[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


 REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT ``THE COAST GUARD'S 
NEXT DECADE: AN ASSESSMENT OF EMERGING CHALLENGES AND STATUTORY NEEDS''

=======================================================================

                                (118-21)

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

                                 OF THE

                              COMMITTEE ON
                   TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION
                               __________

                             JUNE 21, 2023
                               __________

                       Printed for the use of the
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
             
                  [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]             


     Available online at: https://www.govinfo.gov/committee/house-
     transportation?path=/browsecommittee/chamber/house/committee/
                             transportation
                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
                    
52-867 PDF                 WASHINGTON : 2023   
             
             
             
             COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

             Sam Graves, Missouri, Chairman
             
Eric A. ``Rick'' Crawford, Arkansas   Rick Larsen, Washington,
Daniel Webster, Florida                 Ranking Member
Thomas Massie, Kentucky		      Eleanor Holmes Norton,               
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania		 District of Columbia
Brian Babin, Texas                    Grace F. Napolitano, California
Garret Graves, Louisiana	      Steve Cohen, Tennessee      
David Rouzer, North Carolina	      John Garamendi, California 
Mike Bost, Illinois		      Henry C. ``Hank'' Johnson, Jr.,      
Doug LaMalfa, California  	         Georgia
Bruce Westerman, Arkansas	     Andre Carson, Indiana
Brian J. Mast, Florida		     Dina Titus, Nevada
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,	     Jared Huffman, California
  Puerto Rico			     Julia Brownley, California
Pete Stauber, Minnesota		     Frederica S. Wilson, Florida
Tim Burchett, Tennessee		     Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Dusty Johnson, South Dakota	     Mark DeSaulnier, California
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey,	     Salud O. Carbajal, California
  Vice Chairman			     Greg Stanton, Arizona,
Troy E. Nehls, Texas 		       Vice Ranking Member
Lance Gooden, Texas		     Colin Z. Allred, Texas
Tracey Mann, Kansas		     Sharice Davids, Kansas
Burgess Owens, Utah		     Jesus G. ``Chuy'' Garcia, Illinois
Rudy Yakym III, Indiana		     Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Lori Chavez-DeRemer, Oregon	     Seth Moulton, Massachusetts
Chuck Edwards, North Carolina        Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts
Thomas H. Kean, Jr., New Jersey	     Marilyn Strickland, Washington
Anthony D'Esposito, New York	     Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Eric Burlison, Missouri		     Patrick Ryan, New York
John James, Michigan		     Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska
Derrick Van Orden, Wisconsin	     Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Brandon Williams, New York	     Val T. Hoyle, Oregon
Marcus J. Molinaro, New York	     Emilia Strong Sykes, Ohio
Mike Collins, Georgia		     Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan
Mike Ezell, Mississippi		     Valerie P. Foushee, North Carolina
John S. Duarte, California
Aaron Bean, Florida

                                                                                                               
                                ------                                7

        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation

                   Daniel Webster, Florida, Chairman
Brian Babin, Texas                   Salud O. Carbajal, California,
Brian J. Mast, Florida                 Ranking Member
Jenniffer Gonzalez-Colon,            John Garamendi, California
  Puerto Rico                        Chris Pappas, New Hampshire
Jefferson Van Drew, New Jersey       Jake Auchincloss, Massachusetts
Mike Ezell, Mississippi, Vice        Mary Sattler Peltola, Alaska
    Chairman                         Hillary J. Scholten, Michigan,
Aaron Bean, Florida                    Vice Ranking Member
Sam Graves, Missouri (Ex Officio)    Rick Larsen, Washington (Ex 
                                         Officio)

                                CONTENTS

                                                                   Page

Summary of Subject Matter........................................     v

                 STATEMENTS OF MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE

Hon. Daniel Webster, a Representative in Congress from the State 
  of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
  Maritime Transportation, opening statement.....................     1
    Prepared statement...........................................     3
Hon. Rick Larsen, a Representative in Congress from the State of 
  Washington, and Ranking Member, Committee on Transportation and 
  Infrastructure, opening statement..............................     3
    Prepared statement...........................................     5
Hon. Jake Auchincloss, a Representative in Congress from the 
  Commonwealth of Massachusetts, opening statement...............     6

                               WITNESSES

Admiral Steven D. Poulin, Vice Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, oral 
  statement......................................................     8
    Prepared statement...........................................     9
Cary Coglianese, J.D., M.P.P., Ph.D., Chair, Committee for a 
  Study on New Coast Guard Authorities, National Academies of 
  Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine, oral statement............    13
    Prepared statement...........................................    14
Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, U.S. 
  Government Accountability Office, oral statement...............    22
    Prepared statement...........................................    24

[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


                             June 16, 2023

    SUMMARY OF SUBJECT MATTER

    TO:      LMembers, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    FROM:  LStaff, Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime 
Transportation
    RE:      LSubcommittee Hearing on ``Review of the National 
Academy of Sciences Report `The Coast Guard's Next Decade: An 
Assessment of Emerging Challenges and Statutory Needs' ''
_______________________________________________________________________


                               I. PURPOSE

    The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 
of the Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure will hold 
a hearing on Wednesday, June 21, 2023, at 10:00 a.m. ET in 2253 
Rayburn House Office Building to receive testimony on ``Review 
of the National Academy of Sciences Report `The Coast Guard's 
Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and Statutory 
Needs'.'' The Subcommittee will hear testimony from the United 
States Coast Guard (Coast Guard or Service), the Chair of the 
National Academy of Sciences Report, and the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO).

                             II. BACKGROUND

    The Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act of 
2020 directs the Coast Guard to enter into an agreement with 
the National Academy of Sciences to prepare an assessment on 
emerging issues that require Coast Guard action, a description 
of the potential limitations of current Coast Guard authorities 
to address current or emerging issues, and recommendations on 
adjustments or additions to Coast Guard authorities that could 
be made to address deficiencies.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ William M. Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2021, Pub. L. No. 116-283, 134 Stat. 4672, available at 
https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/house-bill/6395/text.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The National Academy of Sciences formed a 12-person 
committee and consulted with current and former members of the 
Coast Guard, industry stakeholders, and others to develop the 
conclusions outlined in the report, which was completed in May 
2023.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine, Coast 
Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and Statutory 
Needs 186 (2023), available at https://nap.nationalacademies.org/
catalog/27059/the-coast-guards-next-decade-an-assessment-of-emerging-
challenges-and-statutory-needs [hereinafter NAS Report].
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                          III. STUDY FINDINGS

CHALLENGES OVER THE NEXT DECADE

    Over the coming decade, a changing environment, 
technological innovation, and global strategic competition are 
predicted to be the most significant external factors impacting 
the Coast Guard's critical missions \3\. Based on these 
external drivers, below are the ten foreseeable developments 
identified by the report that will impact the Coast Guard's 
missions over the next decade: \4\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ NAS Report, supra note 2, at 36.
    \4\ Id. at 35
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    1) LAutonomous Systems: As these systems become more common 
place, the Coast Guard is expected to confront challenges 
regarding the regulation of these systems and account for 
crewing requirements that may differ from traditional vessels. 
Additionally, the Coast Guard must develop best practices to 
prevent nefarious uses and cyber intrusions, and account for 
additional workforce training, development, and certifications 
required to operate these systems. The Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 2023, which has been marked up by the 
Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, directs the 
Coast Guard to conduct a report on the establishment of an 
unmanned systems capabilities office and establishes a National 
Advisory Committee on Autonomous Systems to support the Coast 
Guard's efforts in this area.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, H.R. 2741, 118th Cong. 
(2023), available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/
house-bill/2741/text.

    2) LCybersecurity Risk: Cyber intrusions pose a serious 
safety risk to our Nation's ports and vessels under way, and 
also threaten to disrupt the supply chain. One of America's 
largest ports, the Port of Los Angeles, faces approximately 40 
million cyber-attacks per month.\6\ Given the disastrous 
potential posed by such threats, the Coast Guard needs to treat 
the risk of cyber-attack with the same vigilance as physical 
attacks, by improving its capability to protect against them. 
Congress and the Committee are directing the Coast Guard to 
better prepare for cyber-attacks by passing critical 
legislation. For example, last year, the Don Young Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 2022 directed the Coast Guard to make 
available public tools and resources to help maritime 
stakeholders confront cyber threats.\7\ Additionally, the Coast 
Guard Authorization Act of 2023 strengthens the ability of the 
Coast Guard to confront cyber-attacks at ports.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Sam Fenwick, Cyber-attacks on Port of Los Angeles have doubled 
since pandemic, BBC News, (July 22, 2022), available at https://
www.bbc.com/news/business-62260272.
    \7\ James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2023, Pub. L. No. 117-263, 136 Stat. 4024, available at https://
www.congress.gov/bill/117th-congress/house-bill/7776/text.
    \8\ Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, supra note 5.

    3) LCommercial Spaceflight Operations: As commercial space 
operations increase, the Coast Guard will have a greater 
responsibility in mitigating maritime navigational risks around 
launch zones. For example, the regulation of autonomous 
maritime technology will be crucial as companies such as 
SpaceX, expand their use of autonomous vessels as platforms to 
collect boosters upon reentry. Given this, it is possible that 
as those safety zones expand outside of the United States' 
exclusive economic zone, the Coast Guard could be confronted 
with new challenges regarding the regulation of maritime 
activity around launch and recovery zones.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ NAS Report, supra note 2, at 78.

    4) LOffshore Wind Energy: The Biden Administration has set 
a goal of deploying 30 gigawatts of offshore wind-generated 
electricity by 2030.\10\ As these projects develop, increased 
vessel traffic arising from offshore wind construction and 
operations may impact the safety of navigation. The Coast Guard 
will be charged with balancing the needs of multiple maritime 
stakeholders while simultaneously ensuring that safe navigation 
is preserved for all users. To date, the Coast Guard has failed 
to adequately move forward its Atlantic Coast Port Access Route 
Study--a key milestone in ensuring safe navigation in the area. 
The Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023 directs the Coast 
Guard to finalize its rulemaking on the study by the end of the 
year.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Fact Sheet: Biden-Harris Administration Continues To Advance 
American Offshore Wind Opportunities, The White House (2023), available 
at https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2023/
03/29/fact-sheet-biden-harris-administration-continues-to-advance-
american-offshore-wind-opportunities/.
    \11\ Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, supra note 5.

    5) LAquaculture: While the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) has the primary federal role in 
regulating aquaculture, the Coast Guard has the responsibility 
to deploy aids to navigation around aquaculture facilities.\12\ 
As the number of aquaculture facilities grows over the coming 
years, the Coast Guard will be charged with assessing the 
impacts to navigational safety in a greater number of areas.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ NAS Report, supra note 2, at 92.

    6) LThe Arctic Domain: Vessel traffic through the Arctic 
region is expected to increase, straining the Service's ability 
to conduct its navigation, safety, environmental and other 
critical missions.\13\ The Coast Guard represents the United 
States within international bodies governing the region and, as 
the only government entity with icebreaking capabilities, also 
serves as the Nation's first responder in the region.\14\ The 
Coast Guard suffers from inadequate infrastructure in the 
region, including its icebreaking capability.\15\ The Coast 
Guard is currently in a recapitalization campaign to replace 
its aged icebreaker fleet with three Polar Security 
Cutters.\16\ Additionally, the Coast Guard Authorization Act of 
2023 authorizes the Coast Guard to acquire a commercially 
available icebreaker to help the Service fill the capability 
gap until new ice breakers come online towards the end of the 
decade.\17\ The report notes that the Coast Guard is also 
expected to require increased infrastructure in the region, as 
well as better navigational charts to increase domain awareness 
in the region.\18\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Id. at 94.
    \14\ Id. at 95.
    \15\ Id. at 95.
    \16\ Cong. Research Serv., RL34391, Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: 
Polar Security Cutter: Background and Issues for Congress (2023), 
available at https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/. R/RL3439.
    \17\ Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2023, supra note 5.
    \18\ NAS Report, supra note 2, at 95.

    7) LShip Decarbonization: As the maritime sector works to 
meet its decarbonization goals, the industry is exploring 
various methods and fuels. The report notes that to date, no 
single approach to reducing carbon in the maritime sector has 
shown signs of dominance.\19\ As industry explores and adopts 
various approaches to address ship decarbonization, the Coast 
Guard will be challenged with evaluating and regulating these 
new decarbonization methods.\20\ The Coast Guard will also be 
challenged with recruiting and training personnel capable of 
conducting the necessary reviews and promulgating the necessary 
guidance for these new technologies.\21\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Id. at 105.
    \20\ Id. at 105.
    \21\ Id. at 111.

    8) LDisasters: Over the coming decade, the report projects 
that severe weather is expected to increase in severity and 
frequency, straining Coast Guard capabilities to adequately 
respond to natural and environmental disasters.\22\ This will 
require the Coast Guard to account for increased demands for 
its services and capabilities, including the ability to surge 
operations.\23\ The Coast Guard will also have to account for 
impacts to its own facilities and strengthen resiliency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Id. at 111.
    \23\ Id. at 114.

    9) LMigration: In the coming years, the Coast Guard will be 
further strained by increasing migration numbers. The report 
found that in 2021, the number of undocumented migrants seeking 
to enter the United States through maritime routes was twice 
the number attempting to enter in 2019 and 2020.\24\ The Coast 
Guard will need to continue to monitor major migration triggers 
and maintain a surge capability to shift resources to address 
migration surges.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Id. at 117.

    10) LIllegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) Fishing: 
The report notes that illegal fishing accounts for up to 20 
percent of the global fish catch, harming local fisheries and 
fisherman who are operating lawfully.\25\ The Coast Guard 
currently monitors and addresses illegal fishing, but will need 
to improve its data collection, work with Non-Governmental 
Organizations, and deploy assets to areas where they will be 
most effective.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Id. at 120.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

RECOMMENDATIONS

    In general, the Coast Guard was found to have broad 
statutory authority, which sufficiently empowers the Service to 
carry out its mission. However, with respect to autonomous 
systems and limitations on spaceflight related safety zones, 
expected developments over the coming years may necessitate 
changes to current statutes. Below is a summary of proposed 
legislative changes outlined in the report: \26\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Id. at 161.

------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Likely Action                     Summary Assessment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Autonomous systems: Regulatory              Amend statutory manning
                                             requirements (or authorize
                                             waivers to them) to allow
                                             the Coast Guard to approve,
                                             as appropriate, fully
                                             autonomous vessels.
 
Commercial spaceflight activity:            Weigh statutory and
 Mitigating and responding to risks          international law
                                             limitations on the Coast
                                             Guard's authority to
                                             establish safety zones that
                                             are binding on foreign-
                                             flagged vessels in the
                                             exclusive economic zone.
 
Cybersecurity risk: Regulatory updates      Consider possible amendments
                                             to the Maritime
                                             Transportation Security Act
                                             and the Magnuson Act to
                                             parallel recent changes to
                                             the Ports and Waterways
                                             Safety Act clarifying that
                                             the Coast Guard has
                                             authority to address
                                             cyberincidents.
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    The report also recognizes that as mission demand in the 
Coast Guard grows, statutory authority alone is insufficient 
without the Service having adequate assets, infrastructure, and 
workforce to carry out its critical missions.\27\ Aside from 
aging assets, a growing challenge is the Coast Guard's 
personnel deficit, which is predicted to continue in the coming 
years, putting further strain on the Service's ability to 
effectively conduct operations.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \27\ NAS Report, supra note 2, at 167.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, as the Service continues to confront an ever-
developing environment of changing threats and evolving mission 
capabilities, the report recommends that the Service strengthen 
its strategic foresight and planning by implementing best 
practices, which will aid the Coast Guard in continuing to 
succeed in its critical missions.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Id. at 168.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

                             IV. WITNESSES

     LAdmiral Steve Poulin, Vice Commandant, United 
States Coast Guard
     LDr. Cary Coglianese, Chair, National Academy of 
Sciences Report, `The Coast Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment 
of Emerging Challenges and Statutory Needs'
     LMs. Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security 
and Justice, Government Accountability Office

 
 REVIEW OF THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT ``THE COAST GUARD'S 
NEXT DECADE: AN ASSESSMENT OF EMERGING CHALLENGES AND STATUTORY NEEDS''

                              ----------                              


                        WEDNESDAY, JUNE 21, 2023

                  House of Representatives,
                    Subcommittee on Coast Guard and
                           Maritime Transportation,
            Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:07 a.m., in 
room 2253 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Daniel Webster 
(Chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. The Subcommittee on Coast Guard and 
Maritime Transportation will come to order.
    I ask unanimous consent that the chairman be authorized to 
declare a recess at any time during the hearing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    And I ask also unanimous consent that Members who are not 
on the subcommittee be permitted to sit in on the subcommittee 
at today's hearing and ask questions.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As a reminder to the Members, to insert documents into the 
record, please email them to [email protected].
    So, I recognize myself for 5 minutes for an opening 
statement.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL WEBSTER OF FLORIDA, CHAIRMAN, 
    SUBCOMMITTEE ON COAST GUARD AND MARITIME TRANSPORTATION

