[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-24]
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES
IN THE INDO-PACIFIC REGION
__________
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 18, 2023
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-524 WASHINGTON : 2024
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
One Hundred Eighteenth Congress
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
Chair RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MATT GAETZ, Florida ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
DON BACON, Nebraska MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
JIM BANKS, Indiana VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida SARA JACOBS, California
MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan PATRICK RYAN, New York
RONNY JACKSON, Texas JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
PAT FALLON, Texas GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO,
NANCY MACE, South Carolina Pennsylvania
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
NICK LaLOTA, New York STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam JIMMY PANETTA, California
MARK ALFORD, Missouri MARC VEASEY, Texas
CORY MILLS, Florida
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia
Chris Vieson, Staff Director
Mark Morehouse, Professional Staff Member
Spencer Johnson, Counsel
Brooke Alred, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Committee on Armed Services.................................... 1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking
Member, Committee on Armed Services............................ 2
WITNESSES
Aquilino, ADM John C., USN, Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. 6
LaCamera, GEN Paul J., USA, Commander, United Nations Command;
Commander, United States-Republic of Korea Combined Forces
Command; and Commander, U.S. Forces Korea...................... 7
Royal, Hon. Jedidiah P., Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Department of
Defense........................................................ 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Aquilino, ADM John C......................................... 74
LaCamera, GEN Paul J......................................... 117
Royal, Hon. Jedidiah P....................................... 65
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Kim...................................................... 135
Mr. Ryan..................................................... 135
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 135
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Gallagher................................................ 141
Mr. Golden................................................... 142
Dr. Jackson.................................................. 143
Ms. Mace..................................................... 143
Mrs. McClain................................................. 143
Dr. McCormick................................................ 146
Mr. Moylan................................................... 145
Mr. Scott.................................................... 139
Ms. Stefanik................................................. 141
Ms. Tokuda................................................... 144
U.S. MILITARY POSTURE AND NATIONAL SECURITY CHALLENGES IN THE INDO-
PACIFIC REGION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 18, 2023.
The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:36 a.m., in room
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman
of the committee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Today we
continue our hearing with INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]
and U.S. Forces Korea.
I want to thank our witnesses for being here and their
service to our Nation. I know it takes a lot of time to prepare
for these hearings, and we really appreciate the fact that you
do that and you make yourselves available.
The Indo-Pacific is home to the greatest threat we have
faced in generations. In North Korea, we have a madman who
would rather build an illegal nuclear arsenal than feed his
starving people. The world has sat by while Kim has lobbed
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] over his neighbors,
rebuilt his nuclear testing facility, and expanded his
inventory of warheads.
Last week's announcement that North Korea tested a solid-
fueled ICBM is the latest extremely troubling news. It
eliminates the time-consuming liquid fueling process, making it
much harder for us to detect a missile and neutralize it before
launch.
That is why it is so imperative for us to invest in missile
defense and accelerate the next generation interceptor program.
A strong missile detect and defeat capability is also
critical to our deterrence of the Chinese Communist Party
[CCP]. We have talked a lot this year about the growing threats
we face from the CCP. They have tripled defense spending in a
decade, and that is what they admit to. Rapidly modernized and
expanded their conventional forces. Made unprecedented
advancements in space, hypersonics, AI [artificial
intelligence], and quantum computing. And increased the number
of launchers, missiles, and warheads in their nuclear arsenal
at a dizzying rate.
The CCP's extraordinary military buildup is certainly
concerning. But what is most alarming is the increasingly
provocative actions President Xi has taken in recent years,
pushing out China's borders with new defense agreements and
military bases in foreign nations; illegally building
militarized islands, and trying to limit freedom of navigation
in the South China Sea; threatening our allies in the region
when they work with us; and cozying up to Putin and the
ayatollah and other tyrants. And attempting to coerce Taiwan
with military exercises simulating a blockade and invasion of
the island.
It has gotten to the point where Xi's foreign ministry is
now seeking to intimidate the Speaker of the House and other
Members of Congress just for supporting democracy and self-
determination for the people of Taiwan.
This is not how responsible nations act, especially not
nations armed with nuclear weapons. We have no choice but to
take Xi's threats seriously. And we have to be resolute in our
response.
We need to accelerate our own military modernization. We
need to enhance training and readiness in the region. We need
to better distribute logistics throughout the Pacific. But we
won't prevail in any conflict with the CCP on our own.
We need to expand and strengthen our partnerships in the
region. We need to better arm our allies with agreements like
AUKUS [Australia, United Kingdom, United States]. And we need
to expedite the delivery of arms and training to Taiwan so they
can better defend their own democracy.
But most importantly, we need to take action now. China is
not going to give us 10 or 20 years to prepare for conflict. We
simply cannot procrastinate further.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on their
assessment of the threats and what they support in the need--
and what they need from this committee to deter China.
And with that, I yield to my friend and colleague the
ranking member for any comments he may have.
STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON,
RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I think you did an
excellent job of outlining the threats and the concerns that we
have in the--in the theater in North Korea and in the Indo-
Pacific theater as well more broadly. It is a very challenging
part of the world, and one that contains a lot of threats to
our national security and to global security without question.
We have our, you know, as the National Defense Strategy
says, the pacing threat in China, clearly our largest
competitor both economically and militarily.
And right next door we have our most unpredictable rogue
threat in North Korea, as you outlined their development of
nuclear weapons and the way they are closed off from the rest
of world that puts us in a position to not exactly know what
the leverage points are to deter them or work with them makes
them a significant threat as well.
I appreciate both of our witnesses being with us today to
help us walk through that. On North Korea, there is no easy
answer to the question. But what is our best deterrent
strategy? How do we contain that threat, given the nuclear
capabilities that North Korea is developing and the
unpredictable nature, how does one reach a country like North
Korea that is so isolated from the rest of the world.
And China is a much broader threat. We will talk a great
deal today about Taiwan. And certainly that is the biggest
flashpoint, China's militant attitude towards Taiwan, their
increasingly aggressive language about possibly reunifying
China through military means, something that we must deter.
A conflict there would be devastating for the entire world.
We need to figure out how to deter China from taking that
aggressive action.
But it is also important to point out Taiwan is but the
largest flashpoint. As the chairman alluded to, China is
aggressive and bullying across the world in countless ways. As
mentioned, they are claiming territory in the sovereign nations
of at least a half dozen other countries.
But also the best way to think about the threat that China
puts to the world is you cannot criticize China without them
launching an economic war against you. And there are a number
of examples of this, but Australia is perhaps one of the best.
Back during the pandemic, I think it was sometime in late
2020, Australia dared to suggest that China could perhaps be
ever so slightly more transparent in how they were dealing with
COVID [coronavirus disease]. In response to that mild
criticism, China literally launched an economic war against
Australia.
Now, one of the positive outcomes of that was Australia,
you know, woke up and said wow, you know, doing business with
China is going to be problematic. We better find other allies
and partners to deal with that.
But it happens across the world. Lithuania said something
about Taiwan that China didn't like, same thing. But even in
industry, if anybody in industry says something that China
doesn't like, they will use their economic might to pummel that
country, or entity.
There was, I think it was the GM [general manager] for the
Houston Rockets who said something pro Hong Kong, and the NBA
[National Basketball Association] was instantaneously cut off
by China. If you are going to make a movie in this world and
you want to sell it in China, China has to approve the script,
literally, okay. And if they don't, it doesn't get sold there.
The level of aggression that China has to restrict the
freedoms of the entire world is I think far greater than most
people realize. We need to present an alternative.
Key to that is our presence, us being actively involved in
the Indo-Pacific region. I applaud the efforts of the people
before us today to make clear that we do that.
President Biden's national security strategy prioritizes
China, we are present there, we will continue to be. We need to
have that adequate deterrence. But we also need partners and
allies.
We look forward to hearing from our witnesses today about
those partners and allies. Obviously, you know, Japan,
Australia, South Korea, India, the Philippines, Thailand, these
are some of the most important.
But all the other players, as I was struck by Indonesia as
a place that is just, they are trying to get along with both.
How do we work with them to help us in this fight?
Because ultimately, and the final point is, our goal with
China has to be peaceful coexistence, which sounds weird given
everything we have said about the problems and threats that
China presents.
But we are not going to defeat China. China and the U.S.
are going to be major global powers for as far as the eye can
see. How do we find a way to nudge China back in a more
positive, less aggressive, and less bullying direction?
That is ultimately what we have to do. Conflict with China
is not inevitable, 100 percent not. We need to figure out how
to peacefully coexist with them and deal with the threats that
they present in a way that is--keeps the world at peace.
I look forward to the testimony from our witnesses, and I
yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the ranking member. And now I would
like to introduce our witnesses. We have the Honorable Jed
Royal is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs; Admiral John Aquilino, the
Commander, United States Indo-Pacific Command; and General Paul
LaCamera is the Commander, United States--United Nations
Command Korea and the U.S. Combined Forces Command, the U.S.
Forces Korea.
I welcome our witnesses. And Mr. Royal, we will start with
you for 5 minutes to outline your statement.
STATEMENT OF HON. JEDIDIAH P. ROYAL, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INDO-PACIFIC SECURITY AFFAIRS,
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Royal. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify on what the Department of Defense is doing to safeguard
the interests of the American people, our allies, and our
partners in the Indo-Pacific region.
I would first like to acknowledge the tireless work of
those who serve the U.S. in uniform across the Indo-Pacific, as
well as those who serve in the civilian workforce across the
Department [of Defense].
The very first words of the Biden-Harris administration----
The Chairman. Mr. Royal, could you pull the microphone a
little closer?
Mr. Royal. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. There you go.
Mr. Royal. The very first words of the Biden-Harris
administration's Indo-Pacific strategy state that the U.S. is
an Indo-Pacific power. And Secretary Austin has been clear
about our commitment to seeking transparency, openness, and
accountability; freedom of the seas, skies, and space; and the
peaceful resolution of disputes in the region.
That vision and that commitment continue today. The
Department does not take this vision for granted. We have seen
the PRC [People's Republic of China] increasingly look to the
People's Liberation Army [PLA] as a tool for coercion in
support of its global aims.
The PLA has continued to conduct inherently risky
intercepts against U.S., ally, and partner assets in the air
and at sea, increasing the risk of an accident. And the PLA
continues to conduct coercive military activities in the Taiwan
Strait, the South and East China Seas, and beyond.
The PRC high-altitude balloon that violated our airspace
earlier this year exemplified the PRC's disregard for the basic
principle of sovereignty at the heart of peace and stability.
This is why the National Defense Strategy identifies the PRC as
our pacing challenge.
At the same time, North Korea also continues to engage in
provocative and destabilizing behavior, climate change will
continue to place downward pressure on peace and prosperity
across the region, and violent extremism continues to require
cooperation with our partners on counterterrorism.
The Department of Defense is doing more than ever to
strengthen deterrence and to ensure we can prevail in conflict
if necessary. We are deploying the right capabilities now,
investing in the capabilities we need in the future, and our
budget request shows it.
Efforts like the Rapid Defense Experimentation Reserve show
how we are quickly delivering promising prototypes to
warfighters. And the B-21 Raider, which the Secretary unveiled
last year, is a clear example of a new cutting-edge capability.
Here is the bottom line: Deterrence in the Indo-Pacific is
real and strong today because the U.S. military remains the
world's most capable and credible fighting force. Major
investments like these will help keep it that way.
And the U.S. is not alone in upholding peace and stability
in the region by investing in greater capability and
connection. We have supported Japan's decision to increase
substantially its defense budget over the next 5 years and to
introduce new capabilities, including counterstrike, that will
strengthen regional deterrence.
We are taking clear and meaningful steps to modernize and
strengthen our alliance with the Republic of Korea. We are
working together with the Philippines to accelerate our allied
capabilities.
We are making major investments in our defense ties with
India and maturing our immensely beneficial security
relationship. The AUKUS security pact exemplifies our
collaboration with highly capable allies to expand our combined
capacity.
Finally, we continue to fulfill our commitments under the
Taiwan Relations Act, which has formed the bedrock of peace,
stability, and deterrence in the Taiwan Strait over the last
four decades.
When it comes to modernizing our force posture in the Indo-
Pacific to be even more mobile, distributed, lethal, and
resilient, the Department of Defense is delivering historic
achievements. In December, the U.S. and Australia announced a
series of new force posture initiatives, including increased
rotations of U.S. bombers and fighters at Australian bases.
In January, the U.S. and Japan announced a series of force
posture improvements, including the first forward deployment of
a Marine littoral regiment in Japan. Weeks later, the Secretary
visited the Philippines and our governments announced that U.S.
forces will have access to Philippine military bases in four
new strategic locations.
These announcements add up to a historic improvement of our
regional force posture. We are operating with allies and
partners like never before, with bilateral and multilateral
exercises growing in scale, scope, and complexity.
We have deepened our trilateral security efforts with our
closest regional allies. We have broadened our initiatives with
multilateral partners to deliver real results for peace and
security, especially with ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian
Nations] and the Quad.
States across the Indo-Pacific region are investing in
their own capabilities, their connections with regional
partners, and their relationships with us. Over the past
decade, our five regional treaty allies have increased their
military expenditures by double digits. That is what delivering
on our shared vision looks like.
In closing, I appreciate the work of this committee, both
members and staff, in continuing to sharpen our edge in the
face of many challenges. In the past several years we have
witnessed the growth of a strong bipartisan consensus around
the scale and scope of the China challenge. We are working
toward the transformation of that consensus into a coalition
built around solutions.
The Department of Defense is deploying the capabilities,
driving forward the force posture, and deepening the alliances
and partnerships we need to meet our pacing challenge.
Thank you for your time and attention today. I look forward
to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Royal can be found in the
Appendix on page 65.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Royal.
Admiral Aquilino, you're recognized.
STATEMENT OF ADM JOHN C. AQUILINO, USN, COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-
PACIFIC COMMAND
Admiral Aquilino. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
and distinguished members of the committee, first, thank you
for the opportunity to be here today to discuss the Indo-
Pacific region.
First, just let me say that I appreciate and need your
support and your continuous support for the service members,
their families, government civilians, and all who operate in
the Indo-Pacific Command.
And it is my distinct honor and privilege to serve
alongside these brave men and women who execute our missions of
deterrence and for defense every day. I can't thank you enough
for all of your support. It is instrumental in our ability to
accomplish these missions. But there is more to do, and we must
act with a greater sense of urgency.
Every day, INDOPACOM works tirelessly to prevent conflict,
not provoke it. War is not inevitable and it is not imminent.
However, this decade presents a period of increased risk, and I
say that for the following reasons, and they are real.
The illegitimate, illegal invasion and the war in Ukraine.
The military buildup and malign behavior of the PRC, including
a no-limits relationship articulated as a partnership with
Russia. Continuous missile provocations and nuclear rhetoric by
the DPRK [Democratic People's Republic of Korea]. And the
constant threat of violent extremism in this theater.
Our National Defense Strategy identifies the PRC as the
most consequential strategic competitor of the United States.
And it is the only competitor capable of combining its
economic, diplomatic, military, and technological capabilities
to mount a sustained challenge in an attempt to displace the
United States and the rules-based international order.
``Seize the Initiative'' is INDOPACOM's approach to execute
the National Defense Strategy and accomplish our priorities:
defend the homeland, deter strategic attacks, deter aggression,
and build a resilient joint force. By design, this approach
prevents conflict through integrated deterrence, and it ensures
we can fight and win should deterrence fails.
Lastly, it provides the Secretary of Defense and the
President options for any contingency.
There are four key elements to Seize the Initiative. First,
a robust theater posture. Second, a joint operations campaign
comprised of lethal, persistent forces forward. Third,
technologically superior capabilities to maintain our
warfighting advantages in the near, mid, and long term.
And fourth, an enhanced network of allies, partners, and
friends with common values and goals.
We respectfully request your continued support for these
focus areas, recognizing that any delay in one area directly
affects the others and puts the overall success of our
deterrence efforts at risk.
I say it again, conflict in the Indo-Pacific is not
inevitable. But we cannot rest on our past accomplishments to
secure a peaceful future. Security challengers threaten our
very way of life, as well as the peace and prosperity that the
rules-based international order has enabled for nearly 80
years.
The investments we make today will allow future generations
to enjoy the same legacy of liberty our ancestors entrusted to
us. But we don't have the luxury of time. We must act now to
preserve a free and open Indo-Pacific.
Thanks, Chairman, I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Aquilino can be found in
the Appendix on page 74.]
The Chairman. Thank you, Admiral.
General LaCamera, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF GEN PAUL J. LaCAMERA, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
NATIONS COMMAND; COMMANDER, UNITED STATES--REPUBLIC OF KOREA
COMBINED FORCES COMMAND; AND COMMANDER, U.S. FORCES KOREA
General LaCamera. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith,
the distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you as the Commander of United
Nations Command, Combined Forces Command, and the United States
Forces Korea to discuss the current situation on the Korean
peninsula.
Korea is as important today as it was in 1950 when the
international rules-based order was first challenged and
successfully defended on the Korean peninsula. Located on the
Asian continent, the Republic of Korea is crucial to regional
and global security.
When North Korean communist forces invaded South Korea with
the blessing and assistance of the Soviet Union and China, the
United States, along with 22 members of the United Nation,
stood together with the South Korean people to expel the
aggressors. The Korean War taught us that we must always be
ready and forward-postured with our allies.
To ensure continued peace and stability on the peninsula, I
have five priorities that are nested within the Indo-Pacific
commander's Seize the Initiative approach to ensure a free and
open Indo-Pacific.
My first priority is to defend the homelands, the United
States and our allies. The Korean War has not ended, we are in
armistice, and the Kim regime has developed capabilities that
reach beyond Seoul, Tokyo, Washington, DC, and the capitals of
the United Nation command sending states.
By defending forward in this strategic location, we better
protect our people and the Korean people. Defending forward
reinforces our ironclad commitment to the Republic of Korea.
My second priority is to strengthen the United States and
the Republic of Korea alliance. We must never take the alliance
for granted. This is our center of gravity in deterring the Kim
regime.
The alliance has effectively deterred the Kim regime's
resumption of large-scale aggression for almost 70 years,
allowing security and stability to flourish and the Republic of
Korea to develop into an economically prosperous, vibrant
democracy.
In contrast, the Kim regime ignores the needs and rights of
the great majority of its population and continues to invest
its resources in developing weapons that it uses as leverage.
External leverage coerces concessions from the international
community; internal leverage maintains control of the people
and ensures Kim regime survival.
My third priority is to prepare for combat. This is
decisive. Our alliance alone cannot deter aggression. Our power
of resistance deters.
Maintaining the highest state of combat readiness is our
main effort. Because readiness is perishable, we must continue
realistic training in order to respond to aggression and defend
our homelands.
My fourth priority is to build coalitions to dissuade
aggression in the region. Our network of allies and partners
with common interests on the Korean peninsula represents our
greatest asymmetric advantage.
My fifth priority is to ensure our personnel are taken care
of and prepared to execute our mission on the Korean peninsula.
Mission first, people always. Our people serving on the Asian
continent have the extraordinary responsibility of providing
security and stability throughout the Republic of Korea and
Northeast Asia.
Our focus remains taking care of the mental, physical, and
spiritual needs of our service members, civilians, and
families. Since 1953, the United States and the Republic of
Korea remain ready to deter and respond to North Korean
aggression. Our mutual defense treaty expresses our common
desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments.
It also expresses our common determination to defend
ourselves against external armed attack so that no potential
aggressor could be under the impression that either the United
States or the Republic of Korea stands alone in the Pacific
area.
While the United States and the Republic of Korea alliance
began out of military necessity, it has evolved to become the
linchpin of stability and prosperity in Northeast Asia.
The soldiers, sailors, airmen, Marines, Guardians,
civilians, and contractors are proof of our ironclad commitment
to the alliance and ensures that the authoritarian regimes of
North Korea, China, and Russia cannot unmake the international
rules-based order.
Should the Kim regime resume hostilities, with your
continued support, we are ready. I am proud to serve with them
and am honored to represent them before you. Thank you, and I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General LaCamera can be found in
the Appendix on page 117.]
The Chairman. Thank you, General. I thank all the
witnesses.
We are now going to move into the question period. And I
want to emphasize to the members, but also to the witnesses, we
have a 5-minute time limit.
You should have a clock in front of your microphone. At 5
minutes, I will cut off any answer, so you might want to be
succinct. I don't want to be rude, but I want to treat
everybody the same when it comes to answers, questions and
answer period. And that applies to the chairman and the ranking
member as well.
So I will recognize myself first.
Mr. Royal and Admiral Aquilino, what actions do we need to
take in the near term to improve Taiwan's self-defense
capability?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, thanks for that question. The
interest of the Department is very strongly connected with the
ability of the United States to meet the Taiwan Relations Act.
The Taiwan Relations Act has been the foundation of deterrence
in the Taiwan Strait over the last 40 years.
We need to make sure that Taiwan is, consistent with the
Taiwan Relations Act, is able to defend itself. And we are
looking here, sir, at the opportunity for Taiwan to understand
what threat is posed against the Taiwan Strait.
In this regard, ISR [intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance] command and control battle management systems
are absolutely critical. Taiwan also certainly needs to be able
to make sure that any invading force is caught dead in its
tracks in the strait as it comes across to be able to defend at
the beaches and to be able to be resilient in depth on island.
The Chairman. Admiral Aquilino.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Chairman. Every day we execute
our responsibilities under the Taiwan Relations Act. The
training that is required, the capabilities that have been
identified by the Honorable Nelson are critical in getting them
to the island as soon and as fast as possible is critical.
The Chairman. Great. I think the ranking member would agree
with me that we are very confident that we will get a NDAA
[National Defense Authorization Act], a bipartisan national
defense authorization passed not only out of committee in a
timely fashion, but out of the floor and then the conference
report.
There is more dialog in the Congress about the difficulty
we are going to have in achieving appropriations bills in a
timely fashion. And the consequence of Congress not achieving a
timely and fulsome appropriations bill would mean a 2-year CR
[continuing resolution] possibly.
