[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]


                               
                          [H.A.S.C. No. 118-6]

                     OVERSIGHT OF U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT 
                                TO UKRAINE

                               __________

                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                              HEARING HELD

                           FEBRUARY 28, 2023


                                     
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                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE                    
51-964                       WASHINGTON : 2023                    
          
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                      COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                    
                    One Hundred Eighteenth Congress

                     MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman

JOE WILSON, South Carolina           ADAM SMITH, Washington
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio              JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado               JOHN GARAMENDI, California
ROBERT J. WITTMAN, Virginia, Vice    DONALD NORCROSS, New Jersey
    Chair                            RUBEN GALLEGO, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia                SETH MOULTON, Massachusetts
SAM GRAVES, Missouri                 SALUD O. CARBAJAL, California
ELISE M. STEFANIK, New York          RO KHANNA, California
SCOTT DesJARLAIS, Tennessee          WILLIAM R. KEATING, Massachusetts
TRENT KELLY, Mississippi             ANDY KIM, New Jersey
MIKE GALLAGHER, Wisconsin            CHRISSY HOULAHAN, Pennsylvania
MATT GAETZ, Florida                  ELISSA SLOTKIN, Michigan
DON BACON, Nebraska                  MIKIE SHERRILL, New Jersey
JIM BANKS, Indiana                   VERONICA ESCOBAR, Texas
JACK BERGMAN, Michigan               JARED F. GOLDEN, Maine
MICHAEL WALTZ, Florida               SARA JACOBS, California
MIKE JOHNSON, Louisiana              MARILYN STRICKLAND, Washington
LISA C. McCLAIN, Michigan            PATRICK RYAN, New York
RONNY JACKSON, Texas                 JEFF JACKSON, North Carolina
PAT FALLON, Texas                    GABE VASQUEZ, New Mexico
CARLOS A. GIMENEZ, Florida           CHRISTOPHER R. DELUZIO, 
NANCY MACE, South Carolina               Pennsylvania
BRAD FINSTAD, Minnesota              JILL N. TOKUDA, Hawaii
DALE W. STRONG, Alabama              DONALD G. DAVIS, North Carolina
MORGAN LUTTRELL, Texas               TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama
JENNIFER A. KIGGANS, Virginia        STEVEN HORSFORD, Nevada
NICK LaLOTA, New York                JIMMY PANETTA, California
JAMES C. MOYLAN, Guam                MARC VEASEY, Texas
MARK ALFORD, Missouri                Vacancy
CORY MILLS, Florida
RICHARD McCORMICK, Georgia

                      Chris Vieson, Staff Director
                 Ryan Tully, Professional Staff Member
                  Rob Ikoku, Professional Staff Member
                    Owen McGeary, Research Assistant
                           
                           
                           C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

              STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman, 
  Committee on Armed Services....................................     1
Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking 
  Member, Committee on Armed Services............................     2

                               WITNESSES

Kahl, Hon. Colin H., Under Secretary of Defense for Policy.......     5
Sims, LTG Douglas A., II, USA, Director for Operations, J-3, The 
  Joint Staff....................................................     7
Storch, Hon. Robert P., Inspector General, U.S. Department of 
  Defense........................................................     8

                                APPENDIX

Prepared Statements:

    Kahl, Hon. Colin H...........................................    61
    Sims, LTG Douglas A., II.....................................    65
    Storch, Hon. Robert P........................................    71

Documents Submitted for the Record:

    USA Today article submitted by Mr. Clyde.....................    81
    The Washington Post article submitted by Mr. Courtney........    86
    Global Times article submitted by Mr. Gaetz..................    89
    Additional articles submitted by Mr. Gaetz...................    94

Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:

    Dr. DesJarlais...............................................   139
    Mr. Fallon...................................................   139
    Ms. Houlahan.................................................   139
    Ms. Mace.....................................................   139

Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:

    Mr. Gallagher................................................   145
    Mr. LaLota...................................................   145
    Dr. McCormick................................................   146
    Mr. Moylan...................................................   146
    Mr. Rogers...................................................   143
    Mr. Scott....................................................   143


 
             OVERSIGHT OF U.S. MILITARY SUPPORT TO UKRAINE

                              ----------                              

                          House of Representatives,
                               Committee on Armed Services,
                        Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 28, 2023.
    The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m., in room 
2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman 
of the committee) presiding.

 OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 
         ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    The Chairman. The committee will come to order. Before we 
start, I wanted to notice to every member that you'll find in 
your desk drawer, in addition to a seating chart of the members 
of the committee, a chart of all the staff, both sides of the 
aisle.
    It's just been one of those things that's always driven me 
nuts over the last 20 years, is not knowing who all these 
people are that work for us and keeping up with them as they 
change. So that'll be in your desk drawer.
    Without objection, the Chair may declare the hearing in 
recess at any point, so ordered.
    A few housekeeping matters before we begin. First, we will 
adjourn the public portion of this hearing at 12:30 today and 
immediately move upstairs for the classified portion.
    Second, I want to welcome back to the committee Mr. Veasey 
after his brief hiatus. I'm glad that you remembered where we 
were.
    And finally, after consultation with the minority, I ask 
unanimous consent that Mr. Clyde of Georgia, a member of the 
Appropriations Committee, be allowed to question witnesses at 
today's hearing. Without objection, so ordered.
    Last Friday, we observed the 1-year anniversary of Putin's 
illegal and brutal invasion of Ukraine. The American people 
have responded with extraordinary support for the Ukrainians. 
Millions of Americans have donated their time and money to 
charitable organizations helping the Ukrainian people. Some 
have even volunteered to fight alongside the Ukrainian defense 
forces.
    Congress has responded by appropriating over $100 billion 
in military, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine 
and our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies. To 
date, the administration has distributed over $75 billion of 
that money, including $46 billion in security assistance.
    These are unprecedented numbers, and it requires an 
unprecedented level of oversight by this committee and by 
Congress. We're up to the task.
    Last year, Chairman Smith started monthly classified 
briefings with the administration officials that have continued 
into the new majority. Many of us have traveled to Ukraine and 
surrounding countries to witness firsthand the train-and-equip 
mission.
    We've made classified information on the situation in 
Ukraine available to all Members. And our staff have constantly 
been briefing--being--are constantly being briefed with the 
latest developments by the Department.
    But today is the first time the Committee of the House is 
holding an open public hearing on the matter. I've asked the 
Inspector General and the Under Secretary to appear today 
because it is imperative that the American people understand A, 
where our security assistance is going; B, how it's being used; 
C, and what protections are in place to ensure it doesn't fall 
into the wrong hands.
    But oversight is about more than just accounting. It's 
about ensuring the administration is setting strategic goals 
and implementing a policy to achieve them. That's why we all 
are here with very real concerns.
    Since the beginning, the President has been overly worried, 
in my view, that giving Ukraine what it needs to win would be 
too escalatory. This hesitation has only prolonged the war and 
driven up the cost in terms of dollars and lives.
    This conflict must end. And the President must be willing 
to do what it takes to end it with victory. Continued 
reluctance and indecision only empowers Putin, and it sends the 
wrong message--the wrong signals to President Xi and the 
Chinese Community Party.
    And with that, I yield to my friend and colleague, the 
ranking member.

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM WASHINGTON, 
          RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    Mr. Smith. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I welcome our witnesses 
as well. And really, thank you for the work you've done. You've 
all appeared before us in classified settings to update us on a 
very regular basis on the effort in Ukraine.
    We appreciate the cooperative relationship between the 
executive branch and the legislative branch on this matter. And 
more than anything, we appreciate your leadership in supporting 
Ukraine so effectively over the course of the last year.
    I think it's hard to really imagine the massive undertaking 
that has been done in the last year since Russia made its 
decision to invade. And really since in the weeks and to some 
degree months before the invasion, when we came to realize from 
our intelligence community that this was going to happen.
    First of all, we were about the only country in the world 
that thought it was going to happen. Even the Ukrainians 
themselves, right up literally to the day of the invasion, 
thought that we were exaggerating the intelligence and that 
this wasn't actually going to happen.
    So from pretty much a dead stop, the Biden administration 
had to pull together a massive coalition to do something that 
almost all of the countries involved in that coalition had 
never contemplated doing, and certainly had hoped they would 
never have to do.
    And we've done that with a remarkable, remarkable outcome. 
The way that coalition was pulled together and the forces that 
have been given and the weapons that have been given to Ukraine 
to enable them to be as successful as they have been, combined 
of course with their unbelievable courage and tenacity, is 
really a remarkable accomplishment. And I think we need to 
understand it in that perspective.
    Obviously, we would like Ukraine to win tomorrow, Russia to 
be completely pushed out. But I think we also have to be 
realistic about the challenge that we faced and how we've gone 
about meeting that challenge, and really how effective we've 
been in doing that.
    Now, the purpose of this hearing specifically is on 
oversight. I think we have had a lot of oversight on this 
effort from the very beginning. And that is part of the reason 
why the effort has been so successful.
    There are--there are constant efforts to sort of spin 
stories, primarily coming from Russian propaganda, about 
corruption and weapon systems going where they're not supposed 
to be. But people who have looked at this, and I know the 
chairman has done this in great detail, have found that there 
is no instance of that happening. We have seen the 
effectiveness.
    And the best evidence of this, clearly and unequivocally, 
is the fact that the Ukrainians have been as successful on the 
battlefield as they have been. If the weapons and equipment and 
support that we were sending them was being sent elsewhere or 
stolen or misused, they would have lost a long time ago.
    Because I think one of the other things that we forget here 
is even us, in the U.S., we saw the war coming, we supported 
Ukraine, but even us along with everybody else thought the 
Ukrainians didn't stand a chance. We thought that the Russians 
would be in Kyiv in a week or two, a month at the most.
    So the fact they've been as successful as they have been is 
the best evidence we have that these systems and support that 
we are sending them is being as well used as it possibly can.
    And I do want to touch upon the point that the chairman 
made about how the administration hasn't been quick enough. You 
know, one of the things that we've heard, not just from critics 
of the war who don't want to support it, but even from people 
who do support it, is that there can't be a blank check.
    That's been sort of the criticism that you take if you want 
to sort of make it sound like you're still with Ukraine, but 
you want to be responsible. And I think that's appropriate, 
okay.
    But no blank check means no blank check. It means we don't 
just send everything that people ask for in the blink of an eye 
without even thinking about it, okay. We think about it and we 
get the Ukrainians what they really need.
    And I'm going to go ahead and hit upon one of those 
examples, because I think this is a really good example of the 
problem, and that is the F-16, which everyone has become 
obsessed over here in recent weeks. We have considered that 
request, and I've had many conversations with the witnesses 
before us and with the DOD [Department of Defense] as well.
    And the honest truth is the cost of trying to get the F-16 
up and ready to operate in Ukraine, even if we--even if we 
basically said there's nothing more important than that one 
weapon system and [inaudible] all of our time and all of our 
resources on doing it, best case scenario, we could maybe get 
some operational F-16s into Ukraine within a year, maybe 8 
months if we really pushed it. And this is getting lucky, all 
right.
    Because you don't just have to train the pilots. You have 
to train the mechanics. You have to have airfields that can 
accommodate the F-16. And you have to have the spare parts to 
make it work.
    So we looked at that and we determined that is not a wise 
use of the resources that are necessary to win the fight. 
That's what no blank check means, you don't just send it 
without thinking about it.
    We thought about it and reached a very intelligent 
conclusion that this is not the right system. And oh, by the 
way, a fourth-generation fighter in this particular fight is 
going to struggle to survive. There are isolated circumstances 
where the Ukrainians have been able to use the MiG-29s that 
they have. Very isolated, because it's a fourth-generation 
fighter in the face of a ton of air defense.
    What we are getting the Ukrainians is those air defense 
systems that they desperately need to survive right now and the 
artillery and the HIMARS [M142 High Mobility Artillery Rocket 
System] and the weapon systems that they do need. So the 
administration is doing exactly what it needs to do, getting 
equipment as quickly and as responsibly as possible to make 
this work.
    And I also want to make everybody aware of the fact the 
Russians are fighting a massive information campaign. Yes, 
they're fighting on the battlefield, and I'll look forward to 
hearing more details about that today. But they are also trying 
to break the coalition.
    You know, the Russian military has performed incredibly 
poorly. The Ukrainians have performed incredibly heroically. 
And the war is not going the way that Putin wanted it to. But 
he is not giving up. And he knows his only hope is to break the 
coalition that is trying to support Ukraine.
    And they're trying to do that in a variety of different 
ways. I mean, you can--you can see all the different arguments 
about how, well, NATO really started this because of NATO 
expansion and a whole lot of other nonsense arguments that are 
circulating out there.
    But the other part of the way they're doing it is any break 
in the coalition they see, they're poking and they're prodding, 
okay. They want to undermine the Biden administration.
    So why we have--while we have constructive criticism of 
what's going on, let's make sure that that criticism is 
constructive and we maintain our unity. And I know it is very, 
very difficult for the folks on the other side of the aisle to 
say anything positive about the Biden administration.
    But part of holding this coalition together is to 
acknowledge the incredible job that has been done in the last 
year, and to maintain that unity and to not jump at every shiny 
object that seems to be criticism of the Biden administration, 
like the F-16.
    Right now, and I've asked this question, we are getting 
every single weapon system that we can to Ukraine. There is not 
a decision being made about, eh, that might be escalatory. It's 
about what can we get to them. How can we maintain the support. 
We've spent a lot of money. There is not a limitless amount of 
money or a limitless amount of equipment.
    So I think those decisions are being made, being made 
wisely. I look forward to this hearing. I think it's perfectly 
appropriate that we have aggressive oversight, as we've had 
since the beginning. And that's part of the reason why we've 
been as successful to date as we have been.
    With that, I yield back. I look forward to hearing from our 
witnesses.
    The Chairman. I thank the ranking member. I now want to 
introduce our witnesses.
    The Honorable Colin Kahl is the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy. Dr. Kahl has been the primary official overseeing 
the DOD's response to Ukraine.
    The Honorable Dr. Robert Storch is the Inspector General of 
the Department of Defense. Together with the IGs [Inspector 
Generals] of the State Department and USAID [United States 
Agency for International Development], his office is carrying 
out audits and investigation of the assistance that we are 
providing to Ukraine.
    And Lieutenant General Doug Sims is the Director of 
Operations for the Joint Staff. He assists the Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs in developing and providing operational guidance 
on Ukraine and other military operations.
    I welcome the witnesses. Thank you for your time. Thank you 
for your preparation. I know this takes a lot of effort to get 
ready for these hearings, and it is appreciated and helpful.
    Dr. Kahl, we'll start with you.

STATEMENT OF HON. COLIN H. KAHL, UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR 
                             POLICY

    Dr. Kahl. Thank you. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, 
members of the committee, it's a real honor to appear before 
you today alongside my good friend Lieutenant General D.A. Sims 
over there and Dr. Storch, our Department's Inspector General.
    I want to begin by expressing the unwavering support of the 
Department of Defense for Ukraine's sovereignty and security in 
the face of Russia's unprovoked and brutal invasion. I know 
that support is shared by and is enabled by Congress and the 
American people.
    So I want to thank you for your crucial and continued help 
to get Ukraine the military capabilities and other types of 
assistance that it needs to remain in the fight. Thank you, 
too, for holding this important hearing at this pivotal time 
for the security of Ukraine, of Europe, and of the world.
    As we mark 1 year since Russia's further invasion of 
Ukraine, it's clear that Russia has failed to achieve any of 
its objectives. Its military is paying tremendous costs. 
Ukraine remains united and determined to expel Russia's 
invading forces from its territory. And NATO unity is stronger 
now than it has been in decades.
    We are seeing intense fighting in eastern Ukraine as Russia 
seeks points to exploit and Ukraine defends tenaciously. What 
happens in the coming months may prove decisive, and we are 
focused on providing Ukraine with the capabilities it needs 
right now to defend its people and its territory and change the 
dynamics on the front lines.
    I'd like to take a few minutes to lay out our priority 
capabilities, the ones we're providing to Ukraine now and in 
the coming days, weeks, and months.
    First, we have focused on a layered, integrated approach to 
air defense to counter Russia's attacks on population centers 
and civilian infrastructure. The Patriot capability from the 
United States as well as that provided by Germany and the 
Netherlands will give Ukraine advanced long-range capability.
    These are complemented by medium- and short-range 
capabilities provided by the United States, as well as our 
allies and partners.
    Second, we continue to work with allies and partners to 
deliver a steady flow of artillery rounds and other ammunition 
so Ukraine can sustain its fight.
    Third, to enhance Ukraine's ability to maneuver, the United 
States will provide Abrams main battle tanks, the best tanks in 
the world. The U.K. [United Kingdom] has also committed 
Challenger tanks, and other European states will provide 
Leopard tanks.
    These main battle tanks are complemented by other vital 
armor capabilities from the United States, including Bradleys 
and Stryker fighting vehicles, and other fighting vehicles from 
our European partners.
    Finally, we have expanded U.S.-led collective training to 
enable the Ukrainians to better integrate fires and maneuver.
    Our assistance to Ukraine is possible thanks to the 
tremendous bipartisan support from Congress. As you know, we 
have now provided $31.7 billion in support since Russia 
launched its further invasion of Ukraine a year ago. And our 
allies and partners have now provided over $19 billion in 
addition to what we've done.
    The Department of Defense appreciates the most recent 
additional supplemental appropriations act, which provided 
Presidential drawdown authority, funding for the military 
services to replace items sent to Ukraine, and funding for the 
Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative, or USAI.
    Even as we focus on getting Ukraine what it needs, we've 
always prioritized accountability, and Ukraine has too. We have 
adapted our accountability practice for--practices for the 
combat environment to address the risk of illicit diversion, 
using mechanisms that go above and beyond our standard 
practices.
    One year ago, Russia launched its brutal invasion to 
destroy Ukraine as a free and sovereign nation, threatening 
European security, transatlantic unity, and the security of the 
world. Today, an independent, sovereign, democratic Ukraine 
endures. The incredible people and the armed forces of Ukraine 
remain unbowed and unbroken. And NATO and the wider community 
of democracies around the world is stronger than ever.
    The stakes for our national security remain significant. We 
are determined to support Ukraine's fight against tyranny and 
oppression, and in doing so to defend the American interests 
and values that are so clearly at stake.
    Thank you again for the opportunity to testify, and I look 
forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Dr. Kahl can be found in the 
Appendix on page 61.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, Dr. Kahl. I'd like to recognize 
General Sims now for 5 minutes to summarize his statement.