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Today, we will receive testimony on 
the National Academy of Sciences report entitled ``The Coast 
Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and 
Statutory Needs.''
    I would like to welcome our distinguished witnesses: 
Admiral Steve Poulin, Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard; Dr. 
Cary ``Coglaneesi'' [phonetic]? Is that right?
    Mr. Coglianese. ``Collaneese'' [phonetic].
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Close----
    Mr. Coglianese [interposing]. I have been called every name 
in the book.
    Mr. Webster of Florida [continuing]. Who is the chair of 
the National Academy of Sciences panel that authored this 
study; and Heather MacLeod, Director of Homeland Security and 
Justice at the Government Accountability Office.
    The Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act of 
2020 directed the Coast Guard to enter into an agreement with 
the National Academy of Sciences to assess the emerging issues 
that require Coast Guard action over the next decade and 
provide recommendations on what adjustments they may need to 
support the Coast Guard's efforts to confront these issues.
    The National Academy of Sciences consulted with current and 
former members of the Coast Guard, industry stakeholders, and 
others to develop the conclusions outlined in the report, which 
was delivered to the committee last month.
    Dr. Coglianese, I thank you and the other authors for the 
study and your diligent work.
    Over the next decade, several external factors, including 
the advent of new technologies such as autonomous marine 
systems and global strategic competition--driven largely by 
China's aggressive posture in the Pacific--will challenge the 
Coast Guard's capabilities and require the Service to adapt to 
a changing mission set.
    While this study found that the Coast Guard's current 
authorities are sufficient to confront most of these 
challenges, Congress will need to continuously monitor the 
statutory authorities necessary for the Service to carry out 
these missions, particularly with regard to autonomous systems 
and the regulation of maritime safety zones for spaceflights 
and other emerging uses of the maritime domain.
    As the Coast Guard confronts these new challenges, it must 
recognize that as mission demand grows, it must be realistic 
about the necessary assets, infrastructure, and workforce 
needed to carry out its mission.
    It goes without saying that with growing manpower 
shortages, an increased shoreside infrastructure backlog, and a 
completely defective procurement process, the Coast Guard has a 
lot of work to do in order to meet the increasing mission 
demands the Service will see over the next decade.
    To all the witnesses participating today, I look forward to 
your candid discussion of how the Coast Guard will confront 
this challenging landscape.
    I want to briefly mention another issue. The Coast Guard is 
working with the Federal Railroad Administration, Brightline, 
Florida East Coast Railway, and mariners on a new bridge permit 
that allows the St. Lucie bridge to meet the statutory 
requirements that it does not unreasonably obstruct marine 
navigation while also not restricting rail, freight, and 
passenger commerce in Florida.
    I commend the Coast Guard for these efforts and encourage 
you to continue to work toward a solution that accommodates all 
users of the St. Lucie bridge and its bridge crossings.
    Probably the best solution is a new bridge. St. Lucie 
bridge is more than a century old. Rail officials have plans 
for a new bridge that would increase the vertical and 
horizontal clearances, allowing more than 90 percent of the 
marine traffic to pass under the bridge while it is in the down 
position. The increase in horizontal clearance will allow boats 
to pass one another in both directions. The increase in 
vertical clearance obviates the need for most bridge openings.
    There are a number of infrastructure grant programs that 
are available, and we will see--it kind of goes back to the 
days when I was in the Florida Senate and helped create similar 
programs at the State level.
    [Mr. Webster of Florida's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
    Prepared Statement of Hon. Daniel Webster of Florida, Chairman, 
        Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation
    Today, our Subcommittee will receive testimony on the National 
Academy of Sciences Report entitled ``The Coast Guard's Next Decade: An 
Assessment of Emerging Challenges and Statutory Needs.''
    I'd like to welcome our distinguished witnesses--Admiral Steve 
Poulin, Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard; Dr. Cary Coglianese, Chair 
of the National Academy of Sciences panel that authored the study; and 
Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, Government 
Accountability Office (GAO).
    The Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2020 
directed the Coast Guard to enter into an agreement with the National 
Academy of Sciences to assess the emerging issues that will require 
Coast Guard action over the next decade and provide recommendations on 
what adjustments will be needed to support the Coast Guard's efforts to 
confront these issues.
    The National Academy of Sciences consulted with current and former 
members of the Coast Guard, industry stakeholders, and others to 
develop the conclusions outlined in the report, which was delivered to 
the Committee last month. Dr. Coglianese, I want to thank you and the 
other authors of the study for your diligent work.
    Over the next decade, several external factors, including the 
advent of new technologies such as autonomous marine systems and global 
strategic competition--driven largely by China's aggressive posture in 
the Pacific--will challenge the Coast Guard's capabilities and require 
the Service to adapt to a changing mission set.
    While the study found that the Coast Guard's current authorities 
are sufficient to confront most of these challenges, Congress will need 
to continuously monitor the statutory authorities necessary for the 
Service to carry out its missions--particularly with regard to 
autonomous systems and the regulation of maritime safety zones for 
space flights and other emerging uses of the maritime domain.
    As the Coast Guard confronts these new challenges, it must 
recognize that as mission demand grows, it must be realistic about the 
necessary assets, infrastructure, and workforce needed to carry out its 
mission.
    It goes without saying that with growing manpower shortages, an 
increasing shoreside infrastructure backlog, and a completely defective 
procurement process, the Coast Guard has a lot of work to do in order 
to meet the increasing mission demands the Service will see over the 
next decade.
    To all our witnesses--thank you for participating today. I look 
forward to a candid discussion on how the Coast Guard will confront 
this changing landscape.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, now I would like to recognize--
well, I will go with Mr. Larsen, I guess, for 5 minutes of 
comments.
    You are recognized.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICK LARSEN OF WASHINGTON, RANKING 
     MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND INFRASTRUCTURE

    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you, Chair. And I am glad 
we are having this important hearing.
    Before we start, I want to take a moment to recognize the 
ongoing operation the U.S. Coast Guard and Navy are conducting, 
as well as partner nations, in search of the lost dive 
submersible Titan. My heart breaks for the passengers on board 
as well as their families, and I remain yet hopeful that the 
Coast Guard and their partners will turn this into a successful 
mission.
    Now, the National Academy of Sciences report before us 
today highlights areas where the Coast Guard will likely grow 
over the next decade and recognizes that Congress must increase 
funding to ensure the Service is ready for the future.
    While much of today's hearing will be focused on ensuring 
the Coast Guard has the authority to address new maritime 
technology and developments, we must also acknowledge the 
current mission and resource needs of the Service. While the 
Coast Guard may already have the authority to act, it cannot 
remain mission-ready if it lacks resources, funding, and 
personnel.
    Climate change is humanity's next great challenge. Climate 
change results in rising sea levels, extreme weather events, 
and unpredictable environmental conditions. These challenges 
require our immediate attention and concerted effort to ensure 
the safety and security of our Nation's coastlines, waterways, 
and maritime interests.
    As guardians of the Nation's coasts, the Coast Guard has 
the duty to adapt and respond effectively to shifting maritime 
activity. By adequately resourcing the Coast Guard, we protect 
lives and property and ensure the Service remains mission-
ready.
    The melting Arctic presents new challenges and 
opportunities as well. As polar ice recedes, new shipping 
routes emerge, resulting in opening avenues for maritime 
commerce. However, these routes also introduce a range of 
security and environmental concerns.
    As lead Federal agency in the Arctic, the Coast Guard must 
bolster capabilities to ensure the safety and protection of 
these vulnerable waters. This includes enhancing icebreaking 
capabilities, investing in modern infrastructure, and expanding 
the surveillance and response capabilities to tackle potential 
incidents and emergencies.
    Furthermore, port and vessel decarbonization is an 
important opportunity in maritime operations. As we move to a 
greener future, the Coast Guard must stay ahead of the curve in 
supporting and enforcing emissions regulations, promoting clean 
energy adoption, and developing new technologies to reduce the 
carbon footprint of vessels. This protects our environment 
while positioning the U.S. maritime industry to lead in the 
development and deployment of sustainable maritime practices on 
a global scale.
    We need to invest in the Coast Guard's capabilities, 
ensuring it has the resources, personnel, and equipment to 
address emerging threats and demands. These investments include 
sufficient funding for research and development, acquisition of 
advanced technologies, and training programs that enable our 
Coast Guard personnel to adapt to evolving mission 
requirements.
    The Coast Guard must continue to prioritize innovation and 
the development of cutting-edge technologies. Through research 
and development initiatives, we can find innovative solutions 
to the challenges at hand.
    By embracing emerging technologies such as unmanned systems 
and renewable energy resources, we can enhance the Coast 
Guard's capabilities while reducing our environmental impact.
    By enhancing these authorities to meet evolving mission 
demands, we ensure the safety and security of our coastlines, 
protect the environment, and position the Coast Guard and the 
U.S. maritime industry as leaders in maritime operations and 
sustainability.
    The Coast Guard needs the necessary tools, authorities, and 
resources to address these challenges. Our actions today will 
help shape the future of our coastal communities, our maritime 
industries, and the well-being of our planet for generations.
    So, I hope today we can have a productive, bipartisan 
discussion on how to better position our Coast Guard for the 
future.
    Thank you, and I yield back.
    [Mr. Larsen of Washington's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Hon. Rick Larsen of Washington, Ranking Member, 
             Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure
    Thank you, Chair Webster. I am glad we are having this important 
hearing.
    Before we start, I'd like to take a moment to recognize the ongoing 
operation being conducted by the U.S. Coast Guard and the U.S. Navy as 
well as partner nations in search of the lost dive submersible Titan. 
My heart breaks for the passengers on board as well as their families 
but I remain hopeful that the Coast Guard and their partners will turn 
this into a success mission.
    The National Academies of Sciences report before us today 
highlights areas where the Coast Guard will likely grow over the next 
decade and recognizes that Congress must increase funding to ensure the 
Service is ready for the future.
    While much of today's hearing will be focused on ensuring the Coast 
Guard has the authority to address new maritime technology and 
developments, we must also acknowledge the current mission and resource 
needs of the Service. While the Coast Guard may already have the 
authority to act, it cannot remain mission ready if it lacks resources, 
funding and personnel.
    Climate change is humanity's next great challenge. It results in 
rising sea levels, extreme weather events and unpredictable 
environmental conditions. These challenges require our immediate 
attention and a concerted effort to ensure the safety and security of 
our nation's coastlines, waterways and maritime interests.
    As the guardians of our nation's coasts, the Coast Guard has the 
duty to adapt and respond effectively to shifting maritime activity. By 
adequately resourcing the Coast Guard, we not only protect the lives 
and property of our citizens but ensure that the Service remains 
mission ready.
    The melting Arctic presents new challenges and opportunities. As 
the polar ice recedes, new shipping routes emerge, opening avenues for 
maritime commerce. However, these routes also introduce a range of 
security and environmental concerns.
    As the lead federal agency in the Arctic, the Coast Guard must 
bolster capabilities to ensure the safety and protection of these 
vulnerable waters. This includes enhancing icebreaking capabilities, 
investing in modern infrastructure and expanding surveillance and 
response capabilities to tackle potential incidents and emergencies.
    Furthermore, port and vessel decarbonization is an important 
opportunity in maritime operations. As we move to a greener future, the 
Coast Guard must stay ahead of the curve in supporting and enforcing 
emissions regulations, promoting clean energy adoption and developing 
new technologies to reduce the carbon footprint of our vessels. This 
protects our environment while positioning the U.S. maritime industry 
to lead in the development and deployment of sustainable maritime 
practices on a global scale.
    We need to invest in the Coast Guard's capabilities, ensuring it 
has the necessary resources, personnel and equipment to address 
emerging threats and demands. This includes sufficient funding for 
research and development, acquisition of advanced technologies and 
training programs that enable our Coast Guard personnel to adapt to 
evolving mission requirements.
    The Coast Guard must continue to prioritize innovation and the 
development of cutting-edge technologies. Through research and 
development initiatives, we can find innovative solutions to the 
challenges at hand.
    By embracing emerging technologies, such as unmanned systems and 
renewable energy sources, we can enhance the Coast Guard's capabilities 
while reducing our environmental impact.
    By enhancing the Coast Guard's authorities to meet evolving mission 
demands, we ensure the safety and security of our coastlines, protect 
the environment and position the Coast Guard and the U.S. maritime 
industry as leaders in maritime operations and sustainability.
    The Coast Guard must be equipped with the necessary tools, 
authorities and resources to address these critical challenges. Our 
actions today will help shape the future of our coastal communities, 
maritime industries and the well-being of our planet for generations to 
come.
    I hope today we can have a productive, bipartisan discussion on how 
to better position our Coast Guard for the future.
    Thank you and I yield back.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. I recognize today's ranking member, 
Mr. Auchincloss, for 5 minutes.

  OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAKE AUCHINCLOSS OF MASSACHUSETTS

    Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chair Webster.
    I also would like to begin by acknowledging the Coast 
Guard's ongoing search and rescue efforts out of Boston to find 
the submersible that went missing near the wreck of the 
Titanic. Our thoughts are with the missing and their families 
and with the men and women of the Coast Guard and their allied 
services who continue to search for them.
    Every mission the Coast Guard conducts will change or 
expand in the coming decade as climate change causes more 
severe weather, which complicates search and rescue and 
compounds shoreside infrastructure maintenance.
    Melting sea ice is opening new shipping lanes. Supporting 
our allies in the Pacific demands more Coast Guard resources. 
Increasing cyber attacks require a new type of Coastie. And new 
offshore spaceflight and wind activity will be important 
opportunities to expand the Coast Guard's role in facilitating 
climate and commercial innovation.
    To be ready for the future, the Coast Guard must 
continuously evaluate resource allocation, clearly state its 
funding requirements, and demonstrate its ability to steward 
its funding strategically and efficiently.
    I want to thank the National Academies for their work on 
the report prompting today's hearing, titled ``The Coast 
Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and 
Statutory Needs.'' Their report identifies 10 issues that will 
require Coast Guard foresight, additional resources, and, in 
some cases, additional authority. I would like to touch upon 
several of these issues as well as the recommendations.
    There are few industrial sectors as innovative as 
commercial spaceflight. Over the past 5 years, commercial space 
launches and reentries have more than doubled, and that number 
will only grow. The Coast Guard's role in commercial 
spaceflight is to ensure safety in the maritime domain. That 
responsibility becomes vital during a reentry landing at sea on 
maritime vessels.
    To ensure safety, the Coast Guard establishes safety zones 
to limit or restrict vessel traffic around a landing site. The 
Coast Guard, however, does not have the authority to establish 
safety zones beyond 12 nautical miles. The National Academies 
appropriately flagged this issue, and Congress must consider 
extending the Coast Guard's authority.
    The proliferation of offshore wind is another critical area 
to examine. I completely support President Biden's goal of 
reaching 30 gigawatts of offshore wind by 2030, as many of my 
colleagues on T&I are probably aware. To ensure we can reach 
this goal, the Coast Guard must work to facilitate access and 
navigation, ensure that vessels are safe in these areas, and 
allow offshore wind to thrive.
    While the Service has the requisite authority, it must act 
promptly regarding regulatory decisions and prepare for the 
increased demand on search and rescue, response, and security 
so that we can meet the President's ambitious climate and clean 
energy goals.
    In conclusion 3, the National Academy states that, quote, 
``The Coast Guard . . . needs the sustained vision, resources, 
and leadership commitment to meet future challenges,'' end 
quote. I have full confidence in Admiral Fagan's vision and the 
commitment of Coast Guard leadership.
    I am, however, concerned with Congress' obligation to 
provide necessary funding. As some of my colleagues continue to 
call for a return to 2022 funding, I want to be clear about the 
impact that would have on the Coast Guard.
    As we saw in 2019, when Coasties were forced to go without 
pay, the Coast Guard is not protected by the Department of 
Defense funding umbrella.
    Funding levels from 2022 for the Coast Guard would mean 
fewer maritime drug interdictions, which means more fentanyl in 
all of our districts.
    Funding levels from 2022 would mean significant delays in 
the construction of Polar Security Cutters, of which Russia has 
nearly 50 and the United States has 1.
    Funding levels from 2022 would mean reduced search and 
rescue capacity, resulting in more deaths on the water.
    Funding levels from 2022 would mean fewer Coast Guard 
operations in the Pacific, where our adversaries continue to 
add capacity and our allies need Coast Guard support.
    Our Coasties deserve better, and our country needs better.
    Every mission the Coast Guard undertakes is critical, and 
the report before us today makes clear that increased resources 
are needed to address emerging developments.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses today and 
learning more about the future of the Coast Guard.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. I would like to say that we are 
really appreciative of the witnesses appearing today, and thank 
you for coming. I look forward to hearing your testimony.
    If you have not had the lighting system explained, it is 
pretty simple. Green means keep talking, yellow means slow it 
down, and red means stop, time to quit. So, those happen 
automatically. You don't have to worry about them. It just is 
there.
    So, I ask unanimous consent that the witnesses' full 
statements be included in the record.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    As your written testimony will be made part of the record, 
the committee asks that you limit your remarks to 5 minutes.
    With that, Admiral Poulin, you are recognized for 5 minutes 
for your testimony.

 TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL STEVEN D. POULIN, VICE COMMANDANT, U.S. 
   COAST GUARD; CARY COGLIANESE, J.D., M.P.P., Ph.D., CHAIR, 
COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY ON NEW COAST GUARD AUTHORITIES, NATIONAL 
 ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE; AND HEATHER 
    MacLEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE, U.S. 
                GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

