uniform standard of pipeline safety 
regulations was published, states have had the authority, through 
PHMSA, to regulate the safety of intrastate pipelines. Under the 
authority of Sections 60105 and 60106 of Title 49 U.S. Code (49 U.S.C.) 
for state pipeline safety program certifications, states have been 
allowed to assume safety authority for the inspection and enforcement 
of intrastate pipelines. PHMSA sets the minimum Federal regulations for 
pipeline safety, which the participating states then adopt into their 
state code and enforce. States are allowed, under 49 U.S.C. Section 
60104(c), to adopt more stringent safety standards than the minimum 
standards PHMSA sets. This allows states to codify and enforce 
regulations that deal with specific, regional (or local) risks that 
might not be feasible or cost-beneficial to regulate at the Federal 
level. Many states have established safety regulations that are more 
stringent than the Federal regulations.
    PHMSA relies on this extremely important partnership to accomplish 
its safety mission, which is to protect people and the environment by 
advancing the safe transportation of energy and other hazardous 
materials that are essential to our daily lives. New pipeline safety 
regulations and new infrastructure (such as gas gathering lines) 
specific to state safety authority have and will continue to require 
state pipeline safety programs to increase staff--in order to handle 
the additional infrastructure oversight responsibilities. These state 
pipeline safety programs employ approximately 435 inspectors who are 
responsible for inspecting over 85 percent of the Nation's pipeline 
infrastructure through certification with PHMSA.
    The PIPES Act of 2020 allows PHMSA to pay not more than 80 percent 
of the total cost of the personnel, equipment, and activities 
reasonably required by the state agency for the conduct of its pipeline 
safety program during a given calendar year. This was changed from 50 
percent in the 2006 PIPES Act. However, for fiscal years 2019 to 2021 
State Base Grant federal funding covered less than 70 percent of the 
actual total state program costs. The actual federal funding is 
estimated to be approximately 60 percent of the state program's total 
costs for fiscal year 2022. Unfortunately, current year 2023 federal 
funding is estimated to be only 56 percent of the total state program 
costs--due, in part, to increasing needs from states. This is another 
area where we welcome congressional ideas on how to support states and 
their vital role in implementing many of the new regulations previously 
discussed.
               Control Room Management and Cyber Security
    Not only is the industry facing expansion in the number of 
regulated pipeline miles and changes in product demand, both industry 
and regulators are addressing the growing threat of cyberattacks. 
PHMSA, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and DOE have a 
mutual interest in ensuring coordinated, consistent, and effective 
activities that improve transportation security. PHMSA's safety 
oversight of pipeline control rooms forms a nexus with TSA's 
cybersecurity oversight, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency's (CISA's) role as the national coordinator for critical 
infrastructure security, and DOE's national energy management. The 2021 
cyber-attack on Colonial Pipeline demonstrated how critical it is for a 
whole-of-government approach to safeguarding our Nation's critical 
infrastructure--as well as collaboration with the private sector when 
it comes to planning and communications.
    PHMSA is leveraging its authorities to inspect and enforce three 
components of pipeline operations including pipeline control room 
regulations, integrity management plan requirements, and emergency 
response plan regulations by incorporating cybersecurity questions in 
inspections that focus on considering cyber as a risk and having 
emergency response plans in place that consider the threat of 
cyberattacks as well as envision measures to mitigate impacts to 
operations. PHMSA has also engaged with CISA and TSA on cybersecurity 
exercises for pipeline operators.
    To help advance our safety mission as it relates to cybersecurity, 
PHMSA is in the process of hiring pipeline and cybersecurity experts to 
assist in control room management inspections and provide cyber 
expertise support to PHMSA leadership. Cyber specialists can better 
identify pipeline infrastructure-related cyber risks, incidents, and 
significant issues that PHMSA currently lacks expertise in. This would 
help increase information sharing, create better understanding between 
agencies, and identify key issues between the nexus point of safety and 
security.
    PHMSA is increasing cybersecurity training opportunities for its 
staff, as well as the staff of its state partners. By expanding the 
knowledge base of inspectors, we are better positioned to identify 
risks during routine control room inspections and coordinate when 
needed with colleagues in TSA.
    PHMSA is also developing an adaptable emergency preparedness plan 
that will address the Agency's response to all-threat, all-hazard, 
notice and no-notice incidents, including cybersecurity. As part of the 
process, PHMSA is developing an organizational framework to respond to 
those incidents, formal situational reporting internal and external to 
PHMSA, formal information sharing processes, and specific coordination 
methods between PHMSA, TSA, CISA, DOT Operating Administrations, DOE, 
and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
          OIG inspection, GAO audits, and NTSB recommendations
    In terms of PHMSA's compliance and inspection program, we recently 
underwent a DOT IG audit, which was initiated in May 2022, to review 
PHMSA's implementation of its Integrated Inspection Program. Throughout 
the audit, the PHMSA team provided detailed overviews and walkthroughs 
of its Integrated Inspection Program, including, but not limited to 
planning, training, inspection conduct, and governing policies. PHMSA 
even organized and facilitated the OIG's participation in several 
ongoing integrated inspections, and, at PHMSA's invitation, OIG 
personnel attended the Office of Pipeline Safety's annual inspection 
planning meeting in October 2022. The DOT IG provided helpful feedback 
and we consider the audit to have been beneficial to PHMSA's continual 
improvement. PHMSA learned valuable lessons and received three DOT IG 
recommendations. We continue to have a constructive working 
relationship with the DOT IG, and the audit helped us to continue to 
move toward our common goal of advancing pipeline safety.
    In August 2020, the GAO published a study finding Federal agencies 
have incorporated most but not all key collaboration practices in the 
permitting processes for export facilities for LNG. The GAO identified 
key practices for PHMSA, that can help sustain collaboration among 
federal agencies.
    PHMSA's team worked with GAO to adopt a process for conducting 
standards-specific reviews approximately every two to three years. The 
new process will ensure that a sufficient review is conducted and that 
PHMSA makes appropriate determinations about whether to update 
standards.
    When it comes to our work with the National Transportation Safety 
Board (NTSB), PHMSA is addressing recommendations that include 
requiring control room operators to notify emergency call centers in 
impacted communities when potential ruptures take place, equip control 
rooms with supervisory controls and data acquisition systems to 
pinpoint leaks along transmission lines, and amend Title 49, Code of 
Federal Regulations (CFR) to require automatic shutoff valves or 
remote-control valves at high consequence areas. We continue working to 
resolve any open recommendations--some of which we are constrained by 
resources and some by statutes--such as the congressional prohibition 
on applying the Automatic/Remote Shut Off Valve Rule to existing 
pipelines.
    PHMSA continues to work with NTSB to address recommendations that 
have been made following other natural gas and hazardous liquid 
accidents. We collaborate with NTSB often, including opportunities for 
cross-training of our respective staff. We'll continue to engage with 
NTSB as a partner in advancing safety.
    All of these efforts are important because continual improvement is 
a key principle of safety management systems and high-reliability 
organizations, and one we embrace for both the agency and the 
industries we regulate.
     Transparency, Equity, Environmental Justice, and Outreach to 
                        Underserved Communities
    To both implement the President's executive orders on equity (EO 
13985 and EO 14008), as well as to help address historic inequities in 
the transportation system, PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety has 
expanded its efforts to make public pipeline safety incidents and 
enforcement data (which was also recently the subject of a GAO report 
that lauded PHMSA's transparency and encouraged further actions). 
Specifically, PHMSA has created a publicly available pilot, interactive 
mapping tool that allows users to view the location of pipeline 
incidents, as well as a geographic overlay with underserved 
communities.
    When PHMSA first viewed the preliminary information from this tool, 
staff felt inspired to act--to help ensure all communities are 
receiving requisite safety protections. As part of this effort, PHMSA 
has engaged our state and federal partners, as well as stakeholders, to 
share our findings, and they, too, are engaging in dialogues with 
pipeline operators to ensure maintenance and safety measures do not 
leave underserved communities behind.
    These communities are identified through U.S. Census and internal 
DOT/PHMSA data focused on underserved and transportation-disadvantaged 
communities that have experienced excavation damages, and other 
pipeline incidents and accidents.
    PHMSA has also expanded its public outreach and education on 
pipeline awareness and safety as well as community-based excavation 
damage prevention initiatives to historically underserved and 
socioeconomically challenged geographic areas.
                  Increased Engagement with the Public
    PHMSA is committed to enhancing all stakeholder engagement and has 
increased the number of public meetings and information briefings it 
hosts--holding four public meetings and information briefings so far in 
FY 2023, with additional public meetings and information briefings 
planned. Personally, I have visited community members and victims, on-
site, where pipeline facilities have failed (e.g. Kalamazoo, MI; 
Bellingham, WA; Satartia, MS; and Freeport, TX).
    PHMSA has also increased its engagement with public interest groups 
like the Pipeline Safety Trust, pipeline worker labor unions, and 
environmental groups, actively participating in conferences and 
meetings to hold a two-way dialogue on important pipeline safety 
issues, emphasizing that pipeline safety is a shared responsibility.
    In November and December 2022, PHMSA partnered with the DOE in a 
series of Community Engagement Workshops on Carbon Capture, 
Utilization, and Storage and continues to serve as a resource regarding 
pipelines to DOE and the public. PHMSA has also supported requests from 
individuals and groups to participate in meetings to discuss 
CO2 pipeline projects to listen to concerns on safety, 
environmental justice, environmental impacts, and emergency response 
preparedness, as well as meet with representatives at the state 
legislature level. As previously noted, in May of 2022, I personally 
visited the community of Satartia, MS--about an hour northwest of 
Jackson--the site of one of the worst carbon dioxide pipeline incidents 
in history, in order to hear directly from the community and first 
responders that helped the community during that serious incident.
    Similarly, just yesterday I visited with members of the community 
in and around Freeport, TX, which is home to the Freeport LNG facility. 
In June of 2022, an explosion at the facility resulted in a massive 
fireball and understandably left lasting concerns with the community. 
In February of this year, PHMSA, along with our co-regulators of LNG 
export facilities (the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the 
U.S. Coast Guard) held a town hall meeting in the community--with 
simultaneous bilingual translation--to help inform the surrounding 
community members of our work to investigate the incident and require 
changes needed to enhance safety at the facility.
    In 2022, PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety participated in nearly 
220 public meetings, events, and conferences to educate our 
stakeholders on pipeline safety and damage prevention initiatives and 
to address questions about the Federal pipeline safety regulations or 
concerns about pipeline-related matters. PHMSA continues to promote the 
`Call 811 Program' through participation in events as well as through 
social media and digital campaigns encouraging safe digging practices.
Efficiencies in Oversight, Taxpayer Stewardship, and Focus on Employees
    Roughly 169 midstream oil and gas industry projects are expected to 
begin operations in the United States from 2021 to 2025, according to 
the Pipeline and Gas Journal. Over the last five years, liquid pipeline 
incidents have fallen by 21% while pipeline mileage and barrels 
delivered have increased by more than 27%. As previously noted, and to 
put it simply, our oversight responsibilities continue to grow both in 
terms of the types of facilities we regulate as well as the number of 
facilities we regulate: PHMSA has increasing responsibility for LNG 
facilities, underground natural gas storage, as well as natural gas 
gathering lines. PHMSA's budget, excluding the new gas distribution 
grant program, does not grow at a rate commensurate with its 
responsibilities. Consequently, PHMSA has had to continuously operate 
relatively leaner as compared to our expanded universe of regulated 
facilities. To this end, PHMSA has also utilized advisory bulletins, 
public meetings, research solicitations, and increased collaboration 
with coregulators such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the 
Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Interior, the U.S. 
Coast Guard, and our state partners through collaboration with the 
National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives.
    Hiring times at PHMSA have been reduced by 25% unfortunately--due 
in part to the pandemic--PHMSA was not spared the so-called great 
resignation, losing many individuals to both retirements and other 
departures. But PHMSA is exploring ways to continue to improve the 
agency's hiring and recruitment to make it both more efficient and 
effective in recruiting and retaining talented applicants.
    On the hiring, recruitment, and retention front, unfortunately--due 
in part to the pandemic--PHMSA was not spared the so-called great 
resignation, losing many individuals to both retirements and other 
departures.
    To meet congressional directives to improve efforts to attract and 
retain pipeline engineers and inspectors, PHMSA has undertaken new 
recruitment and retention efforts--seeking approval from the Office of 
Personnel Management to increase special pay rates for some engineer 
inspectors--commensurate with similar federal special pay rates, 
developing new tuition reimbursement efforts, and utilizing new online 
recruitment methods. PHMSA is also utilizing the Department of 
Defense's Operation Warfighter (OWF) program that matches qualified 
wounded, ill, and injured Service members with federal internships for 
veterans to gain valuable work experience during their recovery and 
rehabilitation--and create a pathway from the military to permanent 
employment. PHMSA has kept up with the PIPES Act of 2020 hiring 
mandates--both for inspectors as well as for regulatory personnel, that 
have helped lead the agency to some of its most productive years ever 
in terms of both finalizing regulations as well as enforcement actions 
and a reduction trend in hazardous materials and pipeline incidents.
    PHMSA has also utilized technologies like iPads to eliminate 
paperwork for inspectors--which has resulted in more efficient use of 
inspectors' time and increased the accuracy and standardization of 
inspections.
    On an agency-wide basis, PHMSA has reduced or eliminated its use of 
nearly two dozen disparate software systems in favor of less costly, 
integrated systems. PHMSA is utilizing the cost savings of this nature 
to continue investing in more long-term, cost-saving programs.
                               Conclusion
    In closing, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to 
engage with you on the critical issues facing PHMSA and in turn facing 
a major component of the largest, most sophisticated energy 
transportation system in the world. And most importantly, I would like 
to emphasize my deep gratitude to the nearly 600 full-time federal 
employees and nearly 200 contractors that make up what I believe is the 
most unsung agency in the Federal Government. Congress has charged us 
with tremendous responsibilities--from ensuring the safe transportation 
of some of the most valuable goods that move in commerce, like 
satellites and spacecraft, as well as some of the most essential goods 
like fertilizer used on our farms, which can be transported by 
pipeline. As we take on ever greater oversight responsibilities with 
oversight of the build-out of carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines and 
other energy products of the future, PHMSA must either continue to grow 
our resources, or continue to reassess multiple and increasing 
priorities with the same amount of resources.
    We look forward to continuing to work with Congress to improve 
pipeline and hazardous materials safety and to reduce associated 
environmental impacts.
    Thank you again for inviting me here today. I look forward to your 
questions.

    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
    Mr. Black, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

  TESTIMONY OF ANDREW J. BLACK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE 
       OFFICER, LIQUID ENERGY PIPELINE ASSOCIATION (LEPA)

    Mr. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and 
members of the subcommittee. I am Andy Black, president and CEO 
of the Liquid Energy Pipeline Association.
    LEPA represents pipeline owners and operators delivering 
transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel; 
transportation feedstocks like crude oil; home heating fuels 
like propane; industrial feedstocks like ethane; and low-carbon 
solutions like renewable diesel, carbon dioxide, and liquefied 
petroleum gas. We have over 50 members delivering over 20 
billion barrels annually across a pipeline network of nearly 
230,000 miles.
    As Congress examines Federal pipeline safety, let me begin 
by providing some data and information on the current state of 
liquid pipeline safety. According to publicly available data 
from PHMSA, pipelines are the safest way to transport energy, 
and they are getting safer. Over the last 5 years, total 
incidents from liquid pipelines have dropped 25 percent. 
Incidents impacting people and the environment are down 15 
percent. This last metric, incidents impacting people and the 
environment, was developed jointly by PHMSA, the Pipeline 
Safety Trust, and industry under the recommendation of the 
National Transportation Safety Board.
    Not only are pipelines getting safer, they are the safest 
way to deliver energy. A report for Congress completed by PHMSA 
compared incident and spill rates across pipeline, rail, and 
trucks. PHMSA found pipelines have a lower incident rate per 
barrel of crude oil shipped compared to rail or truck, and the 
lowest percentage of crude oil released compared to rail or 
truck.
    Administration analysis and conclusion that pipelines are 
the safest way to deliver energy is also bipartisan. Secretary 
Hillary Clinton's State Department found not only would a major 
proposed pipeline be the safest way to deliver energy, it would 
be safer and have less impact on the environment than taking no 
action at all. The Obama administration found rejecting that 
pipeline project and shipping the same energy by rail would 
increase the risk of oil release by over 800 times, and barrels 
released by 2.6 times. In many locations, shipment by rail or 
truck is necessary and generally a safe delivery mode. But we 
are proud that pipelines are the safest way to deliver the 
energy American consumers need and want.
    We are also not resting on improving pipeline safety. In 
partnership with the American Petroleum Institute, we have 
ongoing initiatives to improve public engagement, develop best 
practices for managing geohazards and seismicity, improve 
pipeline inspection technologies, implement pipeline safety 
management systems, and share safety improvement lessons from 
pipeline incidents and near misses. Before that, in the last 
several years, we have completed initiatives on crack 
management, pipeline integrity management, data integration, 
hydro testing, and emergency response.
    We look forward to Congress reauthorizing Federal pipeline 
safety provisions and making improvements to PHMSA pipeline 
programs. LEPA recommends improvements in three categories: 
leveraging safety technologies and knowledge; safe, low-carbon 
future; and improving PHMSA safety programs. I have attached to 
my testimony brief summaries of each of our recommendations; I 
will highlight two today.
    First, a continuing frustration for pipeline operators is 
how old are some of PHMSA's regulations. Key requirements for 
inspecting and repairing pipelines are now over 20 years old. 
The pipeline technologies and analytic methods on which they 
are based are woefully out of date, replaced by proven 
technology and analytics and engineering methods that PHMSA 
should reflect in its regulations, but often does not.
    Congress in the 2020 PIPES Act, section 104, authorized a 
pipeline safety technology demonstration program to demonstrate 
cutting-edge pipeline safety technologies and advanced 
analytics. Thank you, Congress. But PHMSA, in implementing the 
program, added a number of administrative hurdles and 
requirements beyond what Congress mandated, making the program 
untenable. We have proposals to unlock this program and others 
from unnecessary Government redtape.
    Second, the pipeline industry supports updating regulatory 
requirements for low-carbon solutions. A major build-out of 
CO2 pipelines is necessary to transport 
CO2 from where it is captured to where it can be 
stored permanently out of harm's way. Without a new network of 
CO2 pipelines, we will not meet our goals for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
    There are already dozens of Federal regulatory requirements 
administered by PHMSA covering CO2 pipeline safety, 
design, construction, operation, maintenance, pressure testing, 
and more. In a handful of discrete areas, PHMSA requirements 
would benefit from updates reflecting the latest safety 
approaches and learnings. We believe a targeted approach is the 
best way for PHMSA to issue new requirements quickly. This 
would also help PHMSA to avoid getting bogged down in an open-
ended exercise that, like other PHMSA rulemakings, can take 
many years.
    I am happy to answer any questions, and I thank the 
subcommittee for the opportunity to testify.
    [Mr. Black's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive 
           Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA)
    Thank you, Chair, Ranking Member, and members of the subcommittee. 
My name is Andy Black and I am President and CEO of the Liquid Energy 
Pipeline Association. LEPA represents pipeline owners and operators 
delivering transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel, 
transportation feedstocks like crude oil, home heating fuels like 
propane and home heating oil, industrial feedstocks like ethane and 
butane, and low carbon solutions like renewable diesel, liquified 
petroleum gas and carbon dioxide. We have over 50 member companies 
delivering over 20 billion barrels annually across a nearly a 230,000-
mile network of pipelines.
    As Congress examines federal pipeline safety provisions and 
programs, let me first begin by providing some data and information on 
the current state of liquids pipeline safety. According to publicly 
available government data from PHMSA, pipelines are the safest way to 
transport energy and they are getting safer.
    Over the last 5 years, total incidents from liquids pipelines have 
dropped over 25%. Incidents impacting people or the environment are 
down 15%. This last metric, Incidents Impacting People or the 
Environment, was developed jointly by PHMSA, the Pipeline Safety Trust 
and industry under the recommendation of the National Transportation 
Safety Board. NTSB asked the pipeline community to identify the most 
meaningful metric for measuring pipeline safety. You'll hear from 
witnesses about various metrics and PHMSA certainly tracks many. But we 
agree that Incidents Impacting People or the Environment are the most 
meaningful and are gratified they are down 15% over the last 5 years.
    Not only are pipelines getting safer, they are the safest way to 
deliver energy. A 2018 report completed by PHMSA at the direction of 
the Senate Appropriations Committee \i\, compared incident and spill 
rates across pipeline, rail and trucks. PHMSA found pipelines have a 
lower incident rate per barrel of crude oil shipped compared to rail or 
truck. PHMSA also found pipelines result in the lowest percentage of 
crude oil released compared to rail or truck.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \i\ Report on Delivering Crude Oil by Truck, Rail, and Pipeline, 
Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous 
Materials Safety Administration, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Administration analysis and conclusion that pipelines are the 
safest way to deliver energy is also bipartisan. Secretary Hillary 
Clinton's State Department during the Obama administration \ii\ found 
not only would a major proposed pipeline be the safest way to deliver 
energy, it would be safer and have less impact on the environment than 
taking no action at all. The Obama administration found rejecting that 
pipeline project and shipping the same energy by rail increased the 
risk of oil release by over 800 times and barrels released by 2.6 
times.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \ii\ Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the 
Keystone XL Project, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental 
and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2014.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We certainly understand in many locations shipment by rail or truck 
is necessary and generally a safe delivery mode on their own. But we 
are proud that pipelines are the safest way to deliver the energy 
American consumers need and want.
    We also are not resting on improving pipeline safety. The pipeline 
industry wants to reduce the number of incidents and barrels released 
even further. That is why we partner with the American Petroleum 
Institute and our member companies on numerous industry-wide 
initiatives to improve pipeline safety.
    We have ongoing industry-wide initiatives to improve public 
engagement, develop best practices for managing geohazards and 
seismicity, improve pipeline inspection technologies, implement 
pipeline safety management systems, and share safety improvement 
lessons from pipeline incidents and near misses across our pipeline 
community. In the last several years, we have completed initiatives on 
crack management, pipeline integrity management, data integration, 
hydrotesting and emergency response. Our upcoming API-LEPA strategic 
plan for pipeline excellence will include new goals on cybersecurity, 
attracting, training and retaining quality personnel, and low carbon 
solutions. We will release that in May and will look forward to 
briefing the committee and member offices on its safety programs.
    We also look forward to Congress reauthorizing federal pipeline 
safety provisions and making improvements to PHMSA pipeline programs. 
LEPA recommends pipeline safety improvements in three categories: 1) 
Leveraging Safety Technology and Knowledge, 2) Safe Low Carbon Future, 
and 3) Improving PHMSA Safety Programs.
    I have attached to my testimony further brief summaries of each of 
our specific recommendations and so will highlight just a few here 
today. A continuing frustration for pipeline operators is how old are 
some of PHMSA's regulations. Key requirements for inspecting and 
repairing pipelines are now over 20 years old. The pipeline 
technologies and analytic methods on which they were based are woefully 
out of date, replaced by new technologies and analytic methods that 
PHMSA should reflect in its regulations but often does not. Congress in 
the 2020 PIPES Act authorized a program to demonstrate cutting edge 
pipeline safety technologies and advanced analytics. The hope is data 
from these technology pilots would help PHMSA modernize their 
regulations. However, PHMSA in implementing the program added a number 
of additional administrative hurdles and requirements beyond what 
Congress mandated, making the program untenable. We have proposals to 
unlock this program and others from unnecessary government red tape.
    The pipeline industry also supports updating regulatory 
requirements for low carbon solutions, such as carbon dioxide 
pipelines. A major buildout of CO2 pipelines is necessary to 
transport CO2 from where it is captured to where we will 
store it permanently out of harm's way. Without a new network of 
CO2 pipelines, we will not meet goals for reducing 
greenhouse gas emissions. We want policymakers and the public to know 
these CO2 pipeline systems will be covered by federal 
pipeline safety requirements. Many do not know there are already dozens 
of federal regulatory requirements administered by PHMSA covering 
CO2 pipeline safety. However, we agree that in a handful of 
discreet areas, PHMSA requirements would benefit from updates 
reflecting the latest safety approaches and learnings. We also believe 
a targeted approach is the best way for PHMSA to issue new requirements 
quickly. This would also help PHMSA avoid getting bogged down in an 
open-ended exercise that like other recent PHMSA rulemakings could take 
many years.
    We also support PHMSA having the expert pipeline safety personnel 
it needs to complete its mission. Congress often places new regulatory 
mandates on PHMSA. Similarly, lessons learned from incidents, advances 
in technology, or our changing infrastructure systems can drive the 
need for PHMSA to issue guidance or undertake rulemakings. We encourage 
Congress to help PHMSA get the experts on pipeline safety it needs to 
meet the expectations of Congress and the public.
    On this or any of our proposals or those under consideration by the 
subcommittee I'm happy to answer questions and thank the subcommittee 
again for inviting me to testify today.
                                                         Attachment
                         LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES
                  2023 Pipeline Safety Reauthorization
    The Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA) represents over 50 
pipeline operators with nearly 230,000 miles of pipelines across 
America delivering affordable, reliable and plentiful energy to 
American drivers, families, farmers, workers and shoppers.
    LEPA members deliver transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel and 
jet fuel, agriculture and rural home heating fuels like propane, 
heating fuels for the Northeastern U.S. like fuel oil and ultra low 
sulfur diesel, industrial feedstocks like ethane and butane, 
transportation fuel feedstocks like crude oil, and low carbon solutions 
like renewable diesel, ethanol, liquified petroleum gas and carbon 
dioxide. LEPA urges Congress to consider the following as they review 
federal pipeline safety laws in 2023:
               1. Leverage Safety Technology & Knowledge
    Hi-tech inspection and analytical tools, like an MRI or ultrasound 
in the doctor's office, are available for pipeline safety. However, key 
parts of PHMSA safety regulations are over 20 years old and do not 
reflect the latest advances in technology or know-how. Congress can do 
more to help modernize pipeline safety programs.
      Improve Pipeline Safety Technology Demonstration Program
      Promote Safety Sharing through Voluntary Information 
Systems
      Modernize Pipeline Incident Notification with Online 
Filing
      Allow Risk-Based Inspections for Storage Tanks
      Incorporate Leading Safety Standards into Program 
Requirements
                       2. Safe Low Carbon Future
    Pipelines are the safest way to deliver liquid products, including 
low carbon economy byproducts like carbon dioxide. While existing 
federal regulatory requirements on CO2 pipelines are 
extensive, Congress can provide additional safety measures and 
clarifications to close remaining gaps in pipeline safety programs.
      Update CO2 Pipeline Safety Standards
      Clarify Methane Regulation Scope
                    3. Improve PHMSA Safety Programs
    PHMSA, like the pipeline operators it oversees, can also benefit 
from adjustments reflecting continuous improvement efforts. Congress 
can help PHMSA increase the effectiveness and transparency of its 
pipeline safety programs and requirements.
      Optimize PHMSA Valve Inspection Scope
      Increase PHMSA Inspection Program Transparency
      Focus PHMSA Special Permit Program
      Improve PHMSA Enforcement Processes
      Provide Expert Pipeline Safety Regulatory Personnel
      Enhance Pipeline Right of Way Management
      Jumpstart Required Regulation of Idled Pipe
      Close Loophole in Penalties for Pipeline Attacks

Improve Pipeline Safety Technology Demonstration Program

Action Needed:
    Congress should prevent bureaucratic red tape from stifling new 
technologies and analytics that could improve pipeline safety.
Background:
    In the 2020 PIPES Act, Congress recognized pipeline safety could 
benefit from harnessing the latest hi-tech inspection technologies and 
analytics. Congress authorized PHMSA to conduct a pipeline safety 
technology demonstration pilot program under certain conditions. 
However, PHMSA added a host of additional administrative, regulatory 
and legal conditions to the program, effectively preventing its use.
Status:
    PHMSA has received no applications to conduct technology pilots. 
Pipeline operators cite the additional conditions PHMSA imposed in its 
implementation guidance as making the program infeasible.

Promote Safety Sharing through Voluntary Information Systems

Action Needed:
    Congress should authorize a Voluntary Information Sharing (VIS) 
program based on the recommendations of the public advisory committee 
formed pursuant to the 2016 pipeline safety reauthorization law.
Background:
    Programs where regulators, operators, vendors, unions and safety 
advocates can share information, with appropriate legal protections, 
and develop joint safety recommendations, have found success at FAA. 
Interested stakeholders developed a legislative proposal to implement 
recommendations of the Congressional VIS public advisory committee. 
That language did not reach consensus before the 2020 Pipes Act.
Status:
    Stakeholders appear to have agreement on draft legislative language 
after overcoming remaining issues which prevented VIS inclusion in the 
2020 Pipes Act.

Modernize Pipeline Incident Notification with Online Filing

Action Needed:
    Congress should require the National Response Center (NRC) to 
develop and allow use of a simple and quick online incident 
notification system.
Background:
    The NRC currently requires placing a telephone call to the NRC to 
notify it of a pipeline incident. Operators and regulators have 
experienced lengthy delays waiting for a live person to answer the 
phone at NRC. In the decades since the NRC first established its 
telephone requirement, web-based applications accessed online now allow 
for simple and quick notification to all stakeholders.
Status:
    Online notification of pipeline incidents, such as through a simple 
online app, is not currently available.

Allow Risk-Based Inspections for Storage Tanks

Action Needed:
    Congress should prevent unnecessary greenhouse gas and air 
pollutant emissions, worker safety threats and hazardous waste by 
allowing risk-based storage tank inspections.
Background:
    PHMSA regulation requires inspection of petroleum storage tanks on 
fixed schedules, regardless of their actual maintenance needs. The 
early draining and cleanout of tanks to perform unneeded inspections 
releases greenhouse gas emissions and air pollutants, subjects workers 
to unnecessary risks in confined spaces, and creates hazardous waste 
needing disposal. Current industry standards on tank inspection are 
already accepted by other federal and state agencies, including EPA's 
program.
Status:
    Engineering assessments methods to set maintenance schedules that 
avoid climate, environmental and worker impacts are available for PHMSA 
to incorporate into regulation.

Incorporate Leading Safety Standards into Program Requirements

Action Needed:
    Congress should direct PHMSA to review pipeline safety best 
practices and incorporate in a timely manner, where appropriate. 
Congress should also encourage PHMSA to participate more fully in the 
standard setting process.
Background:
    Pipeline operators develop industry-wide best practices in an open 
and multi-stakeholder collaborative process certified by the American 
National Standards Institute. These practices are technical documents 
developed by engineers and PHMSA has incorporated several into their 
regulations.
Status:
    PHMSA is often slow to incorporate the latest editions of best 
practice standards. LEPA's legislative proposal would require PHMSA to 
review the latest editions to regulated industry standards in a timely 
manner and incorporate them where appropriate through the regular 
notice and comment process.

Update CO2 Pipeline Safety Standards

Action Needed:
    Congress should direct PHMSA to update existing carbon dioxide 
pipeline safety regulations in key areas.
Background:
    Current federal pipeline safety requirements already regulate 
CO2 pipeline design, construction, operation, maintenance 
and emergency response. However, there are targeted areas in system 
coverage, impact modeling, maintenance and emergency response where 
PHMSA can do more to address the specific needs of CO2 
pipelines. These additions will promote new low carbon infrastructure.
Status:
    While PHMSA has announced general plans to impose additional 
CO2 regulation in the future, an opportunity exists to 
direct PHMSA to act more quickly in key areas that will improve 
CO2 pipeline safety.

Clarify PHMSA Methane Regulation Scope

Action Needed:
    Congress should clarify the 2020 PIPES Act provisions covering 
methane monitoring and mitigation from natural gas pipelines does not 
apply to hazardous liquids pipelines.
Background:
    The 2020 PIPES Act requires PHMSA to issue regulations for the 
monitoring and mitigation of methane from natural gas pipelines. 
Hazardous liquids pipelines delivering crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel 
or other energy liquids do not transport or release methane and the 
PIPES Act does not include them. However, some PHMSA inspectors are 
attempting to require hazardous liquids pipeline operators to update 
their inspection and maintenance plans to meet methane monitoring and 
mitigation program requirements.
Status:
    PHMSA interpretation and implementation of the 2020 PIPES Act 
methane provisions remains uneven.

Optimize PHMSA Valve Inspection Scope

Action Needed:
    Congress should direct PHMSA to revise its recent pipeline rupture 
rule to only apply additional inspection requirements to valves related 
to pipeline ruptures, and drop misapplied inspection requirements of 
all valves, including those which would not contribute to or limit a 
rupture.
Background:
    In 2022, PHMSA required semi-annual inspection of valves that could 
mitigate the extent of a pipeline rupture. However, between the 
proposed and final versions of the rule PHMSA without notice expanded 
the requirement to include all valves, even those unrelated to 
addressing ruptures. PHMSA claims this expansion was unintended but has 
not addressed the legal uncertainty created by the change.
Status:
    Informal PHMSA discussions to issue guidance would not change the 
clear regulatory language and legal liability presented by the final 
regulation.

Increase PHMSA Inspection Program Transparency

Action Needed:
    Congress should require PHMSA annually to share publicly its 
inspection priorities and number of federal and state inspections of 
pipelines across PHMSA regions. PHMSA should also ensure any guidance 
used by PHMSA inspectors is publicly available.
Background:
    The current system of PHMSA region inspections and state inspection 
of pipelines can lead to unbalanced and duplicative inspection patterns 
across the country. More transparency would help ensure PHMSA's 
inspection program is meeting pipeline safety priorities.
Status:
    While PHMSA is transparent with public sharing of its enforcement 
activities, PHMSA does not publicly share its inspection priorities or 
numbers of inspections across PHMSA regions and states.

Focus PHMSA Special Permit Program

Action Needed:
    Congress should direct PHMSA to focus requirements of its special 
permit program on issues presented by the permit request and require 
timely review of applications.
Background:
    Key PHMSA inspection and maintenance regulations are over 20 years 
old reflecting outdated technology and knowledge of the time. Federal 
law authorizes PHMSA to issue special permits varying from existing 
regulations as long they achieve equal levels of safety or are 
consistent with the public interest. However, PHMSA's special permit 
implementation program has grown over the years to include numerous 
requirements unrelated to the variances sought. Permit reviews can also 
take multiple years.
Status:
    PHMSA's special permit process remains stuck in unnecessary 
requirements, reviews and delays.