And my question is this: Admiral Aquilino, you have said
repeatedly in the public and talked about your need to go fast
to help prepare us for conflict in your command, INDOPACOM. If
you were to have a 2-year CR, would you able to go fast in
trying to prepare for conflict in your theater?
Admiral Aquilino. Chairman, a CR of any length is
devastating to the Department of Defense, specifically for
Indo-Pacific Command. Maneuvering in the industrial space,
providing those capabilities we just talked about at pace and
at speed, any new starts, loss of buying power, there are
critical disadvantages to a CR.
Again, my assessment is it would be devastating.
The Chairman. So I would take that as a no.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir.
The Chairman. Great. The ranking member is recognized.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. Just two questions. One, General
LaCamera, what role do you see China playing in the North Korea
challenge, both positive and negative in terms of containing
that threat?
General LaCamera. Thanks, Congressman. I don't see anything
on the Korean peninsula that does not involve Chinese and
Russian involvement with DPRK, and quite frankly with the ROK
[Republic of Korea]. They have put economic pressure on the
Republic of Korea in the past. And but, they also have their
own people that are stationed in the Republic of Korea.
So in a NEO [noncombatant evacuations operation] operation,
getting them off the peninsula I think would be in their best
interest.
Mr. Smith. What would they do to put pressure on North
Korea to not continue, to not do nuclear tests, to not to
continue them?
Are they just going to monitor it, or is there something
that, you know, where if North Korea did this, China would
leverage North Korea to try to get them at least somewhat under
control? Or is China just going to go, not our thing?
General LaCamera. No, they have--they are a treaty--they're
their only treaty ally.
Mr. Smith. Right.
General LaCamera. The borders are back open, so there is
goods that are coming back and forth across the border. I think
they can put pressure on DPRK in that respect.
Mr. Smith. Okay. And Admiral Aquilino, when you look at the
broader China threat in terms of our allies and partners, can
you sort of walk us through that world of those partners? I
believe we have five treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific region.
But then you also have a lot of other countries that are
navigating the world between the U.S. and China and Russia. And
that is the piece that I find most interesting about this, the
way this plays out.
If we are going to be successful in both containing the
threat from China and Russia and hopefully nudging them towards
a more cooperative rules-based approach to resolving
differences, we are going to need the Indias, the Indonesias,
Vietnam.
So what does that look like and what is your strategy for
trying to get as much help as possible out of all of the
countries in the region?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, thanks, Congressman. Certainly
foundational to our strategic deterrence approach and
integrated deterrence is the allies and partners, and it is an
asymmetric advantage.
Let me just say that the strategy and approach is
competition, not containment. And the five treaty allies of
Japan, Korea, Australia, Philippines, and Thailand are
foundational, right. Those are mutual defense treaties that
stand through Senate ratification and are truly important.
But our approach is to pull in as many additional allies
through a set of layers of mini- and multi-lateral engagements,
operations, and work we do together for a variety of reasons.
Number one, we are like-minded nations with common values.
We have deep people-to-people ties, and that is beyond just the
treaty allies. Indonesia, Malaysia, Bangladesh, all the nations
in the region, and we operate and exercise with them
frequently, 120 exercises a year. Deep engagements in the form
of key leader and other events.
So pulling that layer together, Congressman, is really
important. And it is the asymmetric advantage, because it is
the one thing China doesn't have, and that is partners.
Mr. Smith. Thank you very much, I yield back.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Colorado, Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this
hearing. Thank you all for being here.
Admiral Aquilino, one of my top priorities is accelerating
our work on offensive and defensive hypersonic capabilities.
China's significant investments in their hypersonics, which
they view as an important element of their regional warfighting
strategy, are extremely troubling.
Their progress is undeniable. In 2021, they did an around-
the-world fractional orbital bombardment demonstration. They
have intermediate-range hypersonic capability that can hit
targets thousands of miles away and possibly penetrate our
defenses.
And by contrast, our progress has been slow and has lacked
urgency. And I think we need if not quantitative parity, at
least qualitative parity.
Can you share the challenges you face in deterring China
based on their current superiority in hypersonics, and what is
your best military advice on the need for the U.S. to field
these hypersonic capabilities?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So again, in
alignment with the theme that I have starred here today, we
need to go faster, right. The concerning part about the PRC is
both the pace, the speed, and the advanced capabilities that
they continue to deliver and demonstrate. And to deliver a
credible deterrent, we certainly need the ability to counter
and/or exceed.
Currently, our military far exceeds anything China can
deliver. In this particular lane, we need to go faster.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. What can you tell us here in open
session about what you know about their plans for hypersonics
in this decade?
Admiral Aquilino. I think we would have to take that in a
classified hearing, Congressman.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, we will follow up on that. Also,
Admiral, the pace of China's strategic nuclear breakout has
been, as former STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] Commander
Admiral Richards said, breathtaking.
We have learned recently that they have three new
intercontinental ballistic missile fields. They have more
mobile and land-based launchers for ICBMs than the U.S. They
are working with Russia to produce plutonium now.
So how should we respond to China's nuclear--ongoing
nuclear breakout?
Admiral Aquilino. So, sir, the speed at which the Chinese
are delivering nuclear capability is certainly concerning. And
Admiral Richards, and now General Cotton and I have had
multiple conversations.
One thing we ought to be concerned about, the Chinese
narrative is that the United States is beginning a nuclear arms
races in the Indo-Pacific. And the only nation that is
delivering a nuclear arms race in the Indo-Pacific is China.
You just articulated the foundation and the speed and
capabilities they are delivering.
So for the United States, our best strategy is to ensure
that our force is modernized, and that we are able to hold a
superior nuclear deterrent, as required.
Mr. Lamborn. Thanks, Admiral. I will also point out, as you
would agree, that the U.S. and Russia have engaged and are
entering into, have entered into nuclear treaties, but not
China.
General LaCamera, can you describe the challenges you face
to maintain deterrence on the Korean peninsula, giving their--
given the North Korean regime's ongoing missile testing and
capabilities?
General LaCamera. Thanks, Congressman. Our focus is on
building readiness and focusing on all the warfighting
functions in all the domains. Making sure that we are bringing
in, you know, joint combined. So the focus is peace through
strength and focusing on combat readiness.
But also working with the interagency, because it is not
just a military solution.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. Now, Assistant Secretary
Royal, given the discussion we have just had about Chinese and
North Korean nuclear ambitions, I am amazed that the
Administration's fiscal year 2024 budget request once again
attempts to cancel out funding for the Nuclear Sea-Launched
Cruise Missile. I will call it SLCM-N.
And I expect and hope that Congress will once again
overrule that impulse and continue the funding and research on
this, and do--on this critical capability.
So, stepping back, how is the Biden administration going to
address the growing Chinese nuclear threat? I hope it is not by
canceling out other programs. How are we going to address these
growing threats, and North Korea as well?
Mr. Royal. The Nuclear Posture Review is quite clear-eyed
in its approach to these challenges. We understand them fully.
In the President's budget submission, we included $38 billion
to modernize the nuclear triad. And we continue to look hard at
our overall force posture, nuclear force posture and readiness.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair would like to recognize one of our former
colleagues, a long-term member of this committee, John Kline,
Colonel Kline. Good to be with--have you back with us.
Now we'll go to, recognize Mr. Courtney for 5 minutes.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the
witnesses for being here.
Just one quick point regarding the sea-launched missiles.
Last year's budget, we actually included $25 million to have a
fully thorough investigation by the Navy in terms of just the
costs as well as the benefits of that program.
So there is no--whatever sort of is out there, we did not
kill that program. But we really need to understand with our
eyes wide open what the operational impact will be for our
ships and submarines if we start installing nuclear warheads
on, you know, attack subs or other ships.
Admiral Aquilino, in your testimony, you inventoried all
the new cooperation that is going on with allies in the Indo-
Pacific region over the last year. And I am very impressed,
even within the last few months it is really quite striking in
terms of how quickly things are moving out there.
Last month, at Naval Base Point Loma, President Biden,
Australia Prime Minister Albanese, and U.K. [United Kingdom]
Prime Minister Sunak released the, what they called the optimal
pathway to implement AUKUS, which will include transferring to
Australia conventional armed nuclear-powered submarines.
Congress has work to do in terms of enabling that execution
of the agreement in terms of just dealing with export controls
and other issues there. But from your standpoint, can you state
what the strategic benefit of this arrangement is in terms of
sharing these precious assets?
I mean, we are recapitalizing our own submarine fleet at
the same time. But again, can you just sort of talk about what
you see as the value of that arrangement?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman. Well, we articulated
the concern for the strategic environment, right, as the PRC
takes more aggressive actions. I think all of our partners are
seeing that same activity, and it has got them concerned.
So our work with both Australia and the United Kingdom as
it applies to sharing some of our most sensitive technology in
the form of nuclear propulsion and nuclear-powered submarines
is a really large step.
So as it applies to deterrence effect, additional nations
with the capabilities that we have being completely
interoperable at any point over the globe brings a strong
deterrent value to the problem.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. And I think as you know, I mean,
the last time we did this was with--and we have only done it
once, was with one country, and that was in 1958. So I mean,
obviously this is a huge step.
And again, can you just talk about Australia's, you know,
position regarding stewardship of these submarines, which is
going to require obviously some training up to, you know, for
their navy. But also just again their commitment to, again,
complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. But and
also having their own sovereign control over that fleet.
Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, so as we know, Australia is
one of our strongest partners and allies. They have shared
blood and treasure with us for over 100 years in every conflict
that we have ever been in. Again, when you talk about people-
to-people ties, they are deep. Our values, our interests.
So, having the Australians as a part of this program, I
have no worries at all about, you know, losing that technology
elsewhere. They will treat it at the highest level. We also
treat other technologies with the Australians as it applies to
space and cyber in the same kind of vein.
So I have no concerns about Australia taking this on and
being able to be successful. And from my position, we are
taking actions every day to ensure that we can deliver it as
soon as possible.
Mr. Courtney. Well, thank you. And again, your comments
about moving faster, you know, I think also applies to Congress
in terms of really getting these authorities aligned so this
thing can really move in the--at the speed it requires.
Mr. Royal, you also mentioned the AUKUS agreement in your
testimony. And you know, one other part of the President's
budget that came over was new funding, additional funding, $640
million, for submarine industrial base capacity. Last year we
actually put $750 million. That is again, workforce, supply
chain, and facility.
Again, can you talk about really how this is a critical
piece of making sure that both our Navy and also that the AUKUS
agreement can be, you know, have the capacity it needs?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, your point is spot on with respect
to resilience of the submarine industrial base. We believe that
the budget submission there represents a sense of urgency with
respect to maintaining the readiness of that force.
I am also proud that Australia has now committed to invest
in the defense industrial base for submarines as well, to the
tune of $3 billion, and we are very confident that they will
deliver on that.
This represents a historic opportunity for us to be able to
put increasing assets in the undersea domain and strengthen the
interoperability with our closest allies. Thank you.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to thank
our witnesses for joining us today.
Admiral Aquilino, I want to begin with you. First of all,
thanks so much for your leadership there in the Indo-Pacific
Command. That is an incredibly challenging time. We want to
make sure we continue the effort to deter the Chinese Communist
Party and make sure we can continue to maintain a free and open
Indo-Pacific.
We also want to make sure too that the CCP and, for that
matter Beijing, don't test our determination to make sure the
Indo-Pacific stays as a free and open place in the world.
I always think back to your predecessor's testimony here in
2021, when Admiral Davidson said that he believed that China
would make their move to reunify with Taiwan forcefully by
2027.
So I want to revisit that a little bit, and I want to ask,
in your best professional military judgment, do you anticipate
that Beijing will attempt to by force seek reunification with
Taiwan before 2027?
Admiral Aquilino. So Congressman, after having worked for
Admiral Davidson, I know he came up with 2027. It was based on
what Xi Jinping said, which was the challenge to his military
to be prepared to execute a task by 2027. That was
foundationally the approach of his comments.
Now, for me, it doesn't matter what the timeline is. The
Secretary could've given me this mission today. So I'm
responsible to prevent this conflict today, and if deterrence
were to fail, to be able to fight and win.
So the timeline, everybody will have an opinion on when it
is. I think everybody is guessing. The intent and need for
the--for INDOPACOM, the Department, industry, and everybody to
go faster will help prevent this conflict.
Mr. Wittman. Let me ask this, then. In your best
professional military judgment, based on the buildup of the
Chinese Communist Party and all their military assets and where
we are today with what we bring to the table across the joint
force, do you believe that the threat today is greater than it
has been in the past?
Admiral Aquilino. I believe that the trends for the threat
are in the wrong direction.
Mr. Wittman. Okay.
Admiral Aquilino. There is no doubt about that. But I will
tell you, Congressman, that the United States military is ready
today for any contingency.
Mr. Wittman. As you see the future of where China is going
and where the United States is going, when do you think the
balance of forces will be such that it could, it could motivate
China to say here is our opportunity?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, I am not sure that it is a balance
of forces issue. I think there is a ton of variables on what
might motivate President Xi Jinping to take that action,
Congressman. And it is our job to convince him every day that
it would be a bad choice.
Mr. Wittman. What is the most effective thing that we as
the United States can do across the spectrum, strategically,
economically, you name it, that has the greatest chance of
deterring the Chinese Communist Party from forcefully
reunifying Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. As I stated, I think the PRC has taken on
a whole-of-government approach to achieve their objectives.
Again, diplomatic, military, informational, economic. And I
think it is worth--now for me, I own the military piece in
support of the Secretary.
I think our approach and what we have laid out delivers a
deterrent effect. The entire whole-of-government approaching it
the same way would be good.
And some of those things have occurred. The CHIPS [Creating
Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors and Science] Act,
supported by the Congress, was extremely effective. The ability
to protect technologies that are sensitive and important to the
United States is important.
So we just need to compete across the entire spectrum,
understanding that our security challenger will.
Mr. Wittman. Got you. Based on your best professional
military judgment, do you believe that with everything that we
are doing, that we will be able to effectively deter China, not
only now, but also in the future?
Admiral Aquilino. I do. China is a near-, mid-, and long-
term challenge for us. So we need to deter today, tomorrow, and
the next day. And I do believe we are doing that, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentleman, thank you very much for your testimony, for your
work, and for your commitment.
Two lines of questioning. We have discussed the allies in
the Pacific in some detail, and thank you very much for making
that clear and the importance of it. But we have not yet
discussed another set of potential allies in the area, and
these are the Freely Associated States--Palau, Marshall
Islands, and Micronesia.
Mr. Royal, could you please talk to this issue, what we
need to do in that regard? And then Admiral Aquilino, if you
could follow up.
Mr. Royal. Congressman, thank you. We enjoy a substantial
relationship with the Freely Associated States. I think that we
have been extended some very favorable military terms. We have
just completed some memoranda of agreement with these states
for future access basing with the U.S. military.
This is an extraordinary relationship that we share with
them. And in fact, I would just point out, their participation
per capita in the U.S. military is higher than anywhere--any
other part of the United States. And so we are very grateful
for their service involved here.
We have the funding package that we have put forward onto
the--to Capitol Hill here to make sure that we can continue
this arrangement going forward, and would ask for Congress'
support with that funding package.
Mr. Garamendi. And that is also Palau, Marshall Islands,
Micronesia?
Mr. Royal. Yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Very good. Admiral.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. So I just got back from Yap and
Pohnpei. As was stated, the amount of people who have served in
the United States military, I met with about 25 people. I think
15 of them of them had service. Really impressive.
That said, we defend the Freely Associated States as if
they are the U.S. homeland. So that history goes back. They
were critical to our success in World War II. They are
critical, and they are strategically located. So it is really
important we get this agreement done.
Mr. Garamendi. Very good, thank you. I would like now to
turn to the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, $11--$11\1/2\
billion authorized in 2023.
Admiral, if you could bring us up to date on the usefulness
of that. What else you might need, or how you are deploying
that $11\1/2\ billion.
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, sir. So as you know, this body
has passed a law that requires me to submit an independent
assessment identifying the capabilities and the needs from
INDOPACOM to support both the deterrence and defend-the-nation
mission.
And as a part of this year's 1254, we identified the
requirements as needed. That language articulates that
INDOPACOM should provide that input to inform a PDI [Pacific
Deterrence Initiative]. And as PDI is calculated inside of the
Department, my needs were identified and recognized.
Mr. Garamendi. In the upcoming NDAA, do you have
recommendations for enhancement, modification, changes in the
language or authorities?
Admiral Aquilino. I don't, sir. I think the articulation as
it applies I think meets both the intent of this body, and I am
glad to provide my requirements.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Scott, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here. Ranking Member Smith
started talking about China and partnerships and how they
conduct themselves. And you know, it is pretty clear to those
of us on this committee and paying attention that China,
Communist China, operates in the best interest of Communist
China without regard for who they hurt or any of the rules.
And I have every faith in the world that if a situation
kicked off with Taiwan, that between the United States and our
partners, we could win that.
I am concerned, as the PRC has this whole-of-government,
whole-of-world approach, though, that they are embedding
themselves into the U.S. economy in such a way that even if we
win the war, it would destroy our economy inside the United
States.
And Admiral Aquilino, are you aware that less than 15 days
after Communist China flew the spy balloon over the United
States, that Ford Motor Company announced a multibillion dollar
deal with Communist China to purchase their battery technology?
Admiral Aquilino. I did read something about that,
Congressman.
Mr. Scott. I think we have to be very careful when we use
the heavy hand of government. But I will tell you, if corporate
America is going to, less than 15 days after Communist China
does that to the United States, announce a multibillion dollar
partnership with Communist China, I do think that the DOD
[Department of Defense] needs to reach out to corporate America
and say you know what, if you buy that technology from China,
the DOD is not going to buy that technology from you.
And I just think this is one of those few instances where
we are going to have to use that heavy hand to press back on
corporate America and how deep they continue to embed
themselves with Communist China and the financial ties there.
Every faith in the world in our ability to beat China in a
war. I am not sure how we do it if our--if corporate America
continues to get in bed with them like that.
But I want to, with that said, Mr. Royal, I'm concerned--
Admiral Aquilino said that the trend was moving in the wrong
direction. I am concerned it is moving in the wrong direction.
I was a little taken aback at the President of France
going, with everything going on between Russia and China right
now in their alliance in Ukraine, I was a little taken aback
that the President of France went and sat down with Xi Jinping.
Is he trying to protect France's investments in Africa? What is
going on there?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, we were in touch with the French
counterparts during the course of that visit and we have been
in touch with our European allies very closely about the
challenges that we see the PRC representing in the Indo-Pacific
region.
We are very much impressed with the nature and the trend of
the NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] strategic concept
and the way that it describes the PRC challenge to Europe. We
have also seen progress in the EU's [European Union's] new
white paper and the way that they talk about China as well.
So we believe that the conversation with Europe is
advancing with respect to the nature of this challenge. And we
also appreciate the fact that the French are sending surface
combatants into the region and sailing where international law
allows in the Indo-Pacific region.
Mr. Scott. But he did take, I mean, Europe is one thing.
France is a part of Europe. But what Macron did, it seemed to
be selfish and individualistic and not in the best interests of
what is happening in the world at this stage. Are you defending
him?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I am not defending President Macron
or any other European leader. I am telling you that our
relationship with Europe is strong. We continue to advance the
dialog and the discourse about the nature of the PRC threat.
And we are seeing positive trend lines there in our engagement
throughout Europe.
Mr. Scott. Okay. Well, I just, I want to--I want you to
know I have every faith in the world in our ability to handle
China militarily.
I'm very concerned about what I saw, I think Ford Motor
Company is the best example, where less than 15 days after the
Chinese flew a spy balloon across the United States targeting
U.S. military installations, Ford Motor Company--and for the
record, I drive an F-350, I am a Ford guy--partners with
Communist China on their battery technology.
And I think that we have to bust those alliances between
corporate America and Communist China. With that, I yield.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gallego, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Royal, in your written testimony you highlighted the
increasingly provocative conventional military activity that
the PLA is conducting. I am also concerned about the threat in
the gray zone and believe that irregular warfare training in
the region and especially in Taiwan is crucial.
Do you believe the Department has the authorities it needs
for special operations forces to collaborate with allies and
partners in irregular warfare? And where can we further deepen
or expand irregular warfare programs with allied and partner
forces in the Indo-Pacific?
Mr. Royal. Thank you, Congressman. Our special operations
forces amount to a real strategic advantage for the United
States. They complement and enable the strategy that we have
articulated through the National Defense Strategy, and our
budget reflects the importance and the value that they bring to
the Indo-Pacific region.
It is important right now for us to focus on how we
modernize our special operations forces, making sure that they
are well-connected to the other components in the Department.
And that they focus on that enabling capability going forward.
But we believe that that is well-captured within the budget
submission.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Royal. As a follow-up, I also
want to ask you about Chinese disinformation efforts in the
region.
Have you seen a change in the approach to how the CCP
conducts disinformation campaigns since the start of Russia's
second invasion of Ukraine? And what lessons do you believe
China is drawing from Russia's example in the disinformation
space?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I think some of that discussion is
best left to a classified session. I will say that the PRC has
demonstrated a significant appetite in its coercion campaign,
and that is certainly inclusive of a misinformation/
disinformation effort associated with that.
If we look at the high-altitude balloon, to me that is a
very good example of the kind of intrusion that you are
looking--that the PRC is undertaking in a variety of domains
right now.
Mr. Gallego. Okay. Admiral Aquilino, thank you for your
testimony. I want to ask you about the no-limits strategic
partnership between Russia and China that you referenced in
your written statement.
Can you talk about what this enhanced relationship means in
practice for military forces in the region, and is there a
tangible effect on the security situation in the Indo-Pacific
that we have noticed or we will be noticing?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. This kind of ties to
a couple of your questions here to Jed, because this is a
different space, right.
Two large authoritarian nations coming together in an
attempt to change the world order in ways that are beneficial
to authoritarian governments vice the rest of the world. That
is a pretty concerning space to be in.
