[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]





                                     
 
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 118-34] 

                        A REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE 
                   INTELLIGENCE ENTERPRISE'S POSTURE 
                     AND CAPABILITIES IN STRATEGIC 
                    COMPETITION AND IN SYNCHRONIZING 
                    INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS TO COUNTER 
                     THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

                                     

                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             APRIL 27, 2023






                                     
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                 U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
                 
53-525                    WASHINGTON : 2024 


























                                     
  


          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                    JACK BERGMAN, Michigan, Chairman

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 SARA JACOBS, California
NANCY MACE, South Carolina           JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
CORY MILLS, Florida                  JIMMY PANETTA, California

                Craig Greene, Professional Staff Member
                Will Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                  Zachary Calderon, Research Assistant  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                            C O N T E N T S

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                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Bergman, Hon. Jack, a Representative from Michigan, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     1
Gallego. Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations....     2

                               WITNESSES

Berrier, LTG Scott, USA, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency...     4
Moultrie, Hon. Ronald S., Under Secretary of Defense for 
  Intelligence and Security......................................     3
Nakasone, GEN Paul M., USA, Director, National Security Agency/
  Chief, Central Security Service, and Commander, U.S. Cyber 
  Command........................................................     3

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Berrier, LTG Scott...........................................    32
    Moultrie, Hon. Ronald S......................................    23
    Nakasone, GEN Paul M.........................................    27

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]  
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
    
                  A REVIEW OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE 

                ENTERPRISE'S POSTURE AND CAPABILITIES IN 

               STRATEGIC COMPETITION AND IN SYNCHRONIZING 

                    INTELLIGENCE EFFORTS TO COUNTER 

                     THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
       Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
                          Washington, DC, Thursday, April 27, 2023.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:15 p.m., in 
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jack Bergman 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK BERGMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Mr. Bergman. Good afternoon. The subcommittee will come to 
order. I ask unanimous consent that the Chair be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time. Without objection, so ordered.
    Today's hearing is an opportunity for the subcommittee to 
understand the Defense Intelligence Enterprise's posture and 
capabilities in strategic competition and in synchronizing 
intelligence efforts to counter the People's Republic of China. 
The National Defense Strategy focuses the Department's efforts 
on China, and rightfully so. But as we hold this hearing, the 
Russian-Ukraine conflict has been raging for 428 days, North 
Korea continues to test nuclear missiles, Iran is actively 
supporting non-state actors in the Middle East, and threats 
from terrorist organizations are still persistent across the 
globe.
    The Defense Intelligence Enterprise has a challenging task 
to support the Department's efforts in strategic competition, 
counter China, and support the remaining geographic combatant 
commanders to counter threats in their areas of operations, as 
well as the persistent counterterrorism efforts. I am 
interested in understanding each of your roles in synchronizing 
these efforts and ensuring your organizations have the 
capabilities needed, are resourced appropriately, and, probably 
most important, what capabilities gaps exist.
    I would welcome to today's hearing the following witnesses: 
Mr. Ronald Moultrie, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence and Security; General Paul Nakasone, Director of 
the National Security Agency, Chief of the Central Security 
Service, and Commander of U.S. Cyber Command; and Lieutenant 
General Scott Berrier, Director of the Defense Intelligence 
Agency. Welcome, all.
    In the interest of time, I will ask the witnesses to keep 
their opening remarks brief so that we can have more time for 
the closed session. With that, let me again thank our witnesses 
for appearing before us today. I now recognize Ranking Member 
Gallego for any opening remarks.

STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARIZONA, 
   RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank the 
chairman for convening this hearing and the witnesses for their 
time and willingness to appear before the subcommittee. Since 
you testified in front of this subcommittee last year, the 
global security situation remains dynamic. Russia continues its 
violent assaults on Ukraine's sovereignty. China, our pacing 
challenge, as defined by national security and defense 
strategies, continues its posture toward Taiwan, military 
assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific region, and global influence 
campaign. North Korea continues its persistent testing of 
ballistic missiles. Iran's proxies continue their malign 
activities, and violent extremist organizations continue 
seeking to attack the United States and our allies.
    For the Defense Intelligence Enterprise specifically, we 
continue to see concerning trends in the strategic competition. 
Last fall, the NSA [National Security Agency], in coordination 
with the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and CISA 
[Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency], released a 
report highlighting Chinese cyber threats to our critical 
infrastructure and the security of the defense industrial base. 
Likewise, just 2 months ago, the DIA [Defense Intelligence 
Agency] issued a report further exposing ties between Russia 
and Iran over the use of lethal Iranian drones in Ukraine. And 
we're continuing to monitor the growing relationship between 
Russia and the PRC [People's Republic of China], especially as 
the latter reportedly spends billions of dollars in support of 
Russian disinformation. These are just a select few instances 
that reflect the need for increased focus and agility from the 
Defense Intelligence Enterprise when it comes to strategic 
competition.
    I remain committed to working with you to ensure your 
organizations have the resources and authorities required to 
address these challenges in an era of great power competition. 
We cannot do it alone, so I continue to say our partners and 
allies play a key role as we work together to counter the 
aggressive and malign behavior that seeks to erode rules-based 
international order.
    I would especially like to thank Secretary Moultrie for 
reaffirming the value of strategic intelligence partners 
publicly during his visit last year with the Lithuanian 
Minister of National Defence.
    To effectively deal with the challenge of strategic 
competition, the Defense Intelligence Enterprise must remain 
agile, be collaborative across all domains and enterprises, 
quickly provide releasable and actionable intelligence 
throughout the Department, and collaborate with allies and 
partners.
    I look forward to hearing from witnesses on these and other 
issues today. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Ranking Member Gallego. We will now 
hear from our witnesses and then move into the question-and-
answer session. Immediately following one round of questions, 
we will reconvene for the classified session, which will take 
place in Rayburn room 2337.
    I will now recognize Mr. Moultrie.

