[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 118-22]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES HEARING
ON
FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET REQUEST OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR
FIXED-WING TACTICAL AND TRAINING AIRCRAFT PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 29, 2023
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-383 WASHINGTON : 2024
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Chairman
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
SAM GRAVES, Missouri RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
DON BACON, Nebraska SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
PAT FALLON, Texas PATRICK RYAN, New York
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
NICK LaLOTA, New York STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia
Heath Bope, Professional Staff Member
James Vallario, Professional Staff Member
Payson Ruhl, Research Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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Page
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Norcross, Hon. Donald, a Representative from New Jersey, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces........... 4
Wittman, Hon. Robert J., a Representative from Virginia,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces......... 1
WITNESSES
Cederholm, LtGen Michael S., USMC, Deputy Commandant for
Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps.................................... 11
Hunter, Hon. Andrew P., Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
(Acquisition, Technology and Logistics), Department of the Air
Force.......................................................... 6
Loiselle, RADM Andrew J., USN, Director, Air Warfare, U.S. Navy.. 10
Ludwigson, Jon, Director, Contracting and National Security
Acquisitions, U.S. Government Accountability Office............ 14
Moore, Lt Gen Richard G., Jr., USAF, Deputy Chief of Staff (Plans
and Programs), U.S. Air Force.................................. 7
Schmidt, Lt Gen Michael J., USAF, Program Executive Officer, F-35
Lightning II Program........................................... 12
Stefany, Frederick J., Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy
(Research, Development and Acquisition), Department of the Navy 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Hunter, Hon. Andrew P., joint with Lt Gen Richard G. Moore,
Jr......................................................... 42
Ludwigson, Jon............................................... 114
Schmidt, Lt Gen Michael J.................................... 84
Stefany, Frederick J., joint with LtGen Michael S. Cederholm
and RADM Andrew J. Loiselle................................ 62
Wittman, Hon. Robert J....................................... 39
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Courtney................................................. 144
Mr. Turner................................................... 150
Mr. Wittman.................................................. 139
FISCAL YEAR 2024 BUDGET REQUEST OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FOR FIXED-WING TACTICAL AND TRAINING AIRCRAFT
PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 29, 2023.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:39 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Robert J.
Wittman (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT J. WITTMAN, A REPRESENTATIVE
FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Wittman. I want to call the Subcommittee on--the
Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee to order. I would
like to welcome our witnesses today. Thank you so much for
joining us. And this is our first subcommittee hearing of the
118th Congress.
I want to thank my colleagues for being here. I want to
thank the ranking member. Don, thank you so much for all that
you have done up to now, all of your leadership on the
subcommittee, and everything that you will do also going
forward. So it is great to be here with my new ranking member
colleague, Don Norcross, and my true friend, Joe Courtney, who
was a colleague there on Seapower [Subcommittee on Seapower and
Projection Forces] and also a colleague here on TAL
[Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces]. So a great
opportunity.
So we are here today, as we know, to review the 2024 budget
request for the Department of Defense's fixed-wing tactical and
training aircraft programs.
Again, I thank our witnesses for testifying today, and I
welcome both new and returning members, as I have said, to our
TAL subcommittee. Hopefully, we will have a few members on our
side of the aisle actually show up. So we will give the
attendance award today to Don and his colleagues, so.
I look forward to being able to lead the subcommittee. I
really look forward to serving with Don in his capacity. We
have a critically important role here as we review over $133
billion of programs in our jurisdiction, the largest of any of
the hardware subcommittees.
And as I have stated many times in the past, the National
Defense Strategy is clear in its focus on China as our Nation's
pacing threat. During my previous tenure as ranking member on
the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee, we oversaw
critical capabilities of the long-range strike and long-range
logistics portfolios. They are essential components of
executing INDOPACOM's [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's] military
strategy and enabling operational successes of the joint force
competing against the tyranny of distance in response to an
ever-increasing Chinese aggression.
Additionally, I truly believe that these long-range
capabilities I just described are even more essential as they
augment and support the tactical fighter fleet. However, I am
though worried about the Department's current direction
regarding the composition of our United States military's
tactical air force structure and how our fighters are going to
function in that realm and what the required capabilities will
be within that effort.
I am concerned that our existing force structure is
optimized for a counterinsurgency fight and is not prepared to
address the challenges posed by an expected threat in the
INDOPACOM area.
As I review the plans for each service, two threads are
particularly concerning. First, our fighter force structure
continues decreasing. And second, we are not able to deliver
replacement aircraft at affordable prices to achieve similar
quantities going forward. Meanwhile, our adversaries continue
outpacing us building and fielding their own lethal fighter
aircraft capability and capacity.
I find we also continue to ask ourselves whether or not
this administration and the Department of Defense strives to
maintain the U.S. as the enduring global power or whether they
continue down the evident glide slope of reducing us to a
regional power in that status.
For the Air Force, their fiscal 2023 through fiscal 2028
plan includes divesting 801 fighter aircraft but only buying
back 345 new F-35A and F-15EX aircraft.
The F-15EX program of record is not fully funded. The 200
planned Next Generation Air Dominance manned fighters are many
years away from fielding and will cost taxpayers hundreds of
millions of dollars per aircraft.
The Air Force has yet to figure out how they will buy 1,763
F-35A aircraft after acknowledging their major operating cost
assumption of $4.1 million per aircraft per year is
unachievable. The Air Force in this budget cancelled the
electronic warfare upgrade for the fleet of the existing F-16s,
which now puts into question the viability and survivability of
that aircraft fleet in the future and which could be construed
as an intentional precursor to justifying divestment of a
significant amount of that capable fleet at a later date.
And while the Air Force's new Collaborative Combat Aircraft
concept may hold promise in affordability and making up for
fighter capacity shortfalls, there is still a long road ahead
where we have to integrate autonomous capability seamlessly
amongst manned platforms and especially when the Air Force
still can't get their fourth- and fifth-generation manned
fighter aircraft to reliably share tactically relevant data
during combat air operations.
Meanwhile, the Navy has a strike fighter shortfall. This
year it amounts to 17 aircraft. And that number grows in the
future until 2030. The Navy has yet to sign a contract for 20
aircraft appropriated over the past 2 years and still has not
achieved their planned purchase rate of 24 F-35C aircraft per
year.
They still have not demonstrated they can affordably modify
legacy Block 2 Super Hornets into Block 3 capable aircraft.
They have reduced the F-35C squadron force presentation in
carrier air wings from 2 squadrons of 10 aircraft to 1 squadron
of 16 aircraft and have similar challenges as the Air Force in
affordably trying to field their version of the manned Next
Generation Air Dominance aircraft.
And I would be remiss if I didn't also mention the Marine
Corps. While I support the overall contours of the Commandant's
Force Design 2030 concept regarding land forces, I currently
also have concerns with the plans regarding aviation force
structure.
I would like to understand why the Marine Corps plans to
remove 54 combat-coded F-35B and C aircraft in attrition
reserve status for a total of 117 attrition reserve aircraft or
28 percent of their fleet but still maintains an overall
program of record of 420 F-35 aircraft, especially when F-35B
and C fully mission capable rates have averaged over the past
years at only 27 percent and 21.5 percent, respectively.
Finally, I want to discuss the F-35 program given it's
[currently] planned to [comprise] a significant portion of our
future tactical air fleet around the world, presuming we are
still able to afford all 2,456 aircraft for the U.S. and
approximately 1,000 aircraft for partners and foreign
customers.
Upfront, I want to unequivocally state that the F-35 will
be the most advanced tactical aircraft the United States has
ever built. Although multiple challenges exist across various
aspects of the F-35 enterprise, I want to highlight two near-
term issues.
F-35 is currently planned to achieve full operational
capability status after the full TR-3 [Technical Refresh 3] and
Block 4 capabilities of the aircraft are fielded in 2028, 27
years after the program began. That is by any measure
unacceptable, and the program has to do better.
We currently understand that TR-3 is approximately $700
million over budget. And the last update we received from the
program office about delivering TR-3 capability is April 2024
of next year, which puts it a year late to the previous plan.
We have to make sure that we do better because the original
projected date of delivery was April of 2023. We have learned
the late TR-3 delivery is now impacting existing fighter
squadrons, divesting of their legacy fighter aircraft but not
receiving the planned 35A replacements in time, which would
leave the fighter squadrons and highly trained personnel
without any significant aircraft for significant periods of
time.
To quote a senior Air Force official I have met with on the
topic, they have said we currently are paying for a great
capability, but we are currently only getting a good capability
fielded.
The second issue is F-35 propulsion and the thermal
management system modernization. As I continue gathering facts
and data about the existing program and review the budget
proposal of the Department to pursue a sole-source industry
solution known as the Engine Core Upgrade, or ECU, I would like
to understand more from our witnesses about the avionics
cooling requirements that have been set by the services, in
addition to understanding the technical risk, the schedule, and
system integration assessments the program office performed
related to major subsystems for power and fuel thermal
management and electrical generation that they have made in
their proposal.
Again, I want to thank the witnesses today for appearing
before us, and now yield to our ranking member from the great
State of New Jersey, Mr. Don Norcross.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Wittman can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
STATEMENT OF HON. DONALD NORCROSS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM NEW
JERSEY, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND
FORCES
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman, and congratulations. It
is great to have you here. You are surrounded by your ex-
chairman, who is your good friend, and apparently I am only the
friend. So I have to work on that also.
Mr. Wittman. Good friend also.
Mr. Norcross. Good friends. But it is great to be here, and
I look forward to continuing to work with you, having served
under you on Seapower for a number of years. And to all of our
witnesses here today, thank you very much.
As we come out of this pandemic, we are still experiencing,
as has been said before, the hangover of a supply chain
challenge, which goes along with much of the workforce trying
to get them back up. But I think it is important to remember
and to thank those who continued to work during the pandemic.
You cannot build these jets from home. You cannot build them on
Zoom. So to all the men and women who toiled every day during
the pandemic, I very much appreciate it along with all of our
service men and women.
In reviewing the Air Force and Navy request this year for
tactical aircraft, there is clearly great justification as ever
for this subcommittee's continued detailed oversight of these
large, complex, and expensive programs.
This hearing is one of the most important that we do each
year. And understandably we often focus on the issues related
to cost, performance, schedule, and management of these.
However, with this budget request, we need to also get answers
from our witnesses about what they are assessing and managing
of the strategic risk associated with our tactical aviation
force structure.
An example is the Air Force will produce 72 aircraft in
year 2024 but plans to retire 131, and the chairman has already
talked about that, a net loss of 59 tactical fighter aircraft.
Moreover, looking at 2028, they plan to procure 288 aircraft
and retire 685. Although these numbers don't tell the entire
game, they are certainly a clue as some of the challenges we
are going to face.
We should all want reassurances that we are not retiring
too much capability too soon, especially given the continued
delays with the F-35, TR-3 Block 4, and the NGAD [Next
Generation Air Dominance] systems that are not going to be
fielded for a number of years.
We appreciate the Air Force witnesses addressing the
strategy for management of this risk with tactical aviation
capability and capacity. The Navy and Marine Corps' force
structure analysis and plans are just as challenging, and a
coherent message at times is elusive. Three years ago, the Navy
strike fighter shortfall would last until 2030. Two years ago,
the Navy told us that the strike fighter shortfall would be
resolved to zero in 2025. And we have been briefed that the
strike [fighter] shortfall will not be resolved until 2031.
Related, the Marine Corps plan reduces the number of
tactical fighter aircraft in operational squadrons, and all
this makes oversight of the Navy/Marine Corps' management of
risk more difficult, especially concerning the projections
drastically change from year to year, understanding that COVID
[coronavirus disease] did have a play in here but certainly
doesn't make up for all of it.
Finally, focusing on the F-35 program, the most expensive
program in our Nation's history. Although this program has
tremendous accomplishment, it also suffers from enduring
delays, cost overruns, and management decisions that are
particularly recent engine malfunctions that had temporarily
halted the deliveries.
The Joint Simulation Environment delay is delaying IOT&E
[initial operational test and evaluation] full-rate production
decision. We heard that. And also we have yet to field the need
for the TR Block 4 capabilities. And certainly we would like to
hear Mr. Hunter lay out the Air Force's rationale for its
recent decision to go with the Engine Core Upgrade to the 135
engine instead of the alternative.
It is especially helpful to have the GAO [U.S. Government
Accountability Office] here today as they had been in past
years as Congress, with an independent assessment of this key
program including strong, actionable recommendations for how we
can improve.
The bottom line is that with many difficult and challenging
acquisition and sustainment objectives occurring this decade,
we need to understand what adjustments the program's leadership
is undertaking to achieve realistic schedules, reliable cost
estimates that deliver an affordable and full capability that
many nations are relying upon to support their national
security requirement.
Mr. Chairman, as this is our first hearing, I would like to
take an opportunity to introduce our member who has left
already, as I just looked down. So Pat Ryan from New York's
18th District and Jeff Jackson from North Carolina 14th, both
of them great experience, have served our Nation well, and we
look forward to their participation in the future. You can't
make this up. With that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Well, thank you to my good friend, Mr.
Norcross. Don, thanks so much. And, believe me, I know how it
is with members going in and out.
So we are now going to go to our witnesses. We have before
us testifying today the Honorable Andrew Hunter, Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition, Technology and
Logistics; Lieutenant General Richard Moore, Deputy Chief of
Staff for Air Force Plans and Programs; Mr. Jay Stefany, Acting
Assistant Secretary of Navy for Research and Development and
Senior Acquisition Executive for the F-35 program; Rear Admiral
Loiselle, Director of Navy's Air Warfare Division; Lieutenant
General Mike Cederholm, Deputy Commandant of Marine Corps
Aviation; Lieutenant General Michael Schmidt, F-35 Program
Executive Officer; Mr. Jon Ludwigson, Director of the
Contracting and National Security Acquisition Team for the
Government Accountability Office.
Mr. Hunter, we will start with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW P. HUNTER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE
AIR FORCE (ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS), DEPARTMENT
OF THE AIR FORCE
Mr. Hunter. All right. Well, thank you, Chairman Wittman
and Ranking Member Norcross. It is a pleasure to be back. And
all the members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
invitation to testify. Lieutenant General Moore and I are very
pleased to be here to provide testimony on the Air Force's
fiscal year 2024 budget request for fixed-wing tactical and
training aircraft. And I will hit the highlights, because it is
a big panel, in my open testimony and look forward to
responding to your detailed questions as you desire.
The Air Force's fiscal year 2024 budget request reflects
our commitment to developing a threat-informed future Air Force
equipped to win a high-end fight. Last year, Secretary Kendall
and General Brown outlined the seven operational imperatives we
must meet to succeed.
The operational imperatives were the combined work of the
entire Air and Space Force teams, combining the best insights
of our operators, operational analysis, and the acquisition
enterprise. As a result of this analysis and work, we have over
$25 billion requested in fiscal year 2024 for operational
imperative related investments.
Our fiscal year 2024 request balances this investment in
critically needed new capability with recapitalization and
modernization of our existing platforms. I will highlight just
a few of the key investments in my opening remarks.
I do want to emphasize that the F-35 is the cornerstone of
our future fighter fleet, and we have fielded nearly 400 F-35As
to date. In the near-term, we are very focused and must focus
on fielding the F-35 Block 4 capability that we need to address
advanced threats.
While crewed fighters will remain the core of the U.S. Air
Force combat power, a centerpiece of our FY24 [fiscal year
2024] budget request is the uncrewed Collaborative Combat
Aircraft [CCA], which will provide new combat capabilities and
cost-effective capacity to the fighter force.
CCA is the single largest operational imperative
investment, with over $6 billion requested across the FYDP
[Future Years Defense Program]. In fiscal year 2024, we are
investing hundreds of millions to rapidly begin development of
the first CCA platform and to leverage our extensive, existing
work on autonomy to underpin CCA. We are establishing an
operational experimentation unit to work with existing
platforms and capable partner nations to prove out the concept
of operations for CCA.
