[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
SECURING AMERICA'S MARITIME BORDER: CHAL-
LENGES AND SOLUTIONS FOR U.S. NATIONAL
SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 23, 2023
__________
Serial No. 118-5
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-386 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
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COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
Stephen Siao, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
Sean Jones, Legislative Clerk
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRANSPORTATION AND MARITIME SECURITY
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida, Chairman
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Shri Thanedar, Michigan, Ranking
Nick LaLota, New York Member
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Robert Garcia, California
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Vacancy, Subcommittee Staff Director
Alex Marston, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
Halle Sarkisian, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable Carlos A. Gimenez, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Florida, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 2
The Honorable Shri Thanedar, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security:
Oral Statement................................................. 3
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress
From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on
Homeland Security:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Rear Admiral Jo-Ann F. Burdian, Assistant Commandant for Response
Policy, United States Coast Guard:
Oral Statement................................................. 7
Prepared Statement............................................. 9
Mr. Jonathan P. Miller, Executive Director for Operations, Air
and Marine Operations, U.S. Customs and Border Protection:
Oral Statement................................................. 13
Prepared Statement............................................. 14
Brigadier General Sean T. Boyette, Director, Joint Staff, Joint
Forces Headquarters, Representing the Florida National Guard:
Oral Statement................................................. 20
Prepared Statement............................................. 22
Ms. Heather MacLeod, Director, Homeland Security and Justice,
Government Accountability Office (GAO):
Oral Statement................................................. 23
Prepared Statement............................................. 24
Appendix
Questions From Honorable Robert Garcia for Jo-Ann F. Burdian..... 47
SECURING AMERICA'S MARITIME BORDER: CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS FOR U.S.
NATIONAL SECURITY
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Thursday, March 23, 2023
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Transportation and
Maritime Security,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:29 p.m., at
Room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Carlos Gimenez
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Gimenez, Higgins, LaLota, Lee,
Thanedar, Payne, and Garcia.
Also present: Representatives Green, Correa, and Thompson.
Chairman Gimenez. The Committee on Homeland Security
Subcommittee on Transportation and Maritime Security will come
to order. The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony
from a distinguished panel of witnesses who will speak to
Federal and State challenges in securing our maritime borders
and actions Congress can take to improve maritime security and
ensure public safety. I now recognize myself for an opening
statement.
I want to thank each of the witnesses here with us today
for your service and for taking the time to testify. The
subject of today's hearing, examining challenges at the
Nation's maritime borders directly coincides with the work of
our full committee, which aims to hold the Biden administration
accountable for its disastrous open border policies.
As a representative of the Florida Keys, I am infinitely
familiar with the migratory and illegal narcotics crisis in the
open sea and along our coasts. In the last 2 years, the Biden
administration's policies have caused unlawful migration to
surge month after month, creating an unprecedented situation,
including in my community in South Florida. This past January,
Florida's Dry Tortugas National Park temporarily was forced to
close down to the public due to almost 300 arrivals by sea.
U.S. Coast Guard removed the migrants from the park on-board a
Coast Guard cutter and transported them ashore to Key West.
This incident is one of the many along the Nation's
maritime borders. Just last week, off the coast of San Diego,
the U.S. Coast Guard was dispatched to search for 2 migrant
smuggling boats that capsized, tragically killing 8 migrants on
board. Five months ago in November, 2 agents with the U.S.
Customs and Border Protection Air and Marine Operations were
injured and a third agent, Michel Maceda, a 7-year veteran of
AMO, was killed during a shootout with suspected drug smugglers
during a patrol off the coast of Puerto Rico. In my home State
of Florida, State and local authorities are doing their very
best to handle this crisis in the untenable situation and an
untenable situation on the ground.
I want to recognize the efforts of Monroe County Sheriff
Rick Ramsay and our brave sheriff's deputies for their tireless
work to assist Federal authorities throughout this migrant
crisis impacting the Florida Keys. Since August 2022 alone,
nearly 11,000 migrants have been repatriated after attempting
to cross the Florida Straits. Over the past 2 years, I have
continued to raise the alarm about the surge of illicit
narcotics, particularly deadly synthetic opioids like fentanyl,
entering our Nation's borders at record levels.
The drug crisis in our county--in our country is
unsustainable and is a direct result of failed policies this
administration has pursued. With that said, I would like to
recognize the importance of the agencies, each with our
witnesses represented. The U.S. Coast Guard plays a crucial
role in keeping our country safe and our maritime border
secure. While much of the work remains to be done, it is
evident that the men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard have
worked tirelessly to respond to the Nation's migrant and
illicit drug crisis.
CBP AMO is another important component of the drug and
migrant interdiction missions in the maritime environment. AMO
is involved in almost every aspect of the response to the
migrant crisis, from apprehending and processing unlawful
migrants, to conducting law enforcement operations, and
interdicting illicit drug smugglers.
The Florida National Guard has been instrumental in
addressing the migratory purge, or surge in the Florida Keys.
Governor Ron DeSantis recently issued an executive order that
activated the Florida National Guard and mandated that they
provide resources and assist local authorities. Over the past
couple of months, we have seen the Florida National Guard do
just that.
Last, I am deeply appreciative of our GAO witness for
joining us here today. The GAO is known as the Congressional
watchdog, and it lives up to its name. The GAO supports
Congress by ensuring accountability for Federal agencies,
including the U.S. Coast Guard and the CBP AMO. Thank you all
again for being here today.
[The statement of Chairman Gimenez follows:]
Statement of Chairman Carlos A. Gimenez
I want to thank each of the witnesses here with us today, for your
service, and for taking the time to testify.
The subject of today's hearing--examining challenges at the
Nation's maritime borders--directly coincides with the work of our full
committee, which aims to hold the Biden administration accountable for
its disastrous open border policies.
As the representative of the Florida Keys, I am intimately familiar
with the migratory and illegal narcotics crisis on the open sea, and
along our coasts.
For the last 2 years, the Biden administration's policies have
caused unlawful migration to surge month after month, creating an
unprecedented situation, including in my community in South Florida.
This past January, Florida's Dry Tortugas National Park temporarily
was forced to close down to the public due to almost 300 arrivals by
sea. The U.S. Coast Guard removed the migrants from the park on-board a
Coast Guard cutter and transferred them ashore to Key West.
This incident is one of many along the Nation's maritime borders.
Just last week off the coast of San Diego, the U.S. Coast Guard was
dispatched to search for 2 migrant smuggling boats that capsized,
tragically killing 8 migrants on board.
Five months ago, in November, 2 agents with U.S. Customs and Border
Protection Air and Marine Operations (AMO) were injured and a third
agent--Michel Maceda, a 7-year veteran of AMO--was killed during a
shootout with suspected drug smugglers during a patrol off the coast of
Puerto Rico.
In my home State of Florida, State and local authorities are doing
their very best to handle this crisis and the untenable situation on
the ground.
And I want to recognize the efforts of Monroe County Sheriff Rick
Ramsay, and our brave sheriff's deputies, for their tireless work to
assist Federal authorities throughout this migrant crisis impacting the
Florida Keys.
Since August 2022 alone, nearly 11,000 migrants have been
repatriated after attempting to enter Florida by sea.
Over the past 2 years, I've continued to raise the alarm about the
surge of illicit narcotics, particularly deadly synthetic opioids, like
fentanyl, entering our Nation's borders at record levels.
The drug crisis in our country is unsustainable and is a direct
result of the failed policies this administration has pursued. With
that said, I would like to recognize the importance of the agencies
each of our witnesses represent.
The U.S. Coast Guard plays a crucial role in keeping our country
safe and our maritime borders secure. While much work remains to be
done, it is evident that the men and women of the U.S. Coast Guard have
worked tirelessly to respond to the Nation's migrant and illicit drug
crisis.
CBP AMO is another important component of the drug and migrant
interdiction missions in the maritime environment. AMO is involved in
almost every aspect of the response to the migrant crisis, from
apprehending and processing unlawful migrants, to conducting law
enforcement operations and interdicting illicit drug smugglers.
The Florida National Guard has been instrumental in addressing the
migratory surge in the Florida Keys. Governor Ron DeSantis recently
issued an executive order that activated the Florida National Guard and
mandated they provide resources and assist local authorities. Over the
past couple of months, we have seen the Florida National Guard do just
that.
Last, I am deeply appreciative of our GAO witness for joining us
here today. The GAO is known as ``the Congressional watchdog'' and it
lives up to its name. The GAO supports Congress by ensuring
accountability for Federal agencies, including the U.S. Coast Guard and
CBP AMO.
Thank you all again for being here today. I look forward to your
testimony and answers. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the
gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Thanedar, for his opening statement.
Chairman Gimenez. I look forward to your testimony, and I
now recognize the Ranking Member, the gentleman from Michigan,
Mr. Thanadar, for his opening statement.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you, Chairman Gimenez, for calling this
important hearing, and thank you to all our witnesses for
joining us here today. I am honored to serve as the Ranking
Member of this subcommittee, and I look forward to working
alongside our Chairman and all Members of this subcommittee on
a bipartisan basis to secure our transportation and maritime
systems from those who would look to harm innocent people and
disrupt the free flow of commerce that is critical to our
economy.
The topic of today's hearing, the security of our maritime
borders, is an important one. Increasing number of migrants
have been taking to the sea to attempt to reach our shores,
often in overcrowded extremely dangerous vessels, and
tragically, some of them do not survive the journey. These are
men, women, and children who are clearly desperate to find safe
haven. As an immigrant myself, I sympathize with their plight,
as I know you do too, Mr. Chairman, as a fellow immigrant.
It is not difficult to determine what is driving such
desperation and fueling the increase in migrant flow at sea.
The vast majority of migrants taking to the sea are coming from
Haiti, Cuba, where political instability, poverty, and an oil
refinery explosion, and a devastating hurricane have pushed
people past their breaking points. Unfortunately, instead of
recognizing these tragic circumstances and seeking solution for
this humanitarian crisis, my Republican colleagues seem to be
more interested in playing political games to try to place
blame on the Biden administration. In actuality, the
administration is taking action to prevent illegal entry to the
United States while treating people humanely and with dignity.
The Coast Guard and its partners have been surging resources to
the Florida Straits to search for and rescue migrants at sea,
taking them on-board cutters and providing food, water, and
medical attention.
In January, the Biden administration announced the creation
of a new legal pathway for up to Cubans and Haitians, as well
as Venezuelans and Nicaraguans to enter the United States on a
2-year parole. This pathway is now available to 30,000
individuals each month and honors America's long history of
welcoming asylum seekers. Additionally, Homeland Security
Secretary Mayorkas has made clear that those who enter the
United States illegally by sea will be removed and will not be
eligible for parole.
This new program is already showing significant results. In
February, the number of migrants interdicted at sea dropped
more than 75 percent from the average of the previous 4 months.
At the Southwest Border, Border Patrol encounters with
nationals of the four countries eligible for the parole program
dropped by 95 percent in January. The administration is taking
action to stem the flow of drugs coming by sea. As the Coast
Guard, Customs and Border Protection have dedicated significant
resources to drug interdiction, it is important to note that
almost all of the fentanyl fueling the current opioid crisis is
coming over land, not by sea, carried through ports of entry by
U.S. citizens. At sea, the primary threat comes from cocaine.
Drug flows have generally trended downwards in recent years,
with the Coast Guard encountering cocaine on fewer occasions in
2022 than in any year under the Trump administration.
Democrats stand ready to support both migrants and drug
interdiction efforts by providing the Coast Guard, Customs and
Border Protection, and other Federal partners with the
resources they need. Last year, Democrats passed the Omnibus
Appropriation bill, which provided the Coast Guard with
increased funding above the prior year's level, including $1.7
billion for investment in services, air and marine fleet, and
facilities. The bill also provided Customs and Border
Protection with significant funding to support border security
efforts, including 92.7 million for new aircraft and aircraft
sensors.
Despite their tough talk about the need for rigorous border
security, Republicans voted against this critical funding.
Worse still, Republicans have proposed bills to effectively end
asylum in this country. Now, as we work through the
appropriation cycle for next year, some Republicans are
threatening to shut the Government down or refuse to pay our
Nation's debt unless Congress makes draconian cuts to spending,
which would undercut efforts to secure this homeland. I must
remind my colleagues that the last time Republicans recklessly
shut the Government down, they forced the dedicated members of
the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and other
security agencies to work without pay for weeks on end. That
does nothing to help secure our borders.
I hope that we in Congress can come together to deliver
solutions and help the Coast Guard free up resources to carry
out other aspects of its critical mission. Indeed, maritime
security starts not at our shores, but overseas, including in
the Arctic and Indo-Pacific where the Coast Guard's presence is
critical to protecting your interests. I look forward to
hearing from our witnesses today about what they need to carry
out their mission effectively. I thank the Chairman, and I
yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thanedar follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Shri Thanedar
March 23, 2023
I am honored to serve as the Ranking Member of this subcommittee,
and I look forward to working alongside our Chairman and all Members of
the subcommittee on a bipartisan basis to secure our transportation and
maritime systems from those who would look to harm innocent people and
disrupt the free flow of commerce that is critical to our economy. The
topic of today's hearing--the security of our maritime borders--is an
important one.
Increasing numbers of migrants have been taking to the seas to
attempt to reach our shores, often in overcrowded, extremely dangerous
vessels--and tragically, some of them do not survive the journey. These
are men, women, and children who are clearly desperate to find safe
haven. As an immigrant myself, I sympathize with their plight--as I
know you do too, Mr. Chairman, as a fellow immigrant.
It is not difficult to determine what is driving such desperation
and fueling the increase in migrant flows at sea. The vast majority of
migrants taking to the sea are coming from Haiti and Cuba, where
political instability, poverty, an oil refinery explosion, and a
devastating hurricane have pushed people past their breaking points.
Unfortunately, instead of recognizing these tragic circumstances
and seeking solutions for this humanitarian crisis, my Republican
colleagues seem to be more interested in playing political games to try
to place blame on the Biden administration. In actuality, the
administration is taking action to prevent illegal entry to the United
States while treating people humanely and with dignity. The Coast Guard
and its partners have been surging resources to the Florida straights
to search for and rescue migrants at sea, taking them on-board cutters
and providing food, water, and medical attention.
In January, the Biden administration announced the creation of a
new legal pathway for up to Cubans and Haitians, as well as Venezuelans
and Nicaraguans, to enter the United States on a 2-year parole. This
pathway is now available to 30,000 individuals each month and honors
America's long history of welcoming asylum seekers. Additionally,
Homeland Security Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas has made clear that
those who enter the United States illegally by sea will be removed and
will not be eligible for parole.
This new program is already showing significant results. In
February, the number of migrants interdicted at sea dropped more than
75 percent from the average of the previous 4 months. At the Southwest
Border, Border Patrol encounters with nationals of the four countries
eligible for the parole program dropped by 95 percent in January.
The administration is also taking action to stem the flow of drugs
coming by sea, as the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection
have dedicated significant resources to drug interdictions. It is
important to note that almost all the fentanyl fueling the current
opioid crisis is coming over land, not by sea, carried through ports of
entry by U.S. citizens. At sea, the primary threat comes from cocaine.
Drug flows have generally trended downward in recent years, with the
Coast Guard encountering cocaine on fewer occasions in 2022 than in any
year under the Trump administration.
Democrats stand ready to support both migrant and drug interdiction
efforts by providing the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection,
and other Federal partners with the resources they need. Last year,
Democrats passed the Omnibus appropriations bill, which provided the
Coast Guard with increased funding above the prior year's levels,
including $1.7 billion for investments in the service's air and marine
fleet and facilities. The bill also provided Customs and Border
Protection with significant funding to support border security efforts,
including $92.7 million for new aircraft and aircraft sensors.
Despite their tough talk about the need for rigorous border
security, Republicans voted against this critical funding. Worse still,
Republicans have proposed bills to effectively end asylum in this
country.
And now, as we work through the appropriations cycle for next year,
some Republicans are threatening to shut the Government down or refuse
to pay our Nation's debts unless Congress makes draconian cuts to
spending--which would undercut efforts to secure the homeland. I must
remind my colleagues that the last time Republicans recklessly shut the
Government down, they forced the dedicated members of the Coast Guard,
Customs and Border Protection, and other security agencies to work
without pay for weeks on end. That does nothing to help secure our
borders.
I hope that we in Congress can come together to deliver solutions
and help the Coast Guard free up resources to carry out other aspects
of its critical mission. Indeed, maritime security starts not at our
shores but overseas, including in the Arctic and Indo-Pacific, where
the Coast Guard's presence is critical to protecting U.S. sovereignty.
Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Ranking Member. Other Members
of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be
submitted for the record.
[The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
Thank you to Chairman Gimenez and Ranking Member Thanedar for
holding this hearing and to our witnesses for joining us here today.
America is a shining beacon of hope for people across the globe
that come to our shores seeking a better life. Sadly, our broken
immigration system has failed to fulfill the promise America has made
to ``give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses yearning to
breathe free.''
