[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN AFRICA: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON AFRICA
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 18, 2023
__________
Serial No. 118-19
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/, http://docs.house.gov,
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
52-143PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
or http://www.govinfo.gov
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey GREGORY MEEKS, New Yok, Ranking
JOE WILSON, South Carolina Member
SCOTT PERRY, Pennsylvania BRAD SHERMAN, California
DARRELL ISSA, California GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
ANN WAGNER, Missouri WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
BRIAN MAST, Florida DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
KEN BUCK, Colorado AMI BERA, California
TIM BURCHETT, Tennessee JOAQUIN CASTRO, Texas
MARK E. GREEN, Tennessee DINA TITUS, Nevada
ANDY BARR, Kentucky TED LIEU, California
RONNY JACKSON, Texas SUSAN WILD, Pennsylvania
YOUNG KIM, California DEAN PHILLIPS, Minnesota
MARIA ELVIRA SALAZAR, Florida COLIN ALLRED, Texas
BILL HUIZENGA, Michigan ANDY KIM, New Jersey
AMATA COLEMAN-RADEWAGEN, American SARA JACOBS, California
Samoa KATHY MANNING, North Carolina
FRENCH HILL, Arkansas SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK,
WARREN DAVIDSON, Ohio Florida
JIM BAIRD, Indiana GREG STANTON, Arizona
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida MADELEINE DEAN, Pennsylvania
TOM KEAN, JR., New Jersey JARED MOSKOWITZ, Florida
MIKE LAWLER, New York JONATHAN JACOBS, Illinois
CORY MILLS, Florida SYDNEY KAMLAGER-DOVE, California
RICH MCCORMICK, Georgia JIM COSTA, California
NATHANIEL MORAN, Texas JASON CROW, Colorado
JOHN JAMES, Michigan BRAD SCHNEIDER. Illinois
KEITH SELF, Texas
Brendan Shields, Staff Director
Sophia Lafargue, Staff Director
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Subcommittee on Africa
JOHN JAMES, Chair
CHRISTOPHER SMITH, New Jersey, SARA JACOBS, California, Ranking
YOUNG KIM, California Member
JIM BAIRD, Indiana
THOMAS KEAN JR., New Jersey
CORY MILLS, Florida
SHEILA CHERFILUS-MCCORMICK,
Florida
COLIN ALLRED, Texas
JONATHAN JACKSON, Illinois
Sophia Lafargue, STAFF DIRECTOR
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Holman, Amy, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of
African Affairs, U.S. Department of State...................... 7
Waters, Rick, China Coordinator and Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for China and Taiwan, U.S. Department of State........... 11
Davis, Janean, Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Africa,
U.S. Agency for International Development...................... 14
APPENDIX
Hearing Notice................................................... 38
Hearing Attendance............................................... 40
Hearing Minutes.................................................. 41
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Responses to questions submitted for the record.................. 42
GREAT POWER COMPETITION IN AFRICA: THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
Tuesday, April 18, 2023
House of Representatives,
Subcommittee on Africa,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:32 p.m., in
room 210, House Visitor Center, Hon. John James (chairman of
the subcommittee) presiding.
Mr. James. The Committee on Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on
Africa will come to order. The purpose of this hearing is to
examine China's strategic aims in Africa and how the U.S. can
provide a positive set of alternative options that advance
interests of Africans and Americans alike.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Deputy Assistant Secretary Amy Holman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Rick Waters, and Deputy Assistant Administrator
Janean Davis, it is my pleasure to welcome you before the
Subcommittee on Africa for this hearing that follows the full
committee hearing on the Chinese Communist Party that took
place on February 28th.
I want to begin by asking for a moment of silence for the
World Food Program staff who were killed in the fighting in
Sudan.
[Moment of silence observed.]
Thank you.
But we can do much more than moments of silence. And we
intend to. Civilians must be protected. And I reiterate the
call for humanitarian cease-fire.
The renewed conflict serves as a stark reminder that this
Administration has a responsibility to take tangible action to
address terrorism and threats to peace that can metastasize and
spread to our shores. As China seeks to define a future for
Africa in its authoritarian image, the United States must stand
for principles of freedom and the rule of law.
China aims to become the preeminent economic and military
power in the world by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the
Chinese Communist Party. But thanks to America's decades of
foreign policy failures, they are ahead of schedule I fear.
President George W. Bush started two wars, one of which
violated territorial sovereignty, both of which lasted two
decades. President Obama was a deportations and drone king.
President Trump's shithole countries comment caused unnecessary
tension. And now Joe Biden has defined his Administration with
a finger wagging foreign policy that has made a mockery of the
United States on the world stage.
It is the role of Congress to hold the Administration
accountable, each Administration, to the American people. But
in the 118th Congress, it is my role to start with the Biden
Administration. We must ask the hard questions that will lead
us to more friends, stronger alliances, and mutually beneficial
future.
The 21st century has been characterized by foreign policy
blunders that China has capitalized on. And we cannot mend the
errors of the past. But we can use our influence as a
legislative body to hold the current Administration
accountable.
This hearing serves to consider how Africa views China and
how to effectively employ soft power, like U.S. technology and
foreign direct investment, to win over key partners. There are
fundamental human rights, corruption, and predatory elements
that plague the continent. These are real and substantive
issues that we need to deal with.
There is also opportunity to identify successful partners
and to deploy U.S. diplomatic development and global leadership
to advance U.S. strategic interests and ensure the mutual
benefit of African nations.
The ambitions of the CCP has for Africa are the ambitions
they have had for the United States. It is crucial we nip them
in the bud. But, again, we need friends. That is why in a world
where America is no longer the only choice we must return to
being the most desirable. We must, as Teddy Roosevelt said,
speak softly and carry a big stick. It is in our vital national
interests to ensure that when nations have a choice between
America and China they choose America first.
Beijing has consistently prioritized the African continent
and assigns it as a central role in its foreign policy. China's
foreign ministers have chosen African countries as their first
overseas trips each year since 1991. And Xi Jinping has visited
the continent four times, most recently in 2018. More must be
done by the executive to consistently engage African leaders at
the highest levels of our government.
By 2050, one in four people on the planet will be African,
making the continent home to an enormous economic and
manufacturing potential. However, currently Chinese companies
operate near monopolies in a litany of critical sectors while
committing flagrant human rights violations. In the Democratic
Republic of Congo, a country with over two-thirds of the
world's cobalt deposits, CCP-linked companies own 15 of the 19
cobalt producing mines. This provides Beijing with control over
a supply chain crucial for our economic and national security.
Ensuring that Chinese companies do not monopolize these
markets and encouraging and incentive two-way U.S. trade and
investment with Africa is a key priority of mine. Too often in
my conversations with our African partners I am told they have
had no choice but to accept Chinese bids for contracts and
concessions because there was no viable American option. The
U.S. Government must be more proactive in coming up with
measures to unleash the power of the U.S. private sector.
I was very glad to see Chairman McCaul introduce the
Prosper Africa Act last Congress on this issue. And I look
forward to working with Chairman McCaul and anyone else in
furthering this initiative.
Similarly, the African Growth Opportunity Act, AGOA, a
trade preference agreement with African countries, is up for
reauthorization in 2025. As the Subcommittee on Africa, it is
our responsibility to investigate ways to increase the
effectiveness of this program. And I look forward to hearing
you discuss how your institutions are utilizing AGOA to further
our bilateral relations around the continent.
As our African partners move away from Western colonialism,
they must know that they have our full support as partners. It
is essential that we aid their self-sufficiency and trade
efforts.
Chinese military activity in Africa has increased
significantly in the last decade. In addition to serving as the
largest troop provider to peacekeeping operations in Africa,
China employs thousands of security contractors on the
continent. In 2017, the PRC opened its first overseas military
base in Djibouti, about seven kilometers from the U.S. base in
Camp Lemonnier. I am concerned about the potential of a second
Chinese base in Africa, especially on the Atlantic coast.
