[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                           [H.A.S.C. No. 118-13]

                   U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND

    COMMAND--CHALLENGES AND RESOURCE PRIORITIES FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024
                               __________

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                                 OF THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                             MARCH 9, 2023

                                     
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
53-336                    WASHINGTON : 2024     


          SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

                    JACK BERGMAN, Michigan, Chairman

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 SARA JACOBS, California
NANCY MACE, South Carolina           JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               JENNIFER L. McCLELLAN, Virginia
CORY MILLS, Florida                  JIMMY PANETTA, California

                Joe Bartlett, Professional Staff Member
                Will Johnson, Professional Staff Member
                  Zachary Calderon, Research Assistant

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Bergman, Hon. Jack, a Representative from Michigan, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     1
Slotkin, Hon. Elissa, a Representative from Michigan, 
  Subcommittee on Intelligence and Special Operations............     2

                               WITNESSES

Fenton, GEN Bryan P., USA, Commander, U.S. Special Operations 
  Command........................................................     5
Maier, Hon. Christopher P., Assistant Secretary of Defense, 
  Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict..................     3

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Maier, Hon. Christopher P., joint with GEN Bryan P. Fenton...    29

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    [There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Scott....................................................    51


 
             U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES AND COMMAND--
                   CHALLENGES AND RESOURCE PRIORITIES
                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
                         Subcommittee on Intelligence and  
                                        Special Operations,
                           Washington, DC, Thursday, March 9, 2023.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:09 p.m., in 
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Jack Bergman 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JACK BERGMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 MICHIGAN, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL 
                           OPERATIONS

    Mr. Bergman. Good afternoon. I call to order this hearing 
of the Intelligence and Special Operations Subcommittee on 
``U.S. Special Operations Forces and Command--Challenges and 
Resource Priorities for Fiscal Year 2024.''
    I would like to first welcome our newest member to the 
subcommittee, Representative Jennifer McClellan of Virginia. 
So, hi.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm very excited to 
be here.
    Mr. Bergman. Well, welcome, and I served with your 
predecessor. Don and I came in together and, you know, God rest 
his soul. But glad you're here and looking forward to working 
with you as we move through these things.
    Okay. The United States today finds itself in a shifting 
strategic landscape in which great power competition will be 
the defining geopolitical feature over the coming decades.
    With that, our special operations forces similarly find 
themselves at an inflection point. After 20 years of the global 
war on terrorism, the SOF enterprise is retooling and 
retraining for the threats and competition posed by China and 
other strategic adversaries.
    This will not be easy as limited budgets compel the 
Department and Congress to make difficult budget decisions, 
especially as it pertains to special operations.
    While USSOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command] remains 
tasked with combating the continued threat posed by violent 
extremist organizations and other non-state actors, our special 
operations forces will remain the tip of the spear in competing 
against and deterring our strategic adversaries, creating 
strategic dilemmas, and making them think twice about their own 
capabilities.
    As we discuss USSOCOM's priorities for the coming year's 
budget, we must examine which capabilities and tools used for 
the CT [counterterrorism] mission may also be used against 
state adversaries in great power competition, as well as what 
capabilities must be developed or expanded.
    These capabilities and tools may range from counter-UAS 
[unmanned aerial system] and advanced ISR [intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance] technologies, to cyber and 
web-based tools to compete and win in the information 
environment and increased clandestine operations.
    We similarly must examine the force structure of the SOF 
enterprise to ensure that SOCOM is adequately manned to compete 
and operate in great power competition.
    As a small single-digit percentage of the overall force, 
any cuts in personnel to the SOF enterprise will have a 
disproportionate effect on the ability of SOF to execute 
required operations.
    Make no mistake, as we look to compete with and deter 
adversaries like China and Russia, our special operators will 
remain at the tip of the spear, shaping the environment and 
creating conditions for successful follow-on operations by the 
joint force.
    In short, if we are looking to prepare the military 
services for a high-end fight with a near-peer adversary, then 
we must ensure that our special operations forces are properly 
manned, equipped, and trained to enable the rest of the force.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on the 
priorities for U.S. Special Operations ahead of Congress' work 
on the fiscal year 2024 budget and NDAA [National Defense 
Authorization Act].
    With that, I would like to welcome our witnesses here 
today.
    The Honorable Christopher Maier serves as the Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity 
Conflict, and General Bryan P. Fenton, who currently serves as 
the 13th Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command.
    In the interest of time, I ask the witnesses to keep their 
opening remarks to 5 minutes or less so that we can have 
sufficient time for question and answers.
    With that, let me thank our witnesses for appearing before 
us today and I now recognize the ranking member for today, 
Representative Slotkin, who's filling in for Representative 
Gallego, for any opening remarks.

    STATEMENT OF HON. ELISSA SLOTKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
 MICHIGAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS

    Ms. Slotkin. Great. Real quickly, thank you, Mr. Chairman, 
for convening us on this hearing. I also want to welcome HASC's 
[House Armed Services Committee's] newest member, 
Representative McClellan. It's great to have you here.
    We are, I think, doing something historic. I believe this 
is the first time in a long time that two Michiganders have 
chaired a HASC subcommittee. I'm happy to be here with Mr. 
Bergman, my fellow Michigander.
    And I think, you know, from my perspective, the global 
security environment--we all know it's changing. We all know we 
have shifted towards, you know, great power competition.
    We all know that from Ukraine to the Chinese Communist 
Party to Iran, North Korea, violent extremist groups, it's 
dynamic, to say the least, and that these changes need to be 
explained to the American people so that we can understand not 
just what we have gone through in the last 20, 25 years in the 
wake of the wars of Iraq and Afghanistan, but where--how we 
chart the future forward, particularly with the unique 
capabilities of the special operations community.
    We have asked the special forces in the last 20 years to 
really focus on counterterrorism, countering violent extremism, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, other hot spots elsewhere. I lived this 
firsthand as a CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] officer 
working alongside and often living with the special forces on 
three tours in Iraq, and we know the importance and the danger 
of the work that our special forces took part in.
    And while we still need to maintain that capability and not 
lose sight of those gains, I think we really need to help 
explain and chart the way forward on today and tomorrow.
    What is the role of the special forces in an era of 
increased great power competition? Do you have the right 
training, manning, equipping, institutional support, 
professional military education?
    Do the lessons of the last 20 years carry forward or do we 
think about things in a different way and adjust doctrine? 
These are some of the core questions that I'm hoping to hear a 
little bit about today.
    And you all will have, one way or another, an essential 
role in what I understand is, you know, the National Defense/
Security Strategy, going forward. The word deter was mentioned 
56 times in that strategy and I think it's very clear that the 
special forces community is going to have a really key and 
essential role in that deterrence.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses and hand it 
back over to the chairman.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Representative Slotkin.
    And not only do we represent the State of Michigan, between 
your district and my district, we represent almost the whole 
State of Michigan, not just two districts. I think we probably 
would be probably 60-plus percent of the landmass.
    We will now hear from our witnesses, then move on into the 
question and answer session.
    Assistant Secretary Maier, we will begin with you.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTOPHER P. MAIER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF 
     DEFENSE, SPECIAL OPERATIONS AND LOW-INTENSITY CONFLICT

