[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                 CISA 2025: THE STATE OF AMERICAN CYBERSECU-
                   RITY FROM A STAKEHOLDER PERSPECTIVE

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               BEFORE THE

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                    CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE
                               PROTECTION

                                 OF THE

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 23, 2023

                               __________

                            Serial No. 118-4

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     

[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT] 
                                     

        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov

                               __________
                               
                                
                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
52-262                    WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------     

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
                     Sean Jones, Legislative Clerk
                                 ------                                

      SUBCOMMITTEE ON CYBERSECURITY AND INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION

                Andrew R. Garbarino, New York, Chairman
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California, Ranking 
Mike Ezell, Mississippi                  Member
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Mark E. Green, MD,  (ex officio)     Robert Menendez,  New Jersey
                                     Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
                                         (ex officio)
               Cara Mumford, Subcommittee Staff Director
           Moira Bergin, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                    Alice Hayes, Subcommittee Clerk
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable Andrew R. Garbarino, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of New York, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     3
The Honorable Eric Swalwell, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of California, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection:
  Oral Statement.................................................     4
  Prepared Statement.............................................     5
The Honorable Bennie G. Thompson, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of Mississippi, and Ranking Member, Committee on 
  Homeland Security:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     7

                               Witnesses

Ms. Tina Sherman, Director, Critical Infrastructure Protection 
  and Transportation Security, U.S. Government Accountability 
  Office:
  Oral Statement.................................................     8
  Prepared Statement.............................................    10
Mr. Drew Bagley, Vice President and Counsel, Privacy and Cyber 
  Policy, Crowdstrike:
  Oral Statement.................................................    14
  Prepared Statement.............................................    16
Ms. Heather Hogsett, Senior Vice President, Technology and Risk 
  Management, Bank Policy Institute:
  Oral Statement.................................................    22
  Prepared Statement.............................................    24
Mr. Marty Edwards, Vice President, Operational Technology 
  Security, Tenable:
  Oral Statement.................................................    27
  Prepared Statement.............................................    29

                                Appendix

Question From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino for Tina Won Sherman..    53
Question From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino for Marty Edwards.....    53

 
   CISA 2025: THE STATE OF AMERICAN CYBERSECURITY FROM A STAKEHOLDER 
                              PERSPECTIVE

                              ----------                              


                        Thursday, March 23, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                         Subcommittee on Cybersecurity and 
                                 Infrastructure Protection,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m., in 
room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. Andrew R. 
Garbarino [Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Garbarino, Gimenez, Ezell, Lee, 
Luttrell, Swalwell, Jackson Lee, Carter, and Menendez.
    Also present: Representatives Green and Thompson.
    Chairman Garbarino. The Committee on Homeland Security on 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection will come to order.
    The purpose of this hearing is to receive testimony from a 
panel of experts and industry leaders who will provide their 
perspectives on CISA to the subcommittee through the lens of 
its stakeholders. These witnesses will help the subcommittee 
explore how the agency has gotten to where it is today and 
provide ideas to help mature the agency by 2025 and beyond.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    I would like to thank the Members of the subcommittee and 
our witnesses for joining us for our first hearing on the 
Cybersecurity Infrastructure Protection subcommittee of the 
118th Congress. I am honored to continue the great work we 
started in the subcommittee last Congress, this time as 
Chairman. We are here today to discuss a key agency to our 
homeland security, the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency, or CISA, within the Department of Homeland 
Security.
    CISA has a critical mission set. It is tasked with 
administering Federal cybersecurity requirements, supporting 
private-sector cybersecurity, engaging with the Sector Risk 
Management Agency, and ensuring the physical security of our 
critical infrastructure. Today, we will focus specifically on 
the cyber aspects of CISA's mission. CISA has a direct impact 
on securing critical infrastructure, Federal agencies, and our 
way of life. It is an agency built on partnerships, and those 
partnerships with stakeholders play an important role in 
furthering CISA's mission. So today we will hear from some of 
those stakeholders to understand CISA's strengths, weaknesses, 
and where it needs to go in the future.
    In recent years, the United States has experienced a deluge 
of high-profile cyber incidents, from Solar Winds to Colonial 
Pipeline, to Log4shell vulnerability. Our cyber defenses, work 
force, and processes have been put to the test, and CISA has 
been at the center of every response. These incidents have 
elevated cybersecurity issues across the country and 
highlighted the importance of securing both Federal and 
critical infrastructure networks.
    As a result of the evolving cyber threat landscape, 
Congress has asked a lot of CISA from Day 1 and expected it to 
succeed. The reality is that CISA is still a young agency, it 
was created in 2018, and since then it has grown exponentially. 
Since fiscal year 2019, Congress has nearly doubled CISA's 
annual budget from $1.68 billion in fiscal year 2019 to $2.9 
billion in fiscal year 2023, and we are now looking at fiscal 
year 2024 request of $3.1 billion. This level of funding would 
be a lot for even a large, mature department to handle.
    Congress has also given CISA significant new authorities, 
including the responsibility of establishing a cross-sector 
incident reporting rule making and the authority to 
persistently hunt for threats on Federal networks without prior 
agency approval. Properly executed, these new authorities and 
resources will help CISA accomplish its mission.
    This Congress, our subcommittee will conduct rigorous 
oversight of CISA to ensure those new authorities are 
implemented appropriately and CISA is a responsible steward of 
taxpayer dollars. We need to take a step back and allow CISA to 
get a handle on their new responsibilities and ask pointed 
productive questions about its efforts. Like CISA is a 
partnered industry to help them improve their cyber posture, 
Congress should be a partner to CISA to help the agency mature 
and reach its full potential.
    We have four distinguished witnesses to kick off our 
efforts. Each witness brings a different perspective on CISA 
and its partnerships. With these witnesses, we will examine 
CISA's role as the Nation's risk manager and how it balances 
that role with its responsibilities as a Sector Risk Management 
Agency for 8 sectors. We will consider the proper role for 
regulation while balancing security and collaboration with CISA 
as a partner to industry. We will also delve into CISA's 
Federal network programs as well as external efforts as a 
partner with private sector to improve critical infrastructure 
cybersecurity, particularly through the Joint Cyber Defense 
Collaborative.
    Sounds like a lot we are doing today.
    Additionally, we will discuss CISA's effort to secure 
operational technology, or OT, an important aspect of critical 
infrastructure mission.
    If I did not comment on the need to address the cyber work 
force shortage that both the Federal Government and many 
industry partners across the 16 critical infrastructures face, 
none of these efforts that I have outlined today will be 
possible without a fully-equipped cyber work force. I look 
forward to discussing the ways in which we can address the over 
700,000 cyber work force gap that exists today.
    I am looking forward to a thoughtful and productive 
conversation about CISA and how it could improve and grow in 
the future. It is imperative that CISA succeed in its important 
mission. I look forward to working with my colleagues to find 
bipartisan ways to ensure that it does.
    [The statement of Chairman Garbarino follows:]
               Statement of Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino
    I'd like to thank the Members of the subcommittee and our witnesses 
for joining us for our first hearing of the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Protection subcommittee of the 118th Congress. I'm 
honored to continue the great work we started in this subcommittee last 
Congress--this time, as Chairman.
    We are here today to discuss a key agency to our homeland security: 
the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, or CISA, within 
the Department of Homeland Security. CISA has a critical mission set. 
It is tasked with administering Federal cybersecurity requirements, 
supporting private-sector cybersecurity, engaging with the sector risk 
management agency community, and ensuring the physical security of our 
critical infrastructure. Today, we will focus specifically on the cyber 
aspects of CISA's mission.
    CISA has a direct impact on securing critical infrastructure, 
Federal agencies, and our way of life. It is an agency built on 
partnerships--and those partnerships with stakeholders play an 
important role in furthering CISA's mission. So today, we will hear 
from some of those stakeholders to understand CISA's strengths, 
weaknesses, and where it needs to go in the future.
    In recent years, the United States has experienced a deluge of 
high-profile cyber incidents, from SolarWinds, to Colonial Pipeline, to 
the Log4Shell vulnerability. Our cyber defenses, workforce, and 
processes have been put to the test, and CISA has been at the center of 
every response. These incidents have elevated cybersecurity issues 
across the country and highlighted the importance of securing both 
Federal and critical infrastructure networks.
    As a result of the evolving cyber threat landscape, Congress has 
asked a lot of CISA from Day 1, and expected it to succeed. The reality 
is that CISA is still a young agency; it was created in 2018 and since 
then, it has grown exponentially. Since fiscal year 2019, Congress has 
nearly doubled CISA's annual budget, from $1.68 billion in fiscal year 
2019 to $2.9 billion in fiscal year 2023. We're now looking at the 
fiscal year 2024 request of $3.1 billion. This level of funding would 
be a lot for even a large, mature department to handle.
    Congress has also given CISA significant new authorities, including 
the responsibility of establishing a cross-sector incident reporting 
rule-making and the authority to persistently hunt for threats on 
Federal networks without prior agency approval. Properly executed, 
these new authorities and resources will help CISA accomplish its 
mission.
    This Congress, our subcommittee will conduct rigorous oversight of 
CISA to ensure those new authorities are implemented appropriately and 
CISA is a responsible steward of taxpayer dollars. We need to take a 
step back and allow CISA to get a handle on their new responsibilities 
and ask pointed, but productive, questions about its efforts. Like CISA 
is a partner to industry to help them improve their cyber posture, 
Congress should be a partner to CISA to help the agency mature and 
reach its full potential.
    We have four distinguished witnesses to kick off our efforts. Each 
witness brings a different perspective on CISA and its partnerships. 
With these witnesses, we will examine CISA's role as the Nation's Risk 
Manager and how it balances that role with its responsibilities as a 
Sector Risk Management Agency, or SRMA, for 8 sectors. We will consider 
the proper role for regulation while balancing security and 
collaboration, with CISA as a partner to industry. We will also delve 
into CISA's Federal network programs as well as external efforts as a 
partner with the private sector to improve critical infrastructure 
cybersecurity, particularly through the Joint Cyber Defense 
Collaborative. Additionally, we will discuss CISA's efforts to secure 
operational technology, or OT: an important aspect of its critical 
infrastructure mission.
    Finally, I would be remiss if I did not comment on the need to 
address the cyber workforce shortage that both the Federal Government 
and many industry partners across the 16 critical infrastructure 
sectors face. None of these efforts that I've outlined today would be 
possible without a fully-equipped cyber workforce, and I look forward 
to discussing ways in which we can address the over 700,000 cyber 
workforce gap that exists today.
    I am looking forward to a thoughtful and productive conversation 
about CISA and how it could improve and grow in the future. It's 
imperative that CISA succeed in its important mission and I look 
forward to working with my colleagues to find bipartisan ways to ensure 
that it does.

    Chairman Garbarino. I now recognize the Ranking Member, the 
gentleman from California, Mr. Swalwell, for his opening 
statement.
    Mr. Swalwell. Thank you. I thank the Chairman and 
congratulate the Chairman and his staff for taking over this 
subcommittee. I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman.
    There are a lot of topics that come before this committee 
where you will see passionate debate between both sides, mostly 
earnest, substantive, but here, I don't think there is much 
daylight between the two of us as far as what our cybersecurity 
threats are and the resolve that the two of us have to meet 
them.
    For me, particularly in my Congressional district, with so 
many people who work in high tech with two national 
laboratories, to also make sure that we can deploy awareness 
and technologies to small businesses in an affordable way. You 
know, 10 years ago, when I first came on this committee, you 
had to be this tall to be a target of a serious ransomware 
attack. Today, small businesses, thousands of small businesses, 
are being hit every single day. So it is part of my goal on 
this committee to work with the Chairman to make sure that we 
can really harden the defenses, especially for critical 
infrastructure, but especially small businesses.
    I want to thank the witnesses for participating today and 
also our staff who prepared this hearing.
    The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection 
subcommittee has a strong bipartisan support in bipartisan 
collaboration. Just, again, I look forward--as this is the 
first committee hearing of the year--to working with the 
Chairman and his staff and his Members as we pursue that.
    But speaking of CISA, as the Chairman pointed out, we have 
nearly doubled since 2019 CISA's budget. When we established it 
4.5 years ago, we envisioned the agency as a sophisticated 
cybersecurity and infrastructure organization. Thanks to 
bipartisan work on this subcommittee and the full committee, it 
has matured rapidly and growing more capable of meeting our 
Nation's complex and diverse threat environment. All of us have 
been impressed by what CISA has been able to accomplish so far. 
However, as the Chairman referenced, we need to work to support 
the agency as it continues to adapt to the cybersecurity needs 
of our Federal Government, critical infrastructure sector, and 
private enterprises, especially small businesses.
    From election security to ShieldsUP, CISA has demonstrated 
an ability to dynamically surge resources to counter emerging 
threats and collaborate strategically with the private sector. 
Looking ahead, Director Easterly has set ambitious goals to 
modernize CISA's Federal network security programs, to 
tactically engage with entities whose resilience matters most 
to our national security, and to drive adoption of secure by 
design and secure by default. At the same time, CISA is in the 
process of implementing the Cyber Incident Reporting Bill, is 
in the second year of the State and Local Cyber Grants Program, 
and is executing on a range of new authorities.
    As we speak, this week they are hosting the inaugural 
Planning Summit for the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative, also 
known as JCDC, which was established in August 2021. Everyone 
who I have spoken to about JCDC has told me and our staff of 
its importance to ensuring productive collaboration between 
CISA and the private sector. JCDC has enabled rapid information 
sharing among Government and private-sector partners following 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and it was critical to addressing 
the Log4j vulnerability. But JCDC has existed for a year-and-a-
half without a charter or concrete criteria for membership, all 
of which are essential for the JCDC to provide enduring value. 
A number of people have asked me, how do we get into JCDC?
    Toward that end, in the coming weeks, I plan to introduce 
legislation to clarify the activities of the JCDC to improve on 
its successes and increase its impact. CISA is also in the 
process of growing its support for operational technology 
security by continuing implementation of the Cyber Century 
Program and the Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity 
Training Act, which I introduced and was signed into law last 
year.
    I say this to make the point that while CISA pursues the 
ambitious agenda set by its leadership, it must also 
effectively execute its existing obligations, including to 
promote the great training and educational resources provided 
by CISA that are widely utilized across industries.
    Two principles drove Congress' work last year in the 
subcommittee, an increase to the Federal Government's 
visibility of malicious cyber activity, and second, pushing 
resources to entities most vulnerable to cyber attacks.
    As we approach oversight this Congress, we must ensure the 
laws we have enacted deliver concrete security value and 
preserve the trust we have built with the private sector to 
advance critical cybersecurity policy and work with CISA to 
address gaps.
    CISA's collaboration with the private sector is essential 
to both its Federal network and critical infrastructure 
activities. I am glad we are kicking off this Congress by 
hearing from some of CISA's most active partners. The testimony 
from our witnesses today will play a key role in the on-going 
oversight of CISA moving forward.
    With that, again, welcome to the witnesses, and thank you, 
Mr. Chairman, for convening us.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Swalwell follows:]
               Statement of Ranking Member Eric Swalwell
                             March 23, 2022
    Good morning. Before I begin, I would like to congratulate my 
friend from New York, Mr. Garbarino, on becoming Chairman of the 
subcommittee. I am confident that we will be able to continue this 
subcommittee's tradition of bipartisanship under your leadership.
    The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Protection Subcommittee has a 
strong history of productive collaboration and, as a result, has 
enacted meaningful legislation to provide cybersecurity grants to State 
and local governments; enhanced cybersecurity education and training 
programs; strengthen Federal network security; and improved our ability 
to understand and address threats to operational technology.
    In short, this subcommittee's commitment to bipartisanship has 
increased capacity and reduced risk for both the public and private 
sectors. I look forward to building on that record with you this 
Congress, Mr. Chairman.
    Since 2019, Congress has nearly doubled CISA's budget and expanded 
its authorities significantly.
    When Congress established CISA 4\1/2\ years ago, we envisioned the 
agency as a sophisticated cybersecurity and infrastructure protection 
organization. Thanks to bipartisan work on this subcommittee, and the 
full committee, CISA has matured rapidly, and growing more capable of 
meeting the challenges of our complex and diverse threat environment.
    I am impressed by what CISA has been able to accomplish so far, and 
will always work to support the agency as it continues to adapt to the 
cybersecurity needs of our Federal Government, critical infrastructure 
sector, and private enterprises.
    From election security to ``Shields Up'' campaign, CISA has 
demonstrated an ability to dynamically surge resources to counter 
emerging threats and collaborate strategically with the private sector.
    Looking ahead, Director Easterly has set ambitious goals to 
modernize CISA's Federal network security programs, tactically engage 
with entities whose resilience matters most to our national security 
and our economy, and drive adoption of secure-by-design and secure-by-
default.
    I look forward to learning more about how CISA will work with 
Congress, its partners in the Executive branch, and the private sector 
to get the buy-in necessary for success.
    At the same time, CISA is currently in the process of implementing 
the cyber incident reporting bill, is on the second year of the State 
and local cyber grants program, and is executing on a range of new 
authorities.
    As we speak, CISA is hosting the inaugural planning summit for the 
Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC), which was established in 
August 2021.
    Everyone I have spoken to about JCDC has told me about its 
importance to ensuring productive collaboration between CISA and the 
private sector. The JCDC enabled rapid information sharing among 
Government and private-sector partners following Russia's invasion of 
Ukraine and it was critical to addressing the Log4j vulnerability.
    But JCDC has existed for a year-and-a-half without a charter or 
concrete criteria for membership--all of which are essential for the 
JCDC to provide enduring value.
    Toward that end, in the coming weeks, I plan to introduce 
legislation to clarify the activities of the JCDC to improve on its 
successes and increase its impact.
    CISA is also in the process of growing its support for operational 
technology security by continuing implementation of the CyberSentry 
program and the Industrial Control Systems Cybersecurity Training Act, 
which I introduced and was signed into law last year.
    I say this to make the point that while CISA pursues the ambitious 
agenda set by its leadership--some of which will require this committee 
to provide new resources and authorities--it must also effectively 
execute its existing obligations, including to promote the great 
training and educational services provided by CISA are widely utilized 
across industries.
    Last Congress, two principles drove the subcommittee's work: First, 
an increase to the Federal Government's visibility of malicious cyber 
activity and second, pushing resources to entities most vulnerable to 
cyber attack. As we approach our oversight this Congress, we must 
ensure the laws we've enacted deliver concrete security value, preserve 
the trust we built with the private sector to advance critical 
cybersecurity policy, and work with CISA to address gaps in capacity.
    My district is home to countless technology companies, so I know 
the value the private sector adds to the Federal Government's 
cybersecurity efforts.
    CISA's collaboration with the private sector is essential to both 
its Federal network and critical infrastructure activities, and I am 
glad that we are kicking off the Congress by hearing from some of 
CISA's most active partners.
    The testimony from our witnesses today will play a key role in our 
on-going oversight of CISA moving forward.
    With that, I thank our witnesses for being here today and I look 
forward to their testimony.
    I yield back.

    Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Ranking Member Swalwell.
    I have to say we had a lot of wins on this committee the 
last 2 years, and I am really looking forward to working with 
you. A lot of bipartisan wins. So I think we're going to be 
able do a lot together.
    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Thompson follows:]
             Statement of Ranking Member Bennie G. Thompson
                             March 23, 2023
    Good morning. I want to congratulate Chairman Garbarino and Ranking 
Member Swalwell on their first hearing as the leaders of the 
subcommittee.
    As Ranking Member Swalwell observed in his opening statement, this 
subcommittee has an impressive record of bipartisan action.
    I commend former Chairwoman Clarke on everything she accomplished 
last Congress with then-Ranking Member Garbarino--from Cyber Incident 
Reporting legislation to the State and local cybersecurity grant 
program.
    I sincerely hope that this Congress the Chairman and Ranking Member 
will continue the strong tradition of seeking common ground to advance 
critical security policy.
    I am proud of the organization CISA has become over the past 4\1/2\ 
years, thanks in large part to the work of this committee.
    It has matured into a powerful convener of public and private-
sector capacity, with an ability to rapidly shift focus in response to 
national security dynamics.
    Like Ranking Member Swalwell, I am enthusiastic about CISA's 
potential, but want to strike the right balance between continuing to 
grow CISA's authorities and making sure that it can execute the 
missions and objectives Congress has already authorized.
    I am also concerned that CISA's important work on cybersecurity may 
have come at the cost of a diminished focus on its obligations related 
to the physical security of critical infrastructure.
    As our world becomes more interconnected and the line between cyber 
and physical security continues to blur, we must redouble our efforts 
on ensuring our critical infrastructure is resilient to all threats.
    In that vein, new goals in one of CISA's divisions cannot come at 
the cost of diminishing capacity in another.
    I am interested in learning more about Director Easterly's plans to 
work with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMA) to identify and 
provide enhanced support to ``target-rich, cyber-poor'' entities, and I 
hope that in doing so, CISA considers the overall resilience.
    On a related note, I am concerned about a proposed funding cut for 
the Infrastructure Security Division and how it could impact CISA's 
ability to effectively serve as an SRMA for 8 critical infrastructure 
sectors and partner with other SMRAs across government.
    Ensuring that CISA has the resources and expertise to fulfill its 
cross-sector and SMRA obligations is essential to building national 
resilience, and I will be interested to learn what more this committee 
can do to grow that capability at CISA.
    Finally, this committee passed landmark pieces of cybersecurity 
legislation last Congress, and now it is our responsibility to ensure 
that they are implemented as Congress envisioned.
    Toward that end, I will be interested to understand how the 
private-sector witnesses have engaged with CISA as it works to draft 
the cyber incident reporting rule and how multiple incident reporting 
requirements could impact incident response.
    I am also interested in perspectives on the implementation of the 
State and local cybersecurity grant program, how it is improving 
security across the country, and how we can maintain this progress 
moving forward.
    Stakeholder perspectives are critical to this committee's work, and 
I thank the witnesses for being here today.
    I look forward to the testimony, and I yield back the balance of my 
time.

