[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
.
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-10]
FY24 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 8, 2023
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-351 WASHINGTON : 2024
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado, Chairman
JOE WILSON, South Carolina SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California,
DON BACON, Nebraska RO KHANNA, California
JIM BANKS, Indiana CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama MARC VEASEY, Texas
Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
Maria Vastola, Professional Staff Member
Zachary Calderon, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Lamborn, Hon. Doug, a Representative from Colorado, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
Moulton, Hon. Seth, a Representative from Massachusetts, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 3
WITNESSES
Cotton, Gen Anthony J., USAF, Commander, United States Strategic
Command........................................................ 8
Dickinson, GEN James H., USA, Commander, U.S. Space Command...... 7
Plumb, Dr. John F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space
Policy......................................................... 4
VanHerck, Gen Glen D., USAF, Commander, United States Northern
Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command........... 6
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cotton, Gen Anthony J........................................ 106
Dickinson, GEN James H....................................... 82
Plumb, Dr. John F............................................ 35
VanHerck, Gen Glen D......................................... 56
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 139
Mr. Waltz.................................................... 140
Mr. Turner................................................... 140
Dr. DesJarlais............................................... 141
FY24 STRATEGIC FORCES POSTURE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 8, 2023.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:01 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Doug Lamborn
[chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DOUG LAMBORN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
COLORADO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Lamborn. We look forward to your testimony.
As this is the first Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing
of the 118th Congress, I am going to take a chairman's
prerogative and lay out some agenda and priorities for me.
I would like to start by acknowledging the new ranking
member of the subcommittee, Mr. Seth Moulton of Massachusetts.
Weren't you on the screen just a moment ago for CSPAN? You
must have hurried back over here.
Mr. Moulton. I hustled. I am a Marine, I can hustle.
Mr. Lamborn. And just from our short time working together
in our new capacities, I am already confident that we will
continue a strong bipartisan tradition of this subcommittee.
So, I am pleased for us to officially start our work together
today.
And I would like to welcome the new members of the
subcommittee as well, who might be in and out as we are going
through this hearing: Mr. Bacon of Nebraska, Mr. Banks of
Indiana, Mr. Strong of Alabama, Mr. Norcross of New Jersey, Ms.
Houlahan of Pennsylvania, and Mr. Vasquez of New Mexico.
I am honored to be the chairman of this subcommittee, and
privileged to be the first person from Colorado to hold this
position. I have been working on these issues for many years,
as they are integral to the fabric of my district as well as to
our national defense.
I have big shoes to fill. Recently retired Jim Cooper, Mike
Turner, Mike Rogers, Ellen Tauscher are among those who have
served so capably in this position while I have been in
Congress.
Thank you to our witnesses for appearing today. And I wish
we had the President's budget to inform our discussion. The
budget was due last month, but it seems like we are still one
day early.
Regardless, there are a lot of strategic issues that we can
dig into today. Russia's unjustified invasion of Ukraine, which
just passed its year mark, has been punctuated by attempts at
nuclear coercion. Now Putin has suspended Russia's
participation in the New START Treaty.
I understand that Russia has ceased providing the U.S. with
treaty notifications, yet we continue to provide them for
Russia. It is curious that we provide Russia with this benefit
under our treaty when Russia is no longer reciprocating.
Given Russia's suspension and their false declaration that
the U.S. is in material breach, the Joint Staff, with the help
of STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command], needs to
accelerate contingency planning should Russia begin uploading
warheads on its strategic delivery systems beyond the numbers
called for.
China is also building up its nuclear arsenal at an
unanticipated and rapid pace, and is pursuing aggressive
activities in all domains. Most notably, there is public
reporting that Russia's state-owned Nuclear Energy Corporation
ROSATOM [State Nuclear Energy Corporation] is helping China
acquire enough weapons grade plutonium to fuel its strategic
nuclear breakout. I am hopeful that we will see a comprehensive
strategy from the Administration to break this relationship
and, ideally, shutter ROSATOM.
Now that India--Excuse me. Now that China has surpassed the
United States in the number of intercontinental ballistic
missile launchers, STRATCOM has additional targets to hold at
risk. I am sure we will hear from General Cotton about how that
complicates his targeting efforts and challenges his ability to
deter two near-peer nuclear adversaries simultaneously.
We can't also forget that North Korea has an ICBM
[Intercontinental Ballistic Missile] program that is proceeding
apace. And Iran has multiple space launch vehicle programs
giving cover for the development of an Iranian ICBM.
Given all these threats, my priorities for the subcommittee
include the following. We must accelerate and timely field
hypersonic weapons systems for all three services, adjust our
nuclear modernization program to deter both Russia and China
simultaneously, and ensure our missile defenses can outpace the
North Korean and forthcoming Iranian ICBM threats. This
includes ensuring that the Department of Defense maintains the
necessary spectrum to discriminate targets at range in the
atmosphere at all times.
I will also continue to push the Department to develop a
space policy we can debate in public. So, we will take a hard
look at classification, and continue to push for changes in how
we do space acquisitions as well.
Finally, I want to highlight that last year, on a
bipartisan basis, Congress authorized and appropriated funds to
the Navy and the National Nuclear Security Administration for
research and development of the Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise
Missile, or SLCM-N [Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missile]. The
restriction in the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act]
only applies to production work and was not meant to constrain
research and development in any way.
And I also hope to hear how the Department is progressing
on the hard and deeply-buried target study.
With that, I will turn it over to Ranking Member Moulton
for any remarks he would like to make.
STATEMENT OF HON. SETH MOULTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MASSACHUSETTS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And congratulations
on your appointment as chairman of this subcommittee.
I know that you believe, as I do, that the issues this
committee tackles are at the very core of our national security
as a nation. Therefore, it is important that we work together
in a bipartisan fashion to address the critical issues before
us.
I already know that there is much that we agree on. And I
hope that through open and transparent dialog and debate we can
expand that area of agreement as we both learn more about these
important and fascinating issues.
I would also like to welcome General Cotton, as this is
your first Strategic Forces hearing. I am encouraged by our
discussion last week. And your leadership is critical, given
the growing global strategic threat to the United States.
I appreciate your view that strategic deterrence is much
broader than nuclear weapons, as the world and the threats we
face as a nation have evolved significantly since our nuclear
triad was first established. I look forward to learning more
about how you understand and apply integrated deterrence across
multiple demands as you take command of STRATCOM.
And as we welcome you, I also want to acknowledge that this
will be General VanHerck's final or last strategic forces
posture hearing. Thank you, sir, for your 36 years of
distinguished service to our nation and the past 3 years as
head of Northern Command. During that time you have shown great
leadership across a range of critical issues, from welcoming
our Afghan refugees, responding to COVID-19, and highlighting
the need for better situational awareness over the continental
United States which, as we saw very clearly last month, is not
just a hypothetical or a future need.
So, thank you to all our witnesses for being here and for
helping us begin the important work of writing the fiscal year
2024 National Defense Authorization Act.
As we sit in this hearing, Russia continues to wage an
unconscionable war against Ukraine using veiled threats of
nuclear weapons, not to keep the peace between superpowers, but
offensively to try and turn around its losing war.
Meanwhile, China is launching satellites that have dual use
capability, putting U.S. systems at risk.
North Korea has been consistently launching ballistic
missiles that can reach the United States.
And just last week, the U.N. [United Nations] International
Atomic Energy Agency reported that they have found uranium
enriched to near bomb grade purity at an Iranian nuclear
facility.
The mission of this subcommittee is growing in scope,
importance, and urgency.
Our witnesses do not oversee development of weapons systems
per se, but they are responsible for current operations, and
are given the challenging task of predicting what the
Department of Defense will need in the future to maintain
strategic deterrence across all demands--air, land, sea, space,
and cyber.
While we are clear-eyed about the advancements our
competitors are making in various weapons systems, we must also
reflect on how our decisions, actions, and statements are
understood by those competitors and adversaries to avoid
starting or escalating an arms race, or worse, a miscalculation
that could have catastrophic effects.
Ultimately, we should have two shared goals: ensuring our
credible deterrence and strategic advantage over our
adversaries; and reducing the number of weapons and chances of
warfare on all sides.
I am encouraged that the Biden administration is taking a
more balanced approach to strategic deterrence while
maintaining and modernizing the triad and focusing on the
greatest strength of the United States--our partners and
allies.
Dr. Plum, I am heartened to hear you say clearly that the
Department--you are nervous now about what you just said--``the
Department will protect and defend U.S. space capabilities
along with those of our allies, partners, and the commercial
sector when directed to do so.''
And I welcome this Administration's real investments in
domain awareness for what NORAD [North American Aerospace
Defense Command], with the modernization of the over-the-
horizon radars along the existing Northern Warning System
architecture.
But there remains much work to be done in the jurisdiction
of this subcommittee. And the strategic posture of the United
States must remain a top priority across both the
Administration and Congress.
I look forward to working, to conducting that work together
over the next two years.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
Now we will move from opening statements, from our opening
statements to those of the witnesses. I would note that your
prepared statements will be made part of the record but you
will each have 5 minutes to make some opening remarks.
And, Dr. Plum, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN F. PLUMB, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR SPACE POLICY
Secretary Plumb. Thank you very much.
Chairman Lamborn and Ranking Member Moulton, thanks for
inviting me to testify on strategic forces posture. I
appreciated sitting down with both of you last week. And I look
forward to working with you in the new roles, as well as with
the rest of the distinguished members of this committee.
Today the United States finds itself in a highly dynamic
and challenging security environment as characterized by
intensifying strategic competition, assertive behavior by
multiple competitors, rapidly evolving domains of conflict, and
a growing risk of military confrontation.