In February, the PLA Navy conducted exercises with the
South African and Russian navies, along with South Africa's
East Coast. And I introduced a resolution condemning these
exercises and expressing my concern over the growing South
Africa-PRC relationship.
Ultimately, influence in Africa begins with setting a
better example at home. Both on our shores and abroad, we must
cooperate where we can and compete where we must.
Furthermore, I am incredibly worried about the CCP's effort
to export its authoritarian governance model throughout the
African continent. The success of this decades-long strategy
can be seen with the votes of African countries in
international organizations, which increasingly follow
Beijing's direction. Yet polling consistently follows that
Africans, particularly young Africans, want democratic
governance. The United States must stand with the people of
Africa and for the principles of freedom and rule of law as
China seeks to define a future for Africa in its authoritarian
image.
The PRC's claims that they do not meddle in domestic
affairs of African nations has been proven false. The CCP
targets like-minded autocratic regimes and has funded numerous
political training schools throughout the continent. Reports
indicate that there are Chinese overseas police stations in
nearly a dozen African countries. These buildings serve as
regional hubs for the CCP's United Front Department, which uses
coercive tactics to silence dissent against the CCP.
For far too long the United States has been complicit in
these human rights abuses. We are even enabling them by leaning
on the Chinese Communist Party-controlled mining in Africa. We
will never atone for the sins of slavery. But a step in the
right direction is purging our supply chains of slave labor,
particularly in critical mineral mining and electric vehicle
manufacturing. That starts by reshoring the minerals most
essential to our national defense and our economy. A Green New
Deal agenda built on the backs of black lives is worse than
virtue signaling. It is evil.
In closing, the United States must be a reliable and valued
partner to many on the African continent. But more must be done
to counter China's decades-long attempt to export its
authoritarian government's model to the continent. Turning the
tide of decades of failed foreign policies with each
Administration in the 21st century is not going to be an easy
task. But as JFK said, this will not be finished in the first
100 days. But today marks the 101st of a Republican leadership
in Congress. It is a new era. So let us begin.
The chair now recognizes the ranking member, the gentlelady
from California, Ms. Jacobs, for any statement she may have.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I echo your
sentiments regarding the World Food Program folks in Sudan and
your call for civilian lives to be protected during the
bloodshed.
Today's hearing emphasizes the importance of renewed U.S.
engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa and how it compares to that of
our competitors, with the People's Republic of China being the
focus today.
Africa has the youngest population in the world. And how we
engage on the continent and with local communities will be
remembered for decades to come. For too long the African
continent has been sidelined or neglected or seen as merely an
aid beneficiary by leaders from the West, including by the
United States. And it is incredibly important and long overdue
that we correct this.
And thankfully the Biden Administration has already taken
important steps to do that and reimagine America's relationship
in ways that avoid harmful patterns of colonialism. Last
December, the Biden Administration hosted the first U.S.-Africa
Leaders Summit since 2014 to demonstrate our commitment to a
new path forward with African countries. With this summit, the
United States committed $55 billion to the African continent
over the next 3 years in human capital, infrastructure,
agriculture, health systems, and security investments.
I particularly want to commend U.S. support for the African
Union's bid to join the G20 as a permanent member and for U.N.
Security Council reform to include an African permanent member.
Entering African States have a representative seat at the table
where they are directly impacted by the decisions we have made
on the global stage.
During this summit and the rollout of the Biden
Administration's U.S. strategy toward Sub-Saharan Africa,
President Biden has emphasized that renewed U.S. engagement
with the continent is not just through the lens of competition,
that Africa is not just a pawn in a broader geopolitical game.
Secretary Blinken has also made this clear, saying that the
United States will not dictate Africa's choices, neither should
anyone else.
While we engage in strategic competition with the PRC on
the global stage, we need to be mindful of lessons from the
cold war that unfortunately put African governments and
populations in the crosshairs and caused immense suffering as
we aligned with governments and militaries in pursuit of short-
term security gains.
Instead, we need to focus on the long-term impact of our
engagement and ensure that we play a positive role in
furthering progress on the continent, like addressing conflict,
upholding human rights, strengthening good governance, and
tackling global challenges together. Doing so helps protect
other engagements like mobilizing increased trade and
investment between the U.S. and African States.
Another important part of increased U.S. engagement with
African States is upping our game when it comes to our
diplomatic engagement and presence on the continent. We have
struggled for years to adequately staff up our embassies in the
region. And it is critical now more than ever that we address
this challenge so we can show up and engage where and when it
matters. So I look forward to working with the Biden
Administration more on all of this.
It is important to recognize China's increased engagement
on the continent and where they are fulfilling a need that the
United States isn't. But we shouldn't take everything China is
doing as an inherent threat that needs to be countered one to
one. If we do this, we can both create more space for
cooperation with China so that our engagement does not spiral
into greater conflict and allow a healthier version of
competition on the continent that actually benefits African
people and serves their interests.
I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses today
on the Biden Administration's approach to these question and
how we can truly prioritize the needs of African populations.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. James. Thank you.
Other members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
We are pleased to have a distinguished panel of witnesses
before us today on this important topic. Ms. Amy Holman is the
Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of African Affairs and
the Department of State. Thank you for joining.
Mr. Rick Waters is the China Coordinator and Deputy
Assistant Secretary of State for China and Taiwan at the
Department of State. Thank you for joining.
And Ms. Janean Davis is the Deputy Assistant Administrator
in the Bureau for Africa at the U.S. Agency for International
Development, USAID. Thank you for joining.
I appreciate you all being here. Your full statements will
be made part of the record. And I will ask each of you to keep
your spoken remarks to just 5 minutes in order to allow for
member questions and comments.
I now recognize Ms. Holman for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF AMY HOLMAN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE,
BUREAU OF AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Holman. Chairman James, Ranking Member Jacobs,
distinguished members of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee
on Africa, thank you for the opportunity to testify today and
thank you for your bipartisan focus on Africa and our Nation's
approach to the People's Republic of China in Africa.
Before we start, I would like to say a few words about the
situation in Sudan and thank the chairman for the moment of
silence for our three lost colleagues. The Secretary of State
spoke with both the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support
Forces commanders yesterday to underscore the need for an
immediate cease-fire to permit delivery of humanitarian
assistance, enable the reunification of Sudanese families, and
allow the international community in Khartoum to make sure its
presence is secure. We have also spoken with regional leaders
to encourage additional diplomatic efforts. Ensuring the safety
of our diplomatic personnel and U.S. citizens remains our
highest priority.
Moving back to the subject of today's hearing, our African
policy is about Africa, not about the PRC. The United States is
focused on building enduring partnerships with African nations,
with our diplomats engaged daily. Together we advance shared
priorities, including building an inclusive global economy,
tackling the climate crisis, creating opportunities in clean
energy, advancing democracy, promoting respect for human rights
around the world, and building lasting peace and security.
We work to improve African options, not limit them. We
strength local capacity and work with our partners to promote
economic growth that is sustainable and inclusive over the long
term. We partner with African nations to reinforce
environmental standards, protect workers' rights, combat
trafficking in persons, and support anti-corruption measures.
We work with all sectors of African society to build strong
institutions, champion democracy, and promote respect for human
rights.
At the same time, we recognize the serious challenges the
PRC presents in Africa. We counter the PRC's attempts to
project military power from Africa. We are concerned by the
unsustainable levels of debt throughout the continent and
increasing risks of debt distress.
We work to counter Beijing's information manipulation
efforts in Africa to amplify its narratives and to suppress
voices it deems critical of the PRC or the CCP. These practices
threaten the integrity of open and vibrant media ecosystems
across Africa.
The U.S.-African Leaders Summit last year and follow-on
high level visits to the continent this year demonstrate how
seriously the Administration views our relationship with
Africa.
The PRC is a strategic global competitor. We push back on
corrupt or coercive practices that undermine our shared
interests, while offering alternatives in collaboration with
our partners. We ask that everyone play by the same set of
rules. We want to ensure all countries make their own choices.
