[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                                     

                         [H.A.S.C. No. 118-31]

                                HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING

                                   ON

           FISCAL YEAR 2024 NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             APRIL 26, 2023
                             
                             


                                     
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 





          U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 53-742           WASHINGTON : 2024


                                     
  


                    SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

                    DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Chairman

JOE WILSON, South Carolina           SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DON BACON, Nebraska                  RO KHANNA, California
JIM BANKS, Indiana                   CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              MARC VEASEY, Texas

               Whitney Verett, Professional Staff Member
                Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
                  Zachary Calderon, Research Assistant
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Strategic Forces...............................     1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces.......................     3

                               WITNESSES

Calvelli, Hon. Frank, Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 
  Space Acquisitions and Integration, U.S. Air Force.............     7
Plumb, Hon. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space 
  Policy, U.S. Department of Defense.............................     5
Scolese, Christopher J., Director, National Reconnaissance Office     8
Wilkerson, Tonya P., Deputy Director, National Geospatial-
  Intelligence Agency............................................    10

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Calvelli, Hon. Frank.........................................    39
    Plumb, Hon. John F...........................................    25
    Scolese, Christopher J.......................................    48
    Wilkerson, Tonya P...........................................    54

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Carbajal.................................................    63
    Ms. Stefanik.................................................    63
    Mr. Strong...................................................    64
    
    .
           FISCAL YEAR 2024 NATIONAL SECURITY SPACE PROGRAMS

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                          Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
                         Washington, DC, Wednesday, April 26, 2023.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 2:21 p.m., in 
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
      COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Lamborn. Today's hearing will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the Chair be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time. Without objection, so ordered.
    I would like to welcome the witnesses to today's hearing.
    We have Dr. John Plumb, the Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Space Policy, back before the subcommittee.
    John, I think you win the award for the most appearances 
this year. So, you should get a T-shirt for that. I testified 
at all these hearings and all I got was this lousy T-shirt, or 
something like that.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Next, we have Mr. Frank Calvelli, the 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisitions and 
Integration, in his first appearance before this subcommittee.
    We also have Dr. Christopher Scolese, the Director of the 
National Reconnaissance Office; and also, Ms. Tonya Wilkerson, 
the Deputy Director of the National Geospatial-Intelligence 
Agency.
    Welcome back to all of you. Thank you for joining us. Thank 
you for your service to our Nation.
    So, we are here to discuss one of the favorite topics of 
this subcommittee, national security space.
    I was encouraged to hear General Saltzman say just last 
week at Space Symposium in my home district of Colorado Springs 
that, quote, ``The old ways of doing business are too slow, too 
late to need, and too behind the times to meet the challenges 
we are facing today.'' Unquote. And I could not agree more.
    Those of us on this subcommittee know better than most that 
space is vital to how we fight and win wars. Both China and 
Russia have seen the advantage we have built in space over the 
last few decades to enable the joint force. In response, they 
are now developing and deploying asymmetric counterspace 
systems meant to neutralize our advantage.
    China also sees the benefits of space for its own 
deployment of forces. It continues to develop and field its own 
systems to support its long-range fire and standoff 
capabilities.
    These threats are well-known by this point. Discussions 
about the democratization of space by space-faring nations have 
become more commonplace in the last 5 years. The result is more 
systems and more people operating in a domain that was only 
accessible by superpowers until very recently.
    Today, I would like to hear what you all are doing to 
address the problem that General Saltzman identified. All of us 
on the subcommittee are interested in how you are changing the 
way you do business--going faster and becoming more innovative.
    The commercial space sector is setting the pace on putting 
inventive technologies on orbit. I would like to hear from all 
of you how you are leveraging these developments in government 
programs, how you evaluate what is useful to buy versus build, 
and how you are coordinating with each other to maximize your 
efforts. Specifically, I am interested in hearing how space 
acquisition organizations are working with small business 
partners--small businesses as partners in these efforts.
    Dr. Plumb, one area that you and I have talked about often 
is how the overclassification of space contributes to 
inefficiencies and slower processes. Two years ago, we asked 
your office to report back after looking at highly classified 
space programs to see what, if anything, could be reclassified. 
We are still waiting for that report.
    Meanwhile, classification of space is a pervasive problem. 
I believe it is impeding the Department's progress on space; 
specifically, making it more challenging to collaborate with 
our allies and partners.
    I am also interested to get your thoughts on the current 
state of space policy within the Department of Defense. There 
has not been an unclassified national security space policy 
document released since 2020, despite a requirement from 
Congress to produce one. I think you will agree that a lot has 
changed in those 3 years and public discourse is essential to 
getting our space policy right.
    Mr. Calvelli, we recently received a report from you that 
identified the five highest and lowest performing major 
acquisition programs in the Space Force. Unfortunately, it 
doesn't look like much has changed in this report. The lowest 
performing programs are all ground systems led by the perennial 
underperformer, the Operational Control System, or OCX.
    It has been said [so] many times at this point that it is 
now a cliche, but ground systems always seem to be the 
afterthought when it comes to space acquisitions. Ground 
systems are the nuts and bolts, the bread and butter, that make 
our exquisite satellite capabilities function. We cannot have 
one without the other.
    Today I would like to hear your specific plan to get 
programs like OCX back on track and into the hands of the 
force. I would also like to hear about the policies you have 
implemented to make sure that we won't continue to see these 
problems on future ground acquisitions.
    And I'm also interested in hearing from the whole panel how 
the Department of Defense and the intelligence community are 
collaborating on systems and operations to support the joint 
force. As we come to terms with what it means for space to be a 
warfighting domain, we are going to continue to bump up against 
the line between defense and intelligence authorities. We must 
make sure that good collaboration continues, while also 
allowing the Space Force to mature into its role as a service.
    There are many topics for us to cover today. I have gone 
past my time. So, I will leave it there and turn it over to my 
ranking member for any remarks that he would like to make.

     STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES

    Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I would like to associate myself with your remarks, 
both about the topic at hand and about Mr. Plumb. Most of us 
around here believe in that constitutional stipulation that you 
are supposed to be elected to spend so much time in the House 
of Representatives, but we are grateful for your presence and 
your service.
    I will try to move quickly through my remarks because they 
are going to sound very similar to the chairman's.
    But thank you all very much, this entire panel of 
witnesses, for being here.
    Across the jurisdiction of the subcommittee, our national 
security space architecture is one that, in my opinion, has 
experienced the most significant transformation over the past 
several years. And this transformation has been necessary to 
respond to the rapid pace at which our adversaries are 
developing, deploying, and demonstrating capabilities in space 
and on Earth to deny, degrade, and destroy U.S. satellites.
    In the just the past 2 years, the People's Republic of 
China [PRC] has almost doubled their number of satellites on 
orbit to 400, with plans for nearly a thousand by 2030. And 
they include capabilities with inherently offensive 
applications.
    Both the PRC and Russia are increasingly brazen in 
displaying their space warfighting capabilities, whether it be 
the PRC ``grappler,'' which demonstrated the ability to drag a 
satellite out of its orbit; last year's incredibly destructive 
and debris-producing Russian anti-satellite test; or the 
multiple occasions where DOD [Department of Defense] and 
commercial satellites have been jammed during the war in 
Ukraine.
    Broadly, the PRC is putting in place the capability and 
capacity in space, and on the ground, to hold U.S. assets at 
risk. Given what we know about PRC ambitions with regards to 
Taiwan, many experts believe that their first move in a 
conflict would happen in space.
    In response to this growing threat, I'm encouraged that 
this administration has taken seriously the need to move away 
from the status quo and transition to a more robust and 
resilient U.S. national security space architecture. This means 
shifting from several exquisite ``big juicy targets'' in 
geosynchronous Earth orbit, or GEO, to many smaller, more 
commercially available satellites in low Earth orbit, or LEO.
    For the NRO [National Reconnaissance Office] over the next 
decade, this budget request continues efforts to more than 
quadruple the number of satellites currently on orbit. This is 
a sharp departure from the attitude of the Department just a 
few years ago. Despite repeated warnings, the Space Force was 
modernizing the existing space-based missile-warning 
constellation by simply replacing the large, exquisite, 
unprotected satellites in the GEO orbit. Over the course of 3 
years, the development price tag for next-gen OPIR [Overhead 
Persistent Infrared] ballooned to $14.4 billion with 
significant delays.
    But, in 2021, Space Force pivoted to a proliferated 
missile-warning architecture. The U.S. Space Force and the 
Space Development Agency, less than 3 years after contract 
award, just launched its first set of demonstration satellites 
to prove out the proliferated warfighting architecture in LEO, 
which will also provide data transport and missile track 
capabilities. DOD will be able to expand and improve capability 
every 2 years, as soon as this technology is available, rather 
than waiting for the standard 10-year acquisition cycle that 
has plagued the space community in the past.
    In addition to these encouraging steps forward on 
acquisition, the space community is making strides on the 
adoption of commercial data and services. From expanding 
commercial imagery required to meet National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency requirements for the combatant commanders, 
or the great strides Space Systems Command has made to purchase 
commercial satellite communications and space domain awareness 
data, this adoption of commercial space has allowed DOD to 
focus on inherently military needs and stay ahead of our 
adversaries in the domain.
    We have also made significant progress in the past several 
years with our incredible network of allies and partners. In 
addition to the work being done to share space domain awareness 
and adversary space capabilities, the DOD Space Policy guidance 
released last August explicitly directs that our space 
cooperation with allies and partners include policy, strategy, 
capabilities, information sharing, and operations.
    The administration's announcement that it would not conduct 
destructive, debris-producing, direct-ascent anti-satellite 
testing has opened the door to 12 other nations committing to 
do the same. The U.S. must continue to lead by example in 
establishing norms of behavior for the responsible use and 
operations within the space domain.
    Now, I'm increasingly encouraged by the direction of our 
space program as a whole, but there are some areas we will 
continue to watch closely. In addition to the pattern of large 
satellite programs being late and over budget, the ground 
system architecture still frequently comes as an afterthought. 
And the chairman mentioned this already.
    Another area we will continue our oversight is in the 
overclassification of space, another thing the chairman 
mentioned, which inhibits both our ability to advocate for 
increasing investment and expanding collaborations with our 
allies and partners.
    Space is a fascinating and infinite domain. Until recently, 
we really only experienced it through the lens of science 
fiction. But in reality, space has been a part of our daily 
lives as Americans since the dawn of the space race, and our 
adversaries are keenly aware of that.
    Our warfighters everywhere--on the ground, under the sea, 
and in the air--depend on space. But so do people all around 
the world--from Americans driving to work or checking the 
weather to Ukrainians valiantly fighting the unprovoked 
invasion by the Russians.
    The global dependence on space often means relying on 
American satellites. We must keep them secure--not only against 
the threat we see today, but what we will face in the years and 
decades to come.
    I look forward to today's discussion with our witnesses on 
how to best maintain U.S. superiority in space, and how this 
year's President's budget request does that.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Lamborn. All right. Our first witness will be the 
Honorable Dr. John Plumb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for 
Space Policy with the Department of Defense.
    The floor is yours.

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 
          FOR SPACE POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn; thank you, Ranking 
Member Moulton, members of the committee.
    Thanks for inviting me to testify today on the Department's 
national security space programs. I'm honored to appear with my 
colleagues, Assistant Secretary Calvelli, Director Chris 
Scolese, and Deputy Director Tonya Wilkerson.
    Space plays a critical role in our Nation's security, in 
our prosperity, in our way of life. For the Department of 
Defense, space is essential to how we compete and fight in 
every domain. It provides us with the missile warning and 
missile tracking critical to defending our homeland. It 
provides position, navigation, and timing to strike targets 
with precision, and it provides communication in austere 
environments to support global command and control. To put it 
simply, space-based missions are essential to the U.S. way of 
war.
    But our competitors understand this. They are fielding and 
developing increasingly complex capabilities to deny space 
missions to the U.S. joint force. In just the last few years, 
the quantity and quality of counterspace threats has increased 
significantly.
    China has already fielded ground-based counterspace 
weapons, including direct-ascent ASAT [anti-satellite weapons] 
missiles, and it continues to seek new methods to hold our 
satellites at risk. China is building a space architecture that 
enables its military to execute long-range precision strikes. 
China, ultimately, seeks to challenge our ability to conduct 
joint operations in the Indo-Pacific.
    Russia is developing, testing, and fielding its own 
counterspace systems, including ground-based and space-based 
kinetic anti-satellite weapons. These are aimed at degrading 
and denying U.S. space-based services.
    President Biden's $33.3 billion space budget for fiscal 
year 2024 invests in the capabilities necessary to meet these 
challenges. This investment reflects an increase of roughly 15 
percent from fiscal year 2023.
    The President's budget request will accelerate our 
transition to resilient-by-design architectures. It will 
enhance our ability to fight through disruption. It will invest 
heavily in research, development, testing, and experimentation. 
And it will further integrate space-based services across the 
joint force.
    The budget request includes nearly $5 billion for missile 
warning and missile track, including $2.3 billion for new 
proliferated resilient architectures and $2.6 billion for Next 
Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared.
    It has $1.3 billion for position, navigation, and timing, 
including development of the Next Generation Operational 
Control System for GPS [Global Positioning System]. There is $3 
billion for 15 launch vehicles and range upgrades, and there is 
$4.7 billion for protected and jam-resistant satellite 
communications, and this includes the Space Development 
Agency's space data transport layer. And the budget request 
also includes additional investments in ground user equipment, 
science and technology research, and classified programs.
    Now, my office remains laser-focused on three priorities: 
space control, space cooperation, and space classification.
    On space control, the Department will protect and defend 
our national security interests from the growing scope and 
scale of space and counterspace threats. And we will, of 
course, protect and defend our service men and women in harm's 
way from space-enabled threats.
    For space cooperation, we are investing in relationships 
with allies, with partners, and with commercial space. These 
partnerships are an enduring strength and an asymmetric 
advantage our competitors can never hope to match.
    And for space classification, the Department is working at 
the highest levels to remove barriers to sharing information 
with our allies and to strengthen and streamline our ability to 
communicate across the U.S. Government. And I will just note 
both the chairman's and the ranking member's strong interest in 
their opening statements in this issue as well.
    Our competitors have watched us, they have learned from us, 
they have stolen from us, and they have developed capabilities 
to hold us at risk. But they are not ready for us. They are not 
ready for us today, and with congressional support for the 
national security space investments in the President's fiscal 
year 2024 budget request, they will not be ready for us 
tomorrow.
    So, thank you to the committee for your tireless dedication 
to the Department and U.S. national security, and I look 
forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Plumb can be found in the 
Appendix on page 25.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    We will, next, hear from the Honorable Frank Calvelli, 
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisitions and 
Integration.
    The floor is yours.