China and Russia have placed nuclear weapons, space
warfare, and long-range strike at the center of their
strategies to counter the United States and our allies and
partners.
As Secretary Austin has said since his first days in
office, China is the Department's facing challenge. China is
engaged in a significant and fast-paced expansion and
diversification of its nuclear forces. Like Russia, China views
space as a war fighting domain, and China is developing,
testing, and fielding sophisticated counter-space capabilities
intended to deny the United States our space enabling
advantage.
And China has an ever-growing inventory of sophisticated
long-range strike systems to hold U.S. forces at risk at
greater and greater distances.
In Ukraine, Russia's illegal and unprovoked full-scale
invasion has showcased the critical role of strategic forces in
conflict.
Space systems inform U.S. national security decisions every
single day. President Biden has declassified intelligence
gained from U.S. space assets to counter Russian
misinformation.
The Ukrainian military has been leveraging proliferated
satellite broadband constellations in innovate ways to support
their own operations.
Russia has repeated, has conducted repeated missile attacks
against civilian infrastructure, which highlights the need for
air and missile defenses. And as some of the members have
already said, Putin's irresponsible nuclear saber rattling has
further underscored the importance of U.S. nuclear deterrence,
which is the bedrock of our own national security.
Just this last October, the Department released
unclassified versions of the national defense strategy, the
nuclear posture review, and the missile defense review.
Together, these documents recognize that the United States is
entering a period of heightened risk, and they articulate an
urgent imperative to strengthen deterrence.
The national defense strategy identified four priorities
for the Department:
One, defend the homeland;
Two, deter strategic attacks;
Three, deter aggression while preparing to prevail in
conflicts, and we are prioritizing China first and then Russia;
And, four, build a resilient Joint Force.
All four of these priorities rely heavily on our space
systems, our missile defenses, and our nuclear forces.
Cooperation with allies and partners is also a core element
of the national defense strategy, and it is central to our
national security and deterrence goals. The Department is
actively pursuing deeper cooperation to enhance our extended
deterrence commitments, to achieve combined space operations,
and to share data in real time to support air and missile
defenses. Our allies and partners are an asymmetric advantage
that neither China nor Russia can ever hope to match.
Now, for the Department, we are clear-eyed about the
threats we face and the importance of our nuclear, space, and
missile defense forces in defending the nation. The Department
is committed to making critical investments in our nuclear
triad modernization, in a more resilient space architecture,
and in homeland and regional missile defenses.
These investments will be detailed in the upcoming,
forthcoming fiscal year 2024 budget request, but these
investments are necessary to deter conflict and to fight and
win if deterrence fails.
So, thank you to the committee for its tireless dedication
to the Department and our servicemembers. And I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Plumb can be found in
the Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And I didn't say it, but Dr. Plumb
is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy with the
U.S. Department of Defense.
Now we will hear from General Glen VanHerck, Commander of
the United States Northern Command, and North American
Aerospace Defense Command.
STATEMENT OF GEN GLEN D. VANHERCK, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE
COMMAND
General VanHerck. Thank you.
Chairman Lamborn, Ranking Member Moulton, and members of
the committee, the subcommittee, thank you for your opportunity
to appear this afternoon before the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee along with General Dickinson, General Cotton, and
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy, Dr. John
Plumb.
As you know, I testified this morning before the full
committee. Therefore, I will be brief in my remarks here in the
open session. I look forward to the classified discussion
later.
The United States military remains the most powerful and
professional force in history. However, I would like to
reiterate our competitive advantage is eroding, but I believe
our greatest risk for the United States stems from the
inability to adapt at the pace required by the changing
strategic environment.
Our commands and the Department of Defense need your
continued support to outpace the rapid gains made by our
competitors. On behalf of all the soldiers, sailors, airmen,
Marines, Guardians, Coasties, and the civilians at NORAD and
NORTHCOM [Northern Command], I would like to thank the
subcommittee for your steadfast support for all those who
defend our nation.
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General VanHerck can be found in
the Appendix on page 56.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
And our next witness is General James Dickinson.
And I want to say, as was said for General VanHerck, this
is probably your last testimony before this subcommittee. And
you will be missed. And we want to thank you for your decades
of service, including most recently the standing up and the
shepherding of Space Command.
So, the Commander of the U.S. Space Command, General James
Dickinson.
STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES H. DICKINSON, USA, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES SPACE COMMAND
General Dickinson. Thank you, Chairman Lamborn and Ranking
Member Moulton. Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen of the
committee.
It remains my distinct honor to represent the 18,000
military servicemen and women, civilians, and families of U.S.
Space Command who are serving our great nation today around the
world. Thank you for this opportunity to testify before this
committee. I look forward to both this session as well as the
closed session.
I am proud to lead such a talented and patriotic group of
joint space professionals. Their expertise, diversity, and
creativity underpin our strength and effectiveness. Of all the
elements of space power, our most valued asset is and always
will be our great people.
My provisional headquarters achieved initial operational
capability in just two years. And we will reach full
operational capability through the disciplined initiative of
our people. Space power enables our way of life and is a
critical component of our national security.
I want to thank Congress for its support to advance
America's primacy in space. We must maintain our position of
advantage in the space domain and ensure it remains
sustainable, safe, stable, and secure.
The Joint Force relies on space-based capabilities to
project and employ power. China and Russia consider this
dependency a soft underbelly and seek to exploit it. They
intend to limit our access to space during crisis and conflict,
and they are building capabilities to that effect today.
Our strategic competitors' irresponsible actions have
transformed space into a contested domain. We must prevent
today's strategic competition from growing into a conflict in
space. We achieve this by deterring aggression, defending
national interests and, if necessary, prevailing in any domain.
U.S. Space Command contributes to integrated deterrence by
preserving freedom of action in space and by providing critical
support to the rest of the Joint Force. Our mission spans the
spectrum of conflict and in every domain.
For example, we are creating concepts to further integrate
space, cyber, and special operations to generate asymmetrical
advantages around the globe.
Additionally, our protect and defend mission involves all
three segments of the space architecture--the ground, link, and
space--an approach that requires all-domain solutions. My
Command's planning horizon is short. It is near-term. We must
be ready to fight today because the threat will not wait.
To this end, we are leveraging the Joint Force, our allies
and partners, to integrate and maximize the capabilities that
we have today. At the same time, we look forward to the
capabilities the services are developing for the future fight.
As we observe in Ukraine, commercial space assets are a
significant force multiplier. For years our commercial mission
partners have augmented our satellite communications and
provided enhancements to our space domain awareness sensor
networks. Commercial integration is critical to mission
success.
So, today's hearing reasserts the United States' resolve to
maintain our leadership and position of advantage in the space
domain.
But before I address the committee's questions, I just want
to emphasize to the American people my pledge that U.S. Space
Command will ensure that there is never a day without space.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Dickinson can be found
in the Appendix on page 82.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
And the last of our four witnesses will be General Anthony
Cotton, the Commander of United States Strategic Command.
STATEMENT OF GEN ANTHONY J. COTTON, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Cotton. Good afternoon, Chairman Lamborn, Ranking
Member Moulton, and distinguished members of the committee. I
appreciate this opportunity to testify next to ASD [Assistant
Secretary of Defense] Plumb, General VanHerck, and General
Dickinson. And I thank the committee and Congress for its
support for our national defense.
First, I, along with my command senior enlisted leader,
Sergeant Major Howard Kreamer, want to ensure you and the
American people that the United States Strategic Command is
ready today, ready to defend our nation, defend our allies, and
respond decisively if our adversaries miscalculate.
As we speak, there are command watch standers at their
stations: missileers, maintainers, security forces on alert,
submariners on patrol, air crew on duty, standing guard. The
men and women of the United States Strategic Command are the
foundation for the capabilities that underpin our nation's
strategic deterrence. They do this in an environment that
continues to grow more complex and challenging.
Russia's invasion of a sovereign Ukraine is an attempt to
undermine the rules-based international order with conventional
force backed by nuclear saber rattling. As this conflict
continues and Russia's conventional forces fail to achieve
President Putin's strategic objectives, Strategic Command is
monitoring for any indications of escalation.
How this conflict unfolds and eventually ends will shape
the strategic environment for decades to come.
We see the People's Republic of China continuing to rapidly
expand its nuclear capabilities. The PRC's [People's Republic
of China's] actions are wholly inconsistent with its long-
professed policies of minimum deterrence.
I reported to Congress in May that the number of land-based
intercontinental ballistic missile launchers in the PRC now
exceeds that of the United States. Along with its significant
modernization and expansion of conventional capabilities, the
PRC is also investing heavily in lower yield precision weapons
with theater ranges, a new generation of mobile missiles, and a
hypersonic glide vehicle with fractional orbital bombardment
systems.
The PRC's nuclear modernization provides it with an
alarming number of offensive options that can negatively shape
the environment before and during a crisis or conflict.
North Korea continues to be a rogue actor and poses a
threat to the United States and our allies. North Korea
conducted a unprecedented number of missile launches in 2022.
And its new intercontinental ballistic missile, referred to as
the KN-28, highlights that the strategic challenge and security
challenge will continue to grow.
We are meeting today's challenges, though, through
integrated deterrence, the cornerstone of the NDS. Our
unmatched network of allies is a key component of integrated
deterrence, and these relationships are underpinned by our
extended deterrence commitments. These commitments are enabled
by a safe, secure, effective, and credible nuclear deterrent.
The credibility of our extended deterrence commitments is not
only part of the nation's ironclad commitment to our allies,
but has also been essential in limiting the proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
The nation's nuclear forces underpin integrated deterrence
and enable the U.S., our allies, and our partners to confront
aggressive and coercive behavior.
