[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
COUNTERING THREATS POSED BY NATION-STATE ACTORS IN LATIN AMERICA TO
U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 21, 2023
__________
Serial No. 118-18
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-947 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
Stephen Siao, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
Sean Jones, Deputy Chief Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE
August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island,
Tony Gonzales, Texas Ranking Member
Anthony D'Esposito, New York J. Luis Correa, California
Elijah Crane, Arizona Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Dina Titus, Nevada
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Michael Koren, Subcommittee Staff Director
Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
Alice Hayes, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 4
The Honorable Seth Magaziner, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 8
Witnesses
Ms. Elaine K. Dezenski, Senior Director and Head, Center on
Economic and Financial Power, Foundation for Defense of
Democracies:
Oral Statement................................................. 10
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Mr. Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow,
Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International
Studies:
Oral Statement................................................. 18
Prepared Statement............................................. 20
Ms. Jessica Brandt, Policy Director, Artificial Intelligence and
Emerging Technology Initiative, Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe
Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, The
Brookings Institution:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
COUNTERING THREATS POSED BY NATION-STATE ACTORS IN LATIN AMERICA TO
U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY
----------
Wednesday, June 21, 2023
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. August Pfluger
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Pfluger, D'Esposito, Crane,
Magaziner, Correa, Goldman, and Titus.
Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
Chairman Pfluger. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence will come to order.
Without objection, the subcommittee may recess at any
point.
The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from a
non-Governmental panel of expert witnesses to examine the
threats posed by nation-state actors in Latin America, like
China and Russia to the United States homeland security.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good morning and welcome to the Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence. Today, we
are holding an important hearing on the threats posed by
nation-state actors like the People's Republic of China, the
PRC, Russia, Iran, and Venezuela in Latin America to our
homeland security.
There is no doubt that we are facing a migration crisis
caused by the administration's policy decisions. We are
witnessing significant increases in encounters at the Southwest
Border with individuals from countries of concern like the PRC
and Russia. I am concerned that the chaos of the Southwest
Border could be taken advantage of by anti-U.S. regimes--not
just can, but has been. Meanwhile, the PRC and our foreign
adversaries are expanding their spheres of influence in Latin
America right in our backyard. As they grow their diplomatic,
economic, and military activities in the region, there are
clear implications for U.S. homeland security.
Recent data released by the United States Customs and
Border Protection shows a steep increase in encounters with
foreign nationals from the PRC, Russia, Cuba, and Venezuela,
amongst others at our Southwest Border. For example, in the
first 7 months of fiscal year 2023, over 9,711 PRC nationals
were encountered by U.S. Border Patrol along our Southwest
Border, exponentially more than the previous 3 years. Restate
that number: 9,711 PRC nationals. A similar trend involves
encounters with Russian citizens. In 2021, CBP reported just
4,103 encounters of Russian citizens along our Southwest
Border, however, that number jumped to 21,763 in fiscal year
2022, and it is over 33,000 for the first 7 months of fiscal
year 2023. I have heard directly from sheriffs in my own
district that they apprehended multiple individuals from the
PRC who were deemed high-value targets and were taken into
custody by the FBI.
While aliens may have legitimate claims to asylum, the
increased flow of nationals from adversarial countries is
concerning as these individuals blend into the much larger wave
of illegal aliens flooding across the Southwest Border, already
topping 1.4 million illegal alien encounters for the first 7
months of this fiscal year, 2023.
Meanwhile, Border Patrol agents at the Southwest Border are
completely overwhelmed. There have been 1.5 million known
gotaways at the Southwest Border since the start of this
administration. This creates a gap in our homeland security
intelligence that malign nation-states could exploit to send
nefarious actors into the United States. It is important that
this subcommittee fully understand the ways that malign nation-
state actors could take advantage of the wide open Southwest
Border. However, the problem is not just there. It stretches
further than that. There is no doubt that we are facing an
array of security challenges in the region and by extension, to
homeland security.
In particular, the PRC has developed close economic and
security ties with a number of Latin American countries,
including Brazil and Venezuela. For example, the China
Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China offered
approximately $137 billion to the region in loans to a
multitude of sectors, with Venezuela as the most prolific
beneficiary of PRC loans at roughly $60 billion. However, the
PRC's influence in the region goes beyond economic ties. It
also includes military and security partnerships. For example,
in approximately a 10-year period between 2009 and 2019, $615
million in weapons were sold to Venezuela by the PRC. The PRC's
increased influences in the region bolsters the CCP's
geopolitical goals, which also includes strengthening other
authoritarian regimes, leading to significant challenges to
U.S. influence in the region, as well as security risks to the
United States homeland.
Earlier this year, Melissa Dalton, the Pentagon's Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric
Affairs, testified that the PRC and Russia now pose more
dangerous challenges to the safety and security of the U.S.
homeland. They are both, and I quote here from Ms. Dalton,
``already using nonkinetic means against our defense,
industrial base, and mobilization systems to subvert our
ability to project power''. This transcends the egregious
example of when the PRC entered our sovereign airspace with a
high-altitude balloon, which we know with certainty they
intended to use to spy on sensitive U.S. military and critical
infrastructure sites.
Then, just this month, the Biden administration confirmed
the existence of a PRC-run electronic espionage facility in
Cuba, roughly 100 miles from the United States, that would
allow the CCP intelligence services to collect signals
intelligence throughout the southeastern United States. Less
than 48 hours later, an anonymous Biden administration official
confirmed to Politico that the CCP has actually been using a
secret facility in Cuba to spy on the United States since at
least 2019. My Republican colleagues and I are demanding
answers on this latest nefarious action by the CCP from DHS
Secretary Mayorkas and FBI Director Wray to ensure the homeland
security response is robust and steadfast. I would love to have
all of this committee in a nonpartisan way join that effort to
understand those nefarious actions. This activity once again
displays the CCP's willingness to use every tactic and
technique to undermine U.S. sovereignty and shows that
authoritarian regimes in Latin America can and will assist the
CCP in attacking U.S. homeland security.
Additionally, Russia continues to demonstrate its intent
and capability to conduct military and other strategic
activities against the United States in the Western Hemisphere.
Russia's influence in the region mainly comes from security
ties on which it has colluded with anti-U.S. authoritarian
regimes, including Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. For example,
Russia has assisted Venezuela with sanctions evasion using
Russian state-controlled companies to transport Venezuelan oil.
Russia also uses the Wagner Group, a private military company,
to protect power world-wide. The Wagner Group tries to undercut
the United States and present itself as a mediator and security
partner to anti-U.S. countries and gain military access rights
and economic opportunities. For example, they are training
Venezuela's armed forces.
Additionally, Iran plays a secondary role in the region.
The recent docking of Iranian warships in Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil indicate Iran is looking to assert its power across the
region. Iran's backed militia, Hezbollah, continues to have a
presence in the region with the transition from the triborder
area of Paraguay to operations in Venezuela.
Whether it is the PRC, Russia, or Russia's proxies or Iran,
it is vital that we understand the security challenges and
threats posed by nation-state actors to U.S. homeland security
and explore every avenue to address them head on.
This morning, we have a distinguished panel of expert
witnesses to discuss this important topic with. I would just
like to say that we are facing challenges all over the world. I
personally think that this is one of the most challenging
security environments that we have ever been in, including the
World War II era. We know some of the threats and some of the
threats we don't know. The nature and the face of these threats
has changed. It is no longer just missiles in Cuba like we saw
decades ago. The cyber threat is egregious, economically what
these countries are doing to use their influence and to really
hurt the people of countries, especially in our backyard in
South America and Latin America.
So I am excited to hear from our witnesses, I am excited to
have this conversation today because I hope it informs the rest
of Congress that we must keep our eye on the ball. We must
understand what the Chinese Communist Party is doing and the
malign activities that they will use to undermine not just our
influence and our economic prowess around the world, but also
our homeland security right here at home.
I thank all the witnesses for being with us this morning,
and I look forward to our discussion.
[The statement of Chairman Pfluger follows:]
Statement of Chairman August Pfluger
June 21, 2023
Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence.
Today we are holding an important hearing on the threats posed by
nation-state actors like the People's Republic of China (PRC), Russia,
Iran, and Venezuela in Latin America to our homeland security.
There is no doubt that we are facing a migration crisis caused by
the administration's policy decisions.
We are witnessing significant increases in encounters at the
Southwest Border with individuals from countries of concern like the
PRC and Russia.
I am concerned that the chaos of the Southwest Border could be
taken advantage of by anti-U.S. regimes.
Meanwhile, the PRC and our foreign adversaries are expanding their
spheres of influence in Latin America--essentially in our backyard.
As they grow their diplomatic, economic, and military activities in
the region, there are clear implications for U.S. homeland security.
Recent data released by the United States Customs and Border
Protection shows a steep increase in encounters with foreign nationals
from the PRC, Russia, Cuba, and Venezuela, amongst others, at our
Southwest Border.
For example, in the first 7 months of fiscal year 2023, over 9,711
PRC nationals were encountered by U.S. Border Patrol along our
Southwest Border, exponentially more than the previous 3 years.
A similar trend involves encounters with Russian citizens. In 2021,
CBP reported just 4,103 encounters of Russian citizens along our
Southwest Border; however, that number jumped to 21,763 in fiscal year
2022 and is already over 33,000 for the first 7 months of fiscal year
2023.
I have heard directly from sheriffs in my district that they
apprehended multiple individuals from the PRC who were deemed ``high-
value targets'' and were taken into custody by the FBI.
While aliens may have legitimate claims to asylum, the increased
flow of nationals from adversarial countries is concerning as these
individuals blend into the much larger wave of illegal aliens flooding
across the Southwest Border, already topping 1.4 million illegal alien
encounters through the first 7 months of fiscal year 2023.
Meanwhile, Border Patrol agents at the Southwest Border are
completely overwhelmed. There have been 1.5 million known gotaways at
the Southwest Border since the start of this administration.
This creates a gap in homeland security intelligence that malign
nation-states could exploit to send nefarious actors into the United
States.
It is important that this subcommittee fully understand the ways
malign nation-state actors could take advantage of the wide-open
Southwest Border.
However, the problems stretch further than that. There is no doubt
that we are facing an array of security challenges in the region and by
extension to U.S. homeland.
In particular, the PRC has developed close economic and security
ties with a number of Latin American countries, including Brazil and
Venezuela.
For example, the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank
of China offered approximately $137 billion to the region in loans to a
multitude of sectors--with Venezuela as the most prolific beneficiary
of PRC loans at roughly $60 billion.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``China-Latin America Finance Databases,'' The Inter-American
Dialogue, Accessed June 16, 2022, https://www.thedialog.org/map_list/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
However, the PRC's influence in the region goes beyond economic
ties. It also includes military and security partnerships.
For example, in approximately a 10-year period, between 2009 and
2019, $615 million in weapons was sold to Venezuela by the PRC.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Lara Seligman, ``U.S. Military Wary of China's Foothold in
Venezuela,'' Foreign Policy, April 8, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/
2019/04/08/us-military-wary-of-chinas-foothold-in-venezuela-maduro-
faller-guaido-trump-pentagon/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PRC's increased influences in the region bolsters the CCP's
geopolitical goals, which also includes strengthening other
authoritarian regimes, leading to significant challenges to U.S.
influence in the region as well as security risks for the U.S.
homeland.
Earlier this year, Melissa Dalton, the Pentagon's Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs
testified that the PRC and Russia ``now pose more dangerous challenges
to the safety and security of the U.S. homeland.''\3\ They are both
``already using non-kinetic means against our defense industrial base
and mobilization systems to subvert our ability to project power.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-receive-
testimony-on-strategic-competition-and-security-cooperation-in-the-
western-hemisphere.
\4\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This transcends the egregious example of when the PRC entered our
sovereign air space with a high-altitude balloon, which we know with
certainty they intended to use to spy on sensitive U.S. military and
critical infrastructure sites.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
And then, just this month, the Biden administration confirmed the
existence of a PRC-run electronic espionage facility in Cuba--roughly
100 miles from the United States--that would allow the CCP intelligence
services to collect signals intelligence throughout the southeastern
United States.
Less than 48 hours later an anonymous Biden administration official
confirmed to Politico that the CCP has actually been using a secret
facility in Cuba to spy on the United States since at least 2019.
My Republican colleagues and I are demanding answers on this latest
nefarious action by the CCP from DHS Secretary Mayorkas and FBI
Director Wray to ensure the homeland security response is robust and
steadfast.
This activity once again displays the CCP's willingness to use
every tactic and technique to undermine U.S. sovereignty and shows that
authoritarian regimes in Latin America can and will assist the CCP in
attacking U.S. homeland security.
Additionally, Russia continues to demonstrate its intent and
capability to conduct military and other strategic activities against
the United States in the Western Hemisphere.
Russia's influence in the region mainly comes from security ties--
on which it has colluded with anti-U.S. authoritarian regimes,
including Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba.
For example, Russia has assisted Venezuela with sanctions evasion,
using Russian state-controlled companies to transport Venezuelan oil.
Russia also uses the Wagner Group, a private military company to
project power world-wide. The Wagner Group tries to undercut the United
States, present itself as a mediator and security partner to anti-U.S.
countries, and gain military access rights and economic opportunities.
For example, they are training Venezuela's armed forces.
Additionally, Iran plays a secondary role in the region. The recent
docking of Iranian warships in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil indicate Iran is
looking to assert its power across the region.
Iran's-backed militia, Hezbollah continues to have a presence in
the region, with a transition from the tri-border area of Paraguay to
operations in Venezuela.
Whether it is the PRC, Russia or Russia's proxies, or Iran, it is
vital that we understand the security challenges and threats posed by
nation-state actors to U.S. homeland security and explore every avenue
to address them head on.
This morning, we have a distinguished panel of expert witnesses to
discuss this important topic.
I thank all our witnesses for being with us this morning and I look
forward to our discussion.
Chairman Pfluger. I would now like to recognize the Ranking
Member, the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner, for his
opening statement.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
We find ourselves in a time when, once again, democratic
nations like the United States are in a competition for the
hearts and minds in the developing world, with autocratic
competitors like the People's Republic of China, Iran, and
Russia. It is more important than ever that we build strong
relationships with our allies in Latin America based on mutual
respect, fair commerce, and a shared commitment to security and
human rights. If we make the mistake of driving away our allies
in the region, Russia, the Chinese Communist Party, and our
other competitors will gladly fill that void at the expense of
our own security.
In Latin America today, the CCP and Russia are attempting
to manipulate public discourse, discredit elections and the
electoral system, influence policy, and disrupt markets, with
the goal of undermining U.S. security and economic
competitiveness. We cannot allow that to happen. Over the past
20 years, the CCP has spent heavily in Latin America. Chinese
state industry now reaches deep into Latin America's energy,
infrastructure, and space industries. In fact, China has
surpassed the United States as South America's biggest trading
partner. I will say it again, China has surpassed the United
States as South America's biggest trading partner. China now
has free trade agreements in place with Chile, Costa Rica,
Ecuador, and Peru, and 20 countries in Latin America and the
Caribbean participate in the CCP's Belt and Road initiative.
The Chinese Communist Party is investing in soft power through
cultural and educational programs in Latin America, which are
building political goodwill and presenting China as a viable
alternative partner to the United States and other democracies.
This is why it is so important that last year President
Biden launched a new economic cooperation initiative with Latin
America aimed specifically at countering the CCP's growing
clout in the region. Under Vladimir Putin Russia cares less
about competing with the United States economically and more
about stoking chaos and political division to harm democracies
like the United States. Russia has maintained decades-long
relationships with Latin American authoritarian regimes. The
Cuban, Venezuelan, and Nicaraguan regimes are heavily dependent
on Moscow for political, economic, and security assistance.
Russia actively spreads propaganda in Latin America to
undermine U.S. interests and the interests of democratic
allies, just as Russia did in the early days of its invasion of
Ukraine, when Russia used its propaganda assets in Latin
America to push conspiracy theories about Ukraine and the West
to justify the invasion.
With the CCP, Russia, and other autocratic regimes so
determined to build their presence in Latin America, it is
vital that the United States strengthen our relationships with
our neighbors in the region. The worst thing we could do for
our own security is drive our Latin American neighbors into the
arms of our adversaries. That is why it is disturbing to hear
former President Trump and some of my colleagues from across
the aisle, though of course not all, push reckless ideas like
unilateral military action in Mexico, which would seriously
endanger the strategic regional relationships we need to keep
America secure.
It is also alarming that some House Republicans are calling
for significant cuts to USAID, State Department, and Commerce
Department budgets that are crucial to building American
influence in Latin America at the same time that the CCP in
particular continues to invest in aid and commerce to build
their malign influence in the region.
As we go through the appropriations process in the coming
months, we need to keep in mind that investing in aid and
commerce in Latin America is not charity, it is in our national
security interest.
So this is a time for engagement and partnership, not
hyperpartisanship. Today's hearing, I hope, is an opportunity
for this subcommittee to examine what we can do to counter the
wider threat posed by autocratic nation-states that are setting
up shop in the Western Hemisphere with the goal of undermining
U.S. leadership in our own backyard. I hope that we can work
together to counter their efforts and advance American
interests.
With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Magaziner follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
June 21, 2023
We find ourselves in a time when democratic nations, like the
United States, are in a competition for hearts and minds in the
developing world with autocratic competitors like the People's Republic
of China, Iran, and Russia.
It is more important than ever that we develop strong relationships
with our allies in Latin America, based on mutual respect, fair
commerce, and a shared commitment to security and human rights. If we
make the mistake of driving away our allies in the region, Russia, the
CCP and our other competitors will gladly fill that void, at the
expense of our own security.
In Latin America today, the CCP and Russia are attempting to
manipulate public discourse, discredit elections and the electoral
system, influence policy development, and disrupt markets with the goal
of undermining U.S. security and economic competitiveness. We cannot
allow that to happen.
Over the past 20 years, the CCP has spent heavily in Latin America.
Chinese state industry now reaches deep into Latin America's energy,
infrastructure, and space industries. In fact, China has surpassed the
United States as South America's biggest trading partner. China has
free trade agreements in place with Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and
Peru; and 20 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean participate
in the CCP's Belt and Road initiative. And the Chinese Communist Party
is investing in soft power through cultural and educational programs in
Latin America, which are building political goodwill and presenting
China as a viable alternative partner to the United States and
democracies.
This is why it is so important that last year President Biden
launched a new economic cooperation initiative with Latin America aimed
specifically at countering the CCP's growing clout in the region. Under
Vladimir Putin, Russia cares less about competing with the United
States economically and more about stoking chaos and political division
to harm democracies like the United States. Russia has maintained
decades-long, strong relationships with Latin American authoritarian
regimes.
The Cuban, Venezuelan, and Nicaraguan regimes are heavily dependent
on Moscow for political, economic, and security assistance. And Russia
actively spreads propaganda in Latin America to undermine U.S.
interests and the interests of democratic allies--as Russia did during
the early days of its invasion of Ukraine, when Russia used its
propaganda assets in Latin America to push conspiracy theories about
Ukraine and the West to justify the invasion.
With the CCP, Russia and other autocratic regimes so determined to
build their presence in Latin America, it is vital that the United
States strengthen our relationships with our neighbors in the region.
The worst thing we could do for our own security, is drive our
Latin American neighbors into the arms of our adversaries. That is why
it is disturbing to hear former President Trump and some of my
colleagues from across the aisle push reckless ideas like unilateral
military action in Mexico, which would seriously endanger the strategic
regional relationships we need to keep America secure.
It is also alarming that some House Republicans are calling for
significant cuts to USAID, State Department, and Commerce Department
budgets that are crucial to building American influence in Latin
America, at the same time that the CCP in particular continues to
invest in aid and commerce to build their malign influence in the
region. This is a time for engagement and partnership, not hyper-
partisanship.
Today's hearing, I hope, is an opportunity for this subcommittee to
examine the wider threat posed by autocratic nation-states that are
setting up shop in the Western Hemisphere with a singular goal--to
undermine U.S. leadership in our own backyard.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ranking Member Magaziner.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
June 21, 2023
I am grateful for Ranking Member Magaziner's leadership on this
subcommittee and his effort to put today's hearing into focus. It was
committee Democrats' understanding that the purpose of this hearing is
to discuss foreign malign influence in Latin America and how the
actions of our geopolitical adversaries in the region impact U.S.
interests and homeland security. This is certainly an issue worth
exploring.
