[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


  COUNTERING THREATS POSED BY NATION-STATE ACTORS IN LATIN AMERICA TO 
                         U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                           COUNTERTERRORISM,
                          LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
                              INTELLIGENCE

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                             JUNE 21, 2023
                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-18
                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
       
       
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]       
                                     
                               __________


        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
53-947  PDF                WASHINGTON : 2023


                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
                     Sean Jones, Deputy Chief Clerk
                                 ------                                

  SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE

                    August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island, 
Tony Gonzales, Texas                     Ranking Member
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         J. Luis Correa, California
Elijah Crane, Arizona                Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Dina Titus, Nevada
    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
                                         (ex officio)
               Michael Koren, Subcommittee Staff Director
          Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                    Alice Hayes, Subcommittee Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     4
The Honorable Seth Magaziner, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
  Oral Statement.................................................     5
  Prepared Statement.............................................     7
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     8

                               Witnesses

Ms. Elaine K. Dezenski, Senior Director and Head, Center on 
  Economic and Financial Power, Foundation for Defense of 
  Democracies:
  Oral Statement.................................................    10
  Prepared Statement.............................................    11
Mr. Christopher Hernandez-Roy, Deputy Director and Senior Fellow, 
  Americas Program, Center for Strategic and International 
  Studies:
  Oral Statement.................................................    18
  Prepared Statement.............................................    20
Ms. Jessica Brandt, Policy Director, Artificial Intelligence and 
  Emerging Technology Initiative, Fellow, Foreign Policy, Strobe 
  Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology, The 
  Brookings Institution:
  Oral Statement.................................................    26
  Prepared Statement.............................................    29

 
  COUNTERING THREATS POSED BY NATION-STATE ACTORS IN LATIN AMERICA TO 
                         U.S. HOMELAND SECURITY

                              ----------                              


                        Wednesday, June 21, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                         Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, 
                         Law Enforcement, and Intelligence,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. August Pfluger 
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Pfluger, D'Esposito, Crane, 
Magaziner, Correa, Goldman, and Titus.
    Also present: Representative Jackson Lee.
    Chairman Pfluger. The Committee on Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and 
Intelligence will come to order.
    Without objection, the subcommittee may recess at any 
point.
    The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from a 
non-Governmental panel of expert witnesses to examine the 
threats posed by nation-state actors in Latin America, like 
China and Russia to the United States homeland security.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Good morning and welcome to the Subcommittee on 
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence. Today, we 
are holding an important hearing on the threats posed by 
nation-state actors like the People's Republic of China, the 
PRC, Russia, Iran, and Venezuela in Latin America to our 
homeland security.
    There is no doubt that we are facing a migration crisis 
caused by the administration's policy decisions. We are 
witnessing significant increases in encounters at the Southwest 
Border with individuals from countries of concern like the PRC 
and Russia. I am concerned that the chaos of the Southwest 
Border could be taken advantage of by anti-U.S. regimes--not 
just can, but has been. Meanwhile, the PRC and our foreign 
adversaries are expanding their spheres of influence in Latin 
America right in our backyard. As they grow their diplomatic, 
economic, and military activities in the region, there are 
clear implications for U.S. homeland security.
    Recent data released by the United States Customs and 
Border Protection shows a steep increase in encounters with 
foreign nationals from the PRC, Russia, Cuba, and Venezuela, 
amongst others at our Southwest Border. For example, in the 
first 7 months of fiscal year 2023, over 9,711 PRC nationals 
were encountered by U.S. Border Patrol along our Southwest 
Border, exponentially more than the previous 3 years. Restate 
that number: 9,711 PRC nationals. A similar trend involves 
encounters with Russian citizens. In 2021, CBP reported just 
4,103 encounters of Russian citizens along our Southwest 
Border, however, that number jumped to 21,763 in fiscal year 
2022, and it is over 33,000 for the first 7 months of fiscal 
year 2023. I have heard directly from sheriffs in my own 
district that they apprehended multiple individuals from the 
PRC who were deemed high-value targets and were taken into 
custody by the FBI.
    While aliens may have legitimate claims to asylum, the 
increased flow of nationals from adversarial countries is 
concerning as these individuals blend into the much larger wave 
of illegal aliens flooding across the Southwest Border, already 
topping 1.4 million illegal alien encounters for the first 7 
months of this fiscal year, 2023.
    Meanwhile, Border Patrol agents at the Southwest Border are 
completely overwhelmed. There have been 1.5 million known 
gotaways at the Southwest Border since the start of this 
administration. This creates a gap in our homeland security 
intelligence that malign nation-states could exploit to send 
nefarious actors into the United States. It is important that 
this subcommittee fully understand the ways that malign nation-
state actors could take advantage of the wide open Southwest 
Border. However, the problem is not just there. It stretches 
further than that. There is no doubt that we are facing an 
array of security challenges in the region and by extension, to 
homeland security.
    In particular, the PRC has developed close economic and 
security ties with a number of Latin American countries, 
including Brazil and Venezuela. For example, the China 
Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China offered 
approximately $137 billion to the region in loans to a 
multitude of sectors, with Venezuela as the most prolific 
beneficiary of PRC loans at roughly $60 billion. However, the 
PRC's influence in the region goes beyond economic ties. It 
also includes military and security partnerships. For example, 
in approximately a 10-year period between 2009 and 2019, $615 
million in weapons were sold to Venezuela by the PRC. The PRC's 
increased influences in the region bolsters the CCP's 
geopolitical goals, which also includes strengthening other 
authoritarian regimes, leading to significant challenges to 
U.S. influence in the region, as well as security risks to the 
United States homeland.
    Earlier this year, Melissa Dalton, the Pentagon's Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric 
Affairs, testified that the PRC and Russia now pose more 
dangerous challenges to the safety and security of the U.S. 
homeland. They are both, and I quote here from Ms. Dalton, 
``already using nonkinetic means against our defense, 
industrial base, and mobilization systems to subvert our 
ability to project power''. This transcends the egregious 
example of when the PRC entered our sovereign airspace with a 
high-altitude balloon, which we know with certainty they 
intended to use to spy on sensitive U.S. military and critical 
infrastructure sites.
    Then, just this month, the Biden administration confirmed 
the existence of a PRC-run electronic espionage facility in 
Cuba, roughly 100 miles from the United States, that would 
allow the CCP intelligence services to collect signals 
intelligence throughout the southeastern United States. Less 
than 48 hours later, an anonymous Biden administration official 
confirmed to Politico that the CCP has actually been using a 
secret facility in Cuba to spy on the United States since at 
least 2019. My Republican colleagues and I are demanding 
answers on this latest nefarious action by the CCP from DHS 
Secretary Mayorkas and FBI Director Wray to ensure the homeland 
security response is robust and steadfast. I would love to have 
all of this committee in a nonpartisan way join that effort to 
understand those nefarious actions. This activity once again 
displays the CCP's willingness to use every tactic and 
technique to undermine U.S. sovereignty and shows that 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America can and will assist the 
CCP in attacking U.S. homeland security.
    Additionally, Russia continues to demonstrate its intent 
and capability to conduct military and other strategic 
activities against the United States in the Western Hemisphere. 
Russia's influence in the region mainly comes from security 
ties on which it has colluded with anti-U.S. authoritarian 
regimes, including Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba. For example, 
Russia has assisted Venezuela with sanctions evasion using 
Russian state-controlled companies to transport Venezuelan oil. 
Russia also uses the Wagner Group, a private military company, 
to protect power world-wide. The Wagner Group tries to undercut 
the United States and present itself as a mediator and security 
partner to anti-U.S. countries and gain military access rights 
and economic opportunities. For example, they are training 
Venezuela's armed forces.
    Additionally, Iran plays a secondary role in the region. 
The recent docking of Iranian warships in Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil indicate Iran is looking to assert its power across the 
region. Iran's backed militia, Hezbollah, continues to have a 
presence in the region with the transition from the triborder 
area of Paraguay to operations in Venezuela.
    Whether it is the PRC, Russia, or Russia's proxies or Iran, 
it is vital that we understand the security challenges and 
threats posed by nation-state actors to U.S. homeland security 
and explore every avenue to address them head on.
    This morning, we have a distinguished panel of expert 
witnesses to discuss this important topic with. I would just 
like to say that we are facing challenges all over the world. I 
personally think that this is one of the most challenging 
security environments that we have ever been in, including the 
World War II era. We know some of the threats and some of the 
threats we don't know. The nature and the face of these threats 
has changed. It is no longer just missiles in Cuba like we saw 
decades ago. The cyber threat is egregious, economically what 
these countries are doing to use their influence and to really 
hurt the people of countries, especially in our backyard in 
South America and Latin America.
    So I am excited to hear from our witnesses, I am excited to 
have this conversation today because I hope it informs the rest 
of Congress that we must keep our eye on the ball. We must 
understand what the Chinese Communist Party is doing and the 
malign activities that they will use to undermine not just our 
influence and our economic prowess around the world, but also 
our homeland security right here at home.
    I thank all the witnesses for being with us this morning, 
and I look forward to our discussion.
    [The statement of Chairman Pfluger follows:]
                  Statement of Chairman August Pfluger
                             June 21, 2023
    Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, 
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence.
    Today we are holding an important hearing on the threats posed by 
nation-state actors like the People's Republic of China (PRC), Russia, 
Iran, and Venezuela in Latin America to our homeland security.
    There is no doubt that we are facing a migration crisis caused by 
the administration's policy decisions.
    We are witnessing significant increases in encounters at the 
Southwest Border with individuals from countries of concern like the 
PRC and Russia.
    I am concerned that the chaos of the Southwest Border could be 
taken advantage of by anti-U.S. regimes.
    Meanwhile, the PRC and our foreign adversaries are expanding their 
spheres of influence in Latin America--essentially in our backyard.
    As they grow their diplomatic, economic, and military activities in 
the region, there are clear implications for U.S. homeland security.
    Recent data released by the United States Customs and Border 
Protection shows a steep increase in encounters with foreign nationals 
from the PRC, Russia, Cuba, and Venezuela, amongst others, at our 
Southwest Border.
    For example, in the first 7 months of fiscal year 2023, over 9,711 
PRC nationals were encountered by U.S. Border Patrol along our 
Southwest Border, exponentially more than the previous 3 years.
    A similar trend involves encounters with Russian citizens. In 2021, 
CBP reported just 4,103 encounters of Russian citizens along our 
Southwest Border; however, that number jumped to 21,763 in fiscal year 
2022 and is already over 33,000 for the first 7 months of fiscal year 
2023.
    I have heard directly from sheriffs in my district that they 
apprehended multiple individuals from the PRC who were deemed ``high-
value targets'' and were taken into custody by the FBI.
    While aliens may have legitimate claims to asylum, the increased 
flow of nationals from adversarial countries is concerning as these 
individuals blend into the much larger wave of illegal aliens flooding 
across the Southwest Border, already topping 1.4 million illegal alien 
encounters through the first 7 months of fiscal year 2023.
    Meanwhile, Border Patrol agents at the Southwest Border are 
completely overwhelmed. There have been 1.5 million known gotaways at 
the Southwest Border since the start of this administration.
    This creates a gap in homeland security intelligence that malign 
nation-states could exploit to send nefarious actors into the United 
States.
    It is important that this subcommittee fully understand the ways 
malign nation-state actors could take advantage of the wide-open 
Southwest Border.
    However, the problems stretch further than that. There is no doubt 
that we are facing an array of security challenges in the region and by 
extension to U.S. homeland.
    In particular, the PRC has developed close economic and security 
ties with a number of Latin American countries, including Brazil and 
Venezuela.
    For example, the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank 
of China offered approximately $137 billion to the region in loans to a 
multitude of sectors--with Venezuela as the most prolific beneficiary 
of PRC loans at roughly $60 billion.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``China-Latin America Finance Databases,'' The Inter-American 
Dialogue, Accessed June 16, 2022, https://www.thedialog.org/map_list/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, the PRC's influence in the region goes beyond economic 
ties. It also includes military and security partnerships.
    For example, in approximately a 10-year period, between 2009 and 
2019, $615 million in weapons was sold to Venezuela by the PRC.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Lara Seligman, ``U.S. Military Wary of China's Foothold in 
Venezuela,'' Foreign Policy, April 8, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/
2019/04/08/us-military-wary-of-chinas-foothold-in-venezuela-maduro-
faller-guaido-trump-pentagon/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PRC's increased influences in the region bolsters the CCP's 
geopolitical goals, which also includes strengthening other 
authoritarian regimes, leading to significant challenges to U.S. 
influence in the region as well as security risks for the U.S. 
homeland.
    Earlier this year, Melissa Dalton, the Pentagon's Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs 
testified that the PRC and Russia ``now pose more dangerous challenges 
to the safety and security of the U.S. homeland.''\3\ They are both 
``already using non-kinetic means against our defense industrial base 
and mobilization systems to subvert our ability to project power.''\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ https://www.armed-services.senate.gov/hearings/to-receive-
testimony-on-strategic-competition-and-security-cooperation-in-the-
western-hemisphere.
    \4\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This transcends the egregious example of when the PRC entered our 
sovereign air space with a high-altitude balloon, which we know with 
certainty they intended to use to spy on sensitive U.S. military and 
critical infrastructure sites.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    And then, just this month, the Biden administration confirmed the 
existence of a PRC-run electronic espionage facility in Cuba--roughly 
100 miles from the United States--that would allow the CCP intelligence 
services to collect signals intelligence throughout the southeastern 
United States.
    Less than 48 hours later an anonymous Biden administration official 
confirmed to Politico that the CCP has actually been using a secret 
facility in Cuba to spy on the United States since at least 2019.
    My Republican colleagues and I are demanding answers on this latest 
nefarious action by the CCP from DHS Secretary Mayorkas and FBI 
Director Wray to ensure the homeland security response is robust and 
steadfast.
    This activity once again displays the CCP's willingness to use 
every tactic and technique to undermine U.S. sovereignty and shows that 
authoritarian regimes in Latin America can and will assist the CCP in 
attacking U.S. homeland security.
    Additionally, Russia continues to demonstrate its intent and 
capability to conduct military and other strategic activities against 
the United States in the Western Hemisphere.
    Russia's influence in the region mainly comes from security ties--
on which it has colluded with anti-U.S. authoritarian regimes, 
including Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba.
    For example, Russia has assisted Venezuela with sanctions evasion, 
using Russian state-controlled companies to transport Venezuelan oil.
    Russia also uses the Wagner Group, a private military company to 
project power world-wide. The Wagner Group tries to undercut the United 
States, present itself as a mediator and security partner to anti-U.S. 
countries, and gain military access rights and economic opportunities. 
For example, they are training Venezuela's armed forces.
    Additionally, Iran plays a secondary role in the region. The recent 
docking of Iranian warships in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil indicate Iran is 
looking to assert its power across the region.
    Iran's-backed militia, Hezbollah continues to have a presence in 
the region, with a transition from the tri-border area of Paraguay to 
operations in Venezuela.
    Whether it is the PRC, Russia or Russia's proxies, or Iran, it is 
vital that we understand the security challenges and threats posed by 
nation-state actors to U.S. homeland security and explore every avenue 
to address them head on.
    This morning, we have a distinguished panel of expert witnesses to 
discuss this important topic.
    I thank all our witnesses for being with us this morning and I look 
forward to our discussion.

    Chairman Pfluger. I would now like to recognize the Ranking 
Member, the gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner, for his 
opening statement.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
    We find ourselves in a time when, once again, democratic 
nations like the United States are in a competition for the 
hearts and minds in the developing world, with autocratic 
competitors like the People's Republic of China, Iran, and 
Russia. It is more important than ever that we build strong 
relationships with our allies in Latin America based on mutual 
respect, fair commerce, and a shared commitment to security and 
human rights. If we make the mistake of driving away our allies 
in the region, Russia, the Chinese Communist Party, and our 
other competitors will gladly fill that void at the expense of 
our own security.
    In Latin America today, the CCP and Russia are attempting 
to manipulate public discourse, discredit elections and the 
electoral system, influence policy, and disrupt markets, with 
the goal of undermining U.S. security and economic 
competitiveness. We cannot allow that to happen. Over the past 
20 years, the CCP has spent heavily in Latin America. Chinese 
state industry now reaches deep into Latin America's energy, 
infrastructure, and space industries. In fact, China has 
surpassed the United States as South America's biggest trading 
partner. I will say it again, China has surpassed the United 
States as South America's biggest trading partner. China now 
has free trade agreements in place with Chile, Costa Rica, 
Ecuador, and Peru, and 20 countries in Latin America and the 
Caribbean participate in the CCP's Belt and Road initiative. 
The Chinese Communist Party is investing in soft power through 
cultural and educational programs in Latin America, which are 
building political goodwill and presenting China as a viable 
alternative partner to the United States and other democracies.
    This is why it is so important that last year President 
Biden launched a new economic cooperation initiative with Latin 
America aimed specifically at countering the CCP's growing 
clout in the region. Under Vladimir Putin Russia cares less 
about competing with the United States economically and more 
about stoking chaos and political division to harm democracies 
like the United States. Russia has maintained decades-long 
relationships with Latin American authoritarian regimes. The 
Cuban, Venezuelan, and Nicaraguan regimes are heavily dependent 
on Moscow for political, economic, and security assistance. 
Russia actively spreads propaganda in Latin America to 
undermine U.S. interests and the interests of democratic 
allies, just as Russia did in the early days of its invasion of 
Ukraine, when Russia used its propaganda assets in Latin 
America to push conspiracy theories about Ukraine and the West 
to justify the invasion.
    With the CCP, Russia, and other autocratic regimes so 
determined to build their presence in Latin America, it is 
vital that the United States strengthen our relationships with 
our neighbors in the region. The worst thing we could do for 
our own security is drive our Latin American neighbors into the 
arms of our adversaries. That is why it is disturbing to hear 
former President Trump and some of my colleagues from across 
the aisle, though of course not all, push reckless ideas like 
unilateral military action in Mexico, which would seriously 
endanger the strategic regional relationships we need to keep 
America secure.
    It is also alarming that some House Republicans are calling 
for significant cuts to USAID, State Department, and Commerce 
Department budgets that are crucial to building American 
influence in Latin America at the same time that the CCP in 
particular continues to invest in aid and commerce to build 
their malign influence in the region.
    As we go through the appropriations process in the coming 
months, we need to keep in mind that investing in aid and 
commerce in Latin America is not charity, it is in our national 
security interest.
    So this is a time for engagement and partnership, not 
hyperpartisanship. Today's hearing, I hope, is an opportunity 
for this subcommittee to examine what we can do to counter the 
wider threat posed by autocratic nation-states that are setting 
up shop in the Western Hemisphere with the goal of undermining 
U.S. leadership in our own backyard. I hope that we can work 
together to counter their efforts and advance American 
interests.
    With that, I yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Magaziner follows:]
               Statement of Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
                             June 21, 2023
    We find ourselves in a time when democratic nations, like the 
United States, are in a competition for hearts and minds in the 
developing world with autocratic competitors like the People's Republic 
of China, Iran, and Russia.
    It is more important than ever that we develop strong relationships 
with our allies in Latin America, based on mutual respect, fair 
commerce, and a shared commitment to security and human rights. If we 
make the mistake of driving away our allies in the region, Russia, the 
CCP and our other competitors will gladly fill that void, at the 
expense of our own security.
    In Latin America today, the CCP and Russia are attempting to 
manipulate public discourse, discredit elections and the electoral 
system, influence policy development, and disrupt markets with the goal 
of undermining U.S. security and economic competitiveness. We cannot 
allow that to happen.
    Over the past 20 years, the CCP has spent heavily in Latin America. 
Chinese state industry now reaches deep into Latin America's energy, 
infrastructure, and space industries. In fact, China has surpassed the 
United States as South America's biggest trading partner. China has 
free trade agreements in place with Chile, Costa Rica, Ecuador, and 
Peru; and 20 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean participate 
in the CCP's Belt and Road initiative. And the Chinese Communist Party 
is investing in soft power through cultural and educational programs in 
Latin America, which are building political goodwill and presenting 
China as a viable alternative partner to the United States and 
democracies.
    This is why it is so important that last year President Biden 
launched a new economic cooperation initiative with Latin America aimed 
specifically at countering the CCP's growing clout in the region. Under 
Vladimir Putin, Russia cares less about competing with the United 
States economically and more about stoking chaos and political division 
to harm democracies like the United States. Russia has maintained 
decades-long, strong relationships with Latin American authoritarian 
regimes.
    The Cuban, Venezuelan, and Nicaraguan regimes are heavily dependent 
on Moscow for political, economic, and security assistance. And Russia 
actively spreads propaganda in Latin America to undermine U.S. 
interests and the interests of democratic allies--as Russia did during 
the early days of its invasion of Ukraine, when Russia used its 
propaganda assets in Latin America to push conspiracy theories about 
Ukraine and the West to justify the invasion.
    With the CCP, Russia and other autocratic regimes so determined to 
build their presence in Latin America, it is vital that the United 
States strengthen our relationships with our neighbors in the region.
    The worst thing we could do for our own security, is drive our 
Latin American neighbors into the arms of our adversaries. That is why 
it is disturbing to hear former President Trump and some of my 
colleagues from across the aisle push reckless ideas like unilateral 
military action in Mexico, which would seriously endanger the strategic 
regional relationships we need to keep America secure.
    It is also alarming that some House Republicans are calling for 
significant cuts to USAID, State Department, and Commerce Department 
budgets that are crucial to building American influence in Latin 
America, at the same time that the CCP in particular continues to 
invest in aid and commerce to build their malign influence in the 
region. This is a time for engagement and partnership, not hyper-
partisanship.
    Today's hearing, I hope, is an opportunity for this subcommittee to 
examine the wider threat posed by autocratic nation-states that are 
setting up shop in the Western Hemisphere with a singular goal--to 
undermine U.S. leadership in our own backyard.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ranking Member Magaziner.
    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                             June 21, 2023
    I am grateful for Ranking Member Magaziner's leadership on this 
subcommittee and his effort to put today's hearing into focus. It was 
committee Democrats' understanding that the purpose of this hearing is 
to discuss foreign malign influence in Latin America and how the 
actions of our geopolitical adversaries in the region impact U.S. 
interests and homeland security. This is certainly an issue worth 
exploring.
    However, the Republicans' media advisory for the hearing once again 
demonstrates that my colleagues across the aisle are focused on the 
Southern Border to the exclusion of other critical homeland security 
matters. According to the media advisory, the focal point of today's 
hearing for Republicans is Border Patrol's, and I quote, ``encounters 
with individuals from authoritarian countries hostile to the United 
States, such as China, Russia, Cuba, and Venezuela.''
    It goes on to note that Republicans are unaware of the migrants' 
motives for seeking entry into the United States but does not mention 
using today's hearing to explore the root causes of migration. Perhaps 
because Republicans are uninterested in finding solutions and want to 
further their partisan agenda against Secretary of Homeland Security 
Alejandro Mayorkas--a case that they have stated is already ``closed.''
    It is high time that this committee start doing oversight of 
pressing issues, like foreign malign influence in Latin America and how 
the actions of China, Russia, and others in our backyard undermine U.S. 
interests and democracy at large. I--once again--urge my Republican 
colleagues to forgo trying to score political points and join Democrats 
in seeking real solutions to threats to the homeland.
    At the subcommittee's March 9 and May 23 hearings, Chairman Pfluger 
stated, and I quote, ``This conflict is not with individual citizens of 
the PRC--this conflict is with the CCP, an authoritarian regime that 
commits genocide against its own people, censors free speech across the 
globe, and aims to end democracy as we know it.'' I could not agree 
more. Today, we ought to be examining the activities of malign nation-
state actors in Latin America and the subsequent risks to the homeland, 
not vilifying individuals fleeing autocratic and oppressive regimes.
    The Biden administration's National Security Strategy notes that 
the ``Western Hemisphere impacts the United States more than any other 
region.'' It also recognizes the need for the United States to deepen 
partnerships with Latin American countries ``to advance economic 
resilience, democratic stability, and citizen security,'' and to 
protect against external interference or coercion, including from 
China, Russia, and Iran.
    So, I am thankful that under Ranking Member Magaziner's leadership, 
committee Democrats will use today's hearing to learn from witnesses 
about the scope of foreign malign influence in Latin America and how 
the United States Government can best work to help our allies deter 
such efforts.