Whether it is impact into the U.N. [United Nations] or
ability to stifle any, you know, agreements that go forward,
that is the approach. They have no friends. They have
identified that it is better if they are together in order to
achieve their strategic objectives. That is a concerning world.
It ties directly to the misinformation/disinformation
question. The PRC has been echoing Chinese, or excuse me,
Russian disinformation in direct support, articulating that the
war was--their war against Ukraine was derived from an
expansion of NATO. Just not true.
So, misinformation, disinformation in today's day and age
is concerning, weaving through that mess, and the PRC have a
million-man propaganda arm to generate it.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. The chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais, for 5 minutes.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Royal, on three separate occasions we have seen
President Biden commit the United States to the defense of
Taiwan in a potential conflict with China, only to see his
comments walked back by those in his administration.
So I would ask who is driving policy in this administration
on China and Taiwan? Is it the President of the United States,
or unelected bureaucrats and appointees within the State
Department, Pentagon, and White House?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, the Department stands by the Taiwan
Relations Act, the Three Joint Communiques, and the Six
Assurances as the foundation of our relationship with Taiwan.
We continue to believe that our relationship there is aided
well by the relationship we have.
We have maintained it on a variety of levels with key
leader engagements and tight, cohesive understanding of one
another's defense requirements. And we spend a lot of time
talking about the PRC pacing challenge as we are observing it
operate in the region.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay, well, we like to talk about strategic
ambiguity. Do you think President Xi has been ambiguous at all
in his intentions on Taiwan?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, we agree with you that President Xi
has been very assertive in his approach to conducting a
coercion campaign against Taiwan. We believe that he does
intend to build a capable force that could stand to threaten
Taiwan over time.
Dr. DesJarlais. And would you agree that our Commander in
Chief has been pretty clear in his position on the United
States commitments to the defense of Taiwan?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I believe that the President has
been clear with his intentions. I certainly wouldn't want to
speak for him.
I will say again that the Taiwan Relations Act continues to
guide our engagement with Taiwan, including supporting their
self-defense and making sure that we are in a position, as the
United States military, to counter any coercive activity in the
region.
Dr. DesJarlais. What I struggle with on this committee when
I go back home and talk to constituents, and I have heard other
members say the same thing, is how do we message things like
China/Taiwan, how do we message Russia and Ukraine. And it
seems when we don't really know what the endgame is, it is hard
to do that.
We have asked specifically what is the endgame in Ukraine,
and there's not a clear answer. Is there a clear answer for
what the endgame would be if China invades Taiwan?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I won't engage in hypotheticals on
future invasions. I will say that invasion is neither imminent
nor inevitable. And the work that we are doing in the
Department every single day is to focus on deterrence. And we
do that by increasing our lethality, our posture, and our
readiness.
We will continue to operate by the Taiwan Relations Act.
And we will continue to work on counter-coercion readiness
within the U.S. military to do that, and to ensure that we are
supporting Taiwan in their ability to defend themselves.
Dr. DesJarlais. But we seem to be struggling within the
military on recruiting and other issues and morale. And I think
maybe a lot of it is due to strategic ambiguity and nobody
really knows what's going on within our military.
We seem unclear about what our strategy in Ukraine is. We
are getting mixed message from our Commander in Chief and our
State Department and Pentagon on China/Taiwan.
In the past, I remember Presidents going on TV and
addressing the Nation. We can only reach so many people from
within this committee or Congress, and you guys have the same
challenges.
I mean, would it be important for the President to go on TV
and maybe address the Nation on what is happening in Ukraine,
what our strategy is there, and what our strategy would be? And
let President Xi know clearly where the United States stands,
and maybe some of our allies would come along.
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I will defer to the White House on
the President's on-air time. Again, I think that the President
is asking us to do the daily job of deterrence. And that he has
submitted a budget that represents a real qualitative
investment in our ability to maintain deterrence in the region.
Dr. DesJarlais. The saber-rattling about blockades in the
Taiwan Strait and certainly China's aggression in the South
China Sea, we know that, you know, half the world trade goes
through that area.
It seems like, as Representative Scott mentioned a minute
ago, what corporations are doing financially with China may be
the best way to get their attention. And certainly they can
have a blockade of things coming it.
Is it possible we could have a blockade of things going
out? I know it would impact all of us financially, but if--the
best way to win this pending war is to not fight it.
So I guess I would just like to see more unification of our
allies, more talk from Japan, Australia, and people who are
committed. And maybe a better strategy economically to help
deter China. But deterrence did not work with Russia, and I
hope we can do better moving forward with China/Taiwan.
And I thank you for you all being here today.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. Chair now
recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Khanna, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Admiral Aquilino, thank
you for your leadership. You have spoken about the importance
of the strategic relationship with India.
I co-chair with Michael Waltz the U.S.-India Caucus. And on
April 26, we have a major summit with Secretary Mattis, the
ambassadors, others. I hope if you are in the country you may
be able to participate or send someone. But I would like you to
reflect on the importance of the relationship post-colonialism.
India and China had a relationship to emerge as the Asian
voice. But that relationship now has really soured with a
concern that there should not be a hegemon in Asia and that
China is treating other countries as junior partners. It seems
to me that gives us an opportunity to ensure that China doesn't
emerge as an hegemon, to strengthen the relationship with
India. And I would like to get your thoughts.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So we value our
partnership with India, and we have been increasing it and
doing a lot more over time. They have the same primary security
challenger that we do, and it is real on their northern border.
Two skirmishes now over the past 9 or 10 months on that
border as they continue to get pressurized by the PRC for
border gains. So we have the same security challengers. We also
have the desire to operate together based on they're the
world's largest democracy.
We have common values and we also have people-to-people
ties for a number of years. I met with General Chauhan, my
counterpart at the Raisina Dialogue not long ago. I have been
to India five times now in the past 2 years.
So the importance of that relationship can't be overstated.
We operate together frequently with the Quad nations. Again,
the Quad is not a security agreement.
It is diplomatic and economic. But the Quad nations come
together often to operate together in multiple exercises. So we
continue to work to be interoperable and to expand the
relationship.
Mr. Khanna. And I appreciate that. And we will follow up
with your office if you are in the country or have someone for
the April 26 summit. One question, I was out with
Representative Mike Gallagher who chairs the China Select
Committee, and we were out at Stanford.
And I was struck by Oriana Skylar Mastro who is a professor
there. And she wrote in the paper, The Taiwan Temptation, and a
concern that are we deployed enough, do we have the capability
if there was a blockade or an invasion of Taiwan. And in this
article, she makes the argument that we don't, that we don't
have enough long-range missiles to actually shoot down Chinese
ships and that this makes our deterrence weak. I mean, I am not
summarizing in all detail, but that was the gist of it. Do you
have a sense, or anyone on the panel, if that is accurate, do
we need more capability to make sure we have effective
deterrence?
Admiral Aquilino. So today, Congressman, let me just
articulate that the INDOPACOM command is ready and prepared for
any contingency. That said, as we talked about before, the
challenger is moving fast, experimenting and delivering
additional capabilities. And I think that the Department's
budget as it applies and again I have given my 1254 report to
articulate the capabilities that I think I need. So the
delivery of those and again at speed and as fast as possible I
believe would continue that deterrence both today and into the
future.
Mr. Royal. Mr. Congressman, I would add that we are deeply
interested in seeing increasing responsiveness from the U.S.
defense industrial base. This budget puts a lot of money into
making sure that our defense industrial base is even more
competitive, including $30 billion towards munitions, Tomahawk,
LRASM [Long Range Anti-Ship Missile], SM-6, and others and $11
billion towards hyper- and subsonic weapon systems as well. So
we are building, including through the multiyear procurement
authority that Congress has now provided to the Department, a
deeper stock of munitions within the defense industrial base to
meet the challenge you described.
Mr. Khanna. Thank you. I would just say that from my
perspective, the more we can do to have effective deterrence
that China understands, the better in terms of avoiding war.
And so I would be interested in hearing how we can have the
most effective deterrence possible. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Gallagher, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, the fiscal
year 2023 NDAA directs DOD to conduct war games, tabletop
exercises, and most importantly, operational exercises with
Taiwan's armed forces. I sort of view this as the least
expensive way to build operational expertise and create a force
capable of deterring an adversary. When can we expect to see
the first exercises between the U.S. Navy and Air Force and
their Taiwanese counterparts?
Admiral Aquilino. So Congressman, thanks. I would like to
talk to you in a classified hearing about the schedule for our
operations. I think that would be most beneficial.
Mr. Gallagher. I guess in an unclassified setting, when you
wargame these scenarios, put aside the operational exercises,
are you assuming some level of interoperability with Taiwanese
forces?
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, both. As you know how war
games work, right, you can pick the time. We can wargame what
does today look like, what does 2 years from now, what does 4
years from now look like. So we look at all those in order to
ensure that we've got a broad view and we leave no holes in our
understanding and analysis.
Mr. Gallagher. While we are on the subject of wargaming,
tomorrow night, the Subcommittee on the Chinese Communist Party
is going to be conducting a war game. And I think for a lot of
our members, it will be an opportunity to participate in a war
game that haven't done that before. It is going to be Taiwan
focused, Indo-Pacific focused.
Usually when we run these war games, one thing quickly
becomes apparent. We go Winchester on critical weapon systems.
We run out of long-range fires in particular.
I would be curious to get your view on that. What worries
you about the stockpiles of long-range fires that we have west
of the International Date Line? And what do you think is our
best way to start replenishing our stockpiles to make sure that
you have what you need in theater prior to the shooting
starting?
Admiral Aquilino. So thanks, Congressman. First, let me
just make sure--I want to make sure how you know I look at war
games, right? Wargaming is a learning objective. So when people
talk about, hey, who one, who lost, wargaming is not about
that. It is about learning and understanding vulnerabilities,
strengths, and helps you go forward and figure out how to
adjust and what you might need.
So when you go into this event, I hope looking at it in the
same way. With regard to the munitions piece, again, I would
like to talk in a classified setting over the specific issues.
That said, I am not too worried as it applies to our ability to
deter and then deliver effective contingency operations if
required.
Mr. Gallagher. You are not too worried?
Admiral Aquilino. I am not worried. What I would like is
the acceleration of those things identified in the budget. And
in my 1254 report, I have made those requirements be known.
Mr. Gallagher. Interesting. So even in a scenario that goes
kinetic, you are not worried about the sufficiency of our
stockpiles and our magazine capacity right now?
Admiral Aquilino. I am not worried about the United States
ability to respond. Again, we can talk about specific munitions
in a classified setting.
Mr. Gallagher. Okay. I mean, that surprises me. I guess it
goes counter to what little I know from playing a few war games
here or there. But I am not living it in the Indo-Pacific every
day like you are.
Quickly, General, I believe this year at the end of July we
will celebrate the 73rd anniversary of the Korean armistice
agreement. This is referred to as America's forgotten war. The
irony is that in China they have not forgotten it.
In fact, they celebrate it. The highest grossing Chinese
movie of all time is ``The Battle [at] Lake Changjin,'' which
is sort of a creative retelling of the Battle of Chosen
Reservoir. I have sort of an oddball historically focused
question, but what lessons do you believe that this forgotten
war offers for contemporary national security strategists and
planners?
General LaCamera. Thanks, Congressman. Be ready. I mean,
that is ``This Kind of War''; we weren't prepared. So what this
says for us is my main effort of being prepared, combat
readiness, and evolving as the enemy evolves and looking at it
through not just a land fight but making sure that we can fight
in all the domains and we have the capabilities to be able to
do that. So it would be the 73rd anniversary of the beginning
of the war and the 70th anniversary of the armistice which we
are going to celebrate throughout--we have been celebrating
throughout the year. But it will culminate in the fall time
with the Koreans.
Mr. Gallagher. [Inaudible] that you mentioned ``This Kind
of War.'' Can I assume that is on your reading list such as it
exists?
[Simultaneous speaking.]
General LaCamera. When I was a captain, I read it, yes.
Mr. Gallagher. Fantastic. All right. I yield.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
California, Mr. Carbajal, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to all
the witnesses for being here today. INDOPACOM hosts a broad
range of challenges, most notably the People's Republic of
China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, but also
the increasing effects of climate change and building on
relationships with several allies and partnerships.
The PRC is steadily building up their space and anti-space
capabilities. In 2022, they executed 64 launches alone.
Admiral Aquilino, can you speak to the importance of
maintaining space superiority in the INDOPACOM AOR [area of
responsibility], especially as the PRC, our pacing threat, is
making advancements in this domain? And can you speak to how
maintaining fiscal year 2022 funding levels would impact our
superiority?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So as it applies to
deterring and then should deterrence fail being able to fight
and win in space is critical as we integrate all domains, under
sea, on the sea, above the sea, in space and cyberspace. The
synchronization of those effects happens every day in
INDOPACOM. And the space layer is an enabler for the
terrestrial force.
We absolutely need to maintain our superior advantage and
continue to invest as we expand in space. If we were to reduce
the investment, I have already identified in my 1254 report
some shortfalls that we believe are beneficial. But if we were
to fall back, that would also be impactful.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Admiral, the second item on your
unfunded priority list from this year is to operationalize
near-term space control. Can you expand on what factors
contributed to this ending up on your UPL?
Admiral Aquilino. I would rather do that in a classified
setting, sir.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. Admiral Aquilino, it seems that a
majority of space programs in development in the INDOPACOM AOR
are protected at the highest levels of classification. I think
we all share the goal of wanting to prevent any escalation in
the region and believe strategic deterrence is key. Strategic
deterrence is only possible if the deterrent is known to our
adversaries at some level. Is INDOPACOM thinking through what
space programs we should declassify as a strategic deterrent to
the PRC ambitions in the space domain?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, sir. We do that all the time.
Certainly, there is the ability for the security challenger to
understand what we do. In space, there are capabilities that
can do that for him.
We treat all of our capabilities. We look at them in a way
such that we protect what we need to protect. And for those
that we don't believe we need to protect, we allow those to be
seen. We do that with thoughtfulness to ensure we get it right.
But we have to protect those things that are critical for the
United States defense.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. We know that the INDOPACOM area
responsibility is on the front lines of climate change,
experiencing increasingly frequent disruptive storms and sea
level rise that is already encroaching on military
installations and training ranges. While these weather events
lead to demand for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief,
they also directly impact defense infrastructure in the region.
The Army commissioned a study in 2018 that show that many
Pacific islands, including Kwajalein Atoll, home of Ronald
Reagan's ballistic missile defense test site, are at risk of
experiencing significant climate impacts by mid-century.
Secretary Royal, how is the Department planning for and seeking
to mitigate these risks as we look at force posture in the
region?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, thank you for that question. The
climate change does fold into the National Defense Strategy. It
is a growing challenge that we understand. It is certainly one
that we spend a lot of time talking to our partners in the
Indo-Pacific, particularly Pacific island nations, where we see
the effects of climate change occurring rapidly.
Part of our strategy here is to not only recognize it but
to make sure that we are thinking about areas to mitigate the
impacts of climate change, including greater energy resilience,
better infrastructure that protects against the erosion of
rising sea waters, et cetera. So I believe that we have
captured that well. And we certainly are funding against that
in the President's budget submission.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gaetz, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Gaetz. Days ago in The Washington Post, ``in
Washington, military planners are realizing that China has
surpassed the United States in hypersonic military
technology.'' Does anyone seated at the table disagree with
that assessment?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I think in terms of assessments, we
should probably take that to a classified discussion.
Mr. Gaetz. Well, it has been sort of unclassified without
our consent. We had this leak that showed that China could
launch one of these hypersonic glide capabilities 2,100
kilometers, that it could get there in 12 minutes. And I
actually don't think it is that--can't be too classified
because it was a year ago, Admiral, that you were before the
Senate Armed Services Committee.
And you seemed to be giving the warning at that time that
we saw manifest in this leak. You said, quote, ``The Hypersonic
Glide Vehicle threat poses a serious threat to the U.S. and
allied forces in the region and we require a near-term initial
defense capability to meet this challenge.'' I read in between
the lines of that to say you require the capability in the near
term because you didn't have the capability when you gave this
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, not in a
classified setting but in open hearing. So I guess my question
to you, because I sense you are the truth-teller on a lot of
these things, have you acquired the capability since this
testimony?
Admiral Aquilino. The Department is working on the ability
to do hypersonic defense, Congressman. Again, I stand by what I
said. I am concerned about it and we----
Mr. Gaetz. And it is still true today. That statement that
you made to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2021, you
wouldn't revise that or change that? That is true as we sit
here today?
Admiral Aquilino. It is.
Mr. Gaetz. And so what I observe about our posture in
INDOPACOM is that for the last 30 years the United States has
been building aircraft carriers that will never get into the
fight. And we have spent years building littoral combat ships,
Mr. Smith, that will never get into the fight. And while you
have been giving us the accurate information, you gave it to us
now, you gave it to the Senate a year ago, the truth is we have
not made a sufficient investment in hypersonic defense in order
to ensure that we have this credible deterrent threat. Isn't
that right, Admiral?
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, if you look at the report as it
applies to our Guam defense system, we have identified the need
for that capability.
Mr. Gaetz. Right. And so I guess how do our littoral combat
ships ever get into the fight in a China/Taiwan scenario?
Admiral Aquilino. Well, again, I think that would be better
in a classified setting.
Mr. Gaetz. I think it is not going to happen. I think
whether it is classified or not classified, can we hit a moving
target with our hypersonic offense?
Admiral Aquilino. Again, sir, I think we ought to take
those capabilities discussion----
Mr. Gaetz. Well, okay. So if I----
Admiral Aquilino [continuing]. To a closed----
Mr. Gaetz [continuing]. Represent to you that China can hit
a moving target and we can't hit a moving target, do you have
any basis in this setting that you can share with me to rebut
that assertion?
Admiral Aquilino. I disagree that we can't hit a moving
target.
Mr. Gaetz. Oh, you think with our hypersonic capability?
Admiral Aquilino. I didn't say with a hypersonic
capability.
Mr. Gaetz. Okay. But that is what I am talking about
because of course we can hit moving targets. But with a
hypersonic capability, it changes the deterrence analysis
because the time window shortens considerably, as this leak of
classified information tells us kind of as you told us a year
ago. And so I know that there will be great bloodlust to go
after the leaker of this information.
It is never okay to leak classified information, especially
when it could potentially put people at risk. What I wonder is,
who is going to be punished more, the knucklehead who leaked
this information or the generals and admirals and so-called
experts who have sat before this committee and the Senate for
decades saying that these capabilities that we were funding
with gajillions of dollars were going to sufficiently deter
China? And what you said last year, what you have confirmed
now, is that we need a capability in the near term that we do
not have.
What this leak shows is that China has it and we don't. And
yet we continue to build ships that will never get in the
fight. We continue to support these endeavors that don't
enhance deterrence. But if the right Senator or Congressman or
lobbyist is for them, we do them. And I think that is--while it
is never okay to leak classified information, I think that is
what animates the concern among some of our even youngest and
most inexperienced service members that we are not really
positioning to win this fight.
And we have got too many grifters who roll in and out of
the Pentagon, to defense contractors. And some of them even
become Secretary of Defense thereafter. And I think it is
disgraceful and is not worthy of a true Pacific power like the
United States.
Mr. Smith. Thank you. I am not sure why the gentleman kept
looking at me throughout that whole thing. I actually had the
amendment on the floor last year to defund the littoral combat
ship. I am not sure how the gentleman voted on that amendment.
Mr. Gaetz. I voted wrong.
Mr. Smith. Okay. Well, that is good to know. Interesting. I
will say, and I know we can't talk about it in detail, there
are massive investments in the President's budget in hypersonic
missiles. There is no question that we were behind.
And by the way, we were behind under the last
administration as well. And in the last couple years, we have
made massive investments into hypersonics. We don't want to get
into details what works or not, but we recognize the threat.
And I would urge this time the gentleman to join me when we
try to move money away from those platforms that aren't going
to be as useful and into those platforms that are useful. I
just wanted to be clear. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. Chair would advise members not to display
classified information whether it has been leaked or not in
open hearings. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New
Jersey, Ms. Sherrill, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Mr. Royal,
Admiral Aquilino, did you want to say anything about our
classified information, how important it is that we protect
that in our military despite any arguments about where we need
to move in this committee?
Mr. Royal. Congresswoman, I will offer that this appears to
be a disgraceful criminal act that has occurred and it is very
serious. The Department is taking it with the highest degree of
seriousness. We, every single day, have the responsibility to
protect information and make sure that our classified
information remains ours.
We are supporting the Department of Justice. We have been
very clear in offering every bit of support that we possibly
can to help them in their investigation. We are conducting
outreach with allies and partners to make sure that they are
also understanding what the position of the Department is in
this process.
I do want to be clear on this point. This will not knock us
off of our strategy, off of our campaigning approach with
integrated deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region. It is an
exceptionally unfortunate situation that does come with
national security consequence, but it will not knock us off of
our approach.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. I think the gentleman from Florida
raised some very good points. But I just wanted to highlight
that people put themselves, their lives, their family's lives
in danger to bring us this information.
And it is really important to me that we understand how
dangerous it is to people working very hard for the United
States of America around the world when these things are
leaked. Thank you very much. I would also like to thank you for
your service and commitment to keeping our Nation and our
troops safe, especially as our country and the world grapples
with a variety of complex and nontraditional threats, including
the increasing aggressiveness and nuclear posturing of North
Korea, aggressive and coercive transgressions from China in the
region, cybersecurity threats and disinformation campaigns,
climate change, and increases in natural disasters as well as
supply chain shortages.
So INDOPACOM, the region is not an easy one. But thank you
for your service. So Secretary Royal and Admiral Aquilino, we
are currently conducting our largest ever joint exercise with
the Philippines. With the new leadership in the Philippines,
how does our renewed relationship impact our freedom of
navigation operations for sea lanes in the South China Sea?
Mr. Royal. Congresswoman, we are enjoying strategic
convergence with the government of the Philippines and
operating in a manner that is stronger than ever. Training
exercises, information sharing, and our ability to respond
quickly to any kind of contingency that may arise right now. I
was really proud when we were able to secure access to four new
strategic locations through the EDCA [Enhanced Defense
Cooperation Arrangement] sites with the government of the
Philippines.
