[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-4]
THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
FEBRUARY 8, 2023
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
53-350 WASHINGTON : 2024
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan, Chairman
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi JASON CROW, Colorado
RONNY JACKSON, Texas ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
NANCY MACE, South Carolina SARA JACOBS, California
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
CORY MILLS, Florida JIMMY PANETTA, California
Joe Bartlett, Professional Staff Member
Will Johnson, Professional Staff Member
Zachary Calderon, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Bergman, Hon. Jack, a Representative from Michigan, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............ 1
Gallego. Hon. Ruben, a Representative from Arizona, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations.... 2
WITNESSES
Jones, Seth G., Senior Vice President, Center for Strategic and
International Studies.......................................... 3
Ucko, David H., Professor and Department Chair, College of
International Security Affairs, National Defense University.... 5
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Jones, Seth G................................................ 25
Ucko, David H................................................ 39
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted post hearing.]
THE ROLE OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES IN GREAT POWER COMPETITION
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House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 8, 2023.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:03 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jack Bergman
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK BERGMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
Mr. Bergman. Good afternoon. I call to order this hearing
of the Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee on
``The Role of Special Operations Forces in Great Power
Competition.''
The United States is facing a dramatically different
geopolitical environment than any other time in recent decades.
While this century has been dominated by our efforts in the
global war on terrorism, the new era of great power competition
presents strategic challenges from revisionist states in China
and Russia and their rogue state allies in Iran and North
Korea. All the while, the threat from violent extremist
organizations persist, as nodes from ISIS [Islamic State of
Iraq and Syria], al-Qaida, and their affiliates continue to
seek out unstable regions from which they can plot and plan
against Western targets.
As the United States faces an inflection point in
geostrategic competition, so too does our special operations
community. Thankfully, the SOF [special operations forces]
enterprise is well-suited to address the challenges posed by
great power competition, where core SOCOM [U.S. Special
Operations Command] activities such as irregular warfare and
the train, advise, and assist mission offer the ability to
present strategic and operational challenges to our adversaries
and enable our allies and partners to resist outside
aggression.
Great power competition, in which conventional force
capabilities may play a larger role in deterring hostile
actions from our state adversaries, similarly means that
special operations forces will play more of a supporting and
enabling role for the wider joint force. The core functions of
the SOF enterprise, when taken together, provide options and
capabilities across the entire operational spectrum--from gray
zone competition to direct military engagement if the need
arises.
During this transition, it will be critical for our special
operators to continue to hone new skills and expertise in a
variety of areas, from critical cultural knowledge and language
capabilities, to being tactically proficient in the cyber and
information space.
Today's hearing is focused on the role of special
operations forces as the United States enters an era of great
power competition. This subcommittee will seek to examine the
unique capabilities of SOCOM and how special operations forces'
core activities may complement and enable the joint force to
operate against strategic adversaries. We hope to further
understand which skill sets of the SOF community must be
relearned after 20-plus years of counterterrorism, and what new
skills our special operators must learn to operate in the 21st
century gray zone, below the threshold of direct military
intervention.
Our witnesses today have a breadth of experience with the
special operations community and the study of gray zone
conflict and irregular warfare.
Dr. Seth Jones is a senior vice president at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Jones has also served
as a director at the RAND Corporation and has served as a plans
officer and adviser to the commanding general of U.S. Special
Operations Forces in Afghanistan.
Dr. David Ucko is a professor and department chair at the
College of International Security Affairs at the National
Defense University, where he oversees the college's irregular
warfare area of concentration.
In the interest of time, I ask the witnesses to keep their
opening remarks to 5 minutes or less so that we will have
sufficient time for questions and answers.
With that, please let me thank our witnesses for appearing
before us today.
And I now recognize Ranking Member Gallego for any opening
remarks.
And, oh, by the way, just know the subcommittee chairman
and the ranking member both probably look at life from a
slightly Marine Corps perspective. So, having said that, just
keep your words, you know, to simple syllables. We want to be
able to understand.
Congressman Gallego, over to you.
STATEMENT OF HON. RUBEN GALLEGO, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ARIZONA,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL
OPERATIONS
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I look forward to
working with you in a bipartisan manner to continue the great
work that we started last year.
And it is hard to think of a more appropriate topic as we
continue our oversight responsibilities at the beginning of
this Congress. As I said during last year's SOCOM posture
hearing, special operations forces are at an inflection point.
The 2022 National Defense Strategy focuses on strategic
competition to counter China's growing multi-domain challenges
and Russia's persistent aggression, including its ongoing war
in Ukraine.
SOF has a significant role to play and, in this volatile
security environment, should be prioritized.
But I want to return to the inflection point I mentioned
earlier at the hearing. How are SOF postured to support a
whole-of-government approach to great power competition?
What is the role in concert with other departments and
agencies so you are using the right instrument of national
power for its best purposes?
The summary of the Irregular Warfare Annex to the National
Defense Strategy published in 2020 tells us that irregular
warfare is the struggle among state and non-state actors to
influence populations and affect legitimacy. This needs to be
prioritized as a competency within the joint force and the
special operations community.
Some of the core activities that are important to irregular
warfare are ones like foreign international defense and
military information support operations, which are essential if
we are to be successful in confronting our competitors in the
gray zone or below the threshold of armed conflict.
My question stands: Where does the special forces community
stand in the core activities needed for irregular warfare?
Has the focus on counterterrorism and counter violent
extremist organizations, which has been needed for the last 20
years, caused other aspects of SOCOM's core activities to
atrophy?
I would argue that the lessons over the last 20 years, as
is, don't directly translate to the needs of today or tomorrow.
