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THE VILNIUS SUMMIT AND WAR IN UKRAINE:
ASSESSING U.S. POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE
AND NATO
Thursday, June 22, 2023

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EUROPE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 1:06 p.m., in room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. Thomas Kean, Jr. (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. KEAN. The Subcommittee on Europe of the House Foreign Affairs Committee will come to order.

The purpose of this hearing is to discuss U.S. policy toward Europe and NATO, as well as U.S. and allied support to Ukraine, in advance of the July NATO Vilnius leaders summit.

I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

Next month, in Vilnius, NATO member States will meet to discuss the greatest and most pressing challenges facing the alliance. With the largest land war in Europe since World War II ongoing, a rising and increasingly aggressive China, and Finland and hopefully Sweden joining the alliance, there will be no shortage of issues to discuss.

There is strong bipartisan support in Congress for NATO. For decades NATO has served as a cornerstone of American national security and underpinned our relationship with our closest friends and trade partners in Europe. All of us in this room remember when NATO allies came together in America’s defense in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, which was the first and only time that NATO’s Article 5 was ever invoked.

On Ukraine, I firmly believe that NATO allies must leave the summit in Vilnius with a clear path charted for Ukraine to join the alliance once conditions allow. I am concerned by reporting that the U.S. and Germany are resistant to the alliance making a stronger political commitment to Ukraine, one that is 15 years overdue. At the 2008 NATO leaders summit in Bucharest, all NATO allies agreed that Ukraine would become a member of NATO.

Since then, NATO has only repeated that vague promise again and again. In that time, we have learned that NATO’s waiting game—waiting room is not a safe place to be. Ukraine has repeatedly suffered overt and covert aggression from Russia, now including a full-scale war of national survival.

Eventual NATO membership is the most solid guarantee against future Russian aggression. Providing a clear path to that membership will signal to Vladimir Putin that he will not be able to
achieve his goals in Ukraine on the battlefield. This is critical to prove to him that Russia cannot outlast Ukraine’s backers nor determine sovereign foreign policy decisions of his neighbors through war.

Until Ukraine is a full-fledged member of NATO, it will require concrete security guarantees to help win the current war and deter any future Russian aggression. I believe the United States must be actively involved in these discussions, but implementing such guarantees would require Congress to appropriate the necessary funds.

As such, the Administration must engage with this committee and this chamber on a strategy to allow us to conduct our constitutionally mandated oversight responsibilities. Importantly, like with Israel, the guarantees under the consideration will include continued and reliable security assistance for years to come, to ensure that Ukraine can deter future Russian aggression.

Therefore, I am glad to have DASD Cooper here to discuss the weapons Ukraine needs, not only to defeat Putin’s invading forces but also to ensure that we do not have a repeat of 2014 and 2022 once Putin’s regime rebuilds its forces.

In addition, I hope to hear from both of our witnesses why the Administration is refusing to provide Ukraine with the critical weapons systems that could make a real difference on the battlefield, like ATACMS and PDICMs.

In fact, just yesterday this committee passed my bipartisan resolution calling for the immediate transfer of ATACMS to Ukraine. I was honored to be joined in that effort by Ranking Member Keating, a true ally in this fight.

Beyond Ukraine, there is great hope that NATO allies will agree at next month’s summit to make a firm commitment on burden-sharing; namely, by clarifying that NATO’s defense spending target of 2 percent of GDP should be considered a floor and not a ceiling. This 2 percent target was first agreed to by all NATO allies in the summit of 2014 nearly a decade ago.

Yet even as the threats from Russia and China grow every day, there are still far too many NATO allies that fail to meet this target. I expect to hear from Mr. Jones about the U.S.’s plans to press our allies at next month’s summit to live up to their commitments and to share the burden of collective security.

Speaking of China, the strategic concept that NATO released last year said, “The People’s Republic of China’s stated ambitions and coercive policies challenge our interest, security, and values.” It is vitally important that our NATO allies recognize and address the threat posed to all of us by the CCP. Our security will be at serious risk if we allow China to own our critical infrastructure, infiltrate our sensitive industries, and to expand and to influence, to pursue, the malign agenda.

Last, I hope Mr. Jones today can provide an update on Sweden’s efforts to join the alliance. I was pleased that NATO welcomed Finland as its 31st member in April, but Sweden’s application has remained stalled for far too long. Turkey and Hungary’s stonewalling is deeply concerning, and I hope that they will ratify this very capable partner to join this alliance by the summit next month.
I want to once again thank our witnesses for being with us today. And with that, I will now turn to Ranking Member Keating for his opening remarks.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing. As has been proven by the bipartisan interest in this hearing, congressional support for NATO and Ukraine remains steadfast. I look forward to continuing to work with you on these issues as we have with the recent resolution we introduced calling—subject to our own readiness needs, calling for the President to provide ATACMS to Ukraine, which I hope will see the floor soon.

I also want to thank the witnesses for your tireless efforts to support Ukraine in their fight for freedom against Russian aggression. Together, along with our colleagues across the U.S. Government, you work to provide Ukraine with the military, economic, and humanitarian support they need to win the war and to secure their future.

In response to Vladimir Putin’s criminal war and illegal occupation of Ukraine, the Biden Administration has coordinated more than 50-country response with transatlantic alliances as well, and our own global partners, to this effort. Through these efforts, like-minded partners have worked to support Ukraine on the battlefield, providing safe haven for those fleeing violence at home and also to ensure that vital governmental and community services, from schools to hospitals to their own utilities, can literally keep the lights on.

As part of these ongoing efforts, leaders from across the NATO alliance will meet in Vilnius next month to discuss current and future challenges as well as the steps we must take together to ensure our collective security. One such step, which I believe is vital, is the swift approval of Sweden’s ascension into the alliance.

Last Congress I introduced legislation that welcomed the ascension of Sweden and Finland into NATO, two countries that have incredible military might and that are interoperable already with our alliance. This legislation passed with bipartisan support, and I am glad that Finland is now squarely in line for NATO.

And today, while I am encouraged by the Hungarian Parliament and the fact that they have scheduled a vote on the matter, I continue to call on Hungarian and Turkish allies to approve their application expeditiously. Hope Sweden’s membership will be approved soon to ensure we remain united in our response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine.

In addition, I believe that NATO members must recommit to increased defense spending in response to Vladimir Putin’s increasingly aggressive posturing. Vladimir Putin has already made his imperialistic fantasies known when, in a series of letters and memos exchanged between the U.S. and Russia prior to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia requested that the U.S. prevent further eastward expansion of NATO and the disarming of 50 percent of the current NATO countries’ capabilities, and also making direct threats to members of the alliance.

We must take these threats seriously to deter Russian aggression. While many NATO countries have succeeded in reaching 2
percent, we must now view this goal as a floor rather than a ceiling.

I also look forward to discussions at the Vilnius summit regarding Ukraine’s continued progress toward NATO ascension. Much has already been said and discussed on the topic, and Ukraine has clearly surpassed the security relationship that would traditionally warrant a membership action plan.

While discussions are ongoing, I have been clear that after this war is over, Ukraine will emerge as one of—if not one of the strongest, the second strongest, most well-equipped military in Europe. We must show unity at the Vilnius summit, and I remain confident that NATO allies will continue to use the vast resources of our historic alliance to ensure Ukraine’s self-defense.

The European Union has also stepped up as of May 23, providing over $70 billion in financial, military, humanitarian, and refugee assistance. This includes over $41 billion in financial and budgetary support, $18 billion in support of Ukrainian refugees, and over $18 billion in military assistance such as ammunition and air defenses, Leopard tanks, and fighter jets.

The EU is also currently the largest military training provider to the Ukrainian Armed Forces and will have trained more than 30,000 Ukrainian military personnel by the end of the year.

To conclude, I want to briefly address China and the Indo-Pacific. Having served on the subcommittee for many years now, I have always believed that while Russia poses the greatest risk to our collective security today, in the long term China represents the great threat to our alliance. We must consider our relationship with China, de-risk wherever possible, and bring critical supply chains back home.

We must also invest in our partnership in the Indo-Pacific, providing an alternative democratic way forward with like-minded partners.

Unfortunately, as the war in Ukraine is at a pivotal stage, and China prioritizes their foreign assistance budget and increases their diplomatic expenditures by 12 percent in the coming year, Republican House leadership have proposed a 22 percent budget cut of U.S. foreign assistance. While I know my Republican colleagues recognize Russia and China as a threat, their budget says otherwise.

With that, I want to thank our witnesses for joining us here today in this timely discussion, and I yield back.

Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Ranking Member Keating.

Two quick procedural motions. First is I ask unanimous consent that the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Fitzpatrick, and the gentleman from Ohio, Mr. Turner, be allowed to sit on the dais and participate, following all other members, in today’s hearing. Without objection, so ordered.

Second, I would like to welcome the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, and the gentleman from Illinois, Mr. Schneider, who are joining us today. They will participate, following all other members, in today’s hearing.

Other members of the subcommittee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. Mr. Douglas Jones is Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs at the Department of State, and he is joined by Ms. Laura Cooper, who is the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia at the Department of Defense.

Thank you both for being here. Your full statements will be made part of the record, and I will ask each of you to keep your verbal remarks to 5 minutes in order to allow time for member questions. I now recognize Mr. Jones for his opening statement.

STATEMENT OF DOUGLAS D. JONES, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. JONES. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, thank you for the invitation to testify and for the committee’s support for NATO. Your bipartisan leadership and engagement, including in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, reminds our allies that the United States’ commitment to NATO remains robust, durable, and unwavering.

Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine following its previous 9-year campaign of aggression and illegal occupation of Crimea, has reaffirmed the critical importance of the transatlantic alliance. It has galvanized allied unity, driven allies to enhance the defense of allied territory, and strengthened allied commitment to the democratic values on which the alliance is built.

At the NATO summit in Vilnius in July, allies will take decisions to strengthen NATO across three broad areas, and I would like to speak to each briefly.

First, we will see in Vilnius a strong, united NATO. Allies will reinforce our unity and resolve to support Ukraine in the fight to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, democracy, and the right to choose its own path. At Vilnius, NATO will commit to a package of political and practical support for Ukraine that will build on our bilateral support over the past 16 months.