These will offer the opportunity for opening the aperture
of our ability to respond with the Philippines in a timely
fashion and responsive fashion to any contingency, particularly
humanitarian affairs and disaster relief have already been
identified there. We believe this relationship has a lot of
wind in its sails. It is definitely moving forward in the right
direction, and we are seeing the outcomes of that every single
day.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. So again, the
mutual defense treaty with the Philippines is critical. They
are a great partner.
General Santino is my counterpart and a good friend.
Minister Galvez who just recently took over is a wonderful
partner. And they are facing some challenges, right?
The PRC has claims that are inside the Philippine exclusive
economic zone. Those claims went through an international
tribunal. They were articulated as they were not legal in the
international world order as defined.
Yet the PRC continues to pressurize our Philippine
counterparts. So it is really important that we continue to
maintain support. We operate with them. As you said, Balikatan
is going on right now. We do combined patrols and we support
our Philippine partners everywhere.
Ms. Sherrill. And I think traditionally, we have struggled
a bit to get support from our allies in the region on our
freedom of navigation [FON] exercises. Can you talk a little
bit about the support we are receiving from our allies to date?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks. Let me start by articulating. So
the freedom of navigation events that we execute are designed
to demonstrate what the interpreted international law and order
looks like. We don't FON countries. We challenge excessive
claims, and it is supported by our partners in the nation--in
the region.
Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, and I yield back.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Nebraska, General Bacon, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank all three of
you for being here today. These are very important discussions,
and your perspectives are vitally important.
We have been talking for about 8 years a pivot to Asia. We
have talked about China being the pacing threat, near-peer
competitor threat. But I don't know--I have seen the talk. I
have seen the strategy documents.
I don't know that we have actually seen as much physical
movement. So I would ask you, Admiral, if I may. How much has
the Navy increased its size or presence in the Pacific the last
couple years?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So the Navy is
postured; 60 percent of the maritime forces is in the Pacific.
Forty percent is on the east coast.
Mr. Bacon. Has that been an increase over the last 2 years?
Admiral Aquilino. That has been in place now for at least 3
years.
Mr. Bacon. Three years?
Admiral Aquilino. And a little bit before that.
Mr. Bacon. How about the Air Force? Because I have seen
some units being withdrawn from the Pacific.
Admiral Aquilino. As we align and execute the National
Defense Strategy, the positioning of those forces certainly
would be beneficial to be maintained inside of the first island
chain where they are postured. Our forward stationed Air
Forces, I have supported those forces to remain in place and/or
be replaced by equivalent capability and numbers.
Mr. Bacon. But would it be accurate to say we have seen an
actual decline in air order of battle in Asia? I see the talk
but I don't know if I see the actual physical presence.
Admiral Aquilino. I would have to go back and take a look
at that, Congressman. Overall, the force has gotten smaller,
right?
Mr. Bacon. Yes.
Admiral Aquilino. There is no doubt about that. So whether
it is distributed or where it has been pulled from, I'd have to
go look at.
Mr. Bacon. One of the concerns that we have is over the
FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], the Air Force will shrink
by about 400 fighters. What kind of concerns does this give
you?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. I am concerned about
any removal of combat power from the Indo-Pacific theater.
Mr. Bacon. I would be too. Thank you for that. The B-21s
and the Navy long-range precision weapons seem to be very
significant for your theater.
There is a lot of talk from the Army about long-range
surface-to-surface missiles and positioning them also in the
Pacific. But one of the problem areas is where do we station
those. Do we have good options where to put these weapon
systems?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman. So I believe we do,
right? With the service concepts, the Army has delivered the
multi-domain task force. The Marine Corps has shifted to the
Marine littoral regiment.
And when the capabilities deliver for anti-air and anti-
surface, both land and sea, those land forces will be capable
and directly aligned to what I need in this theater. From the
air perspective, their agile combat employment approach to be
able to be survivable and continue to deliver effect, those
capabilities are needed. And the posture required to do that,
we are working really hard on.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you. General, if I may, I know North Korea
just tested a solid-fuel ballistic missile. How does that
change the threat in your perspective?
General LaCamera. Our ability for indications and warning.
Mr. Bacon. So in other words, it will shorten your
indications and warning. So you may get more surprise?
General LaCamera. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. One last thing for you if I may, sir. It
was reported that some of the leaked information involved South
Korea. Have you seen any pushback from our allies regarding
this? Or has that impacted your rapport?
General LaCamera. It has not. No, sir.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. With that, I thank you for your time. And
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes
Ms. Jacobs for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
our witnesses for being here. I wanted to talk about Taiwan.
Admiral Aquilino, in your testimony, you stated that Beijing
significantly increased its military pressure against Taiwan in
2022 in response to, quote, ``a perceived policy shift in the
U.S.-Taiwan political and military ties,'' end quote. I think
it is important to recognize what kinds of U.S. actions are
actually shoring up Taiwan's defenses such as the training and
weapons the U.S. has provided over the years versus the kinds
of things that are symbolic but actually don't help the
Taiwanese in their fight, like calls to rename embassies, high-
profile visits, et cetera. I was hoping you could talk, Admiral
Aquilino or Mr. Royal, about the ways in which the Department
is ensuring that we are not unnecessarily escalating tensions
and how we are maintaining open lines of communication with the
PRC.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. So let me just
start by articulating the U.S. policy as it applies to Taiwan
has not changed despite what may be believed in Beijing.
Second, we do not seek conflict.
Everything we do is designed to prevent conflict, to
maintain the peace and stability in the region. So that is
where we sit. I can't tell you what they believe.
Now additionally, on your point of ability to have
conversations and engagements with my counterparts, I have had
a standing ask to meet with the Eastern Theater Commander and
the Southern Theater Commander from the PLA for my entire time
in this job. And they have yet to accept it. Second, we do--the
chiefs of defense in the region do about a quarterly virtual
meeting of which the PRC has been invited to. And of the, I
think, five we have done so far, they have shown up at one. And
they sent a very low-level individual.
Additionally, we meet annually in person once a year, and
they have not shown up for the last 2 years. We will--working
through the process to invite them again in August. So the
theme here is we continue to try to engage with our partner but
there is a different opinion there.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. Mr. Royal, do you want to add?
Mr. Royal. Sure, Congresswoman. Consistent with the Taiwan
Relations Act, we continue to support Taiwan's development of
their own self-defense. We have talked with them consistently
about their defense requirements. We have $54 billion in
implemented foreign military sales with the government of
Taiwan, including $27 billion in new contracts that have been
put on order since 2017. And so we believe that consistent with
the law of the United States, that this is important to
maintain their defensive requirements.
At the same time, we certainly call on the PRC to maintain
open lines of communication, particularly at moments of crisis.
And we have made a handful of requests, including during the
transit of the high-altitude balloon overflying our sovereign
airspace. And we have not seen the responsiveness that we would
like to see from Beijing in terms of answering our phone calls.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. And as we consider our military
presence in the Indo-Pacific, I think it is incredibly
important that we prioritize civilian harm mitigation,
especially in our ability to convene our partners and build
coalitions that we need to do. And as you guys well know, DOD
Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan
[CHMRAP]provided critical guidance on how to minimize harm. I
think implementing the recommendations outlined in the plan
such as enhanced training and better communication with local
communities will be really important. Admiral Aquilino, could
you talk about how implementing the CHMRAP will change how
military operations are conducted in the Indo-Pacific region?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. So we are
certainly always operating in accordance with the new guidance
that is out there. We have taken that on.
That said, we are currently not in a kinetic theater. But
even in our peacetime operations, we are always focused on
ensuring that the rule of law is followed to ensure we protect
life of all participants in the region, and that we'll always
operate that way.
Ms. Jacobs. I appreciate that. I think as you know the
CHMRAP requires combatant commanders to develop theater-
specific training, especially that addresses cognitive biases
and especially as we are working with partner forces in the
Indo-Pacific to make sure that they too are addressing civilian
harm concerns and human rights. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. The chair now
recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Waltz, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. We have had some
discussion on this committee, a lot of debate actually, on
whether this conflict or conflict with the PRC is inevitable.
And I would just comment to my colleagues that Chairman Xi has
said that reunification with Taiwan one way or another,
including the use of military force, just said it to the 20th
party congress, is inevitable.
He said that he is not going to pass it on to the next
generation. Basically said he is going to do it on his watch.
So I think we got a lot of wishful thinking going on, just like
we had wishful thinking going on in the run-up to Ukraine that
force won't be employed.
And with that context, Admiral Aquilino, thank you so much
for your hosting of various congressional delegations. It has
been incredibly informative. Thank you as well, General
LaCamera.
And one of the key takeaways I continue to take is the
ambiguity amongst our allies from these trips, key allies,
allies that if we don't have use of their airspace, of their
ports, of their basing, that I don't see how we effectively
come to the aid of the defense of Taiwan. And so I guess my
question for you is would greater clarity on our end, on the
U.S.'s end, and our intentions, help drive clarity with our
allies? And I will just tell you one quick anecdote.
In this last trip and in previous trips, we have been
asking our allies, will you help us in the defense of Taiwan
should it come to that. And the continual pushback is, well,
when you tell us what you are going to do, we can make the
tough political decisions what we are going to do. So again, do
you think clarity on our end would help allied clarity much
like it has in Europe?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. Again, I am not the
policymaker. But what I can tell you is for the past 40 years
that policy has been successful. That is just historically
accurate. I think you would have to ask the allies and
partners. What I hear when I talk to them frequently is that
war is not desirable for anyone in the region.
Mr. Waltz. Of course.
Admiral Aquilino. So as that applies, what I read into it
is they are supportive of our approach. They recognize that we
are looking to prevent this conflict. And that is what is
keeping us together.
Mr. Waltz. In the event that deterrence fails--of course
poverty is not desirable, war is not desirable. Got it. But in
the event that deterrence fails as it has in Europe, you have
to have those basing and overflight rights, right, whether it
is Japan, Philippines. We can go down the list. You have to
have those operationally, correct, as operational commander.
Admiral Aquilino. The need for access and basing and
overflight----
Mr. Waltz. Can you assume today, tomorrow, in the near
future that you have them?
Admiral Aquilino. We don't assume. Those are choices of
sovereign nations whenever the time comes.
Mr. Waltz. And I think it is reasonable then to say if the
United States was clear, we are coming to the defense of
democracy in Taiwan, then it would drive clarity in the region.
Clarity in Europe, for example, has deterred Putin in many ways
from going beyond Ukraine. So would clarity in the Pacific help
you having that basing and access?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, I think we would have to ask the
allies and partners, Congressman. I don't want to speak for
them.
Mr. Waltz. And I will just tell you another concern of mine
which we have talked quite a bit about is clarity here amongst
the American people. And one of the lessons that the PRC has
learned from Ukraine is if they decide to do it, they have to
do it quickly. We can't decide here in Congress where the
bathrooms are quickly.
And so I think we need to have that debate now, not when
amphibious ships are being loaded.
Secretary Royal, why does Admiral Aquilino have a $3\1/2\
billion unfunded list? Things like the defense of Guam, the
defense of Hawaii, secure communications. Why if this is the
number one threat according to multiple administrations does
the man sitting next to you may be responsible for the greatest
conflict in American history have $3\1/2\ billion out of an
$850 billion budget that you can't find to support that
warfighter?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, first thing I will say is there is
no daylight between Indo-Pacific Command and the Department of
Defense.
Mr. Waltz. There should be no unfunded priorities for our
number one threat.
Mr. Royal. When we think about the prioritization of the
region, there is absolutely no daylight between us. We
prioritize----
Mr. Waltz. Just in the interest of time, why does it take
2\1/2\ years from congressional notification to contract award
for Harpoons for Taiwan, 2\1/2\ years? Why?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I am happy to follow up with you
specifically on the Harpoon discussion if that is helpful to
you. The contracting----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 135.]
Mr. Waltz. We have to move more quickly, if the theme of
today is we are running out of time.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Kim,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kim. Yeah, thank you, Mr. Chair. I just want to kind of
pick up on where we left off. Admiral Aquilino, you just said
that the policy we have been implementing has been successful
over the last 40 years or so. What policy were you referencing
there?
Admiral Aquilino. Our One China policy and our alignment in
accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, Six Assurances, Three
Communiques.
Mr. Kim. Is that a policy that is also being implemented
right now through the strategic ambiguity approach?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, yes, this is the approach that we
have taken with the Taiwan Relations Act, the Three Joint
Commu-
niques, and the Six Assurances.
Mr. Kim. And so if we are saying that this has been
successful for the last 40 years, do either of you see a need
to change that policy at this point?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I would say that this policy has
served us well, continues to serve us well. It allows us to be
able to conduct all of the deterrence operations that we are
currently conducting in the region. And it allows us to be able
to maintain the cohesion with our alliances and partnerships
throughout the region that serve us very well.
Mr. Kim. I understand the desire about clarity. And I
understand sort of how that could very well prompt some
conversations that we aren't having right now. But I can also
see how that could be sort of a double-edged sword. So I guess
I wanted to ask the admiral and then Mr. Royal, would that
strategic clarity--at this moment, do you think that would help
or hurt our ability to build coalitions with other partners?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I will jump in first on that one. I
believe that we need to maintain constant contact with allies
and partners about how they see stability in the region. We
need to listen to them.
We are doing that regularly. I would also just add one
point on clarity. I think what is clarifying here is the
results that we are seeing in terms of our engagements with
allies and partners in the region, tremendous amount of
progress in terms of our posture, our readiness, our ability to
interoperate with allies and partners.
To be very clear, that is the clarifying element of our
strategy in the region right now. And we are investing in all
of those areas. And our allies and partners are with us.
Mr. Kim. Admiral, anything you would like to add here?
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, I am not a policymaker. So again, as
it applies, I will execute in accordance with.
Mr. Kim. One thing that I do hear from a lot of allies and
partners in the area is about their concern regarding
cybersecurity. This is a place where I feel like we have a lot
of opportunity potentially to be able to engage and build that
up as we are thinking about what we have to offer other
countries. I guess, Admiral, I wanted to just turn to you first
and then I will turn to the general here. But is there more
that we can be doing here to be able to help lift up the
cybersecurity capabilities of different partners in the region
and use that as a way to be able to further our relationships
with them? I wonder if there is something here we can press on
the gas.
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, Congressman. It is absolutely a
field that is needed, we need to expand with our allies and
partners. That said, that responsibility goes to General
Nakasone at CYBERCOM [U.S. Cyber Command].
Now, he and I coordinate all the time. I have identified
the areas, priorities, and needs. He has taken them on full
bore. But protecting both the United States networks as well as
our ally and partner networks is critical and it drives us
together.
Mr. Kim. Thank you, Admiral. And that is something that I
raised with General Nakasone and something that he pointed out
as important as well. So I hope we can follow up with both you
and he to try to figure out how we engage in that way.
General, I wanted to just kind of get your thoughts from
that from the Korean peninsula side. A lot of concerns about
cybersecurity there. What else do we need to be thinking about
on that front? And is there more that we can be doing with our
partners in the ROK to be able to engage there, especially as
we have a state visit coming up? I am trying to think about
what are the priorities we should be trying to push the ROK on
to be able to strengthen our relationship and partnership on
cybersecurity and other issues there.
General LaCamera. Thanks, Congressman. Yeah, the focus is
on that, protecting our information, not just cyber but the
other domains. And working with General Nakasone and his folks
but also working with the Koreans and the commands that they
are standing up, make sure that we can protect this
information.
Mr. Kim. We have seen some promising developments between a
discussion between South Korea and Japan of recent. Mr. Royal,
maybe I will just ask you. Is there an area there that we can
try to again kind of push on the gas and try to see if we can
help strengthen that kind of relationship there but also see it
as part of the kind of security architecture that we are trying
to build?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, just a couple of days ago, we were
able to see Japan and Republic of Korea operate just off the
waters of South Korea together. These are the kinds of
instances and examples where we are watching a growing
convergence in the strategic interest and a growing convergence
in their willingness to----
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 135.]
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. The chair
now recognizes the gentleman from the great State of Alabama,
Mr. Dale Strong, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Before my questioning,
I would like to say for the record any leak of classified
documents related to the national security of America is
unacceptable under any circumstance.
Admiral Aquilino, my first question, I want to echo the
remarks that Chairman Rogers and saying thank you for being so
candid. Your unfunded priorities list might as well be a
highlight reel of what North Alabama does best. I know you have
a close partnership with the Missile Defense Agency, SMDC [U.S.
Army Space and Missile Defense Command], both call Redstone
Arsenal home.
The number one INDOPACOM unfunded priority is for the Guam
defense system. The fiscal year 2023 NDAA requires the
Secretary of Defense to designate a senior DOD official to be
responsible for the development and deployment of a missile
defense system for Guam. Given your expertise, which DOD
official do you believe would be best suited for this role to
reach the objective?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. Again, that current
debate is going on. I am not sure I know exactly who, but I
think that might be better for Jed to take as it is working
through the building.
Mr. Strong. Okay. Let me rephrase it. What would you want
to see their expertise be going into this role? What would be
most beneficial to execute this?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, I think it is somebody who could
direct budgets, who could direct priorities, and then work
towards both delivery and sustainment.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. Your number five unfunded priority,
all-domain missile warnings and tracking architecture would
provide upgrades for the THAAD [Terminal High Altitude Area
Defense] software to assist with integrated air and missile
defense protections. Can you speak to the importance of this
provision and the repercussions if Congress does not find a way
to fund it?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So foundational--
again, as we built the requirement to defend Guam via 360-
degree threats from all capabilities--cruise missiles,
ballistic missiles, and other capabilities. The end state is
this hybrid architecture of integrated capabilities. And the
shortfall identified in my list would slow down or delay the
integration of those different sets of capability, whether it
be the Aegis portion or the Army sets of portions that are
linked together, THAAD, Patriot, IFPC [Indirect Fire Protection
Capability], along with the Aegis piece. So it pushes that
later.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Admiral. Both the Navy and INDOPACOM
both have the SM-6 missile on their unfunded priority list. The
final assembly and testing of the SM-6 takes place at Redstone
Arsenal, in my district. I am aware that there have been delays
with production and the manufacturer is working to get back on
track within the year. Can you give the committee a perspective
of why the SM-6 is critical within the Indo-Pacific?
Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, it is an extremely capable
weapon, has both an anti-air capability; it has an anti-ship
capability. So when you deliver it out into the fleet or
whether it comes in some other form, it has certainly proven
itself to be critically lethal and capable.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. As you shared in your testimony, in
the 2022, China completed 64 successful space launches. This is
concerning at face value especially considering that we are
only 87 launches in 2022 from American carriers. I am proud to
say that the DOD's top launch provider, which manufactures in
my district, ULA [United Launch Alliance], has 100 percent
mission success rate. Speaking to your number two unfunded
priority, which specific resources does your command need to
ensure a national defense space architecture is reliable and
resilient?
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, Congressman. If we could do that in
a classified setting, that would be helpful.
Mr. Strong. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Ryan,
for 5 minutes.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Thank you all for being
here. Thank you also for your in-depth written testimony. It
was appreciated and comprehensive. So thank you.
In the last few weeks, growing concern certainly from me
and many to see more and more cozy relationship between Xi and
Putin. And even more willingness to be overt and blatant about
what we know what has been obviously happening behind the
scenes for a while. With that context in mind as we look at the
lessons over the last near decade looking back to 2014 and
Ukraine, what we did in terms of some of the actions in
response there with training and embedding with Ukrainian
forces.
Both Mr. Royal and Admiral Aquilino, could you talk about
those lessons and how we are trying to apply those in Taiwan?
To be more specific, can you speak to their readiness, both in
terms of capability and intent and the urgency. Is the urgency
there, and what can we do to bolster that?
Mr. Royal. I am happy to share a few initial thoughts with
you and happy to follow up later on. First is I think it is a
real lesson for us that the rules-based international order
cannot be taken for granted, that there is naked ambition that
continues to exist in the world. And we are watching that play
out in Ukraine.
So that is, I think, the first thing we need to be vigilant
about the fact that our international order is under duress.
Secondly, we need to make sure that we are understanding what
the real defense and capability requirements are of those that
might be put under pressure by revanchist powers. And so we
maintain strong capability requirements relationship in
discussion with the government of Taiwan.
And as I mentioned, we continue to service those defense
requirements through the foreign military sales program and
direct commercial sales. And finally, in terms of training,
proficiency is absolutely necessary here. You pointed to a
relationship that we had with the government of Ukraine that
was very productive in terms of its training outcomes since
2014. I believe that we need to be able to think about how we
can support Taiwan's proficiencies with the weapon systems that
they are ordering.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 135.]
Mr. Ryan. Admiral.
Admiral Aquilino. Yeah, Congressman, so again, I will just
leave it as this. We have done a lot of work understanding the
lessons learned from Ukraine and what has occurred. And we are
certainly integrating all those into our responsibilities under
the Taiwan Relations Act.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you both. Building on that, and ranking
member addressed this in his opening statement, I have heard
both from you all and others who have come before us the
importance of our alliances as one of our, I believe, strategic
differentiators and strengths vis-a-vis our PRC adversaries.
Admiral Aquilino, you also touched on this in your
testimony. Can you speak a little bit more about where we are
at with India in particular? And I know that is a broad
question. But are there authorities or requirements that we can
help you all on to advance and bolster that critical alliance?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So again, India is a
critical partner as we talked about. Aside from the cooperation
that we are doing in the military, right? So the exercises like
Malabar, Yudh Abhyas, the fact that we are providing assistance
as it applies to cold weather gear and other capabilities that
they might need as they defend their border on the northern
side.
But additionally, we are expanding our cooperation in the
form of production as India tries to work to develop its own
industrial base. So C-130, critical components made in India.
Helicopter critical frameworks made in India. That is expanding
the partnership and moving them towards certainly self-
sufficiency and increased partnership with the United States.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you. Oh, sorry. Did you have say, sir?
