[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION'S DISASTROUS
WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN, PART I:
REVIEW BY THE INSPECTORS GENERAL
=======================================================================
HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON
OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
APRIL 19, 2023
__________
Serial No. 118-22
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Oversight and Accountability
GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT
Available on: govinfo.gov,
oversight.house.gov or
docs.house.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
51-894 PDF WASHINGTON : 2025
COMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY
JAMES COMER, Kentucky, Chairman
Jim Jordan, Ohio Jamie Raskin, Maryland, Ranking
Mike Turner, Ohio Minority Member
Paul Gosar, Arizona Eleanor Holmes Norton, District of
Virginia Foxx, North Carolina Columbia
Glenn Grothman, Wisconsin Stephen F. Lynch, Massachusetts
Gary Palmer, Alabama Gerald E. Connolly, Virginia
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Raja Krishnamoorthi, Illinois
Pete Sessions, Texas Ro Khanna, California
Andy Biggs, Arizona Kweisi Mfume, Maryland
Nancy Mace, South Carolina Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez, New York
Jake LaTurner, Kansas Katie Porter, California
Pat Fallon, Texas Cori Bush, Missouri
Byron Donalds, Florida Shontel Brown, Ohio
Kelly Armstrong, North Dakota Jimmy Gomez, California
Scott Perry, Pennsylvania Melanie Stansbury, New Mexico
William Timmons, South Carolina Robert Garcia, California
Tim Burchett, Tennessee Maxwell Frost, Florida
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Becca Balint, Vermont
Lisa McClain, Michigan Summer Lee, Pennsylvania
Lauren Boebert, Colorado Greg Casar, Texas
Russell Fry, South Carolina Jasmine Crockett, Texas
Anna Paulina Luna, Florida Dan Goldman, New York
Chuck Edwards, North Carolina Jared Moskowitz, Florida
Nick Langworthy, New York
Eric Burlison, Missouri
Mark Marin, Staff Director
Jessica Donlon, Deputy Staff Director and General Counsel
Jake Greenberg, Deputy Chief Counsel for Investigations
Kaity Wolfe, Senior Professional Staff Member
Mallory Cogar, Deputy Director of Operations and Chief Clerk
Contact Number: 202-225-5074
Julie Tagen, Minority Staff Director
Contact Number: 202-225-5051
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C O N T E N T S
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Page
Hearing held on April 19, 2023................................... 1
Witnesses
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The Honorable Robert Storch, Inspector General, Department of
Defense
Oral Statement................................................... 6
Ms. Diana Shaw, Acting Inspector General, Department of State
Oral Statement................................................... 7
Ms. Nicole Angarella, Acting Deputy Inspector General, U.S.
Agency for International Development (USAID)
Oral Statement................................................... 9
The Honorable John Sopko, Inspector General, Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR)
Oral Statement................................................... 10
Written opening statements of the Members and the statement for
the witness are available on the U.S. House of Representatives
Document Repository at: docs.house.gov.
Index of Documents
----------
* Article, The Washington Post, ``The Afghanistan Papers: At
War With the Truth''; submitted by Rep. Armstrong.
* Article, The Washington Post, ``The Afghanistan Papers:
Unguarded Nation''; submitted by Rep. Armstrong.
* Report, SIGAR, February 2023; submitted by Rep. Armstrong.
* White House Paper, ``U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan'';
submitted by Rep. Armstrong.
* Article, USA Today, ``These 16 Republicans voted against
speeding up visas for Afghans fleeing the Taliban'';
submitted by Rep. Balint.
* Email, exchange between SIGAR and Department of State;
submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Letter, November 7, 2022, from Comer and Grothman to IG
Sopko; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Letter, October 25, 2022, from Comer and Grothman to IG
Sopko; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Letter, June 22, 2022, to Committee Chairs and RMs from
SIGAR; submitted by Rep. Biggs.
* Social Media, Olivia Troye Twitter Thread; submitted by Rep.
Brown.
* Memo, November 11, 2020, from The White House to the Acting
Secretary of Defense; submitted by Rep. Goldman.
* Graphic; submitted by Rep. Luna.
* Letter, June 22, 2022, from SIGAR to Secretary of State and
USAID; submitted by Rep. Turner.
* Letter, July 6, 2022, to President Biden from Rep. Turner;
submitted by Rep. Turner.
* Connolly Statement for the Record; submitted by Rep.
Connolly.
* Questions for the Record: to Ms. Shaw; submitted by Rep.
Gosar.
* Questions for the Record: to Hon. Storch; submitted by Rep.
Gosar.
* Questions for the Record: to Hon. Storch; submitted by Rep.
Mace.
* Questions for the Record: to Angarella; submitted by Rep.
Gosar.
* Questions for the Record: to Hon. Sopko; submitted by Rep.
Gosar.
* Questions for the Record: to Hon. Sopko; submitted by Rep.
Donalds.
* Questions for the Record: to Hon. Sopko; submitted by Rep.
Bush.
Documents are available at: docs.house.gov.
THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION'S DISASTROUS
WITHDRAWAL FROM AFGHANISTAN, PART I:
REVIEW BY THE INSPECTORS GENERAL
----------
Wednesday, April 19, 2023
House of Representatives,
Committee on Oversight and Accountability,
Washington, D.C.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:01 a.m., in
room 2154, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James Comer
[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Comer, Turner, Gosar, Foxx,
Grothman, Palmer, Higgins, Sessions, Biggs, Mace, LaTurner,
Fallon, Donalds, Armstrong, Perry, Timmons, Burchett, Greene,
McClain, Luna, Edwards, Langworthy, Burlison, Raskin, Norton,
Lynch, Connolly, Krishnamoorthi, Mfume, Porter, Brown,
Stansbury, Garcia, Frost, Balint, Lee, Casar, Crockett,
Goldman, and Moskowitz.
Also present: Representative Mills.
Chairman Comer. The Committee on Oversight and
Accountability will come to order. I want to welcome everyone.
Without objection, the Chair may declare a recess at any
time. Without objection, Representative Cory Mills of Florida
is waived on to the Committee for the purpose of questioning
witnesses at today's hearing.
The Committee welcomes the public to this very important
meeting. While you are here, I want to point out to the Members
and the audience today that House Rule XI provides that the
Chairman of the Committee may punish breaches of order and
decorum, including exclusion from the hearing. All participants
will be required to avoid unruly behavior and inappropriate
language. Expressions of support or opposition are not in
order. I expect all parties to these proceedings to conduct
themselves in a manner that reflects properly on the House of
Representatives.
I now recognize myself for the purpose of making an opening
statement.
Today the Oversight Committee welcomes four United States
Inspectors General to provide insight into the Biden
Administration's handling of the U.S. withdrawal from
Afghanistan before, during, and after the fall of Kabul to the
Taliban. No single hearing can tell the story of the United
States' war in Afghanistan. No single hearing can tell two
decades worth of decisions that could have been made
differently. Those decisions are debatable. What is not
debatable is the catastrophe the Biden Administration delivered
in the war's final months, weeks, and days.
For 20 years, Americans, American allies, and Afghans
fought and died in a war to help Afghans create a country free
from the Taliban's control. In August 2021, Joe Biden lost that
war. There was no exit with dignity. It was a panic, and 13
American service members were murdered by a suicide bomber.
Today the Taliban flag flies over Kabul. There is no American
military base there. There is no American embassy there. There
is no hope there, especially for women and girls who are now
terrorized by the Taliban. This is Joe Biden's legacy.
I would like to show a short video of some of the events
Americans saw in August 2021.
[Video shown.]
Chairman Comer. In 2021, Americans watched as crowds of
thousands of Afghans stood outside the gates of Hamid Karzai
International Airport just trying to get out of the country.
Americans watched as people so desperate to flee clung to the
landing gear of airplanes taking off and fell from the sky when
the planes did not stop. Americans watched as parents handed
their infants over to U.S. soldiers. And they watched as
billions of dollars of U.S. equipment, trucks, aircraft,
weaponry, was just abandoned to the Taliban. The American
people watched these scenes and were worried about Americans,
innocent Afghans, and loved ones who were still in Afghanistan.
Since the Afghan Government's collapse, the Oversight
Committee has wanted answers from the Biden Administration, and
we will get them. As our commander-in-chief, President Biden's
poor leadership and planning led to the debacle that unfolded
in Afghanistan in August 2021. Let me be clear. I was in favor
of leaving Afghanistan, but it should have never been done like
this. I want to also say that the U.S. military, which is
stronger and more capable than any other in the world,
accomplished an incredible mission, airlifting 124,000 people
out of Afghanistan in a matter of days. However, they should
have never been put in that position.
The U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan has consequences that
will not go away overnight despite the Biden Administration's
hope that the American people will forget. Afghanistan has once
again become a safe haven for terrorism as demonstrated by a
rise in attacks by ISIS-K. China and Russia are emboldened.
Allies around the world wonder if the US can still rise to meet
the threats that face us today.
Today's hearing will be the first in a series to examine
President Biden's botched withdrawal from Afghanistan. The
inspectors general here today have years of experience when it
comes to monitoring U.S. taxpayer dollars in Afghanistan. They
have identified billions in waste, fraud, and abuse in war
fighting and reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan. The goal of
today's hearing is simple: explore the facts. These IGs will
help us understand the factors and decisions that ultimately
led to the collapse as well as the continued risk to U.S.
taxpayer dollars going to Afghanistan.
I would like to thank our witnesses for being here today
and for their guidance and assistance over the years. I look
forward to your testimony.
I now yield to the Ranking Member for his opening
statement.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you kindly, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to
each of our witnesses for being with us today.
When I was growing up, we were taught that partisan
politics stops at the water's edge. In 1983, after terrorists
killed 241 American service members in Lebanon, our country
united in responding to this act of savagery rather than simply
blame President Reagan for what the terrorists had done. Today,
however, my colleagues seek to blame the Biden Administration
for the cowardly ISIS terror attack at Kabul airport in
Afghanistan, which stole the lives of 13 American heroes in the
final days of the Afghan war. This is not just morally confused
and politically cynical, but historically disoriented.
More than two decades long, the Afghan war was America's
longest war. It spanned four Republican and Democratic
Presidential administrations. Joe Biden was President during 7
of the 238 months of the war, or to put it another way, for
about three percent of the duration of the war compared to
roughly 20 percent for Donald Trump, 40 percent for Barack
Obama, and 37 percent for George W. Bush.
The Afghan war cost the lives of more than 2,400 American
service members; 3,846 private contractors; more than 1,100
allied service members; more than 66,000 national Afghan
military and police; and 47,245 Afghan civilians without even
getting into the Taliban side. Understanding what led to the
collapse of the Afghan Government and security forces is
vitally important, but it requires looking comprehensively at
the dynamics of the massive decades-long military and nation
building failure, not just the last few months of the war. This
hearing's absurdly narrow focus is like trying to explain why
the Confederacy lost the Civil War by examining only what
happened at the surrender of Appomattox.
Today's witnesses have the expertise to explain the
structural factors behind the collapse of the Afghan
Government. John Sopko, the Special Inspector General for
Afghan Reconstruction since 2012, repeatedly warned for years
that the U.S. lacked a coherent strategy and had not defined
its purposes, had set unrealistic expectations for its
reconstruction mission in Afghanistan, did not properly
understand Afghan political culture and institutions, and never
faced the corruption of the Afghan Government.
In 2019, Sopko issued a report warning, not just of risks
created by the ongoing reconstruction effort, but also of risks
arising from the Trump Administration's ongoing efforts to
negotiate a settlement directly with the Taliban.
And when we zero in on the final months of the war, my
Republican colleagues refuse to examine the elephant on the
battlefield: President Trump's disastrous decision to cut out
the Afghan Government and negotiate directly with the Taliban
and then to enter into a dangerously lopsided agreement with
these authoritarian religious fanatics. In the Trump-Taliban
agreement or Doha agreement, Trump struck numerous bad deals
and fateful bargains with the Taliban that would come back to
haunt us, including the release of 5,000 Taliban fighters from
prison, many of whom promptly rejoined the insurgents in their
battle to recapture Kabul.
Our colleagues have also conveniently ignored President
Trump's decision just four days after Joe Biden was declared
the winner of the Presidential election to secretly order the
withdrawal of all troops by January 15, 2021, a move that
stunned his own military generals and which Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Mark Milley, called odd, not
standard, and potentially dangerous. After significant
pushback, President Trump rescinded his secret order and
replaced it with a directive to draw down to 2,500 troops.
Months later when President Trump begrudgingly left
Washington under a cloud of bear mace and tear gas, he did so
without providing the new administration any plans at all on
how to safely withdraw the remaining U.S. troops or how to
safely evacuate Americans and our Afghan allies within the
strict timeline prescribed by Trump's Taliban agreement.
This failure was not an accident but was calculated to
force Biden's hand. President Trump later bragged about this
maneuver at a rally with his supporters, stating, ``I started
the process. All the troops are coming back home. They could
not stop the process. They wanted to, but it was very tough to
stop the process.'' Trump moved forward with the withdrawal of
U.S. troops even as the Taliban increased violent attacks
against the Afghan Government and refused to sever ties with
terrorist groups, including the Haqqani Network and Al-Qaeda.
When President Biden took office in January 2021, he faced
the difficult choice to send more American troops back into
Afghanistan to defend against the newly revitalized Taliban
onslaught in the 20-year civil war or proceed with a full
withdrawal from Afghanistan as contemplated by the Trump
Taliban agreement. After extensive consultation, including with
his top national security advisors and intelligence personnel,
on April 14, Biden announced that the final withdrawal of all
U.S. troops from Afghanistan will begin on May 1 and be
completed by September 11, 2021.
Biden's decision to follow through on the Trump-Taliban
agreement was not without risk. Despite careful planning and a
consensus from the intelligence community and military
leadership on the Afghan military's ability to protect Kabul
and defend against the Taliban after withdrawal, the Afghan
Government and security forces almost immediately collapsed,
far more quickly than expected, forcing the Administration to
evacuate more than 120,000 Americans and Afghan nationals
within two weeks in what became the largest noncombatant
evacuation operation airlift in the history of the United
States. Tragically, 13 American service members lost their
lives during this heroic operation, and we, as a Nation, are
forever indebted to them and more than 2,400 service members
killed during the 20-year war for their commitment to America
and also to the people of Afghanistan.
Today, it is imperative that we put partisan politics aside
to ensure that the suffering Afghan people continue to
experience today, that these people will receive much needed
humanitarian and diplomatic assistance. Let us work together to
find ways to support funding for programs that uplift Afghan
women and girls in light of increasing violent repression
against them. I applaud the Biden-Harris Administration's
commitment to delivering aid to the Afghan people while
continuing to isolate and condemn the repressive and barbaric
Taliban regime.
Our country's essential position as a champion for
democracy, human rights, and freedom against authoritarianism
and violent fanaticism around the world requires us to engage
in fact-based oversight to understand what went wrong with our
two-decade mission in Afghanistan. As Mr. Sopko has stated,
serious analysis means examining a series of blunders made
across multiple administrations over two decades. We cannot do
our faithful duty as Members of Congress by assigning blame on
a partisan basis or scoring points in distorted ways. The fate
of democracy, human rights, and women's equality all over the
world depends on seriously analyzing what went wrong with our
intervention in Afghanistan. Let us be serious to that task.
And I yield back to you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The Ranking Member yields back. I am
pleased to introduce our four witnesses today. Mr. Robert
Storch was recently confirmed as the Department of Defense
Inspector General in December 2022. He has a long history in
the IG community, including serving for five years as the
National Security Agency's Inspector General. Ms. Diana Shaw
serves as the Deputy Inspector General at the Department of
State, where she performs the duties of the Inspector General.
She has also held leadership positions within the U.S.
Department of Homeland Security's Office of the Inspector
General.
Ms. Nicole Angarella is the Acting Deputy Inspector General
at the USAID, where she performs the duties of the Inspector
General. She has a long history of working with USAID's OIG in
various roles. And Mr. John Sopko has been the Special
Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction since 2012. He
has more than 30 years' experience in oversight and
investigations as a prosecutor, congressional counsel, and
senior Federal Government advisor. A very impressive witness
panel.
Pursuant to committee Rule 9(g), the witnesses will please
stand and raise their right hands.
Do you solemnly swear or affirm that the testimony that you
are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing
but the truth, so help you God?
[A chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Comer. Let the record show that the witnesses all
answered in the affirmative.
We appreciate all of you being here today and we look
forward to your testimony. Let me remind the witnesses that we
have read your statements and they will appear in full in the
hearing record. Please limit your oral statements to five
minutes.
As a reminder, please press the button on your microphone
in front of you so that it is on, and the Members can hear you.
When you begin to speak, the light in front of you will turn
green. After four minutes, the light will turn yellow. When the
red light comes on, your five minutes have expired and we would
ask that you please wrap up.
I recognize Mr. Storch to please begin his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF ROBERT STORCH
INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Storch. Chairman Comer, Ranking Member Raskin, and
distinguished Members of the Committee, the war in Afghanistan
was, in the words of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
a strategic failure. Despite an investment of more than $2
trillion over 20 years and the sacrifices of more than 2,400
American service members, the U.S.-supported Afghan Government
and military collapsed almost immediately as U.S. forces began
their final withdrawal from the country, resulting in a more
rushed than contested non-combatant evacuation.
My office has provided robust, independent oversight of DOD
activities involving Afghanistan going back to 2005. Congress
established the lead IG model for coordinating oversight and
reporting on overseas contingency operations in 2013. In 2015,
the DOD IG was designated the lead IG for Operation Freedom's
Sentinel, the U.S. counterterrorism mission against Al-Qaeda,
ISIS-K, and their affiliates in Afghanistan, and related
participation in the NATO-led mission to develop the capacity
of the Afghan security ministries and national defense and
security forces.
As lead IG, my office employs a whole-of-government
approach to continuously engage and coordinate with my
colleagues here from the State Department OIG, U.S. Agency for
International Development OIG, and the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction, and many others to
develop annual oversight plans and issue quarterly reports that
transparently provide information regarding the operation and
our oversight of it.
With the sunset of OFS following the end of U.S. military
presence in Afghanistan, my office's lead IG responsibilities
continue with Operation Enduring Sentinel, the mission to
conduct over the horizon counterterrorism operations and engage
with regional partners. To date, we and our partners have
issued 31 quarterly reports on OFS and OES. The DOD OIG has
issued 223 audit and evaluation reports and advisories related
to Afghanistan oversight, containing approximately 1,500
recommendations to improve DOD programs and operations. Last
fall, we issued a lessons learned report on U.S. security
cooperation activities that analyze the total of 66 reports
from my office and our partners to identify significant
challenge areas, including deficiencies with training and
advising the Afghan security forces and ministries that
resulted in over-reliance on U.S. and coalition forces, and a
lack of accountability and control for U.S. supplied equipment.
In the latter area, my office has issued some 15 separate
reports related to the inability of both the DOD and the ANDSF
to properly account for a variety of military equipment and
property. DOD OIG audits also identified issues with the
accountability of U.S. funds that were provided to support the
ANDSF, including problems with payroll systems and ghost
soldiers and routine theft of fuel and ammunition. Our
oversight also identified an over-reliance on U.S. contractor
maintenance that persisted throughout the U.S. military
withdrawal.
As the U.S. military presence was ending, the DOD OIG
issued a management advisory that compiled weaknesses from nine
reports regarding concerns about not properly removing
sensitive information from controlled inventory, and the lack
of documentation for the retrograde and disposal of such
equipment. We also conducted a classified evaluation of the
air-strike that tragically killed 10 civilians, including seven
children on August 29, one of several reviews related to
kinetic strikes by my office.
After the Afghan collapse, our lead IG reporting summarized
available information regarding the factors contributing to the
sudden demise of the Afghan military, while our audits and
evaluations pivoted to address time sensitive issues regarding
the multi-agency effort supported by the DOD to evacuate and
support refugees. This included assessments of 11 military
installations used in that effort, and last August, the lessons
learned report on those efforts. We also have a number of
completed and ongoing reviews related to DOD support for DHS-
led screening and vetting activities, as well as ongoing
complimentary audits with State and USAID OIGs of withdrawal
related contract closeout costs.
Apart from all these programmatic reviews, my office's
Defense Criminal Investigative Service has conducted over 500
investigations over the course of the U.S. presence in
Afghanistan, resulting in 172 convictions, orders for more than
$1.3 billion in monetary recoveries, and over 500 suspensions
or debarments. Our audits, evaluations, and investigations
contain valuable lessons for the conduct of DOD operations now
and in the future. And we will continue to conduct impactful
oversight related to Afghanistan and as lead IG to provide
joint reporting and oversight of OES.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
Chairman Comer. Thank you. Ms. Shaw?
STATEMENT OF DIANA SHAW
ACTING INSPECTOR GENERAL
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Shaw. Good morning, Chairman Comer, Ranking Member
Raskin, and distinguished Members of the Committee. Thank you
for the opportunity to discuss the Department of State Office
of Inspector General's Afghanistan related oversight work. I am
very pleased to be joined today by my counterparts from the
Defense and USAID OIGs and the Special Inspector General for
Afghanistan Reconstruction. We are all here today prompted by
memories of the shocking and chaotic scene that unfolded at the
Kabul airport during the withdrawal of U.S. forces from
Afghanistan in August 2021.
While the Department has reported that the United States
and its partners ultimately evacuated approximately 124,000
people in the summer of 2021, questions rightfully remain about
the planning, intelligence gathering, information sharing, and
decisions leading up to the events of that summer. We have
questions, too, which is why in the months immediately
following the evacuation and withdrawal, State OIG launched an
independent review to understand not only how the Department
planned for the noncombatant evacuation it helped to execute
but what factors contributed to the confusion and chaos that
ultimately unfolded.
Today, I can share that we do have some answers to these
important questions. In the next few weeks, State OIG will be
issuing its first in a series of reports looking at the
Department's planning for and execution of the evacuation of
Embassy Kabul. Although aspects of this work are classified and
so cannot be discussed in this forum today, I would like to
share a few insights that are appropriate to the setting, and I
will start with the bottom-line up front.
While the Embassy's emergency evacuation planning
activities in the lead-up to the evacuation generally complied
with applicable standards, the Department simply was not fully
prepared for the full range of challenges it encountered, and
the critical question, of course, is why.
Our review found that there were several contributing
factors. For one, we founded Embassy leadership, implementing
the position taken at the time by the Administration, operated
under the understanding that diplomatic operations would
continue in Afghanistan after the military withdrawal and did
not want to engage in overt evacuation planning based on
concerns that it could spark panic and undermine support for
the Afghan Government. As a result, communications with Embassy
personnel were unclear as to the timing and scope of a
potential evacuation, leading to confusion, and in some cases,
inadequate preparation. In addition, we found that the Embassy
was not fully prepared to evacuate the number of people it
ultimately did. This was due in part to the Embassy lacking
clearly defined eligibility criteria for the evacuation and
using unreliable data about the potential number of evacuees.
These issues contributed to the scenes that eventually
unfolded at the airport in Kabul and were further compounded by
issues relating to unclear leadership, logistical mishaps, and
communication failures that I am afraid I cannot discuss in
this setting, but we would be happy to brief to Congress in a
classified setting when our report is released.
While the events of August 2021 have passed, as oversight
professionals and as legislators here today, we must grapple
with the ongoing ramifications of those events. These include
the near doubling of the number of Afghans in need of
humanitarian assistance since the Taliban came to power and the
severe curtailment of the rights of women and girls.
Further, the Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program, for
which the Department of State is primarily responsible, still
has more than 152,000 SIV applicants in Afghanistan undergoing
processing as of last month. This is why it is so important
that we continue to keep a close eye trained on the situation
in Afghanistan, which is precisely what we are doing.
State OIG has issued 14 Afghanistan-related oversight
products since the evacuation, and we have an additional nearly
dozen projects planned and ongoing. This oversight work will
address three primary strategic areas, including additional
coverage of the evacuation of Embassy Kabul, support for Afghan
evacuees, and the resumption of Department programs and
operations related to Afghanistan. Our work will provide
answers to critical questions and offer recommendations that we
hope will prompt positive change.
But in closing, I would like to leave you with one final
message. How the Department responds to our Afghanistan related
findings and recommendations has the potential to impact its
success or failure in other important contexts, including
Ukraine and Iraq. It is, therefore, vitally important that the
Department continue to embrace and learn from our oversight
work. This is true not only for us but for my colleagues on the
panel. Each of us recognizes that our work has long lasting
potential life or death implications, which is why we are so
dedicated to robust, independent, whole of government
oversight.
Thank you for the opportunity, and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Comer. Thank you. Ms. Angarella?
STATEMENT OF NICOLE L. ANGARELLA
ACTING DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL
U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (USAID)
Ms. Angarella. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Comer,
Ranking Member Raskin, and distinguished Members of the
Committee. I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you
today to discuss the Office of Inspector General's Oversight of
USAID's work in Afghanistan. I also look forward to sharing
with you lessons learned from Afghanistan that must inform
USAID's future programming. I am honored to be sitting here
today with my oversight partners from the Department of
Defense, State and SIGAR.
Past and continued oversight of USAID programs and U.S.
programs in Afghanistan cannot be done in silos. In joining
forces, we avoid duplication of effort, ensure policymakers
receive the information they need, and hold accountable bad
actors targeting U.S. funds.
The chaotic events that occurred during the evacuation
impacted our office in a significant and personal way. We had
six colleagues, local Afghan employees of USAID OIG, that were
trying to evacuate with their families. I was not acting as the
head of our office at that time, but as a member of our senior
leadership team, I was on the live group chat we had linking us
with our staff 24/7 as they and their families tried to get to
and through the Abbey Gate day in and day out. Those exchanges
will stay with me forever.
I am happy to say that our colleagues were eventually able
to evacuate and relocate in the United States. I have never
been prouder to work at USAID OIG than I was during those
months. The generosity and kindness our employees showed in
helping their former colleagues as they built new lives in
America was inspiring. I also want to recognize all of our
Afghan USAID OIG employees over the years who were integral to
OIG's work. Without them, the work I am going to talk about
today would not have been possible.
