[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


 THE HOMELAND SECURITY COST OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION'S CATASTROPHIC 
                      WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                           COUNTERTERRORISM,
                          LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
                              INTELLIGENCE

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                             APRIL 18, 2023
                               __________

                            Serial No. 118-7
                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                    
        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
52-889  PDF               WASHINGTON : 2023   



                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
                     Sean Jones, Legislative Clerk
                                 ------                                

  SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE

                    August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island, 
Tony Gonzales, Texas                     Ranking Member
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         J. Luis Correa, California
Elijah Crane, Arizona                Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Dina Titus, Nevada
    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
                                         (ex officio)
               Michael Koren, Subcommittee Staff Director
          Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                    Alice Hayes, Subcommittee Clerk

                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     3
The Honorable Seth Magaziner, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
  Oral Statement.................................................     5
  Prepared Statement.............................................     6
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Texas:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     7

                               Witnesses

Hon. Nathan A. Sales, Former Ambassador-At-Large and Coordinator 
  for Counterterrorism:
  Oral Statement.................................................     9
  Prepared Statement.............................................    11
Ms. Simone A. Ledeen, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
  Defense for the Middle East:
  Oral Statement.................................................    15
  Prepared Statement.............................................    17
Mr. Christopher J. Douglas, Colonel (Ret.), United States Marine 
  Corps:
  Oral Statement.................................................    23
  Prepared Statement.............................................    25
Mr. Jonathan Schroden, PhD, Director, Countering Threats and 
  Challenges Program and Special Operations Program Center for 
  Naval Analyses:
  Oral Statement.................................................    26
  Prepared Statement.............................................    28

                             For the Record

The Honorable Daniel S. Goldman, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of New York:
  Memorandum.....................................................    42

 
 THE HOMELAND SECURITY COST OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION'S CATASTROPHIC 
                      WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN

                              ----------                              


                        Tuesday, April 18, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                         Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, 
                         Law Enforcement, and Intelligence,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., at 
Room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. August Pfluger 
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Pfluger, Bishop, Gonzales, 
D'Esposito, Crane, Magaziner, Goldman, Titus, and Jackson Lee.
    Chairman Pfluger. The Committee on Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and 
Intelligence will come to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from 
national security experts about their perspective of the 
homeland security cost of the catastrophic U.S. withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in August 2021.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Good morning, and I would like to thank the witnesses for 
all being here, for taking time through your personal and 
professional experiences to share with us your thoughts and how 
we can strengthen our own homeland security posture. This 
morning we are going to discuss the homeland security cost of 
the catastrophic withdrawal, as I mentioned, which resulted in 
the unfortunate deaths of 13 U.S. service members and at least 
170 Afghans in an ISIS-K orchestrated terrorist attack. It also 
resulted in thousands of extremist inmates, including many with 
ISIS and al-Qaeda ties, who were released by the Taliban from 
Pul-e-Charkhi prison, as well as the Parwan detention facility 
in Afghanistan. Last Congress, I introduced a bill to make sure 
that there is an assessment of terrorist threats posed by those 
prisoners, 5,000-plus that were released from those two 
facilities by the Taliban. The legislation became law in a 
bipartisan effort and was included in the National Defense 
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022. Unfortunately, to date, 
we have yet to receive an assessment from the administration on 
the threat that those released prisoners pose to the United 
States, our homeland, and to our allies.
    This hearing is actually important to me for a couple of 
reasons. No. 1, personally, because I have served in the Middle 
East, I have friends that have served, colleagues who have 
served, Members of this committee, this subcommittee, have 
served, and many of you, as witnesses have served. We 
understand that the threat in the formation of these 
ideological and often very violent extremist groups is 
something that, if left unchecked, will continue to metastasize 
and get worse. Less than 2 weeks ago, the administration 
released a report that I believe whitewashed and shamelessly 
shifted blame about the execution of deadly withdrawal from 
Afghanistan in a very inaccurate form. The administration's 
continuous denial and downplaying of what happened is an insult 
to the service members sitting here and throughout the United 
States of America, to their families, and to our allies. It is 
inaccurate to say and to suggest that the withdrawal occurred 
without chaos, as was suggested by a spokesman for the 
administration. One doesn't have to see the horrific images or 
footage of the evacuation for more than a couple of minutes to 
make a keen observation that there was a lot of chaos and 
desperation involved.
    Unfortunately, the disastrous withdrawal signaled American 
weakness and damaged our credibility on the world stage. There 
is no doubt that our foreign adversaries, including Russia and 
China and others, were watching and that they were calculating. 
It is important to remember that the genesis of our involvement 
in Afghanistan came as a result of the first and only Article 5 
ever triggered through our NATO membership, and that was the 
attack on our homeland on September 11, 2001. Now there are 31 
members of NATO, with Finland joining as of last week, who look 
at the results of this withdrawal and it impacts not just our 
own homeland and not just our own security, but also that of 
our allies in Europe, as well as those in the Indo-Pacific, 
such as Korea and Japan, who had a lot of skin in the game 
throughout the 20 years.
    Further troubling is the fact that this administration has 
repeated the same mistakes we made 20 years ago. Now, with our 
inability to collect intelligence on the ground, to project 
power, terror groups within Afghanistan have re-established the 
country as a breeding ground and a safe haven for terrorism. 
Just recently, CENTCOM Commander General Kurilla stated that 
ISIS-K is rapidly developing the ability to conduct external 
operations in Europe and Asia and will be able to attack 
American and Western interests outside the country in less than 
6 months.
    In addition, last month, this subcommittee held a hearing 
that examined how the Chinese Communist Party is working to 
exploit our vulnerabilities, including the CCP surveillance 
balloon, which collected information on sensitive military 
installations and critical infrastructure here in our homeland. 
The CCP's use of intellectual property theft, economic 
coercion, and malign influence at American universities 
continues to accelerate.
    I look forward to this subcommittee's work, to coming 
together in a bipartisan way, to look at the facts and to 
understand what we can do better. While we were rightly focused 
on those issues, we must never lose sight of the threats posed 
by terrorist organizations who are emboldened to carry out and 
inspire attacks against not only the United States of America, 
but our Western target allies. I worry that the terrorist 
threat landscape is not just worse, but much worse since the 
botched withdrawal. As I have said before, we see a direct link 
between the foreign terrorist threat abroad and our security 
here at home. For instance, let us not forget an Iraqi man, 
Shihab Ahmed Shihab, who was charged with aiding and abetting a 
plot to murder former President George W. Bush. Shihab was an 
ISIS sympathizer inspired to action by Islamic extremist 
propaganda. In another matter, which affected my home State of 
Texas, a British citizen, Malik Faisal Akram, entered the 
United States using the visa waiver program and then held 
members of the Congregation Beth Israel, a Jewish synagogue in 
North Texas, hostage for 10 hours. These are just a couple of 
examples of cases that highlight the very real foreign threat 
that terrorism poses to our homeland.
    Another concern that I have continually raised is the 
significant increase we have seen in watch-listed individuals 
being encountered at the border, in particular, the number 
which are being apprehended between ports of entry, meaning 
that they are not presenting themselves to be processed at the 
port of entry, but instead attempting to evade law enforcement. 
This comes at a time in which we have an unprecedented crisis 
at the Southern Border as a direct result of Secretary Myorkas' 
failure to enforce the laws that are currently standing on our 
books. It has been revealed by the Department of Homeland 
Security's Inspector General that DHS encountered obstacles to 
screen, vet, and inspect all evacuees during the crisis 
following the withdrawal from Afghanistan. On top of that, the 
Pentagon's watchdog published a report which detailed its 
critical view review of the administration's effort to screen, 
vet, and transport those evacuees to the United States.
    This subcommittee and the greater Committee on Homeland 
Security intend to thoroughly examine these issues to ensure 
that those charged with protecting our security are acting 
responsibly and using their resources to properly engage the 
threats posed to the homeland. We must work together to protect 
our homeland. This committee, the Committee on Homeland 
Security, was formed in the wake of September 11, 2001. It was 
formed directly as a result of the withdrawal that we will now 
be investigating and discussing today. We have to remain 
vigilant. We have to continue to view strength as a peace 
through strength and security as a peace through strength 
mentality. I was recently abroad and met with the Polish Prime 
Minister, and he said this, I desire peace, that is why I 
prepare for war. Nobody wants war, but we desire peace. We have 
to secure our homeland. I think that the Prime Minister is 
absolutely correct.
    Again, thank you to all our witnesses. Thank you for your 
time and your expertise. I look forward to a good discussion to 
look at a fact-based analysis of what happened and how we can 
protect the defense and the security of the United States.
    With that, I will yield to the Ranking Member, the 
gentlemen from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner.
    [The statement of Chairman Pfluger follows:]
                  Statement of Chairman August Pfluger
                    april 18, 2023, 10 o'clock a.m.
    This morning we are going to discuss the homeland security cost of 
the catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, which 
resulted in the deaths of 13 U.S. service members and at least 170 
Afghans in an ISIS-K orchestrated terrorist attack.
    It also resulted in thousands of extremist inmates, including many 
with ISIS and al-Qaeda ties, who were released by the Taliban from Pul-
e-Charkhi prison as well as the Parwan Detention facility in 
Afghansitan.
    Last Congress, I introduced a bill to make sure that there is an 
assessment of terrorist threats posed by those prisoners, 5,000+ that 
were released by the Taliban from the Pul-e-Charkhi and Parwan 
Detention facility. This legislation became law with a bipartisan 
effort after being included in the National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2022. Unfortunately, to date, I we have yet to receive 
an assessment from the administration on the threat that those released 
prisoners posed to the United States and our allies.
    This hearing is actually important to me for a couple of reasons. 
No. 1, personally, because I've served in the Middle East. I have 
friends that have served, colleagues who have served.
    Members of this subcommittee have served, and many of you as 
witnesses have served. We understand that the threat in the formation 
of these ideological and often very violent extremist groups is 
something that if left unchecked will continue to metastasize and get 
worse.
    Less than 2 weeks ago, this administration released a report to 
whitewash and shamelessly shifted blame about the execution of the 
deadly withdrawal from Afghanistan, and in a very inaccurate form.
    The administration's continuous denial and downplaying of what 
happened is an insult to our service members sitting here and 
throughout the United States of America, to their families and to our 
allies.
    It is inaccurate to say and to suggest that the withdrawal occurred 
without chaos as was suggested by a spokesman for the administration.
    One doesn't have to see the horrific images and footage of the 
evacuation for more than a couple of minutes to make a keen observation 
that there was a lot of chaos and desperation involved.
    Unfortunately, the disastrous withdrawal signaled American weakness 
and damaged our credibility on the world stage. There is no doubt that 
our foreign adversaries like Russia and China and others were watching, 
and that they were calculating. It's important to remember that the 
genesis of our involvement in Afghanistan came as a result of the first 
and only Article 5 ever triggered through our NATO membership. That was 
the attack on our homeland on September 11, 2001.
    And now there are 31 members of NATO with Finland joining as of 
last week. You look at the results of this withdrawal and it impacts 
not just our own homeland and not just our own security but also that 
of our allies in Europe as well as those in the indo-Pacific such as 
Korea and Japan, who had a lot of skin in the game throughout the 20 
years.
    Further troubling is the fact that this administration has repeated 
the same mistakes we made 20 years ago. And now with our inability to 
collect intelligence on the ground, to project power, terror groups 
within Afghanistan have reestablished the country as a breeding ground 
and a safe haven for terrorism.
    CENTCOM Commander Gen Kurilla recently stated last month that ISIS-
K is rapidly developing the ability to conduct ``external operations'' 
in Europe and Asia and will be able to attack American and Western 
interests outside the country in less than 6 months.
    In addition, last month this subcommittee held a hearing that 
examined how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is working to exploit 
our vulnerabilities, including the CCP surveillance balloon which 
collected information on our sensitive military installations and 
critical infrastructure here in our homeland. The CCP's intellectual 
property theft, economic coercion, and malign influence at American 
universities continues to accelerate.
    I look forward to the subcommittee's work to come together in a 
bipartisan way to look at the facts and understand what we can do 
better. And while we are rightly focused on those issues, we must never 
lose sight of the threats posed by terrorists organizations who are 
emboldened to carry out and inspire attacks against not only the United 
States of America but our Western target allies.
    I worry that the terrorist threat landscape is not just worse but 
much worse since the botched withdrawal.
    As I have said before, we see a direct link between the foreign 
terrorist threat abroad and our security here at home.
    For instance, let us not forget, an Iraqi man, Shihab Ahmed Shihab, 
who was charged with aiding and abetting a plot to murder former 
President George W. Bush. Shihab was an ISIS-sympathizer, inspired to 
action by Islamic extremist propaganda.
    In another matter, which affected my home State of Texas, a British 
citizen, Malik Faisal Akram, entered the United States using the Visa 
Waiver Program, and then held members of Congregation Beth Israel, a 
Jewish synagogue in North Texas, hostage for 10 hours. These are just a 
couple of examples of cases that highlight the very real foreign threat 
that terrorism poses to our homeland.
    Another concern I have continually raised is the significant 
increase we've seen in watchlisted individuals being encountered at the 
border, in particular the number which are being apprehended between 
ports of entry--meaning that they are not presenting themselves to be 
processed at the port of entry, but instead attempting to evade law 
enforcement.
    This comes at a time in which we have an unprecedented crisis at 
the Southern Border as a direct result of Secretary Mayorkas' failure 
to enforce the laws of our country.
    It has also been revealed by the Department of Homeland Security's 
Inspector General that DHS encountered obstacles to screen, vet, and 
inspect all evacuees during the crisis following the U.S. withdrawal 
from Afghanistan.
    On top of that, the Pentagon's watchdog published a report which 
detailed its critical review of the administration's efforts to screen, 
vet, and transport those evacuees to the United States.
    This subcommittee and the greater Committee on Homeland Security 
intend to thoroughly examine these issues to ensure that those charged 
with protecting our security are acting responsibly and using their 
resources to properly engage the threats posed to the homeland.
    We must work together to protect our homeland. This committee, the 
Committee on Homeland Security, was formed in the wake of September 11, 
2001.
    We have to remain vigilant, we have to continue to view strength as 
peace through strength and security as a peace through strength 
mentality.
    I was recently in Poland and met with the Polish Prime Minister, 
and he said this: ``I desire peace, that is why I prepare for war.''
    Nobody wants war, but we desire peace. We have to secure our 
homeland, and I think that the Prime Minister is absolutely correct.
    Again, thank you to all our witnesses, thank you for your time and 
your expertise. I look forward to a good discussion to look at a fact-
based analysis of what happened and how we can protect the defense and 
the security of the United States.

    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to our 
witnesses for being here today.
    As Members of the Homeland Security Committee, we have a 
duty to protect the United States homeland and the people who 
live here from all threats, foreign and domestic. I speak for 
all the Members of this subcommittee when I say that we honor 
the sacrifices and dedication of all who served our country in 
Afghanistan, including some of the witnesses who are here 
today. The American veterans of the Afghanistan War who I speak 
with have a broad range of opinions about the decision to 
withdraw. Some believe we should have stayed longer, some 
believe that withdrawing was the right thing to do, some 
believe we should have withdrawn earlier. But regardless, I 
want every American who served in Afghanistan to know that you 
made a positive difference. Thanks to you, al-Qaeda and ISIS 
are operating at a fraction of their prior strength, the 
masterminds behind 9/11 and other heinous attacks have been 
brought to justice, countless other attacks have been 
prevented, lives have been saved, and our Nation is safer today 
than it was in 2001. Now that the war is over, it is vital that 
we be proactive in ensuring that terrorist organizations like 
al-Qaeda and ISIS-K, which have been diminished due to the 
sacrifice of American service members, our NATO allies, and 
other partners, never regain the capability to launch a large-
scale attack on the U.S. homeland again.
    The Biden administration's successful drone strike to 
eliminate Ayman al-Zawahiri following the withdrawal was a 
positive development that showed American citizens and people 
around the world that we can and we must continue to take 
proactive steps to defend our homeland and our allies from 
terrorist threats. We must maintain the diplomatic, 
intelligence, and military capabilities to respond to threats 
emanating from Afghanistan whenever necessary. We must also 
focus on the fact that many terror groups have begun using 
alternative methods, including the internet to systematically 
radicalize individuals already living in the United States. 
This is a real threat that has already cost American lives and 
must be taken seriously.
    We must learn from the withdrawal and ensure that in the 
future, when the United States exits a foreign theater, we do 
so with adequate planning for all contingencies, including the 
evacuation of locals who assisted the United States in its 
mission. This includes ensuring that the Department of Homeland 
Security has the planning, the resources, and importantly, the 
data that it needs from other agencies to efficiently and 
accurately screen those who are seeking asylum.
    The security of the United States cannot be a partisan 
issue. My Democratic colleagues and I take our responsibility 
on this committee seriously and undertake our oversight with 
solemnity.
    The Biden administration inherited a chaotic withdrawal 
that was already in progress. On the day that the Biden 
administration began 5,000 Taliban prisoners had been released, 
American forces had been reduced to 2,500 in Afghanistan, and 
the Taliban had re-taken more than 200 of the sectors of 
Afghanistan. Going forward, we must make sure that we learn the 
lessons from withdrawal, that we work across agencies in an 
entirety-of-government approach to ensure that we maintain the 
capabilities necessary to meet terrorist threats wherever they 
emanate from, and particularly from Afghanistan, and that we 
have better procedures in place in the future to make sure that 
American personnel and our allies and those who assist us are 
able to leave foreign theaters in an efficient and safe manner.
    So my hope for today's hearing is that we will focus on 
forward-looking solutions that will improve the safety of 
Americans at home and around the world. I have also been 
informed that Ms. Jackson Lee has requested to waive on to the 
hearing, and so I ask unanimous consent that she be allowed to 
do so.
    With that, I yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Magaziner follows:]
               Statement of Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
                             April 18, 2023
    As Members of the Homeland Security Committee, we have a duty to 
protect the United States homeland and the people who live here from 
all threats, foreign and domestic.
    I speak for all Members of this subcommittee that we honor the 
sacrifices and dedication of all who served in Afghanistan, including 
some of the witnesses here today.
    The American veterans of the Afghanistan War who I speak with have 
a range of opinions on the decision to withdraw.
    But I want every American who served in Afghanistan to know that 
you made a positive difference.
    Thanks to you, AQ and ISIS are operating at a fraction of their 
prior strength, the masterminds behind 9/11 and other heinous attacks 
have been brought to justice, countless other attacks have been 
prevented, lives have been saved, and our Nation is safer than it was 
in 2001.
    Now that the War is over, we must continue to be proactive in 
ensuring that terrorist organizations in Afghanistan never develop the 
capacity to threaten the American homeland again.
    We must maintain the diplomatic, intelligence, and military 
capability to respond to threats emanating from Afghanistan whenever 
necessary.
    It is vital that terrorist organizations like AQ and ISIS, which 
have been diminished due to the sacrifice of American service members, 
our NATO allies, and other partners, never regain the capability to 
launch a large-scale attack on the U.S. homeland.
    We must also focus on the fact that many terror groups have begun 
using the internet to systematically radicalize individuals already 
living in the United States. This is a real threat that has already 
cost American lives and must be taken seriously.
    We must learn from the withdrawal and ensure that in the future 
when the U.S. exits foreign theater, we do so with adequate planning 
for all contingencies, including ensuring that the Department of 
Homeland Security has the planning, the resources, and the data that it 
needs from other agencies to efficiently and accurately screen those 
seeking asylum.
    When President Biden took office, the American force in Afghanistan 
had already been reduced by more than 80 percent from the day the Trump 
Taliban Deal was signed, down to only 2,500 troops. When President 
Biden took office, the Taliban already controlled a large portion of 
the country's 407 districts. And 5,000 Taliban fighters had already 
been released.
    The security of Americans cannot be a partisan issue. My Democratic 
colleagues and I take our responsibility on this committee seriously 
and undertake our oversight with solemnity.
    My hope for today's hearing is that we will focus on forward-
looking solutions that will improve the safety of Americans at home and 
around the world and examine how the Trump-Taliban deal led to a 
chaotic withdrawal.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
    Without objection, that will be possible.
    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Honorable Jackson Lee follows:]
               Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
                             April 18, 2023
    Chairman Pfluger and Ranking Member Magaziner thank you for 
allowing me to join today's hearing under Unanimous Consent.
    As the hearing title suggests, this is an attempt to second-guess 
the decisions made by the Biden administration to effect the withdrawal 
of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, which was significantly impacted by 
the Trump-Taliban plan.
    The Trump-Taliban agreement severely constrained the Biden 
administration's options for a orderly withdrawal by exacting 
conditions and imposing an aggressive time line.
    The September 6, 2022, DHS Office of Inspector General report 
entitled ``DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All 
Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis,'' is an important access 
of the challenges faced to an effort to screen and vet evacuating 
Afghan nationals who aided the United States in its mission.
    The mission in Afghanistan was coming to a close and the need to 
find the strategy to effect a withdrawal was in the hands of the 
previous President.
    When President Donald Trump came into office in January 2017, 
approximately 11,000 U.S. troops were reportedly in Afghanistan, with 
U.S. force levels having declined from their 2009-2011 high point of 
approximately 100,000 U.S. troops.
    In June 2017, President Trump delegated to Secretary of Defense 
James Mattis the authority to set force levels, reportedly limited to 
around 3,500 additional troops; Secretary Mattis signed orders to 
deploy them in September 2017.
    Those additional forces (all of which were dedicated to NATO-led 
RSM [Resolute Support Mission]) arrived in Afghanistan within months, 
putting the total number of U.S. troops in the country between 14,000 
and 15,000 by the end of 2017.
    By mid-2018, President Trump was reportedly frustrated with the 
lack of military progress against the Taliban, and he ordered formal 
and direct U.S.-Taliban talks without Afghan government participation 
for the first time. As those talks developed under Special 
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad, 
President Trump continued to express frustration with the U.S. military 
mission in Afghanistan and a desire to withdraw U.S. forces, saying in 
August 2019 that he wanted to do so ``as quickly as we can.''
    The U.S. withdrawal commitment was not conditioned on the Taliban 
reducing violence against the Afghan government, making concessions in 
intra-Afghan talks, or taking other actions.
    The United States was not able to remain indefinitely and the 
American public's patience for the war were waining.
    What was needed by the previous President was a sustainable plan 
that would implement a process to protect our troops and the Afghan 
people who had supported our mission.
    U.S. force levels began to contract in 2019: at an October 9, 2019, 
news conference, General Austin S. Miller, the top U.S. commander in 
Afghanistan, said that the number of U.S. forces had been gradually 
reduced by 2,000 over the past year, to between 12,000 and 13,000.
    In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a formal 
agreement in which the United States committed to withdrawing all of 
its troops, contractors, and non-diplomatic civilian personnel from 
Afghanistan, with a drawdown in military forces to 8,600 by mid-July 
2020 and a complete withdrawal by the end of April 2021.
    In return, the Taliban committed to prevent any groups, including 
al-Qaeda, from threatening the United States or its allies by not 
allowing those groups to reside, train, or fundraise in Afghanistan.
    The previous President needed to begin the process of an orderly 
withdrawal given the time table established, but that did not happen.
    The consequences were dire for U.S. troops and for Afghans who had 
supported our mission.
    The Biden administration and House and Senate Democrats did what we 
could to help mitigate the situation by authorizing 8,000 additional 
Special Immigrant Visas (SIV) for Afghan applicants and allocating $6.4 
billion to support Afghan resettlement across Federal agencies.
    This funding included $193 million for U.S. Citizen and Immigration 
Services to expand immigration processing, as the Trump administration 
amassed a backlog of over 18,000 Afghan SIV applicants.
    I like many of you received urgent calls for help when the collapse 
of the Afghan government occurred.
    Mr. Abdul Wasi Safi, the Afghan soldier who served alongside of 
U.S. troops in the war in Afghanistan, and Maryam Muradi the wife of 
Masih Shafi Mujadidi who lives in the 18th Congressional District in 
Houston were trapped when U.S. forces departed.
    I spent the months getting Maryam through but the process for her 
to enter the United States.
    Then this year, I helped Mr. Abdul Wasi Safi who made it to the 
U.S. border with Mexico and was held in custody and charged with 
unlawfully entering the country.
    I worked for his release and reunion with his brother who had also 
help our forces.
    This hearing is best served by a briefing that engages the 
Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs.
    I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the 
isle to improve the process for immigrant visas for asylum seekers.