Also, as we modernize the bulk of our F-22 fleet, we are
transitioning from F-22 to NGAD. Funds garnered by divesting F-
22 Block 20s are going to be reinvested or are being reinvested
in NGAD development across the FYDP and the transition timeline
is dependent on our progress of achieving the success and
development of NGAD.
The Air Force is ensuring cost control on NGAD by driving
continuous competition for air vehicles, mission systems,
software, and by mandating the use of the government-owned
reference architecture. We are also changing the way we execute
highly complex acquisition programs by taking a hands-on
approach to digital engineering that accelerates prototyping,
drives efficiencies in manufacturing, and reduces costs in
operation and sustainment.
Our FY24 request funds aircraft design, development tests,
and the integration of advanced mission systems as well as
cooperative development of the agile mission suite.
Perhaps the most essential element of our fiscal year 2024
request is our efforts to develop effective battle management
to meet the pacing challenge.
The PEO [program executive office] C3BM [command, control,
communications, and battle management] established last year is
delivering and integrating cutting-edge battle management
command and control capabilities and systems and driving
digital infrastructure investments that ensure Air and Space
Forces can succeed in high intensity conflict by coordinating
complex missions across the joint force at scale.
Operationally optimized ABMS [Advanced Battle Management
System] and JADC2 [Joint All-Domain Command and Control] is
foundational to many of our operational imperatives. The fiscal
year 2024 President's budget requests over $500 million to
enable ABMS to remain on track and to deliver initial
capabilities, such as the cloud-based command and control
tactical C2 [command and control] software to multiple of our
air defense sectors as well as our digital infrastructure
efforts for software-defined wide-area networking and
deployable edge solutions for battle management teams at
multiple echelons.
In order to achieve these efforts and the many others that
we will discuss in today's hearing, it is critical that we
avoid the delays that would be driven by a continuing
resolution. This substantial investment in new capability, much
of it is critically dependent on receiving funding in fiscal
year 2024 and receiving it as soon as we possibly can.
We estimate approximately 12 new-start programs in fiscal
2024 that would be unable to begin until a full year
appropriation was received absent special authority from
Congress. So we cannot cede any more time during our critical
moment in the Air Force's transition to the future force. I
look forward to working with the subcommittee.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Hunter and General
Moore can be found in the Appendix on page 42.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Hunter. Lieutenant General
Moore.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN RICHARD G. MOORE, USAF, DEPUTY CHIEF OF
STAFF (PLANS AND PROGRAMS), U.S. AIR FORCE
General Moore. Well, thank you, Chairman Wittman and
Ranking Member Norcross, for the opportunity to testify today
about the Air Force's fiscal year 2024 budget request. On
behalf of the Department of the Air Force, thank you for your
continued leadership and your unwavering support of the United
States military and our programs.
For over 70 years, the Air Force has provided air
superiority to American joint forces as well as our allies and
partners. They have rightly come to depend on us. Together, we
survived and won the Cold War, and we fought the war on terror
but times are changing.
While our attention was focused elsewhere, China was
watching, learning, and provisioning for the future. Today we
are in the midst of a difficult transition from a legacy force
built to support counterterrorism ops to one built to deter
Chinese aggression and if necessary win against any peer
competitor. Congress' continued support of Air Force budget
requests and force structure decisions is encouraging, and we
are grateful.
Fiscal year 2024 represents another opportunity for us to
work together to remain the world's preeminent power projection
force. We cannot afford to stop short of achieving the force
our Nation needs. Our most valuable resources--manpower, money,
and time--remain extremely limited. We must be disciplined in
our decisions and focus our investments on what we need most.
Through the lens of the Department's seven operational
imperatives, we have aligned our funding request to design a
force that will give our adversaries pause. In our FY24
request, the Air Force remains focused on achieving a fighter
force mix that provides a capable, sustainable, survivable,
affordable, and properly sized force that can operate across a
range of mission sets.
We seek to maximize procurement of the F-35 and F-15EX,
invest in the Next Generation Air Dominance family of systems,
and we prioritize the munitions portfolio with multiyear
procurements of advanced weapons tailored to our pacing threat.
Visibility and persistence play a key role in shaping
information warfare objectives to influence adversary actions
and perceptions. Winning in a future high-end conflict requires
accelerating investments and transitioning from aging
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance platforms to a
connected, persistent, and survivable force.
In this FYDP, we look forward to fielding the E-7 as a new
air moving target indicator capability as well as bringing on
other platforms in this portfolio. The FY24 budget request is a
shining example of the significant progress we are making
towards closing key capability gaps, but the hard choices are
not behind us. We must remain united as a department and as a
nation to successfully overcome barriers to change.
Time is our most valuable asset on the path to
modernization, but it is no longer on our side. Our adversaries
are watching, and we must act now to make the difficult choices
it takes to modernize. American lives and those of our allies
and partners rely on our ability to deliver air superiority. We
cannot fail in this endeavor.
We look forward to once again working with Congress to
shape a lethal force that efficiently and affordably provides
the most capable air power for our Nation. I'm honored to sit
here today with Honorable Hunter and my joint teammates. And I
look forward to answering your questions.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Lieutenant General Moore. We will
now go to Assistant Secretary Stefany.
STATEMENT OF FREDERICK J. STEFANY, ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY
OF THE NAVY (RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND ACQUISITION), DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY
Mr. Stefany. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Norcross,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the
Department of Navy's tactical aviation programs.
Sustaining our naval tactical air superiority is critical
to engaging in competition now and winning the high-end fight
if necessary. We thank Congress and this committee in
particular for your continuing support of these programs.
The Department of the Navy is committed to investing in
aviation and strike weapon programs. We need to support our
national security priorities.
The FY24 budget calls for procurement of 88 new aircraft,
which include 35 F-35s for the Navy and the Marine Corps, 26
METS [multi-engine training system] training aircraft, 15 CH-53
heavy-lift helicopters, 2 KC-130 J's, and 10 unmanned aircraft.
We continue to focus on the flying hour program and our
aircraft depot maintenance to ensure our naval aviation
enterprise can operate and repair the Navy's fleet of today
while training the pilots we need.
Our strategic FY22 [fiscal year 2022] budget completes the
shift to fifth-generation fighter procurement with the
acquisition of 175 F-35s across the FYDP. It also shows a ramp-
up in our R&D [research and development] for the development of
our next-generation fighter family of systems.
As the service acquisition executive for the Joint Strike
Fighter, I am working closely with all three U.S. services,
Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Program Office,
and our industry partners to continue reducing program costs
and ensuring implementation of a sustainment strategy that
meets the need of the fleet and the entire F-35 enterprise.
Of note, late last year we completed negotiations and
awarded the contract for construction of almost 400 aircraft
across Lots 15 to 17, and we have begun discussions with
industry on the next production contract.
This budget request also takes full advantage of the new
authorities granted by Congress in last year's National Defense
Authorization Act on streamlining multiyear procurement process
for critical munitions. Not only will this authority allow the
Department to replenish our munitions stockpiles, which have
been used in support of the war in Ukraine, it will support
efforts to strengthen our industrial base capacity to develop,
procure, and field munitions at scale. We have started
discussions with both the Air Force and the Army on how best to
implement these new multiyear authorities across multiple
product lines at the same facilities.
Overall this budget represents a deliberate, informed
development of a modernized integrated all-domain naval force
for the future fight. It requires us to think differently, move
faster, and prioritize every dollar to meet an uncertain and
complex security environment.
Thank you once again for the opportunity to appear before
your subcommittee, and I look forward to your questions.
[The joint prepared statement of Mr. Stefany, General
Cederholm, and Admiral Loiselle can be found in the Appendix on
page 62.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Stefany. We will now go to Rear
Admiral Loiselle.
STATEMENT OF RADM ANDREW J. LOISELLE, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR
WARFARE, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Loiselle. Thank you, Chairman Wittman, Ranking
Member Norcross, and the distinguished members of the
subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today. I
look forward to discussing the Department of the Navy's
aviation programs, providing background and rationale for the
Department's fiscal year 2024 budget request, strategic
priorities, and budgetary goals.
The United States Navy and Marine Corps persistent global
maritime presence sustain the U.S. power projection across the
globe from the 11 most survivable airfields in the world, the
American nuclear aircraft carrier.
TACAIR [tactical air] assets delivered from our carrier air
wings are vital to controlling the seas, projecting national
power, and providing long-range fires as necessary to win the
high-end fight.
The Navy closely integrates global force management plans
and operations within the combatant commander requirements to
maximize CVW [carrier air wing] deployments through our
deployable aircraft carriers on the master aviation plan. This
requires close management of our fourth-generation F/A-18
aircraft inventory through service life modification and fifth-
generation requirements through procurement of F-35C aircraft.
As we modernize carrier air wings to pace the threat, we
must continue analyzing strike fighter shortfall through both
an evaluation of the quantity of aircraft available and the
capabilities of both the aircraft and their weapons that are
necessary to defeat our adversaries.
We continue to be successful with our industry partners in
executing the service life modification on our fourth-
generation fleet at a significantly lower cost than that of a
newly procured F/A-18 Super Hornet while still delivering
similar Block 3 capabilities.
While higher Department of Navy budgetary priorities meant
deferred procurement of F-35s, the Navy is committed to the F-
35C carrier transition plan and the TR-3 Block 4 upgrades for
all aircraft in the Navy's inventory, which will reduce long-
term sustainment costs associated with managing both Tech
Refresh 2 and Tech Refresh 3 configurations simultaneously.
After successful deployments with VFA-147 [Strike Fighter
Squadron 147] and VMFA-314 [Marine Fighter Attack Squadron
314], the Navy continues to learn and better qualify costs,
mission capable rates, and operations of the F-35C. And we look
forward to gaining more deployment data from VFA-97 [Strike
Fighter Squadron 97] aboard the USS Carl Vinson later this
year.
As we keep our air wings ready for the fight today, we are
laying the foundation to implement the air wing of the future.
The air wing of the future refers to the composition of the
carrier air wing as it onramps advanced capabilities and
capacity measured at key milestones in the near, mid, and long
term. The carrier air wing will adapt and transform from a
predominantly manned to a team manned-unmanned force structure
over the next two decades.
The Next Generation Air Dominance family of systems is the
mechanism by which the air wing of the future projects power.
It is comprised of both manned and unmanned tactical platforms
with advanced weapons, centers, and networks to attain and
maintain air superiority.
The F/A-XX is the manned quarterback strike fighter
component of this family of systems, orchestrating manned-
unmanned teaming at the leading edge of the battlespace.
Included in the unmanned tactical platforms for the NGAD family
of systems are ``loyal wingman'' unmanned aircraft referred to
as Collaborative Combat Aircraft. These CCA's will augment
current and next-generation crewed platforms with lower cost
complementary capabilities to increase combat effectiveness in
highly contested environments.
Collectively, the carrier air wing will maintain strike
fighter capability and capacity to pace the most stressing
threat through the thirties and beyond.
As we implement the air wing of the future, we are
concurrently developing alternative methods of achieving high-
end training at lower cost. The introduction of tactical
surrogates will enable pilots to maintain critical stick and
rudder skills at a fraction of the cost per flight hour of our
high-end tactical strike fighters.
Live virtual and constructive training will enable air crew
to conduct end-to-end kill chain training in a simulated
environment, mitigating the requirement to continually expand
our live-training ranges.
As the naval aviation enterprise manages fiscal
constraints, we thank Congress and this subcommittee for your
continued support of important aviation priorities, including
the flight hour program, critical aircraft upgrades, and
investment in future capabilities. I look forward to your
questions.
Mr. Wittman. Rear Admiral Loiselle, thanks again. We'll now
go to Lieutenant General Mike Cederholm.
STATEMENT OF LTGEN MICHAEL S. CEDERHOLM, USMC, DEPUTY
COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS
General Cederholm. Thank you, sir. Chairman Wittman,
Ranking Member Norcross, and distinguished members of the
subcommittee, it is my humble privilege to appear before you in
these hallowed halls today. Marine aviation continues to be
organized, trained, equipped, and ready to fight and win
anywhere on the globe. And while our heritage is ironclad, we
should expect no credit tomorrow for the accomplishments or the
posture of today.
The Marine Corps' F-35 program of record remains 420
aircraft procured through 2032. Marine aviation remains fully
committed to the F-35 and is continuing with a transition to an
all F-35 fifth-generation TACAIR force, a linchpin in force
design, and we have heard the Commandant say force design is
here today.
Our F-35 squadron construct provides the most lethal and
sustainable fifth-generation capability forward deployed and
globally engaged to support any tasking. The Marine Corps has
provided an immediate 66 percent increase in TACAIR assets
aboard L-class amphib [amphibious] ships in a Marine
expeditionary unit available to the combatant commander time
now through 2067.
We are working closely with the Joint Program Office and
other services to ensure vital weapons capabilities are
delivered to the fleet on an acceptable timeline and at cost.
As the F-35 continues to see upgrades in its mission systems
capabilities, the requirement for increased cooling capacity
continues to grow to ensure lethality for the remainder of its
expected service life.
The Marine Corps prioritizes the Engine Core Upgrade and
power and thermal management system upgrade to meet our defined
requirements. Continued congressional support of the Marine
Corps Block 4 modification budget is vital to our success.
Looking to the future, the Marine Corps is teaming with the
Navy in the development of the Marine Air-Ground Task Force
unmanned expeditionary family of systems. These efforts include
acceleration of prototyping and experimentation of TACAIR
Collaborative Combat Aircraft and building a common
interoperable system control architecture for control of joint
and all assets.
And while we have an obligation to prepare for the future,
we also have a mission to be prepared today to fight and win
right now. Congress funding of the aviation readiness accounts
over the past 7 years has led to improving readiness of our
aircraft every year since 2017. I would ask for your continued
support in funding of the USMC [United States Marine Corps]
sustainment accounts.
In closing, I would like to thank Congress, and this
subcommittee in particular, for your continued support of
Marine Corps aviation. We are ready to fight and win today and
well into the future. Thank you once again, and I look forward
to your questions.
Mr. Wittman. Lieutenant General Cederholm, thank you so
much. We will now go to Lieutenant General Schmidt.
STATEMENT OF LT GEN MICHAEL J. SCHMIDT, USAF, PROGRAM EXECUTIVE
OFFICER, F-35 LIGHTNING II PROGRAM
General Schmidt. Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Lieutenant General Schmidt, if you will turn
your microphone on.
General Schmidt. Yes, sir. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member
Norcross, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank
you for this opportunity to update you on the F-35 Lightning II
Program. Since you last received testimony on the F-35 program
in April 2022, our adversaries' aggression has increased.
Meanwhile, the alliances and partnerships resident within our
F-35 enterprise have only grown stronger.
The October 2022 National Security Strategy acknowledges we
are living in a decisive decade marked by geopolitical and
technological uncertainty. My job is to meet the demands of
this decade by putting decisive capability in the hands of our
U.S. services, international partners, and a growing number of
foreign military sales customers.
These capabilities are directly enabled by the trust,
confidence, and oversight of this subcommittee. I am grateful
for your support in the fiscal year 2023 National Defense
Authorization Act, and I look forward to a continued engagement
with you and your staff as you execute the fiscal year 2024
legislative cycle.
The mission of the F-35 program remains the delivery of the
world's most capable, affordable, and available fifth-
generation air system. Over the past year, we have made
progress across each of these domains and have reached several
significant milestones, including delivery of 900 F-35 aircraft
and 1,000 F-35 engines.
Meanwhile, our nuclear certification schedule remains on
track, and the enterprise has logged over 625,000 hours while
operating from 27 bases and 10 warships around the world. None
of this would be possible without the dedication of the men and
women of the F-35 Joint Program Office, including U.S. and
international government, military, and industry personnel.
I have been proud to witness these contributions firsthand
while meeting with pilots, maintainers, software developers,
production line workers, and personnel spanning every corner of
this complex global network.
