[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE HOMELAND SECURITY COST OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION'S CATASTROPHIC
WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 18, 2023
__________
Serial No. 118-7
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-889 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
Stephen Siao, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
Sean Jones, Legislative Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE
August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island,
Tony Gonzales, Texas Ranking Member
Anthony D'Esposito, New York J. Luis Correa, California
Elijah Crane, Arizona Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Dina Titus, Nevada
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Michael Koren, Subcommittee Staff Director
Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
Alice Hayes, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
----------
Page
Statements
The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Seth Magaziner, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 5
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
The Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Texas:
Prepared Statement............................................. 7
Witnesses
Hon. Nathan A. Sales, Former Ambassador-At-Large and Coordinator
for Counterterrorism:
Oral Statement................................................. 9
Prepared Statement............................................. 11
Ms. Simone A. Ledeen, Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for the Middle East:
Oral Statement................................................. 15
Prepared Statement............................................. 17
Mr. Christopher J. Douglas, Colonel (Ret.), United States Marine
Corps:
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 25
Mr. Jonathan Schroden, PhD, Director, Countering Threats and
Challenges Program and Special Operations Program Center for
Naval Analyses:
Oral Statement................................................. 26
Prepared Statement............................................. 28
For the Record
The Honorable Daniel S. Goldman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New York:
Memorandum..................................................... 42
THE HOMELAND SECURITY COST OF THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION'S CATASTROPHIC
WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN
----------
Tuesday, April 18, 2023
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., at
Room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. August Pfluger
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Pfluger, Bishop, Gonzales,
D'Esposito, Crane, Magaziner, Goldman, Titus, and Jackson Lee.
Chairman Pfluger. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence will come to order.
The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from
national security experts about their perspective of the
homeland security cost of the catastrophic U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan in August 2021.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good morning, and I would like to thank the witnesses for
all being here, for taking time through your personal and
professional experiences to share with us your thoughts and how
we can strengthen our own homeland security posture. This
morning we are going to discuss the homeland security cost of
the catastrophic withdrawal, as I mentioned, which resulted in
the unfortunate deaths of 13 U.S. service members and at least
170 Afghans in an ISIS-K orchestrated terrorist attack. It also
resulted in thousands of extremist inmates, including many with
ISIS and al-Qaeda ties, who were released by the Taliban from
Pul-e-Charkhi prison, as well as the Parwan detention facility
in Afghanistan. Last Congress, I introduced a bill to make sure
that there is an assessment of terrorist threats posed by those
prisoners, 5,000-plus that were released from those two
facilities by the Taliban. The legislation became law in a
bipartisan effort and was included in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022. Unfortunately, to date,
we have yet to receive an assessment from the administration on
the threat that those released prisoners pose to the United
States, our homeland, and to our allies.
This hearing is actually important to me for a couple of
reasons. No. 1, personally, because I have served in the Middle
East, I have friends that have served, colleagues who have
served, Members of this committee, this subcommittee, have
served, and many of you, as witnesses have served. We
understand that the threat in the formation of these
ideological and often very violent extremist groups is
something that, if left unchecked, will continue to metastasize
and get worse. Less than 2 weeks ago, the administration
released a report that I believe whitewashed and shamelessly
shifted blame about the execution of deadly withdrawal from
Afghanistan in a very inaccurate form. The administration's
continuous denial and downplaying of what happened is an insult
to the service members sitting here and throughout the United
States of America, to their families, and to our allies. It is
inaccurate to say and to suggest that the withdrawal occurred
without chaos, as was suggested by a spokesman for the
administration. One doesn't have to see the horrific images or
footage of the evacuation for more than a couple of minutes to
make a keen observation that there was a lot of chaos and
desperation involved.
Unfortunately, the disastrous withdrawal signaled American
weakness and damaged our credibility on the world stage. There
is no doubt that our foreign adversaries, including Russia and
China and others, were watching and that they were calculating.
It is important to remember that the genesis of our involvement
in Afghanistan came as a result of the first and only Article 5
ever triggered through our NATO membership, and that was the
attack on our homeland on September 11, 2001. Now there are 31
members of NATO, with Finland joining as of last week, who look
at the results of this withdrawal and it impacts not just our
own homeland and not just our own security, but also that of
our allies in Europe, as well as those in the Indo-Pacific,
such as Korea and Japan, who had a lot of skin in the game
throughout the 20 years.
Further troubling is the fact that this administration has
repeated the same mistakes we made 20 years ago. Now, with our
inability to collect intelligence on the ground, to project
power, terror groups within Afghanistan have re-established the
country as a breeding ground and a safe haven for terrorism.
Just recently, CENTCOM Commander General Kurilla stated that
ISIS-K is rapidly developing the ability to conduct external
operations in Europe and Asia and will be able to attack
American and Western interests outside the country in less than
6 months.
In addition, last month, this subcommittee held a hearing
that examined how the Chinese Communist Party is working to
exploit our vulnerabilities, including the CCP surveillance
balloon, which collected information on sensitive military
installations and critical infrastructure here in our homeland.
The CCP's use of intellectual property theft, economic
coercion, and malign influence at American universities
continues to accelerate.
I look forward to this subcommittee's work, to coming
together in a bipartisan way, to look at the facts and to
understand what we can do better. While we were rightly focused
on those issues, we must never lose sight of the threats posed
by terrorist organizations who are emboldened to carry out and
inspire attacks against not only the United States of America,
but our Western target allies. I worry that the terrorist
threat landscape is not just worse, but much worse since the
botched withdrawal. As I have said before, we see a direct link
between the foreign terrorist threat abroad and our security
here at home. For instance, let us not forget an Iraqi man,
Shihab Ahmed Shihab, who was charged with aiding and abetting a
plot to murder former President George W. Bush. Shihab was an
ISIS sympathizer inspired to action by Islamic extremist
propaganda. In another matter, which affected my home State of
Texas, a British citizen, Malik Faisal Akram, entered the
United States using the visa waiver program and then held
members of the Congregation Beth Israel, a Jewish synagogue in
North Texas, hostage for 10 hours. These are just a couple of
examples of cases that highlight the very real foreign threat
that terrorism poses to our homeland.
Another concern that I have continually raised is the
significant increase we have seen in watch-listed individuals
being encountered at the border, in particular, the number
which are being apprehended between ports of entry, meaning
that they are not presenting themselves to be processed at the
port of entry, but instead attempting to evade law enforcement.
This comes at a time in which we have an unprecedented crisis
at the Southern Border as a direct result of Secretary Myorkas'
failure to enforce the laws that are currently standing on our
books. It has been revealed by the Department of Homeland
Security's Inspector General that DHS encountered obstacles to
screen, vet, and inspect all evacuees during the crisis
following the withdrawal from Afghanistan. On top of that, the
Pentagon's watchdog published a report which detailed its
critical view review of the administration's effort to screen,
vet, and transport those evacuees to the United States.
This subcommittee and the greater Committee on Homeland
Security intend to thoroughly examine these issues to ensure
that those charged with protecting our security are acting
responsibly and using their resources to properly engage the
threats posed to the homeland. We must work together to protect
our homeland. This committee, the Committee on Homeland
Security, was formed in the wake of September 11, 2001. It was
formed directly as a result of the withdrawal that we will now
be investigating and discussing today. We have to remain
vigilant. We have to continue to view strength as a peace
through strength and security as a peace through strength
mentality. I was recently abroad and met with the Polish Prime
Minister, and he said this, I desire peace, that is why I
prepare for war. Nobody wants war, but we desire peace. We have
to secure our homeland. I think that the Prime Minister is
absolutely correct.
Again, thank you to all our witnesses. Thank you for your
time and your expertise. I look forward to a good discussion to
look at a fact-based analysis of what happened and how we can
protect the defense and the security of the United States.
With that, I will yield to the Ranking Member, the
gentlemen from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner.
[The statement of Chairman Pfluger follows:]
Statement of Chairman August Pfluger
april 18, 2023, 10 o'clock a.m.
This morning we are going to discuss the homeland security cost of
the catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan in August 2021, which
resulted in the deaths of 13 U.S. service members and at least 170
Afghans in an ISIS-K orchestrated terrorist attack.
It also resulted in thousands of extremist inmates, including many
with ISIS and al-Qaeda ties, who were released by the Taliban from Pul-
e-Charkhi prison as well as the Parwan Detention facility in
Afghansitan.
Last Congress, I introduced a bill to make sure that there is an
assessment of terrorist threats posed by those prisoners, 5,000+ that
were released by the Taliban from the Pul-e-Charkhi and Parwan
Detention facility. This legislation became law with a bipartisan
effort after being included in the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2022. Unfortunately, to date, I we have yet to receive
an assessment from the administration on the threat that those released
prisoners posed to the United States and our allies.
This hearing is actually important to me for a couple of reasons.
No. 1, personally, because I've served in the Middle East. I have
friends that have served, colleagues who have served.
Members of this subcommittee have served, and many of you as
witnesses have served. We understand that the threat in the formation
of these ideological and often very violent extremist groups is
something that if left unchecked will continue to metastasize and get
worse.
Less than 2 weeks ago, this administration released a report to
whitewash and shamelessly shifted blame about the execution of the
deadly withdrawal from Afghanistan, and in a very inaccurate form.
The administration's continuous denial and downplaying of what
happened is an insult to our service members sitting here and
throughout the United States of America, to their families and to our
allies.
It is inaccurate to say and to suggest that the withdrawal occurred
without chaos as was suggested by a spokesman for the administration.
One doesn't have to see the horrific images and footage of the
evacuation for more than a couple of minutes to make a keen observation
that there was a lot of chaos and desperation involved.
Unfortunately, the disastrous withdrawal signaled American weakness
and damaged our credibility on the world stage. There is no doubt that
our foreign adversaries like Russia and China and others were watching,
and that they were calculating. It's important to remember that the
genesis of our involvement in Afghanistan came as a result of the first
and only Article 5 ever triggered through our NATO membership. That was
the attack on our homeland on September 11, 2001.
And now there are 31 members of NATO with Finland joining as of
last week. You look at the results of this withdrawal and it impacts
not just our own homeland and not just our own security but also that
of our allies in Europe as well as those in the indo-Pacific such as
Korea and Japan, who had a lot of skin in the game throughout the 20
years.
Further troubling is the fact that this administration has repeated
the same mistakes we made 20 years ago. And now with our inability to
collect intelligence on the ground, to project power, terror groups
within Afghanistan have reestablished the country as a breeding ground
and a safe haven for terrorism.
CENTCOM Commander Gen Kurilla recently stated last month that ISIS-
K is rapidly developing the ability to conduct ``external operations''
in Europe and Asia and will be able to attack American and Western
interests outside the country in less than 6 months.
In addition, last month this subcommittee held a hearing that
examined how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is working to exploit
our vulnerabilities, including the CCP surveillance balloon which
collected information on our sensitive military installations and
critical infrastructure here in our homeland. The CCP's intellectual
property theft, economic coercion, and malign influence at American
universities continues to accelerate.
I look forward to the subcommittee's work to come together in a
bipartisan way to look at the facts and understand what we can do
better. And while we are rightly focused on those issues, we must never
lose sight of the threats posed by terrorists organizations who are
emboldened to carry out and inspire attacks against not only the United
States of America but our Western target allies.
I worry that the terrorist threat landscape is not just worse but
much worse since the botched withdrawal.
As I have said before, we see a direct link between the foreign
terrorist threat abroad and our security here at home.
For instance, let us not forget, an Iraqi man, Shihab Ahmed Shihab,
who was charged with aiding and abetting a plot to murder former
President George W. Bush. Shihab was an ISIS-sympathizer, inspired to
action by Islamic extremist propaganda.
In another matter, which affected my home State of Texas, a British
citizen, Malik Faisal Akram, entered the United States using the Visa
Waiver Program, and then held members of Congregation Beth Israel, a
Jewish synagogue in North Texas, hostage for 10 hours. These are just a
couple of examples of cases that highlight the very real foreign threat
that terrorism poses to our homeland.
Another concern I have continually raised is the significant
increase we've seen in watchlisted individuals being encountered at the
border, in particular the number which are being apprehended between
ports of entry--meaning that they are not presenting themselves to be
processed at the port of entry, but instead attempting to evade law
enforcement.
This comes at a time in which we have an unprecedented crisis at
the Southern Border as a direct result of Secretary Mayorkas' failure
to enforce the laws of our country.
It has also been revealed by the Department of Homeland Security's
Inspector General that DHS encountered obstacles to screen, vet, and
inspect all evacuees during the crisis following the U.S. withdrawal
from Afghanistan.
On top of that, the Pentagon's watchdog published a report which
detailed its critical review of the administration's efforts to screen,
vet, and transport those evacuees to the United States.
This subcommittee and the greater Committee on Homeland Security
intend to thoroughly examine these issues to ensure that those charged
with protecting our security are acting responsibly and using their
resources to properly engage the threats posed to the homeland.
We must work together to protect our homeland. This committee, the
Committee on Homeland Security, was formed in the wake of September 11,
2001.
We have to remain vigilant, we have to continue to view strength as
peace through strength and security as a peace through strength
mentality.
I was recently in Poland and met with the Polish Prime Minister,
and he said this: ``I desire peace, that is why I prepare for war.''
Nobody wants war, but we desire peace. We have to secure our
homeland, and I think that the Prime Minister is absolutely correct.
Again, thank you to all our witnesses, thank you for your time and
your expertise. I look forward to a good discussion to look at a fact-
based analysis of what happened and how we can protect the defense and
the security of the United States.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you to our
witnesses for being here today.
As Members of the Homeland Security Committee, we have a
duty to protect the United States homeland and the people who
live here from all threats, foreign and domestic. I speak for
all the Members of this subcommittee when I say that we honor
the sacrifices and dedication of all who served our country in
Afghanistan, including some of the witnesses who are here
today. The American veterans of the Afghanistan War who I speak
with have a broad range of opinions about the decision to
withdraw. Some believe we should have stayed longer, some
believe that withdrawing was the right thing to do, some
believe we should have withdrawn earlier. But regardless, I
want every American who served in Afghanistan to know that you
made a positive difference. Thanks to you, al-Qaeda and ISIS
are operating at a fraction of their prior strength, the
masterminds behind 9/11 and other heinous attacks have been
brought to justice, countless other attacks have been
prevented, lives have been saved, and our Nation is safer today
than it was in 2001. Now that the war is over, it is vital that
we be proactive in ensuring that terrorist organizations like
al-Qaeda and ISIS-K, which have been diminished due to the
sacrifice of American service members, our NATO allies, and
other partners, never regain the capability to launch a large-
scale attack on the U.S. homeland again.
The Biden administration's successful drone strike to
eliminate Ayman al-Zawahiri following the withdrawal was a
positive development that showed American citizens and people
around the world that we can and we must continue to take
proactive steps to defend our homeland and our allies from
terrorist threats. We must maintain the diplomatic,
intelligence, and military capabilities to respond to threats
emanating from Afghanistan whenever necessary. We must also
focus on the fact that many terror groups have begun using
alternative methods, including the internet to systematically
radicalize individuals already living in the United States.
This is a real threat that has already cost American lives and
must be taken seriously.
We must learn from the withdrawal and ensure that in the
future, when the United States exits a foreign theater, we do
so with adequate planning for all contingencies, including the
evacuation of locals who assisted the United States in its
mission. This includes ensuring that the Department of Homeland
Security has the planning, the resources, and importantly, the
data that it needs from other agencies to efficiently and
accurately screen those who are seeking asylum.
The security of the United States cannot be a partisan
issue. My Democratic colleagues and I take our responsibility
on this committee seriously and undertake our oversight with
solemnity.
The Biden administration inherited a chaotic withdrawal
that was already in progress. On the day that the Biden
administration began 5,000 Taliban prisoners had been released,
American forces had been reduced to 2,500 in Afghanistan, and
the Taliban had re-taken more than 200 of the sectors of
Afghanistan. Going forward, we must make sure that we learn the
lessons from withdrawal, that we work across agencies in an
entirety-of-government approach to ensure that we maintain the
capabilities necessary to meet terrorist threats wherever they
emanate from, and particularly from Afghanistan, and that we
have better procedures in place in the future to make sure that
American personnel and our allies and those who assist us are
able to leave foreign theaters in an efficient and safe manner.
So my hope for today's hearing is that we will focus on
forward-looking solutions that will improve the safety of
Americans at home and around the world. I have also been
informed that Ms. Jackson Lee has requested to waive on to the
hearing, and so I ask unanimous consent that she be allowed to
do so.
With that, I yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Magaziner follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
April 18, 2023
As Members of the Homeland Security Committee, we have a duty to
protect the United States homeland and the people who live here from
all threats, foreign and domestic.
I speak for all Members of this subcommittee that we honor the
sacrifices and dedication of all who served in Afghanistan, including
some of the witnesses here today.
The American veterans of the Afghanistan War who I speak with have
a range of opinions on the decision to withdraw.
But I want every American who served in Afghanistan to know that
you made a positive difference.
Thanks to you, AQ and ISIS are operating at a fraction of their
prior strength, the masterminds behind 9/11 and other heinous attacks
have been brought to justice, countless other attacks have been
prevented, lives have been saved, and our Nation is safer than it was
in 2001.
Now that the War is over, we must continue to be proactive in
ensuring that terrorist organizations in Afghanistan never develop the
capacity to threaten the American homeland again.
We must maintain the diplomatic, intelligence, and military
capability to respond to threats emanating from Afghanistan whenever
necessary.
It is vital that terrorist organizations like AQ and ISIS, which
have been diminished due to the sacrifice of American service members,
our NATO allies, and other partners, never regain the capability to
launch a large-scale attack on the U.S. homeland.
We must also focus on the fact that many terror groups have begun
using the internet to systematically radicalize individuals already
living in the United States. This is a real threat that has already
cost American lives and must be taken seriously.
We must learn from the withdrawal and ensure that in the future
when the U.S. exits foreign theater, we do so with adequate planning
for all contingencies, including ensuring that the Department of
Homeland Security has the planning, the resources, and the data that it
needs from other agencies to efficiently and accurately screen those
seeking asylum.
When President Biden took office, the American force in Afghanistan
had already been reduced by more than 80 percent from the day the Trump
Taliban Deal was signed, down to only 2,500 troops. When President
Biden took office, the Taliban already controlled a large portion of
the country's 407 districts. And 5,000 Taliban fighters had already
been released.
The security of Americans cannot be a partisan issue. My Democratic
colleagues and I take our responsibility on this committee seriously
and undertake our oversight with solemnity.
My hope for today's hearing is that we will focus on forward-
looking solutions that will improve the safety of Americans at home and
around the world and examine how the Trump-Taliban deal led to a
chaotic withdrawal.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
Without objection, that will be possible.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Honorable Jackson Lee follows:]
Statement of Honorable Sheila Jackson Lee
April 18, 2023
Chairman Pfluger and Ranking Member Magaziner thank you for
allowing me to join today's hearing under Unanimous Consent.
As the hearing title suggests, this is an attempt to second-guess
the decisions made by the Biden administration to effect the withdrawal
of U.S. forces from Afghanistan, which was significantly impacted by
the Trump-Taliban plan.
The Trump-Taliban agreement severely constrained the Biden
administration's options for a orderly withdrawal by exacting
conditions and imposing an aggressive time line.
The September 6, 2022, DHS Office of Inspector General report
entitled ``DHS Encountered Obstacles to Screen, Vet, and Inspect All
Evacuees during the Recent Afghanistan Crisis,'' is an important access
of the challenges faced to an effort to screen and vet evacuating
Afghan nationals who aided the United States in its mission.
The mission in Afghanistan was coming to a close and the need to
find the strategy to effect a withdrawal was in the hands of the
previous President.
When President Donald Trump came into office in January 2017,
approximately 11,000 U.S. troops were reportedly in Afghanistan, with
U.S. force levels having declined from their 2009-2011 high point of
approximately 100,000 U.S. troops.
In June 2017, President Trump delegated to Secretary of Defense
James Mattis the authority to set force levels, reportedly limited to
around 3,500 additional troops; Secretary Mattis signed orders to
deploy them in September 2017.
Those additional forces (all of which were dedicated to NATO-led
RSM [Resolute Support Mission]) arrived in Afghanistan within months,
putting the total number of U.S. troops in the country between 14,000
and 15,000 by the end of 2017.
By mid-2018, President Trump was reportedly frustrated with the
lack of military progress against the Taliban, and he ordered formal
and direct U.S.-Taliban talks without Afghan government participation
for the first time. As those talks developed under Special
Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation Zalmay Khalilzad,
President Trump continued to express frustration with the U.S. military
mission in Afghanistan and a desire to withdraw U.S. forces, saying in
August 2019 that he wanted to do so ``as quickly as we can.''
The U.S. withdrawal commitment was not conditioned on the Taliban
reducing violence against the Afghan government, making concessions in
intra-Afghan talks, or taking other actions.
The United States was not able to remain indefinitely and the
American public's patience for the war were waining.
What was needed by the previous President was a sustainable plan
that would implement a process to protect our troops and the Afghan
people who had supported our mission.
U.S. force levels began to contract in 2019: at an October 9, 2019,
news conference, General Austin S. Miller, the top U.S. commander in
Afghanistan, said that the number of U.S. forces had been gradually
reduced by 2,000 over the past year, to between 12,000 and 13,000.
In February 2020, the United States and the Taliban signed a formal
agreement in which the United States committed to withdrawing all of
its troops, contractors, and non-diplomatic civilian personnel from
Afghanistan, with a drawdown in military forces to 8,600 by mid-July
2020 and a complete withdrawal by the end of April 2021.
In return, the Taliban committed to prevent any groups, including
al-Qaeda, from threatening the United States or its allies by not
allowing those groups to reside, train, or fundraise in Afghanistan.
The previous President needed to begin the process of an orderly
withdrawal given the time table established, but that did not happen.
The consequences were dire for U.S. troops and for Afghans who had
supported our mission.
The Biden administration and House and Senate Democrats did what we
could to help mitigate the situation by authorizing 8,000 additional
Special Immigrant Visas (SIV) for Afghan applicants and allocating $6.4
billion to support Afghan resettlement across Federal agencies.
This funding included $193 million for U.S. Citizen and Immigration
Services to expand immigration processing, as the Trump administration
amassed a backlog of over 18,000 Afghan SIV applicants.
I like many of you received urgent calls for help when the collapse
of the Afghan government occurred.
Mr. Abdul Wasi Safi, the Afghan soldier who served alongside of
U.S. troops in the war in Afghanistan, and Maryam Muradi the wife of
Masih Shafi Mujadidi who lives in the 18th Congressional District in
Houston were trapped when U.S. forces departed.
I spent the months getting Maryam through but the process for her
to enter the United States.
Then this year, I helped Mr. Abdul Wasi Safi who made it to the
U.S. border with Mexico and was held in custody and charged with
unlawfully entering the country.
I worked for his release and reunion with his brother who had also
help our forces.
This hearing is best served by a briefing that engages the
Committees on Armed Services and Foreign Affairs.
I look forward to working with my colleagues on both sides of the
isle to improve the process for immigrant visas for asylum seekers.
Chairman Pfluger. I am pleased to have a distinguished
panel of witnesses before us today on this very important
topic. I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their
right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Pfluger. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
have answered in the affirmative.