However, the Republicans' media advisory for the hearing once again
demonstrates that my colleagues across the aisle are focused on the
Southern Border to the exclusion of other critical homeland security
matters. According to the media advisory, the focal point of today's
hearing for Republicans is Border Patrol's, and I quote, ``encounters
with individuals from authoritarian countries hostile to the United
States, such as China, Russia, Cuba, and Venezuela.''
It goes on to note that Republicans are unaware of the migrants'
motives for seeking entry into the United States but does not mention
using today's hearing to explore the root causes of migration. Perhaps
because Republicans are uninterested in finding solutions and want to
further their partisan agenda against Secretary of Homeland Security
Alejandro Mayorkas--a case that they have stated is already ``closed.''
It is high time that this committee start doing oversight of
pressing issues, like foreign malign influence in Latin America and how
the actions of China, Russia, and others in our backyard undermine U.S.
interests and democracy at large. I--once again--urge my Republican
colleagues to forgo trying to score political points and join Democrats
in seeking real solutions to threats to the homeland.
At the subcommittee's March 9 and May 23 hearings, Chairman Pfluger
stated, and I quote, ``This conflict is not with individual citizens of
the PRC--this conflict is with the CCP, an authoritarian regime that
commits genocide against its own people, censors free speech across the
globe, and aims to end democracy as we know it.'' I could not agree
more. Today, we ought to be examining the activities of malign nation-
state actors in Latin America and the subsequent risks to the homeland,
not vilifying individuals fleeing autocratic and oppressive regimes.
The Biden administration's National Security Strategy notes that
the ``Western Hemisphere impacts the United States more than any other
region.'' It also recognizes the need for the United States to deepen
partnerships with Latin American countries ``to advance economic
resilience, democratic stability, and citizen security,'' and to
protect against external interference or coercion, including from
China, Russia, and Iran.
So, I am thankful that under Ranking Member Magaziner's leadership,
committee Democrats will use today's hearing to learn from witnesses
about the scope of foreign malign influence in Latin America and how
the United States Government can best work to help our allies deter
such efforts.
Chairman Pfluger. I am pleased to have a distinguished
panel of witnesses before us today on this very important
topic.
Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in
the affirmative.
[Witnesses sworn]
Chairman Pfluger. I would now like to formally introduce
our witnesses.
Ms. Elaine Dezenski is the senior director and head of the
Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for
Defensive Democracies. With more than 2 decades of leadership
in public, private, and international organizations, she is a
globally-recognized expert and thought leader on geopolitical
risk, supply chain security, anticorruption, and national
security. She also held positions at the Department of Homeland
Security under the Bush administration, including deputy and
acting assistant secretary for policy and director of cargo and
trade policy. In 2015, Ms. Dezenski launched LumiRisk LCC, a
risk advisory practice. In 2017, she served as a senior fellow
at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University
and as a lecturer of business ethics in Yale's Program on
Ethics, Politics, and Economics. In 2020 to 2021 she served on
the newly-formed Chairman's Council on China Competition at the
Export-Import Bank of The United States. Thank you for being
here.
Mr. Christopher Hernandez-Roy is the deputy director and
senior fellow of the Americas Program at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Throughout his more than
25-year career, Mr. Hernandez-Roy has worked extensively to
advance democratic governance, prevent and resolve conflict,
strengthen the rule of law, respect human rights, ensure
citizen security, and promote integral development across Latin
America and the Caribbean. He has held various senior
leadership positions at the Organization of American States, or
OAS, having served as senior political advisor to two
Secretaries General. In this capacity, he most recently
documented the abuses of authoritarian regimes in Venezuela and
Cuba, and co-led the organization's efforts to hold the
Venezuelan regime accountable for possible crimes against
humanity. He also was intimately involved in the peaceful
resolution of border disputes between Honduras and Nicaragua,
Belize and Guatemala, and Honduras and El Salvador. Thank you
for being here.
Ms. Jessica Brandt is policy director for artificial
intelligence and emerging technology initiative at the
Brookings Institution and a fellow in the Foreign Policy
Program's Strobe Talbot Center for Security Strategy and
Technology. Her research interest in recent publications focus
on foreign interference, digital authoritarianism, and the
implications of emerging technologies for democracies. Ms.
Brandt was previously head of policy and research for the
Alliance for Securing Democracy and a senior fellow at the
German Marshall Fund of the United States, a fellow in the
Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, special
advisor to the president of the Brookings Institution, and an
international and global affairs fellow at the Belfer Center
for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.
I thank all of the witnesses for being here. I know you
have submitted incredible testimonies and I would ask at this
time that you summarize those and please try to keep to 5
minutes. We do have questions on those testimonies.
At this time I recognize Ms. Elaine Dezenski for your 5
minutes to summarize your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF ELAINE K. DEZENSKI, SENIOR DIRECTOR AND HEAD,
CENTER ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POWER, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE
OF DEMOCRACIES
Ms. Dezenski. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner,
thank you so much, distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I
appreciate the opportunity to be part of today's conversation.
Latin America has become increasingly vulnerable to
authoritarian encroachment. Instead of being filled with
democratic friends and booming economies, America's backyard is
home to Russian bombers and mercenaries, 29 Chinese-owned ports
and port projects, a wide-spread Iran- and Russia-fueled anti-
U.S. propaganda, Chinese enabled-fentanyl and money-laundering
operations, wobbling and fallen democracies, and wide-spread
economic and political instability.
In the aftermath of 9/11, DHS could count on and leverage
the primacy of U.S. global leadership and economic influence to
address a range of foreign threats to the homeland. Two decades
later, our economic, trading, and monetary systems are being
weaponized against us by foreign adversaries and competitors
and in the process escalating the erosion of democratic rules
and norms. These threats impact not only our physical borders,
but our financial, digital, and trade borders.
Since 2008, Latin America has seen a greater decline of
democratic indicators than any other region globally.
Authoritarian regimes are driving migration to the Southern
Border in tremendous numbers, with migrants from Cuba,
Venezuela, and Nicaragua now outnumbering migrants from the
Northern Triangle of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. If
we seek to address root causes of migration and broader threats
to the national and economic security landscape, addressing
rising authoritarianism is a strategic imperative. But it also
means fighting back against a false narrative designed to
undermine the U.S. role in the region.
The challenge of authoritarian influence in Latin America
presents critical questions about how the United States can use
its economic and political power to drive stability,
opportunity, investment, and democratic principles. DHS has a
central role to play, but it requires an evolution of mindset
and operational readiness. The Department needs to further
prioritize its assessment of economic security threats, drive
more effective deployment of both physical and digital boots on
the ground, invest in securing new critical infrastructure,
improve border management tools, and have more access to
critical data. Finally, it requires a long-term commitment to
mutual security and economic benefit for the region, with more
purposeful engagement with allies and partners.
In my testimony I outlined several concrete actions that
DHS and the administration could undertake. One is to identify
and analyze a broader range of economic security threats as
core drivers of homeland security vulnerability. We need to
continue to shift the intelligence and analysis framework to
encompass a wider range of actors, threats, and data sources.
Second, reengaging and expanding private-sector supply
chain partnerships to improve information and data that
supports better intelligence gathering and analysis. We need
more and deeper partnerships with the private sector,
especially those involved in manufacturing, transporting,
importing, exporting, and investing in commercial operations
throughout Latin America. Extension of mechanisms like the
Authorized Economic Operator Program offers potential pathways
to work with more private-sector actors and have more access to
trade data.
Third, conducting a detailed review of China's multi-
layered influence on ports and trade infrastructure is
critical. DHS could lead or co-lead a comprehensive review of
vulnerabilities at Latin American ports, including links to
sanctioned entities, Chinese-made technology, assessment of 5G
networks, trade data information, China's operations and
maintenance strategies at ports, and assessing the risk of dual
use infrastructure.
Fourth, expanding the effectiveness of Trade Transparency
units. Trade Transparency Units, or TTUs, were established in
2004 to exchange trade data between the United States and
trading partners to better understand the risks of trade-based
money laundering. We really need to get at this problem, and
TTUs are a good way to do it. Increasing investigative work to
uncover Chinese money-laundering networks and financial
institutions supporting them is absolutely critical. As my
colleague Anthony Ruggiero and I have written, Congress should
authorize the President to impose a range of sanctions on the
facilitators who serve drug traffickers, including individuals
who are grossly negligent concerning financial transactions or
who export drug precursors.
Supporting legislation to counter kleptocracy and State-
sponsored corruption is also critical. Legislation such as the
Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, which was introduced in the
last Congress, could help with expanding anticorruption
enforcement tools and building on the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.
Finally, a broader strategy to ally shore with regional
partners can bring the benefit of new supply chains, emerging
technologies, and opportunities to drive higher levels of U.S.
and Western investment. DHS can help create the security
framework that facilitates deeper trade, economic engagement,
all of which is essential to protecting the homeland.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Dezenski follows:]
Prepared Statement of Elaine K. Dezenski
introduction
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished
Members of this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address
you today on countering threats posed by nation-state actors in Latin
America. I am pleased to provide relevant research and policy insights
from FDD's Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP), where I serve
as senior director and head.
CEFP, one of FDD's three centers on American power, was launched in
2014 to conduct cutting-edge research and promote strategies and
policies to bolster an effective economic security framework that
deters America's adversaries and protects U.S. national security
objectives. Our lines of research and analysis focus on countering
illicit finance, kleptocracy, and authoritarian corruption; economic
warfare, including sanctions, export controls, and regulatory guard
rails; new alliances for economic security; risks to USD primacy; and
global supply chain risk.
Today, I will touch on several examples of how authoritarian states
influence Latin America's political, economic, and security
dimensions--impacting stability in the region and driving mass
migration to the United States. Rising populism, slowing growth,
hyperinflation, crime, endemic corruption, organized crime, and
horrifying violence are displacing populations and changing the
economic and political dynamics. The influence of authoritarian regimes
in Latin America continues to grow, especially China's outsized
economic and political influence.
In the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
was created to take a more unified, ``whole-of-Government'' approach to
counter new and emerging asymmetric terrorist threats to the homeland.
I was honored to help stand up the Department as deputy and acting
assistant secretary for policy development and as director of the DHS
Office of Cargo and Trade Policy. Those first years forming a new
Department were both exhilarating and immensely challenging. We didn't
have a playbook for most decision making. But we could count on and
leverage the primacy of U.S. global leadership and economic influence,
which allowed us to take essential steps at home and abroad to protect
America from further attack.
Two decades later, we find ourselves in a new paradigm where
elements of the U.S.-led global economic, trading, and monetary systems
are being weaponized against us by foreign adversaries and competitors,
and in the process, escalating the erosion of democratic rules and
norms. The traditional terrorist threats evolved and persist, but now
we face additional and fundamentally different sets of threats to the
homeland that require new strategies and tactics--threats that are
attacking not only our physical borders but our financial, digital, or
trade borders as well.
overview: rising authoritarian threats throughout the hemisphere
A lack of a compelling and comprehensive U.S. vision for productive
engagement with Latin America has left our hemisphere vulnerable to
authoritarian encroachment and weakening economies. America's backyard,
instead of being filled with democratic friends and booming economies,
is home to Russian bombers and mercenaries, 29 Chinese-owned ports and
port projects, a wide-spread Iran- and Russia-fueled anti-U.S.
propaganda machinery, Chinese-enabled fentanyl and money-laundering
operations, wobbling and fallen democracies, and wide-spread economic
and political instability.
Over the last two decades, Latin America has seen wild swings from
left-wing populists to right-wing populists and back, all of which have
enabled corruption, disappointed their populations, and left the United
States with fewer stable partnerships across the region. In response,
Washington has settled into a hands-off approach to the region--
allowing Venezuela and Nicaragua to slide into dictatorships and
largely ignoring chaos in Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, and El Salvador.
Since 2008, Latin America has seen a greater decline in democratic
indicators than any other region in the world.
In addition to rising internal autocratic forces within Latin
America, external autocratic forces are imposing their will upon the
region with little in the form of a coordinated American response.
Russia and Iran are increasingly active throughout the Americas,
providing military assistance to Venezuela, evading sanctions in Cuba,
or pushing misinformation and destabilizing democracy. The rising
influence of authoritarianism throughout Latin America is pushing the
region toward totalitarianism and away from the stable and
interdependent democracies that would benefit both local citizens and
the hemisphere at large.
The true autocratic behemoth in the region, however, is China,
which has ramped up its economic investment throughout the hemisphere,
driving deep debt dependency while pushing an anti-democratic vision of
surveillance states and crumbling, corruption-driven infrastructure.
Ecuador has already discovered ``thousands'' of cracks in its new $3
billion Chinese-built and -financed hydroelectric dam. Chinese
organized crime, with tacit state support, is infiltrating Central
American drug trafficking and money-laundering operations--
supercharging both. China has become deeply interwoven in Latin
America's energy grids and critical infrastructure, putting basic
services at risk to the whims of Beijing. And China is increasing its
military engagement throughout the hemisphere, from booming weapons
sales and anti-riot police gear to joint exercises and training. The
United States needs a concrete strategy to address Chinese encroachment
throughout the region, whether through its illegal overfishing off of
South America's Pacific coast or its growing fentanyl operations
throughout Latin America.
America's cool relations with Central and South America have,
meanwhile, failed to capitalize on the tremendous promise of the region
and its critical role in American economic and national security. A
prosperous Latin America lowers the pressure on immigration to the
United States, offers critical supply chain advantages, and is rich
with resources and human talent that should catalyze 21st Century
technologies. Mexico has frequently benefited from U.S. efforts to
locate supply chains closer to home, but so much more could be done.
``Ally shoring'' shifts of U.S. manufacturing from Asia to Latin
America could promote prosperity throughout the region, lower costs for
American businesses, and reduce pressures contributing to political
instability and mass migration.
corruption, trade, critical minerals, and infrastructure: the bri's bad
deal
Trade between China and Latin America has skyrocketed over the last
two decades, increasing more than 25 times in that span. Over the next
decade, trade between China and the region is projected to double again
to over $700 billion. Chinese loans have also increased the debt burden
of Latin American countries by $138 billion. Much of that debt has come
from China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)--a program that promises
quick infrastructure and election-friendly megaprojects for which
leaders in the region have been eager to sign up. Latin America trails
only Asia in terms of BRI funding, having received more funding between
2005 and 2021 than Africa.
BRI projects are particularly appealing to the rulers of
overindebted countries with weak governance standards since BRI loans
provide no protection against corruption or limitations on
indebtedness. Unfortunately, while BRI mega-projects are appealing to
political leaders and their cronies, they have left a troubling legacy
of corruption, broken promises, substandard infrastructure, opaque
contractual terms, and mountains of debt.
In Ecuador, the $3.4 billion Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric
project was supposed to provide 1,500 megawatts of electricity for
Ecuador's people. Instead, Ecuadorian officials, including former
President Lenin Moreno, received more than $75 million in bribes, and
the citizens of Ecuador received a dam with at least 17,000 known
cracks--putting the entire project and the lives of locals living
downstream at risk. A million Ecuadorians were displaced to build the
dam. Now there is major doubt that it will ever be fully operational.
Still, the Chinese debt continues to get paid under opaque terms
that let Beijing walk away with 80 percent of Ecuador's oil--its most
valuable export. On top of that, China gets the oil at a massive
discount, allowing Beijing to resell the oil on the open market for a
profit that should be going to Ecuador.
China has been aggressive in its attempts to exploit Latin
America's abundant natural resources as it seeks to monopolize critical
supply chains vital to the world's energy future. China controls around
65 percent of global lithium processing and refining capacity. In South
America's Lithium Triangle of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, home to
over half of the world's known lithium reserves, China is working to
corner the market in all three countries.\1\
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\1\ Diana Roy, ``China's Growing Influence in Latin America,''
Council on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2023. (https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-
security-energy-bri); ``Ganfeng Global Layout,'' Gangfeng Lithium,
accessed June 16, 2023. (http://www.ganfenglithium.com/about3_en.html);
``Zijin Mining Completes Acquisition of Neo Lithium,'' ZiJin, February
5, 2022. (https://www.zijinmining.com/news/news-detail-119227.htm);
Ward Zhou, An Limin, Luo Guoping, and Lu Yutong, ``China consortium to
develop lithium deposits in Bolivia,'' Caixin (China), January 27,
2023. (https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/China-consortium-to-
develop-lithium-deposits-in-Bolivia); Antonio De la Jara, ``Tianqi buys
stake in lithium miner SQM from Nutrien for $4.1 billion,'' Reuters,
December 3, 2018. (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-tianqi-
lithium/tianqi-buys-stake-in-lithium-miner-sqm-from-nutrien-for-4-1-
billion-idUSKBN1O217F).
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American companies, meanwhile, are being sidelined under suspicious
circumstances. The U.S. company EnergyX, the only bidder in Bolivia to
successfully demonstrate its technology with a pilot plant on-site, was
disqualified from bidding after missing a deadline by 10 minutes. The
project was ultimately awarded to a consortium of Chinese companies.
Finally, a positive trading relationship between the United States
and Latin America has slowly been eroded and replaced with substantial
Chinese engagement. This has spurred Brazil to push to resurrect the
BRICS alliance as a non-America alternative trading and economic
engagement bloc. In particular, Brazil has been vocally promoting the
idea of pursuing a BRICS-based currency as an alternative to U.S.
dollar primacy and dollar-based trade, with others in Latin America,
such as Argentina and Venezuela, actively looking to join the alliance.
The United States, mobilizing its innovative private sector, has
much more to offer Latin America than an alliance with a moribund
Russia and a corrupting China can provide. To date, however, commercial
risk-aversion and U.S. Government disinterest has allowed China to
carve out a dominant economic relationship throughout the region, much
to the detriment of economic security in the Americas. The current
``Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity'' is an important
initiative that focuses on enhancing trade in this critical region, but
it needs resources. The United States must do more to engage
economically with others in the hemisphere, expanding and
reinvigorating free trade agreements and de-risking the environment for
private capital and companies. Strong private-sector engagement
combined with a U.S. reprioritization of the rule of law and
transparency in Latin America has the potential to substantially
stabilize conditions in the hemisphere and diminish the conditions that
contribute to U.S.-bound migration.
ports, logistics, data, and surveillance: logink, cranes, and 5g
China's 29 ports in Latin America control vast swaths of regional
trade, but China also manufactures 96 percent of all shipping
containers and 80 percent of the world's ship-to-shore cranes, and they
lead the world in shipping capacity. Ships, containers, and cranes are
only the beginning. Chinese-operated ports not only commercially link
Beijing to the world but also act as outposts for data gathering and
surveillance on a massive scale. China's port companies are legally
required to collect information for the Chinese Communist Party.
Data collection is happening everywhere in the ports and providing
China with a significant asymmetric advantage. Seemingly mechanical
shipping cranes are being investigated as spying tools. China's
logistical software system, LOGINK, is being used at ports around the
world and tracks a wide range of trade, market, and maritime
information, including: vessel and cargo status, customs information,
billing and payment data, geolocation data, price information,
regulatory filings, permits and driver's licenses, trade information,
and booking data--information that gives Beijing critical commercial
and geopolitical advantages. Chinese ports have 5G towers providing Wi-
Fi to cruise ship tourists, and China provides the operating systems
for the ports facility computers.
China's information advantage could permit Beijing to pinpoint
economic attacks on critical U.S. trade and supply chain
vulnerabilities. Even worse, China has knowledge and control over vast
amounts of maritime infrastructure that underlies the shipping of
Western military supplies, equipment, and components--cornering
logistical data that could severely undermine U.S. and allied military
capabilities in any potential conflict.
China's high-powered navy--now the largest in the world--also
maintains critical advantages by having access to a global web of
state-owned ports. Chinese commercial ports routinely host ships from
China's navy and could act as critical resupply points--providing a
massive tactical advantage in any potential conflict. China is,
moreover, actively pursuing civilian/military interoperability to make
infrastructure, such as its ports, even more militarily valuable.
Foreign ownership or control of global ports and their
informational infrastructure is not an intrinsic hazard. However, given
China's aggressively adversarial economic and geopolitical posture
toward the West, it is critical that risks of China port-ownership are
fully understood and mitigated. This must begin with understanding what
exactly China knows: what information it is collecting, what data
streams it has access to, and what state-sponsored intelligence
gathering is linked to its port operations.