Since February 2022, the United States has provided more than $40 billion in bilateral security assistance to Ukraine. More than 50 other nations, including our NATO allies, acting bilaterally through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, have provided Ukraine with approximately $32 billion in lethal aid.

NATO itself has complemented this bilateral lethal assistance to Ukraine’s military with non-lethal support totaling $82 million, with another $110 million in the pipeline to NATO’s comprehensive assistance package for Ukraine, and more support is on the way.

Second, NATO will strengthen its deterrence and defense in support of our ironclad Article 5 obligations. Allies are completing the full implementation of NATO’s new fit-for-purpose force model to fortify the alliance’s readiness, working to deepen defense production and updating defense plans for all allied territory that will address the heightened threat on NATO’s eastern flank and the new land, sea, air, cyber, and space security challenges.

The alliance is also working to strengthen the Wales Defense Investment Pledge, which States that allies aim to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024. As of today, eight allies are meeting
or exceeding the 2 percent target. Another nine are on track to do so by next year. 2023 will mark the ninth consecutive year of defense spending growth in real terms for non-U.S. allies, with more than $350 billion in additional defense spending by non-U.S. allies since 2014.

But this is not enough. Allies need to do more, and allies will commit to a new, enhanced Defense Investment Pledge in Vilnius.

Finally, even as NATO sees Russia as the most significant and direct threat to security, peace, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area, NATO faces other challenges, the PRC first among them.

This brings me to my third point. At Vilnius, NATO intends to strengthen its global partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and the Global South. For the second time, heads of State from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea have been invited to a NATO summit to coordinate on shared security challenges, including the PRC.

At NATO’s 1949 inception here in Washington, President Truman called the alliance a shield against aggression. For 74 years, it has proven to be the world’s most successful defensive alliance, extending that shield of collective security from 12 to now 31 allies and soon 32. Having Finland, and hopefully soon Sweden, in the alliance makes it stronger, more capable, and more secure.

As we look to the Vilnius summit, and beyond to the 2024 NATO summit here in Washington, the power of that shield providing security to nearly 1 billion citizens of NATO countries, remains as strong as ever.

Thank you for inviting me today, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Jones follows:]
Written Statement
Doug Jones, Acting Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs
House Foreign Affairs Committee
June 22, 2023

Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating – thank you for the invitation to testify and for the Committee’s support for NATO. Your bipartisan leadership and engagement – including in the NATO Parliamentary Assembly – remind our Allies that the United States commitment to the NATO Alliance remains robust, durable, and unwavering.

I would like to speak to the challenges NATO faces today. Russia’s brutal full-scale invasion of Ukraine – following its previous nine-year campaign of aggression and illegal occupation of Crimea – has galvanized Allies to take new action to strengthen the Alliance, defend Allied territory, and uphold the democratic values on which the Alliance is built. At the NATO Summit in Vilnius in July, we will extend this action across three broad areas, while we continue to address rising challenges from the People’s Republic of China and elsewhere. I will speak to each briefly.

First – we will see in Vilnius a strong, united Alliance. Allies will reinforce our unity, strength, and resolve to support Ukraine in its fight to defend its sovereignty, territorial integrity, democracy, and the right to choose its own path.

At Vilnius, NATO will commit to a package of political and practical support for Ukraine that will build on our bilateral support over the past 16 months. Since February 2022, the U.S. has provided more than $40 billion in bilateral security assistance to Ukraine as it defends its territory. More than 50 other nations – including our NATO Allies, acting bilaterally through the Ukraine Defense Contact Group – have provided Ukraine with more than $28 billion in lethal aid.

NATO itself has complemented this bilateral lethal assistance to Ukraine’s military with non-lethal support like winter equipment, drone jammers, medical supplies, fuel, and satellite connectivity totaling $82 million – with another $110 million in the pipeline – to the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) for Ukraine.

Second – NATO will strengthen its deterrence and defense in support of fulfilling our ironclad Article 5 obligations. Allies are completing the full implementation of NATO’s new fit-for-purpose force model that will fortify the Alliance’s readiness; working to deepen defense production; and updating defense plans for all Allied territory that will address heightened threats and new land, sea, air, cyber, and space security challenges.

To meet the needs of a stronger deterrence and defense, the Alliance is working to strengthen the Wales Defense Investment Pledge, which states that Allies aim to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense by 2024. As of today, eight U.S. Allies are meeting or exceeding the 2 percent target. Another nine are on track to do so by next year. And an additional seven Allies have plans to
reach 2 percent between 2025 and 2030. 2023 will be the ninth consecutive year of defense spending growth in real-terms for non-U.S. Allies – with more than $350 billion spent by non-U.S. Allies since Russia’s illegal purported “annexation” of Crimea in 2014. But this is not enough, and Allies need to do more. Allies intend to commit to a new, enhanced Defense Investment Pledge in Vilnius.

Finally, even as NATO confronts Russia as its most significant and direct threat to security, peace, and stability in the Euro-Atlantic, we recognize NATO faces other challenges – including from the PRC. This brings me to my third point. At Vilnius, we intend to strengthen our global partnerships in the Indo-Pacific and the Global South. For the second time, heads of state from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea have been invited to the NATO Summit to coordinate on an agenda of shared security challenges.

Beyond these three major Vilnius priorities, NATO continues to adapt to meet new and emerging security threats and challenges. Since the 2022 NATO Summit in Madrid, we have increased our common civil, military, and security investment funding; decided to tailor support for partners on Europe’s frontline like Moldova, Georgia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina; established new structures to increase resilience within and across the Alliance; revitalized the cyber defense pledge and developed a virtual capability to ensure a rapid response to cyber incidents; stood up the Defense Innovation Accelerator of the North Atlantic (DIANA) to build Allied capabilities in emerging and disruptive technologies, launched a high-level dialogue on the nexus between climate and security, and underscored the key role that women play in peace and security as a core element of Allied security.

Russia’s war of aggression has not only unified the Alliance like never before, but also convinced non-NATO states to seek Alliance membership. Russia’s actions resulted in Finnish membership in NATO, adding 800 miles to Russia’s border with NATO. In the Arctic, Baltic and throughout NATO-space, having Finland – and soon Sweden – in the Alliance makes it stronger, more capable, and more secure.

At NATO’s 1949 inception here in Washington, President Truman called the Alliance “a shield against aggression.” For 74 years, it has proven to be the world’s most successful defensive Alliance – extending that shield of collective security from 12 to now 31 Allies (and soon 32) and defending Alliance values of democracy, individual liberty, and the rule of law. In fact, NATO’s stabilizing effect in the Euro-Atlantic space cannot be stressed enough. During its entire existence, the Alliance has acted under Article 5 only once – on the United States’ behalf after the 9-11 terrorist attacks.

As we look to Vilnius – and beyond to the 2024 NATO Summit here in Washington – the power of that shield – providing security to the 955 million citizens of the combined Allied NATO countries – remains as strong as ever.

Thank you for inviting me today. I look forward to your questions.
Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Mr. Jones.
I now recognize Ms. Cooper for her opening statement.

STATEMENT OF LAURA K. COOPER, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RUSSIA, UKRAINE, AND EURASIA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Ms. COOPER. Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, members of the committee, thank you very much for this opportunity.

At the Department of Defense, I am responsible for policy regarding Ukraine, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. Today I want to focus my remarks on the U.S. policy response to Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, and in particular our work alongside allies and partners to provide Ukrainian forces with the capabilities and the training they need to defend the Ukrainian people and repel Russia’s invasion.

Our objective in Ukraine is to ensure the existence of a free, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine that can defend itself and deter further Russian aggression. Ukraine is attempting to liberate its territory from Russian occupation or control, including in the latest counter-offensive. Ukraine is well prepared and equipped.

Although the course of war is dynamic and unpredictable, we do have great confidence in the training, capabilities, and preparedness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The security assistance that the United States and our allies and partners have provided is substantial, and those resources reflect the shared interests and values that are at stake.

Russia’s war of aggression is a clear and present danger not only to Ukraine but to the security of Europe and to the basic principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that uphold global stability. Russia’s atrocities in Ukraine are an assault on our common values and our common humanity.

In a crisis of this magnitude, one that implicates our national interests and values, and those of the larger free world, the United States must lead. When we lead with determination and purpose, our friends also respond.

For evidence, consider the collective contributions of the group of 50-plus nations Secretary Austin has assembled in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Last week I joined Secretary Austin in Brussels to participate in the 13th meeting of the Contact Group, where we discussed how we can collectively address Ukraine’s priority requirements, both for the immediate fight but also increasingly for the longer term.

All told, we have marshaled over $28 billion in security assistance commitments from allies and partners, including in top priority areas of air defense, armor, and artillery. Nine European countries have contributed more than $1 billion each. You can put these figures in perspective if you consider security assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of GDP. By that measure, the United States actually currently ranks 12th globally.

It is also helpful to break down the contributions into categories of capabilities. For example, over half of all the tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles provided to Ukraine are from allies and partners, not from the United States. Over half of the 155 millimeter artillery systems are from allies and part-
ners. Over half of the counter-unmanned aerial system capabilities and about half of the Stingers and Javelin missiles are from allies and partners.

Moreover, our allies and partners are having a major impact in training Ukrainian forces. In fact, allies have trained more than three times the number of Ukrainian soldiers that the United States has trained.

Coalitions of allies are starting to emerge to focus on certain capabilities. For example, Germany and Poland are collaborating to provide Ukraine with Leopard tanks as well as the training and maintenance and sustainment for those tanks. The Netherlands and Denmark are collaborating to set up training for Ukrainian pilots to fly fourth generation aircraft.

And we are also seeing allies starting to make longer term commitments. Germany has authorized about $13 billion in support to Ukraine over the next 9 to 10 years. Norway has committed over $7 billion, and Denmark recently announced $3.2 billion. You will see many of these figures in the handbook that my team has prepared for you today.

Finally, it is important to note the growing collaboration between the United States and partners on industrial production, both to support Ukraine and to replenish our own stocks.

But in addition to providing the steady flow of security assistance and boosting industrial capacity, we recognize the importance of prioritizing the accountability of that assistance. To date, we have not seen credible evidence of the illicit diversion of U.S.-provided advanced conventional weapons, although Russia continues to spread disinformation to the contrary.

That said, DOD continues to implement adapted end-use monitoring measures in Ukraine to track sensitive U.S. weapons systems and to proactively prevent arms proliferation. And I would be happy to address additional questions on this matter in the discussion.