Now I would like to formally introduce our witnesses.
Ambassador Nathan Sales served in various senior positions
at the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of
Homeland Security. From 2017 to 2021 Ambassador Sales was the
Ambassador at large and coordinator for counterterrorism.
Concurrently, he served as the under secretary of state for
civilian security, democracy, and human rights, as well as a
special Presidential envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat
ISIS. Prior to that, he served at the Department of Homeland
Security as deputy assistant secretary for policy and the
Department of Justice as senior counsel in the Office of Legal
Policy, where he worked on counterterrorism policy.
Ms. Simone Ledeen served as deputy assistant secretary of
defense for the Middle East. She was previously the principal
director and acting deputy assistant secretary for Special
Operations in Combating Terrorism, where she was responsible
for defense policy on counterterrorism activities, in addition
to military information, support operations, irregular warfare
direction, direct action, and other sensitive activities.
Previously, Ms. Ledeen also served as the senior U.S. Treasury
representative to NATO's international security assistance
force in Afghanistan. Thank you for being here.
Colonel Christopher Douglas is a veteran of the United
States Marine Corps. Colonel Douglas served as a Marine
infantry officer for over 31 years in an active and reserve
capacity. He has led Marines for 5 tours in combat operations
since 9/11, including leading two advisor teams in the Helmand
Province of Afghanistan. His last assignment was the assistant
chief of staff, G5, strategy and plans at Marine Corps Forces
Central Command. We thank you for your many years of honorable
service, Colonel Douglas.
Dr. Jonathan Schroden is the director of the Center for
Naval Analysis Countering Threats and Challenges Program, as
well as the Center Special Operations Program. Dr. Schroden has
supported various U.S. military commands and operations in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Middle East and elsewhere.
We thank all of the witnesses for being herein.
I now recognize Ambassador Sales for 5 minutes to summarize
your written testimony and your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NATHAN A. SALES, FORMER AMBASSADOR-
AT-LARGE AND COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM
Mr. Sales. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and
Members of the subcommittee, it's a pleasure to be here.
My testimony today will survey the growing terrorist
threats in Afghanistan since the withdrawal 20 months ago. I'll
discuss how hard it has become to collect intelligence in the
country or to take action against terrorist groups that are
active there and then highlight some implications for our
homeland security.
The threat environment in Afghanistan is bad and it's
getting worse. CENTCOM Commander Kurilla recently warned that
the local ISIS affiliate could carry out ``an external
operation against U.S. or Western interests abroad in under 6
months.'' When terrorists have safe haven, as they now do in
Afghanistan, they're able to plot attacks far beyond their
borders, including their ultimate goal of hitting the U.S.
homeland. We learned this the hard way on 9/11. Two groups are
particularly concerning, al-Qaeda and ISIS-K. Al-Qaeda is
rebuilding under the Taliban's protection. Last year, the
United Nations assessed that al-Qaeda ``has a safe haven under
the Taliban and increased freedom of action'', and that al-
Qaeda now sees Afghanistan as a ``friendly environment to raise
money, recruit, and train.''
After the withdrawal, al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri
resurfaced in a Kabul safe house linked to the Taliban. The
administration deserves credit for eliminating him in a drone
strike last summer. But that was a tactical victory amid a
broader strategic defeat. The key point is that the Taliban
felt emboldened to welcome al-Qaeda's leader back to their
capital, and al-Qaeda's leader felt it was safe enough there to
come.
ISIS-K is probably an even graver threat. While the group
is the enemy of the Taliban, Afghanistan's new rulers lack the
wherewithal to degrade it. In the 20 months since the Taliban
took power, ISIS-K has committed an estimated 400 attacks
across the country and even into neighboring Pakistan. More
than 1,800 people have been killed and countless more injured.
There's also a significant risk that state-of-the-art
American military equipment could wind up in terrorists' hands.
According to the special inspector general for Afghanistan
reconstruction, the United States left behind nearly $7.2
billion worth of vehicles, weapons, and other equipment.
Terrorists in Afghanistan and beyond could easily get their
hands on it. So could drug cartels, mercenaries, like Russia's
Wagner group, and hostile foreign governments. The threats are
compounded by the fact that Afghanistan no longer has
professional counterterrorism forces capable of protecting its
population. The Taliban certainly can't.
During my time at the State Department, we invested
significant resources in building elite police units to respond
to attacks in real time. You may recall the diabolical ISIS-K
attack on a maternity ward in Kabul in May 2020, when 24 people
were gunned down, including mothers and newborn babies. It was
one of our units that responded to that attack, neutralizing
the terrorists and saving countless lives. After August 2021,
those units ceased to exist.
Just as the threats are growing more dire, the United
States is now severely constrained in collecting intelligence
and taking action. To dismantle a terrorist group what's needed
is a sustained campaign to eliminate its leadership, its
infrastructure, its foot soldiers, and so on. It simply isn't
possible to defeat terrorists using an over-the-horizon
strategy. With no presence on the ground, it's much harder to
plot, it's much harder to monitor terrorist groups as they
train and plot. With drones now required to fly in from distant
bases hundreds of miles away, it's much harder to eliminate
terrorists even when they can be found.
The Zawahiri operation was a great success, but it's the
exception that proves the rule. It remains the lone
acknowledged strike in Afghanistan since the withdrawal. One
drone strike in 20 months is not a viable strategy. Nor has the
administration been able to make good on the President's
promise to, ``hunt down those responsible for the Kabul airport
bombing'', which killed 13 American service members and 170
Afghans. America's fallen warriors and the families they left
behind deserve better.
The harms of the withdrawal will also have profound
consequences for our homeland security. The traveler vetting
systems that we've built since 9/11 are only as effective as
the data that's fed into them. Since we can no longer count on
robust data flows from Afghanistan, these systems will be less
effective at flagging potential threats. This all comes at an
ominous time for our border security. We've seen a dramatic
spike in the number of people on CBP's terrorist watch list
apprehended after crossing the Southern Border, as the Chairman
has said. In 2022, there were 98, and so far of this year, 69.
We also know that terrorists have long sought to exploit
our Southern Border to carry out attacks in the homeland. In
2011, the Iranian regime attempted to use a Mexican drug cartel
to assassinate the Saudi ambassador here in Washington. A
decade later, Tehran tried to use a Mexican national with ties
to drug cartels to assassinate a former national security
adviser.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you again for the opportunity to be here.
I'd be happy to answer any questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sales follows:]
Prepared Statement of Nathan A. Sales
April 18, 2023
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and Members of the
subcommittee, it is a pleasure to be here today to discuss this
important topic.
My name is Nathan Sales. I am the founder and principal of Fillmore
Global Strategies LLC, a consultancy that provides legal and strategic
advisory services on matters at the intersection of law, policy, and
diplomacy. I am also a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic
Council, a member of the advisory board at the Vandenberg Coalition,
and a senior advisor at the Soufan Group.
From 2017 to 2021, I served at the U.S. Department of State as the
ambassador-at-large and coordinator for counterterrorism. Concurrently,
I was the under secretary of state for civilian security, democracy,
and human rights (acting) as well as the special Presidential envoy to
the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS. I previously served at the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security as deputy assistant secretary for
policy, and at the U.S. Department of Justice as senior counsel in the
Office of Legal Policy, where I worked on counterterrorism policy.
I am here as a private citizen, but my testimony is informed by my
experiences working on national security and counterterrorism for the
U.S. Government over the course of two decades. Today I will describe
the increasingly grave terrorist threats emanating from Afghanistan
after the administration's withdrawal from the country in August 2021.
I will then discuss the difficulties the United States faces collecting
intelligence in post-withdrawal Afghanistan and degrading the terrorist
groups that now are able to operate more or less freely in the country.
Finally, I will focus on some of the harmful consequences for our
homeland security resulting from the withdrawal.
i.
The terrorist threat environment in Afghanistan has deteriorated
dramatically since August 2021--and it is getting worse. Due to a
combination of Taliban-provided safe haven, the Taliban's lack of
counterterrorism capability, and the absence of sustained
counterterrorism pressure from the United States, Afghanistan has
become hospitable terrain for a variety of terrorist groups. As of
today, the threat seems to be relatively contained within and around
the country's borders, but that will not be true for long. According to
CENTCOM commander General Michael ``Erik'' Kurilla, the local ISIS
affiliate--ISIS Khorasan Province, or ISIS-K--could carry out ``an
external operation against U.S. or Western interests abroad in under 6
months with little to no warning.''\1\ When terrorists have sanctuary,
as they now do in Afghanistan, they are able to plot and execute
attacks abroad. The longer they enjoy safe haven, the greater the risk
they will be able to strike far beyond their borders, eventually
including their ultimate goal of hitting the U.S. homeland. We learned
this lesson the hard way on September 11, 2001.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Quoted in Alexander Ward et al., Inside the GOP Foreign Policy
War, Politico, Mar. 16, 2023, https://www.politico.com/newsletters/
national-security-daily/2023/03/16/inside-the-gop-foreign-policy-war-
00087374. General Kurilla assessed that it would be ``much harder'' for
ISIS-K to attack the U.S. homeland in that time frame. Id.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While Taliban-controlled Afghanistan is a permissive environment
for terrorists in general, two groups are of particular concern: al-
Qaeda and ISIS-K.
The Taliban and al-Qaeda have been allies for more than a quarter
century, and al-Qaeda is now reconstituting itself in its historic safe
haven. Enjoying Taliban sanctuary at the turn of the century, al-Qaeda
was able to plot and execute a deadly series of attacks against the
United States, including the August 1998 attacks on our embassies in
Kenya and Tanzania, the bombing of the USS Cole in October 2000, and,
of course, the 9/11 attacks. While decades of U.S. counterterrorism
pressure decimated core al-Qaeda, the group is now rebuilding under the
Taliban's protection. Last year, the United Nations assessed that the
Taliban ``remains close'' to al-Qaeda, that the terrorist group ``has a
safe haven under the Taliban and increased freedom of action,'' and
that al-Qaeda sees Taliban-controlled Afghanistan as a ``friendly
environment'' to raise money, recruit, and train.\2\ Al-Qaeda has never
abandoned its goal of striking the ``far enemy''--i.e., committing
attacks inside the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ United Nations, Thirteenth Report of the Analytical Support and
Sanctions Monitoring Team Submitted Pursuant to Resolution 2611 (2021)
Concerning the Taliban and Other Associated Individuals and Entities
Constituting a Threat to the Peace, Stability, and Security of
Afghanistan at 3, 12 (May 26, 2022), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/
doc/UNDOC/GEN/N22/333/77/PDF/N2233377.pdf?OpenElement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The continued partnership between the Taliban and al-Qaeda is
perhaps best seen in the fact that, after the U.S. withdrawal, al-Qaeda
leader Ayman al Zawahiri resurfaced in Afghanistan, living in a safe
house associated with the Haqqani Network, a Taliban faction that
maintains close ties to al-Qaeda and is itself a U.S.-designated
Foreign Terrorist Organization. The safe house was located in the
Shirpur district in the heart of Kabul, a prosperous neighborhood that
is controlled by the Haqqanis and is just down the street from the
former U.S. embassy.\3\ The administration deserves credit for
eliminating Zawahiri in a July 2022 drone strike. But this episode may
be best understood as a tactical victory amid a broader strategic
defeat. The key takeaway is that the Taliban felt emboldened to welcome
al-Qaeda's leader back to Kabul, and al-Qaeda's leader felt it was safe
enough there to accept the offer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Shane Harris, Zawahiri Appeared on His Balcony. The CIA Was
Ready to Kill Him., Wash. Post, Aug. 2, 2022, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/08/02/zawahiri-drone-
operation-kabul/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISIS-K likely represents an even graver threat at present, though
for different reasons. While the Taliban considers ISIS-K an enemy,
Afghanistan's new rulers lack the wherewithal to meaningfully degrade
the group. One of the most formidable ISIS branches, ISIS-K controls
territory in eastern Afghanistan and, like al-Qaeda, aspires to carry
out attacks across the region, in Europe, and ultimately in the United
States.
In the 20 months since the Taliban took power, ISIS-K has conducted
a bloody campaign of bombings and other attacks across Afghanistan and
even into neighboring Pakistan, seemingly at will. While firm numbers
are hard to come by, it is estimated that, since August 2021, ISIS-K
has committed nearly 400 attacks in Afghanistan and Pakistan's Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa region, with approximately 330 in the former and around 70
in the latter. These numbers include the 379 attacks claimed by ISIS-K
in its magazine al-Naba, plus an estimated 20 additional unclaimed
attacks, including bombings of mosques and schools, assassinations,
etc. Casualty counts are more difficult to assess but, since August
2021, could be in the range of more than 1,800 killed and many more
injured.\4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Data collected by the Islamabad, Pakistan-based research
platform ``The Khorasan Diary'' in April 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
For instance, in September 2022, ISIS-K likely was responsible for
a suicide bombing at an educational center in Kabul that killed 52 and
injured dozens more, mostly young women and teenage girls who were
there to take a practice college entrance exam.\5\ (The Taliban
subsequently banned women and girls from universities, having
previously banned them from high schools and middle schools.) A month
earlier, on August 7, 2022, a likely ISIS-K attack in Kabul killed 120
people celebrating the Shia holiday of Ashura.\6\ ISIS-K has also
killed Americans. An ISIS-K suicide bomber carried out the August 26,
2021, attack at Hamid Karzai International Airport, killing 13 U.S.
service members and some 170 Afghan civilians who were desperately
trying to escape Taliban misrule. In the days prior, Taliban fighters
had released the bomber from detention at Bagram Air Base,\7\ along
with as many as 5,000 other suspected terrorists.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Fazel Rahman Faizi, Death Toll in Last Week's Kabul School
Blast Climbs to 52, AP, Oct. 3, 2022, https://apnews.com/article/
islamic-state-group-afghanistan-religion-taliban-suicide-bombings-
5a50c846bbbabf6f2bfa5e64d72d67c0.
\6\ Weronika Strzyzynska, Hundreds of Hazaras Killed by ISKP Since
Taliban Took Power, Say Rights Group, The Guardian, Sept. 6, 2022,
https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2022/sep/06/hundreds-of-
hazaras-shia-killed-iskp-islamic-state-khorasan-province-taliban-power-
human-rights-watch.
\7\ Eric Schmitt & Helene Cooper, Lone ISIS Bomber Carried Out
Attack at Kabul Airport, Pentagon Says, N.Y. Times, Feb. 4, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/04/us/politics/kabul-airport-attack-
report.html.
\8\ Oren Liebermann & Natasha Bertrand, ISIS-K Suicide Bomber Who
Carried out Deadly Kabul Airport Attack Had Been Released from Prison
Days Earlier, CNN, Oct. 6, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/10/06/
politics/kabul-airport-attacker-prison/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Many of ISIS-K's attacks have targeted Afghanistan's Hazara
minority, a predominantly Shia community in a largely Sunni nation, in
an apparent effort to inflame sectarian tensions. Beyond the
intolerable bloodshed and risk of further instability in Afghanistan,
ISIS-K's campaign raises the possibility that the Iranian regime might
use the attacks as a pretext to intervene in the country, purportedly
for the benefit of its Shia co-religionists.\9\ Similar interventions
by the world's leading state sponsor of terrorism have left a trail of
death and destruction stretching from Lebanon to Syria to Iraq to Yemen
and beyond.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ See, e.g., Colin P. Clarke & Ariane M. Tabatabai, What Iran
Wants in Afghanistan, Foreign Affairs, July 8, 2020, https://
www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/afghanistan/2020-07-08/what-iran-wants-
afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There is also a significant risk that state-of-the-art American
military equipment could fall into terrorists' hands. According to the
Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, in its haste
to leave Afghanistan by the White House's August 31, 2021 deadline, the
military left behind nearly $7.2 billion worth of vehicles, weapons,
and other gear. That includes:
Over 40,000 Humvees, armored combat vehicles, and other
ground vehicles worth $4.13 billion;
At least 78 aircraft worth $923.3 million;
Over 300,000 machine guns, rifles, and other small arms
valued at $511.8 million;
More than 1.5 million rounds of specialty munitions valued
at $48 million; and
Night-vision goggles, biometric identification systems, and
other specialized equipment worth some $200 million.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, Why
the Afghan Security Forces Collapsed at 65, 66 (Feb. 2023), https://
www.sigar.mil/pdf/evaluations/SIGAR-23-16-IP.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Terrorists in Afghanistan and beyond could well gain access to this
equipment. Nor would it be surprising if these arms end up being sold
on the black market to drug cartels, mercenaries like Russia's Wagner
group, or hostile foreign governments.
These threats are compounded by the fact that Afghanistan no longer
has professional counterterrorism forces able to protect its
population. The Taliban is not capable of doing so, and the Afghan
security services that the United States helped build over the years
did not survive the withdrawal. During my time at the State Department,
the Counterterrorism Bureau invested significant resources in training
and equipping elite police units to respond to terrorist attacks in
real time, and collect evidence for use in criminal trials or for
intelligence purposes. You may recall the diabolical ISIS-K attack on a
maternity ward in Kabul in May 2020, during which 24 people were gunned
down in cold blood, including mothers and newborn babies. It was one of
our units that responded to that incident, neutralizing the attackers
and saving countless lives.\11\ After August 2021, these units ceased
to exist.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Nathan A. Sales, Counterterrorism in the Trump Administration
and Beyond, Jan. 14, 2001, https://2017-2021.state.gov/
counterterrorism-in-the-trump-administration-and-beyond/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ii.
Just as the threat environment in Afghanistan is growing more dire,
the United States finds itself severely constrained in collecting
intelligence about terrorists in the country and taking meaningful
action against them. Our ability to monitor terrorist threats in
Afghanistan has been significantly degraded by the withdrawal, and we
are no longer able to conduct a sustained kinetic campaign against
groups active there.
To dismantle a terrorist organization, or prevent a defeated one
from rebuilding, all levels of the group must be subjected to a
campaign of low intensity but persistent military force. One-off drone
strikes are not enough. What's needed is a sustained effort to
eliminate the group's leadership and infrastructure, its training
camps, its foot soldiers, and so on. (To be sure, kinetic action alone
cannot enduringly defeat a terrorist group. It must be accompanied by
civilian-sector efforts including economic sanctions, criminal
prosecutions, border security tools, and counter-radicalization
programs, among others. Military force is necessary but not
sufficient.) Such a kinetic campaign in turn depends on capabilities
and resources that include drones and other strike assets to carry out
operations against targets; local partner forces that U.S. operators
can work by, with, and through; and exquisite intelligence collection
capabilities. Effective counterterrorism operations do not, however,
necessarily require extensive American ground forces. The United States
dismantled ISIS in Iraq and Syria by supporting local partner forces
with a relatively modest number of operators on the ground and
overwhelming air power. We used a similar strategy to rout al-Qaeda in
Afghanistan in the immediate aftermath of 9/11 before shifting to a
more ambitious mission in the country and the heavier military
footprint that came with it.
When it comes to intelligence, counterterrorism operations
typically rely on a combination of signals intelligence (SIGINT) to
eavesdrop on terrorist communications; robust human intelligence
(HUMINT) operations to penetrate terrorist networks; extensive use of
ISR platforms (``intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance'' or,
more colloquially, drones); and other sources and methods. These
capabilities allow the United States to uncover plots, identify
targets, and develop a ``pattern of life'' that enables the precise use
of force to remove targets from the battlefield while reducing the risk
of inadvertent harm to civilians to the greatest extent possible.
The United States has lost a great deal of counterterrorism
capability in Afghanistan, and a so-called ``over-the-horizon''
strategy--under which strike assets that are based hundreds of miles
away fly occasional sorties into Afghanistan--is a poor substitute.
Simply put, it is not possible to systematically degrade a terrorist
group from over the horizon.
Counterterrorism strikes depend on intelligence and, with no
military or diplomatic presence on the ground in Afghanistan, it is far
more difficult to monitor terrorist groups as they rebuild, train, and
plot. And with U.S. drones now required to fly many hours round-trip
from and to their bases in distant countries, leaving precious little
time to loiter on station, it is far more difficult to eliminate
terrorists even when they can be located. The killing of Ayman al
Zawahiri was a great success, but it is the exception that proves the
rule. To date, the Zawahiri operation remains the lone acknowledged
counterterrorism strike in Afghanistan since August 2021. One drone
strike in 20 months is not a viable counterterrorism strategy. No
wonder some members of the national security community, believing over-
the-horizon to be a fantasy, have taken to disparaging it as ``over-
the-rainbow.''\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Jonathan Swan & Zachary Basu, Red Flags for Biden's ``Over-
the-Horizon'' Strategy, Axios, Sept. 12, 2021, https://www.axios.com/
2021/09/12/afghanistan-counterterrorism-over-horizon-biden.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The limits of over-the-horizon counterterrorism may be best
illustrated by the fact that, nearly 2 years after the Kabul airport
bombing, its perpetrators remain essentially at large. The day of the
attack, President Biden promised the attackers ``[w]e will not forgive.
We will not forget. We will hunt you down and make you pay.''\13\
Twenty months later, the administration has yet to make good on the
President's threat, and part of the reason it has failed to do so is
because it lacks the capability to do so. America's fallen warriors and
the families they left behind deserve better.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Kevin Liptak, Biden to Kabul Attackers: ``We Will Hunt You
Down and Make You Pay'', CNN, Aug. 26, 2021, https://www.cnn.com/2021/
08/26/politics/biden-kabul-attack/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iii.
The harms from the administration's withdrawal from Afghanistan
will not be limited to that unfortunate country. It will have profound
consequences for the security of our homeland as well. With the United
States no longer able to count on robust intelligence flows from
Afghanistan, our traveler vetting and border security systems will be
less effective at identifying possible threats. What happens in
Afghanistan does not stay in Afghanistan.
In the years after 9/11, the United States built a number of
sophisticated systems to identify suspected terrorists and other
potential threats attempting to enter the country. For example, Federal
agencies use a variety of watch lists--such as a database of known or
suspected terrorists (KSTs) and the no-fly list--to screen airline
passengers, inbound international travelers, visa applicants, and
others to assess whether they could be terrorists or otherwise pose a
threat to our national security. The United States has signed dozens of
agreements under Homeland Security Presidential Directive 6, or HSPD-6,
to share terrorist watch list information with foreign partners. U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and the State Department collect
biometrics such as fingerprints from foreigners entering the United
States and applying for visas, respectively, and check them against
databases of terrorists, criminals, and other threats. And CBP uses its
Automated Targeting System to analyze airline reservation data and
other information to screen international travelers entering the
country.
These and other systems have proven extraordinarily effective at
preventing another 9/11-scale attack on the homeland. But they are only
as powerful as the data that is fed into them. For years, the United
States has been able to count on extensive data flows from Afghanistan
about terror suspects--captured enemy material and ``pocket litter''
such as thumb drives and mobile phones seized by U.S. special
operations forces in counterterrorism raids, biometric data and other
identifying information collected and shared by the Afghan government,
and so on. But now, without a meaningful presence on the ground to
enable unilateral collection and lacking a government partner able and
willing to gather and share information with us, our vetting systems
have lost some of the data that made them so effective.
