[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                     RECLAIMING CONGRESS'S ARTICLE I POWERS: 
                         COUNTERTERRORISM AUMF REFORM

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                           September 28, 2023

                               __________

                           Serial No. 118-50

                               __________

        Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
        
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-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------                            

                      COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                   MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     	GREGORY MEEKS, New Yok, Ranking 
JOE WILSON, South Carolina               	Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	 	BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California		GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri			WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida			DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
KEN BUCK, Colorado			AMI BERA, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee			JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee		DINA TITUS, Nevada
ANDY BARR, Kentucky			TED LIEU, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas			SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
YOUNG KIM, California			DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida		COLIN ALLRED, Texas
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan			ANDY KIM, New Jersey
AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN-RADEWAGEN,   	SARA JACOBS, California
  American Samoa			KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas			SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK, 
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio			 	Florida	
JIM BAIRD, Indiana			GREG STANTON, Arizona
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida			MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey		JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
MICHAEL LAWLER, New York		JONATHAN JACOBS, Illinois
CORY MILLS, Florida			SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia			JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas			JASON CROW, Colorado
JOHN JAMES, Michigan			BRAD SCHNEIDER. Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas      
                                    
                    Brenden Shields, Staff Director
                    Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director


                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               WITNESSES

Nuland, Victoria, Acting Deputy Secretary, Undersecretary for 
  Political Affairs, Department of State.........................     7

             ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Maier, Christopher, Assistant Secretary for Defense for Special 
  Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Krass, Caroline, 
  General Counsel, Department of Defense.........................    10
Visek, Richard, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State........    16

                  INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

What Now information submitted for the record from Waltz.........    54
Aghanistan 2022 information submitted for the record.............    59
United Nations U.S. News information submitted for the record....    67

                                APPENDIX

Hearing Notice...................................................    91
Hearing Minutes..................................................    93
Hearing Attendance...............................................    94

    STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..    95

       MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD REPRESENTATIVE PHILLIPS

Letter submitted for the record from Representative Phillips.....    97

            RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    99

 
  RECLAIMING CONGRESS'S ARTICLE I POWERS: COUNTERTERRORISM AUMF REFORM

                      Thursday, September 28, 2023

                          House of Representatives,
                      Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                    Washington, DC.

    The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in 
room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. Michael McCaul (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.
    Chairman McCaul. The committee will come to order. And 
before we get started I want to say happy birthday to my dear 
and good friend from New York, the ranking member, Mr. Meeks, 
who celebrated a very big birthday this week. He is now 70 
years old.
    But can you give us that Muhammad Ali quote so we can--this 
is like the best line.
    Mr. Meeks. Ali always said, ``Don't count the years, make 
the days count.''
    Chairman McCaul. So we will make it count. We are going to 
do the John Boehner birthday song real quick if that is all 
right. All right, Republicans, ready? This is your birthday 
song, it does not last too long--hey.
    We like to have some fun. We had a good time last night at 
the State Department, big music event. And the Secretary played 
a rhythm-and-blues song, amazing.
    So now we get onto something very important. I am going to 
give an opening statement. The ranking member I believe, 
Secretary Nuland, will be giving the statement.
    You know, Article 1 of the Constitution gives Congress 
alone the authority to declare war, and I believe it is our 
most solemn power. Declarations of war and authorizations for 
use of military force are this committee's most consequential 
jurisdiction.
    And now we are 22 years past the 9/11 attacks, and while we 
dramatically degraded those threats, we do face terrorists 
committed to our destruction.
    The bipartisan 9/11 Commission led by New Jersey Governor 
Tom Kean, whose son is now on this committee, and former 
Democratic chair of this committee, Lee Hamilton, made clear 
that the fight against radical Islamist terror would be a 
``generational challenge likely to be measured in decades, not 
years.''
    From my years as a counterterrorism Federal prosecutor and 
as former chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, I know 
that ongoing counterterrorism operations are legal and 
necessary and have saved us from many attacks.
    But Congress has not revisited our authorities in over two 
decades. Ninety percent of current House members were not even 
here when Congress enacted the two key AUMFs still on the 
books.
    Now, the 2001 post-9/11 AUMF has been used against Al 
Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces including ISIS. 2002 
Iraq AUMF was used against Saddam Hussein and also against 
terror threats in Iraq, including IRGC Commander Soleimani and 
Iran-backed militias.
    During that time, Congress has held hundreds of briefings 
and hearings. We have continued to appropriate funds for these 
engagements. But we have not revisited the authorities Congress 
gave to the President 11 congresses ago.
    War should not be on autopilot. Congress owes our troops a 
clear commitment to the missions we are asking them to 
undertake. We need to exercise our Article 1 war powers and 
stop our unhealthy ongoing deference to the executive branch. 
And our troops deserve that.
    My preference would be to repeal or replace all the AUMFs 
with a new, more limited authorization scoped to the terror 
threats that we face today. It would not apply to foreign 
nations or armed forces. It would not provide authority to 
occupy and reconstruct a country.
    There is also bipartisan interest in making a new AUMF 
time-limited so that Congress is required to review and 
reauthorize more regularly. Doing this is hard, and that is why 
we have not done it in 22 years. To succeed, a new AUMF 
requires bipartisan, bicameral, and Presidential support. And 
it will require us to answer tough questions, such as which 
terrorist organizations should be covered.
    As mentioned, current authorities cover al Qaida, the 
Taliban, associated forces including ISIS. But the 
Administration is asking us to now exclude the Taliban and not 
add any new Iran-backed terrorist militias to any new AUMF.
    I have to say that I have some concerns with that. Those 
groups have killed more Americans and pose ongoing threats 
today. Iran-backed militias have attacked U.S. personnel in the 
Middle East more than 80 times since the start of the Biden 
Administration. During the Iraq War, they killed more than 600 
Americans.
    The Taliban actively harbors terror threats including 
Zawahiri, Bin Laden's top lieutenant, and until recently the 
leader of Al Qaeda. The operational brains behind 9/11 were 
living in downtown Kabul under the Taliban's protection.
    Many specially designated global terrorists serve as senior 
officials now in the Taliban government, including Interior 
Minister Haqqani, head of the Haqqani Network, which is a 
designated foreign terrorist organization.
    It is simply not credible to exclude these extreme ongoing 
terror threats from a new counterterrorism AUMF. When the 
President says he can just address them using his Article 2 
powers, he is telling Congress not to exercise our exclusive 
constitutional authority.
    There is no consensus about the scope of the President's 
inherent power to use force, except in cases of self-defense 
after we have been attacked. I want the President to have that 
clear authority. He does not need to wait for these terrorists 
to attack us first.
    So with that, I want to thank our panel here today and the 
Secretary. This is a very important discussion we will have 
today. It should not be a partisan exercise, but rather a 
bipartisan exercise. It is my sincere hope that we can come 
together and mark up a new AUMF by next month.
    And so with that, I would like to recognize the ranking 
member, Mr. Meeks.
    Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    You know, as a member of the House of Representatives from 
the State of New York, I know how much that day, September 11, 
2001, weighs on the hearts of all Americans. Thousands of men 
and women in New York City to this day still bear the physical 
and emotional scars of 9/11, as does those in the Pentagon and 
in Pennsylvania.
    For them, for us, the phrase ``Never forget'' is as much a 
memorial as it is daily reality. Days after the attack, on 
Friday, September 14, I recall being on the House floor and 
reading the resolution to authorize the President to use 
military force and respond to that tragic attack on our 
homeland.
    Let me read the pertinent part aloud again today. ``The 
President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate 
force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or 
harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States.''
    I voted for that authorization. And though I carry the 
burden of that vote, not for 1 second do I regret it. We needed 
to send a message. We needed to take action and prevent future 
terrorist attacks by those who orchestrated 9/11, and we did.
    But let us be clear, that AUMF which my colleagues and I 
voted on was about 9/11, its perpetrators, and those who gave 
them refuge. The targets and scope of the AUMF were clear. Al 
Qaeda committed a terrorist attack on U.S. soil and the Taliban 
had harbored them, refusing to hand over Osama bin Laden.
    My vote to cast off the--to cast authorized force against 
both Taliban and Al Qaeda alike. The Taliban, for all of their 
counterproductive and backward policies and what they are doing 
today, did not warrant a proactive designation by Congress as 
an organization that the President is authorized to use 
military force against.
    We are fighting ISIS-K in Afghanistan and killed the 
organization's leader earlier this year. In 2001, AUMF Repeal 
and Replace Bill should comport with that reality, rather than 
revive a 20-year-old war, which we just ended and which 
Americans have no interest in pursuing again.
    A repeal-and-replace bill should, however, retain the 
President's authority to target non-State actors that have the 
capability and intention to attack our homeland. I submitted 
and proposed--my proposed legislation includes three terrorist 
entities that the President would retain the right to use force 
against: ISIS-K in Afghanistan, ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and Al 
Qaeda in Afghanistan.
    Without getting into information inappropriate to this 
public forum, I believe that several ISIS affiliates remain a 
threat to the United States. President Biden ordered a strike 
that killed ISIS leader in 2022. And our military has taken out 
several top commanders in 2023. Several other ISIS leaders have 
been killed by partner forces.
    This constant pressure and the difficulty it creates for 
planning and executing terrorist operations keep us safer here 
at home, and it would be unwise to discontinue these 
operations. ISIS-K remains a top concern. ISIS-K continues to 
pose a threat to our country and remains engaged in global 
terror. Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is significantly debilitated.
    But I do think operations like the 2022 strike against Al 
Qaeda's leader in 9/11, plotter Ayman al-Zawahiri, should be 
authorized by Congress. It is possible that new intelligence 
could convince me to add or subtract entities from this list.
    These are not simple questions with easy answers, and I 
clearly understand that Mr. McCaul's draft legislation has a 
wider scope. And I hope that, as he has stated, we can reach an 
agreement and dialog together along with the Administration.
    One thing I believe that I know we can agree on, we need to 
have this debate. And we need Congress to reassert its proper 
authority over the power to declare war under the Constitution. 
The time to pass repeal and replace of the 2001 AUMF 
legislation is now long overdue.
    The American people elected us to make tough decisions, not 
duck hard questions by ceding our constitutional authority over 
the executive branch or--. Our constitutional order depends on 
us upholding that responsibility, and I look forward to hearing 
from our witnesses here today before this committee.
    And again I thank the chairman for calling this hearing 
this morning.
    Chairman McCaul. I want to thank the ranking member. And I 
also want to thank Ken Buck and Dean Phillips for leading a 
task force engaging conversations with various groups across a 
spectrum on both sides of the aisle to try to get to a 
consensus. And I know you have put a lot of time and effort 
into this, and I want it to bear fruit at the end of this 
discussion.
    So we have a distinguished panel. First, Ambassador 
Victoria Nuland is Acting Deputy Secretary, Undersecretary for 
Political Affairs, at the Department of State. Thank you for 
being here.
    Mr. Christopher Maier is the Assistant Secretary for 
Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
    Ms. Caroline Krass is the General Counsel at the Department 
of Defense.
    And Mr. Richard Visek is the Acting Legal Advisor at the 
Department of State.
    So with that, I believe that we will call upon Ms. Nuland 
for her testimony.

    STATEMENT OF VICTORIA NULAND, ACTING DEPUTY SECRETARY, 
   UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

    Secretary Nuland. Thank you, Chairman McCaul. Ranking 
Member Meeks, happy birthday. Members of the committee, thank 
you for inviting all of us to testify today.
    President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and the whole 
Administration welcome the opportunity to work with Congress to 
update the existing authorizations for the use of military 
force.
    It is in that spirit that we gather today, as both of you 
said, to consider some of the gravest and weightiest questions 
we face as public servants, questions about how to address and 
eliminate emerging and imminent dangers to our citizens, when 
the use of military force is appropriate, and how those 
decisions should be made.
    Twenty-two years ago the 9/11 terrorist attacks violently 
reminded our country of the threats we faced and renewed our 
national resolve to secure our homeland. Out of that moment of 
tragedy came a measure of unity.
    In the aftermath, Members of the Congress came together to 
enact the 2001 AUMF, which created the legal bedrock of U.S. 
counterterrorism operations, enabling us to dismantle key 
terrorist organizations and thwart their plans to attack 
Americans.
    The world is a different place now. The threat of terrorism 
persists, but it has also evolved. So too must the tools that 
we use to meet it.
    We applaud congressional efforts to update this law to 
reflect the realities of the current landscape. There is no 
more powerful signal we can send to those who wish us harm than 
a new authorization which is broadly supported by both chambers 
of Congress and by both parties.
    We agree that repealing and replacing the 2001 AUMF is 
warranted and is necessary. Here is how the Administration sees 
some of the key issues, some of which you have already 
highlighted in your opening statements.
    First, when it comes--what comes next should provide our 
military with uninterrupted authority to continue critical 
operations authorized by the 2001 law and provide the 
flexibility to rapidly adapt to constantly changing dangers.
    Second, a revised AUMF should explicitly authorize force 
against Al Qaeda and ISIS.
    Third, a revised AUMF, in our view, should not include a 
date-certain expiration date, given the persistence of this 
threat. That said, we know how critical this issue is for 
members of this committee, and we are prepared to discuss ways 
to review the continuing need for these authorities on an 
agreed and regular basis.
    Fourth, a revised AUMF should ensure uninterrupted 
authority for terrorist detention operations. And finally, we 
believe a revised AUMF should enable us to apply this authority 
to new geographic areas and groups as needed.
    While the rate of global terrorist attacks has declined, 
groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda maintain safe havens across the 
globe and an intent to attack our Nation and our people 
overseas.
    Over the past decade, we have built and led a successful 
coalition to root out ISIS, to reduce its territory, and to 
disrupt its recruitment and financial networks. Yet these 
groups continue to pose threats to the United States and our 
interests, whether it's al-Shabaab in Somalia, ISIS-K in 
Afghanistan, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, to ISIS in 
Syria.
    At the same time, terrorist activities in the Sahel are on 
the rise, a trend that is likely to worsen with increased 
political instability in the region. Meanwhile, we have taken 
significant steps toward closing the facility at Guantanamo 
Bay, and that remains our goal. But until that day comes, we 
cannot afford any gaps in our detention authorities.
    We know that military force is only part of the answer to 
countering terrorist threats. With the support of the Congress, 
we are investing hundreds of millions of dollars in State 
Department-run programs in countries around the world to train, 
mentor, and equip law enforcement officers in counterterrorism 
to work effectively and to respect the rule of law and human 
rights.
    We have also worked with partners in more than 25 countries 
across the globe to combat racially and ethnically motivated 
violent extremists. And through the Global Counterterrorism 
Forum, we have collaborated with over 40 countries to increase 
the resilience of local communities to terrorist actors.
    But given the evolving threat, we must be able to use force 
when necessary to prevent groups from planning attacks, 
reestablishing footholds, reconstituting, and resurging. As we 
consider a new AUMF, we support congressional engagement on the 
use of this authorization, including which terrorist groups 
should be the targets.
    The Administration is deeply committed to working with 
Congress on this new authorization and to remaining accountable 
to the American people for actions that are taken under the 
AUMF. We look forward to a very frank discussion today. Thank 
you.
    [The prepared statement of Secretary Nuland follows:]

