[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


.                                  
                         [H.A.S.C. No. 118-11]

                                 HEARING

                                   ON

                   NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT

                          FOR FISCAL YEAR 2024

                                  AND

              OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS

                               BEFORE THE

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

    SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, AND INNOVATION

                                   ON

                       DEFENSE IN A DIGITAL ERA:

                        ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE,

                      INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY, AND

                   SECURING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD
                             MARCH 9, 2023

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
                                     

                                 ________

                   U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
52-381                     WASHINGTON : 2024                    
          
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    SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGIES, AND INNOVATION

                  MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin, Chairman

MATT GAETZ, Florida                  RO KHANNA, California
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan            SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
PAT FALLON, Texas                    WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia        JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
NICK LaLOTA, New York                PATRICK RYAN, New York
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia           CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO, 
                                         Pennsylvania

                Josh Stiefel, Professional Staff Member
                Wendell White, Professional Staff Member
                    Payson Ruhl, Research Assistant
                            
                            
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Gallagher, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Wisconsin, Chairman, 
  Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies, and Innovation     1
Khanna, Hon. Ro, a Representative from California, Ranking 
  Member, Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies, and 
  Innovation.....................................................     2

                               WITNESSES

Martell, Dr. Craig, Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence 
  Officer, Department of Defense.................................     5
Sherman, John, Chief Information Officer, Department of Defense..     3

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Gallagher, Hon. Mike.........................................    35
    Martell, Dr. Craig...........................................    50
    Sherman, John................................................    36

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    [There were no Documents submitted.]

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Mr. Ryan.....................................................    61

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Fallon...................................................    66
    Mr. Gallagher................................................    65
    Mr. Moulton..................................................    66
    
    
    DEFENSE IN A DIGITAL ERA: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE, INFORMATION 
           TECHNOLOGY, AND SECURING THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

                              ----------                              

                  House of Representatives,
                       Committee on Armed Services,
      Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies, and 
                                                Innovation,
                           Washington, DC, Thursday, March 9, 2023.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:30 a.m., in 
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Gallagher 
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE GALLAGHER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
    WISCONSIN, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INFORMATION 
                  TECHNOLOGIES, AND INNOVATION

    The Chairman. Good morning, and welcome to our CITI [Cyber, 
Information Technologies, and Innovation] hearing on ``Defense 
in a Digital Era: Artificial Intelligence, Information 
Technology, and Securing the Department of Defense.''
    Just a reminder of our three holy commandments on the CITI 
Subcommittee. One is that we shall start on time. Check.
    Two, 5 minutes--we will enforce the 5 minutes. I understand 
that you may not have the shot clock there. So we'll give you a 
little bit of grace and we'll try and--you got phones so you 
can time yourself.
    And please try not to use obscure acronyms and jargon. We 
want to communicate in simple and direct language that normal 
human beings in America can understand.
    We are pleased to be joined today by the Department's 
[Department of Defense] Chief Information Officer [CIO], Mr. 
John Sherman, and the inaugural Chief Digital and Artificial 
Intelligence Officer, Dr. Craig Martell.
    I welcome both of you and especially, Dr. Martell, in your 
first appearance with the House Armed Services Committee. You 
both have very important jobs and our job is to ensure that you 
do your jobs well.
    To underscore the stakes of your job and our job, I would 
like to quote a recent report from our friends at the 
Australian Strategic Policy Institute--ASPI--quote, ``Research 
reveals that China has built the foundations to position itself 
as the world's leading science and technology superpower by 
establishing a sometimes stunning lead in high-impact research 
across the majority of critical and emerging technology domains 
including artificial intelligence and key quantum technology 
areas.
    In the long term, China's leading research position means 
that it has set itself up to excel not just in current 
technological development in almost all sectors but in future 
technologies that don't yet exist.
    Unchecked, this could shift not just technological 
development and control but global power and influence to an 
authoritarian state where the development, testing, and 
application of emerging critical and military technologies 
isn't open and transparent and where it can't be scrutinized by 
independent civil society and media.
    In the more immediate term that lead could allow China to 
gain a stranglehold on the global supply of certain critical 
technologies. Such risks are exacerbated because of the 
willingness of the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] to use 
coercive techniques outside of the global rules-based order to 
punish governments and businesses, including withholding the 
supply of critical technologies,'' unquote.
    Gentlemen, I am concerned that we are losing in key areas 
of the strategic competition with the CCP. I would prefer that 
we win. As we say in Green Bay, winning isn't everything. It's 
the only thing.
    So today, I look forward to hearing from you how we can 
fight smarter and win this competition.
    And with that, I recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Khanna.
    [The prepared statement of Chairman Gallagher can be found 
in the Appendix on page 35.]

STATEMENT OF HON. RO KHANNA, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, 
      RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBER, INFORMATION 
                  TECHNOLOGIES, AND INNOVATION

    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Chairman Gallagher, and I appreciate 
your leadership on this committee and your bipartisan spirit in 
which you have conducted the hearings.
    I would also like to welcome Mr. John Sherman, the DOD 
[Department of Defense] Chief Information Officer, and Dr. 
Craig Martell, the Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence 
Officer. Thank you for your service and thank you for appearing 
before the subcommittee.
    On the heels of the 1 year anniversary of the war in 
Ukraine one constant theme that we have seen is ways that the 
war has been transformed and different from the past.
    From the ubiquitous presence of tactical unarmed--unmanned 
aerial vehicles to the use of digital platforms it's obvious 
that the continued integration of advanced technologies in 
combat is an essential component of modern warfare and that is 
why the DOD's CIO and Chief Digital Intelligence and Artificial 
Intelligence Officers' appearance is so important.
    One of the things we need to focus on in the second year of 
the creation of the Chief Digital and Artificial AI [Artificial 
Intelligence]--Artificial Intelligence officer is the 
challenges that you have encountered and ways that we can offer 
assistance. Deconflicting some of the duties is important. One 
of the other pretty important issues is the recruitment of 
talent and the retention of talent, and how we do a good job in 
recruiting the top talent.
    I know we have an advantage of doing that in the private 
sector in Silicon Valley. But we need our best and brightest in 
technology coming into government and I want to get your 
thoughts on additional steps that we can do for recruitment.
    Furthermore, the growing importance of the electromagnetic 
spectrum and the highly visible role of the Department's 
spectrum usage is something that I hope this committee can 
discuss.
    Finally, I want--would like to hear your work about 
securing our networks and that of the Defense Industrial Base. 
That is absolutely critical in any modern warfare.
    Thank you again for both of your appearance before this 
committee.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Sherman is recognized for 5 minutes.

     STATEMENT OF JOHN SHERMAN, CHIEF INFORMATION OFFICER, 
                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Sherman. Good morning, Chairman Gallagher, Ranking 
Member Khanna, and distinguished members of the subcommittee. 
Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today.
    Now, last summer I also held the position of Acting Chief 
Digital and Artificial Intelligence Officer. But as you note, 
sir, sitting next to me is Dr. Craig Martell, who is now the 
permanent CDAO [Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence 
Officer]. We are privileged to have him on the DOD team and we 
work together on many key priorities that we are going to 
discuss today.
    All of our modernization initiatives are focused on 
ensuring the joint force is prepared to win against peer and 
near-peer competitors. This means identifying and leveraging 
effective technologies and approaches to stay ahead of our 
pacing challenge of the People's Republic of China as well as 
any other nation or group that might seek to do us or our 
allies harm.
    Succeeding in this space is why my team and I come to work 
every single day and it is our overriding mission imperative. 
We also continue to take in lessons on how the digital 
landscape is constantly evolving from the battlefields of 
Ukraine and elsewhere, and we endeavor constantly to strengthen 
our interoperability with allies and partners around the globe.
    Driven by these priorities, we have made key strides in 
digital modernization since I last testified before this 
subcommittee last year.
    In December, we announced the award of our new Joint 
Warfighting Cloud Capability, or JWCC, which will provide us 
with enterprise cloud computing from four world-class companies 
at all three security classification levels from the 
continental United States out to what we call the tactical 
edge, meaning an island in the Western Pacific, key terrain in 
Eastern Europe, or even a ship at sea.
    JWCC, which supersedes the single vendor single award JEDI 
[Joint Enterprise Defense Infrastructure] cloud procurement 
that we cancelled in 2021, will enable the Department to 
develop and deploy software in an agile, secure, and scalable 
manner while providing for data and compute and storage that 
will undergird efforts led by my CDAO colleague and others.
    Additionally, we continue to strengthen the Department's 
cybersecurity posture underscored by our Zero Trust strategy 
and implementation plan. The concept of Zero Trust involves 
protecting critical data and assumes that an enemy is already 
on our network, and that we must verify the credentials of 
everyone and everything and that there be no unrestricted 
lateral movement across our enterprise.
    We plan to implement Zero Trust all across the Department 
by 2027 and are working with the DOD components on their plans, 
ongoing actions, and investments to achieve this goal.
    Meanwhile, we are pursuing multiple lines of efforts to 
strengthen the cybersecurity of the Defense Industrial Base 
companies through outreach, provision of services, alignment of 
DOD activities, and preparation of the Cybersecurity Maturity 
Model Certification program, which will provide us with a 
mechanism to verify that companies are handling sensitive DOD 
data and are instituting required cybersecurity measures.
    We are also working with stakeholders and DOD to remediate 
the, quote, ``technical debt,'' unquote, that has accrued on 
many of our key weapon systems. While we didn't necessarily 
have to worry about terrorists and insurgents hacking into our 
jets, ships, or tanks over the last 20 years, we know that 
nation states will certainly try to do so.
    Ensuring our service members operate in cyber-survivable 
equipment is a top priority for the Department. In the same 
vein, we continue to strengthen our command, control, and 
communications capabilities.
    These include electromagnetic spectrum operations for which 
we and CIO have taken over Department level oversight since 
this last year.
    Representing the nexus of electronic warfare and spectrum 
operations, our forces' ability to dominate in this domain is 
critical to fighting and winning on any modern battlefield.
    All the while, we never forget our success comes down to 
people. We are releasing a new cyber workforce strategy and a 
related policy manual that will help us better identify, 
recruit, develop, and retain top-notch talent.
    Also, for the military and civilian members in DOD who have 
had to struggle for far too long with IT [information 
technology] systems that are simply difficult or slow to use, 
we are doubling down on our efforts to improve user experience 
all across our enterprise.
    Using my office's budget certification authority, my team 
and I are driving strategies and will hold organizations 
accountable for continued progress.
    All of these activities rely on the strong support that 
this subcommittee has provided to DOD for many years.
    Thank you for this backing and for the chance to testify 
here today. I look forward to answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Sherman can be found in the 
Appendix on page 36.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Dr. Martell is recognized for 5 minutes.

