[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                  TIKTOK: HOW CONGRESS CAN SAFEGUARD AMER-
                   ICAN DATA PRIVACY AND PROTECT CHILDREN 
                   FROM ONLINE HARMS

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                    COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 23, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-13
                           
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                           


     Published for the use of the Committee on Energy and Commerce

                   govinfo.gov/committee/house-energy
                        energycommerce.house.gov
                        
                               __________

                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
53-839 PDF                      WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     
                      
                        
                    COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE

                   CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, Washington
                                  Chair
MICHAEL C. BURGESS, Texas            FRANK PALLONE, Jr., New Jersey
ROBERT E. LATTA, Ohio                  Ranking Member
BRETT GUTHRIE, Kentucky              ANNA G. ESHOO, California
H. MORGAN GRIFFITH, Virginia         DIANA DeGETTE, Colorado
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida            JAN SCHAKOWSKY, Illinois
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio                   DORIS O. MATSUI, California
LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana               KATHY CASTOR, Florida
RICHARD HUDSON, North Carolina       JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland
TIM WALBERG, Michigan                PAUL TONKO, New York
EARL L. ``BUDDY'' CARTER, Georgia    YVETTE D. CLARKE, New York
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina          TONY CARDENAS, California
GARY J. PALMER, Alabama              RAUL RUIZ, California
NEAL P. DUNN, Florida                SCOTT H. PETERS, California
JOHN R. CURTIS, Utah                 DEBBIE DINGELL, Michigan
DEBBBIE LESKO, Arizona               MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
GREG PENCE, Indiana                  ANN M. KUSTER, New Hampshire
DAN CRENSHAW, Texas                  ROBIN L. KELLY, Illinois
JOHN JOYCE, Pennsylvania             NANETTE DIAZ BARRAGAN, California
KELLY ARMSTRONG, North Dakota, Vice  LISA BLUNT ROCHESTER, Delaware
    Chair                            DARREN SOTO, Florida
RANDY K. WEBER, Sr., Texas           ANGIE CRAIG, Minnesota
RICK W. ALLEN, Georgia               KIM SCHRIER, Washington
TROY BALDERSON, Ohio                 LORI TRAHAN, Massachusetts
RUSS FULCHER, Idaho                  LIZZIE FLETCHER, Texas
AUGUST PFLUGER, Texas
DIANA HARSHBARGER, Tennessee
MARIANNETTE MILLER-MEEKS, Iowa
KAT CAMMACK, Florida
JAY OBERNOLTE, California
                                 ------                                

                           Professional Staff

                      NATE HODSON, Staff Director
                   SARAH BURKE, Deputy Staff Director
               TIFFANY GUARASCIO, Minority Staff Director
                             
                             
                             C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page
Hon. Cathy McMorris Rodgers, a Representative in Congress from 
  the State of Washington, opening statement.....................     2
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Frank Pallone, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 
  State of New Jersey, opening statement.........................     8
    Prepared statement...........................................    10

                               Witnesses

Shou Chew, Chief Executive Officer, TikTok, Inc..................    12
    Prepared statement...........................................    14
    Answers to submitted questions \1\

                           Submitted Material

Inclusion of the following was approved by unanimous consent.
Article of March 10, 2023, "A former TikTok employee tells 
  Congress the app is lying about Chinese spying," by Drew 
  Harwell, Washington Post.......................................   121
Article of March 22, 2023, "TikTok Generation: A CCP Official in 
  Every Pocket," by Kara Frederick, Director, Technology Policy 
  Center, Heritage Foundation....................................   126
Article of June 17, 2022, "Leaked Audio From 80 Internal TikTok 
  Meetings Shows That US User Data Has Been Repeatedly Accessed 
  From China," by Emily Baker-White, Buzzfeed News...............   141
Article of October 25, 2022, "A China-Based ByteDance Team 
  Investigated TikTok's Global Security Chief, Who Oversaw U.S. 
  Data Concerns," by Emily Baker-White, Forbes...................   149
Article of November 28, 2022, "TikTok Couldn't Ensure Accurate 
  Responses To Government Inquiries, A ByteDance Risk Assessment 
  Said," by Emily Baker-White, Forbes............................   158
Article of October 20, 2022, "TikTok Parent ByteDance Planned To 
  Use TikTok To Monitor The Physical Location Of Specific 
  American Citizens," by Emily Baker-White, Forbes...............   168
Article of December 22, 2022, "EXCLUSIVE: TikTok Spied On Forbes 
  Journalists," by Emily Baker-White, Forbes.....................   177
Article of March 21, 2023, "India Banned TikTok In 2020. TikTok 
  Still Has Access To Years Of Indians' Data," by Alexandra S. 
  Levine, Forbes.................................................   187
Article of April 24, 2022, "TikTok Insider: Zhang Yiming's 
  Journey of Giant Waves," from Jiemian News.\2\
Report of the Innovation and Training Division, National Cyber 
  Security Centre, Lithuania, "Assessment of cybersecurity of 
  mobile devices supporting 5G technology sold in Lithuania, 
  Analysis of Products Made by Huawei, Xiaomi and OnePlus," 
  August 23, 2021.\2\
Analysis, "Banning TikTok: What's At Stake and Would a Ban 
  Address the National Security Risk?," by Sarah Kreps and Joshua 
  Clark, Cornell Brooks Tech Policy Institute....................   192

----------

\1\ Mr. Chew's responses have been retained in committee files and are 
available at https://docs.house.gov/meetings/IF/IF00/20230323/115519/
HHRG-118-IF00-Wstate-ChewS-20230323-SD030.pdf.
\2\ The information has been retained in committee files and is 
included in the Documents for the Record at https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF00/20230323/115519/HHRG-118-IF00-20230323-SD030.pdf.
Report by Rachel Lee, et al., "TikTok, ByteDance, and their ties 
  to the Chinese Communist Party," March 14, 2023, submitted to 
  the Australian Senate Select Committee on Foreign Interference 
  through Social Media, March 14, 2023.\2\
Article of September 8, 2021, "How TikTok Serves Up Sex and Drug 
  Videos to Minors," by Rob Barry, et al., Wall Street Journal...   197
Article of March 23, 2023, "China Says It Opposes Forced Sale of 
  TikTok," by Raffaele Huang, Wall Street Journal................   203
Twitter post by Ron Deibert concerning Citizen Lab and TikTok, 
  re-Tweeted by John Scott-Railton, March 23, 2023...............   205
Article of March 22, 2023, "Crunch Time for TikTok and Americans' 
  Freedom of Speech," by Caitlin Vogus, Center for Democracy and 
  Digital Inclusion..............................................   207
Letter from PEN America, et al., to Member of Congress...........   211
Statement of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, "The Government 
  Hasn't Justified a TikTok Ban," by Adam Schwartz and David 
  Greene, March 16, 2023.........................................   214

----------

\2\ The information has been retained in committee files and is 
included in the Documents for the Record at https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF00/20230323/115519/HHRG-118-IF00-20230323-SD030.pdf.

 
 TIKTOK: HOW CONGRESS CAN SAFEGUARD AMERICAN DATA PRIVACY AND PROTECT 
                       CHILDREN FROM ONLINE HARMS

                              ----------                              


                        THURSDAY, MARCH 23, 2023

                  House of Representatives,
                  Committee on Energy and Commerce,
                                            Washington, DC.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m. in the 
John D. Dingell Room 2123, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. 
Cathy McMorris Rodgers (chair of the committee) presiding.
    Members present: Representatives Rodgers, Burgess, Latta, 
Guthrie, Griffith, Bilirakis, Johnson, Hudson, Walberg, Carter, 
Duncan, Palmer, Dunn, Curtis, Lesko, Pence, Crenshaw, Joyce, 
Armstrong, Weber, Allen, Balderson, Fulcher, Pfluger, 
Harshbarger, Miller-Meeks, Cammack, Obernolte, Pallone 
(committee ranking member), Eshoo, DeGette, Schakowsky, Matsui, 
Castor, Sarbanes, Tonko, Clarke, Cardenas, Ruiz, Peters, 
Dingell, Veasey, Kuster, Barragan, Blunt Rochester, Soto, 
Craig, Schrier, Trahan, and Fletcher.
    Staff present: Kate Arey, Digital Director; Sean Brebbia, 
Chief Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Jolie Brochin, 
Clerk, Health; Deep Buddharaju, Senior Counsel, Oversight and 
Investigations; Sarah Burke, Deputy Staff Director; Michael 
Cameron, Professional Staff Member, Innovation, Data, and 
Commerce; Lauren Eriksen, Clerk, Oversight and Investigations; 
Sydney Greene, Director of Operations; Jack Heretik, Press 
Secretary; Slate Herman, Counsel, Communications and 
Technology; Jessica Herron, Clerk, Innovation, Data, and 
Commerce; Nate Hodson, Staff Director; Tara Hupman, Chief 
Counsel; Noah Jackson, Clerk, Communications and Technology; 
Sean Kelly, Press Secretary; Peter Kielty, General Counsel; 
Emily King, Member Services Director; Chris Krepich, Press 
Secretary; Tim Kurth, Chief Counsel, Innovations, Data, and 
Commerce; Giulia Leganski, Professional Staff Member, 
Communications and Technology; Kate O'Connor, Chief Counsel, 
Communications and Technology; Kaitlyn Peterson, Clerk, Energy 
and Environment; Brannon Rains, Professional Staff Member, 
Innovation, Data, and Commerce; Olivia Shields, Communications 
Director; Lacey Strahm, Fellow, Innovation, Data, and Commerce; 
Michael Taggart, Policy Director; Teddy Tanzer, Senior Counsel, 
Innovation, Data, and Commerce; Dray Thorne, Director of 
Information Technology; Hannah Anton, Minority Staff Assistant; 
Ian Barlow, Minority FTC Detailee; Jennifer Epperson, Minority 
Chief Counsel, Communications and Technology; Austin Flack, 
Minority Junior Professional Staff Member; Waverly Gordon, 
Minority Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel; Daniel 
Greene, Minority Professional Staff Member; Tiffany Guarascio, 
Minority Staff Director; Perry Hamilton, Minority Member 
Services and Outreach Manager; Lisa Hone, Minority Chief 
Counsel, Innovation, Data, and Commerce; Liz Johns, Minority 
GAO Detailee; Mackenzie Kuhl, Minority Digital Manager; Una 
Lee, Minority Chief Health Counsel; Will McAuliffe, Minority 
Chief Counsel, Oversight and Investigations; Dan Miller, 
Minority Professional Staff Member; Joe Orlando, Minority 
Senior Policy Analyst; Christina Parisi, Minority Professional 
Staff Member; Caroline Rinker, Minority Press Assistant; Harry 
Samuels, Minority Oversight Counsel; Michael Scurato, Minority 
FCC Detailee; Andrew Souvall, Minority Director of 
Communications, Outreach, and Member Services; Johanna Thomas, 
Minority Counsel; Caroline Wood, Minority Research Analyst; and 
C.J. Young, Minority Deputy Communications Director.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The committee will come to order. Before I 
begin, I would like to take a moment to address the guests in 
the audience.
    First of all, thank you for coming. We think engaged 
citizens are welcome and a valuable part of the political 
process. I do want to remind the guests in the audience that 
the Chair is obliged under the House rules and the rules of the 
committee to maintain order and preserve decorum in the 
committee room. I know that we have deep feelings on these 
issues and that we all may not agree on everything, but I ask 
that we abide by these rules and be respectful of our audience 
members, our viewers, and our witnesses. The Chair appreciates 
the audience cooperation in maintaining order as we have a full 
discussion on these important issues.
    The Chair recognizes herself for 5 minutes for an opening 
statement.

      OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. CATHY McMORRIS RODGERS, A 
    REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

    Mr. Chew, you are here because the American people need the 
truth about the threat TikTok poses to our national and 
personal security. TikTok collects nearly every data point 
imaginable, from people's location to what they type and copy, 
who they talk to, biometric data, and more. Even if they have 
never been on TikTok, your trackers are embedded in sites 
across the Web. TikTok surveils us all, and the Chinese 
Communist Party is able to use this as a tool to manipulate 
America as a whole.
    We do not trust TikTok will ever embrace American values, 
values for freedom, human rights, and innovation. TikTok has 
repeatedly chosen the path for more control, more surveillance, 
and more manipulation. Your platform should be banned.
    I expect today you will say anything to avoid this outcome, 
like you are 100 percent responsible for what TikTok does, that 
you suddenly endorse a national data privacy standard, that 
Project Texas is more than a marketing scheme, that TikTok 
doesn't harm our innocent children, or that your ties to the 
Chinese Communist Party through ByteDance is just a myth. We 
aren't buying it.
    In fact, when you celebrate the 150 million American users 
on TikTok, it emphasizes the urgency for Congress to act. That 
is 150 million Americans that CCP can collect sensitive 
information on, and control what we ultimately see, hear, and 
believe.
    TikTok has repeatedly been caught in the lie that it does 
not answer to the CCP through ByteDance. Today the CCP's laws 
require Chinese companies like ByteDance to spy on their 
behalf. That means any Chinese company must grant the CCP 
access and manipulation capabilities as a design feature. Right 
now ByteDance is under investigation by the DoJ for surveilling 
American journalists, both digital activity and physical 
movements, through TikTok.
    We also know that many of your employees still report 
directly to Beijing. Internal recordings reveal there is a back 
door for China to access user data across the platform. Your 
employees said, ``Everything is seen in China.'`
    A gateway to spy is not the only way TikTok and ByteDance 
can do the bidding of the CCP. TikTok has helped erase events 
and people China wants the world to forget. It has even 
censored an American teenager who exposed CCP's genocide and 
torture of Uyghur Muslims. The facts show that ByteDance is 
beholden to the CCP, and ByteDance and TikTok are one and the 
same.
    TikTok also targets our children. The For You algorithm is 
a tool for TikTok to own their attention and prey on their 
innocence. Within minutes of creating an account, your 
algorithm can promote suicide, self-harm, and eating disorders 
to children. It encourages challenges for them to put their 
lives in danger and allows adults to prey on our beautiful, 
beloved daughters.
    It is also a portal for drug dealers to sell illicit 
fentanyl that China has banned, yet is helping Mexican cartels 
produce, send across our border, and poison our children. In 
China the CCP proactively prohibits this type of TikTok content 
that promotes death and despair to kids.
    From the data it collects to the content it controls, 
TikTok is a grave threat of foreign influence in American life. 
It has been said it is like allowing the Soviet Union the power 
to produce Saturday morning cartoons during the Cold War, but 
much more powerful and much more dangerous.
    Banning your platform will address the immediate threats. 
Make no mistake, this committee is also looking to the future. 
America needs to be prepared to stop the next technological 
tool or weapon China will use for its own strategic gain. We 
must prevent any app, website, and platform like TikTok from 
ever spying on Americans again, and we must provide the 
strongest protections possible for our children.
    That is why this committee is leading on a national privacy 
and data security standard. It restricts sensitive American 
data from reaching our adversaries to begin with, and what Big 
Tech and data brokers collect, process, store, and sell. It 
makes it illegal for any platform to track and target children 
under 17.
    Mr. Chew, the committee has requested that TikTok appear 
before us for a long time. For those we serve, we are glad the 
day has finally come. Today the world is watching. ByteDance is 
watching. The Chinese Communist Party is watching. But the 
answers you owe are to the American people, a free people who 
cherish their God-given unalienable, rights to life, liberty, 
and the pursuit of happiness for all. They deserve the truth.
    Complete honesty is the standard and the law you are being 
held to before this committee as we seek to get answers and a 
full understanding of what happens at TikTok under your watch. 
Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mrs. Rodgers follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mrs. Rodgers. The Chair now recognizes the ranking member, 
Mr. Pallone, for 5 minutes.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK PALLONE, Jr., A REPRESENTATIVE 
            IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY

    Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Madam Chair, and let me say that I 
agree with much of what you just said, and I certainly 
appreciate your enthusiasm and your commenting on being a 
mother and concerned about children. And I am glad that we are 
having this hearing today.
    Big Tech has transformed the information superhighway into 
a super spreader of harmful content, invasive surveillance 
practices, and addictive and damaging design features. Data is 
Big Tech's most valuable commodity, and by collecting far more 
user data than they need, Big Tech platforms can use, share, 
and sell information to generate billions of dollars in 
revenue.
    Today the American people are powerless to stop this 
invasion of their privacy, and we can't wait any longer to pass 
comprehensive national privacy legislation that puts people 
back in control of their data. We must hold Big Tech 
accountable for its actions, and transparency is critical to 
that accountability.
    In the past several Congresses, this committee has heard 
from senior executives of other social media platforms about 
troubling and repeated instances where they put profits over 
people. Now, today, we intend to bring more transparency to 
TikTok, which is controlled by its Beijing, communist-based 
parent company, ByteDance. And while TikTok videos provide a 
new, fun way for people to express their creativity and enjoy 
the videos of others, the platform also threatens the health, 
privacy, and security of the American people. And I am not 
convinced that the benefits outweigh the risks that it poses to 
Americans in its present form.
    More than 130 million people in the United States use 
TikTok every month, including two-thirds of American teenagers. 
TikTok collects and compiles vast troves of valuable personal 
information to create an addictive algorithm that is able to 
predict with uncanny accuracy which videos will keep users 
scrolling, even if the content is harmful, inaccurate, or feeds 
destructive behavior or extremist beliefs.
    Now, the combination of TikTok's Beijing, communist-based 
China ownership and its popularity exacerbates its danger to 
our country and to our privacy. The Chinese Communist 
government can compel companies based in Beijing like TikTok to 
share data with the communist government through existing 
Beijing law or coercion.
    National security experts are sounding the alarm, warning 
that the Chinese Communist government could require TikTok to 
compromise device security, maliciously access American user 
data, promote pro-Communist propaganda, and undermine American 
interests. Disinformation campaigns could be launched by the 
Chinese Communist government through TikTok, which has already 
become rife with misinformation and disinformation, illegal 
activities, and hate speech. A recent report found that 20 
percent of TikTok search results on prominent news topics 
contain misinformation.
    Social media's profitability depends on growth and 
engagement. More eyes on their content for longer time leads to 
more advertising dollars and revenue generation. Addictive 
algorithms are fine-tuned to optimize growth and engagement 
without necessarily taking into account potential harms to 
users.
    Children and teens are particularly vulnerable. Frequent 
online use of interactive media on digital devices is 
associated with increased levels of depression among middle and 
high school students. Research has found that TikTok's 
addictive algorithms recommend videos to teens that create and 
exacerbate feelings of emotional distress, including videos 
promoting suicide, self-harm, and eating disorders.
    Public outrage and hollow apologies alone are not going to 
rein in Big Tech. Congress has to enact laws protecting the 
American public from such online harms, and we simply cannot 
wait any longer to pass the comprehensive privacy legislation 
that I authored with then ranking member, now Chair Rodgers, 
last Congress that overwhelmingly advanced out of the 
committee. It ensures that companies, wherever they live--it 
ensures, I should say, that consumers, wherever they live in 
this country, will have meaningful control over their personal 
information.
    Our legislation establishes baseline data minimization 
requirements, ensuring that companies only collect, process, 
and transfer data necessary to provide a service. And it 
provides heightened privacy protections for children and 
teenagers. So I think it is time to make this legislation the 
law of the land.
    And we also have to examine the reforms needed to section 
230 of the Communications Decency Act. The liability shield for 
social media platforms has for too long been abused and led to 
a lack of accountability for social media platforms. So I hope 
we can find a bipartisan path forward on that issue too--and I 
think you are having a hearing next week on it--so we can stop 
the very real harms to our country and democracy under the 
current law.
    I look forward to the discussion today as we continue to 
bring accountability to Big Tech.
    And let me say to Mr. Chew I know this is about TikTok, but 
I am focusing all my attention not only on TikTok but on these 
concerns, wide concerns about social media and the protection 
of privacy.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Pallone follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Pallone. And with that, I yield back. Thank you again, 
Madam Chair, for having this very important hearing.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Our witness today is Mr. Shou Chew, chief 
executive officer of TikTok.
    You are recognized for 5 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF SHOU CHEW, CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, TIKTOK, INC.

