    [House Hearing, 118 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                    REVIEW OF THE RECAPITALIZATION OF THE
                   UNITED STATES COAST GUARD SURFACE, AIR,
                   IT, AND SHORESIDE ASSETS

    =======================================================================

                                    (118-25)

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                                SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                    COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                     OF THE

                                  COMMITTEE ON
                       TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                                 JULY 27, 2023

                                   __________

                           Printed for the use of the
                 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

         Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
         transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                                 transportation

                                  __________

                        U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    53-883 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                 COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

      Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
    Rick Larsen, Washington,             Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford,
      Ranking Member                     Arkansas
    Eleanor Holmes Norton,               Daniel Webster, Florida
      District of Columbia               Thomas Massie, Kentucky
    Grace F. Napolitano, California      Scott Perry, Pennsylvania
    Steve Cohen, Tennessee               Brian Babin, Texas
    John Garamendi, California           Garret Graves, Louisiana
    Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr., Georgiavid Rouzer, North Carolina
    Andre Carson, Indiana                Mike Bost, Illinois
    Dina Titus, Nevada                   Doug LaMalfa, California
    Jared Huffman, California            Bruce Westerman, Arkansas
    Julia Brownley, California           Brian J. Mast, Florida
    Frederica S. Wilson, Florida         Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,
    Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey       Puerto Rico
    Mark DeSaulnier, California          Pete Stauber, Minnesota
    Salud O. Carbajal, California        Tim Burchett, Tennessee
    Greg Stanton, Arizona,               Dusty Johnson, South Dakota
      Vice Ranking Member                Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,
    Colin Z. Allred, Texas                 Vice Chairman
    Sharice Davids, Kansas               Troy E. Nehls, Texas
    Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois   Lance Gooden, Texas
    Chris Pappas, New Hampshire          Tracey Mann, Kansas
    Seth Moulton, Massachusetts          Burgess Owens, Utah
    Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts      Rudy Yakym III, Indiana
    Marilyn Strickland, Washington       Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon
    Troy A. Carter, Louisiana            Chuck Edwards, North Carolina
    Patrick Ryan, New York               Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey
    Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska         Anthony D'Esposito, New York
    Robert Menendez, New Jersey          Eric Burlison, Missouri
    Val T. Hoyle, Oregon                 John James, Michigan
    Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio            Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin
    Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan        Brandon Williams, New York
    Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina   Marcus J. Molinaro, New York
                                         Mike Collins, Georgia
                                         Mike Ezell, Mississippi
                                         John S. Duarte, California
                                         Aaron Bean, Florida
                                    ------                                7

            Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                       Daniel Webster, Florida, Chairman
    Brian Babin, Texas                   Salud O. Carbajal, California,
    Brian J. Mast, Florida                 Ranking Member
    Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,            John Garamendi, California
      Puerto Rico                        Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
    Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey       Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts
    Mike Ezell, Mississippi, Vice        Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska
        Chairman                         Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan,
    Aaron Bean, Florida                    Vice Ranking Member
    Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)    Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex
                                             Officio)

                                    CONTENTS

                                                                       Page

    Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                     STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

    Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress from the State
      of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
      Maritime Transportation, opening statement.....................     1
        Prepared statement...........................................     3
    Hon. Salud O. Carbajal, a Representative in Congress from the
      State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Coast
      Guard and Maritime Transportation, opening statement...........     5
        Prepared statement...........................................     6
    Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in
      Congress from the State of Washington, and Ranking Member,
      Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure.................    37

                                   WITNESSES

    Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant for Mission
      Support, U.S. Coast Guard, oral statement......................     7
        Prepared statement...........................................     9
    Marie A. Mak, Director, Contracting and National Security
      Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office, oral
      statement......................................................    12
        Prepared statement...........................................    13

                                    APPENDIX

    Questions to Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant for
      Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard, from:
        Hon. Mike Ezell..............................................    39
        Hon. Hillary J. Scholten.....................................    39
        Hon. Rick Larsen on behalf of Hon. Patrick Ryan..............    40
    Questions to Marie A. Mak, Director, Contracting and National
      Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office,
      from:
        Hon. Mike Ezell..............................................    41
        Hon. Hillary J. Scholten.....................................    42
        Hon. Rick Larsen on behalf of Hon. Patrick Ryan..............    42

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                 July 21, 2023

        SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

        TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
    Transportation
        FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
    Transportation
        RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Review of the
    Recapitalization of the United States Coast Guard Surface, Air,
    IT, and Shoreside Assets''
    _______________________________________________________________________

                                   I. PURPOSE

        The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will meet
    on Thursday, July 27, 2023, at 2:00 p.m. ET in 2253 Rayburn
    House Office Building to receive testimony on the ``Review of
    the Recapitalization of the United States Coast Guard Surface,
    Air, IT, and Shoreside Assets.'' Members will receive testimony
    on the United States Coast Guard's (Coast Guard or Service)
    recapitalization efforts, specifically focusing on the
    Service's efforts to modernize its surface assets, including
    the Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPC) and Polar Security Cutters
    (PSC), air assets, shoreside infrastructure, and Information
    Technology (IT).

                                 II. BACKGROUND

    THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD RECAPITALIZATION PROGRAM

        Recognizing that many of its assets were nearing the end of
    their service lives or were technologically insufficient, in
    2007 the Coast Guard approved a program of record to modernize
    its offshore assets and the communication systems that linked
    those assets.\1\ The program of record has subsequently been
    updated to reflect budget realities and other factors.\2\
    However, the plan at the time failed to take into account IT
    systems, shoreside assets or Polar icebreakers. The Coast Guard
    is more than a decade into this recapitalization program and
    significant problems exist. In 2017, the Coast Guard released a
    new program of record that included Polar icebreakers and in-
    service vessel sustainment but failed to incorporate long term
    plans to recapitalize IT systems or shoreside assets.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ United States Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-17-654T, Coast
    Guard Recapitalization: Matching Needs and Continued Resources To
    Strain Acquisition Efforts (2017), available at https://www.gao.gov/
    assets/690/685201.pdf.
        \2\ Id.
        \3\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard has successfully undertaken some of the
    procurement steps outlined in its 2007 recapitalization vision,
    such as the procurement and deployment of the Fast Response
    Cutter (FRC) and the National Security Cutter (NSC).
    Concerningly, however, other programs such as the OPC lag
    behind, while the PSC, rotary wing aircraft, shoreside
    infrastructure, and Information Technology (IT) still remain
    largely unaddressed due to underfunding, mismanagement, poor
    processes, and a lack of long-term planning on the part of the
    Coast Guard.\4\ These shortcomings have created serious
    capability gaps in the ability of the Service to field the
    assets required to fulfill its mission demands.\5\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ Id.
        \5\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Most notably, in 2014, the Government Accountability Office
    (GAO) estimated that a gap exists between the Coast Guard's
    recapitalization needs and the President's budget request--a
    trend that has continued in subsequent years.\6\ For example,
    in 2018, an $800 million gap existed between the Coast Guard's
    needs and the President's budget request. In an effort to
    address the funding constraints it has faced annually, the
    Coast Guard has been reactive, reducing its capability by
    delaying new acquisitions but the Service does not have a plan
    to realistically set forth affordable priorities.\7\ These
    shortcomings have seriously jeopardized Coast Guard
    capabilities across several vital areas, including shoreside
    infrastructure and surface assets.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \6\ Id. at 12.
        \7\ Id. at 13.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                   III. COAST GUARD SURFACE ASSET ACQUISITION

    OFFSHORE PATROL CUTTER (OPC)

        The Coast Guard has stated that the acquisition of the OPC
    is its highest investment priority as it will be the work horse
    of the Coast Guard's offshore presence.\8\ The Service intends
    to replace its 29 medium-endurance Cutters, all of which have
    far surpassed their planned service lives and are becoming
    increasingly expensive to maintain and operate, with 25
    OPCs.\9\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisition Directorate, Offshore
    Patrol Cutter, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/
    Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Surface-Programs/
    Offshore-Patrol-Cutter/ [hereinafter Coast Guard Acquisition
    Directorate]
        \9\ Cong. Rsch. Serv., R42567, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement:
    Background and Issues for Congress 1 (June 21, 2023), available at
    https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/R/R42567/162 [hereinafter
    Coast Guard Cutter Procurement].
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The first four OPCs are being built by Eastern Shipbuilding
    Group (ESG) of Panama City, Florida.\10\ Unable to meet the
    terms of the contract signed in 2018, ESG sought a cash
    infusion from the Coast Guard in order to maintain operations
    at their yard.\11\ The Department of Homeland Security
    subsequently authorized up to $659 million in relief for the
    yard, including up to $65 million for costs not related OPC
    construction, in order to shore up the yard's financial
    position.\12\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ Id. at 10.
        \11\ Id. at 9-10.
        \12\ United States Coast Guard, Offshore Patrol Cutters
    Acquisition: Extraordinary Relief (FY 2022, Fourth Quarter) Rep. to
    Cong. (Mar. 8, 2023) (on file with Comm.).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        On June 30, 2022, the Coast Guard announced it had awarded
    the phase-II fixed-price incentive contract to Austal USA of
    Mobile, Alabama, to produce up to 11 OPCs.\13\ The Service's
    proposed fiscal year (FY) 2024 budget requests $579.0 million
    in procurement funding for the construction of the sixth OPC,
    the procurement of long lead-time materials (LLTM) for the
    seventh OPC, and other program costs.\14\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Id. at 13.
        \14\ Id. at 1.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Although the OPC is labeled as a key priority for the Coast
    Guard, serious program mismanagement has led to long delays,
    cost overruns, and the emergence of a gap in the Coast Guard's
    medium endurance capabilities. A June 2023 GAO report found
    that the OPC's total acquisition cost estimate increased from
    $12.5 billion to $17.6 billion between 2012 and 2022.\15\ The
    program attributes the 40 percent increase to many factors,
    including restructuring the stage one contract [for OPCs one
    through four] and recompeting the stage two requirement [for
    OPCs five through 15].\16\ In addition, the program incurred a
    one and a half year delay in the delivery of the first four
    OPCs issues related to manufacturing the Cutter's propulsion
    system.\17\ GAO also found indicators that the shipbuilder's
    significant level of complex, uncompleted work may lead to
    further delays.\18\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ United States Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-23-105805, Coast
    Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program Needs To Mature
    Technology and Design 28 (June 2023), available at https://www.gao.gov/
    assets/gao-23-105805.pdf.
        \16\ Coast Guard Cutter Procurement, supra note 9, at 28.
        \17\ Id. at 28.
        \18\ Id. at 37.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The GAO attributed these delays and cost overruns to
    fundamental flaws in the Coast Guard's design and construction
    process.\19\ The GAO found that the Coast Guard used a high-
    risk approach to the acquisition of the OPC that attempts to
    concurrently overlap the acquisition phases of technology
    development, design, and construction.\20\ While some overlap
    is common in the industry, the Coast Guard has exceeded
    industry standards.\21\ Specifically, the Coast Guard does not
    require completion of basic and functional design, and maturity
    of all critical technologies, nor does it require completion of
    the design of distributive systems--systems that affect
    multiple zones of the ship--prior to construction of the lead
    ship.\22\ These approaches could, and likely will, result in
    the need for significant design rework late in construction,
    further increasing costs and delays.\23\ This will subsequently
    extend the Coast Guard's dependence on its current fleet of
    medium-endurance cutters, continuing to strain the Coast
    Guard's budget with increased repair and maintenance costs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ Id. at 16.
        \20\ Id. at 15.
        \21\ Id. at 15.
        \22\ Id. at 24.
        \23\ Id. at 16.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    POLAR SECURITY CUTTER (PSC)

        The Coast Guard anticipates the need for enhanced Arctic
    capabilities in the coming years to support United States
    economic, security, and scientific interests.\24\ The Polar
    Star is currently the Coast Guard's only operational heavy ice
    breaker. Commissioned in 1976, the Polar Star has far surpassed
    its regular service life and has been dependent on constant
    service life extension programs to allow it to function--
    heavily straining Coast Guard resources.\25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \24\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, Polar
    Security Cutter, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
    Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/
    Surface-Programs/Polar-Icebreaker/ [hereinafter Polar Security Cutter
    Acquisitions].
        \25\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In 2019, the Coast Guard and United States Navy, operating
    through an integrated program office, awarded VT Halter Marine
    Inc. of Pascagoula, Mississippi, a fixed price incentive
    contract for the detail, design and construction of the lead
    PSC. The yard was subsequently purchased by Bollinger
    Mississippi. Construction on the first PSC was planned to begin
    in 2022, with contract delivery planned for the mid-2020s.\26\
    The contract includes financial incentives for earlier
    delivery. However, construction of the PSC has yet to begin due
    to design delays that have plagued the program, and the Coast
    Guard is unable to commit to a timeline for when the first PSC
    will be mission ready.\27\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ Id.
        \27\ Review of Fiscal Year 2024 Budget Request for the Coast Guard:
    Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime Transp.,
    118th Cong. (2023) (response from Adm. Linda Fagan, Commandant of the
    United States Coast Guard).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    WATERWAYS COMMERCE CUTTER (WCC)

        The Coast Guard maintains a fleet of inland water craft
    responsible for maintaining more than 28,200 marine aids to
    navigation throughout 12,000 miles of inland waterways, on
    which 630 million tons of cargo move annually.\28\ The current
    fleet of inland tenders has been in operation for an average of
    more than 57 years, far exceeding their design service
    life.\29\ The Coast Guard established the WCC Program after
    Congress provided funds to replace the capability provided by
    the inland tender fleet with 16 River Buoy Tenders, 11 Inland
    Construction Tenders, and three Inland Buoy Tenders.\30\ To
    increase efficiency, these vessels will be self-propelled
    monohulls instead of the current tug-and-barge
    configuration.\31\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, Waterways
    Commerce Cutter, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
    Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/
    Surface-Programs/WCC/.
        \29\ Id.
        \30\ Id.
        \31\ Cong. Rsch Serv., IF11672, Coast Guard Waterways Commerce
    Cutter (WCC) Program: Background and Issues for Congress (2023),
    available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11672.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard has faced significant issues with the
    acquisition process as it relates to small business
    requirements. The initial contract was awarded to Birdon
    America, Inc., located in Denver, Colorado, in October of 2022.
    However, after the contract was awarded, challenges to the
    contract award were made based on the small business set aside
    requirements (FAR 52.219 14).\32\ Despite initially determining
    that Birdon met its small business requirements during its pre-
    decision evaluation, on May 26, 2023, the Small Business
    Administration (SBA) informed the Coast Guard that Birdon,
    under its WCC proposal, does not meet the status of a small
    business. The Coast Guard's legal analysis concluded that a new
    size determination does not prevent the Service from continuing
    contract performance; however, the Coast Guard continues to
    evaluate all potential options while the SBA proceedings
    progress.\33\ As a result, the Service may be unable to count
    the WCC construction against its small business set-aside
    requirement.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \32\ United States Coast Guard Briefing to Congress, Waterways
    Commerce Cutter (WCC) Contract Award Brief (June 21, 2023) (on file
    with Comm.) [hereinafter Coast Guard Cutter Briefing].
        \33\ Email from Earl Potter, Commander, United States Coast Guard,
    to Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Maritime Transp. Staff (May 30, 2023,
    17:07 EST) (on file with Comm.).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    NATIONAL SECURITY CUTTER (NSC)

        The Legend-class National Security Cutter (NSC) is the most
    capable cutter in the Coast Guard's fleet, capable of executing
    challenging operations, including supporting maritime homeland
    security and defense missions. The Coast Guard's Program of
    Record (POR) originally called for eight NSCs to replace the
    Service's fleet of 12 high endurance cutters.\34\ The NSCs were
    originally intended to operate in excess of 185 days per year
    to maximize operational capability, but based on crew and
    maintenance concerns, the Coast Guard now intends to operate
    the vessels for a maximum of 185 days per year.\35\ Congress
    has funded 11 vessels. The tenth vessel is scheduled for
    delivery later this year.\36\ As the NSC program winds down,
    that opportunity to acquire additional NSCs has likely been
    missed.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \34\ Coast Guard Acquisition Directorate, supra note 8.
        \35\ United States Coast Guard, Report to Congress: Analyzing Cost
    and Performance for National Security Cutter Operational Employment
    (2023) (on file with Comm.).
        \36\ Polar Security Cutter Acquisitions, supra note 24.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                     IV. COAST GUARD AIR ASSET ACQUISITION

    MH-65 REPLACEMENT PROGRAM

        The MH-65 currently makes up the majority of the Coast
    Guard's rotary-wing fleet, and the Service is the largest
    single operation of the platform in the world. However, in 2018
    Airbus Helicopters announced it was ending production of the
    civilian variant of the MH-65, impacting the supply chain and
    resulting in shortages of critical parts for the fleet.\37\ The
    Coast Guard is part of the Department of Defense's (DOD) Future
    Vertical Lift (FVL) program, which is expected to reach initial
    operating capability by the late 2030's and full operating
    capability by the late 2040's.\38\ The Service Life Extension
    Program (SLEP) for the MH-65 will not be able to cover this
    gap, leaving the Coast Guard with a critical air capability
    shortage.\39\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \37\ United States Coast Guard Briefing to Congress, Coast Guard
    Rotary-Wing Fleet Transition (January 24, 2023) (on file with Comm.)
    [hereinafter Coast Guard Rotary-Wing Briefing].
        \38\ Id.
        \39\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard intends to replace its existing fleet of
    MH-65s with MH-60s, a platform which the Service currently
    operates. Furthermore, the Coast Guard plans to replace them on
    a basis of flight-hour parity.\40\ Due to the MH-60's higher
    endurance in comparison to the MH-65, the Coast Guard believes
    it can downsize its fleet without losing mission
    capability.\41\ There is considerable risk, however, that
    downsizing the fleet would dangerously limit the Coast Guard's
    ability to respond to simultaneous emergencies or mass
    causality events. At the same time, the introduction of a
    folding-tail design, used on the Navy's variant, which is
    needed accommodate the larger aircraft on Coast Guard surface
    vessels, has the potential to introduce increased maintenance
    and operational challenges.\42\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \40\ Id.
        \41\ Id.
        \42\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    HC-130J ACQUISITION