We need to ensure that SOCOM has the right training,
institutional education, and authorities to continue to be the
best at what this nation asks them to do.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this hearing. And I also want
to thank our witnesses for their time today. And I look forward
to hearing your views.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Representative Gallego.
We will now hear from our witnesses, then move into
question and answer session.
So, Dr. Jones, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF SETH G. JONES, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Dr. Jones. Thank you very much, Chairman Bergman, Ranking
Member Gallego, and distinguished members of the committee.
This is an important hearing, and look forward to the
discussion afterwards.
As I will outline in my testimony, U.S. Special Operations
Forces need to play an important role in competition,
particularly with such countries as China, Russia, and Iran,
including in the area of irregular warfare.
My brief remarks are going to cover three areas.
The first is irregular warfare.
The second is the role of SOF in irregular warfare.
And the third are some implications on the congressional
side.
So, let me just say that I think, as has been well
documented in the recent National Defense Strategy and the
National Security Strategy, we are in an era of competition
with a range of countries, particularly with the Chinese at the
top. I would argue, as we have seen historically, we have not
had nuclear powers ever go to war directly with each other, in
part because states get quite cautious in conventional warfare
against other nuclear powers.
So, the Soviets, even the Chinese and the Indians, or the
Indians and Pakistanis, have generally acted with restraint. We
have not seen any of those states go to direct conventional war
with each other.
However, we have still seen intense competition below the
threshold of conventional war. So, I would argue here today
that I consider this area below the threshold of conventional
war as probably being the primary area of competition on an
hourly and a daily category.
As we look at a range of U.S. competitors, the Chinese are
very active below this threshold with elements of the People's
Liberation Army, the Ministry of State Security, the Ministry
of Public Security. The Russians with elements of the GRU, the
Main Directorate; the SVR, Foreign Intelligence Service; the
FSB [Federal Security Service]; several of Russia's special
operations forces, including its Spetsnaz; as well as non-state
entities including, as we have seen in the Ukraine in the
Bakhmut area, the Wagner Group, and some of the private
military companies.
And I don't need to say a lot about the Iranians because
they are among the quintessential irregular actors with the
Islamic Revolutionary Guard Quds Force, and its relationship
with the Lebanese Hezbollah, Popular Mobilization Forces, and
others around the Middle East.
So, I think when we look at, at the role of SOF in this
arena, I think there is a particular role for activities
outside of direct action. That has been the mantra over the 20
years after 9/11 of SOF and many of its units. But I think what
we are talking about primarily, because of the risk of
escalation, is a heavy focus on things like foreign internal
defense, providing assistance to a range of countries. So,
think for a moment about aiding the Baltic States or Finland in
providing assistance in case of an invasion, Russian invasion,
not imminent at this point, but certainly potentially down the
road.
Taiwan in case of an invasion there is an important
component of the Taiwanese would need to resist both
conventionally but also an irregular element of that as well.
Unconventional warfare, which is the support to non-state
entities, non-state partners, a role historically of
organizations like the Green Berets.
And then a range of other activities, including information
operations.
My general view is, again, is that I think there has been a
slight misunderstanding of the non-kinetic side of special
operations forces. And they, they have a range of capabilities.
When it comes to the role of Congress, I think Congress has
a very important role moving forward for SOF, particularly in
this area of irregular warfare. My own view is that funding
should be considered expanding in the section 1202 area,
potentially also in triple-three, section 333. And happy to
discuss that.
I do think there needs to be a broad review, posture review
of the Department of Defense's and the interagency role in
irregular warfare.
And happy to take more specific questions. But as I have
argued so far, I think this will be a major form of
competition. The Chinese, the Russians, and the Iranians are
heavily involved in this, and we need to responsibly as well.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Jones can be found in the
Appendix on page 25.]
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Dr. Jones.
Dr. Ucko.
STATEMENT OF DAVID H. UCKO, PROFESSOR AND DEPARTMENT CHAIR,
COLLEGE OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS, NATIONAL DEFENSE
UNIVERSITY
Dr. Ucko. Chairman Bergman, Ranking Member Gallego, and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me here
today.
As we have heard, the United States finds itself in an era
of strategic competition. How to respond is now the focus of
the U.S. Government, but it is a question compounded by the
variegated and global method of attack.
Indeed, America's rivals are deliberately avoiding U.S.
strengths, particularly in the military domain. And, instead,
they privilege ambiguity and subterfuge, blending statecraft
with subversion and war with peace.
SOF have and can contribute to this competition through its
specialization in irregular warfare. In recent years, SOF has
broadened its application of foreign internal defense and
unconventional warfare to IW [irregular warfare] missions and
SOF core activities to fit this new strategic environment. FID
[foreign internal defense] traditionally meant aiding a
friendly government against an insurgency. But SOF now looks
upon it to boost a country's resilience against foreign-
sponsored proxies.
UW [unconventional warfare] traditionally implied
sponsoring an insurgency against an illicit or occupying
government. But SOF now looks upon its work as supporting
resistance capabilities for states either facing foreign
invasion or seeking to deter such a threat.
Building resilience and resistance will be key lines of
effort in America's overall approach. Yet, they are also highly
demanding tasks requiring institutional readiness and
protracted partnerships abroad. There is today a need to
rebalance SOF in favor of FID and UW, and to harness the skills
they call for within this new strategic era.
This will mean an emphasis on language skills, cultural
know-how, political awareness, and strategic acumen, all at
scale, with major implications for SOF recruitment and career
tracks.
Yet, FID and UW are more than military tasks. In FID the
assets trained by SOF must be supported by a capable security
sector, undergirded by sustainable institutions, and operating
alongside instruments of state that can take the lead in
political, societal, and economic matters.
In UW, fostering potential for armed resistance must be
complemented by a whole-of-society effort to provide a legal
framework, engage with allies and partners, build a narrative
for mobilization, and win the struggle for legitimacy that is
so essential to irregular warfare.
