    [House Hearing, 118 Congress]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                         RECLAIMING CONGRESS'S ARTICLE I POWERS:
                             COUNTERTERRORISM AUMF REFORM

    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
                            HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                        ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 FIRST SESSION

                                   __________

                               September 28, 2023

                                   __________

                               Serial No. 118-50

                                   __________

            Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

           Available:  http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://
                                docs.house.gov,
                           or http://www.govinfo.gov

                                   __________

                       U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    53-676PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2024

    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

                       MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas, Chairman

    CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey     	GREGORY MEEKS, New Yok, Ranking
    JOE WILSON, South Carolina               	Member
    SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	 	BRAD SHERMAN, California
    DARRELL ISSA, California		GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
    ANN WAGNER, Missouri			WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
    BRIAN MAST, Florida			DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
    KEN BUCK, Colorado			AMI BERA, California
    TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee			JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
    MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee		DINA TITUS, Nevada
    ANDY BARR, Kentucky			TED LIEU, California
    RONNY JACKSON, Texas			SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
    YOUNG KIM, California			DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
    MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida		COLIN ALLRED, Texas
    BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan			ANDY KIM, New Jersey
    AUMUA AMATA COLEMAN-RADEWAGEN,   	SARA JACOBS, California
      American Samoa			KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
    FRENCH HILL, Arkansas			SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK,
    WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio			 	Florida
    JIM BAIRD, Indiana			GREG STANTON, Arizona
    MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida			MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
    THOMAS KEAN, JR., New Jersey		JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
    MICHAEL LAWLER, New York		JONATHAN JACOBS, Illinois
    CORY MILLS, Florida			SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
    RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia			JIM COSTA, California
    NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas			JASON CROW, Colorado
    JOHN JAMES, Michigan			BRAD SCHNEIDER. Illinois
    KEITH SELF, Texas

                        Brenden Shields, Staff Director
                        Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director

                                C O N T E N T S

                                  ----------
                                                                       Page

                                   WITNESSES

    Nuland, Victoria, Acting Deputy Secretary, Undersecretary for
      Political Affairs, Department of State.........................     7

                 ADDITIONAL TESTIMONY SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Maier, Christopher, Assistant Secretary for Defense for Special
      Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict and Krass, Caroline,
      General Counsel, Department of Defense.........................    10
    Visek, Richard, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State........    16

                      INFORMATION SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    What Now information submitted for the record from Waltz.........    54
    Aghanistan 2022 information submitted for the record.............    59
    United Nations U.S. News information submitted for the record....    67

                                    APPENDIX

    Hearing Notice...................................................    91
    Hearing Minutes..................................................    93
    Hearing Attendance...............................................    94

        STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM REPRESENTATIVE CONNOLLY

    Statement submitted for the record from Representative Connolly..    95

           MATERIALS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD REPRESENTATIVE PHILLIPS

    Letter submitted for the record from Representative Phillips.....    97

                RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

    Responses to questions submitted for the record..................    99

      RECLAIMING CONGRESS'S ARTICLE I POWERS: COUNTERTERRORISM AUMF REFORM

                          Thursday, September 28, 2023

                              House of Representatives,
                          Committee on Foreign Affairs,
                                                        Washington, DC.

        The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:09 a.m., in
    room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. Michael McCaul (chairman
    of the committee) presiding.
        Chairman McCaul. The committee will come to order. And
    before we get started I want to say happy birthday to my dear
    and good friend from New York, the ranking member, Mr. Meeks,
    who celebrated a very big birthday this week. He is now 70
    years old.
        But can you give us that Muhammad Ali quote so we can--this
    is like the best line.
        Mr. Meeks. Ali always said, ``Don't count the years, make
    the days count.''
        Chairman McCaul. So we will make it count. We are going to
    do the John Boehner birthday song real quick if that is all
    right. All right, Republicans, ready? This is your birthday
    song, it does not last too long--hey.
        We like to have some fun. We had a good time last night at
    the State Department, big music event. And the Secretary played
    a rhythm-and-blues song, amazing.
        So now we get onto something very important. I am going to
    give an opening statement. The ranking member I believe,
    Secretary Nuland, will be giving the statement.
        You know, Article 1 of the Constitution gives Congress
    alone the authority to declare war, and I believe it is our
    most solemn power. Declarations of war and authorizations for
    use of military force are this committee's most consequential
    jurisdiction.
        And now we are 22 years past the 9/11 attacks, and while we
    dramatically degraded those threats, we do face terrorists
    committed to our destruction.
        The bipartisan 9/11 Commission led by New Jersey Governor
    Tom Kean, whose son is now on this committee, and former
    Democratic chair of this committee, Lee Hamilton, made clear
    that the fight against radical Islamist terror would be a
    ``generational challenge likely to be measured in decades, not
    years.''
        From my years as a counterterrorism Federal prosecutor and
    as former chairman of the Homeland Security Committee, I know
    that ongoing counterterrorism operations are legal and
    necessary and have saved us from many attacks.
        But Congress has not revisited our authorities in over two
    decades. Ninety percent of current House members were not even
    here when Congress enacted the two key AUMFs still on the
    books.
        Now, the 2001 post-9/11 AUMF has been used against Al
    Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces including ISIS. 2002
    Iraq AUMF was used against Saddam Hussein and also against
    terror threats in Iraq, including IRGC Commander Soleimani and
    Iran-backed militias.
        During that time, Congress has held hundreds of briefings
    and hearings. We have continued to appropriate funds for these
    engagements. But we have not revisited the authorities Congress
    gave to the President 11 congresses ago.
        War should not be on autopilot. Congress owes our troops a
    clear commitment to the missions we are asking them to
    undertake. We need to exercise our Article 1 war powers and
    stop our unhealthy ongoing deference to the executive branch.
    And our troops deserve that.
        My preference would be to repeal or replace all the AUMFs
    with a new, more limited authorization scoped to the terror
    threats that we face today. It would not apply to foreign
    nations or armed forces. It would not provide authority to
    occupy and reconstruct a country.
        There is also bipartisan interest in making a new AUMF
    time-limited so that Congress is required to review and
    reauthorize more regularly. Doing this is hard, and that is why
    we have not done it in 22 years. To succeed, a new AUMF
    requires bipartisan, bicameral, and Presidential support. And
    it will require us to answer tough questions, such as which
    terrorist organizations should be covered.
        As mentioned, current authorities cover al Qaida, the
    Taliban, associated forces including ISIS. But the
    Administration is asking us to now exclude the Taliban and not
    add any new Iran-backed terrorist militias to any new AUMF.
        I have to say that I have some concerns with that. Those
    groups have killed more Americans and pose ongoing threats
    today. Iran-backed militias have attacked U.S. personnel in the
    Middle East more than 80 times since the start of the Biden
    Administration. During the Iraq War, they killed more than 600
    Americans.
        The Taliban actively harbors terror threats including
    Zawahiri, Bin Laden's top lieutenant, and until recently the
    leader of Al Qaeda. The operational brains behind 9/11 were
    living in downtown Kabul under the Taliban's protection.
        Many specially designated global terrorists serve as senior
    officials now in the Taliban government, including Interior
    Minister Haqqani, head of the Haqqani Network, which is a
    designated foreign terrorist organization.
        It is simply not credible to exclude these extreme ongoing
    terror threats from a new counterterrorism AUMF. When the
    President says he can just address them using his Article 2
    powers, he is telling Congress not to exercise our exclusive
    constitutional authority.
        There is no consensus about the scope of the President's
    inherent power to use force, except in cases of self-defense
    after we have been attacked. I want the President to have that
    clear authority. He does not need to wait for these terrorists
    to attack us first.
        So with that, I want to thank our panel here today and the
    Secretary. This is a very important discussion we will have
    today. It should not be a partisan exercise, but rather a
    bipartisan exercise. It is my sincere hope that we can come
    together and mark up a new AUMF by next month.
        And so with that, I would like to recognize the ranking
    member, Mr. Meeks.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        You know, as a member of the House of Representatives from
    the State of New York, I know how much that day, September 11,
    2001, weighs on the hearts of all Americans. Thousands of men
    and women in New York City to this day still bear the physical
    and emotional scars of 9/11, as does those in the Pentagon and
    in Pennsylvania.
        For them, for us, the phrase ``Never forget'' is as much a
    memorial as it is daily reality. Days after the attack, on
    Friday, September 14, I recall being on the House floor and
    reading the resolution to authorize the President to use
    military force and respond to that tragic attack on our
    homeland.
        Let me read the pertinent part aloud again today. ``The
    President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate
    force against those nations, organizations, or persons he
    determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the
    terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or
    harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any
    future acts of international terrorism against the United
    States.''
        I voted for that authorization. And though I carry the
    burden of that vote, not for 1 second do I regret it. We needed
    to send a message. We needed to take action and prevent future
    terrorist attacks by those who orchestrated 9/11, and we did.
        But let us be clear, that AUMF which my colleagues and I
    voted on was about 9/11, its perpetrators, and those who gave
    them refuge. The targets and scope of the AUMF were clear. Al
    Qaeda committed a terrorist attack on U.S. soil and the Taliban
    had harbored them, refusing to hand over Osama bin Laden.
        My vote to cast off the--to cast authorized force against
    both Taliban and Al Qaeda alike. The Taliban, for all of their
    counterproductive and backward policies and what they are doing
    today, did not warrant a proactive designation by Congress as
    an organization that the President is authorized to use
    military force against.
        We are fighting ISIS-K in Afghanistan and killed the
    organization's leader earlier this year. In 2001, AUMF Repeal
    and Replace Bill should comport with that reality, rather than
    revive a 20-year-old war, which we just ended and which
    Americans have no interest in pursuing again.
        A repeal-and-replace bill should, however, retain the
    President's authority to target non-State actors that have the
    capability and intention to attack our homeland. I submitted
    and proposed--my proposed legislation includes three terrorist
    entities that the President would retain the right to use force
    against: ISIS-K in Afghanistan, ISIS in Iraq and Syria, and Al
    Qaeda in Afghanistan.
        Without getting into information inappropriate to this
    public forum, I believe that several ISIS affiliates remain a
    threat to the United States. President Biden ordered a strike
    that killed ISIS leader in 2022. And our military has taken out
    several top commanders in 2023. Several other ISIS leaders have
    been killed by partner forces.
        This constant pressure and the difficulty it creates for
    planning and executing terrorist operations keep us safer here
    at home, and it would be unwise to discontinue these
    operations. ISIS-K remains a top concern. ISIS-K continues to
    pose a threat to our country and remains engaged in global
    terror. Al Qaeda in Afghanistan is significantly debilitated.
        But I do think operations like the 2022 strike against Al
    Qaeda's leader in 9/11, plotter Ayman al-Zawahiri, should be
    authorized by Congress. It is possible that new intelligence
    could convince me to add or subtract entities from this list.
        These are not simple questions with easy answers, and I
    clearly understand that Mr. McCaul's draft legislation has a
    wider scope. And I hope that, as he has stated, we can reach an
    agreement and dialog together along with the Administration.
        One thing I believe that I know we can agree on, we need to
    have this debate. And we need Congress to reassert its proper
    authority over the power to declare war under the Constitution.
    The time to pass repeal and replace of the 2001 AUMF
    legislation is now long overdue.
        The American people elected us to make tough decisions, not
    duck hard questions by ceding our constitutional authority over
    the executive branch or--. Our constitutional order depends on
    us upholding that responsibility, and I look forward to hearing
    from our witnesses here today before this committee.
        And again I thank the chairman for calling this hearing
    this morning.
        Chairman McCaul. I want to thank the ranking member. And I
    also want to thank Ken Buck and Dean Phillips for leading a
    task force engaging conversations with various groups across a
    spectrum on both sides of the aisle to try to get to a
    consensus. And I know you have put a lot of time and effort
    into this, and I want it to bear fruit at the end of this
    discussion.
        So we have a distinguished panel. First, Ambassador
    Victoria Nuland is Acting Deputy Secretary, Undersecretary for
    Political Affairs, at the Department of State. Thank you for
    being here.
        Mr. Christopher Maier is the Assistant Secretary for
    Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict.
        Ms. Caroline Krass is the General Counsel at the Department
    of Defense.
        And Mr. Richard Visek is the Acting Legal Advisor at the
    Department of State.
        So with that, I believe that we will call upon Ms. Nuland
    for her testimony.

        STATEMENT OF VICTORIA NULAND, ACTING DEPUTY SECRETARY,
       UNDERSECRETARY FOR POLITICAL AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE

        Secretary Nuland. Thank you, Chairman McCaul. Ranking
    Member Meeks, happy birthday. Members of the committee, thank
    you for inviting all of us to testify today.
        President Biden, Secretary Blinken, and the whole
    Administration welcome the opportunity to work with Congress to
    update the existing authorizations for the use of military
    force.
        It is in that spirit that we gather today, as both of you
    said, to consider some of the gravest and weightiest questions
    we face as public servants, questions about how to address and
    eliminate emerging and imminent dangers to our citizens, when
    the use of military force is appropriate, and how those
    decisions should be made.
        Twenty-two years ago the 9/11 terrorist attacks violently
    reminded our country of the threats we faced and renewed our
    national resolve to secure our homeland. Out of that moment of
    tragedy came a measure of unity.
        In the aftermath, Members of the Congress came together to
    enact the 2001 AUMF, which created the legal bedrock of U.S.
    counterterrorism operations, enabling us to dismantle key
    terrorist organizations and thwart their plans to attack
    Americans.
        The world is a different place now. The threat of terrorism
    persists, but it has also evolved. So too must the tools that
    we use to meet it.
        We applaud congressional efforts to update this law to
    reflect the realities of the current landscape. There is no
    more powerful signal we can send to those who wish us harm than
    a new authorization which is broadly supported by both chambers
    of Congress and by both parties.
        We agree that repealing and replacing the 2001 AUMF is
    warranted and is necessary. Here is how the Administration sees
    some of the key issues, some of which you have already
    highlighted in your opening statements.
        First, when it comes--what comes next should provide our
    military with uninterrupted authority to continue critical
    operations authorized by the 2001 law and provide the
    flexibility to rapidly adapt to constantly changing dangers.
        Second, a revised AUMF should explicitly authorize force
    against Al Qaeda and ISIS.
        Third, a revised AUMF, in our view, should not include a
    date-certain expiration date, given the persistence of this
    threat. That said, we know how critical this issue is for
    members of this committee, and we are prepared to discuss ways
    to review the continuing need for these authorities on an
    agreed and regular basis.
        Fourth, a revised AUMF should ensure uninterrupted
    authority for terrorist detention operations. And finally, we
    believe a revised AUMF should enable us to apply this authority
    to new geographic areas and groups as needed.
        While the rate of global terrorist attacks has declined,
    groups like ISIS and Al Qaeda maintain safe havens across the
    globe and an intent to attack our Nation and our people
    overseas.
        Over the past decade, we have built and led a successful
    coalition to root out ISIS, to reduce its territory, and to
    disrupt its recruitment and financial networks. Yet these
    groups continue to pose threats to the United States and our
    interests, whether it's al-Shabaab in Somalia, ISIS-K in
    Afghanistan, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, to ISIS in
    Syria.
        At the same time, terrorist activities in the Sahel are on
    the rise, a trend that is likely to worsen with increased
    political instability in the region. Meanwhile, we have taken
    significant steps toward closing the facility at Guantanamo
    Bay, and that remains our goal. But until that day comes, we
    cannot afford any gaps in our detention authorities.
        We know that military force is only part of the answer to
    countering terrorist threats. With the support of the Congress,
    we are investing hundreds of millions of dollars in State
    Department-run programs in countries around the world to train,
    mentor, and equip law enforcement officers in counterterrorism
    to work effectively and to respect the rule of law and human
    rights.
        We have also worked with partners in more than 25 countries
    across the globe to combat racially and ethnically motivated
    violent extremists. And through the Global Counterterrorism
    Forum, we have collaborated with over 40 countries to increase
    the resilience of local communities to terrorist actors.
        But given the evolving threat, we must be able to use force
    when necessary to prevent groups from planning attacks,
    reestablishing footholds, reconstituting, and resurging. As we
    consider a new AUMF, we support congressional engagement on the
    use of this authorization, including which terrorist groups
    should be the targets.
        The Administration is deeply committed to working with
    Congress on this new authorization and to remaining accountable
    to the American people for actions that are taken under the
    AUMF. We look forward to a very frank discussion today. Thank
    you.
        [The prepared statement of Secretary Nuland follows:]