From 2001 until the evacuation in 2021, USAID invested $24
billion in Afghanistan. The significant level of investment
required a proportionate level of independent oversight from
USAID OIG. In 2010, we established a Kabul office to advance
our work in country. We issued more than 300 reports covering
programs valued at close to $6.4 billion dollars. This work
resulted in nearly 800 recommendations to USAID and identified
hundreds of millions of dollars in question costs. Our
investigative work led to criminal prosecutions, major False
Claims Act statements, and suspensions or debarments of 70
companies and individuals. In addition to the direct impact on
U.S. Government efforts in Afghanistan, our comprehensive body
of work provides vital lessons that can inform USAID's
responses to complex emergencies around the world.
I would like to highlight three key lessons today. First,
effective monitoring of programming activities is essential in
complex environments. USAID must implement and then adhere to
standards to ensure for effective program oversight. It must
also plan ahead to ensure continuity of projects and
anticipation of staff reductions. One of our Afghanistan audits
found that for 127 projects reviewed in Afghanistan, only one
award used USAID's monitoring system as intended.
Second, USAID must clearly define, measure, and link
performance objectives to ensure that programs are actually
meeting the established metrics and goals. For example, one of
our audits found that USAID did not have policies and
procedures in place to verify that payments to a World Bank
trust fund were being used for their intended purpose. Third,
in conflict zones such as Afghanistan, large sums of funding
from outside donors attract corruption and diversion, including
to sanctioned groups like the Taliban. USAID must strengthen
processes to ensure prompt reporting of criminal activity and
ensure accountability over its programs, especially those being
implemented by U.N. and multilateral organizations in
Afghanistan today.
Our Afghanistan oversight work continues today with planned
and ongoing audit work. We also continue to receive allegations
pertaining to fraud and diversion. Currently, we have four open
criminal cases related to Afghanistan and three cases we are
coordinating on with the World Food Program Office of Inspector
General.
Our decades of work in Afghanistan yielded important
lessons that USAID must apply toward programming in future
conflict zones. You have my commitment that my office in
coordination with my oversight partners here today will
continue to provide the comprehensive, independent oversight
that is expected for continued U.S. programming in Afghanistan.
Thank you for your time. I look forward to the discussion
today.
Chairman Comer. Thank you. Mr. Sopko?
STATEMENT OF JOHN SOPKO
INSPECTOR GENERAL
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN
RECONSTRUCTION (SIGAR)
Mr. Sopko. Chairman Comer, Ranking Member Raskin, thank you
very much for inviting me to come back here to testify. I
believe this is the 12th time I have testified before this
Committee.
Unlike my other colleagues here, SIGAR has not been tasked
with, nor do we have the jurisdiction to look at the question
of the Administration's withdrawal. However, just days after
that withdrawal occurred, this Committee in a bipartisan
fashion asked us and directed us to examine the factors that
led up to the Afghan collapse and the Afghan withdraw. Your
request, I believe, is extremely critical to today's hearing
and your ongoing oversight work because it provides the context
for how the Trump and Biden Administrations' policy decisions
were either affected or carried out.
SIGAR's reports--and these are the two reports which we
have prepared for this Committee--are based upon our over 12
years of work in Afghanistan, over 700 audits or reports we
prepared, and includes dozens of lessons learned reports on
particular issues in Afghanistan. They are also based on over
800 interviews of current and former U.S. and Afghan military
and civilian officials. They painstakingly show that the
failure to build a democratic, self-sustainable Afghan state,
which was the purpose for us going into Afghanistan, was the
result of many decisions made over the course of four
Presidential administrations, from ignoring rampant corruption
and the lack of a consistent U.S. strategy to the inability to
develop self-sustaining Afghan military forces and
institutions. The seeds of August 2021's drama were sown many
years before.
We found that the 2020 Doha agreement and the subsequent
decision to go through with the withdrawal in 2021 merely
exacerbated long-existing problems. Among them, these policy
decisions dramatically degraded the morale of the Afghan
security forces and compounded the Afghan military's total
dependence on U.S. combat and contractor support, which left
the Afghan military unable to sustain operations. The Afghan
Government's own self-denial about the U.S. intention to
depart, the exclusion of the Afghan Government from the U.S.
negotiations with the Taliban, again, systemic corruption, and
the insular Afghan Government decision-making were additional
factors that contributed to the disaster. But, remember this.
Once each administration decided to withdraw our troops and
contractors, it was not a question of if, it was rather a
question of when the Afghan Government was going to collapse.
Now, I want to change the subject because there are still
major problems with our assistance in Afghanistan that this
Committee should be alerted to. The United States has
appropriated $2 billion for Afghanistan assistance since the
withdrawal, and a further $3.5 billion may be available through
this newly created Switzerland-based Afghan fund. While I agree
and we all agree Afghanistan faces dire humanitarian and
economic situation, it is critical that our assistance not be
diverted by the Taliban. Unfortunately, as I sit here today, I
cannot assure this Committee or the American taxpayer, we are
not currently funding the Taliban. Nor can I assure you that
the Taliban are not diverting the money we are sending from the
intended recipients, which are the poor Afghan people.
As our 2023 High Risk List for Congress, which we were
releasing today at this hearing, indicates, we face serious
risk due to Taliban interference with U.N. and U.S. assistance,
and we face a lack of aggressive oversight controls on the
trust funds and the multilateral organizations. Which brings me
to the issue that I know I have spoken before, but it is
particularly a problem of the U.S. State Department and USAID's
failure to fully cooperate with SIGAR audits and other
inquiries.
The lack of cooperation by State--and I am not talking
about the IGs; I am talking about the Department of State and,
to a lesser extent, USAID--is unprecedented in the nearly 12
years that I have been the SIGAR and, I must add, in the two
decades that I did congressional oversight both in the Senate
and the House. Due to this refusal to fully cooperate, a
significant portion of SIGAR's work, including the five reports
we did for this Committee, have been hindered and delayed. So,
in conclusion, we need your help to stop this obfuscation and
delay by the Department of State and to some extent USAID.
As I am sure my fellow inspectors general would agree, we
cannot abide a situation in which agencies are allowed to pick
and choose what information an IG gets or who an IG can
interview or what an IG may report on. If permitted to
continue, it will end SIGAR's work in Afghanistan, but also
Congress' access to independent and credible oversight of any
administration.
Thank you very much, and I look forward to answering your
questions.
Chairman Comer. Wow. Thank you, Mr. Sopko. Now, to get to
the question portion. We begin with the Chairman of the
National Security Subcommittee, Mr. Grothman.
Mr. Grothman. Thank you. I am going to go a little bit
different here when we kick off. I think collectively in
Afghanistan since I have been on this Committee, we have had to
have seven or eight hearings. And I always kind of view the
answers I get through the prism of a guy who had been my driver
one summer--was a blue-collar guy, had spent six months in
Afghanistan--and I asked him what he thought was going on in
Afghanistan. He says it is not going to end well. We shouldn't
have stayed around. Maybe we should have, maybe we shouldn't
have, but he said, they hate us.
So here is this guy, 21-year-old guy, and then I come in
here before these Committee hearings, not the IG, but, you
know, all the various agencies, and they are all confident now,
you know, we are advancing and things are getting better and
better, and the government is going to hold on for years and
years. And I knew all along my 21-year-old guy who spent four
or five months there knew a lot more than the high-level State
Department people who were assuring us that everything was
going well.
Prior to delving into the more relevant questions, I guess
I will ask Ms. Shaw, and maybe it is not the IG to know this,
but could you give us an opinion of where we find the State
Department employees that seems so clueless about what is going
on in the real world? Is there a way we could change the hiring
practices or the universities that train these people, so
totally flawed or lacking in common sense? How did they get
this so wrong when just an average guy, boots on the ground, so
to speak, understood exactly what was going on?
Ms. Shaw. So, thank you for your question. I do not know
that we have worked specifically on that issue, although we do
look in the context of contract oversight and monitoring and
find that there are folks filling in, in these positions that
lack the technical expertise, lack the experience. And so, we
do have some work that point to those issues. But on the
broader question, I am afraid I do not have an answer.
Mr. Grothman. Yes. OK. And I am not really worried about
technical expertise. I am worried about common sense, which
seems to be entirely lacking. Ms. Angarella, what ongoing
programs are taking place in Afghanistan today?
Ms. Angarella. Sure. Thank you for your question. In Fiscal
Year 2022, USAID appropriated or spent $912 million in
Afghanistan. Through Q1 and Q2 of Fiscal Year 2023, it is about
$599 million and it is more heavily weighted toward
humanitarian assistance, mostly food aid, and a very small
portion of it, about $59 million, in development funding. But
mostly humanitarian food assistance.
Mr. Grothman. Well, thank you. Are there any indications
that with $900 million, is some of that going toward the goal
of making sure that the people of Afghanistan no longer hate
us?
Ms. Angarella. I think the goal of getting food to people,
there have been significant impediments to that in the last
couple of months with the ban on women working for NGOs and
most recently the U.N. As of right now, the U.N. has halted
much of its programming for humanitarian assistance, I believe,
until May 5 while they decide how to continue implementing
programming.
Mr. Grothman. OK. How does USAID ensure the assistance is
not going to Taliban?
Ms. Angarella. USAID has third-party monitoring and multi-
tiered monitoring, and what we do as USAID is evaluate the type
of monitoring they have in place right now.
Mr. Grothman. OK. We will go to Mr. Sopko. Today, you are
releasing your 2023 high risk list that examines the ongoing
risks to U.S. taxpayer dollars. What are the biggest risks that
you have identified?
Mr. Sopko. I think the biggest risk is the interference the
Taliban has with the U.N. and the Department of State and USAID
programs. We do know, the U.N. has told us that they are
siphoning money off. They are actually going beyond the Ghani
Administration and stealing money from us. So that started.
I think the second problem is that we have to rely on
international trust funds like the U.N. We have identified in
the past, over the last 12 years, that these trust funds with
the United Nations, World Bank, et cetera, do very little
oversight and are very skimpy on giving information about it,
and we think that is continuing. So, we do not think State and
AID--to give you an example, when we asked State how much money
is the Taliban getting from these programs, they could not
answer because they do not know. So, I cannot tell you how
much, but that is the biggest.
The other serious threat to our assistance, I think, is the
refusal of State and AID to answer the simplest oversight
questions that we have, like, who are your implementing
partners. Can we interview them? We are not getting those
answers back. So, I would say the three biggest threats is the
Taliban; it is the fact we are over relying on these
international institutions, which in the past have been
horrible in providing us appropriate information; and the third
thing is State and AID'S abject refusal to allow oversight.
Mr. Grothman. Can you just rattle off quickly one more time
the international organizations that this body, and quite
frankly, the press corps should know cannot really be trusted
with taxpayer dollars?
Mr. Sopko. Well, mainly it is a number of U.N.
organizations we have identified in the past. You have the
World Food Program. You have something called the Colombo Plan,
which the State Department specifically ordered not to talk to
us when we were doing an audit of one of their programs on
this. I think the World Bank is also involved. I would have to
give you a further list of all the programs involved.
Mr. Grothman. Thanks. Well, it is very illuminating. Thank
you much for giving me another couple of seconds.
Chairman Comer. Very good. The Chair recognizes the Ranking
Member.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Sopko, thank you
for your service as the Special Inspector General for the
Afghan Reconstruction and for the reports you have authored
examining the factors that led to the collapse of the Afghan
Government and security forces. Your work is critical also
going forward, as you were just saying. Committee Democrats
strongly support the work of all the IGs, and we will continue
to urge all of the agencies to cooperate fully with your
efforts.
In your February 2023 report, you said there were six key
short-term reasons for collapse of the Afghan armed forces. But
the very first one that you cite was Donald Trump's decision to
negotiate with the Taliban for a U.S. withdrawal, negotiations
that excluded the Afghan Government and then to give the
Taliban exactly what they wanted, which was the commitment of
the U.S. to completely withdraw all U.S. and allied forces as
well as all contractors, and the April 2021 announcement
following through on that agreement. You write about how this
agreement between the Taliban and the Trump Administration led
the jubilant Taliban to declare victory on behalf of the entire
Muslim and Mujahideen nation, how it destroyed morale within
the Afghan military and security forces and how it ``catalyzed
the collapse of the government.''
Mr. Sopko, did President Trump's decision to negotiate
directly with the Taliban and exclude President Ghani and the
Afghan Government from negotiations undermine the ability of
the Afghan Government to negotiate a stable peace agreement
with the Taliban and to defend itself and the Nation against
Taliban military attack?
Mr. Sopko. As we say, this was one of many decisions. But
you are correct. That decision itself undercut the morale of
the average Afghan soldier and the average Afghan civilian. But
the follow-up is, as we say in the report, we also say that the
decision by the Biden Administration to follow also added to
that elimination of the morale of the average Afghan soldier to
continue fighting.
Mr. Raskin. By following that path. I got you.
Mr. Sopko. Yes. Yes.
Mr. Raskin. Did the Trump-Taliban agreement embolden what
you call a reinvigorated Taliban to increase its violent
attacks against the Afghan armed forces?
Mr. Sopko. Yes, it did. It did. And if you talk to the
Afghan generals and people who were on the ground, which we
did, they will tell you that that is exactly what happened.
Mr. Raskin. Well, one of the concessions that Trump made
the Taliban was allowing the release of 5,000 Taliban prisoners
then being held by the Afghan Government, including
perpetrators of terrorist attacks in return for the Taliban
freeing I believe it was 1,000 Afghan prisoners. Thousands of
these Taliban-released fighters immediately returned to the
battlefield and participated, and in some cases, led the
Taliban onslaught against Afghan cities, even though there was
a provision saying that they were not supposed to rejoin the
fight.
In September 2021, after the fall of Kabul, former
President Trump lied about this deal, saying, ``The inept
Afghan Government led by corrupt President Ghani released 5,000
prisoners, not the Trump Administration.'' We know this is a
lie from the language of the Trump-Taliban agreement itself,
which explicitly contemplated the release of ``up to 5,000
prisoners by March 10, 2020.'' Moreover, your report
establishes that the Trump Administration actually pressured
the Afghan Government to agree to this condition. Mr. Sopko,
isn't it correct that the Afghan Government initially opposed
the release of these Taliban and terrorist prisoners?
Mr. Sopko. You are correct.
Mr. Raskin. And how did the Trump Administration
specifically work to pressure or coerce the Afghan Government
to agree to this prisoner exchange?
Mr. Sopko. I believe it may have been Secretary of State
Pompeo, I believe our report indicates may have actually
threatened funding to the Afghan Government. I believe. I would
have to double check with----
Mr. Raskin. Secretary Pompeo, according to the report,
threatened to withhold U.S. aid----
Mr. Sopko. That is correct.
Mr. Raskin [continuing]. If they didn't go along with it.
So just to get the picture straight, President Trump excludes
the Afghan Government from the negotiation, takes it upon
himself to work directly with the Taliban, then negotiates a
provision for the release of 5,000 Taliban fighters, including
terrorists. The Afghan Government opposes it, and in order to
coerce them to go along with it, Secretary Pompeo says he will
withhold aid. The government goes along with it, and then the
disaster ensues. Now, obviously, that infusion of thousands of
new fighters didn't necessarily make the difference, but it
certainly made a pretty big difference. Your report tells a
shocking story indeed. I thank you for your service, and I
yield back to you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes Mr. Palmer for five minutes.
Mr. Palmer. I would point out that the peace agreement with
the Taliban made in February 2020. At least through September
2020, there was zero American service men or women killed in
Afghanistan. I do have a question for Mr. Storch and Mr. Sopko.
Apparently, the U.S. Government gave the Taliban a list of
Americans and Afghan allies, names of people that were trying
to get to the airport in Kabul. Are you aware of that, Mr.
Storch?
Mr. Storch. Our office hasn't done any work on that. I will
say that we are aware of the after-action work that was done by
the Administration. And I immediately requested and obtained
full copies of that. And my team and I are reviewing that.
Mr. Palmer. Mr. Sopko, were you aware that a list of
Americans and Afghan allies was given to the Taliban?
Mr. Sopko. I am only aware from what has been reported in
the press. I am not aware of it. Again, we did not look at the
withdrawal. So, I cannot answer that question.
Mr. Palmer. OK. I have a lot of concern about that, and
this is for the State Department. You do not need to respond.
But I do think the State Department needs to respond on this
question, and if there was a list, who was on the list, and can
they account for those people? It was characterized in the
media by anonymous sources within the State Department that it
was tantamount to giving the Taliban a kill list. Mr. Storch,
were there any American soldiers remaining in Afghanistan after
the final withdrawal from Kabul?
Mr. Storch. Again, as I testified, Congressman, following
the withdrawal, our office----
Mr. Palmer. It is a ``yes'' or ``no?''?
Mr. Storch. I do not have the answer to that, sir.
Mr. Palmer. Do you know, Mr. Sopko?
Mr. Sopko. No, I do not.
Mr. Palmer. Do any of you know in the weeks following the
withdrawal whether or not there were American service members
who were still there?
[No response.]
Mr. Palmer. I will follow up on that later. I may need to
talk to someone else about this. Did any of you encounter
anyone with the State Department that expressed or exhibited
any level of animosity or negative feelings toward American
servicemen and women or American contractors or Afghan allies?
And in your efforts to do your investigations, did you
encounter anyone that displayed any animosity toward U.S.
involvement in Afghanistan? It is a ``yes'' or ``no.'' If you
do not know----
Mr. Sopko. You are saying State Department employees who
expressed that?
Mr. Palmer. Have you talked to people outside of
Washington?
Mr. Sopko. Oh, absolutely. We interviewed 800 some people,
and since the U.S. Government would not talk to us, we
interviewed a lot of former and current employees privately.
Yes, we talked a lot of people. I do not remember encountering
anybody expressing any animosity to U.S. troops in the people
we interviewed.
Mr. Palmer. OK. Mr. Chairman, I will follow up on this
later with you. Mr. Sopko, you have already expressed some
reservations about U.S. funding, sending billions of dollars to
Afghanistan to promote human rights, to support the rights of
women and girls, particularly the right of women and girls to
work, to get an education. How confident are you that the
Taliban will make sure that every dollar of U.S. taxpayer's
money will go toward promoting and supporting human rights and
particularly in regard to women and girls?
Mr. Sopko. I do not trust the Taliban as far as you can
throw them. And the information we are getting, again, not from
the State Department, who is not talking to us, or USAID, who
is giving us access, is that the Taliban are already diverting
funds.
Let me just correct one thing, sir. I am not opposed to
humanitarian assistance. That is a policy decision that
Congress, and the President, and the Administration have to
make. I just am saying, if the purpose is to help the Afghan
people, we have to have effective oversight to ensure the money
goes to those people and not to some Taliban. And I would just
say, I have not seen a starving Taliban fighter on TV. They all
seem to be fat, dumb, and happy. I see a lot of starving Afghan
children on TV, so I am wondering where all this funding is
going.
Mr. Palmer. Well, I think we are all aware that withholding
food and sustenance is a way to maintain control of a
population. And I have some serious, serious concerns about
what has happened there post the withdrawal and how it was
handled and the post-withdrawal of private contractors to
extract people, that, frankly, some of that is still going on.
The fact that the Taliban was going house to house, people
could hear gunshots in the streets. I am very concerned about
what has happened in that country. And I support humanitarian
aid, but I do not support giving money to people who are
murdering people in the street, who are denying people basic
human rights, and who are basically withholding the
opportunities that for 20 years Afghan women and girls enjoyed
while we were there.
My last question, if I may, Mr. Chairman, is, did anyone at
the Department of Defense or the State Department express any
reservations about abandoning Bagram? Does any----
Chairman Comer. The gentleman's time has expired, but feel
free to answer the question.
Mr. Storch. Yes. We reported out in our lead IG reporting
regarding all the facts in the case, but we have not done any
oversight work related to that. And I would say as well, if I
can--I know we are over--but that goes to the point that Mr.
Sopko made earlier. Many of these are policy strategic
decisions. And so, as IGs, our role is once those are set, to
do oversight that determines whether the policy or strategy is
being done efficiently or effectively.
Mr. Palmer. I thank the Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Ms. Norton for five
minutes.
Ms. Norton. I thank the Chair. I strongly agree with the
inspectors general about the need to support the people of
Afghanistan amidst ongoing economic and humanitarian crises and
to uplift Afghan women and girls whose basic human rights have
been stripped away by the Taliban. It is critical that we
provide financial assistance while isolating and condemning the
Taliban regime. This new challenge requires a thoughtful and
careful approach to delivering aid. While providing this vital
assistance is not without risk, we must not turn our backs on
our allies. Instead, we must work with the inspectors general
and the Administration to identify effective ways to enable
direct assistance with appropriate guardrails. We must continue
working on new solutions to provide the much-needed relief to
Afghan people while ensuring this aid stays out of the hands of
the Taliban.
Now, Chairman Comer is holding today's hearing to focus on
the events surrounding the August 2021 withdrawal in
Afghanistan, and the Chairman has made his position on the
withdrawal very clear over the past few years. In an April 2021
interview, Chairman Comer said regarding President Biden's
decision to complete the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Afghanistan by September 2021: ``That is probably the first
decision Joe Biden has made that I actually agree with. I
strongly support removing all the troops from Afghanistan. I
think that the American public has been ready to leave
Afghanistan for at least a decade''.
And it was not just Chairman Comer. Several Republican
Members of the Committee praised President Biden for
withdrawing troops from Afghanistan in March 2021. Mr. Biggs
criticized President Biden for failing to withdraw troops from
Afghanistan sooner, writing, ``You still suggest a May 1
withdrawal date isn't possible. That kind of thinking has kept
us in Afghanistan for 20 years.'' In 2021, Ms. Mace stated on
Fox News, ``I have never been shy to disagree with the
Administration, but I couldn't agree more with bringing our
troops home after two decades of war in Afghanistan, a policy
former President Trump and now President agree on.''
Mr. Sopko, in your testimony today, you stated that while
the Trump Administration's decision to sign the Doha agreement
and the Biden Administration's decision to follow through with
the withdrawal were immediate factors precipitating the
collapse of the Afghan Government and its security forces,
those decisions had antecedents that stretched to the beginning
of the mission of 2001. Mr. Sopko, it sounds like it is your
view that after 20 years in Afghanistan, the U.S. failed to
build stable Afghan institutions that could survive the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from the country. Is that right?
Mr. Sopko. You are absolutely correct. That is what we
found.
Ms. Norton. Mr. Sopko, you have been warning for years that
this was the case that Afghan institutions would not survive
the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Is that right?
Mr. Sopko. Yes, it is. Going back to almost as soon as I
started in 2012, we have been raising concerns.
Ms. Norton. Today my Republican colleagues who so
enthusiastically supported the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Afghanistan seek to blame the Biden-Harris Administration for
results of that withdrawal. I hope my Republican colleagues
will pause their political posturing so that together we can
work on learning the lessons that our country's 20-year
involvement in Afghanistan teach us. I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentlelady yields back. Before I yield
to the next questioner, I feel compelled to respond. I think I
speak for all three of us that you quoted, we supported the
withdrawal, but we assumed that this Administration had more
competence in their ability to withdraw. We have the mightiest
military in the world. They were up against the Taliban in flip
flops and 1970 era rifles. We felt like that this
Administration could have done a better job. And I do not think
you can blame Donald Trump for this Administration not
cooperating with these IGs, which is very, very troubling.
The Chair recognizes the Chairman of the full House
Intelligence Committee, Mr. Turner, for five minutes.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. There certainly is a
lot to learn, and I think we were all aghast as we watched on
television people running for planes, as the United States
withdrew abruptly from Afghanistan. I know the Administration
had promised an orderly withdrawal from Afghanistan, one which
I opposed. I believe that there was a role for a small force to
be able to continue to provide stability in Afghanistan. But
the Administration promised that they were not going to run for
the exits, but they did so and they did so in the middle of the
night, which caused the collapse of the Afghan Government and
the inability of the Afghan military to operate and led to
their inability to be able to defend themselves.
Mr. Sopko, I thank you for all the work that you do. You
and I have spoken before. Good to see you. I wanted to
highlight some of the problems that you are having in doing
your work and in your testimony, some of the problems that you
identify. You sent a letter to Secretary of State Blinken; and
Samantha Power, Administrator of USAID, in June 2022. And in
that letter, you cited that you were directed by Congress to
conduct studies of the collapse of the Afghan military, that
State and USAID were required by law to provide you information
to be able to do that task. And that they were being prohibited
from being able to assist, to provide you the information you
needed, and that you felt that it was thwarting your efforts.
You contacted me. I then sent a letter to President Biden,
transmitting the letter that you had sent. I ask this be
submitted into the record, both your letter and mine.
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Turner. What is troubling is, in your testimony, you
relate that you are still being thwarted, that you are not
getting the information that you need to be able to do the job
that Congress directed you in reviewing this withdrawal and
really the circumstances in Afghanistan.
Mr. Sopko. That is absolutely correct.
Mr. Turner. Now, I have not received a response to my
letter to the President. Have you received responses from your
letters that detail it all, why--that they are not providing
you the information that you need?
Mr. Sopko. Welcome to my world, Chairman, we have not
received the response back from Secretary of State or, well,
anybody in the Administration, really.
Mr. Turner. You are the Special Inspector General for
Afghan Reconstruction. We are not talking small dollars here,
you open on page two saying that most people would be surprised
that more than $8 billion has been provided by the United
States since our withdrawal, 3.5 billion of that from the
Afghan Central Bank Reserve. But we are talking billions of
taxpayers' dollars that are still being spent in Afghanistan.
And yet your task of being able to assess the effectiveness,
what is occurring with those funds is being thwarted by lack of
information.
Mr. Sopko. That is correct.
Mr. Turner. Now, I do find interesting that even though you
are being thwarted, you are still providing us information that
is shocking. You indicate that the Taliban are able to benefit
from these dollars, that both in fees that they provide, and
that they require, in directions to NGOs. On page three, page
four, you go into basically schemes that result in actually
taxpayers' dollars going right into the hands of the Taliban.
Mr. Sopko. That is correct. But we are not getting that
information on a regular basis from State or AID, or in the
past from DOD, although DOD is not really doing much in
Afghanistan anymore. We are clever. My agents and my analysts
have sources. We have developed hundreds and hundreds of
sources. I think we had more sources in Afghanistan than all
the other IGs combined in the GAO. So, we are still trying to
get that information. But the best information, like actual
contract data, actually the names of people would be its best
and it should by law come from State and AID.
Mr. Turner. I think it is shocking that the Biden
Administration would not want you to be able to do your job and
that billions of dollars of taxpayers' moneys are, by your
assessment, going directly into the hands of the Taliban. You
also, in your testimony, speak of the collapse of the Afghan
military and you speak of it as in that our military was
integrated into their military, really the difficulty of them
being able to operate. Could you just speak for a moment of
that, that literally it had to be known by the Administration
that when they abruptly pulled our military from the Afghan
military, that they would be incapable of continuing to
operate?
