[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                REVIEW OF THE RECAPITALIZATION OF THE 
               UNITED STATES COAST GUARD SURFACE, AIR, 
               IT, AND SHORESIDE ASSETS

=======================================================================

                                (118-25)

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             JULY 27, 2023

                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]             


     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation
                             
                              __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
53-883 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
 
             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

  Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
Rick Larsen, Washington,             Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, 
  Ranking Member                     Arkansas
Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Daniel Webster, Florida
  District of Columbia               Thomas Massie, Kentucky
Grace F. Napolitano, California      Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Brian Babin, Texas
John Garamendi, California           Garret Graves, Louisiana
Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiavid Rouzer, North Carolina
Andre Carson, Indiana                Mike Bost, Illinois
Dina Titus, Nevada                   Doug LaMalfa, California
Jared Huffman, California            Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
Julia Brownley, California           Brian J. Mast, Florida
Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey       Puerto Rico
Mark DeSaulnier, California          Pete Stauber, Minnesota
Salud O. Carbajal, California        Tim Burchett, Tennessee
Greg Stanton, Arizona,               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
  Vice Ranking Member                Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
Colin Z. Allred, Texas                 Vice Chairman
Sharice Davids, Kansas               Troy E. Nehls, Texas
Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Lance Gooden, Texas
Chris Pappas, New Hampshire          Tracey Mann, Kansas
Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Burgess Owens, Utah
Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts      Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            Chuck Edwards, North Carolina
Patrick Ryan, New York               Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska         Anthony D'Esposito, New York
Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Eric Burlison, Missouri
Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 John James, Michigan
Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio            Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Brandon Williams, New York
Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
                                     Mike Collins, Georgia
                                     Mike Ezell, Mississippi
                                     John S. Duarte, California
                                     Aaron Bean, Florida
                                ------                                7

        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                   Daniel Webster, Florida, Chairman
Brian Babin, Texas                   Salud O. Carbajal, California,
Brian J. Mast, Florida                 Ranking Member
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,            John Garamendi, California
  Puerto Rico                        Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey       Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts
Mike Ezell, Mississippi, Vice        Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska
    Chairman                         Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan,
Aaron Bean, Florida                    Vice Ranking Member
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)    Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex 
                                         Officio)


                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
  Maritime Transportation, opening statement.....................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast 
  Guard and Maritime Transportation, opening statement...........     5
    Prepared statement...........................................     6
Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in 
  Congress from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member, 
  Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.................    37

                               WITNESSES

Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant for Mission 
  Support, U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement......................     7
    Prepared statement...........................................     9
Marie A. Mak, Director, Contracting and National Security 
  Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office, oral 
  statement......................................................    12
    Prepared statement...........................................    13

                                APPENDIX

Questions to Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant for 
  Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard, from:
    Hon. Mike Ezell..............................................    39
    Hon. Hillary J. Scholten.....................................    39
    Hon. Rick Larsen on behalf of Hon. Patrick Ryan..............    40
Questions to Marie A. Mak, Director, Contracting and National 
  Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
  from:
    Hon. Mike Ezell..............................................    41
    Hon. Hillary J. Scholten.....................................    42
    Hon. Rick Larsen on behalf of Hon. Patrick Ryan..............    42

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                             July 21, 2023

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Review of the 
Recapitalization of the United States Coast Guard Surface, Air, 
IT, and Shoreside Assets''
_______________________________________________________________________


                               I. PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will meet 
on Thursday, July 27, 2023, at 2:00 p.m. ET in 2253 Rayburn 
House Office Building to receive testimony on the ``Review of 
the Recapitalization of the United States Coast Guard Surface, 
Air, IT, and Shoreside Assets.'' Members will receive testimony 
on the United States Coast Guard's (Coast Guard or Service) 
recapitalization efforts, specifically focusing on the 
Service's efforts to modernize its surface assets, including 
the Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) and Polar Security Cutters 
(PSC), air assets, shoreside infrastructure, and Information 
Technology (IT).

                             II. BACKGROUND

THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM

    Recognizing that many of its assets were nearing the end of 
their service lives or were technologically insufficient, in 
2007 the Coast Guard approved a program of record to modernize 
its offshore assets and the communication systems that linked 
those assets.\1\ The program of record has subsequently been 
updated to reflect budget realities and other factors.\2\ 
However, the plan at the time failed to take into account IT 
systems, shoreside assets or Polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard 
is more than a decade into this recapitalization program and 
significant problems exist. In 2017, the Coast Guard released a 
new program of record that included Polar icebreakers and in-
service vessel sustainment but failed to incorporate long term 
plans to recapitalize IT systems or shoreside assets.\3\
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    \1\ United States Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-17-654T, Coast 
Guard Recapitalization: Matching Needs and Continued Resources To 
Strain Acquisition Efforts (2017), available at https://www.gao.gov/
assets/690/685201.pdf.
    \2\ Id.
    \3\ Id.
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    The Coast Guard has successfully undertaken some of the 
procurement steps outlined in its 2007 recapitalization vision, 
such as the procurement and deployment of the Fast Response 
Cutter (FRC) and the National Security Cutter (NSC). 
Concerningly, however, other programs such as the OPC lag 
behind, while the PSC, rotary wing aircraft, shoreside 
infrastructure, and Information Technology (IT) still remain 
largely unaddressed due to underfunding, mismanagement, poor 
processes, and a lack of long-term planning on the part of the 
Coast Guard.\4\ These shortcomings have created serious 
capability gaps in the ability of the Service to field the 
assets required to fulfill its mission demands.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Id.
    \5\ Id.
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    Most notably, in 2014, the Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) estimated that a gap exists between the Coast Guard's 
recapitalization needs and the President's budget request--a 
trend that has continued in subsequent years.\6\ For example, 
in 2018, an $800 million gap existed between the Coast Guard's 
needs and the President's budget request. In an effort to 
address the funding constraints it has faced annually, the 
Coast Guard has been reactive, reducing its capability by 
delaying new acquisitions but the Service does not have a plan 
to realistically set forth affordable priorities.\7\ These 
shortcomings have seriously jeopardized Coast Guard 
capabilities across several vital areas, including shoreside 
infrastructure and surface assets.
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    \6\ Id. at 12.
    \7\ Id. at 13.
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               III. COAST GUARD SURFACE ASSET ACQUISITION

OFFSHORE PATROL CUTTER (OPC)

    The Coast Guard has stated that the acquisition of the OPC 
is its highest investment priority as it will be the work horse 
of the Coast Guard's offshore presence.\8\ The Service intends 
to replace its 29 medium-endurance Cutters, all of which have 
far surpassed their planned service lives and are becoming 
increasingly expensive to maintain and operate, with 25 
OPCs.\9\
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    \8\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisition Directorate, Offshore 
Patrol Cutter, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Surface-Programs/
Offshore-Patrol-Cutter/ [hereinafter Coast Guard Acquisition 
Directorate]
    \9\ Cong. Rsch. Serv., R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: 
Background and Issues for Congress 1 (June 21, 2023), available at 
https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42567/162 [hereinafter 
Coast Guard Cutter Procurement].
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    The first four OPCs are being built by Eastern Shipbuilding 
Group (ESG) of Panama City, Florida.\10\ Unable to meet the 
terms of the contract signed in 2018, ESG sought a cash 
infusion from the Coast Guard in order to maintain operations 
at their yard.\11\ The Department of Homeland Security 
subsequently authorized up to $659 million in relief for the 
yard, including up to $65 million for costs not related OPC 
construction, in order to shore up the yard's financial 
position.\12\
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    \10\ Id. at 10.
    \11\ Id. at 9-10.
    \12\ United States Coast Guard, Offshore Patrol Cutters 
Acquisition: Extraordinary Relief (FY 2022, Fourth Quarter) Rep. to 
Cong. (Mar. 8, 2023) (on file with Comm.).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On June 30, 2022, the Coast Guard announced it had awarded 
the phase-II fixed-price incentive contract to Austal USA of 
Mobile, Alabama, to produce up to 11 OPCs.\13\ The Service's 
proposed fiscal year (FY) 2024 budget requests $579.0 million 
in procurement funding for the construction of the sixth OPC, 
the procurement of long lead-time materials (LLTM) for the 
seventh OPC, and other program costs.\14\
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    \13\ Id. at 13.
    \14\ Id. at 1.
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    Although the OPC is labeled as a key priority for the Coast 
Guard, serious program mismanagement has led to long delays, 
cost overruns, and the emergence of a gap in the Coast Guard's 
medium endurance capabilities. A June 2023 GAO report found 
that the OPC's total acquisition cost estimate increased from 
$12.5 billion to $17.6 billion between 2012 and 2022.\15\ The 
program attributes the 40 percent increase to many factors, 
including restructuring the stage one contract [for OPCs one 
through four] and recompeting the stage two requirement [for 
OPCs five through 15].\16\ In addition, the program incurred a 
one and a half year delay in the delivery of the first four 
OPCs issues related to manufacturing the Cutter's propulsion 
system.\17\ GAO also found indicators that the shipbuilder's 
significant level of complex, uncompleted work may lead to 
further delays.\18\
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    \15\ United States Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-23-105805, Coast 
Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs To Mature 
Technology and Design 28 (June 2023), available at https://www.gao.gov/
assets/gao-23-105805.pdf.
    \16\ Coast Guard Cutter Procurement, supra note 9, at 28.
    \17\ Id. at 28.
    \18\ Id. at 37.
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    The GAO attributed these delays and cost overruns to 
fundamental flaws in the Coast Guard's design and construction 
process.\19\ The GAO found that the Coast Guard used a high-
risk approach to the acquisition of the OPC that attempts to 
concurrently overlap the acquisition phases of technology 
development, design, and construction.\20\ While some overlap 
is common in the industry, the Coast Guard has exceeded 
industry standards.\21\ Specifically, the Coast Guard does not 
require completion of basic and functional design, and maturity 
of all critical technologies, nor does it require completion of 
the design of distributive systems--systems that affect 
multiple zones of the ship--prior to construction of the lead 
ship.\22\ These approaches could, and likely will, result in 
the need for significant design rework late in construction, 
further increasing costs and delays.\23\ This will subsequently 
extend the Coast Guard's dependence on its current fleet of 
medium-endurance cutters, continuing to strain the Coast 
Guard's budget with increased repair and maintenance costs.
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    \19\ Id. at 16.
    \20\ Id. at 15.
    \21\ Id. at 15.
    \22\ Id. at 24.
    \23\ Id. at 16.
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POLAR SECURITY CUTTER (PSC)

    The Coast Guard anticipates the need for enhanced Arctic 
capabilities in the coming years to support United States 
economic, security, and scientific interests.\24\ The Polar 
Star is currently the Coast Guard's only operational heavy ice 
breaker. Commissioned in 1976, the Polar Star has far surpassed 
its regular service life and has been dependent on constant 
service life extension programs to allow it to function--
heavily straining Coast Guard resources.\25\
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    \24\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, Polar 
Security Cutter, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/
Surface-Programs/Polar-Icebreaker/ [hereinafter Polar Security Cutter 
Acquisitions].
    \25\ Id.
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    In 2019, the Coast Guard and United States Navy, operating 
through an integrated program office, awarded VT Halter Marine 
Inc. of Pascagoula, Mississippi, a fixed price incentive 
contract for the detail, design and construction of the lead 
PSC. The yard was subsequently purchased by Bollinger 
Mississippi. Construction on the first PSC was planned to begin 
in 2022, with contract delivery planned for the mid-2020s.\26\ 
The contract includes financial incentives for earlier 
delivery. However, construction of the PSC has yet to begin due 
to design delays that have plagued the program, and the Coast 
Guard is unable to commit to a timeline for when the first PSC 
will be mission ready.\27\
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    \26\ Id.
    \27\ Review of Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for the Coast Guard: 
Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime Transp., 
118th Cong. (2023) (response from Adm. Linda Fagan, Commandant of the 
United States Coast Guard).
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WATERWAYS COMMERCE CUTTER (WCC)

    The Coast Guard maintains a fleet of inland water craft 
responsible for maintaining more than 28,200 marine aids to 
navigation throughout 12,000 miles of inland waterways, on 
which 630 million tons of cargo move annually.\28\ The current 
fleet of inland tenders has been in operation for an average of 
more than 57 years, far exceeding their design service 
life.\29\ The Coast Guard established the WCC Program after 
Congress provided funds to replace the capability provided by 
the inland tender fleet with 16 River Buoy Tenders, 11 Inland 
Construction Tenders, and three Inland Buoy Tenders.\30\ To 
increase efficiency, these vessels will be self-propelled 
monohulls instead of the current tug-and-barge 
configuration.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, Waterways 
Commerce Cutter, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/
Surface-Programs/WCC/.
    \29\ Id.
    \30\ Id.
    \31\ Cong. Rsch Serv., IF11672, Coast Guard Waterways Commerce 
Cutter (WCC) Program: Background and Issues for Congress (2023), 
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11672.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Coast Guard has faced significant issues with the 
acquisition process as it relates to small business 
requirements. The initial contract was awarded to Birdon 
America, Inc., located in Denver, Colorado, in October of 2022. 
However, after the contract was awarded, challenges to the 
contract award were made based on the small business set aside 
requirements (FAR 52.219 14).\32\ Despite initially determining 
that Birdon met its small business requirements during its pre-
decision evaluation, on May 26, 2023, the Small Business 
Administration (SBA) informed the Coast Guard that Birdon, 
under its WCC proposal, does not meet the status of a small 
business. The Coast Guard's legal analysis concluded that a new 
size determination does not prevent the Service from continuing 
contract performance; however, the Coast Guard continues to 
evaluate all potential options while the SBA proceedings 
progress.\33\ As a result, the Service may be unable to count 
the WCC construction against its small business set-aside 
requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ United States Coast Guard Briefing to Congress, Waterways 
Commerce Cutter (WCC) Contract Award Brief (June 21, 2023) (on file 
with Comm.) [hereinafter Coast Guard Cutter Briefing].
    \33\ Email from Earl Potter, Commander, United States Coast Guard, 
to Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime Transp. Staff (May 30, 2023, 
17:07 EST) (on file with Comm.).
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NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER (NSC)

    The Legend-class National Security Cutter (NSC) is the most 
capable cutter in the Coast Guard's fleet, capable of executing 
challenging operations, including supporting maritime homeland 
security and defense missions. The Coast Guard's Program of 
Record (POR) originally called for eight NSCs to replace the 
Service's fleet of 12 high endurance cutters.\34\ The NSCs were 
originally intended to operate in excess of 185 days per year 
to maximize operational capability, but based on crew and 
maintenance concerns, the Coast Guard now intends to operate 
the vessels for a maximum of 185 days per year.\35\ Congress 
has funded 11 vessels. The tenth vessel is scheduled for 
delivery later this year.\36\ As the NSC program winds down, 
that opportunity to acquire additional NSCs has likely been 
missed.
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    \34\ Coast Guard Acquisition Directorate, supra note 8.
    \35\ United States Coast Guard, Report to Congress: Analyzing Cost 
and Performance for National Security Cutter Operational Employment 
(2023) (on file with Comm.).
    \36\ Polar Security Cutter Acquisitions, supra note 24.
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                 IV. COAST GUARD AIR ASSET ACQUISITION

MH-65 REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

    The MH-65 currently makes up the majority of the Coast 
Guard's rotary-wing fleet, and the Service is the largest 
single operation of the platform in the world. However, in 2018 
Airbus Helicopters announced it was ending production of the 
civilian variant of the MH-65, impacting the supply chain and 
resulting in shortages of critical parts for the fleet.\37\ The 
Coast Guard is part of the Department of Defense's (DOD) Future 
Vertical Lift (FVL) program, which is expected to reach initial 
operating capability by the late 2030's and full operating 
capability by the late 2040's.\38\ The Service Life Extension 
Program (SLEP) for the MH-65 will not be able to cover this 
gap, leaving the Coast Guard with a critical air capability 
shortage.\39\
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    \37\ United States Coast Guard Briefing to Congress, Coast Guard 
Rotary-Wing Fleet Transition (January 24, 2023) (on file with Comm.) 
[hereinafter Coast Guard Rotary-Wing Briefing].
    \38\ Id.
    \39\ Id.
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    The Coast Guard intends to replace its existing fleet of 
MH-65s with MH-60s, a platform which the Service currently 
operates. Furthermore, the Coast Guard plans to replace them on 
a basis of flight-hour parity.\40\ Due to the MH-60's higher 
endurance in comparison to the MH-65, the Coast Guard believes 
it can downsize its fleet without losing mission 
capability.\41\ There is considerable risk, however, that 
downsizing the fleet would dangerously limit the Coast Guard's 
ability to respond to simultaneous emergencies or mass 
causality events. At the same time, the introduction of a 
folding-tail design, used on the Navy's variant, which is 
needed accommodate the larger aircraft on Coast Guard surface 
vessels, has the potential to introduce increased maintenance 
and operational challenges.\42\
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    \40\ Id.
    \41\ Id.
    \42\ Id.
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HC-130J ACQUISITION

    The Coast Guard uses fixed wing assets to provide heavy air 
transport and long-range maritime patrol capability.\43\ Each 
aircraft is capable of serving as an on-scene command and 
control platform or as a surveillance platform with the means 
to detect, classify and identify objects, and share that 
information with operational forces across multiple 
domains.\44\
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    \43\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, HC-130J 
Long Range Surveillance Aircraft, available at https://
www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-
Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Air-Programs/LRS-HC-130J/.
    \44\ Id.
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    The Coast Guard is acquiring a fleet of 22 new, fully 
missionized HC-130J aircraft to replace its legacy HC-
130Hs.\45\ Advances in engine and propeller technology 
incorporated in the HC-130J provides a 20 percent increase in 
speed and altitude, and a 40 percent increase in range compared 
to the outgoing HC-130H platform.\46\ This will increase the 
Coast Guard's ability to respond to emergencies, conduct long 
range search and rescue, and counter illicit operations. H.R. 
2741, The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, which passed 
out of the Committee on April 26, 2023, authorizes $138,500,000 
for the acquisition or procurement of one missionized HC-130J 
aircraft.\47\
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    \45\ United States Coast Guard Briefing to Congress, Quarterly 
Acquisition Briefing (Feb. 2023) (on file with Comm.).
    \46\ Coast Guard Cutter Briefing, supra note 32.
    \47\ Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, H.R. 2741, 118th Cong. 
(2023).
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                     V. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT)