    Mr. Chew. Thank you. Chair Rodgers, Ranking Member Pallone, 
members of the committee, thank you for your time.
    I am Shou Chew, and I am from Singapore. That is where I 
was born, as were my parents. And after serving in Singapore's 
military, I moved to the U.K. to attend college, and then here 
to the U.S. to attend business school. I actually met my wife 
here. By the way, she was just born a few miles away from here 
in Virginia.
    Two years ago I became the CEO of TikTok. Today we have 
more than a billion monthly active users around the world, 
including over 150 million in the United States. Our app is a 
place where people can be creative and curious, and where close 
to 5 million American businesses, mostly small businesses, go 
to find new customers and to fuel their growth.
    Now, as TikTok has grown, we have tried to learn the 
lessons of companies that have come before us, especially when 
it comes to the safety of teenagers. While the vast majority of 
people on TikTok are over 18, one of--and one of our fastest-
growing demographics are people over 35, we have spent a lot of 
time adopting measures to protect teenagers. Many of those 
measures are firsts for the social media industry.
    We forbid direct messaging for people under 16, and we have 
a 16-minute watch time by default for those under 18. We have a 
suite of family pairing tools so that parents can participate 
in their teens' experience and make the choices that are right 
for their family.
    We want TikTok to be a place where teenagers can come to 
learn, which is why we recently launched a feed that 
exclusively features educational videos about STEM. STEM videos 
already have over 116 billion views on TikTok, and I think 
TikTok is inspiring a new generation to discover a passion for 
math and science.
    I would also like to talk about national security concerns 
that you have raised that we take very, very seriously. Let me 
start by addressing a few misconceptions about ByteDance, of 
which we are a subsidiary. ByteDance is not owned or controlled 
by the Chinese Government. It is a private company. Sixty 
percent of the company is owned by global institutional 
investors, 20 percent is owned by the founder, and 20 percent 
owned by employees around the world. ByteDance has five board 
members; three of them are American.
    Now, TikTok itself is not available in mainland China. We 
are headquartered in Los Angeles and in Singapore, and we have 
7,000 employees in the U.S. today. Still, we have heard 
important concerns about the potential for unwanted foreign 
access to U.S. data and potential manipulation of the TikTok 
U.S. ecosystem. Our approach has never been to dismiss or 
trivialize any of these concerns. We have addressed them with 
real action. Now, that is what we have been doing for the last 
2 years: building what amounts to a firewall that seals off 
protected U.S. user data from unauthorized foreign access.
    The bottom line is this: American data stored on American 
soil by an American company overseen by American personnel. We 
call this initiative Project Texas. That is where Oracle is 
headquartered. Today U.S. TikTok data is stored, by default, in 
Oracle's servers. Only vetted personnel operating in a new 
company called TikTok U.S. Data Security can control access to 
this data.
    Now, additionally, we have plans for this company to report 
to an independent American board with strong security 
credentials.
    Now there is still some work to do. We have legacy U.S. 
data sitting in our servers in Virginia and in Singapore. We 
are deleting those, and we expect that to be complete this 
year. When that is done, all protected U.S. data will be under 
the protection of U.S. law and under the control of the U.S.-
led security team. This eliminates the concern that some of you 
have shared with me that TikTok user data can be subject to 
Chinese law.
    This goes further, by the way, than what any other company 
in our industry has done.
    We will also provide unprecedented transparency and 
security for the source code for the TikTok app and 
recommendation engine. Third-party validators like Oracle and 
others will review and validate our source code and algorithms. 
This will help ensure the integrity of the code that powers 
what Americans see on our app.
    We will further provide access to researchers, which helps 
them study and monitor our content ecosystem. Now, we believe 
we are the only--the only--company that offers this level of 
transparency.
    Now, trust is about actions we take. We have to earn that 
trust with decisions we make for our company and our products. 
The potential security, privacy, content manipulation concerns 
raised about TikTok are really not unique to us. The same 
issues apply to other companies. We believe what is needed are 
clear, transparent rules that apply broadly to all tech 
companies. Ownership is not at the core of addressing these 
concerns.
    Now, as I conclude, there are more than 150 million 
Americans who love our platform, and we know we have a 
responsibility to protect them, which is why I am making the 
following commitments to you and to all our users.
    Number one: We will keep safety, particularly for 
teenagers, as a top priority for us.
    Number two: We will firewall protect U.S. data from 
unwanted foreign access.
    Number three: TikTok will remain a place for free 
expression and will not be manipulated by any government.
    And fourth, we will be transparent and we will give access 
to third-party independent monitors to remain accountable for 
our commitments.
    I will be grateful for any feedback that you have, and I 
look forward to your questions. Thank you very much.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Chew follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mrs. Rodgers. As you know, the testimony that you are about 
to give is subject to title 18, section 1001 of the United 
States Code.
    As you state in your testimony, ByteDance is TikTok's 
parent company. Is it accurate to say that you are in regular 
communication with the CEO of ByteDance, Liang Rubo?
    Mr. Chew. Chair Rodgers, yes, I am in----
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Communication with him.
    Mrs. Rodgers. OK. Kelly Zhang is the CEO of ByteDance 
China, overseeing Douyin, the Chinese version of TikTok. Are 
you in regular communication with Kelly?
    Mr. Chew. I am not in regular communication with her.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The ByteDance editor in chief is Zhang 
Fuping, correct?
    Mr. Chew. I believe so.
    Mrs. Rodgers. And Wu Shugang is a Beijing ByteDance 
Technology board member, and also an official of the Cyberspace 
Administration in China. Is this correct?
    Mr. Chew. I believe so. I--they are not in the right----
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you. All of these individuals work or 
are affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, are at the 
highest levels of leadership at ByteDance, a company where you 
previously served as the chief financial officer and where you 
regularly communicate with their CEO.
    TikTok has told us that you weren't sharing data with the 
CCP. But leaked audio from within TikTok has proven otherwise. 
TikTok told us that you weren't tracking the geolocation of 
American citizens. You were. TikTok told us you weren't spying 
on journalists. You were.
    In your testimony you state that ByteDance is not beholden 
to the CCP. Again, each of the individuals I listed are 
affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party, including Zhang 
Fuping, who is reported to be the Communist Party Secretary of 
ByteDance and who has called for the party committee to ``take 
the lead'` across all party lines to ensure that algorithm is 
enforced by ``correct political direction.'`
    Just this morning The Wall Street Journal reported that the 
CCP is opposed to a forced sale of TikTok by ByteDance, quoting 
a CCP spokesman as saying the Chinese Government would make a 
decision regarding any sale of TikTok. So the CCP believes they 
have the final say over your company. I have zero confidence in 
your assertion that ByteDance and TikTok are not beholden to 
the CCP.
    Next question. Heating content is a way of promoting and 
moderating content. In your current or previous positions 
within Chinese companies, have employees engaged in heating 
content for users outside of China? Very quickly, yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. Our heating process is approved by our local 
teams----
    Mrs. Rodgers. So----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. In the various countries.
    Mrs. Rodgers [continuing]. The answer is yes. Thank you.
    Have any moderation tools been used to remove content on 
TikTok associated with the Uyghur genocide, yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. We do not remove that kind of content. TikTok is 
a place for freedom of expression and, Chair Rodgers, like I 
said, if you use our app you can go on it and you will see a 
lot of users around the world----
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Expressing content----
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. On that topic and many others.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Thank you. What about the massacre in 
Tiananmen Square, yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. I am sorry, I didn't hear the question.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The massacre in Tiananmen Square.
    Mr. Chew. That kind of content is available on our 
platform. You can go and search it.
    Mrs. Rodgers. I will remind you that making false or 
misleading statements to Congress is a Federal crime.
    Mr. Chew. I understand. Again, you can go----
    Mrs. Rodgers. OK, thank you.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. On our platform. You will find that 
content.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Next question--OK, thank you. Reclaiming my 
time, can you say with 100 percent certainty that ByteDance or 
the CCP cannot use your company or its divisions to heat 
content to promote pro-CCP messages for an act of aggression 
against Taiwan?
    Mr. Chew. We do not promote or remove content at the 
request of the Chinese Government.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The question is----
    Mr. Chew. We will----
    Mrs. Rodgers. The question is are you 100 percent certain 
that they cannot use your company to promote such messages?
    Mr. Chew. It is our commitment to this committee and all 
our users that we will keep this free from any manipulation----
    Mrs. Rodgers. If you can't--OK.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. By any government.
    Mrs. Rodgers. If you can't say 100 percent certain, I take 
that as a no.
    As I previously referenced, TikTok spied on American 
journalists. Can you say with 100 percent certainty that 
neither ByteDance nor TikTok employees can target other 
Americans with similar surveillance techniques?
    Mr. Chew. Chair Rodgers, I, first of all, disagree with the 
characterization that it is spying. It was an internal 
investigation on----
    Mrs. Rodgers. Surveillance. Yes or no, can you do 
surveillance of other Americans?
    Mr. Chew. We will protect the U.S. user data and fire it 
all from all unwanted foreign access is a commitment that we 
have given to the committee.
    Mrs. Rodgers. So I guess my question is, can--I want you 
to--I wanted to hear you say with 100 percent certainty that 
neither ByteDance nor TikTok employees can target other 
Americans with similar surveillance techniques as you did with 
the journalists.
    Mr. Chew. Again, I disagree with the characterization as 
surveillance, and we have given our commitments, Chair Rodgers, 
the four commitments. I think--is our commitment that we will 
not be influenced by any government on these issues.
    Mrs. Rodgers. DoJ is investigating this surveillance right 
now.
    To the American people watching today, hear this: TikTok is 
a weapon by the Chinese Communist Party to spy on you, 
manipulate what you see, and exploit for future generations. A 
ban is only a short-term way to address TikTok. And a data 
privacy bill is the only way to stop TikTok from ever happening 
again in the United States.
    I yield back. I now yield to the ranking member for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Pallone. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Let me just start out by saying, Mr. Chew, that I don't 
find what you suggested with Project Texas and this firewall 
that is being suggested to whoever will be--will be acceptable 
to me. In other words, you know, the--I still believe that the 
Beijing communist government will still control and have the 
ability to influence what you do. And so this idea, this 
Project Texas, is simply not acceptable.
    According to a recent report, TikTok is on target to make 
between 15 and 18 billion dollars in revenue this year. Is that 
an accurate forecast?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, as a private company we are not 
sharing our----
    Mr. Pallone. I thought that is what you would say.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Numbers publicly.
    Mr. Pallone. How much money will TikTok make by delivering 
personalized advertisements just to your users in the United 
States? Will you give me that information?
    Mr. Chew. Again, Congressman, respectfully----
    Mr. Pallone. I thought----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. As a private company, we are not 
disclosing that.
    Mr. Pallone. I thought that is what you would say.
    Look, my--the impression you are giving--and I know, you 
know, I can understand why you are trying to give that 
impression--is that, you know, that you are just performing 
some kind of public service here, right? I mean, this is a 
benign company that is just performing a public service. I--
maybe you are not, maybe that is not what you are saying, but I 
don't buy it, right?
    My concern here is primarily about the privacy issue, the 
fact that TikTok is making all kinds of money by gathering 
private information about Americans that they don't need for 
their business purposes, and then they sell it.
    And I mentioned this legislation that the ranking--that the 
Chair and I have that would minimize data collection and make 
it much more difficult for TikTok and other companies to do 
that. So what--if you want to make some commitments today, why 
don't--I will ask you to make some commitments with regard to 
this legislation. And, you know, you are going to tell me, 
well, ``The bill isn't passed, and so therefore I don't have to 
do it.'' But, you know, you say you are benign, you want to do 
good things for the public.
    So let me ask you, why not--what about a commitment that 
says that you won't sell the data that you collect, would you 
commit to that, not selling the data you collect?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I believe we don't sell data to any 
data brokers.
    Mr. Pallone. You don't sell to anyone.
    Mr. Chew. We don't sell data to data brokers.
    Mr. Pallone. I didn't ask you--data brokers. Do you sell it 
to anyone?
    In other words, under our bill, you could only use the data 
for your own purposes, not to sell it to anyone. Would you 
commit to not selling your data to anyone?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I actually am in support of some 
rules about privacy----
    Mr. Pallone. I didn't ask you whether----
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Pallone [continuing]. Rules. I asked you whether the 
company, TikTok, would commit to not selling its data to 
anyone, and just using it for its own purposes internally.
    Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on the details of that.
    Mr. Pallone. OK, get back to me. All right.
    Another thing that is in our bill says that we would 
prohibit targeting marketing to people under the age of 17. 
Would you be willing to agree to prohibit targeted marketing to 
people, Americans, under the age of 17?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, we have actually stricter rules for 
our advertisers in terms of what they can show to our users----
    Mr. Pallone. So do you prohibit----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Under the age of 18.
    Mr. Pallone. Would you be willing to prohibit targeted 
marketing to those under 17? That is what is in our bill.
    Mr. Chew. I understand that there is some talk and some 
legislation around this around the country----
    Mr. Pallone. Well, again, I am not interested--I wanted you 
to make that commitment without the legislation. Since you say 
you are a good company, you want to do good things, why not?
    Mr. Chew. It is something we can look into and get back to 
you.
    Mr. Pallone. OK, I appreciate that. OK, we also have in our 
bill a requirement of heightened protection for sensitive data, 
particularly location and health data. Would you commit to not 
gathering or dealing with location or health data unless you 
get affirmative consent from the consumer?
    In other words, under our bill those are categorized as 
sensitive. And unless the person specifically says, ``I want 
you to collect that data,'` you wouldn't be able to, location 
and health data. Would you commit to that?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, in principle I support that, which--
by the way, we do not collect precise GPS data at this point, 
and I do not believe we collect any health data.
    Mr. Pallone. All right. So would you be willing to make 
that commitment, that from now on you won't collect location 
and health data without--well, you are saying at all. Is that a 
commitment?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, this is data that is frequently 
collected by many other companies.
    Mr. Pallone. I know other companies do it. I don't think 
they should without affirmative consent. You said you want to 
be a good actor, so why not make that commitment to me today?
    Mr. Chew. We are committed to be very transparent with our 
users about what we collect. I don't think what we collect--I 
don't believe what we collect is more than most players----
    Mr. Pallone. You see----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. In the industry----
    Mr. Pallone [continuing]. My problem here is you are trying 
to give the impression that you are going to move away from 
Beijing and the Communist Party. You are trying to give the 
impression that you are a good actor. But the commitments that 
we would seek to achieve those goals are not being made today. 
They are just not being made. You are going to continue to 
gather data. You are going to continue to sell data. You are 
going to continue to do all these things and continue to be 
under the aegis of the Communist Party through the--through 
your, you know, organization that owns you. So in any case, 
thank you.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Burgess, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Burgess. I thank the Chair. Thank you, Mr. Chew, for 
joining us today.
    I think we have heard you say multiple times that TikTok is 
not a Chinese company, that ByteDance is not a Chinese company. 
But according to an article in today's Wall Street Journal--
quoting here--``China's Commerce Ministry said Thursday that a 
sale or divestiture of TikTok will involve exporting technology 
[that has] to be approved by the Chinese Government.'` 
Continuing to quote: ``The reported efforts by the Biden 
administration would severely undermine global investors' 
confidence in the U.S., said Shu Jueting, a ministry 
spokeswoman.'` Continuing to quote: ```If [the news] is true, 
China will firmly oppose it,' she said, referring to the forced 
sale.'`
    So despite your assertions to the contrary, China certainly 
thinks it is in control of TikTok and its software. Is that not 
correct?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, TikTok is not available in mainland 
China. And today we are headquartered in Los Angeles and 
Singapore. But I am not saying that, you know, the founders of 
ByteDance are not Chinese, nor am I saying that we don't make 
use of Chinese employees, just like many other companies around 
the world. We do, you know, use their expertise on some 
engineering projects.
    Now----
    Mr. Burgess. But according to their ministry spokeswoman, 
it would be a divestiture of exporting technology from China. 
So they--again, China thinks they own it, even though you do 
not.
    Madam Chair, I would just like to ask unanimous consent to 
put today's Wall Street Journal article----
    Mrs. Rodgers. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Burgess [continuing]. Into the record.
    [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
    Mr. Burgess. Now, Mr. Chew, I wouldn't ask you to discuss 
any privileged attorney-client materials, but did anyone, aside 
from your lawyers, assist you in preparation for today's 
hearing?
    Mr. Chew. I prepared for this hearing with my team here in 
DC.
    Mr. Burgess. Did anyone at ByteDance directly provide 
input, help, or instruction for your testimony today?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, this is a very high-profile hearing. 
My phone is full of well-wishers, you know, but I prepared for 
this hearing with my team here in DC.
    Mr. Burgess. Are you willing to share who helped prepare 
you for this hearing with the committee? And you can do that in 
writing.
    Mr. Chew. I can follow up with you, if you like.
    Mr. Burgess. OK. Can you guarantee that no one at ByteDance 
had a role in preparing you for today's hearing?
    Mr. Chew. Like I said, Congressman, this is a high-profile 
hearing. A lot of people around the world were sending me 
wishes and unsolicited advice, but I prepared for this hearing 
with my team here in DC.
    Mr. Burgess. Are the attorneys representing TikTok also 
representing ByteDance?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, I believe so.
    Mr. Burgess. What percentage of TikTok revenue does 
ByteDance retain? Just give me a ballpark estimate, if you 
don't precisely know.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, like I said, as a private company we 
are not prepared to disclose our financials in public today.
    Mr. Burgess. Can we ask you to get back to us with a 
ballpark? We are not asking for the precise figures, but to 
get--so the committee can have some understanding of the 
percentage of TikTok revenue that ByteDance retains.
    Mr. Chew. I understand the question. Respectfully, as a 
private company we are not disclosing our financials today.
    Mr. Burgess. Prior to today's hearing, did anyone 
affiliated with the Chinese Communist Party discuss this 
hearing with you or anyone else on TikTok's senior management?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, since I have been CEO of this 
company I have not had any discussions with Chinese Government 
officials.
    Mr. Burgess. So what--but what about the Chinese Communist 
Party itself? Have any of those officials discussed this with 
you?
    Mr. Chew. Like I said, I have not had any discussion with 
Chinese Government officials. I don't know the political 
affiliation of everybody I speak to, so I can't verify the 
statement.
    Mr. Burgess. Let me ask you a question in a different 
direction.
    A few weeks ago this committee had a field hearing down in 
McAllen, Texas, and it was on the issue of fentanyl and illegal 
immigration. And one of our witnesses, Brandon Judd, a 25-year 
veteran Border Patrol agent, said that all social media 
platforms play a role in illegal immigration. That is one of 
the ways cartels advertise their services throughout the world 
and convince people to put themselves in their hands and come 
to the United States. The cartels all use social media 
platforms. Are you aware of this phenomenon?
    Mr. Chew. Any content that promotes human abuse is 
violative of our community guidelines, which dictates what is 
allowed and not allowed on our platform. We proactively 
identify and remove them from our platform.
    Mr. Burgess. Well, it would be very helpful if you would 
share with the committee examples of how you have removed 
people, because what we heard at the hearing was that TikTok 
was one of the platforms that recruits adolescents in the 
United States to help with transporting people who are in the--
who have been trafficked into the country, as well as 
contraband substances. Would you help us with that, 
understanding who you have removed from your platform?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I would be delighted to check with 
my team and get back to yours and be collaborative.
    Mr. Burgess. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair 
recognizes the lady from California, Ms. Eshoo, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Eshoo. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Mr. Chew, thank you for being here today.
    As Members of Congress, our very first and top 
responsibility is to protect and defend, protect and defend our 
Constitution and the national security of our country. So I 
view this entire issue--now, there are many parts of it that 
are not part of our national security, in my view, but first 
and foremost, for our national security.
    So in examining TikTok breaking away from ByteDance, I 
would like to ask you some questions about that, and how a 
severance in terms of the relationship with ByteDance, how user 
data, American user data, would be protected.
    Now, under Beijing's security laws, article 7 compels 
companies to provide data; article 10 makes the reach of the 
law extra--extraterritorial. Now, this is very clear. I don't 
need to read all of it into the record, but that--those are the 
laws of the PRC.
    How does ByteDance--how does TikTok, rather--how do you 
convince the Congress of the United States that there can be a 
clean break? Why would the Chinese Government sidestep their 
national law, including article 7, article 10, in terms of user 
data?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, thank you for the question. I am 
glad you asked this.
    As I said in the opening statement, our plan is to move 
American data to be stored on American soil by an American 
company----
    Ms. Eshoo. I understand that. I understand that. But you 
are sidestepping--or I haven't read anything in terms of 
TikTok--how you can actually say--and you spoke in your opening 
statement about a firewall relative to the data, but the 
Chinese Government has that data. What--how can you promise 
that that will move into the United States of America and be 
protected here?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I have seen no evidence that the 
Chinese Government has access to that data. They have never 
asked us. We have not provided.
    Ms. Eshoo. Well, you know what? I find that----
    Mr. Chew. I have asked that question----
    Ms. Eshoo. I find that actually preposterous.
    Mr. Chew. I have looked, and----
    Ms. Eshoo. I really do.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. I have seen no evidence of this 
happening. And in order to assure everybody here and all our 
users, our commitment is to move the data into the United 
States, to be stored on American soil by an American company, 
overseen by American personnel. So the risk will be similar to 
any government going to an American company asking for data, if 
that----
    Ms. Eshoo. Well, I am one that doesn't believe that there 
is really a private sector in China. And when you look at their 
national law, and what--specifically, these two articles, 
article 7 and article 10, are very clear. So I think that there 
is a real problem, a real problem relative to our national 
security about the protection of the user data.
    I don't believe that TikTok has--that you have said or done 
anything to convince us that that information, the personal 
information of 150 million Americans, that the Chinese 
Government is not going to give that up. So can you tell me----
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, if I----
    Ms. Eshoo. Can you tell me who writes the algorithms for 
TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. Today the algorithm that powers the U.S. user 
experience is running in the Oracle Cloud infrastructure.
    Yes, you know, in the--initially, there were parts of the 
source code, especially in the infrastructure layer, that 
doesn't touch the user experience. Now, that is a collaborative 
global effort, including built by engineers in China, just like 
many other companies, by the way. The phone you use, the car 
you drive is a global collaborative effort. Now, but today the 
business sites and the main parts of the code for TikTok is 
written by TikTok employees.
    And, Congresswoman, what we are offering is third-party 
monitoring of our source code. I am not aware of any company, 
American companies or otherwise, that has actually done that, 
because we are saying we want to give you transparency and rely 
on third parties to make sure that we get all the comfort that 
we need about the experience.
    Ms. Eshoo. Well, I--my time is up, and I yield back. Thank 
you.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The lady yields back. I am pleased to yield 
to the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Latta, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Latta. Well, thank you, Madam Chair. Unlike the Chinese 
Communist Party, the United States believes in individual 
freedom, innovation, and entrepreneurship. That is in part why 
Congress enacted section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. 
Our goal is to promote growth of the online ecosystem in the 
United States and to protect companies from being held liable 
for good-faith efforts to moderate their platforms.
    Last year a Federal judge in Pennsylvania found that 
section 230 protected TikTok from being held responsible for 
the death of a 10-year-old girl who participated in a blackout 
challenge also known as the Choking Challenge. TikTok actively 
pushed this video on her feed. Unfortunately, this is one of 
the many devastating examples of children losing their lives 
because of content promoted by TikTok.
    Section 230 was never intended to shield companies like 
yours from amplifying dangerous and life-threatening content to 
children. Do you consider this to be a good-faith moderation?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, as a father myself, when I hear 
about the tragic deaths of----
    Mr. Latta. And my question----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. People, it is heartbreaking.
    Mr. Latta. Do you find that good-faith moderation?
    Mr. Chew. Well, Congressman, section 230 is a very complex 
issue.
    Mr. Latta. OK, you know, yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. We are very focused on safety, and all these 
dangerous----
    Mr. Latta. OK, I am going to have to----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Challenges are removed when we find 
them.
    Mr. Latta [continuing]. Assume that is a no.
    Do you believe TikTok deserves this liability protection?
    Mr. Chew. I am sorry, Congressman, I didn't----
    Mr. Latta. Do you believe that TikTok deserves this 
liability protection under section 230?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, as you pointed out, 230 has been 
very important for freedom of expression on the Internet. It is 
one of the commitments we have given to this community and our 
users, and I do think it is important to preserve that.
    But companies should be raising the bar on safety. I really 
agree with that----
    Mr. Latta. Let me follow up real quickly, from your own 
testimony. When you told us--and you repeated it--``We will 
keep safety, particularly for teenagers, a top priority for 
us,'` you are saying you are making that following commitment. 
Why did you have to wait until now to make that following 
commitment now, and not having done it before, when this 10-
year-old lost her life?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am reiterating the commitment 
internally in all my priorities, which is public to my 
employees----
    Mr. Latta. OK, this is a----
    Mr. Chew. Safety has always been a priority.
    Mr. Latta. This company is a picture-perfect example of why 
this committee in Congress needs to take action immediately to 
amend section 230.
    When we recently met I asked you if the Chinese Communist 
Party can currently access user data, and you did not have a 
clear answer. So today I want to follow up. You heard it a 
little bit, but I want to be absolutely sure of this answer.
    Are employees of ByteDance subject to Chinese law, 
including the 2017 national intelligence law which requires any 
organization or citizen to support, assist, and cooperate with 
State intelligence work in accordance with the law?
    Mr. Chew. Like many companies, including many American 
companies, we rely on a global workforce, including engineers 
in China.
    Mr. Latta. OK, but yes or no----
    Mr. Chew. So in the past, yes. In the past, yes, yes. But 
we are building Project Texas, and we are committing to 
firewall off----
    Mr. Latta. OK, I am taking that as----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. All protected data from unwanted 
foreign access.
    Mr. Latta. I am taking that as a yes, because, again, your 
article 7--the article 7 of the 2017 national intelligence law, 
which I just said, because it says, in addition--as was asked a 
little bit earlier--the 2014 counterespionage law states that, 
when the State security organ investigates and understands the 
situation of espionage and collects relevant evidence, the 
relevant organizations and individuals--it does not say 
``maybe,'' it says ``shall'' provide it truthfully and may not 
refuse.
    Yes or no, do any ByteDance employees in China, including 
engineers, currently have access to U.S. user data?
    Mr. Chew. Today all U.S. user data is stored by default in 
the Oracle Cloud infrastructure----
    Mr. Latta. Answer the question.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. And access to that is controlled----
    Mr. Latta. The question is do any ByteDance----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. By American personnel.
    Mr. Latta [continuing]. Employees in China, including 
engineers, currently have access to U.S. data?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I would appreciate--this is a 
complex topic. Today all data is stored by default----
    Mr. Latta. Yes or no? It is not that complex. Yes or no, do 
they have access to user data?
    Mr. Chew. We have--after Project Texas is done, the answer 
is no. Today there is still some data that we need----
    Mr. Latta. Yes, we have----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. To delete----
    Mr. Latta. Yes, we have heard already from the ranking 
member that he hasn't, and--that he doesn't really see that 
Project Texas is going to be useful.
    So I think I am taking that as a no because, again, the 
question is--come up earlier--that on December the 22nd of last 
year, when ByteDance confirmed some of its Chinese employees 
had accessed TikTok data to monitor and track the physical 
location of journalists. So I took that as a yes from an 
earlier answer.
    You know, earlier this week you posted a TikTok video 
asking American users to mobilize in support of your app and 
oppose the potential U.S. Government action to ban TikTok in 
the United States. Based on the established relationship 
between your company and the Chinese Communist Party, it is 
impossible for me to conclude that the video is anything 
different than the type of propaganda the CCP requires Chinese 
companies to push on its citizens.
    And I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the lady from Colorado, Ms. DeGette, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. DeGette. Thank you--thank you very much, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, like my colleagues I am concerned about the 
influence of China on TikTok and what that does for U.S. users. 
But I am also concerned about how the content in TikTok is 
being distributed, particularly to young people.
    This is not a problem unique to TikTok, but TikTok has 150 
million users in the United States, and so I think you will 
agree that TikTok has a particular responsibility to monitor 
content to make sure that it is safe and accurate. Would that 
be fair to say?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, I agree with that.
    Ms. DeGette. So, you know, I know you said in your opening 
statement there is a ban for or limited for kids under 13 and 
under 18 and so on, but I am--I know it won't be news for you 
that computer-savvy kids actually can bypass some of those 
restrictions quite frequently, and they can do it even if they 
have parental oversight.
    And so what I want to ask you is, rather than putting the 
burden on young people and parents to accurately put in the 
birth date and so on when registering for TikTok, I want to ask 
you what TikTok can do to make sure to monitor this content.
    And I want to give you some examples of some of the extreme 
content. Mr. Latta talked about the Blackout Challenge and 
the--some of the dangers to young people's safety. But there is 
also extreme content around healthcare information.
    In one study, 13 out of 20 results for the question ``Does 
mugwort induce abortion?,'` it is--it talked about herbal so-
called abortifacients like papaya seeds, which don't work. And 
so, if people searching for information on safe abortions went 
on TikTok, they could get devastatingly incorrect information.
    Another study showed that TikTok was--had a 
hydroxychloroquine tutorial on how to fabricate this from 
grapefruit. Now, there's two problems with that. Number one, 
hydroxychloroquine is not effective in treating COVID. So that 
is one issue. The second issue is you can't even make 
hydroxychloroquine from grapefruit. So, again, this is a really 
serious miscommunication about healthcare information that 
people looking at TikTok are able to get. And in fact, it is 
being pushed out to them.
    So I want to know from you--and I will give you time to 
answer this--you have current controls, but the current 
controls are not working to keep this information mainly from 
young people, but from Americans in general. What more is 
TikTok doing to try to strengthen its review to keep this 
information from coming across to people?
    Mr. Chew. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. The 
dangerous misinformation that you mentioned is not allowed on 
our platform. It violates them.
    Ms. DeGette. I am sorry to report it is on your platform, 
though.
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I don't think I can sit here and 
say that we are perfect in doing this. We do work very hard----
    Ms. DeGette. So how can you make yourself more perfect? I 
don't want you to say it is not there, or you apologize. What 
can you do to limit it as much as possible, more than what you 
are doing now?
    Mr. Chew. We invest a significant amount in our content 
moderation work. I shared that number in our--in my written 
testimony.
    Ms. DeGette. I know you are investing.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Ms. DeGette. But what steps are you taking to improve the 
AI, or whatever else you are doing to limit this content?
    Mr. Chew. For example, if you search for certain search 
terms, we do direct you on TikTok to resource--safety 
resources. That is one of the things we have done. We will 
continue to invest in this.
    I recognize and fully align with you that this is a problem 
that faces our industry, that we need to really invest and 
address. I am very in alignment.
    The vast majority of our users come to our platform for 
entertaining, safe content. But there are people who do have 
some--who do spout some dangerous misinformation, and we need 
to take that very seriously, invest in it, proactively identify 
it, and remove it from our platform.
    Ms. DeGette. OK. I am going to stop you right now. I asked 
you specifically how you were increasing--how you were trying 
to increase your review of this, and you gave me only 
generalized statements that you are investing, that you are 
concerned, that you are doing more. That is not enough for me. 
That is not enough for the parents of America.
    I am going to ask you to supplement your testimony and have 
your--have your experts tell me what you are doing to make this 
a higher level of scrutiny, not just pablum at a hearing. Thank 
you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Chew. Thank you.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The lady yields back. The Chair recognizes 
the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Hudson, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Hudson. Thank you, Chairwoman McMorris Rodgers, for 
holding this important hearing. I appreciate the witness, Mr. 
Shou Chew, for making yourself available here today.
    While many consider TikTok to be just another video-sharing 
app, in reality TikTok has been functioning as a massive 
surveillance program, collecting vast swaths of personal data 
from more than a billion people worldwide. This includes data 
from the personal devices of Federal employees, contractors, 
and, most concerning, U.S. military service members and their 
families at places like Fort Bragg in North Carolina.
    As Fort Bragg's congressman, I have serious concerns about 
the opportunities TikTok gives the Chinese Communist Party to 
access the nonpublic, sensitive data of our men and women in 
uniform. This personal data and location information can be 
harvested and could be used for blackmail, to conduct 
espionage, and possibly even reveal troop movements.
    While the Department of Defense and most agencies have 
banned TikTok on Government-issued devices, I believe more 
needs to be done at the command level to urge troops and their 
dependents to erase the app from the personal devices and keep 
them off home WiFi. Having an app banned on a device in one 