Mr. Sopko. That is a very good point, and it is one that we
repeatedly made to every administration that we built an Afghan
military that looked like and would rely totally on the U.S.
military. Now, we have a great military, the best in the world,
but the problem is you were dealing with an illiterate country,
basically, and trying to get them very sophisticated. And we
forced them to take very sophisticated U.S. and Western
hardware that they could not supply or fix or whatever, and
particularly when we saw the Doha Agreement, and everybody
focused on the troops leaving. But the Doha Agreement, which
was then ratified by the Biden Administration, specifically
says the contractors have to leave, and we knew, once the
contractors were leaving, it was going to collapse.
And if you talk to the Afghan generals, and I highly
recommend as you go forth in your investigation, talk to
General Sami Sadat, who was one of the best Afghan generals
that fought there. He was head of the Special Forces in
Afghanistan. And he can give you chapter and verse what
happened when all of a sudden they couldn't repair their
helicopters. That is when Afghans started dying dramatically,
and that was the problem. The problem is they could not repair
those.
The irony is, the Afghans were capable of repairing the old
Soviet military equipment. But we decided, for whatever policy
revision, to not give them Soviet military equipment anymore or
former Soviet, but to give them U.S. equipment. Excellent
equipment, but it pushed back by years, by decades, the ability
of the Afghans to prepare or repair the equipment.
Mr. Turner. Thank you for bringing our focus to that. I
yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Mr. Mfume for five
minutes.
Mr. Mfume. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to
thank you and the Ranking Member for convening us today on this
hearing, and I want to go back to something that the Ranking
Member said that I think is important to keep in mind. There
was a unspoken doctrine in this body that all politics stop at
the water's edge. And we have had, over the years, to push
ourselves and to push each other to make sure that we try not
to go back and particularly always assign blame, but to find a
way to move forward, and so I hope that the moving forward on
this is where we are.
Some of us are old enough to remember 1975 when Saigon fell
and the optics, which looks so much like the optics in August
2021. But there was a push, and I urge that we continue to push
now, but that we move forward in looking at the real things
that trouble us. And one of the things that troubles me, quite
frankly, about this whole report is this issue of not enough
accountability. I do not know how any of us can defend that. I
mean, I am simultaneously in a Small Business Committee
meeting, looking at the amount of fraud in the PPP program. So,
we are always going back to try to find a way to be more
accountable to taxpayers, to the American public, and to be
more accountable to the truth in all of this.
Mr. Sopko, I should let you know that Congress, Committee
Democrats here on this Committee and the previous Congress,
including Chairwoman Maloney and Chairman Lynch and staff and
others, repeatedly encouraged and pushed agencies to cooperate
with SIGAR, I mean, repeatedly. So, I regret today, quite
frankly, sir, hearing that the State Department, DOD, and USAID
have produced some documents, provided some written responses
and participated in some meetings, but have not given the full
cooperation that is sought.
And I want to underscore something that the Ranking Member
said earlier also that it is the intention of this Committee to
always support the work of Inspector Generals. If we do not do
that, then it is pretty difficult for us to move forward with
any sense of legitimacy. And, so, given the extraordinary
importance of SIGAR's work, including the role in helping
Congress and the American people to better understand where we
are, I am going to, on the record, urge all three of those
agencies today to cooperate more, so that we might not be in a
position of hearing what we have heard today or in a position
of frustration like I am right now, knowing that there is
apparently more information, more documents, more discussions
that should be held and ought to be held. I am not saying they
have to be held in public, but they have got to be held with
the Inspector General to find out where we are.
We are all concerned about this issue of funding the
Taliban indirectly. And as I sit here today, I am under the
assumption that that is what we regrettably seem to be doing.
The World Bank Trust Fund has not been able to verify fraud
diversion, if that is taking place, we need to know. These are
billions and billions of dollars out of the U.S. Treasury, that
if they are not going to do what they ought to do, could be
better spent at home. But they should be getting into
Afghanistan to protect what we see going on with girls and with
women there, the tremendous suppression of human rights. And,
if that is not occurring, and we really do, ladies and
gentlemen, have a big task before us in making sure that that
takes place.
So, Mr. Sopko, and the other thing that grabbed me that you
said, clearly on the record, that you cannot guarantee that we
are not indirectly funding the Taliban as a result of not
having the proper information you need. That is scary to note.
I would trust the Taliban as far as I could throw them also.
And the fact that they have armaments that have been left
behind, the fact that they claim to be a sovereign, independent
state now, and the fact that they claim that they do not have
to do anything to comply with U.S. requests, concerns me.
I know they have been hanging out with, for a lack of a
better term, the Chinese and the Russians and snuggling up and
creating new allies. But for us, the security of women and
children in Afghanistan remains a paramount concern and the
accountability of agencies of the U.S. Government to all
inspectors general must be a principle that we are guided by,
that we live by, and that we pledge to defend.
So again, I appreciate this hearing from both the Chairman
and the Ranking Member. It helps to get us further down the
road and prevents us, I think, from kind of looking back and
pointing the finger, but looking forward and saying, here is
what we must do now, while we have the power to protect the
process that has always guided us in the Congress, in the
United States in the correct way.
So, Mr. Chairman, I would yield back, and I thank you for
the time.
Chairman Comer. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Mfume. The Chair
recognizes Mr. Higgins from Louisiana for five minutes.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Just to clarify for
Americans watching, we have Inspector General present on our
panel for the Department of Defense, Inspector General for the
Department of State, Inspector General for U.S. Agency for
International Development, commonly referred to as USAID, and
Inspector General for the Afghanistan Reconstruction.
So, ladies and gentlemen, I ask you collectively, just
``yes'' or ``no,'' down the line. Mr. Storch, we will begin
with you. Have any of you in your duties, in your respective
investigations, which we very much appreciate you conducting
and it is an important role that you play for Congress and thus
for the Nation that we are sworn to serve. Have any of you
encountered any obstacles or limitations from the executive
branch that you would categorize as obstruction?
Mr. Storch. I am not aware of any such issues for the DOD
OIG.
Mr. Higgins. That would be a no, you have to----
Mr. Storch. That is a no.
Mr. Higgins. Yes.
Ms. Shaw. No for State OIG.
Ms. Angarella. No for USAID, we do not have any access
issues right now.
Mr. Sopko. Yes, and I am happy to give you a list.
Mr. Higgins. Well, we probably have the same list. But I
look forward to speaking with you further about that.
Mr. Sopko. I am happy to provide it to the full committee,
the whole list in more detail.
Mr. Higgins. Would you do that, sir?
Mr. Sopko. Absolutely.
Mr. Higgins. I will call upon you to do that. Could we get
a timeframe that we will receive that?
Mr. Sopko. I can give it to you in the next 24 hours.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, sir. We expect to have it. Ladies
and gentlemen, I am going to ask you about the bombing. I
understand that this is not perhaps specifically in your
purview, but America needs to know what exactly happened and
why we allowed this terrorist bomber to kill these 13 Americans
and 170 Afghans and horribly maimed many others when according
to testimony that Congress has received, this bomber had been
identified. The test runs of bombings had been conducted in the
days prior to the bombing.
Our intel guys had identified what the bomber look like.
And according to the testimony of Sergeant Vargas-Andrews, 25-
year-old sniper, was blown up that day. He arrived on August 16
at his post. On August 22 they were advised an IED probe, a
practice run by the Taliban had been performed near the
airport, near the gate where he was deployed.
Days later, they received word be on the lookout for two
specific vehicles. These are all signs of intelligence that had
been harvested from the field. And around 2 a.m. on August 26,
the intel guys advises his sniper nest that the suicide bomber
in the vicinity had been identified. It was described as clean
shaven, brown dress wear, a black vest, traveling with a
companion. The sniper asked the intel guys, why wasn't he
apprehended if we had a full description of him, and the intel
guy said, they did not have the authorization to pick him up.
Later, the man was spotted by this sniper from noon to 1
p.m., that he was in the crowd. They had them in their sights.
He was behaving in manners that indicated, according to their
training, he was about to activate his vest. He was being
guided and coached by an older Islamic jihadist man there. It
was very serious, the advisor, chain of command, said please
come and look at what we have got. We have got this guy. The
chain of command came to the nest and told them that they did
not have green light to shoot the guy and they were not going
to arrest him. Why? ``Leadership did not have the engagement
authority. Do not engage.''
We had identified the bomber. Our intel guys did their
work. The Biden Administration would not authorize the shooting
nor the arrest of the bomber that killed these 13 Americans and
170 of our Afghan allies, wounded and maimed many, many others.
Why? Why? Why? I asked the Inspector Generals, do you have an
answer? Can you provide that answer in writing to our Committee
over the course of the next several days? Sir?
Mr. Storch. So, thank you for the question. As I testified
in my opening statement, following the withdrawal, we pivoted
our work at DOD OIG to deal with some emergent issues----
Mr. Higgins. In the interest of time. My time has expired.
Do you have data regarding that?
Mr. Storch. Well, what I was going to say is we have not
done oversight work on that now. But as I testified, we did
obtain a copy of the Administration's after action. And we are
actively reviewing that now. And if there is additional
oversight work to do, we will do it.
Mr. Higgins. Inspector Generals, if you do have data--my
time has expired--if you do have data regarding the bombing
attack and murder of American citizens at the gate in
Afghanistan, we ask you to please provide your observations in
writing to this Committee. Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes Ms. Stansbury for five minutes.
Ms. Stansbury. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to
welcome and thank all of our witnesses for being here today.
Obviously, our Inspector Generals play a vital role in ensuring
the oversight of our Federal Agencies. And I want to thank all
of you, as well as your staff, for the important work that you
do. I also want to take this opportunity to thank all of our
active-duty military and veterans who served bravely in
Afghanistan and continue to serve our country.
And, you know, I want to just acknowledge the comments of
the previous speaker here. There is no question that the
withdrawal from Afghanistan was chaotic. It was terrifying. It
was violent. It was difficult. And the loss of those 13 service
members can never be replaced. They paid the ultimate sacrifice
for their service on behalf of our country. And we should be
honoring their memory here today in this Committee hearing.
But I want to also acknowledge that the American mission in
evacuating both our service members, American citizens, as well
as our allies in Afghanistan was not in vain. In fact, in those
final days, we were able to evacuate 124,000 U.S. citizens and
other nationals who were allies to the United States.
And I want to say, as a New Mexican, I represent New
Mexico's first congressional district, we personally saw the
brave service of our service members and helping with the
evacuation efforts in New Mexico. Holloman Air Force Base was
one of the six designated sites where evacuees were sent when
they came to the United States. And I personally had the
opportunity to go down and visit, not only with the evacuees as
they were arriving on our shores, but also the hundreds,
literally hundreds of service members, mostly reservists,
airwomen and airmen, National Guards who volunteered to go help
with the evacuation mission because they understood, after 20
years of being involved in this conflict, that the Afghan
allies who were being evacuated had stood bravely with our
American troops on the ground.
And that our mission and responsibility as we were pulling
out of Afghanistan, was to ensure that those allies were able
to get out and their families were able to get to safety. So, I
do want to acknowledge that those efforts were not in vain, and
to acknowledge the lives that were lost.
But I also think it is really important that we set the
record straight on really the path that got us into this mess
in those final chaotic days. And so, Mr. Storch, I know you
have been asked many of these questions already, but I just
really want to be clear about the path that got us to the final
days of the evacuation. So, first of all, is it not true that
President Trump entered into negotiations directly with the
Taliban in February 2020? And isn't it true----
Mr. Storch. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Stansbury. Thank you. And isn't it true that over the
course of those negotiations and the agreements that the Trump
Administration had with the Taliban directly, they were
negotiating directly with the Taliban, it included an agreement
for a rapid draw-down of the troops who were stationed in that
region?
Mr. Storch. Yes. And I should say all of this is based on
our lead IG reporting, we have reported on this.
Ms. Stansbury. Right. And so, it was the Trump
Administration who set the wheels into motion to actually
rapidly draw down the troops and did so in direct negotiation
with the Taliban. And yet, even though those agreements were
put into place in 2020, there were a series of agreements on
the side of the Taliban regarding their behavior with respect
to the international community, those who remained in country
and the United States, which ultimately the Trump
Administration did not hold the Taliban accountable for. Is
that correct?
Mr. Storch. We have reported out on the back and forth on
all of this. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Stansbury. Exactly. So, it was President Trump who
failed to actually ensure that the Taliban upheld their portion
of the agreement before agreeing to rapidly remove American
troops, putting our troops at risk in those final days.
And Ms. Angarella, these actions ultimately left our Afghan
communities vulnerable, and also led to the collapse of the
humanitarian assistance infrastructure that was in country at
the time. Is that not correct?
Ms. Angarella. It certainly increased the challenges for
delivering the humanitarian assistance. Yes.
Ms. Stansbury. So, I just want to be clear, you know, in
the final days of the American pullout from the war in
Afghanistan, it is clear, and Mr. Sopko, you stated this
yourself that the Trump Administration ``sold out the Afghan
Government.'' Mr. Sopko, did you state those words?
Mr. Sopko. I think that is quoted from somebody else. I do
not think I said that, but I think it is in our report.
Ms. Stansbury. So, it is in your report. So, it is really
crucial that we are clear about what happened in those final
days, and that it was the previous administration who set
things into motion. And finally, I know I am out of time here.
But I do want to acknowledge once again, our brave service
members who have not only continued to serve and help those
evacuees and Americans who are continuing to work on these
issues, but as well as our aid workers and international
community. So, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair
recognizes Mr. Biggs from Arizona for five minutes.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our
witnesses for being here today. Mr. Chairman, I request
unanimous consent to submit the following into the record,
November 7, 2022, letter from you, and Representative Grothman
to Inspector General Sopko; October 25, 2022, letter from you
and Representative Grothman to Inspector General Sopko; June
22, 2022, letter from the Office of the Special Inspector
General for Afghanistan Reconstruction to Congressional
Committee Chairs; and a February 1, 2022, email exchange
between individuals in the offices of SIGAR and the Department
of State.
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you. And each of these documents discuss
and provide evidence of the Biden Administration's actions to
evade cooperation with SIGAR, which has been working on five
separate reports requested by Congress. These reports discussed
the underlying causes that led to the rapid collapse of
Afghanistan, Afghan national defense and security forces,
potential loss for compromise of U.S. reconstruction assistance
resulting from the Taliban's return to power, the ramifications
to the U.S. military and diplomatic withdrawal for national
security and for the people of Afghanistan.
Mr. Sopko, in particular, I thank you for your testimony.
Last June, you informed this Committee that the Biden
Administration was refusing to respond to requests for
information. And you have given an update today. And quite
frankly, I have not seen any public letters from the previous
Democrat Chair of this Committee requesting that the
Administration comply and cooperate with you. You have
indicated pretty conclusively that you have got a broad scope
of information you need, you are not getting it.
Sitting next to you are the Inspector Generals for those
three agencies or departments. I hope that they will encourage
that and look into that as well. But I want to specifically now
direct the rest of my attention, Mr. Sopko, to you. There has
been a number of public reports alleging that former President
Ghani took money out when he fled. I know that you have tried
to find it--in your own report this time, I want to get to
that.
There is new documents that you have received, alleging
additional funds transferred at that time. They indicate that
tens of millions of dollars in cash and gold bullion spirited
out of the country through Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and other
neighboring countries. Can you elaborate on what you know so
far and what more information you need from this Administration
to conduct that investigation?
Mr. Sopko. Thank you very much for asking about that. That
is a recent investigation that we have opened up. We have
sources who have given us that information. I cannot really
discuss it in much detail, but it covers about the six-months
to a year before the actual collapse. This information
indicates tens of millions of dollars, if we can confirm it,
that is the thing, in gold bullion and in currency that left
the country through those three ``stans'': Uzbekistan, I think
Tajikistan, and maybe Kyrgyzstan.
I cannot really tell you much more. We are digging into
that information. It came to our attention recently. I will
report back once we can. We do not know if we are going to be
able to make the case, some of this information is old. We are
actually in the process of translating a lot of this
information right now. But I cannot really tell you much more.
It seems credible to some of my investigators who have been
working for me for 20 years and are retired of law enforcement
agents, but we still do not know what it actually--what we
have.
Mr. Biggs. Are you getting cooperation from U.S. agencies
and departments in that investigation?
Mr. Sopko. Yes. But they are law enforcement agencies. It
is not the policy people at State and AID and DOD.
Mr. Biggs. OK. All right. Let us talk about something else.
And this is really, we were led to believe that the Afghan
Government and the Afghan military was going to be able to hold
out for some significant period of time post-withdrawal. And
not only that, that the government, even though odd to say, we
were providing more than half of their revenue for government
purposes, we were told that they were going to be able to hang
in there. How did the intelligence community get it so wrong?
Mr. Sopko. I cannot really speak for the intelligence
community. I mean, when we briefed our reports to the
intelligence community, we would always ask them and I cannot
reveal what they are saying in an unclassified. What we always
ask them is, are we wrong? And they would come back and say,
no. So, I do not know who was telling which administration that
things were going really well.
But if you read our reports, and if you read some of the
reports from my fellow IGs, particularly the former DOD IG, you
could not believe the Afghan Government was going to survive,
particularly when we withdrew our troops, particularly when we
withdrew our air support and particularly when we withdrew the
contractors.
I do not really know who would actually have thought the
Afghan Government was going to survive. And in January, I
believe, I issued a report and talked to this Committee, the
January of that year that the Air Force, itself, was saying
that the Afghan Air Force, once the contractors left, would
collapse within a matter of months. So, this was the worst kept
secret in Washington, about the capability of the Afghan
Government to survive. Again, I am just shocked. It is like the
number 300,000 Afghan soldiers and police. I do not know who is
telling the Administration there were 300,000 Afghan soldiers
and police toward the end. Nobody we talked to ever said that
that number was near there. We had reports that half of those
people were probably ghosts. We were paying their salaries, but
they did not exist.
So, I mean, there is a lot of things floating around and I
do not know who is in the Intelligence Committee, not the
people we were talking to, because they all agreed with our
assessments, our negative assessments. I do not know who is
putting this information out, and what is the basis for it.
Mr. Biggs. Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Comer. Thank you.
The Chair recognizes Ms. Balint from Vermont for five
minutes.
Ms. Balint. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Today, we have been examining mistakes made over this 20-
year war that tragically cannot be undone at this point. So, I
want to focus now on one thing that Congress can and should
address immediately. And that is the Afghan Adjustment Act.
Vermont is proudly home to hundreds of Afghans who had been
resettled in our state. And I was honored recently to meet with
a man named Shukla, who is an Afghan interpreter who worked
alongside a Vermonter who served the U.S. Army in Afghanistan.
Now, Shukla and his wife reside in Vermont. And we are so
grateful that they are now part of our community. Under the
Biden-Harris Administration, we have welcomed approximately
100,000 Afghan evacuees to the United States since the summer
of 2021.
But many of those allies were admitted only on a temporary
basis. And right now, they live in fear of an uncertain future.
And I talked to many of those folks in my hometown of
Brattleboro, Vermont.
In July 2021, the House voted overwhelmingly and on a
bipartisan basis to increase the capacity of the Afghan special
immigration visa program. And that bill would have provided an
additional 8,000 special immigrant visas and would have eased
the burden on obtaining visas.
Now, I ask unanimous consent to submit to the record an
August 2021, USA Today article about that vote, which occurred
as more Afghan territory continued to fall to the Taliban. And
it stated, ``Some of the Republican House members, who this
week excoriated President Biden's strategy to pull U.S. troops
out of Afghanistan and evacuate Afghan civilians, voted last
month against legislation to speed up the visa applications
process for Afghan citizens.'' All 16 no votes were from
Republicans and four of those Members sit on this very
Committee.
Ms. Balint. Currently, evacuees have only two options for
resolution, the asylum system or the Afghan Special Immigrant
Visa Program. There are now well over 150,000 people currently
trapped in Afghanistan, awaiting processing through the Special
Immigrant Visa Program, while more than--excuse me, I was going
to say 7,000; it is actually 70,000--70,000 Afghans, many of
whom fought alongside our troops, are currently in the United
States, living in legal limbo. So, Ms. Shaw, is it fair to say
that the Special Immigrant Visa Program is severely
overburdened and needs resources?
Ms. Shaw. Thank you so much for that question. That is a
serious area of oversight for us. As you noted, there are more
than 150,000 SIV applications still pending. And so, our work
has found, prior to the evacuation, and our current work and
ongoing work, I think, are trending in this direction as well,
that while some progress has been made to try to streamline the
process and to better resource it, there is still plenty of
room for improvement. Processing times still exceed well beyond
that nine-month target stated in statute.
And so, I will note that the Department, from April 2021
until 2022, did increase their processing rate by about 15
times. So, we are seeing progress, but there is still that
significant backlog. And, so, it is a major area of focus for
our work.
Ms. Balint. And following up on that, Ms. Shaw, you said
the nine-month turnaround in statute. Where are we right now
with the timeline? What is the average timeline for one of
these folks waiting for relief?
Ms. Shaw. So, I do not have averages as of today. But our
past work, which looked at averages in the 2020 time period,
showed that although we could not get a definitive answer on
every phase of the process because of how some of the data
comes in, we did determine that just two of the four phases
were resulting in average processing times of more than 17
months. And, so, you can sort of extrapolate from there.
Ms. Balint. So, years?
Ms. Shaw. Potentially, yes.
Ms. Balint. OK. Ms. Shaw, so, is it fair to say that
neither the asylum system or the SIV program can provide timely
assistance right now to these individuals who need relief?
Ms. Shaw. So, it is true that they cannot provide that
right now for every person in the backlog. But there are
recommendations pending in our work that certainly could help
improve the situation, and we hope to be able to offer
additional recommendations.
Ms. Balint. So, simply put, I just want to say, you know,
our partners deserve better. This is not acceptable. And I ask
my Republican colleagues to recognize the urgency of this
effort and join Democrats in passing a bipartisan Afghan
Adjustment Act that will make good to these people who risked
their lives alongside of our servicemen and women.
Thank you, Ms. Shaw.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Mr. LaTurner from
Kansas for five minutes.
Mr. LaTurner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
During the summer of 2021, there was much debate in
Congress regarding American military presence in Afghanistan.
There was passionate discourse, even within the Republican
Party over the matter. But nearly two years later, we have
reached a policy consensus.
The Biden Administration's botched withdrawal from
Afghanistan was an unmitigated disaster. Despite four months of
prep time, the failed evacuation was marred by poor decision-
making and incoherent operational logistics every step of the
way.
This began with President choosing to make the State
Department responsible for withdrawal rather than allowing our
military leadership at DOD to determine how best to protect our
service members and American interest.
Abandoning Bagram, our most strategic and fortified
foothold in Afghanistan, before the evacuation was even
complete lead to thousands of Americans and SIV holders
stranded behind enemy lines.
The premature abandonment also left the Taliban armed with
a vast arsenal of American military equipment. Approximately
23,000 armored vehicles and 165 helicopters or fixed-wing
aircraft, in addition to 550,000 firearms, which were promptly
turned upon the people of Afghanistan and the last of our
remaining troops.
It does not take State Department credentials or degree in
foreign affairs to realize terms of withdrawal negotiated with
a terrorist state, one that openly chants, Death to America,
should not be taken at face value.
President Biden's decision to entrust our enemies to secure
our perimeter around Kabul's airport as the city descended into
chaos and violence, resulted in the death of 13 brave United
States service members.
Weeks before this debacle unfolded, President Biden made
the ill-fated prediction that, ``There is going to be no
circumstance for you to see people being lifted off the roof of
an Embassy of the United States from Afghanistan.'' Just 36
days later, we saw people being lifted off the roof of an
embassy of the United States from Afghanistan.
The disastrous withdrawal has lasting implications beyond
the fact that we now lack a militaristic presence in the
preeminent terrorism hub of the world, the region in which the
9/11 attacks were plotted.
Chinese state media openly refer to the Afghan effect as an
accelerant of international instability, which has emboldened
them to increasingly test the waters regarding an invasion of
Taiwan.
Vladimir Putin witnessed this weakness and lack of
leadership and started building up troops on Ukraine's border a
mere month later.
Our botched evacuation underscores much of the geopolitical
upheaval we are witnessing today. And it all could have been
avoided had the Biden Administration simply not rushed our
withdrawal to meet an arbitrary deadline.
President Biden is our Commander-in-Chief, and the buck
stops with him.
For Mr. Storch and Ms. Shaw, no American service members
were killed in action between the signing of the Doha Agreement
and President Trump's departure from office. The Doha Agreement
was conditions based, but the Taliban was not abiding by the
deal.
Do you believe the Biden Administration had ample time to
renegotiate the deal between assuming office and the withdrawal
from Afghanistan had they so wished?
Mr. Storch. We have not done any audits or valuations, any
independent oversight that would address that issue. There are
a lot of factors that go into it. We did report out on the
chronology in the lead IG reports. But other than that, we have
not done any work on that.
Ms. Shaw. The same is true for State OIG.
Mr. LaTurner. Do you have opinions about this?
Mr. Storch. So, I will share with you. I think what makes
the work of OIGs impactful is that we have rigorous standards
and procedures that we follow to produce our oversight
products. And that is true for all of us. So, I appreciate the
opportunity to testify. But on these sort of issues, if we have
not done the work, we cannot really testify.
Mr. LaTurner. We will move on. Troops on the ground
surrounding the Kabul airport were allegedly ordered not to
intervene in passport seizure operations by the Taliban.
Can either of you identify which member of either the State
Department or DOD that issued that stand-down order.
Mr. Storch. I have no information on that. I am sorry.
Ms. Shaw. I do not either. It is potentially covered in
some of our upcoming work. So, we can take that as a get back.
Mr. LaTurner. Why hasn't there been any good faith effort
to identify this individual?
Ms. Shaw. I can tell you that the scope of our work is
looking at the full range of events as they unfolded. The
Department had a role to play. And so, we are looking at each
aspect of that. I do not know if that particular issue is a
major focal point of the work. We had a broader scope.
Mr. LaTurner. Would not you agree that that is an important
piece of information as we are trying to get to the bottom of
what happened and hold people accountable within the
Administration?
