

GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN AFRICA: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

HEARING

BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

APRIL 18, 2023

Serial No. 118-19

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs



Available: <http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/>, <http://docs.house.gov/>,
or <http://www.govinfo.gov>

U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE

52-143PDF

WASHINGTON : 2023

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, *Chairman*

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey	GREGORY MEEKS, New York, <i>Ranking Member</i>
JOE WILSON, South Carolina	BRAD SHERMAN, California
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania	GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
DARRELL ISSA, California	WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
ANN WAGNER, Missouri	DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
BRIAN MAST, Florida	AMI BERA, California
KEN BUCK, Colorado	JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee	DINA TITUS, Nevada
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee	TED LIEU, California
ANDY BARR, Kentucky	SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
RONNY JACKSON, Texas	DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
YOUNG KIM, California	COLIN ALLRED, Texas
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida	ANDY KIM, New Jersey
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan	SARA JACOBS, California
AMATA COLEMAN-RADEWAGEN, American Samoa	KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas	SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK, Florida
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio	GREG STANTON, Arizona
JIM BAIRD, Indiana	MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida	JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
TOM KEAN, JR., New Jersey	JONATHAN JACOBS, Illinois
MIKE LAWLER, New York	SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
CORY MILLS, Florida	JIM COSTA, California
RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia	JASON CROW, Colorado
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas	BRAD SCHNEIDER, Illinois
JOHN JAMES, Michigan	
KEITH SELF, Texas	

BRENDAN SHIELDS, *Staff Director*

SOPHIA LAFARGUE, *Staff Director*

SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA

JOHN JAMES, *Chair*

CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey,	SARA JACOBS, California, <i>Ranking Member</i>
YOUNG KIM, California	SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK, Florida
JIM BAIRD, Indiana	COLIN ALLRED, Texas
THOMAS KEAN JR., New Jersey	JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
CORY MILLS, Florida	

SOPHIA LAFARGUE, *STAFF DIRECTOR*

CONTENTS

	Page
WITNESSES	
Holman, Amy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State	7
Waters, Rick, China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China and Taiwan, U.S. Department of State	11
Davis, Janean, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa, U.S. Agen- cy for International Development	14
APPENDIX	
Hearing Notice	38
Hearing Attendance	40
Hearing Minutes	41
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD	
Responses to questions submitted for the record	42

GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN AFRICA: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Tuesday, April 18, 2023

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m., in room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. John James (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

Mr. JAMES. The Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to examine China's strategic aims in Africa and how the U.S. can provide a positive set of alternative options that advance interests of Africans and Americans alike.

I now recognize myself for an opening statement.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Amy Holman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Rick Waters, and Deputy Assistant Administrator Janean Davis, it is my pleasure to welcome you before the Subcommittee on Africa for this hearing that follows the full committee hearing on the Chinese Communist Party that took place on February 28th.

I want to begin by asking for a moment of silence for the World Food Program staff who were killed in the fighting in Sudan.

[Moment of silence observed.]

Thank you.

But we can do much more than moments of silence. And we intend to. Civilians must be protected. And I reiterate the call for humanitarian cease-fire.

The renewed conflict serves as a stark reminder that this Administration has a responsibility to take tangible action to address terrorism and threats to peace that can metastasize and spread to our shores. As China seeks to define a future for Africa in its authoritarian image, the United States must stand for principles of freedom and the rule of law.

China aims to become the preeminent economic and military power in the world by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. But thanks to America's decades of foreign policy failures, they are ahead of schedule I fear. President George W. Bush started two wars, one of which violated territorial sovereignty, both of which lasted two decades. President Obama was a deportations and drone king. President Trump's shithole countries comment caused unnecessary tension. And now Joe Biden has defined his Administration with a finger wagging foreign policy that has made a mockery of the United States on the world stage.

It is the role of Congress to hold the Administration accountable, each Administration, to the American people. But in the 118th

Congress, it is my role to start with the Biden Administration. We must ask the hard questions that will lead us to more friends, stronger alliances, and mutually beneficial future.

The 21st century has been characterized by foreign policy blunders that China has capitalized on. And we cannot mend the errors of the past. But we can use our influence as a legislative body to hold the current Administration accountable.

This hearing serves to consider how Africa views China and how to effectively employ soft power, like U.S. technology and foreign direct investment, to win over key partners. There are fundamental human rights, corruption, and predatory elements that plague the continent. These are real and substantive issues that we need to deal with.

There is also opportunity to identify successful partners and to deploy U.S. diplomatic development and global leadership to advance U.S. strategic interests and ensure the mutual benefit of African nations.

The ambitions of the CCP has for Africa are the ambitions they have had for the United States. It is crucial we nip them in the bud. But, again, we need friends. That is why in a world where America is no longer the only choice we must return to being the most desirable. We must, as Teddy Roosevelt said, speak softly and carry a big stick. It is in our vital national interests to ensure that when nations have a choice between America and China they choose America first.

Beijing has consistently prioritized the African continent and assigns it as a central role in its foreign policy. China's foreign ministers have chosen African countries as their first overseas trips each year since 1991. And Xi Jinping has visited the continent four times, most recently in 2018. More must be done by the executive to consistently engage African leaders at the highest levels of our government.

By 2050, one in four people on the planet will be African, making the continent home to an enormous economic and manufacturing potential. However, currently Chinese companies operate near monopolies in a litany of critical sectors while committing flagrant human rights violations. In the Democratic Republic of Congo, a country with over two-thirds of the world's cobalt deposits, CCP-linked companies own 15 of the 19 cobalt producing mines. This provides Beijing with control over a supply chain crucial for our economic and national security.

Ensuring that Chinese companies do not monopolize these markets and encouraging and incentive two-way U.S. trade and investment with Africa is a key priority of mine. Too often in my conversations with our African partners I am told they have had no choice but to accept Chinese bids for contracts and concessions because there was no viable American option. The U.S. Government must be more proactive in coming up with measures to unleash the power of the U.S. private sector.

I was very glad to see Chairman McCaul introduce the Prosper Africa Act last Congress on this issue. And I look forward to working with Chairman McCaul and anyone else in furthering this initiative.

Similarly, the African Growth Opportunity Act, AGOA, a trade preference agreement with African countries, is up for reauthorization in 2025. As the Subcommittee on Africa, it is our responsibility to investigate ways to increase the effectiveness of this program. And I look forward to hearing you discuss how your institutions are utilizing AGOA to further our bilateral relations around the continent.

As our African partners move away from Western colonialism, they must know that they have our full support as partners. It is essential that we aid their self-sufficiency and trade efforts.

Chinese military activity in Africa has increased significantly in the last decade. In addition to serving as the largest troop provider to peacekeeping operations in Africa, China employs thousands of security contractors on the continent. In 2017, the PRC opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, about seven kilometers from the U.S. base in Camp Lemonnier. I am concerned about the potential of a second Chinese base in Africa, especially on the Atlantic coast.

In February, the PLA Navy conducted exercises with the South African and Russian navies, along with South Africa's East Coast. And I introduced a resolution condemning these exercises and expressing my concern over the growing South Africa-PRC relationship.

Ultimately, influence in Africa begins with setting a better example at home. Both on our shores and abroad, we must cooperate where we can and compete where we must.

Furthermore, I am incredibly worried about the CCP's effort to export its authoritarian governance model throughout the African continent. The success of this decades-long strategy can be seen with the votes of African countries in international organizations, which increasingly follow Beijing's direction. Yet polling consistently follows that Africans, particularly young Africans, want democratic governance. The United States must stand with the people of Africa and for the principles of freedom and rule of law as China seeks to define a future for Africa in its authoritarian image.

The PRC's claims that they do not meddle in domestic affairs of African nations has been proven false. The CCP targets like-minded autocratic regimes and has funded numerous political training schools throughout the continent. Reports indicate that there are Chinese overseas police stations in nearly a dozen African countries. These buildings serve as regional hubs for the CCP's United Front Department, which uses coercive tactics to silence dissent against the CCP.

For far too long the United States has been complicit in these human rights abuses. We are even enabling them by leaning on the Chinese Communist Party-controlled mining in Africa. We will never atone for the sins of slavery. But a step in the right direction is purging our supply chains of slave labor, particularly in critical mineral mining and electric vehicle manufacturing. That starts by reshoring the minerals most essential to our national defense and our economy. A Green New Deal agenda built on the backs of black lives is worse than virtue signaling. It is evil.

In closing, the United States must be a reliable and valued partner to many on the African continent. But more must be done to counter China's decades-long attempt to export its authoritarian government's model to the continent. Turning the tide of decades of failed foreign policies with each Administration in the 21st century is not going to be an easy task. But as JFK said, this will not be finished in the first 100 days. But today marks the 101st of a Republican leadership in Congress. It is a new era. So let us begin.

The chair now recognizes the ranking member, the gentlelady from California, Ms. Jacobs, for any statement she may have.

Ms. JACOBS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I echo your sentiments regarding the World Food Program folks in Sudan and your call for civilian lives to be protected during the bloodshed.

Today's hearing emphasizes the importance of renewed U.S. engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa and how it compares to that of our competitors, with the People's Republic of China being the focus today.

Africa has the youngest population in the world. And how we engage on the continent and with local communities will be remembered for decades to come. For too long the African continent has been sidelined or neglected or seen as merely an aid beneficiary by leaders from the West, including by the United States. And it is incredibly important and long overdue that we correct this.

And thankfully the Biden Administration has already taken important steps to do that and reimagine America's relationship in ways that avoid harmful patterns of colonialism. Last December, the Biden Administration hosted the first U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit since 2014 to demonstrate our commitment to a new path forward with African countries. With this summit, the United States committed \$55 billion to the African continent over the next 3 years in human capital, infrastructure, agriculture, health systems, and security investments.

I particularly want to commend U.S. support for the African Union's bid to join the G20 as a permanent member and for U.N. Security Council reform to include an African permanent member. Entering African States have a representative seat at the table where they are directly impacted by the decisions we have made on the global stage.

During this summit and the rollout of the Biden Administration's U.S. strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa, President Biden has emphasized that renewed U.S. engagement with the continent is not just through the lens of competition, that Africa is not just a pawn in a broader geopolitical game. Secretary Blinken has also made this clear, saying that the United States will not dictate Africa's choices, neither should anyone else.

While we engage in strategic competition with the PRC on the global stage, we need to be mindful of lessons from the cold war that unfortunately put African governments and populations in the crosshairs and caused immense suffering as we aligned with governments and militaries in pursuit of short-term security gains.

Instead, we need to focus on the long-term impact of our engagement and ensure that we play a positive role in furthering progress on the continent, like addressing conflict, upholding human rights, strengthening good governance, and tackling global challenges to-

gether. Doing so helps protect other engagements like mobilizing increased trade and investment between the U.S. and African States.

Another important part of increased U.S. engagement with African States is upping our game when it comes to our diplomatic engagement and presence on the continent. We have struggled for years to adequately staff up our embassies in the region. And it is critical now more than ever that we address this challenge so we can show up and engage where and when it matters. So I look forward to working with the Biden Administration more on all of this.

It is important to recognize China's increased engagement on the continent and where they are fulfilling a need that the United States isn't. But we shouldn't take everything China is doing as an inherent threat that needs to be countered one to one. If we do this, we can both create more space for cooperation with China so that our engagement does not spiral into greater conflict and allow a healthier version of competition on the continent that actually benefits African people and serves their interests.

I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today on the Biden Administration's approach to these question and how we can truly prioritize the needs of African populations.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you.

Other members of the committee are reminded that opening statements may be submitted for the record.

We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses before us today on this important topic. Ms. Amy Holman is the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs and the Department of State. Thank you for joining.

Mr. Rick Waters is the China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for China and Taiwan at the Department of State. Thank you for joining.

And Ms. Janean Davis is the Deputy Assistant Administrator in the Bureau for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International Development, USAID. Thank you for joining.

I appreciate you all being here. Your full statements will be made part of the record. And I will ask each of you to keep your spoken remarks to just 5 minutes in order to allow for member questions and comments.

I now recognize Ms. Holman for her opening statement.