    Chairman Pfluger. I am pleased to have a distinguished 
panel of witnesses before us today on this very important 
topic.
    Let the record reflect that the witnesses have answered in 
the affirmative.
    [Witnesses sworn]
    Chairman Pfluger. I would now like to formally introduce 
our witnesses.
    Ms. Elaine Dezenski is the senior director and head of the 
Center on Economic and Financial Power at the Foundation for 
Defensive Democracies. With more than 2 decades of leadership 
in public, private, and international organizations, she is a 
globally-recognized expert and thought leader on geopolitical 
risk, supply chain security, anticorruption, and national 
security. She also held positions at the Department of Homeland 
Security under the Bush administration, including deputy and 
acting assistant secretary for policy and director of cargo and 
trade policy. In 2015, Ms. Dezenski launched LumiRisk LCC, a 
risk advisory practice. In 2017, she served as a senior fellow 
at the Jackson Institute for Global Affairs at Yale University 
and as a lecturer of business ethics in Yale's Program on 
Ethics, Politics, and Economics. In 2020 to 2021 she served on 
the newly-formed Chairman's Council on China Competition at the 
Export-Import Bank of The United States. Thank you for being 
here.
    Mr. Christopher Hernandez-Roy is the deputy director and 
senior fellow of the Americas Program at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. Throughout his more than 
25-year career, Mr. Hernandez-Roy has worked extensively to 
advance democratic governance, prevent and resolve conflict, 
strengthen the rule of law, respect human rights, ensure 
citizen security, and promote integral development across Latin 
America and the Caribbean. He has held various senior 
leadership positions at the Organization of American States, or 
OAS, having served as senior political advisor to two 
Secretaries General. In this capacity, he most recently 
documented the abuses of authoritarian regimes in Venezuela and 
Cuba, and co-led the organization's efforts to hold the 
Venezuelan regime accountable for possible crimes against 
humanity. He also was intimately involved in the peaceful 
resolution of border disputes between Honduras and Nicaragua, 
Belize and Guatemala, and Honduras and El Salvador. Thank you 
for being here.
    Ms. Jessica Brandt is policy director for artificial 
intelligence and emerging technology initiative at the 
Brookings Institution and a fellow in the Foreign Policy 
Program's Strobe Talbot Center for Security Strategy and 
Technology. Her research interest in recent publications focus 
on foreign interference, digital authoritarianism, and the 
implications of emerging technologies for democracies. Ms. 
Brandt was previously head of policy and research for the 
Alliance for Securing Democracy and a senior fellow at the 
German Marshall Fund of the United States, a fellow in the 
Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution, special 
advisor to the president of the Brookings Institution, and an 
international and global affairs fellow at the Belfer Center 
for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.
    I thank all of the witnesses for being here. I know you 
have submitted incredible testimonies and I would ask at this 
time that you summarize those and please try to keep to 5 
minutes. We do have questions on those testimonies.
    At this time I recognize Ms. Elaine Dezenski for your 5 
minutes to summarize your opening statement.

  STATEMENT OF ELAINE K. DEZENSKI, SENIOR DIRECTOR AND HEAD, 
CENTER ON ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL POWER, FOUNDATION FOR DEFENSE 
                         OF DEMOCRACIES

