[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
CONFRONTING THREATS FROM THE CCP TO THE HOMELAND
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON
COUNTERTERRORISM,
LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
INTELLIGENCE
of the
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 9, 2023
__________
Serial No. 118-2
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
______
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
51-888 PDF WASHINGTON : 2023
__________
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi,
Clay Higgins, Louisiana Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
Stephen Siao, Staff Director
Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
Sean Jones, Legislative Clerk
------
SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE
August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman
Dan Bishop, North Carolina Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island,
Tony Gonzales, Texas Ranking Member
Anthony D'Esposito, New York J. Luis Correa, California
Elijah Crane, Arizona Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex Dina Titus, Nevada
officio) Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi
(ex officio)
Michael Koren, Subcommittee Staff Director
Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
Alice Hayes, Subcommittee Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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Page
Statements
The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 1
Prepared Statement............................................. 3
The Honorable Seth Magaziner, a Representative in Congress From
the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on
Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
Oral Statement................................................. 4
Prepared Statement............................................. 5
The Honorable Daniel S. Goldman, a Representative in Congress
From the State of New York:
Prepared Statement............................................. 6
Witnesses
Mr. William R. Evanina, Founder and CEO, The Evanina Group:
Oral Statement................................................. 8
Prepared Statement............................................. 10
Lieutenant General Joseph T. Guastella, Jr. (Ret.), Senior
Fellow, The Mitchell Institute:
Oral Statement................................................. 17
Prepared Statement............................................. 19
Ms. Kari A. Bingen, Director, Aerospace Security Project and
Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for
Strategic and International Studies:
Oral Statement................................................. 21
Prepared Statement............................................. 23
Mr. Tyler Jost, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science
and International and Public Affairs, Brown University:
Oral Statement................................................. 28
Prepared Statement............................................. 29
Appendix
Question for William R. Evanina From Ranking Member Seth
Magaziner...................................................... 55
Question for Tyler Jost From Hon. Daniel S. Goldman.............. 55
CONFRONTING THREATS FROM THE CCP TO THE HOMELAND
----------
Thursday, March 9, 2023
U.S. House of Representatives,
Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:01 a.m., in
Room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. August Pfluger
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
Present: Representatives Pfluger, Gonzales, D'Esposito,
Crane, Magaziner, Correa, Goldman, Titus, and Jackson Lee.
Chairman Pfluger. The Committee on Homeland Security,
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence will come to order.
Good morning. The purpose of this hearing is to receive
testimony from expert witnesses in the security realm that will
educate our efforts to mitigate threats posed by the Chinese
Communist Party to the U.S. homeland.
I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
Good morning. I would like to thank all of our witnesses
for testifying today, bringing your expertise to this
committee, and informing Members of Congress about the threats
that we are currently facing. Despite years of attempts by the
United States to develop a productive, fair, and honest
relationship with the People's Republic of China, America has
been met with dishonesty and aggression. The PRC government,
run by the Chinese Communist Party, has deceived and
manipulated us at every turn, committing espionage in our
homeland and working to overturn the global rules-based order.
United States is now locked in a peer competition with the CCP
in which the Chinese government is seeking to place itself at
the top of the global world order while degrading America's
power militarily, diplomatically, and economically. In recent
months, events have shown us that the CCP has escalated this
competition.
On January 28, a Chinese surveillance balloon entered U.S.
airspace and spent the next 8 days traveling over the majority
of the continental United States. While we do not know yet what
kind of information the Chinese surveillance balloon was able
to collect, we can be certain that the CCP's intention was to
exploit sensitive sites, including military sites and critical
infrastructure across our country. This Chinese surveillance
balloon was a brazen display of espionage in the U.S. homeland,
but it is ultimately one of the many ways that the CCP is
working to exploit our vulnerabilities.
Today we must take the conversation beyond that balloon and
discuss all avenues the CCP is threatening U.S. homeland
security in. Through the CCP's aggressive national strategy of
Military-Civil Fusion, which aims to establish the People's
Liberation Army as the dominant global military force by 2049,
the Chinese government is stealing information from U.S.
military and civilian targets. A majority of the threats China
poses to the U.S. homeland security are occurring below the
threshold of traditional conflict. We need to be cognizant of
these threats and generate multi-faceted solutions to deter
them.
These threats are already directly affecting American
citizens. MD Anderson Cancer Center, for instance, one of the
Nation's top hospitals for cancer in my home State of Texas,
ousted several scientists from the center in 2019 who had ties
to the CCP. The scientists were flagged by the U.S. National
Institutes of Health regarding a variety of threats, including
data security, intellectual property loss, and they were
ultimately investigated by the FBI. This incident was by no
means unique, with the CCP consistently targeting American
research and innovation across the country.
Additionally, the CCP is exploiting the open nature of
American academia to steal vital research and development.
Confucius Institutes, marketed as mechanisms to promote Chinese
language and culture, have used the CCP to recruit American
talent to support Military-Civil Fusion, monitor Chinese
nationals who are studying at American universities, and have
faced allegations of visa fraud.
In recent years the U.S. Government has worked to close
most of these Confucius Institutes, however, the CCP has made
efforts to change the Institutes' names or obfuscate their
influence on American universities. Today, as a matter of fact,
I am reintroducing with Chairman Green and Congressman Brad
Wenstrup the DHS restrictions on Confucius Institutes and
Chinese Entities of Concern Act, which passed out of this
committee with bipartisan support last Congress. This bill
works to close Confucius Institutes and any other programs with
the same goal operating in the United States. It also holds
American universities accountable and ensures they prioritize
their students' education and right to free speech, above
partnerships with Confucius Institutes that require
universities to censor curriculums in favor of CCP ideology.
I appreciate the support of Chairman Green, Congressman
Wenstrup, and look forward to a bipartisan discussion on this.
In addition to threats to American IP and academic freedom,
the CCP is targeting U.S. cybersecurity and critical
infrastructure and undermining our economic security. Moreover,
illicit fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and related precursor
chemicals are predominantly sourced from the PRC and then sent
to Mexico. These poisonous drugs continue to fuel the tragic
fentanyl crisis in our homeland. I am eager to discuss these
challenges and more during today's hearing.
Let me be clear about this hearing to anyone who is
listening at home or abroad. This conflict and the discussion
today doesn't have anything to do with the Chinese people who
are living in China and being manipulated by the CCP. This
conflict is with the CCP. It is an authoritarian regime that
commits genocide against its own people, they censor free
speech, not just in China, but across the globe, and they aim
to end democracy as we know it. This hearing is the first of
many, but it is a first step on this subcommittee and the
greater Committee on Homeland Security, which we intend to
confront the threats stemming from CCP influence that target
our homeland. We will meet CCP aggression with strength, its
deception with unflinching truth, and its attempts at
exploitation with justice.
We look forward to a bipartisan cooperation in this
Congress as we all seek effective solutions to combat pervasive
threats posed by the CCP to our homeland security.
I now recognize the Ranking Member, my friend from Rhode
Island, Mr. Magaziner, for his opening statement.
[The statement of Chairman Pfluger follows:]
Statement of Chairman August Pfluger
March 9, 2023
Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism,
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence's first hearing of the 118th
Congress. I would like to thank all our witnesses for testifying today
and welcome the Ranking Member and other Members of the subcommittee.
Despite years of attempts by the United States to develop a
productive, fair, and honest relationship with the People's Republic of
China, America has been met with dishonesty and aggression.
The PRC government, run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has
deceived and manipulated us at every turn, committing espionage in our
homeland and working to overturn the global rules-based order. The
United States is now locked in a peer competition with the CCP in which
the Chinese government is seeking to place itself at the top of the
global world order while degrading America's power militarily,
diplomatically, and economically. In recent months, the CCP has
escalated this competition.
On January 28th, a Chinese surveillance balloon entered U.S.
airspace and spent the next 8 days traveling over the majority of the
continental United States.
While we do not know what kind of information the Chinese
surveillance balloon was able to collect, we can be certain that the
CCP's intention was to exploit sensitive U.S. military sites and
critical infrastructure across the country. This Chinese surveillance
balloon was a brazen display of espionage in the U.S. homeland, but it
is ultimately one of many ways the CCP is working to exploit our
vulnerabilities. Today, we must take the conversation beyond the
balloon and discuss all the avenues the CCP is threatening U.S.
homeland security.
Through the CCP's aggressive national strategy of Military-Civil
Fusion, which aims to establish the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as
the dominant global military force by 2049, the Chinese government is
stealing information from U.S. military and civilian targets. A
majority of the threats China poses to U.S. homeland security are
occurring below the threshold of traditional conflict. We need to be
cognizant of these threats and generate multifaceted solutions to deter
them.
These threats are already directly affecting American citizens.
MD Anderson Cancer Center, one of the Nation's top hospitals for
cancer care in my home State of Texas, ousted several scientists from
the center in 2019 who had ties to China. The scientists were flagged
by the U.S. National Institutes of Health regarding a variety of
threats, including data security and intellectual property loss, and
they were ultimately investigated by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (FBI). This incident was by no means unique, with the CCP
consistently targeting American research and innovation across the
country.
Additionally, the CCP is exploiting the open nature of American
academia to steal vital research and development. Confucius Institutes,
marketed as mechanisms to promote Chinese language and culture, have
been used by the CCP to recruit American talent to support Military-
Civil Fusion, monitor Chinese nationals studying at American
universities, and have faced allegations of visa fraud. In recent
years, the U.S. Government has worked to close most of these Confucius
Institutes; however, the CCP has made efforts to change the Institutes'
names or obfuscate their influence on American universities.
Today, I am reintroducing with Chairman Green and Congressman
Wenstrup the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese
Entities of Concern Act,'' which passed out of this committee with
bipartisan support last Congress. This bill works to close Confucius
Institutes, and any other programs with the same goal, operating in the
United States. It also holds American universities accountable and
ensures they prioritize their students' educations and right to free
speech above partnerships with Confucius Institutes that require
universities to censor curriculums in favor of CCP ideology.
I appreciate the support from Chairman Green and Congressman
Wenstrup and look forward to working with the two of them to advance
this bill.
In addition to threats to American IP and academic freedom, the CCP
is targeting U.S. cybersecurity and critical infrastructure and
undermining our economic security. Moreover, illicit fentanyl, fentanyl
analogues, and related precursor chemicals are predominately sourced
from the PRC and Mexico. These poisonous drugs continue to fuel the
tragic fentanyl crisis in our homeland. I am eager to discuss these
challenges and much more during today's hearing.
Let me be clear to anyone who is listening at home or abroad: This
conflict is not with individual citizens of the PRC--this conflict is
with the CCP, an authoritarian regime that commits genocide against its
own people, censors free speech across the globe, and aims to end
democracy as we know it.
This hearing is the first step of many this subcommittee and the
greater Committee on Homeland Security intend to take to confront the
threats stemming from the CCP that target our homeland security.
We will meet CCP aggression with strength, its deception with
unflinching truth, and its attempts at exploitation with justice. We
look forward to bipartisan cooperation this Congress as we all seek
effective solutions to combat the pervasive threats posed by the CCP to
U.S. homeland security.
Mr. Magaziner. Good morning. I want to thank Chairman
Pfluger for calling this important hearing and thank our
witnesses for coming today. I especially want to thank Dr.
Tyler Jost from Brown University in Rhode Island for joining
us, along with our other expert witnesses.
It is an honor to serve as Ranking Member of this
subcommittee, and I look forward to working with you, Mr.
Chairman, and all Members of the subcommittee on a bipartisan
basis to protect Americans from those who seek to threaten the
security of the homeland.
Make no mistake, China is the competitor with the greatest
combination of intent and capacity to threaten U.S. global
leadership. President Xi himself stated last year that by 2049
he wants to ensure that China and the CCP lead the world in
terms of composite national strength and international
influence. This is concerning for all of us who believe deeply
that democracy and human rights must be advanced and protected
here in our own country and across the world. Just last year,
FBI Director Christopher Wray sat before this committee in this
very room and warned that the greatest long-term threat to our
Nation's information and intellectual property and our economic
vitality is the counterintelligence and economic espionage
threat from China. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo has warned
that the Chinese Communist Party is accelerating their efforts
to fuse economic and technology policies with their military
ambitions in ways that are forcing us, compelling us to defend
United States businesses and workers.
We have already seen the Chinese Communist Party threaten
the safety and privacy of American citizens through economic
espionage and theft of U.S. intellectual property, the theft of
personal data of American citizens through cyber attacks, the
recent use of a spy balloon and other methods of surveillance
to illegally gather intelligence on American territory, and the
build-up of military capabilities that seek to eclipse the
United States and our democratic allies. We must recognize that
threat posed by the CCP and take immediate action to best
position the United States to confront China's attempts to
undermine our national security.
Today's hearing is an important opportunity for Members of
this subcommittee to demonstrate that we are united in a
bipartisan effort to defend the privacy and safety of the
American people, to protect U.S. industries and supply chains,
and enhance national security, all while remembering that one
of the most important ways to counter the Chinese Communist
Party's ambitions is to build an economy here at home that
works for working people, so we can show the world that our
American system of democracy and freedom is more effective in
lifting people up than the CCP model of autocracy and
repression.
Democrats are committed to doing this work with our
Republican colleagues in a spirit of collaboration. Last year,
thanks to the leadership of President Biden, Congress passed
the Bipartisan CHIPS Act to invest $280,000,000,000 into
domestic semiconductor production that will enhance our
national security, strengthen U.S. industry, create jobs,
reduce inflation, and improve our competitiveness with China.
The CIA has recently launched a dedicated China Mission Center
and the State Department has launched a new Office of China
Coordination in order to strengthen the U.S. diplomatic,
military, and intelligence capabilities in meeting CCP threats.
It is my hope that today's hearing will further illuminate the
CCP's strategies to undermine our democracy, our economy, and
way of life, and how Congress can work together to meet these
challenges.
As we do this work together, we must remember that the
people of China and people of Chinese origin experience
oppression and human rights violations at the hands of the
authoritarian Chinese Communist Party, and anti-Asian
harassment and discrimination is too prevalent globally and
here at home. So I also want to be abundantly clear that we do
not condone any anti-Chinese or anti-Asian bigotry, and we must
condemn any acts of anti-Asian discrimination in the strongest
possible terms. Our struggle is not with the Chinese people,
but rather with the Chinese Communist Party that is
increasingly hostile to democracy and human rights. The CCP
wants nothing more than to see Americans become divided and
prejudiced, but they will be disappointed. Instead, we will
out-compete the CCP by ensuring that America remains a beacon
of freedom to the world and by continuing to provide safe
harbor to those fleeing oppression and violence. That is how we
will strengthen our Nation and our economy.
I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses, and I
yield back.
[The statement of Ranking Member Magaziner follows:]
Statement of Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
March 9, 2023
Make no mistake, China is the competitor with the greatest
combination of intent and capacity to threaten U.S. global leadership.
President Xi himself stated last year, that by 2049 he wants to ensure
China and the CCP ``lead the world in terms of composite national
strength and international influence.'' This is concerning for all of
us who believe deeply that democracy and human rights must be advanced
and protected here in our own country and across the world.
Just last year, FBI Director Christopher Wray sat before this
committee, in this very room, and warned that ``[t]he greatest long-
term threat to our Nation's information and intellectual property, and
to our economic vitality, is the counterintelligence and economic
espionage threat from China.''
Director Wray is not alone in his assessment. Commerce Secretary
Gina Raimondo has warned that the Chinese Communist Party is
``accelerating their efforts to fuse economic and technology policies
with their military ambitions . . . in ways that are forcing us,
compelling us, to defend United States businesses and workers.''
We have already seen the Chinese Communist Party threaten the
safety and privacy of American citizens through:
economic espionage and theft of U.S. intellectual property
the theft of personal data of American citizens through
cyber attacks
the recent use of a spy balloon and other methods of
surveillance to illegally gather intelligence on American
territory, and
the build-up of military capabilities that seek to eclipse
the United States and our democratic allies.
We must recognize the threat posed by the CCP and take immediate
action to best-position the United States to confront China's attempts
to undermine our National security.
Today's hearing is an opportunity for Members of this subcommittee
to demonstrate that we are united in a bipartisan effort to defend the
privacy and safety of the American people, to protect U.S. industries
and supply chains, and enhance National security--all the while
remembering that one of the most important ways to counter the Chinese
Communist Party's ambitions is to build an economy here at home that
works for working people so we can show the world that our American
system of democracy and freedom is more effective in lifting people up
than the CCP model of autocracy and repression.
Democrats are committed to doing this work with our Republican
colleagues in a spirit of collaboration.
Last year, thanks to the leadership of President Biden, Congress
passed the bipartisan CHIPS Act, to invest $280 billion into domestic
semiconductor production that will enhance our national security,
strengthen U.S. industry, create jobs, reduce inflation, and improve
our competitiveness with China.
Under President Biden, the CIA has launched a dedicated China
Mission Center and the State Department has launched a new Office of
China Coordination, in order to strengthen the U.S. diplomatic,
military, and intelligence capabilities in meeting CCP threats.
It is my hope that today's hearing will further illuminate the
CCP's strategies to undermine our democracy, our economy, and way of
life--and how Congress can work together to meet these challenges.
As we do this work together we must remember that the people of
China and people of Chinese origin experience oppression and human
rights violations at the hands of the authoritarian Chinese Communist
Party, and anti-Asian harassment and discrimination is too prevalent
globally and here at home.
I want to be abundantly clear that we do not condone any anti-
Chinese or anti-Asian bigotry, and we must condemn any acts of anti-
Asian discrimination in the strongest possible terms. Our struggle is
not with the Chinese people, but rather with the Chinese Communist
Party that is increasingly hostile to democracy and human rights.
The Chinese Communist Party wants nothing more than to see
Americans become divided and prejudiced. But they will be disappointed.
Instead, we will out-compete the CCP by ensuring that America remains a
beacon of freedom to the world and by continuing to provide safe harbor
to those fleeing oppression and violence. That is how we will
strengthen our Nation and our economy. Let us not forget that.
Division and rancor is the goal of the CCP. We must stand together
and work in a bipartisan fashion to show that we stand united and
prepared in the face of their efforts to weaken our Nation.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening
statements may be submitted for the record.
[The statement of Honorable Goldman follows:]
Statement of Honorable Dan Goldman
Thank you to our witnesses for being here. I represent New York's
10th Congressional District, home to Chinatown communities in Manhattan
and Brooklyn--some of the most historic and vibrant Asian communities
in this country.
The Chinese Communist Party and China's government pose legitimate
threats to the United States that must be taken seriously. We cannot
allow the CCP to invade our sovereignty with spy balloons, influence
our elections, or threaten democracies around the world.
At the same time, we must not forget that Asian Americans and
immigrants who live in our communities are suffering because of the
CCP. They suffer because the authoritarian regime in China has
surveilled their communities here in the United States. They suffer
because they have families in China whose lives may be at risk simply
because they have families in America. And they suffer from hate crimes
here in the United States that are fueled, in part, by disgusting
political rhetoric.
Today's hearing is an opportunity for Members to show that we are
united in a bipartisan effort to strengthen the United States in our
global strategic competition with the Chinese government and the
Chinese Communist Party--not with Chinese people or Asian Americans.
At a time when Anti-Asian hate crimes in the United States are up
by 339 percent year over year from 2020 to 2021, and anti-Asian hate
crimes jumped from 30 to 133 in New York City alone,\1\ it is
imperative that Members of Congress and political leaders do not allow
our legitimate critiques of the CCP and China's government to veer into
anti-Asian stereotyping and prejudice that fuels hateful violence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/anti-asian-hate-
crimes-increased-339-percent-nationwide-last-year-repo-rcna14282.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Like when Republicans repeatedly called COVID-19 the ``China
virus'' or ``kung flu'', or when a Republican Member of Congress
recently questioned the loyalty of the first Chinese American
Congresswoman to score cheap political points.