        The Coast Guard uses fixed wing assets to provide heavy air
    transport and long-range maritime patrol capability.\43\ Each
    aircraft is capable of serving as an on-scene command and
    control platform or as a surveillance platform with the means
    to detect, classify and identify objects, and share that
    information with operational forces across multiple
    domains.\44\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \43\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate, HC-130J
    Long Range Surveillance Aircraft, available at https://
    www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-
    Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/Air-Programs/LRS-HC-130J/.
        \44\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard is acquiring a fleet of 22 new, fully
    missionized HC-130J aircraft to replace its legacy HC-
    130Hs.\45\ Advances in engine and propeller technology
    incorporated in the HC-130J provides a 20 percent increase in
    speed and altitude, and a 40 percent increase in range compared
    to the outgoing HC-130H platform.\46\ This will increase the
    Coast Guard's ability to respond to emergencies, conduct long
    range search and rescue, and counter illicit operations. H.R.
    2741, The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, which passed
    out of the Committee on April 26, 2023, authorizes $138,500,000
    for the acquisition or procurement of one missionized HC-130J
    aircraft.\47\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \45\ United States Coast Guard Briefing to Congress, Quarterly
    Acquisition Briefing (Feb. 2023) (on file with Comm.).
        \46\ Coast Guard Cutter Briefing, supra note 32.
        \47\ Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, H.R. 2741, 118th Cong.
    (2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                         V. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY (IT)

        The Coast Guard requires enhancements to its shoreside and
    cyber infrastructure to facilitate new assets and more complex
    mission sets. Currently, limitations in existing physical and
    data infrastructure have hindered newer platforms from
    utilizing the full scope of their capabilities. H.R. 2741, The
    Coast Guard Authorization Bill of 2023, authorizes $36,300,000
    to modernize the Coast Guard's IT systems.\48\ The bill also
    provides additional funds for the Coast Guard to update the
    Merchant Marine Credentialing System, which will improve
    recruitment and retention efforts for Merchant Mariners.\49\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \48\ Id.
        \49\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Investment in IT capabilities will also allow the Service
    to better support its members. On April 9, 2018, DOD announced
    its intent to partner with the Coast Guard to deploy its
    electronic health record (EHR) capability across the Service's
    clinics and sick bays.\50\ On June 7, 2018, the Coast Guard and
    the Defense Health Agency (DHA), the agency responsible for the
    DOD's health care system, signed an Inter-Agency Agreement that
    formally established the partnership to deploy MHS GENESIS.\51\
    The Electronic Health Records Acquisition (EHRA) will modernize
    the Coast Guard's health care data management by acquiring an
    EHR solution in place of its primarily paper-based health
    record system.\52\ Having an EHR capability will make patient
    record retrieval easier and faster, reduce administrative
    errors, and allow electronic information exchange with the DOD,
    the Department of Veterans' Affairs, and commercial care
    providers.\53\ The Coast Guard's EHR program, once fully
    implemented, will service all Coast Guard clinics and sick
    bays--ashore and afloat.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \50\ United States Coast Guard, Acquisitions Directorate,
    Electronic Health Records, available at https://www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-
    Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-Acquisitions-CG-9/Programs/C4ISR-
    Programs/Electronic-Health-Records-Acquisition/ [hereinafter Electronic
    Health Records Directive].
        \51\ Id.
        \52\ Id.
        \53\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In November of 2021, the Coast Guard deployed the MHS
    GENESIS electronic health records (EHR) system to 26 clinics
    and 48 ashore sickbays within the Coast Guard Atlantic Area,
    completing the first segment of EHR system implementation for
    the service. With Segment A now complete, a total of 43 ashore
    clinics and 67 ashore sick bays are using MHS GENESIS for EHR
    management. The Pacific wave was completed earlier this fall.
    The program will now move to the next segment of the deployment
    strategy, known as Segment B. Segment B includes modernization
    of the Coast Guard's entire medical and dental radiology
    system. The Coast Guard is targeting completion for Segment B
    for early summer 2024. The final segment, Segment C, will
    extend an EHR capability to all afloat sickbays; that schedule
    is still being determined.\54\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \54\ United States Coast Guard, Coast Guard launches electronic
    health records system in Atlantic Area, available at https://
    www.dcms.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/Assistant-Commandant-for-
    Acquisitions-CG-9/Newsroom/Latest-Acquisition-News/Article/2838468/
    coast-guard-launches-electronic-health-records-system-in-atlantic-
    area/.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          VI. SHORESIDE INFRASTRUCTURE

        The Coast Guard owns or leases more than 20,000 shore
    facilities, such as piers, docks, boat stations, air stations,
    and housing units at more than 2,700 locations.\55\ Coast Guard
    shoreside infrastructure is aging rapidly, with 40 percent of
    its buildings being 50 years or older.\56\ These buildings and
    infrastructure are also exposed to harsh environments, with
    salt air, high winds, and water contributing to their
    corrosion.\57\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \55\ United States Gov't Accountability Off., GAO-19-82 Coast Guard
    Shore Infrastructure, available at https://www.gao.gov/assets/700/
    697012.pdf.
        \56\ Mike Gooding, ``USCG Commandant says infrastructure
    `antiquated' and `crumbling','' 13NewsNow, (Feb. 20, 2020), available
    at https://www.13newsnow.com/article/news/national/military-news/uscg-
    commandant-says-infrastructure-antiquated-and-crumbling/291-80c90197-
    1e82-4ecd-92f7-c6a9b07f954a.
        \57\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        The Coast Guard's Office of Civil Engineering sets agency-
    wide civil engineering policy, which includes facility
    planning, design, construction, maintenance, and disposal of
    real property.\58\ The Service's Shore Infrastructure Logistics
    Center (SILC), established in 2009, is tasked with the
    management and coordination of infrastructure condition
    assessments via six regional Civil Engineering Units (CEUs),
    along with other divisions and offices, in addition to
    implementing shore infrastructure policies.\59\ The condition
    of individual shore infrastructure assets is determined by CEU
    personnel and civil engineers in the field.\60\ According to
    the Service, every facility is to be inspected by a CEU
    representative every three years.\61\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \58\ Electronic Health Records Directive, supra note 50.
        \59\ Id.
        \60\ Id.
        \61\ Id.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        A 2019 GAO report stated that the Coast Guard has more than
    a $2.6 billion backlog in deferred or overdue maintenance,
    repair, and recapitalization work for its shoreside
    infrastructure.\62\ Importantly, the Service estimates that
    when factoring in recapitalization projects for which it has
    not made cost estimates on, the recapitalization backlog likely
    exceeds $3 billion.\63\ The 2023 Coast Guard Authorization Act
    authorizes $400,000,000 for maintenance, construction, and
    repairs for Coast Guard shoreside infrastructure.\64\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \62\ Id.
        \63\ Id.
        \64\ Coast Guard Rotary-Wing Briefing, supra note 37.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                 VII. WITNESSES

         LVice Admiral Paul Thomas, Deputy Commandant for
    Mission Support, United States Coast Guard
         LMarie Mak, Director, Contracting and National
    Security, United States Government Accountability Office

        REVIEW OF THE RECAPITALIZATION OF THE UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
                     SURFACE, AIR, IT, AND SHORESIDE ASSETS

                                  ----------

                            Thursday, July 27, 2023

                      House of Representatives,
              Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime
                                        Transportation,
                Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:32 p.m. in
    room 2253 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Webster
    (Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
    Maritime Transportation will come to order.
        I ask for unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized
    to declare a recess at any time during the hearing, and without
    objection, show that ordered.
        I also ask unanimous consent that Members who are not
    members of the subcommittee be permitted to sit in the
    subcommittee today and ask questions during the hearing.
        Without objection, show that ordered.
        As a reminder, if you have a document to submit, submit it
    to the House also at DocumentsTI@mail.house.gov.
        I now recognize myself for the purpose of an opening
    statement for 5 minutes.

    OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL WEBSTER OF FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN,
        SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

        Mr. Webster of Florida. Before we begin the discussion of
    the hearing topic at hand, I want to commend the Coast Guard
    for undertaking Operation Fouled Anchor, an investigation of
    sexual assault and harassment incidents at the Coast Guard
    Academy from the late 1980s to early 2000s. As a grandfather of
    13 granddaughters, I was horrified by the report, and the
    Service must use the data gleaned from this review to better
    protect future cadets.
        However, like many of my colleagues, I urge the Coast Guard
    to share important Service oversight actions with Congress as a
    routine matter of day-to-day operations, rather than being
    forced to do it by some sort of press pressure.
        Turning now to the topic at hand, today our subcommittee
    will receive testimony on the Coast Guard's efforts to
    recapitalize its surface, air, IT, and shoreside assets. I
    would like to welcome our witnesses, Vice Admiral Paul Thomas,
    Deputy Commandant of the Coast Guard for mission support, and
    Marie Mak, Director of Contracting and National Security
    Acquisitions at the United States Government Accountability
    Office.
        Ms. Mak, I understand, is retiring at the end of next
    month, and this will probably be the last of the many
    congressional hearings you have attended. This will be it. So,
    I hope we will make it memorable, but not too memorable.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Webster of Florida. On behalf of the subcommittee, I
    would like to thank you for your contributions over the last
    decade to the subcommittee's oversight of Coast Guard
    acquisition programs. Thank you so much. I appreciate that. In
    the spirit of today's hearing, we all wish you fair winds and
    following seas as you embark on your next chapter.
        The Coast Guard is in the middle of a multidecade
    recapitalization campaign to replace aging surface and air
    assets. There have been many successes in this effort. The
    Coast Guard is nearing completion of the 11-ship Bertholf class
    National Security Cutters and the, at present, 64-ship Webber
    class Fast Response Cutters.
        The Coast Guard has acquired 15 C-130J long-range aircraft;
    18 C0144s, and 14 C-27 mid-range aircraft, and reengined the
    MH-65 rotary-wing aircraft. Are those still available? The
    Service has also made significant investments in the shoreside
    facilities necessary to homeport these new assets, but many
    additional home port and hangar upgrades are needed.
        Unfortunately, no administration of either party has
    requested anything even approaching the resources necessary to
    carry out this recapitalization in an efficient and cost-
    effective manner. Congress has provided more resources than
    those requested by multiple administrations, but Congress was
    only able to go so far beyond the requested levels. These
    paltry budgets dramatically stretch out timelines for these
    programs.
        The Coast Guard says that the timeline has moved to the
    right. It has. It keeps moving. Program delays always raise
    program costs. They delay the implementation of the next-in-
    line programs. These delays also reduce the Coast Guard's
    mission capability as legacy assets degrade. In addition, older
    assets require greater maintenance and repair, and costs
    increase.
        Delays prevent the Service from maintaining its shoreside
    assets, and they prevent the Coast Guard from meaningful
    participation in the ongoing digital revolution. Throughout
    this long saga--made longer by severely constrained budgets--
    world and domestic events, new and evolving congressional and
    executive branch policy priorities, and rapidly changing
    maritime technology have all contributed to expanding the scope
    and requirements of Coast Guard mission responsibilities.
        In short, we expect the Coast Guard to do more without
    giving them the resources to carry out their existing programs.
        This committee has consistently produced bills that
    authorized the amounts we believe are the minimum necessary to
    keep the Service from falling behind. However, appropriations
    and administration budget requests then leave the Coast Guard
    at the dock, allowing mission capability creep downward while
    increasing maintenance and construction backlogs.
        Nonetheless, this subcommittee will continue to authorize
    the procurement, construction, and improvement account at
    levels that would at least keep the Coast Guard from losing
    more ground. This is not to say that the Coast Guard doesn't
    have acquisition problems of its own making. In the future, the
    committee hopes that the Coast Guard will use proven parent
    craft designs, and design first, then build.
        The subcommittee looks forward to hearing today how the
    Coast Guard will upgrade and replace aging shoreside
    infrastructure and antiquated IT systems; build its largest,
    most expensive single class of ships; and replace the rapidly
    aging H-65s over the next 15 years.
        So, this is a lot longer than I thought it would be, so, I
    am going to stop there. That is plenty of stuff said already,
    and we just appreciate this opportunity we have.
        But I just wanted to say the subcommittee is deeply
    concerned about the limited ability of the Service to access
    data about the United States documented vessels. As the Federal
    entity tasked with documenting vessels, that information should
    be at your fingertips, and it isn't.
        [Mr. Webster of Florida's prepared statement follows:]

        Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster of Florida, Chairman,
            Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
        Before we begin discussion of the hearing topic at hand, I want to
    commend the Coast Guard for undertaking Operation Fouled Anchor, an
    investigation of sexual assault and harassment incidents at the Coast
    Guard Academy from the late 1980's through the early 2000's. As a
    grandfather of 13 granddaughters, I was horrified by the report, and
    the Service must use the data gleaned from this review to better
    protect future cadets.
        However, like many of my colleagues, I urge the Coast Guard to
    share important Service oversight actions with Congress as a routine
    matter of day-to-day operations, rather than being forced to do so by
    impending press coverage.
        Turning now to our hearing topic, today our subcommittee will
    receive testimony on the Coast Guard's efforts to recapitalize its
    surface, air, IT, and shoreside assets. I'd like to welcome our
    witnesses--Vice Admiral Paul Thomas, Deputy Commandant of the Coast
    Guard for Mission Support, and Marie Mak, Director of Contracting and
    National Security at the United States Government Accountability
    Office.
        Ms. Mak, I understand that you will be retiring at the end of next
    month, and this will be the last of many Congressional hearings at
    which you have testified for GAO. On behalf of the Subcommittee, I
    would like to thank you for your contributions over the last decade to
    the Subcommittee's ongoing oversight of Coast Guard acquisition
    programs. In the spirit of today's hearing, we all wish you fair winds
    and following seas as you embark on your next chapter.
        The Coast Guard is in the middle of a multi-decade recapitalization
    campaign to replace its aging surface and air assets. There have been
    many successes in this effort. The Coast Guard is nearing completion of
    the 11-ship BERTHOLF class National Security Cutters, and the, at
    present, 64-ship WEBBER class Fast Response Cutters.
        The Coast Guard has acquired 15 C-130J long range aircraft, 18 C-
    144, and 14 C-27 medium range aircraft, and reengined the MH-65 rotary
    wing aircraft. The Service has also made significant investments in the
    shoreside facilities necessary to homeport these new assets, but many
    additional homeport and hangar upgrades are needed.
        Unfortunately, no administration of either party has requested
    anything even approaching the resources necessary to carry out this
    recapitalization in an efficient and cost-effective manner. Congress
    has provided more resources than those requested by multiple
    administrations, but Congress was only able to go so far beyond the
    requested levels. These paltry budgets dramatically stretch out
    timelines for these programs. The Coast Guard says, ``The timeline has
    moved to the right,'' almost as often as it says ``Semper paratus.''
        Program delays always raise program costs. They delay
    implementation of the next-in-line programs. These delays also reduce
    the Coast Guard's mission capability as legacy assets degrade. In
    addition, older assets require greater maintenance and repair, and
    costs increase.
        Delays prevent the Service from maintaining its shoreside assets,
    and they prevent the Coast Guard from meaningfully participating in the
    ongoing digital revolution. Throughout this long saga, made longer by
    severely constrained budgets, world and domestic events, new and
    evolving Congressional and Executive Branch policy priorities, and
    rapidly changing maritime technology have all contributed to expanding
    the scope and requirements of Coast Guard mission responsibilities.
        In short, we expect the Coast Guard to do more without giving them
    the resources to carry out their existing programs. This committee has
    consistently produced bills that authorized the amounts we believe are
    the minimum necessary to keep the Service from falling behind. However,
    appropriations and administration budget requests then leave the Coast
    Guard at the dock, allowing mission capability creep downward while
    increasing maintenance and construction backlogs.
        Nonetheless, this subcommittee will continue to authorize the
    Procurement, Construction and Improvement Account at levels that would
    at least keep the Coast Guard from losing more ground. This is not to
    say that the Coast Guard doesn't have acquisitions problems of its own
    making. In the future, the Committee hopes the Coast Guard will use
    proven parent craft designs, and design first, then build.
        The Subcommittee looks forward to hearing today how the Coast Guard
    will upgrade and replace its aging shoreside infrastructure and
    antiquated IT systems, build its largest, most expensive single class
    of ships, and replace its rapidly aging H-65s over the next 15 years.
        While the Coast Guard must be commended for squeezing the most out
    of its current assets, we owe the men and women of the Coast Guard--
    from whom we expect so much and always get even more--the adequate
    tools and resources to do their jobs effectively and safely. Efforts to
    secure new Polar Security Cutters and Offshore Patrol Cutters are still
    in relatively early stages. And work is also underway to replace the
    Service's inland tender fleet.
        The Committee looks forward to learning how these programs are
    going to be completed.
        We are particularly interested in whether the Department of
    Homeland Security and the Office of Management and Budget support
    building two Offshore Patrol Cutters each year. Without a two-a-year
    strategy, which the Coast Guard has long advocated, current Medium
    Endurance Cutters will age out before replacements are available.
        Additionally, unless Polar Security Cutters come online by 2028,
    the United States polar region presence will be maintained by the then
    nearly 30-year-old HEALEY, a research icebreaker. Russia and China, not
    even an Arctic Nation, will both have a significant polar operational
    presence by then. We should not expect academic fishery biologists and
    physical oceanographers, however talented they may be, to be the first
    line of United States sovereignty in the Arctic.
        A new fleet of Polar Security Cutters is critical to advancing our
    Nation's sovereignty in the polar regions. The program is half a decade
    behind its unrealistic original schedule. I am optimistic that new
    leadership at the shipyard is moving the program forward. I look
    forward to hearing from our witnesses on how the Coast Guard will
    correct missteps in the procurement and contracting process.
        Coast Guard aviation also needs to replace its no-longer-
    manufactured MH-65s. While the MH-60 is more capable than the MH-65, I
    oppose the plan to reduce the total number of aircraft. I am also
    concerned about the proposed MH-60 modifications needed for sea
    operations.
        As the Coast Guard modernizes its aviation assets, hangars and
    other ground assets also need to keep pace. The Committee will continue
    to monitor progress as the Coast Guard builds a new hangar at Barbers
    Point.
        Finally, these assets, new and old, require IT and shoreside
    support. The Coast Guard's IT infrastructure, including its merchant
    mariner credentialling system, is antiquated and presents serious
    limitations.
        The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, reported out by this
    Committee, authorizes $36.3 million to modernize the Coast Guard's IT
    systems, including $11 million for a new Merchant Mariner Credentialing
    System. The Subcommittee is also deeply concerned about the limited
    ability of the Service to access data about United States documented
    vessels. As the federal entity tasked with documenting vessels, that
    information should be at your fingertips.
        To our witnesses--thank you for participating today. I look forward
    to a candid discussion on how Congress can support the Coast Guard's
    efforts to modernize its assets, systems, and facilities.