    The Coast Guard requires enhancements to its shoreside and 
cyber infrastructure to facilitate new assets and more complex 
mission sets. Currently, limitations in existing physical and 
data infrastructure have hindered newer platforms from 
utilizing the full scope of their capabilities. H.R. 2741, The 
Coast Guard Authorization Bill of 2023, authorizes $36,300,000 
to modernize the Coast Guard's IT systems.\48\ The bill also 
provides additional funds for the Coast Guard to update the 
Merchant Marine Credentialing System, which will improve 
recruitment and retention efforts for Merchant Mariners.\49\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Id.
    \49\ Id.
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    Investment in IT capabilities will also allow the Service 
to better support its members. On April 9, 2018, DOD announced 
its intent to partner with the Coast Guard to deploy its 
electronic health record (EHR) capability across the Service's 
clinics and sick bays.\50\ On June 7, 2018, the Coast Guard and 
the Defense Health Agency (DHA), the agency responsible for the 
DOD's health care system, signed an Inter-Agency Agreement that 
formally established the partnership to deploy MHS GENESIS.\51\ 
The Electronic Health Records Acquisition (EHRA) will modernize 
the Coast Guard's health care data management by acquiring an 
EHR solution in place of its primarily paper-based health 
record system.\52\ Having an EHR capability will make patient 
record retrieval easier and faster, reduce administrative 
errors, and allow electronic information exchange with the DOD, 
the Department of Veterans' Affairs, and commercial care 
providers.\53\ The Coast Guard's EHR program, once fully 
implemented, will service all Coast Guard clinics and sick 
bays--ashore and afloat.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \50\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, 
Electronic Health Records, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/C4ISR-
Programs/Electronic-Health-Records-Acquisition/ [hereinafter Electronic 
Health Records Directive].
    \51\ Id.
    \52\ Id.
    \53\ Id.
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    In November of 2021, the Coast Guard deployed the MHS 
GENESIS electronic health records (EHR) system to 26 clinics 
and 48 ashore sickbays within the Coast Guard Atlantic Area, 
completing the first segment of EHR system implementation for 
the service. With Segment A now complete, a total of 43 ashore 
clinics and 67 ashore sick bays are using MHS GENESIS for EHR 
management. The Pacific wave was completed earlier this fall. 
The program will now move to the next segment of the deployment 
strategy, known as Segment B. Segment B includes modernization 
of the Coast Guard's entire medical and dental radiology 
system. The Coast Guard is targeting completion for Segment B 
for early summer 2024. The final segment, Segment C, will 
extend an EHR capability to all afloat sickbays; that schedule 
is still being determined.\54\
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    \54\ United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard launches electronic 
health records system in Atlantic Area, available at https://
www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-
Acquisitions-CG-9/Newsroom/Latest-Acquisition-News/Article/2838468/
coast-guard-launches-electronic-health-records-system-in-atlantic-
area/.
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                      VI. SHORESIDE INFRASTRUCTURE

    The Coast Guard owns or leases more than 20,000 shore 
facilities, such as piers, docks, boat stations, air stations, 
and housing units at more than 2,700 locations.\55\ Coast Guard 
shoreside infrastructure is aging rapidly, with 40 percent of 
its buildings being 50 years or older.\56\ These buildings and 
infrastructure are also exposed to harsh environments, with 
salt air, high winds, and water contributing to their 
corrosion.\57\
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    \55\ United States Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-19-82 Coast Guard 
Shore Infrastructure, available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/
697012.pdf.
    \56\ Mike Gooding, ``USCG Commandant says infrastructure 
`antiquated' and `crumbling','' 13NewsNow, (Feb. 20, 2020), available 
at https://www.13newsnow.com/article/news/national/military-news/uscg-
commandant-says-infrastructure-antiquated-and-crumbling/291-80c90197-
1e82-4ecd-92f7-c6a9b07f954a.
    \57\ Id.
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    The Coast Guard's Office of Civil Engineering sets agency-
wide civil engineering policy, which includes facility 
planning, design, construction, maintenance, and disposal of 
real property.\58\ The Service's Shore Infrastructure Logistics 
Center (SILC), established in 2009, is tasked with the 
management and coordination of infrastructure condition 
assessments via six regional Civil Engineering Units (CEUs), 
along with other divisions and offices, in addition to 
implementing shore infrastructure policies.\59\ The condition 
of individual shore infrastructure assets is determined by CEU 
personnel and civil engineers in the field.\60\ According to 
the Service, every facility is to be inspected by a CEU 
representative every three years.\61\
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    \58\ Electronic Health Records Directive, supra note 50.
    \59\ Id.
    \60\ Id.
    \61\ Id.
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    A 2019 GAO report stated that the Coast Guard has more than 
a $2.6 billion backlog in deferred or overdue maintenance, 
repair, and recapitalization work for its shoreside 
infrastructure.\62\ Importantly, the Service estimates that 
when factoring in recapitalization projects for which it has 
not made cost estimates on, the recapitalization backlog likely 
exceeds $3 billion.\63\ The 2023 Coast Guard Authorization Act 
authorizes $400,000,000 for maintenance, construction, and 
repairs for Coast Guard shoreside infrastructure.\64\
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    \62\ Id.
    \63\ Id.
    \64\ Coast Guard Rotary-Wing Briefing, supra note 37.
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                             VII. WITNESSES

     LVice Admiral Paul Thomas, Deputy Commandant for 
Mission Support, United States Coast Guard
     LMarie Mak, Director, Contracting and National 
Security, United States Government Accountability Office

 
    REVIEW OF THE RECAPITALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD 
                 SURFACE, AIR, IT, AND SHORESIDE ASSETS

                              ----------                              


                        Thursday, July 27, 2023

                  House of Representatives,
          Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
                                    Transportation,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:32 p.m. in 
room 2253 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Webster 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation will come to order.
    I ask for unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized 
to declare a recess at any time during the hearing, and without 
objection, show that ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that Members who are not 
members of the subcommittee be permitted to sit in the 
subcommittee today and ask questions during the hearing.
    Without objection, show that ordered.
    As a reminder, if you have a document to submit, submit it 
to the House also at [email protected].
    I now recognize myself for the purpose of an opening 
statement for 5 minutes.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL WEBSTER OF FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN, 
    SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Before we begin the discussion of 
the hearing topic at hand, I want to commend the Coast Guard 
for undertaking Operation Fouled Anchor, an investigation of 
sexual assault and harassment incidents at the Coast Guard 
Academy from the late 1980s to early 2000s. As a grandfather of 
13 granddaughters, I was horrified by the report, and the 
Service must use the data gleaned from this review to better 
protect future cadets.
    However, like many of my colleagues, I urge the Coast Guard 
to share important Service oversight actions with Congress as a 
routine matter of day-to-day operations, rather than being 
forced to do it by some sort of press pressure.
    Turning now to the topic at hand, today our subcommittee 
will receive testimony on the Coast Guard's efforts to 
recapitalize its surface, air, IT, and shoreside assets. I 
would like to welcome our witnesses, Vice Admiral Paul Thomas, 
Deputy Commandant of the Coast Guard for mission support, and 
Marie Mak, Director of Contracting and National Security 
Acquisitions at the United States Government Accountability 
Office.
    Ms. Mak, I understand, is retiring at the end of next 
month, and this will probably be the last of the many 
congressional hearings you have attended. This will be it. So, 
I hope we will make it memorable, but not too memorable.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Webster of Florida. On behalf of the subcommittee, I 
would like to thank you for your contributions over the last 
decade to the subcommittee's oversight of Coast Guard 
acquisition programs. Thank you so much. I appreciate that. In 
the spirit of today's hearing, we all wish you fair winds and 
following seas as you embark on your next chapter.
    The Coast Guard is in the middle of a multidecade 
recapitalization campaign to replace aging surface and air 
assets. There have been many successes in this effort. The 
Coast Guard is nearing completion of the 11-ship Bertholf class 
National Security Cutters and the, at present, 64-ship Webber 
class Fast Response Cutters.
    The Coast Guard has acquired 15 C-130J long-range aircraft; 
18 C0144s, and 14 C-27 mid-range aircraft, and reengined the 
MH-65 rotary-wing aircraft. Are those still available? The 
Service has also made significant investments in the shoreside 
facilities necessary to homeport these new assets, but many 
additional home port and hangar upgrades are needed.
    Unfortunately, no administration of either party has 
requested anything even approaching the resources necessary to 
carry out this recapitalization in an efficient and cost-
effective manner. Congress has provided more resources than 
those requested by multiple administrations, but Congress was 
only able to go so far beyond the requested levels. These 
paltry budgets dramatically stretch out timelines for these 
programs.
    The Coast Guard says that the timeline has moved to the 
right. It has. It keeps moving. Program delays always raise 
program costs. They delay the implementation of the next-in-
line programs. These delays also reduce the Coast Guard's 
mission capability as legacy assets degrade. In addition, older 
assets require greater maintenance and repair, and costs 
increase.
    Delays prevent the Service from maintaining its shoreside 
assets, and they prevent the Coast Guard from meaningful 
participation in the ongoing digital revolution. Throughout 
this long saga--made longer by severely constrained budgets--
world and domestic events, new and evolving congressional and 
executive branch policy priorities, and rapidly changing 
maritime technology have all contributed to expanding the scope 
and requirements of Coast Guard mission responsibilities.
    In short, we expect the Coast Guard to do more without 
giving them the resources to carry out their existing programs.
    This committee has consistently produced bills that 
authorized the amounts we believe are the minimum necessary to 
keep the Service from falling behind. However, appropriations 
and administration budget requests then leave the Coast Guard 
at the dock, allowing mission capability creep downward while 
increasing maintenance and construction backlogs.
    Nonetheless, this subcommittee will continue to authorize 
the procurement, construction, and improvement account at 
levels that would at least keep the Coast Guard from losing 
more ground. This is not to say that the Coast Guard doesn't 
have acquisition problems of its own making. In the future, the 
committee hopes that the Coast Guard will use proven parent 
craft designs, and design first, then build.
    The subcommittee looks forward to hearing today how the 
Coast Guard will upgrade and replace aging shoreside 
infrastructure and antiquated IT systems; build its largest, 
most expensive single class of ships; and replace the rapidly 
aging H-65s over the next 15 years.
    So, this is a lot longer than I thought it would be, so, I 
am going to stop there. That is plenty of stuff said already, 
and we just appreciate this opportunity we have.
    But I just wanted to say the subcommittee is deeply 
concerned about the limited ability of the Service to access 
data about the United States documented vessels. As the Federal 
entity tasked with documenting vessels, that information should 
be at your fingertips, and it isn't.
    [Mr. Webster of Florida's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
    Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster of Florida, Chairman, 
        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    Before we begin discussion of the hearing topic at hand, I want to 
commend the Coast Guard for undertaking Operation Fouled Anchor, an 
investigation of sexual assault and harassment incidents at the Coast 
Guard Academy from the late 1980's through the early 2000's. As a 
grandfather of 13 granddaughters, I was horrified by the report, and 
the Service must use the data gleaned from this review to better 
protect future cadets.
    However, like many of my colleagues, I urge the Coast Guard to 
share important Service oversight actions with Congress as a routine 
matter of day-to-day operations, rather than being forced to do so by 
impending press coverage.
    Turning now to our hearing topic, today our subcommittee will 
receive testimony on the Coast Guard's efforts to recapitalize its 
surface, air, IT, and shoreside assets. I'd like to welcome our 
witnesses--Vice Admiral Paul Thomas, Deputy Commandant of the Coast 
Guard for Mission Support, and Marie Mak, Director of Contracting and 
National Security at the United States Government Accountability 
Office.
    Ms. Mak, I understand that you will be retiring at the end of next 
month, and this will be the last of many Congressional hearings at 
which you have testified for GAO. On behalf of the Subcommittee, I 
would like to thank you for your contributions over the last decade to 
the Subcommittee's ongoing oversight of Coast Guard acquisition 
programs. In the spirit of today's hearing, we all wish you fair winds 
and following seas as you embark on your next chapter.
    The Coast Guard is in the middle of a multi-decade recapitalization 
campaign to replace its aging surface and air assets. There have been 
many successes in this effort. The Coast Guard is nearing completion of 
the 11-ship BERTHOLF class National Security Cutters, and the, at 
present, 64-ship WEBBER class Fast Response Cutters.
    The Coast Guard has acquired 15 C-130J long range aircraft, 18 C-
144, and 14 C-27 medium range aircraft, and reengined the MH-65 rotary 
wing aircraft. The Service has also made significant investments in the 
shoreside facilities necessary to homeport these new assets, but many 
additional homeport and hangar upgrades are needed.
    Unfortunately, no administration of either party has requested 
anything even approaching the resources necessary to carry out this 
recapitalization in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Congress 
has provided more resources than those requested by multiple 
administrations, but Congress was only able to go so far beyond the 
requested levels. These paltry budgets dramatically stretch out 
timelines for these programs. The Coast Guard says, ``The timeline has 
moved to the right,'' almost as often as it says ``Semper paratus.''
    Program delays always raise program costs. They delay 
implementation of the next-in-line programs. These delays also reduce 
the Coast Guard's mission capability as legacy assets degrade. In 
addition, older assets require greater maintenance and repair, and 
costs increase.
    Delays prevent the Service from maintaining its shoreside assets, 
and they prevent the Coast Guard from meaningfully participating in the 
ongoing digital revolution. Throughout this long saga, made longer by 
severely constrained budgets, world and domestic events, new and 
evolving Congressional and Executive Branch policy priorities, and 
rapidly changing maritime technology have all contributed to expanding 
the scope and requirements of Coast Guard mission responsibilities.
    In short, we expect the Coast Guard to do more without giving them 
the resources to carry out their existing programs. This committee has 
consistently produced bills that authorized the amounts we believe are 
the minimum necessary to keep the Service from falling behind. However, 
appropriations and administration budget requests then leave the Coast 
Guard at the dock, allowing mission capability creep downward while 
increasing maintenance and construction backlogs.
    Nonetheless, this subcommittee will continue to authorize the 
Procurement, Construction and Improvement Account at levels that would 
at least keep the Coast Guard from losing more ground. This is not to 
say that the Coast Guard doesn't have acquisitions problems of its own 
making. In the future, the Committee hopes the Coast Guard will use 
proven parent craft designs, and design first, then build.
    The Subcommittee looks forward to hearing today how the Coast Guard 
will upgrade and replace its aging shoreside infrastructure and 
antiquated IT systems, build its largest, most expensive single class 
of ships, and replace its rapidly aging H-65s over the next 15 years.
    While the Coast Guard must be commended for squeezing the most out 
of its current assets, we owe the men and women of the Coast Guard--
from whom we expect so much and always get even more--the adequate 
tools and resources to do their jobs effectively and safely. Efforts to 
secure new Polar Security Cutters and Offshore Patrol Cutters are still 
in relatively early stages. And work is also underway to replace the 
Service's inland tender fleet.
    The Committee looks forward to learning how these programs are 
going to be completed.
    We are particularly interested in whether the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Office of Management and Budget support 
building two Offshore Patrol Cutters each year. Without a two-a-year 
strategy, which the Coast Guard has long advocated, current Medium 
Endurance Cutters will age out before replacements are available.
    Additionally, unless Polar Security Cutters come online by 2028, 
the United States polar region presence will be maintained by the then 
nearly 30-year-old HEALEY, a research icebreaker. Russia and China, not 
even an Arctic Nation, will both have a significant polar operational 
presence by then. We should not expect academic fishery biologists and 
physical oceanographers, however talented they may be, to be the first 
line of United States sovereignty in the Arctic.
    A new fleet of Polar Security Cutters is critical to advancing our 
Nation's sovereignty in the polar regions. The program is half a decade 
behind its unrealistic original schedule. I am optimistic that new 
leadership at the shipyard is moving the program forward. I look 
forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the Coast Guard will 
correct missteps in the procurement and contracting process.
    Coast Guard aviation also needs to replace its no-longer-
manufactured MH-65s. While the MH-60 is more capable than the MH-65, I 
oppose the plan to reduce the total number of aircraft. I am also 
concerned about the proposed MH-60 modifications needed for sea 
operations.
    As the Coast Guard modernizes its aviation assets, hangars and 
other ground assets also need to keep pace. The Committee will continue 
to monitor progress as the Coast Guard builds a new hangar at Barbers 
Point.
    Finally, these assets, new and old, require IT and shoreside 
support. The Coast Guard's IT infrastructure, including its merchant 
mariner credentialling system, is antiquated and presents serious 
limitations.
    The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, reported out by this 
Committee, authorizes $36.3 million to modernize the Coast Guard's IT 
systems, including $11 million for a new Merchant Mariner Credentialing 
System. The Subcommittee is also deeply concerned about the limited 
ability of the Service to access data about United States documented 
vessels. As the federal entity tasked with documenting vessels, that 
information should be at your fingertips.
    To our witnesses--thank you for participating today. I look forward 
to a candid discussion on how Congress can support the Coast Guard's 
efforts to modernize its assets, systems, and facilities.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, anyway, now I would like to 
recognize Ranking Member Carbajal for an opening statement for 
5 minutes.
    You are recognized.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SALUD O. CARBAJAL OF CALIFORNIA, 
   RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME 
                         TRANSPORTATION