    [[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
 JOINT STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM MR. MAIER AND MS. KRASS
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                STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM MR. VISEK
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    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Madam Secretary. We had a 
classified briefing last week as well as a very robust 
discussion, and it seems to me there are three issues, whether 
or not to keep the Taliban on the list. You know, as I 
mentioned, Haqqani is their Minister of Interior and was 
harboring Zawahiri. Haqqani Network being a foreign terrorist 
organization.
    And the other one has to do with Iran Shia militia groups. 
General Kurilla testified 6 months ago that these Iran-backed 
militias had attacked us 78 times, our military, since January 
2021.
    And then finally, as you mentioned, the timeline. I think 
it has to be realistic. It has taken us 22 years to have this 
discussion, and that is for a reason, because it is hard. It is 
hard to get consensus. And so I had asked your legal counsel at 
the time to come up with maybe some creative options to that.
    I will say I think most members do want a time-certain to 
expiration to force future congresses to deal with the issue. 
But having said that, those are the three big issues as I see 
it.
    If I could maybe start with you, Madam Secretary, and then 
go down the panel.
    Secretary Nuland. Thank you, Chairman. I am going to take 
these in turn, and I am going to guess we will come back around 
and around to them. But first with regard to the Taliban. We 
have been very clear, we are going to judge the Taliban by 
their actions.
    It is our assessment that the Taliban have partially 
adhered to their CT commitments. We have seen them disrupt 
ISIS-K for example, but there is obviously plenty more to do to 
ensure that Afghanistan does not become a safe haven or return 
to safe haven or persist as a safe haven.
    That said, I would note that the Director of the National 
Counterterrorism Center, Christine Abizaid, recently said 
publicly that Al Qaeda is at its historic nadir in Afghanistan, 
and its revival is unlikely.
    I would say we have been able, with the authorities that we 
have, to maintain persistent counterterrorism action against Al 
Qaeda, most recently with the August 1922 strike against 
Zawahiri. So the President is not going to hesitate to go after 
Al Qaeda as he needs to. And we believe that we have the 
authorities under Article 2 to do that.
    With regard to the Iran-backed militias, Iran is obviously 
a State sponsor of terrorism; it is the leading State sponsor 
of terrorism in the world. And as this committee knows very 
well, and especially those of you who served selflessly in Iraq 
and elsewhere, they continue in this effort.
    President Biden has repeatedly warned Iran that we will 
hold them to account for any role in attacks against U.S. 
personnel, and the President, again, has done just that using 
his Article 2 authorities, most recently in March in Syria. And 
he is not going to hesitate to do that again.
    So, again, this is a place where we believe we have the 
authorities that we need and the President has shown his 
willingness to use them under Article 2. But obviously we are 
open to further conversation about this.
    Chairman McCaul. And I would just say that, yes, that is 
your Article 2 authority is self-defense, but that is not an 
authority authorized by Congress, though. But please continue.
    Secretary Nuland. Understood. But in this case, when they 
attack us, we respond is the way that that has worked. And in 
fact, what we are trying to do is restore deterrence and we 
have--we feel that that has--we have sent that message strongly 
in March, and we have not seen any attacks since.
    With regard to the sunset, we have a number of things that 
we can talk about. As you said, Chairman, a number of concrete 
proposals. I can run them down here or we can do it later.
    I think our largest, our biggest issue with a firm date 
certain is it signals to our adversaries that they can wait us 
out. That is the biggest problem. It also signals to the 
partners we want to work with that they cannot count on us to 
lead this effort after that if the Congress is not able to 
continue the authority. So that is our biggest concern.
    So we have put forward to members of this committee and to 
the staff some ideas for, as we said, regular reviews at set 
intervals, more reporting requirements, or even the requirement 
at a date that you set for a Presidential certification and a 
conversation about the need to continue these authorities.
    We think that is a better way to go than setting a date now 
and telling the world that we are potentially out of this 
business on that date.
    So let me pause there. Chris, anything to add?
    Mr. Maier. Chairman, the only thing I would add, especially 
on the sunset provision, is I think one of the strengths we see 
still to this day in things like the D/ISIS coalition is the 
really the consistency and sustainability of that coalition.
    And we continue to be frankly surprised. Many of the 
capitals have continued to renew mandates in Iraq and Syria 
long after they have stopped contributing forces.
    And I think if we look at this in the context of a sunset 
provision that had a time-directed end, those partners would 
become far less certain about making those political 
commitments certain.
    Chairman McCaul. And you know, I do see some merit to that, 
because we also say conditions on the ground not a time-base to 
give the signal to the enemy when it is going to expire. So my 
time is running out, but I look forward to visiting with you 
about these options that you have proposed, and thank you for 
that.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Meeks.
    Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Let me make sure that, so we are absolutely clear, and I 
guess Undersecretary Nuland. Does the Administration believe a 
repeal-and-replace of the 2001 AUMF should include an explicit 
authorization to use military force to strike the Taliban?
    Secretary Nuland. Chairman, as I said, with regard to 
actions in Afghanistan, we want to see an explicit 
authorization for ISIS, for Al Qaeda. We do not believe that 
the Taliban needs to be in this authorization.
    Mr. Meeks. And what about does the Administration believe a 
repeal-and-replace of the 2001 AUMF should include an explicit 
authorization to use military force against Iranian-backed Shia 
militia groups?
    Secretary Nuland. Again, Ranking Member, we believe that we 
have proven that we have the authority under Article 2 to help 
defend the American people and restore deterrents, so we do not 
think that is necessary.
    Mr. Meeks. And does the Administration support a repeal of 
2001 AUMF without a simultaneous replacement bill?
    Secretary Nuland. We do not. We would immediately lose 
detention authorities, we would lose our ability to strike Al 
Qaeda and ISIS and other groups.
    Mr. Meeks. And let me jump to, you know, a couple of things 
because I agree that what the chairman said about some of the 
key issues. And I, as I said in my--I'm very firm about, you 
know, not giving over our authority to the executive branch. We 
have got to take the hard votes ourself.
    So can any one of you tell me with precision the threat 
landscape in 2045? Which terrorist groups will be on the rise 
then, and what threats will they pose to the United States in 
2045?
    Secretary Nuland. I certainly would not want to get out my 
crystal ball. I do not know if the Assistant Secretary may or 
would like to get his out. We just hope we are still 
celebrating your birthday.
    Mr. Meeks. Me too. So with that, because when I stood on 
the House floor in 2001 and voted for the 2001 AUMF, I can tell 
you that I firmly and squarely and honestly that most of the 
members if not all of the Members of Congress did not believe 
that we were going to--we were authorizing a global war on 
terror that would still be in force 22 years later. But that is 
where we are now.
    So why should members of this committee have the confidence 
that if we passed a new AUMF this year, that the President in 
2045 would not use our law in ways we could have never 
predicted?
    Secretary Nuland. Well, again, Ranking Member, our 
commitment to you is that we will continue to evolve both the 
groups and the needs, geographic and otherwise, together. And 
there are many ways that we can establish regular consultation 
to do that, regular ways to agree to do that, as I said in my 
opening.
    And we think that is going to be necessary. We are going to 
need an open door to be able to evolve this or to update it 
again.
    Mr. Meeks. So that is why for me, because I know I cannot, 
as you could not, see what is going to take place in 2024--
2045. But I can picture in my mind's eye, say what it looks 
like in 2024 or 2025 or 2026.
    And that is why to me, a sunset makes sense. It forces us 
to stop and reevaluate if things change on the ground, or use a 
military force--the use of a military force has been on 
statutory autopilot for two decades.
    And that is part of the reason why our policies, I believe, 
have been flawed. And I do not think Congress must make the 
same errors. And that is why I think that we need to have a 
sunset so that we can review that.
    Let me just tell you real quickly the other pet peeve that 
I have had recently. And I do not know whether Ms. Krass has 
this answer or not. But are you familiar with Section 1285 
report codified as 50 USC 1550 that the Department of Defense 
sent to the House Foreign Affairs Committee this week?
    Ms. Krass. Yes, sir, I am.
    Mr. Meeks. Do you know if the statutory language mandating 
the report State that the report shall be submitted a few days 
before every full committee Foreign Affairs or AUMF issues, or 
does it State that the report shall be submitted every 180 
days, and that briefing shall occur in the 180-day window?
    Ms. Krass. The latter, sir.
    Mr. Meeks. OK. So look, I have tremendous respect for the 
men and women who protect our national security every day 
across the Department of Defense and the Department of State 
and understand the workload is significant and the burden is 
real. I even understand that sometimes Congress mandates 
reports that are outdated or useless.
    But that 1550 report is one that is necessary for Congress 
to do its job. And I again underscore and emphasize, as I did 
in 2022, look, for us to do our job, we have to have the 
report. So please, give us those reports in a timely manner.
    And I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back. The chair now 
recognizes Ms. Wagner.
    Mrs. Wagner. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this 
hearing and updating the United States' authorization for U.S. 
military against terrorists that seek to kill Americans is 
urgently needed in the current threat landscape.
    Since the Administration's shameful, I think, and tragic 
flight from Afghanistan 2 years ago, the Taliban has been left 
to help manage the very significant terror threats emanating 
from Afghanistan.
    And I know we are talking about leaving them out and really 
focusing on ISIS-K, and Al Qaeda, but I do want to say here 
that Taliban is a U.S. adversary that funds all--funds Al 
Qaeda. It employ Al Qaeda members and it permits Al Qaeda 
training camps. I would be interested in some of your thoughts 
in this regard.
    And I want to add to that, though, that meanwhile Iran has 
only grown bolder and more aggressive in its support for 
terrorist proxies, I think we have seen.
    And I will note here too that the Administration's policies 
have been exceedingly counterproductive. In fact, the 
Administration recently signaled to Tehran that its bad 
behavior will be in fact rewarded with cash payouts to the tune 
of $6 billion.
    Let's be clear. Iran is a State sponsor of terror. U.S. 
policy must always, always aim to deter or punish Iran's use of 
terrorist proxies to harm Americans and sow instability across 
the Middle East.
    The U.S. must retain a powerful toolkit here that empowers 
us to address these threats to our citizens and homeland. And 
Congress has an important opportunity to update and strengthen 
this toolkit, and I look forward to working with my colleagues 
on this critical effort.
    Assistant Secretary Maier, can you speak to a little bit 
both the Taliban activity that I have outlined and their 
involvement with Al Qaeda and the camps and such, along with 
the total attacks, how many have Iran-backed made on American 
targets in the last 5 years?
    We know that Commander Kurilla testified quite a while ago 
here earlier that there were 78 attacks. Surely there have been 
more. I am wondering if you can give us an update, both on 
those Iran-backed militias and proxies, and then the Taliban. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Maier. Yes, ma'am. So starting with the Taliban, I 
think as Secretary Nuland said, we are in a very-not-trust with 
the Taliban. But I think what we have seen is them take the 
fight to ISIS-Khorasan because they are definitely opposed from 
a number of different reasons, namely because ISIS-Khorasan 
attempts to undermine the Taliban governance.
    And they--they, the Taliban have pressured and managed to 
exert a fair degree of control, we would say, over the Al Qaeda 
elements that still remain in Afghanistan to ensure that they 
aren't conducting plotting against Western targets. Now----
    Mrs. Wagner. Are they funding, excuse me, are they still 
funding Al Qaeda? Do they still employ Al Qaeda members? Are 
they still permitting Al Qaeda training camps, the Taliban?
    Mr. Maier. I think some of that would probably be better 
handled in a different session. But I think on balance we see 
that the Taliban remains in some sort of relationship with Al 
Qaeda. But what we have not seen is significant plotting by Al 
Qaeda toward Western interests.
    And I think Secretary Nuland's reference to NCTC Director 
Abizaid is telling there, that Al Qaeda is being kept under 
wraps by the Taliban at this point. That said, we are carefully 
watching all of that because we know ultimately what Al Qaeda's 
intents are.
    I think on Iran, I would not be able to give you the 
accurate number over the last 5 years of Iran, Iran in proxy 
attacks. But I can tell you since General Kurilla testified, we 
have seen a clear drop in Iranian proxy attacks toward U.S. 
forces in both Iraq and Syria.
    Mrs. Wagner. OK, thank you. I want to move and leave this 
question. I may not have enough time for it to be answered, but 
we see terrorism is exploding in Sub-Saharan Africa and the 
Sahel. Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 60 percent of all 
terrorism deaths last year. The Sahel was the site of 43 
percent of terrorism deaths, up from 1 percent in 2007.
    Assistant Secretary Maier and Ms. Krass, what are the key 
terrorist organizations in Africa, and which are currently 
covered by the 2001 AUMF? And do you agree that a new AUMF must 
continue to cover those groups? I know that I am out of time.
    I would appreciate it if I could get an answer in writing, 
Mr. Chairman, and because I do think it is important that we 
include Sub-Saharan Africa in this discussion, especially with 
the explosion of terrorist activities that are going on. And I 
thank you, and I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields back. Chair 
recognizes Mr. Sherman.
    Mr. Sherman. I agree with the ranking member, we shouldn't 
be on autopilot. I hope my colleagues would me in introducing 
legislation to repeal the AUMF of 1957 dealing with communism 
in the Middle East, and 1991, dealing with Saddam Hussein's 
invasion of Kuwait. We should also repeal the 2002 AUMF.
    I agree with the ranking member that we need to revise the 
2001 AUMF and put a sunset on it. Ms. Nuland argues well, that 
will embolden our enemies.
    That is because everybody in the executive branch believes 
that when the executive branch makes foreign policy, that they 
make good foreign policy and instill fear in our enemies. But 
if God forbid Congress has a binding role, then we would make 
bad decisions and our enemies would be emboldened.
    Nothing exemplifies this more than what every 
Administration since the Nixon Administration has said about 
everything we are talking about here today. The AUMF is 
meaningless and our discussion at this hearing and many other 
hearings is meaningless unless the War Powers Act is binding on 
the Administration.
    Yet since the Nixon Administration, every--the executive 
branch has told us it is not binding. They have taken the 
position that it is really kind of a non-binding resolution 
maybe with a few reporting requirements, but that every 
president can send our troops anywhere for as long as that 
president wants, whether Congress wants to authorize it or not.
    And then they work with us on the technicalities of the War 
Powers--of the AUMF to humor us, distract us, and pretend like 
it is important so that we never realize that it is not.
    Ms. Nuland, is the War Powers Act binding on the executive 
branch? And I will point out that Senator Biden said yes. What 
is your answer?
    Secretary Nuland. Yes, Congressman Sherman.
    Mr. Sherman. It is. So the Administration will follow the 
law and will not deploy troops for over 60 or 90 days unless 
authorized by an AUMF?
    Secretary Nuland. That is President Biden's commitment.
    Mr. Sherman. I might add that I asked that same question of 
your predecessor and did not get an answer in this committee 
just a year and a half ago. And I want to thank you for that 
commitment.
    Mr. Visek, as a matter of law, is the War Powers Act 
binding on the executive branch?
    Mr. Visek. Thank you for that question, Congressman. We are 
certainly aware of the history between the executive branch----
    Mr. Sherman. Yes or no.
    Mr. Visek. And the legislative branch on this issue----
    Mr. Sherman. Yes or no, is it binding?
    Mr. Visek. There are, certainly I think there would be 
general agreement that parts of the War Powers Act are 
absolutely----
    Mr. Sherman. Is the part of it that says you cannot deploy 
troops for over 60/90 days binding on the Administration or 
not? Yes or no?
    Mr. Visek. I can say that this Administration has acted 
consistently with----
    Mr. Sherman. Acting consistently? They act consistently 
with many of our non-binding resolutions. Is it binding or is 
it just something you choose to go along with?
    Mr. Visek. Congressman, I am not aware that it has been 
addressed at this point. But I've wanted----
    Mr. Sherman. OK, so we have a disagreement. Your client 
says it is binding, you say it is not. Every Administration, 
prior to the statements of Ms. Nuland, have said it is not 
binding, and that is why last decade I put a provision's most 
important thing I ever enacted into proposal and it was 
actually enacted into law, that says that no money can be spent 
in contravention of the War Powers Act.
    Now Attorney General Mukasey testified before this 
committee a long time ago that if such a provision was in the 
appropriations bill, it was--it was in the appropriations bill 
back a decade ago, because I finally won a vote on the floor. 
It is now in base text so it does not get much attention. But 
it says no money can be spent in contravention.
    Is that provision binding, Mr. Visek?
    Mr. Visek. Congressman, I am not aware that this 
Administration has taken a position on that. We----
    Mr. Sherman. Well, you realize that you were sitting there 
when Wendy Sherman, no relation, said that the Administration 
would look at that provision and reach a decision on that. Was 
she misleading us when she said the Administration would look 
at that?
    Mr. Visek. I do not believe Deputy----
    Mr. Sherman. You were sitting right next to her.
    Mr. Visek. Would be--would mislead this committee. All I 
can say is that I am not aware----
    Mr. Sherman. Will you get back with a yes-or-no answer as 
to whether in your legal opinion it is--the money can be spent 
in contravention of the War Powers Act out of the Defense 
Appropriations Bill that says no money shall be spent in 
contravention of the War Powers Act?
    And Ms. Krass, you will be advising generals. Now and then 
we say no money shall be spent in the Defense bill for this or 
that. And if they just ignore that they could, I believe, go to 
jail.
    Would you advise Defense officials that they could spend 
money in contravention of the War Powers Act if that money was 
appropriated by a bill that says no money shall be spent in 
contravention thereof?
    Ms. Krass. Congressman, we very much respect the role of 
Congress and clear language such as no money can be sent, 
implicates, as you say, the Antideficiency Act. We would always 
comply with that consistent with our constitutional----
    Mr. Sherman. So as long as we put that provision in every 
Defense approps bill, and we frankly, and I hope my colleagues 
will join this, should put it in permanent law, you believe 
that the Defense Department has to abide by it?
    Ms. Krass. Consistent with our constitutional obligations, 
yes.
    Mr. Sherman. Consistent with your constitutional--do you 
have a constitutional right to ignore it?
    Ms. Krass. It would very much depend on the circumstances. 
It would be very unusual that we would----
    Mr. Sherman. OK, so sometimes you can ignore laws you do 
not like----
    Ms. Krass. Only----
    Mr. Sherman. Depending upon the circumstances. I will yield 
back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The chair now 
recognizes Mr. Mast.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman
    Assistant Secretary, I am going to ask you some very 
straightforward questions. I would say it is in everybody's 
best interest to give us simple and straightforward answers. It 
is an opportunity to clear the air on some ongoing issues.
    There is currently an allegation that your chief of staff, 
who was also a former aide for Robert Malley, an Iran deal 
architect, that--who is currently has a revoked security 
clearance and is suspended for classified mishandling, 
allegedly, that she was a part of a group known as the Iran 
Expert Initiative, which reported to the Iranian Foreign 
Ministry and had the mission of influencing U.S. policymakers 
to agree with what the Iranian Government wanted. That is an 
allegation.
    The Pentagon issued a defense, saying that the doctor was 
thoroughly and properly vetted and that we are honored to have 
her serve. I would like to believe that in issuing the defense, 
that was thoughtful and thoroughly vetted as well, and I wanted 
to give you the opportunity to substantiate that.
    So my questions are going to start with this. They will be 
very straightforward. Given that a defense was issued, I want 
to confirm what was reviewed to substantiate that defense.
    Did your Chief of Staff have any affiliation with a group 
known as the Iranian Expert Initiative, its other reported 
associates, or any groups reporting to the Iranian Foreign 
Ministry?
    Mr. Maier. So Congressman Mast, I think you will appreciate 
this is a ongoing personnel matter. We received a letter from 
the House Armed Services Committee chairman and ranking member, 
or excuse me, subcommittee chair of the Intelligence Special 
Operations Committee 2 days ago. So we are looking into that.
    I think the initial response you are referring to was 
issued by our public affairs folks. We are actively looking 
into whether all law and policy was properly followed in 
granting my chief of staff Top Secret Special Compartmented 
information.
    Mr. Mast. Let's pause on that.
    Mr. Maier. Yes.
    Mr. Mast. Was the security clearance a full scope polygraph 
background check, a single scope background check, can you 
speak to that?
    Mr. Maier. I cannot at this point, I do not know that 
information, sir.
    Mr. Mast. Can you speak to the SF-86 national security 
questionnaire? Straightforward questions, they are black and 
white. And so I would ask this, can you say in Section 19, 
Foreign Contacts, was anybody listed within her contacts as a 
part of the Iranian Foreign Ministry?
    Mr. Maier. So Congressman, I think you will understand that 
I am not involved in the vetting process for a security 
clearance. That is part of what we are looking into. When I say 
ensuring it is consistent with law and policy, that would be a 
routine part of a background investigation from my experience, 
sir.
    Mr. Mast. Absolutely. Can you help me with timeline on 
something on this? Understanding the SF-86 national security 
questionnaire, the questions relating to foreign associates, 
work, foreign business dealings, they have a 7-year statute of 
limitations for the questions.
    Records show that she began working for Mr. Malley roughly 
in 2021. And the allegation is that this took place in roughly 
2013/2014. Can you substantiate that if this was not listed, it 
may be because of the lapse of time, the 7-year time window 
that would put it just outside of that?
    Mr. Maier. Yes, again, Congressman, I do not have that 
level of detail of what went into her security clearance. But I 
think there are certainly pieces that have, as investigations 
are underway, as I understand it, they have discretion to look 
beyond that timeline as is required.
    Mr. Mast. To the General Counsel, I would ask you the same 
questions.
    Ms. Krass. We are more than happy to take back your 
questions, sir.
    Mr. Mast. Can you substantiate did the Chief of Staff have 
any affiliation with a group known as the Iranian Expert 
Initiative, its other reported associates, or any groups 
reporting to the Iranian Foreign Ministry?
    Ms. Krass. I do not know that.
    Mr. Mast. OK. Can you substantiate whether that 
association, that alleged association, very alleged 
association, would have been outside of the timeframe in which 
she had to report according to her national security 
questionnaire?
    Ms. Krass. I do not know.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The chair now 
recognizes Mr. Bera.
    Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
holding this hearing. I mean, this is not a Democratic or a 
Republican issue, this is not a House or Senate issue.
    It is something we talked about during the last 
Administration and again, from the comments of the witnesses, I 
think the Biden Administration also would love to see a sunset 
of the 2001 AUMF and a modernization of an AUMF that reflects 
today's world.
    I was not in Congress post-9/11, but vividly remember the 
days immediately after 9/11 where the country came together. We 
weren't Democrats or Republicans, we were all Americans. And 
you know, watched this institution come together as well.
    And I think there is a very non-partisan, bicameral desire 
to continue to do this and give the Administration, whether it 
is a Democratic or Republican Administration, the flexibility 
and ability to protect the American homeland and American 
interests around the world.
    I think this is a place where we should work together and 
provide that flexibility for future Administrations. Thinking 
about the sunset provision, I certainly understand the delicacy 
of setting a hard timeline.
    But I do think there's a compromise that, you know, can 
probably be reached where there are some forcing functions, 
some reporting functions that come back that do not set a hard-
and-fast timeline but also give the legislative body the 
reassurances that on, whether it is every Congress coming back 
to, you know, the chairs of the relevant committees, Congress 
as a whole, etc.
    And reporting, again, I think that certainly can be 
negotiated to where the executive branch is comfortable, we are 
comfortable, and we protect the homeland.
    I also worry about future threats, and I appreciate none of 
us has a crystal ball. And the current AUMF addresses Al Qaeda 
and ISIS and affiliated groups like al-Shabaab et cetera.
    But when I think about what keeps me awake at night, you 
know, having--being both on the Foreign Affairs and the 
Intelligence Committee and having traveled extensively 
throughout the Middle East recently, you see countries like 
Yemen.
    And I do think there is a very real possibility that you 
will get some stabilization in South Yemen but, you know, I 
look at North Yemen, I look at the Houti movement. I look at a 
large number of young men heavily armed, nothing to do, no 
economy, etc.
    And I would also like to think about how do we--the Houtis 
would not be covered under this AUMF and I do not--I am not 
suggesting that they should. But if a new rebel movement or 
terror, counterterror movement emerges, how do we allow the 
flexibility to address new threats?
    And I, you know, I do not expect you to have that answer, 
but I do think it is important for us to give that flexibility. 
Certainly Article 2 would allow some immediate threats.
    But having to come back to Congress every time, I think 
there is, you know, am I thinking about this correctly? Maybe 
Secretary Nuland.
    Secretary Nuland. Thank you, Congressman Bera, and 
particularly for your openness to finding other ways to re-up 
these authorities short of date-certain for the reasons that we 
have talked about.
    I have worked for a number of presidents who have tried 
to--of both parties who have tried to amend this, and with the 
Congress, and it is difficult. So we do not want to put 
ourselves in a position where we have a gap.
    What we would also favor in addition to what we put 
explicitly in the law is provisions where we could come back to 
you ask for additional groups to be covered, whether we did 
that in open or whether we did that in a classified way so as 
not to signal. But we would be open to that for sure.
    Mr. Bera. Great, thank you. And just a last question, we, 
recently in Mexico City, and I know some of my colleagues have 
introduced an AUMF to think about transnational drug cartels. I 
will just go on the record that I think that is a bad idea at 
this juncture.
    And that is not to suggest that we do not have to use all 
means that we have as the Federal Government to address 
fentanyl, address these transnational drug cartels. But to, you 
know, our partners in Mexico, I think there are better ways for 
us to go about stamping out what is major issue here in the 
United States and certainly abroad.
    Secretary Nuland. We agree with that. We think we should 
use criminal statutes against criminals and terrorist statutes 
against terrorists.
    Mr. Bera. Great, thank you, and I will yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The chair recognizes 
Mr. Buck.
    Mr. Buck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Chairman, thank 
you for allowing me to help on this issue. It has been a 
pleasure and an honor to work with you and the ranking member 
on this issue.
    I guess I want to just make one statement about sunsets. 
Regular reviews do not work in Congress. We have a regular 
review of our appropriations process, and we have a term for 
it. It is called shutdown. We have a regular review of a debt 
ceiling, and it is called almost defaulting.
    We have a regular review of many programs that we as 
Congress have authorized in the executive branch, and 1400 of 
those programs are unauthorized we still appropriate to. 
Regular reviews do not work.
    When there is something significant, like FISA, we have a 
deadline accompanying that important program, we get our job 
done. Sometimes we have to kick it for a few months in order to 
get our job done, but we get our job done.
    It is holding the collective feet of Congress to the fire 
that allows us to get something done. A review just does not 
work. The can will be kicked down the road, we will not do our 
job. And more importantly, the men and women who are risking 
their lives will not have the support of Congress.
    It is too easy for Members of Congress to go run around and 
say I never supported that and I am not going to appropriate 
money to it because we did not do our job of reviewing it.
    So I would really ask that you reconsider your position on 
a sunset. It will certainly be something that I will be pushing 
for.
    But my question really is a little bit different, and that 
is how does a terrorist group earn its way onto a list that 
gets targeted? What are the considerations?
    And I guess, Assistant Secretary Maier, I am directing this 
to you. In my mind, there are a few things. One, the group has 
explicitly sought to harm U.S. interests, whether they are 
personnel or embassies, or aided and abetted another group in 
that endeavor. Or sworn allegiance to a group that is involved 
in that.
    But I would love to know, and really this is the key to me 
to gaining the confidence of other members in Congress, that we 
are carefully considering this. It isn't just we saw something 
in a newspaper and decided to target a group.
    Mr. Maier. Congressman Buck, it is a really important 
question. And I think, and we would look at it at the most 
basic as a group that has both the intent and capability to 
harm Americans. And by that, we are talking individual American 
citizens.
    We often use broad, sweeping terms like U.S. interests and 
the United States and the homeland, but we are talking about 
groups that have a consistent, sustained intent to harm 
Americans and also have the capability to do so.
    And then I think as we move past that we apply really a 
policy test to look at those groups that we would add as 
associated forces or affiliates, those that are associated with 
the larger Al Qaeda and ISIS group.
    And there is really two tests to that. One is that it is an 
armed group, so meaning it has the capability. And it has 
entered the fight against the United States aligned with Al 
Qaeda, which is going back to the core of how this 2001 AUMF 
started.
    And then the second is this group is a co-belligerent with 
Al Qaeda against the United States. And I think I already kind 
of covered that, but the intent has to be there to strike at 
the United States.
    So we go through extensive policy discussions on the 
executive side informed by a whole host of information, a lot 
of it coming in of course classified, sir.
    Mr. Buck. So I am interested in--you used the word 
interest. And I guess capability is something that I am 
interested in also. Obviously we have embassies, we have a lot 
of American interests in other countries. The interest does not 
have to be attacking the homeland.
    Mr. Maier. Correct, sir, yes. We would look at it from the 
perspective of threats to Americans. Those can be official 
Americans working in embassies, but those can also be private 
citizens.
    And in fact much of what we have seen Al Qaeda and ISIS 
focused on in recent years are soft targets. So those could be 
tourist locations, those could be businesses that are less 
protected, because they are frankly easier targets.
    Mr. Buck. I would love your help with----
    Mr. Maier. Including overseas, yes, absolutely.
    Mr. Buck. I would love your help with trying to identify 
that in more specific terms. The one thing that we are great at 
is sort of giving broad discretion to the executive branch and 
then blaming the executive branch for abusing or using that 
broad discretion.
    I thank you for your answers, and I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The chair recognizes 
Mr. Castro.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Secretary 
Nuland, thank you to our panel for your testimony today on this 
very important discussion.
    As you all know, the Constitution reserves the power to 
declare war to Congress, and this committee has jurisdiction 
over authorizations for use of military force. Both Democratic 
and Republican Administrations have seized more and more 
authority to unilaterally use force, and congressional inaction 
I believe has enabled this.
    Now, I appreciate Chairman McCaul's decision to consider 
repeal and replacement of the 2001 authorization of the use of 
military force, and I look forward to the debate in this 
committee so Congress can reclaim these authorities that have 
been ceded over the last two decades.
    And I want to first raise an alarming issue that has 
recently gained traction. Representative Bera alluded to it. It 
has gained traction, and I fear it is leading our country down 
a very dark path. There is now open discussion about the use of 
force in Mexico to take on cartels, including air strikes, the 
deployment of armed forces, and special forces operations.
    Now, I am alarmed that many are threatening to do so with 
or without the cooperation of the Mexican Government, which 
could be considered an act of aggression and a violation of 
international law. I am raising these issues and questions to 
get the Administration on the record today.
    And I am directing these questions to Ms. Krass. Is there 
any interpretation of the 2001 AUMF that would allow the use of 
force against cartels in Mexico?
    Ms. Krass. We would not interpret the cartels in Mexico to 
be associated with forces of Al Qaeda.
    Mr. Castro. Are you aware of any executive branch opinion 
or memo that says the President's Article 2 power to repel 
sudden attacks would permit the use of force against cartels?
    Ms. Krass. So the way that we have interpreted through the 
Justice Department the Article 2 power is a two-pronged test. 
One, whether a use of force would serve an important national 
interest, and two, whether or not the use of force would be 
likely to arise in terms of both the use and the response in an 
escalatory response to the war in the constitutional sense.
    Just as you said, Congress has the power to declare war 
under the Constitution, and so that is the twofold test that 
would be applied.
    Mr. Castro. To the best of your understanding, any memo or 
policy that you have seen in the executive branch, is it your 
understanding today that that would include the cartels?
    Ms. Krass. I have not seen anything that would indicate 
that, no.
    Mr. Castro. What steps should Congress take to prevent 
over-broad interpretations of Article 2 that a future 
Administration might try to use to justify congressionally 
unauthorized hostilities with cartels?
    Ms. Krass. Well, that is something that I would have to 
take back to consider. I think that it is very important that 
the executive branch be required to consult with Congress and 
to engage with you fully on our interpretations of the law.
    Mr. Castro. Thank you so much.
    Mr. Visak, this question is for you. Under the U.N. 
Charter, States may use force without the territorial State's 
consent only in response to an, quote, armed attack or with the 
permission of the United Nation's Security Council. Does 
manufacturing, transporting, or selling fentanyl rise to the 
level of a ``armed attack'' in international law?
    Mr. Visek. Congressman, thank you for the question.
    I am not aware of any statement by anyone to suggest that 
it would comply with international law. Normally the U.N. 
Charter talks about the use of force. And that is threats of 
use of force against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of another State.
    Mr. Castro. All right. So, as far as you could tell, as far 
as you know that would be outside the definition?
    Mr. Visek. Yes. I always hesitate to engage in any 
hypotheticals, but it is, it is not an interpretation that 
immediately jumps to mind as the correct one.
    Mr. Castro. Sure. Thank you, sir.
    It is important to my colleagues to get on the record about 
how unwise it would be to start a war with Mexico in this 
manner. And I will soon be introducing a resolution rejecting 
the use of unilateral force in Mexico.
    And so, I encourage my colleagues to please get in touch 
with me if they are in agreement and would like to support such 
a resolution.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Barr.
    Mr. Barr. Thank you.
    Secretary Nuland, welcome back to the committee.
    In June of this year the President claimed that Al Qaeda 
was not present in Afghanistan and that the U.S. was ``getting 
help from the Taliban.'' This, ostensibly, would explain the 
Administration's policy request excluding the Taliban from any 
new AUMF.
    But in June of this year there was a U.N. report outlined, 
that outlined the threat that AQ, Al Qaeda, poses in 
Afghanistan.
    According to the report there are 30 to 60 senior Al Qaeda 
officials, and 400 fighters in Afghanistan today. The Taliban 
provides monthly welfare payments to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has 
safe hub--safe houses, training camps, and trains suicide 
bombers in Afghanistan. At least three Al Qaeda members are 
serving in the Taliban's Government. The Taliban issues 
passports and identity paperwork to foreign AQ members.
    So, my question is, why would the Administration want to 
exclude the Taliban from an AUMF?
    Secretary Nuland. Thanks, Congressman Barr.
    I think you, I am not sure if you have been here from the 
beginning of this----
    Mr. Barr. I have.
    Secretary Nuland. Yes. So, as we said at the outset, we do 
see the Taliban in their own interests, as Assistant Secretary 
Maier underscored, taking actions against ISIS-K.
    And we also see the capability of Al Qaeda in the current 
moment significantly reduced and attrited, including its 
ability to plot, and plan, and strike the homeland.
    So, you know, we, with regard to the President's statement 
we could address some of those things in a different setting 
than this one.
    Mr. Barr. Well, we do not need a different setting. We do 
not need to go to the SCIF. This is a U.N. report. This is open 
source.
    Are the Taliban actively giving aid, and comfort, and 
assistance to terrorists?
    And the further question for any of them, is the Taliban 
killing our Afghan allies that this Administration left behind?
    Secretary Nuland. I am going to defer to Assistant 
Secretary Maier on what we have seen the Al Qaeda be able to--
--
    Mr. Barr. I think that is a very, very important question.
    Is the Taliban murdering our Afghan allies today in 
Afghanistan?
    And if they are, why are they not in an AUMF, or why should 
they not be in an AUMF?
    Secretary Nuland. I do not believe we have seen a 
consistent pattern of those Afghans who worked and supported 
our efforts in Afghanistan being murdered by the Taliban. But 
I----
    Mr. Barr. Well, my constituents, Marines at HKIA----
    Secretary Nuland. Yes.
    Mr. Barr [continuing]. Can tell you. They can tell you what 
the Taliban were doing when we were leaving.
    I represent Marines who were at HKIA. They know what the 
Taliban were doing and planning to do to our Afghan allies that 
we abandoned. They know.
    The Taliban is not our friend.
    Secretary Maier, it is also puzzling that the 
Administration opposes inclusion of Iran-backed militia groups 
in a new AUMF, despite the fact that these very groups are 
responsible for dozens of attacks against U.S. servicemembers 
in the region.
    Is the Administration wishing to not list Iran-backed 
groups in exchange for keeping the door open to a potential 
future Iranian nuclear deal?
    Mr. Maier. Congressman, I think we have said that the 
purpose of not putting Iranian-backed groups on this list is 
because we can already exercise all the military----
    Mr. Barr. Yes, I heard that testimony earlier. We have a 