    STATEMENT OF LTG DOUGLAS A. SIMS II, USA, DIRECTOR FOR 
                OPERATIONS, J-3, THE JOINT STAFF

    General Sims. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, 
distinguished members, ladies and gentlemen, good morning. I 
appreciate today's opportunity to update you on the U.S. 
military efforts to help the Ukrainian people in their 
continued fight against the Russian invasion.
    Today marks the 369th day since Russian forces invaded and 
began their illegal and unprovoked large-scale invasion of 
Ukraine. As we meet today, the current situation between 
Ukraine and Russia is generally static, with both sides 
employing heavy amounts of artillery, resulting in minimal 
changes of territory and significant numbers of casualties.
    In our follow-on session, I'm prepared to discuss 
particulars of Ukrainian disposition, but generally, and as 
you've seen reported in open sources, the most active portion 
of the battlefield today is around the town of Bakhmut.
    As I have briefed before over the past 2 months, the 
Russian army, with assistance of private military contractor 
Wagner Group, has fought savagely to defeat Ukrainians--or 
Ukraine's defenses, employing extreme amounts of artillery and 
waves of thousands of partially trained mobilized soldiers and 
personnel contracted from prisons.
    The Russians have made incremental gains at significant 
cost. Ultimately, as I have described before, the fighting has 
replicated the conditions of the First World War. Key to 
changing this paradigm is creating a Ukrainian armed forces 
capable of breaking this state of fighting.
    In this regard, since I last updated this--since I last 
updated this committee, the concentration of U.S. effort has 
been focused on combining equipment and munitions with people 
and training. The intent and efforts of the U.S. military are 
designed to generate combat-credible forces capable of 
combining fire and movement to achieve maneuver and increase 
the overall capabilities of the Ukrainian armed forces.
    Importantly, this training effort is not solely the work of 
the U.S. Armed Forces, but is a cohesive--a cohesive approach 
with our allies and partners. Collective training is ongoing 
throughout Europe and is dramatically increasing Ukrainian 
combined arms organizations.
    All told since January, the U.S. military has trained 
another 1,000 Ukrainians, bringing the total by the United 
States, trained by the United States, to just over 4,000. As I 
speak, Ukrainians are training in multiple locations in Europe, 
working with U.S. service members and military trainers from 
our allies and partners.
    Key to our ability to conduct collaborative training has 
been the recent increase in maneuver-related equipment. The 
U.S. provision of Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Strykers, and 
Paladin howitzers, combined with similar fighting vehicles and 
tank contributions from our partners, is notably increasing the 
capability of the Ukrainian armed forces.
    In addition, the U.S. continues to supply critical 
munitions and individual equipment, from howitzers, howitzer 
ammunition, to medical and cold-weather gear.
    Finally, and critically important to Ukraine's ability to 
continue to defeat Russian efforts to destroy civilian 
infrastructure, U.S. Armed Forces will soon complete the 
training and equipping of Ukraine's first Patriot battery.
    As you know, our air defense experts are providing key 
training at Fort Sill, Oklahoma. We are confident the 
Ukrainians will employ Patriots with the same expertise they 
are demonstrating every day with their current air defense 
capabilities.
    Thank you for what this committee and this Congress have 
done and continue to do to provide oversight and resources in 
support of Ukraine as they continue the fight against the 
illegal and unprovoked large-scale invasion. While the 
Ukrainians bear the real burdens of this war, your support and 
that of the American people has had a profound impact of 
Ukraine's future.
    I look forward to your questions and discussion today. 
Thank you.
    [The prepared statement of General Sims can be found in the 
Appendix on page 65.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, General.
    Mr. Storch, you're recognized.

  STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT P. STORCH, INSPECTOR GENERAL, U.S. 
                     DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