   STATEMENT OF HON. RONALD S. MOULTRIE, UNDER SECRETARY OF 
             DEFENSE FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY

    Mr. Moultrie. Chairman Bergman, Ranking Member Gallego, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it's a privilege to 
testify on the posture of the Defense Intelligence and Security 
Enterprise. With my colleagues, we will address global threats 
and challenges with a specific focus on the pacing challenge, 
the People's Republic of China, or the PRC.
    On behalf of defense intelligence security professionals 
and intelligence professionals, I thank each of you for your 
steadfast support and partnership in keeping our Nation safe.
    I am joined by Generals Nakasone and Berrier, and they will 
be offering their intelligence-informed perspectives on the PRC 
challenge. We look forward to your questions on these 
challenges and how our enterprises are postured to meet them.
    I have provided the subcommittee with a classified 
statement for the record that outlines our FY24 [fiscal year 
2024] Military Intelligence Program [MIP] budget request in 
greater detail. Our number one priority continues to be the 
pacing challenge of the PRC. As Secretary Austin has testified 
previously, we do not believe that conflict with the PRC is 
either imminent or inevitable. The Department's intelligence 
and security efforts are focused on deterring the PRC's 
regional aggression against Taiwan and its neighbors while 
supporting global adherence to the international rule of law. 
While we seek peaceful resolutions to issues, in the event that 
conflict becomes inevitable, we will deliver a decisive 
information and decision advantage to our leaders and combatant 
commanders. The Military Intelligence Program is postured to 
support that goal.
    While I can provide more specifics of the MIP's efforts in 
closed session, our major lines of effort are focused on 
establishing: one, robust intelligence sharing policies and 
processes; two, secure, resilient, and reliable systems and 
architectures; three, strong regional and global partnerships; 
and, lastly, number four, a deep analytic and linguistic bench.
    I again thank the subcommittee for its leadership and its 
support, and I will now turn to General Nakasone, followed by 
General Berrier, for their testimonies.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Moultrie can be found in the 
Appendix on page 23.]

  STATEMENT OF GEN PAUL M. NAKASONE, USA, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL 
SECURITY AGENCY/CHIEF, CENTRAL SECURITY SERVICE, AND COMMANDER, 
                       U.S. CYBER COMMAND

    General Nakasone. Chairman Bergman, Ranking Member Gallego, 
distinguished members of the committee, I'm honored to 
represent the men and women of the National Security Agency, 
and I'm grateful for your support. Thank you for this 
opportunity to testify today before and with my Department of 
Defense Intelligence Enterprise colleagues. The men and women 
of the National Security Agency are committed to providing 
vital support to policymakers and to military operators in our 
vital role as a combat support agency. We deliver cryptologic 
capabilities to enable the Defense Intelligence Enterprise to 
deliver accurate and timely intelligence on threats facing the 
Nation to our warfighters and national leadership.
    The U.S. faces many threats today. China challenges across 
all elements of national power while coercively seeking to 
expand its malign influence and control over its neighbors and 
around the world. Russia remains engaged in global malign 
influence and its illegal aggression in Ukraine. Iran is a 
regional menace routinely conducting cyber and malign influence 
activities, while North Korea continues to advance its missile 
and WMD [weapons of mass destruction] capabilities. Terror 
groups, criminal cyber actors, and fentanyl-dealing cartels are 
ongoing threats. Rapid changes in the global technological 
environment require better approaches to data, machine 
learning, and artificial intelligence.
    NSA is working with interagency, private sector, and 
foreign partners to build cybersecurity in defense of the 
Nation and is playing a critical role in developing insights to 
counter China. I'd like to emphasize the importance [of] 
intelligence derived from section 702 of the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act to the missions I just mentioned. 
This authority, which allows NSA to collect intelligence on 
non-U.S. persons located overseas that use U.S. communications 
infrastructure, is critical to keeping the Nation safe. I look 
forward to continuing to speak with Congress about 702's 
importance and the rigorous compliance program that guides our 
use of it.
    In my role as the Director of NSA and Commander of U.S. 
Cyber Command, and pursuant to recent guidance issued by the 
Department of Defense, I am closely examining access, 
accountability, and security in our workspaces, in 
collaboration with the whole-of-government efforts related to 
the protection of classified information.
    Maintaining the trust and confidence of our Nation's 
leaders and the public remains a top focus. Your support is 
what allows us to achieve positive national security outcomes 
for the Nation.
    Thank you again for inviting me today, and I look forward 
to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Nakasone can be found in 
the Appendix on page 27.]