Finally, our ability to provide Ukraine’s forces with the capabilities they need, now and over the longer term, rests on continued bipartisan support from Congress. I am committed to working closely with you to maintain enduring support for this national security imperative.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Cooper follows:]
Statement for the Record
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe
June 22, 2023

Chairman Kean, Ranking Member Keating, Members of the Committee: thank you for the opportunity to testify today. At the Department of Defense, I am responsible for policy regarding Russia, Belarus, Ukraine, Moldova, the South Caucasus, and Central Asia. I want to focus my remarks on the U.S. policy response to Russia's aggression in Ukraine, and in particular our work alongside allies and partners to provide Ukrainian forces with the capabilities and training they need to defend the Ukrainian people and repel Russia's invasion.

Our objective in Ukraine is to ensure the existence of a free, prosperous, and democratic Ukraine that can defend itself and deter further Russian aggression. Ukraine is attempting to liberate its territory from Russian occupation or control, including in its latest counteroffensive. Ukraine is well-prepared and equipped. Although the course of a war is dynamic and unpredictable, we have great confidence in the training, capabilities, and preparedness of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

The security assistance that the United States and our allies and partners have provided is substantial, but those resources reflect the shared interests and values at stake. Russia's war of aggression is a clear and present danger, not only to Ukraine itself but also to the security of Europe and to the basic principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that uphold global stability. Russia's atrocities in Ukraine are an assault on our common values and our common humanity.

In a crisis of this magnitude, one that implicates our national interests and values and those of the larger free world, the United States must lead. When we lead with determination and purpose, our friends also respond.

For evidence, consider the collective contributions of the group of 50-plus nations Secretary Austin has assembled in the Ukraine Defense Contact Group. Last week I joined Secretary Austin in Brussels to participate in the 13th meeting...
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All told, we have marshaled over $28 billion in security assistance commitments from allies and partners—including in top priority areas of air defense, armor, and artillery. Nine European countries have committed more than $1 billion each. You can put the dollar figures in perspective by considering security assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of GDP. By that measure, the United States currently ranks only 12th globally.

It is also helpful to break down the contributions into categories of capabilities. For example, over half of the tanks, armored personnel carriers, and infantry fighting vehicles provided to Ukraine are from allies and partners. Over half of the 155mm artillery systems are from allies and partners. Over half of the counter-unmanned aerial system capabilities, and about half of the Stinger and Javelin missiles, are from allies and partners.

Moreover, our allies and partners are having a major impact in training Ukrainian forces. In fact, allies have trained more than three times the number of Ukrainian soldiers than the United States has trained.

Coalitions of allies have started to emerge to focus on certain capabilities. For example, Germany and Poland are collaborating to provide Ukraine with Leopard tanks, as well as the training and maintenance needed to make them effective. The Netherlands and Denmark are collaborating to set up training for Ukrainian pilots to fly fourth-generation fighter aircraft.

We are also starting to see allies make longer-term funding commitments. Germany has authorized about $13 billion in support to Ukraine over the next nine to ten years. Norway has committed over $7 billion in support over five years. On June 19, Denmark announced $3.2 billion in funding over five years.

Finally, it is important to note the growing collaboration between the United States and our allies and partners on industrial production of critical capabilities for Ukraine, and to replenish our own stocks. The war has led the Department of
Defense to mobilize the defense industrial base in a way that we have not seen in decades, and we are working to further expand capacity. A forum of National Armaments Directors, set up under the auspices of the Contact Group and led by the Under Secretary for Acquisition and Sustainment, continues to coordinate these efforts internationally.

In addition to providing a steady flow of security assistance to meet urgent needs on the battlefield, we prioritize the accountability of that assistance. To date, we have not seen credible evidence of the illicit diversion of U.S.-provided advanced conventional weapons, although Russia continues to spread disinformation to the contrary. That said, DoD continues to implement adapted end-use monitoring measures in Ukraine to track sensitive U.S. weapons systems and proactively prevent arms proliferation.

Importantly, DoD personnel at the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv are conducting in-person site visits to verify arms inventories, when and where it is safe to do so.

To complement in-person verification, DoD has also expanded self-reporting mechanisms for the Ukrainians to provide additional data, and has provided them with handheld scanners to remotely account for equipment across the country – including locations where it is not safe for U.S. personnel to visit. Ukraine continues to provide this information openly and transparently, and has given our personnel unprecedented access to their military sites and databases to support these efforts.

Our ability to provide Ukraine’s forces with the capabilities they need, now and over the longer term, rests on continued bipartisan support in Congress. I am committed to working closely with you to maintain enduring support for this national security imperative.
Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Ms. Cooper. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questions.

Mr. Jones, reportedly, the majority of NATO allies are coalescing around the need to provide Ukraine a clear path toward membership once conditions allow. Does the Administration support NATO emerging from Vilnius with a stronger political commitment to Ukraine's NATO membership bid than what was expressed in 2008?

Specifically, as I mentioned in my opening statement, I am concerned by reports that the U.S., Germany, and Hungary are the most resistant to moving beyond the 2008 wording.

Mr. Jones. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I think it is the top goal of the United States, and I think of all allies for the Vilnius summit, that we come out with a strong, unified message of support for Ukraine. And I think we are on track to achieve that.

Allies will of course, as you mentioned, reaffirm Bucharest summit language that Ukraine will become a member of NATO, but we are preparing to go beyond that in several important ways. I think, first of all, is by backing that up with increased levels of non-lethal support through NATO's comprehensive assistance package that Ukraine needs now to help it prevail in its war with Russia.

Second, we are developing what is an unprecedented package of long-term support that signals that the alliance's commitment to Ukraine is for the long run. This long-term support is focused specifically on preparing Ukraine for future NATO membership by advancing Ukraine's reform agenda and helping it to meet NATO's membership standards.

NATO is also preparing to upgrade its partnership with Ukraine, to include a new consultative body, the NATO Ukraine Council, where Ukraine will sit on an equal basis with allies to advance the political dialog and also Ukraine's Euro-Atlantic aspirations.

The Ukraine and all allies agree that NATO cannot join—sorry, Ukraine cannot join the alliance during an active conflict. But NATO can provide Ukraine with the long-term support it needs to advance its reform agenda, so that it can be ready to join the alliance when conditions permit.

Mr. KEAN. Does the Administration have a plan to engage Congress on this issue, particularly given it will likely require additional funding?

Mr. Jones. Yes, sir. We are always available to consult on this issue, and I think that is part of what we are looking forward to hearing today.

Mr. KEAN. Ms. Cooper, yesterday this committee passed mine and Ranking Member Keating's bipartisan resolution supporting the immediate transfer of ATACMS to Ukraine. Unfortunately, this Administration continues to deny these critical systems to Ukraine. Do you agree that ATACMS could—would be useful to Ukraine's counter-offensive?

Ms. Cooper. Mr. Chairman, I think there are many capabilities that are useful. And when we have looked at ATACMS, we have also taken into account other practical considerations, like availability, and also whether there are substitute systems. And right now, Mr. Chairman, we are seeing the effectiveness of the Storm...
Shadow system provided by the U.K., and are finding it to be quite effective.

Mr. KEAN. You had opposed—or, excuse me, this Administration had opposed ATACMS because they saw it as they had many weapons systems and—before as escalatory in nature. But as you just mentioned, the British have sent the Storm Shadow missiles to no reaction by Putin.

Is one of your concerns still the ability to escalate the conflict?

Ms. COOPER. Mr. Chairman, my concerns relate to the practical aspects of availability and also whether there are other systems like Storm Shadow, like the ground-launched small-diameter bomb that will come online this fall, other systems, including UAVs, that can range the same targets.

And I would be more than happy to discuss greater details on these issues in a classified setting.

Mr. KEAN. I would appreciate that. Thank you.

Ms. Cooper, the Russian military has been using cluster munitions with impunity in Ukraine, yet the Administration has refused to provide similar weapons known as DPICMs to Ukraine. I am aware of the dangers of unexploded ordnance. However, the Ukrainians believe that the battlefield benefits outweigh the costs. And since these would be used on Ukraine's own territory, Kyiv would be incentivized to judiciously limit the post-war threat to civilians.

Do you think that the DPICMs would be helpful to Ukraine's counter-offensive, particularly in offsetting Russia's quantitative advantage in manpower or armor and artillery?

Ms. COOPER. Mr. Chairman, our military analysts have confirmed that DPICMs would be useful, especially against dug-in Russian positions on the battlefield. The reason why you have not seen a move forward in providing this capability relates both to the existing congressional restrictions on the provision of DPICMs and concerns about allied unity. But from a battlefield effectiveness perspective, we do believe it would be useful.

Mr. KEAN. OK. Thank you.

I now recognize Ranking Member Keating for any questions that he may have.

Mr. KEATING. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.

On the ATACMS issue, too, you will notice there is language in that that said that subject to our own readiness. Is there an issue, without getting into classified session, generally that that would have to be considered in any kind of dispersion, whether it is Ukraine or otherwise?

Ms. COOPER. Yes, Ranking Member Keating. We would look at readiness considerations, and they would be a clear factor in our decisionmaking. Thank you.

Mr. KEATING. OK. Thank you.

I notice, Mr. Jones, in your testimony you highlighted again for the second time that heads of State from Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and South Korea will be joining NATO at the Vilnius summit. And that is significant.

As we look to China, and you look at the threat that China, you know, currently exerts with a building military and its other types
of coercive activities, that is quite a statement, to see these countries join together again as partners in this summit.

Two things. How significant is that in sending a message to China? And also, again, can you underscore the importance of our victory and Ukraine’s victory against Russia in terms of posturing toward China and their threats?

Mr. Jones. I think the presence of NATO’s four Indo-Pacific partners is significant, and it signifies the evolution that NATO has gone through as it increasingly recognizes the challenges that the PRC poses to Euro-Atlantic security, and it has become increasingly important agenda on—for NATO. This has followed years of effort by the United States, and we are seeing an increasing convergence of views between our European allies and the United States on the way we recognize the challenges posed by the PRC.

And NATO has responded in a couple of ways. One, by really focusing on what NATO can do to reinforce resilience of NATO allies to resist the coercive policies and pressures from the PRC, and also by expanding its partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. And that is what we are seeing at this summit for the second time.