I was elected to Congress to serve my constituents and to stand up
for their safety and security. The best way to counter the Chinese
Communist Party's ambitions is to safeguard our values, our elections,
our sovereignty, and our diversity. As Ranking Member Magaziner said,
the CCP would like nothing more than to see the United States festering
with anti-Asian prejudice.
Chairman Pfluger. I am pleased to have a distinguished
panel of witnesses before us today on this very important
topic, and I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their
right hand.
[Witnesses sworn.]
Chairman Pfluger. Let the record reflect that the witnesses
have answered in the affirmative. Thank you.
I would like to now formally introduce our witnesses.
The Honorable William Evanina dedicated his life for 32
years to government service. In May 2020, the Senate confirmed
him as the very first director of National Counterintelligence
and Security Center. In this position Mr. Evanina was the head
of counterintelligence for the entirety of the U.S. Government.
His background in counterintelligence lends itself well today
to our specific discussion, which will focus heavily on the
ways of CCP espionage efforts and how they impact our homeland,
including the theft of U.S. IP, the exploitation of academic
research, and much more.
Lieutenant General Joseph T. Guastella joins us from the
Mitchell Institute, also a friend of mine in a former life as a
fighter pilot, and he is a senior fellow at the Mitchell
Institute for Aerospace Studies. Lieutenant General Guastella
is a command pilot who most recently served as deputy chief of
staff of operations at U.S. Air Force headquarters. It was his
job to oversee air power capabilities, including the homeland
defense mission of North American aerospace defense, or NORAD
and NORTHCOM.
With the foundation of his impressive background,
Lieutenant General Guastella will be able to speak to America's
evolving homeland security needs as it faces a challenge never
seen before by the CCP. Given the recent shocking events, which
I think were a wake-up call of the surveillance balloon, we are
grateful for your service, General, and for being here today.
The Honorable Kari Bingen joins us from the Center for
Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, where she is the
director of Aerospace Security Project. Prior to this, she
served as deputy under secretary of defense for intelligence
and security. Her strong background in homeland security and
defense policies will be an exceptional addition as we discuss
the growing and changing threat landscape, including threats to
American critical infrastructure as it pertains to the U.S.
peer competition with China.
I now would like to once again recognize the Ranking
Member, gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner, for a brief
introduction of the next witness.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
I am pleased to welcome our fourth witness, Dr. Tyler Jost.
Dr. Jost is an assistant professor of political science and
international and public affairs at Brown University in the
great State of Rhode Island. He is also the Watson Institute
assistant professor of China studies and devotes his time and
effort to improving our understanding of national security
decision making in the People's Republic of China. Professor
Jost also previously served as a military intelligence officer
with assignments in Afghanistan, U.S. Cyber Command, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Thank you to all of our witnesses for being here today, and
I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much. Again, thank you to
all the witnesses for taking time here.
I now recognize the Honorable William Evanina for an
opening statement. We do have a timer and we will keep them 5
minutes.
You are recognized.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. EVANINA, FOUNDER AND CEO, THE EVANINA
GROUP
Mr. Evanina. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner,
Members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be here with you
today to discuss this really important topic.
I spent 32 years of my career working for the U.S.
Government in the FBI, the CIA, as the Chairman referenced, as
the first Senate-confirmed director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center. But I am here before
you today as the CEO of the Evanina Group, where I provide
consulting services to boards of directors, CEOs, and
executives on this exact threat we discussed today.
Today's topic, China and the threat to the homeland, is an
existential threat. It is the most complex, pernicious,
aggressive strategic threat our Nation has ever faced. I
proffer to this subcommittee that the U.S. private sector and
academia have become the geopolitical battlespace for China. Xi
Jinping has one goal to be the geopolitical, military, and
economic leader of the world, period. Along with the Ministry
of State Security, the People's Liberation Army, the United
Front Work Department, they drive a comprehensive whole-of-
country approach to their efforts to invest, leverage,
infiltrate, influence, and steal from every corner of the
United States. This is a generational battle for Xi, and it
drives through every decision. We must approach this threat
from the Communist Party of China with the same sense of
urgency, spending, and strategy we have done for the past two
decades to combat terrorism.
I would offer to the subcommittee that we are in a
terrorism event. A slow, methodical, strategic, persistent, and
enduring event, which requires in response, a degree of urgency
of action. Let me be more specific. The Communist Party of
China's capabilities and intent are second-to-none as an
adversary. The cyber breaches, insider threats, surveillance,
and penetrations into our critical infrastructure, of which 85
percent is owned by the private sector, have all been widely
reported. There is much more in the classified realm, but we
have become numb to it as a Nation. Additionally, it is
estimated that 80 percent of American adults have had all of
their private data stolen by the Communist Party of China. The
other 20 percent, just most of it.
Layering in the Communist Party of China's crippling
stranglehold on many aspects of our supply chain, and what
results is a daunting vulnerability and susceptibility of
unacceptable proportions. When we layer in the current threat
landscape, sophisticated surveillance balloons, maritime port
surveillance, strategic land purchases by military bases,
terrestrial and space-based 5G threats, U.S.-based Chinese
police stations, Huawei and TikTok, the collage begins to paint
a very bleak mosaic. From a cybersecurity perspective, China
possesses persistent and unending resources to penetrate our
systems and exfiltrate our data, or sit dormant and wait, or
plant malware on critical infrastructure for future
hostilities. At the same time, the insider threat epidemic
originating from the Communist Party of China has been nothing
short of devastating to the U.S. corporate world. Additionally,
the Communist Party of China strategically conducts malign
influence campaigns at the State and local level with
precision. This effort must be exposed and mitigated.
So why does it all matter? Economic security is national
security. Our economic global supremacy, stability, and long-
term vitality is at risk and squarely in the cross hairs of Xi
Jinping and the Communist regime.
In 2020 the estimated economic loss from theft of
intellectual property and trade secrets just from the Communist
Party of China, just from what we know in prosecutions, is
between $300 billion and $500 billion per year. That equates to
about $4,000 to $6,000 per year for American family of four
after taxes. The cost is real.
So how do we mitigate these threats? We must create a
robust public-private partnership with real intelligence
sharing, while at the same time staying true to our core
values, morals, and rule of law, which made America the
greatest country the world has ever seen. This will take a
whole-Nation approach. It will take time. Such approach must
start with contextual awareness campaigns reaching a broad
audience from every level of government to chambers of commerce
to university campuses and from the board rooms to the business
schools. Because the why matters. U.S. boards of directors and
investment leaders must begin to look beyond the next fiscal
quarter earnings and begin to think strategically about how
their investment decisions and awareness of the long-term
threat can impact not only their business model, but the
economic and national interest to the United States.
In conclusion, I investigated terror attacks after
September 11 and led counterintelligence programs for the FBI.
I would suggest the threat posed by China is much more
dangerous to the longevity and sustainability of our Nation
than any terrorist threat actor.
Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Evanina follows:]
Prepared Statement of William R. Evanina
March 9, 2023
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and Members of the
subcommittee--it's an honor to appear before you today. I have spent 32
years of my adulthood working the U.S. Government. Twenty-four of which
with the FBI, CIA, and NCSC.
I was tremendously honored to be the first Senate-confirmed
director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC)
in May 2020.
I am here before you today as the CEO of The Evanina Group, LLC. In
this role, I work closely with CEOs, boards of directors, and academic
institutions to provide a strategic approach to mitigating risk in a
complicated global environment.
the china threat
Our Nation faces a diverse, complex, and unprecedented
sophisticated threats by nation-state actors, cyber criminals, and
terrorist organizations.
However, the existential threat our Nation is from the Communist
Party of China (CCP). This threat is the most complex, pernicious,
strategic, and aggressive our Nation has ever faced. It is an
existential threat.
We must first clearly understand this threat. We must also continue
to mitigate this threat with a whole-of-society approach. We must also
approach this comprehensive and holistic threat with the same sense of
urgency, spending, and strategy . . . As we have done for the past two
decades in preventing terrorism.
I would offer to this subcommittee that we ARE in a terrorism
event. A slow, methodical, strategic, persistent, and enduring event
which requires a degree of urgency of action. It is clear that under Xi
Jinping, the CCP's economic war with the United States is manifested
itself into a terrorism framework.
Let me be more specific. The CCP's capabilities and intent are
second-to-none as an adversary. The cyber breaches, insider threats,
surveillance and penetrations into our critical infrastructure have all
been widely reported and we have become numb to these episodes, as a
Nation. Add in the CCP's crippling stranglehold so many aspects of our
supply chain and what results is an imbalance and vulnerability of
unacceptable proportions. When we move to new areas of the CCP to
include surveillance balloons, ZPMC cranes at out maritime ports,
Huawei, and TikTok, the collage begins to paint a bleak mosaic.
I would ask the subcommittee is it not terrorism when a hospital,
high school, police department, college, county services, or water
treatment facility are shut down by a cyber breach or ransomware event?
How about a natural gas pipeline that is shut off via a malware or
virus? How about our electrical grid or natural gas being shut off in
the winter in the Northeast part of the United States resulting in
millions of households, and buildings, without heat? How about our
telecommunications infrastructure going down 1 day because Verizon and
AT&T are hit with a cyber attack on the same day? Or, our financial
services sector having to go off-line, for even a few hours, would
cause significant international chaos and disruption. Are these not
terror events? ``Terror'' must be redefined beyond our framework which
includes loved ones dying from a kinetic event.
It is easy to parlay all the ``would be'' and ``could be''
scenarios as fear-based paranoia. However, intelligence and law
enforcement professionals, cyber professionals and international
organizations have all seen the intent, capabilities deployed by the
CCP. The inability or unwillingness to look behind the curtain and
visualize this existential threat is no longer an option for anyone.
There is no more curtain to look behind.
where is the threat?
The U.S. private sector, academia, research and development
entities, and our core fabric of ideation has become the geopolitical
battlespace for China.
Xi Jinping has one goal. To be the geopolitical, military, and
economic leader in the world. Xi, along with the China's Ministry of
State Security, People's Liberation Army, and the United Front Work
Department, drive a comprehensive and whole of country approach to
their efforts to invest, leverage, infiltrate, influence and steal from
every corner of U.S. success.
Economic security is national security. Our economic global
supremacy, stability, and long-term vitality is not only at risk, but
squarely in the cross hairs of Xi Jinping and the communist regime.
This is a generational battle for Xi and the CCP, it drives their every
decision, particularly geopolitically. How to counter and push past the
United States is goal No. 1 for Xi and the CCP.
how does the threat manifest?
Intelligence services, science & technology investments, academic
collaboration, research partnerships, joint ventures, front companies,
mergers and acquisitions, and outright theft via insiders and cyber
intrusions, begin the comprehensive and strategic framework for how
China implements their strategy.
China continues to utilize ``non-traditional'' collectors to
conduct a plurality of their nefarious efforts here in the United
States due to their successful ability to hide in plain sight. The non-
traditional collectors, serving as engineers, businesspersons,
academics, and students are shrouded in legitimate work and research,
and oftentimes become unwitting tools for the CCP and its intelligence
apparatus.
China's ability to holistically obtain our Intellectual Property
and Trade Secrets via illegal, legal, and sophisticated hybrid methods
is like nothing we have ever witnessed. Joint ventures, creative
investments into our Federal, State, and local pension programs,
collaborative academic engagements, Sister City Programs, Confucius
Institutes on Campus, Talent Recruitment Programs, investments in
emerging technologies, and utilization of front companies continue to
be the framework for strategically acquiring the thoughts and ideas of
our researchers, as well as development of those ideas pre- and post-
patent application. The threat from China pertaining to academia is
both wide, and deep. The past 6 years of indictments and prosecutions
have highlighted the insidiousness of China's approach to obtaining
early and advanced research as well as understanding the complexity of
gifts and funding at U.S. colleges and universities, particularly when
tied to Federal grants.
industries leading as targets
China's priorities for obtaining U.S.-based technology and know-
how, pursuant to their publicly-available ``Made in China 25 Plan'' are
Aerospace, Deep Sea Technology, Biotechnology, Information Technology,
Manufacturing, Clean Energy, Electric Battery Technology, and DNA/
Genomics.
Any CEO or board of directors leading in any of these critical
industries must become aware of the threat posed to them and work with
their security team and outside experts to identify risk-based
mitigation strategies.
long-term consequences of ip theft
The proverbial salt in the wound of the China's nefarious activity
is when the CCP steals our thoughts, ideas, patents, and technology,
and manufactures that same technology in China, and then sells it back
to American companies and around the world. One needs to look no
further than the American Supercomputer Corporation for just a glimpse
of the long-term impact to economic espionage.
Then one must factor in all the manufacturing plants which were are
not built, and the tens of thousands of jobs which were not created
because China, via its theft, beat the United States to the global
market and is selling the same product and a significant reduction in
real costs.
Currently prescient is the passage of the CHIPS and Science Act, as
well as the Inflation Reduction Act. Rest assured, China has already
begun their strategic, and comprehensive, efforts to acquire (both
legally and illegally) any and all ideation, research, and trade
secrets emanating from the extensive funding provisions and
technological incentives, provided by these legislative actions.
I would offer emerging renewable energy technologies, and
semiconductor production will be targeted most aggressively. Congress
must lead and hold everyone accountable for assuring that 10 years from
now Congress cannot be holding hearings and asking how China stole our
technology, and capabilities, and are selling them back to us . . . as
consumers.
corporate awareness of details
Boards of Directors and investment leaders must begin to look
beyond the next fiscal quarterly earnings call and begin to think
strategically with respect to how their decisions and unawareness of
the long-term threat impact their businesses and industries, which is
woven with our national security, economic stability, and endurance of
our republic.
In 2017, the Communist Party of China issued new State laws to
facilitate the perniciousness of their efforts to obtain data, from
everywhere. Three specific portions of those laws should be understood,
and be an enduring reminder to CEOs, general counsels, chief data
officers, CIOs, and CISOs, throughout our private-sector ecosystems.
The first is Article 7 of the People's Republic of China National
Intelligence Law summarily stating that all business and citizens shall
cooperate with China's intelligence services and shall protect all
national work secrets.
The second is Article 77 of the same National Security Law
summarily stating that Chinese citizens and business shall provide
anything required or requested by the Chinese government or
intelligence services.
The third is Article 28 of the 2016 Cybersecurity Law summarily
stating that all network operators must provide data to, and anything
requested by, national, military or public security authorities.
Hence, if you are a U.S. business seeking to enter a business
relationship with a company in, or from, China, your data will be
obtained and provided to the MSS or PLA for their usage. This includes
third-party data as well. The analogy is a U.S. company enters into a
business deal or partnership with a company from another country. The
U.S. company must provide all relevant and requested data from their
company, as well as the partner company, to the NSA, CIA, and FBI.
china does not play by any rules
China plays by their own rules. China does not conform to any
normalized set of regulations, guidelines, norms, laws, or value-based
agreements throughout the global economic ecosystem.
To further the CCP's unleveled economic playing field, out of the
15 largest companies inside China, 13 are either owned by the CCP, or
run by the CCP. The world has seen recently what the CCP is capable of
when one of the largest companies in the world, Alibaba, pushes back on
state-run efforts. Additionally, many of the CCP's largest corporate
leaders and CEO's have gone missing.
American business leaders, and Americans in general, must
understand that China is a Communist country run by an authoritarian
``President'' for life. Unlike in the United States and Western
democracies, and like Putin's Russia, there is no bifurcation between
the government, industry, and or criminal organizations.
analogy
Hence, for a prospective business deal with a company in the United
States, the Chinese company can partner with China's intelligence
services to assist in negotiations, vulnerabilities, and utilization of
any already-acquired data from said U.S. company. Again, this is akin
to a U.S.-based company calling he CIA and NSA for assistance on
preparing a bid to merge with a company outside the United States and
use all types of classified collection to form a proposal or use during
negotiations.
data accumulation
The willingness of China, and its intelligence services, to
illegally, and legally, obtain DATA to drive artificial intelligence,
research and development programs, and to facilitate their military and
economic goals without doing the hard work to independently develop on
their own, drives at the heart of China's unfair practices. It is
estimated that 80 percent of American adults have had all of their
personal data stolen by the CCP, and the other 20 percent most of their
personal data.
From genomics and DNA to third-party financial data stored in cloud
services providers, to fertility to internet of things technology, the
effort du jour is accumulation of data, and lots of it.
social credit score
China continues to surprise the world by aggressively stifling
their citizens via laws, regulations, unparalleled domestic
surveillance, and a debilitating Social Credit Score for every citizen.
And a conversation about what is occurring the Uyghurs is for another
hearing. It is important to remember that Chinese nationals, here in
the United States are continuously monitored and their actions impact
their credit score.
united front work department
China's efforts to prohibit and violate free speech inside the
United States must be identified, exposed, and mitigated. China
conducts such activities on Chinese nationals and on American citizens.
Similarly, the CCP utilizes a suite of capabilities to silence critics
here in the United States when the activity is exposed. The utilization
of the United Front Work Department to drive false narratives in social
media and within mainstream print and television media is consistent
and enduring. There are numerous examples of such, however I want to
reference just a few recent examples. The first is the Chinese Embassy
in Washington, DC pressuring Nobel scientists to censor their speeches
at the 2021 Noble Prize Summit. The prize winners were bullied by the
government of China to disinvite the Dalai Lama for the award ceremony.
The second example is Zoom executive charged for working with the
Chinese intelligence services to disrupt Zoom calls in the United
States commemorating Tiananmen Square. The third example is American
actor John Cena apologizing, in Mandarin, because of the pressure
Chinese officials placed on him, and Hollywood, because he referenced
Taiwan as a country. The pressure being placed by China on Hollywood
has grown to a credibility-questioning level and impacts just about
every decision they make with respect to scripts and potential
villains. This is referred to as ``apology diplomacy'' and has been
publicly visible for many years when CEOs and company executives must
apologize to Xi or the China for indiscretions with respect to
referring to Taiwan as an independent country.
A final example, and one that really illustrates the granularity
and scope of the CCP and UFWP, is when the CCP forced a small Jesuit
high school in Colorado to change language on their website to
designate Taiwan as part of China. The CCP identified this when the
high school applied for credentials to take part in the United Nations
Commission on the Status of Women.
operation fox hunt
One of the most disturbing, and illegal, activities by the CCP on
American soils is Operation Fox Hunt. Operation Fox Hunt is an
international effort by the CCP to identify, locate, and attempt to
bring back Chinese dissidents who have left China and are causing
President Xi and the Communist Party discontent. For almost a decade
Chinese intelligence service have been building teams to conduct
surveillance in the United States, oftentimes falsely entering
relationships with local law enforcement to garner information on who
China claims are fugitives and attempt to bring them back to China. In
January 2023, the FBI conducted a search warrant of a suspected Chinese
police station in New York City which was furthering this effort, and
most likely more undisclosed illegal activity.
The willingness, ability, and success of the Communist Party of
China to conduct such aggressive activity within the confines of
America's borders is disturbing and unacceptable.
cyber capabilities
From a cyber perspective, China has significant and unending
resources to penetrate systems and obtain data, or sit dormant and
wait, or to plant malware for future hostilities.
The FBI recently unveiled details for the first time on a 2011-2013
Chinese state-sponsored cyber campaign against U.S. oil and natural gas
pipeline companies that was designed to hold U.S. pipeline
infrastructure at risk.
Additionally, in July 2021, DOJ unsealed an indictment charging
four individuals working with China's MSS for a global cyber intrusion
campaign targeting intellectual property and confidential business
information, including infectious disease research. Targeted industries
around the world included aviation, defense, education, government,
health care, biopharmaceutical, and maritime.
And last, in July 2021, NSA, FBI, CISA publicly released more than
50 cyber tactics and tools used by Chinese state-sponsored hackers
against the United States as well as mitigation steps for U.S.
companies.
Over the past decade we have seen CCP cyber and insider threat
breaches and criminality to such a level I fear we are becoming numb
when it is identified. One such event was the Equifax breach in May
2017. As a former head of U.S. Counterintelligence, I consider this to
be one of the CCP's greatest intelligence collection successes. More
than 145 million Americans had all their financial data, nicely
aggregated, to the CCP along with Equifax's business process and trade
secrets on how they acquire and share such data. That is every American
adult.