Improve PHMSA Enforcement Processes

Action Needed:
    Congress should direct PHMSA to establish a process when opening 
PHMSA enforcement proceedings to the public.
Background:
    PHMSA historically conducted informal enforcement proceedings 
without public attendance. Public interest in pipeline cases is growing 
and PHMSA has allowed public attendance. PHMSA should set an orderly 
process for public attendance and protection of confidential 
information during proceedings.
Status:
    There is no established process when opening PHMSA enforcement 
proceedings to the public.

Provide Expert Pipeline Safety Regulatory Personnel

Action Needed:
    Congress should direct DOT and PHMSA to hire experienced pipeline 
safety regulatory personnel.
Background:
    PHMSA is a small agency with personnel limitations that prevent it 
from timely addressing Congressional mandates and evolving pipeline 
safety needs. The 2020 PIPES Act authorized PHMSA to hire additional 
inspection and regulatory personnel. PHMSA used the resources to hire 
environmental policy experts and develop a methane monitoring and 
mitigation rulemaking. Work on other pipeline safety priorities face 
years of delay.
Status:
    DOT human resources requirements placed on PHMSA limited hiring to 
junior personnel with less skill and experience. There are no 
requirements to hire pipeline safety expertise.

Enhance Pipeline Right of Way Management

Action Needed:
    Congress should direct PHMSA to allow pipeline right of way 
conservation practices that benefit habitat and the environment.
Background:
    PHMSA regulations requires activities along pipeline rights of way 
which can prevent natural habitat benefitting local wildlife and the 
environment. Conservation practices are available that balance pipeline 
monitoring and conservation.
Status:
    Pipeline industry conservation initiatives are available for 
operator use if PHMSA allows the practice.

Jump Start Required Regulation of Idled Pipe

Action Needed:
    Congress should direct PHMSA to complete the Congressionally 
mandated idled pipe rulemaking.
Background:
    Operators sometimes suspend service on pipeline systems to reflect 
market conditions and temporary lack of demand for product movement 
along certain routes. However, no current PHMSA regulations govern 
maintenance and monitoring of pipelines in an idled status or the steps 
they must take to return to full service. Congress in the 2020 PIPES 
Act mandated PHMSA issue regulations addressing idled pipe.
Status:
    The Congressionally mandated 2-year deadline for PHMSA to complete 
an idled pipeline rulemaking expired December 2022. PHMSA regulatory 
agenda currently predicts it will not issue a proposal before November 
2023 with a future finalization date undetermined.

Close Loophole in Penalties for Pipeline Attacks

Action Needed:
    Congress should close loophole in criminal penalties for pipeline 
attacks that are dangerous but do not result in damage.
Background:
    Multiple past cases of attacks on pipelines and pipeline 
infrastructure posed a danger to the attackers, general public and 
environment. The federal government has obtained convictions on attacks 
resulting in physical damage to energy infrastructure. However, attacks 
that manipulate pipeline valves or other equipment, while not resulting 
in physical damage, are still dangerous due to risk of explosion or 
product release from a pressure buildup and rupture. Judges have 
dismissed prosecution of such cases because they did not result in 
physical damage, as the statute is currently interpreted.
Status:
    Provisions exist in Title 18 against damaging energy infrastructure 
and Title 49 against damaging or destroying pipeline infrastructure, 
but there are no provisions against dangerous non-damaging activities.

    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Black.
    Mr. Grubb, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

TESTIMONY OF KENNETH W. GRUBB, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, NATURAL 
GAS PIPELINES, KINDER MORGAN, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE INTERSTATE 
           NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (INGAA)

    Mr. Grubb. Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, and 
members of the subcommittee, good morning. My name is Kenneth 
Grubb, and I am the chief operating officer for natural gas 
pipelines at Kinder Morgan. As an engineer with over 30 years 
of experience in the pipeline sector, I appreciate the 
opportunity to testify before your subcommittee today.
    Kinder Morgan is one of the largest energy infrastructure 
companies in North America. We have an interest in or operate 
approximately 82,000 miles of pipeline that transport natural 
gas and other products that are essential to daily lives.
    Kinder Morgan is a member of the Interstate Natural Gas 
Association of America, also known as INGAA, which is a trade 
association that represents the interstate natural gas pipeline 
and storage industry. I am here today representing INGAA.
    INGAA's members transport the vast majority of the natural 
gas consumed in the United States through a network of 
approximately 200,000 miles of interstate transmission 
pipelines. These transmission pipelines are critical 
infrastructure systems spanning multiple States, and deliver 
natural gas to end users such as local distribution companies, 
electricity generators, industrial manufacturers, and LNG 
export facilities.
    Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil fuel, and as 
demand for energy increases, expanded use of natural gas has 
helped improve air quality across the country by offsetting the 
use of higher carbon-intensive fuels. According to the Energy 
Information Administration, between 2005 and 2019, carbon 
dioxide emissions from the U.S. power sector declined by 33 
percent, with natural gas accounting for more than half of 
those reductions.
    Additionally, INGAA's members are committed to working 
together as an industry towards achieving net-zero greenhouse 
gas emissions by 2050. With that said, there are four key 
points I wish to make today.
    First, INGAA's number-one priority is safety, and we 
support having a strong safety regulator. Regulators and 
industry experts alike, including the U.S. Department of 
Transportation and PHMSA, have agreed for decades that 
pipelines are the safest mode of energy transportation. 
Accidents are rare, and INGAA's members are committed to making 
them increasingly infrequent. INGAA's members work every day 
towards a goal of zero pipeline incidents. To help achieve this 
goal, INGAA fundamentally believes in having a strong safety 
regulator, and we also support robust, durable regulations 
written by PHMSA to ensure the safety of our Nation's pipeline 
systems.
    Second, PHMSA should complete its work on the class 
location rulemaking and issue a final rule. INGAA's top 
regulatory priority is completion of the class location 
rulemaking, which presents opportunities to increase safety and 
protect the environment. Existing regulations affecting this 
issue are over 50 years old. It is long overdue to update them 
to reflect modern safety technologies. Every year this 
regulation is not final, we estimate that 800 million standard 
cubic feet of natural gas is unnecessarily released to the 
atmosphere.
    Additionally, INGAA members unnecessarily spend between 
$200 and $300 million per year to replace perfectly safe pipe. 
INGAA is hopeful that PHMSA will quickly finalize this crucial 
rule.
    Third, the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee, also known as 
GPAC, strengthens rulemakings and should meet more frequently. 
The GPAC, which provides technical safety guidance to PHMSA, is 
comprised of equal representation from the natural gas 
industry, Federal and State agencies, and the public. Until 
recently, GPAC met frequently. However, since January 2021, the 
GPAC has only met once. With the known benefits of GPAC, INGAA 
believes that Congress should consider requiring PHMSA to hold 
at least two GPAC meetings per year.
    Lastly, PHMSA should prioritize hiring safety engineers to 
assist with its rulemakings. INGAA recognizes that pipeline 
safety regulations are complicated and often take years to 
write. To help assist with rulemaking backlogs that frequently 
occur, PHMSA should hire more safety engineers who already 
understand pipeline systems. This will result in a more 
efficient process to produce effective rules.
    In conclusion, I truly appreciate the opportunity to 
testify in front of your subcommittee today. Your efforts are 
critical to ensuring PHMSA has the resources and direction 
necessary to continually improve safety in our industry.
    I look forward to your questions, and I thank you for your 
time.
    [Mr. Grubb's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
   Prepared Statement of Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer, 
Natural Gas Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc., on behalf of the Interstate 
               Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)
    Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:
    Good morning. My name is Kenneth Grubb, and I am the Chief 
Operating Officer for Natural Gas Pipelines at Kinder Morgan.
    Kinder Morgan is one of the largest energy infrastructure companies 
in North America. Access to reliable, affordable energy is a critical 
component to improving lives around the world, and we are committed to 
providing energy transportation and storage services in a safe, 
efficient, and environmentally responsible manner for the benefit of 
people, communities, and businesses we serve. We have an interest in or 
operate approximately 82,000 miles of pipelines, 140 terminals, 700 
billion cubic feet (Bcf) of working natural gas storage capacity and 
have renewable natural gas generation capacity of approximately 2.2 Bcf 
per year of gross production with up to an additional 5.2 Bcf in 
development. Our pipelines transport natural gas, renewable fuels, 
refined petroleum products, crude oil, condensate, CO2 and 
other products, and our terminals store and handle various commodities 
including gasoline, diesel fuel, chemicals, ethanol, metals and 
petroleum coke.
    Kinder Morgan is a member of the Interstate Natural Gas Association 
of America (INGAA), which is a trade association that represents the 
interstate natural gas pipeline and storage industry. I am here today 
representing INGAA.
    INGAA's members transport the vast majority of the natural gas 
consumed in the United States through a network of approximately 
200,000 miles of interstate transmission pipelines. These transmission 
pipelines are analogous to the interstate highway system; in other 
words, they are large capacity, critical infrastructure systems 
spanning multiple states or regions to deliver natural gas to end users 
such as local distribution companies, electricity generators, 
industrial manufacturers and LNG export facilities.
    I serve as Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the Natural Gas 
Pipelines Group for Kinder Morgan, Inc. In this capacity, I am 
responsible for all operational activities of the Kinder Morgan Natural 
Gas Pipelines Group, which encompasses approximately 70,000 miles of 
pipelines including natural gas transmission, gas storage, gathering, 
and processing facilities. I have served in this capacity since 2017. 
Before assuming this role, I held various other roles in operations, 
engineering, system design, project management, and construction and 
have over 32 years of experience in the energy sector.
    For more than a decade, the shale revolution has gifted our country 
with abundant natural gas supplies, which has elevated the need for 
additional infrastructure to move it around the country. Pipelines make 
it possible to deliver North America's abundant natural gas reserves to 
fuel our homes, businesses, and the American economy, and are the 
safest and most efficient way to transport this critical energy source.
    INGAA's members deliver clean, abundant, affordable natural gas 
throughout North America. Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil 
fuel and, as demand for energy increases, expanded use of natural gas 
has helped improve air quality across the country by offsetting the use 
of higher carbon-intensive fuels. According to the Energy Information 
Administration, between 2005-2019, carbon dioxide emissions from the 
U.S. power sector declined by 33 percent, with natural gas accounting 
for more than half of those reductions. INGAA's members are committed 
to modernizing our nation's interstate natural gas delivery network 
infrastructure, lowering emissions from our operations, and mitigating 
the impacts of climate change by working together as an industry 
towards achieving net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing. There are 
four key points I wish to make in this testimony on behalf of the 
natural gas transmission pipeline industry.
   1. INGAA's number one priority is safety, and we support having a 
                        strong safety regulator.
    Regulators and industry experts alike, including the U.S. 
Department of Transportation and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration (PHMSA), have agreed for decades that pipelines 
are the safest mode of energy transportation. Accidents are rare, and 
INGAA's members are committed to making them increasingly infrequent. 
INGAA's members work every day towards a goal of zero pipeline 
incidents.
    INGAA fundamentally believes in having a strong safety regulator. 
For years, INGAA has sought robust, durable regulations led by PHMSA to 
ensure that all operators are held accountable to operate their systems 
in the safest manner possible. We take our commitment to safety 
seriously and appreciate the role that PHMSA plays to ensure that 
industry keeps its focus, and the public can have confidence in the 
safety and reliability of natural gas pipelines.
    Pipeline companies consider safety every step of the way, from 
planning, to construction, to maintenance. Our members purchase top-
quality materials, address any potential safety or security issues 
during the pipeline planning and citing process, and conduct consistent 
quality and safety checks throughout the construction process. Once 
operational, pipeline companies work to prevent releases by evaluating, 
inspecting, and maintaining pipelines.
    Kinder Morgan is committed to the safe operations of our assets. 
Our pipeline and personal safety program metrics along with our safety 
goals are transparent to the public and are prominently posted on our 
website. We remain engaged with PHMSA and in-line inspection (ILI) tool 
vendors to further the development of ILI tool technology. As an 
example, one of Kinder Morgan's pipelines was the first to gain PHMSA 
acceptance to utilize Electro-Magnetic Acoustic Transducer (EMAT) 
technology to assess for the presence of environmentally induced 
cracking threats in lieu of the traditional hydrostatic testing 
technology that was used to manage these threats previously.
    As part of on-going safety, pipeline companies conduct integrity 
management and continuous improvement programs in the areas of 
evaluation, inspection, and maintenance. A key component of integrity 
management programs is the use of ILI tools, sometimes called ``smart 
pigs.'' Pipeline companies run these tools to detect any potentially 
harmful defects in the pipeline. These modern methods of pipe 
inspection have improved greatly over the last 30 years and are more 
effective, efficient, and environmentally sound compared to other 
assessment methods, with the added benefit of not significantly 
interrupting the operation of the pipeline.
    INGAA's commitment to safety has been an essential priority for 
years. After the unfortunate and tragic incident in San Bruno, 
California, in 2010, INGAA member companies worked proactively to 
improve the industry's safety performance. This effort developed a set 
of guiding principles for pipeline safety, anchored around a goal of 
zero pipeline incidents, titled the ``Integrity Management, Continuous 
Improvement'' (IMCI) program. Since its inception, our industry has 
made rapid advances in safety technology and practices in continuous 
pursuit of our achieving this goal.
    INGAA members recently updated the IMCI program to ensure the 
reliability and resiliency of our infrastructure as we work to safely 
support the energy transition and evolve to a net-zero GHG economy. 
Similar to the EMAT technology previously mentioned, we also focused on 
advancing safety from newer technologies that will hopefully become 
more widespread throughout the industry and by regulators. This updated 
effort, titled IMCI 2.0 was created with the input of PHMSA, the 
National Transportation Safety Board, the National Association of 
Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the National Association of Pipeline 
Safety Representatives, and the Pipeline Safety Trust. The IMCI effort 
follows five guiding principles:
    1.  Our goal is zero incidents;
    2.  We are committed to a strong safety culture;
    3.  We will be relentless in our pursuit of improving by learning;
    4.  We are committed to implementing and continuously improving 
pipeline safety; management systems, and;
    5.  We will regularly engage our stakeholders.

    INGAA's work on the IMCI 2.0 program is nearly complete and we plan 
to share the results with key stakeholders later this year.
2. PHMSA should complete its work on the class location rulemaking and 
                          issue a final rule.
    INGAA's top regulatory priority with PHMSA is completion of the 
class location rulemaking, which presents opportunities to increase 
safety and protect the environment. The class location change 
regulations have not been substantively updated in over 50 years and 
revising them has been an INGAA goal for more than two decades. We were 
pleased that PHMSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on the 
class location rule in October 2020. We were also greatly appreciative 
that Congress included a provision in the enacted 2020 PIPES Act that 
required the agency to hold a Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) 
meeting to review the NPRM by the end of 2021.
    This proposed rulemaking would address scenarios where population 
changes around our pipelines necessitate changes to existing pipeline 
infrastructure. When a class location change occurs, the current 
regulations may require operators to replace the existing pipe even 
when an engineering assessment, including modern inspection tools, has 
shown it to be in safe, operational condition. The advancements in ILI 
tools and other safety technologies help enhance company decision 
making to make repairs and, in many cases, lessen the need for 
disruptive pipe replacements.
    This causes two main problems. When PHMSA requires operators to 
replace pipes, operators must ensure that no gas is in the pipe they 
are about to replace, which results in service disruptions and natural 
gas being released to the atmosphere. Secondly, INGAA estimates that 
the existing requirements costs its members $200-$300 million per year 
to unnecessarily replace perfectly safe pipe. These funds could be 
better used to address other aspects of our safety systems.
    INGAA also estimates that class change pipe replacements under the 
current regulations result in up to 800 million standard cubic feet of 
natural gas blowdowns to the atmosphere annually. To put that into 
perspective, this quantity of gas could meet the needs of over 10,000 
homes for a year and has the same GHG reduction benefits of removing 
80,000 cars from the road. The single best way to further reduce 
methane emissions by the natural gas pipeline industry is to decrease 
the number of ``blow downs'' or voluntary releases of gas. Finalizing 
the rulemaking would substantially decrease methane emissions by 
stopping these unnecessary releases of gas into the atmosphere.
    Historically, in place of a class location pipeline replacement 
change, INGAA members have submitted special permit applications to 
prove the safety of their pipes. However, these applications are 
burdensome to not only the industry, but also to PHMSA. Some of the 
problems include the process changing regularly and that it can take up 
to three years to approve a single permit. Finalizing this rule will 
provide regulatory certainty and consistency for industry stakeholders 
and the regulator.
    INGAA is hopeful that PHMSA will hold a GPAC meeting as soon as 
possible and issue this crucial rule to improve safety and meet the 
collective goal of industry and the Biden Administration to lower GHG 
emissions.
 3. The Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) strengthens rulemakings 
                    and should meet more frequently.
    The GPAC is an advisory committee to the Department of 
Transportation and PHMSA on matters of natural gas pipeline safety and 
regulatory oversight. The GPAC is comprised of 15 members, with equal 
representation from the natural gas industry, federal and state 
agencies, and the public (such as safety advocates and emergency 
managers). GPAC's stated role is to review PHMSA's proposed regulatory 
initiatives to ensure the technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-
effectiveness, and practicability of each proposal. PHMSA is not bound 
by GPAC recommendations but must include its rationale for disagreeing 
with the recommendations in the preamble text of final rules. These 
processes are required by statute.
    GPAC can play an important role in completing our collective 
objective to enhance gas pipeline safety regulations. The time needed 
to complete a rulemaking is affected, in part, by the quantity and 
quality of dialogue with impacted stakeholders. Their dialogue is 
especially important when the subject of a rulemaking is a complex, 
technical topic such as pipeline safety regulation. New rules should 
leverage stakeholder knowledge and expertise to facilitate the 
deployment of new technologies and practices that are more effective 
and efficient, and less disruptive than the legacy methods that may be 
reflected in existing regulations.
    Until recently, GPAC met regularly to consider important rules and 
discuss important safety advancements. However, since January 2021, the 
GPAC has only met once. With the known benefits of GPAC, INGAA believes 
that Congress should consider requiring PHMSA to hold at least two GPAC 
meetings per year.
    Furthermore, PHMSA has chosen to disagree with a number of 
unanimous GPAC recommendations to multiple recent important final 
rules. While INGAA does not challenge PHMSA's independence to make 
these decisions, we believe that Congress can strengthen transparency 
by receiving detailed briefings from PHMSA on their rationales for 
these conclusions soon after issuing final rules.
 4. PHMSA should prioritize hiring safety engineers to assist with its 
                              rulemakings.
    As I stated earlier, INGAA appreciates the important role of having 
a strong safety regulator. An effective way to remain strong is for 
PHMSA to invest in hiring qualified safety engineers to assist with 
writing rules.
    INGAA recognizes that pipeline safety regulations are complicated 
and often take years of work to be drafted and implemented. To help 
assist with the rulemaking backlogs that frequently occur, adding 
safety engineers to PHMSA's team who already understand pipeline 
systems and federal code would be a great asset to the agency.
    INGAA was pleased that Congress included in Section 102 of the 
PIPES Act of 2020 provisions requiring PHMSA to hire ``eight full-time 
employees with subject matter expertise in pipeline safety, pipeline 
facilities, and pipeline systems to finalize outstanding rulemakings 
and fulfill congressional mandates.'' We are hopeful that PHMSA can 
successfully hire safety engineers to fulfil this requirement in a 
timely manner.
    In conclusion, I truly appreciate the opportunity to testify in 
front of your Subcommittee today. Your efforts are critical to ensuring 
that PHMSA has the resources and direction necessary to continually 
improve safety in our industry.

    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Grubb.
    Mr. Caram, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

 TESTIMONY OF BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY 
                             TRUST

    Mr. Caram. Thank you, Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, 
and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to speak 
today on pipeline safety.
    My organization, the Pipeline Safety Trust, was formed 
after the devastating Olympic pipeline tragedy that stole the 
lives of three boys in Bellingham, Washington, in 1999, a 
tragedy Ranking Member Larsen so eloquently described.
    The U.S. Justice Department was so appalled at the 
operations of the pipeline company and the lax oversight from 
the Federal Government that they asked the Federal courts to 
set aside money from the settlement to create the Pipeline 
Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog over the 
pipeline industry and its regulators. And it is with that 
spirit that I am speaking to you today.
    Everyone here today values safe communities, and we all 
share the goal of zero incidents. However, pipeline failures 
continue unabated, and we now face a potential new generation 
of nonhydrocarbon pipelines posing their own unique risks to 
our communities, and making our goal of zero incidents even 
further out of reach.
    Since the last pipeline safety legislation was passed in 
December of 2020, a bit over 2 years ago, our Nation's 
pipelines have had over 1,300 reportable failures, more than 1 
per day, killed or injured to the point of in-patient 
hospitalization 74 people, and caused nearly $1 billion in 
property damage. These failures include recent tragedies like 
the El Paso gas transmission pipeline explosion that killed 
two, including a 14-year-old girl, and the Consumers Energy 
explosion in Flint, Michigan, that killed two, including a 3-
year-old girl, and also many high-profile hazardous liquid 
failures spilling millions of gallons of oil and gasoline into 
our rivers, oceans, and groundwater, including Colonial 
Pipeline's more than 2-million-gallon gasoline spill in a 
nature preserve in Huntersville, North Carolina.
    To give a brief overview of our Nation's state of pipeline 
safety, I am sad to say that, when looking at the data, we 
haven't made much progress. We can, of course, pick out time 
periods to show trends either going up or down. However, going 
back to 2010, which I believe to be an objective starting 
point, since that is when PHMSA changed some of its reporting 
criteria, incident trends on all categories of pipelines, 
including incidents impacting people or the environment, are 
statistically flat. We are not making progress.
    To start making a real difference on pipeline safety. 
Congress needs to remove the statutory handcuffs it has placed 
on the rules PHMSA can produce. PHMSA is the only agency with a 
statutory cost-benefit requirement, an especially difficult 
hurdle to clear for infrastructure with low probabilities of 
failure, yet enormously devastating consequences.
    PHMSA is also prohibited by statute from adopting design, 
initial testing, and construction standards that would apply to 
the existing 3 million miles of existing pipelines. Because of 
this nonapplication clause, PHMSA has been unable to require 
rupture mitigation valves in high-consequence areas--an NTSB 
recommendation after PG&E's pipeline tragedy in San Bruno, 
California, in 2010. Of course, it is the aging infrastructure 
of existing pipelines that need this kind of lifesaving 
technology the most.
    I want to take a moment to discuss one specific pipeline 
failure from 2020, a carbon dioxide pipeline operated by 
Denbury that failed near Satartia, Mississippi. Carbon dioxide 
is an asphyxiant that is heavier than air, and can therefore 
travel in dangerous and even lethal concentrations for long 
distances, displacing oxygen.
    Nearly the entire community of 200 in Satartia was 
evacuated, with 45 of them seeking treatment at the hospital. 
Residents lost consciousness, had seizures, foamed at the 
mouth. First responders heroically pulled many to safety while 
donning scuba gear, probably saving lives, their truck engines 
unable to operate in the oxygen-deprived environment. The 
community of Satartia is incredibly lucky to not have suffered 
any fatalities.
    As Congress has highly incentivized carbon capture and 
sequestration, communities are looking at a potentially 
enormous buildout of CO2 pipelines. Currently 
relatively rare and remote, experts are predicting a future 
with 20 times or more the amount of CO2 pipelines, 
and much closer to communities.
    On top of this, they are dangerously unregulated. Current 
PHMSA standards only regulate CO2 pipelines if in a 
supercritical fluid with more than 90 percent purity. 
Therefore, gas and liquid CO2 pipelines are 
unregulated. Many man-made sources of CO2 can have 
much higher levels of impurities that pose public health and 
pipeline integrity issues such as corrosion. There are no PHMSA 
standards on levels of these dangerous impurities. Congress 
should mandate that PHMSA regulate these and the other equally 
frightening regulatory gaps that need to be addressed before 
the public can have any kind of confidence in a potential 
national buildout of CO2 pipelines.
    In order to honor the value we place on safe communities, 
Congress needs to give PHMSA more authority, more resources, 
and implement the safety recommendations I have detailed in my 
written testimony.
    Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. I look 
forward to answering any questions the subcommittee may have 
and helping Congress improve the Nation's state of pipeline 
safety.
    [Mr. Caram's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety 
                                 Trust
    Good morning, Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, Committee Chair 
Graves, Committee Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the Committee. 
Thank you for inviting me to speak today on the vital subject of 
pipeline safety. My name is Bill Caram, and I am the Executive Director 
of the Pipeline Safety Trust.
    The Pipeline Safety Trust was created after the Olympic Pipe Line 
tragedy in Bellingham, Washington in 1999. That entirely preventable 
failure spilled nearly a quarter-million gallons of gasoline into a 
beautiful salmon stream in the heart of our community which eventually 
ignited and killed three boys. The U.S. Justice Department was so 
appalled at the operations of the pipeline company and equally appalled 
at the lax oversight from the federal government, that they asked the 
federal courts to set aside money from the settlement to create the 
Pipeline Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog organization 
over the pipeline industry and its regulators.
    We work to ensure that no other community must endure the senseless 
grief that Bellingham has had to experience from a pipeline tragedy. 
Sadly, there have been many senseless pipeline tragedies and disasters 
since Bellingham. I am here today, hoping that we can continue to work 
together in a bipartisan way, to help us move towards our shared goal 
of zero incidents. Today I would like to focus my testimony on:
      Overview of the state of U.S. pipeline safety
      Critical pipeline safety issues
      +  Eliminate cost-benefit requirements under 49 U.S.C. Sec.  
60102
      +  Eliminate the nonapplication clause in 49 U.S.C. Sec.  
60104(b)
      +  Include mandamus clause
      +  Prohibit reportable unintended releases
      +  Increase authorized appropriations and add recruitment and 
retention flexibility
      +  Require rupture mitigation valves on existing gas pipelines in 
High Consequence Areas
      +  Improve carbon dioxide pipeline safety regulations
      +  Improve hydrogen pipeline safety
      +  Improve geohazard mitigation regulations
      +  Natural gas incident reporting
      Public transparency improvements
      +  National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) Improvements
      +  Require operators to disclose certain safety information
      +  Improve reporting data metrics
      +  Create Office of Public Engagement
      Other needed safety improvements
      +  Increase penalties
      +  Eliminate natural gas operator's choice in determining High 
Consequence Areas
      +  Close class location loophole on building occupancy
      +  Eliminate safety related condition report exemptions
      +  Require mandatory reporting of liquid over-pressurization 
events
      +  Require improvements to state 811 damage prevention programs
      +  Mandate offshore pipeline safety improvements
      +  Clarify ``confirmed discovery'' definition
      Appendix
      +  Statutory and regulatory language where appropriate
             Overview of the State of U.S. Pipeline Safety
    Since Congress passed the PIPES Act of 2020, a little over two 
years ago, there have been 1,300 reportable pipeline failures, more 
than one per day, 74 people have been either killed or injured to the 
point of in-patient hospitalization, and nearly $1 Billion in property 
damage.
    While everyone on today's panel supports the goal of zero 
incidents, unfortunately, we have a long way to go. While you can slice 
and dice data opportunistically to demonstrate progress, when you look 
at the PHMSA reported data objectively, we are not making real progress 
on pipeline safety. My organization looked at the data going back to 
2010 since that is when PHMSA changed some reporting. That is the 
longest period we can analyze without some data manipulation, and we 
believe that to be an objective starting point. Total incidents for gas 
and hazardous liquids show a trend line going down very slightly--a 
basically flat line with no real progress over the past twelve years.


             Source: PHMSA Incident and Mileage Data (2023)



             Source: PHMSA Incident and Mileage Data (2023)

    Filtering for only those incidents deemed ``significant'' by PHMSA, 
we see a trend that is slightly increasing. For all the progress the 
industry touts on technological advancements and safety management 
systems, we are not moving towards our target of zero incidents.
    Also of concern is the fact that approximately two-thirds of all 
incidents and significant incidents are from causes that are under the 
operator's direct control such as corrosion, incorrect operations, 
equipment failures, and problems with materials, welds, and equipment.



    Over the past twenty years, regulators and industry have focused 
much emphasis in reducing pipeline incidents on ``Integrity 
Management'' efforts in ``High Consequence Areas.'' The theory behind 
Integrity Management programs makes perfect sense--focus efforts in 
those areas where the most harm to people and the environment may 
occur, work hard to identify all risks in those areas, put into place 
programs to test for and mitigate those risks, and implement a 
continuous improvement program to drive down the number of failures.
    Unfortunately, for both hazardous liquid and gas transmission 
pipelines these Integrity Management programs do not seem to have lived 
up to their promise. Incident rates within High Consequence Areas as 
compared to outside HCAs continue to climb in the case of hazardous 
liquid pipelines and do no better with regards to gas transmission 
pipelines. These two graphs, generated from PHMSA's Integrity 
Management Data, demonstrate our concern with current integrity 
management programs. Some in the industry argue that older, 
prescriptive class location rules can now be relaxed because of the 
implementation of Integrity Management, but as the graphs show: It is 
too early to go to a performance-based Integrity Management system 
until the industry can prove that Integrity Management works as it 
should.
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    The below chart visualizes the ratio of incident rates inside HCAs 
vs outside. Values above zero mean that HCA rates are worse inside an 
HCA vs outside, meaning Integrity Management programs are not working.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

               Incident Rate = Incidents per 1,000 Miles
  Source: PHMSA Annual Reports, Flagged Files, and Mileage Data (2005-
                                Present)