    Chairman Pfluger. I am pleased to have a distinguished 
panel of witnesses before us today on this very important 
topic. I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their 
right hand.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Chairman Pfluger. Let the record reflect that the witnesses 
have answered in the affirmative.
    Now I would like to formally introduce our witnesses.
    Ambassador Nathan Sales served in various senior positions 
at the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security. From 2017 to 2021 Ambassador Sales was the 
Ambassador at large and coordinator for counterterrorism. 
Concurrently, he served as the under secretary of state for 
civilian security, democracy, and human rights, as well as a 
special Presidential envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat 
ISIS. Prior to that, he served at the Department of Homeland 
Security as deputy assistant secretary for policy and the 
Department of Justice as senior counsel in the Office of Legal 
Policy, where he worked on counterterrorism policy.
    Ms. Simone Ledeen served as deputy assistant secretary of 
defense for the Middle East. She was previously the principal 
director and acting deputy assistant secretary for Special 
Operations in Combating Terrorism, where she was responsible 
for defense policy on counterterrorism activities, in addition 
to military information, support operations, irregular warfare 
direction, direct action, and other sensitive activities. 
Previously, Ms. Ledeen also served as the senior U.S. Treasury 
representative to NATO's international security assistance 
force in Afghanistan. Thank you for being here.
    Colonel Christopher Douglas is a veteran of the United 
States Marine Corps. Colonel Douglas served as a Marine 
infantry officer for over 31 years in an active and reserve 
capacity. He has led Marines for 5 tours in combat operations 
since 9/11, including leading two advisor teams in the Helmand 
Province of Afghanistan. His last assignment was the assistant 
chief of staff, G5, strategy and plans at Marine Corps Forces 
Central Command. We thank you for your many years of honorable 
service, Colonel Douglas.
    Dr. Jonathan Schroden is the director of the Center for 
Naval Analysis Countering Threats and Challenges Program, as 
well as the Center Special Operations Program. Dr. Schroden has 
supported various U.S. military commands and operations in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East and elsewhere.
    We thank all of the witnesses for being herein.
    I now recognize Ambassador Sales for 5 minutes to summarize 
your written testimony and your opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NATHAN A. SALES, FORMER AMBASSADOR-
         AT-LARGE AND COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

    Mr. Sales. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and 
Members of the subcommittee, it's a pleasure to be here.
    My testimony today will survey the growing terrorist 
threats in Afghanistan since the withdrawal 20 months ago. I'll 
discuss how hard it has become to collect intelligence in the 
country or to take action against terrorist groups that are 
active there and then highlight some implications for our 
homeland security.
    The threat environment in Afghanistan is bad and it's 
getting worse. CENTCOM Commander Kurilla recently warned that 
the local ISIS affiliate could carry out ``an external 
operation against U.S. or Western interests abroad in under 6 
months.'' When terrorists have safe haven, as they now do in 
Afghanistan, they're able to plot attacks far beyond their 
borders, including their ultimate goal of hitting the U.S. 
homeland. We learned this the hard way on 9/11. Two groups are 
particularly concerning, al-Qaeda and ISIS-K. Al-Qaeda is 
rebuilding under the Taliban's protection. Last year, the 
United Nations assessed that al-Qaeda ``has a safe haven under 
the Taliban and increased freedom of action'', and that al-
Qaeda now sees Afghanistan as a ``friendly environment to raise 
money, recruit, and train.''
    After the withdrawal, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri 
resurfaced in a Kabul safe house linked to the Taliban. The 
administration deserves credit for eliminating him in a drone 
strike last summer. But that was a tactical victory amid a 
broader strategic defeat. The key point is that the Taliban 
felt emboldened to welcome al-Qaeda's leader back to their 
capital, and al-Qaeda's leader felt it was safe enough there to 
come.
    ISIS-K is probably an even graver threat. While the group 
is the enemy of the Taliban, Afghanistan's new rulers lack the 
wherewithal to degrade it. In the 20 months since the Taliban 
took power, ISIS-K has committed an estimated 400 attacks 
across the country and even into neighboring Pakistan. More 
than 1,800 people have been killed and countless more injured.
    There's also a significant risk that state-of-the-art 
American military equipment could wind up in terrorists' hands. 
According to the special inspector general for Afghanistan 
reconstruction, the United States left behind nearly $7.2 
billion worth of vehicles, weapons, and other equipment. 
Terrorists in Afghanistan and beyond could easily get their 
hands on it. So could drug cartels, mercenaries, like Russia's 
Wagner group, and hostile foreign governments. The threats are 
compounded by the fact that Afghanistan no longer has 
professional counterterrorism forces capable of protecting its 
population. The Taliban certainly can't.
    During my time at the State Department, we invested 
significant resources in building elite police units to respond 
to attacks in real time. You may recall the diabolical ISIS-K 
attack on a maternity ward in Kabul in May 2020, when 24 people 
were gunned down, including mothers and newborn babies. It was 
one of our units that responded to that attack, neutralizing 
the terrorists and saving countless lives. After August 2021, 
those units ceased to exist.
    Just as the threats are growing more dire, the United 
States is now severely constrained in collecting intelligence 
and taking action. To dismantle a terrorist group what's needed 
is a sustained campaign to eliminate its leadership, its 
infrastructure, its foot soldiers, and so on. It simply isn't 
possible to defeat terrorists using an over-the-horizon 
strategy. With no presence on the ground, it's much harder to 
plot, it's much harder to monitor terrorist groups as they 
train and plot. With drones now required to fly in from distant 
bases hundreds of miles away, it's much harder to eliminate 
terrorists even when they can be found.
    The Zawahiri operation was a great success, but it's the 
exception that proves the rule. It remains the lone 
acknowledged strike in Afghanistan since the withdrawal. One 
drone strike in 20 months is not a viable strategy. Nor has the 
administration been able to make good on the President's 
promise to, ``hunt down those responsible for the Kabul airport 
bombing'', which killed 13 American service members and 170 
Afghans. America's fallen warriors and the families they left 
behind deserve better.
    The harms of the withdrawal will also have profound 
consequences for our homeland security. The traveler vetting 
systems that we've built since 9/11 are only as effective as 
the data that's fed into them. Since we can no longer count on 
robust data flows from Afghanistan, these systems will be less 
effective at flagging potential threats. This all comes at an 
ominous time for our border security. We've seen a dramatic 
spike in the number of people on CBP's terrorist watch list 
apprehended after crossing the Southern Border, as the Chairman 
has said. In 2022, there were 98, and so far of this year, 69.
    We also know that terrorists have long sought to exploit 
our Southern Border to carry out attacks in the homeland. In 
2011, the Iranian regime attempted to use a Mexican drug cartel 
to assassinate the Saudi ambassador here in Washington. A 
decade later, Tehran tried to use a Mexican national with ties 
to drug cartels to assassinate a former national security 
adviser.
    Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the 
subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to be here. 
I'd be happy to answer any questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sales follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Nathan A. Sales
                             April 18, 2023
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and Members of the 
subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be here today to discuss this 
important topic.
    My name is Nathan Sales. I am the founder and principal of Fillmore 
Global Strategies LLC, a consultancy that provides legal and strategic 
advisory services on matters at the intersection of law, policy, and 
diplomacy. I am also a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic 
Council, a member of the advisory board at the Vandenberg Coalition, 
and a senior advisor at the Soufan Group.
    From 2017 to 2021, I served at the U.S. Department of State as the 
ambassador-at-large and coordinator for counterterrorism. Concurrently, 
I was the under secretary of state for civilian security, democracy, 
and human rights (acting) as well as the special Presidential envoy to 
the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. I previously served at the U.S. 
Department of Homeland Security as deputy assistant secretary for 
policy, and at the U.S. Department of Justice as senior counsel in the 
Office of Legal Policy, where I worked on counterterrorism policy.
    I am here as a private citizen, but my testimony is informed by my 
experiences working on national security and counterterrorism for the 
U.S. Government over the course of two decades. Today I will describe 
the increasingly grave terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan 
after the administration's withdrawal from the country in August 2021. 
I will then discuss the difficulties the United States faces collecting 
intelligence in post-withdrawal Afghanistan and degrading the terrorist 
groups that now are able to operate more or less freely in the country. 
Finally, I will focus on some of the harmful consequences for our 
homeland security resulting from the withdrawal.
                                   i.
    The terrorist threat environment in Afghanistan has deteriorated 
dramatically since August 2021--and it is getting worse. Due to a 
combination of Taliban-provided safe haven, the Taliban's lack of 
counterterrorism capability, and the absence of sustained 
counterterrorism pressure from the United States, Afghanistan has 
become hospitable terrain for a variety of terrorist groups. As of 
today, the threat seems to be relatively contained within and around 
the country's borders, but that will not be true for long. According to 
CENTCOM commander General Michael ``Erik'' Kurilla, the local ISIS 
affiliate--ISIS Khorasan Province, or ISIS-K--could carry out ``an 
external operation against U.S. or Western interests abroad in under 6 
months with little to no warning.''\1\ When terrorists have sanctuary, 
as they now do in Afghanistan, they are able to plot and execute 
attacks abroad. The longer they enjoy safe haven, the greater the risk 
they will be able to strike far beyond their borders, eventually 
including their ultimate goal of hitting the U.S. homeland. We learned 
this lesson the hard way on September 11, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Quoted in Alexander Ward et al., Inside the GOP Foreign Policy 
War, Politico, Mar. 16, 2023, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/
national-security-daily/2023/03/16/inside-the-gop-foreign-policy-war-
00087374. General Kurilla assessed that it would be ``much harder'' for 
ISIS-K to attack the U.S. homeland in that time frame. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While Taliban-controlled Afghanistan is a permissive environment 
for terrorists in general, two groups are of particular concern: al-
Qaeda and ISIS-K.
    The Taliban and al-Qaeda have been allies for more than a quarter 
century, and al-Qaeda is now reconstituting itself in its historic safe 
haven. Enjoying Taliban sanctuary at the turn of the century, al-Qaeda 
was able to plot and execute a deadly series of attacks against the 
United States, including the August 1998 attacks on our embassies in 
Kenya and Tanzania, the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000, and, 
of course, the 9/11 attacks. While decades of U.S. counterterrorism 
pressure decimated core al-Qaeda, the group is now rebuilding under the 
Taliban's protection. Last year, the United Nations assessed that the 
Taliban ``remains close'' to al-Qaeda, that the terrorist group ``has a 
safe haven under the Taliban and increased freedom of action,'' and 
that al-Qaeda sees Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a ``friendly 
environment'' to raise money, recruit, and train.\2\ Al-Qaeda has never 
abandoned its goal of striking the ``far enemy''--i.e., committing 
attacks inside the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ United Nations, Thirteenth Report of the Analytical Support and 
Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2611 (2021) 
Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities 
Constituting a Threat to the Peace, Stability, and Security of 
Afghanistan at 3, 12 (May 26, 2022), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/333/77/PDF/N2233377.pdf?OpenElement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The continued partnership between the Taliban and al-Qaeda is 
perhaps best seen in the fact that, after the U.S. withdrawal, al-Qaeda 
leader Ayman al Zawahiri resurfaced in Afghanistan, living in a safe 
house associated with the Haqqani Network, a Taliban faction that 
maintains close ties to al-Qaeda and is itself a U.S.-designated 
Foreign Terrorist Organization. The safe house was located in the 
Shirpur district in the heart of Kabul, a prosperous neighborhood that 
is controlled by the Haqqanis and is just down the street from the 
former U.S. embassy.\3\ The administration deserves credit for 
eliminating Zawahiri in a July 2022 drone strike. But this episode may 
be best understood as a tactical victory amid a broader strategic 
defeat. The key takeaway is that the Taliban felt emboldened to welcome 
al-Qaeda's leader back to Kabul, and al-Qaeda's leader felt it was safe 
enough there to accept the offer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Shane Harris, Zawahiri Appeared on His Balcony. The CIA Was 
Ready to Kill Him., Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 2022, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/08/02/zawahiri-drone-
operation-kabul/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ISIS-K likely represents an even graver threat at present, though 
for different reasons. While the Taliban considers ISIS-K an enemy, 
Afghanistan's new rulers lack the wherewithal to meaningfully degrade 
the group. One of the most formidable ISIS branches, ISIS-K controls 
territory in eastern Afghanistan and, like al-Qaeda, aspires to carry 
out attacks across the region, in Europe, and ultimately in the United 
States.
    In the 20 months since the Taliban took power, ISIS-K has conducted 
a bloody campaign of bombings and other attacks across Afghanistan and 
even into neighboring Pakistan, seemingly at will. While firm numbers 
are hard to come by, it is estimated that, since August 2021, ISIS-K 
has committed nearly 400 attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan's Khyber 
Pakhtunkhwa region, with approximately 330 in the former and around 70 
in the latter. These numbers include the 379 attacks claimed by ISIS-K 
in its magazine al-Naba, plus an estimated 20 additional unclaimed 
attacks, including bombings of mosques and schools, assassinations, 
etc. Casualty counts are more difficult to assess but, since August 
2021, could be in the range of more than 1,800 killed and many more 
injured.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Data collected by the Islamabad, Pakistan-based research 
platform ``The Khorasan Diary'' in April 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    For instance, in September 2022, ISIS-K likely was responsible for 
a suicide bombing at an educational center in Kabul that killed 52 and 
injured dozens more, mostly young women and teenage girls who were 
there to take a practice college entrance exam.\5\ (The Taliban 
subsequently banned women and girls from universities, having 
previously banned them from high schools and middle schools.) A month 
earlier, on August 7, 2022, a likely ISIS-K attack in Kabul killed 120 
people celebrating the Shia holiday of Ashura.\6\ ISIS-K has also 
killed Americans. An ISIS-K suicide bomber carried out the August 26, 
2021, attack at Hamid Karzai International Airport, killing 13 U.S. 
service members and some 170 Afghan civilians who were desperately 
trying to escape Taliban misrule. In the days prior, Taliban fighters 
had released the bomber from detention at Bagram Air Base,\7\ along 
with as many as 5,000 other suspected terrorists.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Fazel Rahman Faizi, Death Toll in Last Week's Kabul School 
Blast Climbs to 52, AP, Oct. 3, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/
islamic-state-group-afghanistan-religion-taliban-suicide-bombings-
5a50c846bbbabf6f2bfa5e64d72d67c0.
    \6\ Weronika Strzyzynska, Hundreds of Hazaras Killed by ISKP Since 
Taliban Took Power, Say Rights Group, The Guardian, Sept. 6, 2022, 
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/sep/06/hundreds-of-
hazaras-shia-killed-iskp-islamic-state-khorasan-province-taliban-power-
human-rights-watch.
    \7\ Eric Schmitt & Helene Cooper, Lone ISIS Bomber Carried Out 
Attack at Kabul Airport, Pentagon Says, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2022, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/04/us/politics/kabul-airport-attack-
report.html.
    \8\ Oren Liebermann & Natasha Bertrand, ISIS-K Suicide Bomber Who 
Carried out Deadly Kabul Airport Attack Had Been Released from Prison 
Days Earlier, CNN, Oct. 6, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/06/
politics/kabul-airport-attacker-prison/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Many of ISIS-K's attacks have targeted Afghanistan's Hazara 
minority, a predominantly Shia community in a largely Sunni nation, in 
an apparent effort to inflame sectarian tensions. Beyond the 
intolerable bloodshed and risk of further instability in Afghanistan, 
ISIS-K's campaign raises the possibility that the Iranian regime might 
use the attacks as a pretext to intervene in the country, purportedly 
for the benefit of its Shia co-religionists.\9\ Similar interventions 
by the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism have left a trail of 
death and destruction stretching from Lebanon to Syria to Iraq to Yemen 
and beyond.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ See, e.g., Colin P. Clarke & Ariane M. Tabatabai, What Iran 
Wants in Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs, July 8, 2020, https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-07-08/what-iran-wants-
afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There is also a significant risk that state-of-the-art American 
military equipment could fall into terrorists' hands. According to the 
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, in its haste 
to leave Afghanistan by the White House's August 31, 2021 deadline, the 
military left behind nearly $7.2 billion worth of vehicles, weapons, 
and other gear. That includes:
   Over 40,000 Humvees, armored combat vehicles, and other 
        ground vehicles worth $4.13 billion;
   At least 78 aircraft worth $923.3 million;
   Over 300,000 machine guns, rifles, and other small arms 
        valued at $511.8 million;
   More than 1.5 million rounds of specialty munitions valued 
        at $48 million; and
   Night-vision goggles, biometric identification systems, and 
        other specialized equipment worth some $200 million.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Why 
the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed at 65, 66 (Feb. 2023), https://
www.sigar.mil/pdf/evaluations/SIGAR-23-16-IP.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Terrorists in Afghanistan and beyond could well gain access to this 
equipment. Nor would it be surprising if these arms end up being sold 
on the black market to drug cartels, mercenaries like Russia's Wagner 
group, or hostile foreign governments.
    These threats are compounded by the fact that Afghanistan no longer 
has professional counterterrorism forces able to protect its 
population. The Taliban is not capable of doing so, and the Afghan 
security services that the United States helped build over the years 
did not survive the withdrawal. During my time at the State Department, 
the Counterterrorism Bureau invested significant resources in training 
and equipping elite police units to respond to terrorist attacks in 
real time, and collect evidence for use in criminal trials or for 
intelligence purposes. You may recall the diabolical ISIS-K attack on a 
maternity ward in Kabul in May 2020, during which 24 people were gunned 
down in cold blood, including mothers and newborn babies. It was one of 
our units that responded to that incident, neutralizing the attackers 
and saving countless lives.\11\ After August 2021, these units ceased 
to exist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Nathan A. Sales, Counterterrorism in the Trump Administration 
and Beyond, Jan. 14, 2001, https://2017-2021.state.gov/
counterterrorism-in-the-trump-administration-and-beyond/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  ii.
    Just as the threat environment in Afghanistan is growing more dire, 
the United States finds itself severely constrained in collecting 
intelligence about terrorists in the country and taking meaningful 
action against them. Our ability to monitor terrorist threats in 
Afghanistan has been significantly degraded by the withdrawal, and we 
are no longer able to conduct a sustained kinetic campaign against 
groups active there.
    To dismantle a terrorist organization, or prevent a defeated one 
from rebuilding, all levels of the group must be subjected to a 
campaign of low intensity but persistent military force. One-off drone 
strikes are not enough. What's needed is a sustained effort to 
eliminate the group's leadership and infrastructure, its training 
camps, its foot soldiers, and so on. (To be sure, kinetic action alone 
cannot enduringly defeat a terrorist group. It must be accompanied by 
civilian-sector efforts including economic sanctions, criminal 
prosecutions, border security tools, and counter-radicalization 
programs, among others. Military force is necessary but not 
sufficient.) Such a kinetic campaign in turn depends on capabilities 
and resources that include drones and other strike assets to carry out 
operations against targets; local partner forces that U.S. operators 
can work by, with, and through; and exquisite intelligence collection 
capabilities. Effective counterterrorism operations do not, however, 
necessarily require extensive American ground forces. The United States 
dismantled ISIS in Iraq and Syria by supporting local partner forces 
with a relatively modest number of operators on the ground and 
overwhelming air power. We used a similar strategy to rout al-Qaeda in 
Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 before shifting to a 
more ambitious mission in the country and the heavier military 
footprint that came with it.
    When it comes to intelligence, counterterrorism operations 
typically rely on a combination of signals intelligence (SIGINT) to 
eavesdrop on terrorist communications; robust human intelligence 
(HUMINT) operations to penetrate terrorist networks; extensive use of 
ISR platforms (``intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance'' or, 
more colloquially, drones); and other sources and methods. These 
capabilities allow the United States to uncover plots, identify 
targets, and develop a ``pattern of life'' that enables the precise use 
of force to remove targets from the battlefield while reducing the risk 
of inadvertent harm to civilians to the greatest extent possible.
    The United States has lost a great deal of counterterrorism 
capability in Afghanistan, and a so-called ``over-the-horizon'' 
strategy--under which strike assets that are based hundreds of miles 
away fly occasional sorties into Afghanistan--is a poor substitute. 
Simply put, it is not possible to systematically degrade a terrorist 
group from over the horizon.
    Counterterrorism strikes depend on intelligence and, with no 
military or diplomatic presence on the ground in Afghanistan, it is far 
more difficult to monitor terrorist groups as they rebuild, train, and 
plot. And with U.S. drones now required to fly many hours round-trip 
from and to their bases in distant countries, leaving precious little 
time to loiter on station, it is far more difficult to eliminate 
terrorists even when they can be located. The killing of Ayman al 
Zawahiri was a great success, but it is the exception that proves the 
rule. To date, the Zawahiri operation remains the lone acknowledged 
counterterrorism strike in Afghanistan since August 2021. One drone 
strike in 20 months is not a viable counterterrorism strategy. No 
wonder some members of the national security community, believing over-
the-horizon to be a fantasy, have taken to disparaging it as ``over-
the-rainbow.''\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Jonathan Swan & Zachary Basu, Red Flags for Biden's ``Over-
the-Horizon'' Strategy, Axios, Sept. 12, 2021, https://www.axios.com/
2021/09/12/afghanistan-counterterrorism-over-horizon-biden.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The limits of over-the-horizon counterterrorism may be best 
illustrated by the fact that, nearly 2 years after the Kabul airport 
bombing, its perpetrators remain essentially at large. The day of the 
attack, President Biden promised the attackers ``[w]e will not forgive. 
We will not forget. We will hunt you down and make you pay.''\13\ 
Twenty months later, the administration has yet to make good on the 
President's threat, and part of the reason it has failed to do so is 
because it lacks the capability to do so. America's fallen warriors and 
the families they left behind deserve better.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Kevin Liptak, Biden to Kabul Attackers: ``We Will Hunt You 
Down and Make You Pay'', CNN, Aug. 26, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/
08/26/politics/biden-kabul-attack/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                                  iii.
    The harms from the administration's withdrawal from Afghanistan 
will not be limited to that unfortunate country. It will have profound 
consequences for the security of our homeland as well. With the United 
States no longer able to count on robust intelligence flows from 
Afghanistan, our traveler vetting and border security systems will be 
less effective at identifying possible threats. What happens in 
Afghanistan does not stay in Afghanistan.
    In the years after 9/11, the United States built a number of 
sophisticated systems to identify suspected terrorists and other 
potential threats attempting to enter the country. For example, Federal 
agencies use a variety of watch lists--such as a database of known or 
suspected terrorists (KSTs) and the no-fly list--to screen airline 
passengers, inbound international travelers, visa applicants, and 
others to assess whether they could be terrorists or otherwise pose a 
threat to our national security. The United States has signed dozens of 
agreements under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, or HSPD-6, 
to share terrorist watch list information with foreign partners. U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the State Department collect 
biometrics such as fingerprints from foreigners entering the United 
States and applying for visas, respectively, and check them against 
databases of terrorists, criminals, and other threats. And CBP uses its 
Automated Targeting System to analyze airline reservation data and 
other information to screen international travelers entering the 
country.
    These and other systems have proven extraordinarily effective at 
preventing another 9/11-scale attack on the homeland. But they are only 
as powerful as the data that is fed into them. For years, the United 
States has been able to count on extensive data flows from Afghanistan 
about terror suspects--captured enemy material and ``pocket litter'' 
such as thumb drives and mobile phones seized by U.S. special 
operations forces in counterterrorism raids, biometric data and other 
identifying information collected and shared by the Afghan government, 
and so on. But now, without a meaningful presence on the ground to 
enable unilateral collection and lacking a government partner able and 
willing to gather and share information with us, our vetting systems 
have lost some of the data that made them so effective.
    This comes at an inauspicious time for our border security. We have 
seen historic numbers of migrant encounters on our Southern Border in 
recent years,\14\ and terrorists could easily take advantage of this 
vulnerability. CBP has reported a dramatic spike in the number of 
individuals on its Terrorist Screening Dataset watch list who were 
apprehended after crossing the Southern Border: zero in fiscal year 
2019, 3 in fiscal year 2020, 15 in fiscal year 2021, 98 in fiscal year 
2022, and 69 so far in fiscal year 2023.\15\ And those are just the 
ones we know about. Furthermore, terrorist organizations have long 
sought to exploit vulnerabilities in our Southern Border to carry out 
attacks inside the United States. In 2011, the Iranian regime attempted 
to use a Mexican drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the 
United States by bombing a restaurant in Georgetown.\16\ In late 2021, 
Tehran planned to use a Mexican national with ties to drug cartels to 
assassinate former national security advisor John Bolton.\17\ I am not 
aware that al-Qaeda, ISIS-K, or other terrorists in Afghanistan 
similarly are currently plotting to attack the homeland by way of the 
Southern Border. But if Afghanistan-based terrorists do seek to conduct 
attacks inside our country in the future, it is safe to assume they 
will be aware of our border vulnerabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Southwest Land Border 
Encounters, Mar. 10, 2023, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/
southwest-land-border-encounters.
    \15\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Enforcement Statistics 
Fiscal Year 2023, Mar. 10, 2023, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/
cbp-enforcement-statistics. The Terrorist Screening Dataset ``is the 
U.S. Government's database that contains sensitive information on 
terrorist identities.'' It ``originated as the consolidated terrorist 
watchlist to house information on known or suspected terrorists (KSTs) 
but has evolved over the last decade to include additional individuals 
who represent a potential threat to the United States, including known 
affiliates of watchlisted individuals.'' Id.
    \16\ Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Iranians Accused of a Plot to 
Kill Saudis' U.S. Envoy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2011, https://
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-
saudi-envoy.html.
    \17\ Nick Schifrin, Iranian Man Charged for Trying to Assassinate 
Former National Security Adviser John Bolton, PBS, Aug. 10, 2022, 
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/iranian-man-charged-for-trying-to-
assassinate-former-national-security-adviser-john-bolton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Members of the subcommittee, 
thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would 
be happy to answer any questions you might have.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ambassador Sales.
    I now recognize Ms. Ledeen for your opening statement of 5 
minutes.