 STATEMENT OF DR. CRAIG MARTELL, CHIEF DIGITAL AND ARTIFICIAL 
          INTELLIGENCE OFFICER, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Dr. Martell. Chairman Gallagher, Ranking Member Khanna, and 
distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify before you today.
    This is my first appearance before Congress and I look 
forward to sharing the ongoing efforts of the Chief Digital and 
Artificial Intelligence Office.
    It's an honor for me to serve our nation as the first DOD 
CDAO. The importance of this role, the mission of the CDAO, and 
our service to the warfighter are not lost on me.
    From my experience as a professor of machine learning at 
the Naval Postgraduate School to my time leading machine 
learning teams at some of the most innovative technology 
companies in the U.S., I am proud to bring best practices and 
lessons learned to accelerate and scale data analytics and AI 
in support of the national security mission.
    The Deputy Secretary of Defense established the CDAO in 
February of last year, bringing together the authorities and 
resources of previously separate organizations, which included 
the DOD Chief Data Officer, the Joint Artificial Intelligence 
Center, the Defense Digital Service, and Advana, the Advancing 
Analytics Office.
    We recognize that data analytics and AI are core 
capabilities in supporting the Secretary of Defense's 
priorities to defend the nation, take care of our people, and 
succeed through teamwork.
    When I arrived in June, my team and I assessed the data 
analytics and AI capabilities and gaps at all levels of the 
Department. We reviewed the recommendations from the National 
Security Commission on Artificial Intelligence.
    We assessed existing digital technologies within the 
Department, partner organizations, and the commercial sector. 
From these efforts we have identified four key strategic 
elements.
    One, improving data quality. I am going to say that over 
and over again today. Two, enabling advanced analytics and 
metrics; three, providing the appropriate AI scaffolding; and 
finally, cultivating the key enablers for all of us. We refer 
to this as our hierarchy of needs.
    At the base of this hierarchy are the enablers--talent, 
culture, and leadership. These are the foundations of the work 
we do in CDAO.
    This includes fostering an educated workforce, leveraging 
the strengths of the commercial and academic centers--sectors, 
and effectively integrating both our data and activities with 
our allies and partners.
    In addition, as a close partner to Honorable Sherman in the 
office of the CIO, they're delivering the storage, security, 
and computing infrastructure that this hierarchy depends upon. 
We work very tightly on this.
    Above these enablers the next level is quality data. As our 
number-one priority, quality data will enable decision 
advantage by powering both the analytics and the AI layers of 
this hierarchy.
    For example, data paired with powerful analytics dashboards 
will allow us to see what we own and where it is. Sounds 
simple. Remarkably important.
    Similarly, complex AI models will bring enhanced 
capabilities both to warfighting and to running the business. 
These are not doable without quality data.
    Addressing these challenges via this hierarchy of needs 
will drive the Department to being data-centric, to being the 
data-centric organization it needs to be.
    Now, note this hierarchy is a logical hierarchy. It doesn't 
mean we are not going to move forward on AI and getting things 
to the warfighter until data is perfect. We are going to be 
doing all of these things simultaneously.
    So, based on this strategy we are pursuing the following 
initiatives in 2023. One, creating the JADC2 [Joint All-Domain 
Command and Control] data integration layer, which will enable 
combatant commands as well as partner nations to access, share, 
and integrate data at all levels; two, providing the enterprise 
with the appropriate AI scaffolding, which includes the 
services and infrastructure most needed to accelerate AI 
development and adoption across the DOD; three, conducting a 
talent management pilot for establishing a defense digital 
corps, a cadre of digital experts aligned to digital positions 
across the DOD and managed as a unified cohort; and finally, 
supporting our business performance metrics to ensure progress 
on the goals laid out in the DOD Strategic Management Plan and 
the National Defense Strategy implementation plan.
    I look forward to working closely with this subcommittee on 
these issues and others as we enable DOD's current and future 
use of data analytics and AI for national security.
    Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Martell can be found in the 
Appendix on page 50.]
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    We'll now proceed to question and answer. I will recognize 
myself for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Martell, you sort of talked about the, I think, or 
hinted at the tension in your job, which is--was all these 
things we need to do over the long term. We need to improve--
turn DOD into a data-centric organization.
    But in the short term, our warfighters, our joint 
warfighters, our combatant commands have needs. They have 
rising threats they have to confront.
    At present, Joint All-Domain Command and Control, or 
JADC2--textbook example of jargon--is increasingly siloed into 
individual service plans, which extends the timelines even 
more.
    As I understand it, the Deputy Secretary created your 
position primarily to help meet this urgent need, that is, to 
rapidly deliver operational data-centric and truly joint 
warfighting capabilities to the COCOMs [combatant commands], 
especially Indo-Pacific Command.
    If this is your mission, and that's a mission I would 
support strongly, can you just tell us clearly what CDAO is 
doing to deliver on it? You mentioned four things. Maybe--is 
that what you would say and that is--what do you mean by 
scaffolding?
    Dr. Martell. Yeah. Thank you for the question, Chairman 
Gallagher. The--sorry.
    [Technical interference.]
    The Chairman. You're not in trouble.
    Dr. Martell. Okay. Did I do something wrong?
    I think fundamental to the problem of the JADC2 issue is 
that we think about it as a product or a destination or a 
particular capability. I don't think that's right at all. 
That's not how we look at it.
    JADC2 is simply a new way to do business. It's being able 
to get the right data at the right time to the right place so 
we can jointly exercise command and control across all domains 
from sensor to shooter.
    So you mentioned that the services are stovepiped. But I 
don't necessarily see that as a stovepipe. They build systems 
that work for their particular needs and that's fine. We 
shouldn't want to stop that. We shouldn't want to dive deep 
into what they know how to do.
    But what we need to do is get the data from those systems 
to a command level so that--and have it flow easily to a 
command level so command decisions--strategic command decisions 
can be made and tasked down to shooters.
    So we see our job as developing this data integration 
layer. We can dive deeper into the geeky aspects of it. But 
this data integration layer, which allows all of those systems 
to talk to it as a--so that it can be shared where it needs to 
be when it needs to be.
    The Chairman. So your office now has substantial staff and 
resources. What will be the fairest way for us to measure your 
success?
    What are the right metrics so that the next time you come 
and testify before us we can sort of fairly assess you on how 
you're doing your job? Is it adoption of capabilities? Speed of 
delivery?
    Is it the number of experiments? Is it the number of 
meetings? Dollars spent? What would be the right metrics to 
judge your success?
    Dr. Martell. I hope it's not the number of meetings or 
dollars spent, right. I think it's very important to not have 
effort-based metrics. We need outcome-based metrics.
    And so we think about--and to be clear, it's still unclear 
to me--that's a weird sentence--to be clear it's unclear--but 
it's still unclear to me how we are going to measure these 
things all the way down to the levels that we need to.
    But what we are driving for is time to usability--if 
someone needs a new capability and we've provided the 
underlying scaffolding how quickly can that capability be 
fielded.
    Amount of data-driven decision making, and we think about 
this sort of a number of ways, but for amount of data-driven 
decision making per COCOM--per combatant command. Amount of 
data-driven decision making per three-star forum.
    So we can actually measure these fora and we can measure 
the number of dashboards being used, which is providing data to 
those four.
    And, finally, time to usability. How quickly--so time to 
delivery is, from a producer's perspective, we are going to get 
it to you. How quickly can that then be used.
    So once it's delivered if it just sits on the shelf that's 
also not sufficient. It has to actually be used. So what sort 
of best practices and training do we have to wrap around that 
so that the warfighter can use it.
    The Chairman. I appreciate that.
    Mr. Sherman, I may have to get to you in a second round of 
questions. Quickly, though, Dr. Martell, can you just explain 
again and just--for a liberal arts major--what do you mean by 
the scaffolding that you're talking about?
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for the question, Chairman 
Gallagher.
    Most people think about AI as a product that's delivered. I 
think those products being delivered will be delivered best by 
our commercial sector. But there are things that the DOD needs 
to do around that product that's being delivered that we are 
not doing.
    For example, what the product should be doing--what a 
particular model should be doing, say, trying to detect 
something on the battlefield we are the subject matter experts 
of that.
    We should be saying this is A, this is B, this is A, this 
is B, and getting that data labelled correctly should be our 
responsibility. Currently, we give that to industry as a 
responsibility but I believe we should own that because that's 
our IP [intellectual property].
    Simultaneously, on the other side----
    The Chairman. My time has expired. I have to hold myself to 
my own rules so we'll have to come back. Otherwise, I will be a 
total hypocrite.
    I just want to emphatically endorse what you said about 
meetings. To paraphrase Drucker [Peter Drucker], meetings are a 
concession to a deficient organization. One either meets or one 
works. One cannot do both. So we should not use that as a 
metric.
    Mr. Khanna is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you. I am reminded of the Oscar Wilde 
quote that the problem with socialism is too many damn 
meetings.
    I appreciate the----
    Dr. Martell. I am not sure if I am supposed to respond to 
that.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Khanna. I appreciate your testimony. You know, we had 
Dr. Eric Schmidt at my oversight hearing and one of the points 
he made in the talent of cyber and tech is that he thought the 
DOD was doing a good job in recruiting, a good job at the 
service academies. But the challenge was really the ability for 
people and technology to rise to meaningful positions.
    Obviously, you know, you don't have the multimillion-dollar 
exits in Silicon Valley. But the other thing that attracts 
people to these tech companies is their ability not just to be 
grunt workers, not just to be mid-level folks, but to actually 
be in leadership and to be central in driving things.
    And as jamming and AI in so many of the theaters of modern 
war may involve technology, what is the pathway to get people 
up the ladder so they feel empowered?
    Both Dr. Martell and then Mr. Sherman.
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for that question, Ranking Member 
Khanna.
    I agree completely that we need to build pathways for tech 
folks in the Department. But I think one of the benefits we 
have is that all of our workforce has been getting increasingly 
technical as our technology is getting increasingly easier to 
use.
    So one of the things we need to depend upon as a nation we 
have to continue those pushes so that we generate 
practitioners. Particularly in AI it has been dominated by 
experts and I would say for the last 15 years it has been 
dominated by experts.
    But there's a movement now where there's enough 
commoditized tools where skilled practitioners can actually 
deliver the value that experts used to be able to do. That's 
the tactic we are taking.
    How do we upskill the folks that are in the Department now 