Recently, thousands of migrants from Cuba and Haiti have taken to
the sea, driven to desperation due to natural and man-made disasters in
their home countries. They have sought help from human smugglers and
have loaded onto cramped and unsafe vessels to undertake a dangerous
voyage, hoping to reach the American dream.
Instead of fixing our broken system so that we may allow those in
need of a safe home to become part of our national community, my
Republican colleagues instead want to blame President Biden and his
administration for what are actually decades-long enforcement issues
and global migration patterns. Rather than falling for this
politically-motivated rhetoric, we must meet these challenges with
smart investments in personnel, technology, and equipment to safeguard
our maritime domain.
Democrats are up to the task. Last year, Democrats provided
significant funding to the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection,
and other Federal partners to invest in border security. Republicans
voted against these investments.
Further, the Biden administration has created a new program to
provide an orderly pathway for people from Cuba and Haiti, as well as
Venezuela and Nicaragua, to come to the United States. This smart
policy is already having a remarkable effect on stemming flows of
migrants both at sea and by land.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses on how we can best
support the Coast Guard, Customs and Border Protection, and their
partners with the resources they need to respond to important needs at
our maritime borders, while still fulfilling their other critical
missions. I am also eager to hear about how the Coast Guard is working
to promote American sovereignty and maritime security across the globe
and to address the needs of the service's workforce moving forward.
Chairman Gimenez. I am pleased to have a distinguished
panel of witnesses before us today on this critical topic. I
ask that our witnesses please stand and raise your right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Gimenez. Thank you. Let the record reflect that
the witnesses have answered in the affirmative. Thank you.
Please be seated.
I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses. Rear
Admiral Jo-Ann Burdian currently serves as the assistant
commandant for response policy with the United States Coast
Guard. In this capacity, she is responsible for the development
of strategic response doctrine and policy guidelines for all
Coast Guard forces. Her role encompasses several operational
maritime missions, including maritime security,
counterterrorism, and defense operations. Mr. Jonathan Miller
is the executive director of the operations for U.S. Customs
and Border Protection Air and Marine Operations. As the
executive director for operations, he oversees all AMO domestic
and foreign aviation and maritime missions and advises the
executive assistant commissioner on operational issues.
Executive Director Miller has over 27 years of law enforcement
and leadership experience. Brigadier General Sean Boyette is
the director of the joint staff for Joint Force Headquarters in
St. Augustine, Florida. He is here today representing the
Florida National Guard. General Boyette is an accomplished
military leader with over 20 years' experience in enterprise
technology and military management. Ms. Heather MacLeod is a
director in the Government Accountability Office's Homeland
Security and Justice Team. With over 20 years' experience at
GAO, Ms. MacLeod oversees Coast Guard and maritime security
issues, including Coast Guard workforce and strategic planning
efforts, and maritime port and cargo security.
I thank all the witnesses for being here today. I now
recognize Rear Admiral Jo-Ann Burdian for 5 minutes to
summarize her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF REAR ADMIRAL JO-ANN F. BURDIAN, ASSISTANT
COMMANDANT FOR RESPONSE POLICY, UNITED STATES COAST GUARD
Admiral Burdian. Good afternoon, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking
Member Thanedar, and Members of the subcommittee. I'm grateful
for your support of the Coast Guard, and I'm honored to be here
today to discuss how the Coast Guard supports maritime border
security. I've submitted my full written statement to the
subcommittee, and I ask that it be entered into the record.
Chairman Gimenez. Yes.
Admiral Burdian. Thank you, sir. Every year, America's
ports and waterways support $5.4 trillion of maritime commerce.
Every day, across the Nation and around the globe, Coast Guard
personnel work alongside international, interagency, and
industry partners to uphold maritime security while
facilitating vital commerce. The United States enjoys 95,000
miles of coastline, which is the maritime border that we're
discussing here today. There are 36 Coast Guard sector
commanders stationed around the Nation who are also designated
as the Federal maritime security coordinator for those regions.
These field commanders manage security cooperation in our
ports through area maritime security committees. They
coordinate operations, share intelligence, and collaborate in
investigations with the other DHS components through the DHS
regional coordinating mechanisms. They also direct Coast Guard
operations offshore to create a layered approach to maritime
homeland security--excuse me--maritime border security.
Transnational criminal organizations, which you'll hear me
refer to as TCOs, are criminal enterprises that create
instability, harm economies, and threaten citizens around the
world. The Coast Guard, which is at all times an armed service
and a maritime law enforcement agency, is uniquely positioned
to combat these TCOs to help secure the maritime border. TCOS
move over 90 percent of cocaine bound for the United States
through maritime routes, and we target these loads where
they're most vulnerable at sea, far from U.S. shores. Over the
last 5 years, the Coast Guard has interdicted 888 metric tons
of cocaine worth over $25 billion. We've detained over 2,700
drug smugglers for Federal prosecution.
The Coast Guard is also keenly focused on historic levels
of irregular maritime migration. In the approaches to the
southeastern United States, irregular maritime migration
increased by over 500 percent between fiscal years 2020 and
2022, primarily consisting of Cuban and Haitian nationals.
We've deployed additional ships, aircraft, boats, and personnel
to support this operational surge. Along our southwest maritime
border in the approaches to California, we recorded a near-200
percent increase during the same time period encountering
primarily Mexican nationals.
Maritime migrant interdiction is a homeland security
mission. But I'll add that for any of us who's ever executed
this mission, it is first and foremost a life-saving operation.
It's one that our crews are carrying around--carrying out with
the utmost professionalism, maturity, and compassion. Maritime
migrants take to the sea, as you mentioned, Mr. Thanedar, in
dangerously overcrowded, unseaworthy vessels that aren't
equipped with any life-saving or communication equipment. I'd
offer, if you look at the well in front of you and imagine it
filled with 300 folks with all of their worldly possessions at
sea for 6 days, that typically is what Coast Guard crews are
encountering on some of these vessels.
Last year, when I was a sector commander in Miami, I
directed search-and-rescue operations after a Good Samaritan
located a single survivor clinging to the hull of a capsized
vessel in the Florida Straits. Following a 3-day search
operation, crews were able to recover the remains of 5 deceased
persons and over 30 additional folks were lost to the sea. I
wish I could say that this is a unique operation, but as you
mentioned, Mr. Chairman, these kinds of cases continue and
really are reflective of the dire circumstances maritime
migrants find themselves in and the absolute depravity for
human life we see in human smugglers.
As the surge persists, Coast Guard crews are witnessing
increased incidents of noncompliance and self-harm. Your Coast
Guard sentinels, alongside our CBP partners have demonstrated
exceptional resilience in the face of increasingly challenging
circumstances.
We face different challenges along the Northern Border.
Together with Customs and Border Protection, the Coast Guard
collaborates with the Royal Canadian Mounted Police to maintain
domain awareness and conduct integrated cross-border maritime
law enforcement operations to disrupt all illicit activity.
Thank you again for your support of the Coast Guard. I
appreciate the opportunity to be here today, and I look forward
to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Burdian follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jo-Ann F. Burdian
March 23, 2023
introduction
Good afternoon, Chairman Gimenez and distinguished Members of the
subcommittee. I am honored to be here today to discuss the Coast
Guard's role in securing America's maritime border.
The United States is a maritime nation with 95,000 miles of
shoreline and 361 commercial ports connecting 25,000 miles of navigable
channels facilitating the flow of $5.4 trillion dollars of maritime
economic commerce. More than 90 percent of the volume of overseas trade
enters or leaves the United States by ship. Your Coast Guard is a
unique, complementary organization within the Department of Homeland
Security enterprise. We are at all times an Armed Force, a Federal law
enforcement agency, humanitarian first responders, environmental
stewards, a regulatory agency, and a member of the intelligence
community. Your Coast Guard is a nimble instrument of national power.
We protect the homeland, save lives, and preserve the world's ocean. I
am pleased to share with you how we leverage our unique authorities and
capabilities, and relationships with international, Federal, State,
local, and Tribal partners to operationalize a layered approach to
maritime border security. I am pleased to share what America's Coast
Guard is doing to protect our communities from transnational threats.
maritime drug interdiction
Transnational Criminal Organizations (TCO) pose a significant
threat to our Nation's maritime border security. TCO enterprises are
diffuse, agile, and independent organizations that engage in drug
trafficking, human smuggling, and other types of illicit activity. TCOs
operate throughout our hemisphere, sowing regional instability and
corruption, and threatening our shared security and prosperity. No
single agency can dismantle this threat alone. The Coast Guard
collaborates with partners across all levels of government, as well as
international partners, to combat TCO activities.
The Coast Guard is the lead Federal agency for maritime law
enforcement, including drug interdiction on the high seas. We share the
lead for drug interdiction in U.S. territorial seas with U.S. Customs
and Border Protection (CBP). The Coast Guard partners with the
Department of Defense, through Joint Interagency Task Force--South
(JIATF-S), for detection and monitoring of illicit drugs bound for the
United States, and the Department of Justice and the Organized Crime
Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF) to target, detect, interdict, and
prosecute transnational organized criminals to dismantle their
networks.
From fiscal years 2018 through 2022, the Coast Guard removed 888
metric tons of cocaine from the transit zone, worth an estimated
wholesale value of $25.75 billion, and detained 2,776 drug smugglers
for U.S. prosecution; in fiscal year 2020, 92 percent of the cocaine
destined to the United States departed South America through the
maritime domain, using commercial and non-commercial conveyances. Our
layered approach to combat TCOs, as far away from U.S. shores as
practical, is through security cooperation and integrated out of area
deployments, and while we mitigate the threat of all narcotics and
recognize the impact of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl on the
United States, the most significant drug threat in the maritime domain
remains cocaine.
The Coast Guard maintains a physical presence in 30 countries
around the world, of which about half of these countries are in the
Western Hemisphere. Coast Guard personnel serve in various capacities
as security cooperation officers, maritime advisors, attaches,
liaisons, support to interdiction and prosecution teams, or technical
experts. Through these integrated touchpoints we work with our partners
to identify challenges and opportunities to increase their capabilities
to combat TCOs inside their borders and maritime jurisdictional zones.
The Coast Guard also maintains more than 40 bilateral agreements.
These agreements enable operations on partner-nation flagged vessels
suspected of illicit activities on the high seas and in waters subject
to their jurisdiction. In fiscal year 2021, partner nations were
responsible for more than 60 percent of cocaine removals in the Western
Hemisphere transit zone, and in fiscal year 2022, our South and Central
American partners contributed to 75 percent of drug disruptions. These
types of international activities, in addition to participation in
combined exercises and Coast Guard provided training, enable partner
nations to increase the professionalization of their workforce, enhance
their maritime capabilities, and empower regional countries to lead
coordinated efforts to combat TCOs at the source.
Coast Guard forces deploy to the Eastern Pacific and Caribbean to
patrol the transit zone to deter, detect, and interdict maritime drug
trafficking events. Coast Guard deployments are complementary to U.S.
Navy, Canadian, British, and Dutch naval deployments with embarked
Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachments, capitalizing on the Coast
Guard's authorities and expertise to interdict narcotics before they
approach our borders. These surface assets are supported by Coast
Guard, CBP, U.S. Navy, and Dutch fixed-wing aircraft. These aircraft
conduct detection and monitoring, with intelligence and investigative
support through JIATF-S embedded liaisons.
In fiscal year 2022, following Coast Guard-led maritime
interdictions, intelligence, and investigative support to our
interagency and partner nation teammates, the Department of Justice
successfully extradited and indicted Julio De Los Santos-Bautista, a
Consolidated Priority Organizational Target and TCO leader responsible
for smuggling cocaine from South America into the United States, via
Puerto Rico. In addition to the indictment, an additional 18 members of
Mr. De Los Santos-Bautista's TCO were arrested, and 16 properties were
seized by Dominican partners. Successes like this investigation are the
result of the Coast Guard's integrated efforts with partners to combat
TCOs attempting to exploit our maritime borders.
migrant interdiction
Another threat to our maritime border security is irregular
maritime migration. We approach maritime migration operations as a
life-saving mission. Migrants can take to the sea in a variety of
conveyances, which are often overloaded with little to no safety
equipment nor experience piloting vessels, especially in adverse
weather conditions. Over the last 5 years, approximately 341 migrants
who embarked on a vessel to enter the United States did not survive the
journey and were either recovered by the Coast Guard or were presumed
lost at sea. It is not uncommon for migrants to pay a smuggler or
organizer upwards of $10,000 to embark on the unsafe journey to the
United States.
Coast Guard policy to interdict migrants at sea is rooted in
national-level policy, established following maritime mass migrations
in the 1980's and 1990's. The key tenets of those policies are to:
Interdict individuals at sea, as far away from U.S. shores as possible,
and collaborate with the Department of State to enter into
international agreements with countries to enable direct maritime
repatriations, when appropriate. The Coast Guard maintains
international agreements and liaisons with the Bahamas, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, and Haiti to support safe, direct repatriations of
interdicted migrants, consistent with international rules and norms and
with U.S. policy on protection screening relating to fear of
persecution or torture upon return. During instances when a migrant
warrants protection screening by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services, the Coast Guard works through an interagency process, as
outlined in the Maritime Operational Threat Response Plan, and may
transfer them to a safe location for further screening. For migrants
who do not warrant further protection screening, the Coast Guard works
closely with the interagency and international partners to ensure a
safe repatriation.
Over the last year-and-a-half, the Coast Guard observed an increase
in irregular maritime migration, above historical norms, across our
southern maritime border. This is a difficult mission for our crews.
The desperation of these individuals we encounter is palpable, and the
human smugglers associated with these voyages are devoid of compassion.
For example, patrolling the waters of the South Florida Straits can be
compared to patrolling a land area the size of Maryland with 7 police
cars limited to traveling at 15 miles per hour. It requires exceptional
tactical coordination between aircraft, ships, boats, and supporting
partners ashore. It is not uncommon for migrant vessels we encounter to
be non-compliant, threatening the lives of other migrants on board
through acts of violence, ingesting hazardous chemicals, even holding
small children over the side of the vessel to deter a Coast Guard
rescue. Once on board our ships, Coast Guard personnel humanely tend to
the needs of migrants, providing food, shelter from the elements, and
medical care where required. Every person we encounter is treated with
dignity and respect, and full acknowledgment that those individuals are
seeking a better quality of life.
Coast Guard operators are professionals, but also spouses, parents,
siblings, aunts, uncles, and sometimes grandparents. These operations
are deeply impactful to our people, who have demonstrated remarkable
resilience in the face of an increasingly challenging operational
environment.
Southeast United States, including Puerto Rico and U.S. Virgin Islands
The southeast maritime approaches encompass much higher levels of
irregular maritime migration as compared to the other U.S. southern
maritime vectors. In this region, from fiscal year 2020 to 2022,
migrant flow increased by 521 percent, from 5,670 to 29,520. Notably in
this vector, Cuban irregular maritime migration flow early into the
second quarter of fiscal year 2023 is 10,964, as compared to the total
Cuban maritime flow for fiscal year 2022, 9,538. Primary nationalities
encountered in this region are Cubans, Haitians, and Dominicans, in
addition to much smaller populations of other nationalities. Most Cuban
and Haitian migrants use transit routes into Florida, either directly
or via the Bahamas. Alternatively, Dominican and some Haitian migrants
use shorter transit routes across the Mona Passage to Puerto Rico and
the U.S. Virgin Islands. Common conveyances used in this region range
from fishing vessels, coastal freighters, sail freighters, go-fast type
vessels, and ``rusticas.''
These conveyances can transport as few as 10 migrants on a
``rustica'' to hundreds on a sail freighter, or coastal freighter.
Interdicting and rescuing migrants from these types of conveyances is
dangerous, not only for the migrant, but also for our crews and
partners. On March 6, 2022, a Haitian coastal freighter ran aground
near Key Largo, Florida, attempting to offload passengers on U.S.
shores. Of the 356 migrants on the vessel, 158 jumped off the vessel
and attempted a perilous swim to shore without any safety equipment.
Responses to incidents of this magnitude require a robust response both
on the water and on shore, what the Coast Guard would refer to as a
mass rescue operation. Despite the quick and effective coordination on
scene, it is not uncommon for responders to be overwhelmed.
In 2003, DHS established an interagency task force called Homeland
Security Task Force--Southeast, to prepare for, prevent, deter, and
respond to a potential or actual maritime mass migration. The task
force is made up of DHS components, the Department of Defense, and
State and local agencies, optimizing authorities, capabilities, and
manpower to prevent a mass maritime migration, which presents a risk to
both national security and our maritime border security. The Coast
Guard integrates its coastal, offshore, aviation, and intelligence
resources to support DHS's operational plan, Operations Vigilant
Sentry. This plan is DHS's standing interagency response plan to deter
irregular maritime migration.
Southwest Maritime Border
The southwest maritime border vector also recorded significant
surges in irregular maritime migration, but not to the scale of the
southeast maritime approaches. Fiscal year 2022 marked a 10-year record
high of migrant flow \1\ or a 200 percent increase from fiscal year
2019. Human smugglers rely on recreational vessels or ``panga'' style
vessels to transport as many as 30 migrants at a time; other common
conveyances include personal watercraft. Although migrants with a
variety of nationalities are interdicted in this vector, the vast
majority are Mexican nationals. The Coast Guard does not have an
agreement with the government of Mexico to directly repatriate migrants
through the sea. In these situations, the Coast Guard transfers the
migrants to CBP for an appropriate processing including expedited
removal.