To ensure our continued ability to serve as the bedrock of
integrated deterrence, we are recapitalizing every leg of the
nuclear triad and the nuclear command, control, and
communications spectrum, as well as addressing the
electromagnetic spectrum. These long-term investments are going
to be absolutely required for us to make sure that we have a
predictable, stable, and efficient nuclear force.
Finally, I want to start as I ended. Our people are the
foundation of every capability that enables strategic
deterrence. I am proud to serve alongside the Soldiers,
Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians, and our civilians at
STRATCOM. I am very appreciative of everything the committee
and Congress is doing for us along those goals. And it's an
honor to be here. And I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Cotton can be found in
the Appendix on page 106.]
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, General. And you did mention
hypersonic vehicles. This subcommittee will be having a hearing
on that subject Friday morning at 9:00 o'clock. And like the
one here today, it will be a public hearing followed by a
classified hearing afterwards.
So, we will start with questions. And with the first round
of questions we will see if we have time for a second round or
not. We do have votes at 5:30, which means we should be able to
have our classified session at 4:30--and the SCIF [Sensitive
Compartmented Information Facility] is occupied until then--
well before we have to go for votes. And should be able to wrap
up everything by that time.
Thank you all again for being here.
Dr. Plumb, various open source outlets, along with a very
detailed Bloomberg story from last week, reported how Russia,
specifically ROSATOM, is providing highly enriched uranium for
Chinese fast breeder reactors. These reactors will almost
certainly help accelerate the pace of the Chinese nuclear
weapons program by producing weapons grade plutonium.
How concerned is the Department that ROSATOM is helping
China accelerate the pace of its nuclear weapons program?
Secretary Plumb. Thank you, Congressman. It is very
troubling to see Russia and China cooperating on this. And they
have talking points around it, but there is no getting around
the fact that breeder reactors are plutonium, and plutonium is
for weapons.
So, I think the Department is concerned. And, of course, it
matches our concerns about China's increased expansion of its
nuclear forces as well, because you need more plutonium for
more weapons.
Mr. Lamborn. General Cotton, this highlights the concern
that we all share about China's seeming nuclear breakout. It
was mentioned that they have now more launchers than the U.S.,
and they are working on warheads as well.
So, the number of targets we have to hold at risk is
rapidly growing because of China's nuclear breakout. But the
forces available to you remain unchanged.
How does the Department reconcile this?
General Cotton. Chairman, thank you for the question.
I think as we discussed last week, one of the things ----
Mr. Lamborn. And if you could hold the microphone just a
little closer. Thank you.
General Cotton. Does that work, sir? There we go.
One of the things that actually the NPR [Nuclear Posture
Review] gives us an opportunity to do is have a conversation on
strategy and have a conversation on force posture. And as the
conversation we had last week, I think that conversation is
going to have to be had.
When we talk about the forces that we currently have today,
that force that we have today was based on a adversary of which
for the first time in the history of the United States of
America we now have two that are nuclear peer adversaries.
Now we are going to have this conversation in regards to
what does it look like now as far as force posture moving
forward.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And that is a critical conversation
we will all be having here in the subcommittee, and the full
committee as well.
On the issue of electromagnetic spectrum operations,
General, can you describe--or let me back up.
As I emphasized in my opening statement, I think DoD
[Department of Defense] needs to commit to fixing
electromagnetic spectrum operations and plugging the holes
identified in the Northern Edge Exercise. I understand that
this has the attention of Secretary Hicks and Admiral Grady.
And I hope that we will have good progress on this.
Can you describe some of the ways that STRATCOM relies on
spectrum to support your missions? And what are some of the
future spectrum that--spectrum warfighter needs that will be
essential to competing with Russia and China on a future
battlefield, if necessary?
General Cotton. Chairman, thank you for that question.
You know, I don't think it is any different than the
requirements that are with my fellow commanders that are here.
STRATCOM depends on EMS [Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority
Strategy] to successfully provide deterrence and deliver
decisive response when called upon.
The things that I worry about is we need to ensure that we
have spectrum for employment of forces; to maintain situational
awareness; to assure communications via all domains, space,
maritime, air, and land; and to assure positioning with PNT
[Position, Navigation, and Timing] with position navigation
systems.
What we are doing within STRATCOM is my top priority is to
execute the DoD EMS superiority strategy implementation plan.
What we are going to do is we are actually in the midst of
standing up a two-star joint EMS operations center known as the
JEC [Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations Center]. Direct
reports to me that raises and aggregates force readiness across
the Department.
We will continue to ensure that the Joint Force
appropriately is organized and equipped to handle EMS. I am
responsibility for advocating the proper training when it comes
to EMS. And as we said when I had my conversation with you last
week, what makes this particularly helpful to me is the fact
that my direct report will be the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
who can direct services to take action.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you.
I have a little follow-up on that issue and then I will
turn it over to others.
The 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz band of radio frequency spectrum
is being studied by DoD and the Department of Commerce for
consideration for auction by the FCC [Federal Communications
Commission]. Can you speak to the value of this specific band
for target discrimination at range in the atmosphere for from
everything from missile defense to tracking Chinese spy
balloons, which has been in the news?
And, Dr. Plumb, you and General Cotton, please.
General Cotton. Well, from my perspective it is what I have
just mentioned as far as the things that are required for me to
be able to execute and exercise and employ the forces.
I think if we lose that spectrum, all of those things that
I had articulated to you that is required for me for force
employment, for maintaining situational awareness, for having
assured navigation and timing, and assured cons, that could
potentially be lost.
And I would, I would yield to Dr. Plumb for further
questions.
Secretary Plumb. Thanks, Congressman.
That particular portion of the band, the S band there from
3.1 to 3.45 is absolutely essential for DoD operations. The
Department of Defense is conducting a study with the Department
of Commerce on whether we can share that spectrum.
For DoD, we need to be able to maintain our operational
capability and readiness in any result. And I will just say we
have looked at what it might take to vacate, by which we mean
leave that band and go somewhere else. We don't know where else
we would go. And it would easily $120 billion, probably more,
just to create the pieces. But that isn't the same as getting
the studies and the physics done, or the recapitalization. It
could take easily 20 years. It is a really difficult problem
for us.
And so we think that the only viable forward would be is
there some way to share so DoD can operate there, and so other,
you know, commercial companies might be able to use that as
well without impeding on us.
Mr. Lamborn. Did you say 120 million or billion?
Secretary Plumb. That is billion with a B. And that is kind
of our low estimate. And I don't want that to be confused with
what it would actually cost because that is really just if you
look what would it cost to make a new AEGIS radar. But that is
not the same as figuring out the physics and all the testing
that would go into figuring out what band we would have to use
it in, let alone the decades of experience we have with the
equipment now to understand how they work.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you both.
I turn it over to Representative Moulton.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me begin with an apology to General Dickinson. I did
not know this is your last hearing before us as well. I
understand you have been serving for 38 years, so you have, you
have outdone your seatmate by two. Thank you for your
incredible service.
You are the senior air defense artillery officer in the
United States Army today. And that is a job that for a long
time we didn't think was terribly important because of our air
superiority. And now we realize how unbelievably critical it
is.
So, we have been very lucky to have you. We are grateful
for your service. And I think I can confidently say that we
will probably miss you more than you will miss us. But good
luck.
Let me start with this, this is for, General Dickinson, for
you and for Dr. Plumb.
Over 10 years ago the joint operational access concept
predicted that ``a logical opening operation to any anti-access
campaign from China against the United States is to neutralize
U.S. space assets because space such a critical role in
enabling operations on the Earth's surface.''
Dr. Plumb, General Dickinson, do you believe this is a
reasonable assessment?
General Dickinson. First of all, thank you for those kind
remarks as you get ready to ask the question. It has been an
honor to serve in the U.S. military for 38 years.
To your question, I think we just have to look, quite
frankly, at some of the PLA [People's Liberation Army] writings
on doctrine and strategy that do suggest what you just
mentioned, which is that the reconnaissance, communications,
navigation, and even early warning satellites could--I am not
saying will--could be among the possible first targets to be
attacked.
And so just in accordance with their own strategy, their
own doctrine, we have reason to believe that that might be the
case.
Mr. Moulton. And Dr. Plumb is nodding his head. So, I will
take that as agreement.
So, if war with China could start in space, then deterring
war with China seems to require having an effective space
deterrent. Do you agree?
General Dickinson. I do agree with that.
Mr. Moulton. One of the challenges with deterrence is it is
not just enough to have capabilities that exceed your
adversary's capabilities, they have to believe that. Right?
I mean, we can look back and say, you know, we knew we
would be able to get together the most remarkable coalition of
NATO allies since World War II to push back Russia out of
Ukraine. The problem is that Vladimir Putin did not believe
that before he started this war. And so, we did not effectively
deter, prevent this war from happening.
So, Dr. Plumb, perhaps we could start with you. We are
developing some exquisite space capabilities that you are
overseeing. But how do we effectively communicate this to our
adversaries so that they believe it?
Secretary Plumb. Thanks, Congressman.
I would say just to start with I think they, they know
that, well, we have space superiority right now. And they know
that this is not an opportunity for them to move forward.
And our goal at the Department of Defense is to make sure
that really every day that President Xi wakes up is not the day
that he thinks this is worth the attempt to go after Taiwan.
And we use as Taiwan as our pacing scenario. I think it is a
good frame of reference, regardless of the actual scenario we
put out.
I will just say I think you are getting to the reveal/
conceal question. And I actually think we should not overlook
statecraft as well. Right? So, we do communicate back and forth
between nations, and they use their statecraft to see or to try
to discern what we are doing.