This calls for greater interagency coordination, and
integration even, in conducting what many see exclusively as a
SOF task.
This brings us to the primary non-military nature of
strategic competition. Indeed, as our competitors seek to avoid
our military strengths, there are clear limits to how much we
can and should expect from SOF, still a military force.
Responding to weaponized corruption, election interference,
media penetration, political infiltration, dodgy trade deals,
and infrastructural development will require a far broader
portfolio. Even where SOF has relevant capability, for example
its PSYOPS [psychological operations] assets, so do other
instruments of power. And they must be made to count.
This is not only a matter of managing SOF's operational
tempo, which has been too high for too long, forcing standards
to slip, it is also about allowing SOF to master the tasks we
expect of them, FID and UW in particular. Thus, where SOF
engages in non-military tasks, it should be to increase the
reach and effectiveness of civilian agencies.
My written testimony sets out useful precedents for such
integration at the operational level, which could be scaled up
for truly strategic effect. This also means integrating better
with general purpose forces for a more calibrated division of
labor, particularly as concerns security force assistance and
persistent partnerships.
Now, such partnerships do rely on an interagency and
conventional military being able to play their parts within
irregular warfare. Thus, I recommend interagency strategic
education, training, and sensitization as to the nature of this
competition and the roles of different components of state in
generating a tailored response.
My college, the College of International Security Affairs
at the National Defense University, provides a model for such
education that could be scaled up for greater effect. At our
campus at Fort McNair here in DC, under the Regional Defense
Fellowship Program we combine senior officials from across the
armed services, the intelligence community, the interagency,
and partner nations for an education in irregular warfare and
associated strategies. The program is partner oriented, with
more than 50 percent of students coming from abroad.
At our MA [master of arts] program at Fort Bragg, civilian
academics teach an irregular warfare curriculum to SOF officers
and NCOs [noncommissioned officers], alongside international
SOF students and State Department personnel.
On integration, there's also a key role here for cross-
functional teams, liaison officers, and other structural ways
of cutting across agencies, thereby enabling awareness and
synchronization of respective strengths. The newly formed
Irregular Warfare Center could play a leading role in this
initiative, as it provides a focal point for irregular warfare
and taps into existing networks devoted to this topic.
As of the FY 2023 defense budget, it has been granted
authorities to engage and coordination across the interagency
to enhance America's capability for irregular and political
warfare.
The final need is for greater strategic clarity and long-
term planning for strategic competition, to understand what we
are both competing for and against. I think this means
developing a strategy that proceeds according to a clearly
elaborated theory of success rather than just the means and
capabilities at our disposal.
I look forward to discussing these issues with you, and to
your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Ucko can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Doctor.
And I will defer my questions until--till last.
I would like to recognize Ranking Member Gallego for his 5
minutes.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Chairman. I just have two
questions. And this is to both of our witnesses.
While we are discussing the role of SOF in great power
competition, are there some areas that should be left to other
departments and agencies?
And are there any tasks that SOF should not necessarily do
when it comes to great power competition?
And that is not necessarily that they can't do it well, but
that someone else could probably be doing it better and we have
the opportunity cost issue here.
Want to start, Dr. Jones?
Dr. Jones. Sure.
Yes, so I think a range of the skill sets that SOF do get
involved in, including information operations, there is a role
in MISO [military information support operations] that SOF can
play. But I think in general, as we look across the U.S.
Government more broadly, there is a critical role and a leading
role for the State Department to play there, including with the
Global Engagement Center.
When it comes to covert activity there is certainly a role
for the U.S. intelligence community to play.
So, I would say on some of these areas SOF and the
Department of Defense are not even the leading agency for this
but need to be nested. This does raise questions about to what
degree on the information side we are nested more broadly into
a broader strategy. And I don't--I think we are still a long
way away from where we were in the last, say, decade of the
Cold War.
So, that is one.
When it comes to providing foreign internal defense, there
are key elements, I think, of training foreign forces that are
probably better left to Army or Marine Corps forces as well. I
think when you're talking about specialized units, your special
operations forces, commando units, some civil defense side that
would be engaged in responding to a foreign invasion, that is
probably where SOF has some comparative advantage.
But general, there are SFABs [security force assistance
brigades] within the Army, for example, that can do broader
training.
So, I think it depends on what kind of foreign military,
for example, is training and whether that is better left to SOF
or conventional forces.
Mr. Gallego. And we have seen some of, for example, State
National Guards going and training other countries, and with a
lot of that, a lot of that relationship that normally would
have been taken up by special forces and they're doing it, and
doing it well, and freeing up our SOF elements for something
else.
Dr. Ucko.
Dr. Ucko. Thank you, Representative Gallego.
I concur with my colleague here. I would say that on the
military or security side it is absolutely worth mentioning the
State Partnership Program that the National Guard leads up. And
the way that that has produced an enduring security cooperation
bond with strategically relevant countries.
The SFAB initiative I think is also a very positive step
for the Army, finally recognizing that it, too, has a role in
security force systems and need to actually devote specialized
assets to that end.
But it is also worth recalling, again, that great power
competition is primarily non-military, and that China, and
Russia, and other actors we're competing with have found a way
of carrying out the so-called war of interlocking, that is to
say synchronizing different efforts across different agencies.
And we need to be as versatile and as nimble.
And on that front, I think that it would be foolish to look
to the special operations community as the go-to option in
responding to this type of aggression. I'm thinking in
particular in terms of countering threat finance. Admittedly,
SOF has a burgeoning expertise in this area, but I think it
would be unwise to neglect the fact that Department of Commerce
and the OFAC [Office of Foreign Assets Control] also should
have a role to play. And that we need to make sure that our
portfolio is as diverse and as specialized, particularly at the
strategic level, as that of our adversaries.