    STATEMENT OF LTG SCOTT BERRIER, USA, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE 
                      INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

    General Berrier. Chairman Bergman, Ranking Member Gallego, 
and distinguished subcommittee members, thank you for the 
opportunity to discuss the Defense Intelligence Agency's 
assessment of the global security environment. I am pleased to 
join Honorable Moultrie and General Nakasone today to discuss 
the complex threat landscape and our work to provide timely, 
insightful, and rigorous intelligence.
    DIA and the Defense Intelligence Enterprise [DIE] are 
transforming our approach to meet threats to our Nation posed 
by strategic competition with China, Russia, and other foreign 
nations. With your continued support, DIA and the DIE will 
continue excel in providing all-source analysis, HUMINT [human 
intelligence] and technical collection, open-source collection, 
material exploitation, modeling and simulation, and other 
unique mission sets.
    Like you, I am very concerned about the ongoing threats 
from China, Russia, North Korea, Iran, and violent extremist 
organizations, but China is our pacing challenge and DIA's top 
priority. Beijing is expanding its global influence and 
stepping up its multi-domain pressure campaign against Taiwan, 
as observed by its sharply increased rhetoric and military 
activity over this past year. Xi Jinping's attainment of a 
third term as the General Secretary of the Chinese Communist 
Party positions Beijing for further progress on military 
modernization and operational goals that will challenge the 
U.S. during the next year and beyond.
    The war in Ukraine is also a priority for DIA. For the 
Russian military, 2022 was not a good year. The ``New Look'' 
army is gone, and in my view we are at a particularly dangerous 
place with Russia. Putin is not seeking an off-ramp, and Moscow 
has asserted publicly that it remains committed to achieving 
its objectives in Ukraine through military force.
    DIA has unique responsibilities, expertise, and missions 
that you trust us to lead, such as foundational military 
intelligence; Defense HUMINT and cover; measurement and 
signature intelligence, known as MASINT; and JWICS [Joint 
Worldwide Intelligence Communications System]. Your DIA 
officers provide strategic operational and tactical defense 
intelligence to our warfighters, defense planners, 
policymakers, and the acquisition community.
    One final area I would like to highlight during my 
testimony is the workforce. As you know, our workforce spans 
the globe with innovative and forward-leaning officers. These 
talented and dedicated experts are making strides to defend the 
United States and our allies. From our defense attaches, to 
combatant command J2 [Joint Staff Intelligence Directorate] 
teams, to analysts and case officers, these professionals are 
mission focused and working tireless behind the scenes to 
defend the nation. I'm proud to represent a dedicated workforce 
that provides intelligence on foreign actors to prevent and win 
wars, and to illuminate opportunities to enable the United 
States to outpace our strategic competitors.
    I also echo General Nakasone's comment on section 702 
reauthorization. Our all-source analysis depends on it.
    I look forward to your questions on the global threat 
environment, and thank you for your continued support and 
opportunity to testify today.
    [The prepared statement of General Berrier can be found in 
the Appendix on page 32.]
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. I would remind everyone, especially 
those giving testimony, we are not in a classified setting 
here. I know I don't have to tell you that, but I think it's 
important that we all understand we will go to closed session 
after this.
    So I will recognize myself here for 5 minutes to start. And 
all of my questions here are for all of you, so feel free to 
whoever feels like you want to, you know, chime in.
    First, what lessons have your organizations taken from the 
Russian-Ukraine conflict that are helping you shape your 
efforts to counter China?
    Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Chairman, I'll start and turn to my 
colleagues. I think one of the top lessons that we took away in 
the Defense Department from an intelligence perspective is that 
we have to have the right sharing policies in place to be able 
to provide our allies and, in this case Ukraine, with the 
intelligence that it needed to actually defend itself against a 
formidable, at least seemingly formidable, adversary, if you 
will. So that was probably lesson number one.
    Lesson number two was ensuring that we had the right 
partnerships and establishing those partnerships early on and 
not waiting until after a conflict actually broke out to do 
that. So ensuring that we had the right individuals and 
partnerships.
    And then the last one that I'll highlight is just ensuring 
that we have the right skill sets, ensuring that we have the 
right analytic expertise, ensuring that we have the right 
linguistical expertise is something that we took away as 
something that we have to be prepared for if we are to face the 
pacing challenge of the PRC.
    General Nakasone. Chairman, I would add two ideas here. 
First of all, intelligence and information and what a strength 
it is to our Nation. If you would have asked me 3 years ago 
would you anticipate releasing some of our most sensitive 
intelligence broadly to the public, I would have said I could 
never imagine such a day. But yet in the fall of 2021, with the 
President's decision and the direction of the Director of 
National Intelligence, we did that, and we did it in a manner 
that was allowing us to do three things: build a coalition, 
impact an adversary, and enable a partner. That is a lesson 
that we have taken to heart, and at the same time, when we've 
been able to do that, be able to protect our sources and 
methods.
    The second piece that I would highlight is the tempo. We go 
from competition to crisis to conflict in weeks, and the pace 
in terms of the provision of intelligence is much quicker today 
than anything I've ever seen before. And I think it will only 
speed up with our ability to process information, the 
collection that we're taking in, and obviously the information 
that we're providing.
    General Berrier. Chairman, thank you for that question. I 
would offer three things from the DIA perspective here: 
partnership, secure communications, and continuously refining 
our tradecraft.
    So on the partnership piece, we all have deep professional 
and personal partnerships with our counterparts in other 
nations, and those personal relationships go very, very far 
when you can pick up a secure line and have a conversation with 
your partner about something bad that's about to happen. That 
is key, it's clutch, and it's clutch today.
    The other piece is secure comms. We had the ability to 
install a secure communications network that was able to 
support Ukraine and our partners on this to be able to 
disseminate the information that Honorable Moultrie and General 