    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chairman Webster, and I will take 
up the rest of your time that you don't want to take on.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Carbajal. So, today we are gathered here to discuss and 
review the Coast Guard's acquisition programs for new cutters, 
boats, airplanes, helicopters, shoreside infrastructure, and 
information technology.
    Prior to getting started, I would like to echo the concerns 
expressed by Chairman Webster regarding the Coast Guard's 
handling of sexual assault and harassment cases during the 
1980s through the early 2000s. The investigation itself, dubbed 
Operation Fouled Anchor, took place from 2014 through 2020.
    After the conclusion of the investigation, the Coast Guard 
then made the reprehensible and irresponsible decision to hide 
the investigation--to hide the investigation--and its findings 
from Congress and the American public, as well. Victim privacy 
is a paramount concern, but choosing not to disclose to 
Congress the existence of the investigation and purposely 
hiding it from any reporting mechanism is shameful, to say the 
least.
    Earlier this week, Ranking Member Larsen, Vice Ranking 
Member Scholten, and I sent a letter to the GAO requesting they 
review the Coast Guard's handling of this investigation and 
management of their Sexual Assault Prevention, Response, and 
Recovery Program. I look forward to getting answers and 
improving Coast Guard procedures.
    To all the victims that never saw justice and went unheard 
for years, we hear you and feel your pain. You were brave for 
coming forward and deserve closure. We will do our best to 
remedy this and prevent this from happening to other 
servicemembers. I am sorry you have to relive this pain again.
    Now, turning to the topic of this hearing, the Coast Guard 
is in the middle of modernizing their fleet, and yet they 
continue to operate ships that are well past their intended 
service life. This is in part due to lack of funding from 
Congress, but also due to delays in production of newer 
cutters.
    As we have learned from multiple GAO reports, the Coast 
Guard's acquisitions typically come in delayed and over budget. 
This is concerning. This is a concerning trend that I hope we 
can get to the bottom of today, but it is not something that 
can be fixed overnight.
    Improving the acquisition program requires investing more 
into the Coast Guard so that they can bolster their oversight. 
It also requires investing more in U.S. shipbuilding to ensure 
we have shipyards capable of building the assets we need. U.S. 
shipyards depend on contracts from the Navy and Coast Guard to 
support their business, but the Coast Guard is often outbid by 
the size and value of Navy contracts.
    We must bring on new cutters, shoreside infrastructure, and 
IT systems quickly. Not only do modern assets mean improved 
mission readiness, they also mean better quality of life for 
our Coasties. Newer cutters mean better connectivity and 
ability for Coasties to contact their families while at sea, 
leading to improved mental health and higher retention rates.
    Servicemembers want their families to live in the best 
quality housing. That starts with investing more in shoreside 
infrastructure and eliminating the estimated $3 billion 
backlog.
    Ultimately, our servicemembers deserve to live and work in 
assets that aren't on the brink of failure. Congress and Coast 
Guard leadership owe it to the personnel to deliver this. That 
is why we cannot revert to fiscal year 2022 funding levels, and 
we must fund the Coast Guard at a higher level than requested.
    GAO has recognized that the funding typically requested by 
the Coast Guard underestimates their needs for 
recapitalization.
    Before I conclude, I want to wish Ms. Mak congratulations 
on a successful career in public service and wish you a happy 
retirement. You and your team have done important oversight, 
and I thank you for all your hard work.
    With that, I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    [Mr. Carbajal's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal of California, Ranking 
    Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    Today, we're gathered here to discuss and review the Coast Guard's 
acquisition programs for new cutters, boats, airplanes, helicopters, 
shoreside infrastructure and information technology.
    Prior to getting started, I would like to echo the concerns 
expressed by Chairman Webster regarding the Coast Guard's handling of 
sexual assault and harassment cases during the 1980's through early 
2000's. The investigation itself, dubbed ``Operation Fouled Anchor,'' 
took place from 2014 through 2020.
    After the conclusion of the investigation, the Coast Guard then 
made the irresponsible decision to hide the investigation and its 
findings from Congress and the American public.
    Victim privacy is a paramount concern but choosing to not disclose 
to Congress the existence of the investigation and purposely hiding it 
from any reporting mechanism is shameful.
    Earlier this week, Ranking Member Larsen, Vice Ranking Member 
Scholten and I sent a letter to GAO requesting they review the Coast 
Guard's handling of this investigation and management of their sexual 
assault prevention, response and recovery program. I look forward to 
getting answers and improving Coast Guard procedures.
    To all the victims that never saw justice and went unheard for 
years, I hear you and feel your pain. You were brave for coming forward 
and deserve closure. We will do our best to remedy this and prevent 
this from happening to other servicemembers. I am sorry you have to 
relive this pain again.
    Now, turning to the topic of this hearing. The Coast Guard is in 
the middle of modernizing their fleet and yet they continue to operate 
ships that are well past their intended service life. This is in part 
due to lack of funding from Congress but also due to delays in 
production of newer cutters.
    As we've learned from multiple GAO reports, the Coast Guard's 
acquisitions typically come in delayed and over budget. This is a 
concerning trend that I hope we can get to the bottom of today but is 
not something that can be fixed overnight.
    Improving the acquisition program requires investing more into the 
Coast Guard so that they can bolster their oversight. It also requires 
investing more in U.S. shipbuilding to ensure we have shipyards capable 
of building the assets we need. U.S. shipyards depend on contracts from 
the Navy and Coast Guard to support their business, but the Coast Guard 
is often outbid by the size and value of Navy contracts.
    We must bring on newer cutters, shoreside infrastructure and IT 
systems quickly. Not only do modern assets mean improved mission 
readiness, they also mean better quality of life for our Coasties. 
Newer cutters mean better connectivity and ability for Coasties to 
contact their family while at sea, leading to improved mental health 
and higher retention rates.
    Servicemembers want their families to live in the best quality 
housing and that starts with investing more in shoreside infrastructure 
and eliminating the estimated $3 billion backlog.
    Ultimately, our servicemembers deserve to live and work in assets 
that aren't on the brink of failure. Congress and Coast Guard 
leadership owe it to the personnel to deliver this. That is why we 
cannot revert to fiscal year 2022 funding and must fund the Coast Guard 
at higher levels than requested.
    GAO has recognized that the funding typically requested by the 
Coast Guard underestimates their needs for recapitalization.
    Before I conclude, I want to wish Ms. Mak congratulations on a 
successful career and wish you a happy retirement. You and your team 
have done important oversight and I thank you for all of your hard 
work.
    With that, I yield back.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Now I would like to welcome our 
witnesses and thank them for being here today.
    Briefly, I would like to take a moment to explain our 
lighting system. When the light is green, you can talk. When it 
gets yellow, it is about time to wrap it up. And red means 
stop. So, that is pretty much it.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full 
statements be included in the record.
    Without objection, show that ordered.
    As your written testimony is made a part of the record, the 
committee asks that you limit your remarks to 5 minutes.
    With that, Vice Admiral Thomas, you are recognized for 5 
minutes for your testimony.

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PAUL F. THOMAS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR 
MISSION SUPPORT, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND MARIE A. MAK, DIRECTOR, 
CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT 
                     ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PAUL F. THOMAS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR 
               MISSION SUPPORT, U.S. COAST GUARD

    Admiral Thomas. Good afternoon, Chairman Webster, Ranking 
Member Carbajal, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
Thank you for this opportunity to speak about our Coast Guard's 
ongoing activities to recapitalize our surface and aviation 
fleets, our C5ISR and information technology, and our shore 
infrastructure. On behalf of the Commandant and our entire 
Coast Guard workforce, I express my sincere appreciation for 
your oversight and for your continuous support of our Service 
and our servicemen and servicewomen.
    While this hearing's focus is on Coast Guard 
recapitalization efforts, I must address the recent reports 
that you have mentioned of our failure to respond properly to 
sexual assaults that occurred at the Coast Guard Academy 
between 1988 and 2006.
    As you are aware and have mentioned, in 2014, we launched 
an extensive investigation into incidents alleged to have 
occurred during that time. And while we took action in cases in 
which we had jurisdiction, and we informed individual victims 
of our findings, we did not disclose the investigation or its 
findings to you, thereby depriving Congress of the opportunity 
to conduct proper oversight.
    I echo our Commandant's recent testimony in saying that was 
a failure on the part of the Coast Guard, and we own it.
    Our Service and our Academy have made much progress in our 
Sexual Assault Prevention, Response, and Recovery Program. But 
there is still work to do. This month, the Commandant directed 
a 90-day accountability and transparency review of our Service, 
led by a flag officer, and intended to ensure that we are doing 
absolutely everything possible to provide a culture where 
everyone is safe and valued.
    We are committed to improving our prevention efforts, we 
are committed to prompt and thorough investigations into 
reports of sexual assault and harassment, and we are committed 
to accountability for perpetrators, compassionate support to 
victims, and full transparency with Congress, our crews, and 
the American people. We are also committed to our mission and 
our service to America. And with this subcommittee's continued 
support, we have made tremendous progress across our portfolio 
of acquisition programs and shore infrastructure projects.
    However, we face tremendous challenges in this regard. 
Lingering delays from COVID-19, continuing supply chain 
restrictions, a shrinking labor pool and industrial base, 
record inflation, and the sheer complexity of the ships, 
aircraft, and systems that we are acquiring have resulted in 
risk to cost and risk to schedule across our portfolio. These 
challenges are not unique to the Coast Guard; our fellow 
services, Federal partners, and the private sector are facing 
them, as well.
    To meet these challenges and advance the Service's 
recapitalization efforts while properly planning for mission 
execution, we must have stable, predictable funding. Our 
Commandant has stated our Coast Guard must be a $20 billion 
organization by 2033. That means a 3- to 5-percent annual 
budget growth over inflation. Right now, increasing O&S costs 
caused by inflation reduce our ability to invest in 
recapitalization.
    Simply put, most of our recent funding increases go to 
running our Service, not to recapitalizing it.
    Despite these challenges, we are operating or building our 
fleet of the future, and delivering systems capability that 
will double down on our return investment. Our Offshore Patrol 
Cutter stage 1 contractor is poised to launch the first ship of 
that class this fall and deliver next year. I visited the 
shipyard and climbed aboard that ship. These will be tremendous 
ships that have enduring value for our Nation for years to 
come.
    And alongside the Navy, we are working with the new Polar 
Security Cutter contractor to accelerate detailed design and 
ensure readiness for full-scale production. This month, 
fabrication of the first prototype module will begin as we 
prepare for full construction next year. And we are excited 
that the design for the Waterways Commerce Cutter is 
progressing well, and we are on track to begin construction 
next year and deliver the first ship of that class in fiscal 
year 2026.
    We are also delivering new and recapitalized aviation 
assets, including standardized missionization packages across 
our fixed-wing fleet. And with your support, we are upgrading 
and extending life on the 865 and the 860 helicopters while 
moving to a fleet of all 860s as a bridge to the future 
vertical-lift capability of the 2040s.
    The Service continues to invest in home port upgrades to 
strategically pair the delivery of new and recapitalized assets 
with investments in our shore infrastructure. We are taking 
steps to address the extensive backlog of shore infrastructure 
projects, and we are committed to investing in these priorities 
to ensure world-class infrastructure for the world's best Coast 
Guard.
    Thank you for your efforts to provide our women and men in 
uniform with the mission capability they need to provide 
mission excellence to our Nation.
    I appreciate the opportunity to testify, and I look forward 
to any questions you may have.
    [Admiral Thomas' prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant 
                 for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard
                              Introduction
    Good afternoon, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and 
distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for your continued 
oversight and strong support of the Coast Guard. I am honored to appear 
before you today to update you on our ongoing efforts to recapitalize 
our aging surface and aviation fleets; Command, Control, 
Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (C5ISR) systems; and shore infrastructure.
    We have never experienced a greater demand for Coast Guard 
services, and we anticipate this demand to grow in the future. We are 
focused on delivering capabilities to meet these demands and confront 
the dynamic and complex challenges that our Coast Guard men and women 
face. New and more capable Coast Guard cutters, aircraft, boats, and 
C5ISR systems support mission execution domestically and in some of the 
most challenging environments around the world, including the Polar 
Regions, Indo-Pacific, and Persian Gulf.
    Our Commandant has spoken about the need to adapt to the ever-
increasing pace of change and provide our Coast Guard men and women 
with modern assets, systems, and infrastructure to support mission 
execution. In line with this direction, the Service continues to invest 
in acquisition programs that provide the assets and capabilities the 
Service needs to execute our missions world-wide. Additionally, the 
Coast Guard continues to prioritize investments in our shore 
infrastructure, where every mission begins and ends: the facilities, 
piers, runways, and buildings, which are as necessary for operations as 
our ships, boats, aircraft, and C5ISR systems.
    Indeed, recapitalization remains a top priority for the Commandant 
and the Service, and today's efforts to invest in tomorrow's needs will 
shape the Coast Guard and impact national security for decades. This 
Subcommittee's continued support has helped us make tremendous 
progress, and it is that critical we field assets that improve mission 
execution and deliver the capabilities the Nation needs. Simply put, we 
must act today to be prepared for tomorrow.
                 The Coast Guard Acquisition Enterprise
    As the Chief Mission Support Officer of the Coast Guard, I lead a 
talented team of professionals dedicated to building and maintaining a 
modern force of assets, infrastructure, and systems that meet the needs 
of the Service. Acquisitions require executable strategy which 
considers the need to plan and scope acquisitions before work begins; 
to oversee the design and production processes; and to prepare future 
crews and the maintenance community for the delivery and future 
operation of new capabilities.
    To bolster acquisition oversight, the Coast Guard developed an 
acquisition governance structure, pursued continued refinement of that 
structure, strengthened processes, institutionalized the roles of our 
technical authorities, and focused on recruiting and retaining a highly 
capable and trained acquisition workforce. We continue to implement 
initiatives to minimize acquisition risks and maximize affordability 
within our programs. We leverage the experience and expertise of our 
partners to perform key functions and guide Coast Guard decision-makers 
throughout the acquisition life cycle.
                   Status of Key Acquisition Efforts
    The Coast Guard continues to make progress in our efforts to 
recapitalize the Coast Guard fleet and support systems. The Service is 
taking delivery of new cutters, aviation assets, boats, C5ISR 
capabilities, and upgraded shore infrastructure and investing in 
critical mission-enabling service life extensions, major maintenance, 
and key upgrades of the legacy surface and aviation fleet to enhance 
mission readiness and performance.
Surface Programs:
    With the strong support of this Subcommittee, we are moving forward 
with the acquisition of the Nation's first new heavy polar icebreakers 
in over four decades. Polar Security Cutter (PSC) design activities are 
ongoing, and initial long lead-time material has been delivered to the 
shipyard. Recognizing the critical need for these assets, the Service 
is working closely with the prime contractor to mitigate schedule risks 
and ensure production readiness. When fully operational, PSCs will 
provide the global reach and icebreaking capability necessary to 
project U.S. sovereignty and influence, conduct Coast Guard missions in 
the high latitudes, and advance our national interests in the Arctic 
and Antarctic regions.
    The Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) remains a top acquisition priority 
for the Service and is vital to recapitalizing the capability provided 
by our legacy fleet of 210-foot and 270-foot Medium Endurance Cutters 
(MEC). The program is progressing, with production of OPCs 1-4 underway 
with the Stage 1 contractor. Additionally, the Service is continuing 
with design activities on the Stage 2 contract, which will lead to the 
future production of up to 11 additional OPCs. As a bridging strategy 
to maintain mission capabilities until the OPCs are delivered, the 
Coast Guard has undertaken a service life extension program (SLEP) that 
will address key systems and component obsolescence on board the MECs, 
many of which already exceed 50 years in service.
    On October 5, 2022, the Coast Guard awarded the Waterways Commerce 
Cutter (WCC) contract for the design and future production of the river 
buoy tender and inland construction tender variants. The contract 
includes options for production of up to 27 cutters, and a separate 
effort is planned to deliver three inland buoy tenders to achieve a 
total fleet of 30 WCCs.
    The prime contractor began design activities earlier this year. 
Investment in our inland fleet is critical to the continued operation 
of the Nation's Marine Transportation System, which accounts for more 
than $4 trillion in annual economic activity. The legacy fleet is 
approaching obsolescence, maintenance costs are rising, and the vast 
majority of these cutters do not support mixed-gender berthing. 
Continued progress toward delivering these new assets and replacing the 
legacy fleet, which has an average age of over 55 years, is critical to 
maintaining the Coast Guard's capability to execute this important 
mission.
    The Service continues to deliver National Security Cutters (NSC) 
and Fast Response Cutters (FRC) to the fleet, providing game changing 
capabilities to operational commanders and supporting expanded mission 
demands around the globe. The Coast Guard plans to take delivery of NSC 
10, CGC Calhoun, later this year and has commissioned 52 FRCs into 
service (out of a program of record of 65 cutters).
    In concert with our efforts to acquire new assets, we are also 
focused on sustaining and improving our existing fleet through the In-
Service Vessel Sustainment (ISVS) program. In recent years, the Coast 
Guard has completed the SLEP for the 140-foot icebreaking tug class and 
Coast Guard Cutter Eagle at the Coast Guard Yard in Curtis Bay, 
Maryland. The Service is approaching the completion of Major 
Maintenance Availability activities for the 225-foot seagoing buoy 
tenders; the last cutter is scheduled to leave the Coast Guard Yard in 
early 2024. After initiating two prototypes of a 270-foot MEC SLEP, 
industrial work on production began earlier this month.
    In addition, the ISVS program is overseeing continued SLEP work on 
Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star, the Service's only operational heavy 
polar icebreaker. The cutter recently began the third of five planned 
annual work periods to enable continued operation of the aging cutter 
and availability for the annual breakout of national facilities in 
Antarctica's McMurdo Sound.
    The Coast Guard is also making investments across the boat fleet, 
producing the next generation of cutter boats to enhance interdiction 
capabilities of parent cutters. Additionally, the Service initiated 
efforts to recapitalize the 52-foot heavy weather boat, a special 
purpose craft, and achieved Acquisition Decision Event One in April. 
The Coast Guard is also performing SLEP activities to extend the useful 
service life of the Service's 47-foot motor lifeboats by replacing 
obsolete, unsupportable, or maintenance-intensive equipment, and 
standardizing configuration across the fleet.
Aviation Programs:
    The Service began production of new MH-60 hull components in March 
2023 to support the ongoing SLEP and continued transition of the 
rotary-wing fleets to a single airframe. When combined with structural 
fitting and dynamic component replacements through the SLEP, the new 
hulls will extend the service life of the Coast Guard's vertical lift 
capability into the 2040s. Service life extension work also continues 
on the H-65 fleet, including critical avionics upgrades. Nearly 70 
upgraded MH-65Es are performing operations at 11 Coast Guard air 
stations across the Nation.
    Acquisition of new C-130J airframes and missionization of the 
fixed-wing fleet (comprised of HC-130J long range surveillance aircraft 
and HC-27J/HC-144B medium range surveillance aircraft) are 
significantly enhancing the Coast Guard's capabilities to conduct 
airborne surveillance, detection, classification, and identification of 
vessels and other aircraft missions in coordination with the surface 
fleet and shoreside facilities.
    The Coast Guard is delivering standardized missionization packages 
based on the U.S. Navy's Minotaur Mission System Suite that improve 
system performance, address obsolescence concerns, improve cyber 
security of the mission system, and increase compatibility with 
Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security assets and 
systems.
    Additionally, the Coast Guard continues to leverage the use of 
unmanned aircraft system (UAS) capabilities to support the surveillance 
and maritime domain awareness capabilities of the NSC fleet. All nine 
operational NSCs have been equipped with UAS infrastructure and 
equipment and routinely deploy with UAS capabilities as part of the 
cutter's total force package.
C5ISR and Information Technology Programs:
    The Coast Guard is acquiring C5ISR and Information Technology (IT) 
systems that enhance the mission capabilities of new and recapitalized 
Coast Guard assets to operate in challenging environments. The systems 
provide standardized capability to major cutters and aircraft, enabling 
assets to receive, evaluate and act upon information, and facilitate 
interoperability and information sharing inside and outside the Coast 
Guard. IT efforts like the Coast Guard Logistics Information Management 
System (CG-LIMS) acquisition program and Cyber and Enterprise Mission 
Platform address needs to replace and modernize obsolete support 
systems to improve mission readiness and operational effectiveness.
Shore Infrastructure:
    As the Commandant noted in her testimony before the Subcommittee, 
shore facility maintenance and recapitalization are critical to mission 
success. New, more capable assets must be paired with investments in 
our infrastructure needs. With the support of this Subcommittee and 
others, we are making progress towards addressing the extensive backlog 
of shoreside infrastructure projects. The Coast Guard is committed to 
taking a leading-edge approach to project planning and execution to 
ensure the Service has the modern and resilient infrastructure required 
to meet the operational demands of today and tomorrow.
                               Conclusion
    Since 1790, the Coast Guard has safeguarded our Nation's maritime 
interests and natural resources on our rivers, in our ports, on the 
high seas, and around the world. Each day, the Coast Guard carries out 
its missions to protect lives, protect the environment, secure our 
maritime borders, and facilitate commerce. Our mission support and 
acquisition enterprises are, likewise, working each day to plan and 
deliver the assets and capabilities needed to support these critical 
missions.
    The cutters, aircraft, boats, C5ISR systems, and shoreside 
infrastructure we acquire today will provide vital capability for 
decades to come. We are committed to maximizing the Nation's return on 
these important investments. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 
before you today and for all you do for the women and men of the U.S. 
Coast Guard. I look forward to answering your questions.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much. So, next we 
have Ms. Mak, and you are recognized for 5 minutes for your 
testimony.