I personally believe there is great value in some
ambiguity. But your point is well taken.
General Dickinson, do you have, I know you have worked in
particular on declassifying some of the work that we are doing,
to better communicate this to our adversaries. Do you have
anything to add?
General Dickinson. That is one of the areas within the
Command that we are looking very closely at is how do we get to
a--you mentioned the allies and partners, and how critical they
are, not only in the space domain and what we do there, but in
the other domains as well.
And so, when we look to integrate and operate with the
allies and partners, it is critical that we take a very close
look at, you know, overclassification and classification
period, so that we can share necessary information with our
allies and partners. And we are working on that every day in
U.S. Space Command.
We have had a couple of areas where we have had some
success in that. Like, for example, we have run operational Big
Defender every day, which is really the operations that does
our space enabling responsibilities to the Joint Force each and
every day. That has been traditionally held at a NOFORN [Not
Releasable to Foreign Nationals] level. And just within the
last year we have been able to start sharing that with the Five
Eyes.
There are many other examples, but that is, that is one in
particular that I think worth noting.
Mr. Moulton. Thank you.
General Dickinson, another question for you. As everyone on
this committee well knows, the DoD has not invested
sufficiently in space until quite recently. My question is will
the budget that we receive tomorrow have enough in it to
protect, defend, and reconstitute our space assets?
And where should we invest more?
General Dickinson. Well, first-off I would say since we
have stood up in 2019 as a combatant command, Congress' support
to what we are doing--and I even mentioned it in my opening
statement where I said helping us sustain primacy in the space
domain--has been very good.
And I thank the Congress for the monies and the resources
that are going towards us in that effect.
The Command has had a good opportunity over the last 4
years as well to start developing the requirements that we need
in support of our operations. And we have done a lot of that.
We have been able to codify that through the normal processes
within the Department in terms of identifying requirements,
ICDs [Intelligence Community Directives] for example, JUONs
[Joint Urgent Operational Needs], IPLs [Integrated Priority
List], those kinds of normal functions within the Command to
put a demand signal, if you will, on the Department and what we
will need in the space domain.
So, I am pleased with that. And, again, I think if you look
at what one of my, my number one priority is in terms of what
more do I need, is the ability to increase my space domain
awareness. So, as we look to today and into the future, and
with the growing congestion, if you will, in the space domain
with regards to current satellites, operating satellites,
defunct satellites, debris itself, it is becoming a bigger
challenge to be able to do that. We have to have the
capabilities to be able to see and characterize what is going
on in the space domain.
So, top priority for the Command right now is to make sure
that we increase that.
And I can go into details, if you would like, on how we are
approaching that.
Mr. Moulton. No, it is very helpful. And a message that we
have heard loud and clear from General VanHerck is that domain
awareness is absolutely critical and something that we need to
improve. So, he may be 2 years your junior but he is very much
following in your footsteps on that count.
General Cotton, final question. Mr. Banks, I guess he has
parted for a time, but he and I co-chair the Future Defense
Task Force. And we looked at a lot of things across the
spectrum of war fighting and, you know, trying to determine
where we need to be in the future.
And, of course, we focused a lot on technology and the
technology that we need to invest in to keep pace with our
adversaries across the globe.
But another point that we made is it is not enough just to
invest in technology. You have to know how you are going to use
that technology. And sometimes in the past we have made the
mistake of pursuing a technology because it seems like the hot
new thing, without having a clear understanding of how we might
actually employ that technology. And, therefore, sometimes that
money goes to waste.
So, we are putting a lot of money into hypersonics. But I
asked this question recently, last year, of some of your
colleagues and people at the Department: how do you actually
plan to employ hypersonic weapons?
We are going to invest a lot in them because China has
them, too, but how do you actually plan to employ them? What
are the operational concepts for the use of hypersonic weapons?
And I can tell you we got a very dissatisfying answer. A
lot of stares, a lot of blank stares saying we are not quite
sure yet. Well, that is not a good enough reason to invest in
them.
So, tell us how your thinking has involved on the
employment of hypersonics, and why--see, explain to the
American people why it is critical that we put such an enormous
amount of money into these new weapons systems?
General Cotton. Thank you, Ranking Member.
I think the answer to that is simple. Our adversaries
already have them as a baseline, so they are using them as,
they are using them as a deterrent already.
When it comes to us, within STRATCOM one of the things that
we are already doing is we are prepared to accept utilizing
hypersonic weapons as a strategic deterrent weapon because it
has strategic effects.
Mr. Moulton. Uh-huh.
General Cotton. So, one of the things that we are thinking
through on my staff and that I am having my team do is to
understand knowing that we are going to have low density, high
demand assets at the beginning, that we can help in the
planning and understanding of how we want to execute those
weapons, just like we do any other strategic weapon.
That is not to say that when the cash gets a lot larger
that it has to stay that way. But from my vantage point as a
strategic deterrent lead, if you will, from STRATCOM, I see
that as the entering argument on what I want to be able to do
and utilize.
And, oh, by the way, the complementary factors of what it
can do with a nuclear force as well as just strategic
deterrence writ large. So, there is a nuclear deterrent aspect
to this where hypersonics can be complementary to some of the
effects that we would do in our planning, as well as what you
would see from conventional long-range strike.
Mr. Moulton. Let me ask one quick corollary to that.
A lot of theorists about nuclear weapons would argue that
the weapons that we have had for some time, the triad,
including ICBMs, which are sort of horrific in concept, are
actually stabilizing weapons. I mean, they have prevented, they
have helped prevent war between our super--the superpowers for
decades.
Do you believe that hypersonics are a stabilizing or
destabilizing strategic weapon?
General Cotton. I see hypersonic weapons just like I see
the ICBMS as stabilizing weapons.
Mr. Moulton. Okay. Well, I will tell you a lot of people
disagree. And I think this is something we need to get to the
bottom of.
Thank you very much. And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Representative Turner.
Mr. Turner. Well, I certainly think that hypersonic weapons
in the hands of our adversaries are destabilizing.
General Cotton, you and I had the opportunity to talk about
the concerns of Russia stepping out of New START. The United
States took several steps to comply with New START.
I, for one, believe that if they step out of New START we
should not give them a pass. We shouldn't say we are going to
continue to comply and stay within New START, and you can do
whatever you want.
That means, of course, that we are going to have to up our
game for deterrence. Because if they are going to expand their
nuclear inventory but also continue to expand their nuclear
offense capabilities, which I personally believe are many first
strike weapon capabilities, we are going to have to look at
reMIRV. We are going to have to be looking at the B-1, the B-
52, how do we ensure the dual capability and the prevalence of
the F-35 and, certainly, the expeditious completion and
deployment of the B-21.
My question to you is, as we look out at all the things
that we need to do, let's say there we wake up tomorrow and
there is no New START, are there things the United States could
and should do in response to that that could ensure our
deterrence of our adversary that is self-declared, which is
Russia?
General Cotton. Thank you for that question, sir.
First of all, nuclear, responsible nuclear parties stick to
the treaties that they sign up for. Suspending NST [New START
Treaty] from the Russian's perspective, from my perspective is
irresponsible.
That being said, my responsibility is to be able to offer
flexible deterrent options to the President. And we have
already, we have already worked and have always worked in
STRATCOM to be able to offer flexible deterrent options when
required.
So, to answer your question, flexible deterrent options are
always available to the President the United States.
Mr. Turner. Excellent.
General VanHerck, we have obviously had a relatively robust
conversation nationwide about our capabilities to see and
understand threats and warnings to the United States and North
America. We are also in the process of reinvesting because some
of these systems are very old.
And, of course, some of these systems now with China's
having, China having chosen to test a hypersonic weapons that
orbits the Earth that looks like it is something that could
be--remain in orbit and be a space-to-ground weapon, and for
which all indications are their intentions to perhaps make this
a nuclear weapon, we are going to have to look at how do we see
better, how do we get greater fidelity, how do we look at areas
where we might have blind spots?
But the next step we are going to have to look at is as
China increases its nuclear weapons capabilities in China, and
Russia increases its nuclear weapons capabilities, that we are
going to be sort of beyond a world that is just mutually
assured destruction and deterrence of we have nuclear weapons
and you have nuclear weapons.
China is building them at such a pace that it is clearly
not just their territorial integrity that they are concerned
about, they are building them at a pace where we can even see
in non-classified areas their new ICBMs areas.
If we are going to go beyond deterrence, we are going to
have to add missile defense. We are going to have to add
missile defense and we are going to have to add it in a robust
fashion where we look at China and Russia as perhaps
perpetrators. To do so we are going to have to upgrade what we
look at for radars and sensing for North America.
Could you speak for a minute about what our current system
is? What we are currently planning on doing for upgrade? And
what would that leap look like that we would have to do in
order to do integrated missile defense for the United States?
General VanHerck. Yes, thank you for the question.
First, to be clear, our missile defense today does not,
from a policy perspective, defend against Chinese ----
Mr. Turner. Right. This is a radar question.
General VanHerck. Okay. Chinese or Russia, radar question.
So, first, I am concerned and very challenged for domain
awareness. I will start with hypersonics.
If you can't see hypersonics it is hard to continuity of
government, and it is certainly hard to protect your nuclear
posture. So, therefore, I would say that would be destabilizing
or erode our strategic stability from a standpoint of not being
able to see them.
From the way forward I would ask two things:
For radars, over-the-horizon radars. We need those soon as
possible. Ten years to field over-the-horizon radars does not
make sense.
Then the question becomes what do you do with the data and
information from those over-the-horizon radars? That needs to
feed an integrated air and missile defense system that
ultimately feeds some type of an in-game factor. That could be
non-kinetic or kinetic, either one.