    Mr. Maier. Well, thank you, Chairman Bergman and Ranking 
Member for today Slotkin, and distinguished members of this 
committee.
    Thank you for providing this opportunity to testify on the 
global posture of our Nation's special operations forces, or 
SOF. I am honored to appear alongside General Fenton.
    I could not ask for better teammates in both General Fenton 
and Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter in ensuring your SOF 
enterprise is prepared to address the threats facing the United 
States today and in meeting the challenges to come.
    I start with thanking Congress and especially this 
committee--this subcommittee--for your enduring support of the 
men and women of SOF. I am particularly grateful for your 
assistance in building the organization I lead, Special 
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict, with dedicated and 
gifted public servants.
    Sitting before this committee last year, I testified that 
we were at an inflection point in SOF's transformation to focus 
more on the pacing challenge of China and the acute threat 
posed by Russia, while maintaining enduring capabilities to 
counter violent extremist organizations, address Iran's 
destabilizing behavior, and conduct no-fail crisis response 
around the globe.
    Today, in updating you on progress and the work that 
remains, I will highlight three areas: SOF's ongoing transition 
in support of the National Defense Strategy [NDS], the 
development of SO/LIC [Special Operations/Low-Intensity 
Conflict], and our continued emphasis on empowering and 
supporting our people.
    First, we are transforming the SOF enterprise to achieve 
the goals of the NDS. While SOF's role in counterterrorism is 
widely understood and appreciated, my team and I work daily to 
ensure the value proposition of SOF in integrated deterrence 
and campaigning against strategic competitors is accounted for 
and incorporated into the Department's processes.
    As it has been in every major military challenge this 
Nation has confronted since World War II, your SOF will play an 
essential role. To start, the deep relationships SOF has forged 
with allies and partners over the last two decades, often 
through shared challenges and sacrifice, has produced an 
international SOF enterprise that provides unique firsthand 
understanding of the global operating environment. It also has 
enhanced the resilience of allies and partners to resist 
aggression.
    Second, drawing on those relationships and our ability to 
reach some of the most difficult locations on the globe, your 
SOF formations provide unique access and placement that creates 
options for our Nation's leaders, and SOF is adept at creating 
dilemmas for our adversaries.
    Here, I would highlight the many years of our investment in 
transforming Ukrainian forces into highly capable--the highly 
capable force that is consistently outperforming Russia on the 
battlefield.
    Representing the value that SOF brings to the joint force 
is one of my primary responsibilities and we continue to make 
progress institutionalizing SO/LIC's role as Congress has 
directed.
    Through my role providing civilian leadership for the 
organize, train, and equip of SOF, we have established over the 
last year in the Department a series of recurring processes and 
delivered key outcomes for the SOF enterprise.
    For example, the Special Operations Policy [and] Oversight 
Council that I chair provides a senior level forum to address 
SOF-unique challenges across the Department.
    We also have made progress on important initiatives to 
deter our adversaries and fill warfighting gaps, especially on 
irregular warfare and information operations. I'm also proud 
that SO/LIC played a central role in the Department's landmark 
Civilian Harm Mitigation Response Action Plan.
    Finally, I would emphasize that the first SOF truth remains 
truer today than ever: Humans are more important than hardware. 
None of our efforts are possible without our most important 
resource, our people.
    With the strong support of Congress, we continue to evolve 
the Preservation of the Force and Families, or POTFF, program 
to address SOF-unique challenges and to optimize physical, 
psychological, social, spiritual, and now cognitive 
performance.
    We also continue to prioritize a diverse, capable force by 
removing barriers to participation and advancement in SOF, an 
operational imperative if we are to succeed in an ever more 
complex geopolitical environment.
    Recent publicized challenges remind us that we must 
continue to evaluate our approaches to force employment, 
accountability, and, most importantly, present and engaged 
leadership.
    A healthy SOF culture that reflects our Nation's values is 
essential to readiness and core to ensuring we remain the most 
lethal SOF enterprise the world has ever known.
    Investing in our people is the cornerstone of ensuring your 
SOF are ready to take on our Nation's toughest challenges, 
because it is not a question of if but when the call will come.
    Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, I 
thank you again for your partnership and support, and for the 
opportunity to testify today. I look forward to your questions.
    [The joint prepared statement of Mr. Maier and General 
Fenton can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, Secretary Maier.
    And, General Fenton, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF GEN BRYAN P. FENTON, USA, COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL 
                       OPERATIONS COMMAND