                    Critical Pipeline Safety Issues
    Please note, suggested statutory and regulatory language is 
provided for each issue, when applicable, in the appendix at the end of 
this testimony.
Eliminate cost-benefit requirements under 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60102
    PHMSA rulemaking is subject to two sets of cost-benefit 
requirements: one under the Pipeline Safety Act and one under Executive 
Order 12866, which requires an economic analysis of every major rule 
reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. While the additional 
analysis does not mandate that the benefit of new regulations outweigh 
the cost, that is often how the industry and PHMSA itself views this 
requirement--making passage of new regulations difficult or nearly 
impossible in some areas. In fact, the industry, represented by 
American Petroleum Institute (API) and GPA Midstream, are suing PHMSA 
over its new gas gathering rule.\1\
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    \1\ Tom DiChristopher, Pipeline Industry Takes Dispute Over US 
Gathering Line Rule to Court, S&P Global (June 7, 2022) https://
www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-
headlines/pipeline-industry-takes-dispute-over-us-gathering-line-rule-
to-court-70713022.
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    In 1996, a concerted Congressional effort was made to insert cost-
benefit analysis requirements into rulemaking requirements under a 
whole host of environmental protection and health statutes, presumably 
to reduce regulatory burden and codify the requirements for regulatory 
cost benefit analyses put in place by Presidents Reagan and Clinton in 
Executive Orders. Those Congressional efforts ultimately fell short of 
widespread success because so many members of Congress realized how 
such measures in the statute would provide a well-funded industry a 
strong litigation hook that would make easy to challenge new 
regulations and nearly impossible to protect people's health and 
safety. The 1996 reauthorization of the pipeline safety program, based 
solely on timing, represents the only health and safety or 
environmental protection statute where such an explicit directive to an 
administrative agency to base regulation of risk on a cost-benefit test 
was inserted into law.\2\
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    \2\ Sara Gosman, Justifying Safety: The Paradox of Rationality, 
Social Sci. Res. Network (Apr. 22, 2017).
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    We urge Congress to put PHMSA's rulemaking on an even playing field 
with all other agencies by amending 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60102 to eliminate 
references to the risk assessment/cost-benefit analysis in Sec.  
60102(b)(2)(D) and (E); Sec.  60102(b)(3), (4), (5) and (6). PHMSA 
would remain subject to the requirements of the Executive Orders 
requiring a cost benefit analysis of major rules proposed by any 
agency, and the requirements for transparency in rulemaking provided by 
the existing statute and procedures.
Eliminate the Nonapplication Clause in 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60104(b)
    49 U.S.C. Sec.  60104(b) specifically prohibits PHMSA from adopting 
a design, installation, construction, initial inspection, or initial 
testing standard from applying to existing pipelines.
    After PGE's tragic failure in San Bruno, CA, when operators were 
unable to close valves and isolate the fuel feeding the blowtorch 
destroying a neighborhood for nearly two hours, NTSB recommended PHMSA 
require operators to install Automatic-Shut-Off or Remote-Controlled 
Valves in all High-Consequence Areas (HCAs), including existing 
pipelines.\3\ Even if such a regulation could survive the statutory 
cost-benefit requirement, it would be prohibited by section 60104(b). 
This means that despite the fact that the science behind safe pipeline 
operation continues to develop, there will almost always be thousands 
or even millions of miles of operational pipelines to which improved 
safety standards will never apply. Often, it is the ageing pipelines 
that need these minimum safety improvements the most. Additionally, 
this is a critical problem at this moment in history, when 
congressional investments have been made that have spurred interest in 
developing carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines. Because of the 
nonapplication clause, if PHMSA does modernize its woefully out-of-date 
CO2 pipeline construction standards or develop special 
standards for hydrogen pipelines prior to their construction, the 
regulations will not apply to any pipelines already in the ground.
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    \3\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Accident Report: Pacific Gas and 
Electric Company Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Rupture and Fire San 
Bruno, California September 9, 2010, NSTB/PAR-11/01 (Aug. 30, 2011) 
https://tinyurl.com/56tfuw9w
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    Congress should eliminate the nonapplication clause found at 49 
U.S.C. Sec.  60104(b) to ensure that design, installation, 
construction, initial inspection, and initial testing standards can 
apply to existing pipelines when appropriate.
Include Mandamus Clause
    In 2015, the City of San Francisco, after witnessing the terrible 
nearby tragedy in San Bruno, felt so strongly that PHMSA was failing to 
uphold the statutory requirements and Congressional mandates under the 
Pipeline Safety Act that it went to court to force PHMSA to do so. The 
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, without addressing the merits of the 
case, dismissed the case with an opinion holding that the Pipeline 
Safety Act does not provide the basis of a mandamus action to force 
PHMSA to carry out a duty under the Act.\4\ The court relied, in part, 
on the absence of any explicit mandamus remedy at 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60121 
(``Actions by private persons'').
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    \4\ City & County of San Francisco v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., No. 
12-cv-0711 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2013) (granting motion to dismiss) 
https://tinyurl.com/kecae69f.
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    The Trust strongly believes that local and state governments, and 
others, should be able to ask the courts to carry out what Congress has 
required of it in statute. This is a common protection in many other 
laws. We urge Congress to include the following language in this year's 
reauthorization to close this loophole.
Prohibit Reportable Unintended Releases
    In 2013, a major failure occurred on ExxonMobil's Pegasus Pipeline 
in Arkansas causing 134,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into a 
neighborhood, contaminating homes and yards, a creek, wetlands, and 
Lake Conway. In a review of the PHMSA enforcement action following the 
2013 spill, the Fifth Circuit found that an operator can cause a 
reportable incident, or even a significant incident, without 
necessarily having violated a safety regulation.\5\ As written, the 
pipeline safety statutes do not expressly prohibit the release of gas 
or hazardous liquid from a pipeline.
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    \5\ ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., Order on 
Petition for Review, No. 16-60448 (Aug. 14, 2017) https://
www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/16/16-60448-CV0.pdf.
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    To close that loophole, the Pipeline Safety Trust proposes that 
section 60118 be amended to require operators to avoid releases of gas 
or hazardous liquids in quantities that would make them reportable 
incidents under PHMSA regulations. This section is subject to 
enforcement by PHMSA under Sec.  60122 or by the Attorney General under 
Sec.  60120.
Increase Authorized Appropriations and Add Recruitment and Retention 
        Flexibility
    PHMSA, already a notoriously underfunded and understaffed agency, 
has had large increases in Congressional mandates without a 
corresponding increase in funding. For example, nearly 100,000 miles of 
gas gathering lines have finally come under PHMSA regulations and 
another approximately 300,000 miles are under new reporting 
requirements. Also on the horizon is a new generation of pipelines 
carrying carbon dioxide and hydrogen, requiring new expertise and 
personnel. State programs, responsible for oversight of more than 80% 
of the nation's pipeline mileage, are also feeling the squeeze on their 
capacity.
    PHMSA has long been considered underfunded and understaffed and 
therefore reliant on the industry it is tasked to regulate for 
technical expertise on rulemaking. A 2015 Politico investigation \6\ 
found that PHMSA is an agency ``that lacks the manpower to inspect the 
nation's . . . oil and gas lines, that grants the industry it regulates 
significant power to influence the rule-making process, and that has 
stubbornly failed to take a more aggressive regulatory role, even when 
ordered by Congress to do so.'' PHMSA has also long had difficulty in 
attracting and retaining experienced personnel as the industry often 
hires staff away at higher salaries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Andrea Restuccia and Elana Shor, Pipelines Blow Up and People 
Die, Politico (Apr. 21, 2015) https://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/
the-little-pipeline-agency-that-couldnt-217227
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    Critical components to changing this culture are authorizing 
significantly more funding and allowing more flexibility in the 
recruitment and retainment of experienced personnel. We also recommend 
a significant increase to authorized funding of PHMSA's state programs.
    Congress should, when amending Section 60125 of title 49, 
subsection (a), include a substantial increase to PHMSA's authorized 
funding to reflect the enormous increase in their charge as previously 
described. Congress should also include a substantial increase for the 
State Pipeline Safety Grant Program authorized in Section 60107 of 
title 49.
Require Rupture Mitigation Valves on Existing Gas Pipelines in High 
        Consequence Areas
    Advancements to rupture mitigation valve technology have been made 
and adopted into PHMSA's regulations, but these regulations do not 
apply to existing pipelines, even on older pipes in areas that could 
affect densely populated areas. Arguably these are the pipelines that 
need this technology the most.
    In 2022, PHMSA revised its pipeline safety regulations to require 
rupture mitigation valves (RMVs), or alternative equivalent 
technologies, to newly constructed or entirely replaced onshore gas 
transmission, Type A gas gathering, and hazardous liquid pipelines with 
diameters of 6 inches or greater.\7\ The rule did not, however, require 
operators to retrofit older pipes because of the nonapplication clause 
found at 49 U.S.C. Sec. `104(b), which prohibits the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) from promulgating 
regulations to existing facilities. Because of this, PHMSA fell short 
of adequately implementing NTSB's recommendation.\8\
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    \7\ Pipeline Safety: Requirement of Valve Installation and Minimum 
Rupture Detection Standards, 87 Fed. Reg. 20,940-992 (Apr. 8, 2022).
    \8\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Press Release: NTSB Issues Response 
to PHMSA's Valve and Rupture Detection Rule, (Apr. 1, 2022) https://
www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20220401B.aspx
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    Excluding certain pipelines from implementation of critical safety 
technology based on age is dangerous. Older pipes are likely more prone 
to failure, and it is arbitrary to require critical safety technology 
on some but not all pipelines. Requiring operator to retrofit older 
pipelines with RMVs in HCAs would protect areas with more people and 
buildings that could be affected by a failure. 49 C.F.R. Sec.  192.903. 
Because of the nonapplication clause, however, Congress must draft 
self-executing language for PHMSA to have the authority to promulgate 
these regulations.ggested language is provided in the appendix.
Improve Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Safety Regulations
    Given the Congressional incentives driving carbon capture and 
sequestration investment, many experts expect a large increase in the 
mileage of the nation's carbon dioxide (CO2) pipelines. Once 
relatively rare and remote, these pipelines will soon be much closer to 
people and communities. The Denbury CO2 pipeline failure in 
Satartia, MS demonstrated the unique safety risks that these pipelines 
pose. An asphyxiant that is heavier than air, CO2 can move 
as a plume in a dangerous and even lethal concentration close to the 
ground for long distances after a failure. Current PHMSA safety 
regulations are inappropriate and insufficient, as described in a 
Pipeline Safety Trust report.\9\
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    \9\ Accufacts, Inc., Accufacts' Perspectives on the State of 
Federal Carbon Dioxide Transmission Pipeline Safety Regulations as it 
Relates to Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration within the 
U.S. (Mar. 23, 2022) https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/3-
23-22-Final-Accufacts-CO2-Pipeline-Report2.pdf
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      The current definition of ``carbon dioxide'' in the 
federal pipeline safety regulation does not apply to all CO2 
pipelines that may be developed for CCS projects.
      +  Currently, only CO2 that is moved in a 
supercritical state is regulated under the current definition, meaning 
gaseous and liquid CO2 pipelines are not currently 
regulated.
      There is currently no defined safe distance or plume 
dispersion model for developing a potential impact radius (PIR) along 
CO2 pipelines.
      +  CO2 has unique physical properties which warrant 
the development of a unique PIR zone to be promulgated into federal 
pipeline regulation.
      There is currently no requirement to add an odorant to 
transported CO2.
      +  Carbon dioxide is odorless, colorless, doesn't burn, and is 
heavier than air meaning that releases are harder to observe and 
therefore avoid.
      The unique physical properties of CO2 moved at 
high pressures through pipelines can cause running ductile fractures 
upon rupturing.
      +  This essentially means that a pipe has a higher likelihood of 
opening up like a zipper when a rupture occurs, leading to more product 
being released over a shorter period of time and potentially violent 
and dangerous pipe shrapnel.
      Contaminants within CO2 products being 
transported can jeopardize the integrity of the pipeline.
      +  Water, when mixed with carbon dioxide, can form carbonic acid 
which can rapidly erode carbon steel.
      +  Different industries can produce numerous other contaminants, 
including SOx and NOx, which can be toxic to public health, affect the 
temperature and pressure of the product, and/or cause corrosion, 
potentially impacting the safe operation of the pipeline.
      The risks associated with the conversion of existing 
transmission pipelines to CO2 service have not been fully 
investigated.
      +  Given the unique properties of CO2 mentioned 
previously, pipeline conversions have the potential to be at higher 
risk of failure from CO2 service than conventional 
hydrocarbon or even new construction CO2 pipelines.

    For the public to have any confidence in the safety of these 
pipelines proposed through communities, regulations need to be 
modernized. However, given the small number of existing mileage of 
CO2 pipelines, PHMSA may not have enough information to 
preemptively justify the cost of such improvements.
    Congress should require PHMSA to promulgate rules addressing each 
of the above-listed regulatory gaps. Given CO2's physical 
properties, unique safety risks, and ability to be transported in 
multiple phases, PHMSA should allot CO2 its own section of 
code, CFR Part 197. These rules should not be subject to PHMSA's 
statutory cost-benefit requirement.
Improve Hydrogen Pipeline Safety
    Hydrogen has been highly incentivized in recent legislation such as 
the Production Tax Credit in the Inflation Reduction Act. Gas 
distribution operators are considering blending hydrogen into existing 
gas distribution infrastructure and the trade group the American Gas 
Association includes hydrogen blends of 20% as a key component of their 
Net Zero plan for the industry.\10\ However, hydrogen transportation by 
pipeline poses many safety risks and key knowledge gaps remain. The 
risks run highest when the pipelines are near people. At least one 
operator in Hawaii has blended hydrogen, however that system is unique 
enough that it likely cannot serve as a model for the rest of the 
country.
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    \10\ American Gas Association, Net Zero Emissions Opportunities for 
Gas Utilities (Feb. 8, 2022) https://www.aga.org/wp-content/uploads/
2022/02/aga-net-zero-emissions-opportunities-for-gas-utilities.pdf
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    Hydrogen has a much higher flammability range than methane and is 
known to embrittle certain types of steel pipelines. A report on 
blending hydrogen commissioned by the California Public Utility 
Commission from University of California Riverside found an alarming 
number of safety risks and knowledge gaps. A report by Accufacts 
commissioned by the Pipeline Safety Trust \11\ stated that the weakest 
safety link for hydrogen blends in the distribution system were the 
pipes inside residences. Additionally, hydrogen has less energy density 
by volume of methane, so any blend will only deliver about a third of 
the greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., a 20% blend of hydrogen will reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions by less than 7%). Hydrogen is also a potent 
indirect greenhouse gas itself with a propensity to leak, therefore 
leaks could quickly erode all the intended climate benefits.\12\
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    \11\ Accufacts, Inc., Safety of Hydrogen Transportations by Gas 
Pipeline (Nov. 28, 2022) https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/
11/11-28-22-Final-Accufacts-Hydrogen-Pipeline-Report.pdf
    \12\ Pipeline Safety Trust, Hydrogen Pipeline Safety Summary for 
Policymakers https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/
hydrogen_pipeline_safety_summary_1_18_23.pdf
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    Congress should prohibit new hydrogen blends in gas distribution 
systems until the National Academy of Sciences has issued a report from 
both a safety and climate perspective.
Require Blended Products to be Reported to PHMSA
    An operator is only required to report the ``predominant product'' 
in a natural gas pipeline system to PHMSA. This has been interpreted to 
mean only reporting a product that is >50% present, overwhelmingly 
methane/natural gas.
    Currently operators blend products such as propane or hydrogen into 
existing systems at unknown rates. In December 2022, CenterPoint Energy 
blended propane into its Southern Indiana natural gas distribution 
system incorrectly and triggered hundreds of carbon monoxide events, 
sending four people to the hospital.\13\ One operator in Hawaii is 
blending hydrogen into its gas distribution system, which we only known 
because they have volunteered the information.
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    \13\ Pipeline Safety Trust, CenterPoint Energy's Apology Not Enough 
(Feb. 8, 2023) https://pstrust.org/centerpoint-energys-apology-not-
enough-more-must-be-done-to-protect-our-communities-from-pipeline-
incidents/
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    Congress should require operators to report to PHMSA blended, non-
predominant products that at any point in time exceed 3% by volume.
Improve Geohazard Mitigation Regulations
    There have been a number of recent, serious pipeline failures due 
to land movement and other geological hazards. The 2020 Enbridge 
failure in Hillsboro, Kentucky; the 2020 Denbury CO2 
pipeline failure in Satartia, MS (45 people sought treatment at the 
hospital); and the 2022 Marathon Pipe Line spill in Edwardsville, IL 
(165,000 gallons of crude spilled in and near creek) were all due to 
land movement. PHMSA has issued multiple Advisory Bulletins to 
operators on geohazard threat mitigation. Operators are required to 
mitigate against any threat within High Consequence Areas, but do not 
have any specific requirement to mitigate against geohazards outside of 
those areas. If we are committed to zero incidents, we need to address 
the risk of geohazards such as land movement, river scouring, and other 
geologic threats to pipeline integrity.
    Congress should amend 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60108 to require operators to 
include geohazard mitigation in their inspection and maintenance plans.
Natural Gas Incident Reporting
    PHMSA can only regulate against issues that it is aware of. 
Unfortunately, shortcomings in PHMSA's incident reporting regulations 
keep it in the dark because its regulations only require reporting if 
certain thresholds are met. Consequently, many large and potentially 
dangerous incidents are not reported to the administration. This means 
that that PHMSA's safety data likely underrepresents incident 
prevalence and that the opportunity to use these incidents as a 
learning opportunity is lost. The Pipeline Safety Trust recommends that 
Congress direct PHMSA to amend part 191 of its pipeline regulations and 
reporting forms to modernize the requirements for reportable incidents. 
More detail, statutory language, and proposed regulatory amendments are 
provided in the appendix.
    Reporting of Fires and Explosions--Gas pipeline leaks are far more 
likely to result in immediate combustion and fire than hazardous liquid 
leaks. This places public safety and the environment at risk. Yet 
unlike hazardous liquid pipeline operators, gas pipeline operators are 
not required to report incidents which result in fire or explosion that 
do not meet other reporting requirements. 49 C.F.R. Sec.  191.5; Sec.  
191.3. Congress should require PHMSA to make reporting of fires and 
explosions associated with gas pipelines mandatory.
    Property Damage Thresholds--Until recently, the property damage 
thresholds for reporting incidents to PHMSA was $50,000 for both gas 
and hazardous liquid pipelines. However, in 2021, PHMSA issued final 
rule in response to industry feedback that the threshold was too low 
for gas pipelines. 86 Fed. Reg. 2219. This rule increased the gas 
incident reporting threshold for property damage to $122,000, to be 
adjusted annually for inflation. 49 C.F.R. pt. 191, app'x. With record 
inflation, the current threshold stands at a staggering $129,300. The 
gas rule excludes the value of the gas itself, which is also distinct 
from the liquid rule.
    There is no reason the property damage incident reporting 
thresholds to differ to such an extreme. This is especially true given 
the fact that methane is a major contributor to climate change and 
presents a dangerous threat to the public when leaked from pipeline 
infrastructure. Congress should require PHMSA to make the threshold for 
reporting of property damage for hazardous liquid and natural gas 
pipelines equal by lowering the property damage threshold for natural 
gas incidents back to $50,000 and require that the cost of lost product 
be included in this calculation. $50,000 is still a substantial amount 
of money for a member of the public, even if it is not for wealthy oil 
and gas companies.
    Reporting of Gas Releases--PHMSA regulations require hazardous 
liquid releases as small as 5 gallons to be reported. 49 C.F.R. Sec.  
195.50(b). By comparison, natural gas regulations, drafted before the 
collective consensus that methane emissions are a major contributor to 
climate change, are extremely permissible, requiring reporting only if 
an incident is an ``unintentional estimated'' release of three million 
cubic feet or more. Id. at Sec.  191.3(1)(iii). Not only is the release 
required to be unintentional, but the threshold is unjustifiably high. 
For context, an operator can release enough gas to power over 17,000 
U.S. homes without reporting the incident to PHMSA.\14\
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    \14\ Am. Gas Ass'n, Natural Gas: The Facts (2019) https://
tinyurl.com/sfhm36nv (``On a daily basis, the average U.S. home uses 
175 cubic feet of natural gas.'').
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Congress should require PHMSA to acknowledge the seriousness of 
methane emissions and reduce the reporting threshold for gas pipelines 
to 50,000 cubic feet, regardless of intent. Operators are already 
required to minimize intentional and accidental releases,\15\ they 
should already have capacity to monitor for releases and be required to 
report them to PHMSA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing 
Safety Act of 2020, S. 2299, 116th Cong. Sec.  114 (2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    Public Transparency Improvements
National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) Improvements
    PHMSA's National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) is one of the main 
ways the public can learn about pipelines in their area. However, they 
are often left in the dark with much needed information hidden from 
public view.
    NPMS is a dataset containing locations of and information about gas 
transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas 
(LNG) plants which are under the jurisdiction of PHMSA. The NPMS also 
contains voluntarily submitted breakout tank data. The data is used by 
PHMSA for emergency response, pipeline inspections, regulatory 
management and compliance, and analysis purposes. It is used by 
government officials, pipeline operators, and the general public for a 
variety of tasks including emergency response, smart growth planning, 
critical infrastructure protection, and environmental protection.
    NPMS offers operator and pipeline specific data to the public, 
first responders, and local governments. There are different versions 
of NPMS, depending on the user. The general public can see pipeline 
maps of one county at a time, with limited information about included 
pipelines and incidents. Approved government officials or pipeline 
operators gain access to more detailed pipeline maps with High 
Consequence Areas identified and additional scope and detail. Gathering 
pipelines and distribution pipelines are not included.
    Both Congress, through statutory mandates, and the NTSB, through 
recommendations, have stressed the importance of public access to this 
information. The PST believes strongly in the supportive role the 
public can play as a partner in safer pipelines, but that partnership 
is only as good as the information the public can access. Given that, 
there are several shortfalls with NPMS. The current accuracy and detail 
of the NPMS data are not sufficient to adequately assist local 
communities who are planning or preparing for potential emergencies. 
Also, no HCAs are viewable on the public maps which is problematic and 
needs to be changed. In fact, there is already a statutory requirement, 
from the Pipeline Safety Regulatory Certainty and Job Creation Act of 
2011, to incorporate HCAs into NPMS and update biennially. Congress 
should finish what it started and give the public, first responders, 
and local governments access to this critical information.
    Congress should also require the mapping of gathering pipelines. 
Gas gathering pipelines have grown in diameter and pressure in recent 
years and their safety risks can be indistinguishable from gas 
transmission pipelines in some cases. All users of NPMS need to be able 
to see where gathering lines are located.
Require Operators to Disclose Certain Safety Information
    The public deserves more transparency about the levels of risk they 
face from pipelines in their communities and near their homes. 
Unfortunately, this information is often shielded from the public eye: 
Concerned citizens cannot obtain information about High Consequence 
Areas (HCAs), Medium Consequence Areas (MCAs), Potential Impact Radii 
(PIRs), or class locations nor can they obtain pipe size or pressure 
information, such as Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) or Maximum 
Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP). Operators are already submitting 
some of this information to PHMSA, but it only discloses minimal 
information to the public, such as approximate location and operator 
name via the NPMS. Allowing the public access to this information would 
significantly increase awareness regarding where integrity management 
is being implemented and allow them to weigh risks when making 
decisions such as where to live.
    Congress should amend 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60116 to require operators to 
disclose pipeline safety and attribute information to those who 
inquire.
Improve Reporting Data Metrics
    PHMSA can improve public engagement around pipelines by making the 
data available on its website easier for the public to digest and draw 
conclusions. Multi-stakeholder groups including the public, regulators, 
and industry met in 2015 and 2017 to develop performance measures for 
natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. The group working on 
hazardous liquid measures created the helpful metric of Accidents 
Impacting People or the Environment (IPEs). Performance measures for 
Highly Volatile Liquids (HVLs) or Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) have not 
been developed, and the performance measures developed for hazardous 
liquid pipelines do not align with those created for natural gas 
pipelines. Over the past few years, the pipeline industry has been 
developing new standards for pipeline safety performance measures that 
do not align with those of PHMSA, potentially creating more confusion 
than clarity regarding performance.
    Congress should mandate PHMSA to convene multiple stakeholder 
groups to revisit the measures previously developed to assess their 
usefulness and effectiveness as well as develop new measures for HVLs 
and LNG. Stakeholders should include, at a minimum, Tribal governments, 
Tribal members, safety advocates, environmental advocates, state and 
federal regulators, and industry.
Create Office of Public Engagement
    Public understanding and engagement are critical aspects in 
ensuring pipeline safety throughout the country. Currently, PHMSA, and 
more specifically the Office of Pipeline Safety, has no independent 
division to ensure effective public engagement and education in the 
pipeline safety process. PHMSA does have ``Community Liaison Services'' 
which are intended to help members of the public when contacted with 
questions related to pipeline safety, however, due to lack of 
independence, training, and support from PHMSA, these services are 
significantly lacking in their ability to provide meaningful assistance 
to the public.
    For members of the public to better understand and engage in the 
regulatory and safety aspects of pipeline awareness, Congress should 
direct PHMSA to create and fund an Office of Public Engagement. This 
independently run office would build on and enhance the effort of the 
already established PHMSA Community Liaison Services program by 
providing much needed support and two-way engagement directive for the 
administration.
    The Office of Public Engagement could dispatch to communities after 
a pipeline failure to offer information and listen to residents' 
concerns. For a timely example, such an office could hold workshops 
across the Midwest and Gulf States to help educate members of the 
public on carbon dioxide pipelines and listen to the communities. 
Effective public engagement is vital to pipeline safety and an 
independent office dedicated to its values would help tremendously.
                    Other Needed Safety Improvements
Increase Penalties
    PHMSA's penalty authority, and the agency's implementation of that 
authority, results in civil penalties that are economically 
insignificant to operators, are significantly smaller than those 
imposed by some states, and are disproportionate to the harm inflicted 
by pipeline failures. PHMSA's criminal penalty authority sets too high 
of a bar for criminal behavior and fails to hold companies accountable 
for criminal acts.
    From 2002 to 2021, PHMSA's resolved civil penalty cases amounted to 
a mere $79,622,174--less than $4 million per year.\16\ By comparison, 
in the same period, 12,793 incidents have occurred killing 276 people, 
injuring 1,145, and causing over $10.1 billion dollars in property 
damage.\17\ Despite PHMSA's 2017 maximum civil penalty adjustment to 
$209,002 for each day or $2,090,022 for a related series of violations, 
there has not been a significant increase in penalties proposed or 
collected, suggesting that PHMSA still remains reluctant to impose 
penalties In fact, some dramatic incidents have resulted in no civil 
penalties whatsoever. For example, just last year PHMSA imposed no 
penalties on operators responsible for a 165,000 gallon spill into an 
Illinois creek \18\ and a methane release of approximately 1 billion 
cubic feet.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ PHMSA, Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties: Civil 
Penalties Resolved (2002-2021) https://tinyurl.com/dvw837tc.
    \17\ PHMSA, Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trend (Jan. 23, 2023) https:/
/tinyurl.com/5n6njd93.
    \18\ NTSB, Marathon Pipe Line LLC Hazardous Liquids Pipeline 
Release, https://tinyurl.com/2d69wchm; PHMSA, Federal Enforcement Data, 
Marathon Pipe Line LLC (2006-2023) https://tinyurl.com/4dansv3m 
(showing no penalties for 2022 pipeline incidents).
    \19\ Letter from Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region Office 
of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, to Clifford Baker, Senior Vice President, 
Equitrans Midstream Corporation (Dec. 29, 2022) https://tinyurl.com/
2p9ekfck (proposing no fine).
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    Some states, notably California, have dramatically increased their 
use of civil penalties in the last decade, levying large fines like the 
one levied against PG&E following the San Bruno tragedy. The state 
regulator fined the utility $1.6 billion dollars for violations related 
to the 2010 failure in San Bruno and has since fined the utility 
additional millions relating to subsequent recordkeeping, reporting and 
other violations. These large fines are possible because the California 
and other state statutes do not have a limit on penalties for a related 
series of violations. Each day in violation is subject to another 
penalty.
    Fortunately, it is very rare that a pipeline operator violates the 
regulations in a way that would be considered criminal. The Pipeline 
Safety Trust was born from one of those rare incidents where an 
operator's actions were proven to be so reckless as to kill members of 
the public and do uncounted environmental harm. The U.S. Department of 
Justice under President Bush did an outstanding job prosecuting that 
case, fining the company, and getting jail time for company employees.
    There have only been a handful of other incidents caused by such 
reckless behavior from pipeline companies since that case nearly 20 
years ago, but it is important to not create barriers that make it 
difficult to hold companies accountable when they knowingly or 
recklessly ignore the laws meant to keep people safe. The criminal 
statute applying to pipeline safety, 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60123 requires 
that an operator ``knowingly and willfully'' violate the law--an 
unusually high bar for holding companies accountable for criminal 
behavior.
    Congress should eliminate the cap on civil penalties for related 
series of violations and impose a mandatory minimum penalty for each 
violation. Congress should direct the Secretary to amend the agency's 
regulations accordingly within 180 days and align PHMSA's pipeline 
safety rules with its transportation of hazardous materials rules with 
respect to criminal penalties by amending section 60123 to adopt the 
``willfully or recklessly'' language from 49 U.S.C. Sec.  5124.
Eliminate Natural Gas Operator's Choice in Determining High Consequence 
        Areas
    Current federal regulations (49 C.F.R. Sec.  192.905 and 192.903) 
allow for natural gas operators to choose between two methods in the 
identification of High Consequence Areas along the route of their 
pipeline.
    High Consequence Areas are generally areas with higher populations 
in proximity to the pipeline. The chosen HCA method may be applied to 
the entire system, or different methods may be applied to different 
individual portions of the system. This discretion given operators not 
only creates inconsistency and uncertainty when PHMSA evaluates 
operator Integrity Management programs, but it also allows operators to 
choose whichever method requires the least effort and/or safety 
measures in their IM program.
    The determination of a High Consequence Area should be limited to a 
singular definition. Specifically, by clarifying the definition of High 
Consequence Area in Sec.  192.903.
Close Class Location Loophole on Building Occupancy
    Under current regulations, gas transmission pipeline operators are 
required to classify their systems into Class Locations 1 through 4. 
These class locations generally signify how many buildings intended for 
human occupancy are located within the potential impact radius (PIR) of 
the pipeline and thus determine the level of safety requirements 
imposed on the operator for that section of pipeline. The regulation 
for determining class 3 areas creates a loophole which has the 
potential to exclude pipelines close to churches, theaters, and other 
public areas that may hold hundreds of people only a few days per week.
    The class location of a gas transmission pipeline impacts the 
pressure at which the pipeline can operate and has other impacts on how 
an operator must comply with the PHMSA regulations. 49 C.F.R. Sec.  
192.5(b)(3)(ii) creates speculative criteria which limits the safety 
requirements associated with class 3 location areas. This section of 
the regulation partially defines a class 3 area as ``An area where the 
pipeline lies within 100 yards (91 meters) of either a building or a 
small, well-defined outside area (such as a playground, recreation 
area, outdoor theater, or other place of public assembly) that is 
occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks 
in any 12-month period. (The days and weeks need not be consecutive.)'' 
This regulation is not strict enough to ensure that pipelines that 
could endanger large numbers of people are held to higher safety 
standards.
    Congress should require PHMSA to clarify and tighten this 
definition and regulation to close this loophole allowing operators to 
avoid stricter safety standards in areas with churches, playgrounds, 
and similar areas and buildings.
Eliminate Safety Related Condition Report Exemptions
    Existing regulations requiring operators to disclose safety related 
conditions are ambiguous, lenient, and do not encompass all situations 
that warrant reporting.
    49 U.S.C. Sec.  60101(h) requires the Secretary to make rules 
requiring each operator of a pipeline facility to submit a written 
report to the Secretary on any (a) condition that is a hazard to life, 
property, or the environment; and (b) any safety related condition that 
causes or has caused a significant change or restriction in the 
operation of a pipeline facility. That written report must go to PHMSA 
and the state regulators within five days of the operator first 
establishing that the condition exists. However, the rules (49 C.F.R. 
Sec.  191.23 and 195.55) enacted to implement that statute list only 8 
specific kinds of safety related conditions, most with a large amount 
of operator discretion built into their definitions, and then provide a 
set of three reasons that even if the condition meets one of those 
eight requirements, a report isn't required.
    Congress should require operators to submit reports to PHMSA on all 
safety-related conditions as originally mandated and make them easily 
available to the public.
Require Mandatory Reporting of Liquid Over-Pressurization Events
    Over-pressure events are a serious threat to pipeline safety that 
can adversely impact pipeline integrity and cause incidents that harm 
people and the environment.
    On June 10, 1999, an over-pressurization event occurred that 
changed the lives of many occurred in Bellingham, WA when the Olympic 
Pipe Line ruptured. The rupture leaked 277,200 gallons of gasoline into 
Hanna and Whatcom Creek, which flow through downtown Bellingham and 
directly into Bellingham Bay. The gasoline vapor subsequently ignited 
and exploded, killing three young men: Liam Wood, Wade King, and 
Stephen Tsiorvas. The cause of the incident was a failed pressure 
relief valve that caused the massive pressure surge and rupture.
    To this day, despite the potential for disaster, operators of 
liquid pipelines are not required to report over-pressurization events 
to PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety so long as they are corrected 
within five days. Over-pressure events are almost always corrected 
within this period, but that fact does not reduce the potential harm to 
the public and the environment that these events can cause by possibly 
weakening a pipeline. This five-day exemption also precludes PHMSA from 
getting important safety data that can help identify operators who are 
having problems properly controlling their pipelines, and that may 
point to pipeline segments in need of certain inspections. This 
exemption was removed for natural gas pipelines in the PIPES Act of 
2011. Congress should remove the exemption for liquid pipelines as 
well.
    Congress should direct PHMSA to amend its safety-related conditions 
reporting regulations to require operators of liquid lines to report 
over-pressurization events.
Require Improvements to State 811 Damage Prevention Programs
    It has been widely recognized among industry and federal regulators 
that third party excavation is one of the greatest threats to 
underground pipelines. Pipeline incidents caused by excavation damage 
can result in fatalities and injuries, as well as significant costs, 
property damage, environmental damage, and unintentional fire or 
explosions. While there are regulations which are intended to prevent 
such damage, such as state ``Call Before You Dig'' 811 programs, there 
are still many gaps in these regulations which leave room for the 
increasing number of excavation related damages caused to pipelines 
every year.
    Under the authority of 49 C.F.R. Sec.  198.35, PHMSA requires that 
states have a one-call damage prevention system to be eligible for 
grants from PHMSA to reimburse the costs of its pipeline safety 
programs. States can receive up to 80% of their costs in grants from 
PHMSA, but only if they've adopted a one-call system. PHMSA reviews not 
only the enforcement part of state systems, but the adequacy of the 
underlying systems as well. Improved enforcement efforts, and PHMSA 
intervention to provide enforcement when a state won't, may help reduce 
the number of excavation incidents even further.
    While PHMSA has been encouraging states to improve their damage 
prevention programs, the following concerns continue to come up:
    1.  Exemptions: There are requests for exemptions from 
participating in the one call system from both the call and response 
sides of the program. Cities and municipal utilities, state departments 
of Transportation, and agriculture seek exemptions, or to retain 
existing exemptions from having to participate in the one call system. 
Production and gathering pipelines will often seek exemptions from 
having to participate in responding to one call locate requests or 
mapping requirements.
          PHMSA maintains that there are no federal exemptions within 
the Excavation Damage Rule of 2015 and that any exemptions from 
participating in the one-call system are to be determined at the State 
level. However, a State must provide to PHMSA a written justification 
for any exemptions for excavators from State damage prevention 
requirements. PHMSA will make the written justifications available to 
the public (Sec.  198.55(a)(7)).
          Whether an exemption is written as an exception to a 
definition of what an underground facility is, what excavation is, or 
whether it's written as an exemption to who must participate, every 
exemption provides another opportunity for a completely preventable 
serious pipeline incident to occur.

    2.  Positive response: Not all states require the excavator to be 
contacted by a utility or the one-call center when all the utilities 
are done locating and marking. This leads to 2 problems: 1) The 
excavator is never positive that they've all been marked, even if the 
48 hours has passed; and 2) accidents can occur to unmarked utilities 
even if the excavator did everything right. These issues would be 
easily resolved by a requirement that the utility either respond 
directly to the contractor once location is complete, or that the one-
call center do so.

    3.  Enforcement authority/equal enforcement: Most state attorneys 
general have more than enough cases to deal with without adding to 
their burden by requiring them to enforce violations of state damage 
prevention laws. Some states have tried to resolve this by creating an 
independent commission to hear complaints, made up of members from all 
the various stakeholder groups. This group can hear complaints and make 
recommendations to an attorney general or a county prosecuting 
attorney.
          Another common concern is that a high percentage of the 
incidents that cause damage to underground utilities are caused by the 
utilities being marked incorrectly after one-call has been used. 
Excavators want to ensure that if they are going to be held accountable 
for their failures to use the one call system properly, the utilities 
are also held equally accountable for failures to mark utilities 
correctly.
Mandate Offshore Pipeline Safety Improvements
    Offshore pipeline safety remains an important area for regulatory 
improvements. These pipelines have unique safety risks and should not 
be exempt from important safety regulations.
    Recent incidents such as the 2020 Enterprise Products propane 
pipeline explosion in Corpus Christi, TX (4 fatalities, 6 serious 
injuries) and the 2021 Amplify Energy/Beta Offshore oil spill near 
Huntington Beach, CA (25,000 gallons of crude oil in San Pedro Bay) 
demonstrate some of the safety issues with offshore pipelines.
    One glaring regulatory shortfall is Offshore pipelines are 
specifically exempted from having a damage prevention program. Another 
shortfall is gas pipelines in navigable waterways are not required to 
have five-year crossing inspections like hazardous liquid pipelines. 
Congress should address both shortfalls.
Clarify ``Confirmed Discovery'' Definition
    The definition of ``confirmed discovery'' of an incident is very 
vague, allowing an operator to potentially delay this notification with 
little risk of enforcement action by PHMSA.
    Pursuant to PHMSA's regulations, operators of gas and hazardous 
liquid pipelines are required to report incidents to the National 
Response Center (NRC) and to the Secretary within one hour of 
``confirmed discovery.'' 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec.  191.3; 191.5; 195.2; 
195.52. Unfortunately, this definition of ``confirmed discovery'' 
allows an operator to delay notification with little risk of 
enforcement action by PHMSA. This is delay in reporting an incident can 
be extremely consequential: Incidents affecting humans or the 
environment could continue for some time before proper notification and 
subsequent remedial action begins.
    Congress should direct PHMSA to modify its regulations to amend its 
definition of ``confirmed discovery'' to ensure that operators notify 
the NRC and the Secretary as soon as possible after an incident occurs.
                                Appendix
          Statutory and Regulatory Language Where Appropriate
    [The appendix to Mr. Caram's written testimony is retained in 
committee files and is available online at https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/PW/PW14/20230308/115415/HHRG-118-PW14-Wstate-CaramB-
20230308.pdf pages 20-33.]