pocket but downloaded on your device in the other doesn't make 
a whole lot of sense to me. I believe Congress and DoD should 
address the continued use of TikTok on military installations, 
as well as any use that depicts U.S. military operations.
    Mr. Chew, does TikTok access the home WiFi network?
    Mr. Chew. Only if the user turns on the WiFi. I am sorry, I 
may not understand the----
    Mr. Hudson. So if I have the TikTok app on my phone, and my 
phone is on my home WiFi network, does TikTok access that 
network?
    Mr. Chew. It will have to access the network to get 
connections to the Internet, if that is the question.
    Mr. Hudson. Is it possible, then, that it could access 
other devices on that home WiFi network?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, we do not do anything that is beyond 
any industry norms. I believe the answer to your question is 
no. It could be technical. Let me get back to you.
    Mr. Hudson. OK. I would appreciate it if you could answer 
that.
    I would like to change directions real quick. Do you 
receive personal employment, salary, compensation, or benefits 
from ByteDance?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, I do.
    Mr. Hudson. What is your salary from ByteDance?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, if you don't mind, I would prefer to 
keep my compensation private.
    Mr. Hudson. OK. Do you personally have any company shares 
or stock in ByteDance or Douyin?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, if you don't mind, I would like to 
keep my personal assets private.
    Mr. Hudson. Is TikTok, the company, your only source of 
employment compensation? Where is your other source of income 
outside of TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. It is my only source of compensation.
    Mr. Hudson. Do you have any financial debts or obligations 
to ByteDance, Douyin, or any other ByteDance-affiliated entity?
    Mr. Chew. Personally? No, I do not.
    Mr. Hudson. Does your management team receive separate 
salary, compensation, or benefits from ByteDance?
    Mr. Chew. We receive salaries from the employer--the 
entities that we are employed in, but we----
    Mr. Hudson. Is that----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Do share in the employee stock 
option plan that is available from the ByteDance top company.
    Mr. Hudson. So your primary salary comes from TikTok, but 
you have other compensation that comes directly from ByteDance?
    Mr. Chew. You can characterize it as that, yes.
    Mr. Hudson. Does your management team have company shares 
or stock in ByteDance or Douyin?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, we--some of our employees are compensated in 
shares in ByteDance.
    Mr. Hudson. Does TikTok share technological resources with 
Douyin?
    Are the two technology systems or IT systems interconnected 
in any way?
    Mr. Chew. They are. As with many companies, some share 
resources on some services, but it doesn't include--anything 
that involves U.S. user data, Congressman, is in Project Texas, 
as we talked about, stored by default in American soil by an 
American company.
    Mr. Hudson. Well, but currently there is shared technology 
or interconnected IT systems.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, with respect, I have to get back to 
you. This could be a very broad question. Like, for example, we 
could all be using Microsoft Windows.
    Mr. Hudson. If you could get back with details on that, I 
would appreciate it.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Hudson. Can Douyin personnel or employees access TikTok 
user data?
    Mr. Chew. Not after Project Texas. This is not allowed.
    Mr. Hudson. Are there employees who are employed by both 
Douyin and TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. I do not believe so.
    Mr. Hudson. OK. So, ``I don't believe so,'` is that a--I 
mean, again, I will allow you to come back in written response, 
if you could give me a definitive answer.
    Mr. Chew. I will go back and check to be very sure.
    Mr. Hudson. OK. Thank you. I am also concerned about an 
issue that our chairwoman brought up about an apparent pattern 
of misinformation or misrepresentation from your company in 
regards to the amount and extent of data that you are 
collecting, as well as how much has been accessed from inside 
China.
    There are dozens of public reports that conclude 
individuals in the People's Republic of China have been 
accessing data on U.S. users, directly contradicting several 
public statements by TikTok employees. And I am referencing 
Project Raven, which was first reported on by Forbes last 
October. Their investigation revealed--I am sorry, I am about 
out of time. Do you want to respond to that?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, Congressman. We do not condone the effort by 
certain former employees to access U.S. TikTok user data in an 
attempt to identify the source of leaked confidential 
information. We condemn these actions.
    After learning about them, we found a highly reputable law 
firm to thoroughly investigate the incident. We took swift 
disciplinary action against employees who were found to be 
involved and are implementing measures to make sure this 
doesn't happen again. We have made this team available to you. 
They--I think they have briefed many of you in this committee 
very extensively, and I will continue to make them very 
available to you as part of our transparent commitment.
    Mr. Hudson. Thank you. My time is expired.
    I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the lady from Illinois, Ms. Schakowsky, for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Thank you. So today in The Wall Street 
Journal, they said--today China's commerce minister said that 
China opposes the sale of TikTok because it would involve 
exporting China's technology and would--and this is the 
important part--and would need to be approved by the Chinese 
Government, would need to be approved by the Chinese 
Government.
    So all of what you have been saying about the distance 
between TikTok and China has been said to be not true in the 
paper today. And I would like to see what you have to say in 
response.
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I do disagree with that 
characterization. I think we have designed Project Texas to 
protect U.S. user interests and to move forward here in the 
U.S.
    Again, it is the protections of storing American data on 
American soil by an American company looked after by American 
personnel. And I do not think that the--you know, our 
commitments to this committee and all our users is impacted by 
any event that you mentioned.
    Now, the whole, you know, discussion on this, the 
resolution of this, is an ongoing and developing event. So we 
will continue to pay attention to this, and we will get back to 
you when we have more specifics. But my commitment stands----
    Ms. Schakowsky. So if--OK.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Ms. Schakowsky. So if it is an ongoing debate, apparently, 
with China, so it is hard to say with any certainty that China 
would not have any influence.
    But let me ask another question. So last fall, along with 
Gus Bilirakis, who--were chair and cochair of the subcommittee 
together--were told that TikTok had surveilled--was involved in 
surveillance of users' very personal information. And you might 
say, well, not more than other companies. And I agree with 
Ranking Member Pallone that I really don't want to go by that 
standard, particularly, but that TikTok's in-app browser 
surveilled everything from Americans, including passwords and 
credit card numbers, et cetera.
    So I just want to ask you if TikTok did track and collect 
this sensitive data that Americans don't want to have 
disclosed.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, thank you. I am glad you asked this 
question because, like you pointed out, we actually do not 
believe we collect more data than any other social media 
company out there. A lot of these reports--and I--we can talk 
about which specific one you are talking about--a lot of them 
are not that accurate. Some of them we have contacted, we have 
actually gotten in touch with the authors to help them 
understand the data that we are collecting. A lot of it is 
speculation. You know, this is something they could do, they 
could do.
    But if you look at the subtext, this is something that any 
company could do----
    Ms. Schakowsky. So I am running out of time. Let me just 
say that if TikTok chose not to take the sensitive--this 
sensitive information that you don't need for a transaction and 
support our comprehensive privacy bill, that would be--that 
would be very helpful.
    The other thing I wanted to ask--so really, this is a yes 
or no, that TikTok--does TikTok share user information from 
companies, from parent companies, from affiliated or--or send 
user information to--overseas?
    Mr. Chew. In the past, yes, for interoperability purposes. 
Now, after Project Texas, all protected U.S. data will be 
stored here, with the access controlled by a special team of 
U.S. personnel.
    Again, Congresswoman, this is something that, as far as I 
understand, no other company, including American companies, are 
willing to go. So maybe this is something that we can ask the 
industry to provide, not just us, to protect U.S.----
    Ms. Schakowsky. But in the case of sharing information, I 
do want to quote from employees that you had that--and here is 
the quote--``Everything is seen in China'` is really what they 
said. People who were in touch with the sensitive data were 
saying that. How do you respond to that?
    Mr. Chew. I disagree with that statement.
    Ms. Schakowsky. Well, I know you disagree with that 
statement. But my point is, how does that happen that employees 
of the company are saying that if, in fact, that is not true?
    Mr. Chew. I cannot speak to--I don't know who this person 
is, so I cannot speak to what a person has or has not said. 
What I can say is, you know, based on my position in this 
company and the responsibility that I have, that statement is 
just not true.
    Ms. Schakowsky. OK. Unfortunately--and I will close, I 
guess I am over my time--we need to look into the facts of 
this, and so do you.
    And I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the lady from Florida, Mrs. Cammack, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Cammack. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
    Mr. Chew, are you aware of Chinese Communist Party leader 
Chairman Xi Jinping's comments in May 2021 during a Communist 
Politburo study session, where he instructed colleagues to 
target different countries, different audiences with short-form 
video? Are you aware of these comments, yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I am not aware of these comments.
    Mrs. Cammack. OK. Well, and as was pointed out by 
Chairwoman Rodgers, you have regular contact with Chinese 
Communist Party Secretary Mr. Zhang Fuping, who is your boss at 
ByteDance, correct?
    Mr. Chew. No.
    Mrs. Cammack. No?
    Mr. Chew. No.
    Mrs. Cammack. Interesting.
    Mr. Chew. He is neither my boss, nor do we have frequent 
contact.
    Mrs. Cammack. But you have regular contact with ByteDance.
    Mr. Chew. With the CEO of ByteDance.
    Mrs. Cammack. Who is--Mr. Zhang Fuping is the editor in 
chief.
    Mr. Chew. He is not----
    Mrs. Cammack. My colleague, Representative Burgess, a few 
minutes ago exposed that TikTok and ByteDance share legal 
teams. You confirmed this, correct?
    Mr. Chew. Our general counsel is----
    Mrs. Cammack. Yes? Yes or no?
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. An American lawyer, a veteran of 
Microsoft----
    Mrs. Cammack. Yes. Also----
    Mr. Chew. And----
    Mrs. Cammack [continuing]. My colleague, Representative 
Latta, confirmed that your parent company, ByteDance, currently 
can access user data. Yes?
    Mr. Chew. Let's----
    Mrs. Cammack. Yes.
    Mr. Chew. We have to be more specific.
    Mrs. Cammack. Yes.
    Mr. Chew. After Project Texas, no.
    Mrs. Cammack. You say--I am not asking after Project Texas. 
I am asking now. Yes.
    Mr. Chew. Some user data is public data, Congresswoman, 
which means everybody----
    Mrs. Cammack. So you confirm that.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Can search around the Internet.
    Mrs. Cammack. What is interesting to me is that you have 
used the word ``transparency'` over a half a dozen times in 
your opening testimony and subsequently again in your answers 
to my colleagues. Yet the interesting thing to me is that 
ByteDance, your parent company, has gone out of their way to 
hide and airbrush corporate structure ties to the CCP, the 
company's founder, and their activities.
    You can look no further than the fact that ByteDance's 
website has been scrubbed. In fact, we found web pages from the 
Beijing Internet Association, the industry association charged 
with Communist Party building work of Internet companies in 
Beijing. They have been archived but since deleted. It makes 
you kind of wonder why.
    Yes or no, ByteDance is required to have a member of the 
Chinese Government on its board with veto power. Is that 
correct?
    Mr. Chew. No, that is not correct. ByteDance owns some 
Chinese businesses, and you are talking about a very special 
subsidiary that is----
    Mrs. Cammack. Mr. Shou----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. For Chinese business licensing----
    Mrs. Cammack. Mr. Shou, I am going to have to move on.
    You have said repeatedly that there is no threat, that this 
is a platform for entertainment and for fun. I have to ask you 
then, if there is no threat to Americans, if there is no threat 
to our data privacy, security, why did an internal memo from 
TikTok corporate headquarters explicitly coach senior 
management to ``downplay the parent company ByteDance'`? Why 
would they say, downplay the China association and downplay AI?
    This is from an internal memo from your company. Why, if 
you had nothing to hide, would you need to downplay the 
association with ByteDance in China?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I have not seen this memo.
    Mrs. Cammack. You can't answer that question.
    Mr. Chew. I can say----
    Mrs. Cammack. Mr. Shou, I would like to direct your 
attention to the screen for a short video, if you don't mind.
    [Video shown.]
    Mrs. Cammack. Mr. Shou, that video was posted 41 days ago. 
As you can see, it is captioned ``Me asf [sic] at the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee on March 23rd of this year.'` 
This video was posted before this hearing was publicly noticed. 
I think that is a very interesting point to raise.
    But more concerning is the fact that it names this 
chairwoman by name. Your own community guidelines state that 
you have a firm stance against enabling violence on or off 
TikTok: ``We do not allow people to use our platform to 
threaten or incite violence, or to promote violent extremist 
organizations, individuals, or acts. When there is a threat to 
public safety or an account is used to promote or glorify off 
platform violence, we ban the account.'` This video has been up 
for 41 days. It is a direct threat to the chairwoman of this 
committee, the people in this room, and yet it still remains on 
the platform. And you expect us to believe that you are capable 
of maintaining the data security--privacy and security of 150 
million Americans, where you can't even protect the people in 
this room?
    I think that is a blatant display of how vulnerable people 
who use TikTok are. You couldn't take action after 41 days, 
when a clear threat, a very violent threat to the chairwoman of 
this committee and the members of this committee, was posted on 
your platform. You damn well know that you cannot protect the 
data and security of this committee or the 150 million users of 
your app, because it is an extension of the CCP.
    And with that I yield back.
    Mr. Chew. Can I respond, Chair?
    Mrs. Rodgers. No, we are going to move on. The gentlelady 
yields back.
    The chairman recognizes the lady from California, Ms. 
Matsui, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Matsui. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And I am 
really glad that we are having this very important hearing here 
today.
    And let me just say, make no mistake, the Chinese 
Government represents a real and immediate threat. Look no 
further than even the vulnerable gear still in our telecom 
networks that needs to be ripped and replaced.
    But we can't lose sight of the important Internet 
governance issues TikTok and other social media companies 
represent. I am especially committed to demanding transparency 
from large platforms about the algorithms that shape our online 
interactions, especially for teenagers and young users. And 
that is why I introduced the Algorithmic Justice and Online 
Platform Transparency Act to bring greater visibility into this 
ecosystem.
    My bill would require--would prohibit algorithms that 
discriminate on the basis of race, age, gender, ability, and 
other protected characteristics. It also would establish a 
safety and effectiveness standard for algorithms, while 
requiring new forms of inner sight--oversight. Now, this bill 
would require online platforms to publish annual public reports 
detailing their content moderation practices, which I believe 
should be a baseline requirement to enable meaningful oversight 
and consumer choice.
    Mr. Chew, just yes or no: Do you believe a requirement for 
annual content moderation practices for social media platforms 
would be beneficial? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Ms. Matsui. This transparency bill would also require 
online platforms to maintain detailed records describing their 
algorithmic process for review by the Federal Trade Commission 
in compliance with key privacy and data de-identification 
standards.
    Mr. Chew, does TikTok currently maintain records describing 
their algorithmic processes? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I would need to check and get back 
to you on what kind of specific records you are talking about.
    Ms. Matsui. I wait for that.
    Over the past few years, alarming information brought to 
light by whistleblowers have shown that social media companies 
are intimately aware of the effect their products have on young 
women, political extremism, and more. Despite this, they 
withheld those studies or declined to investigate further. In 
either case, it shows a pattern--evasive or negligent behavior 
that I find concerning in the extreme.
    Mr. Chew, does TikTok conduct its own studies on the effect 
of its algorithms and content distribution models on mental 
health or safety?
    And if so, how and when are those findings made public?
    And if not, do you believe they are necessary?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, we rely on external third parties 
and fund their research to help us understand some of these 
issues. For example, we worked with the Digital Wellness Lab at 
the Boston Children's Hospital to understand the 60-minute time 
limit that we put for all our under-18 users. And we are 
supportive of legislation that provides more funding for 
research like, for example, for the NIH.
    Ms. Matsui. OK. TikTok tailors its recommended content 
based on user activity to encourage people to spend more time 
on the app. While this practice is by no means unique to 
TikTok, given the prevalence of young users and the digestible 
nature of short-form video, I am concerned about the app's 
tendency to exacerbate existing mental health challenges.
    Mr. Chew, does TikTok have different policies for 
amplifying content that would be related to depression or 
dieting, versus content like gardening and sports? If yes, 
describe these policy differences. If no, why not?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, thank you for that. This is a 
great question. The answer is yes. We are trying out some 
policies together with experts to understand certain contents 
that are not inherently harmful, like extreme fitness, for 
example, but shouldn't be seen too much. And this is--these are 
models that we are building, and we are trying to understand, 
you know, together with experts, how to best implement them 
across our platform, particularly for younger users.
    Ms. Matsui. OK, so----
    Mr. Chew. Under 18, yes.
    Ms. Matsui [continuing]. In cases where users have been 
engaging with potentially harmful content, I believe it is 
imperative that the app takes steps to moderate that behavior 
rather than continuing to promote it. That means, in a sense--
--
    Mr. Chew. I apologize, I----
    Ms. Matsui [continuing]. Very intentional about that.
    Mr. Chew. I wasn't clear. First, anything that is violative 
and harmful we remove. What I meant to say were things--content 
that is not inherently harmful, like some of the extreme 
fitness videos about people running 100 miles, it is not 
inherently harmful, but if we show them too much--the experts 
are telling us that we should disperse them more, and make sure 
that they are not seen too regularly----
    Ms. Matsui. So you are very intentional----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Especially by younger users.
    Ms. Matsui [continuing]. About that, then. It is something 
that you are----
    Mr. Chew. We are working on it, yes, yes.
    Ms. Matsui. You are working on it?
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Ms. Matsui. OK, I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Bilirakis. Thank you, Madam Chair. I appreciate it very 
much. Thanks for holding this hearing.
    Mr. Chew, your algorithms have prioritized providing 
harmful content directly to children, like self-harm challenges 
and even suicide. Just 3 days ago, Italy opened an 
investigation into the TikTok over user safety concerns after 
the so-called French Scar Challenge went viral on your 
platform.
    I know you know about the Blackout Challenge, which others 
may know as the Choking Challenge that encourages children to 
bring them to the point of unconsciousness or, in some cases, 
tragically, death. If that isn't enough, I want to share the 
story of Chase Nasca, a 16-year-old boy from New York who 
tragically ended his life a year ago by stepping in front of a 
train.
    I want to thank his parents again. They are here. I want to 
thank his parents for being here today, and allowing us to show 
this.
    Mr. Chew, your company destroyed their lives. Your company 
destroyed their lives. I admire their courage to be here and 
share Chase's story in the hopes that it will prevent this from 
happening to other families. The content in Chase's For You 
page was not a window to discovery, as you boldly claimed in 
your testimony. It wasn't content from a creator that you 
invited to roam the Hill today, or STEM education content that 
children in China see. Instead, his For You page was, sadly, a 
window to discover suicide. It is unacceptable, sir, that, even 
after knowing all these dangers, you still claim TikTok is 
something grand to behold.
    I want you to see what Chase would see. And I think if you 
want--again, would you share this content with your children, 
with your two children? Would you want them to see this?
    And again, I want to warn everyone watching that you may 
find this content disturbing, but we need to watch this, 
please.
    [Video shown.]
    Mr. Bilirakis. Mr. Chew, please, your technology is 
literally leading to death. Mr. Chew, yes or no: Do you have 
full responsibility for your algorithms used by TikTok to 
prioritize content to its users? Yes or no, please.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I would just like to--respectfully, 
if you don't mind, I would just like to start by saying it is 
devastating to hear about the news of----
    Mr. Bilirakis. Yes, yes.
    Mr. Chew. As a father myself, this is tragic.
    Mr. Bilirakis. Sir, yes or no. I will repeat the question: 
Do you have full responsibility over the algorithms used by 
TikTok to prioritize content to its users? Yes or no, please.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, we do take these issues very 
seriously.
    Mr. Bilirakis. Yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. And we do provide resources for anyone who types 
in anything that----
    Mr. Bilirakis. Sir, yes or no.
    I see you are not willing to answer the question or take 
any responsibility for your parent companies, the technology, 
and the harms it creates. It is just very, very sad. Very sad.
    Mr. Chew. It is very sad. I----
    Mr. Bilirakis. This is why Congress needs to enact a 
comprehensive privacy and data security law to give Americans 
more control over their information, and to protect our 
children. We must save our children from Big Tech companies 
like yours who continue to abuse and manipulate them for your 
own gain.
    And I will yield back, Madam Chair.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the lady from Florida, Ms. Castor, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Castor. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
    Colleagues, it is urgent that the Congress pass an online 
data privacy law that protects the personal privacy of 
Americans online, and particularly our kids. While this hearing 
shines a light on TikTok, this hearing also should serve as a 
call to action for the Congress to act now to protect Americans 
from surveillance, tracking, personal data gathering, and 
addictive algorithmic operations that serve up harmful content 
and has a corrosive effect on our kids' mental and physical 
well-being.
    For many years I have sounded the alarm in this committee 
of how Big Tech platforms like TikTok and Facebook and 
Instagram incessantly surveil, track, gather personal, private 
information, and use it along with data brokers to target and 
influence our behavior. This is a much broader issue than 
TikTok in China. There are other malign actors across the world 
who gather data to use it as an element of social control and 
influence peddling and worse.
    And as I detailed in this committee last year when we 
passed the--our online privacy law, the harms to children are 
very serious and demand swift action. Big Tech platforms profit 
immensely from keeping children addicted. They do not care 
about the privacy, safety, and health of our kids. They are the 
modern-day tobacco and cigarette companies that for so long 
resisted and misled Congress. And it took the Congress--it took 
action by the Congress to actually protect our kids and to 
outlaw smoking by young people.
    In early 2020, based upon the growing body of evidence to 
harm of--to kids online, I introduced the Kids Privacy Act and 
the KIDS Act. And I want to thank all of the researchers, the 
young people, the parents, the Surgeon General of the United 
States, who have explained the correlation between social media 
usage and body dissatisfaction, disordered eating habits, 
anxiety, depression, self-injury, suicide ideation, and cyber-
bullying.
    Heck, Frances Haugen, the Facebook whistleblower, was right 
here and testified to us that Facebook and Instagram conducted 
research on this topic. They knew and understood the harms, but 
they continued to elevate profits over the well-being of 
children. And TikTok does the same.
    Last Congress, when we passed the ADPPA, the committee 
incorporated many of these important child online privacy and 
safety provisions from my bills. But we can make the 118th 
Congress' version of this bill, of this new law, even more 
protective of children. And I look forward to working with the 
Chair and the ranking member to make that happen.
    Mr. Chew, TikTok has incredible sway over children in the 
U.S., but you don't have a very good track record. In 2019 
TikTok was hit with the largest civil penalty by the Federal 
Trade Commission in a children's privacy case. Four years 
later, TikTok still has not taken sufficient action to fix the 
problems, I assume, because child users are incredibly 
profitable to your bottom line.
    So answer me this: TikTok allows advertisers to 
specifically target advertising to children aged 13 to 17, 
correct?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I do want to disagree with the 
statement----
    Ms. Castor. Yes or no?
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. That child abuses are not allowed on 
our platform.
    Ms. Castor. Just yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. It is deplorable conduct, and it is not allowed 
on our platform.
    Ms. Castor. Do you target--do you target--do you target 
advertising to young people aged 13 to 17?
    Mr. Chew. We do serve personalized advertising----
    Ms. Castor. OK, thank you.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. At this point, but the policies are 
very safe for them.
    Ms. Castor. And how much money--how much money does TikTok 
make off selling ads targeted to minors?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, can I clarify? Minors in what age?
    Ms. Castor. From just say age 13 to 17.
    Mr. Chew. For the teenager population, I want to clarify 
that. We do have a 13--under 13 experience, and with zero 
advertising on that platform. For those----
    Ms. Castor. Well, that is a whole other topic. OK.
    Mr. Chew. Between 13 and 17, if you don't mind, I will 
check in with my team and get back to you on those answers.
    Ms. Castor. You know, TikTok could be designed to minimize 
the harm to kids, but a decision was made to aggressively 
addict kids in the name of profits. And it is our 
responsibility, Members, to act swiftly to address this. This 
has gone on for too long. We have dilly-dallied too much. This 
committee, thankfully, we have taken responsibility and 
enacted, but we have an enormous responsibility to act swiftly, 
and get this bill to the floor of the House and passed into law 
as soon as possible.
    Thank you. I yield back my time.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Johnson, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, I am an information technology professional. I 
have been doing it for the most of my life. You have been 
evasive in many of your answers. I am going to talk to you in 
some language that maybe you will better understand, ones and 
zeros. OK?
    Let's talk about the Citizen Lab Report. This is something 
your team frequently mentions in hearings as a way to exonerate 
yourself. For example, in the limitations section it reads, 
``We could not examine every source code component and test in 
the apps in every circumstance, which means our methods could 
not find every security issue, privacy violation, and 
censorship event. So it is an incomplete assessment.'` The 
report notes that TikTok's data collection using third-party 
trackers was in apparent conflict with the GDPR, and that 
multiple themes were censored by TikTok.
    What is shocking to me is the shared source code between 
TikTok in the United States and the CCP-centered Douyin. The 
Citizen Labs Report says that many of the functions and classes 
were identical and that the differences in behavior between 
TikTok in the United States and Douyin in China are slight 
changes in hard-coded values. Incredibly, specific censorship 
parameters from Douyin are present in TikTok, but just turned 
off. The authors say that, for unknown reasons, the parameter 
variable itself is preserved.
    So while Citizen Labs may have been afraid to say the 
obvious conclusion, Mr. Chew, I am not. TikTok's source code is 
riddled with backdoors and CCP censorship devices. Here is the 
truth: In a million lines of code, the smallest shift from a 
zero to a one on just one of thousands of versions of TikTok on 
the market will unlock explicit CCP censorship and access to 
American data.
    Mr. Chew, as CEO of TikTok, why have you not directed your 
engineers to change the source code?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, thank you for the question. I----
    Mr. Johnson. Have you directed them to change the source 
code?
    Mr. Chew. Like what we are offering----
    Mr. Johnson. Yes or no, have you directed them to change 
that source code?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, if you give me a bit of time to 
just----
    Mr. Johnson. No, I don't--it is a yes or no question. Have 
you directed your engineers to change that source code?
    Mr. Chew. I am not sure I understand.
    Mr. Johnson. Why are you allowing TikTok to continue to 
have the capacity for censorship, and yet you claim here that 
you don't?
    Mr. Chew. It doesn't----
    Mr. Johnson. Let me remind you of something. Do you realize 
that making false and misleading statements to Congress is a 
Federal crime?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, I do.
    Mr. Johnson. OK. So have you directed your engineers to 
change that source code?
    Mr. Chew. I am giving third-party access monitoring by 
experts.
    Mr. Johnson. OK.
    Mr. Chew. And Congressmen, you are an expert on this----
    Mr. Johnson. What percentage----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. You could agree with me that no 
other company does this----
    Mr. Johnson. What percentage of TikTok source code is the 
same as Douyin? What percentage?
    Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on the specifics.
    Mr. Johnson. OK, I would appreciate that.
    Where was the source code for TikTok developed? Was it 
developed in China or in the United States?
    Mr. Chew. It is a global collaborative effort, like a lot 
of----
    Mr. Johnson. And was it developed in----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Codes in a lot of countries.
    Mr. Johnson. Was it developed in China? Some of it?
    Mr. Chew. Some of it is.
    Mr. Johnson. OK. And ByteDance.
    Can the--when it is compiled in the compilation process, 
can byte code be manipulated? We have talked a lot about source 
code. What about the byte code, the ones and zeros that 
actually execute on the device?
    Mr. Chew. That is----
    Mr. Johnson. Can it be manipulated?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman?
    Mr. Johnson. Yes.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, to give you comfort, that is why we 
are giving third-party monitors.
    Mr. Johnson. As----
    Mr. Chew. As an expert, I think you can agree that very few 
companies do this----
    Mr. Johnson. I have got the report here by Citizen Lab. I 
want to read you something from Ron Deibert. Specifically, in 
your written testimony to Congress you stated on page 9, 
``Citizen Lab found that there was no overt data transmission 
by TikTok to the Chinese Government, and that TikTok did not 
contact any servers within China.'' You implied that Citizen 
Lab exonerated TikTok from any information-sharing with China.
    Well, the director of Citizen Lab saw this and issued a 
statement correcting the record yesterday. And I am quoting Ron 
Deibert, the director of the lab: ``I am disappointed that 
TikTok executives continue citing the Citizen Lab's research in 
their statements to government as somehow exculpatory. I have 
called them out on this in the past, and it is unfortunate that 
I have to do it again.''
    He goes on to say, and I quote, ``We even speculated about 
possible mechanisms through which the Chinese Government might 
use unconventional techniques to obtain TikTok user data via 
pressure on ByteDance.'`
    Mr. Chew, you sent Congress written testimony citing this 
lab as a support of your claim that China cannot access user 
data, U.S. user data. And now this lab has come out to say, 
``We never said that, that is misleading.'` Mr. Chew, I hope 
you understand what that is. That is misleading. Mr. Chew, this 
is yet another instance of TikTok attempting to mislead 
Americans about what their technology is capable of, and who 
has access to their information.
    Madam Chair, I would like to----
    Mr. Chew. Madam Chair, I would like to respond to that very 
quickly, please.
    Mr. Johnson [continuing]. Enter this statement by Ron 
Deibert and the Citizens Lab into the record.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
    Mr. Johnson. With that I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair yields 
to the gentleman from Maryland, Mr. Sarbanes. Five minutes.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Thanks very much, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, I am going to pick up on a theme we have already 
covered here, which is the effect that your platform, along 
with many other social media platforms, by the way, has in 
terms of mental and behavioral health in this country. I won't 
speak to what is happening elsewhere in the world, but we have 
talked about the impact that it is having on children, on 
teens.
    We took some action last year in this committee to try to 
improve access to resources, reauthorize critical programs to 
address mental health needs. But we need to do even more than 
that. And we have got to address what the Big Tech companies 
like TikTok are doing, because those are platforms that expose 
children and teens to additional risks.
    The more time that middle and high schoolers spend on 
social media, the evidence is, the more likely they are to 
experience depression and anxiety. And this is particularly 
troubling since, apparently, 16 percent of American teenagers 
report that they use TikTok, quote, ``almost constantly.'` That 
is, I think, about 5 million teenagers in this country that are 
on TikTok all the time.
    And we know that Big Tech, including TikTok, uses design 
features that can manipulate users, including children and 
teens, to keep them engaged, designed to feed them a never-
ending stream of content, keep their attention for hours on 
end, which includes capitalizing on the desire for others' 
approval through ``like'` features, preying on the fear of 
missing out through push notifications, and so forth.
    Again, you are part of an industry that is set up to do 
this. You, in some sense, don't appear to be able to help 
yourselves in reaching out and finding that new user and then 
holding onto them. TikTok itself has acknowledged that these 
features and others, like the endless scroll feature, can have 
an outsized effect on teens, and we have been discussing today 
how your app only intensifies that harm by amplifying dangerous 
content and misinformation.
    I don't want to be too paternalistic here, because we have 
young people in the audience. We have got TikTok users that are 
watching this hearing, and I am sure they have their own ideas 
about how this technology is being managed by TikTok and other 
social media platforms. They like to access the platforms, and 
they should be able to do that safely. So it is certainly in 
their interest, and they can drive this conversation, I think, 
perfectly well.
    But it is not a fair fight, is it? I mean, the algorithms 
are on one side of the screen. The human brain is on the other 
side of the screen, drowning in these algorithms, in many 
instances, at an age where the brain is not even fully 
developed yet. So those addictive impulses are being sort of 
perfected by the technology. And again, it leaves the users 
sort of helpless in the face of that.
    Are you looking at ways to redesign core features like the 
ones I mentioned to be less manipulative--excuse me--and 
addictive for users, and can you commit to making some of those 
modifications here today?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, thank you. We do want to be leading 
in terms of safety of our users, particularly for teenagers. We 
were the first to launch a 60-minute watch limit.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Yes, let's talk about the 60-minute watch 
limit.
    Mr. Chew. And I am very glad to see people, others in our 
industry, follow.
    For many of your recommendations, we will study them very 
seriously. We actually have a series of features. Like, for 
example, if you are under 16 you cannot use a direct messaging 
feature because, you know, we want to protect those younger 
users. If you are under 16, you cannot go viral by default. If 
you are under 18, you cannot go live. And----
    Mr. Sarbanes. Let me go back to the 60-minute limit, 
because my understanding is that teens can pretty easily bypass 
the notification to continue using the app if they want to.
    I mean, let's face it, our teens are smarter than we are by 
half, and they know how to use the technology, and they can get 
around these limits if they want to. Are you measuring how many 
teens continue to exceed the 60 minutes of time on that app----
    Mr. Chew. We understand----
    Mr. Sarbanes [continuing]. How that is working?
    Mr. Chew. We understand those concerns. What we--our 
intention is to have the teens and their parents have these 
conversations about what is the appropriate amount of time for 
social media. That is why we give the parents what we call 
Family Pairing----
    Mr. Sarbanes. Let me ask you this question before I run out 
of time. If you concluded that putting some reasonable limits 
in place and trying to find a way to enforce them would lead 
some percentage of your users to leave TikTok and go somewhere 
else, is that something that you are prepared to accept?
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Sarbanes. Really? Well, I would love to get the 
research on how these limits are being implemented, how they 
are being bypassed, and the things that you are taking--the 
measures you are taking to address those issues going forward. 
Please bring that information back to our committee as we move 
forward.
    Mr. Chew. I will be happy to.
    Mr. Sarbanes. I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes 
the gentleman from Kentucky, Mr. Guthrie, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you, Madam Chair, for yielding. I 
appreciate the time.
    Mr. Chew, your terms of service specifically state that 
TikTok does--and I quote--``not allow the depiction, promotion, 
or trade of drugs or other controlled substances.'` Despite 
this content being against your terms of service--and I have 