The United States should also work closely with Canada and Mexico
to ensure that China's logistical advantages do not allow Beijing to
manipulate trade information in ways that undermine North American
security, such as promoting trade-based money laundering, disguising
fentanyl operations, aiding human trafficking, or contributing to other
national security trade risks. In the same vein, the United States has
an opportunity to collaborate with global allies that also face Chinese
port-related risks to comprehensively examine and test operations and
logistical systems to make sure that trade data is not being
compromised or weaponized.
fentanyl and money laundering: two sides of the same coin
The fentanyl crisis has tremendous consequences for the United
States. One hundred thousand Americans are dying from drug overdoses a
year--the vast majority of those from synthetic drugs like fentanyl.
That is more than all the deaths from car crashes and gun violence
combined. While most Americans understand the impact of fentanyl on our
communities, what is less understood is the sophisticated network of
internationally organized criminal syndicates, illicit precursor supply
chains, and Chinese money-laundering operations that underpin this
tragedy.
Fentanyl is unique, both in its lethal nature and in terms of the
victims it targets. By and large, fentanyl is not being used by the
general addict population but is much more likely to be used,
unknowingly, by children and first-time users that believe they are
buying legitimate pharmaceuticals, like Adderall or Vicodin . . . with
deadly consequences. By disguising fentanyl (which costs as little as
10 cents a pill to produce) as more profitable pharmaceuticals, Mexican
cartels make a killing by killing American kids.
Tragically, fentanyl is a drug crisis that is simultaneously a
money-laundering crisis, chewing up American children in the process.
Fentanyl, manufactured in Mexico from precursor chemicals imported
openly from China, is just one link in a money-laundering process that
is primarily designed to allow Chinese nationals circumvent China's
strict controls on taking cash out of the country. Chinese money
launders take dollars from the drug cartels, sell them to Chinese
expats for yuan, trade the yuan to Mexican businesses that trade with
China, taking pesos back, and then they sell the pesos back to the drug
cartels--with the money launderer taking a cut at every transaction.
One anonymous U.S. source described the Chinese operation as ``the most
sophisticated form of money laundering that's ever existed.''
We can no longer consider our border a physical barrier between the
United States and Mexico. Increasingly, our trade and financial borders
reach world-wide--and China is taking advantage, breaching those
borders at will. As Admiral Craig Fuller, commander of U.S. Southern
Command, said in 2021, Chinese money laundering is ``the No. 1
underwriter of transnational criminal organizations.'' As another
expert pointed has pointed out, China launders roughly half of the
world's illicit money, responsible for cleaning approximately $2
trillion in illicit proceeds a year.
Fortunately, the illicit finance backbone of the fentanyl trade is
also its greatest weakness. While interdicting tiny pills at the
physical border is nearly impossible, truckloads of cash are passing
right under our noses, running through our financial system and, often,
operating in plain sight. Building a strategy to follow and attack the
money, therefore, will do far more to stem the dramatic rise in
overdose deaths than any other drug enforcement strategy.
misinformation and rising authoritarianism
Authoritarian regimes are driving migration to the Southern Border
in tremendous numbers with migrants from Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua
now outnumbering even migrants from the Northern Triangle of Honduras,
El Salvador, and Guatemala. If we are seeking to address the root
causes of migration, addressing rising authoritarianism is a strategic
imperative. It also means fighting back against a false narrative
designed to undermine the U.S. role in the region.
Authoritarianism throughout the hemisphere is increasingly
supported and enabled by a sophisticated misinformation campaign by a
new Axis of Authoritarianism, most notably Russia, Iran, and Venezuela.
As Southern Command Administrator General Laura Richardson stated in
her 2022 Posture Statement to Congress, ``Russia intensifies
instability through its ties with Venezuela, entrenchment in Cuba and
Nicaragua, and extensive disinformation operations.''
Russia's main conduits for propaganda throughout Latin America are
Russia Today's Spanish language channel, Actualidad RT, and Sputnik's
Spanish channel, Sputnik Mundo. These are channels are then amplified
by the Venezuelan-led channel, TeleSur and the Iranian channel,
HispanTV, whose broadcasts to Spanish-speaking audiences are closely
intertwined with Russia's.
As pointed out by my colleague, Emanuele Ottolenghi, ``the Spanish
language media networks controlled by Iran, Russia, and Venezuela push
out conspiracy theories, fake news, whataboutism, and disinformation,''
whereby authoritarian governments package ``their imperialism as
resistance, their terrorism as anti-terrorism, and their
authoritarianism as democracy.''
Russia itself is transparent in its attempts to use propaganda as a
weapon of war to promote its narrative throughout Latin America and
build consensus for pro-authoritarian, anti-American policies. As the
editor-in-chief of Russia Today stated `` . . . not having your own
foreign broadcasting is like not having a Ministry of Defense. When
there is no war, it seems to be unnecessary. But damn, when there is a
war, it's downright critical.''
The reach of this propaganda is tremendous. RT's Spanish Twitter
account has 3.4 million followers. Its YouTube account has 5.9 million
subscribers. TeleSur's Twitter has 2 million followers.
The United States has not sanctioned any of these channels. It
should.
Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom have already
blocked RT and Sputnik with sanctions. After ordering the removal of
Russian state-owned media from internet search results, the European
Union imposed sanctions on RT and Sputnik in March 2022, and in May
2022, it banned additional Kremlin-backed media platforms, such as RTR
Planeta, Russia 24, and TV Centre.
But RT and Sputnik are still available on cable, the internet, and
social media, across the United States and throughout Latin America,
with significant, negative impact on global audiences. U.S. sanctions
could change that, severely degrading a key weapon to promote
authoritarian disinformation.
Hispanic TV is owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting
authority, or IRIB. The U.S. Department of Treasury has sanctioned
IRIB. As an IRIB subsidiary, HispanTV, should also be sanctioned.
Russian and Iranian regimes further boost Latin American
authoritarianism with military sales, joint exercises, direct funding,
and commercial engagement. Iranian warships were recently welcomed to
Rio de Janeiro, and 2 weeks ago, Iranian and Venezuelan officials
signed 25 separate memoranda of understanding on issues that could be
used for military cooperation or sanctions evasion. The United States
must do more to push authoritarian regimes out of Latin America.
recommendations
The challenge of authoritarian interference in Latin America
presents critical questions about how the United States can use its
vast economic and political power to drive stability, opportunity,
investment, and democratic principles. Most critically, we must
determine how we can leverage diplomatic and operational engagement in
the region to secure our borders, convey benefit to more people
throughout our hemisphere, and reinvigorate true democracy in the
process. The U.S. Government, in close and aligned partnership with the
private sector, must present a compelling vision for new economic
alliances and democracy-reinforcing engagements that push back against
the malign and corrupting influence of foreign authoritarian
governments from Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.
DHS has a central role to play. DHS and its relevant components can
implement a more effective strategy to understand, address, and
mitigate threats to the homeland emanating from Latin America. But it
requires a shift in mindset and thinking more creatively about the
tools available and new ones required. In general terms, this demands
that DHS:
Have a plan. DHS should implement a more robust economic
security threat assessment process that prioritizes foreign
adversaries and strategic competitor interests.
Show up. A risk-based approach to economic security threats
can drive more effective deployment of both physical and
digital boots on the ground for gathering intelligence and
information, especially at ports, and establishing core
relationships with government counterparts and private-sector
actors.
Bring resources. DHS must invest in its own critical
security infrastructure in the region and more directly support
USG efforts to bring more capital and private-sector partners
to strategic regional investments, especially in critical
supply chains, foreign commercial port operations, and other
strategic vectors where we have known vulnerabilities.
Commit. Long-term responses will send the right message to
partners and allies. The post-9/11 operational readiness and
investment strategies have largely fallen by the wayside. We
need to send a stronger message to friends and partners in the
region that we are committed to long-term partnerships.
Otherwise, China and other malign actors will wait us out.
More specifically, DHS can undertake the following concrete actions
to strengthen its efforts to combat malign authoritarian influence in
Latin America:
(1) Identify and analyze a broader range of economic security threats
as core drivers of homeland security vulnerability.
New and emerging threats across Latin America--from rising
authoritarianism, high-tech surveillance tactics, weaponized
corruption, and increasingly deadly drugs--leave our borders, and our
regional economic and security objectives, vulnerable to the malign
influence of adversaries and competitors, from both within and outside
of the Western Hemisphere. DHS must shift its intelligence and analysis
framework to encompass a wider range of new actors, threats, and data
sources to ensure that its intelligence and analysis anticipate a range
of interrelated national and economic threats in Latin America as
drivers of risk, vulnerability, and migration. The threat picture is
complex and nuanced, but, at the same time, these actors also exploit
existing mechanisms. Smuggling, trafficking, intellectual property
violations, illicit trade, disinformation campaigns, and money
laundering are flourishing and increasingly used by both transnational
criminal organizations (TCOs) and authoritarian state actors. These
tools are leveraged as mechanisms for strengthening criminal networks,
advancing anti-American political and economic objectives, and exerting
malign influence on the homeland. Meanwhile, threats from China's
massive infrastructure investment strategy and growing trade
relationships have dented U.S. economic leadership in the region while
co-opting foreign officials willing to go along with Beijing's wishes
and create unprecedented access to valuable natural resources,
commercial infrastructure, and military engagement. These new and
evolving vectors of risk should be more tightly woven into DHS's
existing threat analysis.
(2) Re-engage and expand private-sector supply chain partnerships to
improve information and data that supports better intelligence
gathering and analysis.
We need more and deeper partnerships with the private sector,
especially those involved in manufacturing, transporting, importing,
exporting, and investing in commercial operations and key supply chains
in Latin America. Much like the immediate post-9/11 environment, it is
critical to take a more collaborative approach to risk-based targeting
and effective use of data to maintain a real-time view at the ports and
across vital economic interests. But we need to evolve beyond legacy
terrorist threats. Extension of mechanisms like the Authorized Economic
Operator (AEO) program and additional Mutual Recognition Arrangements
(MRAs) offers potential pathways. Created after 9/11 as part of the
Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement, AEO is the equivalent of the Customs
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT, for non-U.S. entities.
Programs like AEO, if used effectively, can improve our ``ground game''
by connecting DHS with critical foreign-based private-sector
organizations willing to provide more advanced trade data and
information to CBP in exchange for expedited access at the borders. We
need more connectivity to information and engagement with supply chain
actors and operators that have access to valuable data streams. In some
cases, additional private sector-driven link analysis and analytics can
provide a much deeper view into the actions of individuals, entities,
competitors, and adversaries and our global supply chain vulnerability.
Working with AEOs and helping to grow private-sector participation in
such programs could be a significant contributor to better
informational and intelligence analysis.
(3) Conduct a detailed review of China's multi-layered influence on
ports and related critical trade infrastructure in Latin
America and strategies to counter that influence.
DHS and CBP should lead a comprehensive review of potential
vulnerabilities at Latin American ports, including mapping Chinese
ownership and links to the sanctioned entities; the implementation of
Chinese-made technology, including cranes, screening devices, logistics
software, and the security data associated with these capabilities; an
assessment of 5G network access and ownership, cyber risks, relevant
trade data information; understanding China's operations and
maintenance strategies and influence; assessing the risk of potential
dual-use infrastructure; and investigating illicit actors and entities
associated with critical infrastructure.
(4) Expand and enhance the effectiveness of Trade Transparency Units.
Trade Transparency Units (TTUs) were established in 2004 to
exchange trade data between the United States and its trade partners on
a bilateral basis and improve the understanding of trade-based money
laundering. TTUs should be resourced and supported as part of a broader
effort to counter the illicit financial pathways favored by
authoritarians.
As of 2020, the United States has trade transparency agreements--
the mechanisms that allow for the exchange of information between
jurisdictions--with over a dozen countries and their Trade Transparence
Units (TTUs), primarily in Central and South America. An April 2021 GAO
report recommended that DHS expand the number of agreements and
``develop a strategy for the TTU program to ensure ICE has a plan to
guide its efforts to effectively partner with existing TTUs, and to
expand the program, where appropriate, into additional countries.''
Concurrently, Congress must work with the administration to
strengthen the effectiveness of our own TTU. Another GAO report
released in December 2021 identified two critical deficiencies:
1. The establishment of an ``interagency collaboration mechanism to
promote greater information sharing and data analysis between
Federal agencies and with relevant private-sector entities on
issues related to trade-based money laundering and other
illicit trade schemes''; and
2. Ensuring that ICE take ``steps to enable and implement sharing
of the Trade Transparency Unit's trade data--including for the
purposes of trade data analysis about patterns or trends of
illicit activity related to trade-based money laundering and
similar schemes--with U.S. agencies with roles and
responsibilities related to enforcing trade laws and combating
illicit financial activity, as appropriate.''
As of today, these recommendations remain unresolved, with ICE
officials noting that the ``data-sharing agreements with foreign
countries prohibit the sharing of their information, and data-sharing
agreements among U.S. law enforcement agencies provide a mechanism to
request access and authorization if an agency needs access.'' Congress
should review DHS's authorities to find a way to streamline the
exchange of information between the United States and partner TTUs.
(5) Increase investigative work to uncover Chinese money-laundering
networks and the financial institutions supporting them.
As my colleague Anthony Ruggiero and I have written, Congress
should authorize the President to impose a range of sanctions on the
facilitators who serve the drug traffickers, including individuals who
are grossly negligent concerning financial transactions or export drug
precursors. DHS can play a role in this effort by surging its
investigative resources to identify entities involved in producing and
shipping precursor chemicals and supporting surge capacity with law
enforcement counterparts to investigate U.S.-based and foreign money-
laundering networks and associated persons and entities.
Congress should also enact so-called secondary sanctions targeting
those who do business with the primary targets of fentanyl sanctions.
Specifically, the law should impose sanctions on foreign financial
institutions that knowingly conduct or facilitate significant financial
transactions on behalf of a sanctioned person.
(6) Support legislation to counter kleptocracy and state-sponsored
corruption, such as the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act
(FEPA).
Corruption preys on weak regimes throughout Latin America, boosting
authoritarianism, destroying lives and livelihoods, undermining U.S.
interests, pushing out law-abiding U.S. companies, and facilitating
China's bribe-fueled incursions throughout the hemisphere. U.S.-based
and U.S.-listed companies face major consequences for bribing foreign
officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Corrupt officials,
however, get off scot-free, as do the Chinese companies and officials
bringing gift boxes filled with cash.
China is sidelining American companies in the race for critical
resources, partnerships, and contracts largely because corruption and
opacity are central features of Chinese engagement. In order to raise
the stakes for crooked foreign officials and narrow the window for
Chinese interference, Congress should consider expanding anti-
corruption law enforcement tools such as those found in the Foreign
Extortion Prevention Act (FEPA)--which would parallel the FCPA by
criminalizing bribe demands made of U.S. and U.S.-listed companies.
FEPA had strong bipartisan support in the last Congress, is
supported by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and a broad coalition of
civil society, and reflects a commitment included in the National
Security Council's Strategy on Countering Corruption.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ms. Dezenski.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Hernandez-Roy for his opening
statement of 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER HERNANDEZ-ROY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND
SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAS PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member
Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence, thank you
very much for allowing me to testify today on this important
subject.
The democratic, relatively prosperous, and largely pro-U.S.
nature of Latin America and the Caribbean has been a strategic
asset for the United States for decades. Yet the region today
is at a tipping point. There is a significant risk that it
could become a liability in strategic competition with China,
to a lesser extent Russia in the next decade.
In particular, the influence of extra regional
authoritarians, to include also Iran, has been on the rise
throughout Latin America. These actors pose an interlocking
challenge to regional and by extension, U.S. security. While
each possesses different capabilities and long-term objectives,
they often coordinate both informally and formally to challenge
U.S. influence in the region. It is therefore important to view
these three actors not in isolation, but how their behaviors
reinforce and interrelate.
Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran each espouse different
geopolitical goals and world views, yet they have shown an
alarming degree of convergence when it comes to effort efforts
at fomenting discord and disruption within the United States'
shared neighborhood. Such efforts come both through support for
overt authoritarians, especially the dictatorial regimes of
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, but also where they cannot
totally pull countries out of the U.S. orbit. These regimes
seek to peel away once staunch U.S. allies and convert them
into comparatively neutral bystanders. This can be seen with
the rhetoric of the government of Brazil ascribing blame to
both Ukraine and Russia for the war. In Argentina, Brazil and
longstanding ally Colombia's refusal to sell Soviet legacy
weapons to help Ukraine defend itself. It is noteworthy that no
Latin American country, save Costa Rica, has joined the
international sanctions effort against Russia. Russia's brutal
and illegal invasion of Ukraine has caused autocracies the
world over to close ranks and sharpen their competition with
the United States and with fellow democratic allies.
From a Russian nuclear capable strategic bomber visiting
Caracas a few years ago to more recent developments, such as
the docking of Iranian warships in Brazil, to possible Iranian
drone manufacturing in Venezuela for use against Ukraine, to
revelations about Chinese espionage activities against the
United States from Cuba and reported overtures to Haiti by the
notorious Russian Wagner group. All have plainly illustrated
the risks to U.S. security that come from allowing
dictatorships to proliferate and coordinate their activities.
I should just add that yesterday it was revealed that China
and Cuba are also discussing military training on the island,
which might bring Chinese troops to the island.
Another comparatively underappreciated dimension is the
role authoritarian alliances in helping dictators remain in
power and repress their populations more effectively,
accelerating mass irregular migration to the detriment of the
region at large. The most dramatic example, of course, comes
from Venezuela, where over 7.3 million people have left the
country to escape Nicolas Maduro's gross mismanagement, misery,
and repression. He remains in power, shored up by arms and
intelligence from Russia, China, and Cuba and his sanctions
evading oil trade with Iran.
Nicaragua has also seen a dramatic uptake in outward
migration, with 600,000 people fleeing since the murderous
state crackdown in 2018, creating an acute crisis in
neighboring Costa Rica, while U.S. apprehensions of Nicaragua
at the Southern Border have multiplied by a factor of more than
50 in the last 2 years. Cuba, the longest-standing dictatorship
in the hemisphere continues to send migrants as the country's
economy reels and as the regime further clamps down on dissent
following the massive protests held on the island in July 2021.
The regime in Venezuela has taken advantage of the mass
exodus of its people and the generous humanitarian responses
from neighboring countries to send its spies abroad to continue
to harass and persecute Venezuelan opposition figures in
Colombia, for instance. Thus a U.S. adversary has taken
advantage of this human wave to conceal the entry of spies into
a traditional U.S. ally. This begs the question of what more
sophisticated U.S. adversaries like China and Russia might be
doing to take advantage of the historic migration flows across
the U.S. Southern Border.
The presence of dictatorial regimes within the Western
Hemisphere offers a springboard for extra hemispheric
authoritarians to expand their influence, co-opting, coercing,
and manipulating other countries in the region to undermine
their relations with the United States, often empowering
antidemocratic forces in the process.
These challenges should not cause us to estimate the
considerable advantages we still possess when it comes to
geopolitical competition in the Hemisphere. Latin America, on
the whole, still looks to the United States as its preferred
partner. If the United States seizes the opportunity to present
a comprehensive, well-resourced counteroffer, the region will
consider it seriously. Crafting such a response, however, will
require a sustained and forward-looking strategy for
engagement, which to date has unfortunately appeared lacking
from the U.S. Government, which has long turned to the region
only in response to crisis and neglected it at other times.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Hernandez-Roy follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher Hernandez-Roy
June 21, 2023
Chair Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished Members
of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence, I am very grateful for this opportunity to testify before
you today. The views represented in this testimony are my own and
should not be taken as representing those of my current or former
employers.
The democratic, relatively prosperous and largely pro-U.S. nature
of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been a strategic asset for
the United States for decades. Yet, the region today is at a tipping
point; there is a significant risk that it could become a liability in
strategic competition with China and to a lesser extent Russia in the
next decade. In particular, the influence of extra-hemispheric
authoritarians, including Iran, has been on the rise throughout LAC.
These actors pose interlocking challenges to regional, and by extension
U.S. security. While each possesses different capabilities and long-
term objectives, they often coordinate both informally and formally to
challenge U.S. influence in the region. It is therefore important to
view these three actors not in isolation, but how their behaviors
reinforce and interrelate. Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran each espouse
different geopolitical goals and world views, yet they have shown an
alarming degree of convergence when it comes to efforts at fomenting
discord and disruption within the United States' shared neighborhood.