Thank you.
Mr. Gallego. And, Dr. Ucko, you recently proposed a
modified definition of irregular warfare. Can you share that
with the group and why you believe that is important?
Dr. Ucko. Absolutely.
Irregular warfare, ironically, has become more of a talking
point since we said goodby to the so-called war on terror. And
yet, of course, that was 20 years of very protracted and very
intense involvement in this term.
My concern is that in trying to close that chapter we will
now try to redefine irregular warfare as something very
different from the experience we had there.
To my mind, the definition that was come up in 2007, the
joint operating concept, is still absolutely relevant.
Irregular warfare, then, is a violent struggle for legitimacy.
It is violent because it is, ultimately, something that the
military is involved in. If you take that away, then irregular
warfare becomes pretty much anything China does.
And it is a struggle for legitimacy because in the struggle
a need for partnerships and for mobilizing potential and united
fronts is key. This is an area where China and Russia are
competing extremely heavily.
So, I wrote this piece on redefining irregular warfare to
make sure that we don't lose the lessons, both positive and
negative, from the last two decades, and turn irregular warfare
into something that is in fact very alien to its nature. This
is still something that we have to deal with now versed
against--waged against states, rather, non-state actors. But it
is an area of more continuity than change.
Mr. Gallego. I yield back, Mr. Chair.
Mr. Bergman. Representative Scott, you are recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Scott. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Ucko, I want to stay on that train of thought. And
could you identify briefly, in about 2 minutes so that I can
move to Dr. Jones, the key differences in the way Russia and
China carry out irregular warfare and their competition?
Dr. Ucko. Yes, absolutely.
I would say that--do you mean the difference between the
two respective nations or between us and them?
Mr. Scott. Between the two respective nations.
Dr. Ucko. Right. Thank you, Representative.
Yes. I think Russia has emphasized to a greater degree the
use of violence, seen most egregiously, of course, in Ukraine,
but also previously in Georgia, also in its engagement on the
African continent. Its main contribution to those states have
been in the security realm with the deployment of the so-called
Wagner Group to provide, effectively, the role of mercenaries.
China, in contrast, has adopted a slightly different role.
And I think it is more invested in infrastructural development,
economic, financial, and informational lines of effort. That,
in a sense, and perhaps paradoxically, I think, is a bigger
threat. Because whereas Russia has played the role of spoiler,
China actually threatens to contribute something and to create
a new order.
That order I think is deleterious both to the countries
that it is targeting and to the international system that the
United States upholds. But it is, nonetheless, attractive,
particularly to elites looking for quick solutions to urgent
problems of debt and poverty.
So, therein lies one difference.
And I think going back to the issue of irregular warfare,
then, what we have to make sure is that we also bring into the
fore the notion of political warfare which, of course, George
Kennan described as the application of Clausewitzian logic in
times of peace. But Russia and China, then, bridge the spectrum
from conflict to peace. And we need to ensure that while the
DOD [Department of Defense] and the special operations forces
have a role in particular to play along that spectrum, we don't
use sight of the other instruments of state that must also be
integrated and synchronized to meet a threat where it is
active.
Mr. Scott. So, just in summary, China is using debt and
infrastructure projects, whereas Russia is using mercenaries
and the Wagner Group?
Dr. Ucko. Yes, absolutely. I think that is a fair
characterization.
Mr. Scott. The end result is the same in that the people
lose the country.
Dr. Ucko. Yes.
I would add one point which is, of course, that the target
is never static. And what Russia did in February of last year
will very much inform the way it acts in the future. It would
be foolish, and I think unrealistic, to assume that it won't
learn from this strategic error.
Mr. Scott. Dr. Jones, I want to stay on the issue of
African Wagner Group. My friend Jimmy Panetta and I traveled
there; I've traveled there several times. But the most recent
time we had seen a marked change towards the French on the
continent of Africa in the Lake Chad Basin area and Mali.
And it seems that Wagner Group has been extremely
successful in the use of social media to drive the general
public against the French. There is one, and it is publicly
reported, instant where French ISR [intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance] picked up a mass grave and mass killing
that had been carried out presumably by the Wagner Group. And
when the French reported that, before it was ever disseminated
to the general public, Wagner had picked up on it and put it
out that the French had done that.
The end result of that is the public believed what they
heard first. And the French were asked, have been asked in some
cases to leave the countries.
How fast do we have to operate when it comes to the social
media aspect of information and our special forces groups?
Where should the authorities lie? Should it be at the
lieutenant colonel level where the commander on the ground in-
country has the authority to just unleash his keyboard warrior?
Dr. Jones. Well, two things. On the role of organizations
like the Wagner Group, I mean, it is certainly important to put
this in the context of the Wagner Group. If you look at its
location where it operates out of in Russia, it is collocated
with Russian Spetsnaz. So, there is a close connection deployed
overseas between the Wagner Group and Russian government
agencies, whether it is Spetsnaz, GRU, SVR, or even the Kremlin
itself with Yevgeny Prigozhin.
And they are heavily involved, as you know, in information
operations against the French, against us, against local
governments in some cases. So, I think there is an important
need to combat those kinds of information campaigns.
Now, how much of that gets pushed down, I think it depends.
I do think there is a need to have initiatives at the lower
level. It may depend on the concept of operations. There may be
some CONOPS that need to be approved, because of their
sensitivity, at higher levels.
Mr. Scott. I am out of time.
It just seems to me that with regard to the information
war, if you don't move first, it doesn't matter if it is an
hour or a week behind, you are out.
I yield.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
Now, since we have two members of the subcommittee with the
last name of Jackson, this will be Representative Jeff Jackson.
