[House Hearing, 118 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]







 
            CONFRONTING THREATS FROM THE CCP TO THE HOMELAND

=======================================================================

                                HEARING

                               before the

                            SUBCOMMITTEE ON
                           COUNTERTERRORISM,
                          LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND
                              INTELLIGENCE

                                 of the

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY
                        HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                    ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEENTH CONGRESS

                             FIRST SESSION

                               __________

                             MARCH 9, 2023

                               __________

                            Serial No. 118-2

                               __________

       Printed for the use of the Committee on Homeland Security
                                     


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        Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.govinfo.gov
        
        
                            ______

             U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE 
 51-888 PDF          WASHINGTON : 2023
 
 
                               __________

                     COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY

                 Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee, Chairman
Michael T. McCaul, Texas             Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi, 
Clay Higgins, Louisiana                  Ranking Member
Michael Guest, Mississippi           Sheila Jackson Lee, Texas
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Donald M. Payne, Jr., New Jersey
Carlos A. Gimenez, Florida           Eric Swalwell, California
August Pfluger, Texas                J. Luis Correa, California
Andrew R. Garbarino, New York        Troy A. Carter, Louisiana
Marjorie Taylor Greene, Georgia      Shri Thanedar, Michigan
Tony Gonzales, Texas                 Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island
Nick LaLota, New York                Glenn Ivey, Maryland
Mike Ezell, Mississippi              Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         Robert Garcia, California
Laurel M. Lee, Florida               Delia C. Ramirez, Illinois
Morgan Luttrell, Texas               Robert Menendez, New Jersey
Dale W. Strong, Alabama              Yvette D. Clarke, New York
Josh Brecheen, Oklahoma              Dina Titus, Nevada
Elijah Crane, Arizona
                      Stephen Siao, Staff Director
                  Hope Goins, Minority Staff Director
                       Natalie Nixon, Chief Clerk
                     Sean Jones, Legislative Clerk
                                 ------                                

  SUBCOMMITTEE ON COUNTERTERRORISM, LAW ENFORCEMENT, AND INTELLIGENCE

                    August Pfluger, Texas, Chairman
Dan Bishop, North Carolina           Seth Magaziner, Rhode Island, 
Tony Gonzales, Texas                     Ranking Member
Anthony D'Esposito, New York         J. Luis Correa, California
Elijah Crane, Arizona                Daniel S. Goldman, New York
Mark E. Green, MD, Tennessee (ex     Dina Titus, Nevada
    officio)                         Bennie G. Thompson, Mississippi 
                                         (ex officio)
               Michael Koren, Subcommittee Staff Director
          Brittany Carr, Minority Subcommittee Staff Director
                    Alice Hayes, Subcommittee Clerk
                            C O N T E N T S

                              ----------                              
                                                                   Page

                               Statements

The Honorable August Pfluger, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Texas, and Chairman, Subcommittee on 
  Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
  Oral Statement.................................................     1
  Prepared Statement.............................................     3
The Honorable Seth Magaziner, a Representative in Congress From 
  the State of Rhode Island, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on 
  Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and Intelligence:
  Oral Statement.................................................     4
  Prepared Statement.............................................     5
The Honorable Daniel S. Goldman, a Representative in Congress 
  From the State of New York:
  Prepared Statement.............................................     6

                               Witnesses

Mr. William R. Evanina, Founder and CEO, The Evanina Group:
  Oral Statement.................................................     8
  Prepared Statement.............................................    10
Lieutenant General Joseph T. Guastella, Jr. (Ret.), Senior 
  Fellow, The Mitchell Institute:
  Oral Statement.................................................    17
  Prepared Statement.............................................    19
Ms. Kari A. Bingen, Director, Aerospace Security Project and 
  Senior Fellow, International Security Program, Center for 
  Strategic and International Studies:
  Oral Statement.................................................    21
  Prepared Statement.............................................    23
Mr. Tyler Jost, Ph.D., Assistant Professor of Political Science 
  and International and Public Affairs, Brown University:
  Oral Statement.................................................    28
  Prepared Statement.............................................    29

                                Appendix

Question for William R. Evanina From Ranking Member Seth 
  Magaziner......................................................    55
Question for Tyler Jost From Hon. Daniel S. Goldman..............    55