Such efforts come both through support for overt authoritarians,
especially the dictatorial regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela,
but also where they cannot totally pull countries out of the U.S.
orbit, these regimes seek to peel away once staunch U.S. allies and
convert them into comparatively neutral bystanders. This can be seen
with the rhetoric of the government of Brazil, ascribing blame to both
Ukraine and Russia for the war, and in Argentina, Brazil, and long-
standing ally Colombia's refusal to sell Soviet legacy weapons to help
Ukraine defend itself. It is noteworthy that no LAC country, save Costa
Rica, has joined the international sanctions effort against Russia for
its war of aggression.
Russia's brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine has caused
autocracies the world over to close ranks and sharpen their competition
with the United States and fellow democratic allies.\1\ Indeed, recent
developments in the region, from the docking of Iranian warships in
Brazil, to revelations about Chinese espionage activities in Cuba, and
overtures to Haiti by the notorious Russian Wagner group, have plainly
illustrated the risks to U.S. security that come from allowing
dictatorships to proliferate and coordinate their activities. Another
comparatively under-appreciated dimension is the role of authoritarian
alliances in helping dictators remain in power and repress their
populations more effectively, accelerating mass irregular migration to
the detriment of the region at large.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Carlos Solar, ``Is Russia's War in Ukraine Aiding the Survival
of the Venezuelan Regime?'', The RUSI Journal, 2023, 1-12, https://
doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2195751.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The most dramatic example of this comes from Venezuela, where over
7.3 million people have left the country as a result of the profound
economic, security, and humanitarian crises brought on by the regime of
Nicolas Maduro's gross mismanagement and repression.\2\ Maduro
nevertheless remains in power, shored up by arms and intelligence from
Russia and China, and a sanctions-evading oil trade with Iran.
Nicaragua has also seen dramatic upticks in outward migration, creating
an acute crisis in neighboring Costa Rica, while U.S. apprehensions of
Nicaraguans at the Southern Border have multiplied by a factor of more
than 50 between fiscal years 2020 and 2022.\3\ Even Cuba, the longest-
standing dictatorship in the hemisphere, has seen record-setting levels
of migration as the country's economy continues to reel and as the
regime further clamps down on dissent following the massive protests on
the island in July 2021.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela,'' R4V, accessed June
16, 2023, https://www.r4v.info/en/refugeeandmigrants.
\3\ Charles G. Ripley III, ``Crisis Prompts Record Emigration from
Nicaragua, Surpassing Cold War Era,'' Migration Policy Institute, March
7, 2023, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/record-emigration-
nicaragua-crisis.
\4\ Ed Augustin and Frances Robles, `` `Cuba Is Depopulating':
Largest Exodus Yet Threatens Country's Future,'' The New York Times,
December 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/10/world/americas/
cuba-us-migration.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Furthermore, the presence of dictatorial regimes within the Western
Hemisphere offers a springboard for extra-hemispheric authoritarians to
expand their influence, co-opting, coercing, and manipulating other
countries in the region to undermine their relations with the United
States, often empowering anti-democratic forces in the process.
These challenges should not cause the United States to
underestimate the considerable advantages it still possesses when it
comes to geopolitical competition in the hemisphere. LAC on the whole
still looks to the United States as its preferred partner. If the
United States seizes the opportunity to present a comprehensive, well-
resourced counteroffer, the region will consider it seriously. Crafting
such a response however will require a sustained, and forward-looking
strategy for engagement with LAC which to date has unfortunately
appeared lacking from a United States Government which has long turned
to the region only in response to crisis and neglected it at all other
times.
russia: the great disruptor
Facing resource constraints which have only grown more acute in the
wake of its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia nevertheless
evidences a brazen disregard for international norms and law in its
efforts to disrupt the security of the United States and allies,
including in the Western Hemisphere. While Russia cannot compete with
China or the United States in provision of raw economic assistance, it
makes up for this through the sheer diversity of avenues in which
Moscow seeks to advance its interests by any means necessary.
Russian influence in the region primarily comes from security ties,
fostered through Moscow's global arms industry which countries across
Latin America have relied upon in the past to fill their armories with
cheap, reliable weapons and equipment. In June 2022, Nicaragua renewed
the mandate for Russian military forces to operate within its borders.
Russia also maintains a number of GLONASS satellite positioning
stations, with one outside of Managua and another scheduled to be
deployed in Venezuela.\5\ The infamous Wagner private military
contractor has also set up shop in Venezuela, providing security for
Maduro and training the Venezuelan armed forces.\6\ The role of this
shadowy state-affiliated mercenary group is cause for elevated concern
especially as leaked U.S. intelligence reports have indicated the group
also explored contracts to provide security in Haiti. More recently,
reports have circulated of Cuban citizens living in Russia signing up
to fight in Ukraine, while Havana and Russian client state Belarus
recently inked a deal for Cuban forces to help train the Belarussian
military.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Julieta Pelcastre, ``Russia to Install Satellite Navigation
System in Venezuela,'' Dialogo Americas, September 22, 2022, https://
dialogo-americas.com/articles/russia-to-install-satellite-navigation-
system-in-venezuela/#.ZBuGhHbMJPY.
\6\ Brian Katz, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas
Harrington, ``The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies,''
CSIS, September 2020, https://russianpmcs.csis.org/.
\7\ Evan Dyer, ``Cornered in Ukraine and isolated by the West, the
Kremlin returns to Cuba,'' CBC, June 3, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/
politics/russia-cuba-ukraine-putin-missiles-1.6863359.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cybersecurity is another vulnerability which Russia has proven
adept at exploiting. This in some respects can be traced to a lack of
awareness across the region as to the vulnerabilities faced from
infiltration by malign foreign actors. This extends even to regional
ministries and national defense institutions. The Brazilian military
for instance relies on Russian firm Kaspersky Lab for data protection
services, even to the point of renewing its contract the summer of 2022
as the war in Ukraine raged.\8\ Russian cyber actors have also used
their technologies to interfere in elections in Chile, Colombia,
Ecuador, and Peru, among others. This has mostly taken the form of
disinformation and amplifying polarizing voices and showcases Moscow's
well-developed mis- and disinformation tactics. Such capabilities are
further augmented by ostensibly aboveboard news outlets. RT en espanol
and Sputnik Mundo, Russia's Spanish-language mouthpieces, have over 30
million viewers in Latin America and the Caribbean, with media
agreements to operate in 11 countries.\9\ Russia's ability to exploit
mis- and disinformation opportunistically was on display recently when
images from Mexico of cartel soldiers wielding U.S.-made AT-4 anti-tank
missile launchers began circulating on social media. Russian sources,
amplified by Moscow's embassy in Mexico City, seized on the narrative
that these launchers were redirected from U.S. arms shipments to
Ukraine, pushing false claims that the war there was fueling Mexico's
internal security challenges.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ ``Kaspersky: `Now we have to explain the political issues',''
BNAmericas, June 15, 2022, https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/
kaspersky-now-we-have-to-explain-the-political-issues.
\9\ Calos Malamud, Mira Milosevich-Juaristi, and Rogelio Nunez,
``Latin America in the Ukraine crisis: a pawn in the game for Putin's
resurgent Russia,'' Real Instituto Elcano, March 3, 2022, https://
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/latin-america-in-the-ukraine-
crisis-a-pawn-in-the-game-for-putins-resurgent-russia/.
\10\ ``Propaganda: Russian Embassy in Mexico Accuses Ukraine of
Arming Mexican Cartels with US Weapons,'' Puerto Vallarta Daily News,
June 2, 2023, https://www.vallartadaily.com/propaganda-russian-embassy-
in-mexico-accuses-ukraine-of-arming-mexican-cartels-with-us-weapons/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russia's on-going war has also touched off a wave of migration, as
thousands of mostly young, educated Russians flee the country by
increasingly circuitous and dangerous routes to avoid being drafted to
fight in Ukraine. The number of Russian nationals encountered at the
United States' border quadrupled between 2021 and 2022. Russians
seeking entry to the United States often transit through Mexico due to
significantly easier visa requirements.\11\ While these outflows
underscore the unpopularity of Moscow's war, they create novel
challenges for North American security as well. Rising levels of
Russian migrants through Mexico open new revenue streams for criminal
groups engaged in human smuggling. Those fleeing Russia are not the
only newcomers to Mexico, which, according to U.S. Northern Command, is
home to the largest concentration of GRU agents outside of Russia.\12\
Weaknesses in screenings of Russians seeking asylum may therefore
present new avenues for Moscow to infiltrate and disrupt the United
States itself, to say nothing of the corrosive effects on regional
security Russian espionage has already produced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Yulia Vorobyeva, ``Entrepreneurial newcomers: Russian-speaking
migrant smugglers on the U.S. southern border,'' Global Initiative
Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 11, 2023, https://
globalinitiative.net/analysis/russian-migrant-smugglers-us-southern-
border/.
\12\ MDN Staff, ``More Russian spies in Mexico than any other
country: US defense official,'' Mexico News Daily, March 25, 2022,
https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/more-russian-spies-mexico-us/.
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china: civil-military fusion
The People's Republic of China (PRC) engages with LAC first and
foremost through an economic framework. Between 2000 and 2020, the
PRC's share of trade with the region grew eightfold, and China's
signature Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) has successfully garnered some
21 signatories in the hemisphere. Nevertheless, viewing Beijing's
relationship to the Western Hemisphere solely as one of trade obscures
many of the more nefarious activities which have emerged as part and
parcel of expanded PRC engagement.
The PRC's interests in LAC are manifold. Broadly speaking, LAC is
vital to China's economic development, as it is home to extensive
deposits of natural resources, including minerals and metals such as
copper and lithium, as well as petroleum products. LAC is also key for
China's food security, with the region representing much of the PRC's
food imports.\13\ Increasingly, as China's economy cools off from its
previous red-hot growth, China is turning toward LAC countries not
merely for their raw materials, but as a base of consumers eager to
purchase Chinese-manufactured products. Geopolitically, China has long
been fixated on the region as home to the majority of sovereign states
that continue to recognize Taiwan. The PRC has assiduously chipped away
at this number, and three Central American countries--Panama, El
Salvador, and Nicaragua--have switched diplomatic recognition from
Taiwan to China since 2017. So too has the nearby Caribbean Island
nation of Dominican Republic, and in March 2023, the government of
Xiomara Castro in Honduras recognized the PRC, opening an Embassy in
Beijing on June 11; a move which brought the total number of Taiwanese
diplomatic allies in the region down to just 7 countries. In Guatemala
as well, which is headed toward Presidential elections at the end of
June, outward support for Taiwan may nevertheless belie an internal
calculus where recognition is far more contingent. Should recognition
of Taiwan slip further in the hemisphere, the PRC will in all
likelihood be further emboldened in its rhetoric and provocations
directed toward the island.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Ryan C. Berg, and Thiago de Aragao ``Is Latin America
Important to China's Foreign Policy?,'' CSIS, CSIS Commentary,
September 9, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/latin-america-
important-chinas-foreign-policy.
\14\ Leland Lazarus and Ryan C. Berg, ``What Taiwan Can Learn from
Honduras's Switch to China,'' Foreign Policy, March 31, 2023, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/31/latin-america-taiwan-china-honduras-
united-states-diplomacy-tsai/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the PRC has clear strategic interests underpinning its focus
on LAC, China's engagement in the hemisphere is largely regime-
agnostic. Nevertheless, high levels of PRC engagement have been
associated with worrying trends in recipient countries' democratic
health. China often acts as a ``lender of last resort,'' bankrolling
authoritarian governments when other sources of financing will not
touch these. The China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of
China offered in excess of USD $137 billion to the region in loans to
various sectors, Venezuela being the single greatest recipient of
Chinese loans at USD $60 billion.\15\ Furthermore, China's public
security initiatives have raised concerns after the PRC's ``safe
cities'' surveillance technology was associated with crackdowns on
opposition parties in countries like Ecuador under the Correa
government, to say nothing of China's assistance with social control
and digital monitoring in Venezuela.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ ``China-Latin America Finance Databases,'' The Inter-American
Dialogue, Accessed June 16, 2022, https://www.thedialog.org/map_list/.
\16\ Jaime Moreno, ``China Seen Backing `Digital Authoritarianism'
in Latin America,'' VOA, January 14, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/
china-seen-backing-digital-authoritarianism-in-latin-america-/
6398072.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Military and security collaboration is also a growing aspect of
Chinese activity in LAC. China has sold equipment to military and
police forces from countries historically opposed to the United
States--such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia--as well as close American
partners like Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador. Venezuela, however, is by
far the region's largest buyer of PRC arms. Between 2009 and 2019, $615
million in weapons was sold to Venezuela.\17\ China could be poised to
make greater arms sales to fill a vacuum left by Russia needing to keep
supplies at home due to its invasion of Ukraine. In addition to
military sales, the People's Liberation Army has a burgeoning presence
in the region, which it maintains through training and visits,
permitting it greater familiarity with countries' operational
frameworks and preparedness, as well as their strategic doctrine and
training routines. China has furthermore exploited a paucity of U.S.
police assistance in the region, coupling this with the dire security
crises faced by countries throughout the hemisphere, to advance its own
model of security assistance.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ Lara Seligman, ``U.S. Military Wary of China's Foothold in
Venezuela,'' Foreign Policy, April 8, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/
2019/04/08/us-military-wary-of-chinas-foothold-in-venezuela-maduro-
faller-guaido-trump-pentagon/.
\18\ Brian Fonseca and Leland Lazarus, ``China Is Exploiting a U.S.
Police Void in Latin America,'' Foreign Policy, April 27, 2023, https:/
/foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/27/cities-summit-americas-united-states-
china-police-safe-city-bri/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While China leads with trade and investment, security concerns are
never far off, as one report by the Asia Society outlines how China
employs ``civil-military fusion'' in its development projects, ensuring
that they are designed to specifications that offer both commercial and
military advantages.\19\ In Latin America, this manifests in projects
like the Espacio Lejano space research station in Argentina, which is
effectively off-limits to inspection by Argentine authorities. Analysts
have noted that, while certainly capable of its stated purpose of deep
space scientific research, the station could readily be used for
satellite telemetry tracking and control, collecting signals
intelligence, and even potentially missile guidance, tools which would
serve China well in a potential conflict scenario.\20\ Even further
south, the PRC is seeking to expand its presence with a new agreement
between Chinese state-owned Shaanxi Chemical Industry Group Co. Ltd.
and the province of Tierra del Fuego to begin construction on a port in
Ushuaia, a key gateway to the Antarctic, and strategic chokepoint along
the Drake Passage and Strait of Magellan.\21\ In Peru, a mega-port is
being built by a state-owned company from China which will become a key
link between China and Latin America, ensuring Chinese supply chains of
metals, critical minerals and agricultural products.\22\ General Laura
Richardson in recent testimony before Congress has also raised concerns
that Chinese-constructed infrastructure along the Panama Canal could be
easily turned to military purposes in the event of a conflict or crisis
scenario.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Daniel R. Russel and Blake H. Berger, ``Weaponizing the Belt
and Road Initiative,'' The Asia Society Policy Institute, September
2020, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/weaponizing-belt-and-
road-initiative.
\20\ Matthew P. Funaiole, Dana Kim, Brian Hart, Joseph S. Bermudez
Jr., ``Eyes on the Skies: China's Growing Space Footprint in South
America,'' CSIS, Hidden Reach no. 1, October 4, 2022, https://
features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space/.
\21\ Laureano Perez Izquierdo, ``Avanza el puerto de China en
Tierra del Fuego: el gobernador ratifico con un decreto el memorandum
con el regimen,'' Infobae, June 8, 2023, https://www.infobae.com/
politica/2023/06/08/avanza-el-puerto-de-china-en-tierra-del-fuego-el-
gober- nador-ratifico-con-un-decreto-el-memorandum-con-el-regimen/.
\22\ Tibisay Zea, ``A state-owned company from China is building a
massive commercial port in Peru'', PRI The World, September 20, 2022,
https://theworld.org/stories/2022-09-20/state-owned-company-china-
building-massive-commercial-port-peru.
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Finally, approximately 100 miles off the coast of Florida, the
White House has now confirmed the presence of a PRC-run base, replete
with long-range radars and other electronic surveillance equipment
directed toward the United States.\23\ The revelations underscore how
the PRC utilizes its economic heft to extract far more expansive
geopolitical advantage. Cuba, undergoing its most severe economic
crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union, reportedly accepted
billions of dollars from China to take over and upgrade the facility in
a trade which was likely too good to refuse for Havana.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Dave Sherwood and Matt Spetalnick, ``Las imagenes de la base
cubana que China utiliza para espiar a Estados Unidos y el testimonio
de los vecinos: `Aqui se sabe todo','' Infobae, June 14, 2023, https://
www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/06/14/las-imagenes-de-la-
base-de-espionaje-china-en-cuba-y-el-testimonio-de-los-vecinos-aqui-se-
sabe-todo/.
\24\ Walter Russell Mead, ``Russia, China, and Iran in America's
Backyard,'' The Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2023, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/adversaries-in-americas-backyard-china-russia-
cuba-spy-base-iran-monroe-9504c189.
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As with Russia, a growing trend of Chinese nationals seeking
respite from repressive policies at home have been pursuing circuitous
routes to the United States by way of LAC countries. According to U.S.
Customs and Border Patrol data, more than 4,000 Chinese nationals were
encountered between October 2022 and February 2023 at the Southern
Border, a dramatic uptick from the 421 encounters reported during the
same period from 2021 and 2022.\25\ Typically, these individuals arrive
via countries like Ecuador which does not have a visa requirement for
Chinese citizens to visit. From there, they travel a long and often
dangerous road, together with tens of thousands of Latin American and
Caribbean migrants transiting the Darien Gap between Colombia and
Panama.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Alicia Chen, ``Growing numbers of Chinese citizens set their
sights on the US--via the deadly Darien Gap,'' The Guardian, March 8,
2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/09/growing-numbers-of-
chinese-citizens-set-their-sights-on-the-us-via-the-deadly darien-gap.
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iran: opportunistic encroachment
Often viewed as a secondary, or even tertiary player in the
hemisphere, Iran's engagement with LAC exacerbates many of the
challenges outlined above. The continued global sanctions regime
against Iran limits its tools for influence and has largely relegated
Iranian influence in the hemisphere to Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba,
which are already willing to flaunt U.S. sanctions. Here, Iranian
engagement has a complementary effect to more well-established and
substantive Russian and Chinese efforts.
The docking of Iranian warships in Rio di Janeiro in March 2023 and
high-level visits by Iranian officials to Caracas and Managua and
Havana suggest Iran is seeking to project military power throughout the
region in addition to economic benefit. Diplomatically, it appears
Iranian Foreign Minister, Hosein Amir Abdolahian's February 2023 tour
of the hemisphere's dictatorships was a preview for an even greater
engagement, as President Ebrahim Raisi began making the same circuit of
visits on June 12.\26\ In the past, Iran allegedly sent members of its
Quds Force to help Nicolas Maduro stay in power, including with arms
shipments.\27\ Informed observers have speculated that in return,
Maduro may be shipping Venezuelan-made kamikaze drones, or their parts,
on regular triangular flights between Venezuela, Tehran, and
Moscow.\28\
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\26\ Arturo McFields, '' Latin America's tyrants open their arms to
Iran,'' The Hill, June 11, 2023, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-
security/4043440-latin-americas-tyrants-open-their-arms-to-iran/.
\27\ Michael R. Gordon and Ian Talley, ``Iranian Arms, Fighters
Bolster Maduro Government in Venezuela, U.S. Says'', The Wall Street
Journal, December 2, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-arms-
fighters-bolster-maduro-government-in-venezuela-u-s-says-11606946275?-
mod=lead_feature_below_a_pos1.
\28\ Farzin Nadimi, ``Iran May Be Outsourcing Kamikaze Drone
Production to Venezuela'', The Washington Institute for Near East
Policy, November 17, 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/iran-may-be-outsourcing-kamikaze-drone-production-venezuela.
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Another security concern is the continued presence of Hezbollah in
Latin America. The group's origins in the region extends back decades,
where they were originally concentrated around the Southern Cone,
especially the tri-border area of Paraguay. Today, Hezbollah operations
have shifted northwards, mainly to Venezuela where they have a
sympathetic backer in the form of the Maduro regime.\29\ The group has
been responsible for helping Maduro launder gold as well, with Israeli
intelligence revealing in February 2023 the existence of a gold
smuggling operation between Caracas and Tehran facilitated by
Hezbollah.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\29\ Matthew Levitt, ``Iranian and Hezbollah Operations in South
America: Then and Now,'' National Defense University, PRISM 5, no. 4
(2016): https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5_4/
Iranian%20and%20Hezbollah.pdf.