 STATEMENT OF HON. FRANK CALVELLI, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE 
  AIR FORCE FOR SPACE ACQUISITIONS AND INTEGRATION, U.S. AIR 
                             FORCE

    Mr. Calvelli. Thank you. Good afternoon, everyone.
    We continue to face an unprecedented strategic competitor 
in China, and our space environment continues to become more 
congested and contested. To address these challenges, we are 
fundamentally transforming our space architecture to be more 
resilient, proliferated, and integrated to meet warfighter 
requirements and to counter the growing threats.
    Today, I would like to discuss the architecture changes 
that we are making, capabilities that we are delivering, and 
how we are overseeing and managing the space acquisition 
enterprise.
    We are moving away from those big, juicy targets--highly 
capable systems, but very vulnerable in small numbers--to 
smaller proliferated resilient systems across multiple mission 
areas. For example, we are pivoting from the legacy missile 
warnings architecture to a proliferated resilient architecture 
that adds capability to actually track missile threats.
    We are adding new capabilities to our space domain 
awareness architecture to focus on deterring and defending 
against attempts to negate our critical space capabilities.
    We are fundamentally transforming our military satellite 
communications and data transport architecture through 
disaggregation, proliferation, capacity expansion, partnership 
with allies and with commercial, which will enhance our ability 
to fight in contested and degraded operational environments.
    We are also collaborating with the intelligence community 
to design, develop, deploy, and operate a proliferated space-
based ground moving target indication system.
    Overall, these architecture changes help transform our 
space architecture to be more resilient, integrated, and 
provide new capabilities for our warfighters.
    Over the past 15 months, we continued to deliver new 
critical capabilities. The Space Systems Command delivered last 
year into operations two new Geosynchronous Space Situational 
Awareness Program satellites, a new Space Based Infrared 
missile warning satellite which completes the SBIRS [Space 
Based Infrared System] architecture, and a new GPS III 
satellite which achieved operational acceptance in just 12 days 
after launch.
    The Space Rapid Capabilities Office delivered their first 
set of missions to orbit, including two prototype enhanced 
situational awareness sensors and one new cryptographic 
payload.
    And the Space Development Agency delivered their first 10 
satellites to orbit last month, which included 2 tracking and 8 
data transport satellites. This was accomplished in less than 3 
years from contract award to launch.
    And the Department launched nine national security space 
launch missions, providing critical capability across the 
Nation.
    On launch, the next National Security Space Launch phase 
III procurement starts in FY 2025; pursues a dual-lane, hybrid 
contracting approach to maximize competition, and use of the 
Nation's robust commercial launch industry, as we transition to 
more proliferated architectures.
    Fiscal year 2024 also marks the first time the Space Force 
has specifically budgeted for Tactically Responsive Space, and 
we acknowledge responsive space as an emerging need and thank 
Congress for your leadership in this mission area.
    As the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space 
Acquisition and Integration, I am focused on adding speed to 
our acquisitions and delivering our programs on cost and 
schedule. I recognize that I inherited several troubled 
programs that are behind schedule and overrun on cost. I am 
paying close attention to those programs.
    Overall, I am proactively managing the space acquisition 
enterprise through weekly status reports, biweekly tag-ups with 
my portfolio leads, and detailed quarterly program reviews. 
These reviews enable me to ensure all our programs remain 
focused on delivering capabilities to the warfighters on cost 
and on schedule.
    In October of 2022, I issued strategic acquisition guidance 
to the workforce outlining nine space acquisition tenets. You 
will be happy to see that one of those tenets is deliver ground 
systems before launch. These tenets form the basis of a new 
direction for space acquisition and emphasize speed and program 
management discipline, while addressing the fundamental issues 
that slow up space acquisition.
    I am committed to using all the tools and authorities 
Congress has provided to help speed up space acquisition. This 
includes use of section 804 middle tier of acquisition, use of 
other transactional authorities, and use of the Space 
Acquisition Council to ensure collaboration and integration, 
while avoiding duplication of effort across the entire national 
security space enterprise.
    In summary, in recognition of the evolving threats, the 
Department is transforming its space architecture to be more 
resilient, more integrated, and more capable. We continue to 
deliver critical capabilities in its operations for our 
warfighters. We are focused on adding speed to our space 
acquisitions and proactively overseeing and managing space 
acquisition portfolios.
    Thank you to the committee for all your support, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Calvelli can be found in the 
Appendix on page 39.]
    Mr. Lamborn. And thank you for your testimony.
    We will now hear from Dr. Christopher Scolese, Director of 
the National Reconnaissance Office.
    The floor is yours.

    STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. SCOLESE, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
                     RECONNAISSANCE OFFICE

    Dr. Scolese. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member 
Moulton, and members of the committee.
    It is a pleasure to appear before you today with my 
colleagues John Plumb, Frank Calvelli, and Tonya Wilkerson, and 
to represent the dedicated workforce of the National 
Reconnaissance Office.
    Thanks to the support of Congress, the NRO is creating the 
most capable, diverse, and resilient overhead intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance constellation in our history. 
We are building capabilities to solve the Nation's hardest 
intelligence challenges. We use cutting-edge technologies, both 
in space and on the ground, to deliver more information faster 
than ever before.
    Our capabilities provide vital intelligence that can only 
be obtained from space. This includes geolocations and real-
time situational awareness for our warfighters, high-resolution 
imagery that helps intelligence analysts make informed 
decisions, and support that aids humanitarian responses to 
natural disasters.
    All of this helps make America and the world beyond 
stronger and safer. We are building innovation, agility, and 
resilience into everything we do. This ensures we can answer 
the toughest intelligence questions of today and tomorrow.
    We are designing and delivering systems that can perform 
multiple types of intelligence missions and quickly pivot among 
them, whether the needs are traditional analytical support; 
military requirements for crises, like the events in Ukraine; 
or for humanitarian efforts.
    Demonstration systems are proving concepts, reducing time 
for deployment of operational systems, and enabling us to fill 
key intelligence gaps more quickly.
    All of this requires a skilled and dedicated workforce. I'm 
proud to say that our team of military, DOD, and IC 
[intelligence community] civilians truly lives up to our motto: 
Above and Beyond.
    We continue to attract great people from the CIA [Central 
Intelligence Agency] and military, and with a cadre that is now 
a little more than 6 years old, we just had our best recruiting 
year and continue to attract outstanding interns, many of whom 
come to the NRO. This ensures we have a pipeline of talent and 
skills necessary to maintain our advantage.
    The qualities I just described--innovation, agility, and 
resilience--are integral to our ability to stay ahead of our 
competitors. Our competitors are developing weapons to destroy 
or interfere with our satellites, as has been mentioned. To 
stay ahead of the competition and ensure we continue to operate 
in a heightened threat environment, we are modernizing our 
architecture on the space and ground. With the strong support 
of Congress over the last several years, we are improving 
capabilities, becoming faster, more agile, and more resilient.
    These investments are already paying off. I'm happy to 
report that just in the last year we have fielded over five new 
systems demonstrating innovative capabilities, improved 
utilization of data, and upgraded our ground infrastructure--
with even more to come this year.
    The NRO is building and delivering a diversified 
proliferated architecture that includes large and small 
satellites, both government and commercial, in multiple orbits. 
In the next few years, we will grow from dozens of systems on 
orbit to hundreds. This will enable us to spend more time over 
a given area, minimize the time between observations, and offer 
more capability and a higher degree of resilience.
    We are pushing boundaries and we are thinking differently. 
We are using automation and tools to speed the delivery of 
data.
    We know we can't solve today's most difficult challenges on 
our own. We depend in our partnerships. The most critical of 
those is the U.S. Space Force. Our partnership continues to 
grow stronger as we expand our interactions and deliver on 
capabilities.
    Two examples of the numerous joint efforts between the 
Space Force and NRO are the ground moving target indication, as 
Mr. Calvelli mentioned, and the Silent Barker System. GMTI 
[Ground Moving Target Indicator] will track ground and maritime 
targets for the warfighter, day or night, in all kinds of 
weather, in the very near future. Silent Barker will provide 
situational awareness in space. We will be launching later this 
summer.
    Our partnerships with allies continue to expand and provide 
increased capabilities that allow us to share information, 
provide multiple launch locations, and increase the exchange of 
data and technologies.
    The NRO is leveraging the power of U.S. space industry, 
both traditional and emerging. From commercial data and launch 
to commodity spacecraft, industry is helping us create the 
architectures we are building today.
    NRO initiatives, like the Strategic Commercial Enhancements 
Framework and the Director's Innovation Initiative, allow us to 
explore new and emerging capabilities and technologies with a 
wide range of industry, big and small. At the same time, we are 
ensuring the quality of materials and the integrity of the 
supply chain are not compromised in the name of speed.
    For more than 60 years, the NRO has developed tools and 
technologies to bring the farthest reaches of the planet to our 
grasp. We are using the vantage point to find answers to some 
of the Nation's most important national security questions. Mr. 
Chairman, what was a vision a few years ago is quickly becoming 
a reality.
    Thank you for having me today. I look forward to the 
committee's questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Scolese can be found in the 
Appendix on page 48.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    And before we have our fourth and final witness, I just 
want to remind everybody that, as soon as we are done with one 
round of questions, we will recess and go upstairs to the SCIF 
[sensitive compartmented information facility] on the third 
floor and have a closed session.
    Now we will hear from Tonya Wilkerson, Deputy Director of 
the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency.