Anthem lost 80 million medical records in 2015, Marriott lost 500
million guest's records in 2014, and in 2015 OPM lost 21 million
records to China's cyber theft. I would be remiss if I left out China's
breach of multiple cloud service providers in which China obtained
access to over 150 companies' data.
insider threat
The insider threat epidemic originating from the CCP has been
nothing short of devastating to the U.S. corporate world. Anyone can go
to Department of Justice's web site and search economic espionage. The
result is hard to swallow and quantify. And those listed cases are just
what was identified, reported by a U.S. company, and then prosecuted. I
will touch on the impact of economic espionage a bit later.
In April 2021, a former scientist at Coca-Cola and Eastman Chemical
was convicted of economic espionage & theft of trade secrets, on behalf
of the CCP. The scientist stole trade secrets related to formulations
for bisphenol-A-free (BPA-free) coatings for the inside of beverage
cans. The scientist was working with a corporate partner inside China
to monetize the stolen data utilizing the new company in China. The CCP
had invested millions in the shadow new company in China. The stolen
trade secrets cost U.S. companies approximately $120 million to develop
per open-source reporting. This is one example from the dozens
identified in the past 5 years.
aggregated capabilities
When you combine the persistence of intent and capability for the
CCP's cyber intrusion programs, with the onslaught of insiders being
arrested, indicted, and convicted by the FBI and DOJ over the past
decade, it creates a formidable mosaic of insurmountable levels. But it
is not. With a comprehensive whole-of-government, and whole-of-society,
approach of defending against China with awareness, strategy, enhanced
defenses, practical mitigation programs, and a patriotic value-based
return to great competition, the United States can begin change the
course of history as I see it now.
supply chain
So, what is current and next in the targeted view scope by the CCP?
Look no further than President Biden's economic growth agenda and
proposed Congressional legislation detailing our strategic movement in
the next few years. Electric vehicles, battery technology, bio
agriculture, precision medicine, and sustainable green energy. All of
this is prime targets for penetration, and theft, by the CCP. And at
the same time, Ford Motor Company decided to partner with Contemporary
Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL). This partnership is selfish,
creates disincentive for investors to develop battery plans here in the
United States. Additionally, and more importantly, this partnership
creates a critical supply chain dependency not only to the state-
sponsored CATL, but as well the CCP as a whole.
As an analogy, China manufactures, produces, and delivers 80
percent to the anti-biotics sold and utilized in the United States. We
cannot afford to continue to allow China to control and/or manipulate
our critical and emerging supply chains and potentially hold us hostage
in the future.
legitimate business used as intelligence gathering
China's strategic ability to utilize legitimate business ventures
and investment in the United States that can also serve as intelligence
collection and monitoring vehicles is comprehensive. It also provides
the signature mosaic of how the best capitalistic economy the world has
ever seen can be vulnerable to adversaries who hide their capabilities
on our soil and in plain sight. Three simple and current event examples
I will proffer is Huawei Technologies, farmland purchases near military
installations, and ZPMC Cranes at critical U.S. maritime and military
shipping ports.
malign influence
I would be remiss if I did not reference the strategic and
aggressive nature in which the CCP conducts malign foreign influence in
the United States. Unlike Russia's persistent attempts to undermine our
democracy and sow discord, the CCP strategically, and with precision,
conducts nefarious influence campaigns at the State and local level.
I have referenced the influence success in Hollywood and the self-
censoring which occurs to not offend China to ensure sales of their
product to the Chinese markets. When it comes to Taiwan, the CCP
becomes the most aggressive. Oftentimes State and local officials agree
to travel to Taiwan to identify or negotiate economic investment
opportunities. The CCP will undoubtedly apply holistic pressure to the
local officials, from overt threats to subtle promises of economic
infusion at the city or town level. There is most likely a company or
business located inside an official's town which is heavily influenced
or leveraged by prior investment by the CCP. China will apply pressure
to that U.S. company and threaten to slow down production or
manufacturing in China if the company officials do not apply their
respective influence on the elected leader to not travel to Taiwan.
This State or local official, or even U.S. Congressperson, may have no
knowledge of China's intent beneath the surface. At the same time, and
not coincidently, an op-ed or article will appear in the local
newspaper downplaying economic investment opportunities in Taiwan and
championing alternative efforts in China.
why it all matters
In 2020, the estimated economic loss from the theft of intellectual
property and trade secrets, JUST from the CCP, and JUST from known and
identified efforts, is estimated between $300 billion and $600 billion
per year (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative). To make it more
relevant to Americans reading this, it is approximately $4,000 to
$6,000 per American family of four . . . after taxes.
Additionally, in 2010 China had 1 company in the top 10 of Forbes'
Global 2000 list. In 2020 they had 5. That is a 500 percent increase in
one decade. Competition is great and necessary and is what made America
the global leader we are today. However, I would proffer China's growth
through any and all means is much less than fair competition. To
reiterate, competition is always good, and necessary in any aspect. My
question is . . . are we really competing? If we do not alter how we
compete on the global ecosystem with awareness of China's methodology
and practices, we will not be able to sustain our global position as
the world leaders in technology, manufacturing, education, science,
medicine, research, development, and thoughts and ideas. We must
aggressively enhance our willingness to not only understand these
threats and unfair practices but be willing to create a robust public
private partnership with intelligence sharing to combat the CCP while
at the same time staying true to the values, morals, and rule of laws
made America the greatest country in the world. Additionally, we must
urgently decide that breaking the stranglehold of the CCP on our vast
supply chain must end. The United States must engage in an aggressive
and urgent redundancy effort and begin to have alternate servicing of
goods, products, and technologies.
protect what is developed
Congress's recent passage of a bill to bolster competition and
provide the much-needed resources to do so is a great start down this
long road. However, we must also protect the fruits of this legislative
labor from being stolen and siphoned out of the United States by the
same techniques China successfully utilizes today. Otherwise, we will
continue to conduct research and development which the CCP will obtain,
legally, and illegally, to bolster their economic, geopolitical, and
military goals of global dominance well into the future.
closing
In closing, I would like to thank this subcommittee, and the House
Homeland Committee writ large, for acknowledging the significant threat
posed by China, not only by holding this hearing, but with all the
recent legislative actions the past year on combatting this threat as
well as driving enhanced competition. Continuing to combat the threat
posed by the CCP will take a whole-of-Nation approach with a mutual
fund analogous long-term commitment. Such an approach must start with
robust and contextual awareness campaigns. The WHY matters. Regarding
these awareness campaigns, we must be specific and reach a broad
audience, from every level of government to university campuses, from
board rooms to business schools, educating on how China's actions
impair our competitive spirit by obtaining our research and
development, trade secrets and intellectual property, and degrading our
ability to maintain our role as economic global leaders. I have
provided some recommendations for this committee, the IC, the
administration, academia, research and development, as well as CEOs and
boards of directors in our holistic efforts to detect and deter these
threats, as well as educate, inform, and compete.
Our Nation needs strategic leadership now more than ever,
particularly when we face such an existential threat from a capable
competitor who is looking beyond competition to the global dominance.
Last, I would like to state for the record the significant National
security threat we face from the Communist Party of China is NOT a
threat posed by Chinese people, as individuals. Chinese nationals, or
any person of Chinese ethnicity here in the United States, or around
the world, are not a threat and should NOT be racially targeted in any
manner whatsoever. This is an issue pertaining to a communist country,
with an autocratic dictator who is committed to human rights violations
and stopping at nothing to achieve his goals. As a Nation, we must put
the same effort into this threat as we did for the terrorism threat.
The threat from China, particularly with respect to the long-term
existential threat is hard to see and feel, but I would suggest it is
much more dangerous to our viability as a Nation.
recommendations
The holistic, and existential threat posed by the CCP is one of the
few bipartisan agreements in the U.S. Congress today. We must take this
opportunity to expeditiously advise, inform, and detail the threat to
every fabric of our society, and why it matters. We must, as a Nation,
compete at the highest level possible while at the same time understand
why we are doing so, and what is at stake.
1. Enhanced and aggressive real-time and actionable threat sharing
with private sector. Create an Economic Threat Intelligence
entity which delivers actionable, real-time threat information
to CEOs, boards of directors, State and local economic councils
to enable risk-based decision making on investments and
partnerships. The analogy would be the Financial Services ISAC.
This intelligence delivery mechanism should include the
intelligence community, FBI, and CISA and have at is core
constituency State and local entities at risk and utilize
existing vehicles such National Governors Association and the
Chamber of Commerce to increase threat awareness of illicit
activities investment risk at the State and local level.
2. Congress must ensure U.S. Government agencies are leaning
aggressively forward in providing collected intelligence
pertaining to plans and intentions, as well as nation-state
activities, in software, coding, supply chain, and zero-day
capabilities. The U.S. Government must be more effective in
providing intelligence to the private sector. Enhanced
declassification of collected intelligence with respect to
threats to our economic well-being, industries, and companies
must be delivered at speed to impacted entities prior to the
threat becoming realized.
3. Bipartisan Congressionally-led ``China Threat Road Shows'' to
advice and inform of the threat to CEOs, Governors, and Boards
of Directors in critical economic, research, and manufacturing
sectors.
4. Close governance and oversight of China Competition legislation
with measurable outcomes and effectiveness reviews.
Particularly in the research and development space.
5. Create a panel of CEOs who can conversely advise and inform
Congress, the IC, and U.S. Government entities on perspectives,
challenges, and obstacles in the investment arena and private
sector. Currently, there is no such venue existing. I would
recommend a Business Round Table type of framework. Membership
should be diverse and include but not limited to the following
sectors: Financial Services, Telecommunications, Energy, Bio
Pharmaceutical, Manufacturing, Aerospace, Transportation,
Private Equity and Venture Capital. Select key government
participants and encourage actionable outcomes. This entity
should be co-chaired by a CEO form this group.
6. Create a domestic version of the State Department's Global
Engagement Center. The U.S. Government needs a ``sales and
marketing'' capability which can partner with U.S. business and
academia to guide new and emerging threat intelligence, answer
pertinent questions, and construct awareness campaigns against
the threat from the CCP and other similar issues.
7. Establish an over-the-horizon panel to discuss, in a public
forum, emerging threats posed to the long-term economic well-
being of America. The first topic should take a close look at
the strategic investments the CCP is making into State and
local pension plans, as well as the Federal Thrift Savings
Plan.
8. Immediately create a Supply Chain Intelligence function which
can sit both in the U.S. Government, as well as outside of
government, to facilitate real-time intelligence sharing. This
entity should include members of the private sector skilled in
understanding our supply chain and who can expedite reacting to
emerging threats. This entity will also be able to provide the
U.S. Government cogent mitigation strategies and assistance
with policy formulation to protect our vulnerable supply chain
from persistent penetration and manipulation by China and
Russia.
9. STEM must become a U.S. educational priority once again. It must
be funded, focused, measurable, and begin at the earliest
stages of the K through 12 educational tracks. It must also be
looked upon as a long-term project (25 years).
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Evanina.
I now recognize General Guastella for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH T. GUASTELLA, JR.
(RET.), SENIOR FELLOW, THE MITCHELL INSTITUTE
General Guastella. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member
Magaziner, Members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear before you today.
As an individual who spent over 3 decades in service to our
Nation, I am also deeply concerned about the threats the
Chinese Communist Party drives toward the U.S. homeland,
especially in the military swim lane. That is why events like
this today are so important.
On my last assignment on active duty I was the deputy chief
of staff for operations for the United States Air Force. Our
job was to organize, train, and equip forces, air forces, and
then present those forces to the combatant commanders around
the world. That includes NORAD NORTHCOM, the command in charge
of homeland defense. I also developed a very good understanding
of the threats that China poses to the United States and the
capabilities they use to achieve those those objectives.
I would first like to highlight or begin describing the
threat that China poses to the United States and its allies. So
in 1991, when the United States was celebrating the end of the
cold war, and we also were celebrating victory in Operation
Desert Storm, China went to school on United States. They took
note, and they started a very concerted and deliberate effort
to modernize their military capabilities. Here we are, 3
decades later, they have largely met that mark, and they even
seek further progress. That's why this year, they saw even a
significant increase in their defense spending. Their military
now enjoys leading-edge capabilities that include long-range
precision strike, hypersonic weapons, advanced integrated air
defense weapons, stealthy aircraft, surface-to-air missiles,
and electronic warfare. Several of those systems have the range
to hold the U.S. homeland at risk. So the Chinese spy balloon,
as was mentioned before, which garnered significant attention
this past February, is a very loud wake-up call regarding CCP's
global ambition.
Unfortunately the United States is stretched thin when it
comes to the capabilities and the capacity required to defend
our homeland in the air domain--air and space domain. NORAD was
originally designed to detect and defend North America from a
catastrophic attack from the Soviet Union, later Russia. An
additional role was added on after 9/11 to intercept, identify,
and redirect unidentified aircraft that are approaching
restricted areas. So the NORAD radars were optimized and tuned
to detect aircraft that met those criteria. So balloons, until
recently, generally did not fit in that category.
As threats evolve, including balloons, stealth aircraft,
UASs, unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, so must our
detection and defense enterprise. This will require that we
modernize current radars and install new sensors in emerging
zones of vulnerability, not just over the Nation, but well
outside our sovereign territories so we can get a heads-up that
they are coming.
We must invest resources in the NORAD mission. That command
gets its aircraft from the U.S. Air Force, but the Air Force
today is the oldest and the smallest it's ever been in history.
We're still flying B52s that are 60 years old, tankers that are
over 50 years old, fighters over 30 years old. Even the famed
F22, the best air air fighter ever made, first flew in 1997.
The homeland defense, however, doesn't start here in the
homeland. Homeland defense starts abroad with the combatant
commanders. The combatant commanders that have the forces that
are capable of an offensive punch against our adversary
countries that deters them from attacking United States. That's
where it begins. The Air Force has to be modernized in the
numbers necessary to meet the demands of the National Defense
Strategy, as well as to deter threats against our homeland.
More specifically, consider the Air Force's fighter
inventory is too small to meet real-world demands. It's a major
security concern, for while other services possess fighters,
the Air Force is specifically tasked with homeland security,
the Air Sovereignty Mission. The Air National Guard is the
entity within the Air Force that bears a preponderance of
homeland defense. Their mission is particularly hard-hit by the
gap between old aircraft that are aging out of the inventory
and a lack of new aircraft arriving to back-fill those spots on
the ramp.
So homeland defense also requires investment in
modernization and command and control, resiliency ground and
space-based sensors, data fusion, air refueling capabilities.
Homeland defense is our highest priority mission. We need to
start treating it that way.
You know, and more story, you know, to share with, with the
group here. On January 8, 2020, 11 Iranian ballistic missiles
hit a U.S. base at Al Asad in Iraq. I was the coalition forces
air component commander at that time. We possessed the
intelligence about the attack was going to happen, we were able
to detect the missiles at launch, we were able to track the
trajectory, but when it came to shooting them down, to
defeating the missiles, we lacked any options. Why? Because we
did not have the capacity, the defensive capacity, due to the
other global commitments that our Force was spread across.
American service members had to ride out that attack and hope
for the best. It was an appalling set of circumstances.
Let's think what could happen against our homeland with
threats like that.
Adversaries like China understand these vulnerabilities.
The United States is gradually waking up to this reality, but
leaders have yet to seriously address the shortfall. We're
still in a problem-admiring phase, not in a solution-
implementation phase. That has to change.
So we have the bravest men and women in uniform. But we owe
it to them to ensure they are prepared for the mission we ask
them to execute. We owe it to our American citizens to ensure
they are protected from attack. America's homeland is no longer
a sanctuary against threats like China. We must recognize this
new reality and aggressively close critical gaps in capacity
and capability in the air domain.
Thank you for allowing us to focus on this topic today, and
I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Guastella follows:]
Prepared Statement of Joseph T. Guastella
March 9, 2023
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, Members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. As
an individual who spent over 3 decades in service to our Nation, I am
deeply concerned about the threats the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
poses to the U.S. homeland. That is why events like today's hearing are
so important.
In my last assignment on active duty, I served as the deputy chief
of staff for operations at Headquarters U.S. Air Force, where I was
charged with leading the development and implementation of policy
directly supporting global operations, force management, weather,
training, and readiness across air, space, and cyber fields. To this
end, I am well-versed in the threat China poses to the United States
and the capabilities they have to manifest their objectives. It was my
job to oversee airpower capabilities and capacity so that our combatant
commands could respond to these challenges every day--and this included
the homeland defense mission of North American Aerospace Defense
Command (NORAD)/Northern Command (NORTHCOM).
I would first like to begin by describing the threat China poses to
the United States and its allies. In the 1991, when the United States
was celebrating the end of the cold war and victory in Operation Desert
Storm, China made a concerted decision to modernize their military
capabilities as a key ingredient in empowering their ascent as a
leading military superpower.
Three decades later, they have largely met this mark and they seek
further progress--that is why this year saw a marked increase in their
defense spending. Their military now enjoys leading-edge capabilities
that include long-range precision strike, hypersonic medium-range
ballistic missiles, sophisticated integrated air defense system (IADS)
comprised of stealthy fighter aircraft like the J-20 aircraft, surface-
to-air missiles (SAMS), and electronic warfare (EW) units. These
capabilities radically complicate the operating environment for U.S.
forces and could portend significant combat attrition, especially for
forward-operating bases and the non-stealth portions of America's
combat air arm which makes up a vast portion of Air Force aircraft.
Several of these offensive systems have the range to hold U.S.
territory at risk, affecting us right here in the homeland.
The Chinese spy balloon, which garnered significant attention this
past February, should serve as a wake-up call regarding the CCP's
global ambitions. China's space-based intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance capabilities also gather information regarding the U.S.
homeland. Nor are all these long-range systems passive threats. China's
quest to field a ``fractional orbital bombardment system''--a long-
range missile that transits space en route to its target--are not
capabilities designed to secure China's immediate borders. They are
part of a strategic global strike system. The United States must take
note.
Unfortunately, the United States is stretched thin when it comes to
the capabilities and capacity required to defend our homeland. NORAD
was originally designed to detect and defend North America from a
catastrophic attack from the Soviet Union, later Russia. An additional
role was added after 9/11: to intercept, identify, and redirect
unidentified aircraft heading toward restricted air space. So, the
NORAD radars were optimized and tuned to detect aircraft that meet
those criteria.
Balloons--until recently--generally do not fit into that category.
As the threat evolves, including balloons, stealth aircraft, UASs and
cruise missiles . . . so must our detection and defense enterprise.
This will require that we modernize current radars and install new
radars to cover emerging zones of vulnerability, not just over our
Nation but well outside our sovereign territory. Approaches to our
homeland China would use are far different than those used by Russia.
We must invest new resources in the NORAD mission. The command gets its
aircraft from the Air Force, but our Air Force today is the oldest and
smallest it's ever been in its history.
The balloon intrusions should be a wake-up call to rebuild our air
and space defenses--we are still flying B-52s over 60 years old;
tankers over 50; and fighters over 30. Homeland defense doesn't start
in the homeland. It starts abroad with the combatant commands having
credible offensive punch to hold targets at risk in adversary
countries. The Air Force needs to be modernized in the numbers
necessary to meet the demands of our national defense strategy, and to
deter threats against our homeland.
More specifically, consider that the Air Force's fighter inventory
is too small to meet real-world demand. This is a major security
concern, for while other service branches possess fighter aircraft, the
Air Force is specifically tasked with the homeland security air
sovereignty mission.
In 1991, the Air Force possessed 4,459 fighters. Today, it has
2,221. This represents a 49 percent reduction in capacity--the majority
of which were produced in the cold war. However, this decrease in
volume is not matched with a drop in operational demand. Quite the
contrary given that the Air Force has been meeting non-stop combat
requirements since Desert Storm in 1991. As the numbers of fighters
decreased, the workload assigned to the remaining aircraft increased.