brought this up with other service providers--but despite this 
content being against your terms of service, content on your 
platform related to illicit drugs like fentanyl, drug 
trafficking, and other illicit activity is pervasive and racks 
up hundreds of thousands of views.
    For example, in 2020 the Benadryl Challenge resulted in the 
death of an American teenager. And we heard of another one, a 
challenge earlier today that brought a death of a teenager.
    While you were at ByteDance--you were the CFO for 
ByteDance--did Douyin allow related illicit drug trafficking or 
challenges resulting in death or injury to kids?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I represent TikTok here today. I can 
tell you that TikTok does not allow illegal drugs----
    Mr. Guthrie. Does Douyin----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. On our platform.
    Mr. Guthrie. Does Douyin do it in China?
    Mr. Chew. I believe they don't allow this, but I will need 
to check. I don't run that business.
    Mr. Guthrie. So my question is----
    Mr. Chew. I can tell you TikTok does not allow this.
    Mr. Guthrie. Because all we are concerned about--and my 
guess--and would Douyin allow for 41 days a threat against a 
member of the Chinese Communist Party to stand on their site 
for 41 days?
    Mr. Chew. Again, I cannot speak for Douyin and, I am sorry, 
I didn't hear the second part of what you said.
    Mr. Guthrie. Well, we had a threat against the chairman of 
our committee that was on your site for 41 days. My guess is 
that would not be allowed in China.
    Mr. Chew. That content is violative. I would look into the 
specifics, and I would--if it violates our guidelines, it will 
be taken down on TikTok.
    Mr. Guthrie. Yes, surely----
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Guthrie [continuing]. It appears that it does. But the 
problem is that--what I am trying to get at is you seem to be 
able to prevent this content in China, but you--so not even 
taking it down, just prevent it from being posted. And yet it 
is all--it is on your website.
    So I have a couple of questions about--you said earlier as 
soon as you find this information, you take it down. So how 
quickly does your algorithm detect keywords or content that 
involve illicit drug trafficking before these posts are self-
reported or used by others?
    Mr. Chew. We have about 40,000 people working on this now, 
together with the machines that we train. I don't think any 
company in our industry can be perfect at this. This is a real 
big challenge for our industry, but our goal is to get this--
any violative content, including illegal drugs, down to a very, 
very small number.
    Mr. Guthrie. That is the problem. When we have these 
hearings, we have CEOs of different companies, and of your 
colleagues and competitors. And we always hear apologies, and 
we always hear, ``We want to do better at this,'` but it just 
doesn't seem to keep improving. And we are hearing stories of 
our children and, obviously, that has been talked about today.
    So how many posts and accounts have been identified and 
removed from TikTok due to content posts posted related to 
illicit drugs or other controlled substances?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, we do publish that in a transparency 
report. I can get my team to get the information to yours.
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you. I appreciate that.
    Also, we understand that the way that people use TikTok or 
other platforms similar to yours is that they ensure flagged 
user content isn't permitted to jump from--so my question--so 
what we have heard is that the instances--the users see a drug 
advertisement and then give a code to go to another site. So my 
question is, do you work with other platforms to ensure flagged 
user content isn't permitted to jump from one platform to 
others?
    Mr. Chew. I will check with my team. I would love to work 
with our industry to make sure that we stamp out these 
problems. You know, violative content should not be allowed on 
any platforms, in my opinion.
    Mr. Guthrie. Well, this is what is, you know, kind of 
frustrating to all of us here, is that we look at what is 
happening on your sites and others, and particularly that--we 
know, because we have done the research, that you can't have 
access to illicit drug information on Douyin, which is a sister 
company, as you say, in China. And so it absolutely--if you can 
prevent it on one and not the other, you obviously have the 
ability to stop it from moving forward, and yet you don't.
    Would you like to expand how one of your sister companies 
can prevent that, and you not--I know you don't represent 
Douyin, but they don't allow it. But it happens on your 
platform. What is the difference?
    Mr. Chew. First of all, the majority of the content on 
TikTok is fun, entertaining, informative, and very positive for 
our users. Like other companies that operate in this country, 
we have to deal with some bad actors who come and publish some 
content on illegal drugs, you know, other----
    Mr. Guthrie. But the bad actors don't seem to be able to 
access Douyin.
    Mr. Chew. The TikTok U.S. experience should be compared to 
other U.S. companies, because this is a common----
    Mr. Guthrie. But your parent company has the technology to 
prevent it, because you prevent it in China, but you can't 
prevent it here. What is the difference? That is what I am 
asking.
    Mr. Chew. Oh, Congressman, there is no technology that is 
perfect in doing this. We have to deal with the reality of the 
country that you are operating in. And here in the United 
States, as with other companies, we share this challenge. We 
are investing a lot to address the challenge. But we are--you 
know, it is a shared challenge----
    Mr. Guthrie. But you invest a lot to--seem to be able to 
address it in China, but not here.
    Mr. Chew. Again, you know, I think the comparison has to be 
within the single country. You know, we face the same set of 
challenges here in the U.S.----
    Mr. Guthrie. What is the difference--oh, I am sorry, I am 
out of time. But what is the difference in China and here?
    Mr. Chew. Let me give you an example, Congressman. In my 
home country, Singapore, there is almost no illegal drug 
content because Singapore has very strict drug laws.
    Mr. Guthrie. Thank you.
    My time is expired, and I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. Tonko, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Tonko. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am concerned that 
TikTok's algorithm prize--preys on vulnerable people, including 
those struggling with addiction, eating orders--disorders, and 
other mental health conditions. The platform is designed to 
push content to users that will watch more frequently and for 
longer periods of time.
    Unfortunately for many people suffering from certain mental 
health disorders, videos that reinforce their fears or negative 
self-image are more engaging. On top of that, TikTok has 
received sensitive patient health information and records of 
browsing activity from multiple telehealth companies like 
BetterHelp and Cerebral.
    People's personal struggles should not be fuel for TikTok's 
profits. People should be able to seek help to address serious 
medical concerns without being afraid that their information 
will be shared with social media companies trying to push more 
products, services, or content at them.
    So, Mr. Chew, will TikTok continue to get information from 
third parties on its users' health, including their mental 
health? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. We will continue to work with experts--yes, if 
that is the question--to identify these issues.
    Mr. Tonko. Will you continue to get information from these 
third parties, including their mental health? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am sorry. I may not understand 
your question. If your question is if I am working with them on 
these issues, the answer is yes.
    Mr. Tonko. It is not the question. It is, will you continue 
to get information from these third parties on its users' 
health?
    Mr. Chew. Get information? We do not get any user health 
information from third parties, Congressman.
    Mr. Tonko. You have talked a lot about user privacy and 
safety. Will you commit here today to no longer using data 
about users' health, particularly their mental health, to push 
them content or sell ads? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. We take our users' mental health very seriously. 
We----
    Mr. Tonko. Yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. As far as I am aware, we don't do that, 
Congressman. It is not what----
    Mr. Tonko. So the answer is no, you will no longer use data 
about users' health.
    TikTok systematically exploits users' anxieties by pushing 
alarming and distressing content onto their For You page. For 
example, in May of 2022, the LA Times found that some pregnant 
users searching for information about their pregnancies on 
TikTok were then shown information about miscarriages, 
stillbirths, and delivery room traumas.
    Your company knows that distressing content can have the 
perverse effect of feeding user engagement. And for TikTok, 
engagement means money. In the course of a week, what 
percentage of content that a user sees is considered 
potentially harmful or distressing content?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, we work with a lot of experts on 
this. Even before we set the 60-minute time limit for under 
18s, if you spend too much time on our platform--you can try 
it. If you spend too much time, we will actually send you 
videos to tell you to go out and get some air and get off the 
platform.
    Mr. Tonko. What percentage of content that a user sees is 
considered potentially harmful?
    Mr. Chew. I would need to follow up with my team and get 
back to you on that, if that is OK.
    Mr. Tonko. Well, a ballpark.
    Mr. Chew. I would need to follow up with my team.
    Mr. Tonko. So are teenagers in particular shown more 
distressing content?
    Mr. Chew. The opposite is true. We actually put in more 
restrictions to make sure that our teenagers get a better 
experience, you know----
    Mr. Tonko. Are expectant or new parents showing more 
distressing content?
    Mr. Chew. I know of many parents, including one I met 
recently, who actually used our platform to find communities to 
connect with other parents and learn a lot more. I have heard 
amazing stories of creators who have difficulties, you know----
    Mr. Tonko. Reclaiming my time, are individuals with eating 
disorders shown more distressing content?
    Mr. Chew. We do not--we remove all content that glorifies 
eating disorders, and we have worked with experts to look at 
certain inherently--certain content that may not inherently be 
harmful, like diet trends, and make sure that we disperse them 
more throughout our algorithm.
    Mr. Tonko. What about those with mental health issues, are 
they given----
    Mr. Chew. This is an issue----
    Mr. Tonko [continuing]. More distressing content?
    Mr. Chew. If a user searches, you know, words that 
expresses mental health issues, we actually redirect them to a 
safety page. Like, for example, if you--I don't know if I 
should say this in public--if you search ``I want to die,'` we 
will redirect you to a safety page, for example.
    Mr. Tonko. So what about those suffering from addiction? 
Are they given more distressing content?
    Mr. Chew. I am sorry, Congressman, I missed that question.
    Mr. Tonko. Those suffering from addiction, are they given 
more distressing content?
    Mr. Chew. I missed the first few words, I apologize.
    Mr. Tonko. Those--what about those suffering from 
addiction? Are they given more distressing content?
    Mr. Chew. Oh, those suffering from----
    Mr. Tonko. Addiction.
    Mr. Chew. Addiction? Do you mean drug addiction or----
    Mr. Tonko. Yes, or any order of addiction.
    Mr. Chew. If people search for content--and you can try it 
on a variety of subjects--we will actually direct you to a 
safety page to give you more resources.
    And a lot of recovering addicts have actually found 
communities on TikTok. And it has really helped them, you know, 
find the voices and the community and the courage to really 
overcome their addiction. I personally have heard stories of 
that.
    Mr. Tonko. Well, I appreciate your answers, but I was 
looking for yes or no, and we did not get those. And again, I 
think the more that they watch this distressing content, the 
more profit TikTok makes. And that is distressing.
    I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Walberg, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Walberg. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    And we are glad that you are here, Mr. Chew. As Chair 
Rodgers and Representative Burgess mentioned this morning, The 
Wall Street Journal reported that China will firmly oppose any 
forced sale or divestiture of TikTok. And this is based not on 
conjecture, but it is based on comments provided by the 
official spokesperson at the Ministry of Commerce, who said 
that any TikTok sale or spinoff would amount to a technology 
export and would have to adhere to Chinese law and approval. 
This spokesperson was quoted as saying the Chinese--and I 
quote--``The Chinese Government will make decisions according 
to the law.'` The Chinese Government.
    Mr. Chew, do you agree with this official? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I cannot speak on behalf of a 
Chinese Government official.
    Mr. Walberg. Do you agree with that official?
    Mr. Chew. We will need to look at this, because Project 
Texas is designed to move forward here in the United States, 
and we are not discussing this. So I don't have specifics.
    Mr. Walberg. You know, your company is valued at upwards of 
$50 billion and has been on the verge of forced sale or ban for 
3 years, at least, correct?
    Do you expect this committee to believe you haven't already 
discussed this scenario with your team?
    And you should have an answer to this, yes or no: ``I agree 
with the Communist Party'' or ``I don't agree with the 
Communist Party.''
    So I guess I would say at that point you disagree with the 
Communist Party. Explain your discrepancy.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, for 2 years we spent a billion and a 
half U.S. dollars to build Project Texas. This is after very 
extensive discussions with relevant folks----
    Mr. Walberg. Project Texas is just something expanded for 
the future. We are talking about now. We are talking about what 
you are doing now, what your expectations are now, what your 
relationship is with the Communist Party, which is our major 
concern of what the impact that will be with a country--let me 
rephrase that--with the Communist Party that doesn't care about 
America and sees us as standing in their way for super power. 
That is our concern.
    And for you to have direct relationship, direct ownership 
with ByteDance, and to not have a characterization or an 
agreement or disagreement that you say--explicitly with this 
party policy, it is hard for us to believe what you are saying.
    Let me move on. Following up on what Mr. Latta asked about 
data access by Chinese engineers, in responding to Mr. Latta 
you talked about where American user data would be stored in 
the future. But the question was about access today. Storage in 
the future versus access today. This is total redirection. This 
blows up any trust we could desire to develop.
    So to be clear, Mr. Chew, today do ByteDance employees in 
Beijing have access to American data?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, we have been very open about this. 
We have relied on global interoperability----
    Mr. Walberg. You have access to American data.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am answering your question, if you 
give me just a bit of time. We rely on global interoperability, 
and we have employees in China. So, yes, the Chinese engineers 
do have access to global data.
    Mr. Walberg. They have access to global data.
    Mr. Chew. We have heard.
    Mr. Walberg. Not storage.
    Mr. Chew. No, storage has always been in Virginia and 
Singapore. The physical servers----
    Mr. Walberg. You have no access to storage, to American 
data today.
    Mr. Chew. That is not what I said. I said----
    Mr. Walberg. So you do have access to American data, and 
you have storage of American data.
    Mr. Chew. The American data has always been stored in 
Virginia and Singapore in the past, and access of this is on an 
as-required basis----
    Mr. Walberg. As required of who?
    Mr. Chew. By engineers for business purposes.
    Mr. Walberg. By engineers.
    Mr. Chew. This is a private----
    Mr. Walberg. ByteDance?
    Mr. Chew. ByteDance----
    Mr. Walberg. The Communist Party.
    Mr. Chew. No, no.
    Mr. Walberg. How can you say that----
    Mr. Chew. This is a----
    Mr. Walberg [continuing]. If they have access?
    Mr. Chew. This is a private business. And like many other 
businesses, many other American companies, we rely on a global 
workforce.
    Mr. Walberg. So the global workforce that includes 
ByteDance, which is connected directly to the Chinese Communist 
Party, has access----
    Mr. Chew. That is a characterization that we disagree with.
    Now, in the future----
    Mr. Walberg. That is not what we can disagree with. That is 
a fact.
    Mr. Chew. It is not, unfortunately.
    Mr. Walberg. The CEO of ByteDance and your relationship to 
them----
    Mr. Chew. It is not--Congressman, respectfully, in my 
opening statement I said this is a private company. It is owned 
60 percent by global investors. Three out of the five board 
members of ByteDance are Americans. This is a private business.
    Mr. Walberg. And you report directly to ByteDance, with a 
CEO who is a member of the Communist Party. Let me move on.
    Mr. Chew. He is not.
    Mr. Walberg. I think we got the answer, sadly, at this 
point.
    I believe my time is expired, so I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes Ms. Clarke for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Clarke. Thank you, Chairwoman Rodgers, thank the 
Ranking Member Pallone for holding today's hearing.
    Throughout this hearing--I also want to thank our witness 
for being here to testify on what are very important issues 
before us today.
    Throughout this hearing, my colleagues have outlined the 
potential threat posed by the security of Americans' data by 
TikTok being affiliated--and some would say owned--by a Chinese 
company. Foreign adversaries having direct access to Americans' 
data as well as the ability to influence this content Americans 
see on a prolific social media platform represents an 
unprecedented threat to American security and to our democracy. 
However, the problems of social media platforms' content 
moderation, algorithmic discrimination, and safety are neither 
new nor unique to TikTok.
    Mr. Chew, I share the concerns raised by my colleague, 
Congresswoman Matsui, related to algorithms. I believe that 
without mitigation against bias, platforms will continue to 
replicate, exacerbate discrimination that is illegal under 
civil rights law as well as exclude important dialogue about 
sensitive topics like race from occurring on the platform. For 
example, I was disturbed by reports that TikTok content 
moderation algorithm flagged words like Black or Black Lives 
Matter as inappropriate content.
    So my first question, Mr. Chew, is do you agree that 
platforms like TikTok should be subject to regular audits or 
transparency requirements to identify whether policies have a 
disparate impact on communities that are protected classes like 
race, religion, national origin, or gender?
    Mr. Chew. I think, Congresswoman, I think platforms should 
be very transparent on what they do there and disclose a lot of 
information. We can get back on the specifics of what we mean 
by an audit.
    But I do agree very strongly that platforms should be very 
transparent, and it is a commitment that we are giving to this 
committee and all our users that our platform will be a place 
for freedom of expression. We embrace all diverse points of 
view, all ethnic minorities. You can come and say whatever you 
want, as long as you don't violate the rules of safety that 
were put in place.
    And we will--we also commit to be free of all and any 
government manipulation. So I think I am in strong agreement 
with a lot of what you said.
    Ms. Clarke. Well, thank you. My bill, the Algorithmic 
Accountability Act, would require platforms to be transparent 
about their algorithms, measure disparate impact, and require 
risk mitigation. It is vital that the diverse culture of the 
United States is reflected online.
    But I am concerned the algorithms and content moderation 
practices employed by TikTok are ignorant to the fundamental 
diversity, while also failing to remove content that is 
harmful, like child sexual abuse material, hate speech, or 
domestic terrorism content.
    My next question to you is, it is my understanding that 
users must be in good standing to be eligible for compensation 
from TikTok's Creator Fund. For example, they can't have 
violated community guidelines. Is this correct?
    Mr. Chew. There are some details there, but directionally, 
yes.
    Ms. Clarke. If TikTok's algorithm is flagging content 
incorrectly, resulting in creators violating community 
guidelines when in fact they have not, those creators would not 
be eligible to receive compensation under the Creator Fund, 
correct?
    Mr. Chew. We do have an appeals process.
    Ms. Clarke. You have an appeals process. OK.
    Mr. Chew. Yes----
    Ms. Clarke. In my view, if TikTok employs algorithms that 
disproportionately misremove content from Black creators, it 
disproportionately silences and excludes Black creators from 
compensation opportunities. And this problem happens in 
parallel to the lack of adequate recognition, attribution, and 
compensation to Black creatives for their content.
    The exploitation, cultural misappropriations, the erasure 
of Black creatives' ownership of their fashion, art, and media 
is nothing new. We need transparency, accountability, and bold 
action to mitigate against misinformation, bias, and exclusion 
of certain communities from the opportunities present on 
platforms like TikTok.
    So let me--let me just say this: I am concerned about 
transparency, I am concerned about algorithmic accountability, 
and I am not clear that your organization holds those values. 
So I want to ask that you take a look at this, because this is 
all part and parcel of what we are concerned about with respect 
to social media platforms and the misappropriation, the ways in 
which those algorithms can discriminate within the context of 
the social media platform.
    With that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, is it OK if I just very quickly 
respond? This is a very important topic.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Unfortunately, we only have 4\1/2\ hours with 
you, and I am going to try to get to every Member. So we are 
going to keep going.
    Mr. Chew. It is very important. I would love to follow up.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Well, there will be other opportunities. The 
lady yields back. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Buddy Carter, 
is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, welcome to the most bipartisan committee in 
Congress. We may not always agree on how to get there, but we 
care about our national security, we care about our economy, 
and we sure as heck care about our children. We sure do.
    And that is why you are here today, because two-thirds of 
all the youth in our country are on your app. They spend an 
average of 95 minutes on your app. And, you know, research has 
shown that TikTok is the most addictive platform out there. And 
the reason for that is, we have been told, is because it has 
the most advanced algorithm. And the Chinese Communist Party 
knows this. And I don't speak for everyone, but there are those 
on this committee, including myself, who believe that the 
Chinese Communist Party is engaged in psychological warfare 
through TikTok to deliberately influence U.S. children.
    [Slide]
    Mr. Carter. You know, you see behind me, if you look behind 
me, Mr. Chew, you see some of the challenges that we have seen 
on TikTok. You know about them. You know about the Milk Crate, 
you know about the, about the Blackout Challenge, you know 
about the NyQuil Chicken Challenge, the Benadryl Challenge, the 
Dragon's Breath Liquid Nitrogen Trend, or the challenge that 
promotes car theft.
    I want to ask you. As I understand it, there is a sister 
app in China, Douyin--I am sorry if I am butchering the 
pronunciation. Do they have these same things over there? Do 
they have these kind of challenges in China?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am really glad you asked this 
question.
    Mr. Carter. Do they, yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. I am not sure, because----
    Mr. Carter. Whoa, whoa, whoa, come on, now. You are not 
sure?
    Mr. Chew. I really am not sure.
    Mr. Carter. Remember, you took--the chairlady, she said you 
got to tell the truth, OK? Do you know whether they have these 
kind of challenges like this over in China? Because it is my 
understanding they don't.
    Mr. Chew. I am not sure, because I spend my energies 
running TikTok.
    Mr. Carter. And you don't look at any of your other 
competitors, or look at anything similar to yours. So you don't 
know whether they have--they don't have this over in China.
    Mr. Chew. I did----
    Mr. Carter. We have it here, but they don't have it here. 
And that is why I am asking you this: Why is it that TikTok 
consistently fails to identify and moderate these kinds of 
harmful videos?
    Mr. Chew. Did----
    Mr. Carter. Why is it? Why is it that you allow this to go 
on?
    We have already heard, God bless you, from parents who are 
here with us who have lost children. I submit to you everybody 
up here cares about the children of this country. Tell me, tell 
me why.
    Mr. Chew. This is a real industry challenge, and we are 
working very hard----
    Mr. Carter. No, no, no. It is not industry. This is TikTok.
    Mr. Chew. It is----
    Mr. Carter. We are talking about TikTok. We are talking 
about why is it that you can't control this?
    And--although I believe in giving credit where credit is 
due. I want to thank you. It is my understanding that the video 
that threatened the life of the chairwoman has been removed. 
Thank you for doing that. Sorry we had to bring it to your 
attention here, but it has been removed.
    Tell me why this goes on.
    Mr. Chew. This is an industry challenge for all of us here, 
operating in this industry.
    Mr. Carter. OK. So much for industry challenge. I want to 
shift gears real quick.
    I want to talk about biometric matrix, and I want to talk 
specifically--can you tell me right now, can you say with 100 
percent certainty that TikTok does not use the phone's camera 
to determine whether the content that elicits a pupil dilation 
should be amplified by the algorithm? Can you tell me that?
    Mr. Chew. We do not collect body, face, or voice data to 
identify our users. We do not. The only----
    Mr. Carter. You don't?
    Mr. Chew. No. The only face data that you will get that we 
collect is when you use the filters to have, say, sunglasses on 
your face. We need to know where your eyes are.
    Mr. Carter. Why do you need to know where the eyes are, if 
you are not seeing if they are dilated?
    Mr. Chew. And that data is stored on your local device and 
deleted after use if you use it for facial. Again, we do not 
collect body, face, or voice data to identify our users.
    Mr. Carter. I find that hard to believe. It is our 
understanding that they are looking at the eyes.
    How do you determine what age they are, then?
    Mr. Chew. We rely on age gating as our key age assurance--
--
    Mr. Carter. Age----
    Mr. Chew. Gating, which is when you ask the user what age 
they are.
    We have also developed some tools, where we look at their 
public profile to go through the videos that they post to see 
whether----
    Mr. Carter. Boy, that is creepy. Tell me more about that.
    Mr. Chew. It is public. So if you post a video that is--you 
choose that video to go public, that is how you get people to 
see your video. We look at those to see if you--it matches up 
the age that you talked about.
    Now, this is a real challenge for our industry, because 
privacy versus age assurance is a really big problem.
    Mr. Carter. Look, look, you keep talking about the 
industry. We are talking about TikTok here. We are talking 
about children dying. Do you know how many children have died 
because of this? Do you have any idea? Can you tell me?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, again, it is heartbreaking.
    Mr. Carter. Can you tell me if----
    Mr. Chew. It is heartbreaking.
    Mr. Carter. How many children in America have died because 
of challenges like this?
    Mr. Chew. The majority of people who use our platform use 
it for positive experiences. There are----
    Mr. Carter. That is not what I asked you.
    Mr. Chew. There are some----
    Mr. Carter. I asked you, tell me the number of children, of 
U.S. children who have died because of these challenges.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, again, the majority of people who 
come on our platform get a good experience----
    Mr. Carter. I am not talking about the majority of 
children. I want to know a number.
    Mr. Chew. Dangerous [inaudible] are not allowed on our 
platform. If we find them, we will remove them. We take this 
very seriously.
    Mr. Carter. Obviously, you found one today and you removed 
it. We had to bring it to your attention.
    And I know I am out of time. Thank you for being here. 
Welcome again to the most bipartisan committee in Congress.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. We will now take a 
brief recess and resume in 10 minutes. The committee stands in 
recess.
    [Recess.]
    Mrs. Rodgers. The Chair recognizes the gentleman from 
California, Mr. Cardenas, for 5 minutes--Cardenas, sorry.
    Mr. Cardenas. That's good. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman. I 
appreciate this opportunity for this committee to have this 
important hearing regarding TikTok and its effect on the 
American people, especially the American children, and the 
potential effect--not potential, but the effects that it has 
had and may have in the future when it comes to our democracy 
and misinformation and disinformation that permeates on TikTok.
    It is unfortunate that I think most Americans--or most 
parents--think that TikTok is this innocent little thing where 
kids get on there, and they do a little dance or something like 
that. But TikTok is much, much more, as some of my colleagues--
and I thank them for bringing up some of these serious issues, 
literally life and death issues that TikTok is right in the 
middle of.
    And also, what I would like the witness to acknowledge is 
that it appears that Ms. Cammack, my colleague, brought up 
those two posters, and since then TikTok has taken them down. 
Since then, not before then. Are you aware of that, Mr. Chew?
    Mr. Chew. I was briefed during the break that they are 
taken down, Congressman.
    Mr. Cardenas. OK. How do you feel about the fact that they 
were--it was up for apparently 40-some days, 41 days, and yet 
in the middle of this hearing it was brought directly to your 
attention. And as a result, it has been taken down so quickly.
    Mr. Chew. It goes to show the enormous challenge that we 
have to make sure that, although the vast majority of our users 
come for a good experience, we need to make sure that bad 
actors don't pose violative content.
    Mr. Cardenas. Yes. And the way, Mr. Chew, that you can make 
sure is that you can make sure that you choose to invest more 
resources, more money into more ability to pull down damaging 
and deadly information from your platform.
    Are you investing more and more and more every day into 
bringing down that kind of content? That is my question. Are 
you?
    Mr. Chew. Yes. And I have committed to investing more in 
this regard to stay on top of the growth.
    Mr. Cardenas. Right here in the United States, many, many 
languages are used and spoken. For example, TikTok in the 
United States is being used in many languages. Specifically, 
when it comes to Spanish language, are you dedicating more 
resources today than you did months ago, years ago, on making 
sure that you are combing through that content to make sure 
that, if content is dangerous or damaging or deadly, that you 
are bringing it down as quickly as possible?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, we are investing in more Spanish-language 
content moderation. And yes, we will--once we identify----
    Mr. Cardenas. OK.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Violative content, we will take it 
down as soon as possible.
    Mr. Cardenas. And--thank you. And your testimony today 
isn't the only opportunity for you to commit to answering 
questions to this committee. So I would like you to forward to 
this committee--again, I am not asking for trade secrets, but I 
would like to get some semblance of understanding as to how 
much you are investing with the number of bodies, the number of 
people, the number of resources in making sure that you are 
investing more in pulling down content that is either deadly or 
dangerous on your platform. Can you forward that to the 
committee?
    Mr. Chew. I will check with my team and get back to you on 
this, Congressman.
    Mr. Cardenas. Thank you very much. I appreciate that 
opportunity.
    As was mentioned earlier, it might sound a little funny, 
but you have in fact been one of the few people to unite this 
committee--Members, Republicans and Democrats--to be in 
agreement that we are frustrated with TikTok. We are upset with 
TikTok. And yes, you keep mentioning that there are industry 
issues that not only TikTok faces, but others. You remind me a 
lot of Mike Zuckerberg. He--when he came here, I said to my 
staff, ``He reminds me of Fred Astaire, a good dancer with 
words,'` and you are doing the same today. A lot of your 
answers are a bit nebulous. They are not yes or no.
    So I would like to ask you a question. Yes or no, is your 
revenue going up at TikTok month over month or year over year?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, our revenue is going up year over year.
    Mr. Cardenas. OK. And with that, some of the answers I 
would like you to forward this committee is, are you investing 
more and more money into making sure that content that is 
dangerous and/or deadly, you are investing more and more 
resources in that aspect of your expenditures and your 
commitment to your users and to your organization?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, I commit to that, and we will--we are 
investing more, and we will continue to do that.
    Mr. Cardenas. OK. My last question is this: Are you a 
Chinese company?
    Mr. Chew. TikTok is a company that is now headquartered in 
Singapore and Los Angeles.
    Mr. Cardenas. OK.
    Mr. Chew. We are not available in mainland China. Our users 
are in other countries around the world.
    Mr. Cardenas. OK. Is there a corporation that has any 
authority above TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. TikTok is a subsidiary of ByteDance, which is 
founded by a Chinese founder.
    Mr. Cardenas. And ByteDance is a Chinese company?
    Mr. Chew. Well, ByteDance owns many businesses that 
operates in China.
    Mr. Cardenas. Is it or is it not a Chinese company?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, the way we look at it, it was 
founded by Chinese entrepreneurs----
    Mr. Cardenas. No, no, no, no, I am not asking you how you 
look at it. Fact. Is it a Chinese company or not?
    For example, Dell is a company. It is an American company. 
They have activities all over the world.
    Is it a Chinese company?
    Mr. Chew. I frequently have this discussion with others on 
what is a company that is now global.
    Mr. Cardenas. That is OK. I prefer you answer the question 
and stop dancing verbally on it.
    Madam Chair, my time is expired. Thank you very much.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Obernolte.
    Mr. Obernolte. Well, thank you very much.
    Mr. Chew, it is nice to see you again. If I could just 
bring us back up to 30,000 feet for a second, I just want to 
talk about what we are afraid of here, you know, what we fear 
might happen.
    Social media companies--and TikTok is unique in this--is 
not unique in this--gather a tremendous amount of user data, 
and then use powerful AI tools to use that data to make eerily 
accurate predictions of human behavior, and then seek to 
manipulate that behavior. And that is something that it is not 
just TikTok, it is all our social media companies that are 
doing this.
    Ultimately, the solution is to enact comprehensive Federal 
data privacy legislation that will prevent that kind of 
behavior, or at least allow users to consent to it. And that 
is, I know, something that the Chair is working on, the ranking 
member. I hope that this committee will act on that this year.
    The specific concern here, though, as regards TikTok is 
that this type of capability falling into the hands of foreign 
countries is something that has national security implications. 
And that is why Congress is getting involved on this issue. So 
I know that you have proposed Project Texas in an effort to 
alleviate these fears. So I wanted to ask some specific 
technical questions about Project Texas, and the way that you 
believe that it will solve this problem.
    So one of the things that you have said in your testimony 
is that part of Project Texas will have engineers at Oracle 
going through the source code for TikTok. How large is that 
code base?
    Mr. Chew. Well, it is not small, but it is not just Oracle, 
Congressman. We are also inviting other third-party monitors. 
We are in the process of figuring out who the best----
    Mr. Obernolte. Sure. So we are talking--are we talking 
millions, tens of millions of lines of code? How big is the 
base?
    Mr. Chew. It is significant, but it is something that we 
believe can be done. And again, I want to say that I don't--I 
have not heard of another company, American or not, allowed for 
this to happen.
    Mr. Obernolte. I mean, you are kind of at a unique 
position, having to answer these concerns of Congress.
    So are they going through the code for just the app, or the 
app and the server code?
    Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on the----
    Mr. Obernolte. OK.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. On the technical details.
    Mr. Obernolte. Well----
    Mr. Chew. But it is comprehensive, including the software 
that powers the--a lot of the software that powers the 
experience.
    Mr. Obernolte. And how long will that review take?
    Mr. Chew. I need to get back to you on the timeline, but we 
are progressing quite well on Project Texas, and whenever we 
hit a milestone I commit to be very transparent about it.
    Mr. Obernolte. OK. So I am wondering, because I am also 
concerned, as a software engineer, about the process in which 
new code is introduced into the code base. Do you use a 
software configuration management system at TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. The way we plan for new code to be done is that, 
even before the code becomes live, it has to be reviewed. The 
changes have to be reviewed by the----
    Mr. Obernolte. OK, so you are talking about----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Third-party monitor.
    Mr. Obernolte [continuing]. A code review. That was good. 
That was another question I had for you. So the code review, is 
it done with a team of engineers or just with a single 
engineer?
    Mr. Chew. Oh, it is going to be a team effort.
    Mr. Obernolte. OK.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Obernolte. And that is going to be done at Oracle or 
elsewhere?
    Mr. Chew. It is going to be done in one of our transparency 
centers, so that we--you know, we still need to make sure that 
the code itself is secure, and, you know, so----
    Mr. Obernolte. OK, so----
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Obernolte. What I am hearing you say is that, even 
though the code might be written by someone not in the United 
States, before the code is integrated it will be reviewed in a 
code review by a team of engineers within the United States?
    Mr. Chew. That is the plan.
    Mr. Obernolte. OK. And then back to the question about the 
software configuration management system. How do you manage the 
integration of that code change into the rest of the TikTok 
code base?
    Mr. Chew. The long and short of it is we have built a team 
of American personnel with security credentials. The person who 
leads the team used to work for the Secret----
    Mr. Obernolte. No, no, I understand, but, I mean, there is 
a software solution for integrating those code changes into the 
code base. What solution is that?
    Mr. Chew. I would need to check----
    Mr. Obernolte. Is it a commercial one?
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. And get back to you on the details.
    Mr. Obernolte. OK.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Obernolte. Well, specifically, what I would like to 
know is to make sure that this isn't something that TikTok has 
created custom, which many companies do, because that would 
mean that you would have to review the source code for that, as 
well----
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Obernolte [continuing]. For security.
    How do you protect against threats like the--a malicious 
actor being hired not by TikTok but by Oracle, for example, or 
by USDS?
    Mr. Chew. The approach that most companies take for these 
things is to have several layers of monitoring to make sure 