In conclusion, bipartisan action is critical. With this
subcommittee and with your colleagues across Capitol Hill, we
are confident that we can deepen U.S.-African partnerships,
raise awareness of the PRC's corrupt and coercive practices in
Africa, counter those practices, and advance our country's
national interests. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Holman follows:]
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Mr. James. Thank you, Ms. Holman.
I now recognize Mr. Waters for his opening statement.
STATEMENT OF RICK WATERS, CHINA COORDINATOR AND DEPUTY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR CHINA AND TAIWAN, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Waters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Ranking Member Jacobs,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today.
The chairman stole most of my comments, so I will be very
brief. I would say two broad things. One is that all of you are
familiar with our China strategy. And the PRC is the only
competitor with the means and the intent to reshape the
international order.
Our policy response is premised on three broad concepts.
One is to invest in ourselves in the sources of our domestic
strength and in our democracy, two, to align with our allies
and partners in an effort to find common purpose and to shape
the strategic environment around China, and three, to manage
our relationship with the PRC is a responsible way,
acknowledging that it is a fundamentally competitive and at
times adversarial relationship.
I head the Office of China Coordination, which our
secretary stood up last December to harmonize efforts across
the State Department, to help prioritize and better coordinate
a response to some of the challenges that the chairman and the
ranking member laid out.
I would highlight in the Sub-Saharan African context five
broad areas. The first is the issue of the rules-based
international order, a seemingly esoteric concept that is quite
important I think to everything from the norms and standards
that our companies and our workers face to the very norms of
sovereignty that uphold the international system. And Sub-
Saharan Africa has nearly a quarter of the votes in the U.N.
General Assembly.
You acknowledged, Mr. Chairman, the robust diplomacy the
Chinese have engaged in. We counted at least 120 senior level
visits in 15 years. We believe the PRC continues to promote its
national initiatives, its own concepts in this area, like the
Global Security and Global Development Initiative, with the
goal of reshaping this rules-based international order on terms
favorable to Beijing.
Second, in the economic realm, there are a number of
concerns ranging from critical mineral supply chains to non-
transparent PRC lending practices to illegal, unreported, and
unregulated fishing. There are real infrastructure needs on the
continent. We all acknowledge that. But the way in which these
needs are met should be free from corruption and coercion.
Third, technology, from a U.S. perspective, we support the
free flow of ideas, digital connectivity. These are
foundational bases of growth. And yet the PRC alternatives in
areas such as 5G technology and smart cities often carries
profound risks to national security, to country sovereignty, to
privacy, and to basic human rights.
Fourth, security, the chairman mentioned the PLA's first
overseas base in Djibouti. We believe the PRC is pursuing
additional facilities in Kenya, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola,
and potentially elsewhere along the Atlantic coastline. And we
have made clear in our bilateral relations and in many of our
pronouncements that a PRC military presence on the Atlantic
coast of Africa would represent a threat to our national
security.
Finally, in the informational and influence realm, there
are a number of things that we should talk about here ranging
from how the PRC is leveraging content sharing agreements,
ownership agreements with African media outlets, exchange
programs, and its own high level engagements to shape and
deliver a distorted message of the U.S.
You also mentioned extraterritorial law enforcement, the
challenge of police stations. And I would note yesterday we
took a very resolute response to the one in New York through
the Department of Justice's announcement of a number of
indictments.
So in these areas, I look forward to answering your
questions together with my colleagues on our policy response.
And thank you again for holding this hearing.
Mr. James. Thank you, Mr. Waters.
I now recognize Ms. Davis for her opening statement.
STATEMENT OF JANEAN DAVIS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR,
BUREAU FOR AFRICA, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Ms. Davis. Good afternoon, Chairman James, Ranking Member
Jacobs, and members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to be here today and for your sustained bipartisan
commitment to Africa.
As others have said, the increased presence of the People's
Republic of China in Africa, it is clear. It has invested
heavily both in terms of resources as well as diplomatic
alliances. Today China is Africa's largest trading partner. But
such headlines only tell part of the story.
The United States has long been a partner to Africa. USAID
investments have lifted 700 people from extreme poverty since
1990, dramatically reduced deaths from HIV and malaria, stopped
Ebola in its tracks, and helped the continent increase primary
school enrollment at a rate greater than any region in the
world. We invest in human capital. We provide opportunities.
And we expand democracies, amplifying African voices to choose
their own priorities.
I would like to take this time to outline a few of the
challenges PRC presents and what USAID is doing in response.
The PRC's approach to development in Africa is in direct
contrast to ours. While the PRC seeks to improve its own growth
by using Africa as its frontier market, USAID invests in the
long term, in food security, in health, in education, economic
growth, and the environment.
The PRC we know primarily offers loans for infrastructure.
And no one disputes that infrastructure is much needed
investment for Africa's growth. But the manner in which PRC
loans are negotiated and their lack of transparency continues
to raise our concerns. Many of the PRC's loan contracts have
non-disclosure provisions that can lead to African public debt,
sustainability concerns, when PRC-funded fail to generate the
promised economic returns.
In the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, Russia's full-scale
invasion of Ukraine, and the global economic downturn, climbing
interest rates have brought many borrowers in Africa to
economic distress. PRC loan provisions complicate the ability
for borrower countries to negotiate with lenders and reach
long-term economic sustainability.
But our goal today is not to compare the U.S. to China. It
is to underscore the U.S.'s enduring partnerships and continued
investments in Africa because these investments matter. They
demonstrate a model of development that is empowering and that
truly delivers for the people of Africa. Through continent-wide
initiatives like you mentioned, Prosper Africa, as well as
Power Africa, USAID is driving investment, trade, and
structural changes that offer better alternatives to the PRC
approach.
As home to the world's largest free trade area and a young,
technologically savvy population, Africa offers tremendous
opportunities for prosperity on both sides of the Atlantic.
Since launching Prosper Africa in June 2019, the U.S.
Government has helped close 1,100 deals across 49 countries at
an estimated value of $65 billion in two-way trade and
investment. Prosper Africa has built a partner network of over
1,000 organizations, with nearly 500 more deals in the pipeline
valued at an estimated $25 billion. By 2025, Prosper Africa
plans to invest $171 million to boost African exports and U.S.
investment by $2 billion.
In addition, Power Africa promotes private sector trade and
investment in the Sub-Saharan electricity sector. Since its
launch in 2013, USAID has focused on the importance of contract
negotiations and provided one of the initial grants to the
African Legal Support Facility, which helps countries
strengthen their ability to negotiate contracts. It has built
unparalleled trust with African governments and has enabled
them to obtain favorable deals and more durable contracts.
Power Africa helps African partner countries diversify
supply in export markets, create pro-growth regulatory
frameworks, and develop and join regional markets. Power Africa
also helps an energy planning process that results in
competitive, fair, and transparent procurements for energy
infrastructure.
We are not just focused on trade and energy. USAID is
investing in people. Through Feed the Future and through our
health and health systems, today PEPFAR supports lifesaving
antiretroviral treatment for over 20 million people in Africa
compared to 50,000 in 2003.
In conclusion, our world is at an inflection point. Africa
is a major geopolitical and rising economic player. And our
partnership is built on peace, cooperation, and individual
dignity. Thank you for your continued support of USAID's work
in Africa. We look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Davis follows:]
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Mr. James. Thank you, Ms. Davis. Right on time.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes of questioning.
I am piggybacking on those comments. There is a lot to be
proud of. But I am going to start with you, Ms. Davis. You
mentioned PEPFAR and Prosper and Power and those all phenomenal
investments. And we look to reauthorize, redouble, and reassert
our commitment to those.
But for right now, I would like to ask you about AGOA, the
African Growth Opportunity Act. In 2000, that is a trade
preferential program that we used to increase exports from the
continent to the United States. In 2022, a third of total U.S.
imports from Africa were through this program, massive.