They are now physically worn out and must be retired. Fourteen years
ago, a Congressional Budget Office report concluded: ``By 2009, 80
percent of the [Air Force's fighter] aircraft had used more than 50
percent of their originally planned service life. Clearly, the Air
Force's fighter fleet is wearing out.''\1\ Circumstances have not
improved over the ensuring decade, in fact, they have gotten worse.
That is why you saw F-15C/Ds fighter aircraft withdrawn from Kadena Air
Base in the Pacific this past year--not because the Air Force wanted to
do this, but because the aircraft were so old they had to be retired
and there were not enough new fighters to backfill them. Think of the
signal that sent to China.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Alternatives for Modernizing
U.S. Fighter Forces, (Washington, DC: CBO, May 2009), p. 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The simple reality is that Air Force has lacked funding necessary
to procure a sufficient volume of new fighters to ensure the outflow of
aging aircraft is matched by the inflow of newer examples. They have
ranked third--behind the Army and Navy--in terms of Department of
Defense funding for the past 3 decades.\2\ That manifested very real
results. Consider that the Air Force's leading 5th generation fighter,
the F-22, had its production terminated at less than 20--5 percent of
the original requirement. In the 2000's, leaders outside the Air Force
thought the era of peer conflict was over. They were wrong. Nor is this
a one-off example, with the production ramp rate of the F-35 lagging
dangerously behind original intentions. In 2020, the Air Force was
supposed to have 800 F-35As in its inventory, but instead only had
272.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ David Deptula and Mark Gunzinger, Decades of Air Force
Underfunding Threaten America's Ability to Win (Arlington, VA: Mitchell
Institute for Aerospace Studies, 2022), p. 3.
\3\ John A. Tirpak, ``Keeping 4th-Gen Fighters in the Game,'' Air
Force Magazine, October 1, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Air National Guard, the entity which bears the preponderance of
the homeland defense mission, is particularly hard-hit by gap between
older aircraft aging out and a lack of new aircraft arriving to
backfill their spots on the ramp. The Air National Guard tends to fly
older fighters, so they are a fleet lead indicator for the broader Air
Force. What happened at Kadena will be replicated throughout bases
across America absent rapid intervention to reset the Air Force's
fighter force.
Homeland defense also requires investment and modernization in
command and control, resiliency, ground and space-based sensors, data
fusion technology, AI, and air refueling capabilities. Homeland defense
is our highest-priority mission, we need to start treating it that way.
We also lack sufficient capabilities and capacity to defend against
a concerted air and missile attack at our forward bases. On January 8,
2020, 11 Iranian ballistic missiles struck U.S. forces based at the Ayn
al Asad military complex in Iraq. I was the Coalition Forces Air
Component Commander at the time. Our leadership possessed intelligence
signaling the attack would happen, we were able to detect the missiles
being launched, and we could track their trajectory. However, when it
came to defeating these missiles, we lacked viable options because the
joint force lacked sufficient missile defense capacity given other
global commitments. American service members and many allies had to
ride out the attack and hope for the best. That was an appalling set of
circumstances. Think if that had happened in your home town or key
bases here in America.
Adversaries like China understand these vulnerabilities. The United
States is gradually waking up to this reality, but leaders have yet to
seriously address the shortfall. Note how difficult it is to provide
effective, sustainable solutions to Ukraine--guarding against
everything from air strikes, drone attacks, and missile bombardment. We
are still in a ``problem admiring'' phase, not in a ``solution
implementation'' window. This must change.
It is worth remembering that some of the first responders on the
morning of
9/11 were airmen. Two off them quickly scrambled from Andrews Air Force
Base to intercept a hijacked airliner bound for the Nation's capital.
We had no time to arm those F-16s because in the post-cold war era, we
thought our homeland was safe--we had stopped sitting alert. That meant
those airmen were prepared to sacrifice their lives to bring down that
hijacked aircraft. The passengers on Flight 93 bravely took matters
into their own hands before our airmen were asked to make that
sacrifice. The point in telling this story is to highlight that we have
the bravest men and women in uniform. But we owe it to them to ensure
they are prepared for the mission we ask them to execute. We also owe
it to our citizens, to ensure they are protected from attack. America's
homeland is no longer a sanctuary. We must recognize this new reality
and aggressively close critical gaps in capacity and capabilities for
homeland defense. Thank you for focusing on this topic today. With
that, I look forward to your question.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much for your opening
statement.
I now recognize Ms. Bingen.
STATEMENT OF KARI A. BINGEN, DIRECTOR, AEROSPACE SECURITY
PROJECT AND SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM,
CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
Ms. Bingen. Thank you, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member
Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank
you for letting me appear before you today.
I have been fortunate to examine these issues from my time
at a technology start-up, time at the Department of Defense,
and then here legislatively, as a staffer on the House Armed
Services Committee.
Let me start by saying conflict with China is not
inevitable. Not inevitable. However, the Chinese Communist
Party has ambitions to become the world's leading power and has
undertaken a broad campaign using all tools of national power
and influence to achieve its aims. While strategic competition
and potential military conflict with China may seem abstract to
many Americans, the Chinese surveillance balloon was a
tangible, visible sign that the U.S. homeland is not out of
reach of Beijing's threats. The piracy challenge is one of both
national and economic security. It is not only the pacing
military threat for the United States, but also the top threat
to U.S. technology competitiveness.
I will discuss three areas where the CCP threat to the U.S.
homeland is particularly acute--technology acquisition,
critical infrastructure, and influence operations--and then
I'll offer a few recommendations to help address these
challenges.
First, technology acquisition. Beijing has made it a
national goal to acquire foreign technologies, to advance its
economy and modernize its military. It continues to use both
legal and illegal methods to target U.S. technologies,
including in areas such as high-performance computing,
biopharmaceuticals, robotics, energy, and aerospace. It targets
the people, information businesses, and research institutions
in the United States that underpin them. These methods include
economic espionage, cyber data exfiltration, joint ventures,
research partnerships, and talent recruitment programs, among
others. My written testimony offers several specific examples
of where the CCP has put these methods into practice. This
matters for our defense, as our military's battlefield
advantage has long rested on our superior technology. However,
that is at risk as Beijing seeks to close the gap in our
technology advantage. This matters for American businesses, as
Mr. Evanina said, wherein $225 to $600 billion is the annual
estimated cost to the U.S. economy from stolen intellectual
property. CCP law and policy further bolsters these methods.
For example, its 2017 National Intelligence Law requires
organizations and citizens to support intelligence work and to
keep it secret.
Second, the CCP is targeting critical infrastructure in the
United States. I fully anticipate that Beijing would seek to
disrupt it, possibly through cyber attacks, especially early in
a conflict. This could be motivated by a desire to deter U.S.
action, affect U.S. decision making, delay the mobilization of
U.S. forces, or affect the will of the American people. The
government has taken some steps to share intelligence
information on PRC campaigns to target critical infrastructure,
such as oil and gas pipelines, and importantly, it also
included sharing tactics and techniques and procedures used by
the Chinese.
Third. The U.S. homeland is within reach of the PRC's
influence activities. Examples include TikTok, that U.S.
intelligence officials caution can be influenced by CCP-driven
manipulation of its algorithms. They also include Operation Fox
Hunt, where CCP-directed individuals spy on U.S.-based pro-
democracy advocates, intimidate Chinese and Chinese-American
students at universities, and pressure individuals in the
United States to return to China, including by threatening
their family members. The PRC also exerts influence through its
Belt and Road Initiative, exporting terrestrial infrastructure,
information and communications technologies, and other
technology areas. This global influence directly impacts U.S.
businesses and U.S. security interests here at home.
One acute area of competition is in commercial
telecommunications, including satellite broadband
communications like SpaceX's Starlink and Amazon's Project
Kuiper, which CSIS recently examined. Further expansion of
Chinese telecommunications services could boost Beijing's
presence in foreign terrestrial networks, providing the CCP
with remote access, enabling it to surveil users, block
internet access, and sensor information.
I offer a few recommendations to help address these
challenges. Expanding education and awareness. This hearing is
very important on that regard to remind the American public
that the threat posed by the CCP is not abstract, nor solely a
distant military conflict that could take place across the
Pacific. The American public and businesses need to understand
the security and economic risks posed by the CCP and understand
that they are a target.
Expand intelligence threat sharing with the private sector,
building off CISA's work to date, so companies can better
understand their vulnerabilities and make risk-informed
decisions regarding their protection and resiliency.
Transform counterintelligence and security missions,
including leveraging technology like artificial intelligence to
help identify supply chain vulnerabilities, track foreign
agents, and illuminate disinformation.
Leverage technology innovation. Maintaining U.S. technology
leadership means not just preventing the transfer of technology
to the PRC, but also setting the conditions for our innovation
sector to stay ahead of the competition.
Boosting cooperation with our allies and partners, which is
a competitive advantage and source of strength that the CCP
does not have. Technology cooperation can be a strong feature
of these relationships.
Then finally, continuing to invest in a strong defense,
including homeland defense, which is required to deter PRC
aggression, build resiliency to attacks, and ensure that we
have the trained people posture, intelligence, weapon systems
and munitions to defend the United States and the American
people.
Thank you again for your time today, and I look forward to
your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Bingen follows:]
Prepared Statement of Kari A. Bingen
March 9, 2023
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear
before you today to discuss ``Countering Threats from the CCP to the
Homeland.'' The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS)
does not take policy positions, so the views represented in this
testimony are my own and not those of my employer.
I have the privilege of leading the Aerospace Security Project at
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where I examine
these issues largely through a national security lens, drawing from my
experiences working at a U.S. technology startup, serving in the
Department of Defense (DoD) guiding defense intelligence and security
activities, and supporting the House Armed Services Committee.
Conflict with China is not inevitable, but the Chinese Communist
Party (CCP) has been studying the United States, studying our way of
war and our vulnerabilities, expanding and modernizing its military,
using its economic influence to coerce others, and putting in place the
pieces to ``win without fighting.'' As stated in the administration's
2022 National Security Strategy, the People's Republic of China (PRC)
has ambitions ``to become the world's leading power'' and to ``reshape
the international order . . . to its benefit.''\1\ For the Department
of Defense, the PRC is its ``pacing challenge.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ ``National Security Strategy,'' The White House, October 12,
2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-
Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
\2\ ``National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,''
Department of Defense, October 27, 2022,https://media.defense.gov/2022/
Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beijing has undertaken a broad campaign using all tools of national
power and influence--diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and
informational--to achieve its aims. While strategic competition and
potential military conflict with China may seem abstract to many
Americans, the Chinese surveillance balloon, shot down off the East
Coast on February 4, 2023, was a tangible, visible signal that the U.S.
homeland is not out of reach of Beijing's threats. It is also a
reminder that the CCP's broad campaign for global power status and
domination in the Indo-Pacific necessitates a focus on the U.S.
homeland.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ ``Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence
Community,'' Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February,
7, 2022, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-
Unclassified-Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
I offer three areas where the CCP threat to the U.S. homeland is
particularly acute: Technology acquisition, critical infrastructure,
and influence operations.
technology acquisition
Beijing has made it a national goal to acquire foreign technologies
to advance its economy and modernize its military. It continues to
comprehensively target advanced U.S. technologies, including in areas
such as high-performance computing, biopharmaceuticals, robotics,
energy, and aerospace. These are among ten areas that Beijing has
explicitly identified as high priorities in its ``Made in China 2025''
strategic initiative to achieve technological superiority.\4\ Aerospace
is an example where Chinese President Xi Jinping has articulated his
``space dream'' to make China the foremost space power by 2045.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ Karen M. Sutter, `` `Made in China 2025' Industrial Policies:
Issues for Congress,'' Congressional Research Service, December 22,
2022, 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10964/9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
To acquire these technologies, Beijing uses both licit and illicit
methods to target the people, information, businesses, and research
institutions in the United States that underpin them. These methods
include economic espionage, cyber data exfiltration, joint ventures,
research partnerships, and talent recruitment programs, among
others.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ ``Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace,'' National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, 2018, https://www.dni.gov/
files/NCSC/documents/news/20180724-economic-espionage-pub.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Director of National Intelligence's 2018 Worldwide Threat
Assessment judged that, ``most detected Chinese cyber operations
against U.S. private industry are focused on cleared defense
contractors or IT and communications firms.''\6\ Over the past several
years, U.S. Department of Justice convictions or indictments highlight
numerous of these methods in practice. Both Chinese nationals and U.S.
citizens have been charged with economic espionage and attempted
acquisition of sensitive U.S. defense technology in areas such as anti-
submarine warfare, aviation, and submarine quieting technology.\7\
Lucrative stipends, as part of Beijing's Thousand Talents Program, were
offered to researchers to bring their technical knowledge to China.\8\
Chinese real estate investors sought U.S. farmland and wind farms in
proximity to U.S. military bases, and Chinese telecommunications
equipment (e.g., Huawei devices) has been found near U.S. missile
bases, all of which could be used to surveil or disrupt U.S. defense
activities.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Daniel R. Coats, ``Worldwide Threats Assessment of the US
Intelligence Community,'' Office of the Director of National
Intelligence, Feb 13, 2018, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA_Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.
\7\ United States Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts,
``Chinese National Arrested for Conspiring to Illegally Export U.S.
Origin Goods Used in Anti-Submarine Warfare to China,'' Department of
Justice, June 21, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/chinese-
national-arrested-conspiring-illegally-export-us-origin-goods-used-
anti-submarine; United States Attorney's Office, Northern District of
New York, ``Former GE Power Engineer Sentenced for Conspiracy to Commit
Economic Espionage,'' Department of Justice, January 3, 2023, https://
www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/pr/former-ge-power-engineer-sentenced-
conspiracy-commit-economic-espionage.
\8\ Ellen Barry and Gina Kolata, ``China's Lavish Funds Lured U.S.
Scientists. What Did It Get in Return?,'' The New York Times, February
6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/us/chinas-lavish-funds-
lured-us-scientists-what-did-it-get-in-return.html.
\9\ Eamon Javers, ``Chinese Company's Purchase of North Dakota
Farmland Raises National Security Concerns in Washington,'' CNBC, July
1, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/07/01/chinese-purchase-of-north-
dakota-farmland-raises-national-security-concerns-in-washington.html;
Lars Erik Schoenander and Geoffrey Cain, ``China Is Buying the Farm,''
The Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/the-chinese-are-buying-the-farm-north-dakota-hong-kong-land-
food-shortage-supply-chain-usda-11662666515; Lillis, Katie Bo. ``CNN
Exclusive: FBI Investigation Determined Chinese-Made Huawei Equipment
Could Disrupt US Nuclear Arsenal Communications.'' CNN, July 25, 2022.
https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/23/politics/fbi-investigation-huawei-china-
defense-department-communications-nuclear/index.html.
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This matters for our defense, as the PRC employs methods on
American soil to funnel U.S. technology and know-how back to Beijing to
advance its own military capabilities while also exploiting U.S.
military vulnerabilities. The U.S. military's battlefield advantage has
long rested on our superior technology. But that is at risk as Beijing
seeks to close the gap in our technology advantage and become a world-
class military power, on par with the United States, by 2049.
This matters for American businesses. The Office of the Director of
National Intelligence estimated in 2015 that the cost of economic
espionage through hacking is $400 billion per year, largely
attributable to the PRC. The Commission on the Theft of American
Intellectual Property in 2017 estimated that the cost to the U.S.
economy from stolen intellectual property (IP) could range from $225 to
$600 billion annually.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Chris Strohm, ``No Sign China Has Stopped Hacking U.S.
Companies, Official Says,'' Bloomberg, November 18, 2015, https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-18/no-sign-china-has-stopped-
hacking-u-s-companies-official-says; ``Update to the Report of the
Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property,'' The
National Bureau of Asian Research, February 2017, https://www.nbr.org/
wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/IP_Commission_Report_Update.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
CCP law and policy further bolsters these methods. The CCP's
Military-Civilian Fusion (MCF) policy blurs the distinction between
civil/commercial sectors and military/defense industrial sectors. It
facilitates the transfer of technology and investments from the
commercial sector to the military. Its national intelligence law,
passed in 2017, requires that ``all organizations and citizens shall
support, cooperate with, and collaborate in national intelligence work
. . . and shall protect national work secrets they are aware of.''\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\11\ Murray Scot Tanner, ``Beijing's New National Intelligence Law:
From Defense to Offense,'' Lawfare, July 20, 2017, https://
www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-
offense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Finally, the PRC's advances in technology will undoubtedly also be
fueled by its increase in research and development (R&D) expenditures
and its science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) workforce,
both of which have trendlines that are increasing in China and
decreasing in the United States. Data from the National Science Board
shows that, over the 2000 to 2019 period, the United States share of
global R&D declined from 37 to 27 percent while the share by China
increased from 5 to 22 percent.\12\ A recent study by Georgetown's
Center for Security and Emerging Technology estimated that, by 2025,
China's yearly STEM PhD graduates will nearly triple the number of U.S.
graduates (in the same fields).\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ Amy Burke et al., ``The State of U.S. Science and Engineering
2022'', National Science Board, January 18, 2022, https://
ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20221/u-s-and-global-research-and-development.
\13\ Remco Zwetsloot et al., ``China is Fast Outpacing U.S. STEM
PhD Growth,'' Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown
University, August 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-
is-fast-outpacing-u-s-stem-phd-growth/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PRC challenge is one of both national and economic security. It
is not only the pacing military threat for the United States, but also
the top threat to U.S. technological competitiveness.
critical infrastructure
The CCP is targeting critical infrastructure in the United States.
I fully anticipate that--should a crisis or conflict unfold--Beijing
would seek to disrupt the operations of critical infrastructure in the
United States, especially early on. This could be motivated by a desire
to deter U.S. action, affect U.S. decision making, delay the
mobilization of U.S. forces, or affect the will of the American people.
The DoD's annual military assessment of the PRC was stark in its
assessment, ``China seeks to create disruptive and destructive effects
. . . to shape decision making and disrupt military operations in the
initial stages of a conflict by targeting and exploiting perceived
weaknesses of militarily superior adversaries.''\14\ Both the DoD and
intelligence community have further assessed that China could launch
cyber attacks against critical infrastructure in the United States,
such as oil and gas pipelines, and rail systems, that would disrupt
service for days to weeks.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\14\ ``Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
Republic of China 2020: Annual Report to Congress,'' U.S. Department of
Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-
DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF.
\15\ ``Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
Republic of China 2020: Annual Report to Congress,'' U.S. Department of
Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-
DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF; ``Annual Threat Assessment
of the U.S. Intelligence Community,'' Office of the Director of
National Intelligence, February 2022, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/
documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The ransomware network hack of the Colonial Pipeline in May 2021,
although not attributed to the PRC, provided a glimpse of what such
disruptions could look like, with gas shortages, long lines at gas
stations, and the panic buying that ensued. Similarly, the electrical
grid failure in Texas in February 2021, also not the result of any PRC
action, showcased the wide-spread impact of the loss of power for
millions of Americans.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ ``The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric
Grid Blackouts,'' The University of Texas at Austin's Energy Institute,
July 2021, https://energy.utexas.edu/research/ercot-blackout-2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The U.S. Government has taken some steps to share intelligence
information on PRC campaigns to target critical infrastructure.