        Mr. Webster of Florida. So, anyway, now I would like to
    recognize Ranking Member Carbajal for an opening statement for
    5 minutes.
        You are recognized.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. SALUD O. CARBAJAL OF CALIFORNIA,
       RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME
                             TRANSPORTATION

        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Chairman Webster, and I will take
    up the rest of your time that you don't want to take on.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Carbajal. So, today we are gathered here to discuss and
    review the Coast Guard's acquisition programs for new cutters,
    boats, airplanes, helicopters, shoreside infrastructure, and
    information technology.
        Prior to getting started, I would like to echo the concerns
    expressed by Chairman Webster regarding the Coast Guard's
    handling of sexual assault and harassment cases during the
    1980s through the early 2000s. The investigation itself, dubbed
    Operation Fouled Anchor, took place from 2014 through 2020.
        After the conclusion of the investigation, the Coast Guard
    then made the reprehensible and irresponsible decision to hide
    the investigation--to hide the investigation--and its findings
    from Congress and the American public, as well. Victim privacy
    is a paramount concern, but choosing not to disclose to
    Congress the existence of the investigation and purposely
    hiding it from any reporting mechanism is shameful, to say the
    least.
        Earlier this week, Ranking Member Larsen, Vice Ranking
    Member Scholten, and I sent a letter to the GAO requesting they
    review the Coast Guard's handling of this investigation and
    management of their Sexual Assault Prevention, Response, and
    Recovery Program. I look forward to getting answers and
    improving Coast Guard procedures.
        To all the victims that never saw justice and went unheard
    for years, we hear you and feel your pain. You were brave for
    coming forward and deserve closure. We will do our best to
    remedy this and prevent this from happening to other
    servicemembers. I am sorry you have to relive this pain again.
        Now, turning to the topic of this hearing, the Coast Guard
    is in the middle of modernizing their fleet, and yet they
    continue to operate ships that are well past their intended
    service life. This is in part due to lack of funding from
    Congress, but also due to delays in production of newer
    cutters.
        As we have learned from multiple GAO reports, the Coast
    Guard's acquisitions typically come in delayed and over budget.
    This is concerning. This is a concerning trend that I hope we
    can get to the bottom of today, but it is not something that
    can be fixed overnight.
        Improving the acquisition program requires investing more
    into the Coast Guard so that they can bolster their oversight.
    It also requires investing more in U.S. shipbuilding to ensure
    we have shipyards capable of building the assets we need. U.S.
    shipyards depend on contracts from the Navy and Coast Guard to
    support their business, but the Coast Guard is often outbid by
    the size and value of Navy contracts.
        We must bring on new cutters, shoreside infrastructure, and
    IT systems quickly. Not only do modern assets mean improved
    mission readiness, they also mean better quality of life for
    our Coasties. Newer cutters mean better connectivity and
    ability for Coasties to contact their families while at sea,
    leading to improved mental health and higher retention rates.
        Servicemembers want their families to live in the best
    quality housing. That starts with investing more in shoreside
    infrastructure and eliminating the estimated $3 billion
    backlog.
        Ultimately, our servicemembers deserve to live and work in
    assets that aren't on the brink of failure. Congress and Coast
    Guard leadership owe it to the personnel to deliver this. That
    is why we cannot revert to fiscal year 2022 funding levels, and
    we must fund the Coast Guard at a higher level than requested.
        GAO has recognized that the funding typically requested by
    the Coast Guard underestimates their needs for
    recapitalization.
        Before I conclude, I want to wish Ms. Mak congratulations
    on a successful career in public service and wish you a happy
    retirement. You and your team have done important oversight,
    and I thank you for all your hard work.
        With that, I yield back, Mr. Chair.
        [Mr. Carbajal's prepared statement follows:]

      Prepared Statement of Hon. Salud O. Carbajal of California, Ranking
        Member, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
        Today, we're gathered here to discuss and review the Coast Guard's
    acquisition programs for new cutters, boats, airplanes, helicopters,
    shoreside infrastructure and information technology.
        Prior to getting started, I would like to echo the concerns
    expressed by Chairman Webster regarding the Coast Guard's handling of
    sexual assault and harassment cases during the 1980's through early
    2000's. The investigation itself, dubbed ``Operation Fouled Anchor,''
    took place from 2014 through 2020.
        After the conclusion of the investigation, the Coast Guard then
    made the irresponsible decision to hide the investigation and its
    findings from Congress and the American public.
        Victim privacy is a paramount concern but choosing to not disclose
    to Congress the existence of the investigation and purposely hiding it
    from any reporting mechanism is shameful.
        Earlier this week, Ranking Member Larsen, Vice Ranking Member
    Scholten and I sent a letter to GAO requesting they review the Coast
    Guard's handling of this investigation and management of their sexual
    assault prevention, response and recovery program. I look forward to
    getting answers and improving Coast Guard procedures.
        To all the victims that never saw justice and went unheard for
    years, I hear you and feel your pain. You were brave for coming forward
    and deserve closure. We will do our best to remedy this and prevent
    this from happening to other servicemembers. I am sorry you have to
    relive this pain again.
        Now, turning to the topic of this hearing. The Coast Guard is in
    the middle of modernizing their fleet and yet they continue to operate
    ships that are well past their intended service life. This is in part
    due to lack of funding from Congress but also due to delays in
    production of newer cutters.
        As we've learned from multiple GAO reports, the Coast Guard's
    acquisitions typically come in delayed and over budget. This is a
    concerning trend that I hope we can get to the bottom of today but is
    not something that can be fixed overnight.
        Improving the acquisition program requires investing more into the
    Coast Guard so that they can bolster their oversight. It also requires
    investing more in U.S. shipbuilding to ensure we have shipyards capable
    of building the assets we need. U.S. shipyards depend on contracts from
    the Navy and Coast Guard to support their business, but the Coast Guard
    is often outbid by the size and value of Navy contracts.
        We must bring on newer cutters, shoreside infrastructure and IT
    systems quickly. Not only do modern assets mean improved mission
    readiness, they also mean better quality of life for our Coasties.
    Newer cutters mean better connectivity and ability for Coasties to
    contact their family while at sea, leading to improved mental health
    and higher retention rates.
        Servicemembers want their families to live in the best quality
    housing and that starts with investing more in shoreside infrastructure
    and eliminating the estimated $3 billion backlog.
        Ultimately, our servicemembers deserve to live and work in assets
    that aren't on the brink of failure. Congress and Coast Guard
    leadership owe it to the personnel to deliver this. That is why we
    cannot revert to fiscal year 2022 funding and must fund the Coast Guard
    at higher levels than requested.
        GAO has recognized that the funding typically requested by the
    Coast Guard underestimates their needs for recapitalization.
        Before I conclude, I want to wish Ms. Mak congratulations on a
    successful career and wish you a happy retirement. You and your team
    have done important oversight and I thank you for all of your hard
    work.
        With that, I yield back.

        Mr. Webster of Florida. Now I would like to welcome our
    witnesses and thank them for being here today.
        Briefly, I would like to take a moment to explain our
    lighting system. When the light is green, you can talk. When it
    gets yellow, it is about time to wrap it up. And red means
    stop. So, that is pretty much it.
        I also ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full
    statements be included in the record.
        Without objection, show that ordered.
        As your written testimony is made a part of the record, the
    committee asks that you limit your remarks to 5 minutes.
        With that, Vice Admiral Thomas, you are recognized for 5
    minutes for your testimony.

    TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PAUL F. THOMAS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR
    MISSION SUPPORT, U.S. COAST GUARD; AND MARIE A. MAK, DIRECTOR,
    CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT
                         ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    TESTIMONY OF VICE ADMIRAL PAUL F. THOMAS, DEPUTY COMMANDANT FOR
                   MISSION SUPPORT, U.S. COAST GUARD

        Admiral Thomas. Good afternoon, Chairman Webster, Ranking
    Member Carbajal, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    Thank you for this opportunity to speak about our Coast Guard's
    ongoing activities to recapitalize our surface and aviation
    fleets, our C5ISR and information technology, and our shore
    infrastructure. On behalf of the Commandant and our entire
    Coast Guard workforce, I express my sincere appreciation for
    your oversight and for your continuous support of our Service
    and our servicemen and servicewomen.
        While this hearing's focus is on Coast Guard
    recapitalization efforts, I must address the recent reports
    that you have mentioned of our failure to respond properly to
    sexual assaults that occurred at the Coast Guard Academy
    between 1988 and 2006.
        As you are aware and have mentioned, in 2014, we launched
    an extensive investigation into incidents alleged to have
    occurred during that time. And while we took action in cases in
    which we had jurisdiction, and we informed individual victims
    of our findings, we did not disclose the investigation or its
    findings to you, thereby depriving Congress of the opportunity
    to conduct proper oversight.
        I echo our Commandant's recent testimony in saying that was
    a failure on the part of the Coast Guard, and we own it.
        Our Service and our Academy have made much progress in our
    Sexual Assault Prevention, Response, and Recovery Program. But
    there is still work to do. This month, the Commandant directed
    a 90-day accountability and transparency review of our Service,
    led by a flag officer, and intended to ensure that we are doing
    absolutely everything possible to provide a culture where
    everyone is safe and valued.
        We are committed to improving our prevention efforts, we
    are committed to prompt and thorough investigations into
    reports of sexual assault and harassment, and we are committed
    to accountability for perpetrators, compassionate support to
    victims, and full transparency with Congress, our crews, and
    the American people. We are also committed to our mission and
    our service to America. And with this subcommittee's continued
    support, we have made tremendous progress across our portfolio
    of acquisition programs and shore infrastructure projects.
        However, we face tremendous challenges in this regard.
    Lingering delays from COVID-19, continuing supply chain
    restrictions, a shrinking labor pool and industrial base,
    record inflation, and the sheer complexity of the ships,
    aircraft, and systems that we are acquiring have resulted in
    risk to cost and risk to schedule across our portfolio. These
    challenges are not unique to the Coast Guard; our fellow
    services, Federal partners, and the private sector are facing
    them, as well.
        To meet these challenges and advance the Service's
    recapitalization efforts while properly planning for mission
    execution, we must have stable, predictable funding. Our
    Commandant has stated our Coast Guard must be a $20 billion
    organization by 2033. That means a 3- to 5-percent annual
    budget growth over inflation. Right now, increasing O&S costs
    caused by inflation reduce our ability to invest in
    recapitalization.
        Simply put, most of our recent funding increases go to
    running our Service, not to recapitalizing it.
        Despite these challenges, we are operating or building our
    fleet of the future, and delivering systems capability that
    will double down on our return investment. Our Offshore Patrol
    Cutter stage 1 contractor is poised to launch the first ship of
    that class this fall and deliver next year. I visited the
    shipyard and climbed aboard that ship. These will be tremendous
    ships that have enduring value for our Nation for years to
    come.
        And alongside the Navy, we are working with the new Polar
    Security Cutter contractor to accelerate detailed design and
    ensure readiness for full-scale production. This month,
    fabrication of the first prototype module will begin as we
    prepare for full construction next year. And we are excited
    that the design for the Waterways Commerce Cutter is
    progressing well, and we are on track to begin construction
    next year and deliver the first ship of that class in fiscal
    year 2026.
        We are also delivering new and recapitalized aviation
    assets, including standardized missionization packages across
    our fixed-wing fleet. And with your support, we are upgrading
    and extending life on the 865 and the 860 helicopters while
    moving to a fleet of all 860s as a bridge to the future
    vertical-lift capability of the 2040s.
        The Service continues to invest in home port upgrades to
    strategically pair the delivery of new and recapitalized assets
    with investments in our shore infrastructure. We are taking
    steps to address the extensive backlog of shore infrastructure
    projects, and we are committed to investing in these priorities
    to ensure world-class infrastructure for the world's best Coast
    Guard.
        Thank you for your efforts to provide our women and men in
    uniform with the mission capability they need to provide
    mission excellence to our Nation.
        I appreciate the opportunity to testify, and I look forward
    to any questions you may have.
        [Admiral Thomas' prepared statement follows:]

     Prepared Statement of Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant
                     for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard
                                  Introduction
        Good afternoon, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and
    distinguished members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for your continued
    oversight and strong support of the Coast Guard. I am honored to appear
    before you today to update you on our ongoing efforts to recapitalize
    our aging surface and aviation fleets; Command, Control,
    Communications, Computers, Cyber, Intelligence, Surveillance and
    Reconnaissance (C5ISR) systems; and shore infrastructure.
        We have never experienced a greater demand for Coast Guard
    services, and we anticipate this demand to grow in the future. We are
    focused on delivering capabilities to meet these demands and confront
    the dynamic and complex challenges that our Coast Guard men and women
    face. New and more capable Coast Guard cutters, aircraft, boats, and
    C5ISR systems support mission execution domestically and in some of the
    most challenging environments around the world, including the Polar
    Regions, Indo-Pacific, and Persian Gulf.
        Our Commandant has spoken about the need to adapt to the ever-
    increasing pace of change and provide our Coast Guard men and women
    with modern assets, systems, and infrastructure to support mission
    execution. In line with this direction, the Service continues to invest
    in acquisition programs that provide the assets and capabilities the
    Service needs to execute our missions world-wide. Additionally, the
    Coast Guard continues to prioritize investments in our shore
    infrastructure, where every mission begins and ends: the facilities,
    piers, runways, and buildings, which are as necessary for operations as
    our ships, boats, aircraft, and C5ISR systems.
        Indeed, recapitalization remains a top priority for the Commandant
    and the Service, and today's efforts to invest in tomorrow's needs will
    shape the Coast Guard and impact national security for decades. This
    Subcommittee's continued support has helped us make tremendous
    progress, and it is that critical we field assets that improve mission
    execution and deliver the capabilities the Nation needs. Simply put, we
    must act today to be prepared for tomorrow.
                     The Coast Guard Acquisition Enterprise
        As the Chief Mission Support Officer of the Coast Guard, I lead a
    talented team of professionals dedicated to building and maintaining a
    modern force of assets, infrastructure, and systems that meet the needs
    of the Service. Acquisitions require executable strategy which
    considers the need to plan and scope acquisitions before work begins;
    to oversee the design and production processes; and to prepare future
    crews and the maintenance community for the delivery and future
    operation of new capabilities.
        To bolster acquisition oversight, the Coast Guard developed an
    acquisition governance structure, pursued continued refinement of that
    structure, strengthened processes, institutionalized the roles of our
    technical authorities, and focused on recruiting and retaining a highly
    capable and trained acquisition workforce. We continue to implement
    initiatives to minimize acquisition risks and maximize affordability
    within our programs. We leverage the experience and expertise of our
    partners to perform key functions and guide Coast Guard decision-makers
    throughout the acquisition life cycle.
                       Status of Key Acquisition Efforts
        The Coast Guard continues to make progress in our efforts to
    recapitalize the Coast Guard fleet and support systems. The Service is
    taking delivery of new cutters, aviation assets, boats, C5ISR
    capabilities, and upgraded shore infrastructure and investing in
    critical mission-enabling service life extensions, major maintenance,
    and key upgrades of the legacy surface and aviation fleet to enhance
    mission readiness and performance.
    Surface Programs:
        With the strong support of this Subcommittee, we are moving forward
    with the acquisition of the Nation's first new heavy polar icebreakers
    in over four decades. Polar Security Cutter (PSC) design activities are
    ongoing, and initial long lead-time material has been delivered to the
    shipyard. Recognizing the critical need for these assets, the Service
    is working closely with the prime contractor to mitigate schedule risks
    and ensure production readiness. When fully operational, PSCs will
    provide the global reach and icebreaking capability necessary to
    project U.S. sovereignty and influence, conduct Coast Guard missions in
    the high latitudes, and advance our national interests in the Arctic
    and Antarctic regions.
        The Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) remains a top acquisition priority
    for the Service and is vital to recapitalizing the capability provided
    by our legacy fleet of 210-foot and 270-foot Medium Endurance Cutters
    (MEC). The program is progressing, with production of OPCs 1-4 underway
    with the Stage 1 contractor. Additionally, the Service is continuing
    with design activities on the Stage 2 contract, which will lead to the
    future production of up to 11 additional OPCs. As a bridging strategy
    to maintain mission capabilities until the OPCs are delivered, the
    Coast Guard has undertaken a service life extension program (SLEP) that
    will address key systems and component obsolescence on board the MECs,
    many of which already exceed 50 years in service.
        On October 5, 2022, the Coast Guard awarded the Waterways Commerce
    Cutter (WCC) contract for the design and future production of the river
    buoy tender and inland construction tender variants. The contract
    includes options for production of up to 27 cutters, and a separate
    effort is planned to deliver three inland buoy tenders to achieve a
    total fleet of 30 WCCs.
        The prime contractor began design activities earlier this year.
    Investment in our inland fleet is critical to the continued operation
    of the Nation's Marine Transportation System, which accounts for more
    than $4 trillion in annual economic activity. The legacy fleet is
    approaching obsolescence, maintenance costs are rising, and the vast
    majority of these cutters do not support mixed-gender berthing.
    Continued progress toward delivering these new assets and replacing the
    legacy fleet, which has an average age of over 55 years, is critical to
    maintaining the Coast Guard's capability to execute this important
    mission.
        The Service continues to deliver National Security Cutters (NSC)
    and Fast Response Cutters (FRC) to the fleet, providing game changing
    capabilities to operational commanders and supporting expanded mission
    demands around the globe. The Coast Guard plans to take delivery of NSC
    10, CGC Calhoun, later this year and has commissioned 52 FRCs into
    service (out of a program of record of 65 cutters).
        In concert with our efforts to acquire new assets, we are also
    focused on sustaining and improving our existing fleet through the In-
    Service Vessel Sustainment (ISVS) program. In recent years, the Coast
    Guard has completed the SLEP for the 140-foot icebreaking tug class and
    Coast Guard Cutter Eagle at the Coast Guard Yard in Curtis Bay,
    Maryland. The Service is approaching the completion of Major
    Maintenance Availability activities for the 225-foot seagoing buoy
    tenders; the last cutter is scheduled to leave the Coast Guard Yard in
    early 2024. After initiating two prototypes of a 270-foot MEC SLEP,
    industrial work on production began earlier this month.
        In addition, the ISVS program is overseeing continued SLEP work on
    Coast Guard Cutter Polar Star, the Service's only operational heavy
    polar icebreaker. The cutter recently began the third of five planned
    annual work periods to enable continued operation of the aging cutter
    and availability for the annual breakout of national facilities in
    Antarctica's McMurdo Sound.
        The Coast Guard is also making investments across the boat fleet,
    producing the next generation of cutter boats to enhance interdiction
    capabilities of parent cutters. Additionally, the Service initiated
    efforts to recapitalize the 52-foot heavy weather boat, a special
    purpose craft, and achieved Acquisition Decision Event One in April.
    The Coast Guard is also performing SLEP activities to extend the useful
    service life of the Service's 47-foot motor lifeboats by replacing
    obsolete, unsupportable, or maintenance-intensive equipment, and
    standardizing configuration across the fleet.
    Aviation Programs:
        The Service began production of new MH-60 hull components in March
    2023 to support the ongoing SLEP and continued transition of the
    rotary-wing fleets to a single airframe. When combined with structural
    fitting and dynamic component replacements through the SLEP, the new
    hulls will extend the service life of the Coast Guard's vertical lift
    capability into the 2040s. Service life extension work also continues
    on the H-65 fleet, including critical avionics upgrades. Nearly 70
    upgraded MH-65Es are performing operations at 11 Coast Guard air
    stations across the Nation.
        Acquisition of new C-130J airframes and missionization of the
    fixed-wing fleet (comprised of HC-130J long range surveillance aircraft
    and HC-27J/HC-144B medium range surveillance aircraft) are
    significantly enhancing the Coast Guard's capabilities to conduct
    airborne surveillance, detection, classification, and identification of
    vessels and other aircraft missions in coordination with the surface
    fleet and shoreside facilities.
        The Coast Guard is delivering standardized missionization packages
    based on the U.S. Navy's Minotaur Mission System Suite that improve
    system performance, address obsolescence concerns, improve cyber
    security of the mission system, and increase compatibility with
    Department of Defense and Department of Homeland Security assets and
    systems.
        Additionally, the Coast Guard continues to leverage the use of
    unmanned aircraft system (UAS) capabilities to support the surveillance
    and maritime domain awareness capabilities of the NSC fleet. All nine
    operational NSCs have been equipped with UAS infrastructure and
    equipment and routinely deploy with UAS capabilities as part of the
    cutter's total force package.
    C5ISR and Information Technology Programs:
        The Coast Guard is acquiring C5ISR and Information Technology (IT)
    systems that enhance the mission capabilities of new and recapitalized
    Coast Guard assets to operate in challenging environments. The systems
    provide standardized capability to major cutters and aircraft, enabling
    assets to receive, evaluate and act upon information, and facilitate
    interoperability and information sharing inside and outside the Coast
    Guard. IT efforts like the Coast Guard Logistics Information Management
    System (CG-LIMS) acquisition program and Cyber and Enterprise Mission
    Platform address needs to replace and modernize obsolete support
    systems to improve mission readiness and operational effectiveness.
    Shore Infrastructure:
        As the Commandant noted in her testimony before the Subcommittee,
    shore facility maintenance and recapitalization are critical to mission
    success. New, more capable assets must be paired with investments in
    our infrastructure needs. With the support of this Subcommittee and
    others, we are making progress towards addressing the extensive backlog
    of shoreside infrastructure projects. The Coast Guard is committed to
    taking a leading-edge approach to project planning and execution to
    ensure the Service has the modern and resilient infrastructure required
    to meet the operational demands of today and tomorrow.
                                   Conclusion
        Since 1790, the Coast Guard has safeguarded our Nation's maritime
    interests and natural resources on our rivers, in our ports, on the
    high seas, and around the world. Each day, the Coast Guard carries out
    its missions to protect lives, protect the environment, secure our
    maritime borders, and facilitate commerce. Our mission support and
    acquisition enterprises are, likewise, working each day to plan and
    deliver the assets and capabilities needed to support these critical
    missions.
        The cutters, aircraft, boats, C5ISR systems, and shoreside
    infrastructure we acquire today will provide vital capability for
    decades to come. We are committed to maximizing the Nation's return on
    these important investments. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
    before you today and for all you do for the women and men of the U.S.
    Coast Guard. I look forward to answering your questions.

        Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much. So, next we
    have Ms. Mak, and you are recognized for 5 minutes for your
    testimony.

     TESTIMONY OF MARIE A. MAK, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL
      SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

        Ms. Mak. Good afternoon, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member
    Carbajal, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for your
    kind words, and for inviting me here today to discuss Coast
    Guard's recapitalization efforts, and for valuing GAO's work
    over the years.
        Thank you also to the Coast Guard for recognizing our role
    and working with us to improve mission capabilities, how
    mission capabilities are acquired and delivered.
        I first testified before this committee on the same topic
    back in June 2017. As I reflected back from then to now, there
    are two constants: one, there is no doubt that these efforts to
    recapitalize continue to be critical for the Coast Guard to
    conduct its missions; two, unfortunately, the Coast Guard's
    highest priority acquisition programs continue on without sound
    business cases.
        A sound business case balances the necessary resources and
    knowledge needed to transform a chosen concept into a product.
    Our most recent reports on the Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) and
    Polar Security Cutter (PSC) indicate that the Coast Guard is
    not on track to deliver new ships on time or at initial
    estimated cost. This is because, without requisite knowledge,
    they continue to make optimistic assumptions about what they
    and their contractors can achieve.
        The Coast Guard has time after time prioritized moving
    quickly through the acquisition life cycle without obtaining
    critical levels of knowledge at key points in the process, and
    before making significant investments.
        But the Coast Guard is not unique from other military
    organizations when it comes to generally disappointing
    acquisition results. Like many other military organizations,
    the Coast Guard is driven to be overly optimistic, to
    overpromise performance at unrealistic cost and schedule, and,
    to put it simply, they do so to obtain funding. These
    incentives are more powerful than the policies to follow
    leading acquisition practices such as establishing sound
    business cases.
        The budget process also provides incentives for programs to
    be funded before sufficient knowledge is available to make key
    decisions. However, the impact of not taking the time to gain
    the right knowledge at the right time is costly. The Coast
    Guard uses the optimistic estimates of cost, schedule, and
    design maturity to inform its planning and budgets. Then,
    inevitably, as in most current acquisitions, when the ship's
    design and construction face challenges that increase cost and
    elongate schedules, the Coast Guard has to budget for these
    overruns, and critical future efforts are pushed off to pay for
    these overruns.
        The lack of sound business cases is also showing up in
    significant cost growth to sustain its existing assets. The
    Coast Guard has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on
    extending the older assets' service lives so that missions can
    be performed while waiting for the new assets. If this
    continues, affordability concerns will also continue.
        The Coast Guard can continue to remain in this reactive
    mode, delaying and reducing its capabilities slowly over time.
    But this is not an optimum approach, to say the least. As the
    Coast Guard continues modernizing its fleet and sustaining
    existing assets for much longer than planned, it is important
    that it develop sound business cases as part of a more
    strategic and comprehensive approach to managing its
    acquisition portfolio.
        Congress also has a role in demanding realistic business
    cases through the selection and timing of the programs it
    chooses to authorize and fund. What Congress does with funding
    sets the tone for what acquisition practices are acceptable.
    Congress could consider putting requirements in place to drive
    better acquisition behavior.
        For example, it could require the Coast Guard to fully
    complete design before shipbuilding construction starts, which
    is now what the Navy is required to do. This culture of undue
    optimism when starting programs really needs to shift away from
    the unrealistic business cases, and instead focusing on sound
    practices. Without this change, taxpayers are left holding the
    bill, and operators must make do with aging assets when
    acquisition programs fail to deliver as promised.
        Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, members of the
    subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be
    pleased to respond to any questions you may have. Thank you.
        [Ms. Mak's prepared statement follows:]

    Prepared Statement of Marie A. Mak, Director, Contracting and National
          Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office
         Coast Guard Recapitalization: Actions Needed to Better Manage
            Acquisition Programs and Address Affordability Concerns
                                   Highlights
    Why GAO Did This Study
        The U.S. Coast Guard, a component within the Department of Homeland
    Security, employs a variety of vessels and aircraft, several of which
    are approaching the end of their intended service lives. Consequently,
    the Coast Guard plans to invest billions of dollars in two of its
    highest priority programs--acquiring three heavy icebreakers, known as
    PSCs, and a fleet of 25 OPCs, which are ships that conduct a variety of
    missions in offshore waters.
        This statement addresses (1) the capabilities provided by the newer
    Coast Guard surface vessels, (2) the risks and consequences of not
    establishing sound business cases for two of Coast Guard's highest
    priority programs--the OPC and PSC, and (3) the overall affordability
    of the Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio. This statement is largely
    based on information from GAO-23-105805 and GAO-23-105949. Information
    about the scope and methodology of prior work on which this statement
    is based can be found in those products.
    What GAO Recommends
        GAO made seven recommendations in its 2023 reports on the OPC and
    PSC to better align the Coast Guard's acquisition policy and the
    programs' practices with shipbuilding leading practices. DHS and the
    Coast Guard agreed with five recommendations. Overall, GAO has made 40
    recommendations over the past decade, 14 of which remain open. GAO will
    continue to monitor DHS's and the Coast Guard's progress in addressing
    these recommendations.
    What GAO Found
        The Coast Guard is modernizing its vessels and aircraft, an effort
    known as recapitalization. Its newest cutters--the Offshore Patrol
    Cutter (OPC) and Polar Security Cutter (PSC)--are intended to deliver
    greater capability--such as time a ship can spend at sea without
    returning to port to resupply--than the legacy assets they will
    replace.
        GAO's prior work shows that successful shipbuilding programs use
    solid, executable business cases to design and build ships. They attain
    critical levels of knowledge--such as mature technologies, stable
    designs, and realistic cost estimates--at key points in the
    shipbuilding process before making significant investments. The Coast
    Guard, however, continues to face cost growth and schedule delays in
    some of its newer acquisitions because it has not obtained the right
    knowledge at the right time.
        Immature technologies. The critical technology of the first four
    OPCs--the davit (a crane that deploys and retrieves a cutter's small
    boats)--is still not matured. Without maturing the davit, the Coast
    Guard risks delays and costly rework.
        Unstable design. The PSC's design is not yet stable, which risks an
    extended design phase and contributed to a 3-year schedule delay in the
    shipyard, with the start of construction of the first cutter now
    planned for March 2024. Starting ship construction without a stable
    design risks costly rework.
        Combined, these two programs are billions of dollars over their
    initial cost estimates and are more than 2 years behind schedule,
    increasing the risk of potential capability gaps and putting cost
    pressure on the overall portfolio. For example, in June 2023, GAO
    reported that the Coast Guard projects to have a reduced number of
    cutters available for operation starting in 2024 and through 2039 due
    to the OPC's delivery delays. Since 2010, the Coast Guard has invested
    at least $850 million to maintain the aging Medium Endurance Cutters
    and Polar Star. The Coast Guard is investing $250 million to extend the
    service life for six cutters and $75 million to extend the service life
    of the almost 50-year-old Polar Star until the delayed OPCs and PSCs,
    respectively, are operational.
                                   __________
        Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the
    Subcommittee:
        I am pleased to be here today to discuss key challenges the U.S.
    Coast Guard continues to face as it acquires new assets--such as
    vessels and aircraft--an effort referred to as recapitalization, as
    well as the overall affordability of the Coast Guard's acquisition
    portfolio. The U.S. Coast Guard, within the Department of Homeland
    Security (DHS), is the principal federal agency responsible for
    maritime safety, security, and environmental stewardship in U.S. ports
    and waterways, and supports other missions, such as drug and migrant
    interdiction.
        As part of its efforts to modernize its aging fleet of cutters, the
    Coast Guard is acquiring four new vessels, including Offshore Patrol
    Cutters (OPC), Polar Security Cutters (PSC), Fast Response Cutters
    (FRC), and National Security Cutters (NSC). The Coast Guard intends for
    these new cutters to provide additional capabilities above those
    offered by the legacy ships. The two more recent acquisition programs--
    the OPC and PSC--have faced and are continuing to face significant
    schedule delays and cost increases, spurring concerns about capability
    and affordability gaps.
        My statement today will address (1) the capabilities provided by
    the newer Coast Guard vessels, (2) the risks and consequences of not
    establishing sound business cases for two of the Coast Guard's highest
    priority programs--the OPC and PSC, and (3) the overall affordability
    of the Coast Guard's acquisition portfolio. This statement is based on
    our extensive body of work examining the Coast Guard's shipbuilding
    acquisition efforts spanning the last decade, including our June 2023
    report on the OPC and our July 2023 report on the PSC.\1\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Offshore Patrol Cutter Program
    Needs to Mature Technology and Design, GAO-23-105805 (Washington, D.C.:
    June 20, 2023); Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Security Cutter Needs
    to Stabilize Design Before Starting Construction and Improve Schedule
    Oversight, GAO-23-105949 (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2023).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For the reports cited in this statement, among other methodologies,
    we analyzed Coast Guard guidance, data, and documentation, and
    interviewed Coast Guard officials at its headquarters and field units
    to determine the extent to which Coast Guard acquisition programs are
    meeting their cost, schedule, and performance goals. Each of the
    reports cited in this statement provide further detailed information on
    our objectives, scope, and methodology for that work.
        We conducted the work on which this statement is based in
    accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those
    standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain
    sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our
    findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that
    the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and
    conclusions based on our audit objectives.
       The Coast Guard's Newer Vessels Offer Greater Capability than Its
                                  Legacy Fleet
        The Coast Guard's newest vessels are intended to deliver greater
    capability than the legacy vessels they will replace. Some examples of
    capabilities include range and the time a ship can spend at sea. Table
    1 details examples of key characteristics of new Coast Guard assets and
    the respective legacy assets.

          Table 1: Comparison of Coast Guard's Legacy and New Vessels

                                                                         Legacy vessels
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                            Medium Endurance Cutter
                                          High Endurance Cutter -----------------------------------------------  Island Class Patrol         Polar Star
                                                                        210-foot                270-foot                 Boat
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Number in fleet....................  12....................  14....................  13...................  49...................  1
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Year first-in class cutter           1967..................  1964..................  1983.................  1986.................  1976
     commissioned.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Length.............................  378 feet..............  210 feet..............  270 feet.............  110 feet.............  399 feet
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Maximum time at sea without          45 days...............  21 days...............  21 days..............  5 days...............  80 days
     reprovisioning.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Range..............................  14,000 miles..........  6,000 miles...........  9,900 miles..........  1,900 miles..........  21,500 miles
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Operational tempo..................  185 days away from      185 days away from      185 days away from     1,800 operational      185 days away from
                                          home port per year.     home port per year.     home port per year.    hours per year.        home port per year.
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                                                       New vessels
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                       National Security    Offshore Patrol      Fast Response      Polar Security
                                            Cutter              Cutter              Cutter              Cutter
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Number in fleet.................  11 planned (9       25 planned (not     65 planned (51      3 planned (not yet
                                       operational).       yet operational).   operational).       operational).
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Year first-in class cutter        2008..............  Planned for 2024..  2012..............  Planned for 2028
     commissioned.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Length..........................  418 feet..........  360 feet..........  154 feet..........  460 feet
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Maximum time at sea without       60 days...........  45 to 60 days.....  5 days............  80 days
     reprovisioning.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Range...........................  12,000 miles......  8,500 to 9,500      2,500 miles.......  21,500 miles or
                                                           miles.                                  more
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Operational tempo...............  185 days away from  230 days away from  2,500 operational   3,300 operational
                                       home port per       home port per       hours per year.     hours per year.
                                       year.               year.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Source: GAO presentation of Coast Guard information. GAO-23-106948

        Figure 1 depicts the Coast Guard's OPC and PSC, which are part of
    this modernization effort.