        [[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

     JOINT STATEMENT SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD FROM MR. MAIER AND MS. KRASS
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                    STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD FROM MR. VISEK
    [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, Madam Secretary. We had a
    classified briefing last week as well as a very robust
    discussion, and it seems to me there are three issues, whether
    or not to keep the Taliban on the list. You know, as I
    mentioned, Haqqani is their Minister of Interior and was
    harboring Zawahiri. Haqqani Network being a foreign terrorist
    organization.
        And the other one has to do with Iran Shia militia groups.
    General Kurilla testified 6 months ago that these Iran-backed
    militias had attacked us 78 times, our military, since January
    2021.
        And then finally, as you mentioned, the timeline. I think
    it has to be realistic. It has taken us 22 years to have this
    discussion, and that is for a reason, because it is hard. It is
    hard to get consensus. And so I had asked your legal counsel at
    the time to come up with maybe some creative options to that.
        I will say I think most members do want a time-certain to
    expiration to force future congresses to deal with the issue.
    But having said that, those are the three big issues as I see
    it.
        If I could maybe start with you, Madam Secretary, and then
    go down the panel.
        Secretary Nuland. Thank you, Chairman. I am going to take
    these in turn, and I am going to guess we will come back around
    and around to them. But first with regard to the Taliban. We
    have been very clear, we are going to judge the Taliban by
    their actions.
        It is our assessment that the Taliban have partially
    adhered to their CT commitments. We have seen them disrupt
    ISIS-K for example, but there is obviously plenty more to do to
    ensure that Afghanistan does not become a safe haven or return
    to safe haven or persist as a safe haven.
        That said, I would note that the Director of the National
    Counterterrorism Center, Christine Abizaid, recently said
    publicly that Al Qaeda is at its historic nadir in Afghanistan,
    and its revival is unlikely.
        I would say we have been able, with the authorities that we
    have, to maintain persistent counterterrorism action against Al
    Qaeda, most recently with the August 1922 strike against
    Zawahiri. So the President is not going to hesitate to go after
    Al Qaeda as he needs to. And we believe that we have the
    authorities under Article 2 to do that.
        With regard to the Iran-backed militias, Iran is obviously
    a State sponsor of terrorism; it is the leading State sponsor
    of terrorism in the world. And as this committee knows very
    well, and especially those of you who served selflessly in Iraq
    and elsewhere, they continue in this effort.
        President Biden has repeatedly warned Iran that we will
    hold them to account for any role in attacks against U.S.
    personnel, and the President, again, has done just that using
    his Article 2 authorities, most recently in March in Syria. And
    he is not going to hesitate to do that again.
        So, again, this is a place where we believe we have the
    authorities that we need and the President has shown his
    willingness to use them under Article 2. But obviously we are
    open to further conversation about this.
        Chairman McCaul. And I would just say that, yes, that is
    your Article 2 authority is self-defense, but that is not an
    authority authorized by Congress, though. But please continue.
        Secretary Nuland. Understood. But in this case, when they
    attack us, we respond is the way that that has worked. And in
    fact, what we are trying to do is restore deterrence and we
    have--we feel that that has--we have sent that message strongly
    in March, and we have not seen any attacks since.
        With regard to the sunset, we have a number of things that
    we can talk about. As you said, Chairman, a number of concrete
    proposals. I can run them down here or we can do it later.
        I think our largest, our biggest issue with a firm date
    certain is it signals to our adversaries that they can wait us
    out. That is the biggest problem. It also signals to the
    partners we want to work with that they cannot count on us to
    lead this effort after that if the Congress is not able to
    continue the authority. So that is our biggest concern.
        So we have put forward to members of this committee and to
    the staff some ideas for, as we said, regular reviews at set
    intervals, more reporting requirements, or even the requirement
    at a date that you set for a Presidential certification and a
    conversation about the need to continue these authorities.
        We think that is a better way to go than setting a date now
    and telling the world that we are potentially out of this
    business on that date.
        So let me pause there. Chris, anything to add?
        Mr. Maier. Chairman, the only thing I would add, especially
    on the sunset provision, is I think one of the strengths we see
    still to this day in things like the D/ISIS coalition is the
    really the consistency and sustainability of that coalition.
        And we continue to be frankly surprised. Many of the
    capitals have continued to renew mandates in Iraq and Syria
    long after they have stopped contributing forces.
        And I think if we look at this in the context of a sunset
    provision that had a time-directed end, those partners would
    become far less certain about making those political
    commitments certain.
        Chairman McCaul. And you know, I do see some merit to that,
    because we also say conditions on the ground not a time-base to
    give the signal to the enemy when it is going to expire. So my
    time is running out, but I look forward to visiting with you
    about these options that you have proposed, and thank you for
    that.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Meeks.
        Mr. Meeks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Let me make sure that, so we are absolutely clear, and I
    guess Undersecretary Nuland. Does the Administration believe a
    repeal-and-replace of the 2001 AUMF should include an explicit
    authorization to use military force to strike the Taliban?
        Secretary Nuland. Chairman, as I said, with regard to
    actions in Afghanistan, we want to see an explicit
    authorization for ISIS, for Al Qaeda. We do not believe that
    the Taliban needs to be in this authorization.
        Mr. Meeks. And what about does the Administration believe a
    repeal-and-replace of the 2001 AUMF should include an explicit
    authorization to use military force against Iranian-backed Shia
    militia groups?
        Secretary Nuland. Again, Ranking Member, we believe that we
    have proven that we have the authority under Article 2 to help
    defend the American people and restore deterrents, so we do not
    think that is necessary.
        Mr. Meeks. And does the Administration support a repeal of
    2001 AUMF without a simultaneous replacement bill?
        Secretary Nuland. We do not. We would immediately lose
    detention authorities, we would lose our ability to strike Al
    Qaeda and ISIS and other groups.
        Mr. Meeks. And let me jump to, you know, a couple of things
    because I agree that what the chairman said about some of the
    key issues. And I, as I said in my--I'm very firm about, you
    know, not giving over our authority to the executive branch. We
    have got to take the hard votes ourself.
        So can any one of you tell me with precision the threat
    landscape in 2045? Which terrorist groups will be on the rise
    then, and what threats will they pose to the United States in
    2045?
        Secretary Nuland. I certainly would not want to get out my
    crystal ball. I do not know if the Assistant Secretary may or
    would like to get his out. We just hope we are still
    celebrating your birthday.
        Mr. Meeks. Me too. So with that, because when I stood on
    the House floor in 2001 and voted for the 2001 AUMF, I can tell
    you that I firmly and squarely and honestly that most of the
    members if not all of the Members of Congress did not believe
    that we were going to--we were authorizing a global war on
    terror that would still be in force 22 years later. But that is
    where we are now.
        So why should members of this committee have the confidence
    that if we passed a new AUMF this year, that the President in
    2045 would not use our law in ways we could have never
    predicted?
        Secretary Nuland. Well, again, Ranking Member, our
    commitment to you is that we will continue to evolve both the
    groups and the needs, geographic and otherwise, together. And
    there are many ways that we can establish regular consultation
    to do that, regular ways to agree to do that, as I said in my
    opening.
        And we think that is going to be necessary. We are going to
    need an open door to be able to evolve this or to update it
    again.
        Mr. Meeks. So that is why for me, because I know I cannot,
    as you could not, see what is going to take place in 2024--
    2045. But I can picture in my mind's eye, say what it looks
    like in 2024 or 2025 or 2026.
        And that is why to me, a sunset makes sense. It forces us
    to stop and reevaluate if things change on the ground, or use a
    military force--the use of a military force has been on
    statutory autopilot for two decades.
        And that is part of the reason why our policies, I believe,
    have been flawed. And I do not think Congress must make the
    same errors. And that is why I think that we need to have a
    sunset so that we can review that.
        Let me just tell you real quickly the other pet peeve that
    I have had recently. And I do not know whether Ms. Krass has
    this answer or not. But are you familiar with Section 1285
    report codified as 50 USC 1550 that the Department of Defense
    sent to the House Foreign Affairs Committee this week?
        Ms. Krass. Yes, sir, I am.
        Mr. Meeks. Do you know if the statutory language mandating
    the report State that the report shall be submitted a few days
    before every full committee Foreign Affairs or AUMF issues, or
    does it State that the report shall be submitted every 180
    days, and that briefing shall occur in the 180-day window?
        Ms. Krass. The latter, sir.
        Mr. Meeks. OK. So look, I have tremendous respect for the
    men and women who protect our national security every day
    across the Department of Defense and the Department of State
    and understand the workload is significant and the burden is
    real. I even understand that sometimes Congress mandates
    reports that are outdated or useless.
        But that 1550 report is one that is necessary for Congress
    to do its job. And I again underscore and emphasize, as I did
    in 2022, look, for us to do our job, we have to have the
    report. So please, give us those reports in a timely manner.
        And I yield back, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields back. The chair now
    recognizes Ms. Wagner.
        Mrs. Wagner. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for organizing this
    hearing and updating the United States' authorization for U.S.
    military against terrorists that seek to kill Americans is
    urgently needed in the current threat landscape.
        Since the Administration's shameful, I think, and tragic
    flight from Afghanistan 2 years ago, the Taliban has been left
    to help manage the very significant terror threats emanating
    from Afghanistan.
        And I know we are talking about leaving them out and really
    focusing on ISIS-K, and Al Qaeda, but I do want to say here
    that Taliban is a U.S. adversary that funds all--funds Al
    Qaeda. It employ Al Qaeda members and it permits Al Qaeda
    training camps. I would be interested in some of your thoughts
    in this regard.
        And I want to add to that, though, that meanwhile Iran has
    only grown bolder and more aggressive in its support for
    terrorist proxies, I think we have seen.
        And I will note here too that the Administration's policies
    have been exceedingly counterproductive. In fact, the
    Administration recently signaled to Tehran that its bad
    behavior will be in fact rewarded with cash payouts to the tune
    of $6 billion.
        Let's be clear. Iran is a State sponsor of terror. U.S.
    policy must always, always aim to deter or punish Iran's use of
    terrorist proxies to harm Americans and sow instability across
    the Middle East.
        The U.S. must retain a powerful toolkit here that empowers
    us to address these threats to our citizens and homeland. And
    Congress has an important opportunity to update and strengthen
    this toolkit, and I look forward to working with my colleagues
    on this critical effort.
        Assistant Secretary Maier, can you speak to a little bit
    both the Taliban activity that I have outlined and their
    involvement with Al Qaeda and the camps and such, along with
    the total attacks, how many have Iran-backed made on American
    targets in the last 5 years?
        We know that Commander Kurilla testified quite a while ago
    here earlier that there were 78 attacks. Surely there have been
    more. I am wondering if you can give us an update, both on
    those Iran-backed militias and proxies, and then the Taliban.
    Thank you.
        Mr. Maier. Yes, ma'am. So starting with the Taliban, I
    think as Secretary Nuland said, we are in a very-not-trust with
    the Taliban. But I think what we have seen is them take the
    fight to ISIS-Khorasan because they are definitely opposed from
    a number of different reasons, namely because ISIS-Khorasan
    attempts to undermine the Taliban governance.
        And they--they, the Taliban have pressured and managed to
    exert a fair degree of control, we would say, over the Al Qaeda
    elements that still remain in Afghanistan to ensure that they
    aren't conducting plotting against Western targets. Now----
        Mrs. Wagner. Are they funding, excuse me, are they still
    funding Al Qaeda? Do they still employ Al Qaeda members? Are
    they still permitting Al Qaeda training camps, the Taliban?
        Mr. Maier. I think some of that would probably be better
    handled in a different session. But I think on balance we see
    that the Taliban remains in some sort of relationship with Al
    Qaeda. But what we have not seen is significant plotting by Al
    Qaeda toward Western interests.
        And I think Secretary Nuland's reference to NCTC Director
    Abizaid is telling there, that Al Qaeda is being kept under
    wraps by the Taliban at this point. That said, we are carefully
    watching all of that because we know ultimately what Al Qaeda's
    intents are.
        I think on Iran, I would not be able to give you the
    accurate number over the last 5 years of Iran, Iran in proxy
    attacks. But I can tell you since General Kurilla testified, we
    have seen a clear drop in Iranian proxy attacks toward U.S.
    forces in both Iraq and Syria.
        Mrs. Wagner. OK, thank you. I want to move and leave this
    question. I may not have enough time for it to be answered, but
    we see terrorism is exploding in Sub-Saharan Africa and the
    Sahel. Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 60 percent of all
    terrorism deaths last year. The Sahel was the site of 43
    percent of terrorism deaths, up from 1 percent in 2007.
        Assistant Secretary Maier and Ms. Krass, what are the key
    terrorist organizations in Africa, and which are currently
    covered by the 2001 AUMF? And do you agree that a new AUMF must
    continue to cover those groups? I know that I am out of time.
        I would appreciate it if I could get an answer in writing,
    Mr. Chairman, and because I do think it is important that we
    include Sub-Saharan Africa in this discussion, especially with
    the explosion of terrorist activities that are going on. And I
    thank you, and I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields back. Chair
    recognizes Mr. Sherman.
        Mr. Sherman. I agree with the ranking member, we shouldn't
    be on autopilot. I hope my colleagues would me in introducing
    legislation to repeal the AUMF of 1957 dealing with communism
    in the Middle East, and 1991, dealing with Saddam Hussein's
    invasion of Kuwait. We should also repeal the 2002 AUMF.
        I agree with the ranking member that we need to revise the
    2001 AUMF and put a sunset on it. Ms. Nuland argues well, that
    will embolden our enemies.
        That is because everybody in the executive branch believes
    that when the executive branch makes foreign policy, that they
    make good foreign policy and instill fear in our enemies. But
    if God forbid Congress has a binding role, then we would make
    bad decisions and our enemies would be emboldened.
        Nothing exemplifies this more than what every
    Administration since the Nixon Administration has said about
    everything we are talking about here today. The AUMF is
    meaningless and our discussion at this hearing and many other
    hearings is meaningless unless the War Powers Act is binding on
    the Administration.
        Yet since the Nixon Administration, every--the executive
    branch has told us it is not binding. They have taken the
    position that it is really kind of a non-binding resolution
    maybe with a few reporting requirements, but that every
    president can send our troops anywhere for as long as that
    president wants, whether Congress wants to authorize it or not.
        And then they work with us on the technicalities of the War
    Powers--of the AUMF to humor us, distract us, and pretend like
    it is important so that we never realize that it is not.
        Ms. Nuland, is the War Powers Act binding on the executive
    branch? And I will point out that Senator Biden said yes. What
    is your answer?
        Secretary Nuland. Yes, Congressman Sherman.
        Mr. Sherman. It is. So the Administration will follow the
    law and will not deploy troops for over 60 or 90 days unless
    authorized by an AUMF?
        Secretary Nuland. That is President Biden's commitment.
        Mr. Sherman. I might add that I asked that same question of
    your predecessor and did not get an answer in this committee
    just a year and a half ago. And I want to thank you for that
    commitment.
        Mr. Visek, as a matter of law, is the War Powers Act
    binding on the executive branch?
        Mr. Visek. Thank you for that question, Congressman. We are
    certainly aware of the history between the executive branch----
        Mr. Sherman. Yes or no.
        Mr. Visek. And the legislative branch on this issue----
        Mr. Sherman. Yes or no, is it binding?
        Mr. Visek. There are, certainly I think there would be
    general agreement that parts of the War Powers Act are
    absolutely----
        Mr. Sherman. Is the part of it that says you cannot deploy
    troops for over 60/90 days binding on the Administration or
    not? Yes or no?
        Mr. Visek. I can say that this Administration has acted
    consistently with----
        Mr. Sherman. Acting consistently? They act consistently
    with many of our non-binding resolutions. Is it binding or is
    it just something you choose to go along with?
        Mr. Visek. Congressman, I am not aware that it has been
    addressed at this point. But I've wanted----
        Mr. Sherman. OK, so we have a disagreement. Your client
    says it is binding, you say it is not. Every Administration,
    prior to the statements of Ms. Nuland, have said it is not
    binding, and that is why last decade I put a provision's most
    important thing I ever enacted into proposal and it was
    actually enacted into law, that says that no money can be spent
    in contravention of the War Powers Act.
        Now Attorney General Mukasey testified before this
    committee a long time ago that if such a provision was in the
    appropriations bill, it was--it was in the appropriations bill
    back a decade ago, because I finally won a vote on the floor.
    It is now in base text so it does not get much attention. But
    it says no money can be spent in contravention.
        Is that provision binding, Mr. Visek?
        Mr. Visek. Congressman, I am not aware that this
    Administration has taken a position on that. We----
        Mr. Sherman. Well, you realize that you were sitting there
    when Wendy Sherman, no relation, said that the Administration
    would look at that provision and reach a decision on that. Was
    she misleading us when she said the Administration would look
    at that?
        Mr. Visek. I do not believe Deputy----
        Mr. Sherman. You were sitting right next to her.
        Mr. Visek. Would be--would mislead this committee. All I
    can say is that I am not aware----
        Mr. Sherman. Will you get back with a yes-or-no answer as
    to whether in your legal opinion it is--the money can be spent
    in contravention of the War Powers Act out of the Defense
    Appropriations Bill that says no money shall be spent in
    contravention of the War Powers Act?
        And Ms. Krass, you will be advising generals. Now and then
    we say no money shall be spent in the Defense bill for this or
    that. And if they just ignore that they could, I believe, go to
    jail.
        Would you advise Defense officials that they could spend
    money in contravention of the War Powers Act if that money was
    appropriated by a bill that says no money shall be spent in
    contravention thereof?
        Ms. Krass. Congressman, we very much respect the role of
    Congress and clear language such as no money can be sent,
    implicates, as you say, the Antideficiency Act. We would always
    comply with that consistent with our constitutional----
        Mr. Sherman. So as long as we put that provision in every
    Defense approps bill, and we frankly, and I hope my colleagues
    will join this, should put it in permanent law, you believe
    that the Defense Department has to abide by it?
        Ms. Krass. Consistent with our constitutional obligations,
    yes.
        Mr. Sherman. Consistent with your constitutional--do you
    have a constitutional right to ignore it?
        Ms. Krass. It would very much depend on the circumstances.
    It would be very unusual that we would----
        Mr. Sherman. OK, so sometimes you can ignore laws you do
    not like----
        Ms. Krass. Only----
        Mr. Sherman. Depending upon the circumstances. I will yield
    back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The chair now
    recognizes Mr. Mast.
        Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman
        Assistant Secretary, I am going to ask you some very