This comes at an inauspicious time for our border security. We have
seen historic numbers of migrant encounters on our Southern Border in
recent years,\14\ and terrorists could easily take advantage of this
vulnerability. CBP has reported a dramatic spike in the number of
individuals on its Terrorist Screening Dataset watch list who were
apprehended after crossing the Southern Border: zero in fiscal year
2019, 3 in fiscal year 2020, 15 in fiscal year 2021, 98 in fiscal year
2022, and 69 so far in fiscal year 2023.\15\ And those are just the
ones we know about. Furthermore, terrorist organizations have long
sought to exploit vulnerabilities in our Southern Border to carry out
attacks inside the United States. In 2011, the Iranian regime attempted
to use a Mexican drug cartel to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the
United States by bombing a restaurant in Georgetown.\16\ In late 2021,
Tehran planned to use a Mexican national with ties to drug cartels to
assassinate former national security advisor John Bolton.\17\ I am not
aware that al-Qaeda, ISIS-K, or other terrorists in Afghanistan
similarly are currently plotting to attack the homeland by way of the
Southern Border. But if Afghanistan-based terrorists do seek to conduct
attacks inside our country in the future, it is safe to assume they
will be aware of our border vulnerabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Southwest Land Border
Encounters, Mar. 10, 2023, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/
southwest-land-border-encounters.
\15\ U.S. Customs and Border Protection, CBP Enforcement Statistics
Fiscal Year 2023, Mar. 10, 2023, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/stats/
cbp-enforcement-statistics. The Terrorist Screening Dataset ``is the
U.S. Government's database that contains sensitive information on
terrorist identities.'' It ``originated as the consolidated terrorist
watchlist to house information on known or suspected terrorists (KSTs)
but has evolved over the last decade to include additional individuals
who represent a potential threat to the United States, including known
affiliates of watchlisted individuals.'' Id.
\16\ Charlie Savage & Scott Shane, Iranians Accused of a Plot to
Kill Saudis' U.S. Envoy, N.Y. Times, Oct. 11, 2011, https://
www.nytimes.com/2011/10/12/us/us-accuses-iranians-of-plotting-to-kill-
saudi-envoy.html.
\17\ Nick Schifrin, Iranian Man Charged for Trying to Assassinate
Former National Security Adviser John Bolton, PBS, Aug. 10, 2022,
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/show/iranian-man-charged-for-trying-to-
assassinate-former-national-security-adviser-john-bolton.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, Members of the subcommittee,
thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would
be happy to answer any questions you might have.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ambassador Sales.
I now recognize Ms. Ledeen for your opening statement of 5
minutes.
STATEMENT OF SIMONE A. LEDEEN, FORMER DEPUTY ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST
Ms. Ledeen. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
My experience with the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan
began when I started receiving requests for assistance from
people trying to help contacts on the ground. The stories of
chaos that I was hearing did not align with the picture that
the U.S. Government was trying to paint about the withdrawal. I
was invited to join a group chat that included military members
and individuals with experience in the intelligence community.
The chat allowed us to piece information together, forming a
picture of the reality on the ground so we could help vetted
people leave.
It was a spontaneous volunteer effort, the scope of which
we did not initially comprehend. Our strategy was to find ways
for individuals who had the appropriate documentation to gain
entry to the airport with the assistance of U.S. service
members who were participating in the evacuation. This was
challenging, with thousands of people crowding the airport
perimeter. People we helped included American citizens, legal
permanent residents, interpreters, intelligence assets, and
some Afghan commandos. Yet, as the messages rolled in, I
wondered, how did we get to the point where volunteers were
offering more support to evacuees than our own Government?
Today, I'd like to give a few examples from our group's
involvement which demonstrate that after 20 years of fighting,
everything quickly collapsed.
We could not identify who was running the airport. We were
contacted by civilian volunteers, NGO's, universities, and
corporate entities who had planes either on the ground or en
route to evacuate people. However, these planes could not get
in contact with anyone, nor could their passengers access the
gate. Outside the airport gates the United States failed to
create a safe organized process to identify individuals who
should have been permitted entry. The U.S. Government
instructed American citizens to shelter in place because the
Taliban-controlled entry to the city and the airport, beating
people, including Americans, and burning their exit documents.
When the State Department said the airport was secure, we knew
this was wrong. If the airport was safe, why tell American
citizens to hide?
For every one group that made it through, it seemed like 10
did not. Among those we helped was an Afghan woman who had
worked with U.S. intelligence on a clandestine platform. With
the assistance of a Marine who ran half-an-hour across the
airport to find her, she and her family waded through a canal
of human waste to get inside the airport and are safe today.
On August 25, with virtual assistance from our team, the
heroic service members on the ground rescued 25 interpreters
and former contract employees of a U.S. intelligence agency,
including a double amputee who came on foot with his family.
Our group also supported the evacuation of high-risk Afghans
who had assisted the FBI. That evening 11 buses filled with
evacuees could not enter the airport, and an urgent security
alert advised U.S. citizens to avoid the airport gates. Despite
efforts to contact authorities, American citizens were left
stranded outside the gates. Some gained access only after
intervention from higher-level officials. Many of the Afghans
were denied entry and, to my knowledge, never made it out.
A suicide bomber attacked Abbey Gate, killing 13 American
service members and grievously wounding dozens more. Over 100
Afghans were murdered, including the young son of an
interpreter who we had been helping moments earlier. As the
airport gates were sealed shut, requests for our help continued
for 300 orphans who were dispersed in the blast, music
students, and religious and ethnic minorities. They did not
make it inside, and I do not know what happened to any of them.
Only after the Taliban had captured Kabul and Americans
were taken hostage did President Biden finally address the
Nation. The Taliban immediately asserted its power, hunting our
Afghan allies house to house. Some members of our group
received torture and murder videos of their friends and former
colleagues sent by the Taliban from their own victims' phones.
Our Afghan allies who did not make it out now live in constant
fear, many in safe houses or in third countries like Pakistan
and Iran, where they are recruited by their military and
intelligence services to learn what they know, learn what we
had taught them. In the country where Americans have fought and
died for 2 decades, ISIS-Khorasan has regained immense strength
and the Taliban are the best-armed terrorist group the world
has ever known. Afghanistan is once again a terrorist safe
haven.
Many of us remember that what happens in Afghanistan,
unfortunately, does not stay there. In fiscal year 2022, 98
people on our terrorist watch list crossed over our Southern
Border that we know of, and 324 individuals evacuated from
Afghanistan were allowed to enter the United States despite
appearing on the Defense Department's biometrically-enabled
watch list. How many more have entered undetected? Our
warfighters went into harm's way to keep us safe, but today,
our leaders act as if the war never happened. We must hold
those responsible for the failed Afghanistan withdrawal
accountable.
In my written testimony, I've called for policies that
would provide greater care to our veterans who are reeling from
seeing their hard-fought gains abandoned. I've also suggested
ways to improve the special immigration visa process. Moreover,
I think there should be an official effort to document the
critical work done by volunteer groups during the evacuation so
that we can model their successes in future conflict
environments.
Thank you for the opportunity to be here today, and I look
forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Ledeen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Simone A. Ledeen
April 18, 2023
i. introduction
Chairman Green, Ranking Member Thompson, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking
Member Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you today. My name is Simone
Ledeen. I am currently a senior visiting fellow at the Krach Institute
for Tech Diplomacy, a bipartisan initiative affiliated with Purdue
University, and managing director at Vantage ROI. I previously served
as deputy assistant secretary of defense (DASD) for the Middle East.
Prior to that I was principal director and acting deputy assistant
secretary for special operations and combating terrorism, where I was
responsible for defense policy on counterterrorism activities, as well
as military information support operations, irregular warfare, direct
action, sensitive special operations, and personnel recovery/hostage
issues.
Like many others, after the terrorist attacks on September 11,
2001, I felt moved to serve our country. A family friend was on
American Airlines Flight 77, which was hijacked by al-Qaeda operatives
and crashed into the Pentagon. I served in Iraq from 2003-2004, and
then in Afghanistan in 2005. In Afghanistan, I served alongside the
military in a non-combat role, deploying there for most of 2005 and
again from 2009-2010 as the senior treasury representative to NATO's
International Security Assistance Force. Both of my brothers served in
the Marine Corps--one in Iraq and the other in Afghanistan.
ii. experience with the withdrawal from afghanistan
My experience with the 2021 withdrawal from Afghanistan unfolded
from my own home when I began receiving real-time requests for
assistance from people on the ground in Afghanistan. The stories of
chaos that I was hearing did not align with the picture that the U.S.
Government was trying to publicly paint about the withdrawal.
On August 19, 2021, a dear friend contacted me. She was looking to
help an Afghan family trapped outside the Kabul airport. The father had
served as an interpreter with our Special Forces. He was outside the
airport at the northwest gate with two kids and an injured, pregnant
wife. Upon learning this, I immediately reached out to people in my
network who I thought might know what to do. I was invited to join a
group chat that included active and retired military members and
individuals with experience in the intelligence community. Without
introduction, everyone in the chat started sharing information, which
allowed us to piece bits of information together that we individually
received to form a more robust picture of the reality on the ground,
and help vetted, qualified people safely exit the country.
It was a spontaneous volunteer effort, the scope of which we did
not initially comprehend. Our strategy from the outset was to find ways
for at-risk individuals who had the appropriate documentation, and in
some cases were known by members of our group, to gain entry with the
assistance of U.S. service members who manned the gates and fences at
the airport. This was challenging since there were thousands of people
crowding the airport perimeter. We had group members who were
communicating with teams on the ground. We also had (over time)
telephone numbers for individual Marines. Once a service member made
physical contact with an at-risk group and moved them inside, we
focused on ensuring that they were manifested on a flight to a safe
destination.
Over time we helped more and more people--American citizens, legal
permanent residents, interpreters, intelligence assets, and some Afghan
Commandos--leave. Yet, as the messages rolled in, I had to wonder--
where was the U.S. Government? The urgent, time-sensitive information
we sent to the State Department did not receive a response. The U.S.
Government did not seem to have a full accounting of the number of
people that needed to leave. How did we get to the point where
volunteers in a group chat were offering more resources and support to
evacuees than our own Government?
More than ever, I believe the deaths of our 13 service members, in
addition to catastrophic injuries sustained by the dozens of young men
and women at Abbey Gate, were avoidable and should never have happened.
Our Government's failure to secure the safety of our own citizens and
those who risked their lives for us led to the most disgraceful and
shameful national security crisis in our lifetime. To this date, nobody
has been held accountable.
iii. observations about the chaotic withdrawal
Based on our group's involvement in the evacuation and related
activities, I have some insights into the chaotic withdrawal that are
likely shared by others who were involved in these efforts. Today, I'd
like to give a few examples, which demonstrate that, after 20 years of
fighting, everything quickly collapsed despite nearly 15 years of
withdrawal planning across three administrations. Fundamentally, the
prior plans did not anticipate an arbitrarily imposed troop cap that
negated our ability to make use of Bagram Air Base. This made previous
plans obsolete, and it appeared our military planners had to start from
scratch at the eleventh hour with impossible restrictions. This led to
a number of issues:
As we tried to help people flee, we could not identify who
was running the airport. We were contacted by many groups,
including civilian volunteers, NGO's, universities, and
corporate entities who had planes either on the ground or
enroute to assist in evacuating people. However, these planes
could not get in contact with anyone from the United States or
any government on the airfield, nor could their passengers
access the gate. For example, one group was trying to reach a
Ukrainian plane that had been sitting on the tarmac for several
days. The group reported that the plane was for the Ukrainian
Special Operations Forces (SOF), who had been waiting at the
gate, but the soldiers said that nobody would let them in, even
though they were manifested on the plane. This was the first of
many times we would hear of groups that were manifested on
flights not being able to access the airport. Until the final
days, many chartered planes that were able to land in Kabul
left nearly empty because the people who needed to leave on
them could not get inside the airport. Outside the airport
gates, the area was not secured for Americans waiting to enter
and the United States failed to create an organized process to
identify individuals who should have been permitted entry. For
example, members of our group organized night operations for
American citizens to climb ladders to leap over airport fences.
To further complicate the situation, the United States'
abandonment of Bagram Air Base meant that there was no air
traffic control in place other than for military planes.
On August 17, the U.S. Government instructed American
citizens in Afghanistan to shelter in place and not attempt to
access the airport.\1\ With this instruction, the U.S.
Government was telling its own citizens to hide. In the group
chat, we recognized that this was because the Taliban--the
force that the United States had been fighting for 20 years--
controlled entry to the city and to the airport itself. The
Taliban had started targeting those waiting to enter the
airport, beating people, and burning their documents, which
they needed to depart the country. So when the State Department
stated that the airport was secure, we knew this was wrong.\2\
If the airport was safe, why did the U.S. Government tell
American citizens to hide?
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Adam Shaw, State Dept tells Americans in Afghanistan to
'shelter in place' until they hear from embassy, FOX NEWS (Aug. 17,
2021), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/state-dept-americans-
afghanistan-shelter-in-place.
\2\ Ned Price, State Dep't. Press Briefing, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE
(Aug. 17, 2021), https://www.state.gov/briefings/department-press-
briefing-august-17-2021/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Taliban quickly took back control and began exercising
their power. Videos circulated in our chat showed the Taliban
firing weapons outside of the airport. Wounded civilians could
be seen lying on the ground and covered in blood. These videos
were filmed by the people we were attempting to help escape. At
one point, we were alerted that there was an American family
with a sign that said, ``we are all here.'' They were stranded
outside Abbey Gate. Our teammates rallied cars to pick them up,
but the family got spooked by the Taliban and went back to
their residence. An image of the Taliban's Iwo Jima reenactment
with them kitted up in American gear also surfaced, which
enraged us.\3\
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\3\ Jon Simkins, Taliban photo appears to mock Iwo Jima flag
raising in latest propaganda push, MARINE CORPS TIMES (Aug. 21, 2021),
https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/off-duty/military-culture/2021/08/21/
taliban-photo-appears-to-mock-iwo-jima-flag-raising-in-latest-
propaganda-push/.
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The State Department also instructed at-risk Americans to go
to the Ministry of Interior Headquarters in Kabul on August 21.
Later, the Taliban seized 20 of these U.S. citizens' passports
and held their owners hostage, though these Americans were
eventually recovered.\4\ The following night, the State
Department scheduled another pickup at the Ministry of
Interior, with U.S. military personnel ready to meet and escort
the Americans to the Kabul Airport. These efforts continued for
several days, but required U.S. citizens and their families to
clear a Taliban checkpoint where they were harassed and
sometimes beaten, contrary to the terms agreed to by our
Government. There were no repercussions for this violation and
humiliation of our citizens. Further, U.S. citizens' spouses
and minor children were permitted to depart via this method,
but not their extended family. Our citizens were forced to
decide whether to leave and effectively abandon parents and
adult children or stay and face the new Taliban way of life. In
addition, we know of multiple legal permanent residents who
should have been evacuated, but were turned away by the Taliban
because they did not possess the blue U.S. passport.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Hollie McKay, Taliban seizing Afghan-American's U.S. passports
outside Kabul airport, N.Y. POST (Aug. 20, 2021), https://nypost.com/
2021/08/20/taliban-seizing-afghan-americans-us-passports-outside-
airport/.
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On August 23, as our team faced immense challenges assisting
U.S. citizens and high-risk Afghans who needed to gain access
to the airport, we continued to press forward. For every one
group that made it through, it seemed like 10 did not. Among
those we were helping that day was an Afghan woman who had
worked with U.S. intelligence on a clandestine platform. With
the assistance of a Marine who ran across the airport to find
her, she and her family waded through a canal of human waste to
get inside the airport and are safe today, far away from
Afghanistan. We shared photos of ``our'' families as they
boarded flights.
On August 24, U.S. officials on the ground announced they
would no longer accept Afghan locals and issued a final call
for American citizens to report to the airport. We learned
later that a deal was made with the Taliban to expedite
withdrawal by August 31. The White House claimed they had
contacted all American citizens, but many Americans we were
trying to help had never heard from anyone from our Government.
As the State Department screened individuals at the airport,
they began turning away some Special Immigrant Visa (SIV)
recipients and high-risk Afghans. Once they were sent back
outside the airport, they faced certain death.
On August 25, the team managed to rescue 25 interpreters and
former contract employees of a U.S. intelligence agency,
including a double amputee who walked to Kabul with his family.
That day, our group also supported the evacuation of high-risk
Afghans who had assisted the FBI and the U.S. Treasury
Department. We received reports from several American citizens
and high-risk Afghans who struggled to reach the airport due to
Taliban checkpoints, as well as conflicting information from
the U.S. Government. Some families, including U.S. citizens,
were beaten by the Taliban while attempting to enter the
airport. That evening, 11 buses filled with American citizens
and high-risk Afghans could not gain entry to the airport, and
an urgent security alert advised U.S. citizens to avoid the
airport gates.\5\ Despite multiple efforts to contact relevant
authorities, American citizens were left stranded outside the
closed gates, with some eventually gaining access only after
intervention from higher-level officials. Many of the high-risk
Afghans were denied entry, and to my knowledge never made it
out.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Security Alert, U.S. Embassy Kabul (Aug. 25, 2021), https://
af.usembassy.gov/security-alert-embassy-kabul-afghanistan-august-25-
2021/.
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With imminent threats reported at multiple gates, a suicide
bomber attacked Abbey Gate, resulting in 13 Americans killed
and dozens grievously wounded.\6\ Over a hundred Afghans were
murdered, including the young son of one of the interpreters we
had been trying to assist. As gates were being sealed shut,
requests for help continued to pour in for 300 orphans and
other large convoys, including music school students, and
religious and ethnic minorities who had all been left stranded
after the blast. Although we were distraught and angry, our
team of volunteers continued working to find alternative ways
to evacuate people.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Matthieu Aikins, et al., Suicide Bombers in Kabul Kill Dozens,
Including 13 U.S. Troops, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2021), https://
www.nytimes.com/2021/08/26/world/asia/kabul-airport-bombing.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cleared data-science professionals within our group created
and refined a tool we used to deconflict manifests and track
who was leaving and where they went. As days passed, they met
with leaders at U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) who
were so impressed with this tool that they integrated it into
their own efforts. By the evacuation's conclusion, we had
tracked 7,000 evacuees through our own efforts--including 1,600
American citizens and 3,000 SIVs--and over 41,000 in
partnership with SOCOM. While these figures certainly do not
cover everyone who left, including on flights organized by
other countries, our data suggest that the administration's
estimate of the number of evacuees who departed via the
airport--124,000--is likely inaccurate and overstates the total
number of evacuees.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan at 5, THE WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 6,
2023), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/US-
Withdrawal-from-Afghanistan.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are many examples of quiet but Herculean effort in
those final days--Afghans left behind who were still working to
properly dispose of some of the most sensitive data that
remained with our Afghan contractors. Many databases with
millions of records nearly got left behind, but for the
incredible risks by a few noble warriors who saved both
themselves and the data they smuggled out.
Intelligence tools had been removed too quickly and too
completely from Afghanistan. Following the catastrophic deaths
of the 13 service members during the withdrawal, U.S. Central
Command (CENTCOM) executed a strike based on bad intelligence
that resulted in civilian deaths. Chairman Mark Milley defended
the strike, calling it ``righteous.''\8\ But CENTCOM had pulled
all of its intelligence collection tools out of Afghanistan
already and incredibly said they were relying on the Taliban--a
force we had been fighting for 20 years--for force protection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Alex Horton, et al., Botched drone strike that killed 10
civilians in Kabul was not a result of criminal negligence, Pentagon
says, WASH. POST (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
national-security/2021/11/03/kabul-drone-strike-inspector-general-
report/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even basic essentials like food and water were forgotten.
The situation outside the airport grew so desperate that
inbound aircraft were asked to bring food and water into the
country.
It was only after the Taliban had captured Kabul and
Americans were taken hostage that President Biden finally
addressed the situation.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Remarks by President Biden on the End of the War in
Afghanistan, THE WHITE HOUSE (Aug. 31, 2021), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/08/31/remarks-
by-president-biden-on-the-end-of-the-war-in-afghanistan/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
iv. resurgence of terrorism
The Taliban wasted no time in asserting its power, and retribution
was swift. The Talibs placed a high price on our Afghan partners'
heads. Through various means, they quickly identified who had been
working with United States and hunted those individuals down--going
house to house to find them.\10\ On our watch, they became the most
well-armed terrorist group the world has ever seen. I speak on behalf
of many when I say we cannot forget our Afghan allies who did not make
it out of Afghanistan during the withdrawal. They live in constant fear
that the Taliban will harm them or their families. Some have escaped to
Pakistan, Iran, and other countries, and have been recruited by their
militaries and intelligence agencies. They have been forced to teach
our tactics and methods to our enemies. Some may even be fighting for
the Russians in Ukraine.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Tyler O'Neil and Teny Sahakian, Taliban commit `house-to-house
executions' in Kabul after US exit as chilling audio demonstrates
Afghans' fear, FOX NEWS (Aug. 31, 2021), https://www.foxnews.com/world/
taliban-kabul-executions-afghanistan-gunshots-audio.
\11\ Zheela Noori and Najib Ahmadyar, Former US-Trained Afghan
Commandos Recruited by Russia, Iran, VOICE OF AM. (Nov. 7, 2022),
https://www.voanews.com/a/former-us-trained-afghan-commandos-recruited-
by-russia-iran-/6821028.html.
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To give you a sense for who is leading the Taliban today, 4 of the
5 ex-Guantanamo Bay detainees exchanged for Bowe Bergdahl in 2014 have
senior positions in the Taliban's resurrected Islamic Emirate of
Afghanistan.\12\ The Minister of Interior is Sirajuddin Haqqani, who is
very close with al-Qaeda.\13\ Haqqani has planned multiple operations
that have resulted in the deaths of American soldiers and civilians. He
is wanted by the United States and there is a $10 million bounty on his
head.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Samuel Chamberlain, Four Taliban members swapped for Bowe
Bergdahl now in Afghan government, N.Y. POST (Sept. 7, 2021), https://
nypost.com/2021/09/07/four-taliban-members-swapped-for-bowe-bergdahl-
now-in-afghan-government/.
\13\ Peter Bergen, He's on the FBI's most-wanted list and is now a
key member of the Taliban's new government, CNN (Sept. 9, 2021),
https://www.cnn.com/2021/09/09/opinions/haqqani-taliban-government-
afghanistan-bergen/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
ISIS-Khorasan has also regained immense strength. Prior to the
withdrawal, the United States had crushed ISIS-Khorasan and imprisoned
its few surviving members in the Pol-e-Charkhi prison. After the
collapse of the Afghan government, in one of their first acts, the
Taliban released those terrorist prisoners.\14\ I'm not the only one
ringing the alarm bell on the reemergence of the threat ISIS-Khorasan
once again poses. CENTCOM Commander General Michael Kurilla recently
testified that ISIS-Khorasan would be able to launch attacks against
Western interests outside of Afghanistan in less than 6 months with
little to no warning.\15\ Yet, our political leaders have remained
silent, seemingly ignoring the resurgence of ISIS-Khorasan and our
inability to combat this threat now that we have abandoned our allies
and have no persistent intelligence collection capabilities there or in
neighboring countries since the withdrawal. Afghanistan has become an
ISIS-Khorasan playground. Apparently, we have not learned the lesson
that what happens in Afghanistan does not stay in Afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ Kelly Laco, Pentagon says `thousands' of ISIS-K prisoners
released by Taliban, FOX NEWS (Aug. 27, 2021), https://www.foxnews.com/
politics/pentagon-thousands-isis-prisoners-released-taliban.