Ms. Shaw. Our work is primarily looking for opportunities
for recommendations, so we are looking at policies and
procedures. Now, if we do identify information that suggests
that there was misconduct on the part of a particular
individual, we would, of course, investigate that. I am not
aware of any allegations along those lines.
Mr. Storch. Same answer here.
Mr. LaTurner. I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes Ms. Lee from Pennsylvania.
Ms. Lee of Pennsylvania. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is
easy for my colleagues to Monday morning quarterback about the
time that it took to evacuate more than 120,000 people from
Afghanistan, but I would like to remind them of the reality on
the ground. Unfortunately, the fact is that starting the
evacuation mission any sooner would have likely yielded the
same result.
As President Biden said on August 12, 2021, ``The
evacuation of thousands of people from Kabul is going to be
hard and painful, no matter when it started and when we
began.'' It would have been true if we had started a month ago
or a month from now. There is no way to evacuate this many
people without pain and loss of heartbreaking images you see on
television. If the evacuation mission had begun any earlier, it
would have signaled a lack of confidence in the Afghan
Government when its collapse at that time was not inevitable
certainty.
To my own, I want to say that since the Taliban takeover,
women in Afghanistan have been denied their fundamental rights
and freedoms. They are invisible, isolated, and suffocated in
their own country. Girls can no longer go to school beyond
sixth grade. Women can no longer work or travel without a male
chaperone. Watching this unfold has been a sobering reminder of
how swiftly and aggressively women's and girls' rights can be
taken away. Something we are all too aware of here in the U.S.
as women's access to health care is systematically eroded.
In another significant measure, women were barred from
working for national and international NGOs.
Ms. Angarella, how did the Taliban's decision to ban women
from working in NGOs exacerbate the humanitarian crisis?
Ms. Angarella. Thank you for that question. It is
undeniable that the inability for women aid workers, first with
NGOs who were banned in December, and more recently with U.N.
partners, is having a significant impediment to be able to
provide services at all to women for health care, for food
assistance, and for education.
It is my understanding that there are some exceptions being
made, but it is ad hoc throughout the country. It is not
consistent. And as recently as right now, the U.N. is currently
reassessing what programming they are going to be able to
continue.
Ms. Lee of Pennsylvania. So, would you agree that there are
very legitimate and serious concerns about the survival of
Afghan women and girls as a result of this ban?
Ms. Angarella. Absolutely.
Ms. Lee of Pennsylvania. The United Nations stated that it
may have to pull out of Afghanistan in May. The Taliban
continues to refuse to allow women to work for the
organization. What will the impact of that withdrawal have on
women, and as well as the rest of Afghan civil society?
Ms. Angarella. The work that we have done in conjunction
with our U.N. partners and oversight partners, my office works
very collaboratively and closely with the WFP IG, for example,
UNHCR and other U.N. organizations that right now are
reassessing their programming.
It will impact our ability and their ability to investigate
any cases or allegations of misconduct, sexual exploitation and
abuse, trafficking in persons, or even just the bare necessity,
delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Ms. Lee of Pennsylvania. Thank you. In February, hundreds
of Afghan refugees in Islamabad, Pakistan, organized a protest
over extreme delays in the approval of U.S. visas. Many of
these people are journalists and rights activists meant to be
fast-tracked with priority one and priority two visas. Yet,
they and thousands more remain as our visa processing remains
backlogged and our refugee resettlement system remains
desperately under funded.
Ms. Shaw, as you have closely reviewed the SIV program,
would you commit to a similar review of priority one and two
visa processing for Afghans?
Ms. Shaw. That is certainly something we can take into
consideration as part of our work planning and as part of the
broader series of products we are doing on SIV program.
Ms. Lee of Pennsylvania. Thank you. Over the last year,
around 124,000 people have been evacuated from Afghanistan. Our
communities have stepped up to assist them.
My home city of Pittsburgh welcomed over 700 Afghan
refugees last year, and Pennsylvania as a whole took in over
2,000. The U.S. is responsible for a lot of the harm caused in
Afghanistan and we must work to repair those harms.
We have an obligation to aid our allies who supported
American forces as well as their families. We must work to end
the harmful annihilation of women's rights perpetuated by the
Taliban. I thank you all on the panel. And I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Mr. Fallon for five
minutes.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Inspector General Sopko, who was inaugurated President of
the United States on January 20, 2021? Trump or Biden?
Mr. Sopko. Oh, this is a trick question. I think Biden.
Mr. Fallon. No, it is not. I promise.
Mr. Sopko. Biden, I think.
Mr. Fallon. Yes. OK. And the fighting season in
Afghanistan, roughly speaking, Mr. Sopko, is it May through
September or is it October through April?
Mr. Sopko. I am sorry, I did not hear the question.
Mr. Fallon. I am sorry. The fighting season in Afghanistan.
There is a fighting season. Is it roughly April to October? Or
is it October through April?
Mr. Sopko. There used to be that fighting season. But I
think over time, maybe it is global warming or whatever, but it
has changed. So, the Taliban just continued fighting throughout
that whole period of time.
Mr. Fallon. But were there, the violence, was it greater in
the summer than in the winter?
Mr. Sopko. Usually, it is greater in the summer than in the
winter.
Mr. Fallon. Summer, yes.
Mr. Sopko. Once the passes open up, then they were coming
in. But once the Taliban started taking more territory in
Afghanistan, they did not have to worry about going over the
passes and waiting for the snow to melt.
Mr. Fallon. And who was Commander-in-Chief when the troops
retrograded? We drew down from, against the advice incidentally
of senior military commanders, we drew down from 2,500 to about
650. Was it Biden or Trump?
Mr. Sopko. Oh, it was President Biden. I thought you are
talking about the Commander-in-Chief from the ground.
Mr. Fallon. No, no.
Mr. Sopko. OK.
Mr. Fallon. And who was the President of the United States
on August 26, 2021, when ISIS-K terrorists, who are amongst the
5,000 that escaped Bagram because we drew down to 650? Who was
President then, on August 26, 2021? Biden or Trump?
Mr. Sopko. I think it was Biden.
Mr. Fallon. Biden, yes. And this Administration, the Biden
Administration oversaw the abandonment of approximately $7
billion worth of U.S. military equipment in Afghanistan. And
then the Administration, Joe Biden's Administration, the
National Security Council, authored a 12-page report on the
Afghan withdrawal.
Mr. Sopko, who did the report blame for this disaster?
Mr. Sopko. I cannot say. I mean, I have read it. I do not
know.
Mr. Fallon. Well, I mean, it is clearly that they blame
President Trump and that was just very disingenuous. And the
State Department, in your own words, did not cooperate with
your oversight responsibilities. Is that true?
Mr. Sopko. True. But I had nothing to do--my agency was not
asked to help prepare that report.
Mr. Fallon. Oh, I know because that report--yes, Mr.
Sopko----
Mr. Sopko. Our reports stand for themselves.
Mr. Fallon. Yes, your report is actually from an
independent entity.
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Mr. Fallon. That report was garbage, and it was not worth
the paper it was written on. And I remember being in Armed
Services in about a month after the attack on our service
members that killed 13 Americans.
And I asked General Milley and Secretary Austin, if they
could guarantee the American people that none of those 5,000
terrorists and criminals and scumbags that escaped Bagram, a
couple of weeks prior to the 26th, were responsible directly
for the attack that killed the 13 Americans. And they both said
that they could not guarantee that. Well, come to find out that
the suicide bomber was indeed one of the 5,000 folks that
escaped.
And what has this Administration done? I mean, they have
obfuscated, they blamed President Trump, they stonewalled
SIGAR's oversight responsibilities, and this has been a
catastrophic failure. And Secretary Blinken defended the
withdrawal, saying that he made the right decision. Secretary
Austin said that he had no regrets, just recently. I mean, this
is absolutely inexcusable. So, Mr. Sopko, did the Afghan
security forces have the expertise and training required to
take over and secure Bagram airbase?
Mr. Sopko. I cannot speak specifically for that airbase.
But the way it occurred, they didn't even know the Americans
were gone until hours afterwards. But to actually protect the
base? They probably could have if they had been given advance
notice.
But what they told us and what General Sadat told us and
others, they kind of woke up one morning, and all of a sudden,
we were gone.
Mr. Fallon. And how long did the Afghan forces remain in
place before the government fell?
Mr. Sopko. Well, the place was collapsing, starting six
months before. But they basically, it ended when President
Ghani ran away. I forget what actual date that was.
Mr. Fallon. So, we are talking weeks.
Mr. Sopko. Weeks from when to when? From Bagram to Ghani--
--
Mr. Fallon. Well, it is not years. Yes, from the time in
which we had our final withdrawal until the time the Taliban
had full control of Afghanistan.
Mr. Sopko. Yes, Ghani flees, I think, August 15. Doha
Agreement was signed February 29, 2020. Biden made his
decision, I believe, on April 14, 2021. So, those are the
dates.
Mr. Fallon. Well, the tragedy is----
Mr. Raskin. Will the gentleman yield?
Mr. Fallon. Well, my time has expired.
Mr. Raskin. OK. He has expired.
Mr. Fallon. I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman's time has expired.
The Chair recognizes Mr. Casar of Texas.
Mr. Casar. Thank you. The 20-year Afghanistan war caused
extraordinary death and devastation for the Afghan people and
for American troops, killing by some estimates over 70,000
civilians and 2,400 American service members. And we still have
so many constituents and friends here in the United States,
suffering even if they survived the war.
It is really important that the Biden Administration ended
the longest war in the history of our Nation. Not only was it
an important thing to do, I believe it was the right thing to
do. No other president was able to do that in 20 years with
bipartisan support from folks on this Committee. But almost two
years later, in addition to living under a repressive and
autocratic Taliban regime, over half the Afghan population is
on the brink of starvation, in part because of actions taken by
the U.S. when we froze Afghanistan central bank assets,
resulting in a liquidity crisis. That means that normal people
are not able to access their money.
Human rights groups have warned that 70 percent of Afghans
are unable to meet their basic needs, including food, and more
civilians could die from this financial crisis in the country
than during the 20 years of war. Afghan feminist activists have
pointed out that the economic collapse caused in part by the
asset freeze overwhelmingly devastates the lives of Afghan
women and girls. Mr. Sopko's report just came out this morning,
detailing the Biden Administration creating the Afghan funds to
disperse $3.5 billion of people's frozen assets back into
Afghanistan and creating liquidity for folks to make sure that
kids have shoes in their feet and food in their bellies and
farmers can produce and folks can live. But also, the report
details the risks associated with making sure those funds do
not fund terrorism and that there is not money laundering.
We have to fix this problem. People should not starve, for
humanitarian reasons, but also folks starving pushes them
further into the hands of their oppressors. And we do not want
the money going to funding terrorism. So, how are we going to
solve this problem urgently and quickly, to whoever can
respond?
Mr. Sopko. Well, you have hit it on the head, Congressman.
I mean, the dilemma we have is if we do not, and we are giving
most of the assistance, humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan,
of all the countries combined. If we stop that assistance,
millions will starve. Unfortunately, and this is the difficult
thing. The difficult thing is, we do not have the adequate
oversight to prevent the money from going to the Taliban or
other nefarious groups. I think, as IGs, we say, do better
oversight if you make that policy decision on continuing
funding.
There is a further dilemma, which you have touched upon,
and that is the way the Afghans are treating over 50 percent of
their population. Basically, if you are a woman in Afghanistan,
you are in a prison, and this is the thing, I think, one of the
Congressmen was hitting on. By not allowing women to work for
the U.N. or for NGOs, that means poor women who are starving to
death cannot go to get food, because they cannot travel in that
country unless they have a male companion. They cannot go to an
office run by the U.N. unless there is a woman there.
Mr. Casar. And, Mr. Sopko, I do not mean to cut you off.
Mr. Sopko. Yes, sure.
Mr. Casar. It is really serious, but the humanitarian
assistance is critical as we have laid out.
Mr. Sopko. It is critical.
Mr. Casar. But figuring out the macroeconomic situation is
critical so that folks can sustain themselves. It is a real
problem. What are we going to do? I mean, it has been almost
two years. What do we think here, amongst us, we could do to
solve the fact that folks cannot go to the bank and get access
to their money?
Mr. Sopko. Well, right now, we cannot give that money. And
I do not think the State Department or the Treasury wants that
money to go to the central bank, because the central bank is
basically not an independent bank. So, this is a very difficult
thing. And that is what we are just alerting to you. It is a
good idea----
Mr. Casar. Oh, I hear you, and I hear that there are
problems, but my question is, what are we going to do about it?
The world is real rough, and in Afghanistan, it is way worse
than that. So, what are we going to do? And, Ms. Shaw, if you
have 15 seconds to answer that, it would be great, before my
time expires.
Ms. Shaw. Sure. I would just say, as it has been said
before, we do not decide the policy. But when that funding is
given, our work does show that there are improvements that can
be made to the monitoring and oversight of those funds, to
provide the sorts of assurances that you are talking about.
And our investigative work can also look at situations and
allegations of potential fraud, diversion, and mismanagement.
So, there are mechanisms that can be used to better safeguard.
It may not be perfect. It cannot guarantee no dollars will go
into the wrong hands. But in terms of balancing those competing
interests, that is what our work has been able to show.
Mr. Casar. Well, we denounced the Taliban as we should. But
when the U.S. contributes to the suffering of everyday people,
that pushes the population further into the hands of their
oppressors. So, if we want to make Afghans and Americans safer,
if we want to take on the Taliban, we should focus on feeding
and clothing people, not starving them, and we should solve
this problem. Thank you.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes Mr. Donalds from Florida for five minutes.
Mr. Donalds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I really want to get
off the last line of questioning and focusing. We have a
problem, that is pretty clear and apparent. There is
obstruction coming out of the State Department and USAID. Mr.
Sopko, in your letter and in your testimony, it has been very
clear that this Administration has unilaterally stopped all of
your ability to get the information that Congress has
authorized you to collect. Is that correct?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct.
Mr. Donalds. OK. In your letter, you state, ``Three prior
administrations understood and abided by these legal
certainties. It is shocking that State and USAID officials are
choosing, at this particular juncture, to violate the law,
obstruct SIGAR's oversight work, and refuse to cooperate with
our oversight requests.'' Mr. Sopko, how many oversight
requests has SIGAR made of State, of the Department of State
under Tony Blinken and USAID?
Mr. Sopko. I do not have the exact number in front of me,
sir, but I did promise another Congressman and I promised the
Chairman and Ranker, we would give a list of all of that. I
mean, it goes back to the simplest thing, sir, and I do not
want to take your time.
Mr. Donalds. Sure.
Mr. Sopko. But we asked for the Doha Agreement back in
2021, copies of and access to the documents related to the Doha
Agreement, sent multiple letters. We still have not even gotten
a response from that, so it is as simple as that.
Mr. Donalds. Mr. Sopko, and not to cut you off,--Mr. Sopko.
I know.
Mr. Donalds. But to me, it sounds like you are a Republican
Member of Congress, because Republican Members of Congress send
letters over to the Administration and we do not get answers
either, so this is actually a consistent pattern. Ms. Shaw, you
are the IG over at the Department of State. Are you aware of
the obstruction from Department of State employees toward this
Inspector General over Afghanistan?
Ms. Shaw. So, I have read Mr. Sopko's testimony. I can say,
for our part, that we have not experienced the same sort of
lack of cooperation.
Mr. Donalds. No, no, no. I am not asking about if you as an
inspector general with your role of having oversight over
State. I am talking about, are you aware of State Department
employees willfully ignoring and obstructing the investigations
that are lawfully authorized by Congress from SIGAR, Mr.
Sopko's office. Are you aware of State Department employees
ignoring and obstructing his investigations?
Ms. Shaw. I am aware of Mr. Sopko's statements. Yes.
Mr. Donalds. Ms. Angarella. I got it. Ms. Angarella, you
are the IG over USAID?
Ms. Angarella. I am acting in that role. Yes.
Mr. Donalds. Acting?
Ms. Angarella. Yes.
Mr. Donalds. Similar line of question. Are you aware of
USAID employees willfully obstructing SIGAR's ability to
conduct congressional oversight, which is their legal mandate?
Ms. Angarella. I would say the same as Ms. Shaw. I am aware
of IG Sopko's letter. I would say we have not had any access
issues, and I would say further that I am happy to partner with
any oversight IG to do joint work or get access to any
documents or people at USAID and assist in that matter.
Mr. Donalds. Well, I guess, here is the question. Ms. Shaw,
you do not have a problem. Ms. Angarella, you do not have a
problem. What is the problem with Mr. Sopko? What is his
problem? Like, why is it that he is being blocked from doing
the thing that he was legally charged by this Congress and
previous congresses, mind you? Not just the 118th, the 117th,
the 116th, the 115th have all given him authority to conduct
oversight and State and USAID are blocking him. Is anybody at
the table aware of the President's thought process when it
comes to inspector generals? I mean, has the President put out
a statement that he does not want his Administration to comply
with the requests from inspector generals? Anybody? Has the
President made that statement?
Mr. Sopko. My experience, sir, is that most Presidents do
not like to talk to inspectors general in both parties. As I
joke about, I work for one person and one person only and that
person never wants to see me, and I think it is just they avoid
talking to IGs. Now, we have talked to senior officials at
State and AID and DOD over the years, not since this
Administration. But we used to brief on a regular basis the
Administrator of USAID, senior officials at State, senior
officials at DOD, including the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
but since this Administration coming in, it has been radio
silence with us.
Mr. Donalds. So, Mr. Sopko, look, I am going to end my line
of question with you, because I actually read one of the SIGAR
classified reports right after the fall of Afghanistan. It was
quite eye opening, to be frank, about your capabilities, of
your team to get information about what was actually going to
happen in Afghanistan. I would urge my colleagues to go back
and read some of those classified reports on what was going on
in the ground in Afghanistan, because it is revealing. Mr.
Sopko, I will let you answer, but it was pretty clear to me,
anybody who read this report could see that Afghanistan will
fall pretty quickly. Your reports or your Department's reports,
were they transmitted to the White House prior to the fall of
Afghanistan?
Mr. Sopko. Actually, all of our reports are provided to all
agencies. The classified ones are obviously not put on the
website, but we definitely provided those, and we provided it
to all the intelligence communities. Let me just add one thing
about those classified reports that you should also know. At
the request of this Committee and other committees, we
requested DOD, State, and AID to declassify all of those
reports, many of them going back 12 years. We still have heard
nothing back from those agencies. And I see Congressman Lynch
is here. I believe he was fighting to get those reports and
that information declassified. Many of those reports were
classified because we had a general tell us because President
Ghani was embarrassed if they were released. Now, there is no
President Ghani anymore, but still the DOD, State, and AID will
not declassify.
I have no declassification authority as a SIGAR. I have to
rely on the agencies. You have to rely on the agencies. And we
are still waiting for, like, 12 years of reports to be
declassified, many of them just because they embarrass
President Ghani who is no longer president of Afghanistan. So,
I may sound a little upset. I think you should be upset. This
is ridiculous.
Mr. Donalds. Well, I share your concerns. I think those
reports should be declassified, especially considering the fact
that we have gold bullion moving all over the place. We got
billions of dollars going into Afghanistan, not getting to the
people. I mean, we should have all that information. The
American people should have it as well. I apologize. Mr.
Chairman, I yield.
Mr. Armstrong. The Chair calls on Ms. Crockett from Texas.
Ms. Crockett. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you so much
for being here. I know it has already been a pretty long day
for you all.
My Republican colleagues have convened this hearing today
to condense the conflict in Afghanistan into the last few
months of this, what I call, forever war. However, the price of
this decades-long war has had long standing effects on
Americans. My district, Texas 30, is home to the Dallas VA
Medical Center. I had an opportunity to go and sit down with
them over the last two weeks. The cost of this war on our
servicewomen and men is immeasurable. Members of our armed
forces died in battle, other sustained injuries, physical and
mental, that have altered their lives forever. We owe it to
them to talk about this war and their service, beyond what
transpired during the last few months, months that were largely
dictated by a withdrawal agreement from the last
administration. We also owe it to our service members to take
the lessons of this war and make sure we fully understand the
cost and not just sit up here and pontificate for political
points.
As Members of the Oversight Committee, it is our duty to
ensure effective management and accountability mechanisms for
our government when engaged in longstanding wars, particularly
when it comes to lives, taxpayer dollars, and trauma both here
and abroad. So, Mr. Sopko, in your estimate, how long was the
U.S. aware of waste, fraud, and financial corruption in
addition to issues in tracking military equipment?
Mr. Sopko. I think we may have started highlighting that
going back to the first year I was a SIGAR back in 2013.
Ms. Crockett. OK. I have got some reports that may go back
a little bit earlier than that.
Mr. Storch. And I would just say that if it is helpful, we
have reporting going back to 2005 that identified some of these
issues, many issues related to accountability and controls over
all sorts of both financial and equipment, if that is helpful.
Ms. Crockett. OK. Perfect.
Mr. Sopko. I only started in 2012, so I cannot go back
before that. But I think you are right. There have been reports
for a long time.
Mr. Storch. I started more recently, but I have been
reading a lot, so.
Ms. Crockett. In my research, it looks like it went back to
the early 2000's. And so, you know, just to be clear, because
in this Committee a lot of times it feels like it is D versus
R, and our job is really just to be oversight. We are supposed
to all care about let us just be transparent, let us be real,
and let us be honest. And so, I just want to point out that
that was under a Republican Administration that we are talking
about, I won't say the name, if we go back that far. And so,
what I want to talk about is the impact of the waste and fraud
on our service members and missions. We are talking about money
that was meant for girls in Afghanistan. We are talking about
money that was meant for service members. Yet, you know, we are
talking about these young girls receiving fewer hygiene
products and medical supplies overall going into the country.
During the 20-year war, we spent roughly $2.3 trillion. You
may have given a different number. You opened, and I thought,
man, he got my notes. But roughly $2.3 trillion taxpayer
dollars. But in July 2018, in a letter to three Members of
Congress, Inspector General Sopko reported that of the roughly
42 percent of money appropriated for Afghan reconstruction
between 2002 and 2017, nearly a third was found to have been
subject to waste, fraud, and abuse. That is an alarming number.
These taxpayer dollars could have been used to support our
servicewomen and men at home and abroad. We could have
increased the salaries for our military members sacrificing
their lives while being deployed. We could have used those
taxpayer dollars to fund our VA centers to give our members the
physical and mental treatment they deserve at a quicker rate.
We could have funded VA workforce and vocational training
programs for our members transitioning back to civilian life.
We could have helped hundreds of thousands of veterans
struggling with substance abuse, and also address the
unacceptable rates of veteran homelessness.
Clearly, I have a long laundry list of things that we could
have done, and I am running out of time, so I am going to skip
this question, maybe.
Mr. Armstrong. You can have a little more time.
Ms. Crockett. Thank you so much. How can the United States
ensure that there are robust oversight mechanisms in place so
that American supplied equipment and taxpayer dollars are
adequately accounted for in future conflicts? And I am going to
just try to keep it real short, because I am going somewhere
with this even though you all may not have thought I was.
Anybody?
Ms. Angarella. Sure. I would say for USAID, who does the
majority of non-security programming in complex environments,
the three top lessons that I think are practical from
Afghanistan are USAID conducting better and more effective
monitoring and oversight of its programming, of better defining
what success means and matching the programmatic metrics to
those humanitarian or development objectives. And then third,
holding their implementing partners accountable for reporting
and doing the first line of monitoring and evaluating.
Ms. Crockett. Thank you so much, and first of all, I really
do appreciate you all being here. I bring up all of this
because right now we are dealing with conversations here in
D.C. and we are talking about the debt ceiling. And when we
talk about the debt ceiling, the average American does not know
what we are talking about. But we are talking about the fact
that we have run up the credit card, we have spent this money.
And now, we have to pay our bills otherwise we end up with bad
credit essentially, right?
And so, what I want us to do in this Committee is focus on
figuring out how we can be better stewards of taxpayer dollars
so that we do not end up at a cliff. And we are at a cliff
because we ended up spending money on stuff that we did not
need to spend it on anyway. It was a forever war.
And let me be clear. I am also upset about the lives that
were lost not just in the withdrawal, but in the war as a
whole. I am also upset that the American people right now are
potentially going to suffer the effects of the fact that we
failed at our oversight. And, now, for whatever reason, we are
going to be held hostage by the people in charge in this body
instead of just paying our bills, moving on, and making sure
that as we go forward with our new budget, we are clean about
it. And the money that we give out in that new budget, we make
sure that we have effective and good oversight, and we do not
sit in forever wars. Thank you so much, and I yield back.
Mr. Armstrong. The Chair now recognizes himself for five
minutes.
In 2019, The Washington Post published the Afghanistan
papers, which largely comprised of a series of interviews
conducted by SIGAR. The Post wrote that there are gaping
contradictions between what the U.S. official said in public
and what they believed in private as the war unfolded. The
Afghanistan papers combined with SIGAR's work painted a very
bleak picture of an unwinnable, untenable situation. Mr. Sopko,
you have stated in the past that, ``I am assuming throughout
the course of the 20-year conflict that the American people
were constantly lied to.'' Is that a fair statement?
Mr. Sopko. I think I use the term hubris and mendacity. I
do not say lying, but mendacity.
Mr. Armstrong. I will use the term lie. I won't put that in
your words. My problem is, is I think the Biden Administration
is continuing to perpetuate these very same lies. Two weeks
ago, the White House posted on its website a 12-page review of
the withdrawal.
The AMP reported that this was written by National Security
Council with input from President Biden. Unfortunately, this
document lists no date, no author, and yet again, tells a story
that anyone with eyes can see is meant to politically protect
the Administration rather than give an open and honest account.
Mr. Sopko, the White House paper claims that the assessment
in early 2021 was that the Taliban advances would accelerate
across large portions of Afghanistan after a complete U.S.
military withdrawal and potentially lead to the Taliban
capturing of Kaboul within a year or two. Was this claim
consistent with your assessments prior to withdrawal?
Mr. Sopko. Partially. We predicted the Taliban would win.
We never gave a date. I think that may have been overly
generous to think it would have lasted two years, particularly
since the U.S. Air Force was telling us as of January of that
year that if we took away the contractors, the Afghan Air Force
would collapse within a matter of months. So, I do not know
where that assessment came from.
Mr. Armstrong. The White House paper claims that throughout
the late spring and early summer of 2021, intelligence reports
continued to suggest that even if the Taliban made gains in
some Afghan provinces, the capital, Kabul, would be more
difficult for the Taliban to take and that the Afghan forces
would defend it. Was that claim consistent with your assessment
prior to withdrawal?