However, the total value of AGOA trade has decreased from a
peak of a little bit over $56 billion in 2008 down to about $6
billion in 2021.
As we look forward to reauthorizing AGOA, can you describe
some of the technical assistance that USAID provides
specifically for AGOA implementation, as well as for trade
capacity building, funding efforts through Africa more
generally?
Ms. Davis. Thank you for the question and for the
recognition of AGOA. I will defer to my colleagues at USTR, the
U.S. Office of, U.S. Trade Representative to comment
specifically on the AGOA reauthorization, as they are the USG
lead on that reauthorization.
But your question around technical assistance that USAID is
providing, our trade and investment programs have been the
primary platform for two-way trade for over two decades,
including through AGOA. And as you recognized, that volume has
increased substantially from, it has grown by 25 percent from
2000 to 2019.
Our technical assistance, looking at both the value as well
as the volume of that growth, is really working with partner
governments to help them develop their national implementation
strategies and to expand those such strategies. We also build
capacities within key ministries within African countries, at
the border crossings, as well as at critical supports.
Mr. James. Where are the gaps? And how can we do better?
Ms. Davis. Sure. Some of the places where we can do better
right now that is an area focus is really looking at the
challenges that we see countries having with AGOA procedures
and regulations, accessing new sources of capital, connecting
with U.S. buyers and investments. Those are three of the key
areas that we are focused on primarily right now to continue to
grow that volume and value that you mentioned.
Mr. James. Thank you.
For Ms. Holman, the Belt and Road Initiative has leveraged
China's cooperative advantage, excuse me, competitive advantage
in sectors like construction services to increase its economic
footprint in Africa. Why hasn't Africa participated in the
supply chain initiative given the threats to competitive system
of global trade and its opportunities for U.S. businesses to
grow? What are the primary hurdles for these U.S.-based
companies to conduct additional business on the continent? And
how can we help?
Ms. Holman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for that question.
There are considerable hurdles for U.S. businesses being
interested in Africa. This is an area that I have invested
considerable amounts of time in episodically over the past 10
to 15 years.
U.S. companies tend to trade where the terrain is most
familiar, which would be, first of all, domestically, and then
the NAFTA countries, Canada and Mexico. We have had, in
conjunction with USAID, the Department of Commerce, and USTR,
numerous events to encourage companies to invest in Africa. Our
embassies are very committed to encouraging any companies that
wish to trade or invest with Africa.
And we were very encouraged by the oversubscribed U.S.-
Africa Business Summit on day two of the African Leaders Summit
where U.S. companies inked some $15 billion worth of deals. And
we are systematically following up on those deals as an
interagency team to see that our companies get the best deals
possible that they can and that those deals come to fruition.
We also work with African countries to make sure that there
is a level playing field. As I said in my oral statement, we
want everyone to play by the same set of rules. And that means
encouraging U.S. companies and countries who want to receive
them for those countries to have a level playing field and for
the international financial institutions and our own U.S.
Government programs to encourage that level playing field.
Thank you.
Mr. James. So basically everything. Thank you. I appreciate
that.
I now recognize Ranking Member Jacobs for 5 minutes.
Ms. Jacobs. Well, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to fixing
everything with you.
Thank you to our witnesses for testifying again. So as a
framing question for this conversation, I want to discuss the
ways we can approach strategic competition on the continent in
a responsible and healthy way and how we avoid the unhealthy
forms of competition.
During the cold war, the United States partnered with
autocratic regimes in exchange for strategic alignments,
spurring violence and increased civil war in the process. So as
the Biden Administration is engaging in competition with the
PRC on the continent, I think it is incredibly important that
we are doing so in a way that considers the lessons learned
from the cold war and prioritizes long-term interests, like
good governance, democracy, human rights.
So, Deputy Assistant Secretary Holman, Deputy Assistant
Secretary Waters, how is the State Department thinking about
these lessons and ensuring we are not engaging in this kind of
unhealthy competition or race to the bottom?
Mr. Waters. Thank you, Ranking Member Jacobs.
Look, the lessons of history are not lost on us. I think
part of the reason that we have spent much of the past few
months reorganizing the way that we handle the issue of PRC
strategic competition at the State Department is to bring
together the resources in the building across the enterprise
that have looked at similar challenges historically.
And so I think, you know, what you see behind me with
Lauren, Charles, and Kendra, our team who are here who do all
of the real work, is a reflection of the fact that we are
trying to approach strategic competition globally in a manner
that is I think in accordance with what, the spirit of what you
are saying.
Now, I will defer to Amy about how we are prioritizing it
within the Sub-Saharan African region.
But I will say that in terms of our overall approach this
is a competitive relationship. It does have adversarial
dimensions. But when we talk about how we engage the Chinese,
including with our allies and partners, we have put a premium
on recognizing that there are still areas of competition or
areas where interests align where we have to work together,
issues like food security, global climate change, macroeconomic
stability. It is just a reality that we have to do that.
And even in areas where the interests are adversarial, we
are trying to keep channels open so that we can talk
responsibly about our differences, because I do think that is
what the American people and also our allies and partners
expect of us.
Ms. Holman. Thank you, Ranking Member Jacobs, for that
question.
I think what we have been doing over the past 2 years is
really building partnerships. If you look at what we said in
the Africa strategy, if you look at how we designed and the
work that went into designing the African Leaders Summit where
we did listening tours, we worked with the AU, who worked with
another subset of countries. We worked very closely with the
embassies here in Washington. We wanted to hear what the
Africans want out of these partnerships.
And I think that, it is a two-way conversation, which I
think is a big difference from what I read about during the
cold war, because I wasn't, you know, I wasn't--I was around
for it, but I wasn't really, I wasn't part of government,
except for the very, very tiny, little end piece.
And what we heard from the Africans were a number of
different concerns. One is peace and security. We see that
concern playing out in Sudan today and in other parts of Sub-
Saharan Africa.
We see with the inclusion of the African Business Summit is
day No. 2 that economics and building a partner, you know, and
building a strong economic partnership is very important to
them. They want to have choices. We do not want to make people
choose.
And then we have the whole basket of governance issues that
dovetail with peace and security, that governments are very
concerned about how to provide services to their people,
particularly when they do not have peace and security
throughout their country. So we have looked at different tools
for that.
The Global Fragility Act that was passed recently, we are
very excited about that, about having long-term plans and long-
term money so that everything isn't just done on an annual
basis so that we can make progress in all the areas that both
you and the chairman of the committee highlighted. We also look
at the basket of climate and environmental issues, which are
equally important to the Africans.
I will leave it at that. Thank you.
Ms. Jacobs. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. James. The chair now recognizes Congressman Mills for 5
minutes.
Mr. Mills. Thank you. I appreciate you guys being here
today and answering all these questions. I am going to get them
quickly.
How is the Minerals Security Partnership working in
countries like the DRC? And what is being done to support
Congolese partners to increase economical security, increase
economic diversification, and in exploitation by opportunists?
Ms. Holman. I guess that one is mine. Thank you,
Representative Mills, for that question. I spend a lot of my
time trying to figure out exactly how to address those
concerns.
On the Minerals Security Partnership, we are always looking
for the kinds of projects throughout Sub-Saharan Africa, in
fact, throughout the world, that will respond to the governance
criteria that are inherent in this partnership. In order for a
project to qualify, there must be a number of conditions,
responsible stewardship of the natural environment,
consultative and participatory process with local communities,
and safe, fair, inclusive, and ethical working conditions.
And at this time, although we do look for opportunities and
Amos Hochstein is heading up our efforts in that category, we
haven't found a project that has brought all of these
qualifications together. We continue to look. We continue to
work.
We continue to work very actively with the government of
the Democratic Republic of Congo to improve its business
climate. We understand that they are working to, at using the
Millennium Challenge Corporation criteria as a guideline to
guide their efforts to move forward so that we can establish
the kind of business environment that will make U.S. companies
want to go in and take advantage of the considerable
opportunities that exist in the DRC both in the mining sector
and outside the mining sector. This is an active part of
Administration activities. But it is difficult, and we haven't
seen fruits.