Georgetown Law grad and we have a Yale Law grad in the 
Administration sitting right next to you. And I know that they 
have read the Youngstown decision and the conferring opinion 
from Justice Jackson.
    And I would like to ask the lawyers, is the Administration 
invoking Article II operating in a zone of twilight?
    Shouldn't we in Congress specifically authorize use of 
force against these murderers of U.S. servicemembers to give 
the President, the Command-in-Chief, the zenith of his power 
here?
    I will ask the lawyers.
    Ms. Krass. Congressman, you are absolutely correct that the 
President's power is at the extent of its zenith, as you say, 
when both Congress and the President are acting together. But 
we believe that the nature of the threat from the IMGs was one 
that the President has been able to address thus far, and has 
not shied away from addressing under his constitutional 
authority.
    Mr. Barr. Well, I do not have time for a final question. 
And I am not really going to disagree necessarily with you on 
the President's Article II powers, but I think it would be 
wise, given the fact that these are groups that are killing 
U.S. servicemembers, that Congress authorize the President to 
give him maximum authority and flexibility with respect to 
responding to those, those attacks against U.S. servicemembers 
in Iraq and Syria.
    I have run out of time. So, I will yield back. But I could 
go on for, for more time. Yield.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Ms. Titus.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the 
witnesses.
    Both the Biden Administration and senior military officials 
have made it clear--OK?--on several occasions that the 2002 
AUMF no longer underpins any of our military. operations. And 
the President said he would sign legislation that repeals it, 
passed by both chambers. So, and that seems to me an indication 
that we could do something here to make a difference, and he 
would be supportive of it.
    Now, I know you all know that the Senate passed a bill 
repealing 1991 and 2002 just this last March. And it was 
bipartisan. And we have voted to repeal the 2002 several times 
in recent years, but not in this Congress.
    So, I am just thinking that if this committee is really 
serious about doing something for war powers reform, and 
reclaiming our powers under the Article I, that maybe we should 
just take up the Senate bill that is sitting over here, and 
move forward and make some progress so we can get on to 
something else.
    So, I would ask you all, do you find it necessary to 
replace the 2002 AUMF, as some of my Republican colleagues have 
suggested? Or should we just repeal it and then take these 
things up as they come along in a more appropriate and relevant 
way?
    Secretary Nuland. We do not see the need to replace the 
2002 AUMF, Congresswoman Titus.
    Ms. Titus. Will you just elaborate on that a little bit? 
And you probably already have and I missed it. I am sorry. But 
that would be helpful.
    Secretary Nuland. So, just, just to say that, obviously, 
our relationship with Iraq has greatly evolved since the 2002 
AUMF. We are now partners with Iraq in Iraq in fighting 
terrorists. We work intensively together.
    And our relationship is, obviously, about much more than 
security. It is about energy independence, combating climate 
change, economic renewal, all of those kinds of things, being a 
good neighbor in the region. So, those circumstances have 
changed dramatically.
    Ms. Titus. And that brings me to my next point that the 
President has also said that we cannot afford to remain 
tethered to the old way or the old policies. We need to keep 
current with what is actually happening in the rest of the 
world because the security landscape has evolved, to use your 
word.
    And our Constitution demands that Congress shapes our 
response to threats, especially when we are sending force.
    Would you say the threats that we face today are different 
from the threats that we faced 2 years ago, 4 years ago, 
however long?
    And how do we keep that relevant? Should we have reports 
back to the Congress? Because that has been pretty lacking in 
the past, of why we need the authorization, how it is being 
used, so that we can stay on top of it on a regular basis.
    Secretary Nuland. I am going to hand to Chris in a minute 
for more detail. But, obviously, the threat is, is evolving 
significantly.
    We talked about Al Qaeda at its nadir. We also talked about 
the increasing threat from affiliated groups in the Sahel, and 
particularly with the political instability that we have seen. 
And we do not know how that is going to evolve going forward. 
We are doing our best diplomatically to try to restore 
democratic governance in some of the, in some of those 
countries.
    But this is one of the reasons why one of the options that 
we proposed here is that the President could be asked to 
certify on a regular basis what groups needs to be covered, et 
cetera. That is one option available to, to you all as you 
think about how to maintain the freshness of this 
authorization.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Titus. Before you go, when you said ``affiliated 
groups,'' how do you define ``affiliated groups''? Do we have 
some certainty about what would be considered affiliated and 
not, or is it just I know it when I see it?
    Secretary Nuland. Well, obviously, if they get support in 
the financial sense, in the military sense, in the training 
sense from ISIS or Al Qaeda in other parts of the world, that 
would be--make them an affiliated group.
    Ms. Titus. Africa?
    Secretary Nuland. In Africa. And some of those groups do 
receive support.
    But, again, Assistant Secretary Maier, who does this all 
day every day, can give you more detail.
    Secretary Nuland. Thank you.
    Mr. Maier. Congresswoman, I think your two questions fit 
very well together. The dynamic nature of the threat is, 
especially in the context of Al Qaeda and ISIS, really one of 
these groups diversifying, and spreading to new places, and 
reinventing themselves.
    So, as we talk about affiliates or associated forces, a lot 
of that is them looking to move to places where there is less 
pressure on them, like, in Africa.
    Ms. Titus. Uh-huh.
    Mr. Maier. And so, I think what we would like to see in 
working with the Congress in a consultative process, if 
possible, that reflection of a mechanism that reflects that 
dynamic nature of this threat over time, ma'am.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
    The chair recognizes Ms. Kim.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, and 
Ranking Member Meeks for holding today's hearing.
    Sorry. Excuse me.
    You know, since the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs became law, the 
national security landscape has changed. And this has led to 
calls to reform or repeal the AUMFs. And I believe it is 
important that as Congress has this discussion that we 
carefully consider the fact that while the landscape may look 
different, the threats of terrorism to our national security 
still exists.
    Congress must increase oversight of the use of military 
force, but it must be also careful not to eliminate the ability 
of the President to confront these threats before an attack on 
the U.S. homeland or our personnel abroad.
    As a member of the Subcommittee on Africa, I am interested 
in how AUMF reform will affect our response to the terrorism in 
the Sahel where the terrorists are proliferating. Sub-Saharan 
Africa accounted for 60 percent of all terrorism deaths last 
year. And the Sahel was the site of 43 percent of all terrorism 
deaths, which is one--this is up from 1 percent in 2007.
    ISIS is present in the Sahel. And Burkina Faso, Niger, and 
Mali all recently had proof. I am deeply concerned that the 
destabilization in the region is further empowering ISIS. And 
as the U.S. loses security partners in the region to coups, we 
need to ensure that AUMF reform accommodates our military's 
ability to respond to terrorism threats in Sub-Saharan Africa.
    So, I want to ask you what are the key terrorist 
organizations in Africa and which are currently covered by the 
2001 AUMF?
    Mr. Maier. So, thank you for that question.
    Very much agree with you. And I think all the indications 
point to these groups looking to exploit insecurity in Africa, 
especially West Africa.
    And you highlighted the number of coups that are very 
disturbing to us. I would also add to that instability, the 
onset of Wagner, the Russia military contractor looking to 
exploit some of that, and some of these groups, some of these 
countries relying on that group.
    So, I think the short answer, ma'am, is that both ISIS and 
Al Qaeda are covered under the AUMF. And they both have 
affiliates or associated forces operating there. We tend to 
think of ISIS as being more comprehensive. And so, when we 
think of ISIS operating there, it has different groups: ISIS 
West Africa,----
    Mrs. Kim of California. Just quickly. Do you agree that a 
new AUMF must cover or continue to cover those groups?
    Mr. Maier. Yes, ma'am, I do.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Are there terrorist groups in Sahel 
that are currently not covered by the 2001 AUMF.
    Mr. Maier. There are groups that we have not to date used 
force against using the AUMF. But I think that was, that is a 
question probably best handled by our, our legal folks.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Let me ask one last question.
    How would the Administration ask Congress to codify 
authorities to act against terrorist groups in the Sahel?
    Secretary Nuland. Again, I think as Assistant Secretary 
Maier said, the vast majority of the ones that we have 
identified are affiliates of Al Qaeda or ISIS. And, therefore, 
we do feel that we are covered now. As we saw when we were able 
to operate in Mali, and when we were able to operate in Niger 
we did not hesitate.
    The issue now is these coups and the difficulty of 
attacking these, this threat when these governments are not 
responsive to U.S. support. So, we are working on that 
diplomatically, as you know.
    Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
    Chairman, I would like to yield the balance of my time to 
Congressman Mast.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Representative.
    I just have one further question going back to our previous 
conversation.
    Does Dr. Tabatabai currently have a suspended position or a 
suspended security clearance pending further review of his 
situation?
    Mr. Maier. No. No, she does not. At this point she is 
working in the Department.
    Mr. Mast. In a capacity outside of your office?
    Mr. Maier. She is in the role she is in, and that she has 
been hired in.
    Mr. Mast. Current chief of staff for you?
    Mr. Maier. She is current chief of staff, yes.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you. Thank you for the clarification.
    I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields, the gentlelady 
yields.
    And Mr. Phillips is recognized.
    Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And both to you and 
Ranking Member Meeks, thank you for leading this committee in 
such a thoughtful, principled, and effective manner at a time 
where we need more of that in this institution.
    And I think our founders anticipated the very discussions 
like the one we are having today when they laid out Article I 
and Article II, some thoughtful tension between the two.
    And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and 
also for your time spent with us over the last few weeks.
    Starting with you, Secretary Nuland, I have heard from many 
Administration officials that the AUMF is a helpful tool but 
not necessarily a requisite tool to carry out the work about 
which we are speaking today.
    Do you share that assertion?
    Secretary Nuland. Congressman Phillips, as we have said, 
when the executive branch and the Congress speak together we 
are at our strongest. So, we very much want to update this AUMF 
and----
    Mr. Phillips. I understand that. And you have said it many 
times. But my question is a little bit more distinct.
    Is it a helpful tool that would be nice to have? Or is it a 
mandatory tool in your estimation, necessary to have?
    Secretary Nuland. Again, I think it would depend on the 
circumstance that you, you are in. And I want to defer to 
Counsel Visek on the specifics. Although there are 
circumstances that are covered by the AUMF where we could not 
act without it. But----
    Mr. Phillips. Yes, if you could lay out very specifically 
what authorities may not be included under Article II that you 
would require the tension, for example, others. I would like to 
hear.
    Mr. Visek. Thank you. It is an excellent question, 
Congressman.
    I think what, what the question gets at is the interplay 
between the AUMF and Article II.
    Mr. Phillips. Uh-huh.
    Mr. Visek. And when do we use Article II? And what is the 
utility of an AUMF?
    As Ms. Krass earlier noted, with respect to Article II 
typically does it serve a--would an operation serve an 
important national interest? And then also because of its 
duration, scope, and nature, and as well as any anticipated 
response, would that military action implicate the ``declare 
war'' clause of the Constitution?
    And so, what I think that is getting at is we, we tend to 
use Article II for defensive, episodic sort of responses.
    When we are looking at a more prolonged authority that is 
needed, if we have a foreseeable, enduring need, it is very 
important, I think, to have a statutory authorization.
    Mr. Phillips. OK. So, what I am hearing is there is a need. 
Is that a fair?
    Mr. Visek. Yes.
    Mr. Phillips. OK. My time is limited, so I would like to 
continue on to Mr. Maier and Ms. Krass.
    You wrote in your testimony that a sunset would be ``a 
major obstacle to providing the legal, strategic, and policy 
certainty needed to fulfill the Nation's counterterrorism 
missions.''
    Now, I know President Obama in his letter to Congress in 
February 2015 asked for a 3-year sunset. Asked for a 3-year 
sunset. So, I am just curious if you disagree with him? And is 
that congruent with your message today?
    Mr. Maier. So, I think, Congressman, we continue to 
consistently point to a time-based sunset clause as being 
challenging as we try to both maintain a large coalition and 
clearly articulate to our adversaries that they are not going 
to be able to wait us out, sir.
    Ms. Krass. And if I could just.
    Mr. Phillips. Ms. Krass.
    Ms. Krass. It is important to us to have uninterrupted 
authority for our detention activities. Back to your point, 
sir, that is one of the important functions that the 2001 AUMF 
is currently fulfilling in terms of----
    Mr. Phillips. Right.
    Ms. Krass [continuing]. All of our war detainees, as 
covered by the AUMF.
    Mr. Phillips. So, you have both spoken to some degree about 
alternatives to a sunset. Can you just articulate clearly and 
somewhat quickly, if you can, just what that looks like so our 
committee can better understand that?
    And as I have said, I have said privately, you know, I 
think no sunset is a non-starter, I think, for this, for the 
U.S. Congress. But we should have that conversation. I would 
like you to respect it.
    If you would just take 20 seconds, someone answer it. 
Thanks.
    Secretary Nuland. Just to say a number of the things we 
have put on the table here.
    Mr. Phillips. Yes.
    Mr. Nuland. Regular reviews by the President and Congress 
at set intervals as to whether it is still needed, would be one 
option.
    Reporting or senior level briefing requirement.
    Presidential, No. 3 would be Presidential certification to 
Congress, at dates certain, that the issue is still needing 
these authorities.
    Next would be expedited procedure for consideration of 
legislation----
    Mr. Phillips. Uh-huh.
    Secretary Nuland [continuing]. To expand or modify.
    And we have engaged the staffs on both sides of the aisle 
on all of these ideas.
    Mr. Phillips. OK. And just, and I will close with this. You 
know, we currently have a, a reporting mandate every 180 days, 
of course. The last we received until this last week was from 
June 2021.
    So, if this is to work and we are to fill our, fulfill our 
constitutional responsibilities, we need to have that reporting 
done on a timely basis.
    And I would ask that you bring that back to your respective 
offices most importantly.
    Thank you. And I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    Mr. Green is recognized.
    Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member.
    As a combat veteran who served under the authorities of 
both 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, and a proud representative in 
Congress for the soldiers at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for whom 
this isn't just an intellectual exercise, I would like to thank 
Chairman McCaul for his leadership and for organizing this 
hearing today.
    I would also like to thank our witnesses for their time, 
expertise, and incredible service to the country.
    One of my favorite days of the years is when I host Service 
Academy Day. Back in the district it is the coolest job I have. 
Meeting the immensely talented young men and women who seek to 
attend our military service academies makes me hopeful for the 
future of our country. It reaffirms the importance of 
everything we do here, that we truly can make this grand 
experiment of ours a more perfect union.
    However, the joy and optimism of this day comes with a 
solemn responsibility. As Members of Congress, one of our 
greatest enumerated powers it to oversee and authorize the use 
of military force, oftentimes sending the very young men and 
women we have nominated to service academies to the battlefield 
and asking them to make, ultimately, the ultimate sacrifice at 
times.
    Under the Constitution we swore an oath to uphold Congress 
is entrusted with the burden of determining if our Nation 
should undertake the trials and ultimate costs of a war. 
Congress has abdicated this duty for far too long, and failed 
to provide the proper legal standing to our troops.
    I welcome the opportunity to work with my colleagues in the 
House to develop a path forward for AUMF authorities that 
respects congressional leadership on this issue, but also 
continues to grant our troops the authorities they need for 
combat operations against Jihadist terrorist groups.
    These Jihadis are the successors of the terror cells that 
attacked our Nation on 9/11, and our operations against these 
groups remain critical to U.S. national security.
    I am confident that there is a constitutionally appropriate 
solution that we can come to. I look forward to developing this 
solution with our witnesses here today.
    Question really to whomever:
    How important is it to ensure a seamless continuity of 
authority between the 2001 AUMF and any replacement to it?
    Secretary Nuland. It is essential, Congressman, for all the 
reasons we have stated here: the tension of the ability to not 
lose an opportunity if we can and need to take a strike; but 
also as Assistant Secretary Maier has underscored, maintaining 
the confidence of the coalition that we need around the world 
that we will stay in this fight, and so that they will stay 
with us in this fight; and budget enact appropriately.
    Mr. Green. If the 2001 AUMF were repealed before a 
replacement was enacted, how would that impact or endanger our 
ability to legally detain the 30 Al Qaeda terrorists at 
Guantanamo?
    Ms. Krass. We would be very concerned by an interruption in 
that authority, sir. And we believe that without a doubt the 
detainees would bring litigation over whether there continued 
to be authority to hold them.
    Mr. Green. Congress is likely to include a time limit in 
any new AUMF. I know my colleagues across the aisle, colleague 
has said yes/no to this. There are differences of opinion.
    But what kind of concerns should we look at in deciding how 
long that should be, if there is a time limit?
    Secretary Nuland. Again, I think we have been pretty clear 
here that a set date just will embolden our enemies.
    Just to clarify one of the proposals that we have put on 
the table in this hearing and with staff is this idea of a 
Presidential certification that there is a continuing 
requirement. One way that you could work with this would be the 
right legislation that would lapse if the President did not 
certify. That would put this back in your hands and would 
create a sense of comity between the Executive and the 
Congress.
    So, that that is one option that is available to you.
    Mr. Green. I like that course of action.
    Secretary Nuland. Yes. Uh-huh.
    Mr. Green. Do you think a new counterterrorism AUMF should 
be global, or regional? I mean, I, I have my opinion, but I 
would be very interested to hear yours.
    Secretary Nuland. It has got to be global, Congressman, 
because of the way, as Assistant Secretary Maier said, these 
groups are morphing and moving to more hospitable environments.
    Mr. Green. So, we have got a lot of new organizations that 
have entered the fight. How do we word it so that we make sure 
any of these new entities that get new names are also included?
    Secretary Nuland. We have talked about a number of 
mechanisms. As you know, we have not been shy about coming to 
you in open session or in classified session with new 
affiliated groups, et cetera. So, we would continue to do that.
    You could do any of a number of things: a regular request 
to the Administration to re-up the list; regular reporting 
requirement; regular consultation; regular recertification. Any 
of those because, as you rightly point out, the groups are 