 TESTIMONY OF ADMIRAL STEVEN D. POULIN, VICE COMMANDANT, U.S. 
                          COAST GUARD

    Admiral Poulin. Good morning, Chairman Webster, Ranking 
Member Larsen, Representative Auchincloss, and distinguished 
members of the subcommittee.
    Before I get into my statement, I just want to extend our 
thoughts and prayers to those missing on the submersible Titan 
and their families.
    I have had a chance to talk, over the last several days, 
with the operational commanders representing the unified 
command in Boston, and they are doing everything that they can 
to locate and rescue those who are missing.
    Again, our thoughts and prayers are with them and their 
families during this difficult period.
    Sir, thank you for the opportunity to testify today and for 
your continuing support of the United States Coast Guard.
    And thank you to the members of the National Academy of 
Sciences committee, chaired by Dr. Coglianese, for their 
professionalism and the tremendous work that went into the 
report.
    I also would like to express my sincere gratitude to Ms. 
Heather MacLeod and her colleagues at the Government 
Accountability Office for their collaboration.
    Congress has provided the Coast Guard with adequate 
authority to respond to nearly all the challenges that we will 
face in the coming decade. However, the National Academy of 
Sciences study identified that gaps exist in the Service's 
authority pertaining to autonomous systems and commercial 
spaceflight.
    The Coast Guard acknowledges that we lack clear authority 
to adequately regulate fully autonomous vessels or to establish 
safety zones in the U.S. exclusive economic zone with respect 
to commercial space operations that are binding on foreign-flag 
vessels.
    Even so, we are taking the strongest action possible under 
our existing authorities. The National Defense Authorization 
Act for fiscal year 2023 includes an at-sea recovery operations 
pilot program. This will advance our understanding of the 
actions we must take to ensure the safe navigation of 
autonomous and remotely operated vessels in the Nation's 
waters.
    Similarly, we are 1 year into a 2-year pilot program to 
establish safety zones for space activities and offshore energy 
development in the U.S. EEZ. We are analyzing the impact, if 
any, that these safety zones have on maritime traffic.
    For both autonomous vessels and offshore energy, we will 
continue to work in concert with the International Maritime 
Organization to ensure alignment with customary international 
law.
    Autonomous systems are but one issue that challenges the 
Coast Guard in an ever-changing maritime environment. The Coast 
Guard's responsibility to maintain a safe and secure Marine 
Transportation System includes addressing threats in 
cyberspace, our newest operational domain. To this end, the 
Coast Guard is working with the Department of Homeland Security 
to strengthen established maritime security regulations for 
vessels and shoreside waterfront facilities.
    Cybersecurity is not the only emerging threat in the 
maritime domain. Unmanned aircraft systems pose a physical 
threat to vessels and critical port infrastructure. It is 
crucial that the Department of Homeland Security's existing 
authority, from which the Coast Guard derives its counter-UAS 
operations, does not expire. Without renewal, DHS will lose 
this authority on September 30, 2023.
    To meet the demands of these emerging missions, the further 
development of an agile and adaptable Coast Guard workforce is 
the Commandant's highest priority. We would greatly benefit 
from more flexible authority to involuntarily recall Coast 
Guard Reserve forces to support planned operations. Current 
authority limits involuntary recall to a Presidential 
declaration or an emergency condition.
    Now, I understand that Chairman Graves recently introduced 
a related amendment to the forthcoming National Defense 
Authorization Act to that end. And I thank him and I thank this 
committee for their advocacy on this critical issue.
    It is an exciting time to be in the Coast Guard. We are 
preparing the Service for the future. Empowered by the 
tremendous support that we enjoy here in Congress and by this 
subcommittee and in coordination with international bodies like 
the International Maritime Organization, the Coast Guard will 
achieve mission excellence, and we will leverage all existing 
authorities, and we will seek new authorities when necessary.
    I want to extend my thanks again to the National Academy of 
Sciences for their incredible work.
    Chairman, I appreciate the opportunity to testify, and I 
look forward to answering the questions of the subcommittee.
    Thank you, sir.
    [Admiral Poulin's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
 Prepared Statement of Admiral Steven D. Poulin, Vice Commandant, U.S. 
                              Coast Guard
                              Introduction
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and distinguished 
Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify and 
for your continuing support of the United States Coast Guard. I look 
forward to discussing the findings and recommendations from the 
National Academy of Sciences' study of U.S. Coast Guard authorities and 
the emerging challenges our Service is likely to face over the next 
decade.
    I thank the National Academy of Sciences and the study committee 
chaired by Dr. Cary Coglianese for their professionalism and for the 
tremendous amount of work that went into this study. I am grateful to 
the numerous subject matter experts who contributed to this important 
research.
    As the world's premier, multi-mission, maritime service responsible 
for the safety, security, and stewardship of the Nation's waters, the 
Coast Guard offers a unique and enduring value to the American public. 
At all times a military service and branch of the U.S. Armed Forces, a 
federal law enforcement agency, a first responder, a regulatory body, 
and a member of the U.S. Intelligence Community, the Coast Guard serves 
on the front lines for a Nation whose economic prosperity and national 
security are inextricably linked to the sea.
    The study found that Congress has provided the Coast Guard adequate 
authority to respond to nearly all anticipated issues that will 
challenge the Service in the next decade; however, it identified that 
the Coast Guard does not currently have sufficient authorities 
pertaining to autonomous systems and commercial space flight. 
Furthermore, the study found the Coast Guard's authorities related to 
cybersecurity are not explicitly included in relevant statutes.
    The Coast Guard is prepared to work with the Administration and 
then Congress to review the findings and develop or modify authorities 
as necessary to deal with the rapid pace of global technological, 
geopolitical, and climate change effectively and to prepare the Service 
for tomorrow's challenges.
    We must adapt mission support capabilities, particularly data 
management, asset procurement, and workforce development, and 
strengthen our strategic planning to further the Nation's maritime 
safety, security, and prosperity.
                           Autonomous Vessels
    The study identifies as a deficiency the inability of the Coast 
Guard to approve or adequately regulate fully autonomous vessels. The 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 (NDAA) includes 
an At-Sea Recovery Operations Pilot Program. This pilot program will 
further our understanding of what is required to ensure the safe 
navigation of autonomous and remotely operated vessels in Federal 
waters. Lessons learned from this pilot program will inform future 
Coast Guard and legislative decision-making regarding autonomous and 
remote-controlled vessels.
    In March 2023, the Coast Guard released our Unmanned Systems 
Strategic Plan. This document lays out three lines of effort, the 
second of which is to ``establish a prevention and response framework 
essential to facilitate the safe use of remotely operated and 
autonomous vehicles and systems in the Marine Transportation System.'' 
As the study notes, increased use of fully autonomous and remotely 
controlled vessels introduces risk into the Marine Transportation 
System (MTS). These risks include navigation and collision avoidance, 
cybersecurity issues, and unpredictable artificial intelligence (AI) 
system failures. The Service is taking a prudent approach towards 
regulating fully autonomous vessels in Federal waters that optimizes 
the opportunities inherent with such technologies and ensures safe and 
equitable use of our Nation's maritime resources for all our 
stakeholders. The Coast Guard is working with Federal, State, local, 
tribal, and industry stakeholders to that end, while being mindful that 
any solution must be developed in accordance with the International 
Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea and in concert with the 
International Maritime Organization (IMO).
                      Commercial Space Operations
    The study also outlines limitations in the Coast Guard's ability to 
establish spaceflight-related safety zones that are binding on foreign 
flagged vessels inside of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The 
Coast Guard leverages traditional authorities vested in the Captain of 
the Port to support space launch and reentry activities. However, 
outside U.S. territorial seas, these authorities generally apply only 
to U.S. flagged vessels and are not applicable to foreign flagged 
vessels.
    Since 2016, the number of space launches and reentry activities has 
steadily increased each year to a total of 84 in 2022. As of May 22, 
2023, there have been 40 licensed launches and reentries in 2023, and 
NASA anticipates between 90 and 100 launches in total, by the end of 
the year. The FAA forecasts as many as 186 launches per year by 2026.
    The Elijah E. Cummings Coast Guard Authorization Act of 2020 
required the Coast Guard to conduct a two-year pilot program to 
establish and implement safety zones to address space activities and 
offshore energy development activities in the EEZ. Although the pilot 
program will not be complete until next year, preliminary review 
indicates safety zones cause minimal impact to commercial shipping 
because they are located offshore, away from congested port entrances, 
and are in effect for short durations. We are conducting further 
analysis of the impacts to commercial fishing where traditional fishing 
areas are located within offshore safety zones.
    The authority to establish and enforce safety zones in the EEZ 
directly supports the United States' Space Priorities Framework and 
contributes to safety in the MTS while strengthening U.S. strategic 
needs in space-based operations. The Coast Guard continues to explore 
this issue with the Administration and in close consultation with the 
IMO to ensure that the United States continues to respect the 
principles of freedom of navigation guaranteed by customary 
international law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea.
                                 Cyber
    The study recommends Congress consider amending the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA) and the Magnuson-Stevens Act to 
align with recent changes in the Ports and Waterways Safety Act. 
Existing MTSA authorities do not differentiate the threat source, 
whether cyber or physical. Using these authorities, we have required 
MTSA facilities to assess and document cyber vulnerabilities and 
address these vulnerabilities in their Facility Security Plans. Within 
the bounds of our MTSA authority, we are also working with the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency (CISA) to update established maritime security 
regulations to strengthen cybersecurity requirements for both 
facilities and vessels.
    In August 2021, the Coast Guard published a Cyber Strategic Outlook 
outlining three lines of effort: (1) Defend and Operate the U.S. Coast 
Guard Enterprise Mission Platform, (2) Protect the MTS, and (3) Operate 
In and Through Cyberspace. The Coast Guard is operationalizing MTS 
cyber risk management at the port level. We verify that port facilities 
and vessels conduct cybersecurity risk assessments, develop security 
plans to address cyber risks, and report cyber incidents. The Coast 
Guard established three Cyber Protection Teams. Each team has three 
deployable Mission Elements trained to Department of Defense (DoD) 
standards and are interoperable with DHS and DoD cyber forces. Cyber 
Protection Teams support Captains of the Port by responding to cyber 
incidents and assessing critical infrastructure cybersecurity. Coast 
Guard Captains of the Port leverage existing Area Maritime Security 
Committees and Harbor Safety Committees to evaluate port-wide cyber 
risks, share threat information, participate in joint exercises, and 
report and respond to cyber-attacks when needed.
                            Data Management
    The Study highlights the criticality of data management and 
analysis to Coast Guard mission support capabilities. The DHS Chief 
Privacy Officer partners with our Coast Guard Privacy Office to advise 
on data management initiatives. To sharpen our competitive edge as an 
organization, the Coast Guard formally established the Office of Data & 
Analytics (CG-ODA) led by the Service's first Chief Data and Artificial 
Intelligence Officer on September 1, 2022. CG-ODA's mission is to 
accelerate the advancement of data and analytics, AI, and machine 
learning to increase business efficiency and mission effectiveness 
across the Coast Guard, while appropriately safeguarding privacy and 
civil liberties. To do so, CG-ODA is building an adaptable data 
governance framework to collect data in accordance with law; protect 
privacy, civil rights, and civil liberties; manage data responsibly; 
secure data effectively; and share data effortlessly, and is 
identifying and nurturing the skills required to cultivate a data-
literate workforce.
                              Procurement
    The study recommends Congress ensure the Coast Guard has the 
statutory authority to keep pace with emerging technological trends by 
acquiring state-of-the-market assets. In 2022, Congress provided the 
Coast Guard authority to use other transaction agreements (OTA) to 
operate, test, and acquire cost effective technology to meet the 
mission needs of the Coast Guard.
                               Workforce
    As noted in the study, recruiting, training, and retaining a 
technically proficient workforce is integral to successfully executing 
Coast Guard missions. The Commandant's highest priority is modernizing 
the Coast Guard's talent management system, which has not significantly 
changed in 75 years, to best recruit and retain a 21st century 
workforce. To achieve this priority, we are deploying innovative 
recruiting practices; revolutionizing talent management policies; 
developing individually tailored, on-demand, and modernized learning; 
and delivering point of need healthcare and family services.
    In May 2022, the Coast Guard established an Incident Management 
Team (IMT) that focuses Service-wide resources on three lines of effort 
to bolster recruiting efforts: generate more leads, improve the 
recruiting process, and increase recruiting capacity and performance. 
To generate more leads the Service upgraded messaging and recruiting 
logos and is surging marketing efforts into non-traditional media 
spaces. To improve the recruiting process and correspondingly increase 
capacity, the Coast Guard aligned accession standards with the DoD 
while also adding recruiting offices and a recruiting call center.
    Retention of Coast Guard members is essential to conduct and 
support missions around the globe. The Coast Guard's Workforce Planning 
Teams (WPTs) monitor and evaluate the total active duty, reserve, and 
civilian workforce to identify trends, assess gaps, and provide 
recommendations for policy modifications, as well as monetary and non-
monetary interventions to ensure the Coast Guard is best positioned to 
meet future needs. The WPTs carefully consider organizational and 
programmatic equities and risks to optimize Service readiness. To 
maintain a competitive edge, the Coast Guard must continue 
modernization efforts for personnel management and family support 
services.
    The Coast Guard continues to enhance the workforce's quality of 
life through improved support programs. We modified assignment policies 
to better facilitate the co-location of dual military families, 
increased parental leave, and expanded the childcare fee assistance 
subsidy program. The Service also continues to improve healthcare 
service and access to care for its workforce and their families by 
expanding access to telehealth services, offering online appointment 
scheduling, migrating to electronic health records, and offering 
expansions to key health services such as physical therapy and 
behavioral health services.
    Still, issues persist regarding access to affordable housing and 
healthcare, especially for members stationed at units far from 
concentrations of personnel and family support services. Recent 
phenomena, like the proliferation of short-term rental properties, 
place financial constraints on service members forced to rent or buy 
housing on the private market, where costs outpace adjustments in Basic 
Allowance for Housing. Furthermore, some Coast Guard families must stay 
overnight in hotels for routine medical care, with specialty care often 
requiring multi-night stays. We are working to remove these hardships.
    We are also seeking additional authority to allow the Coast Guard 
to commit Reserve Forces to foreseeable operations to augment the 
Active Duty workforce. Currently, the Secretary of Homeland Security 
has Title 14 authority to involuntarily recall reservists for emergency 
augmentation for limited durations. This is in addition to applicable 
Title 10 authorities to involuntarily recall reservists during war, 
national emergencies, or following a Presidential authorization for a 
named operational mission or an emergency involving weapons of mass 
destruction or a terrorist attack. In March 2023, the Service provided 
a legislative change proposal to Congress proposing authority for the 
Commandant to involuntarily activate reservists for preplanned 
operations that are not conditioned on an emergency.
                      Strategic Foresight Planning
    Project Evergreen, the Coast Guard's strategic foresight program, 
was chartered in 2002 to ``infuse the Service with strategic intent.'' 
Operating in four-year cycles, Project Evergreen now includes a 
facilitated strategic foresight gaming and workshop series that yields 
insights which are incorporated into enterprise strategies and 
implementation frameworks. Project Evergreen prepares current and 
rising Service leaders to fulfill national imperatives despite future 
uncertainty by inculcating strategic thinking and perspectives across 
long-range planning and short-term operations.
    A necessary corollary to Service-wide strategic resilience is 
regulatory and statutory foresight to empower the Coast Guard with 
appropriate tools to meet national needs. Thus, the study's 
recommendation to add legal foresight into the Evergreen process is 
aligned with our strategic intent for the program and will be 
incorporated into future Evergreen experiences where possible.
                               Conclusion
    The Coast Guard has broad authorities to meet the demands of an 
uncertain future influenced by geopolitical conflict, rapid 
technological change, and an increasingly dynamic climate. We are 
committed to working with DHS, the Administration, and Congress to 
preserve the Service's existing authorities and secure any additional 
authorities needed to provide enduring value to the American public.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and thank you for 
your continued support of the United States Coast Guard. I look forward 
to your questions.

    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you, Admiral.
    So, next, we have Mr. Coglianese.
    You are recognized for 5 minutes.

   TESTIMONY OF CARY COGLIANESE, J.D., M.P.P., Ph.D., CHAIR, 
COMMITTEE FOR A STUDY ON NEW COAST GUARD AUTHORITIES, NATIONAL 
        ACADEMIES OF SCIENCES, ENGINEERING, AND MEDICINE

    Mr. Coglianese. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Webster, 
Ranking Member Larsen, and Representative Auchincloss, and 
members of the subcommittee. I appreciate the opportunity to 
testify about the recent National Academy of Sciences report.
    I am a law professor at the University of Pennsylvania, and 
I served as the chair of the study committee that developed the 
report. The report is the product of extensive information-
gathering and deliberation by 12 committee members. And, 
personally, it has been a distinct privilege to work with my 
colleagues on this study.
    I also want to offer my personal appreciation to Admiral 
Poulin and to the thousands of military and civilian personnel 
of the Coast Guard who serve the Nation so admirably every day. 
Over the course of our study, we benefited from much input from 
the Coast Guard. We also consulted with more than 50 outside 
experts.
    The committee's charge, which originated in legislation 
passed by Congress, focused on having us determine the adequacy 
of the Coast Guard's statutory authority over the next 10 
years. This meant the study had a sweeping scope.
    The Coast Guard faces a range of future challenges driven 
by climate change, technological innovation, and global 
strategic competition. The academy's study investigated 10 
major emerging issues, and the committee identified nearly 
three dozen types of actions needed to respond to these 
emerging challenges.
    The bottom line is that the Coast Guard has the authority 
it needs to respond to most foreseeable challenges, but we 
found two limited exceptions to this general conclusion, and we 
saw one additional area where statutory change, while not 
absolutely essential, may be prudent. Let me highlight each.
    First, autonomous vessels. The Coast Guard here has 
authority to do much, but even when fully autonomous vessels 
are shown to be safe enough for general use, the Coast Guard 
will be unable to authorize unmanned or uncrewed vessels, 
because current statutes call for vessels to have watchmen and 
pilots on board.
    A recent congressionally authorized pilot program does 
allow waivers for uncrewed vessels in commercial space 
operations, but at some point--and we are not there yet--
Congress may need to act to provide some modification of these 
statutory requirements or at least to give the Coast Guard 
general authority to waive them as appropriate.
    Second, with respect to commercial space operations, the 
Coast Guard again has much authority, but as these operations 
move farther out into the sea, the Coast Guard lacks statutory 
authority to impose binding safety orders on foreign-flag 
vessels.
    Now, the limitation on statutory authority, though, has a 
parallel in international law, which protects freedom of 
navigation. And so, too, I hasten to add there are 
international law counterparts with respect to the issue of 
fully autonomous vessels. International conventions contain 
manning requirements similar to those in U.S. statutory law. As 
a result, congressional action on either of these issues will 
need to be coordinated with international legal standards.
    With respect to a third development--cybersecurity--
prudence may dictate statutory change. Current statutes are 
broad enough to cover cyber attacks, but, with Congress in 2021 
amending the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to affirm that it 
encompasses cyber incidents, now may be the time for Congress 
to do the same for other maritime security statutes.
    Overall, except for these three issues, the study committee 
concluded that the Coast Guard generally possesses the 
statutory authority it needs. But that authority alone is not 
enough. To meet the future challenges, the Coast Guard must 
enhance its mission support capabilities too, including the 
ability to manage and analyze data, to nimbly produce and 
procure needed technology, and to maintain workforce readiness.
    The Coast Guard is working on these issues, but 
congressional action will be needed too, not only to provide 
the necessary resources but also potentially to adjust certain 
management-related statutory provisions. We urge further 
exploration by the Coast Guard and Congress of these issues.
    Finally, because the Coast Guard must remain vigilant and 
ready to adapt, the Service will continue to benefit from its 
well-known Evergreen process. It is vital that strategic 
foresight be given a high priority and be institutionalized as 
a continuous process.
    At the same time, the Coast Guard should build legal 
analysis into its strategic planning too. Legal foresight by 
the Coast Guard can help Congress ensure that the Service has 
what it needs to confront future challenges with agility and 
efficacy.
    In conclusion, I wish to thank the subcommittee for the 
opportunity to testify, and I look forward to any questions.
    [Mr. Coglianese's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
  Prepared Statement of Cary Coglianese, J.D., M.P.P., Ph.D., Chair, 
    Committee for a Study on New Coast Guard Authorities, National 
            Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today 
to testify about the recently issued National Academy of Sciences, 
Engineering, and Medicine (NASEM) committee report on ``The Coast 
Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and Statutory 
Needs.'' Congress requested this report to identify emerging issues 
that are likely to demand U.S. Coast Guard action over the next decade 
and then to assess whether the Service's existing statutory authority 
will be sufficient to meet these future demands.
    I served as the chair of the NASEM committee that developed this 
report. By way of additional background, I am also the Edward B. Shils 
Professor of Law at the University of Pennsylvania, where I serve as 
the Director of the Penn Program on Regulation. I am also currently a 
Senior Fellow of the Administrative Conference of the United States. 
The focus of my research and teaching throughout my career has been on 
administrative law and government regulation, with an emphasis on the 
empirical evaluation of alternative regulatory processes and strategies 
and the role of public participation, technology, and business-
government relations in regulatory policymaking.
    Although I am before you today owing to my service as the chair of 
the NASEM study committee that led to the report I will be describing, 
that report is the product of extensive information-gathering, 
deliberation, and ultimately consensus among the eleven other expert 
colleagues who served as members of the committee, to which I wish to 
give great credit and my many thanks: Admiral Thad W. Allen, U.S. Coast 
Guard (retired); James-Christian B. Blockwood, Partnership for Public 
Service; Annie Brett, University of Florida; Vice Admiral Sally Brice-
O'Hara, U.S. Coast Guard (retired); Martha R. Grabowski, Le Moyne 
College and Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute: Donald Liu, American 
Bureau of Shipping (retired) and member of the National Academy of 
Engineering; Wen C. Masters, MITRE Corporation; Rodrigo Nieto-Gomez, 
Naval Postgraduate School; Sean T. Pribyl, Holland & Knight LLP; Vice 
Admiral Sandra Stosz, U.S. Coast Guard (retired); and Rear Admiral 
David W. Titley, U.S. Navy (retired) and RV Weather.
    As part of the committee's efforts to gather information over the 
course of the more than 17-month period of the study, we benefited 
greatly from several public meetings at which we heard from senior 
leadership of the U.S. Coast Guard, including from the Commandant at 
the time the study commenced (Admiral Karl L. Schultz, now retired) and 
later from the current Commandant (Admiral Linda L. Fagan). We also 
benefited from extensive written input from responses to questions we 
posed to the Coast Guard as well as from consultations at numerous 
other meetings with more than 50 experts from outside the Coast Guard, 
including representatives from maritime shipping and other maritime-
related industries, other government agencies in the United States and 
abroad, nongovernmental organizations, experts in technology, policy, 
and maritime law, and experts in strategic foresight and forecasting. 
The committee's penultimate report also underwent a rigorous, 
independent review process involving 12 outside peer reviewers, all in 
accordance with NASEM's customary procedures.
    In a nutshell, the NASEM study's principal results can be distilled 
into the following four points:
    1.  The Coast Guard will face new or increasing challenges in the 
coming decade from climate change, technological and industry 
innovation, and global strategic competition.