    Ms. Dezenski. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, 
thank you so much, distinguished Members of the subcommittee. I 
appreciate the opportunity to be part of today's conversation.
    Latin America has become increasingly vulnerable to 
authoritarian encroachment. Instead of being filled with 
democratic friends and booming economies, America's backyard is 
home to Russian bombers and mercenaries, 29 Chinese-owned ports 
and port projects, a wide-spread Iran- and Russia-fueled anti-
U.S. propaganda, Chinese enabled-fentanyl and money-laundering 
operations, wobbling and fallen democracies, and wide-spread 
economic and political instability.
    In the aftermath of 9/11, DHS could count on and leverage 
the primacy of U.S. global leadership and economic influence to 
address a range of foreign threats to the homeland. Two decades 
later, our economic, trading, and monetary systems are being 
weaponized against us by foreign adversaries and competitors 
and in the process escalating the erosion of democratic rules 
and norms. These threats impact not only our physical borders, 
but our financial, digital, and trade borders.
    Since 2008, Latin America has seen a greater decline of 
democratic indicators than any other region globally. 
Authoritarian regimes are driving migration to the Southern 
Border in tremendous numbers, with migrants from Cuba, 
Venezuela, and Nicaragua now outnumbering migrants from the 
Northern Triangle of Honduras, El Salvador, and Guatemala. If 
we seek to address root causes of migration and broader threats 
to the national and economic security landscape, addressing 
rising authoritarianism is a strategic imperative. But it also 
means fighting back against a false narrative designed to 
undermine the U.S. role in the region.
    The challenge of authoritarian influence in Latin America 
presents critical questions about how the United States can use 
its economic and political power to drive stability, 
opportunity, investment, and democratic principles. DHS has a 
central role to play, but it requires an evolution of mindset 
and operational readiness. The Department needs to further 
prioritize its assessment of economic security threats, drive 
more effective deployment of both physical and digital boots on 
the ground, invest in securing new critical infrastructure, 
improve border management tools, and have more access to 
critical data. Finally, it requires a long-term commitment to 
mutual security and economic benefit for the region, with more 
purposeful engagement with allies and partners.
    In my testimony I outlined several concrete actions that 
DHS and the administration could undertake. One is to identify 
and analyze a broader range of economic security threats as 
core drivers of homeland security vulnerability. We need to 
continue to shift the intelligence and analysis framework to 
encompass a wider range of actors, threats, and data sources.
    Second, reengaging and expanding private-sector supply 
chain partnerships to improve information and data that 
supports better intelligence gathering and analysis. We need 
more and deeper partnerships with the private sector, 
especially those involved in manufacturing, transporting, 
importing, exporting, and investing in commercial operations 
throughout Latin America. Extension of mechanisms like the 
Authorized Economic Operator Program offers potential pathways 
to work with more private-sector actors and have more access to 
trade data.
    Third, conducting a detailed review of China's multi-
layered influence on ports and trade infrastructure is 
critical. DHS could lead or co-lead a comprehensive review of 
vulnerabilities at Latin American ports, including links to 
sanctioned entities, Chinese-made technology, assessment of 5G 
networks, trade data information, China's operations and 
maintenance strategies at ports, and assessing the risk of dual 
use infrastructure.
    Fourth, expanding the effectiveness of Trade Transparency 
units. Trade Transparency Units, or TTUs, were established in 
2004 to exchange trade data between the United States and 
trading partners to better understand the risks of trade-based 
money laundering. We really need to get at this problem, and 
TTUs are a good way to do it. Increasing investigative work to 
uncover Chinese money-laundering networks and financial 
institutions supporting them is absolutely critical. As my 
colleague Anthony Ruggiero and I have written, Congress should 
authorize the President to impose a range of sanctions on the 
facilitators who serve drug traffickers, including individuals 
who are grossly negligent concerning financial transactions or 
who export drug precursors.
    Supporting legislation to counter kleptocracy and State-
sponsored corruption is also critical. Legislation such as the 
Foreign Extortion Prevention Act, which was introduced in the 
last Congress, could help with expanding anticorruption 
enforcement tools and building on the Foreign Corrupt Practices 
Act.
    Finally, a broader strategy to ally shore with regional 
partners can bring the benefit of new supply chains, emerging 
technologies, and opportunities to drive higher levels of U.S. 
and Western investment. DHS can help create the security 
framework that facilitates deeper trade, economic engagement, 
all of which is essential to protecting the homeland.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Dezenski follows:]
                Prepared Statement of Elaine K. Dezenski
                              introduction
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished 
Members of this subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to address 
you today on countering threats posed by nation-state actors in Latin 
America. I am pleased to provide relevant research and policy insights 
from FDD's Center on Economic and Financial Power (CEFP), where I serve 
as senior director and head.
    CEFP, one of FDD's three centers on American power, was launched in 
2014 to conduct cutting-edge research and promote strategies and 
policies to bolster an effective economic security framework that 
deters America's adversaries and protects U.S. national security 
objectives. Our lines of research and analysis focus on countering 
illicit finance, kleptocracy, and authoritarian corruption; economic 
warfare, including sanctions, export controls, and regulatory guard 
rails; new alliances for economic security; risks to USD primacy; and 
global supply chain risk.
    Today, I will touch on several examples of how authoritarian states 
influence Latin America's political, economic, and security 
dimensions--impacting stability in the region and driving mass 
migration to the United States. Rising populism, slowing growth, 
hyperinflation, crime, endemic corruption, organized crime, and 
horrifying violence are displacing populations and changing the 
economic and political dynamics. The influence of authoritarian regimes 
in Latin America continues to grow, especially China's outsized 
economic and political influence.
    In the aftermath of 9/11, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
was created to take a more unified, ``whole-of-Government'' approach to 
counter new and emerging asymmetric terrorist threats to the homeland. 
I was honored to help stand up the Department as deputy and acting 
assistant secretary for policy development and as director of the DHS 
Office of Cargo and Trade Policy. Those first years forming a new 
Department were both exhilarating and immensely challenging. We didn't 
have a playbook for most decision making. But we could count on and 
leverage the primacy of U.S. global leadership and economic influence, 
which allowed us to take essential steps at home and abroad to protect 
America from further attack.
    Two decades later, we find ourselves in a new paradigm where 
elements of the U.S.-led global economic, trading, and monetary systems 
are being weaponized against us by foreign adversaries and competitors, 
and in the process, escalating the erosion of democratic rules and 
norms. The traditional terrorist threats evolved and persist, but now 
we face additional and fundamentally different sets of threats to the 
homeland that require new strategies and tactics--threats that are 
attacking not only our physical borders but our financial, digital, or 
trade borders as well.
    overview: rising authoritarian threats throughout the hemisphere
    A lack of a compelling and comprehensive U.S. vision for productive 
engagement with Latin America has left our hemisphere vulnerable to 
authoritarian encroachment and weakening economies. America's backyard, 
instead of being filled with democratic friends and booming economies, 
is home to Russian bombers and mercenaries, 29 Chinese-owned ports and 
port projects, a wide-spread Iran- and Russia-fueled anti-U.S. 
propaganda machinery, Chinese-enabled fentanyl and money-laundering 
operations, wobbling and fallen democracies, and wide-spread economic 
and political instability.
    Over the last two decades, Latin America has seen wild swings from 
left-wing populists to right-wing populists and back, all of which have 
enabled corruption, disappointed their populations, and left the United 
States with fewer stable partnerships across the region. In response, 
Washington has settled into a hands-off approach to the region--
allowing Venezuela and Nicaragua to slide into dictatorships and 
largely ignoring chaos in Bolivia, Peru, Argentina, and El Salvador. 
Since 2008, Latin America has seen a greater decline in democratic 
indicators than any other region in the world.
    In addition to rising internal autocratic forces within Latin 
America, external autocratic forces are imposing their will upon the 
region with little in the form of a coordinated American response. 
Russia and Iran are increasingly active throughout the Americas, 
providing military assistance to Venezuela, evading sanctions in Cuba, 
or pushing misinformation and destabilizing democracy. The rising 
influence of authoritarianism throughout Latin America is pushing the 
region toward totalitarianism and away from the stable and 
interdependent democracies that would benefit both local citizens and 
the hemisphere at large.
    The true autocratic behemoth in the region, however, is China, 
which has ramped up its economic investment throughout the hemisphere, 
driving deep debt dependency while pushing an anti-democratic vision of 
surveillance states and crumbling, corruption-driven infrastructure. 
Ecuador has already discovered ``thousands'' of cracks in its new $3 
billion Chinese-built and -financed hydroelectric dam. Chinese 
organized crime, with tacit state support, is infiltrating Central 
American drug trafficking and money-laundering operations--
supercharging both. China has become deeply interwoven in Latin 
America's energy grids and critical infrastructure, putting basic 
services at risk to the whims of Beijing. And China is increasing its 
military engagement throughout the hemisphere, from booming weapons 
sales and anti-riot police gear to joint exercises and training. The 
United States needs a concrete strategy to address Chinese encroachment 
throughout the region, whether through its illegal overfishing off of 
South America's Pacific coast or its growing fentanyl operations 
throughout Latin America.
    America's cool relations with Central and South America have, 
meanwhile, failed to capitalize on the tremendous promise of the region 
and its critical role in American economic and national security. A 
prosperous Latin America lowers the pressure on immigration to the 
United States, offers critical supply chain advantages, and is rich 
with resources and human talent that should catalyze 21st Century 
technologies. Mexico has frequently benefited from U.S. efforts to 
locate supply chains closer to home, but so much more could be done. 
``Ally shoring'' shifts of U.S. manufacturing from Asia to Latin 
America could promote prosperity throughout the region, lower costs for 
American businesses, and reduce pressures contributing to political 
instability and mass migration.
corruption, trade, critical minerals, and infrastructure: the bri's bad 
                                  deal
    Trade between China and Latin America has skyrocketed over the last 
two decades, increasing more than 25 times in that span. Over the next 
decade, trade between China and the region is projected to double again 
to over $700 billion. Chinese loans have also increased the debt burden 
of Latin American countries by $138 billion. Much of that debt has come 
from China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)--a program that promises 
quick infrastructure and election-friendly megaprojects for which 
leaders in the region have been eager to sign up. Latin America trails 
only Asia in terms of BRI funding, having received more funding between 
2005 and 2021 than Africa.
    BRI projects are particularly appealing to the rulers of 
overindebted countries with weak governance standards since BRI loans 
provide no protection against corruption or limitations on 
indebtedness. Unfortunately, while BRI mega-projects are appealing to 
political leaders and their cronies, they have left a troubling legacy 
of corruption, broken promises, substandard infrastructure, opaque 
contractual terms, and mountains of debt.
    In Ecuador, the $3.4 billion Coca Codo Sinclair hydroelectric 
project was supposed to provide 1,500 megawatts of electricity for 
Ecuador's people. Instead, Ecuadorian officials, including former 
President Lenin Moreno, received more than $75 million in bribes, and 
the citizens of Ecuador received a dam with at least 17,000 known 
cracks--putting the entire project and the lives of locals living 
downstream at risk. A million Ecuadorians were displaced to build the 
dam. Now there is major doubt that it will ever be fully operational.
    Still, the Chinese debt continues to get paid under opaque terms 
that let Beijing walk away with 80 percent of Ecuador's oil--its most 
valuable export. On top of that, China gets the oil at a massive 
discount, allowing Beijing to resell the oil on the open market for a 
profit that should be going to Ecuador.
    China has been aggressive in its attempts to exploit Latin 
America's abundant natural resources as it seeks to monopolize critical 
supply chains vital to the world's energy future. China controls around 
65 percent of global lithium processing and refining capacity. In South 
America's Lithium Triangle of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, home to 
over half of the world's known lithium reserves, China is working to 
corner the market in all three countries.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Diana Roy, ``China's Growing Influence in Latin America,'' 
Council on Foreign Relations, June 15, 2023. (https://www.cfr.org/
backgrounder/china-influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-
security-energy-bri); ``Ganfeng Global Layout,'' Gangfeng Lithium, 
accessed June 16, 2023. (http://www.ganfenglithium.com/about3_en.html); 
``Zijin Mining Completes Acquisition of Neo Lithium,'' ZiJin, February 
5, 2022. (https://www.zijinmining.com/news/news-detail-119227.htm); 
Ward Zhou, An Limin, Luo Guoping, and Lu Yutong, ``China consortium to 
develop lithium deposits in Bolivia,'' Caixin (China), January 27, 
2023. (https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Caixin/China-consortium-to-
develop-lithium-deposits-in-Bolivia); Antonio De la Jara, ``Tianqi buys 
stake in lithium miner SQM from Nutrien for $4.1 billion,'' Reuters, 
December 3, 2018. (https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-tianqi-
lithium/tianqi-buys-stake-in-lithium-miner-sqm-from-nutrien-for-4-1-
billion-idUSKBN1O217F).
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    American companies, meanwhile, are being sidelined under suspicious 
circumstances. The U.S. company EnergyX, the only bidder in Bolivia to 
successfully demonstrate its technology with a pilot plant on-site, was 
disqualified from bidding after missing a deadline by 10 minutes. The 
project was ultimately awarded to a consortium of Chinese companies.
    Finally, a positive trading relationship between the United States 
and Latin America has slowly been eroded and replaced with substantial 
Chinese engagement. This has spurred Brazil to push to resurrect the 
BRICS alliance as a non-America alternative trading and economic 
engagement bloc. In particular, Brazil has been vocally promoting the 
idea of pursuing a BRICS-based currency as an alternative to U.S. 
dollar primacy and dollar-based trade, with others in Latin America, 
such as Argentina and Venezuela, actively looking to join the alliance.
    The United States, mobilizing its innovative private sector, has 
much more to offer Latin America than an alliance with a moribund 
Russia and a corrupting China can provide. To date, however, commercial 
risk-aversion and U.S. Government disinterest has allowed China to 
carve out a dominant economic relationship throughout the region, much 
to the detriment of economic security in the Americas. The current 
``Americas Partnership for Economic Prosperity'' is an important 
initiative that focuses on enhancing trade in this critical region, but 
it needs resources. The United States must do more to engage 
economically with others in the hemisphere, expanding and 
reinvigorating free trade agreements and de-risking the environment for 
private capital and companies. Strong private-sector engagement 
combined with a U.S. reprioritization of the rule of law and 
transparency in Latin America has the potential to substantially 
stabilize conditions in the hemisphere and diminish the conditions that 
contribute to U.S.-bound migration.
    ports, logistics, data, and surveillance: logink, cranes, and 5g
    China's 29 ports in Latin America control vast swaths of regional 
trade, but China also manufactures 96 percent of all shipping 
containers and 80 percent of the world's ship-to-shore cranes, and they 
lead the world in shipping capacity. Ships, containers, and cranes are 
only the beginning. Chinese-operated ports not only commercially link 
Beijing to the world but also act as outposts for data gathering and 
surveillance on a massive scale. China's port companies are legally 
required to collect information for the Chinese Communist Party.
    Data collection is happening everywhere in the ports and providing 
China with a significant asymmetric advantage. Seemingly mechanical 
shipping cranes are being investigated as spying tools. China's 
logistical software system, LOGINK, is being used at ports around the 
world and tracks a wide range of trade, market, and maritime 
information, including: vessel and cargo status, customs information, 
billing and payment data, geolocation data, price information, 
regulatory filings, permits and driver's licenses, trade information, 
and booking data--information that gives Beijing critical commercial 
and geopolitical advantages. Chinese ports have 5G towers providing Wi-
Fi to cruise ship tourists, and China provides the operating systems 
for the ports facility computers.
    China's information advantage could permit Beijing to pinpoint 
economic attacks on critical U.S. trade and supply chain 
vulnerabilities. Even worse, China has knowledge and control over vast 
amounts of maritime infrastructure that underlies the shipping of 
Western military supplies, equipment, and components--cornering 
logistical data that could severely undermine U.S. and allied military 
capabilities in any potential conflict.
    China's high-powered navy--now the largest in the world--also 
maintains critical advantages by having access to a global web of 
state-owned ports. Chinese commercial ports routinely host ships from 
China's navy and could act as critical resupply points--providing a 
massive tactical advantage in any potential conflict. China is, 
moreover, actively pursuing civilian/military interoperability to make 
infrastructure, such as its ports, even more militarily valuable.
    Foreign ownership or control of global ports and their 
informational infrastructure is not an intrinsic hazard. However, given 
China's aggressively adversarial economic and geopolitical posture 
toward the West, it is critical that risks of China port-ownership are 
fully understood and mitigated. This must begin with understanding what 
exactly China knows: what information it is collecting, what data 
streams it has access to, and what state-sponsored intelligence 
gathering is linked to its port operations.
    The United States should also work closely with Canada and Mexico 
to ensure that China's logistical advantages do not allow Beijing to 
manipulate trade information in ways that undermine North American 
security, such as promoting trade-based money laundering, disguising 
fentanyl operations, aiding human trafficking, or contributing to other 
national security trade risks. In the same vein, the United States has 
an opportunity to collaborate with global allies that also face Chinese 
port-related risks to comprehensively examine and test operations and 
logistical systems to make sure that trade data is not being 
compromised or weaponized.
       fentanyl and money laundering: two sides of the same coin
    The fentanyl crisis has tremendous consequences for the United 
States. One hundred thousand Americans are dying from drug overdoses a 
year--the vast majority of those from synthetic drugs like fentanyl. 
That is more than all the deaths from car crashes and gun violence 
combined. While most Americans understand the impact of fentanyl on our 
communities, what is less understood is the sophisticated network of 
internationally organized criminal syndicates, illicit precursor supply 
chains, and Chinese money-laundering operations that underpin this 
tragedy.
    Fentanyl is unique, both in its lethal nature and in terms of the 
victims it targets. By and large, fentanyl is not being used by the 
general addict population but is much more likely to be used, 
unknowingly, by children and first-time users that believe they are 
buying legitimate pharmaceuticals, like Adderall or Vicodin . . . with 
deadly consequences. By disguising fentanyl (which costs as little as 
10 cents a pill to produce) as more profitable pharmaceuticals, Mexican 
cartels make a killing by killing American kids.
    Tragically, fentanyl is a drug crisis that is simultaneously a 
money-laundering crisis, chewing up American children in the process. 
Fentanyl, manufactured in Mexico from precursor chemicals imported 
openly from China, is just one link in a money-laundering process that 
is primarily designed to allow Chinese nationals circumvent China's 
strict controls on taking cash out of the country. Chinese money 
launders take dollars from the drug cartels, sell them to Chinese 
expats for yuan, trade the yuan to Mexican businesses that trade with 
China, taking pesos back, and then they sell the pesos back to the drug 
cartels--with the money launderer taking a cut at every transaction. 
One anonymous U.S. source described the Chinese operation as ``the most 
sophisticated form of money laundering that's ever existed.''
    We can no longer consider our border a physical barrier between the 
United States and Mexico. Increasingly, our trade and financial borders 
reach world-wide--and China is taking advantage, breaching those 
borders at will. As Admiral Craig Fuller, commander of U.S. Southern 
Command, said in 2021, Chinese money laundering is ``the No. 1 
underwriter of transnational criminal organizations.'' As another 
expert pointed has pointed out, China launders roughly half of the 
world's illicit money, responsible for cleaning approximately $2 
trillion in illicit proceeds a year.
    Fortunately, the illicit finance backbone of the fentanyl trade is 
also its greatest weakness. While interdicting tiny pills at the 
physical border is nearly impossible, truckloads of cash are passing 
right under our noses, running through our financial system and, often, 
operating in plain sight. Building a strategy to follow and attack the 
money, therefore, will do far more to stem the dramatic rise in 
overdose deaths than any other drug enforcement strategy.
               misinformation and rising authoritarianism
    Authoritarian regimes are driving migration to the Southern Border 
in tremendous numbers with migrants from Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua 
now outnumbering even migrants from the Northern Triangle of Honduras, 
El Salvador, and Guatemala. If we are seeking to address the root 
causes of migration, addressing rising authoritarianism is a strategic 
imperative. It also means fighting back against a false narrative 
designed to undermine the U.S. role in the region.
    Authoritarianism throughout the hemisphere is increasingly 
supported and enabled by a sophisticated misinformation campaign by a 
new Axis of Authoritarianism, most notably Russia, Iran, and Venezuela. 
As Southern Command Administrator General Laura Richardson stated in 
her 2022 Posture Statement to Congress, ``Russia intensifies 
instability through its ties with Venezuela, entrenchment in Cuba and 
Nicaragua, and extensive disinformation operations.''
    Russia's main conduits for propaganda throughout Latin America are 
Russia Today's Spanish language channel, Actualidad RT, and Sputnik's 
Spanish channel, Sputnik Mundo. These are channels are then amplified 
by the Venezuelan-led channel, TeleSur and the Iranian channel, 
HispanTV, whose broadcasts to Spanish-speaking audiences are closely 
intertwined with Russia's.
    As pointed out by my colleague, Emanuele Ottolenghi, ``the Spanish 
language media networks controlled by Iran, Russia, and Venezuela push 
out conspiracy theories, fake news, whataboutism, and disinformation,'' 
whereby authoritarian governments package ``their imperialism as 
resistance, their terrorism as anti-terrorism, and their 
authoritarianism as democracy.''
    Russia itself is transparent in its attempts to use propaganda as a 
weapon of war to promote its narrative throughout Latin America and 
build consensus for pro-authoritarian, anti-American policies. As the 
editor-in-chief of Russia Today stated `` . . . not having your own 
foreign broadcasting is like not having a Ministry of Defense. When 
there is no war, it seems to be unnecessary. But damn, when there is a 
war, it's downright critical.''
    The reach of this propaganda is tremendous. RT's Spanish Twitter 
account has 3.4 million followers. Its YouTube account has 5.9 million 
subscribers. TeleSur's Twitter has 2 million followers.
    The United States has not sanctioned any of these channels. It 
should.
    Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom have already 
blocked RT and Sputnik with sanctions. After ordering the removal of 
Russian state-owned media from internet search results, the European 
Union imposed sanctions on RT and Sputnik in March 2022, and in May 
2022, it banned additional Kremlin-backed media platforms, such as RTR 
Planeta, Russia 24, and TV Centre.
    But RT and Sputnik are still available on cable, the internet, and 
social media, across the United States and throughout Latin America, 
with significant, negative impact on global audiences. U.S. sanctions 
could change that, severely degrading a key weapon to promote 
authoritarian disinformation.
    Hispanic TV is owned by the Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting 
authority, or IRIB. The U.S. Department of Treasury has sanctioned 
IRIB. As an IRIB subsidiary, HispanTV, should also be sanctioned.
    Russian and Iranian regimes further boost Latin American 
authoritarianism with military sales, joint exercises, direct funding, 
and commercial engagement. Iranian warships were recently welcomed to 
Rio de Janeiro, and 2 weeks ago, Iranian and Venezuelan officials 
signed 25 separate memoranda of understanding on issues that could be 
used for military cooperation or sanctions evasion. The United States 
must do more to push authoritarian regimes out of Latin America.
                            recommendations
    The challenge of authoritarian interference in Latin America 
presents critical questions about how the United States can use its 
vast economic and political power to drive stability, opportunity, 
investment, and democratic principles. Most critically, we must 
determine how we can leverage diplomatic and operational engagement in 
the region to secure our borders, convey benefit to more people 
throughout our hemisphere, and reinvigorate true democracy in the 
process. The U.S. Government, in close and aligned partnership with the 
private sector, must present a compelling vision for new economic 
alliances and democracy-reinforcing engagements that push back against 
the malign and corrupting influence of foreign authoritarian 
governments from Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.
    DHS has a central role to play. DHS and its relevant components can 
implement a more effective strategy to understand, address, and 
mitigate threats to the homeland emanating from Latin America. But it 
requires a shift in mindset and thinking more creatively about the 
tools available and new ones required. In general terms, this demands 
that DHS:
   Have a plan. DHS should implement a more robust economic 
        security threat assessment process that prioritizes foreign 
        adversaries and strategic competitor interests.
   Show up. A risk-based approach to economic security threats 
        can drive more effective deployment of both physical and 
        digital boots on the ground for gathering intelligence and 
        information, especially at ports, and establishing core 
        relationships with government counterparts and private-sector 
        actors.
   Bring resources. DHS must invest in its own critical 
        security infrastructure in the region and more directly support 
        USG efforts to bring more capital and private-sector partners 
        to strategic regional investments, especially in critical 
        supply chains, foreign commercial port operations, and other 
        strategic vectors where we have known vulnerabilities.
   Commit. Long-term responses will send the right message to 
        partners and allies. The post-9/11 operational readiness and 
        investment strategies have largely fallen by the wayside. We 
        need to send a stronger message to friends and partners in the 
        region that we are committed to long-term partnerships. 
        Otherwise, China and other malign actors will wait us out.
    More specifically, DHS can undertake the following concrete actions 
to strengthen its efforts to combat malign authoritarian influence in 
Latin America:
(1) Identify and analyze a broader range of economic security threats 
        as core drivers of homeland security vulnerability.
    New and emerging threats across Latin America--from rising 
authoritarianism, high-tech surveillance tactics, weaponized 
corruption, and increasingly deadly drugs--leave our borders, and our 
regional economic and security objectives, vulnerable to the malign 
influence of adversaries and competitors, from both within and outside 
of the Western Hemisphere. DHS must shift its intelligence and analysis 
framework to encompass a wider range of new actors, threats, and data 
sources to ensure that its intelligence and analysis anticipate a range 
of interrelated national and economic threats in Latin America as 
drivers of risk, vulnerability, and migration. The threat picture is 
complex and nuanced, but, at the same time, these actors also exploit 
existing mechanisms. Smuggling, trafficking, intellectual property 
violations, illicit trade, disinformation campaigns, and money 
laundering are flourishing and increasingly used by both transnational 
criminal organizations (TCOs) and authoritarian state actors. These 
tools are leveraged as mechanisms for strengthening criminal networks, 
advancing anti-American political and economic objectives, and exerting 
malign influence on the homeland. Meanwhile, threats from China's 
massive infrastructure investment strategy and growing trade 
relationships have dented U.S. economic leadership in the region while 
co-opting foreign officials willing to go along with Beijing's wishes 
and create unprecedented access to valuable natural resources, 
commercial infrastructure, and military engagement. These new and 
evolving vectors of risk should be more tightly woven into DHS's 
existing threat analysis.
(2) Re-engage and expand private-sector supply chain partnerships to 
        improve information and data that supports better intelligence 
        gathering and analysis.
    We need more and deeper partnerships with the private sector, 
especially those involved in manufacturing, transporting, importing, 
exporting, and investing in commercial operations and key supply chains 
in Latin America. Much like the immediate post-9/11 environment, it is 
critical to take a more collaborative approach to risk-based targeting 
and effective use of data to maintain a real-time view at the ports and 
across vital economic interests. But we need to evolve beyond legacy 
terrorist threats. Extension of mechanisms like the Authorized Economic 
Operator (AEO) program and additional Mutual Recognition Arrangements 
(MRAs) offers potential pathways. Created after 9/11 as part of the 
Bali Trade Facilitation Agreement, AEO is the equivalent of the Customs 
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, or C-TPAT, for non-U.S. entities. 
Programs like AEO, if used effectively, can improve our ``ground game'' 
by connecting DHS with critical foreign-based private-sector 
organizations willing to provide more advanced trade data and 
information to CBP in exchange for expedited access at the borders. We 
need more connectivity to information and engagement with supply chain 
actors and operators that have access to valuable data streams. In some 
cases, additional private sector-driven link analysis and analytics can 
provide a much deeper view into the actions of individuals, entities, 
competitors, and adversaries and our global supply chain vulnerability. 
Working with AEOs and helping to grow private-sector participation in 
such programs could be a significant contributor to better 
informational and intelligence analysis.
(3) Conduct a detailed review of China's multi-layered influence on 
        ports and related critical trade infrastructure in Latin 
        America and strategies to counter that influence.
    DHS and CBP should lead a comprehensive review of potential 
vulnerabilities at Latin American ports, including mapping Chinese 
ownership and links to the sanctioned entities; the implementation of 
Chinese-made technology, including cranes, screening devices, logistics 
software, and the security data associated with these capabilities; an 
assessment of 5G network access and ownership, cyber risks, relevant 
trade data information; understanding China's operations and 
maintenance strategies and influence; assessing the risk of potential 
dual-use infrastructure; and investigating illicit actors and entities 
associated with critical infrastructure.
(4) Expand and enhance the effectiveness of Trade Transparency Units.
    Trade Transparency Units (TTUs) were established in 2004 to 
exchange trade data between the United States and its trade partners on 
a bilateral basis and improve the understanding of trade-based money 
laundering. TTUs should be resourced and supported as part of a broader 
effort to counter the illicit financial pathways favored by 
authoritarians.
    As of 2020, the United States has trade transparency agreements--
the mechanisms that allow for the exchange of information between 
jurisdictions--with over a dozen countries and their Trade Transparence 
Units (TTUs), primarily in Central and South America. An April 2021 GAO 
report recommended that DHS expand the number of agreements and 
``develop a strategy for the TTU program to ensure ICE has a plan to 
guide its efforts to effectively partner with existing TTUs, and to 
expand the program, where appropriate, into additional countries.''
    Concurrently, Congress must work with the administration to 
strengthen the effectiveness of our own TTU. Another GAO report 
released in December 2021 identified two critical deficiencies:
    1. The establishment of an ``interagency collaboration mechanism to 
        promote greater information sharing and data analysis between 
        Federal agencies and with relevant private-sector entities on 
        issues related to trade-based money laundering and other 
        illicit trade schemes''; and
    2. Ensuring that ICE take ``steps to enable and implement sharing 
        of the Trade Transparency Unit's trade data--including for the 
        purposes of trade data analysis about patterns or trends of 
        illicit activity related to trade-based money laundering and 
        similar schemes--with U.S. agencies with roles and 
        responsibilities related to enforcing trade laws and combating 
        illicit financial activity, as appropriate.''
    As of today, these recommendations remain unresolved, with ICE 
officials noting that the ``data-sharing agreements with foreign 
countries prohibit the sharing of their information, and data-sharing 
agreements among U.S. law enforcement agencies provide a mechanism to 
request access and authorization if an agency needs access.'' Congress 
should review DHS's authorities to find a way to streamline the 
exchange of information between the United States and partner TTUs.
(5) Increase investigative work to uncover Chinese money-laundering 
        networks and the financial institutions supporting them.
    As my colleague Anthony Ruggiero and I have written, Congress 
should authorize the President to impose a range of sanctions on the 
facilitators who serve the drug traffickers, including individuals who 
are grossly negligent concerning financial transactions or export drug 
precursors. DHS can play a role in this effort by surging its 
investigative resources to identify entities involved in producing and 
shipping precursor chemicals and supporting surge capacity with law 
enforcement counterparts to investigate U.S.-based and foreign money-
laundering networks and associated persons and entities.
    Congress should also enact so-called secondary sanctions targeting 
those who do business with the primary targets of fentanyl sanctions. 
Specifically, the law should impose sanctions on foreign financial 
institutions that knowingly conduct or facilitate significant financial 
transactions on behalf of a sanctioned person.
(6) Support legislation to counter kleptocracy and state-sponsored 
        corruption, such as the Foreign Extortion Prevention Act 
        (FEPA).
    Corruption preys on weak regimes throughout Latin America, boosting 
authoritarianism, destroying lives and livelihoods, undermining U.S. 
interests, pushing out law-abiding U.S. companies, and facilitating 
China's bribe-fueled incursions throughout the hemisphere. U.S.-based 
and U.S.-listed companies face major consequences for bribing foreign 
officials under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. Corrupt officials, 
however, get off scot-free, as do the Chinese companies and officials 
bringing gift boxes filled with cash.
    China is sidelining American companies in the race for critical 
resources, partnerships, and contracts largely because corruption and 
opacity are central features of Chinese engagement. In order to raise 
the stakes for crooked foreign officials and narrow the window for 
Chinese interference, Congress should consider expanding anti-
corruption law enforcement tools such as those found in the Foreign 
Extortion Prevention Act (FEPA)--which would parallel the FCPA by 
criminalizing bribe demands made of U.S. and U.S.-listed companies.
    FEPA had strong bipartisan support in the last Congress, is 
supported by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and a broad coalition of 
civil society, and reflects a commitment included in the National 
Security Council's Strategy on Countering Corruption.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ms. Dezenski.
    The Chair now recognizes Mr. Hernandez-Roy for his opening 
statement of 5 minutes.

  STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER HERNANDEZ-ROY, DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND 
   SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAS PROGRAM, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND 
                     INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member 
Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee on 
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence, thank you 
very much for allowing me to testify today on this important 
subject.
    The democratic, relatively prosperous, and largely pro-U.S. 
nature of Latin America and the Caribbean has been a strategic 
asset for the United States for decades. Yet the region today 
is at a tipping point. There is a significant risk that it 
could become a liability in strategic competition with China, 
to a lesser extent Russia in the next decade.
    In particular, the influence of extra regional 
authoritarians, to include also Iran, has been on the rise 
throughout Latin America. These actors pose an interlocking 
challenge to regional and by extension, U.S. security. While 
each possesses different capabilities and long-term objectives, 
they often coordinate both informally and formally to challenge 
U.S. influence in the region. It is therefore important to view 
these three actors not in isolation, but how their behaviors 
reinforce and interrelate.
    Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran each espouse different 
geopolitical goals and world views, yet they have shown an 
alarming degree of convergence when it comes to effort efforts 
at fomenting discord and disruption within the United States' 
shared neighborhood. Such efforts come both through support for 
overt authoritarians, especially the dictatorial regimes of 
Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, but also where they cannot 
totally pull countries out of the U.S. orbit. These regimes 
seek to peel away once staunch U.S. allies and convert them 
into comparatively neutral bystanders. This can be seen with 
the rhetoric of the government of Brazil ascribing blame to 
both Ukraine and Russia for the war. In Argentina, Brazil and 
longstanding ally Colombia's refusal to sell Soviet legacy 
weapons to help Ukraine defend itself. It is noteworthy that no 
Latin American country, save Costa Rica, has joined the 
international sanctions effort against Russia. Russia's brutal 
and illegal invasion of Ukraine has caused autocracies the 
world over to close ranks and sharpen their competition with 
the United States and with fellow democratic allies.
    From a Russian nuclear capable strategic bomber visiting 
Caracas a few years ago to more recent developments, such as 
the docking of Iranian warships in Brazil, to possible Iranian 
drone manufacturing in Venezuela for use against Ukraine, to 
revelations about Chinese espionage activities against the 
United States from Cuba and reported overtures to Haiti by the 
notorious Russian Wagner group. All have plainly illustrated 
the risks to U.S. security that come from allowing 
dictatorships to proliferate and coordinate their activities.
    I should just add that yesterday it was revealed that China 
and Cuba are also discussing military training on the island, 
which might bring Chinese troops to the island.
    Another comparatively underappreciated dimension is the 
role authoritarian alliances in helping dictators remain in 
power and repress their populations more effectively, 
accelerating mass irregular migration to the detriment of the 
region at large. The most dramatic example, of course, comes 
from Venezuela, where over 7.3 million people have left the 
country to escape Nicolas Maduro's gross mismanagement, misery, 
and repression. He remains in power, shored up by arms and 
intelligence from Russia, China, and Cuba and his sanctions 
evading oil trade with Iran.
    Nicaragua has also seen a dramatic uptake in outward 
migration, with 600,000 people fleeing since the murderous 
state crackdown in 2018, creating an acute crisis in 
neighboring Costa Rica, while U.S. apprehensions of Nicaragua 
at the Southern Border have multiplied by a factor of more than 
50 in the last 2 years. Cuba, the longest-standing dictatorship 
in the hemisphere continues to send migrants as the country's 
economy reels and as the regime further clamps down on dissent 
following the massive protests held on the island in July 2021.
    The regime in Venezuela has taken advantage of the mass 
exodus of its people and the generous humanitarian responses 
from neighboring countries to send its spies abroad to continue 
to harass and persecute Venezuelan opposition figures in 
Colombia, for instance. Thus a U.S. adversary has taken 
advantage of this human wave to conceal the entry of spies into 
a traditional U.S. ally. This begs the question of what more 
sophisticated U.S. adversaries like China and Russia might be 
doing to take advantage of the historic migration flows across 
the U.S. Southern Border.
    The presence of dictatorial regimes within the Western 
Hemisphere offers a springboard for extra hemispheric 
authoritarians to expand their influence, co-opting, coercing, 
and manipulating other countries in the region to undermine 
their relations with the United States, often empowering 
antidemocratic forces in the process.
    These challenges should not cause us to estimate the 
considerable advantages we still possess when it comes to 
geopolitical competition in the Hemisphere. Latin America, on 
the whole, still looks to the United States as its preferred 
partner. If the United States seizes the opportunity to present 
a comprehensive, well-resourced counteroffer, the region will 
consider it seriously. Crafting such a response, however, will 
require a sustained and forward-looking strategy for 
engagement, which to date has unfortunately appeared lacking 
from the U.S. Government, which has long turned to the region 
only in response to crisis and neglected it at other times.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Hernandez-Roy follows:]
            Prepared Statement of Christopher Hernandez-Roy
                             June 21, 2023
    Chair Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished Members 
of the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and 
Intelligence, I am very grateful for this opportunity to testify before 
you today. The views represented in this testimony are my own and 
should not be taken as representing those of my current or former 
employers.
    The democratic, relatively prosperous and largely pro-U.S. nature 
of Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) has been a strategic asset for 
the United States for decades. Yet, the region today is at a tipping 
point; there is a significant risk that it could become a liability in 
strategic competition with China and to a lesser extent Russia in the 
next decade. In particular, the influence of extra-hemispheric 
authoritarians, including Iran, has been on the rise throughout LAC. 
These actors pose interlocking challenges to regional, and by extension 
U.S. security. While each possesses different capabilities and long-
term objectives, they often coordinate both informally and formally to 
challenge U.S. influence in the region. It is therefore important to 
view these three actors not in isolation, but how their behaviors 
reinforce and interrelate. Moscow, Beijing, and Tehran each espouse 
different geopolitical goals and world views, yet they have shown an 
alarming degree of convergence when it comes to efforts at fomenting 
discord and disruption within the United States' shared neighborhood. 
Such efforts come both through support for overt authoritarians, 
especially the dictatorial regimes in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela, 
but also where they cannot totally pull countries out of the U.S. 
orbit, these regimes seek to peel away once staunch U.S. allies and 
convert them into comparatively neutral bystanders. This can be seen 
with the rhetoric of the government of Brazil, ascribing blame to both 
Ukraine and Russia for the war, and in Argentina, Brazil, and long-
standing ally Colombia's refusal to sell Soviet legacy weapons to help 
Ukraine defend itself. It is noteworthy that no LAC country, save Costa 
Rica, has joined the international sanctions effort against Russia for 
its war of aggression.
    Russia's brutal and illegal invasion of Ukraine has caused 
autocracies the world over to close ranks and sharpen their competition 
with the United States and fellow democratic allies.\1\ Indeed, recent 
developments in the region, from the docking of Iranian warships in 
Brazil, to revelations about Chinese espionage activities in Cuba, and 
overtures to Haiti by the notorious Russian Wagner group, have plainly 
illustrated the risks to U.S. security that come from allowing 
dictatorships to proliferate and coordinate their activities. Another 
comparatively under-appreciated dimension is the role of authoritarian 
alliances in helping dictators remain in power and repress their 
populations more effectively, accelerating mass irregular migration to 
the detriment of the region at large.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Carlos Solar, ``Is Russia's War in Ukraine Aiding the Survival 
of the Venezuelan Regime?'', The RUSI Journal, 2023, 1-12, https://
doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2023.2195751.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The most dramatic example of this comes from Venezuela, where over 
7.3 million people have left the country as a result of the profound 
economic, security, and humanitarian crises brought on by the regime of 
Nicolas Maduro's gross mismanagement and repression.\2\ Maduro 
nevertheless remains in power, shored up by arms and intelligence from 
Russia and China, and a sanctions-evading oil trade with Iran. 
Nicaragua has also seen dramatic upticks in outward migration, creating 
an acute crisis in neighboring Costa Rica, while U.S. apprehensions of 
Nicaraguans at the Southern Border have multiplied by a factor of more 
than 50 between fiscal years 2020 and 2022.\3\ Even Cuba, the longest-
standing dictatorship in the hemisphere, has seen record-setting levels 
of migration as the country's economy continues to reel and as the 
regime further clamps down on dissent following the massive protests on 
the island in July 2021.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ ``Refugees and Migrants from Venezuela,'' R4V, accessed June 
16, 2023, https://www.r4v.info/en/refugeeandmigrants.
    \3\ Charles G. Ripley III, ``Crisis Prompts Record Emigration from 
Nicaragua, Surpassing Cold War Era,'' Migration Policy Institute, March 
7, 2023, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/record-emigration-
nicaragua-crisis.
    \4\ Ed Augustin and Frances Robles, `` `Cuba Is Depopulating': 
Largest Exodus Yet Threatens Country's Future,'' The New York Times, 
December 10, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/12/10/world/americas/
cuba-us-migration.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Furthermore, the presence of dictatorial regimes within the Western 
Hemisphere offers a springboard for extra-hemispheric authoritarians to 
expand their influence, co-opting, coercing, and manipulating other 
countries in the region to undermine their relations with the United 
States, often empowering anti-democratic forces in the process.
    These challenges should not cause the United States to 
underestimate the considerable advantages it still possesses when it 
comes to geopolitical competition in the hemisphere. LAC on the whole 
still looks to the United States as its preferred partner. If the 
United States seizes the opportunity to present a comprehensive, well-
resourced counteroffer, the region will consider it seriously. Crafting 
such a response however will require a sustained, and forward-looking 
strategy for engagement with LAC which to date has unfortunately 
appeared lacking from a United States Government which has long turned 
to the region only in response to crisis and neglected it at all other 
times.
                      russia: the great disruptor
    Facing resource constraints which have only grown more acute in the 
wake of its 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia nevertheless 
evidences a brazen disregard for international norms and law in its 
efforts to disrupt the security of the United States and allies, 
including in the Western Hemisphere. While Russia cannot compete with 
China or the United States in provision of raw economic assistance, it 
makes up for this through the sheer diversity of avenues in which 
Moscow seeks to advance its interests by any means necessary.
    Russian influence in the region primarily comes from security ties, 
fostered through Moscow's global arms industry which countries across 
Latin America have relied upon in the past to fill their armories with 
cheap, reliable weapons and equipment. In June 2022, Nicaragua renewed 
the mandate for Russian military forces to operate within its borders. 
Russia also maintains a number of GLONASS satellite positioning 
stations, with one outside of Managua and another scheduled to be 
deployed in Venezuela.\5\ The infamous Wagner private military 
contractor has also set up shop in Venezuela, providing security for 
Maduro and training the Venezuelan armed forces.\6\ The role of this 
shadowy state-affiliated mercenary group is cause for elevated concern 
especially as leaked U.S. intelligence reports have indicated the group 
also explored contracts to provide security in Haiti. More recently, 
reports have circulated of Cuban citizens living in Russia signing up 
to fight in Ukraine, while Havana and Russian client state Belarus 
recently inked a deal for Cuban forces to help train the Belarussian 
military.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Julieta Pelcastre, ``Russia to Install Satellite Navigation 
System in Venezuela,'' Dialogo Americas, September 22, 2022, https://
dialogo-americas.com/articles/russia-to-install-satellite-navigation-
system-in-venezuela/#.ZBuGhHbMJPY.
    \6\ Brian Katz, Seth G. Jones, Catrina Doxsee, and Nicholas 
Harrington, ``The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies,'' 
CSIS, September 2020, https://russianpmcs.csis.org/.
    \7\ Evan Dyer, ``Cornered in Ukraine and isolated by the West, the 
Kremlin returns to Cuba,'' CBC, June 3, 2023, https://www.cbc.ca/news/
politics/russia-cuba-ukraine-putin-missiles-1.6863359.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Cybersecurity is another vulnerability which Russia has proven 
adept at exploiting. This in some respects can be traced to a lack of 
awareness across the region as to the vulnerabilities faced from 
infiltration by malign foreign actors. This extends even to regional 
ministries and national defense institutions. The Brazilian military 
for instance relies on Russian firm Kaspersky Lab for data protection 
services, even to the point of renewing its contract the summer of 2022 
as the war in Ukraine raged.\8\ Russian cyber actors have also used 
their technologies to interfere in elections in Chile, Colombia, 
Ecuador, and Peru, among others. This has mostly taken the form of 
disinformation and amplifying polarizing voices and showcases Moscow's 
well-developed mis- and disinformation tactics. Such capabilities are 
further augmented by ostensibly aboveboard news outlets. RT en espanol 
and Sputnik Mundo, Russia's Spanish-language mouthpieces, have over 30 
million viewers in Latin America and the Caribbean, with media 
agreements to operate in 11 countries.\9\ Russia's ability to exploit 
mis- and disinformation opportunistically was on display recently when 
images from Mexico of cartel soldiers wielding U.S.-made AT-4 anti-tank 
missile launchers began circulating on social media. Russian sources, 
amplified by Moscow's embassy in Mexico City, seized on the narrative 
that these launchers were redirected from U.S. arms shipments to 
Ukraine, pushing false claims that the war there was fueling Mexico's 
internal security challenges.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ ``Kaspersky: `Now we have to explain the political issues','' 
BNAmericas, June 15, 2022, https://www.bnamericas.com/en/news/
kaspersky-now-we-have-to-explain-the-political-issues.
    \9\ Calos Malamud, Mira Milosevich-Juaristi, and Rogelio Nunez, 
``Latin America in the Ukraine crisis: a pawn in the game for Putin's 
resurgent Russia,'' Real Instituto Elcano, March 3, 2022, https://
www.realinstitutoelcano.org/en/analyses/latin-america-in-the-ukraine-
crisis-a-pawn-in-the-game-for-putins-resurgent-russia/.
    \10\ ``Propaganda: Russian Embassy in Mexico Accuses Ukraine of 
Arming Mexican Cartels with US Weapons,'' Puerto Vallarta Daily News, 
June 2, 2023, https://www.vallartadaily.com/propaganda-russian-embassy-
in-mexico-accuses-ukraine-of-arming-mexican-cartels-with-us-weapons/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Russia's on-going war has also touched off a wave of migration, as 
thousands of mostly young, educated Russians flee the country by 
increasingly circuitous and dangerous routes to avoid being drafted to 
fight in Ukraine. The number of Russian nationals encountered at the 
United States' border quadrupled between 2021 and 2022. Russians 
seeking entry to the United States often transit through Mexico due to 
significantly easier visa requirements.\11\ While these outflows 
underscore the unpopularity of Moscow's war, they create novel 
challenges for North American security as well. Rising levels of 
Russian migrants through Mexico open new revenue streams for criminal 
groups engaged in human smuggling. Those fleeing Russia are not the 
only newcomers to Mexico, which, according to U.S. Northern Command, is 
home to the largest concentration of GRU agents outside of Russia.\12\ 
Weaknesses in screenings of Russians seeking asylum may therefore 
present new avenues for Moscow to infiltrate and disrupt the United 
States itself, to say nothing of the corrosive effects on regional 
security Russian espionage has already produced.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Yulia Vorobyeva, ``Entrepreneurial newcomers: Russian-speaking 
migrant smugglers on the U.S. southern border,'' Global Initiative 
Against Transnational Organized Crime, May 11, 2023, https://
globalinitiative.net/analysis/russian-migrant-smugglers-us-southern-
border/.
    \12\ MDN Staff, ``More Russian spies in Mexico than any other 
country: US defense official,'' Mexico News Daily, March 25, 2022, 
https://mexiconewsdaily.com/news/more-russian-spies-mexico-us/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                      china: civil-military fusion
    The People's Republic of China (PRC) engages with LAC first and 
foremost through an economic framework. Between 2000 and 2020, the 
PRC's share of trade with the region grew eightfold, and China's 
signature Belt-and-Road Initiative (BRI) has successfully garnered some 
21 signatories in the hemisphere. Nevertheless, viewing Beijing's 
relationship to the Western Hemisphere solely as one of trade obscures 
many of the more nefarious activities which have emerged as part and 
parcel of expanded PRC engagement.
    The PRC's interests in LAC are manifold. Broadly speaking, LAC is 
vital to China's economic development, as it is home to extensive 
deposits of natural resources, including minerals and metals such as 
copper and lithium, as well as petroleum products. LAC is also key for 
China's food security, with the region representing much of the PRC's 
food imports.\13\ Increasingly, as China's economy cools off from its 
previous red-hot growth, China is turning toward LAC countries not 
merely for their raw materials, but as a base of consumers eager to 
purchase Chinese-manufactured products. Geopolitically, China has long 
been fixated on the region as home to the majority of sovereign states 
that continue to recognize Taiwan. The PRC has assiduously chipped away 
at this number, and three Central American countries--Panama, El 
Salvador, and Nicaragua--have switched diplomatic recognition from 
Taiwan to China since 2017. So too has the nearby Caribbean Island 
nation of Dominican Republic, and in March 2023, the government of 
Xiomara Castro in Honduras recognized the PRC, opening an Embassy in 
Beijing on June 11; a move which brought the total number of Taiwanese 
diplomatic allies in the region down to just 7 countries. In Guatemala 
as well, which is headed toward Presidential elections at the end of 
June, outward support for Taiwan may nevertheless belie an internal 
calculus where recognition is far more contingent. Should recognition 
of Taiwan slip further in the hemisphere, the PRC will in all 
likelihood be further emboldened in its rhetoric and provocations 
directed toward the island.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Ryan C. Berg, and Thiago de Aragao ``Is Latin America 
Important to China's Foreign Policy?,'' CSIS, CSIS Commentary, 
September 9, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/latin-america-
important-chinas-foreign-policy.
    \14\ Leland Lazarus and Ryan C. Berg, ``What Taiwan Can Learn from 
Honduras's Switch to China,'' Foreign Policy, March 31, 2023, https://
foreignpolicy.com/2023/03/31/latin-america-taiwan-china-honduras-
united-states-diplomacy-tsai/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the PRC has clear strategic interests underpinning its focus 
on LAC, China's engagement in the hemisphere is largely regime-
agnostic. Nevertheless, high levels of PRC engagement have been 
associated with worrying trends in recipient countries' democratic 
health. China often acts as a ``lender of last resort,'' bankrolling 
authoritarian governments when other sources of financing will not 
touch these. The China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of 
China offered in excess of USD $137 billion to the region in loans to 
various sectors, Venezuela being the single greatest recipient of 
Chinese loans at USD $60 billion.\15\ Furthermore, China's public 
security initiatives have raised concerns after the PRC's ``safe 
cities'' surveillance technology was associated with crackdowns on 
opposition parties in countries like Ecuador under the Correa 
government, to say nothing of China's assistance with social control 
and digital monitoring in Venezuela.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ ``China-Latin America Finance Databases,'' The Inter-American 
Dialogue, Accessed June 16, 2022, https://www.thedialog.org/map_list/.
    \16\ Jaime Moreno, ``China Seen Backing `Digital Authoritarianism' 
in Latin America,'' VOA, January 14, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/
china-seen-backing-digital-authoritarianism-in-latin-america-/
6398072.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Military and security collaboration is also a growing aspect of 
Chinese activity in LAC. China has sold equipment to military and 
police forces from countries historically opposed to the United 
States--such as Venezuela, Cuba, and Bolivia--as well as close American 
partners like Colombia, Chile, and Ecuador. Venezuela, however, is by 
far the region's largest buyer of PRC arms. Between 2009 and 2019, $615 
million in weapons was sold to Venezuela.\17\ China could be poised to 
make greater arms sales to fill a vacuum left by Russia needing to keep 
supplies at home due to its invasion of Ukraine. In addition to 
military sales, the People's Liberation Army has a burgeoning presence 
in the region, which it maintains through training and visits, 
permitting it greater familiarity with countries' operational 
frameworks and preparedness, as well as their strategic doctrine and 
training routines. China has furthermore exploited a paucity of U.S. 
police assistance in the region, coupling this with the dire security 
crises faced by countries throughout the hemisphere, to advance its own 
model of security assistance.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Lara Seligman, ``U.S. Military Wary of China's Foothold in 
Venezuela,'' Foreign Policy, April 8, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/
2019/04/08/us-military-wary-of-chinas-foothold-in-venezuela-maduro-
faller-guaido-trump-pentagon/.
    \18\ Brian Fonseca and Leland Lazarus, ``China Is Exploiting a U.S. 
Police Void in Latin America,'' Foreign Policy, April 27, 2023, https:/
/foreignpolicy.com/2023/04/27/cities-summit-americas-united-states-
china-police-safe-city-bri/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While China leads with trade and investment, security concerns are 
never far off, as one report by the Asia Society outlines how China 
employs ``civil-military fusion'' in its development projects, ensuring 
that they are designed to specifications that offer both commercial and 
military advantages.\19\ In Latin America, this manifests in projects 
like the Espacio Lejano space research station in Argentina, which is 
effectively off-limits to inspection by Argentine authorities. Analysts 
have noted that, while certainly capable of its stated purpose of deep 
space scientific research, the station could readily be used for 
satellite telemetry tracking and control, collecting signals 
intelligence, and even potentially missile guidance, tools which would 
serve China well in a potential conflict scenario.\20\ Even further 
south, the PRC is seeking to expand its presence with a new agreement 
between Chinese state-owned Shaanxi Chemical Industry Group Co. Ltd. 
and the province of Tierra del Fuego to begin construction on a port in 
Ushuaia, a key gateway to the Antarctic, and strategic chokepoint along 
the Drake Passage and Strait of Magellan.\21\ In Peru, a mega-port is 
being built by a state-owned company from China which will become a key 
link between China and Latin America, ensuring Chinese supply chains of 
metals, critical minerals and agricultural products.\22\ General Laura 
Richardson in recent testimony before Congress has also raised concerns 
that Chinese-constructed infrastructure along the Panama Canal could be 
easily turned to military purposes in the event of a conflict or crisis 
scenario.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Daniel R. Russel and Blake H. Berger, ``Weaponizing the Belt 
and Road Initiative,'' The Asia Society Policy Institute, September 
2020, https://asiasociety.org/policy-institute/weaponizing-belt-and-
road-initiative.
    \20\ Matthew P. Funaiole, Dana Kim, Brian Hart, Joseph S. Bermudez 
Jr., ``Eyes on the Skies: China's Growing Space Footprint in South 
America,'' CSIS, Hidden Reach no. 1, October 4, 2022, https://
features.csis.org/hiddenreach/china-ground-stations-space/.
    \21\ Laureano Perez Izquierdo, ``Avanza el puerto de China en 
Tierra del Fuego: el gobernador ratifico con un decreto el memorandum 
con el regimen,'' Infobae, June 8, 2023, https://www.infobae.com/
politica/2023/06/08/avanza-el-puerto-de-china-en-tierra-del-fuego-el-
gober- nador-ratifico-con-un-decreto-el-memorandum-con-el-regimen/.
    \22\ Tibisay Zea, ``A state-owned company from China is building a 
massive commercial port in Peru'', PRI The World, September 20, 2022, 
https://theworld.org/stories/2022-09-20/state-owned-company-china-
building-massive-commercial-port-peru.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, approximately 100 miles off the coast of Florida, the 
White House has now confirmed the presence of a PRC-run base, replete 
with long-range radars and other electronic surveillance equipment 
directed toward the United States.\23\ The revelations underscore how 
the PRC utilizes its economic heft to extract far more expansive 
geopolitical advantage. Cuba, undergoing its most severe economic 
crisis since the collapse of the Soviet Union, reportedly accepted 
billions of dollars from China to take over and upgrade the facility in 
a trade which was likely too good to refuse for Havana.\24\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Dave Sherwood and Matt Spetalnick, ``Las imagenes de la base 
cubana que China utiliza para espiar a Estados Unidos y el testimonio 
de los vecinos: `Aqui se sabe todo','' Infobae, June 14, 2023, https://
www.infobae.com/america/america-latina/2023/06/14/las-imagenes-de-la-
base-de-espionaje-china-en-cuba-y-el-testimonio-de-los-vecinos-aqui-se-
sabe-todo/.
    \24\ Walter Russell Mead, ``Russia, China, and Iran in America's 
Backyard,'' The Wall Street Journal, June 12, 2023, https://
www.wsj.com/articles/adversaries-in-americas-backyard-china-russia-
cuba-spy-base-iran-monroe-9504c189.
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    As with Russia, a growing trend of Chinese nationals seeking 
respite from repressive policies at home have been pursuing circuitous 
routes to the United States by way of LAC countries. According to U.S. 
Customs and Border Patrol data, more than 4,000 Chinese nationals were 
encountered between October 2022 and February 2023 at the Southern 
Border, a dramatic uptick from the 421 encounters reported during the 
same period from 2021 and 2022.\25\ Typically, these individuals arrive 
via countries like Ecuador which does not have a visa requirement for 
Chinese citizens to visit. From there, they travel a long and often 
dangerous road, together with tens of thousands of Latin American and 
Caribbean migrants transiting the Darien Gap between Colombia and 
Panama.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Alicia Chen, ``Growing numbers of Chinese citizens set their 
sights on the US--via the deadly Darien Gap,'' The Guardian, March 8, 
2023, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/mar/09/growing-numbers-of-
chinese-citizens-set-their-sights-on-the-us-via-the-deadly darien-gap.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                    iran: opportunistic encroachment
    Often viewed as a secondary, or even tertiary player in the 
hemisphere, Iran's engagement with LAC exacerbates many of the 
challenges outlined above. The continued global sanctions regime 
against Iran limits its tools for influence and has largely relegated 
Iranian influence in the hemisphere to Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba, 
which are already willing to flaunt U.S. sanctions. Here, Iranian 
engagement has a complementary effect to more well-established and 
substantive Russian and Chinese efforts.
    The docking of Iranian warships in Rio di Janeiro in March 2023 and 
high-level visits by Iranian officials to Caracas and Managua and 
Havana suggest Iran is seeking to project military power throughout the 
region in addition to economic benefit. Diplomatically, it appears 
Iranian Foreign Minister, Hosein Amir Abdolahian's February 2023 tour 
of the hemisphere's dictatorships was a preview for an even greater 
engagement, as President Ebrahim Raisi began making the same circuit of 
visits on June 12.\26\ In the past, Iran allegedly sent members of its 
Quds Force to help Nicolas Maduro stay in power, including with arms 
shipments.\27\ Informed observers have speculated that in return, 
Maduro may be shipping Venezuelan-made kamikaze drones, or their parts, 
on regular triangular flights between Venezuela, Tehran, and 
Moscow.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Arturo McFields, '' Latin America's tyrants open their arms to 
Iran,'' The Hill, June 11, 2023, https://thehill.com/opinion/national-
security/4043440-latin-americas-tyrants-open-their-arms-to-iran/.
    \27\ Michael R. Gordon and Ian Talley, ``Iranian Arms, Fighters 
Bolster Maduro Government in Venezuela, U.S. Says'', The Wall Street 
Journal, December 2, 2020, https://www.wsj.com/articles/iranian-arms-
fighters-bolster-maduro-government-in-venezuela-u-s-says-11606946275?- 
mod=lead_feature_below_a_pos1.
    \28\ Farzin Nadimi, ``Iran May Be Outsourcing Kamikaze Drone 
Production to Venezuela'', The Washington Institute for Near East 
Policy, November 17, 2022, https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/iran-may-be-outsourcing-kamikaze-drone-production-venezuela.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another security concern is the continued presence of Hezbollah in 
Latin America. The group's origins in the region extends back decades, 
where they were originally concentrated around the Southern Cone, 
especially the tri-border area of Paraguay. Today, Hezbollah operations 
have shifted northwards, mainly to Venezuela where they have a 
sympathetic backer in the form of the Maduro regime.\29\ The group has 
been responsible for helping Maduro launder gold as well, with Israeli 
intelligence revealing in February 2023 the existence of a gold 
smuggling operation between Caracas and Tehran facilitated by 
Hezbollah.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Matthew Levitt, ``Iranian and Hezbollah Operations in South 
America: Then and Now,'' National Defense University, PRISM 5, no. 4 
(2016): https://cco.ndu.edu/Portals/96/Documents/prism/prism_5_4/
Iranian%20and%20Hezbollah.pdf.
    \30\ Amir Bohbot, ``Secret Hezbollah gold trade in South America 
foiled by Israeli intelligence,'' The Jerusalem Post, February 26, 
2023, https://www.jpost.com/middle-east/iran-news/article-732802.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          cross-cutting themes
    All three extra-hemispheric authoritarian regimes recognize that 
their goals in Latin America are aligned for the time being, and all 
have a vested interest in sustaining anti-U.S. regimes, and disrupting 
U.S. security. In many cases, there is strong complementarity between 
the interests of these authoritarians. China for instance has high 
demand for cheap oil, while both Iran and Venezuela need to find 
clients willing to buy their energy exports in the face of sanctions. 
At other times, cooperation among autocrats gives different regimes the 
ability to defray costs and deflect responsibility. Russia for example 
can supply Nicaragua with arms and equipment while entrusting the 
training of its repressive apparatus to Venezuelan and Cuban 
officials.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ Julieta Pelcastre, ``Cuban Agents Advise Nicaraguan 
Military,'' Dialogo Americas, August 10, 2019, https://dialogo-
americas.com/articles/cuban-agents-advise-nicaraguan-military/
#.ZBuL93bMJPY.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Accordingly, it must be understood that autocrats around the world 
follow a similar ``playbook'' of policies for how to take and hold 
power, clamp down on dissent, and survive in the face of international 
pressure. Nicaragua's Foreign Agents Law for instance was closely 
modeled after Russia's, allowing it to clamp down and expel dissenting 
voices.\32\ Cybersecurity and the information space more broadly 
represent key vulnerabilities that malign authoritarians view as entry 
points for influence, many countries in the region still do not take 
their data security seriously enough.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Ryan C. Berg, ``Nicaragua's Upcoming Election Highlights Need 
for Long-Term Forms of Pressure on the Ortega Regime,'' CSIS, CSIS 
Commentary, August 6, 2021, https://www.csis.org/analysis/nicaraguas-
upcoming-election-highlights-need-long-term-forms-pressure-ortega-
regime.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Another common thread is the linkage between authoritarian regimes 
and migration. Dictatorships are associated with a number of push 
factors for migration, the most basic of which is the simple reality 
that most people do not wish to live under unaccountable and repressive 
governments. This is evidenced today by the thousands of Russian and 
Chinese nationals who have uprooted and risked their lives in an 
attempt to find better conditions oceans away. Autocracies also drive 
migration by adopting poor economic policies and channeling resources 
to inner circles while the rest of the country languishes. Venezuela is 
perhaps the archetypical case of such gross economic mismanagement 
producing the world's largest migration crisis outside of an active war 
zone. Authoritarianism is part and parcel of the root causes of 
migration, and ought to be treated as such in any U.S. response.
                            recommendations
    The 2022 National Security Strategy notes that ``No region impacts 
the United States more directly than the Western Hemisphere.''\33\ 
Unfortunately, resources and political capital have not been 
commensurate with the scale of the threat posed by the interlocking 
efforts of Russia, China, and Iran, along with regional authoritarians. 
A comprehensive resource-backed approach to LAC is urgently needed if 
the region is to be secure, democratic, and prosperous. This would 
include, as one example, revising Development Finance Corporation rules 
to allow financing of projects in middle income counties of the region, 
especially given the huge disparities in development within different 
LAC countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ White House, National Security Strategy, 22. White House. 
National Security Strategy of the United States of America. Washington, 
DC: White House, October 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2022/10/Biden-Harris-Administrations-National-Security-
Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Strengthen Regional Migration Responses.--Irregular migration 
remains one of the most profound challenges affecting the entire 
Western Hemisphere. As authoritarian regimes the world over contribute 
to mass outflows of people, the United States has an important 
leadership role to play in identifying and advancing solutions to 
manage migration, protect the security and rights of individuals in 
transit, and support host countries. At the same time, the United 
States should encourage countries with visa-free entry policies for 
Russian and Chinese nationals to reexamine their screening processes to 
prevent the espionage apparatuses of these regimes from gaining access 
to the United States and allies under the guise of humanitarian need. 
The opening of new migration processing centers in Colombia and 
Guatemala in this respect represents an important step forward. Reports 
of Russian efforts to negotiate visa-free entry with Mexico and a 
number of Caribbean states should also come as cause for concern, and 
the United States should be active in opposing measures which could 
facilitate the entry of Russian government agents into the region.
    Invest in Digital Capabilities.--Cyber vulnerabilities not only 
create practical information security risks that damage the national 
security of Latin American and Caribbean countries, but a lack of 
general knowledge on cybersecurity opens the door to malign foreign 
powers offering facile solutions. SOUTHCOM, in partnership with 
CYBERCOM, and the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 
(CISA), can lead training with partner countries to outline key risks, 
and the elements of a better strategy to counter cyber threats.
    Counter the Dictator's Playbook.--As it becomes increasingly 
apparent that autocrats both within LAC and beyond are borrowing from a 
shared ``playbook'' of policies and tactics for maintaining their grip 
on power, the United States must double down on efforts to coordinate a 
response among like-minded democracies to counter instances of 
autocratization. Such a ``democratic playbook'' should include measures 
such as helping to strengthen democratic institutions, early warning 
signs for civil society watchdogs to track, forums like the Summit for 
Democracies which allow international coordination to pressure 
dictatorships, as well as a reexamination of how U.S. sanctions policy 
can be more effectively deployed against dictators and would-be 
autocrats.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Hernandez-Roy.
    The Chair now recognizes Ms. Brandt for her opening 
statement of 5 minutes.