We do have Minerals Security Partnerships in Angola,
Malawi, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda, as well as here in
the United States and in Canada as well, in our efforts to
break the PRC domination of supply chains in the kinds of
minerals that we need to have a clean energy economy throughout
the world. Thank you.
Mr. Mills. Thank you.
And just following up on that, to also counter Chinese
corruption and abuse, it is critical that elections later this
year in the DRC are free and fair and on time. Credible
democratic outcome in Zambia has led to a sea change, I'm
sorry, has led to a sea change there. And in DRC, what is the
State Department doing to ensure candidates are able to run
without intimidation or interference?
Ms. Holman. Thank you very much for that question. When I
am not thinking about the conflict in the eastern DRC or how to
get more economic opportunity, we are thinking on elections.
The government of the DRC has already pledged that they
will be doing elections on time. We continue to encourage them,
along with our like-minded partners, to ensure that these
elections are free, fair, and transparent, in addition to being
on time. And we will be looking at the results very carefully.
Our friends at USAID were able to act quickly early last
year to provide almost $24 million in election assistance so
that we could be able to disperse that election assistance in a
timely manner. If we do it 2 months before the elections, it is
not useful.
And we really appreciate your interest and ongoing support
in this area. Thank you.
Mr. Mills. Thank you so much. I really appreciate your
time.
With that, I yield back.
Mr. James. Thank you, Congressman Mills.
The chairman now recognizes Congressman Allred for 5
minutes.
Mr. Allred. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thanks to our
witnesses for being here.
I had the honor of being part of the Presidential
delegation to the inauguration of Kenyan President Ruto last
September, led by our capable trade rep, Katherine Tai. And
while I was there, I was struck by the desire for further
engagement with us, but also I think some of the fatigue over
some of the PRC's actions.
And we have had a number of hearings on PRC activity around
the world. But particularly in Africa, I think we have to
always keep track of what I think you discussed in your
testimony, Ms. Davis, regarding the strengths that we bring to
the table, what we do far better than them. Obviously there are
things that, engagements that we want to increase, but to
remember basically who we are and that we want to be the best
partner we can be, that, yes, there is a competitive nature to
it, Mr. Waters, but there is also, of course, a capacity
building that I think is important and that only we can do
really in a lot of way and that I think is, particularly when
we met with Kenyan youth, that is the direction they want to
go, right.
And we also, of course, in December had, there was a
roundtable hosted by the trade rep on AGOA. And just for you
all's kind of information, there were trade ministers from
pretty much every major country on the continent there. And
they raised concerns with us helping us boost their productive
capacity, complying with our food safety regulations, and
decreasing utilization among smaller and less developed
countries. I know that is not directly in your wheelhouse. But
it is going to come to us in terms of reauthorizing AGOA.
And I do think that USAID has announced recently the Africa
Localization Initiative to direct more funding to local
organizations based in Sub-Saharan Africa. And I was wondering,
Deputy Assistant Administrator Davis, what the status of that
is, that initiative is and why this locally led approach is so
important for our strategy as you see it on the continent.
Ms. Davis. Thank you. I appreciate the question.
So the Localization Initiative, there are currently 12
countries that are across Sub-Saharan Africa that are part of
the initiative. The current status, they have completed their
strategic documents outlining their plans and efforts to expand
those plans.
We are also currently engaged in a budget exercise to
realign, to identify additional resources to help support
localization. We have a goal to establish a mechanism that
allows us to provide increased capacity building in a more
sustained way to allow these local organizations to do business
with us directly.
Finally, it is important to note that while there are 12
countries in this specific localization initiative, it is just
one piece of our broader localization agenda, where across all
of our countries we are emphasizing the importance of
identifying new and local partners to expand our work, and as
you said, just capture what we do best on the continent. Thank
you.
Mr. Allred. I think it is an exciting program.
One of the issues that they continually raised, the trade
ministers at the roundtable in December, was the, trying to
attract more foreign investment, attract American investment.
And I noted to them in that discussion that, you know,
stability and, you know, consistency are, you know, fundamental
for attracting our investment.
And I am concerned with the State of democracy, of course,
on the continent and want to know, and really see us do more to
be helpful in improving conditions there. But only about 5
percent of our USAID and State-led assistance programs deal
with democracy, human rights, and governance. And I am
wondering, Deputy Assistant Administrator Davis, if USAID has
any plans for increasing the funding in that area or for
requesting more in that area or focusing more on that area?
Ms. Davis. Thank you, Congressman. The simple answer is
yes.
So in the 2024 request for Africa, the request is 440.3
million, which is almost $170 million increase, 63 percent
increase over our Fiscal Year levels for democracy, human
rights, and government, and governance. We recognize the
importance of that work and as USAID continues to focus our
messaging on Democracy Delivers and the criticality of that. So
we will continue to work with you, with your support, to expand
and deepen the impact of our democracy programs. Thank you.
Mr. Allred. Thank you.
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. James. Thank you, Congressman Allred.
I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
Mr. Waters, you mentioned the CCP and their overseas police
stations and how within 24 hours cracked down on one in New
York. That should be scary for everyone.
The CCP has designs on everywhere in the globe and
dominating economically and from a military standpoint
everywhere, not just in Africa but in the United States of
America.
There are over 100 overseas police stations throughout the
world, which it uses to coordinate tracking and harassing of
PRC dissidents, what Beijing refers to as United Front work.
Reports indicate that these stations exist in nearly a dozen
countries throughout Africa and, again, most importantly, in
our own country, on our own shores.
Two questions. One, what is the department doing to expose
and push back against these egregious infringement on national
sovereignty for ourselves and our allies by the CCP? And
question two, is there any cross-talk between verticals,
between departments to leverage the lessons learned so that we
can identify, define, and eliminate any threats to ourselves or
allies?
Mr. Waters. Mr. Chairman, thank you for the question. I
think this is one of the most important areas that we have been
engaged on in the counter-influence realm.
The Safeguard Defenders report that I think you are
referencing, this report that came out last year identifying a
problem that we have long been aware of, the problem of
transnational law enforcement within our borders, within the
borders of dozens of countries, is an issue that we have been
working to respond to in two ways.
One is through our public diplomacy and through our private
diplomatic channels. We have been engaged in a pretty extensive
effort to share what we know and to develop the tools and
response options that are most effective to this unique aspect
of China's influence agenda.
The second piece of our response really is in law
enforcement channels. And there I will defer to the Department
of Justice. But I think in the statement they issued yesterday,
the indictments against 44 Chinese nationals and a few others
in New York, I think DOJ made clear that we will be resolute in
responding to transnational law enforcement within our own
borders.
Mr. James. Thank you, Mr. Waters.
The chair now recognizes Congressman Jackson for 5 minutes.
Mr. Jackson. Thank you very much, Chairman James.
I have had the privilege of going to Kenya just the other
week and went to the front lines to see the starvation that is
going on in the camps that are now bordering Kenya that are
now, its recipients are the refugees who are now coming into
Kenya. So, for example, in that region you have got Sudan,
Somalia, Uganda, DRC, Ethiopia all merging in on Kenya
specifically.
And I was hoping that we could be more specific when we are
talking about the largest landmass in the world. So I am just
little bit concerned about the generality of speaking of Africa
and Africans as if they are a monolithic group, that I think in
order to be more specific and to be more beneficial we have to
talk about what are our priorities and where are we going. But
there are over 1,000 dialects of derivatives of the language of
Swahili. There is French. There is Spanish. There is English.
It seems like we need a room full of people to talk about
the continent, besides the Chinese are very specific on roads
initiatives, ports initiative, mining initiatives. And somehow
I feel as if we are talking down to the entire continent as if
we have to manage their affairs and not simply align ourselves
with what their interests are and with their self-
determination.
