    [House Hearing, 118 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                        PIPELINE SAFETY: REVIEWING IMPLEMENTATION
                         OF THE PIPES ACT OF 2020 AND EXAMINING
                         FUTURE SAFETY NEEDS

    =======================================================================

                                    (118-4)

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                     SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES,
                            AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                       TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 MARCH 8, 2023

                                   __________

                           Printed for the use of the
                 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

         Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
         transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                                 transportation

                                    ________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    54-072 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

      Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
    Rick Larsen, Washington,             Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,
      Ranking Member                     Arkansas
    Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Daniel Webster, Florida
      District of Columbia               Thomas Massie, Kentucky
    Grace F. Napolitano, California      Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
    Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Brian Babin, Texas
    John Garamendi, California           Garret Graves, Louisiana
    Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr.,      Georgiavid Rouzer, North Carolina
    Andre Carson, Indiana                Mike Bost, Illinois
    Dina Titus, Nevada                   Doug LaMalfa, California
    Jared Huffman, California            Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
    Julia Brownley, California           Brian J. Mast, Florida
    Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
    Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey       Puerto Rico
    Mark DeSaulnier, California          Pete Stauber, Minnesota
    Salud O. Carbajal, California        Tim Burchett, Tennessee
    Greg Stanton, Arizona,               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
      Vice Ranking Member                Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
    Colin Z. Allred, Texas                 Vice Chairman
    Sharice Davids, Kansas               Troy E. Nehls, Texas
    Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Lance Gooden, Texas
    Chris Pappas, New Hampshire          Tracey Mann, Kansas
    Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Burgess Owens, Utah
    Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts      Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
    Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
    Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            Chuck Edwards, North Carolina
    Patrick Ryan, New York               Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
    Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska         Anthony D'Esposito, New York
    Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Eric Burlison, Missouri
    Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 John James, Michigan
    Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio            Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
    Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Brandon Williams, New York
    Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
                                         Mike Collins, Georgia
                                         Mike Ezell, Mississippi
                                         John S. Duarte, California
                                         Aaron Bean, Florida

         Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials

      Troy E. Nehls, Texas, Chairman
    Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey,    Brian Babin, Texas
      Ranking Member                     David Rouzer, North Carolina
    Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Mike Bost, Illinois
    Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Doug LaMalfa, California
    Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
    Andre Carson, Indiana                Pete Stauber, Minnesota
    Mark DeSaulnier, California          Tim Burchett, Tennessee
    Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
    Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina,  Lance Gooden, Texas
      Vice Ranking Member                Tracey Mann, Kansas
    Grace F. Napolitano, California      Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
    Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
    Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiaic Burlison, Missouri
    Jared Huffman, California            Brandon Williams, New York,
    Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois     Vice Chairman
    Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
    Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex Officio) John S. Duarte, California
                                         Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)

                                    CONTENTS

                                                                       Page

    Summary of Subject Matter........................................   vii

                     STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

    Hon. Troy E. Nehls, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
      and Hazardous Materials, opening statement.....................     1
        Prepared statement...........................................     2
    Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the
      State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
      Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, opening
      statement......................................................    13
        Prepared statement...........................................    14
    Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of
      Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and
      Infrastructure, opening statement..............................    15
        Prepared statement...........................................    17

                                   WITNESSES

    Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous
      Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), oral statement........    19
        Prepared statement...........................................    21
    Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive Officer, Liquid
      Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA), oral statement.............    28
        Prepared statement...........................................    30
    Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer, Natural Gas Pipelines,
      Kinder Morgan, Inc., on behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas
      Association of America (INGAA), oral statement.................    36
        Prepared statement...........................................    38
    Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety Trust, oral
      statement......................................................    41
        Prepared statement...........................................    43

                           SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD

    Submissions for the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls:
        Letter of March 8, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and
          Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
          Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, from Stuart
          Saulters, Vice President of Government Relations, American
          Public Gas Association.....................................     4
        Statement of the American Petroleum Institute................     5
        Press Release of March 8, 2023, from the Distribution
          Contractors Association and the United Association of Union
          Plumbers and Pipefitters...................................    12
        Letter of March 22, 2023, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and
          Hon. Rick Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on
          Transportation and Infrastructure, from Geoff Moody, Senior
          Vice President, Government Relations and Policy, American
          Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers.......................    87
    Letter of March 7, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and
      Donald M. Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
      Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, and Hon. Sam
      Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick Larsen, Ranking Member,
      Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, from Edwin H.
      ``Skip'' Williams, Bellingham City Council (Washington State),
      Submitted for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen...................    16

                                    APPENDIX

    Questions to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and
      Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA), from:
        Hon. Troy E. Nehls...........................................    89
        Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr.....................................   107
        Hon. Mike Bost...............................................   109
    Questions to Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive
      Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA), from Hon.
      Donald M. Payne, Jr............................................   110
    Questions to Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer, Natural
      Gas Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc., on behalf of the Interstate
      Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA), from Hon. Donald M.
      Payne, Jr......................................................   110
    Questions to Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety
      Trust, from:
        Hon. Troy E. Nehls...........................................   112
        Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr.....................................   112
        Hon. Mike Bost...............................................   113

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                 March 3, 2023

        SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

        TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
    and Hazardous Materials
        FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and
    Hazardous Materials
        RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Pipeline Safety:
    Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining
    Future Safety Needs.''
    _______________________________________________________________________

                                   I. PURPOSE

        The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
    Materials will meet on March 8, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. ET in 2167
    Rayburn House Office Building to hold a hearing titled
    ``Pipeline Safety: Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act of
    2020 and Examining Future Safety Needs.'' The purpose of this
    hearing is to examine the progress of the Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) in
    implementing the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and
    Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (P.L. 116-260, PIPES Act of 2020)
    and examining future needs in pipeline safety.

                                 II. BACKGROUND

    ABOUT THE AGENCY

        The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
    (PHMSA) was created under the Norman Y. Mineta Research and
    Special Programs Improvement Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-426, ``2004
    Act''). Prior to enactment of the 2004 Act, the Department of
    Transportation's (DOT) Research and Special Programs
    Administration administered the DOT's pipeline and hazardous
    materials safety programs.\1\ PHMSA's mission is to protect
    people and the environment by advancing the safe transportation
    of energy through 3.4 million miles of natural gas and
    hazardous liquid pipelines, which account for the
    transportation of 65 percent of the energy commodities consumed
    in the United States. PHMSA also is charged with the safe and
    secure movement of over one million daily shipments of
    hazardous materials by all modes of transportation.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Norman Y. Mineta Research and Special Programs Improvement Act
    of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-426 [hereinafter the 2004 Act].
        \2\ See Pub. L. No.117-58; see also PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Program
    Budget and Grants Presentation (Jan. 25, 2023) (on file with Comm.)
    [hereinafter PHMSA Budget and Grants Presentation].
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The first statute regulating pipeline safety was the
    Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, which Congress amended
    in 1976.\3\ Congress added hazardous liquid pipelines to the
    statute in the Pipeline Safety Act of 1970.\4\ Recent enacted
    legislation regulating the safety of natural gas and hazardous
    liquid pipeline facilities for which mandates remain
    outstanding include the Protecting our Infrastructure of
    Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2016, and the Protecting
    our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety (PIPES)
    Act of 2020.\5\ The current authorization expires at the end of
    Fiscal Year (FY) 2023 on September 30, 2023.\6\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-481
    (amended by the Natural Gas Pipeline Safety Act Amendments of 1976,
    Pub. L. No. 94-477, 90 Stat. 2073).
        \4\ Pipeline Safety Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 96-129.
        \5\ Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-
    561, 102 Stat. 2805; Pipeline Safety Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-508,
    106 Stat. 3289; Accountable Pipeline Safety and Partnership Act of
    1996, Pub. L. No. 104-304, 110 Stat. 3793; Pipeline Safety Improvement
    Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-355, 116 Stat. 1757; The 2004 Act;
    Pipeline Inspection, Protection, Enforcement and Safety Act of 2006,
    Pub. L. No. 109-468, 120 Stat. 3486; Pipelines Safety, Regulatory
    Certainty, and Job Creation Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-90, 125 Stat.
    1904; the Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing
    Safety Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-183, 130 Stat. 514; Protecting Our
    Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020, Pub. L.
    No. 116-260 [hereinafter PIPES Act of 2020].
        \6\ PIPES Act of 2020, Sec.  101.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PIPELINE SAFETY FRAMEWORK

        Safety regulations differ depending on the nature of the
    pipeline and the commodity that is moving through it. PHMSA's
    regulations govern pipelines and facilities that transport
    natural gas separately from those that transport hazardous
    liquid.\7\ Additionally, the pipelines and facilities used to
    transport natural gas and hazardous liquids vary in operating
    pressures, diameter size, intended purpose, and proximity to
    populated areas.\8\ This infrastructure includes:
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec.  192, 195 (2023).
        \8\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LDistribution pipelines: These pipelines transport
    natural gas to commercial and residential end-users. Gas
    distribution pipelines tend to be smaller in diameter and
    operate at lower pressures.\9\ PHMSA estimates there are 2.3
    million miles of gas distribution lines, much of which are
    intrastate pipelines.\10\ There are no hazardous liquid
    distribution pipelines.\11\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Distribution Pipelines, available at https:/
    /primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/FSDistributionPipelines.htm (last
    updated Feb. 26, 2018).
        \10\ PHMSA Budget and Grants Presentation supra note 2.
        \11\ GAO, GAO-12-388, Pipeline Safety, Collecting Data And Sharing
    Information on Federally Unregulated Gathering Pipelines Could Help
    Enhance Safety 3 (2022), available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/gao-
    12-388.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LTransmission pipelines: These pipelines transport
    energy products from treatment and processing facilities to
    bulk customers, storage facilities, and local distribution
    networks.\12\ The products transported can include natural gas
    and hazardous liquids \13\ Transmission pipelines can range in
    size from several inches to several feet in diameter and are
    designed to operate from relatively low pressures to high
    pressures.\14\ These lines can operate within a single State or
    span hundreds of miles, crossing one or more State lines.\15\
    PHMSA estimates there are 301,484 miles of gas interstate
    transmission lines.\16\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Transmission Pipelines, available at
    https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/
    FSTransmissionPipelines.htm (last updated Jan. 2018).
        \13\ PHMSA, Pipeline Miles and Facilities 2010+, available at
    https://portal.phmsa.dot.gov/
    analytics/
    saw.dll?Portalpages&PortalPath=%2Fshared%2FPDM%20Public%20Website%2F_
    portal%2FPublic%20Reports&Page=Infrastructure (last updated Jan. 28,
    2022) [hereinafter Pipeline Miles].
        \14\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Transmission Pipelines, available at
    https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/FactSheets/
    FSTransmissionPipelines.htm (last updated Jan. 11, 2018).
        \15\ PHMSA, State Programs Overview, available at https://
    www.phmsa.dot.gov/working-phmsa/state-programs/state-programs-overview
    (last updated Sep. 16, 2022) [hereinafter State Programs Overview].
        \16\ PHMSA Budget and Grants Presentation supra note 2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LGathering lines: These lines transport natural
    gas from the production site to a central collection point.
    PHMSA currently regulates 488,064 miles of gas gathering
    lines.\17\ Historically, gathering lines were built in lower
    populated areas, had smaller diameters than transmission lines,
    and operated at pressures and flow lower than transmission
    lines.\18\ However, as new gas development occurs around the
    country, regulators are considering the impacts of producers
    building larger diameter and higher pressure gathering lines
    and a growing national population.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ PHMSA, Safety of Gas Gathering Pipelines (Jan. 8, 2019),
    available at https://primis.phmsa.dot.gov/meetings/FilGet.mtg?fil=1029.
        \18\ PHMSA, Fact Sheet: Gathering Pipelines, available at https://
    primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/factsheets/fsgatheringpipelines.htm (Jan. 12,
    2018).
        \19\ See PHSMA, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Pipeline Safety:
    Safety of Gas Transmission and Gathering Pipelines, 81 Fed. Reg. 29,830
    (Apr 8, 2016.) available at https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/FR-
    2016-05-13/pdf/2016-11240.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LHazardous liquid pipelines: These pipelines
    transport liquid petroleum and other types of liquid energy
    from sources of origin to refineries and chemical plants, and
    in some cases to storage or distribution facilities.\20\
    According to PHMSA, hazardous liquids traverse the United
    States through approximately 260,000 miles of hazardous liquid
    pipelines.\21\ Hazardous liquids can include energy sources
    such as crude oil, refined petroleum products, highly volatile
    liquids, and anhydrous ammonia, and carbon dioxide in the
    supercritical (fluid or vapor) state.\22\ Hazardous liquids can
    be transported by transmission and gathering lines.\23\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ Pipeline Safety Trust, Hazardous Liquid Pipelines--Basics and
    Issues, available at https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/
    2015-PST-Briefing-Paper-03-HazLiquidBasics.pdf (last updated Sept.
    2015) [hereinafter Hazardous Liquid Pipelines--Basics and Issues].
        \21\ PHMSA, PHMSA Presentation: Pipeline Safety Program Budget and
    Grants, (Jan. 25, 2023) (on file with Comm.); see also Pipeline Miles,
    supra note 13.
        \22\ Hazardous Liquid Pipelines--Basics and Issues, supra note 20.
        \23\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LLiquefied natural gas (LNG) facilities: These
    facilities are used for converting, transporting, or storing
    LNG. There are several Federal agencies involved in the
    regulation of LNG.\24\ Historically, PHMSA has regulated peak
    shaving facilities and satellite facilities where LNG has been
    used to manage capacity during times of peak demand. PHMSA also
    regulates import terminals.\25\ Market changes led to a rapid
    growth in export terminals; however, PHMSA regulations
    governing LNG facilities predate such expansion.\26\ In 2022,
    the United States became the world's top LNG exporter tied with
    Qatar.\27\ To address these changes, the PIPES Act of 2016 and
    the PIPES Act of 2020 mandated that PHMSA update its safety
    regulations for LNG facilities. PHMSA estimates it will
    complete this regulation by September 2023.\28\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ PHMSA, Jurisdiction of LNG Plants, available at https://
    www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/jurisdiction-lng-
    plants (last updated Jan. 31, 2018); see also 49 C.F.R. Sec.  193.2001
    (2023).
        \25\ See PHMSA, LNG Facility Siting, available at https://
    www.phmsa.dot.gov/pipeline/liquified-natural-gas/lng-facility-siting.
        \26\ 49 C.F.R. Sec.  193.
        \27\ Stephen Stapczynski, U.S. Surges to Top of LNG Exporter Ranks
    on Breakneck Growth, Bloomberg, (Jan. 2, 2023), available at https://
    www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-01-03/us-surges-to-top-of-lng-
    exporter-ranks-on-breakneck-growth.
        \28\ PHMSA, PIPES Act Web Chart, available at https://
    www.phmsa.dot.gov/legislative-mandates/pipes-act-web-chart (last
    updated Jan. 24, 2023) [hereinafter Pipes Act Web Chart].
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    PHMSA'S PIPELINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT

        PHMSA sets Federal minimum safety standards for pipeline
    safety functions, including developing, issuing, and enforcing
    regulations for the safe transportation of natural gas
    (including liquefied natural gas) and hazardous liquids by
    pipeline through the Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS).\29\ The
    Agency's regulatory programs are focused on the design,
    construction, operation, and maintenance or abandonment of
    pipeline facilities, and in the construction, operation, and
    maintenance of LNG facilities.\30\ The Agency has jurisdiction
    over transportation-related facilities; not drilling, siting,
    or production facilities.\31\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ PHMSA, Office of Pipeline Safety, available at https://
    www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/offices/office-pipeline-safety (last
    updated Dec. 13, 2018).
        \30\ PHMSA, Pipeline Safety Regulations, available at https://
    primis.phmsa.dot.gov/comm/SafetyStandards.htm?nocache=8847.
        \31\ See PHMSA, PHMSA Regulations, available at https://
    www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulations (last updated May 5, 2021); see also
    FERC, Natural Gas Pipelines, available at https://www.ferc.gov/
    industries-data/natural-gas/overview/natural-gas-pipelines (last
    updated Feb. 10, 2021); see also Library of Cong., Oil and Gas
    Industry: A Research Guide, available at https://guides.loc.gov/oil-
    and-gas-industry/laws/agencies.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        PHMSA has long-experienced difficulty in recruiting and
    maintaining an inspection workforce capable of meeting PHMSA's
    oversight needs, as it often competes with industry for
    personnel.\32\ As with previous reauthorization laws, the PIPES
    Act of 2020 required PHMSA to ensure the number of pipeline
    inspection and enforcement personnel did not fall below certain
    levels (224 in FY 21, 235 in FY 22, and 247 in FY 23).\33\ It
    also directed PHMSA to hire eight fulltime employees to
    finalize outstanding and new congressional mandates, and to
    seek OPM authority to use recruitment and retention incentives,
    such as special pay rates, coupled with continued service
    agreements, that similarly situated agencies have found
    effective at hiring and retaining staff.\34\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \32\ DOT Inspector General, PHMSA Has Improved Its Workforce
    Management but Planning, Hiring, and Retention Challenges Remain 2
    (2017), available at https://www.oig.dot.gov/sites/default/files/
    PHMSA%20Workforce%20Final%20Report%20112117-ST2018010.pdf [hereinafter
    PHMSA Workforce Report].
        \33\ PIPES Act of 2020, supra note 5 Sec.  102.
        \34\ Id.; see also PHMSA Workforce Report, supra note 32.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        When violations of PHMSA's regulations occur, the Agency
    has several enforcement mechanisms it can use. These include
    the issuance of a warning letter, a notice of probable
    violation, or a corrective action order.\35\ The Agency may
    also issue fines for non-compliance.\36\ In 2022, PHMSA closed
    227 enforcement cases.\37\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \35\ See 49 C.F.R. Sec.  190.205 (2023) (allowing for letter
    notifying an operator of alleged violations and directs them to correct
    the violation or be subject to additional enforcement action); 49
    C.F.R. Sec.  190.207 (2023) (providing for a Regional Director to serve
    a notice--commonly issued after routine inspections, incident
    investigations, and other activity--alleging specific regulatory
    violations and proposing remedial action or civil penalties); 49 C.F.R.
    Sec.  190.233 (2023) (providing for the Associate Administrator to
    issue an order finding a particular situation represents a serious
    hazard to life, property, or the environment and directing certain
    actions to be taken, up to and including shutdown of the pipeline
    system).
        \36\ See PHMSA, Civil Penalty Summary, available at https://
    www.phmsa.dot.gov/regulatory-compliance/pipeline/enforcement/civil-
    penalty-summary (last updated Jan. 25, 2023).
        \37\ See PHMSA, Listing of Cases Initiated, available at https://
    primis.phmsa.dot.gov/
    comm/reports/enforce/CasesOpen_opid_0.html?nocache=745#_TP_1_tab_2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    STATES' PIPELINE SAFETY OVERSIGHT

        PHMSA supports states' oversight work by authorizing states
    to assume certain aspects of pipeline safety for intrastate gas
    pipelines, hazardous liquid pipelines, and underground natural
    gas storage through certifications and agreements with PHMSA
    under 49 U.S.C. Sec. Sec.  60105 and 60106(a). The Agency also
    authorizes states with certifications to participate in the
    oversight of interstate pipeline transportation through
    agreements under 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60106(b). States with
    certified pipeline safety programs may impose additional
    standards for intrastate pipelines and facilities so long as
    they are compatible with the minimum Federal standards issued
    by PHMSA.\38\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \38\ State Programs Overview, supra note 16.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CYBERSECURITY

        Regarding cybersecurity, PHMSA signed an annex to its
    Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the Transportation
    Security Administration (TSA) that identifies TSA as the lead
    entity for pipeline security, which has included cybersecurity
    threats.\39\ In May 2021, the Colonial Pipeline sustained a
    ransomware attack, causing the operator to shut down the
    pipeline for six days.\40\ PHMSA issued a Notice of Probable
    Violation (NOPV) and Proposed Compliance Order, and proposed
    civil penalties of $986,400. The NOPV alleges that failures to
    adequately plan and prepare for a manual restart and shutdown
    operation contributed to the national impacts when the pipeline
    remained out of service after the May 2021 cyberattack.\41\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \39\ PHSMA, Annex to the Memorandum of Understanding Between the
    Department of Homeland Security and DOT Concerning TSA and PHMSA
    Cooperation on Pipeline Transportation Security and Safety (Feb. 2020),
    available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/files/docs/
    regulatory-compliance/phmsa-guidance/73466/phmsa-tsa-mou-
    annexexecuted.pdf.
        \40\ Vanessa Romo, Panic Drives Gas Shortages After Colonial
    Pipeline Ransomware Attack, NPR, (May 11, 2021), available at https://
    www.npr.org/2021/05/11/996044288/panic-drives-gas-shortages-after-
    colonial-pipeline-ransomware-attack.
        \41\ Letter from Gregory Alan Ochs, Dir., Central Region, Off. of
    Pipeline Safety, PHMSA to Joseph A. Blount, President and Chief
    Executive Officer, Colonial Pipeline Company (May 5, 2022) (notifying
    of probable violation, proposed civil penalty, and proposed compliance
    order), available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/phmsa.dot.gov/
    files/2022-05/32022026_Colonial_Pipeline_
    NOPV_PCP_PCO_05052022.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                        III. PIPELINE SAFETY LEGISLATION

        In 2021 and 2022, PHMSA finalized seven mandates, including
    four from the PIPES Act of 2011: Safety of Gas Transmission
    Pipelines; Discretionary Integrity Management Improvements;
    Safety of Gas Gathering Pipelines; Amendments to Parts 192 and
    195 to require Valve Installation and Minimum Rupture Detection
    Standards.\42\ These final rules completed congressional
    responses to catastrophic pipeline failures, such as the fatal
    explosion of a gas transmission pipeline in San Bruno,
    California in 2010 and the release of one million barrels of
    crude oil near Marshall, Michigan in 2010.\43\ PHMSA also
    issued an interim final rule on Coastal Ecological Unusually
    Sensitive Areas, a mandate from the PIPES Act of 2016 and the
    PIPES Act of 2020.\44\ One mandate from the PIPES Act of 2016
    is outstanding: finalizing updates to regulations governing LNG
    facilities.\45\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \42\ Pipeline Safety: Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines: Repair
    Criteria, Integrity Management Improvements, Cathodic Protection,
    Management of Change, and Other Related Amendments, 87 Fed. Reg. 52,224
    (Aug. 24, 2022), available at https://www.federalregister.gov/
    documents/2022/08/24/2022-17031/pipeline-safety-safety-of-gas-
    transmission-pipelines-repair-criteria-integrity-management; Pipeline
    Safety: Safety of Gas Gathering Pipelines: Extension of Reporting
    Requirements, Regulation of Large, High-Pressure Lines, and Other
    Related Amendments: Response to a Petition for Reconsideration;
    Technical Corrections; Issuance of Limited Enforcement Discretion, 87
    Fed. Reg. 26,296, available at https://www.federalregister.gov/
    documents/2022/05/04/2022-09474/pipeline-safety-safety-of-gas-
    gathering-pipelines-extension-of-reporting-requirements-regulation-of;
    Pipeline Safety: Requirement of Valve Installation and Minimum Rupture
    Detection Standards, 87 Fed. Reg. 20,940 (Apr. 8, 2022), available at
    https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2022/04/08/2022-07133/
    pipeline-safety-requirement-of-valve-installation-and-minimum-rupture-
    detection-standards.
        \43\ Id.
        \44\ Pipes Act Web Chart, supra note 28.
        \45\ PIPES Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-183, Sec.  27, 130 Stat.
    514; PIPES Act of 2020, Pub. L. No. 116-260, Sec.  110, 134 Stat. 620;
    See Off. of Info. and Regulatory Affairs, PHMSA, DOT, Pipeline Safety:
    Amendment to Liquefied Natural Gas facilities (2018), available at
    https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/
    eAgendaViewRule?pubId=201810&RIN=2137-AF45.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 2020, Congress enacted the PIPES Act of 2020, which
    directed PHMSA to:
         LDetermine whether to issue a notice of proposed
    rulemaking on class location change requirements and to advance
    the rulemaking process if it makes a positive determination;
    \46\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \46\ PIPES Act of 2020, supra note 5, Sec.  115.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LFrequently report publicly on progress made
    toward completing outstanding mandates; \47\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \47\ Id. Sec.  106.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LUpdate distribution pipeline safety regulations
    in response to the September 2018 distribution pipeline
    explosions in the Merrimack Valley region of Massachusetts;
    \48\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \48\ Id. at Title II.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LPrioritize completion of a final rulemaking on
    gas gathering lines and direct GAO to study capabilities of
    mapping gathering lines; \49\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \49\ Id. Sec.  112.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LStrengthen whistleblower protections; \50\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \50\ Id. Sec.  116.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LUpdate its current regulations for large-scale
    LNG facilities and allowing it to establish an LNG Center of
    Excellence; \51\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \51\ Id. Sec. Sec.  110, 111.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LIssue regulations prescribing the applicability
    of pipeline safety requirements to certain idled pipelines;
    \52\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \52\ Id. Sec.  109.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LCreate a technology pilot program, which allows
    pipeline operators to test and evaluate innovative technologies
    or practices on their systems that improve pipeline safety;
    \53\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \53\ Id. Sec.  104.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LEnter into agreement with the National Academies
    of Science to study potential methods or standards for
    installing automatic or remote-controlled shut-off valves on
    pipelines located in certain sensitive areas; \54\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \54\ Id. Sec.  119.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LIssue regulations directing distribution,
    transmission, and gathering pipeline operators to conduct leak
    detection and repair programs that protect the environment and
    pipeline safety, requiring use of advanced leak detection
    technologies; \55\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \55\ Id. Sec. Sec.  113, 114.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LRequire broader transmission of safety-related
    condition reports to include state authorities, Tribes, and
    emergency response and planning entities; \56\ and
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \56\ Id. Sec.  121.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
         LPrioritize a rulemaking to protect unusually
    sensitive areas and require operators of certain hazardous
    liquid pipelines to use internal inspection technology at least
    once every 12 months and establish procedures for assessing
    potential impacts by marine vessels.\57\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \57\ Id. Sec.  120.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                      IV. FUTURE NEEDS IN PIPELINE SAFETY

    PIPELINE SAFETY INCIDENTS

        PHMSA reports that in 2022, 631 pipeline incidents
    occurred, from which 10 individuals died, 24 were injured, and
    property damages totaled more than $685 million.\58\ Of these
    incidents, 17 were classified as serious and 267 were
    significant.\59\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \58\ PHMSA, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Administration
    Pipeline Safety Incidents 20 Year Trends, available at https://
    portal.phmsa.dot.gov/analytics/saw.dll?Portalpages&Portal
    Path=%2Fshared%2FPDM%20Public%20Website%2F_portal%2FSC%20Incident
    %20Trend&Page=All%20Reported [hereinafter PHMSA 20 Year Trends].
        \59\ Id. (explaining Serious incidents involve a fatality or injury
    requiring in-patient hospitalization and that significant incidents
    involve a fatality or injury requiring in-patient hospitalization,
    $50,000 or more in total costs, highly volatile liquid releases of five
    barrels or more or other liquid release of 50 barrels or more, or
    liquid releases resulting in an unintentional fire or explosion).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    CARBON DIOXIDE PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION

        There are approximately 5,000 miles of pipeline
    transporting CO2 primarily for enhanced oil
    recovery.\60\ Carbon capture, utilization, and sequestration
    (CCUS) is a process that captures CO2 emissions from
    sources, such as power plants, and either reuses or stores it
    so it will not enter the atmosphere.\61\ The Infrastructure
    Investment and Jobs Act (P.L. 117-58) establishes a Carbon
    Dioxide Transportation Infrastructure Finance and Innovation
    (CIFIA) program for CO2 pipelines and authorizes
    $2.1 billion over five years for low-interest CIFIA loans and
    grants through the Department of Energy (DOE).\62\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \60\ Paul W. Parfomak, Cong. Rsch. Serv., IN11944, Carbon Dioxide
    Pipelines: Safety Issues, (2022), available at https://
    crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IN/IN11944.
        \61\ DOE, Carbon Capture, Utilization & Storage, available at
    https://www.energy.gov/carbon-capture-utilization-storage.
        \62\ Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 117-58,
    Division D, 135 Stat. 429, 923.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CO2 can be transported in various states.
    Currently, nearly all CO2 is transported in a
    supercritical state (a dense fluid or vapor phase between a
    liquid and gas) and is regulated under 49 CFR Part 195.\63\
    Future carbon capture and sequestration (CCS) pipeline projects
    may be transported in a subcritical state (a liquid) or a
    gas.\64\ PHMSA hazardous liquid regulations address
    CO2 that is transported as a fluid compressed to a
    supercritical state and is 90% pure CO2.\65\ The
    potential future use of CO2 with higher levels of
    impurities which may be transported as a liquid or gas are not
    regulated by PHMSA.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \63\ DOE, Meeting the Dual Challenge, a Roadmap to At-Scale
    Deployment of Carbon Capture, Use, and Storage 6-4 (2019), available at
    https://www.energy.gov/sites/default/
    files/2021-06/2019%20-%20Meeting%20the%20Dual%20Challenge%20Vol%20III
    %20Chapter%206.pdf.
        \64\ Richard B. Kuprewicz, Accufacts' Perspectives on the State of
    Federal Carbon Dioxide Transmission Pipeline Safety Regulations as It
    Relates to Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration Within the
    U.S., Prepared for Pipeline Safety Trust 4 (2022), available at https:/
    /pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/3-23-22-Final-Accufacts-CO2-
    Pipeline-Report2.pdf [hereinafter Accufacts Perspectives].
        \65\ 49 C.F.R. Sec.  195.2.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        CO2 is colorless and odorless and in
    concentrations is an asphyxiant, displacing the oxygen in air
    and causing negative health impacts.\66\ On February 22, 2020,
    in Satartia, Mississippi, Denbury's 24-inch Delhi Pipeline
    ruptured, releasing liquid CO2 that immediately
    began to vaporize.\67\ 200 people surrounding the rupture
    location were evacuated, and 45 people were taken to the
    hospital.\68\ PHMSA's investigation identified contributing
    factors to the accident, including lack of assessment of
    geohazards in plans and procedures, underestimating the
    potential affected areas that could be impacted by a release in
    its CO2 dispersion model, and not notifying local
    responders to advise them of a potential failure.\69\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \66\ Accufacts Perspectives, supra note 64.
        \67\ PHSMA Failure Investigation Report, Denbury Gulf Coast
    Pipelines, LLC, available at https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/sites/
    phmsa.dot.gov/files/2022-05/Failure%20Investigation
    %20Report%20-%20Denbury%20Gulf%20Coast%20Pipeline.pdf.
        \68\ Id.
        \69\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    HYDROGEN PIPELINE TRANSPORTATION

        As of December 2020, there were 1,608 miles of hydrogen
    pipeline in the United States, primarily on the Gulf Coast.\70\
    Today, almost all hydrogen is consumed by the oil industry or
    chemical industry; however, hydrogen pipeline expansion may
    occur to coincide with emerging hydrogen hubs that offer
    hydrogen to end users for purposes such as mobility, goods
    movement, heat for manufacturing processes, and other
    services.\71\ Some United States pipeline operators have
    initiated projects to blend hydrogen and methane in natural gas
    pipelines.\72\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \70\ Paul W. Parfomak, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R46700, Pipeline
    Transportation of Hydrogen: Regulation, Research, and Policy (2021),
    available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R46700.
        \71\ Martin C. Offutt, Cong. Rsch. Serv., R47289, Hydrogen Hubs and
    Demonstrating the Hydrogen Energy Value Chain, (2022), available at
    https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R47289.
        \72\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                  V. WITNESSES

         LTristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
         LAndrew Black, President and CEO, Liquid Energy
    Pipeline Association (LEPA)
         LKenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer--Gas
    Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc.
         LBill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety
    Trust

    PIPELINE SAFETY: REVIEWING IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PIPES ACT OF 2020 AND
                         EXAMINING FUTURE SAFETY NEEDS

                                  ----------

                            WEDNESDAY, MARCH 8, 2023

                      House of Representatives,
    Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous
                                             Materials,
                Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m. in
    room 2167 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Troy E. Nehls
    (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Nehls. The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and
    Hazardous Materials will come to order.
        I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to
    declare a recess at any time during today's hearing.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        I also ask unanimous consent that Members not on the
    subcommittee be permitted to sit with the subcommittee at
    today's hearing and ask questions.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        I now recognize myself for an opening statement for 5
    minutes.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TROY E. NEHLS OF TEXAS, CHAIRMAN,
     SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

        Mr. Nehls. Today's hearing will examine implementation of
    the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing
    Safety Act of 2020, or PIPES 2020 Act, as well as future needs
    and pipeline safety.
        The United States has the largest pipeline network in the
    world, consisting of about 3.4 million miles of pipeline. The
    oil and natural gas industry generates about 11.3 million
    American jobs and accounts for nearly 8 percent of the United
    States gross domestic product, which is an economic impact of
    about $1.7 trillion--with a T--per year. The United States is
    now a leading exporter of energy to the rest of the world, and
    investments made by the energy sector will continue to provide
    high-paying jobs for a diversifying workforce and promote
    domestic energy security.
        Pipelines are critical infrastructure for supporting our
    energy sector and represent the safest, most efficient, most
    environmentally friendly mode of transporting energy. Pipelines
    are an essential part of the energy supply chain and ensure
    communities across the country and our allies abroad have
    access to affordable and reliable American energy. The recent
    supply chain crisis and rising inflation, coupled with the war
    in Ukraine, demonstrate the importance of having reliable, easy
    access to energy and the negative consequences of restricting
    or cutting off our energy supply.
        The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration,
    or PHMSA, is the Federal agency responsible for overseeing the
    safe and reliable operation of the United States pipeline
    network. Promoting pipeline safety has been a priority for
    Congress, which enacted several bipartisan laws in recent years
    to reauthorize crucial pipeline safety programs at PHMSA and
    direct the agency to initiate actions that advance pipeline
    safety.
        The 2020 pipeline safety reauthorization made advances in
    safety through some commonsense policy and a balanced, not
    overly burdensome, regulatory approach. And it is essential
    that Congress ensure PHMSA is prioritizing and implementing
    prior congressional mandates and does not impermissibly favor
    administration priorities over these mandates. PHMSA must
    prioritize hiring competent pipeline safety inspectors, not
    more lawyers, and must keep its focus on protecting people and
    the environment by advancing the safety and reliability of
    pipelines.
        Today, we will hear from PHMSA on progress made towards
    implementing the PIPES 2020 Act and how it is working to meet
    the requirements set by Congress. Pipeline safety is a
    collaborative effort between PHMSA, State governments,
    industry, and the public. We must continue to promote
    cooperation between stakeholders and regulators to find a
    balanced approach that fosters innovation in technology and
    implementation of best safety practices.
        I am looking forward to hearing from industry and public
    safety representatives today about some of these practices and
    new technologies that can help us improve safety. This includes
    how we can support the development of infrastructure to
    transport new and emerging fuels such as carbon dioxide and
    hydrogen and how innovative technology and operations are being
    used to improve inspections, leak detection, leak prevention,
    and the overall safety of pipeline networks.
        As Congress looks to the next pipeline safety
    reauthorization, we must embrace ways in which the industry and
    regulators can work together to achieve our goal of zero
    pipeline incidents. I hope to renew the tradition of passing a
    bipartisan pipeline safety bill from this committee, and I look
    forward to working with the ranking member, my colleagues on
    both sides of the aisle, and the Senate to accomplish this
    important goal.
        [Mr. Nehls' prepared statement follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Hon. Troy E. Nehls, a Representative in Congress
       from the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Railroads,
                       Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
        The United States has the largest pipeline network in the world,
    consisting of about 3.4 million miles of pipeline. The oil and natural
    gas industry generates about 11.3 million American jobs and accounts
    for nearly 8 percent of the United States' gross domestic product,
    which is an economic impact of about $1.7 trillion per year. The United
    States is now a leading exporter of energy to the rest of the world.
    Investments by the energy sector will continue to provide high paying
    jobs for a diversifying workforce and promote domestic energy security.
        Pipelines are critical infrastructure for supporting our energy
    sector and represent the safest, most efficient, most environmentally
    friendly mode of transporting energy. Pipelines are an essential part
    of the energy supply chain and ensure communities across the country,
    and our allies abroad, have access to affordable and reliable American
    energy. The recent supply chain crisis and rising inflation, coupled
    with the war in Ukraine, demonstrate the importance of having reliable,
    easy access to energy and the negative consequences of restricting or
    cutting off our energy supply.
        The Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
    is the Federal agency responsible for overseeing the safe and reliable
    operation of the United States pipeline network. Promoting pipeline
    safety has been a priority for Congress, which enacted several
    bipartisan laws in recent years to reauthorize crucial pipeline safety
    programs at PHMSA and direct the agency to initiate actions that
    advance pipeline safety.
        The 2020 pipeline safety reauthorization made advances in safety
    through some commonsense policy and a balanced, not overly burdensome,
    regulatory approach. It is essential that Congress ensure PHMSA is
    prioritizing and implementing prior congressional mandates and does not
    impermissibly favor Administration priorities over these mandates.
    PHMSA must prioritize hiring competent pipeline safety inspectors, not
    more lawyers, and must keep its focus on protecting people and the
    environment by advancing the safety and reliability of pipelines.
        Today, we will hear from PHMSA on progress made towards
    implementing the PIPES 2020 Act and how it is working to meet the
    requirements set by Congress. Pipeline safety is a collaborative effort
    between PHMSA, state governments, industry, and the public. We must
    continue to promote cooperation between stakeholders and regulators to
    find a balanced approach that fosters innovation in technology and
    implementation of best safety practices.
        I am looking forward to hearing from industry and public safety
    representatives today about some of these practices and new
    technologies that can help us improve safety. This includes how we can
    support the development of infrastructure to transport new and emerging
    fuels such as carbon dioxide and hydrogen, and how innovative
    technology and operations are being used to improve inspections, leak
    detection, leak prevention, and the overall safety of pipeline
    networks.
        As Congress looks to the next pipeline safety reauthorization, we
    must embrace ways in which industry and regulators can work together to
    achieve our goal of zero pipeline incidents. I hope to renew the
    tradition of passing a bipartisan pipeline safety bill from this
    Committee, and I look forward to working with the Ranking Member, my
    colleagues on both sides of the aisle, and the Senate to accomplish
    this important goal.

        Mr. Nehls. I have a few documents to enter into the record.
    I ask unanimous consent to enter into the record the following
    items: a March 8, 2023, letter from the American Public Gas
    Association; a March 8, 2023, statement from the American
    Petroleum Institute; and a March 8, 2023, press release from
    the Distribution Contractors Association and the United
    Association of Union Plumbers and Pipefitters.
        And without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]

      Letter of March 8, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and Hon.
       Donald M. Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads,
        Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials, from Stuart Saulters, Vice
      President of Government Relations, American Public Gas Association,
                 Submitted for the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
                                                         March 8, 2023.
    The Honorable Troy Nehls,
    Chairman,
    Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2164 Rayburn
            House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
    The Honorable Donald M. Payne, Jr.,
    Ranking Member,
    Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2165 Rayburn
            House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.

    Re:  Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
    (Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure) Hearing: Pipeline
    Safety: Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining
    Future Safety Needs.

        The American Public Gas Association (``APGA'') is the trade
    association representing more than 730 communities across the U.S. that
    own and operate their retail natural gas distribution entities. These
    include not-for-profit gas distribution systems owned by municipalities
    and other local government entities, all accountable to the citizens
    they serve. As such, APGA's members are critical stakeholders impacted
    by reauthorization of pipeline safety programs at the Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (``PHMSA'') within the United
    States Department of Transportation (``DOT''). With reauthorization
    needed in the 118th Congress, we appreciate your holding a hearing on
    the implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and examining future safety
    needs.
        Public gas utilities focus on safe operations, and effective
    pipeline safety programs implemented by our federal regulator supports
    our member's ability to deliver energy to Americans. Following are
    APGA's legislative priorities for consideration during reauthorization
    discussions.
       1. Consider extending the Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure
                  Safety and Modernization (``NGDISM'') Grants
        The grant program is set to expire after five years, Fiscal Year
    (``FY'') 2026. However, grant award winners can still access awarded
    money for ten years. This allows reimbursements even after PHMSA stops
    awarding new funding.
        APGA's members have demonstrated tremendous demand for the program.
    More money was requested in the first funding cycle, about $1.25
    billion, than is available for the program in its entirety, $1 billion
    over 5 years.
        PHMSA needed more time than originally anticipated to stand up the
    program, and as of March 3rd, PHMSA still has not announced the
    utilities provisionally selected for FY 2022. As well, the grant
    agreements won't be fully executed until the National Environmental
    Policy Act (``NEPA'') Tier 2 Environmental Review process is completed
    later in 2023.
        PHMSA and Congress seemed to want to target smaller systems with
    fewer resources through the NGDISM grant program. But many of them were
    not able to participate in the first funding cycle because they lack
    the staff and time to devote to grant writing. As well, APGA
    understands these smaller utilities are interested in learning from
    successful first round grant recipients to use their resources more
    efficiently in future funding cycles. The second funding cycle may open
    before awards are made for the first, which may discourage the smallest
    systems from applying until year three. Of note, only 179 of the 999
    systems eligible applied in 2022.
       2. Consider Language Strengthening the Advisory Committee Process
        In recent years, PHMSA has occasionally disregarded the
    recommendations it receives from its Advisory Committees. While it is
    rare, the impacts are significant. As legislation to reauthorize
    pipeline safety programs is drafted, APGA would be very interested in
    engaging with the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure on
    establishing a more formal requirement for how often the Advisory
    Committees should be meeting and how PHMSA should treat recommendations
    from these groups.
             3. Maintain PHMSA's Cost-Benefit Analysis Requirement
        PHMSA must meet a unique cost-benefit analysis requirement before
    promulgating a new rule. The pipeline safety regulator must ensure its
    justification for any rulemaking is appropriate prior to sending it to
    the Office of Management and Budget (``OMB'') for review. APGA believes
    this step results in effective, transparent, and comprehensive
    regulations and should be maintained.
             4. Adequate Funding for PHMSA and their State Partners
        APGA believes that a strong pipeline safety regulator ultimately
    leads to effective regulations and enhanced pipeline safety. APGA
    supports PHMSA's full funding and encourages allocation of resources to
    their state pipeline safety partners. These state partners are
    responsible for ensuring natural gas distribution operators comply with
    federal and state, if applicable, pipeline safety regulations.

        APGA hopes the above input will be helpful to the Committee. Please
    do not hesitate to contact me with any additional questions.
            Respectfully submitted,
                                               Stuart Saulters,
           Vice President of Government Relations, American Public Gas
                                                           Association.