Over the past 8 months, I've listened to operators share
spectacular stories about how the F-35 performs, senses, and
communicates, and to maintainers who appreciate the ease of
maintaining the aircraft when critical parts are available.
In support of our operators, the Block 4 capabilities we
are delivering are critical in deterring and defeating evolving
threats. As we provide affordable and effective capability
today, we are also executing a war on readiness to mature
sustainment processes and maximize F-35 availability for
decades to come.
While we have accomplished much over the last year, we have
much more work ahead of us. In recent years, the Tactical Air
and Land Forces Subcommittee has made expectations clear with
respect to key focus areas, such as Tech Refresh 3 delivery and
Block 4 capability development, air system modernization, depot
stand-up and supply chain maturity, sustainment cost reduction,
and other critical program activities.
Since becoming program executive officer in July of 2022, I
have carefully evaluated plans and progress across these lines
of effort and look forward to providing you with a
comprehensive update today.
Alongside our colleagues at the Government Accountability
Office, we are working aggressively to drive lasting results
that will position the growing F-35 fleet for success across
capability, availability, and affordability today and for
decades to come.
While this is my first opportunity to brief you as the F-35
PEO [Program Executive Officer], I fully own the challenges set
forth above, and my team and I will deliver on our commitments.
Our warfighters and the men and women they defend deserve
nothing less. Thank you once again for the opportunity to share
the story of the F-35 with you today.
[The prepared statement of General Schmidt can be found in
the Appendix on page 84.]
Mr. Wittman. Lieutenant General Schmidt, thank you so much.
We will now go to Mr. Ludwigson.
STATEMENT OF JON LUDWIGSON, DIRECTOR, CONTRACTING AND NATIONAL
SECURITY ACQUISITIONS, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Ludwigson. Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Norcross,
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity
to discuss our work examining tactical aircraft and the F-35.
Tactical aircraft, including the A-10, F-15, F-16, F/A-18, F-
22, and the multiservice F-35 variants are critical to
achieving and maintaining air dominance.
About half of DOD's [Department of Defense's] current
tactical aircraft fleet were first produced before 2000 and are
more than 25 years old. As we reported in December, DOD is
making and proposing changes to its mix of tactical aircraft
but lacks key portfolio-level analysis to better inform its
decisions.
Congress, DOD, and the services face difficult decisions
regarding investments to retain existing aircraft, divesting of
some aircraft, and funding of replacement aircraft, among
others. Last year DOD proposed spending an average of $20
billion per year toward these efforts.
While DOD is taking some narrower steps to improve its
portfolio management practices, it has not conducted an
integrated analysis that provides insights into the
interdependencies and risks across all tactical air platforms
and all services.
We believe that conducting an integrated portfolio review
would benefit DOD and the Congress as they balance these
decisions.
Looking at the F-35 program and including preliminary
insights from a report forthcoming later this year, challenges
continue to delay completion of the baseline development and
challenge modernization efforts.
Regarding the baseline development, the program has
struggled to complete and validate the simulator needed for
final testing. In addition, aircraft and engines have been
delivered late and have not met reliability and maintainability
metrics set for them.
Regarding modernization, the Block 4 effort aimed at
upgrading the F-35 to face modern threats has continued to lag
schedule estimates, exceed cost estimates, and expand its
scope. More recently, the program has begun moving to modernize
the engine and related systems.
The original specifications were not reflective of the
eventual full cooling and power needs of the aircraft, which
contributed to accelerated wear and tear on the existing
engine. Further, the existing cooling system and engine faces
limits in supporting new planned capabilities. To address these
issues, the program is taking steps to develop an enhanced
power and thermal management system [PTMS] and a new engine.
Based on our preliminary analysis, these engine related
efforts lack key elements of a full business case to support
decisions and are proceeding without requirements. We are also
concerned that the program may seek to develop and acquire this
complex, costly, and important upgrade of the PTMS, engine, and
related systems within the F-35 program and without its own
baseline cost and schedule.
Chairman Wittman, Ranking Member Norcross, this concludes
my statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you may
have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Ludwigson can be found in
the Appendix on page 114.]
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Ludwigson. I appreciate your
perspective there. Very, very informing. General Schmidt, let
me begin with you. I want to get your thoughts and ideas on the
schedule for TR-3 hardware upgrade.
As we have seen, the schedule has now moved another year to
the right. Can you give me an idea, is that schedule estimate
still accurate and tell me what's occurring currently with the
development, testing, and production of the TR-3 hardware and
what can we expect in that realm as it relates to delivery in
2024? Are there other things that may be unexpected that could
move things even farther to the right? So give me your thoughts
on where we are with the development, testing, and production.
General Schmidt. Chairman, thank you very much for the
question. So you said a lot there. So let me try to pick that
apart a little bit.
So relative to the complex TR-3 development effort, we are
behind, as you know. We really started out in development of
the hardware itself was behind and has now matured to the point
where the hardware is proving itself reliable. All of the
hardware has passed the 800-hour reliability requirements for
safety of flight. All of the hardware is well past the halfway
point of getting to the 8,000-hour life requirement for the
hardware.
The hardware itself, the initial production of the hardware
to support all of the testing, all of the production lines,
that yield was slow, very slow. I will tell you, I just
reviewed it this morning. In the last few weeks, over the last
month or so, we are much better than where we were even just
recently in delivering hardware to the various test sites and
the production line.
Software got a late start. Software integration has been
challenged, and they had a late start. We went to flight test
for the first time on January 6. We have flown 25 times as of
yesterday. It is very important for us to get the next software
drop, which should come in a month or so. The next software
drop that unleashes most of the tactical capabilities in there
so we can truly do a flight test for score, you know, across a
large spectrum of the requirements.
You said earlier April 2024 was the end date. I will say we
did a schedule risk assessment, 80 percent schedule risk
assessment, yes, that is the JPO's, the Joint Program Office's
scheduled risk assessment is April 2024. Lockheed's is December
of 2023. To me there is kind of a window there.
Additionally, we have put measures in places to try to
deliver the capabilities actually this fall to add additional
flight test aircraft. I was just out with the squadron
commanders last week of both the Air Force and Navy's flight
test squadrons out at Edwards and that team is doing everything
they can to deliver those capabilities as early as possible not
to mention everything our team is doing, the whole software
team, and all the industry teams that make up that hardware.
But that's kind of the window, sir, the December 2023 to
April 2024 to get TR-2 equivalent capability on TR-3 jets,
which is the bar that we are measuring ourselves against, sir.
Mr. Wittman. That's great. It's great to hear that you have
talked with the pilots that are doing the development testing
and will ultimately be involved in where the production goes
and that hopefully April 2024 is the worst case scenario. So
it's good to hear that things aren't moving farther to the
right.
I want to go to Mr. Ludwigson's testimony where he talked
about the F135 business case analysis, better known as the BCA,
and that it wasn't performed in the traditional manner of which
you see business case analysis performed. And I want to talk
about the things he specifically pointed out.
He said it didn't contain service-approved cooling
requirements over the service life of the aircraft. It didn't
involve a completed technical risk assessment of developing and
integrating the aircraft's subsystems as we talked about the
power and thermal management systems involved in the
modernization, a completed risk schedule assessment, approved
acquisition strategy, and an independent cost estimate
performed by an outside agency.
I want to get your perspective. Do you agree or disagree
with GAO's assessment of this analysis?
General Schmidt. Sir, I am not sure I can answer what
exactly an approved proper business case analysis is by the GAO
standards, but made a lot of good points in there. We compared
these engines, the AETP [Adaptive Engine Transition Program]
engine, the current engine, modernization of the current engine
as well as identifying a significant power and thermal
management system requirement. And we evaluated numerous
options of power and thermal management systems to get us to
various levels of cooling and power that is required.
I would say that as Mr. Ludwigson mentioned, we have been
eating into the life of this engine since the beginning of the
program because we did underspec the engine and its
requirements. So we are building costs into this program by
eating into the life of this engine with additional overhauls
that are expected over the life of the program.
To say I didn't have any requirements, I have a derived
requirement for power and thermal management because I'm
running out of power at the end of Block 4. So, yes, I believe
I have a derived requirement.
I also believe I have a derived requirement for engines
because we can't keep eating the life out of this engine and
adding costs to an engine that has been underspec'd since the
beginning.
He probably makes a--he makes a good point on not having a
requirement specifically for what is the high-end margin that
we are trying to get to. Those are discussions that we are
having with services. How much margin do we want to build to?
And we are working through the acquisition strategy and all the
technical rigor that would be required for me to sign up to an
acquisition program baseline and make a full commitment to the
schedule and the technical requirements of the program.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you. This subcommittee is doing its due
diligence to understand all the aspects of both ECU and AETP,
both from Pratt & Whitney and General Electric. We want to make
sure we have all of the information. We are going through the
Joint Program Office BCA to understand that. It is good to get
Mr. Ludwigson's perspective on that.
We would love too to get your perspective. There are other
things in what would be a traditional BCA as pointed to, things
additionally that would be helpful to the committee. You know,
our job is not to take a position. The JPO has made that
decision. Our job as a subcommittee is to fully understand all
aspects of this.
And, listen, I think that this issue is going to come back
up again with the committee in discussions. I have no
reservations about that happening. But I want to make sure that
everyone has the full scope of information.
Having been through this debate when F-35 was first coming
onboard with engines, I want to make sure that we are fully
informed on the entire scope of decision-making. So anything
there, too, that has been pointed out by Mr. Ludwigson that
would be helpful to the committee as it relates to information
in the elements that he states are lacking, those things would
be incredibly helpful to the committee.
So, Lieutenant General Schmidt, thank you so much for your
efforts there in letting us know. And with that, I am going to
go to my good friend, Mr. Norcross.
Mr. Hunter. Mr. Chairman? Could I address the----
Mr. Wittman. Yes, please, please, Mr. Hunter.
Mr. Hunter [continuing]. Business case just very briefly?
Mr. Wittman. Yes.
Mr. Hunter. I wanted to say I have read the GAO testimony,
and I think they make some good points about analysis that is
good to do and that we will do and should do. You know,
business case analysis is designed to inform a decision. And so
depending on what decision one is making, the way that one
structures the BCA can be different.
I do think what--the work the JPO performed did inform the
decision that was in play at the time, which was an investment
decision on what path forward to take between ECU and AETP. And
I think the Department did have the information it needed to
make that decision. I think some of the other elements that
were referenced are needed things, and as the general
referenced, we will work through those decisions in the
acquisition strategy in implementing the program.
Mr. Wittman. Sure. Well, listen. I think it will be helpful
if you let us know your thoughts and ideas about things that
might be available to further develop and refine what is in the
BCA.
Listen, our interest is not in relitigating the decision. I
can tell you, it will be debated, I think, within this
committee as well as on the House floor. Our job is not to
relitigate that. But our job is to make sure that we fully
gather every significant piece of information in both
situations, ECU and AETP, make sure that our subcommittee
members, as well as the full committee members, have full
awareness of all that information.
If there are additional things in the BCA that are lacking,
things that you can further refine, please make sure that you
get that to us because that will be helpful because our members
need to have every shred of that information because I am
confident there will be continued debate about this decision
going forward.
So, again, Honorable Hunter, thank you so much for that,
and I will go, again, to my good friend, Don Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Chairman. I wasn't going to start
out this way, but since we have heard from two of you, I think
Mr. Ludwigson, you are entitled to your position to address
some of the questions that have come up in the way they look at
it.
Mr. Ludwigson. Thank you, sir. And I believe all of the
documents that we have referred to are important to inform the
decision. When you think about the way these investment
decisions are made, especially a large important decision,
normally it would follow a pattern of looking through to see if
there was a material solution, then through an AOA [analysis of
alternatives], and then a BCA is built to construct the case of
why a specific decision is being made.
And what I think a traditional BCA allows you to do is to
understand the risks you are taking and the consequences of the
risks you are taking because in a perfect world, of course, you
know all the information, and there is no risk. In the reality
that we all have to live in, there are risks.
It is important to understand what those risks are. And
with respect to the PTMS and the engine, you want to understand
what is the status of the technologies that go into those, what
is the cost estimate, and what are the contingencies within
that cost estimate to get to a solution that delivers to the
warfighter what you say you need when you need it. And so those
assessments of cost and schedule really help you understand the
extent to which an independent view of technology, how that
populates into the cost and schedule estimate. I hope that
answers your question, sir.
Mr. Norcross. Well, needless to say extremely complicated
in looking at some of the challenges that we are facing from
near and far. This is the fifth year the panel in different
configurations have come before us, specifically since I
chaired. And it seems like we are in the same place identifying
problems, slightly different. TR-3 obviously has been one that
is ongoing. Is this getting better?
Mr. Ludwigson. Well, as I alluded to, based on our
preliminary work, the report that should be in your hands in
the next few weeks, we are concerned about the three things
that I raised at the end, which is--I will go to the third one
first, which is developing the path toward a PTMS and an engine
within the F-35 program is concerning if that is the path
forward because it doesn't establish that sort of baseline cost
and schedule estimate that allows--you build in the
accountability for the services, for the contractor to be able
to know if things are going well or going poorly.
I think we saw some of this in a similar path with respect
to Block 4, and I think I worry a little bit that the engine
looks a little bit like Block 4 except in this case the program
is really poised to move from a development program into
sustainment where there will be less overt visibility to
oversight committees like this one.
Mr. Norcross. Well, last year I think we did this jointly
with Readiness [Subcommittee on Readiness] and obviously, the
sustainment of this aircraft has been a major question for some
time. And I know we are trying to get at that particularly with
the beating that the engine has been taking for the thermal
management.
I want to just shift gears here a little bit and talk to
Mr. Hunter about the divestment of the Block 20, the F-22s,
which you have talked about repeatedly hoping to retire. But as
you know, there is a prohibition. So when it comes to this
budget, how are you handling the requests that you are asking
versus the budget that is submitted?
Mr. Hunter. Sir, I'll defer to General Moore on this. But
in broad strokes, we are requesting, again, the authority to
retire the F-22 so with a legislative proposal to enable that.
And our budget assumes the success of that proposal.
General Moore. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Hunter, and thank you,
Ranking Member Norcross. We maintain our position from the FY23
[fiscal year 2023] budget and that is that the F-22s, the Block
20 specifically, are not combat representative. And we again
propose to divest them.
We seldom link any particular offset to any particular
investment, but in this case all of the resources that came
from the Block 20 went directly to NGAD. And we believe that we
must get to NGAD in order to be able to continue confronting
Chinese aggression into the thirties. And so that to us was a
trade that was worth making. And we also note that upgrading
the Block 20s to a combat configuration is cost prohibitive and
very time intensive.
Based on the most advanced weapons that an F-22 Block 20
can carry now, it is not competitive with the J-20 with the
most advanced weapons the Chinese can put on it.
Mr. Norcross. But it could be used for training?
General Moore. It could be used for training, but the
configuration of the cockpit is different than the
configuration of a combat representative aircraft. And so as we
train pilots in a Block 20 aircraft, there is negative learning
that occurs. They have to unlearn some of the things that they
learn in the Block 20 when they go to an operational aircraft.
Mr. Norcross. So the number that has been tossed around is
$470 million, correct, in the first year, excuse me, for the
budget 2024?
General Moore. Yes, sir.
Mr. Norcross. So you are assuming that it is successful. So
the question comes down if it is not successful, what do you
do?
General Moore. So if it is--if the divestiture is precluded
but not appropriated, then we will have to work through how the
F-22 program makes it to the end of the year. If it is
prohibited and appropriated, then certainly we would fly out
the program for the next year based on the funding received.
Mr. Norcross. So you had indicated that with these savings,
it would go directly into NGAD.
General Moore. They did. And that--in the budget proposal
that is before the Congress, those funds are moved from F-22 to
NGAD and that happened actually in the FY23 cycle, and we
maintain that position in this budget.
Mr. Norcross. So in the event that it is not approved, does
that mean that money will not be available for NGAD?