moving and morphing.
    Mr. Green. Thank you.
    My time is up. I yield.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    Ms. Jacobs is recognized.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all 
of our witnesses for being here.
    You know I represent San Diego, the biggest military 
community in the country. And, you know, my community has borne 
the cost of these decisions, or lack thereof, that Congress has 
not really been making since I was in middle school, which was 
when we voted on this AUMF.
    So, first I just wanted to followup on questions from 
Ranking Member Meeks and my colleague, Representative Phillips, 
on the Section 50 reporting.
    Assistant Secretary Maier, will you commit to providing 
future Section 50 reporting by the statutory deadline?
    Mr. Maier. I will.
    And just to hit that point, because it has come up a number 
of times, I am responsible for the late submission of that 
report. So, we have taken steps internally to ensure that we 
can meet that commitment, Congresswoman Jacobs.
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I appreciate that, especially since 
as you all are asking for a sunset and an exchange promising 
more transparency, it is just hard to believe that when the 
transparency we already mandate is not forthcoming.
    And on that regard, last year in a hearing on the AUMF my 
colleague Mr. Castro asked why the Department of Defense had 
classified the list of countries in which the U.S. military had 
used force. And you responded that you would see if aspects of 
the classified report could be made public.
    We have seen no real disclosure since then. So, can you 
commit to actually going back and taking that look and 
declassifying the list of groups, including affiliates that you 
considered to be covered by the 2001 AUMF?
    Mr. Maier. Yes, ma'am. And, actually, a number of those 
groups are already unclassified that we can speak openly to 
here.
    In some cases we are careful about identifying countries 
for purposes of diplomatic and a host of other things. But I 
think the vast majority of the groups are known publicly, 
ma'am.
    Ms. Jacobs. Great. Well, I will look forward to not having 
to ask you the same question in a year.
    Moving on to discussion of associated or affiliated 
sources, I think that a key question for us in Congress and a 
key reason why it feels like the 2001 AUMF has gone so far 
beyond the original scope, you know, it was originally supposed 
to be about those people who perpetrated 9/11, which is why we 
went after Al Qaeda and the Taliban at the time, but some 
public reporting from what you said today we know that this 
AUMF has been used to justify force not only in Afghanistan, 
but in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Mali, and Niger.
    So, I want to talk about some hypothetical cases. I know 
you have said the standard is enter the fight alongside a named 
group co-belligerent and the intent. So, Ms. Krass, we did go 
through a couple hypothetical associated forces. And you can 
let me know with a yes or no answer if they would--if you would 
consider them covered.
    So, first of all, if a group did not exist in 2001, could 
it still constitute an associated force or otherwise be covered 
by the 2001 AUMF?
    Ms. Krass. So, thank you for that question, Congresswoman 
Jacobs. And I apologize that I prefer not to engage in 
hypotheticals.
    I think we can use as an example the designation of ISIS, 
which was--which is a group that stems from Al Qaeda in Iraq 
from 2003, so that is after the 2001 AUMF. But there were ties 
between its leader and Osama bin Laden before 9/11.
    That group eventually split from Al Qaeda----
    Ms. Jacobs. We are familiar with the history of ISIS. I 
would note there are a number of groups that did not exist in 
2001 that are currently covered, Al-Shabaab, for instance, and 
did not have ties to Osama bin Laden prior to 2001.
    And what if the group itself, this affiliated or associated 
group, if you want to use real examples you are welcome to, but 
if they do not have the ambition, intent, or capability to 
attack the U.S. homeland, as your own reporting that we just 
got this week says, most of the affiliated groups do not, would 
that be considered covered by the 2001 AUMF?
    Ms. Krass. And so, a group under the AUMF has to be one 
which, as Assistant Secretary Maier has explained, an organized 
armed group which has entered the fight alongside Al Qaeda or 
the Taliban, and is a co-belligerent----
    Mr. Jacobs. I got that. But, but we know that in fact many 
of the groups that you all are counting do not actually have 
the intent to strike the United States, as per your own 
reporting.
    Next, if their ends are primarily local, meaning their 
grievances are specific to their community, have nothing to do 
with the United States, and their aim is primarily attacks in 
the region, would that be covered?
    The answer is yes. I will answer for you. I know you do not 
like hypotheticals. We have seen that in the case of the 
elements in the Sahel and Somalia.
    Last, if the group is an affiliate of an affiliate, so ISIS 
is categorized because they were an affiliate, but now we are 
saying ISIS affiliates are also covered, would that be covered?
    Ms. Krass. So, again, to echo what Assistant Secretary 
Maier explained, we see ISIS as we do not look at ISIS as 
having associated forces itself. We see it as itself being a 
single organized group.
    Ms. Jacobs. And I see that for some of the groups you are 
counting as affiliates. But I think, for instance, ISIS 
Mozambique it is very hard to say they are part of ISIS.
    So, I will look forward to continuing this conversation. 
But I think it is clear that we have let these overly broad 
definitions make it so that we do not have any meaningful 
oversight over what you all are doing. And I think that just 
doing Al Qaeda and ISIS and not the affiliated forces 
specifically named is really problematic.
    Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Huizenga.
    Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Right here I was actually a staffer when 9/11 happened. And 
I worked for a gentleman who had just been named to the Intel 
Committee, who actually ended up chairing the Intel Committee, 
Peter Hoekstra.
    And I remember the robust debates, shall we call them, that 
surrounded what we were going to do as a country. And much like 
my friend the birthday boy, Mr. Meeks, had said, I do not think 
anybody imagined that 22 years later we would be operating in 
the same manner.
    And nor did--and I do not want to speak for him, I will 
speak for myself--but nor did we think that Congress would not 
have, at a minimum, periodic involvement in reviewing this. And 
that seems like where we are today, where we are asking, or you 
are asking for that not to be part of this.
    And I would like to know, and probably it is going to be to 
you, Under Secretary, what does this Administration believe 
what Congress' role is in this in determining which groups are 
covered by an AUMF?
    And I understand you do not like the timeline. And I 
understand the thinking and the reasoning why. But what is your 
take on us being involved in the who we are actually fighting?
    Secretary Nuland. Congressman Huizenga, I think we would 
welcome a stronger partnership between the Executive and the 
Congress in the new legislation in terms of how we determine 
the groups and how we report the groups.
    So, as we have said earlier in this hearing, there are many 
ways that we could create a mechanism where we would come to 
you on whatever basis you want, every 2 years, even longer, to 
specify more clearly the groups that we think are covered.
    What I would say, though, as you know in the current 
circumstance we do some of this in the open, particularly with 
groups that we have already acted against, but we do need to 
maintain a classified ability with those groups----
    Mr. Huizenga. OK.
    Secretary Nuland [continuing]. With those groups that we 
may need to go on.
    Mr. Huizenga. Real quickly.
    Does the Administration oppose or support providing 
Congress with the opportunity to review counterterrorism-
related deployments of troops?
    Secretary Nuland. That is going to go to the scope of the--
Yes.
    Mr. Maier. Yes. Congressman, I think we already do that. We 
provide regular updates to the Armed Services Committee on 
those exact things.
    Mr. Huizenga. You had discussed, and my friend from 
Tennessee Congressman Green had thought he was intrigued by 
this, some type of certification by the President.
    What I think maybe I would be more interested in is not 
just having a certification by the President, but a 
congressional review of said certification. Meaning Congress 
would have to approve that need for a certification.
    And, now, that might be problematic with your date 
concerns. But I am not willing to give up the constitutional 
obligation and standing that we have on oversight and our 
involvement in what is going on.
    So, I do not know, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, you 
know, if we can work through some of that type of language, I 
would like that to be a part of it.
    My remaining minute and a half, I would like to know, 
moving to Afghanistan, has anyone at the Department of State or 
the Department of Defense had conversations with Taliban 
leaders regarding its lack of inclusion in a future AUMF?
    Secretary Nuland. I do not believe so, sir. Our 
conversations with the Taliban are extremely constrained and go 
primarily to----
    Mr. Huizenga. So, I am not talking on necessarily official 
channels.
    Secretary Nuland. Yes.
    Mr. Huizenga. I mean, has there been any of that 
conversation?
    Secretary Nuland. To my knowledge, no.
    Mr. Huizenga. OK. Mr. Maier?
    Mr. Maier. No, I am not aware of any conversations of that 
ilk either.
    Mr. Huizenga. OK. Does the Administration oppose listing 
the Taliban on an AUMF? Or is there a fear that somehow that 
would be angering them or set off the relationship?
    Secretary Nuland. Congressman, we have been pretty clear 
that we do think they are making steady progress against ISIS-
K. We can talk about that in a separate session.
    And we do think that Al Qaeda is greatly attrited at the 
current moment.
    Mr. Huizenga. My question is does the Administration oppose 
listing the Taliban on the AUMF?
    Mr. Maier. We do not think it is necessary.
    Mr. Huizenga. OK.
    Mr. Maier. We think we have the authorities to act, 
including what we showed with Zawahiri.
    Mr. Huizenga. OK. Well, I will finish on this with my 
friend Andy Barr's concerns. He has people that were at HKIA. I 
actually have a constituent who was injured at Abbey Gate. I 
have in past referred to him as Jose. He has not wanted to get 
his name out publicly. And I can tell you that he and his 
family, as he has been recovering from this, they do not feel 
confident that the Taliban has made the proper, the proper 
progress that is being claimed here. And that is going to be an 
ongoing concern for us, and should be.
    And with that, my time is up.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    Raises an interesting point. If we got a Presidential 
certification and Congress either approves and moves forward, 
if we disapprove, that could trigger the sunset clause. That 
may be a possible solution.
    And I know, yes, if you would get back to me on that 
particular mechanism, that would be interesting.
    Secretary Nuland. In fact, I was just passed a note from 
folks who have been working on this with your staff, that is 
another way to go.
    Chairman McCaul. Gotcha.
    Ms. Dean is recognized.
    Ms. Dean. I thank you, Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member 
Meeks, for holding this important hearing. I thank you all of 
you, our witnesses, for testifying today, but more importantly 
for your work on behalf of our Nation.
    I want to do a little look back.
    So, I understand, I was not here when the 2001 AUMF was 
signed, was passed, so a little history and then looking 
forward.
    One of the things I am interested in is, maybe legal 
counsel can tell me, how was the 2001 AUMF, how was it so 
broadly interpreted as to allow for a full occupation and 
nation building attempts in Afghanistan? And I say that with 
great respect for what our troops did there. But how do we, 
what do we learn from that broad use of the 2001 AUMF?
    And how do we structure a future AUMF to preclude such 
activities unless congressionally authorized?
    Ms. Krass. Maybe I will start that and then turn to my 
colleague Assistant Secretary Maier.
    The language of the 2001 AUMF, as with other similar AUMFs, 
is broad in that it authorized the President to use all 
necessary and appropriate force to counter the threat 
determined to be a threat from Al Qaeda, and the Taliban, and 
associated forces. And so, various presidents exercised their 
authority consistent with that authorization to take the 
actions that they took in Afghanistan.
    Ms. Dean. Where down that road should we have constricted 
this? If the language was so broad, if we craft one better how 
do we constrict it so that does not go forward without 
congressional approval?
    Ms. Krass. The one means to ensure regular interactions 
with--between the executive branch and Congress are reporting 
mechanisms and consultation requirements.
    Ms. Dean. Did you want to add anything historically?
    Mr. Maier. The only thing I would say, Congresswoman, is 
one of the things that has evolved over time is a lot of 
statutory requirements to update the Congress on ongoing 
operations. And I think we have used that as a mechanism to 
both inform, but at some level continue to move forward 
understanding that there was not legislation that prevented us 
from doing that, ma'am.
    Ms. Dean. OK. And looking forward, I know a lot of us have 
talked about sunset, or a lot of people here.
    And I apologize, we are in and out of this room because of 
conflicts, not because we do not know this is terribly 
important. So, if I, if I am repeating something, let me know.
    Secretary, Assistant Secretary Maier, you testified that 
the sunset, a sunset provision would ``add strategic and 
operational risks to our counterterrorism efforts and 
potentially undermine our international partnerships.''
    In a little more plain English, what does that mean?
    Mr. Maier. I think in as plain an English as I can give 
you, Congresswoman, it means that if our partners start to see 
us backing away from our ongoing commitment, we are the global 
leader, they will do the same.
    And one of the things that we have had as a benefit, 
especially in the defeat ISIS coalition, is a lot of small 
countries looking around seeing each other beginning to be 
involved and, perhaps, in some cases, challenging political 
mandates in their own systems. But they see the United States 
as the leader and the sustainable leader for that.
    Secretary Nuland. And just to add to that, might be 
potential for the terrorists to wait us out. If they know in 3 
years the authority has expired, they are going to go to ground 
and get ready for that moment in 3 years, and then the 
detention authorities as well.
    Ms. Dean. I hear so many echoes of what our concerns are if 
we show weakening support for Ukraine. If others around the 
world think they can wait us out and just grind down this war, 
that level of uncertainty is globally so disastrous. We must 
stand with the folks in Ukraine.
    Ambassador, you talked about this sort of hybrid approach, 
which would be not quite a sense that but a lapse unless 
Presidential certification takes place. What does Presidential 
certification look like, just to build on what you were all 
talking about?
    Secretary Nuland. So, obviously, this is something that we 
need to discuss and work through. But a number of ideas here.
    At regular intervals that you all would set in the law, 3 
years, 5 years, 10 years, the President would have to come 
forward and say, I believe the Nation still needs these 
authorities. It could either be all the authorities or some of 
the authorities, as necessary.
    There could be any number of, you know, you all would have 
to disapprove that if you did not want to grant them. That 
would be one way to go so that there would be a regular 
conversation, and you would have to engage as to whether you 
supported the certification or not. That's one idea and the one 
that the chairman just recently grabbed onto, so.
    Ms. Dean. Again I thank you all for your work. And thank 
you, Mr. Chairman.
    I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
    Mr. Hill is recognized.
    Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman. Appreciate you holding this 
important hearing.
    I was saying to my colleagues it is nice to be in a hearing 
room today working on something extremely important to the 
country. And so, thank you for calling this hearing.
    And a happy birthday to Greg Meeks, the most energetic 70-
year-old guy from Queens that I know personally, who knew 
Cassius Clay. You cannot beat that.
    So, this has been a good discussion, but I want to explore, 
continue to explore this discussion. Thank the panel for being 
here.
    Ms. Krass, Mr. Maier, you said in your testimony that you 
do not believe it is necessary to add or align militia groups 
to a new or upgraded AUMF, partly because--and this is a point 
I am not sure has been made--the 2022 National Security 
Strategy prioritizes China and Russia as the primary strategic 
threats to the U.S.
    Is that really the reason why you do not suggest the Shia 
militia groups be included, or would you say it is the 
principal reason they should be included, Mr. Maier?
    Mr. Maier. Yes, Congressman, I would not say that.
    I think we say in the National Defense Strategy that China 
is our pacing challenge, and Russia is our acute challenge. But 
often forgotten is the fact that we also identify Iran, North 
Korea, and violent extremist organizations as also being 
priorities for us, sir.
    Mr. Hill. Yes. But when you think about that, who is more 
likely to conduct an attack inside the United States or against 
U.S. forces on just an any day basis, one of those terror 
forces, or a Shia militia group, or the Russian Federation?
    Hypothetical question. I know the under secretary will not 
answer it, but I know the assistant secretary might. So, I am 
letting you take a shot at that.
    Secretary Nuland. I am just going to say that it is our job 
to ensure that none of us, none of them take a shot.
    Mr. Hill. Correct. I agree. I agree.
    But it is a difference between, you know, what we are 
dealing with in great power rivalry versus people who have a 
much lower cost potential of taking a shot at the United States 
or U.S. interests. And we have seen that consistently since the 
1950's most, you know, predominantly I think about every day 
since it is October, October to mean means 1983, which means 
the loss of our Marines in Beirut.
    And so, I want to get this right. So, the Shia militia 
groups, who besides the Shia militia groups are active in 
Syria, in Assad's Syria, aiding the Assad regime? Who on your 
list?
    Mr. Maier. Sir, I think some of that goes into a session we 
cannot talk to.
    Mr. Hill. But are the Shia militia active and open-sourced, 
are they active in backing the Assad regime?
    Mr. Maier. Iran definitely used proxies to project its 
power in Syria, sir, yes.
    Mr. Hill. And they have attacked Americans operating in 
Syria?
    Mr. Maier. They have.
    Mr. Hill. And they have attacked other allied partners with 
United States in Syria?
    Mr. Maier. They have.
    Mr. Hill. What is your view of the risk of a Shia militia 
becoming more active and more ingratiated, I would say, and 
having legal standing now in the country of Iraq? Is that a 
risk to expanded Shia militia activities against forces 
connected with the United States?
    Secretary Nuland. I am going to in this open session just 
say that we are working intensively with the Iraqi Government 
and with our security partnership that we have there to ensure 
that Iraq cannot be used as a projection point for Iranian 
militia. I will just leave it there.
    And then just to remind of the strike that the President 
authorized in Syria in March which, you know, was primarily 
designed to restore deterrence.
    Mr. Hill. And in Afghanistan, when was the last time we 
conducted a strike in Afghanistan related to your authorities 
under the AUMF?
    Secretary Nuland. The Zawahiri strike in 2022.
    Mr. Hill. That was in July 2022?
    Secretary Nuland. Correct.
    Mr. Hill. Has there not been any rationale, do you think, 
for a strike since then against the--in the country of 
Afghanistan?
    Secretary Nuland. Congressman Hill, I think it would be 
useful to get you a briefing in another session with regard to 
other work that has been ongoing in Afghanistan, if that makes 
sense.
    Mr. Hill. That is good. Well, I have had those briefings, 
but thank you.
    Ms. Krass, help me understand the legal limitations of 
using the President's Article II authority that you referenced 
in your testimony versus an AUMF from Congress?
    Ms. Krass. So, the President's Article II power is 
constrained in two ways:
    One, he has to determine that the use of force serves an 
important national interest, and;
    Two, that that use of force and any response that is likely 
from whomever the force is being used against would not 
escalate into war in the constitutional sense in terms of its 
nature, scope, or duration.
    Mr. Hill. Good.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Stanton.
    Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Chairman.
    Last year at hearing on the 2001 AUMF Administration 