   STATEMENT OF JESSICA BRANDT, POLICY DIRECTOR, ARTIFICIAL 
   INTELLIGENCE AND EMERGING TECHNOLOGY INITIATIVE, FELLOW, 
 FOREIGN POLICY, STROBE TALBOTT CENTER FOR SECURITY, STRATEGY, 
           AND TECHNOLOGY, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

    Ms. Brandt. Thank you, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member 
Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee for 
inviting me to address you today on the threat posed by nation-
state actors in Latin America to U.S. security.
    With geopolitical competition resurgent, considerable 
attention has been paid to Russian and Chinese playbooks and 
authoritarianism more broadly. As has been widely documented, 
Moscow and Beijing use a suite of low-cost deniable tools and 
tactics to conduct influence operations designed to undermine 
their democratic competitors and make the world safe for 
illiberalism. But Russia and China each apply the tool kit 
differently in Latin America than in their respective home 
regions. Within Latin America, they operate distinctly from one 
another in ways that reflect their unique capabilities and 
goals. Developing a coherent strategy to push back on Russia 
and China's coercive activities depends on an appreciation of 
these nuances.
    Importantly, although Moscow and Beijing share certain 
near-term objectives, the two are operating on different 
trajectories and time horizons toward different long-term aims. 
Russia is a declining power by many measures, which seeks to 
disrupt the partnerships and institutions of its mostly Western 
competitor states here and now as a means of gaining relative 
advantage. With little to lose and perhaps something to gain 
for exposure from its asymmetric activities, it's not 
particularly sensitive to attribution. Seeing the benefits of 
chaos abroad, its efforts tend to be destructive.
    China, by contrast, is a rising power with a great deal to 
lose from having its coercive activities laid bare. It does not 
seek disorder, but rather a new order more conducive to its 
interests, and so its efforts to change the status quo have 
tended to be more patient.
    These nuances carry over into the ways that Russia and 
China have conducted information operations targeting audiences 
in the region. Whereas for Russia, building influence in Latin 
America is a means to the end of disrupting Western alliances 
and institutions, for China, it's a means of building support 
for Beijing's way of doing business. Where Moscow has a long 
history of this sort of activity abroad, China is just 
beginning to experiment with information manipulation far 
afield. Russian state media almost never covers Russia. Chinese 
state media covers China a great deal.
    With that in mind, a word about Russia specifically. As 
you're likely aware, Moscow has made a concerted effort to 
promote its state media properties to Latin American audiences 
on-line, often with remarkable success. The Twitter account of 
RT en Espanol has more followers than RT's primary English 
language account, and it's retweeted nearly twice as often. On 
Facebook RT en Espanol has more than twice the followers of 
RT's English language version and more followers than any other 
Spanish language international broadcaster. On TikTok, it's 
more popular than BBC Mundo, El Pais, and Univision.
    As it wages its assault on Ukraine, the Kremlin is putting 
these assets to use to erode support for Western 
countermeasures among Latin American publics, where opinion 
about the conflict appears up for grabs. For months, it has 
blamed Western sanctions for food and fuel shortages affecting 
the region.
    I know themes related to immigration are of interest to the 
committee. Interestingly, at least within the overt space, 
there's limited apparent evidence that the Kremlin proactively 
stokes chaos at the border. The top 5 most retweeted Spanish 
language Russian state-backed messages on Twitter covering 
migration thus far this year offer praise for the Mexican 
president's handling of the issue. Immigration topics have 
surfaced in known covert information operations targeting the 
United States. That activity seems aimed at weaponizing 
politically divisive issue to exacerbate discord. It's not 
surprising, then, that some state-backed content on migration 
boosts domestic criticism of U.S. policy from both left and 
right.
    Unlike Russia, China's ultimate objective is to frame 
itself as a responsible global power. So its information 
operations primarily seek to build a positive view of Beijing 
and its leadership. Its propaganda casts democracy as feckless 
or hypocritical and highlights the strength of its governance 
model. Beijing uses immigration policy to cast the United 
States as hypocritical and its advocacy for human rights around 
the world. This is in keeping with its strategy of deploying 
whataboutism to deflect criticism of its own rights record.
    Distinguished Members, the United States needs a strategy 
for pushing back on Russia and China's asymmetric activity in 
Latin America. It should reflect these nuances, be rooted in 
the United States' own considerable asymmetric advantages, and 
uphold democratic values, recognizing that those values are 
strengths. To that end, there are numerous steps that 
Washington can take to position the United States for success. 
Let me propose three.
    First, recognizing the range and reach of Russia's 
information manipulation activity in Latin America, Washington 
should focus attention and resources on public diplomacy in the 
region. This could entail investing in U.S. AGM outlets 
targeted to Latin American audiences, ensuring that the Global 
Engagement Center is optimally equipped to track Russian 
propaganda activity there, and supporting research on related 
themes. It could also entail facilitating best practice 
exchanges with independent journalists, researchers, fact 
checkers from across the hemisphere, and engaging democratic 
governments in the region to build resilience to a shared 
challenge.
    There are more than 40 million Spanish speakers in the 
United States, and U.S. security interests are directly tied to 
events in the region. Washington cannot afford to cede the 
information environment to its competitors.
    Second, Washington should conduct messaging campaigns 
grounded in truthful information to highlight the failures of 
oppression to audiences in Latin America. These campaigns could 
build on the successes of the administration's novel strategy 
of downgrading intelligence related to the war in Ukraine. They 
could call attention to the fact that although Russia and China 
position themselves as anti-imperialist powers, both are 
pursuing an expansionist foreign policies. They might also 
highlight the costs of China's Belt and Road initiative to the 
region. Doing so is in keeping with the strategy of exploiting 
Putin and Xi's fragility to open information.
    Third, Washington must equip itself to see across the full 
threat picture, recognizing that Russian and Chinese coercive 
activities in Latin America and elsewhere are multidimensional. 
It's good then that Congress has established the Foreign 
Maligned Influence Center within DNI to consolidate analysis of 
this problem set. It's also good that the Center appears a 
resource to look at the full range of threats which go beyond 
elections.
    As it does all this, Washington should coordinate with 
partners and allies, because ultimately, this is a contest over 
principles, and Washington's strong network of partners is 
perhaps its greatest advantage.
    Distinguished Members, by drawing on a sophisticated 
picture of the complicated ways that Russia and China deploy 
coercive tools in Latin America, and taking these steps that 
flow from it, Washington can position itself to protect its 
interests and the American people.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Brandt follows:]
                  Prepared Statement of Jessica Brandt
                             June 21, 2023
    Thank you Chairman Pflugar, Ranking Member Magaziner, distinguished 
Members of the committee, for inviting me to address you today on the 
threats posed by nation-state actors in Latin America to U.S. security.
    With geopolitical competition resurgent, considerable attention has 
been paid to Russian and Chinese ``playbooks'' and authoritarianism 
more broadly. As has been widely documented, Moscow and Beijing use a 
suite of low-cost, deniable tools and tactics to conduct influence 
operations designed to undermine their democratic competitors and make 
the world safe for illiberalism. They wage these operations using at 
least four non-military, asymmetric tools: Economic coercion, political 
subversion, information manipulation, and cyber operations.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ For definitions, see: Authoritarian Interference Tracker. 
Alliance for Securing Democracy, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/
toolbox/authoritarian-interference-tracker/#methodology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Importantly, Russia and China each apply the toolkit differently in 
Latin America than in their respective home regions. And within Latin 
America, they operate distinctly from one another, in ways that reflect 
their unique capabilities and long-term objectives. As I recently 
argued in the Washington Quarterly, together with AEI's Zack Cooper, 
developing a coherent strategy to push back on Russia and China's 
coercive activities in Latin America--and elsewhere--depends on an 
appreciation of these nuances. Many of the observations in this 
testimony are drawn from that work.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Brandt, J. & Cooper, Z. (2022). Sino-Russian Splits: 
Divergences in Autocratic Coercion, The Washington Quarterly, 45:3, 23-
46, https://doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                   russian coercion in latin america
    Russia takes a different approach to applying the authoritarian 
toolkit in Latin America than it does in its own region. Within Europe, 
Moscow endeavors to weaken political leaders and institutions to gain a 
relative edge over its competitors--in other words, as an end unto 
itself. In Latin America, Moscow's influence activities aim to dent the 
prestige of mostly Western liberal governments and institutions and the 
political model they represent. Which is to say, its activities are 
largely instrumental--a means to the ends of eroding cohesion within 
liberal democracies and among them, and to undermining their soft 
power. Throughout Latin America, the Kremlin works to frustrate 
relationships between the United States and its partners, deepening 
relationships with leaders that share Putin's desire to create 
alternatives to governance institutions that are dominated by the 
United States and Europe. As analyst Paul Stronski has argued, ``Moscow 
hopes to embarrass Washington, and show that it too can make a foray 
into its main global adversary's backyard.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Stronski, P. and Sokolsky, R. (2017). The Return of Global 
Russia: An Analytical Framework, Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/2017/12/14/return-of-global-
russia-analytical-framework-pub-75003.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Economic Coercion
    As elsewhere around the world, Russia uses commercial deals, 
primarily within the energy sector, as an avenue of influence in the 
region. To bolster Kremlin ally Nicolas Maduro, Russian state-
controlled oil firm Rosneft poured roughly $9 billion into projects in 
Venezuela between 2010 and 2019. ``From the very beginning,'' conceded 
an executive involved in the effort, ``it was a purely political 
project.''\4\ More recently, in order to build support for its 
confrontation with Western governments over Ukraine, the Kremlin 
softened the terms of loans it had made to Cuba worth more than $2 
billion. Both countries were among the five that abstained from or 
declined to participate in a U.N. vote last year denouncing Russia's 
brutal invasion.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Lowe, C. & Sagdiev, R. (2019). ``How Russia sank billions of 
dollars into Venezuelan quicksand,'' Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/
investigates/special-report/venezuela-russia-rosneft/.
    \5\ Others included Bolivia, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. Resolution 
A/RES/ES-11/1, ``Aggression against Ukraine: resolution/adopted by the 
General Assembly,'' https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/3959039.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Political Subversion
    Because the Kremlin's activities in Latin America are designed to 
strengthen ties with illiberal partners, rather than weaken the 
cohesion of liberal competitors, the Kremlin does not appear focused on 
undermining democratic political processes in Latin America, as it does 
closer to home. Moscow has, though, deployed private-security 
contractors linked to the Wagner group to prop up its ally in Caracas 
in opposition to U.S. interests, and its mercenaries have looked for 
opportunities to expand their presence in the region, from Haiti to 
Mexico.\6\ Russia's economic and political influence activities in the 
region are by no means the primary driver of migration to the United 
States. However, to the extent that they facilitate corruption, make 
governments less responsive to their citizens, erode the rule of law, 
and otherwise undermine good governance, they contribute to migration's 
root causes.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Roth, A. (2019). ``Russian mercenaries reportedly in Venezuela 
to protect Maduro,'' The Guardian, https://www.theguardian.com/world/
2019/jan/25/venezuela-maduro-russia-private-security-contractors; 
Tsvetkova, M. and Zverev, A. (2019). ``Kremlin-linked contractors help 
guard Venezuela's Maduro,'' Reuters, https://www.reuters.com/article/
us-venezuela-politics-russia-exclusive/exclusive-kremlin-linked-
contractors-help-guard-venezuelas-maduro-sources-idUSKCN1PJ22M; De 
Luce, D. (2023). ``Leaked documents: Russian Wagner Group mercenaries 
look for business close to U.S.,'' NBC News, https://www.nbcnews.com/
politics/national-security/leaked-documents-russian-wagner-group-
mercenaries-haiti-rcna79440; Banco, E., Aarup, S.A., and Carrier, A. 
(2023). ``Inside the stunning growth of Russia's Wagner Group,'' 
Politico, https://www.politico.com/news/2023/02/18/russia-wagner-group-
ukraine-paramilitary-00083553.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Information Manipulation
    Within the information domain, Moscow has made a concerted effort 
to promote its state media properties on-line, often with remarkable 
success. The Twitter account of RT en Espanol (@actualidadRT) has more 
followers than RT's primary English-language account (@RT_com) and is 
retweeted nearly twice as often. Of the five most frequently retweeted 
Russian state media and diplomatic accounts on Twitter thus far this 
year, three target Latin American audiences (@ActualidadRT, 
@mae_russia, @SputnikMundo).\7\ Last year, Russian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs' Spanish-language account (@mae_russia) was more frequently 
retweeted than its Russian-language one (@MID_rf), even though the 
latter tweeted more than five times as frequently.\8\ The same is true 
on other platforms. On Facebook, RT en Espanol has more than twice the 
followers of RT's English language version, and more followers than any 
other Spanish-language international broadcaster. On TikTok, it is more 
popular than BBC Mundo, El Pais, Telemundo, and Univision.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ Hamilton 2.0 Dashboard (2023). Alliance for Securing Democracy, 
https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-dashboard/.
    \8\ Brandt, J., & Wirtschafter, V. (2022). Working the Western 
Hemisphere. Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/research/working-the-
western-hemisphere/.
    \9\ The Global Information Wars: Is the U.S. Winning or Losing?, 
Before the Subcommittee on State Department and USAID Management, 
International Operations, And Bilateral International Development of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 118th Congress (2023) 
(Statement of Jessica Brandt, Brookings Institution). https://
www.foreign.senate.gov/download/05/04/2023/050323_brandt_testimony.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As it wages its unprovoked assault on Ukraine, the Kremlin is 
putting these assets to use to erode support for Western 
countermeasures among Latin American publics, where opinion about the 
conflict appears up for grabs. For months, it blamed Western sanctions 
for food and fuel shortages affecting the region. ``The Russian 
military operation in Ukraine does NOT threaten the food supply,'' 
argued the Russian MFA on Twitter in Spanish, for example, asserting 
that the the ``real reasons'' for shortages include ``myopic U.S. and 
European policies'' and ``illegitimate sanctions against Europe.''\10\ 
Spanish is the fourth most spoken language in the world, and Russian 
content targeting the region could have significant global reach.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Cancilleria de Rusia (@mae_russia), Twitter, June 21, 2022, c; 
RT en Espanol (@ActualidadRT), Twitter, June 6, 2022, https://
twitter.com/ActualidadRT/status/1533947341811638272. For additional 
sample content see https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/
12/FP_20221216_russia_propaganda_brandt_wirtschafter.pdf.
    \11\ Brandt & Wirtschafter (2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Interestingly, at least within overt space--among state media and 
diplomats on Twitter, and on state-backed news websites--there is 
limited apparent evidence that the Kremlin proactively stokes chaos at 
the border. The top five most retweeted Spanish-language Russian state-
backed messages on Twitter covering migration thus far this year offer 
praise for Mexican President Lopez Obrador's handling of the issue.\12\ 
Immigration topics have surfaced in known covert information operations 
targeting the United States, but that activity seems aimed at 
weaponizing a politically divisive issue to exacerbate discord.\13\ 
Unsurprisingly, some Russian state-backed content focused on 
immigration boosts domestic criticisms of U.S. policy.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ RT en Espanol (@ActualidadRT), Twitter, May 6, 2023(a), 
https://twitter.com/i/web/status/1654737760018898944; RT en Espanol 
(@ActualidadRT), Twitter, May 6, 2023(b), https://twitter.com/i/web/
status/1654828357140336644.
    \13\ S. Rept. 116-290--Russian Active Measures Campaigns and 
Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election, Volume II. (2023, June 20), 
https://www.congress.gov/congressional-report/116th-congress/senate-
report/290/1; ``Senate Intel Committee Releases Bipartisan Report on 
Russia's Use of Social Media'' (2019), U.S. Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/press/senate-intel-
committee-releases-bipartisan-report-russia- %E2%80%99s-use-social-
media.
    \14\ Ekimenko, S. (2022). ``Texas' Greg Abbott Slams `Hypocrite-in-
Chief' Biden After WH Dubs Migrant Transport `Illegal Stunt','' Sputnik 
International, https://sputnikglobe.com/20220916/texas-gov-abbott-
slams-hypocrite-in-chief-biden-after-wh-calls-migrant-bussing-illegal-
stunt--1100838329.html?utm_source=dlvr.it&utm_medium=twitter; RT en 
Espanol (@ActualidadRT), Twitter, May 11, 2023, https://twitter.com/i/
web/status/1656522016995041280.
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Cyber Operations
    In its own region, Moscow conducts cyber operations to punish 
entities that expose Russian malfeasance, steal information that it can 
later weaponize in an information operation, and to disrupt critical 
infrastructure, making it more difficult for democracies to govern 
themselves.\15\ Because its activities in Latin America primarily aim 
to foster friendships, there is little evidence that Russia penetrates 
computer networks to alter or collect data, or to disrupt institutions 
or political processes in the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Brandt, J. and Taussig, T. (2020). ``Europe's Authoritarian 
Challenge,'' The Washington Quarterly, 42:4, 133-153, https://doi.org/
10.1080/0163660X.2019.1693099.
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                   chinese coercion in latin america
    China, like Russia, takes a different approach to applying the 
authoritarian toolkit in Latin America than it does in its own region. 
Closer to home, Beijing has been considerably more assertive in 
undermining its opponents than elsewhere around the world, including in 
Latin America, where target countries have at times benefited from 
Beijing's efforts to build influence using positive inducements.
Economic Coercion
    Boycotts, tariffs, import restrictions, and export quotas--these 
are among the mechanisms that China has used to coerce its neighbors in 
response to actions Beijing perceived as undermining its interests, 
exercising its leverage as the top trading partner of most countries in 
its home region. In Latin America, by contrast, Beijing is focused on 
building leverage that it can apply in the future, using the Belt and 
Road Initiative (BRI) to expand its engagement with more than 20 
countries in the region.\16\ These coercive economic activities foster 
dependences that make Latin American governments less responsive to 
their citizens, and therefore undermine good governance. Thus, they too 
may contribute to the root causes of migration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Roy, D. (2023). China's growing influence in Latin America. 
Council on Foreign Relations. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-
influence-latin-america-argentina-brazil-venezuela-security-energy-
bri#:?:text=As%20of%202023%2C%20Beijing%20has,agreement%20with%20- 
Uruguay%20are%20ongoing.)
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Political Subversion
    In Latin America, Bejing uses some of the same political 
inducements that it does to cultivate influence among China's 
neighbors, but with less of an emphasis on direct subversion. China 
tends to use carrots, rather than sticks, to build sway, using BRI 
funding as an incentive to tow Beijing's line. This difference 
primarily stems from the goal of China's activities in the region: to 
position itself as helpful to Latin American societies in their battle 
against hypocritical, over-reaching democracies, led by the United 
States.
Information Manipulation
    Because China's ultimate objective is to frame itself as a 
responsible global power, Beijing's information operations primarily 
seek to build a positive view of China and its leadership. In Latin 
America, as elsewhere, Beijing's propaganda apparatus promotes 
narratives that cast democracy as feckless or hypocritical and 
highlights the strength of its governance model.\17\ In the global 
south, during the height of the COVID crisis, Beijing undertook a 
tailored messaging campaign arguing that its Sinovac vaccine, which 
does not require cold chain storage, should be the option of first 
resort.\18\ In its propaganda targeting overseas audiences, Beijing 
uses U.S. immigration policy to cast the United States as hypocritical 
in its advocacy for human rights elsewhere around the world.\19\ ``For 
a long time, the United States has been giving lessons to other 
countries on human rights,'' China's People's Daily recently tweeted in 
Spanish, ``But the way the U.S. treats migrants and refugees at home 
highlights their hypocrisy on this issue.''\20\ This is in keeping with 
Beijing's strategy of using whataboutism to deflect criticism of its 
own rights record.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Brandt (2021).
    \18\ Schafer, B., Frankland, A., Kohlenberg, N., & Soula, E. 
(2021). Influence-enza: How Russia, China, and Iran have shaped and 
manipulated coronavirus vaccine narratives. Alliance For Securing 
Democracy. https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/russia-china-iran-covid-
vaccine-disinformation/.
    \19\ Lan, L. (2021). ``Whipping migrants shows US human rights 
hypocritical,'' Global Times, https://enapp.globaltimes.cn/article/
1234865; China News [ . . . ] (@Echinanews), April 28, 2023, https://
twitter.com/Echinanews/status/1652129574145097728/photo/1.
    \20\ Pueblo En Linea (@PuebloEnLinea), June 9, 2022, https://
twitter.com/PuebloEnLinea/status/1534823562699104257.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cyber Operations
    While in Asia, there is considerable concern about the use of 
information networks designed and run by Chinese companies, amid 
concerns that equipment sourced from vendors in China could contain 
back doors that enable surveillance by Beijing, that is not as much the 
case in Latin America.\21\ Within the region, China has provided 
surveillance systems to at least 9 countries, including Argentina, 
Chile, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.\22\ To the extent that these 
systems undermine political and human rights, they too may contribute 
to the root causes of migration.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Brands, H. (2021). ``Huawei's Decline Shows Why China Will 
Struggle to Dominate,'' Bloomberg, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/
articles/2021-09-19/huawei-s-decline-shows-why-china-will-struggle-to-
dominate.