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\1\ The Coast Guard characterizes ``flow'' as known landings, other
known departures, and Coast Guard, U.S. partner agency, and foreign
partner interdictions, turn-arounds, and estimates of the number lost
at sea.
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The Gulf of Mexico
In the Gulf of Mexico, irregular maritime migration events
increased by 530 percent from fiscal year 2018 through fiscal year
2022. In this vector, migrant events are organized and facilitated by
human smuggling networks, or TCOs, using ``pangas'' or recreational
vessels. As with the southwest maritime border, the vast majority of
migrants interdicted in this vector are Mexican nationals. In fiscal
year 2022, there were 20 instances resulting in the interdiction of 14
Cuban migrants. In these cases, the Coast Guard works through regional
interagency partners to transfer interdicted migrants ashore to CBP.
northern border
The northern border is expansive and diverse with numerous islands,
waterways, short distances between United States and Canadian
territorial seas creating opportunities for transnational actors to
exploit vulnerable maritime areas with relatively reduced law
enforcement presence.
Maritime security threats along the Northern Border include both
irregular maritime migration and drug trafficking. Known irregular
maritime migration flow averages 30 per year, primarily across the
Great Lakes and St. Lawrence Seaway. TCOs traffic Canadian marijuana,
fentanyl, methamphetamines, and other synthetic drugs near the Strait
of Juan de Fuca, the Great Lakes, and other less populated areas.
The United States signed the Framework Agreement on Integrated
Cross-Border Maritime Law Enforcement Operations (ICMLEO) with Canada
in 2009 and began to operationalize ICMLEO in 2012. Since then, the
Coast Guard and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) developed a
program to train and designate officers to co-crew one another's boats
and aircraft to enforce Canadian and United States Federal laws on
either side of the shared border. Since then, 713 boat crews and 349
aircrews from the Coast Guard and RCMP were trained to conduct ICMLEO
operations. From calendar year 2016 through 2019, ICMLEO units made 32
arrests, interdicted 57 migrants, and seized 150 kg of cocaine, 1,600
kgs of liquid methamphetamines, and 10 kgs of barbiturate and ketamine.
In April 2021, Coast Guard, RCMP, and CBP partners interdicted more
than 342 pounds of methamphetamine worth more than $1.5 million near
Port Angeles, Washington. The ICMLEO program is a fantastic example of
how the Coast Guard teams alongside the RCMP, CBP, and other State and
local law enforcement to prevent TCOs from exploiting our Northern
Border.
secure u.s. ports
Although the Coast Guard works to interdict threats as far from the
United States as possible, we also have key maritime security roles in
our near-shore and port environments. We leverage our unique
authorities as Captain of the Port, Federal Maritime Security
Coordinator, and Officer in Charge Marine Inspection to protect
America's ports and waterways. Area Maritime Security Committees are
established in each port to identify critical port infrastructure,
operations, risks, and mitigation strategies; and to develop, train,
and exercise the Area Maritime Security Plan. The Coast Guard conducts
foreign and domestic vessel inspections and security boardings,
container and facility inspections, and marine casualty investigations
to prevent marine casualties and property losses, minimize security
risks, protect the marine environment, facilitate the legitimate use of
waterways, and suppress violations of Federal law.
The Coast Guard, CBP, and U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement
have established Regional Coordinating Mechanisms (ReCoM) to further
interagency and port partner collaboration through intelligence
integration, operational planning, and interagency operations to target
and disrupt TCOs and threats to protect our marine transportation
system. Additionally, ReCoM partners conduct surge operations such as
Multi-Agency Strike Force Operations which leverage the jurisdictions,
authorities, and resources of multiple agencies to ensure the safe and
legal movement of containerized cargo and waterside facility security.
Another aspect of the Coast Guard's role in securing U.S. ports is
through conducting international port security assessments. These
assessments adhere to the International Ship and Port Facility Security
Code which serves as a framework through which countries cooperate to
deter and prevent maritime threats from entering ports.
the importance of investment in capability
To sustain and improve on these operational successes, the Coast
Guard needs to continue re-capitalizing its patrol boats and major
cutters. The Coast Guard has nearly completed its replacement of legacy
110-ft patrol boats with more capable Fast Response Cutters (FRC).
These ships play key roles every day in both drug and migrant
interdiction missions.
Additionally, National Security Cutters (NSC) demonstrate
tremendous capability and make unique contributions, particularly to
the drug interdiction mission. One of the Coast Guard's highest
priorities is the acquisition of 25 Offshore Patrol Cutters (OPCs). The
OPC will be the backbone of Coast Guard offshore presence and will
replace the 30-to-50-year-old Medium Endurance Cutters that are
operating well beyond their service lives. These assets are essential
to interdicting drug smugglers and irregular migrants at sea, as well
as rescuing mariners, enforcing fisheries laws, responding to
disasters, and protecting our ports. I would like to acknowledge and
thank Congress for the support of the Coast Guard's FRC, NSC, and OPC
acquisition programs; our crews are fighting for the American people
every day, and with the addition of the OPC, we will be able to extend
our presence even further to combat shared transnational threats.
conclusion
The Coast Guard's layered approach to maritime border security
relies on our unique authorities, capabilities, and partnerships to
address threats as far away from U.S. shores as possible. To do this,
we must continue to invest in our workforce, re-capitalize aging assets
and infrastructure, and explore and integrate new technologies that
enhance our interoperability with partner agencies across all levels of
government, including our international partners. The Coast Guard is a
team player in protecting our maritime border security. We recognize
the importance and value of working by, with, and through our partners,
because we cannot do this alone. Our hemispheric security is a shared
responsibility, and your Coast Guard is all-in, complementing our
capabilities and resources through regular collaboration, sharing
information, and innovating in ways to protect the American people.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and thank you for
your continued support of the U.S. Coast Guard. I would be pleased to
answer your questions.
Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Rear Admiral Burdian. I now
recognize Executive Director Miller for 5 minutes to summarize
his opening statements.
STATEMENT OF JONATHAN P. MILLER, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR
OPERATIONS, AIR AND MARINE OPERATIONS, U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER
PROTECTION
Mr. Miller. Good afternoon, Chairman Gimenez, Ranking
Member Thanedar, and Members of the subcommittee. It is my
honor to appear before you today representing the men and women
of Air and Marine Operations and speak to you about our
strategic mission to safeguard our Nation's maritime borders.
As an operational component of U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, AMO protects the security interests of the United
States by using aviation and maritime law enforcement
expertise, innovative capabilities, and partnerships. Our
greatest resources are the sound judgment and experience of our
dedicated agents, of which 60 percent are veterans of the armed
services.
Today, I'd like to focus on two dynamic challenges we're
facing in the maritime border environment, elevated levels of
migrants, and the continued threat of maritime drug smuggling.
Similar to the situation on the southwest land border, we're
seeing surges of irregular migration on the water. In fiscal
year 2022, AMO enforcement efforts led to the apprehension of
nearly 9,400 migrants in the maritime environment, an increase
of 242 percent from fiscal year 2021 and 334 percent from
fiscal year 2020. Already this fiscal year, AMO participated in
6,200 migrant apprehensions in the maritime environment with 94
percent of those apprehensions occurring in the Florida Straits
and the Caribbean.
Migrants attempting to make the journey to the United
States by way of maritime pathways take enormous risks, putting
their lives in the hands of smugglers operating improvised
rustic vessels that are neither sea-worthy nor built to
accommodate the number of people on board. Encounters with
these vessels often transition to rescue missions with some of
the most challenging rescues involving Haitian sail freighters,
often overloaded with hundreds of migrants.
AMO continues to encounter drug smugglers trying to evade
detection and apprehension. Our detection and interdiction
efforts result in the seizure of tons of dangerous illicit
drugs, keeping them from reaching our shores and our
communities. In fiscal year 2022, AMO enforcement efforts led
to the seizure of more than 380,000 pounds of drugs including
approximately 250,000 pounds of cocaine, 100,000 pounds of
marijuana, 25,000 pounds of methamphetamine, and one 1,500
pounds of fentanyl. Approximately 82 percent of these seizures
occurred in the maritime environment.
In addition to increased encounters with drug smugglers and
migrant vessels, we've also seen a rise in violence in the
maritime environment. Use of force events nearly doubled last
year, with Puerto Rico being the most violent maritime threat
vector of any location we patrolled. On November 17, 2022,
Marine Interdiction Agent Michel Maceda was shot and killed and
his two partners gravely injured during a gunfight with drug
smugglers following a vessel interdiction off the coast of Cabo
Rojo, Puerto Rico. Just 2 months later, another gunfight during
a vessel interdiction off the coast of Fajardo resulted in the
death of two drug smugglers.
AMO is committed to its maritime security mission and
continues to make investments in vessels, aircraft, and other
technological capabilities to advance the effectiveness of our
operations. We are heavily invested in radars and sensors,
increasing domain awareness along our littoral borders. Over
the last year and a half, tethered aerostats equipped with
marine surface radars and marine autonomous surveillance towers
have contributed to the seizure of over 12,000 pounds of
cocaine, dozens of vessels, and hundreds of apprehensions.
Partnerships are a crucial force multiplier in the maritime
environment. In addition to the U.S. Coast Guard, AMO routinely
works with the Federal, State, and local partners, including
frequent coordination and joint operations with foreign
governments. AMO is a key component of the DHS Joint Task Force
East and one of the largest aviation contributors to DoD-led
Joint Interagency Task Force South Coalition. AMO provides
thousands of hours of intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities through the source and transit
zones, resulting in the interdiction of hundreds of thousands
of illicit narcotics before they can make it to the U.S.
borders.
I look forward to working with Congress to ensure AMO could
even further serve U.S. national security interests by
extending our operational authority to the contiguous zone of
the United States and by securing permanent foreign authorities
to better engage with foreign partners and conduct aircraft
deployments abroad. Thank you for the opportunity to testify
today, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement of Jonathan P. Miller
March 23, 2023
introduction
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to appear before you today
to discuss Air and Marine Operations' (AMO) strategic mission to
safeguard our Nation's maritime borders. As an operational component of
U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), AMO protects United States'
interests by anticipating and confronting security threats through our
aviation and maritime law enforcement expertise, innovative
capabilities, and partnerships at the border and beyond.
AMO is a critical component of CBP's border security mission and
the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) risk-based and multi-
layered approach to homeland security. We apply advanced aeronautical
and maritime capabilities and employ our unique skill sets to safeguard
our Nation's borders and preserve America's security interests.
With approximately 1,800 Federal agents and mission support
personnel, 250 aircraft, and 290 marine vessels \1\ operating
throughout the United States, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands,
AMO thrives on being extremely efficient and adaptive. Our greatest
resources are the sound judgment and experience of our agents, who
average 17 years of law enforcement experience with AMO. More than 60
percent of these sworn agents are veterans of the Armed Services, and
many have prior law enforcement experience.
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\1\ AMO owns and maintains CBP's 290 vessels, including riverine
vessels that are operated by the U.S. Border Patrol.
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AMO is uniquely positioned--organizationally, with unique
authorities and jurisdiction, and unequaled specialized training,
equipment, and domain awareness capability--to protect America's
security and prosperity interests beyond the Nation's border in source
and transit zones, between ports of entry, in our coastal waters, and
within the Nation's interior.
amo history and authorities
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the
United States, the newly-formed DHS distributed legacy air and marine
programs from the U.S. Customs Service and U.S. Border Patrol into two
newly-created agencies, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE)
and CBP, respectively. In 2005, DHS transferred all of ICE's legacy
Customs air and marine programs to CBP. In 2006, CBP established AMO, a
specialized law enforcement component merging all legacy air and marine
programs into one organization.
Today, AMO operates out of approximately 74 locations through the
United States, and is divided into three regions: Southwest, Northern,
and Southeast Region. Each region is split into Air and Marine
Branches, and then further divided into Air and/or Marine Units.
AMO also has six National Air Security Operations Centers that plan
and conduct missions with P-3 Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) and
unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) programs, and the Air and Marine
Operations Center (AMOC), which is responsible for managing the air and
maritime domain awareness of the Department, as directed by the
Secretary. The AMOC detects, identifies, and coordinates responses to
national security threats in the air domain, in coordination with other
appropriate agencies.
Together, AMO's professional and highly-skilled workforce and
operational assets create a sophisticated domain awareness network
across the United States providing critical aerial and maritime
surveillance, interdiction, and operational capabilities in support of
AMO's maritime border security mission.
AMO Law Enforcement Authorities
An integral part of CBP's border security mission, AMO agents are
credentialed law enforcement officers \2\ with a broad range of
authorities that enable them to transcend land, air, and sea domains
and jurisdictions, providing a critical layer of continuity in
enforcement efforts.
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\2\ 19 U.S.C. 1589a.
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Within the ``customs waters''\3\ of the United States, or at any
place within the United States, AMO agents may board a vessel for the
purpose of enforcing customs law and to use all necessary force to
compel compliance.\4\ Additionally, in certain circumstances, AMO is
authorized to operate on the high seas, for instance when enforcing
laws on U.S. registered vessels,\5\ hovering vessels,\6\ and vessels
subject to hot pursuit.\7\ Additionally, beyond the customs waters, AMO
may enforce the Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Act \8\ where
appropriate, which concerns the trafficking of controlled substances
aboard vessels in extraterritorial waters. These authorities enable AMO
to extend our zone of security surrounding our maritime border and
littorals of the United States.
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\3\ 19 U.S.C. 1401(j), 1709(c).
\4\ 19 U.S.C. 1581(a).
\5\ 19 CFR 162.3.
\6\ 19 U.S.C. 1401(k).
\7\ 19 U.S.C. 1581.
\8\ 46 U.S.C. 70501-70502.
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In their capacity as CBP law enforcement agents, AMO agents also
enforce immigration laws in the territorial sea, on land, and in the
air. AMO has the same broad immigration authority \9\ as the U.S.
Border Patrol; however, it is also in the unique position to enforce
this authority in the maritime environment. Similar to other
investigative agencies, AMO agents recruit confidential sources,
develop criminal cases, support prosecutors, and testify in court in
addition to their enforcement actions in the air, land, and maritime
domains. This combination of authorities enables AMO to conduct
successful investigations in the maritime domain.
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\9\ 8 U.S.C. 1-1778.
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current state of the maritime border
AMO's maritime border security mission is complex and challenging.
The maritime domain is generally less restricted than the air and land
environments, and it is an expansive pathway, without barriers, that
connects to more than 95,000 miles of U.S. shoreline.
Thousands of vessels enter or operate in U.S. territorial waters
every day. While the vast majority operate for recreation or legitimate
commerce, a small percentage engage in smuggling and other illegal
activity. Detecting an illegal activity and apprehending any associated
smuggling can be daunting, as many mimic legitimate traffic, while
others elude detection altogether.
While the Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002 \10\ and the
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) require
many commercial, passenger, and fishing vessels to broadcast their
position via transponder and operate with an Automatic Identification
System (AIS)--a tracking system to, among other things, increase
maritime awareness--the requirement does not cover many small vessels.
Furthermore, unlike air traffic, small vessels \11\ inbound to the
United States are generally not required to announce their arrivals in
advance, nor are they required to make their initial landing at a
designated port of entry. Therefore, detecting and assessing the risk
of small vessels is particularly challenging.
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\10\ 46 U.S.C. 2101.
\11\ ``Small vessels'' are characterized as any watercraft,
regardless of method of propulsion, less than 300 gross tons. Small
vessels can include commercial fishing vessels, recreational boats and
yachts, towing vessels, uninspected passenger vessels, or any other
commercial vessels involved in foreign or U.S. voyages. DHS, Small
Vessel Security Implementation Plan Report to the Public, January 2011.
https://www.dhs.gov/small-vessel-security-strategy-implementation-plan.
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Interdicting Irregular Maritime Migration
Like the situation at our Southwest land border, the United States
is experiencing periodic surges of irregular migration in the maritime
environment. In fiscal year 2022, AMO enforcement efforts led to the
interdictions of 9,392 migrants in the maritime environment, an
increase of 242 percent from fiscal year 2021 and 334 percent from
fiscal year 2020. In fiscal year 2023 to date,\12\ AMO enforcement
actions have led to 6,130 migrant interdictions in the maritime
environment, with 94 percent of those interdictions occurring in South
Florida and the Caribbean Sea as AMO continues to support the DHS-wide
effort to address irregular maritime migration from Haiti and Cuba.
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\12\ As of February 28, 2023.
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Migrants attempting to make the journey to the United States by way
of maritime pathways take an enormous risk, putting their lives in the
hands of transnational criminal organizations (TCO) and human smuggling
networks and often in improvised, rustic vessels. The weather at sea is
unpredictable, and in these handmade crafts, the possibility of
capsizing and even drowning is often imminent. The vessels that make it
far enough for AMO to encounter are often dangerously overloaded with
people--people who most often are not equipped with life preservers.