    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Caram.
    And I want to thank you all, all the witnesses here, for 
your testimony. We will now turn to questions from the panel, 
and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Administrator Brown, the PIPES Act 2020 was signed on 
December 27th of 2020. Included in the legislation was a 
requirement that PHMSA modernize its regulations to accommodate 
the growing LNG export industry. The proposed rule has not yet 
been published. What is PHMSA's path for the promulgation of 
these regulations?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. That rule is a 
priority rulemaking, one of the many in the 2020 PIPES Act, as 
far as our monthly updated web chart showing what our priority 
rulemakings are. And we hope to get a proposal out this year on 
that.
    I was just down in Freeport, Texas, where we had a really 
terrible incident last year in June. We hope to incorporate 
lessons learned from that incident in that rulemaking.
    I will just note, too, that in the first year of this 
administration, we had the most productive series of pipeline 
safety rulemakings in the last 12 years, and maybe beyond that.
    So, we are making tremendous progress, but I agree, and I 
think a theme for the whole day today and the last hearing held 
regarding PHMSA is that our pace of rulemakings is not what 
anybody in the room would like it to be. And so, we are excited 
to work with any and all of you to help improve that ability to 
get rulemakings done.
    Mr. Nehls. And Mr. Brown, we understand PHMSA has long 
dealt with staffing challenges, which is why the PIPES Act of 
2020 mandated--mandated--that enforcement and inspection 
personnel not fall below a certain number. Yet as of January 
21st, PHMSA has only 207--207--inspection and enforcement 
personnel, despite the PIPES Act requiring 247 such employees. 
I think Mr. Grubb was talking a little bit about this, hiring 
people, safety personnel for 2023.
    Instead of filling these essential positions, PHMSA has 
hired environmental specialists, including an environmental 
economist, that do not appear directly tied to its pipeline 
safety mission.
    You have also referred to PHMSA as a climate change agency. 
Considering the agency's current challenges in meeting its 
pipeline safety mission, do you think rebranding PHMSA as a 
climate change agency is helpful in recruiting safety and 
inspection personnel?
    Mr. Brown. Well, so, yes. In fact, when I asked new hires 
why they came to the agency, a lot of them actually referenced 
that. Actually CEOs of companies would be interested to hear 
the representatives here, but the CEOs of oil and gas pipeline 
companies also cite their focus on climate change over recent 
years to attract engineers and Ph.D.'s to their agency to be a 
part of the transition, and to mitigate one of the big 
challenges.
    I will be glad to get you updated numbers on where we are. 
My understanding is we have actually met PIPES Act mandates in 
hiring new inspectors and engineers over the last few years.
    Mr. Nehls. OK.
    Mr. Brown. It has been our top focus. We can't do the work 
without the incredibly dedicated people we have.
    Certainly, during the pandemic and over the last few years, 
the challenges of competing with the private sector, with other 
States, it is a challenge. I just heard from one of our State 
agents that they had four people they were interviewing, nobody 
showed up for the interview. That is real challenging, and any 
tools you can give us to help us get to that----
    Mr. Nehls [interrupting]. Yes, I appreciate that, Mr. 
Brown. It has been over 2 years without a nominee for PHMSA 
Administrator. How has the absence of permanent leadership 
affected the agency's regulatory efficiency?
    Mr. Brown. Honestly, I don't think one bit, but I don't 
have too much to add----
    Mr. Nehls [interrupting]. Has there been any discussion 
when a nominee is coming forward? I mean, when are we going 
to----
    Mr. Brown [interrupting]. I don't have any estimates or 
information.
    Mr. Nehls. All right. Last question. And again, in the 
PIPES Act of 2020, signed on December 27, 2020, included in the 
legislation was a requirement that PHMSA modernize its 
regulations to accommodate the growing LNG export industry. The 
proposed rule has not yet been established.
    Again, what is PHMSA's path forward for the promulgation of 
these regulations?
    Mr. Brown. This door shut when you started. Is this the LNG 
facilities update rule, the one I think you first asked about?
    Our plan is to get it out this year, and we provide monthly 
updates on progress there.
    Mr. Nehls. Well, I am looking forward to--we had a meeting 
a few weeks ago. I look forward to continuing on with this 
relationship so we can do the right thing and make sure that 
our pipelines are as safe as can be. Thank you.
    I will now recognize Ranking Member Payne for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Chairman.
    Deputy Administrator Brown, in February of 2020, Denbury's 
24-inch carbon dioxide pipe ruptured in Mississippi, with 200 
people needing to be evacuated, as was just stated. 
Fortunately, there were no fatalities, but local first 
responders were caught completely unaware.
    Can you please share with us how PHMSA is using lessons 
learned from this incident to inform your ongoing carbon 
dioxide rule development?
    Mr. Brown. Really important question, and I just want to 
relate it back to the chairman's comments about the LNG 
facilities rule and discussions we have frequently with 
industry.
    But in that incident that you referenced--and I visited a 
community of about 70 people in rural Mississippi about an hour 
northwest of Jackson. The first responders were unaware of the 
incident and what was at issue with the rupture of that carbon 
dioxide pipeline. Notification and getting information out--
same thing in East Palestine, Ohio.
    We live in modern society, where I can get notification of 
my food order, that it has been retained by the restaurant, 
they are cooking my food, it is ready to go. That is all within 
minutes. And in that incident, it was over 1\1/2\ hours before 
folks were aware that there was a cloud of CO2 gas 
that was engulfing a community. We can do much better than 
that.
    I really look forward to working with everybody. And I 
think there is consensus on the need to improve that 
communication.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you. As we look forward to a pipeline 
safety reauthorization, do you feel that PHMSA has the 
resources needed to investigate all pipeline incidents?
    And what additional tools do you need to recruit and retain 
an inspection workforce?
    Mr. Brown. We triage our needs. I think we have requisite 
resources to investigate pipeline incidents. But the amount of 
time it can take, we actually have reduced the amount of time 
to open, certainly for an enforcement and compliance issue 
related to an incident, to a record low amount of 323 days.
    So, the amount of resources we have--and that seems to be a 
common theme for the day--is directly proportional to the work 
that we can do. And everybody seems to think we should be doing 
more. We are grateful that this committee has continued to 
support our work. But it is an important question you ask.
    Mr. Payne. Yes, that is the unfortunate position you are 
in, irrespective of what you do, people are always going to 
want more. So, thank you.
    Now, Mr. Caram, your testimony says that we are not making 
real progress on pipeline safety, and that integrity management 
programs have not lived up to their promise. What are the 
shortcomings of the integrity management plans?
    Mr. Caram. Thank you for the question. Yes, the theory 
behind integrity management really makes perfect sense. You 
identify those pipelines that can have the most devastating 
effects on communities or on the environment in the case of a 
failure, and you focus your safety efforts on those sections of 
pipelines with more inspections, more safety requirements, and 
we identify those areas. We call them high-consequence areas.
    But when we look at the data, and we look at incident rates 
within high-consequence areas and compare them to the incidents 
outside of high-consequence areas, they are not doing any 
better. In a lot of cases, they are actually doing worse. And 
so, we see this as a performance-based metric, a performance-
based regulation that leaves a lot up to the operator's 
discretion. It makes it hard for PHMSA to inspect, hard for 
them to enforce. And it is not producing the results that we 
would hope to see, as safety advocates.
    Mr. Payne. And with the time I have remaining, quickly, 
what is the single biggest driver of the lack of progress on 
pipeline safety?
    Mr. Caram. Thank you for the question. It is a good one. I 
would have to say PHMSA's statutory handcuffs on ability to 
make strong rules.
    Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you very much.
    And Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
    And Mr. Brown, in your testimony it says PHMSA has kept up 
with the PIPES Act of 2020 hiring mandates, both for inspectors 
as well as regulatory personnel. And in your office, January 
31st, it says 207 of the 248 inspection enforcement personnel 
were filled. So, obviously, in the last 5 weeks, 6 weeks you 
have hired 41 personnel. I find that incredible, with the 
bureaucracy and the stuff that we have today.
    But I will now yield to Mr. Rouzer.
    Mr. Rouzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Brown, this is not a gotcha question by any means. I am 
just curious how you will answer it. Generally speaking, are 
pipelines safe?
    Mr. Brown. Are pipelines safe, generally speaking? Sure.
    Mr. Rouzer. Let me ask this. Are investigations common when 
there is no safety incident?
    Mr. Brown. Can you repeat the question? I didn't hear.
    Mr. Rouzer. I am sorry. Are investigations common when 
there is no safety incident?
    Mr. Brown. Are investigations common when there is no 
safety incident? Not common, no.
    Mr. Rouzer. OK. A followup to that: What circumstances 
would prompt PHMSA to launch an investigation on a wireline or 
slickline operator that has never had a recorded safety 
incident?
    Mr. Brown. Perhaps a notification through anonymous sources 
or through a hotline. There are many circumstances where you 
might investigate an allegation of a company or an operator, 
sure.
    Mr. Rouzer. So, let me ask it this way. Is there any kind 
of testing available for a regulated wireline or slickline 
operator, where they can be exempt from, quite frankly, 
unapplicable regulations imposed upon them?
    Mr. Brown. I am sorry, I am having trouble hearing.
    Mr. Rouzer. Is there any kind of testing or process 
available for a regulated wireline or slickline operator to be 
exempt from unapplicable regulations that might be imposed upon 
them?
    In other words, is there a process where you check all the 
boxes, you are clear to go, without having to go through an 
investigation when in fact there is no safety incident?
    Mr. Brown. You would never be totally exempt from--just if 
you check boxes and you say you are meeting our requirements. 
We are always going to make sure what you say is accurate, and 
the operator is held accountable if it is not.
    Mr. Rouzer. One other question here. So, what kind of 
research, if there is any, is PHMSA conducting related to 
pipelines and the products that support pipelines?
    Mr. Brown. A tremendous amount of research, actually, and 
it actually gets to Mr. Black's testimony about our commitment 
to innovation. We spend millions of dollars a year working with 
the academic community, the regulated community on the needs to 
improve pipeline safety and technologies. There were actually a 
bunch of patents come out of the research that Congress 
appropriates and that we dole out to those communities.
    Mr. Rouzer. Is that research available to the public?
    Mr. Brown. It is, yes.
    Mr. Rouzer. Where can that be found?
    Mr. Brown. Oh, we can send it to you, but it is on our 
website.
    Mr. Rouzer. OK.
    Mr. Brown. Yes.
    Mr. Rouzer. So, how many different research projects are 
there out there?
    Mr. Brown. I want to say at least a dozen. We have got 
about $8 million currently on some of the new emerging areas of 
energy--hydrogen, carbon dioxide--both to mitigate safety 
risks, to improve leak detection, and to keep the product in 
the pipe, which I think everybody here is focused on. So, that 
is an area that I think we have a really broad stakeholder 
support for and engagement with.
    Mr. Rouzer. Yes. With regard to my earlier questions, later 
on I would like for my team to get with your team to talk about 
some specific incidents, just make sure that you are aware, and 
that all things are being handled properly.
    Mr. Brown. Happy to. I really appreciate your flagging 
that. Thanks.
    Mr. Rouzer. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. Mr. Rouzer yields. I now recognize Mr. Larsen 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 
Strengthening pipeline safety protects our communities. We know 
that in Washington State. It also holds operators accountable. 
In the future, it can help us fight climate change, with the 
role of moving CO2 around. I think we need to focus 
on better identifying our vulnerabilities, addressing safety 
gaps, and giving PHMSA the tools it needs to strengthen the 
safety standards.
    To that end, Mr. Caram, your testimony outlines a variety 
of things, but one point you make is that integrity management 
isn't working. Well, I have been at this 23 years. Many have 
been at this longer. But it was always about integrity 
management when we did the Pipeline Safety Act in 2002 and 
continuing on.
    In your view, why isn't integrity management working, and 
what is the biggest contributor to the pipeline safety 
challenges that you have identified?
    Mr. Caram. Thank you for the question. I wish I could list 
off a number of reasons of why it is not working.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. You get to pick one.
    Mr. Caram. I believe it is the performance-based nature of 
them, and the lack of prescriptions.
    For a lot of the--there are a lot of wonderful operators 
out there that really are leading the way on safety. They take 
it very seriously. It is a part of their culture. And I would 
imagine that those operators have pretty good integrity 
management programs.
    Unfortunately, those are not all the operators out there. 
And for those I think we do need some more prescriptive level 
of minimum safety standards which would allow the other 
operators to continue to do their integrity management 
programs, their safety management systems, and these continuous 
improvement processes.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. You have identified a lot 
of--about--like, 22 recommendations or so in your testimony. I 
appreciate that.
    Are there any new approaches you think would best move the 
needle to improve safety?
    Mr. Caram. Overall, I think the best thing we can do for 
safety is give PHMSA the full resources it needs to be the 
regulator it needs to be. I think they have been historically--
it is a theme today among all of us, they have been 
historically underfunded, they have these statutory handcuffs. 
And if Congress could give them the tools, the resources, and 
the ability to become a more robust regulatory agency, I think 
that is where we will see a real change in pipeline safety, and 
start to move towards our goals.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Mr. Brown, I have been 
around long enough to not ask you specifically what is going to 
be in the President's budget tomorrow, because I know what your 
answer will be. You won't be able to give it.
    Should we expect to see something in the President's budget 
tomorrow with regards to PHMSA and the resources you have 
outlined that are needed?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, thank you for the question and how you 
asked it. There are a couple of things that I can highlight 
without specificity, and one is support for States.
    We oversee 3.4 million miles of pipeline, but the vast 
majority of those are gas distribution, and 80 percent of those 
are overseen by our State agents. They have gotten about 55 
percent of their budgets covered through appropriations that 
you all provide us to give to them. That is--with all the new 
demands on us and on them, that is hefty. And so, we are trying 
to address that in the budget.
    And then, in addition to that, hydrogen, CO2, 
the fuels of the future that have greatly been incentivized in 
the last 2 years through the Inflation Reduction Act, the 
Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. The one thing that sort of was 
missing from those tremendous investments was additional 
oversight by our agency.
    So, the President's budget should reflect those items I can 
preview for you.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. All right, and so, we will look 
for those, especially.
    Mr. Black, we talked a little bit yesterday about the 
technology demonstration. Can you talk a little bit more about 
that?
    I mean, it certainly sounds interesting. I want to move 
forward. Certainly, in the last 25 years, technology has 
changed. I understand the technology of a smart pig hasn't 
changed. It is a matter of thinking of that as a platform, and 
then the stuff you stick on it, if you will, the technology has 
changed to better do integrity management.
    Can you talk a little bit more about the program itself, 
and how it can benefit?
    Mr. Black. Sure. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes.
    Mr. Black. Yes, the smart pig technology or in-line 
inspection is the same as maybe 20 years ago, but the 
sophistication of the devices that can travel inside the 
pipeline looking for issues has improved. So have the analytics 
of what can be done with that information. We can see more. We 
have a better idea of what issues might become a problem. So, 
we know now, through greater advancements, what the proper 
schedule should be on, which features a pipeline operator 
should address.
    But the PHMSA regulations have not changed that. So, 
Congress, in recognition, created this section in the PIPES Act 
2020, right? That sounded great. But what PHMSA did is they 
went beyond the mandate and the limitations imposed by 
Congress.
    First, they required that an application to use it follow 
the NEPA process, and an environmental assessment was done. 
That is the first time PHMSA has ever done that for an R&D 
project.
    They said the standard of review needed to be higher even 
than the special permit process, and the special permit is for 
a permanent waiver of regulations. This is for a temporary 
project.
    And then PHMSA said that anybody asking for a demonstration 
project needed to use the special permit process itself, which 
is has taken 10 years, in some instances.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. To follow up--and I 
appreciate the chair's indulgence, and I have nothing to yield 
back except nothing.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you.
    Mr. Nehls. Mr. Larsen yields, and I will recognize Mr. 
Stauber for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Larsen, thanks for yielding your time to me. I 
appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    In recent years, I am sure everyone has seen the illegal 
protesters that have set fires, cut hydraulic lines, attacked 
equipment and operators during the Enbridge Line 3 replacement 
construction. And they did millions of dollars of damage and 
put union workers in danger.
    Deputy Administrator Brown, are our pipelines, the critical 
infrastructure used to deliver affordable and reliable energy 
to my constituents in Minnesota, are they safe from radical 
protesters?
    Mr. Brown. Congressman, as you and others may know, we 
don't oversee security of pipelines. So, when you say ``safe,'' 
our jurisdiction does include the safe operations, but the line 
is sort of drawn as far as security to the Transportation 
Security Administration. We do work closely with them. And when 
we see issues of security, we let them know. And vice versa, if 
they have issues of security, they flag those issues as they 
may affect operations.
    Mr. Stauber. When these protesters are protesting for 
climate reasons, obviously, do they put the workers in 
jeopardy?
    Mr. Brown. Again, because we focus on the safe operations 
of the pipelines and not on the security, I am certainly 
concerned always about the workers doing work----
    Mr. Stauber [interrupting]. But do they put the workers in 
jeopardy when they jump into pipes as the 49ers are lifting 
that pipe up into place, does that put them in jeopardy?
    Mr. Brown. I mean, that sounds very concerning to me, sure.
    Mr. Stauber. Does it put the community in jeopardy?
    Mr. Brown. All of that, what you are describing, sounds 
very concerning----
    Mr. Stauber [interrupting]. Does it put law enforcement in 
jeopardy?
    Mr. Brown. The way you are describing things, that does 
sound like it puts everybody in jeopardy if you are threatening 
violence to anybody or anything.
    Mr. Stauber. Thank you. Mr. Brown, in your testimony you 
had stated that PHMSA is a climate agency. Do you still stand 
by that?
    Mr. Brown. Yes. Thanks for giving me the opportunity to 
explain that.
    Mr. Stauber. Do you sympathize with the radical protesters?
    Mr. Brown. I don't know to what you are referring.
    Mr. Stauber. Protesters, for instance, on Enbridge Line 3 
that are climate protesters. Do you sympathize with them?
    Mr. Brown. That is a large group of people who I don't know 
exactly what you are referring to. Sort of what--I really just 
don't know what you are referring to. So, I----
    Mr. Stauber [interrupting]. Do you support their radical 
protests that put the workers, community, and law enforcement 
in danger?
    Mr. Brown. I do not support anybody putting anybody in 
danger, especially law enforcement. My dad was a police 
officer, I come from a law enforcement family.
    Mr. Stauber. That should have been easier for you to 
answer, then.
    Mr. Brown. Well, I think I answered the easy ones.
    Mr. Stauber. Are the Biden administration's climate 
priorities driving decisions at PHMSA, yes or no?
    Mr. Brown. We have a whole-of-Government approach to 
mitigating the threat of climate change, which I think 
everybody up here is aligned with.
    And I appreciate the bipartisan PIPES Act focusing on 
minimizing methane emissions, which has 80 times the global 
warming potential as carbon dioxide.
    Mr. Stauber. Ultimately, I am concerned that this 
administration is steering PHMSA away from its mission, and 
using yet another agency to push its activist agenda. PHMSA's 
mission is to protect people and the environment by advancing 
the safe transportation of energy and other materials that are 
essential to our daily lives.
    Reliable, affordable, clean energy is good. Would you agree 
with that?
    Mr. Brown. I would agree that reliable, affordable, clean 
energy is good.
    I think our mission statement also includes protecting the 
environment, and we also focus on that, as well, and I 
appreciate the committee supporting that, as well.
    Mr. Stauber. All the American people want is safe, reliable 
access to affordable energy. We need to protect our pipeline 
infrastructure to accomplish that goal.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Brown. Yes, I agree. Thank you, Congressman.
    Mr. Nehls. Mr. Stauber yields. I now recognize Mrs. Foushee 
for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Foushee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the 
witnesses for being here this morning.
    I would also like to thank Ranking Member Larsen and 
Ranking Member Payne for their work, and I am honored to join 
both of you and my colleagues on this subcommittee.
    First I would like to discuss the Colonial Pipeline spill 
that happened in Huntersville, North Carolina. In August of 
2020, gasoline was found bubbling from the ground on the Oehler 
Nature Preserve in Huntersville. At first, Colonial Pipeline 
estimated that only 63,000 gallons had leaked. But ultimately, 
it was reported that nearly 2 million gallons of fuel was 
released in the nature preserve, resulting in my State's 
largest gasoline spill ever.
    Last summer, the North Carolina Department of Environmental 
Quality filed a consent order holding Colonial Pipeline 
accountable after they failed to provide the State with 
essential information required for remediation after the spill. 
It took 2 years and a consent order.
    Mr. Brown, in May 2022, your agency proposed nearly $1 
million in civil penalties on Colonial Pipeline for multiple 
probable violations of Federal pipeline safety regulations for 
failing to adequately plan and prepare for a manual restart and 
shutdown operation, which contributed to the national impacts 
of the May 2021 cyber attack.
    So, my question is whether PHMSA's civil penalty authority 
is substantial enough to encourage better behavior by pipeline 
operators.
    Mr. Brown. That is a really good question. I don't know if 
I have a great answer. I would welcome other panelists' answer 
of whether a civil penalty of $1 million is going to dissuade a 
company that is valued in the billions. Intuitively, I would 
think not.
    But I will say, we specifically highlighted that proposed 
civil penalty because it was something where we had actually 
given the company a heads up--hey, you have got to fix this--
and they chose not to after we even told them to adhere to our 
regulation. For us, that is a particularly egregious violation, 
and that is why we issued a proposed civil penalty.
    Mrs. Foushee. Thank you for that response.
    Mr. Grubb and Mr. Black, I am interested in learning more 
about how you detect and prevent leaks in your industry. Is 
this a priority for Kinder Morgan, Mr. Grubb?
    And for your member organizations, Mr. Black, do you have a 
means of detecting leakage on your pipelines, and are your 
systems for doing so more stringent in high-population areas, 
also known as high-consequence areas?
    Mr. Grubb, you may go first.
    Mr. Grubb. Thank you for the question. So, in terms of 
detecting methane leaks, we routinely patrol our pipelines for 
leak detection purposes. We also implement leak detection at 
compressor stations along our pipeline routes.
    Detecting leaks is important. It is something that does not 
happen often, in terms of natural gas pipeline leaks. But when 
it does happen, we quickly identify it, and we quickly repair 
those.
    Methane emissions, in general, are something that is of the 
utmost importance to us, as well as our industry. And certainly 
PHMSA acting upon the rulemaking to address class location will 
also minimize or reduce methane emissions associated with 
activities that are required to meet the current regulations, 
that being pipe replacement. And it will minimize the 
unnecessary release of natural gas associated with those 
projects, and that will go a long way in reducing methane 
emissions, as well.
    Mr. Black. Thank you, Congresswoman. Detecting leaks is 
very important. A pipeline operator's goal is to detect the 
leak available in the control room, where you can shut down the 
pipe at the sign. So, they maintain sensors along the pipeline, 
looking for signs of a leak.
    Industry, in the last several years, has developed through 
experts a recommended practice at the American Petroleum 
Institute on leak detection. We are also conducting R&D to 
continue to improve leak detection. We want to be able to see, 
smell, or hear maybe the signs of released product, also 
maintain those aerial patrols, just like Mr. Grubb was saying, 
and have community awareness programs so that, if the public 
knows--if they find an incident of a leak, they know who to 
call. Detecting a leak is very important.
    Mrs. Foushee. Thank you.
    With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. Mrs. Foushee yields. I will now recognize Mr. 
Johnson for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was 
grateful to see that Ranking Member Larsen had focused a little 
bit on the technology pilot program.
    And so, Mr. Brown and Mr. Black, I want to dive a little 
deeper. I mean, talk to me about what improvements we could 
make to the program so that it would be more valuable for 
operators, and more people would take advantage of it.
    Mr. Brown. You want to go? You want me to--go ahead.
    Mr. Black. OK, thank you. Nobody has used the program right 
now. It has been untenable. We need to make some changes.
    One, we need to change the standard of review. It is 
complicated in the law. It is complicated in what PHMSA has 
done. Generally, we want something simple, where it is a 
reasonable level of safety, compared to what the existing 
regulations have.
    Second, we don't----
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [interrupting]. So--hold on. 
Before going to second, let's drill in just a little bit. So, 
when you say we need to change the standard of review, what is 
it, and where do we need to head to?
    Mr. Black. The problem is that PHMSA is using a standard of 
review even higher than its special permit process, which is 
for permanent waivers of regulations. It doesn't need to be 
that way.
    Shall I move to another one?
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. What standards should they 
move to? Should they just move to their standard level of 
review?
    Mr. Black. We want PHMSA to exercise judgment on if this 
application is going to improve pipeline safety.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. I see.
    Mr. Black. This is PHMSA's decision to make. They have made 
it more complicated than they need to.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. OK, very good, sorry. Number 
one. Now number two.
    Mr. Black. Great. Next, we need to not use the NEPA 
process. There is no reason for an environmental assessment to 
be completed for an R&D project.
    Next, we need to not use the special permit process itself. 
It is broken. Everybody recognizes that. It has taken 10 years 
for some special permits.
    Next, we need to extend this program. Congress gave it a 
few years. We have lost 2 years already. Do a 10-year 
reauthorization so we have the full cycle of PHMSA to finish 
developing the updates, operators to apply. Let's conduct the 
research. PHMSA can get the data. The goal is for them to 
update their regulations with the know-how of 20 years of 
developments.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. That is excellent, because 
those are specific changes that we can make that are within our 
power, they are easy to understand, and they would have the 
desired impact.
    Sir, what did he get wrong?
    Mr. Brown. So, we actually opened for public comment, ``How 
can we implement this directive from Congress?'' We didn't get 
the specifics of exactly your question, Congressman. What 
standard do we judge a new technology--it is just an R&D 
project. That is different than deploying a technology that has 
safety implications for the public. I rely on the subject 
matter experts, whose focus is safety, to make that 
determination.
    Now, the question of how to apply the National 
Environmental Policy Act, that is a directive that Congress 
established 50-plus years ago. You can consider environmental 
impacts in different ways, but there was no proposal to provide 
those environmental impacts at all in the public comment period 
that we offered.
    We want innovative technologies. We are happy to work with 
folks on this. That is why we opened it up for public comment. 
Happy to work with LEPA and any of the committee members here. 
But we don't want to sacrifice two things, right? Safety, 
environmental impacts. So, how to do it is absolutely the 
question. You asked the right question. We are asking the same 
question. And if we can come to agreement on an efficient way 
to do it, great. It is definitely a common goal that we have.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Mr. Black, what else?
    Mr. Black. PHMSA has recognized that a decision on a 
pipeline safety demonstration program application is not a 
major Federal action. It has the discretion to not put it 
through the NEPA process. This can be simple. Congress can tell 
PHMSA, ``Don't go beyond the limitations that we tell you to 
use in this program.''
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Certainly----
    Mr. Brown [interrupting]. Well----
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [interrupting]. No, go ahead, 
sir.
    Mr. Brown. So, we certainly, potentially, could face a 
lawsuit, and then have to litigate that. If Congress were to 
provide us the directives, or if we could get a proposal that 
says we are not going to ignore the environmental impacts, here 
is how you know we are not going to ignore the environmental 
impacts, then that would get us closer to what I think we all 
want to get to.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. So, Mr. Chairman, I would just 
close by saying this. I mean, we have specific recommendations. 
We have an opportunity to make this program work better, to get 
additional research and development, to make the system run 
better and more safely. It is not being used properly. This is 
something we can work on together. This is something that we 
might be able to get the overwhelming majority of the people on 
both sides of this dais to understand that the reforms that 
have been described will work, and they will make the system 
better long term. Let's get it done together. I yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. Mr. Johnson yields. I now recognize Mr. Cohen 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I thank you and the 
ranking member for holding this hearing.
    The safe operation of the 3.4 million miles of pipeline 
regulated by PHMSA is vital to the health and safety of the 
American people. I want to focus on a pipeline issue that is 
particularly important to our country's ability to combat the 
climate crisis, which is methane leaks.
    According to a recent report in a Guardian article, methane 
causes about one-quarter of global heating from the greenhouse 
gas effect, and human-caused emissions over the last century 
have contributed about one-third of the total global 
temperature rise. Emissions have surged in recent decades, and 
if we continue on this path, methane alone could push us past a 
number of catastrophic climate tipping points.
    Around 40 percent of those methane emissions come from 
leaks from fossil fuel exploration, production, and 
transportation, and that percentage has increased by half in 
the last two decades. For the sake of the planet and future 
generations, we must do all we can to prevent methane leaks 
from the millions of miles of natural gas pipelines under 
PHMSA's authority.
    In my State, the Tennessee Valley Authority is pushing 
forward with a plan to construct new natural gas powerplants 
and pipelines as a ``bridge'' to renewables, a bridge to 
renewables. I have argued that it is a bridge to more pollution 
and disasters, and have strongly encouraged them to rethink 
this approach.
    Deputy Administrator Brown, in your written testimony, you 
stated that PHMSA has been integral to the whole-of-Government 
approach to mitigating unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions. 
Could you expand on what this approach entails, and what 
resources or support PHMSA might still need to properly carry 
out this vital mission?
    Mr. Brown. Yes. Well, thank you so much, Congressman. And 
really, we have been really energized by this committee's work 
with the 2020 PIPES Act, which said regulated facilities have 
to minimize methane emissions--as noted, 80 times the global 
warming potential as carbon dioxide.
    Also, we have to include in our cost-benefit analysis, as 
we move forward with rulemakings, environmental impacts, which 
just gets to some of the questions from Members today why we 
might hire people with environmental knowledge and skills. We 
have been directed to do that by the committee in carrying out 
these directives. And we are doing it, actually, by hiring 
engineers with environmental knowledge and experience.
    But we have got six rulemakings in the White House Methane 
Emissions Reduction Action Plan, three of them we finalized. 
And those overlap to the chairman's questions about how we are 
prioritizing. We are prioritizing the directives we have from 
Congress to do a host of rulemakings, the ones that have the 
biggest safety impact, that--also, I think it is inextricably 
linked. You reduce methane emissions, you are actually 
improving and mitigating climate change. You are mitigating 
methane emissions when you keep the product in the pipe, which 
is something you hear from industry all the time.
    We are all, I think, focused on that, and how we talk about 
it. And I suggest we talk about it. I suggest we talk about 
keeping the product in the pipe is helping reduce methane 
emissions and global warming. The agency that I lead now wasn't 
allowed to talk about that for 4 years. And a lot of companies 
are talking about it now to recruit folks, and also because 
their investors want that information.
    So, really, over the last few years, the marketplace, the 
free market has said, yes, actually we would like to have 
improved clean energy, but we also want to mitigate the impacts 
to the environment.
    Mr. Cohen. Our time is running out. If I can--I thank you 
for that--very quickly, could operators decide for themselves 
which high-consequence area definitions to use?
    Why do we have two different definitions, and do we allow 
operators to pick and choose even different ones along the same 
route?
    Mr. Brown. I am sorry. I didn't hear that.
    Mr. Cohen. Well, I got 1 minute left. I am going to pass.
    Mr. Caram, in your written testimony, you state that 
natural gas regulations drafted before the collective consensus 
that methane emissions are a major contributor to climate 
change are extremely permissible with regard to leak reporting 
requirements.
    You and Deputy Administrator Brown, methane, a potent 
greenhouse gas, we want to avoid it leaking from pipelines. 
PHMSA has just finished a year-long study to put together a 
proposed rule on the use of advanced leak detection. Where are 
we tackling methane emissions from natural gas pipelines, and 
what still needs to be done?
    Mr. Caram. Thank you for that question. As Mr. Brown 
stated, Congress made extraordinary progress in this area with 
the PIPES Act of 2020, but we still do have a lot of work to 
do. We now have satellites detecting huge methane plumes from 
planned and routine maintenance from pipelines. We don't 
tolerate these kind of planned intentional releases from liquid 
pipelines, and we need to continue this culture change on the 
gas side, and no longer tolerate those, as well.
    These blowdowns, the intentional releases for routine 
maintenance, they are not required to be reported to PHMSA. And 
besides the general language in the PIPES Act about minimizing 
emissions, there is no limitation on them.
    Mr. Cohen. Mr. Brown, do you have something to add?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, we have a rulemaking that is at the Office 
of Management and Budget that addresses leak detection, repair, 
blowdowns, basically what the gentleman just addressed, 
Congressman, and that is a mandate from the 2020 PIPES Act.
    Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir, and I yield back the balance of 
my time.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. I now recognize Mr. Yakym 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Yakym. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our 
witnesses for taking the time to be here today and share with 
us your expertise.
    I am glad that our Transportation and Infrastructure 
Committee kicked off our first hearing on the FAA 
reauthorization with a hearing concerned and centered around 
safety. And I am glad that we are doing the same thing with 
PHMSA today, with the reauthorization, a hearing on safety.
    Pipelines are the lifeblood of our economy. They help put 
gas in our vehicles, they heat our homes, they power our 
factories and our businesses, and they drive exports that lift 
our economy and create jobs right here at home. They are an 
integral part of the conversations as we discuss emerging 
technologies like hydrogen and carbon capture, as well.
    At the heart of all these applications is safety. Without 
pipeline safety, Americans won't have gas, heat, power, or 
exports that we depend on to drive our economy on a daily 
basis. That is why we have agencies like PHMSA, the Pipeline 
and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, which is 
entrusted with this critical mission of safety.
    But I am concerned--concerned because it seems like there 
is a potential movement to deviate from that mission of safety. 
We heard earlier today about a number of pipeline issues that 
have happened, safety issues across our country, and it seems 
like we may have a deviation from that mission of safety.
    Mr. Brown, you recently said, and I quote, ``One thing we 
are trying to brand is as a climate agency.'' I would like you 
to clarify that comment, because Congress created PHMSA to be a 
safety agency, not a climate agency. Full stop. So, if you 
could for the record, Mr. Brown, please clarify. Is PHMSA's top 
and sole priority safety?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, it is. It is the top priority, but it is 
inextricably linked to environmental impacts. And that is in 
our mission statement, and it is in the 2020 PIPES Act for us 
to minimize methane emissions, methane being 80 times the 
impact of carbon dioxide in global warming. When you minimize 
methane emissions, you are mitigating climate change.
    Now, you can talk about it, or you can not talk about it. I 
choose to talk about it. But when you minimize methane 
emissions--and by the way, most of the companies that Mr. Black 
represents, Mr. Grubb, his company, they talk about what they 
are doing to mitigate climate change. It is inextricably linked 
to safety. And so, to just not talk about it, I mean, it is up 
to folks if we want to talk about it. I choose to talk about 
it. I think it is good for recruiting. It happens to be 
accurate. And we are acknowledging the reality that climate 
change exists, and we have to consider ways to mitigate it.
    Mr. Yakym. Do you think that some of the pipeline safety 
issues we have had have happened because maybe we have taken 
our eye off the ball of safety, and we are focused more on 
climate change, it seems, than we are on----
    Mr. Brown [interrupting]. Absolutely not.
    Mr. Yakym [continuing]. Safety, which is the responsibility 
of your agency?
    Mr. Brown. There are 600 people completely dedicated to 
safety. You couldn't convince them not to be focused on safety. 
The first thing I did was what are the rulemakings that will 
have the biggest safety impact at the agency, and that is what 
we are focused on.
    Mr. Yakym. Talk to me about how your agency speaks to 
recruits. I mean, do you tell your recruits that you are a 
climate agency that is concerned about safety?
    Mr. Brown. I mean, as far as what we recruit, we post our 
jobs. I don't think most of them mention climate change. But 
through our social media, through hearings like this, we are 
trying to note, hey, if you want to make a difference--and when 
you talk to people under the age of 30, 35, they really care 
about making a difference in the world and leaving something 
better for the next generation. It is different than what 
people in the 35 to 45 care about, or the 55 to 65.
    We want to recruit from the biggest pool of people that we 
possibly can to get the best engineers, best safety experts. 
And if that can provide a little bit of difference, and get us 
a little bit more folks to address the chairman's comments from 
earlier of how to recruit people, great.
    Mr. Yakym. How would you rate the considerations in hiring 
when you are considering between safety considerations in 
hiring versus climate considerations in hiring?
    Mr. Brown. Well, for the vast majority of our positions, 
safety is integral. We have a few positions--we started off 
with less than 1 position--at an agency of 600 people who has 
in its mission statement environmental impacts, we had less 
than 1 focused on National Environmental Policy Act 
implementation with respect to our agency. We now have three 
and change, one person who is straight out of college, right?
    I mean, we have not revamped our agency of 600 people with 
3 people. We just now are able to carry out the laws that you 
have given us to carry out, which include environmental 
impacts.
    Mr. Yakym. All right, thank you.
    And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [presiding]. Thank you.
    With that, Mr. Garcia, your 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking 
Member, for holding this hearing. This committee, of course, 
has a responsibility to ensure the safety of our transit and 