    STATEMENT OF SIMONE A. LEDEEN, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT 
            SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST

    Ms. Ledeen. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today.
    My experience with the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan 
began when I started receiving requests for assistance from 
people trying to help contacts on the ground. The stories of 
chaos that I was hearing did not align with the picture that 
the U.S. Government was trying to paint about the withdrawal. I 
was invited to join a group chat that included military members 
and individuals with experience in the intelligence community. 
The chat allowed us to piece information together, forming a 
picture of the reality on the ground so we could help vetted 
people leave.
    It was a spontaneous volunteer effort, the scope of which 
we did not initially comprehend. Our strategy was to find ways 
for individuals who had the appropriate documentation to gain 
entry to the airport with the assistance of U.S. service 
members who were participating in the evacuation. This was 
challenging, with thousands of people crowding the airport 
perimeter. People we helped included American citizens, legal 
permanent residents, interpreters, intelligence assets, and 
some Afghan commandos. Yet, as the messages rolled in, I 
wondered, how did we get to the point where volunteers were 
offering more support to evacuees than our own Government?
    Today, I'd like to give a few examples from our group's 
involvement which demonstrate that after 20 years of fighting, 
everything quickly collapsed.
    We could not identify who was running the airport. We were 
contacted by civilian volunteers, NGO's, universities, and 
corporate entities who had planes either on the ground or en 
route to evacuate people. However, these planes could not get 
in contact with anyone, nor could their passengers access the 
gate. Outside the airport gates the United States failed to 
create a safe organized process to identify individuals who 
should have been permitted entry. The U.S. Government 
instructed American citizens to shelter in place because the 
Taliban-controlled entry to the city and the airport, beating 
people, including Americans, and burning their exit documents. 
When the State Department said the airport was secure, we knew 
this was wrong. If the airport was safe, why tell American 
citizens to hide?
    For every one group that made it through, it seemed like 10 
did not. Among those we helped was an Afghan woman who had 
worked with U.S. intelligence on a clandestine platform. With 
the assistance of a Marine who ran half-an-hour across the 
airport to find her, she and her family waded through a canal 
of human waste to get inside the airport and are safe today.
    On August 25, with virtual assistance from our team, the 
heroic service members on the ground rescued 25 interpreters 
and former contract employees of a U.S. intelligence agency, 
including a double amputee who came on foot with his family. 
Our group also supported the evacuation of high-risk Afghans 
who had assisted the FBI. That evening 11 buses filled with 
evacuees could not enter the airport, and an urgent security 
alert advised U.S. citizens to avoid the airport gates. Despite 
efforts to contact authorities, American citizens were left 
stranded outside the gates. Some gained access only after 
intervention from higher-level officials. Many of the Afghans 
were denied entry and, to my knowledge, never made it out.
    A suicide bomber attacked Abbey Gate, killing 13 American 
service members and grievously wounding dozens more. Over 100 
Afghans were murdered, including the young son of an 
interpreter who we had been helping moments earlier. As the 
airport gates were sealed shut, requests for our help continued 
for 300 orphans who were dispersed in the blast, music 
students, and religious and ethnic minorities. They did not 
make it inside, and I do not know what happened to any of them.
    Only after the Taliban had captured Kabul and Americans 
were taken hostage did President Biden finally address the 
Nation. The Taliban immediately asserted its power, hunting our 
Afghan allies house to house. Some members of our group 
received torture and murder videos of their friends and former 
colleagues sent by the Taliban from their own victims' phones. 
Our Afghan allies who did not make it out now live in constant 
fear, many in safe houses or in third countries like Pakistan 
and Iran, where they are recruited by their military and 
intelligence services to learn what they know, learn what we 
had taught them. In the country where Americans have fought and 
died for 2 decades, ISIS-Khorasan has regained immense strength 
and the Taliban are the best-armed terrorist group the world 
has ever known. Afghanistan is once again a terrorist safe 
haven.
    Many of us remember that what happens in Afghanistan, 
unfortunately, does not stay there. In fiscal year 2022, 98 
people on our terrorist watch list crossed over our Southern 
Border that we know of, and 324 individuals evacuated from 
Afghanistan were allowed to enter the United States despite 
appearing on the Defense Department's biometrically-enabled 
watch list. How many more have entered undetected? Our 
warfighters went into harm's way to keep us safe, but today, 
our leaders act as if the war never happened. We must hold 
those responsible for the failed Afghanistan withdrawal 
accountable.
    In my written testimony, I've called for policies that 
would provide greater care to our veterans who are reeling from 
seeing their hard-fought gains abandoned. I've also suggested 
ways to improve the special immigration visa process. Moreover, 
I think there should be an official effort to document the 
critical work done by volunteer groups during the evacuation so 
that we can model their successes in future conflict 
environments.
    Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Ledeen follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Simone A. Ledeen
                             April 18, 2023
                            i. introduction
    Chairman Green, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking 
Member Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank 
you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Simone 
Ledeen. I am currently a senior visiting fellow at the Krach Institute 
for Tech Diplomacy, a bipartisan initiative affiliated with Purdue 
University, and managing director at Vantage ROI. I previously served 
as deputy assistant secretary of defense (DASD) for the Middle East. 
Prior to that I was principal director and acting deputy assistant 
secretary for special operations and combating terrorism, where I was 
responsible for defense policy on counterterrorism activities, as well 
as military information support operations, irregular warfare, direct 
action, sensitive special operations, and personnel recovery/hostage 
issues.
    Like many others, after the terrorist attacks on September 11, 
2001, I felt moved to serve our country. A family friend was on 
American Airlines Flight 77, which was hijacked by al-Qaeda operatives 
and crashed into the Pentagon. I served in Iraq from 2003-2004, and 
then in Afghanistan in 2005. In Afghanistan, I served alongside the 
military in a non-combat role, deploying there for most of 2005 and 
again from 2009-2010 as the senior treasury representative to NATO's 
International Security Assistance Force. Both of my brothers served in 
the Marine Corps--one in Iraq and the other in Afghanistan.
          ii. experience with the withdrawal from afghanistan
    My experience with the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan unfolded 
from my own home when I began receiving real-time requests for 
assistance from people on the ground in Afghanistan. The stories of 
chaos that I was hearing did not align with the picture that the U.S. 
Government was trying to publicly paint about the withdrawal.
    On August 19, 2021, a dear friend contacted me. She was looking to 
help an Afghan family trapped outside the Kabul airport. The father had 
served as an interpreter with our Special Forces. He was outside the 
airport at the northwest gate with two kids and an injured, pregnant 
wife. Upon learning this, I immediately reached out to people in my 
network who I thought might know what to do. I was invited to join a 
group chat that included active and retired military members and 
individuals with experience in the intelligence community. Without 
introduction, everyone in the chat started sharing information, which 
allowed us to piece bits of information together that we individually 
received to form a more robust picture of the reality on the ground, 
and help vetted, qualified people safely exit the country.
    It was a spontaneous volunteer effort, the scope of which we did 
not initially comprehend. Our strategy from the outset was to find ways 
for at-risk individuals who had the appropriate documentation, and in 
some cases were known by members of our group, to gain entry with the 
assistance of U.S. service members who manned the gates and fences at 
the airport. This was challenging since there were thousands of people 
crowding the airport perimeter. We had group members who were 
communicating with teams on the ground. We also had (over time) 
telephone numbers for individual Marines. Once a service member made 
physical contact with an at-risk group and moved them inside, we 
focused on ensuring that they were manifested on a flight to a safe 
destination.
    Over time we helped more and more people--American citizens, legal 
permanent residents, interpreters, intelligence assets, and some Afghan 
Commandos--leave. Yet, as the messages rolled in, I had to wonder--
where was the U.S. Government? The urgent, time-sensitive information 
we sent to the State Department did not receive a response. The U.S. 
Government did not seem to have a full accounting of the number of 
people that needed to leave. How did we get to the point where 
volunteers in a group chat were offering more resources and support to 
evacuees than our own Government?
    More than ever, I believe the deaths of our 13 service members, in 
addition to catastrophic injuries sustained by the dozens of young men 
and women at Abbey Gate, were avoidable and should never have happened. 
Our Government's failure to secure the safety of our own citizens and 
those who risked their lives for us led to the most disgraceful and 
shameful national security crisis in our lifetime. To this date, nobody 
has been held accountable.
             iii. observations about the chaotic withdrawal
    Based on our group's involvement in the evacuation and related 
activities, I have some insights into the chaotic withdrawal that are 
likely shared by others who were involved in these efforts. Today, I'd 
like to give a few examples, which demonstrate that, after 20 years of 
fighting, everything quickly collapsed despite nearly 15 years of 
withdrawal planning across three administrations. Fundamentally, the 
prior plans did not anticipate an arbitrarily imposed troop cap that 
negated our ability to make use of Bagram Air Base. This made previous 
plans obsolete, and it appeared our military planners had to start from 
scratch at the eleventh hour with impossible restrictions. This led to 
a number of issues:
   As we tried to help people flee, we could not identify who 
        was running the airport. We were contacted by many groups, 
        including civilian volunteers, NGO's, universities, and 
        corporate entities who had planes either on the ground or 
        enroute to assist in evacuating people. However, these planes 
        could not get in contact with anyone from the United States or 
        any government on the airfield, nor could their passengers 
        access the gate. For example, one group was trying to reach a 
        Ukrainian plane that had been sitting on the tarmac for several 
        days. The group reported that the plane was for the Ukrainian 
        Special Operations Forces (SOF), who had been waiting at the 
        gate, but the soldiers said that nobody would let them in, even 
        though they were manifested on the plane. This was the first of 
        many times we would hear of groups that were manifested on 
        flights not being able to access the airport. Until the final 
        days, many chartered planes that were able to land in Kabul 
        left nearly empty because the people who needed to leave on 
        them could not get inside the airport. Outside the airport 
        gates, the area was not secured for Americans waiting to enter 
        and the United States failed to create an organized process to 
        identify individuals who should have been permitted entry. For 
        example, members of our group organized night operations for 
        American citizens to climb ladders to leap over airport fences. 
        To further complicate the situation, the United States' 
        abandonment of Bagram Air Base meant that there was no air 
        traffic control in place other than for military planes.
   On August 17, the U.S. Government instructed American 
        citizens in Afghanistan to shelter in place and not attempt to 
        access the airport.\1\ With this instruction, the U.S. 
        Government was telling its own citizens to hide. In the group 
        chat, we recognized that this was because the Taliban--the 
        force that the United States had been fighting for 20 years--
        controlled entry to the city and to the airport itself. The 
        Taliban had started targeting those waiting to enter the 
        airport, beating people, and burning their documents, which 
        they needed to depart the country. So when the State Department 
        stated that the airport was secure, we knew this was wrong.\2\ 
        If the airport was safe, why did the U.S. Government tell 
        American citizens to hide?
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    \1\ Adam Shaw, State Dept tells Americans in Afghanistan to 
'shelter in place' until they hear from embassy, FOX NEWS (Aug. 17, 
2021), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/state-dept-americans-
afghanistan-shelter-in-place.
    \2\ Ned Price, State Dep't. Press Briefing, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE 
(Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-
briefing-august-17-2021/.
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   The Taliban quickly took back control and began exercising 
        their power. Videos circulated in our chat showed the Taliban 
        firing weapons outside of the airport. Wounded civilians could 
        be seen lying on the ground and covered in blood. These videos 
        were filmed by the people we were attempting to help escape. At 
        one point, we were alerted that there was an American family 
        with a sign that said, ``we are all here.'' They were stranded 
        outside Abbey Gate. Our teammates rallied cars to pick them up, 
        but the family got spooked by the Taliban and went back to 
        their residence. An image of the Taliban's Iwo Jima reenactment 
        with them kitted up in American gear also surfaced, which 
        enraged us.\3\
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    \3\ Jon Simkins, Taliban photo appears to mock Iwo Jima flag 
raising in latest propaganda push, MARINE CORPS TIMES (Aug. 21, 2021), 
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/off-duty/military-culture/2021/08/21/
taliban-photo-appears-to-mock-iwo-jima-flag-raising-in-latest-
propaganda-push/.
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   The State Department also instructed at-risk Americans to go 
        to the Ministry of Interior Headquarters in Kabul on August 21. 
        Later, the Taliban seized 20 of these U.S. citizens' passports 
        and held their owners hostage, though these Americans were 
        eventually recovered.\4\ The following night, the State 
        Department scheduled another pickup at the Ministry of 
        Interior, with U.S. military personnel ready to meet and escort 
        the Americans to the Kabul Airport. These efforts continued for 
        several days, but required U.S. citizens and their families to 
        clear a Taliban checkpoint where they were harassed and 
        sometimes beaten, contrary to the terms agreed to by our 
        Government. There were no repercussions for this violation and 
        humiliation of our citizens. Further, U.S. citizens' spouses 
        and minor children were permitted to depart via this method, 
        but not their extended family. Our citizens were forced to 
        decide whether to leave and effectively abandon parents and 
        adult children or stay and face the new Taliban way of life. In 
        addition, we know of multiple legal permanent residents who 
        should have been evacuated, but were turned away by the Taliban 
        because they did not possess the blue U.S. passport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Hollie McKay, Taliban seizing Afghan-American's U.S. passports 
outside Kabul airport, N.Y. POST (Aug. 20, 2021), https://nypost.com/
2021/08/20/taliban-seizing-afghan-americans-us-passports-outside-
airport/.
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   On August 23, as our team faced immense challenges assisting 
        U.S. citizens and high-risk Afghans who needed to gain access 
        to the airport, we continued to press forward. For every one 
        group that made it through, it seemed like 10 did not. Among 
        those we were helping that day was an Afghan woman who had 
        worked with U.S. intelligence on a clandestine platform. With 
        the assistance of a Marine who ran across the airport to find 
        her, she and her family waded through a canal of human waste to 
        get inside the airport and are safe today, far away from 
        Afghanistan. We shared photos of ``our'' families as they 
        boarded flights.
   On August 24, U.S. officials on the ground announced they 
        would no longer accept Afghan locals and issued a final call 
        for American citizens to report to the airport. We learned 
        later that a deal was made with the Taliban to expedite 
        withdrawal by August 31. The White House claimed they had 
        contacted all American citizens, but many Americans we were 
        trying to help had never heard from anyone from our Government. 
        As the State Department screened individuals at the airport, 
        they began turning away some Special Immigrant Visa (SIV) 
        recipients and high-risk Afghans. Once they were sent back 
        outside the airport, they faced certain death.
   On August 25, the team managed to rescue 25 interpreters and 
        former contract employees of a U.S. intelligence agency, 
        including a double amputee who walked to Kabul with his family. 
        That day, our group also supported the evacuation of high-risk 
        Afghans who had assisted the FBI and the U.S. Treasury 
        Department. We received reports from several American citizens 
        and high-risk Afghans who struggled to reach the airport due to 
        Taliban checkpoints, as well as conflicting information from 
        the U.S. Government. Some families, including U.S. citizens, 
        were beaten by the Taliban while attempting to enter the 
        airport. That evening, 11 buses filled with American citizens 
        and high-risk Afghans could not gain entry to the airport, and 
        an urgent security alert advised U.S. citizens to avoid the 
        airport gates.\5\ Despite multiple efforts to contact relevant 
        authorities, American citizens were left stranded outside the 
        closed gates, with some eventually gaining access only after 
        intervention from higher-level officials. Many of the high-risk 
        Afghans were denied entry, and to my knowledge never made it 
        out.
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    \5\ Security Alert, U.S. Embassy Kabul (Aug. 25, 2021), https://
af.usembassy.gov/security-alert-embassy-kabul-afghanistan-august-25-
2021/.
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   With imminent threats reported at multiple gates, a suicide 
        bomber attacked Abbey Gate, resulting in 13 Americans killed 
        and dozens grievously wounded.\6\ Over a hundred Afghans were 
        murdered, including the young son of one of the interpreters we 
        had been trying to assist. As gates were being sealed shut, 
        requests for help continued to pour in for 300 orphans and 
        other large convoys, including music school students, and 
        religious and ethnic minorities who had all been left stranded 
        after the blast. Although we were distraught and angry, our 
        team of volunteers continued working to find alternative ways 
        to evacuate people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Matthieu Aikins, et al., Suicide Bombers in Kabul Kill Dozens, 
Including 13 U.S. Troops, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/08/26/world/asia/kabul-airport-bombing.html.
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   Cleared data-science professionals within our group created 
        and refined a tool we used to deconflict manifests and track 
        who was leaving and where they went. As days passed, they met 
        with leaders at U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) who 
        were so impressed with this tool that they integrated it into 
        their own efforts. By the evacuation's conclusion, we had 
        tracked 7,000 evacuees through our own efforts--including 1,600 
        American citizens and 3,000 SIVs--and over 41,000 in 
        partnership with SOCOM. While these figures certainly do not 
        cover everyone who left, including on flights organized by 
        other countries, our data suggest that the administration's 
        estimate of the number of evacuees who departed via the 
        airport--124,000--is likely inaccurate and overstates the total 
        number of evacuees.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan at 5, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 6, 
2023), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/US-
Withdrawal-from-Afghanistan.pdf.
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   There are many examples of quiet but Herculean effort in 
        those final days--Afghans left behind who were still working to 
        properly dispose of some of the most sensitive data that 
        remained with our Afghan contractors. Many databases with 
        millions of records nearly got left behind, but for the 
        incredible risks by a few noble warriors who saved both 
        themselves and the data they smuggled out.
   Intelligence tools had been removed too quickly and too 
        completely from Afghanistan. Following the catastrophic deaths 
        of the 13 service members during the withdrawal, U.S. Central 
        Command (CENTCOM) executed a strike based on bad intelligence 
        that resulted in civilian deaths. Chairman Mark Milley defended 
        the strike, calling it ``righteous.''\8\ But CENTCOM had pulled 
        all of its intelligence collection tools out of Afghanistan 
        already and incredibly said they were relying on the Taliban--a 
        force we had been fighting for 20 years--for force protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Alex Horton, et al., Botched drone strike that killed 10 
civilians in Kabul was not a result of criminal negligence, Pentagon 
says, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/2021/11/03/kabul-drone-strike-inspector-general-
report/.
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   Even basic essentials like food and water were forgotten. 
        The situation outside the airport grew so desperate that 
        inbound aircraft were asked to bring food and water into the 
        country.
   It was only after the Taliban had captured Kabul and 
        Americans were taken hostage that President Biden finally 
        addressed the situation.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in 
Afghanistan, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 31, 2021), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-
by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/.
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                      iv. resurgence of terrorism
    The Taliban wasted no time in asserting its power, and retribution 
was swift. The Talibs placed a high price on our Afghan partners' 
heads. Through various means, they quickly identified who had been 
working with United States and hunted those individuals down--going 
house to house to find them.\10\ On our watch, they became the most 
well-armed terrorist group the world has ever seen. I speak on behalf 
of many when I say we cannot forget our Afghan allies who did not make 
it out of Afghanistan during the withdrawal. They live in constant fear 
that the Taliban will harm them or their families. Some have escaped to 
Pakistan, Iran, and other countries, and have been recruited by their 
militaries and intelligence agencies. They have been forced to teach 
our tactics and methods to our enemies. Some may even be fighting for 
the Russians in Ukraine.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Tyler O'Neil and Teny Sahakian, Taliban commit `house-to-house 
executions' in Kabul after US exit as chilling audio demonstrates 
Afghans' fear, FOX NEWS (Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.foxnews.com/world/
taliban-kabul-executions-afghanistan-gunshots-audio.
    \11\ Zheela Noori and Najib Ahmadyar, Former US-Trained Afghan 
Commandos Recruited by Russia, Iran, VOICE OF AM. (Nov. 7, 2022), 
https://www.voanews.com/a/former-us-trained-afghan-commandos-recruited-
by-russia-iran-/6821028.html.
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    To give you a sense for who is leading the Taliban today, 4 of the 
5 ex-Guantanamo Bay detainees exchanged for Bowe Bergdahl in 2014 have 
senior positions in the Taliban's resurrected Islamic Emirate of 
Afghanistan.\12\ The Minister of Interior is Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is 
very close with al-Qaeda.\13\ Haqqani has planned multiple operations 
that have resulted in the deaths of American soldiers and civilians. He 
is wanted by the United States and there is a $10 million bounty on his 
head.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Samuel Chamberlain, Four Taliban members swapped for Bowe 
Bergdahl now in Afghan government, N.Y. POST (Sept. 7, 2021), https://
nypost.com/2021/09/07/four-taliban-members-swapped-for-bowe-bergdahl-
now-in-afghan-government/.
    \13\ Peter Bergen, He's on the FBI's most-wanted list and is now a 
key member of the Taliban's new government, CNN (Sept. 9, 2021), 
https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/09/opinions/haqqani-taliban-government-
afghanistan-bergen/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    ISIS-Khorasan has also regained immense strength. Prior to the 
withdrawal, the United States had crushed ISIS-Khorasan and imprisoned 
its few surviving members in the Pol-e-Charkhi prison. After the 
collapse of the Afghan government, in one of their first acts, the 
Taliban released those terrorist prisoners.\14\ I'm not the only one 
ringing the alarm bell on the reemergence of the threat ISIS-Khorasan 
once again poses. CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla recently 
testified that ISIS-Khorasan would be able to launch attacks against 
Western interests outside of Afghanistan in less than 6 months with 
little to no warning.\15\ Yet, our political leaders have remained 
silent, seemingly ignoring the resurgence of ISIS-Khorasan and our 
inability to combat this threat now that we have abandoned our allies 
and have no persistent intelligence collection capabilities there or in 
neighboring countries since the withdrawal. Afghanistan has become an 
ISIS-Khorasan playground. Apparently, we have not learned the lesson 
that what happens in Afghanistan does not stay in Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ Kelly Laco, Pentagon says `thousands' of ISIS-K prisoners 
released by Taliban, FOX NEWS (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.foxnews.com/
politics/pentagon-thousands-isis-prisoners-released-taliban.
    \15\ See Gen. Michael ``Erik'' Kurilla, Statement for the Record 
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of US Central 
Command at 3, 10 (Mar. 13, 2023), https://af.usembassy.gov/security-
alert-u-s-embassy-kabul-afghanistan-august-28-2021/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the withdrawal has turned Afghanistan back into a terrorist 
breeding ground, arguably on track to exceed its pre-September 11 
status, we must be mindful of terrorists who have already entered our 
country. In fiscal year 2022, 98 people on our terrorist watch list 
crossed over our Southern Border that we know of.\16\ With 
unprecedented overland immigration, many individuals have been entering 
the country on foot and avoiding detection. This is a concerning 
development. In the initial airlifts out of Kabul, U.S. Government 
officials did not properly vet all the Afghans who were evacuated. A 
Department of Defense whistleblower has alleged that 324 individuals 
evacuated from Afghanistan were allowed to enter the United States 
despite appearing on the Defense Department's Biometrically Enabled 
Watchlist (BEWL).\17\ This, while thousands of vetted Afghans remained 
trapped and unable to evacuate. Indeed, there are many videos 
circulating on-line and elsewhere of torture and murder of our Afghan 
allies since August 2021. In addition to these horrific and violent 
acts, this situation has caused deep and continuing moral injury to our 
veterans and civilians who served.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Anna Giaritelli, Nearly 100 FBI terror watchlist suspects 
nabbed at southern border WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 25, 2022), https://
www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/nearly-100-
fbi-terror-watch-list-suspects-caught-southern-border.
    \17\ Alayna Treene, Scoop: Pentagon watchdog to open review into 
Afghanistan whistleblower claims, AXIOS (Sep. 8, 2022), https://
www.axios.com/2022/09/08/defense-department-inspector-general-
afghanistan-withdrawal.
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                 v. accountability and recommendations
    Our warfighters voluntarily went into harm's way to keep our 
country safe. Many are alive today because of individual Afghans who 
sacrificed for them. Today, our institutional leaders act as if the war 
and our withdrawal didn't happen, and we are just meant to move on. 
Many veterans cannot move on without accountability. We must hold those 
responsible for the failed Afghanistan withdrawal accountable for their 
decisions. While the withdrawal (and timing) was fundamentally a policy 
decision made by the Commander-in-Chief, military leaders and senior 
Government officials across multiple administrations' departments and 
agencies need to tell our Nation the truth about what led to the chaos, 
rather than continue to rely on career-preserving talking points.
    Moreover, when the U.S. Government supported the Afghan civilian 
leadership, the civilian leaders not only enriched themselves but they 
also funded the Taliban through bribes, contracts with front companies 
and subcontractors and ransom payments.\18\ With few exceptions, the 
U.S. Government looked the other way. We knew this for a decade and 
although changes were made to vetting contractors and subcontractors, 
this situation continued. For a long time, politicians and military 
leaders also issued glowing statements about the progress the Afghan 
National Security Forces were making, which were at odds with the 
intelligence assessments produced at the same time. It is not too late 
for the long-needed reckoning to make sure this never happens again.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ U.S. Special Inspector Gen. for Afg. Reconstruction, 
Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in 
Afghanistan, SIGAR 16-58-LL (Sept. 2016), https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/
lessonslearned/SIGAR-16-58-LL.pdf.
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    Many veterans and civilians who have served have gotten involved in 
resettlement to help address the moral injury they have sustained. Our 
Government can help with this:
    1. The Government should consider establishing a mechanism for 
        direct verification of SIVs that worked under Classified 
        contracts. Over 2 years have passed and this is still not in 
        place. The Government should create a mechanism for DoD to 
        communicate directly with the State Department to verify Afghan 
        employment under Classified contracts. The entire system for 
        employment verification (the entire basis for visa approval) is 
        left to civilian contractors, many of whom dissolved in the 
        lead-up to August 2021 and no longer exist. The Department of 
        Defense has not been held accountable for the local nationals 
        contracted under their employment who continue to bounce 
        between safe houses if they have not fled to third countries.
    2. Consider authorizing SIV eligibility for Afghans who were 
        injured while serving the USG before their 1 year of service 
        eligibility. Currently, the Afghan Allies Protection Act is 
        rigid in the time of service required to be eligible for an 
        SIV.\19\ The result is that an Afghan could have dutifully 
        served for 340 days and have been traumatically injured in 
        combat alongside his American compatriots, but he is ineligible 
        for an SIV because he is a month short of the requirement.
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    \19\ See Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8,  
602(b)(2)(A)(ii), 123 Stat. 524, 807 (2009).
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    3. We must take care of our veterans. The withdrawal was an 
        emotional time for many of our veterans, who careened back and 
        forth between grief and rage. To many, it has seemed like 
        America does not care about the sacrifices they made on their 
        behalf. The ballooning mental health crisis among the veteran 
        population speaks to this devastation. This chaotic withdrawal 
        has significantly added to our military's current recruitment 
        problem. Some veterans I know, all of whom come from military 
        families, have stopped encouraging or are even preventing 
        family members from signing up. Many veterans have been 
        involved in the resettlement process with Afghans to help 
        address the moral injury the veterans have sustained. Our 
        Government has the resources to help with this process and 
        should not wait to assist.
    4. Before too much more time passes, there must be an official 
        effort to document the actions of these volunteer groups--
        specifically, in order to capture successes and what was 
        accomplished with limited resources in a very short period of 
        time. This should include the data architecture created. We 
        could use this as a model of how to design a holistic system on 
        the fly and inside of a dynamic, asymmetric threat environment 
        in a constrained time frame.
    5. In the event of a future overseas conflict, the U.S. Government 
        could maintain a central database of SIV-eligible employees. 
        There could be a requirement for the employing office to upload 
        information verifying employment at the time an employee 
        becomes eligible for SIV.
    With these new policies and processes in place, we can reassure our 
allies, support our veterans, ensure that troops on the ground will be 
able to receive the support they need from local communities in the 
future, and--most importantly--avoid another catastrophic withdrawal in 
the future. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and I look 
forward to your questions.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ms. Ledeen.
    The Chair now recognizes Colonel Douglas for his opening 
statement of 5 minutes.

  STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. DOUGLAS, COLONEL (RET.), UNITED 
                      STATES MARINE CORPS

    Mr. Douglas. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, 
and committee Members, thank you for this opportunity to 
testify before you today. My testimony is based on my 
experience as a combat veteran, my perspective on our efforts 
in Afghanistan, and my reaction to the U.S. withdrawal and 
evacuation, which are sometimes confused as the same event, but 
were actually two separate, distinct activities.
    I've served our country as a Marine infantry officer for 
over 31 years in an active and reserve capacity. In 1995, I 
left active service, began a law enforcement career, and 
entered the Marine Corps Reserve.
    I assumed command of my first infantry company a month 
after 9/11, 2001. Like many Americans, I wanted to serve my 
country and pursue those responsible for the attack. President 
Bush stated, we will not waiver, we will not tire, we will not 
falter, and we will not fail. Peace and freedom will prevail. 
The unprovoked attacks on America and these words remained my 
reason to serve.
    I've had the honor and privilege of leading Marines for 5 
tours in combat operations since 9/11. I led Marines in combat 
operations in Iraq in 2003 and 2005 as a rifle company 
commander. I returned to Iraq leading an advisor team from 2015 
through 2016 that transitioned into a task force responsible 
for advising and assisting Iraqi security forces during 
Operation Inherent Resolve and the pivotal Ramadi counter-
attack against ISIS. I also led two advisors teams in Helmand 
Province, Afghanistan, from 2013 to 2014 and again in 2018. My 
last assignment was as the assistant chief of staff, G5, 
strategy and plans at Marine Corps Forces Central Command in 
Tampa, Florida.
    While serving in this capacity, although I did not return 
to Afghanistan to participate in the evacuation, I facilitated 
evacuation planning efforts within the command and traveled to 
Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, to reinstate and lead the Marine 
Corps coordination element responsible for the processing and 
assisting of more than 12,000 Afghan evacuees as they fled 
Afghanistan.
    Reflecting on the current state of Afghanistan, many U.S. 
service members, some who've served multiple tours in 
Afghanistan, wonder if their efforts, service, and individual 
sacrifices were worth the cost. While this may better be 
decided by historians in the future, I can confidently say that 
for 20 years, the sacrifices of our service members and their 
families have made a difference in the lives of our fellow 
Americans and our counterparts. Working with our Afghan and 
coalition partners, we denied terrorists the ability to plan, 
coordinate, and execute attacks on our homeland from the 
ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan. We also brought hope, growth, 
and prosperity to many Afghan people. The stability we provided 
for 20 years wasn't perfect, it was always tenuous, still, it 
contrasts dramatically with the previous and current state of 
Afghanistan under Taliban rule, as it harbors terrorists, 
remains rampantly corrupt, and dramatically reverses the rights 
of women and girls with medieval-style rules.
    Stability crumbled and the final days of our Afghan 
campaign were chaotic. The culminating event was the loss of 13 
service members, more than 170 Afghan evacuees, and an untold 
number of physical and moral injuries. My participation rapidly 
turned from assistance with the evacuation to the assignment as 
the lead Marine conducting the Abbey Gate investigation.
    To put our exit in perspective, the Soviet Union occupied 
Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. The Soviets worked with the 
government and the Mujahideen, they modified time lines, 
granted extensions, and maintained at least one infantry 
division in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as an emergency QRF in 
case of rapid deterioration. Once Soviet assistance ended, 
Afghanistan fell in 1992. The Soviet Union withdrawal from 
Afghanistan contrasted sharply with the U.S. departure from 
Afghanistan in 2021. Many of us believed the negotiated time 
line would be delayed because the Taliban failed to honor or 
operate within the parameters of the condition-based Doha 
Agreement. As early as April, I and presumably many of our 
Afghan partners, were in disbelief by the announcement of the 
withdrawal date. This reduced our U.S. force posture and boots 
on the ground to nearly zero, with immense pressure to keep the 
number extremely low while preparing the high likelihood of a 
non-combatant evacuation under some of the most trying 
conditions in history.
    I thought back to President Bush's quote, ultimately, peace 
and freedom did not prevail. The final days of our Afghan 
campaign came with extreme consequences. I remember why we 
fought there, and I'd like to think my brothers and sisters in 
arms who fought there remember as well. In the words of the 
CENTCOM Commander in a paper published in the Joint Force in 
2012, we fought to protect the values that grew from the 
Enlightenment. We fought to give hope to those who have lived 
under desperate conditions and to safeguard newfound freedoms 
and values based on human rights that must be matured and 
furthered. Our fight aimed to ensure governments and their 
citizens are fully able to fulfill their social contracts, 
freely addressing social injustices and responding swiftly to 
curb oppressive actors. Finally, we fought knowing that the 
world prospers when we succeed in restoring human rights and 
protecting human dignity.
    Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you again for 
allowing me to speak. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Douglas follows:]
              Prepared Statement of Christopher J. Douglas
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and committee Members, 
thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today. My 
testimony is based on my experience as a combat veteran, my perspective 
on our efforts in Afghanistan, and my reaction to the U.S. withdrawal 
and evacuation, which are sometimes confused as the same event but were 
actually two separate, distinct activities.
    I have served our country as a Marine Infantry Officer for over 31 
years in an active and reserve capacity. In 1995, I left active 
service, began a law enforcement career, and entered the Marine Corps 
Reserve. I assumed command of my first infantry company the month after 
9.11.2001. Like many Americans, I wanted to serve my country and pursue 
those responsible for the attack. President Bush stated, ``We will not 
waver; we will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail. 
Peace and freedom will prevail.'' The unprovoked attacks on America and 
these words remained my reason to serve. I have had the honor and 
privilege of leading Marines for 5 tours in combat operations since 9/
11. I led Marines in combat operations in Iraq in 2003 and 2005 as a 
rifle company commander. I returned to Iraq, leading an advisor team 
from 2015-2016 that transitioned into a task force responsible for 
advising and assisting Iraqi Security Forces during Operation Inherent 
Resolve and the pivotal Ramadi Counterattack against ISIS. I also led 
two advisor teams in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, from 2013-2014 and 
again in 2018. My last assignment was as the assistant chief of staff 
G-5, strategy and plans at Marine Corps Forces Central Command in 
Tampa, FL. While serving in this capacity, although I did not return to 
Afghanistan to participate in the evacuation, I facilitated evacuation 
planning efforts within the command. I traveled to Al Udeid Air Base, 
Qatar, to reinstate and lead the Marine Coordination Element 
responsible for processing and assisting more than 12,000 Afghan 
evacuees as they fled Afghanistan. Encountering Afghan families lucky 
enough to escape with only a backpack, leaving their homes, family 
members, and the lives they had worked to build.
    Reflecting on the current state of Afghanistan, many U.S. service 
members, some who have served multiple tours in Afghanistan, wonder if 
their efforts, service, and individual sacrifices were worth the costs. 
While this may be better decided by historians in the future, I can 
confidently say that for 20 years, the sacrifices of our service 
members and their families have made a difference in the lives of our 
fellow Americans and our counterparts. Working with our Afghan and 
coalition partners, we denied terrorists the ability to plan, 
coordinate, and execute attacks on our homeland from the ungoverned 
spaces in Afghanistan. We also brought hope, growth, and prosperity to 
many Afghan people.
    The stability we provided for 20 years wasn't perfect--it was 
always tenuous--and unfortunately, it crumbled in a matter of days. But 
it contrasts dramatically with the previous and current state of 
Afghanistan under Taliban rule, as it harbors terrorists, remains 
rampantly corrupt, and dramatically reverses the rights of women and 
girls with medieval-style rules. For many service members, this is a 
recurring nightmare, and regrettably, for many Afghans, it is their 
reality. The culminating event was the loss of 13 U.S. service members, 
more than 170 Afghan evacuees, and an untold number of physical and 
moral injuries. My participation rapidly turned from assistance with 
the evacuation to assignment as the lead Marine conducting the Abbey 
Gate investigation.
    To put our exit in perspective, the Soviet Union occupied 
Afghanistan from 1979-1989. Before their withdrawal from Afghanistan, 
Soviet political and military leadership had undertaken strategic 
political, economic, and military measures to provide for the Afghan 
government's survival. Extreme weather conditions delayed the Soviet 
withdrawal, and the Mujahadeen granted an extension. Following the 
withdrawal, the Soviets maintained at least one infantry division and 
airborne units in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as an emergency QRF in case 
of rapid deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan. Two to 3 months 
after the Soviet withdrawal, the situation significantly deteriorated 
in Kandahar, and the Mujahedin launched massive attacks on the city. At 
the Afghan government's request, one Soviet airborne battalion was 
deployed. Its participation in combat was enough to stabilize the 
situation, as the Mujahidin believed that the Soviets would return. 
Soviet military and economic assistance enabled the Afghan government 
to remain in power for more than 3 years. Once Soviet assistance ended, 
the strength of the Afghan government rapidly declined until the 
government fell in 1992.
    This contrasted sharply with the U.S. departure from Afghanistan in 
2021. Many of us believed that the negotiated time line would be 
delayed because the Taliban failed to honor or operate within the 
parameters of the conditions-based Doha agreement. As early as April, I 
and presumably many of our Afghan partners were in disbelief by the 
announcement of the withdrawal date. This reduced our U.S. force 
posture and ``boots on the ground'' to nearly zero, with immense 
pressure to keep that number extremely low while preparing for the high 
likelihood of a noncombatant evacuation under some of the most trying 
conditions in history.
    I thought back to President Bush's quote: ``We will not waver; we 
will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail. Peace and 
freedom will prevail.'' And yet, we had wavered, we had tired, we had 
faltered, and we had failed. Ultimately peace and freedom did not 
prevail.
    The final days of our Afghan campaign were chaotic and came with 
extreme consequences. I remember why we fought there and I'd like to 
think that my brothers-and-sisters-in-arms who fought there remember as 
well.
    In the words of General Mattis, CENTCOM Commander in a paper 
published to the Joint Force in 2012:

``We fought to protect the values that grew from the enlightenment; we 
fought to give hope to those who have lived under desperate conditions 
and to safeguard newfound freedoms and new values based on human rights 
that must be matured and furthered;
``Our fight aimed to ensure governments and their citizens are fully 
able to fulfill their social contracts, freely addressing social 
injustices, and responding swiftly to curb oppressive actors;
``And finally, we fought knowing that the world prospers when we 
succeed in restoring human rights and protecting human dignity.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Unpublished Paper, USCENTCOM, 2012.

    Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you again for allowing me 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to speak this morning/afternoon. I look forward to your questions.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Colonel Douglas.
    The Chair now recognizes Dr. Schroden for your opening 
statement of 5 minutes.

  STATEMENT OF JONATHAN SCHRODEN, PH D, DIRECTOR, COUNTERING 
 THREATS AND CHALLENGES PROGRAM AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS PROGRAM 
                   CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