    Statement of the American Petroleum Institute, Submitted for the Record
                             by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
        On behalf of the American Petroleum Institute (API) \1\, we
    appreciate the opportunity to submit testimony as part of this
    important hearing addressing pipeline safety, and the reauthorization
    of the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
    and the pipeline safety program in 2023.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ API represents all segments of America's oil and natural gas
    industry, which supports more than 11 million U.S. jobs and is backed
    by a growing grassroots movement of millions of Americans. Our nearly
    600 members produce, process, and distribute the majority of the
    nation's energy, and participate in the API Energy Excellence program,
    which is accelerating environmental and safety progress by fostering
    new technologies and transparent reporting. API was formed in 1919 as a
    standards-setting organization and has developed more than 700
    standards to enhance operational and environmental safety, efficiency,
    and sustainability. Through the API Climate Action Framework and
    related initiatives such as The Environmental Partnership, significant
    efforts are being conducted by the oil and natural gas industry to
    balance the increasing demand for affordable and reliable energy
    products with environmental performance and stewardship.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The need for sound energy policy has never been more critical. A
    modern U.S. infrastructure system, including robust pipeline
    infrastructure, is crucial to providing a reliable energy supply to
    every community in America. Every day, a vast network of pipeline
    infrastructure serves Americans across the country, with more than
    530,000 miles of transmission pipelines--the majority underground--
    safely delivering crude oil, petroleum products, natural gas, natural
    gas liquids, low carbon energy products and ethanol to consumers. With
    abundant energy resources, America continues to chart a reliable path
    that directly addresses today's domestic and global energy challenges
    by strengthening our country's energy security while helping allies
    around the world.
        These US energy resources have spurred community growth and
    security, and we have developed them while protecting the environment.
    The pipeline industry is developing new technologies and innovations
    every day to safely deliver affordable, reliable energy to consumers
    while reducing greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. As our industry
    continues to advance a lower carbon future, it is imperative that the
    regulatory environment and PHMSA are responsive to both current and
    potential future safety challenges faced by operators.
        As Congress considers the reauthorization of PHMSA and safety
    programs over the coming year, we urge policymakers to enact policies
    that capitalize on the power of American oil, natural gas, and
    liquified natural gas (LNG) operators by maximizing our investment in
    state-of-the-art technology and sustainable operations while
    recognizing the important role our communities play in advancing
    safety.
                                Energy Security
        American energy leadership is vital, perhaps more than ever, for
    American prosperity and security in uncertain times, and for the world.
    A global energy crisis--driven by surging post-pandemic demand
    outstripping supply and exacerbated by Russia's invasion of Ukraine--
    has shown that the world needs more natural gas and oil, not less.
    America can and should lead the world out of this crisis. The U.S. is
    the world's leading producer of natural gas and oil and, with the right
    regulations and policies, must champion a reliable path forward that
    directly addresses today's energy challenges.
        Europe's energy struggles show what can happen when countries lean
    too much, too soon on still-developing energy sources and energy from
    unstable regions while turning away from reliable natural gas and oil
    resources. Natural gas and oil are projected to provide nearly 50% of
    the world's energy in 2050 \2\. Abundant American natural gas and oil
    should be prioritized as a long-term strategic asset and a foundation
    for economic growth and strengthened energy security, today and
    tomorrow. Our energy resources also will provide opportunity, for
    decades to come, for other energy sources to mature and take on more
    significant roles.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ https://www.eia.gov/outlooks/ieo/consumption/sub-topic-01.php
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Although oil and natural gas companies increased production this
    year to meet rising energy demand \3\, more is required as populations
    and energy needs grow. America lacks sufficient infrastructure for the
    future--including new natural gas and oil pipelines as well as
    investment in maintaining existing infrastructure--to move energy from
    production areas to refineries and processing facilities and then to
    places where it is needed by American families and businesses. Our
    energy infrastructure is a critical component of the oil and natural
    gas supply chain, consisting of terminals, underground and above ground
    storage facilities, pipelines, railcars, trucks, ships, and marine
    vessels. Ensuring we have a robust energy infrastructure system that
    keeps pace with growing production and demand is essential to helping
    provide American families and businesses with reliable access to
    affordable energy. Additionally, export infrastructure is needed so
    that America can aid allies abroad and project leadership in global
    markets, while also supporting domestic production and economic
    benefits.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ https://www.api.org/-/media/Files/misc/Rystad-Energy-APIs-10-
    in-2022-Policy-Plan-Quantification-of-Policy-Impacts
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We need not return to growing dependence on foreign suppliers.
    Quite the opposite: American energy must lead in this space, through
    more domestic production and modernized infrastructure. If America
    doesn't lead, others will. We have the resources, yet sound energy
    infrastructure policymaking is critical to ensure America and other
    nations alike can have access to reliable US energy sources.
                         Commitment to Pipeline Safety
        Industry's commitment to safe operations is evident by the strong
    safety record of the pipeline system that delivers oil, natural gas,
    and petroleum products. Protecting the public and the environment is
    the top priority for pipeline operators and a central component to
    pipeline design, construction, and maintenance. Ultimately, the
    development of a comprehensive pipeline safety system is the product of
    a shared commitment from key entities in the stakeholder community. The
    first element involves the federal and state governments, which provide
    the safety regulations for the industry. Next is the contribution of
    the industry trade associations that, with the help of other
    stakeholders including the public, help to develop industry standards,
    guidance, recommendations, and leading practices. The third key entity
    is individual companies who make the commitment to develop and
    implement effective safety programs. While each of these functions are
    critically important to advancing safety in the pipeline industry, the
    true effectiveness of the pipeline safety program exists because these
    functions complement one another through the coordination and
    collaboration of all three of these entities.
        API, our allied oil and natural gas trades, and our members are
    fully committed to maintaining the highest standards and establishing a
    strong foundation with the public by continually endeavoring for
    improvement through enhanced safety operations. And while greater than
    99 percent of oil, natural gas and their products reach their
    destination without incident, pipeline companies are striving to
    continuously improve performance and address the remaining fraction of
    a percent to reach our shared industry-wide goal of zero incidents. The
    industry's ability to continually advance the safety of oil and natural
    gas pipeline operations is based on three critical elements: (1)
    people, (2) technology, and (3) safety culture. Each of these is
    intertwined with the others to create a comprehensive and cohesive
    safety program. Education and training are constantly provided to
    industry employees to ensure they can operate using the latest and most
    advanced technologies. Similarly, employees are committed to developing
    a culture of safety that is continually assessed and improved. This
    three-pronged approach is designed first and foremost to prevent an
    incident from ever happening, but also ensures that the industry is
    prepared for any incident and can effectively respond in the rare
    instance that an incident occurs.
                          Effective Regulatory Process
        API and its members appreciate the emphasis PHMSA has placed on
    addressing congressional mandates from prior pipeline safety
    reauthorizations. However, we ask PHMSA to continue to advance
    important industry rulemakings mandated by Congress in the PIPES Act of
    2020, specifically leak detection and repair, LNG facility safety,
    class location changes, and pipeline operating status for ``idle''
    pipe. In doing so we ask PHMSA to maintain sight of the importance of a
    holistic, performance-based regulatory approach that maximizes the
    industry's ability to use the latest advances in new technologies and
    leading engineering practices to manage pipeline safety risk.
    Furthermore, as part of that process, we support the collaborative
    approach to reviewing regulations carried out by PHMSA's Technical
    Advisory Committees (Advisory Committee). The Advisory Committee
    process is a transparent and balanced forum that has demonstrated the
    ability to build consensus around complex regulatory issues. To that
    end, we have concern with the limited number of Advisory Committee
    meetings held over the last several years and the number of Advisory
    Committee recommendations that have not been incorporated into final
    regulations despite consensus within the groups. As such, we encourage
    Congress to consider the inclusion of some accountability measures
    within reauthorization, including a set number of meetings required
    each year and reporting by the Secretary on those Advisory Committee
    recommendations that are not being considered by PHMSA in rulemaking.
        Additionally, performing a reasoned cost-benefit analysis before
    making significant regulatory changes must continue to be a part of the
    regulatory process. PHMSA's cost-benefit analyses provide valuable
    input to the public comment and advisory committee review processes.
    Since there are usually multiple practical alternatives to achieve any
    particular pipeline safety objective, the cost-benefit analysis helps
    PHMSA, and industry and public stakeholders, compare and contrast the
    alternatives and identify the best option.
        A statutory requirement to consider costs and benefits in health,
    safety, and environmental regulations is not unique to PHMSA. Congress
    has similarly required the Occupational Safety and Health
    Administration (OSHA), the Mine Safety and Health Administration
    (MSHA), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to analyze costs
    and benefits during rulemaking. An excellent example of the important
    role cost-benefit plays in the regulatory process is PHMSA's
    consideration of class location changes for natural gas transmission
    pipelines through rulemaking. With today's processes and technologies,
    pipeline safety can be managed effectively and at an equivalent level
    of safety through data-driven inspection and maintenance, instead of
    costly, unnecessary, and arbitrary pipe replacements required by the
    current class location change regulations.
                      Well Trained and Efficient Regulator
        As PHMSA and the energy industry together continue to drive toward
    our shared goal of zero pipeline incidents, a modernized regulator with
    the necessary tools, well-trained staff, streamlined programs and data
    transparency can bring needed certainty and consistency into the
    regulatory and oversight process. The oil and natural gas industry
    believes that PHMSA pipeline inspectors must be well trained and
    qualified to effectively fulfill the obligations placed upon them and
    the agency. However, pipeline inspectors frequently come into PHMSA
    with limited pipeline safety experience, and those that already have or
    gain experience often depart the agency to pursue more lucrative
    opportunities. As such, similar to other agency hiring authority for
    specialty positions, the ability to compensate pipeline inspectors at
    market rates through PHMSA's use of Schedule A employees with
    streamlined hiring and flexible pay levels would enhance PHMSA's
    ability to attract and retain expert pipeline inspectors.
        Lastly, multiple repetitive and redundant inspections of operator
    procedures and programs are conducted by PHMSA regional offices, state
    pipeline regulatory agencies, and local authorities (e.g., state
    utility boards, public utility commissions) that evaluate a consistent
    set of company procedures regardless of jurisdiction. As an industry,
    we have concerns with how this multitude of agencies collaborates and
    communicates and the impact it can have on pipeline operators who are
    focusing resources on improving safety programs. As such, Congress
    should consider an independent review and evaluation of PHMSA and State
    inspection programs' interaction to identify opportunities for improved
    collaboration and to reduce redundant inspection activities.
                    The Importance of API Pipeline Standards
        Safety is a core value of the oil and natural gas industry.
    Pipeline operating companies are committed to enhancing the safety of
    our workers and protecting the communities and environments where we
    are present. At API, we establish and disseminate standards and best
    practices across the industry to ensure the highest level of safety and
    achieve our collective goal of operating with zero incidents. Since
    1924, API has been the leader in developing voluntary, consensus-based,
    and internationally recognized industry standards that promote safety
    and reliability. Our standards program is accredited by the American
    National Standards Institute (ANSI), the same organization that
    accredits similar programs at several national laboratories. In
    creating these industry consensus standards and recommended practices
    (RPs), API partners with technical experts from government, academia,
    and industry. This work supports the fulfillment of the National
    Technology Transfer and Advancement Act (NTTAA), which mandates that
    federal agencies use technical standards developed and adopted by
    voluntary consensus standards bodies, as opposed to using government-
    unique standards. Currently, API has more than 800 standards that are
    used globally by oil and natural gas operators, as well as referenced
    by the international regulatory community. They are key to the global
    energy sector, streamlining regulation across borders, improving
    safety, and minimizing economic inefficiencies. Here in the US, these
    standards are referenced more than 650 times in federal regulations,
    covering multiple government agencies, including PHMSA. Additionally,
    API's standards are the most widely cited petroleum industry standards
    by state regulators, with 240 API standards cited over 4,130 times in
    state-based regulations. Finally, API's standards are also the most
    widely cited standards by international regulators in the 14 major
    producing regions.\4\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ OGP Report No. 426, Regulators' Use of Standards, March 2010
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Despite the current lack of certainty in the regulatory process,
    the industry continues to proactively advance safety through the
    development of standards and best practices. API continues to develop
    and revise critical standards and recommended practices for prevention,
    mitigation, and response activities to address pipeline safety.
    Specifically, API has developed a number of standards in close
    coordination with subject matter experts from government, academia and
    industry. API RP 1173, Pipeline Safety Management Systems (Pipeline
    SMS), provides the framework for managing complex operations with
    safety as the top priority. It provides established guidelines for
    pipeline operating companies and contractors to manage risk, promote
    best practices, and build a strong safety culture throughout an
    organization. Safety culture must be organically strengthened from
    within an organization, which is why a voluntary regime is so important
    for the industry's implementation of SMS.
        Recognizing the role of stakeholder input and public engagement as
    critical elements in addressing pipeline safety challenges, industry
    has partnered with government representatives and public advocates to
    develop API RP 1185, Pipeline Public Engagement. The document follows
    the same ``Plan-Do-Check-Act'' cycle of continuous improvement as in
    API RP 1173 to regularly assess and improve public engagement in the
    communities where pipelines operate, including environmental justice
    populations. As U.S. production continues to grow and pipeline capacity
    increases to keep pace, operators are motivated to develop a management
    system that ensures new pipelines are built to the appropriate
    specifications, keeping safety as the top priority. API RP 1177, Steel
    Pipeline Construction Quality Management Systems, outlines the steps
    needed for constructing safe steel pipelines, from purchasing the
    correct material to completing the safety and integrity inspections
    prior to initiating operation. Additionally, API continues to develop
    new standards and revise and update current standards that are focused
    on maintaining the integrity of pipeline infrastructure and ensuring
    continued safe operation of pipeline systems. Examples include RP 1176
    (Assessment and Management of Cracking in Pipelines), RP 1181 (Pipeline
    Operating Status), RP 1183 (Assessment and Management of Dents in
    Pipelines), and an RP under development for geohazard integrity
    management (RP 1187).
        While pipeline operators are taking significant steps to meet the
    goal of zero incidents, they must have a comprehensive mitigation
    strategy to reduce the impact should a release occur. Developed with
    industry, regulator, and broader stakeholder input, API RP 1175,
    Pipeline Leak Detection--Program Management, outlines how to use
    multiple leak detection tools--such as aerial overflights, ground
    patrols, and computational pipeline monitoring--to create a robust and
    holistic program to identify a leak as soon as it occurs. In addition,
    the RP encourages senior leaders within pipeline operating companies to
    instill a leak detection culture that promotes safety and ensures
    employees are properly trained to aid in mitigating incidents. Pipeline
    companies have robust operator qualification (OQ) programs that ensure
    their personnel and contractor personnel are competent to perform
    pipeline operations and maintenance duties, and continuous training and
    testing to verify the skills of qualified employees is an ongoing and
    critical effort of operators. API has also developed RP 1161, Pipeline
    Operator Qualification, to give operators direction on ensuring those
    individuals performing important tasks that relate to pipeline
    operations and safety are appropriately trained and competent.
        Should an incident occur, pipeline operators are ready to respond.
    Through coordinated emergency response programs with federal, state and
    local first responders and agencies, operators ensure timely, seamless,
    and effective responses. API RP 1174, Onshore Hazardous Liquid Pipeline
    Emergency Preparedness and Response, which was developed with input
    from operators, regulators, and first responders, seeks to improve
    emergency response capabilities by providing a management system and
    framework for operators to ensure they are prepared to respond to any
    event and coordinate response actions with both our government and
    first responder partners in an efficient manner. RPs 1161 and 1174 are
    just a few of the available documents developed in collaboration with
    federal and state regulators, academics and other interested
    stakeholders, which through effective implementation and training will
    help improve safety across the industry.
                   Pipeline Safety Reauthorization Priorities
        As stated earlier, to improve upon our strong safety record and
    reach our goal of zero pipeline incidents, it is imperative that the
    regulatory environment and PHMSA be positioned to meet current and
    future safety challenges. As such, there are three priority areas where
    PHMSA reauthorization can support the shared objective of industry and
    the regulating agency in advancing pipeline safety.
    1. Recognizing Role of Technology, Innovation, and Leading Practices in
            Reaching Zero
        As an industry dependent on technology and leading engineering
    practices, pipeline operators want flexibility to implement and utilize
    the latest tools, methodologies and industry standards to appropriately
    manage safety risks on their facilities. However, companies are, in
    many instances, unable to utilize the latest technology and leading
    engineering practices because of the requirements associated with
    outdated regulations coupled with the burdensome approval process in
    the use of alternative safety technology. To facilitate the
    demonstration of an operator's effective use of state-of-the-art
    technology and risk-based approaches, the PIPES Act of 2020 included a
    provision that established a technology pilot program. Although a step
    in the right direction, the onerous nature of the program application
    requirements imposed by PHMSA proved to be an impediment to operators
    pursuing opportunities for testing new technology, and counter to the
    intent of the Congressional mandate. However, we believe the program
    still has merit and should be reauthorized in 2023 but more importantly
    modified to include more streamlined parameters that encourage, rather
    than discourage, an operator to participate.
        For decades, a strong culture of sharing and learning has been at
    the center of our industry's efforts to advance pipeline safety. This
    includes individual company and peer to peer shares as well as annual
    industry wide events to openly share information and lessons learned
    across a broad range of topic areas, including pipeline system
    incidents, near misses, industry best practices, and improvements made
    to pipeline safety programs through practical experiences. This
    commitment and willingness to proactively share information on the part
    of our operators has been an effective tool to drive continuous
    improvement across the industry. That said, over time, the industry has
    evolved to recognize that there are even greater opportunities to learn
    from one another. As such, we continue to support the establishment of
    a more formal voluntary information sharing framework with the right
    protections, similar in nature and function to the successful Federal
    Aviation Administration and airline industry's voluntary information
    sharing framework. This multi-stakeholder center of excellence for the
    energy pipeline sector based on the proposed framework from the PHMSA
    Voluntary Information Sharing (VIS) effort from the PIPES Act of 2016,
    is a starting point. Congress should consider including language that
    encourages the use of academic institutions to house or play a role in
    the new Center location, in particular, institutions that have strong
    energy programs.
        The PHMSA National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) represents the
    system of record upon which pipeline operators determine whether a
    pipeline segment directly intersects or ``could affect'' a High
    Consequence Area (HCA) and, as a result, which segments of a pipeline
    system require an Integrity Management Program (IMP). Recent experience
    of pipeline operators in updating HCA analysis for their systems has
    shown errors in the NPMS data layers for certain HCA categories, and
    questions have been raised about the sources of scientific studies and
    frequency of updating the information used to develop the data layers.
    Transparency and improvements in the process followed by PHMSA need to
    be provided, and industry review and participation in the process
    should be considered.
        Lastly, there are more than 650 API standards referenced in Federal
    regulation. As these standards are improved through the American
    National Standards Institute (ANSI)-accredited process at a minimum of
    every 5 years, Federal regulations where standards were deemed
    appropriate for incorporation by reference, often are unable to be
    updated in a timely manner. As such, they do not keep pace with
    advances in pipeline safety technology and modern engineering practices
    incorporated into leading industry standards. Currently, approximately
    50 percent of the instances where PHMSA cites API standards are not
    referencing the most recent version of those standards. For those API
    standards incorporated by reference that are updated, PHMSA should
    execute a more frequent review that can use the existing rulemaking
    process to incorporate the latest edition. We ask that Congress
    consider a requirement for PHMSA to ensure regulations are updated to
    reflect the latest edition of incorporated by reference standards
    within two years of completion.
    2. Proactively Advancing a Safe and Sustainable Energy Future
        Pipeline operators continue to address the challenge of climate
    change while providing affordable, safe and reliable energy. The oil
    and natural gas industry is also committed to building tools and
    implementing practices to enhance sustainability throughout its
    operations, and advancing a lower carbon future while reliably
    delivering energy products to meet increasing demand in the US, and
    low-carbon solutions are critical to achieving this goal. As the
    industry continues to invest in energy innovations like hydrogen
    (H2) and renewable natural gas (RNG) that will fuel the low-
    carbon future, a robust carbon dioxide (CO2) infrastructure
    system, including pipelines, is vital to meeting environmental
    commitments to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions.
        As we embrace a low carbon energy future, it is imperative that
    pipeline safety regulations reflect current safety risks, consider
    existing industry standards pertaining to CO2 and hydrogen
    pipeline construction and operation, and incorporate the latest
    findings from PHMSA-sponsored and industry funded research and
    development for new pipeline systems and repurposing of existing energy
    pipeline infrastructure. Regulatory updates should consider an
    assessment of the adequacy of Parts of 49 CFR that specifically address
    CO2 pipeline safety for all phases of CO2 in
    pipeline transportation (i.e., supercritical, liquid, gas). As industry
    continues to develop new standards and Recommended Practices for
    CO2 pipeline safety, it will also be important for PHMSA to
    consider and ensure timely incorporation by reference into regulations.
    As a standard setting organization, API strongly supports the
    development of updates to CO2 pipeline safety regulations to
    address transporting CO2 in a gas phase based on existing
    standards developed through API, the American Society of Mechanical
    Engineers (ASME), the Association for Materials Protection and
    Performance (AMPP), and the International Standards Organization (ISO).
    The update to these regulations will require close coordination with
    Department of Energy (DOE), PHMSA, and Pipeline Research Council
    International (PRCI) to ensure incorporation of research and technology
    development programs that address design, construction, operations, and
    inspection and maintenance, and to defer development of new regulations
    until the research is completed and results from that work are
    available.
        Also, in carrying out its responsibility to provide safe, reliable,
    and affordable energy, our industry is committed to sustainable
    operations and risk-based inspection programs that focus on reducing
    harmful emissions. Specifically, as it relates to the inspection of
    above ground storage tanks, operators look to the latest technologies
    and leading engineering practices based on industry standards to
    identify risks without taking tanks out of service. As a result, by
    decreasing the frequency of visual inspections, operators are able to
    reduce unnecessary releases of VOCs associated with preparing tanks for
    inspection. However, as previously discussed, approximately 50 percent
    of the API standards that are cited by PHMSA in federal pipeline safety
    regulations are not referencing the most recent edition of those
    standards which includes API Standard 653, Standards for Tank
    Inspection, Repair, Alteration and Reconstruction and as such do not
    reflect current leading industry approaches for tank inspections. This
    includes risk-based approaches similar to what has been accepted by
    other federal and state agencies, including the EPA's Spill Prevention,
    Control and Countermeasure (SPCC) program. Thus, operators are required
    to take their aboveground storage tanks out of service at predetermined
    intervals with no added benefit to safety, which unnecessarily
    increases VOC emissions. PHMSA should acknowledge the value of
    technology and leading engineering practices, and we are asking
    Congress to require PHMSA through rulemaking to help reduce
    environmental impacts by allowing more proactive operator use of risk-
    based tank inspection protocols through the incorporation of the latest
    edition of API Standard 653 by reference.
        Lastly, pipeline safety can be managed effectively through data-
    driven inspection and maintenance, instead of the arbitrary pipe
    replacements required by the current class location change regulations.
    Class location regulations result in unnecessary replacement projects
    that can disrupt natural gas service and release up to 800 million
    standard cubic feet of natural gas every year, which is equivalent to
    the annual natural gas use of over 12,000 homes. Each year the class
    location changes regulations and diverts hundreds of millions of
    dollars towards replacing less than 75 miles of pipe. There are many
    more productive ways to expend these substantial resources. For
    example, for the same cost of replacing 75 miles of pipe, we could
    instead assess 25,000 miles of pipelines with in-line inspection tools
    that would reduce the risk of potential incidents that could impact
    people or the environment. As such, as mandated by Congress in the 2020
    PIPES Act, PHMSA needs to publish a final rule on class location
    changes.
    3. Embracing and Recognizing Communities as Partners in Safety
        As the industry expands oil and natural gas infrastructure, it is
    incumbent on pipeline operators to establish local relationships,
    address performance issues and engage community stakeholders. The
    industry's commitment to being a good neighbor throughout the lifecycle
    of a pipeline requires ongoing dialogue with local communities and
    other key stakeholders. API continues to spearhead efforts on public
    and community engagement initiatives to reinforce industry's social
    license to operate. The center of API's stakeholder and public
    engagement strategic goal continues to be the development of
    Recommended Practice (RP) 1185, Pipeline Public Engagement, which
    addresses critical topics such as environmental justice, engagement
    with landowners and tenants, and other issues concerning effective
    community engagement throughout the entire lifecycle of a pipeline.
        Additionally, API recently published the third edition of RP 1162,
    Public Awareness Programs for Pipeline Operators and is in the process
    of developing an implementation guidance website. The 3rd edition
    includes significant updates that reflect more forward leaning industry
    approaches to engaging with and raising public and stakeholder
    awareness of pipeline operations and important safety programs along
    pipeline right of ways that protect the public and environment.
    Specifically, this provision expands the current requirements of
    pipeline operator public awareness programs, incorporating the latest
    mechanism for sharing information, expanding risk communications, and
    establishing processes for evaluating the effectiveness of programs.
    API strongly encourages PHMSA to initiate a rulemaking to consider the
    inclusion of the latest edition of RP 1162 (3rd edition).
        Lastly, API remains committed to building tools and platforms to
    help the industry enhance and expand a culture of safety and
    sustainability across all operations. As such, API published
    conservation guidelines for right of way (ROW) ecological and habitat
    management and is working with member companies in partnership with
    NGOs, such as Pheasants Forever, in implementing conservation projects
    throughout the United States. Built upon adaptive management
    principles, the API Conservation Program takes an integrated and
    systematic approach in sustaining ROW land management that is value-
    driven and enhances safety, community benefits, operational
    efficiencies, and a healthier ecosystem while maintaining state and
    federal regulatory compliance and considering associated risk and cost.
    As pipeline operators continue to advance conservation programs, it is
    important that the regulations recognize these alternative approaches
    and allow pipeline operators to maintain right of ways using non-
    traditional methods including conservation, habitat management and
    other related programs while ensuring pipelines can be effectively
    monitored through required surveys. Conservation and habitat management
    programs may require alternatives to existing requirements for line
    markers and leak detection methodologies, etc. As such, API would like
    changes to statute and ultimately regulations that recognize the
    importance of approaching right of way maintenance in non-traditional
    ways, while still meeting regulatory requirements for safety.
                                   Conclusion
        Safety of the public and the environment is our industry's top
    priority, and collaboration with PHMSA only strengthens our ability to
    transport our products across America with the fewest possible number
    of incidents. We are committed to promoting safety in all our
    operations, helping to ensure that American families and businesses can
    efficiently access affordable and reliable energy. Thank you for the
    opportunity to provide comments in advance of the hearing and
    deliberations on pipeline safety reauthorization.

       Press Release of March 8, 2023, from the Distribution Contractors
         Association and the United Association of Union Plumbers and
          Pipefitters, Submitted for the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
                                             Contact:
                                                Eben M. Wyman
                                              (703) 740-6126
                                               eben@wymanassociates.net
    For Immediate Release

    March 8, 2023
        Construction Entities Call for Punishment for Pipeline Attacks,
                  Improved Mapping in Pipeline Safety Hearing
        Richardson, TX--The Distribution Contractors Association (DCA) and
    the United Association of Union Plumbers and Pipefitters (UA) urge
    Congress to take action to address the enduring problem of physical
    attacks on critical energy infrastructure. In addition, Congress should
    include provisions to encourage the use of geographic information
    systems (GIS) mapping as part of these damage prevention programs. On
    Wednesday, the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee's
    Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials held a
    hearing on ``Pipeline Safety: Reviewing Implementation of the PIPES Act
    of 2020 and Examining Future Safety Needs.''
        The hearing was held to evaluate efforts to meet the mandates
    included in the Protecting Our Infrastructure of Pipelines and
    Enhancing Safety (PIPES) Act of 2020 at a time when the Committee
    intends to reauthorize the federal pipeline safety program this year.
    These organizations are advocating on a range of issues pending in this
    year's pipeline safety discussion, including suggested actions to curb
    physical attacks on energy infrastructure and to encourage the use of
    GIS mapping.
    Protection of Critical Infrastructure from Physical Attacks
        ``While criminal attacks on pipeline infrastructure is not headline
    news anymore, sabotage on natural gas pipelines is an enduring problem
    and needs to be addressed,'' said Rob Darden, Executive Vice President
    of DCA. ``While DCA supports the right for peaceful activism, including
    peaceful protests, we strongly support legislative language that would
    hold those who engage in criminal activities during protests more
    accountable.''
        ``In addition, pipeline facilities under construction should be
    included within the scope of this provision. While interfering or
    tampering with the operation of a pipeline would clearly compromise
    pipeline safety, vandalism and destruction of nearby equipment used to
    build a pipeline can be just as dangerous,'' says Darden. ``For
    example, setting construction equipment on fire near a natural gas
    pipeline can be as dangerous as turning a valve.''
        ``United Association members are the best trained and most highly
    skilled craftspeople in the industry--and we work tirelessly to provide
    reliable and affordable energy to millions of Americans. Sadly,
    physical attacks on pipeline infrastructure itself and even our
    equipment and jobsites compromise our shared goals and put the safety
    of our members at risk,'' said Mark McManus, General President of the
    United Association. ``Strong bipartisan action to hold perpetrators
    accountable, and to curb future attacks, is essential to protecting our
    members on the jobsite and ensuring we can meet our shared energy
    goals.''
    GIS Mapping
        The PIPES Act of 2020 include provisions to require operators of
    gas distribution pipelines to ``identify and manage traceable,
    reliable, and complete records, including maps and other drawings,''
    and language that will ensure that this documentation is ``accessible
    to all personnel responsible for performing or overseeing relevant
    construction or engineering work.'' DCA and the UA believe increased
    use of GIS is the most effective method of mapping underground
    facilities, including natural gas pipelines.
        ``Accurate mapping of underground facilities is a fundamental part
    of accurate and timely locating,'' Darden said. ``Ensuring the use of
    GIS should be considered a priority as pipeline safety legislation is
    developed and considered.''
        GIS connects data to a map, integrating location data with a range
    of limiting information regarding the subsurface facilities in that
    area, and it allows for layering of data tied to geographic points.
    Rather than restricting the user to limited features on a static map,
    GIS mapping allows for viewing customizable combinations of data layers
    in a single dynamic tool.

                                     # # #

    The Distribution Contractors Association represents contractors,
    suppliers and manufacturers who provide distribution construction
    services including installation, replacement and rehabilitation of gas
    pipelines and fiber optic, cable and duct systems in communities across
    the country.

    Founded in 1889, the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices
    of the Plumbing and Pipe Fitting Industry of the United States and
    Canada, AFL-CIO, CLC (UA) proudly represents more than 362,000 highly
    skilled journeymen and apprentice plumbers, pipefitters, pipeliners,
    sprinkler fitters, welders, and HVACR service techs in the US and
    Canada. The UA is an affiliate of the AFL-CIO, North America's Building
    Trades Unions (NABTU), and the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC).

        Mr. Nehls. In closing, I want to thank our witnesses for
    coming today. I appreciate you being here.
        I will now yield back and recognize Ranking Member Payne
    for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD M. PAYNE, Jr., OF NEW JERSEY,
       RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON RAILROADS, PIPELINES, AND
                          HAZARDOUS MATERIALS

        Mr. Payne. Thank you, Chairman Nehls. It is an honor and a
    privilege to serve on this committee with you, and I am looking
    forward to your leadership and the bipartisan manner which you
    have already demonstrated. It is greatly appreciated.
        I would like to also thank Chairman Graves for his help,
    and also thank Ranking Member Larsen for being here, and all
    the witnesses that are with us today. Thank you.
        Before I get to the subject of today's hearing, I want to
    note that this is the first hearing of the Subcommittee on
    Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials this Congress,
    and the first following Norfolk Southern derailment in East
    Palestine, Ohio. This has been followed by additional Norfolk
    Southern derailments in southeast Michigan and Springfield,
    Ohio. Just this week, a Norfolk Southern employee lost his life
    in a collision in Cleveland.
        Chairman Nehls, thank you for visiting East Palestine
    immediately following the derailment. I look forward to working
    with you this Congress to tackle freight and rail safety.
        I am pleased that the Senate has put forth a bipartisan
    freight rail safety bill, and I am hopeful that we can do the
    same on this side.
        The safe operation of pipelines is vital to protect both
    our energy needs and the communities these pipelines run
    through.
        These are not just abstract concerns. Just last December, a
    pipeline operated by TC Energy ruptured in northeast Kansas,
    spilling over 14,000 barrels of crude oil. If you have a hard
    time visualizing 14,000 barrels, it's the same volume as 20
    rail tank cars.
        In Linden, New Jersey, in my district, a pipeline operated
    by Buckeye Partners ruptured and spilled 350 barrels adjacent
    to a fragile wetland in March 2021.
        We must learn lessons from these incidents as well as the
    Denbury incident in Satartia, Mississippi, the Beta Offshore
    incident in San Pedro Bay, California, and the Freeport LNG
    incident in Quintana Island.
        PHMSA reports that in 2022, 631 pipeline incidents
    occurred, from which 10 individuals died, 24 were injured, and
    property damages totaled more than $680 million. Of these
    incidents, 17 were serious and 267 were significant.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
    their commitment to safety, if PHMSA has the resources
    necessary to hold bad actors accountable, and how can we make
    sure that what goes into pipelines stays in the pipes.
        I am also interested to hear about PHMSA's progress on
    carbon dioxide pipeline rulemaking.
        The safe transmission of carbon dioxide to sequester
    locations is vital to meeting our carbon reduction goals, and I
    want to make sure this can be implemented without delay.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the time, and I yield back.
        [Mr. Payne's prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr., a Representative in
    Congress from the State of New Jersey, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee
                on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials
        Thank you, Chairman Nehls, Chairman Graves, Ranking Member Larsen,
    and all our witnesses for being with us today.
        Before I get to the subject of today's hearing, I want to note that
    this is the first hearing of the Railroad Subcommittee this Congress
    and the first following the Norfolk Southern derailment in East
    Palestine, Ohio.
        This has been followed by additional Norfolk Southern derailments
    in Southeast Michigan and Springfield, Ohio
        Just this week a Norfolk Southern employee lost his life in a
    collision in Cleveland.
        Chairman Nehls, thank you for visiting East Palestine immediately
    following the derailment.
        I look forward to working with you this Congress to tackle freight
    rail safety.
        I'm pleased that the Senate has put forth a bipartisan freight rail
    safety bill and I'm hopeful that we can do the same over here.
        The safe operation of pipelines is vital to protecting both our
    energy needs and the communities these pipelines run through.
        These are not just abstract concerns.
        Just last December, a pipeline operated by TC Energy ruptured in
    northeast Kansas, spilling over 14,000 barrels of crude oil.
        If you have a hard time visualizing 14,000 barrels, it's the same
    volume as 20 rail tank cars.
        In Linden, New Jersey, in my district, a pipeline operated by
    Buckeye Partners ruptured and spilled 350 barrels adjacent to a fragile
    wetland in March 2021.
        We must learn lessons from these incidents as well as the Denbury
    incident in Satartia, Mississippi, the Beta Offshore incident in San
    Pedro Bay, California, and the Freeport LNG incident in Quintana
    Island.
        PHMSA reports that in 2022, 631 pipeline incidents occurred, from
    which 10 individuals died, 24 were injured, and property damages
    totaled more than 680 million dollars.
        Of these incidents, 17 were serious and 267 were significant.
        I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about their
    commitment to safety, if PHMSA has the resources necessary to hold bad
    actors accountable, and how we can make sure that what goes into
    pipelines stays in the pipes.
        I'm also interested to hear about PHMSA's progress on carbon
    dioxide pipeline rulemaking.
        The safe transmission of carbon dioxide to sequester locations is
    vital to meeting our carbon reduction goals, and I want to make sure
    this can be implemented without delay.
        Thank you again Mr. Chairman, and I yield back my time.

        Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Payne. I appreciate that. I now
    recognize the ranking member of the full committee, Mr. Larsen,
    for 5 minutes for an opening statement.

     OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING
         MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. Thank you, Chair Nehls
    and Ranking Member Payne, for calling this hearing on pipeline
    safety.
        On June 10, 1999, a pipeline explosion in Bellingham,
    Washington, claimed the lives of two 10-year-old boys and a
    young man of 18 years. The explosion released 237,000 gallons
    of gasoline into Whatcom Creek that flowed through Whatcom
    Falls Park in Bellingham, Washington. The ensuing fireball
    caused millions of dollars of damage, shocked the community
    that day, and is still a seminal moment in the history of the
    town of Bellingham.
        It is that explosion that spurred my commitment, which has
    been steadfast over the last 20 years, to the highest level of
    pipeline safety. For my entire tenure in Congress, I have
    fought to reduce the risk of pipeline incidents, promote
    transparency of pipeline safety information for local
    communities, and increase accountability for pipeline
    operators.
        Mr. Chair, I ask unanimous consent to submit a letter for
    the record from a parent of one of the boys killed in the
    explosion in my district, Bellingham City Council Member Skip
    Williams. This letter outlines a number of recommendations to
    improve the safety and oversight of our pipeline system. So, I
    ask unanimous consent to enter that in the record.
        Mr. Nehls. Without objection, so ordered.
        [The information follows:]

    Letter of March 7, 2023, to Hon. Troy E. Nehls, Chairman, and Donald M.
     Payne, Jr., Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and
       Hazardous Materials, and Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick
    Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
     from Edwin H. ``Skip'' Williams, Bellingham City Council (Washington
              State), Submitted for the Record by Hon. Rick Larsen
                                                         March 7, 2023.
    The Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials of
        the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,

    Representative Troy Nehls, Subcommittee Chair,
    Representative Donald Payne, Subcommittee Ranking Member,
    Representative Sam Graves, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
        Chair,
    Representative Rick Larsen, Transportation and Infrastructure Committee
        Ranking Member,

    Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC.

    RE:  Reviewing implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining
    Future Pipeline Safety Needs

        Dear Subcommittee members,
        I am Edwin H ``Skip'' Williams, a 30-year resident of the city of
    Bellingham, Washington, currently serving as a member of the Bellingham
    City Council. Thank you for allowing me to address your subcommittee
    hearing voicing my support for the overall need of pipeline safety and,
    more specifically, the elements addressed in the implementation of the
    PIPES Act of 2020 and your examination of future pipeline needs.
        My family and I are victims of the Olympic Pipeline explosion that
    occurred in our city in 1999 where we lost one of our children. When
    the Olympic pipeline exploded there seemed to be very few regulations,
    industry practices, or oversight regarding pipeline safety. The
    elements that did exist did not seem to be enforced very consistently
    if at all. This event in our community highlighted the need for
    research, consistent industry safety standards regarding best
    practices, and oversight from all levels of government in order to
    enforce these safety standards.
        I strongly believe that there needs to be open communications
    between pipeline operators, local communities, and federal and state
    governmental agencies in order to avoid pipeline accidents such as the
    Olympic Pipeline explosion.
        As I read through the summary of the issues being considered by the
    committee for implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and the
    committee's examination of future safety needs, I see the following as
    priorities:
        1.  Providing greater resources at the state and local level to
    increase the number of pipeline inspectors.
        2.  Eliminating the backlog of rulemaking through greater
    congressional oversight and additional resources.
        3.  Minimizing leaks and releases into our environment by requiring
    updated inspection and maintenance plans of pipeline operators.
        4.  The study of methods to improve pipeline integrity in order to
    address risks posed by ageing cast iron pipes and low pressure systems.

        I feel strongly that these are all significant steps forward
    improving the oversight protections and maintaining the integrity of
    our pipeline system.
        I greatly appreciate the opportunity to share my perspective on
    pipeline safety with the subcommittee. If you would like to discuss
    these concerns with me further, please feel free to contact me.
            Sincerely,
                                    Edwin H. ``Skip'' Williams,
                                               Bellingham City Council.

    Per Washington state law RCW 42.56, my written communications are
    public records and are subject to public disclosure requirements.

        Mr. Larsen of Washington. I share many of Council Member
    Williams' views, and as ranking member, I will ensure that this
    committee's work to reauthorize the PIPES Act of 2020 puts
    safety at the forefront of every policy decision.
        Putting safety first means greater oversight and
    accountability of the activities of pipeline operators. It
    means greater transparency for local communities and the
    public. Reducing the risk of incidents means applying safety
    requirements, where appropriate, to existing pipeline
    infrastructure. PHMSA, the agency, cannot effectively do its
    job if the infrastructure already in the ground is off limits
    to safety regulation.
        Improving safety means preventing incidents. PHMSA needs to
    have the resources and staff to inspect pipelines, conduct
    investigations if incidents occur, and take appropriate
    enforcement action.
        I am especially pleased that we will hear detailed
    recommendations on what actions Congress can take to advance
    safety from a fellow Washingtonian and constituent from Whatcom
    County on today's panel, Bill Caram, executive director of the
    Pipeline Safety Trust. The Trust was formed following the
    deadly Olympic pipeline explosion in my district. I think you
    will hear from Bill that the Pipeline Safety Trust is both a
    watchdog and also can be a partner with communities and with
    industry to ensure long-term safety.
        I appreciate each of our witnesses, as well, being here
    today. I want to welcome PHMSA Deputy Administrator Tristan
    Brown, who visited the district to tour the Olympic pipeline
    site in Bellingham.
        PHMSA has a new charge, as well, since the enactment of the
    Bipartisan Infrastructure Law, to distribute $1 billion over 5
    years under the first-ever Natural Gas Distribution
    Infrastructure Safety and Modernization grant program. The $200
    million available to municipalities and community-owned
    utilities in fiscal year 2022 is the first installment of this
    funding to repair or replace natural gas pipelines and help
    reduce incidents and improve safety. And this is just the
    beginning.
        All safety responsibility, though, must not fall to PHMSA.
    I encourage the involvement of communities and public interest
    organizations in pipeline safety, and I support ongoing grants
    to support the 400 State-based safety inspectors of intrastate
    pipelines and local distribution systems.
        Finally, as we convene the Subcommittee on Railroads,
    Pipelines, and Hazardous Materials for the first time in this
    Congress, I do want to call attention to the request from
    Members on my side of the aisle, led by Ranking Member Payne
    and Representative Sykes, that this committee hold a hearing on
    the Norfolk Southern derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. I
    endorse and support their efforts.
        Pipelines play a critical role in the Nation's
    infrastructure and the daily lives of Americans. And we are
    here today to make sure the national pipeline network safely
    delivers essential energy products across the country. I look
    forward to today's discussion.
        [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress
        from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on
                       Transportation and Infrastructure
        Thank you, Chairman Graves, Chairman Nehls and Ranking Member Payne
    for calling this hearing on pipeline safety.
        On June 10, 1999, a pipeline explosion in Bellingham, WA claimed
    the lives of two 10-year-old boys and a young man of 18 years. The
    explosion also released 237,000 gallons of gasoline into Whatcom Creek
    that flowed through Whatcom Falls Park in Bellingham, Washington. The
    ensuing fireball caused millions of dollars of damage. It shocked the
    community that day and is still a seminal moment in the history of the
    town of Bellingham.
        This explosion spurred my commitment, which has been steadfast for
    over 20 years, to the highest level of pipeline safety. For my entire
    tenure in Congress, I have fought to reduce the risk of pipeline
    incidents, promote transparency of pipeline safety information for
    local communities and increase accountability for pipeline operators.
        I ask unanimous consent to submit a letter for the record from a
    parent of one of the boys killed in the explosion in my district,
    Bellingham City Council Member Skip Williams. This letter outlines a
    number of recommendations to improve the safety and oversight of our
    pipeline system.
        I share many of Councilmember Williams' views and as Ranking
    Member, I will ensure that this Committee's work to reauthorize the
    PIPES Act of 2020 puts safety at the forefront of every policy
    decision.
        Putting safety first means greater oversight and accountability of
    the activities of pipeline operators. It also means greater
    transparency for local communities and the public.
        Reducing the risk of incidents means applying safety requirements,
    where appropriate, to existing pipeline infrastructure. PHMSA cannot
    effectively do its job if infrastructure already in the ground is off
    limits to safety regulation.
        Improving safety means preventing incidents. PHMSA needs to have
    the resources and staff to inspect pipelines, conduct investigations if
    incidents occur, and take appropriate enforcement action.
        I am especially pleased that we will hear detailed recommendations
    on what actions Congress can take to advance safety from a fellow
    Washingtonian--and constituent from Whatcom County--on today's panel:
    Bill Caram, Executive Director of the Pipeline Safety Trust. The Trust
    was formed following the deadly Olympic Pipeline explosion in my
    district. I think you will hear from Bill that the Pipeline Safety
    Trust is both a watch dog and can also be a partner with communities
    and with industry to ensure long-term safety.
        I appreciate each of our witnesses being here today. I want to
    welcome PHMSA Deputy Administrator Tristan Brown, who visited
    Washington's Second District to tour the Olympic pipeline site in
    Bellingham.
        PHMSA has a new charge, since the enactment of the Bipartisan
    Infrastructure Law (BIL), to distribute $1 billion over five years
    under the first ever Natural Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and
    Modernization grant program. The $200 million available to
    municipalities and community-owned utilities in FY 2022 is the first
    installment of this funding to repair or replace natural gas pipelines
    and help reduce incidents and improve safety. This is just the
    beginning.
        All safety responsibility must not fall to PHMSA. I encourage the
    involvement of communities and public interest organizations in
    pipeline safety. I support ongoing grants to support the 400 state-
    based safety inspectors of intrastate pipelines and local distribution
    systems.
        Finally, as we convene the Subcommittee on Railroads, Pipelines,
    and Hazardous Materials for the first time in this Congress, I call to
    attention the request from Members on my side of the aisle, led by
    Ranking Member Payne and Rep. Sykes, that this Committee hold a hearing
    on the Norfolk Southern derailment in East Palestine, Ohio. I endorse
    and support their efforts.
        Pipelines play a critical role in the nation's infrastructure and
    the daily lives of Americans. We are here today to make sure the
    national pipeline network safely delivers essential energy products
    across the country. I look forward to today's discussion.

        Mr. Larsen of Washington. With that, I yield back. Thank
    you, Mr. Chair.
        Mr. Nehls. Mr. Larsen yields. Again, I would like to
    welcome our witnesses, and thank you for being here today.
        I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full statements
    be included in the record.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        As your written testimony has been made part of the record,
    the subcommittee asks that you limit your oral remarks to 5
    minutes.
        With that, Deputy Administrator Brown, you are recognized
    for 5 minutes for your testimony.

    TESTIMONY OF TRISTAN BROWN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND
     HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (PHMSA); ANDREW J.
      BLACK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, LIQUID ENERGY
    PIPELINE ASSOCIATION (LEPA); KENNETH W. GRUBB, CHIEF OPERATING
    OFFICER, NATURAL GAS PIPELINES, KINDER MORGAN, INC., ON BEHALF
     OF THE INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (INGAA);
       AND BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY TRUST

    TESTIMONY OF TRISTAN BROWN, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR, PIPELINE AND
           HAZARDOUS MATERIALS SAFETY ADMINISTRATION (PHMSA)