    Mr. Storch. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and 
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting 
me to appear today to discuss the Department of Defense Office 
of the Inspector General's comprehensive independent oversight 
of U.S. security assistance to Ukraine, as well as our active 
participation in a whole-of-government approach to ensuring 
robust oversight of the full range of American assistance.
    During the year following the 2022 Russian invasion, the 
DOD OIG [Office of the Inspector General] completed four 
Ukraine-related oversight projects, with a fifth report 
released just yesterday.
    We currently have some 20 ongoing and planned audits and 
evaluations that are focused on, among other things, ensuring 
that tax dollars are used properly, that there's appropriate 
accountability for weapons and other material, and that U.S. 
stocks are appropriately replenished so they're available 
should they be needed elsewhere.
    Additionally, the DOD OIG's Defense Criminal Investigative 
Service is actively engaged in conducting fraud prevention and 
investigative activities that play a critical role in ensuring 
the integrity of U.S. assistance to Ukraine.
    The DOD OIG currently has more than 90 professionals 
engaged in oversight of security assistance to Ukraine. In 
2022, we issued two management advisories that identified 
several areas of concern that could directly impact the DOD's 
ability to transparently track and report the supplemental 
appropriations for Ukraine.
    Earlier this year, we initiated an audit about examining 
DOD's execution of funds appropriated to assist Ukraine. We 
have long been focused on end-use monitoring, known as EUM, and 
enhanced end-use monitoring, or EEUM, the DOD's tracking of how 
our country's partners employ military assistance and sensitive 
equipment after those assets are transferred to them.
    As early as 2020, we issued a report on how the DOD was 
conducting EEUM of military assistance to Ukraine. In October 
2022, we published a classified report that identified 
challenges DOD personnel responsible for EUM and EEUM face when 
there are limited or no U.S. personnel present and the actions 
the DOD was taking to address those issues in Ukraine.
    As the situation on the ground has continued to evolve, we 
recently initiated our third evaluation on EEUM in Ukraine, and 
we will continue to focus on this important area.
    Yesterday we publicly released our most recent report 
related to the Ukraine effort, making recommendations to assist 
the Army with its maintenance, inventory, and other processes 
for pre-positioned equipment in the region.
    In addition to the topics above, our ongoing and planned 
projects cover the waterfront of American security assistance 
to Ukraine, addressing critical issues like the replenishment 
of U.S. stocks, intelligence sharing, security control for the 
transport of weapons and equipment, their maintenance and 
sustainment, awards of non-competitive contracts, and the 
training of Ukrainian armed forces.
    And as noted at the outset, DCIS [Defense Criminal 
Investigative Service] agents are drawing on their experience 
around the world to conduct outreach and investigations to help 
prevent and address fraud or other criminal conduct. We are not 
conducting this oversight alone.
    We are partnering closely with the Department of State OIG 
and the U.S. Agency for International Development OIG, and many 
others across the oversight community in a coordinated approach 
to ensure comprehensive oversight of all U.S. assistance to 
Ukraine.
    Along with our oversight partners, the DOD OIG established 
and leads the Ukraine Oversight Interagency Working Group, 
which brings together 20 oversight entities in a whole-of-
government approach. Just last month, my office and the State 
and USAID OIGs, in coordination with the larger working group, 
published our Joint Strategic Oversight Plan, which publicly 
describes our completed and ongoing work.
    As detailed in the plan, we are employing the proven model 
that has been used for years to ensure comprehensive oversight 
of overseas contingency operations, and we will work together 
in this effort for as long as the conflict and the need for 
oversight continue.
    At the end of January, I traveled with the leaders of the 
State and USAID OIGs to Germany, Poland, and into Ukraine in 
order to obtain the latest on-the-ground perspective, to build 
on our coordinated approach, and to deliver an unambiguous 
message to American and in Kyiv high-level Ukrainian officials 
about the expectations for accountability for U.S. assistance.
    The trip made clear that the situation is fluid and calls 
for continuous agile oversight. The DOD OIG, working hand in 
glove with our oversight partners, will continue to make 
independent oversight of assistance to Ukraine a matter of the 
highest priority. And we will continue to keep the Congress and 
the public informed about our work.
    Thank you for the opportunity to speak with you today, and 
I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Storch can be found in the 
Appendix on page 71.]
    The Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Storch.
    Before we move into questions, I wanted to remind everybody 
that the maps that you have in front of you, while they're 
unclassified, we haven't been given permission by the 
Department yet to distribute them beyond the committee, so I'd 
ask you to leave those here when you leave.
    And I recognize myself for 5 minutes.
    Dr. Kahl, if Russia were to be successful in taking control 
of Ukraine, what would that portend for a potential of China 
taking an effort at Taiwan?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, Mr. Chairman, we've seen what a world looks 
like when revisionist authoritarian powers go on the march and 
they're unchecked by the free world and they carve out spheres 
of influence by gobbling up their neighbors. That world was the 
1930s, and it culminated in the worst human tragedy in history, 
the Second World----
    The Chairman. So it would--enhance the likelihood that 
could happen.
    Dr. Kahl. I think if Russia is successful in Ukraine or is 
seen as successful in Ukraine, it will embolden other 
aggressors elsewhere to do similar things.
    The Chairman. That's my point. Chair now yields the balance 
of his time to the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Clyde.
    Mr. Clyde. I thank Chairman Rogers for his invitation to be 
here today and for yielding me his time to discuss this 
important matter of oversight of U.S. military support to 
Ukraine.
    As we all know, the United States has authorized over $100 
billion in aid, to which our government holds a responsibility 
to the American people that it be used for its true, just, and 
intended purpose. It is the responsibility of Congress to 
ensure that every single penny of American taxpayer money is 
being effectively used as intended to assist the Ukrainian 
people in their fight against Russian aggression.
    Just 2 weeks ago, I had the pleasure of joining the 
chairman to visit several of our NATO allies in Europe to 
receive an update on the war effort in Ukraine and the ongoing 
oversight work directly related to U.S. military aid. 
Accountability of the weapons shipped in is absolutely 
paramount, especially the most sensitive weapons, to ensure 
that they are being used for their intended purpose and not 
diverted for a nefarious purpose.
    As a supply officer with both multiple peacetime 
deployments and multiple combat deployments in my 28 years of 
Navy service, I am fully aware of the challenges of maintaining 
visibility and control of critical military hardware and 
components when the supply lines are long and the theater is 
kinetic.
    So Mr. Storch, I would like to start with you as a 
Department of Defense Inspector General. In all your 
inspections and oversight, in-country and out, have you found 
any instances of sensitive weapons, like Stinger missiles, 
being either lost or diverted to those not authorized to have 
them?
    Mr. Storch. Thank you very much for the question. I'm 
obviously not at liberty to talk about any investigations, but 
we have not substantiated any such instances, no, sir.
    Mr. Clyde. So you can confidently say that to your 
knowledge, every sensitive weapon is currently under control of 
those who should have them--who should have them?
    Mr. Storch. Well, thank you very much for the question. 
That's why we're engaged in a--we're laser-focused on this 
issue and engaged in robust oversight to make sure that's the 
case.
    We're doing audits and evaluations that look at the weapons 
from the time they begin at the port, while they're transferred 
throughout, as they get to the transshipment points, and then 
they go into the country.
    And then as I mentioned in my statement, we're now 
conducting our third evaluation of the EUM, and with regard to 
the sensitive assets, the EEUM, the enhanced monitoring, to 
ensure that the Department of Defense is conducting that 
monitoring in a robust way.
    Additionally, as I mentioned, we have the DCIS, the Defense 
Criminal Investigation Service. They have vast experience all 
over the world in doing investigations arising out of conflict 
situations. And so again, we're very much alert to any 
instances where that sort of conduct would occur.
    Mr. Clyde. Okay. All right, moving on, as I understand it, 
your office is currently working on, among other things, an 
audit of DOD award and administration of non-competitively 
awarded contracts in support of Ukraine. Has there been any 
waste, fraud, or abuse uncovered or reported to your office in 
these investigations?
    Mr. Storch. So I want to--I appreciate the question. I want 
to be careful and not get out ahead of my skis, because the 
audit is ongoing.
    Mr. Clyde. Okay.
    Mr. Storch. So we are looking at those issues in our audit 
and we'll report out on what we find. But the purpose of the 
audit is to ensure that the DOD has the controls in place to 
make sure that doesn't happen.
    Mr. Clyde. According to your testimony, you said that there 
were some posters, both in Ukrainian and English, the language, 
sent out about a particular hotline that people could call if 
they wanted to report something. So without compromising any 
identities, have any whistleblowers come forward with 
information using that particular method of reporting, to your 
knowledge?
    Mr. Storch. So thank you for referencing the hotline. It's 
something we worked closely on with our partners----
    Mr. Clyde. I read your testimony.
    Mr. Storch. At [the Department of] State and USAID, and the 
goal is provide an avenue for people to report what they think 
may be wrong. We have gotten all sorts of types of allegations 
over that, and we're, you know, continuing to look at them.
    Mr. Clyde. Okay. Mr. Chairman, for the record, I would like 
to submit a--an article from USA Today. And it says, ``U.S. has 
spent billions in Ukraine war aid, but is that money landing in 
corrupt pockets?'' It was updated as of yesterday, February the 
27th.
    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 81.]
    Mr. Clyde. Thank you.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. The gentleman's time 
has expired.
    Mr. Clyde. Thank you very much----
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the ranking member.
    Mr. Smith. Thank you very much.
    Dr. Kahl, I want to follow up a little bit on what the--
what Chairman Rogers was asking about in terms of the policy 
behind this. As the Under Secretary for Policy, you seem like 
the appropriate person to ask that question to.
    This policy is not without risk, I think we all know that. 
First of all, it is costing an enormous amount of money in 
terms of tens of billions of dollars. We are also acutely aware 
of the fact that we do not want to get into a direct conflict 
with Russia, and we don't want NATO to get into a direct 
conflict with Russia.
    But can you state for us clearly why you still believe this 
is the correct policy to support Ukraine in this war, what the 
implications are for our own national security? Because I think 
it's a legitimate question, the American taxpayer, you know, 
why are spending money.
    It seems like a long way away. You know, and not to be 
overly crass about it, but a lot of constituents ask the 
question, what's all this got to do with me.
    I think the policy is sound, but I want to give you the 
opportunity to say here's why this matters to U.S. national 
security.
    Dr. Kahl. Well, thank you. Look, I think the entire 
international system is grounded on the principle of 
sovereignty and territorial integrity. It's at the heart of the 
U.N. [United Nations]. And that may sound kind of wonky, except 
that the entire rules-based order that that undergirds is what 
ultimately minimizes the number of international conflicts and 
wars that we see.
    If countries like Russia are allowed to go on the march to 
swallow up their neighbors, if might makes right, if the strong 
do what they will and the weak suffer what they must, then the 
rule of law will be replaced with the rule of the jungle. And 
we will live in a very dangerous world.
    And I'll just give you one example. If you're sitting in 
Tehran or in Pyongyang or in Beijing, and you're contemplating 
aggression against a neighbor, and in all those circumstances 
that's conceivable, you're going to ask yourself what would be 
the reaction of the international community.
    And had the international community stood by, had the 
United States not exercised its leadership to rally not only 
the democracies in Europe and North America, but countries 
around the world to Ukraine's aid, the lesson that dictators in 
other countries would take is that aggression can--won't be 
punished. And that it pays. And that would make the world a 
much more dangerous place for Americans.
    Mr. Smith. Very well stated. And I think one other argument 
to make in this is a lot of people who are concerned about this 
point to our policy in Iraq. And certainly there were a ton of 
mistakes made there.
    But the thing that a lot of people forget is on your point 
of sovereignty, what kicked that whole thing out was Saddam 
Hussein trying to take over Kuwait, and then setting his eyes 
on Saudi Arabia. Now, how we handled that is highly debatable 
in terms of the long term, both what we did in 1991, what we 
did in 2003.
    But the principle of sovereignty and the principle of 
exactly what you just stated, not allowing a country like 
Russia or China to think that they can simply grab territory by 
force, is core to our own security and to the security of the 
world long term.
    And as we speak, we are very aware of the Taiwan situation 
with China. But China, and I haven't added up the number of 
countries, but it's more than a half dozen, have sovereign 
territory now that China to one degree or another claims.
    And if, you know, just like Russia says that Ukraine 
shouldn't exist, they should be part of Russia, China has the 
same argument in lands currently controlled by Vietnam, by the 
Philippines, by Japan, by India, all across the world. It kicks 
off a very, very dangerous situation if President Putin is 
successful in Ukraine.
    And I think we need to remember that even while we are 
aware of the cost and while we are aware of the necessity of 
making sure that we check where this money is going. Which, as, 
you know, Mr. Storch outlined, I think we're doing.
    But the policy itself is really crucial to peace and 
stability in the world, and ultimately to our own national 
security in the United States. None of that makes it easy. We 
all want peace in Ukraine as quickly as possible.
    But right now, as has been stated clearly, the path to 
peace in Ukraine is simple. Putin can stop his war and take his 
troops out of sovereign Ukraine. And that stops the war in the 
blink of an eye. But until that happens, we have to support 
Ukraine to force Putin to that choice.
    So I appreciate you articulating that, and I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank the ranking member. Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Chairman Mike Rogers and Ranking 
Member Adam Smith, for this very important bipartisan hearing 
on the issues of Ukraine and immediately the effect that it has 
on the Chinese Communist Party.
    I want to thank the witnesses for being here today. I 
believe the world is in a global competition between 
democracies with rule of law opposed by authoritarians with 
rule of gun.
    Today's conflict is war criminal Putin's mass murder in 
Ukraine. This I believe if--Ukraine must be victorious to deter 
the Chinese Communist Party from attacking the 24 million 
people of Taiwan. Ukraine must be victorious to stop Iran from 
its efforts to vaporize Israel as it develops intercontinental 
ballistic missiles to devastate American families.
    With that, Mr. Storch, there have been billions in U.S. 
weaponry and financial aid flowing to Ukraine, and more coming 
to stop war criminal Putin. We're all concerned about 
accountability.
    And the American people need to know, because somehow this 
hadn't recognized, and that is that in all of the legislation 
that's passed to provide for funding, there have been 39 
provisions that provide for reports to be provided to Congress 
on oversight and accountability.
    And with that, what is the DOD Inspector General's plan, 
and what are the broader coordination with the State Department 
IG, USAID IG, and other relevant IGs, what's the structure to 
protect the American taxpayer?
    Mr. Storch. Thank you very much for the question. We are 
actively engaged on an ongoing basis with the State OIG, the 
USAID OIG, and all of our partners in the working group in 
ensuring comprehensive oversight over all aspects of assistance 
to Ukraine.
    Obviously my office, the DOD OIG, has primary 
responsibility with regard to the security assistance, and we 
have, as we speak, approximately 20 ongoing and planned audits 
and evaluations that cover every aspect of that security 
assistance, including the broad range that I mentioned in my 
statement.
    We're also working with our partners to make sure that 
there aren't any gaps with regard to the different types of 
assistance that are being provided. We're reporting out 
transparently. We did the Joint Strategic Oversight Plan [JSOP] 
that I mentioned.
    And we're going to continue to report out. We have a report 
coming at the beginning of April under one of--under the NDAA 
[National Defense Authorization Act] that will be providing an 
update on our work. And we're going to continue to update the 
JSOP and our other work so this Congress and the American 
public are fully informed regarding our oversight efforts.
    It's on us to ensure that there's appropriate oversight 
across the board to ensure that taxpayer dollars are being 
spent appropriately and the equipment is being used as 
intended.
    Mr. Wilson. And thank you so much for what you do. But 
please, let's get this publicized so the American people can 
trust what the expenditures are.
    And Dr. Kahl, I am really concerned about foreign military 
sales. Delivery to Ukraine? Hey, delivery to Taiwan. And our 
allies are making the best of their ability to provide.
    And then for example, we're providing 31 Abrams tanks. 
Somehow the media presented that that we would not have any 
tanks in the future. They leave out that we have 8,000 tanks, 
Abrams tanks. We potentially have 22,000 actually, Abrams 
tanks. But the 31 was presented as just debilitating the United 
States.
    We can do better. And so what's being done, particularly 
working with Chairman Mike Rogers and others, to have an 
expedited foreign military sales? It's absurd, with pre-
positioning of equipment when we hear that it may take a year 
to get equipment to Ukraine.
    Dr. Kahl. Well, thank you, Congressman. As you know, we 
predominantly use two sets of authorities at DOD to get Ukraine 
weapons: PDA, Presidential drawdown [authority], which allows 
us to draw from stocks; and then USAI, which allows us to put 
things on contract.
    When we draw things out of stocks, things generally arrive 
in Ukraine within days or a handful of weeks. When we put 
things on contract, it depends. Sometimes it's weeks, sometimes 
it's a handful of months. Sometimes it is longer than that.
    So it really depends on which authority we are using. But 
we have surged a tremendous amount of security assistance into 
Ukraine. More than $31.7 billion in a year. I don't know that 
there's any historical precedent for that. The vast majority of 
that has come out of our stocks and has come very rapidly.
    I'll just say I share your frustration with the broader 
foreign military sales process. We are getting after that 
problem through a ``tiger team'' at the Department of Defense 
that has identified I think about 80 process improvements that 
can streamline these things. It's still too slow.
    And all I would say is that there's nothing, as we draw 
things down from our stocks, that is making the FMS [foreign 
military sales] problem worse. It's a different--it's kind of 
an apples and oranges issue. Because FMS is more aligned with 
the USAI authority in terms of putting things on contract.
    Mr. Wilson. We need to follow the example of the Czech 
Republic and then last week, Poland, providing equipment 
immediately. Thank you.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time is expired. Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Courtney, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And again, I want to 
begin by recognizing both your efforts and Ranking Member 
Smith's efforts to hold recurring updates and briefings for--by 
this committee. And in my opinion it has been that healthy 
process which has provided the foundation for the bipartisan 
votes that have passed supplemental funding really over the 
last year.
    And again, the witnesses have been part of that process, so 
thank you for your contribution.
    Just to--and you know, footstomp what I think my friend Mr. 
Wilson just indicated, is that included in those supplemental 
funding bills were actually specific, explicit language by 
Congress directed towards the Offices of Inspector General to 
be engaged at the maximum level.
    And again, Mr. Storch, if you could just sort of confirm 
that for the record that, again, you've been around for a long 
time, thank goodness. But again, it also has been with 
congressional support that your efforts are taking place.
    Mr. Storch. Yes, sir, thank you very much for the question. 
We very much appreciate that support. And we're committed to 
the greatest possible transparency in our oversight efforts.
    Mr. Courtney. So, and again, when we talk about a blank 
check, I mean, I think clearly we in the Congress had our eyes 
wide open when these large amounts of funding were authorized 
and appropriated, that we wanted oversight at every step of the 
way.
    In dealing with, again, Ukraine's efforts to deal with 
waste, fraud, and abuse, Dr. Kahl, there's an international 
organization which kind of keeps score on countries', you know, 
efforts in terms of dealing with corruption and fraud, and it's 
Transparency International.
    In the last year, at the same time that this unprecedented 
almost infusion of money has been flowing in, not just from the 
U.S. but also from the EU [European Union], Ukraine's position 
on Transparency International's ranking actually improved. It 
was one of the few countries in the world. It went up six 
places.
    And I wonder if you could just sort of, with that backdrop, 
talk about your perspective as far as the seriousness with 
which the Ukrainian government has approached this whole 
question of making sure that this help goes to the right place.
    Dr. Kahl. Thank you. You know, I've worked the Ukraine 
issue now for about 9 years. And in our engagements over that 
entire period, corruption was the number one issue we raised 
with Ukrainian officials. And I think there have been 
improvements over time, especially in the defense sector, 
where--which is obviously most germane for DOD.
    I will just tell you in our engagements with senior 
Ukrainian officials now, I was in Kyiv in January, the 
Secretary talks to his counterpart about every other week, the 
importance of accountability, of transparency, and of combating 
corruption are always points of emphasis for us.
    But it's not just what we--what our talking points say. We 
have to put, you know, our effort into it. We've provided the 
Ukrainians with ways to track the systems we provide, to 
include scanners and software.
    We've done, when it's safe, a remote visit, visits to 
sites. We don't see any evidence of diversion in our reporting. 
We think the Ukrainians are using properly what they've been 
given. But we'll continue to footstomp the importance of 
accountability and transparency for all the reasons you 
mentioned.
    Mr. Courtney. And looking again at President Zelensky's own 
efforts, I mean, I would say he courageously took steps to 
remove officials, some very close even to his office and 
political supporters of his own.
    Which shows, I think, you know, tremendous commitment to 
not just talking about trying to address this problem, but 
actually taking action to remove people, which, you know, 
again, I think just sort of demonstrates, you know, true 
commitment. I think, you know, that should be also acknowledged 
in terms of the seriousness with which, you know, he and his 
administration is pursuing this goal.
    And with that, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to, as long as we're 
entering newspaper articles, I would like to ask that the piece 
in this morning's Washington Post, ``Zelensky Takes on 
Ukraine's Top Internal Enemy,'' be admitted to the record.
    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 86.]
    Mr. Courtney. And again, that walks through the whole 
question of how they improved their score with Transparency 
International in the midst of, you know, dealing with an 
existential threat to their country.
    And with that, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Thank the gentleman from Connecticut. Chair 
now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for 
having this hearing. And thank you all for being here today.
    General Sims, I'd like to ask you the first question I 
have. Last week, Vladimir Putin announced the suspension of 
Russia's participation in the New START treaty [Treaty on 
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic 
Offensive Arms]. This followed an earlier declaration by the 
U.S. State Department that Russia was violating the New START 
treaty.
    So it appears that Russia has taken New START hostage and 
is using it to get us to stop funding Ukraine. Is the Joint 
Staff developing plans and options should Russia further 
violate its limitations in New START? For instance, if it 
starts uploading its nuclear delivery systems above the caps.
    General Sims. Sir, thank you for the question. Sir, I'll 
save some fine-tuning on that question for our follow-on 
session, if that's okay. And certainly pass any of the policy 
implications to Dr. Kahl to answer.
    But I would simply say we continue to maintain the 
strongest nuclear force in the world. We continue to monitor 
the nuclear situation around the world, to include Russia. And 
if I was an American, I would not be worried about the nuclear 
situation.
    Mr. Lamborn. Very good. And Dr. Kahl, if you could follow 
up on that. What are some of the diplomatic or other things 
that the administration is doing in response to Russia's latest 
stance on New START?
    Dr. Kahl. Thanks. It's a really important question. Look, I 
think as a practical matter, the suspension doesn't make a lot 
of difference for the reason you mentioned, which is that they 
were already out of compliance with the inspections regime, 
using COVID [coronavirus disease] and other things as excuses.
    It's also interesting that Putin decided to suspend as 
opposed to leave the treaty. And I think that's actually an 
indication that it's not effective leverage over us. It won't 
be effective leverage over the Biden administration.
    Yes, we believe arms control and strategic stability matter 
for the safety of the American people and for the world. But 
frankly, Russia is in no position for an unconstrained nuclear 
arms race. They do not have the money, especially given the 
strain on their military from the war, sanctions, export 
controls.
    So you know, I think this was a way for him to generate 
some rhetorical headlines. But I think as a practical matter, 
it has not changed the situation. Russia remains a dangerous 
power with a lot of nuclear weapons, and we have to be vigilant 
against that danger.
    Mr. Lamborn. Okay, thank you. And I do think it was a 
mistake for President Biden to re-up New START when he first 
took office without any discussions at all with the Russians. I 
think we could have perhaps gotten some concessions or some 
further understanding. So I think that was a mistake.
    However, I will be--I will compliment the President, and 
the ranking member will be glad to hear this, I think it was 
right for him to go to Ukraine recently. And I think that that 
sent the right signal.
    We all hope and pray that--to God that there is no use of 
nuclear weapons by Russia in Ukraine, tactical or anything 
else. And we don't want to give away what our response would be 
should that happen, and a lot would depend on the specific 
circumstances.
    But what would be some of the consequences to Russia should 
that unthinkable thing happen?
    Dr. Kahl. Thank you for that, and I'm happy to talk about 
this at--in greater detail in the classified setting. But what 
I'll say here is the following.
    We've made it very clear to Russian leadership at the 
highest levels through intelligence channels, my boss Secretary 
Austin to his Russian counterpart, the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff to Gerasimov, our National Security Advisor to 
his counterpart in the Kremlin, that any use of nuclear weapons 
in Ukraine on any scale would be considered a world-changing 
event that would bring about severe consequences far in excess 
to anything the Russians have experienced to date.
    And that a lot of the restraints we've been operating under 
would no longer obtain in a world where Russia crossed that 
threshold. But the good news is I don't think they're likely to 
do so.
    Mr. Lamborn. Yeah, and what they have to lose would be far 
more than what they would have to gain.
    And lastly, General Sims, Russia has made some, I think, 
exaggerated claims that it has used hypersonic weapons in 
Ukraine, just as they exaggerate a lot of things about their 
capabilities. Can you shed any further light on that particular 
question?
    General Sims. Sir, we know they've employed advanced 
conventional--conventional munitions. I wouldn't go into detail 
here in this session on the particulars. I would tell you that 
the--they're doing so at their--at great expense. They're 
finding now that their weapons of all types are in--in dire 
straits, in many cases.
    And I think what they're also seeing is that the Ukrainians 
have been very prepared for many of their weapons and are 
shooting down their weapons at a very high rate.
    Mr. Lamborn. Very good. Thank you again for being here, and 
I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes 
the gentleman from California, Mr. Garamendi, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for 
the work that you're personally doing in reaching out and 
trying to make sure that the supplies are getting to where they 
need to go, particularly the journey that you took 2 weeks ago 
to Greece, Romania, and Poland.
    My question first goes to you, Mr. Storch. Thank you for 
your detailed explanation of the various projects that you have 
underway, you and your colleagues have underway. I'd like you 
to very briefly, or as whatever necessary, summarize the 
reports that you have provided over the last year, or year and 
a half.
    There seems to be two different pieces to that, one of 
which you have already talked to, and that is suggested 
improvements in the auditing, in the transfer of weapons and 
the like. And if you'd like to go into that a little more.
    And secondly, if you would summarize the findings of those 
reports, following up on the question earlier about what you 
actually found.
    Mr. Storch. Yes, sir, thank you very much for the question. 
As you say, the reports that we've issued to date over the past 
year since the 2022 invasion really have fallen largely into 
two categories. A couple of them have looked at issues that we 
identified relating to the way in which the money that was 
appropriated is being tracked and the way in which it is being 
entered into the systems.
    And so the concerns there are that if there aren't 
additional improvements, that those could result in a lack of 
transparency or impair the transparency of those funds. So the 
Department has been making progress in those areas. We've 
continued to look at that.
    And as I mentioned, we've recently initiated an audit 
that's looking at the actual execution of the funds 
appropriated. So that's--that's sort of an ongoing priority, is 
how is the money being spent. We did identify issues with the 
systems and with the procedures in place, made recommendations 
to help to address.
    Mr. Garamendi. Let's be clear then, is the Department 
following on your recommendations and making progress to 
achieve the goals that you've stated?
    Mr. Storch. So, yes, sir. The first management advisory 
didn't actually have specific recommendations. It raised a 
number of concerns. The second one did have one recommendation, 
and that related to putting in place procedures that were more 
robust in ensuring things were tracked properly.
    The Department has made progress in that area. The 
recommendation remains open, we're continuing to track it. And 
then we'll continue to look at that in the course of the 
ongoing audit.
    Mr. Garamendi. And so you continue to look for perfection, 
as you should.
    Mr. Storch. Absolutely, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. The second thing, the findings that you--
beyond the recommendations for the procedures----
    Mr. Storch. Right.
    Mr. Garamendi [continuing]. The findings. Did you find any 
indication that there was a diversion of equipment of any kind?
    Mr. Storch. Again, the second set of projects that we've 
released are evaluations looking at the controls that DOD has 
over this end-use monitoring and enhanced end-use monitoring. 
Once the weaponry goes into Ukraine, it--there needs to be 
appropriate accountability and tracking. And so the DOD has 
responsibilities to do that.
    So in the first of those reports, we did make a number of 
findings and recommendation. Most of those have been addressed 
and the recs have been closed. There are a couple that are 
outstanding relating to night vision goggles and steps that are 
being taken.
    The Department has made progress in those areas. And what 
we're going to do is we're going to look at the current state 
of that in connection with the newly announced EUM, EEUM 
evaluation that I mentioned. So there's been progress, and 
that's an ongoing process.
    Mr. Garamendi. Very good. And I would just comment quickly 
I'm very pleased that you're setting up a very robust operation 
in Ukraine itself, that you're reestablishing within the 
embassy the various auditing groups necessary to carry it out. 
Is that the case?
    Mr. Storch. Well, what we have done, sir, is we've--we 
forward deployed a significant number of people into the region 
to do oversight over the supply and training mission, most of 
which occurs before any weaponry crosses into Ukraine.
    Then using some of the same techniques, frankly, we used--
not just my office, but across the IG community--during the 
COVID pandemic, we're doing additional monitoring relating to 