    straightforward questions. I would say it is in everybody's
    best interest to give us simple and straightforward answers. It
    is an opportunity to clear the air on some ongoing issues.
        There is currently an allegation that your chief of staff,
    who was also a former aide for Robert Malley, an Iran deal
    architect, that--who is currently has a revoked security
    clearance and is suspended for classified mishandling,
    allegedly, that she was a part of a group known as the Iran
    Expert Initiative, which reported to the Iranian Foreign
    Ministry and had the mission of influencing U.S. policymakers
    to agree with what the Iranian Government wanted. That is an
    allegation.
        The Pentagon issued a defense, saying that the doctor was
    thoroughly and properly vetted and that we are honored to have
    her serve. I would like to believe that in issuing the defense,
    that was thoughtful and thoroughly vetted as well, and I wanted
    to give you the opportunity to substantiate that.
        So my questions are going to start with this. They will be
    very straightforward. Given that a defense was issued, I want
    to confirm what was reviewed to substantiate that defense.
        Did your Chief of Staff have any affiliation with a group
    known as the Iranian Expert Initiative, its other reported
    associates, or any groups reporting to the Iranian Foreign
    Ministry?
        Mr. Maier. So Congressman Mast, I think you will appreciate
    this is a ongoing personnel matter. We received a letter from
    the House Armed Services Committee chairman and ranking member,
    or excuse me, subcommittee chair of the Intelligence Special
    Operations Committee 2 days ago. So we are looking into that.
        I think the initial response you are referring to was
    issued by our public affairs folks. We are actively looking
    into whether all law and policy was properly followed in
    granting my chief of staff Top Secret Special Compartmented
    information.
        Mr. Mast. Let's pause on that.
        Mr. Maier. Yes.
        Mr. Mast. Was the security clearance a full scope polygraph
    background check, a single scope background check, can you
    speak to that?
        Mr. Maier. I cannot at this point, I do not know that
    information, sir.
        Mr. Mast. Can you speak to the SF-86 national security
    questionnaire? Straightforward questions, they are black and
    white. And so I would ask this, can you say in Section 19,
    Foreign Contacts, was anybody listed within her contacts as a
    part of the Iranian Foreign Ministry?
        Mr. Maier. So Congressman, I think you will understand that
    I am not involved in the vetting process for a security
    clearance. That is part of what we are looking into. When I say
    ensuring it is consistent with law and policy, that would be a
    routine part of a background investigation from my experience,
    sir.
        Mr. Mast. Absolutely. Can you help me with timeline on
    something on this? Understanding the SF-86 national security
    questionnaire, the questions relating to foreign associates,
    work, foreign business dealings, they have a 7-year statute of
    limitations for the questions.
        Records show that she began working for Mr. Malley roughly
    in 2021. And the allegation is that this took place in roughly
    2013/2014. Can you substantiate that if this was not listed, it
    may be because of the lapse of time, the 7-year time window
    that would put it just outside of that?
        Mr. Maier. Yes, again, Congressman, I do not have that
    level of detail of what went into her security clearance. But I
    think there are certainly pieces that have, as investigations
    are underway, as I understand it, they have discretion to look
    beyond that timeline as is required.
        Mr. Mast. To the General Counsel, I would ask you the same
    questions.
        Ms. Krass. We are more than happy to take back your
    questions, sir.
        Mr. Mast. Can you substantiate did the Chief of Staff have
    any affiliation with a group known as the Iranian Expert
    Initiative, its other reported associates, or any groups
    reporting to the Iranian Foreign Ministry?
        Ms. Krass. I do not know that.
        Mr. Mast. OK. Can you substantiate whether that
    association, that alleged association, very alleged
    association, would have been outside of the timeframe in which
    she had to report according to her national security
    questionnaire?
        Ms. Krass. I do not know.
        Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The chair now
    recognizes Mr. Bera.
        Mr. Bera. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for
    holding this hearing. I mean, this is not a Democratic or a
    Republican issue, this is not a House or Senate issue.
        It is something we talked about during the last
    Administration and again, from the comments of the witnesses, I
    think the Biden Administration also would love to see a sunset
    of the 2001 AUMF and a modernization of an AUMF that reflects
    today's world.
        I was not in Congress post-9/11, but vividly remember the
    days immediately after 9/11 where the country came together. We
    weren't Democrats or Republicans, we were all Americans. And
    you know, watched this institution come together as well.
        And I think there is a very non-partisan, bicameral desire
    to continue to do this and give the Administration, whether it
    is a Democratic or Republican Administration, the flexibility
    and ability to protect the American homeland and American
    interests around the world.
        I think this is a place where we should work together and
    provide that flexibility for future Administrations. Thinking
    about the sunset provision, I certainly understand the delicacy
    of setting a hard timeline.
        But I do think there's a compromise that, you know, can
    probably be reached where there are some forcing functions,
    some reporting functions that come back that do not set a hard-
    and-fast timeline but also give the legislative body the
    reassurances that on, whether it is every Congress coming back
    to, you know, the chairs of the relevant committees, Congress
    as a whole, etc.
        And reporting, again, I think that certainly can be
    negotiated to where the executive branch is comfortable, we are
    comfortable, and we protect the homeland.
        I also worry about future threats, and I appreciate none of
    us has a crystal ball. And the current AUMF addresses Al Qaeda
    and ISIS and affiliated groups like al-Shabaab et cetera.
        But when I think about what keeps me awake at night, you
    know, having--being both on the Foreign Affairs and the
    Intelligence Committee and having traveled extensively
    throughout the Middle East recently, you see countries like
    Yemen.
        And I do think there is a very real possibility that you
    will get some stabilization in South Yemen but, you know, I
    look at North Yemen, I look at the Houti movement. I look at a
    large number of young men heavily armed, nothing to do, no
    economy, etc.
        And I would also like to think about how do we--the Houtis
    would not be covered under this AUMF and I do not--I am not
    suggesting that they should. But if a new rebel movement or
    terror, counterterror movement emerges, how do we allow the
    flexibility to address new threats?
        And I, you know, I do not expect you to have that answer,
    but I do think it is important for us to give that flexibility.
    Certainly Article 2 would allow some immediate threats.
        But having to come back to Congress every time, I think
    there is, you know, am I thinking about this correctly? Maybe
    Secretary Nuland.
        Secretary Nuland. Thank you, Congressman Bera, and
    particularly for your openness to finding other ways to re-up
    these authorities short of date-certain for the reasons that we
    have talked about.
        I have worked for a number of presidents who have tried
    to--of both parties who have tried to amend this, and with the
    Congress, and it is difficult. So we do not want to put
    ourselves in a position where we have a gap.
        What we would also favor in addition to what we put
    explicitly in the law is provisions where we could come back to
    you ask for additional groups to be covered, whether we did
    that in open or whether we did that in a classified way so as
    not to signal. But we would be open to that for sure.
        Mr. Bera. Great, thank you. And just a last question, we,
    recently in Mexico City, and I know some of my colleagues have
    introduced an AUMF to think about transnational drug cartels. I
    will just go on the record that I think that is a bad idea at
    this juncture.
        And that is not to suggest that we do not have to use all
    means that we have as the Federal Government to address
    fentanyl, address these transnational drug cartels. But to, you
    know, our partners in Mexico, I think there are better ways for
    us to go about stamping out what is major issue here in the
    United States and certainly abroad.
        Secretary Nuland. We agree with that. We think we should
    use criminal statutes against criminals and terrorist statutes
    against terrorists.
        Mr. Bera. Great, thank you, and I will yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The chair recognizes
    Mr. Buck.
        Mr. Buck. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Chairman, thank
    you for allowing me to help on this issue. It has been a
    pleasure and an honor to work with you and the ranking member
    on this issue.
        I guess I want to just make one statement about sunsets.
    Regular reviews do not work in Congress. We have a regular
    review of our appropriations process, and we have a term for
    it. It is called shutdown. We have a regular review of a debt
    ceiling, and it is called almost defaulting.
        We have a regular review of many programs that we as
    Congress have authorized in the executive branch, and 1400 of
    those programs are unauthorized we still appropriate to.
    Regular reviews do not work.
        When there is something significant, like FISA, we have a
    deadline accompanying that important program, we get our job
    done. Sometimes we have to kick it for a few months in order to
    get our job done, but we get our job done.
        It is holding the collective feet of Congress to the fire
    that allows us to get something done. A review just does not
    work. The can will be kicked down the road, we will not do our
    job. And more importantly, the men and women who are risking
    their lives will not have the support of Congress.
        It is too easy for Members of Congress to go run around and
    say I never supported that and I am not going to appropriate
    money to it because we did not do our job of reviewing it.
        So I would really ask that you reconsider your position on
    a sunset. It will certainly be something that I will be pushing
    for.
        But my question really is a little bit different, and that
    is how does a terrorist group earn its way onto a list that
    gets targeted? What are the considerations?
        And I guess, Assistant Secretary Maier, I am directing this
    to you. In my mind, there are a few things. One, the group has
    explicitly sought to harm U.S. interests, whether they are
    personnel or embassies, or aided and abetted another group in
    that endeavor. Or sworn allegiance to a group that is involved
    in that.
        But I would love to know, and really this is the key to me
    to gaining the confidence of other members in Congress, that we
    are carefully considering this. It isn't just we saw something
    in a newspaper and decided to target a group.
        Mr. Maier. Congressman Buck, it is a really important
    question. And I think, and we would look at it at the most
    basic as a group that has both the intent and capability to
    harm Americans. And by that, we are talking individual American
    citizens.
        We often use broad, sweeping terms like U.S. interests and
    the United States and the homeland, but we are talking about
    groups that have a consistent, sustained intent to harm
    Americans and also have the capability to do so.
        And then I think as we move past that we apply really a
    policy test to look at those groups that we would add as
    associated forces or affiliates, those that are associated with
    the larger Al Qaeda and ISIS group.
        And there is really two tests to that. One is that it is an
    armed group, so meaning it has the capability. And it has
    entered the fight against the United States aligned with Al
    Qaeda, which is going back to the core of how this 2001 AUMF
    started.
        And then the second is this group is a co-belligerent with
    Al Qaeda against the United States. And I think I already kind
    of covered that, but the intent has to be there to strike at
    the United States.
        So we go through extensive policy discussions on the
    executive side informed by a whole host of information, a lot
    of it coming in of course classified, sir.
        Mr. Buck. So I am interested in--you used the word
    interest. And I guess capability is something that I am
    interested in also. Obviously we have embassies, we have a lot
    of American interests in other countries. The interest does not
    have to be attacking the homeland.
        Mr. Maier. Correct, sir, yes. We would look at it from the
    perspective of threats to Americans. Those can be official
    Americans working in embassies, but those can also be private
    citizens.
        And in fact much of what we have seen Al Qaeda and ISIS
    focused on in recent years are soft targets. So those could be
    tourist locations, those could be businesses that are less
    protected, because they are frankly easier targets.
        Mr. Buck. I would love your help with----
        Mr. Maier. Including overseas, yes, absolutely.
        Mr. Buck. I would love your help with trying to identify
    that in more specific terms. The one thing that we are great at
    is sort of giving broad discretion to the executive branch and
    then blaming the executive branch for abusing or using that
    broad discretion.
        I thank you for your answers, and I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The chair recognizes
    Mr. Castro.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you, Secretary
    Nuland, thank you to our panel for your testimony today on this
    very important discussion.
        As you all know, the Constitution reserves the power to
    declare war to Congress, and this committee has jurisdiction
    over authorizations for use of military force. Both Democratic
    and Republican Administrations have seized more and more
    authority to unilaterally use force, and congressional inaction
    I believe has enabled this.
        Now, I appreciate Chairman McCaul's decision to consider
    repeal and replacement of the 2001 authorization of the use of
    military force, and I look forward to the debate in this
    committee so Congress can reclaim these authorities that have
    been ceded over the last two decades.
        And I want to first raise an alarming issue that has
    recently gained traction. Representative Bera alluded to it. It
    has gained traction, and I fear it is leading our country down
    a very dark path. There is now open discussion about the use of
    force in Mexico to take on cartels, including air strikes, the
    deployment of armed forces, and special forces operations.
        Now, I am alarmed that many are threatening to do so with
    or without the cooperation of the Mexican Government, which
    could be considered an act of aggression and a violation of
    international law. I am raising these issues and questions to
    get the Administration on the record today.
        And I am directing these questions to Ms. Krass. Is there
    any interpretation of the 2001 AUMF that would allow the use of
    force against cartels in Mexico?
        Ms. Krass. We would not interpret the cartels in Mexico to
    be associated with forces of Al Qaeda.
        Mr. Castro. Are you aware of any executive branch opinion
    or memo that says the President's Article 2 power to repel
    sudden attacks would permit the use of force against cartels?
        Ms. Krass. So the way that we have interpreted through the
    Justice Department the Article 2 power is a two-pronged test.
    One, whether a use of force would serve an important national
    interest, and two, whether or not the use of force would be
    likely to arise in terms of both the use and the response in an
    escalatory response to the war in the constitutional sense.
        Just as you said, Congress has the power to declare war
    under the Constitution, and so that is the twofold test that
    would be applied.
        Mr. Castro. To the best of your understanding, any memo or
    policy that you have seen in the executive branch, is it your
    understanding today that that would include the cartels?
        Ms. Krass. I have not seen anything that would indicate
    that, no.
        Mr. Castro. What steps should Congress take to prevent
    over-broad interpretations of Article 2 that a future
    Administration might try to use to justify congressionally
    unauthorized hostilities with cartels?
        Ms. Krass. Well, that is something that I would have to
    take back to consider. I think that it is very important that
    the executive branch be required to consult with Congress and
    to engage with you fully on our interpretations of the law.
        Mr. Castro. Thank you so much.
        Mr. Visak, this question is for you. Under the U.N.
    Charter, States may use force without the territorial State's
    consent only in response to an, quote, armed attack or with the
    permission of the United Nation's Security Council. Does
    manufacturing, transporting, or selling fentanyl rise to the
    level of a ``armed attack'' in international law?
        Mr. Visek. Congressman, thank you for the question.
        I am not aware of any statement by anyone to suggest that
    it would comply with international law. Normally the U.N.
    Charter talks about the use of force. And that is threats of
    use of force against the territorial integrity or political
    independence of another State.
        Mr. Castro. All right. So, as far as you could tell, as far
    as you know that would be outside the definition?
        Mr. Visek. Yes. I always hesitate to engage in any
    hypotheticals, but it is, it is not an interpretation that
    immediately jumps to mind as the correct one.
        Mr. Castro. Sure. Thank you, sir.
        It is important to my colleagues to get on the record about
    how unwise it would be to start a war with Mexico in this
    manner. And I will soon be introducing a resolution rejecting
    the use of unilateral force in Mexico.
        And so, I encourage my colleagues to please get in touch
    with me if they are in agreement and would like to support such
    a resolution.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Barr.
        Mr. Barr. Thank you.
        Secretary Nuland, welcome back to the committee.
        In June of this year the President claimed that Al Qaeda
    was not present in Afghanistan and that the U.S. was ``getting
    help from the Taliban.'' This, ostensibly, would explain the
    Administration's policy request excluding the Taliban from any
    new AUMF.
        But in June of this year there was a U.N. report outlined,
    that outlined the threat that AQ, Al Qaeda, poses in
    Afghanistan.
        According to the report there are 30 to 60 senior Al Qaeda
    officials, and 400 fighters in Afghanistan today. The Taliban
    provides monthly welfare payments to Al Qaeda. Al Qaeda has
    safe hub--safe houses, training camps, and trains suicide
    bombers in Afghanistan. At least three Al Qaeda members are
    serving in the Taliban's Government. The Taliban issues
    passports and identity paperwork to foreign AQ members.
        So, my question is, why would the Administration want to
    exclude the Taliban from an AUMF?
        Secretary Nuland. Thanks, Congressman Barr.
        I think you, I am not sure if you have been here from the
    beginning of this----
        Mr. Barr. I have.
        Secretary Nuland. Yes. So, as we said at the outset, we do
    see the Taliban in their own interests, as Assistant Secretary
    Maier underscored, taking actions against ISIS-K.
        And we also see the capability of Al Qaeda in the current
    moment significantly reduced and attrited, including its
    ability to plot, and plan, and strike the homeland.
        So, you know, we, with regard to the President's statement
    we could address some of those things in a different setting
    than this one.
        Mr. Barr. Well, we do not need a different setting. We do
    not need to go to the SCIF. This is a U.N. report. This is open
    source.
        Are the Taliban actively giving aid, and comfort, and
    assistance to terrorists?
        And the further question for any of them, is the Taliban
    killing our Afghan allies that this Administration left behind?
        Secretary Nuland. I am going to defer to Assistant
    Secretary Maier on what we have seen the Al Qaeda be able to--
    --
        Mr. Barr. I think that is a very, very important question.
        Is the Taliban murdering our Afghan allies today in
    Afghanistan?
        And if they are, why are they not in an AUMF, or why should
    they not be in an AUMF?
        Secretary Nuland. I do not believe we have seen a
    consistent pattern of those Afghans who worked and supported
    our efforts in Afghanistan being murdered by the Taliban. But
    I----
        Mr. Barr. Well, my constituents, Marines at HKIA----
        Secretary Nuland. Yes.
        Mr. Barr [continuing]. Can tell you. They can tell you what
    the Taliban were doing when we were leaving.
        I represent Marines who were at HKIA. They know what the
    Taliban were doing and planning to do to our Afghan allies that
    we abandoned. They know.
        The Taliban is not our friend.
        Secretary Maier, it is also puzzling that the
    Administration opposes inclusion of Iran-backed militia groups
    in a new AUMF, despite the fact that these very groups are
    responsible for dozens of attacks against U.S. servicemembers
    in the region.
        Is the Administration wishing to not list Iran-backed
    groups in exchange for keeping the door open to a potential
    future Iranian nuclear deal?
        Mr. Maier. Congressman, I think we have said that the
    purpose of not putting Iranian-backed groups on this list is
    because we can already exercise all the military----
        Mr. Barr. Yes, I heard that testimony earlier. We have a
    Georgetown Law grad and we have a Yale Law grad in the
    Administration sitting right next to you. And I know that they