infrastructure systems, and this hearing is critical to 
ensuring that we provide that safety.
    There is currently a proposal to build a 1,300-mile 
pipeline to transport liquefied CO2 across four 
Midwestern States, with Illinois serving as the endpoint and 
storage facility. The building of this pipeline will cause 
significant safety concerns. And to date, there are no plans 
from PHMSA to update CO2 safety regs until 2024.
    Mr. Brown, regulators are behind on all these issues. And 
given past mismanagement, why would we trust corporations to 
come up with their own appropriate safety standards?
    Mr. Brown. I don't think we should trust anyone. I think we 
should put rules in place, and standards in place, regulations 
in place that are foolproof, that don't involve trusting, but 
involve meeting standards.
    And we are planning to promulgate a draft rule in the 
coming months. I think that will set the standard and bar for 
the projects you referenced.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. And as the pipeline goes, shouldn't 
we hold off on construction?
    Mr. Brown. That is not a question that Congress has given 
to my agency to make any sort of determination.
    I can just tell you we are racing to get these rules out, 
to make them as strong as possible. We have got input from, I 
think, folks across the panel here to acknowledge and the 
consensus that there need to be updates to the rules.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Fair enough. And my next question, 
Mr. Brown, is this: If we don't have definitive standards for 
how far plumes go, or how far back setbacks should be, how can 
we accurately regulate for the health and safety of those 
nearby?
    Mr. Brown. That is something we hope to address in our 
rulemaking.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Why would we put this technology in 
place, risking lives without adequate research or protections 
in place?
    Mr. Brown. Well, so, just for clarification, we have had 
carbon dioxide pipelines around for decades. And it was 
incentivized in the bipartisan infrastructure act as well as 
the Inflation Reduction Act, because of the climate change 
challenge that we face, and this being one of the potential 
solutions to the challenge that I think--I hope everybody in 
the room can help us focus on, which is how to make sure it 
works, how to make sure it works safely because of its 
potential to reduce climate change impacts.
    Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you.
    Mr. Chair, I yield the balance of my time.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thank you very much, Mr. 
Garcia. With that, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Babin.
    You have 5 minutes.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. Thank 
you, all of you witnesses, for being here.
    Pipelines are the backbone of our energy infrastructure. 
The United States has the largest network of energy pipelines 
in the world. My home State of Texas has the highest total 
pipeline mileage by far. And while there is certainly room for 
improvement, studies prove that pipelines are also the 
cheapest, the most environmentally friendly, and the safest way 
to transport oil and gas and other products.
    However, given the Biden administration's actions to shut 
down pipeline projects like the Keystone XL pipeline that they 
killed back in 2021, you would think that it was just the 
opposite. Why would President Biden shoot down a cheaper, 
cleaner, safer way to move our petroleum products, a project 
that supports our national security and energy goals? It is a 
great question, and one we ought to be asking ourselves every 
single day.
    But moving forward, we have got to be sure that the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration is fully 
equipped and prepared to oversee current and future pipelines. 
And they also need to be laser-focused on safety, not 
environmental advocacy or anti-corporate litigation efforts.
    So, Deputy Administrator Brown, due to the growing size of 
the liquefied natural gas, or LNG, market and its importance 
for both domestic and international relations, PHMSA will need 
to step up its important safety role to oversee this industry.
    One proposal is that PHMSA institute an LNG separate Center 
of Excellence at a new location, as discussed in its report to 
Congress under model 3. Model 3 appears to provide 
comprehensive benefits to directly align industry, 
stakeholders, and industry in the continued growth of the 
domestic LNG export facilities. If PHMSA does not intend to 
pursue model 3, how will it make up for the shortfalls and gaps 
in knowledge that would occur?
    Mr. Brown. This is with regards to the creation of the LNG 
Center of Excellence?
    Dr. Babin. That is model 3, that is what--I think you 
mentioned that in your opening statement, did you not?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, I don't think model 3 was in my opening 
statement, but----
    Dr. Babin [interrupting]. OK, well----
    Mr. Brown [continuing]. But we did get appropriated $8.4 
million just a few months ago to create the LNG Center of 
Excellence, and so, we are well on our way in developing that 
model, but don't have anything to report yet as far as where, 
and some of the specifications of what that will look like. But 
it is something that--we are grateful that Congress has 
appropriated this funding to help improve the safety and 
environmental performance of LNG facilities.
    Dr. Babin. OK, well, I have got another question, time 
permitting. The Federal permitting process for energy 
infrastructure projects is complex, often triggering the 
jurisdiction of multiple Federal agencies and reviews. This is 
especially true for large-scale LNG projects, where PHMSA 
provides the regulatory expertise on safe design and 
operations. Yet FERC holds the authority to authorize the 
construction of these projects.
    I understand that often, because of a lack of coordination 
between the agencies, project developers, despite going through 
a multiyear design process, are then questioned and then forced 
to redesign existing facilities to satisfy the evolving demands 
of Federal inspectors and regulators.
    What is your agency doing to improve this coordination and 
to help shorten the permitting process, so that some of these 
projects can move forward, especially in an era of shortfalls 
of energy?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, and thank you, an important question. While 
we don't have, as you recognized, permitting authority, we do 
work closely with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. I 
was actually just down in Freeport, Texas, the site of an 
incident last year, a 450-foot-high fireball and explosion at 
that facility. We want to learn from those mistakes, and make 
sure we don't have that type of incident ever again.
    And so, we had, for the last 9 months, met on a weekly 
basis with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as well as 
the U.S. Coast Guard, to basically not, sort of, stay in our 
lanes, but instead work more closely, as you describe, to 
identify any potential areas of risk, whether it is in our lane 
or their lane typically, and work more robustly to identify 
those items upfront in that process.
    Dr. Babin. OK, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
    Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thank you, Mr. Babin. We now 
turn to the new Member from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez.
    Sir, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank my 
friend, Ranking Member Payne.
    Deputy Administrator Brown, as you know, we have seen 
increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks on our transportation 
infrastructure, including our pipeline systems. Keeping our 
pipelines secure is critical to the safety and well-being of 
the communities we represent. Can you speak to some of the 
cyber threats PHMSA grapples with, and what the interagency 
process for dealing with these attacks looks like?
    Mr. Brown. I can speak a little bit, but just for 
everybody's benefit, Congress has not given us authority to 
oversee cybersecurity of pipelines. The Transportation Security 
Administration does do that. But we do work very closely with 
them.
    Prior to the Colonial Pipeline cyber attack, we would 
engage voluntarily, invite our regulated entities, pipeline 
operators to discuss their cyber plans because, as we 
experienced when that incident occurred, there are operational 
impacts, potentially, when you have a cyber attack, and we are 
responsible for safe operations. Ultimately, the companies are 
always responsible for safe operations, but we are responsible 
for overseeing that. And so, prior to that incident, we had 
about 50 percent of our regulated entities engage in those 
discussions. Post that incident, we had about 100 percent of 
entities engaged in that.
    So, we have provided our input to the Transportation 
Security Administration on their proposed security directives 
on cybersecurity. We have engaged with leadership of pipeline 
companies, including the CEOs of companies that Mr. Black and 
Mr. Grubb represent, to make sure we are all on the same page. 
And more coordination between the Government and the private 
sector and between the Government agencies like the ones I 
referenced is integral to mitigating this increasing threat.
    Mr. Menendez. And a quick followup to that. Do you believe 
you have the statutory authority and tools you need to keep our 
pipeline infrastructure secure?
    Mr. Brown. We don't have the security responsibility, but 
we are actually hiring a cyber expert, even though we don't 
have a jurisdiction in that space, it does affect the areas 
that we do have jurisdiction.
    The nexus between operations and cybersecurity, just the 
same as Congressman Stauber noted for physical security. When 
we find issues, we want to flag them for Transportation 
Security Administration. And when they find them, we want to 
know about that. We train their inspectors on pipeline safety 
issues. So, we will continue to keep up that close 
collaboration.
    Mr. Menendez. That is great, and I appreciate that. And 
speaking of collaboration, this next question is open for all 
the witnesses.
    Where do you see the gaps in our pipeline cybersecurity 
infrastructure?
    And what do you need from Congress to address these 
threats?
    Mr. Brown. I will answer last because I have talked a lot 
here.
    Mr. Black. TSA has primary jurisdiction, as the Deputy 
Administrator has said, and they have identified critical 
facilities and required security directives of pipeline 
operators. That engagement with TSA and DOE is pretty good. 
Pipeline operators participate in a public-private partnership, 
Oil and Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council, where we can 
do classified briefings and talk threats.
    TSA has seen that they need to evolve their requirements on 
pipeline operators to make sure that we are keeping up with the 
latest threats. There are a lot of bad guys out there who are 
trying to stop pipelines, but the public-private partnerships 
and the actions by pipeline operators are heading in the right 
direction.
    I don't have a recommendation for you.
    Mr. Menendez. For sure. Especially, you see more 
sophisticated technology, in terms of the pipeline management. 
I can imagine the increase in technology also increases the 
exposure and the risk. And so, I appreciate you continuing to 
monitor with our different agencies, TSA being the primary 
lead.
    Mr. Black. Yes.
    Mr. Grubb. So I, as well, don't have a recommendation, but 
I appreciate the question.
    But I will tell you that Kinder Morgan is definitely 
engaged with TSA and CEPA regarding cybersecurity of our 
pipelines. And in fact, our CEO was in Washington late last 
week, meeting with those agencies and talking through, and 
collaborating on the importance of cybersecurity and plans and 
programs going forward.
    Mr. Brown. I will just add one thing we have floated is 
having a detailed firm, a regulated entity with cyber 
expertise. Again, while we don't have that jurisdiction, we 
would still benefit, I think, from the sort of internal 
knowledge of how an operator navigates some of these challenges 
and vice versa that I think they can appreciate what we need to 
know in an incident like the Colonial cyber incident.
    Mr. Menendez. Thank you. I appreciate all of you, and I 
apologize for not having any time to yield back.
    Mr. Nehls [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman's time is 
expired. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Duarte.
    Mr. Duarte. Hello. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member. I 
appreciate the hearing today.
    Mr. Brown, good day. The fiscal year 2023 Appropriations 
Act provided more than $319 million in new funding for the 
Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. And as 
you know, the PIPES Act required PHMSA to maintain a minimum of 
247 pipeline inspection personnel for fiscal year 2023. Your 
current count is 207, and now we learn that this funding 
includes a total of 33 positions, including 6 positions for 
pipeline safety climate change experts.
    Given the clear direction of Congress that PHMSA hire a 
minimum of 247 pipeline inspection and enforcement personnel, 
how can you justify 6 positions related to climate change in an 
agency that is supposed to be focused on safety?
    And what are these six climate change experts doing that is 
not covered by the regular pipeline inspection personnel?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, I want to make sure we get a very robust 
answer as a followup to this hearing, because over the first 2 
years, we were meeting the year-on-year increases of 20 percent 
each year. At the end of the year, we often lose folks to 
retirement. I want to make sure we get you up-to-date numbers 
and factor in those changes.
    We also initiated new recruitment and retention proposals 
that are currently pending with the Office of Personnel 
Management. For example, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental 
Enforcement pays their engineering inspectors about 30 percent 
more than we are able to pay ours.
    Additionally, there is at least one State that pays about 
30 percent more. We just want to be able to be on that same 
level playing field.
    We can't compete with the private sector in terms of 
compensation, but we welcome any incentives.
    Mr. Duarte. Great.
    Mr. Brown. It is not for a lack of trying. We certainly 
want----
    Mr. Duarte [interrupting]. Well, thank you. My followup 
question is, what are the climate change experts----
    Mr. Brown [interposing]. Yes, great.
    Mr. Duarte [continuing]. Doing that your regular safety 
personnel are not doing?
    Mr. Brown. Yes. So, this committee directed us to consider 
environmental impacts in our rulemakings. That has been a 
directive from this committee. We have to implement that.
    The last administration promulgated a rule in which 15 
State attorneys general sued us because we did not consider 
environmental impacts. When a rule is litigated and basically 
held in abeyance, we can't do our work on those rules until we 
consider the environmental impacts.
    As I noted before, we had less than one full-time employee 
considering environmental impacts when it is in our mission 
statement. So, we need a few folks. That also includes lithium-
ion batteries. So, half of our agency oversees 1 in 10 goods 
that move in the United States: nuclear waste, lithium-ion 
batteries----
    Mr. Duarte [interrupting]. OK, I got it. It has been said 
that if everything is a priority, then nothing gets priority. 
PHMSA requests more resources from Congress to complete this 
core mission. Now you are spending these resources on 
activities that have no correlation with pipeline safety.
    We can all talk about climate change until the cows come 
home. We can all talk about: Are we facilitating the use of 
natural gas, and does natural gas contribute to climate change? 
Your core mission is keeping the natural gas and the natural 
gas pipeline--because as you said, it is a very powerful--when 
released, a very powerful climate driver.
    And so, in this change in mission--is this change in 
mission being directed by the White House? And what 
communications have you had with them regarding this new 
direction for PHMSA?
    Mr. Brown. So, I agree with what you said. So, I think 
maybe there is just a disconnect on, sort of, our common 
understanding. When we are keeping product in the pipe, that is 
mitigating climate change, right? So, that is what we are 
trying to do, is keep the product in the pipe. That is 
improving safety, mitigating----
    Mr. Duarte [interrupting]. I guess I have to ask. You used 
to have quarterly meetings with the industry, the PHMSA group 
and your group used to have quarterly meetings. And yet, the 
best way to keep gas in the pipe and to keep environmental 
catastrophes from happening is working closely with the people 
who are most engaged in keeping them from happening, as the 
industry folks here are very incentivized to deliver safety and 
delivery within their pipelines. You haven't been having the 
meetings since 2021. How can you achieve your stated purpose 
without better engagement with the industry?
    Mr. Brown. I believe we have had five advisory committee 
meetings in the last few years. Those are primarily focused 
on--and their role as Congress set out--to consider 
rulemakings. We had the most productive year in our agency's 
history in 2021 in rulemakings. Many of those had already had 
the advisory committee meeting for those rulemakings.
    So, you can expect a bunch more, either a bunch more 
meetings or longer meetings to just get more done at one 
meeting, instead of having a bunch of separate meetings, 
because it takes a ton of staff time to actually set up for 
those meetings. And it also takes a lot of time--and I know 
people are very generous, we have got members here represented 
in actually going to those meetings, but we are trying to make 
it as efficient as possible, instead of just having meetings, 
which in this town often don't always produce results.
    Mr. Duarte. I can see that.
    I will yield back.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Carter.
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and 
Ranking Member--273 crossing fatalities, 1,475 per year between 
2005 to 2021. GPAC meetings, making sure these communities are 
safe, becomes very, very important.
    Mr. Grubb, can you explain the benefits of the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration issuing a final class 
rule?
    Mr. Grubb. So, it has three main benefits. I thank you for 
the question, by the way. There are three main benefits 
associated with finalizing the class location rule.
    The first is updating the outdated regulation that has been 
in place for over 50 years. It was put in place prior to in-
line inspection being developed, and those technologies being 
further advanced.
    The second benefit is, we will eliminate over 800 million 
cubic feet that is emitted annually by virtue of having 
alternative methods of compliance with the current regulation.
    The third benefit is the hundreds of millions of dollars 
that industry is spending on replacing perfectly safe pipe that 
is in accordance with the current regulation, can be 
reallocated to other safety measures, other safety benefits on 
these pipeline systems.
    We hope that PHMSA will finalize this rule as soon as 
possible, based on those three benefits.
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Can you share with me what your 
company does to ensure pipeline safety?
    Mr. Grubb. So, the main things are, we respond to incidents 
with the priorities of lives and property, first. We 
investigate incidents to determine the causes and the facts of 
those incidents. And then we use those findings to improve our 
processes and procedures.
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana. So, we know how important it is to 
involve the community. And I just heard Mr. Brown suggest that 
there have been five meetings over the last several years. Do 
you think that is ample?
    I mean, we are talking about keeping the community 
involved, making sure that they understand the most up-to-date 
safety measures, that they know the early warnings, that they 
know their area is to be protected. I suggest that these 
meetings should be much more frequently held.
    Mr. Brown. These are largely to consider the text of 
regulations that we promulgate, and come to a consensus on that 
text. And so, we are trying to time them where we can get--
given the interest in our finishing our rulemakings quickly--as 
many rulemakings on one of those meetings as possible. 
Otherwise, it extends the amount of work everyone has to do.
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana. But you would agree that having 
community involvement is essential?
    Mr. Brown. I am sorry?
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana. You would agree that having 
community involvement is essential?
    Mr. Brown. Yes. Community is welcome to attend those 
meetings, but it is largely only attended by the statutory 
members of that committee, which is 15 individuals, and they 
represent 5 people from industry, 5 from governmental entities, 
and then 5 public members.
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana. What individuals are mandated that 
must be in attendance for these meetings?
    Mr. Brown. Just the--well, actually, no one is mandated to 
attend, but there are 15 members of the committee that are 
statutorily required to be appointed.
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Fifteen members from where?
    Mr. Brown. Five from industry, five from the public, five 
from governmental entities, State and local.
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana. OK, so, tell me about the five 
from the public.
    Mr. Brown. So, we, for the first time, appointed a labor 
representative, the people that actually do the work that we 
are talking about on the ground. Mr. Caram is a member, and his 
organization is represented as a member of the public. We have 
an environmental organization, Environmental Defense Fund, 
represented, a law professor, and then, for the first time, we 
are trying to focus on, can we get some engineer professors, or 
people with sort of the greatest amount of expertise in this 
space committed to our mission of safety and environmental----
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana [interrupting]. Well, why not 
individuals? Why not people from the community, the people that 
are most impacted? You say those five are community, but I 
didn't hear you say anybody from a neighborhood. I didn't hear 
anybody from a school, anyone from a church, anyone from the 
affected community. May I----
    Mr. Brown [interrupting]. Yes, we do.
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana [continuing]. I----
    Mr. Brown [interposing]. Yes.
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Let me ask first.
    Mr. Brown. I am sorry.
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana. It is important that, when we talk 
about these things, that we involve community.
    Mr. Brown. Absolutely.
    Mr. Carter of Louisiana. And if you call it a community 
five, then that community should truly be representative of the 
people in the community.
    Mr. Brown. My understanding of what Congress----
    Mr. Nehls [interrupting]. The gentleman's time is expired. 
I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Molinaro.
    Mr. Molinaro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate 
that.
    Mr. Brown, I want to get to you in a moment, but I strongly 
suggest that long meetings don't produce better outcomes. 
Effective meetings produce better outcomes. Congress is a 
living example of some of that, and I trust that you can 
appreciate that.
    I do want to, Mr. Grubb, though, I want to follow up on the 
classification rule. I appreciated my colleagues' questions. 
Could you remind us, however, how long the industry has been 
waiting for the rule to be finalized?
    Mr. Grubb. Thank you for the question. Over 20 years.
    Mr. Molinaro. So, Mr. Brown, what exactly is the reason why 
over 20 years is the time in which the industry has been 
waiting?
    Mr. Brown. The question the chairman asked me first about 
the LNG facilities rule, that is about 30 years. That one, big 
safety impacts. This one, more efficiency, potential impacts 
for reducing environmental emissions. We focus on safety first.
    We had three rules that we finished last year that were 
over 10 years in the making that this committee said, ``You 
must get done in 30 days'' in 1 year. So, we are focusing on 
the ones that Congress has given us deadlines for, and 
prioritizing safety first.
    Mr. Molinaro. Dear God, I can only imagine that, if 10 
years is priority, I can't imagine what 30 is. It is a bit of 
an embarrassment, wouldn't you think? I mean----
    Mr. Brown [interrupting]. In the last administration--I 
just went to revisit that exact same hearing, and you got the 
exact same questions from both sides of the aisle: Why does it 
take so long?
    And the amount of things that we oversee--natural gas, for 
example--triple what it was 5 years ago that we oversee. Carbon 
dioxide, hydrogen, $100 billion in incentives. We have zero 
people, zero full-time employees focused on that. Our ability 
to get things done is directly proportional to the resources 
that Congress gives us.
    Mr. Molinaro. Yes, I tend to question that, as a former 
government official, local government official. I tend to think 
that it is just--it is a lack of focus and focus on efficient 
outcomes. I have never been involved in government where 
somebody didn't say, ``What I need is more people to accomplish 
more,'' and when we do, they don't accomplish it any quicker, 
we just have more people doing the same thing. That is my 
observation. I will be glad to engage in that a little bit 
further as we get further down the--sorry for the pun--
pipeline.
    But I want to return, Mr. Grubb. So, the PIPES Act of 2016 
convenes this voluntary information-sharing system, a working 
group. It was recommended that Congress authorize such a 
program to share pipeline safety information, while providing 
confidentiality for disclosures.
    Could you speak briefly to the benefits of that? And then 
how might Congress or PHMSA address the concerns about sharing 
proprietary information?
    Mr. Grubb. Thank you for the question. So, INGAA and its 
member companies strongly support sharing of information across 
the sector. It is something that we have done for many years. 
It is something we will continue to do. We learn from those. We 
modify our procedures associated with the learnings from other 
companies, as well as our own. We highly value it. It is 
something that we share not only with industry sectors, but 
across the regulatory groups, the governmental groups, the 
public safety organizations. It is very beneficial. It is 
something we champion.
    With respect to this particular program, I don't have a lot 
of details on the inner workings of it, and how it would work. 
I would certainly be willing to look at that and take that back 
and respond in writing. But I don't have any particular 
information relative to the inner workings of that information-
sharing that you referenced.
    Mr. Molinaro. OK. And, of course, protecting proprietary 
information, obviously, a priority for the industry. And as we 
address that, obviously, some guidance and input would be 
useful.
    Mr. Brown, I know that you have already addressed this for 
my sake, and I am just getting used to the concept of asking 
questions that have already been answered as a new Member of 
Congress, but I am happy to continue in that fine tradition.
    I wanted to talk, if you could, in my last 30 seconds, the 
technology pilot program allows operators to deploy that 
technology that we know will both spur innovation, has 
environmental benefit, and, of course, increased safety. Can 
you just reiterate why we have had no participants?
    Mr. Brown. I think Mr. Black has reiterated it a few times, 
from the perspective of those who are looking to participate. 
The burden is too high for them to meet. And so, we are happy 
to work with folks, because we do want to get to the same 
place, which is using innovative technologies. We don't want to 
sacrifice safety, and we don't want to sacrifice environmental 
impacts. But if we can come up with rules of the road there, I 
mean, that is what we publicly asked for, and we just haven't 
gotten the suggestion of how to do that.
    We have gotten the suggestion that we shouldn't consider 
the environmental impacts, but the Congress said we have to, is 
our legal interpretation of that. So, I don't know if I can add 
too much more, but I do think it is an important point, and I 
am glad to work with you.
    Mr. Molinaro. We would like that.
    And Mr. Chairman, with the degree of priority--without 
being snide--perhaps we could achieve that in less than 20 
years.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired. I 
now recognize Mr. Huffman for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the 
witnesses.
    If I have learned anything in my 10 years in Congress, it 
is that my colleagues across the aisle pretty much look at any 
situation, almost every hearing, every bill, as an opportunity 
to push the fossil fuel agenda. And so, I guess it is no 
surprise that this week, apparently, the GOP messaging memo was 
to use the toxic rail tragedy in East Palestine as a pivot to 
make the case for more fossil fuel pipeline infrastructure. 
Never mind that that was vinyl chloride, and the pipelines that 
they want are oil and gas.
    I understand why they want to pivot to fossil fuel 
pipelines, but let's not pretend that that is safe. The truth, 
if we are honest about it, is that fossil fuel pipelines are 
disasters waiting to happen, plain and simple.
    A great example of that is the Keystone XL, or the Keystone 
Pipeline. Over the last 12 years, it has had 22 oilspills, 
including 2 large spills between 2017 and 2019. The GAO issued 
a report in 2021 regarding this pipeline's safety record, 
showing that it had been deteriorating, identifying 
construction issues as the primary contributor. But maybe the 
more shocking part of that report was that the Keystone 
Pipeline's terrible safety record was about the same, on 
average, as other fossil fuel pipelines all over this country.
    So, when you put that together with Mr. Caram's testimony 
showing the number of significant incidents has slightly 
increased since 2010, I think we have just got to be very 
clear-eyed about pipeline safety and fossil fuel pipeline 
safety, specifically, in this country.
    On December 22, 2022, Keystone sprang another big leak. 
This time, 14,000 barrels spilled in Nebraska. It was the 
pipeline's largest spill since it began operating in 2010, the 
largest onshore oilspill in the U.S. since 2013. And PHMSA 
officials had actually told the GAO way back in 2001 that they 
had learned lessons, and that they were applying those lessons 
to inspecting pipelines that were under construction. But here 
we are.
    And so, Mr. Brown, I have been impressed by your knowledge 
and your competency. You have given great answers to all the 
questions. If we have to have this spaghetti web of pipelines 
moving dangerous, toxic, volatile fossil fuel all over this 
country every day, I want a competent person like you 
overseeing it, I really do. And I respect the work that you do.
    But you also said--you gave us this lessons learned line 
that we have heard many times before. And I just want to ask if 
you can appreciate the fact that we have heard this many, many 
times before. So, as you undertake your rulemaking under the 
PIPES Act, can you give us something more specific about 
specific lessons that you are going to put into practice to 
make these pipelines more safe?
    Mr. Brown. Yes, absolutely. But I just want to get to that 
really important point that people find it very disconcerting 
that we focus on lessons learned. That is, like, by design. 
That is Congress telling us, and the statutes----
    Mr. Huffman [interrupting]. You should do it. I am not 
saying you shouldn't do it.
    Mr. Brown. Yes. No, no, of course. And I just want 
everybody in the room to understand.
    We just had a hearing in the DC Circuit on a rule, and a 
little bit of the commentary was that unless you can point to a 
failure specifically, then you can't do a rulemaking. You are 
not going to survive the legal standard that has been set up by 
Congress.
    Mr. Huffman. Understood. And reclaiming my time, because I 
want you to learn those lessons and to apply them to your 
rulemakings, I do want to ask Mr. Caram about hydrogen.
    One of the latest things that we are hearing is that all of 
these new fossil fuel pipelines will soon be carrying hydrogen. 
We can start blending it right away, and eventually it will be 
all hydrogen. But it is not that simple, is it, Mr. Caram? We 
know that the California PUC has just done a study suggesting 
that there are serious risks and gaps in research and 
regulations regarding blending hydrogen into fossil fuel 
pipelines, and that we could very well face leaks from 
fittings, gaskets, valves, stems.
    What are some of the things we should be concerned about 
before we get too far down the path of hydrogen pipelines?
    Mr. Caram. Yes, thank you for the question. And the 
Pipeline Safety Trust commissioned a report on the safety of 
hydrogen pipelines that I encourage everyone to review.
    We found that hydrogen has some unique physical 
characteristics that are very different from methane that make 
it more dangerous from methane, primarily a much larger 
flammability range, meaning it more likely to ignite at 
different concentrations, and it also poses known integrity 
issues to pipes and components, embrittlement and things like 
that, which would lead to more failures.
    There are some really large knowledge gaps that both PHMSA 
and the industry, through research organizations, are 
attempting to fill, but we are years away from answering those 
questions.
    Mr. Huffman. Thank you. And Mr. Chair, I see that I am out 
of time. I don't have enough time to get into CO2 
pipelines, which are not a climate solution. They are for 
enhanced oil recovery. But we will do that another day. I 
appreciate your indulgence.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Huffman. I now yield 5 minutes to 
Mr. Kean.
    Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want 
to thank all the witnesses for being here today.
    As we begin our work to reauthorize pipeline safety 
legislation, I look forward to working with every single member 
of the subcommittee to improve pipeline safety through a 
balanced regulatory approach.
    As we have heard, the United States has the largest network 
of energy pipelines in the world. Oversight of the Pipeline and 
Hazardous Materials Safety Administration safety programs 
should be a top priority for this subcommittee in achieving our 
common goal and our shared goal of zero pipeline incidents.
    Mr. Black, the PIPES Act of 2020 creates a technology pilot 
program that allows operators to test innovative technologies 
and practices that improve safety in the field. How do 
operators use innovative technology and practices to improve 
the pipeline safety of their systems?
    And what benefits would a technology pilot program give to 
operators?
    Mr. Black. We are excited about the benefits of innovation 
in inspection and analytic technologies, and we want them to be 
rolled into how PHMSA regulates pipelines. And I know 
innovation is very important to you in your part of New Jersey.
    Pipeline inspections occur through in-line inspections, so-
called smart pig, that travel inside of the pipe. And through 
the decades, the sensors that have been put on the pipe have 
gotten more and more sophisticated. We can see more things.
    Similarly, back in the office, we are using newer 
techniques to harness the data from that. But the regulations 
that PHMSA uses for the schedule that pipelines must address 
incidents on are more than 20 years old, but yet we have had 
all these innovations.
    So, we are grateful to Congress for creating a pipeline 
safety demonstration program. Sadly, it hasn't worked. Nobody 
has applied, because it was made too hard, it went beyond what 
Congress was suggesting. With some reforms that I am happy to 
go into, we can road test. PHMSA can see the benefits of new 
inspection technologies, and how reorienting the schedule that 
operators need to address risks on improves pipeline safety. 
That is our goal.
    Let's use innovation, new technology, even machine learning 
to improve. We are doing it, but we need the PHMSA schedules to 
improve.
    Mr. Kean of New Jersey. OK. Thank you.
    Deputy Administrator Brown, PHMSA has only held one GPAC 
meeting since January of 2021, and that was on October 20th and 
21st of 2021. In the past, you have had many GPAC meetings, 
while also issuing complicated notice of rulemakings and final 
rules. Why have you had so few meetings?
    Mr. Brown. So, in the past, we have also had years where we 
didn't get any rulemakings done. So, we might have had meetings 
but not done rulemakings.
    These meetings are exclusively--at least from my 
perspective, and all the demands on getting rulemakings done--
to advance rulemakings. We have to have a meeting in order for 
a rulemaking to advance. So--and we want--we had the busiest 
year in our history in producing pipeline safety rulemakings in 
2021, nearly the busiest in 2022.
    We have no aversion to having these meetings. We just want 
to make them as efficient as possible, given the demands we 
have for all the rulemakings we have to complete.
    Mr. Kean of New Jersey. OK. Thank you. And Mr. Grubb, can 
you explain, please explain to this subcommittee, what your 
committee does to ensure the safety of its pipeline system?
    Mr. Grubb. So, thank you for the question.
    So, over time, pipeline operators have invested highly in 
advancements in pipeline in-line inspection technology. That 
has improved immensely over time.
    The other things are implementation of pipeline safety 
management systems. We have one at Kinder Morgan. We call it 
our operations management system. It is really a system that 
defines our culture.
    And there are three main tenets of our operations 
management system: the first is, every employee has a role in 
the OMS; the second is instilling a culture of continuous 
improvement and operational excellence; and the last, and 
certainly not least, is risk reduction: risk reduction to our 
assets, to the people that live near our pipelines, to our 
employees, to our contractors that work in our pipelines. That 
is a main part of what we do to reduce risk and manage the 
safety of our pipelines.
    The third and last thing is joint industry collaboration, 
over which GPAC meetings are also crucial and key, interacting 
with other industries or other industry subject matter experts, 
Government experts, as well as public safety organization 
experts.
    Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you to the entire panel for 
your testimony.
    I will yield back the remainder of my time.
    Mr. Nehls. Thank you. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. LaMalfa.
    Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad I was able 
to slide into the newer, larger second base just in time. 
Apologies. Overlapping committees make it tough around here, 
but I appreciate your folks' work with this committee and 
extremely important topics here on pipelines, which we rely 
heavily upon in this country, and we need more of. So, let me 
launch into it here real quickly.
    Now, safety is a cornerstone. And that is what much of the 
work of Congress is seeking to do in increasing safety in all 
aspects of our lives, including pipelines.
    What I note is that the average U.S. company pays 
approximately $10,000 per employee per year to comply with 
Federal regulations. So, laws passed with good intent can be 
completely changed by the time the implementation is completed, 
or years and decades go by. We see that a lot with the creep of 
responsibility and jurisdiction.
    So, the more input that is received, the rules that the 
companies have to comply with become less flexible and more 
burdensome--input by Federal Government and agencies. And the 
estimate of the National Association of Manufacturers puts the 
total economic cost of regulations every year at $2 trillion.
    In the 2020 PIPES Act, Congress recognized this and sought 
partially to address it by telling PHMSA to immediately carry 
out a pilot program to let pipeline operators evaluate new 
technology and operational changes to improve pipeline safety. 
But in a way, it is inefficient and also uneconomical.
    Again, apologies if some of this is redundant from earlier 
work today, but since it took too long to send the guidance to 
operators, the report that they were required to send to 
Congress a year later was completely void of recommendations, 
is my understanding.
    So, tossing this to Mr. Grubb here, do you know of any 
recent innovations with technology or operational changes that 
could have improved pipeline safety under this pilot program?
    Mr. Grubb. I am sorry. Could you repeat the last part of 
the question?
    Mr. LaMalfa. Some of the innovations with technology or 
operational changes that could have improved the pipeline 
safety under the pilot program that was to be done under PHMSA.
    Mr. Grubb. Yes, so, to my knowledge, there hasn't been any 
takers on the technology pilot program because of the 
complications that Mr. Black talked about.
    But I can tell you that pipeline operators are advancing 
technology on their own.
    Mr. LaMalfa. On their own, yes.
    Mr. Grubb. And I can tell you that Kinder Morgan, one of 
our pipelines was the first pipeline to implement a tool that 
detects cracks, environmental cracking, in its pipelines. And 
that was done many, many years ago. It received PHMSA approval. 
It was the first pipeline to have received that approval. And 
it has become the industry standard today for detecting cracks.
    Mr. LaMalfa. So, the PIPES Act did not really aid in 
expediting in this in a pilot program?
    Mr. Grubb. No, because of the issues that Mr. Black 
referenced earlier.
    Mr. Black. The PIPES Act helped. PHMSA implementation meant 
nobody took it up. PIPES Act was good. We would like you to 
continue. Maybe give more direction to PHMSA, have a longer 
program. Congress was in the right place.
    Mr. LaMalfa. OK. What do we need to do to then speed up or 
do additional work to make PIPES Act effective and something 
you would want to access?
    Mr. Black. Say that decisions on pilot program applications 
don't need to follow NEPA, have an environmental assessment; 
have a reasonable standard review that is less than something 
for a permanent waiver, and not use the permanent waiver 
process; and give this enough time to work. We believe that it 
can. The technology is an ultrasound, an MRI, and pipelines can 
improve safety.
    Mr. LaMalfa. So, even though it is a pilot program designed 
to speed things up, it is still under the guidelines of a long-
term permitting process. It hasn't really changed.
    Mr. Black. It is suffering many of the same problems, yes, 
sir. Two years later, we haven't made notable progress.
    Mr. LaMalfa. OK. What do we need to do in order to modify 
or streamline, massage that act in order to make it so it would 
be accessible and actually a helpful tool?
    Mr. Black. Thank you. That would be great, and we would 
like to work with you. Reauthorize it for a long time. Tell 
PHMSA to stick with the mandates that you have given. Tell them 
we don't need to do environmental assessments on R&D projects. 
We don't need to use the special permit process. Let's make 
this work.
    Mr. LaMalfa. R&D shouldn't need environmental review.
    Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
    Mr. LaMalfa. OK. Makes sense.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. I appreciate the 
time.
    Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. Are there any further 
questions from any members of the subcommittee who have not 
been recognized?
    Seeing none, that concludes our hearing for today.
    I would like to thank each one of the witnesses for your 
testimony. I would like to thank Ranking Member Payne for being 
here.
    I look forward to working with you for the next several 
months.
    I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing 
remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided 
answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in 
writing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 
for 15 days for any additional comments or information 
submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record 
of today's hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    The subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]