the EUM and EEUM and getting information from the military 
personnel who are at the embassy regarding what's currently 
being done.
    If we need to go further and go in, we will. But at this 
point, we have it covered.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you very much. The bottom line is that 
the programs are working, that diversions are not happening, 
and that the equipment's getting where it needs to go, is that 
it?
    Mr. Storch. We're doing oversight to make sure the 
Department has placed all the controls it needs to make sure 
that happens, sir.
    Mr. Garamendi. Didn't quite get to what I'm talking about. 
You've not found problems of any great significance, is that 
correct?
    Mr. Storch. Right. Well, again, a lot of these audits and 
evaluations are pending, but with regard to the areas I've 
mentioned, we have limited findings. The Department has been 
addressing them. And we're going to continue to look at the 
issue. So yes, that's correct.
    Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
    Mr. Storch. Yes, sir.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired. Chair now 
recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Wittman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our 
witnesses for joining us today.
    We look at the gains that Ukraine has made with assistance 
from around the world and what's happening to Russian forces. 
Degraded presence, about 40 percent of its pre-war fleet of 
tanks gone. And today, 97 percent of the Russian army is in 
Ukraine. And even with that, they're struggling.
    The issue is for us the munitions that we're providing to 
Ukraine. In last year's NDAA, we provided both funding and 
contracting tools to accelerate replenishing our munition 
stockpiles, essentially our weapons magazines.
    I want to talk, though, about where I think there's a 
strategic mismatch. We give those contracting tools, yet how we 
evaluate where the needs are to me is in contradiction to that. 
The needs are supposed to be evaluated on the threats in 
Europe. What's that--what's that threat scenario?
    And as we see, the DOD has up to 2 years to determine that 
threat scenario. So if we're looking at the scenario 2 years 
down the road and whatever's happening at that time in Europe, 
and we are today accelerating the replenishing of our munitions 
stockpile, to me there's a mismatch.
    Because what's--what--giving 2 years to determine what the 
needs are, what the threats are, and we're spinning up today to 
build weapons stockpiles that may be mismatched with what we 
see 2 years from now doesn't seem to me to be a good policy.
    So Dr. Kahl, can you tell us, based on our force structure 
requirements on both munitions and ground forces in Europe, how 
do we make sure that we are making the right determinations 
about what to build today so we don't have, again, a mismatch?
    I mean, we're talking about weapons magazines being 
depleted today, but if we're building weapons that may not have 
a role in where we need to be 2 years from now, how do we--how 
do we correct that mismatch?
    Dr. Kahl. Yes, thank you, it's a very important question. 
So obviously we've made significant investments because of the 
money that Congress has generously given us and the authorities 
to spend it over longer periods of time to recapitalize our 
munitions.
    That means increasing production, but it also means 
addressing supply chain bottlenecks and creating a longer term 
demand so that industry is actually responsive. I think what 
the Ukraine conflict showed is that frankly our defense 
industrial base was not at the level that we needed it to be to 
generate munitions.
    So right now, our priorities are making sure that we are 
increasing production for the things that we anticipate that 
Ukraine will continue to need. So a good example is 155 
millimeter ammunition for the NATO standard howitzers. But also 
the Guided Multiple Launch Rocket Systems, the GMLRS, that 
launch off the HIMARS systems.
    Those are going to matter a year from now, 2 years from 
now, 3 years from now, because even if the conflict in Ukraine 
dies down--and nobody can predict whether that'll happen--
Ukraine is going to need a military that can defend the 
territory it's clawed back and deter the Russians from doing 
this again.
    The other investments we're doing of course are to 
replenish our own stocks. And there actually I think we're 
relatively confident we're making the investments that we made 
not only for Russia contingencies, but also for contingencies 
vis-a-vis China, North Korea, Iran, et cetera.
    But beyond that, we can go into some of the specific 
details in the classified setting if you'd like in terms of how 
we're making targeted investments.
    Mr. Wittman. Well, that leads me to the next question. The 
allocations that we're making today to Ukraine are based on a 
pre-Ukraine Russian conflict scenario. So if we are holding 
back those munitions based on that scenario, then are we 
inadvertently holding back the things that Ukraine may need 
based on what would be an antiquated scenario? So that I think 
is a question.
    And then also, how are the determinations made about what 
we are doing to replenish our stockpiles and what we're sending 
to Ukraine? How is that interacting with our needs in the 
INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command]?
    Dr. Kahl. Yes, so actually it's a very important point. So 
we have a total munitions requirement that is essentially a 
metric against which we need munitions for a whole range of 
contingencies. So they are not pegged to any one contingency, 
it's a pool of munitions we can draw on from a range of 
different scenarios.
    We have adjusted that floor to account for the fact that 
Russia is bogged down in Ukraine. Their land forces have been 
badly attrited. It has changed the dynamic for a future Russia 
contingency.
    At the same time, we have requirements for operational 
plans in other parts of the world, could be North Korea, Iran, 
China, et cetera. So Secretary Austin is--has been laser-
focused on making sure that as we draw down from our own 
stocks, we are getting Ukraine what it needs without taking 
undue risk to those other plans.
    And I think we have so far accomplished that. But we also 
need to recapitalize so that we can build up that hedge in the 
event that something bad happens elsewhere in the world.
    Mr. Wittman. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield 
back.
    The Chairman. Thank the gentleman. Chair now recognizes the 
gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And certainly 
appreciate the ongoing insight and the most recent visit to the 
region.
    The amazing thing that the United States does better than 
anybody in the world, hands down, is the logistics, the ability 
to move men, equipment, resources is short of remarkable.
    I just want to touch base, Chairman, and [inaudible] Mr. 
Wittman, 3 years ago there were some disturbing reports on the 
industrial base issues on our ammo plants, our explosives and 
accelerants. And we had been very much focused on that.
    Had we not actually sped up the recapitalization, I think 
we would be even in a worse place. But we still have a quite a 
ways to go.
    My question goes to Dr. Kahl and the general.
    Putin leaves no chance when he speaks to the people of not 
only his country but the world but to imply the nuclear option 
over and over again. And it finds an audience in the United 
States. People are worried about what might happen.
    We have seen time and time again there's a discussion about 
the red lines and what they are. And if we go back a year what 
a red line was then, certainly may or may not be the red line 
of today. And that is why I want to ask about the evolving or 
changing red lines.
    The calculations that we have made, and HIMARS is one of 
those discussions. Early on we didn't want to do it. What 
calculations are going into effect that something that we are 
providing is or is not going to change the red lines?
    How do we determine what those red lines are, and how have 
they changed since the beginning?
    Doctor, if you could go first.
    Dr. Kahl. Yeah, it is something we watch very closely, I 
think for all the reasons that you have mentioned. Clearly, 
Putin's rhetoric from the very outset of the war on nuclear 
matters has been irresponsible and dangerous. We have attempted 
not to take the bait, while in private making it clear to them 
that if they were to cross certain lines of using nuclear 
weapons on any scale, what a world-changing event that would 
be.
    As a general matter, I do not think that we are holding 
back security assistance from Ukraine at the moment, largely 
for escalatory reasons. I think most of the decisions we are 
making on security assistance are driven first and foremost by 
our assessment of what Ukraine needs right now, given the 
amount of money that the American taxpayer has given the 
Department to work with. How do we use that money for what they 
need right now?
    And then the other is, you know, what can we provide that 
doesn't have huge impacts on our own readiness and our ability 
to respond to our own national security crises in other parts 
of, of the world.
    So, really, those are the two things that we are measuring 
against. I think at the moment we feel relatively comfortable 
on where we are on the escalatory dynamic vis-a-vis Russia. But 
it is something that we consult with our intel--intelligence 
community colleagues constantly to make sure we are setting the 
rheostat, you know, about right without self-deterring 
ourselves.
    Mr. Norcross. Thank you.
    So, General, when we started a year ago there has been much 
discussion from the committee and those in Congress about what 
we are able to send to them. How much of an impact has that 
``red line'' been? And has it changed since a year ago?
    General Sims. Sir, I would tell you what we have sent over 
the last year has made a gigantic difference to the Ukrainians. 
If you start where we were last year at the onset, it was about 
providing things at the moment that they needed. They were 
Javelins. They were Stinger missiles. They were things that 
they needed to defeat the Russian army as they came across the 
border around the country.
    Those things were provided in good order. They were used 
extremely well by the Ukrainians.
    As the conditions changed, so too did the requests from the 
Ukrainians in terms of what they thought was necessary and, as 
we talked with our Ukrainian counterparts, what we thought 
would be most advantageous and available to them. All the 
while, as Dr. Kahl mentioned earlier, balancing it against our 
current readiness and our ability to meet any requirements 
around the world.
    Those have certainly morphed over time. And so, as you have 
seen, sir, now, the provision of Bradley Fighting Vehicles, of 
tanks. And our partners make these same assertions. They have 
all been done with these things in mind.
    And I feel very confident that as we go forward we will 
continue to do so and make decisions in a very thoughtful and 
understanding manner.
    Mr. Norcross. Exactly my point, that we are not holding 
back because of these red lines or nuclear threats. These are 
actual determinations made by what is best for the Ukrainians 
and their use at any time.
    With that, I yield back. Thanks.
    The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
    Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. 
DesJarlais.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Appreciate the 
panel being here for this timely hearing on the oversight of 
U.S. military support to Ukraine.
    Mr. Storch, can you tell us roughly how much money has been 
given total to the Ukrainian war effort since we began last 
year?
    Mr. Storch. Well, it depends a little bit how you count it. 
But I believe it is over $113 billion, approximately.
    Dr. DesJarlais. How much of that is for lethal aid or what 
we would consider standard military equipment?
    Mr. Storch. I am afraid I don't have that number at my 
fingertips.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Have you got a breakdown roughly, 60/40, 
20/80 in terms of what is going to the government, what is 
going to military aid?
    Mr. Storch. There is security assistance, there is economic 
assistance, there is humanitarian assistance. The numbers are 
in the JSOP, but it is approximately, I think, a little over 60 
percent of it is the military assistance.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Okay. And I ask this question because 
whether or constituencies back home are for or against this 
war, they don't have the benefit of the hearings that we have, 
the classified briefings that we have. And so, you know, we 
want to know that we can tell the taxpayers that our money is 
being spent wisely.
    And this hearing today is coming on the heels of a SIGAR 
[Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction] 
report released this week titled ``Why the Afghan Security 
Forces Collapsed,'' in which the Special Inspector General 
reports, among other things, that rampant corruption gradually 
eroded the capabilities of the Afghan National Defense and 
Security Forces, as well as the legitimacy of the Afghan 
government.
    So, we need to make sure we don't make those same mistakes 
in Ukraine.
    And a month ago John Kirby claimed, from the 
administration, that he has not seen any signs so far that our 
budgetary assistance has fallen prey to any kind of corruption.
    Would you agree with that statement?
    Mr. Storch. So, on the issue of corruption, you know, one 
of the reasons we do all these reviews is to ensure the 
integrity of the systems in place and that controls are there 
so to help to prevent it from corruption.
    And as I mentioned, we have DCIS that is there to 
investigate any allegations that might arise.
    With regard to the Afghanistan report I would just say I am 
aware that has been issued. Our folks are looking at that. But 
it is obviously a very different situation in Ukraine, very 
different mission. In Ukraine there aren't large numbers of 
troops on the ground. It is not building the military from the 
ground up. It is primarily a train and supply mission, 
something our office is very well equipped to oversee.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Right. And the Inspector General went on to 
say in his report that the United States played into the hands 
of political leaders and contributed to their corruption by 
spending money faster than it can be accounted for.
    So, I think when we say we spent roughly $100 billion, we 
ought to break that down and have a clearer message from DOD. 
And we have had hearings where we have suggested that to keep 
the public onboard.
    I understand what the strategy is and what the benefit is, 
but we want to make sure the people back home get this. And it 
didn't help last year, for example, in a briefing unnamed 
senior officials said that there was about 100 Kamikaze 
Switchblade drones provided to Ukraine, that they couldn't tell 
where they were, who was using them, and didn't know if they 
would ever know exactly where they had come from--or where they 
would be used at. And so, those type of statements aren't 
helpful.
    But I think that you had mentioned earlier that we have a 
proven model. And maybe you can elaborate and make us feel a 
little bit better that this proven model that you are 
referencing has worked somewhere else and that we are 
accounting for the equipment that we are sending.
    Mr. Storch. Yes, sir, absolutely. We do have a proven 
model, I believe, using the lead IG, IG model that has been 
used in overseas contingency operations showing how we can work 
together as an oversight community to provide comprehensive 
oversight.
    So, we currently are engaged, for instance, on oversight 
over the operation Enduring Sentinel mission, the over-the-
horizon counterterrorism mission that has followed on in 
Afghanistan. And we have a number of projects at DOD OIG 
related to that.
    We are also coordinating with our partners. We report out 
quarterly in public reports on our work in that area. It is 
obviously an area where we have done a lot of other work as 
well.
    But the point of it is, with Ukraine we have not just the 
three of us, but actually 20 different oversight entities, 
including GAO [Government Accountability Office], including all 
the military audit agencies, and all the rest working together 
to ensure that there aren't any gaps, that we are covering the 
waterfront and all types of assistance--security, economic, 
humanitarian, other assistance. That we are doing oversight 
over all of it so that the American public knows that the 
taxpayer dollars are being spent appropriately.
    Dr. DesJarlais. Is there a specific example, like loss 
reports, that is due within a specific time, say 30 days? Or a 
condition that they give us 100 percent accuracy on inventory? 
Or is there anything in place that would make more clarity?
    Because it seems like we all say that this is accounted for 
but yet there is a lot of disparity when we ask for specific 
examples of how we know this equipment's accounted for.
    Mr. Storch. So, we are doing a robust series of oversight 
projects to ensure the accountability of equipment from the 
very beginning until it gets into Ukraine. And then once it is 
in Ukraine we are doing continued work in that critical area. I 
mentioned that----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 139.]
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
California, Mr. Carbajal, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Mr. Chair. And thank you to the 
witnesses for your testimony today.
    We recently marked the 1-year anniversary of Russia's 
illegal invasion of Ukraine. During that year the United States 
and many other nations have stepped up to provide aid. The 
United States has provided approximately $30 billion in 
security assistance. That has been instrumental in allowing 
Ukraine to keep fighting.
    It is important we conduct thorough oversight of taxpayer 
dollars going to this cause. And I think we have been doing 
just that.
    Dr. Kahl, we want the war to end quickly and on Ukraine's 
terms. You stated in your testimony that our goal is to put 
Ukraine in the strongest possible position for future 
negotiations.
    Within the 5-year near-term focus areas, how is the 
Department working with industry to maximize production in 
support of Ukraine and in backfilling our defense stocks that 
have been leveraged to date?
    Dr. Kahl. Thank you for that.
    So, DOD is working with industry to increase production of 
certain capabilities to continue meeting the needs of Ukrainian 
forces while ensuring that the United States is ready to defend 
itself and our allies and partners. And this is that balancing 
act.
    And DOD has identified over $2 billion of industrial base 
investments to increase and/or accelerate production of things 
like Javelin, Stinger, HIMARS, these Guided Multiple Launch 
Rocket Systems, 155-millimeter artillery shells, and Patriot 
missiles.
    And we are also trying to make the best use of the 
multiyear authorities that Congress has given to us to make 
sure that we are getting after the munitions challenges more 
broadly.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you.
    Dr. Kahl, while we hope for a quick end to this conflict, 
we must plan, obviously, for the long term. How do the five 
focus areas evolve over time?
    And what long efforts can we start planning for deployment 
in the long term to ensure that Ukraine has what it needs for 
continued defense against Russia that doesn't seem like it is 
going to go away?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, you know, as the President has said, we are 
in it for as long as it takes. You know, Putin's theory of 
success is that he can outlast everybody, outlast the 
Ukrainians, outlast the United States, outlast NATO and the 
rest of the world. We are going to prove that that is just the 
latest of a string of miscalculations by Putin.
    I think as Lieutenant General Sims noted, what we have 
prioritized has adjusted across the course of the war. So, in 
the initial period of the war, when it was essential for 
Ukraine to win the battle of Kyiv and to use systems they could 
get right now, right away, we emphasized anti-armor systems 
like Javelin; man-portable air defense systems; loitering 
munitions; drones; Soviet legacy ammunition, artillery and air 
defense systems.
    As the conflict shifted to the east, we focused on NATO 
standard artillery systems and, also, providing them HIMARS and 
the GMLRS.
    This winter we have focused on more advanced air defense 
systems, so think NASAMS [National Advanced Surface-to-Air 
Missile System], Patriot, but also armored and mechanized 
systems to help them change the dynamic going into the spring 
and summer.
    And so, we will continue that process as we move forward, 
as Ukraine's needs change. And I do think it is incumbent upon 
all of us to think about what Ukraine needs over the medium 
term to make sure they can defend whatever territory they claw 
back from the Russians, and deter the Russians from going at it 
again when and if there is a halting to the fighting or, you 
know, a peace settlement, or even if there isn't. And so, the 
Department is focused on constantly iterating on that analysis.
    Mr. Carbajal. Do you think we are succeeding to that end?
    Dr. Kahl. I think we are.
    Look, I think that if we are all honest with ourselves 
about where we thought things would be a year ago when Russia 
launched this invasion, I think it was a pretty dire, 
pessimistic assessment. And while I don't know how the war is 
going to end, I think we already know one conclusion for sure 
which is Russia has lost. Russia has lost.
    They intended to take over all of Ukraine. That didn't 
happen. It is not going to happen.
    They intended to divide NATO. NATO is stronger.
    They intended for Russia to emerge out of this war a great 
power in a multipolar world. They will emerge from this 
conflict a shattered military power.
    And so, again, I don't know exactly where the lines, the 
final lines will be drawn when this conflict comes to a close, 
but I know our policy has been successful in keeping a 
sovereign, democratic, independent Ukraine alive, and ensuring 
that Vladimir Putin suffers a loss.
    Mr. Carbajal. Thank you, Dr. Kahl.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentleman.
    Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gaetz, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Gaetz. Mr. Storch, you are our watchdog. Ukraine has a 
corruption problem. Right?
    Mr. Storch. There is a long history of issues with 
corruption in Ukraine. I don't----
    Mr. Gaetz. Infrastructure minister arrested for stealing 
$400,000.
    Deputy head of Zelensky's office can't explain where the 
sports cars came from, so he had to resign.
    Deputy defense minister resigned over contracting 
corruption. But the Defense Ministry put out a statement that 
his resignation was a worthy deed.
    And the wife of a former Ukrainian politician was found 
with $22 million in cash crossing the border into Hungary last 
year.
    It seems as though a lot of the zeal for enforcement of the 
anticorruption effort seems to align with the Republican 
control of the House of Representatives in our country. Maybe 
that is a coincidence.
    But let's get to this end-use monitoring you testified to.
    The Arms Control Act of 1996 requires end-use monitoring 
for certain defense articles that are sold or leased. Right?
    Mr. Storch. Correct.
    Mr. Gaetz. And there is no feature of anything we have 
passed that exempts what we have given to Ukraine from those 
requirements in the Arms Control Act. Right?
    Mr. Storch. Not exempts. There are different provisions as 
to how that plays out in different circumstances.
    Mr. Gaetz. But that is controlling law, controlling policy.
    And here is, here is the upshot. As you testify here today 
you cannot testify truthfully under oath that the DOD has 
complied with the policy and law regarding end-use monitoring 
during all times of this conflict. Isn't that right?
    Mr. Storch. So, I want to be careful here when I respond to 
you, Congressman, to make sure that I am clear.
    We are conducting a series of evaluations that look at the 
controls that DOD has in place to ensure that they are taking 
the steps that are required.
    Mr. Gaetz. I get all that.
    But here is the operative question: We haven't complied 
with end-use monitoring according to the law with everything we 
have sent to Ukraine to date, have we?
    Mr. Storch. So, our 2020 report, which is our last public 
report on this, made a number of recommendations. All of those 
have been----
    Mr. Gaetz. I know. I know. But you are sort of dodging the 
question.
    You cannot testify that we have complied with the end-use 
monitoring requirements at all times during this conflict, can 
you?
    Mr. Storch. So, our, we have an ongoing evaluation right 
now.
    Mr. Gaetz. I get that it is ongoing. I am looking 
backwards.
    You cannot testify that everything has complied with the 
law on the end-use monitoring, can you?
    Mr. Storch. So, some of that gets into the classified 
report that----
    Mr. Gaetz. Right. Right.
    Mr. Storch [continuing]. We issued previously.
    Mr. Gaetz. But I think everyone watching this could see 
that if you could testify to that, you would. You are citing a 
classified report. I don't know why that report is classified. 
I think the American people deserve to know if this 1996 law is 
being followed or not. You can't testify that it is being 
followed. And so I think they can draw reasonable conclusions 
from that.
    Do we have--Dr. Kahl, do we have DOD personnel in Ukraine 
now?
    Dr. Kahl. We do. We have a couple dozen at the embassy.
    Mr. Gaetz. Other than the embassy, any other personnel?
    Dr. Kahl. No.
    Mr. Gaetz. How about CIA [Central Intelligence Agency], are 
there training folks in Ukraine?
    Dr. Kahl. I am not going to talk about that in an 
unclassified setting. Happy to talk about that further in the 
classified briefing.
    Mr. Gaetz. Is the Azov battalion getting access to U.S. 
weapons?
    Dr. Kahl. Not that I am aware of. But if you have 
information, I would be happy to hear it.
    Mr. Gaetz. I seek unanimous consent to enter into the 
record the Global Times investigative report that indicate--
that talks about training. It is from the Atlantic Council's 
Digital Forensics Research Lab citing the Azov battalion was 
even getting stuff as far back as 2018.
    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 89.]
    Mr. Gaetz. Any reason to disagree with that assessment, Dr. 
Kahl?
    Dr. Kahl. Is this the--I am sorry, is this the Global Times 
from China?
    Mr. Gaetz. No. This is----
    Dr. Kahl. That is what you read.
    Mr. Gaetz. Yeah, it might be. Yes. Would that be a 
reasonable----
    Dr. Kahl. As a general matter, I don't take Beijing's 
propaganda at face value.
    Mr. Gaetz. No, no. Yeah, but just tell me if the allegation 
is true or false. I mean, it----
    Dr. Kahl. I don't have any evidence one way or the other.
    Mr. Gaetz. Okay.
    Dr. Kahl. As a general matter, I don't take Beijing's 
propaganda at face value.
    Mr. Gaetz. Fair. Fair enough. I would agree with that 
assessment.
    April 2022 President Biden is describing the supplemental 
funding that we are providing to Ukraine. He says, ``It is also 
going to help schools and hospitals open. It is going to allow 
pensions and social support to be paid to the Ukrainian people 
so they have something, something in their pocket.''
    So, help me understand how the U.S. taxpayer is paying for 
pensions in Ukraine is a good idea for our country?
    Dr. Kahl. I would defer you to other parts of our 
government. The Department of Defense doesn't have a role in 
pensions in Ukraine.
    Mr. Gaetz. You are a senior Biden administration official. 
The President said that it is really important that we keep 
funding the pensions in Ukraine.
    I would observe that the U.S. Census Bureau says that in 
2022 the U.S. pension shortfall is $1.4 trillion. So, while we 
have a corrupt Ukrainian government, while we have our watchdog 
here who can't say that we followed the law in end-use 
monitoring, we have the President of the United States saying 
we need to fund pensions in Ukraine, meanwhile the pensions of 
our fellow Americans are in greater jeopardy.
    Mr. Chairman, I see that my time is expired. But I seek 
unanimous consent to enter a number of articles into the 
record, if I may.
    The Chairman. Without objection, so ordered.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
beginning on page 94.]
    Mr. Gaetz. Very well.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. 
Khanna, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    Dr. Kahl, one of the experts that I was talking to told me 
that Russia has six times the artillery as Ukraine. Is that 
true?
    Dr. Kahl. Not anymore. I think the reality is that we don't 
know precisely how much artillery Russia has left. But we do 
know that they have expended an extraordinary amount of it and 
that they are running low, which is why they are turning to the 
likes of North Korea and others in desperate search of more 
artillery.
    Mr. Khanna. Where would you put the ratio at now?
    Dr. Kahl. It is hard to say. We could talk more about this 
precisely in the classified setting.
    And a lot of it also depends on the assumptions you make 
about the viability of ammunition that Russia has had in 
storage for 40 or 50 years, going back to the Soviet days. So, 
it is a little bit of an art rather than a science.
    I do think the Russians continue to have artillery. But 
they are, they are suffering tremendous shortages at the front 
of artillery, which is why they are turning to countries like 
North Korea.
    Mr. Khanna. And as someone who deeply admires the 
President's policy and Tony Blinken's role, your role, and has 
voted for all the aids packages, I guess my question is what is 
your confidence level at this point that Ukraine will be able 
to hold all the territory it currently holds in a war of 
attrition?
    Dr. Kahl. I think that, as Lieutenant General Sims has 
testified, the front line right now is kind of a grinding slog. 
And you are likely to see incremental gains on both sides.
    So, for example, the Russians have made some incremental 
gains around Bakhmut in recent weeks and months, but at the 
cost of thousands and thousands of casualties in these human 
wave attacks from the Wagner prisoners and others. So, you may 
see small portions of territory change hands in the coming 
weeks and months.
    I do not think that there is anything I see that suggests 
the Russians can sweep across Ukraine and make significant 
territorial gains any time in the next year or so. And we are 
making sure the Ukrainians have the capabilities to stop them 
from doing that, while at the same time giving them the 
capabilities to go on the offensive themselves to claw back 
more territory.
    Mr. Khanna. And I assume, Dr. Kahl, your assumption is 
contingent on the House continuing to support Ukraine with aid, 
or are you saying already with what we have given?
    Dr. Kahl. No, I mean, well, so, first of all the House, the 
Senate, the American people have been extraordinarily generous. 
We have spent about $31.7 billion in security assistance over 
the last year. We have about $12 billion remaining from the 
money that you all provided at the end of last year for the 
remainder of this fiscal year.
    It is true that Ukraine continues to depend on assistance 
from the United States and our allies and partners. And that 
will be true for some period of time.
    So, yes, if the world walked away from Ukraine, then the 
balance would tip in Russia's favor. But there is no reason to 
believe that----
    Mr. Khanna. And how many more rounds of aid do you expect? 
And I say this as someone who supported them and wants to 
continue to support them. But just in terms of the American 
public, how many more times do you think Congress needs to 
provide aid?
    Dr. Kahl. You know, it is difficult. And it is difficult 
because we don't know the course and trajectory of the 
conflict. The conflict could end 6 months from now, it could 
end 2 years from now, or 3 years from now.
    I think the President has said that the United States will 
continue to support Ukraine for as long as it takes.
    I think we have had a good conversation today about why 
that is in the vital national interest of the United States. 
So, I would hope that Congress would continue to be supportive.
    But we should only come and ask for what Ukraine really 
needs and, as this conversation has said, what we can account 
for and demonstrate to the American people is actually 
benefitting our interests.
    Mr. Khanna. And what do you think at the end is the end 
game? I mean, obviously we talk about a just peace. What does 
that look like to you? And how does--how do we get there?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, of course, Ukraine has detailed its 
principles for a just peace. We just had more than 140 
countries in the U.N. General Assembly essentially ratify their 
approach.
    I think a just peace would involve Russia withdrawing from 
the territory that they have illegally occupied from Ukraine. 
But, ultimately, the Ukrainians are going to be the ones that 
determine what peace settlement is--is acceptable or not.
    Our position has been to make sure that at whatever point 
they enter into those conversations they do so from a position 
of strength.
    Mr. Khanna. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Thank the gentleman.
    Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Waltz, 
for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Kahl, did we successfully deter Russia from invading 
Ukraine? Did deterrence work?
    We had a whole series of diplomatic, economic, sanctions, 
the most powerful sanctions the world has ever seen, not to 
mention our ongoing security assistance at the time. Did that 
work? Was it successful?
    Dr. Kahl. Clearly, because he invaded Ukraine, Putin was 
not deterred.
    Mr. Waltz. So, it is safe to say deterrence failed in this 
case?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, one possibility is also that Putin was not 
deterrable as it related to going into Ukraine. He has been 
deterred as it relates to going after the United States or 
NATO.
    Mr. Waltz. So, you would postulate that no matter what we 
provided Ukraine, deterrence would have failed?
    Dr. Kahl. I actually think our intelligence community is 
split on this view. Their, their assessment was that almost no 
amount of weapons prior to the conflict could have deterred----
    Mr. Waltz. I ask this----
    Dr. Kahl. [continuing]. Putin going into Ukraine.
    Mr. Waltz. Well, I ask this in the sense that I was in 
Ukraine the month before, and at the time the answer that the 
Ukrainians were receiving, that we received was that Stingers, 
too escalatory; anti-ship missiles, too provocative; long-range 
artillery, certainly off the books and improbable. Other things 
will take too long to train on.
    And what we have seen is Stingers, too provocative; then we 
provide them. Harpoons, too provocative; then we provide them. 
HIMARS, can't do that; then we give them. Patriots, absolutely 
not; then we give them. Tanks, Bradleys, heck no, takes too 
long; now here we are a year later, we are providing them.
    I think, you know, as we are patting ourselves on the back, 
providing an ally the arms they need to defend themselves if we 
have decided it is within our interests after entire cities and 
whole regions have been devastated, probably isn't a good 
strategy. Would you agree with that?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, we did provide hundreds of millions of 
dollars in assistance in the months leading up to the war. And 