        Mr. Brown. Thank you, Chairman Nehls. Thank you, Ranking
    Member Payne. Thank you, Ranking Member Larsen. And to the rest
    of the committee, welcome to the new Members, and welcome back
    to the returning Members.
        At the Department of Transportation and within PHMSA,
    safety is the top priority of Secretary Buttigieg, Deputy
    Secretary Trottenberg, myself, and all of the employees at
    PHMSA. We all appreciate this subcommittee's interest and
    support for strengthening pipeline safety across our country.
        PHMSA is responsible for overseeing the safe transport of
    hazardous materials through pipelines and also via other modes
    of transportation, including planes, trains, trucks,
    automobiles, and vessels. On that note, although I am here with
    a panel of pipeline experts to discuss PHMSA's work in
    advancing pipeline safety, I want to take this chance to
    acknowledge that, as an agency, as a Department, and across the
    Federal Government, we remain focused on holding Norfolk
    Southern accountable for the terrible tragedy in East
    Palestine, Ohio. And we will continue to provide support to
    that community and to the National Transportation Safety
    Board's investigation.
        Over the years, despite oftentimes fierce opposition from
    the industries we regulate, PHMSA has worked to strengthen
    safety measures for transporting hazardous materials, and we
    look forward to working with Members on both sides of the aisle
    to continue those efforts by statute, by regulation, or any
    other means of achieving results for the people of East
    Palestine and many other communities that have suffered similar
    incidents in the past.
        PHMSA's oversight of hazardous materials via other modes
    includes nearly 1 in 10 goods that are transported in the
    United States, everything from nuclear waste to lithium-ion
    batteries to explosives used in excavation mining and energy
    production. In the United States, nearly two-thirds of the
    energy we consume is transported via a pipeline that we
    regulate.
        Over the past few decades, growth in energy production in
    the United States has increased to record levels over the last
    few years. Concurrently, U.S. transportation of these products
    has increased, and exports of energy have also reached record
    levels. This has placed new and heightened demands on our
    pipeline and refined product storage infrastructure, as well as
    export facilities such as LNG terminals, which PHMSA also
    regulates.
        Under Secretary Buttigieg's leadership, PHMSA has been
    focused on executing bipartisan congressional mandates in the
    PIPES Act of 2020, historic infrastructure investments that
    came from the Bipartisan Infrastructure Law of 2021 that
    Ranking Member Larsen mentioned, strengthening our safety
    mission, and ensuring the U.S. maintains the most efficient and
    competitive transportation system in the world.
        The bipartisan PIPES Act of 2020 significantly strengthened
    PHMSA's jurisdiction related to the minimization of methane
    emissions across all of our regulated entities in an effort to
    improve public safety and protect our environment. Our efforts
    on this front include completing three major legacy pipeline
    safety rulemakings, each of which were more than a decade in
    the making, including new regulations on 400,000 miles of gas
    gathering pipelines, pipeline rupture detection and rupture
    mitigation valve installation, and Coastal Ecological Unusually
    Sensitive Areas, including the Great Lakes.
        Our regulatory agenda over the past 2 years has been
    exceptionally full. PHMSA has been hard at work closing out
    years' long--and in some cases, decades' long--efforts on final
    rules, as well as initiating important new rulemakings from the
    2020 PIPES Act.
        However, with all of the good work that is being done to
    advance pipeline safety by the promulgation of new rules, PHMSA
    has faced a new normal in terms of increased challenges to its
    rulemakings. This is resulting in longer development timelines
    and diversion of personnel resources to respond to legal
    challenges. That time could otherwise be utilized to advance
    the myriad congressional directives and regulatory priorities
    of the agency and stakeholders.
        Regardless of these challenges, PHMSA won't be swayed from
    its mission. PHMSA has initiated several priority rulemakings
    that look to address important PIPES Act mandates and emerging
    safety issues, including leak detection and leak repair, the
    safety of gas distribution pipelines, updated LNG facilities
    regulations, and an overhaul of the safety requirements for
    pipelines transporting carbon dioxide.
        As previously noted, PHMSA's oversight responsibilities
    continue to grow, both in terms of the types of facilities we
    regulate, as well as the number of facilities we regulate. And
    we have had to continuously operate relatively leaner, as
    compared to our expanded universe of regulated facilities. To
    meet congressional directives to improve efforts to attract and
    retain pipeline engineers and inspectors, PHMSA has undertaken
    new recruitment and retention efforts, has kept up with the
    hiring mandates included in the PIPES Act, both for inspectors
    as well as for regulatory personnel, that have helped lead the
    agency to some of its most important, productive years ever, in
    terms of both finalizing rulemakings, as well as enforcement
    actions, and has reduced the trend in hazardous materials
    pipeline incidents.
        In closing, thank you again for the opportunity to engage
    with you on the critical issues facing PHMSA and, in turn,
    facing a major component of the largest, most sophisticated
    energy transportation system in the world. We look forward to
    continuing to work with you to improve pipeline and hazardous
    materials safety, and to reduce associated environmental
    impacts. I look forward to your questions.
        [Mr. Brown's prepared statement follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator, Pipeline and
               Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)
                                  Introduction
        Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, Jr., and members of the
    Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify today on the U.S.
    Department of Transportation's (DOT) Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
    Safety Administration's (PHMSA) pipeline safety program. I appreciate
    this subcommittee's support for strengthening pipeline safety across
    our country. I am here on a panel of pipeline safety experts to discuss
    PHMSA's work advancing pipeline safety, but I want to acknowledge that
    as an agency, as a department, and across the Federal Government, we
    also remain focused on holding Norfolk Southern accountable for the
    terrible tragedy in East Palestine, OH--and will continue to provide
    support to that community and to the National Transportation Safety
    Board, the independent lead investigator. Over the years, despite often
    fierce opposition from the industries we regulate, PHMSA has worked to
    strengthen safety measures for transporting hazardous materials via
    rail and other modes of transportation, We look forward to working with
    members on both sides of the aisle to continue those efforts by
    statute, by regulation, or any other means of achieving results for the
    people of East Palestine and many other communities that have suffered
    similar incidents in the past.
        At DOT, and within PHMSA, safety is the top priority for Secretary
    Buttigieg, Deputy Secretary Trottenberg, me, and all of the employees
    at PHMSA. Specifically, PHMSA is responsible for overseeing the safe
    transport of hazardous materials--through pipelines and also via other
    modes of transportation--including planes, trains, trucks, and vessels.
    PHMSA oversees the safe design, operation, and maintenance of the
    Nation's nearly 3.4 million miles of oil, gas, and other hazardous
    materials pipeline facilities for hydrogen, carbon dioxide, and other
    emerging fuels. Additionally, PHMSA's oversight of hazardous materials
    via other modes includes nearly 1 in 10 goods that are transported in
    the U.S., everything from nuclear waste to lithium-ion batteries, to
    explosives used in excavation, mining, and energy production. PHMSA
    also chairs the International Civil Aviation Organization's Dangerous
    Goods Panel, the international standards making body that sets the
    global framework for the safe and efficient transport of these
    materials across borders and around the world.
        Under Secretary Buttigieg's leadership, PHMSA has been focused on
    executing bipartisan congressional mandates in the Protecting our
    Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (PIPES Act
    of 2020), historic infrastructure investments from the Infrastructure
    Investment and Jobs Act of 2021, strengthening our safety mission, and
    ensuring that the U.S. has the safest, most efficient and competitive
    transportation system in the world.
        From the standpoint of the volume of work before us as an agency,
    the challenges in carrying out our safety mission have never been
    greater. We oversee an aging infrastructure that requires robust
    maintenance, and, when needed, replacement. Most of the cross-country
    pipeline infrastructure was built shortly after World War II--meaning
    many pipelines are over 80 years old--and there are even a few gas
    distribution segments that were installed during the Civil War era,
    more than 150 years ago.
        PHMSA has been integral to the whole-of-government approach to
    mitigating unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions--an essential component
    of operating the safest, most efficient and economically competitive
    transportation and energy system of the 21st century.
        Nearly two-thirds of the energy we consume in the U.S. is
    transported via pipeline. Over the past few decades, growth in energy
    production in the United States has increased to record levels.
    Concurrently, U.S. transportation of these products has necessarily
    increased, and exports of energy have--according to the Energy
    Information Administration--also reached record levels. This has placed
    new and heightened demands on our pipeline and refined products storage
    infrastructure, as well as export facilities, such as liquefied natural
    gas (LNG) terminals, which PHMSA also regulates.
        The bipartisan PIPES Act of 2020 significantly strengthened PHMSA's
    jurisdiction related to the minimization of methane emissions across
    all of our regulated entities in an effort to improve public safety and
    protect our environment. Our efforts on this front include completing
    three major legacy pipeline safety rulemakings, each of which was more
    than a decade in the making, including new regulations on 400,000 miles
    of ``gas gathering'' pipelines--significantly increased by the fracking
    boom that began in the 2000s but remained unregulated at the Federal
    level until this past year. Since the enactment of the PIPES Act of
    2020, Congress has added new incentives for infrastructure aimed at
    decarbonizing energy and industrial sectors. Both the Infrastructure
    Investment and Jobs Act and the Inflation Reduction Act include
    significant incentives for the build-out of the hydrogen and carbon
    capture utilization and storage (CCUS) sectors. To address new risks--
    both safety and environmental--related to this infrastructure, PHMSA
    has focused on strengthening its regulations and improving its research
    in these areas. On the other side of the agency, which focuses on
    hazardous materials transportation via other modes of transportation,
    the agency has focused on improving safety in the transportation of
    hydrogen and other cryogenic materials--via truck, train, plane, and
    vessel--which is seeing new technology development and investments from
    nearly every sector of the economy.
        Also, since the enactment of the PIPES Act of 2020, PHMSA has
    worked with Congress to advance its first-ever infrastructure grant
    program, via the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The Natural
    Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and Modernization (NGDISM) Grant
    Program provides $1 billion spread over five years to improve the
    safety of high-risk, leak-prone legacy natural gas distribution
    infrastructure with a specific emphasis on benefiting underserved rural
    and urban communities, among other considerations. Eligible entities
    are municipality- or community-owned utilities, and funds are available
    to these entities seeking assistance in repairing, rehabilitating, or
    replacing high-risk, leak-prone natural gas distribution
    infrastructure. Funds may also be used to acquire equipment to assist
    in identifying and reducing natural gas distribution pipeline incidents
    and fatalities. This grant funding will help communities of all sizes
    make their infrastructure safer, create good jobs, reduce heat-trapping
    methane from the atmosphere, and reduce the risks of fatality and
    serious injury for residents and businesses. As of this hearing, we
    expect to announce the first round of these grants imminently.
                                   Rulemaking
        Our regulatory agenda over the past two years has been
    exceptionally full. PHMSA has been hard at work closing out years-long,
    and in some cases decade-long, efforts on final rules as well as
    initiating important new rulemakings from the 2020 PIPES Act.
        Some of PHMSA's recently completed final rules include the sibling
    rules to the Safety of Gas Transmission Pipelines final rule that we
    published in 2019, including improved regulation of higher-risk gas
    gathering pipelines; the 400,000 miles of additional pipelines
    previously mentioned; required reporting of safety information for all
    gas gathering pipelines; improved repair criteria for gas transmission
    pipelines; and other enhanced safety requirements for gas transmission
    pipelines regarding corrosion control, management of change, and
    inspections following extreme weather events.
        Additionally, in April of 2022, PHMSA published the long-awaited
    final rule addressing rupture detection and rupture-mitigation valve
    installation for many gas transmission, hazardous liquid, and gas and
    hazardous liquid gathering pipelines, including carbon dioxide lines.
    Among other important provisions, this rule requires the installation
    of remote-control or automatic-shutoff valves, or equivalent
    technology, that can close within 30 minutes of an operator being
    notified of a potential rupture--saving lives and reducing methane
    emissions.
        In response to Congress' very stringent timeline for issuing a
    final rule for Coastal Ecological Unusually Sensitive Areas (90 days),
    PHMSA issued an Interim Final Rule to include additional coastal
    waters, the Great Lakes, and coastal beaches within the definition of
    an ``unusually sensitive area'' for the purposes of resilience and risk
    reduction through hazardous liquid pipeline integrity management--
    strengthening protections for these treasured natural environments.
    PHMSA subsequently held a Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee meeting on
    the rulemaking and emerged from that meeting with recommendations to
    help finalize this rule while addressing stakeholder concerns.
        PHMSA has initiated several priority rulemakings that look to
    address important PIPES Act of 2020 mandates and emerging safety
    issues, including leak detection and leak repair, the safety of gas
    distribution pipelines (as directed in the Leonel Rondon Pipeline
    Safety Act), updated LNG facilities regulations, and an overhaul of the
    safety requirements for pipelines transporting carbon dioxide.
        As required by Congress, PHMSA continues to update the Federal
    pipeline safety regulations (PSRs) to reflect new and revised voluntary
    consensus standards developed and adopted by standards-setting bodies
    (see e.g., PHMSA's periodic standards update rulemakings). We
    understand how important updating and aligning standards can be to
    ensure the PSR include up-to-date standards that reflect current best
    practices and technologies--and to serve as a higher bar, from which
    the regulated community can continue to improve.
        Finally, PHMSA published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) in
    October 2020 for Class Location Change Requirements. As you are aware,
    PHMSA is required by statute to hold advisory committee meetings on our
    proposed rules to solicit recommendations to ensure our rulemakings are
    reasonable, feasible, cost-effective, and practicable. These advisory
    committee meetings have helped derive consensus around highly technical
    regulatory policies. The PIPES Act of 2020 requires PHMSA to hold an
    advisory committee meeting on the NPRM for this rule. Based on the
    aggressive timelines and safety priorities included in the PIPES Act of
    2020, PHMSA is working to make efficient use of agency resources and
    advisory committee members' time and anticipates holding an advisory
    committee meeting on the NPRM in conjunction with publishing the most
    important safety agenda items identified by Congress.
        It is important to point out that rulemaking is designed to be an
    iterative process that encourages maximum participation by all
    stakeholders and rigorous analysis in support of decision making. This
    process helps ensure the promulgation of comprehensive rules that
    protect the public and the environment and meet our statutory
    requirement for rules with benefits that exceed their costs. PHMSA
    holds public meetings and workshops and conducts significant outreach
    prior to rulemakings, using the information gathered to establish a
    legal record and to strive to craft the most effective rules possible.
    Such collaboration, well in advance of the rulemaking process, allows
    PHMSA to identify concerns and potential solutions and to allocate its
    limited resources where they are needed most. In the past, these
    comprehensive efforts have also helped avoid expending additional
    resources on legal challenges.
        In addition to congressionally mandated rules, many of PHMSA's
    rulemakings underway address important recommendations from the
    National Transportation Safety Board, resulting from safety issues
    identified during investigations in the aftermath of some tragic
    accidents. PHMSA's rules also address recommendations from the U.S.
    Government Accountability Office (GAO), the DOT Inspector General (DOT
    IG), and the agency's own safety findings. When PHMSA proceeds with
    such rulemakings identified by independent sources, it must make sure
    that its regulations account for known safety issues, technological
    feasibility, and cost-effectiveness.
                              Increased litigation
        With all the good work that is being done to advance pipeline
    safety by the promulgation of new rules, PHMSA also faces a new normal
    in terms of increased challenges to its rulemakings, resulting in
    longer development timelines and diversion of personnel resources to
    respond to legal challenges--which could otherwise be utilized to
    advance the myriad congressional directives and regulatory priorities
    of the agency and stakeholders.
        PHMSA has also seen a dramatic increase in interest in its
    rulemakings pertaining to energy resources. By way of example, PHMSA's
    LNG by Rail Suspension NPRM, issued in November 2021, has had over
    7,000 comments--including a coordinated letter-writing campaign by
    environmental advocacy organizations and a letter signed by over 20
    State Attorneys General, as well as many members of the House of
    Representatives on both sides of the aisle.
        Specifically, PHMSA has finalized four major rulemakings over the
    last year, and each of which has been the subject of judicial and/or
    administrative challenges. PHMSA currently faces pending litigation
    brought by pipeline industry trade groups on the Gas Gathering Final
    Rule, Valve Installation and Repair Final Rule, among others, from
    stakeholder groups and governments, across the spectrum.
        PHMSA rulemaking resources are consequently spread thin. The same
    subject matter experts, attorneys, and economists who develop new PHMSA
    rules are also the ones who must help develop the briefs and arguments
    to respond to legal challenges after issuance.
                           Enforcement and Compliance
        While PHMSA's enforcement cases have remained relatively steady, we
    have set records for our proposed civil penalties in 2021 and again in
    2022. These cases, many of which are still being adjudicated, include
    the worst carbon dioxide pipeline incident on record as well as a case
    related to the 2021 Colonial Pipeline cybersecurity incident. PHMSA
    continues to pursue 100% collections of the civil penalties it has
    imposed; however, some operators with smaller civil penalties have
    significantly delayed paying the penalties they owe.
        In terms of forward-looking, potential rulemakings, the PSRs
    currently include emergency planning, response, and timely notification
    requirements for pipeline operators. However, incidents involving, for
    example, carbon dioxide pipelines as well as LNG facilities, do not
    necessarily require communications to communities who rightfully have
    an increased fear of these facilities after a safety incident occurs.
    PHMSA will look to its rulemaking authorities to help address the lack
    of post-incident communications but we also welcome congressional ideas
    in this space.
        Another issue we're examining involves the safety and performance
    of pipes manufactured outside of the U.S. Many larger operators deploy
    their own inspectors when utilizing foreign-made pipe in their
    projects--in order to ensure maximum safety and performance. However,
    when those U.S. companies find non-spec pipe (pipe not meeting Federal
    or industry standards), they may simply refuse to purchase it--which
    may result in another U.S. pipeline construction company ultimately
    purchasing or utilizing the same non-spec piping. On the hazardous
    materials side of our agency, PHMSA deploys inspectors across the globe
    to ensure products that are moving hazardous materials in the U.S. are
    inspected by U.S. inspectors. PHMSA is conducting analysis to better
    understand if non-spec foreign made pipes are being utilized in the
    U.S.
                            Research and Innovation
        While PHMSA continues to advance pipeline safety by strengthening
    its regulations and enhancing its inspector training, inspections, and
    enforcement programs, many of the root causes of incidents are best
    addressed through research and technological innovation.
        PHMSA's Pipeline Safety Research Program works with academia, the
    regulated community, private research consortiums and federal partners
    to sponsor research and development (R&D) projects focused on providing
    near-term solutions for pipeline transportation infrastructure issues
    that will improve safety, reduce environmental impact, and enhance
    reliability.
    Hydrogen/Carbon Dioxide (CO2)
        In FY 2022, PHMSA awarded approximately $6 million in research
    investments on hydrogen projects. Specifically, under the Competitive
    Academic Agreement Program, PHMSA awarded two projects on pipeline
    infrastructure and modernization for hydrogen networks to two
    universities. These research opportunities expose students to the
    pipeline safety sector to encourage them to join the federal or state
    pipeline safety workforce or the private sector after graduation. PHMSA
    also leverages the University Transportation Centers Program to meet
    its research needs.
        Also, in FY 2022, PHMSA awarded four projects related to hydrogen
    pipelines and storage, under our Core Research Program, totaling just
    over $2 million. These projects will research the safe transportation
    and storage of hydrogen via repurposing existing infrastructure used
    for natural gas transport and underground storage, improving hydrogen
    leak detection, and characterizing hydrogen-specific pipeline integrity
    threats.
        PHMSA is collaborating with the Department of Energy (DOE) and
    other DOT modes on developing a Memorandum of Understanding to
    establish collaborative partnerships on R&D and safety associated with
    the transport of carbon dioxide and hydrogen via pipelines, rail,
    barge, ship, and truck.
        Lastly, PHMSA announced last year new research topics to better
    determine impact areas for the safer operations of carbon dioxide
    pipelines. The results of this may help inform a current rulemaking
    related to carbon dioxide pipelines but congressional attention related
    to these issues is also welcome.
    LNG
        Recent global fluctuations in natural gas supplies as well as a
    transition from more carbon-intensive energy sources continue to spark
    investments in LNG. Currently, there are eight LNG export terminals
    with a total LNG production capacity of approximately 14 billion
    standard cubic feet per day (bcf/d) in the United States. There are
    also five LNG projects under construction, which will add an estimated
    11.9 bcf/d in LNG production capacity. To that end PHMSA has funded 14
    R&D LNG-safety-related research projects since 2007; with nine
    completed/closed and five currently active, all totaling $5.7 million.
        Additionally, in the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023,
    Congress allocated up to $8.4 million to PHMSA for the creation of an
    LNG Center of Excellence aimed at positioning the United States as the
    leader and foremost expert in LNG operations--including safety and
    environmental performance. PHMSA has already initiated planning for the
    establishment of the Center which will enhance U.S. LNG operations and
    safety education and oversight and may result in LNG regulatory
    improvements. It will also serve as a repository of information and
    facilitate collaboration among stakeholders to enhance safety and
    environmental performance through research.
                   Funding for State Pipeline Safety Programs
        Since 1970, when a national, uniform standard of pipeline safety
    regulations was published, states have had the authority, through
    PHMSA, to regulate the safety of intrastate pipelines. Under the
    authority of Sections 60105 and 60106 of Title 49 U.S. Code (49 U.S.C.)
    for state pipeline safety program certifications, states have been
    allowed to assume safety authority for the inspection and enforcement
    of intrastate pipelines. PHMSA sets the minimum Federal regulations for
    pipeline safety, which the participating states then adopt into their
    state code and enforce. States are allowed, under 49 U.S.C. Section
    60104(c), to adopt more stringent safety standards than the minimum
    standards PHMSA sets. This allows states to codify and enforce
    regulations that deal with specific, regional (or local) risks that
    might not be feasible or cost-beneficial to regulate at the Federal
    level. Many states have established safety regulations that are more
    stringent than the Federal regulations.
        PHMSA relies on this extremely important partnership to accomplish
    its safety mission, which is to protect people and the environment by
    advancing the safe transportation of energy and other hazardous
    materials that are essential to our daily lives. New pipeline safety
    regulations and new infrastructure (such as gas gathering lines)
    specific to state safety authority have and will continue to require
    state pipeline safety programs to increase staff--in order to handle
    the additional infrastructure oversight responsibilities. These state
    pipeline safety programs employ approximately 435 inspectors who are
    responsible for inspecting over 85 percent of the Nation's pipeline
    infrastructure through certification with PHMSA.
        The PIPES Act of 2020 allows PHMSA to pay not more than 80 percent
    of the total cost of the personnel, equipment, and activities
    reasonably required by the state agency for the conduct of its pipeline
    safety program during a given calendar year. This was changed from 50
    percent in the 2006 PIPES Act. However, for fiscal years 2019 to 2021
    State Base Grant federal funding covered less than 70 percent of the
    actual total state program costs. The actual federal funding is
    estimated to be approximately 60 percent of the state program's total
    costs for fiscal year 2022. Unfortunately, current year 2023 federal
    funding is estimated to be only 56 percent of the total state program
    costs--due, in part, to increasing needs from states. This is another
    area where we welcome congressional ideas on how to support states and
    their vital role in implementing many of the new regulations previously
    discussed.
                   Control Room Management and Cyber Security
        Not only is the industry facing expansion in the number of
    regulated pipeline miles and changes in product demand, both industry
    and regulators are addressing the growing threat of cyberattacks.
    PHMSA, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), and DOE have a
    mutual interest in ensuring coordinated, consistent, and effective
    activities that improve transportation security. PHMSA's safety
    oversight of pipeline control rooms forms a nexus with TSA's
    cybersecurity oversight, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
    Agency's (CISA's) role as the national coordinator for critical
    infrastructure security, and DOE's national energy management. The 2021
    cyber-attack on Colonial Pipeline demonstrated how critical it is for a
    whole-of-government approach to safeguarding our Nation's critical
    infrastructure--as well as collaboration with the private sector when
    it comes to planning and communications.
        PHMSA is leveraging its authorities to inspect and enforce three
    components of pipeline operations including pipeline control room
    regulations, integrity management plan requirements, and emergency
    response plan regulations by incorporating cybersecurity questions in
    inspections that focus on considering cyber as a risk and having
    emergency response plans in place that consider the threat of
    cyberattacks as well as envision measures to mitigate impacts to
    operations. PHMSA has also engaged with CISA and TSA on cybersecurity
    exercises for pipeline operators.
        To help advance our safety mission as it relates to cybersecurity,
    PHMSA is in the process of hiring pipeline and cybersecurity experts to
    assist in control room management inspections and provide cyber
    expertise support to PHMSA leadership. Cyber specialists can better
    identify pipeline infrastructure-related cyber risks, incidents, and
    significant issues that PHMSA currently lacks expertise in. This would
    help increase information sharing, create better understanding between
    agencies, and identify key issues between the nexus point of safety and
    security.
        PHMSA is increasing cybersecurity training opportunities for its
    staff, as well as the staff of its state partners. By expanding the
    knowledge base of inspectors, we are better positioned to identify
    risks during routine control room inspections and coordinate when
    needed with colleagues in TSA.
        PHMSA is also developing an adaptable emergency preparedness plan
    that will address the Agency's response to all-threat, all-hazard,
    notice and no-notice incidents, including cybersecurity. As part of the
    process, PHMSA is developing an organizational framework to respond to
    those incidents, formal situational reporting internal and external to
    PHMSA, formal information sharing processes, and specific coordination
    methods between PHMSA, TSA, CISA, DOT Operating Administrations, DOE,
    and the Federal Emergency Management Agency.
              OIG inspection, GAO audits, and NTSB recommendations
        In terms of PHMSA's compliance and inspection program, we recently
    underwent a DOT IG audit, which was initiated in May 2022, to review
    PHMSA's implementation of its Integrated Inspection Program. Throughout
    the audit, the PHMSA team provided detailed overviews and walkthroughs
    of its Integrated Inspection Program, including, but not limited to
    planning, training, inspection conduct, and governing policies. PHMSA
    even organized and facilitated the OIG's participation in several
    ongoing integrated inspections, and, at PHMSA's invitation, OIG
    personnel attended the Office of Pipeline Safety's annual inspection
    planning meeting in October 2022. The DOT IG provided helpful feedback
    and we consider the audit to have been beneficial to PHMSA's continual
    improvement. PHMSA learned valuable lessons and received three DOT IG
    recommendations. We continue to have a constructive working
    relationship with the DOT IG, and the audit helped us to continue to
    move toward our common goal of advancing pipeline safety.
        In August 2020, the GAO published a study finding Federal agencies
    have incorporated most but not all key collaboration practices in the
    permitting processes for export facilities for LNG. The GAO identified
    key practices for PHMSA, that can help sustain collaboration among
    federal agencies.
        PHMSA's team worked with GAO to adopt a process for conducting
    standards-specific reviews approximately every two to three years. The
    new process will ensure that a sufficient review is conducted and that
    PHMSA makes appropriate determinations about whether to update
    standards.
        When it comes to our work with the National Transportation Safety
    Board (NTSB), PHMSA is addressing recommendations that include
    requiring control room operators to notify emergency call centers in
    impacted communities when potential ruptures take place, equip control
    rooms with supervisory controls and data acquisition systems to
    pinpoint leaks along transmission lines, and amend Title 49, Code of
    Federal Regulations (CFR) to require automatic shutoff valves or
    remote-control valves at high consequence areas. We continue working to
    resolve any open recommendations--some of which we are constrained by
    resources and some by statutes--such as the congressional prohibition
    on applying the Automatic/Remote Shut Off Valve Rule to existing
    pipelines.
        PHMSA continues to work with NTSB to address recommendations that
    have been made following other natural gas and hazardous liquid
    accidents. We collaborate with NTSB often, including opportunities for
    cross-training of our respective staff. We'll continue to engage with
    NTSB as a partner in advancing safety.
        All of these efforts are important because continual improvement is
    a key principle of safety management systems and high-reliability
    organizations, and one we embrace for both the agency and the
    industries we regulate.
         Transparency, Equity, Environmental Justice, and Outreach to
                            Underserved Communities
        To both implement the President's executive orders on equity (EO
    13985 and EO 14008), as well as to help address historic inequities in
    the transportation system, PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety has
    expanded its efforts to make public pipeline safety incidents and
    enforcement data (which was also recently the subject of a GAO report
    that lauded PHMSA's transparency and encouraged further actions).
    Specifically, PHMSA has created a publicly available pilot, interactive
    mapping tool that allows users to view the location of pipeline
    incidents, as well as a geographic overlay with underserved
    communities.
        When PHMSA first viewed the preliminary information from this tool,
    staff felt inspired to act--to help ensure all communities are
    receiving requisite safety protections. As part of this effort, PHMSA
    has engaged our state and federal partners, as well as stakeholders, to
    share our findings, and they, too, are engaging in dialogues with
    pipeline operators to ensure maintenance and safety measures do not
    leave underserved communities behind.
        These communities are identified through U.S. Census and internal
    DOT/PHMSA data focused on underserved and transportation-disadvantaged
    communities that have experienced excavation damages, and other
    pipeline incidents and accidents.
        PHMSA has also expanded its public outreach and education on
    pipeline awareness and safety as well as community-based excavation
    damage prevention initiatives to historically underserved and
    socioeconomically challenged geographic areas.
                      Increased Engagement with the Public
        PHMSA is committed to enhancing all stakeholder engagement and has
    increased the number of public meetings and information briefings it
    hosts--holding four public meetings and information briefings so far in
    FY 2023, with additional public meetings and information briefings
    planned. Personally, I have visited community members and victims, on-
    site, where pipeline facilities have failed (e.g. Kalamazoo, MI;
    Bellingham, WA; Satartia, MS; and Freeport, TX).
        PHMSA has also increased its engagement with public interest groups
    like the Pipeline Safety Trust, pipeline worker labor unions, and
    environmental groups, actively participating in conferences and
    meetings to hold a two-way dialogue on important pipeline safety
    issues, emphasizing that pipeline safety is a shared responsibility.
        In November and December 2022, PHMSA partnered with the DOE in a
    series of Community Engagement Workshops on Carbon Capture,
    Utilization, and Storage and continues to serve as a resource regarding
    pipelines to DOE and the public. PHMSA has also supported requests from
    individuals and groups to participate in meetings to discuss
    CO2 pipeline projects to listen to concerns on safety,
    environmental justice, environmental impacts, and emergency response
    preparedness, as well as meet with representatives at the state
    legislature level. As previously noted, in May of 2022, I personally
    visited the community of Satartia, MS--about an hour northwest of
    Jackson--the site of one of the worst carbon dioxide pipeline incidents
    in history, in order to hear directly from the community and first
    responders that helped the community during that serious incident.
        Similarly, just yesterday I visited with members of the community
    in and around Freeport, TX, which is home to the Freeport LNG facility.
    In June of 2022, an explosion at the facility resulted in a massive
    fireball and understandably left lasting concerns with the community.
    In February of this year, PHMSA, along with our co-regulators of LNG
    export facilities (the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission and the
    U.S. Coast Guard) held a town hall meeting in the community--with
    simultaneous bilingual translation--to help inform the surrounding
    community members of our work to investigate the incident and require
    changes needed to enhance safety at the facility.
        In 2022, PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety participated in nearly
    220 public meetings, events, and conferences to educate our
    stakeholders on pipeline safety and damage prevention initiatives and
    to address questions about the Federal pipeline safety regulations or
    concerns about pipeline-related matters. PHMSA continues to promote the
    `Call 811 Program' through participation in events as well as through
    social media and digital campaigns encouraging safe digging practices.
    Efficiencies in Oversight, Taxpayer Stewardship, and Focus on Employees
        Roughly 169 midstream oil and gas industry projects are expected to
    begin operations in the United States from 2021 to 2025, according to
    the Pipeline and Gas Journal. Over the last five years, liquid pipeline
    incidents have fallen by 21% while pipeline mileage and barrels
    delivered have increased by more than 27%. As previously noted, and to
    put it simply, our oversight responsibilities continue to grow both in
    terms of the types of facilities we regulate as well as the number of
    facilities we regulate: PHMSA has increasing responsibility for LNG
    facilities, underground natural gas storage, as well as natural gas
    gathering lines. PHMSA's budget, excluding the new gas distribution
    grant program, does not grow at a rate commensurate with its
    responsibilities. Consequently, PHMSA has had to continuously operate
    relatively leaner as compared to our expanded universe of regulated
    facilities. To this end, PHMSA has also utilized advisory bulletins,
    public meetings, research solicitations, and increased collaboration
    with coregulators such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the
    Environmental Protection Agency, the Department of Interior, the U.S.
    Coast Guard, and our state partners through collaboration with the
    National Association of Pipeline Safety Representatives.
        Hiring times at PHMSA have been reduced by 25% unfortunately--due
    in part to the pandemic--PHMSA was not spared the so-called great
    resignation, losing many individuals to both retirements and other
    departures. But PHMSA is exploring ways to continue to improve the
    agency's hiring and recruitment to make it both more efficient and
    effective in recruiting and retaining talented applicants.
        On the hiring, recruitment, and retention front, unfortunately--due
    in part to the pandemic--PHMSA was not spared the so-called great
    resignation, losing many individuals to both retirements and other
    departures.
        To meet congressional directives to improve efforts to attract and
    retain pipeline engineers and inspectors, PHMSA has undertaken new
    recruitment and retention efforts--seeking approval from the Office of
    Personnel Management to increase special pay rates for some engineer
    inspectors--commensurate with similar federal special pay rates,
    developing new tuition reimbursement efforts, and utilizing new online
    recruitment methods. PHMSA is also utilizing the Department of
    Defense's Operation Warfighter (OWF) program that matches qualified
    wounded, ill, and injured Service members with federal internships for
    veterans to gain valuable work experience during their recovery and
    rehabilitation--and create a pathway from the military to permanent
    employment. PHMSA has kept up with the PIPES Act of 2020 hiring
    mandates--both for inspectors as well as for regulatory personnel, that
    have helped lead the agency to some of its most productive years ever
    in terms of both finalizing regulations as well as enforcement actions
    and a reduction trend in hazardous materials and pipeline incidents.
        PHMSA has also utilized technologies like iPads to eliminate
    paperwork for inspectors--which has resulted in more efficient use of
    inspectors' time and increased the accuracy and standardization of
    inspections.
        On an agency-wide basis, PHMSA has reduced or eliminated its use of
    nearly two dozen disparate software systems in favor of less costly,
    integrated systems. PHMSA is utilizing the cost savings of this nature
    to continue investing in more long-term, cost-saving programs.
                                   Conclusion
        In closing, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to
    engage with you on the critical issues facing PHMSA and in turn facing
    a major component of the largest, most sophisticated energy
    transportation system in the world. And most importantly, I would like
    to emphasize my deep gratitude to the nearly 600 full-time federal
    employees and nearly 200 contractors that make up what I believe is the
    most unsung agency in the Federal Government. Congress has charged us
    with tremendous responsibilities--from ensuring the safe transportation
    of some of the most valuable goods that move in commerce, like
    satellites and spacecraft, as well as some of the most essential goods
    like fertilizer used on our farms, which can be transported by
    pipeline. As we take on ever greater oversight responsibilities with
    oversight of the build-out of carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines and
    other energy products of the future, PHMSA must either continue to grow
    our resources, or continue to reassess multiple and increasing
    priorities with the same amount of resources.
        We look forward to continuing to work with Congress to improve
    pipeline and hazardous materials safety and to reduce associated
    environmental impacts.
        Thank you again for inviting me here today. I look forward to your
    questions.

        Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
        Mr. Black, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

      TESTIMONY OF ANDREW J. BLACK, PRESIDENT AND CHIEF EXECUTIVE
           OFFICER, LIQUID ENERGY PIPELINE ASSOCIATION (LEPA)

        Mr. Black. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and
    members of the subcommittee. I am Andy Black, president and CEO
    of the Liquid Energy Pipeline Association.
        LEPA represents pipeline owners and operators delivering
    transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel;
    transportation feedstocks like crude oil; home heating fuels
    like propane; industrial feedstocks like ethane; and low-carbon
    solutions like renewable diesel, carbon dioxide, and liquefied
    petroleum gas. We have over 50 members delivering over 20
    billion barrels annually across a pipeline network of nearly
    230,000 miles.
        As Congress examines Federal pipeline safety, let me begin
    by providing some data and information on the current state of
    liquid pipeline safety. According to publicly available data
    from PHMSA, pipelines are the safest way to transport energy,
    and they are getting safer. Over the last 5 years, total
    incidents from liquid pipelines have dropped 25 percent.
    Incidents impacting people and the environment are down 15
    percent. This last metric, incidents impacting people and the
    environment, was developed jointly by PHMSA, the Pipeline
    Safety Trust, and industry under the recommendation of the
    National Transportation Safety Board.
        Not only are pipelines getting safer, they are the safest
    way to deliver energy. A report for Congress completed by PHMSA
    compared incident and spill rates across pipeline, rail, and
    trucks. PHMSA found pipelines have a lower incident rate per
    barrel of crude oil shipped compared to rail or truck, and the
    lowest percentage of crude oil released compared to rail or
    truck.
        Administration analysis and conclusion that pipelines are
    the safest way to deliver energy is also bipartisan. Secretary
    Hillary Clinton's State Department found not only would a major
    proposed pipeline be the safest way to deliver energy, it would
    be safer and have less impact on the environment than taking no
    action at all. The Obama administration found rejecting that
    pipeline project and shipping the same energy by rail would
    increase the risk of oil release by over 800 times, and barrels
    released by 2.6 times. In many locations, shipment by rail or
    truck is necessary and generally a safe delivery mode. But we
    are proud that pipelines are the safest way to deliver the
    energy American consumers need and want.
        We are also not resting on improving pipeline safety. In
    partnership with the American Petroleum Institute, we have
    ongoing initiatives to improve public engagement, develop best
    practices for managing geohazards and seismicity, improve
    pipeline inspection technologies, implement pipeline safety
    management systems, and share safety improvement lessons from
    pipeline incidents and near misses. Before that, in the last
    several years, we have completed initiatives on crack
    management, pipeline integrity management, data integration,
    hydro testing, and emergency response.
        We look forward to Congress reauthorizing Federal pipeline
    safety provisions and making improvements to PHMSA pipeline
    programs. LEPA recommends improvements in three categories:
    leveraging safety technologies and knowledge; safe, low-carbon
    future; and improving PHMSA safety programs. I have attached to
    my testimony brief summaries of each of our recommendations; I
    will highlight two today.
        First, a continuing frustration for pipeline operators is
    how old are some of PHMSA's regulations. Key requirements for
    inspecting and repairing pipelines are now over 20 years old.
    The pipeline technologies and analytic methods on which they
    are based are woefully out of date, replaced by proven
    technology and analytics and engineering methods that PHMSA
    should reflect in its regulations, but often does not.
        Congress in the 2020 PIPES Act, section 104, authorized a
    pipeline safety technology demonstration program to demonstrate
    cutting-edge pipeline safety technologies and advanced
    analytics. Thank you, Congress. But PHMSA, in implementing the
    program, added a number of administrative hurdles and
    requirements beyond what Congress mandated, making the program
    untenable. We have proposals to unlock this program and others
    from unnecessary Government redtape.
        Second, the pipeline industry supports updating regulatory
    requirements for low-carbon solutions. A major build-out of
    CO2 pipelines is necessary to transport
    CO2 from where it is captured to where it can be
    stored permanently out of harm's way. Without a new network of
    CO2 pipelines, we will not meet our goals for
    reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
        There are already dozens of Federal regulatory requirements
    administered by PHMSA covering CO2 pipeline safety,
    design, construction, operation, maintenance, pressure testing,
    and more. In a handful of discrete areas, PHMSA requirements
    would benefit from updates reflecting the latest safety
    approaches and learnings. We believe a targeted approach is the
    best way for PHMSA to issue new requirements quickly. This
    would also help PHMSA to avoid getting bogged down in an open-
    ended exercise that, like other PHMSA rulemakings, can take
    many years.
        I am happy to answer any questions, and I thank the
    subcommittee for the opportunity to testify.
        [Mr. Black's prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Andrew J. Black, President and Chief Executive
               Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA)
        Thank you, Chair, Ranking Member, and members of the subcommittee.
    My name is Andy Black and I am President and CEO of the Liquid Energy
    Pipeline Association. LEPA represents pipeline owners and operators
    delivering transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel,
    transportation feedstocks like crude oil, home heating fuels like
    propane and home heating oil, industrial feedstocks like ethane and
    butane, and low carbon solutions like renewable diesel, liquified
    petroleum gas and carbon dioxide. We have over 50 member companies
    delivering over 20 billion barrels annually across a nearly a 230,000-
    mile network of pipelines.
        As Congress examines federal pipeline safety provisions and
    programs, let me first begin by providing some data and information on
    the current state of liquids pipeline safety. According to publicly
    available government data from PHMSA, pipelines are the safest way to
    transport energy and they are getting safer.
        Over the last 5 years, total incidents from liquids pipelines have
    dropped over 25%. Incidents impacting people or the environment are
    down 15%. This last metric, Incidents Impacting People or the
    Environment, was developed jointly by PHMSA, the Pipeline Safety Trust
    and industry under the recommendation of the National Transportation
    Safety Board. NTSB asked the pipeline community to identify the most
    meaningful metric for measuring pipeline safety. You'll hear from
    witnesses about various metrics and PHMSA certainly tracks many. But we
    agree that Incidents Impacting People or the Environment are the most
    meaningful and are gratified they are down 15% over the last 5 years.
        Not only are pipelines getting safer, they are the safest way to
    deliver energy. A 2018 report completed by PHMSA at the direction of
    the Senate Appropriations Committee \i\, compared incident and spill
    rates across pipeline, rail and trucks. PHMSA found pipelines have a
    lower incident rate per barrel of crude oil shipped compared to rail or
    truck. PHMSA also found pipelines result in the lowest percentage of
    crude oil released compared to rail or truck.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \i\ Report on Delivering Crude Oil by Truck, Rail, and Pipeline,
    Office of Hazardous Materials Safety, U.S. Pipeline and Hazardous
    Materials Safety Administration, 2018.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Administration analysis and conclusion that pipelines are the
    safest way to deliver energy is also bipartisan. Secretary Hillary
    Clinton's State Department during the Obama administration \ii\ found
    not only would a major proposed pipeline be the safest way to deliver
    energy, it would be safer and have less impact on the environment than
    taking no action at all. The Obama administration found rejecting that
    pipeline project and shipping the same energy by rail increased the
    risk of oil release by over 800 times and barrels released by 2.6
    times.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \ii\ Final Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement for the
    Keystone XL Project, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental
    and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State, 2014.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We certainly understand in many locations shipment by rail or truck
    is necessary and generally a safe delivery mode on their own. But we
    are proud that pipelines are the safest way to deliver the energy
    American consumers need and want.
        We also are not resting on improving pipeline safety. The pipeline
    industry wants to reduce the number of incidents and barrels released
    even further. That is why we partner with the American Petroleum
    Institute and our member companies on numerous industry-wide
    initiatives to improve pipeline safety.
        We have ongoing industry-wide initiatives to improve public
    engagement, develop best practices for managing geohazards and
    seismicity, improve pipeline inspection technologies, implement
    pipeline safety management systems, and share safety improvement
    lessons from pipeline incidents and near misses across our pipeline
    community. In the last several years, we have completed initiatives on
    crack management, pipeline integrity management, data integration,
    hydrotesting and emergency response. Our upcoming API-LEPA strategic
    plan for pipeline excellence will include new goals on cybersecurity,
    attracting, training and retaining quality personnel, and low carbon
    solutions. We will release that in May and will look forward to
    briefing the committee and member offices on its safety programs.
        We also look forward to Congress reauthorizing federal pipeline
    safety provisions and making improvements to PHMSA pipeline programs.
    LEPA recommends pipeline safety improvements in three categories: 1)
    Leveraging Safety Technology and Knowledge, 2) Safe Low Carbon Future,
    and 3) Improving PHMSA Safety Programs.
        I have attached to my testimony further brief summaries of each of
    our specific recommendations and so will highlight just a few here
    today. A continuing frustration for pipeline operators is how old are
    some of PHMSA's regulations. Key requirements for inspecting and
    repairing pipelines are now over 20 years old. The pipeline
    technologies and analytic methods on which they were based are woefully
    out of date, replaced by new technologies and analytic methods that
    PHMSA should reflect in its regulations but often does not. Congress in
    the 2020 PIPES Act authorized a program to demonstrate cutting edge
    pipeline safety technologies and advanced analytics. The hope is data
    from these technology pilots would help PHMSA modernize their
    regulations. However, PHMSA in implementing the program added a number
    of additional administrative hurdles and requirements beyond what
    Congress mandated, making the program untenable. We have proposals to
    unlock this program and others from unnecessary government red tape.
        The pipeline industry also supports updating regulatory
    requirements for low carbon solutions, such as carbon dioxide
    pipelines. A major buildout of CO2 pipelines is necessary to
    transport CO2 from where it is captured to where we will
    store it permanently out of harm's way. Without a new network of
    CO2 pipelines, we will not meet goals for reducing
    greenhouse gas emissions. We want policymakers and the public to know
    these CO2 pipeline systems will be covered by federal
    pipeline safety requirements. Many do not know there are already dozens
    of federal regulatory requirements administered by PHMSA covering
    CO2 pipeline safety. However, we agree that in a handful of
    discreet areas, PHMSA requirements would benefit from updates
    reflecting the latest safety approaches and learnings. We also believe
    a targeted approach is the best way for PHMSA to issue new requirements
    quickly. This would also help PHMSA avoid getting bogged down in an
    open-ended exercise that like other recent PHMSA rulemakings could take
    many years.
        We also support PHMSA having the expert pipeline safety personnel
    it needs to complete its mission. Congress often places new regulatory
    mandates on PHMSA. Similarly, lessons learned from incidents, advances
    in technology, or our changing infrastructure systems can drive the
    need for PHMSA to issue guidance or undertake rulemakings. We encourage
    Congress to help PHMSA get the experts on pipeline safety it needs to
    meet the expectations of Congress and the public.
        On this or any of our proposals or those under consideration by the
    subcommittee I'm happy to answer questions and thank the subcommittee
    again for inviting me to testify today.
                                                             Attachment
                             LEGISLATIVE PRIORITIES
                      2023 Pipeline Safety Reauthorization
        The Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA) represents over 50
    pipeline operators with nearly 230,000 miles of pipelines across
    America delivering affordable, reliable and plentiful energy to
    American drivers, families, farmers, workers and shoppers.
        LEPA members deliver transportation fuels like gasoline, diesel and
    jet fuel, agriculture and rural home heating fuels like propane,
    heating fuels for the Northeastern U.S. like fuel oil and ultra low
    sulfur diesel, industrial feedstocks like ethane and butane,
    transportation fuel feedstocks like crude oil, and low carbon solutions
    like renewable diesel, ethanol, liquified petroleum gas and carbon
    dioxide. LEPA urges Congress to consider the following as they review
    federal pipeline safety laws in 2023:
                   1. Leverage Safety Technology & Knowledge
        Hi-tech inspection and analytical tools, like an MRI or ultrasound
    in the doctor's office, are available for pipeline safety. However, key
    parts of PHMSA safety regulations are over 20 years old and do not
    reflect the latest advances in technology or know-how. Congress can do
    more to help modernize pipeline safety programs.
          Improve Pipeline Safety Technology Demonstration Program
          Promote Safety Sharing through Voluntary Information
    Systems
          Modernize Pipeline Incident Notification with Online
    Filing
          Allow Risk-Based Inspections for Storage Tanks
          Incorporate Leading Safety Standards into Program
    Requirements
                           2. Safe Low Carbon Future
        Pipelines are the safest way to deliver liquid products, including
    low carbon economy byproducts like carbon dioxide. While existing
    federal regulatory requirements on CO2 pipelines are
    extensive, Congress can provide additional safety measures and
    clarifications to close remaining gaps in pipeline safety programs.
          Update CO2 Pipeline Safety Standards
          Clarify Methane Regulation Scope
                        3. Improve PHMSA Safety Programs
        PHMSA, like the pipeline operators it oversees, can also benefit
    from adjustments reflecting continuous improvement efforts. Congress
    can help PHMSA increase the effectiveness and transparency of its
    pipeline safety programs and requirements.
          Optimize PHMSA Valve Inspection Scope
          Increase PHMSA Inspection Program Transparency
          Focus PHMSA Special Permit Program
          Improve PHMSA Enforcement Processes
          Provide Expert Pipeline Safety Regulatory Personnel
          Enhance Pipeline Right of Way Management
          Jumpstart Required Regulation of Idled Pipe
          Close Loophole in Penalties for Pipeline Attacks

    Improve Pipeline Safety Technology Demonstration Program

    Action Needed:
        Congress should prevent bureaucratic red tape from stifling new
    technologies and analytics that could improve pipeline safety.
    Background:
        In the 2020 PIPES Act, Congress recognized pipeline safety could
    benefit from harnessing the latest hi-tech inspection technologies and
    analytics. Congress authorized PHMSA to conduct a pipeline safety
    technology demonstration pilot program under certain conditions.
    However, PHMSA added a host of additional administrative, regulatory
    and legal conditions to the program, effectively preventing its use.
    Status:
        PHMSA has received no applications to conduct technology pilots.
    Pipeline operators cite the additional conditions PHMSA imposed in its
    implementation guidance as making the program infeasible.

    Promote Safety Sharing through Voluntary Information Systems

    Action Needed:
        Congress should authorize a Voluntary Information Sharing (VIS)
    program based on the recommendations of the public advisory committee
    formed pursuant to the 2016 pipeline safety reauthorization law.
    Background:
        Programs where regulators, operators, vendors, unions and safety
    advocates can share information, with appropriate legal protections,
    and develop joint safety recommendations, have found success at FAA.
    Interested stakeholders developed a legislative proposal to implement
    recommendations of the Congressional VIS public advisory committee.
    That language did not reach consensus before the 2020 Pipes Act.
    Status:
        Stakeholders appear to have agreement on draft legislative language
    after overcoming remaining issues which prevented VIS inclusion in the
    2020 Pipes Act.

    Modernize Pipeline Incident Notification with Online Filing

    Action Needed:
        Congress should require the National Response Center (NRC) to
    develop and allow use of a simple and quick online incident
    notification system.
    Background:
        The NRC currently requires placing a telephone call to the NRC to
    notify it of a pipeline incident. Operators and regulators have
    experienced lengthy delays waiting for a live person to answer the
    phone at NRC. In the decades since the NRC first established its
    telephone requirement, web-based applications accessed online now allow
    for simple and quick notification to all stakeholders.
    Status:
        Online notification of pipeline incidents, such as through a simple
    online app, is not currently available.

    Allow Risk-Based Inspections for Storage Tanks

    Action Needed:
        Congress should prevent unnecessary greenhouse gas and air
    pollutant emissions, worker safety threats and hazardous waste by
    allowing risk-based storage tank inspections.
    Background:
        PHMSA regulation requires inspection of petroleum storage tanks on
    fixed schedules, regardless of their actual maintenance needs. The
    early draining and cleanout of tanks to perform unneeded inspections
    releases greenhouse gas emissions and air pollutants, subjects workers
    to unnecessary risks in confined spaces, and creates hazardous waste
    needing disposal. Current industry standards on tank inspection are
    already accepted by other federal and state agencies, including EPA's
    program.
    Status:
        Engineering assessments methods to set maintenance schedules that
    avoid climate, environmental and worker impacts are available for PHMSA
    to incorporate into regulation.

    Incorporate Leading Safety Standards into Program Requirements

    Action Needed:
        Congress should direct PHMSA to review pipeline safety best
    practices and incorporate in a timely manner, where appropriate.
    Congress should also encourage PHMSA to participate more fully in the
    standard setting process.
    Background:
        Pipeline operators develop industry-wide best practices in an open
    and multi-stakeholder collaborative process certified by the American
    National Standards Institute. These practices are technical documents
    developed by engineers and PHMSA has incorporated several into their
    regulations.
    Status:
        PHMSA is often slow to incorporate the latest editions of best
    practice standards. LEPA's legislative proposal would require PHMSA to
    review the latest editions to regulated industry standards in a timely
    manner and incorporate them where appropriate through the regular
    notice and comment process.

    Update CO2 Pipeline Safety Standards

    Action Needed:
        Congress should direct PHMSA to update existing carbon dioxide
    pipeline safety regulations in key areas.
    Background:
        Current federal pipeline safety requirements already regulate
    CO2 pipeline design, construction, operation, maintenance
    and emergency response. However, there are targeted areas in system
    coverage, impact modeling, maintenance and emergency response where
    PHMSA can do more to address the specific needs of CO2
    pipelines. These additions will promote new low carbon infrastructure.
    Status:
        While PHMSA has announced general plans to impose additional
    CO2 regulation in the future, an opportunity exists to
    direct PHMSA to act more quickly in key areas that will improve
    CO2 pipeline safety.

    Clarify PHMSA Methane Regulation Scope

    Action Needed:
        Congress should clarify the 2020 PIPES Act provisions covering
    methane monitoring and mitigation from natural gas pipelines does not
    apply to hazardous liquids pipelines.
    Background:
        The 2020 PIPES Act requires PHMSA to issue regulations for the
    monitoring and mitigation of methane from natural gas pipelines.
    Hazardous liquids pipelines delivering crude oil, gasoline, diesel fuel
    or other energy liquids do not transport or release methane and the
    PIPES Act does not include them. However, some PHMSA inspectors are
    attempting to require hazardous liquids pipeline operators to update
    their inspection and maintenance plans to meet methane monitoring and
    mitigation program requirements.
    Status:
        PHMSA interpretation and implementation of the 2020 PIPES Act
    methane provisions remains uneven.

    Optimize PHMSA Valve Inspection Scope

    Action Needed:
        Congress should direct PHMSA to revise its recent pipeline rupture
    rule to only apply additional inspection requirements to valves related
    to pipeline ruptures, and drop misapplied inspection requirements of
    all valves, including those which would not contribute to or limit a
    rupture.
    Background:
        In 2022, PHMSA required semi-annual inspection of valves that could
    mitigate the extent of a pipeline rupture. However, between the
    proposed and final versions of the rule PHMSA without notice expanded
    the requirement to include all valves, even those unrelated to
    addressing ruptures. PHMSA claims this expansion was unintended but has
    not addressed the legal uncertainty created by the change.
    Status:
        Informal PHMSA discussions to issue guidance would not change the
    clear regulatory language and legal liability presented by the final
    regulation.

    Increase PHMSA Inspection Program Transparency

    Action Needed:
        Congress should require PHMSA annually to share publicly its
    inspection priorities and number of federal and state inspections of
    pipelines across PHMSA regions. PHMSA should also ensure any guidance
    used by PHMSA inspectors is publicly available.
    Background:
        The current system of PHMSA region inspections and state inspection
    of pipelines can lead to unbalanced and duplicative inspection patterns
    across the country. More transparency would help ensure PHMSA's
    inspection program is meeting pipeline safety priorities.
    Status:
        While PHMSA is transparent with public sharing of its enforcement
    activities, PHMSA does not publicly share its inspection priorities or
    numbers of inspections across PHMSA regions and states.

    Focus PHMSA Special Permit Program

    Action Needed:
        Congress should direct PHMSA to focus requirements of its special
    permit program on issues presented by the permit request and require
    timely review of applications.
    Background:
        Key PHMSA inspection and maintenance regulations are over 20 years
    old reflecting outdated technology and knowledge of the time. Federal
    law authorizes PHMSA to issue special permits varying from existing
    regulations as long they achieve equal levels of safety or are
    consistent with the public interest. However, PHMSA's special permit
    implementation program has grown over the years to include numerous
    requirements unrelated to the variances sought. Permit reviews can also
    take multiple years.
    Status:
        PHMSA's special permit process remains stuck in unnecessary
    requirements, reviews and delays.

    Improve PHMSA Enforcement Processes

    Action Needed:
        Congress should direct PHMSA to establish a process when opening
    PHMSA enforcement proceedings to the public.
    Background:
        PHMSA historically conducted informal enforcement proceedings
    without public attendance. Public interest in pipeline cases is growing
    and PHMSA has allowed public attendance. PHMSA should set an orderly
    process for public attendance and protection of confidential
    information during proceedings.
    Status:
        There is no established process when opening PHMSA enforcement
    proceedings to the public.

    Provide Expert Pipeline Safety Regulatory Personnel

    Action Needed:
        Congress should direct DOT and PHMSA to hire experienced pipeline
    safety regulatory personnel.
    Background:
        PHMSA is a small agency with personnel limitations that prevent it
    from timely addressing Congressional mandates and evolving pipeline
    safety needs. The 2020 PIPES Act authorized PHMSA to hire additional
    inspection and regulatory personnel. PHMSA used the resources to hire
    environmental policy experts and develop a methane monitoring and
    mitigation rulemaking. Work on other pipeline safety priorities face
    years of delay.
    Status:
        DOT human resources requirements placed on PHMSA limited hiring to
    junior personnel with less skill and experience. There are no
    requirements to hire pipeline safety expertise.

    Enhance Pipeline Right of Way Management

    Action Needed:
        Congress should direct PHMSA to allow pipeline right of way
    conservation practices that benefit habitat and the environment.
    Background:
        PHMSA regulations requires activities along pipeline rights of way
    which can prevent natural habitat benefitting local wildlife and the
    environment. Conservation practices are available that balance pipeline
    monitoring and conservation.
    Status:
        Pipeline industry conservation initiatives are available for
    operator use if PHMSA allows the practice.

