[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


               SECURING AMERICA'S MARITIME BORDER: CHAL-
                 LENGES AND SOLUTIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL 
                 SECURITY

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                  TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 23, 2023

                               __________

                            Serial No. 118-5

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
                                     

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________
                               
                               
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
52-386 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
                     Sean Jones, Legislative Clerk
                                 ------                                

          SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY

                  Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Clay Higgins, Louisiana              Shri Thanedar, Michigan, Ranking 
Nick LaLota, New York                    Member
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Robert Garcia, California
    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
                                         (ex officio)
                  Vacancy, Subcommittee Staff Director
           Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                  Halle Sarkisian, Subcommittee Clerk
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     2
The Honorable Shri Thanedar, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Transportation and Maritime Security:
  Oral Statement.................................................     3
  Prepared Statement.............................................     5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     6

                               Witnesses

Rear Admiral Jo-Ann F. Burdian, Assistant Commandant for Response 
  Policy, United States Coast Guard:
  Oral Statement.................................................     7
  Prepared Statement.............................................     9
Mr. Jonathan P. Miller, Executive Director for Operations, Air 
  and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
  Oral Statement.................................................    13
  Prepared Statement.............................................    14
Brigadier General Sean T. Boyette, Director, Joint Staff, Joint 
  Forces Headquarters, Representing the Florida National Guard:
  Oral Statement.................................................    20
  Prepared Statement.............................................    22
Ms. Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice, 
  Government Accountability Office (GAO):
  Oral Statement.................................................    23
  Prepared Statement.............................................    24

                                Appendix

Questions From Honorable Robert Garcia for Jo-Ann F. Burdian.....    47

 
 SECURING AMERICA'S MARITIME BORDER: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS FOR U.S. 
                           NATIONAL SECURITY

                              ----------                              


                        Thursday, March 23, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                        Subcommittee on Transportation and 
                                         Maritime Security,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m., at 
Room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos Gimenez 
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Gimenez, Higgins, LaLota, Lee, 
Thanedar, Payne, and Garcia.
    Also present: Representatives Green, Correa, and Thompson.
    Chairman Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security 
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security will come 
to order. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony 
from a distinguished panel of witnesses who will speak to 
Federal and State challenges in securing our maritime borders 
and actions Congress can take to improve maritime security and 
ensure public safety. I now recognize myself for an opening 
statement.
    I want to thank each of the witnesses here with us today 
for your service and for taking the time to testify. The 
subject of today's hearing, examining challenges at the 
Nation's maritime borders directly coincides with the work of 
our full committee, which aims to hold the Biden administration 
accountable for its disastrous open border policies.
    As a representative of the Florida Keys, I am infinitely 
familiar with the migratory and illegal narcotics crisis in the 
open sea and along our coasts. In the last 2 years, the Biden 
administration's policies have caused unlawful migration to 
surge month after month, creating an unprecedented situation, 
including in my community in South Florida. This past January, 
Florida's Dry Tortugas National Park temporarily was forced to 
close down to the public due to almost 300 arrivals by sea. 
U.S. Coast Guard removed the migrants from the park on-board a 
Coast Guard cutter and transported them ashore to Key West.
    This incident is one of the many along the Nation's 
maritime borders. Just last week, off the coast of San Diego, 
the U.S. Coast Guard was dispatched to search for 2 migrant 
smuggling boats that capsized, tragically killing 8 migrants on 
board. Five months ago in November, 2 agents with the U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine Operations were 
injured and a third agent, Michel Maceda, a 7-year veteran of 
AMO, was killed during a shootout with suspected drug smugglers 
during a patrol off the coast of Puerto Rico. In my home State 
of Florida, State and local authorities are doing their very 
best to handle this crisis in the untenable situation and an 
untenable situation on the ground.
    I want to recognize the efforts of Monroe County Sheriff 
Rick Ramsay and our brave sheriff's deputies for their tireless 
work to assist Federal authorities throughout this migrant 
crisis impacting the Florida Keys. Since August 2022 alone, 
nearly 11,000 migrants have been repatriated after attempting 
to cross the Florida Straits. Over the past 2 years, I have 
continued to raise the alarm about the surge of illicit 
narcotics, particularly deadly synthetic opioids like fentanyl, 
entering our Nation's borders at record levels.
    The drug crisis in our county--in our country is 
unsustainable and is a direct result of failed policies this 
administration has pursued. With that said, I would like to 
recognize the importance of the agencies, each with our 
witnesses represented. The U.S. Coast Guard plays a crucial 
role in keeping our country safe and our maritime border 
secure. While much of the work remains to be done, it is 
evident that the men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard have 
worked tirelessly to respond to the Nation's migrant and 
illicit drug crisis.
    CBP AMO is another important component of the drug and 
migrant interdiction missions in the maritime environment. AMO 
is involved in almost every aspect of the response to the 
migrant crisis, from apprehending and processing unlawful 
migrants, to conducting law enforcement operations, and 
interdicting illicit drug smugglers.
    The Florida National Guard has been instrumental in 
addressing the migratory purge, or surge in the Florida Keys. 
Governor Ron DeSantis recently issued an executive order that 
activated the Florida National Guard and mandated that they 
provide resources and assist local authorities. Over the past 
couple of months, we have seen the Florida National Guard do 
just that.
    Last, I am deeply appreciative of our GAO witness for 
joining us here today. The GAO is known as the Congressional 
watchdog, and it lives up to its name. The GAO supports 
Congress by ensuring accountability for Federal agencies, 
including the U.S. Coast Guard and the CBP AMO. Thank you all 
again for being here today.
    [The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
                Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
    I want to thank each of the witnesses here with us today, for your 
service, and for taking the time to testify.
    The subject of today's hearing--examining challenges at the 
Nation's maritime borders--directly coincides with the work of our full 
committee, which aims to hold the Biden administration accountable for 
its disastrous open border policies.
    As the representative of the Florida Keys, I am intimately familiar 
with the migratory and illegal narcotics crisis on the open sea, and 
along our coasts.
    For the last 2 years, the Biden administration's policies have 
caused unlawful migration to surge month after month, creating an 
unprecedented situation, including in my community in South Florida.
    This past January, Florida's Dry Tortugas National Park temporarily 
was forced to close down to the public due to almost 300 arrivals by 
sea. The U.S. Coast Guard removed the migrants from the park on-board a 
Coast Guard cutter and transferred them ashore to Key West.
    This incident is one of many along the Nation's maritime borders. 
Just last week off the coast of San Diego, the U.S. Coast Guard was 
dispatched to search for 2 migrant smuggling boats that capsized, 
tragically killing 8 migrants on board.
    Five months ago, in November, 2 agents with U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection Air and Marine Operations (AMO) were injured and a third 
agent--Michel Maceda, a 7-year veteran of AMO--was killed during a 
shootout with suspected drug smugglers during a patrol off the coast of 
Puerto Rico.
    In my home State of Florida, State and local authorities are doing 
their very best to handle this crisis and the untenable situation on 
the ground.
    And I want to recognize the efforts of Monroe County Sheriff Rick 
Ramsay, and our brave sheriff's deputies, for their tireless work to 
assist Federal authorities throughout this migrant crisis impacting the 
Florida Keys.
    Since August 2022 alone, nearly 11,000 migrants have been 
repatriated after attempting to enter Florida by sea.
    Over the past 2 years, I've continued to raise the alarm about the 
surge of illicit narcotics, particularly deadly synthetic opioids, like 
fentanyl, entering our Nation's borders at record levels.
    The drug crisis in our country is unsustainable and is a direct 
result of the failed policies this administration has pursued. With 
that said, I would like to recognize the importance of the agencies 
each of our witnesses represent.
    The U.S. Coast Guard plays a crucial role in keeping our country 
safe and our maritime borders secure. While much work remains to be 
done, it is evident that the men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard have 
worked tirelessly to respond to the Nation's migrant and illicit drug 
crisis.
    CBP AMO is another important component of the drug and migrant 
interdiction missions in the maritime environment. AMO is involved in 
almost every aspect of the response to the migrant crisis, from 
apprehending and processing unlawful migrants, to conducting law 
enforcement operations and interdicting illicit drug smugglers.
    The Florida National Guard has been instrumental in addressing the 
migratory surge in the Florida Keys. Governor Ron DeSantis recently 
issued an executive order that activated the Florida National Guard and 
mandated they provide resources and assist local authorities. Over the 
past couple of months, we have seen the Florida National Guard do just 
that.
    Last, I am deeply appreciative of our GAO witness for joining us 
here today. The GAO is known as ``the Congressional watchdog'' and it 
lives up to its name. The GAO supports Congress by ensuring 
accountability for Federal agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard and 
CBP AMO.
    Thank you all again for being here today. I look forward to your 
testimony and answers. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Thanedar, for his opening statement.

    Chairman Gimenez. I look forward to your testimony, and I 
now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Michigan, 
Mr. Thanadar, for his opening statement.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, for calling this 
important hearing, and thank you to all our witnesses for 
joining us here today. I am honored to serve as the Ranking 
Member of this subcommittee, and I look forward to working 
alongside our Chairman and all Members of this subcommittee on 
a bipartisan basis to secure our transportation and maritime 
systems from those who would look to harm innocent people and 
disrupt the free flow of commerce that is critical to our 
economy.
    The topic of today's hearing, the security of our maritime 
borders, is an important one. Increasing number of migrants 
have been taking to the sea to attempt to reach our shores, 
often in overcrowded extremely dangerous vessels, and 
tragically, some of them do not survive the journey. These are 
men, women, and children who are clearly desperate to find safe 
haven. As an immigrant myself, I sympathize with their plight, 
as I know you do too, Mr. Chairman, as a fellow immigrant.
    It is not difficult to determine what is driving such 
desperation and fueling the increase in migrant flow at sea. 
The vast majority of migrants taking to the sea are coming from 
Haiti, Cuba, where political instability, poverty, and an oil 
refinery explosion, and a devastating hurricane have pushed 
people past their breaking points. Unfortunately, instead of 
recognizing these tragic circumstances and seeking solution for 
this humanitarian crisis, my Republican colleagues seem to be 
more interested in playing political games to try to place 
blame on the Biden administration. In actuality, the 
administration is taking action to prevent illegal entry to the 
United States while treating people humanely and with dignity. 
The Coast Guard and its partners have been surging resources to 
the Florida Straits to search for and rescue migrants at sea, 
taking them on-board cutters and providing food, water, and 
medical attention.
    In January, the Biden administration announced the creation 
of a new legal pathway for up to Cubans and Haitians, as well 
as Venezuelans and Nicaraguans to enter the United States on a 
2-year parole. This pathway is now available to 30,000 
individuals each month and honors America's long history of 
welcoming asylum seekers. Additionally, Homeland Security 
Secretary Mayorkas has made clear that those who enter the 
United States illegally by sea will be removed and will not be 
eligible for parole.
    This new program is already showing significant results. In 
February, the number of migrants interdicted at sea dropped 
more than 75 percent from the average of the previous 4 months. 
At the Southwest Border, Border Patrol encounters with 
nationals of the four countries eligible for the parole program 
dropped by 95 percent in January. The administration is taking 
action to stem the flow of drugs coming by sea. As the Coast 
Guard, Customs and Border Protection have dedicated significant 
resources to drug interdiction, it is important to note that 
almost all of the fentanyl fueling the current opioid crisis is 
coming over land, not by sea, carried through ports of entry by 
U.S. citizens. At sea, the primary threat comes from cocaine. 
Drug flows have generally trended downwards in recent years, 
with the Coast Guard encountering cocaine on fewer occasions in 
2022 than in any year under the Trump administration.
    Democrats stand ready to support both migrants and drug 
interdiction efforts by providing the Coast Guard, Customs and 
Border Protection, and other Federal partners with the 
resources they need. Last year, Democrats passed the Omnibus 
Appropriation bill, which provided the Coast Guard with 
increased funding above the prior year's level, including $1.7 
billion for investment in services, air and marine fleet, and 
facilities. The bill also provided Customs and Border 
Protection with significant funding to support border security 
efforts, including 92.7 million for new aircraft and aircraft 
sensors.
    Despite their tough talk about the need for rigorous border 
security, Republicans voted against this critical funding. 
Worse still, Republicans have proposed bills to effectively end 
asylum in this country. Now, as we work through the 
appropriation cycle for next year, some Republicans are 
threatening to shut the Government down or refuse to pay our 
Nation's debt unless Congress makes draconian cuts to spending, 
which would undercut efforts to secure this homeland. I must 
remind my colleagues that the last time Republicans recklessly 
shut the Government down, they forced the dedicated members of 
the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and other 
security agencies to work without pay for weeks on end. That 
does nothing to help secure our borders.
    I hope that we in Congress can come together to deliver 
solutions and help the Coast Guard free up resources to carry 
out other aspects of its critical mission. Indeed, maritime 
security starts not at our shores, but overseas, including in 
the Arctic and Indo-Pacific where the Coast Guard's presence is 
critical to protecting your interests. I look forward to 
hearing from our witnesses today about what they need to carry 
out their mission effectively. I thank the Chairman, and I 
yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thanedar follows:]
               Statement of Ranking Member Shri Thanedar
                             March 23, 2023
    I am honored to serve as the Ranking Member of this subcommittee, 
and I look forward to working alongside our Chairman and all Members of 
the subcommittee on a bipartisan basis to secure our transportation and 
maritime systems from those who would look to harm innocent people and 
disrupt the free flow of commerce that is critical to our economy. The 
topic of today's hearing--the security of our maritime borders--is an 
important one.
    Increasing numbers of migrants have been taking to the seas to 
attempt to reach our shores, often in overcrowded, extremely dangerous 
vessels--and tragically, some of them do not survive the journey. These 
are men, women, and children who are clearly desperate to find safe 
haven. As an immigrant myself, I sympathize with their plight--as I 
know you do too, Mr. Chairman, as a fellow immigrant.
    It is not difficult to determine what is driving such desperation 
and fueling the increase in migrant flows at sea. The vast majority of 
migrants taking to the sea are coming from Haiti and Cuba, where 
political instability, poverty, an oil refinery explosion, and a 
devastating hurricane have pushed people past their breaking points.
    Unfortunately, instead of recognizing these tragic circumstances 
and seeking solutions for this humanitarian crisis, my Republican 
colleagues seem to be more interested in playing political games to try 
to place blame on the Biden administration. In actuality, the 
administration is taking action to prevent illegal entry to the United 
States while treating people humanely and with dignity. The Coast Guard 
and its partners have been surging resources to the Florida straights 
to search for and rescue migrants at sea, taking them on-board cutters 
and providing food, water, and medical attention.
    In January, the Biden administration announced the creation of a 
new legal pathway for up to Cubans and Haitians, as well as Venezuelans 
and Nicaraguans, to enter the United States on a 2-year parole. This 
pathway is now available to 30,000 individuals each month and honors 
America's long history of welcoming asylum seekers. Additionally, 
Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas has made clear that 
those who enter the United States illegally by sea will be removed and 
will not be eligible for parole.
    This new program is already showing significant results. In 
February, the number of migrants interdicted at sea dropped more than 
75 percent from the average of the previous 4 months. At the Southwest 
Border, Border Patrol encounters with nationals of the four countries 
eligible for the parole program dropped by 95 percent in January.
    The administration is also taking action to stem the flow of drugs 
coming by sea, as the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection 
have dedicated significant resources to drug interdictions. It is 
important to note that almost all the fentanyl fueling the current 
opioid crisis is coming over land, not by sea, carried through ports of 
entry by U.S. citizens. At sea, the primary threat comes from cocaine. 
Drug flows have generally trended downward in recent years, with the 
Coast Guard encountering cocaine on fewer occasions in 2022 than in any 
year under the Trump administration.
    Democrats stand ready to support both migrant and drug interdiction 
efforts by providing the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, 
and other Federal partners with the resources they need. Last year, 
Democrats passed the Omnibus appropriations bill, which provided the 
Coast Guard with increased funding above the prior year's levels, 
including $1.7 billion for investments in the service's air and marine 
fleet and facilities. The bill also provided Customs and Border 
Protection with significant funding to support border security efforts, 
including $92.7 million for new aircraft and aircraft sensors.
    Despite their tough talk about the need for rigorous border 
security, Republicans voted against this critical funding. Worse still, 
Republicans have proposed bills to effectively end asylum in this 
country.
    And now, as we work through the appropriations cycle for next year, 
some Republicans are threatening to shut the Government down or refuse 
to pay our Nation's debts unless Congress makes draconian cuts to 
spending--which would undercut efforts to secure the homeland. I must 
remind my colleagues that the last time Republicans recklessly shut the 
Government down, they forced the dedicated members of the Coast Guard, 
Customs and Border Protection, and other security agencies to work 
without pay for weeks on end. That does nothing to help secure our 
borders.
    I hope that we in Congress can come together to deliver solutions 
and help the Coast Guard free up resources to carry out other aspects 
of its critical mission. Indeed, maritime security starts not at our 
shores but overseas, including in the Arctic and Indo-Pacific, where 
the Coast Guard's presence is critical to protecting U.S. sovereignty.

    Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member. Other Members 
of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be 
submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
    Thank you to Chairman Gimenez and Ranking Member Thanedar for 
holding this hearing and to our witnesses for joining us here today.
    America is a shining beacon of hope for people across the globe 
that come to our shores seeking a better life. Sadly, our broken 
immigration system has failed to fulfill the promise America has made 
to ``give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to 
breathe free.''
    Recently, thousands of migrants from Cuba and Haiti have taken to 
the sea, driven to desperation due to natural and man-made disasters in 
their home countries. They have sought help from human smugglers and 
have loaded onto cramped and unsafe vessels to undertake a dangerous 
voyage, hoping to reach the American dream.
    Instead of fixing our broken system so that we may allow those in 
need of a safe home to become part of our national community, my 
Republican colleagues instead want to blame President Biden and his 
administration for what are actually decades-long enforcement issues 
and global migration patterns. Rather than falling for this 
politically-motivated rhetoric, we must meet these challenges with 
smart investments in personnel, technology, and equipment to safeguard 
our maritime domain.
    Democrats are up to the task. Last year, Democrats provided 
significant funding to the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, 
and other Federal partners to invest in border security. Republicans 
voted against these investments.
    Further, the Biden administration has created a new program to 
provide an orderly pathway for people from Cuba and Haiti, as well as 
Venezuela and Nicaragua, to come to the United States. This smart 
policy is already having a remarkable effect on stemming flows of 
migrants both at sea and by land.
    I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how we can best 
support the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and their 
partners with the resources they need to respond to important needs at 
our maritime borders, while still fulfilling their other critical 
missions. I am also eager to hear about how the Coast Guard is working 
to promote American sovereignty and maritime security across the globe 
and to address the needs of the service's workforce moving forward.

    Chairman Gimenez. I am pleased to have a distinguished 
panel of witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I 
ask that our witnesses please stand and raise your right hand.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Chairman Gimenez. Thank you. Let the record reflect that 
the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Thank you. 
Please be seated.
    I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Rear 
Admiral Jo-Ann Burdian currently serves as the assistant 
commandant for response policy with the United States Coast 
Guard. In this capacity, she is responsible for the development 
of strategic response doctrine and policy guidelines for all 
Coast Guard forces. Her role encompasses several operational 
maritime missions, including maritime security, 
counterterrorism, and defense operations. Mr. Jonathan Miller 
is the executive director of the operations for U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection Air and Marine Operations. As the 
executive director for operations, he oversees all AMO domestic 
and foreign aviation and maritime missions and advises the 
executive assistant commissioner on operational issues. 
Executive Director Miller has over 27 years of law enforcement 
and leadership experience. Brigadier General Sean Boyette is 
the director of the joint staff for Joint Force Headquarters in 
St. Augustine, Florida. He is here today representing the 
Florida National Guard. General Boyette is an accomplished 
military leader with over 20 years' experience in enterprise 
technology and military management. Ms. Heather MacLeod is a 
director in the Government Accountability Office's Homeland 
Security and Justice Team. With over 20 years' experience at 
GAO, Ms. MacLeod oversees Coast Guard and maritime security 
issues, including Coast Guard workforce and strategic planning 
efforts, and maritime port and cargo security.
    I thank all the witnesses for being here today. I now 
recognize Rear Admiral Jo-Ann Burdian for 5 minutes to 
summarize her opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JO-ANN F. BURDIAN, ASSISTANT 
   COMMANDANT FOR RESPONSE POLICY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD

    Admiral Burdian. Good afternoon, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking 
Member Thanedar, and Members of the subcommittee. I'm grateful 
for your support of the Coast Guard, and I'm honored to be here 
today to discuss how the Coast Guard supports maritime border 
security. I've submitted my full written statement to the 
subcommittee, and I ask that it be entered into the record.
    Chairman Gimenez. Yes.
    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, sir. Every year, America's 
ports and waterways support $5.4 trillion of maritime commerce. 
Every day, across the Nation and around the globe, Coast Guard 
personnel work alongside international, interagency, and 
industry partners to uphold maritime security while 
facilitating vital commerce. The United States enjoys 95,000 
miles of coastline, which is the maritime border that we're 
discussing here today. There are 36 Coast Guard sector 
commanders stationed around the Nation who are also designated 
as the Federal maritime security coordinator for those regions.
    These field commanders manage security cooperation in our 
ports through area maritime security committees. They 
coordinate operations, share intelligence, and collaborate in 
investigations with the other DHS components through the DHS 
regional coordinating mechanisms. They also direct Coast Guard 
operations offshore to create a layered approach to maritime 
homeland security--excuse me--maritime border security.
    Transnational criminal organizations, which you'll hear me 
refer to as TCOs, are criminal enterprises that create 
instability, harm economies, and threaten citizens around the 
world. The Coast Guard, which is at all times an armed service 
and a maritime law enforcement agency, is uniquely positioned 
to combat these TCOs to help secure the maritime border. TCOS 
move over 90 percent of cocaine bound for the United States 
through maritime routes, and we target these loads where 
they're most vulnerable at sea, far from U.S. shores. Over the 
last 5 years, the Coast Guard has interdicted 888 metric tons 
of cocaine worth over $25 billion. We've detained over 2,700 
drug smugglers for Federal prosecution.
    The Coast Guard is also keenly focused on historic levels 
of irregular maritime migration. In the approaches to the 
southeastern United States, irregular maritime migration 
increased by over 500 percent between fiscal years 2020 and 
2022, primarily consisting of Cuban and Haitian nationals. 
We've deployed additional ships, aircraft, boats, and personnel 
to support this operational surge. Along our southwest maritime 
border in the approaches to California, we recorded a near-200 
percent increase during the same time period encountering 
primarily Mexican nationals.
    Maritime migrant interdiction is a homeland security 
mission. But I'll add that for any of us who's ever executed 
this mission, it is first and foremost a life-saving operation. 
It's one that our crews are carrying around--carrying out with 
the utmost professionalism, maturity, and compassion. Maritime 
migrants take to the sea, as you mentioned, Mr. Thanedar, in 
dangerously overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels that aren't 
equipped with any life-saving or communication equipment. I'd 
offer, if you look at the well in front of you and imagine it 
filled with 300 folks with all of their worldly possessions at 
sea for 6 days, that typically is what Coast Guard crews are 
encountering on some of these vessels.
    Last year, when I was a sector commander in Miami, I 
directed search-and-rescue operations after a Good Samaritan 
located a single survivor clinging to the hull of a capsized 
vessel in the Florida Straits. Following a 3-day search 
operation, crews were able to recover the remains of 5 deceased 
persons and over 30 additional folks were lost to the sea. I 
wish I could say that this is a unique operation, but as you 
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, these kinds of cases continue and 
really are reflective of the dire circumstances maritime 
migrants find themselves in and the absolute depravity for 
human life we see in human smugglers.
    As the surge persists, Coast Guard crews are witnessing 
increased incidents of noncompliance and self-harm. Your Coast 
Guard sentinels, alongside our CBP partners have demonstrated 
exceptional resilience in the face of increasingly challenging 
circumstances.
    We face different challenges along the Northern Border. 
Together with Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard 
collaborates with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to maintain 
domain awareness and conduct integrated cross-border maritime 
law enforcement operations to disrupt all illicit activity. 
Thank you again for your support of the Coast Guard. I 
appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I look forward 
to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Admiral Burdian follows:]
                Prepared Statement of Jo-Ann F. Burdian
                             March 23, 2023
                              introduction
    Good afternoon, Chairman Gimenez and distinguished Members of the 
subcommittee. I am honored to be here today to discuss the Coast 
Guard's role in securing America's maritime border.
    The United States is a maritime nation with 95,000 miles of 
shoreline and 361 commercial ports connecting 25,000 miles of navigable 
channels facilitating the flow of $5.4 trillion dollars of maritime 
economic commerce. More than 90 percent of the volume of overseas trade 
enters or leaves the United States by ship. Your Coast Guard is a 
unique, complementary organization within the Department of Homeland 
Security enterprise. We are at all times an Armed Force, a Federal law 
enforcement agency, humanitarian first responders, environmental 
stewards, a regulatory agency, and a member of the intelligence 
community. Your Coast Guard is a nimble instrument of national power. 
We protect the homeland, save lives, and preserve the world's ocean. I 
am pleased to share with you how we leverage our unique authorities and 
capabilities, and relationships with international, Federal, State, 
local, and Tribal partners to operationalize a layered approach to 
maritime border security. I am pleased to share what America's Coast 
Guard is doing to protect our communities from transnational threats.
                       maritime drug interdiction
    Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) pose a significant 
threat to our Nation's maritime border security. TCO enterprises are 
diffuse, agile, and independent organizations that engage in drug 
trafficking, human smuggling, and other types of illicit activity. TCOs 
operate throughout our hemisphere, sowing regional instability and 
corruption, and threatening our shared security and prosperity. No 
single agency can dismantle this threat alone. The Coast Guard 
collaborates with partners across all levels of government, as well as 
international partners, to combat TCO activities.
    The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime law 
enforcement, including drug interdiction on the high seas. We share the 
lead for drug interdiction in U.S. territorial seas with U.S. Customs 
and Border Protection (CBP). The Coast Guard partners with the 
Department of Defense, through Joint Interagency Task Force--South 
(JIATF-S), for detection and monitoring of illicit drugs bound for the 
United States, and the Department of Justice and the Organized Crime 
Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) to target, detect, interdict, and 
prosecute transnational organized criminals to dismantle their 
networks.
    From fiscal years 2018 through 2022, the Coast Guard removed 888 
metric tons of cocaine from the transit zone, worth an estimated 
wholesale value of $25.75 billion, and detained 2,776 drug smugglers 
for U.S. prosecution; in fiscal year 2020, 92 percent of the cocaine 
destined to the United States departed South America through the 
maritime domain, using commercial and non-commercial conveyances. Our 
layered approach to combat TCOs, as far away from U.S. shores as 
practical, is through security cooperation and integrated out of area 
deployments, and while we mitigate the threat of all narcotics and 
recognize the impact of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl on the 
United States, the most significant drug threat in the maritime domain 
remains cocaine.
    The Coast Guard maintains a physical presence in 30 countries 
around the world, of which about half of these countries are in the 
Western Hemisphere. Coast Guard personnel serve in various capacities 
as security cooperation officers, maritime advisors, attaches, 
liaisons, support to interdiction and prosecution teams, or technical 
experts. Through these integrated touchpoints we work with our partners 
to identify challenges and opportunities to increase their capabilities 
to combat TCOs inside their borders and maritime jurisdictional zones.
    The Coast Guard also maintains more than 40 bilateral agreements. 
These agreements enable operations on partner-nation flagged vessels 
suspected of illicit activities on the high seas and in waters subject 
to their jurisdiction. In fiscal year 2021, partner nations were 
responsible for more than 60 percent of cocaine removals in the Western 
Hemisphere transit zone, and in fiscal year 2022, our South and Central 
American partners contributed to 75 percent of drug disruptions. These 
types of international activities, in addition to participation in 
combined exercises and Coast Guard provided training, enable partner 
nations to increase the professionalization of their workforce, enhance 
their maritime capabilities, and empower regional countries to lead 
coordinated efforts to combat TCOs at the source.
    Coast Guard forces deploy to the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean to 
patrol the transit zone to deter, detect, and interdict maritime drug 
trafficking events. Coast Guard deployments are complementary to U.S. 
Navy, Canadian, British, and Dutch naval deployments with embarked 
Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments, capitalizing on the Coast 
Guard's authorities and expertise to interdict narcotics before they 
approach our borders. These surface assets are supported by Coast 
Guard, CBP, U.S. Navy, and Dutch fixed-wing aircraft. These aircraft 
conduct detection and monitoring, with intelligence and investigative 
support through JIATF-S embedded liaisons.
    In fiscal year 2022, following Coast Guard-led maritime 
interdictions, intelligence, and investigative support to our 
interagency and partner nation teammates, the Department of Justice 
successfully extradited and indicted Julio De Los Santos-Bautista, a 
Consolidated Priority Organizational Target and TCO leader responsible 
for smuggling cocaine from South America into the United States, via 
Puerto Rico. In addition to the indictment, an additional 18 members of 
Mr. De Los Santos-Bautista's TCO were arrested, and 16 properties were 
seized by Dominican partners. Successes like this investigation are the 
result of the Coast Guard's integrated efforts with partners to combat 
TCOs attempting to exploit our maritime borders.
                          migrant interdiction
    Another threat to our maritime border security is irregular 
maritime migration. We approach maritime migration operations as a 
life-saving mission. Migrants can take to the sea in a variety of 
conveyances, which are often overloaded with little to no safety 
equipment nor experience piloting vessels, especially in adverse 
weather conditions. Over the last 5 years, approximately 341 migrants 
who embarked on a vessel to enter the United States did not survive the 
journey and were either recovered by the Coast Guard or were presumed 
lost at sea. It is not uncommon for migrants to pay a smuggler or 
organizer upwards of $10,000 to embark on the unsafe journey to the 
United States.
    Coast Guard policy to interdict migrants at sea is rooted in 
national-level policy, established following maritime mass migrations 
in the 1980's and 1990's. The key tenets of those policies are to: 
Interdict individuals at sea, as far away from U.S. shores as possible, 
and collaborate with the Department of State to enter into 
international agreements with countries to enable direct maritime 
repatriations, when appropriate. The Coast Guard maintains 
international agreements and liaisons with the Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican 
Republic, and Haiti to support safe, direct repatriations of 
interdicted migrants, consistent with international rules and norms and 
with U.S. policy on protection screening relating to fear of 
persecution or torture upon return. During instances when a migrant 
warrants protection screening by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, the Coast Guard works through an interagency process, as 
outlined in the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan, and may 
transfer them to a safe location for further screening. For migrants 
who do not warrant further protection screening, the Coast Guard works 
closely with the interagency and international partners to ensure a 
safe repatriation.
    Over the last year-and-a-half, the Coast Guard observed an increase 
in irregular maritime migration, above historical norms, across our 
southern maritime border. This is a difficult mission for our crews. 
The desperation of these individuals we encounter is palpable, and the 
human smugglers associated with these voyages are devoid of compassion. 
For example, patrolling the waters of the South Florida Straits can be 
compared to patrolling a land area the size of Maryland with 7 police 
cars limited to traveling at 15 miles per hour. It requires exceptional 
tactical coordination between aircraft, ships, boats, and supporting 
partners ashore. It is not uncommon for migrant vessels we encounter to 
be non-compliant, threatening the lives of other migrants on board 
through acts of violence, ingesting hazardous chemicals, even holding 
small children over the side of the vessel to deter a Coast Guard 
rescue. Once on board our ships, Coast Guard personnel humanely tend to 
the needs of migrants, providing food, shelter from the elements, and 
medical care where required. Every person we encounter is treated with 
dignity and respect, and full acknowledgment that those individuals are 
seeking a better quality of life.
    Coast Guard operators are professionals, but also spouses, parents, 
siblings, aunts, uncles, and sometimes grandparents. These operations 
are deeply impactful to our people, who have demonstrated remarkable 
resilience in the face of an increasingly challenging operational 
environment.
Southeast United States, including Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands
    The southeast maritime approaches encompass much higher levels of 
irregular maritime migration as compared to the other U.S. southern 
maritime vectors. In this region, from fiscal year 2020 to 2022, 
migrant flow increased by 521 percent, from 5,670 to 29,520. Notably in 
this vector, Cuban irregular maritime migration flow early into the 
second quarter of fiscal year 2023 is 10,964, as compared to the total 
Cuban maritime flow for fiscal year 2022, 9,538. Primary nationalities 
encountered in this region are Cubans, Haitians, and Dominicans, in 
addition to much smaller populations of other nationalities. Most Cuban 
and Haitian migrants use transit routes into Florida, either directly 
or via the Bahamas. Alternatively, Dominican and some Haitian migrants 
use shorter transit routes across the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands. Common conveyances used in this region range 
from fishing vessels, coastal freighters, sail freighters, go-fast type 
vessels, and ``rusticas.''
    These conveyances can transport as few as 10 migrants on a 
``rustica'' to hundreds on a sail freighter, or coastal freighter. 
Interdicting and rescuing migrants from these types of conveyances is 
dangerous, not only for the migrant, but also for our crews and 
partners. On March 6, 2022, a Haitian coastal freighter ran aground 
near Key Largo, Florida, attempting to offload passengers on U.S. 
shores. Of the 356 migrants on the vessel, 158 jumped off the vessel 
and attempted a perilous swim to shore without any safety equipment. 
Responses to incidents of this magnitude require a robust response both 
on the water and on shore, what the Coast Guard would refer to as a 
mass rescue operation. Despite the quick and effective coordination on 
scene, it is not uncommon for responders to be overwhelmed.
    In 2003, DHS established an interagency task force called Homeland 
Security Task Force--Southeast, to prepare for, prevent, deter, and 
respond to a potential or actual maritime mass migration. The task 
force is made up of DHS components, the Department of Defense, and 
State and local agencies, optimizing authorities, capabilities, and 
manpower to prevent a mass maritime migration, which presents a risk to 
both national security and our maritime border security. The Coast 
Guard integrates its coastal, offshore, aviation, and intelligence 
resources to support DHS's operational plan, Operations Vigilant 
Sentry. This plan is DHS's standing interagency response plan to deter 
irregular maritime migration.
Southwest Maritime Border
    The southwest maritime border vector also recorded significant 
surges in irregular maritime migration, but not to the scale of the 
southeast maritime approaches. Fiscal year 2022 marked a 10-year record 
high of migrant flow \1\ or a 200 percent increase from fiscal year 
2019. Human smugglers rely on recreational vessels or ``panga'' style 
vessels to transport as many as 30 migrants at a time; other common 
conveyances include personal watercraft. Although migrants with a 
variety of nationalities are interdicted in this vector, the vast 
majority are Mexican nationals. The Coast Guard does not have an 
agreement with the government of Mexico to directly repatriate migrants 
through the sea. In these situations, the Coast Guard transfers the 
migrants to CBP for an appropriate processing including expedited 
removal.
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    \1\ The Coast Guard characterizes ``flow'' as known landings, other 
known departures, and Coast Guard, U.S. partner agency, and foreign 
partner interdictions, turn-arounds, and estimates of the number lost 
at sea.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Gulf of Mexico
    In the Gulf of Mexico, irregular maritime migration events 
increased by 530 percent from fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year 
2022. In this vector, migrant events are organized and facilitated by 
human smuggling networks, or TCOs, using ``pangas'' or recreational 
vessels. As with the southwest maritime border, the vast majority of 
migrants interdicted in this vector are Mexican nationals. In fiscal 
year 2022, there were 20 instances resulting in the interdiction of 14 
Cuban migrants. In these cases, the Coast Guard works through regional 
interagency partners to transfer interdicted migrants ashore to CBP.
                            northern border
    The northern border is expansive and diverse with numerous islands, 
waterways, short distances between United States and Canadian 
territorial seas creating opportunities for transnational actors to 
exploit vulnerable maritime areas with relatively reduced law 
enforcement presence.
    Maritime security threats along the Northern Border include both 
irregular maritime migration and drug trafficking. Known irregular 
maritime migration flow averages 30 per year, primarily across the 
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway. TCOs traffic Canadian marijuana, 
fentanyl, methamphetamines, and other synthetic drugs near the Strait 
of Juan de Fuca, the Great Lakes, and other less populated areas.
    The United States signed the Framework Agreement on Integrated 
Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO) with Canada 
in 2009 and began to operationalize ICMLEO in 2012. Since then, the 
Coast Guard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) developed a 
program to train and designate officers to co-crew one another's boats 
and aircraft to enforce Canadian and United States Federal laws on 
either side of the shared border. Since then, 713 boat crews and 349 
aircrews from the Coast Guard and RCMP were trained to conduct ICMLEO 
operations. From calendar year 2016 through 2019, ICMLEO units made 32 
arrests, interdicted 57 migrants, and seized 150 kg of cocaine, 1,600 
kgs of liquid methamphetamines, and 10 kgs of barbiturate and ketamine. 
In April 2021, Coast Guard, RCMP, and CBP partners interdicted more 
than 342 pounds of methamphetamine worth more than $1.5 million near 
Port Angeles, Washington. The ICMLEO program is a fantastic example of 
how the Coast Guard teams alongside the RCMP, CBP, and other State and 
local law enforcement to prevent TCOs from exploiting our Northern 
Border.
                           secure u.s. ports
    Although the Coast Guard works to interdict threats as far from the 
United States as possible, we also have key maritime security roles in 
our near-shore and port environments. We leverage our unique 
authorities as Captain of the Port, Federal Maritime Security 
Coordinator, and Officer in Charge Marine Inspection to protect 
America's ports and waterways. Area Maritime Security Committees are 
established in each port to identify critical port infrastructure, 
operations, risks, and mitigation strategies; and to develop, train, 
and exercise the Area Maritime Security Plan. The Coast Guard conducts 
foreign and domestic vessel inspections and security boardings, 
container and facility inspections, and marine casualty investigations 
to prevent marine casualties and property losses, minimize security 
risks, protect the marine environment, facilitate the legitimate use of 
waterways, and suppress violations of Federal law.
    The Coast Guard, CBP, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 
have established Regional Coordinating Mechanisms (ReCoM) to further 
interagency and port partner collaboration through intelligence 
integration, operational planning, and interagency operations to target 
and disrupt TCOs and threats to protect our marine transportation 
system. Additionally, ReCoM partners conduct surge operations such as 
Multi-Agency Strike Force Operations which leverage the jurisdictions, 
authorities, and resources of multiple agencies to ensure the safe and 
legal movement of containerized cargo and waterside facility security. 
Another aspect of the Coast Guard's role in securing U.S. ports is 
through conducting international port security assessments. These 
assessments adhere to the International Ship and Port Facility Security 
Code which serves as a framework through which countries cooperate to 
deter and prevent maritime threats from entering ports.
               the importance of investment in capability
    To sustain and improve on these operational successes, the Coast 
Guard needs to continue re-capitalizing its patrol boats and major 
cutters. The Coast Guard has nearly completed its replacement of legacy 
110-ft patrol boats with more capable Fast Response Cutters (FRC). 
These ships play key roles every day in both drug and migrant 
interdiction missions.
    Additionally, National Security Cutters (NSC) demonstrate 
tremendous capability and make unique contributions, particularly to 
the drug interdiction mission. One of the Coast Guard's highest 
priorities is the acquisition of 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs). The 
OPC will be the backbone of Coast Guard offshore presence and will 
replace the 30-to-50-year-old Medium Endurance Cutters that are 
operating well beyond their service lives. These assets are essential 
to interdicting drug smugglers and irregular migrants at sea, as well 
as rescuing mariners, enforcing fisheries laws, responding to 
disasters, and protecting our ports. I would like to acknowledge and 
thank Congress for the support of the Coast Guard's FRC, NSC, and OPC 
acquisition programs; our crews are fighting for the American people 
every day, and with the addition of the OPC, we will be able to extend 
our presence even further to combat shared transnational threats.
                               conclusion
    The Coast Guard's layered approach to maritime border security 
relies on our unique authorities, capabilities, and partnerships to 
address threats as far away from U.S. shores as possible. To do this, 
we must continue to invest in our workforce, re-capitalize aging assets 
and infrastructure, and explore and integrate new technologies that 
enhance our interoperability with partner agencies across all levels of 
government, including our international partners. The Coast Guard is a 
team player in protecting our maritime border security. We recognize 
the importance and value of working by, with, and through our partners, 
because we cannot do this alone. Our hemispheric security is a shared 
responsibility, and your Coast Guard is all-in, complementing our 
capabilities and resources through regular collaboration, sharing 
information, and innovating in ways to protect the American people.
    Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and thank you for 
your continued support of the U.S. Coast Guard. I would be pleased to 
answer your questions.

    Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Rear Admiral Burdian. I now 
recognize Executive Director Miller for 5 minutes to summarize 
his opening statements.

    STATEMENT OF JONATHAN P. MILLER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR 
OPERATIONS, AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 
                           PROTECTION

    Mr. Miller. Good afternoon, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking 
Member Thanedar, and Members of the subcommittee. It is my 
honor to appear before you today representing the men and women 
of Air and Marine Operations and speak to you about our 
strategic mission to safeguard our Nation's maritime borders. 
As an operational component of U.S. Customs and Border 
Protection, AMO protects the security interests of the United 
States by using aviation and maritime law enforcement 
expertise, innovative capabilities, and partnerships. Our 
greatest resources are the sound judgment and experience of our 
dedicated agents, of which 60 percent are veterans of the armed 
services.
    Today, I'd like to focus on two dynamic challenges we're 
facing in the maritime border environment, elevated levels of 
migrants, and the continued threat of maritime drug smuggling. 
Similar to the situation on the southwest land border, we're 
seeing surges of irregular migration on the water. In fiscal 
year 2022, AMO enforcement efforts led to the apprehension of 
nearly 9,400 migrants in the maritime environment, an increase 
of 242 percent from fiscal year 2021 and 334 percent from 
fiscal year 2020. Already this fiscal year, AMO participated in 
6,200 migrant apprehensions in the maritime environment with 94 
percent of those apprehensions occurring in the Florida Straits 
and the Caribbean.
    Migrants attempting to make the journey to the United 
States by way of maritime pathways take enormous risks, putting 
their lives in the hands of smugglers operating improvised 
rustic vessels that are neither sea-worthy nor built to 
accommodate the number of people on board. Encounters with 
these vessels often transition to rescue missions with some of 
the most challenging rescues involving Haitian sail freighters, 
often overloaded with hundreds of migrants.
    AMO continues to encounter drug smugglers trying to evade 
detection and apprehension. Our detection and interdiction 
efforts result in the seizure of tons of dangerous illicit 
drugs, keeping them from reaching our shores and our 
communities. In fiscal year 2022, AMO enforcement efforts led 
to the seizure of more than 380,000 pounds of drugs including 
approximately 250,000 pounds of cocaine, 100,000 pounds of 
marijuana, 25,000 pounds of methamphetamine, and one 1,500 
pounds of fentanyl. Approximately 82 percent of these seizures 
occurred in the maritime environment.
    In addition to increased encounters with drug smugglers and 
migrant vessels, we've also seen a rise in violence in the 
maritime environment. Use of force events nearly doubled last 
year, with Puerto Rico being the most violent maritime threat 
vector of any location we patrolled. On November 17, 2022, 
Marine Interdiction Agent Michel Maceda was shot and killed and 
his two partners gravely injured during a gunfight with drug 
smugglers following a vessel interdiction off the coast of Cabo 
Rojo, Puerto Rico. Just 2 months later, another gunfight during 
a vessel interdiction off the coast of Fajardo resulted in the 
death of two drug smugglers.
    AMO is committed to its maritime security mission and 
continues to make investments in vessels, aircraft, and other 
technological capabilities to advance the effectiveness of our 
operations. We are heavily invested in radars and sensors, 
increasing domain awareness along our littoral borders. Over 
the last year and a half, tethered aerostats equipped with 
marine surface radars and marine autonomous surveillance towers 
have contributed to the seizure of over 12,000 pounds of 
cocaine, dozens of vessels, and hundreds of apprehensions.
    Partnerships are a crucial force multiplier in the maritime 
environment. In addition to the U.S. Coast Guard, AMO routinely 
works with the Federal, State, and local partners, including 
frequent coordination and joint operations with foreign 
governments. AMO is a key component of the DHS Joint Task Force 
East and one of the largest aviation contributors to DoD-led 
Joint Interagency Task Force South Coalition. AMO provides 
thousands of hours of intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities through the source and transit 
zones, resulting in the interdiction of hundreds of thousands 
of illicit narcotics before they can make it to the U.S. 
borders.
    I look forward to working with Congress to ensure AMO could 
even further serve U.S. national security interests by 
extending our operational authority to the contiguous zone of 
the United States and by securing permanent foreign authorities 
to better engage with foreign partners and conduct aircraft 
deployments abroad. Thank you for the opportunity to testify 
today, and I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
                Prepared Statement of Jonathan P. Miller
                             March 23, 2023
                              introduction
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and distinguished 
Members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today 
to discuss Air and Marine Operations' (AMO) strategic mission to 
safeguard our Nation's maritime borders. As an operational component of 
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), AMO protects United States' 
interests by anticipating and confronting security threats through our 
aviation and maritime law enforcement expertise, innovative 
capabilities, and partnerships at the border and beyond.
    AMO is a critical component of CBP's border security mission and 
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) risk-based and multi-
layered approach to homeland security. We apply advanced aeronautical 
and maritime capabilities and employ our unique skill sets to safeguard 
our Nation's borders and preserve America's security interests.
    With approximately 1,800 Federal agents and mission support 
personnel, 250 aircraft, and 290 marine vessels \1\ operating 
throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands, 
AMO thrives on being extremely efficient and adaptive. Our greatest 
resources are the sound judgment and experience of our agents, who 
average 17 years of law enforcement experience with AMO. More than 60 
percent of these sworn agents are veterans of the Armed Services, and 
many have prior law enforcement experience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ AMO owns and maintains CBP's 290 vessels, including riverine 
vessels that are operated by the U.S. Border Patrol.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AMO is uniquely positioned--organizationally, with unique 
authorities and jurisdiction, and unequaled specialized training, 
equipment, and domain awareness capability--to protect America's 
security and prosperity interests beyond the Nation's border in source 
and transit zones, between ports of entry, in our coastal waters, and 
within the Nation's interior.
                      amo history and authorities
    Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the 
United States, the newly-formed DHS distributed legacy air and marine 
programs from the U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Border Patrol into two 
newly-created agencies, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) 
and CBP, respectively. In 2005, DHS transferred all of ICE's legacy 
Customs air and marine programs to CBP. In 2006, CBP established AMO, a 
specialized law enforcement component merging all legacy air and marine 
programs into one organization.
    Today, AMO operates out of approximately 74 locations through the 
United States, and is divided into three regions: Southwest, Northern, 
and Southeast Region. Each region is split into Air and Marine 
Branches, and then further divided into Air and/or Marine Units.
    AMO also has six National Air Security Operations Centers that plan 
and conduct missions with P-3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and 
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) programs, and the Air and Marine 
Operations Center (AMOC), which is responsible for managing the air and 
maritime domain awareness of the Department, as directed by the 
Secretary. The AMOC detects, identifies, and coordinates responses to 
national security threats in the air domain, in coordination with other 
appropriate agencies.
    Together, AMO's professional and highly-skilled workforce and 
operational assets create a sophisticated domain awareness network 
across the United States providing critical aerial and maritime 
surveillance, interdiction, and operational capabilities in support of 
AMO's maritime border security mission.
AMO Law Enforcement Authorities
    An integral part of CBP's border security mission, AMO agents are 
credentialed law enforcement officers \2\ with a broad range of 
authorities that enable them to transcend land, air, and sea domains 
and jurisdictions, providing a critical layer of continuity in 
enforcement efforts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ 19 U.S.C.  1589a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Within the ``customs waters''\3\ of the United States, or at any 
place within the United States, AMO agents may board a vessel for the 
purpose of enforcing customs law and to use all necessary force to 
compel compliance.\4\ Additionally, in certain circumstances, AMO is 
authorized to operate on the high seas, for instance when enforcing 
laws on U.S. registered vessels,\5\ hovering vessels,\6\ and vessels 
subject to hot pursuit.\7\ Additionally, beyond the customs waters, AMO 
may enforce the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act \8\ where 
appropriate, which concerns the trafficking of controlled substances 
aboard vessels in extraterritorial waters. These authorities enable AMO 
to extend our zone of security surrounding our maritime border and 
littorals of the United States.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ 19 U.S.C.  1401(j), 1709(c).
    \4\ 19 U.S.C.  1581(a).
    \5\ 19 CFR  162.3.
    \6\ 19 U.S.C.  1401(k).
    \7\ 19 U.S.C.  1581.
    \8\ 46 U.S.C.  70501-70502.
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    In their capacity as CBP law enforcement agents, AMO agents also 
enforce immigration laws in the territorial sea, on land, and in the 
air. AMO has the same broad immigration authority \9\ as the U.S. 
Border Patrol; however, it is also in the unique position to enforce 
this authority in the maritime environment. Similar to other 
investigative agencies, AMO agents recruit confidential sources, 
develop criminal cases, support prosecutors, and testify in court in 
addition to their enforcement actions in the air, land, and maritime 
domains. This combination of authorities enables AMO to conduct 
successful investigations in the maritime domain.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ 8 U.S.C.  1-1778.
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                  current state of the maritime border
    AMO's maritime border security mission is complex and challenging. 
The maritime domain is generally less restricted than the air and land 
environments, and it is an expansive pathway, without barriers, that 
connects to more than 95,000 miles of U.S. shoreline.
    Thousands of vessels enter or operate in U.S. territorial waters 
every day. While the vast majority operate for recreation or legitimate 
commerce, a small percentage engage in smuggling and other illegal 
activity. Detecting an illegal activity and apprehending any associated 
smuggling can be daunting, as many mimic legitimate traffic, while 
others elude detection altogether.
    While the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 \10\ and the 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) require 
many commercial, passenger, and fishing vessels to broadcast their 
position via transponder and operate with an Automatic Identification 
System (AIS)--a tracking system to, among other things, increase 
maritime awareness--the requirement does not cover many small vessels. 
Furthermore, unlike air traffic, small vessels \11\ inbound to the 
United States are generally not required to announce their arrivals in 
advance, nor are they required to make their initial landing at a 
designated port of entry. Therefore, detecting and assessing the risk 
of small vessels is particularly challenging.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ 46 U.S.C.  2101.
    \11\ ``Small vessels'' are characterized as any watercraft, 
regardless of method of propulsion, less than 300 gross tons. Small 
vessels can include commercial fishing vessels, recreational boats and 
yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, or any other 
commercial vessels involved in foreign or U.S. voyages. DHS, Small 
Vessel Security Implementation Plan Report to the Public, January 2011. 
https://www.dhs.gov/small-vessel-security-strategy-implementation-plan.
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Interdicting Irregular Maritime Migration
    Like the situation at our Southwest land border, the United States 
is experiencing periodic surges of irregular migration in the maritime 
environment. In fiscal year 2022, AMO enforcement efforts led to the 
interdictions of 9,392 migrants in the maritime environment, an 
increase of 242 percent from fiscal year 2021 and 334 percent from 
fiscal year 2020. In fiscal year 2023 to date,\12\ AMO enforcement 
actions have led to 6,130 migrant interdictions in the maritime 
environment, with 94 percent of those interdictions occurring in South 
Florida and the Caribbean Sea as AMO continues to support the DHS-wide 
effort to address irregular maritime migration from Haiti and Cuba.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ As of February 28, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Migrants attempting to make the journey to the United States by way 
of maritime pathways take an enormous risk, putting their lives in the 
hands of transnational criminal organizations (TCO) and human smuggling 
networks and often in improvised, rustic vessels. The weather at sea is 
unpredictable, and in these handmade crafts, the possibility of 
capsizing and even drowning is often imminent. The vessels that make it 
far enough for AMO to encounter are often dangerously overloaded with 
people--people who most often are not equipped with life preservers. 
The journey is perilous and AMO encounters with these vessels very 
often become rescue missions.
    Rescue operations at sea are extremely dangerous for migrants as 
well as our marine agents. In July 2022, AMO Miami Air and Marine 
Branch Marine Interdiction Agents partnered with the United States 
Coast Guard (USCG) to rescue 23 people from the sea near Marathon, 
Florida, after their rustic vessel had begun to take on water and sink. 
The Marine Interdiction Agents responded quickly, providing life 
jackets to the migrants who were making frantic attempts to swim or 
cling to any debris within reach. Just a few days after this event, 
CBP, USCG, and other law enforcement partners \13\ rescued 68 Haitian 
migrants after smugglers recklessly dropped them off in the water near 
the shores of Mona Island, Puerto Rico. Tragically, 5 Haitian migrants 
did not survive this smuggling event.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-and-
coast-guard-respond-haitian-smuggling-venture-resulted.
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Interdicting Maritime Drug Smuggling
    In addition to responding to increasing numbers of maritime migrant 
encounters AMO continues to effectively intercept tons of dangerous 
illicit drugs, keeping them from reaching our shores and communities. 
In fiscal year 2022, AMO enforcement efforts led to the seizure of 
382,916 pounds of drugs, including 250,616 pounds of cocaine, 104,262 
pounds of marijuana, 25,625 pounds of methamphetamine, and 1,475 pounds 
of fentanyl.\14\ Approximately 82 percent of these seizures occurred in 
the maritime environment, with AMO enforcement actions leading to the 
seizure of 234,349 pounds of cocaine, 75,918 pounds of marijuana, 1,432 
pounds of methamphetamine, and 146 pounds of fentanyl.
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    \14\ https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/air-sea.
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    AMO encounters a wide range of vessels and tactics used to smuggle 
illicit drugs in the maritime approaches to the United States. Across 
the coastal regions around Florida and the Caribbean, as well as within 
the Gulf Coast and Southern California Coast, AMO encounters both small 
and large vessels attempting to conceal their activities by hiding in 
plain sight among other recreational traffic and legitimate maritime 
commerce.
    A considerable drug smuggling threat is smugglers' continued use of 
modified fishing boats, sometimes called ``pangas.'' Generally made of 
wood or fiberglass, these homemade vessels have relatively high-speed 
capabilities and a small radar signature. Use of these vessels at night 
amplifies their ability to evade detection by surface patrol vessels 
and patrol aircraft. Smaller craft are used for quick cross-border 
trips, while larger vessels can transit in deeper waters, further 
offshore. While pangas have traditionally been used primarily to 
transport illicit drugs, smugglers are increasing the use of these 
dangerous vessels to transport undocumented migrants.
    Overloaded migrant vessels, perilous rescues, and increased 
engagements with drug-smuggling vessels have coincided with increased 
violence in the maritime environment. During an incident this past 
November near Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico, an AMO marine interdiction agent 
was shot and killed and two others gravely injured during an 
interdiction of a suspicious vessel.\15\ This is just one example of a 
pattern of growing violence in the region.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/speeches-and-statements/cbp-
marine-interdiction-agent-dies-line-duty-near-puerto-rico.
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    With a wide maritime area of responsibility, AMO adapts to changing 
conditions and emerging trends and remains vigilant of security threats 
through our maritime law enforcement expertise, advanced assets, 
innovative capabilities, and partnerships.
               strengthening maritime border enforcement
    AMO is committed to its maritime security mission and continues to 
make investments in vessels, aircraft, and other technological 
capabilities to advance the effectiveness of its operations. These 
investments support AMO's on-going ability to effectively respond to 
migrant encounters and drug seizures in the maritime environment, as 
mentioned above, but also contribute to other AMO enforcement actions, 
including those that led to 166 arrests and the seizure of 41 weapons 
and $4.9 million in U.S. currency in fiscal year 2022.
    Often, there is little time to interdict inbound suspect vessels, 
and AMO has honed its maritime border security response capability 
around rapid and effective interception, pursuit, and interdiction of 
these crafts.
Maritime Interdiction Capabilities
    AMO maritime law enforcement agents use high-speed Coastal 
Interceptor Vessels (CIV) that are specifically designed and engineered 
with the speed, maneuverability, integrity, and endurance to intercept 
and engage a variety of suspect non-compliant vessels. Our vessels are 
operated by highly-trained and experienced AMO crews authorized to 
deploy any required use of force, including warning shots and disabling 
fire to stop fleeing vessels.
    Over the last two decades, AMO has evolved to counter the egregious 
threat of non-compliant vessels. AMO has developed capabilities to 
disable non-compliant vessels and to bring dangerous pursuits to a 
conclusion and prevent these vessels from reaching our shores. Since 
2003, AMO has engaged in 248 cases involving marine warning and/or 
disabling rounds, and four cases involving air-to-vessel warning and 
disabling rounds.
    With its maritime vessel expertise and investigative authority AMO 
often works in partnership with ICE, Homeland Security Investigations 
(HSI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) conducting covert and plainclothes operations in 
the maritime border environment; utilizing unmarked and undercover 
vessels when situations dictate that the surveillance of drug loads or 
TCO activity can yield larger seizures as a part of on-going 
investigations.
Maritime Aircraft Assets
    Although AMO routinely makes seizures through maritime border 
patrols, most arrests and seizures are the result of actionable 
information or detection by aircraft. For example, just a couple of 
weeks ago, an AMO Jacksonville, Florida-based P-3 aircraft detected a 
suspect vessel moving toward the southern coast of Puerto Rico and 
guided AMO marine interdiction agents to intercept. AMO agents seized 
2,351 pounds of cocaine and apprehended three smugglers.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/amo-seizes-
2351-pounds-cocaine-southern-puerto-rico.
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    AMO's P-3 Long-Range Tracker and Airborne Early Warning aircraft 
are multi-role, high-endurance aircraft capable of performing border 
security mission sets in the air and maritime environments. Equipped 
with a multitude of highly-sophisticated communications equipment, 
radar, and imagery sensors, operated by highly-trained professional 
sworn law enforcement agents and officers, the P-3 is accredited with 
the interdiction of 137,148 pounds of cocaine and 6,146 flight hours 
within the Western Hemisphere Transit Zones in fiscal year 2022, which 
equated to over 22 pounds of narcotics interdicted per flight hour.
    The integration of UAS provides critical enhancements to AMO's air, 
land, and maritime border domain awareness and capabilities. UAS 
provide high-endurance, long-range capabilities for intelligence, 
surveillance, and reconnaissance collections of land borders, inland 
waters, littoral waters, and high seas with multiple advanced sensor 
arrays. The use of UAS in the maritime environment has increased AMO's 
ability to effectively detect, monitor, and track both personnel and 
conveyances involved in illegal activity.
    CBP's aerial surveillance capabilities in the maritime environment 
have also been enhanced through continued investment and deployment in 
DHC-8 MPA and Super King Air 350 Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA). 
The DHC-8 is a medium-range airplane that bridges the gap between the 
strategic P-3 and UAS, and smaller aircraft operating in the littoral 
waters. With state-of-the art sensors and systems, the DHC-8 has 
provided game-changing detection capability in the Caribbean, Eastern 
Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico. The MEA enhances AMO's ability to maintain 
domain awareness of the U.S. littorals and coastline, while also 
providing AMO agents the ability to continue investigations seamlessly 
into the interior of the United States, landing at small remote 
airports to interdict suspected air smugglers.
    AMO's Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)\17\ is an effective 
surveillance asset providing radar detection and monitoring of low-
altitude aircraft and surface vessels along the U.S.-Mexico border, the 
Florida Straits, and a portion of the Caribbean. Between 2020 and 2021, 
CBP successfully reconfigured the TARS in southwest Puerto Rico into a 
maritime surveillance system with promising results. CBP has also 
invested in its Tactical Maritime Surveillance System (TMSS) that 
consists of flying tactical aerostats equipped with wide-area sea 
surveillance radar and sensors near the coast. The TARS and tactical 
aerostat elevated sensors mitigate the effect of the curvature of the 
earth and terrain-masking limitations, greatly increasing long-range 
radar detection capabilities to combat increasing levels of smuggling 
and illegal immigration via the coastal approaches to southern 
California, Texas, and the Florida Straits.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ CBP assumed responsibility of TARS from the U.S. Air Force in 
2013, but the aerostat surveillance system had been used by DoD since 
1978.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mission Integration Technology
    Some of the most significant advancements in AMO technological 
capabilities concern data integration and exploitation enhancements. 
Downlink technology, paired with the BigPipe system, allows AMO to 
provide video feed and situational awareness in real-time. In addition, 
the Minotaur mission integration system allows multiple aircraft and 
vessels to share networked information, providing AMO a substantial 
level of air, land, and sea domain awareness.
    A vital component of DHS's domain awareness capabilities, the AMOC 
integrates multiple sensor technologies and sources of information to 
provide comprehensive domain awareness in support of CBP's border 
security mission. Utilizing extensive law enforcement and intelligence 
databases and communication networks, AMOC's operational system, the 
Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS), provides a 
single display that is capable of processing up to 750 individual 
sensor feeds and tracking over 50,000 individual air tracks and 150,000 
maritime tracks simultaneously.
    AMOC coordinates with the Department of Defense (DoD), Federal 
Aviation Administration (FAA), the North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD), and international law enforcement partners in the 
governments of Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas, to detect, identify, 
track, and support interdiction of suspect aviation and maritime 
activity in the approaches to U.S. borders and interior as well as at 
the borders.
    Strengthening our partnerships with our international allies is 
also vital to successfully execute our counternarcotic mission, 
combating drug-trafficking organizations, and preventing narcotics from 
reaching the United States. AMO recently partnered with the Department 
of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement to 
transfer four 39-foot Midnight Express Interceptor vessels to 
Guatemala's Comando De Fuerza Especial Naval. The vessels, which were 
being phased out of AMO's maritime fleet, will help Guatemala's forces 
increase their response capabilities and enhance their ability to 
interdict drug smuggling vessels.
Joint Technology Development
    Domain Awareness is a core competency and an essential element of a 
secure border. AMO is engaged with several technological partners to 
expand our domain awareness capabilities and share critical information 
in real time.
    With multiple entities operating in the maritime domain, AMO works 
closely with the DHS Science & Technology Directorate (S&T), USCG, and 
DoD to identify and leverage technology to expand overall maritime 
domain awareness, integrate data from airborne and maritime assets, and 
improve our maritime surveillance and detection capabilities. For 
example, AMO is scheduled to bring two MQ-9 BigWing modified UAS on-
line in fiscal year 2023. With modifications funded by S&T, the BigWing 
UAS is expected to increase mission time, resulting in greater range, 
endurance, and domain awareness.
    The volume of data analyzed by our enforcement personnel at the 
AMOC far exceed human capacity to evaluate. Our partnership with S&T is 
focused on the use of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/
ML) technologies to alert our AMOC personnel when suspect activities 
are identified. Continued research and development of these 
capabilities by S&T will increase our capacity to address these growing 
volumes of data across both our air and maritime domains. AMO will 
continue to modernize its fleet and sensor systems to enhance our data 
analysis capabilities and operational performance in diverse marine 
environments and increase our ability to adapt to the challenges of 
securing the maritime border and approaches to the United States.
Operational Coordination
    AMO leverages its capabilities by empowering its operational units 
to forge crucial partnerships. These relationships, coupled with our 
broad authorities, allow AMO to follow cases wherever they lead across 
air, land, and sea environments.
    In the maritime environment, we operate effectively with a variety 
of Federal, State, and local partners, including frequent joint 
operations with HSI, USCG, and the United States Navy. We also 
frequently cooperate directly with foreign governments. In this way, 
AMO lends critical capabilities and cohesion to an array of border 
security and maritime law enforcement efforts.
    AMO is the largest aviation contributor to the Joint Interagency 
Task Force South (JIATF-S) and is an integral part to their aviation 
capability and success to counter illicit trafficking of narcotics 
within the maritime environment. P-3s patrol in a 42 million square 
mile area that includes more than 41 nations, the Pacific and Atlantic 
Oceans, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and maritime approaches to the 
United States.
    AMO is also a key component of the DHS Joint Task Force East (JTF-
E), where AMO holds the Deputy Director position. JTF-E integrates 
resources, intelligence, planning, and operations across DHS's 
component units. DHS uses JTF-E to combat TCOs, enforce immigration 
laws, and coordinate its border security efforts. AMO agents also 
participate in HSI-led Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST) 
across the Nation. AMO agents provide maritime law enforcement 
expertise and ready access to AMO assets and capabilities. In turn, 
information shared through the BEST refines AMO operations and enables 
more targeted enforcement.
    Focusing specifically on the maritime domain, AMO is working with 
its USCG and HSI partners to update the Maritime Operations 
Coordination Plan (MOC-P). The plan sets forth a layered, DHS-wide 
approach to homeland security issues within the maritime domain, 
ensuring integrated planning, information sharing, and increased 
response capability in each area of responsibility. In accordance with 
the MOC-P, AMO has been a key stakeholder in the implementation of the 
Regional Coordinating Mechanism. Through this mechanism, AMO 
coordinates maritime operational activities through integrated 
planning, information sharing, and intelligence integration.
                            looking forward
    AMO's efforts continue to be a key element of CBP's border security 
mission and have intercepted dangerous contraband and disrupted illicit 
activity before it reaches our shores.
    Across all air, land, and maritime domains, in the past 3 
years,\18\ AMO conducted approximately 293,000 flight hours and 221,000 
float hours, resulting in the arrest of 3,152 suspects, the 
apprehension of more than 304,000 migrants, the seizure of nearly 3,200 
weapons and $146.6 million in currency, and the interdiction of nearly 
two million pounds of illegal drugs, including 769,000 pounds of 
cocaine.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ Fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    AMO's expertise and asset capabilities have matured since legacy 
programs were consolidated in 2006, and today we are a coordinated and 
premier law enforcement entity providing advanced aeronautical and 
maritime operations. As a critical component of CBP's border security 
mission, AMO's highly-trained agents, together with our unique 
authorities, specialized assets, and tactical expertise, comprise a 
well-rounded, professional, and established law enforcement 
organization that is fully engaged in safeguarding the United States' 
maritime borders and protecting its interests from threats at the 
border and beyond.
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today.
    I look forward to answering any questions you may have.

    Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Miller. I now recognize 
Brigadier General Sean Boyette for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statements.

STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL SEAN T. BOYETTE, DIRECTOR, JOINT 
  STAFF, JOINT FORCES HEADQUARTERS, REPRESENTING THE FLORIDA 
                         NATIONAL GUARD