\15\ See Gen. Michael ``Erik'' Kurilla, Statement for the Record
Before the Senate Armed Services Committee on the Posture of US Central
Command at 3, 10 (Mar. 13, 2023), https://af.usembassy.gov/security-
alert-u-s-embassy-kabul-afghanistan-august-28-2021/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the withdrawal has turned Afghanistan back into a terrorist
breeding ground, arguably on track to exceed its pre-September 11
status, we must be mindful of terrorists who have already entered our
country. In fiscal year 2022, 98 people on our terrorist watch list
crossed over our Southern Border that we know of.\16\ With
unprecedented overland immigration, many individuals have been entering
the country on foot and avoiding detection. This is a concerning
development. In the initial airlifts out of Kabul, U.S. Government
officials did not properly vet all the Afghans who were evacuated. A
Department of Defense whistleblower has alleged that 324 individuals
evacuated from Afghanistan were allowed to enter the United States
despite appearing on the Defense Department's Biometrically Enabled
Watchlist (BEWL).\17\ This, while thousands of vetted Afghans remained
trapped and unable to evacuate. Indeed, there are many videos
circulating on-line and elsewhere of torture and murder of our Afghan
allies since August 2021. In addition to these horrific and violent
acts, this situation has caused deep and continuing moral injury to our
veterans and civilians who served.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Anna Giaritelli, Nearly 100 FBI terror watchlist suspects
nabbed at southern border WASH. EXAMINER (Oct. 25, 2022), https://
www.washingtonexaminer.com/policy/defense-national-security/nearly-100-
fbi-terror-watch-list-suspects-caught-southern-border.
\17\ Alayna Treene, Scoop: Pentagon watchdog to open review into
Afghanistan whistleblower claims, AXIOS (Sep. 8, 2022), https://
www.axios.com/2022/09/08/defense-department-inspector-general-
afghanistan-withdrawal.
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v. accountability and recommendations
Our warfighters voluntarily went into harm's way to keep our
country safe. Many are alive today because of individual Afghans who
sacrificed for them. Today, our institutional leaders act as if the war
and our withdrawal didn't happen, and we are just meant to move on.
Many veterans cannot move on without accountability. We must hold those
responsible for the failed Afghanistan withdrawal accountable for their
decisions. While the withdrawal (and timing) was fundamentally a policy
decision made by the Commander-in-Chief, military leaders and senior
Government officials across multiple administrations' departments and
agencies need to tell our Nation the truth about what led to the chaos,
rather than continue to rely on career-preserving talking points.
Moreover, when the U.S. Government supported the Afghan civilian
leadership, the civilian leaders not only enriched themselves but they
also funded the Taliban through bribes, contracts with front companies
and subcontractors and ransom payments.\18\ With few exceptions, the
U.S. Government looked the other way. We knew this for a decade and
although changes were made to vetting contractors and subcontractors,
this situation continued. For a long time, politicians and military
leaders also issued glowing statements about the progress the Afghan
National Security Forces were making, which were at odds with the
intelligence assessments produced at the same time. It is not too late
for the long-needed reckoning to make sure this never happens again.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ U.S. Special Inspector Gen. for Afg. Reconstruction,
Corruption in Conflict: Lessons from the U.S. Experience in
Afghanistan, SIGAR 16-58-LL (Sept. 2016), https://www.sigar.mil/pdf/
lessonslearned/SIGAR-16-58-LL.pdf.
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Many veterans and civilians who have served have gotten involved in
resettlement to help address the moral injury they have sustained. Our
Government can help with this:
1. The Government should consider establishing a mechanism for
direct verification of SIVs that worked under Classified
contracts. Over 2 years have passed and this is still not in
place. The Government should create a mechanism for DoD to
communicate directly with the State Department to verify Afghan
employment under Classified contracts. The entire system for
employment verification (the entire basis for visa approval) is
left to civilian contractors, many of whom dissolved in the
lead-up to August 2021 and no longer exist. The Department of
Defense has not been held accountable for the local nationals
contracted under their employment who continue to bounce
between safe houses if they have not fled to third countries.
2. Consider authorizing SIV eligibility for Afghans who were
injured while serving the USG before their 1 year of service
eligibility. Currently, the Afghan Allies Protection Act is
rigid in the time of service required to be eligible for an
SIV.\19\ The result is that an Afghan could have dutifully
served for 340 days and have been traumatically injured in
combat alongside his American compatriots, but he is ineligible
for an SIV because he is a month short of the requirement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ See Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-8,
602(b)(2)(A)(ii), 123 Stat. 524, 807 (2009).
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3. We must take care of our veterans. The withdrawal was an
emotional time for many of our veterans, who careened back and
forth between grief and rage. To many, it has seemed like
America does not care about the sacrifices they made on their
behalf. The ballooning mental health crisis among the veteran
population speaks to this devastation. This chaotic withdrawal
has significantly added to our military's current recruitment
problem. Some veterans I know, all of whom come from military
families, have stopped encouraging or are even preventing
family members from signing up. Many veterans have been
involved in the resettlement process with Afghans to help
address the moral injury the veterans have sustained. Our
Government has the resources to help with this process and
should not wait to assist.
4. Before too much more time passes, there must be an official
effort to document the actions of these volunteer groups--
specifically, in order to capture successes and what was
accomplished with limited resources in a very short period of
time. This should include the data architecture created. We
could use this as a model of how to design a holistic system on
the fly and inside of a dynamic, asymmetric threat environment
in a constrained time frame.
5. In the event of a future overseas conflict, the U.S. Government
could maintain a central database of SIV-eligible employees.
There could be a requirement for the employing office to upload
information verifying employment at the time an employee
becomes eligible for SIV.
With these new policies and processes in place, we can reassure our
allies, support our veterans, ensure that troops on the ground will be
able to receive the support they need from local communities in the
future, and--most importantly--avoid another catastrophic withdrawal in
the future. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and I look
forward to your questions.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ms. Ledeen.
The Chair now recognizes Colonel Douglas for his opening
statement of 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER J. DOUGLAS, COLONEL (RET.), UNITED
STATES MARINE CORPS
Mr. Douglas. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner,
and committee Members, thank you for this opportunity to
testify before you today. My testimony is based on my
experience as a combat veteran, my perspective on our efforts
in Afghanistan, and my reaction to the U.S. withdrawal and
evacuation, which are sometimes confused as the same event, but
were actually two separate, distinct activities.
I've served our country as a Marine infantry officer for
over 31 years in an active and reserve capacity. In 1995, I
left active service, began a law enforcement career, and
entered the Marine Corps Reserve.
I assumed command of my first infantry company a month
after 9/11, 2001. Like many Americans, I wanted to serve my
country and pursue those responsible for the attack. President
Bush stated, we will not waiver, we will not tire, we will not
falter, and we will not fail. Peace and freedom will prevail.
The unprovoked attacks on America and these words remained my
reason to serve.
I've had the honor and privilege of leading Marines for 5
tours in combat operations since 9/11. I led Marines in combat
operations in Iraq in 2003 and 2005 as a rifle company
commander. I returned to Iraq leading an advisor team from 2015
through 2016 that transitioned into a task force responsible
for advising and assisting Iraqi security forces during
Operation Inherent Resolve and the pivotal Ramadi counter-
attack against ISIS. I also led two advisors teams in Helmand
Province, Afghanistan, from 2013 to 2014 and again in 2018. My
last assignment was as the assistant chief of staff, G5,
strategy and plans at Marine Corps Forces Central Command in
Tampa, Florida.
While serving in this capacity, although I did not return
to Afghanistan to participate in the evacuation, I facilitated
evacuation planning efforts within the command and traveled to
Al Udeid Air Base, Qatar, to reinstate and lead the Marine
Corps coordination element responsible for the processing and
assisting of more than 12,000 Afghan evacuees as they fled
Afghanistan.
Reflecting on the current state of Afghanistan, many U.S.
service members, some who've served multiple tours in
Afghanistan, wonder if their efforts, service, and individual
sacrifices were worth the cost. While this may better be
decided by historians in the future, I can confidently say that
for 20 years, the sacrifices of our service members and their
families have made a difference in the lives of our fellow
Americans and our counterparts. Working with our Afghan and
coalition partners, we denied terrorists the ability to plan,
coordinate, and execute attacks on our homeland from the
ungoverned spaces in Afghanistan. We also brought hope, growth,
and prosperity to many Afghan people. The stability we provided
for 20 years wasn't perfect, it was always tenuous, still, it
contrasts dramatically with the previous and current state of
Afghanistan under Taliban rule, as it harbors terrorists,
remains rampantly corrupt, and dramatically reverses the rights
of women and girls with medieval-style rules.
Stability crumbled and the final days of our Afghan
campaign were chaotic. The culminating event was the loss of 13
service members, more than 170 Afghan evacuees, and an untold
number of physical and moral injuries. My participation rapidly
turned from assistance with the evacuation to the assignment as
the lead Marine conducting the Abbey Gate investigation.
To put our exit in perspective, the Soviet Union occupied
Afghanistan from 1979 to 1989. The Soviets worked with the
government and the Mujahideen, they modified time lines,
granted extensions, and maintained at least one infantry
division in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as an emergency QRF in
case of rapid deterioration. Once Soviet assistance ended,
Afghanistan fell in 1992. The Soviet Union withdrawal from
Afghanistan contrasted sharply with the U.S. departure from
Afghanistan in 2021. Many of us believed the negotiated time
line would be delayed because the Taliban failed to honor or
operate within the parameters of the condition-based Doha
Agreement. As early as April, I and presumably many of our
Afghan partners, were in disbelief by the announcement of the
withdrawal date. This reduced our U.S. force posture and boots
on the ground to nearly zero, with immense pressure to keep the
number extremely low while preparing the high likelihood of a
non-combatant evacuation under some of the most trying
conditions in history.
I thought back to President Bush's quote, ultimately, peace
and freedom did not prevail. The final days of our Afghan
campaign came with extreme consequences. I remember why we
fought there, and I'd like to think my brothers and sisters in
arms who fought there remember as well. In the words of the
CENTCOM Commander in a paper published in the Joint Force in
2012, we fought to protect the values that grew from the
Enlightenment. We fought to give hope to those who have lived
under desperate conditions and to safeguard newfound freedoms
and values based on human rights that must be matured and
furthered. Our fight aimed to ensure governments and their
citizens are fully able to fulfill their social contracts,
freely addressing social injustices and responding swiftly to
curb oppressive actors. Finally, we fought knowing that the
world prospers when we succeed in restoring human rights and
protecting human dignity.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you again for
allowing me to speak. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Douglas follows:]
Prepared Statement of Christopher J. Douglas
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and committee Members,
thank you for this opportunity to testify before you today. My
testimony is based on my experience as a combat veteran, my perspective
on our efforts in Afghanistan, and my reaction to the U.S. withdrawal
and evacuation, which are sometimes confused as the same event but were
actually two separate, distinct activities.
I have served our country as a Marine Infantry Officer for over 31
years in an active and reserve capacity. In 1995, I left active
service, began a law enforcement career, and entered the Marine Corps
Reserve. I assumed command of my first infantry company the month after
9.11.2001. Like many Americans, I wanted to serve my country and pursue
those responsible for the attack. President Bush stated, ``We will not
waver; we will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail.
Peace and freedom will prevail.'' The unprovoked attacks on America and
these words remained my reason to serve. I have had the honor and
privilege of leading Marines for 5 tours in combat operations since 9/
11. I led Marines in combat operations in Iraq in 2003 and 2005 as a
rifle company commander. I returned to Iraq, leading an advisor team
from 2015-2016 that transitioned into a task force responsible for
advising and assisting Iraqi Security Forces during Operation Inherent
Resolve and the pivotal Ramadi Counterattack against ISIS. I also led
two advisor teams in Helmand Province, Afghanistan, from 2013-2014 and
again in 2018. My last assignment was as the assistant chief of staff
G-5, strategy and plans at Marine Corps Forces Central Command in
Tampa, FL. While serving in this capacity, although I did not return to
Afghanistan to participate in the evacuation, I facilitated evacuation
planning efforts within the command. I traveled to Al Udeid Air Base,
Qatar, to reinstate and lead the Marine Coordination Element
responsible for processing and assisting more than 12,000 Afghan
evacuees as they fled Afghanistan. Encountering Afghan families lucky
enough to escape with only a backpack, leaving their homes, family
members, and the lives they had worked to build.
Reflecting on the current state of Afghanistan, many U.S. service
members, some who have served multiple tours in Afghanistan, wonder if
their efforts, service, and individual sacrifices were worth the costs.
While this may be better decided by historians in the future, I can
confidently say that for 20 years, the sacrifices of our service
members and their families have made a difference in the lives of our
fellow Americans and our counterparts. Working with our Afghan and
coalition partners, we denied terrorists the ability to plan,
coordinate, and execute attacks on our homeland from the ungoverned
spaces in Afghanistan. We also brought hope, growth, and prosperity to
many Afghan people.
The stability we provided for 20 years wasn't perfect--it was
always tenuous--and unfortunately, it crumbled in a matter of days. But
it contrasts dramatically with the previous and current state of
Afghanistan under Taliban rule, as it harbors terrorists, remains
rampantly corrupt, and dramatically reverses the rights of women and
girls with medieval-style rules. For many service members, this is a
recurring nightmare, and regrettably, for many Afghans, it is their
reality. The culminating event was the loss of 13 U.S. service members,
more than 170 Afghan evacuees, and an untold number of physical and
moral injuries. My participation rapidly turned from assistance with
the evacuation to assignment as the lead Marine conducting the Abbey
Gate investigation.
To put our exit in perspective, the Soviet Union occupied
Afghanistan from 1979-1989. Before their withdrawal from Afghanistan,
Soviet political and military leadership had undertaken strategic
political, economic, and military measures to provide for the Afghan
government's survival. Extreme weather conditions delayed the Soviet
withdrawal, and the Mujahadeen granted an extension. Following the
withdrawal, the Soviets maintained at least one infantry division and
airborne units in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan as an emergency QRF in case
of rapid deterioration of the situation in Afghanistan. Two to 3 months
after the Soviet withdrawal, the situation significantly deteriorated
in Kandahar, and the Mujahedin launched massive attacks on the city. At
the Afghan government's request, one Soviet airborne battalion was
deployed. Its participation in combat was enough to stabilize the
situation, as the Mujahidin believed that the Soviets would return.
Soviet military and economic assistance enabled the Afghan government
to remain in power for more than 3 years. Once Soviet assistance ended,
the strength of the Afghan government rapidly declined until the
government fell in 1992.
This contrasted sharply with the U.S. departure from Afghanistan in
2021. Many of us believed that the negotiated time line would be
delayed because the Taliban failed to honor or operate within the
parameters of the conditions-based Doha agreement. As early as April, I
and presumably many of our Afghan partners were in disbelief by the
announcement of the withdrawal date. This reduced our U.S. force
posture and ``boots on the ground'' to nearly zero, with immense
pressure to keep that number extremely low while preparing for the high
likelihood of a noncombatant evacuation under some of the most trying
conditions in history.
I thought back to President Bush's quote: ``We will not waver; we
will not tire; we will not falter; and we will not fail. Peace and
freedom will prevail.'' And yet, we had wavered, we had tired, we had
faltered, and we had failed. Ultimately peace and freedom did not
prevail.
The final days of our Afghan campaign were chaotic and came with
extreme consequences. I remember why we fought there and I'd like to
think that my brothers-and-sisters-in-arms who fought there remember as
well.
In the words of General Mattis, CENTCOM Commander in a paper
published to the Joint Force in 2012:
``We fought to protect the values that grew from the enlightenment; we
fought to give hope to those who have lived under desperate conditions
and to safeguard newfound freedoms and new values based on human rights
that must be matured and furthered;
``Our fight aimed to ensure governments and their citizens are fully
able to fulfill their social contracts, freely addressing social
injustices, and responding swiftly to curb oppressive actors;
``And finally, we fought knowing that the world prospers when we
succeed in restoring human rights and protecting human dignity.''\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Unpublished Paper, USCENTCOM, 2012.
Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you again for allowing me
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
to speak this morning/afternoon. I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Colonel Douglas.
The Chair now recognizes Dr. Schroden for your opening
statement of 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN SCHRODEN, PH D, DIRECTOR, COUNTERING
THREATS AND CHALLENGES PROGRAM AND SPECIAL OPERATIONS PROGRAM
CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES
Mr. Schroden. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner,
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for having me here to
discuss this important topic today.
I'm speaking to you as a military analyst with CNA, which
is a nonpartisan, nonprofit, independent research and analysis
organization. For the past 15 years, I have worked continuously
on security sector issues pertaining to Afghanistan. For a
variety of U.S. Government sponsors and independent
publications. I've led 5 independent assessments of
Afghanistan's security forces and numerous assessments of U.S.
strategy and operations in Afghanistan. In total, these efforts
saw me conduct 1 deployment and 13 shorter trips to the country
between 2008 and 2019.
There is no question that the U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan did not go as planned or as hoped. When Ambassador
Zalmay Khalilzad began negotiations with the Taliban at the
direction of President Donald Trump, he stated publicly that
``nothing is agreed until everything is agreed.'' In this case,
everything meant 4 main items, the withdrawal of all U.S.
forces from Afghanistan, a Taliban guarantee to prevent
Afghanistan from becoming a safe haven for international
terrorist attacks, a framework for negotiations between the
Afghan government and the Taliban, and a comprehensive cease-
fire. The final agreement, signed by Secretary of State Mike
Pompeo, achieved only the first two of these goals and left the
Afghan government in an even more precarious position than it
was in previously.
Once President Biden decided to complete the withdrawal in
accordance with this agreement, the U.S. military recognized
that rapid execution of it was necessary to minimize the risk
to U.S. service members associated with a retrograde under
threat of violence. Within 2 months of the withdrawal's
commencement, it was 90 percent complete, a pace that was far
too rapid for Afghanistan's security forces to absorb. For
years prior to the withdrawal, numerous assessments showed that
these forces were critically dependent on U.S. and contracted
support for nearly all of their enabling functions. My own
assessment of Taliban Afghan security force capabilities,
published in January 2021, concluded that after the U.S.
withdrawal ``the Taliban would have a slight military advantage
over Afghanistan's security forces, which would then likely
grow in compounding fashion.'' That scenario is what happened.
With the U.S. withdrawal nearly complete by July 5, the first
of Afghanistan's provincial capitals falling a month later, and
President Ashraf Ghani abandoning Kabul to the Taliban 9 days
after that.
In the year-and-a-half since these events, al-Qaeda has
remained a problem for the United States and Afghanistan. The
group has relative safety under the Taliban government to exist
and operate, though it currently has minimal capability to
conduct attacks beyond the country. The inverse is true of the
Islamic State Khorasan Province, also known as ISKP. It has
substantially more capability in Afghanistan than al-Qaeda, but
is viewed by the Taliban as the primary challenger to their
consolidation of control over the entirety of the country. The
Taliban have thus conducted numerous operations and targeted
raids against ISKP since the U.S. withdrawal.
For its part, the United States established an over-the-
horizon counterterrorism capability designed to monitor and
conduct limited strikes against al-Qaeda and ISKP in
Afghanistan. This capability is limited in its scope and in
what it can detect, though it was clearly sufficient to
identify and kill al-Qaeda leader Ayman al Zawahiri in Kabul.
Recommendations by national security analysts to improve this
capability have included establishing new intelligence networks
in the country, negotiating basing access in a neighboring
country, or establishing a sea base off the coast of Pakistan,
investing in longer-duration drone platforms, increasing cyber
and open-source collection efforts, and sharing intelligence
with the Taliban against our shared enemy, ISKP.
Looking ahead, the Taliban's strong relationship with al-
Qaeda in Afghanistan portends a consistent, albeit nascent,
threat from that group to the United States for some time.
Whether the Taliban will prevent al-Qaeda from using
Afghanistan as a launch pad for external attacks remains to be
seen. But the discovery of al Zawahiri in Kabul is not
encouraging. The Taliban are likely to continue operations
against ISKP, and these operations may be trending toward
increasing effectiveness. But the resilience of ISKP, a group
that was on the rebound even before the U.S. withdrawal, augers
against its elimination anytime soon. The United States will
thus need to maintain and possibly expand its over-the-horizon
approaches to counterterrorism in Afghanistan for years to
come. Congress would therefore be wise to demand long-term
strategies for doing so and to invest in over-the-horizon
counterterrorism capabilities commensurate with operational
time lines of a decade or more.
With that, I thank you and welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Schroden follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jonathan Schroden \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The views expressed in this testimony are the author's alone
and should not be interpreted as representing those of CNA or any of
the sponsors of its research. CNA is an independent nonprofit research
and analysis organization dedicated to the safety and security of the
Nation. CNA's publications do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
its research clients and sponsors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
April 18, 2023
On February 29, 2020, then-Secretary of State Mike Pompeo signed
what has come to be known as the ``Doha Agreement'' between the United
States and the Taliban.\2\ In that agreement, the administration of
President Donald J. Trump agreed to withdraw all military forces from
Afghanistan within about 14 months (May 2021). For its part, the
Taliban agreed to ``not allow any of its members, other individuals or
groups, including al-Qa'ida, to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten
the security of the United States and its allies.''\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ ``Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Which Is Not Recognized by the United
States as a State and Is Known as the Taliban and the United States of
America,'' U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/02/Agreement-For-Bringing-Peace-to-Afghanistan-
02.29.20.pdf.
\3\ Ibid, p. III.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
After candidate Joe Biden won the 2020 Presidential election,
President Trump ordered a drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan to
2,500 troops and 11 bases.\4\ President Biden inherited this force
structure upon his inauguration in January 2021. After several months
of deliberation, on April 14, President Biden announced his intent to
complete the withdrawal of U.S. forces from Afghanistan,\5\ and he
eventually set a deadline of August 31, 2021.\6\ On August 15, after
several months of severe battlefield losses by Afghanistan's security
forces, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani fled the country, and the Taliban
captured Kabul. Over the remaining days in August, the U.S. military
surged troops into Afghanistan to secure the Hamid Karzai International
Airport. Those troops, along with our coalition partners and U.S.
Government civilians, then evacuated over 100,000 individuals from the
airport in the largest airlift ever conducted by the United States.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ ``Enhancing Security and Stability in Afghanistan,'' U.S.
Department of Defense, Dec. 2020, pp. 5-6.
\5\ ``Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in
Afghanistan,'' The White House, Apr. 14, 2021, https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/04/14/remarks-
by-president-biden-on-the-way-forward-in-afghanistan.
\6\ The initial date set for the withdrawal was September 11, 2021.
This date was revised after criticism emerged of its symbolism.
\7\ ``US Withdrawal from Afghanistan,'' The White House, Apr. 6,
2023, p. 9, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/04/US-
Withdrawal-from-Afghanistan.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the rest of this testimony, I will focus on the following
topics, at the request of the subcommittee:
The nature of the Doha Agreement secured under the Trump
administration as well as the Biden administration's decision
to see the agreement through
Why withdrawals are among the most difficult military
operations to undertake
The extent to which al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State--
Khorasan Province (ISKP) retain the intent and capability to
conduct attacks against the U.S. homeland from Afghanistan
The extent to which the Taliban have upheld their commitment
to address terrorist threats in Afghanistan
Impacts of the drawdown of U.S. counterterrorism (CT)
presence and resources dedicated to Afghanistan.