    Jump Start Required Regulation of Idled Pipe

    Action Needed:
        Congress should direct PHMSA to complete the Congressionally
    mandated idled pipe rulemaking.
    Background:
        Operators sometimes suspend service on pipeline systems to reflect
    market conditions and temporary lack of demand for product movement
    along certain routes. However, no current PHMSA regulations govern
    maintenance and monitoring of pipelines in an idled status or the steps
    they must take to return to full service. Congress in the 2020 PIPES
    Act mandated PHMSA issue regulations addressing idled pipe.
    Status:
        The Congressionally mandated 2-year deadline for PHMSA to complete
    an idled pipeline rulemaking expired December 2022. PHMSA regulatory
    agenda currently predicts it will not issue a proposal before November
    2023 with a future finalization date undetermined.

    Close Loophole in Penalties for Pipeline Attacks

    Action Needed:
        Congress should close loophole in criminal penalties for pipeline
    attacks that are dangerous but do not result in damage.
    Background:
        Multiple past cases of attacks on pipelines and pipeline
    infrastructure posed a danger to the attackers, general public and
    environment. The federal government has obtained convictions on attacks
    resulting in physical damage to energy infrastructure. However, attacks
    that manipulate pipeline valves or other equipment, while not resulting
    in physical damage, are still dangerous due to risk of explosion or
    product release from a pressure buildup and rupture. Judges have
    dismissed prosecution of such cases because they did not result in
    physical damage, as the statute is currently interpreted.
    Status:
        Provisions exist in Title 18 against damaging energy infrastructure
    and Title 49 against damaging or destroying pipeline infrastructure,
    but there are no provisions against dangerous non-damaging activities.

        Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Black.
        Mr. Grubb, you are now recognized for 5 minutes.

    TESTIMONY OF KENNETH W. GRUBB, CHIEF OPERATING OFFICER, NATURAL
    GAS PIPELINES, KINDER MORGAN, INC., ON BEHALF OF THE INTERSTATE
               NATURAL GAS ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA (INGAA)

        Mr. Grubb. Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, and
    members of the subcommittee, good morning. My name is Kenneth
    Grubb, and I am the chief operating officer for natural gas
    pipelines at Kinder Morgan. As an engineer with over 30 years
    of experience in the pipeline sector, I appreciate the
    opportunity to testify before your subcommittee today.
        Kinder Morgan is one of the largest energy infrastructure
    companies in North America. We have an interest in or operate
    approximately 82,000 miles of pipeline that transport natural
    gas and other products that are essential to daily lives.
        Kinder Morgan is a member of the Interstate Natural Gas
    Association of America, also known as INGAA, which is a trade
    association that represents the interstate natural gas pipeline
    and storage industry. I am here today representing INGAA.
        INGAA's members transport the vast majority of the natural
    gas consumed in the United States through a network of
    approximately 200,000 miles of interstate transmission
    pipelines. These transmission pipelines are critical
    infrastructure systems spanning multiple States, and deliver
    natural gas to end users such as local distribution companies,
    electricity generators, industrial manufacturers, and LNG
    export facilities.
        Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil fuel, and as
    demand for energy increases, expanded use of natural gas has
    helped improve air quality across the country by offsetting the
    use of higher carbon-intensive fuels. According to the Energy
    Information Administration, between 2005 and 2019, carbon
    dioxide emissions from the U.S. power sector declined by 33
    percent, with natural gas accounting for more than half of
    those reductions.
        Additionally, INGAA's members are committed to working
    together as an industry towards achieving net-zero greenhouse
    gas emissions by 2050. With that said, there are four key
    points I wish to make today.
        First, INGAA's number-one priority is safety, and we
    support having a strong safety regulator. Regulators and
    industry experts alike, including the U.S. Department of
    Transportation and PHMSA, have agreed for decades that
    pipelines are the safest mode of energy transportation.
    Accidents are rare, and INGAA's members are committed to making
    them increasingly infrequent. INGAA's members work every day
    towards a goal of zero pipeline incidents. To help achieve this
    goal, INGAA fundamentally believes in having a strong safety
    regulator, and we also support robust, durable regulations
    written by PHMSA to ensure the safety of our Nation's pipeline
    systems.
        Second, PHMSA should complete its work on the class
    location rulemaking and issue a final rule. INGAA's top
    regulatory priority is completion of the class location
    rulemaking, which presents opportunities to increase safety and
    protect the environment. Existing regulations affecting this
    issue are over 50 years old. It is long overdue to update them
    to reflect modern safety technologies. Every year this
    regulation is not final, we estimate that 800 million standard
    cubic feet of natural gas is unnecessarily released to the
    atmosphere.
        Additionally, INGAA members unnecessarily spend between
    $200 and $300 million per year to replace perfectly safe pipe.
    INGAA is hopeful that PHMSA will quickly finalize this crucial
    rule.
        Third, the Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee, also known as
    GPAC, strengthens rulemakings and should meet more frequently.
    The GPAC, which provides technical safety guidance to PHMSA, is
    comprised of equal representation from the natural gas
    industry, Federal and State agencies, and the public. Until
    recently, GPAC met frequently. However, since January 2021, the
    GPAC has only met once. With the known benefits of GPAC, INGAA
    believes that Congress should consider requiring PHMSA to hold
    at least two GPAC meetings per year.
        Lastly, PHMSA should prioritize hiring safety engineers to
    assist with its rulemakings. INGAA recognizes that pipeline
    safety regulations are complicated and often take years to
    write. To help assist with rulemaking backlogs that frequently
    occur, PHMSA should hire more safety engineers who already
    understand pipeline systems. This will result in a more
    efficient process to produce effective rules.
        In conclusion, I truly appreciate the opportunity to
    testify in front of your subcommittee today. Your efforts are
    critical to ensuring PHMSA has the resources and direction
    necessary to continually improve safety in our industry.
        I look forward to your questions, and I thank you for your
    time.
        [Mr. Grubb's prepared statement follows:]

       Prepared Statement of Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief Operating Officer,
    Natural Gas Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc., on behalf of the Interstate
                   Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)
        Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, and Members of the
    Subcommittee:
        Good morning. My name is Kenneth Grubb, and I am the Chief
    Operating Officer for Natural Gas Pipelines at Kinder Morgan.
        Kinder Morgan is one of the largest energy infrastructure companies
    in North America. Access to reliable, affordable energy is a critical
    component to improving lives around the world, and we are committed to
    providing energy transportation and storage services in a safe,
    efficient, and environmentally responsible manner for the benefit of
    people, communities, and businesses we serve. We have an interest in or
    operate approximately 82,000 miles of pipelines, 140 terminals, 700
    billion cubic feet (Bcf) of working natural gas storage capacity and
    have renewable natural gas generation capacity of approximately 2.2 Bcf
    per year of gross production with up to an additional 5.2 Bcf in
    development. Our pipelines transport natural gas, renewable fuels,
    refined petroleum products, crude oil, condensate, CO2 and
    other products, and our terminals store and handle various commodities
    including gasoline, diesel fuel, chemicals, ethanol, metals and
    petroleum coke.
        Kinder Morgan is a member of the Interstate Natural Gas Association
    of America (INGAA), which is a trade association that represents the
    interstate natural gas pipeline and storage industry. I am here today
    representing INGAA.
        INGAA's members transport the vast majority of the natural gas
    consumed in the United States through a network of approximately
    200,000 miles of interstate transmission pipelines. These transmission
    pipelines are analogous to the interstate highway system; in other
    words, they are large capacity, critical infrastructure systems
    spanning multiple states or regions to deliver natural gas to end users
    such as local distribution companies, electricity generators,
    industrial manufacturers and LNG export facilities.
        I serve as Chief Operating Officer (COO) of the Natural Gas
    Pipelines Group for Kinder Morgan, Inc. In this capacity, I am
    responsible for all operational activities of the Kinder Morgan Natural
    Gas Pipelines Group, which encompasses approximately 70,000 miles of
    pipelines including natural gas transmission, gas storage, gathering,
    and processing facilities. I have served in this capacity since 2017.
    Before assuming this role, I held various other roles in operations,
    engineering, system design, project management, and construction and
    have over 32 years of experience in the energy sector.
        For more than a decade, the shale revolution has gifted our country
    with abundant natural gas supplies, which has elevated the need for
    additional infrastructure to move it around the country. Pipelines make
    it possible to deliver North America's abundant natural gas reserves to
    fuel our homes, businesses, and the American economy, and are the
    safest and most efficient way to transport this critical energy source.
        INGAA's members deliver clean, abundant, affordable natural gas
    throughout North America. Natural gas is the cleanest burning fossil
    fuel and, as demand for energy increases, expanded use of natural gas
    has helped improve air quality across the country by offsetting the use
    of higher carbon-intensive fuels. According to the Energy Information
    Administration, between 2005-2019, carbon dioxide emissions from the
    U.S. power sector declined by 33 percent, with natural gas accounting
    for more than half of those reductions. INGAA's members are committed
    to modernizing our nation's interstate natural gas delivery network
    infrastructure, lowering emissions from our operations, and mitigating
    the impacts of climate change by working together as an industry
    towards achieving net-zero greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 2050.
        Thank you for the opportunity to testify at this hearing. There are
    four key points I wish to make in this testimony on behalf of the
    natural gas transmission pipeline industry.
       1. INGAA's number one priority is safety, and we support having a
                            strong safety regulator.
        Regulators and industry experts alike, including the U.S.
    Department of Transportation and the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials
    Safety Administration (PHMSA), have agreed for decades that pipelines
    are the safest mode of energy transportation. Accidents are rare, and
    INGAA's members are committed to making them increasingly infrequent.
    INGAA's members work every day towards a goal of zero pipeline
    incidents.
        INGAA fundamentally believes in having a strong safety regulator.
    For years, INGAA has sought robust, durable regulations led by PHMSA to
    ensure that all operators are held accountable to operate their systems
    in the safest manner possible. We take our commitment to safety
    seriously and appreciate the role that PHMSA plays to ensure that
    industry keeps its focus, and the public can have confidence in the
    safety and reliability of natural gas pipelines.
        Pipeline companies consider safety every step of the way, from
    planning, to construction, to maintenance. Our members purchase top-
    quality materials, address any potential safety or security issues
    during the pipeline planning and citing process, and conduct consistent
    quality and safety checks throughout the construction process. Once
    operational, pipeline companies work to prevent releases by evaluating,
    inspecting, and maintaining pipelines.
        Kinder Morgan is committed to the safe operations of our assets.
    Our pipeline and personal safety program metrics along with our safety
    goals are transparent to the public and are prominently posted on our
    website. We remain engaged with PHMSA and in-line inspection (ILI) tool
    vendors to further the development of ILI tool technology. As an
    example, one of Kinder Morgan's pipelines was the first to gain PHMSA
    acceptance to utilize Electro-Magnetic Acoustic Transducer (EMAT)
    technology to assess for the presence of environmentally induced
    cracking threats in lieu of the traditional hydrostatic testing
    technology that was used to manage these threats previously.
        As part of on-going safety, pipeline companies conduct integrity
    management and continuous improvement programs in the areas of
    evaluation, inspection, and maintenance. A key component of integrity
    management programs is the use of ILI tools, sometimes called ``smart
    pigs.'' Pipeline companies run these tools to detect any potentially
    harmful defects in the pipeline. These modern methods of pipe
    inspection have improved greatly over the last 30 years and are more
    effective, efficient, and environmentally sound compared to other
    assessment methods, with the added benefit of not significantly
    interrupting the operation of the pipeline.
        INGAA's commitment to safety has been an essential priority for
    years. After the unfortunate and tragic incident in San Bruno,
    California, in 2010, INGAA member companies worked proactively to
    improve the industry's safety performance. This effort developed a set
    of guiding principles for pipeline safety, anchored around a goal of
    zero pipeline incidents, titled the ``Integrity Management, Continuous
    Improvement'' (IMCI) program. Since its inception, our industry has
    made rapid advances in safety technology and practices in continuous
    pursuit of our achieving this goal.
        INGAA members recently updated the IMCI program to ensure the
    reliability and resiliency of our infrastructure as we work to safely
    support the energy transition and evolve to a net-zero GHG economy.
    Similar to the EMAT technology previously mentioned, we also focused on
    advancing safety from newer technologies that will hopefully become
    more widespread throughout the industry and by regulators. This updated
    effort, titled IMCI 2.0 was created with the input of PHMSA, the
    National Transportation Safety Board, the National Association of
    Regulatory Utility Commissioners, the National Association of Pipeline
    Safety Representatives, and the Pipeline Safety Trust. The IMCI effort
    follows five guiding principles:
        1.  Our goal is zero incidents;
        2.  We are committed to a strong safety culture;
        3.  We will be relentless in our pursuit of improving by learning;
        4.  We are committed to implementing and continuously improving
    pipeline safety; management systems, and;
        5.  We will regularly engage our stakeholders.

        INGAA's work on the IMCI 2.0 program is nearly complete and we plan
    to share the results with key stakeholders later this year.
    2. PHMSA should complete its work on the class location rulemaking and
                              issue a final rule.
        INGAA's top regulatory priority with PHMSA is completion of the
    class location rulemaking, which presents opportunities to increase
    safety and protect the environment. The class location change
    regulations have not been substantively updated in over 50 years and
    revising them has been an INGAA goal for more than two decades. We were
    pleased that PHMSA issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) on the
    class location rule in October 2020. We were also greatly appreciative
    that Congress included a provision in the enacted 2020 PIPES Act that
    required the agency to hold a Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC)
    meeting to review the NPRM by the end of 2021.
        This proposed rulemaking would address scenarios where population
    changes around our pipelines necessitate changes to existing pipeline
    infrastructure. When a class location change occurs, the current
    regulations may require operators to replace the existing pipe even
    when an engineering assessment, including modern inspection tools, has
    shown it to be in safe, operational condition. The advancements in ILI
    tools and other safety technologies help enhance company decision
    making to make repairs and, in many cases, lessen the need for
    disruptive pipe replacements.
        This causes two main problems. When PHMSA requires operators to
    replace pipes, operators must ensure that no gas is in the pipe they
    are about to replace, which results in service disruptions and natural
    gas being released to the atmosphere. Secondly, INGAA estimates that
    the existing requirements costs its members $200-$300 million per year
    to unnecessarily replace perfectly safe pipe. These funds could be
    better used to address other aspects of our safety systems.
        INGAA also estimates that class change pipe replacements under the
    current regulations result in up to 800 million standard cubic feet of
    natural gas blowdowns to the atmosphere annually. To put that into
    perspective, this quantity of gas could meet the needs of over 10,000
    homes for a year and has the same GHG reduction benefits of removing
    80,000 cars from the road. The single best way to further reduce
    methane emissions by the natural gas pipeline industry is to decrease
    the number of ``blow downs'' or voluntary releases of gas. Finalizing
    the rulemaking would substantially decrease methane emissions by
    stopping these unnecessary releases of gas into the atmosphere.
        Historically, in place of a class location pipeline replacement
    change, INGAA members have submitted special permit applications to
    prove the safety of their pipes. However, these applications are
    burdensome to not only the industry, but also to PHMSA. Some of the
    problems include the process changing regularly and that it can take up
    to three years to approve a single permit. Finalizing this rule will
    provide regulatory certainty and consistency for industry stakeholders
    and the regulator.
        INGAA is hopeful that PHMSA will hold a GPAC meeting as soon as
    possible and issue this crucial rule to improve safety and meet the
    collective goal of industry and the Biden Administration to lower GHG
    emissions.
     3. The Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) strengthens rulemakings
                        and should meet more frequently.
        The GPAC is an advisory committee to the Department of
    Transportation and PHMSA on matters of natural gas pipeline safety and
    regulatory oversight. The GPAC is comprised of 15 members, with equal
    representation from the natural gas industry, federal and state
    agencies, and the public (such as safety advocates and emergency
    managers). GPAC's stated role is to review PHMSA's proposed regulatory
    initiatives to ensure the technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-
    effectiveness, and practicability of each proposal. PHMSA is not bound
    by GPAC recommendations but must include its rationale for disagreeing
    with the recommendations in the preamble text of final rules. These
    processes are required by statute.
        GPAC can play an important role in completing our collective
    objective to enhance gas pipeline safety regulations. The time needed
    to complete a rulemaking is affected, in part, by the quantity and
    quality of dialogue with impacted stakeholders. Their dialogue is
    especially important when the subject of a rulemaking is a complex,
    technical topic such as pipeline safety regulation. New rules should
    leverage stakeholder knowledge and expertise to facilitate the
    deployment of new technologies and practices that are more effective
    and efficient, and less disruptive than the legacy methods that may be
    reflected in existing regulations.
        Until recently, GPAC met regularly to consider important rules and
    discuss important safety advancements. However, since January 2021, the
    GPAC has only met once. With the known benefits of GPAC, INGAA believes
    that Congress should consider requiring PHMSA to hold at least two GPAC
    meetings per year.
        Furthermore, PHMSA has chosen to disagree with a number of
    unanimous GPAC recommendations to multiple recent important final
    rules. While INGAA does not challenge PHMSA's independence to make
    these decisions, we believe that Congress can strengthen transparency
    by receiving detailed briefings from PHMSA on their rationales for
    these conclusions soon after issuing final rules.
     4. PHMSA should prioritize hiring safety engineers to assist with its
                                  rulemakings.
        As I stated earlier, INGAA appreciates the important role of having
    a strong safety regulator. An effective way to remain strong is for
    PHMSA to invest in hiring qualified safety engineers to assist with
    writing rules.
        INGAA recognizes that pipeline safety regulations are complicated
    and often take years of work to be drafted and implemented. To help
    assist with the rulemaking backlogs that frequently occur, adding
    safety engineers to PHMSA's team who already understand pipeline
    systems and federal code would be a great asset to the agency.
        INGAA was pleased that Congress included in Section 102 of the
    PIPES Act of 2020 provisions requiring PHMSA to hire ``eight full-time
    employees with subject matter expertise in pipeline safety, pipeline
    facilities, and pipeline systems to finalize outstanding rulemakings
    and fulfill congressional mandates.'' We are hopeful that PHMSA can
    successfully hire safety engineers to fulfil this requirement in a
    timely manner.
        In conclusion, I truly appreciate the opportunity to testify in
    front of your Subcommittee today. Your efforts are critical to ensuring
    that PHMSA has the resources and direction necessary to continually
    improve safety in our industry.

        Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Grubb.
        Mr. Caram, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

     TESTIMONY OF BILL CARAM, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PIPELINE SAFETY
                                 TRUST

        Mr. Caram. Thank you, Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne,
    and members of the subcommittee for the opportunity to speak
    today on pipeline safety.
        My organization, the Pipeline Safety Trust, was formed
    after the devastating Olympic pipeline tragedy that stole the
    lives of three boys in Bellingham, Washington, in 1999, a
    tragedy Ranking Member Larsen so eloquently described.
        The U.S. Justice Department was so appalled at the
    operations of the pipeline company and the lax oversight from
    the Federal Government that they asked the Federal courts to
    set aside money from the settlement to create the Pipeline
    Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog over the
    pipeline industry and its regulators. And it is with that
    spirit that I am speaking to you today.
        Everyone here today values safe communities, and we all
    share the goal of zero incidents. However, pipeline failures
    continue unabated, and we now face a potential new generation
    of nonhydrocarbon pipelines posing their own unique risks to
    our communities, and making our goal of zero incidents even
    further out of reach.
        Since the last pipeline safety legislation was passed in
    December of 2020, a bit over 2 years ago, our Nation's
    pipelines have had over 1,300 reportable failures, more than 1
    per day, killed or injured to the point of in-patient
    hospitalization 74 people, and caused nearly $1 billion in
    property damage. These failures include recent tragedies like
    the El Paso gas transmission pipeline explosion that killed
    two, including a 14-year-old girl, and the Consumers Energy
    explosion in Flint, Michigan, that killed two, including a 3-
    year-old girl, and also many high-profile hazardous liquid
    failures spilling millions of gallons of oil and gasoline into
    our rivers, oceans, and groundwater, including Colonial
    Pipeline's more than 2-million-gallon gasoline spill in a
    nature preserve in Huntersville, North Carolina.
        To give a brief overview of our Nation's state of pipeline
    safety, I am sad to say that, when looking at the data, we
    haven't made much progress. We can, of course, pick out time
    periods to show trends either going up or down. However, going
    back to 2010, which I believe to be an objective starting
    point, since that is when PHMSA changed some of its reporting
    criteria, incident trends on all categories of pipelines,
    including incidents impacting people or the environment, are
    statistically flat. We are not making progress.
        To start making a real difference on pipeline safety.
    Congress needs to remove the statutory handcuffs it has placed
    on the rules PHMSA can produce. PHMSA is the only agency with a
    statutory cost-benefit requirement, an especially difficult
    hurdle to clear for infrastructure with low probabilities of
    failure, yet enormously devastating consequences.
        PHMSA is also prohibited by statute from adopting design,
    initial testing, and construction standards that would apply to
    the existing 3 million miles of existing pipelines. Because of
    this nonapplication clause, PHMSA has been unable to require
    rupture mitigation valves in high-consequence areas--an NTSB
    recommendation after PG&E's pipeline tragedy in San Bruno,
    California, in 2010. Of course, it is the aging infrastructure
    of existing pipelines that need this kind of lifesaving
    technology the most.
        I want to take a moment to discuss one specific pipeline
    failure from 2020, a carbon dioxide pipeline operated by
    Denbury that failed near Satartia, Mississippi. Carbon dioxide
    is an asphyxiant that is heavier than air, and can therefore
    travel in dangerous and even lethal concentrations for long
    distances, displacing oxygen.
        Nearly the entire community of 200 in Satartia was
    evacuated, with 45 of them seeking treatment at the hospital.
    Residents lost consciousness, had seizures, foamed at the
    mouth. First responders heroically pulled many to safety while
    donning scuba gear, probably saving lives, their truck engines
    unable to operate in the oxygen-deprived environment. The
    community of Satartia is incredibly lucky to not have suffered
    any fatalities.
        As Congress has highly incentivized carbon capture and
    sequestration, communities are looking at a potentially
    enormous buildout of CO2 pipelines. Currently
    relatively rare and remote, experts are predicting a future
    with 20 times or more the amount of CO2 pipelines,
    and much closer to communities.
        On top of this, they are dangerously unregulated. Current
    PHMSA standards only regulate CO2 pipelines if in a
    supercritical fluid with more than 90 percent purity.
    Therefore, gas and liquid CO2 pipelines are
    unregulated. Many man-made sources of CO2 can have
    much higher levels of impurities that pose public health and
    pipeline integrity issues such as corrosion. There are no PHMSA
    standards on levels of these dangerous impurities. Congress
    should mandate that PHMSA regulate these and the other equally
    frightening regulatory gaps that need to be addressed before
    the public can have any kind of confidence in a potential
    national buildout of CO2 pipelines.
        In order to honor the value we place on safe communities,
    Congress needs to give PHMSA more authority, more resources,
    and implement the safety recommendations I have detailed in my
    written testimony.
        Thank you again for inviting me to testify today. I look
    forward to answering any questions the subcommittee may have
    and helping Congress improve the Nation's state of pipeline
    safety.
        [Mr. Caram's prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Bill Caram, Executive Director, Pipeline Safety
                                     Trust
        Good morning, Chairman Nehls, Ranking Member Payne, Committee Chair
    Graves, Committee Ranking Member Larsen, and members of the Committee.
    Thank you for inviting me to speak today on the vital subject of
    pipeline safety. My name is Bill Caram, and I am the Executive Director
    of the Pipeline Safety Trust.
        The Pipeline Safety Trust was created after the Olympic Pipe Line
    tragedy in Bellingham, Washington in 1999. That entirely preventable
    failure spilled nearly a quarter-million gallons of gasoline into a
    beautiful salmon stream in the heart of our community which eventually
    ignited and killed three boys. The U.S. Justice Department was so
    appalled at the operations of the pipeline company and equally appalled
    at the lax oversight from the federal government, that they asked the
    federal courts to set aside money from the settlement to create the
    Pipeline Safety Trust as an independent national watchdog organization
    over the pipeline industry and its regulators.
        We work to ensure that no other community must endure the senseless
    grief that Bellingham has had to experience from a pipeline tragedy.
    Sadly, there have been many senseless pipeline tragedies and disasters
    since Bellingham. I am here today, hoping that we can continue to work
    together in a bipartisan way, to help us move towards our shared goal
    of zero incidents. Today I would like to focus my testimony on:
          Overview of the state of U.S. pipeline safety
          Critical pipeline safety issues
          +  Eliminate cost-benefit requirements under 49 U.S.C. Sec.
    60102
          +  Eliminate the nonapplication clause in 49 U.S.C. Sec.
    60104(b)
          +  Include mandamus clause
          +  Prohibit reportable unintended releases
          +  Increase authorized appropriations and add recruitment and
    retention flexibility
          +  Require rupture mitigation valves on existing gas pipelines in
    High Consequence Areas
          +  Improve carbon dioxide pipeline safety regulations
          +  Improve hydrogen pipeline safety
          +  Improve geohazard mitigation regulations
          +  Natural gas incident reporting
          Public transparency improvements
          +  National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) Improvements
          +  Require operators to disclose certain safety information
          +  Improve reporting data metrics
          +  Create Office of Public Engagement
          Other needed safety improvements
          +  Increase penalties
          +  Eliminate natural gas operator's choice in determining High
    Consequence Areas
          +  Close class location loophole on building occupancy
          +  Eliminate safety related condition report exemptions
          +  Require mandatory reporting of liquid over-pressurization
    events
          +  Require improvements to state 811 damage prevention programs
          +  Mandate offshore pipeline safety improvements
          +  Clarify ``confirmed discovery'' definition
          Appendix
          +  Statutory and regulatory language where appropriate
                 Overview of the State of U.S. Pipeline Safety
        Since Congress passed the PIPES Act of 2020, a little over two
    years ago, there have been 1,300 reportable pipeline failures, more
    than one per day, 74 people have been either killed or injured to the
    point of in-patient hospitalization, and nearly $1 Billion in property
    damage.
        While everyone on today's panel supports the goal of zero
    incidents, unfortunately, we have a long way to go. While you can slice
    and dice data opportunistically to demonstrate progress, when you look
    at the PHMSA reported data objectively, we are not making real progress
    on pipeline safety. My organization looked at the data going back to
    2010 since that is when PHMSA changed some reporting. That is the
    longest period we can analyze without some data manipulation, and we
    believe that to be an objective starting point. Total incidents for gas
    and hazardous liquids show a trend line going down very slightly--a
    basically flat line with no real progress over the past twelve years.

                 Source: PHMSA Incident and Mileage Data (2023)

                 Source: PHMSA Incident and Mileage Data (2023)

        Filtering for only those incidents deemed ``significant'' by PHMSA,
    we see a trend that is slightly increasing. For all the progress the
    industry touts on technological advancements and safety management
    systems, we are not moving towards our target of zero incidents.
        Also of concern is the fact that approximately two-thirds of all
    incidents and significant incidents are from causes that are under the
    operator's direct control such as corrosion, incorrect operations,
    equipment failures, and problems with materials, welds, and equipment.

        Over the past twenty years, regulators and industry have focused
    much emphasis in reducing pipeline incidents on ``Integrity
    Management'' efforts in ``High Consequence Areas.'' The theory behind
    Integrity Management programs makes perfect sense--focus efforts in
    those areas where the most harm to people and the environment may
    occur, work hard to identify all risks in those areas, put into place
    programs to test for and mitigate those risks, and implement a
    continuous improvement program to drive down the number of failures.
        Unfortunately, for both hazardous liquid and gas transmission
    pipelines these Integrity Management programs do not seem to have lived
    up to their promise. Incident rates within High Consequence Areas as
    compared to outside HCAs continue to climb in the case of hazardous
    liquid pipelines and do no better with regards to gas transmission
    pipelines. These two graphs, generated from PHMSA's Integrity
    Management Data, demonstrate our concern with current integrity
    management programs. Some in the industry argue that older,
    prescriptive class location rules can now be relaxed because of the
    implementation of Integrity Management, but as the graphs show: It is
    too early to go to a performance-based Integrity Management system
    until the industry can prove that Integrity Management works as it
    should.
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        The below chart visualizes the ratio of incident rates inside HCAs
    vs outside. Values above zero mean that HCA rates are worse inside an
    HCA vs outside, meaning Integrity Management programs are not working.
    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                   Incident Rate = Incidents per 1,000 Miles
      Source: PHMSA Annual Reports, Flagged Files, and Mileage Data (2005-
                                    Present)

                        Critical Pipeline Safety Issues
        Please note, suggested statutory and regulatory language is
    provided for each issue, when applicable, in the appendix at the end of
    this testimony.
    Eliminate cost-benefit requirements under 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60102
        PHMSA rulemaking is subject to two sets of cost-benefit
    requirements: one under the Pipeline Safety Act and one under Executive
    Order 12866, which requires an economic analysis of every major rule
    reviewed by the Office of Management and Budget. While the additional
    analysis does not mandate that the benefit of new regulations outweigh
    the cost, that is often how the industry and PHMSA itself views this
    requirement--making passage of new regulations difficult or nearly
    impossible in some areas. In fact, the industry, represented by
    American Petroleum Institute (API) and GPA Midstream, are suing PHMSA
    over its new gas gathering rule.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ Tom DiChristopher, Pipeline Industry Takes Dispute Over US
    Gathering Line Rule to Court, S&P Global (June 7, 2022) https://
    www.spglobal.com/marketintelligence/en/news-insights/latest-news-
    headlines/pipeline-industry-takes-dispute-over-us-gathering-line-rule-
    to-court-70713022.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 1996, a concerted Congressional effort was made to insert cost-
    benefit analysis requirements into rulemaking requirements under a
    whole host of environmental protection and health statutes, presumably
    to reduce regulatory burden and codify the requirements for regulatory
    cost benefit analyses put in place by Presidents Reagan and Clinton in
    Executive Orders. Those Congressional efforts ultimately fell short of
    widespread success because so many members of Congress realized how
    such measures in the statute would provide a well-funded industry a
    strong litigation hook that would make easy to challenge new
    regulations and nearly impossible to protect people's health and
    safety. The 1996 reauthorization of the pipeline safety program, based
    solely on timing, represents the only health and safety or
    environmental protection statute where such an explicit directive to an
    administrative agency to base regulation of risk on a cost-benefit test
    was inserted into law.\2\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ Sara Gosman, Justifying Safety: The Paradox of Rationality,
    Social Sci. Res. Network (Apr. 22, 2017).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We urge Congress to put PHMSA's rulemaking on an even playing field
    with all other agencies by amending 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60102 to eliminate
    references to the risk assessment/cost-benefit analysis in Sec.
    60102(b)(2)(D) and (E); Sec.  60102(b)(3), (4), (5) and (6). PHMSA
    would remain subject to the requirements of the Executive Orders
    requiring a cost benefit analysis of major rules proposed by any
    agency, and the requirements for transparency in rulemaking provided by
    the existing statute and procedures.
    Eliminate the Nonapplication Clause in 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60104(b)
        49 U.S.C. Sec.  60104(b) specifically prohibits PHMSA from adopting
    a design, installation, construction, initial inspection, or initial
    testing standard from applying to existing pipelines.
        After PGE's tragic failure in San Bruno, CA, when operators were
    unable to close valves and isolate the fuel feeding the blowtorch
    destroying a neighborhood for nearly two hours, NTSB recommended PHMSA
    require operators to install Automatic-Shut-Off or Remote-Controlled
    Valves in all High-Consequence Areas (HCAs), including existing
    pipelines.\3\ Even if such a regulation could survive the statutory
    cost-benefit requirement, it would be prohibited by section 60104(b).
    This means that despite the fact that the science behind safe pipeline
    operation continues to develop, there will almost always be thousands
    or even millions of miles of operational pipelines to which improved
    safety standards will never apply. Often, it is the ageing pipelines
    that need these minimum safety improvements the most. Additionally,
    this is a critical problem at this moment in history, when
    congressional investments have been made that have spurred interest in
    developing carbon dioxide and hydrogen pipelines. Because of the
    nonapplication clause, if PHMSA does modernize its woefully out-of-date
    CO2 pipeline construction standards or develop special
    standards for hydrogen pipelines prior to their construction, the
    regulations will not apply to any pipelines already in the ground.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Accident Report: Pacific Gas and
    Electric Company Natural Gas Transmission Pipeline Rupture and Fire San
    Bruno, California September 9, 2010, NSTB/PAR-11/01 (Aug. 30, 2011)
    https://tinyurl.com/56tfuw9w
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress should eliminate the nonapplication clause found at 49
    U.S.C. Sec.  60104(b) to ensure that design, installation,
    construction, initial inspection, and initial testing standards can
    apply to existing pipelines when appropriate.
    Include Mandamus Clause
        In 2015, the City of San Francisco, after witnessing the terrible
    nearby tragedy in San Bruno, felt so strongly that PHMSA was failing to
    uphold the statutory requirements and Congressional mandates under the
    Pipeline Safety Act that it went to court to force PHMSA to do so. The
    Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, without addressing the merits of the
    case, dismissed the case with an opinion holding that the Pipeline
    Safety Act does not provide the basis of a mandamus action to force
    PHMSA to carry out a duty under the Act.\4\ The court relied, in part,
    on the absence of any explicit mandamus remedy at 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60121
    (``Actions by private persons'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ City & County of San Francisco v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., No.
    12-cv-0711 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 28, 2013) (granting motion to dismiss)
    https://tinyurl.com/kecae69f.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Trust strongly believes that local and state governments, and
    others, should be able to ask the courts to carry out what Congress has
    required of it in statute. This is a common protection in many other
    laws. We urge Congress to include the following language in this year's
    reauthorization to close this loophole.
    Prohibit Reportable Unintended Releases
        In 2013, a major failure occurred on ExxonMobil's Pegasus Pipeline
    in Arkansas causing 134,000 gallons of crude oil to spill into a
    neighborhood, contaminating homes and yards, a creek, wetlands, and
    Lake Conway. In a review of the PHMSA enforcement action following the
    2013 spill, the Fifth Circuit found that an operator can cause a
    reportable incident, or even a significant incident, without
    necessarily having violated a safety regulation.\5\ As written, the
    pipeline safety statutes do not expressly prohibit the release of gas
    or hazardous liquid from a pipeline.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ ExxonMobil Pipeline Co. v. U.S. Dep't of Transp., Order on
    Petition for Review, No. 16-60448 (Aug. 14, 2017) https://
    www.ca5.uscourts.gov/opinions/pub/16/16-60448-CV0.pdf.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        To close that loophole, the Pipeline Safety Trust proposes that
    section 60118 be amended to require operators to avoid releases of gas
    or hazardous liquids in quantities that would make them reportable
    incidents under PHMSA regulations. This section is subject to
    enforcement by PHMSA under Sec.  60122 or by the Attorney General under
    Sec.  60120.
    Increase Authorized Appropriations and Add Recruitment and Retention
            Flexibility
        PHMSA, already a notoriously underfunded and understaffed agency,
    has had large increases in Congressional mandates without a
    corresponding increase in funding. For example, nearly 100,000 miles of
    gas gathering lines have finally come under PHMSA regulations and
    another approximately 300,000 miles are under new reporting
    requirements. Also on the horizon is a new generation of pipelines
    carrying carbon dioxide and hydrogen, requiring new expertise and
    personnel. State programs, responsible for oversight of more than 80%
    of the nation's pipeline mileage, are also feeling the squeeze on their
    capacity.
        PHMSA has long been considered underfunded and understaffed and
    therefore reliant on the industry it is tasked to regulate for
    technical expertise on rulemaking. A 2015 Politico investigation \6\
    found that PHMSA is an agency ``that lacks the manpower to inspect the
    nation's . . . oil and gas lines, that grants the industry it regulates
    significant power to influence the rule-making process, and that has
    stubbornly failed to take a more aggressive regulatory role, even when
    ordered by Congress to do so.'' PHMSA has also long had difficulty in
    attracting and retaining experienced personnel as the industry often
    hires staff away at higher salaries.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Andrea Restuccia and Elana Shor, Pipelines Blow Up and People
    Die, Politico (Apr. 21, 2015) https://www.politico.com/story/2015/04/
    the-little-pipeline-agency-that-couldnt-217227
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Critical components to changing this culture are authorizing
    significantly more funding and allowing more flexibility in the
    recruitment and retainment of experienced personnel. We also recommend
    a significant increase to authorized funding of PHMSA's state programs.
        Congress should, when amending Section 60125 of title 49,
    subsection (a), include a substantial increase to PHMSA's authorized
    funding to reflect the enormous increase in their charge as previously
    described. Congress should also include a substantial increase for the
    State Pipeline Safety Grant Program authorized in Section 60107 of
    title 49.
    Require Rupture Mitigation Valves on Existing Gas Pipelines in High
            Consequence Areas
        Advancements to rupture mitigation valve technology have been made
    and adopted into PHMSA's regulations, but these regulations do not
    apply to existing pipelines, even on older pipes in areas that could
    affect densely populated areas. Arguably these are the pipelines that
    need this technology the most.
        In 2022, PHMSA revised its pipeline safety regulations to require
    rupture mitigation valves (RMVs), or alternative equivalent
    technologies, to newly constructed or entirely replaced onshore gas
    transmission, Type A gas gathering, and hazardous liquid pipelines with
    diameters of 6 inches or greater.\7\ The rule did not, however, require
    operators to retrofit older pipes because of the nonapplication clause
    found at 49 U.S.C. Sec. `104(b), which prohibits the Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA) from promulgating
    regulations to existing facilities. Because of this, PHMSA fell short
    of adequately implementing NTSB's recommendation.\8\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \7\ Pipeline Safety: Requirement of Valve Installation and Minimum
    Rupture Detection Standards, 87 Fed. Reg. 20,940-992 (Apr. 8, 2022).
        \8\ Nat'l Transp. Safety Bd., Press Release: NTSB Issues Response
    to PHMSA's Valve and Rupture Detection Rule, (Apr. 1, 2022) https://
    www.ntsb.gov/news/press-releases/Pages/NR20220401B.aspx
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Excluding certain pipelines from implementation of critical safety
    technology based on age is dangerous. Older pipes are likely more prone
    to failure, and it is arbitrary to require critical safety technology
    on some but not all pipelines. Requiring operator to retrofit older
    pipelines with RMVs in HCAs would protect areas with more people and
    buildings that could be affected by a failure. 49 C.F.R. Sec.  192.903.
    Because of the nonapplication clause, however, Congress must draft
    self-executing language for PHMSA to have the authority to promulgate
    these regulations.ggested language is provided in the appendix.
    Improve Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Safety Regulations
        Given the Congressional incentives driving carbon capture and
    sequestration investment, many experts expect a large increase in the
    mileage of the nation's carbon dioxide (CO2) pipelines. Once
    relatively rare and remote, these pipelines will soon be much closer to
    people and communities. The Denbury CO2 pipeline failure in
    Satartia, MS demonstrated the unique safety risks that these pipelines
    pose. An asphyxiant that is heavier than air, CO2 can move
    as a plume in a dangerous and even lethal concentration close to the
    ground for long distances after a failure. Current PHMSA safety
    regulations are inappropriate and insufficient, as described in a
    Pipeline Safety Trust report.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \9\ Accufacts, Inc., Accufacts' Perspectives on the State of
    Federal Carbon Dioxide Transmission Pipeline Safety Regulations as it
    Relates to Carbon Capture, Utilization, and Sequestration within the
    U.S. (Mar. 23, 2022) https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/03/3-
    23-22-Final-Accufacts-CO2-Pipeline-Report2.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          The current definition of ``carbon dioxide'' in the
    federal pipeline safety regulation does not apply to all CO2
    pipelines that may be developed for CCS projects.
          +  Currently, only CO2 that is moved in a
    supercritical state is regulated under the current definition, meaning
    gaseous and liquid CO2 pipelines are not currently
    regulated.
          There is currently no defined safe distance or plume
    dispersion model for developing a potential impact radius (PIR) along
    CO2 pipelines.
          +  CO2 has unique physical properties which warrant
    the development of a unique PIR zone to be promulgated into federal
    pipeline regulation.
          There is currently no requirement to add an odorant to
    transported CO2.
          +  Carbon dioxide is odorless, colorless, doesn't burn, and is
    heavier than air meaning that releases are harder to observe and
    therefore avoid.
          The unique physical properties of CO2 moved at
    high pressures through pipelines can cause running ductile fractures
    upon rupturing.
          +  This essentially means that a pipe has a higher likelihood of
    opening up like a zipper when a rupture occurs, leading to more product
    being released over a shorter period of time and potentially violent
    and dangerous pipe shrapnel.
          Contaminants within CO2 products being
    transported can jeopardize the integrity of the pipeline.
          +  Water, when mixed with carbon dioxide, can form carbonic acid
    which can rapidly erode carbon steel.
          +  Different industries can produce numerous other contaminants,
    including SOx and NOx, which can be toxic to public health, affect the
    temperature and pressure of the product, and/or cause corrosion,
    potentially impacting the safe operation of the pipeline.
          The risks associated with the conversion of existing
    transmission pipelines to CO2 service have not been fully
    investigated.
          +  Given the unique properties of CO2 mentioned
    previously, pipeline conversions have the potential to be at higher
    risk of failure from CO2 service than conventional
    hydrocarbon or even new construction CO2 pipelines.