  STATEMENT OF TONYA P. WILKERSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
                 GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    Ms. Wilkerson. Good afternoon, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking 
Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the subcommittee.
    The National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency [NGA] is the 
leader in timely, accurate, and actionable geospatial 
intelligence [GEOINT] that provides a decisive advantage to 
warfighters, policymakers, and first responders.
    GEOINT goes beyond telling you what, where, and when 
something is happening. It also reveals how it is happening, 
why it matters, and what is likely to happen next.
    Our principal focus is advancing GEOINT capabilities to 
fulfill our role as both a combat support agency and a member 
of the intelligence community. NGA's GEOINT professionals work 
across more than 120 locations at home and abroad. We have 
support teams embedded with U.S. Government agencies, combatant 
commands, service intelligence centers, and most service 
operational centers--for targeting and to allow them to 
navigate safely around the globe every day.
    NGA has well-defined responsibilities for aeronautical and 
maritime safety of navigation, but we are still working to 
evolve the foundation GEOINT role as it applies to the space 
domain.
    Just as NGA's predecessor agencies mapped the moon ahead of 
the Apollo missions, today we are working with NASA to develop 
the lunar geodetic system that will be the coordinate framework 
for accurate and safe movement on the moon.
    We partner with the U.S. Space Force and U.S. Space Command 
to ensure GEOINT fully supports strategic intelligence 
assessments of adversary space and counterspace threats and 
activities. Our presence assists with collection management and 
allows us to team on future architecture requirements and 
career development and training of GEOINT-capable guardians.
    We have seen a dramatic increase in demand for space-
related GEOINT, and NGA is increasing our focus on cutting-edge 
analysis of our adversaries' space-related equipment and 
activities on Earth and in space.
    This is reflected in our new motto: ``Know the World, Show 
the Way . . . from Seabed to Space.'' This revision 
acknowledges that our changing world requires a steadfast 
effort across every domain, including evolving areas that 
require both exquisite tradecraft and our dedicated attention.
    In addition to producing GEOINT analysis on adversary 
capabilities, NGA's foundational physical modeling of our 
planet directly supports the DOD by ensuring the precision and 
accuracy of GPS and maintaining the WGS-84 reference frame. 
These are the backbone for the geolocation our forces require 
for targeting and to allow them to navigate and operate safety 
around the globe.
    As the volume of GEOINT data expands with the proliferation 
of collection systems and expansion into the space domain, the 
transfer of Project Maven to NGA will play an essential role to 
future military operations. Artificial intelligence and machine 
learning are capable of quickly fusing enormous amounts of data 
from across disparate data sets and provide meaningful answers.
    NGA will further automate significant portions of dynamic 
collection, imagery exploitation, and reporting workflows to 
rapidly exploit data and anticipate activity.
    NGA continues to grow and evolve its space intelligence 
mission through people, partnerships, and capabilities to meet 
current and future partner needs. We will continue to have a 
vested interest in the space domain, as much of our overall 
GEOINT mission is enabled by data from space systems.
    Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Wilkerson can be found in 
the Appendix on page 54.]
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    We will now have questions from the members of the 
subcommittee. I will go ahead and jump in first.
    Dr. Plumb, your office owes us several reports. There are 
four I am specifically interested in on reclassification, space 
policy review, a strategy on the protection of satellites, and 
a report on opportunities for collaboration between United 
States and Israel on space. When can we expect to get these 
reports?
    Dr. Plumb. Thanks, Chairman Lamborn. I will just address a 
couple at a time here.
    So, first of all, aware and tracking of the reports that we 
owe you, sir, and we are working on them.
    1602 and 1611--1602 is the unclassified protect and defend 
strategy you've requested, and 1611 is the unclassified space 
policy review. Working on a comprehensive answer to both of 
those. There is obviously more equities than just my office in 
all of these. So, that should be out for coordination soon in 
the building. So, I hope to get that to you in the next few 
months.
    The 1609 on the Space Force capabilities and 
classification, we might better save that for the classified 
session, but we are working hard on it, and I'm working with 
your team on this. But, as you know, there is a SAP [Special 
Access Program] reform effort, and I have been loath to get 
ahead of that.
    And then, on the U.S. and Israel space cooperation piece, 
aware of that and I will make sure we dig into that.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    Dr. Plumb. Thanks, sir.
    Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Calvelli, I am encouraged by many 
innovative acquisition approaches I have seen the Space Force 
taking, but I am concerned that Space Systems Command [SSC] 
seems to be using old approaches that do not serve a fast-paced 
acquisition model.
    Mr. Moulton and I are planning to visit SSC on Monday in 
Los Angeles, where I expect we will hear more details about 
this, but what changes have you implemented to speed up the 
acquisition process out of SSC?
    Mr. Calvelli. I think you are going to be very impressed 
when you visit SSC. They are doing an outstanding job. They 
have really stepped up their game.
    For example, if I look at the MEO [medium Earth orbit] 
missile-warning/missile-tracking capability that they are 
providing, it is an outstanding effort building SmallSats in 
medium Earth orbit. They have done some really great work on 
some ground systems, if you can believe that. They have done 
some really outstanding work in terms of where they are heading 
with GPS and how that program is progressing.
    And so, they have taken to the nine tenets that I put out 
back in October. They are looking at going smaller with their 
systems. They are looking at going faster. They understand the 
direction we want to head in.
    And I'm really proud of the team out that way. So, I hope 
you enjoy your trip out that way and see the great work that 
they are doing.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
    And also, Mr. Calvelli, I am concerned about the 
incorporation of small businesses in space acquisitions. My 
district in Colorado Springs, for instance, is home to scores 
of small businesses who are pursuing many innovative space 
technologies. And I know that other members of the subcommittee 
also represent these types of small businesses.
    Can you share with the committee initiatives you have put 
in place to increase the participation of small businesses in 
space acquisition programs within your purview?
    Mr. Calvelli. Yes. So, I think the whole approach about 
building smaller and trying to get systems in place between, 
you know, less than 3 years from contract award to launch is 
really going to be a key to taking advantage of small business.
    Right now, today, when we build a 7-year--it takes 7 years 
to build a satellite, and then we build the second block, and 
it takes another 7 years to get there. You are talking 12 to 14 
years for technology refresh. If we are launching new systems 
and developing them in less than 3 years and launching them 
every 2 years, you are talking about significant opportunity 
for technology refresh and opportunity to on-ramp new and 
innovative technologies. So, that is really, fundamentally, my 
approach of getting at that.
    Mr. Lamborn. That is exciting. That is great to hear.
    And finally, for all members of the panel--and we will 
start with Ms. Wilkerson and go down in this direction--as we 
mature the concept of space as a warfighting domain, how are 
you thinking about the difference between intelligence and 
Department of Defense operational missions? Where do you draw 
that line?
    Ms. Wilkerson. So, thank you for the question, sir.
    As a combat support agency and a member of the intelligence 
community, we are very well-informed of the national 
intelligence priorities, as well as the priorities of the 
warfighters. And so, we try to ensure that we are addressing 
the needs of both of our user sets.
    Dr. Scolese. And a very similar answer. We principally 
provide capability, as you know, from space. And our 
requirements generally cover both the military needs and the 
intelligence community needs, and oftentimes we see that they 
overlap very significantly. So, we work very closely with the 
Department and the IC to make sure that our requirements 
satisfy their needs.
    Mr. Lamborn. And if you can say so in this setting--if not, 
we will hold off until we are in classified setting--but that 
overlap, does that create friction at times or is there a great 
collaboration instead of friction?
    Dr. Scolese. We can talk more in the other session, but I 
would say that there is great collaboration. I mentioned Silent 
Barker just a little bit earlier. That is a very tight 
collaboration that is going to launch this year that is going 
to allow us to greatly improve our space domain awareness.
    GMTI, as Mr. Calvelli and I mentioned, we have had that 
capability, but we know we have to expand it. We need to work 