    have read the Youngstown decision and the conferring opinion
    from Justice Jackson.
        And I would like to ask the lawyers, is the Administration
    invoking Article II operating in a zone of twilight?
        Shouldn't we in Congress specifically authorize use of
    force against these murderers of U.S. servicemembers to give
    the President, the Command-in-Chief, the zenith of his power
    here?
        I will ask the lawyers.
        Ms. Krass. Congressman, you are absolutely correct that the
    President's power is at the extent of its zenith, as you say,
    when both Congress and the President are acting together. But
    we believe that the nature of the threat from the IMGs was one
    that the President has been able to address thus far, and has
    not shied away from addressing under his constitutional
    authority.
        Mr. Barr. Well, I do not have time for a final question.
    And I am not really going to disagree necessarily with you on
    the President's Article II powers, but I think it would be
    wise, given the fact that these are groups that are killing
    U.S. servicemembers, that Congress authorize the President to
    give him maximum authority and flexibility with respect to
    responding to those, those attacks against U.S. servicemembers
    in Iraq and Syria.
        I have run out of time. So, I will yield back. But I could
    go on for, for more time. Yield.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        The chair recognizes Ms. Titus.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
    witnesses.
        Both the Biden Administration and senior military officials
    have made it clear--OK?--on several occasions that the 2002
    AUMF no longer underpins any of our military. operations. And
    the President said he would sign legislation that repeals it,
    passed by both chambers. So, and that seems to me an indication
    that we could do something here to make a difference, and he
    would be supportive of it.
        Now, I know you all know that the Senate passed a bill
    repealing 1991 and 2002 just this last March. And it was
    bipartisan. And we have voted to repeal the 2002 several times
    in recent years, but not in this Congress.
        So, I am just thinking that if this committee is really
    serious about doing something for war powers reform, and
    reclaiming our powers under the Article I, that maybe we should
    just take up the Senate bill that is sitting over here, and
    move forward and make some progress so we can get on to
    something else.
        So, I would ask you all, do you find it necessary to
    replace the 2002 AUMF, as some of my Republican colleagues have
    suggested? Or should we just repeal it and then take these
    things up as they come along in a more appropriate and relevant
    way?
        Secretary Nuland. We do not see the need to replace the
    2002 AUMF, Congresswoman Titus.
        Ms. Titus. Will you just elaborate on that a little bit?
    And you probably already have and I missed it. I am sorry. But
    that would be helpful.
        Secretary Nuland. So, just, just to say that, obviously,
    our relationship with Iraq has greatly evolved since the 2002
    AUMF. We are now partners with Iraq in Iraq in fighting
    terrorists. We work intensively together.
        And our relationship is, obviously, about much more than
    security. It is about energy independence, combating climate
    change, economic renewal, all of those kinds of things, being a
    good neighbor in the region. So, those circumstances have
    changed dramatically.
        Ms. Titus. And that brings me to my next point that the
    President has also said that we cannot afford to remain
    tethered to the old way or the old policies. We need to keep
    current with what is actually happening in the rest of the
    world because the security landscape has evolved, to use your
    word.
        And our Constitution demands that Congress shapes our
    response to threats, especially when we are sending force.
        Would you say the threats that we face today are different
    from the threats that we faced 2 years ago, 4 years ago,
    however long?
        And how do we keep that relevant? Should we have reports
    back to the Congress? Because that has been pretty lacking in
    the past, of why we need the authorization, how it is being
    used, so that we can stay on top of it on a regular basis.
        Secretary Nuland. I am going to hand to Chris in a minute
    for more detail. But, obviously, the threat is, is evolving
    significantly.
        We talked about Al Qaeda at its nadir. We also talked about
    the increasing threat from affiliated groups in the Sahel, and
    particularly with the political instability that we have seen.
    And we do not know how that is going to evolve going forward.
    We are doing our best diplomatically to try to restore
    democratic governance in some of the, in some of those
    countries.
        But this is one of the reasons why one of the options that
    we proposed here is that the President could be asked to
    certify on a regular basis what groups needs to be covered, et
    cetera. That is one option available to, to you all as you
    think about how to maintain the freshness of this
    authorization.
        Thank you.
        Ms. Titus. Before you go, when you said ``affiliated
    groups,'' how do you define ``affiliated groups''? Do we have
    some certainty about what would be considered affiliated and
    not, or is it just I know it when I see it?
        Secretary Nuland. Well, obviously, if they get support in
    the financial sense, in the military sense, in the training
    sense from ISIS or Al Qaeda in other parts of the world, that
    would be--make them an affiliated group.
        Ms. Titus. Africa?
        Secretary Nuland. In Africa. And some of those groups do
    receive support.
        But, again, Assistant Secretary Maier, who does this all
    day every day, can give you more detail.
        Secretary Nuland. Thank you.
        Mr. Maier. Congresswoman, I think your two questions fit
    very well together. The dynamic nature of the threat is,
    especially in the context of Al Qaeda and ISIS, really one of
    these groups diversifying, and spreading to new places, and
    reinventing themselves.
        So, as we talk about affiliates or associated forces, a lot
    of that is them looking to move to places where there is less
    pressure on them, like, in Africa.
        Ms. Titus. Uh-huh.
        Mr. Maier. And so, I think what we would like to see in
    working with the Congress in a consultative process, if
    possible, that reflection of a mechanism that reflects that
    dynamic nature of this threat over time, ma'am.
        Ms. Titus. Thank you.
        I will yield back, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
        The chair recognizes Ms. Kim.
        Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you, Chairman McCaul, and
    Ranking Member Meeks for holding today's hearing.
        Sorry. Excuse me.
        You know, since the 2001 and 2002 AUMFs became law, the
    national security landscape has changed. And this has led to
    calls to reform or repeal the AUMFs. And I believe it is
    important that as Congress has this discussion that we
    carefully consider the fact that while the landscape may look
    different, the threats of terrorism to our national security
    still exists.
        Congress must increase oversight of the use of military
    force, but it must be also careful not to eliminate the ability
    of the President to confront these threats before an attack on
    the U.S. homeland or our personnel abroad.
        As a member of the Subcommittee on Africa, I am interested
    in how AUMF reform will affect our response to the terrorism in
    the Sahel where the terrorists are proliferating. Sub-Saharan
    Africa accounted for 60 percent of all terrorism deaths last
    year. And the Sahel was the site of 43 percent of all terrorism
    deaths, which is one--this is up from 1 percent in 2007.
        ISIS is present in the Sahel. And Burkina Faso, Niger, and
    Mali all recently had proof. I am deeply concerned that the
    destabilization in the region is further empowering ISIS. And
    as the U.S. loses security partners in the region to coups, we
    need to ensure that AUMF reform accommodates our military's
    ability to respond to terrorism threats in Sub-Saharan Africa.
        So, I want to ask you what are the key terrorist
    organizations in Africa and which are currently covered by the
    2001 AUMF?
        Mr. Maier. So, thank you for that question.
        Very much agree with you. And I think all the indications
    point to these groups looking to exploit insecurity in Africa,
    especially West Africa.
        And you highlighted the number of coups that are very
    disturbing to us. I would also add to that instability, the
    onset of Wagner, the Russia military contractor looking to
    exploit some of that, and some of these groups, some of these
    countries relying on that group.
        So, I think the short answer, ma'am, is that both ISIS and
    Al Qaeda are covered under the AUMF. And they both have
    affiliates or associated forces operating there. We tend to
    think of ISIS as being more comprehensive. And so, when we
    think of ISIS operating there, it has different groups: ISIS
    West Africa,----
        Mrs. Kim of California. Just quickly. Do you agree that a
    new AUMF must cover or continue to cover those groups?
        Mr. Maier. Yes, ma'am, I do.
        Mrs. Kim of California. Are there terrorist groups in Sahel
    that are currently not covered by the 2001 AUMF.
        Mr. Maier. There are groups that we have not to date used
    force against using the AUMF. But I think that was, that is a
    question probably best handled by our, our legal folks.
        Mrs. Kim of California. Let me ask one last question.
        How would the Administration ask Congress to codify
    authorities to act against terrorist groups in the Sahel?
        Secretary Nuland. Again, I think as Assistant Secretary
    Maier said, the vast majority of the ones that we have
    identified are affiliates of Al Qaeda or ISIS. And, therefore,
    we do feel that we are covered now. As we saw when we were able
    to operate in Mali, and when we were able to operate in Niger
    we did not hesitate.
        The issue now is these coups and the difficulty of
    attacking these, this threat when these governments are not
    responsive to U.S. support. So, we are working on that
    diplomatically, as you know.
        Mrs. Kim of California. Thank you.
        Chairman, I would like to yield the balance of my time to
    Congressman Mast.
        Mr. Mast. Thank you, Representative.
        I just have one further question going back to our previous
    conversation.
        Does Dr. Tabatabai currently have a suspended position or a
    suspended security clearance pending further review of his
    situation?
        Mr. Maier. No. No, she does not. At this point she is
    working in the Department.
        Mr. Mast. In a capacity outside of your office?
        Mr. Maier. She is in the role she is in, and that she has
    been hired in.
        Mr. Mast. Current chief of staff for you?
        Mr. Maier. She is current chief of staff, yes.
        Mr. Mast. Thank you. Thank you for the clarification.
        I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields, the gentlelady
    yields.
        And Mr. Phillips is recognized.
        Mr. Phillips. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And both to you and
    Ranking Member Meeks, thank you for leading this committee in
    such a thoughtful, principled, and effective manner at a time
    where we need more of that in this institution.
        And I think our founders anticipated the very discussions
    like the one we are having today when they laid out Article I
    and Article II, some thoughtful tension between the two.
        And I want to thank our witnesses for being here today, and
    also for your time spent with us over the last few weeks.
        Starting with you, Secretary Nuland, I have heard from many
    Administration officials that the AUMF is a helpful tool but
    not necessarily a requisite tool to carry out the work about
    which we are speaking today.
        Do you share that assertion?
        Secretary Nuland. Congressman Phillips, as we have said,
    when the executive branch and the Congress speak together we
    are at our strongest. So, we very much want to update this AUMF
    and----
        Mr. Phillips. I understand that. And you have said it many
    times. But my question is a little bit more distinct.
        Is it a helpful tool that would be nice to have? Or is it a
    mandatory tool in your estimation, necessary to have?
        Secretary Nuland. Again, I think it would depend on the
    circumstance that you, you are in. And I want to defer to
    Counsel Visek on the specifics. Although there are
    circumstances that are covered by the AUMF where we could not
    act without it. But----
        Mr. Phillips. Yes, if you could lay out very specifically
    what authorities may not be included under Article II that you
    would require the tension, for example, others. I would like to
    hear.
        Mr. Visek. Thank you. It is an excellent question,
    Congressman.
        I think what, what the question gets at is the interplay
    between the AUMF and Article II.
        Mr. Phillips. Uh-huh.
        Mr. Visek. And when do we use Article II? And what is the
    utility of an AUMF?
        As Ms. Krass earlier noted, with respect to Article II
    typically does it serve a--would an operation serve an
    important national interest? And then also because of its
    duration, scope, and nature, and as well as any anticipated
    response, would that military action implicate the ``declare
    war'' clause of the Constitution?
        And so, what I think that is getting at is we, we tend to
    use Article II for defensive, episodic sort of responses.
        When we are looking at a more prolonged authority that is
    needed, if we have a foreseeable, enduring need, it is very
    important, I think, to have a statutory authorization.
        Mr. Phillips. OK. So, what I am hearing is there is a need.
    Is that a fair?
        Mr. Visek. Yes.
        Mr. Phillips. OK. My time is limited, so I would like to
    continue on to Mr. Maier and Ms. Krass.
        You wrote in your testimony that a sunset would be ``a
    major obstacle to providing the legal, strategic, and policy
    certainty needed to fulfill the Nation's counterterrorism
    missions.''
        Now, I know President Obama in his letter to Congress in
    February 2015 asked for a 3-year sunset. Asked for a 3-year
    sunset. So, I am just curious if you disagree with him? And is
    that congruent with your message today?
        Mr. Maier. So, I think, Congressman, we continue to
    consistently point to a time-based sunset clause as being
    challenging as we try to both maintain a large coalition and
    clearly articulate to our adversaries that they are not going
    to be able to wait us out, sir.
        Ms. Krass. And if I could just.
        Mr. Phillips. Ms. Krass.
        Ms. Krass. It is important to us to have uninterrupted
    authority for our detention activities. Back to your point,
    sir, that is one of the important functions that the 2001 AUMF
    is currently fulfilling in terms of----
        Mr. Phillips. Right.
        Ms. Krass [continuing]. All of our war detainees, as
    covered by the AUMF.
        Mr. Phillips. So, you have both spoken to some degree about
    alternatives to a sunset. Can you just articulate clearly and
    somewhat quickly, if you can, just what that looks like so our
    committee can better understand that?
        And as I have said, I have said privately, you know, I
    think no sunset is a non-starter, I think, for this, for the
    U.S. Congress. But we should have that conversation. I would
    like you to respect it.
        If you would just take 20 seconds, someone answer it.
    Thanks.
        Secretary Nuland. Just to say a number of the things we
    have put on the table here.
        Mr. Phillips. Yes.
        Mr. Nuland. Regular reviews by the President and Congress
    at set intervals as to whether it is still needed, would be one
    option.
        Reporting or senior level briefing requirement.
        Presidential, No. 3 would be Presidential certification to
    Congress, at dates certain, that the issue is still needing
    these authorities.
        Next would be expedited procedure for consideration of
    legislation----
        Mr. Phillips. Uh-huh.
        Secretary Nuland [continuing]. To expand or modify.
        And we have engaged the staffs on both sides of the aisle
    on all of these ideas.
        Mr. Phillips. OK. And just, and I will close with this. You
    know, we currently have a, a reporting mandate every 180 days,
    of course. The last we received until this last week was from
    June 2021.
        So, if this is to work and we are to fill our, fulfill our
    constitutional responsibilities, we need to have that reporting
    done on a timely basis.
        And I would ask that you bring that back to your respective
    offices most importantly.
        Thank you. And I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        Mr. Green is recognized.
        Mr. Green. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and ranking member.
        As a combat veteran who served under the authorities of
    both 2001 and 2002 AUMFs, and a proud representative in
    Congress for the soldiers at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, for whom
    this isn't just an intellectual exercise, I would like to thank
    Chairman McCaul for his leadership and for organizing this
    hearing today.
        I would also like to thank our witnesses for their time,
    expertise, and incredible service to the country.
        One of my favorite days of the years is when I host Service
    Academy Day. Back in the district it is the coolest job I have.
    Meeting the immensely talented young men and women who seek to
    attend our military service academies makes me hopeful for the
    future of our country. It reaffirms the importance of
    everything we do here, that we truly can make this grand
    experiment of ours a more perfect union.
        However, the joy and optimism of this day comes with a
    solemn responsibility. As Members of Congress, one of our
    greatest enumerated powers it to oversee and authorize the use
    of military force, oftentimes sending the very young men and
    women we have nominated to service academies to the battlefield
    and asking them to make, ultimately, the ultimate sacrifice at
    times.
        Under the Constitution we swore an oath to uphold Congress
    is entrusted with the burden of determining if our Nation
    should undertake the trials and ultimate costs of a war.
    Congress has abdicated this duty for far too long, and failed
    to provide the proper legal standing to our troops.
        I welcome the opportunity to work with my colleagues in the
    House to develop a path forward for AUMF authorities that
    respects congressional leadership on this issue, but also
    continues to grant our troops the authorities they need for
    combat operations against Jihadist terrorist groups.
        These Jihadis are the successors of the terror cells that
    attacked our Nation on 9/11, and our operations against these
    groups remain critical to U.S. national security.
        I am confident that there is a constitutionally appropriate
    solution that we can come to. I look forward to developing this
    solution with our witnesses here today.
        Question really to whomever:
        How important is it to ensure a seamless continuity of
    authority between the 2001 AUMF and any replacement to it?
        Secretary Nuland. It is essential, Congressman, for all the
    reasons we have stated here: the tension of the ability to not
    lose an opportunity if we can and need to take a strike; but
    also as Assistant Secretary Maier has underscored, maintaining
    the confidence of the coalition that we need around the world
    that we will stay in this fight, and so that they will stay
    with us in this fight; and budget enact appropriately.
        Mr. Green. If the 2001 AUMF were repealed before a
    replacement was enacted, how would that impact or endanger our
    ability to legally detain the 30 Al Qaeda terrorists at
    Guantanamo?
        Ms. Krass. We would be very concerned by an interruption in
    that authority, sir. And we believe that without a doubt the
    detainees would bring litigation over whether there continued
    to be authority to hold them.
        Mr. Green. Congress is likely to include a time limit in
    any new AUMF. I know my colleagues across the aisle, colleague
    has said yes/no to this. There are differences of opinion.
        But what kind of concerns should we look at in deciding how
    long that should be, if there is a time limit?
        Secretary Nuland. Again, I think we have been pretty clear
    here that a set date just will embolden our enemies.
        Just to clarify one of the proposals that we have put on
    the table in this hearing and with staff is this idea of a
    Presidential certification that there is a continuing
    requirement. One way that you could work with this would be the
    right legislation that would lapse if the President did not
    certify. That would put this back in your hands and would
    create a sense of comity between the Executive and the
    Congress.
        So, that that is one option that is available to you.
        Mr. Green. I like that course of action.
        Secretary Nuland. Yes. Uh-huh.
        Mr. Green. Do you think a new counterterrorism AUMF should
    be global, or regional? I mean, I, I have my opinion, but I
    would be very interested to hear yours.
        Secretary Nuland. It has got to be global, Congressman,
    because of the way, as Assistant Secretary Maier said, these
    groups are morphing and moving to more hospitable environments.
        Mr. Green. So, we have got a lot of new organizations that
    have entered the fight. How do we word it so that we make sure
    any of these new entities that get new names are also included?
        Secretary Nuland. We have talked about a number of
    mechanisms. As you know, we have not been shy about coming to
    you in open session or in classified session with new
    affiliated groups, et cetera. So, we would continue to do that.
        You could do any of a number of things: a regular request
    to the Administration to re-up the list; regular reporting
    requirement; regular consultation; regular recertification. Any
    of those because, as you rightly point out, the groups are
    moving and morphing.
        Mr. Green. Thank you.