    \22\ AI Global Surveillance Technology. Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org/publications/
interactive/ai-surveillance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 differences between russian and chinese approaches to coercion in the 
                                 region
    Although Putin and Xi work from the same playbook, their approaches 
reflect their unique capabilities, as well as their distinct goals. 
Moscow and Beijing share certain near-term objectives, but the two are 
operating on different trajectories and time horizons, with different 
points of leverage and long-term aims. Russia is a declining power by 
many measures, which seeks to disrupt the partnerships and institutions 
of its mostly Western competitor states here and now as a means of 
gaining relative advantage. With little to lose and perhaps something 
to gain from exposure, it is not particularly sensitive to attribution 
for its coercive activities. Seeing the benefits of chaos abroad, its 
efforts tend to be destructive. China, by contrast, is a rising power 
with a great deal to lose from having its coercive activities laid 
bare. It does not seek disorder, but rather a new order more conducive 
to its interests, and so its efforts to change the status quo have 
tended to be more patient.\23\ Both countries are most active in their 
own regions. For Russia, building influence in Latin America is a means 
to the end of disrupting Western alliances and institutions. For China, 
it is a means of building support for Beijing's way of doing business.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Brandt, J. (2021). How Autocrats Manipulate Online 
Information: Putin's and Xi's Playbooks, The Washington Quarterly, 
44:3, 127-154, DOI: 10.1080/0163660X.2021.1970902; Brandt, J. (2023). 
AidData: Autocratic approaches to information manipulation: A 
comparative case study. AidData, a research lab at William and Mary. 
https://www.aiddata.org/publications/autocratic-approaches-to-
information-manipulation-a-comparative-case-study.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These nuances carry over into the ways that Russia and China 
conduct economic coercion in the region. For Russia, this activity 
leverages its status as a commodity exporter, with energy amounting to 
half of its exports.\24\ For China, its coercive economic practices 
primarily draw on the size of its market, which gives it leverage over 
trading partners, as well as its relative wealth, which it uses to 
support friendly politicians.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ ``Russia (RUS) Exports, Imports, and Trade Partners,'' 
Observatory of Economic Complexity, last modified January 2022, https:/
/oec.world/en/profile/country/rus.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Russia and China differ significantly in their use of political 
subversion as well. Moscow's intelligence agencies are much better 
equipped at understanding how to influence foreign systems than those 
of Beijing, since the Kremlin has made the use of asymmetric tools a 
leading component of its foreign policy for decades. The Kremlin has a 
high tolerance for risk and is comfortable deploying security services 
abroad. China, by contrast, has less experience with political 
subversion far afield. To the extent that Chinese operatives have been 
involved in subversion, they have tended to focus on China's 
neighbors.\25\ But the differences don't just stem from different 
capabilities. Political subversion is a tool more fit for Russia's 
purposes (undermining the cohesion of democratic societies and their 
institutions) than China's (building a new international order).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Schrader, M. (2020). Friends and Enemies: A Framework for 
Understanding Chinese Political Interference in Democratic Countries, 
Alliance for Securing Democracy, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/
wp-content/uploads/2020/05/Friends-and-Enemies-A-Framework-for-
Understanding-Chinese-Political-Interference-in-Democratic-
Countries.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Russia and China have both conducted information operations 
targeting audiences in the region, but likewise, in different ways and 
toward different ends. Where Moscow has a long history of this sort of 
activity abroad, China is just beginning to experiment with information 
manipulation far afield. Where Moscow aims to tarnish the appeal of 
Western systems, China works to position itself as an attractive 
alternative. Russian state media almost never cover Russia; Chinese 
State media cover China a great deal.\26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Brandt (2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     implications for policy makers
    The United States needs a strategy for pushing back on Russia and 
China's asymmetric activity in Latin America. It should reflect these 
nuances, be rooted in the United States's own considerable asymmetric 
advantages, and uphold democratic values, recognizing that those values 
are strengths. To that end, there are numerous steps that Washington 
can take to position the United States for success. Let me propose 
three.
    First, recognizing the range and reach of Russia's manipulation 
activity in Latin America, Washington should focus attention and 
resources on public diplomacy in the region. Concerns over terrorism 
and resurgent geopolitical competition have driven attention to the 
Middle East and Asia, and as a result, U.S. public diplomacy financing 
overseen by the State Department has deprioritized the Western 
Hemisphere.\27\ Washington could make new investments in entities like 
Voice of America (VOA) targeted at Spanish language audiences. Of the 
12 overseas bureaus currently operated by VOA, none are in Latin 
America.\28\ This should change. Such an approach could also include 
ensuring that the Global Engagement Center (GEC) is optimally equipped 
to track Russian information manipulation activity in Latin America. 
There are more than 40 million Spanish speakers in the United States 
and U.S. security interests are directly tied to events in the region. 
Washington cannot afford to cede the information environment to its 
competitors.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ Custer, S., Burgess, B., Baehr, A., & Dumont, E. (2022). 
AidData: Assessing U.S. Historical Strategic Communications: 
Priorities, Practices, and Lessons From the Cold War Through the 
Present Day. AidData, a research lab at William and Mary. https://
docs.aiddata.org/reports/gf01/gf01-02/Assessing-US-Historical-
Strategic-Communications-Priorities-Practices-and-Lessons-from-the-
Cold-War-through-the-Present-Day.html.
    \28\ Brandt. Testimony on The Global Information Wars (2023).
    \29\ Brandt. Testimony on The Global Information Wars (2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Second, Washington should conduct messaging campaigns grounded in 
truthful information to highlight the failures of repression to 
audiences in Latin America. These campaigns could build on the success 
of the administration's novel strategy of downgrading intelligence 
related to the war in Ukraine to shape how it is perceived.\30\ They 
could call attention to the fact that although Russia and China 
position themselves as ``anti-imperialist'' and ``anti-colonial'' 
powers, both are pursuing expansionist foreign policies. They might 
also highlight the costs of China's BRI to the region. Many publics 
have soured on the environmental destruction and unsustainable debt 
that too often come along with Chinese investments.\31\ Many of the 
region's recipient countries are democracies, and drawing attention to 
those shortcomings can better inform their voters. Doing so is in 
keeping with a strategy of exploiting Putin and Xi's weaknesses, 
recognizing their fragility to open information.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ Brandt, J. (2022). Preempting Putin: Washington's Campaign of 
Intelligence Disclosures is Complicating Moscow's Plans for Ukraine. 
Brookings. https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/18/
preempting-putin-washingtons-campaign-of-intelligence-disclosures-is-
complicating-moscows-plans-for-ukraine/.
    \31\ Shepard, W. (2021). How China's Belt and Road became a 
``Global Trail of Trouble,'' Forbes. https://www.forbes.com/sites/
wadeshepard/2020/01/29/how-chinas-belt-and-road-became-a-global-trail-
of-trouble/?sh=2bc0da0a443d.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Third, Washington must equip itself to see across the full threat 
picture, recognizing that Russian and Chinese coercive activities in 
Latin America and elsewhere are multidimensional. It is good, then, 
that Congress established a Foreign Malign Influence Center (FMIC) 
within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to 
consolidate analysis of adversary use of all four tools of 
interference. It is also good that FMIC appears to be resourced to look 
at the full range of threats, which as I and others have documented, go 
beyond elections.\32\ As it undertakes its work, FMIC should aim to cut 
across traditional stovepipes within Government, and share information 
where appropriate and feasible with private-sector partners and the 
public.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Foreign Malign Influence Center. 50 U.S.C.  3059 (2023). 
https://uscode.house.gov/
view.xhtml?req=%28title%3A50+section%3A3059+edition%3Aprelim%29.
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    As it does all of this, Washington should coordinate with partners 
and allies to share best practices, standing shoulder to shoulder with 
other democratic societies to counter foreign interference threats. 
Ultimately, this is a contest over principles, and Washington's strong 
network of partners is perhaps its greatest advantage.
    Distinguished Members, by drawing on a sophisticated picture of the 
complex ways that Russia and China deploy coercive tools in Latin 
America and taking these steps that flow from it, Washington can 
position itself to protect its interests and the American people.
                               Appendix A
Brandt, J. & Cooper, Z. (2022). Sino-Russian Splits: Divergences in 
Autocratic Coercion, The Washington Quarterly, 45:3, 23-46, https://
doi.org/10.1080/0163660X.2022.2124016.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ms. Brandt.
    Of note, this is the subcommittee's sixth hearing on 
homeland security on what we as a subcommittee are looking at.
    I thank you all for your testimony.
    Members will now be recognized by order of seniority for 
their 5 minutes of questioning. An additional round of 
questioning may be called after all Members have been 
recognized.
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of question.
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy, a lot of interesting things that were 
said. Recent reports have indicated that the PRC has 
established and been operating a signals intelligence 
collection center in Cuba since 2019. Florida is home to a 
variety of military installations, sensitive military 
installations, becoming an emerging technology leader, a 
financial services hub. There is so much going on there. Can 
you discuss what type of implications, security implications, 
that the PRC's collusion with Cuba, if these reports are true, 
what it actually means to the United States?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Well, the reports of some sort of spying 
activity in Cuba have been confirmed through a number of public 
sources. So I think we can take that for granted. The extent of 
the spying, we don't know yet. At least we who look at it 
through the public information space.
    Having a signals intelligence operation in Cuba, it's based 
just south of Havana, 150 miles from U.S. mainland, is a 
significant threat, as it can collect information from the 
whole southeastern United States, in particular, all of 
SOUTHCOM's activities in the south and also CENTCOM in Tampa. 
So this would represent a significant threat, a significant 
gain for the Chinese in terms of their ability to monitor 
intelligence and monitor traffic of naval operations in the 
Caribbean, things of that nature. It should be seen as a 
significant threat and a significant escalation on the part of 
the Chinese.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
    This committee will be very active in understanding the 
depth of that threat and what it means to our homeland 
security, and I appreciate that.
    Ms. Dezenski, I would like to focus on a couple of things 
when it comes to the Southwest Border.
    No. 1, when we look at the fentanyl issue and 
understanding--we had a hearing recently, we examined the 
relationship between Mexican TCOs and Chinese crime syndicates 
and how these relationships enable the flow of fentanyl. Do you 
believe that the PRC is using America's fentanyl crisis as a 
gray zone tactic?
    Ms. Dezenski. Thanks for the question.
    I think that at a minimum, there's passive engagement on 
the part of the PRC. They are well aware of the fentanyl 
challenge, and they're not doing much to help us stop that. 
Coordination from previous years has pretty much disappeared, 
even though there's a mound of evidence about the role of 
Chinese money-laundering networks and manufacturers of 
precursor chemicals. So it's hard to understand why we can't 
engage more specifically on that issue, except that I think 
it's being viewed by the PRC as a strategic weapon against our 
country.
    Chairman Pfluger. Wow. You don't believe--in your recent 
article in the Miami Herald, you asserted that the United 
States must expose Chinese hidden hand in America's deadly 
fentanyl crisis, which you just alluded to the money-laundering 
aspect. So you believe we should be doing more as a whole-of-
Government approach?
    Ms. Dezenski. Yes. Yes, exactly.
    The money-laundering piece of this is critical. If we 
follow the money, I think we'll actually have an easier time 
addressing some of these challenges because it's so hard to 
interdict at the border. Fentanyl pills are small, they're 
mistaken for other types of commodities. It's extremely 
difficult to find them. Having said that, I know our Border 
Patrol is doing a better job, and our Customs interdiction is 
doing a better job locating it. But having said that, following 
the money is probably the most important thing that we can do. 
There's been quite a bit written about the complexity of these 
money-laundering operations. What's unique about it is that 
there's this flow, this seamless flow between China, Mexico, 
and the United States and the role of money launderers here, 
Chinese money launderers working in the United States and 
selling U.S. dollar proceeds to Chinese nationals who want 
access to that money. It's incredible.
    So I'm happy to go into more detail on how that works, but 
I do think that this is the most important vector for us to 
look at.
    Chairman Pfluger. Let me quickly jump to a related subject.
    There is no question in my mind that the PRC is exploiting 
the crisis at our Southern Border. It was reported yesterday 
that in this fiscal year, 127 people have entered this 
country--apprehended, that is not gotaways that have matched 
the terror watch list. Is the PRC exploiting the crisis at our 
Southern Border for their own personal gain?
    Ms. Dezenski. I think we should assume that any 
vulnerabilities at our Southern Border are open for 
authoritarian influence of many kinds. I think that's a safe 
assumption. If the gaps are there, then those who are working 
against us are going to use them to their advantage.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
    My time has expired.
    I will now recognize the Ranking Member for his 5 minutes 
of questioning.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
    There is a lot to cover here, but first and foremost, we 
are in a competition for hearts and minds across the region. 
For the last two centuries, and particularly during the Cold 
War, America succeeded by maintaining strong relationships with 
allies in Latin America that allowed us to counter 
authoritarian threats and we need to strengthen those 
relationships now.
    So, Ms. Brandt, can you just expand a little bit on what 
are some of the ways that Russia and China in particular are 
trying to win hearts and minds in Latin America? Then how can 
we as a Nation best counter their efforts?
    Ms. Brandt. Both Russia and China bring large propaganda 
apparatuses that promote content that portrays their preferred 
narratives of polarizing political events. Both of them use 
other assets to try to--for Russia, I think most of its 
activity is aimed, as I said, at driving polarization and 
division within the United States. Its activities, I think, in 
Latin America are instrumental to its broader aim of weakening 
us from within. I think that's in part to prevent us--if we're 
distracted and divided, it prevents us from playing a more 
forward-leaning role in the world that promotes our interests.
    I think there is also an interest on the part of Russia in 
denting our soft power, making it harder again for us to 
exercise leadership in the world.
    For China, China comes in behind Russia's efforts to sort-
of fracture the cohesion and the unity and appeal of 
democracies in order to present their model as a viable 
alternative. Both of these countries are doing that in the 
region.
    Mr. Magaziner. Will they ever use U.S. voices to amplify 
their rhetoric? So, for example, if there are prominent U.S. 
individuals that talk about military strikes in Mexico or talk 
about--repeat Russian talking points with regard to the Ukraine 
invasion, will China or Russia take clips of Americans 
repeating those false and dangerous narratives and use them to 
try to win hearts and minds for China and Russia in Latin 
America?
    Ms. Brandt. Both Russia and China amplify domestic voices. 
I mean, as I said, for Russia, this is primarily about stoking 
division and polarization within our country. For China, it's 
about sort-of boosting the reach and resonance of its message, 
finding fellow travelers that add a sort-of degree of 
legitimacy to these messages and also eliminate a layer of 
culpability.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
    Ms. Dezenski, you wrote in your testimony about the 
significance of the CHIPS and Science Act and other investments 
that the United States have made to try to bring more 
manufacturing and other economic activity back to this 
hemisphere. Can you just expand a little bit on that, on the 
importance of investments like those that are made in the CHIPS 
and Science Act? Also how we can better engage with our 
regional partners again to win hearts and minds through 
commerce here in our hemisphere?
    Ms. Dezenski. Sure. Thank you very much.
    There's no doubt that there's huge potential to utilize 
trade relationships and the potential for economic integration 
with both Mexico and into Latin America. As companies think 
about whether they want to stay in China, and the government 
considers new mechanisms around outbound investment and other 
policies that might encourage pivoting out of China, supply 
chains, particularly critical ones, need to go somewhere. The 
idea that we could have them closer to home is both valuable 
and attractive from an economic integration perspective.
    So it's almost like a perfect opportunity to look at new 
strategies to build those economic alliances, but mindful of 
the economic security objectives in doing so, that we want 
mutual benefit, we want security, we need trade facilitation, 
we want access to critical goods, particularly in the time of 
global shocks. Mexico is fairly well-positioned for this, 
although not entirely. But as you go further south in the 
hemisphere, there's the chance I think that we'll miss this 
opportunity if we don't have the right security backbone in 
place.
    This is a point that I wanted to make about the role of DHS 
and how important it is to ensure that we have that secure 
footprint which allows trade and commerce to be facilitated and 
ultimately has the right objective in terms of creating 
environments where people don't feel that they have to come to 
our border.
    Mr. Magaziner. I know I am running low on time, but I will 
just emphasize again, if China is going to Latin America and 
offering money and infrastructure and security, the United 
States has to counter that with more than rhetoric. We need to 
invest in these partnerships, otherwise our adversaries will be 
happy to fill that void.
    So I thank you all and I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, no 
stranger to law enforcement, former detective for the NYPD, Mr. 
D'Esposito.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good 
morning, everyone.
    I am going to just take a minute to follow up on the 
Chairman's remarks. I know he only had a few seconds left, but 
I think it is important to discuss and talk about.
    So obviously it is no secret that authoritarian regimes 
relish in the opportunity to shine a spotlight and even 
encourage challenges for the United States of America. How 
might authoritarian regimes, including Venezuela, Cuba, Russia, 
and the PRC, take advantage of the current border crisis 
created by Joe Biden and Secretary Mayorkas that our Nation is 
experiencing? I will really leave that for any of you.
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Thank you, Congressman.
    I think there's a number of ways they can take advantage of 
what's happening at the Southern Border. First of all, just 
encourage migration from their own countries by cracking down 
on their populations, sending more people, creating more chaos, 
sowing more division within the United States on how to 
effectively respond. That is one way they're clearly doing it.
    The other way, presumably, which I've provided an example 
in the Venezuelan context, and one of my colleagues has said 
it's a distinct possibility, is they can be taking advantage of 
the massive amounts of people, 2.4 million interventions last 
year. Within that space of 2.4 million people you can try to 
get people that are undesirable, that are going to work for the 
interests of these regimes in the United States. So I think 
that's a vulnerability. I have no direct evidence of that 
happening. I have mentioned direct evidence of that happening 
in the Venezuelan context, sending spies to Colombia. It's a 
distinct possibility that the United States needs to be taking 
seriously.
    Ms. Dezenski. I'll just add one angle to this that I think 
we need to consider.
    So as we see increased engagement in places like Venezuela, 
with Iran, Russia, we should be mindful of the potential that 
local populations may become part of extremist movements, and 
that could be fueled by this increasing engagement from 
authoritarian interests in these countries. How do we relate 
that to what's happening at the Southwest Border? Well, it's 
much as Chris has identified, which is with the massive inflow 
of people, we have the needle in the haystack problem again to 
try to figure out who those extremists might be. We have an 
identity management problem at the border, and somehow we need 
to figure that out because it's going to become more and more 
difficult as we're trying to manage an influx of legitimate 
economic migrants and political migrants from a place like 
Venezuela. How do we know if we're allowing for extremist 
threats to come into the country? So we're going to have to be 
more sophisticated about figuring that out.
    Mr. D'Esposito. I agree. I am sorry.
    Ms. Brandt. Well, I was just going to add from my analysis, 
which again, is focused on the open source space, I see this 
less as Russia trying to drive populations to the border as 
much as it is to weaponize the polarizing nature of debates 
within this country around migration. But again, we don't know 
what we don't know. I think the challenge for us I think is to 
sort-of think capaciously about the challenges so that we can 
get ahead of them without also making Russia 10 ft tall.
    Mr. D'Esposito. So obviously there are real threats, 
whether it is the regimes, whether it is our open border. I 
know some would like to argue that climate change is our 
biggest threat, but I think these pose a bigger threat to our 
country and our freedoms than anything else.
    Just to follow up on what we talked about, because I truly 
believe that this is also a threat, what is your thoughts on 
the CCP and the fact that there have been stories that they 
would embed assets into larger groups of nationals making the 
journey from China to Mexico or other areas along our Southwest 
Border?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Well, since I mentioned that was a 
possibility, I guess I'll try to answer that.
    I have, like Ms. Brant, we work on public information, so I 
have no direct information on that. But I go back to the 
example that has happened in other cases.
    I just wanted to add something to my previous intervention, 
which is that Venezuela has been known publicly to have sold 
passports to Hezbollah operatives and to bring people out of 
Syria as well with Venezuelan passports. So that's another 
potential vulnerability. People from that part of the region 
using Venezuelan passports. Where are they going?
    Mr. D'Esposito. Right? Probably not going there to do good 
things.
    My time has expired, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
Chair now recognizes gentleman from California, my good friend, 