Nakasone are talking about. It's so key to have that.
    And then the last piece is to continuously look at 
ourselves to refine our tradecraft. We rest everything on sound 
tradecraft principles. Whether that's analyzing foreign 
military forces or analyzing their will to fight, we have to go 
through a continuous process to reevaluate that and make sure 
that we're doing the best that we can.
    Thank you.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And I just want to, before my time 
expires here, each of you touch on your ability to get the 
right people in the right positions, have them, you know, a 
full up round, if you will. How are you doing as far as being 
able to recruit and maintain the workforce you need?
    Mr. Moultrie. I'll start, Mr. Chairman. I think we're doing 
better. There's a lot more work to be done, especially if we 
are to get the skill sets and the linguistic skills that we 
need to prepare for any inevitability that we might face with 
China. And so being able to bring in those linguistic skills, 
hiring the right expertise, I think is going to be something 
that we have to continue to focus on.
    General Nakasone. Chairman, we're in the midst of our 
largest hiring ever, year ever in our agency's 70-year history. 
And I would characterize it as being one that, while we will 
meet, it will be incredibly challenging for us just because 
there is so much competition for the best and the brightest 
today.
    It's interesting that, as we go out and make our pitch, one 
of the things that certainly that we're able to do quite well 
is to talk about the benefits of the mission that you work. But 
I would also say just in closing on this that we have to have a 
new paradigm as we look at the workforce of the future. Not 
everyone comes into government service for 30-plus years, and 
so we have to be ready to recruit, train, retain, and then also 
return people that go away for a period of time, bringing them 
back to our agency with open arms and readily.
    General Berrier. Chairman, thank you for that question. We 
are attracting a lot of talent, and we're getting a lot of 
really, really good folks into the agency, and we have to be 
able to sustain that. DIA is undergoing its only HR [human 
resources] modernization effort that we've ever gone through, 
and the ability to attract that talent, to retain that talent, 
to make sure that we can professionally develop them, that we 
have a talent management system that they thrive in, is really, 
really key.
    So we've got some work to do. We think we're on the right 
track, and we do appreciate your support for that.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, everybody. And Ranking Member 
Gallego, you're recognized.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We've all heard the 
public statements from the Chinese president telling his 
military to prepare to invade Taiwan by 2027. There's a fair 
amount of speculation when it comes to that date or any date.
    In your assessment, could the PRC launch a successful 
military invasion of Taiwan? And if they could, what would be 
the cost to China? When I say could they make that--can they 
make that jump by 2027 or near that time, to be more specific. 
And we'll just start with General Nakasone.
    General Nakasone. Ranking Member, as the Secretary has 
talked about, I certainly believe that any type of conflict 
with China is not imminent, nor is necessarily inevitable.
    To your very specific question, while we have heard the 
statements in terms of what President Xi would like to do by a 
specific date, I think where we are focused right now is to 
ensure that there is no miscalculation. And that's where we 
have focused a tremendous amount of time to ensure that we 
clearly understand the capabilities and intents of the People's 
Republic and, at the same time, we're able to provide early 
warning and that type of indication to our forces in the 
Pacific and to our senior policymakers, as well.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you. The follow-up question on that, I 
think, Lieutenant General Berrier and General Nakasone, you 
guys both have created organizations within your respective 
departments that focus on China. One is the USCYBERCOM [U.S. 
Cyber Command]-NSA China Outcomes Group and the other is the 
DIA mission group. Can both of you discuss what these groups 
provide to you in your departments--obviously concerning the 
[inaudible]--and do they collaborate? If you can answer as much 
as possible now, we can also, obviously, follow up in greater 
detail in the classified session.
    General Berrier. Ranking Member, they absolutely 
collaborate. In fact, we had the leader of General Nakasone's 
team into our headquarters just a couple of weeks ago, so 
there's crosstalk and discussion.
    The China mission group is really focused on China and 
Taiwan. We felt, in this pivot to the Pacific that President 
Obama directed in 2012, that we needed to focus internally and 
externally, and the China mission group gives us the capability 
to really stare in deeply and provide the deep insights, 
analysis, and warning support to INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific 
Command] and the Department.
    General Nakasone. Ranking Member, they do collaborate, and 
they collaborate quite closely. As we stood up the China 
Outcomes Group, it was based on our experiences in 2018 when we 
brought together the experts of U.S. Cyber Command and the 
National Security Agency to deal with Russia and election 
influence. That was the same idea. And with us, as we go 
forward, we're looking at our China Outcomes Group primarily to 
support USINDOPACOM with the options and the insights that are 
necessary to understand what China is going to do in the near 
term.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you. Secretary Moultrie, recognizing the 
importance of [inaudible] and timely intelligence sharing with 
our partners and allies, something which we saw with our 
Ukraine engagement with our allies, what updates to policies 
have you made related to that, and how effective have they been 
so far?
    Mr. Moultrie. Yes, Ranking Member. We've looked at a number 
of things since we implemented the sharing changes in early 
2022. One of the things that I signed out in October of last 
year was a new policy on NOFORN [Not Releasable to Foreign 
Nationals], so no foreign intelligence dissemination. So what 
we wanted to do is have a comprehensive review of our NOFORN 
policy to ensure that we were not overly using NOFORN within 
the Department. There are only two conditions where we really 
could only use NOFORN, and so what we wanted to do was to 
ensure that our policies actually match what our practices 
were. And I think that's been a great, of great assistance to 
our partners and allies. We've heard resoundingly from them to 
say that they are looking at their NOFORN, which each of our 
partners have their own eyes-only type intelligence, if you 
will. So we're leading by example in this space by actually 
saying we will ensure that we maximize the sharing that we do 
with you, even on the most sensitive things that we have, if 