STATEMENT OF AMY HOLMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Ms. HOLMAN. Chairman James, Ranking Member Jacobs, distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa, thank you for the opportunity to testify today and thank you for your bipartisan focus on Africa and our Nation's approach to the People's Republic of China in Africa.

Before we start, I would like to say a few words about the situation in Sudan and thank the chairman for the moment of silence for our three lost colleagues. The Secretary of State spoke with

both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces commanders yesterday to underscore the need for an immediate cease-fire to permit delivery of humanitarian assistance, enable the reunification of Sudanese families, and allow the international community in Khartoum to make sure its presence is secure. We have also spoken with regional leaders to encourage additional diplomatic efforts. Ensuring the safety of our diplomatic personnel and U.S. citizens remains our highest priority.

Moving back to the subject of today's hearing, our African policy is about Africa, not about the PRC. The United States is focused on building enduring partnerships with African nations, with our diplomats engaged daily. Together we advance shared priorities, including building an inclusive global economy, tackling the climate crisis, creating opportunities in clean energy, advancing democracy, promoting respect for human rights around the world, and building lasting peace and security.

We work to improve African options, not limit them. We strength local capacity and work with our partners to promote economic growth that is sustainable and inclusive over the long term. We partner with African nations to reinforce environmental standards, protect workers' rights, combat trafficking in persons, and support anti-corruption measures. We work with all sectors of African society to build strong institutions, champion democracy, and promote respect for human rights.

At the same time, we recognize the serious challenges the PRC presents in Africa. We counter the PRC's attempts to project military power from Africa. We are concerned by the unsustainable levels of debt throughout the continent and increasing risks of debt distress.

We work to counter Beijing's information manipulation efforts in Africa to amplify its narratives and to suppress voices it deems critical of the PRC or the CCP. These practices threaten the integrity of open and vibrant media ecosystems across Africa.

The U.S.-African Leaders Summit last year and follow-on high level visits to the continent this year demonstrate how seriously the Administration views our relationship with Africa.

The PRC is a strategic global competitor. We push back on corrupt or coercive practices that undermine our shared interests, while offering alternatives in collaboration with our partners. We ask that everyone play by the same set of rules. We want to ensure all countries make their own choices.

In conclusion, bipartisan action is critical. With this subcommittee and with your colleagues across Capitol Hill, we are confident that we can deepen U.S.-African partnerships, raise awareness of the PRC's corrupt and coercive practices in Africa, counter those practices, and advance our country's national interests. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Holman follows:]

**STATEMENT FOR
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY AMY HOLMAN,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS
and
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY AND CHINA COORDINATOR RICK WATERS,
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
“Great Power Competition Implications in Africa:
The Chinese Communist Party”
HOUSE FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
APRIL 18, 2023**

Chairman James, Ranking Member Jacobs, distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa: thank you for the opportunity to testify today and thank you for your consistent, bipartisan focus on Africa and our nation’s approach to the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in Africa.

Our relationship with the PRC is among the most complex and consequential of any in the world, and we recognize the unique challenges it poses to achieving U.S. objectives worldwide, including in Africa.

The PRC is also the only competitor with the means and intent to reshape the international order. We see proof of this point across the globe and in Africa. We continue to implement the core pillars of our PRC strategy: “Invest, Align, Compete.”

Our Africa policy is about Africa, not the PRC. The United States is focused on building enduring partnerships with African nations. We cannot expect to advance our global foreign policy priorities without the partnership of African governments, institutions, and peoples. African countries are our partners in pursuing shared global and regional priorities —from ending the acute phase of the COVID-19 pandemic and building back a more inclusive global economy, to tackling the climate crisis and building resilience while creating opportunities in clean energy, to advancing democracy and promoting respect for human rights around the world, to working toward lasting peace and security.

This is the framework through which we approach our engagements with Africa. The U.S.-African Leaders Summit last year and the Administration's high-level visits to the continent since demonstrate how seriously the Administration views our bilateral and multilateral engagements with African partners.

We aim to improve African options, not limit them. Part of ensuring that African governments and publics have options is ensuring that U.S. companies can compete on an even playing field. We push back on coercive practices that undermine our interests and those of our African partners, and instead promote fair practices, high standards, and equitable economic growth. Our focus is on strengthening local capacity and working with our allies and partners to promote economic growth that is sustainable, and inclusive over the long term. We partner with African nations to reinforce environmental standards, protect workers' rights, combat trafficking in persons, and support anti-corruption measures such as transparency and respect for the rule of law.

We work with all sectors of African society to build strong institutions, further democratic principles and practices, and promote respect for human rights. We aim to maintain and grow our partnerships with the governments and people of Africa. We highly value the strong people-to-people relationships we have with our African partners.

At the same time, we recognize the serious challenges the PRC can pose in Africa. We are concerned by unsustainable debt throughout the continent and increasing risks of debt distress within many countries. These risks are made more acute by limited transparency surrounding debt generally and the terms and conditions of certain loans. The PRC's lack of transparency, disregard for workers' rights and environmental standards, and willingness to engage in corrupt business practices do not advance the economic and development goals of our African partners. We are concerned about Beijing's information manipulation efforts to amplify preferred narratives and to suppress voices it deems critical of the PRC or CCP. These practices threaten the integrity of open and vibrant media ecosystems across Africa, and the PRC is taking advantage of financially unsustainable media outlets to shape its image. We are also concerned about the PRC's attempts to build up its security infrastructure in Africa to project military power farther afield.

The reality is the PRC is a global strategic competitor. We push back on corrupt or coercive practices that undermine our interests and those of our African partners while offering viable alternatives in collaboration with our partners. We ask that everyone play by the same set of rules. We want to ensure that all countries, including in Africa, make their own choices, free from coercion and based on the best interest of their people. This is our approach throughout the world.

We have also instructed our diplomats to engage on this challenge in Africa. We have made a consistent and concerted effort to share information with our partners to reinforce the scale and scope of the environmental, labor, and corruption risks, among others, posed by the PRC in Africa – and the necessity of our unity in confronting them.

We do not seek conflict with the PRC, and we are ready to work together on areas where our interests align – from climate change and public health to food security, counter-narcotics, and more. Similarly, for example, with refugee assistance and migration: alongside likeminded partners, we will continue to call on the PRC to increase its nominal support to UN agencies and humanitarian organizations, to ensure an equitable and effective response in the face of rising humanitarian needs globally.

More broadly, we bear no illusions about the road ahead. This competition will intensify. The stakes couldn't be higher.

Our Africa Bureau is working closely with the Office of China Coordination ("China House"), which opened its doors last December to guide a shift in how the State Department makes, manages, and messages policy on the PRC.

China House helps us better harmonize efforts across our bureaus and our embassies worldwide. It grows our capabilities to share information more quickly, sharpen our communications more effectively, and adapt to developments in real time. It ensures that data and intelligence flow in all directions – moving back and forth between China House, our posts, our bureaus at headquarters, and our diplomats throughout the globe. It ensures that we see the PRC for what it is: a challenge that touches virtually every issue under the sun – security, trade, technology, human rights, and more.

China House serves as a force multiplier for our Department's leadership on the PRC. It is a key piece of Secretary Blinken's broader modernization agenda, as we seek to apply the right resources to the big-picture issues of our time, from the PRC to cybersecurity and digital diplomacy to public health.

For our country, the PRC is a generational challenge, and this challenge is a top priority at the State Department. We will maintain open lines of communication, so we can keep miscalculations from veering into conflict and responsibly manage the competition between our countries. We will compete vigorously with the PRC while managing that competition responsibly. And we will always make clear that our Africa policy is about Africa and building enduring relationships with African nations.

The Administration's commitment to upholding our interests and values, collaborating with our partners, and defending global principles will remain steadfast.

There are few issues where Bipartisan action is more critical. In coordination with this Subcommittee and with your colleagues across Capitol Hill, we are confident that we can sustain the resources and implement the policies we need to improve U.S.-African partnerships, raise awareness of the PRC's corrupt or coercive practices in Africa, counter those practices, and advance our country's national interests.

Thank you.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you, Ms. Holman.
I now recognize Mr. Waters for his opening statement.

**STATEMENT OF RICK WATERS, CHINA COORDINATOR AND
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CHINA AND
TAIWAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE**

Mr. WATERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ranking Member Jacobs, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today.

The chairman stole most of my comments, so I will be very brief. I would say two broad things. One is that all of you are familiar with our China strategy. And the PRC is the only competitor with the means and the intent to reshape the international order.

Our policy response is premised on three broad concepts. One is to invest in ourselves in the sources of our domestic strength and in our democracy, two, to align with our allies and partners in an effort to find common purpose and to shape the strategic environment around China, and three, to manage our relationship with the PRC is a responsible way, acknowledging that it is a fundamentally competitive and at times adversarial relationship.

I head the Office of China Coordination, which our secretary stood up last December to harmonize efforts across the State Department, to help prioritize and better coordinate a response to some of the challenges that the chairman and the ranking member laid out.

I would highlight in the Sub-Saharan African context five broad areas. The first is the issue of the rules-based international order, a seemingly esoteric concept that is quite important I think to everything from the norms and standards that our companies and our workers face to the very norms of sovereignty that uphold the international system. And Sub-Saharan Africa has nearly a quarter of the votes in the U.N. General Assembly.

You acknowledged, Mr. Chairman, the robust diplomacy the Chinese have engaged in. We counted at least 120 senior level visits in 15 years. We believe the PRC continues to promote its national initiatives, its own concepts in this area, like the Global Security and Global Development Initiative, with the goal of reshaping this rules-based international order on terms favorable to Beijing.

Second, in the economic realm, there are a number of concerns ranging from critical mineral supply chains to non-transparent PRC lending practices to illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing. There are real infrastructure needs on the continent. We all acknowledge that. But the way in which these needs are met should be free from corruption and coercion.

Third, technology, from a U.S. perspective, we support the free flow of ideas, digital connectivity. These are foundational bases of growth. And yet the PRC alternatives in areas such as 5G technology and smart cities often carries profound risks to national security, to country sovereignty, to privacy, and to basic human rights.

Fourth, security, the chairman mentioned the PLA's first overseas base in Djibouti. We believe the PRC is pursuing additional

facilities in Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, and potentially elsewhere along the Atlantic coastline. And we have made clear in our bilateral relations and in many of our pronouncements that a PRC military presence on the Atlantic coast of Africa would represent a threat to our national security.

Finally, in the informational and influence realm, there are a number of things that we should talk about here ranging from how the PRC is leveraging content sharing agreements, ownership agreements with African media outlets, exchange programs, and its own high level engagements to shape and deliver a distorted message of the U.S.

You also mentioned extraterritorial law enforcement, the challenge of police stations. And I would note yesterday we took a very resolute response to the one in New York through the Department of Justice's announcement of a number of indictments.

So in these areas, I look forward to answering your questions together with my colleagues on our policy response. And thank you again for holding this hearing.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you, Mr. Waters.

I now recognize Ms. Davis for her opening statement.

STATEMENT OF JANEAN DAVIS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Ms. DAVIS. Good afternoon, Chairman James, Ranking Member Jacobs, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to be here today and for your sustained bipartisan commitment to Africa.

As others have said, the increased presence of the People's Republic of China in Africa, it is clear. It has invested heavily both in terms of resources as well as diplomatic alliances. Today China is Africa's largest trading partner. But such headlines only tell part of the story.

The United States has long been a partner to Africa. USAID investments have lifted 700 people from extreme poverty since 1990, dramatically reduced deaths from HIV and malaria, stopped Ebola in its tracks, and helped the continent increase primary school enrollment at a rate greater than any region in the world. We invest in human capital. We provide opportunities. And we expand democracies, amplifying African voices to choose their own priorities.

I would like to take this time to outline a few of the challenges PRC presents and what USAID is doing in response. The PRC's approach to development in Africa is in direct contrast to ours. While the PRC seeks to improve its own growth by using Africa as its frontier market, USAID invests in the long term, in food security, in health, in education, economic growth, and the environment.

