[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
STRENGTHENING BIOSAFETY AND
BIOSECURITY STANDARDS:
PROTECTING AGAINST FUTURE
PANDEMICS
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE CORONAVIRUS PANDEMIC
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
OCTOBER 18, 2023
__________
Serial No. 118-70
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available on: govinfo.gov,
oversight.house.gov or
docs.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
54-067 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman
Jim Jordan, Ohio Jamie Raskin, Maryland, Ranking
Mike Turner, Ohio Minority Member
Paul Gosar, Arizona Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Columbia
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Gary Palmer, Alabama Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Pete Sessions, Texas Ro Khanna, California
Andy Biggs, Arizona Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Nancy Mace, South Carolina Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Jake LaTurner, Kansas Katie Porter, California
Pat Fallon, Texas Cori Bush, Missouri
Byron Donalds, Florida Jimmy Gomez, California
Kelly Armstrong, North Dakota Shontel Brown, Ohio
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
William Timmons, South Carolina Robert Garcia, California
Tim Burchett, Tennessee Maxwell Frost, Florida
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
Lisa McClain, Michigan Greg Casar, Texas
Lauren Boebert, Colorado Jasmine Crockett, Texas
Russell Fry, South Carolina Dan Goldman, New York
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Chuck Edwards, North Carolina Rashida Tlaib
Nick Langworthy, New York
Eric Burlison, Missouri
------
Mark Marin, Staff Director
Mitchell Benzine, Subcommittee Staff Director
Marie Policastro, Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5074
Miles Lichtman, Minority Staff Director
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
------
Select Subcommittee On The Coronavirus Pandemic
Brad Wenstrup, Ohio, Chairman
Nicole Malliotakis, New York Raul Ruiz, California, Ranking
Mariannette Miller-Meeks, Iowa Minority Member
Debbie Lesko, Arizona Debbie Dingell, Michigan
Michael Cloud, Texas Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
John Joyce, Pennsylvania Deborah Ross, North Carolina
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Robert Garcia, California
Ronny Jackson, Texas Ami Bera, California
Rich Mccormick, Georgia Jill Tokuda, Hawaii
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on October 18, 2023................................. 1
Witnesses
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Gerald W. Parker, Jr., DVM, PhD, Associate Dean for Global One
Health, College of Veterinary Medicine & Biomedical Sciences,
Texas A&M University
Oral Statement................................................... 5
Jaime Yassif, PhD, Vice President, Global Biological Policy and
Programs, Nuclear Threat Initiative
Oral Statement................................................... 7
Written opening statements and the written statements of the
witnesses are available on the U.S. House of Representatives
Document Repository at: docs.house.gov.
Index of Documents
----------
Questions for the record to: Dr. Parker; submitted by Rep.
Wenstrup.
Questions for the record to: Dr. Parker; submitted by Rep.
Miller-Meeks.
Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.
STRENGTHENING BIOSAFETY AND
BIOSECURITY STANDARDS:
PROTECTING AGAINST FUTURE
PANDEMICS
----------
Wednesday, October 18, 2023
House of Representatives
Committee on Oversight and Accountability
Select Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic
Washington, D.C.
The Subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:05 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Brad Wenstrup
(Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding.
Present: Representatives Wenstrup, Comer, Malliotakis,
Miller-Meeks, Lesko, Cloud, Joyce, Jackson, Ruiz, Dingell,
Ross, and Tokuda.
Dr. Wenstrup. Good morning. The Select Subcommittee on the
Coronavirus Pandemic will come to order.
I want to welcome everyone.
I now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening
statement.
And without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at
any time.
Today, the Select Subcommittee is holding a hearing to
examine our country's biosafety and biosecurity standards. We
are not just examining whether they are effective, but whether
they are sufficient and whether they can protect us from
biological threats, both domestically and abroad, and what
actions should be taken if these standards are insufficient or
outdated and need to be modernized. The hearing is timely and
forward looking. On Monday, the public comment period ended on
proposed changes to oversight policies of federally funded,
dual-use research of concern and gain-of-function research of
concern. I have been told no one knows these proposed changes
better than our witness, Dr. Gerry Parker, and we are also
honored to have Dr. Yassif here today for her input.
As we move forward, we want to make sure that our standards
and capabilities can effectively respond and assess risks
related to new research and biotechnologies, including those
capable of unleashing new pandemics. In addition to pandemics,
we must be prepared for a future public health attack,
including the release of a biological weapon. This is necessary
to protect American lives, and because infectious diseases
don't recognize borders, lives of those around the world are in
jeopardy.
In the earliest stages of the pandemic, scientists and
public health authorities raced to understand the novel
coronavirus, to understand how it is spread, who is at risk,
and, most importantly, its origins. Did it come from a natural
spillover transferred from a bad to an intermediate source to
human, or was it the result of a laboratory or research related
accident? In other words, did it come from a lab, and while
there is mounting evidence supporting lab leak theory,
especially within certain agencies, we may never know with a
100-percent certainty the origins of COVID-19, especially when
transparency is being denied.
However, we do know some things for certain. In early 2018,
before COVID-19 emerged, the U.S. State Department had serious
biosafety concerns about the Wuhan Institute of Virology.
Specifically, they warned that there was a serious shortage of
appropriately trained technicians and investigators needed to
safely operate the high-contaminant laboratory, concerns that
continued through 2019 and into 2020. They also warned that the
WIV, Wuhan Institute of Virology, was conducting coronavirus
research under inadequate biosafety levels, using reverse
genetic engineering techniques to hide their work and creating
chimeric coronaviruses to test infectivity to humans. Worse
yet, we now know, the American taxpayer was likely paying for
it, some of it, and we know, based on emails uncovered by this
Subcommittee, that Dr. Fauci himself knew there was gain-of-
function research happening in Wuhan, before the pandemic broke
out.
We know this wouldn't be the first time that a lab leak
occurred. We know that smallpox escaped a laboratory in the
U.K. in 1978. We know that the former Soviet Union accidentally
released anthrax from the military research facility. We know
that two separate lab-related incidents led to the release of
SARS from the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention
in 2004. Finally, we know that the United States isn't immune
to leaks. There have been lab-related accidents involving H1N1,
H5N1, smallpox, tuberculosis, and Zika, some as recently as
2016.
These lab leaks can occur for a multitude of reasons. They
can occur because of mishandled biological materials, escaped
aerosols, laboratory design flaws, or human error, which can be
as simple as failing to correctly wear protective equipment or
accidentally puncturing a glove. Such an accident could easily
have occurred in Fresno County, California, where we know now a
Chinese company operated an illegal laboratory where it
conducted dangerous experiments involving COVID-19 and other
viruses. Inside this lab, authorities found hundreds of mice
that had been genetically modified to catch and carry the
COVID-19 virus.
Troubling, as we already know, these lab-related incidents,
if not contained, can cause predictable, but disastrous
consequences. Desiring more laboratory safety and more
oversight isn't to chill the scientific community from engaging
in research, but to ensure we are taking every precaution
necessary to protect the public from escaped pathogens of which
we cannot control nor fully understand the consequences until
it is too late. It is critically important that these issues be
addressed proactively. Scientists that are conducting their
work safely and with the proper precautions should not have any
concerns about more oversight on bad labs. This oversight
should be welcomed. One bad lab gives a good lab a bad name.
In recent years, there have been significant advancements
in biotechnology or dual-use technology that makes it far
easier to develop and genetically engineer dangerous viruses,
advancements that could make a genetically altered virus
indistinguishable from a naturally occurring virus. This is one
reason increased oversight into the experiments being conducted
and the viral holding of labs is vital to preventing another
pandemic. There has also been a proliferation of high
contaminant labs throughout the world. Left unchecked, this
makes it conceivable, if not probable, that another pandemic
could occur in the future because of a lab related incident.
This is a matter of public health and a matter of national
security that requires interagency coordination and
international cooperation.
We are holding this hearing today to look at our current
standards and circumstances to help prepare for a future
pandemic or maybe prevent one, to determine what went wrong and
to recommend how to do it better in the future. That is our
goal. I look forward to a strong on topic discussion today, and
I would now like to recognize Ranking Member Ruiz for the
purpose of making an opening statement.
Dr. Ruiz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Today's hearing is on a
topic of critical importance to our national security and our
public health. The fact is we don't know when the next pandemic
will strike, and in order for us to truly be prepared, we must
devote the time and resources now to strengthening our
biosafety and biosecurity so that we can ensure the health
security of Americans all across the country. While the path to
a bio secure future lies ahead, I hope that during today's
hearing, we can identify workable, forward-looking solutions
that the minority has long called for to not only bolster
pandemic preparedness, but also foster innovation and ensure
our country's global competitiveness. At the center of these
solutions must be a whole-of-government approach that
prioritizes the American people's health and safety.
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, our Nation has taken
important steps forward in advancing this approach with
targeted investments in pandemic prevention, refined policies
to promote biological risk management, and informed
recommendations to improve overall biosafety and biosecurity.
In fact, last year's Consolidated Appropriations Act included
robust funding for the Biomedical Advanced Research and
Development Authority to develop countermeasures in response to
public health emergencies and biological threats. At the behest
of congressional Democrats, the Consolidated Appropriations Act
also worked to address public health threats in biomedical
research and improve oversight of research involving select
agents.