    General Fenton. Thank you. Chairman Bergman, Ranking 
Member, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank 
all of you for the opportunity to appear before you today.
    I'm honored to testify alongside the Honorable Chris Maier 
and I'm equally honored to be here on behalf of the dedicated 
men and women of U.S. Special Operations Command.
    Joining me today is Command Sergeant Major Shane Shorter, 
USSOCOM's senior enlisted leader. Command Sergeant Major 
Shorter is representative of the incredible USSOCOM team, 
particularly our noncommissioned officer corps.
    Our noncommissioned officers are the backbone of our 
military and a decisive advantage within your special 
operations community and they make us the envy of every 
military around the world.
    We are thankful for the leadership and support of Congress, 
particularly this subcommittee. Congress had the vision and 
determination to establish USSOCOM almost 36 years ago. Thank 
you for this subcommittee's steadfast support ever since.
    Your special operations forces remain a national advantage 
as we enter a decisive era, an era where strategic competitors, 
such as the PRC [People's Republic of China] and Russia, seek 
to reshape the rules-based international order.
    In response, your special operations forces strengthen and 
sustain deterrence globally as part of our approach to 
integrated deterrence.
    With SOF's World War II origins and DNA rooted in decades 
of experience in strategic competition, now building upon 20-
plus years of hard-won combat credibility, your SOF provide 
creative, tailorable, and asymmetric options for our Nation 
while create dilemmas for any competitor.
    As part of the broader joint force your SOF campaign every 
day to deter and prevent aggression, counter coercion, close 
warfighting gaps, and tackle shared challenges alongside allies 
and partners, all in support of accelerating strategic momentum 
towards NDS objectives.
    Yet your SOF also remain vigilant in protecting our 
homeland and U.S. interests from the persistent threat posed by 
global terrorist networks. In doing so your SOF work tirelessly 
alongside a trusted network of allies and partners, U.S. 
interagency counterparts, and our joint force teammates to 
disrupt VEOs [violent extremist organizations] wherever they 
may be.
    And while we campaign for integrated deterrence and counter 
violent extremists, your SOF's capabilities to respond to 
crisis represent a critical strategic hedge and advantage for 
our Nation.
    Agile, tailored, modernized capabilities enable us to 
undertake sensitive, high-risk missions crucial to safeguarding 
and, when necessary, rescuing our citizens and protecting vital 
national interests.
    Foundational to all these efforts remains our collaborative 
partnership with ASD(SO/LIC) [Assistant Secretary of Defense 
for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict] Chris Maier 
and his team. The oversight, policy guidance, and advocacy 
provided by ASD(SO/LIC) are essential for the modernization, 
readiness, well-being of SOF units and our families, and 
together we are committed to placing people as our number one 
shared priority.
    We're preparing for the future by investing in them and by 
leveraging our Nation's diverse talent to solve diverse 
challenges. And to those listening today who might be 
considering service to our Nation, know the profound sense of 
calling and purpose those of us serving in uniform and SOCOM 
share.
    We know that a deeply rewarding journey lies ahead for all 
those who choose to join. You will be part of an incredible 
team of men and women tackling the toughest challenges for our 
Nation.
    Earlier this week I had the great privilege of hearing from 
Colonel (retired) Paris Davis, our Nation's most recent Medal 
of Honor recipient and a Green Beret. At Monday's ceremony to 
induct him into the Pentagon's Hall of Heroes, he summed up his 
military service and special operations service in three words: 
purpose, opportunity, and pride.
    And as we speak here today, more than 5,000 service members 
of USSOCOM are deployed who share his sense of purpose and 
pride defending our Nation and standing shoulder to shoulder 
with allies and partners in over 80 countries to make our world 
a safer place.
    The courage and commitment of our special operations 
community and our military inspires the Command Sergeant Major 
and me daily.
    We are immensely proud to serve with them, and we look 
forward to your questions.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, General Fenton.
    Mr. Jackson, you're recognized.
    Dr. Jackson of Texas. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks 
to both of our witnesses for being here today. Appreciate your 
time.
    The special operations community is, obviously, one of our 
greatest assets in defense of our country. For the past 20 
years, special operators have carried a heavy burden during the 
war on terror, fighting not against uniformed soldiers under a 
defined flag but, rather, against networks of non-state actors 
uniting under a loose ideology.
    While terrorism remains a threat warranting our vigilance, 
we must focus on state actors with significant economic, 
political, and military influence now, namely China, Russia, 
Korea, and Iran.
    The demands on our operators in the SOF community and, 
frankly, on their families are intense. The training is 
demanding, the ops [operations] tempo is high, deployment tempo 
is high, and often the objectives are no-fail missions.
    There's no doubt that while rewarding, working in the 
special operations community is stressful and even chaotic at 
times. Yet, recruitment and retention in the SOF community 
remains high, especially when compared to the services as a 
whole who are either barely meeting or missing their recruiting 
and retention goals.
    General Fenton, what are you guys doing differently in the 
SOCOM community to continue to recruit and retain your 
personnel? You hit on this a little bit at the end of your 
statement.
    But how do you think the Department of Defense could 
replicate some of the success you're having and is there any 
things in particular that you're doing that are leading to this 
success?
    General Fenton. Congressman, thank you very much for that 
question. I would start that your Special Operations Command 
team takes in its personnel from across the services from the 
service components.
    We have a very small recruiting effort that goes external 
but we are the recipients of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines, 
and Space Guardians into the SOCOM team and in that effect we 
work very closely with the services to assist all of us in 
recruiting goals, certainly, and retention and that we 
recognize as well while there are recruiting challenges for 
services out there we won't be immune even though our 
recruiting numbers right now are very good.
    And at some point that bubble will hit us so it's in our 
best interest and, certainly, as a teammate in the Department 
to work with all the services on anything that we have that we 
would find as best business practices.
    I would also mention that our retention, along with the 
Department's retention, is at an all-time high. My sense in 
many ways would be first to say thanks to this Congress for the 
work that's gone into BAH [Basic Allowance for Housing] 
increases, pay increases, as you think about your troops, and 
those certainly assist in recruiting and retaining our 
teammates.
    I would say in SOCOM I don't know if these are the best 
of--the best business practices but, certainly, each and every 
day, and the services do as well, we make sure our people know 
they are our number one priority.
    I think that has a heck of an impact on folks knowing that 
they're empowered, embraced, experienced, and absolutely cared 
for and educated as we go forward. And I think we offer very 
rigorous standards that are meant to be combat and, certainly, 
a great team of teams to be a part of.
    Dr. Jackson of Texas. Thank you for that. I hope--that 
helps. I appreciate that. I hadn't thought in terms of 
recruitment having your own farm team in place but I guess 
that's kind of what you have going on.
    So one more question. When special operations really came 
into its own the career field was primarily geared toward 
kinetic actions executed by physically fit individuals 
possessing mental fortitude and the ability to problem solve in 
real time.
    No doubt that those attributes are going to continue to be 
of huge importance to the SOF community. But with each passing 
day the realities of warfare continue to evolve. Technology is 
developing at a breakneck speed and every day we hear more 
about artificial intelligence, autonomous weapon systems, and 
cyber issues and cyberattacks.
    So, General Fenton, my question is, BUD/S [Basic Underwater 
Demolition/SEAL], obviously, the Q Course, the Ranger course, 
they're not going anywhere. But how is SOCOM also addressing 
the reality that expertise in technology is going to be 
essential to special operations going forward, and do you 
foresee any changes or additions to the training pipeline or 
integration of new forces into SOCOM to augment your mission 
set that we haven't seen previously?
    General Fenton. Congressman, I'll begin by saying we always 
want to be ready for whatever challenges lie ahead and, 
frankly, stay ahead of those.
    In this instance, I'd say we create talent to solve those 
challenges to congested, certainly increasingly complex 
challenges that we get in the world. And I think it starts, 
first, as it always has, even in World War II, when we had the 
OSS [Office of Strategic Services] and people willing to 
parachute behind enemy lines, raise a resistance, and do 
sabotage and subversion.
    If I take that all the way from Korea, Vietnam, and then, 
we want that person first and foremost that desires a 
challenge, desires hard challenges and problems to solve and 
coming up with creative solutions.
    And I think in this day and age that looks like teammates 
from cyber and space, tech, software engineers, technologists, 
folks who understand autonomy and uncrewed systems as much as 
it does the folks that came to us in those days that when that 
didn't exist it was about grit.
    It was about determination, motivation. We need all that 
now in our operational layer and, certainly, with critical 
enabling expert layer.
    So you'll see us chase all that talent and more as we look 
to, certainly, address adversaries and create dilemmas for 
them.
    Dr. Jackson of Texas. Thank you, sir. My time has expired. 
Thank you.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
    And, Representative Slotkin, you're recognized.
    Ms. Slotkin. Great. So, you know, I think most people 
understand or they think they understand the role of SOF in the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and against the al-Qaida threat 
and affiliate threat.
    But I think it's less commonly understood the role of SOF, 
going forward, in great power competition. And I'm just 
conscious that this committee supported SOCOM and actually 
bumped up the budget request from fiscal year 2023 and gave you 
more in every single category than was requested.
    Help explain in English what the different--how it's going 
to be different and what you're going to be investing in 
differently so that we understand sort of in colloquial terms 
what has changed now that we're sort of through this 20-year 
period and into a different period.
    Mr. Maier.
    Mr. Maier. Thanks for the question, Representative Slotkin.
    So I think it's kind of the fundamental question that we 
spend a lot of time working on. So I think I would say there's 
an element of continuity in this. We still will continue from 
the SOF enterprise to do counterterrorism and crisis response 
and there's some lessons from that are very applicable.
    We will continue to work by, with, and through partners. We 