The journey is perilous and AMO encounters with these vessels very
often become rescue missions.
Rescue operations at sea are extremely dangerous for migrants as
well as our marine agents. In July 2022, AMO Miami Air and Marine
Branch Marine Interdiction Agents partnered with the United States
Coast Guard (USCG) to rescue 23 people from the sea near Marathon,
Florida, after their rustic vessel had begun to take on water and sink.
The Marine Interdiction Agents responded quickly, providing life
jackets to the migrants who were making frantic attempts to swim or
cling to any debris within reach. Just a few days after this event,
CBP, USCG, and other law enforcement partners \13\ rescued 68 Haitian
migrants after smugglers recklessly dropped them off in the water near
the shores of Mona Island, Puerto Rico. Tragically, 5 Haitian migrants
did not survive this smuggling event.
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\13\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/cbp-and-
coast-guard-respond-haitian-smuggling-venture-resulted.
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Interdicting Maritime Drug Smuggling
In addition to responding to increasing numbers of maritime migrant
encounters AMO continues to effectively intercept tons of dangerous
illicit drugs, keeping them from reaching our shores and communities.
In fiscal year 2022, AMO enforcement efforts led to the seizure of
382,916 pounds of drugs, including 250,616 pounds of cocaine, 104,262
pounds of marijuana, 25,625 pounds of methamphetamine, and 1,475 pounds
of fentanyl.\14\ Approximately 82 percent of these seizures occurred in
the maritime environment, with AMO enforcement actions leading to the
seizure of 234,349 pounds of cocaine, 75,918 pounds of marijuana, 1,432
pounds of methamphetamine, and 146 pounds of fentanyl.
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\14\ https://www.cbp.gov/border-security/air-sea.
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AMO encounters a wide range of vessels and tactics used to smuggle
illicit drugs in the maritime approaches to the United States. Across
the coastal regions around Florida and the Caribbean, as well as within
the Gulf Coast and Southern California Coast, AMO encounters both small
and large vessels attempting to conceal their activities by hiding in
plain sight among other recreational traffic and legitimate maritime
commerce.
A considerable drug smuggling threat is smugglers' continued use of
modified fishing boats, sometimes called ``pangas.'' Generally made of
wood or fiberglass, these homemade vessels have relatively high-speed
capabilities and a small radar signature. Use of these vessels at night
amplifies their ability to evade detection by surface patrol vessels
and patrol aircraft. Smaller craft are used for quick cross-border
trips, while larger vessels can transit in deeper waters, further
offshore. While pangas have traditionally been used primarily to
transport illicit drugs, smugglers are increasing the use of these
dangerous vessels to transport undocumented migrants.
Overloaded migrant vessels, perilous rescues, and increased
engagements with drug-smuggling vessels have coincided with increased
violence in the maritime environment. During an incident this past
November near Cabo Rojo, Puerto Rico, an AMO marine interdiction agent
was shot and killed and two others gravely injured during an
interdiction of a suspicious vessel.\15\ This is just one example of a
pattern of growing violence in the region.
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\15\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/speeches-and-statements/cbp-
marine-interdiction-agent-dies-line-duty-near-puerto-rico.
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With a wide maritime area of responsibility, AMO adapts to changing
conditions and emerging trends and remains vigilant of security threats
through our maritime law enforcement expertise, advanced assets,
innovative capabilities, and partnerships.
strengthening maritime border enforcement
AMO is committed to its maritime security mission and continues to
make investments in vessels, aircraft, and other technological
capabilities to advance the effectiveness of its operations. These
investments support AMO's on-going ability to effectively respond to
migrant encounters and drug seizures in the maritime environment, as
mentioned above, but also contribute to other AMO enforcement actions,
including those that led to 166 arrests and the seizure of 41 weapons
and $4.9 million in U.S. currency in fiscal year 2022.
Often, there is little time to interdict inbound suspect vessels,
and AMO has honed its maritime border security response capability
around rapid and effective interception, pursuit, and interdiction of
these crafts.
Maritime Interdiction Capabilities
AMO maritime law enforcement agents use high-speed Coastal
Interceptor Vessels (CIV) that are specifically designed and engineered
with the speed, maneuverability, integrity, and endurance to intercept
and engage a variety of suspect non-compliant vessels. Our vessels are
operated by highly-trained and experienced AMO crews authorized to
deploy any required use of force, including warning shots and disabling
fire to stop fleeing vessels.
Over the last two decades, AMO has evolved to counter the egregious
threat of non-compliant vessels. AMO has developed capabilities to
disable non-compliant vessels and to bring dangerous pursuits to a
conclusion and prevent these vessels from reaching our shores. Since
2003, AMO has engaged in 248 cases involving marine warning and/or
disabling rounds, and four cases involving air-to-vessel warning and
disabling rounds.
With its maritime vessel expertise and investigative authority AMO
often works in partnership with ICE, Homeland Security Investigations
(HSI), Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI) conducting covert and plainclothes operations in
the maritime border environment; utilizing unmarked and undercover
vessels when situations dictate that the surveillance of drug loads or
TCO activity can yield larger seizures as a part of on-going
investigations.
Maritime Aircraft Assets
Although AMO routinely makes seizures through maritime border
patrols, most arrests and seizures are the result of actionable
information or detection by aircraft. For example, just a couple of
weeks ago, an AMO Jacksonville, Florida-based P-3 aircraft detected a
suspect vessel moving toward the southern coast of Puerto Rico and
guided AMO marine interdiction agents to intercept. AMO agents seized
2,351 pounds of cocaine and apprehended three smugglers.\16\
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\16\ https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/local-media-release/amo-seizes-
2351-pounds-cocaine-southern-puerto-rico.
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AMO's P-3 Long-Range Tracker and Airborne Early Warning aircraft
are multi-role, high-endurance aircraft capable of performing border
security mission sets in the air and maritime environments. Equipped
with a multitude of highly-sophisticated communications equipment,
radar, and imagery sensors, operated by highly-trained professional
sworn law enforcement agents and officers, the P-3 is accredited with
the interdiction of 137,148 pounds of cocaine and 6,146 flight hours
within the Western Hemisphere Transit Zones in fiscal year 2022, which
equated to over 22 pounds of narcotics interdicted per flight hour.
The integration of UAS provides critical enhancements to AMO's air,
land, and maritime border domain awareness and capabilities. UAS
provide high-endurance, long-range capabilities for intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance collections of land borders, inland
waters, littoral waters, and high seas with multiple advanced sensor
arrays. The use of UAS in the maritime environment has increased AMO's
ability to effectively detect, monitor, and track both personnel and
conveyances involved in illegal activity.
CBP's aerial surveillance capabilities in the maritime environment
have also been enhanced through continued investment and deployment in
DHC-8 MPA and Super King Air 350 Multi-Role Enforcement Aircraft (MEA).
The DHC-8 is a medium-range airplane that bridges the gap between the
strategic P-3 and UAS, and smaller aircraft operating in the littoral
waters. With state-of-the art sensors and systems, the DHC-8 has
provided game-changing detection capability in the Caribbean, Eastern
Pacific, and Gulf of Mexico. The MEA enhances AMO's ability to maintain
domain awareness of the U.S. littorals and coastline, while also
providing AMO agents the ability to continue investigations seamlessly
into the interior of the United States, landing at small remote
airports to interdict suspected air smugglers.
AMO's Tethered Aerostat Radar System (TARS)\17\ is an effective
surveillance asset providing radar detection and monitoring of low-
altitude aircraft and surface vessels along the U.S.-Mexico border, the
Florida Straits, and a portion of the Caribbean. Between 2020 and 2021,
CBP successfully reconfigured the TARS in southwest Puerto Rico into a
maritime surveillance system with promising results. CBP has also
invested in its Tactical Maritime Surveillance System (TMSS) that
consists of flying tactical aerostats equipped with wide-area sea
surveillance radar and sensors near the coast. The TARS and tactical
aerostat elevated sensors mitigate the effect of the curvature of the
earth and terrain-masking limitations, greatly increasing long-range
radar detection capabilities to combat increasing levels of smuggling
and illegal immigration via the coastal approaches to southern
California, Texas, and the Florida Straits.
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\17\ CBP assumed responsibility of TARS from the U.S. Air Force in
2013, but the aerostat surveillance system had been used by DoD since
1978.
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Mission Integration Technology
Some of the most significant advancements in AMO technological
capabilities concern data integration and exploitation enhancements.
Downlink technology, paired with the BigPipe system, allows AMO to
provide video feed and situational awareness in real-time. In addition,
the Minotaur mission integration system allows multiple aircraft and
vessels to share networked information, providing AMO a substantial
level of air, land, and sea domain awareness.
A vital component of DHS's domain awareness capabilities, the AMOC
integrates multiple sensor technologies and sources of information to
provide comprehensive domain awareness in support of CBP's border
security mission. Utilizing extensive law enforcement and intelligence
databases and communication networks, AMOC's operational system, the
Air and Marine Operations Surveillance System (AMOSS), provides a
single display that is capable of processing up to 750 individual
sensor feeds and tracking over 50,000 individual air tracks and 150,000
maritime tracks simultaneously.
AMOC coordinates with the Department of Defense (DoD), Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA), the North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD), and international law enforcement partners in the
governments of Mexico, Canada, and the Bahamas, to detect, identify,
track, and support interdiction of suspect aviation and maritime
activity in the approaches to U.S. borders and interior as well as at
the borders.
Strengthening our partnerships with our international allies is
also vital to successfully execute our counternarcotic mission,
combating drug-trafficking organizations, and preventing narcotics from
reaching the United States. AMO recently partnered with the Department
of State Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement to
transfer four 39-foot Midnight Express Interceptor vessels to
Guatemala's Comando De Fuerza Especial Naval. The vessels, which were
being phased out of AMO's maritime fleet, will help Guatemala's forces
increase their response capabilities and enhance their ability to
interdict drug smuggling vessels.
Joint Technology Development
Domain Awareness is a core competency and an essential element of a
secure border. AMO is engaged with several technological partners to
expand our domain awareness capabilities and share critical information
in real time.
With multiple entities operating in the maritime domain, AMO works
closely with the DHS Science & Technology Directorate (S&T), USCG, and
DoD to identify and leverage technology to expand overall maritime
domain awareness, integrate data from airborne and maritime assets, and
improve our maritime surveillance and detection capabilities. For
example, AMO is scheduled to bring two MQ-9 BigWing modified UAS on-
line in fiscal year 2023. With modifications funded by S&T, the BigWing
UAS is expected to increase mission time, resulting in greater range,
endurance, and domain awareness.
The volume of data analyzed by our enforcement personnel at the
AMOC far exceed human capacity to evaluate. Our partnership with S&T is
focused on the use of Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/
ML) technologies to alert our AMOC personnel when suspect activities
are identified. Continued research and development of these
capabilities by S&T will increase our capacity to address these growing
volumes of data across both our air and maritime domains. AMO will
continue to modernize its fleet and sensor systems to enhance our data
analysis capabilities and operational performance in diverse marine
environments and increase our ability to adapt to the challenges of
securing the maritime border and approaches to the United States.
Operational Coordination
AMO leverages its capabilities by empowering its operational units
to forge crucial partnerships. These relationships, coupled with our
broad authorities, allow AMO to follow cases wherever they lead across
air, land, and sea environments.
In the maritime environment, we operate effectively with a variety
of Federal, State, and local partners, including frequent joint
operations with HSI, USCG, and the United States Navy. We also
frequently cooperate directly with foreign governments. In this way,
AMO lends critical capabilities and cohesion to an array of border
security and maritime law enforcement efforts.
AMO is the largest aviation contributor to the Joint Interagency
Task Force South (JIATF-S) and is an integral part to their aviation
capability and success to counter illicit trafficking of narcotics
within the maritime environment. P-3s patrol in a 42 million square
mile area that includes more than 41 nations, the Pacific and Atlantic
Oceans, Gulf of Mexico, Caribbean Sea, and maritime approaches to the
United States.
AMO is also a key component of the DHS Joint Task Force East (JTF-
E), where AMO holds the Deputy Director position. JTF-E integrates
resources, intelligence, planning, and operations across DHS's
component units. DHS uses JTF-E to combat TCOs, enforce immigration
laws, and coordinate its border security efforts. AMO agents also
participate in HSI-led Border Enforcement Security Task Forces (BEST)
across the Nation. AMO agents provide maritime law enforcement
expertise and ready access to AMO assets and capabilities. In turn,
information shared through the BEST refines AMO operations and enables
more targeted enforcement.
Focusing specifically on the maritime domain, AMO is working with
its USCG and HSI partners to update the Maritime Operations
Coordination Plan (MOC-P). The plan sets forth a layered, DHS-wide
approach to homeland security issues within the maritime domain,
ensuring integrated planning, information sharing, and increased
response capability in each area of responsibility. In accordance with
the MOC-P, AMO has been a key stakeholder in the implementation of the
Regional Coordinating Mechanism. Through this mechanism, AMO
coordinates maritime operational activities through integrated
planning, information sharing, and intelligence integration.
looking forward
AMO's efforts continue to be a key element of CBP's border security
mission and have intercepted dangerous contraband and disrupted illicit
activity before it reaches our shores.
Across all air, land, and maritime domains, in the past 3
years,\18\ AMO conducted approximately 293,000 flight hours and 221,000
float hours, resulting in the arrest of 3,152 suspects, the
apprehension of more than 304,000 migrants, the seizure of nearly 3,200
weapons and $146.6 million in currency, and the interdiction of nearly
two million pounds of illegal drugs, including 769,000 pounds of
cocaine.
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\18\ Fiscal year 2020 to fiscal year 2022.
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AMO's expertise and asset capabilities have matured since legacy
programs were consolidated in 2006, and today we are a coordinated and
premier law enforcement entity providing advanced aeronautical and
maritime operations. As a critical component of CBP's border security
mission, AMO's highly-trained agents, together with our unique
authorities, specialized assets, and tactical expertise, comprise a
well-rounded, professional, and established law enforcement
organization that is fully engaged in safeguarding the United States'
maritime borders and protecting its interests from threats at the
border and beyond.
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the
subcommittee, thank you for this opportunity to testify today.
I look forward to answering any questions you may have.
Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Miller. I now recognize
Brigadier General Sean Boyette for 5 minutes to summarize his
opening statements.
STATEMENT OF BRIGADIER GENERAL SEAN T. BOYETTE, DIRECTOR, JOINT
STAFF, JOINT FORCES HEADQUARTERS, REPRESENTING THE FLORIDA
NATIONAL GUARD
General Boyette. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar,
and subcommittee Members, thank you for the opportunity to
share the Florida National Guard story and our contributions to
on-going efforts to reduce illegal migration and illicit drug
flow into our great State and the Nation and to protect
Floridians from the dangerous impacts of the border crisis. In
addition to witnessing a drop in the number of people entering
the State through the Florida Keys, as a result of coordinated
State efforts to deter and prevent illegal migration, almost
11,000 migrants have been returned to their country of origin
after attempting to enter Florida illegally since 2022, as
Governor Ron DeSantis announced earlier this month.
In recent months, the number of unauthorized alien
interdictions in and around Florida has risen to alarming
levels not seen for decades, which has put an undue burden on
local resources and threatened public safety. On January 6,
2023, after a peak of over 800 migrant apprehensions during the
first week of January, and inadequate Federal action, Governor
DeSantis took action to provide the resources necessary to
respond to the mass migration event and protect Florida's
communities, signing an executive order declaring a state of
emergency and directing the Adjutant General of Florida to
activate the Florida National Guard as needed to support the
State's efforts to interdict illegal migrants attempting to
gain entry into the United States through Florida. Governor
DeSantis' executive order was timely and based on steady
increase in illegal migrants through Florida Straits, a mass
migration landing in the Dry Tortugas, and an increase to Phase
1 Bravo of Operation Vigilant Sentry, which is the Federal
Government's plan to interdict illegal migrants throughout the
southeast United States and the Caribbean nations, primarily
Asia and Cuba.
The Florida National Guard was activated in a supporting
role to the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission,
under the overall command and control of the Florida Division
of Emergency Management within the Executive Office of the
Governor, and in coordination with the United States Coast
Guard, other Federal agencies, and local law enforcement. Our
role is to provide an aerial observation to queue potential
migrant activity to maritime assets to conduct the actual
interdiction. With Federal support, we have been able to
conduct our flight operations safely and in coordination with
all State agencies. Initially, we activated two LUH-72 Lakota
rotary-wing aircraft within 24 hours of the executive order.
The following weeks, we grew our forces operating out of
Marathon Key, Florida to a total of 12 aircraft, an aviation
battalion tactical operations center with all primary staff and
associated maintenance and logistics personnel for support.