The following sections will address these topics in turn and will
be followed by a brief conclusion.
the doha agreement and the decision to withdraw
As the U.S. Special Representative for Afghanistan Reconciliation,
Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, began negotiations with the Taliban at the
direction of President Trump, he stated publicly that ``nothing is
agreed until everything is agreed.''\8\ In this case, ``everything''
meant four main items: (1) the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from
Afghanistan, (2) a Taliban guarantee to prevent Afghanistan from
becoming a safe haven for international terrorist attacks, (3) a
framework for negotiations between the Afghan government and the
Taliban on the future governing structure of the country, and (4) a
comprehensive cease-fire. The final agreement signed by the United
States and the Taliban in 2020 addressed the first two points in
detail. However, it stated that the third point would be addressed
after the signing of the deal and the fourth point would ``be an item
on the agenda of the intra-Afghan dialog and negotiations.''\9\ Over
the ensuing year, the Taliban engaged in direct talks with
representatives of the Afghan government. Those discussions, however,
accomplished very little. Additionally, even though the two sides
engaged in several limited cease-fires (e.g., around the Eid holiday),
a comprehensive cease-fire was never obtained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Siyar Sirat, ``Nothing Is Agreed Until Everything Is Agreed:
Khalilzad,'' TOLO News, Jan. 29, 2019, https://tolonews.com/
afghanistan/khalilzad-says-%E2%80%98nothing-agreed-%E2%80%99-qatar.
\9\ ``Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan Between the
Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan Which Is Not Recognized by the United
States as a State and Is Known as the Taliban and the United States of
America,'' p. I.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
By the time the U.S. withdrawal began, the security situation in
Afghanistan had deteriorated markedly since the United States completed
the removal of President Barack Obama's surge forces in 2014. At that
time, the United States had adopted a limited role of advising
Afghanistan's security forces and conducting partnered CT operations.
One (imperfect but still useful \10\) metric demonstrating the decline
in the security situation is the change in how many administrative
districts the Afghan government controlled. In 2017, it was assessed to
control 217 of the country's 407 districts, but this number fell to
just 129 districts in 2021 (a decrease of 40 percent).\11\ By my own
assessment, when the U.S. withdrawal began, the Taliban had effectively
surrounded at least 15 of the country's 34 provincial capitals.\12\
Contrary to the arguments of some former senior U.S. Government
officials, the situation President Biden confronted upon entry to the
White House was not one of a stable stalemate that afforded an
effective ``insurance policy'' against terrorism from Afghanistan;\13\
rather, it was a war on the downslope.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Jonathan Schroden, ``The Challenges of Mapping Taliban Control
in Afghanistan,'' Lawfare, Aug. 1, 2021, https://www.lawfareblog.com/
challenges-mapping-taliban-control-afghanistan.
\11\ Bill Roggio, ``Mapping Taliban Control in Afghanistan,'' FDD's
Long War Journal, https://www.longwarjournal.org/mapping-taliban-
control-in-afghanistan.
\12\ Jonathan Schroden, ``Lessons from the Collapse of
Afghanistan's Security Forces,'' CTC Sentinel 14, no. 8 (Oct. 2021),
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/lessons-from-the-collapse-of-afghanistans-
security-forces.
\13\ Mark F. Bernstein, ``Q&A: Former Ambassador Ryan Crocker *85
on Afghanistan,'' Princeton Alumni Weekly, Oct. 1, 2021, https://
paw.princeton.edu/article/qa-former-Ambassador-ryan-crocker-85-
afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Thus, Biden effectively had two options in early 2021: complete the
withdrawal of U.S. forces that Trump had begun in accordance with the
Doha Agreement or abrogate that agreement and surge U.S. forces in what
would have been the third consecutive Presidential attempt to jumpstart
a turnaround in the war. Faced with those choices, Biden chose to
withdraw, stating: ``I'm now the fourth United States President to
preside over American troop presence in Afghanistan: two Republicans,
two Democrats. I will not pass this responsibility on to a fifth.''\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ ``Remarks by President Biden on the Way Forward in
Afghanistan.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
why withdrawals are difficult
When President Biden announced the full withdrawal from
Afghanistan, he said it would begin on May 1, 2021, and be complete by
the end of August. Just before Biden's announcement, military logistics
expert Ryan Baker and I examined why several months would be necessary
to withdraw the 2,500 troops from the country. We found that while the
U.S. military had the logistical capacity to remove that many people
from Afghanistan in a shorter time frame, doing so would have required
``pulling transportation and logistical resources away from other
missions around the world, abandoning a bunch of perfectly good
equipment in Afghanistan, signing expensive contracts for quick-turn
transportation capacity, leaving allied and partner forces in
Afghanistan twisting in the wind, and potentially increasing the risk
to U.S. troops on the ground during the withdrawal.''\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\15\ Ryan Baker and Jonathan Schroden, ``Why Is It So Tough to
Withdraw from Afghanistan?'' War on the Rocks, Apr. 8, 2021, https://
warontherocks.com/2021/04/why-is-it-so-tough-to-withdraw-from-
afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
One of the most difficult types of military operation is a
retrograde under fire. Even withdrawing under the threat of fire
greatly increases the difficulty of moving military personnel and
materiel.\16\ In Afghanistan, while the United States and the Taliban
had reportedly agreed not to attack each other as the withdrawal
proceeded,\17\ the degree of trust between the two sides was not high.
U.S. forces in Afghanistan therefore had to assume that the withdrawal
could turn violent at any time. Additional factors further complicated
the withdrawal: the land-locked and highly mountainous nature of
Afghanistan, the array of coalition forces that the United States was
supporting there, legal complexities surrounding the disposal or
retrograde of U.S. military equipment, and the absence of a staging
area in a neighboring country.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Ibid.
\17\ Kimberly Dozier, ``Secret Annexes, Backroom Deals: Can Zalmay
Khalilzad Deliver Afghan Peace for Trump?'' TIME, Feb. 15, 2020,
https://time.com/5784103/secret-annexes-backroom-deals-can-zalmay-
khalilzad-deliver-afghan-peace-for-trump.
\18\ Baker and Schroden, ``Why Is It So Tough to Withdraw from
Afghanistan?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Those complexities notwithstanding, the U.S. military concluded
that the best way to meet Biden's intent of a ``safe and orderly''
withdrawal \19\ was to conduct it as rapidly as possible, in keeping
with the notion that the longer one takes to complete a withdrawal
under the threat of fire, the longer one is exposed to the high degree
of risk associated with such an operation. To minimize risk to U.S.
service members during the withdrawal, the U.S. military therefore
responded to Biden's order with alacrity. By June 8, 2021, just over a
month after the withdrawal began, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)
reported that the drawdown was half complete. Three weeks later, it
reported 90 percent completion (see Figure 1).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Anne Gearan, ``Biden Signals Short Delay in Withdrawal of
Forces from Afghanistan,'' Washington Post, Mar. 25, 2021, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/politics/biden-signals-short-delay-in-
withdrawal-of-forces-from-afghanistan/2021/03/25/2a37dbc2-8d9e-11eb-
9423-04079921c915_story.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
figure 1: reported progress of the u.s. military withdrawal from
afghanistan (april-august 2021) \20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ Compiled from updates issued by U.S. Central Command on the
progress of the withdrawal. See: https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-
RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/2640121/update-on-withdrawal-of-us-
forces-from-afghanistan-may-31-2021; https://www.defense.gov/News/News-
Stories/Article/Article/2632456/afghanistan-retrograde-nearly-one-
quarter-complete; https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/Press-
Release-View/Article/2649542/update-on-withdrawal-of-us-forces-from-
afghanistan-june-7-2021; https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-RELEASES/
Press-Release-View/Article/2682484/update-on-withdrawal-of-us-forces-
from-afghanistan-july-5-2021; https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-
RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/2708638/update-on-the-withdrawal-
of-us-forces-from-afghanistan-july-26-2021.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
As the United States withdrew, Afghanistan's security forces
overused its air force and special operations forces to compensate for
the loss of U.S. and coalition capabilities. The Afghan Air Force
(AAF), for example, roughly tripled the number of sorties it flew in
June and the Afghan Commandos' operational tempo increased by 30
percent. These activity levels were unsustainable in the absence of
contracted maintainers and logisticians who left along with the U.S.
military forces that had been protecting them. By the end of June, the
AAF's readiness rates had plummeted to 39 percent (from 77 percent in
May), and the Commandos had suffered substantial casualties.\21\ As
Afghanistan's military rapidly depleted the few capabilities that
provided overmatch of the Taliban, more and more districts fell, with
the largest acceleration of Taliban capture occurring between mid-June
and mid-July (see Figure 2).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Jonathan Schroden, ``Lessons from the Collapse of
Afghanistan's Security Forces,'' CTC Sentinel 14, no. 8 (Oct. 2021),
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/lessons-from-the-collapse-of-afghanistans-
security-forces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
figure 2: total number of taliban-controlled districts in afghanistan
(may-july 2021)\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Adapted from Schroden, ``Lessons from the Collapse of
Afghanistan's Security Forces.''
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
aq and iskp intent and capabilities
There is no question that both AQ and the Islamic State retain the
intent to attack the U.S. homeland. The more pressing question is
whether they have the capabilities to do so. Within Afghanistan, the
United Nations (UN) assessed in 2022 that AQ maintained a few hundred
fighters, but these individuals were mostly involved with local Taliban
units. The only notable AQ leader reported to be in Afghanistan after
the United States' killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri on July 31, 2022, is
Abu Ikhlas al-Masri.\23\ The United Nations has assessed that ``it is
unlikely that Al-Qaida and its affiliates will seek to mount direct
attacks outside Afghanistan for the near term owing to a lack of
capability and restraint on the part of the Taliban, as well as an
unwillingness to jeopardize their recent gains,''\24\ though some ana-
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\23\ Al-Masri is an AQ operational commander who had been captured
by U.S. forces in 2010 and was reportedly freed by the Taliban in 2021.
Asfandyar Mir, ``Twenty Years After 9/11: The Terror Threat from
Afghanistan Post the Taliban Takeover,'' CTC Sentinel 14, no. 7 (Sept.
2021), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/twenty-years-after-9-11-the-terror-
threat-from-afghanistan-post-the-taliban-takeover.
\24\ ``Letter Dated 11 July 2022 from the Chair of the Security
Council Committee Pursuant to Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and
2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh),
Al-Qaida and Associated Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities
Addressed to the President of the Security Council,'' U.N. Security
Council, July 15, 2022, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N22/394/29/PDF/N2239429.pdf?OpenElement. The United Nations reaffirmed
this assessment in its most recent report: ``Letter Dated 13 February
2023 from the Chair of the Security Council Committee Pursuant to
Resolutions 1267 (1999), 1989 (2011) and 2253 (2015) Concerning Islamic
State in Iraq and the Levant (Da'esh), Al-Qaida and Associated
Individuals, Groups, Undertakings and Entities Addressed to the
President of the Security Council,'' U.N. Security Council, Feb. 13,
2023, https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N23/038/91/PDF/
N2303891.pdf?OpenElement.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
lysts have argued that the potential for future AQ threats is greater
than it currently appears.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ Mir, ``Twenty Years After 9/11'' and Sara Harmouch, ``Al-
Qaeda's Looming Threat: Are We Looking Over the Wrong Horizon?''
Lawfare, Apr. 4, 2023, https://www.lawfareblog.com/al-qaedas-looming-
threat-are-we-looking-over-wrong-horizon.
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With roughly 1,000 to 3,000 fighters,\26\ ISKP is now about half
the strength of its zenith in 2017.\27\ The group maintains sizable
cells in Afghanistan's eastern Kunar, Nangarhar, and Nuristan
provinces, as well as in Kabul. The United Nations recently assessed
that smaller ISKP elements exist in the northern and northeastern
provinces of Badakhshan, Faryab, Jowzjan, Kunduz, Takhar, and
Balkh.\28\ Since the Taliban's conquest of the country, ISKP has sought
to undermine the Taliban government as a guarantor of security by
attacking Taliban forces and political leaders,\29\ foreign embassies
and hotels housing foreigners,\30\ and religious and ethnic minority
groups.\31\ ISKP has also sought to undermine the Taliban's legitimacy
as a religious movement--and to bolster its own recruiting and
fundraising efforts--by increasing the quality, quantity, and number of
languages of its on-line propaganda.\32\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ ``Letter Dated 13 February 2023 from the Chair of the Security
Council Committee.''
\27\ Amira Jadoon, Abdul Sayed, and Andrew Mines, ``The Islamic
State Threat in Taliban Afghanistan: The Resurgence of the Islamic
State Khorasan,'' CTC Sentinel, Jan. 2022, https://ctc.usma.edu/the-
islamic-state-threat-in-taliban-afghanistan-tracing-the-resurgence-of-
islamic-state-khorasan.
\28\ ``Letter Dated 13 February 2023 from the Chair of the Security
Council Committee.''
\29\ Andrew Mines and Amira Jadoon, ``A String of Assassinations in
Afghanistan Points to ISIS Resurgence with US Officials Warning of
Possible Attacks on American Interests,'' Military.com, Mar. 21, 2023,
https://www.military.com/daily news/opinions/2023/03/21/string-of-
assassinations-afghanistan-points-isis-resurgence-us-officials-warning-
of-possible-attacks.html.
\30\ ``Deadly Attack on Kabul Hotel Popular with Chinese
Nationals,'' Al-Jazeera, Dec. 12, 2022, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/
2022/12/12/deadly-attack-on-kabul-hotel-popular-with-chinese-nationals,
and Mohammad Yunus Yawar, ``Two Russian Embassy Staff Dead, Four Others
Killed in Suicide Bomb Blast in Kabul,'' Reuters, Sept. 5, 2022,
https://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/afghan-police-report-
suicide-bomb-blast-near-russian-embassy-kabul-2022-09-05.
\31\ Ewelina U. Ochab, ``Yet Another Attack on the Hazara in
Afghanistan,'' Forbes, Oct. 1, 2022, https://www.forbes.com/sites/
ewelinaochab/2022/10/01/yet-another-attack-on-the-hazara-in-
afghanistan/?sh=3a93ec452fa6.
\32\ ``Letter Dated 13 February 2023 from the Chair of the Security
Council Committee.''
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CENTCOM's General Michael ``Erik'' Kurilla, in his recent
Congressional testimony, stated that ISKP could conduct attacks against
American interests outside Afghanistan in less than 6 months, ``with
little to no warning.'' When pressed on his assessment, however, he
conceded that an attack within the region or Europe was more
likely.\33\ Indeed, ISKP has demonstrated its ability to conduct
attacks throughout much of Afghanistan, against Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan,\34\ and inside Pakistan.\35\
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\33\ Svetlana Shkolnikova, ``ISIS in Afghanistan Capable of Foreign
Attacks in 6 Months, CENTCOM Commander Says,'' Stars and Stripes, Mar.
16, 2023, https://www.stripes.com/theaters/us/2023-03-16/centcom-
kurilla-isis-afghanistan-attacks-9514063.html.
\34\ Sudha Ramachandran, ``ISKP Attacks in Uzbekistan and
Tajikistan,'' Central Asia-Caucasus Analyst, Aug. 31, 2022, https://
www.cacianalyst.org/publications/analytical-articles/item/13731-iskp-
attacks-in-uzbekistan-and-tajikistan.html.
\35\ Ismail Khan and Salman Masood, ``ISIS Claims Bombing of
Pakistani Mosque, Killing Dozens,'' New York Times, Mar. 4, 2022,
https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/04/world/middleeast/pakistan-peshawar-
mosque-explosion.html.
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the taliban's commitment
In the Doha Agreement, the Taliban pledged to not allow terrorist
groups ``to use the soil of Afghanistan to threaten the security of the
United States and its allies.''\36\ As with much of the Doha Agreement,
the language in this clause is imprecise--for example, the meaning of
``threaten the security of'' is not clear. The vagueness of this and
similar clauses clouds the ability of analysts to determine whether the
Taliban are meeting their commitment.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\36\ ``Agreement for Bringing Peace to Afghanistan.''
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The United States' identification--and subsequent targeted
killing--of AQ leader Ayman al-Zawahiri in downtown Kabul demonstrates
this disconnect. From a U.S. perspective, the fact that al-Zawahiri was
present in the capital--and reportedly staying in a house belonging to
an aide of the Taliban's acting interior minister Sirajuddin Haqqani
\37\--violated this clause, since al-Zawahiri had continued to issue
invectives on-line threatening the United States. From the Taliban's
perspective, however, al-Zawahiri had not conducted or directed any
external operations against the United States since the signing of the
Doha Agreement, and his mere presence in Kabul did not violate the
agreement. More concretely, the Taliban generally do not see AQ's
presence in Afghanistan as a problem to be solved, and some senior
members of the Taliban--beyond Haqqani--maintain close ties with AQ
fighters.\38\
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\37\ Jonathan Schroden, ``What Zawahiri's Death Tells Us About
Afghanistan's Future,'' Politico, Aug. 2, 2022, https://
www.politico.com/news/magazine/2022/08/02/zawahris-death-and-
afghanistans-future-00049239.
\38\ Mir, ``Twenty Years After 9/11.''
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The Taliban have, however, consistently pursued and targeted ISKP--
which they view as the primary militant threat to their domination of
Afghanistan--since their ascension to power. These operations were
initially broad in aim and ``brutally ineffective,''\39\ but they have
become refined and targeted over time. Most recently, the Taliban have
engaged in a surge of apparently targeted raids against ISKP cells
across the country.\40\ The efficacy of these raids has been difficult
to assess thus far, though a delay in ISKP's media productions may
suggest the Taliban are achieving some degree of success.\41\ Thus, in
the case of ISKP, the Taliban are conducting operations that appear to
be generally aligned with their commitments in the Doha Agreement,
though the primary motivation behind these operations is likely a
desire to crush any militant opposition in the country, rather than to
demonstrate adherence to the agreement with the United States.\42\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\39\ Colin Clarke and Jonathan Schroden, ``Brutally Ineffective:
How the Taliban Are Failing in Their New Role as Counter-Insurgents,''
War on the Rocks, Nov. 29, 2021, https://warontherocks.com/2021/11/
brutally-ineffective-how-the-taliban-are-failing-in-their-new-role-as-
counter-insurgents.
\40\ See, for example: Tweet by ``Afghan Analyst,'' Apr. 8, 2023,
https://twitter.com/AfghanAnalyst2/status/1644910476067831809?s=20.
\41\ Tweet by Abdul Sayed, Apr. 11, 2023, https://twitter.com/
abdsayedd/status/1645840194510127115?s=20.
\42\ For excellent overviews of the Taliban's political calculus,
see: Andrew Watkins, ``The Taliban One Year On,'' CTC Sentinel 15:8
(August 2022), https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-taliban-one-year-on and
Andrew Watkins, ``What's Next for the Taliban's Leadership Amid Rising
Dissent?'' US Institute for Peace, April 11, 2023, https://
www.usip.org/publications/2023/04/whats-next-talibans-leadership-amid-
rising-dissent.
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impacts of the u.s. drawdown on counterterrorism
The Biden administration recently released a white paper on the
withdrawal that claims the ``decision to leave Afghanistan freed up
critical military, intelligence, and other resources to counter
terrorist threats around the world, including in Syria, Iraq, Somalia,
and Yemen.''\43\ The reality, however, is that in the wake of the 2018
National Defense Strategy \44\ and then-Secretary of Defense Jim
Mattis' declaration that ``terrorism is no longer the top priority'' of
the Department of Defense (DOD),\45\ the United States has been drawing
down its CT capabilities across the globe. Rather than reinvesting
capabilities that were tied up in Afghanistan to pursue increasing
threats of terrorism more vigorously in places like West Africa, the
United States has steadily shifted its focus toward strategic
competition and preparation for high-end conflict with China. As part
of that shift, the United States has been relying more on partners and
proxies in what leaders of the U.S. special operations enterprise
recently described as a ``partner-led, U.S.-enabled'' approach.\46\
This global drawdown of CT capability, which began in DOD, is now
cascading across the rest of the U.S. Government--a trend that CT
practitioners are increasingly concerned about.\47\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\43\ ``U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan,'' p. 11.
\44\ ``Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United
States of America,'' U.S. Department of Defense, 2018, https://
dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-Defense-
Strategy-Summary.pdf.
\45\ David Martin, ``Terrorism No Longer the Military's Top
Priority, Mattis Says,'' CBS News, Jan. 19, 2018, https://
www.cbsnews.com/news/terrorism-no-longer-the-militarys-top-priority-
mattis-says.
\46\ ``Statement for the Record, the Honorable Christopher P.
Maier, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-
Intensity Conflict and General Bryan P. Fenton, USA Commander, United
States Special Operations Command Before the Committee on Armed
Services Subcommittee on Intelligence & Special Operations U.S. House
of Representatives,'' Mar. 9, 2023, https://armedservices.house.gov/
sites/republicans.armedservices.house.gov/files/2023- %20SOLIC-
USSOCOM%20Posture%20-%20Maier-Fenton%20-%20Statement%20(FINAL).pdf.
\47\ Author's conversations with CT practitioners in February and
March 2023.
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Specific to Afghanistan, the U.S. withdrawal has left it reliant on
an ``over-the-horizon'' (OTH) approach to CT, which primarily consists
of flying drones from air bases in the Middle East, through Pakistani
airspace, and over areas of interest in Afghanistan.\48\ As national
security analyst Seth Jones recently described, ``It takes [an MQ-9A]
Reaper roughly 14 hours to fly round-trip from Al Udeid Air Base in
Qatar to Afghanistan, giving it only 12 to 15 hours to collect
intelligence and strike targets if necessary.''\49\ The inefficiency of
this approach, combined with the absence of any U.S. presence or
intelligence partners on the ground in Afghanistan, has dramatically
reduced the ability of U.S. intelligence agencies to track terrorist
threats there. General Frank McKenzie, the former head of CENTCOM,
commented in the wake of the withdrawal, ``We're probably at about 1 or
2 percent of the capabilities we once had to look into
Afghanistan.''\50\ Although the United States has likely improved its
ability since then through experience with the new OTH approach, the
current commander of CENTCOM, General Kurilla, recently testified that
he believed ``we can see the broad contours of an attack, [but]
sometimes we lack the granularity to see the full picture.''\51\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\48\ Jonathan Schroden, ``New Ideas for Over-the-Horizon
Counterterrorism in Afghanistan,'' Lawfare, May 8, 2022, https://
www.lawfareblog.com/new-ideas-over-horizon-counterterrorism-
afghanistan.
\49\ Seth Jones, ``Countering a Resurgent Terrorist Threat in
Afghanistan'' Council on Foreign Relations, Apr. 14, 2022, https://
www.cfr.org/report/countering-resurgent-terrorist-threat-
afghanistan?utm_source=studies&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=New%20Campa
ign- &utm_term=Seth%20Jones%20CPMU%20Sailthru%20Distro%20List.