together in order to make that truly what the warfighter needs.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. And quickly, Mr. Calvelli and Dr. Plumb.
    Mr. Calvelli. Yes. So, I have seen absolutely no 
duplication of effort. And what I have seen is just a great 
partnership, and the DOD relies every day on the great stuff 
that Chris and his team build. So, it is a great partnership 
out there between the IC and DOD.
    Mr. Lamborn. Great.
    Dr. Plumb. And, sir, I would just echo that and say I don't 
think it has ever been stronger, the cooperation/collaboration 
between DOD and IC. And I think this is a perfect example of 
how much more we can unlock with that type of relationship.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you all for what you do and for 
being here today.
    Representative Moulton.
    Mr. Moulton. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    And I'm going to defer most of my questions to the 
classified session, but just a couple of things.
    Ms. Wilkerson, beginning with you, your agency has provided 
great support for the war in Ukraine. And everyone wants to 
know, what are the lessons that we are learning from this. If 
you had to just pick one lesson that you, specifically, in your 
work have taken from the war in Ukraine, what would it be?
    Ms. Wilkerson. Thank you for the question, sir.
    I think the one take-away would be the critical importance 
of partnerships, not only partnerships across the U.S. 
Government, but across our allies as well, and to be able to 
continue to meet user needs with respect to ensuring that we 
are doing so at speed and scale.
    Mr. Moulton. Well, that is the perfect answer to segue into 
my next question for Dr. Plumb.
    You have talked about the overclassification of space. I 
know this is something you have been working on. How do you see 
this affecting our relationships with allies and partners and 
our ability to collaborate on space projects?
    Dr. Plumb. So, thank you, Ranking Member. I would say a 
couple of things.
    One, working with allies and partners is absolutely 
essential in this security environment. And on space, in 
particular, the inability to share some classified information 
with highly capable allies is slowing us down, and we are 
working on it.
    But I don't want that to be misconstrued. We do share 
classified information with allies. The question is, can we 
share more, especially for operationally relevant speeds to be 
able to do combined space operations?
    Mr. Moulton. Great.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Now, we will hear questions from Mr. 
Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Plumb, can you talk just for a moment about what is 
going on with spectrum and with international organizations? 
And do we have a strategy to deny our adversaries necessary 
spectrum, as it gets increasingly crowded up there? And 
conversely, do we have a strategy to protect spectrum that we 
may need and don't want to find ourselves, 5-10 years from now, 
with the PRC, for example, sitting in a key space?
    Dr. Plumb. So, sir, I can't--let me just answer the part 
that I'm partially responsible for, if that is all right. So, 
the----
    Mr. Waltz. And I should have asked probably, does the 
interagency? And you would have a key part of it, and that's my 
concern----
    Dr. Plumb. If I could just lay flat, the main concern of 
DOD at this moment is the issue of the 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz 
portion of the spectrum, the S band. That, we have an agreement 
between the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Commerce 
to conduct a study as to whether this portion of the spectrum 
can be shared. The Department relies heavily across all of our 
forces on that spectrum to communicate and fight and to defend 
the United States.
    And so, the question is, can it be shared? The question is 
not, can it be vacated and can we move somewhere else? I have 
testified at prior hearings that that would be extraordinarily 
costly and it would take decades just to get back to where we 
are now.
    And it is also not a question of, can we partially vacate, 
by which I mean give up some portion of the spectrum. The 
question is, can it be shared in a way that we can do our 
mission and protect the homeland, and then, allow commercial 
entities to also work in that space.
    Mr. Waltz. I think I'm trying to get the Department and 
some others to think more broadly, is we are increasingly--and 
I think rightly--interoperable with commercial, and then, we 
see our adversaries, through a number of means, taking key 
spectrum in the commercial space, I think my concern is the 
Department and interagency is, like, hey that is a commercial 
issue. But we could find ourselves at a real disadvantage. Does 
that make sense?
    Dr. Plumb. It does. I do think, you know, the Department is 
focused on use of spectrum. You know, the nearest one we are 
focused on is, again, 3.1 to 3.45, but there are portions that 
folks all across this table rely on just for the space piece 
only. And I think your point is well taken that we need to be 
looking further down, further in the future, to make sure we 
are also protecting the next thing that might come under.
    Mr. Waltz. I think our adversaries certainly are. 
Separately, can you talk to--I know there are some efforts 
underway--I have talked to General Thompson a good bit about 
it, and I have raised this before in terms of modeling a CRAF 
for space, a civil reserve [air] fleet. I understand there was 
just a--can you just talk to the Department's efforts along 
those lines, and when you think you would have something you 
can come back to the committee with?
    I think it is incredibly important, as we look at 
resiliency, redundancy, and to really have these agreements in 
place now, should we ever need them in a time of emergency.
    Dr. Plumb. So, first of all, fully agree; we need to be 
able to access our commercial space partners and their capacity 
and bandwidth. Maybe something like a CRAF agreement, if not 
exactly that.
    I will say that the Secretary and Deputy Secretary have 
charged all of us to work on that, and different components 
are--you know, SSC is working on it. Director Scolese is 
working on it. I'm kind of working on it from a policy, overall 
arching piece.
    I would say, as to when we could get back to you with a 
coherent story, I mean, we could provide where we are now, but 
I would say, you know, I would say in summer we could probably 
provide a much more fulsome response as to where we are in each 
of these pieces and how they are coming together.
    It is--we are all taken with it. It is very important, and 
I think this is the right time to make sure we are doing it.
    Mr. Waltz. Oh, great. That is good to hear. I think we are 
moving--we are moving in the right direction.
    Just in the time I have remaining, our adversaries have 
clearly militarized space. I mean, let's look at the PRC's new 
space station and who is manning that. Do we need to rethink 
kind of our own protocols? Do we need to man--do we need to 
have manned applications and platforms, both on the moon and in 
low Earth orbit, with a U.S. military application and 
capability?
    Dr. Plumb. I haven't considered the concept of actually--
you know, if you are asking me do I have to have people in 
orbit to defend orbit, I don't think that is correct. I think 
what we need to make sure is that we have the right ability--
and we have the Space Force working hard on this--to protect 
and defend our own systems, both in space and protect and 
defend our troops on the ground from space-enabled threats. And 
we are working hard on both of those.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    We will now have questions from Representative Vasquez.
    Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Thank you to all the witnesses for taking the time to speak 
with us today.
    As you are well aware, space is an increasingly important 
domain for national security. Nowhere is that more understood 
than in my home district in my home State of New Mexico.
    In my district, White Sands Missile Range is currently 
testing and developing the Deep Space Advanced Radar 
Capability, or the DARC, program. This impressive radar 
technology detects objects with extreme precision, which allows 
our operators to have adequate time to maneuver satellites away 
from debris before potential collision and give them the 
ability to identify potential civil and military satellites 
that may pose threats to our national security.
    This question is for Dr. Plumb. How does White Sands 
Missile Range testing and development of the DARC program 
support our national security efforts in space?
    Dr. Plumb. Sir, the DARC program is very important, as you 
just pointed out. I think the ability to have good space domain 
awareness, including through radar capabilities, is essential 
to be able to do safe navigation, track orbit. And that applies 
not just for national security missions, but, really, for all, 
all space missions.
    Mr. Vasquez. Great. And, Dr. Plumb, do you think it would 
be a priority of the Department of Defense to continue R&D 
[research and development] of the DARC program?
    Dr. Plumb. Generally, yes. I think we make sure that it 
works well and we continue R&D. I don't know if Mr. Calvelli 
might have something to add on that since that is----
    Mr. Vasquez. Sure, Mr. Calvelli, go ahead.
    Mr. Calvelli. Yes. Thanks. Thanks for the help from the 
folks from your great organization, the folks out of WSMR 
[White Sands Missile Range].
    We proved out the concept that DARC can actually work.
    Mr. Vasquez. Sure.
    Mr. Calvelli. And thanks to great work by Johns Hopkins and 
APL [Applied Physics Laboratory], and those folks who developed 
the prototype. And because of that, we are building the 