 TESTIMONY OF MARIE A. MAK, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL 
  SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Ms. Mak. Good afternoon, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member 
Carbajal, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for your 
kind words, and for inviting me here today to discuss Coast 
Guard's recapitalization efforts, and for valuing GAO's work 
over the years.
    Thank you also to the Coast Guard for recognizing our role 
and working with us to improve mission capabilities, how 
mission capabilities are acquired and delivered.
    I first testified before this committee on the same topic 
back in June 2017. As I reflected back from then to now, there 
are two constants: one, there is no doubt that these efforts to 
recapitalize continue to be critical for the Coast Guard to 
conduct its missions; two, unfortunately, the Coast Guard's 
highest priority acquisition programs continue on without sound 
business cases.
    A sound business case balances the necessary resources and 
knowledge needed to transform a chosen concept into a product. 
Our most recent reports on the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) and 
Polar Security Cutter (PSC) indicate that the Coast Guard is 
not on track to deliver new ships on time or at initial 
estimated cost. This is because, without requisite knowledge, 
they continue to make optimistic assumptions about what they 
and their contractors can achieve.
    The Coast Guard has time after time prioritized moving 
quickly through the acquisition life cycle without obtaining 
critical levels of knowledge at key points in the process, and 
before making significant investments.
    But the Coast Guard is not unique from other military 
organizations when it comes to generally disappointing 
acquisition results. Like many other military organizations, 
the Coast Guard is driven to be overly optimistic, to 
overpromise performance at unrealistic cost and schedule, and, 
to put it simply, they do so to obtain funding. These 
incentives are more powerful than the policies to follow 
leading acquisition practices such as establishing sound 
business cases.
    The budget process also provides incentives for programs to 
be funded before sufficient knowledge is available to make key 
decisions. However, the impact of not taking the time to gain 
the right knowledge at the right time is costly. The Coast 
Guard uses the optimistic estimates of cost, schedule, and 
design maturity to inform its planning and budgets. Then, 
inevitably, as in most current acquisitions, when the ship's 
design and construction face challenges that increase cost and 
elongate schedules, the Coast Guard has to budget for these 
overruns, and critical future efforts are pushed off to pay for 
these overruns.
    The lack of sound business cases is also showing up in 
significant cost growth to sustain its existing assets. The 
Coast Guard has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on 
extending the older assets' service lives so that missions can 
be performed while waiting for the new assets. If this 
continues, affordability concerns will also continue.
    The Coast Guard can continue to remain in this reactive 
mode, delaying and reducing its capabilities slowly over time. 
But this is not an optimum approach, to say the least. As the 
Coast Guard continues modernizing its fleet and sustaining 
existing assets for much longer than planned, it is important 
that it develop sound business cases as part of a more 
strategic and comprehensive approach to managing its 
acquisition portfolio.
    Congress also has a role in demanding realistic business 
cases through the selection and timing of the programs it 
chooses to authorize and fund. What Congress does with funding 
sets the tone for what acquisition practices are acceptable. 
Congress could consider putting requirements in place to drive 
better acquisition behavior.
    For example, it could require the Coast Guard to fully 
complete design before shipbuilding construction starts, which 
is now what the Navy is required to do. This culture of undue 
optimism when starting programs really needs to shift away from 
the unrealistic business cases, and instead focusing on sound 
practices. Without this change, taxpayers are left holding the 
bill, and operators must make do with aging assets when 
acquisition programs fail to deliver as promised.
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, members of the 
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be 
pleased to respond to any questions you may have. Thank you.
    [Ms. Mak's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Marie A. Mak, Director, Contracting and National 
      Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office
     Coast Guard Recapitalization: Actions Needed to Better Manage 
        Acquisition Programs and Address Affordability Concerns
                               Highlights
Why GAO Did This Study
    The U.S. Coast Guard, a component within the Department of Homeland 
Security, employs a variety of vessels and aircraft, several of which 
are approaching the end of their intended service lives. Consequently, 
the Coast Guard plans to invest billions of dollars in two of its 
highest priority programs--acquiring three heavy icebreakers, known as 
PSCs, and a fleet of 25 OPCs, which are ships that conduct a variety of 
missions in offshore waters.
    This statement addresses (1) the capabilities provided by the newer 
Coast Guard surface vessels, (2) the risks and consequences of not 
establishing sound business cases for two of Coast Guard's highest 
priority programs--the OPC and PSC, and (3) the overall affordability 
of the Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio. This statement is largely 
based on information from GAO-23-105805 and GAO-23-105949. Information 
about the scope and methodology of prior work on which this statement 
is based can be found in those products.
What GAO Recommends
    GAO made seven recommendations in its 2023 reports on the OPC and 
PSC to better align the Coast Guard's acquisition policy and the 
programs' practices with shipbuilding leading practices. DHS and the 
Coast Guard agreed with five recommendations. Overall, GAO has made 40 
recommendations over the past decade, 14 of which remain open. GAO will 
continue to monitor DHS's and the Coast Guard's progress in addressing 
these recommendations.
What GAO Found
    The Coast Guard is modernizing its vessels and aircraft, an effort 
known as recapitalization. Its newest cutters--the Offshore Patrol 
Cutter (OPC) and Polar Security Cutter (PSC)--are intended to deliver 
greater capability--such as time a ship can spend at sea without 
returning to port to resupply--than the legacy assets they will 
replace.
    GAO's prior work shows that successful shipbuilding programs use 
solid, executable business cases to design and build ships. They attain 
critical levels of knowledge--such as mature technologies, stable 
designs, and realistic cost estimates--at key points in the 
shipbuilding process before making significant investments. The Coast 
Guard, however, continues to face cost growth and schedule delays in 
some of its newer acquisitions because it has not obtained the right 
knowledge at the right time.
    Immature technologies. The critical technology of the first four 
OPCs--the davit (a crane that deploys and retrieves a cutter's small 
boats)--is still not matured. Without maturing the davit, the Coast 
Guard risks delays and costly rework.
    Unstable design. The PSC's design is not yet stable, which risks an 
extended design phase and contributed to a 3-year schedule delay in the 
shipyard, with the start of construction of the first cutter now 
planned for March 2024. Starting ship construction without a stable 
design risks costly rework.
    Combined, these two programs are billions of dollars over their 
initial cost estimates and are more than 2 years behind schedule, 
increasing the risk of potential capability gaps and putting cost 
pressure on the overall portfolio. For example, in June 2023, GAO 
reported that the Coast Guard projects to have a reduced number of 
cutters available for operation starting in 2024 and through 2039 due 
to the OPC's delivery delays. Since 2010, the Coast Guard has invested 
at least $850 million to maintain the aging Medium Endurance Cutters 
and Polar Star. The Coast Guard is investing $250 million to extend the 
service life for six cutters and $75 million to extend the service life 
of the almost 50-year-old Polar Star until the delayed OPCs and PSCs, 
respectively, are operational.
                               __________
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:
    I am pleased to be here today to discuss key challenges the U.S. 
Coast Guard continues to face as it acquires new assets--such as 
vessels and aircraft--an effort referred to as recapitalization, as 
well as the overall affordability of the Coast Guard's acquisition 
portfolio. The U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), is the principal federal agency responsible for 
maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship in U.S. ports 
and waterways, and supports other missions, such as drug and migrant 
interdiction.
    As part of its efforts to modernize its aging fleet of cutters, the 
Coast Guard is acquiring four new vessels, including Offshore Patrol 
Cutters (OPC), Polar Security Cutters (PSC), Fast Response Cutters 
(FRC), and National Security Cutters (NSC). The Coast Guard intends for 
these new cutters to provide additional capabilities above those 
offered by the legacy ships. The two more recent acquisition programs--
the OPC and PSC--have faced and are continuing to face significant 
schedule delays and cost increases, spurring concerns about capability 
and affordability gaps.
    My statement today will address (1) the capabilities provided by 
the newer Coast Guard vessels, (2) the risks and consequences of not 
establishing sound business cases for two of the Coast Guard's highest 
priority programs--the OPC and PSC, and (3) the overall affordability 
of the Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio. This statement is based on 
our extensive body of work examining the Coast Guard's shipbuilding 
acquisition efforts spanning the last decade, including our June 2023 
report on the OPC and our July 2023 report on the PSC.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program 
Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, D.C.: 
June 20, 2023); Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Security Cutter Needs 
to Stabilize Design Before Starting Construction and Improve Schedule 
Oversight, GAO-23-105949 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For the reports cited in this statement, among other methodologies, 
we analyzed Coast Guard guidance, data, and documentation, and 
interviewed Coast Guard officials at its headquarters and field units 
to determine the extent to which Coast Guard acquisition programs are 
meeting their cost, schedule, and performance goals. Each of the 
reports cited in this statement provide further detailed information on 
our objectives, scope, and methodology for that work.
    We conducted the work on which this statement is based in 
accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 
standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 
sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 
findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
conclusions based on our audit objectives.
   The Coast Guard's Newer Vessels Offer Greater Capability than Its 
                              Legacy Fleet
    The Coast Guard's newest vessels are intended to deliver greater 
capability than the legacy vessels they will replace. Some examples of 
capabilities include range and the time a ship can spend at sea. Table 
1 details examples of key characteristics of new Coast Guard assets and 
the respective legacy assets.

      Table 1: Comparison of Coast Guard's Legacy and New Vessels

                                                                     Legacy vessels
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                        Medium Endurance Cutter
                                      High Endurance Cutter -----------------------------------------------  Island Class Patrol         Polar Star
                                                                    210-foot                270-foot                 Boat
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number in fleet....................  12....................  14....................  13...................  49...................  1
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year first-in class cutter           1967..................  1964..................  1983.................  1986.................  1976
 commissioned.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Length.............................  378 feet..............  210 feet..............  270 feet.............  110 feet.............  399 feet
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum time at sea without          45 days...............  21 days...............  21 days..............  5 days...............  80 days
 reprovisioning.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Range..............................  14,000 miles..........  6,000 miles...........  9,900 miles..........  1,900 miles..........  21,500 miles
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational tempo..................  185 days away from      185 days away from      185 days away from     1,800 operational      185 days away from
                                      home port per year.     home port per year.     home port per year.    hours per year.        home port per year.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------


                                                   New vessels
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                   National Security    Offshore Patrol      Fast Response      Polar Security
                                        Cutter              Cutter              Cutter              Cutter
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Number in fleet.................  11 planned (9       25 planned (not     65 planned (51      3 planned (not yet
                                   operational).       yet operational).   operational).       operational).
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year first-in class cutter        2008..............  Planned for 2024..  2012..............  Planned for 2028
 commissioned.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Length..........................  418 feet..........  360 feet..........  154 feet..........  460 feet
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Maximum time at sea without       60 days...........  45 to 60 days.....  5 days............  80 days
 reprovisioning.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Range...........................  12,000 miles......  8,500 to 9,500      2,500 miles.......  21,500 miles or
                                                       miles.                                  more
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Operational tempo...............  185 days away from  230 days away from  2,500 operational   3,300 operational
                                   home port per       home port per       hours per year.     hours per year.
                                   year.               year.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Source: GAO presentation of Coast Guard information. GAO-23-106948


    Figure 1 depicts the Coast Guard's OPC and PSC, which are part of 
this modernization effort.

 Figure 1: The Coast Guard's Offshore Patrol Cutter and Polar Security 
                                 Cutter
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

Source: Eastern Shipbuilding Group (left image), Bollinger Mississippi 
                      Shipbuilding (right image).
                             GAO-23-106948

    As I will discuss in my testimony, delays in delivering these 
vessels have required the Coast Guard to invest hundreds of millions of 
dollars, if not more, in trying to maintain and extend the life of its 
legacy fleet. Further delays in these two programs will increase the 
risk that the Coast Guard will not have a sufficient number of vessels 
available to conduct its missions.
Failures to Establish Sound Business Cases and Follow Leading Practices 
  Continue to Result in Significant Schedule Delays and Cost Increases
    Our prior work has found that successful programs start out with 
solid, executable business cases before setting program baselines and 
committing resources.\2\ For the Coast Guard, this would be when a 
program sets its initial program baseline that establishes cost, 
schedule, and performance goals. A sound business case requires balance 
between the concept selected to satisfy user needs and the resources--
technologies, design knowledge, funding, and time--needed to transform 
the concept into a product. At the heart of a robust business case is a 
knowledge-based approach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ GAO, Weapon System Requirements: Detailed Systems Engineering 
Prior to Product Development Positions Programs for Success, GAO-17-77 
(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2016); Best Practices: High Levels of 
Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy 
Shipbuilding, GAO-09-322 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009); and Defense 
Acquisitions: Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy 
Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-07-943T (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2007).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For shipbuilding programs in particular, we have found that 
successful programs attain critical levels of knowledge at key points 
in the shipbuilding process before significant investments are made. We 
found that key enablers of a good business case include mature 
technologies and plans for a stable design, reliable cost estimates, 
and realistic schedule targets, among other things.\3\ Figure 2 depicts 
a leading practice of developing technology and maturing design prior 
to construction--as part of a sound business case--and the increased 
risks for not maintaining a sound business case throughout the 
acquisition life cycle.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ For the purposes of that review, we did not assess the extent 
to which the PSC's requirements are firm and feasible. In April 2018, 
we found that prior to setting program baselines for the PSC, DHS and 
the Coast Guard revised the program's operational requirements 
document--a key acquisition document that provides the key performance 
parameters the program must meet--to make the heavy polar icebreakers 
more affordable, and the revisions included adjusting the range of 
operating temperatures; reducing science and survey requirements; and 
adding space, weight, and power reservations for Navy equipment. GAO, 
Coast Guard Acquisitions: Status of Coast Guard's Heavy Polar 
Icebreaker Acquisition, GAO-18-385R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

  Figure 2: A Sound Business Case Reduces Risk in Acquisition Programs
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