    Mr. Schroden. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for having me here to 
discuss this important topic today.
    I'm speaking to you as a military analyst with CNA, which 
is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, independent research and analysis 
organization. For the past 15 years, I have worked continuously 
on security sector issues pertaining to Afghanistan. For a 
variety of U.S. Government sponsors and independent 
publications. I've led 5 independent assessments of 
Afghanistan's security forces and numerous assessments of U.S. 
strategy and operations in Afghanistan. In total, these efforts 
saw me conduct 1 deployment and 13 shorter trips to the country 
between 2008 and 2019.
    There is no question that the U.S. withdrawal from 
Afghanistan did not go as planned or as hoped. When Ambassador 
Zalmay Khalilzad began negotiations with the Taliban at the 
direction of President Donald Trump, he stated publicly that 
``nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.'' In this case, 
everything meant 4 main items, the withdrawal of all U.S. 
forces from Afghanistan, a Taliban guarantee to prevent 
Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for international 
terrorist attacks, a framework for negotiations between the 
Afghan government and the Taliban, and a comprehensive cease-
fire. The final agreement, signed by Secretary of State Mike 
Pompeo, achieved only the first two of these goals and left the 
Afghan government in an even more precarious position than it 
was in previously.
    Once President Biden decided to complete the withdrawal in 
accordance with this agreement, the U.S. military recognized 
that rapid execution of it was necessary to minimize the risk 
to U.S. service members associated with a retrograde under 
threat of violence. Within 2 months of the withdrawal's 
commencement, it was 90 percent complete, a pace that was far 
too rapid for Afghanistan's security forces to absorb. For 
years prior to the withdrawal, numerous assessments showed that 
these forces were critically dependent on U.S. and contracted 
support for nearly all of their enabling functions. My own 
assessment of Taliban Afghan security force capabilities, 
published in January 2021, concluded that after the U.S. 
withdrawal ``the Taliban would have a slight military advantage 
over Afghanistan's security forces, which would then likely 
grow in compounding fashion.'' That scenario is what happened. 
With the U.S. withdrawal nearly complete by July 5, the first 
of Afghanistan's provincial capitals falling a month later, and 
President Ashraf Ghani abandoning Kabul to the Taliban 9 days 
after that.
    In the year-and-a-half since these events, al-Qaeda has 
remained a problem for the United States and Afghanistan. The 
group has relative safety under the Taliban government to exist 
and operate, though it currently has minimal capability to 
conduct attacks beyond the country. The inverse is true of the 
Islamic State Khorasan Province, also known as ISKP. It has 
substantially more capability in Afghanistan than al-Qaeda, but 
is viewed by the Taliban as the primary challenger to their 
consolidation of control over the entirety of the country. The 
Taliban have thus conducted numerous operations and targeted 
raids against ISKP since the U.S. withdrawal.
    For its part, the United States established an over-the-
horizon counterterrorism capability designed to monitor and 
conduct limited strikes against al-Qaeda and ISKP in 
Afghanistan. This capability is limited in its scope and in 
what it can detect, though it was clearly sufficient to 
identify and kill al-Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul. 
Recommendations by national security analysts to improve this 
capability have included establishing new intelligence networks 
in the country, negotiating basing access in a neighboring 
country, or establishing a sea base off the coast of Pakistan, 
investing in longer-duration drone platforms, increasing cyber 
and open-source collection efforts, and sharing intelligence 
with the Taliban against our shared enemy, ISKP.
    Looking ahead, the Taliban's strong relationship with al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan portends a consistent, albeit nascent, 
threat from that group to the United States for some time. 
Whether the Taliban will prevent al-Qaeda from using 
Afghanistan as a launch pad for external attacks remains to be 
seen. But the discovery of al Zawahiri in Kabul is not 
encouraging. The Taliban are likely to continue operations 
against ISKP, and these operations may be trending toward 
increasing effectiveness. But the resilience of ISKP, a group 
that was on the rebound even before the U.S. withdrawal, augers 
against its elimination anytime soon. The United States will 
thus need to maintain and possibly expand its over-the-horizon 
approaches to counterterrorism in Afghanistan for years to 
come. Congress would therefore be wise to demand long-term 
strategies for doing so and to invest in over-the-horizon 
counterterrorism capabilities commensurate with operational 
time lines of a decade or more.
    With that, I thank you and welcome your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Schroden follows:]
              Prepared Statement of Jonathan Schroden \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ The views expressed in this testimony are the author's alone 
and should not be interpreted as representing those of CNA or any of 
the sponsors of its research. CNA is an independent nonprofit research 
and analysis organization dedicated to the safety and security of the 
Nation. CNA's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of 
its research clients and sponsors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             April 18, 2023
    On February 29, 2020, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo signed 
what has come to be known as the ``Doha Agreement'' between the United 
States and the Taliban.\2\ In that agreement, the administration of 
President Donald J. Trump agreed to withdraw all military forces from 
Afghanistan within about 14 months (May 2021). For its part, the 
Taliban agreed to ``not allow any of its members, other individuals or 
groups, including al-Qa'ida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten 
the security of the United States and its allies.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ ``Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Which Is Not Recognized by the United 
States as a State and Is Known as the Taliban and the United States of 
America,'' U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-
02.29.20.pdf.
    \3\ Ibid, p. III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    After candidate Joe Biden won the 2020 Presidential election, 
President Trump ordered a drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to 
2,500 troops and 11 bases.\4\ President Biden inherited this force 
structure upon his inauguration in January 2021. After several months 
of deliberation, on April 14, President Biden announced his intent to 
complete the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan,\5\ and he 
eventually set a deadline of August 31, 2021.\6\ On August 15, after 
several months of severe battlefield losses by Afghanistan's security 
forces, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country, and the Taliban 
captured Kabul. Over the remaining days in August, the U.S. military 
surged troops into Afghanistan to secure the Hamid Karzai International 
Airport. Those troops, along with our coalition partners and U.S. 
Government civilians, then evacuated over 100,000 individuals from the 
airport in the largest airlift ever conducted by the United States.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ ``Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,'' U.S. 
Department of Defense, Dec. 2020, pp. 5-6.
    \5\ ``Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in 
Afghanistan,'' The White House, Apr. 14, 2021, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-
by-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan.
    \6\ The initial date set for the withdrawal was September 11, 2021. 
This date was revised after criticism emerged of its symbolism.
    \7\ ``US Withdrawal from Afghanistan,'' The White House, Apr. 6, 
2023, p. 9, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/US-
Withdrawal-from-Afghanistan.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the rest of this testimony, I will focus on the following 
topics, at the request of the subcommittee:
   The nature of the Doha Agreement secured under the Trump 
        administration as well as the Biden administration's decision 
        to see the agreement through
   Why withdrawals are among the most difficult military 
        operations to undertake
   The extent to which al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State--
        Khorasan Province (ISKP) retain the intent and capability to 
        conduct attacks against the U.S. homeland from Afghanistan
   The extent to which the Taliban have upheld their commitment 
        to address terrorist threats in Afghanistan
   Impacts of the drawdown of U.S. counterterrorism (CT) 
        presence and resources dedicated to Afghanistan.
    The following sections will address these topics in turn and will 
be followed by a brief conclusion.
            the doha agreement and the decision to withdraw
    As the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation, 
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, began negotiations with the Taliban at the 
direction of President Trump, he stated publicly that ``nothing is 
agreed until everything is agreed.''\8\ In this case, ``everything'' 
meant four main items: (1) the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from 
Afghanistan, (2) a Taliban guarantee to prevent Afghanistan from 
becoming a safe haven for international terrorist attacks, (3) a 
framework for negotiations between the Afghan government and the 
Taliban on the future governing structure of the country, and (4) a 
comprehensive cease-fire. The final agreement signed by the United 
States and the Taliban in 2020 addressed the first two points in 
detail. However, it stated that the third point would be addressed 
after the signing of the deal and the fourth point would ``be an item 
on the agenda of the intra-Afghan dialog and negotiations.''\9\ Over 
the ensuing year, the Taliban engaged in direct talks with 
representatives of the Afghan government. Those discussions, however, 
accomplished very little. Additionally, even though the two sides 
engaged in several limited cease-fires (e.g., around the Eid holiday), 
a comprehensive cease-fire was never obtained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Siyar Sirat, ``Nothing Is Agreed Until Everything Is Agreed: 
Khalilzad,'' TOLO News, Jan. 29, 2019, https://tolonews.com/
afghanistan/khalilzad-says-%E2%80%98nothing-agreed-%E2%80%99-qatar.
    \9\ ``Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the 
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Which Is Not Recognized by the United 
States as a State and Is Known as the Taliban and the United States of 
America,'' p. I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    By the time the U.S. withdrawal began, the security situation in 
Afghanistan had deteriorated markedly since the United States completed 
the removal of President Barack Obama's surge forces in 2014. At that 
time, the United States had adopted a limited role of advising 
Afghanistan's security forces and conducting partnered CT operations. 
One (imperfect but still useful \10\) metric demonstrating the decline 
in the security situation is the change in how many administrative 
districts the Afghan government controlled. In 2017, it was assessed to 
control 217 of the country's 407 districts, but this number fell to 
just 129 districts in 2021 (a decrease of 40 percent).\11\ By my own 
assessment, when the U.S. withdrawal began, the Taliban had effectively 
surrounded at least 15 of the country's 34 provincial capitals.\12\ 
Contrary to the arguments of some former senior U.S. Government 
officials, the situation President Biden confronted upon entry to the 
White House was not one of a stable stalemate that afforded an 
effective ``insurance policy'' against terrorism from Afghanistan;\13\ 
rather, it was a war on the downslope.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Jonathan Schroden, ``The Challenges of Mapping Taliban Control 
in Afghanistan,'' Lawfare, Aug. 1, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/
challenges-mapping-taliban-control-afghanistan.
    \11\ Bill Roggio, ``Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan,'' FDD's 
Long War Journal, https://www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-
control-in-afghanistan.
    \12\ Jonathan Schroden, ``Lessons from the Collapse of 
Afghanistan's Security Forces,'' CTC Sentinel 14, no. 8 (Oct. 2021), 
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/lessons-from-the-collapse-of-afghanistans-
security-forces.
    \13\ Mark F. Bernstein, ``Q&A: Former Ambassador Ryan Crocker *85 
on Afghanistan,'' Princeton Alumni Weekly, Oct. 1, 2021, https://
paw.princeton.edu/article/qa-former-Ambassador-ryan-crocker-85-
afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, Biden effectively had two options in early 2021: complete the 
withdrawal of U.S. forces that Trump had begun in accordance with the 
Doha Agreement or abrogate that agreement and surge U.S. forces in what 
would have been the third consecutive Presidential attempt to jumpstart 
a turnaround in the war. Faced with those choices, Biden chose to 
withdraw, stating: ``I'm now the fourth United States President to 
preside over American troop presence in Afghanistan: two Republicans, 
two Democrats. I will not pass this responsibility on to a fifth.''\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ ``Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in 
Afghanistan.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                     why withdrawals are difficult
    When President Biden announced the full withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, he said it would begin on May 1, 2021, and be complete by 
the end of August. Just before Biden's announcement, military logistics 
expert Ryan Baker and I examined why several months would be necessary 
to withdraw the 2,500 troops from the country. We found that while the 
U.S. military had the logistical capacity to remove that many people 
from Afghanistan in a shorter time frame, doing so would have required 
``pulling transportation and logistical resources away from other 
missions around the world, abandoning a bunch of perfectly good 
equipment in Afghanistan, signing expensive contracts for quick-turn 
transportation capacity, leaving allied and partner forces in 
Afghanistan twisting in the wind, and potentially increasing the risk 
to U.S. troops on the ground during the withdrawal.''\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Ryan Baker and Jonathan Schroden, ``Why Is It So Tough to 
Withdraw from Afghanistan?'' War on the Rocks, Apr. 8, 2021, https://
warontherocks.com/2021/04/why-is-it-so-tough-to-withdraw-from-
afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One of the most difficult types of military operation is a 
retrograde under fire. Even withdrawing under the threat of fire 
greatly increases the difficulty of moving military personnel and 
materiel.\16\ In Afghanistan, while the United States and the Taliban 
had reportedly agreed not to attack each other as the withdrawal 
proceeded,\17\ the degree of trust between the two sides was not high. 
U.S. forces in Afghanistan therefore had to assume that the withdrawal 
could turn violent at any time. Additional factors further complicated 
the withdrawal: the land-locked and highly mountainous nature of 
Afghanistan, the array of coalition forces that the United States was 
supporting there, legal complexities surrounding the disposal or 
retrograde of U.S. military equipment, and the absence of a staging 
area in a neighboring country.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Ibid.
    \17\ Kimberly Dozier, ``Secret Annexes, Backroom Deals: Can Zalmay 
Khalilzad Deliver Afghan Peace for Trump?'' TIME, Feb. 15, 2020, 
https://time.com/5784103/secret-annexes-backroom-deals-can-zalmay-
khalilzad-deliver-afghan-peace-for-trump.
    \18\ Baker and Schroden, ``Why Is It So Tough to Withdraw from 
Afghanistan?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Those complexities notwithstanding, the U.S. military concluded 
that the best way to meet Biden's intent of a ``safe and orderly'' 
withdrawal \19\ was to conduct it as rapidly as possible, in keeping 
with the notion that the longer one takes to complete a withdrawal 
under the threat of fire, the longer one is exposed to the high degree 
of risk associated with such an operation. To minimize risk to U.S. 
service members during the withdrawal, the U.S. military therefore 
responded to Biden's order with alacrity. By June 8, 2021, just over a 
month after the withdrawal began, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) 
reported that the drawdown was half complete. Three weeks later, it 
reported 90 percent completion (see Figure 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Anne Gearan, ``Biden Signals Short Delay in Withdrawal of 
Forces from Afghanistan,'' Washington Post, Mar. 25, 2021, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-signals-short-delay-in-
withdrawal-of-forces-from-afghanistan/2021/03/25/2a37dbc2-8d9e-11eb-
9423-04079921c915_story.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   figure 1: reported progress of the u.s. military withdrawal from 
                  afghanistan (april-august 2021) \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ Compiled from updates issued by U.S. Central Command on the 
progress of the withdrawal. See: https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-
RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/2640121/update-on-withdrawal-of-us-
forces-from-afghanistan-may-31-2021; https://www.defense.gov/News/News-
Stories/Article/Article/2632456/afghanistan-retrograde-nearly-one-
quarter-complete; https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-
Release-View/Article/2649542/update-on-withdrawal-of-us-forces-from-
afghanistan-june-7-2021; https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/
Press-Release-View/Article/2682484/update-on-withdrawal-of-us-forces-
from-afghanistan-july-5-2021; https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-
RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/2708638/update-on-the-withdrawal-
of-us-forces-from-afghanistan-july-26-2021.

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

    As the United States withdrew, Afghanistan's security forces 
overused its air force and special operations forces to compensate for 
the loss of U.S. and coalition capabilities. The Afghan Air Force 
(AAF), for example, roughly tripled the number of sorties it flew in 
June and the Afghan Commandos' operational tempo increased by 30 
percent. These activity levels were unsustainable in the absence of 
contracted maintainers and logisticians who left along with the U.S. 
military forces that had been protecting them. By the end of June, the 
AAF's readiness rates had plummeted to 39 percent (from 77 percent in 
May), and the Commandos had suffered substantial casualties.\21\ As 
Afghanistan's military rapidly depleted the few capabilities that 
provided overmatch of the Taliban, more and more districts fell, with 
the largest acceleration of Taliban capture occurring between mid-June 
and mid-July (see Figure 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Jonathan Schroden, ``Lessons from the Collapse of 
Afghanistan's Security Forces,'' CTC Sentinel 14, no. 8 (Oct. 2021), 
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/lessons-from-the-collapse-of-afghanistans-
security-forces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 figure 2: total number of taliban-controlled districts in afghanistan 
                          (may-july 2021)\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Adapted from Schroden, ``Lessons from the Collapse of 
Afghanistan's Security Forces.''