    2.  The study committee investigated 10 specific and foreseeable 
developments that will present the Coast Guard with new or increasing 
challenges. Across these developments, the committee identified a total 
of 34 different types of actions that the Coast Guard will likely need 
to take in response.

    3.  The committee concluded that the Coast Guard likely has 
sufficient statutory authority to take the needed actions in all but 
two instances, namely with respect to specific actions related to 
autonomous vessels and commercial space development. In a third 
instance--with respect to cybersecurity--the committee did not view new 
authority as essential but did note that statutory change may be 
prudent.

    4.  Even with adequate statutory authority, the Coast Guard will 
need sufficient mission support capacities and capabilities, such as 
with respect to data management, technology acquisition, and workforce 
development, if it is to meet the challenges of tomorrow. 
Prioritization of strategic foresight will also be needed, and legal 
foresight analysis should be systematically incorporated into the Coast 
Guard's ongoing planning for the future.

    In my testimony today, I will describe the scope and process of our 
study--that is, what we were tasked to do and what we did--and then I 
will turn to explaining in greater detail our conclusions and 
recommendations.
                        Study Scope and Process
    The NASEM study was originally called for in Section 8249 of the 
William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for 
Fiscal Year 2021. That legislation directed the Coast Guard to 
commission an ``assessment of Coast Guard Authorities'' that was based 
on ``(1) an examination of emerging issues that may require Coast Guard 
oversight, regulation, or action; (2) a description of potential 
limitations and shortcomings of relying on current Coast Guard 
authorities to address emerging issues; and (3) an overview of 
adjustments and additions that could be made to existing Coast Guard 
authorities to fully address emerging issues.'' The emerging issues 
encompassed in the legislation were those ``reasonably likely to occur 
within 10 years.''
    Pursuant to this legislation, the Coast Guard tasked NASEM with 
conducting a study of ``emerging issues that are likely to demand Coast 
Guard services over the next decade and consider whether the Service's 
existing statutory authorities are sufficient to meet this demand, and 
if not, where the Service's authority could be expanded to do so.'' The 
committee was specifically tasked with considering ``changes in 
technological capabilities, industry trends, cybersecurity risks, 
climate and environmental conditions, and geopolitical factors that 
could affect governance and activities in the maritime domain.'' 
Although the statement of task emphasized that the committee should 
focus on the Coast Guard's statutory authority to address these 
emerging issues, it also called for the committee to consider ``related 
abilities'' that the Coast Guard would need to respond to the 
identified developments over the next decade.
    In accord with these directions, the NASEM study aimed to assess 
the adequacy of the Coast Guard's statutory authority to address 
challenges arising under its existing missions over the next ten years. 
The committee sought to identify those emerging issues or foreseeable 
developments that, as noted in the statement of task, ``it believes are 
likely to have the greatest relevance to and effect on the Coast 
Guard's missions.'' The study was thus not intended as an overall 
strategic re-assessment of the roles and missions of the Coast Guard. 
Moreover, given Section 8249's emphasis on the Coast Guard's statutory 
authority to engage in ``oversight'' and ``regulation,'' as well as 
limitations deriving from the lack of access to classified information, 
the committee did not engage in systematic inquiry of military actions 
in response to armed conflicts that could potentially arise in the 
coming decade. The committee was, however, attentive to national 
security considerations in full recognition of the Coast Guard's 
valuable and essential law enforcement, intelligence, and military 
responsibilities. Finally, in keeping with the study's statement of 
task, the committee focused on statutory authority and not the design 
of Coast Guard regulations or other legal issues.
    Within these parameters, the statement of task called for a 
sweeping inquiry. To address the fundamental question of the Coast 
Guard's potential statutory authority needs, the committee first needed 
to determine which foreseeable developments might hold ``greatest 
relevance'' over the next decade to the Coast Guard's numerous 
missions--whether as an emergency responder, a maritime law enforcer, a 
manager of waterways, a defender of maritime safety and security, or a 
protector and steward of the environment. Next, the committee sought to 
identify what potential actions the Coast Guard would likely need to 
take in fulfilling these missions in response to the foreseeable 
developments. Only then was the committee able to assess whether the 
Coast Guard's existing statutory authority would permit it to undertake 
these likely actions. The figure at the top of the next page, excerpted 
from the committee's report, illustrates the three-step approach the 
committee took to fulfill its study task.

                 Figure: NASEM Study Committee Approach
                 
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]


    Based on the committee's engagement with Coast Guard officials and 
other experts, as well as the committee members' own experience and 
judgment, we identified 10 foreseeable developments that the Coast 
Guard is likely to confront in the coming years. These 10 developments 
are:
      Autonomous systems;
      Cybersecurity risk;
      Commercial spaceflight operations;
      Offshore wind energy;
      Aquaculture;
      The Arctic domain;
      Ship decarbonization;
      Disasters;
      Migration; and
      Illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing.

    To inform the committee's assessment of these developments, we 
sought direct input on each from the Coast Guard as well as independent 
experts. Some of these developments present challenges already facing 
the Coast Guard but which will only grow in significance in coming 
years. Others represent new challenges that are only starting to become 
discernible.
    For each of these 10 foreseeable developments, the committee 
identified a range of actions--34 in total--that the Coast Guard would 
likely need to take in response, such as issuing regulations, 
conducting or expanding operations, and improving monitoring and 
oversight. (See the Appendix to this testimony for a chart from the 
NASEM report that lists each of the types of actions considered.) 
Having identified the types of actions the Coast Guard will likely need 
to take to address the 10 foreseeable developments, the committee then 
considered whether existing statutes provide the Coast Guard with 
sufficient authority to undertake the identified actions over the next 
decade.
    In the next section of my testimony, I detail the committee's 
principal findings with respect to statutory authority. But before 
turning to the committee's conclusions and recommendations, five 
additional clarifications of the study's scope will be helpful to keep 
in mind.
    First, although the committee judged the 10 foreseeable 
developments listed above as ones having greatest relevance to the 
Coast Guard's missions in the coming decade, the committee makes no 
claim that these are all the important issues that the maritime domain 
will confront in this time period. As the committee's report makes 
plain, we cannot rule out ``new, unforeseen scenarios.'' Moreover, 
plenty of existing and longstanding challenges confronting the Coast 
Guard are unlikely to disappear even as new challenges emerge.
    Second, although the committee addressed each of the 10 foreseeable 
developments separately in its report, they are unlikely to manifest as 
entirely separate and distinct problems. As the report notes, the 
effects of these developments on the Coast Guard's missions ``are 
likely to be additive and generative.'' By way of illustration, 
consider how a cybersecurity breach could lead an autonomous vessel to 
damage an offshore energy platform. It seems undeniable that, as the 
committee notes, ``[e]ach of the 10 developments could produce 
incidents or phenomena that occur simultaneously or in quick 
succession.''
    Third, the scope of the committee's legal analysis was necessarily 
conducted at a high level, with the aim of identifying glaring gaps or 
priority areas needing additional attention. A more complete legal 
analysis of the Coast Guard's many existing authorities would need to 
delve into greater detail with respect to any of the issues considered 
by the committee. The study committee's task had been defined in terms 
of breadth rather than depth, in light of the number of major issues 
likely to confront the Coast Guard in the coming decade. As a result, 
the study focused on general types of actions that the Coast Guard will 
likely need to take, even though firm legal conclusions ultimately 
depend on specifics. Developing those specific details for any new 
action might well demand its own separate study. We did not, for 
example, make any determinations about the specific design or content 
of any new Coast Guard regulations that may be needed to address safety 
concerns related to autonomous vessels.
    Fourth, even though the committee was charged with assessing 
questions of statutory authority, this does not mean that statutory 
authority questions will be the only legal questions facing the Coast 
Guard in the coming decade. As noted in the report, and discussed 
further below, some important legal questions will arise under 
international law. Even other important domestic law questions, such as 
those involving potential federal-state conflicts, fell outside the 
scope of this study of statutory authority.
    Finally, as much as adequate statutory authority is a necessary 
prerequisite for the Coast Guard to respond effectively to future 
challenges, such authority will hardly be sufficient. The committee 
highlighted three ``foundational'' capacities and capabilities that 
Congress and the Coast Guard must together ensure are further developed 
and maintained: data management, government contracting, and workforce 
readiness. These core capacities and capabilities are discussed further 
in the next part of this testimony after a review of the study 
committee's conclusions and recommendations on statutory authority.
                    Conclusions and Recommendations
    Major forces such as climate change, technological innovation, and 
global economic and political competition are driving change in the 
maritime domain and presenting new challenges to the Coast Guard. 
Meeting these challenges will necessitate that the Coast Guard take a 
broad range of actions in response to foreseeable developments over the 
coming decade. The NASEM committee reached key conclusions and 
recommendations about the Coast Guard's statutory authority to take 
these actions. Just as importantly, it reached conclusions and 
recommendations about the Coast Guard's need for strong and nimble 
mission support capacities and capabilities. Finally, it also offered 
conclusions and recommendations about the Coast Guard's need for 
integrating strategic foresight, along with legal analysis, into 
ongoing planning and decision-making.
Statutory Authority
    For each of the 34 actions identified in the study, the committee 
considered questions such as the following: Does the action clearly 
fall under the Coast Guard's existing authority? Is the action 
specifically precluded under existing law? Are there obvious instances 
where authority to act is missing, insufficient, unduly restricted, or 
substantially in need of clarification?
    In general, the study committee answered these questions by 
concluding that ``the Coast Guard possesses sufficient statutory 
authority that can be exercised to allow it to respond to most 
developments foreseeable in the maritime domain over the next decade.'' 
As the committee report further notes, ``[f]or an agency with so many 
vital responsibilities, the Coast Guard is already bestowed with much 
statutory authority to act, including authority that affords the Coast 
Guard latitude to take a wide range of actions, both existing and 
new.''
    The Coast Guard's extensive authority notwithstanding, the range of 
developments and the number of likely actions needed to respond to them 
made it not unreasonable to inquire whether the Coast Guard might need 
some new or modified authority for at least some types of actions. 
After methodically addressing 34 actions need to respond to the 10 
foreseeable developments, the study committee found that ``[i]n only a 
few instances did the committee find reason to suspect that existing 
authority could have limited or questionable applicability to the kinds 
of future actions the Coast Guard will likely need to take over the 
next decade.'' In particular, the Coast Guard likely lacks sufficient 
statutory authority ``to respond fully'' with specified actions with 
respect to two of these developments: autonomous vessel technology, and 
commercial space operations. For a third development--cybersecurity 
risks--the committee concluded that the Coast Guard already possesses 
sufficient authority to take all the likely actions needed; however, 
the committee also noted that it might nevertheless be prudent for 
Congress to consider clarifying that the Service's general security 
authority also includes authority specifically to address cyber 
incidents. Together, these three areas deserving of additional 
congressional attention are summarized in Table 1 below, which is 
excerpted from the committee's report.

           Table 1: Three Candidates for Legislative Attention
------------------------------------------------------------------------
               Likely Action                     Summary Assessment
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Autonomous systems: Regulatory              Amend statutory manning
                                             requirements (or authorize
                                             waivers to them) to allow
                                             the Coast Guard to approve,
                                             as appropriate, fully
                                             autonomous vessels.
 
Commercial spaceflight activity:            Weigh statutory and
 Mitigating and responding to risks          international law
                                             limitations on the Coast
                                             Guard's authority to
                                             establish safety zones that
                                             are binding on foreign-
                                             flagged vessels in the
                                             exclusive economic zone.
 
Cybersecurity risk: Regulatory updates      Consider possible amendments
                                             to the Maritime
                                             Transportation Security Act
                                             and the Magnuson Act to
                                             parallel recent changes to
                                             the Ports and Waterways
                                             Safety Act clarifying that
                                             the Coast Guard has
                                             authority to address
                                             cyberincidents.
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the committee's report makes clear, even with respect to 
autonomous vessels and commercial space operations, the Coast Guard 
possesses sufficient authority to take most needed actions. It is 
simply that, as indicated below, without further legal change the Coast 
Guard could find itself constrained to take some specific actions that 
may be needed to address facets of these developments.
    Autonomous systems. When it comes to autonomous vessels, it is 
important to note that the degree of autonomy can vary from mere 
decision support for the onboard crew to a full level of autonomy that 
would made it possible for a vessel to operate without any human crew 
on board. For most of these levels of autonomy, the Coast Guard will 
have sufficient authority to address safety concerns that may arise for 
vessels operating with this new technology. As the committee report 
notes:

        The Coast Guard has a broad range of statutory authorities 
        intended for safety at sea, including those related to vessel 
        operation, safety management systems, navigation, and design 
        and engineering. These authorities will likely allow the Coast 
        Guard to address most regulatory needs for autonomous systems, 
        such as perhaps even by eventually creating a comprehensive 
        regulatory regime that addresses a range of issues presented by 
        these systems.

    Nevertheless, the committee concluded that the Coast Guard will 
likely find its authority constrained with respect to taking action 
that would allow fully autonomous, uncrewed vessels to operate in the 
marine transportation system (MTS). As noted in the report, ``manning 
requirements for vessels currently call for human operators to be on 
board all vessels and may thus limit the Coast Guard's ability to 
approve, as appropriate, vessels that use autonomous systems in lieu of 
an onboard crew.''
    Currently, federal statutory law requires that ``vessels propelled 
by machinery or carrying passengers shall have a licensed master'' and 
``shall be under the direction and control of a pilot'' with ``a 
suitable number of watchmen.'' As these so-called manning requirements 
contemplate human personnel being present on vessels, it would seem to 
require statutory change for the Coast Guard to allow the operation of 
uncrewed vessels. Congress has authorized, of course, the Coast Guard 
to grant limited waivers from these manning requirements, but so far 
only with respect to one specific use of autonomous technology: 
uncrewed vessels used for at-sea recovery of components of commercial 
space vehicles. At some point in the coming decade, uncrewed autonomous 
vessel technology may have demonstrated sufficient safety to justify 
its more widespread general use. For this reason, the NASEM committee 
recommended that the Coast Guard and Congress continue to monitor this 
technology as well as assess whether, at an appropriate time, to lift 
statutory ``constraints on the ability of the Coast Guard to approve 
vessels that use fully autonomous systems in lieu of an onboard crew.''
    Commercial space operations. Over the last five years, commercial 
space launches and reentries in the maritime domain have more than 
doubled. The Coast Guard has already taken a host of regulatory actions 
to protect safety and security of waterways during periods of space 
operations, including by establishing hundreds of safety zones at 
varying times every year. The Coast Guard possesses sufficient 
statutory authority to establish these safety zones for all vessels in 
U.S. territorial waters and for U.S.-flagged vessels even outside of 
territorial waters. But as commercial space operations move farther to 
sea, the Coast Guard lacks the authority to impose binding safety 
orders on the operation of foreign-flagged vessels outside of 
territorial waters. At present, the Coast Guard can only provide non-
enforceable safety warnings to such foreign-flagged vessels operating 
outside territorial waters. The committee concluded:

        Limitations on the authority to establish spaceflight-related 
        safety zones that are binding on foreign-flagged vessels in the 
        exclusive economic zone (EEZ) may impede the Coast Guard's 
        ability to protect both those vessels and commercial 
        spaceflight operations in the EEZ.

    It is imperative to note, though, that these two limitations on the 
Coast Guard's statutory authority--both for commercial space operations 
as well as autonomous vessel technology--have corresponding constraints 
in international law. With respect to autonomous vessels, for example, 
several international maritime conventions include manning requirements 
similar to those reflected in U.S. legislation. And the limitation on 
the Coast Guard's authority to impose mandatory safety zones on 
foreign-flagged vessels outside of U.S. territorial waters derives as 
much from international law's protection of the freedom of navigation 
as it does from a lack of statutory authority. It is for this reason 
that the committee did not recommend any specific legislative changes 
at this time, but instead simply recommended that Congress ``closely 
analyze'' these matters further. As the committee report notes, before 
making any legislative changes with respect to these two issues, 
Congress ``should carefully weigh [such changes] against U.S. adherence 
to principles of international law'' and ``consider coordinating any 
statutory changes with any changes in international legal standards.''
    Cybersecurity risk. With respect to a third foreseeable 
development--cybersecurity--the study committee noted that ``it may be 
prudent for Congress to consider making a clarifying set of changes'' 
to statutory law. Cyberattacks are increasing across all sectors of the 
economy, including in the maritime domain. In the coming years, as 
maritime transportation further relies on advanced digital systems and 
satellite navigation, the vulnerability for serious disruption to the 
MTS from cyber incidents are likely only to increase. The Coast Guard 
is already taking numerous actions to address cybersecurity risks in 
the maritime domain, including adopting regulations under the Maritime 
Transportation Security Act (MTSA). The study committee concluded that 
the Coast Guard possesses adequate authority to take necessary future 
actions under the MTSA and other relevant existing statutes. In 2021, 
however, Congress amended the Ports and Waterways Safety Act to clarify 
that this legislation does encompass the authority for the Coast Guard 
to address cyber incidents. Having made this change to one statute, it 
may be appropriate for Congress now to affirm that the MTSA and the 
Magnuson Act of 1950 also authorize the Coast Guard to take actions 
addressing cybersecurity risks.
Mission Support
    Beyond these three issues of statutory authority that merit 
congressional attention, the study committee also concluded that 
``[o]ther congressional support may be needed to strengthen the Coast 
Guard's mission support capacity and capability, ensuring that it has 
the necessary resources and authority to be nimble and effective in its 
preparation and responses.'' In other words, statutory authority alone 
will not be sufficient to meet the many demands that the Coast Guard 
will confront in the years ahead. If the Coast Guard is to meet new and 
unexpected challenges, it must strengthen three core mission support 
pillars, namely its ability to (1) manage and analyze data, (2) act 
nimbly to procure needed technology, and (3) develop and maintain a 
workforce ready and able to meet future demands.
    These three mission support capabilities and capacities will be so 
crucial to the Coast Guard's performance over the next ten years that 
the committee devoted an entire chapter in its report to detailing the 
abilities that the Service will need in each of these three areas. 
Table 2 below, taken from the committee report, illustrates the types 
of institutional capabilities addressed in the report with respect to 
each of these vital mission support pillars. The report elaborates on 
these needs in much greater detail and relays important ideas for 
strengthening each of these pillars.

       Table 2: Vital Mission Support Capacities and Capabilities
------------------------------------------------------------------------
             Foundational Area                          Needs
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Data management and analysis..............   New sources of
                                             data, management
                                             infrastructure, and
                                             analytic tools
                                             More data sharing
                                             and integration
                                             Protections for
                                             critical data and systems
 
Acquisition and procurement...............   Rapid prototyping
                                             and fielding
                                             Use and
                                             strengthening of pilot
                                             authority
                                             Multiyear funding
                                             for modernizing
 
Workforce.................................   Training and skill
                                             development for new
                                             technologies
                                             Increased scope for
                                             recruitment, hiring,
                                             retention, and contracting
                                             Flexible Reserve
                                             force deployment
------------------------------------------------------------------------

    As the committee report explains, congressional action will be 
needed not only to provide necessary fiscal resources to sustain these 
mission support functions but also potentially to make targeted 
statutory changes that can alleviate barriers or give the Coast Guard 
new management-related authorities. Although the scope of the study 
precluded the committee from fully analyzing potential statutory 
reforms related to mission support, the committee was in agreement that 
further exploration of these issues would be definitely warranted by 
both Congress and the Coast Guard. As the committee recommended:

        The Coast Guard will need the mission support capacity and 
        capabilities to meet foreseeable demands and to respond quickly 
        and effectively to developments that may not be foreseen. 
        Congress should ensure that the Coast Guard has the requisite 
        statutory authority and flexibility to (a) manage, share, and 
        analyze data; (b) procure and manage assets; and (c) support 
        and develop a workforce, all in a manner that is suited to a 
        fast-changing environment. Because the Coast Guard already has 
        many existing broad authorities for mission support, the 
        Service should continue to review the latitude afforded by 
        these existing authorities, including the procedures and 
        processes used to implement them, to make sure that the 
        authorities are being used in the most effective manner, such 
        as to update internal systems and meet evolving workforce 
        needs.