and, secondarily, how do we attract maybe not those people who 
already know walking out of school from a select group of 
schools that they're going to get a Silicon Valley job.
    What about those folks who are not sure they're going to 
get a Silicon Valley job or a high-paying job? That's still 
untapped talent in the United States.
    How do we create a pathway, an extended apprenticeship, so 
that when they leave working for the DOD or working for the 
government they're actually significantly better and more 
attractive to those industrial jobs?
    I don't think hire to retire is the right solution. I think 
transforming them is the right solution.
    Mr. Khanna. And I appreciate that, Dr. Martell.
    But for Mr. Sherman I would just say, though, that you 
shouldn't aim just to have the top folks go to Silicon Valley 
and get the next layer.
    I mean, a lot of the top folks in Silicon Valley--Vint 
Cerf, who is at Google, came out of DARPA [Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency] and it was really the Department of 
Defense that led so much of the innovation that came up with 
the mouse, that came up with drones, that came up with the 
Internet, that came up with GPS [Global Positioning System].
    So, you know, the hope would be that the best and brightest 
would still want to come to Defense and the inverse as opposed 
to going to Silicon Valley.
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for that comment, Representative 
Khanna.
    I think that's right. I think it'd be more attractive if we 
have a robust workforce in place. So I actually see this as a 
means to that.
    Mr. Khanna. Mr. Sherman?
    Mr. Sherman. And, Congressman, I would just add to this a 
couple of points.
    Using every--excuse me, every arrow in our quiver that have 
been given to us by you all in Congress, things like Cyber 
Excepted Service and other hiring authorities where we can pay 
folks a little bit more, get them in the door more quickly, and 
also think differently about how we manage folks' career and 
not the traditional 30-year, come in the door, and have the 
traditional step up the ladder there.
    Now, folks are never going to make the same amount of money 
in DOD. That's not what's going to bring them in here. It's 
going to be the mission--protecting us against the PRC 
[People's Republic of China], putting ISIS [Islamic State of 
Iraq and Syria] back on their heels, those kind of things. I 
saw this in the intelligence community as well.
    But we have to think differently about the credentials that 
folks need to come in, things like apprenticeships, looking--
you know, what are the degree requirements. Maybe a 4 year 
degree is not required. Apprenticeships can be a way to go on 
this.
    And then, very importantly, recognizing that folks are 
going to come in and out of the door here and we have to 
partner with industry and I talk a lot publicly about this. How 
are we going to do this where someone comes to DOD, then goes 
to industry in Silicon Valley or Austin or North Carolina or 
wherever and comes back?
    How can we do this without having the security folks' head 
explode where they have to go through another year and a half 
or 2 years getting in the door?
    We are going to have to figure this out. And to that point, 
sir, we have a new Cyber Workforce Strategy. It's actually 
coming out this week.
    One of the key pillars is exactly this point about creative 
approaches on how we get past the old think about how we manage 
tech careers on this, sir.
    Mr. Khanna. Well, I will look forward to working with you 
and the chairman on this.
    The Chairman. Mr. Gaetz is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Dr. Martell, it seems that for us to beat China 
at AI the first thing we have to do is catch up to China in AI, 
right?
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for that question, Congressman 
Gaetz.
    I don't actually think we are behind China with respect to 
AI. I think--but I--let me sharpen that.
    With respect to technological capabilities we are as far 
ahead as anyone. With respect to talent, we are as far ahead as 
anyone although I think there's a danger there.
    I think the fundamental difference is they are working--
they are doubling down on high-quality data and high-quality 
compute. So we have high-quality compute but we need to double 
down on getting the data right.
    Mr. Gaetz. I think you need to start my clock, Mr. 
Chairman. Thanks. Thanks for that extra time.
    The Chairman. Oh, darn it.
    Mr. Gaetz. So I rescind everything I just said. We can 
start again. No. Yeah, this is all off the record.
    The Chairman. It's still on the record.
    Mr. Gaetz. Yeah.
    The Chairman. But Mr. Gaetz gets----
    Mr. Gaetz. Yeah. No, I got you. I got you, Mr. Chairman.
    So most of the analysis I've seen indicates that they're 
way ahead. So your testimony is interesting because it seems--
you do appreciate and understand that it runs cross current, a 
lot of what we hear about China's current supremacy in AI, 
right?
    Dr. Martell. I do, Congressman Gaetz. Thank you.
    I think we could have a more interesting conversation in 
the closed session. I am happy to do that.
    Mr. Gaetz. Okay. So you talked about the data sets and I am 
really interested in the ways that China builds those data sets 
where they get information. Does China have the capability to 
collect intelligence from the offshore oil rigs that they 
operate and own?
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for that question, Congressman 
Gaetz.
    I would rather talk about it in a closed session.
    Mr. Gaetz. Well, I don't know. Sometimes I worry that we 
over-classify these things. Like, shouldn't the American people 
know if there's oil rigs offshore that are, like, using Chinese 
data to collect information?
    Dr. Martell. So I think probably a more correct answer is 
my expertise doesn't extend to China to that degree. I think we 
are going to win any fight by providing quality data, create 
the right scaffolding to establish their talent.
    Mr. Gaetz. Well, yeah. Let me ask another place--let me ask 
another place where they may collect data.
    So does China collect data from the cranes that they sell 
to U.S. ports?
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for that question. I am not an 
expert on China's----
    Mr. Gaetz. Yeah, but I am kind of concerned that an 
assessment of their AI capabilities is going to lash pretty 
closely to where they're getting these exquisite data sets, 
right.
    And so if they're able to utilize AI to aggregate this 
massive amount of data that they get from the cranes that they 
sell our ports, from the DJI [Da Jiang Innvoations] drones that 
our law enforcement fly around, from the oil rigs that our U.S. 
oil companies sell to them, that really is an important plug 
into AI, don't you think?
    Dr. Martell. Congressman Gaetz, I actually do and I think 
it's a very important point and I am not trying to dismiss it.
    When I said I don't think they're further ahead with 
respect to AI, I don't think they're further ahead with respect 
to the algorithm capabilities or the talent capabilities.
    In fact, most algorithms are commoditized and anybody has 
access to them at this point. If, in fact, they are gathering 
data from more places that will, in fact, produce robust AI and 
if we need to--we can have a really robust conversation about 
what data we should be gathering.
    I am very open to that. But I am in agreement with you that 
getting the data right and getting the right data is what 
drives robust AI.
    Mr. Gaetz. I've spent all my time with you talking about 
how China gets their data because I don't view our AI scenario 
as in a bubble. I think we are in direct competition with 
China. We win or they win.
    Dr. Martell. I agree.
    Mr. Gaetz. And if we don't know who's ahead, I do worry 
about getting to those deliverables in a way that we can 
measure them and fund them and advance them.
    So, hopefully, we'll be able to have more fruitful 
discussion about how they collect data, how we can integrate 
that into our broader cyber strategy and our AI strategy.
    Dr. Martell. I look forward to that. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Gaetz.
    Before I recognize Mr. Ryan, I want to recognize the Stump 
family from Green Bay, Wisconsin. They've travelled all the way 
from America's district, the Eighth District of Wisconsin, to 
listen to our witnesses and engage in this discussion about AI 
and technology. So it's very important. Thank you.
    Mr. Ryan is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Ryan. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and welcome to our guests 
from Wisconsin, and thank you to you, both gentlemen, for being 
here today, for your service, especially Dr. Martell.
    Stepping into a new role and position in any organization 
is always a challenge and in the biggest bureaucracy in the 
world. I am sure ----
    Dr. Martell. It's been a joy.
    Mr. Ryan. ----it's been not boring. So thank you for 
stepping up and both of your public service.
    I wanted to actually build on what Chairman Gallagher was 
getting towards with you, Dr. Martell. You were starting to 
talk about kind of the roles and--not authorities but the roles 
and responsibilities when it comes to within JADC2 specifically 
kind of who builds what.
    You were talking about scaffolding and you were beginning 
to say what you thought the role of commercial partners is.
    Could you expand on that and----
    Dr. Martell. Absolutely.
    Mr. Ryan. ----to be specific and sort of where my--what I 
would like to hear from you is how do we--not a new problem but 
how do we work better with and enable particularly smaller and 
less known but, I think, often most talented companies to plug 
in to the scaffolding that we are building?
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for that question, Congressman Ryan.
    One of the things that's surprising--was surprising to me 
when I got here is how acquisitions work. You set out a bunch 
of requirements and then 5 years later a product is delivered 
and the world has changed drastically in those 5 years.
    That's the sort of thing we are trying to tackle. We are 
trying to be able to be efficient, flexible, iterative, and 
experimental.
    So our goal is to get a data layer which allows for data to 
flow from any point to any other point and then apps can sit on 
top of that data layer.
    So a particular combatant command or a particular commander 
might want an app from one vendor and another combatant 
commander might want an app from another vendor, and we need to 
see that data layer as the underpinning of the marketplace that 
allows any vendor to show up and say, I have a solution for 
this particular problem.
    I think that's a much more iterative way and experimental 
way to get at--to get out this as opposed to saying, every 
commander, you get the same thing, when the commander out on 
the ground might need something very different than something 
in the maritime domain.
    And we need to allow for that marketplace both for the big 
players who produce real value, and particularly in the AI 
space. Three guys in a garage might actually change the game 
and we need to allow that to be available to them as well.
    Mr. Ryan. I agree. My concern is time and urgency. I mean, 
we've heard many different timelines for potential major 
conflict, particularly China, and building a data integration 
layer against a bureaucracy that's not used to doing that.
    I mean, how do--how quickly do you think we can build that? 
What can we do as, you know, in our role as Members of Congress 
to enable that to accelerate that, or what authorities do you 
need? What resources do you need?
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for that--for that offer, 
Congressman Ryan.
    I will take it as a question for the record for probably 
the end of the year to get back with you with more specifics. 
Right now we are undergoing the GIDE experimentation series, 
which is Global Information Dominance, where we are actually 
testing these things.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 61.]
    We just did--we just finished one. We are doing another one 
next month, I believe, with a key partner being INDOPACOM [U.S. 
Indo-Pacific Command], and understanding how what we've 
learned, for example, at EUCOM--at European Command--might be 
applicable in a maritime domain like in INDOPACOM.
    So we'll have--the point of that experimentation is to come 
up with a capabilities gap analysis so we can actually answer 
those sorts of questions for you.
    Mr. Ryan. Great. Thank you. I am running short on time.
    Mr. Sherman, on cyber talent management could you just 
continue to expand on that? Are there additional authorities? 