you will do the same. That will be a force multiplier for the 
partnerships and relationships.
    So we are doing that, while at the same time looking at how 
we can maximize the sharing of other types of intelligence with 
our partners. But we have signed out policies that will 
actually help us institutionalize this across the Department of 
Defense.
    Mr. Gallego. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And I again just remind our members 
who came in a couple of minutes ago, we are in the unclassified 
part of this, so just as a reminder. Mr. Scott, you're 
recognized.
    Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Nakasone, you 
mentioned 702. I understand that we--did we declassify the 
number on the percentage of the information that is given in 
the President's daily briefing on national security with regard 
to how often 702 is used in those briefings?
    General Nakasone. Congressman, we did. In fact, that was 
released just recently. In calendar year 2022, 59 percent of 
the President's daily briefing articles contained section 702 
information reported by our agency.
    Mr. Scott. And we have, obviously, have the reauthorization 
of 702 coming forward. It's extremely important to our national 
security, and I want to say this: the bureaucrats at the FBI in 
some cases have abused their authority, and there are going to 
have to be some systems put in place that stop that if it's 
going to be reauthorized, and there are going to have to be 
consequences for the people who abuse that authority.
    And, again, I appreciate your agency and the way you have 
used it. But people have to understand that, the President of 
the United States needs to understand, there are going to have 
to be some guardrails for 702 to be reauthorized because of the 
abuses that have occurred, predominantly with bureaucrats at 
the FBI.
    With that said, we depend on the private sector for our 
economy, our defense industrial base. The corporate sector 
seems ill-prepared to deal with corporate espionage or cyber 
attacks, and they happen on a daily basis. And my question is, 
who's responsible for the security of the national 
infrastructure, as well as the cybersecurity inside our defense 
industrial base?
    General Nakasone. So, Congressman, in terms of our critical 
infrastructure, as you well know, 16 different sectors are 
critical infrastructure. The one sector that the Department of 
Defense is responsible for is the defense industrial base. And 
what we have done as a department is, working through the 
National Security Agency, Under Secretary of Defense for 
Intelligence and Security, and the DOD [Department of Defense] 
Chief Information Officer, look at ways that we can partner 
more effectively with the defense industrial base. If the 
majority of the intelligence that we have to share with the 
defense industrial base needs to be at an unclassified level, 
why don't we produce that? And we are today.
    And so we have stood up a cyberspace collaboration center 
outside of the National Security Agency that regularly is 
talking with the defense industrial base, over 300 different 
defense industrial base companies today that are talking 
regularly. And I think, to the important piece of not only just 
getting the information from the private sector but giving, 
what are we seeing, as well, and then having this discussion, 
what's anomalous that's happening.
    Mr. Scott. You alluded to this. The Armed Services 
Committee had serious discussions back in December, over a year 
ago, about the declassification of the intel. I want to give 
our intelligence community tremendous credit for just how 
precise the intel was with regard to Russia and what they 
intended to do in Ukraine. And I agree with you 100 percent 
that the decision to declassify that information was important 
to the world. If the world had been surprised by the attack of 
Russia on the Ukraine, I think that you would probably be in 
the midst of a global recession right now that somewhat was 
avoided because people expected what Russia did.
    The thing we missed was how important the will to fight 
was. I mean, we thought Ukrainians could hold out for weeks or 
months, and they have given the Russians a pretty good punch in 
the nose, and I hope they keep doing it.
    With regard to declassification going forward, that's an 
example of how it worked. It obviously doesn't work every time. 
But what suggestions do you have for us on declassification?
    General Nakasone. So I begin with, Congressman, the fact of 
it's a two-way dialogue, right. The importance of the agency 
that is looking at the sanitization or the declassification 
material, working with a series of different senior 
policymakers and senior military commanders, say this is the 
art of the possible. This is what we have to do, and this is 
what we have to protect. That dialogue was very rich in the 
fall of 2021.
    The second piece is the work that this committee has done 
to empower our agencies with the collection that we need gives 
us tremendous opportunity. At the end of the day, this is 
really powerful collection combined with really good analysis.
    Mr. Scott. Gentlemen, thank you.
    Mr. Bergman. Mr. Jackson of North Carolina, you are 
recognized.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. Thank you. General Nakasone, 
I want to follow up on something you just said with respect to 
really powerful collection. Understanding that we're in an 
unclassified setting, and I think we should probably follow 
this up when we're in a different setting, but I'd like to hear 
you speak to the effect that artificial intelligence is going 
to have on magnifying your capabilities with respect to 
collection. I assume a ton of bandwidth goes into taking data 
and turning it into intelligence, and I assume that artificial 
intelligence is going to become critical with respect to both 
collection of data and processing data into intelligence. 
That's my assumption. Am I right about that, or am I wrong 
about that?
    General Nakasone. I believe you're correct about that, 
Congressman. And I might just state, you know, the power of 
bringing together so much information and rapidly being able to 
go through it, we're very interested in this. We've been very 
interested in large language models and this type of data for 
many, many years at the National Security Agency.
    I think, however, we also need to understand that it is by 
no means a panacea to everything that is done. And, in fact, if 
we take a look at some of the examples of artificial 
intelligence today, not all of it is correct. And so we need to 
be very, very judicious about understanding the models and 
understanding both the capabilities and the shortcomings of it.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. Is this technology the 
biggest game changer in your field since you've been in it?
    General Nakasone. It's the biggest game changer that I can 
think of that I've seen in terms of as we go forward. I think 
it's going to have tremendous impacts not only on the 
intelligence community but our economy, the way that we conduct 