    Chairman Garbarino. I am pleased to have a distinguished 
panel of witnesses before us today on this very important 
topic. I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their 
right hand.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Chairman Garbarino. Let the record reflect that the 
witnesses have answered the affirmative.
    Thank you. Please be seated.
    I would now like to formally introduce our witnesses.
    Tina Won Sherman is a director in the Government 
Accountability's Office Homeland Security and Justice Team. She 
oversees work on the protection of the Nation's critical 
infrastructure assets and the security of the U.S. 
Transportation system. She has also been here quite a few 
times. We always enjoy having her. In her over 20 years of 
experience--20 years of tenure at--at GAO, she has done 
extensive work on CISA's role as the Nation's risk manager and 
how it balances that role with its responsibilities as a Sector 
Risk Management Agency for 8 sectors themselves.
    Ms. Sherman has also led reviews--has also led reviews on a 
range of issues including telecommunications, transportation, 
and defense, and served in GAO's Office of Congressional 
Relations.
    Drew Bagley is the vice president and counsel for privacy 
and cyber policy at CrowdStrike, where he is responsible for 
leading Crowdstrike's data protection initiatives, privacy 
strategy, and global policy engagement. He serves on the 
Europol Advisory Group on Internet Security, the U.S. 
Department of State's International Digital Economy and 
Telecommunication Advisory Committee, and the Domain Name 
System Abuse and Institute's Advisory Council. Prior to joining 
CrowdStrike, Mr. Bagley served in the Office of General Counsel 
at the Federal Bureau of Investigation. He will offer an 
important perspective on CISA's internal to Federal network 
program and value insight as a participant in CISA's Joint 
Cyber Defense Collaborative work.
    Heather Hogsett is a senior vice president for technology 
and risk strategy for BITS at the Bank Policy Institute. In 
this capacity, Ms. Hogsett represents a heavily-regulated 
critical infrastructure sector, the financial sector. Before 
joining BPI, Ms. Hogsett served as staff director for Federal 
relations at the National Governors Association, where she 
oversaw NGA's Federal legislative agenda and activities on 
cybersecurity, homeland security and defense, emergency 
management, and Veterans Affairs.
    Her experience with Government and within the financial 
sector will help us understand the proper role for regulation 
and where CISA fits in as a partner to industry.
    Finally we have Mr. Marty Edwards, the deputy chief 
technology officer for operational technology at Tenable. Prior 
to joining Tenable Mr. Edwards served as the global director of 
education at the International Society of Automation, as well 
as the longest-serving director of the U.S. Department of 
Homeland Security's Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency 
Response Team. He brings a wealth of knowledge about critical 
infrastructure and technology security and will be able to 
speak to CISA's efforts to support the community as well as 
provide a perspective on CISA's JCDC.
    I thank all the witnesses for being here today.
    I now recognize Ms. Sherman for 5 minutes to summarize her 
opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF TINA SHERMAN, DIRECTOR, CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE 
    PROTECTION AND TRANSPORTATION SECURITY, U.S. GOVERNMENT 
                     ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

    Ms. Sherman. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Swalwell, 
and Members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be testifying 
before the subcommittee today on this important topic.
    As the subcommittee is keenly aware, cyber and physical 
attacks on critical infrastructure are on the rise, with 
hospitals, schools, and electricity substations all having been 
recent targets. Few of us are immune to the impact of these 
attacks, which can have debilitating effects on the assets and 
systems that underpin our daily lives and also have significant 
financial and sometimes life-threatening implications.
    Strengthening the public- and private-sector partnership to 
address this national security priority, the agency I work for, 
GAO, has been reviewing Federal efforts to secure critical 
infrastructure for over 2 decades and has placed protecting 
cyber critical infrastructure on our high-risk list in 2003.
    The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, CISA, 
within the Department of Homeland Security, serves as the 
national coordinator for critical infrastructure security. In 
this role, CISA is responsible for coordinating Federal actions 
to protect the Nation against risks to this infrastructure, as 
well as foster collaboration between the public and private 
sector to share information and respond to incidents. CISA also 
defines how sector risk management agencies should carry out 
their responsibilities and ensure that they have the guidance 
and support needed to effectively engage with owners and 
operators, those in State, local, Tribal, and territorial 
governments and other stakeholders.
    Sector risk management agencies, or SRMAs, are the Federal 
departments with subject-matter expertise in one or more of the 
16 critical infrastructure sectors and are responsible for 
leading, facilitating, and supporting critical infrastructure 
programs and activities in coordination with CISA. They are 
also uniquely positioned to partner with other government 
entities in the private sector. The Fiscal Year 2021 National 
Defense Authorization Act codified their responsibilities and 
also required GAO to review implementation of these 
responsibilities every 4 years through 2034.
    The administration's recently-issued National Cybersecurity 
Strategy calls on SRMAs to serve as a key player in ensuring 
critical infrastructure security and resilience. Yet, several 
important efforts to strengthen these agencies' ability to 
effectively support their sectors are under way without 
completion. This includes the rewrite of Presidential Policy 
Directive 21 for Critical Infrastructure Security, along with 
updates to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan and all 
16 sector-specific plans.
    The report GAO issued last month also found that CISA could 
assist SRMAs in implementing their responsibilities through 
additional guidance as well as improved communication and 
coordination. For example, CISA does not have a standardized 
approach for agencies to estimate costs or make requests for 
resources, does not consistently measure the maturity and 
effectiveness of the agencies, has created but not yet filled 
liaison positions with them, and does not obtain regular 
feedback on their partnerships. We recommended CISA establish 
milestones and time lines to complete these steps, which we 
believe would help guide and ensure a consistent level of 
effort across SRMAs to safeguard our Nation and its people.
    I want to thank my team in preparing me for this hearing 
and to the subcommittee for including me today in this 
important and timely discussion.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Sherman follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Tina Won Sherman
                        Thursday, March 23, 2023
   critical infrastructure protection.--time frames to complete cisa 
efforts would help sector risk management agencies implement statutory 
                            responsibilities
                             gao-23-106720
    Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Swalwell, and Members of the 
subcommittee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss our work on 
Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMAs)--departments or agencies, 
designated by law or Presidential directive, with responsibility for 
providing institutional knowledge and specialized expertise to a 
sector. My testimony today summarizes the findings from our February 
2023 report entitled Critical Infrastructure Protection: Time Frames to 
Complete DHS Efforts Would Help Sector Risk Management Agencies 
Implement Statutory Responsibilities.\1\ That report examined new 
responsibilities for SRMAs and the Department of Homeland Security's 
role in coordinating SRMA activi- 
ties.\2\ \3\
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    \1\ GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Time Frames to 
Complete DHS Efforts Would Help Sector Risk Management Agencies 
Implement Statutory Responsibilities, GAO-23-105806 (Washington, DC: 
Feb. 7, 2023).
    \2\ 6 U.S.C.  665d.
    \3\ The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2021 outlined these new SRMA responsibilities.
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    Events have demonstrated how disruption or destruction of the 
Nation's critical infrastructure could have debilitating effects. In 
particular, the 2021 cyber attack on the Colonial Pipeline disrupted 
the Nation's largest fuel pipeline, and an extreme weather event in 
Texas caused wide-spread power and water outages.\4\ Such events also 
illustrate how the Nation's critical infrastructure assets and systems 
are often interconnected with critical infrastructure in other sectors 
and the internet, making them more vulnerable to attack. Protecting 
critical infrastructure is a national security priority because it 
provides essential functions--such as supplying water, generating 
energy, and producing food--that underpin American society.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ In May 2021, we issued a WatchBlog post addressing the Colonial 
Pipeline attack and the Federal Government and private-sector response. 
See https://www.gao.gov/blog/colonial-pipeline-cyberattack-highlights-
need-better-federal-and-private-sector-preparedness-infographic.
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    The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018 
assigned the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) 
the responsibility to coordinate a national effort to secure and 
protect against critical infrastructure risks.\5\ As such, the 
Secretary of Homeland Security designated the director of CISA as the 
national coordinator for critical infrastructure security and 
resilience. CISA provides a variety of cyber and infrastructure 
security capabilities and services to Federal and non-Federal 
organizations, including assessments and analysis, capacity building, 
expertise and guidance, and security operations (e.g., incident 
response).
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    \5\ Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency Act of 2018, 
Pub. L. No. 115-278,  2(a), 132 Stat. 4168, 4169 (codified at 6 U.S.C. 
 652). The act renamed the Department of Homeland Security's National 
Protection and Programs Directorate as CISA and outlined CISA's 
responsibilities.
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    At the Federal level, SRMAs are responsible for leading, 
facilitating, or supporting the security and resilience programs and 
associated activities within their designated critical infrastructure 
sector.\6\ The private sector owns and operates the majority of 
critical infrastructure. Therefore, it is vital that the public and 
private sectors work together to protect assets and systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ 6 U.S.C.  651(5). Presidential Policy Directive-21 (PPD-21) 
previously called these agencies Sector-Specific Agencies. The William 
M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2021 codified Sector-Specific Agencies as SRMAs. In 2013, PPD-21 
categorized the Nation's critical infrastructure into 16 sectors with 
at least one Federal agency designated as SRMA for the sector, although 
the number of sectors and SRMA assignments are subject to review and 
modification. Those designations are still in effect. See 6 U.S.C.  
652a(b). Additionally, some sectors have subsectors, such as the 
Education subsector within the Government Facilities sector, with the 
Department of Education having a lead sector risk management role for 
the subsector.
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    The William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2021 (FY21 NDAA) includes a provision for GAO to report 
on the effectiveness of SRMAs in carrying out responsibilities set 
forth in the act. Our February 2023 report and my statement today 
addresses: (1) How the fiscal year 2021 NDAA changed sector risk 
management agency responsibilities, and the actions these agencies 
reported taking to address them; and (2) the extent to which CISA 
identified and undertook efforts to help sector risk management 
agencies implement their responsibilities set forth in the fiscal year 
2021 NDAA.
    To address these objectives, we analyzed the fiscal year 2021 NDAA 
and relevant policy directives, collected written responses from SRMAs 
for all 16 sectors using a standardized information collection tool, 
reviewed other DHS documents, and interviewed CISA officials.\7\ 
Additional information about our scope and methodology can be found in 
our February 2023 report. Our work was performed in accordance with 
generally accepted Government auditing standards.
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    \7\ Three critical infrastructure sectors have co-SRMAs. When co-
SRMAs responded to a question with the same answer, we categorized that 
response as one critical infrastructure sector. In cases where the co-
SRMAs for a critical infrastructure sector disagreed, we did not 
include either of them in the sector count and noted the disagreement.
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fiscal year 2021 ndaa expanded srma responsibilities, and agencies have 
                    actions underway to address them
    The fiscal year 2021 NDAA expanded SRMA responsibilities previously 
outlined in Presidential Policy Directive-21 (PPD-21) and added risk 
assessment and emergency preparedness as responsibilities not 
previously included in the directive for SRMAs.\8\ Specifically, prior 
to the fiscal year 2021 NDAA, PPD-21 included the following four SRMA 
responsibilities: (1) Serve as a Federal interface for the 
prioritization and coordination of sector-specific activities; (2) 
carry out incident management responsibilities; (3) provide, support, 
or facilitate technical assistance and consultations for sectors to 
support risk management activities; and (4) support the Secretary of 
Homeland Security by sharing information on sector-specific critical 
infrastructure. The fiscal year 2021 NDAA expanded the sector 
coordination, incident management, risk management, and information-
sharing responsibilities found in PPD-21 by adding specific activities 
for SRMAs to carry out within these areas. For example, the fiscal year 
2021 NDAA requires SRMAs to conduct sector coordination activities, 
including serving as the day-to-day Federal interface for the 
prioritization and coordination of sector-specific activities; serving 
as Federal Government coordinating council chair; and participating in 
cross-sector coordinating councils, as appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ CISA and the other SRMAs also have roles related to emergency 
preparedness efforts under the National Preparedness Goal and the 
National Response Framework. PPD-8 directed the Secretary of Homeland 
Security to develop a national preparedness goal, which defines the 
core capabilities necessary for emergency response to specific types of 
incidents. The National Response Framework is a guide to how the Nation 
responds to disasters and emergencies of all types. The most recent 
edition of the framework identifies 15 emergency support functions that 
serve as the Federal Government's primary coordinating structure for 
building, sustaining, and delivering response capabilities. According 
to the framework, existing infrastructure plans and coordination 
mechanisms such as SRMAs and councils provide strong foundations for 
strengthening incident response plans and capabilities. As part of the 
National Infrastructure Protection Plan, the critical infrastructure 
sectors and SRMAs have developed sector-specific plans. For more 
information, see Department of Homeland Security, National Response 
Framework, 4th ed. and GAO, Emergency Preparedness: Opportunities Exist 
to Strengthen Interagency Assessments and Accountability for Closing 
Capability Gaps [Reissued on December 9, 2015], GAO-15-20 (Washington, 
DC: Dec. 4, 2014).
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    Expanded responsibilities.--In response to the expanded 
responsibilities required by the fiscal year 2021 NDAA described above, 
some SRMAs reported having actions under way to address these 
responsibilities. SRMA officials for 4 of the 16 critical 
infrastructure sectors reported adapting activities related to sector 
coordination, incident management, risk management, or information 
sharing to address their responsibilities in the act. For example, as 
SRMA in the health care and public health sector, Department of Health 
and Human Services officials reported coordinating an effort to analyze 
the department's existing cyber authorities to identify and mitigate 
any gaps, as well as developing a cyber-incident response plan.
    Additionally, some SRMA officials also reported that activities 
they established prior to the enactment of the fiscal year 2021 NDAA 
already address the responsibilities outlined in the act. For example, 
SRMA officials from the Department of Energy and the Environmental 
Protection Agency, representing the energy sector and water and 
wastewater systems sector respectively, reported that they already 
address the responsibilities outlined in the fiscal year 2021 NDAA.
    Finally, as an SRMA for 8 of the 16 sectors, CISA described 
established activities that address sector coordination, incident 
management, risk management, and information sharing. Specifically, 
CISA officials reported that CISA's Stakeholder Engagement Division 
focuses on developing relationships with industry and Government in 
CISA's sectors by meeting with Sector Coordinating Councils and issuing 
advisories and analysis reports to partners.
    Added responsibilities.--To address the added risk assessment and 
emergency preparedness responsibilities required by the fiscal year 
2021 NDAA, SRMA officials for 5 of the 16 critical infrastructure 
sectors described how they plan to take new actions to address the risk 
assessment responsibilities outlined in the fiscal year 2021 NDAA. For 
example, as SRMA in the communications sectors, DHS officials reported 
plans to develop and maintain a communications risk register that 
includes cybersecurity risks to emergency communications 
infrastructure. SRMA officials for 15 of the 16 critical infrastructure 
sectors also stated that they had conducted risk assessment activities 
prior to their inclusion in the fiscal year 2021 NDAA.\9\
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    \9\ As the co-SRMAs in the government facilities sector, both DHS 
Federal Protective Service and General Services Administration 
officials did not describe conducting prior risk assessment activities. 
They stated that prior to the fiscal year 2021 NDAA, non-CISA co-SRMAs 
were not required to conduct risk assessments for their sector and did 
not have the authority to require their Federal and non-Federal 
partners to provide responses or submit information for such 
assessments.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    With regard to emergency preparedness responsibilities, SRMA 
officials for 6 of the 16 critical infrastructure sectors described how 
they plan to take new actions to address the emergency preparedness 
responsibilities outlined in the fiscal year 2021 NDAA. For example, as 
SRMA in the financial services sector, Department of the Treasury 
officials reported enhancing a tabletop exercise program, developing a 
functional exercise platform to improve cybersecurity exercises, and 
refining incident management and crisis communication tool kits. SRMA 
officials for all 16 critical infrastructure sectors also stated that 
they had conducted emergency preparedness activities prior to their 
inclusion in the fiscal year 2021 NDAA.
    Implementation challenges.--SRMA officials cited two challenges in 
implementing their responsibilities: (1) The voluntary nature of 
private-sector participation in SRMA activities, and (2) limited or no 
dedicated resources for SRMA duties. According to SRMA officials, these 
challenges pre-dated the enactment of the fiscal year 2021 NDAA. 
Additional challenges SRMA officials identified included coordination 
issues related to inaccurate SRMA point-of-contact lists and government 
coordinating council and sector coordinating council membership lists, 
and limited technical cybersecurity expertise. Our past work describing 
other DHS functions has highlighted the importance of maintaining 
accurate and up-to-date contact information for the sharing of 
information.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ See GAO, Cybersecurity: DHS's National Integration Center 
Generally Performs Required Functions but Needs to Evaluate Its 
Activities More Completely, GAO-17-163 (Washington, DC: Feb. 1, 2017). 
SRMA officials said they expected CISA to possibly address this 
challenge if it established consistent communication mechanisms in 
response to the fiscal year 2021 NDAA. According to CISA officials, 
CISA has efforts under way to address issues related to inaccurate 
points of contact lists.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Participation in SRMA critical infrastructure protection efforts is 
voluntary, which SRMA officials for 11 critical infrastructure sectors 
reported as a challenge to conducting their responsibilities. For 
example, they reported that this affected their ability to stay 
apprised of issues in the sector and to collect information. SRMA 
officials reported that these challenges existed prior to the fiscal 
year 2021 NDAA and they generally expected them to continue.
    SRMA officials also stated that they face challenges because they 
have limited or no dedicated resources to implement their 
responsibilities. SRMA officials for 13 of the 16 sectors, including 
those with and without dedicated resources for SRMA activities, stated 
that they planned to request additional resources to help them 
implement their fiscal year 2021 NDAA responsibilities.
cisa has identified and undertaken efforts to help srmas, but does not 
            have milestones and time lines to complete them
    CISA has identified and undertaken some efforts that could help 
SRMAs implement their fiscal year 2021 NDAA responsibilities. In 
November 2021, CISA reported on several on-going and planned efforts to 
help SRMAs implement these responsibilities and to clarify Federal 
roles and responsibilities for cybersecurity and infrastructure 
security actions across the Federal Government.\11\ In addition, CISA 
officials described various efforts to help SRMAs implement their 
fiscal year 2021 NDAA responsibilities, including:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ In response to the fiscal year 2021 NDAA, CISA reviewed the 
framework for securing critical infrastructure and submitted a report 
to the President and Congressional committees that made 
recommendations. According to CISA officials, they met with and 
collected feedback from SRMAs while preparing this report. According to 
CISA officials in January 2023, the President officially approved the 
recommendations in the 9002(b) report, and initiated the process to 
rewrite PPD-21. CISA, Fiscal Year 2021 National Defense Authorization 
Act: Section 9002(b) Report, (Nov. 12, 2021).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Define maturity and effectiveness metrics.--CISA officials told us 
in October 2022 they expect to develop a methodology and metrics to 
measure the maturity and effectiveness of SRMAs in implementing 
responsibilities outlined in the fiscal year 2021 NDAA. For example, in 
its November 2021 report, CISA recommended that the Federal Senior 
Leadership Council conduct a sector-by-sector assessment of SRMA 
partnership participation.\12\ CISA officials told us in March 2022 
that these efforts could include both standardized metrics to measure 
effectiveness across all sectors, and sector-specific metrics.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ CISA, Section 9002(b) Report, 42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Develop standardized budget guidance.--In its November 2021 report, 
CISA officials identified a need to develop a baseline cost estimation 
tool for SRMAs.\13\ According to the report, this tool would provide 
SRMAs a baseline estimate of resource needs, and could be tailored to 
each SRMA. CISA also proposed implementing a consistent resource 
request process across the SRMAs, which could help address the 
challenges associated with their resource limitations, as previously 
discussed. According to CISA officials, this budget formulation tool 
would allow SRMAs to request sufficient resources to implement their 
fiscal year 2021 NDAA responsibilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ CISA, Section 9002(b) Report, 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Create sector liaison positions.--In August 2022, CISA officials 
told us they created liaison positions focused on fostering CISA's 
relationship with SRMAs. According to CISA officials, these liaisons 
will help CISA respond to the responsibilities outlined in the fiscal 
year 2021 NDAA by enhancing communication and coordination with SRMAs, 
triaging information in response to incidents, and responding to 
requests for information.
    Enhance the Federal Senior Leadership Council.--The Federal Senior 
Leadership Council provides a forum for coordination and communication 
among agencies with critical infrastructure responsibilities, including 
SRMAs. The council coordinates implementation of SRMA responsibilities 
as well as other initiatives related to protecting critical 
infrastructure. According to CISA officials, the Federal Senior 
Leadership Council is intended to be one of the primary ways CISA will 
coordinate actions to implement the fiscal year 2021 NDAA across the 
Federal Government.
    Develop a standardized feedback process.--CISA officials told us in 
June 2022 that they are developing a process to conduct standardized 
surveys of critical infrastructure stakeholders and plan to use the 
results to conduct assessments. They said surveys allow them to measure 
the outcome of sector efforts by collecting information from partners 
on their intent to take action based on the information, tools, or 
capabilities provided to them, which they said is important due to the 
voluntary nature of sector partnerships.
    Update the 2013 National Plan and sector-specific plans.--CISA 
officials told us in March 2022 that the updated National 
Infrastructure Protection Plan (National Plan) will clarify SRMA 
responsibilities in response to the fiscal year 2021 NDAA. The National 
Plan is a key guidance document that provides the overarching national 
approach for critical infrastructure protection. CISA officials stated 
that the National Plan will be the ``cornerstone'' to guide SRMAs as 
they implement their responsibilities. According to CISA officials, the 
updated National Plan will: (1) Include a revised approach to critical 
infrastructure protection, (2) provide information on SRMA 
responsibilities set forth in the fiscal year 2021 NDAA, (3) clarify 
Federal roles and responsibilities for sector risk management, and (4) 
outline how Government and industry should coordinate to identify and 
mitigate threats to critical infrastructure. The 2013 update of the 
National Plan responded to new policy in PPD-21, including an explicit 
provision that DHS update the National Plan to implement the new 
directive. CISA officials told us they would not make further updates 
to the National Plan until the review of PPD-21 is completed.
    Further, CISA officials stated in October 2022 they plan to provide 
additional guidance to SRMAs on how they should update their sector-
specific plans. CISA officials told us that the updated sector-specific 
plans should describe how the sector will implement the updated 
National Plan, along with efforts tailored to the sector's unique 
characteristics. CISA officials told us they expected to issue an 
updated sector-specific plan template 3 to 6 months after the release 
of the updated National Plan for SRMAs to use in collaboration with 
their sector partners. Further, they told us that the sector-specific 
plans would likely take 1 year to develop.
    Although CISA has identified and started a number of efforts to 
help SRMAs implement their fiscal year 2021 NDAA responsibilities, CISA 
does not have milestones and time lines to complete its efforts. 
According to selected characteristics from GAO's Key Questions to 
Assess Agency Reform Efforts, Government reform efforts should have 
milestones and time lines to track implementation progress, which can 
also provide transparency about the progress of reforms.\14\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ GAO, Government Reorganization: Key Questions to Assess Agency 
Reform Efforts, GAO-18-427 (Washington, DC: June 13, 2018).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CISA officials said they had not established milestones and time 
lines to complete CISA's efforts because the agency has prioritized 
defining its own role as national coordinator. For example, as of 
October 2022, CISA officials said they were in the process of 
developing ways to implement CISA's new authorities under the fiscal 
year 2021 NDAA, which requires SRMAs to carry out their 
responsibilities in coordination with the CISA director and consistent 
with DHS strategic guidance.
    We recognize that CISA's efforts to address its fiscal year 2021 
NDAA responsibilities are linked to its efforts to mature in its role 
as national coordinator. However, SRMA officials for all 16 critical 
infrastructure sectors reported that CISA had not yet provided guidance 
to help the agencies implement their fiscal year 2021 NDAA 
responsibilities. Establishing milestones and time lines, and updating 
them when necessary, to accomplish its efforts to support SRMAs, would 
help ensure CISA completes them in a timely manner.
    We recommended, and DHS concurred, that the director of CISA 
establish milestones and time lines for its efforts to provide guidance 
and improve coordination and information sharing that would help SRMAs 
implement their fiscal year 2021 NDAA responsibilities, and ensure the 
milestones and time lines are updated through completion.\15\ As of 
March 2023, the agency has not yet implemented the recommendation. CISA 
officials stated that the administration's Homeland and Critical 
Infrastructure Resilience Interagency Policy Committee is in the 
process of updating PPD-21. Once it is completed, CISA will work to 
establish the milestones and time lines needed to develop guidance on 
improving coordination and information sharing.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ GAO-23-105806. GAO has a large body of work examining aspects 
of critical infrastructure protection and has made over 80 
recommendations to SRMAs relevant to the responsibilities outlined in 
the fiscal year 2021 NDAA. These recommendations involved sector risk 
management and assessing sector risk, sector coordination and 
facilitating the sharing of information regarding physical security and 
cybersecurity threats, and incident management and contributing to 
emergency preparedness efforts. As of December 2022, agencies had yet 
to implement 58 of these recommendations. For more information on these 
recommendations, see appendix II in GAO-23-105806.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    However, as of March 2023, CISA had not developed milestones and 
time lines to complete its efforts. CISA officials stated that they 
could not provide a specific time line for issuing the updated National 
Plan until the administration completes a review of PPD-21. CISA 
officials stated that the Federal Senior Leadership Council has started 
the Sector Analysis Working Group, which is an interagency consensus-
based group that will recommend a new sector designation structure and 
corresponding SRMA designations. CISA officials reiterated that they 
plan to issue guidance on improving coordination and information 
sharing.
    Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Swalwell, and Members of the 
subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be pleased 
to respond to any questions you may have at this time.

    Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Ms. Sherman.
    I now recognize Mr. Bagley for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

 STATEMENT OF DREW BAGLEY, VICE PRESIDENT AND COUNSEL, PRIVACY 
                 AND CYBER POLICY, CROWDSTRIKE

    Mr. Bagley. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Swalwell, 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify.
    Today, nation-states, criminal enterprises, and hacktivist 
groups use sophisticated means to exploit unsophisticated 
vulnerabilities to conduct espionage, breach privacy, and 
disrupt infrastructure. This is why it's so important to 
continually evolve in how we prevent, detect, and respond to 
cyber attacks.
    At CrowdStrike we have a unique vantage point on 
cybersecurity threats and the innovation necessary to prevent 
them. We work with CISA on key programs and initiatives. We 
help CISA and other government agencies. We have been involved 
with JCDC since its inception. We also consume CISA's 
advisories and are a key technology provider for its 
stakeholder groups like Critical Infrastructure Entities.
    This hearing is timely for several reasons. CISA has 
matured within a number of operational and planning functions. 
Major transitions are taking place in Federal cybersecurity, 
with an emphasis on zero trust adoption. Geopolitical 
conditions stemming from Russia's war in Ukraine and heightened 
competition with China have worsened the threat environment. 
With respect to information sharing and collaboration, the 
formation of JCDC in August 2021 was a key development. Since 
then, JCDC has created a platform for key players in industry 
and Government to voluntarily work toward common goals.
    While we defer to CISA leadership to describe key outcomes, 
CrowdStrike values best time and expertise in the JCDC 
community, and we look forward to continued shared efforts to 
promote better cybersecurity.
    As JCDC matures, we believe the effort can continue to 
improve. First, consider approaches that stratify or segment 
membership to maintain trust. Second, strengthen administrative 
customer relationship management practices. To their credit, 
JCDC leadership and staff have been proactive about seeking 
feedback from participants. Like any start-up, we anticipate 
continued iteration as the group matures into its full 
potential.
    Importantly, cybersecurity outcomes vary substantially 
across sectors. I've provided a brief overview in my written 
remarks.
    There remains a gap in cybersecurity performance between 
the haves and the have-nots, which threat actors continue to 
exploit and which CISA cannot solve alone. To this end, we are 
pleased to see reference in the new National Cybersecurity 
Strategy to shifting the burden for cybersecurity to those best 
positioned to mitigate risks.
    As a community, we should no longer tolerate certain 
software vendors externalizing the costs of, or worse, nakedly 
monetizing insecure software. While this policy concept must be 
made more concrete, a reasonable first step is ensuring that 
we're not rewarding vendors that cause harm. The Government can 
lead by example, leveraging its own procurement power. This is 
clearly a productive area for continued Congressional 
oversight.
    I'd like to offer a few key recommendations.
    First, the entire field must become more responsive in 
adapting to lessons learned. Unfortunately, cyber attacks with 
the potential for systemic implications take place with 
increasing regularity. Key lessons of recent breaches include: 
Utilize managed security services, adopt cloud-based solutions, 
and employ zero trust. We must approach regulation deliberately 
and harmonize to the greatest extent possible. We must use care 
in advancing new requirements, use formal, open commenting 
periods, and use principles-based requirements rather than 
compliance-based approaches. And critically, Federal agencies, 
particularly regulators, must walk the walk on cybersecurity.
    Third, as a community, we must focus more attention on 
national incident response capacity. JCDC should continue 
developing community response plans, and CISA should 
incorporate JCDC contributions and forthcoming revisions to the 
National Cyber Incident Response Plan. If the Chinese threat 
actors responsible for the Microsoft Exchange hacking campaign 
in 2021 had deployed ransomware at scale, large segments of the 
American economy could have been paralyzed. A CISA-administered 
program to retain outside providers for emergency incident 
response had entities of systemic importance.
    Last, we must empower defenders with cutting-edge cyber 
defense capabilities. Too often, defenders are hobbled with 
ineffective technologies. Those with leading solutions are 
energized with radically improved morale. Our idea, one idea, 
is to consider using tax mechanisms to speed adoption of key 
technologies for small businesses.
    Ultimately, CISA and its stakeholders must continue working 
together collectively to prevent, detect, and respond to cyber 
attacks.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear here today, and I 
look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Bagley follows:]
                   Prepared Statement of Drew Bagley
                             March 23, 2023
    Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Swalwell, Members of the 
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. We are at 
a pivotal moment in the cybersecurity challenges posed to our country. 
Today, nation-states, criminal enterprises, and hacktivist groups alike 
can leverage sophisticated means to exploit unsophisticated 
vulnerabilities to conduct espionage, breach privacy, and wreak havoc 
on critical infrastructure, government systems, and businesses 
throughout the country. We are at a point where the stakes of defensive 
stagnation pose increasing risks in the face of threat actors' 
innovation. This is why it's so important to continually evolve in how 
we prevent, detect, and respond to cyber attacks.
    Throughout my career, I have seen first-hand the challenges and 
opportunities of improving American cybersecurity from my work in the 
private sector, Government, and academia. For nearly a decade, at 
CrowdStrike, a leading cybersecurity company, I have had a front-row 
seat to cybersecurity innovation while building our privacy and public 
policy programs and advising customers around the globe. Prior to that 
I worked at the intersection of law and technology in the FBI's Office 
of the General Counsel. I previously taught at universities in the 
United States and Europe, and currently serve as an adjunct professor 
in American University's cybersecurity policy program. I have been 
asked to speak here today from a stakeholder perspective. Accordingly, 
my testimony is informed not only from my experience but also by my 
continued engagement with Government agencies through formal and 
informal advisory roles, including as a member of CISA's Joint Cyber 
Defense Collaborative (JCDC).
    At CrowdStrike, we have a unique vantage point on cybersecurity 
threats and the innovation necessary to stop them. We not only protect 
15 of the largest 20 banks in the United States but also provide our 
cybersecurity technology and services to thousands of small- and 
medium-sized businesses. This means that it is not only possible for 
small organizations to leverage the same cybersecurity technologies as 
complex multinational enterprises but that it is becoming more common.
    Increasingly, fundamental aspects of cybersecurity program design 
are applicable everywhere--including for the on-going transformation in 
U.S. Federal cybersecurity.
    CrowdStrike works with CISA in a variety of ways across key 
programs and activities. We were one of the original plank holders of 
JCDC and remain active members to this day. We provide cyber threat 
intelligence and cybersecurity technology offerings to CISA that help 
it defend not only its own networks but those of some other Government 
departments and agencies as well. Last, we are a consumer of CISA's 
advisories and a key technology provider for its other stakeholder 
groups, like critical infrastructure entities.
                            key developments
    This hearing is timely for three key reasons. First, over the past 
couple of years CISA has reached its stride across a number of 
operational and planning functions (described in more detail below). 
Second, major transitions are taking place in Federal cybersecurity 
overall, with an emphasis on security program modernization and Zero 
Trust Architecture. CISA is a key actor and implementer in these areas. 
Third, geopolitical conditions have yielded a worsening cyber threat 
environment overall. Russia's war in Ukraine and heightened competition 
with China are just two of several active examples where risks are 
mounting.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ See Adam Meyers, Testimony on Securing Critical Infrastructure 
Against Russian Cyber Threats, House Homeland Security Committee (March 
30, 2022) (How Russia-nexus adversaries use cyber attacks and 
recommendations for U.S. readiness), https://docs.house.gov/meetings/
HM/HM00/20220405/114553/HHRG-117-HM00-WState-MeyersA-20220405.pdf.
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    Now is an impactful time to review the state of cybersecurity 
overall and evaluate CISA's considerable progress and contributions.\2\ 
As DHS and CISA leadership and Members of this committee prepare 
jointly to realize the vision of CISA 2025,\3\ we can identify fruitful 
areas for continued development, alignment, and investment, where 
appropriate.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ See CISA Strategic Plan 2023-2025, CISA (September 2022), 
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/2023-01/
StrategicPlan_20220912-V2_508c.pdf.
    \3\ See CISA 2025 Overview, Committee on Homeland Security, House 
of Representatives (October 13, 2022), https://homeland.house.gov/cisa-
2025/.
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                       the state of cybersecurity
    Cybersecurity outcomes vary substantially across different sectors. 
Different sectors face different threats, have different constraints 
and capacities, and have different tolerances to risk or disruptions. 
To this end, I'd like to survey the state of cybersecurity across a few 
key CISA partner segments.
    Federal Civilian Executive branch (FCEB).--Going back 20 years, 
Federal Government agencies often had considerable cybersecurity 
strengths relative to their private-sector counterparts. However, as 
time went on and cyber attacks increasingly occurred without the use of 
malware, parts of the private sector met and exceeded FCEB 
cybersecurity performance by adjusting to new realities. In some 
instances, Government IT standards and controls failed to evolve at the 
rapid pace of innovation within the commercial IT and cybersecurity 
space. Large Federal Cybersecurity programs (e.g., National 
Cybersecurity Protection System (NCPS) or EINSTEIN, and the Continuous 
Diagnostics and Mitigation Program (CDM)) set ambitious goals aimed to 
standardize and scale approaches to Government cybersecurity, but even 
with considerable investment over the years, that aim remains unmet.
    Over the past several years, however, the Federal cybersecurity 
community has made some significant strides. Recent developments are 
trending positively with the embrace of key cybersecurity concepts like 
centralized visibility of IT infrastructure to detect and respond to 
incidents. Significantly, E.O. 14028 on Improving the Nation's 
Cybersecurity \4\ mandated the use across the FCEB of key best 
practices, like enhanced logging, as well as now-baseline technical 
solutions like Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR). The release of 
the Office of Management and Budget's Federal Zero Trust Strategy \5\ 
in January 2022 was another key decision enforcing the use of sound 
approaches, like increased adoption of cloud-based technologies, 
credential management practices,\6\ and defensible IT architectures. 
Even as implementation continues, these initial efforts are yielding 
positive results.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ See Executive Order on Improving the Nation's Cybersecurity, 
The White House (May 12, 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-
room/presidential-actions/2021/05/12/executive-order-on-improving-the-
nations-cybersecurity/.
    \5\ See M-22-09 Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments 
and Agencies, Executive Office of the President, Office of Management 
and Budget (January 26, 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2022/01/M-22-09.pdf.
    \6\ See 7 TYPES OF IDENTITY-BASED ATTACKS, CrowdStrike (January 10, 
2023), https://www.crowdstrike.com/cybersecurity-101/identity-security/
identity-based-attacks/.
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    CISA plays an essential role in strengthening FCEB cybersecurity. 
As recently as a couple of years ago, CISA had just a few programs 
(e.g., NCPS, CDM, Trusted Internet Connections (TIC)) and a few 
authorities (e.g., Emergency Directives, Binding Operational Directives 
\7\) to meet this mandate. But the Solarium Commission's recommendation 
as enacted by Congress to formally elevate CISA to become the 
operational CISO of the FCEB, including by providing Government-wide, 
proactive cyber threat hunting capabilities, considerably strengthened 
CISA's tool kit. Further, actions taken by CISA to implement E.O. 
14028, particularly with regard to the EDR program, are helping to 
realize this vision.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ See Cybersecurity Directives, Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency. https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The stakes are high. The FCEB continues to be a key target of 
threat actors that seek to do harm to the United States. Friends and 
allies continue to look to the U.S. Government as a model for how to 
organize their own Government cybersecurity efforts. Importantly, the 
Government must lead by example on cybersecurity. CISA's efforts to 
strengthen security across the other entities (e.g., critical 
infrastructure or State and local governments) will lack credibility if 
the FCEB is poorly secured.
    Large Enterprises.--On balance, the most sophisticated large 
enterprises in the United States have seen stronger cybersecurity 
outcomes in recent years, even as threats evolve and multiply. Over the 
past year, we've observed an increase in vulnerability reuse and 
increased reliance on access brokers to facilitate initial infiltration 
into target organizations. We've also witnessed increased targeting 
of--and mounting costs from--breaches of legacy infrastructure.\8\ 
Supply chain attacks, which can be targeted but also used to breach 
many dependent organizations in a single campaign, remain a key 
concern.
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    \8\ See 2023 Global Threat Report, CrowdStrike (2023). https://
www.crowdstrike.com/global-threat-report/.
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    Some large commercial enterprises have greater flexibility and 
stronger security budgets than other entities, and thus serve as an 
important proving ground for new technologies, practices, and 
architectures. From this, recent innovations like Zero Trust and cloud-
native EDR have become today's cybersecurity essentials. In the near 
future, we should expect more attention from other sectors on emerging 
enterprise security concepts like Extended Detection and Response 
(XDR), identity threat protection,\9\ as well as continued adoption of 
managed security services (discussed in more detail below).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ See Andrew Harris, CrowdStrike Falcon Identity Threat 
Protection Added to GovCloud-1 to Help Meet Government Mandates for 
Identity Security and Zero Trust, CrowdStrike (June 1, 2022), https://
www.crowdstrike.com/blog/how-falcon-identity-threat-protection-helps-
meet-identity-security-government-mandates/.
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    Small- and Medium-sized Businesses (SMB).--These entities include 
everything from the family-owned corner store in each of our 
communities to start-ups creating new technologies that could change 
the world. These companies operate off of very different templates but 
nevertheless share two key features. First, resources are scarce. 
Second, a multi-day business disruption might well destroy the company. 
Resource scarcity means there's no place for complex cyber defenses, 
and few if any `spare cycles' for participation in demanding or time-
consuming information sharing initiatives. Sensitivity to disruption 
means these organizations are particularly vulnerable to ransomware and 
``lock-and-leak'' attacks.
    Among the most positive developments in this space in recent years 
is the growing affordability and accessibility of managed security 
services, as well as managed threat hunting services. Organizations 
increasingly look to professional providers to manage the overwhelming 
majority of defense actions--under tight service level agreements--24 
hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
    State, Local, Tribal, and Territorial (SLTT) Entities.--Over the 
past few years, SLTT entities have faced a withering threat 
environment, most notably from criminal ransomware actors. Materially 
all SLTT entities face budgetary and personnel constraints, and rely 
upon critical legacy applications and IT infrastructure. Nevertheless, 
over that same time horizon, cybersecurity outcomes within the sector 
have diverged significantly. As Members of this committee know well, 
many SLTT organizations faced severe incidents and events, and in some 
instances citizens suffered disruption of key services.
    Counterintuitively perhaps, over this time frame the most forward-
leaning States and cities were meaningfully further ahead than most of 
the FCEB in centralizing and modernizing defenses. This was generally 
achieved through a key service provider--typically a Department of 
Technology--implementing and managing transformative technologies like 
EDR and other important security concepts and practices. In addition to 
leveraging a centralized provider, these States often had no inflexible 
security program that acted as a barrier to experimentation and 
technology adoption. In addition, community-oriented support efforts, 
such as those led by the Center for Internet Security, have been a key 
part of stronger defenses.
    The State and Local Cybersecurity Improvement Act, which passed 
into law in the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act of 2021 was a 
positive step in ensuring State and local governments have the funding 
needed to centralize and modernize cyber defenses. We appreciate former 
subcommittee Chairwoman Clarke, Chairman Garbarino, and other Members 
of the committee for their leadership on this important issue.
    Critical Infrastructure.--Most critical infrastructure owners and 
operators face the same set of hardships outlined above: Severe threat 
environment, personnel and budget constraints, and legacy applications 
and IT infrastructure. But they have the added challenges of complex 
Operational Technology (OT) that in some instances is obsolete and/or 
esoteric. In addition to these conditions there is increased interest 
from policy makers in regulatory measures designed to enhance 
cybersecurity.
    The Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act 
(CIRCIA), signed into law in March 2022, which strengthens reporting 
obligations for critical infrastructure players, is the most meaningful 
step to date.\10\ CIRCIA's authors--notably Members and key staff on 
this Committee--recognized these risks and included two key provisions. 
The first is a Cyber Incident Reporting Harmonization Council that 
should reconcile duplicative or conflicting regulations. The second is 
a generous time line for CISA to articulate particulars (like 
thresholds) in a clear and straightforward manner. CISA has solicited 
stakeholder feedback to those ends, to which we, and many others in the 
community, were happy to contribute ideas and suggestions.\11\
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    \10\ See Public Law 117-103, Division Y, Cyber Incident Reporting 
for Critical Infrastructure Act--Consolidated Appropriations Act. 117th 
Congress (March 15, 2022). https://www.congress.gov/bill/117th-
congress/house-bill/2471/text.
    \11\ See CrowdStrike Response to RFI on Cyber Incident Reporting 
for Critical Infrastructure Act (November 14, 2022), https://
www.crowdstrike.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/02/RFI-Incident-Reporting-
for-Critical-Infrastructure-Act-of-2022.pdf.
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    International.--Although somewhat beyond the scope of this hearing, 
we should take a moment to reflect on international cybersecurity. U.S. 
allies' public sector organizations, laws, and policy debates tend to 
reflect somewhat developments here in Washington. This is an incredible 
leadership opportunity. Efforts like the International Counter 
Ransomware Initiative \12\ serve as a good example for how to use this 
influence to strengthen the cybersecurity ecosystem globally. Across 
relevant areas of law and policy, we should embrace interoperable 
approaches that simplify collaboration between governments, NGO's, and 
industry players. In addition, the United States should be receptive to 
areas where other countries have identified helpful policies. These 
include, for example, policies that support the start-up ecosystem, and 
national privacy laws that simplify data protection and the cross-
border data flows integral for modern cybersecurity.\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ See International Counter Ransomware Initiative 2022 Joint 
Statement, The White House (November 1, 2022), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2022/11/01/
international-counter-ransomware-initiative-2022-joint-statement/.
    \13\ See Drew Bagley, Data Protection Day 2023: Misaligned Policy 
Priorities Complicate Data Protection Compliance, CrowdStrike (January 
27, 2023), https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/data-protection-day-2023-
misaligned-policy-priorities-complicate-data-protection-compliance.
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                      public-private collaboration
    The Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC).--Information sharing 
in the cybersecurity space is a complex topic and long-standing policy 
priority. For two decades, various information-sharing efforts--narrow 
and broad; informal, quasi-official, and official; ad hoc and 
enduring--have arisen from a desire within the cybersecurity community 
to do more. While the Cybersecurity Act of 2015 sought to address this 
problem head-on,\14\ structural impediments to comprehensive sharing 
and collaboration remain.\15\ And as a practical matter, we are 
unlikely to identify a ``silver bullet'' solution to a problem with 
this many complexities. However, the formation of JCDC in August 2021 
was a key development in promoting sharing and collaboration. In the 
time since, JCDC has created a platform for key players in industry and 
Government to voluntarily work toward common goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ See Public Law 113-113, Division N, Cybersecurity Act of 2015. 
114th Congress (December 18, 2015), https://www.congress.gov/bill/
114th-congress/house-bill/2029/text.
    \15\ See George Kurtz, Questions for the Record--Hearing on the 
Hack of U.S. Networks by a Foreign Adversary, Senate Select Committee 
on Intelligence (February 23, 2021) (How the private sector has 
promoted practical information sharing), https://
www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/qfr-gkurtz-
022321.pdf.
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    While we would generally defer to CISA Leadership to describe key 
outcomes, we can say that CrowdStrike values the partnership 
opportunity. We continue to invest time and expertise in the JCDC 
community, and we look forward to continued, shared efforts to promote 
better cybersecurity.
    As JCDC matures, we believe the effort can continue to improve. Two 
suggestions:
   Consider approaches that stratify or segment membership to 
        maintain trust.--As the group expands, JCDC leadership should 
        account for the possibility that some members may become less 
        willing to share details about sensitive issues. JCDC has 
        addressed this concern by maintaining clear direct channels of 
        communication with participants, and creating ad hoc working 
        groups with a subset of members. These are important measures, 
        but additional subgroup governance may help promote more active 
        and applied sharing. Articulating long-term aims for membership 
        composition may also be of value.
   Strengthen administrative Customer Relationship Management 
        (CRM) practices.--This would ensure consistent notification of 
        participant stakeholders about upcoming opportunities, events, 
        engagements, etc. A designated partner ``JCDC relationship 
        owner'' should be able to flexibly add or remove corporate 
        participants from various JCDC workstreams to facilitate 
        participation from particular personas (e.g, according to 
        function, experience, protocol, etc.).
    To their credit, JCDC leadership and staff have been proactive 
about seeking feedback from participants. We have provided suggestions 
along these lines to them directly and believe it is taken seriously. 
Like any ``start-up,'' we anticipate continued iteration as the group 
matures into its full potential.
    Ecosystem.--CISA contributes to the cybersecurity ecosystem in a 
variety of other ways. Support to key partners in the SLTT community; 
advice and tools for enhancing infrastructure, Industrial Control 
Systems (ICS), and OT security; alerts and notifications for IT 
security, particularly around emerging vulnerabilities; and leadership 
on workforce topics all contribute to better cybersecurity outcomes. 
Each of these issue areas is complex and requires specific expertise. 
CISA's contributions in this realm continue to mature and become more 
valuable over time.
    There remains a gap in cybersecurity performance between the 
``haves'' and the ``have-nots,'' which threat actors continue to 
exploit and which CISA cannot solve alone. To this end, we are pleased 
to see reference in the new National Cybersecurity Strategy to shifting 
the burden for cybersecurity to those best positioned to mitigate 
risks. This includes, where appropriate, holding platform providers 
accountable for the security of their products.\16\ As a community, we 
should no longer tolerate certain software vendors externalizing the 
costs of--or worse, nakedly monetizing--insecure software 
applications.\17\ While this policy concept must be made more concrete, 
a reasonable first step is ensuring that we're not rewarding vendors 
that cause harm. To this end, the Government can lead by example by 
using its own procurement power to shape market dynamics. This is 
clearly a productive area for continued Congressional oversight.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ See National Cybersecurity Strategy, page 20. The White House 
(March 2023), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/
National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf.
    \17\ For one example of a persistent security issue, see George 
Kurtz, Testimony on Cybersecurity and Supply Chain Threats, Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence (February 23, 2021) (Extended 
discussion on emerging cybersecurity controls and practices), https://
www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/os-gkurtz-
022321.pdf p. 5.
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                            recommendations
    1. The entire field must become more responsive in adapting to 
lessons learned. Unfortunately, cyber attacks with the potential for 
systemic implications take place with increasing regularity. However, 
organizations are uneven in adopting key lessons, from new security 
controls and mitigations to more secure architectures. From our vantage 
point, key lessons of recent breaches include:
     Use managed security services where practical to augment 
        internal security staff and attain responsive and comprehensive 
        security coverage.
     Adopt cloud-based IT systems and where possible, leverage 
        cloud-based security tools to achieve scalability and speed.
     Employ Zero Trust Architecture, with emphasis on identity 
        threat protection, to defend an increasingly diffuse IT 
        infrastructure and radically reduce lateral movement during 
        breach attempts, bringing us closer to cyber and mission 
        resiliency.
    2. We must approach regulation deliberately and harmonize to the 
greatest extent possible. Even as CIRCIA advances through rule making, 
independent regulators are pursuing new obligations \18\ and the 
National Cybersecurity Strategy foreshadows additional actions at the 
sector-level.\19\ Each of these measures is well-intended, but taking 
place simultaneously and with different stakeholders. At best, they 
will close long-standing gaps and strengthen national resilience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ See TSA issues new cybersecurity requirements for airport and 
aircraft operators, Transportation Security Administration (March 7, 
2023), https://www.tsa.gov/news/press/releases/2023/03/07/tsa-issues-
new-cybersecurity-requirements-airport-and-aircraft.
    \19\ Even prior to CIRCIA and recent efforts, data breach victims 
commonly faced more than 50 different reporting requirements in the 
United States alone, with additional international obligations in many 
cases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    At worst, they risk yielding burdensome, distracting, and costly 
compliance obligations without additional security gains. Optimizing 
for the former is among the most important challenges the cybersecurity 
policy community faces at this time. Our hope is that continued 
collaboration between potential regulators and/or muscular 
harmonization efforts will help avert worse outcomes. The best advice 
we can offer is:
     Be deliberate about advancing new requirements;
     Provide formal commenting periods for stakeholders to 
        contribute views;
     Use principles-based requirements rather than burdensome 
        and inflexible compliance-based approaches;
     Include provisions to regularly review and if necessary 
        modify, update, or deprecate requirements or controls based on 
        developments in the threat environment or technology ecosystem;
     The DHS Cyber Incident Reporting Council established under 
        CIRCIA should operate with vigor, and work to clearly identify 
        and reduce duplicative reporting; and
     Set the goal of all Federal agencies showcasing 
        cybersecurity best practices with a particular emphasis on 
        those that regulate cybersecurity ``walking the walk.''
    3. As a community, we should focus more attention on national 
incident response capacity. JCDC should continue coordinating and 
developing community response plans and CISA should weigh potential 
JCDC contributions for the purposes of forthcoming revisions to the 
National Cyber Incident Response Plan (NCIRP).\20\ If the Russian 
threat actors responsible for the major supply chain attack or the 
Chinese threat actors responsible for the Microsoft Exchange hacking 
campaign in 2021 had deployed ransomware or pseudo-ransomware at scale, 
large segments of the American economy would have been paralyzed. A 
CISA-administered program to retain outside providers for emergency 
incident response to attacks at entities of systemic importance could 
be of tremendous value in a future contingency.\21\ This could mitigate 
crippling impacts and ensure CISA had the ability to orchestrate 
response activities and maintain insight into findings in real time.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ See National Cybersecurity Strategy, page 12. The White House 
(March 2023), https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/
National-Cybersecurity-Strategy-2023.pdf.
    \21\ See Robert Sheldon, Testimony on Protecting American 
Innovation, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (September 21, 
2022), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/os-
rsheldon-092122.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    4. We must empower defenders with cutting-edge cyber-defense 
capabilities. Defenders with leading solutions are energized with 
radically improved morale. Too often, defenders are hobbled with 
inefficient and ineffective technologies. When these inevitably fail, 
they begin to feel like little more than a punching bag for 
adversaries, and that their best efforts are for naught. But when 
people are empowered, they can see their impact each day and can remain 
focused on the importance of their mission. To the extent that this 
committee can promote access to better tools, that will absolutely 
strengthen cybersecurity outcomes. For the FCEB, this means the full 
adoption of technologies mandated in E.O. 14028 like EDR and, 
ultimately, better access to managed security services to augment 
staff. To highlight another opportunity, we believe it's time to have a 
more serious conversation as a community about using tax mechanisms to 
speed adoption of key technologies in the SMB space.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ See Robert Sheldon, Testimony on Protecting American 
Innovation, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (September 21, 
2022), https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/os-
rsheldon-092122.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    5. The community must attract and retain top cybersecurity talent. 
The level of talent in our field--across industry and Government--is 
deeply inspiring. Based on our experience, the central motivator for 
people in the field is a sense of mission. A key challenge we have as a 
community is overburdened staff leading to burnout, a concern that 
underpins some of my previous comments on leveraging managed services 
and mitigating time-consuming and ineffective compliance obligations. 
Further, aligning roles to each organization's key missions--and in the 
case of Government authorities--helps people recognize the uniqueness 
of their contributions. A second challenge is expanding recruitment 
efforts to grow additional talent. To this end, I was pleased to 
announce during my participation at a White House Summit last month 
that CrowdStrike would soon launch an emerging leaders program focused 
on diverse candidates.\23\ We must continue efforts to fuel the 
cybersecurity talent pipeline.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ See Readout: Office of National Cyber Director Hosts 
Roundtable on ``The State of Cybersecurity in the Black Community'', 
The White House Briefing Room (February 28, 2023), https://
www.whitehouse.gov/oncd/briefing-room/2023/02/28/readout-office-of-
national-cyber-director-hosts-roundtable-on-the-state-of-cybersecurity-
in-the-black-community/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CISA's evolution is the culmination of non-partisan efforts under 
four consecutive Presidential administrations, and CISA has received 
numerous new key authorities and increases in funding over the past 
several years. Ultimately, in each passing year it is important to ask 
whether the U.S. Government is better able to prevent, detect, and 
respond to cyber attacks. Accordingly, I am pleased to see this 
committee has identified key oversight areas in the CISA 2025 
initiative to put CISA on track to fully implement those authorities 
and fulfill the mission Congress has entrusted it with. CrowdStrike 
looks forward to continuing and building upon its trusted relationship 
with CISA, and playing our part in empowering it to effectively carry 
out its mission.
    Thank you for the opportunity to appear in front of you today, and 
I look forward to your questions.

    Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Bagley.
    I now recognize Ms. Hogsett for 5 minutes to summarize your 
opening statement.

STATEMENT OF HEATHER HOGSETT, SENIOR VICE PRESIDENT, TECHNOLOGY 
           AND RISK MANAGEMENT, BANK POLICY INSTITUTE

    Ms. Hogsett. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Swalwell, 
honorable Members of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting 
me to testify.
    I'm Heather Hogsett, senior vice president of technology 
and risk strategy for BITS, which is the technology policy 
division of the Bank Policy Institute.
    BPI is a nonparty research and advocacy organization 
representing the Nation's leading banks. Through our technology 
division, we work with our members on cyber risk management and 
critical infrastructure protection, as well as fraud reduction, 
regulation, and innovation. We greatly appreciate this 
committee's leadership and the opportunity to provide 
perspective on the role of CISA in defending our Nation.
    Financial institutions are increasingly under cyber attack 
by foreign nations and criminal groups seeking to undermine the 
functioning of the U.S. economy. Our sector takes these risks 
seriously and has strong relationships with the Treasury 
Department, our Sector Risk Management Agency, as well as CISA, 
the National Cyber Director's Office, the FBI, the Secret 
Service, and also our regulators.
    Since being established, CISA has played a vital 
coordination role during the COVID-19 pandemic to keep critical 
infrastructure up and running. It also played a key role in the 
response to Solar Winds, Log4j, ransomware attacks, and on-
going geopolitical tensions with Russia. Throughout these 
efforts, CISA has improved its information sharing and with 
faster declassification of threat information, including a 
significant increase in publications and threat alerts combined 
with recommended mitigation measures, tool kits and other 
support services. Importantly, our members want to emphasize 
that CISA is also uniquely positioned to address longer-term 
strategic planning and cross-sector mitigation that would be 
particularly valuable for more mature sectors like financial 
services.
    As CISA continues to evolve, we encourage a focus on three 
areas.
    First is implementing the Cyber Incident Reporting for 
Critical Infrastructure Act. Last year, this committee led 
efforts, which BPI supported, to pass cyber incident reporting 
legislation requiring companies to report ransomware payments 
and cyber incidents to CISA. Implementing the new law is a 
significant undertaking that CISA must get right from the 
outset. It requires extensive coordination with critical 
infrastructure agencies, other Government agencies, and 
independent regulators. As a critical infrastructure sector 
that has had mandatory cyber reporting requirements for more 
than 20 years, ensuring that the new rules are harmonized with 
current requirements is also a key area of focus. As CISA 
formulates the new rules, it should ensure that definitions, 
time lines, thresholds, and required incident information are 
aligned with existing requirements and designed to avoid 
interfering with response and mitigation activities at an 
affected entity.
    Second, CISA should work with industry to identify and 
prioritize national systemic risks. Last year CISA received 
funding to develop a new systemically-important entity 
designation. Financial institutions are very supportive of 
efforts to identify and prioritize critical infrastructure 
assets that are most important to our national security. 
However, it is vital that CISA clarify what it intends to 
accomplish with a new designation and how it relates to 
existing efforts, including the Section 9 list, national 
critical functions, and sector-specific systemic risk 
designations like Systemically Important Financial Institutions 
or SIFIEs. CISA should avoid duplication and leverage sector-
specific work like ours to create a framework and methodology 
for identification of cross-sector risks and critical 
dependencies.
    Finally, CISA should support cross-sector collaboration and 
joint planning. CISA's role as national coordinator puts it in 
a unique position to support collaboration between critical 
infrastructure sectors and the Government to reduce risk and 
disrupt threats. The Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative was 
helpful in bringing together industry and Government partners 
to improve visibility and communication, particularly in 
response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This response-
oriented focus, however, has not fulfilled the need for longer-
term strategic planning across Government agencies and with the 
private sector. As authorized by Congress, CISA was charged 
with creating a Joint Cyber Planning Office to develop plans 
for cyber defense operations and coordinated actions that 
public and private-sector entities could take to protect, 
mitigate, and defend against malicious cyber attacks. We have 
not seen the JCDC engage in this type of proactive planning, 
but continue to believe this would be beneficial for financial 
institutions and other more mature sectors.
    Although not addressed to date, but noted in CISA's recent 
strategy, we believe that building the organizational 
foundation for sustainable cyber defense operations and 
focusing on the most critical needs of the Nation is of highest 
priority and would be the most critical accomplishment CISA 
could undertake at this time.
    On behalf of BPI, we look forward to continuing to work 
with this committee and with CISA, and I'm happy to answer any 
questions you may have.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Hogsett follows:]
                 Prepared Statement of Heather Hogsett
                             March 23, 2023
    Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Swalwell and Honorable Members 
of the subcommittee, thank you for inviting me to testify. I am Heather 
Hogsett, senior vice president of technology and risk strategy for 
BITS, the technology policy division of the Bank Policy Institute 
(BPI).
    BPI is a nonpartisan policy, research, and advocacy organization 
representing the Nation's leading banks. BPI members include universal 
banks, regional banks, and major foreign banks doing business in the 
United States. BITS, our technology policy division, works with our 
member banks as well as insurance, card companies, and market utilities 
on cyber risk management and critical infrastructure protection, fraud 
reduction, regulation, and innovation.
    I also serve as co-chair of the Financial Services Sector 
Coordinating Council (FSSCC) Policy Committee. The FSSCC coordinates 
across the financial sector to enhance security and resiliency and to 
collaborate with Government partners such as the U.S. Treasury and the 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), as well as 
financial regulatory agencies.
                financial institutions and cybersecurity
    Banks and other financial institutions are increasingly under cyber 
attack by foreign nations and criminal groups seeking to disrupt the 
financial system and undermine the functioning of the U.S. economy. The 
financial sector takes these risks seriously and has a long history of 
working across industry and with Government partners to address and 
manage these risks.
    As one of 16 critical infrastructure sectors, the financial 
industry formed and actively participates in the FSSCC \1\ and the 
Financial Services Information Sharing and Analysis Center (FS-
ISAC)\2\--both of which have served as leading examples other critical 
infrastructure sectors have sought to replicate. We also lead 
cybersecurity and operational resilience collaboration through public-
private partnerships with our Sector Risk Management Agency (SRMA)--the 
U.S. Department of the Treasury--the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Security Agency (CISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the 
U.S. Secret Service, and importantly with our regulators.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://fsscc.org/.
    \2\ https://www.fsisac.com/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    A major part of these industry efforts is focused on in-depth 
information sharing to accelerate and amplify public-private 
cooperation. During the nearly two decades of work, we have established 
exercise programs through the FSSCC and FS-ISAC that have covered a 
wide range of possible events such as destructive malware, an outage at 
a large service provider, or a pandemic and addressed managing public 
confidence during a crisis. More than 40 such exercises have been held 
to date and have included participants from across the industry, third 
parties, regulators, the U.S. Treasury Department, DHS/CISA and law 
enforcement agencies.
    In addition to Treasury and CISA, we also work closely with 
financial regulators to address cybersecurity, third-party, and supply 
chain risks and promote operational resilience across the sector. This 
work occurs with individual firms, through trade associations such as 
BPI, and via joint efforts between the FSSCC and its Government 
counterpart the Financial and Banking Information Infrastructure 
Committee (FBIIC), which is chaired by Treasury and includes 17 Federal 
and State regulators.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ www.fbiic.gov.
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                         experiences with cisa
    Since its establishment in 2018 as an operational component of DHS, 
CISA has taken on an increasingly important role protecting Federal 
civilian agencies and supporting security and resilience across 
critical infrastructure sectors. Following the important coordination 
role CISA filled during the COVID-19 pandemic to keep critical 
infrastructure working for America, there have been notable 
improvements in faster declassification and sharing of threat 
information, including a significant increase in publications, alerts, 
and joint advisories with other Government agencies such as the FBI and 
National Security Agency (NSA). These publications have become more 
frequent, timely, and relevant and included recommended mitigation 
measures to help critical infrastructure entities better protect 
themselves, particularly mid-size and smaller entities where the 
assistance is needed most. For example, CISA's recommended mitigations 
and tool kits to help entities protect themselves during the response 
to Solar Winds, Log4j, and the ransomware attack against Colonial 
Pipeline were welcome for their timeliness and actionable nature. By 
creating a centralized repository for this information CISA has also 
made it easier for companies to quickly find and access relevant 
information and resources.
    Its efforts to help raise awareness and promote baseline 
cybersecurity practices across all critical infrastructure sectors have 
been a welcome focus that will help reduce risk and improve national 
resilience. CISA also deserves credit for fostering collaboration and 
coordination across Government entities including the banking industry 
and other critical infrastructure. Its work to date has built the 
foundation for trusted relationships and very importantly created 
resources to support those sectors that are resource-constrained and in 
the earlier stages of building their cyber risk management programs.
    The preparation and response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine 
highlight a number of these accomplishments. As tensions rose and the 
United States prepared for Russian aggression and the potential for 
retaliatory attacks, CISA's senior leadership, along with senior 
leaders at Treasury, DHS and the FBI, was in regular communications 
with financial institutions and organizations like the FSSCC, FS-ISAC 
and the Analysis and Resilience Center for Systemic Risk (ARC). CISA 
created the ``Shields Up'' campaign to raise awareness and urge 
critical infrastructure companies to shore up their defenses and 
actively share suspicious information with the Government to provide an 
early warning of attacks. During this time, CISA created a new bi-
directional communication mechanism to provide for near-real-time 
information sharing among trusted partners in both industry and 
Government that had never previously been done. This coordination role 
was invaluable for our industry and others and provided a streamlined 
mechanism to exchange threat information and share timely updates to 
those operating some of the Nation's most critical infrastructure.
                        evolving for the future
    Looking ahead, it will be important for CISA to establish a clear 
path for maturing and scaling its operations, including ensuring these 
programs and initiatives have stakeholder input and will continue 
despite future changes in leadership. A number of the efforts to date 
have been in response to current cyber threats, which was and continues 
to be important, but CISA is also uniquely positioned to address 
longer-term strategic planning and cross-sector risk mitigation that 
will be particularly valuable for mature sectors. As CISA continues to 
evolve, we encourage a focus on the following areas:
   Cyber Incident Reporting and Harmonization--Supporting 
        Response and Recovery.--Last year, Congress passed the Cyber 
        Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act (CIRCIA) of 
        2022, requiring critical infrastructure companies to report 
        ransomware payments and cyber incidents to CISA. BPI supported 
        this legislation which we believe will help improve national 
        cyber defense by providing CISA and other Government agencies 
        with timely and relevant information to assess and analyze 
        cyber threats across sectors, improve the alerts and security 
        services CISA provides and ultimately provide earlier warning 
        of potential attacks so companies can better defend themselves. 
        Under the law, CISA must conduct a rulemaking process, seek 
        input from stakeholders, and develop the necessary systems and 
        processes to collect, analyze, and share reported information 
        while ensuring strong data security and protection measures are 
        in place.
    As CISA crafts rules under CIRCIA, it is also required to harmonize 
        the new requirements with existing regulatory reporting to 
        avoid conflicting, duplicative, or burdensome requirements. 
        Given the comprehensive set of cybersecurity and incident 
        notification rules \4\ that financial institutions already 
        comply with, harmonizing and aligning the new rules will be 
        important to ensure cyber defenders can maintain focus on 
        protecting the firm rather than complying with multiple 
        Government reporting requirements.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ https://staging4.bpi.com/cyber-incident-reporting-requirements-
notification-timelines-for-financial-institutions/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This is a significant undertaking that CISA must get right from the 
        outset and will require extensive coordination with critical 
        infrastructure entities, SRMAs, other Government agencies and 
        independent regulators. As a critical infrastructure sector 
        that has had mandatory cyber reporting requirements for more 
        than 20 years and has invested significant time and resources 
        into harmonizing and driving toward regulatory convergence, 
        this is a key area of focus. CISA should ensure that 
        definitions, time lines, thresholds, and required incident 
        information are aligned with existing requirements and designed 
        to avoid interfering with response and mitigation at an 
        affected firm.
    BPI recommends that CISA build a streamlined reporting system that 
        accomplishes the following: (1) Allows an impacted firm to 
        report incident information once and have it shared, as 
        appropriate, with SRMAs, regulators, and law enforcement 
        agencies; (2) provides CISA with timely and relevant 
        information useful to assessing trends, improving analysis, and 
        the development of alerts, tools, and services that can be 
        provided to critical infrastructure companies; and (3) 
        maintains its role as a trusted channel for information and 
        communications, preserving privacy and confidentiality while 
        supporting the response and recovery of an impacted entity.
   Identification and Prioritization of National Systemic 
        Risks.--Identifying critical infrastructure assets that are 
        most important to our national security would help prioritize 
        resources and guide public-private collaboration to prevent or 
        mitigate threats and prepare for potential response and 
        recovery needs.
    Financial institutions have existing designations such as the 
        Systemically Important Financial Institution designation that 
        stems from the Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 and requires firms to 
        adopt enhanced measures for security and resilience and 
        includes additional oversight and examination by financial 
        regulators. Many of these firms are also included in the 
        Section 9 process, established by Executive Order 13636 in 2013 
        and managed by DHS, which recognizes firms where a cyber 
        incident could result in ``catastrophic regional or national 
        effects on public health or safety, economic security, or 
        national security.''
    Similarly, in 2019, CISA created a list of 55 National Critical 
        Functions that are functions ``so vital to the United States 
        that their disruption, corruption, or dysfunction would have a 
        debilitating effect on security, national economic security, 
        national public health or safety, or any combination 
        thereof.''\5\ CISA is in the process of working with SRMAs to 
        decompose or analyze these further. At the same time, CISA is 
        developing a new designation for Systemically Important 
        Entities (SIEs) and was appropriated an increase of $1.9 
        million for the creation of an SIE Program Office.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ https://www.cisa.gov/national-critical-functions.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Financial institutions are very supportive of efforts to better 
        identify and prioritize cross-sector risks; however, the 
        current approach appears disjointed and opaque, making it 
        challenging for industry to provide input or information that 
        might be helpful. Past proposals to create an SIE or 
        Systemically Important Critical Infrastructure (SICI) 
        designation would have duplicated existing designations and 
        requirements on financial institutions, diverting resources 
        from defending against threats to regulatory compliance.
    As CISA continues this work, we encourage greater transparency and 
        clarity in the approach, what it intends to accomplish, and how 
        an SIE designation fits with related areas of work such as the 
        Section 9 list, NCFs and sector-specific systemic risk 
        designations such as SIFI. CISA should not only avoid 
        duplication or overlap with other systemic designations and 
        their requirements but also leverage work that has already been 
        done in the more mature critical infrastructure sectors. 
        Financial institutions have worked through the ARC to analyze 
        financial sector systemic risks and are ready to work with CISA 
        to develop a framework for assessing risks and critical 
        dependencies across sectors.
   Fostering Cross-Sector Coordination and Operational 
        Collaboration.--CISA's role as national coordinator for 
        critical infrastructure security puts it in a unique position 
        to support collaboration among more mature sectors and the 
        Government to reduce risk and disrupt threats. Since 2017, the 
        financial, energy, and communications sectors have conducted 
        joint planning and exercises to address cyber threats that 
        could impact or cascade across the three sectors. CISA 
        supported the creation of the ``tri-sector'' working group 
        which is a good example of fostering and enabling collaborative 
        efforts.
    CISA's Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) was helpful in 
        bringing together industry and Government partners to improve 
        visibility and communication in response to geopolitical 
        tensions and the Russian invasion of Ukraine. This response-
        oriented focus, however, has not fulfilled the need for longer-
        term strategic planning across Government agencies and the 
        private sector. As originally authorized by Congress,\6\ CISA 
        was charged with creating a Joint Cyber Planning Office (JCPO) 
        to develop plans for cyber defense operations and coordinated 
        actions that public- and private-sector entities could take to 
        protect, mitigate, or defend against malicious cyber attacks. 
        To date, we have not seen the JCDC engage in the type of 
        planning directed by Congress but continue to believe this 
        would be beneficial for financial institutions and other more 
        mature sectors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense Authorization Act 
for Fiscal Year 2021. Pub. L. 116-283, Sec 1715.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The recently released National Cybersecurity Strategy recognizes 
        that the private sector has growing visibility into adversary 
        activity and calls for enhancing public-private operational 
        collaboration to disrupt adversaries.\7\ Through our 
        relationship with Treasury as our SRMA, we have robust 
        partnership and dialog. Treasury is establishing a cyber 
        collaboration center to facilitate greater opportunity for 
        firms to exchange Classified and un-Classified information and 
        facilitate discussion around threat actor activity and 
        vulnerabilities. Other parts of Government have created similar 
        centers such as the NSA's Cybersecurity Collaboration Center. 
        Plans to create a cross-sector equivalent or otherwise foster 
        collaboration and exchange among these efforts would be 
        valuable and CISA could play a helpful role.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ National Cybersecurity Strategy, March 2023, p. 15.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
             sustaining progress and building capabilities
    We are at a defining juncture in CISA's development, similar to any 
start-up at this stage, where achieving scale matters. As Congress 
intended and supported with funding, CISA must refine its focus and 
apply resources carefully to be successful. Now that CISA has 
established its presence, developed communications and outreach 
capabilities, and designed tools and services to improve near-term 
resilience, it should shift its approach to expand management 
capabilities, add operational expertise and establish processes that 
will be the foundation for sustained leadership on immediate tactical 
response matters as well as longer-term, proactive planning and support 
that will benefit even the most cyber-mature sectors like financial 
services.
    Successful implementation of CIRCIA, including harmonizing its 
reporting requirements to optimize protection and response and 
streamline coordination, will serve as a cornerstone for the future of 
public-private partnerships and should be a top priority. Similarly, 
developing the means to identify and prioritize the highest risks by 
sector and across sectors will refine CISA's focus and support more 
secure and resilient outcomes for the Nation.
    This is no small task and requires CISA to focus on building 
organizational consistency and rigor, hiring and retaining experienced 
staff, and sourcing support from sectors that have well-established 
security, resilience and, in the financial services case, regulatory 
standards that can be leveraged.
    We are committed to working with CISA to support its continued 
development and look forward to the opportunity to engage in future 
national risk mitigation efforts.

    Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Ms. Hogsett.
    I now recognize Mr. Edwards for 5 minutes to summarize his 
opening statement.