        My time is up. I yield.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        Ms. Jacobs is recognized.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all
    of our witnesses for being here.
        You know I represent San Diego, the biggest military
    community in the country. And, you know, my community has borne
    the cost of these decisions, or lack thereof, that Congress has
    not really been making since I was in middle school, which was
    when we voted on this AUMF.
        So, first I just wanted to followup on questions from
    Ranking Member Meeks and my colleague, Representative Phillips,
    on the Section 50 reporting.
        Assistant Secretary Maier, will you commit to providing
    future Section 50 reporting by the statutory deadline?
        Mr. Maier. I will.
        And just to hit that point, because it has come up a number
    of times, I am responsible for the late submission of that
    report. So, we have taken steps internally to ensure that we
    can meet that commitment, Congresswoman Jacobs.
        Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I appreciate that, especially since
    as you all are asking for a sunset and an exchange promising
    more transparency, it is just hard to believe that when the
    transparency we already mandate is not forthcoming.
        And on that regard, last year in a hearing on the AUMF my
    colleague Mr. Castro asked why the Department of Defense had
    classified the list of countries in which the U.S. military had
    used force. And you responded that you would see if aspects of
    the classified report could be made public.
        We have seen no real disclosure since then. So, can you
    commit to actually going back and taking that look and
    declassifying the list of groups, including affiliates that you
    considered to be covered by the 2001 AUMF?
        Mr. Maier. Yes, ma'am. And, actually, a number of those
    groups are already unclassified that we can speak openly to
    here.
        In some cases we are careful about identifying countries
    for purposes of diplomatic and a host of other things. But I
    think the vast majority of the groups are known publicly,
    ma'am.
        Ms. Jacobs. Great. Well, I will look forward to not having
    to ask you the same question in a year.
        Moving on to discussion of associated or affiliated
    sources, I think that a key question for us in Congress and a
    key reason why it feels like the 2001 AUMF has gone so far
    beyond the original scope, you know, it was originally supposed
    to be about those people who perpetrated 9/11, which is why we
    went after Al Qaeda and the Taliban at the time, but some
    public reporting from what you said today we know that this
    AUMF has been used to justify force not only in Afghanistan,
    but in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Somalia, Mali, and Niger.
        So, I want to talk about some hypothetical cases. I know
    you have said the standard is enter the fight alongside a named
    group co-belligerent and the intent. So, Ms. Krass, we did go
    through a couple hypothetical associated forces. And you can
    let me know with a yes or no answer if they would--if you would
    consider them covered.
        So, first of all, if a group did not exist in 2001, could
    it still constitute an associated force or otherwise be covered
    by the 2001 AUMF?
        Ms. Krass. So, thank you for that question, Congresswoman
    Jacobs. And I apologize that I prefer not to engage in
    hypotheticals.
        I think we can use as an example the designation of ISIS,
    which was--which is a group that stems from Al Qaeda in Iraq
    from 2003, so that is after the 2001 AUMF. But there were ties
    between its leader and Osama bin Laden before 9/11.
        That group eventually split from Al Qaeda----
        Ms. Jacobs. We are familiar with the history of ISIS. I
    would note there are a number of groups that did not exist in
    2001 that are currently covered, Al-Shabaab, for instance, and
    did not have ties to Osama bin Laden prior to 2001.
        And what if the group itself, this affiliated or associated
    group, if you want to use real examples you are welcome to, but
    if they do not have the ambition, intent, or capability to
    attack the U.S. homeland, as your own reporting that we just
    got this week says, most of the affiliated groups do not, would
    that be considered covered by the 2001 AUMF?
        Ms. Krass. And so, a group under the AUMF has to be one
    which, as Assistant Secretary Maier has explained, an organized
    armed group which has entered the fight alongside Al Qaeda or
    the Taliban, and is a co-belligerent----
        Mr. Jacobs. I got that. But, but we know that in fact many
    of the groups that you all are counting do not actually have
    the intent to strike the United States, as per your own
    reporting.
        Next, if their ends are primarily local, meaning their
    grievances are specific to their community, have nothing to do
    with the United States, and their aim is primarily attacks in
    the region, would that be covered?
        The answer is yes. I will answer for you. I know you do not
    like hypotheticals. We have seen that in the case of the
    elements in the Sahel and Somalia.
        Last, if the group is an affiliate of an affiliate, so ISIS
    is categorized because they were an affiliate, but now we are
    saying ISIS affiliates are also covered, would that be covered?
        Ms. Krass. So, again, to echo what Assistant Secretary
    Maier explained, we see ISIS as we do not look at ISIS as
    having associated forces itself. We see it as itself being a
    single organized group.
        Ms. Jacobs. And I see that for some of the groups you are
    counting as affiliates. But I think, for instance, ISIS
    Mozambique it is very hard to say they are part of ISIS.
        So, I will look forward to continuing this conversation.
    But I think it is clear that we have let these overly broad
    definitions make it so that we do not have any meaningful
    oversight over what you all are doing. And I think that just
    doing Al Qaeda and ISIS and not the affiliated forces
    specifically named is really problematic.
        Thank you.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Huizenga.
        Mr. Huizenga. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Right here I was actually a staffer when 9/11 happened. And
    I worked for a gentleman who had just been named to the Intel
    Committee, who actually ended up chairing the Intel Committee,
    Peter Hoekstra.
        And I remember the robust debates, shall we call them, that
    surrounded what we were going to do as a country. And much like
    my friend the birthday boy, Mr. Meeks, had said, I do not think
    anybody imagined that 22 years later we would be operating in
    the same manner.
        And nor did--and I do not want to speak for him, I will
    speak for myself--but nor did we think that Congress would not
    have, at a minimum, periodic involvement in reviewing this. And
    that seems like where we are today, where we are asking, or you
    are asking for that not to be part of this.
        And I would like to know, and probably it is going to be to
    you, Under Secretary, what does this Administration believe
    what Congress' role is in this in determining which groups are
    covered by an AUMF?
        And I understand you do not like the timeline. And I
    understand the thinking and the reasoning why. But what is your
    take on us being involved in the who we are actually fighting?
        Secretary Nuland. Congressman Huizenga, I think we would
    welcome a stronger partnership between the Executive and the
    Congress in the new legislation in terms of how we determine
    the groups and how we report the groups.
        So, as we have said earlier in this hearing, there are many
    ways that we could create a mechanism where we would come to
    you on whatever basis you want, every 2 years, even longer, to
    specify more clearly the groups that we think are covered.
        What I would say, though, as you know in the current
    circumstance we do some of this in the open, particularly with
    groups that we have already acted against, but we do need to
    maintain a classified ability with those groups----
        Mr. Huizenga. OK.
        Secretary Nuland [continuing]. With those groups that we
    may need to go on.
        Mr. Huizenga. Real quickly.
        Does the Administration oppose or support providing
    Congress with the opportunity to review counterterrorism-
    related deployments of troops?
        Secretary Nuland. That is going to go to the scope of the--
    Yes.
        Mr. Maier. Yes. Congressman, I think we already do that. We
    provide regular updates to the Armed Services Committee on
    those exact things.
        Mr. Huizenga. You had discussed, and my friend from
    Tennessee Congressman Green had thought he was intrigued by
    this, some type of certification by the President.
        What I think maybe I would be more interested in is not
    just having a certification by the President, but a
    congressional review of said certification. Meaning Congress
    would have to approve that need for a certification.
        And, now, that might be problematic with your date
    concerns. But I am not willing to give up the constitutional
    obligation and standing that we have on oversight and our
    involvement in what is going on.
        So, I do not know, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Ranking Member, you
    know, if we can work through some of that type of language, I
    would like that to be a part of it.
        My remaining minute and a half, I would like to know,
    moving to Afghanistan, has anyone at the Department of State or
    the Department of Defense had conversations with Taliban
    leaders regarding its lack of inclusion in a future AUMF?
        Secretary Nuland. I do not believe so, sir. Our
    conversations with the Taliban are extremely constrained and go
    primarily to----
        Mr. Huizenga. So, I am not talking on necessarily official
    channels.
        Secretary Nuland. Yes.
        Mr. Huizenga. I mean, has there been any of that
    conversation?
        Secretary Nuland. To my knowledge, no.
        Mr. Huizenga. OK. Mr. Maier?
        Mr. Maier. No, I am not aware of any conversations of that
    ilk either.
        Mr. Huizenga. OK. Does the Administration oppose listing
    the Taliban on an AUMF? Or is there a fear that somehow that
    would be angering them or set off the relationship?
        Secretary Nuland. Congressman, we have been pretty clear
    that we do think they are making steady progress against ISIS-
    K. We can talk about that in a separate session.
        And we do think that Al Qaeda is greatly attrited at the
    current moment.
        Mr. Huizenga. My question is does the Administration oppose
    listing the Taliban on the AUMF?
        Mr. Maier. We do not think it is necessary.
        Mr. Huizenga. OK.
        Mr. Maier. We think we have the authorities to act,
    including what we showed with Zawahiri.
        Mr. Huizenga. OK. Well, I will finish on this with my
    friend Andy Barr's concerns. He has people that were at HKIA. I
    actually have a constituent who was injured at Abbey Gate. I
    have in past referred to him as Jose. He has not wanted to get
    his name out publicly. And I can tell you that he and his
    family, as he has been recovering from this, they do not feel
    confident that the Taliban has made the proper, the proper
    progress that is being claimed here. And that is going to be an
    ongoing concern for us, and should be.
        And with that, my time is up.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        Raises an interesting point. If we got a Presidential
    certification and Congress either approves and moves forward,
    if we disapprove, that could trigger the sunset clause. That
    may be a possible solution.
        And I know, yes, if you would get back to me on that
    particular mechanism, that would be interesting.
        Secretary Nuland. In fact, I was just passed a note from
    folks who have been working on this with your staff, that is
    another way to go.
        Chairman McCaul. Gotcha.
        Ms. Dean is recognized.
        Ms. Dean. I thank you, Chairman McCaul and Ranking Member
    Meeks, for holding this important hearing. I thank you all of
    you, our witnesses, for testifying today, but more importantly
    for your work on behalf of our Nation.
        I want to do a little look back.
        So, I understand, I was not here when the 2001 AUMF was
    signed, was passed, so a little history and then looking
    forward.
        One of the things I am interested in is, maybe legal
    counsel can tell me, how was the 2001 AUMF, how was it so
    broadly interpreted as to allow for a full occupation and
    nation building attempts in Afghanistan? And I say that with
    great respect for what our troops did there. But how do we,
    what do we learn from that broad use of the 2001 AUMF?
        And how do we structure a future AUMF to preclude such
    activities unless congressionally authorized?
        Ms. Krass. Maybe I will start that and then turn to my
    colleague Assistant Secretary Maier.
        The language of the 2001 AUMF, as with other similar AUMFs,
    is broad in that it authorized the President to use all
    necessary and appropriate force to counter the threat
    determined to be a threat from Al Qaeda, and the Taliban, and
    associated forces. And so, various presidents exercised their
    authority consistent with that authorization to take the
    actions that they took in Afghanistan.
        Ms. Dean. Where down that road should we have constricted
    this? If the language was so broad, if we craft one better how
    do we constrict it so that does not go forward without
    congressional approval?
        Ms. Krass. The one means to ensure regular interactions
    with--between the executive branch and Congress are reporting
    mechanisms and consultation requirements.
        Ms. Dean. Did you want to add anything historically?
        Mr. Maier. The only thing I would say, Congresswoman, is
    one of the things that has evolved over time is a lot of
    statutory requirements to update the Congress on ongoing
    operations. And I think we have used that as a mechanism to
    both inform, but at some level continue to move forward
    understanding that there was not legislation that prevented us
    from doing that, ma'am.
        Ms. Dean. OK. And looking forward, I know a lot of us have
    talked about sunset, or a lot of people here.
        And I apologize, we are in and out of this room because of
    conflicts, not because we do not know this is terribly
    important. So, if I, if I am repeating something, let me know.
        Secretary, Assistant Secretary Maier, you testified that
    the sunset, a sunset provision would ``add strategic and
    operational risks to our counterterrorism efforts and
    potentially undermine our international partnerships.''
        In a little more plain English, what does that mean?
        Mr. Maier. I think in as plain an English as I can give
    you, Congresswoman, it means that if our partners start to see
    us backing away from our ongoing commitment, we are the global
    leader, they will do the same.
        And one of the things that we have had as a benefit,
    especially in the defeat ISIS coalition, is a lot of small
    countries looking around seeing each other beginning to be
    involved and, perhaps, in some cases, challenging political
    mandates in their own systems. But they see the United States
    as the leader and the sustainable leader for that.
        Secretary Nuland. And just to add to that, might be
    potential for the terrorists to wait us out. If they know in 3
    years the authority has expired, they are going to go to ground
    and get ready for that moment in 3 years, and then the
    detention authorities as well.
        Ms. Dean. I hear so many echoes of what our concerns are if
    we show weakening support for Ukraine. If others around the
    world think they can wait us out and just grind down this war,
    that level of uncertainty is globally so disastrous. We must
    stand with the folks in Ukraine.
        Ambassador, you talked about this sort of hybrid approach,
    which would be not quite a sense that but a lapse unless
    Presidential certification takes place. What does Presidential
    certification look like, just to build on what you were all
    talking about?
        Secretary Nuland. So, obviously, this is something that we
    need to discuss and work through. But a number of ideas here.
        At regular intervals that you all would set in the law, 3
    years, 5 years, 10 years, the President would have to come
    forward and say, I believe the Nation still needs these
    authorities. It could either be all the authorities or some of
    the authorities, as necessary.
        There could be any number of, you know, you all would have
    to disapprove that if you did not want to grant them. That
    would be one way to go so that there would be a regular
    conversation, and you would have to engage as to whether you
    supported the certification or not. That's one idea and the one
    that the chairman just recently grabbed onto, so.
        Ms. Dean. Again I thank you all for your work. And thank
    you, Mr. Chairman.
        I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentlelady yields.
        Mr. Hill is recognized.
        Mr. Hill. Thank you, Chairman. Appreciate you holding this
    important hearing.
        I was saying to my colleagues it is nice to be in a hearing
    room today working on something extremely important to the
    country. And so, thank you for calling this hearing.
        And a happy birthday to Greg Meeks, the most energetic 70-
    year-old guy from Queens that I know personally, who knew
    Cassius Clay. You cannot beat that.
        So, this has been a good discussion, but I want to explore,
    continue to explore this discussion. Thank the panel for being
    here.
        Ms. Krass, Mr. Maier, you said in your testimony that you
    do not believe it is necessary to add or align militia groups
    to a new or upgraded AUMF, partly because--and this is a point
    I am not sure has been made--the 2022 National Security
    Strategy prioritizes China and Russia as the primary strategic
    threats to the U.S.
        Is that really the reason why you do not suggest the Shia
    militia groups be included, or would you say it is the
    principal reason they should be included, Mr. Maier?
        Mr. Maier. Yes, Congressman, I would not say that.
        I think we say in the National Defense Strategy that China
    is our pacing challenge, and Russia is our acute challenge. But
    often forgotten is the fact that we also identify Iran, North
    Korea, and violent extremist organizations as also being
    priorities for us, sir.
        Mr. Hill. Yes. But when you think about that, who is more
    likely to conduct an attack inside the United States or against
    U.S. forces on just an any day basis, one of those terror
    forces, or a Shia militia group, or the Russian Federation?
        Hypothetical question. I know the under secretary will not
    answer it, but I know the assistant secretary might. So, I am
    letting you take a shot at that.
        Secretary Nuland. I am just going to say that it is our job
    to ensure that none of us, none of them take a shot.
        Mr. Hill. Correct. I agree. I agree.
        But it is a difference between, you know, what we are
    dealing with in great power rivalry versus people who have a
    much lower cost potential of taking a shot at the United States
    or U.S. interests. And we have seen that consistently since the
    1950's most, you know, predominantly I think about every day
    since it is October, October to mean means 1983, which means
    the loss of our Marines in Beirut.
        And so, I want to get this right. So, the Shia militia
    groups, who besides the Shia militia groups are active in
    Syria, in Assad's Syria, aiding the Assad regime? Who on your
    list?
        Mr. Maier. Sir, I think some of that goes into a session we
    cannot talk to.
        Mr. Hill. But are the Shia militia active and open-sourced,
    are they active in backing the Assad regime?
        Mr. Maier. Iran definitely used proxies to project its
    power in Syria, sir, yes.
        Mr. Hill. And they have attacked Americans operating in
    Syria?
        Mr. Maier. They have.
        Mr. Hill. And they have attacked other allied partners with
    United States in Syria?
        Mr. Maier. They have.
        Mr. Hill. What is your view of the risk of a Shia militia
    becoming more active and more ingratiated, I would say, and
    having legal standing now in the country of Iraq? Is that a
    risk to expanded Shia militia activities against forces
    connected with the United States?
        Secretary Nuland. I am going to in this open session just
    say that we are working intensively with the Iraqi Government
    and with our security partnership that we have there to ensure
    that Iraq cannot be used as a projection point for Iranian
    militia. I will just leave it there.
        And then just to remind of the strike that the President
    authorized in Syria in March which, you know, was primarily
    designed to restore deterrence.
        Mr. Hill. And in Afghanistan, when was the last time we
    conducted a strike in Afghanistan related to your authorities
    under the AUMF?
        Secretary Nuland. The Zawahiri strike in 2022.
        Mr. Hill. That was in July 2022?
        Secretary Nuland. Correct.
        Mr. Hill. Has there not been any rationale, do you think,
    for a strike since then against the--in the country of
    Afghanistan?
        Secretary Nuland. Congressman Hill, I think it would be
    useful to get you a briefing in another session with regard to
    other work that has been ongoing in Afghanistan, if that makes
    sense.
        Mr. Hill. That is good. Well, I have had those briefings,
    but thank you.
        Ms. Krass, help me understand the legal limitations of
    using the President's Article II authority that you referenced
    in your testimony versus an AUMF from Congress?
        Ms. Krass. So, the President's Article II power is
    constrained in two ways:
        One, he has to determine that the use of force serves an
    important national interest, and;
        Two, that that use of force and any response that is likely
    from whomever the force is being used against would not
    escalate into war in the constitutional sense in terms of its
    nature, scope, or duration.
        Mr. Hill. Good.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Stanton.
        Mr. Stanton. Thank you very much, Chairman.
        Last year at hearing on the 2001 AUMF Administration
    officials opposed adding a sunset provision to the 2001 AUMF,
    or including a sunset provision in any replacement legislation.