One of the things I would like to know more about, if it is
in your portfolio, is how the Forex market, the exchange rates
are now crippling, indebting the markets. The Kenyan shilling
was 115 to the dollar 90 days ago. Now it is 145 to the dollar,
which has put the debt burden on them. They have lost 20
percent of their purchasing power because of actions from our
Federal Reserve.
I do not know which of you could address on how the
capricious winds of our foreign exchange markets affect these
developing countries and continually make them reset their
economies.
Well, I wouldn't expect, but maybe another time. But that
is something to consider. The Kenyan economy is three trillion
shillings. And now they are spending 300 billion in their
shillings. And they have lost 20 percent purchasing power
because of being connected to the dollar. But I think in our
context we should make that clear, that these countries are
emerging and what exactly is our deal.
Another deal specifically in Kenya is that the last time I
was there was 6 years ago. And there is a road that goes from
the airport in Mombasa, in Nairobi to downtown. I would have to
leave 2 hours in advance to get to the airport. I was into the
airport in 15 minutes. And that specifically was built by the
Chinese. But it wasn't indebtedness. It was a build, operate,
and transfer after 25-year agreement.
So I think we should also let members know that the Chinese
are coming in with some creative financing, that some of their
projects are not adding to indebtedness, and they are building,
operating, and transferring it over as a matter of practice.
And last on that point, Chairman James, is the contract was
led for Nairobi to Mombasa, a road project to U.S. contractors
that we have had for 10 years and haven't executed on it, which
is one of the most heavily trafficked roads in the entire
world, that we need to figure out how do we execute and not
conversate with African nations. They are open for business.
And they are rational people. And they are working with people
that are shovel ready, finance ready, that do not have the
legacy of colonialization in Africa that want to go forward. So
that was a comment.
Ms. Holman. Thank you, Representative, for your thoughtful
comments.
On the Kenyan economic situation, we will need to take that
back. Although I have also had the very positive experience of
the new Chinese roadway in downtown Nairobi, the status of the
Mombasa-Nairobi road and whether a U.S. contractor has been
able to execute a contract, I will need to take that back. But
thank you for your thoughtful comments.
Mr. James. The chairman now recognizes Congresswoman
Cherfilus-McCormick for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Recently I traveled with the Vice President, Kamala Harris,
to Ghana during her trip to Africa, to the African continent
earlier this month. And during that trip, she made several
historic commitments and announced further U.S. investments and
partnerships.
One of the announcements included the intent to invest more
than 100 million to support conflict prevention efforts in
coastal West Africa through the Global Fragility Act. The
assistance includes programs to help strengthen economic
development and increase governance and resilience in at-risk
neighborhoods. In addition to that, we talked about Ghana's
inability to pay back that loan and restructuring.
So my real question is how are we positioning ourselves to
be good neighbors and help the Western African nations become
more sustainable, instead of the loans that China is providing,
which actually causes a dependency. So, Deputy Assistant
Administrator Davis, could you please discuss the strategic
importance of making these investments now?
Ms. Davis. Thank you very much, Congresswoman. I just most
recently came back as mission director in Ghana. So I
appreciate the context of the question.
I think the importance and the urgency of making these
investments under Global Fragility Act under our strategy to
prevent conflict and promote stability, the urgency is now, not
only because of the continued spread in violent extremism, but
as you are saying, this is a moment where our country
government, the African country governments are seeking out
increased opportunity.
They recognize that addressing these issues will require an
integrated approach, as the Vice President highlighted, between
defense diplomacy and development. And now that we have that
agreement, it is our moment to build on it.
So it is a strategic opportunity for us to provide
transparent mechanisms for them to access these resources, and
referring to the Congressman's statement, making sure that we
allow our African partners to take the lead in defining their
own needs and tailoring our offerings to the needs of those
countries. Thank you.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Now, have we had an opportunity
to have an implementation plan that would make sure that all of
these dollars are actually invested, because we have a lot of
announcements, but when we look back to see the oversight, was
it actually invested, how much of it was invested, sometimes we
fall short? So have we evolved to that State where we are
looking at what is actually going to be invested in
implementation?
Ms. Davis. Thank you. Yes. So particular to the Global
Fragility Act, we just recently approved the 10-year
implementation plans, which will define those, which define
those specific investments.
But, again, it is also just important to acknowledge that
this contributes to our broader portfolio and our overall
oversight of making sure that our investments are put forward
to their intended use. So we will continue that process for all
of our resources and apply them as we look at implementation of
the Global Fragility Act.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. And also, as we are looking at
creating economic opportunities for the diaspora or African
Americans in this country, or even Americans who want to
participate since it is a public-private partnership, is there
a clear pathway for any entrepreneurs who would want to engage
to get an opportunity to participate?
Ms. Davis. Thank you. Yes. USAID is working very closely to
increase opportunities for U.S. businesses. In particular, we
are currently in the process of creating our diaspora strategy
to make sure that we have a strategic, intentional approach to
engage members of the African diaspora as well. So, yes, it is
an important part of our response.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much.
Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. James. Thank you.
I now recognize myself for 5 minutes.
This question is for all of our witnesses. The American
private sector is probably the single most potent tool that we
must use in our competition in Africa with China. I represent
the 10th congressional District from Michigan, the No. 1
manufacturing district in America and the best district in the
world. But we are hugely underutilized.
What are State and USAID doing specifically to better
incentivize and facilitate U.S. private sector involvement in
Africa? Do our partners in Africa see the difference between
Chinese State-owned enterprise standards and those provided by
the U.S. and our allies?
Mr. Waters. Mr. Chairman, I'll mention a few thoughts at a
global level on our China policy. And then I'll defer to my
colleagues on the Africa-specific portion.
The point you make, I think, is a very fundamental one that
ultimately we have a different model as we know. One that our
greatest strengths are derived from the private sector, from
manufacturing districts like your own.
And I think that what we have seen of the Chinese overseas
model is a reflection of State industrial policy. Of a
centrally driven approach through the Belt and Road Initiative
that has, you know, in many areas produced real infrastructure
gains on the ground, but at a certain cost.
And I do think that where we are trying to add
competitiveness to our public/private sector partnerships is in
areas like the President's Global Infrastructure Initiative,
which was announced last year. This is a public/private, you
know, cooperative mobilization for which we're trying to
mobilize $200 billion of the $600 billion commitment.
We've also worked with many of your predecessors on
improving the ability of our existing tools, the Development
Finance Corporation, even smaller tools that may sound
esoteric, but I think they do matter to the private sector
here.
The Transaction Advisory Fund, the International
Transaction Advisory Network, these are tools that help third
countries understand what high standards mean. And in some
areas, these tools that we have put on the table are actually
ways of facilitating private sector involvement.
So, again, these resources are in many cases available at a
global level. But I'll defer to my colleagues on how
specifically in the sub-Saharan African region, we're trying to
mobilize private sector development and support.
Ms. Davis. Thank you, Chairman. We are committed to our
continued emphasis on public/private partnerships. And as we
discussed even during the U.S.-Africa Leader Summit, the
commitments that were made in the business fora, and following
through on those commitments to build some of those
partnerships.
I'll recognize time, but just a few examples of what we've
done most recently through Prosper Africa. Just over the past
month with Prosper Africa, we've announced 14 private sector
investment partnerships in Kenya, valued at more than $150
million. That was facilitated through Feed the Future as well
as Prosper Africa.
We supported the close of a $274 million investment in
partners with major financial institutions in the U.S. to
include Bank of America, Brean Capital, Bank of New York, along
with DFC.
We also launched the Prosper Africa Tech for Trade Alliance
that's looking at, through a partnership with major U.S.
companies, a focus on e-commerce and digital trade and works
with members such as Cargill, Google, MasterCard, Visa.
So just some examples of what we've been working on over
the past month. But, broadly speaking, as DAS Waters has
mentioned, we're continuing to look at new and better ways to
support that engagement and to respond to the needs to make
sure that two-way trade and investment becomes a reality. Thank
you.
Ms. Holman. I'd like to add a bit of a view from on the
ground in Africa and how our U.S. Embassies in many countries
work to make U.S. company participation in those economies a
reality.