Mr. Royal. Let me just offer as well that recently we
kicked off what we call an Initiative [on] Critical and
Emerging Technologies [iCET] that was announced by the two
national security advisors of the United States and India. We
are already delivering offers under the context of the iCET
arrangement. This is a real moment of convergence for the
United States and India, and we are looking to take full
advantage of it going forward.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you. Just very briefly, General LaCamera,
how do you assess growing bellicosity from the PRC changing Mr.
Kim's calculus? Is it likely that they sort of feed off each
other essentially?
General LaCamera. Yeah, I mean, they are passing
congratulatory notes back and forth. And I have stated in the
past that I see nothing on the Korean peninsula that won't
involve China and Russia both providing lethal and non-lethal
support.
Mr. Ryan. Thank you. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Indiana, Mr. Banks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral, when did you
first become aware of the spy balloon, before it entered our
airspace over Alaska or after?
Admiral Aquilino. Sir, I would like to that in a classified
setting.
Mr. Banks. A Washington Post story over the weekend said
that there have been several Chinese balloons that have
operated in the INDOPACOM AOR over previous years. What are we
doing about it?
Admiral Aquilino. So as we posture in the INDOPACOM AOR,
sir, I am responsible for defense of Guam, defense of Hawaii.
We have aircraft on alert. Our systems and our architectures
are looking to ensure we can identify those, in a position and
place where we could respond if required.
Mr. Banks. So the story also notes that the spy balloons in
your AOR often fly over U.S. carrier strike groups and over the
South China Sea. So are we concerned about this, or is this
something that we too easily dismiss as the President seemed to
have done when the balloon flew over the entire continental
United States?
Admiral Aquilino. So sir, I am responsible and always
concerned about force protection for our assets. So the network
of sensors that exists, we understand where they are going and
when and whether or not they are threatening. That said, if
they fly over the South China Sea in accordance with the rules-
based international order, if that is international airspace,
then they should be allowed to fly there.
That is the way we would see it. That is what we do. That
is what it means to adhere to the rules-based international
order.
Mr. Banks. Okay. Can you explain to the public or at least
members of the committee why you can't answer the question of
when you became aware of the Chinese spy balloon, before it
entered our airspace in Alaska or after?
Admiral Aquilino. That is certainly the----
Mr. Banks. For the record, why would that have to be
divulged in a classified setting?
Admiral Aquilino. Certainly the way we identified it and
how we knew where it was and when it was is something I would
rather keep to ourselves.
Mr. Banks. Okay. Let's see. Admiral, at a March hearing, I
questioned NORTHCOM [U.S. Northern Command] commander General
VanHerck who told me that President Biden, quote, ``could ask
under special authorities for the military to do more to
prevent fentanyl trafficking at our southern border.'' Could
President Biden use such special authorities to help INDOPACOM
block the export of Chinese fentanyl analogues coming into the
North America from your knowledge?
Admiral Aquilino. I would have to go back and see, sir. As
I understand it, those precursor chemicals are actually legal
to be shipped. So currently, I don't have any authorities to
interdict or stop or prevent legal chemicals from being----
Mr. Banks. Mr. Royal, what would those authorities be that
President Trump--or President Biden could enact that he is not
enacting that President Trump did use?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I can't speak to the specific
authorities that you are referencing right now. I will say that
we believe that the fentanyl problem that we are facing is a
serious one and a serious threat to our society. The
administration does have a strategic implementation plan that
is shared by members of the interagency, and DOD has provided
enabling support to that strategic implementation plan,
including for the provision of aircraft, radar, and
intelligence to support arresting this threat as it continues
to move forward to our country.
Mr. Banks. So just to clear this up, those special
authorities do exist?
Mr. Royal. Sir, I am not entirely sure which specific
authorities you are referring to. Right now, we have the
authority to be able to support our interagency partners. And
we have done that under the rubric of the strategic
implementation plan.
Mr. Banks. Admiral, can you talk about the Joint
Interagency Task Force West that is used to interdict the flow
of fentanyl into the United States?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman. So that is my
organization assigned towards counter drug, counter
transnational crime, and taking on that aspect of what the PRC
might do. We track any of those shipments in accordance and in
conjunction with NORTHCOM, SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command],
and the interagency to provide an understanding of where that
may be going so that if it does end up turning into an illegal
chemical, then it can be interdicted. So my organization is
directly connected. We track those whenever we can.
Mr. Banks. Okay. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes
the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Escobar, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman and ranking
member. Gentleman, thank you so much for your testimony and
your service. I have the privilege of representing Fort Bliss,
Texas, which is in Texas [District] 16, El Paso.
And my questions are going to focus on the importance of
resilient infrastructure, logistics, and mobilization capacity.
We have to make sure that we are increasing our logistics
capacity and force adaptability in a theater where China not
only maintains the advantage of proximity but owns a vast
arsenal of capabilities unlike that of the insurgent forces the
U.S. spent the last 20 years fighting. Admiral Aquilino, my
first question is for you, sir.
I would like to highlight the critical importance of multi-
domain operational training in a contested environment,
especially as it pertains to the Army. Can you talk about how
Pacific Pathways and other initiatives are integrating this
element to prepare our Army for a potential conflict in the
theater? What challenges, if any, do you foresee affecting our
ability to conduct joint training with partners and allies on a
large scale while emulating a highly contested logistics
environment?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. So from the Indo-
Pacific position, right, this is going to take the whole joint
force. And synchronizing and integrating that joint force to be
able to deliver effects is a strength the United States has
that no other nation can do, to include the sustaining of that
force across half the globe.
So Pacific partnership is--or Pacific Pathways is critical
because it is a mechanism to maneuver the land component to
places where either we can exercise or operate with our allies
and partners or to preset the force in places that we need to
operate. That same capability is needed across all of the
service components. So what I identified in my report was a
need for increased campaigning dollars that does exactly that.
It allows for the transportation, sustainment, and support for
forces forward to deliver that deterrent effect.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much. Mr. Royal, any large-scale
operations or increased deployments in the AOR would require
development of key infrastructure. However, the need for this
infrastructure to be resilient to climate disasters cannot be
overstated. What are the biggest challenges impacting your
ability to take environmental factors into consideration in
making assessments required for MILCON [military construction]
needs in the AOR?
Mr. Royal. Congresswoman, I would just add to what Admiral
Aquilino has said by reinforcing that deterrence occurs in this
region based on two things. One, it is having the right
capabilities at the right level of readiness and in the right
locations. And secondly, because our allies and partners are
with us.
And there this question of posture brings those two
together, the capabilities and the allies and partners. And we
are seeing some really terrific progress being made with
respect to how we are able to posture alongside our allies and
partners. In terms of climate concerns, we do have an ongoing
dialogue with partners throughout the region, allies throughout
the region, on how climate change is affecting their ability to
be able to withstand and support U.S. military movement through
the region.
USARPAC [U.S. Army Pacific] has a terrific wargame series
called Unified Pacific War Gaming Series. And they are testing
out their ability to maneuver through a contested environment
in the region, including with respect to the potential effects
of climate change moving forward. So we have addressed that in
the National Defense Strategy and we are addressing that in the
budget submission as well.
Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady. Chair now recognizes
the gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. McClain, for 5 minutes.
Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you all
for being here today. I appreciate it. Admiral Aquilino, I want
to make it clear that I have some serious concerns with the
priority of the White House when it comes to our national
defense.
I also want to make sure that we understand that I have
some serious concerns on how our taxpayers' dollars are spent
as it pertains to the military to make sure that we are ready.
And I think there are a lot of issues that we need to cover. I
think prioritization of these issues are extremely important.
Like you, I am gravely concerned about the CCP and the
PLA's aggressive modernization timeline while you have almost
$3.5 billion in unfunded priorities that you have deemed as
vital to our defense against the PLA; $3.5 billion. The
President's budget over the past several years has been focused
on a woke garbage in my opinion agenda that has nothing to do
with deterring the CCP. So let me just give you some numbers as
I see them.
In 2021, Chairman Milley admitted to the Senate Armed
Services Committee that the DOD spent almost 6 million man-
hours on woke training, 6--it is right here--6 million man-
hours on woke training. May of 2022, the DOD spent $91,000 on
diversity and inclusion for the Air Force band. Okay. Last
year, we found out that Kelisa Wing of the former Chief DEI
[Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion] Officer at the Defense
Department school was pushing her book on White privilege in
those schools. Okay.
Last month, the Air Force launched an effort to hire a
diversity, equity, and inclusion manager and pay them upwards
of $180,000 a year. I am curious as to what their outcomes
would be because when you hire a diversity, equity, and
inclusion manager, I am curious what their outcome is because
if they achieve their outcome, they would be put out of a job.
But that is a different discussion for a different day.
Fiscal year 2023, the President requested $86.5 million for
dedicated diversity and inclusion activities; $86.5 million.
Now remember, you have $3.5 billion of unfunded priorities.
This year, the President wants $114 million more, right?
These ridiculous instances of wokeness sends an
embarrassing message I think to our friends but more
importantly to our allies on what we prioritize. Now I am not
here to say that diversity, equity, and inclusion is not
important. But on the list of priorities, I got to tell you, I
think we have some other funded projects that we can spend 6
million more man-hours on.
So, I know you don't have an exact number. But I would like
to hear your opinion on how much do you think the CCP spends on
diversity, equity, and inclusion? Or do you think they might
prioritize like their hypersonics a little bit ahead of
diversity, equity, and inclusion?
Admiral Aquilino. I don't have that number, ma'am. I would
have to look at it and get back to you.
Mrs. McClain. What is your gut feel? Think they spend like
6 million man-hours talking about diversity, equity, and
inclusion? Or do you think they spend--maybe use those hours to
develop some hypersonics to use against us?
Admiral Aquilino. Well, what I would say is, it is
certainly not a diverse culture by design.
Mrs. McClain. I would agree with that. But I would like to
know what you think of our prioritizations. You have billions
of unfunded mandates, and we are spending taxpayer dollars and
a lot of those taxpayer dollars, on stuff. Do you think that
helps our readiness?
Admiral Aquilino. So, ma'am, what I would say is, as you
clearly identified and looked at the report I have submitted,
it is clear what I have identified as priorities. I think I
would turn that over to Jed to take on.
Mr. Royal. Congresswoman, I think that the----
The Chairman. Mr. Royal, you are very soft-spoken. Please
pull the mic close. We really can't hear you.
Mr. Royal. Sorry, Congressman. Congresswoman, I would say--
--
Mrs. McClain. I too am soft-spoken.
Mr. Royal. The health and the well-being of the
Department's workforce, both in uniform and civilian, is of the
upmost importance. It is one of four key priorities of the
National Defense Strategy. And we are looking comprehensively
on how we are going to support our workforce going forward.
Mrs. McClain. I appreciate that. My time is up. I yield
back. Thank you.
The Chairman. Chair now recognizes Ms. McClellan for 5
minutes.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member
Smith, for convening the hearing today and to our witnesses for
being here. I want to focus a little bit on our regional
alliances. It has been heartening recently that our treaty
allies, South Korea and Japan, have been working recently to
resolve their diplomatic tensions and to cooperate more
effectively. How is INDOPACOM working to encourage similar
breakthroughs to strengthen ties between U.S. allies in the
region so that we can present a stronger united front in the
face of increasing Chinese aggression?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congresswoman. Again, 120
exercises a year with partners across the region. So through
the military landscape, we spend a lot of time ensuring that we
know how to operate together, how we can be interoperable as
best as possible, how we can protect the rules-based
international order. And that is on top of all of our
operations outside of exercises.
Continuous coordination with my counterparts. My staff
always directly involved and linked with both country teams as
well as our partner nations. So that will continue, and we
spend a lot of money there or we spend a lot of effort there.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. And this is for Mr. Royal and
also you, Admiral. Recently, the United States, the U.K., and
Australia announced Pillar 1 of the AUKUS agreement that will
allow Australia to obtain American-manufactured nuclear-power
submarines and eventually make similar vessels indigenously. Is
the U.S. military supplier base ready to expand its capacity to
address increased demand? And if not, what steps can we take to
ensure that we can meet our stated production goals for AUKUS
and for the naval forces?
Mr. Royal. Congresswoman, I would just take one step back
and offer a complementing comment to what Admiral Aquilino just
stated. You referenced Japan and Korea in your question. I
would also note that with Australia in particular, we have
agreed to increase U.S. rotational presence including with
bombers and fighters. And defense industrial base integration
is occurring at this very moment.
Just looking at the level of exercises that we are
conducting in the region, Talisman Saber, Balikatan, Cobra
Gold, Garuda Shield. Each of these are seeing the highest
levels of engagement in their history. And so in terms of the
overall picture of how healthy the alliance is and partnerships
are in the region, we are really seeing some historic steps
forward.
On AUKUS, we do believe that the industrial base can
perform at the level that we have proposed in the agreement
that we have with the U.K. and Australia. We know that it will
take a lot of work. It will take a lot of constant conversation
with industry partners as well. We are encouraged by the
defense industrial base commitment that Australia has already
made to our submarine defense industrial base. And so we think
things are on the right track.
Admiral Aquilino. And Congresswoman, from my role, it is to
be able to accelerate this capability. And in order to do that,
I have sent U.S. submarines to Stirling for familiarization, so
the Australians can also look at it. We have done that in
coordination with the United Kingdom. And then ultimately as
soon as possible, we are going to look to get Australian
sailors on U.S. submarines. So I get to work diligently to
bridge the gap as the industrial base delivers what is needed.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. And we have touched a little bit
on how war is not inevitable. And I want to focus a little bit
on diplomacy. And our military strength can only go as far as
in maintaining powerful alliance systems that concerted
diplomacy has to be the cornerstone of those alliances. Are we
doing enough to maintain a strong and concerted diplomatic
presence that makes the job of our Armed Forces in the region
easier?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I am very pleased to say that our
Indo-Pacific strategy for this administration is very much an
interagency strategy. The role for the U.S. Department of
Defense and for Indo-Pacific Command and our Armed Forces is
discrete. It is tailored. It is focused.
It all fits within a broader context of diplomacy. And
again, I think that we are seeing the impacts of that
interagency diplomacy-led effort when we look at the progress
that is being made in terms of U.S. posture access into the
region and the multilateral arrangements that have been
established, in many cases smaller trilateral progress that we
are seeing right now between Republic of Korea, Japan, United
States, other minilateral settings.
Ms. McClellan. Thank you. I yield back.
The Chairman. The gentleman from Texas, Mr. Fallon, is
recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it very
much. And thanks for all the witnesses for joining us. Admiral,
is it true that China has doubled their military spending in
the last 10 years?
Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, that is true based on the
reports as articulated and presented by the PLA. My belief is
that spending that actually goes on in support of their
military is much higher than that.
Mr. Fallon. And their spending maybe increased year over
year about 7\1/2\ percent. Does that sound about accurate, the
military spending?
Admiral Aquilino. Excuse me?
Mr. Fallon. Their military spending has increased 7\1/2\
percent roughly over the last year?
Admiral Aquilino. Again, that is their advertised number. I
am not sure it is accurate.
Mr. Fallon. So they are focused on improving clearly their
hard power. Let's talk about soft power. In your estimation,
what kind of threats to our interest and influence in the
region does their Belt and Road Initiative present?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. I am not sure it
would be considered soft power. I think it is a coercive tool
as utilized by the PRC to be able to influence and move nations
in the region in directions that are beneficial for the PLA.
When the PLA articulates Belt and Road or One Belt, One Road as
a win-win strategy, that is true. It is a win for the Chinese
and it is a win for the Chinese.
Mr. Fallon. Yeah.
Admiral Aquilino. It is not a win for any nation.
Mr. Fallon. Secretary Royal, can you touch on India's
importance in the region and what we can do to wean them off
their dependence on Russia for weapons and defense assistance
and bring them more into the fold in the Western world?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, as Admiral Aquilino already stated,
India faces the same challenger that we face in the region. And
so what we are seeing right now is a moment of strategic
convergence in our relationship with the government of India.
There is a lot of momentum in that regard. With respect to your
question on from whom do they buy their weapons, we believe
that they are through generational process of looking to
diversify off of traditional suppliers. We want to make sure
that the U.S. defense industrial base is in the best position
possible to be India's partner of choice moving forward. I
noted the Initiative on Critical and Emerging----
The Chairman. Mr. Royal, please pull the microphone closer.
Thank you, sir.
Mr. Royal. I noted earlier the Initiative on Critical and
Emerging Technologies that has been announced by the two
national security advisors of the United States and India. And
so it is in all of these areas where we are able to see the
kind of progress and the kind of promise for this relationship
moving forward.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. Thank you. And I guess for Mr. Royal and
if the admiral and the general want to weigh in on this. How
troubling did you find the comments of President Macron of
France recently?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, as I mentioned earlier, we are
having a really in-depth conversation with all of our European
partners on the challenges that the PRC presents, both in the
Indo-Pacific region and globally. As we look at the NATO
strategic document that has been developed, it includes the PRC
in a way that it hasn't in the past. I would say the same thing
for the latest European Union white paper.
So we are taking President Macron's comments within the
context of all of those trends that we are watching. I would
certainly point to other voices out there. The Foreign Minister
of Germany recently delivered a speech in which she talked a
little bit differently than President Macron. And we have
certainly Foreign Minister Wong of Australia who delivered a
speech along those lines I would point to as well as--I would
say fairly consistent with an understanding and approach the
United States has to the PRC challenge.
Mr. Fallon. Admiral, General, do you have any comments?
Admiral Aquilino. No.
Mr. Fallon. Go ahead, General. Sorry.
General LaCamera. No, sir.
Mr. Fallon. The thing that makes it rather obvious to me is
the PRC would love nothing more than to separate us from the
EU. And if they do that, then that is a huge win for them. And
I just want to make sure that we nip something like that in the
bud because it was very--just really shocking that he said what
he said. It didn't really serve, I don't think, Europe's
interest, France's interest, or certainly ours. So I want to
thank you all again. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. The chair now recognizes the gentleman from
Pennsylvania, Mr. Deluzio, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Deluzio. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentleman, hello. I
know it is a long day. Thanks for being with us. Admiral, I
want to pick up on a question from Mr. Fallon here about PRC
spending and in particular advertised or otherwise, where is
their investment in their shipbuilding relative to ours?
Admiral Aquilino. I don't think I have the comparison,
Congressman. But they are certain putting out ships at a pace
that exceeds ours right now.
Mr. Deluzio. And that is warships, sealift, commercial, all
of it?
Admiral Aquilino. All of the above.
Mr. Deluzio. I ask because one of the pieces I am worried
about is they are very aggressively making territorial claims,
asserting the power to regulate ships within what is
international water that our fleet and otherwise patrols and
protects to submit to Chinese command and supervision of those
waters, again, flagrantly violating international law and
norms. And certainly against the backdrop of raising their
warships--or building more warships relative to what we are
doing.
Our sealift capacity, I worry. I think last month in this
committee the Maritime Administrator told us, talking about the
sealift fleet, the average age of some of those ships is 44
years old, some more than 50 years old.
We are relying on foreign-built ships for our sealift
capacity. And so I guess my question, Admiral, would be whether
you think our sealift capacity is sufficient to meet our needs.
And certainly if you could weigh in on where our sealift
capacity is relative to PRC.
Admiral Aquilino. As it applies to sealift, we certainly
have a distinct advantage over the PRC, both numbers and
capabilities. As it applies to what is needed in the future, so
General Van Ovost, the TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command]
commander, and I speak often. She is aware of the needs
required, and she has done some good work.
And I also thank the Congress for the support to the
additional 10 tankers that we have been able to utilize. So as
a combined effort, sealift and airlift is critical, especially
when you have to do logistics sustainment over half the globe.
And again, in partner with TRANSCOM commander, we have
identified that and asked the services to support it.
Mr. Deluzio. Mr. Royal, anything you want to add to or
weigh in on that question?
Mr. Royal. Thanks, Congressman. I would offer that DOD has
quite a broad range of modeling and analytical capabilities
that we undertake. We are looking at this theater as an all-
domain competitive space. Shipbuilding is certainly one of
those domains, and we want to make sure that we remain
competitive in that regard. But we are also making sure that we
are thinking about the position and the presence of U.S. ships
with respect to all of the other domains that are necessary to
bring to bear the right kind of posture at the right time.
Mr. Deluzio. Gentleman, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
The Chairman. And I want to pause for a minute. I was glad
the way that Mr. Deluzio framed that and that is what are they
doing compared to us because I have said repeatedly what they
spend is--what they say they spend is a lie. But what they
spend compared to what we spend is not apples to apples.
They don't have an EPA [U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency]. They don't have OSHA [Occupational Safety and Health
Administration]. They don't have NEPA [National Environmental
Policy Act]. They don't have a Congress. They don't have any of
the things that we have to deal with and interfere with or
drive cost up on their expenditures. So it is always healthy to
do what Mr. Deluzio did, talk in terms of what is our
capability, what is their capability, not how much they spend
versus how much we spend because it really is a silly argument.
Mr. Moylan from Guam is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to the panel
today, the time that you put in, and the answers that you have
been providing us. It's very helpful. I also want you to know
in the audience we have also guests from Guam, our Guam Chamber
of Commerce here. We have six of them that are very supportive
of our continued military buildup on Guam.
The Chairman. Where are they? Are they in the [room]?
Mr. Moylan. Can you kindly stand up, please?
The Chairman. Welcome. Glad to have you all here with us.
Hope we didn't disappoint you.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you. And we continue to support our
buildup on Guam. Sir, you made in your report regarding the
Guam cluster. Identifying us as Guam as the most forward
territory in the Pacific.
And identifying over 170,000 American citizens. You pointed
out Guam and CNMI [Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands] that no time in history has such a military buildup
and construction been happening. And specifically, you
mentioned that Guam is the third highest construction workforce
per capita nationally.
And the military construction demands require a workforce
more than three times as large as what currently exists. So in
order to do this, we need great relief regarding the H2-B
workers. And right now, these H2-B workers are going to end in
2024.
And in your report, you said we need them until 2029. So I
am completely behind you. I trust you. I know what you are
doing. And I believe in what you can do.