then, of course, Congress----
    Mr. Waltz. Actually, if we really rewind the clock, I mean 
starting in 2014, we provided only non-lethal aid until 2017. 
Was that a mistake?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, you know, I was then national security 
advisor to then-Vice President Biden----
    Mr. Waltz. Yes. That is why I am asking.
    Dr. Kahl [continuing]. And he favored providing lethal 
assistance like Javelins. That is--everybody knows that.
    Mr. Waltz. And the Obama administration----
    Dr. Kahl. Made a different decision.
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. Decided. Was that a mistake?
    Dr. Kahl. I think in retrospect we should have provided 
them Javelin missiles. That has been the position of then-Vice 
President Biden.
    Mr. Waltz. Which the Trump administration then provided?
    Dr. Kahl. It was a complicated tale----
    Mr. Waltz. Yes, right. All right.
    Dr. Kahl [continuing]. I think as you recall from the 
transcript.
    Mr. Waltz. Let's just, let's move to burden sharing because 
I think this is absolutely an issue I hear from my constituents 
and something we need to, we need to address as a policy 
matter.
    The United States provided $30 billion in security 
assistance. The next nearest is Germany at $3.5, a tenth of 
what we have provided. U.K. less than $3 billion. France less 
than a billion, they are in the hundred--hundred millions. And 
poor Estonia has provided three times, just by percentage of 
GDP [gross domestic product], what France has provided.
    So, all in total, even though our economies of the EU and 
the United States, roughly the same, the Europeans have 
provided less than half of what--what we have. And we haven't 
even gotten into the, you know, the rest that makes up the full 
$100 billion.
    Is that--is that fair? Is that effective burden sharing 
from your perspective?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, obviously we have been working with our 
allies and partners throughout. And the Secretary of Defense 
has held now nine of these Ukraine Defense Contact Groups. They 
meet monthly.
    Mr. Waltz. No, I understand.
    Dr. Kahl. I am going to answer your question.
    Mr. Waltz. Yes.
    Dr. Kahl. If you actually take the top 20 contributors of 
security assistance to Ukraine as a percentage of GDP, the 
United States ranks tenth. And there are a number of European 
countries that are above the bar. You mentioned Estonia. 
Latvia----
    Mr. Waltz. Sure.
    Dr. Kahl. [continuing]. Is also up there. But countries 
like Poland, Finland, Norway, Denmark, the Czech Republic, 
Sweden are all above us as a percentage of GDP. And then some 
of the countries that you mentioned are below us in terms of--
--
    Mr. Waltz. But I am talking about the--I mean right on the 
front lines, clearly in their interests, Germany in particular, 
what have we done to get Germany, and France, and Italy, and 
these large economies clearly in the heart of NATO, in the 
heart of Europe, and directly, if we buy into the matter that 
this is in our interests because if Putin slices through 
Ukraine he will keep going, what have we done effectively to 
get them to step up to the plate at least dollar for dollar or 
dollar for euro?
    Dr. Kahl. I mean, I think the Defense Department has 
certainly worked alongside the White House and the State 
Department on diplomacy in this regard from the very beginning. 
That is why the Secretary of Defense holds these monthly 
meetings. They started in Ramstein Air Base in Germany.
    The Germans as of now have provided $3.58 billion. The U.K. 
has provided $2.85 billion.
    Mr. Waltz. I read out the statistics.
    Dr. Kahl. Yes.
    Mr. Waltz. I would just postulate going forward over the 
long term, just as we had in the Gulf War where we had an 
effective diplomatic effort to pay for this, this is a global 
issue----
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Chair now recognizes----
    Mr. Waltz [continuing]. I think we need to do a lot more to 
[inaudible].
    The Chairman [continuing]. The gentleman from 
Massachusetts, Mr. Keating, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Waltz. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I want to thank the Chair and the ranking member for having 
this hearing on an ongoing basis on an important issue of 
oversight.
    This is an all-of-government approach that we have here. 
Secretary Yellen is in Ukraine right now. And we do have 
sanctions that no country has ever seen before.
    In terms of your area particularly, Mr. Storch, or for 
anyone that is here, some of those new sanctions, how helpful 
will they be in terms of the people that are trying to skirt 
those existing sanctions and get around them?
    And how helpful will they be in the overall effort?
    Mr. Storch. Well, I will just start from the oversight 
perspective. We have this working group. Part of the working 
group is the Department of Treasury OIG. So, it is probably 
more a question for them than for the DOD OIG because we have 
oversight over the security assistance.
    In terms of a policy decision, that is not really sort of 
what OIG's do, so I will turn it over to Dr. Kahl.
    Dr. Kahl. I will just say I think, obviously, the sanctions 
have put a dent in the Russian economy. We will continue to 
magnify that.
    I think from a DOD perspective, the bigger constraint on 
the Russians is more likely to be the export controls which are 
making it very difficult for Russia to recapitalize the 
military that has been shattered in Ukraine.
    Mr. Keating. Just a quick question: Does Germany have 
different laws than we do in terms of their defense?
    Dr. Kahl. I mean, all the allies and partners we work with 
have different constraints, different laws.
    You know, Germany was not--one of the reasons we didn't 
provide lethal assistance back in the Obama administration was 
because Germany was so opposed to doing it. So, the fact that 
they provide any lethal assistance was a huge sea change for 
them.
    Now, I know that is frustrating for a lot of folks who want 
our allies and partners to do the most they can. We share that 
desire. But, yes, our allies and partners all have their own 
domestic political constraints, their own domestic regulations. 
And a lot of them have had to change their own laws and 
practices in order to provide the historic support for Ukraine 
that we have seen.
    Mr. Keating. Question. You know, when we read something in 
the newspaper regarding someone being dismissed from his 
position in Ukraine and being replaced, you know, this is a 
sovereign issue that each country has. They make their own 
decisions.
    But just a question, and I want to do this so we can avoid 
classified setting, just a question generally. If those 
decisions are made and they deal--do deal with something that 
would be a concern in our oversight and everything, is that 
communicated to the U.S. and their allies informally?
    Dr. Kahl. I would say sometimes we are aware of the moves 
before they happen, and sometimes we are aware when we read 
about them just like you do. I think the point from our matter 
of U.S. policy is the importance of getting after corruption, 
in Ukraine or anywhere else, is at the top of our points of 
emphasis with Ukrainian leaders.
    I do think they are taking these issues seriously. I think 
it is a problem they are going to continue to work on. But the 
fact that they are making any progress in the midst of this 
existential fight I think is quite remarkable, frankly.
    Mr. Keating. Thank you.
    Mr. Storch, just an observation. I was a prosecutor before 
I was a Member of Congress. And, you know, when there is a line 
of questioning that occurs and your job is one of monitoring 
and an ongoing investigation, whether something is there or not 
but you are in the process of doing it, and you are asked a 
question publicly about what the outcome of that might be 
before it ever occurs, that must put you in a very difficult 
position to answer a question and it might give the perception 
you are not answering the question when, indeed, you are not 
able to answer the question if you are doing your job properly.
    Do you want to comment on, sometimes on the difficulty of 
that line of questioning when it is posed in a public setting 
like it is here?
    Mr. Storch. I appreciate, very much, the observation. And 
that is exactly right, obviously.
    You know, our job in the IG community is to do independent 
oversight. And as an old boss of mine used to say, we hit it 
right down the fairway. I can't do that in golf, but my office 
does that in oversight. So, we are looking at these issues. We 
are trying to determine what happens. And we are going to 
report out as transparently as we can.
    But to try to get ahead of an ongoing audit, or evaluation, 
or to talk about, I can't even begin to speculate about 
investigations, puts me--puts us in a very difficult position. 
So, I appreciate the sensitivity.
    If I can on corruption, I would just add when I was over in 
Kyiv, that was one of the things we really emphasized, both 
myself and my counterparts from the other two OIGs. And we met 
with everybody up to the prime minister and down the minister 
of defense and others, the importance of ensuring that 
corruption was being addressed and that we are being 
transparent about it. They all said they understood that.
    Now, obviously, as a career prosecutor and an IG, you know, 
we are in the trust-but-verify business. But certainly they 
indicated that they understand that issue.
    And, finally, I would just add that sort of in one of 
life's coincidences, I actually previously worked in Ukraine as 
a resident legal advisor for the Department of Justice, working 
on anti-corruption issues. So, I hope that perspective helps my 
office as we look at what is going on here.
    Mr. Keating. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Indiana, Mr. Banks, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Banks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Dr. Kahl, you helped write the dangerous Obama-era Iran 
deal, the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action]. You 
helped negotiate it.
    Last November, President Biden was caught on video saying 
the deal was dead. Yet, just this month the administration has 
renewed sanctions waivers that are key to the deal.
    Why, in your opinion, is the Biden administration so 
hellbent on reentering the new Iran deal?
    Dr. Kahl. Thank you for your question.
    Just as a technical matter, I was not involved in the 
negotiation of the Iran deal.
    Mr. Banks. You helped write it. Is that fair?
    Dr. Kahl. I didn't. But I----
    Mr. Banks. You were, you were involved with it?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, I worked in the administration when the 
deal was negotiated.
    The President, and Secretary Blinken, and others in the 
administration have made clear that we are not about to reenter 
the JCPOA any time soon.
    Mr. Banks. Why did they attempt to reenter it?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, because Iran's nuclear progress since we 
left the JCPOA has been remarkable. Back in 2018, when the 
previous administration decided to leave the JCPOA, it would 
have taken Iran about 12 months to produce one fissile, one 
bomb's worth of fissile material. Now it would take about 12 
days.
    And so, I think there is still the view that if you can 
resolve this issue diplomatically and put constraints back on 
their nuclear program, it is better than the other options. But 
right now, the JCPOA is on ice because there was an arrangement 
on the table last summer that the Iranians were not willing to 
take.
    And, of course, Iran's behavior has changed since then, not 
the least of which their support for Russia in Ukraine, which 
is the subject of the conversation here today.
    So, I don't think we are on the precipice of reentering the 
JCPOA.
    Mr. Banks. So, you are declaring defeat for the new Iran 
deal on behalf of the Biden administration?
    Dr. Kahl. I think our view, actually I am just stating what 
both the President and Secretary of State have already said, 
which is that the JCPOA is not on the horizon in the near term.
    The administration's position remains that a diplomatic 
deal to put constraints around Iran's program remains the best 
alternative to prevent Iran from getting a nuclear weapon.
    But the President has also made clear that his policy is 
that Iran will not get a nuclear weapon, period. And that if a 
diplomatic outcome is not possible, that we have other options 
to deal with that problem.
    Mr. Banks. So, does it concern you that Putin and China are 
on the side of negotiating the same deal that you helped craft 
during the Obama administration?
    Dr. Kahl. There are no active P5+1 [U.N. Security Council's 
five permanent members plus Germany] negotiations, so China and 
Russia being at the table or not being at the table are not 
terribly germane.
    Mr. Banks. Can you shed light for us on why we tapped 
Russians to help negotiate on America's behalf in the renewed 
negotiations during the Biden administration?
    Dr. Kahl. It is not clear to me what you are referencing. 
But I think that during the Obama administration, at least, the 
Russians were able to compartmentalize differences that we had 
in some areas and the common view of not wanting Iran to get a 
nuclear weapon.
    I think we are not in the same place right now because the 
Russians, because of how badly they are doing in Ukraine, are 
becoming increasingly dependent on Iran and, therefore, I think 
are a lot less likely to put pressure of any kind on Iran to 
accede to any diplomatic agreement because they are trying to 
get Iran to ship them more drones, missiles, and other 
capabilities.
    Mr. Banks. In 2021, did you expect the invasion of Ukraine?
    Dr. Kahl. In 2021? Well, in 2021 we warned the world 
about----
    Mr. Banks. Before.
    Dr. Kahl. I am sorry?
    Mr. Banks. You expected it? You anticipated it?
    Dr. Kahl. Beginning in the fall I think it is of public 
record, beginning in the fall we had very good intelligence 
that Vladimir Putin was putting the pieces in place to be able 
to carry out a large-scale invasion. We began to downgrade, 
declassify, and share that information with the world in the 
fall of 2021.
    Mr. Banks. Then why--shed light for us then, why did the 
Biden administration lift sanctions on Nord Stream 2 if we 
anticipated it?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, I think the timelines are different in 
those. You should correct me if the record is different. I 
believe the Nord Stream conversations were several months 
before. And, largely, that was in order to stay united with 
Germany, but also to give us a leverage point.
    In fact, what is interesting is that had that not gone 
forward, the ability of Germany to then essentially walk away 
from the deal would not have been effective punishment or 
leverage over the Russians. But these were not linked in time.
    Mr. Banks. In hindsight should we regret the decision to 
lift those sanctions?
    Dr. Kahl. You know, I work at the Defense Department. I 
wasn't involved in any of those deliberations, so I would 
really defer----
    Mr. Banks. You don't have an opinion about it?
    Dr. Kahl. [continuing]. Those questions to the Treasury 
Department and State Department.
    I don't have, I don't have an opinion on that conversation. 
No, I don't.
    Mr. Banks. Okay. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Dr. Kahl. Thanks.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 
Pennsylvania, Ms. Houlahan, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Houlahan. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    I have been a staunch advocate for providing support to 
Ukraine since President Putin's unjustified invasion just about 
a year ago. Given my past in the Air Force, it probably isn't a 
shock to anyone that I am particularly advocating for the 
transfer of American aircraft. In fact, I started doing that in 
April of last year and, most recently, in a letter with my 
colleagues from the For Country Caucus.
    We asked President Biden to transfer specifically F-16 
aircraft to the Ukrainian military, as President Zelensky 
requested.
    I understand that on Friday that President Biden said in an 
interview that Ukraine ``doesn't need F-16s now.'' And on 
Sunday, NSA [National Security Advisor] advisor Jake Sullivan 
emphasized that ``F-16s are a question for a later time.''
    Last year I also proudly co-led a bill with our former 
colleague Rep. Kinzinger to authorize funding to provide 
training for Ukrainian fighter pilots, recognizing that, of 
course, training may need to happen before they are ready to 
fly our jets, and in the event that we ultimately do transfer 
them.
    We submitted this language for inclusion in last year's 
NDAA. And the final law included that language authorizing the 
United States to provide training for Ukrainian soldiers, both 
on manned and unmanned aerial capabilities, including tactical 
surveillance systems, and fixed and rotary aircraft, such as 
attack, strike, airlift, and surveillance aircraft.
    So, my two or three questions for you. Under Secretary 
Kahl, in your written testimony you noted that you have 
expanded U.S.-led training of Ukrainian air forces on combined 
arms and joint maneuver operations. Could you speak to whether 
or not this training included aircraft such as authorized by 
the fiscal year 2023 NDAA?
    That is my first question.
    My second question also for you is what exactly would a 
later time be as, you know, quoted by President Biden?
    And we may, finally, have to save this for our classified 
briefing, but could you please elaborate on what information 
the President is relying on, or perhaps was relying on, when he 
said that Ukraine doesn't need F-16s now, despite pleas from 
Ukraine's own president?
    Dr. Kahl. Thank you for that.
    So, no, we have not started training on F-16s. Our 
assessment is that a delivery timeline for F-16s, even on the 
most expeditious timeline, and the training timelines are 
essentially the same, that is they are about 18 months. So, you 
don't actually save yourself time by starting the training 
early, in our assessment.
    And since we haven't made the decision to provide F-16s, 
and neither have our allies and partners, it doesn't make sense 
to start to train them on a system they may never get. I mean, 
they could end up getting British Tornadoes, or Gripens, or 
Mirage aircraft. And, therefore, you wouldn't want to train 
them on F-16s.
    So, it just, in our judgment, is not the appropriate time 
to start training.
    It is true that the President has, and the National 
Security Advisor have said that, you know, we don't see F-16s 
as the top priority right now. The President did have this 
conversation with President Zelensky in Kyiv last week. It is a 
priority for the Ukrainians but it is not one of their top 
three priorities.
    Their top priorities are air defense systems, that is 
keeping their interceptors and air defense network alive 
against Russian cruise missiles and the like, and Iranian 
drones.
    Artillery and fires, which we have talked about, and armor 
and mechanized systems.
    A couple of just data points on F-16s that I think actually 
speaks to your second and third questions. We have looked at 
this very carefully about what it would take to get Ukraine F-
16s. So, if we were to do new production it would take 3 to 6 
years to get them F-16s. We could look at older-block F-16s 
that could potentially deliver on a faster timeline, let's call 
it 18 to 24 months. Maybe you can even shave a few months off 
of that.
    Then the question would be how many? The Ukrainians have at 
times asked us for as many as 128 fourth-generation aircraft, a 
mix of F-15s, F-18s, and F-16s.
    Our Air Force estimates that over the long term Ukraine 
would probably need 50 to 80 F-16s to replace their existing 
air force. If you do that--if you did that with new F-16s, so 
say block 70, 72s, that would cost $10 or $11 billion.
    If you did it with older block 30 or 32 aircraft, and let's 
imagine you only did half, 36 of those, it would still cost $2 
to $3 billion. And just as a reminder, that would consume a 
huge portion of the remaining security assistance that we have 
for this fiscal year.
    So, these are the tradeoffs that we are making in real 
time. Would it make sense to, you know, spend $3 billion on a 
capability that will arrive a year and a half from now when 
that $3 billion is needed for Patriot interceptors, or more 
Bradley Fighting Vehicles, or more 155-millimeter ammunition, 
or more GMLRS, et cetera, et cetera?
    And so that is the trade--tradeoffs we are making at the 
moment.
    Ms. Houlahan. I am nearly out of time. I appreciate that.
    I guess my only concern is when we started talking about 
this 10 months ago, 10 months has gone by. And so I just don't 
know when the clock should start. And when we see that this----
    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 139.]
    Ms. Houlahan. I appreciate it. I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Louisiana, Mr. Johnson, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for 
being here. Very important topic, very timely.
    I had a couple more questions about the end-use monitoring 
for Mr. Storch.
    Your office published a report in October stating that the 
Department of Defense was unable to provide end-use monitoring 
in accordance with DOD policy because of the limited U.S. 
presence in Ukraine. So, the report identified the challenges 
that the DOD personnel who are responsible for conducting end-
use monitoring and enhanced end-use monitoring face when there 
is no U.S. personnel present, or at least limited presence 
there.
    Have we learned any lessons or discovered any best 
practices to improve that end-use monitoring in Ukraine despite 
the lack of people there on the ground?
    Mr. Storch. So, to be clear, the report that was issued in 
October of 2022 was a classified report. So, happy to talk more 
in detail about that during the later session.
    I believe it is accurate to say that what the report did is 
it acknowledged the challenges that are faced in those 
circumstances such as they were in Ukraine, and the steps that 
were being taken at the time to try to address those.
    Now, as I say, happy to talk more.
    The reason we initiated the current evaluation, and the 
reason I didn't want to get ahead of what we are finding, is 
that as the situation changes, and conditions on the ground 
evolve, we want to go back and we are going back and looking at 
what is going on now, what steps have been taken to try to 
address those challenges, and where they are, and how things 
move forward. And, frankly, Congressman, given the importance 
of the issue, I think that is something we are going to be 
looking at as long as this goes on. Right? And so, that is 
where we are.
    Mr. Johnson. And I think we agree we have to do that. We 
owe it to all involved.
    And I know that there are classified portions. There 
probably are unclassified things that you could discuss. But 
does the Department have any concerns about the self-reporting 
that is coming out of Ukraine?
    So, you know, specifically Ukraine, we all know Ukraine has 
a documented history of corruption and government waste in the 
past. I know a lot of that is being alleviated. But what gives 
you confidence that the Ukrainians are being entirely 
forthcoming and transparent with us when it comes to what we 
have seen so far?
    Mr. Storch. So, you know, at some level that is why we do 
these audits and reviews; right? Okay, so we want to go, we 
want to look at the evidence, and then be able to assess 
independently where things are.
    As I mentioned, I went to Kyiv. We met with the prime 
minister, we met with the minister of defense. They told us 
they understood the importance of addressing corruption.
    When we were out there actually, coincidentally, a number 
of corruption cases had been announced. They very strongly 
pointed out those did not involve U.S. security assistance or 
U.S. assistance generally. But having said that, they were 
corruption cases. And the point they were making is they were 
trying to address them.
    So, as I say, I have got a long history. I have been going 
out to Ukraine and working out there on behalf of the United 
States Government for more than 15 years, and in the anti-
corruption area. And so, I, you know, I hear what they are 
saying.
    And then we are in the trust-but-verify business. And the 
way we do that on this issue is by doing these evaluations that 
look at what is actually going on. Because, again, there is 
sometimes a misunderstanding. We at the DOD OIG, we don't go 
out and count the--count the missiles. Right?
    Mr. Johnson. Right.
    Mr. Storch. We don't do the monitoring. It is up to the DOD 
to meet the requirements of the law and the policies that 
implement it regarding monitoring. And then we do oversight to 
make sure that is happening, that it is happening in accordance 
with the law, and it is happening appropriately. And we make 
recommendations to help the DOD to improve that.
    So, that is the process we are engaged in now and, as I 
say, I think we are going to continue to be engaged in.
    Mr. Johnson. There are just some inherent challenges, as we 
are acknowledging, that when people are--we don't have DOD 
personnel there. So, we want to ensure, of course, that, you 
know, sensitive weapons end up where they are supposed to be. 
And do you think that we need U.S. inspectors on the ground to 
do that? Or I mean, we are trust but verify, what are the 
details of that, I guess?
    Mr. Storch. I am sorry, do you mean from my office or DOD 
personnel?
    Mr. Johnson. Well, U.S. inspectors.
    Dr. Kahl. I can talk to that a little.
    Mr. Johnson. Okay.
    Dr. Kahl. I can talk to that a little bit.
    So, first of all, you know, we are not just taking the 
Ukrainians' words for it. They are, they provide us information 
on their inventories, their transfer logs.
    We have provided them handheld scanners. That data gets 
transmitted directly back to us so that we can keep custody.
    We have shared NATO standard inventory and logistics 
software, which we also have access to that data.
    And then, of course, we do have a presence at the embassy. 
We have an Office of Defense Cooperation. And they have done 
six different site visits out from Kyiv. These are day trips. 
That is a dangerous place, and we don't have outposts across 
the country. And they have seen no signs of diversion, or that 
the Ukrainians are not following procedure.
    So, look, this is an active combat zone. And it is not like 
Iraq and Afghanistan where we have thousands of soldiers all 
over the country. So, there are inherent restrictions. But we 
are trying to maximize the use of technology and the people we 
do have on the ground to get the best site picture as possible. 
And then, of course, the IG will do oversight to make sure we 
are doing our job the right way.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. 
Sherrill, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
    I recently met with many of our NATO allies and members of 
the Ukrainian Parliament, and two things really became clear. 
One is that U.S. leadership has been effective. We have 
overseen a lot of the support for Ukraine. And our allies 
appreciate that, as well as our intelligence sharing.
    The Chairman. I don't think your microphone is on. Yeah, 
you might want to borrow Ms. Escobar's or Ms. Slotkin's.
    Ms. Sherrill. Steal Ms. Slotkin's.
    The Chairman. There you go.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
    I was saying that two things have really become clear. U.S. 
leadership has been instrumental in this fight and has been--
that has been noted by our allies across the world, and 
appreciated.
    But sadly, what has also become clear is the broad-scale 
use of war crimes by the Russians. Kidnapping of children, over 
6,000 verified cases. And that is simply what we are able to 
verify. I would say that is very low.
    Rape, rape of mothers in front of their children, young 
children. Rape of daughters and mothers.
    As I am hearing from my Ukrainian community as they come 
into the district, targeting of civilian infrastructure.
    And so, it becomes clear. And when you hear from the 
Ukrainian parliamentarians you hear that they believe this is 
an attempt by the Russians to demoralize them, to make them 
want to quit this fight, when in fact it has had the opposite 
effect and understanding of why this fight is so important.
    And so, that is why we on this committee take our, take our 
job so very seriously for making sure that we can support 
Ukraine. And the only way we can continue to do that 
effectively is with the support of the American people.
    And so, our understanding of the oversight, our 
understanding of how Ukrainians are overcoming their history of 
corruption is so important so we can convey it.
    And I--I really appreciate your explanation of all of the 
measures we have in place. But I don't think what is coming 
through is what I heard when I was on the ground in Kyiv from 
the embassy, that they are seeing all--the weapons that come in 
get to the front. They are getting pictures of those weapons on 
the front lines. They are seeing them in use. They feel very 
confident that the weapons that we provide them at the border 
of Poland are in fact making it to the front. And we are 
certainly seeing their effective use time and time again.
    Can you talk a little bit more about why we believe that 
the weaponry that we have sent to Ukraine is in fact making it 
to the front, and how we have not seen the use--we have not 
seen those weapons, for example, for sale on international 
markets?
    And maybe that is a question for Dr. Kahl. I think, Mr. 
Storch, you are doing the aftermath of it. But how do we feel 
right now in time about providing all the assistance we have 
provided to Ukraine and our confidence that it is actually 
getting where we want it to go?
    Dr. Kahl. So, part of it is what we are seeing and part of 
it is what we are not seeing.
    So, what we are not seeing is any evidence of significant 
diversion. I think our assessment is if some of these systems 
have been diverted it is by Russians who have captured things 
on the battlefield, which always happens. But that there is no 
evidence that the Ukrainians are diverting it to the black 
market or some other [inaudible].
    That is not surprising, given the intensity of the fight 
and the fact that they are clearly using what we are providing 
them and what our allies and partners are providing them to 
maximum effect. So, they are asking us for more because they 
are using everything that we have provided them.
    I would just say as a general matter, you know, the 
inventory comes in to the various places in Europe where the 
security assistance flows in. All that inventory is taken note 
of. It is scanned, et cetera. It gets given to the Ukrainians. 
They are responsible for giving us the information on where it 
ends up and the logs of that information, sharing with us 
digital confirmation of where things go.
    They also have scanners. That information comes back to us. 
And they have this NATO standard software that helps keep 
inventory, which we also have access to that information. And 
we do these site visits.
    So, look, this is an active war zone. There are always 
going to be things that you don't know are happening or you 
don't see. But we are not seeing any evidence of systemic 
diversion of the equipment that the United States has provided.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you.
    And in my final few seconds, is there more we could be 
doing as a committee to support ensuring that the weapons are 
being used appropriately?
    Mr. Storch. Well, I would just say hearings like this are 
great. I think oversight and transparency is really important.
    The things that Dr. Kahl talks about, that is the 
information that we are getting as we have our teams out there 
doing evaluations, looking at every aspect of the security of 
this equipment from the beginning until it gets to the front 
lines in Ukraine. And to make sure that everything that can be 
done is being done to ensure that it is being used properly and 
as intended.
    So, I think hearings like this are great. And we appreciate 
the committee's support as we do our oversight. And we will 
keep you informed as we go forward.
    Ms. Sherrill. Thank you. With that I yield back.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. I thank the gentlelady.
    Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Mrs. 
McClain, for 5 minutes.
    Mrs. McClain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    And I would like to thank Mr. Rogers for giving me the 
opportunity to go on a CODEL [congressional delegation] and 
actually see the inventory of weapons that we are sending, and 
just how they are getting from point A to point B and how we 
are tracking them. You know, that, I can assure you, raised my 
level of confidence.
    There is a saying: one look is worth a thousand reports.
    But I want to shift gears for just a moment because 
although I think we are doing some things very well, I think we 
need a little bit of a reset with the American people, or I 
should just say my constituents in my district.
    They have been raising concerns with me about our 
involvement in this war. They are worried that we are getting 
dragged into a never-ending war with no clear and precise 
outcome that has been, in their opinion, right, perception is 
90 percent of reality, that has a clear end in sight.
    They believe that we are spending money and resources on a 
fight overseas rather than getting our own fiscal house in 
order.
    If you could, and anyone can answer, in simple terms just 
lay out to the American people the reasons why it is so 
important for Ukraine to defeat Russia in this war, 
particularly from the eyes of the Americans?
    So, what is the implications for the United States if 
Russia actually does defeat Ukraine?
    Dr. Kahl. I think the implications would be both in Europe 
and felt around the world. You know, the United States did get 
dragged into two world wars in Europe because aggressors 
weren't stopped. Aggressors, you know, initiated their 
conflict. The free world didn't hang together. The aggressors 
weren't deterred, they weren't stopped. And so the United 
States eventually was dragged into those conflicts. So, we 
don't want to see that happening again.
    Mrs. McClain. So, it is a deterrent--and I don't mean to 
put words in your mouth--but it is more of a deterrent so we 
don't end up into a world war?
    Dr. Kahl. I think it is to demonstrate to other would-be-
aggressors that if they engage in the type of aggression that 
Russia has, they would face similar consequences.
    And I think it will matter very much, for example, if you 
are sitting in Beijing wondering about crossing the Taiwan 
Strait. You will ask yourself, if I do that will the world 
react like they did when we went after and absorbed Hong Kong, 
which was to just kind of----
    Mrs. McClain. Yes.
    Dr. Kahl. [continuing]. Look the other way? Or the way the 
world reacted in Ukraine?
    And if it is the latter, then aggression across the Taiwan 
Strait is a lot less likely.
    Mrs. McClain. And can you expand on that, sir, just a 
little bit more? What would a Russian victory or defeat mean 
for China?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, I think, first of all, Russia is China's 
closest ally. They, of course, signed a strategic partnership 
without limits shortly before the war.
    We have seen growing indications that China might be 
considering providing Russia with some assistance, lethal 
assistance, which would be very troublesome.
    So, China has a stake in the outcome here. But, also, I 
think China would, you know, they speak a lot about the 