                       Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              


 Letter of March 22, 2023, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick 
Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 
   from Geoff Moody, Senior Vice President, Government Relations and 
 Policy, American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers, Submitted for 
                    the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
                                                    March 22, 2023.
The Honorable Sam Graves,
Chairman,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2165 Rayburn House 
        Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
The Honorable Rick Larsen,
Ranking Member,
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2164 Rayburn House 
        Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
RE:  Statement for the Record--Pipeline Safety: Reviewing 
Implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining Future Safety 
Needs

    Dear Chairman Graves and Ranking Member Larsen:
    The American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) is the 
leading trade association representing the makers of the fuels that 
keep us moving, the petrochemicals that are the essential building 
blocks for the American manufacturing economy, and the midstream 
companies that get our feedstocks and products where they need to go. 
AFPM members make modern life possible and keep America moving and 
growing as they meet the needs of our nation and local communities, 
strengthen economic and national security, and support over three 
million American jobs. AFPM appreciates the opportunity to provide its 
perspectives on priorities for pipeline safety reauthorization.
    As Congress crafts the pipeline safety reauthorization, it should 
ensure PHMSA focuses on risk-based and cost-effective regulations, 
promote technology development, and ensure existing programs are 
working as intended. AFPM recommends Congress consider the following 
concepts for inclusion in any reauthorization.
 Enhance Pipeline Safety Through Data-driven and Risk Based Initiatives
    Congress can help improve safety by encouraging sensible data- and 
risk-based regulations in the following areas.
      Voluntary information sharing (VIS) can benefit PHMSA's 
safety mission and AFPM supports a VIS regime provided appropriate 
protections are in place to ensure such information is used solely as a 
mechanism to improve pipeline safety. Protecting voluntarily shared 
information, as well as security sensitive information, must remain a 
commitment for PHMSA.
      PHMSA standards regulate the inspection of petroleum 
storage tanks on fixed structures; however, these inspection 
requirements are rigid and not risk-based, which can lead to unneeded 
inspections, environmental impacts, and increased risk for workers. 
Congress should instruct PHMSA to review current storage tank 
inspection procedures and implement a risk-based approach that 
prioritizes worker and environmental safety.
      The National Response Center reporting process currently 
requires tedious telephonic reporting and PHMSA's update to the 
incident reporting threshold for liquid pipelines has been delayed. 
Congress should simplify the National Response Center reporting process 
and instruct PHMSA to periodically adjust the incident reporting 
threshold for inflation.
   Enable Technology Advancements Through Modernized Pipeline Safety 
                               Standards
    The regulatory process often lags behind the pace of technological 
advancements. Congress can foster innovative technologies and support 
programs that will improve safety standards in the following areas.
      In the PIPES Act of 2021, Congress instructed PHMSA to 
implement a pilot program to enable operators to use new advanced 
technologies without major regulations. Unfortunately, the program has 
not been utilized effectively, as many of the parameters are overly 
restrictive and have discouraged pipeline operators from the program. 
Congress should update the Pipeline Safety Technology Demonstration 
program to encourage operators to utilize this option and deploy 
advanced technologies under controlled conditions.
      While current federal pipeline safety standards already 
regulate the design, construction, operation, maintenance, and 
emergency response for CO2 and Hydrogen pipelines, the regulations 
could be updated to ensure they are consistent and current. PHMSA 
should ensure the regulations address any specific safety concerns for 
this material, but at the same time not be so burdensome that they 
stifle development. Congress should instruct PHMSA to review and update 
where necessary specific CO2 and Hydrogen pipeline safety standards.
             Improve PHMSA Safety and Enforcement Programs
    Congress can provide clarity around PHMSA's safety and enforcement 
programs in the following areas.
      The rise of interference directed at both pipeline 
construction and operations creates unsafe conditions and places lives 
at risk. Pipelines must be protected, and deterrents must be in place 
to dissuade such actions. PHMSA's safety mission should include 
authority that ensures pipeline construction and operations remain safe 
at all times and protected from unsafe conditions and damage.
      In 2021 Congress authorized PHMSA to create a program 
that would monitor and mitigate methane emissions from natural gas 
systems. PHMSA expanded the scope of the program beyond natural gas 
pipelines to include liquid pipelines. AFPM members believe that the 
inclusion of liquid pipelines has not resulted in any meaningful 
reductions in hazardous leaks and being overly burdensome on liquid 
pipeline operators. Congress should clarify that this program does NOT 
apply to liquid pipelines and refocus the program on natural gas 
pipelines.
      PHMSA regulations include criteria and procedures for 
determining the effectiveness of State pipeline excavation damage 
prevention programs. While there has been significant improvement over 
the years in avoiding these unintentional hits to pipeline systems, the 
need to make continuous improvements in avoiding such accidents 
remains. Congress should continue to encourage maximum participation in 
these State damage prevention programs by discouraging exemptions from 
such programs via grant funding to the States.

    PHMSA is a small agency with a hugely important mission. While 
previous reauthorizations authorized PHMSA with resources, many safety 
priorities have been delayed. AFPM supports Congress reauthorizing 
PHMSA with the resources to achieve their safety mission. Thank you 
again for your attention and work on Pipeline Safety reauthorization. 
We appreciate your leadership on this important issue and look forward 
to working with lawmakers as the reauthorization process moves forward.
        Sincerely,
                                               Geoff Moody,
            Senior Vice President, Government Relations and Policy,
                       American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers.


                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


      Questions from Hon. Troy E. Nehls to Tristan Brown, Deputy 
 Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
                                (PHMSA)

    Question 1. Is it true the PHMSA has a new Environmental Policy and 
Justice Division?
    Answer. There is no formally established Environmental Policy and 
Justice Division. PHMSA currently has two full time employees with 
engineering and environmental backgrounds within PHMSA's Office of 
Planning and Analytics who work on environmental policy. This work has 
been performed in PHMSA for decades, on an ad hoc basis. PHMSA is 
considering ways to increase efficiency and reduce costs, and 
centralize efforts--aimed at tackling environmental issues proactively 
to help increase the speed of delivery and avoid costly litigation.

Regarding this office:

    Question 1.a. Where in the organization is this office located and 
what are the responsibilities of the personnel in this office?
    Answer. The effort to create more capacity for proactive analysis, 
as previously mentioned, is ongoing.

    Question 1.b. What is its annual budget?
    Answer. There is no formally established Environmental Policy and 
Justice Division so it does not have a budget.

    Question 1.c. Is this office involved in the development of 
rulemakings?
    Answer. PHMSA currently has two full time employees focused on 
ensuring the agency meets the requirements established by Congress for 
NEPA reviews, including for rulemakings.

    Question 1.d. Can you please list the number of personnel and 
corresponding title and GS-level for each personnel located in this 
office?
    Answer. There are currently three personnel who work on 
environmental policy, all with engineering (and environmental) 
backgrounds:
      GS-0028-15 Supervisory Environmental Protection 
Specialist
      GS-0028-14 Lead Environmental Protection Specialist
      GS-0028-09/11/12 Environmental Protection Specialist

    Question 1.e. Are there additional positions to be filled in this 
Division and if so, can you please list those vacant positions?
    Answer. The Office of Planning and Analytics is in the process of 
hiring a GS-0028-13/14 Lead Environmental Protection Specialist to 
conduct state, local, tribal, and territorial reviews to ensure that 
PHMSA is meeting its statutory requirements under Section 106 of the 
National Historic Preservation Act. The office does not have any plans 
to hire any additional environmental protection specialists other than 
the ones previously mentioned.

    Question 2. We've learned that PHMSA has six pipeline safety 
climate change expert positions that are open. Can you please detail 
the job titles, GS-level, position duties, and where they are located 
in PHMSA's organizational structure? How many of these positions have 
been filled?
    Answer. The FY 2023 appropriations provided funding for six (6) 
positions to support the requirements in Executive Order 14008 
(Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad), among several other 
duties consistent with their respective job series. Four positions have 
been filled.
    The positions are as follows:
      Office of Planning and Analytics (4 positions)
      +  GS-0028-15 Supervisory Environmental Protection Specialist 
(Filled)
      +  GS-0028-9/11/12/13/14 Environmental Protection Specialist 
(Vacant)
      +  GS-0028-9/11/12/13/14 Environmental Protection Specialist 
(Vacant)
      +  GS-0028-9/11/12 Environmental Protection Specialist (Filled)
      Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS, 2 positions)
      +  GS-2101-14 Transportation Specialist, Standards and Rulemaking 
Division (Filled). This position will help lead the development of 
rulemaking efforts related to methane emissions reduction for gas 
transmission, gas gathering, gas distribution, liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) and hazardous liquid pipeline facilities. This individual will 
also be involved in the implementation, including stakeholder outreach 
and engagement, of these efforts to reduce the safety and climate 
impact of pipeline infrastructure.
      +  GS-2101-13 Transportation Specialist, Standards and Rulemaking 
Division (Filled). This position will support the development of 
rulemaking efforts related to methane emissions reduction for gas 
transmission, gas gathering, gas distribution, LNG, and hazardous 
liquid pipeline facilities. This individual will also be involved in 
the implementation, including stakeholder outreach and engagement, of 
these efforts to reduce the safety and climate impact of pipeline 
infrastructure.

    Question 3. Section 102(b)(1) of the Protecting Our Infrastructure 
of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (PIPES 2020) mandated 
PHMSA hire eight full time employees with subject matter in pipeline 
safety, pipeline facilities, and pipeline systems to finalize 
outstanding rulemakings and fulfill congressional mandates. PHMSA's FY 
2024 budget request states, ``In furtherance of its rulemaking efforts 
and in accordance with the PIPES Act of 2020, PHMSA is in the process 
of completing its hiring of eight full-time employees to help finalize 
outstanding rulemakings and fulfill congressional mandates.''
    Question 3.a. Can you please list the number of positions that have 
been filled related to this mandate along with their associated titles 
and GS-level?
    Answer. PHMSA has filled all eight (8) positions:
      GS-0801-14 General Engineer
      GS-0801-14 General Engineer
      GS-0801-13 General Engineer
      GS-0905-14 Attorney Advisor
      GS-1515-13 Operations Research Analyst
      GS-0110-13 Economist
      GS-1083-13 Technical Writer
      GS-2101-9 Transportation Specialist

    Question 3.b. Can you please also share what subject matter 
expertise in pipeline safety, pipeline facilities, and pipeline systems 
each person hired has?
    Answer. Almost all of the individuals hired to fill the above 
positions had experience in pipeline safety or the pipeline industry. 
The attorney and economist had transferable experience to PHMSA's 
regulatory program, and they have been instrumental to the progress 
that PHMSA has made in the last two years in one of the busiest 
rulemaking periods in the agency's history.

    Question 3.c. Can you describe the important contributions to 
pipeline safety that each person has made since onboarding?
    Answer. Over the last two years, PHMSA has achieved significant 
milestones in rulemaking, supported by personnel with pipeline safety 
rulemaking responsibility, including the eight (8) hired thus far under 
this mandate. Significant contributions include development of Notices 
of Proposed Rulemakings (NPRMs) for Gas Pipeline Leak Detection, Safety 
of Gas Distribution Pipelines, safety of Carbon Dioxide Pipelines, 
Hazardous Liquid Repair Criteria, LNG Safety, and Pipeline Operational 
Status; information collection requests from OMB for the recently 
published Valve Rule; development of congressionally mandated studies 
and reports; and performance of regulatory impact analysis and 
regulatory flexibility analysis for rulemakings.
    The eight (8) personnel hired under this mandate have the following 
responsibilities:
      GS-0801-14 General Engineer, GS-0801-14 General Engineer, 
and GS-0801-13 General Engineer: provide technical expertise and 
engineering and science-based analysis in support of rulemaking, 
improvement of reliability and serviceability of the pipeline 
transportation network, and development of studies and reports mandated 
in the PIPES Act of 2020.
      GS-2101-9 Transportation Specialist: responsible for 
specializing in rulemaking, perform research and analysis related to 
the development of regulatory changes and interpretation of 
regulations, participate in the development of proposed and final 
rulemaking documents, including environmental and economic impact 
statements, evaluation of public comments, and incorporation of legal 
input on proposed regulatory changes.
      GS-0905-14 Attorney Advisor: responsible for providing 
legal advice in support of the policy development efforts, development 
of rulemakings and implementing guidance, and defense of the same from 
administrative and appellate litigation. The incumbent ensures 
rulemakings developed are evidence-based, legally sound, and otherwise 
satisfy the myriad of procedural and substantive requirements under 
Federal administrative law and PHMSA's safety statutes.
      GS-1515-13 Operations Research Analyst: responsible for 
providing data analysis and visualization and reports to various PHMSA 
offices to address inquiries, respond to mandate and audit activities, 
and support Federal regulation compliance.
      GS-0110-13 Economist: responsible for conducting economic 
research to understand economic and industry trends that influence 
risks to pipelines, the transportation of hazardous materials, and/or 
related industries. The incumbent performs regulatory impact analysis 
and regulatory flexibility analysis, assessing the costs, benefits, 
efficiency, and impacts of PHMSA's regulatory and safety programs.
      GS-1083-13 Technical Writer: responsible for providing 
writing and editorial support for rulemaking and to respond to 
Congressional reports, mandates, and other requirements.

    Question 3.d. Can you please list the number of vacant positions, 
along with their associated titles and GS-level?
    Answer. All eight (8) positions have been filled.

    Question 4. Section 102(b)(2) of PIPES 2020 mandated that PHMSA 
ensure the number of full-time positions for the pipeline inspection 
and enforcement personnel in the Office of Pipeline Safety does not 
fall below 224 for fiscal year 2021, 235 for fiscal year 2022, and 247 
for fiscal year 2023.
    Question 4.a. Can you please let us know the current number of 
full-time pipeline inspection and enforcement personnel employed by 
PHMSA?
    Answer. In compliance with this requirement, as of May 18, 2023, 
PHMSA has 247 full-time pipeline safety inspection and enforcement 
positions. We have continued to accept applications and recruit for 
these positions, and recently we received approval and applied 
additional retention and recruitment incentives. As of September 30, 
2023, 214 of these positions have been filled.

    Question 4.b. According to your testimony, ``PHMSA has kept up with 
the PIPES Act of 2020 hiring mandates--both for inspectors as well as 
for regulatory personnel . . .'' However, according to information 
provided by PHMSA to staff, PHMSA currently only has 207 pipeline 
inspection and enforcement personnel. If this number is accurate, do 
you believe it is compliant with the number set out in Section 102?
    Answer. The 2020 PIPES Act requires PHMSA to ensure that the number 
of full-time positions for pipeline inspection and enforcement (I&E) 
personnel in the Office of Pipeline Safety of the Administration does 
not fall below 224 for fiscal year 2021, 235 for fiscal year 2022 and 
247 for fiscal year 2023. PHMSA has established the openings and 
continued to receive applications consistent with the requirement, and 
as noted above has filled the regulatory personnel positions; further:
      With receipt of appropriations in the FY22 cycle, which 
included funding for additional I&E positions in December of FY22, 
PHMSA has put a robust and aggressive recruitment and retention 
strategy in place, focusing on soon-to-be college graduates and recent 
graduates for entry level opportunities, and internships that will 
create a pipeline of future engineers. PHMSA is also working on 
providing student loan repayment to support its recruitment and 
retention efforts.

      PHMSA successfully onboarded 13 full-time I&E employees 
in FY 2021, 24 I&E employees in FY 2022, and 24 I&E employees to date 
in FY 2023. However, more staff separated from PHMSA's Office of 
Pipeline Safety between fiscal years 2021 and 2022; in FY 2023, 14 I&E 
personnel separated from PHMSA. As Congress has recognized, these are 
also hard to fill positions--PHMSA competes with the private sector to 
attract and retain qualified pipeline inspectors and engineering 
analysts. The commercial energy industry and at least one other federal 
agency offer candidates higher salaries and provide incentives. That is 
why PHMSA requested and received approval for a special rate table from 
OPM to provide a 35 percent premium to grade 5-12 engineer inspectors 
in its five regional offices, in line with other Federal agencies (on 
account of Congress' directive and the fierce competition from industry 
salaries), which was instituted as of May of 2023. PHMSA also continues 
to implement other hiring solutions, such as recruitment and retention 
incentives, tuition assistance, and student loan repayment.

      The job pool is small because the work is technically 
challenging--requiring engineering and other technical degrees--and 
requires individuals who are willing to travel frequently and work in 
harsh outdoor and sometimes hazardous conditions.

      Like any organization, public or private sector, large or 
small, PHMSA will have vacancies due to departures and retirements. In 
the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, some employees are choosing to 
pursue work that does not involve frequent travel across the country. 
While PHMSA has been successful in bringing many new inspectors and 
investigators onboard, it has also lost a similar number to retirement 
and resignation. That is the reason that the number of positions does 
not equal the number of current staff onboard. We have noticed similar 
challenges for state pipeline inspector openings as well.

    Question 5. Section 102 (c) of PIPES 2020 provided PHMSA with the 
authority to use incentives to retain a qualified workforce, including 
inspection and enforcement personnel, attorneys, and subject matter 
experts at the Office of Pipeline Safety at PHMSA. Can you please 
provide a status update on the implementation of the following 
incentives and if they have been utilized, including the number of the 
times they have been used:
    Question 5.a. Special pay rates permitted under section 5305 of 
title 5, United States Code;
    Answer. In 2021, PHMSA engaged an outside contractor to determine 
the parameters for increasing its special pay rates--including for 
example the geographic areas and pay grades--necessary for OPM approval 
of the special pay rates. In FY22, PHMSA received additional funding to 
provide financial incentives such as increasing the pay rates. In 
August of 2022, PHMSA/DOT submitted to the Office of Personnel 
Management (OPM) for approval an increase in the special pay rates for 
engineer/inspectors. PHMSA received final approval from OPM on April 
17, 2023, and promptly implemented the new pay rates.

    Question 5.b. Repayment of student loans permitted under section 
5379 of title 5, United States Code;
    Answer. PHMSA has developed a plan to use the repayment of student 
loans as a retention incentive for its 0800 engineering series 
employees. PHMSA is working to develop an internal process for 
applications of the repayment and expects to implement this retention 
incentive in FY23.

    Question 5.c. Tuition assistance permitted under chapter 41 of 
title 5, United States Code;
    Answer. PHMSA is in the process of creating a new tuition 
assistance program.

    Question 5.d. Recruitment incentives permitted under section 5753 
of title 5, United States Code; and
    Answer. PHMSA actively utilizes recruitment incentives for highly 
qualified applicants for mission-critical occupations.

    Question 5.e. Retention incentives permitted under section 5754 of 
title 5, United States Code.
    Answer. PHMSA is examining ways to offer group retention incentives 
to combat increased turnover experienced last year. The group retention 
incentives could be offered to eligible inspectors and engineers in 
positions that are hard to fill or have high turnover. The incentives 
would not exceed 10% of the proposed salary per recipient and would 
help PHMSA compete with industry salaries. The incentive could be 
coupled with a continuation of service agreement as called for in the 
PIPES Act.
    PHMSA has strongly emphasized recruitment efforts and has 
successfully implemented strategies to attract and retain qualified 
talent. However, based on recent data, PHMSA recognizes that retention 
has become a growing concern across the sector, and as such, we are 
dedicating additional resources to retention efforts moving forward. We 
believe that these incentives will be effective in our efforts to 
retain our talented workforce. Once implemented, we will track and 
measure their effectiveness to ensure they have the desired impact.

    Question 6. Are there any recruitment and retention incentives not 
currently held by PHMSA or included in PIPES 2020 that you believe 
would increase PHMSA's ability to recruit a qualified workforce?If so, 
can you please detail them as well as any needed congressional 
authority to be able to utilize them?
    Answer. PHMSA has recently onboarded a new director for human 
resources who is currently reviewing every available incentive possible 
and proceeding with implementation for those most feasible for PHMSA 
and our incumbents. There is an approval process by which agencies like 
PHMSA may utilize existing recruitment and retention incentives--i.e. 
the authorities PHMSA has are not self-executing. Additionally, PHMSA 
invests in employee leadership development--including three tiers of 
leadership development internal programming as well as external 
coaching services that have been shown to both improve employee morale 
as well as increase employee productivity. These areas show additional 
promise for attracting and retaining talent. While PHMSA is not 
requesting any additional authorities at this time, the agency is 
continuing to explore opportunities to ensure we are able to recruit 
and retain a robust pipeline safety workforce.

    Question 7. Can you please explain why PHMSA has not held a Gas 
Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) meeting on the class location rule 
when Congress required in the 2020 PIPES Act to do so by the end of 
calendar year 2021? When does PHMSA plan to hold this meeting?
    Answer. PHMSA has attempted to successfully balance its existing 
statutory directives with new directives from Congress, many of which 
have included aggressive deadlines, including this one. PHMSA 
recognizes that obtaining input from the Gas Pipeline Advisory 
Committee and Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee is a crucial part of 
its rulemaking process, including for the Class Location Change 
Requirements proposed rule. In 2021, after the passage of the 2020 
PIPES Act, the Government Accountability Office completed a report on 
the Keystone pipeline, noting the unique circumstances under which 
PHMSA issued and maintained a special permit for that line. In 
response, PHMSA initiated an independent third-party assessment of its 
special permit process and the safety conditions required of operators 
for class location special permits--across the board. To optimize use 
of the GPAC and ensure that all relevant information related to the 
proposed rule is available to the GPAC, and to make efficient use of 
the agency resources and the Committee's time, PHMSA planned to hold a 
GPAC meeting on the class location rulemaking after the conclusion of 
the special permit process review. PHMSA recently announced the GPAC 
meeting will occur the week of November 27, 2023. The meeting will 
consider both the Class Location Rule as well as the Leak Detection and 
Repair proposed Rule. Holding a PAC meeting before the independent 
report would deprive the PAC of that information and could further 
delay the finalization of the rule. PHMSA has already reached out to 
GPAC members and scheduled a meeting to review this NPRM, as well as 
PHMSA's NPRM for Gas Pipeline Leak Detection and Repair.

    Question 8. When does PHMSA anticipate issuing a final class 
location rule?
    Answer. As stated above, PHMSA has made public an expected date for 
this meeting, to consider both the Class Location Rule as well as the 
Leak Detection and Repair Proposed Rule. PHMSA currently anticipates 
the rule to be published by the end of 2024.

    Question 9. Deputy Administrator Brown, in your response to a 
question from Representative Marc Molinaro (R-NY) about the class 
location rule, you stated that PHMSA is, `` . . . focusing on the 
[rules] that Congress has given us deadlines for and prioritizing 
safety first.'' You also characterized the class location rule as being 
focused on, `` . . . efficiency, potential impacts for reducing 
environmental emissions. We focus on safety first.'' The Interstate 
Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) believes that finalizing 
this rule will significantly benefit safety by allowing its members to 
reallocate between $200-$300 million per year that could be invested in 
running advanced inspection tools on 25,000 miles of pipe. In addition, 
INGAA believes that finalizing this rule would stop up to 800 million 
cubic feet of natural gas from being released to the atmosphere each 
year. Completing the class location rule would clearly fulfil the 
broader safety and environmental objectives of PHMSA. Furthermore, the 
class location rule had a mandate from Congress in the PIPES Act of 
2020 to hold a Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) meeting on it by 
the end of 2021. We have several inquiries on this topic:
    Question 9.a. Can you please explain why your agency has yet to 
prioritize, and possibly ignored, this mandate thus far?
    Answer. Please see response to question 7 above.
    Further, with respect to the characterization of the rule, I would 
also refer you to the August 1, 2022 letter to me from then Ranking 
Members Graves and Crawford as well as Senators Wicker and Fischer who 
noted ``Class location change regulations mandate that pipeline 
operators undertake certain actions when population density changes, 
such as replacing pipeline segments that result in large releases of 
gas into the atmosphere. Modernizing these requirements has the 
potential to create efficiencies for operators and further protect the 
environment by minimizing these releases.''

    Question 9.b. Can you please explain why your agency has yet to 
prioritize the implementation of the class location rule when there are 
both safety and environmental benefits?
    Answer. In addition to the context provided in response to subpart 
a of your question, since the beginning of the Administration, PHMSA 
has prioritized Congressional mandates (and associated) deadlines with 
ensuring PHMSA advances the rules that can have the greatest impact on 
safety. PHMSA in turn prioritized finalizing three rules that were 
twelve years in the making--spanning four Presidential 
administrations--which stemmed from tragic incidents involving 
pipeline-related fatalities such as the 2010 PG&E San Bruno, CA 
incident.

    Question 9.c. When specifically does PHMSA plan to hold a GPAC 
meeting on the class location Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)?
    Answer. PHMSA has already reached out to GPAC members to schedule a 
meeting to review this NPRM, as well as PHMSA's NPRM for Gas Pipeline 
Leak Detection and Repair in the Fall of 2023.

    Question 9.d. Why did PHMSA hold its only GPAC meeting since the 
start of 2021 on the Periodic Updates of Regulatory References to 
Technical Standards and Miscellaneous Amendments NPRM, which was not 
Congressionally mandated?
    Answer. Please see response to question 7 above.
    Additionally, periodic Updates of Regulatory References to 
Technical Standards and Miscellaneous Amendments proposed rule fulfills 
a Congressional mandate. 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60102(l), Updating Standards, 
states that the Secretary shall update incorporated industry standards 
that have been adopted as part of the Federal pipeline safety 
regulatory program. The ``Periodic Updates of Regulatory References to 
Technical Standards and Miscellaneous Amendments'' NPRM is a rulemaking 
that addresses 26 such standards--more than 30 percent of the standards 
that are incorporated by reference in the pipeline safety regulations. 
As required by 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60115, PHMSA convened a GPAC meeting on 
this rule.
    On March 8, I testified ``As required by Congress, PHMSA continues 
to update the Federal pipeline safety regulations (PSRs) to reflect new 
and revised voluntary consensus standards developed and adopted by 
standards-setting bodies (see e.g., PHMSA's periodic standards update 
rulemakings). We understand how important updating and aligning 
standards can be to ensure the PSR include up-to-date standards that 
reflect current best practices and technologies--and to serve as a 
higher bar, from which the regulated community can continue to 
improve.''

    Question 9.e. Can you explain what process your agency has for 
processing Congressional rulemaking mandates?
    Answer. Generally, when PHMSA receives a congressional mandate to 
complete a rulemaking, PHMSA works with personnel in both the program 
office and the Chief Counsel's office to initiate the rulemaking by 
requesting a Regulatory Identification Number (RIN)--which is then 
submitted to the Office of the Secretary's Office of General Counsel 
for approval and inclusion in the Unified Agenda. PHMSA staff then 
reviews the statutory language in the mandate and begins drafting 
proposed regulations and a Notice of Proposed Regulations (NPRM). Once 
drafted, PHMSA will then issue the NPRM in the Federal Register for 
public comment. If required, PHMSA will hold a meeting of the relevant 
Pipeline Advisory Committee to review and discuss the statutory 
language and any proposed regulatory text, as well as any comments 
received. PHMSA will then issue a final rule adopting new or updated 
regulations. Occasionally, in response to public comments on the NPRM, 
PHMSA may elect to issue a Supplemental NPRM if we need to adjust the 
proposed regulations or ask additional questions before finalizing the 
regulations.
    As part of this process, PHMSA continuously works to balance 
completion of outstanding congressional mandates for rulemaking, as 
well as other rulemakings initiated as a result of NTSB 
recommendations, concerns arising from incidents, and other sources. As 
noted at the hearing, the agency--through Republican and Democratic 
administrations, since its inception--has typically had more 
congressional mandates than it has resources to complete under the 
timeframes provided. PHMSA in turn, attempts to triage mandates based 
on the overlapping congressional mandates and with safety being the top 
priority.

    Question 10. Can you please detail the number and dates of meetings 
PHMSA has held of the GPAC and Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee 
(LPAC) since January 1, 2021? What is the agency's target for annual 
frequency of meetings for both of these respective committees?
    Answer. Since January 1, 2021, PHMSA has held three (3) pipeline 
advisory committee meetings:
    a)  October 20, 2021: The LPAC and GPAC both met jointly to discuss 
the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled: ``Periodic Updates of 
Regulatory References to Technical Standards and Miscellaneous 
Amendments.'' The NPRM is relevant to both gas and liquid pipeline 
safety.
    b)  October 21, 2021: The LPAC and GPAC met jointly to discuss the 
Standards Update notice of proposed rulemaking.
    c)  August 17, 2022: The LPAC met to discuss the interim final 
rulemaking (IFR) titled: ``Unusually Sensitive Areas for the Great 
Lakes, Coastal Beaches, and Certain Coastal Waters.''

    Given the statutory role of the LPAC and GPAC, PHMSA schedules 
meetings of those committees to review and discuss specific 
rulemakings. Accordingly, the schedule is based on the progression of 
PHMSA's regulatory agenda--with the goal of maximizing efficiency of 
the meetings. PHMSA also meets with most of the organizations 
represented on the advisory committees on an individual basis--again, 
for efficiency.

    Question 11. What do you believe is the appropriate role for the 
GPAC and LPAC? What value does the GPAC and LPAC provide to PHMSA in 
the rulemaking process?
    Answer. Under 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60115, the Gas Pipeline Advisory 
Committee (GPAC) and the Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee (LPAC) are 
peer-review committees regarding carrying out 49 U.S.C. Ch. 601. As 
required by law, the GPAC and LPAC, respectively, are composed of a 
broad spectrum of stakeholders with equities in PHMSA proceedings, with 
equal representation from government, industry, and the public. These 
committees offer input that is a statutorily mandated part of PHMSA's 
rulemaking process. The committees review PHMSA's regulatory 
initiatives to determine technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-
effectiveness, and practicability.
    PHMSA values the feedback from its advisory committees for Office 
of Pipeline Safety rulemakings. They play a key role in the federal 
pipeline safety rulemaking process. The input they provide helps PHMSA 
ensure a constructive, in-depth look at our rules, helps inform 
potential changes to them, and allows PHMSA to make more effective 
rules to govern pipeline safety.

    Question 12. PHMSA has stated that litigation is impacting its 
ability to finalize rules. Do entities like the Pipeline Advisory 
Committees reduce litigation risk?
    Answer. PHMSA welcomes stakeholder feedback during all stages of 
its rulemaking process. As required by law, PHMSA's Gas Pipeline 
Advisory Committee and the Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee advisory 
committees review PHMSA's regulatory initiatives to determine technical 
feasibility, reasonableness, cost-effectiveness, and practicability. 
PHMSA values the feedback from its advisory committees for Office of 
Pipeline Safety rulemakings and that feedback can help ensure PHMSA's 
rulemakings are more legally defensible.