The PRC we know primarily offers loans for infrastructure. And no one disputes that infrastructure is much needed investment for Africa's growth. But the manner in which PRC loans are negotiated and their lack of transparency continues to raise our concerns. Many of the PRC's loan contracts have non-disclosure provisions that can lead to African public debt, sustainability concerns, when PRC-funded fail to generate the promised economic returns.

In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and the global economic downturn, climbing interest rates have brought many borrowers in Africa to economic distress. PRC loan provisions complicate the ability for borrower countries to negotiate with lenders and reach long-term economic sustainability.

But our goal today is not to compare the U.S. to China. It is to underscore the U.S.'s enduring partnerships and continued investments in Africa because these investments matter. They demonstrate a model of development that is empowering and that truly delivers for the people of Africa. Through continent-wide initiatives like you mentioned, Prosper Africa, as well as Power Africa, USAID is driving investment, trade, and structural changes that offer better alternatives to the PRC approach.

As home to the world's largest free trade area and a young, technologically savvy population, Africa offers tremendous opportunities for prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic.

Since launching Prosper Africa in June 2019, the U.S. Government has helped close 1,100 deals across 49 countries at an estimated value of \$65 billion in two-way trade and investment. Prosper Africa has built a partner network of over 1,000 organizations, with nearly 500 more deals in the pipeline valued at an estimated \$25 billion. By 2025, Prosper Africa plans to invest \$171 million to boost African exports and U.S. investment by \$2 billion.

In addition, Power Africa promotes private sector trade and investment in the Sub-Saharan electricity sector. Since its launch in 2013, USAID has focused on the importance of contract negotiations and provided one of the initial grants to the African Legal Support Facility, which helps countries strengthen their ability to negotiate contracts. It has built unparalleled trust with African governments and has enabled them to obtain favorable deals and more durable contracts.

Power Africa helps African partner countries diversify supply in export markets, create pro-growth regulatory frameworks, and develop and join regional markets. Power Africa also helps an energy planning process that results in competitive, fair, and transparent procurements for energy infrastructure.

We are not just focused on trade and energy. USAID is investing in people. Through Feed the Future and through our health and health systems, today PEPFAR supports lifesaving antiretroviral treatment for over 20 million people in Africa compared to 50,000 in 2003.

In conclusion, our world is at an inflection point. Africa is a major geopolitical and rising economic player. And our partnership is built on peace, cooperation, and individual dignity. Thank you for your continued support of USAID's work in Africa. We look forward to answering your questions.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Davis follows:]

Written Statement of Janean Davis, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for
Africa, United States Agency for International Development
Before the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
Great Power Competition Implications in Africa: The Chinese Communist Party
April 18, 2023

Good afternoon Chairman James, Ranking Member Jacobs, and members of the Subcommittee. Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on how we are meeting the challenges of the People's Republic of China (PRC's) influence in Africa. I would also like to recognize and thank this Subcommittee for its longstanding, bipartisan commitment to the African continent and support of the U.S. Agency for International Development.

The increased presence of the PRC in Africa over the past two decades cannot be disputed. The PRC has invested heavily in a number of African nations, in terms of both resources and diplomatic alliances. Today, the PRC is Africa's largest trading partner, with about \$250 billion in trade in 2021. By comparison, U.S.-Africa trade in 2021 was about \$64 billion.

But focusing on these numbers, or on the various PRC-funded infrastructure projects across Africa, tells only part of the story. The United States has long been a partner to African governments, and for the past 60 years, USAID investments have helped countries across Africa deliver extraordinary progress. We have lifted 700 million people from extreme poverty since 1990; dramatically reduced deaths from HIV and malaria; stopped Ebola in its tracks and strengthened African health care facilities through the Global Health Security Agenda; and helped the continent increase primary school enrollment at a rate greater than any region in the world.

In contrast to the PRC, we invest in human capital, provide opportunities, and support democracy, amplifying African voices to choose their own development priorities. These investments matter. They matter to Africans, and they strengthen our partnerships across the continent. They demonstrate an empowering model of development, and present alternatives to the PRC way of doing business.

USAID is making commitments that focus on emerging opportunities, which foster innovation and economic growth. USAID is also working to ensure that responsive and open governments—informed and energized by democratic principles—can deliver for the people.

We are committed to partnerships and alliances with our African partners based on dialogue, respect, and shared values.

By the middle of this century, one in four people in the world will be African. The continent is home to some of the world's fastest-growing markets and an increasingly young, urban, and digitally connected population. In short, what happens in Africa impacts the entire world.

Today I'd like to outline some of the challenges that the PRC presents in the development space, detail how USAID is responding to these challenges, and highlight our way forward.

The Challenges

The PRC's approach to development in Africa stands in direct contrast to our approach. While USAID invests for the long term—in food security, health, education, and the environment, and in partnership with the private sector through initiatives like Prosper Africa and Power Africa, the PRC primarily offers loans for infrastructure. No one disputes that infrastructure is a much-needed investment for Africa's growth. But the manner in which PRC loans are negotiated—and their lack of transparency—raises significant concerns from development, governance and financial perspectives.

According to AidData, a research lab at William and Mary, many of the PRC's loan contracts have provisions that can lead to "hidden debt," which result in unexpected public liabilities when PRC funded projects fail to generate strong economic returns. Additional provisions ensure that in the event of financial distress, PRC banks are the first to be paid off.

In the face of the challenges brought on by the COVID-19 pandemic and Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, climbing interest rates have brought many African borrowers to economic distress. PRC hidden debt and other provisions have complicated borrower countries' ability to negotiate with lenders and achieve long-term economic stability.

How USAID is Responding: Driving Structural Change and Providing Alternative Finance Sources

USAID is committed to working with international financial institutions, other donors, and the private sector to provide additional sources of finance.

Through Power Africa and Prosper Africa, together with our interagency colleagues, African partners, allies, and the private sector, we have achieved results that are driving structural change and providing alternative finance sources.

Prosper Africa

Prosper Africa mobilizes services and resources across 17 U.S. government agencies to advance two-way trade and investment deals and unlock market opportunities.

As home to the world's largest free trade area and an increasingly young and technologically savvy population, Africa offers a tremendous opportunity for prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic. The United States offers a large consumer base for African products, the world's deepest capital markets, and a commitment to job creation and the development of the African workforce. Increased economic engagement between the United States and Africa advances shared prosperity and demonstrates the superior value of transparent markets and private enterprise for driving economic growth.

In support of its mission to substantially increase two-way trade and investment between the United States and Africa, Prosper Africa helps companies compete on an even playing field by sharing timely information on new opportunities, providing comprehensive packages of assistance, and fostering trade and investment policies that advance transparency and competition. This includes targeted engagement and technical assistance for small and medium-sized businesses, including those led by women and members of the African Diaspora across the United States, to drive job creation and foster shared prosperity.

Since launching Prosper Africa in June 2019, the U.S. government has helped close 1,100 deals across 49 countries for a total estimated value of \$65 billion in two-way trade and investment. Prosper Africa has built a partner network of over 1,000 organizations, with nearly 500 deals in the pipeline valued at an estimated \$25 billion. One example from the Prosper Africa pipeline is Cybastion, a small, diaspora-owned, American cybersecurity company that Prosper Africa is supporting to expand across West Africa. Cybastion, in partnership with Cisco, offers African governments a competitive alternative to the PRC in the cybersecurity space, through lower cost proposals and a commitment to train government officials to sustainably manage their own systems. At the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, President Biden announced ten new Cybastion cybersecurity commitments, which use Cisco equipment. The first of the ten, a \$65 million project in Niger, was just signed on April 13.

USAID investments under Prosper Africa follow an affirmative development model by contributing to local job creation, greater transparency, local economic development, citizen empowerment, gender equality, climate-smart solutions, and improved labor and environmental standards. USAID's flagship effort to support Prosper Africa, the Africa Trade and Investment program, is providing support to businesses and entrepreneurs in Africa; promoting trade and investment; and above all, supporting the African-led trade and investment agenda.

This includes support for a continental market with the implementation of the African Continental Free Trade Agreement—something that can transform African economies and drive inclusive growth and sustainable development.

Through these activities, Prosper Africa demonstrates U.S. competitiveness abroad and creates jobs at home, advancing a foreign policy that serves the American middle class. By 2025, through catalytic investments and partnerships, Prosper Africa plans to invest \$171 million to boost African exports and U.S. investment by \$2 billion dollars – a conservative estimate.

Power Africa

Power Africa is a whole of government initiative led by USAID with 12 interagency, 20 development, and 175 private-sector partners to promote private-sector trade and investment in the sub-Saharan electricity sector. Power Africa aims to end energy poverty, accelerate a carbon-free future, and boost U.S.-Africa private sector innovation.

Since 2013, Power Africa has supported 145 power projects, and brought 34.6 million new connections to homes and businesses on and off the grid. That's 165.4 million people who gained access to electricity through Power Africa assistance.

Since the launch of this initiative in 2013, USAID has focused on the importance of contract negotiations, and provided one of its initial grants to the African Legal Support Facility (ALSF). The ALSF, hosted by the African Development Bank, helps African countries strengthen their legal expertise and negotiating capacity in debt management and litigation, energy, natural resources and extractive industries management and contracting, investment agreements and related commercial transactions. The ALSF is a multi-donor fund, and USAID leverages funds from a large pool of like-minded donors. ALSF has the structure, organization, experience, and established relationships to provide focused and effective legal assistance, and has built an unparalleled level of trust with African governments. ALSF's counsel has enabled African governments to obtain favorable deals, with more durable contracts in the best interest of their respective countries.

Importantly, Power Africa also supports capacity-development activities for African attorneys to ensure they are well-positioned to negotiate future transactions and helps create model templates for future transactions, providing African attorneys with the tools necessary to negotiate and close future transactions.

In addition to legal support—USAID, through Power Africa, helps our African partner countries diversify supply and export markets, create effective, pro-growth regulatory frameworks, and develop and join well-functioning regional markets.

Power Africa focuses on supporting the creation of laws and policies that foster private sector investment and sustainable energy sector growth. Recent examples of this work include support for solar “plug and play” technical standards, environmental and social standards, value-added tax exemption laws, cost reflective tariff policies, and national metering policies. All of these build a foundation for transparent markets that attract competitive investment. By bolstering the capacity of African governments to move away from ad-hoc decision making toward technically sound strategic processes and plans, Power Africa counters the ability of the PRC to influence how these markets are governed.

In Malawi, Power Africa collaborated with the Millennium Challenge Corporation to help the Government of Malawi design and implement the country’s first-ever open, transparent, and competitive tender for renewable energy projects. Over twenty international companies submitted bids to develop new solar power projects. Introducing competition into the process helped drive down the cost of electricity.

Power Africa is achieving tangible results for people across the continent. In 2022 alone, Power Africa delivered first-time and improved electricity access to 37.7 million people through 7.6 million new on- and off-grid connections to homes and businesses. Power Africa also initiated the Health Electrification and Telecommunications Alliance to electrify and digitally connect 10,000 health facilities, and launched the U.S.-Africa Clean Tech Energy Network to increase energy access via technology investment and deals of up to \$350 million over five years.

Other Investments

Prosper and Power Africa are delivering exciting results. They are driving structural changes and finance sources that offer an alternative to the PRC.

But I want to underscore that it is not just about trade and making deals. USAID is investing in people through quality education, skill development, and nutrition and food systems that have been undercut by the pandemic and Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Feed the Future has expanded to eight new countries in Africa and will continue to build stronger food systems and improve nutrition across the continent. Our investments in education and youth prioritize increasing access to quality, relevant, and safe learning opportunities, and promote social well-being, particularly for vulnerable populations. The Young African Leaders Initiative (YALI) has trained more than 22,000 youth across the continent since 2015.

We are continuing our long-standing support for health and health systems. The results we have delivered, along with our interagency partners, are impressive. One example is the President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Where only 50,000 people in sub-Saharan Africa were on HIV treatment in 2003, today, PEPFAR supports life-saving antiretroviral treatment for over 20 million adults and children in Africa and beyond. The public health infrastructure PEPFAR built with our partner countries has been leveraged to support responses for COVID-19, Ebola, and other emerging infectious diseases.