our lives. It will be transformational.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. Would either of you like to 
speak to this?
    Mr. Moultrie. I'll speak to it, Congressman. Thanks for the 
opportunity. I agree completely with General Nakasone that AI 
[artificial intelligence] and generative AI is going to be a 
major game changer for us. I think, when you couple it with 
potential, the potentials of quantum computing, you'll really 
have a powerful tool that we can use.
    I think it's also important, as General Nakasone pointed 
out, to really understand that the outcomes that you will reap 
out of this will only be as good as the data that's been fed 
into the AI model, so data provenance becomes really important 
to us, as we have seen for a number of years and decades, if 
you will. You have to ensure that you feed the right data into 
the model, the large language model. If you don't, you will get 
an outcome that is not the correct outcome. And we know our 
adversaries are considering or already thinking about large 
data models, if you will, and how they may use that against us. 
Our being able to understand and being able to identify when 
something is actually an AI-generated outcome is something 
that's going to be very important to us, too.
    General Berrier. Congressman, I would add that this 
committee expects DIA to be the master sense-makers of the 
operational and strategic environment. To do that, we have to 
be the best at foundational military intelligence. That is to 
know everything there is to know about every military in the 
world: where they're at, how they're organized, what their 
order of battle is, what their equipment is, how they're 
trained, how they fight, when will they fight, why would they 
fight, how they're led.
    If you think about the plethora of data that's out there in 
big data analytics, AI is a game changer for DIA. We're 
incorporating some of these tools now, and I'd be happy to 
discuss that in the closed session.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. Isn't it, to your point, 
also a game changer for our adversaries and maybe more of a 
leveling-up for them than a leveling-up for us? Because it just 
is such a force magnifier that it makes up for a lot of other 
infrastructural deficits they have with their forces. It's an 
acceleration for them.
    Mr. Moultrie. Yes. Congressman, that's an excellent point, 
I think. We get back to why we call China the pacing challenge. 
We need to continue to pace ourselves ahead of them. So they 
are going to do these things. There's no preventing them from 
going there. What we have to do is ensure that the respective 
agencies have the resources that they need, that they have the 
materials that they need, and that they have the intellectual 
firepower that they need to actually look at this.
    General Nakasone. Congressman, I think the other piece, and 
this is really to Secretary Moultrie's point early on, is that 
it truly is about partnerships. This is being driven, for the 
most part, very rapidly in the private sector, and so the 
partnerships that we form with the private sector, 
understanding what's going on, are critical.
    Here's the other point. We think much about the ability of 
what AI is going to do for us in the future. One of the things 
that we have communicated very clearly to a number of the U.S. 
companies is the importance of securing the intellectual 
property that you have invested within this type of capability 
because this will be a target of our adversaries.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. It just seems like, now that 
the genie is out of the bottle, it's less of an advantage to us 
than it will be to our adversaries who are so far behind us, 
that it lets them catch up to us more quickly than it lets us--
it is an incremental gain for us, but it may be an exponential 
gain for our adversaries, is a potential concern.
    Mr. Moultrie. I think we can talk more about that in closed 
session.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. Fair enough. I yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. Mr. Jackson of Texas, you are 
recognized.
    Dr. Jackson of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I appreciate 
it. I just want to say, you know, as a democratic nation, the 
U.S. values of transparency and openness are obviously pretty 
important to all of us. The amount of information that can be 
gathered through a Google search about government policy, 
military activities and facilities, monetary expenditures, 
civilian corporate structures, and anything like that is 
absolutely staggering, I guess, when you look at it relative to 
the United States.
    The PRC, by contrast, has created a system where 
information is suppressed, obscured, and distorted, and there's 
also a profound cultural and language barrier that amplifies 
the intelligence collection challenge that we face.
    My question, Lieutenant Berrier, is, to the extent that you 
can share in an open session, how is the Defense Intelligence 
Enterprise overcoming the challenges of such an inherently 
closed system, and are we developing new practices and 
capabilities that will offset some of these difficulties? And, 
furthermore, does this put us at a significant disadvantage 
that China can so rapidly access so much open-source 
information about us? And to ping off of what Mr. Jackson was 
just saying, as well, I was just thinking as he was speaking 
that, you know, do these facts that I've stated here, does it 
give them a distinct advantage when it comes to AI because 
there's so much open-source information that would be available 
to AI, and we may not have the same amount of data to rely on 
with our AI?
    General Berrier. Congressman, I would say to the latter 
part of your question, I think, because we are a free and open 
society, we put so much out there, that that does give a 
certain advantage to the Chinese and their ability to go in and 
do research on us. But they've been doing this for 30 years. I 
often describe China as really conducting at a nation-state 
level the largest theft of intellectual property in the history 
of mankind.
    So it's not new. They have done it before, they're going to 
continue to do that. And I think it's really up to us to 
determine how we defend against that and how active we get in 
this space to apply counterintelligence methods to do that. And 
we can talk more about that in the closed session.
    From a DIA perspective, though, we talked a little bit 
about the standup of the China mission group focused solely on 
multi-spectrum dimension of all facets of intelligence to be 
able to bring to bear against this problem. It's my number one 
priority.
    Dr. Jackson of Texas. Yes, sir. Thank you. I appreciate 
that. Second question I have is the intelligence community [IC] 
is comprised of 18 total organizations, 9 of which are part of 
the Defense Intelligence Enterprise. I know that, as the 
intelligence collection, the means in which we can collect 
intelligence increases, so does the amount of intelligence that 
we collect. However, what I'm wondering about is--this is for 
you Dr. Moultrie--what are we doing right now regarding 