    Question 13. Congress mandated a 2-year deadline for PHMSA to 
complete the idled pipeline rulemaking as part of the PIPES 2020; 
however, PHMSA missed the congressionally established deadline to 
complete this rulemaking this past December. This rulemaking is 
important to the regulated community as pipeline operators need 
regulatory certainty from PHMSA for situations when pipeline operators 
suspend normal service on pipeline systems due to changes in market 
conditions in which the status of these pipelines is neither ``active'' 
nor ``abandoned''.
    Question 13.a. Why hasn't PHMSA issued a Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (NPRM) addressing idled pipelines when Congress specifically 
required a rule to be promulgated by the end of December 2022?
    Answer. It is important to note that rulemaking is designed to be 
an iterative process that encourages maximum participation by all 
stakeholders and rigorous analysis in support of decision making. PHMSA 
uses its limited resources to promulgate comprehensive rules that 
protect the public and the environment and meet our statutory 
requirement for rules. The PIPES Act 2020 included an aggressive 
timeline for the agency to advance rulemakings (as well as other 
congressional directives), and PHMSA has completed several of these 
rulemakings and other legacy rulemakings with important safety impacts 
related to remote-control valves, gas gathering pipelines, and 
increased protections for unusually sensitive areas. At the same time, 
as mandated by the PIPES Act of 2020, PHMSA has recently issued 
proposed rules related to Gas Pipeline Leak Detection, and the Safety 
of Gas Distribution pipelines. PHMSA anticipates publishing an NPRM on 
idled pipelines by the first quarter of 2024. After the NPRM is 
published, PHMSA will schedule and facilitate the necessary GPAC/LPAC 
meeting and work to complete a final rule.

    Question 13.b. When will PHMSA finalize the idled pipe rulemaking?
    Answer. PHMSA currently anticipates publishing an NPRM on idled 
pipelines by the first quarter of 2024. After the NPRM is published, 
PHMSA will schedule and facilitate the necessary GPAC/LPAC meeting and 
work to complete a final rule.

    Question 14. Section 104 of PIPES 2020 authorized PHMSA to 
establish a Pipeline Safety Enhancement Program (program) as a means 
for operators to demonstrate new technologies and procedures that 
advance pipeline safety. A number of pipeline operator stakeholders are 
encouraging Congress to reauthorize the program as it has not been 
utilized to date. PHMSA says operators have not applied for the 
program. Operators tell us they want to apply, but PHMSA has added 
additional requirements that make participation infeasible.
    Question 14.a. Do you believe a program that allows operators to 
test safety procedures and technology more swiftly is beneficial to 
improving pipeline safety as a whole?
    Answer. PHMSA believes that testing new safety procedures and 
technologies can be beneficial to improving pipeline safety. Because of 
the potential serious consequences to people and the environment, as 
well as existing congressional mandates, testing under the current 
program requires an evaluation process and stakeholder notice and 
comment prior to in-situ testing. PHMSA has sought comment on ways to 
improve the program and would like to work with Congress to find ways 
to improve the program.

    Question 14.b. If an operator would like to test a new safety 
practice or technology in the field, would it take less time to utilize 
the technology pilot program or acquire a special permit?
    Answer. The timing would be based upon the specific application. 
While both follow similar paths and require, in accordance with Federal 
law, the completion of an environmental assessment, the Section 104 
process includes more specific criteria that need to be met in order to 
apply, such as the location being outside prohibited areas (a high 
population area (HPA), high consequence area (HCAs) or an unusually 
sensitive area (USA)).

    Question 14.c. Do you have any suggestions for how Congress could 
improve the program so operators will be more inclined to utilize it?
    Answer. PHMSA sought public comment on ways to improve the program 
and would like to work with the Congress to find ways to improve the 
program.

    Question 14.d. If the program were to be extended for a longer 
period, for example, 10 years or more, how might that impact PHMSA's 
ability to implement the program and how might it affect its use by 
operators?
    Answer. An extension of time would allow for a more thorough 
evaluation of the potential benefit of the new safety procedures and 
technologies by the operators and PHMSA that could be applied 
throughout the industry.

    Question 15. The PHMSA program implementation guidance for the 
Pipeline Safety Enhancement Program (program) requires applicants to 
meet conditions and follow processes beyond those enacted by Congress. 
To date, no pipeline operator has applied to PHMSA under these 
conditions.
    Question 15.a. During the March 8, 2023, hearing, Deputy 
Administrator Brown testified PHMSA believes Federal law requires 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis before approving a 
program. What is the statutory or legal basis for this opinion?
    Answer. PHMSA's consideration and approval of applications for 
pipeline safety enhancement programs established in Section 104 of the 
PIPES Act of 2020--is a discretionary Federal agency action or 
decision, which is presumptively subject to the National Environmental 
Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), as well as any applicable 
implementing regulations and policies issued by the agency or CEQ (40 
CFR parts 1500-1508). Those legal authorities require consideration of 
the impacts of those Federal actions or decisions on the human 
environment.

    Question 15.b. In a February 9, 2022, meeting between industry 
stakeholders and PHMSA career staff, representatives of the PHMSA 
Office of Chief Counsel agreed the program does not trigger a statutory 
obligation to perform NEPA analysis. However, Deputy Administrator 
Brown testified to Congress on March 8, 2023, that PHMSA is obligated 
by law to conduct NEPA analysis. Why did Deputy Administrator Brown 
testify to Congress contrary to the legal opinion of the PHMSA Chief 
Counsel's Office?
    Answer. Like any discretionary Federal agency action or decision, 
PHMSA's consideration and approval of applications for pipeline safety 
enhancement programs established in Section 104 of the PIPES Act of 
2020 are presumptively subject to the National Environmental Policy Act 
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), and to applicable implementing 
regulations and policies issued by the agency or CEQ (40 CFR parts 
1500-1508). Accordingly, during the March 8, 2023, hearing, I testified 
PHMSA believes Federal law requires National Environmental Policy Act 
(NEPA) analysis before approving a program. PHMSA's Office of Chief 
Counsel staff is unaware of any statements inconsistent with the March 
8, 2023, testimony, including in any meetings between industry 
stakeholders and PHMSA staff.

    Question 15.c. Does PHMSA consider establishing a testing program 
as authorized by Sec.104 a major Federal action significantly affecting 
the quality of the human environment?
    Answer. PHMSA's consideration and approval of applications for 
pipeline safety enhancement programs established in Section 104 of the 
PIPES Act of 2020 is a discretionary Federal agency action or decision, 
which is presumptively subject to the National Environmental Policy Act 
(42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), as well as any applicable implementing 
regulations and policies issued by the agency or CEQ (40 CFR parts 
1500-1508). Those legal authorities require consideration of the 
impacts of those Federal actions or decisions on the human environment.

    Question 15.d. If so, representatives of PHMSA's Chief Counsel's 
Office agreed during a February 9, 2022, meeting with industry 
stakeholders that the program did not represent a major Federal action 
that would trigger NEPA analysis. If PHMSA has changed its opinion on 
this, what is the statutory or legal basis for this change?
    Answer. PHMSA understands its consideration and approval of 
applications for pipeline safety enhancement programs established in 
Section 104 of the PIPES Act of 2020--like any discretionary Federal 
agency action or decision--are presumptively subject to the National 
Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), as well as any 
applicable implementing regulations and policies issued by the agency 
or CEQ (40 CFR parts 1500-1508). Those legal authorities require 
consideration of the impacts of those Federal actions or decisions on 
the human environment.
    Section 104 of the PIPES Act of 2020 contains no exception to 
NEPA's procedural requirements. Rather, Section 104 explicitly 
contemplates that PHMSA may, in reviewing applications for pipeline 
safety enhancement programs, employ its longstanding special permit 
procedures issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60118(c)(1)(A). See 49 U.S.C. 
60142(d)(2)(A). NEPA review is a critical component of those special 
permit procedures. See 49 CFR 190.341(c).
    PHMSA's Office of Chief Counsel staff are unaware of any statements 
by PHMSA staff that are contrary to the above position or inconsistent 
with the March 8, 2023, testimony.

    Question 15.e. Has PHMSA ever previously required a research and 
development project, including those demonstrating promising 
technologies or analytic methods, to conduct a NEPA analysis?
    Answer. Unlike traditional pipeline safety-related research and 
development activated, directed, or funded by PHMSA (which are 
typically performed using some combination of software modeling or lab 
or institution-based testing under controlled conditions), pipeline 
safety enhancement programs are expected to be conducted on operational 
gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. Those programs are also expected to 
require a waiver of existing PHMSA safety regulations that would 
otherwise prevent the use of the innovative technologies and 
operational practices being tested. Therefore, novel technologies and 
operational practices employed in pipeline safety enhancement programs 
could involve markedly different potential impacts on the human 
environment than PHMSA's own traditional pipeline safety-related 
research and development activity--including positive impacts, which 
would of course be welcome. In addition, Congress included within that 
provision limitations on pipeline safety enhancement programs evincing 
concern with the potential safety and environmental consequences of the 
novel technologies and operational practices in those programs, such as 
program duration, mileage limitations, location limitations and safety 
thresholds.

    Question 15.f. What is the statutory or legal basis for PHMSA 
requiring program applicants to submit applications in accordance with 
PHMSA's special permit process?
    Answer. Section 104 explicitly contemplates that PHMSA may, in 
reviewing applications for pipeline safety enhancement programs, employ 
its longstanding special permit procedures issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 
60118(c)(1)(A). See 49 U.S.C. 60142(d)(2)(A). NEPA review is a 
component of those special permit procedures. See 49 CFR 190.341(c).

    Question 16. Section 111 of the PIPES 2020 sets out that PHMSA, 
subject to the availability of funds appropriated by Congress, may 
establish a National Center of Excellence for LNG Safety. Per the 
requirements of Section 111, PHMSA submitted a report to Congress 
titled National Center of Excellence for Liquefied Natural Gas Safety. 
One proposal included in the report to Congress is that PHMSA institute 
an LNG Separate Center of Excellence at a new location, as discussed in 
the report under ``Model 3,'' with an estimated annual cost of $8.4 
million. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 provided PHSMA $8.4 
million for PHMSA to establish a Center of Excellence.
    Question 16.a. When will PHMSA issue a decision on if it will 
utilize its authority in Section 111 of the PIPES 2020 and FY 2023 
appropriated funds to create a National Center of Excellence of LNG 
Safety?
    Answer. As stated during my testimony in response to Rep. Brian 
Babin of Texas, PHMSA has already initiated planning for the 
establishment of the Center. Since then, PHMSA has also hosted a public 
meeting on the subject (in May 2023), made visits to potential 
locations for the center, and assigned a senior leader, with 
considerable LNG experience, to oversee the planning, creation and 
management of the Center.

    Question 16.b. If PHMSA does not intend to pursue Model 3, how will 
it make up for the shortfalls and gaps in knowledge that would occur?
    Answer. PHMSA plans to pursue Model 3 to establish the LNG Center 
of Excellence.

    Question 17. How is PHMSA working to improve the Federal permitting 
process for energy infrastructure projects in instances where PHMSA 
provides the regulatory expertise on the safe design and operations and 
FERC holds construction authorization authority, especially for large-
scale LNG projects?
    Answer. On August 31, 2018, PHMSA and FERC entered into a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that describes each agency's 
respective roles and responsibilities concerning the siting, 
construction, and operation of LNG facilities, and established a new 
coordination framework to streamline the permitting approval process 
for those facilities. Specifically, under the terms of the MOU, PHMSA 
is responsible for reviewing whether an application meets the siting 
criteria and safety requirements contained in Part 193, Subpart B.
    In accordance with the MOU, upon receiving an application from 
FERC, PHMSA will issue a Letter of Determination (LOD) to FERC with its 
analysis and conclusions 30 days prior to FERC's final NEPA document 
issuance. The agencies' coordination has helped improve the 
environmental reviews on several LNG export terminal applications. To 
date, PHMSA has issued LODs for 25 projects.
    Currently, PHMSA is reviewing five (5) applications and will issue 
LODs once PHMSA has completed its Part 193, Subpart B review for the 
following proposed projects:
    1.  Golden Pass Uprate Project (CP20-459-000)
    2.  Calcasieu Pass Uprate Amendment Project (CP22-25-000)
    3.  Venture Global CP2 (CP22-21-000)
    4.  Driftwood LNG (CP17-117-000)
    5.  Plaquemines Uprate (CP17-66-000)

    Question 18. Have there been instances where project developers are 
made to redesign existing facilities to comply with requirements from 
different Federal inspectors and regulators? If so, does PHMSA have any 
recommendations or plans to improve this process to avoid such 
instances?
    Answer. PHMSA is unaware of project developers being required to 
redesign existing facilities to comply with other Federal standards. 
PHMSA performs comprehensive safety inspections of LNG facilities and 
monitors and enforces an LNG operator's compliance with the DOT's 
Pipeline Safety regulations. In accordance with Sec.  191.22 
(c)(1)(iii), LNG operators are required to notify PHMSA 60 days prior 
to construction of a new LNG facility. Currently, PHMSA reviews the 
final design records for compliance with Part 193, Subpart C--Design, 
while construction activities are in progress.

    Question 19. United States LNG exports have grown rapidly and 
safely and it is important that regulations that govern these 
facilities are modernized without delay. PIPES 2020 included two 
provisions that impacted LNG--the creation of risk-based regulations 
for LNG facilities, and the creation of a National Center of Excellence 
for LNG safety. Can you give us an update on where PHMSA stands, and if 
PHMSA will meet the timeline set forth by the PIPES 2020?
    Answer. With respect to regulations for LNG facilities, PHMSA 
anticipates issuing an NPRM to update the LNG regulations by the end of 
2023.
    As stated during my testimony in response to Rep. Brian Babin of 
Texas, PHMSA has already initiated planning for the establishment of 
the Center. Since then, PHMSA has also hosted a public meeting on the 
subject (in May), made visits to potential locations for the center, 
and reassigned a senior leader, with considerable LNG experience, to 
oversee the planning, creation and management of the Center.

    Question 20. Do you support efforts to streamline environmental 
reviews at PHMSA in a way that advances projects without impacting 
environmental protections, including through applying One Federal 
Decision, which is bipartisan-supported and applies to other 
transportation modes?
    Answer. Congress enacted NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and the 
Pipeline Safety Laws (49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq.) to mitigate 
environmental and safety impacts. PHMSA is charged by Congress with 
carrying out these laws in an efficient manner. To do that, we have 
employed mechanisms like concurrent reviews and close coordination with 
other federal agencies. When environmental reviews have not been 
fulsome, the agency's work has actually been slowed down by litigation, 
which is why the agency has increased its environmental review 
capacity. The agency is also implementing recent changes to NEPA 
pursuant to the Fiscal Responsibility Act, see e.g. https://
ceq.doe.gov/laws-regulations/fra.html.

    Question 21. There are roughly 5,500 hundred miles of CO2 pipeline 
in this country. These pipelines have safely transported carbon dioxide 
in a dense or supercritical liquid state for decades mostly without 
incident and are regulated by PHMSA under 49 CFR Part 195. There is a 
potential need to build out additional pipeline infrastructure to 
support carbon capture and sequestration efforts that would potentially 
move CO2 in less-dense, gaseous phases. This has raised the question of 
whether current regulations are adequate when it comes to the safe 
construction, operation, and maintenance of carbon dioxide pipelines. 
PHMSA has also stated publicly that it will be issuing new regulations 
on the safety of carbon dioxide pipelines.
    Question 21.a. How does PHMSA intend to proceed with this 
rulemaking? Does it propose to publish an Advanced Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (ANPRM) to gather additional data, information and analysis 
or does it have enough to proceed with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NPRM)?
    Answer. PHMSA is developing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), 
strengthening its regulations in response to the anticipated 
significant expansion of carbon dioxide pipelines and to implement 
lessons learned from the February 22, 2020, rupture of a supercritical-
phase carbon dioxide pipeline in Satartia, MS.
    PHMSA also announced in 2022, new research topics to better 
determine impact areas for the safer operations of carbon dioxide 
pipelines. The results of this may help inform the current rulemaking 
related to carbon dioxide pipelines but congressional attention and 
collaboration in strengthening oversight related to these issues is 
also welcome.
    PHMSA hosted a public meeting focused on carbon dioxide pipeline 
safety on May 31-June 1, 2023, in Des Moines, IA, where PHMSA received 
information from a diverse array of stakeholders and other members of 
the public that will inform PHMSA's NPRM.

    Question 21.b. When does PHMSA anticipate publishing an ANPRM or 
NPRM?
    Answer. PHMSA is working on drafting the NPRM and hopes to publish 
that NPRM in January 2024.

    Question 21.c. Has PHMSA identified particular priority issues the 
agency believes need to be addressed through a potential future 
rulemaking?
    Answer. PHMSA is developing proposed amendments to its regulations 
in response to the anticipated significant expansion of carbon dioxide 
pipelines and to implement lessons learned from the February 22, 2020, 
rupture of a supercritical-phase carbon dioxide pipeline in Satartia, 
MS. Although PHMSA is still determining what specific issues will be 
covered in the rule, PHMSA discussed several topics related to carbon 
dioxide in its public meeting on carbon dioxide pipeline safety on May 
31-June 1, 2023, in Des Moines, Iowa. Information gathered at the 
public meeting will help inform the rulemaking.

    Question 21.d. Is PHMSA considering modifications to existing 
regulations under 49 CFR Part 192 regarding the transportation of 
gaseous CO2 in pipelines or would it create a new section?
    Answer. Consistent with 49 U.S.C. 60102(i), PHMSA is considering 
whether applying the minimum safety standards in 49 CFR part 195 to 
gaseous carbon dioxide would help improve safety.

    Question 22. How does PHMSA intend to work with CO2 pipeline 
operators, other Federal agencies and public stakeholders to develop 
and design dispersion models in the case of a pipeline rupture or 
substantial leak? Will it incorporate dispersion modelling in CO2 
pipeline safety regulations?
    Answer. PHMSA has observed through the published research on the 
topic that all models have different advantages and disadvantages. As 
part of its rulemaking process, PHMSA will seek stakeholder input on 
the best approach to CO2 dispersion modelling. Stakeholder input will 
include both public input as well as collaboration with other Federal 
agencies. For example, PHMSA and DOE's Office of Fossil Energy and 
Carbon Management are discussing these technical issues at agency 
sponsored research events and have agreed to co-chair an Interagency 
Carbon Transport Topic Team. This topic team will include several other 
interested Federal agencies, share information on dispersion modeling 
among many other technical topics, resolve issues and track projects to 
their completion.
    PHMSA requires operators to have a process for identifying which 
pipeline segments could affect a high consequence area, including the 
use of dispersion modeling (see Sec.  195.452(f)(1)). This modeling is 
required prior to the occurrence of an emergency and can also be used 
to inform emergency responders in the event of an actual emergency (see 
Sec.  195.402(e)(8)).

    Question 23. Liquid CO2 pipelines are critical platforms for the 
biofuel industry in the Midwest. Currently, a number of liquid CO2 
projects are in development, working with PHMSA, states, local 
governments, and biofuels producers to develop platforms for the 
capture and storage of millions of metric tons of CO2. Development of 
these platforms not only sustains the biofuel industry, critical to 
farmers and the Midwest economy, but also reduces carbon emissions. 
Liquid CO2 pipelines are definitionally hazardous liquid pipelines and 
currently must adhere to safety regulations put forward by PHMSA.
    Question 23.a. Is PHMSA currently working to ensure the safety of 
CO2 pipeline projects that would utilize carbon capture from biofuel 
plants in the Midwest?
    Answer. Yes. PHMSA is also reviewing the three proposed projects 
for compliance with the federal regulations in 49 CFR Part 195, PHMSA 
is working to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking updating current 
CO2 regulations, and will continue to oversee the safe design, 
operations, and maintenance of such lines going forward. PHMSA also 
recently issued new requirements for automatic and remote shut off 
valves for CO2 (and other hazardous liquid and gas) pipelines (See 87 
Fed. Reg 20940), which PHMSA will be implementing with respect to new 
CO2 pipelines being built.

    Question 23.b. Notwithstanding any potential future regulations, 
would current PHMSA safety regulations for hazardous liquid pipelines 
apply to any liquid CO2 pipeline currently built in the United States?
    Answer. The current regulations apply to any pipeline transporting 
CO2 in a supercritical state as defined by Sec.  195.2.

    Question 24. The Federal Government is spending a substantial 
amount of funding on hydrogen energy as a residential, modal and 
industrial fuel. However, building out a network fully dedicated to 
hydrogen fuel pipelines present a host of challenges.
    Question 24.a. Given the fact that blending of natural gas with 
hydrogen in concentrations up to 20 is occurring on a limited basis, 
does PHMSA have an opinion on the safety of this approach?
    Answer. PHMSA is evaluating existing requirements for hydrogen and 
hydrogen-blended pipelines in 49 CFR Part 192 to identify what changes, 
if any, are needed in its regulations. In addition, PHMSA is supporting 
research to determine how transporting hydrogen can affect the 
integrity of pipelines that today carry natural gas.

    Question 24.b. What research is being done on hydrogen blends and 
pipelines?
    Answer. In FY 2022, PHMSA awarded approximately $6 million in 
research investments on hydrogen R&D projects. Specifically, under the 
Competitive Academic Agreement Program, PHMSA awarded two projects on 
pipeline infrastructure and modernization for hydrogen networks to two 
universities. These projects will research the safe transportation and 
storage of hydrogen via repurposing existing infrastructure used for 
natural gas transport and underground storage, improving hydrogen leak 
detection, and characterizing hydrogen-specific pipeline integrity 
threats.

    Question 24.c. Does PHMSA intend to study the safety impacts of 
blending at concentrations above 20 percent?
    Answer. Yes. All PHMSA hydrogen R&D projects, as part of their 
research scope, involve the safety impacts of blending at 
concentrations over 20 percent. PHMSA is also closely coordinating with 
the Department of Energy HyBlend initiative which is also studying the 
impacts of blending at concentrations over 20 percent. Data resulting 
from both initiatives will inform national standards and support the 
safe transportation by pipeline and underground storage of hydrogen.

    Question 25. How does PHMSA work with standards-establishing bodies 
like the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the 
American National Standards Institute to develop pipeline and 
operational safety standards? How often does PHMSA review and 
incorporate new industry safety standards by reference? What is its 
typical timeline for doing so?
    Answer. PHMSA employees participate in meetings held by national 
standards developing organizations (SDO) that address the design, 
construction, operation, maintenance, inspection, and repair of 
pipeline facilities. PHMSA's subject matter experts represent the 
agency, participate in discussions and technical debates, register 
opinions, and vote in accordance with the procedures of the SDOs at 
each stage of the standards development process (unless prohibited from 
doing so by law). PHMSA participates in this process to ensure that the 
agency's safety priorities are considered and to avoid the need to 
develop separate, government-unique standards. PHMSA also regularly 
reviews updated editions of currently referenced consensus standards 
and amends the regulations to partially or fully incorporate updated 
standards that will enhance or maintain pipeline and environmental 
safety. Previous rules that incorporated updated consensus standards by 
reference were published on May 24, 1996, (61 FR 26121); February 17, 
1998, (63 FR 7721); June 14, 2004, (69 FR 32886); June 9, 2006, (71 FR 
33402); February 1, 2007, (72 FR 4655 (correction)); August 11, 2010, 
(75 FR 48593); January 5, 2015, (80 FR 168); and August 6, 2015, (80 FR 
46847 (correction)). As of late, PHMSA has issued two NPRMs (January 
15, 2021 (86 FR 3938) and August 29, 2022 (87 FR 52713)) that will 
update or otherwise address 60 percent of PHMSA's standards that are 
currently incorporated by reference.

    Question 26. PHMSA has undertaken a number of previous rulemakings 
regarding improvements to state One Call systems.
    How would PHMSA rate the effectiveness of these rulemakings in 
reducing excavation-related damages?
    Answer. PHMSA's Excavation Enforcement Final Rule issued July 13, 
2015, established standards for State damage prevention enforcement 
programs creating accountability at the State level for effective 
enforcement of State excavation damage prevention laws. Prior to this 
rule, the enforcement of one-call laws was strictly a stakeholder-
driven, state-by-state approach, and many states were unable to show 
any consistent or demonstrative enforcement of their laws, even when 
there were violations of existing State laws. Accordingly, in 2016, 
when the first round of State evaluations was conducted to determine 
the adequacy of State damage prevention enforcement programs, 25 of the 
States failed to meet the requirements of 49 CFR 198.55 and were deemed 
``inadequate.'' Currently, the number of States that are inadequate is 
three.
    This rule has helped improve States' enforcement of damage 
prevention laws. The number of excavation damages per thousand 
notifications of excavation (One-Call Tickets) has generally trended 
downward, from 3.0 in 2015 to 2.55 in 2022 indicating improvement in 
reducing damages when a notification to excavate was made. However, the 
actual number of excavation damages continues to increase from 81,974 
in 2015 to 92,006 for 2022 a 12% increase indicating more work to drive 
improvement is necessary to address this threat to pipeline and public 
safety.

    Question 27. PHMSA recently accepted applications for the Natural 
Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and Modernization (NGDISM) grant 
program authorized in the Infrastructure Investment and Job Act of 
2021. This program provides $200 million annually to municipal 
utilities to repair, rehabilitate or replace high-risk distribution 
pipelines.
    Question 27.a. How will PHMSA prioritize applications?
    Answer. For the FY 2022 funding round, PHMSA considered each of the 
statutory criteria, and prioritized high-risk, actively leaking legacy 
natural gas distribution infrastructure with a specific emphasis on 
benefiting underserved rural and urban communities (among other 
considerations).

    Question 27.b. How will it weigh statutory criteria in terms of 
what weight will be given to environmental justice criteria?
    Answer. Please see PHMSA's response to Question 29.

    Question 27.c. Can you please list the number of positions that 
have been filled along with their associated titles and GS-level that 
have been onboarded to implement this program, as well as any vacant 
positions?
    Answer. All 9 positions are currently filled.
    1.  Program Director, GS-15
    2.  Grants Attorney, GS-14
    3.  Senior Grants Management Specialist, GS-14 (Team Lead)
    4.  Grants Management and Acquisitions Specialist, GS-14
    5.  Grants Management Specialist, GS-13 (3 positions)
    6.  Program Specialist, GS-13
    7.  Environmental Protection Specialist, GS-14

    Question 27.d. When will PHMSA issue its first awards under this 
program?
    Answer. PHMSA announced its first awards on April 5, 2023.

    Question 27.e. When will it issue its notice of funding opportunity 
for the second cycle of funding?
    Answer. PHMSA issued its combined FY23 and FY 24 Notice of Funding 
Opportunity on May 23, 2023.

    Question 28. The President's FY 2024 budget for PHMSA references 
``equity'' roughly thirty times, including funding related to 
``equity.'' Please provide a specific definition of ``equity'' and 
explain how it relates to pipeline safety and PHMSA's core mission of 
pipeline safety.
    Answer. For clarity, PHMSA also has a safety mandate pertaining to 
the regulation of transporting hazardous materials. Executive Orders 
13985 and 14901, issued by President Biden, define equity as ``the 
consistent and systematic fair, just, and impartial treatment of all 
individuals, including individuals who belong to underserved 
communities that have been denied such treatment, including persons who 
live in rural areas, and persons otherwise adversely affected by 
persistent poverty or inequality.'' Equity considerations directly 
relate to PHMSA's core mission as data analyses comparing pipeline 
incident rates in socially vulnerable areas indicate a 
disproportionately higher incident rate in some overburdened and 
underserved communities. PHMSA will use data to focus inspection 
efforts on increasing safety in areas with higher incident rates, 
ensure rulemakings and agency decisions affect the safety of 
communities regardless of geography or income level, and increase 
community outreach efforts to raise awareness and education in areas 
with higher rates of incidents. As an example, aging and higher risk 
infrastructure are found disproportionately in rural communities and 
older parts of cities and towns, which often coincide with lower income 
neighborhoods.

    Question 29. The President's FY 2024 budget for PHMSA references 
``environmental justice'' multiple times. Can you please specifically 
define ``environmental justice'' and describe how it applies to PHMSA's 
mission of providing pipeline safety?
    Answer. Presidential Executive Order 14096 of April 21, 2023, 
directs Federal agencies to develop an agency-wide environmental 
justice strategic plan that sets forth the agency's vision, goals, 
priority actions, and metrics to address and advance environmental 
justice and to fulfill the directives of this order. EO 14096 defines 
environmental justice as follows: ``Environmental justice'' means the 
just treatment and meaningful involvement of all people, regardless of 
income, race, color, national origin, Tribal affiliation, or 
disability, in agency decision-making and other Federal activities that 
affect human health and the environment so that people: (i) are fully 
protected from disproportionate and adverse human health and 
environmental effects (including risks) and hazards, including those 
related to climate change, the cumulative impacts of environmental and 
other burdens, and the legacy of racism or other structural or systemic 
barriers; and (ii) have equitable access to a healthy, sustainable, and 
resilient environment in which to live, play, work, learn, grow, 
worship, and engage in cultural and subsistence practices.
    PHMSA looks to this order, which builds on and complements 
Executive Order 12898, and policy objectives of Federal regulation to 
ensure its regulatory oversight activities advance environmental 
justice for all, including in evaluating and addressing, as 
appropriate, disproportionate and adverse benefits and burdens and 
advancing the goal of meaningful involvement. Following statutory 
requirements, environmental justice has, therefore, long been an 
important consideration in PHMSA regulatory oversight of ensuring 
pipeline safety, addressed explicitly in historical PHMSA pipeline 
safety rulemakings, special permit reviews, and other activities. Often 
the procedural vehicle for consideration of environmental justice has 
been PHMSA's consideration of environmental and public safety impacts 
pursuant to NEPA.

    Question 30. We understand there was great interest in the NGDISM 
Program, but PHMSA has not announced its awards for FY 2022 as of March 
14, 2023. Further, the grant agreements will not be executed until the 
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Tier 2 Environmental review 
process is completed in 2023. Smaller utilities often do not have the 
resources dedicated to devote staff to grant writing and therefore may 
seek to learn from the first round of grant funding awarded in order to 
use their resources more efficiently. However, if applications for the 
second cycle of funding are due before the first cycle funding is 
awarded, they may miss out on this learning opportunity.
    Question 30.a. How is PHMSA working to address potential lost 
opportunity and working to ensure smaller utilities are able to use the 
first cycle of awards to use their resources effectively in applying 
for the program?
    Answer. The first round of awards was announced on April 5, 2023. 
PHMSA issued the second NGDISM Notice of Funding Opportunity on 
Grants.gov on May 23, 2023, with an August 4, 2023 deadline. PHMSA 
believes that applicants who were not successful in the first round had 
sufficient opportunity to review their application status letters to 
determine whether to apply for the second round of funding. PHMSA 
received 184 applications for its FY 2023 NOFO with funding requests 
that totaled $1.8 billion. Many applicants from the first round elected 
to re-apply.
    To assist smaller utilities with applying for this grant, PHMSA 
made updated its FY 2023 NOFO to make it more user friendly and 
provided examples in certain areas to assist applicants. PHMSA has also 
provided extensive technical assistance via FAQs, webinars, debriefs, 
and outreach. Going forward, PHMSA will promote DOT's Thriving 
Communities Program as a resource on its website and inform 
stakeholders that this program is available for grant application 
assistance.

    Question 30.b. What feedback will be provided after the 2022 grant 
awards have been provisionally announced so as to allow smaller 
municipal gas systems to learn how to improve their applications?
    Answer. PHMSA informed unsuccessful applicants by letter about 
their application rating and any key factors that impacted their 
application. Additionally, PHMSA offered applicants the opportunity to 
discuss questions about their application, including steps they can 
take to improve their application. In total, 56 of the 161 unique 
applicants requested and received debriefs. PHMSA concluded these 
debriefs in June 2023. Finally, PHMSA offered three public webinars to 
discuss lessons learned and provided examples of best practices and 
common application pitfalls. PHMSA accepted questions during all three 
FY 2023 webinars and provided a FY 2023 FAQ document with responses to 
those questions. PHMSA also continues to accept questions from 
applicants by email ([email protected]) and phone 202-366-
7652. All resource documents are available online at https://
www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/working-phmsa/grants/pipeline/natural-
gas-distribution-infrastructure-safety-and-modernization-grants.

    Question 31. In your testimony, you discuss the importance of 
cybersecurity for pipelines and that PHMSA is working to hire 
cybersecurity specialists. We understand the Transportation Security 
Agency (TSA) has the lead on pipeline security and is working on 
cybersecurity regulations for pipelines.
    Question 31.a. Given that TSA has the lead on cybersecurity 
enforcement and PHMSA faces staffing shortages for pipeline safety 
personnel, how will hiring new cyber specialists benefit PHMSA's 
pipeline safety mission?
    Answer. As stated during my testimony on March 8, 2023, PHMSA's 
safety oversight of pipeline control rooms forms a nexus with TSA's 
cybersecurity oversight, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency's (CISA's) role as the national coordinator for critical 
infrastructure security and as a cybersecurity agency, and DOE's 
national energy management. The 2021 cyber-attack on Colonial Pipeline 
demonstrated how critical it is for a whole-of-government approach to 
safeguard our Nation's critical infrastructure. PHMSA regulates, 
inspects, and enforces operational technology (OT) used in the 
communications and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
systems for pipeline, liquefied natural gas and underground natural gas 
storage facilities. PHMSA's two new cyber specialists will join a small 
team of PHMSA SCADA and control room experts that routinely inspect the 
240-270 control rooms spread across the U.S. and Canada. The 
specialists will be able to leverage their cyber expertise during the 
OT portion of CRM inspections, identifying violations and potential 
cyber-related concerns. In addition, the specialists will provide 
onsite accident and special investigation assistance. Cyber specialists 
will look at specific incidents to identify a potential cyber component 
when reviewing control room details, controller responses, and data 
associated with a pipeline spill or release into the environment.
    Pipeline control rooms are where a cyber-attack could create 
significant safety hazards to the public and threaten energy 
reliability, as demonstrated by the Colonial Pipeline hacking incident. 
PHMSA has oversight of the operator's emergency response to any cyber-
attack that impacts the safe operation of the pipeline. Further, PHMSA 
has safety oversight of a pipeline start-up and return to normal 
operations, including manual operations should commodity movement be 
required. The PHMSA inspection team, including those with combined 
cyber and pipeline operation expertise, are the federal government's 
regular ``in-the-field'' presence and will be a critical component of 
safely restoring pipeline operations should U.S. pipeline 
infrastructure experience another cyber-attack. It is important to note 
that PHMSA routinely collaborates with TSA and CISA and will refer any 
identified cyber risks to TSA for their review and action.

    Question 31.b. Can you please list the number of these 
cybersecurity positions that have been filled along with their 
associated titles and GS-level? Can you please list the number of 
vacant positions PHMSA is planning to hire, along with their associated 
titles and GS-level?
    Answer. PHMSA will soon advertise two GS-14 General Engineer 
positions with a program title of ``Program Manager.'' The best 
qualified candidates for these two positions will have pipeline 
engineering and control room management expertise combined with a sound 
cyber skill set. These individuals will be CRM inspectors and provide a 
unique skill set with understanding of pipeline safety standards, 
pipeline OT and the potential impact that cyber may have on pipeline 
OT.