General Moore. I couldn't say that that is what will
happen. We will have to work with the Congress and determine
how we'll make the F-22 program make it to the end of the year
in the event that divestiture is prohibited but continued
operations are not appropriated.
Mr. Norcross. Thank you. There is a number of the issues
surrounding the engine selection, but I know Mr. Courtney wants
to dig into that a little bit more. But obviously this takes
care of an issue at least in the short-term in our world of the
great stress that is going on those engines, cutting down to
1,600 hours, which is significant. But we didn't spec that out
in the beginning. They have had a number of programs. But then
there also is the time factor when the new ECU would come into
effect. So what year are you looking, assuming things move in
that direction that that engine would be available?
Mr. Hunter. Sir, I think General Schmidt might have a more
detailed timeline. It is a development program so there will be
multiple years on the order of 6--well, greater than 5 years of
development work on the ECU and then we would do production. So
it is out in the future, but General Schmidt may have more
detailed numbers.
General Schmidt. Sir, we have laid out notional dates in
the BCA with the professional staff members. In the 2030 to
2032 range. It is very important that we do the full
acquisition strategy. I want to look at all of the risks and
opportunities.
I will tell you one thing that I want to understand for
sure, sir, is our flight test infrastructure, knowing how
important it is to have a fully instrumented flight test
aircraft with our Block 4 and our aging flight test
infrastructure. All of that work on old airplanes going on
right now, it has been a LIMFAC [limiting factor] in us getting
through even some of the TR-3 testing and some of where we see
TR-4 going.
It is just very important, sir, that I do a full technical
baseline review of the engine program and lay that out in
acquisition strategy for Mr. Stefany and Dr. LaPlante to see
before I commit to a date on the delivery of the ECU. But the
notional dates are laid out pretty well in the BCA.
Mr. Norcross. I have a number of other questions, but I
know we have members here to ask questions so I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Don. I appreciate that. We are
going to go now to Mr. LaLota.
Mr. LaLota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
gentlemen, for your service and for your input to our budgeting
process. I represent the eastern part of Long Island, home to
the 106th Rescue Wing of the Air National Guard. And, Admiral,
during your opening statement you mentioned the Carl Vinson.
Twenty years ago I deployed on her and to that WESTPAC [Western
Pacific] back then, so I appreciate you recalling those
memories.
So my first question is for Lieutenant General Schmidt and
Mr. Ludgwison regarding the F-35. I understand the Air Force's
goal by 2040 is to have a tactical fighter fleet that provides
the capability, capacity, and affordability to meet air
superiority and global strike needs. And on the way to 2040,
the Air Force plans to rightsize current aircraft inventories
and invest in future capabilities such as Next Generation Air
Dominance family of systems which includes the F-35
modernization, Technical Refresh 3, and Block 4 software
capability.
The GAO has reported on the F-35 Block 4 software quality
issues, some of which are not discovered until the software is
delivered to the fleet. So to General Schmidt and Mr.
Ludwigson, what progress, if any, has been made to improve the
quality of Block 4 software development and to ensure the
government is getting a quality product?
General Schmidt. Sir, thank you very much. So, I would say
generally, sir, we have not downed the numbers of deficiencies
out there in the field year after year as we have added
capabilities. The number of overall deficiencies are lower.
By the way, I also was on the USS Carl Vinson just last
week and had an awesome opportunity to hang out with all the
pilots and maintainers and everything that makes F-35s work on
that ship. It was absolutely incredible.
I would say relative to--and it kind of links up with
something that I think Representative Norcross said, was in the
Joint Simulation Environment, which we've had challenges with
in the past trying to get to IOT&E, full completion of IOT&E. I
am very impressed with the progress of what NAVAIR [Naval Air
Systems Command] and the contractor and AFOTEC [Air Force
Operational Test and Evaluation Center] are doing to get to a
simulation environment that truly simulates every one of our
capabilities to validate where the deficiencies are or are not.
It is absolutely incredible the progress they have made over
the last 5 months.
I asked them, I said, I need to put a line in the sand in
December to get to milestone C. That means we have to do runs
for score, DOT&E [Director, Operational Test and Evaluation]
has been very supportive of this as part of the process. And so
all I can say is--what I'm trying to say is we are actually
producing this Joint Simulation Environment to truly understand
in a completely synthetic environment with all of our threats
represented where those airplanes and the deficiencies are.
And once that capability gets through IOT&E, we can upgrade
the Joint Simulation Environment to the latest software version
because we are held to the previous version to get through
IOT&E. So that will be a remarkable tool for proving out all of
our deficiencies or lack thereof in a simulated environment,
which will be much more efficient than we do it today.
Mr. LaLota. Thanks. We appreciate you keeping a watchful
eye on that. Did you want to add to that, Mr. Ludwigson?
Mr. Ludwigson. Yes, sir. I believe that in our forthcoming
report to be, as I said with the Department for agency comment
and with you all for review during that time, we do highlight
the fact that there are a number of--they brought in an
independent assessment to help with the software development
process. They had recommendations. Many of them similar to
recommendations the GAO has made over the years.
I believe that they have started to implement those
recommendations, including bringing in automated software
testing, which can be critically important to make sure that
you are testing against the regression, so the older
capabilities as you add new capabilities, and that can be very
helpful.
I also think that the shift--they have adopted a shift to 1
year releases of new capabilities. We have concerns about that
being a movement against sort of the way you develop agile
software as you regularly and routinely get this out to the
user community. This delays it still further than where they
had been previously.
Mr. LaLota. Thanks for your work. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. LaLota. I will now go to Mr.
Courtney.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to all
the witnesses for, again, your really solid testimony. General
Schmidt, I just wanted to note on page 7 of your testimony, you
pointed out this problem that took place December 2022 where
there was a crash. And within 2 months, a solution had been
found with a lot of people who worked really hard and who are
really smart in terms of coming up with a fix for that program.
It is actually quite an extraordinary effort, engineers and all
the stakeholders, to make sure that a solution was found.
And it is good news to see in the report that the
deliveries are going to be basically caught up by May 1. I
mean, it's really an amazing turnaround. So thank you, again
for--and I will share that with the folks back in East Hartford
and Middletown. I don't know if you wanted to comment on that.
General Schmidt. Sir, just to echo everything you just
said. Yes, it was a challenge that we discovered, the residence
issue between the main fuel throttle valve and the tube. But,
you know, think about the December timeframe when we saw that
and that team of engineers at Pratt & Whitney, in the JPO, in
the Navy, in the Air Force, worked 7 days a week from then to
get this engineering change out to our aircraft, to our fleets,
to our low time engines, which were the ones affected by this,
to allow for this safety mitigation engineering change to be
implemented in a rather short period of time, actually a very
innovative solution, by the way, this orifice that they came up
with. So, yes, I'm very proud of that team across the board. I
couldn't be more proud.
Mr. Courtney. Great. Thank you. Well, it's great to see Mr.
Stefany here. Again, he just kind of migrates from one
subcommittee to another. You know, but, again, you're obviously
wearing your hat for the Navy here today in terms of, you know,
a whole slew of issues in terms of aircraft. And I just want
to, again, focus on, you know, the question of the Engine Core
Upgrade for F-35, which obviously the Navy is, you know,
certainly an important partner in terms of the way that
decision process is made.
And, again, your testimony pretty much echoed Mr. Hunter's
testimony that basically the core upgrade will restore engine
life and prevent degradation for the Navy variant as well as
the other two and partner nations at the lowest cost. I mean,
is that the bottom line in terms of the way the Navy views this
decision in the budget?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, sir. First of all, the thermal management
system, I think, is the most important. You know, that's a
near-term thing that has to be done no matter what. And then I
believe, as the Navy and Marine Corps together, and I don't
want to necessarily speak for my two colleagues here, the
ability to have a single solution across the Navy and Marine
Corps aircraft inventory was critically important to us.
Mr. Courtney. Great. General, maybe on behalf of the Marine
Corps, I don't know if you would want to weigh in?
General Cederholm. Thank you, sir. Just one addition to
that. I fully concur with everything that has been said, sir.
On the Marine Corps perspective what this Engine Core Upgrade
does is it gives us a greater bring-back capability to the
boat. What does that mean? We can bring back 1,000 pounds more
to the boat, which gives us life. Fuel is life. Time on station
is life for us. So that is why we are excited about the ECU and
the PTMS upgrade, sir.
Mr. Courtney. Thank you. Again, having been around here
awhile, I remember the last time we were debating this engine
issue. And Admiral Roughead was CNO [Chief of Naval Operations]
at the time and did sort of point out the fact that the Navy
has a special sort of, you know, issue that they have to
contend with, which is space on aircraft carriers.
And that they just really don't have, you know, again the
capacity to deal with, you know, large and multiple versions of
engines. And, you know, that still resonates with me that, you
know, as we move forward on this decision that we have to be
mindful that all three services, you know, have to sort of--we
have to be sensitive to, you know, what their needs are.
So, again, I think, you know, the decision by the Air Force
in terms of funding ECU is, you know, a pretty powerful
statement to Congress. And, you know, I look forward to, like
the chairman, you know, continuing this discussion. But we are
not a debate club. You know we have to make decisions, and we
have to move forward at some point and with that I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Courtney. I appreciate your
perspective. We will go now to Mr. Gimenez.
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am interested in
the PCA [Penetrating Counter Air] and CCA programs. When do you
anticipate that the PCA and CCA programs will be operational
and part of our fleet?
Mr. Hunter. So they are on different timelines although
they are closely obviously related to one another as part of a
family of systems.
For the NGAD program, we are working very hard to deliver
in the 2030s. That is a very high-end capability, and it is
geared to the environment that we anticipate will be there, the
security environment that we will have to operate in in that
timeframe.
Mr. Gimenez. Is that early thirties, middle thirties, late
thirties, what? Thirties is 10 years.
Mr. Hunter. Early 2030s, sir.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay.
Mr. Hunter. And for the CCA, that is a program where we are
very much focused on speed to ramp. So we are looking to field
that capability as rapidly as possible. It will be integral to
the way that we approach industry and ask them for proposals
that they demonstrate their ability to perform as quickly as
possible. And so we anticipate fielding that in the 2020s, in
the later 2020s.
Mr. Gimenez. So CCA is not tied to PCA? It is as soon as
you can get it out and then somehow tied to whatever aircraft
we have in the inventory at the time.
Mr. Hunter. That is our approach. So it will work with
multiple tactical platforms within the Air Force.
Mr. Gimenez. Okay. In 2019, you indicated that the Air
Force would need seven additional fighter aircraft squadrons.
Is that still the case?
Mr. Hunter. I think in terms of force structure, let me
defer to General Moore on that.
General Moore. Thanks, Mr. Hunter. Thank you, sir. Capacity
is certainly an issue. But I would say since 2019, what we
would now look towards for capacity is, as you just mentioned,
CCAs. The premise of this program was that the kind of fighters
that we are buying in order to create the amount of iron that
needs to be in the air to confront an adversary like China, it
is not affordable the way we have been doing it. And so the way
that we can do that affordably is by buying CCAs and by
creating mass with CCAs.
And so the question that we will have to answer as CCAs
come into the fleet is what actually does a fighter squadron
look like? Are CCAs a part of a fighter squadron or are they a
separate entity altogether? Do they deploy as one entity or do
they come together on the battlefield?
And in order to do that, we put in our budget in the 24
[2024] cycle, as you'll see, an experimental operations
squadron. Ordinarily, we provide a requirement to industry.
They come back with what we've asked for, and we know that it
does exactly what we asked.
In this case, we have asked a question to industry to see
what is possible rather than tell them exactly what we want. So
what we receive back in terms of CCAs, we will have to develop
tactics, techniques, procedures, employment models, and all of
that to make sure that we can get the most out of them possible
and answer the kind of questions that I posed before.
That is a funded project in our budget; it goes along with
the dollars for CCA. And whether or not we need additional
fighter squadrons will depend on how this all turns out. But
certainly capacity is an issue and the mass that it takes to
confront an adversary like China is intense.
Mr. Gimenez. No, I understand that. I understand that. My
concern is that the development you have in your plan, a
reduction in the force of about 400 aircraft. And it is not
necessarily tied to development of the CCA. I mean if you can--
I understand that once you have a CCA that you can, you know,
reevaluate and see how many aircraft you need. But before 2028,
we may need all the aircraft that we have right now and more.
General Moore. Yes, sir. But the ones that we will need in
2028, they have to be capable of operating on the battlefield
that we foresee.
Three-quarters of the aircraft that we divest in the budget
year and two-thirds of the aircraft that we divest across the
FYDP are A-10s and F-15Cs. The A-10s are not capable of
operating in a high-end fight.
Mr. Gimenez. I understand. I understand.
General Moore. F-15Cs last year when we were here there
were two aircraft at Kadena that were grounded and would never
fly again, and two more that could only fly a one-time flight
to the boneyard. Now it is three that are grounded forever and
four that can only--that are only capable of a one-time flight
to the boneyard. Of every 10 aircraft in the F-15C fleet that
we put into depot, only 2 of them come out. Those aircraft are
not going to be useful in FY28 [fiscal year 2028] because they
are not going to still be flying. That, as I said, is three-
quarters of the aircraft we divest in the budget year.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. The other concern that I have is
the retirement of the F-22s. You have 32 F-22s that you want to
retire. They are, as far as I know, still the preeminent
fighter that we have. And we only have 185 of them. That causes
me some concern that we are going to retire 32 of them. Okay?
General Moore. Yes, sir. Those particular F-22s are not the
highest end fighters we have. They don't have the most advanced
communications. They don't have the most advanced electronic
warfare. They don't carry our most advanced weapons. They are
not the same as the other parts of the F-22 fleet to Block 30
and 35. And they are extremely unlikely to ever become so. It's
cost prohibitive and would take over a decade to make that
transition.
Mr. Gimenez. Fair enough. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Gimenez. We will now go to Mr.
Horsford.
Mr. Horsford. Thank you, Chairman Wittman and Ranking
Member Norcross. Last June the Air Force's 65th Aggressor
Squadron with F-35 fighters formally stood up at Nellis Air
Force Base in my district.
The 65th Aggressor Squadron provides U.S. Air Force with
fifth-generation red air to replicate the advanced threats
posed by other fifth-generation fighters from China and Russia,
helps trains students at the Air Force Weapons School, and
assists in red flag exercises to help train pilots from other
services and our allies.
Also in my district is the Nevada Test and Training Range,
which supports the current and future testing and training. And
it is the only location that can train fifth-generation systems
in a live environment.
Lieutenant General Moore and Lieutenant General Schmidt and
Mr. Hunter, how many tactical aircraft and with what
capabilities does the service need to achieve its mission and
on what analysis is this based?
General Moore. Sir, Lieutenant General Moore. I would go
back to the discussion about how we intend to fight and about
how CCAs are integrated into the force.
So I think as we determine what the attributes of CCAs will
be, what is possible for industry to deliver, we will be able
to get to a closer answer to that.
I think right now we foresee between 1,000 and 1,100
mission aircraft in the fighter world but that will surely
change because of CCAs. I don't know that CCAs will compete
against manned fighters. That certainly is not our intent. But
we will have to see what it takes as we go forward.
The threat also drives this. And the threat is changing
dramatically and quickly. And so this is not a static number.
It is a number that we will continue to monitor going forward.
Mr. Hunter. And if I could just add to that, sir. One of
the key insights from our operational imperatives work was the
way in which our different platforms work together. And it is
essential that they be able to work together in order to
actually perform the missions that the operational imperatives
were examining in order to make sure that we can, you know,
prosecute a mission from start to finish, and it involves
critical space assets to make that happen, and it involves
aerial networks that connect our tactical and our ISR
[intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance] and our
command and control platforms together.
And so it is really the linkage that is critical to
success. And so the numbers are obviously incredibly important.
Without aircraft, you can't do it. But what we discovered was
most essential in many cases was the linkages between systems.
Mr. Horsford. And can you explain to the committee the
capabilities gap of a fourth- and fifth-generation fighter,
please?