Notably, in July 2021, the Department of Homeland Security's
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released
information on Chinese state-sponsored cyber intrusion campaigns,
including tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been
been employed with the aim of ``holding U.S. pipeline infrastructure at
risk'' through physical damage to pipelines or disruption of pipeline
operations.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``Cybersecurity Advisory: Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion
Campaign, 2011 to 2013,'' Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security
Agency, Department of Homeland Security, July 21, 2021, https://
www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-201a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
influence activities
The U.S. homeland is within reach of the PRC's influence
activities. The PRC ``conducts influence operations that target media
organizations, business, academic, cultural institutions, and policy
communities of the United States.''\18\ As part of its ``three
warfares'' concept, the PRC seeks to leverage psychological warfare,
public opinion warfare, and legal warfare to influence decision makers,
shape public narratives, spread disinformation, and advance its
interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\18\ ``Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress,'' U.S. Department of
Defense, September 4, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/
2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Examples include TikTok, with over 100 million U.S. users that U.S.
intelligence officials caution can be influenced by CCP-driven
manipulation of its algorithms. They also include Operation Fox Hunt,
where CCP-directed individuals spy on U.S.-based pro-democracy
activists, intimidate Chinese and Chinese-American students at U.S.
universities, and pressure individuals in the United States to return
to China, including by threatening family members.\19\ In contrast,
Chinese state-run media characterize Fox Hunt as, ``targeting suspected
economic criminals, many of them corrupt officials.''\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\19\ Office of Public Affairs, ``Eight Individuals Charged With
Conspiring to Act as Illegal Agents of the People's Republic of
China,'' Department of Justice, October 28, 2020, https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/eight-individuals-charged-conspiring-act-
illegal-agents-people-s-republic-china.
\20\ Cao Yin, ``Success of Fox Hunt campaign continues,'' China
Daily, November 5, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-11/05/
contentx22375920.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The PRC also exerts influence through its Belt and Road Initiative
(BRI), including its Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative, which involves
a strategy of exporting terrestrial infrastructure, information and
communications technology, and other high technology areas.\21\ This
global influence directly impacts U.S. businesses and U.S. security
interests here at home.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Makena Young and Akhil Thadani, ``Low Orbit, High Stakes: All
in on the LEO Broadband Competition,'' Center for Strategic and
International Studies, December 14, 2022, https://csis-website-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/221214_Young_Low-
Orbit_High- Stakes.pdf?VersionId=vH1lp3dD7VcHGRcvuF9OdzV2WJc_KG42.
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One acute area of competition is in commercial satellite
communications, which CSIS recently examined in a study on low Earth
orbit (LEO) broadband networks.\22\ These space-based constellations,
such as SpaceX's Starlink and Amazon's Project Kuiper, offer a
compelling solution for bridging the digital divide, specifically for
rural and underserved communities, as nearly 40 percent of the world's
population, and 28 percent of rural households in America remain
unconnected. However, with its heavy economic presence in many BRI
countries, China is positioned to negotiate concessions for its
telecommunications and satellite broadband services, while discouraging
the adoption of U.S. commercial services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\22\ Ibid.
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Further expansion of its telecommunications services could boost
Beijing's presence in foreign terrestrial networks. This would provide
the CCP with remote access to route data back to Beijing (as was
reportedly done to the African Union Headquarters, whose network
infrastructure was built and operated by Chinese entities), grant it
extensive surveillance and coercive powers, enable it to block internet
access or censor information, and exert greater control over
international data flows.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Abdi Latif Dahir, ``China `Gifted' the African Union a
Headquarters Building and Then Allegedly Bugged It for State Secrets,''
Quartz, January 30, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1192493/china-spied-on-
african-union-headquarters-for-five-years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
While the U.S. Government has taken steps to ban Chinese
telecommunications devices by Huawei, ZTE, and others, such high levels
of dependence by other countries on Chinese-built and -operated digital
infrastructure may lead to greater adoption of Chinese-crafted techno-
authoritarian norms, standards, and data-governance practices.
recommendations
Below are a few recommendations that I believe can help address
these challenges.
Expand education and awareness.--This hearing is an
important way to educate the American public that the threat
posed by the CCP is not an abstract notion nor solely a distant
military conflict that could take place across the Pacific. The
American public and businesses need to understand the security
and economic risks presented by the CCP and understand that
they are a target of CCP influence and operations. Clearly, the
U.S. homeland is not out of reach of Beijing's threats, with
PRC malign activities and operations occurring here every day,
below the level of armed conflict. The FBI now opens two new
counterintelligence investigations nearly every day.\24\ Should
deterrence fail, the CCP is likely to ensure that the conflict
is not contained in the Indo-Pacific but that it is felt in the
United States, particularly through disruptions of critical
infrastructure and influence campaigns.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\24\ Remarks by FBI Director Christopher Wray at the Ronald Reagan
Presidential Library and Museum, January 31, 2022, Simi Valley, CA,
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/director-wray-addresses-threats-posed-
to-the-us-by-china-020122.
\25\ ``Military and Security Developments Involving the People's
Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress,'' U.S. Department of
Defense, September 4, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/
2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Deepen threat sharing with the private sector.--Building off
CISA's work to-date, further expand threat intelligence sharing
with the private sector. Encourage the downgrading of
intelligence and provide security read-ons for business leaders
across critical infrastructure sectors, e.g., energy, water,
and financial services. Examples like the 2021 CISA advisory on
oil and gas pipeline cyber threats, where specific TTPs
attributable to Chinese state actors were shared, enable
companies to better understand their vulnerabilities, the
sophistication of adversary threats, and to make risk-informed
decisions regarding protection and resiliency measures.
Transform counterintelligence (CI) and security missions.--
CI and security missions have traditionally involved manual,
labor-intensive processes, from espionage casework to
background investigations for security clearances to defense
industry site visits for inspections. The scale of the CCP
threat, the various methods it uses for acquiring technology,
and the sheer volume of data that could be tapped into,
necessitate adapting the tradecraft for these challenges. This
includes incorporating new technologies, approaches to, and
additional resources for the mission. For example, how can big
data and artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) help
identify supply chain vulnerabilities, monitor abnormal cyber
activities, track foreign agents, and illuminate
disinformation? How can CI analysts work with technology start-
ups, on relevant business time lines, to prevent investment
deals that involve adversarial capital?
Leverage technology innovation.--Maintaining U.S.
technological leadership means not just preventing the transfer
of technology to the PRC, but also setting the conditions for
our innovation sector to prosper and to stay ahead of the
competition. We are in a period of rapid technological change,
with the commercial sector leading in many areas of
technological innovation. The Government should seek greater
adoption and integration of commercial technologies to support
mission needs, taking advantage of their speed, agility, and
the private capital being invested in them.
Boost cooperation with allies and partners.--Our alliances
and partnerships are a competitive advantage and source of
strength that the CCP does not have. In order to lessen this
advantage, China is actively trying to divide and weaken U.S.
alliances and partnerships.\26\ Our technology is soft power
for the United States, and technology cooperation can be a
strong feature of these relationships while also bolstering our
private-sector innovation base. But increasing cooperation will
require revisiting U.S. technology control policies. We need to
strike the right balance between protecting our sensitive
technology, recognizing Beijing's extensive efforts to steal
it, and enabling American companies to be the partner of choice
for our allies and partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\26\ Seth G. Jones, ``Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment: The
Challenge to the U.S. Defense Industrial Base,'' Center for Strategic
and International Studies, January 23, 2023, https://www.csis.org/
analysis/empty-bins-wartime-environment-challenge-us-defense-
industrial-base.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Continue investing in a strong defense.--Continued
investment in a strong defense is required to deter PRC
aggression, build resiliency to attack, and ensure we have the
trained people, posture, intelligence, weapon systems, and
munitions to defend the United States and the American people.
Thank you again for your time today and I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ms. Bingen.
The Chair now recognizes Dr. Jost for his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF TYLER JOST, PH.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF
POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, BROWN
UNIVERSITY
Mr. Jost. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the
opportunity to testify today. It is really an honor to be with
you.
My testimony is given as a scholar of Chinese foreign
policy, and I emphasize this for two reasons. First, my role in
academia is one of a researcher, not an administrator, and my
testimony is not on behalf of or directly or indirectly
associated with my employer. Second, as a former intelligence
officer in the U.S. military, I am well aware that some of the
most detailed reporting on topics as sensitive as homeland
security remained classified. And as such, the testimony I am
best positioned to offer pertains to the scholarly conclusions
that can be drawn based upon publicly-available research.
My remarks today will focus on two areas. No. 1, the
broader strategic context through which China's overseas
intelligence collection and information campaigns should be
viewed, and No. 2, what the publicly-available research to date
can tell us about the scope and effectiveness of those
campaigns.
The competition between the United States and China
represents one of the defining international challenges of this
century. But in my view, at the center of this critical problem
rests two issues that most divide Washington and Beijing, the
future of Taiwan and perceptions that the other side poses an
existential threat to the stability of the domestic regime.
Thus, while it is important to seriously evaluate the threats
to the homeland posed by China, you should not distract
attention from the issues that are likely to define the future
of the global competition at their root.
China's overseas activities that emerge from this
contemporary strategic context can be loosely divided into two
categories. The first focuses on China's intelligence
collection, which is well-documented. The recent incident in
which a Chinese high-altitude balloon traversed American
airspace illustrates in vivid fashion that China is willing to
assume risks in order to gather data against American targets.
In parallel to intelligence collection, China engages in
operations to disseminate information to foreign audiences. To
date, the bulk of these activities are aimed at shaping global
public opinion. In simplest terms, China presents foreign
citizens with information with a hope that it will shape the
target's attitudes and perhaps their behavior. These efforts to
shape foreign public opinion through party propaganda are real,
and their scope is broad. But there are a few comparatively few
studies that apply validated research methods for estimating
the causal effect that exposure to such messages have on
foreign audiences. In addition, trends in the global public
opinion should provide some comfort. If one judges the
effectiveness of China's public diplomacy campaign based solely
on China's approval rating in foreign countries, the effort
has, at least to date, been a failure.
Finally, what evidence we do have suggests there are
several reasons why these operations might actually prove to be
less effective than some of us might fear. By emphasizing gaps
in public knowledge, I am not suggesting that we can dismiss
potential threats that China poses to the U.S. homeland. The
fact that China has demonstrated its intent to engage in both
intelligence collection and efforts to shape foreign public
opinion, coupled with the competitive nature of the bilateral
relationship broadly, is sufficient cause for serious
attention. Rather, my hope is that emphasizing what we do and
do not yet know can illuminate policy recommendations which are
detailed in my written testimony.
Allow me to briefly summarize them here.
First, the U.S. Government should devote resources toward
publicly-available research that fills in gaps in our knowledge
regarding China's activities abroad.
Second, the U.S. Government should use diplomatic channels
to reestablish opportunities for American researchers to better
understand the Chinese political system and do so in ways that
they feel protected from potential exploitation and detainment
by the Chinese authorities.
Third, the U.S. Government needs to better disclose its
understanding of the threats that China poses to homeland
security. Specifically, it needs to provide citizens with more
data about the different risks that American citizens assume
when they use foreign technologies.
Thank you very much for your time, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Jost follows:]
Prepared Statement of Tyler Jost
March 9, 2023
Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify
before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and
Intelligence. My remarks today will focus on two areas: (1) The broader
strategic context through which China's overseas intelligence
collection and information campaigns should be viewed; and (2) what the
currently available evidence can tell us about the scope and
effectiveness of these campaigns.
My testimony today is given as a scholar of Chinese foreign policy
and U.S.-China relations. I emphasize this for two reasons. First, my
role in academia is one of a researcher, rather than an administrator.
My testimony is not on behalf of or directly or indirectly associated
with my employer. Second, as former intelligence officer in the U.S.
military, I am well aware that some of the most detailed reporting on a
topic as sensitive as homeland security remains classified. As such,
the testimony I am best positioned to offer pertains to the scholarly
conclusions that can be drawn based on publicly-available research.
To summarize, my assessment regarding China's threat to the U.S.
homeland is three-fold. First, it is clear that China is interested in
using its capabilities to gather information and promote narratives
that are consistent with its interests. Second, publicly-available
research provides inconclusive evidence regarding the effectiveness of
China's operations, particularly those aimed at shaping global public
opinion. Third, the U.S. Government should consider devoting more
resources toward research that can more precisely and conclusively
assess the level of threat posed by China's activities in the United
States. The absence of authoritative and publicly-available evidence
does not necessarily confirm the ineffectiveness of China's actions,
but leaves observers without a clear picture of how to rank the
severity of these threats in comparison to other aspects of American
foreign policy toward China, such as the emerging bilateral security
competition and the possibility of future military conflict.
the context of u.s.-china strategic competition
The competition between the United States and China represents one
of the defining international challenges of this century. In my view,
the central problem of the U.S.-China relationship continues to be how
to manage the two issues that most divide Washington and Beijing.
The first is that the United States and China have potentially
irreconcilable differences over Taiwan. These differences have been
effectively managed for decades, but both sides are increasingly
apprehensive about the ability to maintain the status quo. There is
healthy debate among scholars as to what is driving recent
apprehensions. Some emphasize changes to the balance of power.\1\
Others emphasize the difficulties of credible assurance, which might
cause Beijing to feel it has no choice but to take military action.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ Heginbotham, Eric, et al. The US-China Military Scorecard:
Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017. Santa
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2015; Kastner, Scott L. ``Is the Taiwan
Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the prospects for armed conflict
between China and Taiwan.'' International Security 40.3 (2015): 54-92.
\2\ Blanchette, Jude and Ryan Hass. ``The Taiwan Long Game: Why the
Best Solution Is No Solution.'' Foreign Affairs. 102.1 (2023): 102-114;
Weiss, Jessica Chen. ``The U.S. Should Deter--Not Provoke--Beijing over
Taiwan.'' The Washington Post. February 20, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These dynamics are primed to put the United States in a difficult
position. If the United States hopes to deter future military action
against Taiwan, it will need to do one of the following: (1) Match
Chinese capabilities in the region to keep the costs of conflict
prohibitively high; (2) reassure Beijing that the United States and
Taiwan will not change the status quo, assuming that such concerns are
central to Beijing's decision making; or (3) some combination of the
two. If the United States does not manage this aspect of the bilateral
relationship effectively, deterrence may fail. The consequences of such
a conflict would be devastating, not only in terms of the human and
economic costs imparted on both sides, but also in terms of the
reputational toll to the credibility of American strategic judgment if
it fails to win. The stakes of successfully navigating this issue could
not be higher.
The second issue is that the United States and China eye each
other's domestic institutions with suspicion. Chinese decision makers
think about national security as the security of the regime.\3\ From
the perspective of Beijing's leaders, one of the most formative events
in the country's history was the collapse of communist regimes in
Eastern Europe, followed by the Soviet Union, which demonstrated the
possibility of a similar fate for the Chinese Communist Party.\4\
Beijing views some, although not all, of the global rules and norms
that emerged after the cold war as threats to the regime's stability,
particularly those regarding the effectiveness and appropriateness of
democratic institutions.\5\
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\3\ Weiss, Jessica Chen. ``A World Safe for Autocracy?'' Foreign
Affairs 98.4 (2019): 92-108; Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. ``Internal
Security & Grand Strategy: China's Approach to National Security Under
Xi Jinping.'' Statement before the US-China Economic and Security
Review Commission, Hearing on US-China Relations at the Chinese
Communist Party's Centennial (2021).
\4\ Sarotte, Mary Elise. ``China's Fear of Contagion: Tiananmen
Square and the Power of the European Example.'' International Security
37.2 (2012): 156-182; Gewirtz, Julian. Never Turn Back: China and the
Forbidden History of the 1980's. Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
2022.
\5\ Johnston, Alastair Iain. ``China in a World of Orders:
Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing's International
Relations.'' International Security 44.2 (2019): 9-60.
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Thus, while it is important to seriously evaluate the threats that
China poses to the homeland, these inquiries should not distract
attention from the issues that are likely to be central in the global
competition--and will greatly shape whether the two sides end up in
what could be the most costly and dangerous conflict between two major
powers since 1945.
ccp activities abroad
It is helpful to view China's activities toward the U.S. homeland
in this context. Like many countries, China seeks to gain advantages
over states with whom it has differences in order to improve its
bargaining power. The more intelligence that China is able to collect
regarding foreign military capabilities, for instance, the more they
might be able to emulate those capabilities within their own military
portfolio, with an eye toward bargaining hard for the two priority
issues discussed above.
China's overseas activities that emerge from this strategic context
can be loosely divided into two categories. The first focuses on
intelligence collection. The second focuses on information
distribution. It is important to distinguish these two areas, because
each is quite different in terms of the nature, scope, and potential to
impart costs on the United States.
Intelligence Collection
In terms of intelligence collection, it is well-documented that
China is gathering data in order to improve its military capacity,
provide insight into U.S. decision-making processes, and potentially
gain a tactical advantage over the United States in the event of a
future conflict. The recent incident in which a Chinese high-altitude
balloon traversed American airspace illustrates in vivid fashion that
China is willing to assume risks in order to gather data against U.S.
targets.
The fact that this event occurred shortly before Secretary of State
Anthony Blinken's planned diplomatic visit to China is noteworthy. If
recent reporting from the U.S. Department of Defense stating that Xi
Jinping was unaware of the timing of this particular mission is true,
it suggests that Beijing may have delegated decision making regarding
tactical execution of these operations to bureaucratic stakeholders who
had limited understanding of how the disclosure of such an intelligence
mission could shape China's other strategic priorities.\6\ Such a
posture could imply that Beijing has a high level of risk tolerance in
its intelligence collection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Eric Schmitt and Zach Montague. ``Balloon Crisis Highlighted a
Split in China's Leadership, Pentagon Official Says,'' The New York
Times, February 17, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There are equally concerning aspects the security of personal data.
Investigations into Chinese intelligence have long noted Beijing's
interest in collecting data on foreign citizens, demonstrated by the
2015 Office of Personnel Management data breach and the 2017 cyber
espionage operation against Equifax.\7\ These events, coupled with the
technical realities of digital technologies, illustrate that Government
communications and the privacy of American citizens may both
potentially be compromised through the use of foreign hardware and
software.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\7\ David E. Sanger and Julie Hirschfeld Davis. ``Hacking Linked to
China Exposes Millions of U.S. Workers,'' The New York Times, June 4,
2015; Katie Benner. ``U.S. Charges Chinese Military Officers in 2017
Equifax Hacking,'' The New York Times, May 7, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
It seems more than plausible that China's defense espionage
campaign has contributed to its ability to develop more advanced
military technologies, which could shape its ability to fight and win a
war in the Asia-Pacific region.\8\ There is less publicly-available
reporting to document whether these intelligence operations, which have
been successful at the collection phase, have also been effective in
advancing Beijing's broader diplomatic, economic, and security goals
beyond defense production.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Department of Defense. Report on Military and Security
Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2022, 147, 153.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Simply collecting data, particularly in large quantities, is
insufficient to help decision makers achieve their goals.\9\ I am
unaware of any publicly-available study that has been able to document
such a connection in the recent past. Recognizing this gap in our
understanding is important, not only because it should drive the United
States' own intelligence collection priorities, but also because we
should recognize the challenges Beijing will face in effectively
managing such large amounts of data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision.
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shaping Global Public Opinion
In parallel to intelligence collection, China engages in operations
to disseminate information to foreign audiences. To date, the bulk of
these activities are aimed at shaping global public opinion.\10\ In
simplest terms, China presents foreign citizens with information with
the hope that it will shape the target's attitudes and, possibly,
behavior. Perhaps the most concerning facet of these activities
occurred last fall, when Meta and Google each reported that China-based
groups had disseminated political content prior to the 2022 midterm
elections.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ Diamond, Larry, and Orville Schell, eds. Chinese Influence and
American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance. Stanford: Hoover
Institution Press, 2018; Brazys, Samuel, and Alexander Dukalskis.
``China's Message Machine.'' Journal of Democracy 31.4 (2020): 59-73.
\11\ Kurlantzick, Joshua. ``China's Growing Attempts to Influence
U.S. Politics.'' Council on Foreign Relations, October 31, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The idea of information control and propaganda is deeply embedded
in the Chinese Communist Party's institutions--and it is easy to see
how this would naturally spill over into efforts to shape public
opinion abroad.\12\ They also tie into the second core issue motivating
the bilateral competition: China's concern about regime survival and
the threat that a lack of international status might have on the
Party's continued ability to rule. Furthermore, it is plausible that
China genuinely believes that the rest of the world misunderstands it--
and that these misunderstandings can be rectified through methods
similar to those it employs at home.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. ``How
Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism But Silences Collective
Expression.'' American Political Science Review 107.2 (2013): 326-343;
Roberts, Margaret E. Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China's
Great Firewall. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
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These efforts to shape foreign public opinion through party
propaganda are real and their scope broad. It is estimated that China
spends approximately $8 billion on public diplomacy efforts alone.\13\
To date, however, there is limited publicly-available research
documenting whether China's operations to shape foreign attitudes have
been effective. For example, China Global Television Network (CGTN), a
broadcasting company affiliated with the Chinese state, is actively
disseminating China's public messaging world-wide.\14\ But there are
few studies that apply validated research methods for estimating the
causal effect of exposure to such messages on public opinion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Martin, Peter. China's Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf
Warrior Diplomacy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021, 213.