Compounding this work are the National Science Advisory
Board for Biosecurity's recommendations to strengthen existing
oversight of research that raises biosafety and biosecurity
concerns. Released this March after Secretary Becerra tasked
the NSABB to evaluate our Nation's biosecurity and biosafety
frameworks, these recommendations demonstrate a sound start for
enhanced biosafety and biosecurity standards here in the United
States. These are all promising steps forward, and I look
forward to discussing them in more detail here today.
However, it is important to note that our work to enhance
biosafety and biosecurity cannot and should not end here. Risks
to our national security do not end within our borders, and
with every step we take to bolster lab safety and security at
home, we must do so with an eye toward strengthening biosafety
and biosecurity on a global scale as well. That is why I was
glad to see President Biden's executive order focused on
growing our own, take action to promote biosafety best
practices abroad as well. Right now, a patchwork of lab safety
standards and guidance may guide nations in their pursuit to
bolster their own biosafety and biosecurity. However, we as an
international community are without a consistent set of
standards that we can all work together toward to reduce the
threat of biological incidents.
There is no simple solution to how we can achieve this
goal, and every day, emerging technologies further complicate
our work. However, if we remain united around our common goal
of protecting the health and safety of our communities,
fortifying our bio-defense, and enhancing pandemic
preparedness, I know that we can get there. We have the
distinct opportunity right now to make a positive change with
constructive policy that improves people's lives and prevents a
future disaster. I hope that today's discussion moves us closer
to that vision that bolsters biosafety, enhances biosecurity,
and, in turn, fortifies our national health security for
generations to come. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Our witnesses today are Dr. Gerry
Parker. Dr. Parker is the associate dean for Global One Health
at the School of Veterinary Medicine & Biomedical Sciences, and
director of Pandemic Preparedness and Biosecurity Policy
Program at the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs
within the Bush School of Government and Public Service at
Texas A&M University. It is quite a business card you have got.
Dr. Parker's service includes more than 26 years on active
duty leading military medical research and development programs
and organizations. He is a former commander and deputy
commander, United States Army Medical Research Institute of
Infectious Diseases. After his military career, Dr. Parker held
senior executive-level positions at the Department of Homeland
Security, Department of Health and Human Services, and the
Department of Defense. This includes serving as the Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Preparedness and Response at
HHS, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and
Biological Defense at DOD.
Dr. Parker is a member of several advisory boards,
including the Bipartisan Commission for Biodefense. Dr. Parker
also temporarily served as senior advisor to the Assistant
Secretary for Preparedness and Response at the Department of
Health and Human Services from August 2020 to February 2021,
during the COVID-19 response.
Dr. Jaime Yassif: Dr. Yassif currently serves as NTI Vice
President for Global Biological Policy and Programs, where she
oversees the organization's work to reduce catastrophic
biological risks, strengthen biosecurity and pandemic
preparedness, and drive progress in advancing global health
security. Dr. Yassif previously served as a program officer at
Open Philanthropy where she led the biosecurity and pandemic
preparedness initiative. Dr. Yassif has also served as a
science and technology policy adviser at the U.S. Department of
Defense and worked on the global health security agenda at the
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Dr. Yassif holds
a biophysics Ph.D. from UC Berkeley, an M.A. in science and
security from the King's College London War Studies Department,
and a B.A. in Biology from Swarthmore College.
I want to thank you both for being here today. Obviously, a
lot of great expertise with us.
Pursuant to Committee on Oversight and Accountability Rule
9(g), the witnesses will please stand and raise their right
hands.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you
are about to give is the truth, the whole truth and nothing but
the truth, so help you God?
[A chorus of ayes.]
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Let the record show that the
witnesses answered in the affirmative. The Select Subcommittee
certainly appreciates you being here today, and we look forward
to your testimony.
Let me remind the witnesses that we have read your written
statement, and it will appear in full in the hearing record.
Please limit your oral statement to 5 minutes. As a reminder,
please press the button on the microphone in front of you so
that it is on and Members can hear you. When you begin to
speak, the light in front of you will turn green. After 4
minutes the light will turn yellow. When the red light comes
on, your 5 minutes has expired, and we would ask you to please
wrap up.
And I now recognize Dr. Parker to give an opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF GERALD W. PARKER, JR., DVM, PHD
ASSOCIATE DEAN FOR GLOBAL ONE HEALTH
COLLEGE OF VETERINARY MEDICINE &
BIOMEDICAL SCIENCES
TEXAS A&M UNIVERSITY
Dr. Parker. Chair Wenstrup, Ranking Member Ruiz, and
Members of the Select Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify as you consider biosafety and
biosecurity threats to our Nation and the world. My career has
spanned from the bench to executive leadership positions in
biodefense, health security, and pandemic preparedness,
including as a commander of a high-containment lab at Fort
Detrick. The views I offer today are my own and not
representative of past or current organizational affiliations,
employers, or advisory boards.
A high-containment lab consisting of Biosafety Levels 3 and
4 requires the highest level of containment to protect workers
and public safety. Within these labs, highly trained workers
and scientists are conducting infectious disease research and
working with hazardous pathogens that are essential for
biodefense, national security, and public health preparedness.
These labs require a highly skilled work force and detailed
attention to operations and sustainment. Still, lab accidents
happen, and they happen more often than you think. Most are
quickly mitigated and contained, but some are more serious.
I am more concerned about the readily available, dual-use
technologies and the global expansion of high-containment labs.
Lab accidents and misuse are more likely to occur where there
is a lack of institutional norms. This is why it is imperative
for a modernized, harmonized domestic and international
framework to ensure a skilled work force and institutional
norms needed to operate these facilities. Because the United
States is viewed as a model for biosafety and biosecurity, it
will be necessary to make reforms at home to make the biggest
difference worldwide. Congress is an essential partner in this
mission, which will require funding oversight and, in some
cases, legislative authorities.
In my written testimony, I outline the history of U.S.
biosafety and biosecurity, which describes how our fragmented
oversight framework came to be. Today, my intent is to help the
Committee as you look for a path forward. I will discuss five
recommendations for your consideration.
First, the single most important thing Congress and the
Federal agencies can do is to harmonize biosafety and
biosecurity standards and norms domestically and
internationally. Congress should direct the Administration to
commission a top-to-bottom holistic review of the entire
biorisk management framework. The goal will be to harmonize
oversight while minimizing unnecessary and unproductive burdens
on the research institutions. This is long overdue and is
needed to address growing and unproductive compliance
challenges caused simply by the fragmentation of the current
system. For example, there is no single authority for biosafety
or biosecurity oversight at the Federal level, and this
actually is increasing risk.
Second, the vast majority of infectious disease research is
safe when done in compliance with the existing guidelines, but
the exceedingly small subset of especially dangerous research
has the potential to trigger an unnatural epidemic or a
pandemic. We need to incentivize safer alternatives to reduce
or eliminate the need to generate especially dangerous
pathogens by the few scientists and institutions engaged in
this kind of basic research. Congress should act to ensure that
the Administration adopts, implements, and they revise policy
to responsibly govern especially dangerous enhanced pathogen
research. Third, Congress should authorize and fund an
independent biosafety and biosecurity oversight authority,
analogous to the FAA's oversight over air transportation. It is
imperative that this oversight authority be nimble and able to
keep up with the rapidly evolving life science advances.
Fourth, due to the potential for unnatural epidemics or
pandemics resulting from accidents or misuse, particularly in
countries that lacks strong institutional values and norms, we
all should be concerned about the expansion of high-containment
labs and readily available to use technologies worldwide. This
requires a recommitment to international diplomacy. Congress
should direct the State Department to elevate international
biosafety and biosecurity harmonization as a diplomatic
priority. All member-states must assume their responsibility
and accountability for effective oversight. Fifth, as the GAO
has repeatedly pointed out, there is a need for the
Administration to develop a national strategy for high-
containment labs so we can optimize use, establish a better
system for sharing lessons learned, best practices, and
increase collaboration.
In conclusion, the U.S. Government must recommit to working
with international partners. The goal is to harmonize
international standards and norms. This is essential for worker
safety and public safety. The public deserves transparency to
have confidence that these important systems work. I look
forward to answering your questions. Thank you.
Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Dr. Yassif to give an opening
statement, please.
STATEMENT OF JAIME YASSIF, PHD
VICE PRESIDENT
GLOBAL BIOLOGICAL POLICY AND PROGRAMS
NUCLEAR THREAT INITIATIVE
Dr. Yassif. Chairman Wenstrup, Ranking Member Ruiz, and
other Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to join today's hearing to share my perspective on
strengthening biosafety and biosecurity standards. I serve as
Vice President for Global Biological Policy and Programs at
NTI, which is a nonprofit, nonpartisan global security
organization focused on reducing nuclear and biological threats
imperiling humanity.
We are in the midst of a 21st century bioscience and
biotechnology revolution. New technologies create tremendous
opportunities to benefit society, but these same advances also
pose significant risks, namely that the tools of modern
bioscience and biotechnology could be deliberately exploited by
malicious actors or accidentally misused, which could lead to
the next global biological catastrophe.