You are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. I would defer to the doctor.
Only one of these Jacksons is a doctor.
Mr. Bergman. I don't know. Would you like to be a doctor?
Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. I will go and I will defer
afterwards.
I just want to ground this conversation real quick. I
understand we are having a very high-level conversation which I
gather is basically about reorienting SOF in the great power
conflict era into which we appear to be entering.
When I think about reorienting a military group, I think in
terms of mission, training, and equipment, and that we have to
make changes along those three axes.
And I would like you both, if you would, give me a quick
glance at mission, training, equipment. Are there major changes
that need to be made in each one of those categories?
Is it major in one and minor in two others?
Do you think we are okay in one area?
How big of a pivot are we really talking about on the
ground?
Dr. Ucko. I will attempt to answer your question,
Representative. It is a very good one.
I think in terms of mission there is a contrast to be drawn
between aiding El Salvador against the FMLN [Farabundo Marti
National Liberation Front] in a FID environment of the 1980s,
and helping a country that is threatened by China. Not only is
the adversary a state actor, and a very potent one at that, but
the threat of military action is also both more remote and more
existential.
And so, in the mission we have to probably spend some time
redefining what it is that we are fighting for, and what
victory will look like.
How do you know that you are resilient? It is one thing
when you are facing an ongoing insurgency. It is another thing
when you are facing proxies, auxiliaries, and subversion within
your state borders.
So, again, this is perhaps a less military problem set than
a political and societal one. We have to, in a sense,
effectively figure out where would we draw the line.
And I am sorry, that is not a very definitive answer, but I
think it speaks to the messiness of the strategy that is being
waged against us.
In terms of training, then, certainly after two decades of
heavy use of SOF in direct action, it is heartening to see that
after the withdrawal from Afghanistan we have seen initial
steps of rebalancing and returning to the regional alignment of
the Special Forces in particular, but SOF in general. And that
is, I think, a step that we need to continue and sustain so
that you have the, again, cultural knowhow, the linguistic
skill set, and political awareness necessary to engage in
partner countries and to understand the environment in which
you are operating, both human and otherwise.
And then equipment, this is when things get more techy. I
think there's been some interesting news in the last few
months, which I applaud, talking about the deployment of drones
as a particular MOS [military occupational specialty], the
possibility of adding cyber MOSes within special operations
forces, and taking the lessons from Ukraine and trying to
institutionalize that within emerging force structure.
So, that would be my initial attack at that question.
Thank you.
Dr. Jones. Great, great question.
Let me just start off by saying that, that this problem set
is obviously not new to the SOF community. They--organizations
like the U.S. Army Green Berets have a long history of doing
irregular activity. So I think this is--the shifts are not
major in most cases. But I will give you some examples of I
think where.
So, if we go to mission, probably more of a rebalancing
than a big mission shift. The rebalancing is when you are
dealing with countering major powers instead of terrorist
groups, probably shift away from how much you are putting into
direct action and how much you are putting into foreign
internal defense and unconventional warfare, I would argue.
The number of direct action missions you are going to want
to do when it involves the Chinese government or the Russians
is going to be limited because of the risks of escalation.
So, I think it is a rebalancing on the missions.
On the training, I think that is a bit of a challenge
because I think you are talking about shifting from special
operations forces that have had to work through Dari, and
Pashto, and Arabic in some areas, and now you are dealing with
Mandarin and Russian. Or, if you are dealing with, you know,
the Finns or the Baltic States, you are dealing with Eastern
European languages in order to.
So, I think there are some cultural-linguistic challenges
that SOF have to get through in understanding the partners that
they are working with, certainly the case in the Indo-Pacific.
And then on the equipment, I would wholly agree. I think
the issue is the French have withdrawn from key parts of
Africa; so have we. So have we from the Middle East. So, I
think there you are talking about ISR assets, where we are
probably going to need more of to cover a bigger terrain. And
the same thing on drones, and also underwater activity.
Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. Thank you.
I yield to the doctor.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And Dr. Jackson of Texas, you are
recognized for 5 minutes.
Dr. Jackson of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the time. Unfortunately, I came in with three great questions
and they have almost been completely addressed at this
particular point.
So, I will yield my time back. I thank you.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Congressman Panetta of California, you
are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Panetta. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate this
opportunity.
Gentlemen, good afternoon. Thanks for being here.
I think it was Dr. Jones, you talked about 1202 and title
333 authority. So, let's focus on there.
Obviously, 1202 authority enables DOD to support foreign
forces engaged in IW, irregular warfare. However, once a
conflict is determined to turn conventional, that authority is
removed, as happened in Ukraine where 1202 authority is no
longer applied.
Are there other funding authorities that could be used to
supplant 1202 in that situation?
Dr. Jones. Possibly. I mean, I think there are elements of
triple-three, of section 333, that could be used for building
partner capacity. If there's a counterterrorism component of
it, 127 Echo. So, there may be other authorities that could be
used, depending on the circumstances.
Mr. Panetta. But isn't title 33, that can't be used for
irregular, it can only be used for asymmetric warfare; correct?
Dr. Jones. Well, it's a--I am operating in the gray zone
here. It kind of depends on how one interprets it. So, if a
country is--if you want to build the capacity for future
irregular activities, I mean there may be some, some ways you
can, you can define that.
Mr. Panetta. Okay. So, I mean, going forward, once you
either--once you have conventional or asymmetrical warfare,
those two authorities are no longer applied?
Dr. Jones. That is my understanding.
Mr. Panetta. Okay. And is there any other type of authority
that could allow us any other type of funding stream?
Dr. Jones. There may be. I'm not aware off the top of my
head.
Mr. Panetta. Okay. Would you happen to know, sir?