importance of sovereignty and territorial integrity. But, 
frankly, China would benefit greatly from a world that allowed 
big powers to gobble up their small neighbors.
    Mrs. McClain. And would you care to comment, what would the 
loss of Ukraine mean for NATO?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, first of all, Ukraine is not going to lose. 
There will be no loss of Ukraine. I think Vladimir Putin hoped 
that that would happen. It is not, it hasn't happened, it is 
not going to happen.
    Ukraine continues to maintain most of its territory. They 
are fighting tenaciously. The Russians do not have the 
capacity, in my view, to take over Ukraine.
    But, obviously, if they were to do so it would position 
Russian forces and all the developments inside of Ukraine right 
on Ukraine's door--I mean right on NATO's doorstep as it 
relates to Poland and the Baltic States, which is I think one 
of the reasons why you have seen Poland and the Baltic States 
so engaged in Ukraine.
    Mrs. McClain. And can you talk a little bit about the 
economic impact that that would, that that would mean, or that 
would have on the United States?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, I think, you know, you have already seen 
that Russia's aggression, especially their--what they have done 
to limit the ability of grain to get to global markets through 
the Black Sea, has already had an impact on global security, 
writ large.
    Obviously, the energy instability which is generated by the 
war has also had an economic consequence.
    So, I think the war is already having significant 
consequences because of Russia's aggression. And had it been 
unchecked, I think those consequences would have been worse.
    Mrs. McClain. And we would have been farther along.
    Thank you. With that time, I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from 
Texas, Ms. Escobar, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I would like to 
express my gratitude, Mr. Chairman, to you and the ranking 
member for these ongoing conversations and this opportunity for 
us to provide oversight and for the American people to feel 
comfort, I hope and I believe, with the information that is 
being delivered.
    I would like to thank our witnesses as well.
    You know, I would be remiss if I didn't remark on the 
incredible change that I have seen happen over the last 3 years 
since my--since I attended the Munich Security Conference in 
2019 versus the Munich Security Conference last week or 2 weeks 
ago, whenever it was.
    When I was there in 2019, there was significant question 
about the West and whether the West would continue to support 
NATO and just the fears about how untethered things seemed. But 
last week, or the week before, whenever it was--sorry, time 
escapes me--but this year's Munich Security Conference, the 
incredible unity and the strength demonstrated by our allies 
and our friends, especially with regard to Ukraine and our 
defense of democracy.
    And I am very proud of the role that the United States has 
played in rebuilding NATO and ensuring that the West has come 
together in a way to defend our friends and allies and help 
stop the Russian aggression.
    And I would like to, Dr. Kahl, just in that vein, because 
there has been just such a lot of conversation, obviously, 
about the F-16s and about why the United States and some of our 
friends are not stepping up as quickly as some would like. My 
colleague, Representative Houlahan, she was about to ask a 
question, and I would like to follow that up, because I am 
curious as well.
    But her question, she started as her time ran out, when 
should the clock start on those F-16s? You know, you laid out 
for us very clearly and very effectively, you know, the 
considerations involved, and also the financial implications as 
well, and that is on Congress, right, to make sure that we 
provide the continued support and to put our money where our 
mouth is.
    But when should that clock start ticking for the F-16s? And 
is that something you can discuss in this setting?
    Dr. Kahl. Look, I think it is--you know, a more modernized 
Ukrainian air force will be important in the medium and long 
term for Ukraine to continue to defend the territory that it 
claws back, and to deter Russia in the future. So I think there 
is a medium- to long-term requirement.
    The challenge, of course, is even if it was a short-term 
requirement, we couldn't get it to them immediately anyway, and 
we don't assess that it is the highest short-term priority. 
And, by the way, neither do the Ukrainians. The Ukrainians' 
priorities are air defense systems, so they are integrated air 
and missile defense systems, artillery and fires, armor and 
mechanized. And because every dollar you spend on one is a 
dollar you can't spend on another, there are real tradeoffs.
    Obviously, Ukraine is going to continue having 
conversations with us. As I said, President Zelensky discussed 
this with President Biden in Kyiv last week. Zelensky has had 
similar conversations with our U.K. and French allies. The U.K. 
has announced an interest in starting to do some training, so 
we will see where that leads.
    There are other countries in NATO--the Netherlands, 
Denmark, Norway, I think--that have talked about potentially F-
16s, that they may be offloading as they upgrade to F-35s. So I 
do think this conversation will continue.
    I just--as I sit in the Pentagon, I have to say, what does 
Ukraine need right now to stay in the fight and turn the tide 
against the Russians in the first half of this year, which I 
think is going to be decisive for the conflict. It is just hard 
for me to tell any Member of Congress or the American people 
that the best use of that dollar spent right now is on F-16s.
    Ms. Escobar. Thank you so much, Dr. Kahl. And I only have a 
few seconds left, but I am wondering, in terms of the 
replenishment of U.S. stocks, is the Department looking to 
utilize critical technology such as additive manufacturing to 
fill some of those gaps?
    Dr. Kahl. I think the short answer is yes, but I think it 
is probably better for us to arrange a briefing by our 
acquisitions and sustainment folks to really go through the 
kind of the multilayered approach that they are taking to this, 
because they are the real experts on that.
    Ms. Escobar. Great. Thank you.
    Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes the gentleman from 
Texas, Mr. Fallon, for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chair. You know, our aid 
packages to Ukraine have included light tactical vehicles like 
Humvees. I have been a staunch supporter of the Humvee upgrade. 
You know, when we had to retrofit the Humvees because of the 
risk of IEDs [improvised explosive devices], of course that 
made it top heavy, but we have ABS [antilock brake system] and 
the ESC [electronic stability control] rollover kits that 
prevent that. And we have lost too many men and women to 
rollovers, and a lot have been injured as well.
    So at the beginning of this fiscal year, approximately 
40,000 Humvees that are either new or like new were in our 
fleet, hadn't received the anti-rollover technology.
    And my question for the witnesses is, we are sending 
Humvees to the Ukraine, and where are they coming from? And 
more to the point, are we sending Humvees that have already 
been fully upgraded with the anti-rollover technology? Or are 
we sending Humvees that are slated to get this upgrade? Or are 
they coming from the demilitarized vehicle stockpile?
    Dr. Kahl. I might ask General Sims if he--I don't actually 
know the answer to that question, but D.A. may or we may have 
take it to come back to you.
    General Sims. Sir, I will have to come back to you. We will 
bring that answer back to you. I am not quite sure.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 139.]
    Mr. Fallon. Okay. Because we have Red River Army Depot that 
does a lot of this work, and they are starving at the vine, and 
we have got 40,000, you know, units that need this upgrade and 
I would really like to get that, because it saves about $12 
billion rather than buying brand-new ones to retrofit the ones 
we already have. So we want to always be good stewards of 
taxpayer dollars.
    So for the witnesses as well, one of the initiatives we 
have been working on in our office with our colleague, our 
friend from California, Mr. Panetta, is our Ukraine Human 
Rights Policy Act, and this legislation would take concrete 
steps to hold Russia accountable for their atrocities they are 
committing in Ukraine.
    So what evidence of war crimes have you seen in Ukraine, 
including any committed by the Wagner Group? And as the war 
rages into its second year, what can be done to hold Russia 
accountable for their actions? And then what can be done during 
reconstruction?
    Dr. Kahl. You know, I think our colleagues at the State 
Department would probably be better at cataloguing all of the 
horrors, but we have all seen it. There has been a systematic 
targeting of civilians in Ukraine, clearly a callous disregard 
for civilian welfare, but, you know, this winter the targeting 
of critical infrastructure, literally intending to starve and 
freeze tens of millions of people for no military purpose other 
than to try to compel the Ukrainians to give up, but certainly 
in violation of the laws of armed conflict.
    We have seen Russian troops engage in terrible atrocities, 
killing civilians, killing detained forces, and of course we 
have also seen the deportation of Ukrainian children back to 
Russia, which is among the most heinous of war crimes.
    Mr. Fallon. Doctor, how many are we talking, do you think, 
roughly?
    Dr. Kahl. Thousands, but beyond that, I don't have the 
numbers in front of me. I would encourage you to get a brief 
from the State Department. They have catalogued all of that.
    Mr. Fallon. General, as far as the Wagner Group goes, do 
you know any more specifics on that? Could you shed some light?
    General Sims. Sir, I don't. Again, as Dr. Kahl said, I 
think the State Department could answer that better. But as you 
and the rest of the country have seen, we are certainly 
concerned with what we see reported in the news. And just as--
and I don't mean to segue, sir, but there was a comment earlier 
about the--about Russian atrocities, Russian acts.
    I think, you know, what separates our military, what 
separates Western military certainly from the Russians, is our 
concentration on treating people, you know, the way they should 
be treated, with dignity, on the laws of armed conflict that 
Dr. Kahl mentioned. And I know that--I know that we work hard 
to talk to the Ukrainians about the same things.
    Mr. Fallon. Is Russia a signator, General? Do you know? Is 
it a signator to the Geneva Convention?
    General Sims. Sir, that is a great question.
    Mr. Fallon. Just kind of thought about that. I don't know.
    Dr. Kahl. So they are. And even if they weren't, the Geneva 
Conventions are treated as customary international law, and so 
binding even on states that don't abide--you know, sign up to 
them.
    Mr. Fallon. And, General, is it your professional opinion 
that the Wagner Group is something you would be more concerned 
about because they are not Russian military regulars?
    General Sims. Sir, I think the Wagner Group has given 
plenty of reason to be a concern. I mean, you know, the fact 
that they are recruiting members from prisons certainly gives 
an indication of what kind of character that they are willing 
to recruit.
    Mr. Fallon. But, General, they say they are not doing that 
anymore.
    General Sims. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Fallon. Should we believe them?
    General Sims. You know, sir, I am not sure I would trust 
the words that are coming from the Russian side right now.
    Mr. Fallon. So you are saying, in effect, that 
authoritarian regimes should not be taken at their word, 
regardless of whether it is, say, in Beijing or in Moscow?
    General Sims. Sir, I would agree that, you know, we have a 
system in which I would trust, and they don't have that same 
trust.
    Mr. Fallon. I hope all Members of Congress just heard you. 
Thank you.
    I yield back.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Before we go to the next questioner, I want to remind 
everybody that we have a hard stop at 12:30 to go to the 
classified portion of this hearing.
    The gentleman from Maine, Mr. Golden, is recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I want to start by 
looking back to May of last year and point out that a 
bipartisan group of Members of Congress, including members of 
this committee, have sent the administration letters, and that 
has gone on since April of last year, all the way right up to 
right now, calling for the supply of advanced military 
capabilities to Ukraine quite consistently. So 10 months ago, a 
number of us called for anti-ship missiles, HIMARS, Abrams 
tanks, as well as training on and transfer of F-16s.
    About 5 months ago, once again, a bipartisan group of 
members of this committee called for a long-term defense 
commitment to Ukraine, to include surface-to-air missiles, MLRS 
[Multiple Launch Rocket System], anti-ship missiles, howitzers, 
and, again, training on and transfer of advanced aircraft such 
as the F-16. In my opinion, these letters represent differing 
opinions--policy opinions--about the speed at which the United 
States should seek to deliver advanced fighting capabilities to 
the battlefield in Ukraine.
    Now, I really appreciate the conversation that has been 
going on. Just thinking about things such as F-16 or ATACMS 
[MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System] or previously Abrams or 
HIMARS, I think what we have seen is that there are sometimes 
policy questions and debates and differing opinions. Then there 
are logistical challenges, maintenance, and the training and 
capabilities of the Ukrainian fighters themselves, different 
than policy opinions of a differing nature.
    And, of course, I respect the opinion brought forward by 
Dr. Kahl about authorizations, appropriations, and how do we 
get the greatest ROI [return on investment] on the money that 
you have in hand right now to meet the top priorities of the 
Ukrainian military. But, certainly, given enough money, they 
would prefer to have their top 5 or top 6 or top 10 needs or 
capabilities met.
    And the conversation about authorizations and 
appropriations is really I think a question for Congress as 
opposed to questions of policy or logistical concerns and 
challenges.
    Of course, over the weekend the President, the President's 
national security team, said now is not the right phase of the 
war for providing Ukraine advanced aircraft. That sounds like a 
policy decision. And they have also pointed out that the 
assessment of military commanders advising the President is 
that we need to focus on tanks, armored personnel carriers, and 
infantry fighting vehicles, and such.
    I don't think anyone disagrees with that, sir. And you have 
articulated, really, that this is about how much money do we 
have now, what is the greatest need that they have. But Ukraine 
has articulated a desire to advance their long-range fighting 
capabilities in the form of ATACMS and F-16s.
    So just about over a week ago, the Supreme Allied Commander 
of Europe, U.S. European Command, briefed Members of Congress--
Senate and House reportedly--and said that he believed we 
should send aircraft, drones, ATACMS, to enhance the deep fight 
capabilities of the Ukrainian military.
    Setting aside all the concerns about logistics or 
maintenance, or the readiness of the Ukraine military, General 
Sims, would you agree with his assessment that this would help 
Ukraine to win the war ultimately?
    General Sims. Sir, I have no doubt that the continued 
provision of advanced conventional weapons would help Ukraine 
on the battlefield. No doubt. And I certainly have been 
extraordinarily impressed, as most have, with General Cavoli's 
work in Europe.
    On this side of the Atlantic, the conversation continues to 
be around--certainly about policy decisions, but----
    Mr. Golden. Sure.
    General Sims [continuing]. In our conversations with the 
Ukrainians, as recent as yesterday with General Zaluzhny and 
the chairman, we do hold fast to the view that what they need 
right now are the things in front of them--that F-16s is a good 
example, would not help them today; but things like air 
defense, artillery, fighting vehicles, tanks, is what we need 
to ensure we are providing.
    Mr. Golden. So you don't agree with the EUCOM [U.S. 
European Command] commander that possession of F-16s and ATACMS 
and other long-range capabilities would help them to win the 
war.
    General Sims. No, sir. I think that advanced conventional 
weapons would help anybody win a war.
    Mr. Golden. Yeah. Absolutely.
    General Sims. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Golden. Is there a policy objection to giving them 
longer range fires at this time?
    Dr. Kahl. So I think both the F-16s and the ATACMS issues I 
think are slightly different animals in the field.
    Mr. Golden. Slightly different; but in general, is there a 
policy objection?
    Dr. Kahl. No. Because the F-16s issue is less about a long-
range capability. I think there is a general recognition that 
it will make sense for them over time to transition to fourth-
generation aircraft. It is more about the tradeoffs. The ATACMS 
question----
    Mr. Golden. Just a few more seconds. But just, with that, I 
would just point out, why not expand this conversation beyond 
the near term and the limits of the dollars that you have in 
your possession now and come to Congress with a plan that 
includes near term, medium term, and long term, given that 
whether they win the war now or it drags on for several more 
years, the Russian threat will still remain. So I just think we 
have got to expand the conversation.
    Dr. Kahl. Happy to brief you on that. And, frankly, if you 
come to the classified session, we can also provide some more 
details on it, because we have done some analysis on kind of 
the future Ukrainian force and what that might look like.
    Mr. Golden. Thank you.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from South Carolina, 
Ms. Mace, for 5 minutes.
    Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member Smith, 
for hosting this very important hearing.
    And I want to thank the gentlemen who are here today as 
well to take all of our very important questions. We are here 
to address a critical matter of national security and foreign 
policy in regards to Ukraine, the need for oversight of assets, 
weapons, munitions, and other aid, lethal aid, being provided 
to Ukraine.
    The invasion of Ukraine by Russia has highlighted the 
critical need for rapid aid and support that we are providing 
to that region. The conflict has resulted in heavy losses for 
both sides, but we have seen the Ukrainian forces--they have 
demonstrated their resilience and ability to conduct offensive 
operations, I believe, over the last year to everyone's 
surprise.
    There is no price for resiliency and their belief in their 
freedom and their fight for freedom. They have been on the 
world stage, I think have encouraged and inspired many folks 
around the world. However, their capacity to defend their 
sovereignty and security is dependent on receiving timely and 
effective assistance.
    In particular, we have seen a troubling pattern of delays 
and bureaucratic hurdles, policy decisions that have slowed the 
delivery of aid to Ukraine. I have witnessed this first-hand. I 
have witnessed the State Department slow rolling in some cases, 
particularly at the beginning of the invasion of Russia into 
Ukraine. And it is my belief in the meetings I have had, both 
publicly and privately, and in the SCIF [sensitive 
compartmented information facility], that Ukraine just doesn't 
have a lot of time. And we want to make sure that our 
investment in their fight, that they are going to win.
    It is more important than ever, seeing what Russia is 
trying to do. They want to now take away Poland's borders and 
other countries. Ukraine can't lose this fight, in my 
estimation.
    The situation in Ukraine demands urgent action, a 
commitment to ensuring the lethal aid and support be provided 
expeditiously. Congress and DOD need to take the steps to 
remove any hurdles or address them to ensure the necessary 
resources are available to fight--for Ukraine to fight for 
sovereignty and security.
    Failure to do so would not only endanger Ukraine but also 
undermine global stability, global security, and it is my 
estimation Ukraine is just, I believe, under the gun and just 
does not have very much time left in this endeavor.
    My first question is for Under Secretary Kahl. I am 
concerned about the time it took for the U.S. to fully leverage 
some of our existing processes, like convening the Senior 
Integration Group for Ukraine, SIG Ukraine, to disperse 
military aid to Ukraine.
    And thinking ahead, China and Taiwan, we all know that 
China is watching. Are there any specific improvements you 
would make to the Department's decision-making process to 
ensure the U.S. is proactively readying this important partner 
rather than simply reacting with support? Some of the lessons 
learned? How long did it take to stand up SIG Ukraine? Some of 
what you learned over the last year in this process.
    Dr. Kahl. Thank you for that, and I will just say we share 
your sense of urgency. And there is always going to be red 
tape, but we have blasted through a lot of it. And if you had I 
think told us a year ago that we could have executed on $31.7 
billion in security assistance to anybody, I would have said 
that was bureaucratically impossible, and it is precisely 
because we tried to blast through as much red tape as possible.
    Most of that assistance has come through PDA, Presidential 
drawdown authority. And typically because we pre-position 
things and get our ducks in a row, a lot of that equipment 
starts flowing in within days of the President signing the PDA, 
and Lieutenant General Sims can talk to you more about that.
    In terms of our internal processes, we have two. We have 
something called the cross-department working group, which is 
essentially the group that my office runs, but it has got 
stakeholders from all the services, the Joint Staff, the 
combatant commands, et cetera, to rack and stack Ukrainian 
priorities and figure out the priorities for various PDA and 
USAI packages.
    So that is really about kind of teeing up for the Secretary 
ultimately these recommendations that then go over to the White 
House. We then have the SIG process, which you----
    Ms. Mace. How long did it take to stand up the SIG?
    Dr. Kahl. You know, I would have to get back to you on the 
exact date. I think the SIG was stood up within a couple of 
months of the war.
    [The information referred to can be found in the Appendix 
on page 139.]
    Ms. Mace. Is that fast enough in your opinion?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, I think that we have--I mean, we have stood 
up a lot of processes that are new.
    Ms. Mace. Do you think that Taiwan has a couple of months 
if they----
    Dr. Kahl. We already have a SIG for Taiwan. So to your 
point, so----
    Ms. Mace. Set up and ready to go? So it is all----
    Dr. Kahl. It meets----
    Ms. Mace. It is there?
    Dr. Kahl [continuing]. It meets monthly, chaired by the 
Deputy Secretary of Defense.
    Ms. Mace. Excellent. And then on the working group, their 
cross-department working group, is that working better now than 
it has been before because of the urgency with Ukraine? Have 
you all learned over the last year how to improve some of the 
red tape? I guess, what red tape was removed to make it work 
better, faster, more, in this case?
    Dr. Kahl. Well, just traditionally, we did not provide--you 
know, Presidential drawdown authority has been used to provide 
things in the amount of, you know, hundreds of billions of 
dollars at the upper end, not----
    Ms. Mace. Yeah.
    Dr. Kahl. [continuing]. Tens of billions of dollars. So 
there was a lot of learning curve. Essentially, what we figured 
out was to make sure all of the stakeholders were involved, you 
had an iterated process that culminates in a four-star meeting 
that I chair about every 10 days, and then that pushes 
recommendations up to the chairman and the Secretary, who then 
push those recommendations over to the White House.
    The Chairman. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina----
    Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
    The Chairman [continuing]. Mr. Jackson for 5 minutes.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. General Sims, good 
afternoon. I was wondering if you could help me--help me paint 
a picture for my folks back home of what life would look like 
for Ukrainians were we to step aside, were we to withdraw our 
support, were the coalition that we lead to crumble upon our 
withdrawal of our support, and then were the Russians to gain a 
decisive advantage on the battlefield, what that would mean?
    And I ask you because based on your remarks, you said that 
the fighting has replicated the conditions that we saw during 
the First World War. There was a recent conversation about 
plentiful examples of war crimes that have been committed, and 
I think it is important for me in explaining my support to 
folks back home, to give them a sense of what it would look 
like if our effort no longer existed. Could you help me do 
that, please?
    General Sims. So, sir, I will leave the geopolitical 
conversation to what Dr. Kahl was mentioning earlier, and I 
would tell you a couple of things. First would be, as an 
American, this is what we do. This is what we do. This is what 
we have fundamentally done for decades.
    When people are wronged, we stand up for them. And in this 
case, the invasion of Russia, everyone has said it was illegal. 
Everybody says it was wrong, and that is what we do. And in 
this case, we came together with the allies in Europe in a way 
that we haven't done, really, haven't done in the past 50, 60 
years.
    I mean, I was--so a year ago today, sir, we talked about a 
year ago on the 24th was the invasion, a year ago today I 
deployed with my division headquarters as the division 
commander 1st ID [Infantry Division] to Central Europe. And I 
spent a lot of time in Europe--battalion commander, brigade 
commander--and so I have worked a number of times with our 
allies.
    I had never worked with our allies where the desire, the 
intent to work together, was as firm as it was in the time I 
was deployed. That has not changed. I have been back multiple 
times.
    We were talking earlier about the contributions of our 
partners. There is more than dollars, I would argue, that is 
part of this. We have partners that have skin in the game, and 
so they may not be dedicated in--you know, dedicating the same 
percentage of GDP, but in some cases are dedicating individuals 
who are making critical, really important, contributions to 
what we are doing in terms of security assistance, 
intelligence, working in terms of advising and training with 
our partners.
    That is what we do. We are Americans. And when somebody 
says this is--you know, this is how the world should be, and it 
is not, we say no.
    Dr. Kahl has talked about the rules-based order. Why is 
this important? Because after the Second World War, we came 
together with the majority of the world and said this is--this 
last 5, 10 years, is not how we wish to live in the world. And 
we established the geopolitics that exist today, and we need to 
tell people, we need to do something when people go in the 
wrong direction.
    Why is it important to Americans? Because we believe in 
this group in here, sir, in this oversight process, I--no 
politics. I am an Army guy. No politics. American politics, 
field of study at the Academy. And I would tell you watching 
the oversight here, watching what has occurred in DC, all the 
way to the young man or woman in Poland who is transitioning 
that equipment forward to a Ukrainian who plans to use it, that 
is what we exist for. That is why it matters, sir.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. Now that last piece I would 
like you to expand on. Could you help us visualize what it 
looks like when we make the decision to send them light 
tactical vehicles, all the way to that material being fielded. 
Give us a sense of what that process looks like, how quickly it 
is now moving.
    General Sims. Well, sir, and as Dr. Kahl was talking with 
Representative Mace earlier, we are learning all sorts of 
lessons. I mean, listen, where we were a year ago today and 
where we are now, it is a lightyear's difference, and it is 
because we have smart, capable men and women who are working to 
make the processes more effective and efficient.
    What we have done in terms of moving, it is literally--I 
will say literally moving mountains. If you were to stack up 
all of the things that we have provided, we have literally 
moved mountains, from not just the United States but from 
places that we have that we are working with partners around 
the world.
    And we have moved that incrementally across oceans, in the 
air, with hundreds and hundreds of aircraft and ships, moved 
that to Europe and then it is moved further by our partners and 
by men and women that we all are so proud to have there, all 
the way to a point where a Ukrainian man or woman takes it and 
brings it forward to use it.
    And I know a number of you have seen that, sir, but it is 
pretty impressive.
    Mr. Jackson of North Carolina. My time is over. It has been 
an extraordinary logistical accomplishment on top of other 
accomplishments.
    The Chairman. Chair now recognizes our final questioner 
before we go into classified brief, and that is the gentleman 
from Wisconsin, Mr. Gallagher.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Lieutenant General 
Sims, to what degree do the operational plans within DOD rely 
upon the assumption that we would be only forced to defeat an 
adversary in one theater and deter an adversary in another 
theater?
    General Sims. Well, sir, not to jump into the policy side, 
but, I mean, that is what we are saying we are doing. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Gallagher. So given the growing no-limits security 
partnership between Beijing and Moscow in the year since 
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, can we reasonably argue that 
planning for a confrontation with only one adversary is 
becoming an increasingly dangerous presumption?
    General Sims. Sir, I would argue that the fact that the 
Chinese and the Russians are having conversations about ways 
that they can improve their connections is dangerous to all of 
us as Americans, but I think the current work that we are doing 
takes into account where we are around the world.
    Mr. Gallagher. If Xi Jinping makes the foolish decision of 
arming Russia with weapons, what is on the table in terms of 
our response?
    General Sims. Sir, that one I will definitely leave to Dr. 
Kahl.
    Mr. Gallagher. Dr. Kahl. You could make news here.
    Dr. Kahl. So, first of all, I don't think China's 
leadership wants their intentions and plans to be made public.
    So one of the things we have made clear to them is if we 
have information that they are doing this, we will make it 
public. And this actually, it matters because, as you know, 
China is on a bit of a charm offensive to get back into good 
graces of Europe. That is not going to work, I don't think, 
period, but certainly not if they are providing large amounts 
of lethal assistance to Russia.
    We have also signaled, Secretary Blinken with his 
counterpart at the Munich Security Conference and through other 
channels, that there would be significant costs.
    I am happy, in the classified session, to talk about what 
some of that might look like, but it would be the similar tools 
we have used to impose on others that have violated U.S. 
sanctions.
    Mr. Gallagher. So we are actively trying to deter the CCP 
[Chinese Communist Party] from providing lethal assistance to 
Russia.
    Dr. Kahl. Yes.
    Mr. Gallagher. And, of course, at a broader level, we are 
actively trying to deter the CCP from invading Taiwan by force, 
if necessary.
    Dr. Kahl. Yes.
    Mr. Gallagher. I think this is a perfect example--and I 
know you have talked--well, I just came back from 4 days in 
Taiwan, and I was struck by the--all the national security 
leaders there talked about this increasing strategic 
convergence between Russia and China. I am curious if you see 
it in the same way.
    It is sort of my contention that increasingly Putin is Xi's 
junior partner in a de facto alliance against the West, and I 
think we initially understood the no-limits partnership to be a 
piece of paper, and increasingly it is something real. But I 
would love to get your comment on how you see these two problem 
sets as connected.
    Dr. Kahl. Yeah. I think that is insightful and on the 
money. I think, basically, you know, Russia for a long time has 
not wanted to be China's junior partner, and I think that held 
alive the dream in Washington that you could drive a wedge 
between these two actors.
    I think the war in Ukraine has essentially ended that 
proposition as realistic in the foreseeable future, because 
Russia is going to have to turn to China for technology, for 
economic assistance, to help them reconstitute their military 
after the war, and they are already turning to them now.
    But, by the way, this same calculus is driving them--them, 
the Russians--to have greater convergence with Iran and North 
Korea as well. And so I do think because of how attrited the 
Russian military has been, they have no choice but to, you 
know, move closer to some of these other actors.
    Mr. Gallagher. You have said recently, I believe, though, 
that you don't see a PLA [People's Liberation Army] invasion of 
Taiwan as imminent within the next 2 years.
    Dr. Kahl. Yeah, I think that is right. I just see no 
indications that Xi Jinping thinks his military is ready or 
that the PLA thinks they are ready. I think he has put a date 
on the dartboard for them to be ready--that doesn't mean they 
have made the decision to do it--and that is 2027.
    I think in the interim period, I do not see indications 
that they are likely to make a leap to invade the island of 
Taiwan.
    Mr. Gallagher. But just so I understand, your assessment is 
based on the absence of evidence that--you don't see an 
indication that they are getting ready to invade. I guess----
    Dr. Kahl. Actually, this would be a really interesting 
thread of the conversation for us to talk about in the 
classified setting.
    Mr. Gallagher. Got it.
    Dr. Kahl. Because it is not just about that.
    Mr. Gallagher. Interesting. And just out of curiosity, did 
you--2 years ago, did you view a Russian invasion of the rest 
of Ukraine as imminent?
    Dr. Kahl. As imminent, I did not. But, of course, we had 
indications and warnings, first in April, and then of course in 
the fall, that it was a possibility. And, you know, my 
assessment is based on the information and intelligence that I 
have at the moment. If information and intelligence change, 
then my assessment----
    Mr. Gallagher. Sure.
    Dr. Kahl. [continuing]. Would be updated.
    Mr. Gallagher. And so you disagree a lot of time with 
General Minihan's recent assessment that 2025 is the danger 
zone.
    Dr. Kahl. I do.
    Mr. Gallagher. Thank you.
    The Chairman. The gentleman's time has expired.
    We will start questioning in the classified portion with 
those members who haven't been recognized for questions in the 
public portion.
    So right now we stand in recess for 5 minutes, as we move 
to 2212 for the classified portion of this hearing.
    [Whereupon, at 12:33 p.m., the committee proceeded in 
closed session.]     
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                           A P P E N D I X