This problem is much larger than radars, by the way. It is
also the P-LEO, U.S. Space Forces dealing to give us domain
awareness for hypersonics and other missile systems.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the
meeting. And congratulations on your chairmanship, and Mr.
Moulton the same on the ranking.
Fascinating discussion thus far. I am going to ask the big
question, a question that has been on my mind since I came to
this committee, and that is, gentlemen, are we now, the United
States, engaged in a new nuclear arms race?
Mr. Plumb and then on down the line, yes, no, and qualify
if you want.
Secretary Plumb. Thanks, Congressman. I, I don't think I
would characterize it as a new nuclear arms race based on
current numbers and based on what the historical arms race
looked like when the numbers were multiples of this.
Mr. Garamendi. A different?
Secretary Plumb. A different kind. Maybe a capabilities
race perhaps. I don't know if that is quite the same as a
nuclear inventory race.
Mr. Garamendi. Does that include General Cotton's new
strategic weapon, similar to a nation--similar to a nuclear
weapon, otherwise known as a hypersonic? I think that is what
he just said.
Am I correct, General Cotton, didn't you just say that?
General Cotton. I said that if you were to ask what we
could use as far as can a hypersonic be seen as a strategic
weapon.
Mr. Garamendi. And then you went on to say part of the
nuclear ----
General Cotton. I said it could ----
Mr. Garamendi.--strategic weapons.
General Cotton.--it could be complementary to our nuclear
forces.
Mr. Garamendi. In other words, part thereof; correct?
General Cotton. No. Because, sir, we still use conventional
forces to complement our nuclear forces today.
Mr. Garamendi. So it is not a strategic weapon?
General Cotton. You can have conventional strategic weapons
----
Mr. Garamendi. Or I suppose a ----
General Cotton.--as opposed to nuclear strategic weapons is
what I was alluding to.
Mr. Garamendi. Similar to a HIMAR [High Mobility Artillery
Rocket System] being a strategic weapon?
I guess I want to know where you are going here. Are we
going to consider the hypersonic weapon being part of our
strategic defense systems, as we consider the nuclear triad to
be part of our strategic?
Secretary Plumb. So, Congressman, I would say the word
``strategic'' ----
Mr. Garamendi. That was addressed to General Cotton.
General Cotton, you raised this issue. What is the answer?
General Cotton. What I am saying is strategic deterrence is
not just nuclear. Strategic deterrence can also be through
conventional means. We do it every day today.
Mr. Garamendi. Then why did you raise the question of the
hypersonic being specifically in that arena?
General Cotton. I did not. I said it could actually
complement in the nuclear ----
Mr. Garamendi. I will check the record. Enough of that.
We have got this issue of the SLCM [Submarine-Launched
Cruise Missile], which is a strange name. The United States
already deploys a low yield warhead, 76-2 on submarine-based
missiles. And we have the B61-12 low yield. And we have the,
will soon I suppose, or someday have an LSRO [Long Range
Standoff Weapon] that is nuclear capable.
Why do we need a SLCM? Which one of you want to answer
that? I guess Mr. Plumb.
Secretary Plumb. Congressman, the Administration position
is that we do not.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, the Congress thinks differently,
unfortunately.
So, what does that mean for our nuclear submarines that are
presently not necessarily stationed at ports where nuclear
weapons are allowed? It changes everything, doesn't it, if we
put this on our attack submarines?
Secretary Plumb. Congressman, to be fair, I was a fast
attack submariner. Fast attack submarines used to have nuclear
cruise missiles on them. They were removed by presidential
nuclear initiatives years ago just as I was entering the force.
So, I don't know if it would change everything. I guess I
would argue that it would not. But it would certainly change
some things.
Mr. Garamendi. What things?
Secretary Plumb. Some nations are not keen on having
nuclear weapons in their ports. So kind of from a port
standpoint that is a problem from us.
Mr. Garamendi. And they wouldn't be able to use those, the
submarines couldn't use Gordon and Norfolk, they would have to
go to a different?
Secretary Plumb. I wouldn't, I wouldn't be willing to say
that, sir. But additional investments would be required if they
were going to use the naval ports.
Mr. Garamendi. My time is expired. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Mr. Wilson.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you very much, Chairman Doug Lamborn and
Ranking Member Seth Moulton. Look forward to working with you
and your leadership. And we have got a great team. And, truly,
it is significantly bipartisan.
So, I am just grateful to be here. Now, it is really
humbling, okay, to look out there. I have never seen this many
stars, 24. And so, you have done a good job at the first
meeting.
And but thank you for your service. And I truly appreciate
your service. My dad served in the 14th Air Force Flying Tigers
to liberate China, in Kunming, Jengdu, Xi'an, China. So, I
appreciate that.
And then I am really grateful, General Dickinson, you beat
me by 7 years in terms of the number of years' service. And so
I appreciate that. Although I am grateful, my oldest son Allen
is field artillery, received the CAB in his service in Iraq.
So, I appreciate that branch.
And then I am all service behind you. My second son's a
doctor in the Navy, and the third son is signal, and youngest
an engineer, having served in Iraq, Egypt, and Afghanistan.
So, thank you for your service.
With that, General Cotton, the communities in South
Carolina's 2nd District, and our adjacent communities in
Georgia, are extremely supportive of the plutonium pit
production mission at the Savannah River Site. The Savannah
River Site, with its workforce and expertise is ideally suited
to complete this important mission that is so vital to national
security.
Maintaining active levels of funding for the Savannah River
plutonium processing facility is necessary to ensure that our
nation can reach our nuclear modernization needs and maintain
an effective nuclear deterrent. In fact, Congressman Moulton
was absolutely correct, we have got to have a real deterrent
that the enemy understands that they are very effective.
As of February 2023, the National Nuclear Security
Administration notified Congress that it would be unable to
meet the congressionally mandated timelines to achieve a rate
of 30 plutonium pits by 2026, or achieve the 80 pits per year
Congress mandated by 2030.
The question, as the NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration] will not be able to meet the requirements of
producing 80 pits per year by 2030, how critical is it that we
do everything we can to minimize the delay and reach the
requirement as soon as we can?
General Cotton. Congressman Wilson, it is nice seeing you
again, sir.
Bottom line, it is critically important. Eighty pits per
year, the 2030 statutory requirement has not changed when it
comes to delivery for us. We are working hand-in-hand with our
partners in NNSA to understand how they will be able to achieve
that. But it is, it is actually crucial and critical for us to
make sure that they can get as close to meeting that
requirement as they can.
Mr. Wilson. Well, I would like to assure you that the
citizens of central South Carolina and CSRA into Georgia are
ready to back this up in every way.
And, General VanHerck, a rising threat of China, acute
threat of Russia, the unabated threat of Iran building
intercontinental ballistic missiles, and an unstable North
Korea with the capacity to deliver long-range missile threats,
continue a great--to develop a greater capability and capacity,
with the intent to strike the United States and our allies.
How concerned are you about the continued missile
development and production?
Is NORAD preparing adequately to deter, detect, deny, and
protect the homeland from threats?
General VanHerck. Congressman, I am encouraged with recent
funding for NORAD modernization. Specific to the ballistic
missile threat, the basic ballistic missile threat from DPRK
[Democratic People's Republic of Korea], I am confident today
in my threat warning and attack assessment capabilities. And
also to defend in my NORTHCOM hat against a limited attack.
I am very concerned by the numbers I see and the capacity
out of DPRK today as far as the total numbers that they
actually have produced and are capable of potentially launching
at our homeland.
Mr. Wilson. Well, please keep us advised what we can do to
reach and match the threat.
And, General Dickinson, with China continuing to strengthen
its military space capabilities, if China were to conduct an
illegal invasion of Taiwan, what would be the implications of
these satellites? And would they be a threat to the United
States?
General Dickinson. Congressman, first of all, thank you for
those kind remarks as you began your question period.
I would just tell you that space is global in nature, and
so, in particular for us, the U.S. Space Command for the
Department of Defense. So, any regional conflict, if you will,
will depend upon space, and utilize space assets, both blue as
well as China.
So, I think what we would see would be a use because we
know China is leveraging space capabilities now. They have
watched us for many, many years, more than 20 years, and how,
how space-based capabilities facilitate our global reach and
our global ability to employ forces. So, I think we could see a
similar thing with China.
Mr. Wilson. Thank each of you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Lamborn. Representative Carbajal.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to all
the witnesses for being here.
General VanHerck, General Dickinson, thank you for your
service to our country. Reminds me of that movie ``A Few Good
Men.'' We wanted you on that wall, and now you are leaving. But
if General Cotton is any indication of the bench we have and
the people that are ascending to the capacities that you will
leave behind, I think we are in good hands.
Secretary Plumb, we just wrote Mr. Plumb instead of Dr.
Plumb or Assistant Secretary. I think we need to correct that
because we need to give you your due.
Again, thank you for being here.
General Dickinson, the space activity from the Department
of Defense, the United States commercial sector as well as
partners, allies, and competitors, is growing. And in the next
few years a significant number of satellites are planned to be
launched into orbit, particularly P-LEO.
As the launch industry continues to grow and other
countries develop their own launch capabilities, it is
reasonable to believe that there will be more traffic in space,
not to mention debris. Will this increased traffic pose
challenges to space domain awareness?
And is SPACECOM [United States Space Command] prepared for
this?
General Dickinson. Congressman, thanks for those words,
kind words as we have started out.
I could tell you that, frankly, yes, that presents a
challenge to us as we watch. And I think we might all agree
that watching the commercial market around the world starts
showing a lot of interesting space and wanting to be part of
the space community, space-faring nations. We are watching it
grow. We see it every day.