        For the public to have any confidence in the safety of these
    pipelines proposed through communities, regulations need to be
    modernized. However, given the small number of existing mileage of
    CO2 pipelines, PHMSA may not have enough information to
    preemptively justify the cost of such improvements.
        Congress should require PHMSA to promulgate rules addressing each
    of the above-listed regulatory gaps. Given CO2's physical
    properties, unique safety risks, and ability to be transported in
    multiple phases, PHMSA should allot CO2 its own section of
    code, CFR Part 197. These rules should not be subject to PHMSA's
    statutory cost-benefit requirement.
    Improve Hydrogen Pipeline Safety
        Hydrogen has been highly incentivized in recent legislation such as
    the Production Tax Credit in the Inflation Reduction Act. Gas
    distribution operators are considering blending hydrogen into existing
    gas distribution infrastructure and the trade group the American Gas
    Association includes hydrogen blends of 20% as a key component of their
    Net Zero plan for the industry.\10\ However, hydrogen transportation by
    pipeline poses many safety risks and key knowledge gaps remain. The
    risks run highest when the pipelines are near people. At least one
    operator in Hawaii has blended hydrogen, however that system is unique
    enough that it likely cannot serve as a model for the rest of the
    country.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ American Gas Association, Net Zero Emissions Opportunities for
    Gas Utilities (Feb. 8, 2022) https://www.aga.org/wp-content/uploads/
    2022/02/aga-net-zero-emissions-opportunities-for-gas-utilities.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Hydrogen has a much higher flammability range than methane and is
    known to embrittle certain types of steel pipelines. A report on
    blending hydrogen commissioned by the California Public Utility
    Commission from University of California Riverside found an alarming
    number of safety risks and knowledge gaps. A report by Accufacts
    commissioned by the Pipeline Safety Trust \11\ stated that the weakest
    safety link for hydrogen blends in the distribution system were the
    pipes inside residences. Additionally, hydrogen has less energy density
    by volume of methane, so any blend will only deliver about a third of
    the greenhouse gas emissions (e.g., a 20% blend of hydrogen will reduce
    greenhouse gas emissions by less than 7%). Hydrogen is also a potent
    indirect greenhouse gas itself with a propensity to leak, therefore
    leaks could quickly erode all the intended climate benefits.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ Accufacts, Inc., Safety of Hydrogen Transportations by Gas
    Pipeline (Nov. 28, 2022) https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/
    11/11-28-22-Final-Accufacts-Hydrogen-Pipeline-Report.pdf
        \12\ Pipeline Safety Trust, Hydrogen Pipeline Safety Summary for
    Policymakers https://pstrust.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/01/
    hydrogen_pipeline_safety_summary_1_18_23.pdf
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress should prohibit new hydrogen blends in gas distribution
    systems until the National Academy of Sciences has issued a report from
    both a safety and climate perspective.
    Require Blended Products to be Reported to PHMSA
        An operator is only required to report the ``predominant product''
    in a natural gas pipeline system to PHMSA. This has been interpreted to
    mean only reporting a product that is >50% present, overwhelmingly
    methane/natural gas.
        Currently operators blend products such as propane or hydrogen into
    existing systems at unknown rates. In December 2022, CenterPoint Energy
    blended propane into its Southern Indiana natural gas distribution
    system incorrectly and triggered hundreds of carbon monoxide events,
    sending four people to the hospital.\13\ One operator in Hawaii is
    blending hydrogen into its gas distribution system, which we only known
    because they have volunteered the information.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Pipeline Safety Trust, CenterPoint Energy's Apology Not Enough
    (Feb. 8, 2023) https://pstrust.org/centerpoint-energys-apology-not-
    enough-more-must-be-done-to-protect-our-communities-from-pipeline-
    incidents/
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress should require operators to report to PHMSA blended, non-
    predominant products that at any point in time exceed 3% by volume.
    Improve Geohazard Mitigation Regulations
        There have been a number of recent, serious pipeline failures due
    to land movement and other geological hazards. The 2020 Enbridge
    failure in Hillsboro, Kentucky; the 2020 Denbury CO2
    pipeline failure in Satartia, MS (45 people sought treatment at the
    hospital); and the 2022 Marathon Pipe Line spill in Edwardsville, IL
    (165,000 gallons of crude spilled in and near creek) were all due to
    land movement. PHMSA has issued multiple Advisory Bulletins to
    operators on geohazard threat mitigation. Operators are required to
    mitigate against any threat within High Consequence Areas, but do not
    have any specific requirement to mitigate against geohazards outside of
    those areas. If we are committed to zero incidents, we need to address
    the risk of geohazards such as land movement, river scouring, and other
    geologic threats to pipeline integrity.
        Congress should amend 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60108 to require operators to
    include geohazard mitigation in their inspection and maintenance plans.
    Natural Gas Incident Reporting
        PHMSA can only regulate against issues that it is aware of.
    Unfortunately, shortcomings in PHMSA's incident reporting regulations
    keep it in the dark because its regulations only require reporting if
    certain thresholds are met. Consequently, many large and potentially
    dangerous incidents are not reported to the administration. This means
    that that PHMSA's safety data likely underrepresents incident
    prevalence and that the opportunity to use these incidents as a
    learning opportunity is lost. The Pipeline Safety Trust recommends that
    Congress direct PHMSA to amend part 191 of its pipeline regulations and
    reporting forms to modernize the requirements for reportable incidents.
    More detail, statutory language, and proposed regulatory amendments are
    provided in the appendix.
        Reporting of Fires and Explosions--Gas pipeline leaks are far more
    likely to result in immediate combustion and fire than hazardous liquid
    leaks. This places public safety and the environment at risk. Yet
    unlike hazardous liquid pipeline operators, gas pipeline operators are
    not required to report incidents which result in fire or explosion that
    do not meet other reporting requirements. 49 C.F.R. Sec.  191.5; Sec.
    191.3. Congress should require PHMSA to make reporting of fires and
    explosions associated with gas pipelines mandatory.
        Property Damage Thresholds--Until recently, the property damage
    thresholds for reporting incidents to PHMSA was $50,000 for both gas
    and hazardous liquid pipelines. However, in 2021, PHMSA issued final
    rule in response to industry feedback that the threshold was too low
    for gas pipelines. 86 Fed. Reg. 2219. This rule increased the gas
    incident reporting threshold for property damage to $122,000, to be
    adjusted annually for inflation. 49 C.F.R. pt. 191, app'x. With record
    inflation, the current threshold stands at a staggering $129,300. The
    gas rule excludes the value of the gas itself, which is also distinct
    from the liquid rule.
        There is no reason the property damage incident reporting
    thresholds to differ to such an extreme. This is especially true given
    the fact that methane is a major contributor to climate change and
    presents a dangerous threat to the public when leaked from pipeline
    infrastructure. Congress should require PHMSA to make the threshold for
    reporting of property damage for hazardous liquid and natural gas
    pipelines equal by lowering the property damage threshold for natural
    gas incidents back to $50,000 and require that the cost of lost product
    be included in this calculation. $50,000 is still a substantial amount
    of money for a member of the public, even if it is not for wealthy oil
    and gas companies.
        Reporting of Gas Releases--PHMSA regulations require hazardous
    liquid releases as small as 5 gallons to be reported. 49 C.F.R. Sec.
    195.50(b). By comparison, natural gas regulations, drafted before the
    collective consensus that methane emissions are a major contributor to
    climate change, are extremely permissible, requiring reporting only if
    an incident is an ``unintentional estimated'' release of three million
    cubic feet or more. Id. at Sec.  191.3(1)(iii). Not only is the release
    required to be unintentional, but the threshold is unjustifiably high.
    For context, an operator can release enough gas to power over 17,000
    U.S. homes without reporting the incident to PHMSA.\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \14\ Am. Gas Ass'n, Natural Gas: The Facts (2019) https://
    tinyurl.com/sfhm36nv (``On a daily basis, the average U.S. home uses
    175 cubic feet of natural gas.'').
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Congress should require PHMSA to acknowledge the seriousness of
    methane emissions and reduce the reporting threshold for gas pipelines
    to 50,000 cubic feet, regardless of intent. Operators are already
    required to minimize intentional and accidental releases,\15\ they
    should already have capacity to monitor for releases and be required to
    report them to PHMSA.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ Protecting our Infrastructure of Pipelines and Enhancing
    Safety Act of 2020, S. 2299, 116th Cong. Sec.  114 (2020).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        Public Transparency Improvements
    National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) Improvements
        PHMSA's National Pipeline Mapping System (NPMS) is one of the main
    ways the public can learn about pipelines in their area. However, they
    are often left in the dark with much needed information hidden from
    public view.
        NPMS is a dataset containing locations of and information about gas
    transmission and hazardous liquid pipelines and Liquefied Natural Gas
    (LNG) plants which are under the jurisdiction of PHMSA. The NPMS also
    contains voluntarily submitted breakout tank data. The data is used by
    PHMSA for emergency response, pipeline inspections, regulatory
    management and compliance, and analysis purposes. It is used by
    government officials, pipeline operators, and the general public for a
    variety of tasks including emergency response, smart growth planning,
    critical infrastructure protection, and environmental protection.
        NPMS offers operator and pipeline specific data to the public,
    first responders, and local governments. There are different versions
    of NPMS, depending on the user. The general public can see pipeline
    maps of one county at a time, with limited information about included
    pipelines and incidents. Approved government officials or pipeline
    operators gain access to more detailed pipeline maps with High
    Consequence Areas identified and additional scope and detail. Gathering
    pipelines and distribution pipelines are not included.
        Both Congress, through statutory mandates, and the NTSB, through
    recommendations, have stressed the importance of public access to this
    information. The PST believes strongly in the supportive role the
    public can play as a partner in safer pipelines, but that partnership
    is only as good as the information the public can access. Given that,
    there are several shortfalls with NPMS. The current accuracy and detail
    of the NPMS data are not sufficient to adequately assist local
    communities who are planning or preparing for potential emergencies.
    Also, no HCAs are viewable on the public maps which is problematic and
    needs to be changed. In fact, there is already a statutory requirement,
    from the Pipeline Safety Regulatory Certainty and Job Creation Act of
    2011, to incorporate HCAs into NPMS and update biennially. Congress
    should finish what it started and give the public, first responders,
    and local governments access to this critical information.
        Congress should also require the mapping of gathering pipelines.
    Gas gathering pipelines have grown in diameter and pressure in recent
    years and their safety risks can be indistinguishable from gas
    transmission pipelines in some cases. All users of NPMS need to be able
    to see where gathering lines are located.
    Require Operators to Disclose Certain Safety Information
        The public deserves more transparency about the levels of risk they
    face from pipelines in their communities and near their homes.
    Unfortunately, this information is often shielded from the public eye:
    Concerned citizens cannot obtain information about High Consequence
    Areas (HCAs), Medium Consequence Areas (MCAs), Potential Impact Radii
    (PIRs), or class locations nor can they obtain pipe size or pressure
    information, such as Maximum Operating Pressure (MOP) or Maximum
    Allowable Operating Pressure (MAOP). Operators are already submitting
    some of this information to PHMSA, but it only discloses minimal
    information to the public, such as approximate location and operator
    name via the NPMS. Allowing the public access to this information would
    significantly increase awareness regarding where integrity management
    is being implemented and allow them to weigh risks when making
    decisions such as where to live.
        Congress should amend 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60116 to require operators to
    disclose pipeline safety and attribute information to those who
    inquire.
    Improve Reporting Data Metrics
        PHMSA can improve public engagement around pipelines by making the
    data available on its website easier for the public to digest and draw
    conclusions. Multi-stakeholder groups including the public, regulators,
    and industry met in 2015 and 2017 to develop performance measures for
    natural gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. The group working on
    hazardous liquid measures created the helpful metric of Accidents
    Impacting People or the Environment (IPEs). Performance measures for
    Highly Volatile Liquids (HVLs) or Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) have not
    been developed, and the performance measures developed for hazardous
    liquid pipelines do not align with those created for natural gas
    pipelines. Over the past few years, the pipeline industry has been
    developing new standards for pipeline safety performance measures that
    do not align with those of PHMSA, potentially creating more confusion
    than clarity regarding performance.
        Congress should mandate PHMSA to convene multiple stakeholder
    groups to revisit the measures previously developed to assess their
    usefulness and effectiveness as well as develop new measures for HVLs
    and LNG. Stakeholders should include, at a minimum, Tribal governments,
    Tribal members, safety advocates, environmental advocates, state and
    federal regulators, and industry.
    Create Office of Public Engagement
        Public understanding and engagement are critical aspects in
    ensuring pipeline safety throughout the country. Currently, PHMSA, and
    more specifically the Office of Pipeline Safety, has no independent
    division to ensure effective public engagement and education in the
    pipeline safety process. PHMSA does have ``Community Liaison Services''
    which are intended to help members of the public when contacted with
    questions related to pipeline safety, however, due to lack of
    independence, training, and support from PHMSA, these services are
    significantly lacking in their ability to provide meaningful assistance
    to the public.
        For members of the public to better understand and engage in the
    regulatory and safety aspects of pipeline awareness, Congress should
    direct PHMSA to create and fund an Office of Public Engagement. This
    independently run office would build on and enhance the effort of the
    already established PHMSA Community Liaison Services program by
    providing much needed support and two-way engagement directive for the
    administration.
        The Office of Public Engagement could dispatch to communities after
    a pipeline failure to offer information and listen to residents'
    concerns. For a timely example, such an office could hold workshops
    across the Midwest and Gulf States to help educate members of the
    public on carbon dioxide pipelines and listen to the communities.
    Effective public engagement is vital to pipeline safety and an
    independent office dedicated to its values would help tremendously.
                        Other Needed Safety Improvements
    Increase Penalties
        PHMSA's penalty authority, and the agency's implementation of that
    authority, results in civil penalties that are economically
    insignificant to operators, are significantly smaller than those
    imposed by some states, and are disproportionate to the harm inflicted
    by pipeline failures. PHMSA's criminal penalty authority sets too high
    of a bar for criminal behavior and fails to hold companies accountable
    for criminal acts.
        From 2002 to 2021, PHMSA's resolved civil penalty cases amounted to
    a mere $79,622,174--less than $4 million per year.\16\ By comparison,
    in the same period, 12,793 incidents have occurred killing 276 people,
    injuring 1,145, and causing over $10.1 billion dollars in property
    damage.\17\ Despite PHMSA's 2017 maximum civil penalty adjustment to
    $209,002 for each day or $2,090,022 for a related series of violations,
    there has not been a significant increase in penalties proposed or
    collected, suggesting that PHMSA still remains reluctant to impose
    penalties In fact, some dramatic incidents have resulted in no civil
    penalties whatsoever. For example, just last year PHMSA imposed no
    penalties on operators responsible for a 165,000 gallon spill into an
    Illinois creek \18\ and a methane release of approximately 1 billion
    cubic feet.\19\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ PHMSA, Summary of Cases Involving Civil Penalties: Civil
    Penalties Resolved (2002-2021) https://tinyurl.com/dvw837tc.
        \17\ PHMSA, Pipeline Incident 20 Year Trend (Jan. 23, 2023) https:/
    /tinyurl.com/5n6njd93.
        \18\ NTSB, Marathon Pipe Line LLC Hazardous Liquids Pipeline
    Release, https://tinyurl.com/2d69wchm; PHMSA, Federal Enforcement Data,
    Marathon Pipe Line LLC (2006-2023) https://tinyurl.com/4dansv3m
    (showing no penalties for 2022 pipeline incidents).
        \19\ Letter from Robert Burrough, Director, Eastern Region Office
    of Pipeline Safety, PHMSA, to Clifford Baker, Senior Vice President,
    Equitrans Midstream Corporation (Dec. 29, 2022) https://tinyurl.com/
    2p9ekfck (proposing no fine).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Some states, notably California, have dramatically increased their
    use of civil penalties in the last decade, levying large fines like the
    one levied against PG&E following the San Bruno tragedy. The state
    regulator fined the utility $1.6 billion dollars for violations related
    to the 2010 failure in San Bruno and has since fined the utility
    additional millions relating to subsequent recordkeeping, reporting and
    other violations. These large fines are possible because the California
    and other state statutes do not have a limit on penalties for a related
    series of violations. Each day in violation is subject to another
    penalty.
        Fortunately, it is very rare that a pipeline operator violates the
    regulations in a way that would be considered criminal. The Pipeline
    Safety Trust was born from one of those rare incidents where an
    operator's actions were proven to be so reckless as to kill members of
    the public and do uncounted environmental harm. The U.S. Department of
    Justice under President Bush did an outstanding job prosecuting that
    case, fining the company, and getting jail time for company employees.
        There have only been a handful of other incidents caused by such
    reckless behavior from pipeline companies since that case nearly 20
    years ago, but it is important to not create barriers that make it
    difficult to hold companies accountable when they knowingly or
    recklessly ignore the laws meant to keep people safe. The criminal
    statute applying to pipeline safety, 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60123 requires
    that an operator ``knowingly and willfully'' violate the law--an
    unusually high bar for holding companies accountable for criminal
    behavior.
        Congress should eliminate the cap on civil penalties for related
    series of violations and impose a mandatory minimum penalty for each
    violation. Congress should direct the Secretary to amend the agency's
    regulations accordingly within 180 days and align PHMSA's pipeline
    safety rules with its transportation of hazardous materials rules with
    respect to criminal penalties by amending section 60123 to adopt the
    ``willfully or recklessly'' language from 49 U.S.C. Sec.  5124.
    Eliminate Natural Gas Operator's Choice in Determining High Consequence
            Areas
        Current federal regulations (49 C.F.R. Sec.  192.905 and 192.903)
    allow for natural gas operators to choose between two methods in the
    identification of High Consequence Areas along the route of their
    pipeline.
        High Consequence Areas are generally areas with higher populations
    in proximity to the pipeline. The chosen HCA method may be applied to
    the entire system, or different methods may be applied to different
    individual portions of the system. This discretion given operators not
    only creates inconsistency and uncertainty when PHMSA evaluates
    operator Integrity Management programs, but it also allows operators to
    choose whichever method requires the least effort and/or safety
    measures in their IM program.
        The determination of a High Consequence Area should be limited to a
    singular definition. Specifically, by clarifying the definition of High
    Consequence Area in Sec.  192.903.
    Close Class Location Loophole on Building Occupancy
        Under current regulations, gas transmission pipeline operators are
    required to classify their systems into Class Locations 1 through 4.
    These class locations generally signify how many buildings intended for
    human occupancy are located within the potential impact radius (PIR) of
    the pipeline and thus determine the level of safety requirements
    imposed on the operator for that section of pipeline. The regulation
    for determining class 3 areas creates a loophole which has the
    potential to exclude pipelines close to churches, theaters, and other
    public areas that may hold hundreds of people only a few days per week.
        The class location of a gas transmission pipeline impacts the
    pressure at which the pipeline can operate and has other impacts on how
    an operator must comply with the PHMSA regulations. 49 C.F.R. Sec.
    192.5(b)(3)(ii) creates speculative criteria which limits the safety
    requirements associated with class 3 location areas. This section of
    the regulation partially defines a class 3 area as ``An area where the
    pipeline lies within 100 yards (91 meters) of either a building or a
    small, well-defined outside area (such as a playground, recreation
    area, outdoor theater, or other place of public assembly) that is
    occupied by 20 or more persons on at least 5 days a week for 10 weeks
    in any 12-month period. (The days and weeks need not be consecutive.)''
    This regulation is not strict enough to ensure that pipelines that
    could endanger large numbers of people are held to higher safety
    standards.
        Congress should require PHMSA to clarify and tighten this
    definition and regulation to close this loophole allowing operators to
    avoid stricter safety standards in areas with churches, playgrounds,
    and similar areas and buildings.
    Eliminate Safety Related Condition Report Exemptions
        Existing regulations requiring operators to disclose safety related
    conditions are ambiguous, lenient, and do not encompass all situations
    that warrant reporting.
        49 U.S.C. Sec.  60101(h) requires the Secretary to make rules
    requiring each operator of a pipeline facility to submit a written
    report to the Secretary on any (a) condition that is a hazard to life,
    property, or the environment; and (b) any safety related condition that
    causes or has caused a significant change or restriction in the
    operation of a pipeline facility. That written report must go to PHMSA
    and the state regulators within five days of the operator first
    establishing that the condition exists. However, the rules (49 C.F.R.
    Sec.  191.23 and 195.55) enacted to implement that statute list only 8
    specific kinds of safety related conditions, most with a large amount
    of operator discretion built into their definitions, and then provide a
    set of three reasons that even if the condition meets one of those
    eight requirements, a report isn't required.
        Congress should require operators to submit reports to PHMSA on all
    safety-related conditions as originally mandated and make them easily
    available to the public.
    Require Mandatory Reporting of Liquid Over-Pressurization Events
        Over-pressure events are a serious threat to pipeline safety that
    can adversely impact pipeline integrity and cause incidents that harm
    people and the environment.
        On June 10, 1999, an over-pressurization event occurred that
    changed the lives of many occurred in Bellingham, WA when the Olympic
    Pipe Line ruptured. The rupture leaked 277,200 gallons of gasoline into
    Hanna and Whatcom Creek, which flow through downtown Bellingham and
    directly into Bellingham Bay. The gasoline vapor subsequently ignited
    and exploded, killing three young men: Liam Wood, Wade King, and
    Stephen Tsiorvas. The cause of the incident was a failed pressure
    relief valve that caused the massive pressure surge and rupture.
        To this day, despite the potential for disaster, operators of
    liquid pipelines are not required to report over-pressurization events
    to PHMSA's Office of Pipeline Safety so long as they are corrected
    within five days. Over-pressure events are almost always corrected
    within this period, but that fact does not reduce the potential harm to
    the public and the environment that these events can cause by possibly
    weakening a pipeline. This five-day exemption also precludes PHMSA from
    getting important safety data that can help identify operators who are
    having problems properly controlling their pipelines, and that may
    point to pipeline segments in need of certain inspections. This
    exemption was removed for natural gas pipelines in the PIPES Act of
    2011. Congress should remove the exemption for liquid pipelines as
    well.
        Congress should direct PHMSA to amend its safety-related conditions
    reporting regulations to require operators of liquid lines to report
    over-pressurization events.
    Require Improvements to State 811 Damage Prevention Programs
        It has been widely recognized among industry and federal regulators
    that third party excavation is one of the greatest threats to
    underground pipelines. Pipeline incidents caused by excavation damage
    can result in fatalities and injuries, as well as significant costs,
    property damage, environmental damage, and unintentional fire or
    explosions. While there are regulations which are intended to prevent
    such damage, such as state ``Call Before You Dig'' 811 programs, there
    are still many gaps in these regulations which leave room for the
    increasing number of excavation related damages caused to pipelines
    every year.
        Under the authority of 49 C.F.R. Sec.  198.35, PHMSA requires that
    states have a one-call damage prevention system to be eligible for
    grants from PHMSA to reimburse the costs of its pipeline safety
    programs. States can receive up to 80% of their costs in grants from
    PHMSA, but only if they've adopted a one-call system. PHMSA reviews not
    only the enforcement part of state systems, but the adequacy of the
    underlying systems as well. Improved enforcement efforts, and PHMSA
    intervention to provide enforcement when a state won't, may help reduce
    the number of excavation incidents even further.
        While PHMSA has been encouraging states to improve their damage
    prevention programs, the following concerns continue to come up:
        1.  Exemptions: There are requests for exemptions from
    participating in the one call system from both the call and response
    sides of the program. Cities and municipal utilities, state departments
    of Transportation, and agriculture seek exemptions, or to retain
    existing exemptions from having to participate in the one call system.
    Production and gathering pipelines will often seek exemptions from
    having to participate in responding to one call locate requests or
    mapping requirements.
              PHMSA maintains that there are no federal exemptions within
    the Excavation Damage Rule of 2015 and that any exemptions from
    participating in the one-call system are to be determined at the State
    level. However, a State must provide to PHMSA a written justification
    for any exemptions for excavators from State damage prevention
    requirements. PHMSA will make the written justifications available to
    the public (Sec.  198.55(a)(7)).
              Whether an exemption is written as an exception to a
    definition of what an underground facility is, what excavation is, or
    whether it's written as an exemption to who must participate, every
    exemption provides another opportunity for a completely preventable
    serious pipeline incident to occur.

        2.  Positive response: Not all states require the excavator to be
    contacted by a utility or the one-call center when all the utilities
    are done locating and marking. This leads to 2 problems: 1) The
    excavator is never positive that they've all been marked, even if the
    48 hours has passed; and 2) accidents can occur to unmarked utilities
    even if the excavator did everything right. These issues would be
    easily resolved by a requirement that the utility either respond
    directly to the contractor once location is complete, or that the one-
    call center do so.

        3.  Enforcement authority/equal enforcement: Most state attorneys
    general have more than enough cases to deal with without adding to
    their burden by requiring them to enforce violations of state damage
    prevention laws. Some states have tried to resolve this by creating an
    independent commission to hear complaints, made up of members from all
    the various stakeholder groups. This group can hear complaints and make
    recommendations to an attorney general or a county prosecuting
    attorney.
              Another common concern is that a high percentage of the
    incidents that cause damage to underground utilities are caused by the
    utilities being marked incorrectly after one-call has been used.
    Excavators want to ensure that if they are going to be held accountable
    for their failures to use the one call system properly, the utilities
    are also held equally accountable for failures to mark utilities
    correctly.
    Mandate Offshore Pipeline Safety Improvements
        Offshore pipeline safety remains an important area for regulatory
    improvements. These pipelines have unique safety risks and should not
    be exempt from important safety regulations.
        Recent incidents such as the 2020 Enterprise Products propane
    pipeline explosion in Corpus Christi, TX (4 fatalities, 6 serious
    injuries) and the 2021 Amplify Energy/Beta Offshore oil spill near
    Huntington Beach, CA (25,000 gallons of crude oil in San Pedro Bay)
    demonstrate some of the safety issues with offshore pipelines.
        One glaring regulatory shortfall is Offshore pipelines are
    specifically exempted from having a damage prevention program. Another
    shortfall is gas pipelines in navigable waterways are not required to
    have five-year crossing inspections like hazardous liquid pipelines.
    Congress should address both shortfalls.
    Clarify ``Confirmed Discovery'' Definition
        The definition of ``confirmed discovery'' of an incident is very
    vague, allowing an operator to potentially delay this notification with
    little risk of enforcement action by PHMSA.
        Pursuant to PHMSA's regulations, operators of gas and hazardous
    liquid pipelines are required to report incidents to the National
    Response Center (NRC) and to the Secretary within one hour of
    ``confirmed discovery.'' 49 C.F.R. Sec. Sec.  191.3; 191.5; 195.2;
    195.52. Unfortunately, this definition of ``confirmed discovery''
    allows an operator to delay notification with little risk of
    enforcement action by PHMSA. This is delay in reporting an incident can
    be extremely consequential: Incidents affecting humans or the
    environment could continue for some time before proper notification and
    subsequent remedial action begins.
        Congress should direct PHMSA to modify its regulations to amend its
    definition of ``confirmed discovery'' to ensure that operators notify
    the NRC and the Secretary as soon as possible after an incident occurs.
                                    Appendix
              Statutory and Regulatory Language Where Appropriate
        [The appendix to Mr. Caram's written testimony is retained in
    committee files and is available online at https://docs.house.gov/
    meetings/PW/PW14/20230308/115415/HHRG-118-PW14-Wstate-CaramB-
    20230308.pdf pages 20-33.]

        Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Caram.
        And I want to thank you all, all the witnesses here, for
    your testimony. We will now turn to questions from the panel,
    and I will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
        Administrator Brown, the PIPES Act 2020 was signed on
    December 27th of 2020. Included in the legislation was a
    requirement that PHMSA modernize its regulations to accommodate
    the growing LNG export industry. The proposed rule has not yet
    been published. What is PHMSA's path for the promulgation of
    these regulations?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman. That rule is a
    priority rulemaking, one of the many in the 2020 PIPES Act, as
    far as our monthly updated web chart showing what our priority
    rulemakings are. And we hope to get a proposal out this year on
    that.
        I was just down in Freeport, Texas, where we had a really
    terrible incident last year in June. We hope to incorporate
    lessons learned from that incident in that rulemaking.
        I will just note, too, that in the first year of this
    administration, we had the most productive series of pipeline
    safety rulemakings in the last 12 years, and maybe beyond that.
        So, we are making tremendous progress, but I agree, and I
    think a theme for the whole day today and the last hearing held
    regarding PHMSA is that our pace of rulemakings is not what
    anybody in the room would like it to be. And so, we are excited
    to work with any and all of you to help improve that ability to
    get rulemakings done.
        Mr. Nehls. And Mr. Brown, we understand PHMSA has long
    dealt with staffing challenges, which is why the PIPES Act of
    2020 mandated--mandated--that enforcement and inspection
    personnel not fall below a certain number. Yet as of January
    21st, PHMSA has only 207--207--inspection and enforcement
    personnel, despite the PIPES Act requiring 247 such employees.
    I think Mr. Grubb was talking a little bit about this, hiring
    people, safety personnel for 2023.
        Instead of filling these essential positions, PHMSA has
    hired environmental specialists, including an environmental
    economist, that do not appear directly tied to its pipeline
    safety mission.
        You have also referred to PHMSA as a climate change agency.
    Considering the agency's current challenges in meeting its
    pipeline safety mission, do you think rebranding PHMSA as a
    climate change agency is helpful in recruiting safety and
    inspection personnel?
        Mr. Brown. Well, so, yes. In fact, when I asked new hires
    why they came to the agency, a lot of them actually referenced
    that. Actually CEOs of companies would be interested to hear
    the representatives here, but the CEOs of oil and gas pipeline
    companies also cite their focus on climate change over recent
    years to attract engineers and Ph.D.'s to their agency to be a
    part of the transition, and to mitigate one of the big
    challenges.
        I will be glad to get you updated numbers on where we are.
    My understanding is we have actually met PIPES Act mandates in
    hiring new inspectors and engineers over the last few years.
        Mr. Nehls. OK.
        Mr. Brown. It has been our top focus. We can't do the work
    without the incredibly dedicated people we have.
        Certainly, during the pandemic and over the last few years,
    the challenges of competing with the private sector, with other
    States, it is a challenge. I just heard from one of our State
    agents that they had four people they were interviewing, nobody
    showed up for the interview. That is real challenging, and any
    tools you can give us to help us get to that----
        Mr. Nehls [interrupting]. Yes, I appreciate that, Mr.
    Brown. It has been over 2 years without a nominee for PHMSA
    Administrator. How has the absence of permanent leadership
    affected the agency's regulatory efficiency?
        Mr. Brown. Honestly, I don't think one bit, but I don't
    have too much to add----
        Mr. Nehls [interrupting]. Has there been any discussion
    when a nominee is coming forward? I mean, when are we going
    to----
        Mr. Brown [interrupting]. I don't have any estimates or
    information.
        Mr. Nehls. All right. Last question. And again, in the
    PIPES Act of 2020, signed on December 27, 2020, included in the
    legislation was a requirement that PHMSA modernize its
    regulations to accommodate the growing LNG export industry. The
    proposed rule has not yet been established.
        Again, what is PHMSA's path forward for the promulgation of
    these regulations?
        Mr. Brown. This door shut when you started. Is this the LNG
    facilities update rule, the one I think you first asked about?
        Our plan is to get it out this year, and we provide monthly
    updates on progress there.
        Mr. Nehls. Well, I am looking forward to--we had a meeting
    a few weeks ago. I look forward to continuing on with this
    relationship so we can do the right thing and make sure that
    our pipelines are as safe as can be. Thank you.
        I will now recognize Ranking Member Payne for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Payne. Thank you, Chairman.
        Deputy Administrator Brown, in February of 2020, Denbury's
    24-inch carbon dioxide pipe ruptured in Mississippi, with 200
    people needing to be evacuated, as was just stated.
    Fortunately, there were no fatalities, but local first
    responders were caught completely unaware.
        Can you please share with us how PHMSA is using lessons
    learned from this incident to inform your ongoing carbon
    dioxide rule development?
        Mr. Brown. Really important question, and I just want to
    relate it back to the chairman's comments about the LNG
    facilities rule and discussions we have frequently with
    industry.
        But in that incident that you referenced--and I visited a
    community of about 70 people in rural Mississippi about an hour
    northwest of Jackson. The first responders were unaware of the
    incident and what was at issue with the rupture of that carbon
    dioxide pipeline. Notification and getting information out--
    same thing in East Palestine, Ohio.
        We live in modern society, where I can get notification of
    my food order, that it has been retained by the restaurant,
    they are cooking my food, it is ready to go. That is all within
    minutes. And in that incident, it was over 1\1/2\ hours before
    folks were aware that there was a cloud of CO2 gas
    that was engulfing a community. We can do much better than
    that.
        I really look forward to working with everybody. And I
    think there is consensus on the need to improve that
    communication.
        Mr. Payne. Thank you. As we look forward to a pipeline
    safety reauthorization, do you feel that PHMSA has the
    resources needed to investigate all pipeline incidents?
        And what additional tools do you need to recruit and retain
    an inspection workforce?
        Mr. Brown. We triage our needs. I think we have requisite
    resources to investigate pipeline incidents. But the amount of
    time it can take, we actually have reduced the amount of time
    to open, certainly for an enforcement and compliance issue
    related to an incident, to a record low amount of 323 days.
        So, the amount of resources we have--and that seems to be a
    common theme for the day--is directly proportional to the work
    that we can do. And everybody seems to think we should be doing
    more. We are grateful that this committee has continued to
    support our work. But it is an important question you ask.
        Mr. Payne. Yes, that is the unfortunate position you are
    in, irrespective of what you do, people are always going to
    want more. So, thank you.
        Now, Mr. Caram, your testimony says that we are not making
    real progress on pipeline safety, and that integrity management
    programs have not lived up to their promise. What are the
    shortcomings of the integrity management plans?
        Mr. Caram. Thank you for the question. Yes, the theory
    behind integrity management really makes perfect sense. You
    identify those pipelines that can have the most devastating
    effects on communities or on the environment in the case of a
    failure, and you focus your safety efforts on those sections of
    pipelines with more inspections, more safety requirements, and
    we identify those areas. We call them high-consequence areas.
        But when we look at the data, and we look at incident rates
    within high-consequence areas and compare them to the incidents
    outside of high-consequence areas, they are not doing any
    better. In a lot of cases, they are actually doing worse. And
    so, we see this as a performance-based metric, a performance-
    based regulation that leaves a lot up to the operator's
    discretion. It makes it hard for PHMSA to inspect, hard for
    them to enforce. And it is not producing the results that we
    would hope to see, as safety advocates.
        Mr. Payne. And with the time I have remaining, quickly,
    what is the single biggest driver of the lack of progress on
    pipeline safety?
        Mr. Caram. Thank you for the question. It is a good one. I
    would have to say PHMSA's statutory handcuffs on ability to
    make strong rules.
        Mr. Payne. OK. Thank you very much.
        And Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Payne.
        And Mr. Brown, in your testimony it says PHMSA has kept up
    with the PIPES Act of 2020 hiring mandates, both for inspectors
    as well as regulatory personnel. And in your office, January
    31st, it says 207 of the 248 inspection enforcement personnel
    were filled. So, obviously, in the last 5 weeks, 6 weeks you
    have hired 41 personnel. I find that incredible, with the
    bureaucracy and the stuff that we have today.
        But I will now yield to Mr. Rouzer.
        Mr. Rouzer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Brown, this is not a gotcha question by any means. I am
    just curious how you will answer it. Generally speaking, are
    pipelines safe?
        Mr. Brown. Are pipelines safe, generally speaking? Sure.
        Mr. Rouzer. Let me ask this. Are investigations common when
    there is no safety incident?
        Mr. Brown. Can you repeat the question? I didn't hear.
        Mr. Rouzer. I am sorry. Are investigations common when
    there is no safety incident?
        Mr. Brown. Are investigations common when there is no
    safety incident? Not common, no.
        Mr. Rouzer. OK. A followup to that: What circumstances
    would prompt PHMSA to launch an investigation on a wireline or
    slickline operator that has never had a recorded safety
    incident?
        Mr. Brown. Perhaps a notification through anonymous sources
    or through a hotline. There are many circumstances where you
    might investigate an allegation of a company or an operator,
    sure.
        Mr. Rouzer. So, let me ask it this way. Is there any kind
    of testing available for a regulated wireline or slickline
    operator, where they can be exempt from, quite frankly,
    unapplicable regulations imposed upon them?
        Mr. Brown. I am sorry, I am having trouble hearing.
        Mr. Rouzer. Is there any kind of testing or process
    available for a regulated wireline or slickline operator to be
    exempt from unapplicable regulations that might be imposed upon
    them?
        In other words, is there a process where you check all the
    boxes, you are clear to go, without having to go through an
    investigation when in fact there is no safety incident?
        Mr. Brown. You would never be totally exempt from--just if
    you check boxes and you say you are meeting our requirements.
    We are always going to make sure what you say is accurate, and
    the operator is held accountable if it is not.
        Mr. Rouzer. One other question here. So, what kind of
    research, if there is any, is PHMSA conducting related to
    pipelines and the products that support pipelines?
        Mr. Brown. A tremendous amount of research, actually, and
    it actually gets to Mr. Black's testimony about our commitment
    to innovation. We spend millions of dollars a year working with
    the academic community, the regulated community on the needs to
    improve pipeline safety and technologies. There were actually a
    bunch of patents come out of the research that Congress
    appropriates and that we dole out to those communities.
        Mr. Rouzer. Is that research available to the public?
        Mr. Brown. It is, yes.
        Mr. Rouzer. Where can that be found?
        Mr. Brown. Oh, we can send it to you, but it is on our
    website.
        Mr. Rouzer. OK.
        Mr. Brown. Yes.
        Mr. Rouzer. So, how many different research projects are
    there out there?
        Mr. Brown. I want to say at least a dozen. We have got
    about $8 million currently on some of the new emerging areas of
    energy--hydrogen, carbon dioxide--both to mitigate safety
    risks, to improve leak detection, and to keep the product in
    the pipe, which I think everybody here is focused on. So, that
    is an area that I think we have a really broad stakeholder
    support for and engagement with.
        Mr. Rouzer. Yes. With regard to my earlier questions, later
    on I would like for my team to get with your team to talk about
    some specific incidents, just make sure that you are aware, and
    that all things are being handled properly.
        Mr. Brown. Happy to. I really appreciate your flagging
    that. Thanks.
        Mr. Rouzer. Thank you, Mr. Brown.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Nehls. Mr. Rouzer yields. I now recognize Mr. Larsen
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Strengthening pipeline safety protects our communities. We know
    that in Washington State. It also holds operators accountable.
    In the future, it can help us fight climate change, with the
    role of moving CO2 around. I think we need to focus
    on better identifying our vulnerabilities, addressing safety
    gaps, and giving PHMSA the tools it needs to strengthen the
    safety standards.
        To that end, Mr. Caram, your testimony outlines a variety
    of things, but one point you make is that integrity management
    isn't working. Well, I have been at this 23 years. Many have
    been at this longer. But it was always about integrity
    management when we did the Pipeline Safety Act in 2002 and
    continuing on.
        In your view, why isn't integrity management working, and
    what is the biggest contributor to the pipeline safety
    challenges that you have identified?
        Mr. Caram. Thank you for the question. I wish I could list
    off a number of reasons of why it is not working.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. You get to pick one.
        Mr. Caram. I believe it is the performance-based nature of
    them, and the lack of prescriptions.
        For a lot of the--there are a lot of wonderful operators
    out there that really are leading the way on safety. They take
    it very seriously. It is a part of their culture. And I would
    imagine that those operators have pretty good integrity
    management programs.
        Unfortunately, those are not all the operators out there.
    And for those I think we do need some more prescriptive level
    of minimum safety standards which would allow the other
    operators to continue to do their integrity management
    programs, their safety management systems, and these continuous
    improvement processes.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. You have identified a lot
    of--about--like, 22 recommendations or so in your testimony. I
    appreciate that.
        Are there any new approaches you think would best move the
    needle to improve safety?
        Mr. Caram. Overall, I think the best thing we can do for
    safety is give PHMSA the full resources it needs to be the
    regulator it needs to be. I think they have been historically--
    it is a theme today among all of us, they have been
    historically underfunded, they have these statutory handcuffs.
    And if Congress could give them the tools, the resources, and
    the ability to become a more robust regulatory agency, I think
    that is where we will see a real change in pipeline safety, and
    start to move towards our goals.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. Mr. Brown, I have been
    around long enough to not ask you specifically what is going to
    be in the President's budget tomorrow, because I know what your
    answer will be. You won't be able to give it.
        Should we expect to see something in the President's budget
    tomorrow with regards to PHMSA and the resources you have
    outlined that are needed?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, thank you for the question and how you
    asked it. There are a couple of things that I can highlight
    without specificity, and one is support for States.
        We oversee 3.4 million miles of pipeline, but the vast
    majority of those are gas distribution, and 80 percent of those
    are overseen by our State agents. They have gotten about 55
    percent of their budgets covered through appropriations that
    you all provide us to give to them. That is--with all the new
    demands on us and on them, that is hefty. And so, we are trying
    to address that in the budget.
        And then, in addition to that, hydrogen, CO2,
    the fuels of the future that have greatly been incentivized in
    the last 2 years through the Inflation Reduction Act, the
    Bipartisan Infrastructure Law. The one thing that sort of was
    missing from those tremendous investments was additional
    oversight by our agency.
        So, the President's budget should reflect those items I can
    preview for you.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. All right, and so, we will look
    for those, especially.
        Mr. Black, we talked a little bit yesterday about the
    technology demonstration. Can you talk a little bit more about
    that?
        I mean, it certainly sounds interesting. I want to move
    forward. Certainly, in the last 25 years, technology has
    changed. I understand the technology of a smart pig hasn't
    changed. It is a matter of thinking of that as a platform, and
    then the stuff you stick on it, if you will, the technology has
    changed to better do integrity management.
        Can you talk a little bit more about the program itself,
    and how it can benefit?
        Mr. Black. Sure. Thank you, Ranking Member.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes.
        Mr. Black. Yes, the smart pig technology or in-line
    inspection is the same as maybe 20 years ago, but the
    sophistication of the devices that can travel inside the
    pipeline looking for issues has improved. So have the analytics
    of what can be done with that information. We can see more. We
    have a better idea of what issues might become a problem. So,
    we know now, through greater advancements, what the proper
    schedule should be on, which features a pipeline operator
    should address.
        But the PHMSA regulations have not changed that. So,
    Congress, in recognition, created this section in the PIPES Act
    2020, right? That sounded great. But what PHMSA did is they
    went beyond the mandate and the limitations imposed by
    Congress.
        First, they required that an application to use it follow
    the NEPA process, and an environmental assessment was done.
    That is the first time PHMSA has ever done that for an R&D
    project.
        They said the standard of review needed to be higher even
    than the special permit process, and the special permit is for
    a permanent waiver of regulations. This is for a temporary
    project.
        And then PHMSA said that anybody asking for a demonstration
    project needed to use the special permit process itself, which
    is has taken 10 years, in some instances.
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you. To follow up--and I
    appreciate the chair's indulgence, and I have nothing to yield
    back except nothing.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you.
        Mr. Nehls. Mr. Larsen yields, and I will recognize Mr.
    Stauber for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Stauber. Thank you very much.
        Mr. Larsen, thanks for yielding your time to me. I
    appreciate it. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        In recent years, I am sure everyone has seen the illegal
    protesters that have set fires, cut hydraulic lines, attacked
    equipment and operators during the Enbridge Line 3 replacement
    construction. And they did millions of dollars of damage and
    put union workers in danger.
        Deputy Administrator Brown, are our pipelines, the critical
    infrastructure used to deliver affordable and reliable energy
    to my constituents in Minnesota, are they safe from radical
    protesters?
        Mr. Brown. Congressman, as you and others may know, we
    don't oversee security of pipelines. So, when you say ``safe,''
    our jurisdiction does include the safe operations, but the line
    is sort of drawn as far as security to the Transportation
    Security Administration. We do work closely with them. And when
    we see issues of security, we let them know. And vice versa, if
    they have issues of security, they flag those issues as they
    may affect operations.
        Mr. Stauber. When these protesters are protesting for
    climate reasons, obviously, do they put the workers in
    jeopardy?
        Mr. Brown. Again, because we focus on the safe operations
    of the pipelines and not on the security, I am certainly
    concerned always about the workers doing work----
        Mr. Stauber [interrupting]. But do they put the workers in
    jeopardy when they jump into pipes as the 49ers are lifting
    that pipe up into place, does that put them in jeopardy?
        Mr. Brown. I mean, that sounds very concerning to me, sure.
        Mr. Stauber. Does it put the community in jeopardy?
        Mr. Brown. All of that, what you are describing, sounds
    very concerning----
        Mr. Stauber [interrupting]. Does it put law enforcement in
    jeopardy?
        Mr. Brown. The way you are describing things, that does
    sound like it puts everybody in jeopardy if you are threatening
    violence to anybody or anything.
        Mr. Stauber. Thank you. Mr. Brown, in your testimony you
    had stated that PHMSA is a climate agency. Do you still stand
    by that?
        Mr. Brown. Yes. Thanks for giving me the opportunity to
    explain that.
        Mr. Stauber. Do you sympathize with the radical protesters?
        Mr. Brown. I don't know to what you are referring.
        Mr. Stauber. Protesters, for instance, on Enbridge Line 3
    that are climate protesters. Do you sympathize with them?
        Mr. Brown. That is a large group of people who I don't know
    exactly what you are referring to. Sort of what--I really just
    don't know what you are referring to. So, I----
        Mr. Stauber [interrupting]. Do you support their radical
    protests that put the workers, community, and law enforcement
    in danger?
        Mr. Brown. I do not support anybody putting anybody in
    danger, especially law enforcement. My dad was a police
    officer, I come from a law enforcement family.
        Mr. Stauber. That should have been easier for you to
    answer, then.
        Mr. Brown. Well, I think I answered the easy ones.
        Mr. Stauber. Are the Biden administration's climate
    priorities driving decisions at PHMSA, yes or no?
        Mr. Brown. We have a whole-of-Government approach to
    mitigating the threat of climate change, which I think
    everybody up here is aligned with.
        And I appreciate the bipartisan PIPES Act focusing on
    minimizing methane emissions, which has 80 times the global
    warming potential as carbon dioxide.
        Mr. Stauber. Ultimately, I am concerned that this
    administration is steering PHMSA away from its mission, and
    using yet another agency to push its activist agenda. PHMSA's
    mission is to protect people and the environment by advancing
    the safe transportation of energy and other materials that are
    essential to our daily lives.
        Reliable, affordable, clean energy is good. Would you agree
    with that?
        Mr. Brown. I would agree that reliable, affordable, clean
    energy is good.
        I think our mission statement also includes protecting the
    environment, and we also focus on that, as well, and I
    appreciate the committee supporting that, as well.
        Mr. Stauber. All the American people want is safe, reliable
    access to affordable energy. We need to protect our pipeline
    infrastructure to accomplish that goal.
        Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Mr. Brown. Yes, I agree. Thank you, Congressman.
        Mr. Nehls. Mr. Stauber yields. I now recognize Mrs. Foushee
    for 5 minutes.
        Mrs. Foushee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to the
    witnesses for being here this morning.
        I would also like to thank Ranking Member Larsen and
    Ranking Member Payne for their work, and I am honored to join
    both of you and my colleagues on this subcommittee.
        First I would like to discuss the Colonial Pipeline spill
    that happened in Huntersville, North Carolina. In August of
    2020, gasoline was found bubbling from the ground on the Oehler
    Nature Preserve in Huntersville. At first, Colonial Pipeline
    estimated that only 63,000 gallons had leaked. But ultimately,
    it was reported that nearly 2 million gallons of fuel was
    released in the nature preserve, resulting in my State's
    largest gasoline spill ever.
        Last summer, the North Carolina Department of Environmental
    Quality filed a consent order holding Colonial Pipeline
    accountable after they failed to provide the State with
    essential information required for remediation after the spill.
    It took 2 years and a consent order.
        Mr. Brown, in May 2022, your agency proposed nearly $1
    million in civil penalties on Colonial Pipeline for multiple
    probable violations of Federal pipeline safety regulations for
    failing to adequately plan and prepare for a manual restart and
    shutdown operation, which contributed to the national impacts
    of the May 2021 cyber attack.
        So, my question is whether PHMSA's civil penalty authority
    is substantial enough to encourage better behavior by pipeline
    operators.
        Mr. Brown. That is a really good question. I don't know if
    I have a great answer. I would welcome other panelists' answer
    of whether a civil penalty of $1 million is going to dissuade a
    company that is valued in the billions. Intuitively, I would
    think not.
        But I will say, we specifically highlighted that proposed
    civil penalty because it was something where we had actually
    given the company a heads up--hey, you have got to fix this--
    and they chose not to after we even told them to adhere to our
    regulation. For us, that is a particularly egregious violation,
    and that is why we issued a proposed civil penalty.
        Mrs. Foushee. Thank you for that response.
        Mr. Grubb and Mr. Black, I am interested in learning more
    about how you detect and prevent leaks in your industry. Is
    this a priority for Kinder Morgan, Mr. Grubb?
        And for your member organizations, Mr. Black, do you have a
    means of detecting leakage on your pipelines, and are your
    systems for doing so more stringent in high-population areas,
    also known as high-consequence areas?
        Mr. Grubb, you may go first.
        Mr. Grubb. Thank you for the question. So, in terms of
    detecting methane leaks, we routinely patrol our pipelines for
    leak detection purposes. We also implement leak detection at
    compressor stations along our pipeline routes.
        Detecting leaks is important. It is something that does not
    happen often, in terms of natural gas pipeline leaks. But when
    it does happen, we quickly identify it, and we quickly repair
    those.
        Methane emissions, in general, are something that is of the
    utmost importance to us, as well as our industry. And certainly
    PHMSA acting upon the rulemaking to address class location will
    also minimize or reduce methane emissions associated with
    activities that are required to meet the current regulations,
    that being pipe replacement. And it will minimize the
    unnecessary release of natural gas associated with those
    projects, and that will go a long way in reducing methane
    emissions, as well.
        Mr. Black. Thank you, Congresswoman. Detecting leaks is
    very important. A pipeline operator's goal is to detect the
    leak available in the control room, where you can shut down the
    pipe at the sign. So, they maintain sensors along the pipeline,
    looking for signs of a leak.
        Industry, in the last several years, has developed through
    experts a recommended practice at the American Petroleum
    Institute on leak detection. We are also conducting R&D to
    continue to improve leak detection. We want to be able to see,
    smell, or hear maybe the signs of released product, also
    maintain those aerial patrols, just like Mr. Grubb was saying,
    and have community awareness programs so that, if the public
    knows--if they find an incident of a leak, they know who to
    call. Detecting a leak is very important.
        Mrs. Foushee. Thank you.
        With that, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
        Mr. Nehls. Mrs. Foushee yields. I will now recognize Mr.
    Johnson for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was
    grateful to see that Ranking Member Larsen had focused a little
    bit on the technology pilot program.
        And so, Mr. Brown and Mr. Black, I want to dive a little
    deeper. I mean, talk to me about what improvements we could
    make to the program so that it would be more valuable for
    operators, and more people would take advantage of it.
        Mr. Brown. You want to go? You want me to--go ahead.
        Mr. Black. OK, thank you. Nobody has used the program right
    now. It has been untenable. We need to make some changes.
        One, we need to change the standard of review. It is
    complicated in the law. It is complicated in what PHMSA has
    done. Generally, we want something simple, where it is a
    reasonable level of safety, compared to what the existing
    regulations have.
        Second, we don't----
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [interrupting]. So--hold on.
    Before going to second, let's drill in just a little bit. So,
    when you say we need to change the standard of review, what is
    it, and where do we need to head to?
        Mr. Black. The problem is that PHMSA is using a standard of
    review even higher than its special permit process, which is
    for permanent waivers of regulations. It doesn't need to be
    that way.
        Shall I move to another one?
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. What standards should they
    move to? Should they just move to their standard level of
    review?
        Mr. Black. We want PHMSA to exercise judgment on if this
    application is going to improve pipeline safety.
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. I see.
        Mr. Black. This is PHMSA's decision to make. They have made
    it more complicated than they need to.
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. OK, very good, sorry. Number
    one. Now number two.
        Mr. Black. Great. Next, we need to not use the NEPA
    process. There is no reason for an environmental assessment to
    be completed for an R&D project.
        Next, we need to not use the special permit process itself.
    It is broken. Everybody recognizes that. It has taken 10 years
    for some special permits.
        Next, we need to extend this program. Congress gave it a
    few years. We have lost 2 years already. Do a 10-year
    reauthorization so we have the full cycle of PHMSA to finish
    developing the updates, operators to apply. Let's conduct the
    research. PHMSA can get the data. The goal is for them to
    update their regulations with the know-how of 20 years of
    developments.
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. That is excellent, because
    those are specific changes that we can make that are within our
    power, they are easy to understand, and they would have the
    desired impact.
        Sir, what did he get wrong?
        Mr. Brown. So, we actually opened for public comment, ``How
    can we implement this directive from Congress?'' We didn't get
    the specifics of exactly your question, Congressman. What
    standard do we judge a new technology--it is just an R&D
    project. That is different than deploying a technology that has
    safety implications for the public. I rely on the subject
    matter experts, whose focus is safety, to make that
    determination.
        Now, the question of how to apply the National
    Environmental Policy Act, that is a directive that Congress
    established 50-plus years ago. You can consider environmental
    impacts in different ways, but there was no proposal to provide
    those environmental impacts at all in the public comment period
    that we offered.
        We want innovative technologies. We are happy to work with
    folks on this. That is why we opened it up for public comment.
    Happy to work with LEPA and any of the committee members here.
    But we don't want to sacrifice two things, right? Safety,
    environmental impacts. So, how to do it is absolutely the
    question. You asked the right question. We are asking the same
    question. And if we can come to agreement on an efficient way
    to do it, great. It is definitely a common goal that we have.
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Mr. Black, what else?
        Mr. Black. PHMSA has recognized that a decision on a
    pipeline safety demonstration program application is not a
    major Federal action. It has the discretion to not put it
    through the NEPA process. This can be simple. Congress can tell
    PHMSA, ``Don't go beyond the limitations that we tell you to
    use in this program.''
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Certainly----
        Mr. Brown [interrupting]. Well----
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [interrupting]. No, go ahead,
    sir.
        Mr. Brown. So, we certainly, potentially, could face a
    lawsuit, and then have to litigate that. If Congress were to
    provide us the directives, or if we could get a proposal that
    says we are not going to ignore the environmental impacts, here
    is how you know we are not going to ignore the environmental
    impacts, then that would get us closer to what I think we all
    want to get to.
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. So, Mr. Chairman, I would just
    close by saying this. I mean, we have specific recommendations.
    We have an opportunity to make this program work better, to get
    additional research and development, to make the system run
    better and more safely. It is not being used properly. This is
    something we can work on together. This is something that we
    might be able to get the overwhelming majority of the people on
    both sides of this dais to understand that the reforms that
    have been described will work, and they will make the system
    better long term. Let's get it done together. I yield back.
        Mr. Nehls. Mr. Johnson yields. I now recognize Mr. Cohen
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Cohen. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and I thank you and the
    ranking member for holding this hearing.
        The safe operation of the 3.4 million miles of pipeline
    regulated by PHMSA is vital to the health and safety of the
    American people. I want to focus on a pipeline issue that is
    particularly important to our country's ability to combat the
    climate crisis, which is methane leaks.
        According to a recent report in a Guardian article, methane
    causes about one-quarter of global heating from the greenhouse
    gas effect, and human-caused emissions over the last century
    have contributed about one-third of the total global
    temperature rise. Emissions have surged in recent decades, and
    if we continue on this path, methane alone could push us past a
    number of catastrophic climate tipping points.
        Around 40 percent of those methane emissions come from
    leaks from fossil fuel exploration, production, and
    transportation, and that percentage has increased by half in
    the last two decades. For the sake of the planet and future
    generations, we must do all we can to prevent methane leaks
    from the millions of miles of natural gas pipelines under
    PHMSA's authority.
        In my State, the Tennessee Valley Authority is pushing
    forward with a plan to construct new natural gas powerplants
    and pipelines as a ``bridge'' to renewables, a bridge to
    renewables. I have argued that it is a bridge to more pollution
    and disasters, and have strongly encouraged them to rethink
    this approach.
        Deputy Administrator Brown, in your written testimony, you
    stated that PHMSA has been integral to the whole-of-Government
    approach to mitigating unnecessary greenhouse gas emissions.
    Could you expand on what this approach entails, and what
    resources or support PHMSA might still need to properly carry
    out this vital mission?
        Mr. Brown. Yes. Well, thank you so much, Congressman. And
    really, we have been really energized by this committee's work
    with the 2020 PIPES Act, which said regulated facilities have
    to minimize methane emissions--as noted, 80 times the global
    warming potential as carbon dioxide.
        Also, we have to include in our cost-benefit analysis, as
    we move forward with rulemakings, environmental impacts, which
    just gets to some of the questions from Members today why we
    might hire people with environmental knowledge and skills. We
    have been directed to do that by the committee in carrying out
    these directives. And we are doing it, actually, by hiring
    engineers with environmental knowledge and experience.
        But we have got six rulemakings in the White House Methane
    Emissions Reduction Action Plan, three of them we finalized.
    And those overlap to the chairman's questions about how we are
    prioritizing. We are prioritizing the directives we have from
    Congress to do a host of rulemakings, the ones that have the
    biggest safety impact, that--also, I think it is inextricably
    linked. You reduce methane emissions, you are actually
    improving and mitigating climate change. You are mitigating
    methane emissions when you keep the product in the pipe, which
    is something you hear from industry all the time.
        We are all, I think, focused on that, and how we talk about
    it. And I suggest we talk about it. I suggest we talk about
    keeping the product in the pipe is helping reduce methane
    emissions and global warming. The agency that I lead now wasn't
    allowed to talk about that for 4 years. And a lot of companies
    are talking about it now to recruit folks, and also because
    their investors want that information.
        So, really, over the last few years, the marketplace, the
    free market has said, yes, actually we would like to have
    improved clean energy, but we also want to mitigate the impacts
    to the environment.
        Mr. Cohen. Our time is running out. If I can--I thank you
    for that--very quickly, could operators decide for themselves
    which high-consequence area definitions to use?
        Why do we have two different definitions, and do we allow
    operators to pick and choose even different ones along the same
    route?
        Mr. Brown. I am sorry. I didn't hear that.
        Mr. Cohen. Well, I got 1 minute left. I am going to pass.
        Mr. Caram, in your written testimony, you state that
    natural gas regulations drafted before the collective consensus
    that methane emissions are a major contributor to climate
    change are extremely permissible with regard to leak reporting
    requirements.
        You and Deputy Administrator Brown, methane, a potent
    greenhouse gas, we want to avoid it leaking from pipelines.
    PHMSA has just finished a year-long study to put together a
    proposed rule on the use of advanced leak detection. Where are
    we tackling methane emissions from natural gas pipelines, and
    what still needs to be done?
        Mr. Caram. Thank you for that question. As Mr. Brown
    stated, Congress made extraordinary progress in this area with
    the PIPES Act of 2020, but we still do have a lot of work to
    do. We now have satellites detecting huge methane plumes from
    planned and routine maintenance from pipelines. We don't
    tolerate these kind of planned intentional releases from liquid
    pipelines, and we need to continue this culture change on the
    gas side, and no longer tolerate those, as well.
        These blowdowns, the intentional releases for routine
    maintenance, they are not required to be reported to PHMSA. And
    besides the general language in the PIPES Act about minimizing
    emissions, there is no limitation on them.
        Mr. Cohen. Mr. Brown, do you have something to add?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, we have a rulemaking that is at the Office
    of Management and Budget that addresses leak detection, repair,
    blowdowns, basically what the gentleman just addressed,
    Congressman, and that is a mandate from the 2020 PIPES Act.
        Mr. Cohen. Thank you, sir, and I yield back the balance of
    my time.
        Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Cohen. I now recognize Mr. Yakym
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Yakym. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to our
    witnesses for taking the time to be here today and share with
    us your expertise.
        I am glad that our Transportation and Infrastructure
    Committee kicked off our first hearing on the FAA
    reauthorization with a hearing concerned and centered around
    safety. And I am glad that we are doing the same thing with
    PHMSA today, with the reauthorization, a hearing on safety.
        Pipelines are the lifeblood of our economy. They help put
    gas in our vehicles, they heat our homes, they power our
    factories and our businesses, and they drive exports that lift
    our economy and create jobs right here at home. They are an
    integral part of the conversations as we discuss emerging
    technologies like hydrogen and carbon capture, as well.
        At the heart of all these applications is safety. Without
    pipeline safety, Americans won't have gas, heat, power, or
    exports that we depend on to drive our economy on a daily
    basis. That is why we have agencies like PHMSA, the Pipeline
    and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration, which is
    entrusted with this critical mission of safety.
        But I am concerned--concerned because it seems like there
    is a potential movement to deviate from that mission of safety.
    We heard earlier today about a number of pipeline issues that
    have happened, safety issues across our country, and it seems
    like we may have a deviation from that mission of safety.
        Mr. Brown, you recently said, and I quote, ``One thing we
    are trying to brand is as a climate agency.'' I would like you
    to clarify that comment, because Congress created PHMSA to be a
    safety agency, not a climate agency. Full stop. So, if you
    could for the record, Mr. Brown, please clarify. Is PHMSA's top
    and sole priority safety?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, it is. It is the top priority, but it is
    inextricably linked to environmental impacts. And that is in
    our mission statement, and it is in the 2020 PIPES Act for us
    to minimize methane emissions, methane being 80 times the
    impact of carbon dioxide in global warming. When you minimize
    methane emissions, you are mitigating climate change.
        Now, you can talk about it, or you can not talk about it. I
    choose to talk about it. But when you minimize methane
    emissions--and by the way, most of the companies that Mr. Black
    represents, Mr. Grubb, his company, they talk about what they
    are doing to mitigate climate change. It is inextricably linked
    to safety. And so, to just not talk about it, I mean, it is up
    to folks if we want to talk about it. I choose to talk about
    it. I think it is good for recruiting. It happens to be
    accurate. And we are acknowledging the reality that climate
    change exists, and we have to consider ways to mitigate it.
        Mr. Yakym. Do you think that some of the pipeline safety
    issues we have had have happened because maybe we have taken
    our eye off the ball of safety, and we are focused more on
    climate change, it seems, than we are on----
        Mr. Brown [interrupting]. Absolutely not.
        Mr. Yakym [continuing]. Safety, which is the responsibility
    of your agency?
        Mr. Brown. There are 600 people completely dedicated to
    safety. You couldn't convince them not to be focused on safety.
    The first thing I did was what are the rulemakings that will
    have the biggest safety impact at the agency, and that is what
    we are focused on.
        Mr. Yakym. Talk to me about how your agency speaks to
    recruits. I mean, do you tell your recruits that you are a
    climate agency that is concerned about safety?
        Mr. Brown. I mean, as far as what we recruit, we post our
    jobs. I don't think most of them mention climate change. But
    through our social media, through hearings like this, we are
    trying to note, hey, if you want to make a difference--and when
    you talk to people under the age of 30, 35, they really care
    about making a difference in the world and leaving something
    better for the next generation. It is different than what
    people in the 35 to 45 care about, or the 55 to 65.
        We want to recruit from the biggest pool of people that we
    possibly can to get the best engineers, best safety experts.
    And if that can provide a little bit of difference, and get us
    a little bit more folks to address the chairman's comments from
    earlier of how to recruit people, great.
        Mr. Yakym. How would you rate the considerations in hiring
    when you are considering between safety considerations in
    hiring versus climate considerations in hiring?
        Mr. Brown. Well, for the vast majority of our positions,
    safety is integral. We have a few positions--we started off
    with less than 1 position--at an agency of 600 people who has
    in its mission statement environmental impacts, we had less
    than 1 focused on National Environmental Policy Act
    implementation with respect to our agency. We now have three
    and change, one person who is straight out of college, right?
        I mean, we have not revamped our agency of 600 people with
    3 people. We just now are able to carry out the laws that you
    have given us to carry out, which include environmental
    impacts.
        Mr. Yakym. All right, thank you.
        And Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota [presiding]. Thank you.
        With that, Mr. Garcia, your 5 minutes.
        Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking
    Member, for holding this hearing. This committee, of course,
    has a responsibility to ensure the safety of our transit and
    infrastructure systems, and this hearing is critical to
    ensuring that we provide that safety.
        There is currently a proposal to build a 1,300-mile
    pipeline to transport liquefied CO2 across four
    Midwestern States, with Illinois serving as the endpoint and
    storage facility. The building of this pipeline will cause
    significant safety concerns. And to date, there are no plans
    from PHMSA to update CO2 safety regs until 2024.
        Mr. Brown, regulators are behind on all these issues. And
    given past mismanagement, why would we trust corporations to
    come up with their own appropriate safety standards?
        Mr. Brown. I don't think we should trust anyone. I think we
    should put rules in place, and standards in place, regulations
    in place that are foolproof, that don't involve trusting, but
    involve meeting standards.
        And we are planning to promulgate a draft rule in the
    coming months. I think that will set the standard and bar for
    the projects you referenced.
        Mr. Garcia of Illinois. And as the pipeline goes, shouldn't
    we hold off on construction?
        Mr. Brown. That is not a question that Congress has given
    to my agency to make any sort of determination.
        I can just tell you we are racing to get these rules out,
    to make them as strong as possible. We have got input from, I
    think, folks across the panel here to acknowledge and the
    consensus that there need to be updates to the rules.
        Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Fair enough. And my next question,
    Mr. Brown, is this: If we don't have definitive standards for
    how far plumes go, or how far back setbacks should be, how can
    we accurately regulate for the health and safety of those
    nearby?
        Mr. Brown. That is something we hope to address in our
    rulemaking.
        Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Why would we put this technology in
    place, risking lives without adequate research or protections
    in place?
        Mr. Brown. Well, so, just for clarification, we have had
    carbon dioxide pipelines around for decades. And it was
    incentivized in the bipartisan infrastructure act as well as
    the Inflation Reduction Act, because of the climate change
    challenge that we face, and this being one of the potential
    solutions to the challenge that I think--I hope everybody in
    the room can help us focus on, which is how to make sure it
    works, how to make sure it works safely because of its
    potential to reduce climate change impacts.
        Mr. Garcia of Illinois. Thank you.
        Mr. Chair, I yield the balance of my time.
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thank you very much, Mr.
    Garcia. With that, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Babin.
        You have 5 minutes.
        Dr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. Thank
    you, all of you witnesses, for being here.
        Pipelines are the backbone of our energy infrastructure.
    The United States has the largest network of energy pipelines
    in the world. My home State of Texas has the highest total
    pipeline mileage by far. And while there is certainly room for
    improvement, studies prove that pipelines are also the
    cheapest, the most environmentally friendly, and the safest way
    to transport oil and gas and other products.
        However, given the Biden administration's actions to shut
    down pipeline projects like the Keystone XL pipeline that they
    killed back in 2021, you would think that it was just the
    opposite. Why would President Biden shoot down a cheaper,
    cleaner, safer way to move our petroleum products, a project
    that supports our national security and energy goals? It is a
    great question, and one we ought to be asking ourselves every
    single day.
        But moving forward, we have got to be sure that the
    Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration is fully
    equipped and prepared to oversee current and future pipelines.
    And they also need to be laser-focused on safety, not
    environmental advocacy or anti-corporate litigation efforts.
        So, Deputy Administrator Brown, due to the growing size of
    the liquefied natural gas, or LNG, market and its importance
    for both domestic and international relations, PHMSA will need
    to step up its important safety role to oversee this industry.
        One proposal is that PHMSA institute an LNG separate Center
    of Excellence at a new location, as discussed in its report to
    Congress under model 3. Model 3 appears to provide
    comprehensive benefits to directly align industry,
    stakeholders, and industry in the continued growth of the
    domestic LNG export facilities. If PHMSA does not intend to
    pursue model 3, how will it make up for the shortfalls and gaps
    in knowledge that would occur?
        Mr. Brown. This is with regards to the creation of the LNG
    Center of Excellence?
        Dr. Babin. That is model 3, that is what--I think you
    mentioned that in your opening statement, did you not?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, I don't think model 3 was in my opening
    statement, but----
        Dr. Babin [interrupting]. OK, well----
        Mr. Brown [continuing]. But we did get appropriated $8.4
    million just a few months ago to create the LNG Center of
    Excellence, and so, we are well on our way in developing that
    model, but don't have anything to report yet as far as where,
    and some of the specifications of what that will look like. But
    it is something that--we are grateful that Congress has
    appropriated this funding to help improve the safety and
    environmental performance of LNG facilities.
        Dr. Babin. OK, well, I have got another question, time
    permitting. The Federal permitting process for energy
    infrastructure projects is complex, often triggering the
    jurisdiction of multiple Federal agencies and reviews. This is
    especially true for large-scale LNG projects, where PHMSA
    provides the regulatory expertise on safe design and
    operations. Yet FERC holds the authority to authorize the
    construction of these projects.
        I understand that often, because of a lack of coordination
    between the agencies, project developers, despite going through
    a multiyear design process, are then questioned and then forced
    to redesign existing facilities to satisfy the evolving demands
    of Federal inspectors and regulators.
        What is your agency doing to improve this coordination and
    to help shorten the permitting process, so that some of these
    projects can move forward, especially in an era of shortfalls
    of energy?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, and thank you, an important question. While
    we don't have, as you recognized, permitting authority, we do
    work closely with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. I
    was actually just down in Freeport, Texas, the site of an
    incident last year, a 450-foot-high fireball and explosion at
    that facility. We want to learn from those mistakes, and make
    sure we don't have that type of incident ever again.
        And so, we had, for the last 9 months, met on a weekly
    basis with the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, as well as
    the U.S. Coast Guard, to basically not, sort of, stay in our
    lanes, but instead work more closely, as you describe, to
    identify any potential areas of risk, whether it is in our lane
    or their lane typically, and work more robustly to identify
    those items upfront in that process.
        Dr. Babin. OK, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
        Mr. Johnson of South Dakota. Thank you, Mr. Babin. We now
    turn to the new Member from New Jersey, Mr. Menendez.
        Sir, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank my
    friend, Ranking Member Payne.
        Deputy Administrator Brown, as you know, we have seen
    increasingly sophisticated cyber attacks on our transportation
    infrastructure, including our pipeline systems. Keeping our
    pipelines secure is critical to the safety and well-being of
    the communities we represent. Can you speak to some of the
    cyber threats PHMSA grapples with, and what the interagency
    process for dealing with these attacks looks like?
        Mr. Brown. I can speak a little bit, but just for
    everybody's benefit, Congress has not given us authority to
    oversee cybersecurity of pipelines. The Transportation Security
    Administration does do that. But we do work very closely with
    them.
        Prior to the Colonial Pipeline cyber attack, we would
    engage voluntarily, invite our regulated entities, pipeline
    operators to discuss their cyber plans because, as we
    experienced when that incident occurred, there are operational
    impacts, potentially, when you have a cyber attack, and we are
    responsible for safe operations. Ultimately, the companies are
    always responsible for safe operations, but we are responsible
    for overseeing that. And so, prior to that incident, we had
    about 50 percent of our regulated entities engage in those
    discussions. Post that incident, we had about 100 percent of
    entities engaged in that.
        So, we have provided our input to the Transportation
    Security Administration on their proposed security directives
    on cybersecurity. We have engaged with leadership of pipeline
    companies, including the CEOs of companies that Mr. Black and
    Mr. Grubb represent, to make sure we are all on the same page.
    And more coordination between the Government and the private
    sector and between the Government agencies like the ones I
    referenced is integral to mitigating this increasing threat.
        Mr. Menendez. And a quick followup to that. Do you believe
    you have the statutory authority and tools you need to keep our
    pipeline infrastructure secure?
        Mr. Brown. We don't have the security responsibility, but
    we are actually hiring a cyber expert, even though we don't
    have a jurisdiction in that space, it does affect the areas
    that we do have jurisdiction.
        The nexus between operations and cybersecurity, just the
    same as Congressman Stauber noted for physical security. When
    we find issues, we want to flag them for Transportation
    Security Administration. And when they find them, we want to
    know about that. We train their inspectors on pipeline safety
    issues. So, we will continue to keep up that close
    collaboration.
        Mr. Menendez. That is great, and I appreciate that. And
    speaking of collaboration, this next question is open for all
    the witnesses.
        Where do you see the gaps in our pipeline cybersecurity
    infrastructure?
        And what do you need from Congress to address these
    threats?
        Mr. Brown. I will answer last because I have talked a lot
    here.
        Mr. Black. TSA has primary jurisdiction, as the Deputy
    Administrator has said, and they have identified critical
    facilities and required security directives of pipeline
    operators. That engagement with TSA and DOE is pretty good.
    Pipeline operators participate in a public-private partnership,
    Oil and Natural Gas Sector Coordinating Council, where we can
    do classified briefings and talk threats.
        TSA has seen that they need to evolve their requirements on
    pipeline operators to make sure that we are keeping up with the
    latest threats. There are a lot of bad guys out there who are
    trying to stop pipelines, but the public-private partnerships
    and the actions by pipeline operators are heading in the right
    direction.
        I don't have a recommendation for you.
        Mr. Menendez. For sure. Especially, you see more
    sophisticated technology, in terms of the pipeline management.
    I can imagine the increase in technology also increases the
    exposure and the risk. And so, I appreciate you continuing to
    monitor with our different agencies, TSA being the primary
    lead.
        Mr. Black. Yes.
        Mr. Grubb. So I, as well, don't have a recommendation, but
    I appreciate the question.
        But I will tell you that Kinder Morgan is definitely
    engaged with TSA and CEPA regarding cybersecurity of our
    pipelines. And in fact, our CEO was in Washington late last
    week, meeting with those agencies and talking through, and
    collaborating on the importance of cybersecurity and plans and
    programs going forward.
        Mr. Brown. I will just add one thing we have floated is
    having a detailed firm, a regulated entity with cyber
    expertise. Again, while we don't have that jurisdiction, we
    would still benefit, I think, from the sort of internal
    knowledge of how an operator navigates some of these challenges
    and vice versa that I think they can appreciate what we need to
    know in an incident like the Colonial cyber incident.
        Mr. Menendez. Thank you. I appreciate all of you, and I
    apologize for not having any time to yield back.
        Mr. Nehls [presiding]. Thank you. The gentleman's time is
    expired. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Duarte.
        Mr. Duarte. Hello. Thank you, Mr. Chair, Ranking Member. I
    appreciate the hearing today.
        Mr. Brown, good day. The fiscal year 2023 Appropriations
    Act provided more than $319 million in new funding for the
    Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration. And as
    you know, the PIPES Act required PHMSA to maintain a minimum of
    247 pipeline inspection personnel for fiscal year 2023. Your
    current count is 207, and now we learn that this funding
    includes a total of 33 positions, including 6 positions for
    pipeline safety climate change experts.
        Given the clear direction of Congress that PHMSA hire a
    minimum of 247 pipeline inspection and enforcement personnel,
    how can you justify 6 positions related to climate change in an
    agency that is supposed to be focused on safety?
        And what are these six climate change experts doing that is
    not covered by the regular pipeline inspection personnel?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, I want to make sure we get a very robust
    answer as a followup to this hearing, because over the first 2
    years, we were meeting the year-on-year increases of 20 percent
    each year. At the end of the year, we often lose folks to
    retirement. I want to make sure we get you up-to-date numbers
    and factor in those changes.
        We also initiated new recruitment and retention proposals
    that are currently pending with the Office of Personnel
    Management. For example, the Bureau of Safety and Environmental
    Enforcement pays their engineering inspectors about 30 percent
    more than we are able to pay ours.
        Additionally, there is at least one State that pays about
    30 percent more. We just want to be able to be on that same
    level playing field.
        We can't compete with the private sector in terms of
    compensation, but we welcome any incentives.
        Mr. Duarte. Great.
        Mr. Brown. It is not for a lack of trying. We certainly
    want----
        Mr. Duarte [interrupting]. Well, thank you. My followup
    question is, what are the climate change experts----
        Mr. Brown [interposing]. Yes, great.
        Mr. Duarte [continuing]. Doing that your regular safety
    personnel are not doing?
        Mr. Brown. Yes. So, this committee directed us to consider
    environmental impacts in our rulemakings. That has been a
    directive from this committee. We have to implement that.
        The last administration promulgated a rule in which 15
    State attorneys general sued us because we did not consider
    environmental impacts. When a rule is litigated and basically
    held in abeyance, we can't do our work on those rules until we
    consider the environmental impacts.
        As I noted before, we had less than one full-time employee
    considering environmental impacts when it is in our mission
    statement. So, we need a few folks. That also includes lithium-
    ion batteries. So, half of our agency oversees 1 in 10 goods
    that move in the United States: nuclear waste, lithium-ion
    batteries----
        Mr. Duarte [interrupting]. OK, I got it. It has been said
    that if everything is a priority, then nothing gets priority.
    PHMSA requests more resources from Congress to complete this
    core mission. Now you are spending these resources on
    activities that have no correlation with pipeline safety.
        We can all talk about climate change until the cows come
    home. We can all talk about: Are we facilitating the use of
    natural gas, and does natural gas contribute to climate change?
    Your core mission is keeping the natural gas and the natural
    gas pipeline--because as you said, it is a very powerful--when
    released, a very powerful climate driver.
        And so, in this change in mission--is this change in
    mission being directed by the White House? And what
    communications have you had with them regarding this new
    direction for PHMSA?
        Mr. Brown. So, I agree with what you said. So, I think
    maybe there is just a disconnect on, sort of, our common
    understanding. When we are keeping product in the pipe, that is
    mitigating climate change, right? So, that is what we are
    trying to do, is keep the product in the pipe. That is
    improving safety, mitigating----
        Mr. Duarte [interrupting]. I guess I have to ask. You used
    to have quarterly meetings with the industry, the PHMSA group
    and your group used to have quarterly meetings. And yet, the
    best way to keep gas in the pipe and to keep environmental
    catastrophes from happening is working closely with the people
    who are most engaged in keeping them from happening, as the
    industry folks here are very incentivized to deliver safety and
    delivery within their pipelines. You haven't been having the
    meetings since 2021. How can you achieve your stated purpose
    without better engagement with the industry?
        Mr. Brown. I believe we have had five advisory committee
    meetings in the last few years. Those are primarily focused
    on--and their role as Congress set out--to consider
    rulemakings. We had the most productive year in our agency's
    history in 2021 in rulemakings. Many of those had already had
    the advisory committee meeting for those rulemakings.
        So, you can expect a bunch more, either a bunch more
    meetings or longer meetings to just get more done at one
    meeting, instead of having a bunch of separate meetings,
    because it takes a ton of staff time to actually set up for
    those meetings. And it also takes a lot of time--and I know
    people are very generous, we have got members here represented
    in actually going to those meetings, but we are trying to make
    it as efficient as possible, instead of just having meetings,
    which in this town often don't always produce results.
        Mr. Duarte. I can see that.
        I will yield back.
        Mr. Nehls. Thank you. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Carter.
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and
    Ranking Member--273 crossing fatalities, 1,475 per year between
    2005 to 2021. GPAC meetings, making sure these communities are
    safe, becomes very, very important.
        Mr. Grubb, can you explain the benefits of the Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration issuing a final class
    rule?
        Mr. Grubb. So, it has three main benefits. I thank you for
    the question, by the way. There are three main benefits
    associated with finalizing the class location rule.
        The first is updating the outdated regulation that has been
    in place for over 50 years. It was put in place prior to in-
    line inspection being developed, and those technologies being
    further advanced.
        The second benefit is, we will eliminate over 800 million
    cubic feet that is emitted annually by virtue of having
    alternative methods of compliance with the current regulation.
        The third benefit is the hundreds of millions of dollars
    that industry is spending on replacing perfectly safe pipe that
    is in accordance with the current regulation, can be
    reallocated to other safety measures, other safety benefits on
    these pipeline systems.
        We hope that PHMSA will finalize this rule as soon as
    possible, based on those three benefits.
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Can you share with me what your
    company does to ensure pipeline safety?
        Mr. Grubb. So, the main things are, we respond to incidents
    with the priorities of lives and property, first. We
    investigate incidents to determine the causes and the facts of
    those incidents. And then we use those findings to improve our
    processes and procedures.
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana. So, we know how important it is to
    involve the community. And I just heard Mr. Brown suggest that
    there have been five meetings over the last several years. Do
    you think that is ample?
        I mean, we are talking about keeping the community
    involved, making sure that they understand the most up-to-date
    safety measures, that they know the early warnings, that they
    know their area is to be protected. I suggest that these
    meetings should be much more frequently held.
        Mr. Brown. These are largely to consider the text of
    regulations that we promulgate, and come to a consensus on that
    text. And so, we are trying to time them where we can get--
    given the interest in our finishing our rulemakings quickly--as
    many rulemakings on one of those meetings as possible.
    Otherwise, it extends the amount of work everyone has to do.
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana. But you would agree that having
    community involvement is essential?
        Mr. Brown. I am sorry?
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana. You would agree that having
    community involvement is essential?
        Mr. Brown. Yes. Community is welcome to attend those
    meetings, but it is largely only attended by the statutory
    members of that committee, which is 15 individuals, and they
    represent 5 people from industry, 5 from governmental entities,
    and then 5 public members.
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana. What individuals are mandated that
    must be in attendance for these meetings?
        Mr. Brown. Just the--well, actually, no one is mandated to
    attend, but there are 15 members of the committee that are
    statutorily required to be appointed.
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Fifteen members from where?
        Mr. Brown. Five from industry, five from the public, five
    from governmental entities, State and local.
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana. OK, so, tell me about the five
    from the public.
        Mr. Brown. So, we, for the first time, appointed a labor
    representative, the people that actually do the work that we
    are talking about on the ground. Mr. Caram is a member, and his
    organization is represented as a member of the public. We have
    an environmental organization, Environmental Defense Fund,
    represented, a law professor, and then, for the first time, we
    are trying to focus on, can we get some engineer professors, or
    people with sort of the greatest amount of expertise in this
    space committed to our mission of safety and environmental----
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana [interrupting]. Well, why not
    individuals? Why not people from the community, the people that
    are most impacted? You say those five are community, but I
    didn't hear you say anybody from a neighborhood. I didn't hear
    anybody from a school, anyone from a church, anyone from the
    affected community. May I----
        Mr. Brown [interrupting]. Yes, we do.
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana [continuing]. I----
        Mr. Brown [interposing]. Yes.
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana. Let me ask first.
        Mr. Brown. I am sorry.
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana. It is important that, when we talk
    about these things, that we involve community.
        Mr. Brown. Absolutely.
        Mr. Carter of Louisiana. And if you call it a community
    five, then that community should truly be representative of the
    people in the community.
        Mr. Brown. My understanding of what Congress----
        Mr. Nehls [interrupting]. The gentleman's time is expired.
    I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. Molinaro.
        Mr. Molinaro. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate
    that.
        Mr. Brown, I want to get to you in a moment, but I strongly
    suggest that long meetings don't produce better outcomes.
    Effective meetings produce better outcomes. Congress is a
    living example of some of that, and I trust that you can
    appreciate that.
        I do want to, Mr. Grubb, though, I want to follow up on the
    classification rule. I appreciated my colleagues' questions.
    Could you remind us, however, how long the industry has been
    waiting for the rule to be finalized?
        Mr. Grubb. Thank you for the question. Over 20 years.
        Mr. Molinaro. So, Mr. Brown, what exactly is the reason why
    over 20 years is the time in which the industry has been
    waiting?
        Mr. Brown. The question the chairman asked me first about
    the LNG facilities rule, that is about 30 years. That one, big
    safety impacts. This one, more efficiency, potential impacts
    for reducing environmental emissions. We focus on safety first.
        We had three rules that we finished last year that were
    over 10 years in the making that this committee said, ``You
    must get done in 30 days'' in 1 year. So, we are focusing on
    the ones that Congress has given us deadlines for, and
    prioritizing safety first.
        Mr. Molinaro. Dear God, I can only imagine that, if 10
    years is priority, I can't imagine what 30 is. It is a bit of
    an embarrassment, wouldn't you think? I mean----
        Mr. Brown [interrupting]. In the last administration--I
    just went to revisit that exact same hearing, and you got the
    exact same questions from both sides of the aisle: Why does it
    take so long?
        And the amount of things that we oversee--natural gas, for
    example--triple what it was 5 years ago that we oversee. Carbon
    dioxide, hydrogen, $100 billion in incentives. We have zero
    people, zero full-time employees focused on that. Our ability
    to get things done is directly proportional to the resources
    that Congress gives us.
        Mr. Molinaro. Yes, I tend to question that, as a former
    government official, local government official. I tend to think
    that it is just--it is a lack of focus and focus on efficient
    outcomes. I have never been involved in government where
    somebody didn't say, ``What I need is more people to accomplish
    more,'' and when we do, they don't accomplish it any quicker,
    we just have more people doing the same thing. That is my
    observation. I will be glad to engage in that a little bit
    further as we get further down the--sorry for the pun--
    pipeline.
        But I want to return, Mr. Grubb. So, the PIPES Act of 2016
    convenes this voluntary information-sharing system, a working
    group. It was recommended that Congress authorize such a
    program to share pipeline safety information, while providing
    confidentiality for disclosures.
        Could you speak briefly to the benefits of that? And then
    how might Congress or PHMSA address the concerns about sharing
    proprietary information?
        Mr. Grubb. Thank you for the question. So, INGAA and its
    member companies strongly support sharing of information across
    the sector. It is something that we have done for many years.
    It is something we will continue to do. We learn from those. We
    modify our procedures associated with the learnings from other
    companies, as well as our own. We highly value it. It is
    something that we share not only with industry sectors, but
    across the regulatory groups, the governmental groups, the
    public safety organizations. It is very beneficial. It is
    something we champion.
        With respect to this particular program, I don't have a lot
    of details on the inner workings of it, and how it would work.
    I would certainly be willing to look at that and take that back
    and respond in writing. But I don't have any particular
    information relative to the inner workings of that information-
    sharing that you referenced.
        Mr. Molinaro. OK. And, of course, protecting proprietary
    information, obviously, a priority for the industry. And as we
    address that, obviously, some guidance and input would be
    useful.
        Mr. Brown, I know that you have already addressed this for
    my sake, and I am just getting used to the concept of asking
    questions that have already been answered as a new Member of
    Congress, but I am happy to continue in that fine tradition.
        I wanted to talk, if you could, in my last 30 seconds, the
    technology pilot program allows operators to deploy that
    technology that we know will both spur innovation, has
    environmental benefit, and, of course, increased safety. Can
    you just reiterate why we have had no participants?
        Mr. Brown. I think Mr. Black has reiterated it a few times,
    from the perspective of those who are looking to participate.
    The burden is too high for them to meet. And so, we are happy
    to work with folks, because we do want to get to the same
    place, which is using innovative technologies. We don't want to
    sacrifice safety, and we don't want to sacrifice environmental
    impacts. But if we can come up with rules of the road there, I
    mean, that is what we publicly asked for, and we just haven't
    gotten the suggestion of how to do that.
        We have gotten the suggestion that we shouldn't consider
    the environmental impacts, but the Congress said we have to, is
    our legal interpretation of that. So, I don't know if I can add
    too much more, but I do think it is an important point, and I
    am glad to work with you.
        Mr. Molinaro. We would like that.
        And Mr. Chairman, with the degree of priority--without
    being snide--perhaps we could achieve that in less than 20
    years.
        Mr. Nehls. Thank you. The gentleman's time is expired. I
    now recognize Mr. Huffman for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Huffman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for the
    witnesses.
        If I have learned anything in my 10 years in Congress, it
    is that my colleagues across the aisle pretty much look at any
    situation, almost every hearing, every bill, as an opportunity
    to push the fossil fuel agenda. And so, I guess it is no
    surprise that this week, apparently, the GOP messaging memo was
    to use the toxic rail tragedy in East Palestine as a pivot to
    make the case for more fossil fuel pipeline infrastructure.
    Never mind that that was vinyl chloride, and the pipelines that
    they want are oil and gas.
        I understand why they want to pivot to fossil fuel
    pipelines, but let's not pretend that that is safe. The truth,
    if we are honest about it, is that fossil fuel pipelines are
    disasters waiting to happen, plain and simple.
        A great example of that is the Keystone XL, or the Keystone
    Pipeline. Over the last 12 years, it has had 22 oilspills,
    including 2 large spills between 2017 and 2019. The GAO issued
    a report in 2021 regarding this pipeline's safety record,
    showing that it had been deteriorating, identifying
    construction issues as the primary contributor. But maybe the
    more shocking part of that report was that the Keystone
    Pipeline's terrible safety record was about the same, on
    average, as other fossil fuel pipelines all over this country.
        So, when you put that together with Mr. Caram's testimony
    showing the number of significant incidents has slightly
    increased since 2010, I think we have just got to be very
    clear-eyed about pipeline safety and fossil fuel pipeline
    safety, specifically, in this country.
        On December 22, 2022, Keystone sprang another big leak.
    This time, 14,000 barrels spilled in Nebraska. It was the
    pipeline's largest spill since it began operating in 2010, the
    largest onshore oilspill in the U.S. since 2013. And PHMSA
    officials had actually told the GAO way back in 2001 that they
    had learned lessons, and that they were applying those lessons
    to inspecting pipelines that were under construction. But here
    we are.
        And so, Mr. Brown, I have been impressed by your knowledge
    and your competency. You have given great answers to all the
    questions. If we have to have this spaghetti web of pipelines
    moving dangerous, toxic, volatile fossil fuel all over this
    country every day, I want a competent person like you
    overseeing it, I really do. And I respect the work that you do.
        But you also said--you gave us this lessons learned line
    that we have heard many times before. And I just want to ask if
    you can appreciate the fact that we have heard this many, many
    times before. So, as you undertake your rulemaking under the
    PIPES Act, can you give us something more specific about
    specific lessons that you are going to put into practice to
    make these pipelines more safe?
        Mr. Brown. Yes, absolutely. But I just want to get to that
    really important point that people find it very disconcerting
    that we focus on lessons learned. That is, like, by design.
    That is Congress telling us, and the statutes----
        Mr. Huffman [interrupting]. You should do it. I am not
    saying you shouldn't do it.
        Mr. Brown. Yes. No, no, of course. And I just want
    everybody in the room to understand.
        We just had a hearing in the DC Circuit on a rule, and a
    little bit of the commentary was that unless you can point to a
    failure specifically, then you can't do a rulemaking. You are
    not going to survive the legal standard that has been set up by
    Congress.
        Mr. Huffman. Understood. And reclaiming my time, because I
    want you to learn those lessons and to apply them to your
    rulemakings, I do want to ask Mr. Caram about hydrogen.
        One of the latest things that we are hearing is that all of
    these new fossil fuel pipelines will soon be carrying hydrogen.
    We can start blending it right away, and eventually it will be
    all hydrogen. But it is not that simple, is it, Mr. Caram? We
    know that the California PUC has just done a study suggesting
    that there are serious risks and gaps in research and
    regulations regarding blending hydrogen into fossil fuel
    pipelines, and that we could very well face leaks from
    fittings, gaskets, valves, stems.
        What are some of the things we should be concerned about
    before we get too far down the path of hydrogen pipelines?
        Mr. Caram. Yes, thank you for the question. And the
    Pipeline Safety Trust commissioned a report on the safety of
    hydrogen pipelines that I encourage everyone to review.
        We found that hydrogen has some unique physical
    characteristics that are very different from methane that make
    it more dangerous from methane, primarily a much larger
    flammability range, meaning it more likely to ignite at
    different concentrations, and it also poses known integrity
    issues to pipes and components, embrittlement and things like
    that, which would lead to more failures.
        There are some really large knowledge gaps that both PHMSA
    and the industry, through research organizations, are
    attempting to fill, but we are years away from answering those
    questions.
        Mr. Huffman. Thank you. And Mr. Chair, I see that I am out
    of time. I don't have enough time to get into CO2
    pipelines, which are not a climate solution. They are for
    enhanced oil recovery. But we will do that another day. I
    appreciate your indulgence.
        Mr. Nehls. Thank you, Mr. Huffman. I now yield 5 minutes to
    Mr. Kean.
        Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want
    to thank all the witnesses for being here today.
        As we begin our work to reauthorize pipeline safety
    legislation, I look forward to working with every single member
    of the subcommittee to improve pipeline safety through a
    balanced regulatory approach.
        As we have heard, the United States has the largest network
    of energy pipelines in the world. Oversight of the Pipeline and
    Hazardous Materials Safety Administration safety programs
    should be a top priority for this subcommittee in achieving our
    common goal and our shared goal of zero pipeline incidents.
        Mr. Black, the PIPES Act of 2020 creates a technology pilot
    program that allows operators to test innovative technologies
    and practices that improve safety in the field. How do
    operators use innovative technology and practices to improve
    the pipeline safety of their systems?
        And what benefits would a technology pilot program give to
    operators?
        Mr. Black. We are excited about the benefits of innovation
    in inspection and analytic technologies, and we want them to be
    rolled into how PHMSA regulates pipelines. And I know
    innovation is very important to you in your part of New Jersey.
        Pipeline inspections occur through in-line inspections, so-
    called smart pig, that travel inside of the pipe. And through
    the decades, the sensors that have been put on the pipe have
    gotten more and more sophisticated. We can see more things.
        Similarly, back in the office, we are using newer
    techniques to harness the data from that. But the regulations
    that PHMSA uses for the schedule that pipelines must address
    incidents on are more than 20 years old, but yet we have had
    all these innovations.
        So, we are grateful to Congress for creating a pipeline
    safety demonstration program. Sadly, it hasn't worked. Nobody
    has applied, because it was made too hard, it went beyond what
    Congress was suggesting. With some reforms that I am happy to
    go into, we can road test. PHMSA can see the benefits of new
    inspection technologies, and how reorienting the schedule that
    operators need to address risks on improves pipeline safety.
    That is our goal.
        Let's use innovation, new technology, even machine learning
    to improve. We are doing it, but we need the PHMSA schedules to
    improve.
        Mr. Kean of New Jersey. OK. Thank you.
        Deputy Administrator Brown, PHMSA has only held one GPAC
    meeting since January of 2021, and that was on October 20th and
    21st of 2021. In the past, you have had many GPAC meetings,
    while also issuing complicated notice of rulemakings and final
    rules. Why have you had so few meetings?
        Mr. Brown. So, in the past, we have also had years where we
    didn't get any rulemakings done. So, we might have had meetings
    but not done rulemakings.
        These meetings are exclusively--at least from my
    perspective, and all the demands on getting rulemakings done--
    to advance rulemakings. We have to have a meeting in order for
    a rulemaking to advance. So--and we want--we had the busiest
    year in our history in producing pipeline safety rulemakings in
    2021, nearly the busiest in 2022.
        We have no aversion to having these meetings. We just want
    to make them as efficient as possible, given the demands we
    have for all the rulemakings we have to complete.
        Mr. Kean of New Jersey. OK. Thank you. And Mr. Grubb, can
    you explain, please explain to this subcommittee, what your
    committee does to ensure the safety of its pipeline system?
        Mr. Grubb. So, thank you for the question.
        So, over time, pipeline operators have invested highly in
    advancements in pipeline in-line inspection technology. That
    has improved immensely over time.
        The other things are implementation of pipeline safety
    management systems. We have one at Kinder Morgan. We call it
    our operations management system. It is really a system that
    defines our culture.
        And there are three main tenets of our operations
    management system: the first is, every employee has a role in
    the OMS; the second is instilling a culture of continuous
    improvement and operational excellence; and the last, and
    certainly not least, is risk reduction: risk reduction to our
    assets, to the people that live near our pipelines, to our
    employees, to our contractors that work in our pipelines. That
    is a main part of what we do to reduce risk and manage the
    safety of our pipelines.
        The third and last thing is joint industry collaboration,
    over which GPAC meetings are also crucial and key, interacting
    with other industries or other industry subject matter experts,
    Government experts, as well as public safety organization
    experts.
        Mr. Kean of New Jersey. Thank you to the entire panel for
    your testimony.
        I will yield back the remainder of my time.
        Mr. Nehls. Thank you. I now yield 5 minutes to Mr. LaMalfa.
        Mr. LaMalfa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am glad I was able
    to slide into the newer, larger second base just in time.
    Apologies. Overlapping committees make it tough around here,
    but I appreciate your folks' work with this committee and
    extremely important topics here on pipelines, which we rely
    heavily upon in this country, and we need more of. So, let me
    launch into it here real quickly.
        Now, safety is a cornerstone. And that is what much of the
    work of Congress is seeking to do in increasing safety in all
    aspects of our lives, including pipelines.
        What I note is that the average U.S. company pays
    approximately $10,000 per employee per year to comply with
    Federal regulations. So, laws passed with good intent can be
    completely changed by the time the implementation is completed,
    or years and decades go by. We see that a lot with the creep of
    responsibility and jurisdiction.
        So, the more input that is received, the rules that the
    companies have to comply with become less flexible and more
    burdensome--input by Federal Government and agencies. And the
    estimate of the National Association of Manufacturers puts the
    total economic cost of regulations every year at $2 trillion.
        In the 2020 PIPES Act, Congress recognized this and sought
    partially to address it by telling PHMSA to immediately carry
    out a pilot program to let pipeline operators evaluate new
    technology and operational changes to improve pipeline safety.
    But in a way, it is inefficient and also uneconomical.
        Again, apologies if some of this is redundant from earlier
    work today, but since it took too long to send the guidance to
    operators, the report that they were required to send to
    Congress a year later was completely void of recommendations,
    is my understanding.
        So, tossing this to Mr. Grubb here, do you know of any
    recent innovations with technology or operational changes that
    could have improved pipeline safety under this pilot program?
        Mr. Grubb. I am sorry. Could you repeat the last part of
    the question?
        Mr. LaMalfa. Some of the innovations with technology or
    operational changes that could have improved the pipeline
    safety under the pilot program that was to be done under PHMSA.
        Mr. Grubb. Yes, so, to my knowledge, there hasn't been any
    takers on the technology pilot program because of the
    complications that Mr. Black talked about.
        But I can tell you that pipeline operators are advancing
    technology on their own.
        Mr. LaMalfa. On their own, yes.
        Mr. Grubb. And I can tell you that Kinder Morgan, one of
    our pipelines was the first pipeline to implement a tool that
    detects cracks, environmental cracking, in its pipelines. And
    that was done many, many years ago. It received PHMSA approval.
    It was the first pipeline to have received that approval. And
    it has become the industry standard today for detecting cracks.
        Mr. LaMalfa. So, the PIPES Act did not really aid in
    expediting in this in a pilot program?
        Mr. Grubb. No, because of the issues that Mr. Black
    referenced earlier.
        Mr. Black. The PIPES Act helped. PHMSA implementation meant
    nobody took it up. PIPES Act was good. We would like you to
    continue. Maybe give more direction to PHMSA, have a longer
    program. Congress was in the right place.
        Mr. LaMalfa. OK. What do we need to do to then speed up or
    do additional work to make PIPES Act effective and something
    you would want to access?
        Mr. Black. Say that decisions on pilot program applications
    don't need to follow NEPA, have an environmental assessment;
    have a reasonable standard review that is less than something
    for a permanent waiver, and not use the permanent waiver
    process; and give this enough time to work. We believe that it
    can. The technology is an ultrasound, an MRI, and pipelines can
    improve safety.
        Mr. LaMalfa. So, even though it is a pilot program designed
    to speed things up, it is still under the guidelines of a long-
    term permitting process. It hasn't really changed.
        Mr. Black. It is suffering many of the same problems, yes,
    sir. Two years later, we haven't made notable progress.
        Mr. LaMalfa. OK. What do we need to do in order to modify
    or streamline, massage that act in order to make it so it would
    be accessible and actually a helpful tool?
        Mr. Black. Thank you. That would be great, and we would
    like to work with you. Reauthorize it for a long time. Tell
    PHMSA to stick with the mandates that you have given. Tell them
    we don't need to do environmental assessments on R&D projects.
    We don't need to use the special permit process. Let's make
    this work.
        Mr. LaMalfa. R&D shouldn't need environmental review.
        Mr. Black. Yes, sir.
        Mr. LaMalfa. OK. Makes sense.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. I appreciate the
    time.
        Mr. Nehls. The gentleman yields. Are there any further
    questions from any members of the subcommittee who have not
    been recognized?
        Seeing none, that concludes our hearing for today.
        I would like to thank each one of the witnesses for your
    testimony. I would like to thank Ranking Member Payne for being
    here.
        I look forward to working with you for the next several
    months.
        I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
    remain open until such time as our witnesses have provided
    answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in
    writing.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
    for 15 days for any additional comments or information
    submitted by Members or witnesses to be included in the record
    of today's hearing.
        Without objection, so ordered.
        The subcommittee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 12:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                           Submissions for the Record

                                  ----------

     Letter of March 22, 2023, to Hon. Sam Graves, Chairman, and Hon. Rick
    Larsen, Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
       from Geoff Moody, Senior Vice President, Government Relations and
     Policy, American Fuel and Petrochemical Manufacturers, Submitted for
                        the Record by Hon. Troy E. Nehls
                                                        March 22, 2023.
    The Honorable Sam Graves,
    Chairman,
    Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2165 Rayburn House
            Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
    The Honorable Rick Larsen,
    Ranking Member,
    Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 2164 Rayburn House
            Office Building, Washington, DC 20515.
    RE:  Statement for the Record--Pipeline Safety: Reviewing
    Implementation of the PIPES Act of 2020 and Examining Future Safety
    Needs

        Dear Chairman Graves and Ranking Member Larsen:
        The American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers (AFPM) is the
    leading trade association representing the makers of the fuels that
    keep us moving, the petrochemicals that are the essential building
    blocks for the American manufacturing economy, and the midstream
    companies that get our feedstocks and products where they need to go.
    AFPM members make modern life possible and keep America moving and
    growing as they meet the needs of our nation and local communities,
    strengthen economic and national security, and support over three
    million American jobs. AFPM appreciates the opportunity to provide its
    perspectives on priorities for pipeline safety reauthorization.
        As Congress crafts the pipeline safety reauthorization, it should
    ensure PHMSA focuses on risk-based and cost-effective regulations,
    promote technology development, and ensure existing programs are
    working as intended. AFPM recommends Congress consider the following
    concepts for inclusion in any reauthorization.
     Enhance Pipeline Safety Through Data-driven and Risk Based Initiatives
        Congress can help improve safety by encouraging sensible data- and
    risk-based regulations in the following areas.
          Voluntary information sharing (VIS) can benefit PHMSA's
    safety mission and AFPM supports a VIS regime provided appropriate
    protections are in place to ensure such information is used solely as a
    mechanism to improve pipeline safety. Protecting voluntarily shared
    information, as well as security sensitive information, must remain a
    commitment for PHMSA.
          PHMSA standards regulate the inspection of petroleum
    storage tanks on fixed structures; however, these inspection
    requirements are rigid and not risk-based, which can lead to unneeded
    inspections, environmental impacts, and increased risk for workers.
    Congress should instruct PHMSA to review current storage tank
    inspection procedures and implement a risk-based approach that
    prioritizes worker and environmental safety.
          The National Response Center reporting process currently
    requires tedious telephonic reporting and PHMSA's update to the
    incident reporting threshold for liquid pipelines has been delayed.
    Congress should simplify the National Response Center reporting process
    and instruct PHMSA to periodically adjust the incident reporting
    threshold for inflation.
       Enable Technology Advancements Through Modernized Pipeline Safety
                                   Standards
        The regulatory process often lags behind the pace of technological
    advancements. Congress can foster innovative technologies and support
    programs that will improve safety standards in the following areas.
          In the PIPES Act of 2021, Congress instructed PHMSA to
    implement a pilot program to enable operators to use new advanced
    technologies without major regulations. Unfortunately, the program has
    not been utilized effectively, as many of the parameters are overly
    restrictive and have discouraged pipeline operators from the program.
    Congress should update the Pipeline Safety Technology Demonstration
    program to encourage operators to utilize this option and deploy
    advanced technologies under controlled conditions.
          While current federal pipeline safety standards already
    regulate the design, construction, operation, maintenance, and
    emergency response for CO2 and Hydrogen pipelines, the regulations
    could be updated to ensure they are consistent and current. PHMSA
    should ensure the regulations address any specific safety concerns for
    this material, but at the same time not be so burdensome that they
    stifle development. Congress should instruct PHMSA to review and update
    where necessary specific CO2 and Hydrogen pipeline safety standards.
                 Improve PHMSA Safety and Enforcement Programs
        Congress can provide clarity around PHMSA's safety and enforcement
    programs in the following areas.
          The rise of interference directed at both pipeline
    construction and operations creates unsafe conditions and places lives
    at risk. Pipelines must be protected, and deterrents must be in place
    to dissuade such actions. PHMSA's safety mission should include
    authority that ensures pipeline construction and operations remain safe
    at all times and protected from unsafe conditions and damage.
          In 2021 Congress authorized PHMSA to create a program
    that would monitor and mitigate methane emissions from natural gas
    systems. PHMSA expanded the scope of the program beyond natural gas
    pipelines to include liquid pipelines. AFPM members believe that the
    inclusion of liquid pipelines has not resulted in any meaningful
    reductions in hazardous leaks and being overly burdensome on liquid
    pipeline operators. Congress should clarify that this program does NOT
    apply to liquid pipelines and refocus the program on natural gas
    pipelines.
          PHMSA regulations include criteria and procedures for
    determining the effectiveness of State pipeline excavation damage
    prevention programs. While there has been significant improvement over
    the years in avoiding these unintentional hits to pipeline systems, the
    need to make continuous improvements in avoiding such accidents
    remains. Congress should continue to encourage maximum participation in
    these State damage prevention programs by discouraging exemptions from
    such programs via grant funding to the States.