You talked about the Cyber Excepted Service. Are there 
additional authorities or tools that would be helpful to 
advance that mission?
    Mr. Sherman. Congressman, I think we have the tools at our 
disposal like Cyber Excepted Service and targeted local 
management supplement, which is additional funding we can--or 
pay we can provide to folks in certain areas.
    I think we just need to continue to use these authorities 
and continue, sir, to work with industry, you all in Congress 
and elsewhere, as we generate ideas about how to think 
creatively about a 21st century workforce, some of whom may 
come in for a long career but others very likely are going to 
come in and out and matter of fact, we are going to want them 
to do that for career areas like data scientists and others to 
not stay in government their whole time but go to industry and 
come back and figure out how we can do this in an agile way to 
stay ahead of the PRC and others.
    Mr. Ryan. I appreciate that. I would encourage you think 
creatively if there are additional tools and authorities I 
think you're hearing from us we want to give them. So please 
come back, and I yield back my 1 second.
    The Chairman. Great use of time.
    Next up a son of Notre Dame, Mr. Fallon.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, when we talk 
about securing our networks against our adversaries, our 
enemies, it's absolutely--you know, I think it's critical that 
we understand exactly what we are up against and where our 
vulnerabilities may exist.
    It doesn't do us much good to invest billions of dollars in 
security if there are entire swaths of our network that remain 
open and vulnerable, of course, to hostile actors.
    And as we talk to folks in the industry I've come to learn 
that this was, in fact, our reality in the DOD Information 
Network in the not so distant past.
    Thankfully, we've had--you know, we've taken the steps 
necessary to remedy the situation and I believe it's essential 
that we continue to invest in technology and secures our 
networks by leveraging new advances in technology with our 
network through the eyes--we have to see our network through 
the eyes of the enemy and where they would perceive 
vulnerabilities.
    So, Mr. Sherman, how are you leveraging AI-backed 
technologies to discover and remediate vulnerabilities before 
adversaries can exploit them?
    Mr. Sherman. So in terms of AI-backed technologies the main 
place we are going to apply that is what we call the big data 
platform where we bring data together to assess what is going 
on on our networks.
    But, sir, if I could say, AI is just part of this. It 
really is, to your point and your question about what we know 
the other side is doing, is the partnership I have with General 
Nakasone at U.S. Cyber Command and the National Security Agency 
to get threat-informed intelligence about what the other side--
China, Russia, et cetera--are doing against our networks.
    And also, again, AI undergirds some of this but it really 
is that Zero Trust approach I noted in my opening statement 
where we assume an enemy is already on our network. The burglar 
is already in the house, and how do you prevent them from 
moving laterally throughout the house and using what's called 
Identity, Credential, and Access Management where it has to be 
verified--someone's identity--along the way to make sure that 
they can't move to get to your most critical data.
    Sir, it's a new way of thinking about cybersecurity, not 
just at the perimeter or not even a defense in depth but a 
whole new way of thinking about you don't trust anything or 
anyone and that's what we are really doing to lock down our 
networks, sir.
    Mr. Fallon. Kind of assuming that maybe the submarine is 
below the destroyer already, right, and you can't see him but 
he might be there.
    Mr. Sherman. Right.
    Mr. Fallon. Dr. Martell, how do you see AI developing as a 
component of the DOD's cyber mission? And also, how can we 
remove barriers to entry for companies developing and deploying 
AI?
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for those questions, Congressman 
Fallon.
    I echo what Mr.--Honorable Sherman said that it's mostly 
about data and it's mostly about Zero Trust, and let me--let me 
say that Zero Trust underlies it--it's a--it's a binary 
relationship that goes both ways, right.
    So we can't build what we build without the Zero Trust 
underpinnings that Mr. Sherman provides. But I also think AI 
can provide some help to security, particularly in anomaly 
detection.
    So once we know the flows and we can track the flows of 
people through the zero trust architecture, we can build 
systems that will help us detect whether it's an anomalous 
flow, something we might want to look at. We might want to just 
sort of dive a little deeper there.
    Mr. Fallon. And, Mr. Sherman, as far as recruiting talent, 
you know, we have people come into our office, and it doesn't 
matter what industry they're in. They have a labor shortage. 
They have a labor need, and now we are not even meeting our 
recruiting goals.
    I was listening on the Armed Services--I am sorry, we 
learned that last year in Armed Services that the Navy, the Air 
Force, the Army, weren't hitting their recruiting goals. So 
where are you all with labor? And you just mentioned about 
attracting that so how do you attract the talent and--because 
it is competitive and they can make so much more on the 
outside?
    Mr. Sherman. Sir, that is exactly what we've been getting 
after as well with this new Cyber Workforce Strategy. We have 
something called a Defense Cyber Workforce Framework.
    It sounds bureaucratic, but it's where we've taken all of 
the 70-plus work roles in cyber and digital and with a fine 
toothed comb much more granularity than you would see from the 
Office of Personnel and Management on exactly the sort of work 
roles where we are going low or we are right where we need to 
be and we might need to apply some new incentives, kind of with 
the rear stat of adjusting where we are getting low on maybe 
cyber defenders or software coders or whatever, and this has 
been a key tool we've implemented.
    We've added AI in data work roles and this has been 
enlightening for me as a CIO about the levels of specificity we 
have to have to make sure when you start to see a kind of a 
warning light, hey, we are getting low on this type of work 
role, we need to apply some Cyber Excepted Service or other 
types of market supplement we can put against this.
    It's been a lot of pick and shovel work, sir. But now we 
have a foundation to really look across the dashboard to see 
where we are particularly with our civilian but also working 
with our military workforce.
    So I would say we are making a good start on this. We've 
got the tools we need and applying the authorities you all have 
given us to address shortfalls.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you both.
    The Chairman. Thank you.
    Mr. Golden, a great Marine, is recognized.
    Mr. Golden. Semper Fi, man.
    [Laughter.]
    Mr. Golden. Sounds like a bad thing.
    Dr. Martell, in your prepared remarks you talked about the 
Cyber Workforce Framework and you referred to a pilot for a 
defense digital corps program.
    I want to--obviously, the goal is to foster digital talent 
and everyone's--we've had several rounds of questioning there. 
So the National Security Commission on AI previously advised 
that perhaps there should be a Digital Reserve Corps, which I 
think would be a nice complement to what you're talking about 
with having a digital corps.
    So is that something that you have thought about? Here in 
the House, the For Country Caucus has been pushing for that. We 
are a caucus of all vets. Tony Gonzales has been the lead on 
that. We've gotten it through the House and previous NDAAs 
[National Defense Authorization Acts]. It's always kind of 
suffered in the Senate.
    But could either one of you or both of you comment on 
whether or not that might be a way to have your cake and eat 
it, too? I mean, we just had a conversation about talent is 
going to the tech industry and the private sector.
    Why not try and get some of those folks to serve while 
they're also out there in the private sector?
    Dr. Martell. Thanks for the question, Congressman Golden.
    Hallelujah. I think that would be amazing, particularly 
because the Defense Digital Corps' goal is to see--to figure 
out what talent is needed across the Department and to be able 
to bring that talent in and seed it but also manage it as a 
cohort because they're going to be onesies, twosies, and alone, 
and no one wants that job, right.
    And then--and but if they're a cohort and they can share--
and they can share problems, they can share issues, we can much 
better manage and grow them, right, and give them real careers.
    If we can do that seeding by folks coming in for--depending 
on how this works, we can talk about this afterwards. I would 
love to.
    But even if it's, you know, 2 weeks a year and a weekend a 
month but then periodically for a year at a time that would--
that would lend itself very nicely to the way we are thinking 
about it.
    Mr. Sherman. Ditto on all he said and I would add, too, I 
think we need to push ourselves to think creatively about how 
we do this.
    I mentioned security clearances, but not everyone needs a 
secret or top secret, and particularly with the explosion of 
remote work that--how do we tap into talent where they don't 
have to all come move here to the Beltway. They can stay in 
Texas or Massachusetts or Washington State or wherever they are 
and tap into that talent.
    I definitely think that's something we ought to look at. 
And again, on that broader cyber strategy, our third goal on 
there as--it's worded more finely than this but think 
creatively and come up with creative solutions.
    I think this would definitely fit on that that we would 
need to explore further.
    Mr. Golden. Well, I suspected that you both would think 
that was a good idea. So, of course, my audience is the 
committee itself and the Senate committee. So I think that's 
something that we should push once again and, hopefully, get 
through in the next NDAA.
    With the time remaining I wanted to ask either one of you 
to field this question, which is pretty simple and I think Pat 
here was onto something talking about the urgency and how quick 
can you move.
    What are you learning just looking at the battlefield in 
Ukraine right now about how you can adapt on the fly to start 
to use data, to start to use apps, and maybe even blend, you 
know, those emerging technologies with the things that we 
already have in place right now?
    Dr. Martell. Thanks for that follow-up, Congressman Golden.
    We have lots of technology that we can bring to bear on 
solutions on problems and we have lots of people willing to 
tackle those.
    The things that I've seen that have worked well is when we 
get that technology in the hands of a large group of people 
well trained and they're able to stand up quickly and deliver 
real value. I am happy to go into it deeper in a closed 
session.
    Mr. Sherman. We better be secure, we better be agile, and 
we better move in a digital environment. They're fighting World 
War II tactics but on a 21st century battlefield and we better 
adapt, and we are taking lessons learned on this and 
particularly how we would look at a China scenario.
    But I think those pillars, whether it's satellite 
communications, cybersecurity, or, as the ranking member noted, 
electromagnetic spectrum operations, how we fight through 
spectrum and maneuver and survive there, all these lessons are 
going to be relevant and speed matters. So that's what I am 
taking away from this.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you. I will yield back.
    The Chairman. Dr. McCormick?
    Dr. McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The committee has been closely following the prospective 
sharing of the 3.1 to 3.4 gigahertz spectrum and, obviously, 
with the amount of technology and communication that we are 
doing that's just parabolically expanding we have real concerns 
about giving that up to the commercial industry, which would 
just gobble it up instantly, and once you give it away you 
can't bring it back.
    Who ultimately makes the decision on whether that's 
divested from or not?
    Mr. Sherman. As it stands right now, per a 2000 NDAA it 
would be the Secretary of Defense, basically, making that 
decision.
    On proposed legislation that the administration currently 
backs it would be the President and his or her role as 
Commander in Chief, but based on direct advice from the 
Secretary of Defense on that matter.
    Dr. McCormick. Would there be any reason for the Secretary 