Mr. Hunter. I mean, for the most part, having a fifth-
generation platform is sort of the price of entry into a highly
contested environment. Without having the characteristics that
we see on our fifth-generation platforms, we simply won't be
invited to the game.
Now having said that, there are fourth-generation platforms
that do provide important roles from stand-off and in other
ways. They are an important part of our force and that is why
we are maintaining that throughout the next two decades.
But for the most highly contested environment, the fifth-
generation platforms, that their characteristics are
survivability, and the mission systems that they provide and
the fused avionics is really the price of entry to the fight.
Mr. Horsford. Lieutenant General Moore, Secretary Kendall
recently announced a commitment to acquire unmanned
Collaborative Combat Aircraft in large numbers. So can you
comment on the missions the CCAs will be performing?
General Moore. Yes, sir. So we see three kind of basic
mission sets for Collaborative Combat Aircraft. The first is
the ability to augment the combat force as shooters. The second
is the ability to conduct electronic warfare. And the third is
the ability to be sensors in the battlespace.
We will concentrate first on the ability for CCAs to
augment shooters and to be shooters themselves. And then we
will look to the ability to use them for electronic warfare as
well as sensors on the battlefield. First and foremost, though,
we will look to use them to be shooters and to augment the
combat force.
Mr. Horsford. Great. Thank you to the panel. Thank you for
your testifying today. And thank you to my colleagues. I yield
back.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Horsford. We will now go to Mr.
Bacon.
Mr. Bacon. Thank you, Chair. And I appreciate all of you
being here. I want to piggyback on some of the questions from
my friend from Florida here. And so my question is to General
Moore and maybe Mr. Hunter, if you want to add to it.
What I understand is we are going to be procuring 288
aircraft over the FYDP, but we are divesting 685 so that's a
400 aircraft delta roughly that we are going to be decreasing.
And you are saying those are mainly A-10s and F-15Cs?
General Moore. Four hundred nine of the aircraft we are
divesting across the FYDP are A-10s and F-15Cs.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. So there is another 200 and so. Are they
F-16s or what are they?
General Moore. Sir, there are some pre-block F-16s and our
proposal for the F-22 Block 20.
Mr. Bacon. Okay. The concern that we have--sorry, maybe
this isn't quite close enough here, is that at some point we're
so low on our fighter inventory that--and I get it, most of
these aircraft, we don't want them for China, but there could
be other contingencies out there.
So I am hearing from some of our recently retired four-
stars their fear that we are going below the floor we need. Is
there concern that we are going too low because we are--this is
the lowest we have ever been. [Inaudible] go back since the
fifties or post-World War II, and we are dropping down another
400. Is there a point where we are taking too much risk?
General Moore. So there is no zero risk scenario. But we
are very concerned about the balance between near-term risk
that impacts the combatant commander's ability to fight tonight
as well as our need to modernize.
I am proud to say that we have said for several budget
cycles that we needed to procure 72 new fighters a year and
this budget does that.
Mr. Bacon. Right.
General Moore. And we are grateful for the Department for
the resources that it takes to make that proposal. And we will
continue as we go forward to do what we can within our
established budget top lines to maximize the procurement that
will get us the capacity that you described.
Mr. Hunter. If I could just weigh in.
Mr. Bacon. Sure.
Mr. Hunter. You know, there is a balance of risk here. And
so as the general said, there is risk on both sides and there
is no no-risk posture. I am more concerned about the risk that
we face against the pacing challenge than I am about the
concern that--that the risks that we have in performing some of
those other missions that you referenced.
Mr. Bacon. Is there any way to increase the F-35 production
from 48? If we are going to drop 400 aircraft in net, is there
a way that we can expand that F-35 production? Forty-eight
seems like a low bar, but maybe I am wrong. And I open that up
to maybe our F-35 leader here. But what do you think? Is there
a way we could expand that production higher?
Mr. Hunter. We have been working for several years to get
to 48, which we have achieved so give us one moment to
celebrate that. But I would also point in addition, right, 24
F-15EXs, so I think that is a key part of the picture as well.
Mr. Bacon. Okay.
Mr. Hunter. But I will let the general speak to production
capacity.
General Schmidt. Sir, that is a production capacity
question. We have contracted for 156 aircraft a year in Lot 17,
which is FY23 delivered in 2025. So they have hit close to
that. This is the first time we have gone up to 156. I think
they will hit 156.
I do want to make sure that the supply chain that supports
both a spectacular production line as well as the sustainment
side of maintaining all of those airplanes around the world,
that when I want to make sure a supply chain that supports
production at a higher rate than 156 that we also have the
supply posture to support everything else we need around the
world.
But, yes, I think we could go higher than 156. I would want
to make sure we are making the investment for the right reasons
because to stay at a level versus paying to get there and then
falling back down. Our partners and FMS [foreign military
sales] customers and international partners are obviously a
huge part of this program and continue to demand----
Mr. Bacon. I get it. So we have to divide it up with our
friends. Understand. Maybe this is why--I understand the F-35s
were on the unfunded list and then taken off. Is that why it
was taken off because we were at capacity?
General Moore. Sir, there were never F-35s on the unfunded
list this year.
Mr. Bacon. Okay.
General Moore. The Department worked very carefully to make
sure that the number of aircraft we said we needed were in the
base budget. And there were never F-35s on the unfunded
priorities list this year.
Mr. Bacon. I would like to ask maybe one question for the
record since I am out of time. I heard there were some issues
with the Joint Simulation Environment and how that could
potentially affect the full-rate production of F-35s. Is there
a way we can get an update--I will just have to take it for the
record.
General Schmidt. Yes, sir. So I asked to set a line in the
sand for December of this year, 2023, and working with DOT&E,
AFOTEC, NAVAIR, who is developing the Joint Simulation
Environment, our team, and Lockheed, whether we could get there
from here.
I am very proud of collaboration that has happened over the
last 5 months. We have a plan to run IOT&E for score in about
the August timeframe, which would support some kind of a
report, I think, from the DOT&E by December to support that
milestone C deg.ll-rate production decision at the end of the
year. That is the plan that I am working towards, and a lot of
people are trying to help.
Mr. Wittman. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Bacon. We will now go to
Mr. Norcross.
Mr. Norcross. Just a real quick clarification. When we
start to up the numbers of the actual planes rolling off the
line, one of the issues we had is to make sure the engines
which come from obviously elsewhere, Pratt & Whitney, were
there. They were running at such high production that the parts
for the engine were not going to be available for the depot and
repair.
Where are we on that issue because that directly impacts
the question that was just asked?
General Schmidt. That is a great question, sir, and it is a
supply chain. I just met with Pratt & Whitney on that subject
Tuesday. They are doing a lot of work to continue to fill their
supply chain, both that supports the production engines as well
as all of the support sustainment of our fleets around the
world.
It is still a concern. I think in the supply chain side, at
the same time, you know, we could talk about maybe the power
module challenges we had last year, which that is not one of my
top drivers. And I am very proud of our team at Tinker, of
Pratt & Whitney, and all of the folks that work together to
take power modules from being--having 48 holes a little over a
year ago to 1 hole last month for power modules.
But those kinds of things eat into parts and all of that
stuff. So it is a great question, sir. It is certainly on my
radar all the time relative to making sure we have parts
supporting our engine supply chain moving forward.
Mr. Norcross. Because I think we all understand the need
for more aircraft, but robbing Peter to pay Paul because our
partners, ourselves around the world that need these parts. And
if they are going into new ones, somebody else is coming up
short. Really difficult, but I am glad you are getting at it,
and I yield back.
General Schmidt. I would just say one thing to that, sir,
is that while most--we have had a number of late engines as
identified by the GAO, many of them late. Those were not
necessarily due to part shortages, at least on the production
line. They have had some quality things that have been
corrected over time. But they have delivered engines in general
within the given timeframe needed, but some of them late, sir.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Norcross. Now I'll go to Mr.
McCormick.
Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First of all, I am
very glad you clarified how we are going to be decommissioning
the F-22s. I was a little concerned when we started talking
about that because I was very proud to have them make their
first kill this year. And I just wanted to make sure that we
sustain that brilliant program.
With that said, Lieutenant General Schmidt, I am tracking
that Moody Air Force Base is planning to divest the A-10s,
which makes me kind of sad as a former forward air controller.
The F-35s are going to replace--are they going to have a
similar mission or something entirely different as far as what
they are going to be applied for?
Mr. Hunter. Let me start, and I will let General Moore
speak to it as well. But, you know, the F-35 is very much a
multimission aircraft. So they will be fully capable of
performing the close air support mission as are other Air Force
assets. I noted General Brown spoke to this with direct
experience from his time in three different Air Force
platforms, none of which was the A-10 or the F-35 doing close
air support.
But that will definitely be a part of the F-35's mission,
but it is also core to several missions that we see in
INDOPACOM, which may or may not involve close air support like,
you know, defensive counter air, offensive counter air. There
is a whole range of missions the F-35 will be equipped to
perform for the Air Force.
Dr. McCormick. So basically, we are just picking up greater
flexibility in the greater mission to come?
Mr. Hunter. Correct.
Dr. McCormick. Okay. Great. I'll save the remainder of my
time for Lieutenant General Cederholm, who took the liberty of
explaining something to me about the F-35 program. There are a
lot of Marines, former Marines--Marines that have retired who
had big concerns about how we organized our F-35s.
And I just wanted to have you break down the squadron
organization and how we have gone from 16 to 10 and how that
affects our mission going forward and how that is going to give
us greater flexibility into the future. And by the way, just
for the record, I brought my writing material just to take good
notes for my Marines out there.
General Cederholm. Sir, thank you very much, and I totally
dig the crayons. I hope I don't start eating them here in a
second.
Sir, on paper, I understand the concern that some former
Marines may have. And taken alone, I understand the genesis of
that. But when you put it into context as we discussed earlier,
sir, I posit that the resulting factor changes when you put it
into transition, when you put the transition into motion. What
do I mean by that?
Since 2007, our program of record has been 420. And it has
always centered around 18 squadrons for the last decade.
Eighteen squadrons are going to comprise our F-35 transition
for the last decade. That gives us the capability, the
capacity, and the sustainability, long-term sustainability, to
fly off of L-class ship amphibs, to fly off of carriers, to fly
off of land-based, and to fly off of austere expeditionary air
bases.
The Commandant's decision to move to 18 squadrons, still
the central part of our construct, but our 10 aircraft in those
squadrons is the swiftest, most lethal and long-term
sustainable construct of the 3 constructs we have had over the
last 15 years as we have ramped up this transition in the
program.
Just to give you one short example, sir, cognizant of your
time, this transition to 10 squadrons, we have found we have
the ability now to deploy 10 F-35Bs, a full squadron onboard
the MEUs [Marine expeditionary units], which as you know are
globally deployed and engaged forward deployed. That is a 66
percent increase in TACAIR firepower, fifth-gen TACAIR
firepower, out on the point that was not available under any of
the other constructs.
So I am excited. The Marine Corps remains committed to 420,
and I am excited at what this airplane will bring for the MAGTF
[Marine air-ground task force], the joint force maritime
component commander, and the joint force, sir.
Dr. McCormick. Fantastic explanation. I appreciate that.
And just with that, I will yield, with making sure we represent
the rotary wings.
General Cederholm. Love the 53 [CH-53 helicopter], sir.
Dr. McCormick. Oorah.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. McCormick. We will now go to
Mr. Fallon.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, doctor, I thank
you for bringing the crayons. I might use them later.
You know, when we talk about fixed-wing aircrafts, it seems
like there is something--it didn't matter what the service is.
There is something that we have in common. It's delays, right?
I mean, we are talking about upgrades are delayed, engines are
delayed, new airframes, retirements, that kind of thing. So and
delays usually mean extra costs.
So what I wanted to ask was, and, you know, there seems to
be a lot of handwringing as well and hey, we will do better in
the future. But how can we, moving forward, prevent these
really persistent delays? I'd just open it up to the esteemed
panel if anybody wants to tackle that one.
Mr. Hunter. Well, do you want your question--would you
rather focus on F-35 or is your question broader, too?
Mr. Fallon. Just in general like the next weapon system
that we have, what can we do. And, yeah, I would love to touch
on the F-35.
Mr. Hunter. Yeah, well, let me just if I could talk a
little bit, since I've talked about speed to ramp on
Collaborative Combat Aircraft about that approach because we
have a very--it is a very demanding schedule that we are
forecasting for that program and so it will be a challenge.
The way that we address that challenge, partly it is the
resourcing, which starts quickly in this budget request. It is
a substantial request for the Congress. Partly it is about
having very, very, very disciplined and specifying requirements
and not reaching for more than is achievable in the timeframe
that we are trying to achieve. And that is the core in the--
when we go out to industry and ask them for proposals, the core
will be making sure that what we are asking for is achievable
in the timeframe in which we are asking it.
And so I think that is that balance that we strike across
many platforms. And so if you look at Block 4, that is a very
sophisticated and advanced capability. We asked for it because
it is essential to the fight that we see coming and so we need
that capability. We asked for it on a fairly rapid timeframe.
And I think that is where we got a little disconnected. And you
see where we are today and that we wanted a very advanced
capability, and we wanted it very quickly.
I think when all is said and done, I am still reasonably
optimistic that, you know, when all the dust settles, and we
all look back and say given what we asked industry to do with
the Block 4 capability, I think there is a chance we could
still look back and say we actually accomplished that fairly
quickly, but it wasn't as quickly as we initially projected and
asked them to do.
Mr. Fallon. General Schmidt, how many F-35s can we build in
a year?
General Schmidt. In a year, sir? One hundred fifty-six is
our rate for----
Mr. Fallon. Over a 12-month period?
General Schmidt. Yes. We will deliver that in 2025. So we
are a little less than that right now, but that is our Lot 70.
Our FY23 is what we went on contract for, 156 per year. That is
all together, U.S. and international.
Mr. Fallon. And it is $90 million roughly?
General Schmidt. For an F-35A is about $82.5 million, and
yes, sir, and higher for Bs and Cs.
Mr. Fallon. You know, I'm just worried about when you look
forward, if God forbid, we had to get into some kind of a
conflict in Asia with China over Taiwan or something like that,
you know, what we are seeing in Ukraine about just attrition
and making sure that, I mean, these are obviously very
expensive, but that we would have the capability to replace our
losses.
Do you feel confident as far as the F-35 goes that we
could? I mean, are you talking assuming a pretty significant
conflict with a major power like China?
General Schmidt. So I think you are maybe asking a broader
question, sir, which is should we invest in additional capacity
to deal with? Is that what you are asking, sir, I think?
Mr. Fallon. Yeah.
General Schmidt. We can--that is a decision, you know, we
can all make or discuss is the value of investing in additional
capacity to deal with real-world things.
General Schmidt. You think the F-35 is----
Mr. Stefany. Sir, if I could jump in maybe to help the
general. The limiter right now is a single company that makes
the fuselage, Northrop Grumman. So we can bring a--and we are
looking to bring a second company in to help that line and move
that limit to a higher, right? We are limited by just having a
single fuselage maker.
Mr. Fallon. And is the greatest threat to an F-35 another
aircraft that is maybe a fifth-gen or is it SAMs [surface-to-
air missiles] and, you know, the A2/ADs [anti-access/area
denial]?
Mr. Hunter. Yes, sir, I would say it is all of the above.
And it really depends on what mission the F-35 is engaged in. A
ground strike mission it is going to be the SAMs and A2/AD. And
in an air-to-air mission, it is going to be those enemy
aircraft.
Mr. Fallon. Okay. Mr. Chairman, thank you. I yield back.
Thank you.
Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Fallon. We will go to our
members and see if anybody else has any additional questions.
Mr. Gimenez?
Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. So we are talking
about--I want to follow up on my colleague, Mr. Bacon, and the
production. And I am really concerned about retiring 400
aircraft and not having the replacement for those 400 aircraft
because we don't know when the next fight is. And my concern is
that we have too few and not enough replacement. So we are
going back to this F-35 and the production.