will continue to focus on placement and access, sometimes 
through those partners, sometimes through our own exquisite 
capabilities unilaterally.
    But I think what we will need to focus on more is if we 
are, indeed, working across all domains, some of those domains 
have broadened from what was applicable in the fight against 
al-Qaida and ISIS [Islamic State of Iraq and Syria].
    So space, cyber has already been mentioned; the ability to 
recognize that the world is one that operating without being 
seen is particularly challenging so we need more tactics, 
techniques, and procedures that allow us to do that.
    We also need more technology that allows us to do that in a 
very technologically enabled world.
    Ms. Slotkin. Yeah. And on that issue, so I always remember 
being at the Pentagon and being incredibly jealous of SOCOM's 
acquisition authorities and the ability to go from either 
commercially available tech or just a concept.
    I mean, even just watching it in Syria was amazing, right, 
that something was needed and SOCOM always had the ability to 
quickly move to contact.
    Can you tell me if you, A, feel like you still have all the 
acquisition authorities that you need for that and then, B, 
kind of give me an example if you could of how you've gone from 
concept to a piece of tech in the life cycle sort of from 
beginning to end. From idea to fielding, how long is it taking 
you to field new concepts?
    Mr. Maier. So I think, Representative Slotkin, we still 
benefit immensely from that capability. In some respects, it's 
going to be even more applicable as we deal in a more 
complicated environment.
    Some of this is probably better handled in a closed 
session. But I think if--broadly speaking, if you think of some 
of the capabilities that are so critical for more advanced 
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, so we have long 
depended on the same sort of platforms.
    We're going to need capabilities that dwell for much longer 
and are able to operate in non-permissive environments. So 
there's tremendous amount of investment in the SOF enterprise, 
also, across the Department, frankly. But we think in many 
cases we're able to field these faster and operationally test 
them more quickly because we do have that ability to have an 
AT&L [acquisition, technology, and logistics] component within 
the--within the command there.
    Ms. Slotkin. And what would you say, just back of the 
envelope from--you know, if you have a crew that's come to you 
with an idea, if you were going sort of full steam ahead how 
long would it take to go to fielding, at least a test product?
    Mr. Maier. So I think we have cases where we have been able 
to do it within a fiscal year. Other cases, depending on the 
complexity, will take multiple years. But I think benchmark 
we're much faster than the services are.
    But we're also doing much smaller things. So we have an 
advantage there and benefit immensely from the small--many of 
the small businesses we're able to work with in some of the 
flexible ways and some of the authorities that this Congress 
has given us, ma'am.
    Ms. Slotkin. So you all should speak up if you feel like 
there's additional authorities that would help turn the crank. 
I mean, one fiscal year is lightning speed for the Department 
of Defense. But if there was something else that you were 
missing, you should let us know, particularly because you do 
smaller scale stuff, and you're not looking for, like, a new 
fixed-wing airframe or something like that.
    I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. Mr. Mills, you're recognized.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, 
for coming here today.
    General Fenton, we had a very long discussion just the 
other day, which I'm very appreciative for and thank you so 
much for talking about the priorities of where SOCOM is looking 
to go and how you're looking to lead that. Having been in this 
role now for just 6 months, can you share with everyone what 
your command priorities are?
    General Fenton. Congressman, thank you very much for that 
and thanks as well for the session with you the other day. I 
can. When I think about it at the enterprise level--at the 
SOCOM enterprise level--those priorities are, first and 
foremost, people, followed by win, and then transform. And as 
we think about our number one priority, our people are our 
competitive and comparative advantage.
    We have seen that time and time again in the special 
operations community. With just a very little guidance and a 
whole bunch of initiative and training and skill, very complex 
problems are solved quickly and we rush to those problems.
    So each and every day as the Command Sergeant Major and I 
are part of this formation we see it and, certainly, in full 
display, that our people are our number one priority and 
everything we do really focuses on that because they'll take us 
to the win, our second priority, across the spectrum of 
strategic competition, integrated deterrence, counterterrorism, 
and crisis response, and have done that since the origins.
    And I keep going back to World War II and right afterwards 
with the beginning of special forces and UDTs [Underwater 
Demolition Teams] that have become the SEALs, Air Commandos, 
Marine Raiders, and many others in our formation even today. 
And they've won for decades for this Nation, and we'll stay 
focused on that across those three missions of strategic 
competition, crisis response, and counterterrorism.
    The third priority for the enterprise is transform and it 
goes, first and foremost, to our people. It's about this 
continual education of what we will require as we enter any era 
or decade and, certainly, in this one as we think about the PRC 
and Russia it'll be a continuing educational start with our 
Joint Special Operations University.
    In addition to having an acquisition executive, we have our 
own Special Ops University at the Special Operations Command 
that stays on top of that and can turn that very fast. And then 
that's followed by tech, data, the things that we need to 
compete; and not big items very often, almost a Moneyball-type 
approach, many littles in order to get after the challenge that 
the PRC and, certainly, the Russians present.
    But those would be the priorities, Representative. Thank 
you for that.
    Mr. Mills. Well, thank you so much, General Fenton, and for 
having talked to you earlier I have no doubt that you'll be 
able to achieve in all those and that SOCOM's in a great 
position under your leadership.
    Switching to you, Assistant Secretary Maier, in 2020 the 
National Defense Strategy had an irregular warfare annex and in 
this it talked a lot about great power competition and upcoming 
strategies.
    Have we continued to fulfill that 2020 annex and have we 
continued to put that into the field in a strategic way?
    Mr. Maier. Congressman, it is a really important question, 
I think, as we talk about the tools from a more policy and 
framework perspective that we will need, going forward.
    So I think the answer to your question is, yes, we have 
done a number of things. There is no more irregular warfare 
annex. It's integrated into the 2020 National--2022 National 
Defense Strategy.
    We have a process underway that's bringing the Department 
across the spectrum from doctrine to policy to operations and 
resourcing, training, all those tools that make the world go 
round in the Pentagon and in the joint force to actually not 
only apply irregular warfare but look for new opportunities to 
apply it in other cases.
    So I think this is one of my priorities. I have three. It's 
one of those three, and we're very much pushing in conjunction 
with Special Operations Command on that.
    I would just add that we think irregular warfare is the 
responsibility of the joint force. SOF may be in the lead for 
it but it can't be a SOF-only endeavor, sir.
    Mr. Mills. Yeah, I absolutely agree. And in knowing that, 
you know, we do have the geopolitical alignment of China, 
Russia, Iran, North Korea. We see what Chairman Xi is doing 
with advancing his Road and Belt Initiative, which is more 
focused on an economic resource cyber-based warfare.
    We know that the one thing that Chairman Xi and Russia 
lacks is our noncommissioned officer corps. This is something 
that every one of our adversaries try to build up and become 
robust but they cannot meet the United States when it comes to 
this.
    The second thing Chairman Xi said is that he can outpace us 
militarily and economically. But innovation is a real key.
    Do we look at things like quantum entanglement for AI 
[artificial intelligence] autonomous drone systems with regards 
to communication platforms and also how we would be able to 
field those more accurately with the SOCOM communities?
    Either.
    General Fenton. Representative, I'll take that because I'm 
going to start. I absolutely agree with your description of our 
noncommissioned officer corps. Throughout our entire military 
and, in particular, I've lived in this formation for almost 30 
years in your special operations community.
    I spoke a bit about it in the opening statement, and if I 
could pull it a little tighter, every military in the world 
looks towards the U.S. military because of a very key thing 
and, more often than not, not our equipment. It's not a number 
of other things that folks might think. It is our 
noncommissioned officer corps. They want to be the U.S. 
military because of our noncommissioned officer corps. Always 
have been, always will be.
    Any military we engage with one of their first requirements 
is build us a noncommissioned officer corps. Give it mission 
command type orders, initiative, all the tactics, techniques, 
and procedures, and they ask that because they know they'll be 
incredibly better off as a result and we, certainly, appreciate 
when they ask that.
    On your technology discussion, we absolutely are pursuing 
those type of technologies. I would say in the acquisition 
priorities area for me and has been stated thus in the 2023, 
certainly, in my--our 2023 budget was anything--AI, autonomous, 
uncrewed, and much of that really revolves around an artificial 
intelligence application that could sit on the data, give us a 
decision advantage, and then on top of that really work to get 
these systems in the right place to achieve the right effects.
    And as quantum comes into our radar screen to be more 
usable we'll absolutely pursue that as well. Anything that 
gives us an advantage, a comparative and competitive advantage. 
Already we're the best military in the world, but we're not 
satisfied. We want to continue to strive and your SOCOM team is 
right there with them.
    Mr. Mills. Thank you so much for your service and I really 
appreciate it. With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And just so you know, I know that, 
Secretary Maier and General Fenton, you cannot see the time 
clock.
    So what's going to happen is as we move forward here, Mr. 
Green, when there's a minute left will stand up and do the old 
hand and arm signals. So in the--you know, respecting time 
that's how we'll do it in the old manual way.
    Representative Jacobs, you are recognized.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 
Assistant Secretary Maier and General Fenton, for testifying 
before us today.
    You know, as a representative of San Diego, I have to say I 
am always so proud of the SEALs, of our Delta troops. I think 
they are the best in the business and it's clear that they are 
willing to do the most dangerous missions with very little 
notice and I think we should all be incredibly grateful for 
that.
    I think part of our job on this committee is to make sure 
that we're asking them to do the right missions when we're 
sending them out into harm's way and so I wanted to pull us up 
a little bit and ask about the strategic level.
    You know, we have talked a lot about the pivot to great 
power competition and how when we're going to do 