of Defense to ever consider giving up any bandwidth?
    Mr. Sherman. Not giving it up, Congressman, but figuring 
out how we could share it, sharing in terms of time, in terms 
of geography, or in terms of radio frequency so we could 
conduct our military training operations here in the U.S. in 
homeland defense but also giving our economy an ability to stay 
ahead of the Chinese in areas like 5G.
    Dr. McCormick. With the amount of technology that continues 
to expand and the amount of people that keep on burdening the 
gigahertz spectrum, if we start sharing, though, how--I don't 
understand how we ever grab it back and my concern is once we 
start sharing it's a bottomless pit.
    In other words, they will never be satisfied with what they 
get and they'll never want to give it back up, and the fact 
that we--in the military we get more and more advanced needs 
why would we--once again, why would we go there when there's--
there's got to be another way.
    Mr. Sherman. Well, absolutely, Congressman. We wouldn't 
want to vacate where we are shoved out and never to return 
again. Sharing would mean kind of joint ownership of this where 
if we are conducting military operations near an installation, 
conducting homeland or border security, that we would have the 
military radars on and be able to operate and that the telecom 
providers would potentially have to switch to another area, and 
we've got some examples we've done in past administrations 
where we can walk and chew gum.
    But the bands you noted, sir, this 3.1 to 3.45, is 
beachfront property both for long-range radars as well as 
telecom needs here. And to the chairman's point about 
competition and dominating against China, I have the CIO 
equities for DOD.
    I want our radars to work, be able to protect this 
homeland, keep our citizens safe. But I also know economic 
dominance matters, too.
    So I am committed. We have a study we are undertaking right 
now per the Infrastructure and Investment in Jobs Act that 
Congress--you all tasked us to do that culminates on 30 
September. No decisions would be recommended to be made until 
we can do our due diligence and figure out if sharing is even 
possible, sir.
    Dr. McCormick. Okay, great. I am from Camp Pendleton so I 
am used to that, people trying to gobble up prime real estate 
there.
    When it comes to the battlefield and some of the 
technologies, I am a firm believer that we have the best staff 
NCOs [noncommissioned officers] in the whole world and that's 
why we are working better under conditions where we don't have 
comms [communications].
    Obviously, top-heavy organizations like Russia and China 
don't have that luxury nor do they have the same experiences, 
which brings to bear that our technologies and disrupting their 
communications become paramount, as well as securing our own 
because it's always--as an ANGLICO [Air Naval Gunfire Liaison 
Company] guy I've always had problems with disruption of 
frequencies.
    The Chairman. Sorry. I was just excited. That was me.
    Dr. McCormick. He loves the ANGLICO. He loves ANGLICO.
    [Laughter.]
    Dr. McCormick. I guess my question is do you feel like, and 
this--I am not asking any secret questions--do you feel like we 
are putting enough investment into that counter-comm and in the 
comm abilities in the military.
    Mr. Sherman. So what you're talking about, sir, are 
electromagnetic spectrum operations. What we've done--we did in 
Vietnam, we had to do in Desert Storm, Bosnia, and elsewhere, 
but to different degrees in Afghanistan and Iraq. But as we get 
ready for China we better be able to fight and dominate in this 
space.
    So, to your point, sir, I think investments from what I've 
seen are sufficient now but this is something I am going to 
bird dog very carefully from my office here, particularly as we 
see the services starting to kind of regenerate electronic 
warfare and other capabilities both to put the enemy back on 
their heels and ensure our NCOs and our trigger pullers can 
stay in touch with one another.
    As we've seen on the Ukrainian battlefield, all the 
dynamics with EMSO [electromagnetic spectrum operations] of how 
the Russians are trying to use it and the Ukrainians are using 
it that we cannot be cut off on this to be able to make sure we 
can conduct combat operations.
    Dr. McCormick. So your feeling is right now we are doing 
adequate but we need a big investment for the future to 
continue with this?
    Mr. Sherman. I think we need to keep a close eye on it here 
and monitor as we regenerate this capability that we had in the 
Cold War, that we had to kind of maybe somewhat turn away from 
a bit during the War on Terror.
    As we regenerate it I want to assure this committee I am 
going to keep a close, close sight on this as we move forward.
    Dr. McCormick. I yield.
    The Chairman. Well, I apologize for that. I got carried 
away with the gavel. Like the Ring of Power it ultimately 
corrupts.
    So I recognize Mr. Luttrell.
    Mr. Luttrell. Keep it handy.
    Gentlemen, thank you for being here in front of us today.
    You talk about data quality as one of your pillars and I 
absolutely understand the importance of data quality. But as we 
move forward here, aggregating the data is, obviously, what's 
most important because you talk about sensor to shooter.
    My question is are we utilizing retrospective data or 
prospective data only, either one? Because as dirty as data is 
and we have to filter it, and as Mr. Golden said, we are trying 
to keep pace with China.
    But if we don't have the infrastructure in place how are we 
going to clean that data to give that information back to the 
shooter, as you say?
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for that question, Congressman 
Luttrell.
    That's a can of worms in a number of ways, right.
    So do we wait till the data is clean before we act? No. So 
we are going to have to act on dirty data until we--until we 
get it right.
    One way we'll tackle this is to say no new bad, so we know 
that we have to deal with the past stuff, the systems and the 
data that have been built--that have been built in ways that 
are not up to snuff but we need to make sure that things going 
forward are doing things right.
    So part of the way we think about this is as we built up 
this infra [infrastructure] new things that we bring on board 
are doing data right.
    But we absolutely do have to go back and recontract as 
contracts come up as we have to reacquire things. We have to--
part of what we are going to deliver are the contracting 
vehicles that allow folks to specify this is what good data 
looks like and this is what getting data looks like, getting it 
right.
    And the other thing I just want to add is distributed 
governance and building CDO [Chief Data Officer] structures 
down through the components is extremely important to this.
    Mr. Luttrell. It just seems----
    Dr. Martell. It has to be aligned with incentives.
    Mr. Luttrell. It seems like such a slow process considering 
the silos that we all work in, especially in government.
    Dr. Martell. It's absolutely a slow process, sir. But so we 
have to be able to do that slow process and get it right while 
simultaneously still allowing for new folks to deliver value.
    That's a balance that we are going to have to strike. 
There's not going to be a way to snap our fingers and just have 
it get it right fast.
    Mr. Luttrell. Sure. This is going to be a follow-up, but 
we--you and I are going to have to meet because this is--
sitting on a panel with a bunch of shooters right here, who's 
setting the inclusion criteria for the data that's inbound and 
do we have that infrastructure?
    We are talking about exascale computing here. I mean, 
forget about petaFLOPS [floating point operations per second]. 
If we are doing real-time maneuverability it's got to be quick. 
It has to be that lightning fast, and given just the footprint 
of the American arsenal itself does DOD have that 
infrastructure?
    I know DOE [Department of Energy], as far as I know, has 
the fastest computer in the world, Summit, and I don't know if 
DOD is even anywhere close to that.
    Mr. Sherman. Well, not for high--yes, we have high-
performance computers. But to your point, this is why that 
Joint Warfighting Cloud Capability we had to stick the landing 
on this and we got it now with four companies in no particular 
order--Oracle, Google, Amazon, and Microsoft--all bringing 
their cloud computing capabilities--and, sir, I know you're 
familiar with this--out to that tactical edge and that's what 
we are pressing, whether it's out on an island--inside the 
First Island Chain or somewhere in Eastern Europe or Sub-
Saharan Africa to be able to have our special operators or 
wherever cloud computing capabilities, OCONUS [Outside the 
Continental United States] as well. State of the art.
    And this is why JWCC and as we move past that JEDI cloud 
procurement that had all the issues that we have this now, and 
we are going to have it at all three security classifications 
up to top secret, which is going to be a game changer on this 
and that's why this has been so important, sir.
    Mr. Luttrell. Is there a beta test in process--progress 
right now or a scalable program that's in place that you can--
that we can see, so in real time?
    Mr. Sherman. Well, we could show you. We have cloud 
capabilities already underway in the Department and----
    Mr. Luttrell. I am talking all the way from where I can 
reach out to--I can reach out to an operator on the ground say 
this is what I--I am receiving this.
    Mr. Sherman. I think we could show you that. And the other 
thing, sir, I will tell you we are building off what the 
Intelligence Community has pioneered and I know you have likely 
seen some of this yourself, sir. So we are--we are not 
reinventing any wheels on this. We are riffing off what my IC 
[Intelligence Community] counterparts have done.
    So, sir, we'll take that for the record and we'd be happy 
to try to set up a demo or something on that for you, sir.
    Mr. Luttrell. That'd be great. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. 
Chairman.
    The Chairman. Mrs. Kiggans.
    Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you to our 
panellists for being here today.
    As a liberal arts major also I've done some reading about 
spectrum and the backbone of our communications network and 
using abundantly by the public and private sectors alike.
    So the latest battleground over spectrum allocation 
involves the mid-band, which is crucial not only for 5G and 
cellular data but also for DOD, missile defense, air 
navigation, space asset tracking, and several other critical 
uses.
    Private spectrum for telecommunications use is vital for 
economic growth and global connectivity. While the importance 
of federal spectrum allocated to DOD for national security 
purposes cannot be overstated.
    So given the competing interests between public and private 
sector spectrum needs, what proposed solutions does your office 
think are viable for band sharing, going forward? And are there 
other lower spectrum bands being explored for DOD use?
    Mr. Sherman. Ma'am, we're--to the study we are conducting 
here on that 3.1 to 3.45 gigahertz that's beachfront property 
set for the radars as well as the telecoms [telecommunications 
companies].
    We have a study underway, culminates on 30 September, that 
we've been leading since last year sharing--not vacating, not 
where we get kicked out of it, and where DOD has to go find 
some other spectrum, which will be very difficult, but how do 
we walk and chew gum and figure out, again, from geography, 
time and radio frequency use how do we make all this orchestra 
work together with the telecoms in this highly congested but 
highly desirable space?
    We are examining this right now and we would note that this 
is one of the most difficult parts of band analysis we've ever 
done just because it is so desirable both for long-range radars 
to acquire missiles and so on but also for 5G propagation.
    So we are studying this. But what I just talked about, 
those three principles of time, geography, and radio frequency, 
are what we are thinking.
    If we are going to find a potential solution to this, 
that's how it's going to be done with the telecoms and that's 
why I am working so closely with Commerce [Department of 
Commerce] and NTIA [National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration] and our interagency partners to make sure we 
look at the angles on this. But protecting this country is 
paramount consideration on this.
    Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you. And then I have a couple bases in 
my district. I represent Virginia's Second District, so Master 