But I need to support you even greater. Congress needs to
support you even greater. We have introduced the standalone
bill with the H2-B visas to extend till 2029.
And we are even attempting to include that in the NDAA
language. It would be helpful for me if you can further explain
if we don't get this done. And what is the importance of this
construction being done in the Guam cluster and how important
it is for you to complete your mission, sir.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So the development
on Guam, I think we have invested between $11 and $13 billion
to be able to execute the requirements that we believe we need
for both sustainment as well as offensive and defensive
warfighting capabilities. It is critical to be able to deliver
those at speed and with the sense of urgency that I
articulated.
So the criticality of extending the H2-B visas through 2029
would allow us to finalize the investments and the delivery of
the posture needed on Guam. The people of Guam have been
amazing partners throughout history, all the way back to World
War II. So we need to finish our posture initiatives.
Without the ability to get workers, which are mostly from
the Philippines--again, I will be clear, there is no Chinese
workers coming to Guam to do the work that we have asked--it
would delay the implementation and push us back years if we
didn't have that authority.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Admiral. Another question, of
course, is where our budget was significantly short, you are
talking about the Guam defense system, right? The priority
mission to defend our homeland with the GDS [Guam defense
system] 360-degree integrated air and missile defense for Guam
to include an offensive capability as well.
So we understand. The President's proposed budget was $147
million short. You identified that this was the purpose of the
Guam defense system, the 360-degree integrated air and missile
defense for the island.
I want to thank you for making that a top unfunded
priority. And I am going to do my best to make sure that is a
funded priority as well. But again, just to reiterate, that we
are the forward-most deployed, right?
We keep this as far away as possible. Without this, we are
putting in danger I believe all the troops we have on island
and specifically the civilians on Guam. So please reiterate
what you are explaining to us in your report. Thank you, sir.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So again, the
funding shortfall identified as my integration with the Missile
Defense Agency and the Department is targeted at integrating
the different sets of capabilities that are identified in the
architecture. So Aegis capabilities tied with Army capabilities
in the form of THAAD, Patriot, IFPC, LTAMDS [Lower Tier Air and
Missile Defense Sensor], and the other required portions to
deliver a 360-degree integrated defense. That 147 would delay
the integration of some of those capabilities. And that
wouldn't be optimum for the delivery of the defense of Guam.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Admiral. We will fight strong to get
your H2-B extended to 2029 and get you that $147 million in
order for our Nation and for our island of Guam.
Admiral Aquilino. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Moylan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes
the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Davis, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Davis. Thanks so much, Mr. Chair, and to the witnesses
here today. All the focus of the United States security policy
of late has been on the People's Republic of China. North Korea
continues to engage in saber-rattling tactics in the nuclear
weapons domain. General LaCamera, at this moment in time, how
do you assess the threat level from the Democratic People's
Republic of Korea and specifically which leg of the nuclear
triad, air, land, sea capability, in your opinion poses the
most immediate threat to the homeland?
General LaCamera. To answer your last question, his land
capability is the greatest threat, what he has demonstrated
with his ICBM testing. Our focus is on combat readiness and
making sure that we can--we have not deterred him in developing
this capability; we now need to focus on deterring him from
employing this capability.
Mr. Davis. As we saw tragically in Hong Kong, the people at
the top of the institutions matter as much if not more than the
institutions of government themselves. In responding to the
PRC's brazen violation of the ``one country, two systems''
regime that govern Hong Kong since its incorporation a
generation ago, the U.S. offered little in the way of pushback.
Mr. Royal, as we think about our military's posture in the
South China Sea, especially as it relates to Taiwan, how can we
be sure that history does not repeat itself?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I agree with your assessment that
we are watching a PRC increasingly repressive at home and
increasingly assertive abroad. In the South China Sea, the PRC
continues to make unlawful claims. And we call on the PRC to
abide by the 2016 arbitration on the claims in the South China
Sea.
We believe that our mutual defense commitments with allies
and partners in the region represent a demonstrable advancement
in terms of being able to resist those unlawful claims as we
watch them unfold. And so we are going to continue to sail,
fly, and operate wherever international law allows. We talked
about freedom of navigation operations earlier in this hearing.
And we will continue to share information transparently with
allies and partners when we see violations by the PRC in
illicit way along the lines of those unlawful claims.
Mr. Davis. And Mr. Royal and to the Admiral, are you
confident that the South Korean allies and other Quad region
partners continue to have full trust in our intelligence and
military capabilities, especially what we have seen over the
last few weeks with the leak of sensitive classification--
classified information? Any assessment there?
Mr. Royal. Simply put, Congressman, yes, we believe that we
continue to have the full faith and confidence in the
partnership in the alliance with the Republic of Korea.
Admiral Aquilino. Absolutely, Congressman.
Mr. Davis. Thank you so much. We appreciate your presence
today.
And, Mr. Chair, I will yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The chair will now
recognize the gentleman from Missouri, Mr. Alford, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Alford. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith,
and our distinguished witnesses today. Appreciate you all being
here today.
I think we are all concerned about what is going on with
China and Taiwan, and maybe we are not moving fast enough to
develop the capabilities to deter Communist China.
Our military has incredible capabilities, but as we
modernize our forces, particularly our Air Force and Navy, we
have to ensure that we are putting hard power in place to make
China think twice before conducting a naval blockade or full-
scale amphibious assault of Taiwan. We also need to do a better
job of explaining to the American people why Taiwan matters and
why the Indo-Pacific region is critical to our national
security efforts.
More than 50 percent of the world's GDP [gross domestic
product] flows through this region. Taiwan alone produces more
than 60 percent of the world's semiconductors, more than 90
percent of the most advanced ones. We cannot allow China to
seize control of these critical supply chains which impact
goods that we use each and every day.
This leads to our questions today. Mr.--Admiral Aquilino,
after China's recent military drills around Taiwan, China's
military declared it is ready to fight. Can you talk more about
what INDOPACOM is doing to deter the Chinese Communist Party
from launching military drills and threatening our allies in
the region?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So Indo-Pacific
Command is postured with forces west of the International Date
Line that are prepared to respond, executing daily operations
for deterrence, operating with our allies and partners. And
we're able to respond quickly to any aggressive action.
Mr. Alford. Do we have the seapower that we need to combat
China at this point?
Admiral Aquilino. We do at this point. As we've talked
about before, China's moving at a very rapid pace. They're
increasing both capability and capacity. And we certainly have
to make sure that we always have overmatch against the Chinese.
Mr. Alford. What do you see as the biggest challenge right
now [inaudible]?
Admiral Aquilino. Right now I think it's the speed of
urgency at which we're working as we've come out of 20 years in
the Middle East and understanding what this security challenger
is posing as a threat. We need to understand how fast it's
coming and we need to go faster.
Mr. Alford. What are the top priorities for munitions and
can the American sector meet these demands that we are going to
be facing?
Admiral Aquilino. For INDOPACOM, as a part of my 1254
report I've articulated the numbers and types of weapons that
we believe we need to invest in and to deliver quickly. As it
applies to the industrial base, I'll ask Jed to take that.
Mr. Royal. Congressman, on your last point there were 17
munition systems identified for multiyear procurement in the
latest NDAA. Those are the 17 systems that I would say are most
critical right now in terms of our ability to stockpile, to
have magazine depth in the Indo-Pacific region.
Mr. Alford. We have heard you three talk about the
importance of our allies and the critical role that they will
play in helping us counter China. Can you talk about some of
the capabilities that we need to improve on with our allies
such as cyber and where there might be gaps in that?
General, let's start with you, please.
General LaCamera. We're working with the Koreans. They're
standing up a strategic command that has cyber embedded in it.
Working with our CYBERCOM and National Security Agency to be
able to not just look at it from a defensive, but an offensive
capability going forward. And I'd rather talk about the rest of
it----
Mr. Alford. Right.
General LaCamera [continuing]. In a classified setting.
Mr. Alford. Admiral.
Admiral Aquilino. What I would say is that certainly the
shoring up and defense of all of our networks and our partner
networks is step one and most critical because as we continue
to operate with them, the sharing of information and all of
that. And in INDOPACOM one of my unfunded requirements is
identified--is referred to as a Mission Partner Environment. So
right now I got 13 networks to talk to my partners. Maintaining
13 networks and keeping them all cyber safe is a chore. The
Mission Partner Environment brings all of our partners into one
network, think single pane of glass, that has zero trust
capability for cybersecurity for us to be able to operate
together.
Mr. Alford. Thank you again to our witnesses.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr.
Jimmy Panetta, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that.
Gentlemen, thanks to all of you for being here and of
course your service.
Obviously, a Ukrainian victory is important. And no matter
what your definition is of that, America's commitment and
leadership is absolutely necessary for that, quote/unquote,
``win.'' In order for there to be peace in the Indo-Pacific
region obviously when it comes to Korea, when it comes to
Taiwan, America's commitment is essential, as a deterrent and
if--as an ally if that deterrence fails, as you said, Admiral.
Now what we have seen though is obviously build-up on both
sides. For the past 20 years, as the U.S. has been focused on
other areas, China has built up the world's largest stockpile
of precision-guided missiles, which we have heard a lot about
today. And obviously you are seeing the United States have to
counter with its own stockpiles and its own long-range of
precision-guided missiles. In fact, I guess certain war games
have determined that the U.S. will run out in less than a week
if there is a military engagement.
And there is obviously other areas as well. One of those
is--distributed lethality is where the United States has to
enter into. And part of that is this strategy called Marines
2030 where we are basically giving up tanks and getting up on
littoral forces by putting more on islands, kind of a ship-to-
shore or shore-to-shore, as they say.
Admiral, if you could expound on Marines 2030 and then also
go into the fact that as we work to deter China and a China
attack, how do we not provoke one?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. First, the Marine
littoral regiment. Again, General Berger, who came out of
MARFORPAC [U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific], as you know, I
think was pretty understanding of the threat, the scenario, and
what was needed. So I appreciate his effort to focus on the
Indo-Pacific problem set.
That said, we need to deliver that organization with the
capabilities to deliver effect. Surface-to-air, air-to--or
surface-to-surface, surface-to-ship. When that force is armed
and prepared in that set of capability that's exactly what we
need in the Indo-Pacific to support the fight.
To your second question on what do we do to not provoke the
PRC. Well, number one, we've got to make sure that they
understand, we're not seeking conflict. Number two, we haven't
changed our policy. Number three, we don't support independence
for Taiwan. And then we need to make sure that they can operate
inside this international world order in a way that all nations
want to interoperate with them, economically, diplomatically.
And that's the challenge. So first we need to make sure they
understand we are not trying to provoke.
Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you.
Mr. Royal, Taiwan's intelligence community faces constant
infiltrations by the CCP including taking advantage of weak
espionage laws that can challenge our own ability to coordinate
with the Taiwanese. What do you make of our ability to work
with Taiwan's intelligence community and what strategies might
we consider to create a more reliable intelligence sharing with
the Taiwanese?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, this is a topic of our bilateral
discussions with the government of Taiwan. I will say they're
making improvements in their ability to hold and maintain
security over information. We also are able to have some pretty
discreet conversations about what we're seeing in terms of
developments in the region. So I would say that this is an area
for--that we are improving in and needs further improvement
going forward.
Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you.
Last question. Admiral, can you discuss what USINDOPACOM is
doing to ensure our current stockpiles and military assets
remain intact amid a conflict under extreme weather conditions
such as a hurricane, such as other types of extreme weather
events that we are dealing with?
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, thanks, Congressman. So certainly I
have an organization that's the Center for Disaster--for
Excellence for Disaster Management. They are doing a lot of
work for me to make sure I understand where those places are
that we need that might be at risk based on impacts, whether it
be drought, sea level rise, severity of storms. And we ensure
that those are structured correctly and positioned to be able
to sustain and survive any harsh impact. But the ability to
predict and then the ability to take action in advance of the
problem is the approach we've taken.
Mr. Panetta. Great. Thank you, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman from California.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
LaLota, for 5 minutes.
Mr. LaLota. Thank you, Chairman.
Admiral, General, Mr. Royal, I want to start by thanking
you for your service and for being here with our committee
today.
Admiral, I have to say I am a bit excited to speak with you
on the record today. It is not every day I get to dialogue with
a combatant commander who is not only from Long Island, but
from my congressional district. And in fact I understand that--
as you told me earlier, that you lived five houses away from
St. Anthony's High School where my wife and I both attended. So
awesome that you are here, Admiral.
I was a few classes after you at Annapolis. And after
commissioning I was deployed to the Western Pacific three times
and spent 11 months in 2005 attached to a Joint Special
Operations Task Force in the Southern Philippines. And with
that experience I have great respect and appreciation for the
role the Indo-Pacific Command plays to our national security.
And our Nation's most dangerous adversaries--China, Russia, and
North Korea--have a significant presence in your area of
operations and I am honored to have you and your staff here
today to discuss and work with our committee to address
national security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. And a
significant ally in the region is the Republic of the
Philippines and the United States and the Philippines have
maintained a deep multigeneration relationship that includes
bilateral security alliance, extensive military cooperation,
close people-to-people ties, and many shared strategic and
economic interests.
And as you are all aware, the Philippines, China, and other
countries have long-standing disputes over waters and land
features in the South China Sea. And as a result tensions have
risen sharply over the last decade as China has enlarged and
placed military assets on several disputed features in the
South China Sea.
Just recently our DOD has announced the location of four
new naval bases in the Philippines to include three on the
northeastern part of the island chain. And I applaud those
efforts to keep in check the growing threats of China and I am
optimistic about our efforts to achieve deterrence through
strength in the region. And it is crucial that we continue to
position ourselves and have regional readiness in the region.
And, Admiral, my first question is for you. In your
testimony you discussed how important--excuse me, how our
competitors seek to challenge U.S. dominance in all domains
including space and cyber.
Admiral Aquilino. Sure.
Mr. LaLota. And to maintain our warfighting advantage U.S.
INDOPACOM requires resilient and flexible space and cyber
capabilities and we need to continue to integrate these
capabilities into activities and exercises with our allies and
partners in the region.
And so given these new bases and recent joint training
exercises in the Philippines do you envision any additional
resources or manpower that will be needed that are currently
unplanned for? And the question is for everybody.
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. I appreciate the
question. It's good to meet with you as well.
I just want to--one point of clarification. So the sites
that we have coordinated with the Philippines will certainly
not be U.S. bases, right? So those are Philippine sovereign
territory that we will work with them to be able to invest in
and build out so that the Philippines and the United States can
operate together whenever needed to both exercise and rehearse.
That said, those agreements are just going through. So as a
part of INDOPACOM's plan for developing those four places, we
have not even done the assessment, nor have we identified any
planning and design or ultimately coordination with our
Philippine partners on what things are best invested in. So we
have way more work to do. None of those requirements are in my
1254 report. Those will be for future years. But having the
ability to work with our critical ally, the Philippines, we
need to build those out as quick as possible.
And thanks for your service. The team is still supporting
the Philippines down south where you operated from.
Mr. LaLota. Great. Just to follow up on that, Admiral, I am
familiar--I am sure we are using that through, by, and with
method still with Philippines and some other neighbors and
partners in the area. When do you expect to more specifically
drill down to this committee to what resources you need to help
advance a presence through, by, and with our Filipino
counterparts?
Admiral Aquilino. So in my current report, Congressman,
there are identified projects that we would like to build out
in the current sites that they've agreed with that we have
started work on. For the four additional sites, those will show
up next year in that report.
Mr. LaLota. Thanks, Admiral. I appreciate your time and
your efforts.
Chairman, I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes Mr. Horsford for 5 minutes.
Mr. Horford. Thank you very much, Chairman Rogers and
Ranking Member Smith, for holding this important hearing.
As the 2022 U.S. National Security Strategy stated, the
Indo-Pacific is the epicenter of the 21st century geopolitics.
The Indo-Pacific theater encompasses over 35 countries, 15 time
zones, and is home to over half of the world's population. It
is evident to me that success in the region will be a result of
multilateral approaches.
Secretary Austin has stated that we must use every tool at
the Department of Defense's disposal in close collaboration
with our counterparts across the U.S. Government and with
allies and partners to ensure that potential foes understand
the folly of aggression.
The work that we do with our allies and partners plays a
crucial part of our ability to deter conflict. As you know, my
district includes Nellis Air Force Base who, aligned with the
National Defense Strategy, have focused their red flag
exercises on the Indo-Pacific theater and the pacing challenges
alongside our allied partners.
So how are we collaborating with our allies and our
partners to build an advantage and deter any challenges that we
may face in the region? And how are you working with our
counterparts and the U.S. Government to address issues in the
Indo-Pacific? And what can Congress do to further assist in
those efforts?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, I'll jump in first here on this
one. As you alluded to in your comments, deterrence holds in
this region for two reasons: One is because we have the right
capabilities postured at the right level of readiness; and
secondly, because our allies and partners are standing with us.
And in that regard I would say that we're doing more than ever
with respect to advancing our relationships with our allies and
partners.
In Japan, we're watching their--the Japanese Diet increase
the defense budget by over 25 percent just in the next year.
They've supported a counterstrike capability and they are now
offering to host a U.S. Marine littoral regiment in Japan for
the very first time.
The AUKUS arrangement is a historic opportunity for us to
be able to put increasing capability in the undersea domain and
to increase interoperability with two of our most capable
allies.
This is the sort of story that we're seeing repeated
throughout the region right now among all of our defense treaty
allies, but beyond that as well with all of our partners. And
so when we're talking about having the right capabilities and
watching defense budgets support that in--postured in the way
that actually does create the right kind of deterrent effects
to our adversaries, all of that is underway right now and we
are breathing oxygen into that work every single day.
Admiral Aquilino. Yes, Congressman, as it applies from the
training lens, right, so we do a--like I said, 120 exercises,
operations. The training aspect of our allies and partners is
critical. Some of them come to your State and go to the gold
standard, right, of Nellis for the Air Force, Fallon for the
Navy. And the intent that we're trying to push in the approach
is to take that level of training and connect it from Nellis to
Australia to Alaska to Guam to Japan. And if you were to think
about a training range that spanned that size and scope, and
allies and partners from anywhere in the region could jump in
and get high-end training like you're used to and the Air Force
is used to at Nellis, that's a pretty good path forward. That's
our approach.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you for the recognition of the great
work that our service members are doing at Nellis and beyond.
Finally, we know in States like Nevada many of our
constituents are feeling the effects of the climate crisis
every day. And the Indo-Pacific theater also experiences some
of the world's most damaging events. Often they are fast-
occurring and unpredictable. So what are some of the actions
that are being taken towards work around climate resiliency?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, the first thing that we're doing
right now is spending a lot of time with our allies and
partners in the region talking about what they're seeing in
terms of impacts of climate change, in particular for defense
and security requirements where our department is most focused.
And to that regard we are looking at ways to mitigate those
impacts, whether it's related to infrastructure or energy
security. And I do think over time investments that we need to
be making into green technologies that support our defense
requirements and those of our allies and partners will be
absolutely critical in the coming years.
Mr. Horsford. Okay. Thank you.
Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, I've provided--my
organization has done a 30-year prediction on what each of
those nations might be seeing coming their way and they can use
that for understanding preparedness. And as we've worked
projects and other things we make sure we're supporting
anything through the concerns of climate impacts.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you very much.
The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
We are going to do--we have been called for votes. We are
going to do one more witness on each side. It will be Mr. Mills
and Ms. Tokuda and then we are going to call it a day.
So, Mr. Mills, you are recognized for 5 minutes at most.
Mr. Mills. Yes, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will make
this pretty brief.
On multiple occasions we have dealt with people from the
Biden administration within the Department of Defense and the
Department of State. And as I have tried to offer up many
times, the recognition of how we view China is very different
from my perspective of where we are from an economic, resource,
cyber, and other types of aspects of warfare that is being
launched against us. And unfortunately for often far too long
we look at everything from kinetic ability.
So this question is for you, Mr. Royal. When we are doing
all this preparedness to try and identify how we can thwart the
efforts of warfare from China's aggression, do we recognize
them as anything greater than just a competitor, but as an
actual adversary?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, the term that we use in the
National Defense Strategy is the pacing challenge for the
Department.
Mr. Mills. Do we recognize them as anything other than a
competitor?
Mr. Royal. Congressman, we can all get into different
definitions of what is competitor, what is challenger, what is
adversary. Pacing challenge is a term that we believe sets our
sights on a trajectory that allows us to do what we need to do
to be able to make sure that we are defending and deterring
every single day.
Mr. Mills. Okay. Why don't we frame it this way? How does
the CCP view America?
Mr. Royal. I'd be happy to talk with you in a classified
session about our assessments of the CCP's----
Mr. Mills. Well, it is pretty simple. I think that when
they are actually trying to go after us from an economic and
resource perspective or trying to eliminate the U.S. dollar
from being a global currency to ensure they throw us into
hyperinflation; they are trying to encircle us by utilizing the
Road and Belt Initiative as well as economic coercion in Panama
and Honduras to control the tariffs and taxation of the Panama
Canal; when they are actually releasing out of the Darien Gap
the fentanyl that is killing tens of thousands of Americans
every single year in America; when they are utilizing the
marriage of convenience with Russia to try and advance
themselves with the SHAWAs [Streamlined Health and WASH
Activities] of Venezuela, Petro Colombia, and the Cubans, which
are 90 miles off our--I am fairly confident they don't view us
as a competitor or to outpace us, but as an adversary that they
intend to utilize things like even the WHO [World Health
Organization] and WEF [World Economic Forum] to try and create
this hegemony, which is what Chairman Xi is actually looking to
do from the very beginning.
In saying all that, let's talk about economic resource
capability and capacity. Admiral, you have been very forthright
with us even in our closed-door session on where we need to be
at. In the event of a CCP invasion of Taiwan, what role would
the Indian Ocean play in shipping critical supplies and
resources to our partners and allies and could the Indian Ocean
supply chains constrain the PRC aggression?
Admiral Aquilino. Thanks, Congressman. So again no matter
what would happen in the world, a free flow of product commerce
to our allies and partners and from the United States, right--
it's not only the allies and partners and friends in the
region, but it's the EU, it's the U.K. We would come together
to ensure that free flow of commerce could happen for all those
nations. And it's also a vulnerability for the other side.