\50\ Robert Burns and Lolita C. Baldor, ``U.S. Commander: Al-Qaida
Numbers in Afghanistan Up `Slightly,' '' AP News, Dec. 10, 2021,
https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-middle-east-united-states-
taliban-islamic-state-group-bec82acfe6dbd19bed4c11db21d7a78e.
\51\ Jeff Seldin, ``US General: Islamic State Afghan Affiliate
Closer to Attacking Western Targets,'' Voice of America, Mar. 16, 2023,
https://www.voanews.com/a/us-general-islamic-state-afghan-affiliate-
closer-to-attacking-western-targets/7008633.html.
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conclusion
There is no question that the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan did
not go as planned or as hoped. The negotiations between the United
States and the Taliban were supposed to continue until ``everything is
agreed,''\52\ but they concluded well before that point. Secretary
Pompeo ultimately signed an agreement that fell far short of initial
expectations and left the Afghan government in an even more precarious
position than it was in previously.\53\ In addition, the Trump
administration's lack of detailed planning for the withdrawal \54\ and
reported efforts to obstruct the Biden transition team from beginning
such work \55\ left President Biden's administration in an unenviable
position as he entered office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\52\ Sirat, ``Nothing Is Agreed Until Everything Is Agreed:
Khalilzad.''
\53\ Schroden, ``Lessons from the Collapse of Afghanistan's
Security Forces.''
\54\ ``US Withdrawal from Afghanistan,'' p. 2.
\55\ Lara Seligman and Bryan Bender, `` `Really Quite Shocking':
Inside the Ugly Transition at the Pentagon,'' Politico, Jan. 20, 2021,
https://www.politico.com/news/2021/01/20/biden-pentagon-transition-
460768.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Nonetheless, once President Biden decided to complete the
withdrawal and fulfill the terms of the U.S. agreement with the
Taliban, the U.S. military recognized that a rapid withdrawal was
necessary to minimize the risk associated with a retrograde under
threat of violence. Within 2 months of the withdrawal's commencement,
it was 90 percent complete.\56\ That pace--designed to prioritize the
protection of U.S. service members--was far too rapid for Afghanistan's
security forces to absorb. As had been noted by independent entities
for years prior to the withdrawal, Afghan security forces were
critically dependent on U.S. or contracted support for nearly all of
their enabling functions.\57\ With that support removed, numerous
analysts predicted that their ability to defend the country against the
Taliban onslaught would spiral downward. My own assessment of Taliban
and Afghan security force capabilities, published in January 2021,
concluded that after the U.S. withdrawal, ``the Taliban would have a
slight military advantage [over Afghan security forces] . . . which
would then likely grow in a compounding fashion.''\58\
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\56\ ``Update on Withdrawal of US Forces from Afghanistan July 5,
2021,'' CENTCOM, July 6, 2021, https://www.centcom.mil/MEDIA/PRESS-
RELEASES/Press-Release-View/Article/2682484/update-on-withdrawal-of-us-
forces-from-afghanistan-july-5-2021.
\57\ Jonathan Schroden, ``Afghanistan Will Be the Trump
Administration's First Foreign Policy Crisis,'' War on the Rocks, Dec.
5, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2016/12/afghanistan-will-be-the-
trump-administrations-first-foreign-policy-crisis; Jonathan Schroden,
``Afghanistan Will Be the Biden Administration's First Foreign Policy
Crisis,'' Lawfare, Dec. 20, 2020, https://www.lawfareblog.com/
afghanistan-will-be-biden-administrations-first-foreign-policy-crisis.
See also SIGAR's quarterly reports to Congress from 2016 to 2021.
\58\ Jonathan Schroden, ``Afghanistan's Security Forces Versus the
Taliban: A Net Assessment,'' CTC Sentinel 14, no. 1 (Jan. 2021),
https://ctc.westpoint.edu/afghanistans-security-forces-versus-the-
taliban-a-net-assessment/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
On August 6, the first of Afghanistan's provincial capitals fell,
and President Ghani abandoned Kabul 9 days later. The resulting chaos
in the capital substantially escalated the difficulty of the last leg
of the withdrawal. In addition to heartbreaking scenes of Afghan
civilians crowding in squalid conditions around the airport seeking an
exit from the country and stories of Taliban brutality against
them,\59\ 13 U.S. service members and around 170 Afghans were killed in
an ISKP attack at the airport's Abbey Gate.\60\ Another 10 Afghan
civilians lost their lives in an errant U.S. drone strike in the wake
of that ISKP attack.\61\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\59\ Ali M. Latifi, ``Chaos and Violence as Crowds Keep Growing
Outside Kabul Airport,'' Al-Jazeera, Aug. 23, 2021, https://
www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/8/23/afghanistan-taliban-chaos-and-
violence-as-crowds-keep-growing-outside-kabul-airport.
\60\ Jim Garamone, ``US Central Command Releases Report on August
Abbey Gate Attack,'' DOD, Feb. 4, 2022, https://www.defense.gov/News/
News-Stories/Article/Article/2924398/us-central-command-releases-
report-on-august-abbey-gate-attack.
\61\ Azmat Khan, ``Military Investigation Reveals How the US
Botched a Drone Strike in Kabul,'' New York Times, Jan. 6, 2023,
https://www.nytimes.com/2023/01/06/us/politics/drone-civilian-deaths-
afghanistan.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In the year-and-a-half since the withdrawal, AQ has remained a
problem for the United States in Afghanistan. The group has relative
safety under the Taliban government to exist and operate, though it
currently has minimal capability to conduct attacks beyond the country.
The inverse is true of ISKP. It has substantially more capability in
Afghanistan than AQ but is viewed by the Taliban as the primary
challenger to their consolidation of control over the entirety of the
country. The Taliban have thus conducted numerous operations and
targeted raids against ISKP since the withdrawal.
For its part, the United States has accelerated its pivot away from
CT (toward strategic competition with China) and established an OTH CT
capability aimed at AQ and ISKP in Afghanistan. This capability is
limited in its scope and what it can detect, though it was clearly
sufficient to identify the presence of al-Zawahiri in Kabul.
Recommendations by national security analysts to improve the United
States' ability to detect and disrupt terrorist threats in Afghanistan
have included establishing new intelligence networks in the country,
negotiating basing access in a neighboring country or establishing a
sea base off the coast of Pakistan to reduce drone transit times,
investing in longer duration drone platforms (such as the MQ-9B
SkyGuardian), increasing cyber and open-source collection efforts,\62\
and potentially engaging in clandestine cooperation (e.g., intelligence
sharing) with the Taliban against our shared enemy, ISKP.\63\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\62\ Jones, ``Countering a Resurgent Terrorist Threat in
Afghanistan'' and Schroden, ``New Ideas for Over-the-Horizon
Counterterrorism in Afghanistan.''
\63\ Jonathan Schroden and Alexander Powell, ``Working with the
Devil? The Potential for US-Taliban Cooperation Against the Islamic
State in Afghanistan,'' War on the Rocks, Sept. 16, 2021, https://
warontherocks.com/2021/09/working-with-the-devil-the-potential-for-u-s-
taliban-cooperation-against-the-islamic-state-in-afghanistan.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Looking ahead, the Taliban's strong relationship with AQ in
Afghanistan portends a consistent (albeit nascent) threat from AQ to
the United States for some time. Whether the Taliban will prevent AQ
from using Afghanistan as a launchpad for external attacks in
accordance with the Doha Agreement remains to be seen, but the
discovery of al-Zawahiri in Kabul is not an encouraging omen. The
Taliban are likely to continue operations against ISKP that may become
more effective; however, the size, scope, locations, and resilience of
ISKP auger against the group's elimination any time soon. The United
States will thus need to maintain--and possibly expand--its OTH
approaches to CT in Afghanistan for years to come. Congress would
therefore be wise to demand long-term strategies for doing so and to
invest in OTH CT capabilities commensurate with operational time lines
of a decade or more.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Dr. Schroden. Thank you to all
our witnesses for your testimony.
Members will now be recognized in order of seniority for
their 5-minute period of questioning, and an additional round
of questioning will likely be called after all Members have
been recognized.
I now recognize myself and like to start with a brief
video.
[Video shown.]
Chairman Pfluger. This hearing is not about the decision to
withdraw. This hearing is about the effects that a chaotic
withdrawal has on our security because it has not been
investigated or looked into.
I have a couple of yes-or-no questions. We will try to go
quickly. Do you believe that the withdrawal from Afghanistan
was chaotic? We will start with Ambassador Sales.
Mr. Sales. Yes, it was.
Chairman Pfluger. Ms. Ledeen.
Ms. Ledeen. Yes, it was.
Chairman Pfluger. Colonel Douglas.
Mr. Douglas. Yes, it was.
Chairman Pfluger. Dr. Schroden.
Mr. Schroden. I wasn't on the ground, but certainly the
videos and the accounts of what happened are in line with that.
Chairman Pfluger. OK. Ambassador Sales, do you believe the
processes in place for screening and vetting by the Biden
administration, in particular DHS, were sufficient to protect
our homeland?
Mr. Sales. No, Congressman, I don't.
Chairman Pfluger. OK. Ms. Ledeen, do you, to the best of
your knowledge, believe that anyone from Biden administration
has been held accountable or that there has been a review that
the American public deserves to see about the withdrawal?
Ms. Ledeen. Mr. Chairman, there clearly has not.
Chairman Pfluger. At the strategic level, over $7 billion
worth of equipment that is still good, that is still useful,
that our allies, in addition to us, helped provide in the fight
against Afghanistan due to an Article 5 of NATO being
triggered, Ambassador Sales, what is al-Qaeda? What are other
violent extremist groups able and most likely to do with that
equipment in Afghanistan?
Mr. Sales. Well, Mr. Chairman, the fear is that they'll
turn it against us and our allies and use the equipment that we
provided to the Afghan government to wage war against the
United States and our partners. Keep in mind, al-Qaeda is still
using AK-47 from the Soviet era. We're going to be dealing with
this problem for a long time to come.
Chairman Pfluger. Ms. Ledeen, you said that what happens in
Afghanistan doesn't stay in Afghanistan. How does that
negatively affect our own homeland security?
Ms. Ledeen. To add on to what Ambassador Sales rightly
said, the Taliban reportedly are also engaged in weapon sales,
selling our weapons that we left behind. So that's likely one
aspect that will come back to bite us. But in addition, I think
our open Southern Border, the fact that we don't have any idea
who's coming through in many areas, we can only speculate as to
who is coming through. In the future, from a counterterrorism
perspective, who we might need to be concerned about that we're
not aware of.
Chairman Pfluger. Colonel Douglas, you served for 31-plus
years. In that time, when you looked at the Commander-in-Chief,
did you ever blame the previous Commander-in-Chief for the
policies that were being executed during your service at that
time?
Mr. Douglas. Sir, I've had the opportunity of serving under
four Presidents since 9/11 and I can say that while there are
enough successes and failures through Afghanistan that every
administration can take credit or be held accountable for. At
the same time, the Taliban were not being held accountable to
the conditions of the agreement, and so that's at this
administration.
Chairman Pfluger. Let me be specific. When the Commander-
in-Chief makes a decision, is that their decision or is that
the previous administration's decision?
Mr. Douglas. Sir, when the Commander-in-Chief makes a
decision, that's his decision.
Chairman Pfluger. OK.
Mr. Douglas. You can't base that on anybody else, but your
accountability is at the top.
Chairman Pfluger. Dr. Schroden, from your perspective, what
type of analysis should be done right now and where should we
be focused? What keeps you up at night? What threat keeps you
up at night right now?
Mr. Schroden. Well, to be honest, the most significant,
statistically significant terrorist threat to U.S. citizens
right now comes from religious and ethnically motivated violent
extremists here in the United States. So that's what keeps me
up at night is that particular threat. The threat from
jihadists abroad has increased, but it has increased since 2018
as a result of the broader decision to effectively try to end
the war on terror and drawdown U.S. counterterrorism assets
across the globe in order to focus more wholesomely on
strategic competition with the likes of China and Russia.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
My time has expired. I now yield to the Ranking Member, Mr.
Magaziner.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
My hope again is that today's hearing will focus on
forward-looking solutions that will improve the safety of
Americans at home and around the world.
The American people want bipartisan solutions and not
hyperpartisanship. My hope is that going forward, this hearing
will retain that focus. But it is also important that the
American people know the facts. The fact is that it was Donald
Trump's Taliban deal that set the chaos in motion. That Trump-
Taliban deal did not include a comprehensive cease-fire, did
not include any plan for providing protection for Afghan
nationals who risked their lives to assist American service
members, no protections for the Afghan government, no guarantee
that the United States could continue to engage in intelligence
gathering or other operations to root out terror threats in
Afghanistan. The Trump Taliban deal allowed 5,000 Taliban
soldiers to be released from prison prior to the start of the
Biden administration. To celebrate the signing of the deal,
President Trump planned to invite Taliban leaders to Camp
David, only canceling after the American people found out and
were rightly outraged at the notion.
In the months following the signing of the deal, Taliban
attacks in Afghanistan increased by 70 percent to nearly 100
attacks per day over the same period the previous year.
So, look, we can point fingers all day long. I think what
the American people want us to do is focus on the future and
focus on how we can reduce threats to the American people and
the American homeland going forward.
So, Dr. Schroden, I will ask you to expand on the final
points that you made in your testimony. What type of
capabilities should we focus on developing and strengthening in
order to mitigate terror attacks from abroad?
Mr. Schroden. Well, I think specific to Afghanistan, right,
we are in a situation where the bulk of our intelligence, as
it's openly discussed, comes from flying drones from many
hundreds of miles away, air bases in the Middle East, over
Pakistani air base, and over Afghanistan. Roughly 50 percent,
if not slightly more of their available sortie time, their
flight time, is dedicated to transiting to and from
Afghanistan, leaving them only about 50 percent of their
availability to gather intelligence over the country itself.
So there are a couple of ways that one could try to
increase the efficiency of that approach, right. One is to
invest in drones that have longer duration time, and there are
variants being developed now that could do that. Another would
be to try and shorten the transit time by negotiating a basing
agreement in a neighboring country or trying to establish
perhaps a lily pad or some type of sea base off the coast of
Pakistan. So those are immediate things that I think could be
done or at least attempted to do. Then trying to reestablish
our intelligence collection on the ground through HUMINT
networks in Afghanistan is harder and likely longer-term
prospect. But again, given the time lines I described of likely
facing these threats for at least the next 10 years, if not
longer, those types of efforts, even if they have longer
payoffs, are worth investing in now.
Mr. Magaziner. Can you expand on your comment about
gathering open-source and signals intelligence to try to
mitigate terror threats from Afghanistan as well?
Mr. Schroden. Sure. In this day and age, and I think you've
seen this with the war in Ukraine as well as a number of
other--you know, the Chinese balloon incident, et cetera, there
is a wealth of information available through open-source
channels, through social media, that can be harnessed in ways
that was previously unavailable to us. I'm an avid Twitter
user, right, I follow a lot of Twitter accounts coming out of
Afghanistan. There is a lot of very interesting information
that could be used and combined with actual intelligence
gathered by the United States to paint a much richer picture of
what's happening in Afghanistan than we might have been able to
do in the past. The intelligence community has sort-of usually
traditionally been reticent to rely that much on open-source
reporting because they don't control where it comes from. But I
don't think we have the luxury anymore, especially with respect
to Afghanistan, of only relying on sort-of exquisite
intelligence that the United States collects. We need to expand
and include open-source information as well.
Mr. Magaziner. Do you agree that foreign terror
organizations, including possibly in Afghanistan, are focusing
increasingly on radicalizing U.S.-based persons in order to
encourage them to attack the United States homeland?
Mr. Schroden. I think that's been the case for some number
of years, if not 7 years or longer. The U.S. homeland has been
considerably hardened in the decades since 9/11. It is a lot
harder for these organizations to get into the United States
directly. So inspiring people to conduct attacks with weapons
that are readily already available in this country has been a
primary motive of their attempts for some time.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
I yield.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina,
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Sales, Ms. Ledeen, I was glad to hear you raise
the question whether an uncontrolled Southern Border poses a
security risk to the United States.
In November of last year, we had Director Wray and
Secretary Mayorkas and also Director Christine Abizaid of the
National Counterterrorism Threat Center before us, and this
little colloquy occurred. I said, thank you, Director Abizaid.
Does the NCTC assess a significant threat from the historic
level of uncontrolled crossing at the Southern Border? Here was
her answer. Thank you. We don't actually. Border security is
really important. If we look at the nature of the threat and
how it has evolved here in the United States homeland, it has
been striking how the evolution to lone actors actually
reflects how much more difficult it is for terrorists to enter
the United States. We look historically at the kinds of attacks
we have experienced here in the homeland. None of them have
been connected to major illegal crossings or otherwise from the
Southwest Border. Then she finished, that said, it remains a
top intelligence priority. Does that provide you comfort,
Ambassador Sales?
Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I have to say that I'm
considerably more worried about the state of our border
security. As I indicated in my written statement, we've seen a
dramatic spike over recent years in the number of known or
suspected terrorists who were apprehended coming across the
Southern Border. From zero several years ago to 95 last fiscal
year, to 69 so far. Those are just the ones we know about.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you for that.
I find myself in agreement. I asked Secretary Mayorkas back
in April of last year, how do you know that none of the 2.6
million, including the 600,000 gotaways, you don't even know
who they are. You know, 41 of--at that time--41 on the terror
watch list have been encountered, how do you know those people
aren't a source of risk of terrorism? He said, Congressman, the
individuals that we have encountered on the terrorism screen
data--and I said, you are not answering my question, sir. I
said, you know, Ramzi Yousef claimed asylum, right? Now, I got
that a little bit wrong, I don't think--but he got a claim to
come in. He was encountered and admitted into the country. I
think it wasn't called credible fear at the time, but it was
something similar. I said and you know that he got to go and be
released into the country on an assertion of credible fear. He
was released and 6 months later he bombed the World Trade
Center. Among the 600,000 gotaways just that small portion, Mr.
Secretary, how do you know that--are you waiting for a mushroom
cloud? My time had expired and he was given the opportunity to
respond. Here is what he said, Mr. Chairman, I won't dignify
that last question with a response.
What about you, Ms. Ledeen? Are you comforted by the
Secretary of Homeland Security's certitude that we face no risk
among those hundreds of thousands of people entering the United
States without ever contacting authorities? It is not a
material terrorism risk. Does that make any sense to you?
Ms. Ledeen. Mr. Congressman, as a resident of a border
State, I can tell you I'm extremely concerned on a personal
level. With my professional background, I am increasingly
concerned given the sheer number of people who are crossing
over that again, we have no idea who they are and what their
backgrounds are.
Also, going back to the Afghanistan withdrawal, those first
couple of planes that took off from Kabul Airport were full of
people who had not been vetted and subsequent vetting showed
that actually some of them had in place IEDs and appeared on
our biometrics. So I have very grave concerns about this and I
thank you for your attention to this matter.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, ma'am.
Mr. Schroden, I want to give you sort-of the opportunity
maybe for the other side. When I was wrapped up with Ms.
Abizaid, I said that--let's see if I got enough time to do
that--I don't. Let me just ask you the question directly. You
said a minute ago that what keeps you up at night is religious
and ethnically-motivated domestic violent extremists. Given the
600,000 gotaways--and actually I think that number is bigger
now. I have a hard time keeping the number. I know that when I
talked to Secretary Mayorkas that was what we thought it was in
April last year. How do you know that DVEs are a bigger threat
than someone who is lurked in among the 600,000 we have never
contacted?
Mr. Schroden. Well, so I can't speak, sir, to that with any
particular analysis that I've done by myself. My comment
earlier was based on the intelligence assessment of the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence who concluded that
REMVs are the greatest terrorist threat to the United States
citizens right now.
Mr. Bishop. You know, it's interesting, and I hear that all
the time from officials here--and my time is about to--but this
final comment. What concerns me is exactly that. That is what I
get. You get these assessments, but we have seen intel failures
all across time. It is interesting. As a Member of Congress--I
don't know if the American people really understand or
appreciate this--I am never told why they think that. I am
never shown data to indicate the numerosity of those threats
versus others or the likelihood of their carrying something
out. It is a very frustrating thing for me as a Member of
Congress, fairly new, to see that phenomenon exist, but it is
interesting to me because you are in the same spot I am. They
say that, but it doesn't make sense.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
The Chair now recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr.
Goldman.
Mr. Goldman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Bishop, we are happy to share the data to address the
domestic violent extremism with you. It is clearly the No. 1
threat.
I am going to move on a little bit beyond how the
withdrawal from Afghanistan has a significant impact on our
Southern Border security. It seems quite remote, and even our
witnesses seem to say that we don't know who is in the 6,000.
So it is pure speculation. I would really like for us to be
doing really meaningful oversight of the longest war we have
ever had in Afghanistan--20 years. But the reality, of course,
is that proper oversight does not start on January 21, 2021.
There is a lead-up and a situation that any Commander-in-Chief
inherits. Colonel Douglas, wouldn't you acknowledge that any
decision that a Commander-in-Chief makes must factor in what
the previous Commander-in-Chief did?
Mr. Douglas. Sir, while that might be a factor, I think
what you also have to take into account is the advice that was
provided through military officials, and that was the retention
of 2,500 personnel to maintain stability and security in
Afghanistan.
Mr. Goldman. Do you think 2,500 personnel would maintain
security in Afghanistan for an extended period of time?
Mr. Douglas. Sir, based on my own experience in talking
with Afghans that I worked, lived, and served with, that one
American can make a difference. That ties to what Napoleon said
of the moral is to the physical is 3 is to 1. Really an army of
lesser size can beat any enemy if they've got the belief that
somebody's going to stand with them. Their belief was that one
American showed that they had American support. So, yes, I
wholeheartedly believe 2,500 would have maintained stability.
Mr. Goldman. I appreciate that anecdotal evidence of
talking to a few people, but let's point out that Secretary
Austin testified on September 28, 2021, ``If you stayed in
Afghanistan at a forced posture of 2,500, certainly you'd be in
a fight with the Taliban, and you'd have to reinforce
yourself.''
Colonel Douglas, let me ask you this, are you familiar with
the November 11, 2020 order to withdraw all United States
troops from Somalia and Afghanistan by January 15, 2021?
Mr. Douglas. No, sir, I'm not.
Mr. Goldman. OK. Well, I would like to introduce it into
the record. It is quite short, and I would ask unanimous
consent to introduce the November 11, 2020 memo from the acting
secretary of defense, subject withdrawal from Somalia and
Afghanistan.
Mr. Crane [presiding]. So ordered.
[The information follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Goldman. ``I hereby direct you to withdraw all U.S.
military forces from the Federal Republic of Somalia no later
than 31 December 2020, and from the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan no later than 15 January 2021. Inform all allied
and partner forces of the above directives. Please confirm
receipt of this order. Sincerely, Donald J. Trump.''
Now, Chairman Milley has previously testified before
Congress that he received this order from the White House's
personnel director, the PPO director, Johnny McEntee, and that
it had not been vetted by anyone in the Department of Defense.
Colonel Douglas, is it standard operating procedure for the PPO
to issue troop withdrawal orders without any consultation of
the Department of Defense?
Mr. Douglas. Sir, I wish I could comment on that, but that
would be clearly outside of the scope of my position or any
position that I had experienced in my time in military service.
Mr. Goldman. Exactly.
Ms. Ledeen, what about you? What do you think of that
process?