        As an alternative, they proposed conducting periodic
    reviews with Congress of the list of so-called ``associated
    forces.'' And that has been covered, but I want to cover it a
    little bit more.
        This is a question for Assistant Secretary Maier.
        Given that the executive branch has habitually delayed
    complying with the war powers reporting requirements, how can
    Congress meaningfully participate in a periodic review of the
    AUMF?
        Mr. Maier. So, Congressman, I think some of the ways that
    we have highlighted that would go above and beyond a reporting
    requirement such as the Presidential certification, and more
    active engagement as opposed to simply a report, would be some
    options to, if you would, upgrade some, perhaps, some of that
    engagement, sir.
        Mr. Stanton. And however Congress would participate,
    obviously it has to be full compliance with the re--with full
    compliance with the reporting requirements.
        If Congress wanted to delist a group, how could Congress
    ensure that its decisions during a periodic review to delist a
    group would be legally binding?
        Secretary Nuland. As we have talked about, one option could
    be that the President would need to certify to you that he
    needs the authorities to continue, or he needs them to continue
    over some or all of the statute. And then you could approve
    that or respond to that by rejecting some aspects of the
    Presidential request. That is another way to go.
        Mr. Stanton. Your thought is that it would not require an
    actual act of Congress to pass a new bill subject to
    Presidential veto to delist a group?
        Secretary Nuland. It might.
        I am going to stop pretending to be a lawyer. I am not the
    effective lawyer
        Mr. Stanton. Fair enough.
        It is an interesting question and, you know, one that would
    depend on, on the wording, obviously, and what the procedure
    is. I mean, obviously we are mindful of the bicameralism and
    the presentment requirements.
        But I think the idea, however, is to engage with Congress,
    you know, certification to be used as a mechanism to say, yes,
    there is this continuing mean, and then to build in procedures
    for Congress to express its view, whether by passing a law or
    by traditional oversight and reporting.
        You know, obviously Congress always has the ability to pass
    a law. But I think what we are communicating is we are open to
    structuring as many ways as possible and is legal to, to
    increase engagement with Congress. Because I think as has been
    said previously, when Congress and the President are on the
    same page it sends the most powerful signal.
        Ms. Krass, according to the Administration the 2001 AUMF
    allows hostilities with Al Qaeda and the Taliban's associated
    forces. But we know the Department of Defense has used the 2001
    AUMF to pursue the Islamic State of Libya, the Islamic State
    Sinai Province, the Islamic State Yemen Province, among others.
        These groups are affiliated devices, not Al Qaeda, and many
    of them are actually in conflict with regional Al Qaeda
    affiliates.
        How far removed can a ``associated force'' be from Al Qaeda
    and the Taliban under the 2001 AUMF?
        Ms. Krass. Thank you, Congressman.
        The Administration, the Obama Administration in 2014
    determined that ISIS qualified as an associated force of Al
    Qaeda because ISIS is a successor to Al Qaeda in Iraq. And its
    leadership was closely aligned with Osama bin Laden and Al
    Qaeda and to further allegiance to Al Qaeda. They subsequently
    split off. But we cannot allow our adversaries in the terrorist
    group to determine whether they are covered by the AUMF by what
    they name themselves and who they, who they align with.
        Mr. Stanton. I appreciate that.
        Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        Mr. Davidson is recognized.
        Mr. Davidson. Thank you, Chairman.
        I echo the sentiments of many colleagues. This is an
    incredibly important hearing and, frankly, one that is long
    overdue, but I am grateful to have it today.
        Serving in the 75th Ranger Regiment, one of my soldiers who
    had been in combat in Mogadishu, Somalia, asked me whether he
    had done the right thing in a tough situation. He did. But he
    wanted my opinion on why America had asked such incredible
    things of him and then pulled out.
        If we weren't committed to the victory, why did we even go?
    And if we were committed to victory, what did we actually
    achieve?
        In the wake of 9/11 we saw President Bush fly a, quote,
    ``Mission Accomplished'' banner on the deck of a United States
    aircraft carrier. Everyone in the world knew that was a false
    claim and called him out on it. Few knew, but some suspected,
    that an endless war was lying ahead.
        The Constitution reserves the declaration of war for
    Congress for a reason. When America is at war its people must
    support the cause. Even when an all volunteer force wages the
    wars, the American people are credited or blamed for victory or
    defeat and left with the tab.
        It is vitally important that this body, this Congress,
    closest to the people, make the commitments to put America at
    war. Any other standard risks empowering a permanent police
    State. And for that reason, every single Congress must actively
    make that commitment. It is not an open checkbook for an
    unlimited duration. That is not acceptable and it cannot
    continue.
        Now, to be clear, terrorists, transnational criminal
    organizations, and nation States who are actively preparing to
    harm the United States, Americans, or our allies should know
    that there will be no sanctuary for them anywhere. And in my
    view, we should address them all in an effective AUMF.
        It seems the Administration wants to selectively apply that
    principle both in identifying and targeting enemies of our
    country and in whether to name them in an AUMF, whether in
    public or in a classified setting.
        And they want to claim Article II has nearly unlimited and
    uncheckable application in nearly every situation, whether that
    is intelligence collection or active combat. To reclaim Article
    I constitutional authority on this matter, Congress must end
    the status quo with a focused AUMF and, separately, with
    reforms to the Patriot Act, and termination of Executive Order
    12333.
        Mr. Visek, how is an authorization for use of military
    force different than a declaration of war?
        Mr. Visek. Well, I think the authorization to use military
    force, I think it serves sort of three important functions. And
    here what we are talking about is non-State actors. I think
    traditionally they cannot give a declaration of war----
        Mr. Davidson. Focused on a nation State.
        Mr. Visek [continuing]. Focused on nation States.
        But I think they both serve the same purpose in that they
    are authorizing sort of prolonged military activities, you
    know, where there is a continuing threat to the United States
    and I think, as I said, or U.S. interests.
        I think previously, in a response to other questions, both
    Ms. Krass and I have noted that Article II authorizes
    activities short of war, and we tend to use in sort of episodic
    defensive response mode.
        Mr. Davidson. Right. Reactive.
        So, how important is authorization for our actions on the
    battlefield or detention of enemy combatants?
        Mr. Visek. Well, I think, as my DoD colleagues and Acting
    Secretary, Deputy Secretary Nuland said, I think it is fairly
    important to have continuity in our authorities. And so, an
    AUMF, by virtue of the fact that it is sort of an authority
    that is enduring, if you will, until it is, obviously, modified
    or adjusted, is critical to maintaining authorities for
    detention, and also for, you know, operational purposes, and
    also the non-legal but the very, probably, equally important
    policy aspects of showing a commitment to our allies, and also
    telling our adversaries that we are in it for the long haul.
        Mr. Davidson. Just because I will not have time for an
    answer, I would ask that we get a written response to this
    question.
        In the past, AUMFs have led to large and enduring presence
    of boots on the ground, some would say occupation. In the
    Middle East it has led to regime change wars against nation
    States and subsequent, largely unproductive, nation building
    efforts.
        What is considered an occupation? And what are the limiting
    factors, whether it is size, location, and duration?
        And I think we need to address that in the AUMF. So, your
    feedback would be greatly helpful.
        And I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields.
        The chair recognizes Mr. Jackson.
        Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Thank you, Chairman.
        And happy birthday to our Ranking Member Meeks, and many
    more.
        Thank you to Mr. Visek. Can you explain the process whereby
    the Administration determines which and what entities qualify
    as associate forces, and who is at the table to make this
    decision?
        Mr. Visek. Well, I think determinations are made sort of at
    the most senior levels of the U.S. Government. It is an
    interagency process after careful evaluation of the
    intelligence.
        The associated forces, it is a two-part test. And I think,
    first, the entity has to be an organized armed group that has
    entered the fight alongside Al Qaeda. Previously it was also
    the Taliban, but I think the focus here is really Al Qaeda.
        Second, it is not just that they have, you know, entered a
    fight alongside Al Qaeda, but the group must be a co-
    belligerent with Al Qaeda in hostilities against the United
    States or our coalition partners.
        And I think this has been an important sort of test for us
    because, as has been noted, groups can splinter. They can
    morph. They can rebrand. And we have to have some flexibility
    to be able to adjust.
        Now, in the 2001 AUMF expand the associated forces test. I
    think that would be a familiar model and one that has been
    recognized by, you know, Congress, and the Judiciary and,
    obviously, the executive branch as, you know, a model that
    could be used going forward.
        We would, of course, be open to, you know, other ways to
    provide flexibility in terms of----
        Mr. Jackson of Illinois. If I could ask a followup question
    on that.
        How do you determine the scope, the nature, duration of
    which we will have these engagements going forward?
        Mr. Visek. Well, I think at this point I'd like to turn to
    Assistant Secretary Christopher Maier, because I think this is
    a predictive exercise that really involves sort of an
    intelligence in military assessments as well as sort of the
    expertise of policy officials at the State Department.
        Mr. Maier. So, Congressman, I think it's a multi-pronged
    consideration. So, when we look at what is going to be
    necessary in the context of military force, we're really
    applying a series of tests.
        But I think in most--most simply and in the plainest
    English, we're trying to mitigate the threat within the means
    that we have.
        So, that is not always exclusively military force, of
    course. We use a variety of other instruments. But I think from
    a Department of Defense perspective, we're looking to do this
    as effectively and efficiently as possible.
        Mr. Jackson of Illinois. In light of the Administration
    withdrawing from Afghanistan, what is the process, are there
    any people or any groups that have come off of our watch list
    as a result of the shift in the policy in Afghanistan?
        Mr. Maier. Congressman, we have not taken anybody off the
    AUMF Associated Forces List. As too watch-listing, if that's
    what you're also getting at, I think that's probably better
    handled in a different session, sir.
        Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Thank you. And probably the last
    question is, only a handful of members were able to sign this
    AUMF and most of them are gone now. And this is a key
    responsibility, a core responsibility for the--why we got
    elected to be a part of this.
        What would you say, recommend on, that could give us some
    comfort on why we're here and what we can do to help better
    assist in your service?
        Secretary Nuland. Well, Congressman Jackson, I think that's
    exactly why we're here. That we would welcome a re-upping of
    appropriate authorities through a new AUMF. And discussing what
    needs to be there together.
        And that's, I think, why we've been going through all of
    this today. So, because we want members like you to be part of
    the next chapter of this fight against terror.
        Mr. Jackson of Illinois. Thank you, Victoria. I yield back
    my time. Thank you.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields and Mr. Baird is
    recognized.
        Mr. Baird. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you and the
    Ranking Member for holding this important discussion. And happy
    birthday, Ranking Member. We appreciate--also, we appreciate
    all of our witnesses being here today.
        But my area focuses on terrorism is exploding in Africa,
    Sub-Saharan Africa accounted for 60 percent of all terrorism
    deaths last year. AFRICOM describes Al-Shabaab as al-Qaeda's
    largest and best financed affiliate with annual revenues around
    $150 million.
        So, despite robust U.S. and African Union missions to
    degrade the group, DoD reports that Al-Shabaab poses a high
    terrorist threat to the U.S. interest in Somalia and even a
    weak to moderate threat to the U.S. homeland.
        So, is it important that Al-Shabaab be covered by any new
    AUMF?
        Secretary Nuland. Absolutely.
        Mr. Baird. Took care of that question, did not it. So,
    anyway. But under the 2001 AUMF, Al-Shabaab has been targeted
    as an associated force of al-Qaeda.
        And in a new AUMF, should Al-Shabaab be listed as a
    targetable group rather than just an affiliated or associated
    force of al-Qaeda? And why or why not?
        Secretary Nuland. So, I'm going to let Assistant Secretary
    Maier elaborate. But Al-Shabaab started as an affiliate of al-
    Qaeda. It still works with al-Qaeda.
        That would not preclude them being listed separately if
    that's what the Congress wanted to do. But under the current
    AUMF that's how we think about them.
        Mr. Maier. Really Congressman, nothing to add other than
    the fact that the reason we would keep al-Qaeda and Al-Shabaab
    together is because Al-Shabaab's largely speaking on behalf of
    al-Qaeda and using their ideology to really be the impetus for
    why they would threaten Americans.
        So, there's a lineage there, sir.
        Mr. Baird. Anyone else?
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. Ms. Kamlager-Dove is
    recognized.
        Ms. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you, Mr. Chair and Ranking Member
    Meeks. Happy birthday to you as well.
        I want to thank the witnesses who are here. I know it is
    rare to have you here. And I have questions. But before I get
    to them, I do just kind of what to reconnect us to reality for
    a moment.
        We're on the verge of a congressional shutdown. And I hear
    members demanding a more aggressive stance against malign
    actors and posturing a more defiant defense of democracy around
    the globe.
        But when Congress shuts down the government, half of the
    Pentagon's civilian employees will be furloughed. In the event
    of a national defense crisis, new contracts will not be
    awarded.
        Payments to defense contractors would be delayed. Foreign
    aid programs supporting our allies would dry up. Members of the
    military would be expected to maintain operations and posts
    without pay. State Department employees and consular operations
    would only continue for as long as there is funding.
        And in fact later on today, we'll be voting on amendments
    that would compromise and cut critical programs that support
    our national security and diplomacy. So, I do not want us to
    compartmentalize reality here.
        But now for my questions and so grateful that the member
    before me asked about Al-Shabaab, because Africa is now the
    epicenter of international terrorism, with total terrorism
    related fatalities rising by nearly 50 percent since 1921 to
    1922.
        And this is while the United States has had a counter-
    terrorism presence on the continent for over 15 years. The
    international community has seen the destabilizing impacts of
    this violence and the flawed counter-terrorism policies meant
    to address it.
        So, Assistant Secretary Maier, U.S. forces have been
    engaged in Somalia against Al-Shabaab since 2017. Yet, aside
    from some momentum in 2012, we have not seen Somali and
    international forces decisively turn the tide against Al-
    Shabaab.
        So, looking back over the past 15 years, why do you believe
    we have not been more successful in Somalia?
        An, please cover our shortcomings in the U.S. Government
    response as well as any structural obstacles.
        Mr. Maier. So, Congresswoman, I think this is a multi-
    pronged question and a multi-pronged answer. I'll try to be
    very brief in saying that our ability to operate unilaterally,
    the U.S. Government only can deal with some of this problem.
        Many of the conditions in Somalia are a function of poor
    governance. And until really recently, and by that I mean, in
    the last year or so, we have not seen the Somali government
    really take the fight to Al-Shabaab the way we'd like.
        I think with President Hassan Sheikh, we've seen that. So,
    we have a partner there that is much stronger.
        And I'd be remiss if I did not mention that the decision at
    the end of the last Administration to pull all U.S. forces out
    of Somalia and then have our forces commuting to work in a less
    than ideal circumstance certainly had impact operationally on
    our ability to get after the Al-Shabaab threats.
        Ms. Kamlager-Dove. OK. Thank you for that. And following up
    on that question, Undersecretary Nuland, even if we're making
    significant gains, many experts have advised that sustaining
    those over the long term would require restabilization and
    rehabilitation efforts, a local security presence, addressing
    clan divisions, and standing up government services. Yet, we
    sort of mainly allocated military resources.
        So, given this discrepancy, what is your view of our end
    goal in Somalia? And what are the means that we need to achieve
    it?
        Secretary Nuland. First Congresswoman Kamlager-Dove, thank
    you on behalf of the men and women of the State Department and
    DoD for noting how deleterious a shutdown would be for
    government operations and all that we do around the world.
        Just to say in Somalia and to echo what Assistant Secretary
    Maier said, we now have a government in Somalia that's taking
    the fight to Al-Shabaab. We work with them in every way in
    terms of mentoring, going along with them, et cetera.
        But we are also providing significant support to them on
    the economic side where we can, on the humanitarian side where
    we can, thanks to the generosity of the Congress in helping to
    rehabilitate communities when they are cleared of Al-Shabaab.
        It is difficult. But the Somalia we seek is obviously one
    that is democratic, at peace and free of terror.
        Ms. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you. And I yield back, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman McCaul. The lady yields. The Chair recognizes Mr.
    Waltz.
        Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I actually had some other
    things I wanted to talk about today. But, Mr. Chairman, it was
    just brought to my attention, Ms. Nuland, you said earlier in
    this hearing, I quote, I do not believe we've seen consis--a
    consistent pattern of those Afghans who worked and supported
    our efforts.
        And this was in response to a question about SIVs and by
    extension commandos and others who stood and fought with us. I
    do not believe we've seen a consistent pattern of those Afghans
    who worked and supported our efforts in Afghanistan being
    murdered by the Taliban, end quote from earlier in this
    hearing.
        Ms. Nuland, I'll be candid with you, that is one of the
    most ignorant and shameful statements I have heard in this
    Congress. But let me just take a moment and tell you what's
    happening in the real world outside of the cubicles and the
    bureaucracy in the State Department.
        One of the SIVs I successfully got out, his cousin was just
    drug through his village behind a Taliban truck to death, to
    send a message about ever working with Americans again.
        His brother was beaten to an inch of his life just long
    enough so that he could call the SIV that's now in the United
    States and tell him what happened before they killed him.
        I just talked to another SIV that we got out, the Taliban
    kidnaped his 10 year old nephew, had his nephew call him here
    and say, you come back to face Taliban justice, or the 10-year
    old boy will.
        I can keep going. I just had an Uber driver last night that
    said the Taliban just visited his house for the fifth time
    looking for him, and have now kidnapped one of his relatives
    until he comes out. He's put the rest of his family in hiding.
        I can put you in touch with veterans' groups. One gentleman
    I just spoke with exhausted his entire savings and his kid's
    529 plan, still having people in hiding 2 years later, doing
    your job.
        I can go on and on. But, Mr. Chairman, for the record, I'd
    like to enter in just three from a quick Google search, Human
    Rights Watch, No End to Taliban Revenge Killings in
    Afghanistan. I'd like to enter that for the record. Dated
    August 2023.
        [The Information follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Waltz. Amnesty International, at least 237 extra
    judicial executions from the Taliban takeover until June of
    last year.
        [The Information follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman McCaul. Without objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Waltz. The U.N. UNAMA, U.N. News, Afghanistan's Taliban
    responsible for revenge killings, torture of former officials.
    I can go on.
        [The Information follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