    Question 31.c. How will you ensure PHMSA does not duplicate the 
efforts of the TSA?
    Answer. PHMSA's safety oversight forms a nexus with TSA's cyber 
authority and the two agencies have adjacent but different foci. PHMSA 
regulates, inspects, and enforces operational technology (OT) used in 
the communications and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
systems for all pipeline, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and underground 
natural gas storage (UNGS) facilities. PHMSA performs routine, onsite 
inspections of all pipeline control rooms and connects pipeline 
operators with TSA when potential cyber risks are identified. PHMSA 
also routinely investigates both major and minor pipeline, LNG, and 
UNGS incidents, as well as abnormal events. PHMSA field inspections 
include onsite observation of OT components such as PLCs (program logic 
controllers) in-situ, such as in remote, rural settings.
    PHMSA evaluates SCADA controller training and human factors such as 
fatigue. These issues have a cyber nexus as a fatigued, or inadequately 
trained, controller can make risky OT decisions, potentially missing 
pressure and flow indications of a leak or abnormal operations.
    PHMSA exerts is safety and regulatory authority on all pipeline, 
LNG and UNGS facilities; Currently, TSA efforts are limited and 
constrained to certain operators. PHMSA and TSA collaborate under the 
guidance of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that promotes 
communication, efficiency, and nonduplication of effort.

    Question 32. Deputy Administrator Brown, on November 4, 2020, PHMSA 
published a set of draft frequently asked questions (FAQs) in the 
Federal Register under docket number PHMSA-2019-0199 attempting to 
delineate where PHMSA and the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (OSHA) assert jurisdiction to perform inspection and 
enforcement for midstream processing facilities in which there is 
overlapping authority by the two respective regulatory bodies. While 
PHMSA extended the comment period on that proposal to February 2022, to 
date, PHMSA has not finalized this guidance or taken any other 
regulatory action to address this issue. I am aware of confusion and 
other challenges facing the regulated community as a result of the lack 
of clarity around this issue.
    Question 32.a. Will PHMSA take action this year to finalize this 
guidance or perhaps propose some other remedy to this important issue? 
If so, when? If not, why?
    Answer. PHMSA anticipates finalizing the guidance relative to the 
jurisdiction of midstream processing facilities later this year.

    Question 32.b. In the absence of regulatory action, how will PHMSA 
provide clarity to the regulated community around this issue?
    Answer. PHMSA believes that the jurisdictional clarity provided by 
the finalized midstream FAQ's will negate the need for any further 
regulatory action.

    Question 33. The PIPES Act of 2016 convened a Voluntary Information 
Sharing System working group that recommended Congress authorize such a 
program to share pipeline safety information while providing 
confidentiality for disclosures.
    Question 33.a. Does PHMSA believe there are benefits to such a 
program and how might it use such a system to improve pipeline safety 
across the United States pipeline network?
    Answer. PHMSA acknowledges potential benefits to the Voluntary 
Information Sharing System (VIS), if thoughtfully crafted, including 
the potential for:
      Serving as a trusted repository of high-volume, high-
quality data and information that would advance pipeline safety and 
lead to opportunities for reducing pipeline accidents and incidents to 
achieve the goal of ``zero.''
      Enhancing Safety Management Systems.
      Providing technical support for service providers' 
technology investments to improve technology performance.
      Determining gaps in pipeline information to drive 
continuous improvement.

    Question 33.b. How might Congress or PHMSA address concerns about 
the sharing of proprietary information by companies who actively 
participate in a voluntary information sharing program?
    Answer. Industry may be more incentivized to participate in the 
program if their concerns about protecting proprietary and confidential 
information could be better addressed within a VIS program. PHMSA 
welcomes the opportunity to working with Congress on ways to address 
these concerns.

    Question 34. PHMSA recently started asking pipeline operators 
during inspections to fill out the ``Racial Equity and Support for 
Underserved Communities--New Racial Equity and Support for Underserved 
Communities Form 1.'' PHMSA stated the justification for asking these 
questions is Executive Order 13985, Advancing Racial Equity and Support 
for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government. To aid in 
the response of questions, PHMSA inspectors pointed to a Climate and 
Economic Justice Screening Tool map that was put together by the 
Council on Environmental Quality. We have several questions on this 
topic:
    Question 34.a. What was the process that PHMSA used to draft this 
form and send it out to pipeline operators? Were other Federal 
agencies, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 
consulted? Did PHMSA obtain approval from OMB to conduct this 
information collection exercise based on Paperwork Reduction Act 
requirements?
    Answer. In 2022, PHMSA performed a data analysis comparing incident 
occurrence locations relative to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC) 
Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) and found that some SVI areas may be 
disproportionately impacted by natural gas distribution incidents. 
Discussions with a variety of stakeholder groups--including state 
regulators and industry groups--revealed a value in raising awareness 
and improving transparency about the location of incidents, including 
for historically underserved communities. PHMSA data shows that a good 
amount of underserved communities are at significantly greater risk of 
pipeline failures due to aging infrastructure and other factors. To 
help with this, PHMSA initially formulated seven questions to ask 
operators to raise awareness and thoughtful consideration among the 
industry and regulators regarding EO 13985. PHMSA has since converted 
the questions into informational points for its inspectors to 
facilitate discussions with operators during inspections regarding 
equity or impacts on underserved communities. The points not only help 
us communicate that we are seeking to advance protection for all, 
including in these areas, but also helps us understand what efforts 
operators are taking to address safety risks for local communities. 
Similar to PHMSA's other inspection resource materials, the original 
questions were not submitted for OMB approval, as each inspection, 
including questions, are uniquely designed for each pipeline system.

    Question 34.b. Did PHMSA submit this form to the Federal Register 
and institute a formal comment process? If not, why?
    Answer. PHMSA did not submit the questions to the Federal Register 
for comment. PHMSA has converted the questions into informational 
points in a brochure.

    Question 34.c. To which pipeline operators did PHMSA submit this 
form and how were they selected?
    Answer. PHMSA had discussed the questions with companies that it 
interacts with, including during safety inspections. PHMSA has 
converted the questions into informational points in a brochure.

    Question 34.d. The form references ``Disadvantaged Community (DAC) 
datasets.'' How would you explain what a DAC is and what criteria is 
used to establish it? Additionally, are DACs used in any part of 
existing PHMSA regulation?
    Answer. PHMSA initially applied the acronym DAC to refer to various 
datasets that include data components that PHMSA deemed relevant to 
social disadvantage such as components of the Center for Disease 
Control's (CDC) Social Vulnerability Index (CDC/ATSDR Social 
Vulnerability Index (SVI) and many others referenced on the Department 
of Transportation's public facing website at: https://
www.transportation.gov/grants/dot-navigator/federal-tools-determine-
disadvantaged-community-status. These tools are publicly available and 
can assist stakeholders in their own data analysis. The Pipeline Social 
Equity Tool was published on August 8,2023 and does not use the SVI. It 
uses the DOT Equitable Transportation Community (ETC) Explorer Tool 
data. DAC PHMSA--Pipeline Social Equity Tool (arcgis.com).

    Question 34.e. Has PHMSA incorporated any aspects of Executive 
Order 13985 into its regulations?
    Answer. PHMSA has not amended its regulations to incorporate the 
text of Executive Order 13985. However, PHMSA has addressed, at a high 
level, the application of Executive Order 13985 within several of its 
recent rulemakings. See, e.g., 86 FR 63266, 63291 (Nov. 15, 2021). 
PHMSA also has, consistent with the Federal policy objective announced 
in Executive Order 13985 and where appropriate, identified equity 
benefits expected from recent safety-enhancing rulemakings just as it 
recognizes safety, economic, and environmental benefits from its 
rulemakings as appropriate.

    Question 34.f. Does PHMSA have any plans to change its regulations 
to address disadvantaged communities? If so, can you please specify 
which Regulation Identifier Numbers (RIN) you plan on using?
    Answer. PHMSA is still analyzing the safety data and currently has 
no new specific RINs on the matter.

    Question 34.g. Does PHMSA believe safety and environmental 
expectations should be different in DAC areas as opposed to non-DAC 
areas? If so, can you please stipulate how and why?
    Answer. PHMSA believes safety and environmental expectations and 
performance should be commensurate in both DAC and non-DAC areas. This 
is why potentially disparate safety performance is concerning and why 
PHMSA seeks to raise awareness of the potential issue.

    Question 34.h. If PHMSA believes there should be different 
expectations as stipulated in the above question, can you please 
specify which regulations govern this process?
    Answer. As stated above, PHMSA believes expectations should be the 
same.

    Question 34.i. What does PHMSA intend to do with the information 
gleaned from the answers to the form mentioned above?
    Answer. PHMSA's intention is to raise awareness through discussion, 
and any information gathered will be used only to document staff effort 
to reach stakeholders.

    Question 34.j. The Executive order defines ``equity'' as the 
``consistent and systematic fair, just and impartial treatment of all 
individuals.'' Do you believe that the current set of pipeline 
regulations included in 49 CFR Parts 190-199 are adequate regarding 
equity as defined above? If not, why?
    Answer. While the intent of PHMSA regulations is designed to 
accomplish equity as defined in the EO, PHMSA believes empirical data 
is more valuable than interpreting regulatory intent.

    Question 34.k. The Department of Transportation recently sent to 
the Federal Register a notice regarding its updated Transportation 
Disadvantaged Census Tracts Tool asking for input from stakeholders. 
How does PHMSA plan on using this tool?
    Answer. On August 8, 2023, PHMSA published an interactive map 
called the Pipeline Social Equity Tool. This public tool allows 
stakeholders to evaluate safety performance compared to the Department 
of Transportation's Equitable Transportation Community (ETC) Explorer 
Tool. PHMSA has not yet identified other specific uses for the Tool.

   Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Tristan Brown, Deputy 
 Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 
                                (PHMSA)

    Question 1. In 2022, there were more than 280 significant or 
serious incidents and this year we have already had two fatalities as a 
result of pipeline incidents. Meanwhile, your testimony states that 
certain operators are negotiating for reduced civil penalties and other 
operators are delaying paying the civil penalties they owe. Which 
pipeline operators are negotiating for lesser civil penalty payments 
and which ones have not paid what they owe? For the operators who have 
not paid, how long have you been awaiting their payment?
    Answer. Sec. 108 of the 2020 PIPES Act directs PHMSA to allow the 
respondent in an enforcement proceeding to request the use of a consent 
agreement. It further directs PHMSA to allow the respondent and the 
agency to convene at least one meeting to explore the possibility of 
settlement or simplification of the issues. On average over the last 
two years, PHMSA issued 47 proposed penalties and consistent with Sec. 
108, every operator was eligible to request the use of a consent 
agreement and to meet with PHMSA for settlement discussions. Since the 
beginning of 2018, PHMSA, as part of settlement negotiations, issued 
penalties lower than proposed in 24 pipeline enforcement cases, as 
noted below:

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                        CONSENT
                CPF NUM                         OPERATOR            PROPOSED     ASSESSED     OPENED     ORDER
                                                                   PENALTIES    PENALTIES      DATE       DATE
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
42022017NOPV..........................  DENBURY GULF COAST         $3,866,734   $2,868,100    5/26/22    3/24/23
                                         PIPELINES, LLC (32545).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
12022038NOPV..........................  KINDER MORGAN LIQUID         $455,200     $165,700     7/1/22     2/3/23
                                         TERMINALS, LLC (26041).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32022019NOPV..........................  TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION,      $474,300     $237,800    1/21/22     7/1/22
                                         LLC (19270).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32022018NOPV..........................  TALLGRASS PONY EXPRESS        $55,200      $44,800    1/19/22    5/16/22
                                         PIPELINE, LLC (39043).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021046NOPV..........................  TALLGRASS PONY EXPRESS       $437,300     $385,500   11/23/21    5/10/22
                                         PIPELINE, LLC (39043).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021043NOPV..........................  TALLGRASS INTERSTATE GAS     $359,900     $325,382    12/7/21    4/13/22
                                         TRANSMISSION, LLC
                                         (1007).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021045NOPV..........................  TALLGRASS POWDER RIVER        $58,400      $25,920    11/5/21    3/29/22
                                         GATEWAY, LLC (39963).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021049NOPV..........................  DAPL-ETCO OPERATIONS          $93,200      $20,000    7/22/21    1/11/22
                                         MANAGEMENT, LLC (39205).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320215008.............................  HESS ND (39065).........     $127,600      $82,000     3/1/21    12/1/21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021022NOPV..........................  EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE CO        $58,200      $38,900    5/18/21   10/28/21
                                         (4906).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
52021022NOPV..........................  SFPP, LP (18092)........   $2,231,779   $1,493,200    5/12/21   10/22/21
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
32021027NOPV..........................  NORTHERN NATURAL GAS CO       $56,900      $46,700    4/28/21    9/10/21
                                         (13750).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320205024.............................  SPIRE MISSOURI INC. EAST     $139,800      $62,600   11/30/20     4/9/21
                                         (11032).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
42020018NOPV..........................  TEXAS EASTERN                 $36,200      $18,100    12/9/20     4/8/21
                                         TRANSMISSION, LP
                                         (SPECTRA ENERGY
                                         PARTNERS, LP) (19235).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320205004.............................  PEMBINA COCHIN LLC           $187,200     $172,800    3/19/20    3/18/21
                                         (32258).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320205020.............................  SINCLAIR TRANSPORTATION       $97,100      $67,700   10/13/20     2/5/21
                                         COMPANY (15156).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
520192001.............................  HILCORP ALASKA, LLC          $198,700           $0    1/24/19    5/18/20
                                         (32645).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320196006.............................  CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM          $236,100     $200,000   11/22/19    5/13/20
                                         PARTNERS LP (39368).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
120190004.............................  RICHMOND, CITY OF             $80,500           $0    4/22/19    4/22/20
                                         (17360).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
420145025.............................  CENTURION PIPELINE L.P.      $165,600      $92,000    9/30/14    1/31/19
                                         (31888).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
120160005.............................  RICHMOND, CITY OF             $51,800           $0   10/13/16   11/30/18
                                         (17360).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320135014.............................  ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC      $559,100     $550,400    5/13/13   10/23/18
                                         (32109).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320135015.............................  ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC      $230,800           $0    5/13/13   10/23/18
                                         (32109).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
320135020.............................  ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC       $45,700      $22,500     7/3/13   10/23/18
                                         (32109).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    The following two enforcement cases are in an extended non-payment 
status:
      Idaho Pipeline Corp has not paid $49,000 penalty that 
PHMSA assessed in an August 9, 2019, Final Order (CPF 5-2018-6015).
      Bohrenworks LLC has not paid $209,002 penalty that PHMSA 
assessed in a December 2, 2019, Final Order (CPF 5-2019-0018E). 
Bohrenworks is an excavator.

    Question 2. The 2020 PIPES Act allowed PHMSA a number of 
recruitment and retention incentives, including special pay rates 
permitted under section 5305 of title 5, United States Code. How has 
having this authority assisted PHMSA to recruit and retain inspection 
and enforcement personnel? Are there additional barriers to ensuring 
PHMSA has the resources it needs?
    Answer. In recognition of the critical nature of these positions, 
the PIPES Act of 2020 authorized PHMSA to provide recruitment and 
retention incentives such as tuition assistance, student loan 
repayment, and special pay rates to improve efforts to attract and 
retain pipeline engineers and inspectors. In 2021, PHMSA engaged an 
outside contractor to determine the parameters for increasing its 
special pay rates--including for example the geographic areas and pay 
grades. In FY22, PHMSA received additional funding to provide financial 
incentives such as increasing the pay rates. In August of 2022, PHMSA/
DOT submitted to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for approval 
an increase in the special pay rates for engineer/inspectors. PHMSA 
received OPM approval to increase special pay rates for some engineer 
inspectors on April 17, 2023, and promptly applied this to increase to 
existing employees and openings. While awaiting approval, PHMSA 
increased the number of open/available positions for which it is 
hiring. In 2023, PHMSA also proposed establishing additional incentives 
to retain pipeline engineers/inspectors. Upon approval of these new 
incentives, the agency hopes it will experience a significant boost in 
its rate of onboarding and retention of inspectors.

    Question 3. California state law (2022 SB-905) prohibits 
construction of any new pipelines for carbon dioxide, including for new 
carbon capture and storage projects, until PHMSA promulgates a final 
rulemaking regarding minimum federal safety standards for 
transportation of carbon dioxide by pipeline. Can you confirm that 
PHMSA is working to finalize this rulemaking, and provide a publication 
date for the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking?
    Answer. PHMSA is developing a proposed rule updating its 
regulations in response to the anticipated significant expansion of 
carbon dioxide pipelines and to implement lessons learned from the 
February 22, 2020, rupture of a supercritical-phase carbon dioxide 
pipeline in Satartia, MS. PHMSA anticipates publishing an NPRM by 
January 2024.

 Questions from Hon. Mike Bost to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, 
     Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)

    Question 1. Does PHMSA oppose acts to damage or destroy an 
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
    Answer. Yes, as noted in my response to Congressman Stauber, and 
PHMSA personnel work closely with the Transportation Security 
Administration (TSA) to advance pipeline security, which is under the 
jurisdiction of the TSA.

    Question 2. Does PHMSA consider acts to damage or destroy an 
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility a legal 
expression of 1st Amendment free speech rights?
    Answer. PHMSA does not condone any act to damage or destroy a 
pipeline facility. Knowingly and willfully damaging or destroying a 
pipeline facility is a criminal violation of 49 U.S.C. 60123.

    Question 3. Does PHMSA consider acts to damage or destroy an 
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility an 
appropriate form of protest against climate change?
    Answer. PHMSA does not condone any act to damage or destroy a 
pipeline facility. Knowingly and willfully damaging or destroying a 
pipeline facility is a criminal violation of 49 U.S.C. 60123.

    Question 4. Does PHMSA oppose publications or other forms of media, 
such as movies, which encourage the damage or destruction of an 
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
    Answer. PHMSA does not condone any act to damage or destroy a 
pipeline facility. Knowingly and willfully damaging or destroying a 
pipeline facility is a criminal violation of 49 U.S.C. 60123.

    Question 5. Does PHMSA consider dangerous certain acts to tamper 
with or disrupt the operation of an interstate natural gas or hazardous 
liquids pipeline facility, such as valve-turning?
    Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and 
authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a 
pipeline facility.

    Question 6. Does PHMSA agree with the statement expressed by former 
Pipeline Safety Trust (PST) Executive Director Carl Weimer that, 
``[c]losing valves on major pipelines can have unexpected consequences 
endangering people and the environment''?
    Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and 
authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a 
pipeline facility.

    Question 7. Does PHMSA agree with former PST Executive Director 
Weimer that actions by activists to close valves on major pipelines 
were a ``dangerous stunt''?
    Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and 
authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a 
pipeline facility.

    Question 8. Does PHMSA support a Federal prohibition on activities, 
such as closing valves on major pipelines, that are dangerous but do 
not result in damage or destruction?
    Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and 
authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a 
pipeline facility.

Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Andrew J. Black, President 
 and Chief Executive Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA)

    Question 1. How much in annual revenue did LEPA members earn in 
2022?
    Answer. LEPA does not collect or hold information on the revenue of 
its member companies. LEPA focuses on policies and programs that 
improve pipeline safety and the public's perception of the benefits of 
pipelines. LEPA also advocates for the liquids pipeline industry at 
FERC, where the focus is on just and reasonable tariff rates and terms 
of service. Public sources of information on pipeline operator revenue 
would provide some information, although this data would be incomplete. 
Several major members of LEPA are privately owned and do not report 
their financial information publicly. Several other major members are 
subsidiaries of larger organizations with multiple business units and 
generally do not publicly break out liquids pipeline revenues 
separately.

    Question 2. How much of your members' product was exported to other 
countries?
    Answer. For the most part, LEPA member companies do not own the 
product they transport. Similar to FedEx or UPS, pipeline companies 
deliver liquid energy products owned by other parties from one 
destination to another on behalf of shippers. The ultimate destination 
of products delivered by LEPA members, to the extent they are beyond 
the U.S. pipeline network, are usually unknown to LEPA and its members. 
This model is similar to the rail and trucking industries, where trains 
and trucks deliver packages and goods owned by other parties from 
contracted pickup to destination points. The ultimate end point of 
those shipments is not necessarily known to the rail and trucking 
companies.

    Question 3. Could you please explain what statutory prohibitions 
there are on the industry creating its own voluntary information 
sharing system?
    Answer. There are no statutes which directly prohibit the sharing 
of pipeline safety information. However, legal considerations and other 
risks deter or limit free disclosure of information by infrastructure 
owners to a voluntary information sharing system. For example, 
companies will not share safety information which has a security 
component if it would pose a threat to public safety if publicly 
released. Companies will also not disclose to the public information 
which might be used against them in pending or threatened litigation. 
This is separate and apart from information subject to inspection and 
enforcement action by a regulator. Congress recognized that legal 
liabilities discourage safety sharing when it authorized a VIS-like 
program for air carriers administered by the FAA. Indeed, the success 
of the FAA safety sharing program resulting from the Congressional and 
regulator safe harbor granted to air carriers was the inspiration for 
Congress suggesting application of the program to the pipeline sector. 
If Congress wants pipeline safety to benefit from voluntary information 
sharing, it must create the legal safe harbors necessary for such 
sharing.

  Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief 
   Operating Officer, Natural Gas Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc., on 
  behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)

    Question 1. How much in annual revenue did INGAA members earn in 
2022?
    Answer. Many of INGAA's member companies have multiple revenue 
streams in addition to interstate natural gas transmission pipelines. 
To find the annual revenue stream for each Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (``FERC'')-regulated interstate natural gas transmission 
pipeline, please see each pipeline's FERC Form No. 2 and 2-A, which are 
publicly available here [https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/natural-
gas/industry-forms/form-2-2a-3-q-gas-historical-vfp-data]. To find the 
total annual revenue for each INGAA member company for all of its 
business segments, here is a link to each INGAA member company or their 
owner's public disclosures and/or press releases:
      BHE GT&S: https://www.brkenergy.com/assets/upload/
financial-filing/2022
1231_BHE%20Form%2010K.pdf
      Boardwalk Pipelines: https://loews.com/FileStore/2022-Q4-
--Earnings-Remarks.pdf
      Cheniere Energy, Inc.: https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/
Archives/edgar/data/3570/
000000357023000042/lng-20221231.htm#ic1131b9e5c5b41368c2dbfdabf3591
5e_19
      DT Midstream: https://s28.q4cdn.com/581450200/files/
doc_presentation/2023/01/DTM-Q4-2022-Earnings-Call-vF.pdf
      DTE Energy: https://ir.dteenergy.com/news/press-release-
details/2023/DTE-Energy-closes-year-with-strong-financial-results-well-
positioned-for-2023/default.aspx
      Eastern Shore Natural Gas: https://investor.chpk.com/
static-files/aff97881-7a86-4f51-a5ab-0768337b06d5
      Enbridge Energy: https://www.enbridge.com/-/media/Enb/
Documents/Investor-
Relations/2022/2022_Q4_Financials_MDA.pdf?rev=c574188313454a11
8924d6eb033edfcb&hash=8B9FDDC80A7994E26138F731C077F4EC
      Equitrans Midstream: https://s22.q4cdn.com/743133753/
files/doc_news/
Equitrans-Midstream-Announces-Full-Year-and-Fourth-Quarter-2022-
Results-2023.pdf
      Iroquois Pipeline Operating Company--reported through TC 
Energy and BHE GT&S
      Kinder Morgan, Inc.: https://s24.q4cdn.com/126708163/
files/doc_financials/2022/q4/KMI-2022-10K-Final-as-Filed-wo-
Exhibits.pdf
      Millennium Pipeline Company, LLC--reported through TC 
Energy and DT Midstream
      Mountain West Pipeline--acquired by Williams in Feb. 2023
      National Grid: https://www.nationalgrid.com/document/
148586/download
      National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation: https://
www.nationalfuel.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/NFG-9.30.2022-
Earnings-Release-11032022-PDF.pdf
      NextEra Energy: https://www.investor.nexteraenergy.com//
media/Files/N/NEE-
IR/reports-and-fillings/quarterly-earnings/2022/Q4/2023-0125_NEEQ42022
News%20Release%20Final.pdf
      ONEOK, Inc: https://otp.tools.investis.com/clients/us/
oneok_inc2/SEC/sec-show.
aspx?FilingId=16441050&Cik=0001039684&Type=PDF&hasPdf=1
      Pacific Gas & Electric: https://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/
files/doc_financials/2022/q4/PGE-02.23.23-Press-release.pdf
      Sempra LNG: https://www.sempra.com/sempra-reports-fourth-
quarter-2022-business-results
      Southern Company Gas: https://s27.q4cdn.com/273397814/
files/doc_financials/2022/q4/Earnings-Release-Q4-2022-IR.pdf
      Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc.--privately owned 
company that does not report publicly in U.S.
      Spire, Inc.: https://ir.spire.com/sec-filings/all-sec-
filings/content/0000950170-23-008177/0000950170-23-008177.pdf
      TC Energy: https://www.tcenergy.com/siteassets/pdfs/
investors/reports-and-filings/annual-and-quarterly-reports/2022/tc-
2022-annual-report.pdf
      Tellurian, Inc.: https://ir.tellurianinc.com/financials-
filings-and-presentations/annual-reports/content/0000061398-23-000011/
0000061398-23-000011.pdf
      UGI Energy Services, LLC: https://www.ugicorp.com/news-
releases/news-release-details/ugi-reports-fiscal-2022-results
      WBI Energy Transmission, Inc.: https://
d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000067716/c0870b54-f2c5-4d64-88aa-
6000c3abd644.pdf
      The Williams Companies: https://
d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000107263/828947a0-eef8-45b8-93a2-
c623e08108d5.pdf

    Question 2. How much of INGAA members' product was exported to 
other countries?
    Answer. As you may know, INGAA member companies do not own the 
natural gas that they transport. Interstate natural gas transmission 
companies merely transport the natural gas owned and controlled by the 
pipeline customer (shipper). In an integrated pipeline network (both 
inter and intrastate), pipeline customers can transport their natural 
gas over multiple pipelines from various production fields. The 
interstate natural gas transmission pipeline typically does not know 
the final end use of the gas that it transports.
    INGAA does have member companies which own and operate LNG import 
and export terminals, including BHE GT&S (Cove Point, MD), Cheniere 
(Sabine, LA and under construction in Corpus Christi, TX), Kinder 
Morgan (Elba Island, GA), Sempra (Hackberry, LA), and Tellurian (under 
construction in Calcasieu Parish, LA). Please see a list of FERC-
certificated LNG terminals (both INGAA and non-INGAA members) here 
[https://cms.ferc.gov/media/north-american-lng-export-terminals-
existing-approved-not-yet-built-and-proposed-8]. INGAA does not track 
the volume of members' exports. Please refer to their websites for 
further information.
    We note that the U.S. Energy Information Administration (``EIA'') 
reports [https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9133us2m.htm] monthly LNG 
export volumes and reports [https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/
n9050us2a.htm] yearly marketed production volumes.

    Question 3. What is the starting and average salary, benefits and 
bonus, and any additional employment incentives for a Kinder Morgan 
engineer?
    Answer. Kinder Morgan utilizes a market-based approach whereby pay 
ranges are established around a market reference point (MRP) to 
compensate employees within its organization. For pipeline engineering 
positions, there are 6 job titles that make up the job family currently 
used by the company with different experience levels and job functions. 
The average starting compensation for a pipeline engineer at Kinder 
Morgan can range from $121,521 to $172,129, depending on the employee's 
level of experience and qualifications. This dollar figure includes 
salary, bonus, and benefits amounting to roughly one third of the total 
compensation (i.e., health care, payroll taxes, retirement plans, 
educational reimbursement, and service awards). The average total 
compensation across the range of all pipeline engineering positions at 
Kinder Morgan is $208,444 (including the same categories listed 
earlier).

    Question 4. Kinder Morgan has received 39 special permits from 
PHMSA in the last 10 years and experienced more than 500 accidents or 
incidents. Have any of those accidents or incidents occurred on 
pipelines that received a special permit to waive PHMSA's safety 
regulations?
    Answer. Kinder Morgan currently has 17 active natural gas 
transmission class location special permits. No incidents have ever 
occurred in a class location special permit segment. In the last 10 
years, companies operated by Kinder Morgan have experienced 188 natural 
gas incidents (the remainder of the incidents cited in your question 
were on our liquids systems). Almost exactly two-thirds of those 
natural gas incidents, while reportable, were minor and contained 
within company facilities (e.g., within a compressor or meter station). 
Additionally, many of Kinder Morgan's pipelines are hundreds of miles 
long. When there were incidents on pipelines where class location 
special permit segments exist, there was no impact to the class 
location special permit segment.

 Questions from Hon. Troy E. Nehls to Bill Caram, Executive Director, 
                         Pipeline Safety Trust

    Question 1. Information sharing is a critical part of the pipeline 
industry's efforts to advance safety. Since 2016, industry has 
supported the idea of establishing a formal voluntary information 
sharing framework, similar to what is utilized by the airline industry. 
The PIPES Act of 2016 convened a Voluntary Information Sharing System 
working group that recommended Congress authorize such a program to 
share pipeline safety information while providing confidentiality for 
disclosures, but such a provision has been excluded from two previous 
reauthorization bills.
    As the committee considers future safety needs, could you please 
share your thoughts on whether such a framework would be valuable and 
should be included in the next pipeline safety reauthorization bill?
    Answer. The Pipeline Safety Trust believes there is nothing that 
prevents the pipeline industry from creating an information sharing 
system if desired, so we question the need for Congressional 
authorization of such a program. However, we would not oppose a 
provision provided protections from disclosure, FOIA requests, and 
other legal processes are reasonable and do not restrict information 
from the public that is currently available; funding does not pull from 
existing PHMSA resources; and the governing board is fairly balanced 
among stakeholders.

   Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Bill Caram, Executive 
                    Director, Pipeline Safety Trust

    Question 1. Would you recommend that the committee extend the 
Technology Pilot Program as mandated by Sec. 104 of the PIPES Act of 
2020? If so, do you have specific safety concerns or concerns with the 
application process? What recommendations do you have to ensure 
applicants provide a sufficient level of safety during their pilot 
program?
    Answer. Given that the Technology Pilot Program would allow 
companies to operate outside of existing Federal minimum safety 
standards, we believe the program requires robust safeguards, including 
an extensive application and approval process, to operate pipelines in 
our nation's communities without meeting those standards. Regulations 
around maximum pressure, repair criteria, risk assessments, and many 
other standards are important to the safety of people and the 
environment and PHMSA needs to rigorously assess the consequences of 
any potential regulatory leniency.
    The Pipeline Safety Trust would need to assess any proposed changes 
to the existing program that might accompany a proposed extension to 
the Technology Pilot Program before deciding to support its adoption.

    Question 2. Does the Pipeline Safety Trust support H.R.4261, the 
``Pipeline Seismic Safety Study Act'' raised in the last Congress?
    Answer. Yes, we support the ``Pipeline Seismic Safety Study Act''.

   Questions from Hon. Mike Bost to Bill Caram, Executive Director, 
                         Pipeline Safety Trust

    Question 1. Does the PST oppose acts to damage or destroy an 
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
    Answer. Yes, The Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that 
create unsafe conditions for people and the environment on pipeline 
facilities.

    Question 2. Does PST consider acts to damage or destroy an 
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility a 
protected expression of 1st Amendment free speech rights?
    Answer. Acts to damage or destroy a pipeline can create unsafe 
conditions, and The Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that 
create unsafe conditions for people and the environment on pipeline 
facilities.

    Question 3. Does PST consider acts to damage or destroy an 
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility an 
appropriate form of protest against climate change?
    Answer. Acts to damage or destroy a pipeline can create unsafe 
conditions, and The Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that 
create unsafe conditions for people and the environment on pipeline 
facilities.

    Question 4. Does PST oppose publications or other forms of media, 
such as movies, which encourage the damage or destruction of an 
interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
    Answer. Unfortunately, this hypothetical question goes beyond our 
mission and our tiny staff's capacity, but I will reiterate that we 
oppose activities that create unsafe conditions for people and the 
environment on pipeline facilities. However, I am unable to comment on 
the potential constitutional implications of your question.

    Question 5. Does PST consider dangerous certain acts to tamper with 
or disrupt the operation of an interstate natural gas or hazardous 
liquids pipeline facility, such as valve-turning?
    Answer. Acts such as valve-turning by untrained individuals can 
create unsafe conditions on pipeline facilities and the Pipeline Safety 
Trust opposes activities that create unsafe conditions for people and 
the environment on pipeline facilities.

    Question 6. Do you agree with the statement expressed by former PST 
Executive Director Carl Weimer that, ``[c]losing valves on major 
pipelines can have unexpected consequences endangering people and the 
environment''?
    Answer. Yes, I agree with that statement.

    Question 7. Do you agree with former PST Executive Director Weimer 
that actions by activists to close valves on major pipelines were a 
``dangerous stunt''?
    Answer. I am not familiar with the particular circumstances that 
would contextualize Mr. Weimer's comment but given the level of respect 
I have for his integrity and judgment, I think it's safe to say I would 
agree with his assessment at the time.

    Question 8. Does PST support a Federal prohibition on activities, 
such as closing valves on major pipelines, that are dangerous but do 
not result in damage or destruction?
    Answer. I believe such activities are already prohibited.

    Question 9. Does PST support actions to blow up a natural gas or 
hazardous liquids pipeline encouraged by the upcoming movie ``How to 
Blow Up a Pipeline'' set for release April 7 in theaters across 
America?
    Answer. We have not seen the movie nor read the book and do not 
know if either encourages blowing up pipelines. I will reiterate that 
the Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that create unsafe 
conditions for people and the environment on pipeline facilities.

    Question 10. Does PST consider actions to blow up a natural gas or 
hazardous liquids pipeline as encouraged by the upcoming movie ``How to 
Blow Up a Pipeline'' a danger to people or the environment?
    Answer. We have not seen the movie nor read the book and do not 
know if either encourages blowing up pipelines. I will reiterate that 
the Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that create unsafe 
conditions for people and the environment on pipeline facilities.

    Question 11. Does PST condemn the upcoming movie ``How to Blow Up a 
Pipeline''?
    Answer. We have not seen the movie and have enough real pipeline 
issues to keep our tiny staff more than busy without spending time 
dealing with fictional drama meant to entertain. It is always our hope 
that pipeline companies, lawmakers, and regulators, who have the 
ability to change things safely and rapidly, will deal with the 
existential threat of climate change in a proactive manner.

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