    General Boyette. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, 
and subcommittee Members, thank you for the opportunity to 
share the Florida National Guard story and our contributions to 
on-going efforts to reduce illegal migration and illicit drug 
flow into our great State and the Nation and to protect 
Floridians from the dangerous impacts of the border crisis. In 
addition to witnessing a drop in the number of people entering 
the State through the Florida Keys, as a result of coordinated 
State efforts to deter and prevent illegal migration, almost 
11,000 migrants have been returned to their country of origin 
after attempting to enter Florida illegally since 2022, as 
Governor Ron DeSantis announced earlier this month.
    In recent months, the number of unauthorized alien 
interdictions in and around Florida has risen to alarming 
levels not seen for decades, which has put an undue burden on 
local resources and threatened public safety. On January 6, 
2023, after a peak of over 800 migrant apprehensions during the 
first week of January, and inadequate Federal action, Governor 
DeSantis took action to provide the resources necessary to 
respond to the mass migration event and protect Florida's 
communities, signing an executive order declaring a state of 
emergency and directing the Adjutant General of Florida to 
activate the Florida National Guard as needed to support the 
State's efforts to interdict illegal migrants attempting to 
gain entry into the United States through Florida. Governor 
DeSantis' executive order was timely and based on steady 
increase in illegal migrants through Florida Straits, a mass 
migration landing in the Dry Tortugas, and an increase to Phase 
1 Bravo of Operation Vigilant Sentry, which is the Federal 
Government's plan to interdict illegal migrants throughout the 
southeast United States and the Caribbean nations, primarily 
Asia and Cuba.
    The Florida National Guard was activated in a supporting 
role to the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, 
under the overall command and control of the Florida Division 
of Emergency Management within the Executive Office of the 
Governor, and in coordination with the United States Coast 
Guard, other Federal agencies, and local law enforcement. Our 
role is to provide an aerial observation to queue potential 
migrant activity to maritime assets to conduct the actual 
interdiction. With Federal support, we have been able to 
conduct our flight operations safely and in coordination with 
all State agencies. Initially, we activated two LUH-72 Lakota 
rotary-wing aircraft within 24 hours of the executive order. 
The following weeks, we grew our forces operating out of 
Marathon Key, Florida to a total of 12 aircraft, an aviation 
battalion tactical operations center with all primary staff and 
associated maintenance and logistics personnel for support.
    Since January 10, 2023, the Florida National Guard has 
averaged 10 to 12 sorties per day along four air corridors in 
South Florida to provide aerial observation in support of 
maritime assets. We have assisted in interdictions of 349 
migrants and identification of over 100 abandoned vessels, but 
perhaps more importantly, our presence in the air seems to have 
resulted in a notable deterrence. According to data compiled by 
the Florida Division of Emergency Management, from October 2022 
to January 2023, there was an average of 1,210 illegal migrants 
apprehended per month. This number has decreased to 276 for the 
month of February due to the build-up of State law enforcement 
agencies, Florida National Guard air assets acting as a 
deterrent and Federal partner during the month of January.
    The total cost of State activation across all responding 
agencies is currently in excess of 50 million, and that number 
will continue to rise. To date, the State of Florida has paid 
over $7 million for the use of aviation rotary wing aircraft. 
To help mitigate this cost but sustain our presence and 
reconnaissance capability, Florida recently requested the use 
of unmanned aircraft system, the RQ-7B Shadow tactical UAS. 
Currently, we're working with the FAA for approval to fly the 
system in civilian airspace, as well as working to coordinate 
with Navy Region Southeast to launch and recover from Key West 
National Naval Air Station.
    Since the beginning of Florida National Guard's 
involvement, the Florida National Guard has posted a liaison 
officer in the United States Coast Guard District 7 operations 
center in Brickell, Florida. Additionally, the Florida National 
Guard has a full-time liaison officer in the State of Florida 
Emergency Operations Center, and there are daily touchpoints to 
ensure continuity of communication. At a tactical level, the 
Florida National Guard Communications directorate installed 
upgrades to our rotary wing assets to ensure the Florida 
National Guard can directly communicate with the maritime 
assets across all State and Federal agencies.
    Last, the Florida National Guard is conducting these 
operations predominantly with the highly-dedicated part-time 
force of the National Guard soldiers and airmen, all of whom 
have been volunteers who are proud to support both the State 
agencies and the Federal partners charged with protecting our 
borders. The Florida National Guard is proud to be a part of 
this operation to protect Florida citizens and looks forward to 
continuing support and partnership. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Boyette follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Sean T. Boyette
    Chairman Gimenez and committee Members, thank you for the 
opportunity to share the Florida National Guard story and our 
contributions to on-going efforts to reduce illegal migration and 
illicit drug flow into our great State and Nation and to protect 
Floridians from the dangerous impacts of the Border Crisis. In addition 
to witnessing a drop in the number of people entering the State through 
the Florida Keys as a result of coordinated State efforts to deter and 
prevent illegal migration, almost 11,000 migrants have been returned to 
their country of origin after attempting to enter Florida illegally 
since August 2022, as Governor Ron DeSantis announced earlier this 
month.
    In recent months, the number of unauthorized alien interdictions in 
and around Florida has risen to alarming levels not seen for decades, 
which has put an undue burden on local resources and threatened public 
safety. On January 6, 2023, after a peak of over 800 migrant 
apprehensions during the first week of January, and inadequate Federal 
action, Governor DeSantis took action to provide the resources 
necessary to respond to the mass migration event and protect Florida's 
communities; signing an executive order declaring a state of emergency 
and directing the Adjutant General of Florida to activate the Florida 
National Guard, as needed, to support the State's efforts to interdict 
illegal migrants attempting to gain entry to the United States through 
Florida. Governor DeSantis's executive order was timely and based on 
steady increases in illegal migrations through the Florida Straits, a 
mass migration landing in the Dry Tortugas, and an increase to Phase 1b 
of Operation Vigilant Sentry, which is the Federal Government's plan to 
interdict illegal migration throughout the southeast United States and 
Caribbean nations, primarily Haiti and Cuba.
    The Florida National Guard was activated in a supporting role to 
the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, under the 
overall command and control of the Florida Division of Emergency 
Management within the Executive Office of the Governor, and in 
coordination with the United States Coast Guard, other Federal agencies 
and local law enforcement. Our role is to provide aerial observation to 
cue potential migrant activity to maritime assets to conduct the actual 
interdiction. With Federal support, we have been able to conduct our 
flight operations safely and in coordination with all State agencies. 
Initially we activated two LUH-72 Lakota rotary-wing aircraft within 24 
hours of the executive order. In the following weeks, we grew our 
forces operating out of Marathon Key, FL to a total of 12 aircraft, an 
aviation battalion tactical operations center with all primary staff, 
and associated maintenance and logistics personnel for support.
    Since January 10, 2023 the Florida National Guard has averaged 10-
12 sorties per day along 4 air corridors in South Florida to provide 
ariel observation in support of maritime assets. We have assisted in 
interdictions of 349 migrants and identification of over 100 abandoned 
vessels, but perhaps more importantly, our presence in the air seems to 
have resulted in a notable deterrence. According to data compiled by 
the Florida Division of Emergency Management, from October 2022 through 
January 2023, there was an average of 1,210 illegal migrants 
apprehended, per month. This number decreased to 276 for the month of 
February due to the build-up of State law enforcement agencies, Florida 
National Guard air assets acting as a deterrent and Federal partner 
during the month of January.
    The total cost of the State activation across all responding 
agencies is currently in excess of $50 million, and that number will 
continue to rise. To date, the State of Florida has paid over $7 
million for the use of our aviation rotary-wing aircraft. To help 
mitigate the cost, but sustain our presence and reconnaissance 
capability, Florida recently requested to use our unmanned aircraft 
system, the RQ-7B Shadow tactical unmanned aircraft system. Currently 
we are working with the FAA for approval to fly this system in civilian 
airspace, as well as working in coordination with Navy Region Southeast 
to launch and recover from Key West Naval Air Station.
    Since the beginning of the Florida National Guard's involvement, 
the Florida National Guard has posted a liaison officer in the United 
States Coast Guard District 7 operations center in Brickell, FL. 
Additionally, the FLNG has a full-time liaison officer in the State of 
Florida Emergency Operation Center, and there are daily touchpoints to 
ensure continuity of communication. At the tactical level the FLNG's 
communications directorate installed upgrades to our rotary-wing assets 
to ensure the FLNG can communicate with the maritime assets across all 
State and Federal agencies.
    Last, the FLNG is conducting these operations predominantly with 
the highly-dedicated part-time force of traditional National Guard 
Soldiers and Airmen, all of whom have been volunteers who are proud to 
support both our State agencies and the Federal partners charged with 
the protection of our borders. The Florida National Guard is proud to 
be part of this operation to protect Florida's citizens and looks 
forward to the continued support and partnership.

    Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, General. I now recognize Ms. 
Heather MacLeod for 5 minutes to summarize her opening 
statements.

STATEMENT OF HEATHER MAC LEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND 
        JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)