\14\ Diamond and Schell 2018, 103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The available evidence suggests several reasons why these
operations might actually prove to be less effective than we might
fear. Broadly, efforts to shape foreign public opinion do not always
work out the way that states hope. Some research suggests, for example,
that salient components of China's public diplomacy initiatives do not
improve foreign attitudes toward China.\15\ Scholars at Yale University
have found that Twitter messaging by Chinese diplomats were only able
to positively shape perceptions of China when the message was framed in
positive terms. When Chinese diplomats instead resorted to nationalist
messages, often termed ``Wolf Warrior'' diplomacy, Twitter messages
instead had a negative effect on foreign public opinion.\16\
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\15\ Green-Riley, Naima. How States Win Friends and Influence
People Overseas: The Micro-Foundations of U.S. and Chinese Public
Diplomacy (PhD Thesis). Harvard Department of Government.
\16\ Mattingly, Daniel C., and James Sundquist. ``When Does Public
Diplomacy Work? Evidence from China's `Wolf Warrior' Diplomats.''
Political Science Research and Methods (2022).
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Some of the best available evidence on the domestic effects of
China's propaganda also suggests that such messages do not necessarily
operate as one might think. Several experimental studies have found
that propaganda inside China can backfire, causing Chinese citizens to
adopt less favorable views toward the government.\17\ It is worth
noting, however, that these studies have also found that Chinese
propaganda is effective in signaling the strength of the state. That
is, propaganda does not always change political attitudes, but it does
remind citizens of the CCP's ability to coerce. Other studies suggest
that Chinese domestic propaganda can be effective when it is able to
emotionally resonate with its citizens, such as through nationalistic
narratives recounting past wars in a positive light.\18\ However, it is
not yet clear that these same methods can be effectively applied in
foreign countries.
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\17\ Huang, Haifeng. ``Propaganda as Signaling.'' Comparative
Politics 47.4 (2015); Huang, Haifeng. ``The Pathology of Hard
Propaganda.'' The Journal of Politics 80.3 (2018): 1034-1038.
\18\ Mattingly, Daniel C., and Elaine Yao. ``How Soft Propaganda
Persuades.'' Comparative Political Studies 55.9 (2022): 1569-1594.
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One possible reason that Chinese propaganda could fail to sway
global public opinion as intended is that foreign audiences may ascribe
malign intentions to foreign governments, especially China. Research
suggests that the ability to sway political attitudes depends in part
on whether a target audience believes that what social scientists term
the ``cue-giver'' (in this case China) has the audience's best
interests at heart.\19\ To illustrate this point in more familiar
terms, consider how an American voter may be more likely to update
their political attitudes when they receive a message from a co-
partisan than when they receive one from a member of another party.
There is an intuitive logic behind this: people make general judgments
about who they deem trustworthy (e.g., one who shares the same basic
political values) and then prioritize messages from these sources as
they wade through the vast amounts of information to which they are
exposed in daily life.\20\
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\19\ Lupia, Arthur, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Lupia Arthur. The
Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
\20\ Druckman, James N. ``On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can
Frame?'' The Journal of Politics 63.4 (2001): 1041-1066.
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Applying this intuition to China's public messaging campaigns would
suggest that American citizens may be predisposed to severely discount
or even completely discard messages received from Chinese propaganda
outlets, provided that their baseline trust of such sources is low and
they are able to accurately identify the creator of the content. Some
studies of public diplomacy in other country contexts, usually focusing
on the ability of American officials to shape global public opinion,
are congruent with this conclusion.\21\ Other experimental studies find
a similar effect with regard to American perceptions of foreign public
diplomacy as well.\22\
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\21\ Goldsmith, Benjamin E., and Yusaku Horiuchi. ``Spinning the
Globe? US Public Diplomacy and Foreign Public Opinion.'' The Journal of
Politics 71.3 (2009): 863-875.
\22\ Rhee, Kasey, Charles Crabtree, and Yusaku Horiuchi.
``Perceived Motives of Public Diplomacy Influence Foreign Public
Opinion.'' Political Behavior (2023).
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In addition, trends in global public opinion should provide some
comfort. If one judges the effectiveness of China's public diplomacy
campaign based solely on China's approval rating in foreign countries,
the effort has been a catastrophic failure. This is true not only in
the United States, but in Japan, Australia, South Korea, and much of
Europe as well. Across these countries, China is less well-trusted
today that it was 10 years ago. China may be attempting to win hearts
and minds globally, but they have not succeeded in many contexts.\23\
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\23\ Silver, Laura, Christine Huang and Laura Clancy. ``How Global
Public Opinion of China Has Shifted in the Xi Era.'' Pew Research
Center, September 28, 2022.
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If China's public diplomacy campaign has backfired (i.e., the
effect of the program has been in the opposite direction than Beijing
intended), it would be unsurprising not only for the reasons cited
above, but also because China has often miscalculated in its foreign
policy decision making. For example, one scholar at the University of
Southern California has shown that China's attempts to use economic
statecraft to advance its relationships with other countries are often
ineffective, particularly when the target state is a democracy.\24\
Several of China's international security crises, ranging from the 1969
Sino-Soviet Border Conflict to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, failed to
achieve many of the strategic objectives toward which Beijing's use of
force was aimed.\25\ In short, Beijing's ability to get what it wants
in world politics is far from unchecked.
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\24\ Wong, Audrye. ``How Not to Win Allies and Influence
Geopolitics: China's Self-Defeating Economic Statecraft,'' Foreign
Affairs. 100.3 (2021), 44-53.
\25\ Jost, Tyler. ``Authoritarian Advisers: Institutional Origins
of Miscalculation in China's International Security Crises,''
International Security, forthcoming.
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Three points of caution are merited with regard to these data.
First, the aggregate relationship between a more active public
diplomacy campaign and less favorable public opinion toward China is
confounded by other events, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic. This
implies that China could be able to shape public opinion abroad more
effectively as the pandemic ends. Second, while the decline in public
opinion toward China is well-documented in developed countries, these
polls often do not include countries from the Global South, which may
be a priority for Chinese decision makers. Third, none of the research
discussed above addresses the possibility that China could use fake on-
line profiles to hide the source of China's messaging from foreign
audiences.
policy recommendations
By emphasizing gaps in public knowledge, I am not suggesting that
we can dismiss the potential threats that China poses to the U.S.
homeland. The fact that China has demonstrated its intent to engage in
both intelligence collection and efforts to shape foreign public
opinion, coupled with the competitive nature of the bilateral
relationship, is sufficient cause for serious attention. Rather, my
hope is that emphasizing what we do and do not yet know can illuminate
recommendations for policy.
1. Fund Social Science Research on the Topic.--The U.S. Government
should devote resources toward publicly-accessible research
that fills gaps in our knowledge regarding China's activities
abroad. The social sciences are in the early stages of
understanding whether and how new types of social media,
sometimes employed by foreign actors, can shape public opinion.
It is worth emphasizing again that existing research is
insufficient to determine how costly these new technologies
will be to the U.S. homeland. Yet, U.S. policy makers should be
open to the possibility that better research on the topic
would, for example, lead to the conclusion that China's
capacity to shape American public opinion is low--and the
broader conclusion that U.S. efforts might be better directed
toward other parts of the competitive relationship.
2. Protect U.S. Researchers in China.--The U.S. Government should
work to ensure that American scholars who choose to conduct
field research in China are protected.\26\ Our ability to
answer many of the most pressing questions regarding the future
of the competition between the United States and China is
increasingly limited by restrictions on American scholars by
the Chinese government. The U.S. Government should use
diplomatic channels to reestablish opportunities for American
researchers to study the Chinese political system while feeling
protected from potential exploitation and detainment by Chinese
authorities.
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\26\ For an overview, see Greitens, Sheena Chestnut, and Rory
Truex. ``Repressive Experiences Among China Scholars: New Evidence from
Survey Data.'' The China Quarterly 242 (2020): 349-375.
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3. Build Evidence-Based Public Awareness.--The U.S. Government
needs to explain the threats that China poses the privacy of
their data to the American public. Specifically, it needs to
provide more detailed explanations of the different risks that
American citizens assume when they use foreign and domestic
technologies. This may seem obvious to individuals who have
served in government, but the social appeal of these
technologies will raise the burden of proof for U.S. policy
makers to convince American citizens.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Dr. Jost.
Members will now be recognized in order of seniority,
alternating between Republican and Democrat for 5 minutes of
questioning. It is my hope today that we will be able to go
through maybe two rounds of questioning.
The Chair now recognizes myself for 5 minutes of
questioning.
I think what we heard there is just an incredible breadth
of knowledge and experience about what the Chinese Communist
Party has been doing, you know, for several decades; what they
are currently doing; and the threats that, as that wake-up call
moment happened several weeks ago with the Chinese surveillance
balloon, that it is incumbent upon us to really start
uncovering these threats and focusing on them. Quite honestly,
from what we have heard from this panel--thank you for all of
your opening statements--we could have several hearings on the
individual subjects. But appreciate the time here.
I will start with Mr. Evanina.
When you look at the ownership of property in the United
States and we go back, PRC-based ownership of U.S. farmland in
the last 20 years has jumped from about $81 million in 2010 to
$1.9 billion at the end of 2021. Moreover, I think it is widely
reported that a lot of the PRC or PRC-linked ownership is
adjacent to very sensitive facilities, government facilities,
military facilities in the United States. Can you provide
insight as to why that is, what the goal is, and what they are
doing with those lands?
Mr. Evanina. Thanks for the question, Mr. Chairman.
I'm going to try really hard to stay in the unclassified
realm here, but it's a comprehensive strategic plan that goes
back about a decade to the CCP's plans and intentions and
incorporates multifaceted intelligence apparatus, both the MSS
and the PLA. It starts what I would call and phrase outside the
fence line of DoD facilities. That began with the Huawei cell
tower capabilities, tracking and being able to monitor not only
trip movements, but weapon silos and other areas, the strategic
purchases of businesses outside of not only military bases but
military residential areas, the influence of the Chinese to be
able to do software and malware manipulation, penetration on
electrical grids and power stations outside of the military
bases.
I think the next aspect is exactly what you referenced,
right? What is the next thing that the Communist Party of China
and Russia, for that matter, are looking to exploit outside the
fence line of U.S. military bases? That includes land
purchases. I think when you look at all the land that not only
the Chinese Communist Party and their proxies have purchased,
you are going to find a strategic military base and/or
subterrestrial things in the ground as well as energy issues to
the military base. Also we look at the balloon we just saw,
very similar trajectory to those areas. So it's a comprehensive
strategic plan that you see from the Communist Party of China.
Chairman Pfluger. Do you think there was coordination
between--staying in the unclassified--I mean the lands that the
balloon flew over, purchases that we have seen, I mean could
there be coordination either now or in the future?
Mr. Evanina. Absolutely. There's nothing done by the
Communist Party of China that does not have strategic entity or
coordination. I think we'll see in the future, if it's
declassified, what some of the things the balloon was
surveilling and or potentially doing more surveillance too.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
General Guastella, thanks for the testimony. You know, the
threats that you mentioned that you are very worried about and
concerned about, I mean what keeps you up at night on the air
power threats and what needs to happen resource-wise,
specifically here or at NORTHCOM in order to identify, deter,
detect, and defeat?
General Guastella. Thank you, Chairman.
What keeps me up at night is the age and the capabilities
of our existing air and space forces.
You know, for 20 years we have been engaged in the very
land-centric campaigns in the Middle East. We have been doing
counterinsurgency, counter-violent extremists,
counterterrorism, all important for our Nation. But during that
20 years, we did not invest in air and space forces to the
extent we needed to. So we are left with that old fleet that I
described before. You know, a 30-year-old fighter can do fine
providing close air support in Iraq or Afghanistan against a
low-end threat, but it is not going to survive very well
against--and it is not going to survive in China fight and
moreso it doesn't deter China. So we have to realize the
investment that is needed in the air and space domain has been
neglected and we have to get after it for the exact reasons
that's been described by our expert panelists on China.
That's what keeps me up at night.
Chairman Pfluger. When you look at the threats that are
being posed, hypersonics, the ranges that are increasing, the
ability to reach out and touch us, how important is NORAD, the
joint air power enterprise to the defense of our homeland?
General Guastella. You know, NORAD, the National Defense
Strategy, two of them now in a row, have said that homeland
defense is the No. 1 priority. Problem is we haven't resourced
it to that extent that our words say. The commanders of the
NORAD have asked for modernization of radars for years now and
have not gotten it. That would have helped us detect those
balloons sooner. Then the aging fighters. You know, almost
every major metropolitan city in America is defended by our
National Guard fighters that are getting older and older. They
don't have the capabilities, the radars that they need not only
for the balloons, but the radars they need for the real threat,
which would be a cruise missile attack against our homeland.
So that is what concerns me.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
My time has expired. I yield back.
I now recognize the Ranking Member.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
It is clear that the Chinese Communist Party is taking a
whole-of-government approach to advancing its ambitions at the
expense of U.S. and democratic interests, and therefore we must
take a whole-of-government approach to meeting that threat. So
that covers homeland security, defense, commerce, State
Department, et cetera.
So I want to focus on the homeland realm. Dr. Jost, can you
expand on the methods that the CCP is using to influence public
opinion both here at home in the United States and globally,
and what more we could be doing to measure their efforts and to
mitigate their success?
Mr. Jost. Sure. Thank you very much for the question.
The bulk to date of China's influence operations, both in
the United States and abroad, are focused on what you might say
are winning friends and influencing people. Right. This is
coming directly from Xi Jinping, who has directed the Party's
apparatus that has deep roots in propaganda to leverage those
capabilities in order to tell China's story well to the world.
It is interesting to think about the ways in which China's
institutions domestically are sort-of naturally positioned to
make that transition from a domestic-based propaganda machine
to an international one. If one thinks from the perspective of
the Chinese Communist Party, from their perspective domestic
propaganda has worked thus far in keeping the CCP in power.
Those capabilities and organizations exist, and it is easy to
see how they would assume that those same types of propaganda
would work in foreign audiences.
To date, however, as I emphasized in my written testimony,
we don't necessarily have the best evidence to judge whether or
not these propaganda efforts outside of Chinese borders have
been effective. As I mentioned in the opening statement, we do
know that global public opinion toward China, particularly in
the United States and the countries with whom we share closest
interests, has declined substantially in the past few years,
which would actually suggest that from a certain perspective,
the propaganda doesn't necessarily work as well as the CCP
would hope.
That being said, there is a multitude of things that are
confounding that relationship of course. Like the fact that
there has been a global pandemic, the fact that it could be
working in certain areas and not others. Certain framings that
the Chinese Communist Party and its diplomats use are more
effective than others. That is one of the reasons why I think
there needs to be more research on this matter and something
the U.S. Government can certainly help with.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
Mr. Evanina, in your written testimony on the threat of
corporate espionage and the theft of intellectual property, you
recommended the creation of an economic threat intelligence
agency to assist U.S. companies in protecting themselves
against corporate espionage. Can you expand on how that should
be structured to be most effective if we were to do it?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Ranking Member.
I recommended an entity similar to the FS-ISAC that is
specifically geared toward the economic awareness and
understanding of IP and trade secret theft and emerging of not
only the thought process but the ideation, but also the law
that governs our patent processes and our IP theft around the
world and to mirror what the Communist Party are doing around
the world and then educate our American businesses, the general
counsels, the people that do law for them, outside counsel, to
understand what it looks like when you are about to be stolen
and robbed of IP theft and to be able to provide that real-time
actual intelligence from the intelligence community, DHS, and
Commerce and Treasury to businesses who are not only at risk,
but in the process. Because once it happens, it's too late, the
data's already gone. The Government needs to be more forward-
leaning and left of boom.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
I found that very interesting. So perhaps as a follow-up,
after this hearing, you can send us some recommendations in
more detail about where it should be housed, how it should be
staffed, which agencies should be involved? Because I think
that is a very interesting recommendation.
Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir.
Mr. Magaziner. I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr.
D'Esposito.
Mr. D'Esposito Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all.
So dozens of demonstrators protested outside of a building
in New York City's Chinatown last month. The building, which is
owned by the Chang Le Association, operates what they call a
service station, and that they are accused of operating a CCP
police station that allegedly conducts surveillance and
intimidates CCP descendants and activists. Like the recent
incident with the Chinese surveillance balloon, this station
could be the latest CCP action that violates U.S. sovereignty
and poses a threat to national security. It has been reported
that there is over 100 of these offices around the world.
Mr. Evanina, please describe your concerns surrounding this
potential CCP police station in terms of counterintelligence
threats and the safety of Americans.
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Congressman.
I think when you look at that specific issue in New York
City and the subsequent search by Department of Justice and
FBI, which is a high threshold to obtain, it's a manifestation
of the strategic plan of the Communist Party of China to not
only influence, manipulate their own diaspora here in the
United States, but provide an intimidation factor. I would say
that this issue in New York and the search of that domestic
police station is in part and partnership with their Operation
Fox Hunt that my colleague Ms. Bingen talked about, which is an
international program, but very, very aggressive in the United
States, to surveil and try to rendition Chinese diaspora here
who are anti-Xi regime. They have been very successful at it.
The fact that this happens on our American soil to me, is
unacceptable.
Mr. D'Esposito I agree.
So it is been reported that there is over 100 throughout
the world. Do we know how many are actually on U.S. soil?
Mr. Evanina. I do not, but I'm pretty confident our law
enforcement, both at the State, local, and Federal level, are
pretty aware of that.
Mr. D'Esposito Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
I now recognize my good friend, the gentleman from
California, Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Mr. Chairman from Texas, thank you very much.
I have been sitting in this committee for a number of
years. Cyber, big issue continues to be a big issue. A number
of testimonies ago, we heard that Russians have essentially
penetrated most of our infrastructure, just like we penetrated
most of their infrastructure. So we have a stand-off, so to
speak. Action by either side is too expensive, so to speak, in
terms of the damage. Now we have a situation internationally, a
geopolitical realignment, where Russia and China are beginning
to work much more collaboratively.
My question, common thought, first of all, Mr. Evanina, how
do you see this, given that China's foreign minister recently
said, essentially warned us of conflict and confrontation in
the United States? How do you see this evolution in terms of
multiplier effect of a threat on the United States, Russia and
China working together? How real is that? What is the potential
for the future of continued collaboration to really challenge
the United States in ways we have not envisioned in the past?
Thank you.
Mr. Evanina. Mr. Congressman, I concur with your statement,
and I think it is a very concerning issue when two nation-
states who don't like each other are emerging against one
common enemy, the United States.
Geopolitically, diplomatically----
Mr. Correa. You are saying that enemy of an enemy is my
friend? Is that the situation?
Mr. Evanina. I wasn't going to say that, but it--better you
said it. Yes, correct. I think when you look at I will stick in
my lane here from--you mentioned the Russians' penetration to
our systems, both IT and OT, SCADA, ICS systems here in the
United States, probably predates the Communist Party of China,
but I'm pretty confident the Communist Party of China has
either duplicated those penetrations or ridden along those. I
think the sharing of the intelligence services between Vladimir
Putin and Russia and the Communist Party is probably the most
problematic for me as what they see, because that's the most
invisible part of that threat.
Mr. Correa. I think that right now we still have an edge
when it comes to cyber. Two or 3 years, maybe.