        PHMSA is a small agency with a hugely important mission. While
    previous reauthorizations authorized PHMSA with resources, many safety
    priorities have been delayed. AFPM supports Congress reauthorizing
    PHMSA with the resources to achieve their safety mission. Thank you
    again for your attention and work on Pipeline Safety reauthorization.
    We appreciate your leadership on this important issue and look forward
    to working with lawmakers as the reauthorization process moves forward.
            Sincerely,
                                                   Geoff Moody,
                Senior Vice President, Government Relations and Policy,
                           American Fuel & Petrochemical Manufacturers.

                                    Appendix

                                  ----------

          Questions from Hon. Troy E. Nehls to Tristan Brown, Deputy
     Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
                                    (PHMSA)

        Question 1. Is it true the PHMSA has a new Environmental Policy and
    Justice Division?
        Answer. There is no formally established Environmental Policy and
    Justice Division. PHMSA currently has two full time employees with
    engineering and environmental backgrounds within PHMSA's Office of
    Planning and Analytics who work on environmental policy. This work has
    been performed in PHMSA for decades, on an ad hoc basis. PHMSA is
    considering ways to increase efficiency and reduce costs, and
    centralize efforts--aimed at tackling environmental issues proactively
    to help increase the speed of delivery and avoid costly litigation.

    Regarding this office:

        Question 1.a. Where in the organization is this office located and
    what are the responsibilities of the personnel in this office?
        Answer. The effort to create more capacity for proactive analysis,
    as previously mentioned, is ongoing.

        Question 1.b. What is its annual budget?
        Answer. There is no formally established Environmental Policy and
    Justice Division so it does not have a budget.

        Question 1.c. Is this office involved in the development of
    rulemakings?
        Answer. PHMSA currently has two full time employees focused on
    ensuring the agency meets the requirements established by Congress for
    NEPA reviews, including for rulemakings.

        Question 1.d. Can you please list the number of personnel and
    corresponding title and GS-level for each personnel located in this
    office?
        Answer. There are currently three personnel who work on
    environmental policy, all with engineering (and environmental)
    backgrounds:
          GS-0028-15 Supervisory Environmental Protection
    Specialist
          GS-0028-14 Lead Environmental Protection Specialist
          GS-0028-09/11/12 Environmental Protection Specialist

        Question 1.e. Are there additional positions to be filled in this
    Division and if so, can you please list those vacant positions?
        Answer. The Office of Planning and Analytics is in the process of
    hiring a GS-0028-13/14 Lead Environmental Protection Specialist to
    conduct state, local, tribal, and territorial reviews to ensure that
    PHMSA is meeting its statutory requirements under Section 106 of the
    National Historic Preservation Act. The office does not have any plans
    to hire any additional environmental protection specialists other than
    the ones previously mentioned.

        Question 2. We've learned that PHMSA has six pipeline safety
    climate change expert positions that are open. Can you please detail
    the job titles, GS-level, position duties, and where they are located
    in PHMSA's organizational structure? How many of these positions have
    been filled?
        Answer. The FY 2023 appropriations provided funding for six (6)
    positions to support the requirements in Executive Order 14008
    (Tackling the Climate Crisis at Home and Abroad), among several other
    duties consistent with their respective job series. Four positions have
    been filled.
        The positions are as follows:
          Office of Planning and Analytics (4 positions)
          +  GS-0028-15 Supervisory Environmental Protection Specialist
    (Filled)
          +  GS-0028-9/11/12/13/14 Environmental Protection Specialist
    (Vacant)
          +  GS-0028-9/11/12/13/14 Environmental Protection Specialist
    (Vacant)
          +  GS-0028-9/11/12 Environmental Protection Specialist (Filled)
          Office of Pipeline Safety (OPS, 2 positions)
          +  GS-2101-14 Transportation Specialist, Standards and Rulemaking
    Division (Filled). This position will help lead the development of
    rulemaking efforts related to methane emissions reduction for gas
    transmission, gas gathering, gas distribution, liquefied natural gas
    (LNG) and hazardous liquid pipeline facilities. This individual will
    also be involved in the implementation, including stakeholder outreach
    and engagement, of these efforts to reduce the safety and climate
    impact of pipeline infrastructure.
          +  GS-2101-13 Transportation Specialist, Standards and Rulemaking
    Division (Filled). This position will support the development of
    rulemaking efforts related to methane emissions reduction for gas
    transmission, gas gathering, gas distribution, LNG, and hazardous
    liquid pipeline facilities. This individual will also be involved in
    the implementation, including stakeholder outreach and engagement, of
    these efforts to reduce the safety and climate impact of pipeline
    infrastructure.

        Question 3. Section 102(b)(1) of the Protecting Our Infrastructure
    of Pipelines and Enhancing Safety Act of 2020 (PIPES 2020) mandated
    PHMSA hire eight full time employees with subject matter in pipeline
    safety, pipeline facilities, and pipeline systems to finalize
    outstanding rulemakings and fulfill congressional mandates. PHMSA's FY
    2024 budget request states, ``In furtherance of its rulemaking efforts
    and in accordance with the PIPES Act of 2020, PHMSA is in the process
    of completing its hiring of eight full-time employees to help finalize
    outstanding rulemakings and fulfill congressional mandates.''
        Question 3.a. Can you please list the number of positions that have
    been filled related to this mandate along with their associated titles
    and GS-level?
        Answer. PHMSA has filled all eight (8) positions:
          GS-0801-14 General Engineer
          GS-0801-14 General Engineer
          GS-0801-13 General Engineer
          GS-0905-14 Attorney Advisor
          GS-1515-13 Operations Research Analyst
          GS-0110-13 Economist
          GS-1083-13 Technical Writer
          GS-2101-9 Transportation Specialist

        Question 3.b. Can you please also share what subject matter
    expertise in pipeline safety, pipeline facilities, and pipeline systems
    each person hired has?
        Answer. Almost all of the individuals hired to fill the above
    positions had experience in pipeline safety or the pipeline industry.
    The attorney and economist had transferable experience to PHMSA's
    regulatory program, and they have been instrumental to the progress
    that PHMSA has made in the last two years in one of the busiest
    rulemaking periods in the agency's history.

        Question 3.c. Can you describe the important contributions to
    pipeline safety that each person has made since onboarding?
        Answer. Over the last two years, PHMSA has achieved significant
    milestones in rulemaking, supported by personnel with pipeline safety
    rulemaking responsibility, including the eight (8) hired thus far under
    this mandate. Significant contributions include development of Notices
    of Proposed Rulemakings (NPRMs) for Gas Pipeline Leak Detection, Safety
    of Gas Distribution Pipelines, safety of Carbon Dioxide Pipelines,
    Hazardous Liquid Repair Criteria, LNG Safety, and Pipeline Operational
    Status; information collection requests from OMB for the recently
    published Valve Rule; development of congressionally mandated studies
    and reports; and performance of regulatory impact analysis and
    regulatory flexibility analysis for rulemakings.
        The eight (8) personnel hired under this mandate have the following
    responsibilities:
          GS-0801-14 General Engineer, GS-0801-14 General Engineer,
    and GS-0801-13 General Engineer: provide technical expertise and
    engineering and science-based analysis in support of rulemaking,
    improvement of reliability and serviceability of the pipeline
    transportation network, and development of studies and reports mandated
    in the PIPES Act of 2020.
          GS-2101-9 Transportation Specialist: responsible for
    specializing in rulemaking, perform research and analysis related to
    the development of regulatory changes and interpretation of
    regulations, participate in the development of proposed and final
    rulemaking documents, including environmental and economic impact
    statements, evaluation of public comments, and incorporation of legal
    input on proposed regulatory changes.
          GS-0905-14 Attorney Advisor: responsible for providing
    legal advice in support of the policy development efforts, development
    of rulemakings and implementing guidance, and defense of the same from
    administrative and appellate litigation. The incumbent ensures
    rulemakings developed are evidence-based, legally sound, and otherwise
    satisfy the myriad of procedural and substantive requirements under
    Federal administrative law and PHMSA's safety statutes.
          GS-1515-13 Operations Research Analyst: responsible for
    providing data analysis and visualization and reports to various PHMSA
    offices to address inquiries, respond to mandate and audit activities,
    and support Federal regulation compliance.
          GS-0110-13 Economist: responsible for conducting economic
    research to understand economic and industry trends that influence
    risks to pipelines, the transportation of hazardous materials, and/or
    related industries. The incumbent performs regulatory impact analysis
    and regulatory flexibility analysis, assessing the costs, benefits,
    efficiency, and impacts of PHMSA's regulatory and safety programs.
          GS-1083-13 Technical Writer: responsible for providing
    writing and editorial support for rulemaking and to respond to
    Congressional reports, mandates, and other requirements.

        Question 3.d. Can you please list the number of vacant positions,
    along with their associated titles and GS-level?
        Answer. All eight (8) positions have been filled.

        Question 4. Section 102(b)(2) of PIPES 2020 mandated that PHMSA
    ensure the number of full-time positions for the pipeline inspection
    and enforcement personnel in the Office of Pipeline Safety does not
    fall below 224 for fiscal year 2021, 235 for fiscal year 2022, and 247
    for fiscal year 2023.
        Question 4.a. Can you please let us know the current number of
    full-time pipeline inspection and enforcement personnel employed by
    PHMSA?
        Answer. In compliance with this requirement, as of May 18, 2023,
    PHMSA has 247 full-time pipeline safety inspection and enforcement
    positions. We have continued to accept applications and recruit for
    these positions, and recently we received approval and applied
    additional retention and recruitment incentives. As of September 30,
    2023, 214 of these positions have been filled.

        Question 4.b. According to your testimony, ``PHMSA has kept up with
    the PIPES Act of 2020 hiring mandates--both for inspectors as well as
    for regulatory personnel . . .'' However, according to information
    provided by PHMSA to staff, PHMSA currently only has 207 pipeline
    inspection and enforcement personnel. If this number is accurate, do
    you believe it is compliant with the number set out in Section 102?
        Answer. The 2020 PIPES Act requires PHMSA to ensure that the number
    of full-time positions for pipeline inspection and enforcement (I&E)
    personnel in the Office of Pipeline Safety of the Administration does
    not fall below 224 for fiscal year 2021, 235 for fiscal year 2022 and
    247 for fiscal year 2023. PHMSA has established the openings and
    continued to receive applications consistent with the requirement, and
    as noted above has filled the regulatory personnel positions; further:
          With receipt of appropriations in the FY22 cycle, which
    included funding for additional I&E positions in December of FY22,
    PHMSA has put a robust and aggressive recruitment and retention
    strategy in place, focusing on soon-to-be college graduates and recent
    graduates for entry level opportunities, and internships that will
    create a pipeline of future engineers. PHMSA is also working on
    providing student loan repayment to support its recruitment and
    retention efforts.

          PHMSA successfully onboarded 13 full-time I&E employees
    in FY 2021, 24 I&E employees in FY 2022, and 24 I&E employees to date
    in FY 2023. However, more staff separated from PHMSA's Office of
    Pipeline Safety between fiscal years 2021 and 2022; in FY 2023, 14 I&E
    personnel separated from PHMSA. As Congress has recognized, these are
    also hard to fill positions--PHMSA competes with the private sector to
    attract and retain qualified pipeline inspectors and engineering
    analysts. The commercial energy industry and at least one other federal
    agency offer candidates higher salaries and provide incentives. That is
    why PHMSA requested and received approval for a special rate table from
    OPM to provide a 35 percent premium to grade 5-12 engineer inspectors
    in its five regional offices, in line with other Federal agencies (on
    account of Congress' directive and the fierce competition from industry
    salaries), which was instituted as of May of 2023. PHMSA also continues
    to implement other hiring solutions, such as recruitment and retention
    incentives, tuition assistance, and student loan repayment.

          The job pool is small because the work is technically
    challenging--requiring engineering and other technical degrees--and
    requires individuals who are willing to travel frequently and work in
    harsh outdoor and sometimes hazardous conditions.

          Like any organization, public or private sector, large or
    small, PHMSA will have vacancies due to departures and retirements. In
    the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, some employees are choosing to
    pursue work that does not involve frequent travel across the country.
    While PHMSA has been successful in bringing many new inspectors and
    investigators onboard, it has also lost a similar number to retirement
    and resignation. That is the reason that the number of positions does
    not equal the number of current staff onboard. We have noticed similar
    challenges for state pipeline inspector openings as well.

        Question 5. Section 102 (c) of PIPES 2020 provided PHMSA with the
    authority to use incentives to retain a qualified workforce, including
    inspection and enforcement personnel, attorneys, and subject matter
    experts at the Office of Pipeline Safety at PHMSA. Can you please
    provide a status update on the implementation of the following
    incentives and if they have been utilized, including the number of the
    times they have been used:
        Question 5.a. Special pay rates permitted under section 5305 of
    title 5, United States Code;
        Answer. In 2021, PHMSA engaged an outside contractor to determine
    the parameters for increasing its special pay rates--including for
    example the geographic areas and pay grades--necessary for OPM approval
    of the special pay rates. In FY22, PHMSA received additional funding to
    provide financial incentives such as increasing the pay rates. In
    August of 2022, PHMSA/DOT submitted to the Office of Personnel
    Management (OPM) for approval an increase in the special pay rates for
    engineer/inspectors. PHMSA received final approval from OPM on April
    17, 2023, and promptly implemented the new pay rates.

        Question 5.b. Repayment of student loans permitted under section
    5379 of title 5, United States Code;
        Answer. PHMSA has developed a plan to use the repayment of student
    loans as a retention incentive for its 0800 engineering series
    employees. PHMSA is working to develop an internal process for
    applications of the repayment and expects to implement this retention
    incentive in FY23.

        Question 5.c. Tuition assistance permitted under chapter 41 of
    title 5, United States Code;
        Answer. PHMSA is in the process of creating a new tuition
    assistance program.

        Question 5.d. Recruitment incentives permitted under section 5753
    of title 5, United States Code; and
        Answer. PHMSA actively utilizes recruitment incentives for highly
    qualified applicants for mission-critical occupations.

        Question 5.e. Retention incentives permitted under section 5754 of
    title 5, United States Code.
        Answer. PHMSA is examining ways to offer group retention incentives
    to combat increased turnover experienced last year. The group retention
    incentives could be offered to eligible inspectors and engineers in
    positions that are hard to fill or have high turnover. The incentives
    would not exceed 10% of the proposed salary per recipient and would
    help PHMSA compete with industry salaries. The incentive could be
    coupled with a continuation of service agreement as called for in the
    PIPES Act.
        PHMSA has strongly emphasized recruitment efforts and has
    successfully implemented strategies to attract and retain qualified
    talent. However, based on recent data, PHMSA recognizes that retention
    has become a growing concern across the sector, and as such, we are
    dedicating additional resources to retention efforts moving forward. We
    believe that these incentives will be effective in our efforts to
    retain our talented workforce. Once implemented, we will track and
    measure their effectiveness to ensure they have the desired impact.

        Question 6. Are there any recruitment and retention incentives not
    currently held by PHMSA or included in PIPES 2020 that you believe
    would increase PHMSA's ability to recruit a qualified workforce?If so,
    can you please detail them as well as any needed congressional
    authority to be able to utilize them?
        Answer. PHMSA has recently onboarded a new director for human
    resources who is currently reviewing every available incentive possible
    and proceeding with implementation for those most feasible for PHMSA
    and our incumbents. There is an approval process by which agencies like
    PHMSA may utilize existing recruitment and retention incentives--i.e.
    the authorities PHMSA has are not self-executing. Additionally, PHMSA
    invests in employee leadership development--including three tiers of
    leadership development internal programming as well as external
    coaching services that have been shown to both improve employee morale
    as well as increase employee productivity. These areas show additional
    promise for attracting and retaining talent. While PHMSA is not
    requesting any additional authorities at this time, the agency is
    continuing to explore opportunities to ensure we are able to recruit
    and retain a robust pipeline safety workforce.

        Question 7. Can you please explain why PHMSA has not held a Gas
    Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) meeting on the class location rule
    when Congress required in the 2020 PIPES Act to do so by the end of
    calendar year 2021? When does PHMSA plan to hold this meeting?
        Answer. PHMSA has attempted to successfully balance its existing
    statutory directives with new directives from Congress, many of which
    have included aggressive deadlines, including this one. PHMSA
    recognizes that obtaining input from the Gas Pipeline Advisory
    Committee and Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee is a crucial part of
    its rulemaking process, including for the Class Location Change
    Requirements proposed rule. In 2021, after the passage of the 2020
    PIPES Act, the Government Accountability Office completed a report on
    the Keystone pipeline, noting the unique circumstances under which
    PHMSA issued and maintained a special permit for that line. In
    response, PHMSA initiated an independent third-party assessment of its
    special permit process and the safety conditions required of operators
    for class location special permits--across the board. To optimize use
    of the GPAC and ensure that all relevant information related to the
    proposed rule is available to the GPAC, and to make efficient use of
    the agency resources and the Committee's time, PHMSA planned to hold a
    GPAC meeting on the class location rulemaking after the conclusion of
    the special permit process review. PHMSA recently announced the GPAC
    meeting will occur the week of November 27, 2023. The meeting will
    consider both the Class Location Rule as well as the Leak Detection and
    Repair proposed Rule. Holding a PAC meeting before the independent
    report would deprive the PAC of that information and could further
    delay the finalization of the rule. PHMSA has already reached out to
    GPAC members and scheduled a meeting to review this NPRM, as well as
    PHMSA's NPRM for Gas Pipeline Leak Detection and Repair.

        Question 8. When does PHMSA anticipate issuing a final class
    location rule?
        Answer. As stated above, PHMSA has made public an expected date for
    this meeting, to consider both the Class Location Rule as well as the
    Leak Detection and Repair Proposed Rule. PHMSA currently anticipates
    the rule to be published by the end of 2024.

        Question 9. Deputy Administrator Brown, in your response to a
    question from Representative Marc Molinaro (R-NY) about the class
    location rule, you stated that PHMSA is, `` . . . focusing on the
    [rules] that Congress has given us deadlines for and prioritizing
    safety first.'' You also characterized the class location rule as being
    focused on, `` . . . efficiency, potential impacts for reducing
    environmental emissions. We focus on safety first.'' The Interstate
    Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) believes that finalizing
    this rule will significantly benefit safety by allowing its members to
    reallocate between $200-$300 million per year that could be invested in
    running advanced inspection tools on 25,000 miles of pipe. In addition,
    INGAA believes that finalizing this rule would stop up to 800 million
    cubic feet of natural gas from being released to the atmosphere each
    year. Completing the class location rule would clearly fulfil the
    broader safety and environmental objectives of PHMSA. Furthermore, the
    class location rule had a mandate from Congress in the PIPES Act of
    2020 to hold a Gas Pipeline Advisory Committee (GPAC) meeting on it by
    the end of 2021. We have several inquiries on this topic:
        Question 9.a. Can you please explain why your agency has yet to
    prioritize, and possibly ignored, this mandate thus far?
        Answer. Please see response to question 7 above.
        Further, with respect to the characterization of the rule, I would
    also refer you to the August 1, 2022 letter to me from then Ranking
    Members Graves and Crawford as well as Senators Wicker and Fischer who
    noted ``Class location change regulations mandate that pipeline
    operators undertake certain actions when population density changes,
    such as replacing pipeline segments that result in large releases of
    gas into the atmosphere. Modernizing these requirements has the
    potential to create efficiencies for operators and further protect the
    environment by minimizing these releases.''

        Question 9.b. Can you please explain why your agency has yet to
    prioritize the implementation of the class location rule when there are
    both safety and environmental benefits?
        Answer. In addition to the context provided in response to subpart
    a of your question, since the beginning of the Administration, PHMSA
    has prioritized Congressional mandates (and associated) deadlines with
    ensuring PHMSA advances the rules that can have the greatest impact on
    safety. PHMSA in turn prioritized finalizing three rules that were
    twelve years in the making--spanning four Presidential
    administrations--which stemmed from tragic incidents involving
    pipeline-related fatalities such as the 2010 PG&E San Bruno, CA
    incident.

        Question 9.c. When specifically does PHMSA plan to hold a GPAC
    meeting on the class location Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM)?
        Answer. PHMSA has already reached out to GPAC members to schedule a
    meeting to review this NPRM, as well as PHMSA's NPRM for Gas Pipeline
    Leak Detection and Repair in the Fall of 2023.

        Question 9.d. Why did PHMSA hold its only GPAC meeting since the
    start of 2021 on the Periodic Updates of Regulatory References to
    Technical Standards and Miscellaneous Amendments NPRM, which was not
    Congressionally mandated?
        Answer. Please see response to question 7 above.
        Additionally, periodic Updates of Regulatory References to
    Technical Standards and Miscellaneous Amendments proposed rule fulfills
    a Congressional mandate. 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60102(l), Updating Standards,
    states that the Secretary shall update incorporated industry standards
    that have been adopted as part of the Federal pipeline safety
    regulatory program. The ``Periodic Updates of Regulatory References to
    Technical Standards and Miscellaneous Amendments'' NPRM is a rulemaking
    that addresses 26 such standards--more than 30 percent of the standards
    that are incorporated by reference in the pipeline safety regulations.
    As required by 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60115, PHMSA convened a GPAC meeting on
    this rule.
        On March 8, I testified ``As required by Congress, PHMSA continues
    to update the Federal pipeline safety regulations (PSRs) to reflect new
    and revised voluntary consensus standards developed and adopted by
    standards-setting bodies (see e.g., PHMSA's periodic standards update
    rulemakings). We understand how important updating and aligning
    standards can be to ensure the PSR include up-to-date standards that
    reflect current best practices and technologies--and to serve as a
    higher bar, from which the regulated community can continue to
    improve.''

        Question 9.e. Can you explain what process your agency has for
    processing Congressional rulemaking mandates?
        Answer. Generally, when PHMSA receives a congressional mandate to
    complete a rulemaking, PHMSA works with personnel in both the program
    office and the Chief Counsel's office to initiate the rulemaking by
    requesting a Regulatory Identification Number (RIN)--which is then
    submitted to the Office of the Secretary's Office of General Counsel
    for approval and inclusion in the Unified Agenda. PHMSA staff then
    reviews the statutory language in the mandate and begins drafting
    proposed regulations and a Notice of Proposed Regulations (NPRM). Once
    drafted, PHMSA will then issue the NPRM in the Federal Register for
    public comment. If required, PHMSA will hold a meeting of the relevant
    Pipeline Advisory Committee to review and discuss the statutory
    language and any proposed regulatory text, as well as any comments
    received. PHMSA will then issue a final rule adopting new or updated
    regulations. Occasionally, in response to public comments on the NPRM,
    PHMSA may elect to issue a Supplemental NPRM if we need to adjust the
    proposed regulations or ask additional questions before finalizing the
    regulations.
        As part of this process, PHMSA continuously works to balance
    completion of outstanding congressional mandates for rulemaking, as
    well as other rulemakings initiated as a result of NTSB
    recommendations, concerns arising from incidents, and other sources. As
    noted at the hearing, the agency--through Republican and Democratic
    administrations, since its inception--has typically had more
    congressional mandates than it has resources to complete under the
    timeframes provided. PHMSA in turn, attempts to triage mandates based
    on the overlapping congressional mandates and with safety being the top
    priority.

        Question 10. Can you please detail the number and dates of meetings
    PHMSA has held of the GPAC and Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee
    (LPAC) since January 1, 2021? What is the agency's target for annual
    frequency of meetings for both of these respective committees?
        Answer. Since January 1, 2021, PHMSA has held three (3) pipeline
    advisory committee meetings:
        a)  October 20, 2021: The LPAC and GPAC both met jointly to discuss
    the notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM) titled: ``Periodic Updates of
    Regulatory References to Technical Standards and Miscellaneous
    Amendments.'' The NPRM is relevant to both gas and liquid pipeline
    safety.
        b)  October 21, 2021: The LPAC and GPAC met jointly to discuss the
    Standards Update notice of proposed rulemaking.
        c)  August 17, 2022: The LPAC met to discuss the interim final
    rulemaking (IFR) titled: ``Unusually Sensitive Areas for the Great
    Lakes, Coastal Beaches, and Certain Coastal Waters.''

        Given the statutory role of the LPAC and GPAC, PHMSA schedules
    meetings of those committees to review and discuss specific
    rulemakings. Accordingly, the schedule is based on the progression of
    PHMSA's regulatory agenda--with the goal of maximizing efficiency of
    the meetings. PHMSA also meets with most of the organizations
    represented on the advisory committees on an individual basis--again,
    for efficiency.

        Question 11. What do you believe is the appropriate role for the
    GPAC and LPAC? What value does the GPAC and LPAC provide to PHMSA in
    the rulemaking process?
        Answer. Under 49 U.S.C. Sec.  60115, the Gas Pipeline Advisory
    Committee (GPAC) and the Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee (LPAC) are
    peer-review committees regarding carrying out 49 U.S.C. Ch. 601. As
    required by law, the GPAC and LPAC, respectively, are composed of a
    broad spectrum of stakeholders with equities in PHMSA proceedings, with
    equal representation from government, industry, and the public. These
    committees offer input that is a statutorily mandated part of PHMSA's
    rulemaking process. The committees review PHMSA's regulatory
    initiatives to determine technical feasibility, reasonableness, cost-
    effectiveness, and practicability.
        PHMSA values the feedback from its advisory committees for Office
    of Pipeline Safety rulemakings. They play a key role in the federal
    pipeline safety rulemaking process. The input they provide helps PHMSA
    ensure a constructive, in-depth look at our rules, helps inform
    potential changes to them, and allows PHMSA to make more effective
    rules to govern pipeline safety.

        Question 12. PHMSA has stated that litigation is impacting its
    ability to finalize rules. Do entities like the Pipeline Advisory
    Committees reduce litigation risk?
        Answer. PHMSA welcomes stakeholder feedback during all stages of
    its rulemaking process. As required by law, PHMSA's Gas Pipeline
    Advisory Committee and the Liquid Pipeline Advisory Committee advisory
    committees review PHMSA's regulatory initiatives to determine technical
    feasibility, reasonableness, cost-effectiveness, and practicability.
    PHMSA values the feedback from its advisory committees for Office of
    Pipeline Safety rulemakings and that feedback can help ensure PHMSA's
    rulemakings are more legally defensible.

        Question 13. Congress mandated a 2-year deadline for PHMSA to
    complete the idled pipeline rulemaking as part of the PIPES 2020;
    however, PHMSA missed the congressionally established deadline to
    complete this rulemaking this past December. This rulemaking is
    important to the regulated community as pipeline operators need
    regulatory certainty from PHMSA for situations when pipeline operators
    suspend normal service on pipeline systems due to changes in market
    conditions in which the status of these pipelines is neither ``active''
    nor ``abandoned''.
        Question 13.a. Why hasn't PHMSA issued a Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking (NPRM) addressing idled pipelines when Congress specifically
    required a rule to be promulgated by the end of December 2022?
        Answer. It is important to note that rulemaking is designed to be
    an iterative process that encourages maximum participation by all
    stakeholders and rigorous analysis in support of decision making. PHMSA
    uses its limited resources to promulgate comprehensive rules that
    protect the public and the environment and meet our statutory
    requirement for rules. The PIPES Act 2020 included an aggressive
    timeline for the agency to advance rulemakings (as well as other
    congressional directives), and PHMSA has completed several of these
    rulemakings and other legacy rulemakings with important safety impacts
    related to remote-control valves, gas gathering pipelines, and
    increased protections for unusually sensitive areas. At the same time,
    as mandated by the PIPES Act of 2020, PHMSA has recently issued
    proposed rules related to Gas Pipeline Leak Detection, and the Safety
    of Gas Distribution pipelines. PHMSA anticipates publishing an NPRM on
    idled pipelines by the first quarter of 2024. After the NPRM is
    published, PHMSA will schedule and facilitate the necessary GPAC/LPAC
    meeting and work to complete a final rule.

        Question 13.b. When will PHMSA finalize the idled pipe rulemaking?
        Answer. PHMSA currently anticipates publishing an NPRM on idled
    pipelines by the first quarter of 2024. After the NPRM is published,
    PHMSA will schedule and facilitate the necessary GPAC/LPAC meeting and
    work to complete a final rule.

        Question 14. Section 104 of PIPES 2020 authorized PHMSA to
    establish a Pipeline Safety Enhancement Program (program) as a means
    for operators to demonstrate new technologies and procedures that
    advance pipeline safety. A number of pipeline operator stakeholders are
    encouraging Congress to reauthorize the program as it has not been
    utilized to date. PHMSA says operators have not applied for the
    program. Operators tell us they want to apply, but PHMSA has added
    additional requirements that make participation infeasible.
        Question 14.a. Do you believe a program that allows operators to
    test safety procedures and technology more swiftly is beneficial to
    improving pipeline safety as a whole?
        Answer. PHMSA believes that testing new safety procedures and
    technologies can be beneficial to improving pipeline safety. Because of
    the potential serious consequences to people and the environment, as
    well as existing congressional mandates, testing under the current
    program requires an evaluation process and stakeholder notice and
    comment prior to in-situ testing. PHMSA has sought comment on ways to
    improve the program and would like to work with Congress to find ways
    to improve the program.

        Question 14.b. If an operator would like to test a new safety
    practice or technology in the field, would it take less time to utilize
    the technology pilot program or acquire a special permit?
        Answer. The timing would be based upon the specific application.
    While both follow similar paths and require, in accordance with Federal
    law, the completion of an environmental assessment, the Section 104
    process includes more specific criteria that need to be met in order to
    apply, such as the location being outside prohibited areas (a high
    population area (HPA), high consequence area (HCAs) or an unusually
    sensitive area (USA)).

        Question 14.c. Do you have any suggestions for how Congress could
    improve the program so operators will be more inclined to utilize it?
        Answer. PHMSA sought public comment on ways to improve the program
    and would like to work with the Congress to find ways to improve the
    program.

        Question 14.d. If the program were to be extended for a longer
    period, for example, 10 years or more, how might that impact PHMSA's
    ability to implement the program and how might it affect its use by
    operators?
        Answer. An extension of time would allow for a more thorough
    evaluation of the potential benefit of the new safety procedures and
    technologies by the operators and PHMSA that could be applied
    throughout the industry.

        Question 15. The PHMSA program implementation guidance for the
    Pipeline Safety Enhancement Program (program) requires applicants to
    meet conditions and follow processes beyond those enacted by Congress.
    To date, no pipeline operator has applied to PHMSA under these
    conditions.
        Question 15.a. During the March 8, 2023, hearing, Deputy
    Administrator Brown testified PHMSA believes Federal law requires
    National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) analysis before approving a
    program. What is the statutory or legal basis for this opinion?
        Answer. PHMSA's consideration and approval of applications for
    pipeline safety enhancement programs established in Section 104 of the
    PIPES Act of 2020--is a discretionary Federal agency action or
    decision, which is presumptively subject to the National Environmental
    Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), as well as any applicable
    implementing regulations and policies issued by the agency or CEQ (40
    CFR parts 1500-1508). Those legal authorities require consideration of
    the impacts of those Federal actions or decisions on the human
    environment.

        Question 15.b. In a February 9, 2022, meeting between industry
    stakeholders and PHMSA career staff, representatives of the PHMSA
    Office of Chief Counsel agreed the program does not trigger a statutory
    obligation to perform NEPA analysis. However, Deputy Administrator
    Brown testified to Congress on March 8, 2023, that PHMSA is obligated
    by law to conduct NEPA analysis. Why did Deputy Administrator Brown
    testify to Congress contrary to the legal opinion of the PHMSA Chief
    Counsel's Office?
        Answer. Like any discretionary Federal agency action or decision,
    PHMSA's consideration and approval of applications for pipeline safety
    enhancement programs established in Section 104 of the PIPES Act of
    2020 are presumptively subject to the National Environmental Policy Act
    (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), and to applicable implementing
    regulations and policies issued by the agency or CEQ (40 CFR parts
    1500-1508). Accordingly, during the March 8, 2023, hearing, I testified
    PHMSA believes Federal law requires National Environmental Policy Act
    (NEPA) analysis before approving a program. PHMSA's Office of Chief
    Counsel staff is unaware of any statements inconsistent with the March
    8, 2023, testimony, including in any meetings between industry
    stakeholders and PHMSA staff.

        Question 15.c. Does PHMSA consider establishing a testing program
    as authorized by Sec.104 a major Federal action significantly affecting
    the quality of the human environment?
        Answer. PHMSA's consideration and approval of applications for
    pipeline safety enhancement programs established in Section 104 of the
    PIPES Act of 2020 is a discretionary Federal agency action or decision,
    which is presumptively subject to the National Environmental Policy Act
    (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), as well as any applicable implementing
    regulations and policies issued by the agency or CEQ (40 CFR parts
    1500-1508). Those legal authorities require consideration of the
    impacts of those Federal actions or decisions on the human environment.

        Question 15.d. If so, representatives of PHMSA's Chief Counsel's
    Office agreed during a February 9, 2022, meeting with industry
    stakeholders that the program did not represent a major Federal action
    that would trigger NEPA analysis. If PHMSA has changed its opinion on
    this, what is the statutory or legal basis for this change?
        Answer. PHMSA understands its consideration and approval of
    applications for pipeline safety enhancement programs established in
    Section 104 of the PIPES Act of 2020--like any discretionary Federal
    agency action or decision--are presumptively subject to the National
    Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., NEPA), as well as any
    applicable implementing regulations and policies issued by the agency
    or CEQ (40 CFR parts 1500-1508). Those legal authorities require
    consideration of the impacts of those Federal actions or decisions on
    the human environment.
        Section 104 of the PIPES Act of 2020 contains no exception to
    NEPA's procedural requirements. Rather, Section 104 explicitly
    contemplates that PHMSA may, in reviewing applications for pipeline
    safety enhancement programs, employ its longstanding special permit
    procedures issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 60118(c)(1)(A). See 49 U.S.C.
    60142(d)(2)(A). NEPA review is a critical component of those special
    permit procedures. See 49 CFR 190.341(c).
        PHMSA's Office of Chief Counsel staff are unaware of any statements
    by PHMSA staff that are contrary to the above position or inconsistent
    with the March 8, 2023, testimony.

        Question 15.e. Has PHMSA ever previously required a research and
    development project, including those demonstrating promising
    technologies or analytic methods, to conduct a NEPA analysis?
        Answer. Unlike traditional pipeline safety-related research and
    development activated, directed, or funded by PHMSA (which are
    typically performed using some combination of software modeling or lab
    or institution-based testing under controlled conditions), pipeline
    safety enhancement programs are expected to be conducted on operational
    gas and hazardous liquid pipelines. Those programs are also expected to
    require a waiver of existing PHMSA safety regulations that would
    otherwise prevent the use of the innovative technologies and
    operational practices being tested. Therefore, novel technologies and
    operational practices employed in pipeline safety enhancement programs
    could involve markedly different potential impacts on the human
    environment than PHMSA's own traditional pipeline safety-related
    research and development activity--including positive impacts, which
    would of course be welcome. In addition, Congress included within that
    provision limitations on pipeline safety enhancement programs evincing
    concern with the potential safety and environmental consequences of the
    novel technologies and operational practices in those programs, such as
    program duration, mileage limitations, location limitations and safety
    thresholds.

        Question 15.f. What is the statutory or legal basis for PHMSA
    requiring program applicants to submit applications in accordance with
    PHMSA's special permit process?
        Answer. Section 104 explicitly contemplates that PHMSA may, in
    reviewing applications for pipeline safety enhancement programs, employ
    its longstanding special permit procedures issued pursuant to 49 U.S.C.
    60118(c)(1)(A). See 49 U.S.C. 60142(d)(2)(A). NEPA review is a
    component of those special permit procedures. See 49 CFR 190.341(c).

        Question 16. Section 111 of the PIPES 2020 sets out that PHMSA,
    subject to the availability of funds appropriated by Congress, may
    establish a National Center of Excellence for LNG Safety. Per the
    requirements of Section 111, PHMSA submitted a report to Congress
    titled National Center of Excellence for Liquefied Natural Gas Safety.
    One proposal included in the report to Congress is that PHMSA institute
    an LNG Separate Center of Excellence at a new location, as discussed in
    the report under ``Model 3,'' with an estimated annual cost of $8.4
    million. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 provided PHSMA $8.4
    million for PHMSA to establish a Center of Excellence.
        Question 16.a. When will PHMSA issue a decision on if it will
    utilize its authority in Section 111 of the PIPES 2020 and FY 2023
    appropriated funds to create a National Center of Excellence of LNG
    Safety?
        Answer. As stated during my testimony in response to Rep. Brian
    Babin of Texas, PHMSA has already initiated planning for the
    establishment of the Center. Since then, PHMSA has also hosted a public
    meeting on the subject (in May 2023), made visits to potential
    locations for the center, and assigned a senior leader, with
    considerable LNG experience, to oversee the planning, creation and
    management of the Center.

        Question 16.b. If PHMSA does not intend to pursue Model 3, how will
    it make up for the shortfalls and gaps in knowledge that would occur?
        Answer. PHMSA plans to pursue Model 3 to establish the LNG Center
    of Excellence.

        Question 17. How is PHMSA working to improve the Federal permitting
    process for energy infrastructure projects in instances where PHMSA
    provides the regulatory expertise on the safe design and operations and
    FERC holds construction authorization authority, especially for large-
    scale LNG projects?
        Answer. On August 31, 2018, PHMSA and FERC entered into a
    Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that describes each agency's
    respective roles and responsibilities concerning the siting,
    construction, and operation of LNG facilities, and established a new
    coordination framework to streamline the permitting approval process
    for those facilities. Specifically, under the terms of the MOU, PHMSA
    is responsible for reviewing whether an application meets the siting
    criteria and safety requirements contained in Part 193, Subpart B.
        In accordance with the MOU, upon receiving an application from
    FERC, PHMSA will issue a Letter of Determination (LOD) to FERC with its
    analysis and conclusions 30 days prior to FERC's final NEPA document
    issuance. The agencies' coordination has helped improve the
    environmental reviews on several LNG export terminal applications. To
    date, PHMSA has issued LODs for 25 projects.
        Currently, PHMSA is reviewing five (5) applications and will issue
    LODs once PHMSA has completed its Part 193, Subpart B review for the
    following proposed projects:
        1.  Golden Pass Uprate Project (CP20-459-000)
        2.  Calcasieu Pass Uprate Amendment Project (CP22-25-000)
        3.  Venture Global CP2 (CP22-21-000)
        4.  Driftwood LNG (CP17-117-000)
        5.  Plaquemines Uprate (CP17-66-000)

        Question 18. Have there been instances where project developers are
    made to redesign existing facilities to comply with requirements from
    different Federal inspectors and regulators? If so, does PHMSA have any
    recommendations or plans to improve this process to avoid such
    instances?
        Answer. PHMSA is unaware of project developers being required to
    redesign existing facilities to comply with other Federal standards.
    PHMSA performs comprehensive safety inspections of LNG facilities and
    monitors and enforces an LNG operator's compliance with the DOT's
    Pipeline Safety regulations. In accordance with Sec.  191.22
    (c)(1)(iii), LNG operators are required to notify PHMSA 60 days prior
    to construction of a new LNG facility. Currently, PHMSA reviews the
    final design records for compliance with Part 193, Subpart C--Design,
    while construction activities are in progress.

        Question 19. United States LNG exports have grown rapidly and
    safely and it is important that regulations that govern these
    facilities are modernized without delay. PIPES 2020 included two
    provisions that impacted LNG--the creation of risk-based regulations
    for LNG facilities, and the creation of a National Center of Excellence
    for LNG safety. Can you give us an update on where PHMSA stands, and if
    PHMSA will meet the timeline set forth by the PIPES 2020?
        Answer. With respect to regulations for LNG facilities, PHMSA
    anticipates issuing an NPRM to update the LNG regulations by the end of
    2023.
        As stated during my testimony in response to Rep. Brian Babin of
    Texas, PHMSA has already initiated planning for the establishment of
    the Center. Since then, PHMSA has also hosted a public meeting on the
    subject (in May), made visits to potential locations for the center,
    and reassigned a senior leader, with considerable LNG experience, to
    oversee the planning, creation and management of the Center.

        Question 20. Do you support efforts to streamline environmental
    reviews at PHMSA in a way that advances projects without impacting
    environmental protections, including through applying One Federal
    Decision, which is bipartisan-supported and applies to other
    transportation modes?
        Answer. Congress enacted NEPA (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq.) and the
    Pipeline Safety Laws (49 U.S.C. 60101 et seq.) to mitigate
    environmental and safety impacts. PHMSA is charged by Congress with
    carrying out these laws in an efficient manner. To do that, we have
    employed mechanisms like concurrent reviews and close coordination with
    other federal agencies. When environmental reviews have not been
    fulsome, the agency's work has actually been slowed down by litigation,
    which is why the agency has increased its environmental review
    capacity. The agency is also implementing recent changes to NEPA
    pursuant to the Fiscal Responsibility Act, see e.g. https://
    ceq.doe.gov/laws-regulations/fra.html.

        Question 21. There are roughly 5,500 hundred miles of CO2 pipeline
    in this country. These pipelines have safely transported carbon dioxide
    in a dense or supercritical liquid state for decades mostly without
    incident and are regulated by PHMSA under 49 CFR Part 195. There is a
    potential need to build out additional pipeline infrastructure to
    support carbon capture and sequestration efforts that would potentially
    move CO2 in less-dense, gaseous phases. This has raised the question of
    whether current regulations are adequate when it comes to the safe
    construction, operation, and maintenance of carbon dioxide pipelines.
    PHMSA has also stated publicly that it will be issuing new regulations
    on the safety of carbon dioxide pipelines.
        Question 21.a. How does PHMSA intend to proceed with this
    rulemaking? Does it propose to publish an Advanced Notice of Proposed
    Rulemaking (ANPRM) to gather additional data, information and analysis
    or does it have enough to proceed with a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
    (NPRM)?
        Answer. PHMSA is developing a notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM),
    strengthening its regulations in response to the anticipated
    significant expansion of carbon dioxide pipelines and to implement
    lessons learned from the February 22, 2020, rupture of a supercritical-
    phase carbon dioxide pipeline in Satartia, MS.
        PHMSA also announced in 2022, new research topics to better
    determine impact areas for the safer operations of carbon dioxide
    pipelines. The results of this may help inform the current rulemaking
    related to carbon dioxide pipelines but congressional attention and
    collaboration in strengthening oversight related to these issues is
    also welcome.
        PHMSA hosted a public meeting focused on carbon dioxide pipeline
    safety on May 31-June 1, 2023, in Des Moines, IA, where PHMSA received
    information from a diverse array of stakeholders and other members of
    the public that will inform PHMSA's NPRM.

        Question 21.b. When does PHMSA anticipate publishing an ANPRM or
    NPRM?
        Answer. PHMSA is working on drafting the NPRM and hopes to publish
    that NPRM in January 2024.

        Question 21.c. Has PHMSA identified particular priority issues the
    agency believes need to be addressed through a potential future
    rulemaking?
        Answer. PHMSA is developing proposed amendments to its regulations
    in response to the anticipated significant expansion of carbon dioxide
    pipelines and to implement lessons learned from the February 22, 2020,
    rupture of a supercritical-phase carbon dioxide pipeline in Satartia,
    MS. Although PHMSA is still determining what specific issues will be
    covered in the rule, PHMSA discussed several topics related to carbon
    dioxide in its public meeting on carbon dioxide pipeline safety on May
    31-June 1, 2023, in Des Moines, Iowa. Information gathered at the
    public meeting will help inform the rulemaking.

        Question 21.d. Is PHMSA considering modifications to existing
    regulations under 49 CFR Part 192 regarding the transportation of
    gaseous CO2 in pipelines or would it create a new section?
        Answer. Consistent with 49 U.S.C. 60102(i), PHMSA is considering
    whether applying the minimum safety standards in 49 CFR part 195 to
    gaseous carbon dioxide would help improve safety.

        Question 22. How does PHMSA intend to work with CO2 pipeline
    operators, other Federal agencies and public stakeholders to develop
    and design dispersion models in the case of a pipeline rupture or
    substantial leak? Will it incorporate dispersion modelling in CO2
    pipeline safety regulations?
        Answer. PHMSA has observed through the published research on the
    topic that all models have different advantages and disadvantages. As
    part of its rulemaking process, PHMSA will seek stakeholder input on
    the best approach to CO2 dispersion modelling. Stakeholder input will
    include both public input as well as collaboration with other Federal
    agencies. For example, PHMSA and DOE's Office of Fossil Energy and
    Carbon Management are discussing these technical issues at agency
    sponsored research events and have agreed to co-chair an Interagency
    Carbon Transport Topic Team. This topic team will include several other
    interested Federal agencies, share information on dispersion modeling
    among many other technical topics, resolve issues and track projects to
    their completion.
        PHMSA requires operators to have a process for identifying which
    pipeline segments could affect a high consequence area, including the
    use of dispersion modeling (see Sec.  195.452(f)(1)). This modeling is
    required prior to the occurrence of an emergency and can also be used
    to inform emergency responders in the event of an actual emergency (see
    Sec.  195.402(e)(8)).

        Question 23. Liquid CO2 pipelines are critical platforms for the
    biofuel industry in the Midwest. Currently, a number of liquid CO2
    projects are in development, working with PHMSA, states, local
    governments, and biofuels producers to develop platforms for the
    capture and storage of millions of metric tons of CO2. Development of
    these platforms not only sustains the biofuel industry, critical to
    farmers and the Midwest economy, but also reduces carbon emissions.
    Liquid CO2 pipelines are definitionally hazardous liquid pipelines and
    currently must adhere to safety regulations put forward by PHMSA.
        Question 23.a. Is PHMSA currently working to ensure the safety of
    CO2 pipeline projects that would utilize carbon capture from biofuel
    plants in the Midwest?
        Answer. Yes. PHMSA is also reviewing the three proposed projects
    for compliance with the federal regulations in 49 CFR Part 195, PHMSA
    is working to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking updating current
    CO2 regulations, and will continue to oversee the safe design,
    operations, and maintenance of such lines going forward. PHMSA also
    recently issued new requirements for automatic and remote shut off
    valves for CO2 (and other hazardous liquid and gas) pipelines (See 87
    Fed. Reg 20940), which PHMSA will be implementing with respect to new
    CO2 pipelines being built.

        Question 23.b. Notwithstanding any potential future regulations,
    would current PHMSA safety regulations for hazardous liquid pipelines
    apply to any liquid CO2 pipeline currently built in the United States?
        Answer. The current regulations apply to any pipeline transporting
    CO2 in a supercritical state as defined by Sec.  195.2.

        Question 24. The Federal Government is spending a substantial
    amount of funding on hydrogen energy as a residential, modal and
    industrial fuel. However, building out a network fully dedicated to
    hydrogen fuel pipelines present a host of challenges.
        Question 24.a. Given the fact that blending of natural gas with
    hydrogen in concentrations up to 20 is occurring on a limited basis,
    does PHMSA have an opinion on the safety of this approach?
        Answer. PHMSA is evaluating existing requirements for hydrogen and
    hydrogen-blended pipelines in 49 CFR Part 192 to identify what changes,
    if any, are needed in its regulations. In addition, PHMSA is supporting
    research to determine how transporting hydrogen can affect the
    integrity of pipelines that today carry natural gas.

        Question 24.b. What research is being done on hydrogen blends and
    pipelines?
        Answer. In FY 2022, PHMSA awarded approximately $6 million in
    research investments on hydrogen R&D projects. Specifically, under the
    Competitive Academic Agreement Program, PHMSA awarded two projects on
    pipeline infrastructure and modernization for hydrogen networks to two
    universities. These projects will research the safe transportation and
    storage of hydrogen via repurposing existing infrastructure used for
    natural gas transport and underground storage, improving hydrogen leak
    detection, and characterizing hydrogen-specific pipeline integrity
    threats.

        Question 24.c. Does PHMSA intend to study the safety impacts of
    blending at concentrations above 20 percent?
        Answer. Yes. All PHMSA hydrogen R&D projects, as part of their
    research scope, involve the safety impacts of blending at
    concentrations over 20 percent. PHMSA is also closely coordinating with
    the Department of Energy HyBlend initiative which is also studying the
    impacts of blending at concentrations over 20 percent. Data resulting
    from both initiatives will inform national standards and support the
    safe transportation by pipeline and underground storage of hydrogen.