  Source: GAO depiction of notional acquisition process. GAO-23-106948

    The Coast Guard's shipbuilding programs--specifically the OPC and 
PSC programs--have struggled with achieving elements for a good 
business case. As a result of neither maturing technologies nor 
achieving design stability when called for by leading practices, both 
programs are well behind schedule. In addition, both programs' cost 
estimates have increased by billions of dollars for several reasons, 
including that their initial estimates were either not comprehensive or 
not well-informed.
    Technology maturity and design stability. The Coast Guard's OPC and 
PSC programs did not follow shipbuilding leading practices with regards 
to conducting, demonstrating, and achieving technology readiness and 
design stability. Shipbuilding leading practices state that critical 
technologies should be proven prior to the award of the detail design 
and construction contract.\4\ Shipbuilding leading practices also state 
that programs should not proceed with construction with immature 
technology and design instability. When programs proceed into 
construction without maturing and addressing outstanding technology and 
design challenges, they increase the risk of completing out-of-sequence 
construction and rework, which can result in increased costs and 
schedule delays.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ In the case of OPC, the detail design contract award is the 
point when the Coast Guard down-selected to one shipbuilder. Generally, 
detail design includes generating work instructions that show detailed 
system information and also guidance for subcontractors and suppliers 
needed to support construction, including installation drawings, 
schedules, material lists, and lists of prefabricated materials and 
parts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Years after we first identified these deficiencies with the OPC and 
PSC programs, the Coast Guard still has not gained the requisite 
knowledge for its technologies and designs:
      OPC: In October 2020, we found that the Coast Guard did 
not mature a critical technology--the davit, a crane that lowers and 
raises a cutter's small boats--before starting construction.\5\ We 
recommended that the Coast Guard stabilize the OPC's design, including 
that it mature the davit to a technology readiness level (TRL) of 7--
demonstrating it in a realistic environment--prior to the start of 
construction on OPC 3, and the Coast Guard concurred.\6\ However, the 
Coast Guard has since started construction on OPC 3 and OPC 4 without 
maturing the technology, and as of June 2023, the davit remains 
immature and unproven.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Reduce 
Risk for the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program, GAO-21-9 (Washington, 
D.C.: Oct. 28, 2020).
    \6\ A TRL is a measurement of maturity for each critical 
technology, numbered 1 through 9 from least to most mature based on 
demonstrations of increasing fidelity and complexity.
    \7\ GAO-23-105805.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          In October 2020, we also found that the Coast Guard failed to 
complete basic and functional design prior to the start of lead ship 
construction, contrary to leading practices.\8\ We recommended that 
program complete basic and functional design prior to the start of 
construction on OPC 3, and update its acquisition policy to follow 
shipbuilding leading practices. However, in June 2023, we found that 
the Coast Guard had not sufficiently updated its acquisition policy, 
and the OPC program still had not completed functional design prior to 
the start of construction on OPC 4.\9\ Further, we found that 
significant portions of the design related to distributive systems--
systems like water, heating, and cooling that affect multiple zones of 
the ship--still remained incomplete.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Basic design includes establishing the hull form, general 
arrangements of compartments, and outlining significant ship steel 
structure. Some routing of major equipment and related major 
distributive systems, including electricity, water, and other utilities 
is done. It also ensures the ship will meet the performance 
specifications, informs overall ship cost, facilitates shipbuilders' 
development of responsive proposals, and identifies major equipment and 
components that must be purchased in advance. Functional design 
includes providing a further iteration of the basic design, such as 
size and positioning of structural components, information on the 
positioning of major piping and other distributive systems, and 
outfitting in each block--or basic building unit for a ship. See GAO-
23-105805.
    \9\ GAO-23-105805.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          We made a second recommendation that the Coast Guard update 
its policy in this area--specifically in relation to completing the 
design of distributive systems prior to construction--so that programs 
follow shipbuilding leading practices for stabilizing design.\10\ The 
Coast Guard has not fully implemented this recommendation. We also went 
further to recommend that the Coast Guard complete the routing of 
distributive systems prior to starting construction on stage 2 ships. 
While the Coast Guard concurred with our June 2023 recommendation to 
update its policy, it did not concur with our recommendation to apply 
this leading practice to the OPC program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ GAO-23-105805.

      PSC: In September 2018, we found that the Coast Guard did 
not conduct a technology readiness assessment of PSC's key 
technologies, nor did it hold a preliminary design review, prior to 
approving its program baselines.\11\ Coast Guard officials said that a 
technology readiness assessment was not necessary because the 
technologies they plan to employ had been proven on other ships. 
However, according to leading practices, such technologies can still 
pose risks when applied to a different program or operational 
environment. The program subsequently conducted a technology readiness 
assessment and established revised baselines in May 2021 after holding 
its preliminary design review in response to our recommendations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Icebreaker Program Needs 
to Address Risks before Committing Resources, GAO-18-600 (Washington, 
D.C.: Sept. 4, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          As of March 2023, the PSC program reported that the 
functional design was considerably below the desired levels that 
officials expect to inform a decision to proceed with construction. As 
of April 2023, program officials said they anticipate holding the 
production readiness reviews to evaluate design maturity by March 2024. 
However, since September 2021, with about 49 percent functional design 
completed, our analysis indicated that the shipyard is completing, on 
average, approximately three percent of functional design every 6 
months. This means that it would take the shipyard approximately 8 
years to complete 100 percent of functional design. Therefore, to reach 
the program's goal of completing functional design completed prior to 
March 2024, the shipyard would need to increase its design completion 
rate significantly. Coast Guard officials said that design completion 
is further along than the metrics show because the metrics do not 
factor in progress made on design components that are not complete.
          We also found that the program is experiencing challenges 
with the design.\12\ According to program officials, the design 
challenges are related to (1) U.S. industry's general lack of 
experience designing and building icebreakers, (2) the complexity of 
PSC's design, and (3) significant changes from the original design, 
among other things. Given that there are still portions of the design 
that are immature, we recommended that the Coast Guard complete 
functional design prior to approving construction for the lead ship, in 
line with our recommendation to OPC and Coast Guard policy, as a whole. 
The Coast Guard concurred with the recommendations, and we will monitor 
its progress in addressing them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ GAO-23-105949.

    Cost. Both the OPC and PSC have incurred cost growth above their 
initial estimates, in part because the programs initially 
underestimated costs.
      OPC: OPC's acquisition cost estimate increase increased 
from $12.5 billion to $17.6 billion between the program's 2012 and 2022 
life-cycle cost estimates. The Coast Guard attributes the increase to 
many factors, including restructuring the stage 1 contract--for OPCs 1 
through 4--and recompeting the requirement for stage 2--OPCs 5 through 
25--in response to a disruption caused by Hurricane Michael, and 
increased infrastructure costs for homeports and facilities, among 
other things.\13\ While there are instances of unforeseen costs, there 
were some costs that were either based on unrealistic assumptions or 
not fully accounted for in the Coast Guard's initial cost estimate. 
Specifically, OPC's facilities acquisition cost estimate--including 
homeports and shore facilities--increased from $431 million to $1.4 
billion from 2012 to 2022 because Coast Guard officials said they 
originally assumed that the Coast Guard could utilize existing Navy 
bases to homeport the OPC, which did not come to fruition.\14\ In 
addition, the OPC's initial acquisition cost estimate increased by 
about $1 billion, most of which happened after the program settled 
which Navy-provided combat system equipment would go on the OPC. 
Lastly, the OPC's initial acquisition cost estimate did not include 
costs for some outfitting and post-delivery work that includes the 
sensitive compartmented information facility on the cutter, the Combat 
System Equipment Guide, and technical manuals. The sensitive 
compartmented information facility accounted for about 98 percent of a 
$1 billion increase in the estimate for outfitting and post-delivery 
work.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Following significant disruption caused by Hurricane Michael 
in October 2018, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security determined 
that the OPC is essential to the national defense and authorized up to 
$659 million in extraordinary contractual relief to the shipbuilder 
pursuant to Public Law 85-804 for the design and construction of up to 
four OPCs, an effort the Coast Guard refers to as stage 1. As part of 
this determination, the Acting Secretary also directed the Coast Guard 
to recompete the requirement for the remaining 21 cutters.
    \14\ Facilities acquisition costs are funded by the Coast Guard's 
Major Acquisition Systems Infrastructure Program and the Office of 
Civil Engineering.

      PSC: From 2018 to 2021, the program's total life-cycle 
cost estimate increased by about 35 percent, from $9.8 billion to $13.3 
billion. Most of the cost increase was driven by increased operations 
and maintenance costs, resulting from the increased ship size and use 
of additional historical data to reevaluate projected annual 
maintenance costs in the later estimate. The program's additional 
analysis of historical maintenance costs in its January 2021 cost 
estimate addressed, in part, a recommendation we made in 2018 to update 
the cost estimate in accordance with leading practices in cost 
estimating. Specifically, in September 2018, we found that the PSC's 
life-cycle cost estimate that informed the program's $9.8 billion cost 
baseline substantially met GAO's leading practices for being 
comprehensive, well-documented, and accurate, but only partially met 
leading practices for being credible.\15\ The cost estimate did not 
quantify the range of possible costs over the entire life of the 
program. As a result, the cost estimate was not fully reliable and may 
have underestimated the cost. Consequently, the Coast Guard may have 
provided decision makers with incomplete data to make a decision on 
total funding needed for the program.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ GAO-18-600.

    Schedule. The Coast Guard relied on optimistic schedules for both 
the PSC and OPC programs, and both have experienced schedule delays of 
2 years or more (see fig. 3). The two programs' schedule challenges 
have been exacerbated by a lack of reliable schedule data from the 
contractors responsible for building these ships.

  Figure 3: Delivery Delays with the Lead Ship in the Polar Security 
         Cutter and Offshore Patrol Cutter Programs, as of 2023
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

  Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard and Department of Homeland 
                        Security documentation.
                             GAO-23-106948

      OPC: In October 2020, we found that prior to the 
construction award for OPC 1, the OPC contractor's schedule contained 
deficiencies that were contrary to GAO-identified leading practices for 
developing schedules. Further, we found the revised post-hurricane 
delivery dates for the first four OPCs were optimistic and did not 
fully incorporate schedule risks, increasing the likelihood that the 
OPCs will not be delivered when promised. In a review of the 
shipbuilder's schedule, the Defense Contract Management Agency and the 
Coast Guard found deficiencies, such as that the shipbuilder could not 
produce a valid critical path--or the path of longest duration through 
the sequence of activities. We recommended that the Coast Guard fully 
address the deficiencies identified in the contractor's schedule. As of 
July 2023, the recommendation remains open. In June 2023, we found that 
the schedule is still optimistic given that the program is still 
addressing a manufacturing issue with shafting and delays with 
development of the davit.\16\ In total, the program is experiencing at 
least a 2.5-year delay in delivery of the lead ship.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ GAO-23-105805.

      PSC: In September 2018, we found that the PSC's planned 
delivery dates were not informed by a realistic assessment of 
shipbuilding activities. Instead, the schedule was driven by the 
potential gap in icebreaking capabilities once the Coast Guard's only 
operating heavy polar icebreaker--the Polar Star--reaches the end of 
its service life.\17\ We recommended that the program develop a 
schedule in accordance with leading practices for project schedules to 
set realistic schedule goals for all three PSCs before the lead ship 
contract option was awarded. However, we closed the recommendation as 
not implemented because the program proceeded with the award in April 
2019 without developing a realistic schedule. In July 2023, we found 
the program had yet to establish a realistic schedule.\18\ The 
program's current schedule estimates that delivery of the lead ship 
will occur in 2027, which is 3 years later than its previous estimate, 
but this could further slip after the contractor reassesses and revises 
its schedule.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ GAO-18-600.
    \18\ GAO-23-105949.

    Without a sound business case, acquisition programs are at risk of 
breaching the cost, schedule, and performance baselines set when the 
program was initiated--in other words, experiencing cost growth, 
schedule delays, and reduced capabilities. Even after a program has 
established its acquisition program baseline, information about the 
soundness of a program's business case is helpful for Congress as the 
Coast Guard requests funding through the acquisition life cycle.
Schedule Delays Increase the Risk of Capability Gaps and Affordability 
                                Concerns
    The delays in the OPC and PSC programs have increased the 
likelihood of operational capability gaps. Further, it has forced the 
Coast Guard to invest at least $325 million to extend the life of its 
legacy assets, the Medium Endurance Cutters (MEC) and the Polar Star, 
in addition to the $850 million it has spent to maintain them over the 
last decade.\19\ Further, the Coast Guard is confronted with a costly 
backlog of shore infrastructure projects--such as piers, docks, boat 
stations, air stations, and housing units--but has requested funding 
that falls short of its estimated infrastructure needs. The 
affordability of the Coast Guard's surface fleet is in jeopardy, given 
the increasing costs to maintain legacy assets, costs for the OPC and 
PSC acquisition programs, and the overall infrastructure needs to 
support Coast Guard assets.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ These expenditures include Medium Endurance Cutter depot-level 
maintenance costs from 2010 through 2021, and depot-level maintenance 
costs for the Polar Star from 2014 through 2017. The Polar Star's 
expenditures are calculated from 2014 to 2017 since it was in a 
reactivation period prior to 2014 and was not operational, and we have 
not reported on depot-level maintenance expenditures since 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Capability Gaps Are Exacerbated by Delays in Acquisition Programs
    Since April 2017, we have reported that full operational capability 
dates have been delayed for several Coast Guard acquisition programs. 
For example, the OPC's full operational capability (FOC) date has been 
delayed until at least 2039 due to the ongoing issues with design and 
construction. See table 2 for initial FOC dates for the Coast Guard's 
recapitalization programs, 2017 updates, and current estimates.

   Table 2: Delays in Full Operational Capability (FOC) of Coast Guard
                        Recapitalization Programs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                    Initial
                                      DHS-     FOC date (as     Current
                                    approved    of January     FOC date
                                    FOC date       2017)          \a\
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Offshore Patrol Cutter...........       2034            2035        2039
Fast Response Cutter.............       2022            2027        2027
National Security Cutter.........       2016            2020         TBD
Polar Security Cutter............       2029             N/A        2031
Waterways Commerce Cutter \c\....        N/A             N/A        2032
Medium Range Surveillance               2020            2025        2032
 Aircraft (HC-144A/C-27J)........
Long Range Surveillance Aircraft        2017            2027    2030 \b\
 (HC-130J).......................
Medium Range Recovery Helicopter         N/A             N/A         TBD
 (MH-60T) \c\....................
Short Range Helicopter (H-65)....       2020            2020        2024
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Source: GAO presentation of Coast Guard information. GAO-23-106948
 Legend: DHS = Department of Homeland Security; TBD = to be determined;
  N/A = not applicable
\a\ All dates are program estimates. The FOC date for the Offshore
  Patrol Cutter is as of June 2023. FOC dates for the Waterways Commerce
  Cutter, Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft, Long Range Surveillance
  Aircraft, and MH-60T Aircraft are as of April 2023. The FOC date for
  the Polar Security Cutter is as of December 2022. FOC dates for the
  Fast Response Cutter, National Security Cutter, and H-65 Aircraft are
  as of March 2022.
\b\ The Long Range Surveillance Aircraft program's acquisition program
  baseline specifies a full operational capability date of 2033.
  However, according to program officials, the program was able to
  receive funding 3 years ahead of schedule, which has allowed for an
  accelerated schedule.
\c\ As of April 2023, the Waterways Commerce Cutter program and MH-60T
  program did not have official DHS approved baselines.

    Specifically, with the surface assets, the risk of having an 
operational gap increases as the new ships are delayed because the 
legacy ships they are replacing continue to age and face increasing 
risk of mechanical failure. For example, in June 2023, we reported that 
given the delays in delivery of the OPC, the Coast Guard projects to 
have a reduction in asset availability--or a reduction in the number of 
cutters available for operations--starting in 2024 and through 
2039.\20\ This operational gap is at risk of increasing if the OPC 
delivery delays are realized and pushed further to the right.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ GAO-23-105805.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    See figure 4 for the Coast Guard's notional estimated 
decommissioning dates for the MECs based on commissioning date compared 
with the current OPC delivery schedule. While the MECs may not be 
decommissioned in the order depicted depending on the condition of each 
ship at the time, this figure helps depict the sequence of 
commissioning of the OPCs and decommissioning of the MECs.

 Figure 4: U.S. Coast Guard's Estimated Medium Endurance Cutter (MEC) 
 Service Life Dates Compared with Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) Delivery


      Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard documents. GAO-23-106948

    The reduction of asset availability could be further exacerbated if 
the Coast Guard does not effectively mitigate OPC schedule risks:
      Design and manufacturing issues for OPC stage 1. The 
program is experiencing ongoing delays due to a propeller shafting 
manufacturing issue that requires remanufacturing of some of these 
shafts.
      Delays in the award of OPC stage 2. The program will 
delay delivery of OPC stage 2 ships by at least 6 months due to the 
delays of the contract award and subsequent bid protest. The stage 2 
shipbuilder also needs to complete a detail design for the stage 2 
ships, and the Coast Guard needs to approve the design, before the 
shipbuilder can begin construction.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Generally, detail design includes generating work instructions 
that show detailed system information and also guidance for 
subcontractors and suppliers needed to support construction, including 
installation drawings, schedules, material lists, and lists of 
prefabricated materials and parts.