From 2019 to 2021, I was the Deputy Chief of Mission, the
Number Two, at our Embassy in Dakar, Senegal. Dakar is a bit of
an interesting market. It's a very, very emerging economy.
It's francophone, so that there's an additional, an
additional disincentive to some U.S. companies for coming in.
But we spent 3 years to walk a $100 million electric
transmission line installation deal over the finish line.
We worked closely with the U.S. company, a small and medium
company located in the Chicago, Illinois area. We worked with
EXIM to make sure that the government of Senegal got the
flexibilities it needed.
This took a lot of retail diplomacy, as I like to put it,
with constant calls and interfaces with both the company, the
government, and EXIM back in Washington.
We also worked with Bechtel to do a $4 billion road. That
one is still underway, because the government of Senegal would
change the terms of the--you know, change the terms of the
contract. They would not want to move as quickly as Bechtel was
willing to work.
We still thought it was a worthwhile process. It was a way
for us to counter China, because in many of these cases, from
the Embassy perspective on the ground, the major competitor is
China.
And even though--and this has been a worry for us that just
did not start with the inauguration of the Biden
Administration.
This is something that many of us have been watching over
the past five to 10 years and figuring out how to use the
resources of our export financing, the resources on the ground
of our Embassy with very committed people, to see American
companies ink deals.
And to put this, and to put this out there, when Secretary
Pompeo visited Senegal in 2020, and then again when Secretary
Biden visited in 2021, we put economic opportunities for U.S.
businesses very much at the center of the visit.
We also supported, for example, a wave of small
entrepreneurial U.S.-backed companies----
Mr. James. Thank you, ma'am. Take a breath. A little bit
over time.
Ms. Holman. Yes.
Mr. James. The Chairman would now like to recognize the
Congresswoman Kamlager-Dove for 5 minutes.
Ms. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I actually want to
thank you for allowing me to participate in this hearing. I
deeply appreciate it. And thank you to the witnesses here
today.
You know, I just have to share that, I think for far too
long, Africa has been an afterthought in U.S. foreign policy
seen through a reductive lens of security issues and
humanitarian issues. And the United States has treated Africa
as a region full of challenges and devoid of opportunities.
But that has overlooked the reality, as has been Stated,
that Africa is the world's youngest, fastest growing continent.
And it will play a major role in the shaping of the future. It
probably is the future.
Africa's growth opportunities, new markets, and political
alliances carry enormous heft on the international stage,
whether we acknowledge it or not.
When Africa's influence was leveraged to advance PRC
interests through the continent's voting power at the United
Nations, its demand for infrastructure and communications
technology, and its entrepreneurial youth population, the
United States was left scrambling. It was our refusal to view
African countries as mutually beneficial partners, and our
consequent inactivity in the region that created the vacuum for
the PRC influence that we see today.
You know, I think we have convinced ourselves that we are
the most important partner to the continent of Africa, rather
than acknowledging the reality that maybe our bargaining acumen
is too pedestrian in 2023.
So my question for Deputy Assistant Administrator Davis,
and Deputy Assistant Secretary Holman is, if you can provide an
update on the current status of the African Continental Free
Trade Area implementation, and how State and U.S. aid are
supporting our African partners in realizing this agreement?
Ms. Davis. Thank you. Thank you for that commentary. And I
think, as we've discussed in the opening with this, with our
new strategy toward sub-Saharan Africa, really recognizing the
importance of engaging Africa as partners.
The AfCFTA Partnership in particular, opening up has
created, again, continued opportunities for us to invest in
Africa. We at USAID are working as, to use AfCFTA to continue
to improve those negotiated markets, as you've mentioned.
And, I think, we're recognizing that it's another tool and
opportunity for us to build on. I'll turn to my State colleague
to say more about the status.
Ms. Kamlager-Dove. And I'm going to ask that you keep your
comments succinct.
Ms. Holman. We continue to watch the implementation over
the free trade area. Again, this is a difficult area for many
of our African partners to implement the very technical
regulations that are involved in this.
It will be a great boon for our companies to be able to
trade across an entire area once it's implemented.
Ms. Kamlager-Dove. Thank you. I guess I'm just going to ask
that we continue to get our act together as it relates to the
kind of relationship we want to forge with the entire continent
of Africa.
You know, right now 48 percent of the countries in Africa
could be home to 90 percent of the world's poor by 2030. And 20
percent of the world's 38 countries that are in fragile
conflict-affected situations, are on the continent of Africa.
And we need to see all of the countries on that continent
as potential partners rather than as pawns in a competitive
game that we are playing with China. Where you can be
competitive, you can be economically diplomatic.
And you can recognize the history of the continent and the
new kind of relationship we want to forge with the entire
continent, in order to reach goals that are mutually beneficial
and that support self-determination and the actualization of
the continent.
Mr. Chair, I yield back.
Mr. James. Thank you. The Chairman now recognizes
Congressman Kean for 5 minutes.
Mr. Kean. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would first like to
thank all of our witnesses for being here with us today, and
for the important work that they do.
The CCP's involvement in Africa has become a testing ground
for the export of its governance and economic molds. It's part
of the broader vision to rewrite global political norms.
Mr. Waters and Ms. Holman, as American industry undergoes
an energy transition in the coming decades, it is estimated
that global demand for cobalt will increase more than
twentyfold relative to 2020 levels.
If tomorrow's economy will depend on cobalt, so will
tomorrow's military. The mineral is essential for fighter jet
components, precision munitions, stealth technology, and much,
much more.
My understanding that the Democratic Republic of Congo
counts for over two-thirds of global cobalt production. And
that 15 of 19 cobalt producing mines in the DRC are owned and
operated by the Chinese.
This Chinese monopoly is concerning both for the control
that provides Beijing a supply chain, integral to our economy
and national security, and because of the gross human rights
and child labor violations which occur in these Chinese run
mines.
To combat these economic human rights and national security
concerns, how would you recommend the U.S. consider or
reconsider its approach to the Congo's cobalt and other rare
earth minerals?
And should they be viewed as strategic assets that need to
be stockpiled as part of the surreptitious core U.S. access to
in an emergency situation? What are your insights?
Ms. Holman. Thank you, Representative Kean for that
thoughtful commentary and questions. In terms of whether these
minerals should be stockpiled, that's not really under the
purview of the Bureau of African Affairs. So I would defer to
other inter-agency colleagues on that.
In terms of what we're seeing in the DRC, under the PGII
Initiative we are looking for ways to diversify the cobalt
supply chain. We're looking for cobalt mines that could
possibly be acquired under, you know, by either U.S. companies,
or by other like-minded partners.
We recognize that this is a considerable concern for the
reasons that you've raised. Thank you.
Mr. Kean. Also, Ms. Holman, as you're aware, this
Subcommittee has introduced legislation that calls out the
African National Conference's corruption in South Africa, and
use of nonalignment to justify increasingly close ties with
China and Russia, as seen in the war games conducted off the
South African coast, all the while taking for granted the
relationship of the United States.
What does the Department of State doing to reinforce
relations with our partners in South Africa and to deter future
CCP and Russian engagement?
And the conversation would be to the, the question would be
to the entire panel regarding how are we working to deter
Russian and Chinese engagement in the African continent?
Ms. Holman. Thank you for that question, Representative. On
the South African, Chinese, Russian military exercises that
were recently concluded, we share your concerns entirely and
have expressed them to the government of South Africa.
We had conducted military exercises with them in 2022. And
we were quite troubled to see that these exercises were going
forward.
In terms of what we're doing to counter China and Russia, I
think that was the question on the continent, we have a, you
know, we recognize that both countries, per our--represent a
considerable risk to individual countries, to governance, and
to in certain cases, to the U.S. itself.
So we have undertaken a number of efforts, whether it's
facing, whether it's diversification of the critical mineral
supply chain through partnerships and encouraging investment,
to counter these threats.