The world has seen the devastating effects of the COVID
pandemic, and the next pandemic could be as damaging or
potentially much worse. As discussions continue to swirl about
COVID origins, the evidence as to whether it emerged naturally
or resulted from an accident is still inconclusive. We cannot
say with confidence what the origins of COVID are, but the fact
that it is even plausible that so much disruption could have
been caused by a possible lab accident is a big blinking red
light. It signals the urgent need to strengthen biosafety and
biosecurity. To protect the U.S. population here at home and
save lives globally, it is in our interest to take an
international approach to bolstering biosafety and biosecurity.
That is because infectious diseases, no matter their origin, do
not respect borders.
Unfortunately, biosafety and biosecurity are very weak
globally. For example, according to the Global Health Security
Index, only 6 percent of countries have national-level
oversight measures for dual-use bioscience research.
Furthermore, there is currently no international entity that
has its primary mission dedicated to reducing emerging
biological risks associated with rapid technology advances.
To address these gaps, I am very pleased that the Biden
Administration has taken a number of steps to bolster biosafety
and biosecurity, both domestically and internationally. Just
last week, the Administration released updated guidance for DNA
synthesis screening, which provides helpful improvements over
the original 2010 guidance. Another promising development is a
2023 report from the National Science Advisory Board for
Biosecurity. Huge congratulations are due to my colleague, Dr.
Gerry Parker, and his colleagues for producing such a forward-
leaning set of recommendations for bolstering U.S. Government
oversight of dual-use bioscience research. Now, it will fall to
the Administration and Congress to find practical, effective
ways to implement these recommendations.
Additionally, the White House's 2022 National Biodefense
Strategy notes the importance of raising the global bar for
biosafety and biosecurity norms and practices. The plan is
focused on preventing global biological catastrophe through
such efforts and is crucial. The executive order on the
American bioeconomy sets up a requirement to launch a biosafety
and biosecurity innovation initiative, and it calls for
investments in applied biosafety research and biosecurity
innovation to reduce biological risks throughout the biotech
R&D and biomanufacturing lifecycles.
And yet, even with all the efforts that I have described,
most of the work lies ahead. The U.S. Government can take
several concrete actions to advance critical biosafety and
biosecurity goals going forward: One, make dedicated financial
investments to bolstering biosafety and biosecurity,
specifically by dedicating 2 to 4 percent of investments in
pandemic preparedness research and development to support
innovation in biosafety and biosecurity; two, establish an
office within the U.S. Government to lead and serve as an
innovation hub to build biosecurity and biosafety into life
science research, biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and awards;
three, establish a legal requirement to screen DNA synthesis
orders coupled with incentives to make implementation
achievable. The recent guidance from the Biden Administration
on DNA synthesis screening is a good first step, but
establishing this as a legal requirement will also be
important; four, implement key elements of U.S. biosecurity
strategy documents. The U.S. Government has set a number of
ambitious goals for itself, now is the time to implement these
plans; five, and finally, provide political and diplomatic
support for the International Biosecurity and Biosafety
Initiative for Science or IBBIS. NTI has been working to
establish this new independent international organization,
which we are planning to launch soon. IBBIS' mission will be to
work collaboratively with global partners to strengthen
biosecurity norms and develop practical innovative tools to
uphold them.
Bolstering biosafety and biosecurity is extremely important
work, and it is urgent. If the U.S. Government can achieve the
biosafety and biosecurity goals it has set for itself and work
with partners in industry and civil society to further advance
these goals, it will be a big win for reducing biological risks
domestically and around the world. If not, the risk of facing
another pandemic on the scale of COVID-19 or larger will grow
with even higher stakes as biological threats increase over
time.
Chairman Wenstrup, Ranking Member Ruiz, and other Members
of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify
today. I look forward to answering your questions.
Dr. Wenstrup. Well, thank you both very much. I now
recognize myself for questions, and I agree with both of you.
To start off, it is important that our focus be forward
looking, and as you know, many of our current biosafety and
biosecurity policies and regulations, may have been enacted in
response to specific events. For instance, the Federal Select
Agent Program was effectively created in response to improper
orders of plague strains by an unauthorized individual and was
subsequently bolstered in response to the 2001 anthrax letter
attacks.
I heard both of you saying some of the things Congress can
do, and it is appreciated. You talked about investments and
investments into what--you have got specifics; I appreciate
that as well--and the role of oversight, and role of State
Department internationally should be well defined. I think that
is something that we can try to do and recommend.
Internationally, I do take concern when I look at an
organization like the World Health Organization, which I would
like to see it be more independent, aside from the United
Nations, which is full of political realm, but may be separate
from that and not be under the influence of its members that
have a political agenda, and I don't think I need to go into
much detail on that. The question is, if we can establish an
international organization, what do you recommend as far as how
we enforce biosafety and biosecurity? And I am going to ask
both of you that question, your opinions on that, as you both
have dealt internationally many times.
Dr. Parker. Yes, I think the question of enforcement is
really the hard one, and I guess that is why my recommendation,
first and foremost, is focused on recommitment to diplomacy.
And there are some actually good efforts already underway and
the State Department working with the G7 countries and USDA is
part of that, but it is a small effort to try to just encourage
collaboration on harmonization of high-containment standards
and norms and work with infectious agents, but it just needs to
be elevated as a secretarial priority and resourced
appropriately.
But I think for those diplomatic negotiations and
collaborations, I think some additional ideas will come out of
those conversations and through diplomacy about how to better
strengthen the World Health Organization so it can be less
dependent upon regional offices than member-states within the
regional office because the director general does need some
support. But there are other ideas, too, that could be
considered that I think would come out of those diplomatic
conversations.
But first and foremost, member-states, all of us, United
States, all member-states of the WHO or the United Nations, we
all have a responsibility to make sure that we have the
appropriate guidelines, laws, regulations in our own countries.
And so how do we encourage all member-states to make sure that
they do what they need to do and assume their responsibility
and accountability to make sure their institutions have the
right norms, ethical values, they are operating high-
containment labs, they have to have the appropriate skilled
work force, funding, and so forth to do so, so the
international community can have better confidence in these
labs.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Dr. Yassif?
Dr. Yassif. Thank you. I think the question of how to
strengthen global approaches to biosafety and biosecurity
through stronger international institutions is really
important, and I agree with Gerry that the enforcement part is
going to be really challenging. And before we can even envision
that possible future, we need to do a lot of groundwork to lay
a foundation, have a shared understanding globally of what the
rules of the road are, and what are the best practices for
biosafety and biosecurity that we would like to see that can
meaningfully reduce risks. And I think that is going to take a
lot of work. One of the efforts that we are really focused on
through IBBIS is to help to build that foundation. We envision
that IBBIS will serve as a resource to help countries as well
as members in the private sector, in industry and academia and
civil society to sort of share and develop best practices, so
we can raise the bar both domestically and internationally.
I would say that nations have an enlightened self-interest
in advancing biosecurity and biosafety. No one wants to see a
lab leak or some sort of catastrophic event from within their
borders, and I think that we can enhance that through
transparency and accountability of implementing best practices
in biosafety and biosecurity. That is why we track those kinds
of provisions through our global health security index that I
mentioned during my testimony. And I think nations should be
accountable to each other for upholding biosafety and
biosecurity standards, and by tracking, that we can support
that.
And the last thing I will say is, WHO is one place that can
carry out this work, the BWC is another piece of it. And they
both are international institutions that have credibility
internationally, and it will be important to have them at the
table to continue to advance this work. But I do think that
other complementary institutions, like IBBIS, can support that
work, and take on some of the tasks of innovation, and taking
risk and developing best practices that may be harder for some
of the U.N.-based institutions to do. And I think together, we
can really drive progress.
Dr. Wenstrup. Yes. I mean, I am hoping that maybe here in
the United States, we can set the gold standard with high level
of expectations and be the example for others. And it just
seems to me that if a certain nation is not cooperating, then
we point that out to the world, and they no longer are part of
the international organization. Just a thought going forward.
I do have a question because we talked a lot about dual-use
research and into dual-use, and I am just curious. What
positives have come out of dual-use research in the last decade
or so, and maybe more specifically, to gain-of-function or
creation of chimeras, what positives have come out of that type
of research?
Dr. Parker. Well, by definition, let me just take the dual-
use part of that question first. So dual-use, I would say by
far that most dual-use is good and bad. And so most of our life
science, scientific advances in biotechnology and biomedicine,
by far the vast majority of those advancing technologies are
improving our way of life, our health, our well-being, our
economy, our agriculture. So these are important technologies
that we need to continue to innovate and foster. But there is
another side to that dual use and that is the bad, and so how
do we mitigate the misuse of the potential of these advancing
technologies and somebody who wants to do harm?
Dr. Wenstrup. But, again, I guess what I am asking
specifically, if you look at what has taken place is, one,
obviously potential for bioweapon, right? And let's not kid
ourselves on that. So what are the positives? If you are
advancing research that can lead to a bioweapon, are we
advancing research that also can lead to something good? What
is that good?