Mr. Correa.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate this 
hearing. It is very timely and very important. Thank the 
witnesses for being here today.
    I hear your statements. Latin America, there are challenges 
and we talk about an open border, we talk about regimes. I 
didn't hear a lot of talk about poverty, the challenges in 
Latin America, and in alternatives.
    Talk about history a little bit. The Pan American Highway 
was built in 1920's, 1930, and through the 1950's, and we 
essentially financed the construction of that highway south of 
Mexico through Panama--almost to Panama--except for the Darien 
Gap--because of our strategic interest in fighting against 
communism. Honduras has a four-lane highway. You know who paid 
for that? The United States of America. We have forgotten the 
role that we played in the Americas throughout history. That 
has been our area of national interest. Today we wake up, last 
3 years, China has signed more than 30 agreements with Latin 
America, free trade agreements. Twenty Latin American nations 
signed on to China's Belt and Road Initiative.
    I am trying to figure out what is going on. Is our private 
sector asleep at the wheel? We have this challenge of these 
precious metals that China is controlling around the world. 
They are part of Latin America and nobody is discussing these 
issues. I am at a loss here.
    Ms. Dezenski, you mentioned DHS stepping up. Apparently, 
our private sector is not doing a good job. So I guess we as 
legislators need to take your recommendations and move forward 
because China, Russia, Iran, I don't care what those folks are 
doing, I care about what is in our power to do. Our power is to 
move forward. We are sitting here pointing fingers at them. If 
you want to win a race, you focus on your lane, don't be 
chasing the other person. Focus, then we can do the best.
    In Latin America, 20-30 years ago, when you would see a 
food box that said donations from America, the goodwill that 
was there was tremendous--tremendous. Where is that going 
today? Have we forgotten the lectures? The lessons of history?
    I only have 2 minutes, but I want to give you an example. 
We talk about the Cuban electronic espionage base by China. My 
understanding, please fact check me, that was actually started 
operating in 1999, and that was actually upgraded in 2019. 
Let's think about history of Cuba, OK. Obama lifted some of the 
restrictions, trade with Cuba. Cuba's private sector exploded. 
Two-thousand seventeen, Trump administration reversed that 
position and added additional few other restrictions. President 
Biden has essentially followed the Biden model. I am trying to 
figure out what are the incentives that we are giving folks in 
this hemisphere to work with the United States.
    I am going to open it up to the three of you in the 1 
minute that I have to help us figure out a road map here, 
because I don't like the fact that our American influence in 
our backyard is going down the drain.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Dezenski. Thank you so much.
    There's so many things to bring up in response to all of 
your good points. I would just make the following.
    No. 1, with regard to the private sector, we need to do a 
better job of----
    Mr. Correa. I mean, you know, and I will give you here an 
example. Venezuela, you can throw rocks at what is going on in 
Venezuela. I don't like the fact that probably the world's 
largest oil reserves are now under the influence of China and 
Russia. What are we doing to counter that? Very quick, specific 
question, what are we doing to get back our influence in that 
area of the world? More sanctions?
    Ms. Dezenski. I would suggest that we need to de-risk to 
make it easier for Western companies and Western investment to 
go into the region. Part of that----
    Mr. Correa. Is that in our power, is that in Venezuela's 
power, Russia's power, or China's power?
    Ms. Dezenski. Oh, it's absolutely in our power. It's a very 
positive step that we could take.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I am out of time. Thank you very much for 
indulging me, sir.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, a Navy 
SEAL, Mr. Crane, for his 5 minutes of question.
    Mr. Correa. Mr. Chairman, if I may interrupt you. I wanted 
to ask unanimous consent that Ms. Jackson Lee be permitted to 
sit with us in this subcommittee and be part of the 
questioning. Thank you.
    Chairman Pfluger. Yes, the Chair will entertain that. Thank 
you, Ms. Jackson Lee, for showing up.
    Now, Mr. Crane.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to all our 
guests and panelists who have come here today.
    I wanted to know if any of you guys saw the article in 
yesterday's Associated Press titled, ``Pentagon Accounting 
Error Provides Extra $6.2 Billion for Ukraine Military Aid''. 
Anybody see that headline? Anybody read that story? No? OK.
    Are you guys aware that to date, the United States has sent 
$113 billion to Ukraine? Anybody? OK. Does it surprise you guys 
when you see stories like that? Accounting error, $6.2 billion 
to Ukraine? Accounting error up here to the tune of $6.2 
billion. Mr. Roy, does it surprise you when you see errors to 
that extent?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. An error of that magnitude could only be 
justified if the economy of the United States was hundreds of 
trillions of dollars. It's a rather surprising headline, I 
would say.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you.
    As I listen to your testimonies and knowledge about some of 
the unrestricted and asymmetric warfare right here in our own 
Western Hemisphere, down in Latin America by the Chinese, 
Russians, and Iranians, I want to ask you guys, does it bother 
any of you when we see all this money going to someplace over 
in Europe that happens to be a very corrupt country that most 
Americans can't even point to on a map, when we have all this 
nefarious activity going on right in our own backyard?
    I want to start with you, Ms. Brandt.
    Ms. Brandt. I think we have to be able to walk and chew gum 
at the same time. I mean, I think the challenges that we face 
in our hemisphere are enormous. As I've argued, we need to pay 
more attention there. I also think Ukraine is on the front 
lines of the conflict between democracies and authoritarian 
challengers.
    Mr. Crane. Yes, that seems to be the general consensus in 
this town. The problem is, ma'am, when you talk about walking 
and chewing gum at the same time, you have to take into account 
that the United States of America has about $32 trillion in 
debt, right? So we don't even have this money that we continue 
to send over in Ukraine. Do you see that as a problem, ma'am?
    Ms. Brandt. As I said, I think our support for Ukraine is 
important and consequential to our national security interest. 
It's fundamental.
    Mr. Crane. OK. What about our national debt? Do you think 
that is important?
    Ms. Brandt. That's beyond my expertise.
    Mr. Crane. It is actually pretty common-sense.
    What about you, Ms. Dezenski? What do you think about our 
national debt and this idea up in this town that we can 
continue to spend hundreds of billions of dollars of the 
American taxpayers' money that we don't even have, yet let 
alone when you look at some of these threats that we are 
talking about in Latin American countries, right in our 
backyard, we don't seem to have the resources to make sure that 
our own border security is in order and secure?
    Ms. Dezenski. I think the most challenging thing about the 
threats in Latin America, and perhaps even at the Southwest 
Border, is that for years, we've probably underestimated it. It 
seems like what we're dealing with now is the equivalent of a 
soft underbelly in the Western Hemisphere. That will require us 
to think a little bit more strategically and creatively about 
what Latin America policy should be, how we bring together more 
resources around economic security, and how we balance that out 
with what we have to do in the rest of the world.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, ma'am.
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy, are you familiar with the saying peace 
through strength?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Pardon me? Could you repeat that, 
please?
    Mr. Crane. Are you familiar with the saying peace through 
strength?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Vaguely, yes.
    Mr. Crane. What do you think the opposite of that would be, 
Mr. Hernandez-Roy?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. War through weakness.
    Mr. Crane. Yes. War, chaos through weakness. That is 
exactly where we find ourselves right now. War, chaos because 
of weakness. We are facing a world on fire because of weakness, 
incompetence, and internal corruption.
    I want to read this for the American people that might be 
watching this. Hard times create strong men, strong men create 
good times. Good times create weak men, and weak men create 
hard times. We are all aware that our current leadership is 
pretty weak, falls in public regularly, struggles to put 
sentences together, and is embroiled in multiple layers of 
corruption.
    My point is this. Elections have consequences. If we want 
to continue to see this global dumpster fire continue, then we 
should, by all means, keep this current administration in 
place. If we want to return to peace through strength, we must 
reinstall somebody who projects strength and puts America and 
Americans first.
    Thank you all for coming.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Goldman.
    Mr. Goldman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you 
for having this hearing.
    I certainly hope my colleague from Arizona will look to 
reduce our deficit by examining our $860 billion defense 
budget.
    I want to focus a little bit right now on what gives China 
and Russia the opportunity to have such significant influence 
in Latin America. I am not actually sure which one of you is 
sort-of the foremost expert among the panel in terms of the 
upheaval, disarray, and cratering governmental issues that are 
going on in Latin America, especially Central America.
    But in the last 2 to 4 years--Ms. Dezenski, you seem to be 
focused on this--can you describe a little bit about what has 
been going on in terms of upheaval in governments in Central 
and Latin America.
    Ms. Dezenski. Thank you for the question.
    Let me talk a little bit about China. You've asked about 
China and Russia in the region and how they're exerting that 
influence and how that came to be and maybe what the 
implications are for governments in the region. I'll take on 
the China piece of this, which is very much driven by their 
brilliant use of their trade relationships.
    Mr. Goldman. I am sorry, I just want to interrupt because I 
think we have a lot of attention and you all have spoken very 
much on how China infiltrates and influences, and they are 
doing the same thing in Africa as well. But I want to talk a 
little bit about the political situation, the governmental 
upheaval in the countries, in Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, to name a few. There are others.
    Maybe Mr. Hernandez-Roy, you want to talk a little bit 
about what has been going on in the last 2 to 4 years in that 
region that has also caused so many more citizens from there to 
seek refuge in other countries?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I think there's a couple of points to be 
made that aren't necessarily totally related. But why so many 
people are seeking refuge is because they're living under 
dictatorial regimes. They're being oppressed, they're being 
persecuted, they're being arbitrarily detained. People who have 
nothing to do with political activism, just because they might 
be in the wrong place at the wrong time, are being imprisoned. 
Venezuela for the last 10 years has had a revolving door of at 
least 300 political prisoners. Since the massive protests in 
2014 and again in 2017, something like 16,000 or 17,000 people 
have been detained in Venezuela. In Nicaragua, since 2018, 
during the protests of 2018, there were 355 people that were 
murdered by the by the regime. Since then, journalists, civil 
society activists, students, over 400 NGO's have lost their 
legal personality, 600,000 people have fled the country. That's 
what's going on in those regimes.
    But going back a little further, talking about the 
political upheaval, if you go back 20 years, Latin America 20 
years ago and today is a profoundly unequal part of the world. 
Probably the most unequal if you look at gini coefficients. 
Populists in that part of the world, particularly Hugo Chavez, 
were able to leverage that discontent and use Venezuela's 
massive oil wealth at the time--this was before the economic 
collapse in Venezuela and when oil prices were sky-high--to 
spread the wealth around, to keep like-minded politicians, both 
in Venezuela and in friendly countries abroad in power, to 
create friends through corruption. There's a well-known 
PetroCaribe and Petrofraude scheme where billions, if not 
hundreds of billions of Venezuelan petrodollars were spread 
around the region. If you look at the region 10 years ago, 
there was one dictatorship. You look at the region today, 
there's three dictatorships. There's at least two semi-
authoritarian regimes that are on the way to becoming 
dictatorships.
    There's one completely failed state, which is Haiti. 
Against the backdrop of all that chaos, Russia and China have 
multiple opportunities to get involved. They have ideological--
at least the Russians have ideological affinity with many of 
these populist movements. The Chinese are more pragmatic. 
They're really primarily interested in business and making 
money and securing primary commodities for their economy. But I 
think all of that history, both 20 years ago and more recent, 
is what is the upshot of what you're seeing today.
    Mr. Goldman. Thank you for that explanation.
    Ms. Brandt, I just have a couple of seconds, but I am 
curious how you would view that vacuum to provide the 
opportunity, especially--I know your expertise is more Russia, 
how Russia can interfere and influence those regimes.
    Chairman Pfluger. We will do about 20 seconds here.
    Ms. Brandt. I guess I would just say very quickly, to the 
extent that Russia's and China's coercive economic activity and 
political subversive activity make governments less responsive 
to their citizens, they undermine rule of law, they facilitate 
corruption I think they--speaking to your question, I think 
they contribute to the root causes of migration and so----
    Mr. Goldman. They exacerbate the situation that already 
exists.
    Ms. Brandt. Yes. I think Russia's by no means responsible, 
but it's not helping.
    Mr. Goldman. Right.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for indulging me.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentle lady from Texas, Ms. 
Jackson Lee, for her 5 minutes of questioning.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Mr. Chairman, first of all, let me thank 
you and the Ranking Member for your courtesies. I am deeply 
involved and interested in this long-running story of our 
interaction with those who have become adversaries.
    Let me say to Mr. Christopher Hernandez-Roy, you view it as 
important for us to be engaged with South and Central America, 
do you not?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. We have adversaries, but we need to be a 
major positive force in those regions. Would you agree that 
this era of our time is one of the greatest migrations that any 
of us may have seen coming from that part of the hemisphere?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I would agree, ma'am, that we are at 
historic times in terms of migration in the entire region, not 
necessarily just from Central America.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Absolutely. I said Central and South 
America.
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Yes. I appreciate that because we are 
actually in an era, in a decade, maybe 2, of the greatest 
migration, at least of this current era around the world. I 
mean, I have watched flows of traffic going from many different 
places. I make that point as I pursue my line of questioning. I 
thank this committee for this hearing, because we do need to 
counter bad guys in Latin America, in Iran, Russia, and 
otherwise other places as well.
    I was really baffled by a filing of articles of impeachment 
for what is really both a historical fact and will not be 
solved by impeachment. The late John McCain tried to solve it, 
as we did, joining with him by comprehensive immigration 
reform. You do note that that is valuable? I will just answer 
my own question on that.
    Let me pursue important line of reasoning for China and 
Russia. Let me ask Ms. Brandt, if you would, in Iran--and I 
thought we had Iran in this discussion, but if not, I am going 
to add it to the discussion--we have countries like France and 
Albania stopping freedom-loving Iranians from peacefully 
protesting or having meetings suggesting that Iran now is 
spreading its wings to intimidate those nations that have to 
receive its oil products. What is your interpretation of that 
power that they are using to denounce democracy around the 
world and as a tyrannical nation?
    Ms. Brandt. Well, Russia, China, and Iran I think are all 
interested in denting the prestige of liberal democracy around 
the world. It's a part of a tactic to I think make democracy 
less appealing to would-be rights advocates at home and so 
helping autocrats to tighten their grip on power, which I think 
is fundamentally in their self interest. Then again, it's about 
sort-of weakening their global competitors.
    You mentioned comprehensive immigration reform and I would 
say there's another way that this connects with the 
conversation that we're having today, which is--I'm mindful of 
Kennen's sort-of admonition that we need to sort-of resist the 
temptation to become that against like which we are coping, or 
something to that effect. The idea here is that we need to lead 
into our own asymmetric strengths in this asymmetric 
competition and our vibrant, open society is one of them. And 
this----
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I have another question, so--allow you to 
finish your point on that.
    So basically we should lean in when these countries are 
trying to tamp down democracy and we should lean in our friends 
in France and Albania in terms of denying that free speech for 
those Iranians. I would hope that would be the case.
    But let me also talk about some of the tactics that Russia 
has used. Certainly the Ukraine war is dastardly and 
devastating, not instigated by the United States or the Western 
world. They have taken to using hostages to extract and 
strangle relationships with foreign countries. Would you 
comment on this hostage approach so that America knows we 
shouldn't be intimidated by that and we should fight hard for 
our hostages to be returned? I guess this way you can finish 
your overall point.
    Then with China it is all about the technology and 
artificial intelligence. The meeting of Secretary Blinken. How 
do we frame our lean-in to those issues and those countries?
    Ms. Brandt. Yes, I think that's where I was going, which is 
that there's another layer to this competition which is not 
just within the information domain, but within the technology 
domain. There it's essential that we again lean into our 
strengths, which is our vibrant, open, innovation economy. Our 
immigration policy is relevant to that because we want to make 
sure that we are the top. We have an edge in talent. It's 
critically important. We want to make sure that we maintain 
that edge by being an attractive place for talent to come.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, the hostages situation?
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you.
    Chairman Pfluger. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady 
from Nevada, Ms. Titus.
    Ms. Titus. Well, thank you very much.
    I apologize for being late. I hope I don't repeat 
something.
    I sit on the Foreign Affairs committee and so we hear a lot 
about the malign influences of China and Russia. Russia more 
politically, China more economically. In fact, we just heard 
about China building the port in Lima. So we know the Belt and 
Road extends all over the world.
    But I would like to ask you about China's relations with 
Taiwan and how they respond to other countries in Latin America 
as they in turn have different affairs with Taiwan.
    Recently, I believe that Secretary Blinken said that we 
don't support independence of Taiwan. I don't know how that is 
going to play in Latin America, but we know that Latin 
America's support for Taiwan has been waning. It is now down to 
seven countries, I think. Coupled with China's authoritarian 
regime, relations with such governments as Cuba and Venezuela, 
I wonder how this is going to impact our push for democracy in 
Latin America or our just even trade relations between the 
United States and Latin American countries as they tend to lean 
more in the direction of China over the Taiwan issue.
    Anybody.
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Yes. There's no doubt that--as you 
correctly said, there are still--the the largest number of 
Taiwan allies are in Latin America globally. You're correct 
about the number of seven. Taiwan recently lost one ally. In 
March, Honduras switched allegiance from Taiwan to the PRC, 
which had been a campaign promise of that country's president. 
The largest two countries that are still allies of Taiwan are 
in the Western Hemisphere, Guatemala and Paraguay. Guatemala is 
about to have an election. The issue of whether it will 
continue to recognize Taiwan is, I think, up in the air. 
Paraguay did recently have an election and I think for the time 
being, it is secure in its continuing relationship with Taiwan 
and not the PRC.
    But this is clearly one of the objectives of the PRC in the 
region, is to continue to peel away Taiwan's allies.
    Ms. Titus. Anybody else.
    Well, thank you. I think that is something we ought to keep 
a look at.
    The question is about regime change. China and Russia are 
using different tactics, overt and covert, to influence 
countries in Latin America. The United States doesn't have a 
very good history of this. If we don't like them, we have gone 
in and tried to throw them, overthrow them. This is 
particularly true again for Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua. So 
how do we try to counter China's influence, offer an 
alternative, and still deal with that history of meddling that 
many people have long memories about?
    Ms. Dezenski. Thank you for the question.
    I think this is a particularly challenging problem for us. 
When China engages with countries, particularly in the global 
south, they typically employ their policy of non-interference, 
which means they come ostensibly to engage in economic 
integration. They'll work with whatever regime is in power. 
They'll often play by local rules, which could facilitate how 
China uses opaque contracts, employs corruption, any number of 
tools that cater particularly to weak democracies or 
authoritarian regimes, where there's more likelihood that 
opacity will kind-of drive the conversation and rule the day. 
So I think we have a real challenge in terms of how to counter 
that. We need to get at those issues first and foremost by 
protecting our own interests, our own capital, our engagement, 
staying true to our democratic values, pushing on 
anticorruption, stopping the money laundering, calling out the 
bad behavior. Because if we don't do that, we've really lost 
the game. We really need to focus on these governance 
principles. But then we need to take it a step further, which 
is show up in the region for the long term with the right kind 
of economic commitments to drive that kind of economic security 
that we were talking about earlier, and maybe in the process 
keep some supply chains closer to home.
    Ms. Titus. We don't want to force them to make a choice. We 
don't want to put it in those contexts, but we want to let them 
know they have options in countries.
    Thank you. I think my time is up.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    We will now enter a second round of questioning, again, 
alternating sides based on seniority.
    The Chair now recognizes myself for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    I think it has been a great discussion so far. I am 
incredibly worried about what the PRC is doing. The Chinese 
Communist Party not only is right at our doorstep, I mean, they 
are literally inside of our country in a lot of different ways. 
I think the Chinese spy balloon highlighted that this 
subcommittee held a hearing on that. We are hearing today the 
vast array of initiatives that the CCP is using, economic 
militarily, influence and information operations campaigns. The 
fact that we now know, which is completely unacceptable, that 
they have a surveillance and spy machine that is ongoing inside 
Cuba, which is less than 100 miles away from our shores. I 
think for all these reasons, it really is incredibly important 
that we focus on it.
    Ms. Dezenski, in your written testimony, as well as in your 
responses to questions here, you talk about the true autocratic 
behemoth in the region, China, which has ramped up its economic 