    Given these challenges, the Coast Guard will likely need to further 
maintain and keep the MECs in service longer or otherwise face a 
reduction of assets. Coast Guard officials told us that they do not 
anticipate the need to employ alternative options to meet mission 
requirements. However, officials stated that if the Coast Guard needs 
to decommission cutters earlier than planned, they could reallocate 
cutters to support emergent needs, employ other cutters to support 
missions previously handled by MECs, or extend the date for other 
planned decommissions to support continued operations.
    Similarly, as noted earlier, according the PSC program schedule, 
the delivery of the lead ship is now delayed until at least 2027--3 
years behind the original plan in its 2018 schedule--and all three 
ships are expected to be operational by at least 2031.\22\ In April 
2023, a Coast Guard fleet mix analysis indicated that the service in 
fact needed a mix of eight or nine heavy and medium polar icebreakers 
to meet its projected requirements. The Coast Guard currently only has 
one heavy polar icebreaker, the Polar Star, and one medium polar 
icebreaker, the Healy, and therefore already has an operational gap. 
The Polar Star is well beyond its planned operational service life and 
has become more complicated and costly to maintain as it ages. Based 
off the Coast Guard's fleet mix analysis, its icebreaker fleet will 
remain in a deficit even after all three PSCs on the current contract 
are delivered.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ GAO-23-105949.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Service Life Extension Programs Will Help Relieve Some Pressure, but 
        Legacy Assets Are Expensive and Challenging to Maintain
    To help mitigate the delays of the OPC and PSC, the Coast Guard 
began two service life extension programs (SLEP) for its legacy 
assets--the 270-foot Medium Endurance Cutters, and the Polar Star--for 
an estimated $325 million. The Coast Guard initiated the MEC SLEP in 
2018 and the Polar Star SLEP in 2021. They are aimed to extend the 
service life of six MECs and the one Polar Star by 10 years and 4 to 5 
years, respectively (see table 3).

Table 3: The Coast Guard's Current and Recent Maintenance History of the Medium Endurance Cutter and Heavy Polar
                                                   Icebreaker
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                            Major maintenance
                Vessel                   Design service life          Average age                history
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
270-foot                               30 years...............  36 years...............   The 270-foot Medium
Medium                                                                                    Endurance Cutters
Endurance                                                                                 completed a Mission
Cutter.                                                                                   Effectiveness Project
                                                                                          in 2014.This effort
                                                                                          was intended to
                                                                                          minimize maintenance
                                                                                          costs and maximize the
                                                                                          reliability of
                                                                                          critical systems, but
                                                                                          not increase the
                                                                                          service life of the
                                                                                          cutters. The Coast
                                                                                          Guard initiated
                                                                                          another program to
                                                                                          extend the service
                                                                                          life of six of the 13
                                                                                          270-foot Medium
                                                                                          Endurance Cutters.
                                                                                          This service life
                                                                                          extension project is
                                                                                          projected to cost $250
                                                                                          million, and intended
                                                                                          to extend service life
                                                                                          for up to 10 years and
                                                                                          close the gap in
                                                                                          capability until the
                                                                                          Offshore Patrol Cutter
                                                                                          is operational.
Heavy polar icebreaker: Polar Star...  30 years...............  46 years...............  The Polar Star
                                                                                          completed a
                                                                                          reactivation
                                                                                          maintenance period in
                                                                                          2013 that was intended
                                                                                          to add an additional 7-
                                                                                          10 years to its
                                                                                          service life from the
                                                                                          time of reactivation.
                                                                                          The Coast Guard
                                                                                          initiated another
                                                                                          service life extension
                                                                                          program in 2021 to
                                                                                          span 5 years and focus
                                                                                          on upgrades or
                                                                                          replacements of
                                                                                          different systems. The
                                                                                          Coast Guard completed
                                                                                          the second year of
                                                                                          this 5-year program in
                                                                                          2022, and plans on
                                                                                          investing $75 million
                                                                                          in total to perform
                                                                                          work from fiscal years
                                                                                          2021 through 2025
                                                                                          toward this effort.
                                                                                          Ultimately, the
                                                                                          service life extension
                                                                                          program is intended to
                                                                                          extend the service
                                                                                          life of the Polar Star
                                                                                          by 4 to 5 years, or,
                                                                                          according to Coast
                                                                                          Guard officials, until
                                                                                          at least 2029 or 2030.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Source: GAO presentation and analysis of Coast Guard data. GAO-23-106948


    In addition, we previously found that these legacy assets are 
getting harder and more expensive to maintain. In July 2018, we found 
that it is unclear how the Coast Guard will be able to fund planned 
SLEPs on several aging assets in order to sustain them--that is, keep 
them operating at acceptable levels--until replacement assets are 
available.\23\ We found that several of the Coast Guard's aging cutters 
have spent more on depot-level maintenance than was planned. Combined, 
these cutters--the 210-foot and 270-foot MECs, and the Polar Star--
expended about $550 million, more than twice what was originally 
estimated (standard support levels), from 2010 to 2017.\24\ In June 
2023, we reported that depot-level maintenance costs for the MECs 
totaled about $300 million from 2018 through 2021.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Address 
Longstanding Portfolio Management Challenges, GAO-18-454 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 24, 2018).
    \24\ The Polar Star's expenditures are calculated from 2014 to 2017 
since it was in a reactivation period prior to 2014 and was not 
operational.
    \25\ GAO-23-105805.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition to increased maintenance costs, Coast Guard operators 
have had to make do with deteriorating legacy assets.
      MEC: The MECs have generally met or remained within 
target levels for operational and materiel availability. However, we 
found that maintenance being conducted was on significant systems that 
were resulting in casualties for the cutters.\26\ For example, in 
fiscal year 2021, MEC crews reported 317 casualties with their 
propulsion system's main diesel engines, generators, and the hull. Some 
of these casualties rendered the cutters disabled for multiple days. In 
addition, habitability remains a concern for both 210-foot and 270-foot 
MECs. Crews experience problems maintaining heating, venting, and air 
conditioning (HVAC) systems and those HVAC inefficiencies have led to 
high levels of condensation and mold in crew living spaces, such as 
berthing areas. Coast Guard crews told us they try to address these 
issues as they occur, but the number and frequency of maintenance 
issues, in addition to their regular mission duties, make living in 
these conditions a fact of life.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ GAO-23-105805.

      Heavy polar icebreaker: In July 2023, we found that the 
Polar Star continues to face similar maintenance issues.\27\ From 2019 
through 2021, the Coast Guard reported that some of the top cost 
drivers for maintenance on the Polar Star included components like the 
main diesel engines, engine cylinders, a propulsion shaft, and fuel 
pumps. Electrical systems have also posed problems. For example, during 
the Polar Star's 2019-2020 mission to Antarctica, the crew reported a 
cutter-wide loss of power. Polar Star crew told us that a cutter-wide 
loss of power can sometimes take an hour to fully resolve as they have 
to manually reset each system since older systems lack centralized 
digital controls. Further, during the 2021-2022 deployment, a 
propulsion control failure placed the cutter at risk of colliding with 
another vessel in Puget Sound.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ GAO-23-105949.

    The Polar Star SLEP, which began in 2021 and is conducted annually 
during dry dock, has made upgrades to the Polar Star such as 
improvements to its propulsion control system. However, habitability 
remains a health concern for its crew. For example, annual assessments 
of the cutter's condition noted the need to remove asbestos and lead 
paint from compartments of the cutter, and a past assessment also found 
that systems to produce fresh water and filter air for the crew were 
barely functional. The Polar Star crew also told us that the heaters in 
some operational spaces are inadequate to combat Antarctic 
temperatures.
    When combined with the challenges facing the acquisition portfolio 
noted above, the Coast Guard will likely struggle to pay for the 
maintenance of older assets, a situation that could lead to deferred 
maintenance and lost operational capability.
Coast Guard Has Not Effectively Managed the Backlog of Shore 
        Infrastructure Projects
    In February 2019, we found that the Coast Guard is confronted with 
a costly backlog of shore infrastructure projects--such as piers, 
docks, boat stations, air stations, and housing units--that is 
contributing to concerns of affordability for its recapitalization and 
related sustainment efforts.\28\ We found that 45 percent of the Coast 
Guard's shore infrastructure was beyond its service life. For example, 
at least 53 percent of piers--all of which the Coast Guard has 
identified as mission-critical assets--were past their service lives as 
of 2017.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading 
Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least $2.6 
Billion, GAO-19-82 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Also at this time, the Coast Guard rated its overall shore 
infrastructure condition as mediocre. For example, the waterfront asset 
line--which includes piers, wharfs, boathouses, and small boat lifts--
was rated as mediocre and showing signs of deterioration and 
increasingly vulnerable to risk. The industrial asset line--which 
includes maintenance shops, corrosion control facilities, and ship 
lifts--was rated as poor to fair condition and mostly below standard. 
This is in part because the eight of the nine assets that are part of 
the Coast Guard Yard in Baltimore, Maryland--the only Coast Guard 
facility that can perform dry dock maintenance on large Coast Guard 
ships--are more than 5 years beyond their service life.
    We also found that the Coast Guard had not provided accurate 
information about its requirements-based budget targets for shore 
infrastructure in its budget requests.\29\ According to the Coast 
Guard, a requirements-based budget is an estimate of the cost to 
operate and sustain its shore infrastructure portfolio of assets over 
the life cycle of the asset, from initial construction or capital 
investment through divestiture or demolition.\30\ We found that Coast 
Guard targets for recapitalization of shore assets exceeded $290 
million annually. However, its budget requests for fiscal years 2012 
through 2021 ranged from about $5 million to about $99 million 
annually, and allotments ranged from about $5 million to about $266 
million annually (see fig. 5).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ GAO-19-82.
    \30\ According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard's 
requirements-based budget planning is based on industry standards and 
aligns with the National Academy of Sciences benchmarks for sustainable 
facility and infrastructure management. National Research Council of 
the National Academy of Sciences, Stewardship of Federal Facilities: A 
Proactive Strategy for Managing the Nation's Public Assets (Washington, 
D.C.: National Academies Press, 1998).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Figure 5: Coast Guard's Allotments for Shore Procurement, Construction 
   and Improvements from Its Appropriations and Shore Infrastructure 
       Requirements-based Budget, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2021


      Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard documents. GAO-23-106948

   Notes: Reported in current-year dollars. Beginning in fiscal year 
      2019, the President's budget requests refer to Procurement, 
      Construction and Improvements, which previously referred to 
Acquisitions, Construction, and Improvements in the annual fiscal year 
                            appropriations.

  \a\ Beginning in 2016, the Coast Guard started using a requirements-
based budget to determine shore infrastructure budget needs and applied 
 it for the first time with its fiscal year 2017 submission. According 
to this budgeting approach and Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard's 
  targets for recapitalization of shore infrastructure exceeded $290 
        million annually as determined by the U.S. Coast Guard.

    \b\ ``Amount requested'' represents the amount requested in the 
  President's budget, as identified in the Coast Guard's fiscal year 
                     congressional justifications.

               \c\ Values for 2013 reflect sequestration.