And the United States, through USAID and the Department of State continues to provide critical humanitarian assistance and we continue to support vital human rights and democracy work. Across the continent, data shows a demand for democracy and elections as well as adherence to the rule of law. We are helping governments fight corruption, expanding space for civil society, helping citizens choose their leadership, and strengthening the trend toward democratization.

In short, USAID continues to build on our longstanding partnerships across health, education, agriculture, and democracy and governance. These partnerships are built on peace, cooperation, and a mutual commitment to self-determination. They go to the core of all of our work, which is individual dignity.

Conclusion

Our world is at an inflection point. Africa is a major geopolitical and rising economic player and is essential to our collective progress.

As we highlighted during the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, we are stepping up our engagement with African partners, affirming their agency, and elevating our partnership. We must work together to advance our shared vision of a better, more sustainable, healthier, and more prosperous future. This means creating jobs, bolstering two-way trade and investment, and building long-term, sustainable partnerships.

Through Power Africa and Prosper Africa and our broader economic and commercial engagement across the continent, USAID is committed to increasing two-way trade and mobilizing investment in Africa's fast-growing markets. We will continue to advance this goal by unlocking the full suite of U.S. government tools and resources to help companies and investors do business on the African continent and in the United States.

We believe in the power of the African and U.S. private sectors to solve global challenges – and doing that together with business leaders and investors from across the African diaspora, representing America’s rich diversity and underscoring the deep ties between African and American cultures.

Our engagement plays to our comparative advantages and illustrates our long-standing investments. Our field-based, longer-term, country-driven approach reinforces our partners’ autonomy and shows that “democracy delivers,” and delivers better for long-term economic and development gains.

Thank you for your continued support of USAID’s work in Africa, and for the opportunity to appear before you today. I look forward to answering your questions.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you, Ms. Davis. Right on time.

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.

I am piggybacking on those comments. There is a lot to be proud of. But I am going to start with you, Ms. Davis. You mentioned PEPFAR and Prosper and Power and those all phenomenal investments. And we look to reauthorize, redouble, and reassert our commitment to those.

But for right now, I would like to ask you about AGOA, the African Growth Opportunity Act. In 2000, that is a trade preferential program that we used to increase exports from the continent to the United States. In 2022, a third of total U.S. imports from Africa were through this program, massive. However, the total value of AGOA trade has decreased from a peak of a little bit over \$56 billion in 2008 down to about \$6 billion in 2021.

As we look forward to reauthorizing AGOA, can you describe some of the technical assistance that USAID provides specifically for AGOA implementation, as well as for trade capacity building, funding efforts through Africa more generally?

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you for the question and for the recognition of AGOA. I will defer to my colleagues at USTR, the U.S. Office of, U.S. Trade Representative to comment specifically on the AGOA reauthorization, as they are the USG lead on that reauthorization.

But your question around technical assistance that USAID is providing, our trade and investment programs have been the primary platform for two-way trade for over two decades, including through AGOA. And as you recognized, that volume has increased substantially from, it has grown by 25 percent from 2000 to 2019.

Our technical assistance, looking at both the value as well as the volume of that growth, is really working with partner governments to help them develop their national implementation strategies and to expand those such strategies. We also build capacities within key ministries within African countries, at the border crossings, as well as at critical supports.

Mr. JAMES. Where are the gaps? And how can we do better?

Ms. DAVIS. Sure. Some of the places where we can do better right now that is an area focus is really looking at the challenges that we see countries having with AGOA procedures and regulations, accessing new sources of capital, connecting with U.S. buyers and investments. Those are three of the key areas that we are focused on primarily right now to continue to grow that volume and value that you mentioned.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you.

For Ms. Holman, the Belt and Road Initiative has leveraged China's cooperative advantage, excuse me, competitive advantage in sectors like construction services to increase its economic footprint in Africa. Why hasn't Africa participated in the supply chain initiative given the threats to competitive system of global trade and its opportunities for U.S. businesses to grow? What are the primary hurdles for these U.S.-based companies to conduct additional business on the continent? And how can we help?

Ms. HOLMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.

There are considerable hurdles for U.S. businesses being interested in Africa. This is an area that I have invested considerable amounts of time in episodically over the past 10 to 15 years.

U.S. companies tend to trade where the terrain is most familiar, which would be, first of all, domestically, and then the NAFTA countries, Canada and Mexico. We have had, in conjunction with USAID, the Department of Commerce, and USTR, numerous events to encourage companies to invest in Africa. Our embassies are very committed to encouraging any companies that wish to trade or invest with Africa.

And we were very encouraged by the oversubscribed U.S.-Africa Business Summit on day two of the African Leaders Summit where U.S. companies inked some \$15 billion worth of deals. And we are systematically following up on those deals as an interagency team to see that our companies get the best deals possible that they can and that those deals come to fruition.

We also work with African countries to make sure that there is a level playing field. As I said in my oral statement, we want everyone to play by the same set of rules. And that means encouraging U.S. companies and countries who want to receive them for those countries to have a level playing field and for the international financial institutions and our own U.S. Government programs to encourage that level playing field. Thank you.

Mr. JAMES. So basically everything. Thank you. I appreciate that.

I now recognize Ranking Member Jacobs for 5 minutes.

Ms. JACOBS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to fixing everything with you.

Thank you to our witnesses for testifying again. So as a framing question for this conversation, I want to discuss the ways we can approach strategic competition on the continent in a responsible and healthy way and how we avoid the unhealthy forms of competition.

During the cold war, the United States partnered with autocratic regimes in exchange for strategic alignments, spurring violence and increased civil war in the process. So as the Biden Administration is engaging in competition with the PRC on the continent, I think it is incredibly important that we are doing so in a way that considers the lessons learned from the cold war and prioritizes long-term interests, like good governance, democracy, human rights.

So, Deputy Assistant Secretary Holman, Deputy Assistant Secretary Waters, how is the State Department thinking about these lessons and ensuring we are not engaging in this kind of unhealthy competition or race to the bottom?

Mr. WATERS. Thank you, Ranking Member Jacobs.

Look, the lessons of history are not lost on us. I think part of the reason that we have spent much of the past few months reorganizing the way that we handle the issue of PRC strategic competition at the State Department is to bring together the resources in the building across the enterprise that have looked at similar challenges historically.

And so I think, you know, what you see behind me with Lauren, Charles, and Kendra, our team who are here who do all of the real work, is a reflection of the fact that we are trying to approach strategic competition globally in a manner that is I think in accordance with what, the spirit of what you are saying.

Now, I will defer to Amy about how we are prioritizing it within the Sub-Saharan African region.

But I will say that in terms of our overall approach this is a competitive relationship. It does have adversarial dimensions. But when we talk about how we engage the Chinese, including with our allies and partners, we have put a premium on recognizing that there are still areas of competition or areas where interests align where we have to work together, issues like food security, global climate change, macroeconomic stability. It is just a reality that we have to do that.

And even in areas where the interests are adversarial, we are trying to keep channels open so that we can talk responsibly about our differences, because I do think that is what the American people and also our allies and partners expect of us.

Ms. HOLMAN. Thank you, Ranking Member Jacobs, for that question.

I think what we have been doing over the past 2 years is really building partnerships. If you look at what we said in the Africa strategy, if you look at how we designed and the work that went into designing the African Leaders Summit where we did listening tours, we worked with the AU, who worked with another subset of countries. We worked very closely with the embassies here in Washington. We wanted to hear what the Africans want out of these partnerships.

And I think that, it is a two-way conversation, which I think is a big difference from what I read about during the cold war, because I wasn't, you know, I wasn't—I was around for it, but I wasn't really, I wasn't part of government, except for the very, very tiny, little end piece.

And what we heard from the Africans were a number of different concerns. One is peace and security. We see that concern playing out in Sudan today and in other parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.

We see with the inclusion of the African Business Summit is day No. 2 that economics and building a partner, you know, and building a strong economic partnership is very important to them. They want to have choices. We do not want to make people choose.

And then we have the whole basket of governance issues that dovetail with peace and security, that governments are very concerned about how to provide services to their people, particularly when they do not have peace and security throughout their country. So we have looked at different tools for that.

The Global Fragility Act that was passed recently, we are very excited about that, about having long-term plans and long-term money so that everything isn't just done on an annual basis so that we can make progress in all the areas that both you and the chairman of the committee highlighted. We also look at the basket of climate and environmental issues, which are equally important to the Africans.

I will leave it at that. Thank you.

Ms. JACOBS. Thank you. I yield back.

Mr. JAMES. The chair now recognizes Congressman Mills for 5 minutes.

Mr. MILLS. Thank you. I appreciate you guys being here today and answering all these questions. I am going to get them quickly.

How is the Minerals Security Partnership working in countries like the DRC? And what is being done to support Congolese part-

ners to increase economical security, increase economic diversification, and in exploitation by opportunists?

Ms. HOLMAN. I guess that one is mine. Thank you, Representative Mills, for that question. I spend a lot of my time trying to figure out exactly how to address those concerns.

On the Minerals Security Partnership, we are always looking for the kinds of projects throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, in fact, throughout the world, that will respond to the governance criteria that are inherent in this partnership. In order for a project to qualify, there must be a number of conditions, responsible stewardship of the natural environment, consultative and participatory process with local communities, and safe, fair, inclusive, and ethical working conditions.

And at this time, although we do look for opportunities and Amos Hochstein is heading up our efforts in that category, we haven't found a project that has brought all of these qualifications together. We continue to look. We continue to work.

We continue to work very actively with the government of the Democratic Republic of Congo to improve its business climate. We understand that they are working to, at using the Millennium Challenge Corporation criteria as a guideline to guide their efforts to move forward so that we can establish the kind of business environment that will make U.S. companies want to go in and take advantage of the considerable opportunities that exist in the DRC both in the mining sector and outside the mining sector. This is an active part of Administration activities. But it is difficult, and we haven't seen fruits.

We do have Minerals Security Partnerships in Angola, Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, as well as here in the United States and in Canada as well, in our efforts to break the PRC domination of supply chains in the kinds of minerals that we need to have a clean energy economy throughout the world. Thank you.

Mr. MILLS. Thank you.

And just following up on that, to also counter Chinese corruption and abuse, it is critical that elections later this year in the DRC are free and fair and on time. Credible democratic outcome in Zambia has led to a sea change, I'm sorry, has led to a sea change there. And in DRC, what is the State Department doing to ensure candidates are able to run without intimidation or interference?

Ms. HOLMAN. Thank you very much for that question. When I am not thinking about the conflict in the eastern DRC or how to get more economic opportunity, we are thinking on elections.

The government of the DRC has already pledged that they will be doing elections on time. We continue to encourage them, along with our like-minded partners, to ensure that these elections are free, fair, and transparent, in addition to being on time. And we will be looking at the results very carefully.

Our friends at USAID were able to act quickly early last year to provide almost \$24 million in election assistance so that we could be able to disperse that election assistance in a timely manner. If we do it 2 months before the elections, it is not useful.

And we really appreciate your interest and ongoing support in this area. Thank you.

Mr. MILLS. Thank you so much. I really appreciate your time.

With that, I yield back.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you, Congressman Mills.

The chairman now recognizes Congressman Allred for 5 minutes.

Mr. ALLRED. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to our witnesses for being here.

I had the honor of being part of the Presidential delegation to the inauguration of Kenyan President Ruto last September, led by our capable trade rep, Katherine Tai. And while I was there, I was struck by the desire for further engagement with us, but also I think some of the fatigue over some of the PRC's actions.

And we have had a number of hearings on PRC activity around the world. But particularly in Africa, I think we have to always keep track of what I think you discussed in your testimony, Ms. Davis, regarding the strengths that we bring to the table, what we do far better than them. Obviously there are things that, engagements that we want to increase, but to remember basically who we are and that we want to be the best partner we can be, that, yes, there is a competitive nature to it, Mr. Waters, but there is also, of course, a capacity building that I think is important and that only we can do really in a lot of way and that I think is, particularly when we met with Kenyan youth, that is the direction they want to go, right.