potential stovepiping within the intelligence agencies? I think 
that's haunted organizations, not just the IC but, you know, 
law enforcement and everybody else, and it's led to things that 
easily could have been prevented but, you know, one agency 
didn't know what the other agency was doing.
    What are we doing within the defense intelligence 
community, you know, to prevent stovepiping and work with the 
sister agencies?
    Mr. Moultrie. Thank you. Both my colleagues have talked 
about the relationships that we have, but there's also formal 
mechanisms that we have that allow us to collaborate. There's 
integrees that we have in all of our agencies where we have 
individuals who work from my organization within NSA, from my 
organization within DIA, from DIA within my organization, NGA 
[National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency], and the same with 
the National Reconnaissance Office. We all have an integrated 
system, if you will.
    What we started recently was the first stand-up of the 
Defense Intelligence Enterprise Management Council. So one of 
the things that we decided to do, at the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Intelligence and Security, is actually bring a 
council together of agency heads where we could get together 
and actually talk about how we can further share, how we can 
further collaborate on a number of different things. That 
session, I think we had it in March, I want to say it was early 
March, if you will, it was actually visited by the Deputy 
Secretary of Defense. The Secretary was out that day and could 
not do it. And she talked about the importance of us 
collaborating and sharing to ensure just what you're talking 
about, sir, that there is no stovepipes.
    So I think what we've done is we've taken some of the 
informal mechanisms that we've had and we formalized them. Of 
course, the DNI, Director of National Intelligence, has the 
executive committee that brings all 18 heads together, if you 
will. We do that once every other month or so, and we have this 
way of communicating between those integrees that we have that 
are scattered throughout the various agencies, the 
relationships that we have, and the formal mechanisms, 
Congressman, that we have put in place.
    Dr. Jackson of Texas. Okay. Thank you, sir. I appreciate 
that. Thank you all for your time. I yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Representative Slotkin, you're recognized.
    Ms. Slotkin. Thank you, Mr. Bergman. So thanks for being 
here. A couple of questions and then a comment. I would say 
also, for those of us who are engaging now so frequently with 
folks who are in the AI commercial space who are developing new 
commercial technology, I mean, all of them would say that 
ChatGPT is one of the most ground shaking changes or 
innovations out there. It's the fastest growing system right 
now, at least if you talk to the folks in Silicon Valley. And 
they will rattle off a list of military implications of the 
commercial availability of that AI, right, putting it at 
someone's fingertips. They will say automated target 
recognition, military robotics, intel analysis, and I say this 
as a former CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] officer, right, 
logistics, modeling and simulation, missile guidance, wearable 
systems, terrain analysis, like on and on and on and on.
    So I certainly know that you all have been focused on 
looking at other militaries and what they are incorporating in 
terms of AI, but who is in charge of looking at what the 
commercial availability of AI will mean for the U.S. military?
    Mr. Moultrie. So, for the Department of Defense, we have a 
chief data officer that looks at this and has been looking at 
AI. We also have our research organization led by Under 
Secretary Shyu that is looking at AI. Of course, ChatGPT is 
just one of the programs that are out there, and, of course, if 
you look at discussions that are being held even today out in 
San Francisco with the RSA security conference, I think they 
have identified generative AI as the number one thing that we 
should be looking at, and that's rightfully so. And I believe 
you have a representative out there who has been on the news 
over the last 2 days or so.
    So we have the mechanism in place to understand exactly 
what this might mean in terms of being the game changer we've 
already discussed in front of this committee. Now we're trying 
to look at the applications of it. We're trying to ensure that 
we understand the models, and when we go into closed session, I 
think we can tell you what we're doing a little bit more to 
actually understand how our adversaries may be using it, what 
we're doing to potentially counter that, and how we need to 
approach this with your support moving forward in the future.
    Ms. Slotkin. Yes. I think it's adversaries, but it's also, 
just as we've seen, the average American has been the victim of 
some kind of identity theft, ransomware attack, and it's not 
necessarily, maybe it's permitted by a nation state, but it's 
not necessarily directed by a nation state. And so I would just 
offer that, to the average citizen, defending them also means 
against the commercial use by bad actors, not necessarily by 
the Department of Defense.
    And then who is in charge at the Department of Defense at 
looking at the rules of the road for the incorporation of AI 
into, you know, into the Defense Department? We're struggling 
with that here for folks who are interested in this topic. You 
know, do we legislate, do we regulate, do we think about it, is 
there a commission, do we want the flip phone generation 
regulating AI. I don't know. [Inaudible humorous exchange with 
Mr. Bergman.] But who is doing the sort of ethical and moral 
implications of the AI incorporation into the Department of 
Defense? Who owns that?
    Mr. Moultrie. For us, we turn to Policy within our 
organization. They're the ones who really set those frameworks 
and those guidelines that we live by. They work very closely 
with our OGC, Office of General Counsel, and then they'll work 
very closely with the DOJ [Department of Justice] and others to 
determine what's the right thing for us to do as the 
interagency to get after this and how it's used and how it's 
not used.
    Of course, we will provide our input as to the benefits of 
it, and we'll provide our input as to what the adversaries may 
do against us. But, yes, it really is, it's an interagency 
effort, ma'am.
    Ms. Slotkin. Okay. I would offer it might need to be 
someone's responsibility. It's an issue that's coming to a 
theater near us.
    Lastly, can anyone tell me if you've participated in any 
war game vis-a-vis a China-Taiwan scenario in which the private 
sector have been cleared in to participate, captains of 
industry, folks who are not normally part of the executive 
branch but who have major stakes in either transportation in 
and around China, supply chain issues, those of us who come 
from manufacturing, homes, you know. There is a possibility of 
mutually assured economic destruction if we have war with 
China, so please tell me if you've actually had the instance 