Jet Base Oceana.
    Just listening to users over there, and I don't know if 
this is the right venue to ask, but I just want to communicate 
some complaints of those guys.
    When--they got a lot going on, right. They're training to 
fly. They're flying jets over there. But they complain about 
the computers and when you ask them what frustrates you about 
your job, what can we do better, it's the computers and it's 
the time to log on and I don't know--it's the security portals 
that they have to go through. It's the wifi capabilities. It's 
the age of the equipment.
    So it's--for me, it's the little things. We talk about 
quality of life and recruitment and retention for our armed 
forces, and that's what they communicate. I mean, number one, 
it's--infrastructure is a big one. But, I mean, computers is 
the second thing that they tell me.
    So I am assuming this is your department. I mean, are those 
things that--those little day-to-day things for those end users 
that they just show up and they want to go home to their 
families at night too and they get frustrated?
    And I want to do better for them so how can you help me do 
that?
    Mr. Sherman. So we are going to lean in and the term we use 
is called user experience. But, really, it's the fix our 
computers piece what you're getting at.
    And I got to tell you from my--however much longer I am in 
this job this is a top priority here and we already have some 
wind in our sails on this as the budget comes out here shortly, 
some investments we are making.
    It's a multifaceted problem. It is, yes, some new hardware. 
It is, yes, having cybersecurity scans that don't conflict with 
one another. It's having fiber on base down in Norfolk or where 
else.
    It's not having dated hardware like routers and switches 
and stuff that have been allowed to atrophy. It's a 
multifaceted problem.
    And just yesterday, ma'am, I was talking to the Air Force's 
Chief Experience Officer about how we do things like measure 
and not just go anecdotes, because I hear a lot, too, from the 
sailors and airmen and guardians and everybody else.
    But what can we do to really monitor the network to know 
when the spinny wheel is happening for the sergeant at Fort 
Eustis and she's trying to get her maintenance report in.
    We are going to get after this because we are not going to 
fight with one hand tied behind our back, and it is a quality 
of life issue, ma'am, and I am dedicated to getting after this.
    Mrs. Kiggans. Thank you so much. Please make that a 
priority, and I yield back. Thank you.
    The Chairman. Mr. Deluzio.
    Mr. Deluzio. Mr. Chairman, good afternoon. Good morning. 
Lost track of the time of day.
    Good morning, Mr. Sherman, Dr. Martell. Thanks for being 
here. Thanks for your work and your team's work to protect our 
information technology, cybersecurity, our networks. I think 
folks often don't understand what goes into that good work. So 
thank you.
    In our full committee hearing yesterday with NORTHCOM [U.S. 
Northern Command], SOUTHCOM [U.S. Southern Command], Assistant 
Secretary for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs, one of 
the issues we touched on that I asked some questions about was 
defense of our critical infrastructure, which I think is a 
place that, obviously, touches defense but, certainly, homeland 
security and other parts of our vital defenses here.
    And we talked about not just malicious actors in China and 
otherwise but one of the--some of the challenges coming from 
the fact that much of our critical infrastructure is privately 
owned. It's not just under public control.
    So, Mr. Sherman, I will start with you if you could talk 
about what those challenges are, what we can do better, what, 
you know, this subcommittee and our committee should be 
thinking about.
    Mr. Sherman. So the biggest thing is just what you said. We 
are going to take this seriously here. We need to work across 
the interagency as we work with Homeland Security, CISA 
[Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency], my friend, 
Jen Easterly over there--I've worked with her for years--on how 
we work across all the industrial sectors.
    Now, for us at DOD, the Defense Industrial Base piece, the 
defense critical infrastructure, is where my line of sight is, 
but this is going to take a whole of government, whole of 
industry, and folks taking it seriously, and this is where we 
could continue to use your assistance here on the subcommittee 
and the broader HASC [House Armed Services Committee] is making 
sure COs [commanding officers] and others don't see this as a 
nice to have--we saw Colonial Pipeline 2 years ago and other 
places--that this isn't just a blinky lights something that you 
can invest in if you want to.
    This is critical. An adverse actor can take down your 
entire--whether it's a pipeline, network. We've seen technical 
debt in things like with air traffic control and things that 
have happened recently. We've got to take this very seriously.
    So at Department of Defense we are focused on the 
Department of Defense Information Network but also our critical 
infrastructure.
    And one thing I have is budget certification authority 
where I can hold services' and others' feet to the fire to make 
sure they're having appropriate investments, and we need to do 
better on this, on areas like defense critical infrastructure 
to make sure we are protecting that piece of our enterprise as 
well, sir.
    Mr. Deluzio. Well, as a follow-up, you know, how would 
you--and for folks who aren't as dialed into what it is we are 
discussing--the work that goes into defense of critical 
infrastructure--how do you compare where our Defense Industrial 
Base is relative to other components of our critical 
infrastructure in this country?
    Mr. Sherman. Sir, I think that would be hard from my seat 
as the DOD CIO to do a holistic looking across energy, 
automotive, and everything.
    I will know that--say that in the defense side we know 
that's where the Chinese, Russians, and others are trying to 
expropriate plans, blueprints, and everything else, and really 
trying to help work with that industry to lock that down.
    I would just add, working with our interagency partners on 
all the different areas, raising awareness of this--we have a 
new National Cyber Strategy. There's been other executive 
orders and so forth. Working with you all here in Congress to 
raise awareness about this.
    And we've had some notable incidents, I think, that have 
been in the news that are raising companies' awareness. So we 
have to keep up the press and not stop on that.
    Mr. Deluzio. I will ask maybe just one more follow-up.
    Pieces of the way that we ensure cybersecurity in the 
Defense Industrial Base do you think have application to other 
components of our critical infrastructure in other sectors?
    Mr. Sherman. I think it absolutely does as we have 
standards that I know some may see as onerous and we are 
working with industry to not make it onerous.
    But to make sure there's something we can all hold 
ourselves to account, and implementing basic cybersecurity. The 
National Institutes of Standards and Technology, which I know 
sounds bureaucratic, has standards to be able to apply on basic 
things, on principles like two-factor authentication, end-to-
end encryption, and things that all companies ought to be able 
to looking at to do.
    And I grew up in South Texas in an area where we had a very 
small family company. I know how it is to have federal 
regulations land on somebody in Victoria, Texas or elsewhere. 
But we've got to be thoughtful about, whether it's a small 
company or a big one, that everybody should take responsibility 
on this.
    Mr. Deluzio. Okay. Mr. Chairman, thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back, and I think I did use two 
acronyms, NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM. I apologize.
    The Chairman. It's going into your social credit score.
    Mr. Deluzio. Fair enough.
    The Chairman. Mr. LaLota.
    Mr. LaLota. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Gentlemen, appreciate you being here and your leadership, 
your dedication, sharing your experiences with us.
    I represent a suburban district east of New York City, 
750,000 people in Suffolk County. We, Mr. Chairman, are 
America's district and appreciate the dialogue we have here 
today.
    Last September the government of Suffolk County suffered a 
cyberattack that shut down many of the government services that 
my constituents rely upon. Emergency dispatchers had to take 
down 911 calls by hand. We had no access to the geolocating 
function that's typically normal there.
    Police were forced to use finicky radio transmissions in 
call incidents and had no access to email reporting from the 
field. Contractors were paid in paper checks. That created a 
huge backlog of services in the county.
    At the county's traffic agency people were unable to pay 
pending tickets, which created extra fees and became a huge 
hassle in Suffolk County.
    In addition to the major shutdown of government services, 
the hackers who claimed responsibility for the attack 
threatened to slowly leak sensitive information that the 
government had at hand and, unfortunately, the situations like 
this aren't unique to Suffolk County.
    We are constantly hearing about cyberattacks, data 
spillage, and ransomware and phishing throughout the country 
almost on a daily basis. If hackers can have such an effect on 
my county I fear that there can be a larger government entity, 
state, or, God forbid, our federal government be subject to a 
similar attack.
    The Office of the CIO, as I understand it, was responsible 
for the DOD IT enterprise cybersecurity. I, too, am a liberal 
arts major so I am leaning a little bit into this as well. And 
I do understand that you have protection over our unclassified 
and classified networks.
    So my question is this to both of you, please, gentlemen. 
What is your office doing to gather lessons learned from these 
state and local attacks to ensure that their prevalence, their 
impact, is reduced prospectively?
    Mr. Sherman. Sir, we work closely across the interagency--I 
mentioned DHS and CISA, for example, Department of Homeland 
Security--to learn about the very unfortunate attack against 
your district there, sir, and elsewhere, where we hear about 
attacks against schools, industries, and elsewhere, and what we 
call the targets or, excuse me, tactics, techniques, and 
procedures--TTPs is the government acronym on that--on how the 
adversary is using these mechanisms to employ ransomware or to 
hack into systems.
    I work very closely with the U.S. Cyber Command and the 
National Security Agency, which is both under General Paul 
Nakasone, and from them I not only get the cyber aspects but 
also the threat-based intelligence of what state and nonstate 
actors are doing and how they're operating and evolving.
    This is something I do every week and multiple days a week 
working with them to understand how we ought to be defending 
differently. I mentioned earlier about a concept called Zero 
Trust where we assume an enemy is already on our network.
    This is the state of the art on--we've talked about it for 
a while but we are getting after it at the Department of 
Defense on not just the old perimeter defend at the castle and 
moat, and not even what we call defense in depth but really 
preventing an adversary's ability to move across a network and 
hold data at risk as what happened in the attack you described, 
sir.
    So we must be a learning organization and stay very up with 
the threat-based intelligence on how an adversary is going to 
operate.
    Mr. LaLota. Can you describe what your interactions are or 
will be with state and local governments to that end? I 
understand that you properly explained the big picture on what 
the issue is and how it should be attacked.
    But I fear that information, that guidance, isn't getting 
to the local officials where the rubber meets the road.
    Mr. Sherman. Sir, my interaction would not be direct. It 
would be through the Department of Homeland Security who would 
interact with the state and locals there and also, maybe 
obliquely, where we have, of course, U.S. military 
installations and garrisons that are relying on defense 
critical infrastructure, power, and so on, coming on to those 
garrisons and bases and so on.
    But primarily through DHS is where that interaction and 
where I am going to be hearing about what's happening in your 
district and also where if we are seeing something from a 
national security perspective U.S. Cyber Command working with 
them could share that from a national security perspective.
    Mr. LaLota. Thank you.
    Switching gears for a moment, Congress required the 