Dr. Ucko. No. I would [inaudible] the same answer.
But I would add, if I may----
Mr. Panetta. Please.
Mr. Ucko [continuing]. That part of the confusion here is
this delineation between irregular and major combat operations.
It just doesn't really make sense in reality. And I think that
is when we come up to these legislative hurdles with
authorities.
I would probably prefer just to speak of war as war in all
its complexity, but we are where we are. But that might be one
of the issues confronting us at this point.
Mr. Panetta. Understood. And one I am sure we will talk
more about in this committee, I would imagine.
Moving on to Africa. Obviously, as you heard from my travel
partner over there, Representative Scott of Georgia, we have
taken a couple trips to Africa actually, three total, two to
the Sahel. Obviously seeing some unfortunate developments that
have gone on there, not just with the spread of VEOs [violent
extremist organizations] and, obviously, the influx of Wagner,
be it in Central African Republic, Mali, and possibly Burkina
Faso based on some of the flags we saw at the coup, creating a
lot of instability, pushing out France and, obviously, having
military governments filling that vacuum that are openly
sympathetic to Moscow, unfortunately.
I know I think, Mr. Scott, Mr. Jones, you talked about
there has been a withdrawal from Africa. Well, I wouldn't
necessarily says a withdrawal from Africa, because if you look
at Chad, and you look at Niger, I believe Niger is kind of the
Alamo. That is what I call it, in the sense that, you know, you
saw the French forces go there after leaving Mali. We have our
forces there, either in Diffa or Ouallam or right there in the
capital city.
I mean, do you believe that we can hold the Alamo based on
the situation that we are facing right now?
Dr. Jones. It is a very good question. By withdrawal my, my
only comment there is when it comes to U.S. Special Operations
Forces in Africa, the number has decreased over the last couple
of years. So, we have----
Mr. Panetta. Fair.
Mr. Jones [continuing]. Withdrawn some numbers.
And the challenge when you look at the Sahel, with groups
like JNIM [Jama'at Nasr al-Slam wal Muslimin], some of the
areas of North Africa, including in Libya, or even in the Horn
with Somalia, is we are seeing pretty significant activity of
violent extremist organizations.
I think the situation in the Sahel is extremely dangerous
right now with the spread of both al-Qaida and Islamic State-
linked groups operating. On the one hand it is a spreading
right now. And we have got now Russian Wagner Group and Russian
intelligence agencies linked up.
On the other hand, I am not aware of much external plotting
going on against the United States from these areas. So, you
know, it is different--it is a different situation from Syria
where we have seen external plotting in the west from areas.
So, I think it is an area of monitoring closely. We need to
be involved to some degree. How much? That is an area of debate
and discussion.
Mr. Panetta. Understood. Look forward to having that
debate.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
Mr. Mills of Florida, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Mills. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for
coming.
And understanding this is about the great power resurgence,
if you will, and knowing the geopolitical alignments now of
Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea, I feel that the United
States for many decades now has been very good in the kinetic
elements of things. But we have failed to address a lot of the
economic resource and cyber warfare capabilities that we are
against.
In many cases while we are seeing where there is an
increase in the capability of messaging strategies of
propaganda and information warfare against the West whereby we
don't have an effective countermessaging strategy to be able to
prevent this. From your perspective, would you see fit more
allocations of funding that would address the geopolitical
alignments as opposed to just the kinetic elements of things?
Dr. Jones. Absolutely. And I think this goes back to our
discussion both on amounts of funding, but also the speed with
which we respond.
I mean, I think the Chinese also--we talked about Africa
and the Russians--the Chinese are a very good example. Their
entire three warfares campaign involve--all of them are non-
kinetic. All of them involved information. And all of them are
aggressive. That is in part, along with bribery and corruption,
how they got into the Solomon Islands.
Which is for anybody that has read our World War II
history, including our Marine Corps history, we fought tooth
and nail against the Japanese there. So, now the Chinese have
moved in. We lost that information fight in the Solomon
Islands.
So, I think the funding side, as well as the speed with
which we respond, are important.
Mr. Mills. And just kind of following up on that same tone,
and obviously this is information I am aware of, but I just
want it for the chamber.
Knowing that it is an economic resource warfare that's been
launched against, and it is one of Chairman Xi's primary
focuses to try and expand out the Eurasian border, which is
what I believe Ukraine was truly about, take Africa, Oceania,
with an attempt to try to create a maritime silk route to choke
off Western Hemisphere supply chain while dominating resources
and attacking things like the petrodollar for the ultimate goal
of U.S. dollar elimination, do you feel that the State
Department, the DOD, and other elements work well together in
addressing all of these complex issues when they are so diverse
and just outside of the SOF kinetic capabilities?
Dr. Ucko. Thank you for that question, Representative.
I would offer that we don't have a strategic framework or
guidance at this point with which to synchronize and integrate
those respective agencies and departments.
Mr. Mills. And do you feel that is something that is
needed?
Dr. Ucko. I would very much say so. I think a looming
question in this era is who actually sets a strategy?
Where are the structures where you have that level of
interagency integration?
Certainly at the country team, great things are done, but
that's within specific countries rather than as a nation. So
this, I think, is an area of urgent concern, and one that I
think we should certainly keep moving.
Mr. Mills. And, Dr. Jones, in your testimony you mention
that the Department of Defense does not use all the funds
appropriated to it by Congress for IW activities.
In what ways would you recommend Congress play a more
active role in ensuring that DOD maximizes its capabilities in
this area to counter the very real and very heavily invested
war being waged against our country by our adversaries?
Dr. Jones. So, my comment was, was not that it is
necessarily being used inappropriately. It is more that there
is a focus predominantly, and there needs to be a focus to some
degree, on the conventional side of warfare.