I will give you a statistic just to think about. In terms
of when this Command stood up in 2019, we tracked about 25,000
pieces of debris, old satellites, new satellites in the space
domain. Today we are up over 48,000.
So, you can see that, the growth that you mentioned
earlier, and how that is creating a more congested domain. So,
as we look at that there are two things I want to point out
that we are working on right now.
One, as I mentioned earlier, my top priority is to increase
space domain awareness. And how I do that is through commercial
integration as well as bringing on non-traditional type assets
that we haven't used before to look into the space domain
specifically; air defense radars, missile defense radars around
the world, both maritime as well as ground-based; leveraging
the commercial market.
The other thing we are looking at very carefully is, you
know, how we will do that transition with the Department of
Commerce for them to start doing the space traffic management
functions that are required to do space domain awareness.
I think when you look at the size, as I described, of how
much it is populated, how much it has grown in numbers, we are
going to need the Department of Commerce to do that type of
civil type of operations to account for the debris and things
that are in orbit. So, that will allow me to use the assets
that I have to do characterization of things that I need to
look at that aren't necessarily just civil or pieces of debris.
So, in other words, I will have a better opportunity with
the resources I have to do better characterization of the space
domain.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
General Dickinson, as the number of launches continues to
grow, can you speak to how you envision the Space Force range
of the future?
And do trained access-to-launch ranges meet your needs as
the combat combatant--combatant commander responsible for
space, particularly when it comes to responsive space
capability?
And how can the Department further help ensure access to
ranges?
General Dickinson. Congressman, I think a robust launch
infrastructure and responsive launch capabilities are
absolutely essential to our assured use of space, which remains
a top national security priority.
The launch stations themselves, launch facilities is
critical to the tactical response of space. But I will tell you
it is not just the only piece to it. It is ``a'' piece to it.
The other pieces are, you know, having more assets on orbit
that can be looked at to provide capabilities. It is also what
is on each of the satellites that go up and how quickly those
can be actually deployed upon a rapid response launch type
capability.
So, it is really kind of those three together. But the
launch structure is absolutely critical to what we are going to
do today and in the future.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
Dr. Plumb and General Cotton, I have limited time now, but
I am concerned by Russia's decision to suspend implementation
of the New START Treaty. In your statement you note the
``continued degradation of Russian conventional capabilities in
Ukraine will likely increase Russia's reliance on its nuclear
arsenal.''
Can you speak to the role Russia's failures in Ukraine
played in their decision to suspend New START?
And how important is it for us to maintain our commitment
to the New START Treaty?
Secretary Plumb. Thanks. Thanks, Congressman.
I will say I do think that the more Russia shows that its
conventional forces are being degraded or not up to par, then
they do rely more and more on nuclear weapons. I do think that
is a hallmark of a conventionally weak state that has to, that
you rely more on nuclear weapons as their conventional forces
fail in the field or continue to be degraded, against Ukraine
in this case.
I am not convinced, sir, that the problems Russia is facing
in the field are directly related to the New START piece. There
is a lot of political and narrative pieces inside the Russian
Government, inside Putin's mind that may be more related to
this. It is troubling nonetheless.
I will just say at the top of the meeting, if you--I forget
who, but someone noted, maybe it was Congressman Lamborn--but
they have stopped their, suspended their notifications. This is
new. This has just happened in the last couple, really the last
week. And so we can see what they are doing there. We are
looking at this closely to understand what that means for us.
Mr. Carbajal. Thank you. I am out of time.
General Cotton, you are saved by the bell.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
Dr. DesJarlais.
Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Chairman.
I would like to join my colleagues in thanking General
VanHerck and General Dickinson for your commitment and your
contribution and service to our country. And don't worry,
General Cotton, we appreciate you, too. You will get your day.
But it seems like we have too many hearings--and Mr.
Plumb--we have too many hearings now where it seems like we are
talking about how our adversaries are looking in the rearview
mirror at us when it comes to hypersonic weapons or expansion
and modernization of nuclear forces. And that is very
concerning.
So, General Cotton, I wanted to let you for a minute, if
you would, describe how delays in modernization programs impact
your ability to field sufficient forces in the future?
And are there steps STRATCOM can take now to better hedge
against the possibility that some programs do not deliver on
time?
General Cotton. Congressman, thank you for the question.
First of all, what it shows us, and the ability of us
being, having a triad shows that that strategic theory works.
Because what a triad does, it allows me to be able to balance
amongst the three legs.
Those three legs have to work together. Some folks try to
talk about the triad and stovepipes. They are not stovepipes.
So, the balancing of being able to understand. And what we are
facing today is the legacy systems across the triad are all
being modernized. That is a good thing.
But to your point, how do we balance as we make that
transition, the other good news is the legacy systems are safe.
They are secure. They are effective, and they are credible
today.
So, we constantly look at all three legs to ensure that we
can balance, to ensure that we can, you know, cover to your
point and make sure we have an effective deterrent.
Dr. DesJarlais. Would you say if we stay on our current
modernization trajectory will the President and the STRATCOM
Commander, if it is not you, have the capabilities that we will
need to deter both Russia and China if our intel on their
modernization continues at the current pace, say, in 2030?
General Cotton. Sir, I think, I said it in an earlier
statement, I think we probably need to have a conversation in
regards to strategy as well as force posture to ensure that we
can, that we can make sure we have what we need in regards to I
would say probably the mid-2030s and beyond.
Now, the transition to our newer weapons systems are
happening in the time frame that you just mention. And I think
I can deliver, as long as we stay in alignment and produce and
deliver the weapons systems, the new modernization systems as
close to on time as we can.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Shifting gears just a little bit, we
had a conversation regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons. And
how many non-strategic nuclear weapons does Russia have? And in
what ways is their arsenal expanding and expected to expand?
General Cotton. Sir, I have to take that for the record to
get you the exact number. But by definition, non-strategic
nuclear weapons are anything that is not counted in New START.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. What is your assessment of Russia's
motivation for investing so heavily in these non-strategic,
low-yield nuclear weapons?
And do they detect a gap in our deterrence that they
believe they can derive a military advantage from exploiting?
General Cotton. I think it is based on their strategic
theories on the utilization that it is below threshold where
they can actually utilize non-strategic nuclear weapons or
tactical nuclear weapons.
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. General VanHerck, I had a question
for this morning on North Korea's missile capabilities. But we
will address that in the next closed session.
So, with that, I will yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Now to one of our new members of the
subcommittee, Representative Houlahan.
Ms. Houlahan. I am new to the subcommittee but not new to
this. I served in the Air Force myself, and this is what I did
when I was in the Air Force 30-something years ago. So, I am
grateful to be here with you guys today.
My questions are for General Cotton, and for General
Dickinson, and Dr. Plumb.
General VanHerck, we asked questions at the last meeting,
so maybe we will skip that today, and maybe something in the
classified session.
First for General Cotton, three days ago reports emerged
that the PRC is increasing their defense budget by 7.2 percent
next year. And we already know, as you said in your written
testimony, that the PRC has rapidly increased their supply of
both warheads and missiles, with the expectation that they will
control about 1,000 warheads over the next decade.
So, as Commander of the Strategic Command, I guess having,
you know, spent the next 30 years working in industry with KPIs
[Key Performance Indicators] and learning to measure what
matters, what matters to you?
How do you measure success with strategic deterrence? Is it
the number of warheads? Is it the size, or is it the range, or
is it comparison against our pacing threat? Or is it something
else, as you mentioned, that is a balance of non-nuclear and
other assets as well?
Do you believe that we have to outspend or have a larger
missile supply than the PRC to maintain our effective levels of
deterrence?
General Cotton. Congresswoman, thank you so much. And hooah
at you. You are an Air Force veteran.
I think it is a little bit of all the above. And what I
mean by that is the definition of strategic--no, excuse me--of
deterrence from my perspective. For me, deterrence is about,
first, understanding what the adversary values. And when you
understand what the adversary values, ensuring the adversary
understands that the action you impose, that imposition is so
great that they will not risk what they value.
I think an incredible start for that in what we are doing
right now with the modernization of our nuclear forces is a
start to that.
I agree with you, I think adding different capabilities
that we are talking about today from a strategic deterrence
perspective is also something that needs to be added in that
calculus.
Ms. Houlahan. Thank you. I appreciate your brevity in your
answer so it allows me time to ask Dr. Plumb a question.
As we are rightfully focusing more of our time on space and
improving our security and collaboration in space, we are
running into some issues working with our allies due to the
tendency that many of us have to overclassify space-related
information. And Representative Moulton asked about this, too.
The fiscal year 2022 NDAA required that the Secretary would
conduct a review of the classified programs under Space Force
to determine whether any level of classification of the program
could be changed to a lower level, or if the program could be
declassified and reported back to us.
Dr. Plumb, my understanding is that report was due last
April. Do you have any expectation of when we might be able to
get that report?
Secretary Plumb. Thanks, Congresswoman.
First, let me just say I have got three C's from my ASD
space hat that I wear, all related to space. I am interested in
space control. I am interested in space cooperation with
allies, which you raised. And both of those are also contingent
on kind of our tendency to over classify space.
It really does make it hard to share information with our
allies. General Dickinson and I have been to New Zealand to
talk about this with some of our closest allies, as a matter of
fact.
I will say I am aware that the report was due then. It is
actually a pretty Herculean task. The Deputy Secretary of
Defense has started last year a SAP [Special Access Program]
reform effort--it might have been even before that--which is
coming to a, at least a new stage.
I don't think any of those things, I don't expect any of
those things are going to become unclassified. But we are
hoping to find ways to better share information with industry,
just as an example, another partner we don't talk about as
much.