I think there is also increasing realization that what happens in the Indo-Pacific also impacts security in the Euro-Atlantic space, and the reverse as well. So the outcome of the war in Ukraine is extremely important to show that countries who engage in aggression, who violate the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity, and use force to try to redraw borders, will not succeed.

And that is a message that will be particularly important, that the PRC take the right lessons from the outcome of this conflict.

Mr. Keating. Ms. Cooper, do you want to comment in terms of our defense posture and how important it is to send a message—not just a message but the reality that these countries—like-minded countries in terms of values are coming together on issues as a deterrent to China?

Ms. Cooper. Yes, Ranking Member Keating. I would say that one sign of the importance of this and the shared unity is not just the participation at NATO but also participation by countries around the world in the Ukraine Defense Contract Group that I had referenced earlier.

And I will tell you that, you know, from my consultations with our Indo-Pacific allies, they are watching this very closely, and they want to ensure that there is an unequivocal message of support for Ukraine and unequivocal condemnation of Russia’s actions, lest we send a signal to other dictators around the world who think——

Mr. Keating. I also think—I am sorry.

Ms. Cooper. Please. Please, sir.

Mr. Keating. I am approaching my time here. But so it is not lost in the overall picture, but still important I think, what can NATO do to incentivize Georgia to halt some of its democratic backsliding and continue to make the reforms necessary for eventual NATO membership?

I think this is important to underscore the need for these kind of reforms as we go forward, too, with other countries as we approach the summit.

Ms. Cooper. So I can answer this from not just the NATO perspective but the bilateral perspective. I know that we, with our
NATO allies, are very concerned about what we see in political developments in Georgia. But at the same time, we have to make sure that we are continuing to send that message to Russia that they must not press forward and continue their aggression in Georgia.

So it means that we have to maintain our military-to-military relationships. We have to maintain our capacity-building efforts, but at the same time send very strong political signals to the leadership.

Mr. Keating. Thank you very much.

I yield back.

Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Keating.

I now recognize Mr. Lawler from New York for 5 minutes.

Mr. Lawler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Last week some of my colleagues and I sent a letter to President Biden urging that the Administration prioritize discussion on Ukraine’s ascension to NATO at the Vilnius summit. At the very least, we must establish a clear and achievable pathway to membership accompanied by concrete security commitments, of course.

Is the Administration planning to put forward this discussion at the summit?

Mr. Jones. So I can speak to certainly your comment about a clear path. That is a major focus of the summit, and we are working diligently to send that clear message of support for Ukraine at Vilnius.

Mr. Lawler. Well, yet just this weekend the President said that his Administration wouldn’t “make it easy” for Ukraine to join NATO. So is it going to be a clear path or is it going to be difficult?

Mr. Jones. I do not think there is any contradiction there. The NATO membership process is a rigorous process. It is a standards-based process. And to get through it successfully——

Mr. Lawler. Right. So if it——

Mr. Jones [continuing]. Will have to——

Mr. Lawler [continuing]. If it is standard, why do—why even have the comment that we are not going to make it easy? What is it that we are concerned about?

Mr. Jones. Because every applicant, including Ukraine, has to make reforms to meet the criteria for membership. And so what we are focused on in this summit is really providing Ukraine the support that it needs to make those reforms, so it can be successful in the membership process.

Mr. Lawler. Is the goal of the Administration ultimately to have them part of NATO?

Mr. Jones. So we have said that we stand by what was said in Bucharest, that Ukraine will become a member of the alliance.

Mr. Lawler. OK. With respect to Moldova, Moldova obviously is in the process of reforming its government. President Sandu has taken on corruption in concert with the United States and the EU, putting sanctions in place. They are obviously seeking EU membership, and in that process. Is there any talk with respect to Moldova being part of NATO and, obviously, rigorous process understood, but is there any talk with respect to Moldova and what NATO can and should do to help with security?
Ms. Cooper. Perhaps, Congressman, I can first address it from a bilateral perspective, because right now the government of Moldova is really focusing on EU membership, and they aren’t emphasizing NATO membership. So we actually have ramped up significantly our engagement with Moldova to support them in this critical time.

And from a Defense Department perspective, we have significantly expanded security assistance and training and other forms of engagement and support, and it really is intended to strengthen their ability to defend themselves and have a deterrent effect and build toward what they see as an immediate EU goal.

But if you wanted to comment on NATO?

Mr. Jones. I just wanted to add that Moldova follows a policy of constitutional neutrality. And so it is not requesting or seeking NATO membership. It is not a NATO aspirant, but it is a strong partner to NATO. And NATO has tailored its support for Moldova to be fully in respect of its policy of constitutional neutrality, and NATO does recognize Moldova as one of its partners particularly at risk and has targeted its support of——

Mr. Lawler. Understood. It is common knowledge that the majority of NATO members still fail to meet the alliance’s 2 percent of GDP threshold for defense spending. But this past February, Secretary Austin met with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg and then announced that NATO countries would agree to a “new Defense Investment Pledge” at the Vilnius summit.

Ms. Cooper, do you know what this new pledge would look like and what it—would it be an increased threshold?

Ms. Cooper. Congressman, I am going to defer to DAS Jones, since my primary responsibility is not specific to NATO.

Mr. Jones. So allies are intensively negotiating what the new updated Defense Investment Pledge will be, and our position is that the new Defense Investment Pledge needs to affirm an enduring commitment to spend—to spend 2 percent of GDP as a floor for all allies.

But, in addition to that, there needs to be strong language to spend—to aim to spend even beyond that, because in our assessment 2 percent spending by each ally would actually not be sufficient.

Mr. Lawler. Is there going to be accountability measures as a part of this?

Mr. Jones. So the Secretary General does release a report annually that details defense spending by all allies, and all allies are asked to produce a plan—a credible plan—for how they will get to the 2 percent mark.

Mr. Lawler. Thank you.

Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Lawler.

I now recognize Ms. Titus from Nevada for 5 minutes.

Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I am glad to hear that Turkey has kind of softened its opposition to Sweden joining NATO, but I am—at the same time, I am concerned about the Administration and some lawmakers softening their stance on the possibility of selling F-16s to Turkey.
We know Turkey is nothing if not practical or transactional. So I just believe that Turkey has proven it is not a reliable NATO ally, and its actions are contrary to the spirit of NATO.

So I would ask both of you, are you aware of any other of our NATO allies that we have imposed sanctions on under CAATSA besides Turkey? And are you aware of any other NATO allies that antagonize other NATO allies, like flying into the airspace of Greece and Cyprus, besides Turkey?

Mr. Jones. So I am not aware of other NATO allies that we have applied CAATSA sanctions to. I do want to say it is no secret that we have differences with Turkey. But also, from a NATO perspective, Turkey is also a longstanding and committed NATO ally. It does contribute strongly to NATO operations, including through the entire time of our NATO mission in Afghanistan. I think the most recent example, in the flare-up of violence in Kosovo recently, Turkey——

Ms. Titus. That is all right. I do not need——

Mr. Jones [continuing]. Quickly sent 500 additional soldiers——

Ms. Titus. I will ask your colleague there the same two questions.

Ms. Cooper. I also am not aware of any instance of imposing CAATSA sanctions on another NATO member.

Ms. Titus. Any other NATO members flying in the airspace or taking aggressive action against other NATO fellow allies?

Ms. Cooper. At the current time, no examples come specifically to mind.

Ms. Titus. Thank you. I think that makes Turkey the outlier, so whatever they may have done in the past, let’s look at what they are doing in the present.

I also want to ask about the situation with Kosovo and Serbia. That seems to be boiling over again. We have seen divisive mayoral appointments in Kosovo. Northern Kosovo, ethnic Serbs are attacking the U.N. peacekeepers. Kosovar police officers are being detained in Serbia.

Any instability in the western Balkans, whether they are NATO members or not, is really a threat to NATO itself, and not to mention the security of the U.N. peacekeepers or to Kosovo’s own NATO aspirations.

I would ask you, Mr. Jones, how is the U.S. working with NATO to help lower the temperature between Kosovo and Serbia?

Mr. Jones. Well, we have called on all parties to take immediate action to de-escalate tensions. We have condemned the violence which has been directed both at NATO troops, but also law enforcement and journalists.

We have been deeply engaged with Kosovo and with Serbia to de-escalate and to urge both to quickly return to the EU-facilitated dialog. And I would—and from the NATO perspective, you know, NATO continues to be responsible for the safety and security through the—and freedom of movement through the KFOR mission, recently reinforced that mission, to be able to execute that mission.

Ms. Titus. I know there are high hurdles for Kosovo to join as a full member of NATO. But can you tell us where things stand on its bid to join the Partnership for Peace Program? Is the U.S.
supporting that? Are the tensions causing that to be delayed or affected in any way negatively?

Mr. JONES. Well, there are hurdles to NATO—to Kosovo moving forward. We have been clear that both Kosovo and Serbia need to immediately fulfill commitments to the Normalization Agreement and also its Implementation Annex.

And we have continued to support Kosovo’s 10-year transition plan to transform the Kosovo security force into a multi-ethnic NATO interoperable territorial defense force, and that would help move Kosovo forward on this path.

Ms. TITUS. Ms. Cooper, do you want to add to any of this?

Ms. COOPER. Congresswoman, since the Balkans is not part of my portfolio, I will refrain. Thank you.

Ms. TITUS. OK. Thank you.

I yield back.

Mr. KEAN. Thank you. This committee will recess until 2:15 when we will reconvene after votes. 2:15. Thank you.

[Recess.]

Mr. KEAN. The committee will come to order.

Ms. Wagner, for 5 minutes.

Mrs. WAGNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I thank you for organizing this hearing.

The NATO summit in Vilnius is fast approaching. And I appreciate the opportunity to examine allied priorities ahead of this great, critically important meeting. I am privileged to serve as a U.S. delegate to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, the Alliance’s legislative, I guess, advisory body.

At our spring meeting in Luxembourg I was moved and gratified to hear firsthand from our transatlantic partners that the Alliance commitment to an independent, sovereign, and victorious Ukraine remains absolutely ironclad.

Equally important, our NATO partners made it clear to us that they understand the need to put real skin in the game. And I know that this has been addressed previously. But as we discussed in Luxembourg at the NATO Parliament, you know, spending 2 percent of GDP on defense should be a floor, not a ceiling, for each member of the Alliance. And I hope that the United States makes that case to our partners during the Vilnius Summit.