    STATEMENT OF MARTY EDWARDS, VICE PRESIDENT, OPERATIONAL 
                  TECHNOLOGY SECURITY, TENABLE

    Mr. Edwards. Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Swalwell, 
and Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to 
testify before you today on CISA and the state of American 
cybersecurity.
    I am Marty Edwards, deputy chief technology officer for 
operational technology at Tenable, the leading cybersecurity 
exposure management company, with 43,000 customers world-wide, 
including just about every Federal department and many critical 
infrastructure providers.
    From Russia's invasion of Ukraine to the Colonial Pipeline 
incident, we're operating in a heightened threat landscape. 
CISA, the National Coordinator for Critical Infrastructure 
Security and Resiliency, and Congress have recognized the need 
to prioritize critical infrastructure security. Under Director 
Jen Easterly's leadership, CISA has taken significant steps to 
strengthen the U.S. cyber posture, including through 
prioritizing public-private partnerships, enhancing strategic 
collaboration, and developing new cybersecurity initiatives in 
favor of greater security and resiliency, which were emphasized 
the recent National Cyber Security strategy.
    This includes addressing the security of IT and OT system 
Convergence operational technology, or OT, is the hardware used 
in manufacturing, utilities, and critical infrastructure 
industries. But while today's technology are implemented to 
improve efficiencies, the convergence of these technologies 
between IT and OT makes OT susceptible to many new threat 
vectors. Successful OT attacks can impact human safety and 
damage physical equipment, making this a national security 
imperative. Public-private-sector collaboration, including 
CISA's Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative, of which Tenable is a 
proud alliance partner, is essential to building resilient and 
robust converged IT-OT environments and enabling collaboration 
on a range of issues.
    To combat the growing cyber threats, the White House tasked 
the President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committee with examining key challenges to securing converged 
IT-OT systems. I co-ed this Convergence Subcommittee Working 
Group to produce a report to the President which found that 
despite having the technology and the expertise to secure these 
systems, organizations still lack visibility into their OT 
environments.
    To strengthen the cybersecurity posture of the U.S. 
Government-owned and -operated OT systems with relatively low 
risk, the NSTAC report recommends three key steps for the U.S. 
Government, including No. 1, issue a binding operational 
directive that requires Federal agencies to maintain a real-
time, continuous inventory of all OT systems and assets, 
including any interconnectivity to other systems.
    No. 2, develop guidance on procurement language for OT 
products and services to incentivize and prioritize 
cybersecurity capabilities. Existing technology products and 
services should be secure by design, especially those that 
support critical infrastructure.
    And third, prioritize the development and implementation of 
interoperable, technology-neutral, vendor-agnostic information-
sharing mechanisms to enable real-time information sharing 
between the U.S. critical infrastructure stakeholders. We 
should not allow for learned helplessness by Federal Government 
agencies or by private industry. There is too much at stake for 
organizations to remain negligent and not take the most basic 
steps to improve their cybersecurity posture.
    From Tenable's perspective, Congress has the opportunity to 
enhance U.S. preparedness by establishing baseline 
cybersecurity standards of care and ensuring that CISA is 
adequately resourced to support its critical mission.
    Oh, that's interesting, I don't have the rest of my page 
here. Sorry about that.
    Many critical operating environments lack a formal, 
systemic approach to risk assessments, let alone the continuous 
visibility required for critical services and high-value 
targets. In these instances, policy guidance can help drive 
improved risk management practices and foster innovation.
    Thank you again, Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member 
Swalwell, and Members of the subcommittee for your attention to 
these important bipartisan issues, your continued assessment of 
the work CISA is doing to help keep Americans safe, and for the 
opportunity to testify here today.
    I look forward to working with you to secure our Nation's 
cyber assets and answer your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Edwards follows:]
                  Prepared Statement of Marty Edwards
                             March 23, 2023
                              introduction
    Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Swalwell, Chairman Green, 
Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the subcommittee, thank you for 
the opportunity to testify before you today on the Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) and the state of American 
Cybersecurity.
    My name is Marty Edwards and I am the deputy chief technology 
officer for operational technology (OT) and internet of things (IoT) at 
Tenable, a cybersecurity exposure management company that provides 
organizations, including the Federal Government, with an unmatched 
breadth of visibility and depth of analytics to measure and communicate 
cybersecurity risk. My expertise is in OT and Industrial Control System 
(ICS) cybersecurity, and my work with Tenable has focused on furthering 
Government and industry initiatives to improve critical infrastructure 
security. In collaboration with industry, Government, and academia, 
Tenable is raising awareness of the growing security risks impacting 
critical infrastructure and of the need to take steps to mitigate those 
risks. I also recently served as the staff lead under Tenable co-
founder Jack Huffard in the development of the Report on Information 
Technology (IT)/OT Convergence Report \1\ issued by The President's 
National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC). Prior 
to joining Tenable, I worked in industry as an industrial control 
systems engineer and as a program manager at the U.S. Department of 
Energy's Idaho National Laboratory focused on cybersecurity. I was the 
longest-serving director of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security's 
Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team (ICS-CERT), 
which is now part of CISA.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committee, ``Information Technology and Operational Technology 
Convergence Report,'' https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/
publications/NSTAC%20ITOT%20Convergence%20Report_508%20Compliant_0.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                             about tenable
    Tenable is headquartered in nearby Columbia, Maryland, and has 
1,900 employees globally and approximately 43,000 customers world-wide. 
Tenable is publicly traded on the NASDAQ and is the world's leading 
provider of vulnerability management capabilities. We believe 
cybersecurity is foundational to making better and more strategic 
decisions. Our goal is to eliminate blind spots and help organizations 
prioritize which actions they can take to most efficiently reduce 
exposure and loss.
    Tenable empowers organizations of all sizes to understand and 
reduce their cybersecurity risk. For the Federal Government 
specifically, Tenable provides the most widely-deployed vulnerability 
management solution, serving just about every department and agency. 
Our solutions are also broadly used by State and local governments to 
manage cybersecurity risk.
 the current state of ot/critical infrastructure/federal cybersecurity
    Over the past few years, we have seen a dramatic increase in the 
frequency of successful cyber attacks against U.S. public and private-
sector organizations and have experienced new threats targeting our 
critical infrastructure. New ransomware and extortion groups routinely 
exploit known vulnerabilities to gain access into organizations, with 
at least 31 new groups discovered from November 2021 to October 2022, 
resulting in ransomware attacks intensifying, exposing reams of data 
and accounting for over 35 percent of data breaches.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ Tenable, ``2022 Threat Landscape Report,'' https://
static.tenable.com/marketing/research-reports/Research-Report-
2022_Threat_Landscape_Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In February 2021, a water treatment plant in Oldsmar, Florida, was 
breached when attackers attempted to poison the water supply.\3\ Just 
months later, a ransomware attack against Colonial Pipeline shut down 
operations for 6 days, prompting the President of the United States to 
issue a state of emergency.\4\ Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine 
last year, and increased threats of malicious activity against the 
United States and our allies, CISA and other law enforcement agencies 
took swift steps to warn Governors, public-sector partners and critical 
infrastructure providers to harden their cyber defenses, including 
through the ``Shields Up'' initiative.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ ABC News, ``Florida city's water treatment system hacked by 
`intruder,' investigators say,'' https://abcnews.go.com/US/florida-
citys-water-treatment-system-hacked-intruder-investigators.
    \4\ NPR, ``What We Know About The Ransomware Attack On A Critical 
U.S. Pipeline,'' https://www.npr.org/2021/05/10/995405459/what-we-know-
about-the-ransomware-attack-on-a-critical-u-s-pipeline.
    \5\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, ``Shields Up,'' https://www.cisa.gov/
shields-up.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Just this month, a breach of D.C. Health Link, the health insurance 
exchange which serves Members of Congress and their staff, resulted in 
the on-line exposure of personal data of more than 56,000 customers.\6\ 
While unfortunate, this breach is not surprising as health care was the 
No. 1 sector targeted by ransomware attacks last year with 472 
breaches, followed by the public administration sector, which includes 
governments, towns, and municipalities with 162 breaches.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Roll Call, ``House, Senate members affected in DC Health Link 
breach to total 21,'' https://rollcall.com/2023/03/14/house-senate-
members-affected-in-dc-health-link-breach-total-21.
    \7\ Ibid 2.
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    When it comes to reducing cyber risk, organizations world-wide find 
themselves restricted by deeply entrenched people, process, and 
technology issues. An orientation toward reactive, incident-focused 
cybersecurity practices means preventive tasks are often relegated to 
nothing more than a compliance exercise. Teams are measured by how many 
vulnerabilities they've remediated, rather than by how effectively 
they've reduced their organization's exposure.
    The siloed nature of cybersecurity, especially between IT and OT 
teams--each with their own, sometimes contradictory, goals--exacerbates 
the problem. It is nearly impossible for cybersecurity leaders to 
obtain a unified and contextual view of their exposure using the 
existing tools at their disposal. The processes involved--which often 
require cybersecurity teams to convince their counterparts in IT, 
cloud, and Development Operations (DevOps) to take necessary security 
precautions--are fraught with opportunities for error and conflict. The 
siloed nature of the many preventive security tools offered by 
cybersecurity vendors means there's no way to determine how much 
exposure any given weakness actually represents at any given time. The 
reason? Security pros using siloed tools are unable to determine the 
relationships among users, systems, and software. Without a unified and 
contextual view of their environments, security professionals cannot 
realistically identify the objective security truths that indicate 
their exposure to risk.
    These issues are not new. While applying basic cyber hygiene can 
reduce exposure, it's long been challenging for organizations to 
achieve with existing preventive tools. What is new is the expanding 
complexity of the modern attack surface. Modern IT infrastructure 
encompasses multiple cloud systems, numerous identity and privilege 
management tools, multiple web-facing assets along with operational 
technology (OT) and internet of things (IoT) systems and software.
    Today's IT environment brings with it numerous opportunities for 
misconfigurations and overlooked assets. The lack of a unified and 
contextual view of users, systems, and software means security teams 
cannot effectively evaluate what's happening across the attack surface. 
Competing business interests often mean speed and uptime are favored 
over security.
    Government officials and private-sector leaders are paying 
increasing attention to critical infrastructure vulnerabilities, 
particularly those brought on by the convergence of IT and OT 
technologies. Since the late 1960's, OT has been part of manufacturing, 
utilities, and other critical infrastructure sectors, and has been 
considered technology ``safe'' from attacks because most OT devices 
were not connected to outside networks. However, in today's modern 
facilities, these devices are no longer air-gapped and are now in many 
cases exposed to the internet--and to the threat of cyber attacks.\8\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Tenable, ``Operational Technology (OT) Security: How To Reduce 
Cyber Risk When IT and OT Converge,'' https://www.tenable.com/source/
operational-technology.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The combination of IT and OT systems makes OT systems susceptible 
to the same risks of malware and threats that IT systems face today. 
Between the two: OT has different performance requirements than IT; OT 
systems serve a specific purpose while IT systems serve a wide variety 
of technologies; and OT systems have a life cycle of a decade or more 
while IT systems are much shorter. This creates different priorities 
between IT security professionals and OT system operators within 
organizations. While IT security practices can inform OT security 
requirements, the OT systems require more specialized solutions which 
address the performance requirements of the system.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committee, ``Information Technology and Operational Technology 
Convergence Report,'' https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/
publications.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Securing IT and OT systems and their convergence has become a 
national security imperative. Public-private-sector collaboration to 
address cyber threats is essential to building resilient and robust 
converged IT/OT environments. CISA is the national coordinator for 
critical infrastructure security and resilience and, as the 
administration's National Cybersecurity Strategy emphasizes, it must 
enhance strategic collaboration and scale public-private partnerships 
in favor of greater security and resiliency.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ The White House, ``National Cybersecurity Strategy,'' https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-
Strategy-2023.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Given the heightened threat landscape, CISA and Congress have 
started to recognize the need to prioritize critical infrastructure 
security and have begun making much-needed investments. CISA is working 
to guide the Nation's State and local governments, critical 
infrastructure providers, and other private-sector organizations, and 
Federal entities, to strengthen their cyber defenses. In Congress, the 
House Committee on Homeland Security-led efforts to include a $1 
billion State and local cybersecurity grant program in the 
Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act. The program will help State, 
local, Tribal, and territorial governments safeguard these vital 
systems from future attacks.
                                cisa 101
    CISA was established on November 16, 2018, to defend and secure our 
Nation's cyber space and build a resilient and robust critical 
infrastructure for the American people. As a relatively new Federal 
agency, CISA has made strides in elevating cybersecurity and 
infrastructure security as national security issues. Unlike other well-
established Federal organizations, CISA is working at start-up speed to 
keep American organizations ahead of growing and constant cyber 
threats.
    There has been significant activity under Director Jen Easterly's 
leadership to strengthen the U.S. cyber posture, including prioritizing 
public-private partnerships, developing new cybersecurity initiatives 
and implementing cybersecurity policies proposed by Congress and the 
administration.
Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC)
    CISA established the Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) to 
lead ``integrated public-private sector cyber defense planning, 
cybersecurity information fusion, and dissemination of cyber defense 
guidance to reduce risk to critical infrastructure and National 
Critical Functions.''\11\ Tenable is a proud Alliance Partner of the 
JCDC, which has enabled us to collaborate with CISA across a range of 
cybersecurity issues and challenges, to provide strategic insights and 
operational response acumen. Managing vulnerabilities is essential to 
secure critical IT and OT infrastructure and the work done by JCDC and 
CISA promotes the prioritization of network security. In fact, known 
vulnerabilities dating as far back as 2017 were so prominent in 
Tenable's 2022 Threat Assessment Report findings that they occupied the 
top spot in the 2022 list of the top 5 vulnerabilities.\12\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, ``Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative,'' 
https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/
JCDC_Fact_Sheet_508C.pdf.
    \12\ Ibid 2.
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Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 
        (CIRCIA)
    Following passage and implementation of the Cyber Incident 
Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA), CISA began 
development of cyber incident reporting regulations as required by the 
new law.\13\ Timely cyber incident reporting--both from critical 
infrastructure entities to CISA and from CISA to its industry 
stakeholders--enables rapid identification, remediation, and proactive 
defense against these and similar incidents. CISA's commitment to 
working with industry stakeholders to develop thoughtful, effective, 
and balanced reporting requirements will further strengthen the 
cybersecurity of our Nation's critical infrastructure.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, ``Cyber Incident Reporting for Critical 
Infrastructure Act of 2022 (CIRCIA),'' https://www.cisa.gov/topics/
cyber-threats-and-advisories.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As part of the regulatory development process, Tenable provided 
CISA with input as the agency developed its cyber incident reporting 
regulations required by CIRCIA. Among its input, Tenable proposed the 
following three primary recommendations to effectively improve threat 
and incident situational awareness:
    1. That CISA request contextual details about the specific 
        vulnerability exploited in the cyber incident and actionable 
        information about the nature of the incident, including 
        tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs), and indicators of 
        compromise (IOCs).
    2. That CISA share this information, utilizing the traffic light 
        protocol with a trusted group of cybersecurity stakeholders, 
        such as JCDC Alliance Partners.
    3. That actionable information sharing across the critical 
        infrastructure sectors would enable owners and operators to 
        help defend their organizations against and respond to cyber 
        attacks.
Binding Operational Directives (BOD)
    CISA also has authority to issue Binding Operational Directives 
(BOD), which are compulsory directions to Federal, Executive branch, 
departments and agencies for purposes of safeguarding Federal 
information and information systems.\14\ In 2021, CISA issued BOD 22-
01, which requires Federal agencies ``to remediate vulnerabilities in 
the KEV catalog within prescribed time frames.''\15\ The Known 
Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog is maintained by CISA and helps 
organizations prioritize remediation of listed vulnerabilities and 
reduce the opportunities for threat actors to compromise systems.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ 44 U.S.C.  3552(b)(1). U.S. Department of Homeland Security 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency, ``Binding Operational 
Directive 23-01,'' https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/binding-
operational-directive-23-01.
    \15\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, ``Reducing the Significant Risk of 
Known Exploited Vulnerabilities,'' https://www.cisa.gov/known-
exploited-vulnerabilities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Following recommendations to conduct asset inventories of OT 
systems included in last year's NSTAC Report to the President, CISA 
issued BOD 23-01 to require Federal agencies to improve asset 
visibility and vulnerability detection on Federal networks.\16\ To 
provide additional visibility into the variety of assets that make up 
the modern attack surface and help agencies understand the full scope 
of their cybersecurity risk, BOD 23-01 mandates continuous and 
comprehensive asset visibility. The BOD focuses on two core activities 
that are essential to maintaining a successful cybersecurity program:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ Ibid 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Asset discovery
   Vulnerability enumeration.
    By mandating continuous and comprehensive asset visibility, BOD 23-
01 will ensure that Federal agencies have the necessary foundation to 
maintain a successful cybersecurity program.
    This directive applies to all IP-addressable networked assets that 
can be reached over IPv4 and IPv6 protocols. It builds on BOD 22-01 and 
outlines new requirements for cloud assets, IPV6 address space, and 
operational technology (OT) in an effort to reduce cyber risk.
Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals (CPGs)
    In 2021, the Biden administration issued the National Security 
Memorandum on Improving the Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure 
Control Systems, outlining initiatives in the electricity, pipeline, 
water, and chemical sectors, and calling for the development of cross-
sector cybersecurity performance goals for critical infrastructure.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ The White House, ``National Security Memorandum on Improving 
the Cybersecurity for Critical Infrastructure Control Systems,'' 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Last October, CISA released its Cross-Sector Cybersecurity 
Performance Goals (CPGs), based on relevant categories and 
subcategories of the NIST Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), to address 
some of the Nation's most frequent and impactful cybersecurity risks. 
The CPGs also emphasize OT security and how it is often overlooked and 
under-resourced.\18\ By offering IT/OT cybersecurity guidance, CISA's 
CPGs create a baseline set of cybersecurity practices and benchmarks 
for critical infrastructure operators to measure and improve their 
cyber posture. Earlier this week, CISA released stakeholder-based 
updates to the CPGs that are more strongly aligned with the functions, 
categories, and subcategories of the National Institute of Standards 
and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF). The NIST CSF is 
widely utilized by critical infrastructure owners and operators and the 
greater alignment of the CPGs will make them more accessible to these 
entities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, ``Cross-Sector Cybersecurity 
Performance Goals,'' https://www.cisa.gov/cross-sector-cybersecurity-
performance-goals.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Pillar One of the administration's new National Cybersecurity 
Strategy builds on this notion of establishing cybersecurity best 
practices and expanding the use of minimum cybersecurity standards, 
such as the adoption of basic cyber hygiene and secure-by-design 
principles. This reinforces that IT/OT convergence will continue to be 
a security issue for years to come, and organizations need a plan to 
address these challenges.\19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ The White House, ``National Cybersecurity Strategy,'' https://
www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2023/03/National-Cybersecurity-
Strategy-2023.pdf.
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    Tenable was pleased that CISA incorporated input from multiple 
critical infrastructure industry stakeholders, including relevant 
sector-coordinating councils (SCCs) in the development of the CPGs, 
ensuring they were aligned with the NIST CSF. We are also encouraged to 
see the administration emphasize similar approaches to mitigate 
cybersecurity risk in its National Cybersecurity Strategy. Baseline 
cybersecurity requirements or standards of care for critical 
infrastructure, which align with CISA's Cross-Sector Cybersecurity 
Performance Goals, international standards, and the NIST CSF, drive 
better cybersecurity and a more resilient ecosystem.
Secure-by-Default
    In recent months, CISA has spearheaded efforts to shift the 
security burden from consumers to putting the onus on manufacturers to 
ensure built-in security is a feature of all technology products, 
especially those that support critical infrastructure. Director 
Easterly stated, ``the leaders of technology manufacturers should 
explicitly focus on building safe products, publishing a roadmap that 
lays out the company's plan for how products will be developed and 
updated to be both secure-by-design and secure-by-default.''\20\ 