\30\ Amir Bohbot, ``Secret Hezbollah gold trade in South America
foiled by Israeli intelligence,'' The Jerusalem Post, February 26,
2023, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-732802.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
cross-cutting themes
All three extra-hemispheric authoritarian regimes recognize that
their goals in Latin America are aligned for the time being, and all
have a vested interest in sustaining anti-U.S. regimes, and disrupting
U.S. security. In many cases, there is strong complementarity between
the interests of these authoritarians. China for instance has high
demand for cheap oil, while both Iran and Venezuela need to find
clients willing to buy their energy exports in the face of sanctions.
At other times, cooperation among autocrats gives different regimes the
ability to defray costs and deflect responsibility. Russia for example
can supply Nicaragua with arms and equipment while entrusting the
training of its repressive apparatus to Venezuelan and Cuban
officials.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\31\ Julieta Pelcastre, ``Cuban Agents Advise Nicaraguan
Military,'' Dialogo Americas, August 10, 2019, https://dialogo-
americas.com/articles/cuban-agents-advise-nicaraguan-military/
#.ZBuL93bMJPY.
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Accordingly, it must be understood that autocrats around the world
follow a similar ``playbook'' of policies for how to take and hold
power, clamp down on dissent, and survive in the face of international
pressure. Nicaragua's Foreign Agents Law for instance was closely
modeled after Russia's, allowing it to clamp down and expel dissenting
voices.\32\ Cybersecurity and the information space more broadly
represent key vulnerabilities that malign authoritarians view as entry
points for influence, many countries in the region still do not take
their data security seriously enough.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\32\ Ryan C. Berg, ``Nicaragua's Upcoming Election Highlights Need
for Long-Term Forms of Pressure on the Ortega Regime,'' CSIS, CSIS
Commentary, August 6, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nicaraguas-
upcoming-election-highlights-need-long-term-forms-pressure-ortega-
regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Another common thread is the linkage between authoritarian regimes
and migration. Dictatorships are associated with a number of push
factors for migration, the most basic of which is the simple reality
that most people do not wish to live under unaccountable and repressive
governments. This is evidenced today by the thousands of Russian and
Chinese nationals who have uprooted and risked their lives in an
attempt to find better conditions oceans away. Autocracies also drive
migration by adopting poor economic policies and channeling resources
to inner circles while the rest of the country languishes. Venezuela is
perhaps the archetypical case of such gross economic mismanagement
producing the world's largest migration crisis outside of an active war
zone. Authoritarianism is part and parcel of the root causes of
migration, and ought to be treated as such in any U.S. response.
recommendations
The 2022 National Security Strategy notes that ``No region impacts
the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere.''\33\
Unfortunately, resources and political capital have not been
commensurate with the scale of the threat posed by the interlocking
efforts of Russia, China, and Iran, along with regional authoritarians.
A comprehensive resource-backed approach to LAC is urgently needed if
the region is to be secure, democratic, and prosperous. This would
include, as one example, revising Development Finance Corporation rules
to allow financing of projects in middle income counties of the region,
especially given the huge disparities in development within different
LAC countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\33\ White House, National Security Strategy, 22. White House.
National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington,
DC: White House, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-
Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
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Strengthen Regional Migration Responses.--Irregular migration
remains one of the most profound challenges affecting the entire
Western Hemisphere. As authoritarian regimes the world over contribute
to mass outflows of people, the United States has an important
leadership role to play in identifying and advancing solutions to
manage migration, protect the security and rights of individuals in
transit, and support host countries. At the same time, the United
States should encourage countries with visa-free entry policies for
Russian and Chinese nationals to reexamine their screening processes to
prevent the espionage apparatuses of these regimes from gaining access
to the United States and allies under the guise of humanitarian need.
The opening of new migration processing centers in Colombia and
Guatemala in this respect represents an important step forward. Reports
of Russian efforts to negotiate visa-free entry with Mexico and a
number of Caribbean states should also come as cause for concern, and
the United States should be active in opposing measures which could
facilitate the entry of Russian government agents into the region.
Invest in Digital Capabilities.--Cyber vulnerabilities not only
create practical information security risks that damage the national
security of Latin American and Caribbean countries, but a lack of
general knowledge on cybersecurity opens the door to malign foreign
powers offering facile solutions. SOUTHCOM, in partnership with
CYBERCOM, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
(CISA), can lead training with partner countries to outline key risks,
and the elements of a better strategy to counter cyber threats.
Counter the Dictator's Playbook.--As it becomes increasingly
apparent that autocrats both within LAC and beyond are borrowing from a
shared ``playbook'' of policies and tactics for maintaining their grip
on power, the United States must double down on efforts to coordinate a
response among like-minded democracies to counter instances of
autocratization. Such a ``democratic playbook'' should include measures
such as helping to strengthen democratic institutions, early warning
signs for civil society watchdogs to track, forums like the Summit for
Democracies which allow international coordination to pressure
dictatorships, as well as a reexamination of how U.S. sanctions policy
can be more effectively deployed against dictators and would-be
autocrats.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Hernandez-Roy.
The Chair now recognizes Ms. Brandt for her opening
statement of 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JESSICA BRANDT, POLICY DIRECTOR, ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, FELLOW,
FOREIGN POLICY, STROBE TALBOTT CENTER FOR SECURITY, STRATEGY,
AND TECHNOLOGY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ms. Brandt. Thank you, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member
Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee for
inviting me to address you today on the threat posed by nation-
state actors in Latin America to U.S. security.
With geopolitical competition resurgent, considerable
attention has been paid to Russian and Chinese playbooks and
authoritarianism more broadly. As has been widely documented,
Moscow and Beijing use a suite of low-cost deniable tools and
tactics to conduct influence operations designed to undermine
their democratic competitors and make the world safe for
illiberalism. But Russia and China each apply the tool kit
differently in Latin America than in their respective home
regions. Within Latin America, they operate distinctly from one
another in ways that reflect their unique capabilities and
goals. Developing a coherent strategy to push back on Russia
and China's coercive activities depends on an appreciation of
these nuances.
Importantly, although Moscow and Beijing share certain
near-term objectives, the two are operating on different
trajectories and time horizons toward different long-term aims.
Russia is a declining power by many measures, which seeks to
disrupt the partnerships and institutions of its mostly Western
competitor states here and now as a means of gaining relative
advantage. With little to lose and perhaps something to gain
for exposure from its asymmetric activities, it's not
particularly sensitive to attribution. Seeing the benefits of
chaos abroad, its efforts tend to be destructive.
China, by contrast, is a rising power with a great deal to
lose from having its coercive activities laid bare. It does not
seek disorder, but rather a new order more conducive to its
interests, and so its efforts to change the status quo have
tended to be more patient.
These nuances carry over into the ways that Russia and
China have conducted information operations targeting audiences
in the region. Whereas for Russia, building influence in Latin
America is a means to the end of disrupting Western alliances
and institutions, for China, it's a means of building support
for Beijing's way of doing business. Where Moscow has a long
history of this sort of activity abroad, China is just
beginning to experiment with information manipulation far
afield. Russian state media almost never covers Russia. Chinese
state media covers China a great deal.
With that in mind, a word about Russia specifically. As
you're likely aware, Moscow has made a concerted effort to
promote its state media properties to Latin American audiences
on-line, often with remarkable success. The Twitter account of
RT en Espanol has more followers than RT's primary English
language account, and it's retweeted nearly twice as often. On
Facebook RT en Espanol has more than twice the followers of
RT's English language version and more followers than any other
Spanish language international broadcaster. On TikTok, it's
more popular than BBC Mundo, El Pais, and Univision.
As it wages its assault on Ukraine, the Kremlin is putting
these assets to use to erode support for Western
countermeasures among Latin American publics, where opinion
about the conflict appears up for grabs. For months, it has
blamed Western sanctions for food and fuel shortages affecting
the region.
I know themes related to immigration are of interest to the
committee. Interestingly, at least within the overt space,
there's limited apparent evidence that the Kremlin proactively
stokes chaos at the border. The top 5 most retweeted Spanish
language Russian state-backed messages on Twitter covering
migration thus far this year offer praise for the Mexican
president's handling of the issue. Immigration topics have
surfaced in known covert information operations targeting the
United States. That activity seems aimed at weaponizing
politically divisive issue to exacerbate discord. It's not
surprising, then, that some state-backed content on migration
boosts domestic criticism of U.S. policy from both left and
right.
Unlike Russia, China's ultimate objective is to frame
itself as a responsible global power. So its information
operations primarily seek to build a positive view of Beijing
and its leadership. Its propaganda casts democracy as feckless
or hypocritical and highlights the strength of its governance
model. Beijing uses immigration policy to cast the United
States as hypocritical and its advocacy for human rights around
the world. This is in keeping with its strategy of deploying
whataboutism to deflect criticism of its own rights record.
Distinguished Members, the United States needs a strategy
for pushing back on Russia and China's asymmetric activity in
Latin America. It should reflect these nuances, be rooted in
the United States' own considerable asymmetric advantages, and
uphold democratic values, recognizing that those values are
strengths. To that end, there are numerous steps that
Washington can take to position the United States for success.
Let me propose three.
First, recognizing the range and reach of Russia's
information manipulation activity in Latin America, Washington
should focus attention and resources on public diplomacy in the
region. This could entail investing in U.S. AGM outlets
targeted to Latin American audiences, ensuring that the Global
Engagement Center is optimally equipped to track Russian
propaganda activity there, and supporting research on related
themes. It could also entail facilitating best practice
exchanges with independent journalists, researchers, fact
checkers from across the hemisphere, and engaging democratic
governments in the region to build resilience to a shared
challenge.
There are more than 40 million Spanish speakers in the
United States, and U.S. security interests are directly tied to
events in the region. Washington cannot afford to cede the
information environment to its competitors.
Second, Washington should conduct messaging campaigns
grounded in truthful information to highlight the failures of
oppression to audiences in Latin America. These campaigns could
build on the successes of the administration's novel strategy
of downgrading intelligence related to the war in Ukraine. They
could call attention to the fact that although Russia and China
position themselves as anti-imperialist powers, both are
pursuing an expansionist foreign policies. They might also
highlight the costs of China's Belt and Road initiative to the
region. Doing so is in keeping with the strategy of exploiting
Putin and Xi's fragility to open information.
Third, Washington must equip itself to see across the full
threat picture, recognizing that Russian and Chinese coercive
activities in Latin America and elsewhere are multidimensional.
It's good then that Congress has established the Foreign
Maligned Influence Center within DNI to consolidate analysis of
this problem set. It's also good that the Center appears a
resource to look at the full range of threats which go beyond
elections.
As it does all this, Washington should coordinate with
partners and allies, because ultimately, this is a contest over
principles, and Washington's strong network of partners is
perhaps its greatest advantage.
Distinguished Members, by drawing on a sophisticated
picture of the complicated ways that Russia and China deploy
coercive tools in Latin America, and taking these steps that
flow from it, Washington can position itself to protect its
interests and the American people.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Brandt follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jessica Brandt
June 21, 2023
Thank you Chairman Pflugar, Ranking Member Magaziner, distinguished
Members of the committee, for inviting me to address you today on the
threats posed by nation-state actors in Latin America to U.S. security.
With geopolitical competition resurgent, considerable attention has
been paid to Russian and Chinese ``playbooks'' and authoritarianism
more broadly. As has been widely documented, Moscow and Beijing use a
suite of low-cost, deniable tools and tactics to conduct influence
operations designed to undermine their democratic competitors and make
the world safe for illiberalism. They wage these operations using at
least four non-military, asymmetric tools: Economic coercion, political
subversion, information manipulation, and cyber operations.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For definitions, see: Authoritarian Interference Tracker.
Alliance for Securing Democracy, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/
toolbox/authoritarian-interference-tracker/#methodology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Importantly, Russia and China each apply the toolkit differently in
Latin America than in their respective home regions. And within Latin
America, they operate distinctly from one another, in ways that reflect
their unique capabilities and long-term objectives. As I recently
argued in the Washington Quarterly, together with AEI's Zack Cooper,
developing a coherent strategy to push back on Russia and China's
coercive activities in Latin America--and elsewhere--depends on an
appreciation of these nuances. Many of the observations in this
testimony are drawn from that work.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Brandt, J. & Cooper, Z. (2022). Sino-Russian Splits:
Divergences in Autocratic Coercion, The Washington Quarterly, 45:3, 23-
46, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124016.
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russian coercion in latin america
Russia takes a different approach to applying the authoritarian
toolkit in Latin America than it does in its own region. Within Europe,
Moscow endeavors to weaken political leaders and institutions to gain a
relative edge over its competitors--in other words, as an end unto
itself. In Latin America, Moscow's influence activities aim to dent the
prestige of mostly Western liberal governments and institutions and the
political model they represent. Which is to say, its activities are
largely instrumental--a means to the ends of eroding cohesion within
liberal democracies and among them, and to undermining their soft
power. Throughout Latin America, the Kremlin works to frustrate
relationships between the United States and its partners, deepening
relationships with leaders that share Putin's desire to create
alternatives to governance institutions that are dominated by the
United States and Europe. As analyst Paul Stronski has argued, ``Moscow
hopes to embarrass Washington, and show that it too can make a foray
into its main global adversary's backyard.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Stronski, P. and Sokolsky, R. (2017). The Return of Global
Russia: An Analytical Framework, Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/14/return-of-global-
russia-analytical-framework-pub-75003.
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Economic Coercion
As elsewhere around the world, Russia uses commercial deals,
primarily within the energy sector, as an avenue of influence in the
region. To bolster Kremlin ally Nicolas Maduro, Russian state-
controlled oil firm Rosneft poured roughly $9 billion into projects in
Venezuela between 2010 and 2019. ``From the very beginning,'' conceded
an executive involved in the effort, ``it was a purely political
project.''\4\ More recently, in order to build support for its
confrontation with Western governments over Ukraine, the Kremlin
softened the terms of loans it had made to Cuba worth more than $2
billion. Both countries were among the five that abstained from or
declined to participate in a U.N. vote last year denouncing Russia's
brutal invasion.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Lowe, C. & Sagdiev, R. (2019). ``How Russia sank billions of
dollars into Venezuelan quicksand,'' Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/venezuela-russia-rosneft/.
\5\ Others included Bolivia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Resolution
A/RES/ES-11/1, ``Aggression against Ukraine: resolution/adopted by the
General Assembly,'' https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959039.
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Political Subversion
Because the Kremlin's activities in Latin America are designed to
strengthen ties with illiberal partners, rather than weaken the
cohesion of liberal competitors, the Kremlin does not appear focused on
undermining democratic political processes in Latin America, as it does
closer to home. Moscow has, though, deployed private-security
contractors linked to the Wagner group to prop up its ally in Caracas
in opposition to U.S. interests, and its mercenaries have looked for
opportunities to expand their presence in the region, from Haiti to
Mexico.\6\ Russia's economic and political influence activities in the
region are by no means the primary driver of migration to the United
States. However, to the extent that they facilitate corruption, make
governments less responsive to their citizens, erode the rule of law,
and otherwise undermine good governance, they contribute to migration's
root causes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Roth, A. (2019). ``Russian mercenaries reportedly in Venezuela
to protect Maduro,'' The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2019/jan/25/venezuela-maduro-russia-private-security-contractors;
Tsvetkova, M. and Zverev, A. (2019). ``Kremlin-linked contractors help
guard Venezuela's Maduro,'' Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-venezuela-politics-russia-exclusive/exclusive-kremlin-linked-
contractors-help-guard-venezuelas-maduro-sources-idUSKCN1PJ22M; De
Luce, D. (2023). ``Leaked documents: Russian Wagner Group mercenaries
look for business close to U.S.,'' NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/national-security/leaked-documents-russian-wagner-group-
mercenaries-haiti-rcna79440; Banco, E., Aarup, S.A., and Carrier, A.
(2023). ``Inside the stunning growth of Russia's Wagner Group,''
Politico, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/18/russia-wagner-group-
ukraine-paramilitary-00083553.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Manipulation
Within the information domain, Moscow has made a concerted effort
to promote its state media properties on-line, often with remarkable
success. The Twitter account of RT en Espanol (@actualidadRT) has more
followers than RT's primary English-language account (@RT_com) and is
retweeted nearly twice as often. Of the five most frequently retweeted
Russian state media and diplomatic accounts on Twitter thus far this
year, three target Latin American audiences (@ActualidadRT,
@mae_russia, @SputnikMundo).\7\ Last year, Russian Ministry of Foreign
Affairs' Spanish-language account (@mae_russia) was more frequently
retweeted than its Russian-language one (@MID_rf), even though the
latter tweeted more than five times as frequently.\8\ The same is true
on other platforms. On Facebook, RT en Espanol has more than twice the
followers of RT's English language version, and more followers than any
other Spanish-language international broadcaster. On TikTok, it is more
popular than BBC Mundo, El Pais, Telemundo, and Univision.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ Hamilton 2.0 Dashboard (2023). Alliance for Securing Democracy,
https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-dashboard/.
\8\ Brandt, J., & Wirtschafter, V. (2022). Working the Western
Hemisphere. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/research/working-the-
western-hemisphere/.
\9\ The Global Information Wars: Is the U.S. Winning or Losing?,
Before the Subcommittee on State Department and USAID Management,
International Operations, And Bilateral International Development of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 118th Congress (2023)
(Statement of Jessica Brandt, Brookings Institution). https://
www.foreign.senate.gov/download/05/04/2023/050323_brandt_testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As it wages its unprovoked assault on Ukraine, the Kremlin is
putting these assets to use to erode support for Western
countermeasures among Latin American publics, where opinion about the
conflict appears up for grabs. For months, it blamed Western sanctions
for food and fuel shortages affecting the region. ``The Russian
military operation in Ukraine does NOT threaten the food supply,''
argued the Russian MFA on Twitter in Spanish, for example, asserting
that the the ``real reasons'' for shortages include ``myopic U.S. and
European policies'' and ``illegitimate sanctions against Europe.''\10\
Spanish is the fourth most spoken language in the world, and Russian
content targeting the region could have significant global reach.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Cancilleria de Rusia (@mae_russia), Twitter, June 21, 2022, c;
RT en Espanol (@ActualidadRT), Twitter, June 6, 2022, https://
twitter.com/ActualidadRT/status/1533947341811638272. For additional
sample content see https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/
12/FP_20221216_russia_propaganda_brandt_wirtschafter.pdf.
\11\ Brandt & Wirtschafter (2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Interestingly, at least within overt space--among state media and
diplomats on Twitter, and on state-backed news websites--there is
limited apparent evidence that the Kremlin proactively stokes chaos at
the border. The top five most retweeted Spanish-language Russian state-
backed messages on Twitter covering migration thus far this year offer
praise for Mexican President Lopez Obrador's handling of the issue.\12\
Immigration topics have surfaced in known covert information operations
targeting the United States, but that activity seems aimed at
weaponizing a politically divisive issue to exacerbate discord.\13\
Unsurprisingly, some Russian state-backed content focused on
immigration boosts domestic criticisms of U.S. policy.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ RT en Espanol (@ActualidadRT), Twitter, May 6, 2023(a),
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1654737760018898944; RT en Espanol
(@ActualidadRT), Twitter, May 6, 2023(b), https://twitter.com/i/web/
status/1654828357140336644.
\13\ S. Rept. 116-290--Russian Active Measures Campaigns and
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume II. (2023, June 20),
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/116th-congress/senate-
report/290/1; ``Senate Intel Committee Releases Bipartisan Report on
Russia's Use of Social Media'' (2019), U.S. Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/press/senate-intel-
committee-releases-bipartisan-report-russia- %E2%80%99s-use-social-
media.
\14\ Ekimenko, S. (2022). ``Texas' Greg Abbott Slams `Hypocrite-in-
Chief' Biden After WH Dubs Migrant Transport `Illegal Stunt','' Sputnik
International, https://sputnikglobe.com/20220916/texas-gov-abbott-
slams-hypocrite-in-chief-biden-after-wh-calls-migrant-bussing-illegal-
stunt--1100838329.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter; RT en
Espanol (@ActualidadRT), Twitter, May 11, 2023, https://twitter.com/i/
web/status/1656522016995041280.
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Cyber Operations
In its own region, Moscow conducts cyber operations to punish
entities that expose Russian malfeasance, steal information that it can
later weaponize in an information operation, and to disrupt critical
infrastructure, making it more difficult for democracies to govern
themselves.\15\ Because its activities in Latin America primarily aim
to foster friendships, there is little evidence that Russia penetrates
computer networks to alter or collect data, or to disrupt institutions
or political processes in the region.