The world is a safer, safer place when NATO is strong, capable, and ready.

In addition to the shortcomings that many NATO members face on their kind of overall defense spending, several also lag in their bilateral support for Ukraine.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Cooper, which countries could and should provide more assistance to Ukraine? And how does the Biden Administration engage with them to ensure that they are pulling their weight?

Ms. COOPER. Thank you, Congresswoman Wagner. I would say that, first of all, it is important to note that our NATO allies are, are pulling their own weight and their fair share in terms of supporting Ukraine. And we see tremendous support in terms of near-term provision of support on the immediate battlefield, but also we are seeing more and more allies actually investing in long-term
support, with billions of dollars in multi-year commitment packages, which are really important.

The areas where we see less support and where we have a lot of private, quiet conversations because of the countries’ policies tend to be outside of Europe in regions where countries are not willing to be vocally in support of Ukraine, but sometimes quietly will agree to provide donations without publicity.

But those are much more challenging conversations. But they are conversations that we are having at the highest levels of the U.S. Government.

Mrs. Wagner. Thank you. Deputy Assistant Secretary Cooper, keeping with you, a little earlier you mentioned Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs as an alternative to ATACMS that the U.S. has agreed to provide. However, I do not believe these will be delivered to Ukraine’s armed forces before October, is my understanding.

With Ukraine’s counteroffensive underway, the critical time is now, not in 4 months. Why would we wait until October to provide critical, longer-range systems rather than provide ATACMS now?

Ms. Cooper. Thank you for that. In terms of the capabilities that we are providing to Ukraine for their immediate needs, we are always looking at every possible opportunity. And we always have to weigh the question of effectiveness: you know, will it work on the battlefield, and are there alternative capabilities?

In this case, you are absolutely right, ma’am, that the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bombs will not arrive until later this fall. But what we are seeing on the ground today is the employment of various long-range UAV systems, as well as the Storm Shadow system that the U.K. has provided, which both have that, that range. And in the case of Storm Shadow, also significant, significant payroll.

Mrs. Wagner. There is nothing we could do to move that, that timeframe up at all?

Ms. Cooper. My colleagues in the acquisition and sustainment organization have been working to try to move up the Ground Launched Small Diameter Bomb timeframe. We absolutely agree that we would like to do that. But, so far that the earlier is this fall that we, that we have heard.

And in the meantime we will keep, we will keep looking for other capabilities within our own stocks. There are availability challenges with, with certain capabilities.

Mrs. Wagner. I just want to reiterate in my 2 seconds left here that, you know, the counteroffensive is now. Now is our moment. And we have to do whatever we possibly can to provide the Ukrainians with the necessary armament, weaponry to try and finish this.

So, I thank you for your work. And I thank you for the chair’s indulgence. And I shall yield back and submit the rest of my questions, Mr. Chairman, for this in writing.

Thank you.

Mr. Kean. Thank you, Ms. Wagner.

I now recognize Ms. Dean for 5 minutes.

Ms. Dean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Keating.
And I thank you, both of the assistant secretaries, for your testimony today and, more importantly, for your work and your service to our country, especially around this incredibly important global issue of Ukraine.

I wanted to let you know I serve suburban Philadelphia in Pennsylvania’s 4th congressional District, which is Montgomery and Berks County, home to a tremendous number of Ukrainian Americans, just a wonderful community that I have known and loved since before this horrific invasion and set of war crimes.

And I share the sentiment of some folks on the other side of the aisle. I am very proud of this Administration and the President for what he has done, how he has led, and how we, the United States of America, has brought 53 countries, if not more, together, seeing clearly the grotesque invasion by Russia.

But my question, I am posing it to both of you, either of you, Mr. Jones, Ms. Cooper, what additional steps is NATO considering in order to end Russia’s war in Ukraine as soon as possible, as well as to deter any future aggression?

Obviously, if we end it sooner than later, I think that will be a powerful deterrent.

What else is NATO doing? What else is the Administration summoning up to end this sooner?

Mr. Jones. I will talk briefly about what NATO is doing.

NATO is also committed to supporting Ukraine in this conflict. But NATO’s role has been primarily to provide non-lethal support to complement the lethal assistance that is being given bilaterally to the Ukraine defense coordination group that Laura described.

The Alliance has been going through a historic transformation of its own deterrence and defense in order to, to ensure that there is no aggression against NATO territory. NATO has expanded its forward-deployed forces, doubling the number of battle groups that it has on its eastern front, almost doubling the number of troops it has forward deployed.

And NATO is also in the process of completing and is on track to complete at the Vilnius Summit a complete rework of its defense plans to take in a comprehensive plan for the defense of Europe, which will both strengthen its deterrence and, I think, send a clear message about our ironclad commitment to defend every inch of NATO territory.

Ms. Cooper. And if I may add, so, from a perspective of your point, you know, to support the Ukrainians in winning this war, I would say that right now we are very focused on ensuring that the Ukrainians have what they need in the counteroffensive. We have helped support them to build nine new brigades. This is an amazing achievement and a tribute to the work of U.S. European Command and our allies and partners.

So, these nine brigades have been outfitted with the best kit possible: with tanks, with infantry fighting vehicles, artillery, and with plenty of ammunition. And we are watching to see what else they need. As things break we are getting them spare parts or replacement capabilities.

So, that is a very tangible, very practical thing that we are doing. But I want to also emphasize that, you know, this is not just about today, it is also about showing Russia that they cannot wait
us out, and showing Russia that we are there to support Ukraine for the long haul. And that is something that you see reflected in the NATO discussions, but you also see it reflected in our bilateral discussions, both in private and in public. And I think that will be increasingly important.

Thank you.

Ms. DEAN. Thank you. And with the little time I have left, I thank you both for those answers. And the nine brigades is impressive and important. I know we must continue to do more and more of that.

I am thinking, also, what additional security assurances for Ukraine will the Biden Administration support at the upcoming summit?

I am thinking along the lines of the kind of Israel-style support, the security agreement, the memorandum of understanding that we have, multi-year commitments to Ukraine.

I know you spoke to it a little bit in your testimony, but if you wouldn’t mind detailing that?

Ms. COOPER. Thank you. And I’ll just touch on, again, the bilateral dimension of this. And, of course, there is the multilateral NATO dimension of this.

So, you know, we are engaged in discussions on how we can support Ukraine and give that sense of confidence that they will have what they need, not just today but in the long term, so that after there is an end to this war we will also be deterring future Russian aggression.

And so, these are conversations that are occurring in diplomatic and in military-to-military channels and will continue to unfold.

Ms. DEAN. Terrific. I see my time has expired. I yield back.

Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Ms. Dean.

I now recognize Mr. Self from Texas for 5 minutes.

Mr. SELF. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think my colleagues are going to cover Ukraine and the major issues quite well. In the lead up to Vilnius I want to go to former Yugoslavia.

You have a potential flashpoint, Assistant, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jones, in the Serbia-Kosovo area. And I think people need to realize it.

From my time in NATO and the European Command in the 1990’s during the multiple civil wars, there are some issues that have not been solved between Serbia and Kosovo. As you know, the Serbs basically boycotted the recent election. The Kosovars took their rightfully elected positions. And now we have a potential flashpoint between Serbia and Kosovo.

Can you give me your opinion before I ask my questions?

Mr. JONES. So, I agree with your assessment on the potential flashpoint. And certainly NATO has a long history in the Balkans.

Regarding Serbia and Kosovo, we are engaged in intense diplomacy currently to urge both sides to de-escalate and return to the EU-facilitated dialog. And we are supporting, as a way ahead, the EU’s three point plan which is calling for de-escalation by both parties, new elections, this time with Kosovo-Serb participation, and also the normalization agreement implementation.
Mr. **SELF.** And you have, you have mentioned Bosnia-Herzegovina. In your written testimony you did not mentioned this at all.

And let’s go to this election, because the Serbs boycotted it. And I thought you had mentioned you wanted new elections.

Why do you want new elections? Because when someone boycotts an election, when a side boycotts the election the election is held, duly held, and the people who win the election take office. Why would you ask for new elections?

Mr. **JONES.** So, the plan, including new elections, was referring to elections in Kosovo and which were boycotted by the——

Mr. **SELF.** Correct.

Mr. **JONES** [continuing]. Serbs, Kosovo Serbs.

So, we have recognized that the mayors that were elected were elected through a proper election. However, they have not been able to fully execute their duties. And, in fact, their attempt to move into their municipal office buildings is what has led to the, to the violence.

And so——

Mr. **SELF.** But that is my question. Duly elected mayors are trying to do their duty to move into the office buildings, and we are supporting a re-do as opposed to supporting these duly elected mayors.

Why is that?

Mr. **JONES.** So, these mayors, due to the, to the boycott they were elected with an extremely low percentage of electorate.

Mr. **SELF.** That happens every day in America. We have local elections where we have 10 percent turnout. And we do not fight it because we have a low turnout.

Mr. **JONES.** But it has led to large portions of the electorate feeling disenfranchised. They are—at their own choice.

Mr. **SELF.** Correct.

Mr. **JONES.** They are willing to come back and vote, as we are urging them to. I think that would result in a more stable process and a more representative government that would help end the current conflict that we are seeing now.

Mr. **SELF.** The real problem I see is the State Department is trying to pull Serbia away from the Russian orbit. You are intervening in elections that were properly held. You are interfering with people who were properly elected to try to insert yourself into a millennia-old issue here. And you are upsetting a duly executed election.

You are not going to pull Serbia out of the Russian orbit. You might as well let Kosovo—we have recognized Kosovo. I know a lot of people have not, a lot of countries have not. But we have recognized Kosovo. You need to, I encourage you to re-think your position on this Serbian-Kosovar conflict here because you need to be standing for the rule of law, which is duly elected officials trying to do their duty.

With that, I yield back.

Mr. **KEAN.** Thank you.

The chair now recognizes Mr. Costa from California for 5 minutes.
Mr. COSTA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Ranking Member Keating. I have got a number of questions. First of all, let me begin with weapons to Ukraine. Clearly we have done an incredible job. But, obviously, more work needs to be done for, I think for ourselves and NATO to ensure that this counteroffensive is successful.