officials opposed adding a sunset provision to the 2001 AUMF, 
or including a sunset provision in any replacement legislation.
    As an alternative, they proposed conducting periodic 
reviews with Congress of the list of so-called ``associated 
forces.'' And that has been covered, but I want to cover it a 
little bit more.
    This is a question for Assistant Secretary Maier.
    Given that the executive branch has habitually delayed 
complying with the war powers reporting requirements, how can 
Congress meaningfully participate in a periodic review of the 
AUMF?
    Mr. Maier. So, Congressman, I think some of the ways that 
we have highlighted that would go above and beyond a reporting 
requirement such as the Presidential certification, and more 
active engagement as opposed to simply a report, would be some 
options to, if you would, upgrade some, perhaps, some of that 
engagement, sir.
    Mr. Stanton. And however Congress would participate, 
obviously it has to be full compliance with the re--with full 
compliance with the reporting requirements.
    If Congress wanted to delist a group, how could Congress 
ensure that its decisions during a periodic review to delist a 
group would be legally binding?
    Secretary Nuland. As we have talked about, one option could 
be that the President would need to certify to you that he 
needs the authorities to continue, or he needs them to continue 
over some or all of the statute. And then you could approve 
that or respond to that by rejecting some aspects of the 
Presidential request. That is another way to go.
    Mr. Stanton. Your thought is that it would not require an 
actual act of Congress to pass a new bill subject to 
Presidential veto to delist a group?
    Secretary Nuland. It might.
    I am going to stop pretending to be a lawyer. I am not the 
effective lawyer
    Mr. Stanton. Fair enough.
    It is an interesting question and, you know, one that would 
depend on, on the wording, obviously, and what the procedure 
is. I mean, obviously we are mindful of the bicameralism and 
the presentment requirements.
    But I think the idea, however, is to engage with Congress, 
you know, certification to be used as a mechanism to say, yes, 
there is this continuing mean, and then to build in procedures 
for Congress to express its view, whether by passing a law or 
by traditional oversight and reporting.
    You know, obviously Congress always has the ability to pass 
a law. But I think what we are communicating is we are open to 
structuring as many ways as possible and is legal to, to 
increase engagement with Congress. Because I think as has been 
said previously, when Congress and the President are on the 
same page it sends the most powerful signal.
    Ms. Krass, according to the Administration the 2001 AUMF 
allows hostilities with Al Qaeda and the Taliban's associated 
forces. But we know the Department of Defense has used the 2001 
AUMF to pursue the Islamic State of Libya, the Islamic State 
Sinai Province, the Islamic State Yemen Province, among others.
    These groups are affiliated devices, not Al Qaeda, and many 
of them are actually in conflict with regional Al Qaeda 
affiliates.
    How far removed can a ``associated force'' be from Al Qaeda 
and the Taliban under the 2001 AUMF?
    Ms. Krass. Thank you, Congressman.
    The Administration, the Obama Administration in 2014 
determined that ISIS qualified as an associated force of Al 
Qaeda because ISIS is a successor to Al Qaeda in Iraq. And its 
leadership was closely aligned with Osama bin Laden and Al 
Qaeda and to further allegiance to Al Qaeda. They subsequently 
split off. But we cannot allow our adversaries in the terrorist 
group to determine whether they are covered by the AUMF by what 
they name themselves and who they, who they align with.
    Mr. Stanton. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    Mr. Davidson is recognized.
    Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman.
    I echo the sentiments of many colleagues. This is an 
incredibly important hearing and, frankly, one that is long 
overdue, but I am grateful to have it today.
    Serving in the 75th Ranger Regiment, one of my soldiers who 
had been in combat in Mogadishu, Somalia, asked me whether he 
had done the right thing in a tough situation. He did. But he 
wanted my opinion on why America had asked such incredible 
things of him and then pulled out.
    If we weren't committed to the victory, why did we even go? 
And if we were committed to victory, what did we actually 
achieve?
    In the wake of 9/11 we saw President Bush fly a, quote, 
``Mission Accomplished'' banner on the deck of a United States 
aircraft carrier. Everyone in the world knew that was a false 
claim and called him out on it. Few knew, but some suspected, 
that an endless war was lying ahead.
    The Constitution reserves the declaration of war for 
Congress for a reason. When America is at war its people must 
support the cause. Even when an all volunteer force wages the 
wars, the American people are credited or blamed for victory or 
defeat and left with the tab.
    It is vitally important that this body, this Congress, 
closest to the people, make the commitments to put America at 
war. Any other standard risks empowering a permanent police 
State. And for that reason, every single Congress must actively 
make that commitment. It is not an open checkbook for an 
unlimited duration. That is not acceptable and it cannot 
continue.
    Now, to be clear, terrorists, transnational criminal 
organizations, and nation States who are actively preparing to 
harm the United States, Americans, or our allies should know 
that there will be no sanctuary for them anywhere. And in my 
view, we should address them all in an effective AUMF.
    It seems the Administration wants to selectively apply that 
principle both in identifying and targeting enemies of our 
country and in whether to name them in an AUMF, whether in 
public or in a classified setting.
    And they want to claim Article II has nearly unlimited and 
uncheckable application in nearly every situation, whether that 
is intelligence collection or active combat. To reclaim Article 
I constitutional authority on this matter, Congress must end 
the status quo with a focused AUMF and, separately, with 
reforms to the Patriot Act, and termination of Executive Order 
12333.
    Mr. Visek, how is an authorization for use of military 
force different than a declaration of war?
    Mr. Visek. Well, I think the authorization to use military 
force, I think it serves sort of three important functions. And 
here what we are talking about is non-State actors. I think 
traditionally they cannot give a declaration of war----
    Mr. Davidson. Focused on a nation State.
    Mr. Visek [continuing]. Focused on nation States.
    But I think they both serve the same purpose in that they 
are authorizing sort of prolonged military activities, you 
know, where there is a continuing threat to the United States 
and I think, as I said, or U.S. interests.
    I think previously, in a response to other questions, both 
Ms. Krass and I have noted that Article II authorizes 
activities short of war, and we tend to use in sort of episodic 
defensive response mode.
    Mr. Davidson. Right. Reactive.
    So, how important is authorization for our actions on the 
battlefield or detention of enemy combatants?
    Mr. Visek. Well, I think, as my DoD colleagues and Acting 
Secretary, Deputy Secretary Nuland said, I think it is fairly 
important to have continuity in our authorities. And so, an 
AUMF, by virtue of the fact that it is sort of an authority 
that is enduring, if you will, until it is, obviously, modified 
or adjusted, is critical to maintaining authorities for 
detention, and also for, you know, operational purposes, and 
also the non-legal but the very, probably, equally important 
policy aspects of showing a commitment to our allies, and also 
telling our adversaries that we are in it for the long haul.
    Mr. Davidson. Just because I will not have time for an 
answer, I would ask that we get a written response to this 
question.
    In the past, AUMFs have led to large and enduring presence 
of boots on the ground, some would say occupation. In the 
Middle East it has led to regime change wars against nation 
States and subsequent, largely unproductive, nation building 
efforts.
    What is considered an occupation? And what are the limiting 
factors, whether it is size, location, and duration?
    And I think we need to address that in the AUMF. So, your 
feedback would be greatly helpful.
    And I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
    The chair recognizes Mr. Jackson.
    Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Thank you, Chairman.
    And happy birthday to our Ranking Member Meeks, and many 
more.
    Thank you to Mr. Visek. Can you explain the process whereby 
the Administration determines which and what entities qualify 
as associate forces, and who is at the table to make this 
decision?
    Mr. Visek. Well, I think determinations are made sort of at 
the most senior levels of the U.S. Government. It is an 
interagency process after careful evaluation of the 
intelligence.
    The associated forces, it is a two-part test. And I think, 
first, the entity has to be an organized armed group that has 
entered the fight alongside Al Qaeda. Previously it was also 
the Taliban, but I think the focus here is really Al Qaeda.
    Second, it is not just that they have, you know, entered a 
fight alongside Al Qaeda, but the group must be a co-
belligerent with Al Qaeda in hostilities against the United 
States or our coalition partners.
    And I think this has been an important sort of test for us 
because, as has been noted, groups can splinter. They can 
morph. They can rebrand. And we have to have some flexibility 
to be able to adjust.
    Now, in the 2001 AUMF expand the associated forces test. I 
think that would be a familiar model and one that has been 
recognized by, you know, Congress, and the Judiciary and, 
obviously, the executive branch as, you know, a model that 
could be used going forward.
    We would, of course, be open to, you know, other ways to 
provide flexibility in terms of----
    Mr. Jackson of Illinois. If I could ask a followup question 
on that.
    How do you determine the scope, the nature, duration of 
which we will have these engagements going forward?
    Mr. Visek. Well, I think at this point I'd like to turn to 
Assistant Secretary Christopher Maier, because I think this is 
a predictive exercise that really involves sort of an 
intelligence in military assessments as well as sort of the 
expertise of policy officials at the State Department.
    Mr. Maier. So, Congressman, I think it's a multi-pronged 
consideration. So, when we look at what is going to be 
necessary in the context of military force, we're really 
applying a series of tests.
    But I think in most--most simply and in the plainest 
English, we're trying to mitigate the threat within the means 
that we have.
    So, that is not always exclusively military force, of 
course. We use a variety of other instruments. But I think from 
a Department of Defense perspective, we're looking to do this 
as effectively and efficiently as possible.
    Mr. Jackson of Illinois. In light of the Administration 
withdrawing from Afghanistan, what is the process, are there 
any people or any groups that have come off of our watch list 
as a result of the shift in the policy in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Maier. Congressman, we have not taken anybody off the 
AUMF Associated Forces List. As too watch-listing, if that's 
what you're also getting at, I think that's probably better 
handled in a different session, sir.
    Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Thank you. And probably the last 
question is, only a handful of members were able to sign this 
AUMF and most of them are gone now. And this is a key 
responsibility, a core responsibility for the--why we got 
elected to be a part of this.
    What would you say, recommend on, that could give us some 
comfort on why we're here and what we can do to help better 
assist in your service?
    Secretary Nuland. Well, Congressman Jackson, I think that's 
exactly why we're here. That we would welcome a re-upping of 
appropriate authorities through a new AUMF. And discussing what 
needs to be there together.
    And that's, I think, why we've been going through all of 
this today. So, because we want members like you to be part of 
the next chapter of this fight against terror.
    Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Thank you, Victoria. I yield back 
my time. Thank you.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields and Mr. Baird is 
recognized.
    Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you and the 
Ranking Member for holding this important discussion. And happy 
birthday, Ranking Member. We appreciate--also, we appreciate 
all of our witnesses being here today.
    But my area focuses on terrorism is exploding in Africa, 
Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 60 percent of all terrorism 
deaths last year. AFRICOM describes Al-Shabaab as al-Qaeda's 
largest and best financed affiliate with annual revenues around 
$150 million.
    So, despite robust U.S. and African Union missions to 
degrade the group, DoD reports that Al-Shabaab poses a high 
terrorist threat to the U.S. interest in Somalia and even a 
weak to moderate threat to the U.S. homeland.
    So, is it important that Al-Shabaab be covered by any new 
AUMF?
    Secretary Nuland. Absolutely.
    Mr. Baird. Took care of that question, did not it. So, 
anyway. But under the 2001 AUMF, Al-Shabaab has been targeted 
as an associated force of al-Qaeda.
    And in a new AUMF, should Al-Shabaab be listed as a 
targetable group rather than just an affiliated or associated 
force of al-Qaeda? And why or why not?
    Secretary Nuland. So, I'm going to let Assistant Secretary 
Maier elaborate. But Al-Shabaab started as an affiliate of al-
Qaeda. It still works with al-Qaeda.
    That would not preclude them being listed separately if 
that's what the Congress wanted to do. But under the current 
AUMF that's how we think about them.
    Mr. Maier. Really Congressman, nothing to add other than 
the fact that the reason we would keep al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab 
together is because Al-Shabaab's largely speaking on behalf of 
al-Qaeda and using their ideology to really be the impetus for 
why they would threaten Americans.
    So, there's a lineage there, sir.
    Mr. Baird. Anyone else?
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. Ms. Kamlager-Dove is 
recognized.
    Ms. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member 
Meeks. Happy birthday to you as well.
    I want to thank the witnesses who are here. I know it is 
rare to have you here. And I have questions. But before I get 
to them, I do just kind of what to reconnect us to reality for 
a moment.
    We're on the verge of a congressional shutdown. And I hear 
members demanding a more aggressive stance against malign 
actors and posturing a more defiant defense of democracy around 
the globe.
    But when Congress shuts down the government, half of the 
Pentagon's civilian employees will be furloughed. In the event 
of a national defense crisis, new contracts will not be 
awarded.
    Payments to defense contractors would be delayed. Foreign 
aid programs supporting our allies would dry up. Members of the 
military would be expected to maintain operations and posts 
without pay. State Department employees and consular operations 
would only continue for as long as there is funding.
    And in fact later on today, we'll be voting on amendments 
that would compromise and cut critical programs that support 
our national security and diplomacy. So, I do not want us to 
compartmentalize reality here.
    But now for my questions and so grateful that the member 
before me asked about Al-Shabaab, because Africa is now the 
epicenter of international terrorism, with total terrorism 
related fatalities rising by nearly 50 percent since 1921 to 
1922.
    And this is while the United States has had a counter-
terrorism presence on the continent for over 15 years. The 
international community has seen the destabilizing impacts of 
this violence and the flawed counter-terrorism policies meant 
to address it.
    So, Assistant Secretary Maier, U.S. forces have been 
engaged in Somalia against Al-Shabaab since 2017. Yet, aside 
from some momentum in 2012, we have not seen Somali and 
international forces decisively turn the tide against Al-
Shabaab.
    So, looking back over the past 15 years, why do you believe 
we have not been more successful in Somalia?
    An, please cover our shortcomings in the U.S. Government 
response as well as any structural obstacles.
    Mr. Maier. So, Congresswoman, I think this is a multi-
pronged question and a multi-pronged answer. I'll try to be 
very brief in saying that our ability to operate unilaterally, 
the U.S. Government only can deal with some of this problem.
    Many of the conditions in Somalia are a function of poor 
governance. And until really recently, and by that I mean, in 
the last year or so, we have not seen the Somali government 
really take the fight to Al-Shabaab the way we'd like.
    I think with President Hassan Sheikh, we've seen that. So, 
we have a partner there that is much stronger.
    And I'd be remiss if I did not mention that the decision at 
the end of the last Administration to pull all U.S. forces out 
of Somalia and then have our forces commuting to work in a less 
than ideal circumstance certainly had impact operationally on 
our ability to get after the Al-Shabaab threats.
    Ms. Kamlager-Dove. OK. Thank you for that. And following up 
on that question, Undersecretary Nuland, even if we're making 
significant gains, many experts have advised that sustaining 
those over the long term would require restabilization and 
rehabilitation efforts, a local security presence, addressing 
clan divisions, and standing up government services. Yet, we 
sort of mainly allocated military resources.
    So, given this discrepancy, what is your view of our end 
goal in Somalia? And what are the means that we need to achieve 
it?
    Secretary Nuland. First Congresswoman Kamlager-Dove, thank 
you on behalf of the men and women of the State Department and 
DoD for noting how deleterious a shutdown would be for 
government operations and all that we do around the world.
    Just to say in Somalia and to echo what Assistant Secretary 
Maier said, we now have a government in Somalia that's taking 
the fight to Al-Shabaab. We work with them in every way in 
terms of mentoring, going along with them, et cetera.
    But we are also providing significant support to them on 
the economic side where we can, on the humanitarian side where 
we can, thanks to the generosity of the Congress in helping to 
rehabilitate communities when they are cleared of Al-Shabaab.
    It is difficult. But the Somalia we seek is obviously one 
that is democratic, at peace and free of terror.
    Ms. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chair.
    Chairman McCaul. The lady yields. The Chair recognizes Mr. 
Waltz.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I actually had some other 
things I wanted to talk about today. But, Mr. Chairman, it was 
just brought to my attention, Ms. Nuland, you said earlier in 
this hearing, I quote, I do not believe we've seen consis--a 
consistent pattern of those Afghans who worked and supported 
our efforts.
    And this was in response to a question about SIVs and by 
extension commandos and others who stood and fought with us. I 
do not believe we've seen a consistent pattern of those Afghans 
who worked and supported our efforts in Afghanistan being 
murdered by the Taliban, end quote from earlier in this 
hearing.
    Ms. Nuland, I'll be candid with you, that is one of the 
most ignorant and shameful statements I have heard in this 
Congress. But let me just take a moment and tell you what's 
happening in the real world outside of the cubicles and the 
bureaucracy in the State Department.
    One of the SIVs I successfully got out, his cousin was just 
drug through his village behind a Taliban truck to death, to 
send a message about ever working with Americans again.
    His brother was beaten to an inch of his life just long 
enough so that he could call the SIV that's now in the United 
States and tell him what happened before they killed him.
    I just talked to another SIV that we got out, the Taliban 
kidnaped his 10 year old nephew, had his nephew call him here 
and say, you come back to face Taliban justice, or the 10-year 
old boy will.
    I can keep going. I just had an Uber driver last night that 
said the Taliban just visited his house for the fifth time 
looking for him, and have now kidnapped one of his relatives 
until he comes out. He's put the rest of his family in hiding.
    I can put you in touch with veterans' groups. One gentleman 
I just spoke with exhausted his entire savings and his kid's 
529 plan, still having people in hiding 2 years later, doing 
your job.
    I can go on and on. But, Mr. Chairman, for the record, I'd 
like to enter in just three from a quick Google search, Human 
Rights Watch, No End to Taliban Revenge Killings in 
Afghanistan. I'd like to enter that for the record. Dated 
August 2023.
    [The Information follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Waltz. Amnesty International, at least 237 extra 
judicial executions from the Taliban takeover until June of 
last year.
    [The Information follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Waltz. The U.N. UNAMA, U.N. News, Afghanistan's Taliban 
responsible for revenge killings, torture of former officials. 
I can go on.
    [The Information follows:]