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                  aq and iskp intent and capabilities
    There is no question that both AQ and the Islamic State retain the 
intent to attack the U.S. homeland. The more pressing question is 
whether they have the capabilities to do so. Within Afghanistan, the 
United Nations (UN) assessed in 2022 that AQ maintained a few hundred 
fighters, but these individuals were mostly involved with local Taliban 
units. The only notable AQ leader reported to be in Afghanistan after 
the United States' killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri on July 31, 2022, is 
Abu Ikhlas al-Masri.\23\ The United Nations has assessed that ``it is 
unlikely that Al-Qaida and its affiliates will seek to mount direct 
attacks outside Afghanistan for the near term owing to a lack of 
capability and restraint on the part of the Taliban, as well as an 
unwillingness to jeopardize their recent gains,''\24\ though some ana-
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Al-Masri is an AQ operational commander who had been captured 
by U.S. forces in 2010 and was reportedly freed by the Taliban in 2021. 
Asfandyar Mir, ``Twenty Years After 9/11: The Terror Threat from 
Afghanistan Post the Taliban Takeover,'' CTC Sentinel 14, no. 7 (Sept. 
2021), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/twenty-years-after-9-11-the-terror-
threat-from-afghanistan-post-the-taliban-takeover.
    \24\ ``Letter Dated 11 July 2022 from the Chair of the Security 
Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 
2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), 
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities 
Addressed to the President of the Security Council,'' U.N. Security 
Council, July 15, 2022, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N22/394/29/PDF/N2239429.pdf?OpenElement. The United Nations reaffirmed 
this assessment in its most recent report: ``Letter Dated 13 February 
2023 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to 
Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic 
State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and Associated 
Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Addressed to the 
President of the Security Council,'' U.N. Security Council, Feb. 13, 
2023, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/038/91/PDF/
N2303891.pdf?OpenElement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
lysts have argued that the potential for future AQ threats is greater 
than it currently appears.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Mir, ``Twenty Years After 9/11'' and Sara Harmouch, ``Al-
Qaeda's Looming Threat: Are We Looking Over the Wrong Horizon?'' 
Lawfare, Apr. 4, 2023, https://www.lawfareblog.com/al-qaedas-looming-
threat-are-we-looking-over-wrong-horizon.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With roughly 1,000 to 3,000 fighters,\26\ ISKP is now about half 
the strength of its zenith in 2017.\27\ The group maintains sizable 
cells in Afghanistan's eastern Kunar, Nangarhar, and Nuristan 
provinces, as well as in Kabul. The United Nations recently assessed 
that smaller ISKP elements exist in the northern and northeastern 
provinces of Badakhshan, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Takhar, and 
Balkh.\28\ Since the Taliban's conquest of the country, ISKP has sought 
to undermine the Taliban government as a guarantor of security by 
attacking Taliban forces and political leaders,\29\ foreign embassies 
and hotels housing foreigners,\30\ and religious and ethnic minority 
groups.\31\ ISKP has also sought to undermine the Taliban's legitimacy 
as a religious movement--and to bolster its own recruiting and 
fundraising efforts--by increasing the quality, quantity, and number of 
languages of its on-line propaganda.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ ``Letter Dated 13 February 2023 from the Chair of the Security 
Council Committee.''
    \27\ Amira Jadoon, Abdul Sayed, and Andrew Mines, ``The Islamic 
State Threat in Taliban Afghanistan: The Resurgence of the Islamic 
State Khorasan,'' CTC Sentinel, Jan. 2022, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-
islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-
islamic-state-khorasan.
    \28\ ``Letter Dated 13 February 2023 from the Chair of the Security 
Council Committee.''
    \29\ Andrew Mines and Amira Jadoon, ``A String of Assassinations in 
Afghanistan Points to ISIS Resurgence with US Officials Warning of 
Possible Attacks on American Interests,'' Military.com, Mar. 21, 2023, 
https://www.military.com/daily news/opinions/2023/03/21/string-of-
assassinations-afghanistan-points-isis-resurgence-us-officials-warning-
of-possible-attacks.html.
    \30\ ``Deadly Attack on Kabul Hotel Popular with Chinese 
Nationals,'' Al-Jazeera, Dec. 12, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/
2022/12/12/deadly-attack-on-kabul-hotel-popular-with-chinese-nationals, 
and Mohammad Yunus Yawar, ``Two Russian Embassy Staff Dead, Four Others 
Killed in Suicide Bomb Blast in Kabul,'' Reuters, Sept. 5, 2022, 
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-police-report-
suicide-bomb-blast-near-russian-embassy-kabul-2022-09-05.
    \31\ Ewelina U. Ochab, ``Yet Another Attack on the Hazara in 
Afghanistan,'' Forbes, Oct. 1, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
ewelinaochab/2022/10/01/yet-another-attack-on-the-hazara-in-
afghanistan/?sh=3a93ec452fa6.
    \32\ ``Letter Dated 13 February 2023 from the Chair of the Security 
Council Committee.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CENTCOM's General Michael ``Erik'' Kurilla, in his recent 
Congressional testimony, stated that ISKP could conduct attacks against 
American interests outside Afghanistan in less than 6 months, ``with 
little to no warning.'' When pressed on his assessment, however, he 
conceded that an attack within the region or Europe was more 
likely.\33\ Indeed, ISKP has demonstrated its ability to conduct 
attacks throughout much of Afghanistan, against Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan,\34\ and inside Pakistan.\35\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ Svetlana Shkolnikova, ``ISIS in Afghanistan Capable of Foreign 
Attacks in 6 Months, CENTCOM Commander Says,'' Stars and Stripes, Mar. 
16, 2023, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2023-03-16/centcom-
kurilla-isis-afghanistan-attacks-9514063.html.
    \34\ Sudha Ramachandran, ``ISKP Attacks in Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan,'' Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Aug. 31, 2022, https://
www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13731-iskp-
attacks-in-uzbekistan-and-tajikistan.html.
    \35\ Ismail Khan and Salman Masood, ``ISIS Claims Bombing of 
Pakistani Mosque, Killing Dozens,'' New York Times, Mar. 4, 2022, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/world/middleeast/pakistan-peshawar-
mosque-explosion.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                        the taliban's commitment
    In the Doha Agreement, the Taliban pledged to not allow terrorist 
groups ``to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the 
United States and its allies.''\36\ As with much of the Doha Agreement, 
the language in this clause is imprecise--for example, the meaning of 
``threaten the security of'' is not clear. The vagueness of this and 
similar clauses clouds the ability of analysts to determine whether the 
Taliban are meeting their commitment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \36\ ``Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The United States' identification--and subsequent targeted 
killing--of AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in downtown Kabul demonstrates 
this disconnect. From a U.S. perspective, the fact that al-Zawahiri was 
present in the capital--and reportedly staying in a house belonging to 
an aide of the Taliban's acting interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani 
\37\--violated this clause, since al-Zawahiri had continued to issue 
invectives on-line threatening the United States. From the Taliban's 
perspective, however, al-Zawahiri had not conducted or directed any 
external operations against the United States since the signing of the 
Doha Agreement, and his mere presence in Kabul did not violate the 
agreement. More concretely, the Taliban generally do not see AQ's 
presence in Afghanistan as a problem to be solved, and some senior 
members of the Taliban--beyond Haqqani--maintain close ties with AQ 
fighters.\38\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \37\ Jonathan Schroden, ``What Zawahiri's Death Tells Us About 
Afghanistan's Future,'' Politico, Aug. 2, 2022, https://
www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/08/02/zawahris-death-and-
afghanistans-future-00049239.
    \38\ Mir, ``Twenty Years After 9/11.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Taliban have, however, consistently pursued and targeted ISKP--
which they view as the primary militant threat to their domination of 
Afghanistan--since their ascension to power. These operations were 
initially broad in aim and ``brutally ineffective,''\39\ but they have 
become refined and targeted over time. Most recently, the Taliban have 
engaged in a surge of apparently targeted raids against ISKP cells 
across the country.\40\ The efficacy of these raids has been difficult 
to assess thus far, though a delay in ISKP's media productions may 
suggest the Taliban are achieving some degree of success.\41\ Thus, in 
the case of ISKP, the Taliban are conducting operations that appear to 
be generally aligned with their commitments in the Doha Agreement, 
though the primary motivation behind these operations is likely a 
desire to crush any militant opposition in the country, rather than to 
demonstrate adherence to the agreement with the United States.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \39\ Colin Clarke and Jonathan Schroden, ``Brutally Ineffective: 
How the Taliban Are Failing in Their New Role as Counter-Insurgents,'' 
War on the Rocks, Nov. 29, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/
brutally-ineffective-how-the-taliban-are-failing-in-their-new-role-as-
counter-insurgents.
    \40\ See, for example: Tweet by ``Afghan Analyst,'' Apr. 8, 2023, 
https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1644910476067831809?s=20.
    \41\ Tweet by Abdul Sayed, Apr. 11, 2023, https://twitter.com/
abdsayedd/status/1645840194510127115?s=20.
    \42\ For excellent overviews of the Taliban's political calculus, 
see: Andrew Watkins, ``The Taliban One Year On,'' CTC Sentinel 15:8 
(August 2022), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-taliban-one-year-on and 
Andrew Watkins, ``What's Next for the Taliban's Leadership Amid Rising 
Dissent?'' US Institute for Peace, April 11, 2023, https://
www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/whats-next-talibans-leadership-amid-
rising-dissent.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
            impacts of the u.s. drawdown on counterterrorism
    The Biden administration recently released a white paper on the 
withdrawal that claims the ``decision to leave Afghanistan freed up 
critical military, intelligence, and other resources to counter 
terrorist threats around the world, including in Syria, Iraq, Somalia, 
and Yemen.''\43\ The reality, however, is that in the wake of the 2018 
National Defense Strategy \44\ and then-Secretary of Defense Jim 
Mattis' declaration that ``terrorism is no longer the top priority'' of 
the Department of Defense (DOD),\45\ the United States has been drawing 
down its CT capabilities across the globe. Rather than reinvesting 
capabilities that were tied up in Afghanistan to pursue increasing 
threats of terrorism more vigorously in places like West Africa, the 
United States has steadily shifted its focus toward strategic 
competition and preparation for high-end conflict with China. As part 
of that shift, the United States has been relying more on partners and 
proxies in what leaders of the U.S. special operations enterprise 
recently described as a ``partner-led, U.S.-enabled'' approach.\46\ 
This global drawdown of CT capability, which began in DOD, is now 
cascading across the rest of the U.S. Government--a trend that CT 
practitioners are increasingly concerned about.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \43\ ``U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,'' p. 11.
    \44\ ``Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United 
States of America,'' U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, https://
dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf.
    \45\ David Martin, ``Terrorism No Longer the Military's Top 
Priority, Mattis Says,'' CBS News, Jan. 19, 2018, https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/terrorism-no-longer-the-militarys-top-priority-
mattis-says.
    \46\ ``Statement for the Record, the Honorable Christopher P. 
Maier, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict and General Bryan P. Fenton, USA Commander, United 
States Special Operations Command Before the Committee on Armed 
Services Subcommittee on Intelligence & Special Operations U.S. House 
of Representatives,'' Mar. 9, 2023, https://armedservices.house.gov/
sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/2023- %20SOLIC-
USSOCOM%20Posture%20-%20Maier-Fenton%20-%20Statement%20(FINAL).pdf.
    \47\ Author's conversations with CT practitioners in February and 
March 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Specific to Afghanistan, the U.S. withdrawal has left it reliant on 
an ``over-the-horizon'' (OTH) approach to CT, which primarily consists 
of flying drones from air bases in the Middle East, through Pakistani 
airspace, and over areas of interest in Afghanistan.\48\ As national 
security analyst Seth Jones recently described, ``It takes [an MQ-9A] 
Reaper roughly 14 hours to fly round-trip from Al Udeid Air Base in 
Qatar to Afghanistan, giving it only 12 to 15 hours to collect 
intelligence and strike targets if necessary.''\49\ The inefficiency of 
this approach, combined with the absence of any U.S. presence or 
intelligence partners on the ground in Afghanistan, has dramatically 
reduced the ability of U.S. intelligence agencies to track terrorist 
threats there. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of CENTCOM, 
commented in the wake of the withdrawal, ``We're probably at about 1 or 
2 percent of the capabilities we once had to look into 
Afghanistan.''\50\ Although the United States has likely improved its 
ability since then through experience with the new OTH approach, the 
current commander of CENTCOM, General Kurilla, recently testified that 
he believed ``we can see the broad contours of an attack, [but] 
sometimes we lack the granularity to see the full picture.''\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \48\ Jonathan Schroden, ``New Ideas for Over-the-Horizon 
Counterterrorism in Afghanistan,'' Lawfare, May 8, 2022, https://
www.lawfareblog.com/new-ideas-over-horizon-counterterrorism-
afghanistan.
    \49\ Seth Jones, ``Countering a Resurgent Terrorist Threat in 
Afghanistan'' Council on Foreign Relations, Apr. 14, 2022, https://
www.cfr.org/report/countering-resurgent-terrorist-threat-
afghanistan?utm_source=studies&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campa
ign- &utm_term=Seth%20Jones%20CPMU%20Sailthru%20Distro%20List.
    \50\ Robert Burns and Lolita C. Baldor, ``U.S. Commander: Al-Qaida 
Numbers in Afghanistan Up `Slightly,' '' AP News, Dec. 10, 2021, 
https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-middle-east-united-states-
taliban-islamic-state-group-bec82acfe6dbd19bed4c11db21d7a78e.
    \51\ Jeff Seldin, ``US General: Islamic State Afghan Affiliate 
Closer to Attacking Western Targets,'' Voice of America, Mar. 16, 2023, 
https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-
closer-to-attacking-western-targets/7008633.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                               conclusion
    There is no question that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan did 
not go as planned or as hoped. The negotiations between the United 
States and the Taliban were supposed to continue until ``everything is 
agreed,''\52\ but they concluded well before that point. Secretary 
Pompeo ultimately signed an agreement that fell far short of initial 
expectations and left the Afghan government in an even more precarious 
position than it was in previously.\53\ In addition, the Trump 
administration's lack of detailed planning for the withdrawal \54\ and 
reported efforts to obstruct the Biden transition team from beginning 
such work \55\ left President Biden's administration in an unenviable 
position as he entered office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \52\ Sirat, ``Nothing Is Agreed Until Everything Is Agreed: 
Khalilzad.''
    \53\ Schroden, ``Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan's 
Security Forces.''
    \54\ ``US Withdrawal from Afghanistan,'' p. 2.
    \55\ Lara Seligman and Bryan Bender, `` `Really Quite Shocking': 
Inside the Ugly Transition at the Pentagon,'' Politico, Jan. 20, 2021, 
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/20/biden-pentagon-transition-
460768.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Nonetheless, once President Biden decided to complete the 
withdrawal and fulfill the terms of the U.S. agreement with the 
Taliban, the U.S. military recognized that a rapid withdrawal was 
necessary to minimize the risk associated with a retrograde under 
threat of violence. Within 2 months of the withdrawal's commencement, 
it was 90 percent complete.\56\ That pace--designed to prioritize the 
protection of U.S. service members--was far too rapid for Afghanistan's 
security forces to absorb. As had been noted by independent entities 
for years prior to the withdrawal, Afghan security forces were 
critically dependent on U.S. or contracted support for nearly all of 
their enabling functions.\57\ With that support removed, numerous 
analysts predicted that their ability to defend the country against the 
Taliban onslaught would spiral downward. My own assessment of Taliban 
and Afghan security force capabilities, published in January 2021, 
concluded that after the U.S. withdrawal, ``the Taliban would have a 
slight military advantage [over Afghan security forces] . . . which 
would then likely grow in a compounding fashion.''\58\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \56\ ``Update on Withdrawal of US Forces from Afghanistan July 5, 
2021,'' CENTCOM, July 6, 2021, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-
RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/2682484/update-on-withdrawal-of-us-
forces-from-afghanistan-july-5-2021.
    \57\ Jonathan Schroden, ``Afghanistan Will Be the Trump 
Administration's First Foreign Policy Crisis,'' War on the Rocks, Dec. 
5, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/afghanistan-will-be-the-
trump-administrations-first-foreign-policy-crisis; Jonathan Schroden, 
``Afghanistan Will Be the Biden Administration's First Foreign Policy 
Crisis,'' Lawfare, Dec. 20, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/
afghanistan-will-be-biden-administrations-first-foreign-policy-crisis. 
See also SIGAR's quarterly reports to Congress from 2016 to 2021.
    \58\ Jonathan Schroden, ``Afghanistan's Security Forces Versus the 
Taliban: A Net Assessment,'' CTC Sentinel 14, no. 1 (Jan. 2021), 
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/afghanistans-security-forces-versus-the-
taliban-a-net-assessment/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    On August 6, the first of Afghanistan's provincial capitals fell, 
and President Ghani abandoned Kabul 9 days later. The resulting chaos 
in the capital substantially escalated the difficulty of the last leg 
of the withdrawal. In addition to heartbreaking scenes of Afghan 
civilians crowding in squalid conditions around the airport seeking an 
exit from the country and stories of Taliban brutality against 
them,\59\ 13 U.S. service members and around 170 Afghans were killed in 
an ISKP attack at the airport's Abbey Gate.\60\ Another 10 Afghan 
civilians lost their lives in an errant U.S. drone strike in the wake 
of that ISKP attack.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \59\ Ali M. Latifi, ``Chaos and Violence as Crowds Keep Growing 
Outside Kabul Airport,'' Al-Jazeera, Aug. 23, 2021, https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/23/afghanistan-taliban-chaos-and-
violence-as-crowds-keep-growing-outside-kabul-airport.
    \60\ Jim Garamone, ``US Central Command Releases Report on August 
Abbey Gate Attack,'' DOD, Feb. 4, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/
News-Stories/Article/Article/2924398/us-central-command-releases-
report-on-august-abbey-gate-attack.
    \61\ Azmat Khan, ``Military Investigation Reveals How the US 
Botched a Drone Strike in Kabul,'' New York Times, Jan. 6, 2023, 
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/06/us/politics/drone-civilian-deaths-
afghanistan.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In the year-and-a-half since the withdrawal, AQ has remained a 
problem for the United States in Afghanistan. The group has relative 
safety under the Taliban government to exist and operate, though it 
currently has minimal capability to conduct attacks beyond the country. 
The inverse is true of ISKP. It has substantially more capability in 
Afghanistan than AQ but is viewed by the Taliban as the primary 
challenger to their consolidation of control over the entirety of the 
country. The Taliban have thus conducted numerous operations and 
targeted raids against ISKP since the withdrawal.
    For its part, the United States has accelerated its pivot away from 
CT (toward strategic competition with China) and established an OTH CT 
capability aimed at AQ and ISKP in Afghanistan. This capability is 
limited in its scope and what it can detect, though it was clearly 
sufficient to identify the presence of al-Zawahiri in Kabul. 
Recommendations by national security analysts to improve the United 
States' ability to detect and disrupt terrorist threats in Afghanistan 
have included establishing new intelligence networks in the country, 
negotiating basing access in a neighboring country or establishing a 
sea base off the coast of Pakistan to reduce drone transit times, 
investing in longer duration drone platforms (such as the MQ-9B 
SkyGuardian), increasing cyber and open-source collection efforts,\62\ 
and potentially engaging in clandestine cooperation (e.g., intelligence 
sharing) with the Taliban against our shared enemy, ISKP.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \62\ Jones, ``Countering a Resurgent Terrorist Threat in 
Afghanistan'' and Schroden, ``New Ideas for Over-the-Horizon 
Counterterrorism in Afghanistan.''
    \63\ Jonathan Schroden and Alexander Powell, ``Working with the 
Devil? The Potential for US-Taliban Cooperation Against the Islamic 
State in Afghanistan,'' War on the Rocks, Sept. 16, 2021, https://
warontherocks.com/2021/09/working-with-the-devil-the-potential-for-u-s-
taliban-cooperation-against-the-islamic-state-in-afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Looking ahead, the Taliban's strong relationship with AQ in 
Afghanistan portends a consistent (albeit nascent) threat from AQ to 
the United States for some time. Whether the Taliban will prevent AQ 
from using Afghanistan as a launchpad for external attacks in 
accordance with the Doha Agreement remains to be seen, but the 
discovery of al-Zawahiri in Kabul is not an encouraging omen. The 
Taliban are likely to continue operations against ISKP that may become 
more effective; however, the size, scope, locations, and resilience of 
ISKP auger against the group's elimination any time soon. The United 
States will thus need to maintain--and possibly expand--its OTH 
approaches to CT in Afghanistan for years to come. Congress would 
therefore be wise to demand long-term strategies for doing so and to 
invest in OTH CT capabilities commensurate with operational time lines 
of a decade or more.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Dr. Schroden. Thank you to all 
our witnesses for your testimony.
    Members will now be recognized in order of seniority for 
their 5-minute period of questioning, and an additional round 
of questioning will likely be called after all Members have 
been recognized.
    I now recognize myself and like to start with a brief 
video.
    [Video shown.]
    Chairman Pfluger. This hearing is not about the decision to 
withdraw. This hearing is about the effects that a chaotic 
withdrawal has on our security because it has not been 
investigated or looked into.
    I have a couple of yes-or-no questions. We will try to go 
quickly. Do you believe that the withdrawal from Afghanistan 
was chaotic? We will start with Ambassador Sales.
    Mr. Sales. Yes, it was.
    Chairman Pfluger. Ms. Ledeen.
    Ms. Ledeen. Yes, it was.
    Chairman Pfluger. Colonel Douglas.
    Mr. Douglas. Yes, it was.
    Chairman Pfluger. Dr. Schroden.
    Mr. Schroden. I wasn't on the ground, but certainly the 
videos and the accounts of what happened are in line with that.
    Chairman Pfluger. OK. Ambassador Sales, do you believe the 
processes in place for screening and vetting by the Biden 
administration, in particular DHS, were sufficient to protect 
our homeland?
    Mr. Sales. No, Congressman, I don't.
    Chairman Pfluger. OK. Ms. Ledeen, do you, to the best of 
your knowledge, believe that anyone from Biden administration 
has been held accountable or that there has been a review that 
the American public deserves to see about the withdrawal?
    Ms. Ledeen. Mr. Chairman, there clearly has not.
    Chairman Pfluger. At the strategic level, over $7 billion 
worth of equipment that is still good, that is still useful, 
that our allies, in addition to us, helped provide in the fight 
against Afghanistan due to an Article 5 of NATO being 
triggered, Ambassador Sales, what is al-Qaeda? What are other 
violent extremist groups able and most likely to do with that 
equipment in Afghanistan?
    Mr. Sales. Well, Mr. Chairman, the fear is that they'll 
turn it against us and our allies and use the equipment that we 
provided to the Afghan government to wage war against the 
United States and our partners. Keep in mind, al-Qaeda is still 
using AK-47 from the Soviet era. We're going to be dealing with 
this problem for a long time to come.
    Chairman Pfluger. Ms. Ledeen, you said that what happens in 
Afghanistan doesn't stay in Afghanistan. How does that 
negatively affect our own homeland security?
    Ms. Ledeen. To add on to what Ambassador Sales rightly 
said, the Taliban reportedly are also engaged in weapon sales, 
selling our weapons that we left behind. So that's likely one 
aspect that will come back to bite us. But in addition, I think 
our open Southern Border, the fact that we don't have any idea 
who's coming through in many areas, we can only speculate as to 
who is coming through. In the future, from a counterterrorism 
perspective, who we might need to be concerned about that we're 
not aware of.
    Chairman Pfluger. Colonel Douglas, you served for 31-plus 
years. In that time, when you looked at the Commander-in-Chief, 
did you ever blame the previous Commander-in-Chief for the 
policies that were being executed during your service at that 
time?
    Mr. Douglas. Sir, I've had the opportunity of serving under 
four Presidents since 9/11 and I can say that while there are 
enough successes and failures through Afghanistan that every 
administration can take credit or be held accountable for. At 
the same time, the Taliban were not being held accountable to 
the conditions of the agreement, and so that's at this 
administration.
    Chairman Pfluger. Let me be specific. When the Commander-
in-Chief makes a decision, is that their decision or is that 
the previous administration's decision?
    Mr. Douglas. Sir, when the Commander-in-Chief makes a 
decision, that's his decision.
    Chairman Pfluger. OK.
    Mr. Douglas. You can't base that on anybody else, but your 
accountability is at the top.
    Chairman Pfluger. Dr. Schroden, from your perspective, what 
type of analysis should be done right now and where should we 
be focused? What keeps you up at night? What threat keeps you 
up at night right now?
    Mr. Schroden. Well, to be honest, the most significant, 
statistically significant terrorist threat to U.S. citizens 
right now comes from religious and ethnically motivated violent 
extremists here in the United States. So that's what keeps me 
up at night is that particular threat. The threat from 
jihadists abroad has increased, but it has increased since 2018 
as a result of the broader decision to effectively try to end 
the war on terror and drawdown U.S. counterterrorism assets 
across the globe in order to focus more wholesomely on 
strategic competition with the likes of China and Russia.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
    My time has expired. I now yield to the Ranking Member, Mr. 
Magaziner.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
    My hope again is that today's hearing will focus on 
forward-looking solutions that will improve the safety of 
Americans at home and around the world.
    The American people want bipartisan solutions and not 
hyperpartisanship. My hope is that going forward, this hearing 
will retain that focus. But it is also important that the 
American people know the facts. The fact is that it was Donald 
Trump's Taliban deal that set the chaos in motion. That Trump-
Taliban deal did not include a comprehensive cease-fire, did 
not include any plan for providing protection for Afghan 
nationals who risked their lives to assist American service 
members, no protections for the Afghan government, no guarantee 
that the United States could continue to engage in intelligence 
gathering or other operations to root out terror threats in 
Afghanistan. The Trump Taliban deal allowed 5,000 Taliban 
soldiers to be released from prison prior to the start of the 
Biden administration. To celebrate the signing of the deal, 
President Trump planned to invite Taliban leaders to Camp 
David, only canceling after the American people found out and 
were rightly outraged at the notion.
    In the months following the signing of the deal, Taliban 
attacks in Afghanistan increased by 70 percent to nearly 100 
attacks per day over the same period the previous year.
    So, look, we can point fingers all day long. I think what 
the American people want us to do is focus on the future and 
focus on how we can reduce threats to the American people and 
the American homeland going forward.
    So, Dr. Schroden, I will ask you to expand on the final 
points that you made in your testimony. What type of 
capabilities should we focus on developing and strengthening in 
order to mitigate terror attacks from abroad?
    Mr. Schroden. Well, I think specific to Afghanistan, right, 
we are in a situation where the bulk of our intelligence, as 
it's openly discussed, comes from flying drones from many 
hundreds of miles away, air bases in the Middle East, over 
Pakistani air base, and over Afghanistan. Roughly 50 percent, 
if not slightly more of their available sortie time, their 
flight time, is dedicated to transiting to and from 
Afghanistan, leaving them only about 50 percent of their 
availability to gather intelligence over the country itself.
    So there are a couple of ways that one could try to 
increase the efficiency of that approach, right. One is to 
invest in drones that have longer duration time, and there are 
variants being developed now that could do that. Another would 
be to try and shorten the transit time by negotiating a basing 
agreement in a neighboring country or trying to establish 
perhaps a lily pad or some type of sea base off the coast of 
Pakistan. So those are immediate things that I think could be 
done or at least attempted to do. Then trying to reestablish 
our intelligence collection on the ground through HUMINT 
networks in Afghanistan is harder and likely longer-term 
prospect. But again, given the time lines I described of likely 
facing these threats for at least the next 10 years, if not 
longer, those types of efforts, even if they have longer 
payoffs, are worth investing in now.
    Mr. Magaziner. Can you expand on your comment about 
gathering open-source and signals intelligence to try to 
mitigate terror threats from Afghanistan as well?
    Mr. Schroden. Sure. In this day and age, and I think you've 
seen this with the war in Ukraine as well as a number of 
other--you know, the Chinese balloon incident, et cetera, there 
is a wealth of information available through open-source 
channels, through social media, that can be harnessed in ways 
that was previously unavailable to us. I'm an avid Twitter 
user, right, I follow a lot of Twitter accounts coming out of 
Afghanistan. There is a lot of very interesting information 
that could be used and combined with actual intelligence 
gathered by the United States to paint a much richer picture of 
what's happening in Afghanistan than we might have been able to 
do in the past. The intelligence community has sort-of usually 
traditionally been reticent to rely that much on open-source 
reporting because they don't control where it comes from. But I 
don't think we have the luxury anymore, especially with respect 
to Afghanistan, of only relying on sort-of exquisite 
intelligence that the United States collects. We need to expand 
and include open-source information as well.
    Mr. Magaziner. Do you agree that foreign terror 
organizations, including possibly in Afghanistan, are focusing 
increasingly on radicalizing U.S.-based persons in order to 
encourage them to attack the United States homeland?
    Mr. Schroden. I think that's been the case for some number 
of years, if not 7 years or longer. The U.S. homeland has been 
considerably hardened in the decades since 9/11. It is a lot 
harder for these organizations to get into the United States 
directly. So inspiring people to conduct attacks with weapons 
that are readily already available in this country has been a 
primary motive of their attempts for some time.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
    I yield.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, 
Mr. Bishop.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador Sales, Ms. Ledeen, I was glad to hear you raise 
the question whether an uncontrolled Southern Border poses a 
security risk to the United States.
    In November of last year, we had Director Wray and 
Secretary Mayorkas and also Director Christine Abizaid of the 
National Counterterrorism Threat Center before us, and this 
little colloquy occurred. I said, thank you, Director Abizaid. 
Does the NCTC assess a significant threat from the historic 
level of uncontrolled crossing at the Southern Border? Here was 
her answer. Thank you. We don't actually. Border security is 
really important. If we look at the nature of the threat and 
how it has evolved here in the United States homeland, it has 
been striking how the evolution to lone actors actually 
reflects how much more difficult it is for terrorists to enter 
the United States. We look historically at the kinds of attacks 
we have experienced here in the homeland. None of them have 
been connected to major illegal crossings or otherwise from the 
Southwest Border. Then she finished, that said, it remains a 
top intelligence priority. Does that provide you comfort, 
Ambassador Sales?
    Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I have to say that I'm 
considerably more worried about the state of our border 
security. As I indicated in my written statement, we've seen a 
dramatic spike over recent years in the number of known or 
suspected terrorists who were apprehended coming across the 
Southern Border. From zero several years ago to 95 last fiscal 
year, to 69 so far. Those are just the ones we know about.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you for that.
    I find myself in agreement. I asked Secretary Mayorkas back 
in April of last year, how do you know that none of the 2.6 
million, including the 600,000 gotaways, you don't even know 
who they are. You know, 41 of--at that time--41 on the terror 
watch list have been encountered, how do you know those people 
aren't a source of risk of terrorism? He said, Congressman, the 
individuals that we have encountered on the terrorism screen 
data--and I said, you are not answering my question, sir. I 
said, you know, Ramzi Yousef claimed asylum, right? Now, I got 
that a little bit wrong, I don't think--but he got a claim to 
come in. He was encountered and admitted into the country. I 
think it wasn't called credible fear at the time, but it was 
something similar. I said and you know that he got to go and be 
released into the country on an assertion of credible fear. He 
was released and 6 months later he bombed the World Trade 
Center. Among the 600,000 gotaways just that small portion, Mr. 
Secretary, how do you know that--are you waiting for a mushroom 
cloud? My time had expired and he was given the opportunity to 
respond. Here is what he said, Mr. Chairman, I won't dignify 
that last question with a response.
    What about you, Ms. Ledeen? Are you comforted by the 
Secretary of Homeland Security's certitude that we face no risk 
among those hundreds of thousands of people entering the United 
States without ever contacting authorities? It is not a 
material terrorism risk. Does that make any sense to you?
    Ms. Ledeen. Mr. Congressman, as a resident of a border 
State, I can tell you I'm extremely concerned on a personal 
level. With my professional background, I am increasingly 
concerned given the sheer number of people who are crossing 
over that again, we have no idea who they are and what their 
backgrounds are.
    Also, going back to the Afghanistan withdrawal, those first 
couple of planes that took off from Kabul Airport were full of 
people who had not been vetted and subsequent vetting showed 
that actually some of them had in place IEDs and appeared on 
our biometrics. So I have very grave concerns about this and I 
thank you for your attention to this matter.
    Mr. Bishop. Thank you, ma'am.
    Mr. Schroden, I want to give you sort-of the opportunity 
maybe for the other side. When I was wrapped up with Ms. 
Abizaid, I said that--let's see if I got enough time to do 
that--I don't. Let me just ask you the question directly. You 
said a minute ago that what keeps you up at night is religious 
and ethnically-motivated domestic violent extremists. Given the 
600,000 gotaways--and actually I think that number is bigger 
now. I have a hard time keeping the number. I know that when I 
talked to Secretary Mayorkas that was what we thought it was in 
April last year. How do you know that DVEs are a bigger threat 
than someone who is lurked in among the 600,000 we have never 
contacted?
    Mr. Schroden. Well, so I can't speak, sir, to that with any 
particular analysis that I've done by myself. My comment 
earlier was based on the intelligence assessment of the Office 
of the Director of National Intelligence who concluded that 
REMVs are the greatest terrorist threat to the United States 
citizens right now.
    Mr. Bishop. You know, it's interesting, and I hear that all 
the time from officials here--and my time is about to--but this 
final comment. What concerns me is exactly that. That is what I 
get. You get these assessments, but we have seen intel failures 
all across time. It is interesting. As a Member of Congress--I 
don't know if the American people really understand or 
appreciate this--I am never told why they think that. I am 
never shown data to indicate the numerosity of those threats 
versus others or the likelihood of their carrying something 
out. It is a very frustrating thing for me as a Member of 
Congress, fairly new, to see that phenomenon exist, but it is 
interesting to me because you are in the same spot I am. They 
say that, but it doesn't make sense.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
    The Chair now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. 
Goldman.
    Mr. Goldman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Bishop, we are happy to share the data to address the 
domestic violent extremism with you. It is clearly the No. 1 
threat.
    I am going to move on a little bit beyond how the 
withdrawal from Afghanistan has a significant impact on our 
Southern Border security. It seems quite remote, and even our 
witnesses seem to say that we don't know who is in the 6,000. 
So it is pure speculation. I would really like for us to be 
doing really meaningful oversight of the longest war we have 
ever had in Afghanistan--20 years. But the reality, of course, 
is that proper oversight does not start on January 21, 2021. 
There is a lead-up and a situation that any Commander-in-Chief 
inherits. Colonel Douglas, wouldn't you acknowledge that any 
decision that a Commander-in-Chief makes must factor in what 
the previous Commander-in-Chief did?
    Mr. Douglas. Sir, while that might be a factor, I think 
what you also have to take into account is the advice that was 
provided through military officials, and that was the retention 
of 2,500 personnel to maintain stability and security in 
Afghanistan.
    Mr. Goldman. Do you think 2,500 personnel would maintain 
security in Afghanistan for an extended period of time?
    Mr. Douglas. Sir, based on my own experience in talking 
with Afghans that I worked, lived, and served with, that one 
American can make a difference. That ties to what Napoleon said 
of the moral is to the physical is 3 is to 1. Really an army of 
lesser size can beat any enemy if they've got the belief that 
somebody's going to stand with them. Their belief was that one 
American showed that they had American support. So, yes, I 
wholeheartedly believe 2,500 would have maintained stability.
    Mr. Goldman. I appreciate that anecdotal evidence of 
talking to a few people, but let's point out that Secretary 
Austin testified on September 28, 2021, ``If you stayed in 
Afghanistan at a forced posture of 2,500, certainly you'd be in 
a fight with the Taliban, and you'd have to reinforce 
yourself.''
    Colonel Douglas, let me ask you this, are you familiar with 
the November 11, 2020 order to withdraw all United States 
troops from Somalia and Afghanistan by January 15, 2021?
    Mr. Douglas. No, sir, I'm not.
    Mr. Goldman. OK. Well, I would like to introduce it into 
the record. It is quite short, and I would ask unanimous 
consent to introduce the November 11, 2020 memo from the acting 
secretary of defense, subject withdrawal from Somalia and 
Afghanistan.
    Mr. Crane [presiding]. So ordered.
    [The information follows:]