counterterrorism, moving forward, it's going to be more by, 
with, and through, more over the horizon, smaller footprints, 
lighter counterterrorism.
    I would argue that's actually how we have been doing 
counterterrorism in sub-Saharan Africa for the past 20 years. 
And, you know, in sub-Saharan Africa U.S. Special Operations 
have been conducting counterterrorism training for over two 
decades and we have provided over $3 billion in related 
equipment, training, and logistics.
    And, General Fenton, I want to ask you, would you 
characterize this effort in sub-Saharan Africa as a success?
    General Fenton. Congresswoman, I'm in--certainly, in 
constant contact with Africa Command, as they look at this 
through their lens and a number of other whole-of-government 
efforts. I think it's necessary because as we have put in our 
written posture statement, the counter--the VEO threat still 
persists even though it's been disrupted and we have got to 
remain vigilant as we think about ISIS, al-Qaida, and, 
certainly, al-Shabaab and their desires, certainly always, to 
attack homeland and partners and allies.
    Ms. Jacobs. Yeah, and I certainly agree with you that 
getting our counterterrorism mission right, especially in sub-
Saharan Africa, is really important.
    But I actually want to point out that despite our billions 
of dollars in investments and the incredible bravery and 
professionalism of our tier one operators we have actually 
seen, and it's just a fact, that violent extremism has 
increased over threefold since 2013, as you can see on this 
poster. And just in the last year, according to the Africa 
Center for Strategic Studies, which is a research institute 
within DOD [Department of Defense], just in the last year 
violent extremist violence has increased by 22 percent with 
fatalities surging over 50 percent and just in the Sahel alone 
violence has seen a 130 percent increase since 2020.
    So I guess as we're talking about using these strategies in 
other parts of the world, how is SOCOM thinking about the 
lessons from this clear lack of success so that we're not 
recreating it both as we move forward in sub-Saharan Africa and 
in other parts of the world?
    General Fenton.
    General Fenton. Representative, thank you very much for 
that. I'll start.
    As we continue, we'll do it the way we have been doing it, 
which is one part of the whole of U.S. Government effort that 
gets after countering VEOs. That's in concert with the 
combatant command.
    So where we as a SOCOM team operate they have special 
operations elements there that campaign, contest, and 
coordinate all of our activities in that arena and as well with 
our Department of State and the intel and interagency 
colleagues, and partners and allies. So we'll continue that as 
one part.
    Second, I think I would say across all the various domains, 
information operations to get after an unconstrained ideology 
that still exists out there in the violent extremist way and 
use capability tools and, certainly, partner and allied 
thoughts as we go forward that can contain, in some ways, the 
physical terrain in places, Syria and Iraq, that we have been 
able to do against ISIS. But----
    Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I don't mean to cut you off. I just 
want to make sure I get to my last question for Assistant 
Secretary Maier.
    I think, as we have talked a lot, one of the main lessons 
is that the over military-first DOD-led approach to violent 
extremism is clearly not working. You are the point person for 
DOD on the bipartisan Global Fragility Act [GFA] and a part of 
that law is, quote, ``that all DOD activity in priority 
countries will be in joint formulation and with the concurrence 
of the Secretary of State.''
    Given that that is part of the law, will you commit today 
to ensure the Department abides by that and only implements 
policy or conducts activities in all GFA priority countries 
that have been developed through joint formulation with the 
State Department and through Secretary of State concurrence 
including as it relates to all title 10 and section 127 Echo 
and 1202 programs?
    Mr. Maier. So, Congresswoman, it's a very important thing. 
I think, the Global Fragility Act, because it gets at your core 
question of trying to do things differently than we've done in 
the past to attrit some of those trend lines you showed. I 
think as a matter of practice on GFA we are aiming as much as 
possible to be that three Ds concept: the development, 
diplomacy, and then our defense piece.
    All the plans and programs are developed jointly, all three 
agencies--USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development], 
State, and DOD--and I think, as we've talked about in the past, 
both our 127 Echo programs and other title 10 programs are done 
in concurrence with the State Department. The chiefs of mission 
concur on those programs as do other elements of the U.S. 
Government.
    So I think that's an important safeguard against any 
perception that DOD is doing things that aren't in concert with 
the President's priorities and the interagency's concerns and 
also perspectives, ma'am.
    Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you. And I'll just remind you that 
that joint formulation is part of the law, and so I will look 
forward to working with you as we move forward.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you, and point noted here that we have 
two Representatives named Jackson on this subcommittee. So, 
henceforth, it'll be Mr. Jackson of Texas and Mr. Jackson of 
North Carolina.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina, you are recognized.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. Good afternoon, General.
    Sir, you've been on the job for about 6 months, which is 
long enough to learn your way around but not long enough so 
that any problem is necessarily of your making. It's kind of 
the sweet spot for reflecting on leadership and vision and sort 
of where you plan on taking things.
    And my first question is, what do you know now that you 
didn't know the first day you assumed this command?
    General Fenton. Congressman, I think I know more now about 
how important SOF's role is going to be as we go forward in 
this new--this era of increasingly dangerous challenges in the 
strategic competition space with the PRC and Russia, and that 
we still have to absolutely stay and remain vigilant on the 
counterterrorism mission, getting after the C-VEO [counter 
violent extremist organizations] threat while the sacred 
obligation to, certainly, rescue our U.S. citizens and 
safeguard them around the world remains.
    I don't think before I got this job I recognized the 
totality and how we will probably be needed more-fold going 
into the future.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. I've listened to your 
remarks and I've read the memo here. This is a simple question. 
But is there anything that you need--truly need--that you just 
don't have? Are there any glaring deficiencies on which this 
subcommittee should be focused in the short term?
    General Fenton. Congressman, I don't have any glaring 
requirements right now that we need except the continued 
support of this Congress; your ability to understand how 
important your special operations team will be, going forward; 
that your special operations forces, in my estimation, as we 
proceed in this era will be--and our capability very decisive 
in preventing aggression, deterring, and really addressing 
coercion because it's in our DNA.
    We've done this for almost 70-plus years before the global 
war on terrorism. We never stopped and we're [inaudible] needed 
to continue that even now. The key to that is, certainly, 
partnerships--partnerships and allies and the training and the 
combat credibility we bring into that mission area.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. I don't know exactly how to 
phrase this question, but I know you mentioned that one of your 
top three priorities was people and I don't know if everyone 
fully appreciates the extent to which the service members under 
your command just participate in an op tempo that is not 
necessarily experienced by all of our service members, that 
you-all deal with an elevated op tempo and you certainly did 
for the last two decades.
    With the conclusion of Operation Enduring Freedom, has 
there been an intentional, deliberate effort on the part of--
the part of--on your part or your immediate predecessor to give 
some breathing space to some service members who just got 
pulled as tight as any could ever be pulled for the last 
decades? Some of them served in excess of a decade. You said 
that retention rates exceed standard. So that tells me 
something good.
    But there are just a ton of horror stories that come out of 
this space, in particular, because of the level of stress 
derived, my understanding, is from the op tempo.
    Has there been--this is a unique period where we are, 
perhaps, in between major contingency operations. Are we 
working on giving these folks some mental health and a bit of a 
breath?
    General Fenton. Congressman, thank you very much for that 
question. It does hit at the heart of our number one priority, 
our people. As I think about this, my sense is there has been a 
slowdown in the tempo, how we've been addressing both 
counterterrorism and crisis response for the last 20 years.
    That's allowed us to do a number of things. Reeducate in 
terms of how we will go forward in the future, and that is 
often an opportunity for folks to be at home to do that 
education in not only our Joint Special Operations University 
but also in the schoolhouses throughout all of our components 
in Special Operations Command.
    We've had an opportunity to experiment and exercise and 
that's really important as we think about the challenges that 
PRC and Russia will throw at us. And that's been extremely 
helpful in figuring out some new options for combatant 
commanders and dilemmas for the adversary that we didn't have 
when we were going at a pace in the CT fight.
    I think it's given us a chance as well for--to really fold 
around our service members our POTFF program that looks at a 
number of domains, not to mention the cognitive and the 
behavioral.
    I think all that has been a very good thing for this 
formation as we think about being needed manyfold more as we go 
forward in strategic competition through crisis response and 
counterterrorism.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. Thank you, sir. I yield 
back.
    General Fenton. Thank you.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
    And, Representative Mace, you're recognized.
    Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member 
Gallego, for this hearing today.
    General, it is good to see you. Again, we appreciate both 
of you being here to answer our questions today.
    I just had my first hearing--I'm a subcommittee chairman on 
Oversight of Cyber, Technology, and Innovation, and I just had 
my first hearing on Oversight yesterday with Dr. Eric Schmidt 
on the subject of AI and emerging technologies.
    And this is a guy who was one of the original folks at 
Google--original CEO [chief executive officer], a former CEO--
and he said that AI--the advent of AI, what's going to happen 
is going to transform the world and it's going to be epic. It's 
going to happen fast.
    And, in my sense in being here--I'm just over 2 years in 
now--but it feels like DOD, Pentagon, military, you all are 
going to have it together better, faster, more, before the rest 
of the Federal Government.
    But I have great concerns just at what some of our 
vulnerabilities may be both from a defensive and offensive side 
of things. And so I just wanted to ask--sort of just pick your 
brain a little bit today, if you can share with us a little bit 
about SOCOM and some of your investments in emerging 
technology.
    How do we retain our competitive advantage? What I learned 