that everything that somebody has reviewed, there is a 
secondary review so that one malicious actor is not able to 
create the damage that the malicious actor can do.
    But you rightly pointed out these kind of problems are 
industrywide problems.
    Mr. Obernolte. Right.
    Mr. Chew. Every company has to deal with them.
    Mr. Obernolte. OK. Well, let me ask a specific question 
about that. I mean, I--in thinking about--if I were a malicious 
actor, a software engineer on one of your projects, how I would 
go about writing a malicious code, I wouldn't put it right 
there and say, ``Hey, I am malicious.'' I would put unrelated 
lines of code in different sections of the code that work 
together to do something malicious. How do you think that that 
could get caught?
    Mr. Chew. Again, you know, we have to rely on third-party 
experts to help us with that. I think there are enough experts 
who can catch a lot of these things. The work on security 
globally, on all data security, is never perfect.
    Mr. Obernolte. Yes, I understand.
    Mr. Chew. But we can have a lot of oversight to keep it 
safer than any other experience.
    Mr. Obernolte. I appreciate the effort. My concern, Mr. 
Chew, is I don't believe that it is technically possible to 
accomplish what TikTok says it will accomplish through Project 
Texas. I just think that there are too many backdoors through 
that process to allow that to be possible, and I think a 
malicious actor would succeed in inserting malicious code in 
there if they wanted to. But I hope we--I see we are out of 
time. I hope we get an opportunity to talk some more about 
this.
    I yield back, Madam Chair.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. Dingell, for 5 
minutes.
    Mrs. Dingell. Thank you, Chairman Rodgers and Ranking 
Member Pallone, for holding this hearing, and to Mr. Chew for 
testifying here today. Your good news: You are halfway through 
with me.
    As screen time increases, so do inherent risks. And with 
the proliferation and popularity of new social media platforms, 
so does the potential reach of dangerous, provocative, and 
often harmful content and, my fear, the abuse of collected 
data.
    As a representative from the State of Michigan, I can speak 
from experience on how social media has been used to target 
members of the Michigan delegation, including a plot to kidnap 
our Governor, and how it can be weaponized to perpetuate harms 
towards individuals and communities, and you saw firsthand how 
it targeted the Chair of this committee.
    Today many of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle have 
raised legitimate concerns about protecting children online, 
misinformation, and securing our data, concerns that I share 
and, as has been said by many of my colleagues, are 
bipartisanly shared. I think, in many ways, these myriad of 
issues highlight the need for comprehensive data privacy 
legislation that would ensure the safety and integrity of every 
American's data on every social media platform and mitigate 
potential harms.
    One important area of concern I have regarding data 
collection is geolocation data and how it can be abused. I have 
seen it abused. I have seen women die because it has been 
abused. This subject has dangerous implications for survivors 
of domestic violence, people seeking medical care, and 
protecting children from potential predators.
    Mr. Chew, in your testimony you wrote that current versions 
of the app do not collect precise or approximate GPS 
information from U.S. users. Yes or no answers, please: Mr. 
Chew, have any prior versions of TikTok's app collected precise 
GPS information from U.S. users? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. Yes, from back in 2020, about 3 years ago.
    Mrs. Dingell. Are there currently TikTok users who still 
hold old versions of the app that collect precise GPS 
information from U.S. users? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. There could be, but that is a small percentage 
today.
    Mrs. Dingell. Still dangerous. Has TikTok at any time fed 
precise GPS information collected from U.S. users into 
algorithms to serve user ads? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. I will need to check on the details, because we 
do not currently collect that. So I need to check on the 
details.
    Mrs. Dingell. Yes, I am sure there is a yes there. But has 
TikTok at any time fed precise GPS information collected from 
U.S. users into algorithms--I am having--talk today--to make 
inferences about users? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. I am not sure of the specifics. I----
    Mrs. Dingell. I would like answers, yes or no, after this. 
Has TikTok at any time sold precise GPS information collected 
from U.S. users? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. We do not sell data to data brokers, if that is 
the question.
    Mrs. Dingell. That--and you have never done that?
    Mr. Chew. I do not believe so.
    Mrs. Dingell. Has TikTok at any time sold or shared with 
third parties algorithmic inferences that were made using, in 
part or in whole, precise GPS information collected from U.S. 
users, yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I need to check on these 
specifics. What I can tell you is right now we do not collect 
precise GPS location data in the United States.
    Mrs. Dingell. All right. Does TikTok still use inferences 
that were made using, in part or in whole, precise GPS 
information collected from U.S. users?
    Mr. Chew. I am sorry. Would you repeat that?
    Mrs. Dingell. Does TikTok still use inferences that you 
have gained that were made using, in part in--or whole, precise 
GPS information collected from U.S. users in your algorithms?
    Mr. Chew. That will be a very technical question. I would 
have to check and get back to you.
    Mrs. Dingell. Has TikTok at any time provided the Chinese 
Government with either precise GSP information collected from 
U.S. users or inferences made from that data?
    Mr. Chew. That I can give you a straight--no.
    Mrs. Dingell. Mr. Chew, even in Congress--even if Congress 
were to ban TikTok, I am concerned that China or others would 
still have access to U.S. consumer data by purchasing it 
through data brokers. Will you commit not to sell any of 
TikTok's data to data brokers now or in the future?
    Mr. Chew. We do not do that. We do not sell data to data 
brokers now.
    Mrs. Dingell. Will you commit to not do it in the future?
    Mr. Chew. This is a--there are certain members of our 
industry who do this. You know, I think this has to be broad 
legislation to help us, the whole industry, address this 
problem.
    Mrs. Dingell. I think I am out of time.
    Thank you, Madam Chair. I will yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair yields 
5 minutes to the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Palmer.
    Mr. Palmer. Thank you.
    When the Chinese Communist government bought a share of 
ByteDance, it has been described as the Chinese Communist 
government's way of quieter form of control. And the companies 
have little choice in selling a stake to the government if they 
want to stay in business.
    And what I would like to know is when the Chinese Communist 
government moved to buy shares of ByteDance, were you informed 
beforehand? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. No. Congressman----
    Mr. Palmer. OK.
    Mr. Chew. ByteDance----
    Mr. Palmer. Were----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Hasn't----
    Mr. Palmer. Were you or anyone with TikTok asked for your 
opinion about the sale of shares of ByteDance to the Chinese 
Communist government? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. It just--this hasn't happened.
    Mr. Palmer. Did you or anyone employed by or affiliated 
with TikTok state any objections or concerns about the 
possibility of the Chinese Communist government, once they had 
shares in ByteDance, exercising control over content, using 
your platform for conducting misinformation campaigns, or 
restrictions ensuring nothing is posted that reflects badly on 
the Chinese Communist government, or for surveillance and data 
collection for use against anyone?
    Did any of your--you or anyone affiliated with TikTok raise 
any concerns about that?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, we do not collect--we do not 
promote----
    Mr. Palmer. I didn't ask you that.
    Mr. Chew. We do not promote----
    Mr. Palmer. Yes or no, did you raise any concerns about it? 
Because that is why we are here.
    Mr. Chew. But we do not promote or remove any content on--
--
    Mr. Palmer. I didn't ask you that.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. The behalf of the Chinese 
Government.
    Mr. Palmer. Did you communicate in any form or fashion with 
the directors of ByteDance that there might be concerns about 
government control over content? Yes or no, did--you either did 
or you didn't.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I----
    Mr. Palmer. You didn't.
    Mr. Chew. I just want to make this clear. We do not 
remove----
    Mr. Palmer. Let me ask you this.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Or promote content at the request of 
the Chinese Government.
    Mr. Palmer. TikTok insiders have already said that the 
company is tightly controlled by ByteDance. It even gets down 
to the hours they work. So obviously, you didn't say anything. 
There is a serious concern by Chinese companies, privately held 
companies, about doing anything against what the Chinese 
Communist government wants.
    I want to ask you this: Does TikTok screen against 
manipulative content from child predators? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. Do we screen against----
    Mr. Palmer. Do you screen against them----
    Mr. Chew. Yes, we do this----
    Mr. Palmer. How about----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Child predator----
    Mr. Palmer. How about drug cartels?
    Mr. Chew. Drug cartels, child predatory content, this is 
all violative----
    Mr. Palmer. You had a drug cartel that was engaged in a 
police chase with Spanish authorities, and they posted it on 
TikTok and got over a million views. Why wasn't that taken 
down? And are you doing it with human traffickers or 
terrorists?
    I mean, do you withhold content from nations that might be 
committing crimes against humanity? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, our platform is a place of----
    Mr. Palmer. Yes or no?
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Freedom of expression. And users 
come here, and----
    Mr. Palmer. Yes or no? I know, you talk about that. But yes 
or no, do you screen against content from nations that commit 
crimes against humanity?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, our users come and----
    Mr. Palmer. Yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. Our users come and----
    Mr. Palmer. Yes or no?
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Present any points of views that 
they want, and----
    Mr. Palmer. You don't.
    Mr. Chew. And it is a commitment to keep this free from----
    Mr. Palmer. Let me ask you this. Michael Beckerman, who is 
your vice president and head of public policy for the Americas, 
right? Is he part of the team that helped you prepare for this 
meeting? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. Can I clarify who you mean?
    Mr. Palmer. Michael Beckerman?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, he is.
    Mr. Palmer. OK. Where is he at this moment?
    Mr. Chew. I am sorry?
    Mr. Palmer. Where is Mr. Beckerman at this moment?
    Mr. Chew. He is probably here.
    Mr. Palmer. No, you know he is here. He is sitting right 
behind you. I want to know why, when Mr. Beckerman was on with 
Jake Tapper on CNN and asked repeatedly to condemn Chinese 
Communist government's treatment of the Uyghurs when that 
treatment has been classified by the United States as a 
genocide, when a UN report classifies it as a crime against 
humanity, why after multiple questions Mr. Beckerman refused to 
address that. Are you afraid of the Chinese Communist 
government?
    Mr. Chew. No, because you----
    Mr. Palmer. Are you concerned that----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Can find that content on our 
platform. Any content that our users want to express their 
views on this issue----
    Mr. Palmer. Well, why couldn't your----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Is freely available on our platform.
    Mr. Palmer [continuing]. Vice president of public policy, 
the guy who is head of public policy for the Americas, and an 
American on an American television news channel, why couldn't 
he say--why couldn't he condemn that?
    Mr. Chew. I think it is very important to look at our 
platform. And if you use our--and open our app, and search for 
any content----
    Mr. Palmer. I am not talking about your platform. I am 
asking about your personnel now, because personnel is policy. 
Everybody in this room understands that, except maybe you. 
Personnel is--let me just conclude with this. And I hate to 
bring this up, because I--this is part of the stuff that I have 
studied. But deception is fundamental to the Chinese Communist 
Party's political intelligence and military strategy. And you 
have repeatedly used the word ``transparency'` throughout this 
hearing. And every time you have said it, what I have heard is 
deception.
    And I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Veasey, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Madam Chair. I got to tell you, Mr. 
Chew, as a father of a 16-year-old that likes social media, 
the--a lot of your evasiveness today in answering many of these 
questions really disturbs me, because I can tell you that the 
teenagers of today, they really don't want to be on Facebook. 
They want--they want your platform. And you were asked to come 
before this committee to testify about many things, and a lot 
of us are worried about our kids' personal data.
    As the cochair of the Congressional Voting Rights Caucus, I 
also worry that TikTok is the world's most powerful and 
extensive propaganda machine, allowing the Chinese Communist 
Party to use TikTok's platform to influence public opinion and 
undermine the integrity of our democratic elections.
    And I have a report called ``TikTok and Facebook Failed to 
Detect Election Disinformation in the U.S., While YouTube 
Succeeds.'` And this report was published by the nonprofit 
Global Witness and the Cybersecurity for Democracy Team at NYU. 
And the purpose of the study was to test platforms like TikTok 
and whether or not they can detect and take down false 
political ads targeted at U.S. voters, young voters, ahead of 
last year's midterm elections. And according to this report, 90 
percent of election disinformation ads tested were approved by 
your platform.
    Again, that is 90 percent of ads containing false and 
misleading election misinformation went undetected on TikTok. 
And just to add some color to the type of misleading ads that 
were approved by TikTok, this included ads that were live on 
TikTok that said the wrong election day and actually encouraged 
people to vote twice.
    You do know that voting twice is a felony. Mr. Chew, you do 
know that it is illegal to vote twice.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, any misinformation that comes around 
a political action----
    Mr. Veasey. OK.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Is something we take very seriously.
    Mr. Veasey. Let me--I am particularly troubled about this 
type of information, because it can run rampant on TikTok. And 
given that TikTok--again, you all are appealing to a very young 
and diverse user base. That is exactly the people that we have 
seen targeted time and time again with voter suppression 
campaigns run by malicious actors.
    Mr. Chew, do you agree with me that is--that it is 
completely unacceptable that 90 percent of these ads were 
undetected on your platform?
    And can you detail for us right now TikTok's policy 
regarding election misinformation and paid political ads, and 
how the company monitors such information, and how you plan to 
get that number down to zero?
    Mr. Chew. Well, TikTok is a place for our users to come and 
express their points of views freely. We do take 
misinformation, dangerous misinformation particularly around an 
election, very seriously. And we will work with third-party 
experts to identify misinformation----
    Mr. Veasey. Do you call allowing 90 percent of false 
content, political content on your platform, to be taken--you 
call that--you define that as being taken seriously?
    Mr. Chew. I need to look into the specifics. I am, you 
know, not sure where the number came from, but I can tell you, 
Congressman, that we are the only platform that I know of that 
doesn't actually take political ads. We don't accept money. I 
don't think other platforms can say that.
    Mr. Veasey. Mr. Chew, can you detail how you responded to 
that report? Did you respond to that report that I just 
mentioned?
    Mr. Chew. I need to look at the specifics of the report, 
Congressman, and I can get back to you on that.
    Mr. Veasey. All right, Mr. Chew, I want to shift to Project 
Texas.
    I know that we have discussed this initiative throughout 
today's hearing, but I want to dive deeper into your notion 
that promises about Project Texas should give us any confidence 
in TikTok's ability to localize U.S. data and discontinue 
access to that data to ByteDance employees in China.
    Why? Because we have already had a TikTok executive appear 
before Congress and give sworn testimony about the comfort that 
we should take in TikTok's U.S.-based resources. Well, TikTok 
data security practices were being scrutinized by the U.S. 
Government--and unfortunately, we have since found out from a--
from journalists and recorded conversations that those 
assurances were worthless.
    In your testimony you also mentioned that Oracle has 
already begun inspecting TikTok's source code and has access to 
the platform's recommendation algorithm. Why should this give 
the American public any great assurances, particularly given 
that Oracle now owns a stake in TikTok and stands to gain 
monetarily, the more revenue that TikTok and its algorithm 
generates?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, not only is Project Texas 
unprecedented in our industry in protecting U.S. user data and 
interests, we are inviting third parties to come in and monitor 
this. And we will, you know, be transparent in that process. 
And this is more--beyond most--all companies that I know of in 
my industry----
    Mr. Veasey. Thank you, Madam Chair. I am out of time.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Florida for 5 minutes, Mr. Dunn.
    Mr. Dunn. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, I am aware that on arriving in DC this week you 
appeared on TikTok and boasted you had 150 million U.S. users, 
5 million U.S. businesses. That represents a lot of data. You 
also referenced your appearance before this committee as a 
chance to share all that TikTok is doing to protect Americans 
using the app.
    Mr. Chew, has ByteDance spied on Americans at the direction 
of the Chinese Communist Party?
    Mr. Chew. No.
    Mr. Dunn. Madam Chair, I would like to enter into the 
record this October 2022 Forbes article entitled ``TikTok 
Parent ByteDance Planned To Use TikTok to Monitor the Physical 
Location of Specific U.S. Citizens.'`
    Mrs. Rodgers. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
    Mr. Dunn. Thank you. The project assigned this to a 
Beijing-led team, and they were going to follow individual 
American citizens.
    I ask you again, Mr. Chew, has ByteDance spied on American 
citizens?
    Mr. Chew. I don't think that spying is the right way to 
describe it. This is ultimately----
    Mr. Dunn. We can differ on that.
    Mr. Chew. This is, ultimately, an internal investigation--
--
    Mr. Dunn. Any TikTok or ByteDance data that is viewed, 
stored, or passes through China is subject to the laws of 
China, a one-party, authoritarian state hostile to all American 
standards of privacy.
    China's court system reports to and falls under the Chinese 
Communist Party. And like fentanyl analogues, which we all know 
are also manufactured in China, although they are illegal 
there, I fear TikTok will grow into a much bigger problem--a 
cancer, if you will. And I am deeply worried that it may be too 
late to stop the spread of this cancer. Like fentanyl, another 
China export which causes addiction and death, dangerous 
algorithms and the Chinese Communist Party are not good for 
Americans, not good for our families, and definitely not good 
for the United States.
    Mr. Chew, prior to serving as the CFO of ByteDance, you 
served as a CFO and director of global operations for Xiaomi 
from 2015 to 2021. Is that correct?
    Mr. Chew. Are you asking me in 2015?
    Mr. Dunn. Very good----
    Mr. Chew. Would you mind repeating that, please?
    Mr. Dunn. Madam Chair, I would like to enter another 
article into evidence. This is from the National Cyber Security 
Centre in Lithuania.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Without objection, so ordered.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The information has been retained in committee files and is 
included in the Documents for the Record at https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF00/20230323/115519/HHRG-118-IF00-20230323-SD030.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Dunn. Thank you. This report outlines numerous data 
security risks, including how the privacy of European users was 
violated in clear cases of unauthorized collection of user data 
by Xiaomi. This sounds exactly--what many of my colleagues have 
been talking about today.
    Worse yet, the Xiaomi phones sold to Europeans had a list 
of 449 words and phrases which would be automatically censored 
on the device. Censored phrases included ``the Voice of 
America'' and ``democratic movement,'` among others. This 
analysis was conducted on devices which were manufactured and 
sold to Europeans while you were the head of operations for 
Xiaomi.
    It does not follow that you expect us to believe that you 
would not censor on behalf of the Chinese Communist Party, 
since you have already done so.
    Mr. Chew. I want to be unequivocal on this. We do not 
remove or promote content on behalf of----
    Mr. Dunn. I reclaim my time.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. The Chinese Government.
    Mr. Dunn. While TikTok, in your words, strives to deliver 
on their ``mission to inspire creativity and bring joy'' to 
American users, I assure you that is not the mission or goal of 
the Chinese Communist Party, which runs the People's Republic 
of China, that TikTok's parent company, ByteDance, is domiciled 
in.
    Mr. Chew----
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, you can check with our users----
    Mr. Dunn [continuing]. Straightforward----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. To see the experience that they are 
getting.
    Mr. Dunn [continuing]. Answer. You have not given 
straightforward answers. We don't find you credible on these 
things.
    And with that, Madam Chair, I would like to yield the 
balance----
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, you have given me no time to answer 
your questions.
    Mr. Dunn [continuing]. To Congressman Obernolte of 
California.
    Mr. Chew. I reject the characterizations.
    Mr. Dunn. I yielded to Mr.----
    Mrs. Rodgers. Who are you yielding to?
    Mr. Dunn [continuing]. Obernolte.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Dr. Dunn, Mr. Obernolte?
    Mr. Dunn. Yes.
    Mrs. Rodgers. OK.
    Mr. Obernolte. Well, thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, I would like to continue our discussion of 
Project Texas, if we could.
    Part of Project Texas is that engineers at Oracle will 
review the algorithms used by TikTok to confirm that they are 
free of foreign influence. I have a question about that, 
because we are talking about AI. That is a very generic term. 
Do you use machine learning to influence the algorithms at 
TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. This gets very technical, and we have published 
several blogs about this, which I can forward to your team.
    Mr. Obernolte. OK.
    Mr. Chew. But yes, it is mainly based on interest signals.
    Mr. Obernolte. Right, OK.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Obernolte. So here is my question: How could looking at 
the algorithm confirm that it is for--free from foreign 
influence? Because the algorithm is just a neural net 
architecture with inputs and outputs and weights, and how to 
train that.
    I mean, the influence is an external factor. So I would 
appreciate it if you could give us--I see we are out of time 
again--a written answer to that.
    But again, I am concerned that what you are proposing with 
Project Texas just doesn't have the technical capability of 
providing us the assurances that we need.
    I yield back, Madam Chair.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes Ms. Kuster.
    Ms. Kuster is not here. Ms. Barragan for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Barragan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, TikTok warns users when content is graphic or 
disturbing and labels state-affiliated media accounts to ensure 
the viewers aren't seeing propaganda. Does TikTok provide 
similar information to Spanish speakers--users, as well as 
English speakers?
    Mr. Chew. I believe so, Congresswoman. I will get back to 
you on that.
    Ms. Barragan. OK. And do you know if TikTok has a specific 
strategy for tackling Spanish-language content that violates 
its trust and safety guidelines?
    Mr. Chew. We do. I will get back to you on the specifics on 
that.
    Ms. Barragan. OK. When offensive English-language search 
terms or hashtags are blocked for violating community 
guidelines in English, is the Spanish translation of the term 
or the hashtag automatically blocked, as well?
    Mr. Chew. I believe so, but let me check the specifics and 
get back to you.
    Ms. Barragan. Do you have any idea how many people that you 
might have working at TikTok that addresses Spanish 
misinformation?
    Mr. Chew. I know ballpark. It is quite a significant team, 
but I can get back to you on the details.
    Ms. Barragan. You said significant. So are you saying it 
is--do you have a ballpark at all you can give us? Would you 
say it is like 10 percent of your force, or more than----
    Mr. Chew. It is an important number, so I want to be 
precise, and I will get back to you.
    Ms. Barragan. OK. Do you happen to know how TikTok--how--if 
TikTok can effectively ensure that Spanish-speaking users 
between the ages of 13 and 17 are not being targeted by ads 
promoting harmful content?
    Mr. Chew. We have very strict policies for our users who 
are in the teenage age group, and regardless of what language 
that they speak. So we want to make sure that they are given a 
very safe experience on our platform, regardless of the 
language they----
    Ms. Barragan. Well, I know. I am just trying to--I am 
trying to ascertain resources you may be putting into Spanish-
speaking--Spanish language.
    Last year the Congressional Hispanic Caucus met with 
TikTok. This was one of the conversations, and a source of the 
discussion was addressing Spanish-language disinformation and 
misinformation. It remains an urgent priority for the 
Congressional Hispanic Caucus, as Hispanics across the country 
increasingly turn to social media for vital information.
    We heard earlier in this hearing that there was, you know, 
video--there was a TikTok post threatening the Chair of the 
committee, and it took some 40 days to take it down. So I guess 
I am a little concerned if you--if your team doesn't have the 
resources and the capability to flag that, what kind of 
capability is it going to have to bring down misinformation, 
disinformation to Spanish speakers, which I am assuming is a 
smaller fraction of the workers that you have at TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. TikTok is a place for, you know, all our users to 
come and express their very diverse views. And, you know, we 
are open to all ethnicities, you know, and we are open to all, 
everyone to come here and express their--freely express their 
views.
    So it is our commitment to make sure that the safety of 
those users, regardless of the language, you know--and of 
course, you know, the Spanish-language user base is super 
important to us.
    Ms. Barragan. OK, so you can't----
    Mr. Chew. So we need to make sure that we continue to 
invest in that----
    Ms. Barragan. OK, so you don't--you don't have an answer, 
then. OK. I will look forward in your coming--your coming back.
    We have heard a lot about the concerns about children who 
may be on TikTok. Mr. Chew, at what age do you think it would 
be appropriate for a young person to get on TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. We have three different experiences here in the 
United States. There is an experience for under 13s, which is 
highly, highly restricted.
    Ms. Barragan. I am asking what--I am asking what you think 
would be the appropriate age to have a child get on TikTok.
    Mr. Chew. Our approach is to give differentiated 
experiences for different age groups and let the parents have 
these conversations with their children to decide what is best 
for their family.
    Ms. Barragan. So you think that there is a sufficient 
safety mechanism for an 8-year-old to be able to access TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. An 8-year-old's experience on TikTok would be so 
highly restricted that every single piece of content he or she 
will see will be vetted by common sense, our third-party child 
safety expert, and the 8-year-old would not be able to post, 
and the 8-year-old would not be able to see any personalized 
feed, and zero advertising in that experience. So I believe, 
yes, it is the appropriate experience for an 8-year-old.
    Ms. Barragan. Well, then why don't you let your 8-year-old 
child on TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. I have seen these news articles. I would like to 
address that. My kids live in Singapore. And in Singapore we do 
not have the under-13 experience. If they lived here in the 
United States, I would let them use the under-13 experience.
    Ms. Barragan. OK. So you are saying it is because of the 
country you live in doesn't have the same mechanisms. Is there 
a reason you don't have those same mechanisms everywhere?
    Mr. Chew. In principle, we want to provide, you know, a 
good experience for our users in general. We don't want to 
monetize from people who are under 13. In the U.S. we are COPPA 
compliant, and as part of that we will deem as a--I want to get 
the specifics right. We will deem as a particular type of 
audience--mixed audience app. We want to make sure that that is 
right. And as a result of that, we have to provide an 
experience to our under-13 users in this country, as well.
    Ms. Barragan. My time has expired. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Utah, Mr. Curtis.
    Mr. Curtis. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, my children are getting ready to run a marathon. 
And I know that during this hearing that they will be running 
for about the same amount of time that you will be sitting in 
that chair today. Unfortunately, I only get you for 5 minutes. 
So instead of a marathon, I would like to do a sprint with you. 
And I want to go back up to that 30,000-feet level.
    Would you agree with me that section 230 was created to 
protect platforms like yours from lawsuits when you distribute 
information?
    Mr. Chew. I----
    Mr. Curtis. Don't overcomplicate it. Just, like, 30,000 
feet.
    Mr. Chew. I understand.
    Mr. Curtis. Yes.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Curtis. So then would you agree that there is a line 
drawn between publishers of information and distributors of 
information in----
    Mr. Chew. I----
    Mr. Curtis. Specifically in the section 230 language.
    Mr. Chew. I think 230 is a very complex topic.
    Mr. Curtis. Yes, I understand. But remember, we are at 
30,000 feet. So in short, your platform distributes content 
that other peoples publish.
    One of the early challengers to section 230 was when AOL 
refused to take down a post of somebody that had 
inappropriately put a phone number--associated a phone number 
with the Oklahoma City bombings. The courts ruled that AOL was 
not liable for that post because of section 230.
    Now, I want you to do a hypothetical with me, because I am 
going to use the absurd to try to make a point here. Let's 
suppose, hypothetically, that AOL, instead of just posting 
that, actually wanted to magnify that voice, and so they took 
out an ad in the Wall Street Journal linking that phone number 
with the Oklahoma City bombing. And let's suppose they didn't 
stop there, but they went further and they took out a Super 
Bowl ad linking that phone number with the Oklahoma City 
bombing. And let's suppose, hypothetically, they didn't stop 
there, they sent a flier to every home in America linking that 
phone number to the bombing.
    And I guess the question is, would AOL have moved from a 
distributor to a publisher in this made-up example?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, respectfully, I----
    Mr. Curtis. I think everybody can see that they would. This 
is not a hard question. Moving that far away from the intent 
would have moved them to a publisher.
    So my question is--platforms are protected because they 
post content. But I want this room to see--not just you--that 
protection has limits. And if AOL moves to a distributor 
instead of a publisher, they go outside of those limits.
    Now let's talk algorithms just super quickly. We have 
thrown that word around a lot today. Let me here again go 
30,000 feet, and we will use another platform so it is not 
sensitive. But Pinterest, I like to go on Pinterest. My home--
my wife and I are building a home. I am working on the yard 
right now. If you went on my Pinterest page, you would see 
swing sets and things made for my grandkids.
    Now, another hypothetical. Let's suppose there is some 
devious intent inside Pinterest, and they decide they want to 
influence John Curtis with these algorithms, and they want me 
to believe it is the end of the world. And all of a sudden now 
I am buying bomb shelters instead of swing sets for my kids. 
Have they become a publisher? And should that be protected from 
section 230?
    And if you don't feel--I am pretty sure the room 
understands that they have crossed this line, and you can tell 
me if you think they have or not.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I will have to study that specific 
example and get back to you.
    Mr. Curtis. It is a hypothetical, but you can see the--at 
some point they have crossed a line, and they have become a 
publisher and a distributor.
    So we have touched on this today, but I want to be super 
specific. Is it possible that TikTok had enough data--could get 
enough data on me that you could use artificial intelligence 
and your algorithms and machine learning to write an algorithm 
that could persuade me to change how I view a policy issue? 
Does that possibility exist?
    Mr. Chew. The way we look at it----
    Mr. Curtis. Thirty-thousand feet. We are on the sprint.
    Mr. Chew. I will stay very high level.
    Mr. Curtis. OK, please.
    Mr. Chew. The way we look at it is our users come in and 
express whatever views they want.
    Mr. Curtis. But that is not the point. The point is you 
could write an algorithm that would change. And we have 
actually seen--the Washington Post reported the Stop the Willow 
campaign shows how TikTokers are tackling climate change. I 
think that is all fine, right, and all good, unless somebody 
has interjected into that and magnified or diminished voices in 
that. And what I am proposing to you today is that that pushes 
them across the line from a distributor to a publisher if they 
make those decisions.
    Now, serious allegations have been made against your 
platform and others, many of them here today. And you are not 
new to these, right, to these allegations. This isn't your 
platform, but some time ago there was an allegation that a 
platform recommended ISIS-related videos. We have talked about 
the weight loss videos, we have talked about--we didn't talk 
about it, but the stealing the elections. Whatever the 
motivation, I am trying to point out that as you move from a 
publisher, you manipulate this data with algorithms, that you 
step out from the protections of section 230. Do you see that 
logic?
    Mr. Chew. This is a very complex----
    Mr. Curtis. I understand it is very complex.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Curtis. But you see the logic. In your mind, has TikTok 
ever stepped across the line from a distributor to a publisher?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, again, this is a very complex topic. 
I would need to get back to you on----
    Mr. Curtis. I understand that. OK.
    And finally, very quickly, you produced a video that now is 
well known about your visit here today in Washington, DC. Can 
you tell me 100 percent that no TikTok employees manually 
manipulated that to get more views?
    Mr. Chew. I checked. And as far as I know, there was no 
boosting and heating. I went viral organically.
    Mr. Curtis. OK. Madam Chair, I am sorry, I am out of time. 
I yield my time.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes Ms. Blunt Rochester for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, as I am sure you know, this hearing is part of an 
ongoing effort by our committee to examine data security and 
other concerns with social media companies broadly. And I have 
to tell you, I came to this hearing interested to hear the 
actions that TikTok is taking to combat misinformation, protect 
our young people, and ensure our national security. But I have 
not been reassured by anything you have said so far. And I 
think, quite frankly, your testimony has raised more questions 
for me than answers.
    As some of my colleagues already noted, platforms like 
TikTok can easily manipulate and undermine user autonomy with 
addictive features, invasive data collection practices, and 
disseminating misinformation and disinformation. That is why I 
will be reintroducing the DETOUR Act to mitigate this harm.
    Mr. Chew, yes or no, would you oppose legislation that 
banned the use of intentionally manipulative design techniques 
that trick users into giving up their personal information?
    Mr. Chew. In principle----
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. It is just a yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. In principle, I agree that the kind of practices 
is not----
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. And can TikTok users opt out of 
targeted ads, yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. At this moment in time, we believe that this is a 
very important part of the experience----
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Yes or no? Time is ticking.
    Mr. Chew. It is an important part of the experience.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. If--even if someone wants targeted 
ads, do you give a user a clear opportunity to prevent TikTok 
from using tools like pixels to collect their data and track 
them off of the TikTok platform?
    Mr. Chew. We give our users a lot of tools to control their 
privacy settings on our app.
    And by the way, if you are below 16, it is private by 
default. So you cannot even go viral.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. An August of 2022 response to a letter 
I wrote to your company on abortion misinformation, TikTok 
asserted several actions to address abortion misinformation. In 
light of recent attacks on safe and effective medication 
abortion, I am--remained worried by this misinformation.
    And following on Ms. DeGette's questioning, how many posts 
did you actually take down that contained abortion 
misinformation?
    Mr. Chew. Contents and views on both sides of the--on 
abortion is allowed on our platform. It is just freedom of 
expression. If it is dangerous misinformation, we rely on 
third-party experts to help us identify and remove them. I can 
get back to you on specifics.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Yes, please get back with us----
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester [continuing]. On the specifics.
    Mr. Chew, in your testimony you indicated TikTok has taken 
several steps to implement Project Texas. You have said you 
have spent--in your testimony--$1.5 billion, you have hired 
1,500 full-time employees. Can I ask for some specifics about 
the implementation? This $1.5 billion, what was it used for? 
The employees, were they people that you already had that you 
just transferred over? And what types of roles will they have?
    Mr. Chew. Oh, OK. This billion and a half U.S. dollars is 
spread across many things, including the infrastructure we have 
to build, the migration of the data to a new cloud 
infrastructure, and all the third-party security partners that 
we are hiring, and, of course, the new employees.
    Now, this team will now be run by a gentleman who used to 
be the--who has spent his career as a chief security officer in 
other companies, and another gentleman who used to work, I 
believe, in----
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. If you could just follow up----
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester [continuing]. With us, that would be 
very helpful.
    Mr. Chew. I will, I will.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. Because we would really like to 
understand the details. Where is the money going? How many 
people are--and what will they be doing?
    Mr. Chew. OK.
    Ms. Blunt Rochester. You know, as I put just kind of a 
finer point on this, one of my concerns is that we came here 