    Ms. MacLeod. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
be here today to discuss GAO's work on maritime security. My 
testimony focuses on Coast Guard and CBP's progress in 
implementing recommendations we have made related to managing 
assets and workforce needs. Securing the Nation's borders 
against the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and 
terrorist activities is a key part of the Department of 
Homeland Security's mission. Within DHS, the Coast Guard and 
CBP share responsibility for patrolling and enforcing U.S. law 
along maritime borders. CBP secures U.S. air, land, and 
maritime borders through its Air and Marine Operations, and 
Border Patrol.
    The Coast Guard has 11 statutory missions, including drug 
and migrant interdiction. The Coast Guard also conducts defense 
readiness and other law enforcement activities. From 2011 to 
2020, the Coast Guard used more resources for drug interdiction 
in ports, waterways, and coastal security than other missions. 
However, the Coast Guard is constantly balancing its multiple 
missions and adjusting to a wide variety of tasks and 
circumstances. Our prior work has identified challenges in 
determining the appropriate allocation of assets across 
geographic locations and in response to catastrophic events or 
emergencies. For example, we examined Coast Guard surge 
operations such as hurricane response, which can vary in number 
and severity from year to year. The Coast Guard was still 
generally able to meet mission goals, but we made 
recommendations for the service to improve the tracking of 
lessons learned. This will help the Coast Guard improve future 
surge operations. They are in the process of addressing these 
recommendations.
    Our work has also noted the challenges due to aging 
infrastructure and acquisition programs continue to affect the 
availability of Coast Guard assets. For example, our 2019 work 
identified that almost half of the Coast Guard's shore 
infrastructure is beyond its service life. The Coast Guard has 
subsequently taken some steps to address challenges with its 
deteriorating infrastructure by establishing targets to 
prioritize expenditures. On acquisitions, our recent work has 
found that while the majority of DHS's major acquisition 
programs are meeting cost and schedule goals, the Coast Guard 
and CBP experience challenges with acquisition programs that 
support their law enforcement missions.
    Determining workforce needs for maritime security also 
continues to be a challenge. For example, our prior work shows 
that the Coast Guard has conducted limited assessments of its 
workforce needs. The Coast Guard recently provided us with 
their revised plan, which we are in the process of evaluating. 
Although we think it's important that the Coast Guard continue 
to analyze workforce needs service-wide, this issue could be 
particularly important for certain portions of the workforce. 
For example, in September 2022, we reported on challenges the 
Coast Guard faces in ensuring it has the necessary workforce, 
given its growing cyber-related mission needs. We found that 
the Coast Guard had not developed a strategic plan for its 
cyber space workforce. As a result, we made six 
recommendations, including that the Coast Guard assess and 
determine the cyber space staffing levels needed to meet 
mission demands. DHS agreed to address these.
    CBP has also faced some workforce challenges. For example, 
we previously reported on challenges CBP has faced in efforts 
to recruit, hire, and retain law enforcement personnel across 
its operational components. CBP has taken steps to enhance its 
efforts in this area in response to our recommendations.
    In closing, the Coast Guard and CBP play key roles in 
securing the Nation's maritime borders. Taking additional steps 
to implement GAO's recommendations will further help the 
agencies manage their assets and workforce needs as they 
continue to monitor new challenges.
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, Members of the 
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I'm happy 
to answer any questions. Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. MacLeod follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod
                        Thursday, March 23, 2023
                             gao highlights
    Highlights of GAO-23-106695, a testimony before the Subcommittee on 
Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security, 
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
    Securing the Nation's borders against unlawful movement of people, 
illegal drugs and other contraband, and terrorist activities is a key 
part of the DHS's mission. With increased attention to overland routes 
in recent years, such as along the Southwest Border, criminal 
organizations use maritime routes to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons 
into the United States. Within DHS, the Coast Guard and CBP share 
responsibility for securing the Nation's maritime borders.
    This statement discusses: (1) Coast Guard and CBP resources for 
maritime security and related Federal coordination, (2) challenges 
these agencies have faced managing assets, and (3) related workforce 
challenges.
    This statement is based on GAO's prior work on a variety of asset 
and workforce issues. For that work, GAO analyzed Coast Guard and CBP 
documentation and data and interviewed officials. For this statement, 
GAO also obtained updates on actions DHS has taken to address GAO's 
recommendations as of March 2023. For a full list of the reports, see 
Related GAO Products at the conclusion of this statement.
What GAO Recommends
    GAO made 35 recommendations in the reports covered by this 
statement, including to improve comparability of asset operating costs 
and workforce assessment processes. As of March 2023, 9 of 35 have been 
implemented, and 26 remain open. GAO continues to monitor the agencies' 
progress in implementing them.
 maritime security.--coast guard and cbp efforts to address prior gao 
              recommendations on asset and workforce needs
What GAO Found
    The Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employ 
assets--including aircraft and vessels--and personnel, to ensure 
maritime security and safety. Coast Guard and CBP also coordinate with 
the Department of Defense on the allocation of assets and specialized 
personnel in their efforts to counter the flow of illicit drugs.
    GAO previously identified challenges Coast Guard and CBP face in 
managing maritime security assets. This includes determining the 
appropriate allocation of assets across geographic locations and in 
response to catastrophic events or emergencies, such as hurricanes, oil 
spills, and humanitarian events. For example, in September 2020, GAO 
found that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) ability to 
assess the costs and benefits of consolidating Coast Guard and CBP 
operating locations was limited, in part due to the lack of a standard 
cost measure between the components. GAO recommended DHS develop and 
implement a way to compare costs. In September 2021, DHS implemented a 
standardized methodology for costs.
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    The Coast Guard and CBP have taken steps to assess workforce needs. 
In February 2020, GAO found that the Coast Guard had assessed a small 
portion of its workforce needs and recommended that Coast Guard update 
its workforce plan with time frames and milestones to meet its 
workforce assessment goals. As of March 2023, the Coast Guard reported 
that it had revised this plan and submitted it to Congress, as 
required. GAO is continuing to evaluate the plan. In June 2018, GAO 
found that CBP faced challenges meeting target hiring and retention 
levels, such as for law enforcement personnel. CBP implemented an 
agency-wide exit survey and uses data to inform retention efforts.
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the 
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on 
maritime security assets and workforce. Securing the Nation's borders 
against unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs and other 
contraband, and terrorist activities is a key part of the Department of 
Homeland Security's (DHS) mission. Within DHS, the Coast Guard and U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) use aircraft and vessels to secure 
U.S. borders, support criminal investigations, and ensure maritime 
security and safety. The Coast Guard is the principal Federal agency 
charged with ensuring the security and safety of vessels on the high 
seas and waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction by enforcing laws to 
prevent death, injury, and property loss. CBP is responsible for 
securing U.S. borders at and between ports of entry in the air, land, 
and maritime environments.\1\ Coast Guard and CBP share responsibility 
for patrolling and enforcing U.S. law along the U.S. maritime borders 
and territorial sea--maritime approaches 12 nautical miles seaward of 
the U.S. coast.
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    \1\ Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the controlled 
entry into or departure from the United States. Specifically, a port of 
entry is any officially designated location (seaport, airport, or land 
border location) where CBP officers clear passengers, merchandise, and 
other items; collect duties; enforce customs and other U.S. laws; and 
inspect persons seeking to enter or applying for admission into, or 
departing the United States pursuant to U.S. immigration and travel 
controls.
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    The U.S. Government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the 
transnational and domestic criminal organizations that traffic and 
smuggle them, as significant threats to the public, law enforcement, 
and the national security of the United States. With increased 
attention to overland routes in recent years, such as along the 
Southwest Border, criminal organizations smuggling people, drugs, and 
weapons into the United States have adapted their methods to include 
maritime routes. Further, given challenges the Federal Government faces 
in responding to the drug misuse crisis, in March 2021, we added 
national efforts to prevent, respond to, and recover from drug misuse 
to our High-Risk List. We identified several challenges in the Federal 
Government's response to drug misuse, such as the need for more 
effective implementation and monitoring, and related on-going efforts 
to address the issue, including law enforcement and drug 
interdiction.\2\
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    \2\ See GAO, High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to 
Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas, GAO-21-119SP 
(Washington, DC: Mar. 2, 2021). GAO's High-Risk Series identifies 
Government operations with vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and 
mismanagement, or in need of transformation to address economy, 
efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.
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    In 2022, the Coast Guard reported that operating in the dynamic 
security and maritime domains will become more complicated as it 
acquires upgraded information systems as well as technologically 
advanced aircraft and vessels. The Coast Guard reported that these 
changes require workforce growth and enhanced skills to operate and 
maintain updated assets.
    My statement today discusses: (1) Coast Guard and CBP resources for 
maritime security and related Federal coordination, (2) challenges we 
have identified and recommendations we have made to Coast Guard and CBP 
related to managing assets, and (3) challenges we have identified and 
recommendations we have made related to their workforce needs. This 
statement is based primarily on reports published from June 2018 to 
March 2023 related to Coast Guard and CBP allocations and acquisitions 
of aircraft and vessels, and the agencies' efforts to determine their 
workforce needs. For these products, we analyzed DHS documents and data 
related to the Coast Guard and CBP and interviewed agency officials. We 
made 35 recommendations in the reports covered by this statement, 
including to improve comparability of asset operating costs and 
workforce assessment processes. As of March 2023, 9 of these 35 
recommendations have been implemented, and 26 remain open. GAO 
continues to monitor the agencies' progress in implementing them.
    More detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology 
for that work can be found in the issued reports listed in Related GAO 
Products at the conclusion of this statement. We conducted the work on 
which this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted 
Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and 
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
   coast guard and cbp employ various resources to address maritime 
                   security in coordination with dod
    Within DHS, the Coast Guard and CBP employ assets--including 
aircraft and vessels--and personnel across the United States and abroad 
to secure U.S. borders, support criminal investigations, and ensure 
maritime security and safety. Their air and marine missions vary 
depending on operating location. Coast Guard and CBP also coordinate on 
the deployment and allocation of assets and specialized personnel with 
the Department of Defense (DOD) to reduce the availability of illicit 
drugs by countering the flow of such drugs into the United States.\3\
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    \3\ DOD is the lead Federal agency for the detection and monitoring 
of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United 
States, and it operates systems, such as radar, that can be used in 
support of DHS and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement 
activities.
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    Coast Guard resources.--One of the six armed forces, the Coast 
Guard is a multimission maritime military service within DHS. It is 
responsible for implementing 11 statutory missions, such as drug 
interdiction, as well as other concurrent missions (see appendix I). As 
of September 2020, the Coast Guard operates a fleet of about 200 fixed- 
and rotary-wing aircraft, with more than 1,600 boats and about 250 
cutters.\4\ It employs approximately 55,200 personnel--including 
active-duty, reserve, and civilian.\5\ In addition, the Coast Guard 
owns or leases 20,000 facilities, which consist of various types of 
buildings and structures. For example, within its shore operations 
asset line, the Coast Guard maintains over 200 stations along U.S. 
coasts and inland waterways to carry out its search-and-rescue 
operations, as well as other missions, such as maritime security (see 
fig. 1).
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    \4\ The Coast Guard classifies vessels under 65 feet in length as 
boats, which usually operate near shore, on inland waterways, or 
attached to cutters. Coast Guard also operates cutters, defined as a 
vessel 65 feet in length or greater with accommodations for a crew to 
live aboard.
    \5\ As of April 2022, Coast Guard officials stated that the agency 
had a total workforce of 55,236--including 46,235 military and 9,001 
civilian personnel.
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    In September 2021, we reported that Coast Guard data show that more 
than 20 percent of its total estimated operating expenses were for drug 
interdiction (13 percent) and migrant interdiction (8 percent) for 
fiscal years 2011 through 2020.\6\ Vessel and aircraft deployments for 
these missions accounted for nearly 30 percent of the average annual 
operational hours during that period, as shown in figure 2.
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    \6\ GAO, Coast Guard: Information on Defense Readiness Mission 
Deployments, Expenses, and Funding, GAO-21-104741 (Washington, DC: 
Sept. 15, 2021).
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    CBP resources.--Within CBP, the Air and Marine Operations and U.S. 
Border Patrol are the uniformed law enforcement arms responsible for 
securing U.S. borders between ports of entry in the air, land, and 
maritime environments.\7\
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    \7\ CBP's Office of Field Operations also has border security 
responsibilities, such as inspecting pedestrians, passengers, and 
cargo--including international mail and express cargo--at the more than 
320 air, land, and sea ports of entry.
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    In September 2020, we reported that CBP's Air and Marine Operations 
operates a fleet of over 200 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and over 
100 vessels to secure U.S. borders in the air, maritime, and land 
domains. The majority of CBP's Air and Marine Operations' activities 
support its law enforcement mission, including providing surveillance 
capabilities to detect and support the interdiction of illicit cross-
border activity.\8\ CBP's Air and Marine Operations develops annual 
authorized staffing-level targets for law enforcement positions based 
on operational needs and available funding. We previously reported that 
CBP's Border Patrol staffing goals were based, in part, on its then-
statutory minimum staffing level for Border Patrol agency positions.\9\ 
CBP's Air and Marine Operations field structure is divided into three 
regions--northern, southeast, and southwest--and National Air Security 
Operations throughout the continental United States, Puerto Rico, and 
the U.S. Virgin Islands (see fig. 3).
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    \8\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessment of Air and 
Marine Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs across All 
DHS Marine Operations, GAO-20-663 (Washington, DC: Sept. 24, 2020).
    \9\ GAO, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Progress and 
Challenges in Recruiting, Hiring, and Retaining Law Enforcement 
Personnel, GAO-18-487 (Washington, DC: June 27, 2018).
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    DHS and DOD Interagency coordination.--DHS components, including 
the Coast Guard and CBP, coordinate with DOD on counterdrug missions 
through the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South. In July 2019, 
we reported on the contribution and allocation of assets, such as ships 
and surveillance aircraft, through the JIATF-South.\10\ Coast Guard, 
the lead Federal agency for maritime drug interdiction, contributes 
aircraft and vessels to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs smuggled into 
the United States. JIATF-South provides maritime and air assets to 
detect and monitor the trafficking of illicit drugs, such as cocaine, 
being smuggled north on noncommercial maritime vessels across its area 
of responsibility.
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    \10\ GAO, Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces 
Should Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug 
Activities, GAO-19-441 (Washington, DC: July 9, 2019).
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    In November 2019, we reported that the Coast Guard employs 
specialized units to serve as force multipliers, including for 
specialized capabilities needed to handle drug interdiction, terrorism, 
and other threats in the U.S. maritime environment.\11\ Among these 
units, the Coast Guard has two Tactical Law Enforcement Teams which 
provide specialized capabilities for offshore drug interdiction and 
vessel interception operations, primarily in the Caribbean Sea and 
Eastern Pacific Ocean. These specialized teams do not maintain their 
own vessels, relying on and deploying via Coast Guard cutters or U.S. 
Navy or Allied vessels. Figure 4 shows Coast Guard personnel conducting 
a drug interdiction operation that included a Coast Guard Tactical Law 
Enforcement member boarding a foreign, semi-submersible vessel, which 
resulted in seizing 17,000 pounds of cocaine.
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    \11\ GAO, Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces' 
Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap 
or Gaps in Capabilities, GAO-20-33 (Washington, DC: Nov. 21, 2019).
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 coast guard and cbp have faced challenges managing maritime security 
                                 assets
    Our previous reports have identified various challenges the Coast 
Guard and CBP have faced in managing assets, as well as some steps they 
have taken to address them. These include assessing the geographic 
allocation of assets, providing assets to meet critical mission needs, 
maintaining shore infrastructure, and addressing on-going acquisition 
challenges.
    Geographic allocation of assets.--DHS has taken some steps to 
better identify opportunities to consolidate assets. In September 2020, 
we reported on DHS assessment activities to support integration and 
consolidation of cross-component efforts, including opportunities for 
colocation of Coast Guard and CBP operating locations for air and 
marine mission activities.\12\ We found that DHS's ability to assess 
the costs and benefits of consolidating operating locations was 
limited. Specifically, the agency could not compare costs between Coast 
Guard and CBP because it did not have comparable marine operating cost 
information and had not developed and implemented a standard cost per 
float hour methodology.
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    \12\ GAO-20-663.
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    We recommended DHS develop these tools to help ensure that it has 
key information to support initiatives to examine integrating and 
consolidating nearby marine operating locations. DHS concurred with 
this recommendation. In September 2021, DHS took steps to fully 
implement our recommendation. Specifically, DHS developed a colocation 
assessment methodology to assess operating locations based on the types 
of assets, performance, and cost; and implemented a standard cost per 
float hour methodology for Coast Guard and CBP vessels.
    Assets to meet critical needs.--The Coast Guard provides assets to 
meet critical emergent needs, but may not be fully addressing 
recommended actions based on lessons learned from these activities. In 
September 2021, we found that from 2017 through 2020 the Coast Guard 
conducted 23 major surge operations--high-intensity, short-notice 
efforts to respond to catastrophic events or emergencies, such as 
hurricanes, oil spills, and humanitarian events.\13\ To support these 
surge operations, the Coast Guard deploys varying levels of aircraft 
and vessels, as well as personnel, which may require a reallocation of 
resources to the affected areas while continuing to support and carry 
out its regular missions. For example, we found that the Coast Guard 
deployed nearly 1,000 personnel and contributed 495 aircraft and 325 
vessel hours to support CBP in response to the February 2019 national 
emergency declaration at the Southwest Border from April through 
November 2019. Following Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017, 
the Coast Guard deployed over 4,700 personnel and logged about 4,000 
aircraft and more than 2,000 vessel hours.
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    \13\ GAO, Coast Guard: A More Systematic Process to Resolve 
Recommended Actions Could Enhance Future Surge Operations, GAO-21-584 
(Washington, DC: Sept. 21, 2021).
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    The Coast Guard conducts after-action reviews following these 
operations, which identify lessons learned and best practices to 
improve future surge operations. For example, we reported that the 
Coast Guard's review of its 2014 response to the influx of 
unaccompanied children/minors at the Southwest Border found that 
certain considerations should be taken into account when deploying 
aircraft long-term, such as the availability of ground support and 
flight crew personnel as well as the security of the aircraft. However, 
the Coast Guard did not systematically track whether recommended 
actions were taken. Coast Guard officials stated that the lessons 
learned and related recommended actions help improve future surge 
operations. We recommended the Coast Guard establish a process for 
tracking and resolving recommended actions in line with its resolution 
rate and timeliness goals. DHS and the Coast Guard identified five 
actions that the Coast Guard would take to do so, including developing 
a process to identify lead and supporting offices to track and address 
recommended actions. As of February 2023, the Coast Guard is still in 
the process of completing these actions.
    Coast Guard shore infrastructure.--The Coast Guard has taken steps 
to address challenges with its aging and deteriorating shore 
infrastructure. In February 2019, we reported that the Coast Guard has 
taken steps to improve how it manages its shore infrastructure, 
including identifying risks posed by the lack of timely investment and 
identifying mission-critical facilities.\14\ For example, we found that 
the Coast Guard had documented its process to classify its real 
property under a tier system--ranging from mission-critical to mission-
supportive assets. Using this tier system, the Coast Guard established 