    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Chairman McCaul. Without Objection, so ordered.
    Mr. Waltz. Ms. Nuland, I do not know how you and Secretary 
Blinken look yourselves in the mirror. I do not know how you 
collect a paycheck in good conscious.
    But I can tell you what, I and others on this Committee and 
other veterans who are out there watching you guys pat 
yourselves on the back as we have a spike in veteran suicide, I 
will not quit for those Gold Star families until you all are 
held accountable.
    When you make statements like that, it only reinforces why 
I get up in the morning to come and hold this position the 
American people have elected me to.
    Let me switch very quickly. We mentioned two cartels. 
There's two tests, right? It's international interest and it 
will not escalate to war.
    We've had hundreds of thousands, we've had more people 
killed in the United States from the poison these cartels are 
pumping over the border than we lost in every major war since 
World War II.
    So, I want to open it up to the panel, but Assistant 
Secretary Maier, I'll go with you first, is it in our national 
interest to prevent the deaths of 100 thousand Americans a 
year?
    Mr. Maier. Yes, Congressman Waltz, absolutely. And I think 
the fentanyl challenge and other opioid challenges are really 
something that this also falls in my portfolio and we're 
focused on all the time.
    Mr. Waltz. Right.
    Mr. Maier. I think the one nuance I would give you is, I'm 
not sure that military force in every instance is the right 
tool. As we----
    Mr. Waltz. So, we all remember in the 90's, we were using 
legal authorities to try to run around the world and arrest al-
Qaeda, right?
    Whether that was in Africa or elsewhere. It was not until 
3,000 Americans were killed on 9/11 this body and other, and 
the President at the time decided it was a national security 
issue that warranted military force.
    Mr. Chairman, we are losing far more than that every day. 
These cartels, if we change the name tomorrow from Sinaloa and 
Jalisco to Isis and al-Qaeda, it would not even be a debate on 
what action that we have to take.
    And I will certainly support that in this Committee. Thank 
you, Mr. Chairman. I yield my time.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. Mr. Crow is 
recognized.
    Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you to all of you 
for coming in today and for your professional testimony and 
your work.
    You know, I do want to address though, I think, a 
fundamental misunderstanding of something that we have not 
really dove into. And that is just the real meaning behind this 
relationship, the relationship between the executive branch and 
the legislative branch.
    And there have been some phrases that have been used 
consistently today. Comments like, we want to have a stronger 
partnership. Comments like, you know, there has to be periodic 
reviews and only in the absence of periodic reviews does 
Congress then come in and exercise its constitutional 
obligations.
    Comments like, we want to make Congress a stronger part of 
the next chapter of terrorism, counter-terrorism. I think all 
of those fundamentally misunderstand the issue here.
    Twenty-two years, $3 trillion by most estimations, 
thousands of American lives, hundreds of thousands of non-
American lives. I fought the war three times, was on a, you 
know, a special operations task force. Conducted direct action 
missions against many of these entities we're talking about 
here today.
    But Congress has to make the decision. Congress is in 
charge. There is no partnership. We make the decision. We take 
the vote.
    And when there's a situation regarding sunset provisions, 
we've talked a lot about sunset provisions, and the refrain 
over and over again is, if we forecast to our partners that 
there's a sunset, maybe they'll back away. Maybe they'll lose 
resolve. That's kind of the point.
    Now, if they're a partner and they're willing to back away 
only if we're engaged or if they're willing to lose their 
resolve if we actually do not have a debate, then maybe they're 
not a good partner. Then maybe we should back away.
    That is the debate that has to happen in this body before 
the American people. And that's the debate that hasn't happened 
the last two decades. That is the point.
    So, I'm not afraid of those debates. And I'm not afraid of 
putting a sunset provision in there, to actually have a 
discussion about maybe we shouldn't be in some of these places.
    Maybe after 20 years and hundreds of billions of dollars in 
Afghanistan we should have had a discussion earlier about their 
lack of resolve and the nature of their partnership.
    So, I think that is really the debate here. And for my 
part, I will not vote for anything that does not put an 
affirmative obligation in the U.S. Congress to cast a vote to 
use force. Period.
    There's no certification in my view. There's nowhere the 
President has to act or not act and then Congress steps in 
later. That is not the way the Constitution works.
    And if history has shown anything, that is a failed policy. 
It has failed, because it will not force a discussion on the 
nature of our partners and allies. And it will not hold them 
accountable too for their own destiny.
    It has failed because we're not actually having a 
discussion about what success looks like. Right, over and over 
again Presidents, regardless of political affiliation, define 
success as, there's been no attacks on the homeland. Yes, that 
is a success. I agree with that.
    But also look at the other elements of success, because if 
that is our definition of success and that is our only 
definition of success, then we will be locked into this in 
perpetuity. It will go on forever, because forever we will have 
to be doing this to prevent an attack on the homeland.
    Another element of success has to be, it has to be, what is 
the geographic scope of these entities? Are they growing?
    Are they metastasizing? Because by that definition of 
success, we are failing. We are actually failing.
    And we have to have a debate about what other elements of 
our national policies and our national security that we need to 
bring to bear, humanitarian, diplomatic, governance, that we 
are not bringing to bear in appropriate ratios to achieve that 
other definition of success.
    We are locked into a perpetual conflict that unless we are 
very serious and have debate in this body, will go on forever. 
So, I'm sorry, I had some questions, I will submit those for 
the record.
    But I think it's just really important that we level set 
about what this is really about. And I am not afraid of having 
the discussion, an honest discussion about what we should and 
shouldn't be doing.
    And we should not, as a country, shy away from that. And if 
our partners are afraid of that, if they waver because we want 
to have that debate, then good riddance to them. Maybe they 
shouldn't be a partner.
    Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes 
Mr. Lawler.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sanctions should be 
tied to behavioral change. But under the recent Iranian hostage 
deal, the Biden Administration waived certain sanctions to 
facilitate the transfer of $6 billion in frozen Iranian funds 
to accounts in Qatar despite Iran's ongoing malign activity.
    Ms. Nuland, what message does this send regarding U.S. 
sanctions policies?
    Secretary Nuland. Congressman, thank you. Just to remind 
and to be very clear, no American taxpayer dollars went to Iran 
to get our five American citizens and two family members home.
    This was money that was Iran's to begin with that was 
frozen at our request by our allies and partners so that it 
could----
    Mr. Lawler. Frozen why?
    Secretary Nuland. Frozen because of our concern about their 
malign activity, including the----
    Mr. Lawler. So, what has changed--what has changed about 
their malign activity since this Administration chose to 
unfreeze $6 billion in Iranian assets that were sanctioned?
    Secretary Nuland. One aspect of what has changed, is they 
have been willing to release these seven people after 
exceptionally----
    Mr. Lawler. Did we not trade--did we not trade hostages for 
hostages?
    Secretary Nuland. Again, let me just also remind, if I may.
    Mr. Lawler. Did we not trade hostages for hostages?
    Secretary Nuland. I'm not sure what you're----
    Mr. Lawler. Did we not give hostages?
    Secretary Nuland. We did. Of course we did.
    Mr. Lawler. OK. So, not only did we trade hostages----
    Secretary Nuland. They were not hostages. Our people were 
not hostages.
    Mr. Lawler. Not only did we--not only did we trade 
hostages, we then did what? We gave $6 billion to the biggest 
State sponsor of terrorism.
    And you know what was insulting? That this Administration 
informed Congress on September 11. The worst terrorist attack 
in the history of our Nation. That's the day that this 
Administration chose to inform Congress officially?
    Secretary Nuland. Congressman, let me just clarify one 
thing here first of all. The people that we got home were 
wrongfully detailed in Iran. The people that we ultimately 
released, had been charged and convicted in American courts.
    We made that decision because----
    Mr. Lawler. Right. So, on top of that we gave----
    Secretary Nuland. Because, if I may finish----
    Mr. Lawler. We gave six--no. We gave six----
    Secretary Nuland. If I may finish?
    Mr. Lawler. I'm reclaiming my time. We gave $6 billion on 
top of that exchange.
    Secretary Nuland. Again, this----
    Mr. Lawler. For what--what does that say, as my original 
question, what does that say about our policies with respect to 
sanctions?
    It says they mean nothing. That's what it says. It says 
they mean absolutely nothing.
    Secretary Nuland. First that was----
    Mr. Lawler. And we all know that money is fungible. So, 
what we're doing is freeing up $6 billion that Iran otherwise 
would have had to spend on humanitarian efforts to go fund 
terrorism once again.
    It is idiotic, truly.
    Secretary Nuland. This money can only be drawn on for food 
or medicine for the Iranian people. And that is a stipulation--
--
    Mr. Lawler. Right. But it is freeing up $6 billion that 
they otherwise would have had to spend on food and water and 
humanitarian aid to go fund terrorism.
    This is the problem when you start negotiating with 
terrorist regimes.
    Secretary Nuland. Except that they have not been spending 
money on food or medicine for their own people as you have 
seen.
    Listen, I would also make the point that we continue to 
have over hundreds of sanctions on Iranian entities and 
individuals for all of their nefarious and malign behavior 
around the world. And we were----
    Mr. Lawler. Except we just undercut that by unfreezing $6 
billion in assets.
    Moving onto a different topic. If we included al-Qaeda in 
the new AUMF, but not the Taliban, could the Taliban later 
become a targetable associate force of al-Qaeda if the Taliban 
increase cooperation with them?
    Ms. Krass. Yes, I can take that question, sir. And the 
answer is yes. Particularly if the current draft Committee 
proposal were enacted. And it would have the same associated 
forces construct that we have now.
    Mr. Lawler. OK. Given the extensive current al-Qaeda/
Taliban cooperation that we see, what else would we have to see 
for the Taliban to be listed?
    Mr. Maier. I think Congressman, we would need to see actual 
Taliban facilitation of al-Qaeda's attacks on Americans. At 
this point, we're not seeing that, sir.
    Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes 
Mr. Lieu.
    Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Let me start by thanking 
Secretary Nuland and Secretary Blinken and the State Department 
for fighting very hard to try to get more jet fighters to 
Ukraine last March.
    The State Department understood the importance of air power 
in modern warfare. The State Department made the decision to 
win very early on in this war. And I thank the State Department 
for doing so.
    I have some questions about now the AUMF. I support 
repealing other existing AUMFs, because I believe they've been 
abused by both Republican and Democratic Administrations. The 
hard part is putting in a new one.
    In 2015, the Obama Administration tried to put in a new 
AUMF if you recall. I came out against it pretty early on, 
because as I read that AUMF, it was going to give the 
Administration authority to put our personnel, our men and 
women in our Armed Forces in harm's way and then handcuff them 
by not letting them do what they needed to win.
    It had a phrase basically saying, you could go fight the 
enemy, except you cannot do enduring offensive ground combat 
operations. Which made literally no sense.
    Because, why would you allow our troops to be in harm's way 
and not let them destroy the enemy?
    It would seem that if we're going to authorize force, we 
better give our military the ability to use the force they need 
too win.
    So, I have a question for the panel. Do you think that 
limitation was good to have been in that 2015 AUMF?
    Would you want something like that? Or would you oppose 
something like that?
    Ms. Krass. Thank you very much for the question, 
Congressman. Speaking as a lawyer, I would prefer the 
formulation allowing the President to use all necessary and 
appropriate force.
    Mr. Lieu. Thank you. So, I would agree with you on that. 
Now, it appears to me the panel does not like a time 
limitation. You do not seem like a sunset.
    I'm sort of curious why you'd be opposed to just listing 
additional groups like the Taliban?
    I mean, you do not have to use it. You do not have to use 
that authority. I'm just wondering, is there--what is driving 
that?
    Are you waiting for the Taliban to do something? Do you 
think this would offend them?
    What is sort of saying, no, no, no, we do not actually want 
this authority.
    Secretary Nuland. So, Congressman Lieu, first of all, thank 
you for your comments on Ukraine and for your stalwart support 
of Ukraine against Russian aggression.
    With regard to the Taliban, three things here. First of 
all, they are making steady, if not sufficient, progress 
against ISIS-K.
    We have also said here that at the current moment under the 
environment that they've created, al-Qaeda is at its weakest 
point in a long, long time.
    Mr. Lieu. No, no, no, I understand the argument between 
them.
    Secretary Nuland. Yes.
    Mr. Lieu. I'm just wondering, if you do not want a time 
limitation in the AUMF, how do you know what the Taliban looks 
like in 7 years?
    And why would not you just want that authority? I do not 
sort of get why it's necessary, and say no, no, no, do not give 
us this authority.
    Secretary Nuland. I think we should probably have a 
consultation in a setting other than this one on some aspects--
--
    Mr. Lieu. I got it. All right.
    Secretary Nuland. Of this.
    Mr. Lieu. OK. That's fine. I'll wait.
    Secretary Nuland. With regard to a sunset, you know, we've 
talked about being able to adjust in consultation the groups, 
et cetera, as needed.
    And as Chris said earlier, if the Taliban were to take a 
different stance, vis-a-vis terrorist groups on their territory 
and a significantly different one, obviously we would want them 
listed.
    Mr. Lieu. Thank you. I have a question about what you all 
view as force. So, right now, and let's say there were no 
AUMFs, the Administration could not launch missiles at Iran.
    Could the Administration launch a cyber attack without an 
AUMF? Is that force?
    Ms. Krass. So, depending on the facts and circumstances, a 
cyber attack could constitute a use of force, in which case it 
would need to be authorized either by Congress or by the 
President's Article II power.
    Mr. Lieu. All right. If the Administration had some special 
operations unit go and take out an Iranian scientist who was 
working on nuclear weapons, would that constitute force?
    Would--they must issue an AUMF to do that?
    Ms. Krass. Again, I prefer not to engage in hypotheticals. 
But a use of force would include killing an individual, yes.
    Mr. Lieu. OK. And would a use of force include, let's say, 
the U.S. installing a computer virus on centrifuges that make 
them not work well?
    Would that constitute force?
    Ms. Krass. I think it would really depend on the 
circumstance of whether whatever it was that was being done 
constituted an actual use of force in terms of a kinetic.
    As you may be aware, there are challenges in determining 
what in cyber actually constitutes a use of force. And so, we 
have mainly kept to those things that we know would be a use of 
force in the more physical context.
    Mr. Lieu. Thank you. So, my time is up. I just want to 
request the Chairman to maybe set up a classified briefing on 
what constitutes force, especially in terms of cyber.
    Chairman McCaul. And I think those are very good questions. 
I'd be happy to do so.
    The Chair recognizes Mr. Self.
    Ms. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I've listened to this 
discussion back and forth, the panel has used the word depends 
and depending a lot. I understand while I was not here that you 
had a discussion about the War Powers Act.
    And basically the Administration does not believe the War 
Powers Act is a constraint on the Presidency. And that's where 
my concern lies, because I am from Texas. We have an 
international situation on the southern border in which the 
President considers the Congress and the law irrelevant.
    And that informs my opinions about this discussion, along 
with, I share Mr. Waltz' concerns, because I've not been in 
Afghanistan as recently as he has been, I was there very early. 
But I want to ask you about, and the first question will maybe 
get at it.
    Is there any consideration in the Administration to 
recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan?
    Secretary Nuland. No. We have not taken that up. And we do 
not intend to.
    Ms. Self. So, what do you consider the situation of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan today? How do you characterize it?
    Secretary Nuland. They have self described themselves as 
assuming governing authority in Afghanistan.
    Ms. Self. No. How do you consider it?
    Secretary Nuland. Um----
    Ms. Self. Who governs Afghanistan?
    Secretary Nuland. They are in their own telling, 
endeavoring to govern Afghanistan. But we do not consider this 
authority that they have assumed to be constitutional within 
Afghanistan's own circumstances.
    Rich, I do not know if you want to take this?
    Mr. Visek. Yes. Thank you for the question. At this point 
we do not recognize any entity as the government of 
Afghanistan.
    Ms. Self. Yes. That's, I think you're absolutely correct. 
We have discussed permutations here. I like some of the issues, 
some of the suggestions that have been made.
    But in my opinion, this Administration will take liberties 
with whatever this body and the U.S. Senate pass and agree to. 
And even if it's signed, I think they will take liberties.
    So, I've heard lists, I've heard time, I've heard global. 
From my career in the military, I want it to be as broad as 
possible and that will actually relieve us of the 
Administration taking liberties.
    But there also is Mr. Crow's concern that Congress must 
have the vote. However we work that out, Congress must have a 
vote that is meaningful in this AUMF replacement.
    So, I'm going to go ahead and yield back my time. Those are 
my concerns. And again, Mr. Chairman, I want this to be tight 
enough that the Administration will find it hard-pressed to 
take liberties with it without the congressional say so.
    Chairman McCaul. Thank you, sir. The gentleman yields. The 
Chair recognizes Mr. Schneider.
    Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 
witnesses for your patience. It's been a long day. It's been a 
long week for most of us here.
    And, Ambassador Nuland, I want to thank you for clarifying 
that the United States does not take hostages. We have just in 
the course of my lifetime, I can think of prisoner swaps with 
the former Soviet Union, with current day Russia, with other 
countries.
    We do not take hostages. We do not hold hostages. We deal 
with other countries who are taking American citizens. And 
we've always had to make very difficult choices.
    As we turn our attention now to the AUMF, look, I think 
there's universal agreement on the dais that Congress has, as 
it should, the sole authority to declare war as well as the 
authority to raise and support armies.
    The Administration has its own authorities under Article 
II. But at the end of the day, and we've talked about the War 
Powers Act among other things, it is Congress's responsibility.
    I think all of us will say here, and I know we say it when 
we go home, that the most difficult decision we ever face as a 
Member of Congress is when to send American men and women into 
harm's way, defending our Nation, protecting our freedoms, but 
also laying their lives on the line.
    And this is something we do have to take seriously. I was 
not here in 2001 or 2002 when the decisions were taken then. 
But I have been here for now pretty much a decade. I'm in my 
fifth term.
    We have not been able to express our voice necessarily on 
these. It is critical, and I agree with my colleague, Mr. Crow, 
that Congress has to have its say and evaluate these.
    But I also have real concerns about this idea of an 
absolute sunset. And I'd like to explore that a little bit with 
you.
    And maybe you've talked about this, because we've had to 
come and go. But what are some of the implications of a date 
certain that an authority ends on December 31, 2029?
    Secretary Nuland. Congressman Schneider, let me just first 
reiterate, because I did not get a chance to answer Congressman 
Crow.
    Obviously, Article I powers are for the Congress alone. We 
are your invited guests to engage in a conversation about where 
you might take this based on our experiences implementing the 
legislation that you have, we have in front of us. And we thank 
you for that.
    Let me just say that with regard to sunset, I think we've 
made critical over the course of this hearing the three 
concerns that we have. No. 1, a date certain tells our 
adversaries, tells every terrorist out there that they can go 