yesterday is that the country of China--the largest nonprofit 
that's invested in AI in the world is in China. And so I'd just 
like to hear a little bit from you all sort of your perspective 
just kind of high level and some of the emerging technologies 
that you all have seen us invest in and kind of get your 
perspective on that, too.
    Mr. Maier. So, Congresswoman, it's very important. I think 
we often throw out AI and there's a lot of different components 
of this. I'll give you a couple examples and then I know 
General Fenton has actually had Eric Schmidt out to the command 
and could probably talk in even greater detail.
    But especially as we look at it in the information space, 
we are not, as a department, despite your hope for us, very 
fast in that space. And our adversaries use AI to generate 
things like deepfakes and all kinds of other things that have 
the benefit of distracting and misleading, and sometimes that's 
just enough space to be able to do what they want to do.
    So we have to think about this on the defensive side as 
much as we think about this on the offensive side. I think some 
of what we envision using AI for is to reduce the--some of the 
delays of human beings in the loop or on the loop. Some of that 
might be in the information space. But some of that could be in 
traditional warfighting capabilities or the ability to take in 
large quantities of data and gain situational awareness.
    But still, at some point, probably there's going to be a 
human being that makes a decision, especially as we talk about 
things that may be lethal or kinetic in that process. So 
there's an ethics piece of this.
    There's a functional man-machine interface that's going to 
have to be worked out. And there's also the--I think, the 
question of which types of technology do you invest in to 
actually get the biggest bang for the buck because if you 
choose wrongly you may end up being even further behind. But 
maybe General Fenton----
    Ms. Mace. Yeah. And to your point, it's not just software. 
It's hardware, too. I mean, there are multiple components. 
There has to be----
    Mr. Maier. Yes, ma'am.
    Ms. Mace [continuing]. You know, human intelligence 
involved.
    General.
    General Fenton. Congresswoman, thank you very much for 
that. I'll go--it hits at the heart of where we're working to 
transform in our--transform priority and we have had a number 
of meetings with Dr. Schmidt and many of his teammates----
    Ms. Mace. He's brilliant on this, yeah.
    General Fenton [continuing]. And many others in that 
community. And I would start on a couple fronts.
    Artificial intelligence and what it brings in terms of the 
applications, first and foremost, for us is about putting those 
applications over oceans of data that we have in the 
Department, certainly from our counterterrorism years but even 
before that, understanding of locations we've been in 
previously, all of that, and using those applications to crush 
that information, synthesize it for us, and get it to us with 
speed.
    And in special operations we add an extra S to that with 
speed speed--SOF speed--so we can make a decision, faster 
either for our teammates on the ground or at the mission 
command nodes.
    I think the second reason is that decision is important is 
because it allows us to not only make a decision but put the 
effects to be achieved in the right place faster than any 
adversary, and that could be in the information operations 
domain or it could be a kinetic domain or any number--cyber and 
space.
    So I think you will absolutely see us continue to pursue it 
in that arena, and if folks asked even more it would be natural 
language processing and things like picture generation. All of 
this is important not only----
    Ms. Mace. Yes, generative. It's machine learning. I mean, 
it's all these things. It's all-encompassing, we're learning. 
And I apologize for cutting you short. But to piggyback on that 
intersection of government and industry, like, how is that 
going? Has that been more efficient in trying to make those 
decisions?
    General Fenton. Your SOCOM team is routinely reaching out 
to all those: academia, industry. We even go overseas to 
partners and allies. We just don't look here. So we're in 
search of that technology with anybody that has it, both to use 
it and understand how the adversary uses it.
    Ms. Mace. Thank you, General.
    And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And, Representative McClellan, you 
are recognized.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and vice--I'm 
sorry, Ranking Member Slotkin for putting this hearing 
together, and I want to thank our witnesses for being here 
today.
    This is my first hearing since being sworn in as a Member 
of Congress and I look forward to working with this 
subcommittee to strengthen and improve our special forces and 
maintain American leadership in this space.
    And I have a couple of questions for--a few questions for 
both of you. First, we are now 1 year into the war in the 
Ukraine--the war in Ukraine, a conflict that has seen immense 
conflict in the information and digital sphere.
    What has U.S. Special Operations Forces and Command learned 
from this conflict and is SOCOM ready to implement those 
lessons learned?
    Mr. Maier. So, Representative McClellan, welcome. I wish it 
was my first hearing but it's not.
    So I think there's a lot of lessons learned, some of these 
probably better handled in a different session. But I'll give 
you a couple off the bat.
    First off, we've had a long-standing relationship with 
Ukraine and, I think, goes to that fundamental principle, 
invest early and be prepared, because you can't manufacture 
partnerships or teaming when crisis hits.
    So you asked specifically about the information space. 
We've had long-standing relationship with not only the 
Ukrainians but others in the region to help share lessons 
learned and really expand on our ability to deal with 
misinformation, disinformation, that we know Russia is apt to 
use, but also be able to get the message out for our own forces 
and I think Ukrainians have demonstrated a tremendous aptitude 
to do that.
    I think also the long-standing investment in the personal 
relationships that we have had through our 10th Special Forces 
Group with the Ukrainians and in Europe is really something you 
can't replicate when you have a situation of a crisis as the 
Ukrainians have experienced.
    So there's lots of elements to it, lots of lessons learned, 
I think, that we are actively looking at from the SOF 
enterprise. But I give you those as two pretty clear ones.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you.
    General Fenton.
    General Fenton. Thank you very much, Congresswoman.
    I would echo that and just pull a little tighter on invest 
early. It is the power of partnerships with allies and nations 
around the world.
    We started in the 1990s but we got--it spiked in earnest in 
Ukraine--spiked in earnest in 2014 when the first invasion, and 
that partnership, the relationship, the speed of trust that had 
already been worked through allowed us to get to the place we 
are now where the Ukrainian SOF have done a phenomenal job 
against the Russians.
    Second would be the power of investing in partners and 
allies around that--around Ukraine. For us, special operations. 
We worked very closely with European SOF up and down and in the 
Baltics and that has paid off.
    They are doing it the U.S. Special Operations way of 
warfare as either they're inside of Ukraine or they're training 
alongside us, and that makes us exponentially better and 
certainly more powerful.
    And then, lastly, the power and the increasing advantage--
competitive advantage of technologies like we just spoke 
about--open source, one-way strike drones, counter-UAS. All 
this is very important. We've seen it in previous incursions 
and we're seeing it front and center right now.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you. And in your statement for the 
record you discussed the importance of investing in the men and 
women serving in SOF--and you mentioned several times here the 
importance of the people--your people. Can you expand on the 
work that SOCOM is employing to develop a highly trained and 
diverse workforce?
    General Fenton. Congresswoman, I can. It's my favorite 
thing to talk about. I'll probably get the signal in the back.
    But, number one, it's about talent in our people as a 
competitive comparative advantage. It's about we seek talent 
any domain and in our instance we talked about cognitive, 
experiential, and demographic.
    We want talent in the formation because we know what 
happens when we get it. We win. We think about it in terms of 
announcing to anybody and anyone, please come to the SOCOM 
formation and give us a shot.
    We want that. Embrace it, empower it, and educate so that 
our people, at the end of the day, continue to be the winning 
recipe for the SOCOM team.
    The number of efforts, I'd be happy to take that for the 
record and give you a more fulsome piece just in the interest 
of time.
    But we absolutely believe it's a mission imperative and an 
operational requirement to continue to invest in our people and 
have, certainly, across cognitive, experiential, and 
demographic domains a talented force to solve the complex, 
diverse challenges we'll have in the future.
    Ms. McClellan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
    Mr. Panetta, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Panetta. Outstanding. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, good afternoon. Thank you for being here.
    General Fenton, after Crimea was annexed in 2014 we 
established a joint multinational training program to bring 
conventional and special operators across NATO [North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization] to train Ukraine's military.
    We also then established a qualification course--a Q 
course, as they call it--to train the Ukrainian troops. 
Obviously, I think as we're seeing, that training has been 
pretty decisive on the battlefield.
    I was wondering if you can give an update as to what 
exactly is in those trainings and then any particular lessons 
that we've learned watching it take effect on the battlefield 
today.
    General Fenton. Congressman, thank you very much for that.
    I speak just to the special operations piece of the 
entirety of training that was going on in European Command at 
the time, but I'll start with the qualification course.
    The qualification course at its very nature is designed to 
build someone who has an approach that has cognitive, physical, 
and other domains in its very nature, that can go through 
hardships, continue to do as the Ukrainians are doing, fight 
this existential threat, who shoot a very high proficiency 
level, communicate with the equipment that we're able to bring 
them, and certainly can maneuver in a way that avoids the type 
of work that the Russians are trying to--and certainly the 
ammunition and armor that the Russians are bringing.
    We also taught a bit about a resistance concept, this idea 
of how sabotage, subversion, the things that would be in a 
resistance type of kit bag, would be very important if and when 
something like this happened.
    The Ukrainian special operations forces not only embraced 
all of it, they engulfed it, and are certainly the superb force 
that I spoke about--have spoken about before that they are 
today and admit, certainly, taking it to the Russians.
    I think in information operations there was an important 
piece to ensure that the Ukrainian military and then they, with 
their government and others, understood the misinformation 
campaign coming at them from the Russians even before 2014, but 
certainly 2014 and even now, and then on the other side an idea 
how to really harness the power of the Ukrainian people towards 
that existential threat.
    I think there are--and the last one I would really 