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\15\ Brandt, J. and Taussig, T. (2020). ``Europe's Authoritarian
Challenge,'' The Washington Quarterly, 42:4, 133-153, https://doi.org/
10.1080/0163660X.2019.1693099.
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chinese coercion in latin america
China, like Russia, takes a different approach to applying the
authoritarian toolkit in Latin America than it does in its own region.
Closer to home, Beijing has been considerably more assertive in
undermining its opponents than elsewhere around the world, including in
Latin America, where target countries have at times benefited from
Beijing's efforts to build influence using positive inducements.
Economic Coercion
Boycotts, tariffs, import restrictions, and export quotas--these
are among the mechanisms that China has used to coerce its neighbors in
response to actions Beijing perceived as undermining its interests,
exercising its leverage as the top trading partner of most countries in
its home region. In Latin America, by contrast, Beijing is focused on
building leverage that it can apply in the future, using the Belt and
Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its engagement with more than 20
countries in the region.\16\ These coercive economic activities foster
dependences that make Latin American governments less responsive to
their citizens, and therefore undermine good governance. Thus, they too
may contribute to the root causes of migration.
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\16\ Roy, D. (2023). China's growing influence in Latin America.
Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-
influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-
bri#:?:text=As%20of%202023%2C%20Beijing%20has,agreement%20with%20-
Uruguay%20are%20ongoing.)
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Political Subversion
In Latin America, Bejing uses some of the same political
inducements that it does to cultivate influence among China's
neighbors, but with less of an emphasis on direct subversion. China
tends to use carrots, rather than sticks, to build sway, using BRI
funding as an incentive to tow Beijing's line. This difference
primarily stems from the goal of China's activities in the region: to
position itself as helpful to Latin American societies in their battle
against hypocritical, over-reaching democracies, led by the United
States.
Information Manipulation
Because China's ultimate objective is to frame itself as a
responsible global power, Beijing's information operations primarily
seek to build a positive view of China and its leadership. In Latin
America, as elsewhere, Beijing's propaganda apparatus promotes
narratives that cast democracy as feckless or hypocritical and
highlights the strength of its governance model.\17\ In the global
south, during the height of the COVID crisis, Beijing undertook a
tailored messaging campaign arguing that its Sinovac vaccine, which
does not require cold chain storage, should be the option of first
resort.\18\ In its propaganda targeting overseas audiences, Beijing
uses U.S. immigration policy to cast the United States as hypocritical
in its advocacy for human rights elsewhere around the world.\19\ ``For
a long time, the United States has been giving lessons to other
countries on human rights,'' China's People's Daily recently tweeted in
Spanish, ``But the way the U.S. treats migrants and refugees at home
highlights their hypocrisy on this issue.''\20\ This is in keeping with
Beijing's strategy of using whataboutism to deflect criticism of its
own rights record.
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\17\ Brandt (2021).
\18\ Schafer, B., Frankland, A., Kohlenberg, N., & Soula, E.
(2021). Influence-enza: How Russia, China, and Iran have shaped and
manipulated coronavirus vaccine narratives. Alliance For Securing
Democracy. https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/russia-china-iran-covid-
vaccine-disinformation/.
\19\ Lan, L. (2021). ``Whipping migrants shows US human rights
hypocritical,'' Global Times, https://enapp.globaltimes.cn/article/
1234865; China News [ . . . ] (@Echinanews), April 28, 2023, https://
twitter.com/Echinanews/status/1652129574145097728/photo/1.
\20\ Pueblo En Linea (@PuebloEnLinea), June 9, 2022, https://
twitter.com/PuebloEnLinea/status/1534823562699104257.
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Cyber Operations
While in Asia, there is considerable concern about the use of
information networks designed and run by Chinese companies, amid
concerns that equipment sourced from vendors in China could contain
back doors that enable surveillance by Beijing, that is not as much the
case in Latin America.\21\ Within the region, China has provided
surveillance systems to at least 9 countries, including Argentina,
Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.\22\ To the extent that these
systems undermine political and human rights, they too may contribute
to the root causes of migration.
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\21\ Brands, H. (2021). ``Huawei's Decline Shows Why China Will
Struggle to Dominate,'' Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2021-09-19/huawei-s-decline-shows-why-china-will-struggle-to-
dominate.
\22\ AI Global Surveillance Technology. Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/
interactive/ai-surveillance.
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differences between russian and chinese approaches to coercion in the
region
Although Putin and Xi work from the same playbook, their approaches
reflect their unique capabilities, as well as their distinct goals.
Moscow and Beijing share certain near-term objectives, but the two are
operating on different trajectories and time horizons, with different
points of leverage and long-term aims. Russia is a declining power by
many measures, which seeks to disrupt the partnerships and institutions
of its mostly Western competitor states here and now as a means of
gaining relative advantage. With little to lose and perhaps something
to gain from exposure, it is not particularly sensitive to attribution
for its coercive activities. Seeing the benefits of chaos abroad, its
efforts tend to be destructive. China, by contrast, is a rising power
with a great deal to lose from having its coercive activities laid
bare. It does not seek disorder, but rather a new order more conducive
to its interests, and so its efforts to change the status quo have
tended to be more patient.\23\ Both countries are most active in their
own regions. For Russia, building influence in Latin America is a means
to the end of disrupting Western alliances and institutions. For China,
it is a means of building support for Beijing's way of doing business.
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\23\ Brandt, J. (2021). How Autocrats Manipulate Online
Information: Putin's and Xi's Playbooks, The Washington Quarterly,
44:3, 127-154, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970902; Brandt, J. (2023).
AidData: Autocratic approaches to information manipulation: A
comparative case study. AidData, a research lab at William and Mary.
https://www.aiddata.org/publications/autocratic-approaches-to-
information-manipulation-a-comparative-case-study.
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These nuances carry over into the ways that Russia and China
conduct economic coercion in the region. For Russia, this activity
leverages its status as a commodity exporter, with energy amounting to
half of its exports.\24\ For China, its coercive economic practices
primarily draw on the size of its market, which gives it leverage over
trading partners, as well as its relative wealth, which it uses to
support friendly politicians.
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\24\ ``Russia (RUS) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners,''
Observatory of Economic Complexity, last modified January 2022, https:/
/oec.world/en/profile/country/rus.
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Russia and China differ significantly in their use of political
subversion as well. Moscow's intelligence agencies are much better
equipped at understanding how to influence foreign systems than those
of Beijing, since the Kremlin has made the use of asymmetric tools a
leading component of its foreign policy for decades. The Kremlin has a
high tolerance for risk and is comfortable deploying security services
abroad. China, by contrast, has less experience with political
subversion far afield. To the extent that Chinese operatives have been
involved in subversion, they have tended to focus on China's
neighbors.\25\ But the differences don't just stem from different
capabilities. Political subversion is a tool more fit for Russia's
purposes (undermining the cohesion of democratic societies and their
institutions) than China's (building a new international order).
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\25\ Schrader, M. (2020). Friends and Enemies: A Framework for
Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries,
Alliance for Securing Democracy, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/
wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Friends-and-Enemies-A-Framework-for-
Understanding-Chinese-Political-Interference-in-Democratic-
Countries.pdf.
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Russia and China have both conducted information operations
targeting audiences in the region, but likewise, in different ways and
toward different ends. Where Moscow has a long history of this sort of
activity abroad, China is just beginning to experiment with information
manipulation far afield. Where Moscow aims to tarnish the appeal of
Western systems, China works to position itself as an attractive
alternative. Russian state media almost never cover Russia; Chinese
State media cover China a great deal.\26\
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\26\ Brandt (2021).
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implications for policy makers
The United States needs a strategy for pushing back on Russia and
China's asymmetric activity in Latin America. It should reflect these
nuances, be rooted in the United States's own considerable asymmetric
advantages, and uphold democratic values, recognizing that those values
are strengths. To that end, there are numerous steps that Washington
can take to position the United States for success. Let me propose
three.
First, recognizing the range and reach of Russia's manipulation
activity in Latin America, Washington should focus attention and
resources on public diplomacy in the region. Concerns over terrorism
and resurgent geopolitical competition have driven attention to the
Middle East and Asia, and as a result, U.S. public diplomacy financing
overseen by the State Department has deprioritized the Western
Hemisphere.\27\ Washington could make new investments in entities like
Voice of America (VOA) targeted at Spanish language audiences. Of the
12 overseas bureaus currently operated by VOA, none are in Latin
America.\28\ This should change. Such an approach could also include
ensuring that the Global Engagement Center (GEC) is optimally equipped
to track Russian information manipulation activity in Latin America.
There are more than 40 million Spanish speakers in the United States
and U.S. security interests are directly tied to events in the region.
Washington cannot afford to cede the information environment to its
competitors.\29\
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\27\ Custer, S., Burgess, B., Baehr, A., & Dumont, E. (2022).
AidData: Assessing U.S. Historical Strategic Communications:
Priorities, Practices, and Lessons From the Cold War Through the
Present Day. AidData, a research lab at William and Mary. https://
docs.aiddata.org/reports/gf01/gf01-02/Assessing-US-Historical-
Strategic-Communications-Priorities-Practices-and-Lessons-from-the-
Cold-War-through-the-Present-Day.html.
\28\ Brandt. Testimony on The Global Information Wars (2023).
\29\ Brandt. Testimony on The Global Information Wars (2023).
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Second, Washington should conduct messaging campaigns grounded in
truthful information to highlight the failures of repression to
audiences in Latin America. These campaigns could build on the success
of the administration's novel strategy of downgrading intelligence
related to the war in Ukraine to shape how it is perceived.\30\ They
could call attention to the fact that although Russia and China
position themselves as ``anti-imperialist'' and ``anti-colonial''
powers, both are pursuing expansionist foreign policies. They might
also highlight the costs of China's BRI to the region. Many publics
have soured on the environmental destruction and unsustainable debt
that too often come along with Chinese investments.\31\ Many of the
region's recipient countries are democracies, and drawing attention to
those shortcomings can better inform their voters. Doing so is in
keeping with a strategy of exploiting Putin and Xi's weaknesses,
recognizing their fragility to open information.
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\30\ Brandt, J. (2022). Preempting Putin: Washington's Campaign of
Intelligence Disclosures is Complicating Moscow's Plans for Ukraine.
Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/18/
preempting-putin-washingtons-campaign-of-intelligence-disclosures-is-
complicating-moscows-plans-for-ukraine/.
\31\ Shepard, W. (2021). How China's Belt and Road became a
``Global Trail of Trouble,'' Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/
wadeshepard/2020/01/29/how-chinas-belt-and-road-became-a-global-trail-
of-trouble/?sh=2bc0da0a443d.
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Third, Washington must equip itself to see across the full threat
picture, recognizing that Russian and Chinese coercive activities in
Latin America and elsewhere are multidimensional. It is good, then,
that Congress established a Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC)
within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to
consolidate analysis of adversary use of all four tools of
interference. It is also good that FMIC appears to be resourced to look
at the full range of threats, which as I and others have documented, go
beyond elections.\32\ As it undertakes its work, FMIC should aim to cut
across traditional stovepipes within Government, and share information
where appropriate and feasible with private-sector partners and the
public.
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\32\ Foreign Malign Influence Center. 50 U.S.C. 3059 (2023).
https://uscode.house.gov/
view.xhtml?req=%28title%3A50+section%3A3059+edition%3Aprelim%29.
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As it does all of this, Washington should coordinate with partners
and allies to share best practices, standing shoulder to shoulder with
other democratic societies to counter foreign interference threats.
Ultimately, this is a contest over principles, and Washington's strong
network of partners is perhaps its greatest advantage.
Distinguished Members, by drawing on a sophisticated picture of the
complex ways that Russia and China deploy coercive tools in Latin
America and taking these steps that flow from it, Washington can
position itself to protect its interests and the American people.
Appendix A
Brandt, J. & Cooper, Z. (2022). Sino-Russian Splits: Divergences in
Autocratic Coercion, The Washington Quarterly, 45:3, 23-46, https://
doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124016.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ms. Brandt.
Of note, this is the subcommittee's sixth hearing on
homeland security on what we as a subcommittee are looking at.
I thank you all for your testimony.
Members will now be recognized by order of seniority for
their 5 minutes of questioning. An additional round of
questioning may be called after all Members have been
recognized.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of question.
Mr. Hernandez-Roy, a lot of interesting things that were
said. Recent reports have indicated that the PRC has
established and been operating a signals intelligence
collection center in Cuba since 2019. Florida is home to a
variety of military installations, sensitive military
installations, becoming an emerging technology leader, a
financial services hub. There is so much going on there. Can
you discuss what type of implications, security implications,
that the PRC's collusion with Cuba, if these reports are true,
what it actually means to the United States?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Well, the reports of some sort of spying
activity in Cuba have been confirmed through a number of public
sources. So I think we can take that for granted. The extent of
the spying, we don't know yet. At least we who look at it
through the public information space.
Having a signals intelligence operation in Cuba, it's based
just south of Havana, 150 miles from U.S. mainland, is a
significant threat, as it can collect information from the
whole southeastern United States, in particular, all of
SOUTHCOM's activities in the south and also CENTCOM in Tampa.
So this would represent a significant threat, a significant
gain for the Chinese in terms of their ability to monitor
intelligence and monitor traffic of naval operations in the
Caribbean, things of that nature. It should be seen as a
significant threat and a significant escalation on the part of
the Chinese.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
This committee will be very active in understanding the
depth of that threat and what it means to our homeland
security, and I appreciate that.
Ms. Dezenski, I would like to focus on a couple of things
when it comes to the Southwest Border.
No. 1, when we look at the fentanyl issue and
understanding--we had a hearing recently, we examined the
relationship between Mexican TCOs and Chinese crime syndicates
and how these relationships enable the flow of fentanyl. Do you
believe that the PRC is using America's fentanyl crisis as a
gray zone tactic?
Ms. Dezenski. Thanks for the question.
I think that at a minimum, there's passive engagement on
the part of the PRC. They are well aware of the fentanyl
challenge, and they're not doing much to help us stop that.
Coordination from previous years has pretty much disappeared,
even though there's a mound of evidence about the role of
Chinese money-laundering networks and manufacturers of
precursor chemicals. So it's hard to understand why we can't
engage more specifically on that issue, except that I think
it's being viewed by the PRC as a strategic weapon against our
country.
Chairman Pfluger. Wow. You don't believe--in your recent
article in the Miami Herald, you asserted that the United
States must expose Chinese hidden hand in America's deadly
fentanyl crisis, which you just alluded to the money-laundering
aspect. So you believe we should be doing more as a whole-of-
Government approach?
Ms. Dezenski. Yes. Yes, exactly.
The money-laundering piece of this is critical. If we
follow the money, I think we'll actually have an easier time
addressing some of these challenges because it's so hard to
interdict at the border. Fentanyl pills are small, they're
mistaken for other types of commodities. It's extremely
difficult to find them. Having said that, I know our Border
Patrol is doing a better job, and our Customs interdiction is
doing a better job locating it. But having said that, following
the money is probably the most important thing that we can do.
There's been quite a bit written about the complexity of these
money-laundering operations. What's unique about it is that
there's this flow, this seamless flow between China, Mexico,
and the United States and the role of money launderers here,
Chinese money launderers working in the United States and
selling U.S. dollar proceeds to Chinese nationals who want
access to that money. It's incredible.
So I'm happy to go into more detail on how that works, but
I do think that this is the most important vector for us to
look at.
Chairman Pfluger. Let me quickly jump to a related subject.
There is no question in my mind that the PRC is exploiting
the crisis at our Southern Border. It was reported yesterday
that in this fiscal year, 127 people have entered this
country--apprehended, that is not gotaways that have matched
the terror watch list. Is the PRC exploiting the crisis at our
Southern Border for their own personal gain?
Ms. Dezenski. I think we should assume that any
vulnerabilities at our Southern Border are open for
authoritarian influence of many kinds. I think that's a safe
assumption. If the gaps are there, then those who are working
against us are going to use them to their advantage.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
My time has expired.
I will now recognize the Ranking Member for his 5 minutes
of questioning.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
There is a lot to cover here, but first and foremost, we
are in a competition for hearts and minds across the region.
For the last two centuries, and particularly during the Cold
War, America succeeded by maintaining strong relationships with
allies in Latin America that allowed us to counter
authoritarian threats and we need to strengthen those
relationships now.
So, Ms. Brandt, can you just expand a little bit on what
are some of the ways that Russia and China in particular are
trying to win hearts and minds in Latin America? Then how can
we as a Nation best counter their efforts?
Ms. Brandt. Both Russia and China bring large propaganda
apparatuses that promote content that portrays their preferred
narratives of polarizing political events. Both of them use
other assets to try to--for Russia, I think most of its
activity is aimed, as I said, at driving polarization and
division within the United States. Its activities, I think, in
Latin America are instrumental to its broader aim of weakening
us from within. I think that's in part to prevent us--if we're
distracted and divided, it prevents us from playing a more
forward-leaning role in the world that promotes our interests.
I think there is also an interest on the part of Russia in
denting our soft power, making it harder again for us to
exercise leadership in the world.
For China, China comes in behind Russia's efforts to sort-
of fracture the cohesion and the unity and appeal of
democracies in order to present their model as a viable
alternative. Both of these countries are doing that in the
region.
Mr. Magaziner. Will they ever use U.S. voices to amplify
their rhetoric? So, for example, if there are prominent U.S.
individuals that talk about military strikes in Mexico or talk
about--repeat Russian talking points with regard to the Ukraine
invasion, will China or Russia take clips of Americans
repeating those false and dangerous narratives and use them to
try to win hearts and minds for China and Russia in Latin
America?
Ms. Brandt. Both Russia and China amplify domestic voices.
I mean, as I said, for Russia, this is primarily about stoking
division and polarization within our country. For China, it's
about sort-of boosting the reach and resonance of its message,
finding fellow travelers that add a sort-of degree of
legitimacy to these messages and also eliminate a layer of
culpability.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
Ms. Dezenski, you wrote in your testimony about the
significance of the CHIPS and Science Act and other investments
that the United States have made to try to bring more
manufacturing and other economic activity back to this
hemisphere. Can you just expand a little bit on that, on the
importance of investments like those that are made in the CHIPS
and Science Act? Also how we can better engage with our
regional partners again to win hearts and minds through
commerce here in our hemisphere?
Ms. Dezenski. Sure. Thank you very much.
There's no doubt that there's huge potential to utilize
trade relationships and the potential for economic integration
with both Mexico and into Latin America. As companies think
about whether they want to stay in China, and the government
considers new mechanisms around outbound investment and other
policies that might encourage pivoting out of China, supply
chains, particularly critical ones, need to go somewhere. The
idea that we could have them closer to home is both valuable
and attractive from an economic integration perspective.
So it's almost like a perfect opportunity to look at new
strategies to build those economic alliances, but mindful of
the economic security objectives in doing so, that we want
mutual benefit, we want security, we need trade facilitation,
we want access to critical goods, particularly in the time of
global shocks. Mexico is fairly well-positioned for this,
although not entirely. But as you go further south in the
hemisphere, there's the chance I think that we'll miss this
opportunity if we don't have the right security backbone in
place.
This is a point that I wanted to make about the role of DHS
and how important it is to ensure that we have that secure
footprint which allows trade and commerce to be facilitated and
ultimately has the right objective in terms of creating
environments where people don't feel that they have to come to
our border.
Mr. Magaziner. I know I am running low on time, but I will
just emphasize again, if China is going to Latin America and
offering money and infrastructure and security, the United
States has to counter that with more than rhetoric. We need to
invest in these partnerships, otherwise our adversaries will be
happy to fill that void.
So I thank you all and I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, no
stranger to law enforcement, former detective for the NYPD, Mr.
D'Esposito.
Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good
morning, everyone.
I am going to just take a minute to follow up on the
Chairman's remarks. I know he only had a few seconds left, but
I think it is important to discuss and talk about.
So obviously it is no secret that authoritarian regimes
relish in the opportunity to shine a spotlight and even
encourage challenges for the United States of America. How
might authoritarian regimes, including Venezuela, Cuba, Russia,
and the PRC, take advantage of the current border crisis
created by Joe Biden and Secretary Mayorkas that our Nation is
experiencing? I will really leave that for any of you.
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Thank you, Congressman.