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
    
    Mr. Goldman. ``I hereby direct you to withdraw all U.S. 
military forces from the Federal Republic of Somalia no later 
than 31 December 2020, and from the Islamic Republic of 
Afghanistan no later than 15 January 2021. Inform all allied 
and partner forces of the above directives. Please confirm 
receipt of this order. Sincerely, Donald J. Trump.''
    Now, Chairman Milley has previously testified before 
Congress that he received this order from the White House's 
personnel director, the PPO director, Johnny McEntee, and that 
it had not been vetted by anyone in the Department of Defense. 
Colonel Douglas, is it standard operating procedure for the PPO 
to issue troop withdrawal orders without any consultation of 
the Department of Defense?
    Mr. Douglas. Sir, I wish I could comment on that, but that 
would be clearly outside of the scope of my position or any 
position that I had experienced in my time in military service.
    Mr. Goldman. Exactly.
    Ms. Ledeen, what about you? What do you think of that 
process?
    Ms. Ledeen. Congressman, do you want me to speak to 
Somalia?
    Mr. Goldman. No, we are here on Afghanistan and getting an 
order from PPO that wasn't vetted through DoD. Is that standard 
operating procedure?
    Ms. Ledeen. I was operating at a level well below having 
any ability----
    Mr. Goldman. OK. Ambassador Sales?
    Mr. Sales. Congressman, that's not normal, which is why the 
White House retracted that order that you referred to.
    Mr. Goldman. Right. Then they said that there will be a 
drawdown to 2,500, is that right?
    Mr. Sales. That's correct. Which is the current number of 
troops we have in Iraq.
    Mr. Goldman. All right. I guess my time is up.
    I would just mention to our Majority that I think we all on 
this side recognize a meaningful oversight of the withdrawal of 
Afghanistan is very important, and we should be doing that. But 
we should be focusing not on what started January 21, 2021 to 
the present, but throughout the 20-year war, and especially on 
what prompted the drawdown to 2,500 troops and the order to 
withdraw all troops from Afghanistan. That has to be part of 
meaningful oversight, and I hope it can be as we move forward. 
I yield back.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you.
    The Chair now yields to himself. Hope I said that right. 
Ambassador, this question is for you. Are you familiar with the 
saying peace through strength?
    Mr. Sales. It's one of my favorites, Congressman.
    Mr. Crane. Ambassador Sales, with all your experience in 
homeland security and counterterrorism, what does this saying 
mean to you?
    Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, it means that overwhelming 
American military capability is capable of deterring our 
adversaries, whether we're talking about nation-state 
adversaries, such as the Chinese Communist Party or Russia, or, 
on a smaller scale, terrorist groups like ISIS, like al-Qaeda. 
If the United States has the meaningful ability to deploy 
overwhelming force against our adversaries, we are far less 
likely to have to do so.
    Mr. Crane. Colonel Douglas, in your own words, what do you 
think would be the opposite of peace through strength?
    Mr. Douglas. It'd have to be weakness, sir, the opposite.
    Mr. Crane. You think it would be fair to say chaos may be 
violence by way of weakness? Something like that?
    Mr. Douglas. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Crane. Ambassador Sales, are you aware that shortly 
after our disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan that Russia 
invaded Ukraine?
    Mr. Sales. I am, Congressman.
    Mr. Crane. Another current event. Ambassador, are you aware 
that China flew a spy balloon over the entire United States?
    Mr. Sales. I'm aware of that, sir.
    Mr. Crane. This is for the entire panel. Are you guys aware 
that many of our economic partners and allies around the world 
are ditching the U.S. dollar right now, putting the dollar in 
danger of no longer being the global reserve currency?
    Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I wouldn't necessarily 
consider Lula's Brazil a partner of the United States, but the 
broader trend you've identified is exactly right.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Ambassador.
    Ambassador Sales, I am wondering if, like any of the 
constituents that I talked to, you see any connection between 
the weakness and incompetence that we showed in Afghanistan and 
some of these other world events that I just mentioned, or if 
you think that this is just a spurious, non-connected chain of 
events?
    Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I could take this back to 
Osama bin Laden. I think he said something that is instructive 
several decades ago. When people see a strong horse and a weak 
horse, they prefer the strong horse. A weak America invites 
aggression, a weak America invites instability. To the extent 
the United States appears weak on a world stage, that's not 
only bad for our homeland security, it's not only bad for our 
national security and foreign policy interests, it's bad for 
the stability and security of the whole world.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you.
    Colonel Douglas, you were a Marine officer for 31 years, is 
that correct?
    Mr. Douglas. Yes, sir, it is.
    Mr. Crane. I am just a Navy guy and I am familiar that in 
the Marine Corps, you guys often like to joke around and say 
you are the men's department of the Navy. Is that correct, 
Colonel?
    Mr. Crane. Sir, I've never said that. You and I share some 
close associates.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you for your tact, Colonel. I appreciate 
that.
    Colonel, in your opinion, who does bear the ultimate 
responsibility of the dead Marines, the billions of gear we 
left behind, the equipment left behind, and the global chaos we 
see unfolding after the Afghanistan withdrawal?
    Mr. Douglas. Sir, I think the President said it best when 
he said, the buck stops here. I think that that's where we need 
to stay is the buck stops here.
    Mr. Crane. Colonel, in the Marine Corps, when they were 
teaching you guys leadership, what did they teach you about 
accountability?
    Mr. Douglas. One of the many things they taught us was you 
can delegate responsibility, you cannot delegate 
accountability.
    Mr. Crane. Colonel, do you feel, do you see any 
accountability for this withdrawal of Afghanistan and our dead 
Marines?
    Mr. Douglas. At this point, we have not seen 
accountability.
    Mr. Crane. Colonel, what would you like to see happen going 
forward?
    Mr. Douglas. Acknowledgment that there could have been 
better options and that our withdrawal was, in fact, chaotic.
    Mr. Crane. Ambassador Sales, I will ask you the same 
question. What would you like to see moving forward?
    Mr. Sales. I'd like to see accountability, Congressman, for 
a colossal foreign policy and national security failure of the 
sort that we saw in Afghanistan. I would like to see 
accountability for the decisions that were made.
    Mr. Crane. Do you think that is possible after watching the 
video that we watched at the beginning of this hearing?
    Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I have to say I was 
discouraged by the statement that the White House put out a 
week or so ago, which seemed to be more interested in pointing 
fingers than in learning lessons. I'm hopeful that 
Congressional oversight can help bring the accountability 
that's needed.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Ambassador.
    I yield my time.
    I now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Congresswoman 
Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chair and the Ranking 
Member for their courtesy. Let me, first of all, acknowledge 
and appreciate the service of each and every one of you. Having 
not served, but having family members who have served and 
having the good fortune of serving in the U.S. Congress, to go 
on to most all military war zones, including the very first 
one, the Bosnia war that was going on with then Republican 
leadership going in before the Dayton Peace Treaty was signed 
and then, tragically, Afghanistan during the action. I was not 
in action, but I was one of the few members that were in and as 
well Iraq and then subsequent places as well, including the DMZ 
in North and South Korea.
    So let me say to Honorable Nathan Sales and Simone Ledeen 
and Colonel Christopher Douglas, the service that you have 
given Dr. Schroden, we appreciate the service in the myriad of 
ways that you have done so. I will not get into the Marine-Navy 
debate at this point, just to say there are very fine men and 
women who serve in both of those branches of the United States 
military, including all others.
    But what I would like to do is to take on the task very 
quickly of understanding the inherited chaotic withdrawal that 
was a result of Trump's Taliban deal. How do I know this? 
Because I met with--unfortunately, obviously, the president of 
Afghan did not show himself well in that moment--but I met with 
his leadership preceding and the First Lady who came and 
begged, begged for the Afghan government to be involved, to no 
avail. No one listened.
    So let me quickly, Dr. Schroden, just quickly indicate that 
with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, Donald 
Trump came into office 2017, approximately 11,000 troops. He 
wanted 3,005--well, he gave permission to add troops, 3,500 
were added. Additional troops were NATO-led. They were 14,000 
to 15,000. By mid-2018 President Trump was reportedly 
frustrated with the lack of military progress against the 
Taliban, and he ordered formal and direct U.S. talks without 
the Afghan government participating for the first time. As 
those talks developed under special representative, who I knew 
as well, Khalilzad, who we met with several times, President 
Trump continued to express frustration with the U.S. military 
mission in Afghanistan and a desire to withdraw U.S. troops, 
saying in August 2019 that he wanted to do so quickly, as 
quickly as we can. Then, of course, the withdrawal commitment 
was not conditioned on Taliban reducing violence against the 
Afghan government, making concessions in intra-Afghan talks, or 
taking other actions, which we saw with a complete condemnation 
of women, destroying of small businesses, and destroying Kabul, 
the real heart of democracy there. The United States was not 
able to remain indefinitely and the American public's patient 
as well, was getting.
    So in February 2020, United States and Taliban signed the 
agreement that committed to withdrawing all of its troops, 
contracts, non-diplomatic, civilian, from Afghanistan with a 
draw-down forces to 8,600 by mid-July and then on to April 21.
    Very quickly, if I might, Dr. Schroden, what are your 
thoughts on the Trump-Taliban deal, particularly the Trump 
administration negotiating directly with the Taliban, planning 
to invite them on U.S. soil and negotiating with them absent 
the Afghan government? Did that not contribute to the mix of 
the controversy? In addition, as well, DHS indicated that it 
was such a rush, they didn't have a system to vet everyone. 
That is something we should look at. But if I yield to you on 
that question, please.
    Mr. Schroden. Sure. Thank you, ma'am.
    I would say the decision to negotiate without the Afghan 
government in the room was made largely because that was the 
only way that negotiations would proceed. President Obama had 
tried to negotiate with the Taliban previously, had insisted on 
a precondition being that they'd negotiate with the Afghan 
government there, and they refused. So that condition was the 
only way to get the Taliban to sit down and begin talks.
    That said, again, Ambassador Khalilzad's going in 
proposition was that nothing would be agreed until everything 
was agreed. Everything included a framework for structured 
negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban as 
part of the end-point of the agreement. That point was 
conceded. The agreement that was signed in February only 
established that as a follow-on step to be taken. It was not an 
integral part of the agreement itself.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. So they rolled over the Afghan government 
at the end? You are saying they couldn't get to the table 
because they couldn't get the Taliban to the table with them 
there?
    Let me just say that I was not at the table for 
negotiation, so I am going to be a Democrat that is going to 
second-guess. I stand with President Obama on that and I don't 
think that we should have left the government out. We should 
have found a way to have the government in maybe bilateral 
negotiations.
    Was there anything that you saw that resulted--in can you 
just be specific--that resulted in the calamity because the 
Afghan government was not in the end results, if you could?
    Mr. Schroden. Well, so I wasn't involved in the 
negotiations directly, so I can't speak to specific points of 
discussion. Certainly, the Afghan government was frustrated by 
the fact that they were not in the room. President Ghani and 
his national security advisor expressed that frustration quite 
openly to include in hearings here in Washington, DC on 
multiple occasions. So, yes, they were quite frustrated by the 
fact they were not in the room for those talks.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you see any homeland implications on--
--
    Mr. Crane. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman. Could I just let 
him answer, Mr. Chairman, this last point?
    Mr. Crane. Ma'am, you are 1 minute and 15 seconds over.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Am I?
    Mr. Crane. If we can make it real quick, I will let you.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Homeland security implications of the 
agreement signed.
    Mr. Schroden. The homeland security is really outside of my 
area of expertise, ma'am, in terms of the DHS aspect of it.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Thank you. I yield back.
    Mr. Crane. I only let you go longer because you said 
something really nice about the Navy.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I truly believe it. Thank you. I yield 
back.
    Mr. Crane. I now recognize Mr. D'Esposito from New York.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. Good morning, 
everyone, to our panel. Thank you for being here and thank you 
for your service.
    One of the things that we discuss regularly is the view of 
America's credibility on a world stage. Ambassador, I would 
have to ask, do you believe that America's credibility on the 
world stage has been damaged as a result of the Biden 
administration's catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan?
    Mr. Sales. It gives me no pleasure to say it, Congressman, 
but I do.
    Mr. D'Esposito. It gives none of us pleasure, to be honest. 
Do you agree that our foreign adversaries, like China and 
Russia perceive the botched U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as 
a manifestation of American weakness? Please just elaborate a 
little further on it, if you could.
    Mr. Sales. I'm afraid they do. I think it's difficult to 
answer these questions as a private citizen who lacks access to 
U.S. Government collection on these matters. But it stands to 
reason that if a foreign adversary sees the United States run 
out of Afghanistan in chaos--and let's be clear, it was chaos--
13 dead service members is chaos, Afghans falling to their 
deaths from airplanes is chaos. If foreign adversaries see the 
United States humiliated in such a manner, they will calculate 
that the United States can be pushed back at low cost to them.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you.
    Mr. Chair, I yield back.
    Mr. Crane. The committee will now move to a second round of 
questioning.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member, Representative 
Magaziner.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chair.
    Let me just say the reason that so many of us are concerned 
about domestic violence, violent extremism, is because over the 
last 5 years, more Americans have been killed by racially and 
ethnically motivated mass casualty events than by events 
connected with foreign terrorism on U.S. soil. That is not to 
say that we should lose focus on the foreign terror threats as 
well, but the list is extensive--El Paso, Buffalo, Charleston, 
Orlando. The list goes on and on, and the victims of those 
attacks matter.
    I would also thank my Republican colleagues for their 
concern about the strength of the U.S. dollar. I will take that 
as a sign that the brinkmanship over raising the debt ceiling 
will end in the interest of national security, although I am 
not optimistic.
    Turning the focus back to Afghanistan. Listen, I think Mr. 
Goldman said it well, accountability is important, but 
accountability does not begin in January 2021. There is a 
larger story here that if we are going to draw lessons for the 
future and how to do better, we have to be mindful of. So let 
me just be clear about this. Dr. Schroden, when the Trump-
Taliban deal was signed, attacks by the Taliban against the 
Afghan security forces and police went up by an average of 70 
percent a day. In the ensuing months did President Trump or his 
administration ever say that, well, maybe we should slow down 
or re-think this deal, slow down our troop withdrawals, 
reconsider, push back the time line in light of the fact that 
Taliban attacks were going up instead of down? OK. To your 
knowledge, during that period of the drawdown, when the Taliban 
successfully recaptured 217 of Afghanistan's 407 districts, did 
the Trump administration ever say, wait a minute, maybe we 
should reconsider, slow down the troop withdrawals?
    Mr. Schroden. Not to my knowledge, no.
    Mr. Magaziner. OK. When it became clear that Afghan 
nationals who risked their own lives to help the United States 
in our mission were not being protected from Taliban 
retribution, was there ever any indication from the Trump 
administration that they were re-thinking the terms of their 
deal?
    Mr. Schroden. I'm not aware of them re-thinking the terms 
of the deal, no.
    Mr. Magaziner. When President Biden inherited this 
withdrawal and made the decision to delay the deadline for 
moving all U.S. troops by I believe it was 5 months, the former 
President did not say that this was a reasonable step to 
protect U.S. service members and our Afghan allies; he, in fact 
criticized President Biden for moving back the deadline.
    So looking forward, what lessons can we draw here? We have 
talked about the importance of having a screening process in 
place to remove potentially special immigrant visa-eligible 
individuals who have assisted the United States from foreign 
theaters. One of the things that my understanding did not 
happen in advance was the Department of Defense did not share 
its full list of individuals that could be SIV-eligible with 
the Department of Homeland Security, which was tasked with 
screening these individuals. That is certainly a lesson that we 
should learn from going forward.
    We also need to make sure that, as we discussed in our 
previous round of questioning, we explore all options for 
monitoring and eliminating terrorist threats emanating from 
Afghanistan for whatever means are at our disposal, given the 
fact that the withdrawal deal did not include a provision to 
allow for intelligence gathering or operations in Afghanistan 
in order to neutralize terrorist threats.
    So I want to thank our witnesses for your service to our 
country. I want to thank you for offering proactive ideas for 
how we can mitigate terror threats emanating from Afghanistan 
and around the world on a go-forward basis. I know that all of 
us, despite our differences here, take that responsibility 
seriously. We want to protect Americans, and we want to make 
sure that we do it in a way that is comprehensive and 
effective. With that, I will yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
    The Chair will now recognize myself for a second round of 
questioning.
    As I think about the Commander-in-Chief and my previous 
question to Colonel Douglas, if Commander-in-Chief has not 
liked many of the deals that were done in the previous 
administration--in fact, there has been 180-degree reversal on 
many of those. So somebody who served for 20-plus years wearing 
a uniform, you don't like it, you are the commander, well 
change it. So that ability was there.
    Dr. Schroden, you publicly criticized the Biden 
administration's report on the U.S. withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. Particularly you stated the administration's 
report is not an objective attempt to identify or summarize 
lessons learned, you said it is a political document designed 
to deflect blame. You also said at the end of the day that 
Biden is President, who made the call and the disastrous 
withdrawal occurred on his watch. Is that true?
    Mr. Schroden. Yes, that's true.
    Chairman Pfluger. OK. Look, if we are going to have a 
discussion about the facts and what happened, when you are the 
Commander-in-Chief, you have a 4-year period and you can make 
those decisions. What I am worried about right now, Ambassador 
Sales, is in the 9/11 Commission it was stated and recognized 
that in the days leading up to September 11, 2001, the words 
``the system was flashing red'' was said many times. They 
acknowledged there was a problem. What I want to know right 
now, and make sure that we don't get to, is is the system 
flashing red right now? Because it seems like it to me with all 
the issues we are talking about.
    Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, it's hard to know what the 
system is flashing if you don't have intelligence-collection 
capabilities on the ground. Our intelligence professionals are 
incredibly skilled, they're the best in the world, but there's 
only so much they can do if they don't have HUMINT networks on 
the ground in Afghanistan, if they don't have ISR platforms 
doing orbits overhead.
    If I could, Congressman, address the broader question of 
the Doha Agreement. I think it's important to remember that 
President Biden, as a candidate, promised to get out of 
Afghanistan months before the Doha Agreement was signed. On 
July 30, 2019, 7 months before Doha, he told the Council on 
Foreign Relations, ``I would bring American combat troops in 
Afghanistan home during my first term.'' He reiterated that 
message on TV with George Stephanopoulos in a clip that was not 
aired. In that video, George Stephanopoulos says: So you would 
have withdrawn troops like this even if President Trump had not 
made that deal with the Taliban?/The President: I would have 
tried to figure out how to withdraw those troops, yes.
    Mr. Chairman, if I may, just one last comment about the 
terms of the Doha Agreement I'm not here to criticize the deal, 
I'm not here to defend the deal, but one thing that is 
important to recall about the deal is that it was conditions-
based. If the Taliban did not meet their obligations under the 
deal, then the United States was released from its obligations 
under the deal. This is exactly what Secretary of Defense Mark 
Esper said in March 2020. I quote: ``Doha is a conditions-based 
agreement. If we assess that the Taliban is honoring the terms 
of the deal, the U.S. will reduce our presence toward a goal of 
zero in 2021. But''--and this is the key quote--``if progress 
stalls, then our drawdown likely will be suspended as well.'' 
President Biden did not have his hands tied by the Doha 
Agreement. He made a decision months before the Doha Agreement 
to withdraw, and the Agreement gave him all the flexibility he 
needed to adjust his approach.
    Chairman Pfluger. Conditions-based. As somebody who flew 
combat missions over the Middle East, not in Afghanistan, but 
has, again, 2 decades of military experience, the conditions-
based approach is what every military commander learns. It is 
what every general and secretary of defense aims for. I am 
afraid that we got this completely opposite. It was not 
conditions-based. General McKenzie, in fact, at this point, in 
December 2021, stated, we are probably at 2 percent of the 
capabilities we once had to look into Afghanistan, making it 
very hard to understand what is happening there.
    Colonel Douglas, do you agree with that statement, that we 
virtually have no idea what is going on?
    Mr. Douglas. I would have to agree with General McKenzie on 
that. I mean, bottom line is even if we have an over-the-rise 
in capability, it's best to find humans with humans.
    Chairman Pfluger. Ms. Ledeen, your thoughts. You have 
previously said that what happens in Afghanistan does not stay 
in Afghanistan. That lack of intelligence, how does that 
negatively impact our security?
    Ms. Ledeen. Mr. Chairman, as someone who served two tours 
in Afghanistan working with the intelligence community, I can 
tell you that we were successful based on our HUMINT-enabled 
signals intelligence. We have incredible tools, but they're 
also limited in the sense that they need to be focused in the 
correct place to get what we need. That's why we traditionally 
rely on sources on the ground to help direct us as to where we 
need to focus those efforts. We have lost that HUMINT element 
at this point, and our SIGINT element is greatly reduced. So I 
would say there's no way to just turn that HUMINT spigot back 
on. We are not a trustworthy partner anymore. We abandoned our 
human assets, and many of them have been tortured and murdered 
now. Again, it doesn't only stay in Afghanistan, our partners 
around the world have seen that and they have reacted 
accordingly. Saudi Arabia has gone from a potential Abraham 
Accords partner to de-dollarization in 2 years.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much.
    My time has expired.
    It is time that we focus on the threats and get our minds 
back right.
    With that, I recognize the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. 
Titus.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Since we are on this agreement, I would ask you, Dr. 
Schroden, what do you think of the agreement? Do you think that 
negotiating directly with the Taliban without the Afghan 
government present was a good idea? Talk about lack of 
intelligence. We didn't have their input when they negotiated 
this deal. Do you think also that future homeland security 
implications can come from our commitment to the deal?
    Mr. Schroden. Thank you for the question, ma'am.
    I would say that, again, the only way that the Taliban was 
going to negotiate with the United States was to not have the 
Afghan government in the room. So to the extent that we wanted 
to have a negotiation with them, that was a condition that had 
to be met in order for those talks in order to begin. They had 
steadfastly refused to engage with us or to engage with the 
Afghan government being in the room. So that was a condition 
that had to be met to even get the talks going.
    That said, one of the goals of the talks at the outset was 
to include a structured framework for the Afghan government and 
the Taliban to talk and to reach agreement on sort-of a future 
governance structure for the country. That term, which was a 
goal at the outset of the initiation of these discussions, was 
not included in the agreement that was signed in February 2020.
    Ms. Titus. So what about future homeland security issues, 
which is what this committee is supposed to be focused on? How 
much of a threat does that situation now pose for us?
    Mr. Schroden. Well, I think there's two primary groups in 
Afghanistan that have an expressed intent to attack the United 
States homeland, that would be al-Qaeda and the Islamic State 
Khorasan Province, or ISKP. Al-Qaeda has minimal, if any, 
capability to do that from Afghanistan right now. That's not 
just my assessment, the United Nations has also assessed that 
as recently as late 2022. So al-Qaeda is largely a localized 
actor at this point in time in Afghanistan. ISKP has a lot more 
capability to attack beyond Afghanistan. Indeed, they've 
conducted some tens of attacks in Pakistan as well as cross-
border attacks against both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. So they 
are a regional menace at this point. They don't currently have 
the ability to attack the United States homeland, nor, to my 
knowledge, have we detected any intent or any sort of planning 
or activities on their part to do that. I know several people 
have quoted General Kurilla, the commander of Central Command, 
having said that in his estimation, within 6 months, ISKP could 
attack externally. When he was pressed on that particular 
point, though, in his testimony, he acknowledged that those 
attacks would much more likely to be regional or potentially 
into Europe and that an attack against U.S. homeland would be 
much, much more unlikely.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    Along those same lines, Mr. Sales, you quote a Washington 
Examiner article that warns about 98 individuals who are on the 
terrorist watch list were apprehended after crossing the 
Southern Border. So do you think this is a threat to the 
homeland? Or would you acknowledge what percentage of the 
people that we have encountered along the border are 
represented by this 98?
    Mr. Sales. Well, thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
    Just to be clear, the source that I cited for those numbers 
was not a newspaper, but rather U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection.
    I do think that the dramatic spike we've seen from zero 
KSTs encountered several years ago to 98 last year and 69 so 
far this year is troubling. I think terrorists are aware of 
gaps in our border security, and they will certainly try to 
exploit those gaps.
    Ms. Titus. I would give you the number since you didn't 
answer my question. It is .0044 percent--.0044 percent. These 
individuals were apprehended, isn't that correct?
    Mr. Sales. That is correct, Congresswoman. But I think, 
remember, it was just 19 hijackers who were able to pull off 
the 9/11 attack. So that is the number that matters.
    Ms. Titus. But those weren't apprehended and that is not 
relevant to what we are talking about now. We are talking about 