    The committee also emphasized that, ``[w]hile these three domains 
are by no means the only areas of institutional capability that matter, 
they emerged as recurring themes in the committee's gathering of 
information, and, in the committee's view, they are foundational to the 
Coast Guard's ability to respond effectively to a range of future 
demands.''
Strategic and Legal Foresight
    The NASEM study revealed more than potential gaps in the Coast 
Guard's statutory authority and renewed needs for strong mission 
support. Given the likelihood that ``the Coast Guard may well face 
other developments that are difficult if not impossible to anticipate 
now,'' the Coast Guard will need to remain vigilant and ready to adapt 
as needed to respond to all that comes its way in the next decade and 
beyond. The undeniable dynamism of the maritime domain means that the 
Coast Guard will continue to benefit from the scenario-building and 
other forecasting efforts that are part of its Evergreen process. As 
the committee concluded:

        No matter what the future holds, it behooves the Coast Guard, 
        with its many responsibilities in the vast and varied maritime 
        domain, to continue to monitor the horizon for future 
        developments and assess their likely implications on Coast 
        Guard actions, plans, and preparations.

    The committee observed that the Coast Guard's Evergreen process 
could do more to incorporate a ``wider range of strategic foresight 
methods [that] can be valuable for maximizing insights.'' The committee 
also considered ``the importance of having a dedicated institutional 
capacity for the continual execution of strategic foresight planning, 
as opposed to ad hoc, periodic exercises conducted to inform leadership 
transitions.'' Rapid flux in the maritime environment makes plain the 
need for giving strategic planning ``a high priority among the Coast 
Guard leadership.''
    At the same time, the NASEM study revealed ``the critical 
importance of building stronger connections between legal foresight and 
operational and strategic planning.'' After all, it is not just the 
operational maritime environment that is changing, but the legal 
environment can change as well, with new developments occurring in 
international law or with domestic courts changing their approaches to 
statutory interpretation. These legal changes, combined with changes in 
the operational environment, make it critical that the Coast Guard 
integrate legal foresight into its strategic planning processes. By 
``legal foresight,'' the committee means the

        regular, systematic assessment of statutory authorities to 
        ensure that they will be sufficient to allow the Coast Guard to 
        take needed actions and to build the capacity to carry them 
        out. Such legal foresight would seek to anticipate not only the 
        likely adverse impacts of foreseeable developments, but also 
        the statutory authority needs that the Coast Guard will require 
        to address them.

    Robust strategic planning, combined with legal foresight, will not 
only help the Coast Guard be better prepared for the future, but it 
will also better ensure that Congress can ``act responsively to ensure 
that the Coast Guard has the flexibility and capacity, through its 
statutory authority and other resources, that it will need to face a 
rapidly changing maritime domain with agility and efficacy.''
    Finally, the NASEM committee believes that the value from its study 
goes beyond the insights reflected in its conclusions and 
recommendations. This study and its conceptual framework also offer a 
kind of a template for future efforts at legal foresight by the Coast 
Guard itself. It shows by its example ``how to search for obvious 
instances where new and expanded Coast Guard actions may be needed--and 
then to assess whether such action might be precluded or inhibited by 
insufficient or unclear statutory authority.''

                                 * * *

    In conclusion, I wish to thank you--Chairman Webster, Ranking 
Member Carbajal, and Members of the Subcommittee--for the opportunity 
to testify before you about the NASEM committee report, ``The Coast 
Guard's Next Decade: An Assessment of Emerging Challenges and Statutory 
Needs.'' The Coast Guard has throughout its history protected the 
nation by successfully undertaking a broad and diverse array of vital 
missions that protect, among other things, maritime safety, homeland 
security, and environmental quality. These mission demands appear 
likely only to increase in significance over the coming decade. Indeed, 
precisely because the future will bring new developments and increased 
challenges calling for continued Coast Guard response, I am grateful 
for your committee's support in seeking to ensure that the Coast Guard 
will have the statutory authority and mission support capabilities it 
needs to act with agility in the face of these future challenges.
 Appendix: List of 10 Foreseeable Developments and 34 Likely Response 
                                Actions

------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Foreseeable Development             Likely Coast Guard Action
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Autonomous systems........................   Regulatory
                                             Confronting
                                             nefarious uses
                                             Adoption of
                                             autonomous technology
                                             Workforce training
                                             and development
 
Cybersecurity risk........................   Cyberincident
                                             response
                                             Collection of
                                             cyberincident data
                                             Threat sharing
                                             Regulatory updates
                                             Cyberrisk
                                             management
                                             Clarification of
                                             roles and responsibilities
 
Commercial space operations...............   Mitigating and
                                             responding to risks
 
Offshore wind energy......................   Interagency
                                             coordination
                                             Port access studies
                                             Search and rescue
                                             capabilities
                                             Navigational safety
                                             aids and security measures
 
Aquaculture...............................   Assessment of
                                             facility siting proposals
                                             Oversight and
                                             management of facilities
 
Arctic domain.............................   Regulatory action
                                             Data and data
                                             infrastructure
                                             Expanding and
                                             strengthening partnerships
 
Ship decarbonization......................   Guidance and
                                             regulatory oversight
                                             Workforce training
                                             and development
                                             Pollution incident
                                             response
                                             Emissions
                                             monitoring and reporting
                                             Engagement and
                                             collaboration
 
Disasters.................................   National response
                                             framework and contingency
                                             plans
                                             Surge operations
                                             Mobilizing Coast
                                             Guard Reserve
                                             Preparing Coast
                                             Guard facilities
 
Migration.................................   Contingency
                                             planning
 
IUU fishing...............................   Data collection,
                                             sharing, and analysis
                                             Bilateral fisheries
                                             agreements
                                             Nontraditional
                                             partnerships
                                             Force and asset
                                             deployment
------------------------------------------------------------------------


    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you, Doctor.
    Now, Ms. MacLeod, you are recognized for 5 minutes.

 TESTIMONY OF HEATHER MacLEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
         JUSTICE, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Ms. MacLeod. Thank you, Chairman Webster, Ranking Member 
Larsen, Mr. Auchincloss, and members of the subcommittee. Thank 
you for the opportunity to be here today to discuss GAO's 
recent work related to challenges the Coast Guard faces and the 
actions it should take to more effectively manage resources.
    Coast Guard's unique authorities allow it to seamlessly 
operate across missions. Ensuring that the Service has complete 
and accurate information to manage its workforce, operations, 
and assets is critical to its ability to meet mission demands.
    GAO's recent work has identified specific actions the Coast 
Guard could take to make certain that it has this needed 
information. These include collecting and assessing information 
on workforce needs, safety efforts, and infrastructure 
investments.
    Related to identifying workforce needs, we have found that 
the Coast Guard has conducted limited assessments. 
Specifically, as of March 2023, the Service reported that it 
had assessed workforce needs for just 15 percent of its units--
a process that began 20 years ago.
    One of our outstanding recommendations from this work is 
for the Coast Guard to update its workforce planning document 
with timeframes and milestones for completing these 
assessments. Fully addressing this recommendation will help 
ensure that the Coast Guard has the right number of people with 
the right set of skills to meet its mission demands.
    Although we think it is important that the Coast Guard 
continue to analyze workforce needs Servicewide, the issue 
could be particularly important for certain portions of the 
workforce. Last September, we reported on challenges the Coast 
Guard faces ensuring it has the necessary cyberspace personnel.
    We made six recommendations, including that the Coast Guard 
assess and determine its cyberspace staffing levels needed to 
meet mission demands. Fully addressing these recommendations 
could help the Coast Guard better understand the resources it 
requires, including those to protect its information systems 
and data from threats.
    Now, turning to safety information, for decades we have 
reported that the Coast Guard faces challenges maintaining an 
adequate staff of experienced marine safety personnel, 
including marine inspectors. Marine inspections help the Coast 
Guard ensure that ships are following safety, security, and 
environmental laws. But demand for vessel inspections has 
consistently exceeded the supply of inspectors.
    We made five recommendations to strengthen the Coast 
Guard's marine inspection workforce planning efforts. This 
included collecting additional data to forecast future industry 
and workforce trends.
    We have also noted that the marine inspector shortage can 
lead to delays in examinations, including to gas carriers. Gas 
carrier ships that transport liquefied natural gas and other 
products can pose safety and environmental risks because the 
cargo is highly combustible. They are required by law to be 
inspected each year.
    We recommended that the Coast Guard collect information to 
assess the benefits and risks of changing the annual inspection 
requirement. Earlier this year, the Coast Guard told us that 
this assessment is underway. Once completed, these actions 
could help the Coast Guard determine whether any changes to its 
authorities are needed.
    We have also recently reported on IT and shore 
infrastructure investments. Our work has shown that, despite 
considerable recent investments, the Service still doesn't have 
a comprehensive inventory of its technology or hasn't fully 
assessed its IT network capacity needs. Subsequently, we have 
made recommendations to the Coast Guard to improve its IT 
program implementation.
    Finally, we have found that the Coast Guard could increase 
budget transparency related to its shore infrastructure needs. 
The backlog of Coast Guard shore infrastructure projects is in 
the billions, and we have found that the Coast Guard has not 
provided Congress with accurate information about its funding 
needs and priorities.
    While the Coast Guard has a culture of making do with the 
resources it has, these backlogs pose financial, safety, and 
mission performance risks. We have recommended that the Coast 
Guard include better information in congressional budget 
requests and related reports.
    In closing, addressing our recommendations will help the 
Coast Guard improve mission execution and better manage its 
resources.
    This completes my prepared statement, and I would be 
pleased to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.
    [Ms. MacLeod's prepared statement follows:]

                                 
Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and 
             Justice, U.S. Government Accountability Office
 Coast Guard: Actions Needed To Improve Mission Execution and Resource 
                               Management
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee:
    Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on the U.S. Coast 
Guard. The Coast Guard--a multi-mission, maritime military service 
within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)--is responsible for 
conducting 11 statutory missions, such as marine safety and ports, 
waterways, and coastal security.\1\ Coast Guard personnel are 
responsible for protecting and defending more than 100,000 miles of 
U.S. coastline and inland waterways, and safeguarding an economic 
region covering 4.5 million square miles. To carry out its missions, 
the Coast Guard must use its resources in a manner that allows it to 
maintain capabilities needed to execute its missions and make necessary 
investments for the future while operating within its existing 
resources.
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    \1\ 6 U.S.C. Sec.  468(a). For further information on the Coast 
Guard's 11 missions, see appendix I. By statute, the Coast Guard is at 
all times a military service and branch of the armed forces. It is 
required to maintain a state of readiness, including when functioning 
as a specialized service in the Navy in time of war or when directed by 
the President. See 14 U.S.C.Sec. Sec.  101-103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    My statement today discusses our prior work that identified areas 
where the Coast Guard could further improve upon its efforts to carry 
out its mission and better manage its resources. This statement is 
based primarily on eight reports published from February 2019 to 
November 2022 related to the Coast Guard. It also includes selected 
updates to those reports as of June 2023 regarding Coast Guard efforts 
to address our previous recommendations. For these products and our 
selected updates, we analyzed Coast Guard documentation and interviewed 
agency officials.
    We made 39 recommendations to the Coast Guard in the reports 
covered by this statement. As of June 2023, the Coast Guard has taken 
action to fully address seven of the 39 recommendations, and 32 remain 
unaddressed. GAO continues to monitor the Coast Guard's progress in 
addressing them.
    More detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology 
for our work can be found in the issued reports listed in Related GAO 
Products at the conclusion of this statement. We conducted the work 
upon which this statement is based in accordance with generally 
accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we 
plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence 
to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 
our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 
reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives.
  Improvements Needed to More Effectively Execute Missions and Manage 
                               Resources
    While the Coast Guard has taken steps to more effectively execute 
its missions, we have identified several specific areas in our recent 
work where the Coast Guard could improve its information collection, 
use, and reporting efforts and better manage resources. Such 
improvements to mission execution are critical to the Coast Guard's 
ability to meet demands while operating within its existing resources.
      Collect and assess information related to gas carrier 
examinations. Gas carrier ships that transport liquefied natural gas 
and other products can pose safety and environmental risks because the 
cargo is highly combustible. In January 2022, we reported on challenges 
associated with the Coast Guard's examinations of gas carriers.\2\ 
Specifically, we found that the Coast Guard faces a shortage of marine 
inspectors in key sectors that conduct compliance exams for gas 
carriers, which can lead to examination delays. Representatives from 
six of nine gas carrier industry stakeholders told us that they 
sometimes experienced delays because the Coast Guard did not have gas 
carrier examiners available to conduct a compliance exam on their 
vessel. Coast Guard officials told us that because there have been no 
serious accidents involving gas carriers at U.S. ports, lowering the 
frequency of compliance exams would help address this challenge and 
free up resources to focus inspections on riskier vessels. However, the 
Coast Guard is statutorily required to conduct annual compliance exams 
for gas carriers, regardless of risk. Therefore, any changes to the 
frequency of the compliance exams would require a change in current 
law.\3\ The Coast Guard previously considered collecting information to 
assess the benefits and risks of reducing the frequency of exams but 
did not complete this effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ GAO. Coast Guard: Assessment of a Risk-Based Approach for 
Conducting Gas Carrier Exams is Needed GAO-22-105432 (Washington, D.C.: 
January 12, 2022).
    \3\ See 46 U.S.C. Sec.  3714. While conducting risk-based gas 
carrier compliance exams could generate efficiencies, the Coast Guard 
has also recognized potential consequences of such an approach. Because 
of the combustible nature of their contents, gas carriers pose safety 
and environmental risks, and a safety incident or accident could have 
dire consequences.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          We recommended that the Coast Guard conduct an assessment of 
the benefits and risks of adopting a risk-based approach for conducting 
gas carrier compliance exams and take actions to address the results, 
as appropriate and feasible. In February 2023, the Coast Guard told us 
that it had entered into contract with the National Academies of 
Science, Engineering, and Medicine to assess the effectiveness of 
adopting a risk-based approach to gas carrier examinations and that the 
study was underway. These actions to collect and effectively use 
information are consistent with our recommendation. Once completed, 
these actions should help the Coast Guard determine whether any changes 
to its authorities are appropriate and ensure that the Coast Guard is 
efficiently and effectively using its marine inspection resources.

      Fully implement statutory safety requirements for fishing 
vessels. Commercial fishing has one of the highest industry death rates 
in the U.S., according to the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Coast 
Guard efforts to promote commercial fishing vessel safety include 
conducting dockside exams, engaging with industry, and collaborating 
with other federal agencies. Since fiscal year 2011, Congress has 
enacted multiple safety requirements for commercial fishing vessels. 
These requirements directed the Coast Guard to take specific actions 
related to commercial fishing vessel safety, such as issuing 
regulations, and established vessel safety requirements that the agency 
has the authority to enforce. In November 2022, we found that the Coast 
Guard had fully implemented five of the 21 key statutory requirements 
related to commercial fishing vessel safety that were enacted from 
fiscal years 2011 through 2021.\4\ However, it had partially or not 
implemented the remaining 16 requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ At the time of our November 2022 report, the Coast Guard was 
required to implement 22 statutory requirements related to commercial 
fishing vessel safety and had partially or not implemented 17 of the 22 
requirements. However, since our report, one of the statutory 
requirements Coast Guard had not implemented was repealed. See Pub. L. 
No. 117-263, div. K, tit. CXV, Sec.  11509(a)(3), 136 Stat. 2395, 4137 
(2022). See GAO. Coast Guard: Additional Actions Needed to Improve 
Commercial Fishing Vessel Safety Efforts, GAO-23-105289 (Washington, 
D.C.: November 2, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          We also found that the Coast Guard has established strategic 
goals and performance goals for its safety program for commercial 
fishing vessels. However, it has not fully incorporated other key 
performance management practices, such as establishing performance 
goals that fully address all aspects of its strategic goals, setting 
realistic targets for its performance goals, and using performance data 
to assess progress towards program goals.
          We recommended that the Coast Guard develop a plan with time 
frames and interim milestones to fully implement the other outstanding 
statutory requirements. As of June 2023, we are waiting for additional 
information from the Coast Guard about their planned efforts to address 
this recommendation. Fully incorporating such practices could help the 
Coast Guard better assess program performance and address any 
performance issues.

      Verify vessel response plan information. The Coast Guard 
has the authority to verify certain information in vessel response 
plans, which could improve marine safety and environmental protection. 
Tankers and other large vessels are required to develop vessel response 
plans that identify contracts in place for response resource providers, 
such as oil spill removal, and salvage and marine firefighting 
services. These plans help ensure that vessel owners and operators are 
prepared to respond in a timely manner of a marine incident to protect 
lives, property, and the environment. In September 2020, we reported on 
Coast Guard efforts to assess the regulatory compliance of vessel 
response plans.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ GAO: Coast Guard: Improved Analysis of Vessel Response Plan Use 
Could Help Mitigate Marine Pollution Risk GAO-20-554 (Washington, D.C.: 
September 29, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          Specifically, we found that while the Coast Guard has 
processes to assess vessel response plans, officials stated that their 
efforts do not include verifying certain aspects of response resources 
in their plan reviews. For example, the Coast Guard does not verify 
information about the location and capability of equipment, which could 
help determine whether the vessel owners have engaged response 
resources that are able to be responsive when called upon. Coast Guard 
officials stated that they have authority to do more to verify response 
resource capability and availability. For example, they noted the Coast 
Guard could conduct verifications to validate the vessel owner's 
certification regarding response resource providers.\6\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ The regulations identify 15 selection criteria that vessel 
owners are to consider when determining the adequacy of salvage and 
marine firefighting response resource providers included in their plans 
and they are required to certify in their plans that they considered 
those factors when choosing their response resource providers. 33 
C.F.R. Sec.  155.4050.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          To improve its assessments, we recommended that the Coast 
Guard establish a process to analyze incidents where vessel response 
plans have been activated to determine whether or how the Coast Guard 
should improve its review processes--including its approach to 
verifying plan information, contracts, and the quality of data used in 
review processes. In February 2022, Coast Guard officials indicated 
that they were in the process of evaluating potential tools to 
establish ways of gathering information from real-world incidents and 
exercises involving vessels with a vessel response plan. They stated 
that they anticipated such tools and information would help confirm the 
adequacy of resources and identify potential deficiencies in vessel 
response plans that may need to be addressed by the vessel owner or 
operator.
          In April 2023, Coast Guard officials told us that the agency 
is in the final stages of revising its Marine Environmental Response 
and Preparedness Manual to reflect these changes. Officials estimated 
that the new version of the manual will likely be promulgated by 
September 2023. Developing a process for more thoroughly analyzing 
incident data to identify whether or how its review processes for 
vessel response plans should be strengthened could help the Coast Guard 
mitigate the risks identified in the review processes and provide 
greater assurance of vessel response plan effectiveness.