Mr. Sopko. Again, I do not know where that assessment came
from. I do not think we would agree with that.
Mr. Armstrong. The White House papers states prevailing
military intelligence and military view was that Kabul would
hold beyond the end of the withdrawal. But according to the
Afghanistan papers, one unnamed U.S. military official told
government interviewers in 2016 that about a third of the local
police seemed to be drug addicts or Taliban. He added that
their main concern was getting fuel from the U.S. unit. They
always wanted fuel. Would you have confidence in a force who a
third was either drug addicts or the Taliban?
Mr. Sopko. Well, it was not just drug addicts and the
Taliban. They just were not there. The provincial Governor of I
believe it was Herat province back in 2000--it was the second
year I was there I believe, third year--said that 50 percent of
his police never existed. So, I mean I go back to saying it was
not just drug addicts and Taliban, it was also they did not
exist.
Mr. Armstrong. My next question is on ghost soldiers. The
White House paper states that the ANDSF had significant
advantages compared to the Taliban. They had vastly superior
numbers and equipment, 300,000 troops compared to 80,000
Taliban fighters, an Air Force and two decades of training and
support. Yes or no, was that an accurate assessment?
Mr. Sopko. Well, they did have an air force. Unfortunately,
they were trained on the Soviet equipment, and we switched
equipment to American. And our Air Force, again, said they were
not going to be ready as an air force by themselves till 2030.
Mr. Armstrong. So, they had an air force, but when stuff
broke down, they could not get it in the air?
Mr. Sopko. Yes. Have you ever repaired a helicopter----
Mr. Armstrong. I have not.
Mr. Sopko [continuing]. Via telephone and Zoom? I mean, it
does not work.
Mr. Armstrong. And I think that is my problem. And we have
20 years of conflict. We have 20 years of painting a rosy
picture. We have it across Republican Administrations,
Democratic Administrations. We know all that. But given
everything that we have heard testifying and the Biden
Administration's 12-page report, we are not having an open
assessment of the errors made in the war as a whole, but
particularly in the withdrawal, and we want to talk about
leaving politics at the water's edge and dealing with all these
things. I think the first thing would be, is not to have a 12-
page piece of political fiction that is on an official White
House Administration website.
I thank you all for your time. And before I quit, I am
going to ask unanimous consent to enter the following documents
into the record: SIGAR's report, Why the Afghan Security Forces
Collapsed; the 12-page White House paper on the Afghanistan
withdrawal; and from the Afghanistan Papers, The Unguarded
Nation: At War With the Truth.
Mr. Armstrong. And I think we are going to allow the
witnesses to have a 10-minute break just to refresh. So, we
will take a 10-minute recess. Thank you all.
[Recess.]
Mr. Fallon.[Presiding.] The Committee on Oversight and
Accountability will reconvene. And the Chair will recognize the
gentleman from Florida, Mr. Frost, for five minutes.
Mr. Frost. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. You know, like many
folks have said, and I will say for myself, I do not support
endless wars. I know that when we send in troops, we need to
ensure that we know how we are going to get them back out and
at home with their families. You know, many Republican
colleagues and Democrats for a while have agreed that the war
in Afghanistan needed to end. And just a few years ago when
Donald Trump was President, Republicans in Congress were raving
about the need for a speedy withdrawal.
And my Republican colleague, you know, Mr. Biggs, had
publicly called for an immediate withdrawal from Afghanistan.
Our Chairman, Comer, praised the Trump-Taliban agreement, which
was riddled with concessions, including the release of 5,000
Taliban members, and the agreement that President Trump made
set a deadline to withdraw that, I would say, was even worse,
January 15, a time of transition, just a few days before
President Biden was sworn in. And so now that President Biden
had the courage to do what President Trump could not, which was
saying no to the endless war, now we have this political
outrage. And the reality of war, especially this war, is that
withdrawal was always going to be messy.
And, Mr. Storch, I want to ask, can you point to a specific
thing you believe that President Biden could have done to
guarantee a safe and orderly withdrawal with no lives lost?
Mr. Storch. Thank you for the question. So, we have not
done any oversight regarding what one administration or the
other did with regard to that. We did find a number of issues,
and some of them are very similar to the ones that IG Sopko
talked about that led to the rapid demise of the Afghan
security force and that led to the much more expedited
noncombatant operation.
Mr. Frost. And given that the war in Afghanistan spanned
decades and countless Americans serving overseas, if President
Biden had waited another year or deployed another 100,000
troops, would that have helped guarantee a safe and orderly
withdrawal with no lives lost?
Mr. Storch. Again, that is not something we have done an
independent oversight on, although as I have testified before,
one of the things we did do is get a copy of the full after
action that was done, and we are examining that now. And if
there is additional lesson learned or oversight to be done, we
will do that.
Mr. Frost. OK. Ms. Angarella, if President Biden had
doubled the amount of aid that we were providing, can you say
that would have prevented the rise of a Taliban Government?
Ms. Angarella. We have not done specific work on that, so I
could not say.
Mr. Frost. And, Ms. Shaw, I think you know kind of where I
am going with this, but if President Biden had re-negotiated
the terms of the withdrawal bearing in mind that the Taliban
were already ignoring many of the Trump Administration's lax
terms, would that have guaranteed a safe and orderly
withdrawal?
Ms. Shaw. So, not specifically speaking to decisions that
might have been made with the President, which are not in my
purview. But the upcoming work that we have done did find that
there were contributing factors that led to the confusion and
chaos, including, you know, unreliable data about the number of
evacuees, so there are definitely opportunities for
improvement. That work will have recommendations, and
certainly, we are fully supportive of ensuring that we all
learn from the mistakes of the past.
Mr. Frost. Of course. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the
gentlelady from North Carolina, Representative Foxx.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, very much. I thank our
witnesses for being here today.
You know, it is getting a little tiresome to hear President
Trump blamed over and over for the Afghan withdrawal. It was
the Biden Administration that pushed the disastrous and chaotic
withdrawal, and it is the Biden Administration that is
responsible for its poor execution. We all have confidence in
our military, but when they are given orders from their
Commander-in-Chief, they follow those orders. Mr. Sopko, were
the orders to withdraw in the manner that they withdrew given
by the Biden Administration?
Mr. Sopko. Congresslady, as I mentioned before, we did not
look at the withdrawal--my Agency, so you could ask the State
Department IG. I think they looked at the withdrawal.
Ms. Foxx. Ms. Angarella, do you have a comment on that?
Ms. Angarella. From USAID's perspective, no.
Ms. Foxx. No? Ms. Shaw?
Ms. Shaw. I am sorry. Do you mind restating the question?
Ms. Foxx. Were the orders to withdraw in the manner that
they withdrew given by the Biden Administration?
Ms. Shaw. So, our work looks specifically at decisions and
directions given by embassy leadership at the time. And so, we
did find that they were taking primary lead working with the
Department of Defense to execute that noncombatant evacuation.
Ms. Foxx. But somebody had to give the order to the
Embassy, right?
Ms. Shaw. Presumably so.
Ms. Foxx. Presumably so. OK. Mr. Storch----
Mr. Storch. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Foxx [continuing]. Were the orders to withdraw from
Afghanistan given by the Biden Administration?
Mr. Storch. Thank you for the question. We reported out in
the lead IG reporting on the facts of what happened with the
operation. In terms of doing any oversight related to that, as
I have testified, when the evacuation took place, our office
pivoted to working on very time-sensitive issues related to the
evacuation itself, to the refugees, and that. So, we have not
done any independent oversight that I could testify to. As I
have also testified, we have gone back and gotten the full
after action that was done by the Department. And my folks and
I are examining that, and if there is work to be done, we will
do it.
Ms. Foxx. I think it is a pretty pitiful situation where we
have four Federal Government employees who cannot answer a
simple question, was the order to withdraw given by the Biden
Administration. I am really not sure that that is under any
question.
Mr. Sopko. Congresswoman, I will cut to the chase.
Obviously, the Biden Administration was in charge, so the order
had to come from the Biden Administration. I think what all the
IGs are saying, particularly mine, I have no jurisdiction to
look at that decision, but, obviously, it was made by the
Biden----
Ms. Foxx. I didn't ask you to look at the jurisdiction.
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Ms. Foxx. I asked a simple question. Were the orders to
withdraw given by the Biden Administration?
Mr. Sopko. Somebody in the Biden Administration gave those
orders.
Ms. Foxx. OK.
Mr. Sopko. I will take a risk and say that, but yes, yes,
yes.
Mr. Storch. To the extent that is the question, there is no
question----
Ms. Foxx. A Federal Government employee taking a risk. Oh,
my goodness, this is a red-letter day. Ms. Angarella, do you
agree with that?
Ms. Angarella. I would agree with IG Sopko, yes.
Ms. Foxx. All right. Let us take this to Ms. Shaw. Will you
agree with that?
Ms. Shaw. Yes, I will agree.
Ms. Foxx. And Mr. Storch?
Mr. Storch. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Foxx. All right. Finally, we get an answer out of this
panel having to do with the withdrawal. OK. Probably my next
question is going to be a waste, so I will go on. Let me ask
this question, or let me make a comment. I think the hasty and
chaotic withdrawal reeks of poor planning, failed execution
paid with the blood of American soldiers. But as inspectors
general, all of you had offices at the U.S. Embassy in
Afghanistan. So, what was your experience like while planning
and executing the evacuation of your officers?
Mr. Sopko. I am happy to answer that. I think the statement
you made about it being confusing, hectic, and whatever, I did
have people there. It was, and I think the best example of
this, if you can get access to it, is to get a hold of the
dissent cable. Because what we were told--I have never seen it,
but there was a dissent cable done by career State Department
employees who describe, we have been told, the problems and how
chaotic and how horrible it was at that situation.
Ms. Foxx. Well, thank you for that information. Ms.
Angarella?
Ms. Angarella. Yes, I would say our direct hire American
Foreign Service Officer staff were withdrawn earlier, but USAID
IG had locally employed staff, six of whom were trying day in
and day out to get to and through the Abbey Gate. And as a
member of the senior leadership team at the time, we were
engaging 24 hours a day on a text message exchange with all of
that staff, and, as I testified, it will stay with me forever.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you. Ms. Shaw?
Ms. Shaw. So, our two remaining U.S. personnel left with
the order departure in April 2021, so did not experience the
circumstances of August, but our work did find that it was
confusing and chaotic.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you. Mr. Storch?
Mr. Storch. Yes, ma'am. We have a number of offices at
different times in Afghanistan doing oversight. The number of
people in country started to decline beginning in 2016 and then
with COVID. So, by the time of the actual demise of the Afghan
Government and the like, we were primarily working from Qatar
and other locations.
Ms. Foxx. Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I apologize
for going over.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes Ranking
Member Lynch from Massachusetts.
Mr. Lynch. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate your
great work on all these issues as well. I just want to clean up
something that was said earlier in the hearing hours ago. Mr.
Chairman, before you were in the chair, there was an allegation
that our Committee, and specifically my Subcommittee, had not
done oversight of the withdrawal process, including the Biden-
Harris Administration's Afghanistan withdrawal. I just want to
remind my colleagues that in the 117th Congress, my National
Security Subcommittee held three separate hearings regarding
U.S. policy in Afghanistan, including one with former Special
Representative for Afghan Reconstruction, Zalmay Khalilzad,
after President Biden announced the withdrawal in April.
In August 2021, at Mr. Grothman's request, who was my
Ranking Member then, Republican colleague, we received a
bipartisan briefing for the Subcommittee from one of today's
witnesses, Special Inspector General John Sopko. The
Subcommittee also received a classified briefing jointly from
State, DOD, DHS, and intelligence community in September 2021.
And in December 2021, we held another hearing on withdrawal,
and we had a classified briefing on the Administration's
counterterrorism policies, including in Afghanistan.
So, to claim that the Democrats hadn't done oversight on
Afghanistan is simply not true. In addition to those formal
settings, we also sat with the negotiating team, the Donald
Trump's negotiating team with the Taliban at the Munich
Security Conference. And also, here at the Capitol with
Republican leadership, we were able to sit down twice with--we
had two luncheons with President Ghani and his whole team after
the agreement had been signed to withdraw by the Trump
Administration with the Taliban, but prior to actual
withdrawal.
You know, oddly enough, I was elected on September 11, the
day of the attack. So, as soon as I arrived in Washington, DC.
as a new Member of Congress, Afghanistan was at the top of our
list of priorities. During my time in Congress, I have led or
participated in over 20 CODELs to Afghanistan. Mr. Sopko and I
are old friends. We have done a lot of work.
And Mr. Sopko, you know, you are an honest broker in all of
this. You have seen enough of me, and every single CODEL I did
was with Democrat and Republican Members. And I know sometimes
people do this, but I never, ever went to Afghanistan without
Republican Members as important and participating Members of
those congressional delegations.
So, Mr. Sopko, there was a suggestion that we were a
hindrance, the Democrats were a hindrance to getting
information, you know, on the ground in Afghanistan and getting
information to Congress. What do you think? You saw this
Committee and the Subcommittee particularly in action many,
many times in Afghanistan. Were we a hindrance to getting the
truth and the information? Or were we of assistance to you?
Mr. Sopko. Congressman, furthest from the truth. This
Committee, yourself included, the Chairman now, the Ranking
Members, I mean I think I have testified I think 11, 12 times
before this Committee. This Committee has cared more about
Afghanistan and more about getting the truth than probably any
other committee of Congress. I mean, kudos to all of you for
what you did and what you are continuing to do, I hope.
So, I cannot say more about how happy I am to come back
here. My first Committee I ever testified about in Afghanistan
was this Committee. Maybe you were chairing at that time. I
remember Chairman Issa, and my mind is going blank--forgive
me--who the Ranking Member was. And he said, Mr. Sopko, you are
about the only witness who brings us all together in a
bipartisan manner, and I will remember that. Because that is
what the job of an IG is, to be nonpartisan, to bring people
together to try to get the facts. And this Committee should be
proud of itself for doing that. And I think under Chairman
Comer, I think, it is continuing that, so that is all I can
say.
Mr. Lynch. Well, that is plenty. Mr. Chairman, just a
unanimous consent request. So, the Committee Democrats have
long supported the vital work of inspectors general and we
appreciate the work that you do. That is why last Congress my
colleague, then-Chair Maloney, and I was then Chair as well,
Subcommittee Chair, we spearheaded a bipartisan request to
SIGAR to examine the factors that contributed to the collapse
of the Afghan Government and its security forces last
September.
As Mr. Sopko has testified before, this request led to five
reports that have provided us and the American people with
exceptional insights into the failures and mistakes over 20
years that explain the rapid collapse of the Afghan Government
and its armed forces.
So, what I would ask through you, Mr. Chairman, to Chairman
Comer, Full Committee Chair Comer, would be an effort to draft
another letter similar to the one that we tried to do last
session to support our inspectors general and to encourage the
Administration and the agencies to be forthcoming and
cooperative with the attorney general community in terms of
getting the information and the truth and the facts out so that
we might learn from those lessons and maybe prevent, you know,
missteps from being made in the future.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you. And yes, I think that, clearly, the
Inspector Generals' Offices play a vital and critical role. We
need independent oversight. And I am sure that myself, the
other Subcommittee Chairs and Chairman Comer would very much
like to write a letter supporting, in a bipartisan fashion, the
work of the IGs, because that is just one critical tool to get
to the truth.
Mr. Lynch. And I will leave that up to our very capable
staffs to come up with language that would reflect that intent.
And I yield back. And I thank you for your courtesy, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Perry.
Mr. Perry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank each one of
you for your service to the country. You can imagine that we,
as Members of Congress in the legislative branch, have a little
bit of a difficult time getting information from the
Administration for no other reason than they are the executive
branch and we are the legislative branch, and the whole
separation and so on and so forth. But I am concerned that it
is deeper than that and there are reasons other than that.
And in the shadow of Tax Day, look, a lot of people in the
last couple of days just wrote checks to the Federal
Government. They are probably not real happy about it, and they
probably do not realize, and this is according to your report,
sir, Mr. Sopko, that since October 2021, the American taxpayers
spent $8,275,952,000 in Afghanistan. That is since October
2021.
And, also, included in your report 23-16, the United States
left 43,139 ground vehicles behind in Afghanistan; specialty
munitions, including millions of rounds of small arms
ammunition in the tune of 1,537,000 rounds; weapons from Mark
4s and M-16s to howitzers and mortar systems; 316,260 aircraft
vehicles, including individual GPS devices, 22,950. These
numbers are staggering. They are staggering. They are
unacceptable.
Now, in previous conversations with some of my colleagues,
the other inspector generals kind of implied and gave me the
impression via the questioning that everybody is cooperating
and there is no obstruction. And I want to drill down on that,
because that is not the perception I get from Mr. Sopko. And if
you are getting something different, then we need to know that.
A November 22 report found that the Taliban likely gained
access to approximately $57.6 million in funds. And I just
remind everybody we say the Taliban. Let us remind ourselves
that the Taliban is a murderous terrorist regime. A murderous
terrorist regime. $57.6 million in funds that DOD, State, and
USAID provided to the former Afghan Government, yet the
murderous Taliban has them.
And it also in the report says that the three agencies did
not provide or were unable to provide SIGAR with information
showing the amount of on budget assistance funds they left in
the country at the time of the Taliban takeover.
So, are they just not complying with him? Or are they
providing you with this information regarding the $57.6 million
that goes to DOD, sir? Ma'am, State? And ma'am, USAID? What say
you?
Mr. Storch. So, a couple of things. Thank you for the
question. First of all, we have not experienced a lack of
cooperation in getting information from the Department. With
regard to the important question you ask about equipment that
was left behind, I believe the Department in its submissions to
the Hill has estimated $7.12 billion worth of equipment that
was in the hands of the Afghan military when it collapsed. They
have indicated that much of that may not still be in operation.
Mr. Sopko has talked and we had similar work about the lack
of----
Mr. Perry. So, are you saying they are cooperating with you
but not the Special Inspector General in Afghanistan? They are
fully cooperating with you. And should he be coming to you for
the information since he cannot get it from DOD?
Mr. Storch. So, it is a great question. Just to finish the
last point, we have no ability to audit, obviously, in
Afghanistan at this point to determine how much
[inaudible].
Mr. Perry. Yes, I know, ``The server went down, and we do
not know where the equipment was. And oh, my goodness, we got
to spend more money on the military.''
Mr. Storch. With regard to our office, we have not
experienced any lack of cooperation from the department----
Mr. Perry. So once again, should Mr. Sopko be talking to
you since DOD won't cooperate with him?
Mr. Storch. Well, it is the Department's information. I am
happy to help with any IG to ensure----
Mr. Perry. OK. How about State?
Ms. Shaw. So, we also have not encountered any lack of
cooperation or access issues related to our Afghanistan
oversight. We de-conflict our work, so we are not looking at
those same questions when we know that SIGAR is looking at
them. So, we have not encountered the same issues. We are about
to launch work to look specifically at how the Embassy disposed
of its armored vehicles and sensitive assets. So, we do have
work in that space that we hope will answer questions.
Mr. Perry. So, the October 22 report also details State's
failure to complete required oversight and evaluation of its
anti-terrorism assistance program in Afghanistan. Do you
recognize that as true? And has the information they provided
lead you to the same conclusion or a different conclusion?
Ms. Shaw. We have not looked specifically at that issue
because that was an issue that SIGAR was looking at. So, we
work really hard to stay out of their way.
Mr. Perry. But if they cannot get the information, should
he come to you?
Ms. Shaw. He is certainly welcome to. He has not.
Mr. Perry. And how about USAID?
Ms. Angarella. Yes, we are happy to do joint work.
Mr. Perry. OK. Mr. Chairman, I yield.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the gentleman
from South Carolina, Mr. Timmons.
Mr. Timmons. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This has been one of
the more difficult hearings I have had in Congress over the
last four and a half years. I am very frustrated in the
narratives that are being pushed. I am very frustrated with the
lack of accountability. I am very frustrated just across the
board with the manner in which particularly Ranking Member
Raskin's opening statement characterized all of this.
And I tried to think through what made me so mad about it.
And I am offended at the manner in which he is accusing the
Trump Administration. I tried to think through it: ``What is
wrong with it? Why is it so bad?''
And the best example I could think of is the JCPOA, the
Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that was negotiated by the
Obama Administration. What was the problem? Everybody knew the
problem. The problem was Iran was trying to get a bomb. There
was disagreement about how to best go about stopping that. But
they chose a path. That path was agreed to in July 2015.
When Trump got into office, he said, ``I disagree with that
path. We are going to take a different path.'' And in May 2018,
he pulled out. The thing that drives me crazy is that if Iran
had gotten a nuclear weapon during the Trump Administration and
he had not pulled out of the JCPOA, this would be 100 percent
Trump's fault. It would not be Obama's fault. We would not be
talking about the $400 million that was sent over in U.S.
currency. We would be talking about Trump and Trump's failure.
But here we are, 13 service members are dead. Thousands of
Afghans have been brutally murdered. Women have had their
rights given to them and then taken away in a manner in which
this world has never seen. But we are talking about Trump's
failure because of the agreement that he entered into, his
Administration entered into, in February 2020. So, this is
Trump's fault because he tried to do something we all knew we
needed to do. We needed to leave Afghanistan. The question was
how.
He negotiated an agreement. His Administration negotiated
an agreement, and now here we are having a hearing about what
went wrong and what we can do differently to make sure it does
not happen again in the future. But instead of talking about
that, we get these ridiculous documents that I read, these
classified documents that are just ridiculous. We need to
actually get to the bottom of this, so it does not happen
again. The American lives that were lost, deserve that, they
deserve that.
I guess, Mr. Sopko, do you think that my JCPOA analogy is a
good one? I mean, did the Biden Administration have the ability
to change course? I mean, they technically delayed the
withdrawal from May to September. They could have pushed it
back further. They could have said, Taliban, if you do XYZ, we
are going to stay, we are going to do this, we are going to,
and he could have shot some missiles somewhere. He could have
done anything, but instead he did not, and 13 service members
died, thousands of people were killed, and our credibility in
the global stage was lost.
I guess what are your thoughts on my JCPOA analogy, No. 1?
And No. 2, in what world are we talking about Trump's deal and
not talking about the mistakes that were made in the days and
weeks leading up to the withdrawal?
Mr. Sopko. Well, Congressman, I really cannot comment on
the JCPOA analogy.
Mr. Timmons. Do you think it would have been Obama's fault
if Iran got a nuclear bomb under the Trump Administration?
Mr. Sopko. Look, I think you are asking a good question. I
think this Committee or State IG or whatever should look at
that question. You know, was it reasonable to delay? I cannot
tell you whether it was reasonable for President Biden to delay
or not. Maybe the State IG is looking at that, but those are
good questions to ask. That is what oversight should be, and it
should be independent, nonpartisan oversight. And I fully
support that. I spent 20 years working on Congress working for
Sam Nunn, John Dingell, Bill Roth. We did independent
oversight, and I think you need to do that. But I cannot really
tell you if he was right or wrong on that because we have not
looked at it.
Mr. Timmons. The 20 years that we spent money and blood in
Afghanistan and the 13 service members that died deserve
accountability for the mistakes that were made. And we are not
doing our job. The documents that I read, the classified
documents, the biggest joke I have ever seen. We need to do our
job. We need to make sure this does not happen again. We need
to learn from our mistakes, so we do not make them again, and
with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Sopko. And I agree with you, 100 percent.
Mr. Fallon. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from Virginia by way of Massachusetts, Mr. Connolly.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you very much. Go Red Sox. And thank
you all for being here today, and I agree with the gentleman
who just asked his line of questions. We need to learn from
history, but you do not learn from history by whitewashing it.
Decisions and events that took place had history, they had
context, they had antecedents. And some of my friends on the
other side want to pretend history never existed. It all
started when Kabul fell on someone else's watch, but that did
not happen in a vacuum.
And I might add, until that very day, my friends at the
other side of the aisle were still trumpeting Donald Trump's
peace agreement in Doha. In fact, let me quote from their web
page, which is behind me here.
[Chart.]
Mr. Connolly. ``Trump has continued to take the lead in
peace talks as he signed a historic peace agreement with the
Taliban in Afghanistan which would end America's longest war.''
You know when that came down? The day the Taliban marched into
Kabul. They were proud of it. But today, they want you to
believe none of that happen, Joe Biden caused it all.
Mr. Sopko, you and I have known each other a long time. And
you know the respect I hold you in and the work you and your
team have done, always thorough, not always well sung, not your
fault. And I wish Congress had listened a lot earlier to some
of the warning signals you sent us.
And I am not going to ask you who is at fault. I am going
to ask you some facts, though. You had a report and I want to
quote from your report. ``The U.S. decision to withdraw U.S.
military and military contractors from Afghanistan through the
February 2020 signing of the U.S.-Taliban agreement under the
Trump Administration and the withdrawal following President
Biden's public address in 2021 was a factor in the
demoralization and ultimate disintegration of the Afghan
military, and ultimately, Afghan Government.'' Is that a
correct statement?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct.
Mr. Connolly. And let us go back to the decision led by
then Ambassador Khalilzad. He was a chief U.S. negotiator on
behalf of our government under the Trump Administration, and he
led the U.S. side in the negotiations in Doha, correct?
Mr. Sopko. That is correct.
Mr. Connolly. And did he not bless a decision that was a
State Department decision, I assume backed by the Pentagon at
the time, to negotiate with the Taliban and not to invite the
Afghan Government itself in the preliminary negotiations?
Mr. Sopko. That also is correct.
Mr. Connolly. Now, let us stop there. That took place on
Trump's watch entirely. What could possibly be the impact of
actually not inviting the government we are allegedly fighting
for and defending and equipping by telling them, ``We are going
to negotiate with your armed, violent terrorist, medieval
opponents, the Taliban, without you at the table, and we are
going to cut our own deal with them and you are going to have
to live with it whatever it is''?
I am just spit balling here. Mr. Storch, you are from the
Pentagon. Could that have a demoralizing effect on any
military?
Mr. Storch. Well, we didn't do any work on that, but I see
your point, Congressman.
Mr. Sopko. We did, Congressman. And we said it did have a
debilitating effect upon the Afghan morale.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you.
Mr. Sopko. If you talk to any of the Afghans, they will
tell you that.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Sopko. I counted on that.