Ms. Ledeen. Congressman, do you want me to speak to
Somalia?
Mr. Goldman. No, we are here on Afghanistan and getting an
order from PPO that wasn't vetted through DoD. Is that standard
operating procedure?
Ms. Ledeen. I was operating at a level well below having
any ability----
Mr. Goldman. OK. Ambassador Sales?
Mr. Sales. Congressman, that's not normal, which is why the
White House retracted that order that you referred to.
Mr. Goldman. Right. Then they said that there will be a
drawdown to 2,500, is that right?
Mr. Sales. That's correct. Which is the current number of
troops we have in Iraq.
Mr. Goldman. All right. I guess my time is up.
I would just mention to our Majority that I think we all on
this side recognize a meaningful oversight of the withdrawal of
Afghanistan is very important, and we should be doing that. But
we should be focusing not on what started January 21, 2021 to
the present, but throughout the 20-year war, and especially on
what prompted the drawdown to 2,500 troops and the order to
withdraw all troops from Afghanistan. That has to be part of
meaningful oversight, and I hope it can be as we move forward.
I yield back.
Mr. Crane. Thank you.
The Chair now yields to himself. Hope I said that right.
Ambassador, this question is for you. Are you familiar with the
saying peace through strength?
Mr. Sales. It's one of my favorites, Congressman.
Mr. Crane. Ambassador Sales, with all your experience in
homeland security and counterterrorism, what does this saying
mean to you?
Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, it means that overwhelming
American military capability is capable of deterring our
adversaries, whether we're talking about nation-state
adversaries, such as the Chinese Communist Party or Russia, or,
on a smaller scale, terrorist groups like ISIS, like al-Qaeda.
If the United States has the meaningful ability to deploy
overwhelming force against our adversaries, we are far less
likely to have to do so.
Mr. Crane. Colonel Douglas, in your own words, what do you
think would be the opposite of peace through strength?
Mr. Douglas. It'd have to be weakness, sir, the opposite.
Mr. Crane. You think it would be fair to say chaos may be
violence by way of weakness? Something like that?
Mr. Douglas. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crane. Ambassador Sales, are you aware that shortly
after our disastrous withdrawal from Afghanistan that Russia
invaded Ukraine?
Mr. Sales. I am, Congressman.
Mr. Crane. Another current event. Ambassador, are you aware
that China flew a spy balloon over the entire United States?
Mr. Sales. I'm aware of that, sir.
Mr. Crane. This is for the entire panel. Are you guys aware
that many of our economic partners and allies around the world
are ditching the U.S. dollar right now, putting the dollar in
danger of no longer being the global reserve currency?
Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I wouldn't necessarily
consider Lula's Brazil a partner of the United States, but the
broader trend you've identified is exactly right.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Ambassador.
Ambassador Sales, I am wondering if, like any of the
constituents that I talked to, you see any connection between
the weakness and incompetence that we showed in Afghanistan and
some of these other world events that I just mentioned, or if
you think that this is just a spurious, non-connected chain of
events?
Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I could take this back to
Osama bin Laden. I think he said something that is instructive
several decades ago. When people see a strong horse and a weak
horse, they prefer the strong horse. A weak America invites
aggression, a weak America invites instability. To the extent
the United States appears weak on a world stage, that's not
only bad for our homeland security, it's not only bad for our
national security and foreign policy interests, it's bad for
the stability and security of the whole world.
Mr. Crane. Thank you.
Colonel Douglas, you were a Marine officer for 31 years, is
that correct?
Mr. Douglas. Yes, sir, it is.
Mr. Crane. I am just a Navy guy and I am familiar that in
the Marine Corps, you guys often like to joke around and say
you are the men's department of the Navy. Is that correct,
Colonel?
Mr. Crane. Sir, I've never said that. You and I share some
close associates.
Mr. Crane. Thank you for your tact, Colonel. I appreciate
that.
Colonel, in your opinion, who does bear the ultimate
responsibility of the dead Marines, the billions of gear we
left behind, the equipment left behind, and the global chaos we
see unfolding after the Afghanistan withdrawal?
Mr. Douglas. Sir, I think the President said it best when
he said, the buck stops here. I think that that's where we need
to stay is the buck stops here.
Mr. Crane. Colonel, in the Marine Corps, when they were
teaching you guys leadership, what did they teach you about
accountability?
Mr. Douglas. One of the many things they taught us was you
can delegate responsibility, you cannot delegate
accountability.
Mr. Crane. Colonel, do you feel, do you see any
accountability for this withdrawal of Afghanistan and our dead
Marines?
Mr. Douglas. At this point, we have not seen
accountability.
Mr. Crane. Colonel, what would you like to see happen going
forward?
Mr. Douglas. Acknowledgment that there could have been
better options and that our withdrawal was, in fact, chaotic.
Mr. Crane. Ambassador Sales, I will ask you the same
question. What would you like to see moving forward?
Mr. Sales. I'd like to see accountability, Congressman, for
a colossal foreign policy and national security failure of the
sort that we saw in Afghanistan. I would like to see
accountability for the decisions that were made.
Mr. Crane. Do you think that is possible after watching the
video that we watched at the beginning of this hearing?
Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I have to say I was
discouraged by the statement that the White House put out a
week or so ago, which seemed to be more interested in pointing
fingers than in learning lessons. I'm hopeful that
Congressional oversight can help bring the accountability
that's needed.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Ambassador.
I yield my time.
I now recognize the gentlelady from Texas, Congresswoman
Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank the Chair and the Ranking
Member for their courtesy. Let me, first of all, acknowledge
and appreciate the service of each and every one of you. Having
not served, but having family members who have served and
having the good fortune of serving in the U.S. Congress, to go
on to most all military war zones, including the very first
one, the Bosnia war that was going on with then Republican
leadership going in before the Dayton Peace Treaty was signed
and then, tragically, Afghanistan during the action. I was not
in action, but I was one of the few members that were in and as
well Iraq and then subsequent places as well, including the DMZ
in North and South Korea.
So let me say to Honorable Nathan Sales and Simone Ledeen
and Colonel Christopher Douglas, the service that you have
given Dr. Schroden, we appreciate the service in the myriad of
ways that you have done so. I will not get into the Marine-Navy
debate at this point, just to say there are very fine men and
women who serve in both of those branches of the United States
military, including all others.
But what I would like to do is to take on the task very
quickly of understanding the inherited chaotic withdrawal that
was a result of Trump's Taliban deal. How do I know this?
Because I met with--unfortunately, obviously, the president of
Afghan did not show himself well in that moment--but I met with
his leadership preceding and the First Lady who came and
begged, begged for the Afghan government to be involved, to no
avail. No one listened.
So let me quickly, Dr. Schroden, just quickly indicate that
with the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of Defense, Donald
Trump came into office 2017, approximately 11,000 troops. He
wanted 3,005--well, he gave permission to add troops, 3,500
were added. Additional troops were NATO-led. They were 14,000
to 15,000. By mid-2018 President Trump was reportedly
frustrated with the lack of military progress against the
Taliban, and he ordered formal and direct U.S. talks without
the Afghan government participating for the first time. As
those talks developed under special representative, who I knew
as well, Khalilzad, who we met with several times, President
Trump continued to express frustration with the U.S. military
mission in Afghanistan and a desire to withdraw U.S. troops,
saying in August 2019 that he wanted to do so quickly, as
quickly as we can. Then, of course, the withdrawal commitment
was not conditioned on Taliban reducing violence against the
Afghan government, making concessions in intra-Afghan talks, or
taking other actions, which we saw with a complete condemnation
of women, destroying of small businesses, and destroying Kabul,
the real heart of democracy there. The United States was not
able to remain indefinitely and the American public's patient
as well, was getting.
So in February 2020, United States and Taliban signed the
agreement that committed to withdrawing all of its troops,
contracts, non-diplomatic, civilian, from Afghanistan with a
draw-down forces to 8,600 by mid-July and then on to April 21.
Very quickly, if I might, Dr. Schroden, what are your
thoughts on the Trump-Taliban deal, particularly the Trump
administration negotiating directly with the Taliban, planning
to invite them on U.S. soil and negotiating with them absent
the Afghan government? Did that not contribute to the mix of
the controversy? In addition, as well, DHS indicated that it
was such a rush, they didn't have a system to vet everyone.
That is something we should look at. But if I yield to you on
that question, please.
Mr. Schroden. Sure. Thank you, ma'am.
I would say the decision to negotiate without the Afghan
government in the room was made largely because that was the
only way that negotiations would proceed. President Obama had
tried to negotiate with the Taliban previously, had insisted on
a precondition being that they'd negotiate with the Afghan
government there, and they refused. So that condition was the
only way to get the Taliban to sit down and begin talks.
That said, again, Ambassador Khalilzad's going in
proposition was that nothing would be agreed until everything
was agreed. Everything included a framework for structured
negotiations between the Afghan government and the Taliban as
part of the end-point of the agreement. That point was
conceded. The agreement that was signed in February only
established that as a follow-on step to be taken. It was not an
integral part of the agreement itself.
Ms. Jackson Lee. So they rolled over the Afghan government
at the end? You are saying they couldn't get to the table
because they couldn't get the Taliban to the table with them
there?
Let me just say that I was not at the table for
negotiation, so I am going to be a Democrat that is going to
second-guess. I stand with President Obama on that and I don't
think that we should have left the government out. We should
have found a way to have the government in maybe bilateral
negotiations.
Was there anything that you saw that resulted--in can you
just be specific--that resulted in the calamity because the
Afghan government was not in the end results, if you could?
Mr. Schroden. Well, so I wasn't involved in the
negotiations directly, so I can't speak to specific points of
discussion. Certainly, the Afghan government was frustrated by
the fact that they were not in the room. President Ghani and
his national security advisor expressed that frustration quite
openly to include in hearings here in Washington, DC on
multiple occasions. So, yes, they were quite frustrated by the
fact they were not in the room for those talks.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you see any homeland implications on--
--
Mr. Crane. The gentlelady's time has expired.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank the gentleman. Could I just let
him answer, Mr. Chairman, this last point?
Mr. Crane. Ma'am, you are 1 minute and 15 seconds over.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Am I?
Mr. Crane. If we can make it real quick, I will let you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Homeland security implications of the
agreement signed.
Mr. Schroden. The homeland security is really outside of my
area of expertise, ma'am, in terms of the DHS aspect of it.
Ms. Jackson Lee. All right. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Crane. I only let you go longer because you said
something really nice about the Navy.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I truly believe it. Thank you. I yield
back.
Mr. Crane. I now recognize Mr. D'Esposito from New York.
Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair. Good morning,
everyone, to our panel. Thank you for being here and thank you
for your service.
One of the things that we discuss regularly is the view of
America's credibility on a world stage. Ambassador, I would
have to ask, do you believe that America's credibility on the
world stage has been damaged as a result of the Biden
administration's catastrophic withdrawal from Afghanistan?
Mr. Sales. It gives me no pleasure to say it, Congressman,
but I do.
Mr. D'Esposito. It gives none of us pleasure, to be honest.
Do you agree that our foreign adversaries, like China and
Russia perceive the botched U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan as
a manifestation of American weakness? Please just elaborate a
little further on it, if you could.
Mr. Sales. I'm afraid they do. I think it's difficult to
answer these questions as a private citizen who lacks access to
U.S. Government collection on these matters. But it stands to
reason that if a foreign adversary sees the United States run
out of Afghanistan in chaos--and let's be clear, it was chaos--
13 dead service members is chaos, Afghans falling to their
deaths from airplanes is chaos. If foreign adversaries see the
United States humiliated in such a manner, they will calculate
that the United States can be pushed back at low cost to them.
Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. Crane. The committee will now move to a second round of
questioning.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, Representative
Magaziner.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chair.
Let me just say the reason that so many of us are concerned
about domestic violence, violent extremism, is because over the
last 5 years, more Americans have been killed by racially and
ethnically motivated mass casualty events than by events
connected with foreign terrorism on U.S. soil. That is not to
say that we should lose focus on the foreign terror threats as
well, but the list is extensive--El Paso, Buffalo, Charleston,
Orlando. The list goes on and on, and the victims of those
attacks matter.
I would also thank my Republican colleagues for their
concern about the strength of the U.S. dollar. I will take that
as a sign that the brinkmanship over raising the debt ceiling
will end in the interest of national security, although I am
not optimistic.
Turning the focus back to Afghanistan. Listen, I think Mr.
Goldman said it well, accountability is important, but
accountability does not begin in January 2021. There is a
larger story here that if we are going to draw lessons for the
future and how to do better, we have to be mindful of. So let
me just be clear about this. Dr. Schroden, when the Trump-
Taliban deal was signed, attacks by the Taliban against the
Afghan security forces and police went up by an average of 70
percent a day. In the ensuing months did President Trump or his
administration ever say that, well, maybe we should slow down
or re-think this deal, slow down our troop withdrawals,
reconsider, push back the time line in light of the fact that
Taliban attacks were going up instead of down? OK. To your
knowledge, during that period of the drawdown, when the Taliban
successfully recaptured 217 of Afghanistan's 407 districts, did
the Trump administration ever say, wait a minute, maybe we
should reconsider, slow down the troop withdrawals?
Mr. Schroden. Not to my knowledge, no.
Mr. Magaziner. OK. When it became clear that Afghan
nationals who risked their own lives to help the United States
in our mission were not being protected from Taliban
retribution, was there ever any indication from the Trump
administration that they were re-thinking the terms of their
deal?
Mr. Schroden. I'm not aware of them re-thinking the terms
of the deal, no.
Mr. Magaziner. When President Biden inherited this
withdrawal and made the decision to delay the deadline for
moving all U.S. troops by I believe it was 5 months, the former
President did not say that this was a reasonable step to
protect U.S. service members and our Afghan allies; he, in fact
criticized President Biden for moving back the deadline.
So looking forward, what lessons can we draw here? We have
talked about the importance of having a screening process in
place to remove potentially special immigrant visa-eligible
individuals who have assisted the United States from foreign
theaters. One of the things that my understanding did not
happen in advance was the Department of Defense did not share
its full list of individuals that could be SIV-eligible with
the Department of Homeland Security, which was tasked with
screening these individuals. That is certainly a lesson that we
should learn from going forward.
We also need to make sure that, as we discussed in our
previous round of questioning, we explore all options for
monitoring and eliminating terrorist threats emanating from
Afghanistan for whatever means are at our disposal, given the
fact that the withdrawal deal did not include a provision to
allow for intelligence gathering or operations in Afghanistan
in order to neutralize terrorist threats.
So I want to thank our witnesses for your service to our
country. I want to thank you for offering proactive ideas for
how we can mitigate terror threats emanating from Afghanistan
and around the world on a go-forward basis. I know that all of
us, despite our differences here, take that responsibility
seriously. We want to protect Americans, and we want to make
sure that we do it in a way that is comprehensive and
effective. With that, I will yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
The Chair will now recognize myself for a second round of
questioning.
As I think about the Commander-in-Chief and my previous
question to Colonel Douglas, if Commander-in-Chief has not
liked many of the deals that were done in the previous
administration--in fact, there has been 180-degree reversal on
many of those. So somebody who served for 20-plus years wearing
a uniform, you don't like it, you are the commander, well
change it. So that ability was there.
Dr. Schroden, you publicly criticized the Biden
administration's report on the U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan. Particularly you stated the administration's
report is not an objective attempt to identify or summarize
lessons learned, you said it is a political document designed
to deflect blame. You also said at the end of the day that
Biden is President, who made the call and the disastrous
withdrawal occurred on his watch. Is that true?
Mr. Schroden. Yes, that's true.
Chairman Pfluger. OK. Look, if we are going to have a
discussion about the facts and what happened, when you are the
Commander-in-Chief, you have a 4-year period and you can make
those decisions. What I am worried about right now, Ambassador
Sales, is in the 9/11 Commission it was stated and recognized
that in the days leading up to September 11, 2001, the words
``the system was flashing red'' was said many times. They
acknowledged there was a problem. What I want to know right
now, and make sure that we don't get to, is is the system
flashing red right now? Because it seems like it to me with all
the issues we are talking about.
Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, it's hard to know what the
system is flashing if you don't have intelligence-collection
capabilities on the ground. Our intelligence professionals are
incredibly skilled, they're the best in the world, but there's
only so much they can do if they don't have HUMINT networks on
the ground in Afghanistan, if they don't have ISR platforms
doing orbits overhead.
If I could, Congressman, address the broader question of
the Doha Agreement. I think it's important to remember that
President Biden, as a candidate, promised to get out of
Afghanistan months before the Doha Agreement was signed. On
July 30, 2019, 7 months before Doha, he told the Council on
Foreign Relations, ``I would bring American combat troops in
Afghanistan home during my first term.'' He reiterated that
message on TV with George Stephanopoulos in a clip that was not
aired. In that video, George Stephanopoulos says: So you would
have withdrawn troops like this even if President Trump had not
made that deal with the Taliban?/The President: I would have
tried to figure out how to withdraw those troops, yes.
Mr. Chairman, if I may, just one last comment about the
terms of the Doha Agreement I'm not here to criticize the deal,
I'm not here to defend the deal, but one thing that is
important to recall about the deal is that it was conditions-
based. If the Taliban did not meet their obligations under the
deal, then the United States was released from its obligations
under the deal. This is exactly what Secretary of Defense Mark
Esper said in March 2020. I quote: ``Doha is a conditions-based
agreement. If we assess that the Taliban is honoring the terms
of the deal, the U.S. will reduce our presence toward a goal of
zero in 2021. But''--and this is the key quote--``if progress
stalls, then our drawdown likely will be suspended as well.''
President Biden did not have his hands tied by the Doha
Agreement. He made a decision months before the Doha Agreement
to withdraw, and the Agreement gave him all the flexibility he
needed to adjust his approach.
Chairman Pfluger. Conditions-based. As somebody who flew
combat missions over the Middle East, not in Afghanistan, but
has, again, 2 decades of military experience, the conditions-
based approach is what every military commander learns. It is
what every general and secretary of defense aims for. I am
afraid that we got this completely opposite. It was not
conditions-based. General McKenzie, in fact, at this point, in
December 2021, stated, we are probably at 2 percent of the
capabilities we once had to look into Afghanistan, making it
very hard to understand what is happening there.
Colonel Douglas, do you agree with that statement, that we
virtually have no idea what is going on?
Mr. Douglas. I would have to agree with General McKenzie on
that. I mean, bottom line is even if we have an over-the-rise
in capability, it's best to find humans with humans.
Chairman Pfluger. Ms. Ledeen, your thoughts. You have
previously said that what happens in Afghanistan does not stay
in Afghanistan. That lack of intelligence, how does that
negatively impact our security?
Ms. Ledeen. Mr. Chairman, as someone who served two tours
in Afghanistan working with the intelligence community, I can
tell you that we were successful based on our HUMINT-enabled
signals intelligence. We have incredible tools, but they're
also limited in the sense that they need to be focused in the
correct place to get what we need. That's why we traditionally
rely on sources on the ground to help direct us as to where we
need to focus those efforts. We have lost that HUMINT element
at this point, and our SIGINT element is greatly reduced. So I
would say there's no way to just turn that HUMINT spigot back
on. We are not a trustworthy partner anymore. We abandoned our
human assets, and many of them have been tortured and murdered
now. Again, it doesn't only stay in Afghanistan, our partners
around the world have seen that and they have reacted
accordingly. Saudi Arabia has gone from a potential Abraham
Accords partner to de-dollarization in 2 years.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much.
My time has expired.
It is time that we focus on the threats and get our minds
back right.
With that, I recognize the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms.
Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Since we are on this agreement, I would ask you, Dr.
Schroden, what do you think of the agreement? Do you think that
negotiating directly with the Taliban without the Afghan
government present was a good idea? Talk about lack of
intelligence. We didn't have their input when they negotiated
this deal. Do you think also that future homeland security
implications can come from our commitment to the deal?
Mr. Schroden. Thank you for the question, ma'am.
I would say that, again, the only way that the Taliban was
going to negotiate with the United States was to not have the
Afghan government in the room. So to the extent that we wanted
to have a negotiation with them, that was a condition that had
to be met in order for those talks in order to begin. They had
steadfastly refused to engage with us or to engage with the
Afghan government being in the room. So that was a condition
that had to be met to even get the talks going.
That said, one of the goals of the talks at the outset was
to include a structured framework for the Afghan government and
the Taliban to talk and to reach agreement on sort-of a future
governance structure for the country. That term, which was a
goal at the outset of the initiation of these discussions, was
not included in the agreement that was signed in February 2020.
Ms. Titus. So what about future homeland security issues,
which is what this committee is supposed to be focused on? How
much of a threat does that situation now pose for us?
Mr. Schroden. Well, I think there's two primary groups in
Afghanistan that have an expressed intent to attack the United
States homeland, that would be al-Qaeda and the Islamic State
Khorasan Province, or ISKP. Al-Qaeda has minimal, if any,
capability to do that from Afghanistan right now. That's not
just my assessment, the United Nations has also assessed that
as recently as late 2022. So al-Qaeda is largely a localized
actor at this point in time in Afghanistan. ISKP has a lot more
capability to attack beyond Afghanistan. Indeed, they've
conducted some tens of attacks in Pakistan as well as cross-
border attacks against both Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. So they
are a regional menace at this point. They don't currently have
the ability to attack the United States homeland, nor, to my
knowledge, have we detected any intent or any sort of planning
or activities on their part to do that. I know several people
have quoted General Kurilla, the commander of Central Command,
having said that in his estimation, within 6 months, ISKP could
attack externally. When he was pressed on that particular
point, though, in his testimony, he acknowledged that those
attacks would much more likely to be regional or potentially
into Europe and that an attack against U.S. homeland would be
much, much more unlikely.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
Along those same lines, Mr. Sales, you quote a Washington
Examiner article that warns about 98 individuals who are on the
terrorist watch list were apprehended after crossing the
Southern Border. So do you think this is a threat to the
homeland? Or would you acknowledge what percentage of the
people that we have encountered along the border are
represented by this 98?
Mr. Sales. Well, thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
Just to be clear, the source that I cited for those numbers
was not a newspaper, but rather U.S. Customs and Border
Protection.
I do think that the dramatic spike we've seen from zero
KSTs encountered several years ago to 98 last year and 69 so
far this year is troubling. I think terrorists are aware of
gaps in our border security, and they will certainly try to
exploit those gaps.
Ms. Titus. I would give you the number since you didn't
answer my question. It is .0044 percent--.0044 percent. These
individuals were apprehended, isn't that correct?
Mr. Sales. That is correct, Congresswoman. But I think,
remember, it was just 19 hijackers who were able to pull off
the 9/11 attack. So that is the number that matters.
Ms. Titus. But those weren't apprehended and that is not
relevant to what we are talking about now. We are talking about
today across the Southern Border the percentage and those were
the ones who were apprehended. So let's don't spread
misinformation claiming that this big wave is waltzing across
our border to attack like 9/11. Is that what you are trying to
say? We are going to have another 9/11? Is that what you are
saying?
Mr. Sales. Well, Congresswoman, I think the American people
would generally agree with me that if almost 100 known----
Ms. Titus. Well, we can say one person can blow up a
building. So I think that is stretching the point of what we
are doing here. I think we can say that our border agents are
working pretty effectively if they have captured this 98 that
you are talking about that is such a small percent, that we are
doing a pretty good job of stopping these outside people coming
in to threaten our national security. Would you not concede
that?