hoping to hear some actions that would alleviate some of our 
concerns and our fears. We have got family members, we have a 
lot of folks here that are constituents, that are content 
creators. And for us, we were looking for action. We wanted to 
see--make us feel like we really can trust, as you use the 
word.
    What I leave here with is thinking about the fact that your 
company is--I learned that you are--you have personalized data 
advertising for kids as young as 13. And we have heard until 
Project Texas is supposedly stood up, engineers in China still 
have access to personal data, and that--that means engineers in 
China have access to personal data of 13-year-olds in the 
United States. And I think that really summarizes why you see 
so much bipartisan consensus and concern about your company. 
And I imagine that it is not going away any time soon.
    Thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady yields back. I yield to the 
lady from Arizona, Mrs. Lesko, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Lesko. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, do you agree that the Chinese Government has 
persecuted the Uyghur population?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, you--if you use our app and you 
open it, you will find our users who give all sorts of 
content----
    Mrs. Lesko. That is not my question. My question is, do you 
agree that the Chinese Government has persecuted the Uyghur 
population?
    Mr. Chew. Well, it is deeply concerning to hear about all 
accounts of human rights abuse. My role here is to explain----
    Mrs. Lesko. I think you are being pretty evasive.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. What our platform does on this.
    Mrs. Lesko. It is a pretty easy question. Do you agree that 
the Chinese Government has persecuted the Uyghur population?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, I am here to describe TikTok, and 
what we do as a platform. And as a platform----
    Mrs. Lesko. All right.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. We allow our users to freely express 
their views----
    Mrs. Lesko. All right. Earlier today----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. On this issue and any other issue 
that matters to them.
    Mrs. Lesko. Well, you didn't answer the question.
    Earlier today Chairman Rodgers asked you, and I quote, 
``Have any moderation tools been used to remove content 
associated with the Uyghur genocide, yes or no?'` Your answer, 
``We do not remove that kind of content.'` Yet in 2019 TikTok 
suspended the account of Feroza Aziz, an American 17-year-old, 
after she put out a video about the Uyghur genocide. So your 
answer, sir, does not align with history.
    Mr. Chew. That particular case was a mismoderation. I 
believe that video had a picture of Osama bin Laden, so we 
thought it was----
    Mrs. Lesko. No, I----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Content that was inappropriate.
    Mrs. Lesko. Yes, I looked it up. That was a different post 
that they banned, TikTok banned.
    Mr. Chew. I can get back on the specifics, yes.
    Mrs. Lesko. My next question. India banned the use of 
TikTok in their country in 2020. New Zealand has banned the 
installation of TikTok on devices connected to the country's 
parliamentary network. Canada banned the installation of TikTok 
on government devices. The United Kingdom has banned the TikTok 
app from government-owned devices. Belgium banned the TikTok 
from government phones. The European Union banned the 
installation of TikTok on government devices. All cited 
security risks with the company's data collection and 
connection to the Chinese Communist Party.
    Recently, our U.S. FBI Director, Christopher Wray, said 
about TikTok, ``This is a tool that is ultimately within the 
control of the Chinese Government. And it--to me, it screams 
out with national security concerns.'`
    Mr. Chew, how can all of these countries and our own FBI 
Director have been wrong?
    Mr. Chew. I think a lot of risks that I pointed out are 
hypothetical and theoretical risks. I have not seen any 
evidence. I am, you know, eagerly awaiting discussions where we 
can talk about evidence, and we then can address the concerns 
that are being raised.
    Mrs. Lesko. Yes. My next question revolves around an 
article, ``India Banned TikTok in 2020.'` A March 21st Forbes 
article revealed how troves of personal data of Indian citizens 
who once used TikTok remain widely accessible to employees at 
the company and its Beijing-based parent, ByteDance.
    A current TikTok employee told Forbes that nearly anyone 
with basic access to company tools, including employees in 
China, can easily look up the closest contacts and other 
sensitive information about any user. This current TikTok 
employee also said, ``If you want to start a movement, if you 
want to divide people, if you want to do any of the operation 
to influence the public on the app, you can just use that 
information to target those groups.'`
    Why would a--Mr. Chew, why would a current TikTok employee 
say this if it wasn't true?
    Mr. Chew. This is a recent article. I have asked my team to 
look into it. As far as I know, there is--we have rigorous data 
access protocols. There is really no such thing where anybody 
can get access to tools.
    Mrs. Lesko. All right.
    Mr. Chew. So I disagree with a lot of the conclusions of 
that.
    Mrs. Lesko. Madam Chair, I request unanimous consent that 
the Forbes March 21st, 2023 article be added to the record.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Without objection.
    [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
    Mrs. Lesko. And I have--would like to turn over the rest of 
my time to Mr. Obernolte.
    Mr. Obernolte. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, I would like to continue asking the question that 
we were--ran out of time last time.
    So, as part of Project Texas, you are going to have 
engineers at Oracle review the algorithms, the machine learning 
algorithms that TikTok uses to ensure that they are free from 
foreign influence. But as you and I were discussing, reviewing 
the algorithms doesn't do anything. The algorithms are simple. 
That is not where the secret sauce is. The secret sauce is in 
the data used to train them and the outcomes that you are 
asking them to predict. Would you agree with that?
    Mr. Chew. I actually believe that, with third-party 
monitoring, you can identify a lot of the motivation of the 
code. And with enough third-party experts, you can identify a 
lot of what the code is designed to do.
    Mr. Obernolte. But how would----
    Mr. Chew. So I----
    Mr. Obernolte. How would you verify that you couldn't ask 
the algorithm for a different outcome than the one that the 
rest of the source code is asking for?
    Mr. Chew. The algorithm will be trained with this--it gets 
very technical, but it will be trained based on weights, for 
example. And those are things that we can verify. You know, 
what weights are you putting on----
    Mr. Obernolte. Well, if you could give us a written 
response to that, I would appreciate it, because I am 
interested.
    Thank you, Madam Chair. I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The lady yields back. The gentleman--
gentlelady yields back. The Chair recognizes for 5 minutes the 
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Soto.
    Mr. Soto. Thank you, Madam Chair. The genie is really out 
of the bottle on this now, so to speak.
    A hundred and fifty million Americans are now on TikTok. 
That is almost half of America. They are expressing themselves 
in art and music, poetry, short film, comedy, among other 
creative expressions. And many of them are inspiring, talented 
young people. But we also on the committee recognize there is a 
darker side to it, right? Violence, adult themes, drug and 
alcohol, sexualization, suicide, all major issues on TikTok, 
but also Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and other social media 
platforms.
    So the solution, as I see it, is to regulate TikTok and 
other social media platforms. And that job, Mr. Chew, as you 
know, really falls to us. There are real concerns, bipartisan 
common ground we have already had. We had a Federal device ban 
that was voted on bipartisan in the omnibus. And I cointroduced 
a bill with my dear friend, Representative Cammack, about 
notices of that Federal ban.
    Madam Chair, I think the first key is privacy. We have to 
pass the comprehensive legislation that got out of this 
committee but eluded us in the last Congress. I am really 
hoping we can get that done, and I am really excited about 
hearing that from folks.
    The other thing is that TikTok needs to be an American 
company with American values and end its ties to the Chinese 
Communist Party. This is something that will be critical as we 
look and go forward.
    And then three, we all agree we have to protect our kids. 
The committee should consider banning the use for children 
under 13 of not just TikTok but all social media platforms, or 
at least empower parents.
    In addition, have rules of the road for teens that are 13 
to 17, so that families can do what is right for their 
families.
    So for privacy, that is on us. Internet privacy is on us.
    As far as being an American company, Mr. Chew, as you know, 
the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States at the 
Department of Treasury reviews foreign investment that affects 
national security. Right now they have negotiated with your 
company about this Oracle setup that you have talked about, 
servers in an American company in America, in Texas, and then 
Oracle would monitor the algorithms. But pressure is mounting.
    So, Mr. Chew, would TikTok be prepared to divest from 
ByteDance and Chinese Communist Party ties if the Department of 
Treasury instructed you all to do so?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I said in my opening statement I 
think we are--need to address the problem of privacy. I agree 
with you. I don't think ownership is the issue here. With a lot 
of respect, American social companies don't have a good track 
record with data privacy and user security. I mean, look at 
Facebook and Cambridge Analytica, just one example.
    So I do think that, you know, it is not about the 
ownership. It is a lot about making sure we have Project Texas, 
making sure that we are protecting and firewalling U.S. user 
data from unwanted foreign access, giving third parties to come 
in to have a look at this, and making sure that everybody is 
comfortable. We are giving transparency and third-party 
monitoring, and that is what we are doing for Project Texas.
    Mr. Soto. Well, I would at least encourage you all to start 
having the dialogue, should that be where the President and the 
Congress ends up going.
    The third thing is on parents. I had a constituent of mine, 
Brandy of Lake Nona, say, ``I am a parent of 2 teenagers, 14 
and 18 years old, both of whom have been harmed by social 
media. TikTok's algorithms supply my 14-year-old son with a 
continuous stream of inappropriate content, and has negatively 
influenced his perception of all females. I noticed the 
attention span of both of my teens has changed or decreased 
dramatically, and social media has made my daughter insecure, 
leading to an eating disorder, and ultimately depression.'`
    What safeguards do you have, and what should we tell Brandy 
of Lake Nona on--about how we can help her protect her 
children?
    Mr. Chew. We have a differentiated experience. I mentioned 
just now about the experience if you are below 13, very, very 
restricted. If you are below--13 to 17, Congressman, we 
actually have a whole series of things. The first--the content 
that you see, you know, we make sure that we remove things that 
could be mature themes from your--from your feed. We also, by 
default, do not allow under-16s to use direct messaging. We do 
not allow under-16s to--we set their accounts to private, by 
default. They can't go viral. If you are below 18, we shut off 
some features for you. Like, for example, you are not allowed 
to post live streams. Neither are you allowed to send virtual 
gifts.
    So we take this very seriously, and we want to continue to 
build to ensure that we are giving our under-18 teenagers on 
our platform--although they--today they are only a minority of 
our user base today, but we still take it very seriously.
    Mr. Soto. Mr. Chew, I would encourage you to continue 
thinking about how to get the word out to parents across the 
Nation on some of these tools, as well, as we here craft a 
privacy law that will help provide well-needed regulation to 
social media companies across the Nation.
    Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Pence, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Pence. Thank you, Chairwoman Rodgers and Ranking Member 
Pallone, for holding this hearing. I love both of your opening 
remarks.
    Like my colleagues have discussed today, our increasingly 
digital world leaves Hoosiers and all Americans in the dark 
about who has access to their information. For TikTok users, 
that could be third-party data brokers, advertisers, or the 
Chinese Communist Party. TikTok aggressively feeds addictive 
content to users to glean massive amounts of personal data that 
is worth a fortune. For Hoosiers watching at home, this isn't 
just data about your favorite sports team.
    You know, if there really are 150 million users in the 
U.S., this suggests to me that the CCP has a finger on the 
pulse of almost half our Nation's population. I find that hard 
to believe. But this week I decided I would ask my constituents 
in southern Indiana to share their stories with me. I went out 
Monday night, and we got 800 responses in less than 12 hours, 
OK? Let me share a couple of those with you.
    One of my constituents shared, I quote: ``I am a mental 
health counselor. Most of my teenage clients are on TikTok. 
They spend hours online being negatively influenced by others. 
I have seen kids experience self-harm, gender dysphoria, and 
many mental illnesses they have picked up from TikTok. I will 
not allow my children to have TikTok. The creators know the 
algorithms are addicting our children. They know that children 
are suffering more anxiety and depression from screen time, but 
they do not care. They will not change their algorithms because 
it is financially lucrative for them to keep their kids 
addicted.'`
    Another parent said, ``We let our child, our daughter, try 
it out. The feed was continuously suggesting sexually explicit, 
stupid, and vulgar videos. We discontinued it within a week.'` 
And there has been many more, many more. Like I said, 800, OK?
    In your testimony, Mr. Chew, you walked through a number of 
supposed actions taken by your company to create a safe 
environment, empower parents to oversee content shown to their 
children. But virtually everything we have heard reflects the 
opposite. And some of your answers are a little confusing.
    You know, all of those sitting here and maybe watching on 
C-SPAN, this is the 32d hearing we have held about privacy and 
Big Tech. Each hearing I have been part of, we have heard the 
same stories about our constituents' experience and the same 
promises for Big Tech to do better. The truth of the matter is, 
this disgusting and dangerous content littered across your 
platform is not justifiable, and it is uncontrollable. 
Americans' data is not safe, and Big Tech is doing nothing to 
protect it.
    Putting aside the dangers of the CCP involvement and after 
these 32 hearings, I believe it is actually time to change the 
narrative, change the focus, and change the outcome by talking 
about the money you are making at TikTok. Mr. Chew, I have a 
question. How much revenue is generated per user?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, we----
    Mr. Pence. It is a private company, and you are not going 
to tell me.
    Mr. Chew. A private company, yes.
    Mr. Pence. Does each user receive a comparable benefit for 
the amount of profit their data brings to your company?
    Mr. Chew. We do share some revenue with some creators who 
produce, say, 1-minute-plus informative content.
    Mr. Pence. Thanks. When am I going to get paid for the data 
that you are selling or your--or you are getting revenue from 
advertisers--when am I going to get paid for the data you are 
getting from my children, my grandchildren, my neighbors? I 
think that is the only way to get your attention, is talk about 
the money you are making, and maybe that will get you all to do 
what you are supposed to do.
    Mr. Chew. I respect and understand your opinion. The vast 
majority of our users have a great experience. I sent a video 
recently, as well. I got hundreds of thousands of comments.
    Mr. Pence. But what am I getting? It is a great experience? 
What about these 800 bad experiences that people in the Indiana 
6th district have been getting?
    Mr. Chew. We will look into them, and a lot of the issues--
--
    Mr. Pence. You are going to look into it? But this is my--
this is the 32d Big Tech hearing, and you are always going to 
look at it. Frankly, I think you are all stalling, is what you 
are doing. You are just trying to buy time while you are making 
the 18 billion, perhaps, whatever you are making.
    Mr. Chew. I--the majority of our users have a great 
experience on our platform. It is our duty to keep it safe. I 
agree with you. That is why our commitment is to make sure that 
safety----
    Mr. Pence. I think it is----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Is a priority for----
    Mr. Pence. I think it is your duty to pay attention to what 
you are doing, and maybe you paying people for the information 
that you are getting from it is a way to get that done.
    Thank you, I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentlelady from Washington, Ms. Schrier, for 5 
minutes.
    Ms. Schrier. Thank you for being here, Mr. Chew. I am 
really concerned about everything that we are hearing in this 
conversation today, and I appreciate your good intentions, but 
the actions are really falling short.
    As a pediatrician and the parent of a teenager, I am 
particularly concerned about how social media generally and 
TikTok specifically is affecting our kids and teens. We just 
heard a lot about this from testimony from a psychologist.
    Last year the American Academy of Pediatrics sounded the 
alarm about our children's mental health crisis. And as a 
pediatrician, I know this has been going on for more than a 
decade. In fact, it tracks perfectly with social media 
engagement. And during the pandemic, teens who are missing out 
on in-person interactions turned even more to social media to 
connect with friends.
    Social media is designed to be addicting. That is the 
business model. And your platform is the most addictive of all. 
And this endless, mindless scrolling takes teens away from 
human relationships. And here is what is important: It keeps 
teens awake all night, well past their bedtime at a time in 
their lives when sleep is critical for brain and physical 
development. In fact, sleep deprivation alone--ignoring even 
content--alone can cause depression, anxiety, social 
withdrawal, inattention, poor coping skills, and academic 
failure.
    So, Mr. Chew, I just want to follow up a little bit on what 
my colleague Mr. Sarbanes was discussing. It is your business 
model to keep eyes on the app, to keep it addictive. I know you 
likely have experts who have advised you on how to design this 
to keep those eyes on your platform for the longest possible 
time. So I want to know if you have psychologists or other 
health experts on staff looking at screen time, hours of use, 
and sleep.
    Mr. Chew. We worked with the Digital Wellness Lab, 
Congresswoman, and--at the Boston Children's Hospital, and we 
came up with a 60-minute default limit for any users under 18.
    Ms. Schrier. OK, so that is a----
    Mr. Chew. We were the first to do it in our industry.
    Ms. Schrier. That is an opt out, and I can tell you they 
are going to immediately opt out. It is addictive.
    Mr. Chew. We also give tools----
    Ms. Schrier. It is like asking a chain smoker not to take 
the next cigarette. It is not going to happen.
    And by the way, so--first I have a question, then I will go 
back to Boston Children's. Mr. Sarbanes asked earlier, what is 
the percentage of teens who actually adhere to the 60-minute 
limit?
    Mr. Chew. I would need to check on those numbers and get 
back to you on specifics.
    Ms. Schrier. I would appreciate those numbers.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Ms. Schrier. I am guessing it is an incredibly low 
percentage who actually heed that.
    Now, as far as Boston Children's goes, I know you are 
referring to them as a source for these ideas about, you know, 
go outside, get some air, take some time out. But I can tell 
you, as a pediatrician, I am guessing their suggestions were a 
little stronger than that. And so I am wondering, what is the 
next step? What are you doing when you find out that almost 
nobody is really opting out after 60 minutes, to take this 
burden off of the kids and off of the parents and change your 
algorithms to make them not so hooked?
    Mr. Chew. We give our parents, as you pointed out, the 
family--the family pairing tool. And in that tool, if you pair 
it with your teenager's phone, you can actually set a 
restriction, how many minutes. And we believe it is very 
important for parents to have these conversations with their 
teenagers, so--to decide what is best for their family.
    I also--Congresswoman, a lot of people come to our platform 
to have a really informative experience. Like I said, there 
were 116 billion pieces of content on STEM, and we are creating 
a feed dedicated to that. Book Talk has 115 billion----
    Ms. Schrier. We also--we have also heard today that well 
over 20 percent of the information is misinformation. We heard 
that about medical remedies that are not really remedies. We 
have heard it about mental health topics.
    I mean, this becomes very dangerous, especially when people 
who are not trained to think very critically are being given 
information and thinking that it is true. And you have said 
many times that the destructive information isn't available to 
kids, but it is. Like, we keep seeing examples here.
    And so I am just wondering, what are you going to do with 
the algorithms? I mean, just because you are removing something 
that says ``anorexia,'' ``bulimia,'' or ``eating disorder,'' 
that doesn't do it. If you show girls repeatedly skinny bodies 
and advice on how to cook meals that are less than 300 
calories, that is dangerous.
    Mr. Chew. We have worked with--first of all, all--anything 
that glorifies eating disorders, we remove that from our 
platform as violative. We are working with experts now. It is a 
challenging problem for our industry, but we are actually 
identify--identifying some of these themes that you are talking 
about, and trying to build models where that kind of content is 
not up for the younger users. So it is something we take very 
seriously too.
    Ms. Schrier. We are seeing eating disorders in elementary-
age kids now, and I need you to expedite that process as much 
as possible, because parents out there are worried, and I am 
worried as a pediatrician. Parents can't take themselves off of 
these platforms. Kids, there is no way they are going to take 
themselves off. And we need you to do your part. It may affect 
your bottom line, but it could save this generation.
    Mr. Chew. I share your concerns, and I commit to doing 
more.
    Ms. Schrier. I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Joyce.
    Mr. Joyce. Thank you, Chair Rodgers and Ranking Member 
Pallone, for holding this hearing.
    According to an August 2022 article in the New York Times, 
TikTok's in-app web browser can track every individual 
keystroke made by a user. We have heard today about the various 
ways in which the app's code could be used to monitor or track 
users. And likewise, we have heard concerns that this data may 
not be fully isolated from access by the Chinese Communist 
Party.
    That said, I would like to know more about the historical 
nonpublic U.S. personal data that your company has already 
amassed. Mr. Chew, you have publicly stated that the nonpublic 
information of TikTok users in the United States is being 
transferred to an Oracle-based cloud infrastructure because of 
safety concerns. Will that be completed by the end of this 
week, by the end of this month?
    What is the outline for dealing with that data that you 
have already amassed?
    Mr. Chew. All new data is already stored by default in this 
Oracle Cloud infrastructure, with the----
    Mr. Joyce. No, I am talking about the data that you have 
already amassed.
    Mr. Chew. We are in the process of deleting.
    Mr. Joyce. What timeline will that data be able to be 
stored?
    Mr. Chew. We will--I believe we will be able to get it done 
this year. I am hiring----
    Mr. Joyce. This year. Thank you. It is not going to occur 
any time soon.
    To be clear, until that data transfer happens, user data 
remains accessible to the Chinese Communist Party.
    On March 1st of this year, the committee asked you when you 
plan to delete nonpublic historical U.S. user data. Are you 
aware of this?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I disagree with this assessment that 
the Chinese Government can get access to the data. It is really 
for--look, this is a private company. This is what--Chinese 
employees----
    Mr. Joyce. You responded in writing to this committee. I 
have the response that we got back from you on March 7th, just 
6 days later. Your attorneys wrote, ``The company'`--I am 
quoting--``The company plans to begin the process of deleting 
nonpublic historic U.S. user data this month, and anticipates 
that the process will be completed this year.'`
    You came up with a supposed plan in the summer of 2022, 
specifically based on our concerns that the communist Chinese 
Government was spying on U.S. users. But you only just came up 
with the idea to delete historic nonpublic U.S. data just 2 
weeks ago?
    Let me read it again: On March 7th, your attorneys wrote--
and I quote--``The company plans to begin the process of 
deleting nonpublic historical U.S. data this month, and 
anticipates that the process will be completed this year.'`
    Mr. Chew, did you just come up with this plan only because 
we asked about it on March 1st?
    Mr. Chew. No, we started deleting this----
    Mr. Joyce. Because that is what it looks like to me.
    Mr. Chew. We hired a third-party auditor----
    Mr. Joyce. This is incredibly disappointing.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. To help us with this.
    Mr. Joyce. Wouldn't you agree that awaiting even minutes 
for this personal privacy protection is absolutely wrong, and 
it is not in the best interest of your users?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, respectfully, there are many 
companies that use a global workforce. We are not the only one. 
We are just taking action after hearing----
    Mr. Joyce. Given the delay----
    Mr. Chew. Many other companies have not.
    Mr. Joyce [continuing]. In reading this data, and what we 
have already established about the ability of the Chinese 
Communist Party to access personal user data, would you agree 
that no U.S. Government electronic devices should have access 
to TikTok platform, as your lackluster security currently 
stands?
    Mr. Chew. I disagree with that characterization. Like I 
said, the U.S.----
    Mr. Joyce. Do you think that any individual should be 
utilizing that on any Government platform?
    Mr. Chew. I think the Government devices should have no 
social media apps, to be honest, but----
    Mr. Joyce. And particularly TikTok.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Targeted to us.
    Mr. Joyce. Mr. Chew, during this hearing you have mentioned 
several times that there is a ``different experience,'` your 
words, for children under the age of 13.
    Mr. Chew. That is correct.
    Mr. Joyce. A different experience. Mr. Chew, do you allow 
your children under the age of 13 to participate in TikTok? Yes 
or no.
    Mr. Chew. I did just explain this in detail. This 
experience doesn't exist in Singapore, where my children live. 
If my children lived here, then yes.
    Mr. Joyce. Based on what we have heard today, it is clear 
to me that TikTok, as a company, cannot be trusted, and that 
Americans remain significantly at risk because of the TikTok 
app. I still contend that TikTok is the spy in Americans' 
pockets.
    I want to acknowledge that TikTok does have the ability to 
make those changes. But unfortunately, we have not heard that 
from you today. We have not heard a commitment to be able to 
protect the personal privacy that Americans expect and that 
Americans deserve.
    Thank you, Madam Chair, and I yield the remainder of my 
time.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes Mrs. Trahan for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Trahan. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, many Big Tech CEOs have sat where you are 
sitted--seated today and tried to run out the clock during a 
hearing like this one. They were trained not to answer 
questions and just wait for the news cycle to pass so that they 
could get on with business as usual. Those same executives want 
this moment, TikTok's moment under the microscope, to distract 
Congress and the American people from the very real issues that 
exist on their platforms.
    You have an opportunity to turn the tables on them. While 
U.S.-based social media giants have regressed on protections 
for children and teens, on protecting our data privacy, and on 
embracing transparency, you can lead, and you should lead. Last 
month you announced that TikTok would expand access to its 
researcher API. But I am concerned that your new policy could 
be more bark than bite, that it won't actually lead to the 
rigorous research that we, as lawmakers, and that parents and 
everyday TikTok users need.
    In fact, your terms of service demand that researchers 
delete their data at TikTok's unilateral direction. It puts 
onerous restrictions on how researchers' findings can be 
published, and it only allows access to public data, which 
researchers already have access to within the app.
    In order to actually address the content moderation and 
algorithmic amplification concerns that my colleagues have 
raised here today and that I have heard about directly from 
parents in my home State of Massachusetts, independent 
researchers, not just other tech companies like Oracle, need to 
be able to evaluate how TikTok's algorithm is making decisions 
to promote content.
    Mr. Chew, will you commit to expanding your API to include 
data that would let researchers investigate how your algorithm 
is pushing content to users, whether it is showing up on your 
For You page, the hashtag page, or somewhere else?
    Mr. Chew. We are--one of the commitments I gave in the 
opening statement is a commitment to transparency and third-
party monitoring. So Congresswoman, I will look into the 
details of that and get back to you.
    Mrs. Trahan. And as well as the algorithm, including data 
on what types of users were targeted by the algorithm so that 
researchers can fully understand what content is being 
prioritized and who it is being pushed to.
    Mr. Chew. Again, we have a commitment to transparency. 
These are very important questions, and I will get back to you 
on the specifics.
    Mrs. Trahan. Under this same proposal, you require that 
researchers give TikTok, quote, ``worldwide, free, 
nonexclusive, and perpetual,'` end quote, rights to their 
papers. This threatens to clash directly with well-established 
practices of exclusive publication rights in research journals.
    Mr. Chew, why does TikTok need those rights?
    Mr. Chew. I would need to get back to you on the specifics, 
if that is OK.
    Mrs. Trahan. Yes. I don't see how we can expect researchers 
to do their work under these terms and then tout transparency.
    I am going to shift gears with the time that I have 
remaining, Mr. Chew. I would like to talk about TikTok's 
efforts to protect children and young users. In 2021 the UK's 
age-appropriate design code went into effect, mandating 15 
standards that companies like you need to follow to protect 
children on your platform. You still operate in the United 
Kingdom, which means you should be in compliance with this 
code.
    So my question is simple: Will you commit to extending the 
protections currently afforded children in the UK to the 
millions of kids and teens who use your app here in the United 
States?
    Mr. Chew. We take the safety of the younger users on our 
platform very seriously. Every----
    Mrs. Trahan. This is a good way to prove it.
    Mr. Chew. Every country is a little bit different in 
context, and in--so let me look at the specifics, and bring 
some of the best practices across the world. But----
    Mrs. Trahan. Well, those best practices are in--they are 
being executed around the world. We just want the same for our 
kids here in the United States.
    I mean, Mr. Chew, when we spoke a couple of weeks ago you 
indicated interest in taking steps to earn trust, our trust. 
And to me, it hasn't happened today so far. But rather, you 
have ducked behind industry standards and comparables to your 
competitors, which we know are woefully insufficient.
    I strongly urge you to consider these terms, these 
commitments. Make the case for why you are different from your 
American competitors, and do better on--than them on 
transparency, which you have mentioned countless times today, 
but which we don't really have anything tangible to point to.
    Mr. Chew. Yes, I don't want to make excuses for our 
industry or ourselves. I think there is a lot of work that 
needs to be done. We take this very seriously. Nothing is--it 
is not perfect. We need to keep investing to stay ahead of our 
growth.
    So I agree that, you know, we need to prioritize safety and 
continue to do that as part of our company. And----
    Mrs. Trahan. Well, I look forward to getting back your 
comments and your commitments and those updated terms of 
service when you write back to the committee.
    Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew. Thank you.
    Mrs. Trahan. I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from North Dakota, Mr. Armstrong, for 
5 minutes.
    Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, Madam Chair. You know, we have 
heard a lot today about the procedural safeguards, independent 
code review, server locations, and the corporate independence 
between ByteDance and the CCP. But I think there is something 
else a little more telling.
    You know, when you were asked about Chinese censorship, you 
pivoted immediately to drug use in Singapore. You have 
absolutely tied yourself in knots to avoid criticizing the 
CCP's treatment of the Uyghur population. And I think it begs 
the first question: Before we ever get to Project Texas, which 
I will get to in a second, if the CCP demanded that ByteDance 
hand over all of the data that they had on user--on U.S. users 
in their possession and ByteDance refused, I wonder what would 
happen. I wonder if Jack Ma might have an opinion on that, and 
I wonder if he would be allowed to give it.
    But let's talk about Project Texas for a second. Project 
Texas envisions a new U.S.-based TikTok subsidiary. You have 
stated that this arrangement is unprecedented. I would argue 
the reason it is unprecedented is because it requires continual 
oversight and monitoring by the U.S. of a private business 
because it poses a national security threat.
    The new subsidiary's board would report to and be approved 
by CFIUS. CFIUS will also specify hiring requirements, as well 
as interact with Oracle as it performs its data role. That is 
an extraordinary corporate governance structure. I have 
questioned whether it complies with corporate law and fiduciary 
duty to shareholders.
    Yet the core concern is that the--proposes unparalleled 
integration with the U.S. Government with a private company, 
which will require significant Government resources, all of 
that to allow a continued operation of a social media platform 
that has serious national security implications. And CFIUs' 
workload has already dramatically increased in recent years, 
with a 30 percent increase in declarations and a 45 percent 
increase in joint voluntary notices. And there is bipartisan 
consensus that CFIUS needs to be expanded as we speak.
    The only--Mr. Chew, can you identify any similar corporate 
arrangement that requires Federal Government to expand such 
resources to monitor an alleged data privacy and national 
security risk?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am not an expert on this matter. I 
believe that there are certain similar arrangements, but I am 
not the expert on this matter.
    Mr. Armstrong. Well, the only one I could find was the UK 
created the Huawei Cyber Security Evaluation Center in 2010 to 
assess Huawei's tech and to detect malicious activity and guard 
UK's networks. That has worked so well that the United Kingdom 
is now planning on kicking Huawei out of Great Britain.
    You have stated that TikTok has invested $1.5 billion in 
Project Texas. Are you aware of any discussions or proposals 
that entail TikTok funding or offsetting the costs of CFIUs' 
role?
    Mr. Chew. Those discussions are--I need to get back on 
you--on the specifics. But I can tell you, yes, we did spend 
approximately 1.5 billion U.S. dollars on our side.
    Mr. Armstrong. You spent $1.5 billion on Project Texas. But 
do you have any--I mean, you agree that, if CFIUS takes on this 
role, they are going to need a massive influx of dollars in 
human resources, right?
    Mr. Chew. I cannot speak on behalf of CFIUS, Congressman.
    Mr. Armstrong. Should the U.S. Government expend such 
resources to create this extraordinary arrangement for TikTok, 
especially considering alleged data privacy and national 
security risks?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I cannot speak on behalf of the 
United States----
    Mr. Armstrong. Well, the Project Texas doesn't work without 
CFIUS, right? And Project Texas, as you guys have proposed it, 
does not work without CFIUS involvement.
    Mr. Chew. The idea behind Project Texas is the firewall of 
U.S. user data, make sure it is stored by an American company 
overseen by American personnel, and we will invite third-party 
monitors to monitor this. So that, in essence, at least as far 
as I know, is the majority of the cost, because it will rely on 
not just us building the infrastructure, but us, you know, 
finding and hiring these third-party monitors who are vetted to 
come in and monitor this structure.
    Mr. Armstrong. You talked earlier about the shareholder's 
ownership of TikTok, and you said 60 percent global investors, 
20 percent is employees, and 20 percent is original founders. 
Are all those voting shares the same?
    Mr. Chew. No, the founder has weighted voting rights, as is 
common in our industry.
    Mr. Armstrong. So do--as far as a voting block of shares 
owned in ByteDance, do you know if the Chinese Communist 
Party--not Chinese Communist Party officials, the Chinese 
Communist Party--do you know what their percentage of the 
actual voting block share of ByteDance is?
    Mr. Chew. The Chinese Communist Party doesn't have voting 
rights in ByteDance.
    Mr. Armstrong. Chinese Communist Party members is a 
different question. Do the founders control the voting block of 
ByteDance's shares?
    Mr. Chew. I do know that the founder himself is not a 
member of the Communist Party, but we don't know the political 
affiliation of our employees, because that is not something we 
ask.
    Mr. Armstrong. Does the Chinese Government know the 
political affiliation of their Chinese citizens?
    Mr. Chew. I cannot answer that question on their behalf.
    Mr. Armstrong. I yield back.
    Mr. Chew. The gentleman yields back. I yield to the lady 
from--the gentlelady from New Hampshire, Ms. Kuster, 5 minutes.
    Ms. Kuster. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, I just want to say I agree with all of the 
comments of many of my colleagues today that we need to take a 
close look at whether TikTok poses a national security risk. 
For today I am going to focus my limited time on how TikTok can 
better protect its youngest users. And I think a number of us 
have identified as parents today and have serious concerns, as 
we relayed to you.
    Just this week I heard from a parent in my district in 
Nashua, New Hampshire, whose child was served harmful content 
on TikTok and has needed counseling as a result. This 
experience is not unique to this family, and it underscores the 
need for better child protections on your app.
    I would like to dig further into TikTok's current safety 
and privacy controls for children. I understand that TikTok 
restricts certain app capabilities for users under age 18 and 
has additional restrictions for users under age 16 or 13, such 
as limiting who can interact with them on the platform. 
However, these protections are worthless if any savvy child can 
easily bypass these age restrictions by deleting their own 
account and creating a new one with a different age. And by 
``easily,'` I mean you can literally go in and open another 
account using the same email address.
    So I have been made aware by child safety groups, including 
Fair Play for Kids and Common Sense, that it is that simple for 
young users to bypass the age restrictions on TikTok. Yes or 
no, are you aware of this issue?
    Mr. Chew. I apologize. I think that is a great issue--
question that you raised. If a user inputs an age and is 
blocked, my understanding is that if the user tries to do it 
again within a short period of time--and I won't disclose 
publicly----
    Ms. Kuster. We did it in our office yesterday. You can go 
right back in, use the exact same email address, and open a new 
account. So can I get your commitment that you will at least 