I think there's a number of ways they can take advantage of
what's happening at the Southern Border. First of all, just
encourage migration from their own countries by cracking down
on their populations, sending more people, creating more chaos,
sowing more division within the United States on how to
effectively respond. That is one way they're clearly doing it.
The other way, presumably, which I've provided an example
in the Venezuelan context, and one of my colleagues has said
it's a distinct possibility, is they can be taking advantage of
the massive amounts of people, 2.4 million interventions last
year. Within that space of 2.4 million people you can try to
get people that are undesirable, that are going to work for the
interests of these regimes in the United States. So I think
that's a vulnerability. I have no direct evidence of that
happening. I have mentioned direct evidence of that happening
in the Venezuelan context, sending spies to Colombia. It's a
distinct possibility that the United States needs to be taking
seriously.
Ms. Dezenski. I'll just add one angle to this that I think
we need to consider.
So as we see increased engagement in places like Venezuela,
with Iran, Russia, we should be mindful of the potential that
local populations may become part of extremist movements, and
that could be fueled by this increasing engagement from
authoritarian interests in these countries. How do we relate
that to what's happening at the Southwest Border? Well, it's
much as Chris has identified, which is with the massive inflow
of people, we have the needle in the haystack problem again to
try to figure out who those extremists might be. We have an
identity management problem at the border, and somehow we need
to figure that out because it's going to become more and more
difficult as we're trying to manage an influx of legitimate
economic migrants and political migrants from a place like
Venezuela. How do we know if we're allowing for extremist
threats to come into the country? So we're going to have to be
more sophisticated about figuring that out.
Mr. D'Esposito. I agree. I am sorry.
Ms. Brandt. Well, I was just going to add from my analysis,
which again, is focused on the open source space, I see this
less as Russia trying to drive populations to the border as
much as it is to weaponize the polarizing nature of debates
within this country around migration. But again, we don't know
what we don't know. I think the challenge for us I think is to
sort-of think capaciously about the challenges so that we can
get ahead of them without also making Russia 10 ft tall.
Mr. D'Esposito. So obviously there are real threats,
whether it is the regimes, whether it is our open border. I
know some would like to argue that climate change is our
biggest threat, but I think these pose a bigger threat to our
country and our freedoms than anything else.
Just to follow up on what we talked about, because I truly
believe that this is also a threat, what is your thoughts on
the CCP and the fact that there have been stories that they
would embed assets into larger groups of nationals making the
journey from China to Mexico or other areas along our Southwest
Border?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Well, since I mentioned that was a
possibility, I guess I'll try to answer that.
I have, like Ms. Brant, we work on public information, so I
have no direct information on that. But I go back to the
example that has happened in other cases.
I just wanted to add something to my previous intervention,
which is that Venezuela has been known publicly to have sold
passports to Hezbollah operatives and to bring people out of
Syria as well with Venezuelan passports. So that's another
potential vulnerability. People from that part of the region
using Venezuelan passports. Where are they going?
Mr. D'Esposito. Right? Probably not going there to do good
things.
My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired. The
Chair now recognizes gentleman from California, my good friend,
Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate this
hearing. It is very timely and very important. Thank the
witnesses for being here today.
I hear your statements. Latin America, there are challenges
and we talk about an open border, we talk about regimes. I
didn't hear a lot of talk about poverty, the challenges in
Latin America, and in alternatives.
Talk about history a little bit. The Pan American Highway
was built in 1920's, 1930, and through the 1950's, and we
essentially financed the construction of that highway south of
Mexico through Panama--almost to Panama--except for the Darien
Gap--because of our strategic interest in fighting against
communism. Honduras has a four-lane highway. You know who paid
for that? The United States of America. We have forgotten the
role that we played in the Americas throughout history. That
has been our area of national interest. Today we wake up, last
3 years, China has signed more than 30 agreements with Latin
America, free trade agreements. Twenty Latin American nations
signed on to China's Belt and Road Initiative.
I am trying to figure out what is going on. Is our private
sector asleep at the wheel? We have this challenge of these
precious metals that China is controlling around the world.
They are part of Latin America and nobody is discussing these
issues. I am at a loss here.
Ms. Dezenski, you mentioned DHS stepping up. Apparently,
our private sector is not doing a good job. So I guess we as
legislators need to take your recommendations and move forward
because China, Russia, Iran, I don't care what those folks are
doing, I care about what is in our power to do. Our power is to
move forward. We are sitting here pointing fingers at them. If
you want to win a race, you focus on your lane, don't be
chasing the other person. Focus, then we can do the best.
In Latin America, 20-30 years ago, when you would see a
food box that said donations from America, the goodwill that
was there was tremendous--tremendous. Where is that going
today? Have we forgotten the lectures? The lessons of history?
I only have 2 minutes, but I want to give you an example.
We talk about the Cuban electronic espionage base by China. My
understanding, please fact check me, that was actually started
operating in 1999, and that was actually upgraded in 2019.
Let's think about history of Cuba, OK. Obama lifted some of the
restrictions, trade with Cuba. Cuba's private sector exploded.
Two-thousand seventeen, Trump administration reversed that
position and added additional few other restrictions. President
Biden has essentially followed the Biden model. I am trying to
figure out what are the incentives that we are giving folks in
this hemisphere to work with the United States.
I am going to open it up to the three of you in the 1
minute that I have to help us figure out a road map here,
because I don't like the fact that our American influence in
our backyard is going down the drain.
Thank you.
Ms. Dezenski. Thank you so much.
There's so many things to bring up in response to all of
your good points. I would just make the following.
No. 1, with regard to the private sector, we need to do a
better job of----
Mr. Correa. I mean, you know, and I will give you here an
example. Venezuela, you can throw rocks at what is going on in
Venezuela. I don't like the fact that probably the world's
largest oil reserves are now under the influence of China and
Russia. What are we doing to counter that? Very quick, specific
question, what are we doing to get back our influence in that
area of the world? More sanctions?
Ms. Dezenski. I would suggest that we need to de-risk to
make it easier for Western companies and Western investment to
go into the region. Part of that----
Mr. Correa. Is that in our power, is that in Venezuela's
power, Russia's power, or China's power?
Ms. Dezenski. Oh, it's absolutely in our power. It's a very
positive step that we could take.
Mr. Correa. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. Thank you very much for
indulging me, sir.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, a Navy
SEAL, Mr. Crane, for his 5 minutes of question.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt you. I wanted
to ask unanimous consent that Ms. Jackson Lee be permitted to
sit with us in this subcommittee and be part of the
questioning. Thank you.
Chairman Pfluger. Yes, the Chair will entertain that. Thank
you, Ms. Jackson Lee, for showing up.
Now, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all our
guests and panelists who have come here today.
I wanted to know if any of you guys saw the article in
yesterday's Associated Press titled, ``Pentagon Accounting
Error Provides Extra $6.2 Billion for Ukraine Military Aid''.
Anybody see that headline? Anybody read that story? No? OK.
Are you guys aware that to date, the United States has sent
$113 billion to Ukraine? Anybody? OK. Does it surprise you guys
when you see stories like that? Accounting error, $6.2 billion
to Ukraine? Accounting error up here to the tune of $6.2
billion. Mr. Roy, does it surprise you when you see errors to
that extent?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. An error of that magnitude could only be
justified if the economy of the United States was hundreds of
trillions of dollars. It's a rather surprising headline, I
would say.
Mr. Crane. Thank you.
As I listen to your testimonies and knowledge about some of
the unrestricted and asymmetric warfare right here in our own
Western Hemisphere, down in Latin America by the Chinese,
Russians, and Iranians, I want to ask you guys, does it bother
any of you when we see all this money going to someplace over
in Europe that happens to be a very corrupt country that most
Americans can't even point to on a map, when we have all this
nefarious activity going on right in our own backyard?
I want to start with you, Ms. Brandt.
Ms. Brandt. I think we have to be able to walk and chew gum
at the same time. I mean, I think the challenges that we face
in our hemisphere are enormous. As I've argued, we need to pay
more attention there. I also think Ukraine is on the front
lines of the conflict between democracies and authoritarian
challengers.
Mr. Crane. Yes, that seems to be the general consensus in
this town. The problem is, ma'am, when you talk about walking
and chewing gum at the same time, you have to take into account
that the United States of America has about $32 trillion in
debt, right? So we don't even have this money that we continue
to send over in Ukraine. Do you see that as a problem, ma'am?
Ms. Brandt. As I said, I think our support for Ukraine is
important and consequential to our national security interest.
It's fundamental.
Mr. Crane. OK. What about our national debt? Do you think
that is important?
Ms. Brandt. That's beyond my expertise.
Mr. Crane. It is actually pretty common-sense.
What about you, Ms. Dezenski? What do you think about our
national debt and this idea up in this town that we can
continue to spend hundreds of billions of dollars of the
American taxpayers' money that we don't even have, yet let
alone when you look at some of these threats that we are
talking about in Latin American countries, right in our
backyard, we don't seem to have the resources to make sure that
our own border security is in order and secure?
Ms. Dezenski. I think the most challenging thing about the
threats in Latin America, and perhaps even at the Southwest
Border, is that for years, we've probably underestimated it. It
seems like what we're dealing with now is the equivalent of a
soft underbelly in the Western Hemisphere. That will require us
to think a little bit more strategically and creatively about
what Latin America policy should be, how we bring together more
resources around economic security, and how we balance that out
with what we have to do in the rest of the world.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Hernandez-Roy, are you familiar with the saying peace
through strength?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Pardon me? Could you repeat that,
please?
Mr. Crane. Are you familiar with the saying peace through
strength?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Vaguely, yes.
Mr. Crane. What do you think the opposite of that would be,
Mr. Hernandez-Roy?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. War through weakness.
Mr. Crane. Yes. War, chaos through weakness. That is
exactly where we find ourselves right now. War, chaos because
of weakness. We are facing a world on fire because of weakness,
incompetence, and internal corruption.
I want to read this for the American people that might be
watching this. Hard times create strong men, strong men create
good times. Good times create weak men, and weak men create
hard times. We are all aware that our current leadership is
pretty weak, falls in public regularly, struggles to put
sentences together, and is embroiled in multiple layers of
corruption.
My point is this. Elections have consequences. If we want
to continue to see this global dumpster fire continue, then we
should, by all means, keep this current administration in
place. If we want to return to peace through strength, we must
reinstall somebody who projects strength and puts America and
Americans first.
Thank you all for coming.
I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Goldman.
Mr. Goldman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you
for having this hearing.
I certainly hope my colleague from Arizona will look to
reduce our deficit by examining our $860 billion defense
budget.
I want to focus a little bit right now on what gives China
and Russia the opportunity to have such significant influence
in Latin America. I am not actually sure which one of you is
sort-of the foremost expert among the panel in terms of the
upheaval, disarray, and cratering governmental issues that are
going on in Latin America, especially Central America.
But in the last 2 to 4 years--Ms. Dezenski, you seem to be
focused on this--can you describe a little bit about what has
been going on in terms of upheaval in governments in Central
and Latin America.
Ms. Dezenski. Thank you for the question.
Let me talk a little bit about China. You've asked about
China and Russia in the region and how they're exerting that
influence and how that came to be and maybe what the
implications are for governments in the region. I'll take on
the China piece of this, which is very much driven by their
brilliant use of their trade relationships.
Mr. Goldman. I am sorry, I just want to interrupt because I
think we have a lot of attention and you all have spoken very
much on how China infiltrates and influences, and they are
doing the same thing in Africa as well. But I want to talk a
little bit about the political situation, the governmental
upheaval in the countries, in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador,
Guatemala, to name a few. There are others.
Maybe Mr. Hernandez-Roy, you want to talk a little bit
about what has been going on in the last 2 to 4 years in that
region that has also caused so many more citizens from there to
seek refuge in other countries?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I think there's a couple of points to be
made that aren't necessarily totally related. But why so many
people are seeking refuge is because they're living under
dictatorial regimes. They're being oppressed, they're being
persecuted, they're being arbitrarily detained. People who have
nothing to do with political activism, just because they might
be in the wrong place at the wrong time, are being imprisoned.
Venezuela for the last 10 years has had a revolving door of at
least 300 political prisoners. Since the massive protests in
2014 and again in 2017, something like 16,000 or 17,000 people
have been detained in Venezuela. In Nicaragua, since 2018,
during the protests of 2018, there were 355 people that were
murdered by the by the regime. Since then, journalists, civil
society activists, students, over 400 NGO's have lost their
legal personality, 600,000 people have fled the country. That's
what's going on in those regimes.
But going back a little further, talking about the
political upheaval, if you go back 20 years, Latin America 20
years ago and today is a profoundly unequal part of the world.
Probably the most unequal if you look at gini coefficients.
Populists in that part of the world, particularly Hugo Chavez,
were able to leverage that discontent and use Venezuela's
massive oil wealth at the time--this was before the economic
collapse in Venezuela and when oil prices were sky-high--to
spread the wealth around, to keep like-minded politicians, both
in Venezuela and in friendly countries abroad in power, to
create friends through corruption. There's a well-known
PetroCaribe and Petrofraude scheme where billions, if not
hundreds of billions of Venezuelan petrodollars were spread
around the region. If you look at the region 10 years ago,
there was one dictatorship. You look at the region today,
there's three dictatorships. There's at least two semi-
authoritarian regimes that are on the way to becoming
dictatorships.
There's one completely failed state, which is Haiti.
Against the backdrop of all that chaos, Russia and China have
multiple opportunities to get involved. They have ideological--
at least the Russians have ideological affinity with many of
these populist movements. The Chinese are more pragmatic.
They're really primarily interested in business and making
money and securing primary commodities for their economy. But I
think all of that history, both 20 years ago and more recent,
is what is the upshot of what you're seeing today.
Mr. Goldman. Thank you for that explanation.
Ms. Brandt, I just have a couple of seconds, but I am
curious how you would view that vacuum to provide the
opportunity, especially--I know your expertise is more Russia,
how Russia can interfere and influence those regimes.
Chairman Pfluger. We will do about 20 seconds here.
Ms. Brandt. I guess I would just say very quickly, to the
extent that Russia's and China's coercive economic activity and
political subversive activity make governments less responsive
to their citizens, they undermine rule of law, they facilitate
corruption I think they--speaking to your question, I think
they contribute to the root causes of migration and so----
Mr. Goldman. They exacerbate the situation that already
exists.
Ms. Brandt. Yes. I think Russia's by no means responsible,
but it's not helping.
Mr. Goldman. Right.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me.
I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentle lady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee, for her 5 minutes of questioning.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me thank
you and the Ranking Member for your courtesies. I am deeply
involved and interested in this long-running story of our
interaction with those who have become adversaries.
Let me say to Mr. Christopher Hernandez-Roy, you view it as
important for us to be engaged with South and Central America,
do you not?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. We have adversaries, but we need to be a
major positive force in those regions. Would you agree that
this era of our time is one of the greatest migrations that any
of us may have seen coming from that part of the hemisphere?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I would agree, ma'am, that we are at
historic times in terms of migration in the entire region, not
necessarily just from Central America.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely. I said Central and South
America.
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes. I appreciate that because we are
actually in an era, in a decade, maybe 2, of the greatest
migration, at least of this current era around the world. I
mean, I have watched flows of traffic going from many different
places. I make that point as I pursue my line of questioning. I
thank this committee for this hearing, because we do need to
counter bad guys in Latin America, in Iran, Russia, and
otherwise other places as well.
I was really baffled by a filing of articles of impeachment
for what is really both a historical fact and will not be
solved by impeachment. The late John McCain tried to solve it,
as we did, joining with him by comprehensive immigration
reform. You do note that that is valuable? I will just answer
my own question on that.
Let me pursue important line of reasoning for China and
Russia. Let me ask Ms. Brandt, if you would, in Iran--and I
thought we had Iran in this discussion, but if not, I am going
to add it to the discussion--we have countries like France and
Albania stopping freedom-loving Iranians from peacefully
protesting or having meetings suggesting that Iran now is
spreading its wings to intimidate those nations that have to
receive its oil products. What is your interpretation of that
power that they are using to denounce democracy around the
world and as a tyrannical nation?
Ms. Brandt. Well, Russia, China, and Iran I think are all
interested in denting the prestige of liberal democracy around
the world. It's a part of a tactic to I think make democracy
less appealing to would-be rights advocates at home and so
helping autocrats to tighten their grip on power, which I think
is fundamentally in their self interest. Then again, it's about
sort-of weakening their global competitors.
You mentioned comprehensive immigration reform and I would
say there's another way that this connects with the
conversation that we're having today, which is--I'm mindful of
Kennen's sort-of admonition that we need to sort-of resist the
temptation to become that against like which we are coping, or
something to that effect. The idea here is that we need to lead
into our own asymmetric strengths in this asymmetric
competition and our vibrant, open society is one of them. And
this----
Ms. Jackson Lee. I have another question, so--allow you to
finish your point on that.
So basically we should lean in when these countries are
trying to tamp down democracy and we should lean in our friends
in France and Albania in terms of denying that free speech for
those Iranians. I would hope that would be the case.
But let me also talk about some of the tactics that Russia
has used. Certainly the Ukraine war is dastardly and
devastating, not instigated by the United States or the Western
world. They have taken to using hostages to extract and
strangle relationships with foreign countries. Would you
comment on this hostage approach so that America knows we
shouldn't be intimidated by that and we should fight hard for
our hostages to be returned? I guess this way you can finish
your overall point.
Then with China it is all about the technology and
artificial intelligence. The meeting of Secretary Blinken. How
do we frame our lean-in to those issues and those countries?
Ms. Brandt. Yes, I think that's where I was going, which is
that there's another layer to this competition which is not
just within the information domain, but within the technology
domain. There it's essential that we again lean into our
strengths, which is our vibrant, open, innovation economy. Our
immigration policy is relevant to that because we want to make
sure that we are the top. We have an edge in talent. It's
critically important. We want to make sure that we maintain
that edge by being an attractive place for talent to come.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, the hostages situation?
Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
Chairman Pfluger. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady
from Nevada, Ms. Titus.
Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much.
I apologize for being late. I hope I don't repeat
something.
I sit on the Foreign Affairs committee and so we hear a lot
about the malign influences of China and Russia. Russia more
politically, China more economically. In fact, we just heard
about China building the port in Lima. So we know the Belt and
Road extends all over the world.
But I would like to ask you about China's relations with
Taiwan and how they respond to other countries in Latin America
as they in turn have different affairs with Taiwan.
Recently, I believe that Secretary Blinken said that we
don't support independence of Taiwan. I don't know how that is
going to play in Latin America, but we know that Latin
America's support for Taiwan has been waning. It is now down to
seven countries, I think. Coupled with China's authoritarian
regime, relations with such governments as Cuba and Venezuela,
I wonder how this is going to impact our push for democracy in
Latin America or our just even trade relations between the
United States and Latin American countries as they tend to lean
more in the direction of China over the Taiwan issue.
Anybody.
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Yes. There's no doubt that--as you
correctly said, there are still--the the largest number of
Taiwan allies are in Latin America globally. You're correct
about the number of seven. Taiwan recently lost one ally. In
March, Honduras switched allegiance from Taiwan to the PRC,
which had been a campaign promise of that country's president.
The largest two countries that are still allies of Taiwan are
in the Western Hemisphere, Guatemala and Paraguay. Guatemala is
about to have an election. The issue of whether it will
continue to recognize Taiwan is, I think, up in the air.
Paraguay did recently have an election and I think for the time
being, it is secure in its continuing relationship with Taiwan
and not the PRC.
But this is clearly one of the objectives of the PRC in the
region, is to continue to peel away Taiwan's allies.
Ms. Titus. Anybody else.
Well, thank you. I think that is something we ought to keep
a look at.
The question is about regime change. China and Russia are
using different tactics, overt and covert, to influence
countries in Latin America. The United States doesn't have a
very good history of this. If we don't like them, we have gone
in and tried to throw them, overthrow them. This is
particularly true again for Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. So
how do we try to counter China's influence, offer an
alternative, and still deal with that history of meddling that
many people have long memories about?
Ms. Dezenski. Thank you for the question.
I think this is a particularly challenging problem for us.
When China engages with countries, particularly in the global
south, they typically employ their policy of non-interference,
which means they come ostensibly to engage in economic
integration. They'll work with whatever regime is in power.
They'll often play by local rules, which could facilitate how
China uses opaque contracts, employs corruption, any number of
tools that cater particularly to weak democracies or
authoritarian regimes, where there's more likelihood that
opacity will kind-of drive the conversation and rule the day.