Ukraine has repeatedly requested cluster munitions, including dual purpose improvised conventional munitions. And I am not going to go through the acronym. But, a host of other factors. Where are we on that? I know we have struggled with the F–16s, and I know that is in progress. But right now they need these, these dual purposes improved conventional munitions. Where are we?

Ms. COOPER. Congressman, on, I refer to it as DPICMs for short, on——

Mr. COSTA. That is fine.

Ms. COOPER. On this issue the military advice that we have received is that they would make a difference on the battlefield, that they would be effective against dug-in Russian positions. There are two factors that weigh heavily in the decisionmaking. The one is that, you know, Congress has actually legislated a restriction on transfer of these munitions with a dud rate above 1 percent. So, the congressional——

Mr. COSTA. Well, if it is our responsibility, we can deal with that. I am not looking for excuses. We know they would be effective. So, you are saying that we have to act?

Ms. COOPER. Well, right now there is, there is legislation that restricts the transfer.

Mr. COSTA. I heard you.

Ms. COOPER. And then the second piece is the question of allies’ reactions and alliance——

Mr. COSTA. Well, then what you are saying is we are at a standstill until we make changes on the legislation, and until we get support with our allies. Is that the answer?

I have got other questions I want to ask. That is the answer?

Ms. COOPER. I think it would be important for us to understand where Members of Congress are on this issue.

Mr. COSTA. Well, OK. Let’s move on. We will take that and followup.

Germany’s National Security Strategy. Last week Germany published its first National Security Strategy. That document takes kind of a broad view at major threats facing Germany, strategically broad goals to increase defense spending and deploy more capable, robust armed forces.

What is your impression of the strategy? Have you looked at it, the goals? Is this aspirational or is it realistic?

Mr. JONES. So, I think in general the strategy, we are reviewing the strategy. And but we have been quite like-minded with Germany in a lot of the issues——

Mr. COSTA. OK, but the bottom line, is this aspirational or is this, can they achieve this? Is it realistic?

Mr. JONES. Are you talking about the defense spending?

Mr. COSTA. Yes. That has been a problem as well with Germany.
Mr. JONES. So, so far, you know, they laid out a very impression plan for increased defense spending, but we have yet to see it materialize.

Mr. COSTA. So, the proof is in the pudding. OK.

Let me move to Armenia.

Clearly, you know, Azerbaijan has no intention of following through with the Minsk Accord. And Russia is not going to, they cannot abide by any international rules that they have previously committed to.

The Lachin corridor continues to be closed to Nagorno-Karabakh. And the blockade exists.

Simply put, you know, Armenians are suffering.

What is our effort to try to deal with this?

Ms. COOPER. I can share my perspective as the Defense Department official who handles this part of the world.

First of all, I have to credit Secretary Blinken and National Security Council leadership for the work that they are doing to try to actually achieve a successful peace process.

Mr. COSTA. So, I know, that is fine. But what are we doing to deal with the blockade on the Lachin corridor?

Ms. COOPER. And so that, you know, those peace negotiations are the path to stability and peace in the region.

Mr. COSTA. So, where are we on this? I mean, Azerbaijan has no intention of following through. They haven't followed through on their previous agreements.

And we sure as hell cannot expect Russia.

Ms. COOPER. So, in terms of the peace negotiations, we actually are cautiously optimistic that we are making progress.

Mr. COSTA. I would like find out what your optimism is and why?

Ms. COOPER. Absolutely. If the——

Mr. COSTA. Yes, all right. I have got 49 seconds now, please.

I want to talk about burden sharing and defense spending.

The Vilnius Summit that is coming up includes making 2 percent of the GDP a targeted spending floor rather than a ceiling. However, we know some of the European countries are struggling to reach the 2 percent historically. And this goes back three Administrations, back to the Bush Administration.

The pace of the military procurements has led to delays in spending appropriated funds. And, finally, NATO countries close to reaching 2 percent increased funding I think is coming as a one-off thing, in other words, one-off supplemental funding packages instead of an increased annual funding.

Where do you think we can make some progress in the summit coming up?

Mr. JONES. So, we are seeing progress, slow progress, too slow progress in increased allied defense spending. I think for the summit specifically, it is with a stronger defense investment pledge.

And we agree that we should set 2 percent as the floor for allied defense spending. And in addition to that, we are working to ensure there is also language in there that aims to go higher than 2 percent because we will need more than 2 percent, in our estimation, for allies to be able to have the money to provide——

Mr. COSTA. Oh, absolutely. Absolutely.

Mr. JONES [continuing]. Military simple needs.
Mr. Costa. Mr. Chairman, my time has expired. But I do want to follow up.

Chairman Moran and I were in Vilnius—I mean Stockholm this weekend meeting with the Swedish officials about their ability to become a part of NATO. And I want to find out what we are prepared to do in the upcoming summit to assist Sweden in its ability to become a part of NATO. It is critical.

Thank you.

Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Costa.

I now recognize Mr. Moran from Texas for 5 minutes.

Mr. Moran. That was a perfect segue to the first question I have. So, let's go with Mr. Costa's question, because we did have a good time discussing the NATO accession for Sweden this weekend, both bilaterally with Swedish government officials, and then multilaterally with EU Parliament members. And there is strong support all the way around from everybody to make sure that Sweden gets into NATO, and to do it in a very timely fashion.

So, what pressures are we applying from the U.S. Government to ensure that the blockade or the objection by Turkey goes away and that Hungary follows suit, and that we get Sweden into NATO as quickly as possible?

Mr. Jones. This is a top priority of the United States that Sweden become a NATO ally by Vilnius. And we are actively and persistently raising this with Turkey and with Hungary at all levels.

Most recently, yesterday, Secretary Blinken in his meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Fidan focused intensely on this.

So, our belief is that allies have taken—or Sweden has taken Turkey's counterterrorism concerns into account and has implemented largely the memorandum of agreement that they, that they reached with Turkey and Finland. And Sweden is ready to become a member of the Alliance now.

Mr. Moran. Let me just take issue just briefly with the word you said, "largely." You said that Sweden largely complied with the MOU. But I haven't found an instance where they did not comply.

And, in fact, it looks like to me that Sweden has complied beyond what the MOU required, has gone above and beyond, and has done everything that Turkey has required in order to remove those objections.

Is there something specifically that the U.S. Government would say that Sweden still needs to do?

Mr. Jones. No, I would agree they have, they have implemented the MOA.

Mr. Moran. All right. And they have done a great job getting to that 2 percent mark for defense spending of the GDP. And that is getting there quickly.

And so, it looks like to me that we need to continue to put pressure on Turkey.

Does Turkey understand that if this does not happen, if the objection does not go away and Sweden does not accede into NATO that their request for military equipment could be in peril?

Mr. Jones. So, yes. I mean, I think Turkey realizes, and because they are hearing it not only from us, but from all allies, the strong support for Sweden to join by Vilnius.
They also realize that confirm—ratifying Sweden by the Vilnius Summit would help in many of these, the weapons transfers that you are talking about.

Mr. Moran. Yes, I think it is critical that we continue. And we are, as a bipartisan group, at least this last weekend and I think consistently, have projected that message from Congress to Turkish officials that we need them to cooperate in this manner because Sweden’s decision to come out of neutrality after 200 years, frankly, of being neutral, I mean, most folks do not know that, that Sweden, it is a big step for them. They have been a neutral country for 200 years, and they decided to come out and apply for NATO membership.

They, in the first time in about 80 years, provided weapons systems to another country. They hadn’t done that since the World War II time period.

Those are big steps for them to take to say we are on the side of what is good in this world. And we need to meet that with appropriate force, in my opinion, and appropriate leverage to make sure that their, that their steps are successful in getting into NATO.

Would you agree with that?

Mr. Jones. I agree with that. It is a historic shift that we have seen in both Finland and Sweden.

These were centuries old policies of neutrality. And so, a point that we frequently make to Turkey is not only is it about Turkey demands on counterterrorism, but this is also an issue that affects Alliance security, and it affects the security of other allies as well.

Mr. Moran. OK. All right, so when we are talking about the NATO Alliance, just with my last minute let’s talk a little bit about Ukraine. And I know they want to get into NATO one of these days. There is some hesitation to do that before peace, after the Ukraine-Russia war, once that ends.

And there is talk about maybe a pathway.

But at the Vilnius Summit do you think it might be better just to set some benchmarks out there to say, hey, we need to get to these benchmarks before we even establish a pathway potentially for Ukraine to becoming part of NATO? Do you think that is an appropriate and wise step?

Mr. Jones. Well, I think what we are trying to accomplish, and I think we will accomplish is a really strong message of support for Ukraine, including not only, you know, going beyond what we said before about our commitment that Ukraine will become an ally, but also to provide increased support from NATO for its current, in its current conflict with Russia. And also, a really package that we are building, really an unprecedented package to help Ukraine implement the reforms it needs so that it is ready to join NATO once the conflict ends.

Mr. Moran. All right. Thanks.

I would continue to urge you to do whatever we can for Sweden to get them into NATO. As you know, they are going to be a great, long-term economic, diplomatic, and military partner. And them being part of NATO is a critical step in that process.

So, thank you. I yield back.

Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Moran.
I recognize Mr. Wilson of South Carolina for 5 minutes.

Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Kean. And thank you and Representative Bill Keating.

Both secretaries, you are going to see something really remarkable with the leadership of Chairman Kean. Republicans and Democrats want you to succeed. And that is why so many of the questions that you see are meant to be positive. And they are. But we want you to succeed because war criminal Putin has inadvertently unified NATO, as we see with Congressman Moran pointing out about Sweden joining NATO, giving up its neutralism after 20—200 years.

We see the incredible people of Finland who were successful in the Winter War of 1939 to resist invasion.

We see the European Union coming together, providing over $75 billion of aid to the people of Ukraine.

And then, again, possibly even more remarkable, something that Putin didn't mean to do, and that is get Republicans and Democrats to work together.

And that is why we want you to succeed.

And you could see by the questions from Congressman Costa, Congressman Moran with the Parliamentary Assembly, we want you to do well.

And then I was really very pleased with the passion by Congresswoman and Ambassador Ann Wagner. We want the right weaponry delivered as quickly as possible.