Department of Defense to establish a comprehensive framework 
for the cybersecurity of the Defense Industrial Base in section 
1648 of the 2020 NDAA.
    Their support was a full 2 years late and yet didn't seem 
to address a host of problems that still seem apparent about 
how the DOD manages the Defense Industrial Base cybersecurity.
    Did section 1648 force any lasting change to how the 
department manages its support to the Defense Industrial Base?
    Mr. Sherman. It absolutely motivated it and we've got to 
keep doing better on this front. As we conduct outreach to the 
Defense Industrial Base, as we organize ourselves internally, 
there's over a dozen DOD entities, large offices that are 
touching this sector here to make sure we are organizing 
properly and not double communicating or sending conflicting 
messages and also offering services as--to the Defense 
Industrial Base.
    For example, the National Security Agency's Cybersecurity 
Collaboration Center works--has service----
    The Chairman. Your time has expired. However, I was going 
to ask that question in the second round. So why don't we plant 
a flag there and we'll come back to it? Sorry.
    Mr. Sherman. Roger. I will be right at audible, sir.
    The Chairman. I am a rule follower, a Catholic Marine. So I 
am sorry.
    Mr. Keating is recognized for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I just had one strain of questioning. Thank you both for 
being here.
    I noticed, Dr. Martell, your background on the private 
side. I noticed the experience, you know, as head of machine 
learning for Lyft and head of machine intelligence for Dropbox 
as well as leading several IE teams' initiatives at LinkedIn, 
and I also know the challenges we have with workforce and 
getting trained educated people throughout our workforce.
    So I was wondering, given that background that you had, 
what plans you might have to leverage from those experiences 
and expand knowledge and skill sets in AI across the Department 
of Defense as a whole.
    Can we do those kind of things internally as well and can 
we expand what we have?
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for that question, Congressman 
Keating.
    I was born in Massachusetts, by the way.
    Mr. Keating. Well, we won't hold that against you.
    Dr. Martell. Thank you. It's a tough year for the Red Sox 
this year. So I think perhaps but----
    Mr. Keating. Go Bo Sox.
    Dr. Martell. So I think we have to get at two things here. 
If you look at what a--what talent used to be needed for AI it 
was Ph.D. level expertise.
    As the tools become commoditized and as just education, 
even JPME [joint professional military education], for 
example--professional military education--sorry, sir--
professional military education is starting to add more data, 
more AI, more IT literacy, that the need for that expertise is 
going down.
    So I think there's two ways we can tackle this. One is we 
need to upskill folks we already have. We've already built out 
10 new work roles that are specific to AI--with Honorable 
Sherman's org [organization] that are specific to AI and data, 
and my team has--is beginning to do analyses across the 
Department about which components need which work roles.
    Secondarily, I think we can--we need to work with the 
services and the civilian orgs to be able to give actual 
careers to folks who want to do those sorts of work roles.
    Currently, it's the case that you--if you're in the service 
you might do a data work role for one tour and then you move on 
to something else and you're doing something completely 
different.
    And, in addition, your promotion is not based upon being 
successful in the data aspects. Your promotion is based upon, 
for example, if you're an unrestricted line officer on your 
leadership.
    So we need to actually think hard about how we can have the 
careers and the motivations in those careers drive expertise in 
data, AI, et cetera.
    Simultaneously, I think we really need to tackle some 
untapped aspects of our workforce in the U.S. If you went to a 
select school you're going to have people pounding down your 
door to give you a very expensive job offer. I think that's 
great, and if we can motivate those folks to come into the 
service, to come into government, that's wonderful.
    But there's a number of folks who might be just below that 
level or just a little bit below that where we can serve as an 
apprenticeship that transforms their capabilities.
    And so we might take a hit on the front side where we are 
having to do extra work to bring them up to speed. But at the 
end, we have folks who are highly capable, and my view is we 
actually want to encourage those highly capable folks to go out 
to industry because that motivates people to come in the other 
side of the pipeline.
    Now, they might stay forever. That would be awesome. But if 
we are seen as the ones that take you from not being able to 
get that amazing job, come work with us, and then you get that 
amazing job, I am very happy with that.
    Mr. Keating. I am really glad to hear that. It really 
echoes and what I learned way back in my MBA [Master of 
Business Administration] days in a Massachusetts college BC 
[Boston College]. So I really am pleased that you're going in 
that direction.
    Thank you so much, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Onto a second round, I want to pick up where 
we left off with Mr. LaLota's question. He mentioned that the 
Section 1648 report was 2 years late. Additionally, DIB 
[Defense Industrial Base] cybersecurity is your responsibility, 
correct?
    I am tracking, however, at least six separate offices 
within OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] who have 
asserted leadership--some sort of leadership role in protecting 
the Defense--I did an acronym--Defense Industrial Base. Not 
DIB. Defense Industrial Base. To outside organizations and 
entities.
    So two questions. One is Mr. LaLota's question--did the 
report force change, and then, two, what are you doing in your 
role to bring coherence to an effort that, from my vantage 
point, looks somewhat scattershot at present?
    Mr. Sherman. So to riff off that earlier question, yes, it 
has driven change, Congressman. Absolutely it has.
    Onto the how are we organizing ourselves for victory here, 
so when I got this last year, looking--polling around DOD how 
many organizations are touching a Defense Industrial Base 
company, whether it's a small or medium or one of the big 
primes, and it's more. It's 12 to 13, depending upon how we 
count it.
    And I first held a meeting and brought all them in a room--
Defense Contract Management Agency, Defense Counterintelligence 
and Security Agency, DOD Policy [Office of the Secretary of 
Defense for Policy]. I can go down a list.
    But putting myself in the shoes and talking to a lot of 
companies, how does this feel when you have got different 
entities either providing helpfully or trying to be helpful 
providing information or coming to you with a requirement?
    So what we've done, my acting deputy, who's also the chief 
information security officer, has stood up a monthly cadence 
with these organizations to get ourselves aligned on the DIB 
Management Council here. I think we call it something a little 
bit different.
    But bringing these organizations, who's sharing what, who's 
talking to whom. Let's get aligned here and, again, put 
ourselves in the shoes of the affected companies.
    So maybe it could be helpful. It could be threat-based 
intelligence that maybe national security agencies providing 
through that collaboration center I mentioned or another 
entity, and they need to be cross talking so if they hand 
something to one company and they say also, we got this from 
another DOD organization.
    So that's what we are doing, sir. We are trying to align 
this and make it a little more sensible and less bureaucratic.
    The Chairman. But you consider yourself the leader of that 
council?
    Mr. Sherman. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Of the six different offices that----
    Mr. Sherman. Actually 12. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Well, okay.
    Mr. Sherman. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. Twelve different offices.
    Okay. Mr.--Dr. Martell, excuse me--before JADC2 we had the 
Joint Information Environment. Before the Joint Information 
Environment we had the Global Information Grid.
    Have you reviewed those past efforts to understand why they 
failed and what you might do differently so that JADC2 does not 
suffer the same fate?
    Dr. Martell. Thank you for that question, Chairman 
Gallagher.
    When I--I have been in the office now eight months and I've 
tried very hard to ignore history, and the reason I have is as 
I started going down that rabbit hole I felt myself being 
inculcated with the old ways of doing things.
    So I've asked myself what's the right solution, and we are 
now just turning to making sure that this right solution maps 
correctly to our goals.
    So, look, I think the right solution is building out a 
marketplace that allows multiple vendors to bring apps to bear 
where these older solutions were--and I am going to defer a lot 
to Honorable Sherman because I believe these were under his 
purview--but they were older--these older solutions had rigid 
requirements that were established a long time before delivery 
and by the time the delivery came the world has changed.
    We need to create a marketplace and infrastructure that 
allows for that dynamic change and that's how we are tackling 
JADC2.
    The Chairman. Mr. Sherman, in what little time I have left, 
I am pleased to hear that we are moving out on a multi-cloud 
expeditiously. However, it seems we just lost the last 2 and a 
half years.
    What lessons should we derive from that?
    Mr. Sherman. Sir, do you mean in terms of the acquisition 
or what did we learn in the 2 years?
    The Chairman. Well, both. What did we learn----
    Mr. Sherman. So this was one area here that--yes, as the 
U.S. government it shouldn't take us this many years to get 
enterprise class for the Department of Defense and we mention 
about the CCP and if Xi on that side said something--he needs 
something that quickly he'll have it very quickly.
    We have to do better as a whole of government here in being 
able to procure and acquire services for the Department of 
Defense. This is an area we did get through. There was no 
protest. It's ready to go.
    But this is something that, frankly, sir, we should have 
been able to do more quickly and without all the bureaucratic 
and other issues that came up.
    Now, on the functional piece the upshot here we have what 
we've learned on the intelligence side with our multi-cloud 
multi-vendor approach, and then also within the military 
services their own cloud efforts.
    You hear terms like Cloud One and others. That's the Air 
Force effort. We have a lot of lessons learned we are 
integrating into this enterprise cloud effort. So we are not at 
a standstill. We have a running start from what we did there, 
sir.
    The Chairman. My time is about to expire.
    Does either Mr. Khanna, Mr. Keating, Mr. Luttrell--any more 
questions?
    You guys got off easy today.
    Well, with that, I just would emphasize a couple points as 
we close.
    One, I think you saw a lot of interest in sort of general 
talent management and whether we are adequately using the 
authorities that Congress has given you, particularly Cyber 
Excepted Service authorities. I know we talked about that 
earlier this week, Mr. Sherman.
    So I would like to develop some sort of routine process 
whereby you can come and tell us, here's how these authorities 
are being used, here's what we are learning, and here's, you 
know, where we may need--we could expand it or maybe we can't 
expand it.
    So I just would hope you would commit to that, going 
forward.
    And then, Dr. Martell, we had a little bit of a discussion 
about metrics. I just would encourage you to think through and 
would welcome a follow-up discussion on what is achievable.
    I recognize that, you know, the Pentagon is a massive 
aircraft carrier. It doesn't turn on a dime. But what is 
achievable in the next 2 years? What can we really deliver to 
our warfighters within the next 2 years?
    And so I would be eager to work with you on what are fair 
metrics in both of those areas, going forward.
    And with that, the hearing is adjourned.
    Oh, we are going to move into a closed session--closed 
briefing.
    And now the hearing is adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:48 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]      
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                           A P P E N D I X