Since January 10, 2023, the Florida National Guard has
averaged 10 to 12 sorties per day along four air corridors in
South Florida to provide aerial observation in support of
maritime assets. We have assisted in interdictions of 349
migrants and identification of over 100 abandoned vessels, but
perhaps more importantly, our presence in the air seems to have
resulted in a notable deterrence. According to data compiled by
the Florida Division of Emergency Management, from October 2022
to January 2023, there was an average of 1,210 illegal migrants
apprehended per month. This number has decreased to 276 for the
month of February due to the build-up of State law enforcement
agencies, Florida National Guard air assets acting as a
deterrent and Federal partner during the month of January.
The total cost of State activation across all responding
agencies is currently in excess of 50 million, and that number
will continue to rise. To date, the State of Florida has paid
over $7 million for the use of aviation rotary wing aircraft.
To help mitigate this cost but sustain our presence and
reconnaissance capability, Florida recently requested the use
of unmanned aircraft system, the RQ-7B Shadow tactical UAS.
Currently, we're working with the FAA for approval to fly the
system in civilian airspace, as well as working to coordinate
with Navy Region Southeast to launch and recover from Key West
National Naval Air Station.
Since the beginning of Florida National Guard's
involvement, the Florida National Guard has posted a liaison
officer in the United States Coast Guard District 7 operations
center in Brickell, Florida. Additionally, the Florida National
Guard has a full-time liaison officer in the State of Florida
Emergency Operations Center, and there are daily touchpoints to
ensure continuity of communication. At a tactical level, the
Florida National Guard Communications directorate installed
upgrades to our rotary wing assets to ensure the Florida
National Guard can directly communicate with the maritime
assets across all State and Federal agencies.
Last, the Florida National Guard is conducting these
operations predominantly with the highly-dedicated part-time
force of the National Guard soldiers and airmen, all of whom
have been volunteers who are proud to support both the State
agencies and the Federal partners charged with protecting our
borders. The Florida National Guard is proud to be a part of
this operation to protect Florida citizens and looks forward to
continuing support and partnership. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of General Boyette follows:]
Prepared Statement of Sean T. Boyette
Chairman Gimenez and committee Members, thank you for the
opportunity to share the Florida National Guard story and our
contributions to on-going efforts to reduce illegal migration and
illicit drug flow into our great State and Nation and to protect
Floridians from the dangerous impacts of the Border Crisis. In addition
to witnessing a drop in the number of people entering the State through
the Florida Keys as a result of coordinated State efforts to deter and
prevent illegal migration, almost 11,000 migrants have been returned to
their country of origin after attempting to enter Florida illegally
since August 2022, as Governor Ron DeSantis announced earlier this
month.
In recent months, the number of unauthorized alien interdictions in
and around Florida has risen to alarming levels not seen for decades,
which has put an undue burden on local resources and threatened public
safety. On January 6, 2023, after a peak of over 800 migrant
apprehensions during the first week of January, and inadequate Federal
action, Governor DeSantis took action to provide the resources
necessary to respond to the mass migration event and protect Florida's
communities; signing an executive order declaring a state of emergency
and directing the Adjutant General of Florida to activate the Florida
National Guard, as needed, to support the State's efforts to interdict
illegal migrants attempting to gain entry to the United States through
Florida. Governor DeSantis's executive order was timely and based on
steady increases in illegal migrations through the Florida Straits, a
mass migration landing in the Dry Tortugas, and an increase to Phase 1b
of Operation Vigilant Sentry, which is the Federal Government's plan to
interdict illegal migration throughout the southeast United States and
Caribbean nations, primarily Haiti and Cuba.
The Florida National Guard was activated in a supporting role to
the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission, under the
overall command and control of the Florida Division of Emergency
Management within the Executive Office of the Governor, and in
coordination with the United States Coast Guard, other Federal agencies
and local law enforcement. Our role is to provide aerial observation to
cue potential migrant activity to maritime assets to conduct the actual
interdiction. With Federal support, we have been able to conduct our
flight operations safely and in coordination with all State agencies.
Initially we activated two LUH-72 Lakota rotary-wing aircraft within 24
hours of the executive order. In the following weeks, we grew our
forces operating out of Marathon Key, FL to a total of 12 aircraft, an
aviation battalion tactical operations center with all primary staff,
and associated maintenance and logistics personnel for support.
Since January 10, 2023 the Florida National Guard has averaged 10-
12 sorties per day along 4 air corridors in South Florida to provide
ariel observation in support of maritime assets. We have assisted in
interdictions of 349 migrants and identification of over 100 abandoned
vessels, but perhaps more importantly, our presence in the air seems to
have resulted in a notable deterrence. According to data compiled by
the Florida Division of Emergency Management, from October 2022 through
January 2023, there was an average of 1,210 illegal migrants
apprehended, per month. This number decreased to 276 for the month of
February due to the build-up of State law enforcement agencies, Florida
National Guard air assets acting as a deterrent and Federal partner
during the month of January.
The total cost of the State activation across all responding
agencies is currently in excess of $50 million, and that number will
continue to rise. To date, the State of Florida has paid over $7
million for the use of our aviation rotary-wing aircraft. To help
mitigate the cost, but sustain our presence and reconnaissance
capability, Florida recently requested to use our unmanned aircraft
system, the RQ-7B Shadow tactical unmanned aircraft system. Currently
we are working with the FAA for approval to fly this system in civilian
airspace, as well as working in coordination with Navy Region Southeast
to launch and recover from Key West Naval Air Station.
Since the beginning of the Florida National Guard's involvement,
the Florida National Guard has posted a liaison officer in the United
States Coast Guard District 7 operations center in Brickell, FL.
Additionally, the FLNG has a full-time liaison officer in the State of
Florida Emergency Operation Center, and there are daily touchpoints to
ensure continuity of communication. At the tactical level the FLNG's
communications directorate installed upgrades to our rotary-wing assets
to ensure the FLNG can communicate with the maritime assets across all
State and Federal agencies.
Last, the FLNG is conducting these operations predominantly with
the highly-dedicated part-time force of traditional National Guard
Soldiers and Airmen, all of whom have been volunteers who are proud to
support both our State agencies and the Federal partners charged with
the protection of our borders. The Florida National Guard is proud to
be part of this operation to protect Florida's citizens and looks
forward to the continued support and partnership.
Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, General. I now recognize Ms.
Heather MacLeod for 5 minutes to summarize her opening
statements.
STATEMENT OF HEATHER MAC LEOD, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY AND
JUSTICE, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO)
Ms. MacLeod. Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
be here today to discuss GAO's work on maritime security. My
testimony focuses on Coast Guard and CBP's progress in
implementing recommendations we have made related to managing
assets and workforce needs. Securing the Nation's borders
against the unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs, and
terrorist activities is a key part of the Department of
Homeland Security's mission. Within DHS, the Coast Guard and
CBP share responsibility for patrolling and enforcing U.S. law
along maritime borders. CBP secures U.S. air, land, and
maritime borders through its Air and Marine Operations, and
Border Patrol.
The Coast Guard has 11 statutory missions, including drug
and migrant interdiction. The Coast Guard also conducts defense
readiness and other law enforcement activities. From 2011 to
2020, the Coast Guard used more resources for drug interdiction
in ports, waterways, and coastal security than other missions.
However, the Coast Guard is constantly balancing its multiple
missions and adjusting to a wide variety of tasks and
circumstances. Our prior work has identified challenges in
determining the appropriate allocation of assets across
geographic locations and in response to catastrophic events or
emergencies. For example, we examined Coast Guard surge
operations such as hurricane response, which can vary in number
and severity from year to year. The Coast Guard was still
generally able to meet mission goals, but we made
recommendations for the service to improve the tracking of
lessons learned. This will help the Coast Guard improve future
surge operations. They are in the process of addressing these
recommendations.
Our work has also noted the challenges due to aging
infrastructure and acquisition programs continue to affect the
availability of Coast Guard assets. For example, our 2019 work
identified that almost half of the Coast Guard's shore
infrastructure is beyond its service life. The Coast Guard has
subsequently taken some steps to address challenges with its
deteriorating infrastructure by establishing targets to
prioritize expenditures. On acquisitions, our recent work has
found that while the majority of DHS's major acquisition
programs are meeting cost and schedule goals, the Coast Guard
and CBP experience challenges with acquisition programs that
support their law enforcement missions.
Determining workforce needs for maritime security also
continues to be a challenge. For example, our prior work shows
that the Coast Guard has conducted limited assessments of its
workforce needs. The Coast Guard recently provided us with
their revised plan, which we are in the process of evaluating.
Although we think it's important that the Coast Guard continue
to analyze workforce needs service-wide, this issue could be
particularly important for certain portions of the workforce.
For example, in September 2022, we reported on challenges the
Coast Guard faces in ensuring it has the necessary workforce,
given its growing cyber-related mission needs. We found that
the Coast Guard had not developed a strategic plan for its
cyber space workforce. As a result, we made six
recommendations, including that the Coast Guard assess and
determine the cyber space staffing levels needed to meet
mission demands. DHS agreed to address these.
CBP has also faced some workforce challenges. For example,
we previously reported on challenges CBP has faced in efforts
to recruit, hire, and retain law enforcement personnel across
its operational components. CBP has taken steps to enhance its
efforts in this area in response to our recommendations.
In closing, the Coast Guard and CBP play key roles in
securing the Nation's maritime borders. Taking additional steps
to implement GAO's recommendations will further help the
agencies manage their assets and workforce needs as they
continue to monitor new challenges.
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I'm happy
to answer any questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. MacLeod follows:]
Prepared Statement of Heather MacLeod
Thursday, March 23, 2023
gao highlights
Highlights of GAO-23-106695, a testimony before the Subcommittee on
Transportation and Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland Security,
House of Representatives.
Why GAO Did This Study
Securing the Nation's borders against unlawful movement of people,
illegal drugs and other contraband, and terrorist activities is a key
part of the DHS's mission. With increased attention to overland routes
in recent years, such as along the Southwest Border, criminal
organizations use maritime routes to smuggle people, drugs, and weapons
into the United States. Within DHS, the Coast Guard and CBP share
responsibility for securing the Nation's maritime borders.
This statement discusses: (1) Coast Guard and CBP resources for
maritime security and related Federal coordination, (2) challenges
these agencies have faced managing assets, and (3) related workforce
challenges.
This statement is based on GAO's prior work on a variety of asset
and workforce issues. For that work, GAO analyzed Coast Guard and CBP
documentation and data and interviewed officials. For this statement,
GAO also obtained updates on actions DHS has taken to address GAO's
recommendations as of March 2023. For a full list of the reports, see
Related GAO Products at the conclusion of this statement.
What GAO Recommends
GAO made 35 recommendations in the reports covered by this
statement, including to improve comparability of asset operating costs
and workforce assessment processes. As of March 2023, 9 of 35 have been
implemented, and 26 remain open. GAO continues to monitor the agencies'
progress in implementing them.
maritime security.--coast guard and cbp efforts to address prior gao
recommendations on asset and workforce needs
What GAO Found
The Coast Guard and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) employ
assets--including aircraft and vessels--and personnel, to ensure
maritime security and safety. Coast Guard and CBP also coordinate with
the Department of Defense on the allocation of assets and specialized
personnel in their efforts to counter the flow of illicit drugs.
GAO previously identified challenges Coast Guard and CBP face in
managing maritime security assets. This includes determining the
appropriate allocation of assets across geographic locations and in
response to catastrophic events or emergencies, such as hurricanes, oil
spills, and humanitarian events. For example, in September 2020, GAO
found that the Department of Homeland Security's (DHS) ability to
assess the costs and benefits of consolidating Coast Guard and CBP
operating locations was limited, in part due to the lack of a standard
cost measure between the components. GAO recommended DHS develop and
implement a way to compare costs. In September 2021, DHS implemented a
standardized methodology for costs.
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
The Coast Guard and CBP have taken steps to assess workforce needs.
In February 2020, GAO found that the Coast Guard had assessed a small
portion of its workforce needs and recommended that Coast Guard update
its workforce plan with time frames and milestones to meet its
workforce assessment goals. As of March 2023, the Coast Guard reported
that it had revised this plan and submitted it to Congress, as
required. GAO is continuing to evaluate the plan. In June 2018, GAO
found that CBP faced challenges meeting target hiring and retention
levels, such as for law enforcement personnel. CBP implemented an
agency-wide exit survey and uses data to inform retention efforts.
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the
subcommittee: I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on
maritime security assets and workforce. Securing the Nation's borders
against unlawful movement of people, illegal drugs and other
contraband, and terrorist activities is a key part of the Department of
Homeland Security's (DHS) mission. Within DHS, the Coast Guard and U.S.
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) use aircraft and vessels to secure
U.S. borders, support criminal investigations, and ensure maritime
security and safety. The Coast Guard is the principal Federal agency
charged with ensuring the security and safety of vessels on the high
seas and waters subject to U.S. jurisdiction by enforcing laws to
prevent death, injury, and property loss. CBP is responsible for
securing U.S. borders at and between ports of entry in the air, land,
and maritime environments.\1\ Coast Guard and CBP share responsibility
for patrolling and enforcing U.S. law along the U.S. maritime borders
and territorial sea--maritime approaches 12 nautical miles seaward of
the U.S. coast.
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\1\ Ports of entry are facilities that provide for the controlled
entry into or departure from the United States. Specifically, a port of
entry is any officially designated location (seaport, airport, or land
border location) where CBP officers clear passengers, merchandise, and
other items; collect duties; enforce customs and other U.S. laws; and
inspect persons seeking to enter or applying for admission into, or
departing the United States pursuant to U.S. immigration and travel
controls.
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The U.S. Government has identified illicit drugs, as well as the
transnational and domestic criminal organizations that traffic and
smuggle them, as significant threats to the public, law enforcement,
and the national security of the United States. With increased
attention to overland routes in recent years, such as along the
Southwest Border, criminal organizations smuggling people, drugs, and
weapons into the United States have adapted their methods to include
maritime routes. Further, given challenges the Federal Government faces
in responding to the drug misuse crisis, in March 2021, we added
national efforts to prevent, respond to, and recover from drug misuse
to our High-Risk List. We identified several challenges in the Federal
Government's response to drug misuse, such as the need for more
effective implementation and monitoring, and related on-going efforts
to address the issue, including law enforcement and drug
interdiction.\2\
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\2\ See GAO, High-Risk Series: Dedicated Leadership Needed to
Address Limited Progress in Most High-Risk Areas, GAO-21-119SP
(Washington, DC: Mar. 2, 2021). GAO's High-Risk Series identifies
Government operations with vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse, and
mismanagement, or in need of transformation to address economy,
efficiency, or effectiveness challenges.
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In 2022, the Coast Guard reported that operating in the dynamic
security and maritime domains will become more complicated as it
acquires upgraded information systems as well as technologically
advanced aircraft and vessels. The Coast Guard reported that these
changes require workforce growth and enhanced skills to operate and
maintain updated assets.
My statement today discusses: (1) Coast Guard and CBP resources for
maritime security and related Federal coordination, (2) challenges we
have identified and recommendations we have made to Coast Guard and CBP
related to managing assets, and (3) challenges we have identified and
recommendations we have made related to their workforce needs. This
statement is based primarily on reports published from June 2018 to
March 2023 related to Coast Guard and CBP allocations and acquisitions
of aircraft and vessels, and the agencies' efforts to determine their
workforce needs. For these products, we analyzed DHS documents and data
related to the Coast Guard and CBP and interviewed agency officials. We
made 35 recommendations in the reports covered by this statement,
including to improve comparability of asset operating costs and
workforce assessment processes. As of March 2023, 9 of these 35
recommendations have been implemented, and 26 remain open. GAO
continues to monitor the agencies' progress in implementing them.
More detailed information on the objectives, scope, and methodology
for that work can be found in the issued reports listed in Related GAO
Products at the conclusion of this statement. We conducted the work on
which this statement is based in accordance with generally accepted
Government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and
perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide
a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit
objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable
basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
coast guard and cbp employ various resources to address maritime
security in coordination with dod
Within DHS, the Coast Guard and CBP employ assets--including
aircraft and vessels--and personnel across the United States and abroad
to secure U.S. borders, support criminal investigations, and ensure
maritime security and safety. Their air and marine missions vary
depending on operating location. Coast Guard and CBP also coordinate on
the deployment and allocation of assets and specialized personnel with
the Department of Defense (DOD) to reduce the availability of illicit
drugs by countering the flow of such drugs into the United States.\3\
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\3\ DOD is the lead Federal agency for the detection and monitoring
of the aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs into the United
States, and it operates systems, such as radar, that can be used in
support of DHS and other Federal, State, and local law enforcement
activities.
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Coast Guard resources.--One of the six armed forces, the Coast
Guard is a multimission maritime military service within DHS. It is
responsible for implementing 11 statutory missions, such as drug
interdiction, as well as other concurrent missions (see appendix I). As
of September 2020, the Coast Guard operates a fleet of about 200 fixed-
and rotary-wing aircraft, with more than 1,600 boats and about 250
cutters.\4\ It employs approximately 55,200 personnel--including
active-duty, reserve, and civilian.\5\ In addition, the Coast Guard
owns or leases 20,000 facilities, which consist of various types of
buildings and structures. For example, within its shore operations
asset line, the Coast Guard maintains over 200 stations along U.S.
coasts and inland waterways to carry out its search-and-rescue
operations, as well as other missions, such as maritime security (see
fig. 1).