So I often think of defense, a good offense is the best
defense you can have. So, if I may, what would you recommend
moving forward would it be the best way to counter these
unprecedented challenges that a country has?
Mr. Evanina. Congressman, I think you make a good point,
and it's probably important that we reiterate the fact that as
much as what you're hearing here is depressing, demoralizing,
and it is a legitimate threat to our Nation, we must pause and
remember that we have the most amazing military and
intelligence and law enforcement capabilities the world has
ever seen. The women and men of DoD and the intelligence
community are phenomenal. Our capabilities are second-to-none
in cyber, military apparatus, and intelligence. So Americans
should go to sleep at night, be thankful of the fact that
offensively, we've never seen anything better than we can do.
Unfortunately, it's not public.
Mr. Correa. Today. Today.
Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir.
Mr. Correa. Please continue. Didn't mean interrupt you.
Anybody else have comments, thoughts on my questions?
Ma'am?
Ms. Bingen. Congressman, if I might build off of that on
cyber. When I look at the homeland, so much of our commerce and
activity rights on commercial infrastructure, and building off
of Mr. Evanina's point earlier, it's very important that the
government figure out how to share threat intelligence
information with the private sector with those oil, gas
pipeline, energy, financial services sectors----
Mr. Correa. In real time.
Ms. Bingen. In real time. That's the key. If you're a
business, you hear this top-level talk. But what is
particularly valuable is figuring out a way to provide security
read-ins to some of these business leaders, bring them into the
tent, but also share specific tactic, techniques, procedures
with them. It's one thing to hear about this general Chinese
threat, it's another thing to hear, here are the tactics that
they're using to go after you. Then you realize, holy crap,
that's what is been happening in my network. Now, let me work
with you to take some preventative measures.
Mr. Correa. Thirty seconds--anybody else?
The Chair, I yield. Thank you very much.
Oh, please.
Mr. Evanina. Just amplifying, Ms. Bingen, I would I would
point to your question, sir, to the incredible success our
Intelligence and Defense Department has had with Ukraine and
preventing Russian cyber capabilities, not only in Ukraine and
Europe and here in the United States as a category for us being
ahead of others in the cyber space.
Mr. Correa. Thank you for ending on a good, positive note.
Mr. Chair. I yield.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, former
Navy Seal, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. Thank
you guys for attending today. We appreciate it.
You know, it is not often up here that, you know, me and my
colleagues on the other side of the aisle can agree upon
something. So it is great to be in agreement on the threat that
China is.
Obviously, the American people are watching and they are
very concerned when they see spy balloons flying over the
United States, farmland being bought up near--you know, farms,
fentanyl all coming across our Southern Border--we know, you
know, where the origin of a lot of that comes from--theft of
intellectual property, covering up the origins of COVID,
Chinese police stations in some of our cities.
My first question is for you, Mr. Evanina. Did I pronounce
that correctly? Sir, do you know what elite capture is?
Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crane. Can you for the panel, and for maybe some of
those watching, can you describe what elite capture is, please?
Mr. Evanina. Congressman, I can.
I would probably refer to some of the more better-informed
experts here on that panel for that particular definition.
Mr. Crane. OK. Is there anybody want to take a stab at it?
Sir? Am I correct that you are an expert in
counterintelligence, right?
Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir.
Mr. Crane. So can you just give me a really broad--doesn't
have to be super specific. What is elite capture?
Mr. Evanina. Yes, I think when you look at the capabilities
and intent of our adversaries and our ability to be proactive
and make an affirmative effort to capture telecommunications to
humans, to technology in or at the battlefield or in the gray
space, provides us the best venue or avenue for potential to
win.
Mr. Crane. OK. can you give me some examples of how that is
often done, how that is carried out?
Mr. Evanina. Sure. Well, first of all, I would say a lot of
it's done with authorities that are granted to both NSA and the
FBI overseas. Section 702, our abilities to capture
telecommunications conversations to foreign adversaries, both
the foreign-born, but are also overseas. That gives us leads
and intentions on nefarious activities, both terrorism and
counterintelligence espionage of those actors overseas that
are, as Ms. Bingen said, riding on commercial capabilities that
are around the world. That capability allows the United States
to be able to pre-identify and do threaten warning to actors
here in the United States, both from a systems data and people
perspective.
Mr. Crane. Would you say that it is accurate that foreign
states and actors often try and compromise and corrupt leaders
and officials within our own government? Would you say that
that is a form of elite capture?
Mr. Evanina. I would. It's done quite regularly for
decades.
Mr. Crane. Would you say that it is often true that family
members are often used in these types of efforts to corrupt
foreign leaders, officials?
Mr. Evanina. Congressman, for the past decade, I have spent
my time in three different organizations advising and informing
Americans, Members of Congress about the threat to them as a
person. It always starts with family members' utilization of
mobile telephones.
Mr. Crane. Thank you.
Sir, are you also aware of some of the reported business
dealings of Hunter Biden with individuals linked to the Chinese
Communist Party?
Mr. Evanina. Only what I have seen in public reporting,
sir.
Mr. Crane. What did you think of the reporting that you
read, sir?
Mr. Evanina. I'm not sure I could actually opine of what I
have read in public reporting, but I could say that the TTPs,
of which foreign entities are utilized against Americans and
family members, is tried and true and very predictable and
reportable.
Mr. Crane. Let me ask you a follow-on to that, sir. Did you
find the reports--whether you believe them or not--did you find
those reports concerning? Just with all of your knowledge in
this space and how you have seen this type of thing play out in
the past?
Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir. I think when you look at what's been
reported publicly about the potential tactics and techniques
that were displayed publicly about the potential for
penetration to a family member of the United States President
is something that most intelligent services try to do
regularly.
Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
We will now proceed to second round of questions, and if we
have other Members that had previous commitments that show up,
then we will yield that initial question to them.
The Chair now recognizes myself for an additional round of
5 minutes of questions.
Ms. Bingen, thank you for your expertise and your testimony
today. I would like to focus on that critical infrastructure
piece and on what you said that the CCP is targeting critical
infrastructure and that you fully anticipate that should a
crisis--hopefully one does not happen--but should one happen
and unfold, that Beijing would seek to disrupt the operations
of critical infrastructure.
Then I was very intrigued by your discussion on sharing
information with local State partners, law enforcement and
otherwise. From the Colonial incident to now, have we as a
Federal Government, and specifically within the Department of
Homeland Security, can you give us your opinion of how we are
sharing information? If that is effective and if our critical
infrastructure, private partners--because most of that is owned
by private industry,--are they ready for what is next should
that Colonial incident happen again?
Ms. Bingen. Chairman, thank you for that question. I think
the Colonial incident, though not attributable to China, as the
Government has come out and said, highlights the catastrophic
impacts that can occur as a result of a potential attack
against cybercritical infrastructure.
Your point is exactly right. From everything that I have
seen previously, I would anticipate that as a crisis or
conflict builds, that the CCP would seek to target critical
infrastructure early on. There's a first mover advantage here,
I would say, in terms of the kind of tools that they would seek
to use to delay or to deter us or to potentially delay us.
On the point of information hearing, I think the success
that I would point to is the summer of 2021. I thought CISA did
a very good job bringing in oil and gas operators and providing
very specific detail on the CCP cyber intrusion campaign, what
specifically they were targeting, but equally important, how
they were doing it, so the tactics, techniques, and procedures.
But that is one sector. There are several different critical
infrastructure sectors, and I think there's some very good
intelligence information that the community has that they could
provide, whether it be to financial services, the electrical
grids, et cetera.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much.
I will turn to General Guastella. What is the impact of 8
days transit of a balloon, a surveillance balloon, you know,
when we look at the fact that it transited and then, you know,
got to the Atlantic Ocean before it was eventually shot down?
What kind of message is that sending? What is the impact
strategically?
General Guastella. It's a significant wake-up call, like we
discussed before, that an air vehicle could traverse American
airspace for that long and be afforded the opportunity to
collect that much information. You know, a balloon is up there
around 12 miles up, satellites are 350 miles. So it's down in
close or it hangs out for a long time. The potential for
collection is significant. So, ideally, the thing would have
been taken down prior to hitting U.S. airspace. But like I
said, they exploited the scene. I don't think that'll happen
again. We have to talk to Government officials about it. But we
don't know until we fully exploit what was flown over, what
they could have gotten, or what they got. But to me, it is a
very grave violation of our sovereignty.
Chairman Pfluger. Does something like that embolden the CCP
and reduce our deterrence? Then what do we have to do to claw
that back if it does?
General Guastella. Absolutely anytime an authoritarian
regime does something of that nature and we don't do anything
about it, they will say, what can I get away with next? So we
have to close this gap. We also have to demonstrate credible
capability that we can affect them in some way of our choosing.
I think that's important for us not only have the capability,
but the will to do so. That's how you deal with the regime of
that nature.
Chairman Pfluger. Mr. Evanina, let's turn to the precursors
that China produces that are then used in the production of
fentanyl and the connection between the cartels that are, you
know, taking these products that they are making fentanyl and
then eventually getting it into the United States. Can you
kind-of talk to your opinion as a former intelligence expert on
that flow, what the CCP and the cartels are doing to work
together, collude, and produce a very deadly substance?
Mr. Evanina. Mr. Chairman, this is a very important topic,
not only for this conversation, for our Nation. I think the
recent reporting is that over 100,000 people have died in the
last year, 12-15 months from fentanyl overdose. That's multiple
times what happened on 9/11, right? So for our Nation to not
look at fentanyl as a national epidemic that stems from a
nation-state threat actor is probably unacceptable and we have
to be more vigilant in what we do. We can map the production of
the precursors from China to Mexico, to the drug gangs, to the
American soil. It's clear and I know our intelligence and
military apparatus are working hard to disrupt that, but it
takes more than that to disrupt. There has to be a preemptive
effort to put China on notice that this process of killing
Americans must stop, and we have to look at it as a terrorism
event.
Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much.
My time has expired.
The Chair yields back and now recognizes the Ranking
Member, Mr. Magaziner.
Mr. Magaziner. Thank you very much.
Dr. Jost, in your testimony, you wrote that while the
evidence shows that Chinese propaganda efforts in the United
States and in other aligned countries do not show evidence of
much success yet, we do not have as much data in the global
south, in the emerging markets. We know that China is making
big investments in many of these emerging countries for
strategic reasons. I think that is very important for our work
here in Congress because there is always a perennial debate on
the level of foreign aid that we provide to those same nations.
So can you just expand a little bit on why this topic is
important and what the tie is to the homeland security of the
United States?
Mr. Evanina. Thank you, sir.
So when one thinks about how propaganda works, we have to
think about why a target audience would ever believe it. If I
were to come in here and read a bit of Chinese Communist
propaganda--obviously I would not, but if I were, folks in this
room would discount that bit of information pretty
significantly. The reason is that they know it is propaganda.
So the effectiveness of such an information or influence
campaign rests upon the ability of targets to be able to
understand that what political scientists would--the cue giver,
the actor who is giving the information, doesn't have their
best interests at heart. So that's component No. 1.
Component No. 2 is some baseline level of distrust of that
target state.
So what we don't know, I think, is in countries outside of
the United States and countries that the United States shares
very close relationships with, is that baseline level of
mistrust that is present in most of the U.S. public, present in
those other countries, which would then cause the targets in
those countries to discount the cue or discount the bit of
propaganda.
Mr. Magaziner. Yes. Thank you. I think especially when we
look at things like access to rare earth minerals that are
critical to our economy and other factors, those relationships
with the global south are important. China certainly
understands that and we must understand it as well.
Question for Dr. Jost or anyone, you know, Chairman Pfluger
and I both in our opening statements were clear that our
adversary here is not the Chinese people, it is an
authoritarian and anti-democratic regime that is becoming
increasingly aggressive. On the topic of anti-Asian hate
globally, would you agree--and Dr. Jost, but anyone else can
weigh in as well, that it is important that we combat anti-
Asian hate in all of its forms for a range of reasons, but
including the fact that we do not want to give the Chinese
Communist Party ammunition to fuel their propaganda both in
China and here at home?
Mr. Jost. Thank you, Ranking Member.
Yes, absolutely. Anti-Asian racism has absolutely no place
in American society. I think we can all agree on that. I think
we can also all agree that the reasons why that is unacceptable
in the United States are orthogonal to whether or not the
Chinese Communist Party is able to exploit it, just as you
said.
That being said, it is true that Chinese diplomats and the
Chinese state do call attention to these trends. So, for
example, there is an annual report that the Chinese state
issues on human rights in the United States, which often times
calls out these types of events, both broadly in terms of race
and specifically on anti-Asian racial issues.
Mr. Evanina. I would double down and amplify Doctor--
statement here. As I had in my written statement, this is
clearly not about the Chinese citizens, both in China or in the
United States. This is an issue of Xi and the Communist Party
regime and their intelligence services and their strategy.
Clear. But, however, that makes it very difficult, and not only
to the Doctor's point. I think we have to be very, very clear
to say this all the time, this is not about Chinese citizens.
But most importantly, the United Front Work Department will use
that against us at every single point. So it's a double-edged
sword. The more that we don't say it, the more the Communist
regime and the United Front Work Department will use it against
us when we don't say it. Omission is denial that it's real.
Mr. Magaziner. I will just close by saying I think this is
yet another reason why it is important that this committee and
this Congress focus on combating the rise of racially-motivated
extremism here in the homeland as well.
I thank you all very much again for your testimony.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentlemen yields.
I now recognize Mr. D'Esposito.
Mr. D'Esposito Thank you, Chairman.
In your capacity as the director of the National
Counterintelligence and Security Center, you estimated that the
theft of intellectual property by the PRC cost America as much
as $500 billion--with a B--a year. Can you just describe the
impact this theft has on the everyday American, like people
back in my district and on Long Island?
Mr. Evanina. Congressman, I think to make this succinct, as
I mentioned in my oral remarks, the real impact is about $4,000
to $6,000 per American family after taxes. It's a real cost to
an American homeowner family member.
Mr. D'Esposito I am sorry, can you just say that number
again? I apologize.
Mr. Evanina. Between $4,000 and $6,000 per year per
American family of four after taxes is what that $500 billion
of intellectual property theft equals. Those are known cases.
That's not a guesstimate.
Secondarily, I'll proffer the subcommittee, those aren't
the real costs. The real costs for all that IP theft, ideation
theft, manufacturing theft, results in the Communist Party of
China building that same capability overseas, getting it to
patent and global markets before we do, and then selling it
back to the American people, the American public and
corporations. Then multiple CEOs have said to me, Bill, it's
not just the dollar value of our product that's been stolen,
it's the manufacturing plants that aren't built in the United
States and it is the tens of thousands of jobs that are not
created here in the United States because we lost that patent
ideation technology to the Communist Party of China, who went
to global market first.
Mr. D'Esposito What are some ways that the U.S. Government
is working to identify counterintelligence issues that
threatened American IP?
Mr. Evanina. Well, I think there was a robust agenda
probably starting in 2015 and 2016. Here I'd have to commend
the efforts of Senator Burr, Senator Rubio, and Senator Warner
and Sissy to have what I would call the Chinese roadshows. We
went out around the country and briefed thousands of CEOs of
industries about this threat and from different sectors
financial services, energy, private equity, venture capital,
telecommunications, to make sure that they understood what they
were doing has a direct impact on national interests and
national security. I think that Members of Congress, both in
the House and Senate, should have a robust capability to go
back to their home districts and document these threats to the
chambers of commerce, to where you live, and to economic
development corporations and to small businesses so they could
identify nefarious capability early and often to prevent it
before it happens.
Mr. D'Esposito Thank you, sir. Thank you for your service.
Chairman, I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I wanted to focus a little bit on our backyard south of the
border. Had a chance to go to El Salvador a few years ago and
learned that China was looking to acquire, purchase 80 percent
of their coast and really build a deep water port in that area.
Today I am really bothered that world's largest oil reserves in
Venezuela are essentially in a government of Venezuela that it
has very close ties to Russia and to China. This is our
backyard. It is my understanding we still have a good brand
south of the border. Most countries, Colombia included, and
others, still like the brand of America--the American dreams,
so to speak.
Again thinking about best defense being a good offense,
what do we do to make sure that we keep our backyard, our
backyard, secure, and not have these kinds of advances by other
countries?
Mr. Evanina. I'll start, Congressman. I think there's some
great answers on the panel as well.
I think when you look at South America specifically, we
could look--as my colleagues mentioned, subsequent to 9/11, we
concentrated on counterterrorism and we missed the boat of the
influence of both Russia and China on South America. That
influence comes with a price because they provide critical
infrastructure for free, they provide mobile phones to citizens
of South American countries for free. Specifically, the Chinese
invest a lot of money in South America to have them beholden to
their interests as well as Russia did historically. I think we
probably--and this is getting more in the policy lane--have to
be more aggressive and offensive with our brand and our
capabilities and our investment in South America to help us in
the long run.
Mr. Correa. We make the best medicines in the world, best
COVID vaccine, we are essentially breadbasket of the world. How
can you use those assets to really project our presence in the
backyard?
Thoughts, Lieutenant General.
General Guastella. Sir, it's a fantastic question and it's
absolutely a concern.
Chinese investment in countries around the world,
especially when we're absent, allows inroads for them to
develop relationships, not just buy what is immediately there,
but also leads to future investments and other things. It comes
as a detriment to the United States. You know, like I said,
homeland defense doesn't start in the homeland, it starts
overseas, not only with a credible capability that we need to
have, but also with our allies and partners. So if we become
isolationist, if we cede that terrain to the Chinese, we're
going to pay a price militarily.
When Chinese military comes into countries, it allows them
to start to train with the Chinese, develop a relationship with
the Chinese, and it results in an inability for us to leverage
them the way we should. So it is a very significant thing for
us and we need to look at that.
One last point, and that's in arms sales. A lot of times we
don't sell things to countries because we have issues with the
country, which is understandable, but sometimes they're going
to buy it anyway. When that happens, it's the choice between
them buying Chinese or buying American, sometimes we need to
think, hey, maybe it's worth it. Should buy American.
Mr. Correa. General, I am going to challenge you here. Did
you use the word absence? Our absence? Did you say that?
General Guastella. I may have. Absence or less----
Mr. Correa. Are you saying we are not doing our job of
here? Going overseas, visiting people, being diplomats, as
Members of Congress? Do we need to do more of that?
General Guastella. Sir, I think you're doing a great job.
Mr. Correa. No, that is not the answer I am looking for,
sir. You just said something and I want to make sure all of our
Members of Congress understand exactly--that is a great point.
I want you to back it because we do need to show our faces
around the world. We need to do that. General, I want to thank
you for that comment.
General Guastella. You're absolutely right. We do need to
show our faces around the world. Our military does a lot of
international engagement, Mil to Mil. We need that same
engagement at other levels of government. Our state does that.
But getting out and seeing and understanding from those allied
and partner perspectives--you know, the one big advantage the
United States has militarily is that we have a lot of friends
out there that China doesn't enjoy that same thing. We're going
to lose those friends if we don't get out there and engage,
because those friends allow us to base from their countries,
they'll support us, they'll back us up in international forums.
It happens if we engage them.
Mr. Correa. Thank you, sir.
Chairman, I yield.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
I will now recognize my good friend and national security
expert, somebody who has spent 20-plus years in the U.S. Navy,
Mr. Gonzalez from Texas.
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you, Chairman.
I want to associate my comments with my good friend Lou
Correa. Him and I took a trip to Central America. We went to
Guatemala, we went to Honduras and went to El Salvador. One of
the, I guess, surprising things that I wasn't aware of is no
Members of Congress had visited that area in 3 years. So to the
point, yes, there is a military aspect of it, but there is also
a diplomatic. We would like to see the State Department do
more.
But up here in Congress in a bipartisan manner, we need to
be doing more in our own backyard. I know many of us on this
committee are committed to doing just that.