Maybe the Pentagon could learn from the forthrightness we just
heard. That is kind of common sense, Mr. Storch. And if you are
advising another government and you withdraw support from that
government in the form of who we are going to negotiate with,
it has consequences.
And by the way, did that agreement that was produced
between us and the Taliban, did that lead to any release of
prisoners?
Mr. Sopko. Yes, I think we referred to as 5,000 Taliban
were released. They agreed not to participate in fighting. But
almost every one of them joined the fight against the Afghan
Government.
Mr. Connolly. So, it was kind of a fig leaf agreement,
right? Like we agreed to it, we accepted it----
Mr. Sopko. Yes. And it was forced upon the Afghan
Government.
Mr. Connolly. Right. And forced upon the Afghan Government
by whom?
Mr. Sopko. I believe we found it was Secretary of State
Pompeo.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Mr. Sopko. I just think it is
important as we are discussing lessons learned, so that we do
not repeat mistakes, we be honest about the history and the
context that preceded dramatic events in August 2021.
I yield back.
Mrs. McClain. [Presiding]. Thank you. The Chair now
recognizes the gentlelady from Georgia, Ms. Greene.
Ms. Greene. Thank you, Madam Chair. This has been a pretty
interesting hearing today. I would like to remind everyone here
watching this hearing and in this room and my colleagues across
the aisle that Joseph R. Biden was inaugurated on January 21 of
2021 and was President and Commander-in-Chief over the
Afghanistan withdrawal.
The all attempts to blame President Trump for all of the
failures and deaths and arming the terrorist Taliban Government
fall completely and squarely on the shoulders of President
Biden.
Since 2002, the U.S. has spent over $2.3 trillion in
Afghanistan. The U.S. lost 2,328 U.S. military lives and over
20,000 other military members were wounded. Our country is
responsible for funding and building the mines in Afghanistan
that hold $1 trillion worth of rare earth minerals.
The United States had intelligence days before the suicide
bomber exploded himself, murdering 13 of our military members.
They had the intelligence. It was even in the news that they
knew this was coming. But yet, it happened anyway. Arming the
terrorist Taliban, the Taliban who we fought since 2002, is
unthinkable and most Americans cannot even comprehend it.
And now, since the failure in the withdrawal in
Afghanistan, Bagram is now under the control of Taliban and
China. And since Biden's failure, $8 billion has been given in
assistance to Afghans and Afghanistan. It is incomprehensible.
But yet, we are here trying to figure out how and why and what
happened.
And I have to tell you, most people I talk to in my
districts and most people I talk to when I travel across the
country cannot understand how this happened. And many veterans
I talk to take pride in our military, as I take pride in our
military, and they are so ashamed that our military was
humiliated in this failure in Afghanistan.
And so, I do have some questions. And I thank you all for
coming to speak with our committee. Mr. Sopko, in October 2021,
in a letter to Dafna Rand, an official at the State Department,
you said the Biden Administration instructed SIGAR to remove
all reports from your website following the collapse and asked
you to redact information on the website. Who specifically in
the Admin instructed your office to do that and why?
Mr. Sopko. I do not remember the name. We can get the name
of the person who sent that. I do not have that in front of me.
The explanation was that this could be potentially a threat to
Afghans. But we asked for any specific threats, ``Do you have
any specific threat information?'' And some of the requests
were just unbelievable. They wanted us to take down our
complete website and also to take down from all of our reports
the name of, let us say, President Ghani.
We assumed the Taliban knew who President Ghani was, why do
we have to scrub all of our reports for that? They also wanted
us to take down the name of a city in the United States, which
I think the Taliban could look at a map. So, it was a bizarre
request. And they never did give us any information as to why
they wanted us to pull down all of our reports, which had been
public, many of them, for 12 years.
Ms. Greene. Yes, that is pretty hard to understand why any
administration would want to censor information. And you are
right. I mean, Afghanistan can easily look at the map. Or they
can talk to their friends in China because they flew a spy
balloon across our country, and I am sure they pretty much have
pictures of everything. Thank you.
Mr. Storch, on August 17, 2021, a U.S. air-strike in
Afghanistan killed 10 civilians, including seven children.
Since the strike was supposed to target an ISIS terrorist, Mark
Milley called it a righteous strike. A few weeks later,
however, U.S. Central Command admitted that they had hit the
wrong Toyota Corolla.
My question is, as the Inspector General of the Department
of Defense, do you see this kind of absolute failure from Mark
Milley a lot? And have there been other times when the military
has hit the wrong Toyota Corolla or another target on accident
accidentally killing a bunch of innocent children? And then
Mark Milley called it a righteous strike. I still do not
understand that. Can you explain, please?
Mr. Storch. Yes, ma'am. Thank you very much for the
question. So, the strike on, I believe it was 29 August, our
office did do a classified review of that strike and we looked
at what led up to it. We looked at the reporting on it. We
looked at the communications thereafter. As I say, it is
classified, so I cannot talk about it in this briefing, but
happy in an appropriate setting to provide more information
about that.
I would also say that is one of a number of reviews that
our office has done regarding different kinetic strikes, and
not limited to Afghanistan as well. And as I say, happy to
provide more information in the appropriate setting.
Ms. Greene. Thank you, Mr. Storch. We will have committee
staff follow up. And I yield back my time.
Mrs. McClain. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the
gentleman from New York, Mr. Goldman.
Mr. Goldman. Thank you very much, Madam Chairwoman. Mr.
Sopko, did the Afghanistan war start on January 21, 2021?
Mr. Sopko. No, 20 years before.
Mr. Goldman. Yes. It is the longest war in our history.
Mr. Sopko. Absolutely.
Mr. Goldman. Is not that right?
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Mr. Goldman. And certainly, in your evaluation of the last
9 or 10 years of that war, was it your understanding that one
decision impacts the next decision, which impacts the next
decision and so forth?
Mr. Sopko. It depends on the decision. But yes, I mean, I
think we highlight that four administrations made many mistakes
over that 20 years.
Mr. Goldman. Right. Now, Mr. Storch, are you aware of a
November 11, 2020, memorandum from President Trump relating to
the withdrawal of troops from Somalia and Afghanistan?
Mr. Storch. I am not sure I am familiar with that. I am
sorry.
Mr. Goldman. OK. I find that interesting, because it was a
memo that Donald Trump issued to all servicemen to withdraw all
troops, every single troop from Afghanistan by January 15,
2021. Is that familiar to you now?
Mr. Storch. Yes, it does. Thank you.
Mr. Goldman. Yes. And do you know whether that was vetted
by anyone at the Department of Defense?
Mr. Storch. And let me explain my initial question. That is
not something that our office has done independent oversight
on, so I honestly do not know the answer to that.
Mr. Goldman. Why not? I mean, it is absolutely incredible
that a President would issue an order to withdraw all troops
from an ongoing war without consulting anyone at DOD, which is
what both Secretary Austin and Chairman Milley have said.
Mr. Storch. Yes, it is a great question. I really
appreciate it. You know, one of the things that I think
underlies the response to that question and just in general
some of the issues we have discussed is, as inspectors general,
our work looks at the execution of policies and strategies that
are set by administrations regardless of partisan affiliation,
right?
So, with regard to who made which decision and how that was
made, those are matters for the management and for the
Administration and the leadership of the agencies to do. Once
those policies are set, we look to see whether they are done
effectively, efficiently, economically----
Mr. Goldman. Thank you for that. Thank you for that
explanation.
Mr. Storch. Yes, sir.
Mr. Goldman. The point I am making here and, Mr. Sopko, you
have been making this all day, and I think it is a very valid
point, which is, if we are to conduct meaningful oversight over
the war in Afghanistan that lasted for 20 years, we cannot just
start on January 21, 2021. Would you agree with that, Mr.
Sopko?
Mr. Sopko. No, you cannot start with the Doha agreement,
either.
Mr. Goldman. Right.
Mr. Sopko. I mean, we had years of problems, which put the
context of why the Trump made a certain decision and the Biden
Administration made a certain decision.
Mr. Goldman. Right. The 5,000 members of the Taliban who
you just referenced to have been released and then not abided
by their promises, in your investigation of the withdrawal, did
you determine whether any one of those 5,000 Taliban members
were involved in the violence surrounding the evacuation?
Mr. Sopko. I do not think we had that granularity on that.
We just knew that the Afghans said that most of them, the
Afghan soldiers and military, they said most of those Taliban
went back to fight.
Mr. Goldman. But it is certainly possible that some of
those would have been there, right?
Mr. Sopko. It could have been. It could have been.
Mr. Goldman. They were fighting.
Mr. Sopko. Yes, yes.
Mr. Goldman. You know, this war is very personal to me and
my district. I represent Wall Street and 911, the World Trade
Towers. And this is where the 911 Museum lives. This is where
the principal attack that led to the Afghanistan war. And one
of the things that I am really struggling with is that we have
what is clearly politicized oversight, trying to have a got you
moment against President Biden. But my colleagues on the other
side do not support additional support for our veterans. They
did not support the PACT Act, the burn pits.
Mrs. Luna. Will the gentleman yield for a question?
Mr. Goldman. I have 20 seconds. We are about to go.
Mrs. Luna. Well, you know, I can give you some of my time.
So, the issue that----
Mr. Goldman. Can I just finish? Can I just finish?
Mrs. Luna. Will you yield?
Mr. Goldman. I will not yield. Let me just finish, and if I
could have a little bit more time, Mr. Chairman. You will have
plenty of time to respond, Mrs. Luna.
The point I am trying to make here is that there are two
significant pieces of legislation that would not only support
our veterans by providing more health care, but would also
support the many Afghans, the hundreds of thousands of Afghans
who helped our troops during the 20 years of the war. And my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle do not support these
bills. So, we can talk all we want about the evacuation, but
let us see where we are going to be when we put our votes on
the line and whether we are going to support our troops and
whether we are going to support our foreign allies who helped
us over a 20-year war.
And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. [Presiding] The gentleman yields back.
Before the Chair recognizes the next speaker, I feel we have to
respond to the statement that this is a political hearing. Our
four witnesses are inspectors general, and the main thing that
I have heard thus far is that they are not getting cooperation
from this Biden White House.
Mr. Goldman. OK. Mr. Chairman, what is the basis for you
opining on this right now?
Chairman Comer. Well, I was just correcting a misstatement.
Mr. Goldman. It is not a misstatement. It is an assertion
of me that you want to focus solely on what has happened since
January 21, 2021. And that is to score political points because
meaningful oversight would go back for 20 years.
Mrs. Luna. It is about fighting for the families that never
got closure because they lost loved ones on failed military
leadership, so stop making it about this. If you want to ask
the questions, do not bring up the PACT Act.
Mr. Goldman. I do not understand what basis she has to
talk.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes the Ranking Member for
point of order.
Mr. Raskin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I mean, I appreciate
the Chair's indulgence of real discussion among the Members. I
hope that we would be able to keep it balanced in some way. So,
if the gentleman could have the chance to respond to you, that
would be wonderful, and then we could move on.
Chairman Comer. We will move on. Point taken. The Chair
recognizes Mrs. McClain from Michigan for five minutes.
Mrs. McClain. Wow. I think from both sides of what we hear,
this has not been a success. But at the end of the day, we have
to take a look at leadership, because if you are in charge of
the greatest country in the world, which is the United States,
then it is your job to lead. You cannot just pick up what is
ever convenient to pick up when you want it to pick up, so I am
hoping we can all agree on that.
Biden is our President. That is a fact. He made the choices
he made when he made them. That is a fact. And we can go back
and go back and make this about Trump if we want. What I do not
understand is, the other side, you just cannot quit Trump. I
mean, man, he is living in your head rent free. So right now,
we are talking about the Commander-in-Chief right now, which is
President Biden. Anytime he wants to relinquish that, I am sure
we could have a different discussion.
But with that said, let us talk about the facts. The Biden
Administration has wholeheartedly defended this atrocity in
Afghanistan. They have defended it. They have told Congress to
ignore images of people desperately hanging and falling to
their deaths from the U.S. military aircrafts that they left at
the Kabul airport. We have the photos of that. The
Administration had claimed that the death of 13 American
service members as a success. The President calls the
abandoning of billions of U.S. assets a success. The President
thinks abandoning our allies to be hunted down and killed by
the Taliban as a success.
To my colleagues on the other side of the aisle, you
honestly cannot call that a success. I do not know how in any
frame of reference that can be delivered as a success. For
anyone in this chamber to parrot the Administration's lies that
the debacle of Afghanistan and the withdrawal of it was a
success, I think in my humble opinion is delusional.
So, I have one question, sincerely. In good conscience,
would you call the death of 13 U.S. service members, the loss
of billions of U.S. assets, which, by the way, are paid for by
the U.S. taxpayers, the abandonment of U.S. partners, and now
the potential for another terrorist safe haven in Afghanistan,
would we define that as a success? General Sopko, I would like
to hear.
Mr. Sopko. Congresswoman, I do not think I would ever, ever
say the death of an American soldier as a success.
Mrs. McClain. Thank you. What about the billions of assets
that we left over there?
Mr. Sopko. That is wasteful to say the least, but----
Mrs. McClain. I think that is the frustration with the
American people, is, you know, you hear the waste, the fraud,
and the abuse.
Mr. Sopko. But, Congresswoman, if I can just tell you, I
mean, if you are talking about a withdrawal, no matter what
time, you are going to leave a lot of equipment behind. And a
lot of it is broken and you try to destroy some of it. So, a
lot of this equipment was not under the control of the U.S.
military.
Mrs. McClain. How much did we destroy?
Mr. Sopko. I do not know. I did not look at it. But we
tried to destroy. But remember, we were not at all of these
Afghan military bases.
Mrs. McClain. Agree.
Mr. Sopko. The Afghan soldiers and police were there, and
what they did with them, I think that is part of the problem.
And at the end, our troops were gone. They were protecting
Kabul. And, you know, we do not know where that stuff was.
Mrs. McClain. To my point.
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Mrs. McClain. To my point. And to the gentleman's question
earlier about going back, I think we cannot fix a problem and
learn from history unless we can have an honest look at
history.
Mr. Sopko. I agree.
Mrs. McClain. So, I agree. We have to stop whitewashing
this as a success. I do not think the American people expect
perfection from us, but I do think that they expect progress
from us. And I think we owe it to the American people to have
an honest dialog about the facts of what actually happened on
the withdrawal. And again, if you are in charge, if you are the
coach of a baseball team or if you are the coach of a football
team, and you lose the game--I've never heard Nick Saben say,
``Well, you know, it is not my fault. It is my offensive line's
fault.'' No. As the leader, you actually take some ownership. I
think we all could learn a little bit from that.
But in conclusion, we all have eyes. We all saw what
happened during the disastrous withdrawal. There is no way
anyone can claim this as a success, and with that, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Comer. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair
recognizes Mr. Moskowitz for five minutes.
Mr. Moskowitz. Mr. Chairman, thank you. This is an
important topic and we do need to get to the answers of why the
Afghanistan withdrawal did not go according to what the experts
in the Pentagon and elsewhere thought. We need to know why
there were intelligence gaps. We need to know how that
happened. There are lessons to be learned so they are not
repeated, so that other soldiers, other Americans, men and
women, do not wind up in the same situation.
I want to remind everyone we had soldiers die over 20 years
of the war, not just in the withdrawal, so this is just as much
about them as well. And it is an important topic, and it is
something I think the American people want to know and want
examined, and we have to make sure that we improve our military
through oversight. But, you know, this Committee, who says it
is an important topic, you know, we are 100-plus days into the
next Congress and this Committee thought that before we would
talk about the Afghanistan withdrawal, they thought it was more
important to talk about Twitter first.
And not only did they think it was more important than the
Afghanistan withdrawal, they thought it was more important to
talk about the hiring policies of the Biden Administration.
They also thought it was more important to talk about a laptop
that was found at RadioShack before the Afghan withdrawal. You
know, they thought it was more important to talk about the D.C.
Government and public urination before the Afghan withdrawal. I
know this is a serious topic, but just look at the hearings we
have had before this one. And so, it is tough for us on this
side of the aisle to accept that this is not a serious hearing.
This was a 20-year war. It was started by President Bush.
You remember President Bush? I know many of you have disowned
him because he disagrees with President Trump. But four
Presidents, 20 years of good decisions, 20 years of bad
decisions. You do not want to examine 20 years. You only want
to examine, like, the last week. You know, when marriages
dissolve after 20 years and they get in front of a judge, they
do not just say, you know, everything was great until the last
week of marriage. It is crazy.
President Trump invited the Taliban to Camp David around
the anniversary of 9/11. What? Like, are there any questions
about that? Trump released 5,000 prisoners, many that included
terrorists. 5,000 Taliban prisoners, many that included
terrorists. 5,000 Taliban prisoners, many that included
terrorists. I thought, Mr. Sopko, you said that it was
Secretary Pompeo who negotiated that release of the Taliban
prisoners. Is that correct?
Mr. Sopko. That is my understanding. It may have been
somebody else with him, but I do not remember now.
Mr. Moskowitz. No, fair enough, and because this Committee
has amnesia, as we have shown on our COVID debates and other
debates, who did Secretary Pompeo work for again?
Mr. Sopko. This is another trick question, isn't it?
Mr. Moskowitz. It is.
Mr. Sopko. I think President Trump.
Mr. Moskowitz. OK. Can you imagine for a second--you do not
have to answer this one--if Joe Biden had released 5,000
Taliban prisoners, many of who probably wound up in Kabul that
day, can you imagine what these folks would be doing? I mean,
the heavens would open for them based on that. I mean, it would
be unbelievable to watch, but they have no questions and never
had any questions, and many supported the release of these
prisoners. No, they do not want to know what effect that had at
all on the fall of Kabul. No, do not look at that at all. Only
look at the fact that it happened during a Democratic
Administration.
You know, I am even hearing some of my colleagues say that
they cannot get information out of this Administration. It is
ironic when those same colleagues did not comply with subpoenas
now complain they cannot get information. That is the problem
with this place. It is not serious. This is no different than
COVID. You guys only wanted to talk about COVID under the Biden
Administration. COVID was a three-year issue.
And so, I will end with this, Mr. Chairman. It was accused
that the Democrats do not want to quit Trump. We will quit
Trump when you quit Trump. We look forward in a bipartisan
fashion quitting Trump together. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
yield back.
Mr. Goldman. Mr. Chairman, I have a unanimous consent
motion. I would like to introduce a November 11, 2020, memo
from the Acting Secretary of Defense. The subject is Withdrawal
from Somalia and Afghanistan.
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Mr. Edwards for five
minutes.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you, Mr. Chair. I can see now why things
are so tough to get done up here in Washington, DC. And I also
understand why the folks on the other side of the aisle want to
distract this conversation from its true purpose. As I look at
this memorandum for the purpose of this meeting, I read that it
is to examine the audits and evaluations conducted by
inspectors general regarding factors that led to the collapse
of the Afghan Government and its' security forces, issues when
it comes to evacuee resettlement, and lessons learned from the
evacuation from Afghanistan. And when I look at the timeline
given to us produced by the Department of Defense under control
of Biden, that evacuation began on April the 14th, 2021 under
Biden's control.
So, I would like to return the conversation back to the
purpose of this hearing. And I appreciate all four of you being
here and indulging us through the duration of this often-
distracted process. Mr. Sopko, you have mentioned many, many
times that you have not received the cooperation that you would
have expected to have received in your investigation. And
obviously, while this is the first time I have had a chance to
meet you, obviously, you have got a long history in testifying
before this Committee. And so, based on that history, what
would be the advice to this Committee as to what our next steps
should be given the obstruction that you are getting from the
current Administration?
Mr. Sopko. Just dealing with the obstruction issue, sir, I
mean--I think the question somebody asked before is why are not
they providing us with the information, but they are providing
it to the other IGs. I would seriously like to find out why
they are doing it.
If you are talking about just the obstruction, I am not
talking about your obstruction that you may have related to
other investigations. I am talking about my problem. I have a
job to do, and I am not able to do that job because of State
and AID, and mainly State, because they have issued this
ridiculous legal opinion basically saying I no longer exist.
Mr. Edwards. Thank you. And so, what would be your advice
to this Committee as to enable you to do your job? What can we
do to enable you to do your job?
Mr. Sopko. Well, call in the Administration and have them
explain it. Look, I used to work for----
Mr. Edwards. Perfect. That is all I need. Thank you. Mr.
Storch, do you know through your investigation was there any
specific consideration given to sensitive equipment that might
have been left behind? We have talked about broken equipment
and flat tires and all the other things that might have been
left behind, a total of $7.2 billion I heard you testify. Was
there any specific consideration to sensitive equipment?
Mr. Storch. Thank you for the question, Congressman. Yes,
my office actually did an evaluation in August 2021 as events
were unfolding that looked at exactly that issue in terms of
the accountability and controls to ensure that sensitive
equipment was essentially wiped, that the sensitive information
was taken care of, and that also that there were appropriate
controls in place. And essentially, we found that there were
concerns that some of the sensitive information had not been
taken off it before it was turned back in.
Now, to be clear, this is being turned back in to the
United States authorities. But on the other hand, we found that
there were significant concerns regarding controls over that
equipment so that we really could not be sure that all of it in
fact was turned in.
Mr. Edwards. And so, would you consider that we had
additional national security risks because sensitive equipment
was left behind?
Mr. Storch. I would not have any basis to go there. Again,
you know, you do not know what you do not know, right? So, I
cannot say that there would be particular national security
risks. What our report found was that with the equipment that
was turned in, not all the sensitive information was
appropriately taken off it and that there were concerns
regarding accountability. And frankly, concerns about
accountability, as we have both testified, Mr. Sopko and I,
about going back years. And so, those two taken together create
risks, but I could not go beyond that.
Mr. Edwards. And so, if there was sensitive equipment of
national security interests left behind and now we do not know
whose hands that equipment is in, then there has to be
additional risk, would not you agree?
Mr. Storch. Well, again, I cannot say whether or not there
was national security information that would not have been
wiped. A lot of this was personal information, medical
information, and things like that. But certainly, if you cannot
account for all the equipment, you cannot rule out that
possibility.
Mr. Edwards. All right. Thank you. Mr. Chair, I see my time
has expired, so I yield.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes Mr. Garcia for five minutes.
Ms. Garcia. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all the
witnesses for being here. I want to obviously just begin by
saying that there is no question that the withdrawal from
Afghanistan was very difficult, that we know this. We have had
a 20-year war, and certainly we had failed to build a
sustainable state or an Afghan military that could withstand
alone against the Taliban. And so, we understand this is a very
complex issue, and I want to thank you all for your service.
Now, in an era of increasing global threats, and with so
many priorities, we know that we can also not fight these
forever wars. And so, this has been a difficult withdrawal, and
certainly we can argue that the Administration could have moved
slower, but I also want to remind some of our colleagues some
of the history here. Now, in July 2019, just two years into Mr.
President Trump's presidency, then Secretary of State Pompeo
revealed that President Trump had ordered him to reduce the
number of U.S. troops in Afghanistan by the 2020 election, even
though the Pentagon was opposing this policy. So first, to Mr.
Storch, were you aware of any tactical or are you aware of any
tactical reason why November 2020 would have been the
appropriate date to draw down troops from Afghanistan?
Mr. Storch. So, we reported out in the lead IG reporting
regarding that chain of events. We did not do independent
auditing or evaluation to analyze the tactics involved or the
strategic decisions. And staffing in particular is a, sort of
quintessentially, management position. There are a lot of
things that go into it. So, we did not go any further than.
Mr. Garcia. Mr. Sopko, same question.
Mr. Sopko. We do not have any specific information on what
was behind that decision.
Mr. Garcia. Because I am not personally aware of any
technical reason why that date would have been set, and I think
most of the public would agree with that. Before that plan
could be enacted, President Trump signed also the highly flawed
Doha Agreement. In October 2020, President Trump's national
security adviser announced that the Trump Administration would
follow through on the Trump-Taliban agreement that was made in
draw-down forces in Afghanistan to 2,500 by early 2021. Just
hours later, and before the vice-Presidential debate, we are
all aware, President Trump then recklessly tweeted, ``We should
have the small remaining number of our brave men and women
serving in Afghanistan home by Christmas.'' Now, Mr. Sopko,
based on your extensive research, did the Trump
Administration's conflicting messages have an impact on any of
the morale of the Afghan security forces?
Mr. Sopko. Yes, it was not just the Trump Administration,
but I think there was mass confusion on statements being made
about the withdrawal.
Mr. Garcia. And, Mr. Storch, to your knowledge, was there
any military reason to designate December 2020 as a withdrawal
date?
Mr. Storch. Again, Congressman, my answer would be the
same. We reported out on the chronology, but we did not do
independent audits or evaluations as to the rationale.
Mr. Garcia. OK. I think most of the public and I certainly
agree that there was no reasoning as far as that date, and I
think that has been pretty clear and been made clear today at
this hearing as well.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Milley,
testified that on November 11, 2020, just four days after
President Trump lost the Presidential election, and he did lose
that election, he received the memo signed by President Trump
directing the immediate withdrawal of all U.S. forces from
Afghanistan no later than January 15, 2021. And we have heard
this as well in this Committee. Mr. Storch, to your knowledge,
by November 2020, have the situation on the ground changed in
such a way to warrant the complete withdrawal of troops by
January 15, 2021?
Mr. Storch. Again, Congressman, in the interest of time, my
answer would be the same.
Mr. Garcia. OK, and mine would as well. I want to thank you
all because I find it troubling that President Trump, knowing
that he had lost an election and with just weeks left in
office, set in motion a series of events that would lead to the
collapse of the Afghan Government and its security forces. And
that is a real failure that this Committee should be
investigating. And with that, I yield back the remainder of my
time.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes, Mr. Langworthy, for
five minutes.
Mr. Langworthy. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like
to express my gratitude to our witnesses for joining us here
today to discuss one of the most significant failures in
American military history. And even though the military
operations in Afghanistan have concluded, we are still
discovering that our American tax dollars are being spent in
Afghanistan. Americans have lost too much in Afghanistan, and I
do not believe that this body will stand for wasted tax dollars
ending up in the hands of Taliban and other bad actors.
Mr. Sopko, based on your high-risk list report, can you
speak a little more about multilateral organizations in Taliban
interference?