        Chairman McCaul. Without Objection, so ordered.
        Mr. Waltz. Ms. Nuland, I do not know how you and Secretary
    Blinken look yourselves in the mirror. I do not know how you
    collect a paycheck in good conscious.
        But I can tell you what, I and others on this Committee and
    other veterans who are out there watching you guys pat
    yourselves on the back as we have a spike in veteran suicide, I
    will not quit for those Gold Star families until you all are
    held accountable.
        When you make statements like that, it only reinforces why
    I get up in the morning to come and hold this position the
    American people have elected me to.
        Let me switch very quickly. We mentioned two cartels.
    There's two tests, right? It's international interest and it
    will not escalate to war.
        We've had hundreds of thousands, we've had more people
    killed in the United States from the poison these cartels are
    pumping over the border than we lost in every major war since
    World War II.
        So, I want to open it up to the panel, but Assistant
    Secretary Maier, I'll go with you first, is it in our national
    interest to prevent the deaths of 100 thousand Americans a
    year?
        Mr. Maier. Yes, Congressman Waltz, absolutely. And I think
    the fentanyl challenge and other opioid challenges are really
    something that this also falls in my portfolio and we're
    focused on all the time.
        Mr. Waltz. Right.
        Mr. Maier. I think the one nuance I would give you is, I'm
    not sure that military force in every instance is the right
    tool. As we----
        Mr. Waltz. So, we all remember in the 90's, we were using
    legal authorities to try to run around the world and arrest al-
    Qaeda, right?
        Whether that was in Africa or elsewhere. It was not until
    3,000 Americans were killed on 9/11 this body and other, and
    the President at the time decided it was a national security
    issue that warranted military force.
        Mr. Chairman, we are losing far more than that every day.
    These cartels, if we change the name tomorrow from Sinaloa and
    Jalisco to Isis and al-Qaeda, it would not even be a debate on
    what action that we have to take.
        And I will certainly support that in this Committee. Thank
    you, Mr. Chairman. I yield my time.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. Mr. Crow is
    recognized.
        Mr. Crow. Thank you, Chairman. And thank you to all of you
    for coming in today and for your professional testimony and
    your work.
        You know, I do want to address though, I think, a
    fundamental misunderstanding of something that we have not
    really dove into. And that is just the real meaning behind this
    relationship, the relationship between the executive branch and
    the legislative branch.
        And there have been some phrases that have been used
    consistently today. Comments like, we want to have a stronger
    partnership. Comments like, you know, there has to be periodic
    reviews and only in the absence of periodic reviews does
    Congress then come in and exercise its constitutional
    obligations.
        Comments like, we want to make Congress a stronger part of
    the next chapter of terrorism, counter-terrorism. I think all
    of those fundamentally misunderstand the issue here.
        Twenty-two years, $3 trillion by most estimations,
    thousands of American lives, hundreds of thousands of non-
    American lives. I fought the war three times, was on a, you
    know, a special operations task force. Conducted direct action
    missions against many of these entities we're talking about
    here today.
        But Congress has to make the decision. Congress is in
    charge. There is no partnership. We make the decision. We take
    the vote.
        And when there's a situation regarding sunset provisions,
    we've talked a lot about sunset provisions, and the refrain
    over and over again is, if we forecast to our partners that
    there's a sunset, maybe they'll back away. Maybe they'll lose
    resolve. That's kind of the point.
        Now, if they're a partner and they're willing to back away
    only if we're engaged or if they're willing to lose their
    resolve if we actually do not have a debate, then maybe they're
    not a good partner. Then maybe we should back away.
        That is the debate that has to happen in this body before
    the American people. And that's the debate that hasn't happened
    the last two decades. That is the point.
        So, I'm not afraid of those debates. And I'm not afraid of
    putting a sunset provision in there, to actually have a
    discussion about maybe we shouldn't be in some of these places.
        Maybe after 20 years and hundreds of billions of dollars in
    Afghanistan we should have had a discussion earlier about their
    lack of resolve and the nature of their partnership.
        So, I think that is really the debate here. And for my
    part, I will not vote for anything that does not put an
    affirmative obligation in the U.S. Congress to cast a vote to
    use force. Period.
        There's no certification in my view. There's nowhere the
    President has to act or not act and then Congress steps in
    later. That is not the way the Constitution works.
        And if history has shown anything, that is a failed policy.
    It has failed, because it will not force a discussion on the
    nature of our partners and allies. And it will not hold them
    accountable too for their own destiny.
        It has failed because we're not actually having a
    discussion about what success looks like. Right, over and over
    again Presidents, regardless of political affiliation, define
    success as, there's been no attacks on the homeland. Yes, that
    is a success. I agree with that.
        But also look at the other elements of success, because if
    that is our definition of success and that is our only
    definition of success, then we will be locked into this in
    perpetuity. It will go on forever, because forever we will have
    to be doing this to prevent an attack on the homeland.
        Another element of success has to be, it has to be, what is
    the geographic scope of these entities? Are they growing?
        Are they metastasizing? Because by that definition of
    success, we are failing. We are actually failing.
        And we have to have a debate about what other elements of
    our national policies and our national security that we need to
    bring to bear, humanitarian, diplomatic, governance, that we
    are not bringing to bear in appropriate ratios to achieve that
    other definition of success.
        We are locked into a perpetual conflict that unless we are
    very serious and have debate in this body, will go on forever.
    So, I'm sorry, I had some questions, I will submit those for
    the record.
        But I think it's just really important that we level set
    about what this is really about. And I am not afraid of having
    the discussion, an honest discussion about what we should and
    shouldn't be doing.
        And we should not, as a country, shy away from that. And if
    our partners are afraid of that, if they waver because we want
    to have that debate, then good riddance to them. Maybe they
    shouldn't be a partner.
        Thank you. I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes
    Mr. Lawler.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Sanctions should be
    tied to behavioral change. But under the recent Iranian hostage
    deal, the Biden Administration waived certain sanctions to
    facilitate the transfer of $6 billion in frozen Iranian funds
    to accounts in Qatar despite Iran's ongoing malign activity.
        Ms. Nuland, what message does this send regarding U.S.
    sanctions policies?
        Secretary Nuland. Congressman, thank you. Just to remind
    and to be very clear, no American taxpayer dollars went to Iran
    to get our five American citizens and two family members home.
        This was money that was Iran's to begin with that was
    frozen at our request by our allies and partners so that it
    could----
        Mr. Lawler. Frozen why?
        Secretary Nuland. Frozen because of our concern about their
    malign activity, including the----
        Mr. Lawler. So, what has changed--what has changed about
    their malign activity since this Administration chose to
    unfreeze $6 billion in Iranian assets that were sanctioned?
        Secretary Nuland. One aspect of what has changed, is they
    have been willing to release these seven people after
    exceptionally----
        Mr. Lawler. Did we not trade--did we not trade hostages for
    hostages?
        Secretary Nuland. Again, let me just also remind, if I may.
        Mr. Lawler. Did we not trade hostages for hostages?
        Secretary Nuland. I'm not sure what you're----
        Mr. Lawler. Did we not give hostages?
        Secretary Nuland. We did. Of course we did.
        Mr. Lawler. OK. So, not only did we trade hostages----
        Secretary Nuland. They were not hostages. Our people were
    not hostages.
        Mr. Lawler. Not only did we--not only did we trade
    hostages, we then did what? We gave $6 billion to the biggest
    State sponsor of terrorism.
        And you know what was insulting? That this Administration
    informed Congress on September 11. The worst terrorist attack
    in the history of our Nation. That's the day that this
    Administration chose to inform Congress officially?
        Secretary Nuland. Congressman, let me just clarify one
    thing here first of all. The people that we got home were
    wrongfully detailed in Iran. The people that we ultimately
    released, had been charged and convicted in American courts.
        We made that decision because----
        Mr. Lawler. Right. So, on top of that we gave----
        Secretary Nuland. Because, if I may finish----
        Mr. Lawler. We gave six--no. We gave six----
        Secretary Nuland. If I may finish?
        Mr. Lawler. I'm reclaiming my time. We gave $6 billion on
    top of that exchange.
        Secretary Nuland. Again, this----
        Mr. Lawler. For what--what does that say, as my original
    question, what does that say about our policies with respect to
    sanctions?
        It says they mean nothing. That's what it says. It says
    they mean absolutely nothing.
        Secretary Nuland. First that was----
        Mr. Lawler. And we all know that money is fungible. So,
    what we're doing is freeing up $6 billion that Iran otherwise
    would have had to spend on humanitarian efforts to go fund
    terrorism once again.
        It is idiotic, truly.
        Secretary Nuland. This money can only be drawn on for food
    or medicine for the Iranian people. And that is a stipulation--
    --
        Mr. Lawler. Right. But it is freeing up $6 billion that
    they otherwise would have had to spend on food and water and
    humanitarian aid to go fund terrorism.
        This is the problem when you start negotiating with
    terrorist regimes.
        Secretary Nuland. Except that they have not been spending
    money on food or medicine for their own people as you have
    seen.
        Listen, I would also make the point that we continue to
    have over hundreds of sanctions on Iranian entities and
    individuals for all of their nefarious and malign behavior
    around the world. And we were----
        Mr. Lawler. Except we just undercut that by unfreezing $6
    billion in assets.
        Moving onto a different topic. If we included al-Qaeda in
    the new AUMF, but not the Taliban, could the Taliban later
    become a targetable associate force of al-Qaeda if the Taliban
    increase cooperation with them?
        Ms. Krass. Yes, I can take that question, sir. And the
    answer is yes. Particularly if the current draft Committee
    proposal were enacted. And it would have the same associated
    forces construct that we have now.
        Mr. Lawler. OK. Given the extensive current al-Qaeda/
    Taliban cooperation that we see, what else would we have to see
    for the Taliban to be listed?
        Mr. Maier. I think Congressman, we would need to see actual
    Taliban facilitation of al-Qaeda's attacks on Americans. At
    this point, we're not seeing that, sir.
        Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
        Chairman McCaul. The gentleman yields. The Chair recognizes
    Mr. Lieu.
        Mr. Lieu. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Let me start by thanking
    Secretary Nuland and Secretary Blinken and the State Department
    for fighting very hard to try to get more jet fighters to
    Ukraine last March.
        The State Department understood the importance of air power
    in modern warfare. The State Department made the decision to
    win very early on in this war. And I thank the State Department
    for doing so.
        I have some questions about now the AUMF. I support
    repealing other existing AUMFs, because I believe they've been
    abused by both Republican and Democratic Administrations. The
    hard part is putting in a new one.
        In 2015, the Obama Administration tried to put in a new
    AUMF if you recall. I came out against it pretty early on,
    because as I read that AUMF, it was going to give the
    Administration authority to put our personnel, our men and
    women in our Armed Forces in harm's way and then handcuff them
    by not letting them do what they needed to win.
        It had a phrase basically saying, you could go fight the
    enemy, except you cannot do enduring offensive ground combat
    operations. Which made literally no sense.
        Because, why would you allow our troops to be in harm's way
    and not let them destroy the enemy?
        It would seem that if we're going to authorize force, we
    better give our military the ability to use the force they need
    too win.
        So, I have a question for the panel. Do you think that
    limitation was good to have been in that 2015 AUMF?
        Would you want something like that? Or would you oppose
    something like that?
        Ms. Krass. Thank you very much for the question,
    Congressman. Speaking as a lawyer, I would prefer the
    formulation allowing the President to use all necessary and
    appropriate force.
        Mr. Lieu. Thank you. So, I would agree with you on that.
    Now, it appears to me the panel does not like a time
    limitation. You do not seem like a sunset.
        I'm sort of curious why you'd be opposed to just listing
    additional groups like the Taliban?
        I mean, you do not have to use it. You do not have to use
    that authority. I'm just wondering, is there--what is driving
    that?
        Are you waiting for the Taliban to do something? Do you
    think this would offend them?
        What is sort of saying, no, no, no, we do not actually want
    this authority.
        Secretary Nuland. So, Congressman Lieu, first of all, thank
    you for your comments on Ukraine and for your stalwart support
    of Ukraine against Russian aggression.
        With regard to the Taliban, three things here. First of
    all, they are making steady, if not sufficient, progress
    against ISIS-K.
        We have also said here that at the current moment under the
    environment that they've created, al-Qaeda is at its weakest
    point in a long, long time.
        Mr. Lieu. No, no, no, I understand the argument between
    them.
        Secretary Nuland. Yes.
        Mr. Lieu. I'm just wondering, if you do not want a time
    limitation in the AUMF, how do you know what the Taliban looks
    like in 7 years?
        And why would not you just want that authority? I do not
    sort of get why it's necessary, and say no, no, no, do not give
    us this authority.
        Secretary Nuland. I think we should probably have a
    consultation in a setting other than this one on some aspects--
    --
        Mr. Lieu. I got it. All right.
        Secretary Nuland. Of this.
        Mr. Lieu. OK. That's fine. I'll wait.
        Secretary Nuland. With regard to a sunset, you know, we've
    talked about being able to adjust in consultation the groups,
    et cetera, as needed.
        And as Chris said earlier, if the Taliban were to take a
    different stance, vis-a-vis terrorist groups on their territory
    and a significantly different one, obviously we would want them
    listed.
        Mr. Lieu. Thank you. I have a question about what you all
    view as force. So, right now, and let's say there were no
    AUMFs, the Administration could not launch missiles at Iran.
        Could the Administration launch a cyber attack without an
    AUMF? Is that force?
        Ms. Krass. So, depending on the facts and circumstances, a
    cyber attack could constitute a use of force, in which case it
    would need to be authorized either by Congress or by the
    President's Article II power.
        Mr. Lieu. All right. If the Administration had some special
    operations unit go and take out an Iranian scientist who was
    working on nuclear weapons, would that constitute force?
        Would--they must issue an AUMF to do that?
        Ms. Krass. Again, I prefer not to engage in hypotheticals.
    But a use of force would include killing an individual, yes.
        Mr. Lieu. OK. And would a use of force include, let's say,
    the U.S. installing a computer virus on centrifuges that make
    them not work well?
        Would that constitute force?
        Ms. Krass. I think it would really depend on the
    circumstance of whether whatever it was that was being done
    constituted an actual use of force in terms of a kinetic.
        As you may be aware, there are challenges in determining
    what in cyber actually constitutes a use of force. And so, we
    have mainly kept to those things that we know would be a use of
    force in the more physical context.
        Mr. Lieu. Thank you. So, my time is up. I just want to
    request the Chairman to maybe set up a classified briefing on
    what constitutes force, especially in terms of cyber.
        Chairman McCaul. And I think those are very good questions.
    I'd be happy to do so.
        The Chair recognizes Mr. Self.
        Ms. Self. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I've listened to this
    discussion back and forth, the panel has used the word depends
    and depending a lot. I understand while I was not here that you
    had a discussion about the War Powers Act.
        And basically the Administration does not believe the War
    Powers Act is a constraint on the Presidency. And that's where
    my concern lies, because I am from Texas. We have an
    international situation on the southern border in which the
    President considers the Congress and the law irrelevant.
        And that informs my opinions about this discussion, along
    with, I share Mr. Waltz' concerns, because I've not been in
    Afghanistan as recently as he has been, I was there very early.
    But I want to ask you about, and the first question will maybe
    get at it.
        Is there any consideration in the Administration to
    recognize the Taliban as the government of Afghanistan?
        Secretary Nuland. No. We have not taken that up. And we do
    not intend to.
        Ms. Self. So, what do you consider the situation of the
    Taliban in Afghanistan today? How do you characterize it?
        Secretary Nuland. They have self described themselves as
    assuming governing authority in Afghanistan.
        Ms. Self. No. How do you consider it?
        Secretary Nuland. Um----
        Ms. Self. Who governs Afghanistan?
        Secretary Nuland. They are in their own telling,
    endeavoring to govern Afghanistan. But we do not consider this
    authority that they have assumed to be constitutional within
    Afghanistan's own circumstances.
        Rich, I do not know if you want to take this?
        Mr. Visek. Yes. Thank you for the question. At this point
    we do not recognize any entity as the government of
    Afghanistan.
        Ms. Self. Yes. That's, I think you're absolutely correct.
    We have discussed permutations here. I like some of the issues,
    some of the suggestions that have been made.
        But in my opinion, this Administration will take liberties
    with whatever this body and the U.S. Senate pass and agree to.
    And even if it's signed, I think they will take liberties.
        So, I've heard lists, I've heard time, I've heard global.
    From my career in the military, I want it to be as broad as
    possible and that will actually relieve us of the
    Administration taking liberties.
        But there also is Mr. Crow's concern that Congress must
    have the vote. However we work that out, Congress must have a
    vote that is meaningful in this AUMF replacement.
        So, I'm going to go ahead and yield back my time. Those are
    my concerns. And again, Mr. Chairman, I want this to be tight
    enough that the Administration will find it hard-pressed to
    take liberties with it without the congressional say so.
        Chairman McCaul. Thank you, sir. The gentleman yields. The
    Chair recognizes Mr. Schneider.
        Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the
    witnesses for your patience. It's been a long day. It's been a
    long week for most of us here.
        And, Ambassador Nuland, I want to thank you for clarifying
    that the United States does not take hostages. We have just in
    the course of my lifetime, I can think of prisoner swaps with
    the former Soviet Union, with current day Russia, with other
    countries.
        We do not take hostages. We do not hold hostages. We deal
    with other countries who are taking American citizens. And
    we've always had to make very difficult choices.
        As we turn our attention now to the AUMF, look, I think
    there's universal agreement on the dais that Congress has, as
    it should, the sole authority to declare war as well as the
    authority to raise and support armies.
        The Administration has its own authorities under Article
    II. But at the end of the day, and we've talked about the War
    Powers Act among other things, it is Congress's responsibility.
        I think all of us will say here, and I know we say it when
    we go home, that the most difficult decision we ever face as a
    Member of Congress is when to send American men and women into
    harm's way, defending our Nation, protecting our freedoms, but
    also laying their lives on the line.
        And this is something we do have to take seriously. I was
    not here in 2001 or 2002 when the decisions were taken then.
    But I have been here for now pretty much a decade. I'm in my
    fifth term.
        We have not been able to express our voice necessarily on
    these. It is critical, and I agree with my colleague, Mr. Crow,
    that Congress has to have its say and evaluate these.
        But I also have real concerns about this idea of an
    absolute sunset. And I'd like to explore that a little bit with
    you.
        And maybe you've talked about this, because we've had to
    come and go. But what are some of the implications of a date
    certain that an authority ends on December 31, 2029?
        Secretary Nuland. Congressman Schneider, let me just first
    reiterate, because I did not get a chance to answer Congressman
    Crow.
        Obviously, Article I powers are for the Congress alone. We
    are your invited guests to engage in a conversation about where
    you might take this based on our experiences implementing the
    legislation that you have, we have in front of us. And we thank
    you for that.
        Let me just say that with regard to sunset, I think we've
    made critical over the course of this hearing the three
    concerns that we have. No. 1, a date certain tells our