minimum investment targets to prioritize expenditures on shore 
infrastructure supporting front-line operations, such as piers or 
runways.
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    \14\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading 
Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least $2.6 
Billion, GAO-19-82 (Washington, DC: Feb. 21, 2019).
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    Challenges with acquisition of assets.--In March 2023, we reported 
on our eighth and most recent annual assessment of cost and schedule 
goals for DHS's major acquisition programs.\15\ We found that the 
majority of DHS's major acquisition programs are meeting cost and 
schedule goals, although the Coast Guard and CBP experienced challenges 
with acquisition programs that support their law enforcement missions. 
For example, we found that the Coast Guard continues to face challenges 
with its Offshore Patrol Cutter and Polar Security Cutter programs, 
which include providing law enforcement and maritime security 
capabilities across a range of sea conditions and locations. Despite a 
program restructure and other efforts, the Offshore Patrol Cutter 
program still faces significant cost and schedule concerns. For 
example, the program has determined it will not meet its lead ship 
delivery date of June 2023. Further, we found that the Polar Security 
Cutter program does not have enough information from the shipbuilder to 
determine a new delivery date for its lead ship.
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    \15\ GAO, DHS Annual Assessment: Major Acquisition Programs Are 
Generally Meeting Goals, but Cybersecurity Policy Needs Clarification, 
GAO-23-105641SU (Washington, DC: Mar. 16, 2023). This report provided 
assessments of Coast Guard and CBP major acquisition programs, but it 
did not include recommendations specific to these programs. We have on-
going work related to Coast Guard's acquisition of its Offshore Patrol 
and Polar Security Cutters.
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 coast guard and cbp have experienced challenges determining workforce 
                      needs for maritime security
Coast Guard Has Conducted Limited Assessments of Workforce Needs
    Limited steps taken to assess workforce needs.--We have previously 
reported that the Coast Guard had taken some steps to assess its 
workforce needs, including developing a Manpower Requirements Plan in 
2018.\16\ However, since 2003, it has assessed only a small portion of 
its workforce needs through the requirements determination process, 
which was a key component of its 2018 plan.\17\ Specifically, in 
February 2020, we found that the Coast Guard had completed workforce 
requirements determinations from calendar years 2003 through 2019 for 6 
percent of its workforce.
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    \16\ GAO, Coast Guard: Increasing Mission Demands Highlight 
Importance of Assessing Its Workforce Needs, GAO-22-106135 (Washington, 
DC: July 27, 2022); Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Evaluate the 
Effectiveness of Organizational Changes and Determine Workforce Needs, 
GAO-20-223 (Washington, DC: Feb. 26, 2020).
    \17\ In April 2018, the Coast Guard reported to Congress that it 
faced challenges meeting its daily mission demands because it was 
operating below the workforce level necessary to meet all of its 
mission requirements. In this report, the Coast Guard set a goal to 
complete workforce requirements determinations--its preferred tool for 
assessing needed workforce levels--for all of its units. U.S. Coast 
Guard, Manpower Requirements Plan Report to Congress (Apr. 13, 2018).
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    We also found several limitations affecting the Coast Guard's 
ability to effectively implement its workforce requirements 
determination process. Specifically, it lacks time frames for how it 
will achieve its workforce assessment goals--notably, to assess the 
workforce requirements for all of its positions and units.\18\ Among 
other things, we recommended that the Coast Guard update its Manpower 
Requirements Plan with time frames and milestones for doing so.\19\ DHS 
concurred with our recommendations and described actions planned to 
address them. Among them, the Coast Guard was required to submit this 
plan to Congress in fiscal year 2022, but did not do so until March 
2023. We are in the process of evaluating the plan to determine the 
extent to which these actions fully address the intent of our 
recommendation.
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    \18\ The Coast Guard's workforce requirements determination process 
uses a structured analysis to determine the number and types of 
personnel needed to effectively perform each mission to a specified 
standard. The process takes into account the effect of existing, new, 
or modified requirements on Coast Guard's workforce and is to conclude 
with a documented determination of the results.
    \19\ We made a total of 6 recommendations, 4 of which addressed 
limitations with Coast Guard's workforce requirements determination 
process. The Coast Guard implemented 3 of these recommendations by 
updating its guidance, determining necessary personnel to conduct the 
workforce determination process, and tracking the extent to which it 
completed this process for its units.
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    Assessing workforce needs for specialized capabilities.--We have 
previously reported on Coast Guard's workforce challenges related to 
identifying capability gaps in specific mission needs, including 
specialized forces and cybersecurity. In November 2019, we reported 
that the Coast Guard could benefit from assessing workforce needs for 
its Deployable Specialized Forces workforce--units of personnel who 
have a range of specialized capabilities needed to handle drug 
interdiction, terrorism, and other threats in the U.S. maritime 
environment.\20\ Specifically, we found that the Coast Guard had not 
used data and evidence to fully assess its Deployable Specialized 
Forces workforce needs.\21\ We reported that conducting this analysis 
would better position the Coast Guard to identify capability gaps 
between mission requirements and mission performance caused by 
deficiencies in the numbers of personnel available.
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    \20\ GAO-20-33. We have also previously reported on Coast Guard's 
challenges related to other specific mission needs, including marine 
inspection and health care. See GAO, Coast Guard: Enhancements Needed 
to Strengthen Marine Inspection Workforce Planning Efforts, GAO-22-
104465, (Washington, DC: Jan. 12, 2022); GAO, Coast Guard Health Care: 
Improvements Needed for Determining Staffing Needs and Monitoring 
Access to Care, GAO-22-105152 (Washington, DC: Feb. 4, 2022); and GAO-
22-106135.
    \21\ As of November 2019, the Coast Guard had 25 specialized forces 
teams and 2 units.
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    As a result, we recommended that the Coast Guard conduct a 
comprehensive analysis of its Deployable Specialized Forces' workforce 
needs. DHS concurred with this recommendation and, in February 2023, 
the Coast Guard reported that drafts of the mission analysis reports on 
two Specialized Forces were being reviewed, with an estimated 
completion of Spring 2023. However, the Coast Guard informed us that 
completion of the three remaining Specialized Force unit types is 
subject to available funding and is not estimated to be completed until 
September 2023.
    In September 2022, we reported on challenges the Coast Guard faces 
ensuring it has the necessary workforce, given its growing cyber-
related mission needs.\22\ For example, we found that the Coast Guard 
had not developed a strategic workforce plan for its cyber space 
workforce. We made 6 recommendations, including that the Coast Guard 
assess and determine the cyber space staffing levels needed to meet its 
cyber space mission demands and fully implement 5 recruitment and 
retention leading practices, such as establishing a strategic workforce 
plan for its cyber space workforce. DHS concurred with these 
recommendations, but the Coast Guard has not yet taken actions to 
implement them.
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    \22\ GAO, Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address 
Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands, GAO-22-105208 (Washington, DC: 
Sept. 27, 2022)
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CBP has Addressed Some Workforce Recruitment and Retention Challenges
    We previously reported on challenges CBP has faced in efforts to 
recruit, hire, and retain law enforcement personnel across its 
operational components at and between U.S. ports of entry, in the U.S. 
air and maritime environment, and at certain overseas locations.\23\ We 
reported that in recent years CBP had not attained its then-statutory 
minimum staffing level for its Border Patrol agent positions or its 
staffing goals for other law enforcement officer positions. CBP 
identified high attrition rates in some locations, a protracted hiring 
process, and competition from other Federal, State, and local law 
enforcement agencies as barriers to meeting its staffing goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ GAO, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Progress and 
Challenges in Recruiting, Hiring, and Retaining Law Enforcement 
Personnel, GAO-19-419T (Washington, DC: Mar. 7, 2019); and GAO-18-487.
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    In June 2018, we found that CBP increased its emphasis on 
recruitment by, among other things, establishing a central recruitment 
office in 2016; increasing its participation in recruitment events; and 
hiring a contractor in November 2017 to more effectively target 
potential applicants and better utilize data. We also found that CBP 
improved its hiring process as demonstrated by two key metrics--
reducing its time-to-hire and increasing the percentage of applicants 
that are hired. Last, we found that CBP enhanced its efforts to address 
retention challenges but that staffing levels for law enforcement 
positions consistently remained below target levels.
    We recommended that CBP systematically collect and analyze data on 
departing law enforcement officers and use this information to inform 
retention efforts. DHS concurred with our recommendation and, as of 
October 2019, has completed actions to fully implement it. 
Specifically, CBP implemented an agency-wide exit survey to collect and 
analyze data on departing law enforcement officers and is using these 
data to inform its retention efforts.
    Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the 
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
        appendix i: information on the coast guard's 11 missions
    This appendix details the Coast Guard's 11 missions (see Table 1).
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    Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. MacLeod. Members will be 
recognized by the order of seniority for their 5 minutes of 
questioning. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. Mr. Miller, 
what percentage of migrants trying to cross the Florida Straits 
into the Keys, into my State, what percentage do you think you 
actually interdict?
    Mr. Miller. I'm sorry, Chairman, I didn't hear the end part 
of your question.
    Chairman Gimenez. What percentage of them do you actually 
believe you are interdicting? You had 11,000 that were 
interdicted. How many more got away, I mean, that you don't 
even know? What is your guesstimate on that?
    Mr. Miller. Yeah, thank you for the question, Chairman. So, 
in the maritime environment, especially in the Florida Straits 
and especially in the lower Keys, there is somewhat of more of 
a telltale sign of smuggling ventures, whether it's an 
abandoned vessel, life jackets on the beach. Obviously, if they 
land in the Marquesas or the Tortugas, someone's going to be 
going to pick them up. So, we know of those. The Haitian events 
are typically large law enforcement response events as well. 
So, we have a good sense of that.
    Like you mentioned, the unknown, I would say, is would be 
largely from the Bahamas. So, you've got, you know, Freeport is 
less than 90 miles away, Bimini less than 50, Cuba is, you 
know, 80-something. So, especially with some of the fast 
vessels that they have now, that distance, and in marine 
interdiction, everything is a calculus of speed, time, and 
distance. So, a lot of those vessels can traverse that distance 
in a very short amount of time. Depending on whether or not we 
have a maritime patrol up running radar or marine. So, that is 
my unknown in Florida, Chairman.
    Chairman Gimenez. So, do you have evidence that migrants 
are going into the Bahamas and then making their way over from 
the Bahamas?
    Mr. Miller. Thank you for the question. So, we know that 
for a fact that there's a big route, whether they're generating 
from the Lesser Antilles, or the Turks and Caicos, or flying 
directly into the Bahamas and then coming across.
    Chairman Gimenez. Either the Rear Admiral or yourself, Mr. 
Miller can answer this question. What percentage of the drugs 
are getting through? I know you have had great seizures, but 
how many more pounds of cocaine, fentanyl, and the other drugs 
that these cartels are flooding our markets with? What 
percentage more do you think are actually getting through, not 
being stopped? Actually, what percentage do you stop?
    Admiral Burdian. So, in fiscal year 2022, we interdicted 
152 metric tons of cocaine. Again, the Coast Guard role is in 
support of joining the Regency Task Force staff to interdict 
that as close to the source and transit zone as possible. It's 
about 10 to 20 percent of what the known flow is, is what, 
given the resources that are available to us, what we're able 
to access, sir.
    Chairman Gimenez. So, 80 percent gets through, 20 percent 
is stopped?
    Admiral Burdian. At the source in transit zone, yes, sir.
    Chairman Gimenez. OK. You know, some of my colleagues on 
the other side of the aisle, they cite the stats from the 
Department of Homeland Security saying that most fentanyl is 
captured at ports of entry. They don't take into account that 
on the Southern Border, 1\1/2\ million people got away. We 
don't even know who they are. They came to this country. We 
don't know who they are, what they got, what they are doing 
here, what they were carrying. Would it be easier, is it easy 
for a one person to carry a sizable load of fentanyl? Anybody 
know that? Yeah, Mr. Miller.
    Mr. Miller. Thank you for the question. I could tell you, 
Chairman, that in the maritime environment, we do not see a lot 
of fentanyl in the maritime environment.
    Chairman Gimenez. Probably because the drugs that you are 
dealing with are much heavier, bulkier than fentanyl, because 
fentanyl is just one pill can do a lot of damage. So, I 
estimate, or I believe that probably the fentanyl is getting in 
through those got-aways. Some fentanyl is being captured at the 
port of entry. But there is definitely a lot of fentanyl in 
this country at this point, enough to kill us tens, if not 
hundreds of times over. That the heavier drugs are actually 
being transported different method, probably by sea, et cetera. 
OK.
    When you talk about the numbers that are coming through, 
you said that there was a drop from October to February of this 
year. How does that compare to the numbers from October to 
February of last year? Because now we are talking about the 
winter. You know, the conditions are rougher, and I am pretty 
sure that the numbers drop during the winter months, but do 
they somehow compare to the previous years? Do you guys have 
any information on that?
    Admiral Burdian. Absolutely, sir. The data suggests going 
backwards. I'm sorry. Our information concerns--confirms that 
absolutely in the winter months, when the weather is rough on 
the streets of Florida, you see fewer migrant ventures. The 
numbers for February 2023 and 2022 are roughly equivalent. 
They're within just a couple of hundred.
    Chairman Gimenez. Fair enough. OK, thank you. My time is 
up. I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois. The Ranking 
Member, Mr. Thanedar.
    Mr. Thanedar. Michigan. Admiral Burdian, this is a question 
for you. The Coast Guard and its partners are stretched thin in 
trying to address increased migration at sea. We cannot solve 
these problems without addressing the root causes by fixing our 
broken immigration system and creating expanded legal pathways 
to the United States. The Biden administration's new parole 
program is a big step in the right direction. My questions are 
how would you characterize the flow of migrants seen over the 
past 2 months compared to the preceding months? Also, 
recognizing that the maritime migration flows will never reach 
zero, what would you consider a more manageable rate of 
migration for the Coast Guard to address? Have the numbers been 
more in line with that rate over the past 2 months?
    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, sir. As mentioned, absolutely 
the numbers are down in February. Though I'll stress we're 
unable to apply that reduction to any single factor. Whether 
it's the increased presence due to our surged forces, Coast 
Guard, and partner agencies, whether it's the worsened weather 
that you typically see during this time of year or whether, as 
you stated, it's the January 9 announcement of the expanded 
parole policy. Sir, I think the ideal flow of migrants in the 
maritime domain is zero. As I've mentioned, these are 
incredibly dangerous ventures and we often see loss of life.
    Mr. Thanedar. My next question is to Ms. MacLeod. Both the 
Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection have to allocate 
their workforces and resources across a range of competing 
missions that support maritime security. You testified that 
both agencies have struggled to manage their assets and 
determine their workforce needs. My question is, in your view, 
what could the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection do 
to allocate resources more effectively? Second, both of these 
agencies are facing challenges in recruiting and retaining 
workers. What actions could these agencies take that would have 
the greatest possible impact to addressing recruitment and 
retention challenges?
    Ms. MacLeod. Thank you for the question. Our reports on the 
Coast Guard's workforce analysis showed that they have 
completed manpower requirements determinations on just 6 
percent of their workforce. As I mentioned, we made 
recommendations in that area and the Coast Guard has recently 
put forth a plan to implement our recommendations in terms of 
establishing a time line and milestones for assessing its 
workforce. This should position the Coast Guard better to 
understand needs across its various missions and place its 
personnel and assets accordingly.
    For CBP, the issues that we've identified are more in line 
with difficult remote locations, competition with other law 
enforcement agencies, and along with other issues, so slightly 
different issues there. In terms of recruitment and retention, 
we haven't looked specifically at the Coast Guard in this area 
recently, but we have done a lot of work looking at Department 
of Defense and the other military services and found that 
they're facing their most challenging recruiting environment in 
history. We've made a number of recommendations to DoD to 
address the growing range of challenges, such as the eligible 
population declining from which to recruit.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. Last question to Admiral Burdian, 
if I may. What is included in the President's budget request 
for 2024 to help address these resource needs?
    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Mr. Thanedar. Certainly, the 
continued funding to recapitalize our aging medium-endurance 
cutter fleet, the acquisition of the offshore patrol cutter is 
critically important. As you mentioned, we've searched so, so 
many resources down to the region. I would offer we are 
grateful for the support we get from Congress, and the 
increases in operating and maintenance funds have been 
incredibly helpful to maintain the Coast Guard we have.
    I would offer into the future a 35 percent increase in the 
operating maintenance funds is critical to buy the Coast Guard 
we need to support surging operations, emergency response, and 
increased security needs all over the Nation, including in the 
Arctic.
    Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired and I 
recognize the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Border Security 
and Enforcement, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Burdian, I 
represent southwest Louisiana. We have a lot of coastline, 
obviously, and constant interaction with the United States 
Coast Guard. I am an army veteran and my district director in 
Louisiana at my headquarters is an army veteran. I have two 
other senior staff members down there that are army veterans, 
including a retired colonel. So, over the course of the last 6 
years, I have been honored to serve this capacity, my Nation.
    We have had many, many interactions with the Coast Guard. 
We very rarely have an opportunity to commend the Coast Guard 
for their services and professionalism in this setting. So, I 
just wanted to do so for this moment. You guys are incredibly 
professional. As an old army staff sergeant working amongst 
three army buddies in my district office, we are consistently 
impressed with the United States Coast Guard. So, thank you for 
your service, ma'am. How long have you been in your current 
position, Admiral?
    Admiral Burdian. Thanks for your comments, sir. I'm 
likewise proud of all of our Coasties. I've been in my current 
position since May of last year.
    Mr. Higgins. Last year? Were you in the Response Policy 
Division during 2019 and 2020?
    Admiral Burdian. I was not. No, sir.
    Mr. Higgins. You were not. Can you give us a perspective of 
the change in response policy and the demands upon response 
operations for the Coast Guard in the era of 2019 and 2020 
under President Trump versus 2021 and 2022? How have things 
changed?
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Higgins. Are they worse? Are they better?
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir. I think Coast Guard policy 
constantly matures, and between 2019 and 2022, I was in command 
in South Florida, one of those field commanders I mentioned in 
my opening statement. Certainly, there were multiple policy 
changes that occurred in that time.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you. Let me summarize that things are 
worse than they were in 2019 and 2020. Just the changes of what 
we are dealing with at the Southern Border has impacted 
maritime operations, no doubt. It is just the reality of what 
we are dealing with. I am seeing that it is clear in my 
research and in your testimony today, Admiral Burdian and 
Director Miller, that cocaine remains the greatest threat. 
Admiral, you stated that in your opening statement, that while 
we mitigate the threat of all narcotics and recognize the 
impact of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl on the United 
States, the most significant drug threat in the maritime domain 
remains cocaine. Director Miller, you noted that in 2022 alone, 
you interdicted 250,000 pounds of cocaine. Is that correct?
    Mr. Miller. Thank you for the question. Yes, that's 
correct, sir.
    Mr. Higgins. That is a tremendous amount of cocaine. These 
cocaine shipments that are coming in through the maritime 
domain, Admiral, you mentioned that 92 percent of cocaine 
destined to the United States departed South America through 
the maritime domain using commercial and non-commercial 
vessels. Director, you stated that the vessels you are 
encountering have the ability to evade detection. They run at 
night a lot, and they evade surface patrol, obviously, and they 
have a low radar signature, so they are hard to catch.
    I would imagine, to the Chairman's question, that it is 
truly immeasurable the number of vessels that get away. This is 
not to the detriment of your effort, or your mission, or your 
determination, or your professionalism. I mean, on land, it is 
much easier to track the spore and then sort of measure what 
you missed. But I would imagine that in the maritime 
environment, it is much more difficult to measure those that 
got away. Would you say that is a fair statement?
    Mr. Miller. Thank you for the question. Yes, I would. Like 
the Admiral said, you know, we catch a lot of cocaine in the 
source and transit zone. The vast majority of other cocaine 
smuggling happens in the Caribbean, Puerto Rico, eastern 
Caribbean, especially. But, no, you are absolutely right. I am 
sad to tell you today that I fear that we are missing a lot of 
drug trafficking.
    Mr. Higgins. Final brief question, if you could. What kind 
of armament are you running into out there? What are your 
interdiction teams seeing?
    Mr. Miller. Thank you for your questions. So, we're seeing, 
in terms of weapons, our agents that were shot and our one 
agent that was killed, those were handguns. The shooter was an 