And we also, of course, in December had, there was a roundtable hosted by the trade rep on AGOA. And just for you all's kind of information, there were trade ministers from pretty much every major country on the continent there. And they raised concerns with us helping us boost their productive capacity, complying with our food safety regulations, and decreasing utilization among smaller and less developed countries. I know that is not directly in your wheelhouse. But it is going to come to us in terms of reauthorizing AGOA.

And I do think that USAID has announced recently the Africa Localization Initiative to direct more funding to local organizations based in Sub-Saharan Africa. And I was wondering, Deputy Assistant Administrator Davis, what the status of that is, that initiative is and why this locally led approach is so important for our strategy as you see it on the continent.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you. I appreciate the question.

So the Localization Initiative, there are currently 12 countries that are across Sub-Saharan Africa that are part of the initiative. The current status, they have completed their strategic documents outlining their plans and efforts to expand those plans.

We are also currently engaged in a budget exercise to realign, to identify additional resources to help support localization. We have a goal to establish a mechanism that allows us to provide increased capacity building in a more sustained way to allow these local organizations to do business with us directly.

Finally, it is important to note that while there are 12 countries in this specific localization initiative, it is just one piece of our broader localization agenda, where across all of our countries we are emphasizing the importance of identifying new and local partners to expand our work, and as you said, just capture what we do best on the continent. Thank you.

Mr. ALLRED. I think it is an exciting program.

One of the issues that they continually raised, the trade ministers at the roundtable in December, was the, trying to attract more foreign investment, attract American investment. And I noted to them in that discussion that, you know, stability and, you know, consistency are, you know, fundamental for attracting our investment.

And I am concerned with the State of democracy, of course, on the continent and want to know, and really see us do more to be helpful in improving conditions there. But only about 5 percent of our USAID and State-led assistance programs deal with democracy, human rights, and governance. And I am wondering, Deputy Assistant Administrator Davis, if USAID has any plans for increasing the funding in that area or for requesting more in that area or focusing more on that area?

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Congressman. The simple answer is yes.

So in the 2024 request for Africa, the request is 440.3 million, which is almost \$170 million increase, 63 percent increase over our Fiscal Year levels for democracy, human rights, and government, and governance. We recognize the importance of that work and as USAID continues to focus our messaging on Democracy Delivers and the criticality of that. So we will continue to work with you, with your support, to expand and deepen the impact of our democracy programs. Thank you.

Mr. ALLRED. Thank you.

I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you, Congressman Allred.

I recognize myself for 5 minutes.

Mr. Waters, you mentioned the CCP and their overseas police stations and how within 24 hours cracked down on one in New York. That should be scary for everyone.

The CCP has designs on everywhere in the globe and dominating economically and from a military standpoint everywhere, not just in Africa but in the United States of America.

There are over 100 overseas police stations throughout the world, which it uses to coordinate tracking and harassing of PRC dissidents, what Beijing refers to as United Front work. Reports indicate that these stations exist in nearly a dozen countries throughout Africa and, again, most importantly, in our own country, on our own shores.

Two questions. One, what is the department doing to expose and push back against these egregious infringement on national sovereignty for ourselves and our allies by the CCP? And question two, is there any cross-talk between verticals, between departments to leverage the lessons learned so that we can identify, define, and eliminate any threats to ourselves or allies?

Mr. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. I think this is one of the most important areas that we have been engaged on in the counter-influence realm.

The Safeguard Defenders report that I think you are referencing, this report that came out last year identifying a problem that we have long been aware of, the problem of transnational law enforcement within our borders, within the borders of dozens of countries, is an issue that we have been working to respond to in two ways.

One is through our public diplomacy and through our private diplomatic channels. We have been engaged in a pretty extensive effort to share what we know and to develop the tools and response options that are most effective to this unique aspect of China's influence agenda.

The second piece of our response really is in law enforcement channels. And there I will defer to the Department of Justice. But I think in the statement they issued yesterday, the indictments against 44 Chinese nationals and a few others in New York, I think DOJ made clear that we will be resolute in responding to transnational law enforcement within our own borders.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you, Mr. Waters.

The chair now recognizes Congressman Jackson for 5 minutes.

Mr. JACKSON. Thank you very much, Chairman James.

I have had the privilege of going to Kenya just the other week and went to the front lines to see the starvation that is going on in the camps that are now bordering Kenya that are now, its recipients are the refugees who are now coming into Kenya. So, for example, in that region you have got Sudan, Somalia, Uganda, DRC, Ethiopia all merging in on Kenya specifically.

And I was hoping that we could be more specific when we are talking about the largest landmass in the world. So I am just little bit concerned about the generality of speaking of Africa and Africans as if they are a monolithic group, that I think in order to be more specific and to be more beneficial we have to talk about what are our priorities and where are we going. But there are over 1,000 dialects of derivatives of the language of Swahili. There is French. There is Spanish. There is English.

It seems like we need a room full of people to talk about the continent, besides the Chinese are very specific on roads initiatives, ports initiative, mining initiatives. And somehow I feel as if we are talking down to the entire continent as if we have to manage their affairs and not simply align ourselves with what their interests are and with their self-determination.

One of the things I would like to know more about, if it is in your portfolio, is how the Forex market, the exchange rates are now crippling, indebting the markets. The Kenyan shilling was 115 to the dollar 90 days ago. Now it is 145 to the dollar, which has put the debt burden on them. They have lost 20 percent of their purchasing power because of actions from our Federal Reserve.

I do not know which of you could address on how the capricious winds of our foreign exchange markets affect these developing countries and continually make them reset their economies.

Well, I wouldn't expect, but maybe another time. But that is something to consider. The Kenyan economy is three trillion shillings. And now they are spending 300 billion in their shillings. And they have lost 20 percent purchasing power because of being connected to the dollar. But I think in our context we should make that clear, that these countries are emerging and what exactly is our deal.

Another deal specifically in Kenya is that the last time I was there was 6 years ago. And there is a road that goes from the airport in Mombasa, in Nairobi to downtown. I would have to leave 2 hours in advance to get to the airport. I was into the airport in

15 minutes. And that specifically was built by the Chinese. But it wasn't indebtedness. It was a build, operate, and transfer after 25-year agreement.

So I think we should also let members know that the Chinese are coming in with some creative financing, that some of their projects are not adding to indebtedness, and they are building, operating, and transferring it over as a matter of practice.

And last on that point, Chairman James, is the contract was led for Nairobi to Mombasa, a road project to U.S. contractors that we have had for 10 years and haven't executed on it, which is one of the most heavily trafficked roads in the entire world, that we need to figure out how do we execute and not converse with African nations. They are open for business. And they are rational people. And they are working with people that are shovel ready, finance ready, that do not have the legacy of colonialization in Africa that want to go forward. So that was a comment.

Ms. HOLMAN. Thank you, Representative, for your thoughtful comments.

On the Kenyan economic situation, we will need to take that back. Although I have also had the very positive experience of the new Chinese roadway in downtown Nairobi, the status of the Mombasa-Nairobi road and whether a U.S. contractor has been able to execute a contract, I will need to take that back. But thank you for your thoughtful comments.

Mr. JAMES. The chairman now recognizes Congresswoman Cherfilus-McCormick for 5 minutes.

Mrs. CHERFILUS-McCORMICK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Recently I traveled with the Vice President, Kamala Harris, to Ghana during her trip to Africa, to the African continent earlier this month. And during that trip, she made several historic commitments and announced further U.S. investments and partnerships.

One of the announcements included the intent to invest more than 100 million to support conflict prevention efforts in coastal West Africa through the Global Fragility Act. The assistance includes programs to help strengthen economic development and increase governance and resilience in at-risk neighborhoods. In addition to that, we talked about Ghana's inability to pay back that loan and restructuring.

So my real question is how are we positioning ourselves to be good neighbors and help the Western African nations become more sustainable, instead of the loans that China is providing, which actually causes a dependency. So, Deputy Assistant Administrator Davis, could you please discuss the strategic importance of making these investments now?

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. I just most recently came back as mission director in Ghana. So I appreciate the context of the question.

I think the importance and the urgency of making these investments under Global Fragility Act under our strategy to prevent conflict and promote stability, the urgency is now, not only because of the continued spread in violent extremism, but as you are saying, this is a moment where our country government, the African country governments are seeking out increased opportunity.

They recognize that addressing these issues will require an integrated approach, as the Vice President highlighted, between defense diplomacy and development. And now that we have that agreement, it is our moment to build on it.

So it is a strategic opportunity for us to provide transparent mechanisms for them to access these resources, and referring to the Congressman's statement, making sure that we allow our African partners to take the lead in defining their own needs and tailoring our offerings to the needs of those countries. Thank you.

Mrs. CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK. Now, have we had an opportunity to have an implementation plan that would make sure that all of these dollars are actually invested, because we have a lot of announcements, but when we look back to see the oversight, was it actually invested, how much of it was invested, sometimes we fall short? So have we evolved to that State where we are looking at what is actually going to be invested in implementation?

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you. Yes. So particular to the Global Fragility Act, we just recently approved the 10-year implementation plans, which will define those, which define those specific investments.

But, again, it is also just important to acknowledge that this contributes to our broader portfolio and our overall oversight of making sure that our investments are put forward to their intended use. So we will continue that process for all of our resources and apply them as we look at implementation of the Global Fragility Act.

Mrs. CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK. And also, as we are looking at creating economic opportunities for the diaspora or African Americans in this country, or even Americans who want to participate since it is a public-private partnership, is there a clear pathway for any entrepreneurs who would want to engage to get an opportunity to participate?

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you. Yes. USAID is working very closely to increase opportunities for U.S. businesses. In particular, we are currently in the process of creating our diaspora strategy to make sure that we have a strategic, intentional approach to engage members of the African diaspora as well. So, yes, it is an important part of our response.

Mrs. CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK. Thank you so much.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you.

I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.

This question is for all of our witnesses. The American private sector is probably the single most potent tool that we must use in our competition in Africa with China. I represent the 10th congressional District from Michigan, the No. 1 manufacturing district in America and the best district in the world. But we are hugely underutilized.

What are State and USAID doing specifically to better incentivize and facilitate U.S. private sector involvement in Africa? Do our partners in Africa see the difference between Chinese State-owned enterprise standards and those provided by the U.S. and our allies?

Mr. WATERS. Mr. Chairman, I'll mention a few thoughts at a global level on our China policy. And then I'll defer to my colleagues on the Africa-specific portion.

The point you make, I think, is a very fundamental one that ultimately we have a different model as we know. One that our greatest strengths are derived from the private sector, from manufacturing districts like your own.

And I think that what we have seen of the Chinese overseas model is a reflection of State industrial policy. Of a centrally driven approach through the Belt and Road Initiative that has, you know, in many areas produced real infrastructure gains on the ground, but at a certain cost.

And I do think that where we are trying to add competitiveness to our public/private sector partnerships is in areas like the President's Global Infrastructure Initiative, which was announced last year. This is a public/private, you know, cooperative mobilization for which we're trying to mobilize \$200 billion of the \$600 billion commitment.

We've also worked with many of your predecessors on improving the ability of our existing tools, the Development Finance Corporation, even smaller tools that may sound esoteric, but I think they do matter to the private sector here.

The Transaction Advisory Fund, the International Transaction Advisory Network, these are tools that help third countries understand what high standards mean. And in some areas, these tools that we have put on the table are actually ways of facilitating private sector involvement.

So, again, these resources are in many cases available at a global level. But I'll defer to my colleagues on how specifically in the sub-Saharan African region, we're trying to mobilize private sector development and support.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Chairman. We are committed to our continued emphasis on public/private partnerships. And as we discussed even during the U.S.-Africa Leader Summit, the commitments that were made in the business fora, and following through on those commitments to build some of those partnerships.

I'll recognize time, but just a few examples of what we've done most recently through Prosper Africa. Just over the past month with Prosper Africa, we've announced 14 private sector investment partnerships in Kenya, valued at more than \$150 million. That was facilitated through Feed the Future as well as Prosper Africa.

We supported the close of a \$274 million investment in partners with major financial institutions in the U.S. to include Bank of America, Brean Capital, Bank of New York, along with DFC.

We also launched the Prosper Africa Tech for Trade Alliance that's looking at, through a partnership with major U.S. companies, a focus on e-commerce and digital trade and works with members such as Cargill, Google, MasterCard, Visa.