Likewise, CISA launched the Ransomware Vulnerability Warning Pilot 
program to help identify vulnerabilities in critical infrastructure 
systems and inform owners to take action before a potential 
cybersecurity incident occurs.\21\ In conjunction with the other 
initiatives CISA has developed, these efforts will work to advance the 
Nation's cybersecurity resiliency.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \20\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, ``The Cost of Unsafe Technology and 
What We Can Do About It,'' https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/news/cost-
unsafe-technology-and-what-we-can-do-about-it.
    \21\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, ``CISA Announces Ransomware 
Vulnerability Warning Pilot,'' https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/
2023/03/13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
        separation of duties/independent assessments of software
    Similar to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 requirement for firms to 
separate their auditing function from their consulting function, 
``separation of duties'' in cybersecurity is necessary to prevent 
conflicts of interest, misaligned incentives, and increased security 
risks. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission states that an 
auditor is not capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment 
if a relationship with or service provided by an auditor ``(a) creates 
a mutual or conflicting interest with their audit client; (b) places 
them in the position of auditing their own work . . . ''.\22\ CISA 
should apply the Sarbanes-Oxley ``separation of duties'' principles to 
cybersecurity and prohibit the provider responsible for developing and/
or running software programs from also testing its security, conducting 
security audits, or reporting on its security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, ``Audit 
Committees and Auditor Independence,'' https://www.sec.gov/oca/
audit042707.
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                         what's next: cisa 2025
    CISA has worked to enable organizations and critical infrastructure 
providers to understand, manage, and reduce their cybersecurity risks, 
but there is still much work to be done. Naturally, as the agency 
evolves, there is a significant need for continued improvements to 
strengthen our cybersecurity efforts and to address the many unique 
needs of the critical infrastructure sectors.
    While some of the 16 identified critical infrastructure sectors 
\23\ have a high degree of cybersecurity preparedness, strong risk 
understanding and risk management practices, and very strong security 
programs, others are woefully ill-prepared. New technology investments 
represent great efficiency opportunities, like the move to smart 
factories and smart cities, but these shifts can introduce real gaps in 
security. Continued digital transformation, increasingly interconnected 
IT and OT systems, and an expanding cyber attack surface will require 
enhancements to security and resiliency. Critical infrastructure 
providers must be prepared to address tomorrow's cyber threats and it 
is CISA's responsibility to support them in that effort.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, ``Critical Infrastructure Sectors,'' 
https://www.cisa.gov/topics/critical-infrastructure-security-and-
resilience/critical-infrastructure-sectors.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Zero Trust Architecture
    The White House issued a Federal Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) 
Strategy in January 2022, requiring agencies to implement Attack 
Surface Management (ASM) as part of their ZTA by the end of fiscal year 
2024. The memorandum states, ``to effectively implement a zero trust 
architecture, an organization must have a complete understanding of its 
internet-accessible assets so that it may apply security policies 
consistently and fully define and accommodate user workflows.''\24\ ASM 
enables organizations to identify assets and look for vulnerabilities 
from the outside in, from the attacker's perspective, and will give 
agencies complete asset discovery, increase awareness of what is on 
their networks, and improve vulnerability management.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ The White House, ``Federal Zero Trust Architecture (ZTA) 
Strategy,'' https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/01/M-22-
09.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The memorandum further states, ``for agencies to maintain a 
complete understanding of what internet-accessible attack surface they 
have, they must rely not only on their internal records, but also on 
external scans of their infrastructure from the internet.''\25\ 
Ultimately, organizations cannot take a `trust no one' approach on a 
device if they do not know the device exists; however, ASM enables that 
visibility.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \25\ Ibid 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    As agencies look to comply with the White House's ZTA strategy by 
moving toward a zero trust architecture and taking a `trust no one' 
approach to security, the security of an agency's underlying user 
identity and privilege management system itself comes into play. To 
ensure identity systems are secure, agencies need to be able to 
identify everything in their complex Active Directory (AD) environment, 
predict what matters to reduce risk, and eliminate attack paths before 
attackers exploit them. Effective management of AD users and privileges 
allows agencies to take a proactive approach to address and mitigate 
future cyber threats.
NSTAC IT/OT Convergence Report
    In response to growing cybersecurity threats to the critical 
infrastructure upon which Americans depend, the White House tasked The 
President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee 
(NSTAC) with conducting a multi-phase study on ``Enhancing Internet 
Resilience in 2021 and Beyond.''\26\ The subcommittee for the second 
phase of the study was charged with developing the NSTAC Report to the 
President on IT/OT Convergence.\27\ I co-led the subcommittee's working 
group to produce this report. The report identifies three opportunities 
for the Federal Government:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ President's National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committee, ``NSTAC Fact Sheet,'' https://www.cisa.gov/resources-tools/
resources/presidents-nstac-fact-sheet.
    \27\ Ibid 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   to help relevant stakeholder communities execute a secure 
        convergence of IT and OT cybersecurity;
   to examine the key challenges of securing converged OT 
        systems against threats that emerge from IT network 
        connections; and
   to identify emerging approaches to increase OT resiliency to 
        these threats.
    The subcommittee received briefings from more than 30 subject-
matter experts across Government and private industry. First, the 
subcommittee heard from Government owners and operators of OT systems 
and policy makers focused on IT and OT cybersecurity; second, we heard 
from critical infrastructure owners and operators of converged IT/OT 
environments and original equipment manufacturers; and third, we heard 
from cloud service providers, integrators, and cybersecurity vendors.
NSTAC Report Findings
    On August 23, 2022, NSTAC approved the Report to the President. The 
report findings revealed several consistent themes highlighting that 
the convergence of IT and OT systems is not a new issue. As a Nation, 
we have not prioritized securing IT/OT interconnected systems, despite 
having the technology and knowledge readily available. Even in 2022, 
the report found organizations lack visibility into their OT 
environments, which is exacerbated by the traditional silos within 
which OT and IT personnel operate. The current siloed approach 
demonstrates a need to promote harmonization through a unified 
structure to better manage shared responsibility to secure converged 
environments.\28\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \28\ Ibid 9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Stakeholders also rarely take the opportunity to proactively 
``build in'' security where appropriate and opt instead to ``bolt-on'' 
security in OT environments after the fact, costing organizations 
valuable time and resources to recover from cyber incidents and 
unpatched vulnerabilities.
    Businesses, organizations, and governments need to share the 
responsibility of building a more sustainable cybersecurity model to 
create ecosystems that take a secure-by-design approach to ensure the 
long-term cybersecurity resiliency of our country--a point Director 
Easterly and CISA Executive Director Eric Goldstein recently 
emphasized.\29\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \29\ Foreign Affairs, ``Stop Passing the Buck on Cybersecurity,'' 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/united-states/stop-passing-buck-
cybersecurity.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
NSTAC Recommendations to Improve Critical Infrastructure Security
    Based on the findings, the subcommittee developed 15 Presidential, 
strategic, and actionable recommendations to address the many concerns 
expressed to the subcommittee through the briefing phases. Amongst the 
15 recommendations, the subcommittee identified 3 consequential 
recommendations for the President to strengthen the cybersecurity 
posture of U.S. Government-owned and -operated OT systems that should 
be prioritized.
    The report first recommends that CISA issue a Binding Operational 
Directive (BOD), similar to what Section 1505 of the Fiscal Year 2022 
National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) requires for the Department 
of Defense (DoD), that requires Executive civilian branch departments 
and agencies to maintain a real-time, continuous inventory of all OT 
devices, software, systems, and assets within their areas of 
responsibility, including an understanding of any interconnectivity to 
other systems. An up-to-date inventory should be required as part of 
each department's or agency's annual budget process.
    Once Federal agencies clearly understand the vast and 
interconnected nature of their OT devices and infrastructure, they can 
then make risk-informed decisions about how to prioritize their 
cybersecurity budgets to best protect the most consequential of those 
assets.
    Second, CISA should develop guidance on procurement language for OT 
products and services, and for products and services that support 
converged IT/OT environments, to incentivize the inclusion of risk-
informed cybersecurity capabilities, including for supply chain risk 
management. This guidance should also help organizations understand 
best practices for bolt-on security for legacy OT devices that are 
difficult or expensive to replace.
    CISA should work with the General Services Administration (GSA) to 
require the inclusion of risk-informed cybersecurity capabilities in 
procurement vehicles for the Federal Government. There should also be a 
mechanism for both private-sector users of the procurement guidance and 
public sector agencies, which must follow the new requirements, to 
provide feedback and lessons learned to aid the community.
    Finally, the NSC, CISA, and the Office of the National 
Cybersecurity Director (ONCD) should prioritize developing and 
implementing interoperable, technology-neutral, vendor-agnostic 
information-sharing mechanisms to enable real-time sharing of sensitive 
collective-defense information between authorized stakeholders involved 
with securing U.S. critical infrastructure. This should include 
breaking down the artificial barriers for sharing controlled 
unclassified information, both within the U.S. Government and between 
Government and other key, cross-sector stakeholders.
    Additional recommendations in the report to secure U.S. OT 
infrastructure call on CISA and the ONCD to clearly articulate roles 
and responsibilities for Federal agencies that support critical 
infrastructure and other industry stakeholders. Concurrently, CISA 
should work with the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to develop 
key IT/OT convergence cybersecurity performance indicators and 
implementation time lines for agencies and hold agency heads 
accountable. Furthermore, the ONCD, in partnership with CISA, should 
facilitate an interagency study that evaluates conflicting regulations 
for OT operators to identify opportunities to streamline OT 
cybersecurity regulation.
    Based on the subcommittee briefings, it was evident that the 
Federal Government has historically underfunded OT cybersecurity. 
Fortunately, the Infrastructure Investment and Jobs Act (IIJA) has 
created numerous grant programs that include cybersecurity as an 
allowable expense, presenting an opportunity for the ONCD and CISA to 
collaborate with Sector Risk Management Agencies (SRMA) to ensure that 
cybersecurity is a priority item in any grant application. Of note, the 
State and Local Cybersecurity Grant Program (SLGCP) appropriates $1 
billion in grant funding over the next 4 years to help advance OT 
cybersecurity. Tenable has been leading efforts to educate eligible 
entities on how to apply for grant funding and implement cybersecurity 
solutions that address the growing threats and risks to their 
information systems.\30\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \30\ H.R. 368--117th Congress (2021-2022): Infrastructure 
Investment and Jobs Act. (2021, June 4). https://www.Congress.gov/bill/
117th-congress/house-bill/3684/text.
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Binding Operational Directive 23-01
    As previously mentioned, last October CISA issued Binding 
Operational Directive (BOD) 23-01, calling on Federal civilian 
departments and agencies to ``make measurable progress toward enhancing 
visibility into agency assets and vulnerabilities,'' aligning with 
NSTAC's IT/OT Convergence Report recommendations.\31\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \31\ U.S. Department of Homeland Security Cybersecurity and 
Infrastructure Security Agency, ``Binding Operational Directive 23-
01,'' https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/directives/binding-operational-
directive-23-01.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    BOD 23-01 mandates continuous and comprehensive asset visibility, 
focusing on two core activities essential to maintaining a successful 
cybersecurity program: asset discovery and vulnerability enumeration. 
According to BOD 23-01, ``continuous and comprehensive asset visibility 
is a basic precondition for any organization to effectively manage 
cybersecurity risk. Accurate and up-to-date accounting of assets 
residing on Federal networks is also critical for CISA to effectively 
manage cybersecurity for the Federal Civilian executive branch (FCEB) 
enterprise.''\32\ Federal agencies need comprehensive visibility into 
their assets and vulnerabilities across their organizations to protect 
against external unknowns.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \32\ Ibid 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Enumerating OT assets, critical infrastructure and vulnerabilities 
present unique challenges to Federal agencies. Compared to the IT 
environment, where patching, upgrading, and replacing systems is 
standard, an OT environment typically requires working with legacy 
technologies. To prioritize remediation efforts, agencies need a 
detailed view of OT and IT assets in the OT environment and the ability 
to map connections between devices and identify high-risk assets.
    To ensure FCEB systems and agencies operating those systems meet 
said requirements, Congress should appropriate funding to implement 
CISA's BOD 23-01, enabling agencies to maintain an updated inventory of 
assets, identify software vulnerabilities, track how often an agency 
enumerates its assets, and share information with CISA's Continuous 
Diagnostics and Mitigation Program (CDM) Federal Dashboard. Pursuant to 
BOD 23-01, the scope of this implementation encompasses all reportable 
OT as well as IT assets.
                         policy recommendations
    Congressional action should not allow for ``learned helplessness'' 
by Federal Government agencies or private industry. There is too much 
at stake for individuals and organizations to remain negligent and not 
take even the most basic steps to improve their cyber posture.
    Tenable recommends the following steps that Congress should 
implement to enhance the cyber preparedness of U.S. critical 
infrastructure:
   Establish baseline cybersecurity requirements or standards 
        of care for critical infrastructure that align with CISA's 
        Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance Goals, international 
        standards, and the NIST CSF, based on effective cyber hygiene 
        and preventive security practices.--Basic cyber hygiene for 
        critical infrastructure operators includes continuous 
        understanding of what assets are on networks, ensuring strong 
        identity and access management, scanning for and patching known 
        vulnerabilities, and implementing incident detection and 
        response capabilities. Pillar One of the recently-released 
        National Cybersecurity Strategy calls for baseline 
        cybersecurity requirements for critical infrastructure 
        providers. The CISA Cross-Sector Cybersecurity Performance 
        Goals, based on the NIST CSF, are an excellent resource for 
        industry and Sector Risk Management Agencies to utilize in the 
        development of baseline requirements and standards of care.
   In its oversight of CISA implementation of CIRCIA, Congress 
        should ensure that CISA: is adequately resourced to ingest the 
        wealth of information that will be shared by critical 
        infrastructure entities; will request and share anonymized data 
        on the types of vulnerabilities that were exploited and the 
        attack paths that adversaries followed after infiltrating 
        target networks; and provides actionable information through 
        trusted partners, such as JCDC Alliance Partners, to provide 
        cyber situational awareness to the broader critical 
        infrastructure ecosystem to enable entities to protect 
        themselves against on-going and potential attacks.
   Require Independent Assessments of IT Management Software.--
        CISA should apply the Sarbanes-Oxley ``separation of duties'' 
        principles to cybersecurity and prohibit the provider 
        responsible for developing and/or running IT management 
        software from also conducting its exposure management or 
        otherwise testing its security, conducting security audits, or 
        reporting on its security.
   Continue implementation of the NSTAC IT/OT Convergence 
        Report policy recommendations.
     Direct Federal civilian agencies to inventory their OT 
            assets and provide OT asset and vulnerability information 
            to the CDM Dashboard.--CISA has already taken steps to 
            address this obstacle through BOD 23-01, but Congress 
            should reinforce the need to gain visibility into these 
            mission-critical environments so we can understand the 
            scale of cybersecurity challenges and begin to 
            systematically address the serious risk. The foundation for 
            every security framework, whether IT or OT, always begins 
            with visibility into the assets for which you are 
            responsible. Achieving this visibility is a significant 
            step forward for Federal departments and agencies to 
            protect their critical IT and OT assets against evolving 
            cybersecurity threats.
     Develop enhanced OT-specific cybersecurity procurement 
            language.--Public- and private-sector OT requests for 
            proposals and procurement processes seldom require the 
            inclusion of risk-informed cybersecurity capabilities for 
            products and services. Updating procurement language 
            guidance will help asset owners specify that cybersecurity 
            be built into products and projects rather than bolted on 
            as an afterthought. Including cybersecurity in both 
            government and private-sector procurement vehicles will 
            significantly enhance the resilience of critical 
            infrastructure systems.
     Implement standardized, technology-neutral, real-time 
            interoperable information-sharing mechanisms to promote the 
            sharing of sensitive information across agencies and to 
            break the traditional siloed approach.--Cyber attacks often 
            target multiple critical infrastructure sectors and 
            attackers have the ability to move at machine speed to 
            compromise multiple industrial sectors. Our defenses need 
            to match this threat and it is imperative for our critical 
            infrastructure sectors to securely communicate with each 
            other to get the right information to the right person, at 
            the right time, in a standardized, technology-neutral way, 
            in order to leverage cyber threat and vulnerability 
            information from the broader critical infrastructure 
            ecosystem.
   Ensure CISA and FCEB agencies are adequately resourced to 
        implement BOD 22-01 and BOD 23-01 policy recommendations.--
        Protecting our Nation's cybersecurity means knowing what's on 
        our networks and maintaining it in good working order, which 
        includes conducting an inventory of OT assets and prioritizing 
        remediation of known vulnerabilities. If an organization does 
        not know an asset exists, it cannot scan it for 
        vulnerabilities. With the issuance of BOD 23-01, Federal 
        agencies need comprehensive visibility into their assets and 
        vulnerabilities across their organization. This includes:
     External unknowns
     Cloud workload and resources
     Operational technology
     Network infrastructure and endpoints
     Web application
     Identity systems.
   Ensure sufficient funding for CISA and the Office of the 
        National Cyber Director to ensure they can meet mission 
        requirements.--Our company supported the creation of the Office 
        of the National Cyber Director and applauded efforts to stand 
        up and staff the new office. The threats to Federal networks 
        and critical infrastructure are growing at a significant rate, 
        and CISA must serve as an effective coordinator to strengthen 
        security in these environments. Congress should see the fiscal 
        year 2024 appropriations for CISA as a new baseline number, 
        which should grow at a rate commensurate with the needs of the 
        mission.
   Support and strengthen value-added engagement between the 
        private sector and public sector.--The JCDC, of which Tenable 
        is a member, is bringing together representatives from private 
        industry and key Government agencies to drive strategic 
        planning and incident response capabilities. This type of 
        operational Government-industry engagement has been a positive 
        step forward and we urge Congress to continue supporting and 
        strengthening the JCDC's alignment.
   Accelerate deployment of Zero Trust including Active 
        Directory and Attack Surface Management.--Congress should 
        provide Federal agencies with the resources needed to implement 
        Cyber Executive Order 14028 to modernize and strengthen our 
        collective cyber defenses, recognizing that Zero Trust is a 
        philosophy that dictates systems design and operation, not a 
        singular product.
     All Government systems must incorporate Active Directory 
            security to ensure least privileges for user identities, 
            and to scan for misconfigurations that can be exploited to 
            gain access to Active Directory and monitor for on-going 
            suspicious and high-risk activities within Active 
            Directory.\33\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \33\ U.S Department of Commerce, ``NOAA Inadequately Managed Its 
Active Directories That Support Critical Missions,'' https://
www.oig.doc.gov/OIGPublications/OIG-22-018-A.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
     Attack Surface Management, which continuously scans the 
            internet to discover, inventory, classify, and monitor an 
            organization's IT infrastructure, will give agencies 
            complete asset discovery, increase awareness of what is 
            actually on their networks, and will improve vulnerability 
            management.
                               conclusion
    There are fundamental steps all Federal agencies and critical 
infrastructure sectors must take--from knowing what's on their network 
and how those systems are vulnerable to addressing known exposures, and 
from controlling user access and privileges to managing critical 
systems that are interconnected--that will make it harder for bad 
actors to compromise interconnected IT and OT systems.
    Many critical operating environments lack a formal systemic 
approach to risk assessments and processes, let alone the continuous 
visibility expected for critical services and high-value targets. These 
formal processes are desperately needed as rapid increases in access 
and interconnectivity dramatically increase risk. In these instances, 
policy guidance for transparency and standards of care can help drive 
improvements in risk management practices and at the same time foster 
innovation.
    Thank you Chairman Garbarino, Ranking Member Swalwell, Chairman 
Green, Ranking Member Thompson, and Members of the subcommittee for 
your attention to these important issues and continued assessment of 
the work CISA is doing to keep Americans safe. I appreciate the work 
this committee is doing to elevate cybersecurity with bipartisan 
support. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today and I look 
forward to working with you to secure our Nation's cyber assets.