systems.
    Mr. Vasquez. Great.
    Mr. Calvelli. We are going to deploy them globally, and it 
is going to be something we really, really critically need to 
keep track of objects at GEO. So, thanks to the folks at WSMR 
for helping us out with that.
    Mr. Vasquez. Absolutely. And I'm so happy to hear that. 
Because we want to make sure that we are continuing to fund 
cutting-edge, both space exploration and national security 
tools, at places like White Sands Missile Range, and in 
conjunction with some of our partners at Holloman Air Force 
Base and at Kirtland Air Force Base.
    Not only is New Mexico an essential part of testing and 
developing these types of technologies, but we play an integral 
role in manufacturing key physical space infrastructure. Now, 
for example, New Mexico is one of only two domestic providers 
of space-qualified satellite solar cells. This industry employs 
hundreds of folks in New Mexico, many in the Albuquerque area, 
including in my district, who make this mission possible. Now, 
these good-paying, highly skilled jobs have contributed to over 
1,000 satellites that are currently in orbit.
    I have always said, if we can design it in New Mexico and 
test it in New Mexico, we should be able to build it in New 
Mexico. And through our work on this committee, I want to 
ensure that we will continue to be key contributors to 
supporting satellite-based space missions for years to come.
    Dr. Plumb and Secretary Calvelli, what is the state of our 
current satellite production capabilities for both military and 
commercial use?
    Mr. Calvelli. You know, so far, it seems pretty good. I 
mean, the Nation experienced an economic boom in terms of the 
commercial space, and that has been something that we have been 
able to leverage, especially in the standpoint of satellite 
busses and being able to buy busses off production lines and 
add payloads to them, and get them launched quickly, like we 
just did with a Space Development Agency system. So, so far, 
from what I have seen, sir, the environment is pretty good.
    Mr. Vasquez. Great.
    Dr. Plumb.
    Dr. Plumb. I think I will just add, I fully take your point 
on the solar cell manufacturing and the difference between 
solar cells for space-qualified and ground, and the importance 
of being able to do that at scale.
    Mr. Vasquez. Thank you, Dr. Plumb.
    It is incredibly important that we have these domestic and 
very robust satellite production capabilities. And in our home 
State in New Mexico, and in our district, I think we are very 
interested in continuing to produce those.
    So, thank you for your responses today.
    I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. 
Chairman.
    Mr. Lamborn. And thank you.
    Representative Wilson.
    Mr. Wilson. And thank you very much, Chairman Lamborn and 
Ranking Member Seth Moulton, for putting together this 
bipartisan hearing.
    You can see we want you to succeed. And so, with that in 
mind, Secretary Plumb, the Secretary, the senior Department of 
Defense officials, and Defense Intelligence Agency officials 
have developed the Challenges to Security in Space 2022 report. 
And it points to a rapid rise of the adversary counterspace 
capabilities, especially for China and Russia.
    We have seen demonstrations of these capabilities, 
including China's ability to move a defunct satellite and 
Russia's destruction of a satellite in November 2021. What is 
the DOD's assessment of China's and Russia's ability and intent 
to operationalize such capabilities, should a direct conflict 
arise? And what is DOD's assessment of the current requirement 
and response options, if China and Russia operationalize such 
capabilities? To what extent has the conflict and the invasion 
of Ukraine by war criminal Putin impacted Russian development?
    Dr. Plumb. Thank you, Congressman.
    Just in order, on the ability of Russia or China to 
operationalize these capabilities, I think, from a military 
mindset, once we see something tested, we have to assume it has 
some operational capability as well. So, I think that is just a 
standard, conservative form of planning, and that is what we 
do. We are a contingency planning department.
    On the DOD response options, I will just make clear--and 
this is not a new statement--but the Department reserves the 
right to respond at a time, place, and domain of our choosing, 
and that is across any domain--space, cyber, air, ground, land.
    And your third question on how the Ukraine conflict is 
affecting Russia's ability, you know, my assessment there would 
simply be that the sanctions have made it harder for Russia to 
get at some type of, you know, modern chip sets and equipment, 
and that has set them back some, as they try to find 
workarounds.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you.
    Again, every effort to match or meet or exceed opposition, 
please, we are, again, in bipartisan support.
    And, Dr. Scolese, our partnerships with allies continue to 
expand and help to provide increased capabilities and 
flexibility. During the ongoing invasion of Ukraine by war 
criminal Putin, we have been working together with NRO systems 
that have provided vital support to our European partners and 
allies in NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization].
    What has the NRO systems supporting our allies and partners 
in Europe against war criminal Putin? Are we leveraging and 
building relationships with our allies and partners in the 
Indo-Pacific area of operations with the ongoing threats of the 
Chinese Communist Party to Taiwan? And then, also, in the 
Middle East, what are we doing to recognize the regime in Iran, 
which still chants, ``death to Israel, death to America''?
    Dr. Scolese. Yes, sir, I can best answer that question in 
the next session, but at a broad level, we have very strong 
partnerships. We have learned a lot from Ukraine and how to 
work with our allies to both share information and share 
technologies to enhance our capabilities and to enhance their 
capabilities at the same time.
    And I would like to turn a little bit of this over to Ms. 
Wilkerson because we work directly through them, and that is 
where the direct support to the allies comes from. So, our 
systems provide the information and they deliver it.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you. Yes.
    Ms. Wilkerson. Thank you for the question.
    So, as I noted earlier, one of the key critical lessons 
learned through the crisis has been the importance of allies, 
sharing with our partners, and specifically, the allies.
    One of the other highlights that I would note is that the 
nature of commercial GEOINT, in particular, makes it especially 
valuable as an opportunity to be able to share and continue to 
strengthen the partnerships with our allies as well.
    Mr. Wilson. And an unintended consequence of war criminal 
Putin is that we are all--NATO is enhanced with Sweden and 
Finland. How incredible the resources of both of those 
countries that we should be working so closely with.
    So, I wish you well and best wishes for continued success.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    Now, we have questions from Representative Garamendi.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And for the witnesses, thank you. Very important 
information and much appreciated.
    My question goes to you, Ms. Wilkerson. The National 
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency has state-of-the-art equipment 
capable of providing time-critical information to firefighters. 
Needless to say, we have plenty of those throughout the entire 
Nation and, indeed, the world. But the access to such 
information should not be held financial hostage to other 
agencies. Yet, in fiscal years 2011 to 2018, FEMA [Federal 
Emergency Management Agency] paid nearly a million dollars, 
reimbursing the NGA for information. Money is not just the 
issue here; it is the time necessary to get the information.
    We have introduced legislation called the Military Support 
for Fighting Wildfires Act. It is cosponsored by Ms. Jacobs and 
Mr. Carbajal. We introduced it last year. We are going to do it 
again this year.
    It, basically, would require that the NGA make information 
readily available to our firefighters as they attempt to save 
our communities and our lives. Do you have a position on this 
issue, and can you explain to me how we can make this work?
    Ms. Wilkerson. Yes, sir. Thank you for the question.
    So, NGA is reimbursed only if another Federal Government 
agency, such as FEMA, designates NGA as a mission assigned. And 
it is in that instance that there would be a reimbursement. 
From an NGA perspective, we do not initiate reimbursement for 
mission support to any domestic crisis response.
    As it relates to wildfire disasters, we do have two 
programs that support, can support wildfire disasters, and we 
do operate those programs 24 by 7. And that support is not 
based in an event reaching a major disaster--is not based in an 
event reaching a major disaster classification. Our support is 
constant and it is not intended to incur any additional cost or 
manpower for wildfire support.
    Mr. Garamendi. I appreciate your answer. We do have an 
administrative complexity here to make sure that information is 
readily available on time 24/7. And I do know you do collect 
it; making it available sometimes gets to be a bureaucratic 
difficulty.
    So, we look forward to the legislation which clears all of 
that up.
    Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
    Okay. We have no other members to ask questions. So, we 
will take a 5-minute recess and convene in the SCIF at 2337, I 
believe is the room number, one floor up.
    Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 3:16 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             April 26, 2023