into their hole and wait us out and come back out on that date 
certain if Congress is not able to act. That's No. 1.
    No. 2, detention authorities. You know, if there's a lapse, 
we will not have the authority we need to continue to detain.
    And then the last one, which, you know, for those of us who 
spend our lives building international coalitions, if the 
United States does not lead, coalitions rarely cohere. When our 
partners and allies are not sure that our authorities persist, 
they are less likely to ensure that they have the authority 
absent us.
    So, those are the three reasons.
    Mr. Schneider. I think that's important. Look, we have the 
greatest military force in the world. We should all be rightly 
proud of that.
    But I think our secret weapon is our convening powers as a 
Nation. That ability to lead. So, I agree with you and that 
comes from the authority. And the authority is what really 
matters.
    As I've been sitting here listening and I've been thinking, 
you know, how do wars in previous times come to an end?
    You know, you can sue for peace. There's an armistice, 
there's a truest, there's a treaty. We tend to think of wars as 
a conflict between nation States.
    That people get together at a table or on the deck of a 
battleship and say, this war is coming to an end. We will agree 
to this, that, and the other thing.
    We're in a different time. We're in a different place. My 
colleague at the beginning of the questioning asked you what 
will the threat landscape look like in 2045?
    He picked that number for a specific reason. That is as far 
to the future as we are today from when the first AUMF was 
authorized.
    We do not know. But I think I can say with some degree of 
confidence that in the conflict we're fighting today where 
we're trying to resolve what we do here, there is not going to 
be a peace treaty with al-Qaeda or a cessation of hostilities 
with ISIS.
    It's going to be a war that we're going to have to win as 
Mr. Crow said. We're going to have to define success and 
recognize it in our own terms, in or own way, at our own time.
    And it is imperative, I agree with Mr. Crow, this Congress 
has to make our voice heard. It's essential that the debates 
take place on the floor and in the committee rooms of the House 
and the Senate.
    And we have to figure out a way to do that. And I'm running 
out of time. But I think it's really important that we 
understand what the implications of sunsets are.
    What we ask, how we answer the questions of why, who, what, 
where, and when in a way that does not hamstring our Nation, 
but allows us to lead our allies and make sure that we keep our 
citizens safe, our interests protected and our role in the 
world as a leader, preserved.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Smith [presiding]. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Dr. 
McCormick.
    Mr. McCormick. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chair. In earlier 
testimony we were talking, and I'll get right to the point, 
because I know time is short.
    Congressman, Congresswoman Wagner asked about the Iran-
based militias and you discussed how in the last 6 months 
there's been a decrease in violence. We talked about the 
inclusion in the AUMF.
    Obviously, there's been a drop. But we know that they in 
Iraq killed around 600 of ours. They've also had 80 attacks in 
the last 2 years.
    We talked about in a 5-year report. For the record, do we 
have that report available?
    Mr. Maier. Congressman, we can compile that report. We have 
not done specifically a 5-year report. But that information is 
in our possession.
    Mr. McCormick. OK. When can we get that?
    Mr. Maier. We can turn it as quickly as we can pull people 
together to put that information in. And within, you know, some 
number of weeks or assuming no government shutdown.
    Mr. McCormick. I hate that answer. Some number of weeks is 
way too vague for me. Can we assume within 4 weeks?
    Mr. Maier. Congressman, I think we can get that information 
to you within 4 weeks if the government is open.
    Mr. McCormick. OK. I'll leave it at that. I'll hold you to 
your word.
    Also, just so you know I was paying attention at least 
during the time I was here, I heard you specifically say, Mr. 
Maier, al-Qaeda is not significantly planning to harm western 
interests.
    I wrote that down, because I thought, that's interesting. 
We know that al-Qaeda is training people in Afghanistan and 
several regions under the protection of the Taliban, which is 
kind of how we ended up in this situation to begin with.
    If they're not training to harm western interests, what are 
they training for?
    Mr. Maier. Congressman, I think what we see on balance and 
what I can talk about in this forum is not al-Qaeda having the 
capability or the intent under the Taliban regime to be able to 
strike at the United States.
    Mr. McCormick. So, as a veteran of the Persian Gulf and 
Afghanistan, I dispute that claim. I do not think they ever 
have an intent not to harm us. They've been openly and 
significantly, and contrary to everything that we stand for.
    And would do great harm to us if they were able to. They 
may not be able to right now. But I think you mistake their 
intent. That's just my opinion.
    As far as in review of the Taliban's association with al-
Qaeda, I'm just going to go on further with this, and I'm going 
to stick with you, Mr. Maier.
    On July 22, 2022, the CI Special Activity Center drone over 
Kabul fired two hellfire missiles, killing al-Zawahiri, the 
Emir of al-Qaeda. At the time al-Zawahiri enjoyed Taliban 
protection in a house owned by the leader of the Haqqani 
Network.
    On June 1 a report released in the United Nations confirmed 
that there are between 30 and 60 senior al-Qaeda officials in 
country. Four hundred fighters in country. At least three al-
Qaeda members in the Taliban government.
    So, there's an obvious link between al-Qaeda and Taliban. 
They've been very open about their intentions toward the west.
    And toward us and what they intend to do. I think they're 
violent people. They're training for violent things.
    Undersecretary Nuland, do you agree with the U.N.'s report 
assessment?
    And would you agree that the Taliban is currently 
supporting, enabling terrorist groups, and we can call al-Qaeda 
a terrorist group, that they're associated with?
    Secretary Nuland. Congressman, as we have said here, one of 
the things that we have documented most recently by the public 
comments of Christy Abizaid of the National Counterterrorism 
Center is, regardless of the protection that they continue to 
have under the Taliban, al-Qaeda's capabilities and membership 
have shrunk significantly.
    They're at the lowest level. And we do not access that they 
have the capability of----
    Mr. McCormick. So, we're going back to capabilities. Let me 
talk about intent. At one time we did not have a problem with 
al-Qaeda at all. It did not exist.
    We've seen terrorist organizations wax and wane in the 
past. The question goes back to, integrated inside the Taliban.
    The reason that they've had, that they've been weakened is 
because we fought a war for 20 years there. Which I was part 
of.
    That's why they do not have the capability. We're no longer 
there. Thanks to politicians, we withdrew after we won the war.
    Where we had stabilized the Nation with 25 hundred people, 
we're losing less than a dozen people in 10 years. We withdrew.
    Now, they're incorporated in the Taliban government. Their 
training bases are there inside of a country that trained 
people to kill us originally. That's why we went there in the 
first place.
    So, let's not say that they're too weak to attack us, 
because that's really myopic thinking. We started, and I'm 
going to finish, because I'm out of time.
    But we started this without a problem until those training 
bases and al-Qaeda and other organizations inside of a foreign 
government, ruled by the same government that exists there now, 
harbored these people that crashed four planes into United 
States territory, killing thousands of people.
    And then, we fought a two decade war only to give it back 
to the same people who are now harboring terrorist groups 
again. The same people, Taliban harboring terrorist 
organizations, dozens of bases training to do harm.
    And I do not know if you think it's not for, against 
western interests, I'd like to know what interest it's against. 
Because I've never seen a terrorist organization that was pro 
west or pro United States. I'm pretty sure they're anti-United 
States and anti-Semite.
    With that, I rest.
    Mr. Smith. Did you want to respond? All right.
    Secretary Nuland. You know what, I think the Congressman 
just made the point for a continued AUMF and continued Article 
II ability to strike, as the President authorized against al-
Zawahiri. And to remain vigilant.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. McCormick. Just let me 
ask you, if in reading the prepared testimony, I was late 
because I was at a meeting on the Committee of anti-Semitism. 
And then, I was on the floor with the foreign office bill.
    So, I apologize, I did not hear your presentations. But in 
reading through at least one of them, and I'll read the others 
later, it seems that you're suggesting that the President does 
not really need the AUMF, because he has the inherent power to 
use force as Mr. Visek puts it, to protect the national 
security interest of the United States.
    But as I think the lawyers on the panel understand, that 
view is only an opinion internal to the executive branch. It 
has never been ratified by Congress, in law, or affirmed by the 
Supreme Court.
    In fact, the one law that--on the books that addresses the 
issue, the War Powers Resolution, spells out a far more limited 
view of the President's power to act without congressional 
authority.
    According to the War Powers Resolution, the President's 
Constitutional powers to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities 
quote, are exercises only pursuant to one, a declaration of war 
specific--two, specific statutory authorization, or three, a 
national emergency created by attack upon the United States, 
its territories or possessions or its armed forces, close 
quote.
    In other words, the law says that the President can only 
use force with congressional authorization or after we've been 
attacked.
    So, just to be very clear, are you saying that you're not 
bound by that portion of the 50 USC Code, Section 1541 that I 
just quoted, Mr. Visek?
    Mr. Visek. Well, thank you, Congressman. The--just a couple 
points of clarification.
    Mr. Smith. Sure.
    Mr. Visek. First, I think with respect to Article II 
authorities, we do not see them as unbounded. We do see them as 
limited by the Declare War Clause.
    That's why we've characterized our exercise of the Article 
II authorities in the space as episodic. You know, it's 
defensive in nature, intended to deter.
    We see the value in the AUMF of providing a prolonged 
authority. Now, I realize that there have been, you know, 
debates over the years about whether the War Powers Resolution, 
you know, addresses all the instances that might be, might 
arise under an Article II context.
    But the point is that this Administration, and I think many 
Administrations, have acted consistently with the War Powers 
Resolution, such that the legal debates do not have to be 
engaged.
    And I think the way this all gets tied together, I think, 
is look, there are instances where Article II authorities are 
appropriate and useful. We've noted how they've been used in 
the context of the Iran aligned militia groups.
    But where we have a prolonged need for enduring authority 
to engage in not just defense but also offensive acts, the 
authorizations are vital. And I think that is consistent with 
this notion.
    And without weighing in one way or the other on the 
ultimate legality, but, you know, the idea that the War Powers 
Resolution has this 60 day clock, that tends to reinforce this 
notion that when we're in it for a longer term, we want 
Congress onboard.
    Mr. Smith. Let me just ask one other question and I'll 
yield to my distinguished colleague. Do you have any concerns 
that the deal with Iran will incentivize any further hostage 
taking? Ms. Nuland?
    Secretary Nuland. We obviously made clear, Congressman 
Smith, that this deal needed to be the end of this kind of 
practice.
    And, frankly, this was a long negotiation. It was a 
difficult one. And when you look at the balance here, getting 
our Americans back who had been wrongfully detained and their 
two family members, was extremely important to do.
    To underscore to Iran that this kind of behavior does not, 
in fact, pay and makes everything else in their, from their 
international reputation to the relationship that they say they 
want with the international community, harder.
    Mr. Smith. In looking at the Iranians who were released, if 
what I read was accurate, they're mostly for crimes of 
sanctions.
    Are there any terrorists among them? That we released to 
Iran. Not the Americans, they were hostages and victims.
    Secretary Nuland. My memory of this, Rich may correct me, 
is that they were all charged for criminal behavior.
    Mr. Smith. Yes. But was the criminality----
    Secretary Nuland. Not terrorist behavior but sanctions 
violations and/or drugs or other things.
    Mr. Smith. That's what I thought. And finally, again on the 
incentivization of hostage taking, when the negotiations were 
ongoing about the amount of money, were there various proposals 
put forward for less or more?
    Or, I mean, $6 billion is what we, I know where that's 
coming from. But how did that get on the table?
    I mean, that's a lot of money. And as Mr. Lawler pointed 
out, money is fungible. And I remember I met with Zarif once 
when we were trying to get Pastor Abedini out of Iran, because 
he was wrongfully held as well.
    It was appalling to me that he said, oh, you're sanctions. 
He knows that I wrote the Trafficked Victim's Protection Act. 
He did his homework. And he goes, the sanctions are causing 
Iranian women to be trafficked.
    And he made this big spiel. I said, well, change your 
behavior, you know, stop your human rights abuse against your 
own people. But he did use that as a leaver.
    And I'm just wondering, you know, when it came to the $6 
billion, what was on the table?
    Secretary Nuland. Congressman, let's have a private 
discussion about the intricacies of the negotiation if you'd 
like. You can image that Iran had a higher price tag at one 
point. This was a particular chunk of money that was held by a 
U.S. ally at our request, et cetera.
    I want to go back to another point you made, which is 
arbitrary detention of Americans and deterring it. This is a 
major priority of Secretary Blinken and our team.
    And we are working with other international partners, 
including Canada. There was a meeting on this at the U.N. 
General Assembly last week to increase deterrence measures in 
common.
    So, to ensure that countries that do this, from Russia, to 
Iran, to North Korea, pay a steep price. And it's a consistent 
multi-lateral price.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you. Mr. Connolly.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to our 
panel. I'm sorry I'm late, but I was at the impeachment 
hearing, which was a real treat.
    And let me just say, some of my colleagues on the other 
side want to have an AUMF that specifically says Taliban. I 
wish they'd been equally concerned about the Taliban when the 
previous President, President Trump, ordered negotiations under 
Ambassador Khalilzad. I think in Doha, was it not Ms. Nuland?
    Secretary Nuland. It was, Congressman Connolly.
    Mr. Connolly. Yes. And is it not true that the President 
authorized negotiations without the presence of the then Afghan 
government we were purportedly supporting, so that the 
negotiations were directly with the Taliban without 
representatives of the Afghan government.
    Is that true?
    Secretary Nuland. That is correct. At least for the 
majority of the time.
    Mr. Connolly. And is it not also true that under President 
Trump and Ambassador Khalilzad, those negotiations led to the 
release of five thousand Taliban prisoners, many of whom we'd 
tagged as terrorists.
    Is that correct?
    Secretary Nuland. Also correct.
    Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Ms. Nuland, I have to say, I think 
the Administration is going to have trouble with an AUMF on the 
Democrat side, and let me cite two aspects of your testimony 
today.
    One is, you say you want an AUMF without sunset provisions. 
You do not want an expiration date. Is that correct?
    Is that your testimony?
    Secretary Nuland. Congressman, in your absence, we spoke 
about our concerns about a date certain and what that would do 
in terms of empowering terrorists to wait us out. Concerns 
about losing our detention authority.
    Concerns about our partner's worry about our staying power.
    Mr. Connolly. Yes.
    Secretary Nuland. However, we did hear during the course of 
the hearing, put on the table, a number of new ideas or ideas 
that we've been talking with Committee staff about----
    Mr. Connolly. OK.
    Secretary Nuland. For ensuring that there is, that the 
Congress has the opportunity to cancel this legislation as 
needed.
    Mr. Connolly. You, I was informed, but thank you. And I 
certainly concede the complexity and nuance of the issue and 
why we have to tread delicately on that.
    But, you know, I'm a child the Vietnam War. And I remember 
vividly the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was supposed to be 
a limited reaction to two events, alleged events in the Gulf of 
Tonkin.
    And the President of the United States then, a Democrat, 
Lyndon Johnson, used that Resolution as an open-ended 
commitment and we did not end that war until 11 years later. 
Ignorant of many maybe, but we ended it.
    Never did Congress intend that that Resolution would be 
used to justify a half a million U.S. troops being introduced 
onto the soil of Vietnam.
    And so, I hope you can appreciate there's deep sensitivity 
here about the issue of an expiration date. Though we're not 
unmindful of the points you made.
    And so, I think that's got to be worked out if we're going 
to have common ground.
    The other is, I think your testimony also said that you did 
not want us to--you wanted to be able to have an AUMF that 
authorized introduction of troops or some military presence to 
new geographic areas and groups as needed, quote/unquote.
    Is that correct? Your microphone.
    Secretary Nuland. Sorry. Yes. I think what we were 
reflecting there, was the fact that the greatest rise of 
terrorism currently is in the Sahel as a result of recent 
coops----
    Mr. Connolly. The coops, yes.
    Secretary Nuland. Of governments. So, and we have been 
able, all of those, the groups that we work against with our 
allies and partners, there are affiliates of al-Qaeda.
    But we want to be able to work with you and say hey, this 
thing has morphed and moved and renamed itself.
    Mr. Connolly. Right. And again, I do not think there's a 
desire to hamstring the Administration in responding quickly to 
emergency situations. We, you know, we're not unsupportive of 
that.
    But again, if you think about the history and you think 
about Article I of the Constitution of the United States, which 
has been, you know, diluted over many decades with the 
compliance of Congress, nonetheless the War Power is 
exclusively granted to the Congress of the United States, under 
the Constitution.
    And so, circumscribing that power is something we need to 
do in a responsible way working with you. But an open-ended 
commitment with respect to geography and groups as needed, the 
downside of that is maybe you would never abuse it.
    You would never do anything untoward. But that does not 
mean your successor would not gleefully take that open-ended 
authority and use it in ways never envisioned by the Congress 
and not supported by the American people.
    And so, I just think, especially in those two areas, we 
understand the desire of any Administration to want 
flexibility.
    But I hope the Administration understands the desire of the 
legislative branch on both sides to circumscribe that 
flexibility in the interest of Constitutional prerogatives. And 
the prerogative of war making is exclusively granted to the 
Congress of the United States.
    And, you know, we talk about implied powers for the 
Executive, it's time we talk about implied powers under Article 
I, that are Legislative powers. And so, this is a necessary 
dialog. But I think it is a necessary dialog.
    And I--speaking on the Democratic side of the aisle, and I 
know some of my colleagues previously raised concerns about 
this, let me add my voice to it, happy to work with you. But 
we're very reluctant to grant broad new authorities that are 
not circumscribed by time and geography.
    And with that, I yield back. Unless Ms. Nuland wants to 
respond. She's fully welcomed to, if you will allow Mr. 
Chairman.
    I thank my friend.
    Secretary Nuland. Thank you, Congressman Connolly. I think 
this is a perfect ending, I think, to this hearing.
    We very much appreciate understanding that these powers are 
yours. The opportunity to come and present and to be in 
conversation about how we go forward here.
    We have, I think, over the course of this hearing teased 
out a number of options that might bridge the gap here to 
ensure that Congress is regularly reviewing both the geography, 
the lists, the authorities.
    And we would welcome that obviously. Thank you.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you. On behalf of Chairman McCaul and the 
Committee, I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony 
and the Members for their questions.
    The Members of the committee may have some additional 
questions for the witnesses. And we respectfully ask that you 
respond in writing to those questions.
    Pursuant to the Committee rules, all Members may have five 
legislative days, 5 days to submit statements, questions, and 
extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length 
limitations.
    Without objection, the committee stands adjourned, and 
thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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