You were asking for, I believe, what, 72 additional
aircraft. How many were F-35s?
General Moore. Forty-eight F-35s and 24 F-15EXs.
Mr. Gimenez. Yes. We can produce 100 and something, 150
aircraft a year. So is that based on budget or is that based on
what you want or what you need? Because I want to know--I want
to base our production on what you need. And I am not sure that
what you are asking for is what you need. I think that what you
are asking for is what you think you can afford.
General Moore. So I think it is a combination. There
certainly is an affordability component, not just in procuring
the airplanes, but also in maintaining and operating them.
There is a manpower component in how rapidly we can bring on
pilots and maintainers, and there is also a production line
capacity.
So all of those things come together and that is how 48
comes to be. So in a world with unlimited resources, there
could certainly be a different number. But in the world that we
operate in where both manpower, production line capacity, as
well as budget top line all come into play, 48 is where we
landed in this budget. And 72 has been the number we have used
for the last several cycles to say that that is the minimum
that we need to both bring down the fleet age and increase our
capability.
Mr. Gimenez. Again, you kind of went around, but I think
that the answer is a lot of it has to do with the budget, what
your budget constraints are. And I was asked the question about
what we need to spend on defense. And my answer was whatever we
need to spend on defense is what we need to spend on defense.
And, again, that 400 number of fewer aircraft really
concerns me until we get the CCAs. And actually, what I would
like to see is just the CCAs be an additional capability and
not just supplanting, you know, the other combat aircraft. So
if it is budget, then Mr. Chairman, I think we need to deal
with that.
Mr. Wittman. Very good.
General Moore. Yes, sir. And we do not intend for CCAs to
reduce the number of manned fighters in the inventory. They are
intended to do exactly as you mentioned, to augment, to create
mass in an affordable way.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thanks, Mr. Gimenez. Dr. McCormick,
any additional questions?
Dr. McCormick. No.
Mr. Wittman. All right. Very good. Listen, I appreciate the
box of crayons up there. Could you hand me one? They are all
there, though, right? They are all there. I love it. I love it.
Don, any additional questions?
Mr. Norcross. No. I just want to thank the witnesses.
Obviously, a very large topic and thanks for coming here and
sharing your testimony. And to those who are behind you,
figuratively, I thank them also.
Mr. Wittman. Very good. I do have one concluding question
for Secretary Hunter. I want to look a little bit more at the
T-7 program. It was supposed to be the Air Force's marquee
digital engineering and production program. However, we see the
award of the production contract has actually slipped by 3
years.
We are at a point right now where the prime contractor,
Boeing, is going to get underway without there being a formal
contract. I just want to know, how does the Air Force and the
Defense Contract Management Agency [DCMA] plan to do proper
oversight and look at the assembly and production of the
aircraft without having a contract, a formal contract, awarded.
Do you have any concerns about the prime contract, beginning
production without a contract?
Mr. Hunter. So as you have indicated, Boeing has notified
the Air Force they intend to begin production of the initial T-
7s at risk. So that is at their risk.
We have been working with DCMA to come up with a solution
where they can do observation of the production process so that
when we get to the point of accepting aircraft, we will know
that it in fact meets our requirements. And, again, the at risk
part means if when we get there it doesn't meet our
requirement, Boeing will then have to pay for any corrections
to any deficiencies that are identified.
But actually, I think your staff highlighted this issue
about DCMA and its ability to work on the program when Boeing
is at risk to us. And we believe we have identified a path
forward which we are in the process of implementing to get them
engaged in that.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. It would be great for us to
have up-to-date information as you pursue that. Listen, it is
great that Boeing is willing to jump out there and take the
risk on T-7, but we also don't want to get too far in the risk
category and then have things grind to a halt because things
have gone far awry or there is a lack of communication between
the Air Force and Boeing on what is necessary.
So it can end up okay. But I want to make sure that we
understand, you know, where things could also go awry. And GAO
obviously highlighted that to us and wanted us to make sure
that we were aware of that. And obviously, there is risk on
both sides.
It is great that Boeing is willing to take risk. But there
is significant risk, too, on the Air Force's side. So we
definitely want to make sure that we are kept informed as that
continues to go forward.
Mr. Hunter. Yes. And I should note that we did have a
substantial achievement in February of getting through
performing a sled test, dealing with some of the issues with
the escape system that we were hung up on that would allow us
to get to military flight release and begin the developmental
tasks. So we are now moving forward from areas where the
program had gotten stalled.
Mr. Wittman. Okay. Very good. Thank you, Secretary Hunter.
I want to thank again our witnesses. Thank you so much for
joining us today. Incredibly helpful. Lots of things going on
with tactical aircraft. That is both a challenge, but a good
thing too that we are moving forward in a lot of these
different areas.
Please keep us informed on the progress that is being made.
There will be, I'm sure, much additional discussion by the full
committee as we go forward with T-135, F-35, retirements, the
whole realm of what happens in the tactical aircraft realm.
So I appreciate what you all do. We look forward to
continued conversations. And with that, this hearing is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:23 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 29, 2023
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 29, 2023
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 29, 2023
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN
Mr. Wittman. According to the F-35 JPO, the F-35 Block 4 upgrade is
estimated to require 32Kw, and up to 51kW of power and cooling for
planned capabilities fielded beyond Block 4 on the F-35 roadmap being
developed by JPO and the services via the recently awarded Lockheed
Systems Engineering Integration and Testing (SEI&T) contract. What is
the Air Force's required power and cooling requirements growth profile
for full Block 4 and future Block of capabilities beyond Block 4? When
will the Air Force validate and formalize these power and cooling
requirements for the service-life of the F-35A?
Mr. Hunter. Air Force F-35 requirements beyond Block 4 have not yet
been formalized and validated. Air Combat Command is working with the
F-35 JPO to formalize requirements for known (intended) future
capabilities. The timeline for formalizing known (potential) future
capabilities is yet to be determined.
Mr. Wittman. What is Air Combat Command's current performance
capabilities requirements estimate for F-35A power, cooling, aircraft
combat radius beyond full Block 4 capabilities during the service-life
of the F-35A?
Mr. Hunter. Air system power and cooling capacity requirements are
derived from required mission system upgrades. Power and cooling
requirements for known (potential) future capabilities beyond Block 4
during the service-life of the F-35A are still evolving. With respect
to aircraft combat range, emerging threat capabilities may warrant
modifying operational requirements to extend the F-35 combat radius.
Mr. Wittman. The subcommittee understands that HAF/A5, in
coordination with Air Combat Command, performed an operational
assessment regarding baseline F135, F135 ECU, and AETP technologies and
what each propulsion system modernization capability provided to F-35A
regarding thrust, subsonic and transonic acceleration improvements,
combat radius, external weapons carriage capacity, weapons kinematic
employment, fuel efficiency, and aerial refueling aircraft support.
What were the specific results of the Air Force's operational analysis
for each of the 3 configurations of available propulsion system
technologies regarding F-35A thrust, subsonic and transonic
acceleration improvements, combat radius, external weapons carriage
capacity or limitations, weapons kinematic employment improvements,
fuel efficiency, and aerial refueling aircraft support.
Mr. Hunter. The results of the Air Force Operational Benefits
Analysis and F-35 Joint Program Office (JPO) Business Case Analysis
(BCA) determined the Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP) engines
met the operational needs and provided the best overall F-35A
operational performance, including significantly more range, better
fuel efficiency, and increased thrust. However, the F135 Engine Core
Upgrade will restore engine life and prevent degradation for all three
F-35 variants at an affordable cost. Findings from these and other
operational analyses informed the DOD decision to move forward with the
F135 Engine Core Upgrade and accompanying power and thermal management
system upgrades.
Mr. Wittman. In what way(s) is the USAF leveraging onboard serial
bus data to increase fleet readiness and drive cost efficiencies across
the service's maintenance processes?
General Moore. The following response was drafted by the
Secretariat for Acquisition and Air Staff for Logistics, Installations,
and Mission Support.
The Department of the Air Force has developed a Condition Based
Maintenance Strategic Implementation Plan. The plan integrates
predictive analytics using Artificial Intelligence & Machine Learning,
data from sensor-based systems, and enhanced reliability centered
maintenance. The Air Force can predict failures and enable maintainers,
at field and depot level, to replace components at opportune times to
maximize aircraft availability using all these technologies.
Mr. Wittman. Readiness is the backbone to the Department's ability
to project power and keep the Homeland safe; how does the USAF
determine readiness across aircraft fleets, particularly at the
platform level? How is the USAF considering, leveraging, and
integrating onboard platform data to make informed decisions about
conditions-based and predictive maintenance requirements?
General Moore. The following response was drafted by Secretariat
for Acquisition and Air Staff for Logistics, Installations, and Mission
Support.
Lead Commands will establish availability standards and capability
goals in accordance with Air Force policy and guidance. Readiness for
each mission design series is calculated annually using prescribed
equations and subject to recurring senior leader oversight. For
example, the Air Force Material Command Readiness of Combat
Capabilities Review provides program performance details relative to
the established lead command standards and requirements.
And as stated in the previous question, the Department of the Air
Force has developed a Condition Based Maintenance Strategic
Implementation Plan to leverage various technologies to maximize
aircraft availability.
Mr. Wittman. According to the F-35 JPO, the F-35 Block 4 upgrade is
estimated to require 32Kw and up to 51kW of power and cooling for
planned capabilities fielded beyond Block 4 on the F-35 roadmap being
developed with JPO and the Lockheed Systems Engineering Integration and
Testing (SEI&T) contract. What is the Navy's and Marine Corps' required
power and cooling requirements growth profile for Block 4 and future
Block(s) of capabilities beyond Block 4 for the service-life of the F-
35B and F-35C? When will the Navy and Marine Corps formalize these
requirements?
Mr. Stefany. The Engine Core Upgrades (ECU) and Power Thermal
Management System (PTMS) modernization efforts will support Block 4
capability requirements and restore the F135 service life and drive
down sustainment costs. The services are continuing to work with the F-
35 Program Office to define and validate requirements associated with
air vehicle integration and beyond Block 4 mission systems
enhancements. A draft statement of requirements is being circulated
among stakeholders for review and ultimate approval.
Mr. Wittman. Does F-35B currently deploy or operate on any Navy
aircraft carriers?
How would onboard CVN maintenance operations be affected--
positively or negatively--with installation of AETP technology into F-
35C?
Admiral Loiselle. No Sir, the F-35B does not currently deploy or
operate on any Navy aircraft carriers. Navy aircraft carriers are not
designed to support fixed-wing VSTOL operations since they lack
modifications to the landing area required to support F-35B operations.
Due to the developmental nature of AETP and its focus on integration
with the F-35A, impacts to onboard CVN maintenance operations are
unknown at this time. The DON does anticipate onboard CVN maintenance
operations would likely be negatively affected by the installation of
AETP technology into F-35C due to the following:
1. The modular design of the F135 permits the transport of
replacement modules to and from the CVN in the CMV-22; to limit impact
to CVN maintenance operations, AETP would need to be of similar modular
design to prevent negative impacts.
2. Negative impacts to CVN maintenance operations are also
anticipated supporting a bifurcated fleet. Until production capacity
and operational demands support the retrofit of all F-35C aircraft,
parts and spares for two engines will be required, negatively impacting
the already limited space on the CVN.
3. Lastly, negative impacts of bifurcation will be realized given
the Marine Corps has no plans to procure AETP for installation in F-
35C. The AETP is not compatible with F-35B, which is the variant that
comprises a majority of the Marine Corps' fleet. Bifurcating the USMC
propulsion fleet, and the overall F-35 enterprise fleet, would be cost
prohibitive.
Mr. Wittman. Does F-35C currently deploy or operate on any Navy
large-deck amphibious ships?
How would onboard large-deck amphibious ship maintenance operations
be affected--positively or negatively--with installation of F135 ECU
technology into F-35B?
Admiral Loiselle. No Sir, F-35C does not currently deploy or
operate on any Navy large-deck amphibious ships. Amphibious ships are
not designed to facilitate F-35C operations, and lack the arresting
gear and catapults required for the F-35C to take-off from and land on
amphibious ships.
The DON anticipates onboard amphibious ship maintenance operations
should not be significantly affected by Engine Core Upgrade (ECU)
technology inclusion in F-35B aircraft. As ECU installations occur
through the 2030s, there will be a bifurcated propulsion fleet since
F135 will continue service in non-upgraded aircraft until their
scheduled overhauls occur. However, the DON assesses the potential
maintenance impacts can be mitigated by inventory management and
deployment planning that ensures the ability to employ all-ECU or all-
F135 Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) is possible. Additionally,
similar ECU/F135 designs should limit the need to deploy with
significantly different support equipment on potential ECU/F135 mixed
deployments.
Mr. Wittman. Does F-35B currently deploy or operate on any Navy
aircraft carriers?
How would onboard CVN maintenance operations be affected--
positively or negatively--with installation of AETP technology into F-
35C?
General Cederholm. No Sir, the F-35B does not currently deploy or
operate on any Navy aircraft carriers. Navy aircraft carriers are not
designed to support fixed-wing VSTOL operations since they lack
modifications to the landing area required to support F-35B operations.
Due to the developmental nature of AETP and its focus on
integration with the F-35A, impacts to onboard CVN maintenance
operations are unknown at this time. The DON does anticipate onboard
CVN maintenance operations would likely be negatively affected by the
installation of AETP technology into F-35C due to the following:
1. The modular design of the F135 permits the transport of
replacement modules to and from the CVN in the CMV-22; to limit impact
to CVN maintenance operations, AETP would need to be of similar modular
design to prevent negative impacts.
2. Negative impacts to CVN maintenance operations are also
anticipated supporting a bifurcated fleet. Until production capacity
and operational demands support the retrofit of all F-35C aircraft,
parts and spares for two engines will be required, negatively impacting
the already limited space on the CVN.
3. Lastly, negative impacts of bifurcation will be realized given
the Marine Corps has no plans to procure AETP for installation in F-
35C. The AETP is not compatible with F-35B, which is the variant that
comprises a majority of the Marine Corps' fleet. Bifurcating the USMC
propulsion fleet, and the overall F-35 enterprise fleet, would be cost
prohibitive.
Mr. Wittman. Does F-35C currently deploy or operate on any Navy
large-deck amphibious ships?
How would onboard large-deck amphibious ship maintenance operations
be affected--positively or negatively--with installation of F135 ECU
technology into F-35B?
General Cederholm. No Sir, F-35C does not currently deploy or
operate on any Navy large-deck amphibious ships. Amphibious ships are
not designed to facilitate F-35C operations, and lack the arresting
gear and catapults required for the F-35C to take-off from and land on
amphibious ships.
The DON anticipates onboard amphibious ship maintenance operations
should not be significantly affected by Engine Core Upgrade (ECU)
technology inclusion in F-35B aircraft. As ECU installations occur
through the 2030s, there will be a bifurcated propulsion fleet since
F135 will continue service in non-upgraded aircraft until their
scheduled overhauls occur. However, the DON assesses the potential
maintenance impacts can be mitigated by inventory management and
deployment planning that ensures the ability to employ all-ECU or all-
F135 Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) is possible. Additionally,
similar ECU/F135 designs should limit the need to deploy with
significantly different support equipment on potential ECU/F135 mixed
deployments.
Mr. Wittman. Understanding that only the F135 ECU can integrate
into the F-35B platform, will the F-35B be limited to only hosting
Block 4 capabilities during the service-life of the F-35B aircraft due
to limitations on integrating additional power and cooling capacity,
and vertical lift aircraft performance requirements?
General Schmidt. The existing F135 engine and the 32-kW Power
Thermal Management System (PTMS) effort, currently on contract with
Lockheed Martin, support the necessary capabilities for all Block 4 in
development but not full implementation. The Business Case Analysis
(BCA) studied additional configurations and capabilities beyond Block 4
to ensure the cooling, electrical, and fuel thermal management systems
will be able to support future capability growth. The Engine Core
Upgrade (ECU) & PTMS Modernization will restore full engine life,
increase vertical lift, and provide additional cooling for future
capability growth. This is common for all 3 variants and is not unique
to only the F-35B.