Mr. Mills. And that is exactly what I was getting to, which
is that in identifying and trying to prevent, yes, we can
continue to try and be a porcupine so that China looks at it
and says that it is not a viable option right now. But also I
think exposing their vulnerabilities to track them away from
the invasion, to allow them to try and strengthen up their
vulnerabilities, which could buy us the precious time that we
need to get our industrial base where it has to be to support a
war of this magnitude.
And so have we looked at how we strengthen the
quadrilateral agreements, or the Quad as it is referred to,
with India to ensure that we have that capability to try and
expose these vulnerabilities?
Admiral Aquilino. We're certainly working with our Indian
partners both to advance our warfighting capabilities together,
to ensure that we're sharing information that's needed. Again,
we do have the same strategic competitor, or whatever
definition we want to put on it. And in my time over the--in
the theater now for 5 years straight it has increased
exponentially. And again, it's trending in the right direction.
They're really good partners.
Mr. Mills. I agree. And I think that our strengthening, as
we saw under the Trump administration with Modi, it is to their
economic advantage to weaken China's aggression from an
economic coercive stance, but also it is to our advantage to
find reliable resource and economic partners that we can
conduct not only just trade, but security cooperations in the
area to ensure that we have stability in operations that are
sustainable for decades to come.
Thank you so much, gentlemen. With that I yield back.
The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from--the gentlelady
from Hawaii----
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you so much.
The Chairman [continuing]. Ms. Tokuda, for 5 minutes.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
For decades our country has enjoyed a close relationship
with the Freely Associated States under the Compact of Free
Association, especially in my home State of Hawaii where
thousands of FAS citizens live and work contributing to our
diverse communities.
Ambassador Joseph Yun alongside the Department of State and
the Department of the Interior has been leading the efforts to
renegotiate these compacts and send them to Congress for
approval before they expire. But to me, the Department of
Defense, especially U.S. INDOPACOM, remains the primary
beneficiary of these compacts.
Admiral Aquilino, I think we both agree on the strategic
importance of these compacts. Briefly, how important is it for
Congress to act quickly to renew these agreements when they are
sent to Congress for review and approval?
Admiral Aquilino. Aloha, Congresswoman. Thank you. It is
critically important. Ambassador Yun and I have spent time
together. I've offered my support wherever and whenever needed.
I've hosted him in the headquarters. Again, when we say it's
beneficial, it's beneficial to the United States.
The largest number of military service per capita comes out
of the Freely Associated States. We defend them as if they were
the U.S. homeland. And it's critical that we get these
agreements across the goal line.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you. I also want to add that the PRC is
working aggressively as you know to undermine our relationships
with our FAS allies. Last month President David Panuelo of the
Federated States of Micronesia [FSM] wrote a shocking letter
detailing the extensive influence campaigns and political
warfare that the PRC is conducting in his country. His letter
is a bold move to assert that FSM sovereignty through
transparency. And I hope this committee will join me in
applauding his courage and his service to his country.
Now INDOPACOM's independent assessment for fiscal year 2024
included several military contract--construction projects for
harbor and port infrastructure in the Federated States of
Micronesia and the Republic of Palau. These projects are
possible in part because of the compacts and the access they
provide.
Admiral, what is the importance of these types of projects
in the Freely Associated States? What value are these projects
delivering for our FAS allies?
Admiral Aquilino. And, Congresswoman, for the United States
to have the--we talked a little bit before about access,
basing, and overflight. You know, those places are critical.
They're much needed. To have them in the Freely Associated
States provides a level of defense that's beneficial.
And I would once--say one thing about the President Panuelo
letter. I'd sat with him just a couple of weeks ago. His letter
was far from shocking for me. And it's a good read for
everybody because it's the model being utilized all across the
region by the PRC that he shined some light on. It was well
done.
Ms. Tokuda. Thank you, Admiral.
With the remaining time I have, I would like to expound on
our military presence in Okinawa. As a fourth-generation
Okinawan-American and Hawaii resident I feel more acutely than
most the impacts of our presence there and the similarities
that exist between my homeland and my home.
Like Hawaii, Okinawa is strategically important to our
defense posture in the Indo-Pacific and it too is home to a
significant U.S. military presence with all the benefits and
the challenges that come with it.
The planned relocation of Marine Corps Air Station Futenma
to Henoko Bay has been delayed into the next decade.
Significant environmental and ecological challenges to this
plan in addition to local political opposition beg the question
of when this relocation will ever be completed and if so, at
what cost?
In the past 7 years it has been revealed that there is PFAS
[per- and polyfluoroalkyl substances] contamination of
waterways, soil, and drinking water around the Kadena and
Futenma bases. Blood tests conducted by Kyoto University in
2019 found elevated PFAS concentration in residents' blood,
strongly suggesting potential exposure to not just Okinawan
residents, but our own U.S. service members to PFAS compounds.
There is no denying Okinawa's strategic importance to our
posture in the Indo-Pacific. My two island homes are destined
to play a role in the story of this era and I am very proud of
that. I only ask that our witnesses here today consider a
whole-of-government approach as we define and strengthen our
relationship with both Okinawa and Hawaii. More than just a
location for our fleets and our bases, these islands and her
people are our allies that should be included in future
decision making as we work to secure and defend the region.
Mahalo for your time, and I yield back. Thank you, Mr.
Chair.
The Chairman. Thank you. What I would like to do, since
nobody else has scooted in is--okay. I was going to give them
time.
But, listen, I want to thank you all for your patience and
your service and being here today.
And, with that, we are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 1:40 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 18, 2023
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
April 18, 2023
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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 18, 2023
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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KIM
Mr. Royal. The Republic of Korea (ROK) and Japan are two of our
most important allies in the Indo-Pacific region. We continue to
encourage both countries to seek ways to cooperate further through
bilateral and multilateral activities on security matters. We are
encouraged by the summit that was held between Japanese Prime Minister
Kishida and ROK President Yoon in Seoul on May 7-8 to discuss the
bolstering of bilateral ties. For U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral
cooperation, it is critical that we maintain strong and close
relationships between our three countries to meet the shared challenges
posed by the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the
People's Republic of China (PRC). The Department of Defense is
currently working to further security cooperation through the
regularization of trilateral exercises and the implementation of a
presidential-level commitment to share DPRK missile warning data in
near-real time between the United States, the ROK, and Japan. These
efforts are building greater interoperability and preparedness among
our forces to help maintain peace and security in the region and uphold
the rules-based international order. As outlined in the National
Defense Strategy, cooperation with allies such as the ROK and Japan
provide the United States with an advantage in dealing with regional
threats and is critical to building enduring advantages for the future
force. [See page 36.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Royal. The Department supports using all available authorities
and corresponding appropriations, in coordination with interagency
partners, to bolster Taiwan's self-defense. I will emphasize that the
Department is accelerating the provision of both materiel and non-
materiel support to Taiwan to enhance cross-Strait deterrence.
Department staff are engaged in regular discussions with Members of the
Committee and their staff members about this specific matter, and I
would welcome the opportunity to discuss this further in a classified
setting. [See page 34.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN
Mr. Royal. The differences between Ukraine and Taiwan are just as
important as their similarities. We can draw some important lessons
from Ukraine that can apply to Taiwan, including the importance of
building a civilian defense capacity as a critical component of an
overall self-defense strategy. Ukraine's rapid mobilization orders,
activation of conscripts and reservists, and efforts to equip citizens
in supporting the country's defense against Russian aggression were,
and remain, critical. Taiwan has indeed taken recent steps along these
lines, including by enhancing the readiness of its Armed Forces through
increased training and resources, as well as elevating the role of
reserve forces in crisis and contingency planning. We applaud these
important steps by Taiwan, and the Department continues to support
these efforts through our comprehensive security cooperation efforts.
Our ongoing security cooperation will continue to prioritize efforts
that build Taiwan's preparedness--including fundamental capability and
capacity building, modernization, and sustainment to ensure Taiwan is
organized, trained, and equipped for a range of potential
contingencies. [See page 38.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 18, 2023
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. What message would it send to the PRC if European Navies
routinely patrolled the Taiwan Strait?
Admiral Aquilino. Congressman, I would respectfully suggest a
different characterization--neither we nor our allies ``patrol'' the
Taiwan Strait. Our air and maritime transits of the Taiwan Strait are
conducted within a corridor that is beyond the territorial sea of any
coastal state, where high-seas freedoms of navigation and overflight
apply. Such transits demonstrate U.S. commitment to uphold a free and
open Indo-Pacific by flying, sailing, and operating wherever
international law allows. When our allies and partners fly or sail
through the Taiwan Strait, they demonstrate their commitment to the
rules-based international order.
Mr. Scott. Is there a role for the E-11A BACN in the USINDOPACOM
area of responsibility?
Admiral Aquilino. There is a role for Battlefield Airborne
Communications Node (BACN) capability in the Indo-Pacific to support
Joint All Domain Command and Control (JADC2). Peer competition
necessitates resilient communications and data links for our joint
forces. USINDOPACOM is agnostic of the platform but requires any
solution to be persistent and operationally effective in all contested
domains.
Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Coast Guard be better utilized in the
USINDOPACOM area of responsibility?
Admiral Aquilino. The U.S. Coast Guard's (USCG) mix of maritime law
enforcement authorities and capabilities make it ideal to promote a
free and open Indo-Pacific region. Their presence in this region
strengthens regional maritime governance, enhances Allied and partner
nation maritime capabilities, and deepens those maritime relationships.
The USCG is a vital instrument of national security, humanitarian
assistance, regulatory authority, and law enforcement that supports
USINDOPACOM's Theater Campaign Plan and U.S. national interests. The
USCG provides enormous impact in the region with these unique
authorities and is fully integrated with USINDOPACOM and JIATF-W. The
USCG's actions reinforces that the U.S. is a dedicated and present
partner, which counters the PRC's increased presence in the Indo-
Pacific. We welcome USCG expansion and enduring presence in the region,
to include recapitalized surface and air fleets, new infrastructure,
and increased workforce strength.
Mr. Scott. Does the U.S. Navy's command ships provide greater
survivability and more flexibility than land-based counterparts?
Admiral Aquilino. Command ships provide additional survivability
and flexibility for the joint force commander and complements the
capability of command nodes ashore. The immense size of the Indo-
Pacific, as well as peer competitors' access to improved targeting
systems, means that the joint force requires a variety of capable
options for operational command and control of forces.
Mr. Scott. How can we expect to engage with merchant mariners from
Allied/Partner nations if U.S. merchant mariners are not allowed to
participate in planning exercises and wargames?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM does not plan or execute exercises or
``wargames'' with merchant marines. The U.S. Merchant Marine (USMM) is
managed by the Department of Transportation's Maritime Administration
(MARAD) and consists of privately-owned, U.S.-registered merchant ships
and vessels that provide waterborne transportation for passengers and
cargo moving in domestic and international commerce. There are no
training requirements for merchant mariners outside of what the U.S.
Coast Guard has designated to maintain their certificates/licenses. Any
U.S. or allied/partner merchant mariner participation inside of
USINDOPACOM exercises is as a ``service provider'', specifically they
are operating a vessel inside of an exercise to facilitate support but
do not have any training objectives to be satisfied by exercise
participation.
Mr. Scott. What additional assistance can the United States Coast
Guard provide to the Philippine Coast Guard?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM and USCG are synchronized across the
spectrum of activities, with USCG's unique capabilities and authorities
supporting the USINDOPACOM Theater Campaign Plan. USCG additional
efforts with Philippines Coast Guard (PCG) include greater training
with a new Southeast Asia Training Team coming online, and intentions
to double USCG operations and footprint in the region over the next few
years. USCG and USINDOPACOM have a shared effort to advance information
sharing and cooperation across maritime law enforcement, fisheries,
Search and Rescue, and other core coast guard missions. Areas of
potential cooperation include bilateral ``ship rider'' agreements for
enforcing maritime law within the Philippines EEZ as well as joint
patrol opportunities with USCG. The USCG's Indo-Pacific Support Cutter,
the USCGC HARRIET LANE, is purpose-built for bi- and multi-lateral
engagements. The USCG is looking at ways to further bolster the PCG's
fleet readiness with additional subject matter expert (SME) exchanges
and industrial/materiel support alongside existing U.S. facility and
capability capacity building efforts already underway. The USCG is the
executive agent for the six-member Southeast Asia Maritime Law
Enforcement Initiative (SEAMLEI) Commanders' Forum, which seeks to
enhance multi-lateral cooperation between the PCG and other member
coast guards, and created a first-ever Standard Operating Procedure
(SOP) for combined coast guard operations.
Mr. Scott. How unprepared is the U.S. Transportation Command to
meet your requirements?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM advocates for the air and sealift
required to meet our operational and strategic mobility requirements.
Doing so enables continual improvement in USTRANSCOM's ability to
satisfy USINDOPACOM's strategic lift and fuel requirements. USINDOPACOM
and USTRANSCOM will continue to coordinate to achieve operational
requirements
Mr. Scott. How unprepared is the Military Sealift Command to meet
your requirements?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM advocates for the sealift
capabilities required to meet our requirements in the AOR. The
implementation of a Jones Act waiver during periods of crisis will
substantially increase our sealift capabilities. Simultaneously, this
waiver would increase the flexibility to balance the employment of
military and civilian strategic lift across the AOR.
Mr. Scott. How unprepared is the Maritime Administration (MARAD) to
meet your requirements?
Admiral Aquilino. USINDOPACOM relies on the combined efforts of
MARAD, USTRANSCOM, and U.S. commercial industry to meet our sealift
requirements. Achieving sufficient inventory of tanker and cargo
sealift to meet our operational requirements is an area that MARAD
continues to assess and work solutions. USINDOPACOM advocates for the
air and sealift required to meet operational and strategic needs.
Mr. Scott. During World War II, many nations operated seaplanes. Is
there a need for seaplanes today in the USINDOPACOM area of
responsibility?
Admiral Aquilino. The Indo-Pacific operational environment has
evolved significantly since World War II. The employment of seaplanes
today would not meet the operational demands and current threat
scenario. However, we support the continuous development of new and
innovative solutions that may provide solutions to logistical
challenges. As an example, DARPA's Liberty Lifter X-Plane seeks to
leverage emerging technologies that may demonstrate seaborne strategic
and tactical lift capabilities.
Mr. Scott. Are there any nations in your AOR you would like added
to the National Guard's State Partnership Program on an accelerated
basis?
Admiral Aquilino. For FY24, USINDOPACOM is nominating Palau for
partnership with the Guam National Guard. For future years (FY25-FY33),
USINDOPACOM prioritizes developing State partnerships with Brunei,
Laos, Solomon Islands, and Vanuatu. These countries have not formally
or informally asked for a partnership, but Laos and Vanuatu have been
introduced to the program and its benefits.
Mr. Scott. Is there a mission for an expanded number of hospital
ships in the USINDOPACOM area of responsibility should the U.S. Navy
expand the size of their hospital ship fleet in the future?
Admiral Aquilino. Currently, the joint force does not have
sufficient at-sea capacity to meet the medical and surgical needs of
the joint force. In particular, USINDOPACOM requires additional
hospital ship capacity to meet the force's current tertiary care needs.
In addition to hospital ships, USINDOPACOM needs expeditionary at-sea
hospital capability. This is because the two hospital ships, due to
their size and ship draft, only provide partial coverage of the AOR
while at the same time requiring a large medical staff. In addition to
hospital ships, options to improve at-sea medical capability and
capacity in maritime and littoral operations include:
Expeditionary Fast Transport (T-EPF) Flight II--Increase
medical capacity by providing high-speed sealift mobility and agility.
Amphibious assault ships--Provide robust medical and
surgical capability when augmented by medical teams.
Platform agnostic expeditionary surgical teams can also
augment almost any afloat platform and provide medical/surgical
capability with limited requirement for patient holding.
Mr. Scott. Is there a role for the E-11A BACN on the Korean
peninsula?
General LaCamera. We continue to consider the concept of operation
for the E-11A Battlefield Airborne Communication Node (BACN) platform
for the Korea Theater of Operations. The E-11A was a tremendous asset
to military operations during Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING
FREEDOM. The platform provided the ability to relay communications
signals, including air and ground tracks, with high bandwidth
communication capabilities, fusing the battlefield into one network.
While Korea's mountainous terrain has similarities to the Afghanistan
theater, the Korean peninsula is a much smaller landmass with densely
packed communication infrastructure. Unlike in the Middle East, we are
not intrinsically challenged by extended distances, lack of ground-
based repeaters, or more geographically distributed fighter/bomber
caps. The operational requirement for the E-11A could be considered
later in conflict after air superiority has been established, to help
address pockets of communication gaps once we have entered stability
operations. We will work with our US Components to continue exploring
the concept of operations for the E-11A BACN to enhance operations on
the Korean peninsula.
Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Coast Guard be better integrated with
United States Forces Korea?
General LaCamera. The United States is an active participant in
multiple Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) exercises to include
the Republic of Korea (RoK)-hosted Eastern Endeavor Exercise 2023,
which took place on 31 May and included forces from the RoK, Japan, and
the United States, in addition to other partners. The exercise
demonstrated interoperability and encouraged follow-on dialogue for
exercises with other partners. We continue to explore training
opportunities with the RoK and the U.S. Coast Guard to further develop
capabilities in Multi Domain Operations.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. STEFANIK
Ms. Stefanik. Does INDOPACOM and other combatant commands have the
ability, through commercial means or otherwise, to measure ``Will To
Resist'' or and other measures of on-the-ground civilian sentiment in
the Pacific theater, specifically in Taiwan? If your command does not,
do you have plans to acquire those means?
Admiral Aquilino. Every day, we execute our responsibilities on the
Taiwan Relations Act. USINDOPACOM leverages interagency and non
government organization methodologies, assessments and surveys to
assist in measuring Taiwan's will to prepare, fight, and resist. The
current methods and means available are sufficient in informing our
decision-making and assessments in how to best assist Taiwan and its
self-defense. Ultimately, USINDOPACOM is primarily focused on enhancing
Taiwan's ability to fight, an indispensable complement to their will to
fight.
Ms. Stefanik. Can you discuss how you utilize HUMINT to augment
efforts to identify secure basing and personnel and equipment movement?
Are there other means with which you are able to identify logistical
challenges, commercial or otherwise? How are you measuring the
effectiveness of the Pacific Pathways exercises among our partners and
allies in the region. Can you discuss how you measure that?
Admiral Aquilino. We utilize all available sources of data to
assess risk and identify mitigation strategies when seeking to validate
suitable basing locations and logistics routes that prioritize the
security of our personnel and resources. Pacific Pathways, now termed
OPERATION PATHWAYS, is U.S. Army Pacific's number one operational
shaping activity in the Indo-Pacific. Exercises such as YAMA SAKURA,
KEEN SWORD, COBRA GOLD, and BALIKATAN support both partnership and
posture goals within and beyond the First Island Chain. Each PATHWAYS-
supported exercise is deliberately assessed against the Theater Army
Campaign Plan's lines of effort, with key assessment metrics focused on
deterring potential adversaries and reassuring our allies and partners.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
Mr. Gallagher. Admiral Aquilino, I would like to give you the
opportunity to clarify the remarks that you made in response to my
question about current munitions stockpiles within the Indo-Pacific
theater. At an unclassified level, how do you assess the risk that we
assume within the Indo-Pacific theater if we fail to prioritize and
increase the size of missile stockpiles from what we currently possess
west of the international date line? Please elaborate on the importance
of the investments in a Joint Fires Network and in Integrated Maritime
Fires that you lay out in your Section 1254 report.
Admiral Aquilino. As we learned from the conflict in Ukraine,
munitions stockpiles are critically important both for deterrence and
while in conflict. If we fail to prioritize increasing the size of
missile stockpiles west of the international dateline, we incur severe
risk to our overall deterrence strategy for peer competitors in the
Indo-Pacific Theater. In the event of conflict, insufficient missile
stockpiles present a high level of risk to mission and to our platforms
and personnel who would lack sufficient standoff munitions needed to
confront an adversary. The Integrated Maritime Fires requirements
outlined in the Section 1254 report outline my highest priority
munitions (Maritime Strike Tomahawk, Long Range Anti-Ship Missile,
Standard Missile 6 1B, Joint Strike Missile, Precision Strike Missile
Increment 2, and others listed in my unfunded priority list) which
would be critical to a conflict in the Western Pacific. I would like to
accelerate the development and acquisition of these weapons systems
identified in the budget, and it is essential that we increase the
inventories of these munitions, or others providing similar capability.
he Joint Fires Network is equally critical because it will enable
joint, all-domain fires at the speed and scale necessary for a high-end
warfighting conflict in the Indo-Pacific theater, through improving the
pace, synchronization, and efficiency of our munitions and non-kinetic
effects employment.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GOLDEN
Mr. Golden. Admiral Aquilino, as you noted in your prepared
testimony the PLA's rapid military buildup includes the addition of 17
major warships in 2022, increasing the PLA Navy battle force ships to
around 350. China currently has the world's largest Navy, and by 2025,
the PLA Navy is expected to grow to 400 ships, then to 440 ships by
2030.
In contrast, our Navy currently has 298 ships and our fleet size is
expected to decrease in the coming years, contrary to the current
national policy for a 355 ship fleet and to the reported 373-ship
force- level goal from the Navy's Battle Force Ship Assessment and
Requirement Report. Although no one would deny that the U.S. Navy's
ships are of superior quality to their Chinese counterparts, as the
saying goes quantity can be a quality of its own. Moreover, I am
concerned that China, aided by consistently increasing shipbuilding
industrial base capacity, appears to be fielding increasingly capable
surface combatants, including the new Type 055 Cruiser/Large Destroyer,
which reportedly may be able to field directed energy weapon systems.
Others and I on this committee continue to be concerned with the
lack of necessary investment in our shipbuilding defense industrial
base, and given China's consistently expanding naval fleet and
capability, this is becoming an issue of the utmost urgency.