today across the Southern Border the percentage and those were 
the ones who were apprehended. So let's don't spread 
misinformation claiming that this big wave is waltzing across 
our border to attack like 9/11. Is that what you are trying to 
say? We are going to have another 9/11? Is that what you are 
saying?
    Mr. Sales. Well, Congresswoman, I think the American people 
would generally agree with me that if almost 100 known----
    Ms. Titus. Well, we can say one person can blow up a 
building. So I think that is stretching the point of what we 
are doing here. I think we can say that our border agents are 
working pretty effectively if they have captured this 98 that 
you are talking about that is such a small percent, that we are 
doing a pretty good job of stopping these outside people coming 
in to threaten our national security. Would you not concede 
that?
    Mr. Sales. Well, to continue my thought, Congresswoman, I 
think I believe--and I believe that the American people would 
agree, that if nearly 100 known or suspected terrorists are 
able to come into the United States----
    Ms. Titus. But they weren't, they were apprehended.
    Mr. Sales. Mr. Chairman, may I finish that sentence?
    Chairman Pfluger. Go ahead.
    Mr. Sales. If 98 known or suspected terrorists are able to 
enter the United States, that would be of concern. It would 
raise this further question, how many others are getting in 
that we were not able to catch and that we don't know about?
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, also a 
veteran and serving in Afghanistan, Mr. Gonzalez.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for holding 
this very important hearing.
    I spent 20 years in the military, 5 years in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. I grew up in Afghanistan. I remember being 21 
years old, landing in Kandahar, and it was as if I landed on 
the backside of the moon. Poppy fields everywhere, I remember 
walking around with a hand pistol, and there was a warlord 
driving a brand new Range Rover. I am going, how the heck did 
he get a Range Rover on the moon? That is what we were dealing 
with. Then behind him was a Toyota pickup truck with about 20 
people with AKs and RPGs. So that is the world I grew up in. 
Those were our allies, right?
    So the question I have for you is, OEF Vets, we will never 
forget what happened in Afghanistan. We will never forget that 
there were 13 Americans killed just days before the Biden 
administration pulled the rug from underneath us. We will never 
forget having to, as many of you all did, having to put 
together organizations to go save Americans and also save our 
allies. We will never forget those things.
    But I am deeply concerned with some of the repercussions of 
what happened. In particular, my first question is for 
Ambassador Sales or Ms. Ledeen. As was noted during the opening 
remarks, the Biden administration left over $7 billion worth of 
vehicles, weapons, and other gear in the country for the 
Taliban and other terrorist organizations. Are either you aware 
of any reports or evidence showing any of these articles in the 
possession of U.S. adversaries are being used in armed 
conflicts outside of Afghanistan? I am thinking of Ukraine, I 
am thinking of all these different hotbeds--Iranians in 
particular. Any of you aware of any of this material popping up 
around the world?
    Ms. Ledeen. Congressman, thank you for the question.
    In terms of the materials, I am limited as to my scope at 
this point. But I have heard secondarily from other former 
colleagues who are still in government that there are some 
materials that have crossed the border and are turning up in 
bordering countries that are not friendly to the United States.
    I would add to that, if I may, the many, many Afghan 
commandos that we trained over the years, many of whom actually 
came here for training, had to escape because we didn't help 
them. So they have escaped to countries like Pakistan and Iran. 
There have been multiple reports about them joining, some of 
them joining the Wagner Group and fighting on behalf of Russia 
in Ukraine. So the sort-of global repercussions of this 
continue. Thank you.
    Mr. Gonzalez. My next question is for Colonel Douglas. 
Seeing first-hand the chaos of the withdrawal, what do you 
believe could have been done differently in the planning and 
evacuation efforts? One thing that in particular comes to mind 
is Iraq. All right. So at some point, we are going to have to 
get out of Iraq. Ideally, it is not the same situation of what 
happened in Afghanistan, bu that is what is on my mind. What 
can we do to prevent the next type of withdrawal, whatever that 
is, from happening?
    Mr. Douglas. Sir, to talk about Afghanistan, what could 
have happened is we had a conditions-based agreement that 
wasn't being honored, was to follow the conditions-based 
agreement. DoD was conducting planning. All plans were multi-
option and multi-jurisdictional. So I think all agencies 
working together to come to a workable time line I think would 
probably be in the best interest.
    As you mentioned, Iraq, I mean we've already seen the exit 
of there once and the repercussions of having had to go back as 
a service member to fight the ISIS campaign, I can say that 
let's make sure that we do that with care, consistency, and 
confidence as we move forward.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you.
    My last question, because I am almost out of time, Ms. 
Ledeen, has any Federal agency contacted you about your group's 
effort to coordinate evacuations or any other group that you 
are aware of? I will preface with may of our offices 
essentially turned into many State Department offices, many 
FEMA offices, where we were the ones coordinating, we were the 
ones helping Americans. One American in particular was an 
Afghan interpreter that I helped get to San Antonio and his 
family, or they would have been killed. I mean, it wasn't a 
slap on the wrist. Has anyone reached out to you for lessons 
learned? Any Federal agencies?
    Ms. Ledeen. No, they have not.
    Mr. Gonzalez. See, that is part of a problem. I think part 
of it, too, is we can't let our knowledge, our information end 
in this hearing. We have to continue to push the issue. That is 
why I think it is so important and grateful for Chairman 
Pfluger for bringing this up. We have got to continue to get 
ahead of it, because it doesn't end in Afghanistan. Afghanistan 
doesn't end at those borders. With that, I yield back, 
Chairman.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. 
Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Again, let me thank the Chairman and 
Ranking Member for your courtesies, and let me indicate that we 
should be finding solutions, but forgive me for trying to 
ensure that the record is set correct.
    Also my opinion, no matter what administration it was, it 
certainly was not done with the Trump administration. There 
should have been--as I say, let me put on the record, this 
whole thing of the weakness and weak-kneed of the United 
States, we are the most powerful nation in the world, 
militarily-based, bar none. So whatever chattering is going on 
around the world, I am a defender and not an offender. I am not 
an aggressor, I am a defender. But I know and have confidence 
that we are prepared. So let that be on the record and others 
can investigate it. All of this hyperbole and seemingly 
hysteria, I think, does not fit well with what we need to do.
    Mr. Chairman, I respect you very much, and I think we 
should get to solutions.
    So let me again try to set the record straight. There were 
some comments about the dollar going under. I would venture to 
say on the record that this debt ceiling debate and debacle is 
more having to do with the dollar than anything else. I think 
economists from all walks of life will say that.
    In addition, the people coming across the border are not 
all known terrorists. They may be family members of such. We 
have already seen the minute number. I would venture to say, 
having had the privilege, in spite of the horrific catastrophic 
incident that generated the creation of Homeland Security 
Committee, I was on from the beginning, and I went to Ground 
Zero during the recovery--will never say rescue. I walked on 
the grounds when firefighters were still obtaining the remains 
of our beloved persons, Americans and others who perished. I 
take this very seriously, and I think we would do better if we 
find a way to work together.
    So, Dr. Schroden, you answered. Maybe I was not clear 
enough, because I sort-of talked very quickly. But let me again 
try to go to you on the question. I want to ask, I think it is 
Ambassador Sales. Ambassador Sales, I will come to you within 
my time to ask what are good next steps or a reflection of what 
we should do? I will welcome your comments. In fact, let me go 
to you first, sir. What can we do or what should we do? Right 
now we have--I use the term before, catastrophic debacle in 
Afghanistan. It breaks my heart. I have been there. I saw 
Kabul, I saw the women, I saw life. Yes, sir, your answer. I 
want to go to you, Dr. Schroden.
    Mr. Sales. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    I'll try to be brief. First of all, it's good to see you. 
You may recall that I actually represented you as your lawyer a 
decade ago in a case involving an Iranian dissident group. So 
it's good to see you again. I agree with you that the most 
important thing that we can do going forward is figure out how 
we can degrade terrorist threats that are growing in 
Afghanistan. I agree with a lot of what Dr. Schroden has said. 
I would not suggest that the United States share intelligence 
information with the Taliban. Their interests are not our 
interests. They are not a reliable counterterrorism partner. So 
I would instead focus on, No. 1, continuing to apply sanctions 
pressure to the Taliban until they uphold their commitments 
under the Doha Agreement to break with terrorists. Candidly, 
they are exceedingly unlikely to do so. That means that our 
sanctions need to remain in place for this foreseeable future. 
No diplomatic recognition for the Taliban, no sanctions relief, 
et cetera.
    The second thing I think that would be critical would be 
developing basing rights in the region for U.S. drones and 
perhaps other strike assets so that we are in a better position 
to collect intelligence in the country and to take action 
against those threats when warranted.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. That is very helpful. That can be whatever 
administration is in place can take some instructive 
counseling.
    Dr. Schroden, can I again get from you the horror of 
leaving out the Afghan government, even though you don't have 
the details, in that early agreement and going forward now, any 
signs of any level of democracy in Afghanistan at this point? 
Any smidgen of such that we can help contribute to? Yes, 
Doctor.
    Mr. Schroden. I don't see any Democratic-leaning trends on 
behalf of the Taliban, ma'am. I mean, they they are largely a 
totalitarian authoritarian-style government and their trends 
have been increasingly in that direction since they've been in 
power.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. The question about leaving them out, and 
you already said it, but you have got to give a little bit more 
flesh, and you have got 4 seconds or less I guess. I am over.
    Mr. Schroden. I mean, certainly in hindsight, not having 
them in the room for the discussions was--less than optimal is 
probably a generous way of saying it, though, again, I come 
back to had we continued to insist on the Afghan government 
being in the room for the negotiations, the negotiations would 
have likely never taken place because the Taliban insisted on 
that as a condition for them occurring at all. So had we not 
agreed to that, we would largely most likely be in a 
situation--again, this is a counterfactual--of continuing to 
fight in the same way that we were fighting when President 
Trump took office. There would be no negotiations at all.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. I hear you are tapping my last sentences, 
but they should have been included in the external--they should 
have been included in the extending, Mr. Chairman. They should 
have been included in the extending part of it.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina Mr. 
Bishop.
    Mr. Bishop. Ambassador Sales, I want to revisit--since 
Representative Titus sort-of ridiculed or trivialized what you 
said about the terrorism risk, uncontrolled Southern Border. It 
is my time, ma'am. I just was sitting here tallying, and I used 
a figure of 600,000 gotaways. Boy, that is an old figure. I 
asked staff to give me a figure, 1.3 million gotaways over the 
course of the Biden administration. What Border Patrol tells me 
is usually going to add in another 10 percent or so for 
gotaways that they don't even know about. They have some reason 
to believe it is about another 10 percent or so. But let's say 
1.3 million. If 1 percent of that number were folks intending 
to do harm in the nature of terrorists, something like that, 
that would be 13,000. That is 650 9/11 teams.
    Do you have anything to add or do you want to--which you 
weren't allowed to say during the time you were being sort-of 
talked over about the risk that is entailed there? Because it 
seems to me, just as a matter of common sense, that it is quite 
grave.
    Mr. Sales. Well, thank you for the question, Congressman.
    I agree with you that the risk is grave. It's not simply a 
matter of numbers, it's a matter of specific and concrete 
terrorist plots that have sought to exploit our Southern 
Border. As I mentioned in my written statement, in 2011 the 
Iranian regime in Tehran attempted to plot with a Mexican drug 
cartel to carry out an assassination of the Saudi Ambassador to 
the United States right here in, Washington. They were going to 
bomb Cafe Milano in Georgetown. That's not simply a matter of 
statistics, that's an actual plot that terrorists attempted to 
carry out by exploiting weaknesses on our Southern Border. More 
recently, in 2021, the Mullahs in Tehran were back at it again, 
attempting to work with an individual in Mexico who had ties to 
drug cartels in that country to assassinate former national 
security adviser John Bolton here in the United States. We know 
that the Iranian regime is aware of vulnerabilities in our 
Southern Border. They have attempted to exploit those 
vulnerabilities to carry out terrorist attacks here in the 
United States. I think we have to assume that other terrorist 
groups, including terrorists in Afghanistan, likewise are aware 
of the vulnerabilities in our border.
    Mr. Bishop. It is amazing to me, if you think back to that 
language, and it has been referred to here today, that was in 
the 
9/11 Commission report that the system was blinking red. That 
is to say that the risks were palpable. It was obvious to 
anyone who would analyze with common sense the risks of being 
hit and where the risk might come from, and they were ignored 
and trivialized by folks who decided that they could never 
happen, hadn't happened that way before, but it is obvious that 
it could. I thank you for giving voice to it.
    Let me switch to something else. Colonel Douglas, I think 
the phrase came from you, you mentioned the phrase, ``the buck 
stops here''. As you look over, I was reviewing again the memo 
released by the White House on April 6 about sort-of assessing 
Afghanistan debacle and what a disgrace it is. But that of 
course, came from whom? Who said that? Remember?
    Mr. Douglas. Yes, sir, that came from the President.
    Mr. Bishop. The President of the United States. Do you 
remember which President that was?
    Mr. Douglas. That was President Biden.
    Mr. Bishop. Actually, the first person who popularized that 
phrase and put it on his desk was Harry Truman. The buck stops 
here. I was looking on the internet just quickly, just thinking 
about that phrase, and it turns out President Biden said that 
about Afghanistan. That may have been he said, the buck stops 
with me. Yet all the weakness that is betrayed--or that is 
portrayed in the way the Afghanistan withdrawal was handled, 
doesn't it seem true that to pass the buck, that to have person 
after person, including the White House, stand up and say, 
well, the reason this was disaster happened is because Donald 
Trump was President before me and made some decisions, and I 
just couldn't figure out a way to get around those decisions in 
Donald Trump. Doesn't that actually exacerbate the weakness?
    Mr. Douglas. Sir, the initial statement that the buck stops 
with me taking accountability for the evacuation and the 
subsequent statement saying it was the previous administration 
is counterintuitive to his initial statement.
    Mr. Bishop. They are utterly contradictory of one another, 
which actually is a separate element of it that projects 
weakness even more. You can't even get a single line of thought 
going that you can stand behind.
    It is really a great tragedy, and it proposes grave danger 
to the United States.
    My time is about expired. I yield.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms. 
Titus.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Ambassador Sales, you said we need to keep sanctions up and 
we shouldn't have diplomatic recognition. I take it you also 
wouldn't agree to invite Taliban to Camp David.
    Let me go on, though. I don't need a response to that.
    I would also point out that nearly all of the terror-
related--or their names were on the terror watch individuals 
who were arrested at the border came from Latin America, not 
from Afghanistan. Most of the groups that they represented at 
the time are no longer active. I would also point out that the 
people who are so concerned about our activity at the border, 
who are so critical of our people who are trying to do the best 
they can at the border, are in favor of cutting funding to the 
border. Only two Republican Members of Congress serving today 
voted for the omnibus, which would have given more funding to 
the border. Cutting money for law enforcement, it seems to be 
part of their so-called budget plan. So if you want better 
border, you have got to support their efforts. Let's just be 
clear about that.
    Now, my question goes to Dr. Schroden. What, if anything, 
would have changed if the United States had stayed in 
Afghanistan for an eternity, which is apparently what these 
folks want to have happened, as opposed to doing some kind of 
withdrawal? Would that have been an improvement? Did you 
support that? What would be the situation had we stayed?
    Mr. Schroden. Ma'am, so the analysis that I did between 
2015 and 2020 routinely showed the security situation in 
Afghanistan deteriorating over that time frame. So the Taliban 
were increasingly encroaching on Afghan districts, right. 
Between 2017 and 2019, the number of districts that the 
government controlled decreased by about 40 percent. My own 
analysis in 2020, toward the end of 2020, showed that the 
Taliban had effectively surrounded 15 of Afghanistan's 34 
provincial capitals. So the situation was not, as some 
described at the time, a stable stalemate that could be 
maintained through the application of 2,500 U.S. troops 
indefinitely. It was a deteriorating security situation that 
would have--to arrest that situation would likely have required 
the re-influx, another surge, if you will, of U.S. forces to 
try and turn that around.
    Ms. Titus. So putting more of our men and women in danger 
by sending more troops to try to maintain some kind of 
stability?
    Mr. Schroden. In the same way that the Trump administration 
and the Obama administration inherited a declining security 
situation in Afghanistan, the Biden administration also 
inherited a declining security situation in Afghanistan.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. 
D'Esposito.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Ms. Titus, I am not sure how you can look into your crystal 
ball and know how two freshmen Members of Congress were going 
to vote.
    Nonetheless----
    Chairman Pfluger. The committee will be in order.
    Mr. D'Esposito. I would like to share a quote with you. In 
the fall of 2020, my analysis was that an accelerated 
withdrawal without meeting specific and necessary conditions 
risks losing the substantial gains made in Afghanistan, 
damaging U.S. world-wide credibility and could precipitate a 
general collapse of the Afghan National Security Forces and the 
Afghan government, resulting in a complete Taliban takeover or 
general civil war. That was a year ago. My assessment remained 
consistent throughout. That was General Mark Milley, Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
    Ambassador Sales, what are your thoughts and what response 
to that quote?
    Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, thanks for the question.
    Unfortunately, that crystal ball appears to have been an 
accurate one, because that appears to have been exactly what 
happened. With the withdrawal of U.S. forces completed in 
August 2021, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces no 
longer had the capability to defend themselves and were 
demoralized, furthermore, by statements from the United States 
that our commitment to partnering with them was over.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you.
    Ms. Ledeen, in your testimony you noted that you worked on 
a spontaneous volunteer effort that worked around-the-clock to 
coordinate and help circumvent a broken and hostile security 
system. This effort highlights the ingenuity of the American 
industrious spirit, as well as the integrity by which the 
Americans operate, especially those who have served in our 
military. Can you explain why this group had to exist and just 
share with us some of the best work that it did?
    Ms. Ledeen. Congressman, thank you for the question.
    I would say the group had to exist because we realized 
quickly that there were thousands of Americans and Afghan 
allies that were trapped and not able to get to the one airport 
that was still open. They were not able to travel to the 
airport, they were not able to make it inside the airport, they 
were getting beaten by the Taliban. There was nobody in general 
helping them. There were some specific efforts with whom we 
linked up, and unfortunately--we were able to help, our group 
was able to help, but many, many people were left behind. 
Congressman, would you repeat the second part of your question? 
I'm sorry.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Just----
    Ms. Ledeen. Oh, stories, yes.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Yes, some of the best work that was done.
    Ms. Ledeen. So I would say one of the most heartwarming 
stories was about a double amputee. He had had his legs blown 
off. It was an Afghan ally who had served with the Marines. He 
had had his legs blown off, had actually traveled to Texas 
several years prior to get prosthetics and went back to 
Afghanistan to continue to live there. So he ended up having to 
walk on his prosthetic legs for several days with his family to 
get to the airport. Our group was able to find a service member 
to come and get them and bring them inside. Each one of these 
was incredibly dangerous, incredibly heroic efforts by our 
military to actually go out into crowds and pull people and 
bring them inside, crossing a canal of human waste. There are 
many, many stories like this.
    But I would also, if I may, like to add, the situation and 
the degradation of the Afghan National Security Forces. I 
served in Afghanistan multiple times. I think I would encourage 
this body to look into why that was the case where we had our 
military and political leaders for many years saying everything 
was going well, they're improvements, they're improvements. 
Meanwhile, people who were serving on the ground knew that was 
not the case. How is that allowed to happen for 2 decades? I 
would really encourage this body to look into that, and I know 
a lot of veterans agree with this.
    Thank you.
    Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you. Thank you for your service.
    Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields back.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr. 
Crane.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Colonel Douglas, we both did several combat tours in the 
Middle East, fighting against more or less the same enemies. 
What concerns you more, sir: the increased terrorist encounters 
at our Southern Border, or domestic terrorism?
    Mr. Douglas. Increased terrorist encounters in general, 
sir. Yes, terrorism in general concerns me.
    Mr. Crane. Yes, I guess what I am driving at, sir, is when 
we hear our colleagues on the other side of the aisle talk 
about domestic terrorism, domestic terrorism, domestic 
terrorism, it is kind-of a different type of terrorism than you 
and I are probably used to dealing with. Would you concur with 
that?
    Mr. Douglas. From my experience, I'd concur with that, sir.
    Mr. Crane. OK. Thank you.
    Mr. Sales, same question to you. What concerns you more, 
sir? The fallout that we are seeing from our disastrous 
withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fact that we have no 
Southern Border whatsoever, and the increased encounters that 
you have been talking about over and over again, and the 
American people are worried sick about because they know we 
have no Southern Border, or this idea of domestic terrorism?
    Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I'm going to do what lawyers 
call fighting the hypothetical, because I think my answer to 
your question is all the above. When I was at the State 
Department, my team and I didn't have the luxury of saying, all 
right, we're going to focus on this threat and this threat 
alone.
    Mr. Crane. Right.
    Mr. Sales. We had to address all of them. Whether you're 
talking about ISIS, whether you're talking about al-Qaeda or 
other Sunni Jihadists, whether you're talking about Shia 
terrorist organizations backed by Iran, Colombian terrorist 
groups like the FARC, and dissidents from the FARC, when it 
comes to domestic terrorism, this is a threat as well. Focusing 
on domestic terrorism, however--we cannot allow that focus, 
which is important, to distract us from other terrorist 
threats.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, sir.
    One of my colleagues was basically taking up the same line 
of attack as several of the other ones, blaming Trump for the 
disastrous withdrawal. Again, Mr. Sales, would you concur and 
do you agree with that assessment, that this was Trump's fault 
because of the deal that he made?
    Mr. Sales. No, Congressman, I wouldn't. Again, I'm not here 
to defend the deal, I'm not here to criticize the deal. My 
testimony is simply that the deal gave the President sufficient 
flexibility to make his own choices. The President's choice was 
to withdraw.
    Mr. Crane. Yes.
    My colleague, Mr. Magaziner said that Biden inherited the 
withdrawal. Do you agree with that assessment?
    Mr. Sales. No, Congressman. My assessment is that the 
President Biden inherited a conditions-based agreement and was 
briefed by his senior military advisers that the United States 
should keep a residual force in country of 2,500 soldiers that 
would be capable of maintaining stability and applying 
counterterrorism pressure to al-Qaeda and ISIS.
    Mr. Crane. Colonel Douglas, do you agree that President 
Biden inherited the withdrawal?
    Mr. Douglas. He inherited a conditions-based agreement that 
the Taliban were not honoring, and then subsequently----
    Mr. Crane. Thank you.
    Dr. Schroden, what are your thoughts on that inheriting the 
withdrawal comment?
    Mr. Schroden. So I would agree that the U.S.-Taliban 
agreement was a conditions-based agreement and that the Taliban 
were not meeting the conditions of that deal. However, I would 
say they were not meeting the conditions of the deal even while 
President Trump was in office. So the drawdown from 8,600 to 
2,500 was also made in sort-of absence of the Taliban 
maintaining the conditions that they had agreed to. So in this 
case, I would say both parties agreed to drawdowns in absence 
of the Taliban meeting their conditions under the terms of the 
agreement.
    Mr. Crane. My colleague over here, Ms. Titus, said she 
wants to focus on future homeland security, not reliving 
Afghanistan and not misinformation. Is there a connection 
between future homeland security, Mr. Sales, and what happened 
in Afghanistan? Are the two connected at all?
    Mr. Sales. I think they are, Congressman, in a number of 
different ways. The withdrawal from Afghanistan was an enormous 
morale boost for our adversaries. They feel emboldened by our 
withdrawal. They feel that they have been vindicated for 20 
years of fighting American soldiers and our allies.
    I also worry, secondarily, about the loss of intelligence 
information that we are no longer able to collect as robustly 
as was previously the case in Afghanistan. That is, data that 
is fed into our border screening systems, biometric systems at 
the airports, customs systems to scan inbound arriving 
international airline passengers. Those systems have been 
incredibly effective at preventing another 9/11-scale attack on 
the homeland. They are more effective with more intel.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Once again, I would like to thank the witnesses for your 
valuable testimony, for your experience, for your service to 
this country. During the course of this hearing, the Ranking 
Member and I have had a couple of conversations on where we go 
next and what we do with this information in order to make sure 
that if the system is blinking red or if there are issues, that 
we can address those. We will have a follow-up hearing on this. 
We will discuss those issues.
    I would like to thank the Ranking Member for your 
participation and remind the Committee that the Members of the 
subcommittee may have some additional questions for witnesses, 
and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing. 
Pursuant to the committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will 
be held open for 10 days.
    Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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