      Collect better vessel accident information. The Coast 
Guard has the authority to collect more information on marine 
accidents, which could help it assess the efficacy of lifesaving 
equipment and improve marine safety. In March 2021, we reported that 
the Coast Guard's vessel accident investigators are not required to 
collect information on passengers' dates of birth or potential 
disabilities, or its use of lifesaving equipment, when conducting their 
investigations.\7\ However, Coast Guard officials told us that 
collecting this information could help the service assess risk and 
identify opportunities for regulatory changes or issuing safety 
bulletins to improve marine safety. Moreover, the Coast Guard 
Authorization Act of 2016 requires that the Coast Guard report every 5 
years on the number of casualties from water immersion involving people 
with disabilities, children, and the elderly, and what impact the 
carriage of out-of-water survival craft has on improving their 
survivability.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ GAO. Coast Guard: More Information Needed to Assess Efficacy 
and Costs of Vessel Survival Craft Requirements GAO-21-247 (Washington, 
D.C.: March 31, 2021).
    \8\ Pub. L. No. 114-120, tit. III, Sec.  301(b)(1)(A), (C)(ii), 
(3), 130 Stat. 27, 50-51 (2016) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 114-328, 
tit. XXXV, subtit. A, Sec.  3503(a), 130 Stat. 2000, 2775 (2016)).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          We recommended that the Coast Guard revise its guidance for 
investigating vessel accidents to require investigators to collect date 
of birth, known disability, and use of lifesaving equipment of people 
in vessel accidents. DHS did not concur with our recommendation, noting 
that Coast Guard investigators are not required by statute or 
regulation to collect this information. In addition, DHS noted that 
investigators already collect this information on a case-by-case basis 
when it is needed for a specific investigative purpose, such as to 
determine causal factors of a vessel accident or personnel casualty. 
However, we maintain that not having of statutory or regulatory 
requirements does not prevent the Coast Guard from issuing requirements 
for its investigators to collect this information. For example, the 
Coast Guard routinely issues guidance to its personnel to take certain 
actions--such as through Commandant Instructions and Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures--and these requirements are not all outlined 
in statute and regulation. As of April 2023, DHS's position remained 
unchanged; we continue to follow up with the department on actions the 
Coast Guard may take in the future in response to our recommendation. 
By not collecting this information, the Coast Guard cannot fully assess 
the efficacy of lifesaving equipment.

      Identify workforce needs. The Coast Guard has conducted 
limited assessments of its workforce needs, which could help inform its 
recruiting goals. For example, in February 2020 we reported that since 
the Coast Guard began using its workforce requirements determination 
process in 2003, it has assessed only a 6 percent of its workforce 
needs.\9\ We made four recommendations to the Coast Guard which 
addressed limitations with Coast Guard's workforce requirements 
determination process. As of April 2023, the Coast Guard implemented 
three of these recommendations by updating its guidance, determining 
necessary personnel to conduct the workforce determination process, and 
tracking the extent to which it completed this process for its units. 
However, as of May 2023, it had not determined time frames and 
milestones to fully implement its workforce requirements plan. Fully 
addressing this recommendation will help ensure that the Coast Guard 
has the right number of people with the right set of skills to meet its 
mission demands.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ The Coast Guard's manpower requirements determination process 
is its preferred method for determining workforce needs because it 
identifies the workforce needed to conduct required mission activities. 
See GAO. Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Evaluate the Effectiveness of 
Organizational Changes and Determine Workforce Needs GAO-20-223 
(Washington, D.C.: February 26, 2020).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          With respect to its cyberspace workforce needs, in September 
2022, we found that because the Coast Guard had not determined 
necessary staffing levels and skills to meet mission needs, it was not 
positioned to fully understand the resources such a workforce 
requires.\10\ However, the Coast Guard is increasingly dependent upon 
its cyberspace workforce to maintain and protect its information 
systems and data from threats. We recommended that the Coast Guard take 
six actions, including to determine the cyberspace staff needed to meet 
its mission demands and fully implement five recruitment and retention 
leading practices, such as establishing a strategic workforce plan for 
its cyberspace workforce.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ GAO. Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address 
Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands GAO-22-105208 (Washington, D.C.: 
September 27, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          As of March 2023, Coast Guard officials noted that they are 
in various stages of taking actions to address the recommendations. 
Fully addressing these recommendations could help the Coast Guard 
better understand the resources it requires, including those to protect 
its information systems and data from threats.

      Ensure certain technology is inventoried and has 
appropriate cyber controls. Historically, the Coast Guard has had 
longstanding issues managing its technology resources, yet it relies 
extensively on IT systems and services to carry out its 11 statutory 
missions. It also relies on operational technology, which encompasses a 
broad range of programmable systems or devices that interact with the 
physical environment, such as sensors and radar. In July 2022, we found 
that the Coast Guard did not consistently apply a process to ensure 
cyber controls were in place for all types of its operational 
technology, due in part to not having a comprehensive and accurate 
inventory of these technologies.\11\ According to Coast Guard 
officials, the inventory does not include all of the Coast Guard's 
operational technology due to resource constraints.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ GAO. Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Enhance IT Program 
Implementation GAO-22-105092 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          We made three recommendations to the Coast Guard to (1) 
establish a comprehensive and accurate inventory of all operational 
technology; (2) develop a plan or strategy to ensure that appropriate 
cyber controls are identified and applied for all types of operational 
technology; and (3) ensure that the plan is effectively implemented. As 
of January 2023, the Coast Guard reported that it is in various stages 
of taking actions to address the recommendations. Ensuring that it has 
adequate cybersecurity measures in place for all its systems could help 
the Coast Guard manage risks of unauthorized access to those systems or 
devices, potentially leading to system disruptions and loss of data.

      Report shore infrastructure information more completely 
and accurately. In February 2019, we found that the Coast Guard could 
increase budget transparency for shore infrastructure.\12\ 
Specifically, we found that the Coast Guard's budget requests (1) had 
not clearly identified funding allotted for routine shore 
infrastructure maintenance needs, and (2) had not generally addressed 
deferred maintenance and repair deficiencies, resulting in increases to 
its backlogs. In addition, the Coast Guard had not included information 
in its Unfunded Priorities Lists and other related reports that clearly 
articulated trade-offs among competing project alternatives, as well as 
the impacts on missions conducted from shore facilities in disrepair. 
This information could help to inform decision makers of the risks 
posed by untimely investments in maintenance and repair backlogs.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ GAO. Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading 
Practices Could Help Manage Project Backlogs Of At Least $2.6 Billion, 
GAO-19-82 (Washington, D.C.: February 21, 2019).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
          We also found that the Coast Guard budget requests had not 
been aligned with its requirements-based budget targets for shore 
infrastructure. According to the Coast Guard, a requirements-based 
budget is an estimate of the cost to operate and sustain its shore 
infrastructure portfolio of assets over the life cycle of the asset, 
from initial construction or capital investment through divestiture or 
demolition. We found that Coast Guard targets for recapitalization of 
shore assets exceeded $290 million annually. However, its budget 
requests for fiscal years 2012 through 2021 ranged from about $5 
million to about $99 million annually. Notwithstanding the mismatch 
between Coast Guard budget requests and its requirements-based budget 
targets, Coast Guard's allotments for this area for years 2016 through 
2018 exceeded the Coast Guard's requests. For example, in fiscal year 
2016, the Coast Guard's allotment of $130 million was almost three 
times the nearly $47 million requested. In 2018, the almost $45 million 
allotted was more than four times the $10 million requested.
          We recommended that the Coast Guard include supporting 
details about competing project alternatives and report trade-offs in 
congressional budget requests and related reports. The Coast Guard 
agreed with our recommendation, but noted that addressing this 
recommendation is challenging due to limitations imposed by the Office 
of Management and Budget and DHS. As of May 2023, the Coast Guard was 
working toward publishing some related information on its website, 
according to officials. Without such information about Coast Guard 
budgetary requirements, Congress will lack critical information that 
could help to prioritize funding to address the Coast Guard's shore 
infrastructure backlogs.

    In closing, by taking action in these areas Coast Guard could 
improve mission execution and better manage its resources.
    Chairman Webster, Ranking Member Carbajal, and Members of the 
Subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
     Appendix I: Information on the U.S. Coast Guard's 11 Missions
    This appendix details the U.S. Coast Guard's 11 missions (see table 
1).

       Table 1: Information on the U.S. Coast Guard's 11 Missions
------------------------------------------------------------------------
                  Mission                            Description
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Aids to Navigation........................  Mitigate the risk to safe
                                             navigation by providing and
                                             maintaining more than
                                             51,000 buoys, beacons,
                                             lights, and other aids to
                                             mark channels and denote
                                             hazards.
 
Defense Readiness.........................  Maintain the training and
                                             capability necessary to
                                             immediately integrate with
                                             Department of Defense
                                             forces in both peacetime
                                             operations and during times
                                             of war.
 
Drug Interdiction.........................  Stem the flow of illegal
                                             drugs into the United
                                             States.
 
Ice Operations............................  Establish and maintain
                                             tracks for critical
                                             waterways, assisting and
                                             escorting vessels beset or
                                             stranded in ice, and remove
                                             navigational hazards
                                             created by ice in navigable
                                             waterways.
 
Living Marine Resources...................  Enforce laws governing the
                                             conservation, management,
                                             and recovery of living
                                             marine resources, marine
                                             protected species, and
                                             national marine sanctuaries
                                             and monuments.
 
Marine Environmental Protection...........  Enforce laws which deter the
                                             introduction of invasive
                                             species into the maritime
                                             environment, stop
                                             unauthorized ocean dumping,
                                             and prevent and respond to
                                             oil and chemical spills.
 
Marine Safety.............................  Enforce laws which prevent
                                             death, injury, and property
                                             loss in the marine
                                             environment.
 
Migrant Interdiction......................  Stem the flow via maritime
                                             routes of unlawful
                                             migration and human
                                             smuggling activities.
 
Other Law Enforcement.....................  Enforce international
                                             treaties, including the
                                             prevention of illegal
                                             fishing in international
                                             waters and the dumping of
                                             plastics and other marine
                                             debris.
 
Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security....  Ensure the security of the
                                             waters subject to the
                                             jurisdiction of the United
                                             States and the waterways,
                                             ports, and intermodal
                                             landside connections that
                                             comprise the marine
                                             transportation system--and
                                             protect those who live or
                                             work on the water or who
                                             use the maritime
                                             environment for recreation.
 
Search and Rescue.........................  Search for, and provide aid
                                             to, people who are in
                                             distress or imminent
                                             danger.
------------------------------------------------------------------------
 Source: 6 U.S.C. Sec.  468(a); GAO summary of Coast Guard information.
  GAO-23-106852