Mr. Kean. Thank you. I yield back my time.
Mr. James. Thank you, Mr. Kean. The Chairman now recognizes
Congresswoman Cherfilus-McCormick.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much, Chair. I just
wanted to followup with some questions. One of the
announcements was the U.S.-Tanzania Bilateral Development
Partnership, a 5-year, approximately $1.1 billion assistance
agreement between the USAID and the government of Tanzania to
advance their development priorities.
Once again, my question is for Deputy Assistant
Administrator Davis. Why are investments like these strategic,
strategically important for us?
And also is there any development with the implementation
plan?
Ms. Davis. Thank you for the question. On the specific
agreement with Tanzania, my team will have to get back to you
to get a sense of the status.
I think the second part of your question of why they're
important, goes to the core of a lot of our discussion today,
in terms of creating those opportunities and providing options,
and allowing the African countries to identify options that
best meet their needs, such as the announcement in Tanzania.
But we'll be happy to followup to get that specific status
for you.
Mrs. Cherfilus-McCormick. Thank you so much. Mr. Chairman,
I yield back.
Mr. James. Thank you. The Chairman now recognizes Mrs. Kim
for 5 minutes.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you, Chairman James, for holding this very
important hearing on CCP's influence on the Africa Continent.
And I want to thank all the witnesses for your testimony and
attending and answering all of our questions today.
You know, Chinese economic activity and investment
throughout Africa has been directly linked to environmental
degradation and has created public health emergencies
throughout the continent.
For example, since 2014, Ethiopia-Somalia-Ogaden region has
seen thousands die from mysterious disease in the areas
surrounding a Chinese government-linked natural gas plant,
which has poisoned the drinking water supply.
Coordinator Waters, can you please speak to how your
department plans to hold China accountable for the negative
impact of their investments in Africa and local communities?
And how you will pressure PRC to abide by international
environmental protection and labor laws?
Mr. Waters. Representative Kim, thank you for the question.
This is a very complicated topic. And I think, you know, at a
general level what I would say is, one element of our response
to the challenge China presents in many domains is simply
transparency.
It's shining a spotlight on practices, whether they're
related to corruption, environmental degradation. I will say
that in this area, you know, we face a very big challenge to be
honest.
The Chinese spend billions on their influence efforts, on
their informational activities. There are 30 Xinhua offices in
the subcontinent.
This year, despite having a domestic economy in China that
has slowed, their foreign ministry budget increased by double
digits, by 12 percent.
And so while dollars are not the only measure of success, I
do think that, you know, our strategy first and foremost is to
shine a spotlight. To work with allies and partners, with----
Mrs. Kim. Right. Which we're doing by obviously having
hold, you know, we're holding hearings and stuff. But I was
hoping that you would give us more concrete, one, two, three
pressure points that you will keep China accountable.
But let me followup with maybe Deputy Assistant Secretary
Holman and Deputy Assistant Administrator Davis, maybe you can
also speak to how your agencies are messaging the negative
impacts of Chinese investments to our African partners?
And what role should the United States play in delivering
technical assistance to countries like sub-Saharan Africa,
suffering from those negative impacts?
Mr. Waters. Thank you, Congresswoman. I can start. A lot of
USAID's work is working directly with the host countries to
build their, their ability to protect against some of the
issues that you're describing. To report them. To engage
community members, to increase awareness and report them.
Some of the examples of the work that we're doing, we have
a significant portfolio of anti-corruption activities. We have
community hotlines, capacity building of local administrators,
for example, working in mines, strengthening judiciaries,
making sure that when these types of incidents are reported
that there's a system in country to be able to followup and
report on them.
S, a lot of USAID's work is working directly with the host
countries on their national response when these issues occur
and encouraging the reporting of them when they occur.
Mrs. Kim. And in the interest of time, if you do not mind,
I'm going to ask just one more question to Ms. Davis. For the
United States to truly compete with the PRC in Africa, I
believe we must do more to incorporate the American private
sector into development assistance.
So how does USAID's Africa Trade and Investment Program
interact with Prosper Africa's deal teams?
And how can this help facilitate greater AGOA utilizations
throughout the continent? As you know, AGOA has been termed as
a very successful, you know, tool.
Ms. Davis. Thank you. Very briefly, for the sake of time. I
think the initiatives that you mentioned, the critical part
response to your question is that inter-connectivity.
So our deal teams in-country, our interagency deal teams
feed into identifying opportunities within each of their
countries. They direct companies, both African as well as U.S.
companies to initiatives that are supported by Prosper Africa.
We work closely with DFC to link to support opportunities
through AGOA. So it's that inter-connectiveness that reinforces
our ability to increase private sector engagement.
And again, just to mention, our new commitments that were
made during the U.S.-Africa Leader Summit in the business fora,
to continue to build on those connections to reach those
commitments.
Mrs. Kim. Thank you very much. And I yield back the
overtime.
Mr. James. Thank you. The Chairman now recognizes himself
for 5 minutes for one last question and comment.
We all want clean air and clean water. We believe that's
vital to life and thriving. Not just here, but all over the
world.
Ms. Holman, you mentioned we want to increase choices for
African nations to have more choices, not less. Ms. Davis, you
mentioned that African nations should be allowed to make
investments as they see fit, according to their needs.
These are all things, clean air, clean water, making
investments according to their needs, and having self-
determination. Sub-Saharan does not mean subhuman, and we
should not treat anyone as such.
And so dictating and deciding what another nation's policy
should be in this area, is something I find interesting with
the, what seems like gaslighting nations in Africa, with this
Administrations' current strategy of pursuing greenhouse gas
counting, despite the continent, the whole continent being
responsible for a fraction of historic and current emissions.
When we talk about progress, we talk about prosper, we talk
about power. Can you speak to why a one size fits all, first
world strategy fits Africa and their self-determination as many
nations on a large continent, a quarter of the world's
population, to get out of poverty without proven low cost
available energy sources like natural gas, which we could
export to boost America's economy, cleaner, safer, with
American union labor.
Can we explain why we would not use an all of the above
energy approach to help Africa become a greater and stronger
partner to the United States and to the world?
Ms. Davis. Thank you, Chairman. I'll begin. I first want to
comment that particular to Power Africa, we are using an energy
mix.
We create country strategies that apply to country specific
energy programming. We look project by project, country by
country. And more, and more we are seeing African requests for
more renewable energy options.
But that is not to say that we do not continue to provide a
large array of energy sources through our Power Africa
activities that include solar, and wind, and hydro, as addition
to natural gas.
You also mentioned in particular the greenhouse gas
question, which is also important. And the climate resilience
that you described is a shared objective of our African
partners. And one----
Mr. James. Is it a barrier? Is it a barrier to inclusivity
across the continent? And is it a barrier to our partnership
with African nations?
Ms. Davis. The concern that we have with the discussions
around greenhouse gas is that 17 of the most, of the 20 most
climate vulnerable countries are in Africa.
So it's a vulnerability for them that we cannot ignore in
our discussions when we have, when we have these conversations.
Mr. James. Yes. But the largest contributor is currently
China, for one, permitting two coal plants per week.
If we can hold African nations accountable for greenhouse
gas emissions that they have not even emitted, and fail to hold
competitors like China, and allies like India, accountable as
we in the west are pushing toward a green future, building our
green future on the backs of black slaves in artisanal mines in
the DRC. And it's the height of hypocrisy.
And I would challenge the Administration to look hard at
balancing its agenda with the human rights implications that it
has and to work within the realm of reality to make sure that
we provide, I love your term, energy mix, to allow African
nations to self-determination that they not only require and
deserve, but are entitled to.
I thank the witnesses for their valuable testimony and the
Members for their questions. The Members of the Committee may
have some additional questions for the witnesses and we'll ask
for you to respond to these in writing.
Pursuant to the Committee rules, all Members may have 5
days to submit these statements, questions, and extraneous
materials for the record, subject to the length of limitations.
Without objections, the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:02 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
APPENDIX
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
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