So, we need to build our, we need to build our F-35s. We
need to build our Virginia-class and Columbia-class submarines.
We need to build our B-21.
But the problem is, I think, at least in my view, are some
of our funding for irregular warfare activities--we are not
asking for a lot of money. I mean, they are not, they are not
very costly. But they are pretty low right now. And there is,
as you are noting, the challenge with the Chinese, I think the
problem is bigger than what our National Defense Strategy
highlights, which is a focus on China and the Indo-Pacific.
And the reality is when you look at the Belt and Road
Initiative, and you look at China's Digital Silk Road, it is
global in nature. And it touches key parts of Africa where they
are building infrastructure and there are information campaigns
that go along with that; same thing on the Digital Silk Road.
Which means that, I think, we have got to also be heavily
invested in countering that activity and funding it.
So, when I talk about funding, I am talking about some of
these sections, 1202, triple-three, that I think are pretty low
right now.
Mr. Mills. And just really quickly, knowing that it is also
a geopolitical alliance that has the Chavez in Venezuela, Petro
in Colombia, and they are developing that kind of Iron Curtain,
if you will, do you feel counternarco operations would be a
very effective thing with combating the fentanyl overdoses
coming across the borders?
Dr. Jones. Yes. Although I am not an expert on
counternarcotics. But it certainly is a problem.
Mr. Mills. Thank you so much for that. I appreciate it.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. Bergman. Mr. Luttrell of Texas, you are recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Luttrell. Am I the clean-up shot?
Thank you, gentlemen.
I always get very uneasy when the words ``rebalance,'' and
``restructure,'' and ``reorganize'' SOF communities come about.
It seems that that happens as the war starts to progress. We
saw it in early 2000s as we came in, hard direct action
missions. And we were at learning curves completely vertical.
And as we reached out up to the ten and the early, and the
early teens, we went from--we went into more of a FID where
organizations were fighting for work, but still forward
deployed.
And then ISIS hit and then we went right back to direct
action missions where it seems like we, we essentially focused
on FID and certain things when we lost the capability that we
should have been hyper aggressive on but patiently focused.
And I hope that is just not the case right now because SOF
fills out a portfolio of all the experiences that we have had
over the past two decades. And that is something that we need
to hold near and dear in case China or Russia clacks off and we
are actively involved in that.
But my question to you both is regarding the Tier 1
organizations in Russia and China, how does the American Tier 1
organizations compare and compete?
Dr. Jones. So, I can start there.
Look, I think our special operations forces in my view are
the best in the world, whether it's Joint Special Operations
Command or any of the other special operations forces that are
within the Department of Defense and, frankly, their partners
in the U.S. intelligence community.
I think where we do not have--we are not as well organized
and not as well structured is what I will call the broader
interagency. So, that is we see a fair amount of Chinese
activity across the Chinese intelligence, MSS [Ministry of
State Security], Chinese PLA [People's Liberation Army], the
United Front Workers Department. Same thing on the Russian side
as well.
That, I think we are being outcompeted in the interagency
national scope, not on the capabilities of our SOF.
Mr. Luttrell. And to your point earlier, it seems to me
that we are trying to spread SOF too thin when it comes to
these extracurricular activities that the other countries seem
to be performing in, where we can bring in civil affairs or the
Army units or the Marine units to help us.
Does that, does that hold water?
Dr. Ucko. Yeah. That is exactly the point that I tried to
make in my testimony.
There is simply no appetite for irregular warfare really
outside of SOF. Even the general purpose forces, although I did
comment on the SFABs as a very positive step. Of course, they
are oriented predominantly towards conventional warfare. And
irregular warfare doesn't really translate outside of the
Pentagon. And so we don't have a strategic construct, which I
think the Communist--Chinese Communist Party does have and I
think the Kremlin has for this type of competition.
Irregular warfare spend does not have to be very high, as
Dr. Jones put it. But there is also no proponent for it. And I
think that is allowing us to complete at a more suboptimal
level than we should be.
Mr. Luttrell. Okay. I am fairly familiar with the Russian
Spetsnaz capabilities. Not so much on China. How does that, how
does that look?
Dr. Jones. Chinese capabilities of their special operations
forces I would call mediocre. Where they are high, high profile
is in areas outside of PLA special operations forces so, for
example, offensive cyber operations and espionage, along those
lines, reasonably competent. You know, those are probably the
areas where, in my view, the Chinese are reasonably competent,
but not in the special operations.
Mr. Luttrell. They don't define their SOF like we define
our SOF with direct action, aggressive warfare?
Dr. Jones. And they don't use them in the same way. Our
special operations forces have had several decades of
experience conducting direct action, unconventional warfare,
foreign internal defense. So, we have got--we know how to do a
lot of activity. Chinese are not.
Again, what the--on the irregular warfare side, the Chinese
are able to use a range of different agencies in conducting
action.
Mr. Luttrell. I yield back. Thank you.
Mr. Bergman. Ranking Member Gallego, you are recognized.
Mr. Gallego. Thank you, Mr. Chair, for giving me one more
bite at the apple. And it is kind of following up on
Congressman Luttrell's question a little.
How much and what did we learn from the last 20 years of
special forces operations, which were largely dominated by CT
[counterterrorism]-like missions? And did it prepare us for
irregular warfare?
I mean, there is the downside but there also should be some
of the lessons that we can carry over.
And it is for both witnesses.
Dr. Ucko. I think what we have learned in the last 20
years, and it really comes on the back of the information
technology revolution that started in the 1990s, perhaps even
1980s, is that SOF equipped with that technology, and having
the training and education that they do have, can achieve
amazing things through direct action, but also very sensitive
clandestine operations.