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\4\ The Coast Guard classifies vessels under 65 feet in length as
boats, which usually operate near shore, on inland waterways, or
attached to cutters. Coast Guard also operates cutters, defined as a
vessel 65 feet in length or greater with accommodations for a crew to
live aboard.
\5\ As of April 2022, Coast Guard officials stated that the agency
had a total workforce of 55,236--including 46,235 military and 9,001
civilian personnel.
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In September 2021, we reported that Coast Guard data show that more
than 20 percent of its total estimated operating expenses were for drug
interdiction (13 percent) and migrant interdiction (8 percent) for
fiscal years 2011 through 2020.\6\ Vessel and aircraft deployments for
these missions accounted for nearly 30 percent of the average annual
operational hours during that period, as shown in figure 2.
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\6\ GAO, Coast Guard: Information on Defense Readiness Mission
Deployments, Expenses, and Funding, GAO-21-104741 (Washington, DC:
Sept. 15, 2021).
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
CBP resources.--Within CBP, the Air and Marine Operations and U.S.
Border Patrol are the uniformed law enforcement arms responsible for
securing U.S. borders between ports of entry in the air, land, and
maritime environments.\7\
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\7\ CBP's Office of Field Operations also has border security
responsibilities, such as inspecting pedestrians, passengers, and
cargo--including international mail and express cargo--at the more than
320 air, land, and sea ports of entry.
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In September 2020, we reported that CBP's Air and Marine Operations
operates a fleet of over 200 fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft and over
100 vessels to secure U.S. borders in the air, maritime, and land
domains. The majority of CBP's Air and Marine Operations' activities
support its law enforcement mission, including providing surveillance
capabilities to detect and support the interdiction of illicit cross-
border activity.\8\ CBP's Air and Marine Operations develops annual
authorized staffing-level targets for law enforcement positions based
on operational needs and available funding. We previously reported that
CBP's Border Patrol staffing goals were based, in part, on its then-
statutory minimum staffing level for Border Patrol agency positions.\9\
CBP's Air and Marine Operations field structure is divided into three
regions--northern, southeast, and southwest--and National Air Security
Operations throughout the continental United States, Puerto Rico, and
the U.S. Virgin Islands (see fig. 3).
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\8\ GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessment of Air and
Marine Operating Locations Should Include Comparable Costs across All
DHS Marine Operations, GAO-20-663 (Washington, DC: Sept. 24, 2020).
\9\ GAO, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Progress and
Challenges in Recruiting, Hiring, and Retaining Law Enforcement
Personnel, GAO-18-487 (Washington, DC: June 27, 2018).
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
DHS and DOD Interagency coordination.--DHS components, including
the Coast Guard and CBP, coordinate with DOD on counterdrug missions
through the Joint Interagency Task Force (JIATF)-South. In July 2019,
we reported on the contribution and allocation of assets, such as ships
and surveillance aircraft, through the JIATF-South.\10\ Coast Guard,
the lead Federal agency for maritime drug interdiction, contributes
aircraft and vessels to disrupt the flow of illicit drugs smuggled into
the United States. JIATF-South provides maritime and air assets to
detect and monitor the trafficking of illicit drugs, such as cocaine,
being smuggled north on noncommercial maritime vessels across its area
of responsibility.
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\10\ GAO, Drug Control: Certain DOD and DHS Joint Task Forces
Should Enhance Their Performance Measures to Better Assess Counterdrug
Activities, GAO-19-441 (Washington, DC: July 9, 2019).
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In November 2019, we reported that the Coast Guard employs
specialized units to serve as force multipliers, including for
specialized capabilities needed to handle drug interdiction, terrorism,
and other threats in the U.S. maritime environment.\11\ Among these
units, the Coast Guard has two Tactical Law Enforcement Teams which
provide specialized capabilities for offshore drug interdiction and
vessel interception operations, primarily in the Caribbean Sea and
Eastern Pacific Ocean. These specialized teams do not maintain their
own vessels, relying on and deploying via Coast Guard cutters or U.S.
Navy or Allied vessels. Figure 4 shows Coast Guard personnel conducting
a drug interdiction operation that included a Coast Guard Tactical Law
Enforcement member boarding a foreign, semi-submersible vessel, which
resulted in seizing 17,000 pounds of cocaine.
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\11\ GAO, Coast Guard: Assessing Deployable Specialized Forces'
Workforce Needs Could Improve Efficiency and Reduce Potential Overlap
or Gaps in Capabilities, GAO-20-33 (Washington, DC: Nov. 21, 2019).
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
coast guard and cbp have faced challenges managing maritime security
assets
Our previous reports have identified various challenges the Coast
Guard and CBP have faced in managing assets, as well as some steps they
have taken to address them. These include assessing the geographic
allocation of assets, providing assets to meet critical mission needs,
maintaining shore infrastructure, and addressing on-going acquisition
challenges.
Geographic allocation of assets.--DHS has taken some steps to
better identify opportunities to consolidate assets. In September 2020,
we reported on DHS assessment activities to support integration and
consolidation of cross-component efforts, including opportunities for
colocation of Coast Guard and CBP operating locations for air and
marine mission activities.\12\ We found that DHS's ability to assess
the costs and benefits of consolidating operating locations was
limited. Specifically, the agency could not compare costs between Coast
Guard and CBP because it did not have comparable marine operating cost
information and had not developed and implemented a standard cost per
float hour methodology.
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\12\ GAO-20-663.
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We recommended DHS develop these tools to help ensure that it has
key information to support initiatives to examine integrating and
consolidating nearby marine operating locations. DHS concurred with
this recommendation. In September 2021, DHS took steps to fully
implement our recommendation. Specifically, DHS developed a colocation
assessment methodology to assess operating locations based on the types
of assets, performance, and cost; and implemented a standard cost per
float hour methodology for Coast Guard and CBP vessels.
Assets to meet critical needs.--The Coast Guard provides assets to
meet critical emergent needs, but may not be fully addressing
recommended actions based on lessons learned from these activities. In
September 2021, we found that from 2017 through 2020 the Coast Guard
conducted 23 major surge operations--high-intensity, short-notice
efforts to respond to catastrophic events or emergencies, such as
hurricanes, oil spills, and humanitarian events.\13\ To support these
surge operations, the Coast Guard deploys varying levels of aircraft
and vessels, as well as personnel, which may require a reallocation of
resources to the affected areas while continuing to support and carry
out its regular missions. For example, we found that the Coast Guard
deployed nearly 1,000 personnel and contributed 495 aircraft and 325
vessel hours to support CBP in response to the February 2019 national
emergency declaration at the Southwest Border from April through
November 2019. Following Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017,
the Coast Guard deployed over 4,700 personnel and logged about 4,000
aircraft and more than 2,000 vessel hours.
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\13\ GAO, Coast Guard: A More Systematic Process to Resolve
Recommended Actions Could Enhance Future Surge Operations, GAO-21-584
(Washington, DC: Sept. 21, 2021).
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The Coast Guard conducts after-action reviews following these
operations, which identify lessons learned and best practices to
improve future surge operations. For example, we reported that the
Coast Guard's review of its 2014 response to the influx of
unaccompanied children/minors at the Southwest Border found that
certain considerations should be taken into account when deploying
aircraft long-term, such as the availability of ground support and
flight crew personnel as well as the security of the aircraft. However,
the Coast Guard did not systematically track whether recommended
actions were taken. Coast Guard officials stated that the lessons
learned and related recommended actions help improve future surge
operations. We recommended the Coast Guard establish a process for
tracking and resolving recommended actions in line with its resolution
rate and timeliness goals. DHS and the Coast Guard identified five
actions that the Coast Guard would take to do so, including developing
a process to identify lead and supporting offices to track and address
recommended actions. As of February 2023, the Coast Guard is still in
the process of completing these actions.
Coast Guard shore infrastructure.--The Coast Guard has taken steps
to address challenges with its aging and deteriorating shore
infrastructure. In February 2019, we reported that the Coast Guard has
taken steps to improve how it manages its shore infrastructure,
including identifying risks posed by the lack of timely investment and
identifying mission-critical facilities.\14\ For example, we found that
the Coast Guard had documented its process to classify its real
property under a tier system--ranging from mission-critical to mission-
supportive assets. Using this tier system, the Coast Guard established
minimum investment targets to prioritize expenditures on shore
infrastructure supporting front-line operations, such as piers or
runways.
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\14\ GAO, Coast Guard Shore Infrastructure: Applying Leading
Practices Could Help Better Manage Project Backlogs of at Least $2.6
Billion, GAO-19-82 (Washington, DC: Feb. 21, 2019).
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Challenges with acquisition of assets.--In March 2023, we reported
on our eighth and most recent annual assessment of cost and schedule
goals for DHS's major acquisition programs.\15\ We found that the
majority of DHS's major acquisition programs are meeting cost and
schedule goals, although the Coast Guard and CBP experienced challenges
with acquisition programs that support their law enforcement missions.
For example, we found that the Coast Guard continues to face challenges
with its Offshore Patrol Cutter and Polar Security Cutter programs,
which include providing law enforcement and maritime security
capabilities across a range of sea conditions and locations. Despite a
program restructure and other efforts, the Offshore Patrol Cutter
program still faces significant cost and schedule concerns. For
example, the program has determined it will not meet its lead ship
delivery date of June 2023. Further, we found that the Polar Security
Cutter program does not have enough information from the shipbuilder to
determine a new delivery date for its lead ship.
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\15\ GAO, DHS Annual Assessment: Major Acquisition Programs Are
Generally Meeting Goals, but Cybersecurity Policy Needs Clarification,
GAO-23-105641SU (Washington, DC: Mar. 16, 2023). This report provided
assessments of Coast Guard and CBP major acquisition programs, but it
did not include recommendations specific to these programs. We have on-
going work related to Coast Guard's acquisition of its Offshore Patrol
and Polar Security Cutters.
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coast guard and cbp have experienced challenges determining workforce
needs for maritime security
Coast Guard Has Conducted Limited Assessments of Workforce Needs
Limited steps taken to assess workforce needs.--We have previously
reported that the Coast Guard had taken some steps to assess its
workforce needs, including developing a Manpower Requirements Plan in
2018.\16\ However, since 2003, it has assessed only a small portion of
its workforce needs through the requirements determination process,
which was a key component of its 2018 plan.\17\ Specifically, in
February 2020, we found that the Coast Guard had completed workforce
requirements determinations from calendar years 2003 through 2019 for 6
percent of its workforce.
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\16\ GAO, Coast Guard: Increasing Mission Demands Highlight
Importance of Assessing Its Workforce Needs, GAO-22-106135 (Washington,
DC: July 27, 2022); Coast Guard: Actions Needed to Evaluate the
Effectiveness of Organizational Changes and Determine Workforce Needs,
GAO-20-223 (Washington, DC: Feb. 26, 2020).
\17\ In April 2018, the Coast Guard reported to Congress that it
faced challenges meeting its daily mission demands because it was
operating below the workforce level necessary to meet all of its
mission requirements. In this report, the Coast Guard set a goal to
complete workforce requirements determinations--its preferred tool for
assessing needed workforce levels--for all of its units. U.S. Coast
Guard, Manpower Requirements Plan Report to Congress (Apr. 13, 2018).
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We also found several limitations affecting the Coast Guard's
ability to effectively implement its workforce requirements
determination process. Specifically, it lacks time frames for how it
will achieve its workforce assessment goals--notably, to assess the
workforce requirements for all of its positions and units.\18\ Among
other things, we recommended that the Coast Guard update its Manpower
Requirements Plan with time frames and milestones for doing so.\19\ DHS
concurred with our recommendations and described actions planned to
address them. Among them, the Coast Guard was required to submit this
plan to Congress in fiscal year 2022, but did not do so until March
2023. We are in the process of evaluating the plan to determine the
extent to which these actions fully address the intent of our
recommendation.
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\18\ The Coast Guard's workforce requirements determination process
uses a structured analysis to determine the number and types of
personnel needed to effectively perform each mission to a specified
standard. The process takes into account the effect of existing, new,
or modified requirements on Coast Guard's workforce and is to conclude
with a documented determination of the results.
\19\ We made a total of 6 recommendations, 4 of which addressed
limitations with Coast Guard's workforce requirements determination
process. The Coast Guard implemented 3 of these recommendations by
updating its guidance, determining necessary personnel to conduct the
workforce determination process, and tracking the extent to which it
completed this process for its units.
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Assessing workforce needs for specialized capabilities.--We have
previously reported on Coast Guard's workforce challenges related to
identifying capability gaps in specific mission needs, including
specialized forces and cybersecurity. In November 2019, we reported
that the Coast Guard could benefit from assessing workforce needs for
its Deployable Specialized Forces workforce--units of personnel who
have a range of specialized capabilities needed to handle drug
interdiction, terrorism, and other threats in the U.S. maritime
environment.\20\ Specifically, we found that the Coast Guard had not
used data and evidence to fully assess its Deployable Specialized
Forces workforce needs.\21\ We reported that conducting this analysis
would better position the Coast Guard to identify capability gaps
between mission requirements and mission performance caused by
deficiencies in the numbers of personnel available.
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\20\ GAO-20-33. We have also previously reported on Coast Guard's
challenges related to other specific mission needs, including marine
inspection and health care. See GAO, Coast Guard: Enhancements Needed
to Strengthen Marine Inspection Workforce Planning Efforts, GAO-22-
104465, (Washington, DC: Jan. 12, 2022); GAO, Coast Guard Health Care:
Improvements Needed for Determining Staffing Needs and Monitoring
Access to Care, GAO-22-105152 (Washington, DC: Feb. 4, 2022); and GAO-
22-106135.
\21\ As of November 2019, the Coast Guard had 25 specialized forces
teams and 2 units.
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As a result, we recommended that the Coast Guard conduct a
comprehensive analysis of its Deployable Specialized Forces' workforce
needs. DHS concurred with this recommendation and, in February 2023,
the Coast Guard reported that drafts of the mission analysis reports on
two Specialized Forces were being reviewed, with an estimated
completion of Spring 2023. However, the Coast Guard informed us that
completion of the three remaining Specialized Force unit types is
subject to available funding and is not estimated to be completed until
September 2023.
In September 2022, we reported on challenges the Coast Guard faces
ensuring it has the necessary workforce, given its growing cyber-
related mission needs.\22\ For example, we found that the Coast Guard
had not developed a strategic workforce plan for its cyber space
workforce. We made 6 recommendations, including that the Coast Guard
assess and determine the cyber space staffing levels needed to meet its
cyber space mission demands and fully implement 5 recruitment and
retention leading practices, such as establishing a strategic workforce
plan for its cyber space workforce. DHS concurred with these
recommendations, but the Coast Guard has not yet taken actions to
implement them.
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\22\ GAO, Coast Guard: Workforce Planning Actions Needed to Address
Growing Cyberspace Mission Demands, GAO-22-105208 (Washington, DC:
Sept. 27, 2022)
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CBP has Addressed Some Workforce Recruitment and Retention Challenges
We previously reported on challenges CBP has faced in efforts to
recruit, hire, and retain law enforcement personnel across its
operational components at and between U.S. ports of entry, in the U.S.
air and maritime environment, and at certain overseas locations.\23\ We
reported that in recent years CBP had not attained its then-statutory
minimum staffing level for its Border Patrol agent positions or its
staffing goals for other law enforcement officer positions. CBP
identified high attrition rates in some locations, a protracted hiring
process, and competition from other Federal, State, and local law
enforcement agencies as barriers to meeting its staffing goals.
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\23\ GAO, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Progress and
Challenges in Recruiting, Hiring, and Retaining Law Enforcement
Personnel, GAO-19-419T (Washington, DC: Mar. 7, 2019); and GAO-18-487.
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In June 2018, we found that CBP increased its emphasis on
recruitment by, among other things, establishing a central recruitment
office in 2016; increasing its participation in recruitment events; and
hiring a contractor in November 2017 to more effectively target
potential applicants and better utilize data. We also found that CBP
improved its hiring process as demonstrated by two key metrics--
reducing its time-to-hire and increasing the percentage of applicants
that are hired. Last, we found that CBP enhanced its efforts to address
retention challenges but that staffing levels for law enforcement
positions consistently remained below target levels.
We recommended that CBP systematically collect and analyze data on
departing law enforcement officers and use this information to inform
retention efforts. DHS concurred with our recommendation and, as of
October 2019, has completed actions to fully implement it.
Specifically, CBP implemented an agency-wide exit survey to collect and
analyze data on departing law enforcement officers and is using these
data to inform its retention efforts.
Chairman Gimenez, Ranking Member Thanedar, and Members of the
subcommittee, this completes my prepared statement. I would be pleased
to respond to any questions that you may have at this time.
appendix i: information on the coast guard's 11 missions
This appendix details the Coast Guard's 11 missions (see Table 1).
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Gimenez. Thank you, Ms. MacLeod. Members will be
recognized by the order of seniority for their 5 minutes of
questioning. I now recognize myself for 5 minutes. Mr. Miller,
what percentage of migrants trying to cross the Florida Straits
into the Keys, into my State, what percentage do you think you
actually interdict?