Ms. Houlahan. Do we have an estimation on when that report
would be due?
Secretary Plumb. I don't have a great one for you. But I am
hoping for later this year.
Ms. Houlahan. Well, I look forward to following up on that,
with that.
And with my last half a minute, General Dickinson, you
talked a little bit about sort of the implications about
working with our allies. And, Dr. Plumb, you talked a little
bit about industry. But I am also thinking about the American
people.
A lot of what has effectively been effective about Ukraine
has been that release of information by the Administration and
others that has been sanitized and is allowed to be advanced,
you know, to the American public to help them understand space,
and Space Force, and Space Command as one of those problems
where people just don't understand its impact.
I know I have run out of town. But I would be interested,
perhaps afterwards, in learning more from you about whether you
think there is an appetite or an ability to have that
information available to the American public in a more abundant
way and a more sanitized way.
And I am sorry, and I yield back.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. And now we have another new member,
although not new to this issue, just like Representative
Houlahan is not new to this issue, and that is Representative
Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. I am glad to be on this committee. Thank you.
I want to welcome all four of you here today. We appreciate
your leadership and what you do.
I want to welcome General VanHerck. General Dickinson,
Omaha where you are retiring, you can join General Cotton who
has been well-received and welcome there.
So, but congratulations to both. And we thank you.
I volunteered to be on the Strategic Forces Committee to
focus on NC3 [nuclear command, control, and communication], as
General Cotton knows. We are investing in the triad. I think we
are on a great glidepath for success to modernize all three of
those legs of the triad.
I am concerned about the survivability of our NC3. I know
STRATCOM and our DoD has been working on the comm systems and
the architectures. But the area that I am focused on is, or
worried about is the survivability of command. With
hypersonics, and cruise missiles, perhaps submarines off our
coasts at some point again, it is harder to ensure that command
authorities can survive a first strike and conduct a second
counterstrike.
I want to have 100 percent confidence that the Russians and
Chinese have 100 percent confidence that we can do a second
strike, because that ensures deterrence. And that is ultimately
what we are about. Job number one is strategic deterrence.
So, with that, General Cotton, can you share your thoughts
on what parts of our deterrence, our alert, and our readiness
posture that you are watching most closely, and what elements
you believe may warrant more attention from us and more
funding?
General Cotton. Congressman Bacon, thank you so much for
the question. It is all of it.
You know, I look at our E6B fleet. I look at our E4B fleet.
I look at the mission readiness of those fleets. I look at our
submarine fleet as well as the ICBM leg and our bomber fleet,
to include all of the bomber forces, not just those that are
directly assigned, which is the B-52 and the B-2.
We carefully manage that, Congressman, to make sure that we
are, that we are confident that we can do exactly what you are
saying in regards to being able to disperse when we need to
disperse, and get to locations of safety when we need to get to
locations of safety.
Mr. Bacon. A lot of this is predicated on strategic
warning. But I am an intel officer by trade, and historian. I
love reading history. And more often than not, adversaries are
caught flatfooted.
So I just, I want to ensure that we have a debate done
every day that we have that survivability there.
A follow-up question with you, General Cotton, is how is
our hosting Nuclear Enterprise Center at Offutt working to
design the next generation NC3 architecture?
And how is that work informing DoD NC3 modernization?
General Cotton. Thank you for that question.
You know, as I took command on the 9th of December, one of
the things that we did on the 12th of December was we created a
cross-functional team within the Command to really get after
how do we describe the incredible things that are going on
within the NC3 portfolio, and describe it, to be frank, to the
members of Congress and to my own bosses within the Department?
So, one of the things that we are doing is we are changing
what we would call our OV1 strategy to describe what we are
doing within the architecture. And I have directed our team to
come out with what we would call a roadmap construct to better
describe the dollars, and the investments, and everything that
is happening within the enterprise.
It is still nascent, but we will be ready to present that
to my bosses in the Pentagon, as well as to the members here
shortly.
But there is a lot of work that is going on with the next
gen NC3 implementation plan. And I look forward to being able
to describe that to you.
Mr. Bacon. I have a question for General Dickinson. But
before I do, before my focus on NC3, I have been working on
electronic warfare. I really appreciate the great work STRATCOM
and the whole DoD is doing on it. It is an area that we have
fallen behind on. So, I appreciate your focus on that as well
as STRATCOM.
General Dickinson, while I have about 30 seconds left, can
you explain a little more about the dynamic space operations
and your requirements?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Congressman.
So, dynamic space operations is the concept where we get to
the point where we are not having to worry about consumables
that might be on spacecraft. In other words, we need to be able
to have dynamic space capabilities that don't--an operator or a
warfighter can actually use that in the actual context or the
tactics they want to employ, without having to worry about
replenishment. Whether it is a battery drain, whether it is a
fuel consumption, something along the lines where you can
refuel, be able to have a replenishment of that capability so
you can use it not only today but in the future. And then when
you are actually doing operations, that you are not limited in
what you can do because of that.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. And for everyone's situational
awareness, I have asked Joint Staff, OSD, and STRATCOM to put
together a classified NC3 brief for members. So, be looking for
a notice coming soon.
I was going to ask Representative Norcross. He wants to
defer. So, Representative Strong, you are next.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is an honor when I get to see a panel of generals who
spend a lot of time in my hometown of Huntsville, Alabama, at
Redstone Arsenal, where I served 26 years on the Madison County
Commission, the last 10 as the chairman.
General Dickinson, Redstone Arsenal and the surrounding
community was sorry to see you leave SMDC [Space and Missile
Defense Command] in 2019. We are proud of everything you have
done for the U.S. Space Command.
Your successor, General Dan Karbler, has done a fantastic
job as well. And I know General Cotton will agree.
General Cotton, thank you for taking time from your
schedule to come by my office last week and give me a brief. In
our discussion you stressed the importance of guaranteeing the
U.S. strategic forces are safe, secure, effective, and
credible. This applies to the three legs of the nuclear triad
and nuclear command, control, and communications.
Can you briefly summarize what Strategic Command is doing
to ensure that all ongoing modernization efforts and our
strategic forces and capabilities are safe, secure, effective,
and credible?
General Cotton. Congressman Strong, thank you so much. And
I had a great opportunity, it was a great time talking with you
last week.
You know, there is nothing more sacred than ensuring that
we have a safe, secure, and effective, and credible nuclear
deterrent, just because of the weapons systems effort described
in themselves. When we talk about the men and women that are
working those systems each and every day, and the training and
readiness that goes in ensuring that they are ready to do their
job, that is paramount for us.
So, I oversee the service components that have that mission
set every day to ensure that they are properly trained, they
are properly equipped, and have the means to be able to deliver
effects when they are required to do so.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, General.
Dr. Plumb, as you know, my hometown of Rocket City, USA,
Huntsville, Alabama, is a haven for traditional defense
contractors and commercial industry alike. As the Department of
Defense continues to increase its reliance on commercial
partners in space I have two questions:
One, what is the DoD doing to ensure there is no foreign
adversary influence on commercial partners and their dual-use
service or technology?
Two, what authorities does the DoD have to safely integrate
commercial partners into current architectures and information
sharing?
Secretary Plumb. Thank you, Congressman.
So, a two-part question. So, first, I think if I have you
right you are asking about supply chain.
Mr. Strong. That is right.
Secretary Plumb. So, obviously, or if not obviously, let me
just stress how important supply chain integrity is to the
Department of Defense for any, really any capability, but
certainly any high-end capability, and that is a thing that the
Department takes seriously and works on every day.
Your second question is authorities that I think I am
integrating commercial into. So, it is a good question. I think
I am not aware of any authority limitations. I think it is very
clear to those of us at the table, and anyone working on space
at the industry, right, commercial providers are moving at a
pace that is probably rapid and the Department of Defense said
that they can move at. So, we are trying to harness that and
see how we can use that to our advantage.
We are looking at different ways we can use commercial
space. There are some missions that are probably almost
completely could be filled by commercial, and there are some
that are very unique to DoD. I will just say I think the
general approach going forward, and I am not the acquisition
authority here, sir, is that we should buy what we can and
build what we have to.
Mr. Strong. Thank you, Dr. Plumb.
General Dickinson, I have heard a lot of talk about dynamic
space operations and maneuvering satellites without regret. Can
you explain on what your requirements are for this and how it
intersects with ensuring robust and redundant situational
awareness capabilities?
General Dickinson. Thank you, Congressman. And good to see
you. Thanks for those kind words.
I would say for dynamic space operations we are still
looking at crafting our requirements, drafting our
requirements, what that really means, and being able to
describe that. But in essence, as I mentioned earlier, it is
being able to maneuver on orbit in any manner that we need to
given the situation, and not be constrained by fuel,
electricity, batteries, whatever the consumables might be on
that particular spacecraft or that particular capability.
So, like in other domains where you are able to refuel
trucks, and tanks, and aircraft, we need to be able to do the
same thing in space.
Mr. Strong. Thank you.
I thank each of you for being here. I yield my time.
Mr. Lamborn. Representative Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. I'll ask in the classified.
Mr. Lamborn. In a moment we are about to recess and go up
to 2337 for the conclusion of this hearing in a classified
setting
I have one quick follow-up on something you said, General
Dickinson, earlier.
You talked about achieving initial operating capability at
your provisional headquarters at Peterson Space Force Base. I
know that reaching full operational capability is a high
priority, but there have been complications regarding Space
Command's permanent headquarters and where it will be located.
Can you talk about the readiness challenges you face should
those headquarters be moved from Colorado Springs, and the
additional time that would be involved?