Mr. Sales. Well, to continue my thought, Congresswoman, I
think I believe--and I believe that the American people would
agree, that if nearly 100 known or suspected terrorists are
able to come into the United States----
Ms. Titus. But they weren't, they were apprehended.
Mr. Sales. Mr. Chairman, may I finish that sentence?
Chairman Pfluger. Go ahead.
Mr. Sales. If 98 known or suspected terrorists are able to
enter the United States, that would be of concern. It would
raise this further question, how many others are getting in
that we were not able to catch and that we don't know about?
Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, also a
veteran and serving in Afghanistan, Mr. Gonzalez.
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you, Chairman. Thank you for holding
this very important hearing.
I spent 20 years in the military, 5 years in Iraq and
Afghanistan. I grew up in Afghanistan. I remember being 21
years old, landing in Kandahar, and it was as if I landed on
the backside of the moon. Poppy fields everywhere, I remember
walking around with a hand pistol, and there was a warlord
driving a brand new Range Rover. I am going, how the heck did
he get a Range Rover on the moon? That is what we were dealing
with. Then behind him was a Toyota pickup truck with about 20
people with AKs and RPGs. So that is the world I grew up in.
Those were our allies, right?
So the question I have for you is, OEF Vets, we will never
forget what happened in Afghanistan. We will never forget that
there were 13 Americans killed just days before the Biden
administration pulled the rug from underneath us. We will never
forget having to, as many of you all did, having to put
together organizations to go save Americans and also save our
allies. We will never forget those things.
But I am deeply concerned with some of the repercussions of
what happened. In particular, my first question is for
Ambassador Sales or Ms. Ledeen. As was noted during the opening
remarks, the Biden administration left over $7 billion worth of
vehicles, weapons, and other gear in the country for the
Taliban and other terrorist organizations. Are either you aware
of any reports or evidence showing any of these articles in the
possession of U.S. adversaries are being used in armed
conflicts outside of Afghanistan? I am thinking of Ukraine, I
am thinking of all these different hotbeds--Iranians in
particular. Any of you aware of any of this material popping up
around the world?
Ms. Ledeen. Congressman, thank you for the question.
In terms of the materials, I am limited as to my scope at
this point. But I have heard secondarily from other former
colleagues who are still in government that there are some
materials that have crossed the border and are turning up in
bordering countries that are not friendly to the United States.
I would add to that, if I may, the many, many Afghan
commandos that we trained over the years, many of whom actually
came here for training, had to escape because we didn't help
them. So they have escaped to countries like Pakistan and Iran.
There have been multiple reports about them joining, some of
them joining the Wagner Group and fighting on behalf of Russia
in Ukraine. So the sort-of global repercussions of this
continue. Thank you.
Mr. Gonzalez. My next question is for Colonel Douglas.
Seeing first-hand the chaos of the withdrawal, what do you
believe could have been done differently in the planning and
evacuation efforts? One thing that in particular comes to mind
is Iraq. All right. So at some point, we are going to have to
get out of Iraq. Ideally, it is not the same situation of what
happened in Afghanistan, bu that is what is on my mind. What
can we do to prevent the next type of withdrawal, whatever that
is, from happening?
Mr. Douglas. Sir, to talk about Afghanistan, what could
have happened is we had a conditions-based agreement that
wasn't being honored, was to follow the conditions-based
agreement. DoD was conducting planning. All plans were multi-
option and multi-jurisdictional. So I think all agencies
working together to come to a workable time line I think would
probably be in the best interest.
As you mentioned, Iraq, I mean we've already seen the exit
of there once and the repercussions of having had to go back as
a service member to fight the ISIS campaign, I can say that
let's make sure that we do that with care, consistency, and
confidence as we move forward.
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you.
My last question, because I am almost out of time, Ms.
Ledeen, has any Federal agency contacted you about your group's
effort to coordinate evacuations or any other group that you
are aware of? I will preface with may of our offices
essentially turned into many State Department offices, many
FEMA offices, where we were the ones coordinating, we were the
ones helping Americans. One American in particular was an
Afghan interpreter that I helped get to San Antonio and his
family, or they would have been killed. I mean, it wasn't a
slap on the wrist. Has anyone reached out to you for lessons
learned? Any Federal agencies?
Ms. Ledeen. No, they have not.
Mr. Gonzalez. See, that is part of a problem. I think part
of it, too, is we can't let our knowledge, our information end
in this hearing. We have to continue to push the issue. That is
why I think it is so important and grateful for Chairman
Pfluger for bringing this up. We have got to continue to get
ahead of it, because it doesn't end in Afghanistan. Afghanistan
doesn't end at those borders. With that, I yield back,
Chairman.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms.
Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Again, let me thank the Chairman and
Ranking Member for your courtesies, and let me indicate that we
should be finding solutions, but forgive me for trying to
ensure that the record is set correct.
Also my opinion, no matter what administration it was, it
certainly was not done with the Trump administration. There
should have been--as I say, let me put on the record, this
whole thing of the weakness and weak-kneed of the United
States, we are the most powerful nation in the world,
militarily-based, bar none. So whatever chattering is going on
around the world, I am a defender and not an offender. I am not
an aggressor, I am a defender. But I know and have confidence
that we are prepared. So let that be on the record and others
can investigate it. All of this hyperbole and seemingly
hysteria, I think, does not fit well with what we need to do.
Mr. Chairman, I respect you very much, and I think we
should get to solutions.
So let me again try to set the record straight. There were
some comments about the dollar going under. I would venture to
say on the record that this debt ceiling debate and debacle is
more having to do with the dollar than anything else. I think
economists from all walks of life will say that.
In addition, the people coming across the border are not
all known terrorists. They may be family members of such. We
have already seen the minute number. I would venture to say,
having had the privilege, in spite of the horrific catastrophic
incident that generated the creation of Homeland Security
Committee, I was on from the beginning, and I went to Ground
Zero during the recovery--will never say rescue. I walked on
the grounds when firefighters were still obtaining the remains
of our beloved persons, Americans and others who perished. I
take this very seriously, and I think we would do better if we
find a way to work together.
So, Dr. Schroden, you answered. Maybe I was not clear
enough, because I sort-of talked very quickly. But let me again
try to go to you on the question. I want to ask, I think it is
Ambassador Sales. Ambassador Sales, I will come to you within
my time to ask what are good next steps or a reflection of what
we should do? I will welcome your comments. In fact, let me go
to you first, sir. What can we do or what should we do? Right
now we have--I use the term before, catastrophic debacle in
Afghanistan. It breaks my heart. I have been there. I saw
Kabul, I saw the women, I saw life. Yes, sir, your answer. I
want to go to you, Dr. Schroden.
Mr. Sales. Thank you, Congresswoman.
I'll try to be brief. First of all, it's good to see you.
You may recall that I actually represented you as your lawyer a
decade ago in a case involving an Iranian dissident group. So
it's good to see you again. I agree with you that the most
important thing that we can do going forward is figure out how
we can degrade terrorist threats that are growing in
Afghanistan. I agree with a lot of what Dr. Schroden has said.
I would not suggest that the United States share intelligence
information with the Taliban. Their interests are not our
interests. They are not a reliable counterterrorism partner. So
I would instead focus on, No. 1, continuing to apply sanctions
pressure to the Taliban until they uphold their commitments
under the Doha Agreement to break with terrorists. Candidly,
they are exceedingly unlikely to do so. That means that our
sanctions need to remain in place for this foreseeable future.
No diplomatic recognition for the Taliban, no sanctions relief,
et cetera.
The second thing I think that would be critical would be
developing basing rights in the region for U.S. drones and
perhaps other strike assets so that we are in a better position
to collect intelligence in the country and to take action
against those threats when warranted.
Thank you.
Ms. Jackson Lee. That is very helpful. That can be whatever
administration is in place can take some instructive
counseling.
Dr. Schroden, can I again get from you the horror of
leaving out the Afghan government, even though you don't have
the details, in that early agreement and going forward now, any
signs of any level of democracy in Afghanistan at this point?
Any smidgen of such that we can help contribute to? Yes,
Doctor.
Mr. Schroden. I don't see any Democratic-leaning trends on
behalf of the Taliban, ma'am. I mean, they they are largely a
totalitarian authoritarian-style government and their trends
have been increasingly in that direction since they've been in
power.
Ms. Jackson Lee. The question about leaving them out, and
you already said it, but you have got to give a little bit more
flesh, and you have got 4 seconds or less I guess. I am over.
Mr. Schroden. I mean, certainly in hindsight, not having
them in the room for the discussions was--less than optimal is
probably a generous way of saying it, though, again, I come
back to had we continued to insist on the Afghan government
being in the room for the negotiations, the negotiations would
have likely never taken place because the Taliban insisted on
that as a condition for them occurring at all. So had we not
agreed to that, we would largely most likely be in a
situation--again, this is a counterfactual--of continuing to
fight in the same way that we were fighting when President
Trump took office. There would be no negotiations at all.
Ms. Jackson Lee. I hear you are tapping my last sentences,
but they should have been included in the external--they should
have been included in the extending, Mr. Chairman. They should
have been included in the extending part of it.
I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
I now recognize the gentleman from North Carolina Mr.
Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Ambassador Sales, I want to revisit--since
Representative Titus sort-of ridiculed or trivialized what you
said about the terrorism risk, uncontrolled Southern Border. It
is my time, ma'am. I just was sitting here tallying, and I used
a figure of 600,000 gotaways. Boy, that is an old figure. I
asked staff to give me a figure, 1.3 million gotaways over the
course of the Biden administration. What Border Patrol tells me
is usually going to add in another 10 percent or so for
gotaways that they don't even know about. They have some reason
to believe it is about another 10 percent or so. But let's say
1.3 million. If 1 percent of that number were folks intending
to do harm in the nature of terrorists, something like that,
that would be 13,000. That is 650 9/11 teams.
Do you have anything to add or do you want to--which you
weren't allowed to say during the time you were being sort-of
talked over about the risk that is entailed there? Because it
seems to me, just as a matter of common sense, that it is quite
grave.
Mr. Sales. Well, thank you for the question, Congressman.
I agree with you that the risk is grave. It's not simply a
matter of numbers, it's a matter of specific and concrete
terrorist plots that have sought to exploit our Southern
Border. As I mentioned in my written statement, in 2011 the
Iranian regime in Tehran attempted to plot with a Mexican drug
cartel to carry out an assassination of the Saudi Ambassador to
the United States right here in, Washington. They were going to
bomb Cafe Milano in Georgetown. That's not simply a matter of
statistics, that's an actual plot that terrorists attempted to
carry out by exploiting weaknesses on our Southern Border. More
recently, in 2021, the Mullahs in Tehran were back at it again,
attempting to work with an individual in Mexico who had ties to
drug cartels in that country to assassinate former national
security adviser John Bolton here in the United States. We know
that the Iranian regime is aware of vulnerabilities in our
Southern Border. They have attempted to exploit those
vulnerabilities to carry out terrorist attacks here in the
United States. I think we have to assume that other terrorist
groups, including terrorists in Afghanistan, likewise are aware
of the vulnerabilities in our border.
Mr. Bishop. It is amazing to me, if you think back to that
language, and it has been referred to here today, that was in
the
9/11 Commission report that the system was blinking red. That
is to say that the risks were palpable. It was obvious to
anyone who would analyze with common sense the risks of being
hit and where the risk might come from, and they were ignored
and trivialized by folks who decided that they could never
happen, hadn't happened that way before, but it is obvious that
it could. I thank you for giving voice to it.
Let me switch to something else. Colonel Douglas, I think
the phrase came from you, you mentioned the phrase, ``the buck
stops here''. As you look over, I was reviewing again the memo
released by the White House on April 6 about sort-of assessing
Afghanistan debacle and what a disgrace it is. But that of
course, came from whom? Who said that? Remember?
Mr. Douglas. Yes, sir, that came from the President.
Mr. Bishop. The President of the United States. Do you
remember which President that was?
Mr. Douglas. That was President Biden.
Mr. Bishop. Actually, the first person who popularized that
phrase and put it on his desk was Harry Truman. The buck stops
here. I was looking on the internet just quickly, just thinking
about that phrase, and it turns out President Biden said that
about Afghanistan. That may have been he said, the buck stops
with me. Yet all the weakness that is betrayed--or that is
portrayed in the way the Afghanistan withdrawal was handled,
doesn't it seem true that to pass the buck, that to have person
after person, including the White House, stand up and say,
well, the reason this was disaster happened is because Donald
Trump was President before me and made some decisions, and I
just couldn't figure out a way to get around those decisions in
Donald Trump. Doesn't that actually exacerbate the weakness?
Mr. Douglas. Sir, the initial statement that the buck stops
with me taking accountability for the evacuation and the
subsequent statement saying it was the previous administration
is counterintuitive to his initial statement.
Mr. Bishop. They are utterly contradictory of one another,
which actually is a separate element of it that projects
weakness even more. You can't even get a single line of thought
going that you can stand behind.
It is really a great tragedy, and it proposes grave danger
to the United States.
My time is about expired. I yield.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Nevada, Ms.
Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Ambassador Sales, you said we need to keep sanctions up and
we shouldn't have diplomatic recognition. I take it you also
wouldn't agree to invite Taliban to Camp David.
Let me go on, though. I don't need a response to that.
I would also point out that nearly all of the terror-
related--or their names were on the terror watch individuals
who were arrested at the border came from Latin America, not
from Afghanistan. Most of the groups that they represented at
the time are no longer active. I would also point out that the
people who are so concerned about our activity at the border,
who are so critical of our people who are trying to do the best
they can at the border, are in favor of cutting funding to the
border. Only two Republican Members of Congress serving today
voted for the omnibus, which would have given more funding to
the border. Cutting money for law enforcement, it seems to be
part of their so-called budget plan. So if you want better
border, you have got to support their efforts. Let's just be
clear about that.
Now, my question goes to Dr. Schroden. What, if anything,
would have changed if the United States had stayed in
Afghanistan for an eternity, which is apparently what these
folks want to have happened, as opposed to doing some kind of
withdrawal? Would that have been an improvement? Did you
support that? What would be the situation had we stayed?
Mr. Schroden. Ma'am, so the analysis that I did between
2015 and 2020 routinely showed the security situation in
Afghanistan deteriorating over that time frame. So the Taliban
were increasingly encroaching on Afghan districts, right.
Between 2017 and 2019, the number of districts that the
government controlled decreased by about 40 percent. My own
analysis in 2020, toward the end of 2020, showed that the
Taliban had effectively surrounded 15 of Afghanistan's 34
provincial capitals. So the situation was not, as some
described at the time, a stable stalemate that could be
maintained through the application of 2,500 U.S. troops
indefinitely. It was a deteriorating security situation that
would have--to arrest that situation would likely have required
the re-influx, another surge, if you will, of U.S. forces to
try and turn that around.
Ms. Titus. So putting more of our men and women in danger
by sending more troops to try to maintain some kind of
stability?
Mr. Schroden. In the same way that the Trump administration
and the Obama administration inherited a declining security
situation in Afghanistan, the Biden administration also
inherited a declining security situation in Afghanistan.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
D'Esposito.
Mr. D'Esposito. Well, thank you, Mr. Chair.
Ms. Titus, I am not sure how you can look into your crystal
ball and know how two freshmen Members of Congress were going
to vote.
Nonetheless----
Chairman Pfluger. The committee will be in order.
Mr. D'Esposito. I would like to share a quote with you. In
the fall of 2020, my analysis was that an accelerated
withdrawal without meeting specific and necessary conditions
risks losing the substantial gains made in Afghanistan,
damaging U.S. world-wide credibility and could precipitate a
general collapse of the Afghan National Security Forces and the
Afghan government, resulting in a complete Taliban takeover or
general civil war. That was a year ago. My assessment remained
consistent throughout. That was General Mark Milley, Chairman
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Ambassador Sales, what are your thoughts and what response
to that quote?
Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, thanks for the question.
Unfortunately, that crystal ball appears to have been an
accurate one, because that appears to have been exactly what
happened. With the withdrawal of U.S. forces completed in
August 2021, the Afghan National Defense and Security Forces no
longer had the capability to defend themselves and were
demoralized, furthermore, by statements from the United States
that our commitment to partnering with them was over.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you.
Ms. Ledeen, in your testimony you noted that you worked on
a spontaneous volunteer effort that worked around-the-clock to
coordinate and help circumvent a broken and hostile security
system. This effort highlights the ingenuity of the American
industrious spirit, as well as the integrity by which the
Americans operate, especially those who have served in our
military. Can you explain why this group had to exist and just
share with us some of the best work that it did?
Ms. Ledeen. Congressman, thank you for the question.
I would say the group had to exist because we realized
quickly that there were thousands of Americans and Afghan
allies that were trapped and not able to get to the one airport
that was still open. They were not able to travel to the
airport, they were not able to make it inside the airport, they
were getting beaten by the Taliban. There was nobody in general
helping them. There were some specific efforts with whom we
linked up, and unfortunately--we were able to help, our group
was able to help, but many, many people were left behind.
Congressman, would you repeat the second part of your question?
I'm sorry.
Mr. D'Esposito. Just----
Ms. Ledeen. Oh, stories, yes.
Mr. D'Esposito. Yes, some of the best work that was done.
Ms. Ledeen. So I would say one of the most heartwarming
stories was about a double amputee. He had had his legs blown
off. It was an Afghan ally who had served with the Marines. He
had had his legs blown off, had actually traveled to Texas
several years prior to get prosthetics and went back to
Afghanistan to continue to live there. So he ended up having to
walk on his prosthetic legs for several days with his family to
get to the airport. Our group was able to find a service member
to come and get them and bring them inside. Each one of these
was incredibly dangerous, incredibly heroic efforts by our
military to actually go out into crowds and pull people and
bring them inside, crossing a canal of human waste. There are
many, many stories like this.
But I would also, if I may, like to add, the situation and
the degradation of the Afghan National Security Forces. I
served in Afghanistan multiple times. I think I would encourage
this body to look into why that was the case where we had our
military and political leaders for many years saying everything
was going well, they're improvements, they're improvements.
Meanwhile, people who were serving on the ground knew that was
not the case. How is that allowed to happen for 2 decades? I
would really encourage this body to look into that, and I know
a lot of veterans agree with this.
Thank you.
Mr. D'Esposito. Thank you. Thank you for your service.
Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields back.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, Mr.
Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Colonel Douglas, we both did several combat tours in the
Middle East, fighting against more or less the same enemies.
What concerns you more, sir: the increased terrorist encounters
at our Southern Border, or domestic terrorism?
Mr. Douglas. Increased terrorist encounters in general,
sir. Yes, terrorism in general concerns me.
Mr. Crane. Yes, I guess what I am driving at, sir, is when
we hear our colleagues on the other side of the aisle talk
about domestic terrorism, domestic terrorism, domestic
terrorism, it is kind-of a different type of terrorism than you
and I are probably used to dealing with. Would you concur with
that?
Mr. Douglas. From my experience, I'd concur with that, sir.
Mr. Crane. OK. Thank you.
Mr. Sales, same question to you. What concerns you more,
sir? The fallout that we are seeing from our disastrous
withdrawal from Afghanistan and the fact that we have no
Southern Border whatsoever, and the increased encounters that
you have been talking about over and over again, and the
American people are worried sick about because they know we
have no Southern Border, or this idea of domestic terrorism?
Mr. Sales. Well, Congressman, I'm going to do what lawyers
call fighting the hypothetical, because I think my answer to
your question is all the above. When I was at the State
Department, my team and I didn't have the luxury of saying, all
right, we're going to focus on this threat and this threat
alone.
Mr. Crane. Right.
Mr. Sales. We had to address all of them. Whether you're
talking about ISIS, whether you're talking about al-Qaeda or
other Sunni Jihadists, whether you're talking about Shia
terrorist organizations backed by Iran, Colombian terrorist
groups like the FARC, and dissidents from the FARC, when it
comes to domestic terrorism, this is a threat as well. Focusing
on domestic terrorism, however--we cannot allow that focus,
which is important, to distract us from other terrorist
threats.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, sir.
One of my colleagues was basically taking up the same line
of attack as several of the other ones, blaming Trump for the
disastrous withdrawal. Again, Mr. Sales, would you concur and
do you agree with that assessment, that this was Trump's fault
because of the deal that he made?
Mr. Sales. No, Congressman, I wouldn't. Again, I'm not here
to defend the deal, I'm not here to criticize the deal. My
testimony is simply that the deal gave the President sufficient
flexibility to make his own choices. The President's choice was
to withdraw.
Mr. Crane. Yes.
My colleague, Mr. Magaziner said that Biden inherited the
withdrawal. Do you agree with that assessment?
Mr. Sales. No, Congressman. My assessment is that the
President Biden inherited a conditions-based agreement and was
briefed by his senior military advisers that the United States
should keep a residual force in country of 2,500 soldiers that
would be capable of maintaining stability and applying
counterterrorism pressure to al-Qaeda and ISIS.
Mr. Crane. Colonel Douglas, do you agree that President
Biden inherited the withdrawal?
Mr. Douglas. He inherited a conditions-based agreement that
the Taliban were not honoring, and then subsequently----
Mr. Crane. Thank you.
Dr. Schroden, what are your thoughts on that inheriting the
withdrawal comment?
Mr. Schroden. So I would agree that the U.S.-Taliban
agreement was a conditions-based agreement and that the Taliban
were not meeting the conditions of that deal. However, I would
say they were not meeting the conditions of the deal even while
President Trump was in office. So the drawdown from 8,600 to
2,500 was also made in sort-of absence of the Taliban
maintaining the conditions that they had agreed to. So in this
case, I would say both parties agreed to drawdowns in absence
of the Taliban meeting their conditions under the terms of the
agreement.
Mr. Crane. My colleague over here, Ms. Titus, said she
wants to focus on future homeland security, not reliving
Afghanistan and not misinformation. Is there a connection
between future homeland security, Mr. Sales, and what happened
in Afghanistan? Are the two connected at all?
Mr. Sales. I think they are, Congressman, in a number of
different ways. The withdrawal from Afghanistan was an enormous
morale boost for our adversaries. They feel emboldened by our
withdrawal. They feel that they have been vindicated for 20
years of fighting American soldiers and our allies.
I also worry, secondarily, about the loss of intelligence
information that we are no longer able to collect as robustly
as was previously the case in Afghanistan. That is, data that
is fed into our border screening systems, biometric systems at
the airports, customs systems to scan inbound arriving
international airline passengers. Those systems have been
incredibly effective at preventing another 9/11-scale attack on
the homeland. They are more effective with more intel.
Mr. Crane. Thank you.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman's time has expired.
Once again, I would like to thank the witnesses for your
valuable testimony, for your experience, for your service to
this country. During the course of this hearing, the Ranking
Member and I have had a couple of conversations on where we go
next and what we do with this information in order to make sure
that if the system is blinking red or if there are issues, that
we can address those. We will have a follow-up hearing on this.
We will discuss those issues.
I would like to thank the Ranking Member for your
participation and remind the Committee that the Members of the
subcommittee may have some additional questions for witnesses,
and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to the committee rule VII(D), the hearing record will
be held open for 10 days.
Without objection, the subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:04 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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