highlight, Representative, is we built a noncommissioned 
officer corps. We took them from a Soviet-style military. You 
can see what happens to those right now.
    Russians are not even the second best military in Ukraine. 
The Ukrainians are the very best and not even near in the world 
anymore that the Russian had--the Russians had at one time.
    But I'll tell you, the NCO [noncommissioned officer] corps 
is the difference maker and we built that as well.
    Mr. Panetta. Outstanding. Switching continents, I've had 
the fortunate opportunity to visit at our operators from 
Baledogle to Bamako to Agadez to Ouallam to Diffa to N'Djamena, 
and what I found is that they do a hell of a lot with very 
little, unfortunately.
    Now, obviously, in many of those places imminent [danger] 
pay is afforded to service members across the Sahel including 
those in Chad, Mali, and Niger, but not in Burkina Faso, 
despite the country witnessing two coups in less than 1 year 
and an uptick in violence from VEOs and we now have reasons to 
believe that Wagner has already made a presence in that area 
with French forces being expelled from that country.
    We know that there's been a submission by AFRICOM [U.S. 
Africa Command]--USAFRICOM--to request that the SECDEF 
[Secretary of Defense] has--puts imminent danger pay afforded 
to these service members in Burkina Faso, and their spillover 
threats from neighboring Mali and Chad.
    And why--if you can add--let us know why it's important to 
provide them with that imminent danger pay, especially when you 
have that--and affording that for Mali and Chad as well to 
those service members.
    General Fenton. Congressman, I've personally been in the 
African continent, everywhere from East Africa and Somalia all 
the way through Mali, Mauritania, and Niger locations you're 
addressing.
    The work our teammates do is at the front edge of very 
often not only the challenging conditions that you find in an 
austere base logistically, communications, and a number of our 
different operating systems and base support, but the very edge 
of what they may encounter when they're in support of AFRICOM 
addressing the ISIS threat and other threats that are out 
there.
    I would be--Congressman, I'll take this for the record and 
look into the fact that that hazard pay has been addressed by 
AFRICOM.
    Mr. Panetta. Please.
    General Fenton. I'd like to take that one for the record 
and certainly get back to you on that one.
    [The information referred to was not available at the time 
of printing.]
    Mr. Panetta. Please do, and I look forward to working with 
you on that. Thank you, gentlemen. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you.
    Mr. Luttrell, you're recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Luttrell. Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary, General. Great 
to see you again, sir, Sergeant Major. Always great to see you, 
sir.
    Mr. Secretary, I'm going to ask you a question. Earlier 
today I was briefed by Secretary Sherman, the Chief Information 
Officer, and Mr. Martell, the Chief Digital and AI Officer for 
the DOD, and the question was asked multiple times if we are in 
lockstep or behind or in front of China when it comes to our 
artificial capabilities--artificial intelligence capabilities--
and the doctor said not only are we in stride with but we are 
most likely ahead of. But I'm pretty sure I just heard you say 
that we're not.
    Mr. Maier. So, Congressman, I think I would defer to them. 
They're the experts on this. I think what I was saying in 
responding to Representative Mace's question is that we're in 
competition with them in the application of AI. So technology, 
that is absolutely John Sherman and others' job to know on.
    We just have anecdotal examples in the operational space 
where, in some cases, it's less about the AI technology and 
more about their risk acceptance and ability to do things in a 
disinformation-misinformation way than we might be inclined to 
do, sir.
    Mr. Luttrell. Here's my concern is--so they gave an example 
from sensor to shooter. And General, this is where I'm going to 
need your help. This is a request. Okay. And, Mr. Secretary, 
I'm not coming after you. Okay.
    I just want to make sure that we're very clear on this 
because this--from what I understand this organization of Mr. 
Martell's is a new organization inside the DOD which we've had 
two to three of these similar organizations, correct?
    Mr. Maier. It is an amalgamation of previous organizations. 
Yes, sir.
    Mr. Luttrell. Okay. So from sensor to shooter the idea is 
that we take quality data in order to better enforce and inform 
and train our shooters.
    Now, my question was, who's setting the criteria? Where's 
the data coming from? Because if the inclusion is information 
from the shooter to the scientist, I would hate for the 
bureaucrats here at DC to not--to sit up and brief us but our 
operators are completely in the dark.
    So my request is, General, is that you need to keep them 
honest because this is a great idea, a great concept. I'm 100 
percent behind artificial intelligence, machine learning, and 
advancing our opportunities for our--for the individuals on the 
ground.
    But my concern is, like I said, is that it won't come to 
fruition. So, General, would you help us out on that?
    General Fenton. Congressman, I absolutely will. I will--
I'll stay on it, and what I would tell you we are absolutely 
integrated with Secretary Maier and the Department on this. We 
recognize that, first, our challenge is a couple-fold.
    We've got to get data from all the services, all the COCOMs 
[combatant commands], and, frankly, anywhere, even as it 
relates sometimes to a personnel action. So that idea of how 
that data comes in, the structured, unstructuring of it, we are 
absolutely pursuing that right now.
    When it comes to operations, we assess it will be the same 
challenge. So you've got my commitment, Congressman, to stay 
absolutely integrated on this and to be a key part of it as it 
pertains to special operations, sensor to shooter, and, 
frankly, taking care of our people and that people is the 
number one priority space.
    Mr. Luttrell. Thank you, sir, because I'm sure you 
understand the silos that each individual service, especially 
in the special operations. Like, I would never talk to a 
Ranger. No offense. Just not my thing.
    But you can understand that the silos that we work in. So 
it's going to take you, sir, from the top to break those silos 
down and make sure the information is being shared for Mr. 
Martell so he can do his job effectively. So thank you.
    I yield back, sir.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. So, now, you know, Mr. Luttrell, we're 
going to talk to everybody.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. No--I know. The point is, number one, 
thanks to all the members of the subcommittee for the focused 
nature of your questions. Secretary Maier, General Fenton, 
thank you for the focused nature of your answers. Because, as 
we try to communicate and do the right thing here on the 
subcommittee, we need to be listening, and I was--I mean, if we 
can't throw some friendly jabs in the inter-service [inaudible] 
nature of things, then shame on all of us. We've lost our 
ability to actually be adaptable in the fight, and that's what 
makes us successful.
    But, from the higher level point here, Secretary Maier, how 
can Congress better enable the SOF enterprise to compete in 
great power competition? For example, do we need to permanently 
authorize irregular warfare authorities and/or strengthen other 
authorities or, you know, add some, reduce some?
    How do we, from the congressional point of view, really 
kind of streamline what we're doing to help you downstream 
streamline? I know that's overuse of the word stream. But the 
point is, any thoughts on how--what we might do authorities-
wise?
    Mr. Maier. Chairman, thanks for the question. I think, as 
been highlighted by Representative Mills in my opening 
statement here, irregular warfare is going to be a very 
important tool, going forward, and I think with that there's 
probably some maturing in the authorities framework.
    So section 1202, which is--this committee has worked on in 
the past, I think, is one that we could use your help on. I 
think at a staff level we're already working on that.
    But it's an area where having that authority then allows us 
to introduce some concepts and also do experimentation in some 
respects, but most importantly, allows us to get tight with our 
partners who want to work with us against the PRC and Russia 
but don't want to do that in a--as an overt way as some of our 
other authorities prompt us to do. So that would be one, sir.
    And then I think the continued support from this committee 
for my office, ASD(SO/LIC), not because it's a nameless, 
faceless element of the bureaucracy in the Pentagon but because 
of the authorities we have to really be that articulator of the 
SOF value proposition, that advocate in the Department.
    The fact that I sit with the Secretary of Navy, Secretary 
of the Army, and Secretary of the Air Force when the Secretary 
of Defense calls together service secretaries, I think is an 
important role that allows us to do some of the things that 
your committee members have asked today are we doing and we can 
continue to keep that top-down pressure on the enterprise, sir.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Yeah. What I heard you say was, you 
know, a seat at the table, or said a different way if you're 
not at the table you're on the menu, so to speak?
    Mr. Maier. Sir, I think there's a lot of competing interest 
in the Department. If there isn't a voice for one, it is really 
at the mercy of where it falls in the prioritization for very 
busy senior people, sir.
    Mr. Bergman. Thank you. And, General Fenton, you know, 
we've talked a lot about people--recruiting, training, 
retention--you know, the ability to execute the mission. We can 
build a lot of really cool things, tools. But those tools 
ultimately in most cases have to be used by human beings, your 
operators.
    Can you explain how any potential manpower cuts to SOF 
could restrict SOCOM's ability to operate in nonpermissive 
environments when shaping the environment for the joint force 
to operate against strategic adversaries--you know, putting 
where you are in the fight in the lead, whatever it happens to 
be, its manpower is critical.
    Thoughts? Comments?
    General Fenton. Chairman, thank you for that. Certainly, a 
couple comments.
    I'd start with anything that degrades or impacts or 
decreases either personnel or fiscal resources would have a--
would hurt. It would impact your special operations team and I 
say that through the lens of we certainly have a wide array and 
remit for very high-priority missions.
    Counterterrorism still--as we--still persists in the VEO 
space and we've got to stay vigilant--crisis responses, 
strategic competition. And as a, I would say, a very small 
portion of both personnel and fiscal resources--maybe 3 percent 
of the population and 2 percent of the budget, your SOCOM 
team--any degradation of that capability, Chairman, would 
absolutely hurt and I would assess, and I'd have to do 
additional study, impact our ability, going forward.
    And I think about it in terms of not only our operational 
teammates who are incredible across the array of Army, Navy, 
Air Force, Marines, but our critical facilitators in terms of 
communications, electronics, logistics. It all makes up your 
SOCOM team.
    So I'll just wrap it up, Chairman, by saying any of that 
would hurt and impact your SOCOM team.
    Mr. Bergman. Okay. Thank you very much.
    Basically, the open portion of the hearing is now adjourned 
and we will reconvene in room 2337 for a closed session as soon 
as people walk in, but in the next 8 minutes. Thank you.
    [Whereupon, at 2:23 p.m., the subcommittee proceeded in 
closed session.]