        Question 25. How does PHMSA work with standards-establishing bodies
    like the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) and the
    American National Standards Institute to develop pipeline and
    operational safety standards? How often does PHMSA review and
    incorporate new industry safety standards by reference? What is its
    typical timeline for doing so?
        Answer. PHMSA employees participate in meetings held by national
    standards developing organizations (SDO) that address the design,
    construction, operation, maintenance, inspection, and repair of
    pipeline facilities. PHMSA's subject matter experts represent the
    agency, participate in discussions and technical debates, register
    opinions, and vote in accordance with the procedures of the SDOs at
    each stage of the standards development process (unless prohibited from
    doing so by law). PHMSA participates in this process to ensure that the
    agency's safety priorities are considered and to avoid the need to
    develop separate, government-unique standards. PHMSA also regularly
    reviews updated editions of currently referenced consensus standards
    and amends the regulations to partially or fully incorporate updated
    standards that will enhance or maintain pipeline and environmental
    safety. Previous rules that incorporated updated consensus standards by
    reference were published on May 24, 1996, (61 FR 26121); February 17,
    1998, (63 FR 7721); June 14, 2004, (69 FR 32886); June 9, 2006, (71 FR
    33402); February 1, 2007, (72 FR 4655 (correction)); August 11, 2010,
    (75 FR 48593); January 5, 2015, (80 FR 168); and August 6, 2015, (80 FR
    46847 (correction)). As of late, PHMSA has issued two NPRMs (January
    15, 2021 (86 FR 3938) and August 29, 2022 (87 FR 52713)) that will
    update or otherwise address 60 percent of PHMSA's standards that are
    currently incorporated by reference.

        Question 26. PHMSA has undertaken a number of previous rulemakings
    regarding improvements to state One Call systems.
        How would PHMSA rate the effectiveness of these rulemakings in
    reducing excavation-related damages?
        Answer. PHMSA's Excavation Enforcement Final Rule issued July 13,
    2015, established standards for State damage prevention enforcement
    programs creating accountability at the State level for effective
    enforcement of State excavation damage prevention laws. Prior to this
    rule, the enforcement of one-call laws was strictly a stakeholder-
    driven, state-by-state approach, and many states were unable to show
    any consistent or demonstrative enforcement of their laws, even when
    there were violations of existing State laws. Accordingly, in 2016,
    when the first round of State evaluations was conducted to determine
    the adequacy of State damage prevention enforcement programs, 25 of the
    States failed to meet the requirements of 49 CFR 198.55 and were deemed
    ``inadequate.'' Currently, the number of States that are inadequate is
    three.
        This rule has helped improve States' enforcement of damage
    prevention laws. The number of excavation damages per thousand
    notifications of excavation (One-Call Tickets) has generally trended
    downward, from 3.0 in 2015 to 2.55 in 2022 indicating improvement in
    reducing damages when a notification to excavate was made. However, the
    actual number of excavation damages continues to increase from 81,974
    in 2015 to 92,006 for 2022 a 12% increase indicating more work to drive
    improvement is necessary to address this threat to pipeline and public
    safety.

        Question 27. PHMSA recently accepted applications for the Natural
    Gas Distribution Infrastructure Safety and Modernization (NGDISM) grant
    program authorized in the Infrastructure Investment and Job Act of
    2021. This program provides $200 million annually to municipal
    utilities to repair, rehabilitate or replace high-risk distribution
    pipelines.
        Question 27.a. How will PHMSA prioritize applications?
        Answer. For the FY 2022 funding round, PHMSA considered each of the
    statutory criteria, and prioritized high-risk, actively leaking legacy
    natural gas distribution infrastructure with a specific emphasis on
    benefiting underserved rural and urban communities (among other
    considerations).

        Question 27.b. How will it weigh statutory criteria in terms of
    what weight will be given to environmental justice criteria?
        Answer. Please see PHMSA's response to Question 29.

        Question 27.c. Can you please list the number of positions that
    have been filled along with their associated titles and GS-level that
    have been onboarded to implement this program, as well as any vacant
    positions?
        Answer. All 9 positions are currently filled.
        1.  Program Director, GS-15
        2.  Grants Attorney, GS-14
        3.  Senior Grants Management Specialist, GS-14 (Team Lead)
        4.  Grants Management and Acquisitions Specialist, GS-14
        5.  Grants Management Specialist, GS-13 (3 positions)
        6.  Program Specialist, GS-13
        7.  Environmental Protection Specialist, GS-14

        Question 27.d. When will PHMSA issue its first awards under this
    program?
        Answer. PHMSA announced its first awards on April 5, 2023.

        Question 27.e. When will it issue its notice of funding opportunity
    for the second cycle of funding?
        Answer. PHMSA issued its combined FY23 and FY 24 Notice of Funding
    Opportunity on May 23, 2023.

        Question 28. The President's FY 2024 budget for PHMSA references
    ``equity'' roughly thirty times, including funding related to
    ``equity.'' Please provide a specific definition of ``equity'' and
    explain how it relates to pipeline safety and PHMSA's core mission of
    pipeline safety.
        Answer. For clarity, PHMSA also has a safety mandate pertaining to
    the regulation of transporting hazardous materials. Executive Orders
    13985 and 14901, issued by President Biden, define equity as ``the
    consistent and systematic fair, just, and impartial treatment of all
    individuals, including individuals who belong to underserved
    communities that have been denied such treatment, including persons who
    live in rural areas, and persons otherwise adversely affected by
    persistent poverty or inequality.'' Equity considerations directly
    relate to PHMSA's core mission as data analyses comparing pipeline
    incident rates in socially vulnerable areas indicate a
    disproportionately higher incident rate in some overburdened and
    underserved communities. PHMSA will use data to focus inspection
    efforts on increasing safety in areas with higher incident rates,
    ensure rulemakings and agency decisions affect the safety of
    communities regardless of geography or income level, and increase
    community outreach efforts to raise awareness and education in areas
    with higher rates of incidents. As an example, aging and higher risk
    infrastructure are found disproportionately in rural communities and
    older parts of cities and towns, which often coincide with lower income
    neighborhoods.

        Question 29. The President's FY 2024 budget for PHMSA references
    ``environmental justice'' multiple times. Can you please specifically
    define ``environmental justice'' and describe how it applies to PHMSA's
    mission of providing pipeline safety?
        Answer. Presidential Executive Order 14096 of April 21, 2023,
    directs Federal agencies to develop an agency-wide environmental
    justice strategic plan that sets forth the agency's vision, goals,
    priority actions, and metrics to address and advance environmental
    justice and to fulfill the directives of this order. EO 14096 defines
    environmental justice as follows: ``Environmental justice'' means the
    just treatment and meaningful involvement of all people, regardless of
    income, race, color, national origin, Tribal affiliation, or
    disability, in agency decision-making and other Federal activities that
    affect human health and the environment so that people: (i) are fully
    protected from disproportionate and adverse human health and
    environmental effects (including risks) and hazards, including those
    related to climate change, the cumulative impacts of environmental and
    other burdens, and the legacy of racism or other structural or systemic
    barriers; and (ii) have equitable access to a healthy, sustainable, and
    resilient environment in which to live, play, work, learn, grow,
    worship, and engage in cultural and subsistence practices.
        PHMSA looks to this order, which builds on and complements
    Executive Order 12898, and policy objectives of Federal regulation to
    ensure its regulatory oversight activities advance environmental
    justice for all, including in evaluating and addressing, as
    appropriate, disproportionate and adverse benefits and burdens and
    advancing the goal of meaningful involvement. Following statutory
    requirements, environmental justice has, therefore, long been an
    important consideration in PHMSA regulatory oversight of ensuring
    pipeline safety, addressed explicitly in historical PHMSA pipeline
    safety rulemakings, special permit reviews, and other activities. Often
    the procedural vehicle for consideration of environmental justice has
    been PHMSA's consideration of environmental and public safety impacts
    pursuant to NEPA.

        Question 30. We understand there was great interest in the NGDISM
    Program, but PHMSA has not announced its awards for FY 2022 as of March
    14, 2023. Further, the grant agreements will not be executed until the
    National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Tier 2 Environmental review
    process is completed in 2023. Smaller utilities often do not have the
    resources dedicated to devote staff to grant writing and therefore may
    seek to learn from the first round of grant funding awarded in order to
    use their resources more efficiently. However, if applications for the
    second cycle of funding are due before the first cycle funding is
    awarded, they may miss out on this learning opportunity.
        Question 30.a. How is PHMSA working to address potential lost
    opportunity and working to ensure smaller utilities are able to use the
    first cycle of awards to use their resources effectively in applying
    for the program?
        Answer. The first round of awards was announced on April 5, 2023.
    PHMSA issued the second NGDISM Notice of Funding Opportunity on
    Grants.gov on May 23, 2023, with an August 4, 2023 deadline. PHMSA
    believes that applicants who were not successful in the first round had
    sufficient opportunity to review their application status letters to
    determine whether to apply for the second round of funding. PHMSA
    received 184 applications for its FY 2023 NOFO with funding requests
    that totaled $1.8 billion. Many applicants from the first round elected
    to re-apply.
        To assist smaller utilities with applying for this grant, PHMSA
    made updated its FY 2023 NOFO to make it more user friendly and
    provided examples in certain areas to assist applicants. PHMSA has also
    provided extensive technical assistance via FAQs, webinars, debriefs,
    and outreach. Going forward, PHMSA will promote DOT's Thriving
    Communities Program as a resource on its website and inform
    stakeholders that this program is available for grant application
    assistance.

        Question 30.b. What feedback will be provided after the 2022 grant
    awards have been provisionally announced so as to allow smaller
    municipal gas systems to learn how to improve their applications?
        Answer. PHMSA informed unsuccessful applicants by letter about
    their application rating and any key factors that impacted their
    application. Additionally, PHMSA offered applicants the opportunity to
    discuss questions about their application, including steps they can
    take to improve their application. In total, 56 of the 161 unique
    applicants requested and received debriefs. PHMSA concluded these
    debriefs in June 2023. Finally, PHMSA offered three public webinars to
    discuss lessons learned and provided examples of best practices and
    common application pitfalls. PHMSA accepted questions during all three
    FY 2023 webinars and provided a FY 2023 FAQ document with responses to
    those questions. PHMSA also continues to accept questions from
    applicants by email (PHMSAPipelineBILGrant@dot.gov) and phone 202-366-
    7652. All resource documents are available online at https://
    www.phmsa.dot.gov/about-phmsa/working-phmsa/grants/pipeline/natural-
    gas-distribution-infrastructure-safety-and-modernization-grants.

        Question 31. In your testimony, you discuss the importance of
    cybersecurity for pipelines and that PHMSA is working to hire
    cybersecurity specialists. We understand the Transportation Security
    Agency (TSA) has the lead on pipeline security and is working on
    cybersecurity regulations for pipelines.
        Question 31.a. Given that TSA has the lead on cybersecurity
    enforcement and PHMSA faces staffing shortages for pipeline safety
    personnel, how will hiring new cyber specialists benefit PHMSA's
    pipeline safety mission?
        Answer. As stated during my testimony on March 8, 2023, PHMSA's
    safety oversight of pipeline control rooms forms a nexus with TSA's
    cybersecurity oversight, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
    Agency's (CISA's) role as the national coordinator for critical
    infrastructure security and as a cybersecurity agency, and DOE's
    national energy management. The 2021 cyber-attack on Colonial Pipeline
    demonstrated how critical it is for a whole-of-government approach to
    safeguard our Nation's critical infrastructure. PHMSA regulates,
    inspects, and enforces operational technology (OT) used in the
    communications and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
    systems for pipeline, liquefied natural gas and underground natural gas
    storage facilities. PHMSA's two new cyber specialists will join a small
    team of PHMSA SCADA and control room experts that routinely inspect the
    240-270 control rooms spread across the U.S. and Canada. The
    specialists will be able to leverage their cyber expertise during the
    OT portion of CRM inspections, identifying violations and potential
    cyber-related concerns. In addition, the specialists will provide
    onsite accident and special investigation assistance. Cyber specialists
    will look at specific incidents to identify a potential cyber component
    when reviewing control room details, controller responses, and data
    associated with a pipeline spill or release into the environment.
        Pipeline control rooms are where a cyber-attack could create
    significant safety hazards to the public and threaten energy
    reliability, as demonstrated by the Colonial Pipeline hacking incident.
    PHMSA has oversight of the operator's emergency response to any cyber-
    attack that impacts the safe operation of the pipeline. Further, PHMSA
    has safety oversight of a pipeline start-up and return to normal
    operations, including manual operations should commodity movement be
    required. The PHMSA inspection team, including those with combined
    cyber and pipeline operation expertise, are the federal government's
    regular ``in-the-field'' presence and will be a critical component of
    safely restoring pipeline operations should U.S. pipeline
    infrastructure experience another cyber-attack. It is important to note
    that PHMSA routinely collaborates with TSA and CISA and will refer any
    identified cyber risks to TSA for their review and action.

        Question 31.b. Can you please list the number of these
    cybersecurity positions that have been filled along with their
    associated titles and GS-level? Can you please list the number of
    vacant positions PHMSA is planning to hire, along with their associated
    titles and GS-level?
        Answer. PHMSA will soon advertise two GS-14 General Engineer
    positions with a program title of ``Program Manager.'' The best
    qualified candidates for these two positions will have pipeline
    engineering and control room management expertise combined with a sound
    cyber skill set. These individuals will be CRM inspectors and provide a
    unique skill set with understanding of pipeline safety standards,
    pipeline OT and the potential impact that cyber may have on pipeline
    OT.

        Question 31.c. How will you ensure PHMSA does not duplicate the
    efforts of the TSA?
        Answer. PHMSA's safety oversight forms a nexus with TSA's cyber
    authority and the two agencies have adjacent but different foci. PHMSA
    regulates, inspects, and enforces operational technology (OT) used in
    the communications and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA)
    systems for all pipeline, liquefied natural gas (LNG) and underground
    natural gas storage (UNGS) facilities. PHMSA performs routine, onsite
    inspections of all pipeline control rooms and connects pipeline
    operators with TSA when potential cyber risks are identified. PHMSA
    also routinely investigates both major and minor pipeline, LNG, and
    UNGS incidents, as well as abnormal events. PHMSA field inspections
    include onsite observation of OT components such as PLCs (program logic
    controllers) in-situ, such as in remote, rural settings.
        PHMSA evaluates SCADA controller training and human factors such as
    fatigue. These issues have a cyber nexus as a fatigued, or inadequately
    trained, controller can make risky OT decisions, potentially missing
    pressure and flow indications of a leak or abnormal operations.
        PHMSA exerts is safety and regulatory authority on all pipeline,
    LNG and UNGS facilities; Currently, TSA efforts are limited and
    constrained to certain operators. PHMSA and TSA collaborate under the
    guidance of Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that promotes
    communication, efficiency, and nonduplication of effort.

        Question 32. Deputy Administrator Brown, on November 4, 2020, PHMSA
    published a set of draft frequently asked questions (FAQs) in the
    Federal Register under docket number PHMSA-2019-0199 attempting to
    delineate where PHMSA and the Occupational Safety and Health
    Administration (OSHA) assert jurisdiction to perform inspection and
    enforcement for midstream processing facilities in which there is
    overlapping authority by the two respective regulatory bodies. While
    PHMSA extended the comment period on that proposal to February 2022, to
    date, PHMSA has not finalized this guidance or taken any other
    regulatory action to address this issue. I am aware of confusion and
    other challenges facing the regulated community as a result of the lack
    of clarity around this issue.
        Question 32.a. Will PHMSA take action this year to finalize this
    guidance or perhaps propose some other remedy to this important issue?
    If so, when? If not, why?
        Answer. PHMSA anticipates finalizing the guidance relative to the
    jurisdiction of midstream processing facilities later this year.

        Question 32.b. In the absence of regulatory action, how will PHMSA
    provide clarity to the regulated community around this issue?
        Answer. PHMSA believes that the jurisdictional clarity provided by
    the finalized midstream FAQ's will negate the need for any further
    regulatory action.

        Question 33. The PIPES Act of 2016 convened a Voluntary Information
    Sharing System working group that recommended Congress authorize such a
    program to share pipeline safety information while providing
    confidentiality for disclosures.
        Question 33.a. Does PHMSA believe there are benefits to such a
    program and how might it use such a system to improve pipeline safety
    across the United States pipeline network?
        Answer. PHMSA acknowledges potential benefits to the Voluntary
    Information Sharing System (VIS), if thoughtfully crafted, including
    the potential for:
          Serving as a trusted repository of high-volume, high-
    quality data and information that would advance pipeline safety and
    lead to opportunities for reducing pipeline accidents and incidents to
    achieve the goal of ``zero.''
          Enhancing Safety Management Systems.
          Providing technical support for service providers'
    technology investments to improve technology performance.
          Determining gaps in pipeline information to drive
    continuous improvement.

        Question 33.b. How might Congress or PHMSA address concerns about
    the sharing of proprietary information by companies who actively
    participate in a voluntary information sharing program?
        Answer. Industry may be more incentivized to participate in the
    program if their concerns about protecting proprietary and confidential
    information could be better addressed within a VIS program. PHMSA
    welcomes the opportunity to working with Congress on ways to address
    these concerns.

        Question 34. PHMSA recently started asking pipeline operators
    during inspections to fill out the ``Racial Equity and Support for
    Underserved Communities--New Racial Equity and Support for Underserved
    Communities Form 1.'' PHMSA stated the justification for asking these
    questions is Executive Order 13985, Advancing Racial Equity and Support
    for Underserved Communities Through the Federal Government. To aid in
    the response of questions, PHMSA inspectors pointed to a Climate and
    Economic Justice Screening Tool map that was put together by the
    Council on Environmental Quality. We have several questions on this
    topic:
        Question 34.a. What was the process that PHMSA used to draft this
    form and send it out to pipeline operators? Were other Federal
    agencies, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB),
    consulted? Did PHMSA obtain approval from OMB to conduct this
    information collection exercise based on Paperwork Reduction Act
    requirements?
        Answer. In 2022, PHMSA performed a data analysis comparing incident
    occurrence locations relative to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
    Social Vulnerability Index (SVI) and found that some SVI areas may be
    disproportionately impacted by natural gas distribution incidents.
    Discussions with a variety of stakeholder groups--including state
    regulators and industry groups--revealed a value in raising awareness
    and improving transparency about the location of incidents, including
    for historically underserved communities. PHMSA data shows that a good
    amount of underserved communities are at significantly greater risk of
    pipeline failures due to aging infrastructure and other factors. To
    help with this, PHMSA initially formulated seven questions to ask
    operators to raise awareness and thoughtful consideration among the
    industry and regulators regarding EO 13985. PHMSA has since converted
    the questions into informational points for its inspectors to
    facilitate discussions with operators during inspections regarding
    equity or impacts on underserved communities. The points not only help
    us communicate that we are seeking to advance protection for all,
    including in these areas, but also helps us understand what efforts
    operators are taking to address safety risks for local communities.
    Similar to PHMSA's other inspection resource materials, the original
    questions were not submitted for OMB approval, as each inspection,
    including questions, are uniquely designed for each pipeline system.

        Question 34.b. Did PHMSA submit this form to the Federal Register
    and institute a formal comment process? If not, why?
        Answer. PHMSA did not submit the questions to the Federal Register
    for comment. PHMSA has converted the questions into informational
    points in a brochure.

        Question 34.c. To which pipeline operators did PHMSA submit this
    form and how were they selected?
        Answer. PHMSA had discussed the questions with companies that it
    interacts with, including during safety inspections. PHMSA has
    converted the questions into informational points in a brochure.

        Question 34.d. The form references ``Disadvantaged Community (DAC)
    datasets.'' How would you explain what a DAC is and what criteria is
    used to establish it? Additionally, are DACs used in any part of
    existing PHMSA regulation?
        Answer. PHMSA initially applied the acronym DAC to refer to various
    datasets that include data components that PHMSA deemed relevant to
    social disadvantage such as components of the Center for Disease
    Control's (CDC) Social Vulnerability Index (CDC/ATSDR Social
    Vulnerability Index (SVI) and many others referenced on the Department
    of Transportation's public facing website at: https://
    www.transportation.gov/grants/dot-navigator/federal-tools-determine-
    disadvantaged-community-status. These tools are publicly available and
    can assist stakeholders in their own data analysis. The Pipeline Social
    Equity Tool was published on August 8,2023 and does not use the SVI. It
    uses the DOT Equitable Transportation Community (ETC) Explorer Tool
    data. DAC PHMSA--Pipeline Social Equity Tool (arcgis.com).

        Question 34.e. Has PHMSA incorporated any aspects of Executive
    Order 13985 into its regulations?
        Answer. PHMSA has not amended its regulations to incorporate the
    text of Executive Order 13985. However, PHMSA has addressed, at a high
    level, the application of Executive Order 13985 within several of its
    recent rulemakings. See, e.g., 86 FR 63266, 63291 (Nov. 15, 2021).
    PHMSA also has, consistent with the Federal policy objective announced
    in Executive Order 13985 and where appropriate, identified equity
    benefits expected from recent safety-enhancing rulemakings just as it
    recognizes safety, economic, and environmental benefits from its
    rulemakings as appropriate.

        Question 34.f. Does PHMSA have any plans to change its regulations
    to address disadvantaged communities? If so, can you please specify
    which Regulation Identifier Numbers (RIN) you plan on using?
        Answer. PHMSA is still analyzing the safety data and currently has
    no new specific RINs on the matter.

        Question 34.g. Does PHMSA believe safety and environmental
    expectations should be different in DAC areas as opposed to non-DAC
    areas? If so, can you please stipulate how and why?
        Answer. PHMSA believes safety and environmental expectations and
    performance should be commensurate in both DAC and non-DAC areas. This
    is why potentially disparate safety performance is concerning and why
    PHMSA seeks to raise awareness of the potential issue.

        Question 34.h. If PHMSA believes there should be different
    expectations as stipulated in the above question, can you please
    specify which regulations govern this process?
        Answer. As stated above, PHMSA believes expectations should be the
    same.

        Question 34.i. What does PHMSA intend to do with the information
    gleaned from the answers to the form mentioned above?
        Answer. PHMSA's intention is to raise awareness through discussion,
    and any information gathered will be used only to document staff effort
    to reach stakeholders.

        Question 34.j. The Executive order defines ``equity'' as the
    ``consistent and systematic fair, just and impartial treatment of all
    individuals.'' Do you believe that the current set of pipeline
    regulations included in 49 CFR Parts 190-199 are adequate regarding
    equity as defined above? If not, why?
        Answer. While the intent of PHMSA regulations is designed to
    accomplish equity as defined in the EO, PHMSA believes empirical data
    is more valuable than interpreting regulatory intent.

        Question 34.k. The Department of Transportation recently sent to
    the Federal Register a notice regarding its updated Transportation
    Disadvantaged Census Tracts Tool asking for input from stakeholders.
    How does PHMSA plan on using this tool?
        Answer. On August 8, 2023, PHMSA published an interactive map
    called the Pipeline Social Equity Tool. This public tool allows
    stakeholders to evaluate safety performance compared to the Department
    of Transportation's Equitable Transportation Community (ETC) Explorer
    Tool. PHMSA has not yet identified other specific uses for the Tool.

       Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Tristan Brown, Deputy
     Administrator, Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration
                                    (PHMSA)

        Question 1. In 2022, there were more than 280 significant or
    serious incidents and this year we have already had two fatalities as a
    result of pipeline incidents. Meanwhile, your testimony states that
    certain operators are negotiating for reduced civil penalties and other
    operators are delaying paying the civil penalties they owe. Which
    pipeline operators are negotiating for lesser civil penalty payments
    and which ones have not paid what they owe? For the operators who have
    not paid, how long have you been awaiting their payment?
        Answer. Sec. 108 of the 2020 PIPES Act directs PHMSA to allow the
    respondent in an enforcement proceeding to request the use of a consent
    agreement. It further directs PHMSA to allow the respondent and the
    agency to convene at least one meeting to explore the possibility of
    settlement or simplification of the issues. On average over the last
    two years, PHMSA issued 47 proposed penalties and consistent with Sec.
    108, every operator was eligible to request the use of a consent
    agreement and to meet with PHMSA for settlement discussions. Since the
    beginning of 2018, PHMSA, as part of settlement negotiations, issued
    penalties lower than proposed in 24 pipeline enforcement cases, as
    noted below:

    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                            CONSENT
                    CPF NUM                         OPERATOR            PROPOSED     ASSESSED     OPENED     ORDER
                                                                       PENALTIES    PENALTIES      DATE       DATE
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    42022017NOPV..........................  DENBURY GULF COAST         $3,866,734   $2,868,100    5/26/22    3/24/23
                                             PIPELINES, LLC (32545).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    12022038NOPV..........................  KINDER MORGAN LIQUID         $455,200     $165,700     7/1/22     2/3/23
                                             TERMINALS, LLC (26041).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    32022019NOPV..........................  TEXAS GAS TRANSMISSION,      $474,300     $237,800    1/21/22     7/1/22
                                             LLC (19270).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    32022018NOPV..........................  TALLGRASS PONY EXPRESS        $55,200      $44,800    1/19/22    5/16/22
                                             PIPELINE, LLC (39043).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    32021046NOPV..........................  TALLGRASS PONY EXPRESS       $437,300     $385,500   11/23/21    5/10/22
                                             PIPELINE, LLC (39043).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    32021043NOPV..........................  TALLGRASS INTERSTATE GAS     $359,900     $325,382    12/7/21    4/13/22
                                             TRANSMISSION, LLC
                                             (1007).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    32021045NOPV..........................  TALLGRASS POWDER RIVER        $58,400      $25,920    11/5/21    3/29/22
                                             GATEWAY, LLC (39963).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    32021049NOPV..........................  DAPL-ETCO OPERATIONS          $93,200      $20,000    7/22/21    1/11/22
                                             MANAGEMENT, LLC (39205).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    320215008.............................  HESS ND (39065).........     $127,600      $82,000     3/1/21    12/1/21
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    32021022NOPV..........................  EXXONMOBIL PIPELINE CO        $58,200      $38,900    5/18/21   10/28/21
                                             (4906).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    52021022NOPV..........................  SFPP, LP (18092)........   $2,231,779   $1,493,200    5/12/21   10/22/21
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    32021027NOPV..........................  NORTHERN NATURAL GAS CO       $56,900      $46,700    4/28/21    9/10/21
                                             (13750).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    320205024.............................  SPIRE MISSOURI INC. EAST     $139,800      $62,600   11/30/20     4/9/21
                                             (11032).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    42020018NOPV..........................  TEXAS EASTERN                 $36,200      $18,100    12/9/20     4/8/21
                                             TRANSMISSION, LP
                                             (SPECTRA ENERGY
                                             PARTNERS, LP) (19235).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    320205004.............................  PEMBINA COCHIN LLC           $187,200     $172,800    3/19/20    3/18/21
                                             (32258).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    320205020.............................  SINCLAIR TRANSPORTATION       $97,100      $67,700   10/13/20     2/5/21
                                             COMPANY (15156).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    520192001.............................  HILCORP ALASKA, LLC          $198,700           $0    1/24/19    5/18/20
                                             (32645).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    320196006.............................  CRESTWOOD MIDSTREAM          $236,100     $200,000   11/22/19    5/13/20
                                             PARTNERS LP (39368).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    120190004.............................  RICHMOND, CITY OF             $80,500           $0    4/22/19    4/22/20
                                             (17360).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    420145025.............................  CENTURION PIPELINE L.P.      $165,600      $92,000    9/30/14    1/31/19
                                             (31888).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    120160005.............................  RICHMOND, CITY OF             $51,800           $0   10/13/16   11/30/18
                                             (17360).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    320135014.............................  ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC      $559,100     $550,400    5/13/13   10/23/18
                                             (32109).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    320135015.............................  ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC      $230,800           $0    5/13/13   10/23/18
                                             (32109).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    320135020.............................  ONEOK NGL PIPELINE, LLC       $45,700      $22,500     7/3/13   10/23/18
                                             (32109).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

        The following two enforcement cases are in an extended non-payment
    status:
          Idaho Pipeline Corp has not paid $49,000 penalty that
    PHMSA assessed in an August 9, 2019, Final Order (CPF 5-2018-6015).
          Bohrenworks LLC has not paid $209,002 penalty that PHMSA
    assessed in a December 2, 2019, Final Order (CPF 5-2019-0018E).
    Bohrenworks is an excavator.

        Question 2. The 2020 PIPES Act allowed PHMSA a number of
    recruitment and retention incentives, including special pay rates
    permitted under section 5305 of title 5, United States Code. How has
    having this authority assisted PHMSA to recruit and retain inspection
    and enforcement personnel? Are there additional barriers to ensuring
    PHMSA has the resources it needs?
        Answer. In recognition of the critical nature of these positions,
    the PIPES Act of 2020 authorized PHMSA to provide recruitment and
    retention incentives such as tuition assistance, student loan
    repayment, and special pay rates to improve efforts to attract and
    retain pipeline engineers and inspectors. In 2021, PHMSA engaged an
    outside contractor to determine the parameters for increasing its
    special pay rates--including for example the geographic areas and pay
    grades. In FY22, PHMSA received additional funding to provide financial
    incentives such as increasing the pay rates. In August of 2022, PHMSA/
    DOT submitted to the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) for approval
    an increase in the special pay rates for engineer/inspectors. PHMSA
    received OPM approval to increase special pay rates for some engineer
    inspectors on April 17, 2023, and promptly applied this to increase to
    existing employees and openings. While awaiting approval, PHMSA
    increased the number of open/available positions for which it is
    hiring. In 2023, PHMSA also proposed establishing additional incentives
    to retain pipeline engineers/inspectors. Upon approval of these new
    incentives, the agency hopes it will experience a significant boost in
    its rate of onboarding and retention of inspectors.

        Question 3. California state law (2022 SB-905) prohibits
    construction of any new pipelines for carbon dioxide, including for new
    carbon capture and storage projects, until PHMSA promulgates a final
    rulemaking regarding minimum federal safety standards for
    transportation of carbon dioxide by pipeline. Can you confirm that
    PHMSA is working to finalize this rulemaking, and provide a publication
    date for the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking?
        Answer. PHMSA is developing a proposed rule updating its
    regulations in response to the anticipated significant expansion of
    carbon dioxide pipelines and to implement lessons learned from the
    February 22, 2020, rupture of a supercritical-phase carbon dioxide
    pipeline in Satartia, MS. PHMSA anticipates publishing an NPRM by
    January 2024.

     Questions from Hon. Mike Bost to Tristan Brown, Deputy Administrator,
         Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration (PHMSA)

        Question 1. Does PHMSA oppose acts to damage or destroy an
    interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
        Answer. Yes, as noted in my response to Congressman Stauber, and
    PHMSA personnel work closely with the Transportation Security
    Administration (TSA) to advance pipeline security, which is under the
    jurisdiction of the TSA.

        Question 2. Does PHMSA consider acts to damage or destroy an
    interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility a legal
    expression of 1st Amendment free speech rights?
        Answer. PHMSA does not condone any act to damage or destroy a
    pipeline facility. Knowingly and willfully damaging or destroying a
    pipeline facility is a criminal violation of 49 U.S.C. 60123.

        Question 3. Does PHMSA consider acts to damage or destroy an
    interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility an
    appropriate form of protest against climate change?
        Answer. PHMSA does not condone any act to damage or destroy a
    pipeline facility. Knowingly and willfully damaging or destroying a
    pipeline facility is a criminal violation of 49 U.S.C. 60123.

        Question 4. Does PHMSA oppose publications or other forms of media,
    such as movies, which encourage the damage or destruction of an
    interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
        Answer. PHMSA does not condone any act to damage or destroy a
    pipeline facility. Knowingly and willfully damaging or destroying a
    pipeline facility is a criminal violation of 49 U.S.C. 60123.

        Question 5. Does PHMSA consider dangerous certain acts to tamper
    with or disrupt the operation of an interstate natural gas or hazardous
    liquids pipeline facility, such as valve-turning?
        Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and
    authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a
    pipeline facility.

        Question 6. Does PHMSA agree with the statement expressed by former
    Pipeline Safety Trust (PST) Executive Director Carl Weimer that,
    ``[c]losing valves on major pipelines can have unexpected consequences
    endangering people and the environment''?
        Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and
    authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a
    pipeline facility.

        Question 7. Does PHMSA agree with former PST Executive Director
    Weimer that actions by activists to close valves on major pipelines
    were a ``dangerous stunt''?
        Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and
    authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a
    pipeline facility.

        Question 8. Does PHMSA support a Federal prohibition on activities,
    such as closing valves on major pipelines, that are dangerous but do
    not result in damage or destruction?
        Answer. Only trained personnel with explicit direction and
    authority of the pipeline operator should ever perform activities on a
    pipeline facility.

    Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Andrew J. Black, President
     and Chief Executive Officer, Liquid Energy Pipeline Association (LEPA)

        Question 1. How much in annual revenue did LEPA members earn in
    2022?
        Answer. LEPA does not collect or hold information on the revenue of
    its member companies. LEPA focuses on policies and programs that
    improve pipeline safety and the public's perception of the benefits of
    pipelines. LEPA also advocates for the liquids pipeline industry at
    FERC, where the focus is on just and reasonable tariff rates and terms
    of service. Public sources of information on pipeline operator revenue
    would provide some information, although this data would be incomplete.
    Several major members of LEPA are privately owned and do not report
    their financial information publicly. Several other major members are
    subsidiaries of larger organizations with multiple business units and
    generally do not publicly break out liquids pipeline revenues
    separately.

        Question 2. How much of your members' product was exported to other
    countries?
        Answer. For the most part, LEPA member companies do not own the
    product they transport. Similar to FedEx or UPS, pipeline companies
    deliver liquid energy products owned by other parties from one
    destination to another on behalf of shippers. The ultimate destination
    of products delivered by LEPA members, to the extent they are beyond
    the U.S. pipeline network, are usually unknown to LEPA and its members.
    This model is similar to the rail and trucking industries, where trains
    and trucks deliver packages and goods owned by other parties from
    contracted pickup to destination points. The ultimate end point of
    those shipments is not necessarily known to the rail and trucking
    companies.

        Question 3. Could you please explain what statutory prohibitions
    there are on the industry creating its own voluntary information
    sharing system?
        Answer. There are no statutes which directly prohibit the sharing
    of pipeline safety information. However, legal considerations and other
    risks deter or limit free disclosure of information by infrastructure
    owners to a voluntary information sharing system. For example,
    companies will not share safety information which has a security
    component if it would pose a threat to public safety if publicly
    released. Companies will also not disclose to the public information
    which might be used against them in pending or threatened litigation.
    This is separate and apart from information subject to inspection and
    enforcement action by a regulator. Congress recognized that legal
    liabilities discourage safety sharing when it authorized a VIS-like
    program for air carriers administered by the FAA. Indeed, the success
    of the FAA safety sharing program resulting from the Congressional and
    regulator safe harbor granted to air carriers was the inspiration for
    Congress suggesting application of the program to the pipeline sector.
    If Congress wants pipeline safety to benefit from voluntary information
    sharing, it must create the legal safe harbors necessary for such
    sharing.

      Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Kenneth W. Grubb, Chief
       Operating Officer, Natural Gas Pipelines, Kinder Morgan, Inc., on
      behalf of the Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA)

        Question 1. How much in annual revenue did INGAA members earn in
    2022?
        Answer. Many of INGAA's member companies have multiple revenue
    streams in addition to interstate natural gas transmission pipelines.
    To find the annual revenue stream for each Federal Energy Regulatory
    Commission (``FERC'')-regulated interstate natural gas transmission
    pipeline, please see each pipeline's FERC Form No. 2 and 2-A, which are
    publicly available here [https://www.ferc.gov/industries-data/natural-
    gas/industry-forms/form-2-2a-3-q-gas-historical-vfp-data]. To find the
    total annual revenue for each INGAA member company for all of its
    business segments, here is a link to each INGAA member company or their
    owner's public disclosures and/or press releases:
          BHE GT&S: https://www.brkenergy.com/assets/upload/
    financial-filing/2022
    1231_BHE%20Form%2010K.pdf
          Boardwalk Pipelines: https://loews.com/FileStore/2022-Q4-
    --Earnings-Remarks.pdf
          Cheniere Energy, Inc.: https://www.sec.gov/ix?doc=/
    Archives/edgar/data/3570/
    000000357023000042/lng-20221231.htm#ic1131b9e5c5b41368c2dbfdabf3591
    5e_19
          DT Midstream: https://s28.q4cdn.com/581450200/files/
    doc_presentation/2023/01/DTM-Q4-2022-Earnings-Call-vF.pdf
          DTE Energy: https://ir.dteenergy.com/news/press-release-
    details/2023/DTE-Energy-closes-year-with-strong-financial-results-well-
    positioned-for-2023/default.aspx
          Eastern Shore Natural Gas: https://investor.chpk.com/
    static-files/aff97881-7a86-4f51-a5ab-0768337b06d5
          Enbridge Energy: https://www.enbridge.com/-/media/Enb/
    Documents/Investor-
    Relations/2022/2022_Q4_Financials_MDA.pdf?rev=c574188313454a11
    8924d6eb033edfcb&hash=8B9FDDC80A7994E26138F731C077F4EC
          Equitrans Midstream: https://s22.q4cdn.com/743133753/
    files/doc_news/
    Equitrans-Midstream-Announces-Full-Year-and-Fourth-Quarter-2022-
    Results-2023.pdf
          Iroquois Pipeline Operating Company--reported through TC
    Energy and BHE GT&S
          Kinder Morgan, Inc.: https://s24.q4cdn.com/126708163/
    files/doc_financials/2022/q4/KMI-2022-10K-Final-as-Filed-wo-
    Exhibits.pdf
          Millennium Pipeline Company, LLC--reported through TC
    Energy and DT Midstream
          Mountain West Pipeline--acquired by Williams in Feb. 2023
          National Grid: https://www.nationalgrid.com/document/
    148586/download
          National Fuel Gas Supply Corporation: https://
    www.nationalfuel.com/wp-content/uploads/documents/NFG-9.30.2022-
    Earnings-Release-11032022-PDF.pdf
          NextEra Energy: https://www.investor.nexteraenergy.com//
    media/Files/N/NEE-
    IR/reports-and-fillings/quarterly-earnings/2022/Q4/2023-0125_NEEQ42022
    News%20Release%20Final.pdf
          ONEOK, Inc: https://otp.tools.investis.com/clients/us/
    oneok_inc2/SEC/sec-show.
    aspx?FilingId=16441050&Cik=0001039684&Type=PDF&hasPdf=1
          Pacific Gas & Electric: https://s1.q4cdn.com/880135780/
    files/doc_financials/2022/q4/PGE-02.23.23-Press-release.pdf
          Sempra LNG: https://www.sempra.com/sempra-reports-fourth-
    quarter-2022-business-results
          Southern Company Gas: https://s27.q4cdn.com/273397814/
    files/doc_financials/2022/q4/Earnings-Release-Q4-2022-IR.pdf
          Southern Star Central Gas Pipeline, Inc.--privately owned
    company that does not report publicly in U.S.
          Spire, Inc.: https://ir.spire.com/sec-filings/all-sec-
    filings/content/0000950170-23-008177/0000950170-23-008177.pdf
          TC Energy: https://www.tcenergy.com/siteassets/pdfs/
    investors/reports-and-filings/annual-and-quarterly-reports/2022/tc-
    2022-annual-report.pdf
          Tellurian, Inc.: https://ir.tellurianinc.com/financials-
    filings-and-presentations/annual-reports/content/0000061398-23-000011/
    0000061398-23-000011.pdf
          UGI Energy Services, LLC: https://www.ugicorp.com/news-
    releases/news-release-details/ugi-reports-fiscal-2022-results
          WBI Energy Transmission, Inc.: https://
    d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000067716/c0870b54-f2c5-4d64-88aa-
    6000c3abd644.pdf
          The Williams Companies: https://
    d18rn0p25nwr6d.cloudfront.net/CIK-0000107263/828947a0-eef8-45b8-93a2-
    c623e08108d5.pdf

        Question 2. How much of INGAA members' product was exported to
    other countries?
        Answer. As you may know, INGAA member companies do not own the
    natural gas that they transport. Interstate natural gas transmission
    companies merely transport the natural gas owned and controlled by the
    pipeline customer (shipper). In an integrated pipeline network (both
    inter and intrastate), pipeline customers can transport their natural
    gas over multiple pipelines from various production fields. The
    interstate natural gas transmission pipeline typically does not know
    the final end use of the gas that it transports.
        INGAA does have member companies which own and operate LNG import
    and export terminals, including BHE GT&S (Cove Point, MD), Cheniere
    (Sabine, LA and under construction in Corpus Christi, TX), Kinder
    Morgan (Elba Island, GA), Sempra (Hackberry, LA), and Tellurian (under
    construction in Calcasieu Parish, LA). Please see a list of FERC-
    certificated LNG terminals (both INGAA and non-INGAA members) here
    [https://cms.ferc.gov/media/north-american-lng-export-terminals-
    existing-approved-not-yet-built-and-proposed-8]. INGAA does not track
    the volume of members' exports. Please refer to their websites for
    further information.
        We note that the U.S. Energy Information Administration (``EIA'')
    reports [https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/n9133us2m.htm] monthly LNG
    export volumes and reports [https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/hist/
    n9050us2a.htm] yearly marketed production volumes.

        Question 3. What is the starting and average salary, benefits and
    bonus, and any additional employment incentives for a Kinder Morgan
    engineer?
        Answer. Kinder Morgan utilizes a market-based approach whereby pay
    ranges are established around a market reference point (MRP) to
    compensate employees within its organization. For pipeline engineering
    positions, there are 6 job titles that make up the job family currently
    used by the company with different experience levels and job functions.
    The average starting compensation for a pipeline engineer at Kinder
    Morgan can range from $121,521 to $172,129, depending on the employee's
    level of experience and qualifications. This dollar figure includes
    salary, bonus, and benefits amounting to roughly one third of the total
    compensation (i.e., health care, payroll taxes, retirement plans,
    educational reimbursement, and service awards). The average total
    compensation across the range of all pipeline engineering positions at
    Kinder Morgan is $208,444 (including the same categories listed
    earlier).

        Question 4. Kinder Morgan has received 39 special permits from
    PHMSA in the last 10 years and experienced more than 500 accidents or
    incidents. Have any of those accidents or incidents occurred on
    pipelines that received a special permit to waive PHMSA's safety
    regulations?
        Answer. Kinder Morgan currently has 17 active natural gas
    transmission class location special permits. No incidents have ever
    occurred in a class location special permit segment. In the last 10
    years, companies operated by Kinder Morgan have experienced 188 natural
    gas incidents (the remainder of the incidents cited in your question
    were on our liquids systems). Almost exactly two-thirds of those
    natural gas incidents, while reportable, were minor and contained
    within company facilities (e.g., within a compressor or meter station).
    Additionally, many of Kinder Morgan's pipelines are hundreds of miles
    long. When there were incidents on pipelines where class location
    special permit segments exist, there was no impact to the class
    location special permit segment.

     Questions from Hon. Troy E. Nehls to Bill Caram, Executive Director,
                             Pipeline Safety Trust

        Question 1. Information sharing is a critical part of the pipeline
    industry's efforts to advance safety. Since 2016, industry has
    supported the idea of establishing a formal voluntary information
    sharing framework, similar to what is utilized by the airline industry.
    The PIPES Act of 2016 convened a Voluntary Information Sharing System
    working group that recommended Congress authorize such a program to
    share pipeline safety information while providing confidentiality for
    disclosures, but such a provision has been excluded from two previous
    reauthorization bills.
        As the committee considers future safety needs, could you please
    share your thoughts on whether such a framework would be valuable and
    should be included in the next pipeline safety reauthorization bill?
        Answer. The Pipeline Safety Trust believes there is nothing that
    prevents the pipeline industry from creating an information sharing
    system if desired, so we question the need for Congressional
    authorization of such a program. However, we would not oppose a
    provision provided protections from disclosure, FOIA requests, and
    other legal processes are reasonable and do not restrict information
    from the public that is currently available; funding does not pull from
    existing PHMSA resources; and the governing board is fairly balanced
    among stakeholders.

       Questions from Hon. Donald M. Payne, Jr. to Bill Caram, Executive
                        Director, Pipeline Safety Trust

        Question 1. Would you recommend that the committee extend the
    Technology Pilot Program as mandated by Sec. 104 of the PIPES Act of
    2020? If so, do you have specific safety concerns or concerns with the
    application process? What recommendations do you have to ensure
    applicants provide a sufficient level of safety during their pilot
    program?
        Answer. Given that the Technology Pilot Program would allow
    companies to operate outside of existing Federal minimum safety
    standards, we believe the program requires robust safeguards, including
    an extensive application and approval process, to operate pipelines in
    our nation's communities without meeting those standards. Regulations
    around maximum pressure, repair criteria, risk assessments, and many
    other standards are important to the safety of people and the
    environment and PHMSA needs to rigorously assess the consequences of
    any potential regulatory leniency.
        The Pipeline Safety Trust would need to assess any proposed changes
    to the existing program that might accompany a proposed extension to
    the Technology Pilot Program before deciding to support its adoption.

        Question 2. Does the Pipeline Safety Trust support H.R.4261, the
    ``Pipeline Seismic Safety Study Act'' raised in the last Congress?
        Answer. Yes, we support the ``Pipeline Seismic Safety Study Act''.

       Questions from Hon. Mike Bost to Bill Caram, Executive Director,
                             Pipeline Safety Trust

        Question 1. Does the PST oppose acts to damage or destroy an
    interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
        Answer. Yes, The Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that
    create unsafe conditions for people and the environment on pipeline
    facilities.

        Question 2. Does PST consider acts to damage or destroy an
    interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility a
    protected expression of 1st Amendment free speech rights?
        Answer. Acts to damage or destroy a pipeline can create unsafe
    conditions, and The Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that
    create unsafe conditions for people and the environment on pipeline
    facilities.

        Question 3. Does PST consider acts to damage or destroy an
    interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility an
    appropriate form of protest against climate change?
        Answer. Acts to damage or destroy a pipeline can create unsafe
    conditions, and The Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that
    create unsafe conditions for people and the environment on pipeline
    facilities.

        Question 4. Does PST oppose publications or other forms of media,
    such as movies, which encourage the damage or destruction of an
    interstate natural gas or hazardous liquids pipeline facility?
        Answer. Unfortunately, this hypothetical question goes beyond our
    mission and our tiny staff's capacity, but I will reiterate that we
    oppose activities that create unsafe conditions for people and the
    environment on pipeline facilities. However, I am unable to comment on
    the potential constitutional implications of your question.

        Question 5. Does PST consider dangerous certain acts to tamper with
    or disrupt the operation of an interstate natural gas or hazardous
    liquids pipeline facility, such as valve-turning?
        Answer. Acts such as valve-turning by untrained individuals can
    create unsafe conditions on pipeline facilities and the Pipeline Safety
    Trust opposes activities that create unsafe conditions for people and
    the environment on pipeline facilities.

        Question 6. Do you agree with the statement expressed by former PST
    Executive Director Carl Weimer that, ``[c]losing valves on major
    pipelines can have unexpected consequences endangering people and the
    environment''?
        Answer. Yes, I agree with that statement.

        Question 7. Do you agree with former PST Executive Director Weimer
    that actions by activists to close valves on major pipelines were a
    ``dangerous stunt''?
        Answer. I am not familiar with the particular circumstances that
    would contextualize Mr. Weimer's comment but given the level of respect
    I have for his integrity and judgment, I think it's safe to say I would
    agree with his assessment at the time.

        Question 8. Does PST support a Federal prohibition on activities,
    such as closing valves on major pipelines, that are dangerous but do
    not result in damage or destruction?
        Answer. I believe such activities are already prohibited.

        Question 9. Does PST support actions to blow up a natural gas or
    hazardous liquids pipeline encouraged by the upcoming movie ``How to
    Blow Up a Pipeline'' set for release April 7 in theaters across
    America?
        Answer. We have not seen the movie nor read the book and do not
    know if either encourages blowing up pipelines. I will reiterate that
    the Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that create unsafe
    conditions for people and the environment on pipeline facilities.

        Question 10. Does PST consider actions to blow up a natural gas or
    hazardous liquids pipeline as encouraged by the upcoming movie ``How to
    Blow Up a Pipeline'' a danger to people or the environment?
        Answer. We have not seen the movie nor read the book and do not
    know if either encourages blowing up pipelines. I will reiterate that
    the Pipeline Safety Trust opposes activities that create unsafe
    conditions for people and the environment on pipeline facilities.

        Question 11. Does PST condemn the upcoming movie ``How to Blow Up a
    Pipeline''?
        Answer. We have not seen the movie and have enough real pipeline
    issues to keep our tiny staff more than busy without spending time
    dealing with fictional drama meant to entertain. It is always our hope
    that pipeline companies, lawmakers, and regulators, who have the
    ability to change things safely and rapidly, will deal with the
    existential threat of climate change in a proactive manner.

                                 [all]