    Chairman Garbarino. Thank you, Mr. Edwards.
    Members will be recognized by order of seniority for their 
5 minutes of questioning. An additional round of questioning 
may be called after all Members have been recognized.
    I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Sherman, Congress has increased CISA's budget from 
$1.68 billion to $2.9 billion in a couple of years. This is a 
big increase, even for a mature department. In your experience 
analyzing CISA more broadly since its inception, how has this 
increase in budget changed CISA's coordination assistance to 
the private sector?
    Ms. Sherman. CISA, a few years back as it was stood up and 
then subsequently within a couple of years, undertook a 
reorganization. As a function of that reorganization, there was 
movement within the agency to kind-of reshape different offices 
and the roles that they played.
    I think GAO, we took a look at the reorganization and at 
that time made a number of recommendations with respect to both 
coordination within CISA and coordination between CISA sector 
risk management agencies, State and local entities, and the 
private sector, and a number of those recommendations still 
remain open. So, in part, the additional budget that the agency 
has been receiving over time and how it's using those funds is 
really important as it's thinking about implementing not only 
the recommendations that we made, but being able to implement 
an effective organization to be able to address cybersecurity 
issues and infrastructure security issues, the different parts 
of its mission. But it remains a challenge because it has a lot 
of priorities on its plate and it also is at, I think, a 
difficult position with challenges with respect to the 
cybersecurity work force as well and being able to fill 
positions within the agency.
    So we continue to monitor and watch the efforts that they 
have undertaken, but it's a daunting task in a lot of ways.
    Chairman Garbarino. I am not going to ask you for the list 
of recommendations they haven't fulfilled yet right now, but if 
you can get that to us, that would be great to have for the 
upcoming hearing we are going to have with Director Easterly.
    Ms. Sherman. Absolutely.
    Chairman Garbarino. I just want to ask, has CISA's sector 
risk management agency capabilities matured at a similar rate 
to its budget or budget growth or?
    Ms. Sherman. That's an interesting question. We cannot say 
for certain. Part of that is with our current review, or the 
review that we just recently completed and issued a report on, 
we attempted to try to get an understanding and spoke with all 
the sector risk management agencies to understand exactly what 
their maturity levels are and the extent to which they've been 
affected in their roles. But CISA doesn't have a very good 
handle on what that looks like. In fact, we heard that directly 
also from those agencies themselves. Part of the recommendation 
that we made was to be able to establish milestones and time 
lines to implement some of the efforts they have under way, one 
of which is being able to better understand and assess maturity 
and effectiveness of those agencies.
    Chairman Garbarino. Thank you very much.
    Ms. Hogsett, I want to move over to you now. I am fortunate 
to not only to serve as Chairman of this committee, but as a 
member of Financial Services. I look forward to working with 
BPI and other financial service industry stakeholders on cyber 
issues.
    But I want to ask you, how has the authorization--I think 
you mentioned a little bit in your opening statement--how has 
the authorization of new reporting requirements like the Cyber 
Incident Reporting for Critical Infrastructure Act, changed 
your sector's relationship with CISA?
    Ms. Hogsett. Thank you for the question.
    So I think our relationship with CISA right now we is have 
a very good relationship. CISA has been able to establish 
itself as a trusted partner not only for our sector, but a 
variety of others. So I think the voluntary information sharing 
that they have today will be improved with implementation of 
the new Incident Reporting rules. But it is really important 
throughout that process that CISA look at the existing 
regulations. We within the financial sector have several that 
are all sort-of happening at the same time and impacting a firm 
in a really challenging way.
    So just by way of example, we from a regulatory perspective 
have an incident notification rule to notify our primary 
regulators within 36 hours that a significant event may have 
occurred. Then the reporting to CISA after that with more 
detail within 72 hours, which the benefit of that will help 
CISA have a better view of the threats and what's happening out 
there to improve its ability to support critical 
infrastructure. So we very firmly believe that this is 
important work. But then for us now and other companies who 
fall under the Securities and Exchange Commission, we are also 
then potentially facing about a day later a public notification 
of those same incidents and challenges which will undermine 
some of the work that has been done by our regulators and by 
CISA.
    So we think that CISA is in an important role to really 
move forward and get this right. There is a requirement to 
streamline those requirements which we stand ready to assist 
and engage with them to help make that happen. It will be a key 
challenge and I think most importantly, the fact that CISA is 
not a regulator will be helpful in this effort.
    Chairman Garbarino. I appreciate that.
    My time has expired, so I now call--I will start with other 
questions. OK, sure.
    I now recognize Representative Carter for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carter. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, Ranking 
Members--Member rather. Thank you all for being here.
    Ms. Hogsett, in your submitted testimony you emphasize that 
in order for there to be successful implementation of CIRCIA, 
it is critically important that these agencies harmonize for 
their reporting requirements to optimize protection and 
response, a streamlined coordination. Let's take a step back 
here and see how private-sector entities, specifically the 
banking sector, for which you are an expert, can speak to how 
the private sector assesses cyber risk internally, how they 
ensure the risk assessments that they utilize are objective, 
independent, and reliable.
    Ms. Hogsett. So financial institutions have a variety of 
different requirements that we need to meet with our 
regulators. So we have--just at the Federal level we have, for 
instance, the Federal Reserve Board, the Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation, all of whom look at cyber risk management 
practices, they look at third-party risk management, they look 
at how you architect your systems for operational resilience. 
So what firms do internally is we have actually what we refer 
to as a three lines of defense model, in essence, where you 
have your front-line cyber defenders doing a lot of work, you 
will have a second line, which is independent of that and will 
look at those policies and programs and challenge them 
internally, and then you have a third line internally, which is 
internal audit, which will then do all of that same work again 
from yet another independent perspective. Then we have for the 
largest institutions, they have an on-site examiner sitting in 
their headquarters working with them day in and day out. So 
there was an on-going oversight relationship there. So it's a 
very complex interwoven set of rules and requirements that we 
work with every day.
    Mr. Carter. What input do you get from outside with that, 
do you?
    Ms. Hogsett. So firms will bring in outside security 
consultants to do additional review, things like penetration 
testing, to sort-of test how good their defenses are from a 
variety of different angles. They will assess themselves 
independently against things like the NIST Cybersecurity 
framework. That happens alongside and in addition to the 
regulatory oversight that happens. All of that gets reported up 
to senior management and the board of directors level for 
regular conversation and action.
    Mr. Carter. So with technology moving as fast as it does, 
as you evaluate the risk, the pace at which the bad guys, if 
you will, are getting technology to undermine systems, how are 
we doing with keeping pace with the outside forces that we have 
to manage?
    Ms. Hogsett. It is absolutely a challenge and it is one 
reason why you need to ensure that any rules put in place are 
flexible and can be adaptable over time, because the threats do 
change. So we have layered defense models. Zero trust was 
mentioned earlier, that's one of multiple things that we will 
employ. The challenge there is in the regulatory structure to 
be nimble and get that right and not dictate that something has 
to be protected a certain way or with a certain type of 
technology. Because I think that's where you can run into 
challenges. You need that flexibility and that ability to be 
nimble in how you're protecting your organization.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you.
    Ms. Sherman, presently FISMA requires annual audits of 
Federal Government entities to conduct cybersecurity compliance 
and risk assessment. Their inspector general or an independent 
auditor can conduct this for them. This ensures reliability of 
the information that they share with CISA, it ensures 
accountability. What can be done to ensure that this 
reliability and accountability with private-sector entities as 
information-sharing reporting requirements expand?
    Ms. Sherman. With respect to the ability to ensure 
reliability of the data and information sharing, I think it's 
important. We've been talking today so far about the 
partnerships and the relationships not only between CISA and 
the sector risk management agencies but between the sector risk 
management agencies and all of the other critical 
infrastructure entities that they rely on the owners and 
operators, the SLTTs and others in the private sector. That 
partnership is critical in order to be able to bring and be 
able to receive reliable information.
    But that comes from a place of trust, which can be 
challenging sometimes, to be able to acquire that type of 
information on a regular basis and again, have that flow of 
information in order be able to really kind-of understand what 
actions are being taken and also how the specific sectors are 
carrying out their work in order to be able to improve 
cybersecurity.
    The partnerships working to strengthen those partnerships 
would help to encourage trust and would contribute to building 
the information sharing or improve the information sharing in 
order to have more reliable data.
    Mr. Carter. Thank you.
    Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back.
    I now recognize my friend from Florida, Mr. Gimenez for 5 
minutes questioning.
    Mr. Gimenez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As the Chairman of the committee's Transportation and 
Maritime Services Subcommittee, I have a distinct interest in 
transportation and maritime cybersecurity.
    So in light of what happened in the Colonial Pipeline a 
couple of years ago, Mr. Bagley, have you seen any improvements 
in our posture, in our ability to stop these kind of attacks, 
ransomware, and others in the future in our pipelines?
    Mr. Bagley. Thank you for the question.
    Vast improvement from a technological standpoint in terms 
of the capabilities available, as well as the ability for those 
cyber have-nots to be able to acquire sophisticated defensive 
cybersecurity technologies in recent years. However, there is 
still a great disparity between those who are deploying these 
technologies, like endpoint detection and response, zero trust 
architecture, identity protection and whatnot and those who are 
not.
    However, one of the things that we've seen as a positive 
development in recent years has been the call to action from 
Executive Order 1428, which calls out the very same 
cybersecurity technologies that are successful by many large 
entities in the private sector. In CISA's efforts to expand use 
of these technologies within Federal Government as well as 
within critical infrastructure entities, is one where we're 
still in the early stages, but so far we are seeing the 
technology proliferated more. I think that that's important 
because right now we're really in a war of innovation against 
adversaries. Adversaries traditionally had to have some sort of 
technological ability themselves and now we're in an era in 
which literally there are access brokers that sell credential 
access to victim organizations, we're in an era in which there 
is not only ransomware, but ransomware as a service. Meaning a 
threat actor does not actually have to develop the ransomware 
themselves or even operate it in many cases in order to deploy 
it and target it. So that's where the threatscape has changed 
in recent years and yet the defensive capabilities are 
fortunately improving.
    Mr. Gimenez. So are you saying that you have, like, rent-a-
cyber attack?
    Mr. Bagley. That's correct, Congressman. It is now possible 
not only for ransomware, but for other types of services, such 
as if a threat actor wants to do data leak extortion whereby 
they infiltrate a victim organization, exfiltrate data, hold it 
ransom, and perhaps leak some of it subject to a ransom or 
purely for embarrassment and destruction of that organization's 
reputation, they're able to do so without actually being able 
to code themselves or even have the infrastructure because they 
can rent it in the same way that we use different services 
today or the same way we pay for our monthly services as 
consumers.
    Mr. Gimenez. Where are the vast majority of these companies 
for rent? Where are they located?
    Mr. Bagley. These threat actors are located throughout the 
world. Our reporting certainly shows that naturally there are a 
lot of threat actors based in Eastern Europe and in Russia who 
run some of these ransomware-as-a-service operations. But 
they're proliferated throughout the world.
    Mr. Gimenez. The ones that are operating out of Russia, is 
it your thought that they are wink, nod, et cetera? They are 
allowed to operate in Russia by the Russian government? If the 
Russian government wanted to shut them down, could they?
    Mr. Bagley. From what we've seen, we've certainly seen use 
of nation-states, including Russia, utilizing and leveraging 
the capabilities of Ecrime actors to carry out state goals and 
means. That's certainly the case with Russia.
    Mr. Gimenez. What about China?
    Mr. Bagley. China traditionally targets just about every 
sector. Recently, we released our Global Threat Report and in 
it what we saw from the data that we've analyzed is that China 
has targeted just about every sector, not only in the United 
States, but also more broadly around the globe for its aims.
    Mr. Gimenez. Does anybody attack China?
    Mr. Bagley. I imagine there are others who might be able to 
answer that on behalf of the U.S. Government, but certainly 
cyber attacks are rampant everywhere.
    Mr. Gimenez. Look, in a nuclear age, we have mutually 
assured destruction, which kind-of kept the peace. So do you 
find that the Russians and maybe the Chinese and those bad 
actors are operating with impunity? Is that your opinion?
    Mr. Bagley. Well, what we see is that you not only have 
nation-state actors to contend with in the modern era, but you 
also have Ecrime groups which will run by their own rules, as 
well as hacktivist organizations, which will be motivated by 
specific aims related to issues.
    Mr. Gimenez. OK, thank you very much. My time is up. Thank 
you.
    Chairman Garbarino. The gentlemen yields back.
    I now recognize Mr. Menendez for 5 minutes for questioning.
    Mr. Menendez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for communing us 
here today, thank you to our witnesses, and to our Ranking 
Member.
    In recent years, communities across the country have been 
impacted by the spike in ransomware attacks. Last year, as part 
of the bipartisan infrastructure law, Congress provided $1 
billion over 4 years in new grants to improve the cybersecurity 
of State and local governments.
    Mr. Edwards, as State and local governments seek to utilize 
this new strength in their cybersecurity, how should they 
prioritize their cybersecurity investments? Do you believe 
additional support for State and local cybersecurity will be 
necessary going forward?
    Mr. Edwards. Thank you very much for your question.
    In general, my perspective is that we should look at those 
systems that have the highest risk to society. In my perhaps 
not-so-humble opinion, that usually falls to these operational 
technology systems that operate things like power grids, 
pipelines, and other infrastructure that's critical. I think 
that both the U.S. Federal Government and State and local 
governments have done a reasonably good job of prioritizing 
what I would call information technology, or IT, security over 
the years, right. But we certainly are behind in investing in 
protection of these critical systems that are investor control 
system applications or other operational technology 
applications.
    I think when it comes to funding for the States, that seems 
to be a good mechanism that we use in our country to ensure 
that the State and local governments have the adequate types of 
programs that they need to run. I think that cybersecurity is 
going to benefit, for example, from the cybersecurity language 
that was inserted into the Infrastructure and Jobs Act and 
things like that.
    So I see some positive trends with regards to funding at 
the State and local level. They do need to, I think, move 
beyond--some of the other witnesses talked about going in to do 
an assessment of a facility or a system. We used to do that 
kind-of on a periodic basis. You'd go in and hire a consultant 
and do an assessment once a year or once every 3 years and it 
would satisfy your compliance requirements. I don't think that 
we can live in that world anymore. We need to move to 
continuous visibility so that we know what's happening on those 
networks at all times, rather than waiting for somebody to come 
in in 2 years to tell us that we were hacked a year-and-a-half 
ago.
    Thank you for your question.
    Mr. Menendez. No, I appreciate your answer.
    Mr. Bagley, you have mentioned a couple of times the 
cybersecurity have and have-nots. We are still clearly trying 
to come up with a cohesive system to address our greatest, 
highest-risk assets. Talk to us about some of the challenges in 
scaling up cybersecurity protections for all different segments 
of our industries, economy, folks of different size who want to 
implement cybersecurity best practices, but No. 1, have an 
allocation of resource challenge and No. 2, I think the 
director also mentioned the cybersecurity work force. Are we 
training enough people?
    So, sort-of a two-part question, but would love to get your 
thoughts on those items.
    Mr. Bagley. Thank you for the question.
    One of the recent positive developments that we've seen is 
that managed service providers are able to augment existing 
security programs or sometimes completely replace security in 
an organization that would not otherwise be able to afford to 
have its own security program. One of the advantages of modern 
managed service providers is that managed service providers can 
bring the very same sorts of cybersecurity best practices that 
are currently called upon in the U.S. Government today, such as 
endpoint detection and response as well as proactive threat 
hunting.
    One of the things that managed service providers can bring 
is scale, meaning that a small organization that might not be 
as well-resourced, a cybersecurity have-not, could easily 
utilize a managed service provider instead of building its own 
security program, whereas if we look back not that many years 
ago when we looked at the cybersecurity haves and have-nots, 
the have-nots would not have the capabilities of building their 
own security program. It might not have an alternative, and 
today there exists an alternative.
    I think that's something that can be highly effective and I 
think that that can be highly effective too when we look at the 
SLTT space and we look at the broader Federal Government space 
and think about shared services models. So for example, with 
CISA, with its newer powers as a CISO, CISA is able to bring to 
bear cybersecurity capabilities to Government agencies that 
traditionally have lacked the same resources as their larger 
counterparts. This trend is one that we see in the private 
sector as well.
    Mr. Menendez. Appreciate it. Four seconds. I will yield 
back the remainder of the time, but do want to hopefully 
eventually get everyone's thoughts either in writing, but about 
the challenges that we are seeing from a work force perspective 
and what we could at the Federal Government to ensure that we 
are aiding and developing that work force so we can meet these 
challenges with a robust system.
    I do apologize for going over, Chair.
    Chairman Garbarino. Not a problem.
    The gentlemen yields back.
    I now recognize my friend from Mississippi, Mr. Ezell, for 
5 minutes of questioning.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    As a former sheriff with decades of experience fighting to 
protect the people and communities in Brown, South Mississippi, 
I am eager to join the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure 
Protection Subcommittee to combat the threat of the malicious 
cyber actors.
    Mr. Bagley, you have talked today about how JCDC aims to 
connect private industry with Federal partners such as DoD, the 
intelligence community, and law enforcement. In your role. Can 
you describe how JCDC interacts with local law enforcement?
    Mr. Bagley. Thank you for the question.
    From my perspective as a stakeholder in JCDC, from what 
we've seen is we've seen it's very issue-oriented. So, for 
example, if there is an issue, such as certainly what we saw 
come to bear with Log4j, where CISA was rallying all members to 
come together, bring information, share information, and 
consume information, we've certainly seen involvement at all 
level of government and what--where JCDC can share information. 
Specifically, in terms of how local law enforcement is 
prioritized within the apparatus of JCDC, I would defer to CISA 
leadership, but we've certainly seen involvement across 
industry and across government in JCDC.
    Mr. Ezell. Do you think the balance between CISA's asset 
response and the FBI's threat response activities has been 
successful?
    Mr. Bagley. I think that there are certainly different 
missions at play. One of the strengths of JCDC is that it's not 
trying to necessarily define a brand-new mission for all 