General Dickinson. Chairman, I did say I reached IOC,
initial operational capability, a couple years ago. And we are
on the glidepath right now, moving aggressively towards full
operational capability in the provisional headquarters and the
infrastructure that I have in Colorado Springs right now.
To me it is all about readiness. It is all about being able
to do the mission sets that I have been given by the President
of the United States. And so, as we move with resourcing the
both infrastructure as well as people, which are the most
important part of the command, we are moving in that direction.
Mr. Lamborn. All right, thank you.
We will now go into recess and reconvene in a few moments
in 2337.
[Whereupon, at 4:29 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 8, 2023
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 8, 2023
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[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 8, 2023
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you for your frank comments on Russia's
provision of highly enriched uranium for Chinese CFR-600 Fast Breeder
reactors. In February 2023, the administration sanctioned three Rosatom
entities, but this is a far cry from enough. Can you please describe
what policy proposals the Department of Defense is pursuing to knee-cap
Rosatom?
Secretary Plumb. The Department of Defense (DoD) has expressed its
concern regarding Russia's provision of highly enriched uranium to the
PRC for use in its CFR-600 fast breeder reactors now under
construction, which will likely be used by the PRC to produce fissile
material that could be used in its expanding nuclear weapons program.
As the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states, the PRC should adopt a
moratorium on fissile material production or, at a minimum, provide
increased transparency to assure the international community that
fissile material produced for civilian purposes is fully accounted for
and not diverted to military uses. Russia's cooperation with the PRC
does not reflect the behavior of responsible nuclear weapons states. On
April 12, the State Department announced further sanctions on five
entities and one individual that are part of Rosatom. The DoD will
continue to work closely with other U.S. government agencies to address
and constrain Rosatom's activities, including with the PRC.
Mr. Lamborn. Can you please provide an update as to when the
Committee can expect the reports on the nuclear sea launched cruise
missile (SLCM-N) and Hard and Deeply Buried Targets directed in the
FY2023 NDAA.
Secretary Plumb. The FY 2023 NDAA tasked reports related to a
nuclear sea-launched cruise missile to several components within the
Defense Department as well as to the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). These reporting requirements include a letter
from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), a report from the
Office of the Secretary of Defense, a report from the Joint Staff, a
report from the Navy, and spend plans from the Navy and the NNSA.
Efforts to complete the DOD required reports are proceeding. The Navy
is finalizing the process to submit a spend plan to the Congressional
defense committees. In compliance with Congressional requirements, the
Navy has obligated FY22 funds appropriated and authorized for SLCM-N.
These funds went to support relevant research conducted by Navy
Strategic Systems Programs (SSP).
The Navy intends to obligate authorized and appropriated FY23
funds. This process is ongoing with the intent to submit the report in
the near future. OSD is drafting the required report on deterring
theater nuclear use and is coordinating completion of the remaining
reports by the Joint Staff and the Department of the Navy. The
Department is working towards completing these reports by their
required NDAA due dates. OSD is also drafting the required letter from
the Secretary of Defense identifying ``one or more preferred courses of
action from among the actions identified in the analysis of
alternatives for a nuclear-capable sea-launched cruise missile.'' The
Department is aware that this letter was due to the committee in
January 2023. We are working to provide a satisfactory answer to this
requirement that is consistent with the legal requirement as well as
current administration policy.
A study on enduring approaches to HDBT defeat, one that takes an
all-domain approach, is underway. OSD Policy is monitoring this work as
part of the Department's efforts to develop an enduring capability for
improved HDBT defeat as an outcome of 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. The
study team is examining a range of nuclear and non-nuclear options to
hold at risk adversary HDBTs. We anticipate timely submission of the
report to Congress in the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2023. The
Department is complying with Congressional requirements to retain a
portion of the B83s in the active stockpile until the HDBT study is
complete.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you for your comments on the importance of Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (JEMSO) in the open hearing. I was
hoping that you could provide a more fulsome answer for the record. To
the best of your ability in an unclassified format, can you describe
the ways that United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) relies on
spectrum to support its missions and what are some of the future
spectrum warfighter needs that will be essential to competing with
Russia and China on a future battlefield?
General Cotton. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Lamborn. What did the Chinese balloon observe while over
STRATCOM and U.S. nuclear facilities? What countermeasures did you take
to limit or prevent it from collecting intelligence?
General Cotton. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Lamborn. Your opening statement described Chinese warhead
production capacity and the total number you estimate China will have
in 2030 and 2035. Please provide an unclassified estimates for Russia.
General Cotton. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Lamborn. Recent press reported that the Russia's tested a
Sarmat ICBM while President Biden was in Kyiv. Can you describe the
recent failed test launch of the Russian Sarmat ICBM that has been in
the opensource? Do we know what caused the failure, and whether it will
impact the system's deployment? Do you believe the timing of the test
was adjust to occur during President Biden's visit?
General Cotton. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
Mr. Lamborn. In our open session, Secretary Plumb spoke to reports
that Russia, specifically Rosatom, is providing highly enriched uranium
for Chinese Fast Breeder reactors. These reactors, the CFR-600 that
will almost certainly help accelerate the pace of the Chinese nuclear
weapons program by producing weapons grade-plutonium. These reports
highlight the importance of simultaneously deterring both Russia and
China at the same time. How concerned are you about increasing evidence
of Russian material support for China's nuclear program and what does
this tell you about their strategic defense relationship?
General Cotton. [No answer was available at the time of printing.]
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WALTZ
Mr. Waltz. There's been discussion recently about satellite
tactical surveillance and reconnaissance and whether Space Force should
be responsible for requirements, budget, and acquiring government
systems or commercial solutions to satisfy warfighter needs. What is
your perspective on this? Should Space Force have its own budget for
and be able to either acquire or commercially procure tactical
satellite surveillance and reconnaissance?
General Dickinson. I disagree with this claim. USSTRATCOM began
advocating for hypersonic weapon capabilities in 2003, and the
Department of Defense formally recognized the need for a prompt global
strike capability in 2006, well before potential adversaries began
maturing and fielding hypersonic weapons.
The challenge of holding adversary targets at risk continues to
grow as advanced offensive and defensive systems hinder our ability to
employ fires in highly contested environments. Today, the only prompt
long-range strike capabilities are ballistic missile systems armed with
nuclear warheads. Hypersonic strike weapons will provide a highly
responsive, long-range, conventional capability for distant, defended,
and/or time-critical threats when other forces are unavailable, denied
access, or not preferred. Hypersonic weapon systems will provide senior
leaders additional credible strike options to influence all stages of
conflict without crossing the nuclear threshold.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. We are just past the three-year anniversary for the
Space Force. Can you please explain in detail how the establishment of
the Space Force as a separate service has benefitted the country and
national security, particularly when compared to how Space was managed
prior to the Force's establishment?''
Secretary Plumb. The decision to pursue the establishment of the
U.S. Space Force (USSF) reflected recommendations and advice of
multiple independent commissions and studies regarding how to adapt our
defense space enterprise to the growing security challenges in space.
These reviews considered many potential models including making changes
within the U.S. Air Force, establishing a structure like Special
Operations Command, and the establishment of a separate Military
Service.
Ultimately, these efforts led to the legislation establishing the
USSF as the sixth Armed Force. This outcome reflected the importance of
strengthening advocacy for space in budgeting decisions, strengthening
development of doctrine for space, and the need to bring coherency to
the complex research, development, and acquisition challenges of
developing hardware and software for space architectures of the future.
Access to and freedom to operate in space is critical to our
national security and economic prosperity. However, space is a
contested domain. Potential adversaries are fielding and developing
increasingly complex capabilities in order to have the means to deny
the United States access to the space capabilities that are fundamental
to our way of war and modern way of life. The Space Force's organize,
train, and equip role enables our Guardians to protect national
security interests, together with the rest of the Joint Force, in space
and across all domains.
In the Fiscal Year 2024 Presidential budget, we saw the largest
increase to the space budget to date--reflecting the increased
importance of space to our national security and the need to address
the challenges we face from adversary threats.
In addition to equipping and budgeting, USSF fills the statutory
role to organize and train our Guardians and has established a mission
and vision to prepare for conflict that may begin or extend into space.
The USSF has established warfighter training and doctrine that had not
previously existed, and has organized itself into a force capable of
providing space capabilities to the joint warfighter, and moreover,
fully capable of reacting to hostile activities during conflict, and
denying the adversary use of space-based capabilities that would
provide them an advantage terrestrially.
Mr. Turner. I have heard some claim that the only reason we are
investing in hypersonic weapons is because our adversaries already have
them. Do you agree with this claim or are there other reasons the US
might want to invest in hypersonic weapon capabilities?
General Cotton. I disagree with this claim. USSTRATCOM began
advocating for hypersonic weapon capabilities in 2003, and the
Department of Defense formally recognized the need for a prompt global
strike capability in 2006, well before potential adversaries began
maturing and fielding hypersonic weapons. (U) The challenge of holding
adversary targets at risk continues to grow as advanced offensive and
defensive systems hinder our ability to employ fires in highly
contested environments. Today, the only prompt long-range strike
capabilities are ballistic missile systems armed with nuclear warheads.
Hypersonic strike weapons will provide a highly responsive, long-range,
conventional capability for distant, defended, and/or time-critical
threats when other forces are unavailable, denied access, or not
preferred. Hypersonic weapon systems will provide senior leaders
additional credible strike options to influence all stages of conflict
without crossing the nuclear threshold.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. DESJARLAIS
Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. Shifting gears just a little bit, we had a
conversation regarding non-strategic nuclear weapons. And how many non-
strategic nuclear weapons does Russia have? And in what ways is their
arsenal expanding and expected to expand?
General Cotton. Please see classified response.
[all]