Mr. Sopko. From our discussions with the United Nations,
basically, and I think maybe the World Food Programme, they are
talking about the Taliban, first of all, issuing the order, not
allow women to work at NGOs, issuing another order not allowing
women to work at the international organizations. We also were
told that the Taliban is not so much stealing the money
directly from the United Nations, although they may be doing
that. We do not know for sure. But what they are doing, is that
they are illegally billing or charging the subcontractors for
the U.N. and other international organizations, and then
getting that money.
They are also interfering by telling the U.N. and other
implementing partners that they cannot give money or assistance
to certain ethnic groups. The Hazaras, in particular, have been
identified. We have also been told that they are diverting some
of the food assistance, mainly to the wives, the children and
actually Taliban fighters, instead of going to people who are
maybe more needy. So, there is a whole series of those issues
that were being told by officials of the international
organizations. Problem is, we are not able to get books and
records from the international organizations or from the State
Department or USAID.
Mr. Langworthy. OK. I think it is just important that we
understand how funds are getting to Afghanistan, especially
knowing that wire transfers are restricted. Regarding your
high-risk list report, can you explain the process of how U.S.
funds are going to humanitarian aid groups and then getting to
Afghanistan?
Mr. Sopko. We are sending bulk cash to Afghanistan, I
think, on a regular basis, and maybe the AID IG would remember
the exact number. I do not know if it was $5 million or $15
million a week or whatever. And then the money is then used to
go to the U.N. and go to the implementing agencies. So, it is
all cash. You are always worried when you are dealing with that
much cash in a place like Afghanistan.
Mr. Langworthy. Yes, I can imagine. So, we are not seeing
that the Taliban is directly shaking down the NGOs. It is more
through fees, and other means that they are----
Mr. Sopko. That has been explained to us. They are getting
clever at that. We do not know. They may be doing other
shakedowns, but, again, if State and AID do not answer our
questions, and do not give us the books and records, I cannot
tell you.
Mr. Langworthy. Thank you very much. Ms. Angarella, does
the USAID have any ongoing programs in Afghanistan?
Ms. Angarella. Yes, USAID has mostly humanitarian
assistance, very small developmental programs. And to add on to
what IG Sopko said, we do have current work in Afghanistan. We
have investigations that we are working. Our criminal law
enforcement agents are working for cases that have come to us
either through USAID self-reporting or the NGOs or implementing
partners that USAID is working with. We also have memorandums
of understanding, which are formal information sharing
agreements. So, we know how many open investigations the WFP IG
has, and how many effect USAID funding. So, we are coordinating
right now on three cases that are active that WFP is
investigating in Afghanistan related to USAID funds.
And specifically, what we are seeing in the interference of
the delivery of foreign assistance, both in-kind, is pressuring
organizations to pay taxes and tariffs, intimidating some aid
organizations to hire Taliban affiliated personnel, and the
preclusion of NGOs and U.N. organizations from hiring women to
actually deliver the assistance and the programs.
Mr. Langworthy. Thank you very much. I yield back, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The Chair recognizes Ms. Brown for five
minutes.
Ms. Brown. Thank you. I first want to acknowledge the
Chairman, Ranking Member and our witnesses for being here
today. I would also like to say it is important to note that
while in office, President Trump routinely vilified public
servants across the government. He particularly antagonized
what he referred to as the Deep State Department. Amid this
tenure, the State Department's workforce plummeted by nine
percent from December 2016 to March 2018. So, Ms. Shaw, can you
tell us how the attrition at the State Department impacted the
Afghan Special Immigrant Visa Program?
Ms. Shaw. Thank you so much for the question. Our work over
many years has determined that staffing has been an issue in
terms of being able to keep pace with a number of applications.
The work we published in 2020, I believe, recommended that an
assessment be done of staffing levels. When we did a follow-up
compliance review, we found that the staffing assessment had
been done and some changes had been made, but the backlog still
was not being wound down at a pace that would keep pace with
the applications. And so, we have ongoing work to further look
at the way the program has been streamlined to see if we are
finally seeing some of those positive effects.
Ms. Brown. To follow up, you mentioned the backlog. Was
there a substantial backlog for the Special Immigrant Visa
application program in 2020?
Ms. Shaw. You know, off the top of my head, I could not
tell you exactly where it was at that time, but I believe that
what our work found at that time period was that there was a
backlog. It has, of course, since been impacted by the
evacuation.
Ms. Brown. For the record, that backlog had increased to
18,864. Another question. Ms. Shaw, what was the Trump
Administration's impact on other refugee settlement and support
services relevant to the Afghanistan withdrawal?
Ms. Shaw. Well, I can think of one context. We recently
issued a report about resettlement agencies that the department
worked with domestically to resettle Afghan evacuees. And what
we did find is that the reduction in the number of refugees
that was decided within the Trump Administration had a down-
stream effect, and that the implementers and resettlement
agencies did scale back their resources, recognizing that they
would not have as many people to serve. And then of course,
with the evacuation, we saw a huge surge, and so their ability
to quickly staff up to meet that spike was one of the major
challenges that we identified.
Ms. Brown. So, would you say that the visa and resettlement
program should have been contemplated as part of a successful
Afghan withdrawal effort during the Trump Administration?
Ms. Shaw. I cannot say whether it was or not. But I know
from the State Department perspective, based on our work that
they did give some focus to it after we found that there were
significant issues, including one of the most senior level
positions to oversee that program, the senior coordinating
official, had been a position left vacant for several years
during that Administration.
Ms. Brown. I will take that as a ``yes.'' I think it is
fair to say then that President Trump failed to put critical
pieces in place before aggressively advancing the U.S.
withdrawal from Afghanistan. And I want to close by asking
unanimous consent to submit to the record a Twitter thread by
Olivia Troye, the Former Homeland Security and Counterterrorism
Advisor to Mike Pence.
Chairman Comer. Without objection, so ordered.
Ms. Brown. Thank you. In this Twitter thread, she is
replying to an assertion that Trump would have successfully
evacuated all Afghan partners. And she wrote, ``There were
Cabinet meetings about this during the Trump Administration
where Stephen Miller would peddle his racist hysteria about
Iraq and Afghanistan. He and his enablers across government
would undermine anyone who worked on solving the SIV issue by
devastating the system at DHS and State.'' She continued to
say, ``Trump had four years while putting his plan in place to
evacuate these Afghan allies who were lifelines for many of us
who spent time in Afghanistan. They had been waiting a long
time. The process slowed to a trickle for review of their
priorities, then came to a halt.''
Donald Trump and his Administration knew full well that his
withdrawal commitments were a recipe for disaster but did
nothing to address it. Those facts should not be ignored during
our discussion today. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
Chairman Comer. The gentlelady yields back. The Chair
recognizes Mr. Burlison for five minutes.
Mr. Burlison. Thank you, Mr. Chair. You know, real leaders
accept responsibility for mistakes and pass on credit for
successes. I am from Missouri. We are the home of President
Harry Truman, who famously had on his desk, ``The buck stops
here.'' We are a long way from Harry Truman because this whole
hearing for hours, all we are hearing is we want to blame any
mistakes, not on myself or my Administration or accept any
responsibility. Instead, we are going to blame it on previous
administrations. And so, I think--I respect and applaud your
efforts because you and your reports have looked past blame and
are just trying to get to the answers. And what? Because we do
not want to see this ever happen again.
And so, I think most of my questions are going to go in a
different direction than what some of the ones I have heard
earlier. I want to find out what is going on today. So, in
October 2022, the Department of Defense OIG released a report
called the evaluation of DOD security and life support for
Afghan evacuees at Camp Bondsteel. OK. Camp Bondsteel is
located in Kosovo and was selected for one of the several
locations where we temporarily housed Afghanistan refugees. It
was scheduled to be decommissioned or taken down, but has been
renewed and apparently it is going to be keep going. What is
happening there?
Mr. Storch. Thank you for the question. The report you are
referencing is one of 11 management advisories that we did
looking at different facilities, U.S. military installations,
that were used in order to house, feed, give medical care and
the like to evacuees. The one in question is actually one where
I think it is fair to say we found a fair number of issues and
concerns regarding the way in which that was carried out, and
we made a number of findings. My understanding is that those
were addressed promptly there, after-action reports were done.
And so, our office, you know, continues to follow up on all of
that, but as we have moved forward, we have moved on into
audits and evaluations looking more at the cost of the process.
But having said that, there were after-actions done to address
those issues.
Mr. Burlison. So, the issues were processing issues or
conditions?
Mr. Storch. I think there were a number of issues regarding
the way in which different aspects of care were conducted; the
medical care, some of the feeding, the housing, those sorts of
issues, and then the more processing issue.
Mr. Burlison. About how many evacuees were processed there?
Mr. Storch. I do not have the specific number for that one.
The total number was about 108,000.
Mr. Burlison. And what is the purpose for this? These
people, they are kind of in purgatory. You know, what is their
status?
Mr. Storch. So, as I understand it, the purpose was to
provide safe spaces for these individuals to continue to pursue
their refugee status and their applications for visas. And so,
folks were evacuated from Afghanistan----
Ms. Burlison. But there was red flag issues with some of
these evacuees, is that not accurate?
Mr. Storch. So, we also found in our in our vetting work,
and again, DOD is not primarily responsible for the vetting.
That is primarily the responsibility of DHS. But we did find
issues when we looked at that, regarding whether all of the
information that DOD had in its systems regarding some
individuals was whether all of that information was being
provided to DHS, essentially, because of limitations on the
sharing of that information that were in place when they got
that.
And so, there were sort of informal procedures worked out
to identify individuals who had derogatory information. That
does not mean that they necessarily say, we are terrorists or
something else, but there were concerns and not all of that
went forward. We are doing a follow-up project right now, that
is looking at the current status of that.
Mr. Burlison. So, the reason why the camp is still being
funded, and we have, you know, the U.S. nationals, you know,
government housing these individuals because we have not been
able to process them? We have not figured out who they really
are, whether they are a terrorist or not?
Mr. Storch. No, I am sorry. I think those are separate
issues, and I can get back to you with more information on this
if you would like. But, there is the one issue regarding the
provision of housing and other services to the people under
Operation Allies Welcome. The separate issue is the support for
the screening and vetting process, and that is what I was
alluding to with the latter. I do not believe that the latter
was particularly related to Camp Bondsteel.
Mr. Burlison. Do you have any idea how many Afghanistan
refugees that have entered in the United States? Are you aware
or investigating any crimes that they have committed in the
United States?
Mr. Storch. So, my office has, I believe, about two dozen
active investigations that--both from legacies, from OFS, and
from OES, those do not involve refugees or that sort of
situation. One of the issues we found was that there was
ambiguity regarding jurisdiction over how to investigate crimes
involving individuals who were brought into the country, and
that is one of the places.
Mr. Burlison. But there have been crimes?
Chairman Comer. The gentleman's time has expired, but
please go ahead and answer.
Mr. Storch. Yes, I do not know that there have been crimes,
my office--that would not be our jurisdiction, our jurisdiction
is over DOD. One of the things we found was there needed to be
better delineation of jurisdiction over who would investigate
any such crimes, but I do not have any information regarding
whether those individuals themselves had committed crimes, if
that helps.
Chairman Comer. Thank you. The Chair recognizes the
gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Gosar, for five minutes.
Mr. Gosar. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, four,
for being here. The United States' 20-year experiment in
Afghanistan has been a complete and total disaster. Two-point-
three trillion dollars was spent, 23,028 U.S. military
personnel have been killed, and in almost every theater the
U.S. meddles in, whether it be Iraq, Syria or Afghanistan,
death and destruction follows, and the U.S. has nothing to show
for it. And what a shame considering the immense sacrifice our
brave soldiers have made fighting in senseless wars, forced
upon them by out-of-touch political elites.
The obvious lesson to draw from the recent Middle Eastern
wars, and the one that the American people learned long ago,
but somehow few elected officials from either party seem to
understand, is that these wars do not work. The only fruits are
evil. Many people die, lives are ruined, and America is
weakened. But now our genius leaders have decided that what did
not work in the Middle East, and which was tried multiple
times, must be rinsed and repeated in Europe. And the same
result is playing out in Ukraine as it did in Afghanistan,
Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, the list goes on and on. And the
result is a more unstable world and an immense amount of human
suffering.
Mr. Storch, the grieving mother of a Marine who was one of
the fallen 13 servicemen who died at the hands of the infamous
suicide bomber in Kabul, contacted my office with some
pertinent questions. The Marine's name was Marine Lance
Corporal Dylan Merola. As a background, President Biden sent
3,000 troops in August 2021 to help with that evacuation. Also,
if one would use the ages of the 11 of the 13 servicemen who
died, they were anywhere from the ages of 20 to 23. Marine
Lance Corporal Dylan Merola, and eight others had only been in
Afghanistan for under two weeks when they were killed. So, my
question, why were such young, inexperienced troops chosen for
such a dangerous mission?
Mr. Storch. So, thank you for the question. Obviously, each
of those losses is a tragedy, right? So, having said that, I
always want to be frank with you. Our office has not looked at
that. I did mention earlier, I did reach out to get the full
after-action report, the classified report that was done by the
Department. And my team and I are reviewing that and if there
is additional oversight that is impactful to do, but we will do
it.
Mr. Gosar. Love to, you know, one of the things you are
going to look at is, what percentage of the 3,000 troops had
two years of experience of service or less? We want to find out
about that, because this seems that when you are coming from a
hostile situation, you want your best, your brightest, your
most trained. And then also who made the final call as to that
the 3,000 troops? And reading in your testimony, it is clear
that U.S. taxpayer money has been funding the Taliban. Once
again, you mentioned in your testimony that you could not
determine whether hundreds of millions of dollars of ammunition
were used properly. Are you confident this ammunition did not
fall in the hands of the Taliban?
Mr. Storch. So, we know and the Department, I believe, as
it reported to Congress, that there was about $7.12 billion
worth of various equipment that was in the possession of the
Afghan military at the time of the collapse. The condition of
that, we do not know. And obviously we cannot go back in to
audit. With regard to things like ammunition, we found for
years, in many audits, that there was not adequate control, and
there was subjecting to theft and otherwise, things like
ammunition, radios, vehicles, night vision devices, all sorts
of stuff. And so, I would not have any confidence as to the
status of any of that.
And with regard to the equipment, I will say in fairness,
the, you know, the Department of Defense has said that much of
that was demilled, it was rendered inoperable. Again, we have
no way to go back in to check on any of that.
Mr. Gosar. Mr. Sopko, in your testimony, you cite the
Taliban's practice of forcing NGOs to give them a cut of the
aid the NGOs distributed. You even mentioned an instance where
the Taliban often allowed one particular NGO to rent vehicles
directly from them, the Taliban. How much foreign aid do you
suspect reaches the Taliban? And could you hazard to give me a
percentage?
Mr. Sopko. I cannot, sir, because of lack of cooperation
from State and AID.
Mr. Gosar. This is troubling to me, really troubling, and I
think it is troubling for a lot of us because you cannot make
decisions if you have no information in front of you.
Mr. Sopko. I agree.
Mr. Gosar. And it is really sad. I will have a bunch of
follow-up questions for all of you, and I think we need to
follow the money. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back. The Chair
recognizes Mrs. Luna for five minutes.
Mrs. Luna. Good afternoon, everyone. Thank you for being
here. And before I go into my questioning, I just wanted to
correct some of the statements made by one of my colleagues
from across the aisle.
First of all, for those who are reporters here, the reason
why some Republicans did not support the PACT Act, and I say
this as a veteran and the wife of a combat wounded veteran in
Afghanistan, that when you are using veterans, especially with
burn pits, and then you stick $400 billion in unnecessary
spending so you can get your pet projects paid for, we are not
going to support that. And we do not advise using veterans to
get your pet projects paid for, so that is the first thing.
Second thing, Mr. Garcia had annotated earlier that this is
a very complicated issue. Obviously, the entire region of
Afghanistan has been destabilized, and it is known as the
graveyard of empire. So, there is a big foreign policy issue
that we have in this country. And I do believe that this
Administration is unqualified and intentionally doing the wrong
thing because, in my opinion, they are trying to empower China
and I will go to the grave with that one.
But to further why we are here today, I believe that the
military as a whole is suffering from people that have been put
in charge and do not truly understand the culture of the
military, and, thus, they have implemented policy that is not
enabling our warfighters to do their jobs. War is not fun. I
would never advocate for it. But when you have people that are
on the ground, specifically with what happened in Afghanistan,
they need to be trusted to do the right thing, and therefore
the red tape has to be cut.
My question is for Mr. Sopko. You know, I heard a testimony
from a previous Committee that had a young Marine sniper that
had said that he was not authorized to take the shot that could
have prevented the suicide bomber from detonating that and thus
saving the lives of the 13 killed, 170 civilians and then the
45 wounded service members. Has anything been changed with the
laws of armed conflict and/or memorandums from the DOD to
enable, whether it is team sergeants and special operations
communities, whether it is people who are at the lowest level
of leadership to authorize those military officials to do their
jobs?
Mr. Sopko. I am not able to answer that because I am not
the DOD IG. I think you should ask Mr. Storch.
Mrs. Luna. OK. Mr. Storch, would you be able to answer that
question?
Mr. Storch. I am sorry. Could you repeat the question?
Mrs. Luna. Has anything been done in regards to the law of
armed conflict or memorandum done to allow lower levels of
leadership, to include team sergeants of special operations
communities and/or the acting commanders in some of these units
that go out, to do their jobs to make those decisions, where
they are not looking at necessarily, I guess, from my opinion,
getting in trouble for doing the right thing and protecting
their guys?
Mr. Storch. So, I am honestly not aware of the answer to
your question. I would be happy to have my folks look into it
and get back to you.
Mrs. Luna. OK.
Mr. Storch. I will say, we have done work looking at the
law of war and the need for updating of the policies. Whether
that goes to your question, I do not honestly know the answer,
but we will check into it and get back to you.
Mrs. Luna. We need to empower our warfighters to do their
jobs. And that means that we have to trust them to make those
difficult decisions in those horrific times. The reason why I
am so impassioned about this topic is, behind me, you will see
a picture of Staff Sergeant Ryan Christian Knauss. He was
actually one of the 13 that was killed in Afghanistan, and his
mother lives in my district back home. And although I was not a
Member of Congress at the time, within 24 hours of finding out
that he had been killed, I actually called his mom, and I had
to make that phone call.
And as a Member now, I am sure any Representative who has
had to do that, that is one of the hardest phone calls you will
have to make to hear the heartbreak in a parent's voice for
losing a child. And when you sit here and you hear how this
Administration handled it--I do not know if you are aware of
this, but President Biden after seeing his mom at a memorial
for this, his first statement to her, her name is Paula Knauss,
``I can understand if you are angry,'' but then declined to hug
the actual mother of which she responded, ``This could and
should have never happened.'' What has this Administration done
to really help the families heal after the fact, because the
fact is, is that had that Marine Corps sniper been authorized
to take that shot, this might not have happened the way that it
did.
There are a lot of, obviously, drops in regards to foreign
policy, but I want to know now that that is done, what is the
Administration doing to allow this family and these families to
have closure? Any of you.
Mr. Storch. I can just say that is not something we have
done any work on. I appreciate the question.
Mrs. Luna. Are you guys in correspondence or actively
talking to any of the family members in regards to your report?
Mr. Storch. The oversight that we have done would not call
on us to contact the family members, so I think the answer is
no.
Mrs. Luna. Would you be willing to if they reached out?
Because I can tell you that my office spoke with about seven of
those family members, and I think that they would like to get
some answers?
Mr. Storch. So, we are always happy to talk to people and
to hear from them, and if there are issues to be addressed, we
will look into addressing them.
Mrs. Luna. Perfect. Thank you very much. Chairman, I yield
my time.
Chairman Comer. The Chairman recognizes Ms. Mace for five
minutes.
Ms. Mace. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank all our
witnesses today for being with us this afternoon. As one of the
biggest military failures in decades, this Administration has
yet to provide adequate information regarding the botched
Afghanistan withdrawal. Instead of reflecting and learning from
this catastrophe over the past year and a half, it has been
nothing but stonewalling and pointing fingers. Even the
Secretary of Defense, Lloyd Austin, said he has no regrets
about the U.S. military withdrawal from Afghanistan, no regrets
for the 13 lives lost. I believe that is an embarrassing
comment from the Secretary. Well, I am not sure what Secretary
Austin saw in August 2021, but I can tell you, the American
people saw the execution of a half-baked withdrawal plan which
resulted in the deaths of 13 U.S. soldiers and left behind
thousands of interpreters that were willing to risk and take a
bullet for our country, whom we left behind our country and our
soldiers.
I want to say thank you to the Inspector Generals for being
here. We have a long road ahead of us to get down to the bottom
of what actually went wrong. And we appreciate your time and
your effort this afternoon in that endeavor, as we continue
this fact-finding mission.
Mr. Storch, while I have you here this afternoon, I have a
few questions unrelated to Afghanistan. My first few questions
are about the role of an Inspector General and you can presume
that my questions are ``yes'' or ``no.'' Do you believe in
protecting the integrity of our government? Is that the role of
the IG?
Mr. Storch. Yes.
Ms. Mace. Do you believe in detecting waste, fraud, abuse,
misconduct, and corruption in our government?
Mr. Storch. Yes, ma'am.
Ms. Mace. Do you believe the government should be
transparent in all that it does?
Mr. Storch. Yes.
Ms. Mace. Do you believe in providing reports to the
government about potential waste, fraud, abuse, misconduct, and
corruption in government?
Mr. Storch. Yes.
Ms. Mace. Do you believe such reports should have a full
set of facts in order for them to be complete?
Mr. Storch. Yes.
Ms. Mace. All right. Mr. Storch, in 2020, your office
issued a report on the JEDI cloud contract. Are you familiar
with that contract?
Mr. Storch. I am.
Ms. Mace. Are you familiar with the report?
Mr. Storch. I am.
Ms. Mace. OK. As you said earlier, without having a full
set of facts, a review cannot possibly be full and complete. I
have read the report and talked to different folks. It appears
here we had an employee at the Pentagon who sold her company to
a partner of a major contractor at the Pentagon, and you had
exposure to that contractor in her job. And when you read it,
it looks like there is the potential for conflict of interest,
something that the American people have no appetite for,
regardless of who is in charge. And either she spectacularly
failed to disclose who she sold her company to and the amount
of money that she was paid during the duration of her
employment at the Pentagon, or maybe she did the bare minimum
legally. It was appropriate, but maybe not morally or
ethically.
If you sell your company for a $1.5 million to a partner
that does business with a major company, billions of dollars of
business with the DOD, maybe you would want to disclose that
information before taking that job. And she spectacularly would
have failed to disclose payments and/or maybe she did the bare
minimum legally. It is hard to say. But to the average
American, it just looks like pay to play. It looks like
corruption at DOD. It looks like corruption of a Federal
agency.
And so, my next few questions are for you today. Would you
be able to provide me a list of all the IG investigators and
employees who worked on this particular report?
Mr. Storch. So, let me say I am familiar with the report.
Ms. Mace. ``Yes'' or ``no,'' would you be able to provide
me a list of the IGs and/or investigators--excuse me--or
employees who worked on this particular report?
Mr. Storch. I am responsible for the work of my office, so,
no, I do not believe it is consistent with IG practice to
provide the names of underlying individuals who worked on it.
Ms. Mace. Do you think the report is complete and full?
Mr. Storch. So, I did have the opportunity, as I am sure
you know, based upon other inquiries, to review it myself. And
I am satisfied with the report. We are doing additional follow-
up work and I am aware of this.
Ms. Mace. I am not satisfied with the report. How can
anyone conclude----
Mr. Storch. I would be happy to discuss that with you,
ma'am.
Ms. Mace. Well, we are doing that now. How can anyone
conclude there was no conflict of interest or ethical violation
by this employee if we failed to find out who purchased her
company and how that connection was--like, you know, do you
believe that a DOD employee should disclose who is buying their
company before they come into the job or after because she
disclosed these payments the week that she left on her
termination report but did not disclose all of it before she
got hired?
Mr. Storch. So, when you are----
Ms. Mace. Should they disclose this information before or
after they get hired?
Mr. Storch. When you were taking me through the litany of
questions, you may have noticed----
Ms. Mace. Yes.
Mr. Storch [continuing]. I paused a bit when you talked
about all the relevant information.
Ms. Mace. So, my question is, should a DOD employee
disclose who they sold their company to before or after they
take the job?
Mr. Storch. I think the only honest answer is, it depends,
ma'am. And so, what I would not do is assume that the
information in the report represents the full sum of
information that was available at my office.
Ms. Mace. So, it is an incomplete report is what you are
saying?
Mr. Storch. No, no, it is standard practice----
Ms. Mace. Well, if it does not have the full sum of
information in the report, then how do you describe it as
complete?
Mr. Storch. So, it is. I was a Federal prosecutor for 24
years before I joined the IG community. Not all the information
you obtain in any audit or investigation is going to be
included within the report.
Ms. Mace. It is 317 pages document.
Mr. Storch. Believe me, I am painfully aware of that,
ma'am.
Ms. Mace. So, how do you say it is complete if it does not
have the sum of all information? I mean, it is certainly in the
20 pages that mentioned the specific employee, does not mention
at all who she sold her company to. I mean, it is absent there.
Would you agree to cooperate with me and other Members of
Congress as we investigate this issue?
Mr. Storch. I would be happy to cooperate with Congress and
provide whatever information I appropriately can.
Ms. Mace. All right, thank you. Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Mr.
Burchett from Tennessee for five minutes.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Members, Ranking
Member. Mr. Sopko, do I get that name right?
Mr. Sopko. Yes, it is.
Mr. Burchett. All right, great. My name gets slandered
quite a bit. So, I just want to make sure I got yours right.
Mr. Sopko, what is the value of the equipment and weapons left
behind?
Mr. Sopko. I do not have that figure in front of me. I
think it was close to $7 billion, I believe. I think.
Mr. Burchett. All right, 7.2, that is close.
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Mr. Burchett. Thank you. Is there any evidence that Taliban
is using those weapons?
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Mr. Burchett. All right. How much money we give in
Afghanistan in aid since we have left?
Mr. Sopko. Maybe I have been sitting here for too long. I
think a total of $8 billion if you include the $3.5 to the
Afghan fund in Switzerland, $2 billion for humanitarian. It is
getting----
Mr. Burchett. That is the ballpark.
Mr. Sopko. Yes, it is billions.
Mr. Burchett. Pretty big ballpark.
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Mr. Burchett. Mr. Storch, the Department of Defense report
to Congress states at least 78 aircraft, worth $923 million
were left behind. I assume that is correct?