                             March 9, 2023
    
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                             March 9, 2023

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    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]                        
  
      
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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                             March 9, 2023

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               RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. RYAN

    Dr. Martell. The initial prototype (version 1.0) for the data 
integration layer, that CDAO is building in the classified cloud for 
experimentation, will be available by the end of May 2023 for usage in 
GIDE 6 (June and July). This sustained experiment will allow for CDAO 
to assess the performance of the data layer and measure the impact of 
its services to warfighter workflows. Subsequent revisions of the data 
layer will be deployed quarterly to align with the ongoing series of 
experiments.   [See page 13.]
      
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                             March 9, 2023

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                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER

    Mr. Gallagher. Between the war in Ukraine, persistent 
counter-terrorism operations, and recent brazen actions by the 
CCP, the need for advanced data, algorithmic and AI 
capabilities is more urgent than ever. Some Combatant 
Commanders are really leaning in here. For example, GEN 
Kurrilla's team is discussing leveraging data-driven technology 
at CENTCOM to create new warfighting concepts and GEN Van 
Herck's team is discussing something similar at NORAD/NORTHCOM. 
I understand much of this work is on the back of significant 
congressional investment in Project Maven and continued through 
the CDAO. What is your plan to expand the capabilities the DoD 
has employed there across the Combatant Commands? Are there any 
funding issues that will prevent accelerating the expansion?
    Dr. Martell. In FY23, CDAO received $36.8M for the tactical 
integration of AI in combatant commands. This resource 
supported a limited rollout of Maven Smart System to each of 
the geographic combatant commands on certain networks through 
the end of Q1 FY24 as an R&D activity. CDAO put heavy emphasis 
on INDOPACOM, EUCOM, CENTCOM, and NORTHCOM to match NDS 
priorities and meet ongoing user demand. In aggregate, the FY23 
$36.8M appropriation will not meet CCMD demand for integrated 
software solutions that enable decision advantage within the 
combatant commands, as the user demand for advanced digital 
solutions continues to skyrocket.
    Therefore, for FY24, CDAO has requested $225.5M for its 
JADC2 Project Management team. A notional breakdown of funding 
follows: (actual costs will depend on negotiated contract 
rates)
     LCCMD mission applications ($127.5M)--
Establishing an enterprise business model for procuring 
existing mission command applications to improve the 
acquisition approach (e.g.,safeguarding government data 
rights), ensuring efficient allocation of development and 
sustainment licenses, and standardizing best practices within 
mission applications across Combatant Commands. This will 
include, as appropriate, the Maven Smart System or alternative 
capabilities as determined in partnership with the Combatant 
Commands, warfighters, and appropriate contracting and 
acquisition officials.
     LData Integration Layer for JADC2 ($54M)--
Developing data mesh services and enabling capabilities to 
integrate data across CCMDs, the Joint Staff, and the Services 
to ensure accurate, timely, and secure data flow across DoD 
organizations.
     LGIDE Experimentation ($44M)--Using user-centered 
experiments to test the effectiveness of workflow support 
applications and the data integration layer in achieving 
decision advantage. CDAO believes this approach to evolving 
data and applications in tandem with user-centered concepts, 
and measuring effectiveness, is the best way to evolve JADC2 
capabilities across organizations and domains, while also 
building a robust commercial marketplace for software providers 
to DoD. Building on our efforts in FY24, future efforts would 
expand to additional CCMDs in accordance with the priorities 
set out in the National Defense Strategy and would require 
additional funding.
                                ------                                


                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOULTON

    Mr. Moulton. With the looming vulnerability of our nation's 
cryptographic enterprise due to advances in quantum computing, 
can you tell us the full scope of effort required to prepare 
for the continued protection of national security information?
    Mr. Sherman. Ultimately, the full scope of effort will 
require the migration of our vulnerable national security 
systems to a quantum resistant capability. DoD components will 
accomplish this incrementally as technology and solutions 
become available for procurement and integration. Success also 
hinges on industry's timely commitment to adopt stronger 
algorithms. Our crypto modernization efforts must ensure the 
protection of information from the moment of transmission to 
the end of the intelligence life of the information from 25-50 
years, depending on the classification of the information.
    Mr. Moulton. When will we know how much it will cost to get 
to continuous modernization of encryption, to include post-
quantum, and how do you assess the `critical path' to get 
there?
    Mr. Sherman. Crypto Modernization (CM) is an enduring 
effort that includes recurring procurement, integration, and 
sustainment costs. These efforts are driven by Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance for CM planning and the 
retirement dates for cryptographic algorithms also referred to 
as the last year of use date. DoD components are beginning to 
specify their CM requirements for the FY25 Program Objective 
Memorandum (POM). We anticipate DoD organizations will have 
improved cost projections in their FY26 POM projections as the 
next generation of Quantum Resistant (QR) cryptographic 
capabilities become available for procurement.
    Also, as NSA publishes the formal cryptographic 
modernization requirements for the CM2 initiative later this 
year, DoD organizations will also begin to program funding to 
modernize and replace their currently fielded systems. Although 
NSA has released its full list of high-assurance quantum 
resistant algorithms specifications for use in NSS, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) will not 
release their list of medium assurance public QR algorithms 
until mid-2024. This timing gap will impact many NSS programs' 
ability to POM for future encryption devices as many of these 
cryptographic devices rely on the NSA high grade algorithms to 
protect data transmitted or stored, and require the public 
medium assurance algorithms for software, firmware, and user 
authentication.
                                ------                                


                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FALLON

    Mr. Fallon. Mr. Sherman, the reality of today's workforce 
requires personnel to use their own devices to conduct business 
for the Department of Defense. This is especially true for 
members of the National Guard and Reserves. 13 other federal 
agencies have developed programs to secure personal devices and 
allow them access to their networks, but not the DoD. What 
steps are you taking to develop a ``bring your own device'' 
policy that would allow for necessary flexibility while 
maintaining security? Have you contemplated moving to a device 
or application-centric security model that would allow for 
necessary access and isolate threats to a single application 
instead of the entire DODIN?
    Mr. Sherman. On August 10, 2022, the DoD CIO released 
policy guidance to DoD components that allows them to develop 
and tailor their Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) solution(s). The 
DoD policy allows users to voluntarily participate in the BYOD 
initiative. DoD components are responsible for following and 
integrating all applicable Security Technical Implementation 
Guides (STIG) and the DoD CIO's guidance for use of non-
government mobile devices, excluding laptops. The DoD CIO's 
office is currently refining a mobile applications policy to 
ensure the protection of information on mobile devices.

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