The broader strategic lesson, however, I think comes from
places like Colombia, places like the Philippines, where we see
FID missions being conducted on a protracted basis through
partnerships with the host nation government. And, in
comparison with Afghanistan and Iraq, albeit in a very
different strategic context, Philippines and Colombia I think
points to a way forward for FID and for the special operations
community.
What does that mean? It requires then a political
engagement. It requires an enduring partnership, trust. And
those things, of course, cannot be instantly manufactured. But
it also requires different instruments of state power to make
sure that the operational gains can have a strategic meaning.
So, I think 20 years of war on terror, those are some of
the key lessons that I would take away from SOF activity.
Dr. Jones. And I would say what we can do well is if we
need to hit a target in a specific location, we can do that
quickly, and we can do it probably better than--not probably--
better than anybody else in the world. So, we can do direct
action extremely well.
I think we can generally train foreign forces relatively
well. We did it in Colombia. We have done it with the Iraqi
counterterrorism services. But there are limitations to what
that means. You can't rebuild a government that way. You can't
nation build.
So, by training key partner forces it doesn't mean you win
in that case. We struggled in Afghanistan, despite the fact
that the commandos were a phenomenal organization as part of a
broader government that was collapsing.
So, there are limits to what I think you can do with these
activities if you don't have it.
The other thing that I would just add is I think we,
hopefully, have learned that the answer to dealing with
challenges is not to flood a foreign country with large numbers
of American forces. That as I think we finally got to a point
by 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020 where a small number of both special
operations and conventional forces, working with an indigenous
force, the Syrian opposition, could retake territory on the
Syrian side and on the Iraqi side.
And I think that was a much better way to end those 20
years than the way we started by 100,000-plus in both
countries. We ended up, I think, largely getting it right at
the end.
Mr. Gallego. I yield back.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And I know we are going to call
votes here in a couple minutes.
But, you know, Dr. Jones, just how would you ideally
delineate SOCOM's core activities between the component
commands, TSOCs [Theater Special Operations Commands], JSOCs
[Joint Special Operations Commands], to compete in irregular
warfare and continue the CT mission?
Dr. Jones. Well, I think U.S. Special Operations Command
generally does not own its forces when they go to the combatant
commanders. So, it has got a coordinating function with the
combatant commanders.
But I think it does have a responsibility. It has got to
help equip those forces. It has got the responsibility to help
and work and train with U.S. Army Special Operations Command,
with the Navy SEALs, with WARCOM [Warfare Command] to help
train.
And then with the TSOCs, to help manage the role of special
operations globally in the combatant commands.
So, it has got a very important role in preparing for and
then supporting combatant commanders in the use of special
operations forces. But, really, without SOCOM and without a
major role, the special operations community breaks down into
Army SF [Special Forces], into Navy SEALs. So, it provides
really the overarching umbrella for the training.
And then it also has an important role, I think, on the
personnel side in pushing for the, you know, the--how well the
forces are dealing with PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder],
with suicide, with a range of those issues. SOCOM's got a very
important component of that as well.
Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
Dr. Ucko, in your written statement you equate FID and UW
to resilience and resistance respectively. How have resilience
and resistance evolved in the 21st century, especially with the
expansion of cyber and information space?
Dr. Ucko. Thank you.
So, the main change, I think, from what we saw during the
Cold War is that the threat is no longer primarily military.
And, of course, it was the military nature of the threat that
brought SOF into the scene. Defending, again, El Salvador, or
supporting mujahedeen in Afghanistan is a very different
enterprise when you are looking at the strategy that China and
Russia are now using.
So, that brings in new capabilities that have to be
sharpened, whether it is countering threat finance, countering
disinformation. And the question for me is to what degree SOF
really ought to be taking the lead in those particular areas.
So, while we speak of FID and UW, really have to bring in other
agencies and expertise to that portfolio.
Doctrinally, that is anyway recognized. I think it is also
recognized within SOF's emphasis on partnerships and working
with and through their interagency. But it does, perhaps, run
up against a tendency to press what one former Secretary--one
former Assistant Secretary of Defense called the SOF easy
button, that is to say, to delegate things to the special
operations community because of problems being unorthodox and
no one else is around to solve them.
I think that is fighting this competition with one arm tied
behind our back. And so, we have to probably instead broaden
what we mean by resilience and resistance to bring in the
relevant civilian capabilities that can give us strategic
purpose.
Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you.
You know, I wanted to thank--I want to thank everybody, our
members and our witnesses for, I believe, getting our 118th
Congress subcommittee off to a great start with a presentation
of ideas, thoughts based on experience, both your experience,
with all of the members' here experience, to bring us into the
reality of where we are here in 2023 and going forward.
And I think since where the first two wolves, Romulus and
Remus, life has been a competition for resources. You find that
carcass on the road, you are going to tear it apart and you are
going to fight for what you want.
And when we look at what we do as Members of Congress in
allocating funds, understanding which authorities exist and
don't exist, and how it relates to the future resources that we
are going to need, and then understand how we as a
congressional committee do the right thing then to enable the
Department of Defense to do what it needs to do, it is--we have
to be very careful in life that we don't fight yesterday's war
or use yesterday's--in the case, my case, I would love to be
able to use just yesterday's phone and make it work, but we
know it is going to change.
The point is, as a committee we are going to work through
this, and we are going to--we are going to test areas where we
are not comfortable. And we would hope that all of the
services, all of our subject matter experts who come from the
different communities will run with us. And we will run
together and figure out ways in the next 2 years to do the
right thing for the defense of our Nation through our special
operations, through our irregular warfare, through the
recruiting, training, and sustaining of the MOSes that we are
going to need to win the next fight.
So, I just with that, unless there is anything else, this
hearing is adjourned.
Thank you, everybody.
[Whereupon, at 4:01 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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