      
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                            A P P E N D I X

                             March 9, 2023

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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 9, 2023

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[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 9, 2023

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                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT

    Mr. Scott. What are the unique challenges and possible mitigations 
for SOF operating in a sparse electromagnetic signal environment?
    General Fenton. Challenges. In environments where the operational 
electromagnetic spectrum capacity is sparse, units can expect to run 
into a variety of information exchange challenges. These range from 
low-level tactical problems, such as Intra team/unit communications to 
operational and strategic friction induced by loss of Command and 
Control with higher headquarters elements. These conditions would also 
influence communications between partner forces and surrogates, which 
may yield a higher overall mission impact depending on the operation.
    Technology is another factor when considering how to operate in 
this environment. Adversaries have incorporated spectrum dominance as a 
key enabler against the United States. Their rapid innovation in this 
field has given them opportunities to outpace dated capabilities while 
continuing to generate tempo against upcoming technologies, which may 
be slow to field due to acquisition processes, and test and evaluation 
requirements.
    Another challenge that studies identified relates to an organic 
increase in the need for usable spectrum. As commercial entities, 
allies, and adversaries continue fielding capabilities and expanding 
their need for capacity, spectrum segments have become increasingly 
congested.
    Mitigation Strategies. New technologies are continuously developed, 
which provide reliable, low probability of intercept, and anti-jam 
communications for Special Operations Forces (SOF) within a contested 
environment. Spectrum survivability may be obtained through asset 
diversification. Leveraging a combination of systems in a threat-
informed theater allows SOF operators to build a wider and more 
resilient spectrum presence. Using multiple satellite-based transport 
options creates a scenario where you have diversity in frequency bands, 
satellites, and even space vehicle orbits.
    From a terrestrial perspective the use of adaptive networking radio 
technology that maximizes spectrum use while avoiding interference is 
becoming more common. By emphasizing more traditional methods, such as 
High Frequency radios with enhanced data rate capabilities provide an 
option to enable information exchange in challenging environments.
    Additionally, the SOF enterprise is currently conducting numerous 
exercises annually to replicate contested communication environments. 
During these exercises, we focus on masking transmissions using Low 
Probability of Intercept/Low Probability of Detection solutions and 
using red teams to attempt to locate and intercept blue force 
communications. The lessons learned from these exercises inform our 
acquisition and future training to improve tradecraft.
    Mr. Scott. How can the U.S. Space Command and U.S. Cyber Command be 
better integrated with USSOCOM as part of the new trinity of multi-
domain conflict that consists of space, cyber, and SOF?
    General Fenton. USSOCOM can best integrate with the U.S. Space 
Command and the U.S. Cyber Command through consistent and deliberate 
engagements to achieve tangible effect within the SOF-Space-Cyber 
Nexus. We hosted the first of one of these sessions at Headquarters, 
USSOCOM to seek synergy and opportunity across concepts for either 
operations and/or employment. Our U.S. Army Special Operations Command 
led part of the discussion on a unique and mature proposal for the 
``new trinity of multi-domain conflict'' to achieve an integrated 
deterrent effect. How we ``routinize'' this integration within the 
Department of Defense and across the Combatant Commands is the end 
state through our Nexus exploration efforts over the next year.
    Through the SOF-Space-Cyber Nexus effort, we seek to improve upon 
the foundation of solid tactical and operational teaming. The U.S. 
Strategic Command is also a key member of this willing Nexus effort. In 
addition to concepts for operation or employment, we are collectively 
seeking solutions to overcome any impediments for coordination and 
synchronization in terms of policy, authorities/permissions, command 
and control, and technical challenges. This is a nascent but important 
effort.
    Mr. Scott. How can JSOU enhance their ability to play a unique role 
in helping to link U.S. national security interests and objectives to 
SOF capabilities at all levels? What additional resources in terms of 
personnel and dollars are needed by JSOU?
    General Fenton. The USSOCOM Joint Special Operations University 
(JSOU) is in the process of reorganizing into what I refer to as JSOU 
Next, which will focus on not only JSOU's traditional teaching and 
learning, but also research in action and outreach, as well as 
engagement to enable the future force to support the priorities 
articulated in the 2022 National Defense Strategy. This will include 
fostering critical thinking and analytical skills, and generating deep 
expertise in understanding key technologies, as well as about our 
competitors and the future of warfare. Utilizing the title 10 (U.S. 
Code) hiring authority granted by Congress in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2019 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), JSOU Next would rely on a 
blended mix of faculty comprised of both academics with specific 
subject matter expertise and highly qualified SOF practitioners. This 
hybrid mix of faculty will enable JSOU to achieve its goal of becoming 
the premiere polytechnic university for the study and application of 
special operations in a near peer competitor environment.
    Mr. Scott. Does USSOCOM have all of the authorities needed to train 
resistance fighters in occupied countries? If not, what authorities do 
you need?
    General Fenton. U.S. SOF (USSOF) could apply Section 1202 of the 
FY2018 NDAA (as amended) to provide training and other support to a 
resistance in an occupied country--assuming administration policy and 
operational authority are aligned in favor of such support. However, to 
leverage the full utility of 1202, the current definition of 
``irregular warfare'' in 1202 must be modified to allow for the 
provision of support to resistance elements that are in armed conflict. 
Furthermore, codifying 1202 into statute and expanding the cap would 
broaden the aperture, increase opportunities, and provide greater 
flexibility, thus enhancing the USSOF value proposition in support of 
Combatant Command irregular warfare requirements.
    Mr. Scott. Is there a role for SOF in countering illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF)?
    General Fenton. Although many of the skill sets normally attributed 
to special operations (i.e. Direct Action, Unconventional Warfare, and 
Counterterrorism) are not currently exercised directly in the 
countering illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing (IUUF) effort, 
there are three noteworthy categories of contributions from USSOCOM: 
Military Information Support Operations (MISO) and Counter Threat 
Finance (CTF), Intelligence and Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance (ISR).
    USSOCOM is the Joint Proponent for Counter Threat Finance. In this 
capacity, the CTF Cell at Headquarters USSOCOM is actively working to 
support the counter-IUUF efforts by linking and illuminating the 
various global financial entities tied to the People's Republic of 
China (PRC) IUUF enterprise. USSOCOM CTF provided the strategy, 
strategic art, and operational design for a law enforcement operation 
entitled JADE SPEAR (starting in 2020) under the Customs and Border 
Protections' National Targeting Center. A multinational effort that 
also included 29 different U.S. departments, agencies, and offices 
contributing more than 70 action officers, JADE SPEAR was the largest 
strategic competition operation since the cold war. The operation was a 
`greenfield' pilot program to test means and methods against the stated 
problem: IUUF by a Chinese state directed company on the high seas. 
SOF's ability to integrate disparate institutions, both domestic and 
allied, apply campaign planning to hold at risk elements of China's 
political-economy in a de-risked manner, and deliver significant costs 
to a malign predator was a first of its kind operation. Two notable 
successes included the revocation of visas for Pingtan Marine 
executives (2020), and the imposition of sanctions against Pingtan 
Marine resulting in them being dropped from the NASDAQ Composite Index 
(2023).
    Additionally, USSOCOM supports the Combatant Commanders through 
regionally aligned Theater Special Operations Commands in a variety of 
missions including countering illegal fishing and other illicit 
activities through the employment of Identity Intelligence (I2) 
exploitation capabilities to deny national security threat actors 
anonymity. In the maritime domain, I2 is extremely effective while 
collaborating with Partners to positively identify persons of interest 
involved in illegal fishing and other illicit activities.
    SOF Intelligence assets provide unique capability in identifying 
IUUF activities and compelling compliance with international fisheries 
conservation and management enactments (e.g., Southern Pacific Regional 
Fisheries Management Organization). These illegal activities also 
include piracy, narcotics smuggling, and human trafficking, and human 
rights violations. In many cases, maritime vessels conceal their 
location, which is a key indicator of vessels conducting IUUF and other 
illegal activities. SOF utilizes Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, 
and Reconnaissance assets to gain visual fidelity on vessels who 
conceal their location by turning off their with Automatic 
Identification System (AIS) transponders. This intelligence is used to 
support international law enforcement operations and investigations.
    Additionally, the SOF Intelligence Enterprise can leverage Digital 
ISR capabilities to enable collection, enhancement, and analysis of 
unclassified data on IUUF. Publicly and commercially available 
information (PAI/CAI) can be collected and merged with exquisite 
intelligence through the SOCOM Intelligence Data Science Team's DIAMOND 
architecture. Data can then be visualized using data-agnostic tools on 
Top Secret systems for analysis. Using collected unclassified data to 
inform intelligence assessments can provide opportunities for improved 
partner nation engagement to counter IUUF activity.
    As a recent example, the Joint Interagency Task Force--South 
assigned to U.S. Southern Command, commissioned a ship to conduct 
maritime interdiction operations with Partner Forces. USSOCOM I2 
capabilities allow for 24/7 match comparison against the larger 
Department of Defense and Interagency holdings. Access to these 
holdings allows the addition of persons of interest to the Department 
of Defense ``Watchlisting'' for enterprise level alerts during future 
encounters, and supports partner prosecutorial finishes.
    USSOCOM MISO organizations, including the USSOCOM Joint MISO WebOps 
Center (JMWC) and Theater Special Operations Commands (TSOC), focus on 
messaging to affected populations that highlights the negative 
consequences of un-checked IUUF by PRC. Informed by intelligence and 
ISR provided by the US Coast Guard, interagency partners and partner 
nation forces, TSOC and WebOps messaging has reached populations in 
SOUTHCOM, CENTCOM, INDOPACOM, and AFRICOM. Additionally in FY21, 
USSOCOM, as the synchronizer of the Senior Military Engagement Program 
(SMEP), coordinated a global effort to address IUUF. This continues to 
be a recurring theme, on the SMEP platform, in SOUTHCOM, INDOPACOM, and 
AFRICOM AORs.
    It should also be noted that SOF engagements with other countries 
that focus on more traditional SOF-peculiar skill-sets have second and 
third order effects by enabling those countries to counter IUUF on 
their own, or in cooperation with U.S. Government assets.
    Mr. Scott. Does USSOCOM need any enhanced authority for provision 
of support to partner nation liaison officers assigned to Headquarters 
USSOCOM?
    General Fenton. Headquarters USSOCOM was structured to facilitate 
SOF leaders' access and maximum utilization of exquisite intelligence 
to prepare and deploy fully capable and informed SOF to meet national 
and geographic operational needs. The Office of the Undersecretary of 
Defense for Intelligence and Security (OUSD(I&S)) policy currently 
places significant limits and processing delays on non-indoctrinated 
foreign partners being approved or permitted escorted access to high-
level secure facilities, limiting our liaisons' ability to directly 
engage with U.S. personnel. Our request is to engage with OUSD(I&S) and 
the Office of the Director of National Intelligence to allow for 
greater latitude for foreign partner integration. Understanding that 
information sharing with partner countries is done on a case-by-case 
basis, updates in the Department of Defense policies, directives, and 
authorities overseeing information sharing will improve integration and 
interoperability in support of the National Defense Strategy and 
National Disclosure Policy. In addition, the department working with 
Congress to ensure the Arms Export Control Act meets Congressional 
security requirements, while improving the timely export of defense 
articles and services in support of SOF missions.
    Mr. Scott. Does USSOCOM need an increase in the micro-purchase 
threshold for purchases by USSOCOM in support of operations overseas?
    General Fenton. Yes. Given the enduring nature of USSOCOM missions 
abroad, USSOCOM lacks permanent authority for all Special Emergency 
Procurement Authorities under 41 U.S.C, Section 1903 for SOCOM missions 
overseas. This includes increased micro-purchase thresholds, Simplified 
Acquisition Thresholds (SAT), Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP), 
and the expanded use of Standard Form 44s (SF 44s).

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