     Figure 1: The Coast Guard's Offshore Patrol Cutter and Polar Security
                                     Cutter
    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    Source: Eastern Shipbuilding Group (left image), Bollinger Mississippi
                          Shipbuilding (right image).
                                 GAO-23-106948

        As I will discuss in my testimony, delays in delivering these
    vessels have required the Coast Guard to invest hundreds of millions of
    dollars, if not more, in trying to maintain and extend the life of its
    legacy fleet. Further delays in these two programs will increase the
    risk that the Coast Guard will not have a sufficient number of vessels
    available to conduct its missions.
    Failures to Establish Sound Business Cases and Follow Leading Practices
      Continue to Result in Significant Schedule Delays and Cost Increases
        Our prior work has found that successful programs start out with
    solid, executable business cases before setting program baselines and
    committing resources.\2\ For the Coast Guard, this would be when a
    program sets its initial program baseline that establishes cost,
    schedule, and performance goals. A sound business case requires balance
    between the concept selected to satisfy user needs and the resources--
    technologies, design knowledge, funding, and time--needed to transform
    the concept into a product. At the heart of a robust business case is a
    knowledge-based approach.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \2\ GAO, Weapon System Requirements: Detailed Systems Engineering
    Prior to Product Development Positions Programs for Success, GAO-17-77
    (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2016); Best Practices: High Levels of
    Knowledge at Key Points Differentiate Commercial Shipbuilding from Navy
    Shipbuilding, GAO-09-322 (Washington, D.C.: May 13, 2009); and Defense
    Acquisitions: Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy
    Shipbuilding Programs, GAO-07-943T (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2007).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        For shipbuilding programs in particular, we have found that
    successful programs attain critical levels of knowledge at key points
    in the shipbuilding process before significant investments are made. We
    found that key enablers of a good business case include mature
    technologies and plans for a stable design, reliable cost estimates,
    and realistic schedule targets, among other things.\3\ Figure 2 depicts
    a leading practice of developing technology and maturing design prior
    to construction--as part of a sound business case--and the increased
    risks for not maintaining a sound business case throughout the
    acquisition life cycle.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \3\ For the purposes of that review, we did not assess the extent
    to which the PSC's requirements are firm and feasible. In April 2018,
    we found that prior to setting program baselines for the PSC, DHS and
    the Coast Guard revised the program's operational requirements
    document--a key acquisition document that provides the key performance
    parameters the program must meet--to make the heavy polar icebreakers
    more affordable, and the revisions included adjusting the range of
    operating temperatures; reducing science and survey requirements; and
    adding space, weight, and power reservations for Navy equipment. GAO,
    Coast Guard Acquisitions: Status of Coast Guard's Heavy Polar
    Icebreaker Acquisition, GAO-18-385R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 13, 2018).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

      Figure 2: A Sound Business Case Reduces Risk in Acquisition Programs
    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      Source: GAO depiction of notional acquisition process. GAO-23-106948

        The Coast Guard's shipbuilding programs--specifically the OPC and
    PSC programs--have struggled with achieving elements for a good
    business case. As a result of neither maturing technologies nor
    achieving design stability when called for by leading practices, both
    programs are well behind schedule. In addition, both programs' cost
    estimates have increased by billions of dollars for several reasons,
    including that their initial estimates were either not comprehensive or
    not well-informed.
        Technology maturity and design stability. The Coast Guard's OPC and
    PSC programs did not follow shipbuilding leading practices with regards
    to conducting, demonstrating, and achieving technology readiness and
    design stability. Shipbuilding leading practices state that critical
    technologies should be proven prior to the award of the detail design
    and construction contract.\4\ Shipbuilding leading practices also state
    that programs should not proceed with construction with immature
    technology and design instability. When programs proceed into
    construction without maturing and addressing outstanding technology and
    design challenges, they increase the risk of completing out-of-sequence
    construction and rework, which can result in increased costs and
    schedule delays.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \4\ In the case of OPC, the detail design contract award is the
    point when the Coast Guard down-selected to one shipbuilder. Generally,
    detail design includes generating work instructions that show detailed
    system information and also guidance for subcontractors and suppliers
    needed to support construction, including installation drawings,
    schedules, material lists, and lists of prefabricated materials and
    parts.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Years after we first identified these deficiencies with the OPC and
    PSC programs, the Coast Guard still has not gained the requisite
    knowledge for its technologies and designs:
          OPC: In October 2020, we found that the Coast Guard did
    not mature a critical technology--the davit, a crane that lowers and
    raises a cutter's small boats--before starting construction.\5\ We
    recommended that the Coast Guard stabilize the OPC's design, including
    that it mature the davit to a technology readiness level (TRL) of 7--
    demonstrating it in a realistic environment--prior to the start of
    construction on OPC 3, and the Coast Guard concurred.\6\ However, the
    Coast Guard has since started construction on OPC 3 and OPC 4 without
    maturing the technology, and as of June 2023, the davit remains
    immature and unproven.\7\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \5\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Opportunities Exist to Reduce
    Risk for the Offshore Patrol Cutter Program, GAO-21-9 (Washington,
    D.C.: Oct. 28, 2020).
        \6\ A TRL is a measurement of maturity for each critical
    technology, numbered 1 through 9 from least to most mature based on
    demonstrations of increasing fidelity and complexity.
        \7\ GAO-23-105805.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              In October 2020, we also found that the Coast Guard failed to
    complete basic and functional design prior to the start of lead ship
    construction, contrary to leading practices.\8\ We recommended that
    program complete basic and functional design prior to the start of
    construction on OPC 3, and update its acquisition policy to follow
    shipbuilding leading practices. However, in June 2023, we found that
    the Coast Guard had not sufficiently updated its acquisition policy,
    and the OPC program still had not completed functional design prior to
    the start of construction on OPC 4.\9\ Further, we found that
    significant portions of the design related to distributive systems--
    systems like water, heating, and cooling that affect multiple zones of
    the ship--still remained incomplete.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \8\ Basic design includes establishing the hull form, general
    arrangements of compartments, and outlining significant ship steel
    structure. Some routing of major equipment and related major
    distributive systems, including electricity, water, and other utilities
    is done. It also ensures the ship will meet the performance
    specifications, informs overall ship cost, facilitates shipbuilders'
    development of responsive proposals, and identifies major equipment and
    components that must be purchased in advance. Functional design
    includes providing a further iteration of the basic design, such as
    size and positioning of structural components, information on the
    positioning of major piping and other distributive systems, and
    outfitting in each block--or basic building unit for a ship. See GAO-
    23-105805.
        \9\ GAO-23-105805.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              We made a second recommendation that the Coast Guard update
    its policy in this area--specifically in relation to completing the
    design of distributive systems prior to construction--so that programs
    follow shipbuilding leading practices for stabilizing design.\10\ The
    Coast Guard has not fully implemented this recommendation. We also went
    further to recommend that the Coast Guard complete the routing of
    distributive systems prior to starting construction on stage 2 ships.
    While the Coast Guard concurred with our June 2023 recommendation to
    update its policy, it did not concur with our recommendation to apply
    this leading practice to the OPC program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \10\ GAO-23-105805.

          PSC: In September 2018, we found that the Coast Guard did
    not conduct a technology readiness assessment of PSC's key
    technologies, nor did it hold a preliminary design review, prior to
    approving its program baselines.\11\ Coast Guard officials said that a
    technology readiness assessment was not necessary because the
    technologies they plan to employ had been proven on other ships.
    However, according to leading practices, such technologies can still
    pose risks when applied to a different program or operational
    environment. The program subsequently conducted a technology readiness
    assessment and established revised baselines in May 2021 after holding
    its preliminary design review in response to our recommendations.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \11\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Polar Icebreaker Program Needs
    to Address Risks before Committing Resources, GAO-18-600 (Washington,
    D.C.: Sept. 4, 2018).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
              As of March 2023, the PSC program reported that the
    functional design was considerably below the desired levels that
    officials expect to inform a decision to proceed with construction. As
    of April 2023, program officials said they anticipate holding the
    production readiness reviews to evaluate design maturity by March 2024.
    However, since September 2021, with about 49 percent functional design
    completed, our analysis indicated that the shipyard is completing, on
    average, approximately three percent of functional design every 6
    months. This means that it would take the shipyard approximately 8
    years to complete 100 percent of functional design. Therefore, to reach
    the program's goal of completing functional design completed prior to
    March 2024, the shipyard would need to increase its design completion
    rate significantly. Coast Guard officials said that design completion
    is further along than the metrics show because the metrics do not
    factor in progress made on design components that are not complete.
              We also found that the program is experiencing challenges
    with the design.\12\ According to program officials, the design
    challenges are related to (1) U.S. industry's general lack of
    experience designing and building icebreakers, (2) the complexity of
    PSC's design, and (3) significant changes from the original design,
    among other things. Given that there are still portions of the design
    that are immature, we recommended that the Coast Guard complete
    functional design prior to approving construction for the lead ship, in
    line with our recommendation to OPC and Coast Guard policy, as a whole.
    The Coast Guard concurred with the recommendations, and we will monitor
    its progress in addressing them.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \12\ GAO-23-105949.

        Cost. Both the OPC and PSC have incurred cost growth above their
    initial estimates, in part because the programs initially
    underestimated costs.
          OPC: OPC's acquisition cost estimate increase increased
    from $12.5 billion to $17.6 billion between the program's 2012 and 2022
    life-cycle cost estimates. The Coast Guard attributes the increase to
    many factors, including restructuring the stage 1 contract--for OPCs 1
    through 4--and recompeting the requirement for stage 2--OPCs 5 through
    25--in response to a disruption caused by Hurricane Michael, and
    increased infrastructure costs for homeports and facilities, among
    other things.\13\ While there are instances of unforeseen costs, there
    were some costs that were either based on unrealistic assumptions or
    not fully accounted for in the Coast Guard's initial cost estimate.
    Specifically, OPC's facilities acquisition cost estimate--including
    homeports and shore facilities--increased from $431 million to $1.4
    billion from 2012 to 2022 because Coast Guard officials said they
    originally assumed that the Coast Guard could utilize existing Navy
    bases to homeport the OPC, which did not come to fruition.\14\ In
    addition, the OPC's initial acquisition cost estimate increased by
    about $1 billion, most of which happened after the program settled
    which Navy-provided combat system equipment would go on the OPC.
    Lastly, the OPC's initial acquisition cost estimate did not include
    costs for some outfitting and post-delivery work that includes the
    sensitive compartmented information facility on the cutter, the Combat
    System Equipment Guide, and technical manuals. The sensitive
    compartmented information facility accounted for about 98 percent of a
    $1 billion increase in the estimate for outfitting and post-delivery
    work.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \13\ Following significant disruption caused by Hurricane Michael
    in October 2018, the Acting Secretary of Homeland Security determined
    that the OPC is essential to the national defense and authorized up to
    $659 million in extraordinary contractual relief to the shipbuilder
    pursuant to Public Law 85-804 for the design and construction of up to
    four OPCs, an effort the Coast Guard refers to as stage 1. As part of
    this determination, the Acting Secretary also directed the Coast Guard
    to recompete the requirement for the remaining 21 cutters.
        \14\ Facilities acquisition costs are funded by the Coast Guard's
    Major Acquisition Systems Infrastructure Program and the Office of
    Civil Engineering.

          PSC: From 2018 to 2021, the program's total life-cycle
    cost estimate increased by about 35 percent, from $9.8 billion to $13.3
    billion. Most of the cost increase was driven by increased operations
    and maintenance costs, resulting from the increased ship size and use
    of additional historical data to reevaluate projected annual
    maintenance costs in the later estimate. The program's additional
    analysis of historical maintenance costs in its January 2021 cost
    estimate addressed, in part, a recommendation we made in 2018 to update
    the cost estimate in accordance with leading practices in cost
    estimating. Specifically, in September 2018, we found that the PSC's
    life-cycle cost estimate that informed the program's $9.8 billion cost
    baseline substantially met GAO's leading practices for being
    comprehensive, well-documented, and accurate, but only partially met
    leading practices for being credible.\15\ The cost estimate did not
    quantify the range of possible costs over the entire life of the
    program. As a result, the cost estimate was not fully reliable and may
    have underestimated the cost. Consequently, the Coast Guard may have
    provided decision makers with incomplete data to make a decision on
    total funding needed for the program.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \15\ GAO-18-600.

        Schedule. The Coast Guard relied on optimistic schedules for both
    the PSC and OPC programs, and both have experienced schedule delays of
    2 years or more (see fig. 3). The two programs' schedule challenges
    have been exacerbated by a lack of reliable schedule data from the
    contractors responsible for building these ships.

      Figure 3: Delivery Delays with the Lead Ship in the Polar Security
             Cutter and Offshore Patrol Cutter Programs, as of 2023
    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Coast Guard and Department of Homeland
                            Security documentation.
                                 GAO-23-106948

          OPC: In October 2020, we found that prior to the
    construction award for OPC 1, the OPC contractor's schedule contained
    deficiencies that were contrary to GAO-identified leading practices for
    developing schedules. Further, we found the revised post-hurricane
    delivery dates for the first four OPCs were optimistic and did not
    fully incorporate schedule risks, increasing the likelihood that the
    OPCs will not be delivered when promised. In a review of the
    shipbuilder's schedule, the Defense Contract Management Agency and the
    Coast Guard found deficiencies, such as that the shipbuilder could not
    produce a valid critical path--or the path of longest duration through
    the sequence of activities. We recommended that the Coast Guard fully
    address the deficiencies identified in the contractor's schedule. As of
    July 2023, the recommendation remains open. In June 2023, we found that
    the schedule is still optimistic given that the program is still
    addressing a manufacturing issue with shafting and delays with
    development of the davit.\16\ In total, the program is experiencing at
    least a 2.5-year delay in delivery of the lead ship.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \16\ GAO-23-105805.

          PSC: In September 2018, we found that the PSC's planned
    delivery dates were not informed by a realistic assessment of
    shipbuilding activities. Instead, the schedule was driven by the
    potential gap in icebreaking capabilities once the Coast Guard's only
    operating heavy polar icebreaker--the Polar Star--reaches the end of
    its service life.\17\ We recommended that the program develop a
    schedule in accordance with leading practices for project schedules to
    set realistic schedule goals for all three PSCs before the lead ship
    contract option was awarded. However, we closed the recommendation as
    not implemented because the program proceeded with the award in April
    2019 without developing a realistic schedule. In July 2023, we found
    the program had yet to establish a realistic schedule.\18\ The
    program's current schedule estimates that delivery of the lead ship
    will occur in 2027, which is 3 years later than its previous estimate,
    but this could further slip after the contractor reassesses and revises
    its schedule.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \17\ GAO-18-600.
        \18\ GAO-23-105949.

        Without a sound business case, acquisition programs are at risk of
    breaching the cost, schedule, and performance baselines set when the
    program was initiated--in other words, experiencing cost growth,
    schedule delays, and reduced capabilities. Even after a program has
    established its acquisition program baseline, information about the
    soundness of a program's business case is helpful for Congress as the
    Coast Guard requests funding through the acquisition life cycle.
    Schedule Delays Increase the Risk of Capability Gaps and Affordability
                                    Concerns
        The delays in the OPC and PSC programs have increased the
    likelihood of operational capability gaps. Further, it has forced the
    Coast Guard to invest at least $325 million to extend the life of its
    legacy assets, the Medium Endurance Cutters (MEC) and the Polar Star,
    in addition to the $850 million it has spent to maintain them over the
    last decade.\19\ Further, the Coast Guard is confronted with a costly
    backlog of shore infrastructure projects--such as piers, docks, boat
    stations, air stations, and housing units--but has requested funding
    that falls short of its estimated infrastructure needs. The
    affordability of the Coast Guard's surface fleet is in jeopardy, given
    the increasing costs to maintain legacy assets, costs for the OPC and
    PSC acquisition programs, and the overall infrastructure needs to
    support Coast Guard assets.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \19\ These expenditures include Medium Endurance Cutter depot-level
    maintenance costs from 2010 through 2021, and depot-level maintenance
    costs for the Polar Star from 2014 through 2017. The Polar Star's
    expenditures are calculated from 2014 to 2017 since it was in a
    reactivation period prior to 2014 and was not operational, and we have
    not reported on depot-level maintenance expenditures since 2017.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Capability Gaps Are Exacerbated by Delays in Acquisition Programs
        Since April 2017, we have reported that full operational capability
    dates have been delayed for several Coast Guard acquisition programs.
    For example, the OPC's full operational capability (FOC) date has been
    delayed until at least 2039 due to the ongoing issues with design and
    construction. See table 2 for initial FOC dates for the Coast Guard's
    recapitalization programs, 2017 updates, and current estimates.

       Table 2: Delays in Full Operational Capability (FOC) of Coast Guard
                            Recapitalization Programs
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                        Initial
                                          DHS-     FOC date (as     Current
                                        approved    of January     FOC date
                                        FOC date       2017)          \a\
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Offshore Patrol Cutter...........       2034            2035        2039
    Fast Response Cutter.............       2022            2027        2027
    National Security Cutter.........       2016            2020         TBD
    Polar Security Cutter............       2029             N/A        2031
    Waterways Commerce Cutter \c\....        N/A             N/A        2032
    Medium Range Surveillance               2020            2025        2032
     Aircraft (HC-144A/C-27J)........
    Long Range Surveillance Aircraft        2017            2027    2030 \b\
     (HC-130J).......................
    Medium Range Recovery Helicopter         N/A             N/A         TBD
     (MH-60T) \c\....................
    Short Range Helicopter (H-65)....       2020            2020        2024
    ------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Source: GAO presentation of Coast Guard information. GAO-23-106948
     Legend: DHS = Department of Homeland Security; TBD = to be determined;
      N/A = not applicable
    \a\ All dates are program estimates. The FOC date for the Offshore
      Patrol Cutter is as of June 2023. FOC dates for the Waterways Commerce
      Cutter, Medium Range Surveillance Aircraft, Long Range Surveillance
      Aircraft, and MH-60T Aircraft are as of April 2023. The FOC date for
      the Polar Security Cutter is as of December 2022. FOC dates for the
      Fast Response Cutter, National Security Cutter, and H-65 Aircraft are
      as of March 2022.
    \b\ The Long Range Surveillance Aircraft program's acquisition program
      baseline specifies a full operational capability date of 2033.
      However, according to program officials, the program was able to
      receive funding 3 years ahead of schedule, which has allowed for an
      accelerated schedule.
    \c\ As of April 2023, the Waterways Commerce Cutter program and MH-60T
      program did not have official DHS approved baselines.

        Specifically, with the surface assets, the risk of having an
    operational gap increases as the new ships are delayed because the
    legacy ships they are replacing continue to age and face increasing
    risk of mechanical failure. For example, in June 2023, we reported that
    given the delays in delivery of the OPC, the Coast Guard projects to
    have a reduction in asset availability--or a reduction in the number of
    cutters available for operations--starting in 2024 and through
    2039.\20\ This operational gap is at risk of increasing if the OPC
    delivery delays are realized and pushed further to the right.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \20\ GAO-23-105805.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        See figure 4 for the Coast Guard's notional estimated
    decommissioning dates for the MECs based on commissioning date compared
    with the current OPC delivery schedule. While the MECs may not be
    decommissioned in the order depicted depending on the condition of each
    ship at the time, this figure helps depict the sequence of
    commissioning of the OPCs and decommissioning of the MECs.

     Figure 4: U.S. Coast Guard's Estimated Medium Endurance Cutter (MEC)
     Service Life Dates Compared with Offshore Patrol Cutter (OPC) Delivery

          Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard documents. GAO-23-106948

        The reduction of asset availability could be further exacerbated if
    the Coast Guard does not effectively mitigate OPC schedule risks:
          Design and manufacturing issues for OPC stage 1. The
    program is experiencing ongoing delays due to a propeller shafting
    manufacturing issue that requires remanufacturing of some of these
    shafts.
          Delays in the award of OPC stage 2. The program will
    delay delivery of OPC stage 2 ships by at least 6 months due to the
    delays of the contract award and subsequent bid protest. The stage 2
    shipbuilder also needs to complete a detail design for the stage 2
    ships, and the Coast Guard needs to approve the design, before the
    shipbuilder can begin construction.\21\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \21\ Generally, detail design includes generating work instructions
    that show detailed system information and also guidance for
    subcontractors and suppliers needed to support construction, including
    installation drawings, schedules, material lists, and lists of
    prefabricated materials and parts.