    adversaries, tells every terrorist out there that they can go
    into their hole and wait us out and come back out on that date
    certain if Congress is not able to act. That's No. 1.
        No. 2, detention authorities. You know, if there's a lapse,
    we will not have the authority we need to continue to detain.
        And then the last one, which, you know, for those of us who
    spend our lives building international coalitions, if the
    United States does not lead, coalitions rarely cohere. When our
    partners and allies are not sure that our authorities persist,
    they are less likely to ensure that they have the authority
    absent us.
        So, those are the three reasons.
        Mr. Schneider. I think that's important. Look, we have the
    greatest military force in the world. We should all be rightly
    proud of that.
        But I think our secret weapon is our convening powers as a
    Nation. That ability to lead. So, I agree with you and that
    comes from the authority. And the authority is what really
    matters.
        As I've been sitting here listening and I've been thinking,
    you know, how do wars in previous times come to an end?
        You know, you can sue for peace. There's an armistice,
    there's a truest, there's a treaty. We tend to think of wars as
    a conflict between nation States.
        That people get together at a table or on the deck of a
    battleship and say, this war is coming to an end. We will agree
    to this, that, and the other thing.
        We're in a different time. We're in a different place. My
    colleague at the beginning of the questioning asked you what
    will the threat landscape look like in 2045?
        He picked that number for a specific reason. That is as far
    to the future as we are today from when the first AUMF was
    authorized.
        We do not know. But I think I can say with some degree of
    confidence that in the conflict we're fighting today where
    we're trying to resolve what we do here, there is not going to
    be a peace treaty with al-Qaeda or a cessation of hostilities
    with ISIS.
        It's going to be a war that we're going to have to win as
    Mr. Crow said. We're going to have to define success and
    recognize it in our own terms, in or own way, at our own time.
        And it is imperative, I agree with Mr. Crow, this Congress
    has to make our voice heard. It's essential that the debates
    take place on the floor and in the committee rooms of the House
    and the Senate.
        And we have to figure out a way to do that. And I'm running
    out of time. But I think it's really important that we
    understand what the implications of sunsets are.
        What we ask, how we answer the questions of why, who, what,
    where, and when in a way that does not hamstring our Nation,
    but allows us to lead our allies and make sure that we keep our
    citizens safe, our interests protected and our role in the
    world as a leader, preserved.
        I yield back.
        Mr. Smith [presiding]. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Dr.
    McCormick.
        Mr. McCormick. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chair. In earlier
    testimony we were talking, and I'll get right to the point,
    because I know time is short.
        Congressman, Congresswoman Wagner asked about the Iran-
    based militias and you discussed how in the last 6 months
    there's been a decrease in violence. We talked about the
    inclusion in the AUMF.
        Obviously, there's been a drop. But we know that they in
    Iraq killed around 600 of ours. They've also had 80 attacks in
    the last 2 years.
        We talked about in a 5-year report. For the record, do we
    have that report available?
        Mr. Maier. Congressman, we can compile that report. We have
    not done specifically a 5-year report. But that information is
    in our possession.
        Mr. McCormick. OK. When can we get that?
        Mr. Maier. We can turn it as quickly as we can pull people
    together to put that information in. And within, you know, some
    number of weeks or assuming no government shutdown.
        Mr. McCormick. I hate that answer. Some number of weeks is
    way too vague for me. Can we assume within 4 weeks?
        Mr. Maier. Congressman, I think we can get that information
    to you within 4 weeks if the government is open.
        Mr. McCormick. OK. I'll leave it at that. I'll hold you to
    your word.
        Also, just so you know I was paying attention at least
    during the time I was here, I heard you specifically say, Mr.
    Maier, al-Qaeda is not significantly planning to harm western
    interests.
        I wrote that down, because I thought, that's interesting.
    We know that al-Qaeda is training people in Afghanistan and
    several regions under the protection of the Taliban, which is
    kind of how we ended up in this situation to begin with.
        If they're not training to harm western interests, what are
    they training for?
        Mr. Maier. Congressman, I think what we see on balance and
    what I can talk about in this forum is not al-Qaeda having the
    capability or the intent under the Taliban regime to be able to
    strike at the United States.
        Mr. McCormick. So, as a veteran of the Persian Gulf and
    Afghanistan, I dispute that claim. I do not think they ever
    have an intent not to harm us. They've been openly and
    significantly, and contrary to everything that we stand for.
        And would do great harm to us if they were able to. They
    may not be able to right now. But I think you mistake their
    intent. That's just my opinion.
        As far as in review of the Taliban's association with al-
    Qaeda, I'm just going to go on further with this, and I'm going
    to stick with you, Mr. Maier.
        On July 22, 2022, the CI Special Activity Center drone over
    Kabul fired two hellfire missiles, killing al-Zawahiri, the
    Emir of al-Qaeda. At the time al-Zawahiri enjoyed Taliban
    protection in a house owned by the leader of the Haqqani
    Network.
        On June 1 a report released in the United Nations confirmed
    that there are between 30 and 60 senior al-Qaeda officials in
    country. Four hundred fighters in country. At least three al-
    Qaeda members in the Taliban government.
        So, there's an obvious link between al-Qaeda and Taliban.
    They've been very open about their intentions toward the west.
        And toward us and what they intend to do. I think they're
    violent people. They're training for violent things.
        Undersecretary Nuland, do you agree with the U.N.'s report
    assessment?
        And would you agree that the Taliban is currently
    supporting, enabling terrorist groups, and we can call al-Qaeda
    a terrorist group, that they're associated with?
        Secretary Nuland. Congressman, as we have said here, one of
    the things that we have documented most recently by the public
    comments of Christy Abizaid of the National Counterterrorism
    Center is, regardless of the protection that they continue to
    have under the Taliban, al-Qaeda's capabilities and membership
    have shrunk significantly.
        They're at the lowest level. And we do not access that they
    have the capability of----
        Mr. McCormick. So, we're going back to capabilities. Let me
    talk about intent. At one time we did not have a problem with
    al-Qaeda at all. It did not exist.
        We've seen terrorist organizations wax and wane in the
    past. The question goes back to, integrated inside the Taliban.
        The reason that they've had, that they've been weakened is
    because we fought a war for 20 years there. Which I was part
    of.
        That's why they do not have the capability. We're no longer
    there. Thanks to politicians, we withdrew after we won the war.
        Where we had stabilized the Nation with 25 hundred people,
    we're losing less than a dozen people in 10 years. We withdrew.
        Now, they're incorporated in the Taliban government. Their
    training bases are there inside of a country that trained
    people to kill us originally. That's why we went there in the
    first place.
        So, let's not say that they're too weak to attack us,
    because that's really myopic thinking. We started, and I'm
    going to finish, because I'm out of time.
        But we started this without a problem until those training
    bases and al-Qaeda and other organizations inside of a foreign
    government, ruled by the same government that exists there now,
    harbored these people that crashed four planes into United
    States territory, killing thousands of people.
        And then, we fought a two decade war only to give it back
    to the same people who are now harboring terrorist groups
    again. The same people, Taliban harboring terrorist
    organizations, dozens of bases training to do harm.
        And I do not know if you think it's not for, against
    western interests, I'd like to know what interest it's against.
    Because I've never seen a terrorist organization that was pro
    west or pro United States. I'm pretty sure they're anti-United
    States and anti-Semite.
        With that, I rest.
        Mr. Smith. Did you want to respond? All right.
        Secretary Nuland. You know what, I think the Congressman
    just made the point for a continued AUMF and continued Article
    II ability to strike, as the President authorized against al-
    Zawahiri. And to remain vigilant.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. Thank you, Dr. McCormick. Just let me
    ask you, if in reading the prepared testimony, I was late
    because I was at a meeting on the Committee of anti-Semitism.
    And then, I was on the floor with the foreign office bill.
        So, I apologize, I did not hear your presentations. But in
    reading through at least one of them, and I'll read the others
    later, it seems that you're suggesting that the President does
    not really need the AUMF, because he has the inherent power to
    use force as Mr. Visek puts it, to protect the national
    security interest of the United States.
        But as I think the lawyers on the panel understand, that
    view is only an opinion internal to the executive branch. It
    has never been ratified by Congress, in law, or affirmed by the
    Supreme Court.
        In fact, the one law that--on the books that addresses the
    issue, the War Powers Resolution, spells out a far more limited
    view of the President's power to act without congressional
    authority.
        According to the War Powers Resolution, the President's
    Constitutional powers to introduce U.S. forces into hostilities
    quote, are exercises only pursuant to one, a declaration of war
    specific--two, specific statutory authorization, or three, a
    national emergency created by attack upon the United States,
    its territories or possessions or its armed forces, close
    quote.
        In other words, the law says that the President can only
    use force with congressional authorization or after we've been
    attacked.
        So, just to be very clear, are you saying that you're not
    bound by that portion of the 50 USC Code, Section 1541 that I
    just quoted, Mr. Visek?
        Mr. Visek. Well, thank you, Congressman. The--just a couple
    points of clarification.
        Mr. Smith. Sure.
        Mr. Visek. First, I think with respect to Article II
    authorities, we do not see them as unbounded. We do see them as
    limited by the Declare War Clause.
        That's why we've characterized our exercise of the Article
    II authorities in the space as episodic. You know, it's
    defensive in nature, intended to deter.
        We see the value in the AUMF of providing a prolonged
    authority. Now, I realize that there have been, you know,
    debates over the years about whether the War Powers Resolution,
    you know, addresses all the instances that might be, might
    arise under an Article II context.
        But the point is that this Administration, and I think many
    Administrations, have acted consistently with the War Powers
    Resolution, such that the legal debates do not have to be
    engaged.
        And I think the way this all gets tied together, I think,
    is look, there are instances where Article II authorities are
    appropriate and useful. We've noted how they've been used in
    the context of the Iran aligned militia groups.
        But where we have a prolonged need for enduring authority
    to engage in not just defense but also offensive acts, the
    authorizations are vital. And I think that is consistent with
    this notion.
        And without weighing in one way or the other on the
    ultimate legality, but, you know, the idea that the War Powers
    Resolution has this 60 day clock, that tends to reinforce this
    notion that when we're in it for a longer term, we want
    Congress onboard.
        Mr. Smith. Let me just ask one other question and I'll
    yield to my distinguished colleague. Do you have any concerns
    that the deal with Iran will incentivize any further hostage
    taking? Ms. Nuland?
        Secretary Nuland. We obviously made clear, Congressman
    Smith, that this deal needed to be the end of this kind of
    practice.
        And, frankly, this was a long negotiation. It was a
    difficult one. And when you look at the balance here, getting
    our Americans back who had been wrongfully detained and their
    two family members, was extremely important to do.
        To underscore to Iran that this kind of behavior does not,
    in fact, pay and makes everything else in their, from their
    international reputation to the relationship that they say they
    want with the international community, harder.
        Mr. Smith. In looking at the Iranians who were released, if
    what I read was accurate, they're mostly for crimes of
    sanctions.
        Are there any terrorists among them? That we released to
    Iran. Not the Americans, they were hostages and victims.
        Secretary Nuland. My memory of this, Rich may correct me,
    is that they were all charged for criminal behavior.
        Mr. Smith. Yes. But was the criminality----
        Secretary Nuland. Not terrorist behavior but sanctions
    violations and/or drugs or other things.
        Mr. Smith. That's what I thought. And finally, again on the
    incentivization of hostage taking, when the negotiations were
    ongoing about the amount of money, were there various proposals
    put forward for less or more?
        Or, I mean, $6 billion is what we, I know where that's
    coming from. But how did that get on the table?
        I mean, that's a lot of money. And as Mr. Lawler pointed
    out, money is fungible. And I remember I met with Zarif once
    when we were trying to get Pastor Abedini out of Iran, because
    he was wrongfully held as well.
        It was appalling to me that he said, oh, you're sanctions.
    He knows that I wrote the Trafficked Victim's Protection Act.
    He did his homework. And he goes, the sanctions are causing
    Iranian women to be trafficked.
        And he made this big spiel. I said, well, change your
    behavior, you know, stop your human rights abuse against your
    own people. But he did use that as a leaver.
        And I'm just wondering, you know, when it came to the $6
    billion, what was on the table?
        Secretary Nuland. Congressman, let's have a private
    discussion about the intricacies of the negotiation if you'd
    like. You can image that Iran had a higher price tag at one
    point. This was a particular chunk of money that was held by a
    U.S. ally at our request, et cetera.
        I want to go back to another point you made, which is
    arbitrary detention of Americans and deterring it. This is a
    major priority of Secretary Blinken and our team.
        And we are working with other international partners,
    including Canada. There was a meeting on this at the U.N.
    General Assembly last week to increase deterrence measures in
    common.
        So, to ensure that countries that do this, from Russia, to
    Iran, to North Korea, pay a steep price. And it's a consistent
    multi-lateral price.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. Mr. Connolly.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to our
    panel. I'm sorry I'm late, but I was at the impeachment
    hearing, which was a real treat.
        And let me just say, some of my colleagues on the other
    side want to have an AUMF that specifically says Taliban. I
    wish they'd been equally concerned about the Taliban when the
    previous President, President Trump, ordered negotiations under
    Ambassador Khalilzad. I think in Doha, was it not Ms. Nuland?
        Secretary Nuland. It was, Congressman Connolly.
        Mr. Connolly. Yes. And is it not true that the President
    authorized negotiations without the presence of the then Afghan
    government we were purportedly supporting, so that the
    negotiations were directly with the Taliban without
    representatives of the Afghan government.
        Is that true?
        Secretary Nuland. That is correct. At least for the
    majority of the time.
        Mr. Connolly. And is it not also true that under President
    Trump and Ambassador Khalilzad, those negotiations led to the
    release of five thousand Taliban prisoners, many of whom we'd
    tagged as terrorists.
        Is that correct?
        Secretary Nuland. Also correct.
        Mr. Connolly. Thank you. Ms. Nuland, I have to say, I think
    the Administration is going to have trouble with an AUMF on the
    Democrat side, and let me cite two aspects of your testimony
    today.
        One is, you say you want an AUMF without sunset provisions.
    You do not want an expiration date. Is that correct?
        Is that your testimony?
        Secretary Nuland. Congressman, in your absence, we spoke
    about our concerns about a date certain and what that would do
    in terms of empowering terrorists to wait us out. Concerns
    about losing our detention authority.
        Concerns about our partner's worry about our staying power.
        Mr. Connolly. Yes.
        Secretary Nuland. However, we did hear during the course of
    the hearing, put on the table, a number of new ideas or ideas
    that we've been talking with Committee staff about----
        Mr. Connolly. OK.
        Secretary Nuland. For ensuring that there is, that the
    Congress has the opportunity to cancel this legislation as
    needed.
        Mr. Connolly. You, I was informed, but thank you. And I
    certainly concede the complexity and nuance of the issue and
    why we have to tread delicately on that.
        But, you know, I'm a child the Vietnam War. And I remember
    vividly the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, which was supposed to be
    a limited reaction to two events, alleged events in the Gulf of
    Tonkin.
        And the President of the United States then, a Democrat,
    Lyndon Johnson, used that Resolution as an open-ended
    commitment and we did not end that war until 11 years later.
    Ignorant of many maybe, but we ended it.
        Never did Congress intend that that Resolution would be
    used to justify a half a million U.S. troops being introduced
    onto the soil of Vietnam.
        And so, I hope you can appreciate there's deep sensitivity
    here about the issue of an expiration date. Though we're not
    unmindful of the points you made.
        And so, I think that's got to be worked out if we're going
    to have common ground.
        The other is, I think your testimony also said that you did
    not want us to--you wanted to be able to have an AUMF that
    authorized introduction of troops or some military presence to
    new geographic areas and groups as needed, quote/unquote.
        Is that correct? Your microphone.
        Secretary Nuland. Sorry. Yes. I think what we were
    reflecting there, was the fact that the greatest rise of
    terrorism currently is in the Sahel as a result of recent
    coops----
        Mr. Connolly. The coops, yes.
        Secretary Nuland. Of governments. So, and we have been
    able, all of those, the groups that we work against with our
    allies and partners, there are affiliates of al-Qaeda.
        But we want to be able to work with you and say hey, this
    thing has morphed and moved and renamed itself.
        Mr. Connolly. Right. And again, I do not think there's a
    desire to hamstring the Administration in responding quickly to
    emergency situations. We, you know, we're not unsupportive of
    that.
        But again, if you think about the history and you think
    about Article I of the Constitution of the United States, which
    has been, you know, diluted over many decades with the
    compliance of Congress, nonetheless the War Power is
    exclusively granted to the Congress of the United States, under
    the Constitution.
        And so, circumscribing that power is something we need to
    do in a responsible way working with you. But an open-ended
    commitment with respect to geography and groups as needed, the
    downside of that is maybe you would never abuse it.
        You would never do anything untoward. But that does not
    mean your successor would not gleefully take that open-ended
    authority and use it in ways never envisioned by the Congress
    and not supported by the American people.
        And so, I just think, especially in those two areas, we
    understand the desire of any Administration to want
    flexibility.
        But I hope the Administration understands the desire of the
    legislative branch on both sides to circumscribe that
    flexibility in the interest of Constitutional prerogatives. And
    the prerogative of war making is exclusively granted to the
    Congress of the United States.
        And, you know, we talk about implied powers for the
    Executive, it's time we talk about implied powers under Article
    I, that are Legislative powers. And so, this is a necessary
    dialog. But I think it is a necessary dialog.
        And I--speaking on the Democratic side of the aisle, and I
    know some of my colleagues previously raised concerns about
    this, let me add my voice to it, happy to work with you. But
    we're very reluctant to grant broad new authorities that are
    not circumscribed by time and geography.
        And with that, I yield back. Unless Ms. Nuland wants to
    respond. She's fully welcomed to, if you will allow Mr.
    Chairman.
        I thank my friend.
        Secretary Nuland. Thank you, Congressman Connolly. I think
    this is a perfect ending, I think, to this hearing.
        We very much appreciate understanding that these powers are
    yours. The opportunity to come and present and to be in
    conversation about how we go forward here.
        We have, I think, over the course of this hearing teased
    out a number of options that might bridge the gap here to
    ensure that Congress is regularly reviewing both the geography,
    the lists, the authorities.
        And we would welcome that obviously. Thank you.
        Mr. Smith. Thank you. On behalf of Chairman McCaul and the
    Committee, I want to thank the witnesses for their testimony
    and the Members for their questions.
        The Members of the committee may have some additional
    questions for the witnesses. And we respectfully ask that you
    respond in writing to those questions.
        Pursuant to the Committee rules, all Members may have five
    legislative days, 5 days to submit statements, questions, and
    extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length
    limitations.
        Without objection, the committee stands adjourned, and
    thank you.
        [Whereupon, at 1:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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