                           February 28, 2023
      
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              PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                           February 28, 2023

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                   DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

                           February 28, 2023

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              WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING

                              THE HEARING

                           February 28, 2023

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            RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY DR. DESJARLAIS

    Mr. Storch. The DOD OIG is conducting evaluations at several 
logistics nodes in Europe to assess accountability for equipment as it 
is transported by the DOD to Ukraine, including through ports, rail, 
and air transfer locations. The DOD OIG is also conducting evaluations 
of the DOD's end-use monitoring and enhanced end-use monitoring (EEUM) 
of selected equipment once it has been transferred to Ukraine. Bi-
lateral agreements between the U.S. and Ukraine require Ukraine to 
provide timely loss reports to U.S. Office of Defense Cooperation-
Ukraine representatives. In December 2022, the U.S. and Ukraine signed 
a Concept of Operations that requires Ukraine to provide loss reports 
for U.S. EEUM defense articles within four days. We expect to issue 
several reports that will address the DOD's accountability for 
equipment in transit to Ukraine, and EEUM for defense articles after 
they are transferred to Ukraine.   [See page 26.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. HOULAHAN
    Dr. Kahl. We continuously evaluate Ukraine's near- and long-term 
needs and prioritize our support accordingly. As of right now, in close 
consultation with the Ukrainians, our top priorities remain air and 
missile defense and interceptors for these systems, fires, and armored 
capabilities, as well as sustainment and maintenance.   [See page 39.]
                                 ______
                                 
             RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FALLON
    General Sims. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]   [See page 47.]
    Mr. Storch. We defer to the Department to provide details on the 
specifications of the HMMWVs provided to Ukraine.   [See page 47.]
                                 ______
                                 
               RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. MACE
    Dr. Kahl. The Deputy Secretary of Defense established the Senior 
Integration Group-Ukraine on May 11, 2022.   [See page 51.]