fix that bug?
    Mr. Chew. I will go and have a look at it, yes.
    Ms. Kuster. Thank you. If--we are here today to talk TikTok 
and not other platforms, but I am happy to look at legislative 
solutions.
    In the interim, TikTok has a responsibility to do more to 
protect its young users, and I will accept your commitment to 
take a look at fixing that issue. Will you--let's see--sorry. I 
recognize that TikTok has made efforts to provide parents and 
guardians--increase options to monitor and limit their child's 
activity on the app, including family pairing and time limit 
features. But I still have concerns.
    In order to access family pairing, parents then must 
download the app onto their phone, and this sounds like a 
design to lure more users onto the app rather than a practical 
safety feature. Furthermore, downloading the app may not be a 
viable option for many patients--parents.
    Mr. Chew, will TikTok commit to developing other methods 
for parents to monitor their child's use of the app without 
having to download the TikTok app on their phone?
    Mr. Chew. I can look into that specifically, and get back 
to you.
    Ms. Kuster. OK.
    Mr. Chew. But the family pairing that you mentioned is a 
very good tool that we developed. I encourage parents with 
teenagers to----
    Ms. Kuster. But it is not a perfect----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. To use it.
    Ms. Kuster [continuing]. Tool, and let me just say one of 
my concerns is that the minimum time limit TikTok lets parents 
set for their children is 40 minutes, which, for a young child, 
is a very long period of time. Actually giving parents control 
would mean providing them the freedom to set the screen time 
that makes sense for their family.
    Now, I have got a copy of the app page that shows just the 
four options. Would you commit to adding an ``other'' option, 
so that the parent can easily set their own screen time limit?
    Mr. Chew. I can take a look at that.
    Ms. Kuster. I think it is important. I think parents are 
looking for control. They are looking to allow their family to 
use these apps without TikTok taking over their child's media 
use.
    I have heard use reports--I have heard reports of users 
struggling to access the feature. And so I will look forward to 
hearing back from you on adding an ``other'` so that a parent 
can add a custom limit.
    So finally, I ask that you commit to report back to this 
committee and the American public on how TikTok addresses these 
safety issues and the steps that you are taking to default 
children's accounts to the most protective possible settings.
    And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady yields back. I yield to--the 
Chair yields to the gentleman from Ohio.
    Five minutes, Mr. Balderson.
    Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thank you, Mr. Chew, for being here today.
    I would like to start by inserting into the record a report 
entitled ``TikTok, ByteDance and Their Ties to the Chinese 
Communist Party,'` which was published by the Australian 
Parliament just over a week ago. If I could add that to the 
record, please.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Without objection, so ordered. 1A\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The information has been retained in committee files and is 
included in the Documents for the Record at https://docs.house.gov/
meetings/IF/IF00/20230323/115519/HHRG-118-IF00-20230323-SD030.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Balderson. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, we know that your company's algorithm has been 
exposed for delivering videos to China that encourages them to 
develop eating disorders, promotes challenges that have caused 
children to accidentally commit suicide, glorifies the use of 
drugs and pornography. Despite the constant media coverage of 
this issue, your company continues to feed our children this 
dangerous and harmful content.
    Can you explain to parents back in my congressional 
district why it should be their burden and not TikTok's to set 
up the guardian parental controls for their children so that 
they do not view content which encourages eating disorders or 
committing suicide?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I take these issues very seriously. 
If the user is between--is a teenage user on our platform, we 
actually have a differentiated experience, including certain 
models that we are building with experts to help identify 
certain content that is not inherently harmful but could lead 
people to eating disorders. Anything that glorifies eating 
disorders is violative of our platform, and we remove that. And 
I want to assure you that I take this very, very seriously, 
this commitment.
    Mr. Balderson. OK. Mr. Curtis, my colleague, mentioned the 
use of a heating tool on your platform to make specific videos 
go viral or get more views. Does TikTok use a cooling tool, 
where employees can manually limit the amplification of content 
that TikTok should hide, like content that promotes eating 
disorders, drug use, or suicide among children?
    Mr. Chew. The only promotion tool that we have is approved 
by the local teams--so in the U.S. by the U.S. team--and it is 
for commercial purposes. Like Taylor Swift, you know, I think 
when she onboarded we, you know, heated----
    Mr. Balderson. So would that be a yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. My--I just want to make sure that I am answering 
your question with specifics.
    Mr. Balderson. If this tool exists, why isn't it being used 
to cool then the spread of dangerous content? I mean, why is it 
still happening?
    Mr. Chew. Dangerous content has--that violates, we remove 
them. When we see them, we actually remove them from the 
platform.
    Mr. Balderson. OK. The fact of the matter here is that, 
despite whatever action you take, that TikTok is taking to 
protect teens, your algorithm continues to promote harmful 
content. Wouldn't you agree that indicates there is something 
inherently wrong with the algorithm your platform employs?
    Mr. Chew. I do respectfully disagree with that. The 
algorithm drives a great user experience for many, many users. 
Well, I talked about STEM content. That has 116 billion views 
on our platform. One more example: Book Talk is a trend that 
happened on our platform. It is to encourage people to read. 
And globally, it has 115 billion views, and it is fantastic. I 
have heard people telling me that they are reading more because 
of Book Talk. So there is a lot of good, and joy, and positive 
that can be derived from the TikTok experience. Yes, there are 
some bad actors who come in and post violative content, and it 
is our job to remove them. But the overwhelming experience is a 
very positive one for our community.
    Mr. Balderson. But if it is your job to remove them, it has 
been said many times here today about the 41 days that that 
video stood up with addressing Mrs.--the chairwoman.
    Mr. Chew. After this I am going to go and look into the 
specifics of that.
    Mr. Balderson. All right, thank you.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Balderson. Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the lady from Texas, Mrs. Fletcher, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Fletcher. Thank you, Chairwoman McMorris Rodgers, and 
thanks to Ranking Member Pallone for holding today's hearing. 
And thank you, Mr. Chew, for appearing today.
    It has been a long day, but we are here to learn about a 
complex set of issues that relate to TikTok and how to address 
them. And I think that is what we are hearing from colleagues 
on both sides of the aisle today, is a real effort to grapple 
with the challenges that we see for national security, and for 
the safety and protection of American citizens, especially our 
children and young adults.
    And we have already covered today a lot of the information 
about the extensive use of the app, the number of users who are 
children and young adults. But I think it bears repeating, as 
Mr. Veasey mentioned, that TikTok is the preferred platform of 
young Americans, and they use it for all kinds of creative and 
important things. And we have seen that. But there are also 
some dangerous things that we know it has and continues to be 
used for, and that--also that the data that is collected is 
posing additional dangers. And that is--that is what we are 
here for.
    Most people using TikTok do not realize that TikTok is 
collecting data about their keystrokes or about their browsing 
history on other sites, and so much more. And I agree with my 
colleagues that we need a comprehensive set of data privacy 
laws here in the country, and we have heard some very good 
ideas today.
    Mr. Chew, you have mentioned several times today that these 
are industrywide issues, and I agree with you that there are 
industrywide challenges here. But there are also some specific 
things relating to TikTok that I want to focus my questions on, 
and really want to understand where there is a difference and 
how we can craft legislation that addresses the very real 
challenges that we have been hearing about today.
    As you know, States across the country have joined an 
ongoing investigation into possible violations of consumer 
protection laws by TikTok as they pertain to TikTok's effect on 
the mental health of American children and teenagers. As part 
of this investigation, States have requested to review internal 
TikTok communications that takes place on Lark. That is 
TikTok's primary instant messaging system. Is that right?
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mrs. Fletcher. OK. And does every TikTok employee have a 
Lark account?
    Mr. Chew. It is very similar to companies that use Slack or 
any other instant messaging tool.
    Mrs. Fletcher. But Lark is a proprietary instant messaging 
tool. It is not Slack.
    Mr. Chew. It is something that was developed, yes, by 
ByteDance.
    Mrs. Fletcher. And it was developed by TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. No, it was developed by ByteDance.
    Mrs. Fletcher. It is developed by ByteDance. OK. And so a 
couple of questions stemming from that.
    Is it true that Lark videoconferencing has a translation 
feature in which Chinese is translated to English text and vice 
versa?
    Mr. Chew. That is correct. It helps with global 
cooperation.
    Mrs. Fletcher. OK, and those translated conversations are 
somehow saved into the Lark system?
    Mr. Chew. I would need to get back to you on the specifics. 
There is a--you know, I will get back to you on the specifics.
    Mrs. Fletcher. OK. That would be great to know. And I 
neglected to ask, but does every TikTok employee have a Lark 
account?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, I believe so. Yes.
    Mrs. Fletcher. Including you, do you have one?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, I believe so, yes.
    Mrs. Fletcher. And then do you have a--there is some kind 
of profile for your instant messaging system so every employee 
identifies their manager and their department, who they work 
for, what they do. Is that all included in their Lark profile, 
do you know?
    Mr. Chew. It is very common for companies to have 
enterprise messaging tools that----
    Mrs. Fletcher. Sure.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Companies use.
    Mrs. Fletcher. It does. And I guess I am asking 
specifically about Lark, since it is specific to TikTok, 
whether it includes information like identifying who, for 
example, your manager is. Do you know whether that is something 
that is identified in Lark?
    Mr. Chew. Yes. Again, some of these HR features are built 
into a lot of enterprise tools that we use. And--yes.
    Mrs. Fletcher. So, like, for your own profile, does it 
identify who your manager is?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, it does.
    Mrs. Fletcher. And who does it identify as your manager?
    Mr. Chew. I report to the CEO of ByteDance.
    Mrs. Fletcher. OK. And so that is Zhang Yiming. Is that 
identified as your manager? That is the former CEO.
    Mr. Chew. He has stepped down from the board. And----
    Mrs. Fletcher. OK, so----
    Mr. Chew. That is the CEO, yes.
    Mrs. Fletcher. OK. So Mr. Rubo is identified now as your 
manager on----
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mrs. Fletcher [continuing]. The system? OK. And as you 
mentioned, it was developed by ByteDance. So it is not just 
used by TikTok employees, it is also used by ByteDance 
employees, is that right?
    Mr. Chew. Also by other companies now. I think Lark is 
selling it, and it is a good tool for instant messaging.
    Mrs. Fletcher. So Lark is available to third parties 
outside of the ByteDance system, as well, like Slack?
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mrs. Fletcher. And do you personally ever use Lark to 
communicate with ByteDance?
    Mr. Chew. With employees at ByteDance? Yes, I do.
    Mrs. Fletcher. You do? OK. Well, I am running out of time, 
and I am sorry to say, because this is really interesting. I do 
think it underscores some of the concerns that have been raised 
in this hearing. So I think it is clear we have work we need to 
continue to do here in the Congress to address data protection 
and privacy.
    And with that, Madam Chairwoman, I thank you, and I will 
yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady yields back. The committee 
stands in recess, and we will reconvene immediately following 
the third vote being called.
    [Recess.]
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Weber, is 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Weber. Thank you, Madam Chair and, Mr. Chew, thanks for 
being here.
    Mr. Chew, I am one of six Texans on this committee. I am 
over here. So when you invoke the name of Texas, you get my 
attention.
    Mr. Chew, when you were the CFO of ByteDance, did the 
Chinese Government instruct you on how content was to be 
moderated on Douyin or TikTok, yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. Sorry, Congressman, would you mind repeating that 
question?
    Mr. Weber. When you were the CFO of ByteDance, did the 
Chinese Government instruct you on how content to be 
moderated--was to be moderated on Douyin or TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. I was not in charge of that. That is the CFO of--
--
    Mr. Weber. You were not?
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Of ByteDance.
    Mr. Weber. OK, we have a discrepancy there.
    Reports have shown that TikTok accounts managed by media 
links to be a propaganda arm of the CCP, pushed divisive 
content before the recent midterm election. Mr. Chew, yes or 
no, has--to your knowledge, has the CCP coordinated or utilized 
TikTok to influence users through algorithms, state-paid 
content creation, or in any other capacity?
    Mr. Chew. No, they do not do that. We do not promote or 
remove any content on behalf of the Chinese Government.
    Mr. Weber. You don't, but did the Chinese Government? Do 
you have any knowledge of that?
    Mr. Chew. We do not do--Congressman, we have only one 
process of removing content on our platform----
    Mr. Weber. OK.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. And the process is done by our 
content moderation team headquartered in Ireland, in Dublin--
sorry--Ireland and the U.S. And we will only remove content if 
it violates our guidelines. And that is something that we 
audit, you know, or if there is a valid legal order. So----
    Mr. Weber. OK. Several reports, hearings, and leaked 
internal documents have indicated that TikTok has repeatedly 
censored or deamplified content that is critical of the Chinese 
Communist Party's party policies in the U.S. and abroad. Are 
you aware of those reports?
    Mr. Chew. I don't think that is accurate, Congressman. I do 
not----
    Mr. Weber. Are you aware of those reports?
    Mr. Chew. There could be some reports that say that, but 
that action itself is not something----
    Mr. Weber. But your testimony here today is that you can 
keep up with stuff and make it as ``clean as possible.'` Are 
you aware of those reports?
    Mr. Chew. I want to make it very clear that we--there is 
content on TikTok that is great and fun, there is content that 
is critical of China, and----
    Mr. Weber. That is not what I am saying. Are you aware of 
the reports citing that fact?
    Mr. Chew. Again, like I said, the fact is if you go onto 
our platform, you will find content that is critical of China.
    Mr. Weber. Well, we are going to talk about that. Now, this 
committee is looking at reforming section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act, which has already been mentioned 
here today. Do you think that censoring history and--historical 
facts and current events should be protected by section 230's 
good faith requirement?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, that is a more complex topic. I 
would need to speak to my team and get back to you on the 
specifics.
    Mr. Weber. Is your team behind you?
    Mr. Chew. It is my broader team. I will speak to them and I 
will get back to you.
    Mr. Weber. It is always good to have folks behind you, 
isn't it?
    Mr. Chew. Not them.
    Mr. Weber. Oh, no? OK, I got you.
    Here are my concerns with TikTok. Your claims are hard to 
believe. It is no secret to us that TikTok is still under the 
thumb of CCP influence. And let's be honest, TikTok is 
indoctrinating our children with divisive, woke, and pro-CCP 
propaganda, all while threatening our national security with 
Chinese spyware.
    In fact--let me look at my notes here--you had an exchange 
with Anna Eshoo. In your exchange with Congresswoman Eshoo you 
said that ``extreme fitness videos shouldn't be viewed too 
much,'` do you remember that exchange here today?
    Mr. Chew. What extremist videos?
    Mr. Weber. With Anna Eshoo out of California.
    Mr. Chew. I--any content that is--has extremist content----
    Mr. Weber. OK.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Is not allowed on our platform. It 
will be--we identify them, and we----
    Mr. Weber. Was that also true about the gun video that you 
saw today? Was that extreme content that should have been taken 
down?
    Mr. Chew. I would need to look at the specifics of the 
whole video. There was a bit of lag just now. We couldn't see 
the whole video.
    Mr. Weber. OK. You know it threatened our committee chair 
here?
    Mr. Chew. That is unacceptable.
    Mr. Weber. OK.
    Mr. Chew. And, you know----
    Mr. Weber. So you are aware of that extreme video. And why 
did it take 40-plus days to get it down? Does it take literally 
an act of Congress? Should we plan to have a committee hearing 
every time, every day, every time there is something brought 
up, so that we can limit the content on TikTok? Should Congress 
plan to do that, Mr. Chew?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, we work very hard to remove 
violative content on our platform.
    Mr. Weber. OK. Well, let me move on. With Congressman 
Hudson, he asked you about your wages and your stocks, and you 
said you would prefer to keep that information private. Now you 
know how we feel about American public's information. We prefer 
to keep it private, as well, and we don't think TikTok does 
that.
    So, Madam Chair, my time is up. And if this committee gets 
its way, TikTok's time is up.
    Mr. Chew. Madam Chair, if I may----
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. In my response to an earlier 
question----
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman--I am sorry, the gentleman's 
time has expired, or--yes, I--the Chair recognizes Mr. Ruiz 
from California for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Ruiz. Thank you, Chair Rodgers. I echo my colleagues' 
concerns about TikTok's impacts on the health and well-being of 
the American public.
    As a doctor and the ranking member of the Select 
Subcommittee on the Coronavirus Pandemic, I am troubled that 
TikTok is rife with medically inaccurate information, including 
dangerous misinformation and the intentional disinformation 
about COVID-19 and vaccines. TikTok's community guidelines 
state that the company will remove content or accounts that 
involve, quote, ``misleading information that causes 
significant harm.'` However, since the early stages of the 
pandemic, TikTok has been used as a platform for people pushing 
misinformation, disinformation, including by those casting 
doubt on the safety and efficacy of lifesaving vaccines.
    And despite TikTok's pledge to address harmful 
misinformation, these videos are being viewed millions of 
times. For example, the Institute for Strategic Dialogue found 
that a sample of 124 TikTok videos containing vaccine 
misinformation were viewed 20 million times. And Media Matters 
found that a sample of 18 videos with COVID-19 misinformation 
were viewed over 57 million times.
    Here is another shocking study: The Journal of American 
Medical Informatics Association found that, when searching 
``#coronavirus'` on TikTok, almost 30 percent of the videos 
that came up contained misinformation. Videos in that sample 
containing a high level of misinformation were viewed a median 
of 9.4 million times.
    Mr. Chew, what are these--why are these dangerous videos 
falling through the cracks of your company's efforts to enforce 
its own community guidelines and remove harmful misinformation?
    Mr. Chew. Before I answer that, in my response to an 
earlier----
    Mr. Ruiz. No, no, you are----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Question from Representative Dunn--
--
    Mr. Ruiz. You are in my--Mr. Chew you are in my time. 
Answer my question.
    Mr. Chew. I understand. But if--I would like to clarify 
something.
    Mr. Ruiz. Clarify, I have 5 minutes.
    Mr. Chew. OK.
    Mr. Ruiz. In my time. You are in my time now. Answer my 
question.
    Mr. Chew. Yes. Any dangerous misinformation is--we partner 
with third-party experts to be able to identify and help us 
with subject domain expertise, and with the expertise that we 
recognize we rely on those to develop policies that recognize 
and remove content that could be----
    Mr. Ruiz. Well, your efforts are--have failed, and they are 
dangerous. OK? It's public health risks that--you are putting 
millions of people's lives at risk for not being able to do a 
better job.
    And I am concerned that TikTok's features make it--users 
uniquely vulnerable to the spread of this misinformation. For 
example, TikTok makes it extremely easy to reuse audio and 
videos to create content, which allows misinformation to 
quickly spread through the platform and TikTok's algorithm. To 
recommend videos means that a user viewing one video containing 
misinformation can easily result in their quote-unquote ``For 
You page'' becoming filled with videos containing similar 
misinformation. This is a dangerous feedback loop.
    So is TikTok taking any action to modify these features so 
that they no longer facilitate the spread of this 
misinformation or this misinformation feedback loop?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, again, like I said, any dangerous 
mis- or disinformation we work with third parties to recognize 
that, and it is proactively removed from our platform.
    Mr. Ruiz. OK, so----
    Mr. Chew. So it doesn't get into those loops at all.
    Mr. Ruiz. So I can--I can go back and read you the data and 
the Journal of American Medical Informatics: 30 percent of 
videos after searching for #coronavirus had misinformation. 
Like, almost one out of three. Your third party and your 
company are missing one--almost one out of three misinformed 
videos. So you are telling me what you are doing; I am telling 
you the data shows that you are grossly failing at that effort.
    The other thing, the other question I have for you is that 
TikTok is also in Spanish, and Spanish-speaking populations 
have been specifically targeted to misinformation when it comes 
to many aspects, especially medical misinformation. And as 
chair of the Congressional Hispanic Caucus, we reached out to 
you last Congress on this issue.
    So what is your intent, or how does your team look like to 
address Spanish versus English?
    How many staff do you have focusing on Spanish versus how 
many staff do you have focusing on English misinformation?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I was--like I had explained just 
now, the Spanish-speaking population is very important to our 
platform. We do have a lot of Spanish-speaking moderators, and 
we will continue to----
    Mr. Ruiz. So how many Spanish-speaking staff versus 
English-speaking staff for misinformation do you have?
    Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on the specifics, but 
dangerous misinformation is moderated, regardless of language.
    Mr. Ruiz. Not to the degree that it needs to be.
    Mr. Chew. We are--we can continue to work hard to----
    Mr. Ruiz. And when there is misinformation, people base 
their decisions that oftentimes put them at risk and exposures, 
and their families at risk. And with the coronavirus, 
especially prior to the vaccines, they--the risk was their 
life.
    Thank you, I yield back.
    Mr. Chew. Madam Chair, I would like to clarify something. 
In the followup question to Representative Dunn's question just 
now, I misunderstood the followup about ByteDance buying on 
behalf of the Chinese Government. My answer to that question 
should be a no, because it came very rapidly. I just want to 
clarify that.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman's time has expired. The 
gentleman--or the Chair, the Chair recognizes the gentleman 
from Idaho, Mr. Fulcher, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Fulcher. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
    Mr. Chew, we have been going a long time here by now, and a 
lot of questions have been answered, and a lot of them have not 
been answered. And the primary thing I want to do is just share 
some thoughts of what I have seen, learned today, been exposed 
to.
    First of all, I have got to compliment you on having a 
product that is impressive. It is a very influential tool. It 
is addictive. And that is what you want users to be exposed to, 
something addictive. And it is a data-gathering masterpiece. So 
clearly, it has got the potential to sell products, connect 
like-minded people with that artificial intelligence capability 
in a viral, viral fashion, and perhaps spread information 
quicker, better than anything else that has been developed out 
there.
    Now, I am just going to tell you, I am not a subscriber, at 
least a willing subscriber. But probably in that database 
somewhere is my preferences with colors or foods or who I have 
spoken to or what I have said, my favorite newspapers, I don't 
know. But that is available to be sold or given to whomever or 
whatever. And the whatever is what bothers me.
    And I will use myself as an example again. If for whatever 
reason I became a target in this, I became somebody you didn't 
like--and I know that would be hard to believe, because you 
have got to like me--but let's say you didn't, or your company 
didn't. Or for whatever reason, I became an app target. That 
artificial intelligence algorithm could be shared or spread 
selectively to a targeted audience that--with negative 
information that maybe they--has been paired up with that 
knowledge and that app to make me look really, really bad. Or 
to the converse, the same thing could be done to make me look 
really, really good.
    Here is the problem. It is someone else or some artificial 
intelligence algorithm that has inordinate power to 
subjectively combine strategic data with strategic audiences to 
shape whatever thoughts and news they want. And I have equipped 
it, not even knowing it. And that process could apply to anyone 
or anything. There is the danger. It could be the President of 
the United States, it could be their kids, it could be a 
company, it could be a political party, it could be a news 
outlet. Anything could be targeted for that selective viral 
spread of just some information.
    Mr. Chew, this may be genius, but that doesn't make it 
fair, it doesn't make it good, and it doesn't make it 
accountable. I wouldn't want my government to have that 
ability. I wouldn't want a company or a political party or my 
friend August here or my mother to have that capability. And I 
certainly don't want that to be accessible to anyone in China.
    Now, there is no question it has got immense value. And as 
proof that, you are here, because this hasn't been a fun day. I 
know that. It hasn't been a fun day for us, either.
    Artificial intelligence is difficult to manage once it is 
on autocruise control. And it is, as we have talked about, 
nearly impossible to wall off data. I know the idea, I know a 
little bit about databases, I know a little bit about 
corruption of those databases. It is very difficult to wall 
things off.
    And unfortunately, there is this thing called human nature, 
where there's some dark components from time to time. There is 
always a temptation to monetize things or perhaps use some of 
these tools for nefarious purposes, and they can have 
absolutely devastating consequences.
    So, Mr. Chew, I am going to wrap up my comments and just 
say that this is so attractive. TikTok poses as a Mr. Rogers' 
Neighborhood, but it acts like Big Brother. And that has got to 
stop.
    Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Griffith. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. Oh----
    Mr. Griffith. Will the gentleman yield?
    Mr. Fulcher. The gentleman yields.
    Mrs. Rodgers. Yield to Mr. Morgan Griffith.
    Mr. Griffith. I thank the gentleman for yielding.
    Mr. Chew, earlier we had submitted into evidence the 
TikTok, ByteDance, and their ties to the Chinese Communist 
Party report that was filed as an exhibit last week with the 
Senate in Australia.
    If you have any comment, I would like to get it on this 
paragraph out of their summary: ``Our research confirms beyond 
any plausible doubt that TikTok is owned by ByteDance. 
ByteDance is a PRC company, and ByteDance is subject to all the 
influence, guidance, and de facto control to which the Chinese 
Communist Party now subjects all PRC technology companies. We 
show'`--in this report--``how the CCP and the PRC state 
agencies together'`--the party state--``have extended their 
ties into ByteDance to the point that the company can no longer 
be accurately described as a private enterprise.'`
    You keep calling it a private enterprise, but all the 
countries in the world are saying it is not a private 
enterprise, it is part of the Chinese Communist Party. What say 
you, sir? Yes or no, is it part of the Chinese Communist Party, 
as everybody thinks, or are you still living in some mystical 
world?
    Mr. Chew. I disagree with many conclusions----
    Mr. Griffith. So you are living in the mystical world.
    I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes Ms.--the lady--gentlelady from Minnesota, Ms. Craig, 
for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Craig. Well, thank you so much, Madam Chair, for 
yielding.
    Mr. Chew, I am probably like a lot of parents who are also 
Members of Congress out here. I know a number of us--when you 
testified earlier today, you mentioned that the over-35 segment 
was a growing group of potential users, as if over 35 is old. 
And I realize that my own children think that I am ancient, our 
four boys.
    But like a lot of us up here, we understand that there is 
some potential good. And of course, many of your influencers 
are doing what they are doing for all the right reasons. But 
one thing in your testimony you said a lot was ``safety.'` But 
as a mother and as a Member of Congress and as someone who is 
very concerned about drug use in our country, I was surprised 
that that didn't come up once in your testimony. No real 
reference to it here today. You know, I have raised my concerns 
in general about social media platforms serving as an illegal 
marketplace for drugs in prior Big Tech hearings. And I plan to 
continue that focus during today's hearing.
    Mr. Chew, a March 8th, 2023 article in the Washington Post 
detailed the fact that TikTok has made little progress in 
combating the sale of illegal drugs on your platform. In fact, 
Colorado Attorney General Phil Weiser said that getting drugs 
on platforms like yours was nearly as convenient as using a 
phone to order a pizza or call an Uber. That same article 
mentions that law enforcement agencies have been frustrated by 
TikTok's lack of competition in the form of data sharing.
    In my view, TikTok has taken little action in response to 
this crisis. According to a May 2022 blog post from TikTok, you 
donated $125,000 or 0.001 percent of your 2022 revenue to an 
antidrug effort on your platform in the form of ad credits. You 
also redirected #drugs, #fentanyl, and other obvious hashtags 
away from posts selling drugs to a community resources page, as 
if a teenager looking for drugs is going to look for them at 
#drugs.
    Drug dealers have easily worked their way around this, 
using emojis and slang to communicate that they have drugs for 
sale. To this day it is possible for anyone to log into your 
platform and acquire drugs, and the consequences of that can be 
fatal.
    What are you doing to move past these token efforts to 
prevent teenagers from accessing drugs on your platform?
    Look, as parents up here today we not--we may not 
understand everything about your platform. I am not a tech 
guru. Many of us up here may not use exactly the right 
language, but we know when our kids are at risk. And our kids 
are at risk on your platform. So what are you going to do to 
move past these previous token efforts?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, we do take illegal drugs content 
on our platform very seriously. It violates our guidelines. We 
proactively identify and remove them. And as you pointed out, 
if anybody searches for any drugs on our platform, we do point 
them to resources to help them with that.
    At the same time, we have also taken product changes. Like, 
for example, we don't allow our under-16 users to use the right 
messaging. And the reason is because, you know, we wanted to--
that was a trade-off here. And we believe that, you know, it 
will protect these younger users better from getting contacts 
from people trying to push illegal activity.
    So we will continue to work on it. Again, no company can be 
perfect at this. We are not saying we are----
    Ms. Craig. Mr. Chew, I--with all due respect, the ``no 
company can be perfect'` line has been used way too much today.
    I am going to reclaim my time. You know, clearly, in the 3-
plus hours you have been before us today, what you are saying 
about Project Texas just doesn't pass the smell test. My 
constituents are concerned that TikTok and the Chinese 
Communist Party are controlling their data and seeing our own 
vulnerabilities.
    If you are an American company, we could look at your 10-K, 
we could see who your shareholders are. The answer you provided 
earlier today, you would rather not tell us what your 
compensation is or how it is derived? Well, no American CEO 
would like to tell us that, but they have to because they are 
an American company. So what you are doing down in Texas, it is 
all well and good, but it is not enough for us to be convinced 
that our privacy is not at risk.
    So how can you say that you are protecting American users' 
privacy with the CCP being so heavily involved with ByteDance? 
It is not possible. China won't even carry your product. How is 
it that you can convince us that our privacy is not at risk 
and, more than that, our kids' privacy is not at risk in this 
country?
    Mr. Chew. In my opening statement----
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Ms. Craig. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady's time has expired. We are 
going to have to continue on. The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. 
Allen, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Allen. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, Mr. Chew, 
for being here today.
    In September 2021 the Wall Street Journal published an 
article titled ``How TikTok Serves Up Sex and Drug Videos to 
Minors.'` This article gives a chilling depiction of the types 
of content that TikTok's algorithm is curating for our 
children. This article claims that your application served an 
account that was registered as a 13-year-old ``videos about 
drug use'` referenced--it referenced to cocaine and meth 
addiction and promotional videos for online sales of drugs.
    The algorithm was also found to have delivered countless 
videos depicting ``pornography and other adult content'` to the 
device of an account that was registered as a 13-year-old.
    Could you please explain to the members of this committee 
and parents across the country why your company deems it 
acceptable for such inappropriate content to be prominently 
featured on a child's For You page?
    Mr. Chew. The--a lot of the content that you mentioned, 
Congressman, are violative of our own policies. And we don't 
think they are acceptable, and we remove them when we identify 
them. We take this very seriously. I mentioned this.
    This is an industrywide challenge. We are investing as much 
as we can. We don't think it represents the majority of the 
users' experience on TikTok, but it does happen. Some bad 
actors try and come in and post some of this content, and we 
are doing our best to invest as much as we can to remove them.
    Mr. Allen. Well, I would say you are not doing enough.
    I have 14 grandchildren, Mr. Chew. Do you personally 
believe that such content is appropriate for minor children to 
consume?
    Mr. Chew. A lot of the content that you mentioned, like 
porn, for example, is not allowed on our platform. So no, I do 
not think they are acceptable for young people to consume.
    Mr. Allen. Earlier this week, the Wall Street Journal 
published an article titled ``TikTok's Chinese Partner Has 
Another Wildly Popular App in the U.S.'` This app is called 
CapCut. It is a video editing tool to help users go viral on 
TikTok. While for obvious reasons most of our attention is 
focused on TikTok and ByteDance, other companies and their 
applications are also continuing to exploit the privacy of 
Americans. TikTok, CapCut, Lark, FaceU, all of these apps are 
also controlled by ByteDance and pose serious privacy concerns.
    In 2022, it was reported that TopBuzz, an international 
version of ByteDance-censored Chinese news app was used to 
spread pro-China messages to Americans. When it comes to the 
data privacy of Americans, we must have a clear set of 
guidelines to ensure Americans' data is protected and not 
passed along to unknown third-party actors who could pose a 
threat to our security.
    I urge my colleagues to continue to work together to pass a 
national data privacy bill, not just one out of the House 
Energy and Commerce Committee but also through the House of 
this Congress. It is the only systematic way we can address 
privacy concerns. Unfortunately, I have been given no reason to 
believe that TikTok does not pose a threat, and cannot be 
trusted to follow our laws when they conflict with the desires 
of the Chinese Communist Party.
    Your firewall that you are talking about, if you had a bad 
actor in your--what you call your Texas initiative--could get 
through that firewall and send any information that they wanted 
to send anywhere direct to the--into--directly to the Chinese 
Communist Party, would you deny that?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, this risk that you talk about exists 
for every company. Bad actors----
    Mr. Allen. I am talking about TikTok, sir.
    Mr. Chew. In fact, the risk is lower for us, because 
these----
    Mr. Allen. It is a risk, correct?
    Mr. Chew. The personnel will be vetted.
    Mr. Allen. Yes.
    Mr. Chew. So the risk is actually lower than most companies 
in the industry.
    Mr. Allen. Well, that is why we have to deal with your 
company.
    And with that, Madam Chair, I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The Chair 
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Peters, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Peters. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, thanks for being here today. You know, your 
testimony discusses an effort your company has named Project 
Texas and the investments your company has made in creating a 
firewall between the United States user data and entities in 
China susceptible to influence by China's government.
    And with your company's recent announcement by CFIUS--that 
CFIUS has instructed TikTok to separate itself from ByteDance 
or face a ban--TikTok's commitment to retaining this firewall 
is at a crossroads. So I want to ask you some questions about 
your company's long-term plans to ensure the safety and 
security of American data. And this, for me, is the crux of the 
concern for me about TikTok.
    First of all, does the Chinese Government need to approve 
Project Texas for TikTok to agree to it?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, we have designed Project Texas to 
move forward in the United States. This is something that we 
have described at length in the written testimony and in my 
opening statement: the firewall of American data stored on 
American soil by an American company overseen by American 
personnel. This is designed to move forward in the United 
States.
    Mr. Peters. But does the Chinese Government need to approve 
Project Texas for you to agree to it?
    Mr. Chew. We do not believe so.
    Mr. Peters. How is TikTok considering the future of Project 
Texas in the event of a sale or other ownership changes?
    Are there elements of the Project Texas that TikTok would 
change prior to, or----
    Mr. Chew. I cannot speak on this hypothetical or on, you 
know, on potential, you know, owners who would--I cannot 
represent.
    Mr. Peters. OK. You don't know.
    Mr. Chew. I don't know, yes.
    Mr. Peters. Despite Project Texas' planned positive 