Dr. Parker. Well, I don't think the intent of most of the
life sciences are to develop and advancing technology that is
going to be misused. I think our issue is how do we control and
mitigate the misuse of it. And almost anything that we have
throughout humankind, somebody has figured out how to misuse
technology that we develop. And I think you really kind of get
into the enhanced dual use, especially dangerous gain-of-
function research is what you are really getting at, and what
benefits have come out of that research.
And I think we have to be realistic about those benefits,
and I think we have to be realistic about what those benefits
are. And I can see where there is possibly a need for basic
science, knowledge advancement with some of this research. I am
not going to negate that that could be useful, but I think we
have to be very careful and not exaggerating the benefits of
that type of research. And so I am not going to prejudge that
somebody may come with a good idea that there may be a need to
engage in a dual use, especially dangerous, enhanced pathogen
research that might advance our basic science knowledge if it
is good for public health too, but that is why we need to have
additional oversight of that. And actually, we need to be
incentivizing safer alternatives because many believe that
safer alternatives can be used for answering the basic science
questions for most of these proposed research proposals.
So we need to really incentivize safer alternatives. And if
one is justified, I mean, really justified, and the risks are
mitigated, and there is verification that there is no safer
alternatives, and there is public transparency, then it just
needs to be reviewed, and there is nothing wrong with having a
review. And so I think a lot of folks don't like the extra
review.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. Dr. Yassif, do you have anything
to add to that?
Dr. Yassif. Yes, I largely agree with my colleague. I think
our colleagues in the molecular biology and virology community
would share that, for example, gain-of-function research and
their view is important for advancing public health and
development of medical countermeasures. But I agree that we do
have to, on the balance, consider that with downside risks of
accidental or deliberate misuse. That is a really serious set
of considerations we need to balance in figuring out how to do
that as we improve our oversight practices to figure out what
kind of research should go forward and what kind of research
perhaps should not because the cost-benefit calculation doesn't
make sense.
I think that there is more work to be done to figure out
how to thread the needle there, and it is a really hard
question. So some of the work that the Administration is doing
to revise oversight and to revise review processes for funding
decisions is going to have to figure out how to do this well,
and I think that is where we really need to focus our efforts
at the moment.
Dr. Wenstrup. Thank you. I appreciate the feedback from
both of you. Dr. Ruiz?
Dr. Ruiz. Thank you. Bolstering international biosafety is
at the heart of our efforts to prevent future pandemics. And
currently, the existing framework for ensuring that research
across the globe occurs safely relies on a patchwork of non-
enforceable standards and guidance, including the World Health
Organization's laboratory biosafety manual. Beyond these
international guidance documents, it is incumbent upon each
nation to enact its own policies and standards to promote
biosafety. Dr. Yassif, what shortcomings exist within this
current international biosafety framework?
Dr. Yassif. Thank you. Yes, the international biosafety
framework is primarily, as you have noted, in the form of
guidelines and not regulations, and so it is not enforceable.
Another challenge is that it is very high level and not
necessarily as specific as some of the U.S. biosafety
guidelines in particular. I think that there is more work that
can be done both in the United States to improve our own
biosafety guidelines as well as to improve biosafety guidelines
and practices and regulations internationally so that we can
really more effectively safeguard this research.
Dr. Ruiz. OK. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, renewed
attention has been paid to ensuring that research to advance
our understanding of dangerous pathogens is done safely across
the globe, including by tightening standards for lab
operations. Dr. Yassif, what measures have the United States
and other nations taken to bolster lab safety standards, and
how can these policies serve as a blueprint for the types of
biosafety reforms we would like to see implemented at the
international level?
Dr. Yassif. Sure. So we have a patchwork of biosafety
guidelines and regulations here in the United States, includes
the recombinant DNA guidelines for recombinant molecular
genetics work in labs that work with NIH funding. We have got
the Federal Select Agent Program, and then we have got the
biosafety in microbiological and biomedical laboratories
guidelines, and so this is a patchwork. It is not
comprehensive, but it is a lot better than some of the other
systems that we see overseas that are considerably weaker.
Some of these features are not perfect, but they could be
emulated internationally. So, for example, our system here in
United States of biosafety oversight committee review within
universities is a really valuable tool that we could replicate
overseas. Some of the regulations we have in the United States,
like the Federal Select Agent Program, are not perfect and
could be made more comprehensive, but it could be the beginning
of a blueprint for efforts overseas.
I think one of the challenges, though, is that the sort of
personnel training and the resources and the lab infrastructure
internationally is not necessarily to the same standard that we
have in the U.S. So we would have to make an investment in
terms of capacity building, and partnership to really help
raise the bar internationally, the level we would like to see.
And so we really need to put our money where our mouth is if we
really want to drive progress there, and I think we are also
hoping that IBBIS can help with some of this work.
Dr. Ruiz. OK. And so what precautions can be taken to
ensure that bolstering lab safety is appropriately balanced
with continued scientific advancement, including in the realm
of pandemic preparedness? And I will ask you that question too,
Dr. Parker. Dr. Yassif?
Dr. Yassif. Sure. I think we can certainly continue with
our work domestically and internationally to invest in pandemic
preparedness research and development. That is critical. But as
we see the global spread of research into these areas and the
global spread of high-containment labs, we have to ensure that
it is done in a safe and secure environment. We have to make
investments to make sure that the labs, the high-containment
labs where this work is being conducted, have appropriate
biosafety provisions in place and biosecurity provisions in
place. As I have noted in my written and oral testimony,
biosafety and biosecurity are very weak globally, so we have a
lot of work to do if we are really going to safeguard this work
and make sure it is done safely and responsibly.
Dr. Ruiz. Yes. Dr. Parker?
Dr. Parker. Sure. I think the most important thing to do, I
think, internationally is how do we make sure and support
institutional norms, even a broader institution, that may host
a high-containment lab within their university. It is the
institutional norms. I think the guidance and regulations will
come. We got to do that, but if we don't have strong
institutional norms that understand the need for having a
skilled work force that need the funding and resources for
operations and maintenance, and sustaining these laboratories
are extremely complex. And I am a former commander of a high-
containment lab, and I know how complex they are and the
detailed attention that you have to do there. And so not all
countries share our view of what that means to have strong
institutional norms, and that would extend and the need for
resources----
Dr. Ruiz. Would a international school of lab safety and
biosecurity practices in the United States help with that?
Dr. Parker. I am sorry. I didn't----
Dr. Ruiz. An international school of biosafety in the U.S.
with certain institutions that brings in personnel from other
labs to come and get trained here on biosafety, would that be
helpful?
Dr. Parker. That would be helpful, but I also think about
it as trainings is necessary, but not sufficient. So
educational is important, too, and it is, like, ongoing.
Dr. Ruiz. You also need the equipment.
Dr. Parker. There is an organization called ABSA
International. That is the Professional Society for Biosafety,
Scientists and Professionals. And ABSA actually had a great
idea several years ago, third-party accreditation for high-
containment labs. And that would be analogous----
Dr. Ruiz. What role does gain-of-function research play in
pandemic preparedness research, if anything?
Dr. Parker. Yes. First let's make sure that we are using
the right terminology because ``gain of function'' is a very,
very confusing term.
Dr. Ruiz. Yes. Let's clarify.
Dr. Parker. And, well, it is not codified.
Dr. Ruiz. I said let's clarify.
Dr. Parker. Oh, clarify it. OK. Clarify it. OK. So gain of
function is a common experimental procedure used in biomedical
research and biotechnology, so it is fairly common, but there
are guidelines. The NIH guidelines are appropriate, but there
is then in the vast majority of it, as long as it is done under
the appropriate guidelines, can be done safely with appropriate
institutional oversight, too, at the laboratory level. But
there is this exceedingly small--I think it is exceedingly
small--area of gain-of-function research of concern. I actually
call it especially dangerous enhanced pathogen research that we
have to have more oversight of.
But the first, I would say, the normal research procedures
using the relatively safe gain of function, that is just part
of our biomedical research enterprise, and it has been
important for our biodefense and pandemic preparedness. I don't
believe, my opinion, that the especially dangerous enhanced
pathogen research has contributed significantly to pandemic
preparedness. And remember, I was a previous executive leader
at ASPR, and some of those studies came out did not affect any
of our vaccine development decisions.
Dr. Ruiz. Got it. Thank you. So beyond building on the
guidance and standards promulgated by the WHO and other
international institutions, we must also dedicate time and
energy to cultivating a shared culture of collaboration on best
practices for safe research. As a leader in the global health
community, the United States has a key role to play here. So
Dr. Yassif, what steps can be taken to promote a culture of
shared norms that prioritizes research and lab safety? And
also, what role does Congress have in paving the way for
stronger international biosafety cultures?
Dr. Yassif. Thank you. So, I mean, I think we are all in
agreement that having stronger norms and best practices for
biosafety and biosecurity is critical, and we have to figure
out how to do it well. And we see a gap in the international
system in terms of the structures in place that aren't really
prioritizing this as their top mission, and that is why we are
working with international partners to establish IBBIS. We
really believe that IBBIS can help contribute to this. We think
that IBBIS will play a role in serving as a resource to
institutions and countries around the world that are looking to
get assistance with having more effective biosecurity
provisions and biosafety as well in places where, working
alongside organizations like ABSA, so I think that that is
critical.