        Given these challenges, the Coast Guard will likely need to further
    maintain and keep the MECs in service longer or otherwise face a
    reduction of assets. Coast Guard officials told us that they do not
    anticipate the need to employ alternative options to meet mission
    requirements. However, officials stated that if the Coast Guard needs
    to decommission cutters earlier than planned, they could reallocate
    cutters to support emergent needs, employ other cutters to support
    missions previously handled by MECs, or extend the date for other
    planned decommissions to support continued operations.
        Similarly, as noted earlier, according the PSC program schedule,
    the delivery of the lead ship is now delayed until at least 2027--3
    years behind the original plan in its 2018 schedule--and all three
    ships are expected to be operational by at least 2031.\22\ In April
    2023, a Coast Guard fleet mix analysis indicated that the service in
    fact needed a mix of eight or nine heavy and medium polar icebreakers
    to meet its projected requirements. The Coast Guard currently only has
    one heavy polar icebreaker, the Polar Star, and one medium polar
    icebreaker, the Healy, and therefore already has an operational gap.
    The Polar Star is well beyond its planned operational service life and
    has become more complicated and costly to maintain as it ages. Based
    off the Coast Guard's fleet mix analysis, its icebreaker fleet will
    remain in a deficit even after all three PSCs on the current contract
    are delivered.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \22\ GAO-23-105949.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Service Life Extension Programs Will Help Relieve Some Pressure, but
            Legacy Assets Are Expensive and Challenging to Maintain
        To help mitigate the delays of the OPC and PSC, the Coast Guard
    began two service life extension programs (SLEP) for its legacy
    assets--the 270-foot Medium Endurance Cutters, and the Polar Star--for
    an estimated $325 million. The Coast Guard initiated the MEC SLEP in
    2018 and the Polar Star SLEP in 2021. They are aimed to extend the
    service life of six MECs and the one Polar Star by 10 years and 4 to 5
    years, respectively (see table 3).

    Table 3: The Coast Guard's Current and Recent Maintenance History of the Medium Endurance Cutter and Heavy Polar
                                                       Icebreaker
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                                                                                Major maintenance
                    Vessel                   Design service life          Average age                history
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    270-foot                               30 years...............  36 years...............   The 270-foot Medium
    Medium                                                                                    Endurance Cutters
    Endurance                                                                                 completed a Mission
    Cutter.                                                                                   Effectiveness Project
                                                                                              in 2014.This effort
                                                                                              was intended to
                                                                                              minimize maintenance
                                                                                              costs and maximize the
                                                                                              reliability of
                                                                                              critical systems, but
                                                                                              not increase the
                                                                                              service life of the
                                                                                              cutters. The Coast
                                                                                              Guard initiated
                                                                                              another program to
                                                                                              extend the service
                                                                                              life of six of the 13
                                                                                              270-foot Medium
                                                                                              Endurance Cutters.
                                                                                              This service life
                                                                                              extension project is
                                                                                              projected to cost $250
                                                                                              million, and intended
                                                                                              to extend service life
                                                                                              for up to 10 years and
                                                                                              close the gap in
                                                                                              capability until the
                                                                                              Offshore Patrol Cutter
                                                                                              is operational.
    Heavy polar icebreaker: Polar Star...  30 years...............  46 years...............  The Polar Star
                                                                                              completed a
                                                                                              reactivation
                                                                                              maintenance period in
                                                                                              2013 that was intended
                                                                                              to add an additional 7-
                                                                                              10 years to its
                                                                                              service life from the
                                                                                              time of reactivation.
                                                                                              The Coast Guard
                                                                                              initiated another
                                                                                              service life extension
                                                                                              program in 2021 to
                                                                                              span 5 years and focus
                                                                                              on upgrades or
                                                                                              replacements of
                                                                                              different systems. The
                                                                                              Coast Guard completed
                                                                                              the second year of
                                                                                              this 5-year program in
                                                                                              2022, and plans on
                                                                                              investing $75 million
                                                                                              in total to perform
                                                                                              work from fiscal years
                                                                                              2021 through 2025
                                                                                              toward this effort.
                                                                                              Ultimately, the
                                                                                              service life extension
                                                                                              program is intended to
                                                                                              extend the service
                                                                                              life of the Polar Star
                                                                                              by 4 to 5 years, or,
                                                                                              according to Coast
                                                                                              Guard officials, until
                                                                                              at least 2029 or 2030.
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Source: GAO presentation and analysis of Coast Guard data. GAO-23-106948

        In addition, we previously found that these legacy assets are
    getting harder and more expensive to maintain. In July 2018, we found
    that it is unclear how the Coast Guard will be able to fund planned
    SLEPs on several aging assets in order to sustain them--that is, keep
    them operating at acceptable levels--until replacement assets are
    available.\23\ We found that several of the Coast Guard's aging cutters
    have spent more on depot-level maintenance than was planned. Combined,
    these cutters--the 210-foot and 270-foot MECs, and the Polar Star--
    expended about $550 million, more than twice what was originally
    estimated (standard support levels), from 2010 to 2017.\24\ In June
    2023, we reported that depot-level maintenance costs for the MECs
    totaled about $300 million from 2018 through 2021.\25\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \23\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Address
    Longstanding Portfolio Management Challenges, GAO-18-454 (Washington,
    D.C.: July 24, 2018).
        \24\ The Polar Star's expenditures are calculated from 2014 to 2017
    since it was in a reactivation period prior to 2014 and was not
    operational.
        \25\ GAO-23-105805.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        In addition to increased maintenance costs, Coast Guard operators
    have had to make do with deteriorating legacy assets.
          MEC: The MECs have generally met or remained within
    target levels for operational and materiel availability. However, we
    found that maintenance being conducted was on significant systems that
    were resulting in casualties for the cutters.\26\ For example, in
    fiscal year 2021, MEC crews reported 317 casualties with their
    propulsion system's main diesel engines, generators, and the hull. Some
    of these casualties rendered the cutters disabled for multiple days. In
    addition, habitability remains a concern for both 210-foot and 270-foot
    MECs. Crews experience problems maintaining heating, venting, and air
    conditioning (HVAC) systems and those HVAC inefficiencies have led to
    high levels of condensation and mold in crew living spaces, such as
    berthing areas. Coast Guard crews told us they try to address these
    issues as they occur, but the number and frequency of maintenance
    issues, in addition to their regular mission duties, make living in
    these conditions a fact of life.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \26\ GAO-23-105805.

          Heavy polar icebreaker: In July 2023, we found that the
    Polar Star continues to face similar maintenance issues.\27\ From 2019
    through 2021, the Coast Guard reported that some of the top cost
    drivers for maintenance on the Polar Star included components like the
    main diesel engines, engine cylinders, a propulsion shaft, and fuel
    pumps. Electrical systems have also posed problems. For example, during
    the Polar Star's 2019-2020 mission to Antarctica, the crew reported a
    cutter-wide loss of power. Polar Star crew told us that a cutter-wide
    loss of power can sometimes take an hour to fully resolve as they have
    to manually reset each system since older systems lack centralized
    digital controls. Further, during the 2021-2022 deployment, a
    propulsion control failure placed the cutter at risk of colliding with
    another vessel in Puget Sound.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \27\ GAO-23-105949.

        The Polar Star SLEP, which began in 2021 and is conducted annually
    during dry dock, has made upgrades to the Polar Star such as
    improvements to its propulsion control system. However, habitability
    remains a health concern for its crew. For example, annual assessments
    of the cutter's condition noted the need to remove asbestos and lead
    paint from compartments of the cutter, and a past assessment also found
    that systems to produce fresh water and filter air for the crew were
    barely functional. The Polar Star crew also told us that the heaters in
    some operational spaces are inadequate to combat Antarctic
    temperatures.
        When combined with the challenges facing the acquisition portfolio
    noted above, the Coast Guard will likely struggle to pay for the
    maintenance of older assets, a situation that could lead to deferred
    maintenance and lost operational capability.
    Coast Guard Has Not Effectively Managed the Backlog of Shore
            Infrastructure Projects
        In February 2019, we found that the Coast Guard is confronted with
    a costly backlog of shore infrastructure projects--such as piers,
    docks, boat stations, air stations, and housing units--that is
    contributing to concerns of affordability for its recapitalization and
    related sustainment efforts.\28\ We found that 45 percent of the Coast
    Guard's shore infrastructure was beyond its service life. For example,
    at least 53 percent of piers--all of which the Coast Guard has
    identified as mission-critical assets--were past their service lives as
    of 2017.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \28\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading
    Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least $2.6
    Billion, GAO-19-82 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2019).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        Also at this time, the Coast Guard rated its overall shore
    infrastructure condition as mediocre. For example, the waterfront asset
    line--which includes piers, wharfs, boathouses, and small boat lifts--
    was rated as mediocre and showing signs of deterioration and
    increasingly vulnerable to risk. The industrial asset line--which
    includes maintenance shops, corrosion control facilities, and ship
    lifts--was rated as poor to fair condition and mostly below standard.
    This is in part because the eight of the nine assets that are part of
    the Coast Guard Yard in Baltimore, Maryland--the only Coast Guard
    facility that can perform dry dock maintenance on large Coast Guard
    ships--are more than 5 years beyond their service life.
        We also found that the Coast Guard had not provided accurate
    information about its requirements-based budget targets for shore
    infrastructure in its budget requests.\29\ According to the Coast
    Guard, a requirements-based budget is an estimate of the cost to
    operate and sustain its shore infrastructure portfolio of assets over
    the life cycle of the asset, from initial construction or capital
    investment through divestiture or demolition.\30\ We found that Coast
    Guard targets for recapitalization of shore assets exceeded $290
    million annually. However, its budget requests for fiscal years 2012
    through 2021 ranged from about $5 million to about $99 million
    annually, and allotments ranged from about $5 million to about $266
    million annually (see fig. 5).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \29\ GAO-19-82.
        \30\ According to Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard's
    requirements-based budget planning is based on industry standards and
    aligns with the National Academy of Sciences benchmarks for sustainable
    facility and infrastructure management. National Research Council of
    the National Academy of Sciences, Stewardship of Federal Facilities: A
    Proactive Strategy for Managing the Nation's Public Assets (Washington,
    D.C.: National Academies Press, 1998).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------

    Figure 5: Coast Guard's Allotments for Shore Procurement, Construction
       and Improvements from Its Appropriations and Shore Infrastructure
           Requirements-based Budget, Fiscal Years 2012 through 2021

          Source: GAO analysis of Coast Guard documents. GAO-23-106948

       Notes: Reported in current-year dollars. Beginning in fiscal year
          2019, the President's budget requests refer to Procurement,
          Construction and Improvements, which previously referred to
    Acquisitions, Construction, and Improvements in the annual fiscal year
                                appropriations.

      \a\ Beginning in 2016, the Coast Guard started using a requirements-
    based budget to determine shore infrastructure budget needs and applied
     it for the first time with its fiscal year 2017 submission. According
    to this budgeting approach and Coast Guard officials, the Coast Guard's
      targets for recapitalization of shore infrastructure exceeded $290
            million annually as determined by the U.S. Coast Guard.

        \b\ ``Amount requested'' represents the amount requested in the
      President's budget, as identified in the Coast Guard's fiscal year
                         congressional justifications.

                   \c\ Values for 2013 reflect sequestration.

        To address the backlog, we found that the Coast Guard could
    increase budget transparency for shore infrastructure. Specifically, we
    found the Coast Guard's budget requests had (1) not clearly identified
    funding allotted for routine shore infrastructure maintenance needs,
    and (2) not generally addressed deferred maintenance and repair
    deficiencies, resulting in increases to its backlogs. In addition, the
    Coast Guard had not included information in its Unfunded Priorities
    Lists and other related reports that clearly articulated trade-offs
    among competing project alternatives, as well as the impacts on
    missions conducted from shore facilities in disrepair.\31\ This
    information could help to inform decision makers of the risks posed by
    untimely investments in maintenance and repair backlogs.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \31\ The term ``unfunded priority'' means a program or mission
    requirement that (1) has not been selected for funding in the
    applicable proposed budget; (2) is necessary to fulfill a requirement
    associated with an operational need; and (3) the Commandant would have
    recommended for inclusion in the applicable proposed budget had
    additional resources been available, or had the requirement emerged
    before the budget was submitted. 14 U.S.C. Sec.  5108.
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        We recommended that the Coast Guard include supporting details
    about competing project alternatives and report trade-offs in
    congressional budget requests and related reports. The Coast Guard
    agreed with our recommendation, but noted that addressing this
    recommendation is challenging due to limitations imposed by the Office
    of Management and Budget and DHS. As of May 2023, the Coast Guard was
    working toward publishing some related information on its website,
    according to officials. Without such information about Coast Guard
    budgetary requirements, Congress will lack critical information that
    could help to prioritize funding to address the Coast Guard's shore
    infrastructure backlogs.
        Over the last decade, we have made 40 recommendations to DHS and
    the Coast Guard on how to better manage the Coast Guard's acquisition
    programs. Currently, we have 14 recommendations that remain open and
    that the Coast Guard has not fully addressed--many discussed above--and
    six others that have not been acted upon by the Coast Guard over
    several years or overcome by events. Addressing the open
    recommendations will help the Coast Guard better manage its
    recapitalization efforts.
        Additionally, we recommended two matters to Congress in June 2023.
    Specifically, we recommended that you consider requiring the Coast
    Guard to update its acquisition policy to establish that all
    shipbuilding programs should (1) mature critical technologies--
    including those that are developmental or that are novel in application
    or form, fit, and function--to a TRL 7 (successfully demonstrating
    critical technologies in a realistic environment) prior to a program's
    contract award for detail design and construction; and (2) achieve 100
    percent completion of basic and functional design, including the
    routing of all distributive systems, prior to lead ship construction.
    Doing so will help ensure that future Coast Guard acquisitions follow
    leading practices and will help get these programs on a sound footing.
        Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the
    Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
    to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.

        Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you both for appearing, I
    appreciate that. And now it turns to the time we ask questions.
    I will start it off with 5 minutes' worth of questions.
        And so, Admiral Thomas, can you provide an update on
    programs toward a new hangar at Barbers Point to accommodate
    the new C-130J aircraft?
        Admiral Thomas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the question,
    and thanks for support, particularly at Barbers Point. I was
    there recently, and we have a C-130 that can fit the nose in
    the hangar and the tail is hanging out. That is suboptimal.
        So, we do have about $46 million that's set aside for a
    project for a hangar, and we have started that project to
    install a membrane hangar that can hold two of our aircraft in
    there, and we can do full maintenance. I don't know right now
    if that is going to be enough money. We have to do an
    environmental assessment. We do know there is PFAS on that
    site. And as we get those results, we will be able to determine
    how far that money will go. But we do appreciate continued
    support on that project.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. So, the Coast Guard has previously
    communicated that it had all the resources it needed for the
    construction of a new hangar. So, how would you explain that?
        Admiral Thomas. Well, I think I mentioned in my statement
    that the economic conditions that we see now are not what we
    saw 4 years ago. There are all sorts of supply chain issues.
    There are inflation issues that are driving the cost of
    projects up across our portfolio and, as well, environmental
    remediation is always a wild card that you can't really price
    until you have stuck a shovel in the ground.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. Compared to other programs, the
    Waterways Commerce Cutter acquisition program has been on
    track, which is very encouraging. Can you provide an update on
    the milestones that program has achieved to date?
        Admiral Thomas. Yes, thank you for the question.
        So, we awarded that contract in October of last year. We
    experienced some delays because of GAO protest, but we were
    able to push ahead with the work on March 1st, or the notice to
    proceed to the contractor, and they are proceeding well with
    the detailed design. And as I mentioned in my statement, we
    expect to begin construction next year.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. So, are there milestones you are
    trying to hit in the future that would keep it on track?
        Admiral Thomas. Yes, sir, there are. Before we go to
    construction, as Ms. Mak mentioned, we will do a design review,
    final critical design review, and then we will do a production
    readiness review. And we are on track to hit those milestones.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. What would be the result or the
    impact of operations and costs if the acquisition were delayed?
        Admiral Thomas. Well, it depends on the nature of delay,
    Congressman. If we were somehow caused to recompete this
    contract, the delay would be about 2 years, the cost would be
    about $150 million, and I would imagine we would be in the
    exact same place we are today in 2 years, which, we would have
    a contract award, and we would have appeals ongoing.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. Ms. Mak, the Coast Guard appears to
    have systemic issues in effectively executing major
    acquisitions. Are there requirements placed on the Coast Guard,
    either by regulation or statute, that impair the Coast Guard's
    contracting and acquisition abilities and capabilities?
        Ms. Mak. No requirements on legislation that I am aware of,
    but I still think it is important that the Coast Guard focus on
    doing the things the right way the first time around when it
    comes to better business case and getting the design done
    before construction, and figuring out where you are going to go
    when it comes to what requirements, how you do that, and how
    you manage the contractors, oversight.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. So, is that happening?
        Ms. Mak. I would say with the OPC and the PSC, based on our
    recent reports, they could do a lot better when it comes to
    design.
        They are starting--OPC started construction for all four
    ships, for the first four ships, well before the design. And we
    are hoping--we have made recommendations to address for stage 2
    that they complete that design because it is having a lot of
    different challenges.
        For instance, the davit, which is on the OPC, that is
    critical. That is where they use the small boats to go down and
    do their mission, and that--davits have found problems in terms
    of, like, the electrical cabinet. It was supposed to fit on the
    interior of the OPC, and now they can't fit that in the
    interior, so, part of it has to go in the exterior and part of
    it has to go in the interior. That is to power the davit.
        So, if some of it is going to go outside instead of inside,
    it has got a lot more weather, environmental issues that it has
    got to address. So, it is better not to move on to stage 2
    until you have those design issues addressed.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. My time is expired. Thank you so
    much for your answers, both of you, and I will turn it over to
    Mr. Carbajal.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Admiral Thomas, while there are several factors that have
    contributed to the vessel acquisition issues that you are
    having, shipyards' capacity and availability is certainly a
    factor. That said, where would the Coast Guard vessel
    procurement be without the Jones Act and the sustained
    commercial business that the shipyards have?
        Admiral Thomas. Thank you, Congressman, for the question.
        I mean, the Coast Guard has long recognized the
    significance of the Jones Act in ensuring our national security
    in several different ways. One of those is ensuring we retain
    an industrial base that can build and service our ships.
        Our ships are getting larger. We are now in competition
    with the Navy for drydocks. We need to invest in our own
    capabilities at our Coast Guard Yard, but we certainly need the
    Jones Act to remain in place so we retain that capability as a
    Nation.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        Ms. Mak, how can Congress better support the Coast Guard's
    major acquisition programs moving forward?
        Ms. Mak. I think, as I mentioned in my oral statement, that
    programs generally tend to overpromise and underbid costs to
    secure funding for the programs. To minimize that, Congress may
    want to consider restricting or fencing off certain amounts of
    funding until you see a sound, realistic business case.
        Or Congress could require more information, which I know we
    have talked about a little bit on the shore infrastructure
    side, but it applies the same thing for acquisitions. They have
    priorities for homeporting needs for the ongoing acquisitions
    and recapitalization efforts such as the OPC, the PSC, the WCC,
    and the information that is needed for Congress to provide the
    appropriate information and funding is impacts to operations,
    should the funding not be available.
        And what are the timeframes? What are the impacts when you
    don't get that funding? I think that is important for Congress
    to be able to make better decisions.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I have heard of underpromise and
    overdeliver, but I have never really understood the opposite
    approach, as you said takes place.
        Admiral Thomas, the Army typically chooses to retire their
    helicopters at 20,000 hours. Why does the Coast Guard refurbish
    and use your helicopters well past the age?
        And has the Coast Guard explored the option of purchasing
    new helicopters?
        Admiral Thomas. Well, thank you for the question. We are in
    the midst of extending the service life on both our 65s and our
    60s. We are able to do that organically at our Aviation
    Logistics Center. We are able to take Navy hulls that don't
    have many hours on them and put them into a Coast Guard
    configuration.
        While we haven't done the business case yet on purchasing
    fully built-out helicopters or buying new hulls from the OEM,
    and then we are changing them out ourselves, that is something
    we would consider, although we are currently on a pace to
    increase the size of our 60 fleet, which is about right for the
    Service. It doesn't need to be accelerated.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        Ms. Mak, do you have anything to add to that?
        Ms. Mak. The largest concern about increasing their fleet
    is going to come back to the infrastructure that is needed to
    support that. There is definitely going to be expected growth
    and significant investments in the facilities at both the
    Aviation Logistics Center and at air stations. So, that needs
    to be planned for and determined, what priorities when.
        Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
        Mr. Chair, I am going to use my prerogative with my
    remaining time to recognize my intern, Jasmine Oang, who is
    here. She might be interested in the Coast Guard, so, she is
    here checking you guys out, interviewing if you are the service
    she might be interested in. So, I just want to recognize it.
        Raise your hand, Jasmine.
        Mr. Chair, with that I yield back.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Babin, you are recognized for 5
    minutes.
        Dr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate that. And
    I also thank Admiral Thomas and Ms. Mak for being here.
        My questions are going to be for you, Admiral Thomas.
        But Ms. Mak, if you feel like you need to jump in, please
    feel free.
        In April of 2019, the Coast Guard issued a contract for the
    construction of a new polar icebreaker. What is the status of
    the design and construction of this vessel?
        And are there outstanding issues with the proposed
    propulsion system used for this vessel?
        Please bring us up to speed, and give me your take on the
    propulsion system issues.
        Admiral Thomas. Thanks for your interest in our Polar
    Security Cutter program. It is a significant program for our
    Nation, as you well know.
        We are 4 years into what was supposed to be a 1-year design
    cycle on the Polar Security Cutter, and we are frustrated by
    that. It is my top priority to get this project back on track.
    We have a new primary contractor now, and I meet with the
    senior leadership of that shipyard myself personally once a
    week, along with my colleague from the Navy. Our focus is on
    getting to design maturity and making sure the yard is ready
    for production.
        I was at the shipyard just recently to look at some of the
    capital expenditures they had put in place in order to build
    this ship. It is impressive, the robotic welding, the
    preheating--just what it takes to bend the steel that thick.
        At the end of the day, we need these ships, but we also
    need the shipyard. It will bring tremendous capability to our
    Nation. And as I mentioned, we have begun prototype
    fabrication.
        With regard to the propulsion system, I am not aware that
    we have concerns. It will be a complex system. We are making
    sure that we build the control systems ashore first so that we
    can make sure it is fully integrated before we go on the ship.
    But we have not yet identified specific concerns with our
    propulsion system.
        Dr. Babin. OK, thank you. I am also interested in
    discussing some of the Coast Guard's air assets.
        The Coast Guard is currently recapitalizing your vertical
    lift platforms in addition to acquiring additional C-130s.
    However, I am curious about the Coast Guard's lack of medium-
    altitude, long-endurance assets such as the MQ-9. In my
    district we proudly host the Air National Guard unit of the MQ-
    9s, and they are extremely capable aircraft.
        However, I recently found out that the MQ-9B, an upgraded,
    all-weather and Maritime Domain-aware aircraft, is being
    operated right now by the Japanese Coast Guard. These have the
    capability to perform Maritime Domain Awareness, patrolling for
    illegal shipping, drug interdiction, search and rescue, and
    illegal trafficking.
        I wanted to ask if the Coast Guard has any plans to
    modernize its aviation fleet with assets such as the MQ-9
    Reaper. And if not, why not, and is it simply a budgetary
    issue?
        Admiral Thomas. We are very much aware of the capabilities
    of unmanned aerial systems. We employ them off of our National
    Security Cutters. We intend to do the same off of our OPCs when
    they are in the fleet, and we operate other MQ-9s with CBP.
        We have just recently issued our unmanned systems strategy,
    and that is the beginning of our efforts to build a program of
    record that will bring capability like MQ-9s to the Coast
    Guard. We do not yet have a program of record to do that.
        Dr. Babin. OK, thank you very much. Last question: Can you
    briefly mention the changes that you have made following the
    Coast Guard's internal review of Operation Fouled Anchor?
        We have got to protect our Coasties. And for our part, we
    need to know the changes you have already implemented before
    Congress starts developing any new recommendations. What
    changes have you made?
        How will you all do a better job of protecting Coasties
    while ensuring that Congress is up to speed on important issues
    and able to perform its oversight role?
        Admiral Thomas. Thank you. We are very much focused, and
    have been for a very long time, on improving the culture in the
    Coast Guard and providing a safe environment for our members.
        Thanks to the actions of Congress over the last several
    years, and in concert with our sister services, we have been
    focused on improvements to reporting processes, support to our
    victims, investigation and accountability, and prevention
    programs. And just quickly, some of the things we have done, we
    have instituted a restricted and nonrestricted reporting
    structure that gives options to victims on how they want to
    report, we have taken care of what is called collateral
    misconduct associated with sexual assaults, and we participate
    in the DoD's CATCH program that allows us to identify repeat
    offenders.
        With regard to support to victims, we have professional
    sexual assault response coordinators. We now have a sexual
    assault prevention program office and program leadership. We
    have volunteer and professional victims advocates in the field,
    special victims councils out there to help through the legal
    process, and we have a policy in place that allows members to
    ask for a transfer if they or their spouses have been affected
    by sexual violence.
        Again, we have improved investigations and accountability.
    Every single case of sexual assault must be investigated by our
    Coast Guard Investigative Service.
        And really, the key thing is to prevent these from
    happening. And we have done a lot to build a culture of
    prevention. We need to do more there. Other services have
    thousands of people working for primary prevention in the
    field. We have one at Coast Guard headquarters. We don't need
    thousands, but we need dozens, and I am going to work hard to
    get them in place.
        Dr. Babin. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate that very much.
        I am out of time, Ms. Mak, and I am sorry you didn't get a
    chance to say anything.
        I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. Well, the chair has been
    notified that there is a vote series on the floor, and the
    committee will stand in recess not subject to the call of the
    chair, but we are going to call as soon as you get done. Don't
    come back too giddy. It is not over yet.
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Webster of Florida. But come back if you wanted to ask
    questions.
        So, we are in recess.
        [Recess.]
        Mr. Webster of Florida. I thank the witnesses for staying,
    and now we are back at it again, and we will get done here.
        Mr. Ezell, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Vice Admiral Thomas and Ms. Mak, thank you for being here
    today.
        From protecting our ports and waterways to assisting our
    communities during hurricanes, the Coast Guard is an
    indispensable asset to southern Mississippi. I proudly
    represent Port Security Guard 308, the Gulfport Coast Guard
    Station, and the Coast Guard personnel at Pascagoula Naval
    Station. I also take pride in representing the shipbuilders of
    southern Mississippi that build many of the world-class vessels
    the Coast Guard sails every day.
        One of these vessels being constructed is the Polar
    Security Cutter, which is essential to the project of our
    sovereignty in the Arctic against our adversaries in China and
    Russia. I have spoken with the shipyard in my district
    constructing these vessels, and they have assured me they are
    working diligently with the Coast Guard to expedite the
    program. It brings me pride to say the workforce of southern
    Mississippi will be responsible for building the most superior
    and technologically advanced polar cutters in the entire world.
        In addition, the Legend class National Security Cutters
    utilized by the Coast Guard are built in my district at Ingalls
    Shipbuilding. This cutter has been referenced as the most
    capable and advanced cutter in the Coast Guard's fleet. Vice
    Admiral Thomas, how vital has that Legend class cutter been in
    the Coast Guard's operations?
        Admiral Thomas. Well, thank you for your support of our
    people in your home State and your district. I know they really
    enjoy seeing you.
        Look, the National Security Cutters have been game-
    changing. They have been game-changing in our interdiction
    missions, they have been game-changing in our missions in
    competitive space with the Chinese and others. So, very, very
    capable ships. We have been very happy with them. And we
    really, really appreciate your support of that program.
        Mr. Ezell. Yes, sir. Thank you, Admiral. I do have some
    concerns regarding the MH-65 replacement program.
        The Coast Guard plans to replace the MH-65 fleet with a
    notably smaller number of MH-60s. This approach is centered on
    the fact that the 60s are larger helicopters with a longer
    range. However, I worry that downsizing the fleet would
    dangerously limit the Coast Guard's ability to respond to
    simultaneous emergencies like those that come after hurricanes.
        Can you assure me that the new fleet of less MH-60s will
    have the same response capabilities as the current mixed fleet?
        Admiral Thomas. So, our current fleet of approximately 146
    rotary-wing aircraft split between the 60s and 65s is roughly
    one-third 60s and two-thirds 65s. We will transition to all 60s
    at, at least, 127 aircraft. That number is not set. That is the
    current program of record. We are currently required to do a
    review of our aircraft laydown by the NDAA, and that work is
    ongoing.
        Mr. Ezell. Thank you. I also have some concerns with the
    Coast Guard's intention to have that single model helicopter
    fleet.
        Last year, we saw the Army ground its entire fleet of
    Chinook helicopters due to engine fire concerns. If an
    unfortunate event like this were to happen with the 60s in the
    future, the Coast Guard might be left with no helicopter
    capabilities.
        Moreover, I believe there are multiple air intercept
    missions where a smaller helicopter would be a more practical
    platform.
        Vice Admiral, can you explain why you think a single model
    helicopter fleet is advantageous for the Coast Guard?
        Admiral Thomas. Yes. Again, thank you for the question.
        I mean, there are a lot of advantages to operating a single
    fleet. It is easier to maintain them, it is easier to train
    people. You have full cross-decking of crews. I can't put a 65
    qualified crewmember on a 60 right now. And the 60 is aircraft
    that all of our sister services operate. There are thousands of
    them in service. Our Airbus helicopters, we are the largest
    operator of those helicopters right now.
        So, we think the right thing to do is to move to a single
    rotary-wing fleet. Thank you.
        Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Admiral.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Auchincloss, you are recognized
    for 5 minutes.
        Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
        Ms. Mak has laid forward in her written testimony, very
    substantively and specifically, examples of the over-
    concurrence of technology development, design, and construction
    that seems to be a feature of the last 15 years in the Coast
    Guard, and has, I think, been a primary driver--Ms. Mak, if you
    would agree--in the cost overruns and delays.
        Yet, Admiral, you have been mostly pointing to exogenous
    factors--inflation, supply chain snarls, workforce--as being
    the primary reason. Of course, everyone is facing those issues.
    Would you accept that some of this is endogenous, that some of
    this is because of Coast Guard decisionmaking and the over-
    concurrence of those issues?
        Admiral Thomas. What I would accept is the premise that if
    you want to drive risk to cost and schedule during construction
    to zero, you don't start until you have 100 percent design.
        The problem is we have to manage more than just risk to
    cost and schedule during construction. We have to manage the
    operational risk. We have to manage the financial risk to the
    contractor. And in both cases that Ms. Mak talked about, those
    contractors would go broke if we were not able to begin
    construction with a well-developed design, but not a fully
    developed design.
        Mr. Auchincloss. So, then, in particular, in her written
    testimony, she has the example with the Offshore Patrol Cutter
    that the GAO recommended that you wait until the davit gets to
    TRL 7 before starting construction on OPC 3, and that the Coast
    Guard actually concurred.
        But now the Coast Guard has started construction on OPC 3,
    and the davit is not at TRL 7. What explains that?
        Admiral Thomas. Well, again, we would love to have all of
    the critical technology at TRL 7 before we begin construction.
    We have a mitigation plan for the davits, and we are
    comfortable enough with that mitigation plan that we need to
    move ahead with the construction.
        The Nation needs these ships. Our----
        Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. I agree that the Nation
    needs the ships, but it sounds like the Nation is not getting
    these ships partly because the technology development is
    underdeveloped, relative to the design and construction
    timeline. So, we are all in a hurry here, but it doesn't seem
    like we are going--there is an old saying in the Marine Corps,
    ``Slow is smooth, smooth is fast.'' And it seems like we are
    not being very smooth here, and hence we are not being very
    fast.
        Admiral Thomas. So, we are confident that the davit will be
    at the right TRL level when we need it on the current
    construction timeline.
        Mr. Auchincloss. Ms. Mak, are you confident in that?
        Ms. Mak. No, obviously not. That is why we made the
    recommendation that we did.
        I mean, in general, when it comes to acquisitions,
    accelerating plans without the appropriate knowledge is going
    to cause a lot of rework and extend your schedule anyway. It
    does not equate to the ability to deliver on those plans.
        Mr. Auchincloss. And has that rework leading to delays been
    a feature since 2007 of the Coast Guard procurement plans?
        Ms. Mak. I would say as far back as I have been looking at
    them since 2017, yes.
        Mr. Auchincloss. And now it seems like we are seeing the
    same thing with the polar cutters here, where design is not yet
    complete prior to construction for the lead ship in line with
    the recommendation that you have made.
        Admiral, what are the reasons why you are confident that,
    even though you are more concurrent than has been recommended,
    that you are going to be able to do it?
        Admiral Thomas. Well, again, there are a lot of risks that
    we are balancing.
        I agree, if we want to drive risk to cost and schedule
    during construction to zero, we would probably not begin
    construction until we are 100 percent designed. But we have
    mitigation measures in place. We have authorized a number of
    special studies that have allowed the contractor to understand
    what it is going to take to build this ship with this material
    that they have never worked with before. We have helped them
    with capital investments that will allow them to work with the
    material, with things like robotic welders and induction
    heaters for the material. And we are moving ahead with
    prototype fabrication, prototype module fabrication, that will
    allow them to continue their learning.
        We have not yet begun construction on the polar cutter.
        Mr. Auchincloss. Ms. Mak, do you think that these measures
    are going to be sufficient?
        Ms. Mak. At this point it is really hard to tell, because
    the Polar Security Cutter--they are saying that it is going to
    be delivered by 2027. But as of right now, the contractor does
    not have sufficient business systems to be able to address the
    schedule. So, it is optimistic.
        We don't think the data is very accurate at this point. So,
    until we get a little more accurate data, we don't know if they
    are going to be able to meet that timeline, either. I mean,
    back in 2018, when we looked at it, we were supposed to have an
    icebreaker, a heavy polar icebreaker, by 2024.
        Mr. Auchincloss. Right. Admiral, I would submit that it
    seems like the Coast Guard is not fully internalizing the
    lessons of the last 15 years. Is there a big learning that you
    have taken forward from what has happened in the last 15 years
    that you are going to adopt to do things differently?
        Admiral Thomas. Well, let me just address the delivery
    schedule.
        We are currently doing the work with a new contractor to
    re-baseline this project so that we can truly understand cost
    and schedule, and we will have those numbers. There is no
    question the schedule has slipped, probably into at least 2028,
    and the costs will rise.
        Mr. Auchincloss. But what is your biggest learning over the
    last 15 years that you are going to do differently?
        Admiral Thomas. I think Ms. Mak hit on what needs to be
    done differently in terms of how funding comes to the services
    for major acquisition, and----
        Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. But why would we say more
    money is the answer when part of the problem clearly is in the
    concurrency of technology, development, design, and
    construction that Ms. Mak has pointed out? That is not a money
    problem. That sounds like a program management problem.
        Admiral Thomas. Again, the issue of managing risk across
    the entire acquisition as opposed to managing only risk
    associated with cost and construction--or cost and schedule
    during construction is the challenge.
        Mr. Auchincloss. The chairman has been indulgent, I
    appreciate it. Thank you.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. The gentleman yields back. No one
    else is here to ask a question, but I have got one, just one
    more.
        Turning to the Offshore Patrol Cutter program, the Coast
    Guard has long stated that after completion of the initial ship
    in the class, it must build two per year in order to limit the
    loss of the mission capabilities as Medium Endurance Cutters go
    offline. Fiscal year 2022-2023 capital improvement plans
    envision that a full rate of production will happen. Is that
    going to happen? That is the real question.
        Admiral Thomas. Well, the full rate of production will
    happen for stage 1, which will be delivering cutters on 1-year
    centers. In stage 2, we will reach a full rate of production of
    two per year. And from what I have seen of that particular
    shipyard, they may actually produce more than that.
        But your concern about the Medium Endurance Cutters is a
    valid one. Last year, we lost about 3\1/2\ cutters' worth of
    time due to unscheduled repairs, which is why it is so
    important that we get the OPCs into our fleet.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. Do you have anything to add to
    that, Ms. Mak?
        Ms. Mak. Nothing other than, yes, they need this as fast as
    they can do it, but they've got to do it right the first time.
    Before you build more OPCs on the stage 2, make sure you have
    some of the design issues addressed.
        I mean, like I mentioned, that electrical cabinet which is
    in the davit, if you don't have that right, you are going to go
    back and you are going to have to redo all the ones you have
    already done. That is going to take more time, and it is going
    to take a lot more money.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you so much. Well, I don't
    think there is any other testimony. Any other questions?
        Do you have any other questions?
        I gave you a little extra time [to Mr. Auchincloss].
        [Laughter.]
        Mr. Auchincloss. I just want to let the admiral one more
    time--is the biggest learning of the last 15 years on your
    design, tech development, and construction process really just
    that you need more money? There is no other learning that you
    want to present to Congress?
        Admiral Thomas. I think the biggest learning that the Coast
    Guard has had in our acquisition history has to do with the
    system integrator and the use of system integrators, which we
    tried and we will never do again.
        Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you.
        Mr. Webster of Florida. OK. Any other questions?
        Thank you both for appearing. I appreciate your testimony,
    and I ask unanimous consent that the record of today's hearing
    remain open for such time as our witnesses have provided
    answers to any questions that may be submitted to them in
    writing.
        Without objection, show that ordered.
        I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open
    for 15 days for any additional comments or information
    submitted by the Members or witnesses to be included in the
    record of today's hearing.
        Without objection, show that ordered.
        The subcommittee stands adjourned.
        [Whereupon, at 3:42 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                           Submissions for the Record