extensive shooter after we found out. We run into AK-47s. The 
shooting that happened off of Fajardo was a AR-15 pistol. So, 
we're seeing some heavy armament that is difficult and creates 
challenges for us.
    Mr. Higgins. Thank you all for being here today. Mr. 
Chairman, I yield.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired. I 
recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I ask my 
questions, I would just like to clarify the Rear Admiral's 
response to my colleague's question on had things changed? She 
said, yes, they had changed. She did not say they got worse. 
Just for clarification.
    Let's see. In our modern world, we know that American 
security must begin before our immediate maritime borders. The 
Coast Guard has an essential mission to safeguard our maritime 
security and our national sovereignty across the globe. Admiral 
Burdian, first of all, as a young man, I wanted to be in the 
Coast Guard. I don't think I ever made the muster, but, you 
know, I appreciate all that all of you do in the defense of 
this Nation in our maritime borders. How do the U.S. Coast 
Guard's mission in the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific work to 
protect our overall maritime and national security?
    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, sir. We are hiring. We'd love 
to welcome you into a recruiting office in case this thing 
doesn't work out here on the Hill.
    Mr. Payne. Well, after 2 years, I might come see you.
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir. Certainly, the Coast Guard is 
actively engaged in both of the theaters you mentioned, both in 
support of the combatant commands and conducting, you know, 
stand-alone Coast Guard Title 14 missions. In the Indo-Pacific, 
one of the most exciting things happening is our work to combat 
illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing, basically illegal 
fishing. Working with international partners, interagency 
partners, and also non-governmental partners to really get 
after folks that are robbing the sea from critical living 
marine resources that feed about 3 billion people globally. So, 
if economic security is national security, and I would argue 
that it is, we certainly are contributing there and making an 
investment in the future health of our oceans.
    In the Arctic, sir, you know, there are areas of new ocean 
that we haven't seen before. So, understanding the risks of 
increased human activity, both from the ability to respond to 
disasters, things like oil spills and mass rescue operations as 
we continue to see transits for pleasure, things like cruise 
ships up there, but also understanding what our near-peer 
competitors are doing up in the Arctic to protect our 
sovereignty and our resources, sir.
    Mr. Payne. Well, you know, that is great because I was on 
my way in that direction. How has the Coast Guard's work in the 
Arctic, particularly with the growing threat from Russia and 
China, as well as from climate change affected by an aging 
fleet and limited resources?
    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, sir. I would be remiss if I 
didn't mention that the Coast Guard is currently undergoing an 
effort to recapitalize our fleet of icebreakers.
    Mr. Payne. Excellent.
    Admiral Burdian. Our terms, polar security cutters. 
Understanding that the purpose of icebreaking in our polar 
regions is certainly to facilitate commerce, but really to 
exert national sovereignty and protect national security. Right 
now, our plan is for a fleet of three heavy icebreakers, three 
large polar security cutters, and a follow-on fleet of three.
    Mr. Payne. Excellent. That is very good to hear. In recent 
years, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and economic factors, our 
armed services have struggled to reach recruitment and 
retention goals. In 2022, the Coast Guard recruited just 2,793 
service members out of a goal of 4,200. Ms. MacLeod, has the 
U.S. Coast Guard struggled because of these and other workforce 
issues?
    Ms. MacLeod. Yeah, our work has shown that all branches of 
military service are struggling to recruit and retain service 
members at this time, and the Coast Guard is certainly among 
those. We do have an upcoming study. We'll be looking 
specifically at the Coast Guard that I expect to initiate later 
this summer. But without those workforce analyses that I 
mentioned earlier, the Coast Guard is really left with 
incomplete information on the number of personnel that is 
required to conduct its missions.
    Mr. Payne. Thank you for that question. Mr. Chairman, I 
will yield back.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman yields back. I now 
recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. LaLota.
    Mr. LaLota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your 
leadership and for focusing this committee's attention on 
securing America's maritime border. To our witnesses, thank you 
for your expertise, your dedication, and for what you do in 
your respective fields. I represent New York's 1st 
Congressional District on Long Island. We are surrounded by 
water by three sides. Admiral, while my district is not home to 
a Coast Guard base, we do have several Coast Guard stations in 
Montauk, Shinnecock, Eatons Neck. We have an Aids to Navigation 
team in Hampton Bays, a Maritime Safety Detachment in Coram, 
and a cutter base in Montauk. We have a robust Coast Guard 
auxiliary on Long Island as well. Specifically in my district, 
there are flotillas in East Hampton, Riverhead, Southold, 
Huntington, Northport, Stony Brook, and Port Jefferson. My 
stepfather is actually a member of the flotilla in East 
Moriches, and I am very grateful for his service. My 
grandfather was a Coast Guardsman as well. I am grateful for 
what you are doing to help secure our waters and keeping Long 
Island and the country safe.
    The reason we are here today is to highlight the crisis we 
are seeing on our borders, and specifically our maritime 
borders. The reality in which we live is that in the last 
fiscal year, in the 12 months of fiscal year 2022, the Coast 
Guard interdicted 12,000 migrants at sea, while just in the 
first 4 months of this fiscal year, the number is at 7,400. So, 
we are on a pace to double last year's numbers, and the Coast 
Guard is being stretched extremely thin.
    So, Admiral, my question relates to some things that you 
mentioned in your testimony about the Coast Guard's mission in 
the waters of South Florida Strait can be compared to, 
``patrolling a land the area the size of Maryland, with seven 
police cars limited to traveling at 15 miles per hour.'' I 
understand the auxiliary does not have a law enforcement 
capabilities or authority and I am not advocating for them to 
have any. But with the increase in the number of interdictions, 
I would like to talk about how the Coast Guard Auxiliary can be 
better used and shared to help secure our borders, specifically 
to stop these extremely dangerous voyages from continuing. So, 
my first question, Admiral, is how has the auxiliary been used 
by the Coast Guard in their missions thus far?
    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Congressman, and thanks to 
grandpa and stepdad for their service as well. The Coast Guard 
auxiliary is an incredibly important component of our overall 
force. We're 20,000 strong in the Coast Guard auxiliary. These 
are volunteers who choose to spend their time supporting Coast 
Guard operations and more importantly, Coast Guard personnel. I 
can tell you from my own experience and our auxiliary chaplain, 
we have an auxiliary chaplain program which is incredibly 
important as you consider the impacts of conducting these life-
saving missions.
    It is exhilarating when you can rescue someone from the 
sea. But I can tell you just the opposite is true when you have 
to inform a parent that their child is not coming home having 
been lost to the sea, which, unfortunately, I had to do 
multiple times. It was my auxiliary chaplain, Rick Braswell, 
who not only helped console those families but helped me in the 
aftermath of those circumstances. That is, what the Coast Guard 
Auxiliary does is relieve the burden on our active-duty 
workforce, whether it's providing, you know, ministry services 
like those I just described. Cooking for Coast Guard crews. We 
have physicians. They really are immeasurably productive. In 
these particular cases, you know, in direct support of the 
migrant interdiction mission, you're right, sir, they're 
prohibited by law from doing that. But they absolutely are part 
of the unified command that's structured to support these 
operations.
    Mr. LaLota. Great. Admiral, I hope that you would continue 
to tell Congress what we can do more to help build a robust 
auxiliary. But moving from that, have you had to pull, while 
you are patrolling in Florida and around the southern part of 
the United States, have you had to pull resources from other 
parts of the country like New York to assist in the efforts 
around the Keys, the Gulf, and other waters around the 
Caribbean?
    Admiral Burdian. We have, sir. We've redirected all major 
cutter deployments from the East Coast down to South Florida. 
About half of our patrol boat deployments and about 40 percent 
of our maritime patrol aircraft have been redirected to South 
Florida, and further offshore, the old Bahama Channel, closer 
to Haiti, and places like that. Our direction is to detect and 
interdict these migrant ventures as far from U.S. shores as 
possible. We, with the authority to do that, tend to push 
further offshore, sir.
    Mr. LaLota. Great. Back to the auxiliary, as you have moved 
some of the more conventional active-duty forces to important 
missions like this, has the auxiliary had to backfill some of 
the traditional Coast Guard mission back in New York?
    Admiral Burdian. I'll get back to you with their exact 
employment up in your region, sir, but absolutely. Our Coast 
Guard auxiliarists and communication watch stations again, they 
conduct, you know, they act as culinary specialists under way 
cooking for Coast Guard crews at sea. They really are an 
incredibly valuable component of the force.
    Mr. LaLota. Great. Thanks again for your service and I 
yield back, Chairman.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentlemen yields back. I now 
recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Garcia.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do want to 
thank all of you for your service to our country and for all 
the service that you provide us and all the different agencies. 
I am also an immigrant myself, and I know, I want to just let 
you all know that as you all know and as I have stated in this 
committee that coming by water to seek asylum is also a symptom 
of a broken immigration system. It is one of the reasons that 
folks come through our waterways to the United States. We know 
that many are risking these conditions, oftentimes on unsafe 
boats, because they don't have other options. There are no 
pathways for them once they arrive. I think we can all 
understand why someone, for example, would flee persecution 
from Cuba, for instance, and we won't solve this issue with 
only just more patrols. There has to be an orderly process 
around asylum and around immigration.
    We know that maritime drug smuggling is also a challenge 
for us to address. I was the mayor of Long Beach prior to this 
role just last year and I had served for 8 years as mayor. We 
have one of the largest seaports in the United States. The 
second-largest container cargo port in the country. So, 
certainly, our relationship as a city, our port was a city 
department. So, our relationship with the Coast Guard, with 
Homeland Security, with CBP, with all the various agencies was 
critical to the success of our ports, which are a huge economic 
driver for the country. So, in the case of the ports of Long 
Beach and Los Angeles, 40 percent of America's goods are coming 
in just in and out of those ports alone.
    We know also that our maritime borders are not wide open. I 
think you all and various agencies are doing a great job of 
ensuring that there is an orderly process on our maritime 
borders. Also want to note that Congress, particularly House 
Democrats, has also fought for more resources for agencies like 
the Coast Guard.
    Back in November 2021, President Biden and Congressional 
Democrats, of course, passed an infrastructure bill. I believe 
only about 13 House Republicans voted for this legislation, and 
it included $430 million for the Department of Homeland 
Security to expand facilities and improve screening 
capabilities at our ports of entry, which for ports like the 
port of Long Beach, like the port of Los Angeles, were critical 
in the work that we are doing there with our partner agencies. 
It also provided $429 million for Coast Guard infrastructure 
priorities, which are also very important to cities and to 
coastal communities.
    The 2023 appropriations package, which I believe only 9 
House Republicans voted for, provided an additional $130 
million for the Department of Homeland Security to hire 
additional workers at our ports of entry and to invest in more 
innovative and efficient technologies to speed up inspections. 
So, both in the appropriations package and in the 
infrastructure bill, both, of course, presented by the 
President, both overwhelmingly supported by House Democrats and 
overwhelmingly not supported by House Republicans, those 
provided additional support for these agencies.
    We know that an overwhelming majority of drugs enter our 
country through legal ports of entry. I think that has been 
reiterated at this committee and at many other subcommittees 
throughout the Congress. But we also know that effective 
screening is very important, which is why these funds are so 
critical. The American people earn $5 billion a year in customs 
revenues from the Port of Long Beach and the Port of Los 
Angeles; 2.6 million jobs throughout the United States are 
linked just to the trade in the ports that I currently 
represent and represented as mayor. As someone representing a 
coastal California community, I also want to acknowledge all 
the work that you all do to Rear Admiral Bourdain and the Coast 
Guard, your phenomenal work with our partnership should be 
hailed. I also want to thank you for your trailblazing 
leadership, as the first Hispanic American female flag officer 
in the Coast Guard's history. I think that is something that 
should be recognized, and I want to add my voice in that.
    I want to know a couple of questions. I know how much the 
Coast Guard does to protect Southern California, to protect 
coastal communities, the maritime industry, and certainly the 
district I represent and represented as mayor. As part of that, 
Admiral, for people that are unfamiliar with the needs of the 
Coast Guard, can you explain how the infrastructure bill that 
has been recently passed and now being implemented directly 
impacts and supports the mission of the Coast Guard?
    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Congressman. The support is 
really support to Coast Guardsmen. When you report aboard to a 
boat station, many of which were, you know, included in the 
infrastructure money, you're reporting aboard to work, but 
you're also reporting to a schoolhouse, a gym, a church, and 
you're home for several days as you stand the watch, as we like 
to say. So that's what that money does is improve the 
environment around Coast Guardsmen so they can focus on the 
mission.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you for that. We have also talked some 
about just the way that traffickers are trying to stay ahead 
with tech innovations around smuggling. What are we doing as 
the Coast Guard to really take on kind-of the tech innovations 
that are happening around smuggling?
    Admiral Burdian. Sir, Director Miller mentioned it earlier. 
The most important thing we have in our favor is our 
partnerships domestically with one another and internationally. 
We certainly at our research and development center up in the 
Northeast, are working on innovations in terms of information 
sharing, detecting, things like that. We'd love to get you some 
more information on that, sir.
    Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much. I just want to commend all 
of you for the great work you all do. With that, Mr. Chairman, 
I yield back.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired. I now 
recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Lee.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding 
this important hearing. I am grateful to all of our witnesses 
for being here today and for your service to our country. I 
represent Florida's 15th Congressional District, and maritime 
security affects every Floridian and is a key concern for our 
residents. In recent months, Florida has seen a surge in 
migrants attempting to enter our State illegally through our 
maritime border. This dramatic surge in migrants attempting to 
illegally enter the United States through Florida's maritime 
border so overwhelmed local law enforcement that as we have 
heard today, our Governor declared a state of emergency and 
activated our Florida National Guard to help address this 
crisis.
    Nationally, we know that our maritime border is a target 
for drug traffickers and the cartels who attempt to bring 
methamphetamine, and cocaine, and other drugs into the United 
States. This is a major security concern for our State, local, 
and Federal law enforcement officers and for all Americans. So, 
I thank you all for the critical work that you are doing to 
help keep our border safe.
    I would like to direct my questions to general Boyette and 
your role with the Florida National Guard. Specifically, since 
Governor DeSantis has declared the state of emergency and 
activated Florida's National Guard to help with this surge, 
tell me what are the greatest challenges that you have 
encountered in your work?
    General Boyette. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman. 
The initial challenge we had was direct communication and we 
since, through partnership with the Coast Guard, were able to 
address that. Now we have direct communications with the vessel 
assisting in quicker interdictions and quicker oversight for 
interdictions.
    The second big challenge is we are a traditional force. 
It's an all-volunteer force. These soldiers and airmen are 
volunteer, taken away from their families, communities, and 
their civilian jobs, and they're on a volunteer basis. So, this 
also applies to the aircraft and airframes that are doing the 
mission. They're part of the State of Florida and it's non-
sustainable for the long term for our formation.
    Ms. Lee. Tell me, what would make the operation more 
sustainable? If this did continue to be an operation that you 
needed to carry forward in the longer term, what would assist 
you in making it a more viable, sustainable operation for the 
guard?
    General Boyette. Thank you again for the question. I think 
there's a variety of different options and solutions to the 
problem. Several solutions could be a little bit more Federal 
support in terms of Federal mobilization, turning a Title 32 
soldier into a Title 10 soldier to give them the benefits, and 
support, and entitlements from the Federal Government. Thank 
you.
    Ms. Lee. Overall, how do you feel the efforts of 
interdiction of drug and migrants over the Florida coast, how 
is that going? How would you rate the overall effectiveness of 
the project so far?
    General Boyette. Thank you again for the question. Trending 
data suggests that we're having an impact. I believe it's a 
tremendous deterrent impact. We look forward to continuing the 
partnership with the Coast Guard and other Federal agencies and 
local agencies to continue the mission.
    Ms. Lee. Apart from the specific matter that you already 
mentioned, are there other things that we could be doing to 
help equip you and enhance the effectiveness of your mission?
    General Boyette. I think at the moment we're trending the 
next phase, I guess, is to learn and see how we can implement 
UAS, which we're already in the midst of doing. At the moment, 
we have no requirements.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the 
remainder of my time.
    Chairman Gimenez. The gentlelady yields back her time.
    Mr. Thanedar. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that 
Mr. Correa be allowed to sit and ask questions of today's 
witnesses.
    Chairman Gimenez. Without objection, so ordered. I now 
recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa.
    Mr. Correa. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for 
the opportunity of being in your committee. I used to chair 
this committee many moons ago. It is a privilege to be here 
again. I want to thank our witnesses today for your valuable 
service to our country. You are appreciated. Rear Admiral 
Burdian, I was reading your testimony, listening to you. 
Ninety-five thousand miles of shoreline, 361 commercial ports, 
25,000 miles of navigable channels, most importantly, $5.4 
trillion of commerce. That's 25 percent of our gross domestic 
product. That is unbelievable. So, in many ways your job here, 
the prosperity, the health of our economy really depends on you 
doing your job. So, my basic quick question here is what do you 
need to do to continue to do that great job of keeping the good 
stuff coming and keeping the bad stuff out?
    Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Mr. Correa.
    Mr. Correa. In about 20 seconds.
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir. I think I mentioned earlier, you 
know, Congress has made significant investments in the Coast 
Guard for which we're grateful. But those investments really 
are sustaining the Coast Guard that we have and not investing 
in the future Coast Guard, not giving us the opportunity to 
really recapitalize, operate, and maintain the Coast Guard of 
the future. Our top line now is right around $13 billion. 
Really, based on future need, we would seek investment in a $20 
billion Coast Guard.
    Mr. Correa. Please continue to come and let us know what is 
going on, because I know you also help with keeping embargo 
blockade on North Korea. You also work on the Arctic area and 
all parts of the world. I think most people would look at the 
Coast Guard and not even begin to imagine the kind of work you 
do for this country. So, thank you very much.
    Other area we discussed migrant and migrant policy, your 
job rescuing really human beings out at sea. Do you have 
predictive models that tell you when you are going to have a 
surge and people would be so desperate that they would go to a 
sea in an unworthy ship vessel and risk their lives? When you 
see political instability, economic chaos, are you able to 
predict to say this is where we expect a surge in people going 
to sea?
    Admiral Burdian. We don't have a predictive model, sir, but 
we certainly, there are Coast Guardsmen stationed in 30 nations 
around the globe, including those that are some of the nations 
where some of these folks are coming from. So, I think we 
understand the factors that can contribute to migration, 
political instability, natural man-made disasters, things like 
that, those are the things we look at.
    Mr. Correa. Refugees, we talk about desperation, pressure. 
The Biden administration just announced a new legal pathway for 
people from Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela, and Nicaragua to come to 
the United States. According to some reports from CBP, the 
average weekly encounters at the border, Southern Border have 
dropped by 98 percent. Are you seeing anything like that in 
your area, meaning a drop in numbers of refugees going to the 
sea?
    Admiral Burdian. We are seeing a drop in those numbers, 
sir. I don't think we're prepared to attribute that to a 
specific causal factor, but absolutely, we're seeing a 
reduction.
    Mr. Correa. Again, coming back to my question about a 
predictive model, I would love to learn more about what you 
think are the factors that are leading to that drop, because 
we, as policy makers myself, want to know what is it that works 
and what doesn't, and how we can address these issues before 
they are full-blown at our doorstep.
    Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Correa. Finally, I just want to say again, my 1 minute 
I have left, to all of you, thank you for your great work. I do 
hope that, Mr. Chairman, we continue to hear from these great 
individuals. The more we know, the more facts we get, the 
better public policy makers we become. Going beyond Democrat or 
Republican, I think we are all good Americans trying to do the 
best thing we can for this country. For that reason, I thank 
you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me be part of this committee 
hearing today. Thank you.
    Chairman Gimenez. It is our pleasure. The gentleman yields 
back. I want to thank the witnesses for the valuable testimony 
and the Members for their questions. The Members of the 
subcommittee may have some additional questions for the 
witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these 
in writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(D), the hearing 
record will be placed and held open for 10 days. Without 
objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