What the U.S. Government can do to support that work is to
diplomatically and politically support IBBIS so that we can
build more political support in countries around the world to
really have IBBIS have a prominent position. I do think that
IBBIS, even though it is going to be a non-governmental
organization, can help advance U.S. goals on biosafety and
biosecurity and raise the bar globally. And so for that reason,
I think it is important.
The role of Congress, in particular, I think is funding.
There are a lot of initiatives that have been set forth in the
various strategy documents that I outlined in my testimony
that, I think, are really promising initiatives for supporting
research and innovation in biosecurity and biosafety. There are
certain things that we know that we need to do, but with rapid
advances in science and technology, we have to continue to
innovate and stay ahead of the curve. The emerging risks are
constantly moving the goalposts, so we need to invest in
innovation in biosecurity and biosafety. This will help
domestically but also internationally.
Dr. Ruiz. Thank you. And so now that we have turned the
page on the darkest days of the pandemic, we have an obligation
to enact forward-looking policy solutions to reduce the
likelihood of future deadly novel airborne viruses. And I look
forward to building on the progress that the Biden
Administration and congressional Democrats have made, and do so
in a strong bipartisan way to bolster biosafety and prevent
future pandemics. And I yield back.
Dr. Wenstrup. I now recognize Ms. Malliotakis from New York
for 5 minutes of question.
Ms. Malliotakis. Thank you very much, and I appreciate this
discussion. I think it is really important to safeguard our
future.
The U.S. biosecurity rules don't apply overseas, as has
been mentioned here, yet Federal money went to the Wuhan
Institute of Virology. And we know now that they had inadequate
training. They had subpar conditions. The FBI and Department of
Energy testimony here in this Committee as well point to the
fact that COVID came from the lab. So my question is really
regarding we have no centralized oversight or standards. There
is not enough risk assessment. There needs to be a set of
standards that are meant to receive U.S. tax dollars, in my
opinion. We saw what happened with money going either directly
to WIV or through EcoHealth Alliance. So should we stop Federal
grants from being sent to foreign subrecipients like it did
through EcoHealth, particularly if they don't have biosecurity
rules that are comparable to ours?
Dr. Parker. Is that for me?
Ms. Malliotakis. Whoever would like to answer.
Dr. Parker. First, I would just point out, the National
Science Advisory Board report of March 2023 actually has a
recommendation regarding international funding and the need--
essentially, I will summarize it--if international-funded
research should comply with the same standards that we have in
the United States. That essentially summarizes one of the
recommendations in that report.
Ms. Malliotakis. What is the best way to determine that if
they are, if they aren't?
Dr. Parker. Well, you need to have oversight. I can just
give an example. I don't know if this is an example, but what I
used to do when I was the commander of a high-containment lab.
This is 20 years ago, and we did not fund international
research, but we funded domestic research. Most of our research
was done intramurally, but we had some extramural contracts.
But we would always have a site visit from one of our own
biosafety officers, government biosafety officer, to provide a
detailed inspection and then further onsite visits later on,
but that is just what I did 20 years ago when I was commander
at USAMRIID.
Ms. Malliotakis. And, Doctor, I would like to give you an
opportunity to also respond.
Dr. Yassif. Thank you. I mean, I think the main thing I
will say is I do think we should be conducting more effective
biosafety and biosecurity pre-funding review to make sure that
any grantee, domestically or internationally, is in compliance
with our standards. I think that makes sense.
Ms. Malliotakis. Should we just not allow foreign grant
subrecipients? If one entity here in the United States gets a
grant, is it appropriate for them to then move that money over
to a facility overseas?
Dr. Parker. Well, subcontracting is pretty normal in
Federal acquisitions, whether it be life science research or
other lines of research. So subcontracting is fairly common and
often needed to get the right expertise to the right location
you need to do whatever work may be done. But we need to make
sure that whatever Federal acquisition regulation requirements
flow down to the subcontractor and the subcontractor is
complying with those requirements.
Ms. Malliotakis. OK. Alright. Thank you very much for your
time.
Chairman Comer [presiding]. The Chair now recognizes Mrs.
Dingell from Michigan for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you to the
witnesses for what I believe is excellent testimony and
balanced, and gives us guidance on how to work together in a
very bipartisan way or nonpartisan way, a way that protects
research globally to help people. I am going to build on the
discussion we are just having that we continually hear, have
heard over this hearing, but in other places, is the importance
of enhanced biosafety and biosecurity and what they are to the
future of pandemic preparedness.
Now, I do want to say to my colleague, it has never been
where the original COVID came from. It has not been established
that it leaked from the Wuhan laboratory. I think everybody's
got their own theories, but I don't want the facts that aren't
true to be on the record either, but it is very clear that
international labs are not meeting the kind of standards that
they should be meeting. And as our witness said, that there is
a scientific report out in March that recommends that
international standards be the same as our standards.
But it is a fact that bears repeating, we will not be
prepared to face the next pandemic if we don't start doing the
work now to fortify our biodefense with meaningful biosafety
and biosecurity reforms. And to do so effectively, we must take
a lessons-learned approach to pandemic preparedness and
prevention. So I would like to urge my colleagues on all sides
that we must meet the urgency of this moment in the policy
issues we are attacking. I will give you an example of
something we should be doing. Attempts to reauthorize critical
legislation, such as the Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness
Act, in other words known as PAHPA, currently is falling short
of applying the lessons we have learned from the COVID-19
pandemic to improve national health security and biodefense
capabilities.
On top of that, we are letting the legislation expire at
the end of September, and I wish Republicans unfortunately, no,
I don't mean that. That didn't come out right. Republicans have
control right now, so we got to work together. I didn't mean
that, Ronny, to come out that way, but we are not making the
investments needed to actually advance biosafety and
biosecurity, two causes that we talked about today and I know
that my colleagues care about. In fact, the current Republican
PAHPA proposal would reduce funding for state and local public
health emergency preparedness grants down to pre-pandemic
levels. That is a $50 million cut from current appropriation
levels, which would ultimately hamstring the ability of state,
local, and territorial public health departments to respond to
public health threats, including biological, chemical, nuclear,
and radiological events.
So, Dr. Yassif, let me ask you this. What role do state and
local public health responses to public health threats, like
the ones I just mentioned, play in biosafety and biosecurity at
a national level?
Dr. Yassif. Thank you. If we are really going to have an
effective layer defense against pandemic risks to the American
public and to the global population, we need to both have
stronger biosafety and biosecurity to prevent those events from
happening in the first place, but we also have to have
effective capabilities to detect and respond quickly. And in
addition to Federal capabilities, state and local public health
capabilities are critical, and we do have to resource them at
the level that is necessary, so they can perform their role.
The COVID pandemic showed that we were woefully
underprepared and unprepared to respond, and I am hoping that
we can, as you say, learn the lesson from that and build the
capacity that we need because when the next pandemic inevitably
arises, we need to be ready.
Mrs. Dingell. I am going to submit questions for the
record, too, but yes or no, would you say we are prepared for
the next one?
Dr. Yassif. No.
Mrs. Dingell. Thank you. Dr. Parker, what policies should
Congress consider to fortify our biodefense capabilities from
the local all the way to the Federal level?
Dr. Parker. I think the more that we can emphasize the need
to provide the right tools to our local and state colleagues,
whether that is public health, emergency management, the
private sector, NGO's, all disasters, including pandemics hit
multifocal areas around the country at different times and
different severity, so the more that we can do to encourage and
have our policies emphasize the support, that will support our
state and local.
Just as an example, PAHPA, and I am really glad you brought
up PAHPA reauthorization. To my view, that is essential, and
you might see in my testimony of last June, for that hearing
last June, I did talk about the need for supporting. The tools
that ASPR needs are really the tools that our state and local
community needs. The tools you may be thinking about for CDC
are really the tools that need to be at the state and local
communities, again, whether that is public health or emergency
management. So just that philosophy on supporting the local and
state authorities and citizens is really would be very helpful
as we think about policies emanating from Washington, DC.
Mrs. Dingell. Thank you. I have more questions for the
record. I am assuming you would say we are not prepared now,
too.
Dr. Parker. We are not prepared.
Mrs. Dingell. And I really do want to work with my
Republican colleagues because I think this is something we
really can agree on, and if we came out of this Committee with
just that, it would really be good for our country. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Comer.[Presiding.] The Chair now recognizes Dr.
Miller-Meeks from Iowa for 5 minutes.
Dr. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Chair Comer. And I also thank
Chair of this Select Subcommittee, Brad Wenstrup, for holding
this hearing, and our witnesses for appearing here. I also want
to say thank you very much for your support for local public
health and your comments on local public health.
As the former director of the Iowa Department of Public
Health, I was one of the very few people in my first year in
Congress during the pandemic in 2021 that talked about the
COVID funding that was being put across. Only one-half of 1
percent of all of that $1.9 trillion went to noncompetitive
grants to local public health. And as we know, the CDC went
from the CDC to the CDC&P, the Centers for Disease Control to
the Centers for Disease Control & Prevention, and more and more
of the funding has gone into other health entities rather than
to infectious diseases. And so as this relates to both
biodefense and our preparation for the next pandemic, I think
it is important.