    To address the backlog, we found that the Coast Guard could 
increase budget transparency for shore infrastructure. Specifically, we 
found the Coast Guard's budget requests had (1) not clearly identified 
funding allotted for routine shore infrastructure maintenance needs, 
and (2) not generally addressed deferred maintenance and repair 
deficiencies, resulting in increases to its backlogs. In addition, the 
Coast Guard had not included information in its Unfunded Priorities 
Lists and other related reports that clearly articulated trade-offs 
among competing project alternatives, as well as the impacts on 
missions conducted from shore facilities in disrepair.\31\ This 
information could help to inform decision makers of the risks posed by 
untimely investments in maintenance and repair backlogs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ The term ``unfunded priority'' means a program or mission 
requirement that (1) has not been selected for funding in the 
applicable proposed budget; (2) is necessary to fulfill a requirement 
associated with an operational need; and (3) the Commandant would have 
recommended for inclusion in the applicable proposed budget had 
additional resources been available, or had the requirement emerged 
before the budget was submitted. 14 U.S.C. Sec.  5108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    We recommended that the Coast Guard include supporting details 
about competing project alternatives and report trade-offs in 
congressional budget requests and related reports. The Coast Guard 
agreed with our recommendation, but noted that addressing this 
recommendation is challenging due to limitations imposed by the Office 
of Management and Budget and DHS. As of May 2023, the Coast Guard was 
working toward publishing some related information on its website, 
according to officials. Without such information about Coast Guard 
budgetary requirements, Congress will lack critical information that 
could help to prioritize funding to address the Coast Guard's shore 
infrastructure backlogs.
    Over the last decade, we have made 40 recommendations to DHS and 
the Coast Guard on how to better manage the Coast Guard's acquisition 
programs. Currently, we have 14 recommendations that remain open and 
that the Coast Guard has not fully addressed--many discussed above--and 
six others that have not been acted upon by the Coast Guard over 
several years or overcome by events. Addressing the open 
recommendations will help the Coast Guard better manage its 
recapitalization efforts.
    Additionally, we recommended two matters to Congress in June 2023. 
Specifically, we recommended that you consider requiring the Coast 
Guard to update its acquisition policy to establish that all 
shipbuilding programs should (1) mature critical technologies--
including those that are developmental or that are novel in application 
or form, fit, and function--to a TRL 7 (successfully demonstrating 
critical technologies in a realistic environment) prior to a program's 
contract award for detail design and construction; and (2) achieve 100 
percent completion of basic and functional design, including the 
routing of all distributive systems, prior to lead ship construction. 
Doing so will help ensure that future Coast Guard acquisitions follow 
leading practices and will help get these programs on a sound footing.
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you both for appearing, I 
appreciate that. And now it turns to the time we ask questions. 
I will start it off with 5 minutes' worth of questions.
    And so, Admiral Thomas, can you provide an update on 
programs toward a new hangar at Barbers Point to accommodate 
the new C-130J aircraft?
    Admiral Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question, 
and thanks for support, particularly at Barbers Point. I was 
there recently, and we have a C-130 that can fit the nose in 
the hangar and the tail is hanging out. That is suboptimal.
    So, we do have about $46 million that's set aside for a 
project for a hangar, and we have started that project to 
install a membrane hangar that can hold two of our aircraft in 
there, and we can do full maintenance. I don't know right now 
if that is going to be enough money. We have to do an 
environmental assessment. We do know there is PFAS on that 
site. And as we get those results, we will be able to determine 
how far that money will go. But we do appreciate continued 
support on that project.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, the Coast Guard has previously 
communicated that it had all the resources it needed for the 
construction of a new hangar. So, how would you explain that?
    Admiral Thomas. Well, I think I mentioned in my statement 
that the economic conditions that we see now are not what we 
saw 4 years ago. There are all sorts of supply chain issues. 
There are inflation issues that are driving the cost of 
projects up across our portfolio and, as well, environmental 
remediation is always a wild card that you can't really price 
until you have stuck a shovel in the ground.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Compared to other programs, the 
Waterways Commerce Cutter acquisition program has been on 
track, which is very encouraging. Can you provide an update on 
the milestones that program has achieved to date?
    Admiral Thomas. Yes, thank you for the question.
    So, we awarded that contract in October of last year. We 
experienced some delays because of GAO protest, but we were 
able to push ahead with the work on March 1st, or the notice to 
proceed to the contractor, and they are proceeding well with 
the detailed design. And as I mentioned in my statement, we 
expect to begin construction next year.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, are there milestones you are 
trying to hit in the future that would keep it on track?
    Admiral Thomas. Yes, sir, there are. Before we go to 
construction, as Ms. Mak mentioned, we will do a design review, 
final critical design review, and then we will do a production 
readiness review. And we are on track to hit those milestones.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. What would be the result or the 
impact of operations and costs if the acquisition were delayed?
    Admiral Thomas. Well, it depends on the nature of delay, 
Congressman. If we were somehow caused to recompete this 
contract, the delay would be about 2 years, the cost would be 
about $150 million, and I would imagine we would be in the 
exact same place we are today in 2 years, which, we would have 
a contract award, and we would have appeals ongoing.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Ms. Mak, the Coast Guard appears to 
have systemic issues in effectively executing major 
acquisitions. Are there requirements placed on the Coast Guard, 
either by regulation or statute, that impair the Coast Guard's 
contracting and acquisition abilities and capabilities?
    Ms. Mak. No requirements on legislation that I am aware of, 
but I still think it is important that the Coast Guard focus on 
doing the things the right way the first time around when it 
comes to better business case and getting the design done 
before construction, and figuring out where you are going to go 
when it comes to what requirements, how you do that, and how 
you manage the contractors, oversight.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, is that happening?
    Ms. Mak. I would say with the OPC and the PSC, based on our 
recent reports, they could do a lot better when it comes to 
design.
    They are starting--OPC started construction for all four 
ships, for the first four ships, well before the design. And we 
are hoping--we have made recommendations to address for stage 2 
that they complete that design because it is having a lot of 
different challenges.
    For instance, the davit, which is on the OPC, that is 
critical. That is where they use the small boats to go down and 
do their mission, and that--davits have found problems in terms 
of, like, the electrical cabinet. It was supposed to fit on the 
interior of the OPC, and now they can't fit that in the 
interior, so, part of it has to go in the exterior and part of 
it has to go in the interior. That is to power the davit.
    So, if some of it is going to go outside instead of inside, 
it has got a lot more weather, environmental issues that it has 
got to address. So, it is better not to move on to stage 2 
until you have those design issues addressed.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. My time is expired. Thank you so 
much for your answers, both of you, and I will turn it over to 
Mr. Carbajal.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Admiral Thomas, while there are several factors that have 
contributed to the vessel acquisition issues that you are 
having, shipyards' capacity and availability is certainly a 
factor. That said, where would the Coast Guard vessel 
procurement be without the Jones Act and the sustained 
commercial business that the shipyards have?
    Admiral Thomas. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
    I mean, the Coast Guard has long recognized the 
significance of the Jones Act in ensuring our national security 
in several different ways. One of those is ensuring we retain 
an industrial base that can build and service our ships.
    Our ships are getting larger. We are now in competition 
with the Navy for drydocks. We need to invest in our own 
capabilities at our Coast Guard Yard, but we certainly need the 
Jones Act to remain in place so we retain that capability as a 
Nation.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Ms. Mak, how can Congress better support the Coast Guard's 
major acquisition programs moving forward?
    Ms. Mak. I think, as I mentioned in my oral statement, that 
programs generally tend to overpromise and underbid costs to 
secure funding for the programs. To minimize that, Congress may 
want to consider restricting or fencing off certain amounts of 
funding until you see a sound, realistic business case.
    Or Congress could require more information, which I know we 
have talked about a little bit on the shore infrastructure 
side, but it applies the same thing for acquisitions. They have 
priorities for homeporting needs for the ongoing acquisitions 
and recapitalization efforts such as the OPC, the PSC, the WCC, 
and the information that is needed for Congress to provide the 
appropriate information and funding is impacts to operations, 
should the funding not be available.
    And what are the timeframes? What are the impacts when you 
don't get that funding? I think that is important for Congress 
to be able to make better decisions.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I have heard of underpromise and 
overdeliver, but I have never really understood the opposite 
approach, as you said takes place.
    Admiral Thomas, the Army typically chooses to retire their 
helicopters at 20,000 hours. Why does the Coast Guard refurbish 
and use your helicopters well past the age?
    And has the Coast Guard explored the option of purchasing 
new helicopters?
    Admiral Thomas. Well, thank you for the question. We are in 
the midst of extending the service life on both our 65s and our 
60s. We are able to do that organically at our Aviation 
Logistics Center. We are able to take Navy hulls that don't 
have many hours on them and put them into a Coast Guard 
configuration.
    While we haven't done the business case yet on purchasing 
fully built-out helicopters or buying new hulls from the OEM, 
and then we are changing them out ourselves, that is something 
we would consider, although we are currently on a pace to 
increase the size of our 60 fleet, which is about right for the 
Service. It doesn't need to be accelerated.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Ms. Mak, do you have anything to add to that?
    Ms. Mak. The largest concern about increasing their fleet 
is going to come back to the infrastructure that is needed to 
support that. There is definitely going to be expected growth 
and significant investments in the facilities at both the 
Aviation Logistics Center and at air stations. So, that needs 
to be planned for and determined, what priorities when.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Mr. Chair, I am going to use my prerogative with my 
remaining time to recognize my intern, Jasmine Oang, who is 
here. She might be interested in the Coast Guard, so, she is 
here checking you guys out, interviewing if you are the service 
she might be interested in. So, I just want to recognize it.
    Raise your hand, Jasmine.
    Mr. Chair, with that I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Babin, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. And 
I also thank Admiral Thomas and Ms. Mak for being here.
    My questions are going to be for you, Admiral Thomas.
    But Ms. Mak, if you feel like you need to jump in, please 
feel free.
    In April of 2019, the Coast Guard issued a contract for the 
construction of a new polar icebreaker. What is the status of 
the design and construction of this vessel?
    And are there outstanding issues with the proposed 
propulsion system used for this vessel?
    Please bring us up to speed, and give me your take on the 
propulsion system issues.
    Admiral Thomas. Thanks for your interest in our Polar 
Security Cutter program. It is a significant program for our 
Nation, as you well know.
    We are 4 years into what was supposed to be a 1-year design 
cycle on the Polar Security Cutter, and we are frustrated by 
that. It is my top priority to get this project back on track. 
We have a new primary contractor now, and I meet with the 
senior leadership of that shipyard myself personally once a 
week, along with my colleague from the Navy. Our focus is on 
getting to design maturity and making sure the yard is ready 
for production.
    I was at the shipyard just recently to look at some of the 
capital expenditures they had put in place in order to build 
this ship. It is impressive, the robotic welding, the 
preheating--just what it takes to bend the steel that thick.
    At the end of the day, we need these ships, but we also 
need the shipyard. It will bring tremendous capability to our 
Nation. And as I mentioned, we have begun prototype 
fabrication.
    With regard to the propulsion system, I am not aware that 
we have concerns. It will be a complex system. We are making 
sure that we build the control systems ashore first so that we 
can make sure it is fully integrated before we go on the ship. 
But we have not yet identified specific concerns with our 
propulsion system.
    Dr. Babin. OK, thank you. I am also interested in 
discussing some of the Coast Guard's air assets.
    The Coast Guard is currently recapitalizing your vertical 
lift platforms in addition to acquiring additional C-130s. 
However, I am curious about the Coast Guard's lack of medium-
altitude, long-endurance assets such as the MQ-9. In my 
district we proudly host the Air National Guard unit of the MQ-
9s, and they are extremely capable aircraft.
    However, I recently found out that the MQ-9B, an upgraded, 
all-weather and Maritime Domain-aware aircraft, is being 
operated right now by the Japanese Coast Guard. These have the 
capability to perform Maritime Domain Awareness, patrolling for 
illegal shipping, drug interdiction, search and rescue, and 
illegal trafficking.
    I wanted to ask if the Coast Guard has any plans to 
modernize its aviation fleet with assets such as the MQ-9 
Reaper. And if not, why not, and is it simply a budgetary 
issue?
    Admiral Thomas. We are very much aware of the capabilities 
of unmanned aerial systems. We employ them off of our National 
Security Cutters. We intend to do the same off of our OPCs when 
they are in the fleet, and we operate other MQ-9s with CBP.
    We have just recently issued our unmanned systems strategy, 
and that is the beginning of our efforts to build a program of 
record that will bring capability like MQ-9s to the Coast 
Guard. We do not yet have a program of record to do that.
    Dr. Babin. OK, thank you very much. Last question: Can you 
briefly mention the changes that you have made following the 
Coast Guard's internal review of Operation Fouled Anchor?
    We have got to protect our Coasties. And for our part, we 
need to know the changes you have already implemented before 
Congress starts developing any new recommendations. What 
changes have you made?
    How will you all do a better job of protecting Coasties 
while ensuring that Congress is up to speed on important issues 
and able to perform its oversight role?
    Admiral Thomas. Thank you. We are very much focused, and 
have been for a very long time, on improving the culture in the 
Coast Guard and providing a safe environment for our members.
    Thanks to the actions of Congress over the last several 
years, and in concert with our sister services, we have been 
focused on improvements to reporting processes, support to our 
victims, investigation and accountability, and prevention 
programs. And just quickly, some of the things we have done, we 
have instituted a restricted and nonrestricted reporting 
structure that gives options to victims on how they want to 
report, we have taken care of what is called collateral 
misconduct associated with sexual assaults, and we participate 
in the DoD's CATCH program that allows us to identify repeat 
offenders.
    With regard to support to victims, we have professional 
sexual assault response coordinators. We now have a sexual 
assault prevention program office and program leadership. We 
have volunteer and professional victims advocates in the field, 
special victims councils out there to help through the legal 
process, and we have a policy in place that allows members to 
ask for a transfer if they or their spouses have been affected 
by sexual violence.
    Again, we have improved investigations and accountability. 
Every single case of sexual assault must be investigated by our 
Coast Guard Investigative Service.
    And really, the key thing is to prevent these from 
happening. And we have done a lot to build a culture of 
prevention. We need to do more there. Other services have 
thousands of people working for primary prevention in the 
field. We have one at Coast Guard headquarters. We don't need 
thousands, but we need dozens, and I am going to work hard to 
get them in place.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate that very much.
    I am out of time, Ms. Mak, and I am sorry you didn't get a 
chance to say anything.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. Well, the chair has been 
notified that there is a vote series on the floor, and the 
committee will stand in recess not subject to the call of the 
chair, but we are going to call as soon as you get done. Don't 
come back too giddy. It is not over yet.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Webster of Florida. But come back if you wanted to ask 
questions.
    So, we are in recess.
    [Recess.]
    Mr. Webster of Florida. I thank the witnesses for staying, 
and now we are back at it again, and we will get done here.
    Mr. Ezell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Vice Admiral Thomas and Ms. Mak, thank you for being here 
today.
    From protecting our ports and waterways to assisting our 
communities during hurricanes, the Coast Guard is an 
indispensable asset to southern Mississippi. I proudly 
represent Port Security Guard 308, the Gulfport Coast Guard 
Station, and the Coast Guard personnel at Pascagoula Naval 
Station. I also take pride in representing the shipbuilders of 
southern Mississippi that build many of the world-class vessels 
the Coast Guard sails every day.
    One of these vessels being constructed is the Polar 
Security Cutter, which is essential to the project of our 
sovereignty in the Arctic against our adversaries in China and 
Russia. I have spoken with the shipyard in my district 
constructing these vessels, and they have assured me they are 
working diligently with the Coast Guard to expedite the 
program. It brings me pride to say the workforce of southern 
Mississippi will be responsible for building the most superior 
and technologically advanced polar cutters in the entire world.
    In addition, the Legend class National Security Cutters 
utilized by the Coast Guard are built in my district at Ingalls 
Shipbuilding. This cutter has been referenced as the most 
capable and advanced cutter in the Coast Guard's fleet. Vice 
Admiral Thomas, how vital has that Legend class cutter been in 
the Coast Guard's operations?
    Admiral Thomas. Well, thank you for your support of our 
people in your home State and your district. I know they really 
enjoy seeing you.
    Look, the National Security Cutters have been game-
changing. They have been game-changing in our interdiction 
missions, they have been game-changing in our missions in 
competitive space with the Chinese and others. So, very, very 
capable ships. We have been very happy with them. And we 
really, really appreciate your support of that program.
    Mr. Ezell. Yes, sir. Thank you, Admiral. I do have some 
concerns regarding the MH-65 replacement program.
    The Coast Guard plans to replace the MH-65 fleet with a 
notably smaller number of MH-60s. This approach is centered on 
the fact that the 60s are larger helicopters with a longer 
range. However, I worry that downsizing the fleet would 
dangerously limit the Coast Guard's ability to respond to 
simultaneous emergencies like those that come after hurricanes.
    Can you assure me that the new fleet of less MH-60s will 
have the same response capabilities as the current mixed fleet?
    Admiral Thomas. So, our current fleet of approximately 146 
rotary-wing aircraft split between the 60s and 65s is roughly 
one-third 60s and two-thirds 65s. We will transition to all 60s 
at, at least, 127 aircraft. That number is not set. That is the 
current program of record. We are currently required to do a 
review of our aircraft laydown by the NDAA, and that work is 
ongoing.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you. I also have some concerns with the 
Coast Guard's intention to have that single model helicopter 
fleet.
    Last year, we saw the Army ground its entire fleet of 
Chinook helicopters due to engine fire concerns. If an 
unfortunate event like this were to happen with the 60s in the 
future, the Coast Guard might be left with no helicopter 
capabilities.
    Moreover, I believe there are multiple air intercept 
missions where a smaller helicopter would be a more practical 
platform.
    Vice Admiral, can you explain why you think a single model 
helicopter fleet is advantageous for the Coast Guard?
    Admiral Thomas. Yes. Again, thank you for the question.
    I mean, there are a lot of advantages to operating a single 
fleet. It is easier to maintain them, it is easier to train 
people. You have full cross-decking of crews. I can't put a 65 
qualified crewmember on a 60 right now. And the 60 is aircraft 
that all of our sister services operate. There are thousands of 
them in service. Our Airbus helicopters, we are the largest 
operator of those helicopters right now.
    So, we think the right thing to do is to move to a single 
rotary-wing fleet. Thank you.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Admiral.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Auchincloss, you are recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
    Ms. Mak has laid forward in her written testimony, very 
substantively and specifically, examples of the over-
concurrence of technology development, design, and construction 
that seems to be a feature of the last 15 years in the Coast 
Guard, and has, I think, been a primary driver--Ms. Mak, if you 
would agree--in the cost overruns and delays.
    Yet, Admiral, you have been mostly pointing to exogenous 
factors--inflation, supply chain snarls, workforce--as being 
the primary reason. Of course, everyone is facing those issues. 
Would you accept that some of this is endogenous, that some of 
this is because of Coast Guard decisionmaking and the over-
concurrence of those issues?
    Admiral Thomas. What I would accept is the premise that if 
you want to drive risk to cost and schedule during construction 
to zero, you don't start until you have 100 percent design.
    The problem is we have to manage more than just risk to 
cost and schedule during construction. We have to manage the 
operational risk. We have to manage the financial risk to the 
contractor. And in both cases that Ms. Mak talked about, those 
contractors would go broke if we were not able to begin 
construction with a well-developed design, but not a fully 
developed design.
    Mr. Auchincloss. So, then, in particular, in her written 
testimony, she has the example with the Offshore Patrol Cutter 
that the GAO recommended that you wait until the davit gets to 
TRL 7 before starting construction on OPC 3, and that the Coast 
Guard actually concurred.
    But now the Coast Guard has started construction on OPC 3, 
and the davit is not at TRL 7. What explains that?
    Admiral Thomas. Well, again, we would love to have all of 
the critical technology at TRL 7 before we begin construction. 
We have a mitigation plan for the davits, and we are 
comfortable enough with that mitigation plan that we need to 
move ahead with the construction.
    The Nation needs these ships. Our----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. I agree that the Nation 
needs the ships, but it sounds like the Nation is not getting 
these ships partly because the technology development is 
underdeveloped, relative to the design and construction 
timeline. So, we are all in a hurry here, but it doesn't seem 
like we are going--there is an old saying in the Marine Corps, 
``Slow is smooth, smooth is fast.'' And it seems like we are 
not being very smooth here, and hence we are not being very 
fast.
    Admiral Thomas. So, we are confident that the davit will be 
at the right TRL level when we need it on the current 
construction timeline.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Ms. Mak, are you confident in that?
    Ms. Mak. No, obviously not. That is why we made the 
recommendation that we did.
    I mean, in general, when it comes to acquisitions, 
accelerating plans without the appropriate knowledge is going 
to cause a lot of rework and extend your schedule anyway. It 
does not equate to the ability to deliver on those plans.
    Mr. Auchincloss. And has that rework leading to delays been 
a feature since 2007 of the Coast Guard procurement plans?
    Ms. Mak. I would say as far back as I have been looking at 
them since 2017, yes.
    Mr. Auchincloss. And now it seems like we are seeing the 
same thing with the polar cutters here, where design is not yet 
complete prior to construction for the lead ship in line with 
the recommendation that you have made.
    Admiral, what are the reasons why you are confident that, 
even though you are more concurrent than has been recommended, 
that you are going to be able to do it?
    Admiral Thomas. Well, again, there are a lot of risks that 
we are balancing.
    I agree, if we want to drive risk to cost and schedule 
during construction to zero, we would probably not begin 
construction until we are 100 percent designed. But we have 
mitigation measures in place. We have authorized a number of 
special studies that have allowed the contractor to understand 
what it is going to take to build this ship with this material 
that they have never worked with before. We have helped them 
with capital investments that will allow them to work with the 
material, with things like robotic welders and induction 
heaters for the material. And we are moving ahead with 
prototype fabrication, prototype module fabrication, that will 
allow them to continue their learning.
    We have not yet begun construction on the polar cutter.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Ms. Mak, do you think that these measures 
are going to be sufficient?
    Ms. Mak. At this point it is really hard to tell, because 
the Polar Security Cutter--they are saying that it is going to 
be delivered by 2027. But as of right now, the contractor does 
not have sufficient business systems to be able to address the 
schedule. So, it is optimistic.
    We don't think the data is very accurate at this point. So, 
until we get a little more accurate data, we don't know if they 
are going to be able to meet that timeline, either. I mean, 
back in 2018, when we looked at it, we were supposed to have an 
icebreaker, a heavy polar icebreaker, by 2024.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Right. Admiral, I would submit that it 
seems like the Coast Guard is not fully internalizing the 
lessons of the last 15 years. Is there a big learning that you 
have taken forward from what has happened in the last 15 years 
that you are going to adopt to do things differently?
    Admiral Thomas. Well, let me just address the delivery 
schedule.
    We are currently doing the work with a new contractor to 
re-baseline this project so that we can truly understand cost 
and schedule, and we will have those numbers. There is no 
question the schedule has slipped, probably into at least 2028, 
and the costs will rise.
    Mr. Auchincloss. But what is your biggest learning over the 
last 15 years that you are going to do differently?
    Admiral Thomas. I think Ms. Mak hit on what needs to be 
done differently in terms of how funding comes to the services 
for major acquisition, and----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. But why would we say more 
money is the answer when part of the problem clearly is in the 
concurrency of technology, development, design, and 
construction that Ms. Mak has pointed out? That is not a money 
problem. That sounds like a program management problem.
    Admiral Thomas. Again, the issue of managing risk across 
the entire acquisition as opposed to managing only risk 
associated with cost and construction--or cost and schedule 
during construction is the challenge.
    Mr. Auchincloss. The chairman has been indulgent, I 
appreciate it. Thank you.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back. No one 
else is here to ask a question, but I have got one, just one 
more.
    Turning to the Offshore Patrol Cutter program, the Coast 
Guard has long stated that after completion of the initial ship 
in the class, it must build two per year in order to limit the 
loss of the mission capabilities as Medium Endurance Cutters go 
offline. Fiscal year 2022-2023 capital improvement plans 
envision that a full rate of production will happen. Is that 
going to happen? That is the real question.
    Admiral Thomas. Well, the full rate of production will 
happen for stage 1, which will be delivering cutters on 1-year 
centers. In stage 2, we will reach a full rate of production of 
two per year. And from what I have seen of that particular 
shipyard, they may actually produce more than that.
    But your concern about the Medium Endurance Cutters is a 
valid one. Last year, we lost about 3\1/2\ cutters' worth of 
time due to unscheduled repairs, which is why it is so 
important that we get the OPCs into our fleet.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Do you have anything to add to 
that, Ms. Mak?
    Ms. Mak. Nothing other than, yes, they need this as fast as 
they can do it, but they've got to do it right the first time. 
Before you build more OPCs on the stage 2, make sure you have 
some of the design issues addressed.
    I mean, like I mentioned, that electrical cabinet which is 
in the davit, if you don't have that right, you are going to go 
back and you are going to have to redo all the ones you have 
already done. That is going to take more time, and it is going 
to take a lot more money.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you so much. Well, I don't 
think there is any other testimony. Any other questions?
    Do you have any other questions?
    I gave you a little extra time [to Mr. Auchincloss].
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Auchincloss. I just want to let the admiral one more 
time--is the biggest learning of the last 15 years on your 
design, tech development, and construction process really just 
that you need more money? There is no other learning that you 
want to present to Congress?
    Admiral Thomas. I think the biggest learning that the Coast 
Guard has had in our acquisition history has to do with the 
system integrator and the use of system integrators, which we 
tried and we will never do again.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. Any other questions?
    Thank you both for appearing. I appreciate your testimony, 
and I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing 
remain open for such time as our witnesses have provided 
answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in 
writing.
    Without objection, show that ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 
for 15 days for any additional comments or information 
submitted by the Members or witnesses to be included in the 
record of today's hearing.
    Without objection, show that ordered.
    The subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]