stakeholders, but instead be a centralized place where 
stakeholders with different missions can come and cooperate. So 
naturally, the FBI, having an interest in law enforcement and 
focusing on seeking justice for victims, is one where the FBI 
obviously has ad hoc relationships with partners. But I think 
the strength is the FBI can bring its expertise to JCDC and 
similarly JCDC and its mission as a civilian agency focused on 
cybersecurity for regulated entities as well as a convener of 
public and private partnerships, can utilize that expertise and 
the expertise of others. I think that naturally strengthens the 
dynamic, especially if we think about having the system in 
place in the events of big events, such as the Log4shell, Log4j 
event.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you.
    I want to move on the importance of leveling the playing 
field to ensure there is active participation from a mix of 
large- and small-sized companies. What can CISA do to be more 
business-friendly in order to increase participation?
    Mr. Bagley. I think that as JCDC grows in its structure, I 
think it's important to put into place different structures so 
that as it expands there can be different working groups that 
might be well-suited for organizations of different sizes or 
organizations focused on different topics in general. So I 
think that's one way.
    I think also CISA, what we've seen in recent years is CISA 
has certainly demonstrated its ability to serve as a 
clearinghouse for certain types of information and proliferate 
that information to the community. I think that's another one 
where there is an awareness component in addition to, of 
course, a resource component when we think about the 
cybersecurity haves and the have-nots. I think CISA has an 
important role to play and that it has been playing in recent 
years with regard to raising awareness not only about 
cybersecurity threats, but also cybersecurity resources and 
capabilities. I would expect that that would continue to grow 
and expand and be for the benefit of smaller entities.
    Mr. Ezell. Thank you for your answer.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Garbarino. The gentleman yields back.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Mr. Swalwell. Great.
    Ms. Sherman, GAO has made a number of recommendations 
related to how CISA can improve its support to critical 
infrastructure and sector risk management agencies. Can you 
just prioritize those recommendations?
    Ms. Sherman. What I would want to do is I would want to 
highlight actually in our recently-issued report from last 
month, we included a section in the report where we outlined 
all outstanding open recommendations that we had made to sector 
risk management agencies, specific to critical infrastructure, 
of which there are many. There are challenges in prioritizing 
those recommendations, but what we would say with respect to 
CISA is that it's important for CISA to take in the near-term, 
a set of following actions. We think that there's gaps in 
guidance that the agency could provide. In part, this has to do 
with the national plan and being able to update the national 
plan and the sector-specific plans. We understand that there's 
a pause essentially that's going on with a lot of the sector 
management agencies because of the PPD-21 rewrite, but we think 
that CISA can be taking action in the interim to position 
themselves to be able to update those plans expeditiously once 
the rewrite is completed.
    We also feel that there could be opportunities, of course, 
to be able to standardize the set of approaches in order to 
really understand--harking back to what we were talking about a 
little bit before, how mature and how effective these agencies 
are in their efforts. So we would want CISA to prioritize being 
able to collect that information.
    I think finally, that feedback loop of really being able to 
understand what the relationships are like between the sector 
and all of their partners, look at those existing partnerships, 
getting a recognition of what's working and perhaps what's not 
and where improvements can be made.
    Mr. Swalwell. Great.
    Exactly the cogent answer I would expect from a fellow 
government and politics degree holder from the University of 
Maryland.
    Ms. Sherman. I noticed that. Thank you.
    Mr. Swalwell. Go Terps.
    Ms. Sherman. Go Terps.
    Mr. Swalwell. Mr. Edwards, can I also ask you, JCDC has a 
new dedicated unit focused on industrial control system 
security. What should we expect to see from the JCDC ICS?
    Mr. Edwards. Yes, thank you for your question.
    It certainly is a fairly new initiative that the JCDC has 
taken on to build a dedicated group, or a tiger team, I guess, 
of sorts, for industrial control systems. I think I agree with 
my other witnesses here that have stated that in order to be 
successful, the JCDC is going to have to be able to break some 
of these topics down in all discussions, rather than having 
every discussion happen with the entire group, right. This is 
going to be a scalability challenge of sorts, right, where we 
can't solve every problem with everybody in every room, we have 
to break these into smaller digestible pieces. So I believe 
that we will see a lot of good information come out of the JCDC 
ICS group or OT group.
    The other thing I believe that is important that CISA can 
work on here is with regards to the CIRCIA, incident risk 
reporting. That information, when it comes in and is analyzed, 
needs to be disseminated to technology service providers such 
as represented here, so that we can build the coverage to 
detect those threats or those weaknesses in those systems in a 
timely fashion. So we're eager to work with CISA and the JCDC 
construct on how to best make this into a machine-readable, 
real-time, information-sharing platform.
    Mr. Swalwell. Great.
    Building off of Mr. Menendez's point at the end of his 
questioning, Mr. Edwards, what is your assessment of the 
current state of our Nation's OT cybersecurity work force? What 
can the Federal Government do to ensure that OT cybersecurity 
skills are prioritized in any work force development training?
    Mr. Edwards. Yes, it's a very complex problem, right. So 
you have sort-of this overlap between cybersecurity 
professionals who typically come from business colleges or 
degrees, they've come up through the business side of a 
corporation or an enterprise, and the operational technology 
people such as myself come from an engineering background, and 
many of the engineering schools, the curricula is such that 
there's no more room to put in there to talk about 
cybersecurity, they're going through the physics and the basics 
of an engineering discipline. So I think that in some cases, 
the educational institutions themselves are somewhat challenged 
with how to put this in.
    Another thing that I believe is that we have a little bit 
of a chicken or the egg problem, right. As the NSTAC report 
stated, we believe that the United States actually has the 
technology and actually has the knowledge base to solve these 
problems. We just haven't manifested it at scale. So I think 
things like the NICE Framework, that are coming out with work 
force development, that are focusing more on OT, are good 
initiatives, and we should continue to invest there.
    Mr. Swalwell. Great. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Garbarino. The gentlemen yields back.
    I now recognize Ms. Lee from Florida for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    Ms. Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    In my former role as Florida's secretary of State 
elections, I worked extensively with CISA in securing our 
elections infrastructure. CISA was a key partner to State and 
local elections officials. I look forward to our work together 
to ensure that we are advancing cybersecurity across all of the 
critical infrastructure sectors.
    My questions, I would like to begin with you Ms. Sherman, 
and specifically in the subject of elections and election 
security, since it has been designated part of our critical 
infrastructure. First this, because CISA has become such an 
important part of assisting and aiding State and local election 
officials, would you describe for me some of the things that 
you think are working well there? Or if there are other places 
where CISA needs additional support or resources from Congress 
to make sure that you can do that job effectively?
    Ms. Sherman. So the election security sector is in some 
respects, I think, just a little over 5 years old and the 
subsector-specific plan that guides it also is somewhat 
outdated. So for the last election, guidance was put out by the 
Subsector Coordinating Council to ensure that there was a more 
kind-of relevant, timely understanding of efforts and to be 
able to kind-of fill that gap--or in the absence of an updated 
plan.
    In the recent review that we carried out, we did hear from 
individuals that we spoke with, officials that we spoke with, 
and actually as part of the priorities work for last year that 
we had carried out with CISA, that the agency has done a good 
job of sharing election-specific information that's general, so 
kind-of Nation-wide threats to consider, but that there was an 
interest and a desire for and a need for more locally-tailored 
information. So the information they had was limited along 
those lines and they were looking for more.
    We also heard that with respect to day-of capabilities and 
ability to have kind-of a quick response for incidents that 
occur, that CISA should build their capacity along those lines 
as well.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. You just touched on something that is 
another area of interest for me, and that is specifically the 
incident response capability. At present is CISA able to meet 
the call when that is coming in or are you receiving a larger 
number of requests for that more hands-on critical incident 
response than you can provide?
    Ms. Sherman. I can only speak to the conversations and the 
information that we had and collected during the course of our 
specific review. But that is something that we had heard from 
election officials, that there was a concern that the agency 
did not necessarily have those capabilities in place to be able 
to quickly address an incident that might occur, and they were 
looking to work and partner with CISA to help build that 
capacity.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Do you have any thoughts--another feature 
I think of the approach to securing infrastructure is a need 
for CISA to work collaboratively with other Federal law 
enforcement partners. Any feedback for us about how that is 
going or any input about how the relationships with other 
Federal law enforcement partners are productive or could use 
additional enhancements?
    Ms. Sherman. We didn't collect any information specific to 
the relationship between law enforcement and the election in 
the course of our review, so I can't speak in detail to that. 
But I can talk to the fact that local officials also pointed to 
limited awareness and conversations or dialog at the Federal 
level and that they wanted to see more of that as well.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Garbarino. The gentlelady yields back.
    I will now move into a second round of questions.
    I recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
    Chairman Garbarino. Ms. Hogsett, the Biden administration 
released its new National Cybersecurity Strategy. The strategy 
rightly emphasizes the need to harmonize regulations to avoid 
duplication and overly burdensome requirements, but the 
implementation plan will be key to demonstrating how they 
actually plan to achieve harmonization.
    What sorts of aspects will you look for in the eventual 
implementation plan to deconflict requirements?
    Ms. Hogsett. We've actually started discussing 
implementation with the National Cyber Director's Office 
because this is such a critical issue for us to get right.
    The challenge that we in financial services face, and 
certain other sectors will as well, is the fact that most of 
our regulators are independent. So no matter what CISA may put 
out, it's still up to them, in essence, whether they will 
follow that and align. We are lucky that three of our primary 
regulators collaborate with each other and have done a lot of 
work to sort-of streamline and align their requirements where 
they can. I know they're participating in some of these 
Government conversations right now, but that's like 3 out of 9, 
for instance, that we have to work with across our sector.
    So it's really important for us. Actually something where 
Congress could help, I think is encourage when it comes to 
cybersecurity. Given the importance of getting it right, given 
the work force challenges that we've just been discussing, we 
are frankly hearing increasing concern from our member firms 
that the regulatory and Government reports are placing a strain 
on the existing staff. We have some figures that folks are 
spending anywhere from 30 to 40 percent of their time not 
focused on the day-to-day protective mission that is so 
important that they need to do instead, they're focusing on 
compliance matters. That's a challenge and that can't continue 
as we layer on new and additional requirements, which, each on 
their own, can be very beneficial, but when you layer them 
together, it's a real challenge.
    So our hope and the discussion that we've started having 
with the White House is how can we get to sort-of this idea of 
regulatory reciprocity where one regulator might accept 
another's work, where can you create even an 80 percent 
solution where you align on the core things that various 
regulators and Government agencies would want, and then you're 
just doing some additional pieces above that. That's the 
conversation that we're looking forward to contributing to and 
is critically important for us.
    Chairman Garbarino. Appreciate that answer.
    Then I know everybody talks about we are going to have a 
separate hearing just on work force if we need to.
    I did want to ask you this before when we were talking 
about the incident reporting, the legislation and the rule-
making that is going on, with the implementation we have heard 
about how there is no private-sector work force, there are a 
lot of people. Does CISA have the proper amount of work force 
for a proper implementation of the incident reporting language, 
in your opinion?
    Ms. Hogsett. It's a very good question. I'm not sure. What 
we would hope to see at this point is one or two people are in 
an office set-up that we can go to on a regular basis to have a 
dialog. That's what we do with our regulators. We would like to 
see CISA set that up. It was good that they put out a request 
for information. We certainly responded to that. They did a 
series of sort-of listening sessions. But there are so many--I 
mean, as you know, the 16 critical infrastructure sectors, each 
of them is so unique. For those that have regulations, even 
those regulations, whether you're talking from an OT or an IT 
perspective, they can be very different. So we think and would 
love support to have CISA set up more on-going dialog so we can 
kind-of help them jointly problem-solve to make sure they get 
this right.
    Chairman Garbarino. I appreciate that answer.
    I just have one final question for Mr. Bagley.
    I understand CISA, through the JCDC plans to update the 
National Cyber Incident Response Plan. In your view, where does 
CISA's role start and stop in terms of incident response and 
support of the private sector?
    Mr. Bagley. Well, I think we have to think about what the 
stakes are today. What we've seen in recent years with some of 
the high-profile systemic cyber attacks that JCDC in fact has 
responded to, like the Log4j incident, is that they could have 
been so much worse. So one of the things we have to anticipate, 
and that should certainly be considered in that planning, is 
how we as a Nation would deal not just with currently-
designated infrastructure, but how would we deal with some sort 
of victim that in a specific context is fundamentally important 
and that them being hit by, say, disruptive or destructive 
ransomware would be catastrophic for the country. That's where 
it's important to be able to have that flexibility to respond, 
to rally both the public and private sector together to ensure 
that we have the capacity.
    One of the things that we see in the private sector is that 
the way complex multinational organizations or large U.S. 
organizations respond is by ensuring that they have playbooks 
ahead of time as well as the actual resources on retainer, such 
as incident response firms. I think for CISA to be able to 
scale up, they must consider not only their own organic 
capacity, but those of private partners as well.
    Chairman Garbarino. Thank you.
    I am out of time.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member, Mr. Swalwell, for his 
second round of 5 minutes.
    Mr. Swalwell. Great. Thank you, Chair.
    Ms. Hogsett, wanted to get the benefit of your wisdom on a 
recent banking crisis that especially hit my area, that is 
Silicon Valley Bank. We are still taking an MRI to this to see 
exactly what happened. But one thing that was different in this 
``run on the bank'' than any other was the speed at which it 
happened. Of course, in the digital age, the speed at which you 
can move money is different than having to wait on the phone or 
wait in line in past crises. But we are also looking at the 
role that on-line chatter and on-line panic and rumors led to 
this run on the bank. I have sent a letter to the SEC with my 
colleague Brad Sherman asking them as well to look at whether 
there was a short that took place that was followed by any sort 
of on-line manipulation of the market.
    But have you all at the Bank Policy Institute, just in the 
realm of cyber, looked at whether there was a potential cyber 
incident around the run on Silicon Valley Bank?
    Ms. Hogsett. We have not. I think it's early stages, so I 
would be getting ahead of, I think, all of us who want to get 
to a better sense for what happened and where were the 
deficiencies.
    It's an interesting point, though, around the role of 
social media. We actually saw this with Colonial Pipeline, to 
provide another example, where the initial reports were that 
there were going to be sufficient gas supply. But when it hit 
the news, human behavior kicked in and you had in essence, like 
what we saw with the run on a bank, you had a run on gas 
stations. So it's a new era where we need to think about how do 
we communicate and involving social media. Treasury is our 
sector risk management agency and we have actually recently re-
looked at our communications plans, including among large 
banks, the trade associations, our information-sharing analysis 
center, and Treasury's role with the regulators as to at 
various points in time based on certain scenarios when might it 
make sense for the Treasury Secretary to put something out and 
do exercise that. So can't respond specifically to the SVB 
example, but we are carefully watching that, so.
    Mr. Swalwell. Did that incident at Silicon Valley Bank, 
though, did it give you concern that a foreign adversary or a 
hacktivist could seize on a bank crisis like that and use on-
line information or disinformation to try and manipulate a 
result or to cause further chaos?
    Ms. Hogsett. We did not see indicators of that with this 
recent issue. However, the potential for mis-, dis- and mal-
information is very real and that is something that CISA has 
done some work on. We've contributed to that. It is something 
that firms need to consider and our firms internally for their 
own response playbooks think about those dynamics as they plan 
for when do you notify your board internally, if it hits the 
media, what then? It makes the response that much more complex, 
quite frankly, to think about it that way.
    Mr. Swalwell. Great. Thanks, Ms. Hogsett.
    Mr. Bagley, how can CISA give JCDC the structure and 
clarity it needs to sustain momentum over time and how can we 
do that without losing the flexible, agile features that make 
it successful today?
    Mr. Bagley. Thank you for the question.
    I think one of the things that's very important is for CISA 
to ensure that as JCDC grows, it's growing with intention, with 
deliberation, and with a bit more structure. So that's not to 
say that there's one ideal size for JCDC. Certainly there are 
strengths to the fact that there are more members bringing more 
capabilities, but the more that CISA can actually structure 
with purpose and with theme different working groups, I think 
that can lead to certain advantages and certain efficiencies. 
Just as any organization that's going from start-up to scale 
needs to adjust and reorganize, I think that is the case with 
JCDC today. So it would be more structure and more working 
groups. Great.
    Mr. Swalwell. Great.
    Chairman Garbarino. Thank you very much.
    The gentleman yields back.
    I thank the witnesses for the valuable testimony and the 
Members for their questions. We got a lot of information today 
and we are going to have to digest this and hopefully get some 
answers from Director Easterly when she comes in. I talked 
about we are going to have, I think, a future hearing on work 
force. I think we should have one on IT-OT. I mean, there is 
some really important stuff that was brought up to you today.
    The Members of the subcommittee may have additional 
questions for the witnesses and we would ask the witnesses to 
respond to these in writing.
    Pursuant to the committee rule VII(D), the hearing record 
will be held open for 10 days.
    Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 11:21 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



                            A P P E N D I X

                              ----------                              

    Question From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino for Tina Won Sherman
    Question. From GAO's perspective, are you satisfied with the level 
of innovation seen from CISA and its industry partners as they evolve 
to meet advanced persistent threats to Federal agency IT systems? Or 
are we still doing things the same way as 5 years ago?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
      Question From Chairman Andrew R. Garbarino for Marty Edwards
    Question. The NSTAC report discusses the many benefits as well as 
risks of IT and OT convergence. Will we always be faced with this 
trade-off between efficiency and security? Are there any steps 
organizations can take to mitigate the security risks while still 
enjoying the benefits of digital transformation?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.

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