One of the things I have also talked about repetitively and
why I was pleased that this Select Subcommittee was continued
into this Congress was one of the rationale in my mind for
knowing the origins of COVID-19, and continuing to investigate
that and determine that. And I think it is unlikely now, with
evidence having been destroyed, we will. But the reason for
that is, internationally, all communities, all countries have
vested interest in bio lab safety. We know that there was bio
lab 4 research being done in a biosafety lab, too, so we have a
vested interest in putting out those standards for biosafety
labs. No. 2, disclosure. We have requirements for disclosure.
They were not followed, and so there is an immediate
disclosure, 24 hours, if you think that there is a virus or
bacteria that could lead to a pandemic. So we have a vested
interest in making sure that that is followed by all countries,
and our international community needs to be part of that.
And then three, the ethics of what research is being done,
whether or not gain-of-function research should be done. We had
a temporary prohibition on funding that in the United States,
and then that was waived. But too often I found in medicine
that the research goes forward, and then after it is unleashed
and there is a problem, then we start looking at the ethics of
that. So the ethics of that research should be done
concurrently and in parallel, in tandem. So thank you very much
for being here and thank you for your testimony.
I am going to skip over some of the things that I was going
to talk about because of the research component of this and
just going to say Allison Young, author of Pandora's Gamble,
highlights many lab biosafety failures that have largely gone
unnoticed, including one in my home state of Iowa. She
describes the threat to suspend a USDA National Animal Disease
Center's permit to work with dangerous pathogens in Ames, Iowa.
And I visited these facilities and they are truly great
facilities, but it had a failure to abide by regulations that
are meant to prevent releases from wastewater systems.
According to information from a FOIA request, the USDA
National Animal Disease Center had three releases of wastewater
that were potentially contaminated with select agent pathogens.
The Select Agent Pathogen Program by mistake released an
unredacted report of the three lab incidents which occurred on
June 5, 2019, to April 16, 2020 and May 3, 2020. None of these
incidents were reported to the Iowa Department of Natural
Resources, even though the incidents were considered as posing
a risk to agriculture and public health.
So, Dr. Parker, the former CDC director, Tom Frieden,
expressed concerns that the Select Agent Program did not
complete any unannounced inspections to see how labs truly
operated. Furthermore, the U.S. doesn't have comprehensive
regulations, as you both have indicated, on biosafety at
laboratories experimenting with infectious organisms, to ensure
a safe operation in the United States. You state in your
written testimony that you support an independent biorisk
management Federal authority and claim that such authority
could consolidate the patchwork of current biosafety and
biosecurity policies and regulations. I am just going to ask
you to further clarify that and whether ASPR would be a good
place for that location, given the CDC's failure in this
pandemic to take research and then translate that into action
or policies or messaging.
Dr. Parker. Sure. Thank you for the question, and I do
believe that it is time to consider an independent biosafety
oversight someplace in the Federal Government to consolidate
the current patchwork of fragmented guidance and policies. And
I am not saying that each one is a bad policy or hasn't been
effective, but it is the overall kind of patchwork. It is
confusing for research institutions about who is their
oversight authority, and for what pathogen, for what funding
stream and so forth. So we need some kind of consolidation and
also to look for how we can get efficiencies, close any gaps,
and really make it easier for the research institutions because
it is pretty confusing, and that confusion increases our
biosecurity risks.
As far as the organizational home for something like that,
I am not sure if ASPR is the right home. You know, remember, I
was a Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary at ASPR. You know,
actually when the Federal Select Agent Program was first
established, I think that that decision had a lot of debate,
and it was understood there is really no good place. At least
in USDA, it is in APHIS, and APHIS is a regulatory agency, and
I think that is something to think about is what is the right
regulatory agency that has that culture. But you have to do it
in a way that is going to still not stifle scientific
innovation, and that is the challenge. How do you improve
efficiencies in our current fragmented system and put it in the
right regulatory structure without stifling innovation? And
that is hard.
Dr. Miller-Meeks. Thank you very much. I am sorry, I went
over. I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Ross from
North Carolina for 5 minutes.
Ms. Ross. Thank you very much, and I am pleased that my
Republican colleagues are heeding our calls to consider
forward-looking policy solutions with today's hearing, and I am
also very pleased that there is some consensus about what we
should be doing going forward.
In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, Democrats have been
at the forefront of Congress' work to fortify our Nation's
biosafety, biosecurity, and biodefense. Last year,
congressional Democrats passed the Consolidated Appropriations
Act of 2023, which includes $950 million in funding for the
Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority. BARDA
leads our Nation's development of medical countermeasures in
response to public health emergencies, including chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear incidents and attacks, as
well as outbreaks of emerging infectious diseases. Dr. Yassif,
how do comprehensive investments in BARDA safeguard America's
public health and security?
Ms. Yassif. Thank you. Comprehensive investments in BARDA
and other parts of the U.S. Government that are investing in
medical countermeasure development are critical for protecting
the American public and our friends and allies overseas. I said
in my testimony that we are experiencing a 21st century
biotechnology and bioscience revolution, and it is hard to
imagine a place where that could be more important and useful
than in development of vaccines.
We have seen with the response to COVID. Fortunately, we
were able to develop a medical countermeasure much faster than
at least I expected us to be able to, but I think in the
future, to be prepared for future pandemics and to be prepared
for the unexpected, we need to be much faster. We need to be
able to prepare novel medical countermeasures in response to
novel unanticipated pathogens. For example, we are looking at
the 100-day mission. We want to go from zero to 60 in 100 days.
That would make us here in the United States and
internationally much safer. Those kinds of investments are
critical.
Ms. Ross. Wonderful. And BARDA also plays a key role in the
United States global bio preparedness, as you alluded to, and
our partnerships, including on international initiatives to
reduce the risk of pandemic influenza through vaccine
development, as we discussed, and to advance our arsenal of
medical countermeasures against Ebola and other known diseases.
What role does BARDA play in fortifying our leadership on
pandemic preparedness within the international community? And
that is for both of you, but Dr. Yassif first.
Dr. Yassif. Sure. I will be really quick. I think, in
addition to all the benefits that I just described, I think us
making investments in our domestic capabilities and talent pool
ensures that we have a seat at the table internationally as we
are working with our allies and partners to develop a stronger
medical countermeasure infrastructure and better capacity
generally to detect and respond to pandemics.
Ms. Ross. Dr. Parker, do you have anything to add to that?
Dr. Parker. Sure. Yes, BARDA is absolutely essential for
our biodefense pandemic preparedness, and, in fact, the
Operation Warp Speed and the ability to develop vaccines in 11
months was predicated on the investments in infectious disease
research and advanced development from vaccines and
technologies and also a commitment to regulatory science, and
so we have to continue that, absolutely. But BARDA also plays
an international role of actually with a broader ASPR
organization and the Office of Global Affairs within HHS. There
has been longstanding international collaboration in pandemic
preparedness, biodefense, health security, and BARDA is a big
player in that within the HHS family and in the interagency
family, and it has got to continue.
Ms. Ross. Thank you so much. Just as a reminder because the
last session of Congress seems so long ago, alongside the
investments in BARDA and increased protection for BioShield,
Democrats in the Consolidated Appropriations Act also directed
the Secretary of Health and Human Services to develop
strategies to prevent, mitigate, and address threats in
biomedical research, including those stemming from undue
foreign influence. It strengthened training for personnel
handling biological agents and toxins, and it bolstered Federal
reporting requirements for the release, loss, or theft of
biological agents and toxins. We have much more to do. It
appears we will be able to do that in a bipartisan way, but it
is nice to remember that some action has been taken. And thank
you, Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair now
recognizes Mr. Cloud from Texas for 5 minutes.
Mr. Cloud. Thank you, Chairman. The Federal Government
isn't hesitant to insert itself into the daily lives of
Americans, whether it is banning gas stoves, restricting their
ability to choose their own doctor, pressuring social media
companies to censor their constitutionally protected speech.
All have been backed by the full force of law. OSHA can slap a
small business with thousands of dollars in fines for a
misplaced extension cord or for failing to have their first aid
kit approved by a physician. We have seen intelligence agencies
ban physicians from and medical experts from social media
companies. The Department of Labor can impose civil and
criminal penalties on mine operators for such transgressions as
failing to ensure that miners ride hoist buckets in an orderly
manner.
But somehow the government zeal to protect us from the
smallest threats to our health and safety standards seems to
stop at the doors of these agencies responsible for preventing
the hazardous biological research from ongoing, and it is
terribly wrong and potentially resulting in global catastrophe.
Agencies like the NIH don't have a problem imposing burdensome
regulations on everyday Americans, but they fail to monitor the
high-containment laboratories that could potentially produce
another pandemic.
It is a Federal crime to ride a bicycle, believe it or not,
without a horn on NIH grounds, but funneling NIH money to shady
foreign labs lacks even the requirements of basic effective
reporting. So it is clearly not a lack of conviction from their
own authority or the righteousness in their safety standards
that the Federal Government has refrained from imposing
enforceable standards on dangerous biological research. We have
seen far too often in the past few years the current system is
designed to allow unelected bureaucrats and self-proclaimed
experts shield their conduct from accountability and the
taxpayers who fund them.