                       Submissions for the Record

                              ----------                              


 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member, 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair Webster, for holding this important oversight 
hearing.
                        Operation Fouled Anchor
    Before we get into the substance of today's hearing, I want to take 
a moment to address Operation Fouled Anchor.
    In 2020, the Coast Guard completed a 6-year secret investigation 
into sexual assaults at the Coast Guard Academy between 1990 and 2006. 
The results and recommendations of Operation Fouled Anchor were hidden 
from Congress, the public and not distributed widely within the Coast 
Guard.
    While I'm still parsing the details of the investigation and 
awaiting documentation, the Coast Guard's lack of transparency is 
unacceptable. Congress and, more importantly, members of the Coast 
Guard cannot trust the system if these types of violent crimes are kept 
behind closed doors.
    Congress cannot conduct oversight and the Coast Guard cannot 
improve its Sexual Assault Prevention Program when the results and 
recommendations of a six year/20,000 hour operation are kept secret. 
The Coast Guard can and must do better.
                    Coast Guard Cutter Acquisitions
    Today's hearing is an opportunity for this Committee to receive an 
update on the Coast Guard's now 16-year-old recapitalization plan which 
was enacted in 2007. Included in this plan, and the subsequent update 
in 2017, are National Security Cutters, Fast Response Cutters, Offshore 
Patrol Cutters, Polar Security Cutters, Waterways Commerce Cutters, and 
HC130J aircraft.
    Several of these acquisition programs have gone well but others 
have faced significant cost increases and delivery delays.
    For instance, after awarding the Service's largest acquisition 
contract to a shipyard that had never had a government contract, the 
Coast Guard determined that the program was so far delayed and over 
budget that it recompeted the contract and awarded the construction of 
all but four cutters to another shipyard.
    The Polar Security Cutter is facing similar issues. The original 
projected delivery date was 2024 but the detailed design remains at 50 
percent and the Coast Guard has been unable to commit to a delivery 
date in this decade.
    While it's appropriate to scrutinize the Coast Guard's decisions, 
we in Congress must consider our own actions and the structural 
impediments facing the Service. Inadequate resources and irregular 
procurement programs result in cutting corners and inexperience.
    We cannot deliver vessels without access to shipyards.
    Diminished shipbuilding capacity as well as increased competition 
from the Navy has left the Coast Guard with limited options--we must 
all work together to resolve this shortage to keep our seas safe.
    While I'm confident the Coast Guard will complete the ongoing 
recapitalization effort, I am concerned that Congress and the 
Administration are not providing the resources to support the women and 
men who operate these vessels and aircraft.
                    Shoreside Infrastructure Backlog
    The growing shoreside infrastructure backlog has real world 
consequences for Coasties. During my recent visit to the Coast Guard 
Academy, I saw firsthand the unacceptable living conditions of cadets. 
No cadet should live in fear that moving their desk chair the wrong way 
could scratch the floor and expose them to asbestos, but that is the 
reality.
    Now that Congress has funded the construction of assets, we need to 
ensure that Coasties get the shoreside support they deserve. This 
includes workstations, housing, health care, and childcare. We need to 
do better.
                    Ms. Mak's Retirement and Closing
    I'd like to end by recognizing Ms. Marie Mak testifying before us 
today from the GAO. Your distinguished 37-year career in government 
service has resulted in a stronger Navy, a stronger Coast Guard and a 
better-informed Congress which has led to better laws. Thank you for 
your service and I hope you enjoy your next chapter.
    Thank you, Chairman Webster, and I look forward to today's 
discussion.


                                Appendix

                              ----------                              


 Questions from Hon. Mike Ezell to Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy 
            Commandant for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard

    Question 1. The PSU 308 is a deployable special forces unit that is 
specifically equipped to provide support to any port in the world in 
under 96 hours. However, they have been stationed in trailers on the 
Stennis Airport grounds for the past ten years and there is uncertainty 
on their ability to stay in this location in the future. Can you please 
provide the Coast Guard's plan to rehouse this unit in a permanent 
facility without interrupting the unit's mission?
    Answer. The Coast Guard is conducting the planning required to 
relocate Port Security Unit 308 into a permanent facility. The general 
timeline to complete a project from concept, through planning, 
budgeting, design, and execution is approximately eight years and 
largely depends on the timing of Major Shore Procurement Construction & 
Improvement funding.

    Question 2. The Coast Guard's stated rotary-wing plan is to phase 
out the standard shipboard-deployable, short range recovery helicopter 
in favor of an all medium-range recovery helicopter fleet. The medium-
range recovery helicopter requires significant modifications and 
additional equipment to deploy shipboard. Has the Coast Guard conducted 
operational testing and evaluation to ensure it effectively operates 
on, and in conjunction with, all USCG assets capable of supporting 
rotary-wing aircraft and mission profiles? What were the results?
    Answer. The Coast Guard can operate the MH-60T from seven of its 13 
Famous Class Medium Endurance Cutters and from all its National 
Security Cutters (NSC). Additionally, the Coast Guard designed its 
newest medium endurance and polar ice-breaking cutters, the Offshore 
Patrol Cutter (OPC), and the Polar Security Cutter, to enable MH-60T 
operations. The Coast Guard successfully completed operational testing 
and evaluation of blade-fold, tail-fold equipment and will configure 
the entire MH-60T fleet to be blade-fold, tail-fold capable to ensure 
that deployed MH-60Ts will fit into hangars on both the NSC and the 
OPC.

    Question 3. Has the Coast Guard explored new, more cost-effective 
aircraft currently in production to improve budget challenges, rather 
than continuing to reinvest in aging and costly legacy platforms? If 
not, would the Coast Guard consider conducting an analysis of 
alternatives of existing DoD inventory aircraft to enhance operational 
capabilities and reduce current personnel and budget constraints?
    Answer. The Coast Guard is actively exploring new rotary wing 
aircraft in concert and lock step with the U.S. Department of Defense 
Future Vertical Lift Program (FVL). The Service looks forward to FVL 
aircraft joining our ranks and retiring aging and costly legacy 
platforms.

Questions from Hon. Hillary J. Scholten to Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, 
        Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard

    Question 1. As we work to productively recapitalize assets and 
modernize the Coast Guard's capabilities, it's incumbent upon Congress 
to ensure American tax dollars are spent wisely so we set our Coast 
Guard up for success for future generations. As a Michigander, I know 
how much my state's economy and our nation's economy depends on safe 
and sustainable Great Lakes.
    Question 1.a. We have heard that the construction of a new heavy 
Great Lakes icebreaker will take 10 years, yet the need is now. What 
can Congress do to expedite the delivery of this much needed asset?
    Question 1.b. To follow up, if Congress funds the additional $20 
million for the Great Lakes icebreaker in the Coast Guard's Unfunded 
Priorities List, would this help deliver this icebreaker faster than 
just funding the $55 million in the budget request?
    Answer to 1.a. & 1.b. Until an acquisition is formally initiated, 
schedules and projected delivery timelines are notional as they are 
dependent on receipt of an appropriation and the shipbuilding 
industrial base's capacity, interest, and availability to meet program 
requirements. As part of the Analyze/Select Phase, comprehensive 
industry engagement and analyses are conducted to identify 
opportunities and risks for executing the acquisition and to establish 
a baseline schedule.
    Initial examination of the Federal Acquisition Regulations yielded 
few opportunities to accelerate the Great Lakes icebreaker (GLIB) 
acquisition timeline. The Coast Guard is consulting with its lawyers 
and acquisition professionals to find efficiencies in the Acquisition 
Lifecycle Framework to improve upon initial GLIB delivery timeline 
projections, provided in the below graphic. Funding of the additional 
$20 million for the GLIB on the Coast Guard's unfunded priorities list 
would not help deliver this icebreaker faster but would mitigate the 
potential for schedule delays in out-years.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Question 2. Last year's Coast Guard authorization bill directed the 
Coast Guard to establish and maintain a database on Great Lakes 
icebreaking operations and commercial vessel and ferry voyages during 
ice season. This has the potential to be a useful tool not only for the 
Coast Guard, but also for organizations that rely on its capabilities, 
such as our Lake Carriers. Where is the Coast Guard on establishing 
this database?
    Answer. The Coast Guard is actively working to develop and refine 
the technical requirements of the database. As required by the Coast 
Guard Authorization Act (CGAA) of 2022, the Coast Guard consulted 
operators of Great Lakes commercial vessels to gather input on current 
industry data collection, methodology used to assess the impact of 
delays caused by ice conditions, and ways industry can contribute to 
the Coast Guard data collection.
    While the database development efforts started upon enactment of 
the CGAA, the mild ice season this past winter/ice season (2022-2023) 
did not afford the Coast Guard opportunities to collect or analyze the 
necessary data to construct requirements based on industry's input. 
Looking forward to the upcoming winter/ice season (2023-2024), the 
Coast Guard will continue working with industry to collect required 
data and use existing enterprise applications to refine the database's 
technical requirements. This effort will assist in the future 
acquisition of a sustainable database solution.

Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen on behalf of Hon. Patrick Ryan to Vice 
  Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, U.S. 
                              Coast Guard

    Question 1. How did the United States Coast Guard (USCG) come to 
decide to redefine the boundaries of the Port of New York?
    Answer. The Coast Guard did not redefine the Port of New York's 
boundaries; it reaffirmed codified authorities and regulations. Since 
the language in Marine Safety Information Bulletin (MSIB) 2015-14 was 
unclear, the Coast Guard, via MSIB 2023-01, clarified the Port of New 
York's definition and applicable regulations.

    Question 2. How does the new definition fit into USCG's broader 
responsibility to regulate anchoring in the Hudson in a way that 
protects navigational safety for commercial vessels, the interests of 
other waterway users, and the environment?
    Answer. The Coast Guard did not redefine the Port of New York's 
boundaries; it reaffirmed codified authorities and regulations. Section 
8437 of the Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2020 
suspended the establishment of new anchorage grounds on the Hudson 
River between Yonkers, NY and Kingston, NY. As such, the Coast Guard 
has no legal authority to establish new anchorage grounds in this 
region.

    Question 3. Why was this decision made when the Port and Waterway 
Safety Assessment (PAWSA) in 2017 did not find that additional 
commercial anchorages were needed for navigational safety?
    Answer. The Coast Guard currently has no legal authority to 
establish any new anchorages in this region. Section 8437 of the Elijah 
E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2020 suspended the 
establishment of new anchorage grounds on the Hudson River between 
Yonkers, NY and Kingston, NY.
    The Coast Guard published Marine Safety Information Bulletin (MSIB) 
2023-01 to clarify the Port of New York's definition and applicable 
regulations.

    Question 4. How is the USCG working in collaboration with local 
government and non-governmental organizations to ensure that its 
activities in the region support the abundant and highly-prized natural 
resources in the river that are critical to the economy and way of life 
of waterfront communities and create a safe environment for all users 
of the river?
    Answer. To address issues that may include the safety, security, 
mobility, and environmental protection of a port or waterway, the Coast 
Guard leverages its Harbor Safety Committees to collaborate amongst and 
with local and non-governmental organizations in the area. Membership 
is open to all interested parties and typically comprised of 
representatives of governmental agencies, maritime labor, industry 
organizations, and public interest groups.
    The Coast Guard collaborates extensively with the Hudson River 
Safety Navigation and Operations Committee (HRSNOC) concerning the 
safe, secure, and environmentally sound usage of the Hudson River. The 
HRSNOC is a consensus-driven forum for coordination, collaboration, and 
decision making among private and public stakeholders on the Hudson 
River.

    Question 5. In the Coast Guard's work with local government and 
non-governmental organizations, how has it sought to balance the voices 
of stakeholders to ensure that environmental and ecological goals in 
the Hudson River are addressed?
    Answer. The Coast Guard works extensively with the HRSNOC 
concerning the safe, secure, and environmentally responsible usage of 
the Hudson River. The HRSNOC is a consensus-driven forum for 
coordination, collaboration and decision making among private and 
public stakeholders on the Hudson River.

    Question 6. What studies were conducted before the geographic 
limits of the Port of New York were changed?
    Answer. The Coast Guard did not redefine the Port of New York's 
boundaries; it reaffirmed codified authorities and regulations. Since 
the language in MSIB 2015-14 was unclear, the Coast Guard, via MSIB 
2023-01, clarified the Port of New York's definition and applicable 
regulations.

 Question from Hon. Mike Ezell to Marie A. Mak, Director, Contracting 
  and National Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability 
                                 Office

    Question 1. Section 11233 of the Don Young Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 2022 tasks the GAO with assessing USCG's past and 
future efforts to upgrade or recapitalize its aviation fleets. Has GAO 
begun the study, how is it progressing, and have there been any initial 
findings shared with the USCG?
    Answer. GAO began the review of the Coast Guard's aircraft 
operational availability and modernization in late calendar year 2022. 
We have completed much of our planned field work, and are now in the 
early stages of developing a draft report. We have not shared our 
initial findings with the Coast Guard. We plan to do so during our exit 
conference with the Coast Guard this fall. Please contact Heather 
MacLeod, Director in our Homeland Security and Justice team, if you 
have any further questions about this topic area.

  Questions from Hon. Hillary J. Scholten to Marie A. Mak, Director, 
    Contracting and National Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government 
                         Accountability Office

    Question 1. As we work to productively recapitalize assets and 
modernize the Coast Guard's capabilities, it's incumbent upon Congress 
to ensure American tax dollars are spent wisely so we set our Coast 
Guard up for success for future generations. As a Michigander, I know 
how much my state's economy and our nation's economy depends on safe 
and sustainable Great Lakes.
    Question 1.a. We have heard that the construction of a new heavy 
Great Lakes icebreaker will take 10 years, yet the need is now. What 
can Congress do to expedite the delivery of this much needed asset?
    Question 1.b. To follow up, if Congress funds the additional $20 
million for the Great Lakes icebreaker in the Coast Guard's Unfunded 
Priorities List, would this help deliver this icebreaker faster than 
just funding the $55 million in the budget request?
    Answer to 1.a. & 1.b. In February 2019, we found that the annual 
Unfunded Priorities List does not clearly articulate prioritization 
decisions, including information about trade-offs among competing 
project alternatives, as well as the impacts on missions conducted from 
projects that had not been prioritized in previous years.\1\ According 
to Coast Guard officials, and as we previously reported, such 
information is not included in the Unfunded Priorities List because it 
is not statutorily required.\2\ These information shortcomings are 
consistent with previous findings and recommendations that the DHS 
Office of Inspector General has made.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading 
Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of At Least $2.6 
Billion, GAO-19-82 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2019).
    \2\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Address 
Longstanding Portfolio Management Challenges, GAO-18-454 (Washington, 
D.C.: July 24, 2018).
    \3\ Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, 
Maintenance, Rehabilitation, and Upgrading of Shore Facilities in 
Support of United States Coast Guard Missions, OIG-08-24 (Washington, 
D.C.: February 14, 2008).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, regardless of whether Congress funds the Great Lakes 
icebreaker, the Coast Guard needs to provide a good business case, 
which includes setting firm requirements. Further, the Coast Guard 
needs to have the adequate knowledge to move through the acquisition 
cycle--this means reducing concurrency between technology development, 
design, and construction. If technologies are not fully developed and 
the design stabilized prior to construction, this could lead to further 
delays in the Coast Guard obtaining an icebreaker to meet mission needs 
in the Great Lakes. Instead of funding the icebreaker, potentially 
before other Coast Guard priorities, it might be beneficial for 
Congress to consider requiring Coast Guard to complete these 
activities, such as determining the requirements, by an established 
timeframe.
    The fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act included a 
provision for GAO to review Coast Guard icebreaking operations in the 
Great Lakes, including assessing proposed standards for icebreaking. We 
plan to report on this topic around winter 2024. However, the Coast 
Guard should be able to respond about its acquisition and construction 
timelines, as well as the total costs associated with a new heavy 
icebreaker. Please contact Heather MacLeod, Director in our Homeland 
Security and Justice team, if you have any further questions about this 
topic area.

Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen on behalf of Hon. Patrick Ryan to Marie 
A. Mak, Director, Contracting and National Security Acquisitions, U.S. 
                    Government Accountability Office

    Question 1. How did the United States Coast Guard (USCG) come to 
decide to redefine the boundaries of the Port of New York?
    Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and 
therefore cannot provide a response.

    Question 2. How does the new definition fit into USCG's broader 
responsibility to regulate anchoring in the Hudson in a way that 
protects navigational safety for commercial vessels, the interests of 
other waterway users, and the environment?
    Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and 
therefore cannot provide a response.

    Question 3. Why was this decision made when the Port and Waterway 
Safety Assessment (PAWSA) in 2017 did not find that additional 
commercial anchorages were needed for navigational safety?
    Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and 
therefore cannot provide a response.

    Question 4. How is the USCG working in collaboration with local 
government and non-governmental organizations to ensure that its 
activities in the region support the abundant and highly-prized natural 
resources in the river that are critical to the economy and way of life 
of waterfront communities and create a safe environment for all users 
of the river?
    Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and 
therefore cannot provide a response.

    Question 5. In the Coast Guard's work with local government and 
non-governmental organizations, how has it sought to balance the voices 
of stakeholders to ensure that environmental and ecological goals in 
the Hudson River are addressed?
    Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and 
therefore cannot provide a response.

    Question 6. What studies were conducted before the geographic 
limits of the Port of New York were changed?
    Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and 
therefore cannot provide a response.

                                 [all]