investment throughout the hemisphere, driving debt dependency, 
antidemocratic vision of surveillance states. You talk about 
the critical minerals that they are acquiring inside Latin 
America, you talk about the 29 different ports that they have 
established. I mean, they are literally knocking at our 
doorstep. I would like to really further investigate your 
ideas.
    Previously in your testimony, you talked about you were 
there when we stood up DHS. It was created to have a more 
unified whole-of-Government approach to counter new and 
emerging asymmetric terrorist threats. These threats are right 
there. So what is that approach economically, specifically, and 
also militarily? If you have any thoughts on that.
    Ms. Dezenski. Thank you so much.
    The approach is, for certain, a multifaceted one. We really 
need to think about this from a whole-of-Government picture. 
We'll never have the centralized industrial policy focus that 
China has, but arguably we don't need it if we use all of the 
tools in our own toolkit to bring a combination of security, 
investment, economic integration, better political engagement 
with allies and friends and partners in the region. All of this 
needs to work together. We need a big strategy around this.
    In terms of the more specific actions that could be taken 
around some of these threats that we've identified around port 
security, for example, we really need to get a handle on these 
nodes of commerce where we see this layering of technology, 
surveillance, infrastructure investment, the potential to use 
commercial operations to support military, the transport of 
military supplies, for example. There are a lot of 
vulnerabilities in this commerce structure, this commerce 
ecosystem that connects into the DHS agenda very, very closely. 
But I'm not sure that we've really made the pivot around that 
operational readiness, that we've taken the analysis and the 
intelligence, that big picture. Then is it being driven by the 
right boots on the ground, the right engagement?
    So there's multifacets to this, but I think we need to get 
at an asymmetric approach where we identify what those most 
critical elements of Chinese influence are and go after them. 
We're not going to compete in terms of the size of our trade 
relationships. We just won't be everywhere that China is. 
Frankly, we don't have to be. We don't have to spend as much 
money through some equivalent of the Belt and Road initiative, 
but we need to use those tools that we have in a much more 
effective way.
    Chairman Pfluger. Ms. Brandt, it seems to me over the past 
10 to 20 years that we have been ignoring our neighbors to the 
south in many ways. It seems that during that time, the 
People's Republic of China, led by the Chinese Communist Party, 
have just inched their way into that territory with a goal of 
influencing those countries in a way that undermines our own 
national security. Are you seeing something similar to that?
    Ms. Brandt. Yes. Concerns about terrorism and resurgent 
geopolitical competition have shifted the focus to the Middle 
East and to Asia. To some extent, we've deprioritized 
engagement in our own region. As all of us have described here 
today, I think we're the poorer for it.
    Chairman Pfluger. Mr. Hernandez-Roy, I have got 12 seconds 
left.
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I think that Chinese motivation is 
primarily economic, but it's from a power that is obviously a 
Communist dictatorship. With that comes corruption, comes 
antidemocratic practices, and that leads to it opens up spaces 
for all sorts of nefarious things to go on.
    Chairman Pfluger. Those nefarious things are killing 
100,000 Americans a year through fentanyl. They are creating 
chaos, money laundering, criminal organizations, destabilizing 
the region just to the south of us.
    I appreciate your testimony here. I hope that this 
committee can urge our colleagues throughout the rest of 
Congress to take the actions that you are recommending and to 
do more when it comes to securing our own country through the 
stabilization in South and Central America.
    With that, my time has expired.
    I recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
    Another aspect of this that I would like to focus on for a 
moment is the importance of rare earth minerals, particularly 
lithium and others. No coincidence that we are seeing China 
make investments in commerce and diplomacy in areas around the 
world that are rich in these rare earth minerals, including in 
South America in particular. Ms. Dezenski, I noticed that you 
touched on this in your testimony and others. Could you just 
expand on that a bit more? What is happening with rare earth 
minerals in South America? What should we as a Nation be doing 
in order to prevent our adversaries from cornering the market 
essentially, for these important rare earth minerals?
    Ms. Dezenski. Thank you very much.
    Yes, we have a big challenge in Latin America. As I've 
noted in my testimony, the so-called Lithium Triangle of 
Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile is home to over half of the 
world's known lithium reserves. China has been working to 
corner that market. U.S. companies have had, to date, somewhat 
limited success. There was a bid put forward by a U.S. group of 
companies in the last year or so, and it was beat out by a 
Chinese conglomerate and under some strange circumstances where 
the U.S. bid was knocked out because it was submitted 10 
minutes late or something strange like that. So there's a lot 
of competition going on right at the source of this. We have 
not been in an ideal position to address it from a political 
perspective because China has really leveraged its 
relationships, its trade relationships, to support its 
interests. Because China is the processing behemoth with 65 
percent of the refining capacity around lithium in particular, 
it's very difficult to break that.
    One thing that we will need to look at is how to do so. 
Whether it's moving some processing to the United States or 
working with partners in the region to identify other areas of 
processing, this could be an asymmetric opportunity for us. We 
need to get at the kind-of the point in the supply chain that 
is most critical, and processing is really a key part of that.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
    Switching gears a bit, Mr. Hernandez-Roy, in an article 
that you co authored, you remarked that among U.S. presidents, 
President Biden has shown some of the most knowledge and 
appreciation for Latin America. One of the examples that you 
cited in the article was the decision to invite the Brazilian 
and Colombian presidents to the United States within their 
respective first years in office. Brazil and Colombia 
historically have been two of our most important allies in the 
hemisphere.
    Can you talk a little bit about what more we could be doing 
to strengthen our relationships with Brazil and with Colombia 
in particular, and why those relationships are so important in 
the context of competition with our autocratic competitors?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Absolutely. If I may, just very, very 
quickly on your last question, with regard to critical minerals 
and Argentina specifically, and its lithium deposits, which are 
some of the largest. Argentina is exporting about 9 percent of 
its lithium to the United States, and something like 49 
percent, if if memory serves, to China. I've been told by 
representatives of that government that they prefer it to be 
the other way around, but that's just the way the economics are 
right now. The IRA Act provides incentives to members, to 
countries that have FTA agreements with the United States in 
terms of critical minerals. Argentina does not have an FTA 
agreement and is seeking an exemption under that. So that's one 
thing that the United States could do to counter Chinese 
influence.
    With regard to your other question, Brazil and Colombia, 
Colombia, as you've pointed out correctly, is a long-standing 
U.S. partner and ally dating back to the 1990's when Colombia 
was at risk of being overrun by narco-trafficking. The United 
States invested heavily in that country and it became one of 
its closest allies, beating back the security threat to 
Colombia and building up its democracy. It remains a key ally 
in the United States, despite a change of posture by this 
particular government in terms of its outlook.
    Brazil is the largest economy in Latin America, and 
obviously is an important trading partner with the United 
States, but it's also an important trading partner with China. 
Therefore, in fact, I think the Chairman earlier alluded to the 
fact that--well, he said Latin America as a whole, I'm not sure 
that's entirely accurate, but I'm pretty confident at this 
point that China is is Brazil's largest trading partner, and 
therefore we have an interest to strengthen relationship with 
Brazil, to find ways to compete with China in Brazil.
    Mr. Magaziner. My time has expired.
    Thank you.
    Mr. D'Esposito [presiding]. The gentleman's time has 
expired.
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy, as was mentioned by some of my 
colleagues, our weakness, or the view of this country being 
weak or administration being weak, has led to threats. The 
PRC's role in Latin America has grown rapidly since 2000. The 
PRC state firms are major investors in Latin America's energy, 
infrastructure, and space industries. Just want to give you 
some numbers. By 2021, PRC trade in the region totaled $450 
billion, and economists predict that it could exceed $700 
billion by 2035. Of particular concern, and as was discussed, 
the PRC's infrastructure in the region has displayed dual use 
that could have security implications for this great country.
    Could you explain the concept of dual-use infrastructure 
and the impact the facilities could have on homeland security?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Sure. I can mention at least three 
specific examples.
    The Chinese now control the loading and unloading 
facilities in the Panama Canal. They're building, and it's 
almost finished, a very large port in Peru. Last week, if I'm 
not mistaken, they inked an agreement with the regional 
government of Tierra del Fuego in the very southern tip of 
Argentina to build a port that would control the Drake Strait--
I think that's the name of the Strait--that would control 
access to the fishing fields off of Antarctica. Then again in 
Argentina, it has a space port in Argentina that's ostensibly 
for research and to track Chinese satellites. It is essentially 
a piece of sovereign Chinese territory within Argentina. The 
Argentine authorities cannot even set foot on this property. 
Each one of those things has a dual use. They have a peaceful 
use for commerce, for research, for scientific research, and 
for the movement of trade goods. But each one of them can also 
be used in a second capacity--this is where the term dual-use 
comes from--for military capacity. The Chinese space station 
can be used to track U.S. satellites, it could be conceivably 
used to track intercontinental ballistic missiles. Ports can be 
used as refueling and supply and logistics hubs for Chinese 
warships. Ports can be closed, facilities can be sabotaged in 
the event of a conflict. The Panama Canal is obviously one of 
the most strategically important areas in the hemisphere.
    So each of those investments, each of those pieces of 
infrastructure that the Chinese have either bought or built, 
has a dual use.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you.
    So, obviously, it is a real threat. What do you believe 
that this committee and our colleagues in this Congress could 
do to deter and to really get a handle on the dual-use 
infrastructure that is causing a threat to this Nation?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. That's not an easy solution.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Not in a minute and 44 seconds.
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I think the easiest thing to do is to 
prevent it before it happens. So in that sense, the United 
States can do a number of things. It can provide new mechanisms 
or fix old mechanisms to have more development financing in the 
region. For instance, the DFC is prevented from providing 
financing to middle-income, middle- and upper-income countries. 
It can only provide financing to lower- and lower-middle-income 
countries. There's only five countries that qualify as lower- 
and lower-middle-income countries in Latin America. They're all 
in Central America. However, it's well-known that there are 
huge disparities within a country in terms of their economic 
development. So changes to those rules, for instance, could 
allow more financing to some of the South American countries to 
counter some of the infrastructure financing from China. The 
United States can replenish the capital in the Inter-American 
Development Bank. That's another large multilateral institution 
that can provide more lending for infrastructure in the region. 
There's examples like that in my--I'm over the time. But those 
are kinds of the kinds of things that the United States can do 
to prevent these dual-use things from being built in the first 
place.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you very much.
    I now recognize Mr. Correa from California for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I wanted to, in my 5 minutes that I have, let me ask all of 
you for your opinion. It is a big topic, a lot of ways we can 
go, but specifically, how does Department of Homeland Security, 
what are some of the actions that we can take to begin to turn 
the ship around, so to speak? You mentioned, and I agree with, 
the investment in the area. I would prefer a Marshall Plan that 
is accompanied by some economic reform, anticorruption. But 
that is the big picture. Specifically here today, homeland 
security. I am going to ask each one of you, what can we do to 
begin to address, to begin to bring attention to what I believe 
is 20-30 years of being asleep at the wheel?
    Ms. Dezenski.
    Ms. Dezenski. Thank you.
    One thing that really strikes me about where we are now 
facing these economic security threats, a broader range of 
threats to the homeland, is how much of what was built after 9/
11 has kind-of fallen by the wayside.
    Let me give you an example. After 9/11, we spent a lot of 
time thinking about how to secure the ports, we had something 
called the Container Security Initiative, we had the Customs 
Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, we had a number of 
international engagements that exerted U.S. leadership and 
provided a basis for much more strategic engagement with 
partners around the world. Some of that we've lost. I think we 
need to get back to a more strategic footprint, whether we're 
putting people on the ground or we're using the ``digital 
boots'' on the ground, some combination of these things. We 
need more eyes and ears, and we need to drive that footprint 
based on a better analysis of where the threats are and where 
we need to have that deeper engagement. We have the opportunity 
to do that at ports. We can do that with key players in the 
supply chain. We can do that through better interagency 
coordination. All of these things need to happen.
    Mr. Correa. Mr. Hernandez-Roy.
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Thank you, Congressman.
    The commenting on DHS is really beyond my expertise. But 
what I will say--you mentioned a couple of things. You 
mentioned a Marshall Plan. The U.S. influence in Latin America 
was probably at its highest in the 1960's after President 
Kennedy launched something called the Alliance for Progress, 
which was essentially a Marshall Plan for the region. It 
provided development assistance on a massive scale. At the 
time, it was the largest development assistance package that 
the United States had ever implemented, and it had significant 
effects on reducing poverty in the region, which is something 
you mentioned earlier. I would also say that what the United 
States needs to do is create better conditions in the region to 
prevent threats from washing up on our shores. So that it goes 
back to this idea of an Alliance for Progress. We have argued, 
we at CSIS, some of us have argued that the United States 
should entertain a new Alliance for Progress, or 2.0 at some 
point. Ms. Brandt.
    Ms. Brandt. I said in my testimony that China and Russia 
both apply the course of toolkit in Latin America differently 
than in their home regions. China in particular, at home, 
closer to home, it's really weaponizing the leverage that it 
has as its own region's largest trading partner. But abroad, 
it's really patiently building leverage that it can sort-of use 
later. So we're closer to home, those countries have sort-of 
faced the sharpest or like the brunt, the sharpest elements of 
China's toolkit. Farther abroad, I think they've really 
benefited in some ways from China's use of inducements, 
positive inducements.
    So I think the task for us is to both provide alternatives, 
as you've suggested, and then also to tell a more compelling 
story about what we offer, right. Ultimately, competition is 
about the pursuit and use of advantages. So just sort-of rather 
than a tit-for-tat reactive approach to authoritarian moves, we 
need to do an assessment of what our own strengths are and I 
think go at authoritarians, where they're weak. I think one 
such fragility is to open information.
    Mr. Correa. One final quick question here to all of you.
    You mentioned the popularity of TikTok social media. I 
think probably 90 percent--excuse me, about 70 percent of the 
world uses a smartphone. Latin America is the same thing. Great 
communication device. You have a lot of Latin Americans living 
in the United States. You have a lot of cross-cultural 
influence. How can you use that, what I would call continuing 
American goodwill, to really influence and try to continue to 
integrate this continent the way it was before, I should say?
    Please.
    Ms. Brandt. Yes. I mean, we have 40 million native Spanish 
speakers in the United States and some of the best content 
creators in the world. So we should be leveraging those assets, 
especially in our communication in the region. Right. I'm 
thinking about, like, low-cost content distribution agreements 
that would allow some of our content to be shown in the region, 
for example.
    Mr. Correa. In my last 25 seconds, in your opinion, three 
of you, kind of a yes-or-no question, is Congress doing enough 
to make sure that we are present in Latin American countries? 
That is, are we visiting enough, are we paying enough 
attention? Yes, no--5 seconds?
    Ms. Brandt. Yes. I would just say it's incredibly important 
that we focus attention and research.
    Mr. Correa. Are we putting enough attention? Yes, no----
    Ms. Brandt. I think there's more we can do.
    Mr. Correa. Sir?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I think there's more we can do. Not just 
Congress, but also the Executive.
    Mr. Correa. Ms. Dezenski.
    Ms. Dezenski. There's more that we can do.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you very much.
    Mr. Chair, I yield.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you, sir. The gentleman's time's 
expired.
    I now recognize my friend from Arizona, Mr. Crane.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Again, I realize we are talking about Latin American 
countries today and the influence of China, Russia, and Iran 
down there. That being said, I do want to ask a question. Is 
anybody on the panel aware how many men conducted the attacks 
on the World Trade Center during 9/11? Anybody? Anybody know 
the number?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. Could you repeat the number of? Pardon 
me, the number of what?
    Mr. Crane. The number of men who conducted the attacks on 
the World Trade Center. Anybody know the answer to that? How 
many men? How many terrorists?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. That was somewhere in the neighborhood 
of 12 to 20, I believe.
    Ms. Dezenski. It was about 17.
    Mr. Crane. Yes, it was around that--19 men. The reason I 
bring that up is because in 2021 CBP reported 4,103 encounters 
of Russian citizens along our Southwest Border. It continues to 
increase. Following the start of the war in Ukraine, this 
number jumped from 21,763 in 2022 and then in 2023, it rose 
again to 33,000.
    Now let's go to China. In the first 3 months of 2023, we 
saw 9,711 individuals coming from China encountered at our 
Southern Border. That obviously doesn't count the number of 
gotaways, which we can't count, but it is substantially more 
than the 3 years. Since again we are in homeland security, does 
it concern anybody on the panel knowing the current state of 
our Southern Border, to see these numbers increasing from the 
very countries that we are talking about in our Southern 
Hemisphere?
    Mr. Roy, does it concern you to hear those numbers 
increasing?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. I think there's a two-part answer to 
that. The numbers are increasing in part, in large part because 
there are freedom-loving people in those countries----
    Mr. Crane. Absolutely.
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy [continuing]. Who also want to leave 
their repressive regimes and come to the United States.
    Mr. Crane. We understand that. We all understand that. But 
does it concern you, just knowing how I opened with only it 
only took 19 individuals to conduct one of the greatest attacks 
on the United States ever?
    Mr. Hernandez-Roy. It is a concern of mine, given my 
experience within the region and what other dictatorships have 
done in the region to infiltrate spies into neighboring allies.
    Mr. Crane. Absolutely. Do you guys think that either China 
or Russia might be smart enough to figure out that our Southern 
Border is pretty porous? Even our own President, while he was a 
candidate, said, if you want to come to the United States, 
come? Does that concern you? How about you, Ms. Dezenski? Sorry 
if I pronounce that wrong.
    Ms. Dezenski. No, it is fine. Thank you. Yes, it is a 
concern. When the vulnerabilities are known, they can be 
exploited. As the immigration flow continues to grow, it 
becomes a more difficult challenge to figure out the very small 
number of people within a very large number coming across the 
border that are actually of security interest and concern. This 
is a problem we've had for a very long time.
    Mr. Crane. Yes. Let me ask a follow-on, ma'am. Do you think 
we should finish the wall that we started building on our 
Southern Border?
    Ms. Dezenski. It's probably outside of my scope to comment 
specifically on the wall because I'm not following where things 
are at, but I do firmly believe that we need to be able to 
control the border.
    Mr. Crane. OK.
    Ms. Brandt, what about you?
    Ms. Brandt. Like Ms. Dezenski, that's sort-of beyond the 
focus of my research. I will say, of course, I think we should 
have a secure Southern Border. Also, as I said, one of our 
greatest advantages is our open, welcoming, being an attractive 
destination for talent. So we need to ensure that we continue 
to be that kind of place that bolsters freedom-loving people 
around the world.
    Mr. Crane. It is interesting when I hear people come up 
here and they testify before this committee and they say--I ask 
about should we complete a wall and you guys say, oh, that is 
outside of my scope. I know you guys are very smart or you 
wouldn't be here. I read your bios. You are both very smart. 
You guys both have a lot of common sense. Do you guys have 
walls around your house? Do you guys have walls in your 
backyard? Do you know why there are walls at prisons? Do you 
know why most schools have walls? Do you know why most castles 
have walls? I am asking a question. It as a pretty simplistic 
question, and the American people are tired of it.
    Ms. Brandt. I think our openness is a competitive 
advantage. I mean, not the openness of our border like 
literally, but our open welcoming environment. The openness of 
our society.
    Mr. Crane. Well, Ms Brandt, I would love to see you tell 
that to some of the people in my district who have lost their 
loved ones to fentanyl. Do you think that is an advantage to 
have parents that are losing their kids to fentanyl?
    Ms. Brandt. I don't mean the literal--no, of course not. Of 
course not.
    Mr. Crane. Because that is a byproduct of what you are 
talking about, ma'am.
    Ms. Brandt. Of course not. I'm not speaking about the 
literal openness of the border, but our----
    Mr. Crane. That is what you said, openness.
    Ms. Brandt. I'm clarifying that I mean the openness of our 
society.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. D'Esposito. The gentleman's time has expired.
    I want to thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony, 
the Ranking Member and Members for their questions.
    The Members of the subcommittee may have some additional 
questions for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to 
respond to those in writing.
    Pursuant to committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will 
be open for 10 days.
    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:46 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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