So just some examples of what we've been working on over the past month. But, broadly speaking, as DAS Waters has mentioned, we're continuing to look at new and better ways to support that engagement and to respond to the needs to make sure that two-way trade and investment becomes a reality. Thank you.

Ms. HOLMAN. I'd like to add a bit of a view from on the ground in Africa and how our U.S. Embassies in many countries work to make U.S. company participation in those economies a reality.

From 2019 to 2021, I was the Deputy Chief of Mission, the Number Two, at our Embassy in Dakar, Senegal. Dakar is a bit of an interesting market. It's a very, very emerging economy.

It's francophone, so that there's an additional, an additional disincentive to some U.S. companies for coming in. But we spent 3 years to walk a \$100 million electric transmission line installation deal over the finish line.

We worked closely with the U.S. company, a small and medium company located in the Chicago, Illinois area. We worked with EXIM to make sure that the government of Senegal got the flexibilities it needed.

This took a lot of retail diplomacy, as I like to put it, with constant calls and interfaces with both the company, the government, and EXIM back in Washington.

We also worked with Bechtel to do a \$4 billion road. That one is still underway, because the government of Senegal would change the terms of the—you know, change the terms of the contract. They would not want to move as quickly as Bechtel was willing to work.

We still thought it was a worthwhile process. It was a way for us to counter China, because in many of these cases, from the Embassy perspective on the ground, the major competitor is China.

And even though—and this has been a worry for us that just did not start with the inauguration of the Biden Administration.

This is something that many of us have been watching over the past five to 10 years and figuring out how to use the resources of our export financing, the resources on the ground of our Embassy with very committed people, to see American companies ink deals.

And to put this, and to put this out there, when Secretary Pompeo visited Senegal in 2020, and then again when Secretary Biden visited in 2021, we put economic opportunities for U.S. businesses very much at the center of the visit.

We also supported, for example, a wave of small entrepreneurial U.S.-backed companies—

Mr. JAMES. Thank you, ma'am. Take a breath. A little bit over time.

Ms. HOLMAN. Yes.

Mr. JAMES. The Chairman would now like to recognize the Congresswoman Kamlager-Dove for 5 minutes.

Ms. KAMLAGER-DOVE. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I actually want to thank you for allowing me to participate in this hearing. I deeply appreciate it. And thank you to the witnesses here today.

You know, I just have to share that, I think for far too long, Africa has been an afterthought in U.S. foreign policy seen through a reductive lens of security issues and humanitarian issues. And the United States has treated Africa as a region full of challenges and devoid of opportunities.

But that has overlooked the reality, as has been Stated, that Africa is the world's youngest, fastest growing continent. And it will play a major role in the shaping of the future. It probably is the future.

Africa's growth opportunities, new markets, and political alliances carry enormous heft on the international stage, whether we acknowledge it or not.

When Africa's influence was leveraged to advance PRC interests through the continent's voting power at the United Nations, its demand for infrastructure and communications technology, and its entrepreneurial youth population, the United States was left scrambling. It was our refusal to view African countries as mutually beneficial partners, and our consequent inactivity in the region that created the vacuum for the PRC influence that we see today.

You know, I think we have convinced ourselves that we are the most important partner to the continent of Africa, rather than acknowledging the reality that maybe our bargaining acumen is too pedestrian in 2023.

So my question for Deputy Assistant Administrator Davis, and Deputy Assistant Secretary Holman is, if you can provide an update on the current status of the African Continental Free Trade Area implementation, and how State and U.S. aid are supporting our African partners in realizing this agreement?

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you. Thank you for that commentary. And I think, as we've discussed in the opening with this, with our new strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa, really recognizing the importance of engaging Africa as partners.

The AfCFTA Partnership in particular, opening up has created, again, continued opportunities for us to invest in Africa. We at USAID are working as, to use AfCFTA to continue to improve those negotiated markets, as you've mentioned.

And, I think, we're recognizing that it's another tool and opportunity for us to build on. I'll turn to my State colleague to say more about the status.

Ms. KAMLAGER-DOVE. And I'm going to ask that you keep your comments succinct.

Ms. HOLMAN. We continue to watch the implementation over the free trade area. Again, this is a difficult area for many of our African partners to implement the very technical regulations that are involved in this.

It will be a great boon for our companies to be able to trade across an entire area once it's implemented.

Ms. KAMLAGER-DOVE. Thank you. I guess I'm just going to ask that we continue to get our act together as it relates to the kind of relationship we want to forge with the entire continent of Africa.

You know, right now 48 percent of the countries in Africa could be home to 90 percent of the world's poor by 2030. And 20 percent of the world's 38 countries that are in fragile conflict-affected situations, are on the continent of Africa.

And we need to see all of the countries on that continent as potential partners rather than as pawns in a competitive game that we are playing with China. Where you can be competitive, you can be economically diplomatic.

And you can recognize the history of the continent and the new kind of relationship we want to forge with the entire continent, in order to reach goals that are mutually beneficial and that support self-determination and the actualization of the continent.

Mr. Chair, I yield back.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you. The Chairman now recognizes Congressman Kean for 5 minutes.

Mr. KEAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to thank all of our witnesses for being here with us today, and for the important work that they do.

The CCP's involvement in Africa has become a testing ground for the export of its governance and economic molds. It's part of the broader vision to rewrite global political norms.

Mr. Waters and Ms. Holman, as American industry undergoes an energy transition in the coming decades, it is estimated that global demand for cobalt will increase more than twentyfold relative to 2020 levels.

If tomorrow's economy will depend on cobalt, so will tomorrow's military. The mineral is essential for fighter jet components, precision munitions, stealth technology, and much, much more.

My understanding that the Democratic Republic of Congo counts for over two-thirds of global cobalt production. And that 15 of 19 cobalt producing mines in the DRC are owned and operated by the Chinese.

This Chinese monopoly is concerning both for the control that provides Beijing a supply chain, integral to our economy and national security, and because of the gross human rights and child labor violations which occur in these Chinese run mines.

To combat these economic human rights and national security concerns, how would you recommend the U.S. consider or reconsider its approach to the Congo's cobalt and other rare earth minerals?

And should they be viewed as strategic assets that need to be stockpiled as part of the surreptitious core U.S. access to in an emergency situation? What are your insights?

Ms. HOLMAN. Thank you, Representative Kean for that thoughtful commentary and questions. In terms of whether these minerals should be stockpiled, that's not really under the purview of the Bureau of African Affairs. So I would defer to other inter-agency colleagues on that.

In terms of what we're seeing in the DRC, under the PGII Initiative we are looking for ways to diversify the cobalt supply chain. We're looking for cobalt mines that could possibly be acquired under, you know, by either U.S. companies, or by other like-minded partners.

We recognize that this is a considerable concern for the reasons that you've raised. Thank you.

Mr. KEAN. Also, Ms. Holman, as you're aware, this Subcommittee has introduced legislation that calls out the African National Conference's corruption in South Africa, and use of nonalignment to justify increasingly close ties with China and Russia, as seen in the war games conducted off the South African coast, all the while taking for granted the relationship of the United States.

What does the Department of State doing to reinforce relations with our partners in South Africa and to deter future CCP and Russian engagement?

And the conversation would be to the, the question would be to the entire panel regarding how are we working to deter Russian and Chinese engagement in the African continent?

Ms. HOLMAN. Thank you for that question, Representative. On the South African, Chinese, Russian military exercises that were recently concluded, we share your concerns entirely and have expressed them to the government of South Africa.

We had conducted military exercises with them in 2022. And we were quite troubled to see that these exercises were going forward.

In terms of what we're doing to counter China and Russia, I think that was the question on the continent, we have a, you know, we recognize that both countries, per our—represent a considerable risk to individual countries, to governance, and to in certain cases, to the U.S. itself.

So we have undertaken a number of efforts, whether it's facing, whether it's diversification of the critical mineral supply chain through partnerships and encouraging investment, to counter these threats.

Mr. KEAN. Thank you. I yield back my time.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you, Mr. Kean. The Chairman now recognizes Congresswoman Cherfilus-McCormick.

Mrs. CHERFILUS-McCORMICK. Thank you so much, Chair. I just wanted to followup with some questions. One of the announcements was the U.S.-Tanzania Bilateral Development Partnership, a 5-year, approximately \$1.1 billion assistance agreement between the USAID and the government of Tanzania to advance their development priorities.

Once again, my question is for Deputy Assistant Administrator Davis. Why are investments like these strategic, strategically important for us?

And also is there any development with the implementation plan?

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you for the question. On the specific agreement with Tanzania, my team will have to get back to you to get a sense of the status.

I think the second part of your question of why they're important, goes to the core of a lot of our discussion today, in terms of creating those opportunities and providing options, and allowing the African countries to identify options that best meet their needs, such as the announcement in Tanzania.

But we'll be happy to followup to get that specific status for you.

Mrs. CHERFILUS-McCORMICK. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you. The Chairman now recognizes Mrs. Kim for 5 minutes.

Mrs. KIM. Thank you, Chairman James, for holding this very important hearing on CCP's influence on the Africa Continent. And I want to thank all the witnesses for your testimony and attending and answering all of our questions today.

You know, Chinese economic activity and investment throughout Africa has been directly linked to environmental degradation and has created public health emergencies throughout the continent.

For example, since 2014, Ethiopia-Somalia-Ogaden region has seen thousands die from mysterious disease in the areas surrounding a Chinese government-linked natural gas plant, which has poisoned the drinking water supply.

Coordinator Waters, can you please speak to how your department plans to hold China accountable for the negative impact of their investments in Africa and local communities?

And how you will pressure PRC to abide by international environmental protection and labor laws?

Mr. WATERS. Representative Kim, thank you for the question. This is a very complicated topic. And I think, you know, at a general level what I would say is, one element of our response to the challenge China presents in many domains is simply transparency.

It's shining a spotlight on practices, whether they're related to corruption, environmental degradation. I will say that in this area, you know, we face a very big challenge to be honest.

The Chinese spend billions on their influence efforts, on their informational activities. There are 30 Xinhua offices in the subcontinent.

This year, despite having a domestic economy in China that has slowed, their foreign ministry budget increased by double digits, by 12 percent.

And so while dollars are not the only measure of success, I do think that, you know, our strategy first and foremost is to shine a spotlight. To work with allies and partners, with—

Mrs. KIM. Right. Which we're doing by obviously having hold, you know, we're holding hearings and stuff. But I was hoping that you would give us more concrete, one, two, three pressure points that you will keep China accountable.

But let me followup with maybe Deputy Assistant Secretary Holman and Deputy Assistant Administrator Davis, maybe you can also speak to how your agencies are messaging the negative impacts of Chinese investments to our African partners?

And what role should the United States play in delivering technical assistance to countries like sub-Saharan Africa, suffering from those negative impacts?

Mr. WATERS. Thank you, Congresswoman. I can start. A lot of USAID's work is working directly with the host countries to build their, their ability to protect against some of the issues that you're describing. To report them. To engage community members, to increase awareness and report them.

Some of the examples of the work that we're doing, we have a significant portfolio of anti-corruption activities. We have community hotlines, capacity building of local administrators, for example, working in mines, strengthening judiciaries, making sure that when these types of incidents are reported that there's a system in country to be able to followup and report on them.

S, a lot of USAID's work is working directly with the host countries on their national response when these issues occur and encouraging the reporting of them when they occur.

Mrs. KIM. And in the interest of time, if you do not mind, I'm going to ask just one more question to Ms. Davis. For the United States to truly compete with the PRC in Africa, I believe we must do more to incorporate the American private sector into development assistance.

So how does USAID's Africa Trade and Investment Program interact with Prosper Africa's deal teams?

And how can this help facilitate greater AGOA utilizations throughout the continent? As you know, AGOA has been termed as a very successful, you know, tool.

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you. Very briefly, for the sake of time. I think the initiatives that you mentioned, the critical part response to your question is that inter-connectivity.

So our deal teams in-country, our interagency deal teams feed into identifying opportunities within each of their countries. They direct companies, both African as well as U.S. companies to initiatives that are supported by Prosper Africa.