Mr. Wittman. Is F-35B planned to field capability beyond Block 4
and what power, cooling, and aircraft flight performance limitations
are currently known as Lockheed's Systems Engineering Integration and
Testing (SEI&T) contract with F-35 JPO has progressed in its analysis?
General Schmidt. In order to ensure the F-35 continues to outpace
threats, all three Services intend to add capabilities on all variants
beyond Block 4. The most notable limitation for incorporation of future
capabilities is the Power Thermal Management System (PTMS), which will
require an upgrade regardless of engine solution. While current F135
engine can support further cooling with a new PTMS design, it will come
at the cost of a greater reduction in engine life and future
performance. Therefore, to support the future capabilities roadmap, a
new PTMS and Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) is required to overcome current
limitations and restore engine life. In addition to PTMS, electrical
power systems and fuel thermal management system (FTMS) upgrades may be
required. In terms of performance limitations, the current F135
propulsion system is expected to run out of Vertical Landing Bring Back
(VLBB) margin by Lot 19 for F-35B. Additionally, for externally-carried
heavy weapons, preliminary analysis indicates operational limitations
imposed related to weight, center of gravity, airspeed, altitude, and
weapons employment.
Mr. Wittman. Will any F-35 aircraft variant be required to
implement additional Bleed and Burn operations with F135 ECU to host
capabilities at 47-51kW of power and cooling required for the service-
life of any F-35 aircraft variant? If so, what service-life and/or cost
impacts will this pose on F-35 variant aircraft during the service-life
of each aircraft variant?
General Schmidt. Bleed and Burn (BnB) remains one of the options
being assessed as part of the Program's System's Engineering and
Manufacturing Design (EMD) Phase for the Power Thermal Management
System (PTMS) solution set to meet future mission system cooling
requirements. There would be no impact to engine life; however, there
could be a small reduction in combat radius and potentially a life
impact on the PTMS which is being assessed. The limiting factors for
using BnB would be related to the PTMS system, not the engine.
Mr. Wittman. What is the unrefueled combat radius, subsonic and
transonic acceleration capabilities of an F-35C with an F135, ECU,
XA100, and XA101 installed?
General Schmidt. Based on the results of the analysis conducted by
Lockheed Martin, Pratt and Whitney, GE, and the Government, the
following combat radius and acceleration values were calculated for
each of the configurations assessed for the F-35C.
Note--No values were calculated for the XA-101 as it was
determined that the modifications required for it to fit into
the F-35C were too extensive to be meet cost and schedule
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Mr. Wittman. Would F-35C weapons bring-back onto CVN
limitations be positively or negatively impacted with installation of
AETP technology into F-35C?
General Schmidt. A full system engineering and shipboard
integration assessment, for both the aircraft and the aircraft carrier,
is required to address any weight and performance impacts associated
with installing and operating an F-35C with AETP afloat.
Mr. Wittman. How would installation of AETP technology into F-35C
address the time limitation issue with flight time in afterburner on
the F-35C currently with F135 baseline or F135 ECU installed?
General Schmidt. The afterburner limitation is temperature and time
driven, as it relates to the proximity of the exhaust plume to the
airframe. The JPO will not be able to fully understand the change, if
any, to this limitation for AETP or Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) for any
variant most likely until the completion of flight test.
Mr. Wittman. Are the XA100 and XA101 compatible with the F-35A and
F-35C? What airframe modifications, if any, are required for each
engine to integrate AETP technology into each variant?
General Schmidt. Yes, we believe that both XA engines are
compatible with the F-35A and the F-35C, although only limited AETP
engine and airframe integration analysis was performed for both
options. The JPO AV engineering team--who is responsible for the
structural loads, fatigue life, thermal management, flying qualities,
and weight and balance impacts of integrating these engines--would need
a more in-depth review of the analysis in order to identify all risk
areas where life impacts or modifications may exist. Specifically for
the F-35C tailhook, we do know that both XA engines would require
airframe modifications.
Mr. Wittman. What additional operational level maintenance support
equipment and/or tooling is required above the support equipment
required for the F135 or F135 ECU in order to sufficiently maintain
either the XA100 or XA101 in the field?
General Schmidt. Our sustainment & cost team reviewed the AETP &
Engine Core Upgrade (ECU configuration for the BCA and assessed that
AETP has zero commonality to the F135, while the ECU will have roughly
60% commonality. AETP is a new engine requiring all new infrastructure
from the ground up for support equipment, tooling, publications,
spares, etc., while the ECU requires new support only for those
redesigned sections of the engine.
Mr. Wittman. Are there any major obstacles to exporting AETP
technology to F-35 program Partners or current/planned FMS customers?
General Schmidt. Lieutenant General Schmidt has no input, since it
is outside of the JPO's decision-making jurisdiction. The AETP PMO
provided the following:
Air Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC)--There are no
anticipated major obstacles to exporting AETP technology to some or
possibly all F-35 program Partners or current/planned FMS customers.
The Air Force recently approved an AETP Topline to initiate the
exportability process, but an export decision has not been made at this
time.
Mr. Wittman. Understanding the F135 gearbox will likely need to be
redesigned and retrofitted to support higher electrical power demands,
at which point in time and for which capabilities can the gearbox no
longer support mission systems? What is the cost estimate for
redesigning and retrofitting a new F135 gearbox?
General Schmidt. The current F135 gearbox can support up to 47 kW
levels of horsepower extraction. This is the structural design limit of
the gearbox. A study is underway to determine what capabilities can be
supported at this limit.
The Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) is contracted to meet the 62 kW
installation requirements, and a gearbox upgrade is part of the ECU
design. The ECU and gearbox upgrade are installed at an F135 scheduled
depot overhaul, and it is estimated that the gearbox upgrade during
that overhaul will be roughly 8% greater than today's estimate. First
engine overhauls begin this year, so actual costs are not yet known.
If AETP was pursued, it would also need an upgraded gearbox in line
with the requirements levied on ECU, but it would need to be a fully
purchased spare instead of a depot overhaul upgrade.
Mr. Wittman. What Fuel Thermal Management System (FTMS)
modifications are necessary to support additional cooling capacity for
any combination of PTMS and F135 baseline, ECU, and AETP propulsion
technologies? What is the cost, engineering analysis and technical risk
assessment to date that has been completed to assess FTMS modifications
for all propulsion options evaluated? What maintenance actions and
schedule duration would be involved to modify existing FTMS systems on
fielded aircraft to host additional cooling capabilities beyond 32kW of
power and cooling capacity?
General Schmidt. Overall, AETP engines performed better than any
two-stream engine (F135, ECU--Engine Core Upgrade) because of the
superior heat rejection from the cooled third stream. This means that
more heat would need to be rejected into the fuel for F135 and ECU than
for AETP, imparting additional thermal stress on the Fuel Thermal
Management System (FTMS). At higher mission system demand loads, such
as those seen in the 62kW configuration, more extensive FTMS
modifications will likely be necessary for ECU and F135 than for AETP.
Multiple FTMS technologies are being assessed on both the engine
and PTMS to address the potential, additional heat transfer to the fuel
system. Additional studies are necessary to fully quantify which system
is necessary and what the costs are to upgrade those systems, as it is
still highly dependent on the engine design, PTMS, and the maximum
necessary mission system cooling solution. This will be addressed
through the standard engineering development and the design phase and
review process.
For a more comprehensive review of impacts of future capabilities
on the FTMS please refer to section 5.3 of the BCA report--Fuel Thermal
Management System (FTMS) Results.
Mr. Wittman. Did the BCA directly assess the F-35 aircraft's
electrical power system (EPS) as it relates to hosting additional
capabilities and power/thermal management capacity requirements? Were
any limitations of the existing EPS uncovered? If so, please describe
and what actions would be necessary to accommodate hosting mission
system capabilities beyond Block 4 systems?
General Schmidt. The BCA did not directly assess the electrical
power system. However, as potential planned mission system upgrades
were evaluated, the limitations of the existing electrical power system
(EPS) were uncovered. Other than the F135 gearbox, the EPS limitations
are independent of the engine and/or PTMS solution. Any new engine (ECU
or AETP) will require a gearbox redesigned for the anticipated higher
electrical demand of future mission systems. The F135 gearbox, however,
would eventually be unable to support the electrical demands of
additional mission systems beyond the 47kW capability class.
The aircraft electrical distribution system is also limited, with
the F-35C having the least margin for growth and the F-35A having the
most. Several options on minimizing impacts of future capabilities on
the electrical distribution system were initially assessed as part of
the BCA. Additional studies are underway to fully understand the
electrical risks and the options to address future capability growth.
For a more comprehensive review of the impacts from future
capabilities on the electrical system please refer to section 5.4 of
the BCA report--Electrical Power System (EPS) Results.
Mr. Wittman. Does the JPO plan to remove the F-35's Engine Ice
Protection System (EIPS) from each aircraft variant of the F-35? If so,
why? What risks are involved by removing the EIPS? If the EIPS is not
removed from each aircraft variant, how does this affect each aircraft
variant's ability to support mission system capability growth that
would require at least 47kW of power and cooling capacity?
General Schmidt. The Engine Ice Protection System (EIPS) removal is
undergoing studies as part of continued affordability improvement, to
determine the operational impacts of removing this system. The removal
decision will be part of the next steering boards discussion, which
includes US Services & Partners assessment and approval of any changes.
Removing the EIPS would help mitigate the electrical margin
shortfall, but it would not be fully sufficient, depending on how many
mission systems are added. A study to address the safety impacts of
removing the EIPS is well underway, and sufficient data will be
available to support a decision this upcoming Fall of 2023. If EIPS is
not removed, electrical power growth will be a significant concern for
all three F-35 variants. For capability growth beyond a 47kW roadmap,
costly upgrades may be required, including an upgraded Engine Starter/
Generator (ES/G), upgraded Inverter Converter Controller (ICCs), extra
contactors, and larger wires. These costs are not known at this time
and are therefore not included in the Business Case Analysis (BCA).
Mr. Wittman. Did the BCA analyze all aircraft integration
activities required for the modernization of all aircraft variants of
the F-35 regarding propulsion and thermal management systems necessary
to increase power and thermal management cooling capabilities and
capacity for the service-life duration of the F-35 aircraft? What
aircraft integration considerations, if any, were not addressed in the
BCA and what aircraft integration considerations are considered
incomplete and require further study and assessment?
General Schmidt. The full integration and required testing
activities of a new engine, Power Thermal Management System (PTMS), and
Fuel Thermal Management System (FTMS) was beyond the scope of the
Business Case Analysis (BCA). The integration of a new engine, PTMS and
any other required systems modification will be assessed through the
program's Systems Engineering development and design phase, as well as
through all design reviews common to all new design activities.
Preliminary Design Review is the first event-driven activity that will
address the integration and full system risks that might not have been
assessed in the BCA.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COURTNEY
Mr. Courtney. The FY24 budget requests $254.685 million for F-35A
F135 Engine Modernization. What are the long-term impacts if an engine
core upgrade is not fully funded for the F-35A in FY24?
Mr. Hunter. If the engine core upgrade is not fully funded, we will
have delayed fielding of improved F-35 capabilities and restoration of
engine life, with impacts to the organic industrial base.
Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
Mr. Hunter. Yes, the Power Thermal Management System (PTMS)
modernization and engine core upgrade will provide sufficient power and
cooling capacity for Block 4 aircraft while also restoring engine life
for each of the variants.
Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
Mr. Hunter. In the full context of risk to the integration of AETP
technology, it should be considered that three stream adaptive engine
technology has been in development for nearly two decades, and the AETP
engines themselves have been in design and development for over a
decade with significant investment in their maturation. Prototype
engines have been built and run, and AETP is in the final stages of
design maturation. Additionally, some aircraft integration work has
been completed with AETP; however, additional work remains. For
example, comprehensive airframe structural analysis, stability and
controls development, air vehicle subsystem interoperability, support
equipment and maintenance tool (ALIS/ODIN) updates, and dedicated
flight test and certification. If the Air Force were to procure AETP, a
bifurcated fleet would require the USAF to either realign existing or
establish new sustainment infrastructure (e.g., depot facilities,
support equipment, spares, manpower, training, contracts, and technical
manuals) to support a two-engine fleet (F135 ECU and AETP). Although
AETP design requirements pushed maximum re-use of existing support
equipment and tooling, further analysis and development is required to
determine how much interchangeability can exist between F135 ECU and
AETP. The Air Force has successfully managed similar sustainment
impacts with the introduction of the F110 engine into the F-16 and
subsequently the introduction of both the F110-GE-129 and F100-PW-229
improved performance engines into the F-16 and F-15 fleets.
Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
General Moore. As indicated by Honorable Hunter, the PTMS
modernization and engine core upgrade meets the current requirements
approved by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council. The propulsion
modernization for the F35 is required to acquire the Block-4
capabilities necessary to win in a highly contested environment.
Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
General Moore. The following response was drafted by the
Secretariat for Acquisition and Air Staff for Logistics, Installations,
and Mission Support.
The Department of the Air Force is focused on delivering
transformational operational capabilities as quickly as possible. All
new technologies and systems are rigorously evaluated, tested, and
validated before they are fielded. The rigorous process reduces risk to
the greatest extent possible, while meeting guidelines and criteria for
operational safety, reliability, and sustainability.
Sustaining a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines is likely to
increase life cycle operating and support (O&S) costs, since the Air
Force would need to maintain two separate engine maintenance and repair
pipelines. However, the operational benefits could outweigh additional
cost sustainment issues. Additionally, competition between multiple
engine manufacturers may promote better engine performance, increased
engine reliability, and improved contractor responsiveness. A second
engine production line may also enable engine production to surge
during contingencies.
Mr. Courtney. The FY24 budget requests $120.881 million for F-35B
F135 Engine Modernization. What are the long-term impacts if an engine
core upgrade is not fully funded for the F-35B in FY24?
Mr. Stefany. The services fully funded development of PTMS and
propulsion modernization across the FYDP based on the estimate
available at the time of budget submission. These funding levels are in
alignment with established cost share ratios. Any change to an
individual service's funding levels would result in a proportional
adjustment by the other services or developmental efforts will be
delayed until funding is available for the Marine Corps share.
Mr. Courtney. The FY24 budget requests $56.259 million for F-35C
F135 Engine Modernization. What are the long-term impacts if an engine
core upgrade is not fully funded for the F-35C in FY24?
Mr. Stefany. There is an adjustment in work by the program office
and Navy to align funds across the FYDP that were inadvertently entered
for the Power Thermal Management System (PTMS) project unit instead of
the Engine Core Upgrade project unit in the budget submission. Once
that adjustment is complete, the services will have fully funded
development of PTMS and propulsion modernization across the FYDP based
on the estimate available at the time of budget submission. These
funding levels are in alignment with established cost share ratios. Any
change to an individual service's funding levels would result in a
proportional adjustment by the other services or developmental efforts
will be delayed until funding is available for the Navy's share.
Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
Mr. Stefany. Yes, PTMS modernization and an Engine Core Upgrade
(ECU) will provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4. The Navy and
Marine Corps are currently working with the F-35 Program Office to
validate and explore PTMS/ECU capability to support follow-on growth
(beyond Block 4) for additional mission systems enhancements.
Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
Mr. Stefany. The risks associated with fielding all new technology
and an unproven system are similar to any other program fielding a new
technology. Development timelines, cost estimate accuracy, and
capability performance are among the areas of concern. The F135 ECU is
currently the only option available to support all variants as AETP is
not compatible with the F-35B and will likely require modifications to
accommodate the F-35C. The Navy and Marine Corps have no plans to
procure AETP for incorporation into F-35C.