                                  ----------

     Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member,
                 Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
        Thank you, Chair Webster, for holding this important oversight
    hearing.
                            Operation Fouled Anchor
        Before we get into the substance of today's hearing, I want to take
    a moment to address Operation Fouled Anchor.
        In 2020, the Coast Guard completed a 6-year secret investigation
    into sexual assaults at the Coast Guard Academy between 1990 and 2006.
    The results and recommendations of Operation Fouled Anchor were hidden
    from Congress, the public and not distributed widely within the Coast
    Guard.
        While I'm still parsing the details of the investigation and
    awaiting documentation, the Coast Guard's lack of transparency is
    unacceptable. Congress and, more importantly, members of the Coast
    Guard cannot trust the system if these types of violent crimes are kept
    behind closed doors.
        Congress cannot conduct oversight and the Coast Guard cannot
    improve its Sexual Assault Prevention Program when the results and
    recommendations of a six year/20,000 hour operation are kept secret.
    The Coast Guard can and must do better.
                        Coast Guard Cutter Acquisitions
        Today's hearing is an opportunity for this Committee to receive an
    update on the Coast Guard's now 16-year-old recapitalization plan which
    was enacted in 2007. Included in this plan, and the subsequent update
    in 2017, are National Security Cutters, Fast Response Cutters, Offshore
    Patrol Cutters, Polar Security Cutters, Waterways Commerce Cutters, and
    HC130J aircraft.
        Several of these acquisition programs have gone well but others
    have faced significant cost increases and delivery delays.
        For instance, after awarding the Service's largest acquisition
    contract to a shipyard that had never had a government contract, the
    Coast Guard determined that the program was so far delayed and over
    budget that it recompeted the contract and awarded the construction of
    all but four cutters to another shipyard.
        The Polar Security Cutter is facing similar issues. The original
    projected delivery date was 2024 but the detailed design remains at 50
    percent and the Coast Guard has been unable to commit to a delivery
    date in this decade.
        While it's appropriate to scrutinize the Coast Guard's decisions,
    we in Congress must consider our own actions and the structural
    impediments facing the Service. Inadequate resources and irregular
    procurement programs result in cutting corners and inexperience.
        We cannot deliver vessels without access to shipyards.
        Diminished shipbuilding capacity as well as increased competition
    from the Navy has left the Coast Guard with limited options--we must
    all work together to resolve this shortage to keep our seas safe.
        While I'm confident the Coast Guard will complete the ongoing
    recapitalization effort, I am concerned that Congress and the
    Administration are not providing the resources to support the women and
    men who operate these vessels and aircraft.
                        Shoreside Infrastructure Backlog
        The growing shoreside infrastructure backlog has real world
    consequences for Coasties. During my recent visit to the Coast Guard
    Academy, I saw firsthand the unacceptable living conditions of cadets.
    No cadet should live in fear that moving their desk chair the wrong way
    could scratch the floor and expose them to asbestos, but that is the
    reality.
        Now that Congress has funded the construction of assets, we need to
    ensure that Coasties get the shoreside support they deserve. This
    includes workstations, housing, health care, and childcare. We need to
    do better.
                        Ms. Mak's Retirement and Closing
        I'd like to end by recognizing Ms. Marie Mak testifying before us
    today from the GAO. Your distinguished 37-year career in government
    service has resulted in a stronger Navy, a stronger Coast Guard and a
    better-informed Congress which has led to better laws. Thank you for
    your service and I hope you enjoy your next chapter.
        Thank you, Chairman Webster, and I look forward to today's
    discussion.

                                    Appendix

                                  ----------

     Questions from Hon. Mike Ezell to Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy
                Commandant for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard

        Question 1. The PSU 308 is a deployable special forces unit that is
    specifically equipped to provide support to any port in the world in
    under 96 hours. However, they have been stationed in trailers on the
    Stennis Airport grounds for the past ten years and there is uncertainty
    on their ability to stay in this location in the future. Can you please
    provide the Coast Guard's plan to rehouse this unit in a permanent
    facility without interrupting the unit's mission?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is conducting the planning required to
    relocate Port Security Unit 308 into a permanent facility. The general
    timeline to complete a project from concept, through planning,
    budgeting, design, and execution is approximately eight years and
    largely depends on the timing of Major Shore Procurement Construction &
    Improvement funding.

        Question 2. The Coast Guard's stated rotary-wing plan is to phase
    out the standard shipboard-deployable, short range recovery helicopter
    in favor of an all medium-range recovery helicopter fleet. The medium-
    range recovery helicopter requires significant modifications and
    additional equipment to deploy shipboard. Has the Coast Guard conducted
    operational testing and evaluation to ensure it effectively operates
    on, and in conjunction with, all USCG assets capable of supporting
    rotary-wing aircraft and mission profiles? What were the results?
        Answer. The Coast Guard can operate the MH-60T from seven of its 13
    Famous Class Medium Endurance Cutters and from all its National
    Security Cutters (NSC). Additionally, the Coast Guard designed its
    newest medium endurance and polar ice-breaking cutters, the Offshore
    Patrol Cutter (OPC), and the Polar Security Cutter, to enable MH-60T
    operations. The Coast Guard successfully completed operational testing
    and evaluation of blade-fold, tail-fold equipment and will configure
    the entire MH-60T fleet to be blade-fold, tail-fold capable to ensure
    that deployed MH-60Ts will fit into hangars on both the NSC and the
    OPC.

        Question 3. Has the Coast Guard explored new, more cost-effective
    aircraft currently in production to improve budget challenges, rather
    than continuing to reinvest in aging and costly legacy platforms? If
    not, would the Coast Guard consider conducting an analysis of
    alternatives of existing DoD inventory aircraft to enhance operational
    capabilities and reduce current personnel and budget constraints?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is actively exploring new rotary wing
    aircraft in concert and lock step with the U.S. Department of Defense
    Future Vertical Lift Program (FVL). The Service looks forward to FVL
    aircraft joining our ranks and retiring aging and costly legacy
    platforms.

    Questions from Hon. Hillary J. Scholten to Vice Admiral Paul F. Thomas,
            Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, U.S. Coast Guard

        Question 1. As we work to productively recapitalize assets and
    modernize the Coast Guard's capabilities, it's incumbent upon Congress
    to ensure American tax dollars are spent wisely so we set our Coast
    Guard up for success for future generations. As a Michigander, I know
    how much my state's economy and our nation's economy depends on safe
    and sustainable Great Lakes.
        Question 1.a. We have heard that the construction of a new heavy
    Great Lakes icebreaker will take 10 years, yet the need is now. What
    can Congress do to expedite the delivery of this much needed asset?
        Question 1.b. To follow up, if Congress funds the additional $20
    million for the Great Lakes icebreaker in the Coast Guard's Unfunded
    Priorities List, would this help deliver this icebreaker faster than
    just funding the $55 million in the budget request?
        Answer to 1.a. & 1.b. Until an acquisition is formally initiated,
    schedules and projected delivery timelines are notional as they are
    dependent on receipt of an appropriation and the shipbuilding
    industrial base's capacity, interest, and availability to meet program
    requirements. As part of the Analyze/Select Phase, comprehensive
    industry engagement and analyses are conducted to identify
    opportunities and risks for executing the acquisition and to establish
    a baseline schedule.
        Initial examination of the Federal Acquisition Regulations yielded
    few opportunities to accelerate the Great Lakes icebreaker (GLIB)
    acquisition timeline. The Coast Guard is consulting with its lawyers
    and acquisition professionals to find efficiencies in the Acquisition
    Lifecycle Framework to improve upon initial GLIB delivery timeline
    projections, provided in the below graphic. Funding of the additional
    $20 million for the GLIB on the Coast Guard's unfunded priorities list
    would not help deliver this icebreaker faster but would mitigate the
    potential for schedule delays in out-years.
    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Question 2. Last year's Coast Guard authorization bill directed the
    Coast Guard to establish and maintain a database on Great Lakes
    icebreaking operations and commercial vessel and ferry voyages during
    ice season. This has the potential to be a useful tool not only for the
    Coast Guard, but also for organizations that rely on its capabilities,
    such as our Lake Carriers. Where is the Coast Guard on establishing
    this database?
        Answer. The Coast Guard is actively working to develop and refine
    the technical requirements of the database. As required by the Coast
    Guard Authorization Act (CGAA) of 2022, the Coast Guard consulted
    operators of Great Lakes commercial vessels to gather input on current
    industry data collection, methodology used to assess the impact of
    delays caused by ice conditions, and ways industry can contribute to
    the Coast Guard data collection.
        While the database development efforts started upon enactment of
    the CGAA, the mild ice season this past winter/ice season (2022-2023)
    did not afford the Coast Guard opportunities to collect or analyze the
    necessary data to construct requirements based on industry's input.
    Looking forward to the upcoming winter/ice season (2023-2024), the
    Coast Guard will continue working with industry to collect required
    data and use existing enterprise applications to refine the database's
    technical requirements. This effort will assist in the future
    acquisition of a sustainable database solution.

    Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen on behalf of Hon. Patrick Ryan to Vice
      Admiral Paul F. Thomas, Deputy Commandant for Mission Support, U.S.
                                  Coast Guard

        Question 1. How did the United States Coast Guard (USCG) come to
    decide to redefine the boundaries of the Port of New York?
        Answer. The Coast Guard did not redefine the Port of New York's
    boundaries; it reaffirmed codified authorities and regulations. Since
    the language in Marine Safety Information Bulletin (MSIB) 2015-14 was
    unclear, the Coast Guard, via MSIB 2023-01, clarified the Port of New
    York's definition and applicable regulations.

        Question 2. How does the new definition fit into USCG's broader
    responsibility to regulate anchoring in the Hudson in a way that
    protects navigational safety for commercial vessels, the interests of
    other waterway users, and the environment?
        Answer. The Coast Guard did not redefine the Port of New York's
    boundaries; it reaffirmed codified authorities and regulations. Section
    8437 of the Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2020
    suspended the establishment of new anchorage grounds on the Hudson
    River between Yonkers, NY and Kingston, NY. As such, the Coast Guard
    has no legal authority to establish new anchorage grounds in this
    region.

        Question 3. Why was this decision made when the Port and Waterway
    Safety Assessment (PAWSA) in 2017 did not find that additional
    commercial anchorages were needed for navigational safety?
        Answer. The Coast Guard currently has no legal authority to
    establish any new anchorages in this region. Section 8437 of the Elijah
    E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2020 suspended the
    establishment of new anchorage grounds on the Hudson River between
    Yonkers, NY and Kingston, NY.
        The Coast Guard published Marine Safety Information Bulletin (MSIB)
    2023-01 to clarify the Port of New York's definition and applicable
    regulations.

        Question 4. How is the USCG working in collaboration with local
    government and non-governmental organizations to ensure that its
    activities in the region support the abundant and highly-prized natural
    resources in the river that are critical to the economy and way of life
    of waterfront communities and create a safe environment for all users
    of the river?
        Answer. To address issues that may include the safety, security,
    mobility, and environmental protection of a port or waterway, the Coast
    Guard leverages its Harbor Safety Committees to collaborate amongst and
    with local and non-governmental organizations in the area. Membership
    is open to all interested parties and typically comprised of
    representatives of governmental agencies, maritime labor, industry
    organizations, and public interest groups.
        The Coast Guard collaborates extensively with the Hudson River
    Safety Navigation and Operations Committee (HRSNOC) concerning the
    safe, secure, and environmentally sound usage of the Hudson River. The
    HRSNOC is a consensus-driven forum for coordination, collaboration, and
    decision making among private and public stakeholders on the Hudson
    River.

        Question 5. In the Coast Guard's work with local government and
    non-governmental organizations, how has it sought to balance the voices
    of stakeholders to ensure that environmental and ecological goals in
    the Hudson River are addressed?
        Answer. The Coast Guard works extensively with the HRSNOC
    concerning the safe, secure, and environmentally responsible usage of
    the Hudson River. The HRSNOC is a consensus-driven forum for
    coordination, collaboration and decision making among private and
    public stakeholders on the Hudson River.

        Question 6. What studies were conducted before the geographic
    limits of the Port of New York were changed?
        Answer. The Coast Guard did not redefine the Port of New York's
    boundaries; it reaffirmed codified authorities and regulations. Since
    the language in MSIB 2015-14 was unclear, the Coast Guard, via MSIB
    2023-01, clarified the Port of New York's definition and applicable
    regulations.

     Question from Hon. Mike Ezell to Marie A. Mak, Director, Contracting
      and National Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability
                                     Office

        Question 1. Section 11233 of the Don Young Coast Guard
    Authorization Act of 2022 tasks the GAO with assessing USCG's past and
    future efforts to upgrade or recapitalize its aviation fleets. Has GAO
    begun the study, how is it progressing, and have there been any initial
    findings shared with the USCG?
        Answer. GAO began the review of the Coast Guard's aircraft
    operational availability and modernization in late calendar year 2022.
    We have completed much of our planned field work, and are now in the
    early stages of developing a draft report. We have not shared our
    initial findings with the Coast Guard. We plan to do so during our exit
    conference with the Coast Guard this fall. Please contact Heather
    MacLeod, Director in our Homeland Security and Justice team, if you
    have any further questions about this topic area.

      Questions from Hon. Hillary J. Scholten to Marie A. Mak, Director,
        Contracting and National Security Acquisitions, U.S. Government
                             Accountability Office

        Question 1. As we work to productively recapitalize assets and
    modernize the Coast Guard's capabilities, it's incumbent upon Congress
    to ensure American tax dollars are spent wisely so we set our Coast
    Guard up for success for future generations. As a Michigander, I know
    how much my state's economy and our nation's economy depends on safe
    and sustainable Great Lakes.
        Question 1.a. We have heard that the construction of a new heavy
    Great Lakes icebreaker will take 10 years, yet the need is now. What
    can Congress do to expedite the delivery of this much needed asset?
        Question 1.b. To follow up, if Congress funds the additional $20
    million for the Great Lakes icebreaker in the Coast Guard's Unfunded
    Priorities List, would this help deliver this icebreaker faster than
    just funding the $55 million in the budget request?
        Answer to 1.a. & 1.b. In February 2019, we found that the annual
    Unfunded Priorities List does not clearly articulate prioritization
    decisions, including information about trade-offs among competing
    project alternatives, as well as the impacts on missions conducted from
    projects that had not been prioritized in previous years.\1\ According
    to Coast Guard officials, and as we previously reported, such
    information is not included in the Unfunded Priorities List because it
    is not statutorily required.\2\ These information shortcomings are
    consistent with previous findings and recommendations that the DHS
    Office of Inspector General has made.\3\
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        \1\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading
    Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of At Least $2.6
    Billion, GAO-19-82 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 21, 2019).
        \2\ GAO, Coast Guard Acquisitions: Actions Needed to Address
    Longstanding Portfolio Management Challenges, GAO-18-454 (Washington,
    D.C.: July 24, 2018).
        \3\ Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General,
    Maintenance, Rehabilitation, and Upgrading of Shore Facilities in
    Support of United States Coast Guard Missions, OIG-08-24 (Washington,
    D.C.: February 14, 2008).
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        However, regardless of whether Congress funds the Great Lakes
    icebreaker, the Coast Guard needs to provide a good business case,
    which includes setting firm requirements. Further, the Coast Guard
    needs to have the adequate knowledge to move through the acquisition
    cycle--this means reducing concurrency between technology development,
    design, and construction. If technologies are not fully developed and
    the design stabilized prior to construction, this could lead to further
    delays in the Coast Guard obtaining an icebreaker to meet mission needs
    in the Great Lakes. Instead of funding the icebreaker, potentially
    before other Coast Guard priorities, it might be beneficial for
    Congress to consider requiring Coast Guard to complete these
    activities, such as determining the requirements, by an established
    timeframe.
        The fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorization Act included a
    provision for GAO to review Coast Guard icebreaking operations in the
    Great Lakes, including assessing proposed standards for icebreaking. We
    plan to report on this topic around winter 2024. However, the Coast
    Guard should be able to respond about its acquisition and construction
    timelines, as well as the total costs associated with a new heavy
    icebreaker. Please contact Heather MacLeod, Director in our Homeland
    Security and Justice team, if you have any further questions about this
    topic area.

    Questions from Hon. Rick Larsen on behalf of Hon. Patrick Ryan to Marie
    A. Mak, Director, Contracting and National Security Acquisitions, U.S.
                        Government Accountability Office

        Question 1. How did the United States Coast Guard (USCG) come to
    decide to redefine the boundaries of the Port of New York?
        Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and
    therefore cannot provide a response.

        Question 2. How does the new definition fit into USCG's broader
    responsibility to regulate anchoring in the Hudson in a way that
    protects navigational safety for commercial vessels, the interests of
    other waterway users, and the environment?
        Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and
    therefore cannot provide a response.

        Question 3. Why was this decision made when the Port and Waterway
    Safety Assessment (PAWSA) in 2017 did not find that additional
    commercial anchorages were needed for navigational safety?
        Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and
    therefore cannot provide a response.

        Question 4. How is the USCG working in collaboration with local
    government and non-governmental organizations to ensure that its
    activities in the region support the abundant and highly-prized natural
    resources in the river that are critical to the economy and way of life
    of waterfront communities and create a safe environment for all users
    of the river?
        Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and
    therefore cannot provide a response.

        Question 5. In the Coast Guard's work with local government and
    non-governmental organizations, how has it sought to balance the voices
    of stakeholders to ensure that environmental and ecological goals in
    the Hudson River are addressed?
        Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and
    therefore cannot provide a response.

        Question 6. What studies were conducted before the geographic
    limits of the Port of New York were changed?
        Answer. GAO has not conducted any audit work in this area, and
    therefore cannot provide a response.

                                     [all]