    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you for your testimony.
    We will now turn to the questions from the panel, and I 
will now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    So, Admiral Poulin, as cybersecurity incidents continue to 
proliferate, the National Academy's report underscores the need 
to clarify certain roles and responsibilities of various 
agencies with regards to cyber response in the maritime domain.
    As the Coast Guard expands its cybersecurity capabilities, 
what is being done to ensure the Service is not suffering 
mission creep and duplicating the work of other agencies, such 
as CISA, which also plays an important role in this area? What 
is the Coast Guard doing to leverage existing Government 
capabilities?
    Admiral Poulin. Thank you for the question, Mr. Chairman.
    We are building our cyber capability, one, to protect our 
own systems; two, to ensure adequate oversight of regulated 
facilities and vessels under the Maritime Transportation 
Security Act and the Ports and Waterways Safety Act; and then 
working to build capability to leverage cyber as an operating 
domain for the Coast Guard. We do this in collaboration with 
all our interagency partners, including CISA.
    Currently, vessels and facilities that are regulated by the 
MTSA are required to do a cyber vulnerability assessment and 
then include in their plans measures to mitigate those cyber 
effects.
    For our oversight responsibilities, we are hiring cyber 
specialists, and have hired quite a few, but continue to hire 
into positions at every echelon of the Coast Guard--at the area 
command level, at the district command level, and at the sector 
command level--to provide support and assistance to private 
industry and public-sector facilities to ensure cybersecurity.
    So, I am happy to go into more detail, Chairman, but I 
think we have the adequate authority, we have the plans in 
place, and we have the collaborative efforts of the interagency 
to make sure that we are leveraging all available capability.
    I should also note that, on our unified regulatory agenda, 
we have noted our intent to do a notice of proposed rulemaking 
to bolster cybersecurity requirements for regulated facilities 
and vessels.
    Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. So, are these civilian positions 
only?
    Admiral Poulin. Most of our cybersecurity specialists that 
are helping facilities and vessels with the assessments are 
civilian positions.
    With respect to our Cyber Protection Teams--and we have 
three Cyber Protection Teams that are built--those are largely 
Coast Guard Active Duty and Reserve members. There are some 
civilian support there as well. But it is largely an Active 
Duty force that is well-nested with the National Security 
Agency and also with U.S. Cyber Command.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    Doctor, the report examined the Coast Guard's acquisition 
and procurement authorities and practices, and notes that, 
despite having generally the same authorities as other 
services, the Coast Guard has been comparatively less 
successful in executing an acquisition system that is lean and 
agile.
    Can you discuss some of these barriers, and what the Coast 
Guard can learn from other services? And to what degree would 
increased use of off-the-shelf commercial technologies, which 
the Coast Guard has historically opposed, support the Service's 
acquisition efforts?
    Mr. Coglianese. Thank you very much.
    The area of procurement the committee identified as very 
important, as you say. We did not do an intensive study of 
procurement itself. The focus of the study was on statutory 
authority to address those major foreseeable areas. But because 
of these mission support functions, procurement being one of 
them--in addition to that, we focus on data analysis and 
management; we also focus on workforce readiness--but 
procurement being an important one to make sure that the force 
has the technology that is ready today.
    Chapter 4 of the report does detail ideas that came before 
us, but, to be very frank, we heard from different points of 
view from different experts we consulted with, whether the 
Coast Guard has adequate authority right now to address the 
needs to be flexible in its procurement.
    It would be an important area--and this is what the 
committee concluded--it would be an important area for further 
inquiry to really fully address the question that you ask.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you very much.
    So, my time has expired.
    Mr. Larsen, the ranking member of the full committee, you 
are recognized.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you very much.
    Admiral, on the issue of commercial space recovery and the 
pilot, are there standards yet established, say, at IMO or 
anywhere else, for international cooperation on recovery?
    Admiral Poulin. No, sir. Customary international law 
authorizes a coastal state to provide a 500-meter safety zone 
around offshore installations. So, there is nothing in 
customary international law right now that would recognize the 
safety zone.
    However, there is a process to have areas to be avoided, 
which are advisory areas. And, functionally, that is what we 
are doing under the pilot program with respect to foreign 
vessels.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. For outside the EEZ?
    Admiral Poulin. For outside the EEZ, yes, sir. I am sorry. 
Yes, inside the EEZ, we have plenary authority to establish 
safety zones, security zones. Outside the EEZ is where really 
the issue is that was pointed out by the National Academy of 
Sciences.
    Obviously, if we establish a safety zone outside the 
Territorial sea, it is binding on U.S. vessels, because U.S. 
vessels are always subject to U.S. jurisdiction. It is an issue 
with respect to foreign vessels.
    However, even though it may be advisory in nature, that 
doesn't mean that we don't have other levers that we might be 
able to use. So, if a foreign vessel is engaging in negligent 
operations, impeding the safe recovery of commercial space 
operation, that is a factor that we might consider if they are 
looking to come into a U.S. port.
    There are ongoing discussions at the International Maritime 
Organization. But, largely, we think the advisory nature of 
this, plus the other levers that we have right now, is suitable 
for ensuring the safety of commercial space.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. So, that is U.S. Coast Guard's 
thought. Other countries' Coast Guards, or your equivalents, 
given that this is not a--we have a very robust industry in the 
U.S., but it is not just in the U.S.
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir. I am not sure of any equivalent 
with any other country. I think most countries support freedom 
of navigation. And I think we want to assure freedom of 
movement, mobility, and navigation in waters that are outside 
national jurisdiction.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes.
    Doctor, did you look at that question?
    Mr. Coglianese. We did not identify any other country that 
would have addressed that matter.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Were you asked to do that, and 
then you----
    Mr. Coglianese [interrupting]. No. No, we were not. I mean, 
that would have been outside of the scope of our focus on the 
statutory authority here in the U.S.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. I will write you a letter then. 
How is that? I will get an answer for it.
    In your recommendations on people, recruiting and such, did 
you make any recommendations to the Coast Guard to types of 
folks or subject-matter-expert types of folks, really, about 
where to focus recruitment?
    Mr. Coglianese. Absolutely. I mean, the workforce 
challenges for the Coast Guard in the coming decade will 
principally--not exclusively, but principally--lie in the area 
of high technology, digital technology, cybersecurity. Those 
are absolutely critical areas for workforce development and 
readiness for the Coast Guard in the coming decade.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. I was at the Academy earlier this 
year and met with some of the cybersecurity students, and all 
of them, very excited. But I can tell it is--there is a bigger 
demand and a smaller supply, and so--in a highly competitive 
environment. So, thanks.
    Ms. MacLeod, in last year's Coast Guard Authorization Act, 
we required the Service to produce a detailed assessment and 
report on its infrastructure needs.
    Do you believe that report addresses the GAO's concerns 
about the transparency and accuracy of the infrastructure 
needs, or are there other actions the Coast Guard needs to 
take?
    Ms. MacLeod. We did review that as well, and I think that 
what remains is a systematic review of priorities.
    For example, it was unclear to us on items that the Coast 
Guard was putting forth and then removing from prior years' 
lists--it kind of comes on and off the lists, and while that is 
happening, it is unclear if they are using a systematic 
approach to evaluate the needs and priorities.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Yes. OK. Great.
    Admiral, in my remaining time, I will give it to you. Did 
you have any other update on the search for the Titan folks 
there?
    Admiral Poulin. Sir, just what I mentioned at the outset, 
that the unified command is doing everything that they can to 
locate and rescue those who are missing.
    I want to recognize the tremendous efforts of those 
responders who are out there working around the clock, doing 
their best to rescue those who are missing.
    Mr. Larsen of Washington. Thank you.
    With that, I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Babin, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I would like to thank you, witnesses, for being here today. 
We appreciate you very much.
    The Coast Guard is a well-known and vital part of my 
community in southeast Texas and the Greater Houston area. And 
I represent Coast Guard Sector Houston-Galveston and Air 
Station Houston, each housed in Ellington Field in southeast 
Houston.
    My questions today are related to a subject covered in the 
National Academy's report.
    And, Admiral--is it ``Poo-lin'' or ``Po-lin''?
    Admiral Poulin. ``Poo-lin,'' sir.
    Dr. Babin. ``Poo-lin.'' OK. These questions are going to be 
directed to you, if you don't mind.
    I also serve as the chairman of the Space and Aeronautics 
Subcommittee on the Science, Space, and Technology Committee. 
In that role, I work regularly with space companies that I know 
are familiar to the Coast Guard, given the important work that 
Coast Guard conducts with commercial space operations.
    The Coast Guard's important role in commercial space 
operations is sure to grow as commercial space grows, and 
Congress needs to ensure the Coast Guard has the personnel, the 
equipment, and the authority to support these operations.
    So, Admiral Poulin, can you please spend a minute or two 
detailing the current state of play for Coast Guard commercial 
space operations? What kind of strain and demand is it placing 
on the Coast Guard? And do you have the supplies and authority 
that are needed to conduct this mission?
    Admiral Poulin. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the question.
    We are leveraging the lessons learned at Cape Canaveral and 
exporting that to other areas of the country to build our IQ on 
how to safely ensure the safety and security of space 
operations. We work very closely with the space companies--
SpaceX, Blue Origin, others--as well as NASA and FAA to make 
sure that we have a coordinated approach.
    But your point is a good one, sir. This is a growing 
mission area for us. When we talk to NASA, the projection for 
increased space operations is an order of magnitude greater 
than what we are seeing now.
    I think what it reinforces is what the Commandant testified 
to at the budget hearing before this subcommittee. The Coast 
Guard needs about 3- to 5-percent growth per year to manage our 
operational requirements. And that means that we need to grow 
to be a $20 billion Coast Guard within the next 10 years.
    Dr. Babin. Yes, sir. OK. Thank you.
    Another question. This administration's immigration 
policies have led us to a crisis at the southern border like we 
have never experienced or seen before. While I am not going to 
do a deep dive into how this administration's immigration 
failures have led us there, I do want to hear your thoughts on 
what the future role of the Coast Guard in combating illegal 
immigration looks like.
    The Coast Guard's migrant interdiction operations are vital 
to our Nation's border security. Does the Coast Guard have the 
supplies and the authority needed to conduct this mission? Does 
the Coast Guard have the personnel needed to conduct its 
migrant interdiction mission? What can Congress do to improve 
and assist the Coast Guard in its battle against illegal 
immigration?
    Admiral Poulin. Thank you, sir.
    Our focus in the Coast Guard is on maritime migration. We 
are seeing at present irregular maritime migration at its 
highest level in 30, maybe 40 years, and we have had to make 
very difficult decisions in how we handle our operational 
priorities.
    For us, maritime migration is a lifesaving mission, because 
the migrants that we interdict are taking to sea in vessels 
that are overloaded and are completely unseaworthy. For us, 
this is fundamentally a search-and-rescue operation.
    And we are taxed. We are doing most of this effort with 
vessels that are 50 years old. That is why it is critically 
important that we continue on the path to recapitalize our 
cutter fleet and build long-range aviation capability and 
accelerate our transition to H-60 aircraft as well. And that is 
all in the President's budget request.
    It is really important that we recapitalize our aging 
cutter fleet with the Offshore Patrol Cutter and complete the 
full program of record for the National Security Cutter as 
well. These are game-changing capabilities that we are going to 
be able to apply to maritime migration to ensure the safety of 
life at sea.
    Dr. Babin. Is Florida one of the worst, if not the worst, 
area for these types of interdiction? Are you seeing anything 
in south Texas as well?
    Admiral Poulin. Sir, predominantly, irregular maritime 
migration affects the south Florida region, the Straits of 
Florida, migrants who are taking to the sea from both Haiti and 
Cuba and the Bahamas as well. We do see increasing migrant flow 
from Mexico into southern California.
    There has been some irregular migration across the Rio 
Grande into Texas on the gulf coast as well. That flow rate is 
not as large as what we are seeing in the Caribbean or that we 
are seeing in southern California, but it is still a concern. 
And we are periodically providing support to the Border Patrol 
by putting Maritime Safety and Security Teams and Boat Forces 
units on the Rio Grande for the specific purpose of saving 
people in distress who are trying to cross the river.
    Dr. Babin. Thank you, Admiral. I appreciate it.
    My time has expired. I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Auchincloss, you are recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Thank you, Chairman.
    Ms. MacLeod--well, first, thank you to all the witnesses 
for your excellent testimony, written and oral.
    Ms. MacLeod, to begin with you, GAO made 39 recommendations 
to the Coast Guard, 7 of which are being acted upon, 32 not 
yet.
    Is the Coast Guard responding with a sufficient sense of 
urgency to the recommendations that you are making? Do you have 
any ones in particular that you want to see them act on?
    Ms. MacLeod. Yes, overall, the Coast Guard is highly 
collaborative with GAO in addressing our recommendations. Most 
of these studies have been completed over the last 3 years, so, 
they are fairly new in the process. And we monitor the Coast 
Guard progress on an ongoing basis on all of our 
recommendations.
    It is difficult for me to point to one recommendation or a 
handful in particular, but I would say, at the core of it, one 
of the biggest challenges the Coast Guard faces is in its 
workforce.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Hmm.
    Ms. MacLeod. In this environment and balancing its multiple 
missions, identifying the workforce that it needs and being 
able to allocate that strategically is going to be key for the 
Coast Guard going forward as it faces shortages in workforce.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Please keep my office apprised if there 
are any of these that you feel like are being insufficiently 
addressed. I would be interested to know that.
    Ms. MacLeod. Thank you.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Admiral Poulin, the National Academy's 
report highlights the Coast Guard's insufficient infrastructure 
in the Arctic, in particular, icebreaking capabilities. This is 
at a time when China has declared itself a near-Arctic state 
and aims to develop a Polar Silk Road, investing billions in 
the effort.
    With increased Chinese and Russian investment and activity 
in the region, what resources does the Coast Guard need, if 
any, besides the three planned Polar Security Cutters, in order 
to uphold the rules-based international order in the Arctic?
    Admiral Poulin. Thank you for the question, sir.
    Presence matters. Presence matters in the Arctic for us to 
ensure good maritime governance and for us to ensure a rules-
based order.
    We are on a trajectory to build the Polar Security Cutters, 
but we recently delivered to this committee and other 
committees our fleet mix analysis, and in that fleet mix 
analysis, we concluded that we likely need eight to nine new 
icebreakers.
    Some of those will be heavy icebreakers like the Polar 
Security Cutter that is being built at Bollinger Mississippi. 
Others may be Arctic Security Cutters----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. Do we need a permanent 
presence in the Arctic? Right now, it is on a rotating basis.
    Admiral Poulin. We need capability to have a permanent 
presence in the Arctic, yes, sir.
    And that is one of the reasons why, in the President's 
budget, we have also requested funding for a commercially 
available icebreaker as well--not as a bridging strategy but to 
add capability to our Coast Guard fleet to make sure that there 
is model behavior by anybody operating in the Arctic.
    Mr. Auchincloss. Continuing on this theme of competition 
with China, the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific Strategy 
calls for expanding the U.S. Coast Guard presence and 
cooperation in South and Southeast Asia and the Pacific 
Islands, with a focus on advising, training, deployment, and 
capacity-building.
    I am a member of the Select Committee on the Strategic 
Competition Between the United States and the Chinese Communist 
Party. I know from those activities that there is tremendous 
demand in the Indo-Pacific amongst our allies and partners for 
Coast Guard expertise and equipment to help them contest 
increasingly aggressive PLA and PLAN maneuvers in the South 
China Sea in particular.
    What resources do you need to successfully implement this 
Indo-Pacific Strategy so that we can be a continued presence 
not just in the Arctic but also in the Indo-Pacific?
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir. Thank you.
    We need to build capability in the Indo-Pacific region. The 
more we talk to our partners and allies in the region, the 
greater the demand for Coast Guard support.
    When you talk to them about their greatest national 
security concerns, they talk about illegal, unregulated, and 
unreported fishing; they talk about the effects of climate 
change; they talk about disaster response; they talk about a 
challenge in maintaining domain awareness on their sovereign 
waters.
    Those are all Coast Guard missions, and I think that is why 
the Coast Guard is in growing demand.
    Mr. Auchincloss. And would taking the Coast Guard down to 
fiscal year 2022 levels of funding, would that impair our 
ability to have a strong Indo-Pacific and Arctic presence as we 
contest Chinese and Russian influence?
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir. That would affect our ability to 
provide operations wherever and whenever, not just in the Indo-
Pacific region.
    Our unfunded priorities list includes four Fast Response 
Cutters to help us build capability as a starting point in the 
Indo-Pacific. Those Fast Response Cutters are critical assets 
for us. They are proving their value every day, whether it is 
in the counterdrug transit zone, whether it is in irregular 
maritime migration, but certainly will prove a high return on 
investment in the Indo-Pacific region.
    Mr. Auchincloss. And, in 10 more seconds, Admiral, the 
Atlantic Coast Port Access Route Study for offshore wind, are 
we going to get that by the end of the year?
    Admiral Poulin. The study has been completed, and it is our 
intent to translate that into a regulation.
    Mr. Auchincloss. By the end of the year?
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir--well----
    Mr. Auchincloss [interrupting]. I will take it as a 
``yes.'' Time is up. Time is up, Chairman.
    [Laughter.]
    Admiral Poulin. Let me go back to check, sir. I don't want 
to promise something I can't deliver.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Mast, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Chairman. And I want to thank you for 
bringing up Florida East Coast Railway, Brightline, and the St. 
Lucie Waterway.
    Semper paratus, Admiral. In my experience, the Coast Guard 
does not drop the ball. That has been my experience with the 
Coast Guard.
    I want to bring up a meeting I had yesterday. It was with 
the United States Coast Guard, Florida Department of 
Transportation, Florida East Coast Railway, Brightline, the 
Federal Railroad Administration, and myself. I think it was the 
first time a meeting like that, with all parties, those 
stakeholders, had taken place.
    And I want to give you an opportunity to refute a claim 
that Coast Guard dropped the ball. This was a claim made by 
Brightline or Florida East Coast Railway, that basically they 
had no knowledge, when talking about this waterway, this 
bridge, these trains that the chairman brought up, that a 
temporary deviation to how this bridge would operate--local 
automobile traffic, local maritime traffic, freight rail and 
passenger rail--how that would all be affected. They didn't 
have an opportunity to weigh in on how that would all be 
affected by--and ensuring that waterway has the right of way, 
which is the law.
    So, my question is, did everybody have an opportunity to 
weigh in on that proposed deviation, this rulemaking process?
    Admiral Poulin. Congressman, we have tried to be as 
transparent as possible with respect to the St. Lucie bridge. I 
think it was in May of last year--I may have the dates a little 
bit off--but we issued a notice of inquiry because we were 
considering what changes needed to be made to the bridge 
schedule to ensure the reasonable needs of navigation as well 
as balancing interests of all the stakeholders involved. We----
    Mr. Mast [interrupting]. So, in that, you did make all of 
the stakeholders aware, Admiral, that you were doing this?
    Admiral Poulin. Sir, I think we did. We tried to do that. 
We tried to be transparent. We tried to have open lines of 
communication----
    Mr. Mast [interrupting]. To pause you, Admiral, I believe 
you, and I just--limited time.
    I have the public comments of Brightline and FEC here. It 
is 14 pages. To your knowledge, they commented in the 
opportunity, the public comments section on this rulemaking?
    Admiral Poulin. Sir, you are showing me the document.
    Mr. Mast. Yep.
    Admiral Poulin. I will defer to you on that.
    Mr. Mast. To your knowledge, they have been participating 
actively, speaking to the Coast Guard since at least 2015 about 
their plans for rail, the interaction between passenger, 
freight, automobile, and maritime?
    Admiral Poulin. We have regular discussions and open lines 
of communication, sir, and we want to be transparent.
    Mr. Mast. So, to be clear, then, all of those lines of 
discussion and open communication, they are not all public?
    Admiral Poulin. Some of those are meetings with our Seventh 
Coast Guard District. Some of those are probably one-on-one 
phone calls. Any number of different ways to communicate. I 
think the key point here, sir, again, is open lines of 
communication.
    Mr. Mast. And I expect that they have the opportunity to 
call you. But just to say, they have had at least the same 
amount of access as everybody in the public, if not more?
    Admiral Poulin. Open lines of communication, sir.
    Mr. Mast. Open lines. I will take that.
    So, in that, I would say, do you have any comment that you 
would like to say? It is fair to refute the claim that they had 
no opportunity to give you input on what these test deviations 
would look like?
    And I am going to pause there 1 second and also say, we 
worked here on the Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation 
Subcommittee to actually get language over in the Senate that 
asked for a number of deviations to try to get to the best 
place. The current deviation we are talking about is a dividing 
of an hour in four 15-minute segments. We asked for deviations 
also that said 30-minute segments and 60 minutes over 120 
minutes. It was actually the Senate that rejected that. But we 
wanted to see the Coast Guard do an array of tests to make sure 
that we got to the right place. But that was rejected over 
there.
    But I think you have refuted it, that everybody had the 
opportunity to comment?
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir. I wasn't party to the 
conversation, but, again, we have tried to include all 
stakeholders and trying to balance the reasonable needs of 
navigation with the impact and the effects on the rail line, 
navigation, and other stakeholders.
    Mr. Mast. So, moving forward to that, their comments in 
2022, the trains did say that, if they were to even have to 
give 15 fixed minutes of access to the local maritime traffic, 
that that one 15 minutes of access would result in them 
stopping 23 trains a day across our roads.
    To your knowledge, was that ever brought up in the 
environmental impact statement discussions back before, in 
2015? Because I read it cover to cover several times, and I 
couldn't find that.
    Admiral Poulin. Sir, I am not read in on that, but what I 
can tell you is that our approach to this thing has been to 
find a balance of all the competing interests. We want to do 
that in a transparent way. It is our obligation to----
    Mr. Mast [interrupting]. And I thank you, Admiral. My time 
is about expired, but I think you have worked hard to find that 
balance and find equilibrium between all parties. And so, thank 
you for your work on that.
    Admiral Poulin. Sir.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Ms. Scholten, you are recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    And thank you so much to our witnesses for joining us here 
today, and to the committee as a whole for this critical 
discussion on the most pressing challenges facing our Coast 
Guard in the next decade to come.
    It is so important to me, as the Representative of Coast 
Guard City, U.S.A.--Grand Haven, Michigan--proud home of a 
wonderful Coast Guard installation protecting our Great Lakes.
    As we discuss how we, as lawmakers, can prepare our 
Coasties for the road ahead, it is incumbent on us, as well, to 
remember that our policies would be useless without the support 
and dedication of our men and women in uniform, who we rely on 
every day to execute these policies and to keep Americans safe. 
I think we would all agree, our Coasties are the most valuable 
resource of the United States Coast Guard.
    Admiral Poulin, a number of the focus areas identified in 
the report will require significant numbers of well-trained 
personnel to fulfill the Coast Guard's mission. We have 
established in past hearings that the workforce and recruiting 
deficit the Coast Guard faces is significant.
    As you have seen, last week, some extremist Republicans 
indicated that they would be willing to shut down the 
Government rather than keep their party's promises on 
Government funding levels. And, as you know, Coasties aren't 
paid during a Government shutdown.
    Can you speak to the likely effect a shutdown would have on 
Coast Guard servicemember morale, recruitment, and the ability 
of the Coast Guard to carry out its mission?