If USAF procures the AETP, it will bifurcate the F-35 Enterprise
and break apart the existing sustainment infrastructure. A decision to
procure AETP would impact all US Services as well as Partners and FMS
customers in two ways. First, and most notably, it would require the
USAF to establish a completely new sustainment infrastructure (depot
facilities, SE, spares, manpower, training, etc.) quickly to support a
large existing fleet along with their remaining F135 engines. Likewise,
the financial requirement for the rest of the partnership, to include
the DON, will also increase as the baseline of the joint program was to
leverage commonality to maximize cost savings. Second, the current
infrastructure funded and established would need to be realigned,
agreements with our Partners would be broken, and sustainment costs
would rise due to the significant reduction in shared resources and
reduced quantities of scale. Per the BCA, it is estimated that a
decision to pursue both AETP and ECU would result in roughly an
additional $30B Life Cycle Cost increase while adding overall readiness
risks across the entire program.
Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
Admiral Loiselle. Yes, PTMS modernization and an Engine Core
Upgrade (ECU) provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft.
The services are currently working with the JPO to validate and explore
PTMS/ECU capability to support follow-on growth (beyond Block 4) for
additional mission systems enhancements.
Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
Admiral Loiselle. The primary risk associated with fielding all new
technology and an unproven system is cost. From a procurement
perspective, the cost of producing an AETP engine (essentially a
completely new engine) versus a core upgrade to the F135 is
substantial; bifurcating the propulsion fleet, and the overall F-35
enterprise fleet, would likely be cost prohibitive.
Given the significant differences between F135/ECU and AETP, the
sustainment impacts of a bifurcated fleet would include increased costs
associated with requirements for additional manpower, different support
equipment, training and subject matter expertise.
Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
General Cederholm. Yes, PTMS modernization and an Engine Core
Upgrade (ECU) provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft.
The services are currently working with the JPO to validate and explore
PTMS/ECU capability to support follow-on growth (beyond Block 4) for
additional mission systems enhancements.
Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
General Cederholm. The primary risk associated with fielding all
new technology and an unproven system is cost. From a procurement
perspective, the cost of producing an AETP engine (essentially a
completely new engine) versus a core upgrade to the F135 is
substantial; bifurcating the propulsion fleet, and the overall F-35
enterprise fleet, would likely be cost prohibitive.
Given the significant differences between F135/ECU and AETP, the
sustainment impacts of a bifurcated fleet would include increased costs
associated with requirements for additional manpower, different support
equipment, training and subject matter expertise.
Mr. Courtney. When is the expected development and fielding of
Engine Core Upgrade across all variants? o What was the expected
development and fielding of AETP for the Alpha and Charlie variant?
General Schmidt. They would field about the same time, around FY32,
taking all things into consideration.
Per the Business Case Analysis (BCA), the Government assesses that
AETP Engineering Manufacturing Development (EMD) will take five years,
starting in 2024, and will cost $6.3B. Initial Service Release (ISR) is
expected by the end of 2029, and aircraft deliveries with an AETP
engine should commence in Lot 23 (2031) or Lot 24 (2032). F135 Engine
Enhancement funding provided by Congress in FY22 allowed development of
the Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) to commence in late 2022, which would
enable Initial Service Release (ISR) by the end of 2029 and aircraft
equipped with ECU engines to deliver in Lot 24 (2032), should ECU be
fully funded.
Mr. Courtney. Since 2019, please show, by year, the delta between
removals and depot outputs for power modules for engine availability.
General Schmidt.
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
There is no longer a power module (PM) backlog issue. From 2019
to 2021, the JPO had a negative delta, as illustrated by comparing PM
removals to depot output. In 2022, the JPO had a positive depot output.
This positive depot output affected PM backlog burndown and the
rightsizing of the global depot network PM pipeline. Propulsion
readiness is now on track. Thank you for the support enabling the
enterprise to reach this point 5 years earlier than originally
anticipated!
Mr. Courtney.: In your testimony, you acknowledge the extensive
process between Government and industry to ensure mitigations efforts
fully addressed the pause in F135 delivery following the December 15,
2022 mishap. Can you provide more detail into the work that was done
between the Government and contractor to accelerate the mitigation
process?
General Schmidt. The same amount of rigor was performed in the
validation of the current, interim mitigation to resume F135 deliveries
as for any other F135 modifications or engineering change. The
accelerated mitigation process (culminating in fleet incorporation) was
due to a highly integrated and motivated project team--composed of SMEs
from the JPO, DON, USAF, Pratt and Whitney, and Lockheed Martin--
committed to resume engine deliveries and return affected operational
assets back to service. Some examples/details that highlight the
successes of the team include: acceleration of airworthiness artifacts
through pre-communication to set expectations based on fleet need;
identifying and prioritizing test facilities to perform engine
validation testing; testing over 80 data points to validate the
mitigating hardware; supplier-to-field communications to state--to the
day--when hardware would be available for fleet retrofit; and
leadership removing barriers as they were encountered. Regular
communications were established to keep vertical and lateral
stakeholders apprised of efforts and to reduce potential inefficiencies
with mitigation efforts.
Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
General Schmidt. The F135 base engine and the 32 kW effort,
currently on contract with Lockheed Martin, supports necessary
capabilities for Block 4 currently in development. The Business Case
Analysis (BCA) studied additional configurations and capabilities,
beyond the current Block 4 configuration in order to ensure the
cooling, electrical and fuel thermal management systems can support
future capability growth. The Engine Core Upgrade (ECU) and Power
Thermal Management System (PTMS) modernization will enable the engine
to meet its full life requirement, while providing up to 62 kW of
growth capability for the air system.
Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
General Schmidt. The risks associated with fielding all new
technology and an unproven system are similar to any other program
fielding new technology. Development timelines, cost estimate accuracy,
and capability performance are among the areas of concern. The Air
Systems Modernization Business Case Analysis (BCA) report, section 5.5,
summarizes the risks associated with fielding the various levels of
technology options.
If USAF procures the Adaptive Engine Transition Program (AETP), it
will bifurcate the F-35 Enterprise and break apart the existing
sustainment infrastructure, which has been funded and built. A decision
to procure AETP would impact all US Services as well as F-35
Cooperative Partners and FMS customers in two ways. First, and most
notably, it would require the USAF to quickly establish a completely
new sustainment infrastructure (depot facilities, SE, spares, manpower,
training, etc.), to support a large existing fleet along with their
remaining F135 engines. Likewise, the financial requirement for the
rest of the partnership, to include the Department of the Navy (DON),
will also increase as the baseline of the joint program was to leverage
commonality to maximize cost savings. Second, the current funded and
established infrastructure would need to be realigned, agreements with
our Partners would be broken, and sustainment costs would rise due to
the significant reduction in shared resources and reduced quantities of
scale. Per the BCA, it is estimated that a decision to pursue both AETP
and ECU would result in roughly an additional $30B Life Cycle Cost
increase while adding overall readiness risks across the entire
program.
Mr. Courtney. Does PTMS modernization and an engine core upgrade
provide the necessary capabilities for Block 4 aircraft?
Mr. Ludwigson. Program officials we met with estimate that the
power and thermal management system (PTMS) and engine core upgrade,
collectively, could support Block 4 and other planned capabilities
through 2035. However, the content of Block 4 has changed considerably
since its inception and DOD has not approved all of the future
capabilities in the F-35 program office's plan. Therefore, there is
some uncertainty regarding how far into the future the program office's
proposed PTMS and engine core upgrades could support.
As we testified on March 29, 2023, Block 4 and other planned
capabilities require even more cooling capacity and air pressure than
the PTMS and the engine can support, respectively. The current design
of the engine and PTMS, collectively, will not meet the cooling
capacity needed to support future capabilities planned beyond 2029.
Based on the program office's estimates, if they do not upgrade the
PTMS by 2029, the program will not be able to support new capabilities
planned after that year. Program officials stated that with an upgraded
PTMS, the current F135 engine could support capabilities planned
through 2035, albeit with a significantly degraded engine lifespan.
Therefore, the program determined it need to upgrade both the PTMS and
engine to support future planned capabilities and restore engine life,
which in turn the program estimates could reduce life cycle sustainment
costs.
While the program reports that it generally knows the cooling
capacity it will need to support Block 4 and other capabilities through
2035, program officials stated that the military services have not
validated those capabilities as performance requirements, so they are
notional. Furthermore, we have reported that the content of Block 4 has
evolved considerably since the program first estimated it would
comprise 66 capabilities delivered through 2026. As of July 2022,
according to the program's most recent plan submitted to Congress, it
expects to deliver 80 Block 4 capabilities through 2029 and has yet to
define post Block 4 capabilities through 2035.
Until the military departments approve the capabilities planned
through 2035, the program is limited in determining what additional
power and cooling is needed to support future capabilities. By clearly
defining the military services' requirements, the program would reduce
risks of poor program outcomes such as not meeting future power and
cooling needs and cost and schedule growth. Our previous work found
that key enablers of a good business case include firm, feasible
requirements that are clearly defined, affordable, and clearly
informed. Until the military services define their requirements for
engine and thermal management modernization, they will be at risk of
selecting modernization options without understanding the future cost,
schedule, and technical effects.
Mr. Courtney. What are the risks associated with fielding all new
technology and an unproven system? And what are the sustainment impacts
for future costs of a bifurcated fleet with multiple engines?
Mr. Ludwigson.
A. GAO has found that incorporating immature technologies into
plans for developing weapons systems increases the likelihood of cost
overruns and delays in product development, which we also previously
identified within the F-35 program.\1\ For example, in October 2001,
GAO reported that the F-35 program was at risk of not meeting its
affordability objective because critical technologies were not
projected to be mature by the planned start of development.\2\ At the
time, we noted that the failure to do so could result in increases in
costs, schedule delays, and compromised performance as problems arise
in product development and recommended DOD mature those technologies.
At that same time in October 2001, the program estimated the F-35's
development and procurement would cost $233 billion. As of December
2021, that figure had risen to $416.2 billion--an increase of about
$183 billion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ GAO, Technology Readiness Assessment Guide: Best Practices for
Evaluating the Readiness of Technology for Use in Acquisition Programs
and Projects [Reissued with revisions on Feb. 11, 2020.] GAO-20-48G
(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 11, 2020).
\2\ GAO, Joint Strike Fighter Acquisition: Mature Critical
Technologies Needed to Reduce Risks GAO-02-39 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
19, 2001).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Proceeding with immature technology, raises the risk of not
delivering the full capability expected or needed. If a project has a
lower Technology Readiness Level (TRL) than recommended by preliminary
design review, the project does not have a solid technical basis of its
design and the program could put itself at risk of approving a design
that is less likely to remain stable.\3\ Major design modifications can
cause substantial and costly changes in the manufacturing process. The
F-35 program experienced this previously when the manufacturing process
was altered due to redesigning required to resolve weight and
performance problems discovered after the first F-35 aircraft entered
production.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ GAO recommends maturing critical technology to a TRL 7, where
the technology is demonstrated in an operational environment, before
this milestone.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The more mature technology is at the start of the program, the more
likely the program will succeed in meeting its objectives. When certain
critical technologies are assessed as immature or as not progressing as
planned, a best practice is to use the Technology Readiness Assessment
(TRA) report information to:
consider or identify an alternate or backup technology;
initiate development of a Technology Maturation Plan
(TMP), a project management tool that is used to address immature
critical technologies;
update the program's risk management plan by ensuring
that all potential critical technologies are included in the program's
risk management database and plan; and
update or revise cost and schedule risk assessments, as
appropriate.
The program's comparative analysis of engine and PTMS upgrade
options did not include an assessment of the technology readiness for
the various engine and thermal management modernization options.
Furthermore, while the program has not completed a formal TRA for each
engine and PTMS option, it has assessed some aspects of technology
maturity. For example, program officials stated that they assessed
technology maturity for the engine core upgrade option but not for the
PTMS upgrade options. Officials noted, however, that the PTMS
contractors estimated that its components are immature, with many
around a TRL 3. A TRL 3 means development and analysis of separate
elements of the technology have begun, but these elements are not yet
integrated. If these technologies are not matured by the start of
development, the program risks moving forward with an unstable design
that can cause cost increases and schedule delays.
B. Our prior work has identified existing challenges with F-35
engine sustainment.\4\ For example, in July 2022, we found that an
increasing number of F-35 aircraft have not been able to fly because
they were non-mission capable due to the engine, including not having
an operating engine or waiting for specific parts to repair the engine.
In that same report, we reported that engine modules sent to depot have
taken significantly more time to repair than planned. Since fall 2020,
DOD has been implementing corrective-action plans to improve the
capacity of its engine-repair maintenance depots. DOD's plans have
resulted in improvements over time. These plans focus on (1) improving
depot capacity--the facilities, personnel, support equipment, and
necessary spare parts--to make the necessary repairs to the engine and
(2) taking actions to reduce maintenance demands by improving the
reliability and maintainability of spare parts and extending the time
the engine can remain on the aircraft. However, DOD's plans are highly
dependent on assumptions about obtaining funding over the coming years
and its ability to address future risks. For example, as the F-35 fleet
grows the depot maintenance infrastructure to repair F-35 engines will
have to grow and become more robust.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ GAO, F-35 Aircraft: DOD Should Assess and Update Its Engine
Sustainment Strategy to Support Desired Outcomes, GAO-22-104678
(Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
A bifurcated fleet with multiple engines would likely mean that the
DOD selected both the Adaptive Engine Transition Program option--to
support the F-35A and C variants--, and the engine core upgrade
option--to support all F-35 variants. According to program officials,
bifurcating the fleet with multiple engines would present additional
sustainment challenges and costs to those that the department currently
faces, as the program would have two different engines to sustain.
According to program officials, multiple engines would require
changes to the existing infrastructure that supports engine
sustainment, such as depot maintenance facilities. Furthermore, program
officials told us that DOD would likely need to train maintainers and
create supply chains to provide spare parts for each engine in
operation.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. The F-35 Block 4 upgrade requires 47kW of power and
cooling. What are the Air Force's projected power and cooling
requirements for Block 4+ and Block 5 and what are the expected years
when those power and cooling capacities must be delivered? When will
the Air Force formalize these requirements?
Mr. Hunter. Air Force F-35 requirements beyond Block 4 have not yet
been formalized and validated. Air Combat Command is working with the
F-35 JPO to formalize requirements for known (intended) future
capabilities. The timeline for formalizing known (potential) future
capabilities is yet to be determined.
Mr. Turner. The F-35 Block 4 upgrade requires 47kW of power and
cooling. What are the Air Force's projected power and cooling
requirements for Block 4+ and Block 5 and what are the expected years
when those power and cooling capacities must be delivered? When will
the Air Force formalize these requirements?
General Moore. As indicated by Honorable Hunter, the Air Force F-35
requirements beyond Block 4 have not been formalized and validated. Air
Combat Command is working with the F-35 Joint Program Office to
formalize requirements for future capabilities. The timeline for
formalizing potential future capabilities is yet to be determined.
Mr. Turner. Readiness is the backbone to the Department's ability
to project power and keep the Homeland safe; how does the [USAF]
determine readiness across aircraft fleets, particularly at the
platform level? How is the [USAF] considering, leveraging, and
integrating onboard platform data to make informed decisions about
conditions-based and predictive maintenance requirements?
General Moore. The following response was drafted by the
Secretariat for Acquisition and Air Staff for Logistics, Installations,
and Mission Support.
Lead Commands will establish availability standards and capability
goals in accordance with Air Force policy and guidance. Readiness for
each mission design series is calculated annually using prescribed
equations and subject to recurring senior leader oversight. For
example, the Air Force Material Command Readiness of Combat
Capabilities Review provides program performance details relative to
the established lead command standards and requirements.
The Department of the Air Force has developed a Condition Based
Maintenance Strategic Implementation Plan. The plan integrates
predictive analytics using Artificial Intelligence & Machine Learning,
data from sensor-based systems, and enhanced reliability centered
maintenance. The Air Force can predict failures and enable maintainers,
at field and depot level, to replace components at opportune times to
maximize aircraft availability using all these technologies.
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