Mr. Miller. I'm sorry, Chairman, I didn't hear the end part
of your question.
Chairman Gimenez. What percentage of them do you actually
believe you are interdicting? You had 11,000 that were
interdicted. How many more got away, I mean, that you don't
even know? What is your guesstimate on that?
Mr. Miller. Yeah, thank you for the question, Chairman. So,
in the maritime environment, especially in the Florida Straits
and especially in the lower Keys, there is somewhat of more of
a telltale sign of smuggling ventures, whether it's an
abandoned vessel, life jackets on the beach. Obviously, if they
land in the Marquesas or the Tortugas, someone's going to be
going to pick them up. So, we know of those. The Haitian events
are typically large law enforcement response events as well.
So, we have a good sense of that.
Like you mentioned, the unknown, I would say, is would be
largely from the Bahamas. So, you've got, you know, Freeport is
less than 90 miles away, Bimini less than 50, Cuba is, you
know, 80-something. So, especially with some of the fast
vessels that they have now, that distance, and in marine
interdiction, everything is a calculus of speed, time, and
distance. So, a lot of those vessels can traverse that distance
in a very short amount of time. Depending on whether or not we
have a maritime patrol up running radar or marine. So, that is
my unknown in Florida, Chairman.
Chairman Gimenez. So, do you have evidence that migrants
are going into the Bahamas and then making their way over from
the Bahamas?
Mr. Miller. Thank you for the question. So, we know that
for a fact that there's a big route, whether they're generating
from the Lesser Antilles, or the Turks and Caicos, or flying
directly into the Bahamas and then coming across.
Chairman Gimenez. Either the Rear Admiral or yourself, Mr.
Miller can answer this question. What percentage of the drugs
are getting through? I know you have had great seizures, but
how many more pounds of cocaine, fentanyl, and the other drugs
that these cartels are flooding our markets with? What
percentage more do you think are actually getting through, not
being stopped? Actually, what percentage do you stop?
Admiral Burdian. So, in fiscal year 2022, we interdicted
152 metric tons of cocaine. Again, the Coast Guard role is in
support of joining the Regency Task Force staff to interdict
that as close to the source and transit zone as possible. It's
about 10 to 20 percent of what the known flow is, is what,
given the resources that are available to us, what we're able
to access, sir.
Chairman Gimenez. So, 80 percent gets through, 20 percent
is stopped?
Admiral Burdian. At the source in transit zone, yes, sir.
Chairman Gimenez. OK. You know, some of my colleagues on
the other side of the aisle, they cite the stats from the
Department of Homeland Security saying that most fentanyl is
captured at ports of entry. They don't take into account that
on the Southern Border, 1\1/2\ million people got away. We
don't even know who they are. They came to this country. We
don't know who they are, what they got, what they are doing
here, what they were carrying. Would it be easier, is it easy
for a one person to carry a sizable load of fentanyl? Anybody
know that? Yeah, Mr. Miller.
Mr. Miller. Thank you for the question. I could tell you,
Chairman, that in the maritime environment, we do not see a lot
of fentanyl in the maritime environment.
Chairman Gimenez. Probably because the drugs that you are
dealing with are much heavier, bulkier than fentanyl, because
fentanyl is just one pill can do a lot of damage. So, I
estimate, or I believe that probably the fentanyl is getting in
through those got-aways. Some fentanyl is being captured at the
port of entry. But there is definitely a lot of fentanyl in
this country at this point, enough to kill us tens, if not
hundreds of times over. That the heavier drugs are actually
being transported different method, probably by sea, et cetera.
OK.
When you talk about the numbers that are coming through,
you said that there was a drop from October to February of this
year. How does that compare to the numbers from October to
February of last year? Because now we are talking about the
winter. You know, the conditions are rougher, and I am pretty
sure that the numbers drop during the winter months, but do
they somehow compare to the previous years? Do you guys have
any information on that?
Admiral Burdian. Absolutely, sir. The data suggests going
backwards. I'm sorry. Our information concerns--confirms that
absolutely in the winter months, when the weather is rough on
the streets of Florida, you see fewer migrant ventures. The
numbers for February 2023 and 2022 are roughly equivalent.
They're within just a couple of hundred.
Chairman Gimenez. Fair enough. OK, thank you. My time is
up. I now recognize the gentleman from Illinois. The Ranking
Member, Mr. Thanedar.
Mr. Thanedar. Michigan. Admiral Burdian, this is a question
for you. The Coast Guard and its partners are stretched thin in
trying to address increased migration at sea. We cannot solve
these problems without addressing the root causes by fixing our
broken immigration system and creating expanded legal pathways
to the United States. The Biden administration's new parole
program is a big step in the right direction. My questions are
how would you characterize the flow of migrants seen over the
past 2 months compared to the preceding months? Also,
recognizing that the maritime migration flows will never reach
zero, what would you consider a more manageable rate of
migration for the Coast Guard to address? Have the numbers been
more in line with that rate over the past 2 months?
Admiral Burdian. Thank you, sir. As mentioned, absolutely
the numbers are down in February. Though I'll stress we're
unable to apply that reduction to any single factor. Whether
it's the increased presence due to our surged forces, Coast
Guard, and partner agencies, whether it's the worsened weather
that you typically see during this time of year or whether, as
you stated, it's the January 9 announcement of the expanded
parole policy. Sir, I think the ideal flow of migrants in the
maritime domain is zero. As I've mentioned, these are
incredibly dangerous ventures and we often see loss of life.
Mr. Thanedar. My next question is to Ms. MacLeod. Both the
Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection have to allocate
their workforces and resources across a range of competing
missions that support maritime security. You testified that
both agencies have struggled to manage their assets and
determine their workforce needs. My question is, in your view,
what could the Coast Guard and Customs and Border Protection do
to allocate resources more effectively? Second, both of these
agencies are facing challenges in recruiting and retaining
workers. What actions could these agencies take that would have
the greatest possible impact to addressing recruitment and
retention challenges?
Ms. MacLeod. Thank you for the question. Our reports on the
Coast Guard's workforce analysis showed that they have
completed manpower requirements determinations on just 6
percent of their workforce. As I mentioned, we made
recommendations in that area and the Coast Guard has recently
put forth a plan to implement our recommendations in terms of
establishing a time line and milestones for assessing its
workforce. This should position the Coast Guard better to
understand needs across its various missions and place its
personnel and assets accordingly.
For CBP, the issues that we've identified are more in line
with difficult remote locations, competition with other law
enforcement agencies, and along with other issues, so slightly
different issues there. In terms of recruitment and retention,
we haven't looked specifically at the Coast Guard in this area
recently, but we have done a lot of work looking at Department
of Defense and the other military services and found that
they're facing their most challenging recruiting environment in
history. We've made a number of recommendations to DoD to
address the growing range of challenges, such as the eligible
population declining from which to recruit.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. Last question to Admiral Burdian,
if I may. What is included in the President's budget request
for 2024 to help address these resource needs?
Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Mr. Thanedar. Certainly, the
continued funding to recapitalize our aging medium-endurance
cutter fleet, the acquisition of the offshore patrol cutter is
critically important. As you mentioned, we've searched so, so
many resources down to the region. I would offer we are
grateful for the support we get from Congress, and the
increases in operating and maintenance funds have been
incredibly helpful to maintain the Coast Guard we have.
I would offer into the future a 35 percent increase in the
operating maintenance funds is critical to buy the Coast Guard
we need to support surging operations, emergency response, and
increased security needs all over the Nation, including in the
Arctic.
Mr. Thanedar. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral.
Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired and I
recognize the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Border Security
and Enforcement, the gentleman from Louisiana, Mr. Higgins.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Admiral Burdian, I
represent southwest Louisiana. We have a lot of coastline,
obviously, and constant interaction with the United States
Coast Guard. I am an army veteran and my district director in
Louisiana at my headquarters is an army veteran. I have two
other senior staff members down there that are army veterans,
including a retired colonel. So, over the course of the last 6
years, I have been honored to serve this capacity, my Nation.
We have had many, many interactions with the Coast Guard.
We very rarely have an opportunity to commend the Coast Guard
for their services and professionalism in this setting. So, I
just wanted to do so for this moment. You guys are incredibly
professional. As an old army staff sergeant working amongst
three army buddies in my district office, we are consistently
impressed with the United States Coast Guard. So, thank you for
your service, ma'am. How long have you been in your current
position, Admiral?
Admiral Burdian. Thanks for your comments, sir. I'm
likewise proud of all of our Coasties. I've been in my current
position since May of last year.
Mr. Higgins. Last year? Were you in the Response Policy
Division during 2019 and 2020?
Admiral Burdian. I was not. No, sir.
Mr. Higgins. You were not. Can you give us a perspective of
the change in response policy and the demands upon response
operations for the Coast Guard in the era of 2019 and 2020
under President Trump versus 2021 and 2022? How have things
changed?
Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir.
Mr. Higgins. Are they worse? Are they better?
Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir. I think Coast Guard policy
constantly matures, and between 2019 and 2022, I was in command
in South Florida, one of those field commanders I mentioned in
my opening statement. Certainly, there were multiple policy
changes that occurred in that time.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you. Let me summarize that things are
worse than they were in 2019 and 2020. Just the changes of what
we are dealing with at the Southern Border has impacted
maritime operations, no doubt. It is just the reality of what
we are dealing with. I am seeing that it is clear in my
research and in your testimony today, Admiral Burdian and
Director Miller, that cocaine remains the greatest threat.
Admiral, you stated that in your opening statement, that while
we mitigate the threat of all narcotics and recognize the
impact of synthetic opioids such as fentanyl on the United
States, the most significant drug threat in the maritime domain
remains cocaine. Director Miller, you noted that in 2022 alone,
you interdicted 250,000 pounds of cocaine. Is that correct?
Mr. Miller. Thank you for the question. Yes, that's
correct, sir.
Mr. Higgins. That is a tremendous amount of cocaine. These
cocaine shipments that are coming in through the maritime
domain, Admiral, you mentioned that 92 percent of cocaine
destined to the United States departed South America through
the maritime domain using commercial and non-commercial
vessels. Director, you stated that the vessels you are
encountering have the ability to evade detection. They run at
night a lot, and they evade surface patrol, obviously, and they
have a low radar signature, so they are hard to catch.
I would imagine, to the Chairman's question, that it is
truly immeasurable the number of vessels that get away. This is
not to the detriment of your effort, or your mission, or your
determination, or your professionalism. I mean, on land, it is
much easier to track the spore and then sort of measure what
you missed. But I would imagine that in the maritime
environment, it is much more difficult to measure those that
got away. Would you say that is a fair statement?
Mr. Miller. Thank you for the question. Yes, I would. Like
the Admiral said, you know, we catch a lot of cocaine in the
source and transit zone. The vast majority of other cocaine
smuggling happens in the Caribbean, Puerto Rico, eastern
Caribbean, especially. But, no, you are absolutely right. I am
sad to tell you today that I fear that we are missing a lot of
drug trafficking.
Mr. Higgins. Final brief question, if you could. What kind
of armament are you running into out there? What are your
interdiction teams seeing?
Mr. Miller. Thank you for your questions. So, we're seeing,
in terms of weapons, our agents that were shot and our one
agent that was killed, those were handguns. The shooter was an
extensive shooter after we found out. We run into AK-47s. The
shooting that happened off of Fajardo was a AR-15 pistol. So,
we're seeing some heavy armament that is difficult and creates
challenges for us.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you all for being here today. Mr.
Chairman, I yield.
Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired. I
recognize the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Payne.
Mr. Payne. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. When I ask my
questions, I would just like to clarify the Rear Admiral's
response to my colleague's question on had things changed? She
said, yes, they had changed. She did not say they got worse.
Just for clarification.
Let's see. In our modern world, we know that American
security must begin before our immediate maritime borders. The
Coast Guard has an essential mission to safeguard our maritime
security and our national sovereignty across the globe. Admiral
Burdian, first of all, as a young man, I wanted to be in the
Coast Guard. I don't think I ever made the muster, but, you
know, I appreciate all that all of you do in the defense of
this Nation in our maritime borders. How do the U.S. Coast
Guard's mission in the Arctic and the Indo-Pacific work to
protect our overall maritime and national security?
Admiral Burdian. Thank you, sir. We are hiring. We'd love
to welcome you into a recruiting office in case this thing
doesn't work out here on the Hill.
Mr. Payne. Well, after 2 years, I might come see you.
Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir. Certainly, the Coast Guard is
actively engaged in both of the theaters you mentioned, both in
support of the combatant commands and conducting, you know,
stand-alone Coast Guard Title 14 missions. In the Indo-Pacific,
one of the most exciting things happening is our work to combat
illegal, unregulated, and unreported fishing, basically illegal
fishing. Working with international partners, interagency
partners, and also non-governmental partners to really get
after folks that are robbing the sea from critical living
marine resources that feed about 3 billion people globally. So,
if economic security is national security, and I would argue
that it is, we certainly are contributing there and making an
investment in the future health of our oceans.
In the Arctic, sir, you know, there are areas of new ocean
that we haven't seen before. So, understanding the risks of
increased human activity, both from the ability to respond to
disasters, things like oil spills and mass rescue operations as
we continue to see transits for pleasure, things like cruise
ships up there, but also understanding what our near-peer
competitors are doing up in the Arctic to protect our
sovereignty and our resources, sir.
Mr. Payne. Well, you know, that is great because I was on
my way in that direction. How has the Coast Guard's work in the
Arctic, particularly with the growing threat from Russia and
China, as well as from climate change affected by an aging
fleet and limited resources?
Admiral Burdian. Thank you, sir. I would be remiss if I
didn't mention that the Coast Guard is currently undergoing an
effort to recapitalize our fleet of icebreakers.
Mr. Payne. Excellent.
Admiral Burdian. Our terms, polar security cutters.
Understanding that the purpose of icebreaking in our polar
regions is certainly to facilitate commerce, but really to
exert national sovereignty and protect national security. Right
now, our plan is for a fleet of three heavy icebreakers, three
large polar security cutters, and a follow-on fleet of three.
Mr. Payne. Excellent. That is very good to hear. In recent
years, due to the COVID-19 pandemic and economic factors, our
armed services have struggled to reach recruitment and
retention goals. In 2022, the Coast Guard recruited just 2,793
service members out of a goal of 4,200. Ms. MacLeod, has the
U.S. Coast Guard struggled because of these and other workforce
issues?
Ms. MacLeod. Yeah, our work has shown that all branches of
military service are struggling to recruit and retain service
members at this time, and the Coast Guard is certainly among
those. We do have an upcoming study. We'll be looking
specifically at the Coast Guard that I expect to initiate later
this summer. But without those workforce analyses that I
mentioned earlier, the Coast Guard is really left with
incomplete information on the number of personnel that is
required to conduct its missions.
Mr. Payne. Thank you for that question. Mr. Chairman, I
will yield back.
Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman yields back. I now
recognize the gentleman from New York, Mr. LaLota.
Mr. LaLota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for your
leadership and for focusing this committee's attention on
securing America's maritime border. To our witnesses, thank you
for your expertise, your dedication, and for what you do in
your respective fields. I represent New York's 1st
Congressional District on Long Island. We are surrounded by
water by three sides. Admiral, while my district is not home to
a Coast Guard base, we do have several Coast Guard stations in
Montauk, Shinnecock, Eatons Neck. We have an Aids to Navigation
team in Hampton Bays, a Maritime Safety Detachment in Coram,
and a cutter base in Montauk. We have a robust Coast Guard
auxiliary on Long Island as well. Specifically in my district,
there are flotillas in East Hampton, Riverhead, Southold,
Huntington, Northport, Stony Brook, and Port Jefferson. My
stepfather is actually a member of the flotilla in East
Moriches, and I am very grateful for his service. My
grandfather was a Coast Guardsman as well. I am grateful for
what you are doing to help secure our waters and keeping Long
Island and the country safe.
The reason we are here today is to highlight the crisis we
are seeing on our borders, and specifically our maritime
borders. The reality in which we live is that in the last
fiscal year, in the 12 months of fiscal year 2022, the Coast
Guard interdicted 12,000 migrants at sea, while just in the
first 4 months of this fiscal year, the number is at 7,400. So,
we are on a pace to double last year's numbers, and the Coast
Guard is being stretched extremely thin.
So, Admiral, my question relates to some things that you
mentioned in your testimony about the Coast Guard's mission in
the waters of South Florida Strait can be compared to,
``patrolling a land the area the size of Maryland, with seven
police cars limited to traveling at 15 miles per hour.'' I
understand the auxiliary does not have a law enforcement
capabilities or authority and I am not advocating for them to
have any. But with the increase in the number of interdictions,
I would like to talk about how the Coast Guard Auxiliary can be
better used and shared to help secure our borders, specifically
to stop these extremely dangerous voyages from continuing. So,
my first question, Admiral, is how has the auxiliary been used
by the Coast Guard in their missions thus far?
Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Congressman, and thanks to
grandpa and stepdad for their service as well. The Coast Guard
auxiliary is an incredibly important component of our overall
force. We're 20,000 strong in the Coast Guard auxiliary. These
are volunteers who choose to spend their time supporting Coast
Guard operations and more importantly, Coast Guard personnel. I
can tell you from my own experience and our auxiliary chaplain,
we have an auxiliary chaplain program which is incredibly
important as you consider the impacts of conducting these life-
saving missions.
It is exhilarating when you can rescue someone from the
sea. But I can tell you just the opposite is true when you have
to inform a parent that their child is not coming home having
been lost to the sea, which, unfortunately, I had to do
multiple times. It was my auxiliary chaplain, Rick Braswell,
who not only helped console those families but helped me in the
aftermath of those circumstances. That is, what the Coast Guard
Auxiliary does is relieve the burden on our active-duty
workforce, whether it's providing, you know, ministry services
like those I just described. Cooking for Coast Guard crews. We
have physicians. They really are immeasurably productive. In
these particular cases, you know, in direct support of the
migrant interdiction mission, you're right, sir, they're
prohibited by law from doing that. But they absolutely are part
of the unified command that's structured to support these
operations.
Mr. LaLota. Great. Admiral, I hope that you would continue
to tell Congress what we can do more to help build a robust
auxiliary. But moving from that, have you had to pull, while
you are patrolling in Florida and around the southern part of
the United States, have you had to pull resources from other
parts of the country like New York to assist in the efforts
around the Keys, the Gulf, and other waters around the
Caribbean?
Admiral Burdian. We have, sir. We've redirected all major
cutter deployments from the East Coast down to South Florida.
About half of our patrol boat deployments and about 40 percent
of our maritime patrol aircraft have been redirected to South
Florida, and further offshore, the old Bahama Channel, closer
to Haiti, and places like that. Our direction is to detect and
interdict these migrant ventures as far from U.S. shores as
possible. We, with the authority to do that, tend to push
further offshore, sir.
Mr. LaLota. Great. Back to the auxiliary, as you have moved
some of the more conventional active-duty forces to important
missions like this, has the auxiliary had to backfill some of
the traditional Coast Guard mission back in New York?
Admiral Burdian. I'll get back to you with their exact
employment up in your region, sir, but absolutely. Our Coast
Guard auxiliarists and communication watch stations again, they
conduct, you know, they act as culinary specialists under way
cooking for Coast Guard crews at sea. They really are an
incredibly valuable component of the force.
Mr. LaLota. Great. Thanks again for your service and I
yield back, Chairman.
Chairman Gimenez. The gentlemen yields back. I now
recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Garcia.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do want to
thank all of you for your service to our country and for all
the service that you provide us and all the different agencies.
I am also an immigrant myself, and I know, I want to just let
you all know that as you all know and as I have stated in this
committee that coming by water to seek asylum is also a symptom
of a broken immigration system. It is one of the reasons that
folks come through our waterways to the United States. We know
that many are risking these conditions, oftentimes on unsafe
boats, because they don't have other options. There are no
pathways for them once they arrive. I think we can all
understand why someone, for example, would flee persecution
from Cuba, for instance, and we won't solve this issue with
only just more patrols. There has to be an orderly process
around asylum and around immigration.
We know that maritime drug smuggling is also a challenge
for us to address. I was the mayor of Long Beach prior to this
role just last year and I had served for 8 years as mayor. We
have one of the largest seaports in the United States. The
second-largest container cargo port in the country. So,
certainly, our relationship as a city, our port was a city
department. So, our relationship with the Coast Guard, with
Homeland Security, with CBP, with all the various agencies was
critical to the success of our ports, which are a huge economic
driver for the country. So, in the case of the ports of Long
Beach and Los Angeles, 40 percent of America's goods are coming
in just in and out of those ports alone.
We know also that our maritime borders are not wide open. I
think you all and various agencies are doing a great job of
ensuring that there is an orderly process on our maritime
borders. Also want to note that Congress, particularly House
Democrats, has also fought for more resources for agencies like
the Coast Guard.
Back in November 2021, President Biden and Congressional
Democrats, of course, passed an infrastructure bill. I believe
only about 13 House Republicans voted for this legislation, and
it included $430 million for the Department of Homeland
Security to expand facilities and improve screening
capabilities at our ports of entry, which for ports like the
port of Long Beach, like the port of Los Angeles, were critical
in the work that we are doing there with our partner agencies.
It also provided $429 million for Coast Guard infrastructure
priorities, which are also very important to cities and to
coastal communities.
The 2023 appropriations package, which I believe only 9
House Republicans voted for, provided an additional $130
million for the Department of Homeland Security to hire
additional workers at our ports of entry and to invest in more
innovative and efficient technologies to speed up inspections.
So, both in the appropriations package and in the
infrastructure bill, both, of course, presented by the
President, both overwhelmingly supported by House Democrats and
overwhelmingly not supported by House Republicans, those
provided additional support for these agencies.
We know that an overwhelming majority of drugs enter our
country through legal ports of entry. I think that has been
reiterated at this committee and at many other subcommittees
throughout the Congress. But we also know that effective
screening is very important, which is why these funds are so
critical. The American people earn $5 billion a year in customs
revenues from the Port of Long Beach and the Port of Los
Angeles; 2.6 million jobs throughout the United States are
linked just to the trade in the ports that I currently
represent and represented as mayor. As someone representing a
coastal California community, I also want to acknowledge all
the work that you all do to Rear Admiral Bourdain and the Coast
Guard, your phenomenal work with our partnership should be
hailed. I also want to thank you for your trailblazing
leadership, as the first Hispanic American female flag officer
in the Coast Guard's history. I think that is something that
should be recognized, and I want to add my voice in that.
I want to know a couple of questions. I know how much the
Coast Guard does to protect Southern California, to protect
coastal communities, the maritime industry, and certainly the
district I represent and represented as mayor. As part of that,
Admiral, for people that are unfamiliar with the needs of the
Coast Guard, can you explain how the infrastructure bill that
has been recently passed and now being implemented directly
impacts and supports the mission of the Coast Guard?
Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Congressman. The support is
really support to Coast Guardsmen. When you report aboard to a
boat station, many of which were, you know, included in the
infrastructure money, you're reporting aboard to work, but
you're also reporting to a schoolhouse, a gym, a church, and
you're home for several days as you stand the watch, as we like
to say. So that's what that money does is improve the
environment around Coast Guardsmen so they can focus on the
mission.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you for that. We have also talked some
about just the way that traffickers are trying to stay ahead
with tech innovations around smuggling. What are we doing as
the Coast Guard to really take on kind-of the tech innovations
that are happening around smuggling?
Admiral Burdian. Sir, Director Miller mentioned it earlier.
The most important thing we have in our favor is our
partnerships domestically with one another and internationally.
We certainly at our research and development center up in the
Northeast, are working on innovations in terms of information
sharing, detecting, things like that. We'd love to get you some
more information on that, sir.
Mr. Garcia. Thank you very much. I just want to commend all
of you for the great work you all do. With that, Mr. Chairman,
I yield back.
Chairman Gimenez. The gentleman's time has expired. I now
recognize the gentlelady from Florida, Ms. Lee.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding
this important hearing. I am grateful to all of our witnesses
for being here today and for your service to our country. I
represent Florida's 15th Congressional District, and maritime
security affects every Floridian and is a key concern for our
residents. In recent months, Florida has seen a surge in
migrants attempting to enter our State illegally through our
maritime border. This dramatic surge in migrants attempting to
illegally enter the United States through Florida's maritime
border so overwhelmed local law enforcement that as we have
heard today, our Governor declared a state of emergency and
activated our Florida National Guard to help address this
crisis.
Nationally, we know that our maritime border is a target
for drug traffickers and the cartels who attempt to bring
methamphetamine, and cocaine, and other drugs into the United
States. This is a major security concern for our State, local,
and Federal law enforcement officers and for all Americans. So,
I thank you all for the critical work that you are doing to
help keep our border safe.
I would like to direct my questions to general Boyette and
your role with the Florida National Guard. Specifically, since
Governor DeSantis has declared the state of emergency and
activated Florida's National Guard to help with this surge,
tell me what are the greatest challenges that you have
encountered in your work?
General Boyette. Thank you for the question, Congresswoman.
The initial challenge we had was direct communication and we
since, through partnership with the Coast Guard, were able to
address that. Now we have direct communications with the vessel
assisting in quicker interdictions and quicker oversight for
interdictions.
The second big challenge is we are a traditional force.
It's an all-volunteer force. These soldiers and airmen are
volunteer, taken away from their families, communities, and
their civilian jobs, and they're on a volunteer basis. So, this
also applies to the aircraft and airframes that are doing the
mission. They're part of the State of Florida and it's non-
sustainable for the long term for our formation.
Ms. Lee. Tell me, what would make the operation more
sustainable? If this did continue to be an operation that you
needed to carry forward in the longer term, what would assist
you in making it a more viable, sustainable operation for the
guard?
General Boyette. Thank you again for the question. I think
there's a variety of different options and solutions to the
problem. Several solutions could be a little bit more Federal
support in terms of Federal mobilization, turning a Title 32
soldier into a Title 10 soldier to give them the benefits, and
support, and entitlements from the Federal Government. Thank
you.
Ms. Lee. Overall, how do you feel the efforts of
interdiction of drug and migrants over the Florida coast, how
is that going? How would you rate the overall effectiveness of
the project so far?
General Boyette. Thank you again for the question. Trending
data suggests that we're having an impact. I believe it's a
tremendous deterrent impact. We look forward to continuing the
partnership with the Coast Guard and other Federal agencies and
local agencies to continue the mission.
Ms. Lee. Apart from the specific matter that you already
mentioned, are there other things that we could be doing to
help equip you and enhance the effectiveness of your mission?
General Boyette. I think at the moment we're trending the
next phase, I guess, is to learn and see how we can implement
UAS, which we're already in the midst of doing. At the moment,
we have no requirements.
Ms. Lee. Thank you, sir. Mr. Chairman, I yield back the
remainder of my time.
Chairman Gimenez. The gentlelady yields back her time.
Mr. Thanedar. Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that
Mr. Correa be allowed to sit and ask questions of today's
witnesses.
Chairman Gimenez. Without objection, so ordered. I now
recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you very much for
the opportunity of being in your committee. I used to chair
this committee many moons ago. It is a privilege to be here
again. I want to thank our witnesses today for your valuable
service to our country. You are appreciated. Rear Admiral
Burdian, I was reading your testimony, listening to you.
Ninety-five thousand miles of shoreline, 361 commercial ports,
25,000 miles of navigable channels, most importantly, $5.4
trillion of commerce. That's 25 percent of our gross domestic
product. That is unbelievable. So, in many ways your job here,
the prosperity, the health of our economy really depends on you
doing your job. So, my basic quick question here is what do you
need to do to continue to do that great job of keeping the good
stuff coming and keeping the bad stuff out?
Admiral Burdian. Thank you, Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. In about 20 seconds.
Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir. I think I mentioned earlier, you
know, Congress has made significant investments in the Coast
Guard for which we're grateful. But those investments really
are sustaining the Coast Guard that we have and not investing
in the future Coast Guard, not giving us the opportunity to
really recapitalize, operate, and maintain the Coast Guard of
the future. Our top line now is right around $13 billion.
Really, based on future need, we would seek investment in a $20
billion Coast Guard.
Mr. Correa. Please continue to come and let us know what is
going on, because I know you also help with keeping embargo
blockade on North Korea. You also work on the Arctic area and
all parts of the world. I think most people would look at the
Coast Guard and not even begin to imagine the kind of work you
do for this country. So, thank you very much.
Other area we discussed migrant and migrant policy, your
job rescuing really human beings out at sea. Do you have
predictive models that tell you when you are going to have a
surge and people would be so desperate that they would go to a
sea in an unworthy ship vessel and risk their lives? When you
see political instability, economic chaos, are you able to
predict to say this is where we expect a surge in people going
to sea?
Admiral Burdian. We don't have a predictive model, sir, but
we certainly, there are Coast Guardsmen stationed in 30 nations
around the globe, including those that are some of the nations
where some of these folks are coming from. So, I think we
understand the factors that can contribute to migration,
political instability, natural man-made disasters, things like
that, those are the things we look at.
Mr. Correa. Refugees, we talk about desperation, pressure.
The Biden administration just announced a new legal pathway for
people from Cuba, Haiti, Venezuela, and Nicaragua to come to
the United States. According to some reports from CBP, the
average weekly encounters at the border, Southern Border have
dropped by 98 percent. Are you seeing anything like that in
your area, meaning a drop in numbers of refugees going to the
sea?
Admiral Burdian. We are seeing a drop in those numbers,
sir. I don't think we're prepared to attribute that to a
specific causal factor, but absolutely, we're seeing a
reduction.
Mr. Correa. Again, coming back to my question about a
predictive model, I would love to learn more about what you
think are the factors that are leading to that drop, because
we, as policy makers myself, want to know what is it that works
and what doesn't, and how we can address these issues before
they are full-blown at our doorstep.
Admiral Burdian. Yes, sir.
Mr. Correa. Finally, I just want to say again, my 1 minute
I have left, to all of you, thank you for your great work. I do
hope that, Mr. Chairman, we continue to hear from these great
individuals. The more we know, the more facts we get, the
better public policy makers we become. Going beyond Democrat or
Republican, I think we are all good Americans trying to do the
best thing we can for this country. For that reason, I thank
you, Mr. Chairman, for letting me be part of this committee
hearing today. Thank you.
Chairman Gimenez. It is our pleasure. The gentleman yields
back. I want to thank the witnesses for the valuable testimony
and the Members for their questions. The Members of the
subcommittee may have some additional questions for the
witnesses, and we would ask the witnesses to respond to these
in writing. Pursuant to Committee Rule VII(D), the hearing
record will be placed and held open for 10 days. Without
objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 3:43 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Questions From Honorable Robert Garcia for Jo-Ann F. Burdian
maritime safety
Question 1a. Since 1999, the National Transportation Safety Board
has investigated 3 accidents involving passenger ferries in New York, a
deadly fire on the small passenger vessel Island Lady in Florida, duck
boat accidents in Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and Missouri, and the 2019
fire and sinking of the MV Conception off Santa Cruz Island, CA. These
tragedies have cost the lives of 86 people, unnecessarily. The NTSB has
issued a number of safety recommendations to the United State Coast
Guard to close safety gaps, and yet many remain unfulfilled, including
the recommendation made 20 years ago for preventative maintenance--
which was reiterated to the Coast Guard in 2012, 2018, and again in
2020.
Rear Admiral Burdian, while I understand this falls under
Prevention Police and not under you responsibility of Response Policy,
will you please convey to the Coast Guard's leadership my interest in
this matter and please have the Coast Guard answer these questions?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 1b. What is the status of the Coast Guard rule making to
require safety management systems for operators?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 2. With regard to the Conception and vessel safety, the
Coast Guard is constantly short qualified marine inspectors. Does the
Coast Guard have the necessary marine inspectors to ensure marine
safety?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 3. With new requirements related to small passenger
vessels, the Coast Guard will need to conduct more inspections. How
many marine inspectors is the Service currently short?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
sexual assault
Question 4a. CNN recently ran a report entitled, ``Failed
oversight, lax punishments: How the Coast Guard has allowed sexual
assault at sea to go unchecked,'' which reported a deeply concerning
failure of the Coast Guard to prevent and punish sexual assault and
misconduct in the maritime industry.
Rear Admiral Burdian, while I understand this does not fall under
Response Policy, as a female leader in the Coast Guard, have you read
this reporting and what are your thoughts on her the Coast Guard
currently responds to allegations of sexual assault and harassment?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 4b. Can more be done by the Coast Guard in this area?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 5. Do you have personal recommendations to Congress on
what should be done?
Additionally, I ask that you convey these questions to the Coast
Guard for response. It is the Coast Guard's job to ensure that the more
than 200,000 merchant mariners, who are given Government credentials to
work on vessels, do not pose a safety risk.
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 6. Is it true that no Merchant Mariner has had their
credentials revoked for shipboard sexual misconduct in the last decade?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 7. Under current regulations, Mariners' credentials can be
suspended during investigation for drug or alcohol use but not for
sexual misconduct. Congress enacted statutory change to this in Sec.
11603 of the fiscal year 2023 National Defense Authorizing Act (Sexual
harassment or sexual assault as grounds for suspension or revocation).
What measures is the Coast Guard taking to ensure the prompt and
effective implementation of 46 U.S.C. 7704a?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 8. How many cases has the Coast Guard identified of
Mariners holding credentials who have been convicted of convicted of
sex crimes including rape, sexual battery, sexual assault, and child
molestation?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 9. Do Coast Guard regulations allow for the sharing of
information about criminal convictions, past enforcement actions, or
on-going criminal or administrative investigations with potential
employers? If not, is this something the Coast Guard is considering?
Are statutory changes required to allow the sharing of such
information?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question 10. How many Coast Guard Administrative Law Judges are
currently female? In the history of ALJ, how many judges have been male
and how many have been female?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
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