The world has already suffered large-scale consequences of
one biosecurity failure fueled by government corruption. We
should be careful to ensure there isn't a second one. We work
on funding. Our main job here in Congress is funding, and so
the grant process is tremendously opaque, and you couple that
with the investigations that happen. And for example, OSHA can
show up at a workplace any point, anytime and go through, but
our inspections generally will be scheduled way far in advance.
The labs cancel them, and so there is not the kind of oversight
that we would expect to see from that kind of thing. We can
continue, as Congress, to ask the executive branch to continue
to put a heavy regulatory burden on it. The other thing that we
can do, since our job is the purse string, is to be careful on
how we are spending the money.
And so I would ask you, what role we should play in the
funding aspect of it? What restrictions? What ideas you would
have for us placing restrictions on the government funding
going out to make sure that it is not being misused? And one
other thought that has been presented, because this happens
quite often up here, is that the taxpayers will fund the
government that creates a problem, and then the solution is
more money toward that problem. I have real concerns when it
comes to these international labs getting taxpayer funded money
when it comes to that, but if you could help us out with what
kind of restrictions we could be looking at, and also how do we
provide transparency to the grant writing process?
Dr. Parker. Well, I think everything that I included in my
written testimony about, first, just the need to reexamine top
to bottom our biosafety/biosecurity framework and look for
efficiencies and then close gaps is absolutely essential and to
improving our biosafety and biosecurity. And I would point you
again to a comment I made earlier about one of the NSABB
recommendations when it came to funding work internationally
and any international funded research should comply with the
same standards, laws, guidelines that we have in the United
States, and that can be done.
We have to be careful. We talk about restricting funding
for biomedical research. We are in a global competition for the
bioeconomy. Now is not the time to restrict funding for
biomedical research when we are in a global competition, and
that we need advancements in our healthcare system. And our
investments in our healthcare system are underpinned by
advancing technology, so we have to be very careful there.
Mr. Cloud. To that point, that is kind of one of my major
concerns that you are touching on is we have U.S. taxpayer
dollars funding the research in other countries who are
competing against us for preeminence in this, and why we would
put that on the American taxpayer is kind of beyond me. It
seems like that should be extremely limited, what we are doing
with international. I mean, again, we don't have a smoking gun
when it comes to the labs, but it is not a stretch to say that
U.S. taxpayer dollars helped fund the pandemic with what we do
know. We do know that evidence was destroyed. We don't have the
smoking gun, but we know that they potentially destroyed the
smoking gun.
So why would we put the burden on taxpayer dollars? I am
not saying cancel all funding. I am saying we should put
restrictions on the funding that is going out. What should
those restrictions be? And then when it comes to international,
I mean, that seems to me to be very limited. Certainly we
shouldn't be investing in labs that are competing against us.
Dr. Parker. Well, I think the vast majority of our
biomedical research dollars go domestically, but international
collaboration is also important. And that is also how we are
going to be able to enhance norms and enhance behaviors
internationally, but how we fund that research is important. I
agree with you there. Those are the how and the what research
we fund internationally will be an important thing to consider.
And I think when we do do international research, especially
with hazardous pathogens, we have to make sure that the
oversight complies with the same U.S. standards we have here
and probably needs onsite inspections and evaluation of that to
just improve that oversight. I will end with that.
Mr. Cloud. Thank you.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman's time has expired. We now
recognize Dr. Joyce from Pennsylvania for 5 minutes.
Dr. Joyce. Thank you Chairman Comer and Ranking Member
Ruiz, and thank you for the witnesses for being with us today.
We appreciate both your time and your testimony.
This Select Subcommittee has the responsibility of
investigating the origins of the coronavirus, and analyzing and
scrutinizing the failed policies that arose. And further, we
have been charged with holding those public health officials
accountable for enforcing those harmful COVID-era policies.
More important, what the American people want and what the
American people deserve is to know what this body intends to do
and how this body intends to safeguard our Nation and protect
our citizens from the next public health emergency.
Clearly, the coronavirus pandemic is a direct result of
failed biosecurity and failed biosafety regulations. In fact,
this Committee held a hearing in July that examined the
controversy of proximal origins piece that confused the picture
by not allowing the necessary information to come forth by
pointing to a lab leak. Even the ODNI report that was released
said, ``The Department of Energy and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation assess that a laboratory associated incident was
the most likely cause of the first human infection with SARS-
CoV-2.'' Now more than ever, it is crucial that we strengthen
and we secure our regulatory framework as it relates to both
biosafety and biosecurity. Only then can we ensure better
preparedness and execute a more effective response ahead of
that next public health emergency.
Dr. Parker, how important is oversight biosafety and
security in foreign countries? Let's carve out because we have
been talking about subcontractors. Let's carve out and look at
those subcontractors where the initial funding comes from here,
comes from United States. Do you feel that U.S. funds should
continue to labs that are subcontracted that don't have the
same safety standards that we have in the United States?
Dr. Parker. Well, I think, as I said, any of our work with
infectious diseases internationally ought to be compliant with
the same guidelines standards that we have in the United
States.
Dr. Joyce. Thank you. I think that is an important message
for all of us to take home. Dr. Parker, your extensive
background in this area, are you aware that some countries have
that inherent lack of biosafety and bioethics that are so
important? Should certain countries be excluded?
Dr. Parker. I think really the issue, and I think I have
said it already before, is any country that lacks the
institutional norms, the ethical foundation, and the commitment
to making sure that these laboratories can operate safely and
securely and they are sustained, they have the skilled work
force, those are all essential, no matter what country.
Dr. Joyce. Are there any countries that have come to top of
mind that you think should be excluded that currently might
function as subcontractors?
Dr. Parker. Well, I think any country that lacks those
institutional norms, and that would be up to the funding agency
to verify that they have the right institutional norms.
Dr. Joyce. So before that funding comes from an NIH grant,
which this body approves, those countries should be thoroughly
evaluated before any subcontractors are used. Is that your
point?
Dr. Parker. Yes.
Dr. Joyce. Thank you. Dr. Yassif, you made an incredibly
interesting point. In your testimony, you said that the
question of a lab leak in China allows a big blinking red light
to be present. A big blinking red light to me means stop. How
do we stop?
Dr. Yassif. Thank you for the question. My choice of the
big blinking red light is a warning light, not a stoplight, and
I think it is----
Dr. Joyce. Well, I think then we need that clarification
because I think most of us as drivers see a big blinking red
light to mean stop, and we have seen those concerns. I think
that those concerns from this Select Subcommittee continue to
exist, and I think in that preparedness, which we are trying to
formulate how to protect and be prepared for that next public
health emergency, I actually think you were spot on with that
assessment. I think a big blinking red light, we have to stop,
we have to pause, and we have to make sure that the biosecurity
is in place. It is an important role for our charge to make
sure that we protect, and each of us representing 750,000
constituents, each of us take that responsibility, incredibly
important. I thank both of you for being here today, and, Mr.
Chairman, I yield.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back. I will now
recognize myself for 5 minutes.
In March 2020, five scientists published Proximal Origin of
SARS-CoV-2, which effectively shut down the lab leak theory.
However, the authors relied more on political implication than
actual science. In uncovered emails, Dr. Rambaut, one of the
authors of Proximal Origin, stated that their conclusion
downplaying the lab leak theory would limit the chances of new
biosafety discussions. Dr. Parker, in your expert opinion, is
opposition to increased biosafety or biosecurity regulations
common amongst the scientific community?
Dr. Parker. I don't think it is common. I think
virologists, scientists, everybody working in the infectious
disease research community and including hazardous pathogens,
they want to do this work safely and securely, those that I
know in the United States. I don't think they are trying to
avoid oversight, but in their defense, the oversight system is
becoming very fragmented, it is confusing.
Chairman Comer. Are you aware of the Proximal Origin paper?
Dr. Parker. I am.
Chairman Comer. Do you think it is problematic that the
author's conclusion may have been, in part, based on the fact
that they wanted to avoid more strict biosafety guidelines?
Dr. Parker. Those emails are black and white, and I will
let the Committee interpret those emails.
Chairman Comer. Dr. Yassif, do you agree that constructing
scientific conclusions to avoid increased biosafety regulations
is inappropriate?
Dr. Yassif. Conceptually, hypothetically, yes, such an
action would be inappropriate, but I am not making a judgment
about whether that happened in this instance.
Chairman Comer. The authors were aware that the Wuhan
Institute of Virology was conducting risky gain-of-function
research with coronaviruses under questionable biosafety
conditions, including in BSL-2 laboratories. They were also
aware that this research could be done without leaving a trace.
Troublingly, the U.S. Government also knew about these
concerns. In January 2018, the State Department warned that the
Wuhan Lab had serious biosafety issues, specifically that there
were serious shortages of appropriately trained technicians and
investigators necessary to operate its laboratory. They also
noted the research of coronavirus is aiming to make them more
transmissible. So, Dr. Parker, to safely conduct this kind of
research, is it important to have trained technicians and
investigators?