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             April 26, 2023

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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             April 26, 2023

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK

    Ms. Stefanik. Dr. Scolese, the NDAA 2023 clarified the National 
Reconnaissance Office and the Director of the National Geospatial-
Intelligence Agency, shall leverage to the extent possible domestic 
commercial geospatial-intelligence services and domestic commercial 
satellite imagery, and that domestic commercial services shall include 
companies operating in the U.S. that have active mitigation agreements 
pursuant to the National Industrial Security Program. In your upcoming 
competitions for commercial services, including the upcoming commercial 
radar layer imagery contract, will you confirm that the NRO will comply 
with this provision of law and allow all domestic commercial service 
providers as defined above to participate?
    Dr. Scolese. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARBAJAL
    Mr. Carbajal. I think we'd all agree that innovation has been a key 
contributor to our military's success. Today there's no shortage of 
innovation in our country, but it seems the department has struggled to 
leverage its full potential. The term ``valley of death'' is widely 
used to acknowledge the difficulty to transition cutting-edge 
technologies from concepts and demonstrations to programs of record. 
What do you see as key contributors to the ``valley of death'' in the 
area of space and how are you working to bridge the valley across Space 
Systems Command, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, and the Space 
Development Agency?
    Mr. Calvelli. One of the biggest contributors to the ``valley of 
death'' for space systems is the historically lengthy time from 
contract award to launch. Prolonged space system development timelines 
reduce the number of opportunities to bring new cutting-edge 
technologies into operational systems. It has commonly taken seven 
years to build and launch a satellite. That means we might have to wait 
that many years to incorporate promising new technology for a given 
mission, which is simply too long.
    My tenet of building smaller is intended to enable our acquisition 
organizations to develop and launch new systems faster. Moving faster 
inherently increases the frequency of opportunities to onramp new and 
innovative technologies from our research labs and industry, thereby 
helping to bridge the ``valley of death.'' Achieving my target of no 
more than three years from contract award to launch will substantially 
increase our ability to transition demonstrated technology into 
operational capabilities.
    To emphasize how my space acquisition tenets enable speed, I 
derived a simple formula for going fast in space acquisition, which 
includes: 1) Build smaller systems + 2) Use existing technology designs 
to minimize non-recurring engineering + 3) Drive contract scope to 3 
years or less from start to launch + 4) Use fixed-price contracts = 
Mission Capabilities Faster to Our Warfighters
    1Mr. Carbajal. Continuing the focus on innovation, many around the 
world watched SpaceX launch the most powerful rocket in human history . 
. . it concluded in a ``rapid unscheduled disassembly'' but was hailed 
as a massive success. SpaceX and others in the industry are leveraging 
an approach to go fast, accept failures, apply lessons learned, and 
keep going. In your testimony, you mentioned the need for rapid space 
acquisitions, and I agree with the need to pick up our pace. As 
industry has demonstrated, in order to move along faster, you have to 
accept some risk. Can you explain your approach to risk and provide 
examples where your approach has been implemented?
    Mr. Calvelli. I published the 9 Tenets and the Simple Formula memos 
for the Space Acquisition Workforce to emphasize what they need to do 
to be more agile and responsive. This is a culture change.
    By building smaller and on shorter timelines, we are able to take 
smart risks and plan in the potential for some failures along the way 
while also increasing the rate and capacity of capability delivery to 
our warfighters.
    We also need to share this risk with industry. Industry must be 
onboard with rapid contract delivery, fixed priced contracts, providing 
realistic bids, and bidding on contracts on which they have mission 
area experience.
    The U.S. Space Force's Space Development Agency approach to 
satellite acquisition has spread the risk by awarding tranches of 
satellites to different vendors for a proliferated constellation of 
low-Earth orbit satellites. They have capitalized on harnessing 
commercial development and shorter timeframes to enhance resiliency and 
add capabilities as the threat evolves.
    Mr. Carbajal. There's been a lot of focus on the amount we spend on 
the Department of Defense. Some are saying we need to curb our 
spending, while others talk about the rise of near-peer threats and a 
need to invest in our outdated systems from the cold war. Last 
September, the GAO published a report on the acquisition of commercial 
satellite imagery across the Intelligence Community and the Department 
of Defense. The report points to the possibility of the same image 
being purchased multiple times, which wouldn't be the best use of 
taxpayer dollars. How are you working together across the NGA andNRO to 
ensure DOD requirements are being met across the combatant commanders 
to minimize duplicative purchases of imagery?
    Dr. Scolese. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Carbajal. I think we'd all agree that innovation has been a key 
contributor to our military's success. Today there's no shortage of 
innovation in our country, but it seems the department has struggled to 
leverage its full potential. The term ``valley of death'' is widely 
used to acknowledge the difficulty to transition cutting-edge 
technologies from concepts and demonstrations to programs of record. 
What do you see as key contributors to the ``valley of death'' in the 
area of space and how are you working to bridge the valley across Space 
Systems Command, the Space Rapid Capabilities Office, and the Space 
Development Agency?