     
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              QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

                           February 28, 2023

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                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS

    Mr. Rogers. How has the Department of Defense leveraged commercial 
publicly available and open-source data to share valuable operational 
information with Ukrainian and NATO forces without violating policies 
surrounding intelligence sharing? Are there specific lessons-learned 
and/or use cases from a year of war in Ukraine where these tools could 
augment traditional intelligence or data sources to provide real-time 
situational awareness in operation centers during complex emergencies 
or a crisis--particularly internationally where the United States might 
lack ``boots on the ground''?
    Dr. Kahl. Allies have repeatedly noted the importance of the United 
States sharing intelligence regarding Russia's invasion of Ukraine, 
particularly in the early days of the conflict. Commercially available 
data, including imagery, has played a significant role in enabling the 
United States to better inform the public of the war in Ukraine and to 
counter disinformation. Continued transparency and sharing with Allies, 
in line with current policies and procedures, in the days since has 
played a crucial role in continued Alliance unity.
    The United States also leverages various open-source and publically 
available data in its efforts to help Ukraine and NATO Allies better 
understand the regional environment, but I am unable to comment on the 
specific types and sources of information that the United States shares 
with Ukraine or specific lessons learned in an unclassified setting. 
The Department will provide a more detailed response through classified 
channels.
    Mr. Rogers. A growing point of contention between Congress and the 
Biden administration remains over the White House's decision not to 
designate Russia as a state-sponsor of terrorism. While this was an 
interagency process the Secretary of State ultimately decides whether 
to designate a government as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Does DOD 
believe that Russia meets the criteria for designation as a State 
Sponsor of Terrorism?
    Dr. Kahl. DOD defers to the Department of State, as the Secretary 
of State has the authority to make such a determination.
    Mr. Rogers. Russia has traditionally used the tactic of blaming 
adversaries for attacks they have not carried out. In the past, this 
has included accusing Ukrainian forces of preparing to blow up a 
fertilizer storage facility so that the Ukrainians could then accuse 
Russian forces of having launched a chemical weapons attack.
    Given the frequency of these accusations by the Russians, does the 
Department have any evidence to suggest that Russia has used chemical 
weapons or riot control agents on the battlefield in Ukraine?
    Dr. Kahl. The Department has seen the media reports from Russian 
and Ukrainian sources that the Russian military has employed riot 
control agents on the battlefield in Ukraine. Likewise, both Russian 
and Ukrainian sources allege chemical weapons use on the battlefield by 
the other side, but the Department has not corroborated these claims.
    Additional information on this question will be provided in 
classified channels.
                                 ______
                                 
                    QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
    Mr. Scott. After 20 years of warfare in either Iraq or Afghanistan, 
the United States has created the premier treatment for wounded 
warriors especially in regards to double, triple and even quadruple 
amputees. What more could the United States do to help treat Ukraine's 
severely injured wounded warriors and innocent civilians especially in 
regards to prosthetics? What is the current DOD policy on treatment of 
Ukrainian wounded warriors and civilians? What DOD policy requires 
Ukrainians to pay for their non-medical expenses?
    Dr. Kahl. The Department is committed to doing everything within 
our authorities to provide timely medical support to care for Ukrainian 
servicemembers, to aid their fight in defending Ukraine against 
Russia's illegitimate war. We continue to explore options to best 
support the Ukrainian armed forces as part of our close and continuous 
contact with Ukrainian counterparts and European Allies, and other 
stakeholders. This includes leveraging DOD best practices in advanced 
combat casualty medical care to wounded soldiers.
    We'd also like to highlight the extensive efforts of USAID and the 
Department of State's Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration 
(State/PRM) to aid Ukrainian civilians with acute medical needs. 
Through implementing partners, the State/PRM has supported emergency 
medical teams in Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and Moldova to assist with 
trauma care.
    DOD has played a supporting role to our European Allies, 
particularly Poland and Germany, who lead medical support to wounded 
Ukrainian soldiers. DOD would consider deploying military medical 
capabilities to Poland, but to date Poland has not made such a request. 
Nevertheless, we are coordinating with Poland to determine where 
specialized assistance is needed. In response to a Ukrainian request to 
NATO for medical support in 2022, Germany established the Multinational 
Medical Coordination Center to facilitate medical support. If Germany 
or Poland cannot provide support, then patients can be referred through 
the Secretarial Designee Program, which authorizes treatment by DOD 
personnel at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany. This program 
covers treatment for members of the military and national security 
forces of Ukraine for a class of conditions sustained in conflict on a 
non-reimbursable basis. The program allows for inpatient and outpatient 
medical treatment for Ukrainian servicemembers, including those who 
have severe injuries that puts preservation of life, limb, or eyesight 
in jeopardy. The program does not appropriate funds for non-medical 
expenses, but to date these expenses have been largely borne by both 
U.S. and European NGOs facilitating medical treatment.
    Mr. Scott. Have you noticed any reluctance by the Ukrainians to ask 
for medical supplies since they might not be as high of a priority as 
some weapons systems?
    Dr. Kahl. No. Ukraine has requested medical supplies from a variety 
of U.S. government partners. The bulk of Ukraine's requests for U.S. 
medical and humanitarian aid committed to support Ukraine are fielded 
by the State Department and USAID.
    However, DOD has also provided a number of medical supplies as part 
of multiple security assistance packages in response to validated 
requirements from Ukraine's Armed Forces. This has included equipment 
like first aid kits, bandages, and monitors, as well as larger items 
like armored treatment vehicles and HMMWVs configured for medical 
evacuation.
    In addition, Ukraine has requested support from several NATO Allies 
and partners. To date, more than 40 countries are providing support for 
Ukraine's urgent lethal security requirements, with a majority of those 
countries also providing non-lethal assistance to include significant 
amounts of medical supplies to Ukraine.
    Mr. Scott. How has been the partnership between the Department of 
Defense and the Department of Health & Human Services in terms of 
providing medical supplies and training to Ukraine?
    Dr. Kahl. The Department actively engages with counterparts at the 
Ministry of Defense and the Ukrainian Armed Forces General Staff to 
best understand Ukraine's urgent priorities. This includes providing 
training and key medical supplies to Ukrainian counterparts from DOD's 
existing stocks.
    The Department is able to provide this assistance using its own 
authorities and does not rely on its partnership with the Department of 
Health and Human Services for this purpose.
    Other agencies like the Department of State and USAID have played 
the primary role in providing Ukraine the humanitarian aid it needs to 
care for the broader population.
    Mr. Scott. What internal U.S. Government processes need to improve 
to better support NATO and non-NATO partners?
    Dr. Kahl. In line with the National Defense Strategy, early and 
continuous consideration, engagement, and--where possible--
collaboration with Allies and partners in planning is essential for 
advancing our shared interests. The Department will continue to 
leverage current processes and procedures to ensure the necessary flow 
of communication and the releasability of information to Allies in 
order to ensure continued engagement and collaboration.
    Mr. Scott. Have you noticed any reluctance by the Ukrainians to ask 
for medical supplies since they might not be as high of a priority as 
some weapons systems?
    General Sims. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
    Mr. Scott. What internal U.S. Government processes need to improve 
to better support NATO and non-NATO partners?
    General Sims. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER
    Mr. Gallagher. Whether it were HIMARS, Patriots, Phoenix Ghosts, 
and now finally Abrams tanks--hesitancy from the administration has 
left Ukraine repeatedly on their heels. If you could turn back time, 
would you have sent these weapons when they were first asked for?
    Dr. Kahl. Regular consultations with the government of Ukraine 
inform the capabilities that ultimately are included in U.S. security 
assistance packages, alongside other key considerations like U.S. 
readiness and resource trade-offs. As developments on the ground in 
Ukraine have changed, so too have Ukraine's most pressing requirements. 
Through Presidential Drawdown Authority and the Ukraine Security 
Assistance Initiative, the Department continues to provide Ukraine the 
types of equipment, arms, and munitions it needs for the fight today 
and to be able to defend itself well into the future.
    When Russia's full-scale invasion began, the Department surged 
Stinger air defense and additional Javelin anti-tank missiles. These 
capabilities were suited to the terrain and nature of the fight, making 
best use of the available security assistance resources at the time and 
were critical to Ukraine driving Russia back from Kyiv in the early 
days of Russia's war.
    As the war shifted to the south and east, it presented a new need 
for long-range fires and loitering munitions. High Mobility Artillery 
Rocket Systems and artillery helped Ukraine take the momentum from 
Russia, alongside Unmanned Aerial Systems like Switchblade and Phoenix 
Ghost.
    When Russia increased its air attacks in the fall of 2022, air 
defense became more important and we committed critical systems, 
including a Patriot air defense battery, along with counter-Unmanned 
Aerial System capabilities and other air defense assets.
    Going into the spring and summer months, we have been laser-focused 
on getting Ukraine more armored maneuver capability, enabling them to 
retake more territory.
    We will continue working in close consultation with Ukrainian 
counterparts to ensure we are providing the most relevant and critical 
capabilities to support Ukraine's efforts to push back on Russia's 
unprovoked war of aggression.
    Mr. Gallagher. Our botched withdrawal from Afghanistan was quickly 
followed by failed deterrence in Ukraine--can you describe what forces 
within the Department that you assess to be paralyzing our ability to 
respond to aggression in a way that deters conflict?
    Dr. Kahl. Regarding the statement that deterrence failed in Europe, 
President Biden made clear from the outset that our core military 
deterrence objective was to deter an attack on the United States or 
NATO. We have thus far been successful in sustaining and strengthening 
deterrence in support of this objective.
    To your question about deterring conflict, we made integrated 
deterrence a cornerstone of the National Defense Strategy (NDS). We are 
aligning the Department's policies, investments, and activities to 
sustain and strengthen deterrence--tailored to specific competitors and 
coordinated to maximum effect inside and outside the Department.
    Integrated deterrence is enabled by combat-credible forces prepared 
to fight and win, as needed, and backstopped by a safe, secure, and 
effective nuclear deterrent.
    The Fiscal Year 2024 budget proposal is a prime example of the 
Department's full commitment to providing the right mix of capabilities 
to achieve the vision of the NDS. DOD is modernizing the Joint Force, 
with a focus on building a future force that is lethal, sustainable, 
resilient, survivable, agile, and responsive.
    Mr. Gallagher. LTG Sims, to what degree do operational plans within 
the DOD rely upon the assumption that we would only be forced to defeat 
in one theater and deter in another?
    Given the growing ``no limits'' security partnership between 
Beijing and Moscow in the year since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, can 
we reasonably argue that planning for a confrontation with only one 
adversary is becoming an increasingly dangerous presumption? How does 
DOD plan to respond should China deliver weapons systems for Russia to 
use against Ukraine?
    To what extent has the failure of deterrence in Ukraine 
demonstrated to the DOD the pressing need to arm Taiwan to the teeth to 
prevent a similar failure in the Indo-Pacific?
    General Sims. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LALOTA
    Mr. LaLota. According to recent public sources, the United States 
has provided approximately $76.8 billion in aid to Ukraine. Conversely, 
our European allies have provided approximately $35.02 billion--less 
than half as much. At the same time, the U.S. is currently $31 trillion 
in debt--a number that is 125 percent of our gross domestic product. 
Michael Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff famously 
warned, ``the most significant threat to our national security is our 
debt.'' Given the significant price tag of our debt and the ongoing 
crisis in Ukraine, how can the administration and or Congress assist 
with encouraging our European allies to share more of the financial 
burden of this ongoing conflict?
    Dr. Kahl. The United States has committed approximately $31.7 
billion in security assistance since February 24, 2022 to help 
Ukraine's ability to push back on Russia's unprovoked war of 
aggression. At the same time, Secretary Austin has led an effort to 
coordinate international support for Ukraine through the Ukraine 
Defense Contact Group. This brings together some 50 nations in support 
of Ukraine on a regular basis to coordinate assistance, sustainment, 
and training.
    Contributions from Allies and partners have contributed key 
capabilities to Ukraine, totaling more than $19 billion in direct 
security assistance, and often providing unique capabilities to Ukraine 
the United States may not have in our own inventories. This has 
included Leopard tanks, infantry fighting vehicles, 152mm ammunition, 
and multiple launch rocket systems.
    When measured as a share of GDP, the generosity of Allies like 
Estonia and Latvia--which have made donations worth more than 1 percent 
of GDP--as well as other frontline states such as Poland, Slovakia, and 
Bulgaria is clear. By this metric, the United States ranks as the ninth 
largest donor.
    As the Department continues to work hard to get Ukraine the 
capabilities it so urgently needs, the Secretary and others across 
government will continue urging Allies and partners to provide Ukraine 
with additional means to counter Russia's ongoing aggression.
    The $31.7 billion in support has contributed to significant 
degradation of Russia's military without directly involving U.S. or 
Allied forces.
    Mr. LaLota. According to recent public sources, the United States 
has provided approximately $76.8 billion in aid to Ukraine. Conversely, 
our European allies have provided approximately $35.02 billion--less 
than half as much. At the same time, the U.S. is currently $31 trillion 
in debt--a number that is 125 percent of our gross domestic product. 
Michael Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff famously 
warned, ``the most significant threat to our national security is our 
debt.'' Given the significant price tag of our debt and the ongoing 
crisis in Ukraine, how can the administration and or Congress assist 
with encouraging our European allies to share more of the financial 
burden of this ongoing conflict?
    General Sims. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
    Mr. LaLota. According to recent public sources, the United States 
has provided approximately $76.8 billion in aid to Ukraine. Conversely, 
our European allies have provided approximately $35.02 billion--less 
than half as much. At the same time, the U.S. is currently $31 trillion 
in debt--a number that is 125 percent of our gross domestic product. 
Michael Mullen, former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff famously 
warned, ``the most significant threat to our national security is our 
debt.'' Given the significant price tag of our debt and the ongoing 
crisis in Ukraine, how can the administration and or Congress assist 
with encouraging our European allies to share more of the financial 
burden of this ongoing conflict?
    Mr. Storch. We defer to the Department to explain its efforts to 
encourage partners and allies to provide assistance to Ukraine.
                                 ______
                                 
                   QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MOYLAN
    Mr. Moylan. Mr. Kahl, given that the Ukraine war offers the United 
States an opportunity to practice military logistics, are efforts being 
made to ensure that the lessons currently being learned in Europe can 
be applied to the Indo-Pacific theater given it's different geographic 
and political challenges.
    Dr. Kahl. I can confirm that the Department is continually 
reviewing lessons learned from the war in Ukraine, including how these 
lessons can be applied to the Indo-Pacific theater both before and 
during a crisis.
                                 ______
                                 
                  QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. MCCORMICK
    Dr. McCormick. LTG Sims, many constituents and other folks I've 
spoken to worry about how sending significant quantities of materiel to 
Ukraine may hurt our own readiness for a major conflict. When 
identifying munitions and ammunition to deliver to Ukraine, is it DOD 
policy to, where possible, send materiel closer to its expiration date 
so that we retain materiel with the greatest remaining shelf life?
    If not, can you speak to measures we're taking to maintain 
sufficient stockpiles while being fiscally responsible?
    What other criteria and standards are we using to identify 
platforms, systems, and other material eligible for shipment to Ukraine 
besides them just being surplus and/or antiquated?
    General Sims. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
    Dr. McCormick. LTG Sims, for better of worse, it appears to me that 
our involvement in Ukraine offers an opportunity to see how our weapons 
systems measure up to Russian systems and how they function in that 
environment. Do we have the capability to track outcomes and collect 
performance data once Ukrainian forces have taken possession of those 
systems? If not, do you think we have the capability to collect that 
data without detracting from Ukraine's combat effectiveness? What 
insights have we garnered regarding the performance and resilience of 
our communications and command & control systems against Russian 
cyberattacks?
    General Sims. [The information is classified and retained in the 
committee files.]
    Dr. McCormick. In recent months, President Zelenskyy has removed 
several officials from national and regional-level offices presumably 
due to instances of graft and corruption. How is the DOD assisting the 
Ukrainian government in preventing poor governance, rooting out 
corruption, and ensuring that the aid we deliver to Ukraine reaches its 
intended destination? Are you aware of instances where our aid and 
materiel has been diverted from its intended destination? What measures 
are in place to ensure that weapons and munitions we deliver aren't 
diverted to an illicit market where they could potentially fall into 
the hands of adversarial state and non-state actors?
    Mr. Storch. We defer to the Department to respond as to how the DOD 
is assisting the Ukrainian government in preventing poor governance and 
rooting out corruption. With regard to ensuring that the aid the U.S. 
delivers to Ukraine reaches its intended, in late January 2023, I 
traveled to Germany, Poland, and Ukraine with the leaders of the State 
and USAID OIGs. The purposes of this trip were to obtain the latest on-
the-ground perspective of the evolving security and non-security 
assistance provided to Ukraine; to build on our coordinated, whole-of-
government approach to oversight of the United States' significant 
investment in this effort; and to deliver an unambiguous message to 
both American and Ukrainian stakeholders about the expectations for 
accountability for such assistance. In Kyiv, my colleagues and I 
personally and forcefully delivered this message in meetings with the 
Ukrainian Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of 
Finance, the Prosecutor General, and other key Ukrainian leaders and 
counterparts.
    The DOD OIG is engaged in a comprehensive set of audits and 
evaluations examining the full range of issues relating to the DOD's 
train and supply mission, including ongoing examinations of security 
and accountability controls for defense items transferred to Ukraine 
within the U.S. European Command area of responsibility, the ground 
transportation of equipment to support Ukraine from port to transfer 
locations, land-based security controls for equipment bring transferred 
to Ukraine, and our third in a continuing series of reviews of the 
DOD's enhanced end-use monitoring of defense articles provided to 
Ukraine. This work will examine the DOD's efforts to track American 
security assistance provided to Ukraine, including the tracking 
technology that has been deployed by the United States and Ukraine and 
the DOD's ability to conduct remote site visits within Ukraine. Based 
on our completed work, the DOD OIG has not substantiated any instances 
where American aid and material has been diverted from its intended 
destination.

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