changes, it does include several broad exceptions that would 
allow large amounts of U.S. user data to routinely leave the 
country. I want to know a little bit more about these 
exceptions so I can understand whether Project Texas can live 
to--up to its promise of protecting Americans' user data.
    I understand that, under Project Texas, business data and 
public data will be permitted to regularly leave the United 
States. Is that correct?
    Mr. Chew. Almost all the data is under the--that is not 
public is under the definition of protected data. This excepted 
data that you mentioned--I can get back to your team on this--
is really for interoperability purposes, to make sure that the 
business can still operate and American users are still getting 
the benefit----
    Mr. Peters. Can you tell us what data--what date--where the 
data goes, and how it is used by the company?
    Mr. Chew. It will travel outside of the United States, but 
I can get back to you on the specifics.
    Mr. Peters. OK.
    Mr. Chew. It is data that doesn't--it cannot be used to 
identify users, you know, so it really is data that ensures the 
interoperability of the platform.
    Mr. Peters. And I understand that. I think we would want to 
have some understanding of how we would distinguish that by 
definition, and then also how it would be enforced.
    Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on those specifics.
    Mr. Peters. How is the U.S. data used to promote certain 
content back in the United States market, for instance?
    Mr. Chew. I am sorry?
    Mr. Peters. So what--you have--U.S. data feed the--all 
right.
    How--can you discuss--when you discuss where the data goes 
and how it is used by the company, how and at what points of 
data transfer does the U.S. data feed the PRC-developed 
algorithm used by TikTok?
    How would the data that you are talking about----
    Mr. Chew. We--TikTok does not--is not available in mainland 
China.
    Mr. Peters. The PRC-developed algorithm used by TikTok, how 
does U.S. data get fed by that?
    Mr. Chew. The U.S.--the algorithm that leads to the U.S. 
app is in the Oracle Cloud infrastructure, and is trained by 
U.S. and global data. Again, TikTok does not--is not available 
in mainland China.
    Mr. Peters. How can we trust that these exceptions for 
Project Texas won't be used abused by China's government or by 
foreign adversaries?
    Mr. Chew. We can--we--this is the fourth commitment, 
transparency, third-party monitors, including the definitions 
of these exceptions. And, you know, we can be very transparent 
on how they are used.
    Mr. Peters. OK. I guess--I guess my question will be, 
then--and if you want to get back to me in writing, that is 
fine, but how we would distinguish between the data for 
interoperability that you suggest needs to be shared with what 
data wouldn't be shared?
    Mr. Chew. It is--again, you know, it is--first of all, 
public data is not part of the protected data definition, 
because public data is what users want to share globally. So if 
you post a video and you want someone in France to see it, just 
by definition it has to leave the United States. Otherwise, the 
world cannot see it.
    Now, there are certain aggregated and anonymized data sets 
that's useful for interoperability, for advertising, for 
example.
    Mr. Peters. Right.
    Mr. Chew. And that is part of what we are talking about.
    Mr. Peters. Right.
    Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on the specifics, but----
    Mr. Peters. I think we would also want to know how it is 
anonymized, and how--what oversight and enforcement we can 
count on.
    Mr. Chew. OK, I can get back to you on specifics.
    Mr. Peters. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from 
Texas, Mr. Pfluger, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, I got to hand it to you. You have actually done 
something that in the last 3 to 4 years has not happened, 
except for the exception of maybe Vladimir Putin: you have 
unified Republicans and Democrats. And if only for a day, we 
are actually unified because we have serious concerns.
    Do you--does TikTok support good? I mean, is TikTok a 
platform for good? Just yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. I believe, yes.
    Mr. Pfluger. OK. Does TikTok support freedom of speech?
    Mr. Chew. Yes. It is one of the commitments I have given 
this committee.
    Mr. Pfluger. Do you personally support the First Amendment?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am here to talk about----
    Mr. Pfluger. As the CEO of TikTok.
    Mr. Chew. I am here to talk about TikTok.
    Mr. Pfluger. As the CEO of TikTok, do you support the----
    Mr. Chew. TikTok supports freedom of----
    Mr. Pfluger. Thank you. Does TikTok support genocide?
    Mr. Chew. Again, Congressman, I am here to talk about 
TikTok.
    Mr. Pfluger. Does TikTok support genocide? Does TikTok----
    Mr. Chew. No, but----
    Mr. Pfluger. OK.
    Mr. Chew. But----
    Mr. Pfluger. So--reclaiming my time, I am going to go to a 
video now, and it is from Enes Kanter Freedom. And I would like 
you to see Enes Kanter Freedom, who has spent his entire career 
post-NBA fighting against human rights violations within the 
Chinese Communist Party.
    Go ahead and play this video, which highlights a situation 
that allegedly shows some human rights violations inside China. 
Please play.
    [Video shown.]
    Mr. Pfluger. Mr. Chew, this was a video that was posted on 
TikTok by Enes Kanter Freedom. Are you familiar with this 
basketball player?
    Mr. Chew. I am not familiar with the specifics of this----
    Mr. Pfluger. Are you----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. But I can tell you that----
    Mr. Pfluger. Are you familiar with the player Enes Kanter 
Freedom?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I am not----
    Mr. Pfluger. OK.
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Familiar with this. You have--you 
just have to open TikTok and just search for this kind of 
content.
    Mr. Pfluger. OK.
    Mr. Chew. It really exists.
    Mr. Pfluger. I have read the moderation policy. Let me just 
quote what--you have talked about content moderation. TikTok 
has a moderation policy. Yes?
    Mr. Chew. We do have community guidelines that----
    Mr. Pfluger. One of the guidelines says, ``material that in 
the sole judgment of TikTok is objectionable.'` Is this an 
example, banning Enes Kanter Freedom? Is that an example of 
objectionable material inside the Chinese Communist Party in 
mainland China?
    Mr. Chew. We do not take down content simply because it is 
critical of China.
    Mr. Pfluger. He was banned 1 week after this video.
    Mr. Chew. We do not do that. And I can check about the 
specific----
    Mr. Pfluger. If you need a note, go ahead.
    Mr. Chew. The note says he is not banned.
    Mr. Pfluger. His account was taken off 1 week after.
    Mr. Chew. Well, we can check on the specifics.
    Mr. Pfluger. We can check.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Pfluger. So let's get to some other questions. Thank 
you for the slide.
    Your privacy policy states that you collect a great array 
of data: keystroke patterns, app file names and types, 
sometimes approximate location, GPS location. Are keystroke 
patterns and rhythms part of TikTok gathering--the data that is 
gathered by TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. If you are talking, Congressman, specifically 
about keystrokes, you know, keystrokes, we do not engage in 
keystroke logging to monitor what the users say. It is to 
identify bots.
    Mr. Pfluger. OK.
    Mr. Chew. It is for security purposes. And this is a 
standard industry practice.
    Mr. Pfluger. You gather a lot of data, it is safe to say.
    Mr. Chew. We don't gather--we don't believe we gather more 
than any other social media company.
    Mr. Pfluger. TikTok gathers a lot of data, because your 
value proposition, as you sat in my office and told me, was to 
connect people to each other around the world. You told me this 
in my office. So you gather data on what they like and what 
they don't like, and then you show them things that they don't 
know they like, but eventually they may. You told me this.
    Mr. Chew. I think that is--I don't think that is what I 
said. What I said is that we connect people together, yes.
    Mr. Pfluger. Reclaiming----
    Mr. Chew. And that doesn't mean that we collect more data--
--
    Mr. Pfluger. Are you aware of any instances of TikTok 
distributing content from Chinese state media?
    Mr. Chew. I am sorry?
    Mr. Pfluger. Are you aware of any instances of TikTok 
distributing content from Chinese state media on the platform?
    Mr. Chew. We will label them clearly to--for our users to 
understand that.
    Mr. Pfluger. Do you disagree with FBI Director Wray and NSA 
Director Nakasone when they said that the CCP could have the 
capability to manipulate data and send it to the United States? 
Do you disagree with their statement?
    Mr. Chew. Their statement says ``could.'`
    Mr. Pfluger. So do you disagree with that?
    Mr. Chew. No, I don't disagree with that.
    Mr. Pfluger. OK. So it is possible that the CCP, under the 
auspices of ByteDance, which is your parent company, which you 
get paid from, has the ability to manipulate content that is 
being shared with 130 million Americans. Yes?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I just want to make sure I am 
understanding all these questions.
    I don't disagree with them, that there are data risks in 
general. That is what I meant.
    Mr. Pfluger. There is a big data risk, because----
    Mr. Chew. But on us, specifically----
    Mr. Pfluger. Are there engineers located inside mainland 
China that work on TikTok? Not Douyin, but TikTok.
    Mr. Chew. We are not the only company that has that.
    Mr. Pfluger. Are there engineers inside mainland China 
currently working on the algorithm for TikTok----
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, like I said----
    Mr. Pfluger [continuing]. As you told me in my office.
    Mr. Chew. There are other companies that--as I told you in 
your office, there are other companies that----
    Mr. Pfluger. I am going to reclaim my time.
    Please rename your project. Texas is not the appropriate 
name. We stand for freedom and transparency, and we don't want 
your project.
    I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The gentlelady 
from Tennessee is recognized for 5 minutes, Mrs. Harshbarger.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you, 
Mr. Chew, for being here today.
    Both President Trump and now President Biden have backed 
forcing TikTok to sell to an American company. However, the 
Chinese Communist Party has put export controls on algorithms 
ByteDance owns that power TikTok. And of course, this has 
created a gauntlet of regulatory hurdles in China and the U.S. 
that prevented the sale of TikTok.
    Now, as a longtime business owner, I want to tell you, Mr. 
Chew, that waiting until your hands are forced will only drive 
down the price of your app. And right now, both your hands are 
tied, and you are going to have to make a decision about 
whether you choose freedom from the CCP or you continue to be 
an agent of the CCP.
    And I will tell you why I say it that way. As a former 
member of Homeland Security, I point blank asked FBI Director 
Wray, ``Is TikTok a national security threat?'`
    And without hesitation, sir, he looked at me and said, 
``Yes, Congresswoman, it is.'`
    Now, how much data is ByteDance collecting through TikTok 
that is worth continuing to fight this regulatory gauntlet? You 
know, why not take the money and run, like any other company 
would do?
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, we built Project Texas in order to 
safeguard, and we listened to the concerns that have been 
raised, and we are building something that is unprecedented, 
that no other company is offering to protect U.S. user 
interests. And we believe it is rigorous and robust. And, you 
know, we are even offering third-party transparency and 
monitors to come in to verify this.
    Frankly, I haven't heard any good reason why this doesn't 
work. I have heard a lot of rhetoric around this, but I haven't 
heard a good reason why it doesn't work.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Well----
    Mr. Chew. I look forward to these conversations, by the 
way, with you.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Absolutely. Well, let me go down this 
road.
    When TikTok was unveiled to the public, its business model 
was solely based on generating revenue from advertising. Of 
course, ByteDance operated a separate app called Douyin for the 
Chinese marketplace. TikTok is embarking on becoming a so-
called super app. In other words, it is a one-stop shop with 
everything you do, as Representative Fulcher said.
    It is reported that TikTok's algorithms are so powerful 
that owner ByteDance has begun to license it to other 
companies. TikTok's recommendation engine drives usage on the 
platform, and this leads to promises of quick exposure and fame 
that leads to even more people joining. And when you sign up, 
TikTok starts collecting data about you, your location, your 
gender, your age, your facial data. The user never gets to the 
end of the content. And that is by design. And obviously, that 
makes you a lot of money.
    Now, I know that the Chinese Communist Party is preventing 
ByteDance from selling TikTok due to export restrictions on the 
technology. And this causes me to question how are you going to 
power TikTok with your Oracle servers located in the U.S. with 
that Texas Project with ByteDance technology, if it can't leave 
China? How is that going to happen? I just want you to explain 
how it is going to happen.
    Mr. Chew. Congresswoman, the way that we design this is so 
that any piece of software that is impactful to the code, that 
enters, you know, that--some technical details around this will 
be reviewed by a third party or a few third-party monitors, 
just to make sure that we are all comfortable with the code.
    I want to say this again: I don't know of any other company 
in my industry who is offering this level of transparency.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Well, why are there two different 
versions of apps, one in China and one in the United States?
    Mr. Chew. It is just a different business.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Well, I think we all know the reason that 
the Chinese get a different version, because ByteDance puts 
China first and America last.
    And, you know, TikTok has--with everything we have heard 
today, sir, when you see 13-year-olds, 16-year-olds, you see 
the degradation that is happening to our youth and our society, 
you know, it is deceptive, and it is destructive comment, and 
it is comments, and the worst thing is that it is deliberate, 
sir. And that is not acceptable.
    And with that, Chairwoman, I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady yields back. The gentlelady 
from Iowa, Mrs. Miller-Meeks, is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. Thank you, Madam Chair, and I would just 
like to thank our witness, Mr. Chew. Having been in the hot 
seat, so to speak, before, when I was in State Senate, I know 
how challenging this can be.
    And thank you for your demeanor throughout all of this. But 
certainly, as you can see, in a bipartisan way we have 
concerns, and those concerns are valid.
    And this is a yes-or-no question: Does TikTok track users' 
individual keystrokes?
    Mr. Chew. Only for security purposes, for--like, for 
example, like detecting bots. But we don't monitor what users 
say.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So the only purpose that you would 
monitor keystrokes is for security purposes.
    Mr. Chew. I can get back to you on more specifics, but this 
is not unlike what many other companies in the industry does.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So the keystroke monitoring does not go 
beyond what common industry practice in comparison to platforms 
like Facebook or Instagram use.
    Mr. Chew. Yes, I believe so.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. OK. And does TikTok keep records of 
users' credit cards and passwords?
    Mr. Chew. I am not aware of that. You don't need that to 
log in. Of course, I can get back to you on specifics if you 
make a transaction on an e-commerce platform.
    But regardless, all that U.S. data will be stored within 
the Project Texas firewall, you know, within the Oracle Cloud 
infrastructure, and overseen by American personnel.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. So you would store credit card and 
password information?
    Mr. Chew. I need to check on the specifics. We are 
launching a pilot e-commerce plan, and we are making sure that 
the data is very secure within the Oracle Cloud infrastructure.
    Mrs. Miller-Meeks. I think you have made a point of saying 
that your platform is not different than other platforms on 
social media and therefore are no more responsible than 
Facebook or Instagram or Twitter or the other social media 
platforms.
    The concern, however, comes with where the technology is 
generated and whom it is owned by. And in the case of other 
companies, it is generated in the U.S., under U.S. guidelines, 
under U.S. privacy laws with certain parameters, versus 
generated through a parent company, ByteDance, which, as we 
know, is susceptible to the laws of the Chinese Communist 
Party, which has access to all of that data and information.
    And I understand that TikTok has just reinstated Enes 
Kanter's account recently.
    So our concern, and the question I have for you, is why 
would China or the Chinese Communist Party be opposed to a 
forced sale of TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. I cannot speak on behalf of the Chinese 
Government.
    I can say that we designed Project Texas to take it forward 
here in the United States. And again, I believe it offers 
unprecedented protection for U.S. user data.
    Mrs. Harshbarger. Yes, I think the problem is when there is 
a lack of transparency, then that leads people to believe that 
there is something more nefarious, and that there is in fact 
data that is captured, is stored, and poses a risk not only to 
children in the United States, but also poses a risk to 
national security.
    With that, I yield the rest of my time to my colleague, Jay 
Obernolte.
    Mr. Obernolte. I thank the gentlelady from Iowa for 
yielding.
    Mr. Chew, I would like to continue our discussion about 
Project Texas and the technical details about what you are 
proposing to do. So you are migrating all storage of U.S. user 
data to the Oracle Cloud infrastructure, and you think that 
that will be done by the end of the year. Was that right?
    Mr. Chew. Again, I can get back to you on the technical 
parts of it, the migration. Today, by default, all U.S.--new 
U.S. data is stored, by default----
    Mr. Obernolte. Sir, I am just using what you have said in 
your testimony in your opening here. So----
    Mr. Chew. It is stored there by default. What I said in my 
testimony is I am deleting legacy data.
    Mr. Obernolte. I see, OK.
    Mr. Chew. This is Virginia and Singapore. That is the 
difference.
    Mr. Obernolte. So who--when this migration is complete, who 
will have access to that data?
    Mr. Chew. Right now a team called TikTok U.S. Data 
Security, led by American personnel, they have access to that. 
We have begun these operations already.
    Mr. Obernolte. OK, but the app itself has access to the 
data, correct?
    Mr. Chew. Only through them. Any employees that have the 
data----
    Mr. Obernolte. Oh, no. What I mean is, like, if I lose my 
iPhone and I reinstall the app, and I put in my username and 
password, my app will reconnect to the mothership and download 
some of that data, my settings----
    Mr. Chew. That is not the way it works, no.
    Mr. Obernolte. It is not?
    Mr. Chew. That is not the way it works. It will go through 
the Oracle Cloud infrastructure, and that team----
    Mr. Obernolte. No, no. Yes, I realize that. So let me ask 
you this: What would prevent them, someone with detailed 
technical knowledge of the way the app is constructed, from 
creating an almost identical version of the app that could also 
access that data?
    Mr. Chew. That is--we are giving you third-party monitors 
and transparency----
    Mr. Obernolte. Yes, but they are monitoring the source code 
for your app. I mean, ByteDance, these engineers, have been 
working on this app for years. What would prevent them from 
making an app that could also access that data?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I think we are going into the area 
where, you know, what if there is a hacker, what if there is 
this.
    Mr. Obernolte. OK.
    Mr. Chew. You know, this is a common industry problem, as 
you know.
    Mr. Obernolte. Yes. But, well, I mean, it is just--I see my 
time is expired. It illustrates the point----
    Mrs. Rodgers. OK----
    Mr. Obernolte [continuing]. I am just skeptical that you 
are technically able to do----
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Mr. Obernolte [continuing]. What you promised.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Mr. Chew, I recognize that we have run over. I appreciate 
your time. We have just a few Members left and would appreciate 
the chance for them to get to answer--or ask their 5 minutes' 
worth of questions.
    The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Griffith, is recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Griffith. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, you share legal counsel lawyers with ByteDance, 
yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, we do.
    Mr. Griffith. And you testified that you prepared 
extensively with your legal team for this hearing, yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. With my team in DC, including the----
    Mr. Griffith. Including some of your legal counsel.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Griffith. Right. And did they tell you about the report 
to the Australian Senate of March 14th that I referenced 
earlier? Did they tell you that that report was out there? Yes 
or no.
    Mr. Chew. I cannot recall how I found out about the report.
    Mr. Griffith. But you know about the report. OK.
    Mr. Chew. I can check, and--yes.
    Mr. Griffith. And did they tell you to favorably cite the 
Citizens Lab in your written testimony today, yes or no?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I need to get back to you on 
specifics----
    Mr. Griffith. They helped you with the preparation of your 
written statement, though, didn't they?
    Mr. Chew. A team prepares, yes.
    Mr. Griffith. Yes. And did they tell you that the director 
of Citizen Labs says he has called out your company for 
misrepresenting their report repeatedly, and has--and did so as 
late as yesterday? Did they tell you about that? Yes or no.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, the Citizen Lab is saying they 
cannot prove a negative, which is what I have been trying to do 
for the last 4 hours.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. But you cited it favorably as 
saying that it did positive things for you.
    That being said, let me ask you this. You keep talking 
about transparency, but you haven't been transparent with us 
here today. You were asked earlier by Mr. Hudson if you own 
stock in ByteDance. You said you didn't want to reveal that. 
Well, we are trying to figure out what the ties are between 
ByteDance and TikTok. I am not going to ask you how many shares 
you own, but do you own shares in ByteDance, sir?
    Mr. Chew. Yes, I do.
    Mr. Griffith. All right. There you go. How about in TikTok?
    Mr. Chew. Right now all employees own shares in one----
    Mr. Griffith. Yes, sure. I expected that. I just don't 
understand why you didn't tell Mr. Hudson that, and were 
transparent earlier. Instead, you made us drag it out of you.
    All right. Now let's talk about the kids. You told several 
of our folks that there was a 60-minute deadline. You also told 
us that, if you were under the age of 18, you couldn't access 
the live section, the live option. So I texted my 17-year-old 
and my 15-year-old, and I basically got scoffs back--scoffs--
when I said, ``Are you all limited to 60 minutes?'`
    My older son said, ``Well, there is a notice I get from 
time to time that says I shouldn't be on more than 60 minutes, 
but it never has kicked me off.'`
    And my younger son said, ``Oh, I am on as long as I want to 
be.'`
    So I am just informing you whoever told you, particularly 
if it was your legal team, that that is not accurate, that they 
are on for more than 60 minutes, and they can access the live 
section. I believe it was Mr. Carter that you said they 
couldn't, under 18, access the live--you know, being on the 
live section. He has done it. So whatever it is you think you 
are doing, it ain't getting done.
    Now, let's talk about the law for a minute. You share a 
legal team, but you keep talking about how you got a firewall 
between you and ByteDance. You can't have an effective firewall 
under the United States interpretation of such if you are 
sharing legal counsel, because anything that you say to your 
legal counsel, they can share internally. If you have got the 
same lawyers--now, maybe you have two different teams of 
lawyers in the law firm, but that is not what you said to us 
today. You said you share lawyers. There is no firewall, 
legally. I am just telling you.
    So if you want to clean it up and be transparent, you need 
to do something about that. Wouldn't you agree, yes or no----
    Mr. Chew. Congressman----
    Mr. Griffith [continuing]. That you need to do something 
about that?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I----
    Mr. Griffith. You will look into it.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Griffith. You will look into it. You have been looking 
into it all the time.
    All right. You told Dr. Burgess, when asked if your 
employees--if your employees who were members of the Chinese 
Communist Party had access to TikTok data from the U.S., you 
said you didn't know who was a member of the Communist Party. 
But then Congressman--to Congressman Walberg you said that the 
CEO of TikTok was not a member of the Communist--the Chinese 
Communist Party. And to Congressman Kelly you said the founder 
of TikTok was not a member of the Communist Chinese Party.
    Sir, either you know who is and isn't a member of the 
Chinese Communist Party or you don't. Which one is it? I submit 
that you know, and you just aren't giving us the straight 
story. Clearly you know, but you denied that to Dr. Burgess.
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, I can ask one or two people, but we 
have no policy to ask all the employees. I can ask one or two 
people, but I--you know, who are in----
    Mr. Griffith. But it is reasonable to assume that, with a 
significant number of members of the country of China being 
members of the Chinese Communist Party, logic would tell us--
you are a logical man, I assume--logic would tell us that there 
are a fair number of your employees who are members of the 
Chinese Communist Party, at least a dozen or so, who have 
access to this data. Isn't that so?
    Mr. Chew. Again, like I said, I can ask one or two people. 
We don't have a policy to ask everybody.
    Mr. Griffith. I said earlier you are living in some kind of 
a cloud world, because either you know or you don't know.
    I yield back. Thank you, ma'am.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman from South Carolina the Chair 
recognizes for 5 minutes, Mr. Duncan.
    Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Madam Chair. I think it has been 
revealed today there is not a degree of separation between 
ByteDance and TikTok.
    I would like to enter in the record a Heritage Foundation 
document, ``TikTok Generation: a CCP Official in Every 
Pocket.'`
    Mrs. Rodgers. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
    Mr. Duncan. And I would like to yield the balance of my 
time to Kelly Armstrong from North Dakota.
    Mr. Armstrong. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Mr. Chew, the TikTok Privacy Policy details extensive data 
collection on users. One line states that ``we may collect 
information about you from other publicly available sources.'` 
What publicly available data is TikTok collecting and adding to 
the profiles of users?
    Mr. Chew. It will be publicly available, but I can get back 
to you on specifics.
    Mr. Armstrong. OK. What is the purpose of obtaining even 
more data on your users beyond the data collected from the 
platform?
    Mr. Chew. We collect data--we want to give our users, by 
the way, a lot of transparency on what data we collect. We give 
them choices on the controls of their own privacy settings, and 
it really is to serve them a better experience. This is the 
reason why so many people love the app. It is a great 
experience.
    Mr. Armstrong. So how does the non-TikTok-related data 
service relate to the service provided?
    Mr. Chew. I need to check the specifics and understand the 
question, and get back to you.
    Mr. Armstrong. OK. Do you think the average TikTok user 
knows that you are--and understands that TikTok's data 
collection extends to information outside the use of the app?
    Mr. Chew. We do give transparent information on this. And 
like I said, we--I--we don't--I don't believe we collect more 
information than most other social media platforms out there.
    Mr. Armstrong. Well, and the reason I ask this--because I 
am going to go back into the corporate structure. You described 
that TikTok is a subsidiary of ByteDance. Mr. Griffith just 
said that you guys share the same lawyers. You have stated that 
your direct report is the CEO of ByteDance. But you have also 
stated that, at certain levels, TikTok operates without direct 
daily control from ByteDance. You have used content moderation 
as an example for that.
    TikTok's privacy policy states that you may share user data 
within your corporate group. Does that corporate group include 
ByteDance?
    Mr. Chew. If you are talking about that one entity that has 
the share for the--for Chinese media licensing purposes, I 
think it is called Beijing Douyin Services. If you are talking 
about that entity, of the government share, the answer is, you 
know, we have cut off, you know, all access of U.S. data sets 
to that.
    Mr. Armstrong. So----
    Mr. Chew. Employees of the entity.
    Mr. Armstrong. But your user privacy--so your corporate--
ByteDance is part of your corporate group.
    Mr. Chew. ByteDance is the top company.
    Mr. Armstrong. So----
    Mr. Chew. So, yes, you are talking about the other entities 
within the group.
    Mr. Armstrong. So you just testified that you firewalled 
this. Does that statement--so you are saying the TikTok's 
executives you--that operate independently of ByteDance, but 
does that statement not hold for sharing of access to data?
    Mr. Chew. Well, I was talking about that one entity that 
has--that many of you have raised some concerns, you know. That 
is the entity that I am talking about, the entity with the 
Chinese Government's investment that has--that is for the 
purpose of Chinese Internet licensing for the Chinese 
business----
    Mr. Armstrong. Let me ask it a different way: What other 
entities have access to TikTok user data?
    Mr. Chew. Well, after Project Texas, we are going to move 
it so that only TikTok user data security has controlled access 
of that data.
    Mr. Armstrong. OK. So--and we could bring you back either--
and after Project Texas is done. But right now, what other 
entities have access to TikTok's user data today?
    Mr. Chew. Only by requirement. It is really only by 
requirement. Certain employees may use--may need--require some 
access of data to help build the product.
    But for U.S., you know, we have moved it from Project 
Texas, and by the end of this year it will be firewalled away.
    Mr. Armstrong. But this is your privacy policy today. Like, 
I understand what you are telling us, what is potentially going 
to happen in the future. I have concerns again about CFIUS and 
government involvement, private organization, all of that. I am 
just saying this is your user agreement today.
    So your user agreement says that you share access with your 
corporate group.
    Mr. Chew. You know----
    Mr. Armstrong. You are telling me what is going to happen 
whenever Project Texas gets done. I am asking you today. Who 
has access to TikTok's user data?
    Mr. Chew. In our user agreement, Congressman, in our 
privacy policy, we also added a link so that our users in the 
U.S. can be informed about Project Texas. The link is there.
    Mr. Armstrong. So the link is there to private--but--I 
understand what you are trying to do moving forward. I have my 
own concerns about that. But we are sitting here today in a 
hearing, and your privacy policy is different than your 
testimony. Your privacy policy specifically says that you can 
share user data within your corporate group.
    So you are saying, even though your privacy policy says 
that, you are not doing it?
    Mr. Chew. Like I said, no, I don't think there is any 
contradiction here. Like I said, Project Texas, when it is 
done, we firewall off that data. We still have some legacy data 
in Virginia and Singapore that we started deleting, and we will 
be done by the end of this year.
    Mr. Armstrong. So at the end of this year, then you won't 
share it. Does that mean you are sharing it today?
    Mr. Chew. I don't believe so, but there is some----
    Mr. Armstrong. Then why haven't you changed your privacy 
policy? Why haven't you updated it?
    Mr. Chew. We did update it, and we gave our users more 
information on Project Texas. We did update it.
    [Pause.]
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back. The gentleman from 
Texas the Chair recognizes for 5 minutes, Mr. Crenshaw.
    Mr. Crenshaw. Thank you, Madam Chair.
    Thank you, Mr. Chew, for bringing Republicans and Democrats 
together. I appreciate that.
    I want to get right to the critical point of concern. So 
TikTok is able to collect massive amounts of personal data. We 
all know that. That means it could, if it desired to, use this 
data to influence narratives and trends, create misinformation 
campaigns, encourage self-destructive behavior, purposefully 
allow drug cartels to communicate freely and organize human and 
drug trafficking.
    Now, to be fair, all social media companies could do that. 
But here is the difference. It is only TikTok that is 
controlled by the Chinese Communist Party. All these other 
social media companies are not. Mr. Chew, do you agree that 
TikTok is controlled by the CCP?
    Mr. Chew. No.
    Mr. Crenshaw. OK, I thought you would say that. I disagree, 
as you thought I might say.
    Here is why I disagree: Your parent company is ByteDance, 
right?
    Mr. Chew. That is correct.
    Mr. Crenshaw. It is correct. So, many of the workers who 
work at ByteDance are Communist Party members, right?
    Mr. Chew. I wouldn't know.
    Mr. Crenshaw. Well, I think, for example, the chief editor 
at ByteDance, Zhang Fuping, is the Communist Party's secretary. 
Correct?
    Mr. Chew. He works on the Chinese business, not on TikTok.
    Mr. Crenshaw. Right. He works for ByteDance, the parent 
company.
    Mr. Chew. He works on the Chinese business.
    Mr. Crenshaw. Right, the parent company of TikTok.
    Mr. Chew. The Chinese business is called Douyin.
    Mr. Crenshaw. Yes, but it is all associated with ByteDance, 
right?
    Mr. Chew. So ByteDance owns a number of businesses.
    Mr. Crenshaw. Right. You all report to ByteDance. Everybody 
is part of ByteDance. OK? And do you know of any other 
employees that work for ByteDance that are part of the Chinese 
Communist Party?
    Mr. Chew. Like I said, you know, there are--ByteDance has--
owns Chinese businesses, and they operate in China.
    Mr. Crenshaw. You don't know how many, but you acknowledge 
many must be card-carrying members of the CCP, right?
    Mr. Chew. In the Chinese business, yes.
    Mr. Crenshaw. Yes. I mean, the CCP holds a--what is called 
a golden share in ByteDance that allows the CCP to control one 
board seat in ByteDance. That is public----
    Mr. Chew. That is not correct.
    Mr. Crenshaw. It is not correct?
    Mr. Chew. No, it is----
    Mr. Crenshaw. It is publicly reported. They admitted to it.
    Mr. Chew. It is--on our website we have updated it, so we 
have--can give people more transparent information on this.
    They have a share in a subsidiary that is only for the 
Chinese business. It has nothing to do with TikTok, and it is 
for the purposes of content licensing in China.
    Mr. Crenshaw. So there is not an internal CCP committee, 
which is a regular thing that happens in China, they have a CCP 
committee internally inside the company.
    Mr. Chew. I run TikTok. I cannot represent the Chinese 
business.
    Mr. Crenshaw. ByteDance, I am talking about ByteDance. No 
arrangement in ByteDance?
    Mr. Chew. Again----
    Mr. Crenshaw. Here is the main point of concern. China's 
2017 national intelligence law states very clearly that ``any 
organization or citizen shall support, assist, and cooperate 
with state intelligence work in accordance with the law, and 
maintain the secrecy of all knowledge of state intelligence 
work.'`
    In other words, ByteDance, and also your TikTok employees 
that live in China, they must cooperate with Chinese 
intelligence whenever they are called upon. And if they are 
called upon, they are bound to secrecy. That would include you. 
So, Mr. Chew, if the CCP tells ByteDance to turn over all data 
that TikTok has collected inside the U.S., even within Project 
Texas, do they have to do so, according to Chinese law?
    Mr. Chew. Congressman, first, I am Singaporean.
    Mr. Crenshaw. That is fine. But there are employees of 
yours, and ByteDance is in China.
    Mr. Chew. We understand this concern. In my opening 
statement we said we hear these concerns. We didn't try to 
avoid them or, you know, trivialize them. We built something 
where we take that data and put it out of reach. This is what 
we did. We put it out of reach.
    Mr. Crenshaw. Out of reach. But they own you.
    Mr. Chew. No, we put it out of reach by storing them----
    Mr. Crenshaw. ByteDance owns TikTok. If ByteDance is--and 
the CCP owns ByteDance, because the CCP owns everybody in 
China.
    Mr. Chew. Well----
    Mr. Crenshaw. And so, by law, they can make them do 
whatever they want, and they say that, by law, you can't tell 
anyone about it. So they can make you hand over that data. Is 
that correct?
    Mr. Chew. That data is stored here, in American soil, by an 
American company----
    Mr. Crenshaw. Well, you say that. We----
    Mr. Chew [continuing]. Overseen by American----
    Mr. Crenshaw. We thought that, but leaked audio from 80 
internal TikTok meetings shows that U.S. user data has been 
repeatedly accessed from China when you said it hasn't been.
    And here is the other thing. Following back on my 
colleague's line of questioning, in your own privacy policy it 
says that you may share information within your so-called 
corporate group. Is ByteDance part of that corporate group?
    Mr. Chew. If you are talking about the share of the entity 
with the share, like I shared with the previous----
    Mr. Crenshaw. Is ByteDance part of the corporate group?
    Mr. Chew. ByteDance is a holding company. It is part of the 
corporate group, yes.
    Mr. Crenshaw. It is part of the corporate group.
    Mr. Chew. Yes.
    Mr. Crenshaw. OK. So your own privacy policy says you have 
to share data with ByteDance. And if the CCP says, ``Hey, 
ByteDance, you are going to do what we say, and you can't tell 
anyone about it'' because by law, according to that 2017 
national intelligence law, they have to do it, that is our 
concern.
    Mr. Chew. This----
    Mr. Crenshaw. Maybe you haven't done it yet, but my point 
is that you might have to. And that is where our concerns come 
from.
    I mean, over 300 TikTok employees have worked for China's 
state-run propaganda media. That is just from looking at their 
LinkedIn profiles. OK?
    So here--and my last point is this. I want to say this to 
all the teenagers out there and TikTok influencers who think we 
are just old and out of touch and don't know what we are 
talking about, trying to take away your favorite app. You may 
not care that your data is being accessed now, but it will be 
one day when you do care about it.
    And here is the real problem: With data comes power. They 
can choose what you see and how you see it. They can make you 
believe things that are not true. They can encourage you to 
engage in behavior that will destroy your life. Even if it is 
not happening yet, it could in the future.
    The long-term goal of the Chinese Communist Party is the 
demise of the American power, and that starts with our youth. 
At any moment they could demand that all of TikTok's data be 
used to design an AI algorithm with the sole purpose of 
promoting Chinese interests and destroying our society from 
within. You want to know why that is Democrat--why that is--why 
Democrats and Republicans have come together on this? That is 
why we are so concerned.
    Thank you, and I yield back.
    Mrs. Rodgers. The gentleman yields back.
    I remind the Members they have 10 business days to submit 
questions for the record, and I ask our witness to respond to 
the questions promptly.
    Pursuant to committee rules, I ask unanimous consent to 
enter the documents from the staff list into the record.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information appears at the conclusion of the hearing.]
    Mrs. Rodgers. Members should submit their questions by the 
close of business on April 6th.
    Without objection, the committee is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:23 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
    [Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                 [all]