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, ma'am. Thank you for your support of 
our Coast Guard men and women and our families.
    It is important that we have parity with DoD with respect 
to pay and benefits. It was hard on our Coast Guard and our 
families when there was a shutdown, and we didn't get paid. It 
was demoralizing. It had a profound effect, which translates 
into an operational effect as well.
    We have committed Coast Guard men and women and families 
who want to get about the Coast Guard business and want to 
execute missions anytime, anywhere. And it is important that we 
clearly send a signal that they are valued, that they are 
respected, and that we are going to stand behind them.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you. I agree completely. That is why I 
have introduced with Rep. Gonzalez-Colon the bipartisan Pay Our 
Coast Guard Parity Act, to ensure Coasties are treated the same 
as other members of the DoD, to get parity there, as you said.
    I know, as a former civil servant myself in the Department 
of Justice, what it was like to go through a Government 
shutdown, as a new mom. And it was certainly difficult, 
unstable. With the national security issues at stake, it is 
just a risk we cannot take.
    I invite my colleagues, again, to join me in supporting 
this crucial piece of legislation.
    I want to use my remaining time to ask an additional 
followup question.
    Last Congress, this committee passed and included in the 
NDAA much-needed legislation aimed at reducing sexual assault 
and sexual harassment in the maritime industry. This 
legislation granted new authority and built on the Coast 
Guard's existing authority as law enforcement to investigate 
these crimes. It is now essential that the Coast Guard act on 
these authorities to ensure our mariners are safe.
    Admiral Poulin, again, does the Coast Guard need additional 
authorities to continue to investigate and prosecute these 
crimes?
    Admiral Poulin. Thank you, ma'am.
    We are fully committed to eliminating sexual assault and 
sexual harassment not just in our Service but in the maritime 
industry. We are committed to that end. We don't need any new 
authorities. We appreciated the authorities that Congress 
provided in the last authorization bill.
    And we are stepping out, and we are stepping out quickly. 
We have got committed Coast Guard Investigative Service agents 
who are taking the reports. They will triage those, investigate 
every report, and, if it is criminal, refer it to DOJ; if it is 
not criminal, make sure that the companies exercise due 
diligence.
    And then we have the back-end support through our 
suspension and revocation process if it reaches a threshold of 
a suspension/revocation action.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you.
    Admiral Poulin. So, we are fully committed to this, ma'am.
    Ms. Scholten. OK. Thank you.
    So, just to reiterate, at this point, you feel the Coast 
Guard has everything it needs to conduct these investigations?
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, ma'am. We are fully committed to this.
    We are also working with maritime industry to raise 
awareness of their responsibilities, but also to potential 
victims and those who have been victimized, what the reporting 
mechanisms are, so that we can take these claims and 
investigate.
    Ms. Scholten. Thank you, sir.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Ezell, you are recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Countering illegal, unreported, unregulated fishing is one 
of the biggest challenges that the Coast Guard will face over 
the next decade.
    No commercial fishing industry has been more harmed by 
these fishing practices than the shrimpers on the gulf coast. 
Over 20 percent of the wild-caught shrimp imported into our 
country is caught illegally, second only to the swimming crab, 
which is also caught in the gulf.
    To add to this concerning number, foreign exporters are 
feeding their shrimp with fish caught by the IUU and using 
forced labor to produce their shrimp. All these damaging 
practices allow these exporters to undercut legitimate 
shrimpers in our country with artificially low prices.
    Admiral Poulin, how is the Coast Guard countering illegal, 
unreported, and unregulated fishing and protecting our 
shrimpers?
    Admiral Poulin. Thank you, sir.
    The first thing we are trying to do is raise awareness 
globally that this is an international problem. Fish stocks are 
depleted in many parts of the world, and predatory fishing 
practices affect all of us, whether it is on the gulf coast, 
whether it is in another region of the world. So, the first 
thing is to raise awareness.
    The second thing is to provide more persistent presence in 
areas where we see a congregation of people engaged in illegal 
fishing. And, again, this is where presence matters and why we 
talk about building the Coast Guard the 3 to 5 percent per 
year, getting us to a $20 billion Coast Guard, recapitalizing 
those assets so that we can have a more persistent presence.
    And then it is about working with our international 
partners and our allies to leverage their capabilities as well. 
Much of the work that we do is through something called 
regional fisheries management organizations. These are consent-
based organizations that develop rules-based orders for illegal 
fishing around the globe.
    And in many of those, we have partnership arrangements with 
other countries where we can go on board their vessels through 
a boarding and inspection regime. There are other opportunities 
to take shipriders on board our Coast Guard cutters.
    But, again, the bottom line is, this requires Coast Guard 
presence.
    Mr. Ezell. How can the Congress do better to help support 
the Coast Guard in this area?
    Admiral Poulin. Sir, it is critical that we have stable and 
predictable funding for our major acquisition programs. I have 
outlined many of those. It is our National Security Cutters, 
our Offshore Patrol Cutters, our Fast Response Cutters, 
accelerating our transition to the MH-60 aircraft, building a 
full fleet of C-130 aircraft, the Polar Security Cutter that we 
talked about previously.
    It is about providing the Coast Guard the ability to 
deliver mission excellence anytime, anywhere, and provide a 
more persistent presence rather than episodic engagement.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
    In Ms. MacLeod's testimony, she mentioned GAO's findings 
that recommended a risk-based approach to gas carrier 
inspections that may support the Coast Guard's efforts to 
address the shortage of marine inspectors and free up resources 
to do focused inspections on riskier vessels.
    Given the substantial shortage of inspectors, does the 
Coast Guard intend to conduct the GAO-recommended assessment of 
a risk-based review and inspection system of the LNG carriers, 
Admiral?
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir, we do. And we agree with the GAO 
recommendation. We think conducting a risk-based approach to 
inspections is the right direction.
    Through one of the prior Coast Guard Authorization Acts, 
you directed us to commission a study through the National 
Academy of Sciences to look at this. We have contracted that 
study. We expect the study to be completed in June of 2024. And 
I think that will give us a good baseline on how we want to 
move forward on risk-based inspections.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
    In addition to the gas carrier inspections, are there other 
areas, particularly other types of tank vessels, where the 
Coast Guard would benefit from considering risk-based 
approaches to vessel inspections?
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir, I think there are. But I think 
that study from the National Academy of Sciences is going to be 
an important foundation for us as we make those risk-based 
determinations moving forward.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you, sir.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mrs. Gonzalez-Colon, you are 
recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And thank you to the witnesses for being with us today.
    I have, actually, two questions. The first one will be to 
Admiral Poulin.
    According to Coast Guard figures, the migrant flow in the 
southeast maritime approaches to the United States, which 
includes the Caribbean transit routes into Florida, Puerto 
Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, increased by 521 percent 
from fiscal year 2020 to 2022.
    The National Academy of Sciences report concluded that, if 
current trends hold, in the next decade, migration from 
Caribbean nations will continue to grow, and this will further 
strain the Coast Guard, creating additional demands for its 
cutters and crew.
    And I am particularly concerned about the impact this will 
have on other vital missions, specifically counterdrug 
operations, especially when considering that the Coast Guard 
has already reported that it has been unable to meet the target 
drug removal rate, partly because of the decrease in the number 
of available surface assets due to the relocation to migrant 
interdiction operations.
    So, my question will be: In light of those trends, could 
you tell us, moving forward, how the Coast Guard plans to adapt 
to effectively monitor and respond to an increase in migrant 
activity while at the same time supporting and allocating the 
necessary resources for other missions, such as drug 
interdiction operations, are going to be handled?
    Admiral Poulin. Thank you for the question.
    We are seeing irregular maritime migration at record 
levels, levels that I have not seen in my almost 40-year Coast 
Guard career. And our Coast Guard is committed to saving lives 
of those who have taken to the sea in unseaworthy vessels. And 
as I was mentioning earlier, this is a life-saving mission for 
us.
    It starts with taking a whole-of-Government approach to 
prevent migration from happening in the first place. That is 
not solely a Coast Guard function. We can provide a presence 
offshore, which we are doing, but it requires a whole-of-
Government effort to set the conditions to prevent migration 
from happening.
    If irregular maritime migration does happen, we are 
committed to doing our best to interdict and save those lives. 
It is critically important for us that we maintain the 
opportunity to directly repatriate migrants interdicted at sea 
back to their country of origin, because we have limited Coast 
Guard cutters, we have limited capacity on those Coast Guard 
cutters, and the ability to turn those cutters around and bring 
them into port and into Cuba or Haiti to repatriate those 
migrants is critically important.
    And, as I was mentioning also, we are doing this mission 
right now with many Coast Guard cutters that are 50 years old 
or older, and we need to recapitalize that fleet. This is going 
to be an important mission for the Offshore Patrol Cutter. And 
it gives us the capability to address illicit flow of narcotics 
in the transit zone as well, especially in that vector from 
South America into the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico.
    Mrs. Gonzalez-Colon. I was actually in one of the cutters 
in San Juan last week, so, I know what you are talking about.
    My next question will be in terms of how the Coast Guard is 
dealing or addressing the vulnerabilities within our Nation's 
maritime transportation system to cyber attacks and those 
associated risks to our supply chain and economy. And, coming 
from Puerto Rico, where approximately 80 percent of our goods 
comes into the island through the Port of San Juan, this is an 
issue that deeply concerns us.
    The National Academy of Sciences report identified a series 
of actions the Coast Guard will likely need to take to address 
cybersecurity risks within the maritime environment and 
highlights the need to strengthen the Service's cybersecurity 
workforce to accomplish that. And I remember we approved the 
Jones Act that actually gave some directions to that end.
    So, how is the Coast Guard working to build up its 
cybersecurity workforce, particularly at the district and 
sector level? And how is the Service partnering with maritime 
stakeholders?
    Admiral Poulin. Thank you, ma'am.
    Before I get into the cybersecurity issues, I was remiss in 
not commending the work of AMO, Air and Marine Operations, in 
Puerto Rico, the Caribbean port interdiction group that 
operates out of San Juan.
    I was a former director of Joint Task Force-East. I think 
you and I have talked on the phone. And it would be a failure 
on my part if I didn't commend HSI, CBP, and all the other 
organizations that are helping us with maritime migration and 
illegal drugs.
    With respect to cyber vulnerabilities, we have a structure 
right now that requires facilities and vessels to do a cyber 
vulnerability assessment and then come up with a mitigation 
strategy in their plan to address those vulnerabilities.
    We have cybersecurity specialists that are in the field 
helping them conduct those assessments. Those are experts that 
also help plan regional exercises and local exercises with 
respect to cybersecurity.
    We backstop all of that with our Cyber Protection Teams 
that are there to deploy, if necessary, to work with our Coast 
Guard commands or with facilities and vessels to address those 
vulnerabilities.
    Lastly, we are looking to develop new regulatory standards 
for cybersecurity across the maritime industry. We want to work 
with CISA and other agencies to make sure that we map over 
commonsense standards into the maritime domain. We want to 
harmonize where it makes sense to harmonize.
    Mrs. Gonzalez-Colon. My time expired, but when do you 
expect to have all the information for the regulations?
    Admiral Poulin. It is hard to predict right now. The 
regulation is in draft. We are going through the economic 
impact analysis right now----
    Mrs. Gonzalez-Colon [interrupting]. A year?
    Admiral Poulin. I can't commit. I wish I could. Any time I 
have predicted a regulation, I have usually failed.
    Mrs. Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you.
    Thank you, Chairman. I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Thank you.
    So, another round of questions has been requested.
    Mr. Mast, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Mast. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to continue, Admiral, where we left off, that the 
Brightline train said, and the FEC, if there is any fixed 
window of time for maritime to have access across their own 
local waterway, it would result in 23 stopped trains a day. 
Those could be 2-mile-long trains going over dozens of 
intersections. That is what they said in their public comment.
    And I want to go back to the environmental impact statement 
that was done years prior. I don't expect you to know chapter 
and verse, so, I hope you will take my word that I am reading 
you quotes from it. But it did say in the mitigation in the 
impact statement: Develop a set schedule for downtimes of each 
bridge. It was in the impact statement that this would take 
place.
    So, can you think of a reason why developing a set schedule 
for bridges to be down or up, why that wouldn't be calculated 
as to the ripples that it would have on local vehicle traffic? 
In your estimation, would that be calculated?
    Admiral Poulin. Sir, I am not going to--I really can't 
speak to the calculation. This temporary deviation was intended 
to learn lessons, apply those lessons, understand impacts, 
understand effects, and then adjust----
    Mr. Mast [interposing]. Yes, sir.
    Admiral Poulin [continuing]. As necessary, to balance the 
needs of navigation with other stakeholder interests.
    Mr. Mast. Yes, sir, attempted to learn.
    But, in that, in the environmental impact statements, they 
tried to anticipate what was going to happen very, very 
specifically. I will read you a couple quotes from it.
    ``Along the north-south corridor, passenger rail service 
would result in minor increased traffic delays''--not 23 trains 
a day stopped for 15, 20 minutes.
    ``This demonstrates the project would not result in the 
degradation of average level of service''--again, talking about 
that. This is the environmental impact statement. It wasn't 
going to do anything to it.
    ``Would have a minor, not significant, impact on local 
traffic''--again, they were very specific in this environmental 
impact statement.
    And what I am really wondering is, I have to believe that 
if this information was told to the Coast Guard, that 20-plus 
trains would be stopped, if there was just one 15-minute 
opening for waterway, that you would have been told and you 
would have passed that on to the FRA.
    If you were told that, would you have passed it on to the 
Federal Railroad Administration?
    Admiral Poulin. Sir, we are trying to be transparent and 
collaborative----
    Mr. Mast [interrupting]. I am not saying you were told. I 
am just saying, if you were told that, you would have passed it 
on?
    Admiral Poulin. Sir, we want to be transparent with 
everybody, and we want to have a collaborative approach. Our 
intent is not to stop trains.
    Mr. Mast. Yes.
    Admiral Poulin. Our intent is to use this temporary 
deviation to understand the actual----
    Mr. Mast [interrupting]. And I don't want you to stop 
trains, Admiral.
    Admiral Poulin. Right.
    Mr. Mast. I am just saying, when you would participate in 
an environmental impact statement, if you are given information 
and you are working with the Federal Railroad Administration, 
you would pass it on, correct?
    Admiral Poulin. If I was in the position, I would----
    Mr. Mast [interposing]. OK.
    Admiral Poulin [continuing]. Pass it on.
    Mr. Mast. It is a simple question.
    Admiral Poulin. Again, we are just trying----
    Mr. Mast [interrupting]. Would you pass on important 
information like that?
    Admiral Poulin [continuing]. To be transparent.
    Mr. Mast. So, I am trying to wonder: Either it didn't get 
passed on, or it wasn't told, or FRA for some reason didn't 
think, ``OK, develop a set schedule for the downtimes of each 
bridge. We better calculate what that is going to do to road 
traffic,'' even though they calculated very specifically 
``minor impacts,'' ``no degradation,'' ``not a significant 
impact.''
    That is on the FRA. I am not saying that is on you, 
provided that Coast Guard didn't withhold any information.
    I want to go back to something that the chairman brought 
up, something I believe is important as well, and that is a new 
bridge, right?
    If they can't cooperatively work with local vehicle/
automobile traffic, maritime traffic, freight and rail 
together, because they have a bridge that is 6 feet above mean-
high water above a major waterway--and Coast Guard believes in 
securing water as the right of way, and so, they rightly gave 
two 15-minute windows of access to the local waterway users. I 
thought that was very fair. But we don't want to see all these 
ripple effects down the line for automobiles and stuff like 
that.
    It seems to me that they shouldn't have put the cart before 
the horse. They should have built a new bridge first. And this 
is why I say this: These train companies, they spent, I don't 
know, let's say $75 million or more on a new train station in 
Miami and a new train station in Aventura, Florida, and a new 
train station in Boca Raton, Florida, and a new train station 
in West Palm Beach, Florida, probably $50 million to $70 
million for each one, probably $100 million-plus for one in 
Orlando, and they laid over $1 billion in track is my 
understanding. I don't have an exact number, but that is my 
understanding.
    Doing all of that, I just can't for the life of me 
understand why they would omit building a bridge that would 
have to be built in order to allow for all of those modes of 
transportation to work together in any kind of acceptable way 
without holding maritime traffic hostage or without holding 
local vehicle traffic hostage or without having to stop freight 
rails from getting their goods from A to B or without having to 
stop passenger trains from getting people to A to B. It is the 
known chokepoint, and I can't understand why they didn't 
calculate it.
    I thank you, Chairman, for the extra 15 seconds, and I 
can't yield you anything back, but I relinquish the microphone.
    Dr. Van Drew. It got so quiet when I walked in.
    Mr. Mast. That is what happens when New Jersey walks in.
    Dr. Van Drew. Sorry, everybody. I am in the middle of the 
Judiciary Committee.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mrs. Gonzalez-Colon, you are 
recognized if you have a question.
    Mrs. Gonzalez-Colon. Well, I understand Mr. Van Drew may 
need the time.
    Thank you, Chairman. I just have one extra question, and it 
will be for Ms. MacLeod.
    As you explain in your testimony, in July 2022, the 
Government Accountability Office found that the Coast Guard did 
not consistently apply a process to ensure cyber controls were 
in place for all types of its operational technology, which may 
include services such as sensors and radars.
    Your office recommended that the Coast Guard establish a 
comprehensive and accurate inventory for its operational 
technology and that it should develop and implement a plan to 
ensure appropriate cyber controls are applied to these systems 
and devices.
    Could you elaborate on the Government Accountability Office 
findings and the risk associated with the lack of appropriate 
cyber controls for the Coast Guard operational technology?
    And will you also discuss what progress, if any, the Coast 
Guard has made to date to comply with your recommendations?
    Ms. MacLeod. Sure.
    So, without knowing which systems exist where and what 
exactly they are doing, it is really impossible to protect your 
systems. And so, our recommendation was a first step: Create an 
inventory of your systems. Identify what systems you have, what 
they do, and what levels of protection they may need. So, that 
is really the basis of our recommendation.
    Since our report, we have communicated with the Coast 
Guard, and they have begun to inventory their IT systems in the 
units. And then the next step will be to create a more broad 
inventory Coast Guard-wide.
    So, it is in the beginning stages, I would say, which isn't 
dissimilar from a lot of other Federal agencies that the GAO 
has looked at these issues on, I will mention. But we are 
seeing some progress there from the Coast Guard.
    Mrs. Gonzalez-Colon. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. Mr. Van Drew, you are recognized 
for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Van Drew. Thank you, Chairman.
    Thank you all for being here.
    Last year, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration proposed rules that would dramatically expand 
seasonal 10-knot vessel restrictions, as you know, across a 
large geographic area and many new types of vessels.
    The proposed expansion of the speed restriction would 
seriously impede maritime commerce on the Atlantic coast. It is 
a blunt tool that would apply to the wrong vessel sizes and the 
wrong areas.
    I submitted comments, supported by the American Association 
of Port Authorities; the Shipping Chamber of America; the 
International Organization of Masters, Mates, and Pilots Union; 
and the American Pilots Association, stating that the proposed 
NOAA speed restrictions are dangerous to maritime workers and 
they will hurt our economy.
    NOAA's proposed speed restrictions would also affect over 
63,000 recreational vessels from Massachusetts to Florida, most 
of which do not have full AIS equipage.
    This would all place a massive new enforcement 
responsibility on the United States Coast Guard. This is a time 
where the United States Coast Guard is dealing with an ever-
increasing workload and does not have enough resources.
    While I hope that NOAA opts for a more moderate approach as 
they further develop the rule, it is the Coast Guard's 
responsibility to enforce the rule when it does happen, in any 
case.
    So, my question is for the admiral: Does the U.S. Coast 
Guard have the budget, the fleet size, and the personnel to 
enforce the NOAA speed restrictions expansion as they are 
proposed currently?
    Thank you.
    Admiral Poulin. Thanks, Congressman. And I just want to 
note that I was up in Cape May to celebrate the 75th 
anniversary----
    Dr. Van Drew [interrupting]. Yes. I couldn't be. Oh, it 
is----
    Admiral Poulin [continuing]. Of the home of our enlisted 
workforce. Thank you for your support.
    Dr. Van Drew. I love you guys. I may be tough on windmills, 
but that has nothing to do with you, hopefully, but as far as 
the Coast Guard and the work they do and what they do in Cape 
May and how important it is. And that is why we are always 
advocating, whether it is for barracks or other needs that you 
have. We appreciate you.
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir. Well, thank you.
    I think I would like to respond a little bit more broadly. 
We have many different missions in the Coast Guard, and, as 
senior leaders, we are always challenged to prioritize those 
missions. There is not enough Coast Guard to go around, so, we 
have to take an operational risk-based approach to our 
missions.
    And that is why I said in earlier testimony we need that 3- 
to 5-percent growth in the Coast Guard's budget every year to 
manage those missions. We need to grow to be a $20 billion 
Coast Guard in about 10 years. And that is irrespective of what 
we may do in the Indo-Pacific or other regions where we need to 
build even greater Coast Guard capability.
    But focused on domestic missions, we always engage in those 
discussions about how do we prioritize, because we have high 
demand but low-density capability in many respects. So, we are 
always engaged in that operational risk assessment, sir.
    Dr. Van Drew. I appreciate that. But just to be a little 
more direct, in this situation, would I be correct if I said it 
would be stressful for you to have that additional 
responsibility, that this rule in the process of rulemaking 
would be a burden placed upon you?
    And I know you are up to any challenge, but, still, I mean, 
would this be a stressful situation?
    Admiral Poulin. Sir, I think we have a very collaborative 
relationship with NOAA. Obviously, we want to fulfill our 
statutory responsibilities. We are committed to the safety and 
security of navigation.
    And I think it is incumbent upon us, when we see new 
demands, to make sure that we project that. In fact, the 
National Academy of Sciences report anticipates that, that we 
would come to Congress and explain what the demands are and 
what our resource needs are for growth in current missions or 
expanded missions elsewhere. And we are----
    Dr. Van Drew [interrupting]. So, you would need more 
resources for this, correct?
    Admiral Poulin. Sir, we always need more resources. We need 
that 3 to 5 percent----
    Dr. Van Drew [interrupting]. I know, but I am just focused 
on this one particular area right now.
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir. I----
    Dr. Van Drew [interrupting]. Because I think the rulemaking 
could go better or could go worse, and we will see how it works 
out, but I think the point is to realize that this affects far 
more than just a very small segment of folks. I mean, there is 
a broad swath of regulatory groups, of enforcement in what you 
do, and just others that are in industry of different types, in 
boating, that it is going to affect.
    Admiral Poulin. Yes, sir. I think the Commandant and I have 
been very clear--I hope we have been very clear--that we are 
not a Coast Guard that is going to do the same with less or 
more with less. If we need to do more, we need more.
    Dr. Van Drew. OK. I appreciate you.
    And I yield back. Thank you, Chairman.
    Please forgive me. I have to leave immediately. I have to 
go back to the Judiciary Committee.
    Mr. Webster of Florida. I ask unanimous consent that the 
record for today's hearing remain open until such time as our 
witnesses have provided answers to any questions that may be 
submitted to them in writing.
    Without objection, so ordered.
    I also ask unanimous consent that the record remain open 
for 15 days for any additional comments or information 
submitted by the Members or witnesses to be included in the 
record of today's hearing.
    Without objection, show that ordered.
    No one else to talk?
    The meeting stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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