My first question is for you, General. I just got back from
a trip from Taiwan, it is the second trip to Taiwan in the past
14 months. I spent 20 years in the military, as my good friend
August Pfluger pointed out, our Chairman pointed out, I know
what war looks like. We are at war. I mean, this is a war,
maybe a cold war, but this is a war with China, with the
People's Republic of China, every single day are invading
Taiwan via their cyber space. Not only that, but the question I
have for you is in particular, your expertise is in air. I
spent 5 years as an air crewman flying against China. I know
exactly when they come out and they intercept our aircraft.
They are doing that every single day. There is a danger in
that, right? Because everything is fine until there is an
accident, a spark, if you will, that turns a cold war into a
hot war.
Can you speak just to some of the dangers in which playing
this game of chicken brings up in particular to Taiwan?
General Guastella. Absolutely. China has demonstrated
significant aggression in the air by penetrating Taiwanese
airspace, and it is a violation of Taiwan's sovereignty. Also,
when they're in the air, their professionalism is nonexistent.
They will ``dust us off'', if you will. In one case, we had a
collision, mid-air collision from one of their aircraft in a
Navy P-3. That is the nature of how they do business.
So what we can't do is watch them and let them get away
with behavior like that and not do something back and not be
there with Taiwan, not be present, not be out there, and make
them respect us the way they are driving fear into the Taiwan
ease with their aggression.
Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you for that.
My next question for you, Ms. Bingen, is turning over to
cyber space. This is what war looks like. That is the first
aspect of it. In cyber space, there are no boundaries, there
are no borders. We are all in on this together, and you can't
go it alone. You need to have allies. I put together a bill,
the U.S. Taiwan Advanced Research Act, that essentially creates
a closer relationship in the cyber space with our allies. Can
you just speak to that? As far as how can the United States
grow our relationships with others that, let's say, are not
traditional relationships? Yes, we have our five eyes and we
have got those relationships that have had for a long time, but
other places like Taiwan, what are your thoughts on growing
that, in particular in the cyber space?
Ms. Bingen. Well, Congressman, first, if I can go back to
your Taiwan point, and thank you very much for visiting. I had
the chance to go there in January as well. On Taiwan, if I can
say, the arming is incredibly important, giving them a greater
defensive capability. It includes not just the tangible weapon
systems, but the training that goes along with it. I think
there's much more capacity there for increased training
opportunities with our forces.
The other point that you raised on Taiwan is every day they
are in this cognitive disinformation war with China, with the
CCP. So that the more that we can do to help them and highlight
or create transparency around those disinformation campaigns is
important.
On the cyber front, you're absolutely right on the allies.
You know, these are areas, and this ties back into China's Belt
and Road Initiative. They are doing a lot to try to get their
infrastructure and make others more dependent on them. Where
that leads to is other countries--not only their ability to
surveil and steal data, but also they're advancing their techno
authoritarian norms and standards. So I think that there are
things we can do on the international front, threat sharing,
but also building norms much more akin to how we see the world
and how we want the internet to be operated, data to be
protected than the Chinese model.
Mr. Gonzalez. I think it is very clear to point out that
the People's Republic of China are the aggressor. You know, I
spent 5 years in Iraq and Afghanistan, Chairman Pfluger has
also been at war. I think it is safe to say we don't want war.
We want to prevent a war. Part of that is showing that we are
going to stand firm with our allies to prevent those.
Thank you, Chairman.
I yield back.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
The Chair now recognizes the general lady from Nevada, Ms.
Titus.
Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Before I ask my specific question, I would like to say that
I agree too with Mr. Correa, and it also was brought up by our
last speaker that we need to do more. We don't do more by
cutting the small foreign aid budget that we have in place now,
we do more by investing more. You mentioned Belt and Road. You
know, China is investing all across Africa, they are building
ports in Lima, they just bailed out Sri Lanka. You know, that
is what we are up against. If we walk away, that is not going
to be helpful in these difficult areas.
But I want to ask you the question, we just heard this week
about China saying that there is a potential conflict or
confrontation if we don't put on the brakes. Now, I wonder just
what that means for us. Is it an existential threat? Is it
saber-rattling? Is it nuclear war? What does that mean? How
should we be gauging that? What should we be doing in response
besides shoring up Taiwan or trying to make these investments
that seem to be fairly difficult to get people to support?
Anybody?
Mr. Evanina. So I'll start.
Ms. Titus. OK.
Mr. Evanina. I would say the narrative to the recent
statement by the Chinese minister is a false narrative that we
need to put on the brakes. We should start asking them to
minimize their aggression, right. Not only here in the United
States but with our allies and friends around the world. I
think they're really great at putting us in the bucket as being
the aggressors. As we've heard from our distinguished
Congressman and Congresswoman, that's not the case, right. I
think we, as the United States, diplomatically have to do a
better job, a more effective job of making sure the world knows
that they are the aggressors, because I think their narrative--
and they have a great propaganda program, as we heard, and they
will use that to show us as the aggressors.
Ms. Titus. General, how would you compare the threat by
China to the threat internally, our homeland threat by domestic
terrorists compared to China? If we are looking at where our
priorities should be?
General Guastella. Well, ma'am, the threat to the United
States from China is the most grave threat we have faced in our
lifetime, certainly since the cold war. The reason why is we
have an economic superpower that's stealing our technology,
that's leaping ahead on weapons that can strike us right here
in the homeland or deny our objectives overseas in defense of
Taiwan. If we let them continue at this pace, and we don't
answer that, we will find ourselves in a very uncomfortable
position as Americans, which is watching U.S. service members
lose fights.
So, to me, the existential threat posed by China and--the
CCP is absolutely the largest threat to the United States. We
have to realize it. They are approaching us at any seam they
can find, any way in. The balloon was a seam that they
exploited. There's 100 other seams that's been discussed here.
I think it's time that we wake up. It's a Sputnik moment for us
here, and I think we need to realize that as an American
society.
Ms. Titus. Just continuing with this down the panel, how
about the CHIPS Act? We often hear that China is not the enemy,
they are the competitor. Has this helped in any way to deal
with the problem that we are now making chips at home instead
of being so dependent on them economically?
Ms. Bingen. One aspect on the CHIPS Act that I would like
to highlight is really the national security piece to it. When
we look at was that 80-plus percent of the world's chips,
including everything that we use from commercial to our weapon
systems, are manufactured within the First Island Chain. We've
talked also here about the military threat. We and the Taiwan
semiconductor facility, we need to look at building greater
resiliency in our industrial bases and our manufacturing
capacities. So that for me was a big benefit of CHIPS Act.
Ms. Titus. Would you like to add to this conversation?
Mr. Jost. Sure. Thank you, Congresswoman.
To go back to your original question about the pathways by
which we would be most likely to see Chinese aggression, it is
my view that the most likely avenue would be over a Taiwan
scenario. If one thinks about how to deter that, there are two
primary things in place that the United States has in our
strategy. The first is a credible reassurance to Beijing that
the status quo will not change, because if Beijing thinks that
it is backed into a corner and has to choose either losing
Taiwan or launching a very risky and even low-probability-win
war, it's quite possible one can imagine them choosing the
latter. So that credible reassurance portion is important.
The other portion of deterrence, which relates to the CHIPS
Act, is the change in the balance of power. So another way in
which deterrence could fail is if over time shifts toward
Beijing's favor in the probability that they would win a
conflict would prompt them to act, even though the cost of the
risk would be high. That's why it's so important to ensure that
the U.S. defense industrial base, through things like the CHIPS
Act, is closely protected.
Ms. Titus. I can't see a clock. Is my time up?
Well, just real quickly, is there anything specific we need
to do next, like building off of the CHIPS Act other than going
on CODELs to Central America?
Mr. Evanina. Congressman, if I may just amplify the great
comments here.
I think on the CHIPS and Science Act, two things need to
occur. More of that type of legislation that really partners
our U.S. Government legislative body funding with U.S.
corporate sector. No. 2, the CHIPS and Science Act must be
protected now from ideation to development of new technologies.
If we don't protect it, you're going to be hearing hearings in
5 years saying how did all the technology from CHIPS and
Science Act gets stolen and in the hand of the Chinese?
So two things can be true.
Ms. Titus. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
The Chair now recognizes for the final question, Mr. Crane.
Mr. Crane. General, this question is for you.
A second ago you were talking about how you were concerned
about the age of the fleet, is that correct? Then also you were
talking about how China continues to steal our intellectual
property. Is that correct as well? How do we stop that,
General?
General Guastella. Well, the theft of intellectual property
is something that probably goes beyond what I can comment on.
But step No. 1 is realizing that it's happening and ensuring
not only the prime contractors, but the subcontractors that
develop our defense systems have the appropriate resiliency in
hardening. The best way for us to counter China is to invest.
You know, the investments the Department of Defense has made
for the last 20 years to fight the wars we've been in are not
necessarily the investments that are going to make us
successful against dealing with a peer competitor like China.
So it's important that we transform our investment to the areas
that most concerns them, which is our ability to hold targets
at risk in their homeland and our ability to deny them their
objectives visa vis Taiwan. So we can deter them through
punishment and we can also deter them through denial. That
happens by investment in the Department, in the domains that
are most critical facing a peer competitor, aerospace.
Mr. Crane. Thank you, General.
My next question is for Mr. Evanina.
A moment ago, you were raving about the capabilities and
dominance of the U.S. Intelligence Agency. I think that
probably everybody up here would agree how impressive our
intelligence agencies are and have been over the years. My
question for you, sir, is are you aware of the lack of trust in
our intelligence agencies by U.S. citizens?
Mr. Evanina. Congressman, yes, I am, and it's a concerning
issue.
Mr. Crane. Yes. You are aware that there is a select
committee on the weaponization of the Federal Government up
here right now?
Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir, I'm aware of that.
Mr. Crane. You know, I represent some amazing people in
Arizona, rural Arizona. They love this country. One of the most
patriotic districts in Arizona. I myself am a Navy Seal. I
joined the Navy after 9/11 and I served for 13 years. I love
this country. I want our intelligence agencies to be strong. I
think they need to be strong for good reason. But I am going to
tell you right now, sir, when when we when we read years after
the fact that, you know, 50 former national intelligence folks,
several heads of the CIA claim that the Hunter Biden laptop is
Russian disinformation, only to find out years later what we
all knew, that it wasn't, that is alarming to a lot of
Americans, and it makes us lose trust in our intelligence
agencies.
For me, when I look at a guy like you that has done
everything that you have done, as intelligent as you are, I
know that has got to piss you off. If there are 50 former Navy
Seals out there lying to the American people and I found out
about it, that would piss me off because it undermines the
community that I hold so dear. I am sure you probably have a
very similar endearment to your community. Am I correct in
assuming that?
Mr. Evanina. You're correct, sir.
Mr. Crane. What do you think we do about that, sir? How do
you think we regain the trust with the American people and our
intelligence agency?
Mr. Evanina. Congressman, I think you bring up a very valid
point that not only reaches the current events of today with
our intelligence and law enforcement community, but also
impacts the recruiting of future generations of women and men
who want to serve in the U.S. Government intelligence and
military apparatus. I think that is the core element.
I think two things have to happen. No. 1, there has to be
complete transparency of things that happened in the past. But
more importantly, with the great things that women and men are
doing, we have to be more proactive in getting out to your
district and other districts at the local level.
Secondarily, there has to be some transparency of what's
real and what's not real with the narrative reporting that we
have seen in the media. I think that's the obligation of law
enforcement intelligence agencies to be forthwith of
declassification and transparency of what's going on.
Mr. Crane. Real quick, Mr. Evanina, if it seemed like I was
coming after you today, I apologize for that. It is nothing
personal at all. I love this country, and I am tired of losing
faith and trust in the institutions and the organizations that
as a little kid I had aspired to and I upheld. I know I am
speaking for a lot of Americans when I say that, brother. OK.
Last question I have real quick is for Ms. Bingen.
You said that war with China was not certain. Can you
expound on that a little bit? Please tell us all how, in your
opinion, we can avoid war with China.
Thank you.
Ms. Bingen. Absolutely, Congressman.
I want to say that the cause isn't lost, and there are
things that we as a Nation can proactively do. So, for example,
continuing to invest in a strong defense, ensuring our forces
are ready, is a signal and a deterrent. Making sure that we
invest in resilience, resilient networks so that if the CCP
decides to launch an attack, it will have a less effect on our
networks and our infrastructure. Superior technology. A former
secretary of defense I worked for would always say, we never
want to send our sons and daughters into a fair fight. With the
technology theft happening, we are very much at risk of sending
our sons and daughters into a fair fight. So superior
technology and agility in terms of how we use that technology.
Then ensuring that we have a network of allies and partners.
This is a weakness that the CCP has that we have. Sir, with all
of your service, you know that we fight in coalitions, and it
is important to make sure that our allies are with us and
partners are with us and not with China.
Mr. Crane. Thank you.
I yield back.
Mr. Goldman. All right. So we have some logistical changes
here. The Chairman had to step out. So I am going to ask
unanimous consent for Ms. Jackson Lee to be recognized for 5
minutes.
Mr. Magaziner. We are in trouble now.
Mr. Goldman. We are both freshmen, so bear with us.
Mr. Magaziner. Yes, all right.
Mr. Goldman. Unanimous consent for Ms. Jackson Lee to be
recognized.
Mr. Magaziner. I recognize Ms. Jackson Lee.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, to both of the Chairman and the
Ranking Member, I am very pleased to be able to join you. From
my perspective, you are two distinguished Members of Congress.
Thank you for your service, thank you for your military
service.
Before I start, I think because we are in Homeland Security
allow me just to put on the record that to be able to compete
with China, I think it is extremely important that we assert
our democratic values, our values, the strength of our values,
our competitiveness. Maybe we will have an opportunity to get
the answer to why I believe it is public now, all of the
personal data of so many Washingtonians, Members of Congress,
House and Senate have been breached. I don't believe that we
have had any determination of who breached it, but we certainly
want to be on top of those elements, be they commercial or be
they a foreign country, from exposing private data of members
of the House and Senate who have the responsibility of
governing this Nation. I wanted to put that on the committee's
record because I am incensed about it and hope that we will
have some involvement ultimately in assessing that situation.
But this is a very important hearing, and I want to begin
by raising this question. I will have a second question, and I
think, gentlemen, I will be finished. But I want to raise the
question, Dr. Jost, you have described the evolution of the
Chinese Communist Party's thinking when it comes to China's
role around the world. We know that in recent years, the CCP
has set its aims at developing China-centered and -controlled
global infrastructure, transportation, trade, and production
networks. They tolerate no diversity when they go into
countries. It is China, China, China. They don't even use the
indigenous people. China is competing with the United States in
a global competition over government values. We have to win the
world over by saying that our values of trade and otherwise are
much better than theirs.
So how successful are China's efforts? What actions can the
Federal Government take to out compete the Chinese Communist
Party? Frankly, I think we are a nicer, but I also think that
if you interact with us, you will have the benefits of
investment in your own country, and you will have the benefits
of long-term recovery.
Many of you know that we passed the CHIPS and Science Act--
close to my heart as a former member of the Science Committee--
which invests $280,000,000,000 to increase domestic
semiconductor production. I am excited about that. Some of that
may even come to Texas.
Unfortunately not these gentlemen here, I don't think--that
90 percent of our friends on the other side of the aisle did
not vote for it, but I know that they are probably working with
it in their districts.
So, Dr. Jost, would you share that with me? I would love to
have Ms. Bingen to answer that question as well.
Dr. Jost, would you please?
Mr. Jost. Thank you, Congresswoman. These are really
excellent questions and I thank you for them.
So you raised the issue of difference in government values,
and I agree, although I should note that we do have some common
interests, if not common values. China and the United States
both want to see their populations live prosperous lives, for
example, and both sides want to see the world address some of
the challenges of global climate change.
That being said, it is very true that the two countries
have stark differences in the way they see the relationship
between state and society. The protections that we have in the
United States by which citizens enjoy civil liberties and can
organize against the state in order to keep its power in check
are simply not present there. It is true that China,
indiscriminately, or without considering the types of behaviors
that the target regime or the target state is conducting, will
invest in it. You mentioned the Belt and Road initiative. This
is certainly one of the keystone portions of China's efforts.
I do agree that the nature of the regime in that target
country is quite important. We do have some research that
suggests that economic statecraft that China uses, for example,
is less effective when the target country is democratic.
There's an intuitive logic there, of course, because if
individuals, just like in the United States, can mobilize
against their government, if they are in collusion with the
Chinese Communist Party for illicit gain, they can hold them
accountable. So I think that is a mechanism by which we can
indirectly shape China's ability to use the Belt and Road in
the way that you are describing.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Bingen.
Ms. Bingen. Congressman, if I can add, you mentioned it
exactly right. China has a playbook that they are using with
the Belt and Road. We've seen it. The ports and 5G are
examples. The ports where they go into countries. Djibouti is a
great example where they go in, they operate the commercial
port, they kick out the locals, they build up military
infrastructure, and then it's a greater threat to the region
and to our national security interest. So we see that happening
across the globe.
We as a government--we say formally--but the government
needs to figure out how do they bring all their different tools
of national power to the table to provide alternatives. Some of
the areas we have been talking about today are on the
technology front. I have a space background. I would offer as
an example, our commercial space innovation sector right now is
phenomenal. We are using our space technologies, our data, in
ways well beyond national security, understanding the climate
mapping, countering illegal fishing. This is soft power for
Americans and for our companies. So ways that we can leverage
some of these newer technologies while clearly protecting and
ensuring that they don't fall into the hands of the CCP, but
working with our allies and partners across the globe who want
to work with us in these areas, figuring out ways to get that
kind of information to them. Opening up markets for our
businesses so they are not just relying on U.S. Government is
also important.
Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you all so very much. I think
it has been established that the Belt and Road technology, or
approach, is a danger to the framework of democracy of this
Nation. We need to use that power of our values and, of course,
of our technology. I like commercial space just because I am a
NASA aficionado and space exploration is crucial. Dr. Jost,
thank you for that framework that we can utilize.
This is an important hearing, and I thank you, gentlemen
for yielding, and I yield back to the Chairman.
Mr. Goldman. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
I want us to thank the witnesses for their valuable
testimony and Members for their questions today. I also want to
thank the Members of the subcommittee. We may have some
additional questions for the witnesses and we would ask the
witnesses to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee
rule VII(D), the hearing record will be open for 10 days.
Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 10:44 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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Question for William R. Evanina From Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
Question. Can you expand on your recommendation for the creation of
an Economic Threat Intelligence entity, to combat corporate espionage
and the theft of IP? What need would such an entity address and how
should it be structured (e.g., what agencies should be involved and how
it should be staffed) to be most effective?
Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
Question for Tyler Jost From Hon. Daniel S. Goldman
Question. Dr. Jost, in your written testimony, you mention that the
Chinese government ``is interested in using its capabilities to . . .
promote narratives that are consistent with its interests'' and that
``propaganda is deeply embedded in the Chinese Communist Party's
institutions.'' How does anti-Asian hate crime in the United States and
some of our political leaders regularly trafficking in xenophobic and
racist rhetoric strengthen the CCP's propaganda efforts around the
world?
Answer. China's global messaging campaigns routinely draw attention
to racism, including anti-Asian racism, in the United States. One
illustration of this is found in reports published by China's State
Council Information Office on ``human rights violations'' in the United
States. The version of this document released in February 2022, for
example, cited anti-Asian hate crimes in the United States as evidence
of ``deeply entrenched racism in the United States'' that was
``spreading along with the novel coronavirus.''
The goal of such messages is presumably to deflect criticism of
China's own human rights record by shaping global public opinion toward
the United States, particularly toward the sincerity of American
commitment to human rights.
While we know that such criticisms are commonly featured in China's
global messaging campaigns, there is comparatively little scholarly
research that directly evaluates their effectiveness in terms of
shaping global public opinion. To my knowledge, there have been no
peer-reviewed studies to date that have systematically evaluated
whether China's efforts to call attention to xenophobia and racism in
the Unites States achieves the Chinese Communist Party's goal of
shaping global attitudes. Congress might consider funding future
academic research that is able to more definitely measure the effects
of China's overseas propaganda.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of further
assistance.