We work closely with DFC to link to support opportunities through AGOA. So it's that inter-connectiveness that reinforces our ability to increase private sector engagement.

And again, just to mention, our new commitments that were made during the U.S.-Africa Leader Summit in the business fora, to continue to build on those connections to reach those commitments.

Mrs. KIM. Thank you very much. And I yield back the overtime.

Mr. JAMES. Thank you. The Chairman now recognizes himself for 5 minutes for one last question and comment.

We all want clean air and clean water. We believe that's vital to life and thriving. Not just here, but all over the world.

Ms. Holman, you mentioned we want to increase choices for African nations to have more choices, not less. Ms. Davis, you mentioned that African nations should be allowed to make investments as they see fit, according to their needs.

These are all things, clean air, clean water, making investments according to their needs, and having self-determination. Sub-Saharan does not mean subhuman, and we should not treat anyone as such.

And so dictating and deciding what another nation's policy should be in this area, is something I find interesting with the, what seems like gaslighting nations in Africa, with this Administrations' current strategy of pursuing greenhouse gas counting, despite the continent, the whole continent being responsible for a fraction of historic and current emissions.

When we talk about progress, we talk about prosper, we talk about power. Can you speak to why a one size fits all, first world strategy fits Africa and their self-determination as many nations on a large continent, a quarter of the world's population, to get out of poverty without proven low cost available energy sources like natural gas, which we could export to boost America's economy, cleaner, safer, with American union labor.

Can we explain why we would not use an all of the above energy approach to help Africa become a greater and stronger partner to the United States and to the world?

Ms. DAVIS. Thank you, Chairman. I'll begin. I first want to comment that particular to Power Africa, we are using an energy mix.

We create country strategies that apply to country specific energy programming. We look project by project, country by country. And more, and more we are seeing African requests for more renewable energy options.

But that is not to say that we do not continue to provide a large array of energy sources through our Power Africa activities that include solar, and wind, and hydro, as addition to natural gas.

You also mentioned in particular the greenhouse gas question, which is also important. And the climate resilience that you described is a shared objective of our African partners. And one—

Mr. JAMES. Is it a barrier? Is it a barrier to inclusivity across the continent? And is it a barrier to our partnership with African nations?

Ms. DAVIS. The concern that we have with the discussions around greenhouse gas is that 17 of the most, of the 20 most climate vulnerable countries are in Africa.

So it's a vulnerability for them that we cannot ignore in our discussions when we have, when we have these conversations.

Mr. JAMES. Yes. But the largest contributor is currently China, for one, permitting two coal plants per week.

If we can hold African nations accountable for greenhouse gas emissions that they have not even emitted, and fail to hold competitors like China, and allies like India, accountable as we in the west are pushing toward a green future, building our green future on the backs of black slaves in artisanal mines in the DRC. And it's the height of hypocrisy.

And I would challenge the Administration to look hard at balancing its agenda with the human rights implications that it has and to work within the realm of reality to make sure that we provide, I love your term, energy mix, to allow African nations to self-determination that they not only require and deserve, but are entitled to.

I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the Members for their questions. The Members of the Committee may have some additional questions for the witnesses and we'll ask for you to respond to these in writing.

Pursuant to the Committee rules, all Members may have 5 days to submit these statements, questions, and extraneous materials for the record, subject to the length of limitations.

Without objections, the Committee stands adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

APPENDIX



**COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
SUBCOMMITTEE HEARING NOTICE**
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
WASHINGTON, DC 20515-6128

**Subcommittee on Africa
John James (R-MI), Chairman**

April 11, 2023

TO: MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS

You are respectfully requested to attend an OPEN hearing of the Committee on Foreign Affairs to be held by the Subcommittee on Africa at 2:30 p.m. on April 18th in room 210 of the House Visitor's Center. The hearing is available by live webcast on the Committee website at <https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/>.

Date: Tuesday, April 18, 2023

Time: 2:30 p.m.

Location: HVC-210

Subject: Great Power Competition in Africa: The Chinese Communist Party

Witnesses: Rick Waters
China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
China and Taiwan
U.S. Department of State

Amy Holman
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of African Affairs
U.S. Department of State

Janean Davis
Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa
U.S. Agency for International Development

*NOTE: Witnesses may be added.

By Direction of the Chair

The Committee on Foreign Affairs seeks to make its facilities accessible to persons with disabilities. If you are in need of special accommodations, please call 202-226-8467 at least four business days in advance of the event, whenever practicable. Questions with regard to special accommodations in general (including availability of Committee materials in alternative formats and assistive listening devices) may be directed to the Committee.

To fill out this form online: Either use the tab key to travel through each field or mouse click each line or within blue box. Type in information.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MINUTES OF FULL COMMITTEE HEARING

Note: Red boxes with red type will NOT print.

Day 18 Date April Room HVC-210

Starting Time 2:31 PM Ending Time 4:01 PM

Recesses (___ to ___) (___ to ___) (___ to ___) (___ to ___) (___ to ___) (___ to ___)

Presiding Member(s)

Check all of the following that apply:

Open Session

Executive (closed) Session

Televised

Electronically Recorded (taped)

Stenographic Record

To select a box, mouse click it, or tab to it and use the enter key to select. Another click on the same box will deselect it.

TITLE OF HEARING:

Great Power Implications in Africa: The Chinese Communist Party

COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

Chairman John James, Ranking Member Jacobs, Rep. Young Kim, Rep. Allred, Rep. Baird, Rep. Cherfilus-McCormick, Rep. Jackson, Rep. Kean, Rep. Kamlager-Dove, Rep. Mills

NON-COMMITTEE MEMBERS PRESENT:

HEARING WITNESSES: Same as meeting notice attached? Yes No

(If "no", please list below and include title, agency, department, or organization.)

STATEMENTS FOR THE RECORD: *(List any statements submitted for the record.)*

TIME SCHEDULED TO RECONVENE _____
or
TIME ADJOURNED 4:01 PM

Note: Please include accompanying witnesses with their titles, etc. (please note the fact that they are accompanying witnesses)

Clear Form

Full Committee Hearing Coordinator

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Questions for the Record for Ms. Janean Davis by
Congressman John James
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023

Question 1

USAID fought hard interagency battles to make sure the PROSPER Africa Coordinator position was housed at USAID. Yet the coordinator position remains unfilled. I am concerned that the Agency has said one thing to promote deals with U.S. and African firms and done another by leaving this important position unfilled. Why is that? When can we expect a new candidate for the Coordinator position?

Answer 1

USAID has put in place strong interim leadership for the Prosper Africa initiative as the Agency works with the White House to appoint a permanent Coordinator. A new Coordinator is expected to be in position in the near future. USAID, its interagency partners, and the full Prosper Africa Executive Secretariat remain committed to the mission of substantially increasing two-way trade and investment between the United States and Africa. The Prosper Africa team continues to build a pipeline of new deals and bring them to close. As of April 2023, there were 534 deals in the Prosper Africa pipeline valued at more than \$43 billion.

Question 2

In the last Administration, USAID built an organizational infrastructure to carry out its multiple lines of counter-China operations. An agencywide Clear Choice Executive Council and USAID–U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Working Group reviewed all proposed assistance programs and proposals through a counter-China lens. A senior executive-level Clear Choice Coordinator, reporting to the Administrator, advised the agency’s leadership on initiatives to counter China, supported by a fully dedicated six-person Secretariat. What is the architecture in USAID’s Africa Bureau today?

Answer 2

As part of the Biden Administration’s recalibration of the U.S. government’s strategy toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC), USAID sunsetted the framework referred to internally as the “USAID Clear Choice Framework” while retaining a Senior Advisor on the PRC based in the Bureau of Policy, Planning, and Learning (PPL). PPL works cooperatively with all Bureaus on the strategic aspects of USAID’s development in the context of the PRC. The Africa Bureau centralizes their strategic work via the Office of Development Planning. From September 2021 through July 2022, this Advisor launched an intra-agency process to establish a new “Strategic Approach to the PRC,” in coordination with the Agency’s PRC Advisory Group – composed of key subject matter experts from every regional and functional bureau from across the Agency,

Questions for the Record for Ms. Janean Davis by
Congressman John James
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023

including from the Africa Bureau – who informed and consulted all units within the Bureau throughout the process.

Question 3

It is not true, as one frequently hears, including from the Chinese government, that the U.S. has retreated from or abandoned Africa. The U.S. has, for instance, saved tens of millions of African lives with health programs. Yet in a relatively short amount of time, China has eclipsed American influence essentially everywhere in Africa. What happened and why does the U.S. seem to derive so little influence in Africa from its initiatives? Does USAID have a plan for better telling the story of what the U.S. has for decades done, and continues to do, for African countries?

Answer 3

Recent Afrobarometer surveys carried out in 34 African countries show that the preferred development model for Africans remains that of the United States, and the majority of those who were aware of Chinese loans and development assistance to their countries were concerned about being indebted to China. Data shows that in the countries where USAID works, the USAID brand enjoys widespread recognition and carries high levels of equity, consistently polls favorably with target audiences, and is strongly identified with the United States. USAID has over 60 dedicated communications staff at our missions across sub-Saharan Africa who are using a variety of platforms – from social media to more traditional platforms that resonate with local audiences, like radio and print media – to ensure people are aware of our work. Our messaging is focused on the fact that USAID through the U.S. government has been a partner to African governments for roughly 60 years, and has contributed to many positive, long-term outcomes in public health, agricultural development, women’s empowerment, technology innovation, and environmental conservation.

Question 4

Has the Agency developed, or do they have access to, a comprehensive accounting of all Chinese economic, diplomatic, and military activities in Africa? If not, where are the gaps, and do those gaps impede the Agency’s ability to defend U.S. interests in Africa against Beijing’s challenges?

Answer 4

USAID leverages multiple sources of third party data, both publicly available and proprietary, to better understand PRC economic and political activities globally and within Africa. This

Questions for the Record for Ms. Janean Davis by
Congressman John James
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023

includes: trade, investment, official finance, debt holdings, public attitudes, in-kind donations, and public diplomacy activities. Despite these efforts, the opaque nature of PRC activity makes it very difficult to have a full accounting. For example, much of PRC private investment travels via off-shore tax havens, which are inherently difficult to track. To help shed light on PRC activity, for the past 12 years, the agency has supported the data collection of PRC official finance lending and development assistance with the AidData team at the College of William and Mary. Since the PRC does not fully report on its official finance or development activities, this data collection effort has been critical to the ability of the broader U.S. government and public to understand the scope of PRC economic activity in Africa, particularly with the growth in PRC investment and lending associated with the Belt and Road Initiative. Multiple sources of data provide USAID a solid basis upon which to consider strategies and programs that respond to the PRC's challenges.

Question 5

China flaunts how it does not meddle in the domestic affairs of the African countries they invest in. By contrast our comparative advantage as Americans is that we do promote democracy and human rights values throughout the world. However, this needs to be done in a strategic manner which recognizes the values of our African partners rather than forcing our American domestic social agenda upon them – a social agenda which the African people themselves do not want. How does the Agency ensure that DEI imperatives pushed from Washington do not backfire, offend and ultimately harm our relations on the continent?

Answer 5

USAID is committed to advancing human rights and diversity, equity, inclusion, and accessibility (DEIA) principles through our programming and engagements with a range of African partners, to include governments, civil society, and the private sector. USAID is committed to the sustainable development of communities around the world. We ensure that these principles operate with the ethos of “nothing about us without us,” meaning that we are most effective at meeting the needs of diverse populations by directly engaging them in the development of their own communities. This close collaboration reinforces our close relations on the continent. For example, USAID’s education programming in Africa focuses on reaching all learners. In Rwanda, a new design is focusing on engaging local stakeholders within the deaf community, promoting deaf youth to become teachers and/or teaching assistants, and creating opportunities for Rwandans to become fluent in Rwandan Sign Language. Additionally, early grade reading programs in Malawi, Tanzania, and Zambia train teachers on disability screening and instruction. This direct engagement with the community builds more sustainable outcomes.