Mr. Storch. Well, honestly, as I said earlier, I have no
way of knowing. That was the reported figure, but we cannot go
in to audit that. But that is what they reported, yes, sir.
Mr. Burchett. Well, if we do not have it, then they do, I
would assume. The Department of Defense also reported 300,000
weapons and 40,000 vehicles were left behind. And that is
correct as well?
Mr. Storch. Again, I have reviewed the same report.
Mr. Burchett. All right. Is the Taliban giving U.S.
equipment left behind to other terrorist organizations or
hostile countries, do you think?
Mr. Storch. I have no idea.
Mr. Burchett. Does anybody have any idea? Mr. Sopko?
Mr. Sopko. Yes. I just talked to General Sami Sadat who was
an Afghan general, last week, and he said it has become
basically a weapons bazaar, and the money----
Mr. Burchett. Right.
Mr. Sopko [continuing]. And the equipment is going to
terrorists both in country and out of country.
Mr. Burchett. OK.
Mr. Storch. And if I can, the thing I just want to be
careful about is speculating without going in to be able to do
the sort of auditing and review.
Mr. Burchett. Right. Right.
Mr. Storch. When I say I have no idea, I can hear what
people say.
Mr. Burchett. Sure.
Mr. Storch. But unless we can go in and independently
verify it, I do not want to give you an answer on that.
Mr. Burchett. Yes.
Mr. Sopko. I trust General Sadat.
Mr. Burchett. Yes. I agree with you on that. Ms. Angarella,
did I get that?
Ms. Angarella. You are----
Mr. Burchett. Yes. How do you say that?
Ms. Angarella. Angarella.
Mr. Burchett. Angarella. Thank you, ma'am. How is USAID
working to ensure the aid we are sending now does not end up in
the hands of the Taliban?
Ms. Angarella. Sure. Thank you. Right now, USAID is not
physically on the ground, so they are using third-party
monitors and their multi-tiered system in addition----
Mr. Burchett. Is that generally reliable?
Ms. Angarella. There are limitations to it. Absolutely.
Mr. Burchett. OK. Again, as Mr. Storch has pointed out
multiple times, you are not there to see it. I guess, that is
tough. OK. Mr. Sopko, have you experienced any difficulties
getting documents and information from U.S. Department of
State, USAID, Department of Defense, or the Treasury
Department?
Mr. Sopko. Yes, to all four.
Mr. Burchett. Which would you say is the most difficult?
Mr. Sopko. State.
Mr. Burchett. What about USAID?
Mr. Sopko. They come in second.
Mr. Burchett. Department of Defense?
Mr. Sopko. Well, they are not doing much in my world over
there. So, their obfuscation and delay is no more, but they
did. I mean, they were particularly big problem when we were
doing about the collapse of the Afghan military----
Mr. Burchett. Obfuscation is a big word, and I am sure I
understand what it means, but Chairman Comer does not. And
could you explain that to me?
Chairman Comer. Well, I am from that area, too, so I think
he understands it well. He has probably experienced it. They
are foot dragging.
Mr. Burchett. OK. That is what I figured. OK. Well, thank
you. You know, Robert Gates, he is the former Secretary of
Defense under President Obama, warned that Biden had been wrong
on nearly every dadgum major foreign policy and national
security issue for the last four decades. This Afghanistan
withdrawal to me is no exception. $7.2 billion in equipment is
being used or sold to our enemies.
And, of course, we know that will end up probably killing
Americans in the future or our allies. Hundreds, if not
thousands of Afghans are dead, 13 U.S. service members were
killed, including my constituent, Army Staff Sergeant Ryan
Knauss from Corryton, Tennessee. I know his daddy, and I know
Mrs. Luna represents his mama, and I know them very well. His
father, I guess, is a neighbor of mine since I live in the
Corryton community now. And it just disgusts me that he should
have been spending his Easter with his family.
And the Biden Administration cannot keep hiding the true
cost of his disastrous actions. And I appreciate the inspector
generals being here today to finally provide some dadgum
transparency for the American people. I think we deserve it,
these families deserve it, and it still just disgusts me, so
thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman's time has expired. The Chair
recognizes the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Government
Operations, Mr. Sessions, for five minutes.
Mr. Sessions. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and thank
you to each of you. I sat in for about 40 minutes earlier
today, and it was lively then and probably exactly what you
came to expect. Perhaps it has turned a little bit later this
afternoon. Thank you for your time. We count on you. We count
on your reports. We count on your information.
When I was here a little bit earlier, there was a brief
discussion about the Administration's view about how they
became prepared or lack of preparedness based upon some bit of
intel that they, and I do not mean an intelligence report, I am
talking about their viewpoint--that the Afghan air force would
be able to take care of the problem when we pulled out. We know
that is the crux, the part of how they defended themselves. Is
that a fact?
Mr. Storch. Well, as both Mr. Sopko and I have testified,
there are significant concerns about relying upon the Afghan
air force both in terms of it being overtaxed, in terms of its
dependence on U.S. contractor support for maintenance and some
of our work. I think we found anywhere from 80 percent and up
of the maintenance was done by U.S. contractors. So, once those
were pulled out, hard to figure out how those planes were going
to stay up in the air. And as has previously been testified,
there were pretty clear predictions that they were not going to
last for long.
Mr. Sessions. Yes, sir. I am not very bright today. My
point is, is not that true that that became some symbolism by
the State Department, the Defense Department, they were relying
upon that bit of information about how they decided their
withdrawal would work? In other words that the Afghans, someone
had told them, hey, we got the air force. We will be stable. We
can sustain ourself. Is that the true statement, or is there
more to that?
Mr. Storch. Well, Mr. Sopko may have more. But I will say,
in the lead IG reporting, we do report that there was a belief
that the Afghan air force and the military would last longer,
and therefore that would facilitate a more orderly evacuation.
Mr. Sessions. Right. OK. Thank you. That is what I was
wanting to hear back. So now, I have got 2 minutes and 19
seconds, give or take, our Chairman is very benevolent and our
Ranking Member is very benevolent. And maybe this is not the
bow to wrap it up, although you are getting close to the end.
You can go have lunch by about 4:30 or 5 today.
My point is, we lots of times have found ourselves
fighting, whether it be getting out of Vietnam, getting out of
anything else, we fought about getting out of here. Has someone
taken time to have a document that really depicts a ``what-if''
chart, and how we need to be prepared for things? Because I
will be quite blunt. I was shocked, stunned, disappointed.
I had heard that the NSA, DOD, three letter organizations,
maybe others, CIA, had said to the White House or to the NSA,
maybe, or the White House, this is now January 2021. President
comes in, here is the document, here is what we think to be
prepared for. And they waited until well past August to even
give direction to those agencies. Is there truth to that? Did
you look at that, to say what kind of preparation was necessary
because we heard that? I was a part of everybody leaving,
trying to get people here who had been supportive of us. What
was that modeling to the White House to say, look, you started,
when President Biden, 100 days before the election, they
embedded people into the Administration. You know that, I do
too, to be prepared for when, whoever the winner was, would
take over. Did the agencies that I suggested, did they provide
the White House an analysis, and when was that analysis
responded to?
Mr. Storch. That is not something that my office has looked
at, to my knowledge.
Mr. Sessions. Anybody?
Mr. Sopko. That is a very good question, sir, and hopefully
your Committee will look into that. We have not looked at that.
Mr. Sessions. Who would be best for us to write to and say,
can you please go give us this analysis because I have looked
at a number of these briefings, and I have yet to see, ``oh,
DOD provided this, CIA provided this'', the vulnerabilities
about how we might be approaching this. And then once again,
unfair, we heard the White House waited months and months and
months and months to give them direction back, and that was the
biggest frailty. The planning that was done ahead of time was
not responded to.
Mr. Sopko. If I can help you answer that question. I think,
first of all, you have to look to the people who are on the
ground. So, it is General Miller and his team, very competent
generals, who were giving advice back to Washington as to what
the situation was on the ground. Also, we have intelligence
entities that were on the ground, giving advice. So, I would
start there as to what those people, the Embassy to some
extent, was giving advice on what they saw and what they
thought. I would start there and then see what happened back in
Washington with the information.
Mr. Sessions. OK. I know I am taking time here. I am
suggesting, I believe on or about February 10 or 15, documents
of preparation were given to the White House. And those
documents were never responded to until literally weeks before
the decision was made. I want to thank each of you. I am going
to write you a letter. We are going to ask for this. Mr.
Chairman, thank you for the extra time.
Chairman Comer. Thank you. The Chair recognizes myself for
the purpose of asking questions.
Mr. Sopko, the White House Press Secretary was just asked
about an hour ago, whether the Biden Administration has
stonewalled you and your office. She responded, ``The Biden
Administration has consistently provided updates and
information.'' My question, sir, is the Biden Administration
cooperating with your investigation?
Mr. Sopko. I cannot talk about the whole Administration,
but I can talk about State and AID and DOD and, no, they have
not, and I am happy to give you chapter and verse on that.
Chairman Comer. Have they consistently provided updates and
information?
Mr. Sopko. No.
Chairman Comer. Do you have all the information you need to
complete your work?
Mr. Sopko. No.
Chairman Comer. Is it even the Administration's decision to
determine what information and documents your office is
entitled to?
Mr. Sopko. No. That flies in the face of what an
independent IG should do. We determine what we need, who we
need to talk to, and what reports we write. Otherwise, we are
not independent Inspectors General.
Chairman Comer. I am sure the Washington Post fact checker
will correct her. Mr. Sopko, in President Biden's memo released
earlier this month, he indicated he was bound by the Trump
Administration's Doha Agreement when it came to planning for
the withdrawal. The President Trump's agreement outlines
several conditions the Taliban had to meet for the U.S. forces
to leave. After the agreement, negotiated by President Trump,
and President Biden's inauguration, how many of U.S. service
members were killed in action in Afghanistan? After President
Trump and President Biden's inauguration?
Mr. Sopko. The only ones were the unfortunate individuals
killed at----
Chairman Comer. They were zero at that time. For over a
year, the agreement negotiated by President Trump kept our
military men and women serving in Afghanistan safe while we
were still at war. The agreement negotiated by President Trump
ensured not one life was lost at the hands of the Taliban,
ISIS, or Al Qaeda. And is it your understanding that the Biden
Administration was bound to enforce an agreement negotiated by
the Trump Administration?
Mr. Sopko. That is really beyond my pay grade.
Chairman Comer. Because they have undone a lot of other
executive orders and resolutions and agreements, but were they
bound to this particular agreement?
Mr. Sopko. We did not look at that, so I could not tell
you, sir. I am sorry.
Chairman Comer. In your testimony, you mentioned the
withdrawal of contractors from Afghanistan and how it
contributed to the collapse of the Afghan Government. Did SIGAR
ever provide any kind of report before the withdrawal and what
the removal of contractors may do, and what was the
significance of contractors' work in Afghanistan?
Mr. Sopko. We alerted numerous administrations on that
going back to 2013. We kept talking about the inability of the
Afghan military to fight on their own. And I think as late as
January of that year, we highlighted in particular a problem of
the support for the air force, that it would cause the collapse
of the air force within a matter of months.
Chairman Comer. You referred several times to the Afghan
fund being in Switzerland.
Mr. Sopko. Yes.
Chairman Comer. In a Swiss account. That sounds peculiar to
me. Why a Swiss account? Would not that be the hardest country
on the planet to get any information about an account and where
the funds were being spent?
Mr. Sopko. Well, Mr. Chairman, when you think of openness
and transparency in financial institutions, you usually do not
think of Switzerland?
Chairman Comer. Yes.
Mr. Sopko. They do not----
Chairman Comer. The President's family, I wish they had
thought of Switzerland here before.
Mr. Sopko. I am not going to go there, sir. All I am saying
is that one of the questions we have is what rules of law cover
the access to that material? Is it Swiss law or is it U.S. law?
And so that was one of the questions we asked Treasury, and we
still have not heard back.
Chairman Comer. Mr. Storch, it is my understanding the
Department of State believed it was going to maintain a
diplomatic presence with a U.S. Embassy in Kabul, while the
Intelligence Community and Department of Defense were clear
about the threat from the Taliban. As the lead IG who worked
with many different IGs to examine Afghanistan, how can
departments streamline their effort to create more coherent
evacuation strategies?
[No response.]
Chairman Comer. Microphone, hit the microphone.
Mr. Storch. Thank you. I am sorry. It is a great question.
I know that my colleague from the Department of State has
indicated their office is doing work on that, so maybe it is
better for her.
Chairman Comer. Please, Ms. Shaw.
Ms. Shaw. That is exactly right. Thank you so much. Our
work is looking at the issues with the evacuations, in
particular the planning and execution, and we will have
recommendations to help in the future.
Chairman Comer. OK. Let me ask one last question before my
time expires. What was the number the State Department
estimated about how many evacuees there would be prior to the
evacuation? Because the estimates that I was hearing prior to
the evacuation, and the total number of evacuees far exceeded
the numbers that I was hearing. Can you answer that question?
Ms. Shaw. Sure. So, I do not have the precise number that
they were anticipating, but our work did find that they were
not prepared to evacuate as many people as they did, and, in
part, it has to do with the way the rules are set up. So, in an
evacuation, typically planning would include U.S. citizens and
permanent residents and U.S. staff, but, of course, there were
many more at-risk Afghan partners and allies that ultimately
were considered for evacuation.
Chairman Comer. Should we be concerned that there were
significantly more people who were evacuated than what we had
planned on evacuating? In other words, could there be Taliban
people that we evacuated to the United States from Afghanistan?
Ms. Shaw. Certainly it is a risk that I think is baked into
the process. So, the screening and vetting is incredibly
important, and we are actually partnering with the Department
of Homeland Security OIG to look specifically at those
processes to assess that risk.
Chairman Comer. Thank you. The Chair recognizes Mr. Mills
from Florida for five minutes.
Mr. Mills. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman. It is an honor.
I really appreciate you waiving me on. You see, unlike a lot of
the Members of Congress, I do not use a boilerplate photo, the
chaos that had assumed, you know, all of Afghanistan. The
actual photo behind me actually comes from my own personal
photos because during my campaign, I actually paused to go over
and rescue a mother and three children with our team,
conducting the very first successful overland rescue after this
botched withdrawal. You see, I spent over seven years of my
life in Iraq, three years in Afghanistan. I am intimately
familiar with not only the work that the IG does, but also of
the mistakes that happen when you put political optics over
military strategy.
Now, I will start with you, Mr. Storch. In seeing that
there was a drastic increase in veteran suicides from 22 a day
to 25 a day after this botched withdrawal, would you feel
confident in saying that this botched withdrawal contributed to
the increase in suicide and deaths of our veteran service
members who served abroad?
Mr. Storch. Well, thank you for the question, first of all,
and thank you very much for your service. This is an incredibly
serious issue obviously, and one that our office has taken
seriously for a long time. We have done a good body of work on
mental health issues, and particularly in the area you are
speaking about. One of my Deputy Inspector Generals testified
here before SASC last year, I believe, about it. I do not know
honestly whether I have enough, you know, sort of information
to make the causal link that you are saying, definitively, but,
you know, sort of generally what you are saying certainly make
sense. And so, that is probably the best I can do.
Mr. Mills. Understood, and I appreciate that. And I am sure
the family of Master Sergeant Chadwick Paul, who was a good
teammate of mine, who took his own life, would feel the same
way.
Mr. Storch. Goodness. Yes, sir.
Mr. Mills. Ms. Shaw, would you agree that State Department
cables are not protected by executive privilege if they are not
directly being sent to the President themselves or the
executive branch?
Ms. Shaw. Thank you for that question. It is actually not
an issue that I have considered. It was not an issue in the
course of our work, so I am not sure I have an answer for you
on that.
Mr. Mills. Well, the reason I asked that is that there was
a cable that was sent by the United States State Department,
which was known as the 23 diplomat dissent cable, that talked
about the fact that the political optics that was being placed
above military strategy was actually endangering the mission as
a whole. Now, I found it really interesting that, not only are
we having to subpoena those cables, which are not protected by
executive privileges, being blocked, but I heard from Mr. Sopko
that the State Department and the USAID is also not wanting to
cooperate.
Mr. Sopko, I know you have said it many times, and I will
make it really quickly. Was there a tremendous amount of
obstruction that was being placed to try and get information by
USAID and State?
Mr. Sopko. Obstruction, against us? Yes. Yes.
Mr. Mills. And is there any mystery to the fact that even
as far back as 2011, during the original SIGAR, you started
having things where they were talking about billions of dollars
of waste, fraud, and abuse that was utilized by things like the
Kandahar Helmand Power Project, by things like the ASI, Afghan
Stabilization Initiative, South, North, West and East. The fact
that the implementing partners who were there on the ground at
the time could not even stop the corruption and fraud that was
going on. And now we think that not having Americans on the
ground is going to somehow make our corruption more under
control or worse? What would you say, Ms.--and I am sorry, I do
not want to butcher your name.
Ms. Angarella. Angarella. Yes, I appreciate the question.
Not having eyes on the ground makes oversight much less
effective and more complicated.
Mr. Mills. I think that is a polite way of stating it. And
as someone who had spent a tremendous amount of time in
Afghanistan, especially understanding the significant
importance of Bagram and knowing that it had the ability for us
to not only shelter and provide the force protection that could
have prevented the 13 brave heroes and the 13 new Gold Star
families from losing their lives, but also give us the
opportunity to be able to do proper vetting, which you talked
about the thousands that were put on the plane, which were
actually prioritized above Americans and above P2 and SIVs that
were just randomly being thrown on grade sell aircraft.
But my question is, is that, would you feel that if we were
able to have had Bagram Air Base to be able to do proper
vetting and manifesting without the chaos before they went on
to the plane, that that could have contributed to potentially
making sure that we did this more effectively? I will start
with you, Ms. Shaw.
Ms. Shaw. Thanks for that question. So, we have not
considered that question squarely. Bagram was a DOD facility
and so I would invite IG Storge to weigh in, but certainly----
Mr. Mills. Understood, Ms. Shaw, understood, but the reason
I asked you is because it was something that was very strange
from my understanding. When I saw the State Department taking
operational control over the Department of Defense when it came
to what planes were flying and flying out. The reason I know
this is because I was on a plane that was a November tail
number, which is an American aircraft designated as a
humanitarian aircraft to rescue 28 Americans, with 20 special
operations operators on there, with five PPR approvals that was
continually being denied on approach when we are already
hovering above Afghanistan by the State Department, not to
mention the coordination to have an F16 do a flyover for
intimidations and the threats of being shot down as an American
aircraft there to save Americans.
These are the types of answers that people need to get an
answer to, the 13 Gold Star families, why they are dead, the
Americans that were left behind, the billions of dollars to
supply a nation that I fought in to stop from being a safe
haven of terror that you have actually permitted through failed
administrations to be a safe haven of terror. I want the
response, I want these reactions, I want IG to do a better job,
and I want accountability for those who are actually left
behind and those who died. With that, I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman's time has expired. We will
now move into closing statements. I recognize the Ranking
Member for his closing statement.
Mr. Raskin. Chairman Comer, thank you. You know, some of
our colleagues today have been assailing endless wars and
hopeless wars and so on, and that rhetoric resonates with me. I
grew up with the central image of World War II as the paradigm
of a just and defensive war that unifies the country. And that
ends, actually, with the elevation of democracy and human
rights over authoritarianism and fanaticism. But so many of the
wars of our times have been failures: the Vietnam War, the Iraq
War, the Afghan War, the War on Drugs, all of them wrapped up
with corruption, profit taking, and massive loss of civilian
life. And it would be wonderful, indeed, to have a serious
investigation of the Afghanistan war, all 20 years of it, and
it would be a wonderful thing to have investigation of all
these wars and whether war works today. But that was not this
hearing. The purpose of this hearing, obviously, was to
belatedly score a few cheap political points at the expense of
President Biden.
The Afghan war was our longest war, and there was broad
bipartisan consensus it was time to end it and bring the troops
home, and there are lots of Members over on that side of the
aisle, including our distinguished Chairman, who were demanding
that the troops come home and demanding an end to the war. Now,
President Biden, whose Administration constituted, by my
reckoning, 2.8 percent or 3 percent of the duration of the
Afghan war, inherited an impossible situation as a result of a
series of disastrous decisions, I think, Mr. Sopko has proven
that in his reports, but, specifically, most recently, the
disastrous decisions of President Donald Trump while he was in
office.
Trump entered into a bizarre, lopsided Trump-Taliban
agreement that not only excluded the Afghan Government from the
negotiations, but then proceeded to negotiate the release of
5,000 jailed Afghan freedom, so-called freedom fighters, whose
ranks included terrorists. So, Afghan fighters, including
terrorists were released under the terms of that agreement, and
President Trump agreed to withdraw all U.S. troops by May 1,
2021.
But he left no plans for executing the withdrawal at all to
his successor in office, but he moved forward with the draw
down to just 2,500 troops. So, he negotiated for the release of
5,000 Taliban fighters and then drew down our troops to 2,500.
And when the Afghan President and Government balked at
releasing those 5,000 Taliban fighters, according to the
testimony of Mr. Sopko and other sources, Secretary Pompeo
threatened to withhold aid, millions of dollars in aid from the
Afghan Government if they did not go along with the release of
these Taliban fighters.
President Trump also gutted the Special Immigrant Visa
Program, which is supposed to allow Afghan allies to seek
refuge in the United States. With only three months left under
the timeline set by the Trump-Taliban agreement, Biden faced an
impossible choice: pull out of the agreement entirely and then
send more troops into Afghanistan to face renewed attacks from
an emboldened and resurgent Taliban, with everybody telling him
to get out and attacking him, or carry out the withdrawal set
into motion by his predecessor, which is what would be done
normally from one presidency to the next.
Unlike his predecessor, Biden extensively consulted his
national security advisors and military leadership, and he made
difficult decisions informed by the best available
intelligence. The Administration conducted an historic
withdrawal and non-combatant evacuation operation--124,000
people, including not just our soldiers and civilians and
contractors, but Afghan nationals evacuated in just 17 days.
The last few months of the war were agonizing and deeply
flawed, and we all need to recognize that. And we must always
honor the heroic sacrifice of the 13 service members who were
killed by ISIS in a terrorist attack during the evacuation,
along with the more than 2,400 other American service members
who perished in Afghanistan. But if we truly want to learn from
this experience, from the mistakes of this 20-year war, we
cannot focus on the last few days to the exclusion of the prior
231 months, any more than we could learn about the causes or
character or conduct of the Civil War just by studying what
happened at Appomattox.
Meantime, we must ensure the continued support of the women
and girls whose basic rights have been stripped away by the
fanatical, misogynistic Taliban regime by providing much needed
humanitarian assistance to the millions of Afghans experiencing
poverty and food insecurity while establishing the guardrails
needed to prevent any funds from falling into the hands of the
Taliban. Although we are no longer in Afghanistan, we have
every continuing interest in seeking to determine what went
wrong. And that is why it is so important that we continue to
support SIGAR and work to ensure that the agencies cooperate
with Mr. Sopko requests, just as they have been cooperating
with their own inspector generals.
I look forward to working with you, Mr. Chairman, on
drafting a bipartisan letter to relevant agencies to ensure
that SIGAR has access to the information needed to carry out
its mandate, so we can carry out our own. Thank you for your
indulgence. I yield back.
Chairman Comer. The gentleman yields back. As I said in my
opening statement, no single hearing can tell the history of
the United States' war in Afghanistan, but today was a good
start. And it is a good start, because when the Democrats were
in the Majority, they held no hearings after Kabul fell. The
testimony provided by today's witnesses answered questions and
raised troubling new ones that this Committee will pursue. The
fact that the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan
Reconstruction, Mr. Sopko, today cannot confirm American tax
dollars are not funding the Taliban is shameful. It is
horrifying.
Nearly two years after the United States withdrawal from
Afghanistan, the United States continues to send billions of
dollars to Afghanistan, which is run by the Taliban, since the
country was lost in August 2021. The Biden Administration is
taking money out of the paychecks of American truckers,
American teachers, American farmers, American builders and
American soldiers, and sending it to the same people who shot
at those soldiers, who murdered those soldiers until not long
ago. That is on the top of the billions of dollars in equipment
left for the Taliban to use. And the Biden Administration has
no interest in identifying the waste, fraud, and abuse
connected to Afghanistan.
Mr. Sopko's testimony today that the State Department is
continuing to direct its employees not to cooperate with SIGAR
is shocking to me. We have demanded the Administration
cooperate with SIGAR, yet it continues to stonewall and ignore
SIGAR's important work. Secretary Blinken will be expected to
answer for this obstruction of the inspector general. A
reckless Biden Administration will not avoid accountability
whether from inspectors general or this Committee.
Finally, I want to respond to some of the comments made
today about the necessity of this hearing or who is to blame
for the loss of America's war in Afghanistan. This hearing has
been to conduct oversight. That is what this Committee is meant
to do. That is what Congress is meant to do. To characterize a
hearing with four inspectors general, who also conduct
oversight, as political theater or Monday morning
quarterbacking is just, it is bizarre.
The witnesses today are nonpartisan, government witnesses
tasked with identifying problems within their agencies. The
decisions of this Administration toward Afghanistan deserve the
Oversight Committee's attention because, after all, it is the
current Administration. I think some of my friends on the other
side of the aisle forget Joe Biden is the President, not Donald
Trump.
This Committee had many hearings on the Trump
Administration's Afghanistan policies while President Trump was
in office. Was that political theater? That there have been
problems identified in the Biden Administration by the
inspectors general and that this Committee seeks to hear those
problems is not political theater. Those problems identified in
the Biden Administration's withdrawal from Afghanistan were
obvious to anyone who had a television in August 2021 and
witnessed the disastrous withdrawal the Biden Administration
oversaw.
I supported withdrawing from Afghanistan. I am grateful no
additional Americans will die in Afghanistan. Joe Biden told
the American people to trust him to be their Commander-in-Chief
of the U.S. military. He lost the war in Afghanistan in eight
months. That is President Biden's legacy, and that is what the
American people should and will hold him accountable for.
In closing, I want to thank our panelists once again for
their important and insightful testimony today. We respect and
depend on the IG community for our substantive oversight work.
And with that, and without objection, all Members will have
five legislative days within which to submit materials and to
submit additional written questions for the witnesses, which
will be forwarded to the witnesses for their response.
Chairman Comer. If there is no further business, without
objection, the Committee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:45 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]