And in line with that, Ms. Cooper, you mentioned the legislative restrictions on the provision of the DPICMs. And that's the Dual Purpose Improved Conventional Munitions. However, there is a waiver available for the President that was not mentioned, that he can exercise this waiver at any time. And given the assessment that these would be effective for the people of Ukraine for the counteroffensive, why isn't this issue addressed with a waiver immediately?

Ms. Cooper. Congressman, so, on the issue of DPICMs there is the question of congressional support. And certainly there is a provision for a waiver. That is absolutely accurate. But certainly the Administration would want to understand, you know, congressional sentiment on this issue before taking such a step.

And then the other piece of it that I had mentioned earlier is the Alliance unity piece. Since we do have a considerable number of NATO members that have signed up to the convention prohibiting cluster munitions, there are some concerns about whether this would lead to divisions.

Mr. Wilson. OK. I want you to be aware, when you have good people, amazingly enough, like former NATO President of the NATO Parliamentary Assembly Gerry Connolly here, he can verify to you that there is a majority in Congress that wants DPICMs to be provided. That even though there may be members of NATO that will not be supportive, it needs to be done.

And for the benefit of success, we want President Biden to be successful in this initiative. And to be successful means that the people of Ukraine have the most advanced weaponry with the longest range, the most effectiveness to face a war criminal who the
mining of Ukraine, I mean just over and over again the war crimes are being committed.

With that in mind, also, Secretary Jones, following the 2008 Bucharest Summit Ukraine's NATO aspirations were welcomed and a path to membership was confirmed. The people of Ukraine have certainly indicated by giving blood to every effort that they want a clear path to NATO membership.

And Americans also want victory. And that is why myself, as chairman of the U.S. Helsinki Commission, we introduced House Resolution 332 which defines victory and a path forward for NATO membership. And also, it is bipartisan with 12 other members to provide for President Biden to call for a concrete pathway for Ukraine at the Vilnius Summit to provide for NATO membership.

With that, why is the Administration hesitant on moving ahead with Ukraine?

Mr. Jones. So, I think, as I have said, one of our top goals for this summit is a strong message of support for Ukraine. And to not only reaffirm what the allies said at Bucharest, that Ukraine will become a member of the Alliance, but also to back that up with an increased package of non-lethal support, larger than before, and also to unveil this package of support to signal the Alliance's long-term commitment, that the Alliance is there to support Ukraine over the long term.

And to focus this assistance on helping Ukraine meet its reform agenda so that they can meet NATO's membership standards. Because Ukraine and allies agree that Ukraine cannot join NATO while there is an active conflict, but we can, through this assistance, help Ukraine to advance its reforms so that it can be ready to join NATO when conditions permit.

Mr. Wilson. Well, there will be bipartisan support for this. And I yield back. Thank you.

Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for allowing me to participate.

Welcome to our two witnesses. And let me just say I think, hopefully, you have heard on a bipartisan basis. And I hope it helps you diplomatically and in counterpart discussions.

I do think the sentiment here in Congress is no F-16s or major weapon sales to Turkey until they have decided to release Sweden and allow Sweden's accession immediately into NATO. Turkey doesn't get to do that without, you know, to block it without consequences.

I also believe that in Congress is probably broad, broad support for going ahead with F-16s for Ukraine, and going ahead at Vilnius and giving a green light to an invitation, a direct invitation to Ukraine for membership.

Ms. Cooper, I would say to you I appreciate, and I think a lot of my colleagues appreciate your concern and deference to Congress about certain things like cluster bombs. That is not a non-controversial item. And it is not necessarily on the approved list on a bipartisan basis going to Ukraine.
And we need to have that debate and that discussion. And it is you are absolutely right to express the caution you did, from my point of view.

Mr. Assistant Secretary, I am going to ask you two questions. One is maybe easier than the other. The other one is not going to be particularly an invitation to a diplomatic answer, but it is going to be direct.

So, the first one is where are we, as you know, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has virtually unanimously, hundreds of parliamentarians representing 31 parliaments, have recommended the creation of the Center for Democratic Resilience at NATO itself. So, we are in fact operationalizing the avowed commitment we have to democratic shared values, creating an architecture to propound, advocate for, and be a resource about democracy and democratic institutions.

Real briefly, where are we on that? Because last time I checked, we had 29 out of 30 Ambassadors to the North Atlantic Council supporting the idea.

Mr. JONES. So, we support the idea. We think it would be an important forum for NATO to protect shared values that are the basis for the Alliance. And we have advocated for this at NATO.

We made a strong push for this before the Madrid Summit. But, unfortunately, there was not NATO consensus or unanimity as is required for all NATO decisions. And so, we elected, rather than take on amendments to that proposal that would have in our mind gutted it, we elected to play a long game and continue to push for this.

And we are regularly raising this at NATO, including at recent North Atlantic Council meetings. And we do not think this will be delivered by Madrid—I mean by Vilnius. But we think we can keep advocating for this and, in the long term.

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, taking a page out of Ms. Cooper’s book, I think it is important to take cognizance of the fact that the House of Representatives passed a resolution endorsing this, on a big bipartisan vote.

So, you know, it is not like some stray idea that might be good to pursue. Not that you are saying that. But it has standing in Congress. We actually acted on it.

Mr. JONES. And I think that the support from the NATO Parliamentary Assembly has actually been a critical——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Good.

Mr. JONES [continuing]. Effort, and it makes a big impact with those allies who have——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Now, you are being——

Mr. JONES [continuing]. Not yet agreed.

Mr. CONNOLLY. You are being diplomatic. Mr. Jones. You said we operate unanimously. And pointed out 29 of 30 Ambassadors support us.

So, who, pray tell, is not supporting it and blocking it?

Mr. JONES. Well——

Mr. CONNOLLY. You can say it.

Mr. JONES [continuing]. I prefer not to talk about what happened——

Mr. CONNOLLY. I know. But we, we prefer to talk about it.
Mr. Jones. All right. Well, I think you know. So, the——
Mr. Connolly. Did I hear you say Hungary?
Yes. That is what I got.
Mr. Jones. You said that.
Mr. Connolly. So, real quickly I will make a statement so I do not put you in it.
I think the time has come to reassess the relationship with Hungary across the board. The EU is doing it and has suspended aid. It is, it is absolutely going down a road that compromises democratic institutions. It has publicly criticized the United States for undermining its own legitimacy as a government rather than Russia.
It has strengthened its relationships with Russia in the middle of a war.
It has threatened to block further sanctions.
And it is blocking, certainly, the membership of Sweden, the accession of Sweden to NATO.
And I think the time has come for a serious reassessment about the relationship with Hungary.
With that, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Connolly.
I now recognize Mr. Huizenga for 5 minutes.
Yes, then you yield back?
Mr. Huizenga. I yield back.
Mr. Kean. OK.
Mr. Schneider, I yield to you for 5 minutes.
Mr. Schneider. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for allowing me to waive onto the committee and join the conversation. I want to thank the witnesses.
And to my friend, Mr. Huizenga, I am happy to go long. I have been there before.
Anyway, thank you guys very much.
We have talked a lot about NATO. And the NATO Alliance is absolutely one of the remarkable accomplishments of the last 80 years, and is unprecedented in global history.
At this moment, with so many countries coming together, united to defend each other, but also to defend democracy in the Free World, and as we discuss here today, we need to make sure that not only Finland but Sweden is able to join NATO.
When the cold war ended the need for the Alliance was questioned. Few could even conceive of the possibility of a land war in Europe. But Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine has made it clear that the Free World needs to work together as much as ever, and that America must lead, as we have over the past year-and-a-half.
Ukraine’s fight has been an inspiration from the day it was invaded. And President Zelensky’s refusal to leave Kyiv and to lead his nation has been an inspiration to the world.
It has been our privilege to support the brave Ukrainians, warfighters who sacrificed and continue to sacrifice each and every day. This war will end when the guns stop firing. But the peace can only begin once Ukraine has ironclad guarantees of its independence and security.
What I would like to ask both of you is can you touch on what is significant and what potential guarantees would help Ukraine? And what are the advantages and disadvantages of providing those guarantees?

Mr. JONES. I think I will talk briefly about NATO and then pass it to Deputy Secretary Cooper.

NATO, of course, provides security guarantees only to NATO allies, of which Ukraine is not a member. But what NATO is looking to do is to send rather, through this longer-term package of support at NATO, indication of its commitment to support Ukraine in its struggle in the way that it can, primarily through its non-lethal assistance to complement the bilateral lethal assistance. And to make that commitment not only sort of year to year, as it has been done so far in the past, but to talk about a much longer-term commitment to indicate the long-term NATO support for Ukraine.

Ms. COOPER. And then, Congressman, I will just fill in from the bilateral perspective which complements this NATO perspective on how to assure Ukraine in the long term, the United States, but also other allies, are considering how we can convey that long-term support.

And it is a security issue, so it is an issue for my department when you think about ensuring the viability of the Ukrainian armed forces in the long term, but it is also important to note that this is an economic, and recovery, and reconstruction issue as well. And that is where you see, you know, allies and partners coming together in London to talk about reconstruction.

So, we are engaging in these, in these conversations, you know, privately. And we are working on how we might be able to provide this kind of support.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Thank you.

And expanding the view or expanding the focus for a second, the other gray zones, independent from Russia but within striking distance is, for example, Georgia and Moldova. What should we do in those circumstances?

Ms. COOPER. Congressman, I spend, when I am not thinking about Ukraine or Russia, I tend to be thinking about Moldova and Georgia a good deal. And what we have seen is very different in both countries. But in both cases we have, during this period of crisis, have redoubled our effort to have strong military-to-military ties, and to maintain our support for these countries to be able to defend themselves, recognizing that the threat is quite real.

I will leave it at that.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. OK.

Mr. JONES. And I would just like to add that following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, NATO realized that some of its partners were at risk to Russian malign influence. And that includes Georgia, Moldova, but also Bosnia-Herzegovina. And it has initiated tailored packages for each one to help them resist malign influence.

And, also, the Alliance will be inviting the foreign ministers of these three countries to come to the summit to meet with NATO foreign ministers as a sign of support for them, and a special focus on them as at-risk NATO partners.

Mr. SCHNEIDER. Great. Thanks.
And my red light is on, so I am out of time. But I would be negligent if I didn't mention I am the co-chair, with my friend Joe Wilson, of the Bulgaria Caucus. And if we had more time we would talk about the Balkans as well.

Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. KEAN. Thank you. The chair now recognizes Mr. Huizinga for 5 minutes.

Mr. HUIZINGA. Thank you, Mr. Kean. I appreciate your indulgence in giving me a moment.

I had a chance this past weekend to be in Stockholm, in Sweden, with the Transatlantic Legislative Dialogue. That, as you can imagine, a fascinating time right now with what has been going on. There was members of the EU Parliament from Finland that were there, and a number of other, a number of other countries. Quite a lot of conversation about Sweden's ascension into NATO.

And I just want to publicly again, State my support of that. And we hope that those that appear to be holding us back, Hungary and Turkey, that they come to their senses on this, and that they see that this would be a positive, positive thing to have for NATO.

One of the issues that I discussed at length while we were there with a number of our European colleagues was the Arctic and what was going on. Certainly with Finland and Sweden or—hopefully, soon Sweden now being a part of NATO, they are part of the Arctic Council. Russia is also a part of that Arctic Council.

Incredibly, China is trying to claim near Arctic status, and soon to have a cooperation with Russia about that. In fact, these are published public facts that Canada earlier this year discovered Chinese listening buoys in Canadian waters up in the Arctic.

So, I have been seeing that this is not just a strategic area, valuable and ripe with valuable commodities, and energy, and minerals, but it also has commercial, geopolitical implications and, frankly, security implications.

And it is no doubt that China has its eyes and designs on that. And, in fact, it even has something called the Polar Silk Road Initiative. So, it cannot be ignored that that area is rising in its importance.

So, recently I sent a letter, with the support of Chairman Kean and fellow members of this committee, to Secretary Blinken seeking State's plan to bolster our Arctic allies and partners to thwart Russia and Chinese influence in the reason.

Within the letter I pointed to Finland's ascension to NATO, in addition to Sweden's pending ascension, as a marker of a fundamental shift in the Arctic.

So, first and foremost, and I guess this should be to you, Deputy Assistant Secretary Jones, what can NATO do to expand and strengthen our partnership in the Arctic?

And is there a common understanding of a path ahead from NATO on further engagement in the Arctic region? Or are there some other member nations that might take some more convincing?

Mr. JONES. So, I agree that the Arctic is a area of increased attention, growing geostrategic challenges, and it is also rising on NATO's agenda. As you mentioned, when Sweden and Finland join the Alliance, then seven of the eight Arctic nations will be in NATO.
Mr. HUIZENGA. Yes.

Mr. JONES. So, that is a lot more of the Arctic in NATO. And NATO also sees rising importance there, primarily as a result of Russia’s increased military presence in what it calls the High North, and also China.

Mr. HUIZENGA. OK. We have got just a little over a minute now. I want to hit on a couple of other quick things.

There is a 2022 report titled the “National Strategy for the Arctic Region.” One of the areas was sustainable development capacity. However, the security capacity was not, was not mentioned in that.

And I am trying to push on this, does the Biden Administration support the idea of an escalated involvement in the Arctic region, not just for development reasons and for sustainable development reasons, but for security reasons?

You understand my distinction here, right? I mean, the security was not, and military importance and security importance wasn’t discussed, but there was a lot of emphasis more on sustainability.

And I want to make sure that we are not just focused on sustainability and green initiatives in the Arctic. I want to make sure that we are also seeing the strategic military as well as security elements in the Arctic.

Ms. COOPER. Congressman, you know, aside from that particular document I can just emphasize that, yes, we recognize the strategic and security dimensions of the Arctic. And we have long recognized the malevolent role that Russia plays in the region. And now are very mindful of watching China’s moves.

So, this is an occupation for the Department of Defense. And it is something that we are focused on.

Mr. HUIZENGA. And I know, Mr. Chairman, my time is up. And I would like to follow up with some written questions through the chair to you about an Arctic, unified Arctic NATO Command, as well as how NATO can address the challenges from the PRC in that Arctic security, regarding Arctic security in that region.

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate your indulgence and yield back. Thank you.

Mr. KEAN. Without objection.

There are no further questions from members. I want to thank our witnesses for their valuable testimony and the members for their questions. In closing, I would like to make some brief remarks.

Mr. Jones, I appreciate the steps you laid out in reaffirming NATO allies’ strong support for Ukraine. However, none of the steps you outlined provide Ukraine a clear path to NATO membership when conditions allow.

Only by providing a clear path can we signal to Putin that he cannot achieve his objectives on the battlefield and he will lose this war.

Our allies from Poland to the Baltic States to even, now, France are pushing for a clearer path. The U.S. leadership is required to get this over the finish line. And I fear from what I have heard today that the U.S. may in fact be impeding this critical effort. The U.S. needs to do more than simply put window dressing on the 2008 Bucharest pledge.
The members of the subcommittee may have some additional written questions for the witnesses. And we would ask you to respond to these promptly in writing.

Pursuant to the committee rules, all members may have 5 days to submit statements, questions, extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length limitations.

Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 3:09 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

Subcommittee on Europe
Thomas H. Kean, Jr (R-NJ), Chairman

June 15, 2023

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on Europe on June 22, 2023 at 1:00 p.m. in Room 210 of the House Visitor’s Center. The hearing is available by live webcast on the Committee website at https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/.

DATE: Thursday, June 22, 2023

TIME: 1:00 p.m.

LOCATION: HVC-210

SUBJECT: The Vilnius Summit and War in Ukraine: Assessing U.S. Policy towards Europe and NATO

WITNESSES: Mr. Douglas D. Jones
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Bureau of European and Eurasian Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Ms. Laura K. Cooper
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia
U.S. Department of Defense

*NOTE: Witnesses may be added.

By Direction of the Chair

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-226-8467 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with
regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.
Subcommittee on Europe
118th Congress

ATTENDANCE

Meeting on: The Vilnius Summit and War in Ukraine: Assessing U.S. Policy Towards Europe and NATO

Date: 22 June 2023
Convened: 1:06 PM
Adjourned: 3:09 PM

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* Recessed: 1:50 PM | Reconvened: 2:17 PM *
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Day       Thursday       Date    06/22/2023       Room    HVC-210
Starting Time: 1:06 p.m.   Ending Time: 3:09 p.m.

Recesses

(1:06 p.m. to 1:09 p.m.) (1:10 p.m. to 1:13 p.m.) (1:14 p.m. to 1:17 p.m.) (1:18 p.m. to 1:21 p.m.)

Presiding Member(s)
Chairman Thomas H. Kean, Jr.; Rep. William Keating

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session [X]  Executive (closed) Session [ ]
Televised [X]  Electronically Recorded (taped) [X]
Stenographic Record [X]

TITLE OF HEARING:
The Vilnius Summit and War in Ukraine: Assessing U.S. Policy Towards Europe and NATO

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:
See attached

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes [X] No [ ]
(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: (List any statements submitted for the record)
QFRs attached from: Kean

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE
or
TIME ADJOURNED 3:09 p.m.

Lance Koloni
Full Committee Hearing Coordinator
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Questions for the Record Submitted to
DAS Jones by
Representative Kean (No. 1 to No. 4)
House Foreign Affairs Committee
June 22, 2023

Question 1:

In 1997, NATO and Russia concluded a political agreement known as the "NATO-Russian Founding Act" which committed the alliance to carry out its collective defense by "ensuring the necessary interoperability, integration, and capability for reinforcement rather than by additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces" on the territories of the former Warsaw Pact states. That same Act also obliged Russia to "exercise similar restraint in its conventional force deployments in Europe." Russia effectively killed this agreement via its invasions of Georgia in 2008, Ukraine in 2014, and then Ukraine again in 2022.

Does the Biden Administration agree this political agreement is dead? Or does it consider the U.S. bound to its unilateral prohibition on 'permanent' stationing of forces in Central and Eastern European NATO members?

Answer 1:

The Russian Federation no longer abides by the NRFA, just one of the many international agreements and commitments Russia has flouted following its February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine. However, the United States, and NATO, take our international commitments seriously, including the NRFA's language reiterating NATO's role as a defensive
Alliance. As stated in NATO’s 2022 Strategic Concept, the Alliance will continue to respond to Russian threats and hostile actions in a united and responsible way.

Question 2:

Do our NATO Allies believe this political agreement is dead?

Answer 2:

The United States cannot speak on behalf of our NATO Allies, but we are committed to reaching all decisions within NATO through consensus, including regarding NATO’s political relationship with Russia.
Russia just announced its full withdrawal from the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe. To be fair, this statement inners that the CFE had been an effective treaty in constraining Russia’s conventional forces in Europe, but that is far from the truth. The Russians announced their suspension on implementation in 2007 and have been in violation since. While they have ignored their treaty obligation, not only by failing to abide by the forces limitation, but by invading other countries like Georgia and Ukraine as well as stationing troops in Moldova without the Moldovan government consent, we have unilaterally disarmed ourselves by abiding in the name of ‘norms setting, when it is apparent the Russia’s do not consider it necessary to reciprocate our action and continue to build their forces without the constrains of these treaties.’ Further, Russia has faced limited consequences for their actions beyond the U.S. using diplomacy to "encourage" the Russians to comply with their treaty obligations undermining our credibility.

Question 3:

Which obligations under the CFE Treaty with regard to Russia does the United States still carry out?

Answer 3:

In 2011, the United States, along with the 21 other NATO Allied CFE States Parties, as well as Georgia and Moldova, ceased implementing CFE obligations specifically vis-à-vis Russia as a lawful countermeasure aimed at inducing Russia’s return to compliance with its CFE obligations. That countermeasure remains in place.
Question 4:

What are the implications of Russia’s announced withdrawal in May from the CFE Treaty on the NATO alliance?

Answer 4:

We condemn Russia’s decision to walk away from the mutually beneficial stabilizing value of arms control and continue to call on Russia to change course and rescind its notification of withdrawal from CFE, which will take effect on November 7, 2023. As a practical matter, Russia’s withdrawal changes nothing on the ground in terms of current implementation of the Treaty. Since 2007, Russia has “suspended” its implementation of the CFE Treaty without a valid legal basis and failed to live up to its obligations under the treaty. The United States is consulting with our NATO Allies, and we will review Russia’s actions together. This is a multilateral treaty of importance to Euro-Atlantic security, so we will work together on next steps in responding to Russia’s actions regarding CFE.