    Dr. Scolese. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
    Mr. Carbajal. There's been a lot of focus on the amount we spend on 
the Department of Defense. Some are saying we need to curb our 
spending, while others talk about the rise of near-peer threats and a 
need to invest in our outdated systems from the cold war. Last 
September, the GAO published a report on the acquisition of commercial 
satellite imagery across the Intelligence Community and the Department 
of Defense. The report points to the possibility of the same image 
being purchased multiple times, which wouldn't be the best use of 
taxpayer dollars. How are you working together across the NGA andNRO to 
ensure DOD requirements are being met across the combatant commanders 
to minimize duplicative purchases of imagery?
    Ms. Wilkerson. Congressman Carbajal, thank you for your question. 
NGA and NRO work closely to ensure our processes and plans for the 
acquisition of commercial imagery remain aligned. NGA's most important 
steps to mitigate uncoordinated purchases has been the establishment of 
a commercial GEOINT Requirements Process for the user community. This 
process allows the GEOINT community to submit GEOINT needs that could 
be satisfied by commercial solutions, including imagery, products, or 
services. These needs are prioritized to enable collaborative 
procurements and licensing terms that reduce duplicative purchases and 
maximize mission utility across the community. NGA also gathers 
information on current and planned purchases of commercial GEOINT by 
other government organizations as part of our annual user data calls. 
These efforts provide the transparency and coordination necessary to 
enable informed acquisition decisions across the GEOINT user community.
    I'll also highlight that DOD and IC policies and instructions 
direct NRO to coordinate its commercial GEOINT acquisition activities 
with GNA. This partnership enables collaboration in situations where 
other government agencies engage NRO for independent procurement of 
commercial GEOINT.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. STRONG
    Mr. Strong. It's my understanding the missions in Lane 1 of Phase 3 
allow for new entrants to bid for less complicated missions while Lane 
2 of Phase 3 represents the most difficult missions and are therefore 
reserved for experienced launch providers. For Lane 2 missions, why it 
is important that providers selected are experienced and meet all NSSL 
requirements?
    Mr. Calvelli. NSSL missions require assured access to space, so 
Lane 2 providers are incentivized to meet all unique gov't 
requirements, to include Western Range capabilities and vertical 
integration.
      They have more challenging mission requirements, 
necessitating full mission assurance (e.g., Space Based Infrared 
System, USSF classified missions, NRO missions).
      To bid on Lane 2 does not require prior experience, but 
requires fully-certified launch vehicles in accordance with the New 
Entrant Certification Guide prior to launching an NSSL Phase 3 Lane 2 
mission.
    This strategy avoids the possibility of providers optimizing to 
meet some, but not all requirements, resulting in potential gaps in DOD 
launch capabilities
    Mr. Strong. Please explain the importance of ensuring all national 
security space launch providers have the capability to launch from our 
Western range at Vandenberg to reach polar orbits. Do you expect the 
Space Force to maintain this requirement into Phase 4?
    Mr. Calvelli. Currently, the USSF expects to maintain the Western 
Range requirement for all Phase 3 Lane 2 providers. Phase 3 Lane 1 
(IDIQ) providers will not be required to maintain launch capability 
from the Western Range. The only instance that would require a Lane 1 
provider to launch from the Western Range is when a provider bids on a 
Task Order for a Western Range mission.
      The Western Range maintains resiliency by providing an 
additional site to launch from in the event of an anomaly or other 
event that denies the use of Cape Canaveral Space Force Station, FL.
      Many critical missions manifested on NSSL Phase 3 require 
launches from the Western Range at Vandenberg Space Force Base, CA 
since its location allows for a more direct insertion into polar and 
retrograde orbits.
      This location also increases the payload mass that a 
given launch vehicle may deliver in a single launch to these specific 
orbits.
    Mr. Strong. This committee was recently briefed by Space Force 
officials who indicated that adding a third launch provider in Lane 2 
would likely increase launch costs by more than $5 billion, which could 
instead be used to buy 330 SDA satellites, and that three launch awards 
would not properly incentivize industry to bid the best prices. Please 
explain how the Space Force came to this conclusion.
    Mr. Calvelli. Adding a third provider to NSSL Phase 3 Lane 2 will 
inherently increase costs. The Space Force based its cost estimate for 
adding a third provider to Lane 2 on the following parameters:
      Phase 2 actuals (plus escalation) to calculate estimates 
for:
          8 years of launch service support (FY25-FY32) for an 
        additional launch service provider
      Launch service support pays for NSSL-unique costs not 
directly associated with any one mission (e.g., maintenance of secure 
facilities, support to west coast launch capability, and vertical 
integration, etc.).
          8 years award fee (FY25-FY32) for an additional 
        launch service provider
          8 years of fleet surveillance (FY25-FY32) on an 
        additional launch system
      Assumed space vehicles need to be designed/compatible to 
fly on all three launch systems for max resiliency (tri-integration); 
drives additional cost on both the launch vehicle and space vehicle 
sides, and demands additional resources (both government and 
contractor) to manage multiple, simultaneous efforts
      Assumed additional overhead for program management and 
other Program Executive Office support to manage a third provider
      Assumed potential increase in launch service costs if 
providers are less incentivized to competitively bid given all bidders 
will win something The SDA comparison was only provided as an example 
to show the capability tradeoff between adding a third provider and on-
orbit assets.