      Questions From Honorable Robert Garcia for Jo-Ann F. Burdian
                            maritime safety
    Question 1a. Since 1999, the National Transportation Safety Board 
has investigated 3 accidents involving passenger ferries in New York, a 
deadly fire on the small passenger vessel Island Lady in Florida, duck 
boat accidents in Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and Missouri, and the 2019 
fire and sinking of the MV Conception off Santa Cruz Island, CA. These 
tragedies have cost the lives of 86 people, unnecessarily. The NTSB has 
issued a number of safety recommendations to the United State Coast 
Guard to close safety gaps, and yet many remain unfulfilled, including 
the recommendation made 20 years ago for preventative maintenance--
which was reiterated to the Coast Guard in 2012, 2018, and again in 
2020.
    Rear Admiral Burdian, while I understand this falls under 
Prevention Police and not under you responsibility of Response Policy, 
will you please convey to the Coast Guard's leadership my interest in 
this matter and please have the Coast Guard answer these questions?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 1b. What is the status of the Coast Guard rule making to 
require safety management systems for operators?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 2. With regard to the Conception and vessel safety, the 
Coast Guard is constantly short qualified marine inspectors. Does the 
Coast Guard have the necessary marine inspectors to ensure marine 
safety?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 3. With new requirements related to small passenger 
vessels, the Coast Guard will need to conduct more inspections. How 
many marine inspectors is the Service currently short?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
                             sexual assault
    Question 4a. CNN recently ran a report entitled, ``Failed 
oversight, lax punishments: How the Coast Guard has allowed sexual 
assault at sea to go unchecked,'' which reported a deeply concerning 
failure of the Coast Guard to prevent and punish sexual assault and 
misconduct in the maritime industry.
    Rear Admiral Burdian, while I understand this does not fall under 
Response Policy, as a female leader in the Coast Guard, have you read 
this reporting and what are your thoughts on her the Coast Guard 
currently responds to allegations of sexual assault and harassment?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 4b. Can more be done by the Coast Guard in this area?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 5. Do you have personal recommendations to Congress on 
what should be done?
    Additionally, I ask that you convey these questions to the Coast 
Guard for response. It is the Coast Guard's job to ensure that the more 
than 200,000 merchant mariners, who are given Government credentials to 
work on vessels, do not pose a safety risk.
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 6. Is it true that no Merchant Mariner has had their 
credentials revoked for shipboard sexual misconduct in the last decade?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 7. Under current regulations, Mariners' credentials can be 
suspended during investigation for drug or alcohol use but not for 
sexual misconduct. Congress enacted statutory change to this in Sec. 
11603 of the fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorizing Act (Sexual 
harassment or sexual assault as grounds for suspension or revocation). 
What measures is the Coast Guard taking to ensure the prompt and 
effective implementation of 46 U.S.C.  7704a?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 8. How many cases has the Coast Guard identified of 
Mariners holding credentials who have been convicted of convicted of 
sex crimes including rape, sexual battery, sexual assault, and child 
molestation?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 9. Do Coast Guard regulations allow for the sharing of 
information about criminal convictions, past enforcement actions, or 
on-going criminal or administrative investigations with potential 
employers? If not, is this something the Coast Guard is considering? 
Are statutory changes required to allow the sharing of such 
information?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
    Question 10. How many Coast Guard Administrative Law Judges are 
currently female? In the history of ALJ, how many judges have been male 
and how many have been female?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

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