Dr. Parker. It is important to have a skilled work force,
have high-containment labs that are supported by appropriate
operations and maintenance, and they have the right biosafety
officers, they have the right building engineers for any work
with hazardous pathogens.
Chairman Comer. I agree. Would you fund a lab that has a
shortage of properly trained technicians and investigators and
was operating at a low biosafety level?
Dr. Parker. No.
Chairman Comer. Dr. Yassif, what about you? Is it important
to have properly trained staff while operating a high-
containment laboratory?
Dr. Yassif. Yes.
Chairman Comer. Dr. Parker, do you know if the State
Department told the rest of the government about these
warnings?
Dr. Parker. I am sorry. I didn't quite hear.
Chairman Comer. Do you know if the State Department told
the rest of the government about these warnings?
Dr. Parker. I am not aware. The only thing I am aware of is
what has been in the media.
Chairman Comer. Do you think that there is a lack of
coordination between government agencies regarding biosafety
and biosecurity threats?
Dr. Parker. I think there is a lack of coordination overall
in a lot of our pandemic preparedness and biodefense efforts
just at large, and that is why leadership is so important. And
that is why actually in my written testimony, I do talk about
the need for a single focal point somewhere in the Federal
Government that can be the focal point for biosafety and
biosecurity.
Chairman Comer. So it is clear that China has actively
sought to conceal and suppress information related to COVID-19.
Dr. Parker, how can we hold foreign laboratories accountable
and ensure they are complying with international biosafety
standards?
Dr. Parker. That is one of the challenges we talked about
earlier that enforcement is extremely difficult. At the moment,
our best tool is to recommit to international diplomacy, work
with our strategic international countries, and begin a dialog
to make sure that all member-states and the WHO, United Nations
family are taking on their responsibilities and accountability
for managing and overseeing this important research. Every
country has got to assume that responsibility and
accountability for that.
Chairman Comer. OK. Thank very much. Dr. Yassif, would you
like to answer that in my remaining few seconds?
Dr. Yassif. No, I have nothing to add. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Comer. Do you all have any other questions? OK.
The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I am
grateful to have a chance to have a substantive discussion
today about how we can help the American public and certainly
keep us safe from future pandemics.
Earlier, the Chairman was able to clarify at the start of
the hearing that we don't know for sure how the COVID-19
pandemic started, and I think it is really important to re-
emphasize that point. None of our intelligence agencies have
been able to make a determination with complete certainty about
the lab leak theory or the theory that COVID was a natural
spillover from animals, and so that was good to hear from the
Chairman earlier. We should be clear about that and stay within
the boundaries of what the evidence tells us.
We know this has not always been the case. In the past, on
this Subcommittee or within the Congress, we have had Members
in the past publicly stating their beliefs of how the pandemic
started without actually any conclusive evidence, which I think
is a huge mistake. Now, Dr. Yassif, can you clarify for us just
once again, just to end this part of the debate, can any Member
of Congress say with absolute certainty that they know how the
pandemic was caused, whether a lab leak versus natural
transmission, given the available evidence?
Dr. Yassif. No.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you. So if any of my colleagues were to
say that they know for certain without question that COVID
started as a lab leak or as a bioweapon, that is not consistent
with the assessment of our intelligence agencies. Is that
correct?
Dr. Yassif. Yes.
Mr. Garcia. And that would be speculation on their part?
Dr. Yassif. I think that there are different people in the
community that have looked at this set of evidence and have
come to different conclusions with varying degrees of
confidence, and so it is a very challenging topic. And
different people can look at the same set of evidence and come
to different conclusions.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you. So to say that there is just one
certain known or outcome would be incorrect? I mean, obviously,
folks----
Dr. Yassif. That is my view.
Mr. Garcia. Yes. No, I appreciate that. Thank you. That is
my view as well, so I want to thank you for clarifying again.
Now, and this was just also referenced by the Chair, so I
want to just be clear. I know that in July, we had an entire
hearing where my colleagues had accused Dr. Fauci, that Dr.
Fauci persuaded the authors of a key research paper to change
their conclusions and cover up evidence that the pandemic had
emerged from a lab. They were obviously very serious
accusations, and we called several of the paper's authors to
Washington to answer questions about Dr. Fauci's involvement.
And both in this room under oath and in the documents and
written testimony provided to the Committee, the people
directly involved all told us that the allegation was simply
incorrect. So I just want to repeat that because hopefully now
we can put to rest any allegations that we know for certain how
the pandemic started at this point.
Just also a quick question for both of our witnesses. Why
is it important to strengthen biosafety and biosecurity
standards universally, irrespective of where potential
pandemic-causing pathogen may emerge?
Dr. Yassif. I will start. So I think, as I noted in my
testimony, we are really only as strong as our weakest link. So
a pandemic that is caused, either through a deliberate
bioweapons attack or through an accidental release, could
emerge anywhere in the world, and infectious diseases, no
matter what their origin, don't respect borders. And as we saw
with the COVID pandemic, an outbreak can happen in one part of
the world, if it is not quickly, rapidly contained, can quickly
spread globally, causing vast human casualties, political
disruption, and extensive economic damage. And so if we really
want to prevent those kinds of events in the future, it is
critical to invest in biosafety and biosecurity as a
preventative measure, as part of a broader layer defense that
is complementary to broader biodefense efforts to detect and
rapidly respond, those are all critical.
Mr. Gracia. Thank you.
Dr. Parker. And I agree with my colleague a hundred
percent. And really, we know enough already that we must take
action at the animal-human-environmental interface nexus,
whether that is in nature, whether that is in a laboratory.
Inaction really is not an option. Thank you.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you. I just want to add I am also just
grateful that the Biden Administration has taken important
steps to prioritize biosafety and biosecurity, promote strong
biosafety standards, and make sound investments in biorisk
management, disease surveillance, and safe and responsible
research. As you both mentioned, there is still a lot of work
to be done, which you have mentioned throughout this hearing
today. Both of you also specifically mentioned the need for
additional funding and investment in these efforts. Democrats
in Congress and President Biden agree with you.
Now, earlier this year, the President requested Congress
appropriate $6.1 billion for the CDC to enhance domestic and
global disease surveillance, biosafety and biosecurity efforts.
I know that if we had a Speaker of the House, we could actually
vote to advance some of that funding, and hopefully we will get
there soon. Democrats in Congress are ready to get to work, but
we are, of course, here listening to this important work, not
able to move forward because the House is still in a
standstill. So hopefully that will end very shortly, and with
that Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back. That concludes
our questions. We will now move to closing statement, if the
Ranking Member wants to do one. The Ranking Member declines.
I will have a brief closing statement if that is all right.
I want to thank the witnesses for being here today.
The purpose of today's hearing was to examine the
effectiveness of our current biosecurity and biosafety
policies, and discuss ways that we can improve them going
forward. Again, the witness testimony today is very appreciated
by this Committee. As we move forward, it is vital to properly
investigate the gaps in oversight that currently exist for
biosafety and biosecurity standards and draw attention to the
lack of transparency surrounding lab incidents and safety
inspections due to inadequate reporting requirements. Through
this investigation, we will determine what policies currently
exist, whether those policies are sufficient, how those
policies are applied internationally and how to move forward.
The COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need to better
understand what safeguards are needed to protect ourselves and
prevent a future pandemic. While the U.S. has one of the
strongest regulatory oversight mechanisms to enforce
biosecurity, it only applies to research in this country or
research funded by U.S. taxpayer money. As we heard today, if
research is conducted outside the U.S., including in China,
there is not only limited oversight, but an increased chance
that lab leaks and accidents could occur. This current posture
is not only wildly unsafe, but it significantly impairs our
ability to respond to emerging threats. And as we discussed
today, we must be able to effectively respond to and assess
risk so that we can be prepared for a future pandemic,
including the potential deliberate release of a biological
weapon.
As we learned during COVID-19, infectious diseases don't
recognize borders, and once there is a containment issue, it
may only be a matter of time before it gets to United States.
We know that there were sufficient concerns regarding
biosecurity and biosafety at the Wuhan Institute of Virology,
but nothing was done, and we know that the American taxpayer
was likely paying for some of this dangerous research. We
cannot afford to have another COVID-19 pandemic. We cannot
allow dangerous research to continue without proper safeguards
in place because the next time might be worse.
The Select Subcommittee has been focused on gathering
evidence in order to conduct fact-based investigations because
Americans deserve answers, and we have been gathering data,
recommendations, and information so that we can predict,
prepare, protect, and prevent a future public health disaster.
This hearing was an essential step in this process because
safeguards are lacking. Biosecurity and biosafety standards
must be strengthened. We have a chance right now to prepare
better to ensure that high risk laboratories are safe as
possible, and we need to take advantage of this opportunity. So
thank you for being here today, and we look forward to
continuing to work with the witnesses on this issue as this
Select Subcommittee continues its work.
With that and without objection, all Members will have 5
legislative days within which to submit materials and to submit
additional written questions for the witnesses, which will be
forwarded to the witnesses for their response.
Chairman Comer. If there is no further business, without
objection, the Select Subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:38 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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