Can you please describe how China's expanding naval capability
impacts the INDOPACOM area of operations? Can you describe what
concerns you may have regarding how China's ability to grow its fleet
so consistently may impact our force structure and presence in the
area?
Admiral Aquilino. The growth of the PLA Navy allows China to
conduct more operations and to sustain a higher operational tempo than
we've seen previously. Even so, the PLA Navy remains a regional force,
with an overwhelming percentage of their operations and exercises
conducted within the First or Second Island Chains. The PLAN does
execute a small number of extra-regional deployments for area
familiarization, naval diplomacy, occasional humanitarian assistance,
or in support of counter-piracy efforts. This has at least three
specific impacts within the Indo-Pacific. First, it allows the PRC to
project a more engaged and committed image, though I would note the
PRC's humanitarian efforts, for example, continue to lag other nations
and organizations both in time and scale. Second, it has allowed the
CCP to increase pressure against Taiwan and rival South and East China
Sea claimant states. And third, it has thickened the PLA presence in
the western Pacific in the event of a crisis. This changing reality in
the Indo-Pacific demands a U.S. military posture with both the right
capabilities and capacity that can deter a crisis, and, if required,
fight and win.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. McCLAIN
Mrs. McClain. Admiral Aquilino, your unfunded priorities list this
year again includes funding--almost $100M this year--for the
Quickstrike-Powered JDAM standoff naval mine system. Can you please
explain the importance of this capability--and its related Maritime
Strike Weapons--to your plans? Why are standoff munitions like this so
important to the defense of Taiwan?
Admiral Aquilino. Naval mines are a cost-effective means to
exercise strategic influence over naval and amphibious operations in
our plans and specifically to the defense of Taiwan. Mines provide
improved deterrence and defeat options at the onset of an adversary
military campaign. Additionally, advanced maritime mining significantly
delays and disrupts adversary operational timelines, which allows
greater time for the joint force to flow into the theater and provide
an extended opportunity for joint force fires to attrite adversary
maritime vessels.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. JACKSON
Dr. Jackson. For the first time since 1987, the Marine Corps does
not own any tactical UAS; the RQ-21 Blackjack flew its last flight in
March 2023 as part of the Force Design 2030 ``divest to invest''
strategy. However, the Marine Corps still has a validated requirement
for a shipboard-capable vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) UAS per the
Marine Corps Unmanned Expeditionary UAS (MUX) program. This would have
particular utility in the USINDOPACOM AOR, especially if it has long
range, endurance, and the ability to operate from austere locations.
Admiral Aquilino, do you see a capability gap in your AOR for a
tactical (Group 3 sized) VTOL UAS that is capable for all ship classes
and of supporting forces ashore? What UAS are currently supporting
deployed Marine Expeditionary Units in your AOR? Is the Marine Corps or
the Science and Technology community actively developing a shipboard-
capable UAS? If so, what attributes would you prioritize highest?
Admiral Aquilino. In 2022, the Department of the Navy awarded a
$135.8M contract to supply eight MQ-9A Extended Range drones for the
U.S. Marine Corps. The unmanned aerial systems are scheduled for
delivery by late 2023 as part of the Marine Air Ground Task Force
Unmanned Expeditionary (MUC) Program of Record. USINDOPACOM continues
to prioritize capabilities that increase the Marine Littoral Regiment's
domain awareness to enable Joint Fires. Marine Corps Unmanned
Expeditionary UAS (MUX) is a family of systems with MQ-9A providing the
Medium Altitude Long Endurance (MALE) capability to the MEUs from
ashore, while Small UAS (Group 1-2) are employed at the battalion and
below level. V-BAT (Group 3 UAS) is currently supporting VTOL UAS
requirements for MEUs under a Contractor Owned/Contractor Operated
contract, the capabilities and flexible employment models being
executed with MQ-9A provide a more capable product to the supported
forces. HQMC Marine Corps Warfighting Lab is researching and investing
in additional MUX-Medium Altitude Long Endurance payloads and the MQ-9B
as a future replacement to the MQ-9A (although the MQ-9 is not a
shipboard capability).
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. MACE
Ms. Mace. Admiral Aquilino and Mr. Royal, you have both stated the
importance of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) as one of the
cornerstones of the US Security architecture in Oceania, along with
other Freely Associated States (FAS). The Compact of Free Association
(COFA) agreements with the FAS provide them economic assistance along
with defense posture opportunities in the Indo-Pacific. I also agree
these allies are extremely important to maintain geographically.
However, the outgoing President David Panuelo recently disclosed the
initiatives he has taken to push ahead with a diplomatic realignment in
favor of Taiwan, saying the nation ``will be much better off without
China. Yet the 22nd FSM Congress recently adopted a Congressional
Resolution states their ``One-China'' policy remains the official
policy of the islands, and they instruct their outgoing President not
to make any changes to their diplomatic relations with China. In fact
it was also quoted in their official press release ``the nation's
diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China is an example
of its consistent policy which over time has only strengthened and
become significantly beneficial to both sides''. Mr. Royal, as the COFA
agreement is currently under renegotiation before it expires in 2023,
is this concerning in regard to the nation's defense? Where does the US
stand on our allies' relations with the PRC?
Mr. Royal. The Pacific Islands' geography connects the United
States with the broader Indo-Pacific region; U.S. prosperity and
security depend on the future of the Indo-Pacific region remaining free
and open. The Department of Defense continues to enjoy exclusive
military access to the Freely Associated States under the provisions of
the Compacts of Free Association (COFA). We strive to be a trusted
defense partner and welcome the conclusion of the negotiations with the
Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) for the extension of Compact-
related economic assistance. We believe that renewed funding for the
COFA through congressional appropriation is in our national security
interest. President Panuelo's letter highlighting the political
interference from the People's Republic of China (PRC) that many Indo-
Pacific countries face serves to underscore the importance of the COFA
agreement in preserving regional peace and security. Countries around
the world, including Pacific Island countries, have a vital interest in
a free and open international system. We do not ask countries to choose
between the United States and the PRC. Rather, our efforts are aimed at
preserving an international order where all countries, regardless of
size or strength, have freedom to choose policies that serve their
interests. The Department will continue to seek opportunities for
further engagement and collaboration, including through the COFA
agreements, with the FSM to strengthen and safeguard security in the
Indo-Pacific region.
Ms. Mace. If Congress were to fully fund the JTF-M does INDOPACOM
currently have the workforce to execute all of the construction
projects across Guam? Is there anything Congress and the Department of
Defense can do to increase the available workforce to complete these
military construction projects? Is there a risk to national security by
extending the H2-B visas to increase the workforce in Guam?
Admiral Aquilino. Joint Task Force Micronesia (JTF-M) provides an
operational headquarters to oversee DoD operations in its area of
responsibility, which will be the Guam cluster and include Guam and
U.S. Territories (CNMI, Wake Island, and Midway Island) and also
include the Freely Associated States (FAS), which consist of the
Federated States of Micronesia, Republic of Palau, and the Republic of
the Marshall Island. Fully funding JTF-M will provide the resources
necessary to meet the FY23 NDAA requirement of establishing a JTF in
the INDOPACOM Area of Responsibility. This mission is separate from
execution and oversight of Military Construction (MILCON) which falls
under the purview of Joint Region Marianas and the military components.
The Department requires relief from the H-2B visa restrictions through
at least 2029 to be able to field the workforce required for our
construction needs. A longer-term extension, beyond the current date of
December 31, 2024, helps meet the Department's requirements and deliver
critical military construction projects on time. There is minimal risk
to national security in extending the H2-B visas for Guam and the CNMI.
Workers go through a thorough vetting process prior to receiving a
visa.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TOKUDA
Ms. Tokuda. Multiple significant aspects of the environment in the
Korean theater of operations--like weapons capabilities and force
employment strategies--have recently changed and continue to evolve at
a relatively rapid pace. Some of these changes may alter the basic
assumptions on which operational plans utilized by the U.S. and our
allies are built. Given that ROK and Japan appear to be more closely
aligned on security issues than at any previous time, is there a good
technical solution for agile collaborative planning between the U.S.
and our allies, and particularly between allies, like the ROK and
Japan? How can current planning capabilities be improved?
General LaCamera. Deepening U.S.-Republic of Korea-Japan trilateral
cooperation, collaboration, and partnership is vital for addressing the
most pressing challenges of the 21st century. In November 2022,
President Biden, President Yoon, and Prime Minister Kishida released a
joint statement reaffirming our trilateral partnership guided by shared
values, driven by innovation, and committed to shared prosperity and
security. This statement commits each country to share Democratic
People's Republic of Korea missile warning data in real time. USFK
along with US Forces Japan, INDOPACOM, and the Department of Defense,
are working with the ROK and Japan to implement this commitment.
Additionally, as noted in the April 2023 U.S.-ROK-Japan Defense
Trilateral Talks joint statement, each country committed to an annual
trilateral exercise calendar, resumption of missile defense exercises,
and anti-submarine exercises. We are also reviewing opportunities to
undertake exercises in trilateral naval air operations, search and
rescue, disaster relief, unconventional operations, and multi-domain
operations. These commitments will be vital to routinizing military-to-
military ties and more importantly, enhancing our extended deterrence
and commitment to counter and deter the growing DPRK missile and
nuclear threat. In terms of planning, we must be more integrated and
interoperable with our allies than ever before. There are both
technical and pragmatic solutions that can assist in the planning and
execution of contingency operations within the region. USFK and the
ROK-U.S. Combined Forces Command are addressing this capability with
our Korean allies this year, using a commercial program that helps
expedite planning, while increasing collaboration. If successful,
expanding planning automation to our Japanese allies would be a superb
next step. Additionally, as we develop new Artificial Intelligence and
Machine Learning tools, we would ensure that USFK's Digital Operational
Plan is scalable for allies and partners. We are also working with our
Korean allies to harness their expertise in coding for innovating our
planning processes. We will partner with INDOPACOM to maximize
resources and capabilities to enable the acceleration of our efforts
moving forward.
Ms. Tokuda. What is the Command doing to enable rapid updates to
existing plans and to build new plans that are suited and adaptable to
the frequently shifting conditions in theater? How is the Command
harnessing both existing and emerging technologies to ensure that it
can make decisions better and faster than our adversaries? What
resources are required for the Command to advance its digital OPLAN
initiative?
General LaCamera. USFK worked diligently the past 10 months to
bring the Joint Planning Process into the 21st Century. USFK's current
approach is to implement human/machine teaming into the Joint Planning
Process. We created a digital planning branch to accomplish this
mission need with four distinct efforts: Data Governance, Artificial
Intelligence/Machine Learning enhancements, Automation, and Partnering.
Our overall methodology is to produce quick wins as we march towards
decision dominance that is made possible when we leverage Artificial
Intelligence/Machine Learning in our planning. One example of planning
innovation is being addressed by partnering with a software company
that enables collaborative planning at the Top-Secret level.
Additionally, by bringing this software onto the CENTRIXS-K network, we
will improve the speed and quality of planning with service components
and alliance partners. Lastly, our team partnered with the Office of
Secretary Defense's Chief Digital & Artificial Intelligence Office on
their Global Information Dominance Experiments-6 experimental work
using the Korean Theater of Operations' Time Phased Force Deployment
Data to provide the type of conditioned data that Artificial
Intelligence/Machine Learning tools thrive from.
We are partnered with the Department of Defense Missile Defense
Agency as we work together on an Artificial Intelligence/Machine
Learning enabled ballistic missile shot optimization planning tool. The
pace of work is rapid, and MDA is helping the warfighter make better
informed decisions in an ever-increasingly dangerous theater. This
entails an adversary equipped with missile delivery systems capable of
holding not just Northeast Asia at risk but pose a persistent threat
and growing danger to the U.S. homeland. Our team has harnessed the
technological advances in deep neural networks, combined with
probabilistic outcome results to help our planners develop courses of
action faster than the enemy. This provides commanders more decision
space in which to plan and operate.
While initiated on a very small budget, the costs for innovative
changes to planning using next-gen tech are significant. We have been
able to keep our costs to a minimum. However, as we continue to build
irreversible momentum, this initiative will require us to procure
capabilities in the form of trained personnel and hardware/software
solutions. We are currently investigating the steps behind the creation
of a Digital Planning and Capabilities Branch, which will require an
overall net increase of personnel within the command. We will partner
with INDOPACOM to maximize resources and capabilities to enable the
acceleration of our efforts moving forward. The combination of threat
and theater makes USFK's efforts an efficient use of taxpayer dollars.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOYLAN
Mr. Moylan. Admiral Aquilino, your Statement notes the importance
of the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) as one of the cornerstones
of the US Security architecture in Oceania, along with other Freely
Associated States (FAS). The Compact of Free Association (COFA)
agreements with the FAS provide them economic assistance along with
defense posture opportunities in the Indo-Pacific. The 22nd FSM
Congress recently adopted a Congressional Resolution that states that
their ``One-China'' policy remains the official policy of the islands,
and they instruct their President not to make any changes to their
diplomatic relations with China. In fact it was also quoted in their
official press release that ``the nation's diplomatic relations with
the people's Republic of China is an example of its consistent policy
which over time has only strengthened and become significantly
beneficial to both sides''. Is this not concerning in regards to the
nation's defense.
Admiral Aquilino. FSM's diplomatic recognition of the PRC does not
detract from FSM's importance to U.S. defense. The Compacts of Free
Association with Palau, FSM, and RMI guarantee access for DOD forces in
a strategically important area of the Pacific. The Compacts also
provide provisions to designate U.S. defense sites in these countries,
allowing me to develop important posture initiatives that are crucial
to deterring PRC aggression and ensuring we are postured to fight and
win, should conflict arise. The Compacts provide the U.S. with ``veto''
power over any foreign military activity in these countries. While
countries across the Pacific negotiate economic and diplomatic
relationships keeping with their national interests, we respect their
sovereignty and welcome competition with PRC in ways that are
consistent with the rules-based international order.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. McCORMICK
Dr. McCormick. Mr. Royal, I'm consistently encouraged by the level
of partnership between the United States and the Kingdom of Thailand,
and I'm very pleased that our respective militaries were able to
complete a full-strength Cobra Gold exercise just before the 190th
anniversary of the establishment of US-Thailand relations. Can you
briefly summarize the value that the US-Thailand alliance adds to our
deterrence regime in your AOR and give us your assessment on how the
recent Cobra Gold exercise went?
Mr. Royal. The U.S.-Thailand alliance is vital to regional
security. Thailand provides access to critical air and sea hubs, such
as Utapao Navy Airfield, which were instrumental to our combat
operations in Iraq and Afghanistan and remain available for
humanitarian response operations in the Indo-Pacific region. This type
of support, combined with Thailand's consistent defense cooperation
with DoD--facilitating presence of U.S. servicemembers on the Southeast
Asian mainland--contributes to regional integrated deterrence. Cobra
Gold 2023 was very successful; the exercise returned to pre-pandemic
scale, with participation by more than 6,000 U.S. servicemembers--the
largest in a decade--and included personnel from 30 countries. Notably,
this year DoD and the Royal Thai Armed Forces expanded on the scope of
the Cobra Gold exercise by inclusion of a bilateral U.S.-Thai Strategic
Airborne Operation into Thailand from Diego Garcia. Additionally, the
enhanced exercise integrated cyber and space capabilities, marking a
notable step forward in the interoperability of U.S.-Thai forces.
Dr. McCormick. I'm very troubled by the PRC's growing military
footprint and assertiveness across the Indo-Pacific. I'm particularly
troubled by the recent PRC buildup at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. This
base would be the PRC's first overseas installation in the Indo-Pacific
and would allow them to service their aircraft carriers and project
power from the South China Sea's western flank. Can you describe the
strategic value this base would give the PLA Navy and what steps your
command and the administration have taken regarding these developments?
Mr. Royal. The People's Republic of China (PRC) is engaged in a
significant, ongoing construction project at Ream Naval Base. The
military facility at Ream Naval Base will be the PRC's first overseas
base in the Indo-Pacific region. PRC use of Ream Naval Base would
increase the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) operational capability
and would provide further opportunity for the PLA to coerce its
neighbors. Use of the base would also enhance the PLA's ability to
control critical sea lines of communication, including the Malacca
Strait. The United States and countries in the region have expressed
concern about the intent, nature, and scope of the project, as well as
the role the PRC military is playing in its construction and in post-
construction use of the facility. The U.S. Government continues to
press the Cambodian government to closely examine the agreements its
defense officials have made with China to ensure the PRC will not be
allowed exclusive military presence or sensitive technology at the base
that risks undermining Cambodia's sovereignty and affecting regional
stability.
Dr. McCormick. Admiral Aquilino, I'm very excited by the prospect
of increased security cooperation with what I argue will be the most
dynamic and consequential friendly nation in the region: India. The UN
projects that India's population will overtake China's this year, and
economists project that India could leapfrog Germany and Japan to
become the world's third largest economy by 2030. Given that, I'm
profoundly grateful that frameworks like the Quad exist by which our
two great nations can deepen our security ties. With China looking to
achieve its major strategic objectives by 2049, how do you foresee US-
India relations evolving over the next quarter century?
a. [Follow-up] I'm aware that India has displayed real interest in
purchasing American-made weapons systems, particularly fighter
aircraft, which will improve their capabilities and our
interoperability. What are the biggest challenges you see in
transferring these systems and in improving US-India co-production and
co-development?
i. [Follow-up] What authorities or resources could Congress provide
you with to streamline these processes?
Admiral Aquilino. The largest hurdle preventing greater defense co-
production and co-development are restrictive U.S. government tech
transfer policies; for example, our ongoing efforts to clear AUKUS
Pillar 1 challenges. The second hurdle is the case-by-case nature of
the export control system. If a defense industry company were to build
fighters in India under the current ruleset, it would need to request,
one country at a time, export release authority of those fighters from
India to a third party. Almost all the co-production and co-development
ideas that are currently floating around the U.S.-India partnership are
at least partially aimed at export from India to third parties. In
addition to tech transfer, a lack of financing is a major impediment to
the foreign military sales (FMS) system. INDOPACOM would generally
favor efforts made to offer more favorable foreign military financing
to allies & partners to purchase weapons systems through FMS.
Dr. McCormick. Admiral Aquilino, I'm consistently encouraged by the
level of partnership between the United States and the Kingdom of
Thailand, and I'm very pleased that our respective militaries were able
to complete a full-strength Cobra Gold exercise just before the 190th
anniversary of the establishment of US-Thailand relations. Can you
briefly summarize the value that the US-Thailand alliance adds to our
deterrence regime in your AOR and give us your assessment on how the
recent Cobra Gold exercise went?
Admiral Aquilino. The U.S.-Thailand alliance enhances a regional
security architecture to contest growing challenges. It demonstrates
U.S. commitment to Southeast Asia and increases military capability,
interoperability, and readiness of both our militaries. The alliance
fosters regional security promoting a stable, prosperous, and inclusive
Indo-Pacific. USINDOPACOM supports Thailand's military modernization
efforts to enhance Thai capacity and U.S.-Thai interoperability. Most
notably, the United States is currently reviewing Thailand's request to
purchase our most advanced fighter, the F-35. Thailand is a critical
partner for regional security and provides logistical nodes essential
to U.S. military operations throughout the Indo-Pacific region. Efforts
are underway to expand access to Utapao Air Base and additional new
sites to support airfield dispersal, including Hat Yai and Nam Phong
airfields COBRA GOLD 23 was executed 27FEB--10MAR 2023 in Thailand this
year, and the exercise was back to pre-COVID levels of participation.
Over 8,000 U.S. service members from across the joint force, operating
west of the international dateline and side-by-side with 26 other
nations, demonstrated our mutual commitment to maintain a free and open
Indo-Pacific. The exercise reinforced the U.S.-Thai alliance and
relationship with the Royal Thai Armed Forces and participating
regional militaries, improved U.S. readiness, and enhanced joint and
combined multinational military interoperability. Additionally, the
exercise advanced integration of all-domain operations, to include
space effects and defensive cyber training.
Dr. McCormick. I'm very troubled by the PRC's growing military
footprint and assertiveness across the Indo-Pacific. I'm particularly
troubled by the recent PRC buildup at Ream Naval Base in Cambodia. This
base would be the PRC's first overseas installation in the Indo-Pacific
and would allow them to service their aircraft carriers and project
power from the South China Sea's western flank. Can you describe the
strategic value this base would give the PLA Navy and what steps your
command and the administration have taken regarding these developments?
Admiral Aquilino. Once completed, the PLA's first overseas base in
the Indo-Pacific will grant them access to the Strait of Malacca where
they can potentially hold at risk the 3.5 trillion dollars worth of
goods that pass through the Strait each year. It is an additive
capability to what the PRC has built on the Spratly Islands in the
South China Sea. Together, these facilities support the operation of
ships and aircraft to greater distances from the PRC for longer periods
of time. But I would also note that unlike us, the PLA has very little
experience in expeditionary operations and extending themselves could
make them increasingly vulnerable. USINDOPACOM has supported efforts to
publicize the PRC's actions, to ensure the Government of Cambodia
understands the risk they are taking in allowing PLA access to Ream,
and to share information with the many like-minded nations similarly
concerned about developments.
Dr. McCormick. I understand that with Singapore's newly established
Digital and Intelligence Service, they are seeking partnerships with
other allied nations' militaries, notable those with dedicated cyber
services. CYBERCOM is obviously our focal point, however they are
persistently stretch beyond their resources. Like our Singaporean
counterparts, do you support a dedicated cyber service which can offer
bandwidth beyond what you are afforded from CYBERCOM today? If yes, why
so? If not, why not?
Admiral Aquilino. Specific to cyber cooperation with Singapore, the
commanders of USINDOPACOM and USCYBERCOM (USCC), and the Singapore
Chief of Defense signed a memorandum of understanding in August 2021 to
focus on greater strategic cooperation in cyberspace. This MOU shows
good coordination leveraging the current cyber force alignment.
INDOPACOM and USCC have a good working relationship which aligns Cyber
forces to the department's strategic priorities. The creation of a U.S.
cyber service is a policy matter and I defer to the Office of the
Secretary of Defense.
[all]