with the private sector in the room in a classified setting.
    Mr. Moultrie. I would just say if we can talk about what 
we've done in classified settings in a classified session----
    Ms. Slotkin. I just want to know if you've ever had the 
private sector folks, I'm talking about like a Jamie Dimon or 
the head of GM, in any war game you've personally ever attended 
on any China scenario.
    Mr. Moultrie. Once again, I would say that we work closely 
with the private sector and----
    Ms. Slotkin. So, no. I mean, it's just a yes or no. I'm not 
asking if it's classified or unclassified. But have you brought 
in the private sector to game this out?
    Mr. Bergman. Just so you know, sometimes the best answer is 
a non-answer if you don't want to infer things.
    Ms. Slotkin. Okay. All right. Well, I'll take that for what 
it was. Thanks.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And, Mr. Mills, you're recognized.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you so much, and 
Secretary, I apologize for him referring to you as a 
Congressman. You don't want that sentence.
    So I want to touch on the AI autonomous systems. You know, 
one of the things, and I just returned from Fort Bragg and I 
won't go into anything that is not going to be covered in our 
classified section, but I do see a significant importance in 
the quantum race and where we're at on things. And I noted that 
China's big concern right now is that they feel confident in 
their ability to outpace us militarily and economically, but 
they really struggle with knowing where we are from an 
innovative perspective, which is really a direction that 
they're trying to head in. And in seeing that their primary 
goal, and I've written about this numerous times in the past 
years, about this great superpower resurgence with China, 
Russia, Iran, North Korea's geopolitical alignment, they're 
really tailored towards the idea that it's not so much the 
kinetic but the non-kinetic element of things with influence 
campaigns but also looking at that Belt and Road Initiative 
which would pave the way to get that Eurasian expansion; that 
Africa dominance with controls to resources from the port in 
Djibouti, which is, roughly a $560 million investment; the 
railway supplies that goes into the potash farms and harvests 
that you see; and also the control of Oceania in an effort to 
try and cut off Western Hemisphere supply chain.
    And while that, in itself, is concerning, we also know that 
they're attempting to complete that encirclement with the 
economic coercions in Honduras and Panama to control the Panama 
Canal for increased tariff and access while utilizing that 
Russian, I guess, marriage of convenience, if you will, for the 
Chavez of Venezuela, Petro in Colombia, and others within our 
own hemisphere.
    Now, we know that it's economic and resource-based. We know 
innovation is an area that they're most concerned with, and we 
also know that they don't allow their currency and their 
economics to be audited, if you will, because they're really 
far stretched more than what they actually allude to. I look at 
the quantum space or the quantum race very much like we 
utilized against Russia in the space wars in an area that we 
can outpace them if we continue to invest in it and drain down 
further resources.
    Are you in any way along the same lines that the quantum 
entanglement that we're seeking to try and achieve and the AI 
autonomous drone capabilities and capacities which could be 
utilized to leave our enemies deaf, dumb, and blind is the 
right path forward, and do you hear of whether or not China is 
concerned with our advancement in this?
    General Nakasone. So, Congressman, I think this speaks 
directly to the National Defense Strategy when we talk about 
building enduring advantage. You know, our agency does really, 
at its core, two very, very important things for our Nation: we 
make code and we break code. The making of code is what we're 
doing right now as we think about quantum-resistant encryption. 
If this type of computer can be deployed in the future, we will 
ensure that we have an encryption that can defeat it. And we've 
already developed a number of the algorithms that underpin that 
for our national security systems working very, very closely 
with NIST [National Institute of Standards and Technology] 
being able to ensure that they understand this, as well.
    But I think your point is very important as you talk about 
the broader campaign that China has across the world. And this 
is why I come back to the importance of section 702 that 
provides this type of insight in terms of what China is doing 
in South America, in Central America, in Africa, in terms of 
being able to have the insights that are so necessary for us to 
be able to shine a light because, at the end of the day, 
malfeasance that the Chinese have undertaken, whether or not 
that's with outrageous repayment terms or, you know, the 
stripping of natural resources from a country, this is the type 
of information that really sets them back.
    Mr. Mills. Yeah. And, again, I think that, when I'm looking 
at things, the evolution of warfare has gone far beyond the 
ideas of kinetic elements of just bomb-to-bomb, bullet-to-
bullet, gun-to-gun. We have to recognize the economic 
resources, cyber capabilities as being the, you know, future of 
warfare, which can be done in a room this size, as opposed to 
on a battlefield. And so what concerns me the most is knowing 
that their ultimate goal is to eliminate the U.S. dollar from 
the global currency by utilizing economic coercion, other 
methods with WHO [World Health Organization], WEF [World 
Economic Forum], with the OPEC [Organization of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries], to try and undermine the petrodollar with 
what they're doing to decouple us from the EU [European Union].
    I really see this as a whole-of-nation approach, not just 
from our [inaudible] JSOC [Joint Special Operations Command] 
and the operators on the ground or even DIA and the IC but also 
from Treasury and the rest of good policy. And just in a quick 
last 10 seconds, would you agree with that synopsis?
    Mr. Moultrie. I would agree with that and also say the 
international community, the Western-aligned community, too.
    Mr. Mills. And sir?
    General Berrier. Wholeheartedly.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you, sir
    General Nakasone. And I would say this is why working with 
other elements of our broader interagency is so important. The 
CHIPS Act and being able to work with Commerce and being able 
to provide the insight is so very, very important.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you so much. I appreciate it. With that, I 
yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. Unless anybody has any other 
unclassified questions, this will conclude the open portion of 
the hearing. We are adjourned. We will reconvene as soon as 
everyone gets into their seats at Rayburn 2337 for the closed 
session.
    [Whereupon, at 5:05 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]



      
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