So I think we have a real challenge in terms of how to counter
that. We need to get at those issues first and foremost by
protecting our own interests, our own capital, our engagement,
staying true to our democratic values, pushing on
anticorruption, stopping the money laundering, calling out the
bad behavior. Because if we don't do that, we've really lost
the game. We really need to focus on these governance
principles. But then we need to take it a step further, which
is show up in the region for the long term with the right kind
of economic commitments to drive that kind of economic security
that we were talking about earlier, and maybe in the process
keep some supply chains closer to home.
Ms. Titus. We don't want to force them to make a choice. We
don't want to put it in those contexts, but we want to let them
know they have options in countries.
Thank you. I think my time is up.
I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
We will now enter a second round of questioning, again,
alternating sides based on seniority.
The Chair now recognizes myself for 5 minutes of
questioning.
I think it has been a great discussion so far. I am
incredibly worried about what the PRC is doing. The Chinese
Communist Party not only is right at our doorstep, I mean, they
are literally inside of our country in a lot of different ways.
I think the Chinese spy balloon highlighted that this
subcommittee held a hearing on that. We are hearing today the
vast array of initiatives that the CCP is using, economic
militarily, influence and information operations campaigns. The
fact that we now know, which is completely unacceptable, that
they have a surveillance and spy machine that is ongoing inside
Cuba, which is less than 100 miles away from our shores. I
think for all these reasons, it really is incredibly important
that we focus on it.
Ms. Dezenski, in your written testimony, as well as in your
responses to questions here, you talk about the true autocratic
behemoth in the region, China, which has ramped up its economic
investment throughout the hemisphere, driving debt dependency,
antidemocratic vision of surveillance states. You talk about
the critical minerals that they are acquiring inside Latin
America, you talk about the 29 different ports that they have
established. I mean, they are literally knocking at our
doorstep. I would like to really further investigate your
ideas.
Previously in your testimony, you talked about you were
there when we stood up DHS. It was created to have a more
unified whole-of-Government approach to counter new and
emerging asymmetric terrorist threats. These threats are right
there. So what is that approach economically, specifically, and
also militarily? If you have any thoughts on that.
Ms. Dezenski. Thank you so much.
The approach is, for certain, a multifaceted one. We really
need to think about this from a whole-of-Government picture.
We'll never have the centralized industrial policy focus that
China has, but arguably we don't need it if we use all of the
tools in our own toolkit to bring a combination of security,
investment, economic integration, better political engagement
with allies and friends and partners in the region. All of this
needs to work together. We need a big strategy around this.
In terms of the more specific actions that could be taken
around some of these threats that we've identified around port
security, for example, we really need to get a handle on these
nodes of commerce where we see this layering of technology,
surveillance, infrastructure investment, the potential to use
commercial operations to support military, the transport of
military supplies, for example. There are a lot of
vulnerabilities in this commerce structure, this commerce
ecosystem that connects into the DHS agenda very, very closely.
But I'm not sure that we've really made the pivot around that
operational readiness, that we've taken the analysis and the
intelligence, that big picture. Then is it being driven by the
right boots on the ground, the right engagement?
So there's multifacets to this, but I think we need to get
at an asymmetric approach where we identify what those most
critical elements of Chinese influence are and go after them.
We're not going to compete in terms of the size of our trade
relationships. We just won't be everywhere that China is.
Frankly, we don't have to be. We don't have to spend as much
money through some equivalent of the Belt and Road initiative,
but we need to use those tools that we have in a much more
effective way.
Chairman Pfluger. Ms. Brandt, it seems to me over the past
10 to 20 years that we have been ignoring our neighbors to the
south in many ways. It seems that during that time, the
People's Republic of China, led by the Chinese Communist Party,
have just inched their way into that territory with a goal of
influencing those countries in a way that undermines our own
national security. Are you seeing something similar to that?
Ms. Brandt. Yes. Concerns about terrorism and resurgent
geopolitical competition have shifted the focus to the Middle
East and to Asia. To some extent, we've deprioritized
engagement in our own region. As all of us have described here
today, I think we're the poorer for it.
Chairman Pfluger. Mr. Hernandez-Roy, I have got 12 seconds
left.
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I think that Chinese motivation is
primarily economic, but it's from a power that is obviously a
Communist dictatorship. With that comes corruption, comes
antidemocratic practices, and that leads to it opens up spaces
for all sorts of nefarious things to go on.
Chairman Pfluger. Those nefarious things are killing
100,000 Americans a year through fentanyl. They are creating
chaos, money laundering, criminal organizations, destabilizing
the region just to the south of us.
I appreciate your testimony here. I hope that this
committee can urge our colleagues throughout the rest of
Congress to take the actions that you are recommending and to
do more when it comes to securing our own country through the
stabilization in South and Central America.
With that, my time has expired.
I recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
Another aspect of this that I would like to focus on for a
moment is the importance of rare earth minerals, particularly
lithium and others. No coincidence that we are seeing China
make investments in commerce and diplomacy in areas around the
world that are rich in these rare earth minerals, including in
South America in particular. Ms. Dezenski, I noticed that you
touched on this in your testimony and others. Could you just
expand on that a bit more? What is happening with rare earth
minerals in South America? What should we as a Nation be doing
in order to prevent our adversaries from cornering the market
essentially, for these important rare earth minerals?
Ms. Dezenski. Thank you very much.
Yes, we have a big challenge in Latin America. As I've
noted in my testimony, the so-called Lithium Triangle of
Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile is home to over half of the
world's known lithium reserves. China has been working to
corner that market. U.S. companies have had, to date, somewhat
limited success. There was a bid put forward by a U.S. group of
companies in the last year or so, and it was beat out by a
Chinese conglomerate and under some strange circumstances where
the U.S. bid was knocked out because it was submitted 10
minutes late or something strange like that. So there's a lot
of competition going on right at the source of this. We have
not been in an ideal position to address it from a political
perspective because China has really leveraged its
relationships, its trade relationships, to support its
interests. Because China is the processing behemoth with 65
percent of the refining capacity around lithium in particular,
it's very difficult to break that.
One thing that we will need to look at is how to do so.
Whether it's moving some processing to the United States or
working with partners in the region to identify other areas of
processing, this could be an asymmetric opportunity for us. We
need to get at the kind-of the point in the supply chain that
is most critical, and processing is really a key part of that.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
Switching gears a bit, Mr. Hernandez-Roy, in an article
that you co authored, you remarked that among U.S. presidents,
President Biden has shown some of the most knowledge and
appreciation for Latin America. One of the examples that you
cited in the article was the decision to invite the Brazilian
and Colombian presidents to the United States within their
respective first years in office. Brazil and Colombia
historically have been two of our most important allies in the
hemisphere.
Can you talk a little bit about what more we could be doing
to strengthen our relationships with Brazil and with Colombia
in particular, and why those relationships are so important in
the context of competition with our autocratic competitors?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Absolutely. If I may, just very, very
quickly on your last question, with regard to critical minerals
and Argentina specifically, and its lithium deposits, which are
some of the largest. Argentina is exporting about 9 percent of
its lithium to the United States, and something like 49
percent, if if memory serves, to China. I've been told by
representatives of that government that they prefer it to be
the other way around, but that's just the way the economics are
right now. The IRA Act provides incentives to members, to
countries that have FTA agreements with the United States in
terms of critical minerals. Argentina does not have an FTA
agreement and is seeking an exemption under that. So that's one
thing that the United States could do to counter Chinese
influence.
With regard to your other question, Brazil and Colombia,
Colombia, as you've pointed out correctly, is a long-standing
U.S. partner and ally dating back to the 1990's when Colombia
was at risk of being overrun by narco-trafficking. The United
States invested heavily in that country and it became one of
its closest allies, beating back the security threat to
Colombia and building up its democracy. It remains a key ally
in the United States, despite a change of posture by this
particular government in terms of its outlook.
Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America, and
obviously is an important trading partner with the United
States, but it's also an important trading partner with China.
Therefore, in fact, I think the Chairman earlier alluded to the
fact that--well, he said Latin America as a whole, I'm not sure
that's entirely accurate, but I'm pretty confident at this
point that China is is Brazil's largest trading partner, and
therefore we have an interest to strengthen relationship with
Brazil, to find ways to compete with China in Brazil.
Mr. Magaziner. My time has expired.
Thank you.
Mr. D'Esposito [presiding]. The gentleman's time has
expired.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Hernandez-Roy, as was mentioned by some of my
colleagues, our weakness, or the view of this country being
weak or administration being weak, has led to threats. The
PRC's role in Latin America has grown rapidly since 2000. The
PRC state firms are major investors in Latin America's energy,
infrastructure, and space industries. Just want to give you
some numbers. By 2021, PRC trade in the region totaled $450
billion, and economists predict that it could exceed $700
billion by 2035. Of particular concern, and as was discussed,
the PRC's infrastructure in the region has displayed dual use
that could have security implications for this great country.
Could you explain the concept of dual-use infrastructure
and the impact the facilities could have on homeland security?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Sure. I can mention at least three
specific examples.
The Chinese now control the loading and unloading
facilities in the Panama Canal. They're building, and it's
almost finished, a very large port in Peru. Last week, if I'm
not mistaken, they inked an agreement with the regional
government of Tierra del Fuego in the very southern tip of
Argentina to build a port that would control the Drake Strait--
I think that's the name of the Strait--that would control
access to the fishing fields off of Antarctica. Then again in
Argentina, it has a space port in Argentina that's ostensibly
for research and to track Chinese satellites. It is essentially
a piece of sovereign Chinese territory within Argentina. The
Argentine authorities cannot even set foot on this property.
Each one of those things has a dual use. They have a peaceful
use for commerce, for research, for scientific research, and
for the movement of trade goods. But each one of them can also
be used in a second capacity--this is where the term dual-use
comes from--for military capacity. The Chinese space station
can be used to track U.S. satellites, it could be conceivably
used to track intercontinental ballistic missiles. Ports can be
used as refueling and supply and logistics hubs for Chinese
warships. Ports can be closed, facilities can be sabotaged in
the event of a conflict. The Panama Canal is obviously one of
the most strategically important areas in the hemisphere.
So each of those investments, each of those pieces of
infrastructure that the Chinese have either bought or built,
has a dual use.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you.
So, obviously, it is a real threat. What do you believe
that this committee and our colleagues in this Congress could
do to deter and to really get a handle on the dual-use
infrastructure that is causing a threat to this Nation?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. That's not an easy solution.
Mr. D'Esposito. Not in a minute and 44 seconds.
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I think the easiest thing to do is to
prevent it before it happens. So in that sense, the United
States can do a number of things. It can provide new mechanisms
or fix old mechanisms to have more development financing in the
region. For instance, the DFC is prevented from providing
financing to middle-income, middle- and upper-income countries.
It can only provide financing to lower- and lower-middle-income
countries. There's only five countries that qualify as lower-
and lower-middle-income countries in Latin America. They're all
in Central America. However, it's well-known that there are
huge disparities within a country in terms of their economic
development. So changes to those rules, for instance, could
allow more financing to some of the South American countries to
counter some of the infrastructure financing from China. The
United States can replenish the capital in the Inter-American
Development Bank. That's another large multilateral institution
that can provide more lending for infrastructure in the region.
There's examples like that in my--I'm over the time. But those
are kinds of the kinds of things that the United States can do
to prevent these dual-use things from being built in the first
place.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you very much.
I now recognize Mr. Correa from California for 5 minutes.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to, in my 5 minutes that I have, let me ask all of
you for your opinion. It is a big topic, a lot of ways we can
go, but specifically, how does Department of Homeland Security,
what are some of the actions that we can take to begin to turn
the ship around, so to speak? You mentioned, and I agree with,
the investment in the area. I would prefer a Marshall Plan that
is accompanied by some economic reform, anticorruption. But
that is the big picture. Specifically here today, homeland
security. I am going to ask each one of you, what can we do to
begin to address, to begin to bring attention to what I believe
is 20-30 years of being asleep at the wheel?
Ms. Dezenski.
Ms. Dezenski. Thank you.
One thing that really strikes me about where we are now
facing these economic security threats, a broader range of
threats to the homeland, is how much of what was built after 9/
11 has kind-of fallen by the wayside.
Let me give you an example. After 9/11, we spent a lot of
time thinking about how to secure the ports, we had something
called the Container Security Initiative, we had the Customs
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, we had a number of
international engagements that exerted U.S. leadership and
provided a basis for much more strategic engagement with
partners around the world. Some of that we've lost. I think we
need to get back to a more strategic footprint, whether we're
putting people on the ground or we're using the ``digital
boots'' on the ground, some combination of these things. We
need more eyes and ears, and we need to drive that footprint
based on a better analysis of where the threats are and where
we need to have that deeper engagement. We have the opportunity
to do that at ports. We can do that with key players in the
supply chain. We can do that through better interagency
coordination. All of these things need to happen.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Hernandez-Roy.
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Thank you, Congressman.
The commenting on DHS is really beyond my expertise. But
what I will say--you mentioned a couple of things. You
mentioned a Marshall Plan. The U.S. influence in Latin America
was probably at its highest in the 1960's after President
Kennedy launched something called the Alliance for Progress,
which was essentially a Marshall Plan for the region. It
provided development assistance on a massive scale. At the
time, it was the largest development assistance package that
the United States had ever implemented, and it had significant
effects on reducing poverty in the region, which is something
you mentioned earlier. I would also say that what the United
States needs to do is create better conditions in the region to
prevent threats from washing up on our shores. So that it goes
back to this idea of an Alliance for Progress. We have argued,
we at CSIS, some of us have argued that the United States
should entertain a new Alliance for Progress, or 2.0 at some
point. Ms. Brandt.
Ms. Brandt. I said in my testimony that China and Russia
both apply the course of toolkit in Latin America differently
than in their home regions. China in particular, at home,
closer to home, it's really weaponizing the leverage that it
has as its own region's largest trading partner. But abroad,
it's really patiently building leverage that it can sort-of use
later. So we're closer to home, those countries have sort-of
faced the sharpest or like the brunt, the sharpest elements of
China's toolkit. Farther abroad, I think they've really
benefited in some ways from China's use of inducements,
positive inducements.
So I think the task for us is to both provide alternatives,
as you've suggested, and then also to tell a more compelling
story about what we offer, right. Ultimately, competition is
about the pursuit and use of advantages. So just sort-of rather
than a tit-for-tat reactive approach to authoritarian moves, we
need to do an assessment of what our own strengths are and I
think go at authoritarians, where they're weak. I think one
such fragility is to open information.
Mr. Correa. One final quick question here to all of you.
You mentioned the popularity of TikTok social media. I
think probably 90 percent--excuse me, about 70 percent of the
world uses a smartphone. Latin America is the same thing. Great
communication device. You have a lot of Latin Americans living
in the United States. You have a lot of cross-cultural
influence. How can you use that, what I would call continuing
American goodwill, to really influence and try to continue to
integrate this continent the way it was before, I should say?
Please.
Ms. Brandt. Yes. I mean, we have 40 million native Spanish
speakers in the United States and some of the best content
creators in the world. So we should be leveraging those assets,
especially in our communication in the region. Right. I'm
thinking about, like, low-cost content distribution agreements
that would allow some of our content to be shown in the region,
for example.
Mr. Correa. In my last 25 seconds, in your opinion, three
of you, kind of a yes-or-no question, is Congress doing enough
to make sure that we are present in Latin American countries?
That is, are we visiting enough, are we paying enough
attention? Yes, no--5 seconds?
Ms. Brandt. Yes. I would just say it's incredibly important
that we focus attention and research.
Mr. Correa. Are we putting enough attention? Yes, no----
Ms. Brandt. I think there's more we can do.
Mr. Correa. Sir?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I think there's more we can do. Not just
Congress, but also the Executive.
Mr. Correa. Ms. Dezenski.
Ms. Dezenski. There's more that we can do.
Mr. Correa. Thank you very much.
Mr. Chair, I yield.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, sir. The gentleman's time's
expired.
I now recognize my friend from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Again, I realize we are talking about Latin American
countries today and the influence of China, Russia, and Iran
down there. That being said, I do want to ask a question. Is
anybody on the panel aware how many men conducted the attacks
on the World Trade Center during 9/11? Anybody? Anybody know
the number?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Could you repeat the number of? Pardon
me, the number of what?
Mr. Crane. The number of men who conducted the attacks on
the World Trade Center. Anybody know the answer to that? How
many men? How many terrorists?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. That was somewhere in the neighborhood
of 12 to 20, I believe.
Ms. Dezenski. It was about 17.
Mr. Crane. Yes, it was around that--19 men. The reason I
bring that up is because in 2021 CBP reported 4,103 encounters
of Russian citizens along our Southwest Border. It continues to
increase. Following the start of the war in Ukraine, this
number jumped from 21,763 in 2022 and then in 2023, it rose
again to 33,000.
Now let's go to China. In the first 3 months of 2023, we
saw 9,711 individuals coming from China encountered at our
Southern Border. That obviously doesn't count the number of
gotaways, which we can't count, but it is substantially more
than the 3 years. Since again we are in homeland security, does
it concern anybody on the panel knowing the current state of
our Southern Border, to see these numbers increasing from the
very countries that we are talking about in our Southern
Hemisphere?
Mr. Roy, does it concern you to hear those numbers
increasing?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I think there's a two-part answer to
that. The numbers are increasing in part, in large part because
there are freedom-loving people in those countries----
Mr. Crane. Absolutely.
Mr. Hernandez-Roy [continuing]. Who also want to leave
their repressive regimes and come to the United States.
Mr. Crane. We understand that. We all understand that. But
does it concern you, just knowing how I opened with only it
only took 19 individuals to conduct one of the greatest attacks
on the United States ever?
Mr. Hernandez-Roy. It is a concern of mine, given my
experience within the region and what other dictatorships have
done in the region to infiltrate spies into neighboring allies.
Mr. Crane. Absolutely. Do you guys think that either China
or Russia might be smart enough to figure out that our Southern
Border is pretty porous? Even our own President, while he was a
candidate, said, if you want to come to the United States,
come? Does that concern you? How about you, Ms. Dezenski? Sorry
if I pronounce that wrong.
Ms. Dezenski. No, it is fine. Thank you. Yes, it is a
concern. When the vulnerabilities are known, they can be
exploited. As the immigration flow continues to grow, it
becomes a more difficult challenge to figure out the very small
number of people within a very large number coming across the
border that are actually of security interest and concern. This
is a problem we've had for a very long time.
Mr. Crane. Yes. Let me ask a follow-on, ma'am. Do you think
we should finish the wall that we started building on our
Southern Border?
Ms. Dezenski. It's probably outside of my scope to comment
specifically on the wall because I'm not following where things
are at, but I do firmly believe that we need to be able to
control the border.
Mr. Crane. OK.
Ms. Brandt, what about you?
Ms. Brandt. Like Ms. Dezenski, that's sort-of beyond the
focus of my research. I will say, of course, I think we should
have a secure Southern Border. Also, as I said, one of our
greatest advantages is our open, welcoming, being an attractive
destination for talent. So we need to ensure that we continue
to be that kind of place that bolsters freedom-loving people
around the world.
Mr. Crane. It is interesting when I hear people come up
here and they testify before this committee and they say--I ask
about should we complete a wall and you guys say, oh, that is
outside of my scope. I know you guys are very smart or you
wouldn't be here. I read your bios. You are both very smart.
You guys both have a lot of common sense. Do you guys have
walls around your house? Do you guys have walls in your
backyard? Do you know why there are walls at prisons? Do you
know why most schools have walls? Do you know why most castles
have walls? I am asking a question. It as a pretty simplistic
question, and the American people are tired of it.
Ms. Brandt. I think our openness is a competitive
advantage. I mean, not the openness of our border like
literally, but our open welcoming environment. The openness of
our society.
Mr. Crane. Well, Ms Brandt, I would love to see you tell
that to some of the people in my district who have lost their
loved ones to fentanyl. Do you think that is an advantage to
have parents that are losing their kids to fentanyl?
Ms. Brandt. I don't mean the literal--no, of course not. Of
course not.
Mr. Crane. Because that is a byproduct of what you are
talking about, ma'am.
Ms. Brandt. Of course not. I'm not speaking about the
literal openness of the border, but our----
Mr. Crane. That is what you said, openness.
Ms. Brandt. I'm clarifying that I mean the openness of our
society.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. D'Esposito. The gentleman's time has expired.
I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony,
the Ranking Member and Members for their questions.
The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional
questions for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to
respond to those in writing.
Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will
be open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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