Questions for the Record for Ms. Janean Davis by
Congressman John James
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023

Question 6

What are USAID's plans to hold China accountable for the negative impact of China's investments in the Ogaden region and other African local communities, and what are the Agency's plans to pressure China to abide by international public health, environmental protection, and labor laws?

Answer 6

USAID remains deeply concerned about earlier accusations of displacement and natural resource contamination in the Ogaden Basin of Ethiopia's Somali Region. If true, USAID expects the federal and regional governments of Ethiopia to pursue appropriate redress over the alleged role that PRC-controlled firms, such as the POLY-GCL Petroleum Group Holding Limited, may have played. As the largest donor to the people of Ethiopia's Somali regional state, USAID is committed to addressing the urgent needs of the Ethio-Somali population and will continue its engagement with both communities in the region and the diaspora community on this important issue.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 1:

The 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the US and Angola will occur next month, in May 2023. The PRC has been steadfastly reaching out to Angola's President Lourenço, but President Lourenço has been steadfastly reaching out to the United States, setting in motion reforms to fight corruption, increase democracy and transform Angola's economy to encourage American investment. Will the Biden Administration mark next month's US-Angola anniversary, to ensure this moment is marked appropriately and this strategic opportunity for America is not lost? Is a heads of state meeting between President Lourenço and President Biden – something the reform-minded Angolan government has long sought – being considered?

Answer 1:

The Administration values its strategic partnership with Angola. The past year included a series of high-level bilateral visits, and the Administration is developing new avenues of cooperation to support Angola's military modernization, preparations for local elections, and efforts to improve Angola's infrastructure and diversify the country's economy. The U.S. Embassy in Angola will mark the 30th anniversary of U.S.-Angola

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

relations with the Angolan government. The Administration will continue to seek opportunities to engage President Lourenco and his team at all levels.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 2:

What are the State Department's plans to hold China accountable for the negative impact of China's investments in the Ogaden region and other African local communities, and what are the Department's plans to pressure China to abide by international public health, environmental protection, and labor laws?

Answer 2:

We are committed to promoting the highest environmental, social, and governance standards globally. We support democratic institutions and work to improve governance, increase access to justice, strengthen accountability, and promote respect for human rights and labor rights for all people in sub-Saharan Africa. Ethiopian citizens deserve positive health outcomes, equitable access to justice, and protection for worker rights. We also work with our partners in Africa to build media sector capacity and resilience by training on journalistic tradecraft to support transparency.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 3:

China is operating an illegal, unreported, and unregulated (IUU) fishing fleet throughout the world, and notably in Africa. It has been estimated that more than 60 percent of China's distant water catch, worth \$5 billion, takes place in West Africa. These illegal operations off the Horn of Africa contribute to the famine and food insecurity, by robbing fishermen of their catch. What is the Department doing to counter IUU fishing by Chinese fishing fleets?

Answer 3:

The Department is engaged in a range of efforts to counter IUU fishing by PRC fleets. Our Posts engage with partner governments, civil society, NGOs, and fishers to increase public awareness of the environmental and economic risks that PRC IUU fishing poses, as well as to build the capacity of actors to combat it. The Department serves as a Deputy Chair to the Interagency Working Group under the Maritime Security and Fisheries Enforcement (SAFE) Act, which leverages authorities and capabilities of 21 federal agencies and guides efforts to combat IUU fishing.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 4:

China is currently proving itself a bad-faith actor in the debt restructuring negotiations with Zambia and Ghana and in the process is exposing its unreliability and untrustworthiness as a partner to African countries. How does State Department plan to highlight this unwillingness from China to assist their African partners and how will this be used to strengthen and increase the U.S. position in Africa going forward?

Answer 4:

Department principals continue to use public and private opportunities to call for the PRC's urgent and meaningful participation in multilateral debt restructuring negotiations. In bilateral and multilateral fora, we continue to encourage debtor countries to amplify their voices through collectively calls for Beijing to uphold its G-20 commitments. The ongoing delays underscore the stark contrast with the USG's collaborative, grant-driven approach enshrined in the dozens of past and ongoing country compact and threshold programs with the Millennium Challenge Corporation.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 5:

China uses political training as a strategic tool to export its authoritarian governance style throughout Africa. The CCP funds political schools in Tanzania, Ethiopia and South Africa among others which emphasize Chinese governance and economic models. Beijing also hosts African military and political leaders regularly to cement their influence. How is the Department seeking to counter the CCP's brazen attempts to coerce the next generation of African leaders? How does the Department message the repressive nature of the CCP's illiberal political model to our African partners?

Answer 5:

The United States presents a positive, rules-based alternative and supports accountable institutions that respect human rights as cornerstones to promote democracy and good governance and counter democratic backsliding. These efforts provide the greatest opportunity to ensure the human dignity of all persons in sub-Saharan Africa is respected through equitable access to education, freedom from discrimination and violence, social resiliency, and economic opportunity, and thus serve as an example of how democracy delivers for its people.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 6:

Can you describe specifically what China hopes to achieve by using peacekeeping missions in Africa to protect and advance its interests?

Answer 6:

For the PRC, contributing People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces to UN peacekeeping operations is one of several measures it employs to support its country's engagement across the African continent to expand its foreign policy goals. The PRC gains real-world operational experience through current deployments in UN peacekeeping missions in Mali, Sudan, South Sudan, Western Sahara, and the DRC, which simultaneously score public relations points and give the PRC a stronger hand in UNSC negotiations on the mandates of these missions.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 7:

We have heard reports that Beijing has signed or is looking to sign MOUs with the UN Office on Drugs and Crime to train police forces in Africa and elsewhere. I am concerned that the UNODC will be used as a tool to legitimize the CCP's agenda of transnational repression, building on the presence and harassment tactics of Chinese Overseas Police Service stations. Are you aware of any discussions of agreements or agreements between the PRC and UNODC on law enforcement training? What are you doing to curb PRC influence on international law enforcement norms and institutions governing global law enforcement, like the UN?

Answer 7:

UNODC and the PRC signed an MOU in October 2019 regarding cooperation on implementation of the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC). We have no information to indicate the MOU has contributed to expanding networks of overseas policing.

The United States is committed to working with the UN and international organizations, including INTERPOL, to address threats to international peace and security, including PRC misuse of red notices and other acts of transnational repression.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 8:

Is the Department concerned about the potential for Beijing to gather valuable intelligence on U.S. government officials visiting Africa, or to gain an unfair commercial advantage, given Chinese companies' involvement in building so much of Africa's telecommunications infrastructure and so many sensitive government buildings? Are your employees operating in Africa aware of these vulnerabilities, and, given the heightened nature of the problem in Africa, do they receive any extra training on protecting themselves?

Answer 8:

Africa is quickly becoming the most important market for several PRC-based technology companies. Approximately twenty sub-Saharan African countries use PRC technology in some form of "smart city" presence. Another eleven use PRC surveillance equipment. These technologies enable autocratic-leaning governments to adopt the PRC's model of marrying efficiency with social control, while simultaneously providing Beijing with user data. Diplomatic Security provides counterintelligence training and guidance to all our personnel, including our staff operating in Africa.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 9

Does the Department believe that China's reduced international lending levels since 2016 are indicative of a new Chinese investment presence internationally? Or is the CCP merely utilizing new strategies for their overseas investments – such as the apparent equity approach used in Nigeria's Lekki Deep Sea Port?

Answer 9

Declining overseas PRC lending likely is in response to both global economic headwinds and greater domestic pressure to rein in high-risk overseas lending. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) remains a primary PRC foreign and economic policy platform, and BRI-linked projects will continue to attract PRC-backed financing. The PRC is expanding its strategies for overseas investment to include the equity approach. The downturn in lending from official government sources does not include data on unreported loans and credits from PRC state-owned enterprises to firms in recipient countries.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 10

In 2017 the PRC opened its first overseas military base in Djibouti, several miles away from the U.S. base Camp Lemonnier. In the following years it has been reported that the PRC may be seeking to establish additional overseas bases on the continent including in Angola, Equatorial Guinea, Kenya, Namibia, Seychelles, and Tanzania. Does the Department still hold the expectation that China is planning to open additional military bases on the African continent? If so, I would like to receive more information in a classified setting.

Answer 10

The PRC's desire to establish a military presence on the Atlantic coast of Africa is well-documented but to date has not been realized. We will continue to defend U.S. interests while working with our African partners on these issues. We are happy to provide a classified briefing on our efforts in this space.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 11

It is not true, as one frequently hears, including from the Chinese government, that the U.S. has retreated from or abandoned Africa. The U.S. has, for instance, saved tens of millions of African lives with health programs. Yet in a relatively short amount of time, China has eclipsed American influence essentially everywhere in Africa. What happened and why does the U.S. seem to derive so little influence in Africa from its initiatives? Does the State Department have a plan for better telling the story of what the U.S. has for decades done, and continues to do, for African countries?

Answer 11

As the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa makes clear, the Biden-Harris Administration is committed to deepening our engagements and partnerships with African nations. U.S influence in Africa remains strong, and 60% of Africans polled view the United States as having a positive impact on the continent, according to Afrobarometer surveys published in 2021. The State Department will continue to dedicate public diplomacy resources to telling the American story, reaching audiences – especially youth and women – in more accessible and creative ways.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 12

Given many African countries' refusal to condemn the Russian invasion of Ukraine, and their frequent, strong support at international forums for Chinese foreign policy goals, what sort of strategy, if any, does the State Department have for reversing these trends?

Answer 12:

We lead with an affirmative agenda for Africa, demonstrating the benefits of our governance and economic models. U.S. policy does not ask our partners to choose between the United States and the PRC. We are hearing from other countries that they want to deepen their relationships with the United States – without being forced to choose between us or the PRC – in ways that will help them preserve freedom of action and autonomy.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 13

Has the Department developed, or do they have access to, a comprehensive accounting of all Chinese economic, diplomatic, and military activities in Africa? If not, where are the gaps, and do those gaps impede the Department's ability to defend U.S. interests in Africa against Beijing's challenges?

Answer 13

Across the interagency, and at the Department, there are a number of efforts compiling the data you mentioned. We work closely with interagency colleagues and collaborate with likeminded allies and partners to exchange information as well as coordinate potential actions to counter PRC behaviors that threaten us or our allies militarily; to push back on the PRC's unfair economic practices that distort markets and harm American workers and businesses; to shine a light on the PRC's human rights abuses and do our part to stop them.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 14

China flaunts how it does not meddle in the domestic affairs of the African countries they invest in. By contrast our comparative advantage as Americans is that we do promote democracy and human rights values throughout the world. However, this needs to be done in a strategic manner which recognizes the values of our African partners rather than forcing our American domestic social agenda upon them – a social agenda which the African people themselves do not want. How does the Department ensure that DEI imperatives pushed from Washington do not backfire, offend and ultimately harm our relations on the continent?

Answer 14

We will continue to support democratic institutions and promote respect for human rights for all people to help states and communities foster legitimate, inclusive political systems. Further, polling conducted in countries across the continent indicates that African citizens remain committed to democracy and democratic institutions. U.S. promotion of democracy and respect for human rights is not only in our strategic interest, but also supports a future Africans themselves have identified as a priority.

**Questions for the Record Submitted to
Bureau of African Affairs, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Amy Holman by
Chairman John James (No.1 to No.15)
House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Africa
April 18, 2023**

Question 15

In 2014 President Xi stated that the CCP “should increase China’s soft power, give a good Chinese narrative and better communicate China’s messages to the world.” This coordinated strategy has underpinned Chinese economic investment in Africa in the years since then to spread pro-China and anti-US media propaganda throughout the continent. Media outlets controlled by the CCP offer African outlets cheap or free international content in order to amplify their messaging while disguising it beneath a veneer of grassroots legitimacy. What is the Department doing throughout the continent to counter these misinformation strategies and to promote free and fair media coverage?

Answer 15

The State Department offers African media outlets credible alternatives to PRC propaganda. Recently, the Global Engagement Center, in coordination with the Bureau of African Affairs, launched a project to build the capacity of foreign media outlets, diversifying sub-Saharan African information environments through access to credible wire and other news services’ content as well as equipment and training provision. This effort is in addition to the journalist training and capacity building programs the Department regularly organizes.