            CONFRONTING THREATS FROM THE CCP TO THE HOMELAND

                              ----------                              


                        Thursday, March 9, 2023

             U.S. House of Representatives,
                    Committee on Homeland Security,
                         Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, 
                         Law Enforcement, and Intelligence,
                                                    Washington, DC.
    The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:01 a.m., in 
Room 310, Cannon House Office Building, Hon. August Pfluger 
[Chairman of the subcommittee] presiding.
    Present: Representatives Pfluger, Gonzales, D'Esposito, 
Crane, Magaziner, Correa, Goldman, Titus, and Jackson Lee.
    Chairman Pfluger. The Committee on Homeland Security, 
Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and 
Intelligence will come to order.
    Good morning. The purpose of this hearing is to receive 
testimony from expert witnesses in the security realm that will 
educate our efforts to mitigate threats posed by the Chinese 
Communist Party to the U.S. homeland.
    I now recognize myself for an opening statement.
    Good morning. I would like to thank all of our witnesses 
for testifying today, bringing your expertise to this 
committee, and informing Members of Congress about the threats 
that we are currently facing. Despite years of attempts by the 
United States to develop a productive, fair, and honest 
relationship with the People's Republic of China, America has 
been met with dishonesty and aggression. The PRC government, 
run by the Chinese Communist Party, has deceived and 
manipulated us at every turn, committing espionage in our 
homeland and working to overturn the global rules-based order. 
United States is now locked in a peer competition with the CCP 
in which the Chinese government is seeking to place itself at 
the top of the global world order while degrading America's 
power militarily, diplomatically, and economically. In recent 
months, events have shown us that the CCP has escalated this 
competition.
    On January 28, a Chinese surveillance balloon entered U.S. 
airspace and spent the next 8 days traveling over the majority 
of the continental United States. While we do not know yet what 
kind of information the Chinese surveillance balloon was able 
to collect, we can be certain that the CCP's intention was to 
exploit sensitive sites, including military sites and critical 
infrastructure across our country. This Chinese surveillance 
balloon was a brazen display of espionage in the U.S. homeland, 
but it is ultimately one of the many ways that the CCP is 
working to exploit our vulnerabilities.
    Today we must take the conversation beyond that balloon and 
discuss all avenues the CCP is threatening U.S. homeland 
security in. Through the CCP's aggressive national strategy of 
Military-Civil Fusion, which aims to establish the People's 
Liberation Army as the dominant global military force by 2049, 
the Chinese government is stealing information from U.S. 
military and civilian targets. A majority of the threats China 
poses to the U.S. homeland security are occurring below the 
threshold of traditional conflict. We need to be cognizant of 
these threats and generate multi-faceted solutions to deter 
them.
    These threats are already directly affecting American 
citizens. MD Anderson Cancer Center, for instance, one of the 
Nation's top hospitals for cancer in my home State of Texas, 
ousted several scientists from the center in 2019 who had ties 
to the CCP. The scientists were flagged by the U.S. National 
Institutes of Health regarding a variety of threats, including 
data security, intellectual property loss, and they were 
ultimately investigated by the FBI. This incident was by no 
means unique, with the CCP consistently targeting American 
research and innovation across the country.
    Additionally, the CCP is exploiting the open nature of 
American academia to steal vital research and development. 
Confucius Institutes, marketed as mechanisms to promote Chinese 
language and culture, have used the CCP to recruit American 
talent to support Military-Civil Fusion, monitor Chinese 
nationals who are studying at American universities, and have 
faced allegations of visa fraud.
    In recent years the U.S. Government has worked to close 
most of these Confucius Institutes, however, the CCP has made 
efforts to change the Institutes' names or obfuscate their 
influence on American universities. Today, as a matter of fact, 
I am reintroducing with Chairman Green and Congressman Brad 
Wenstrup the DHS restrictions on Confucius Institutes and 
Chinese Entities of Concern Act, which passed out of this 
committee with bipartisan support last Congress. This bill 
works to close Confucius Institutes and any other programs with 
the same goal operating in the United States. It also holds 
American universities accountable and ensures they prioritize 
their students' education and right to free speech, above 
partnerships with Confucius Institutes that require 
universities to censor curriculums in favor of CCP ideology.
    I appreciate the support of Chairman Green, Congressman 
Wenstrup, and look forward to a bipartisan discussion on this.
    In addition to threats to American IP and academic freedom, 
the CCP is targeting U.S. cybersecurity and critical 
infrastructure and undermining our economic security. Moreover, 
illicit fentanyl, fentanyl analogs, and related precursor 
chemicals are predominantly sourced from the PRC and then sent 
to Mexico. These poisonous drugs continue to fuel the tragic 
fentanyl crisis in our homeland. I am eager to discuss these 
challenges and more during today's hearing.
    Let me be clear about this hearing to anyone who is 
listening at home or abroad. This conflict and the discussion 
today doesn't have anything to do with the Chinese people who 
are living in China and being manipulated by the CCP. This 
conflict is with the CCP. It is an authoritarian regime that 
commits genocide against its own people, they censor free 
speech, not just in China, but across the globe, and they aim 
to end democracy as we know it. This hearing is the first of 
many, but it is a first step on this subcommittee and the 
greater Committee on Homeland Security, which we intend to 
confront the threats stemming from CCP influence that target 
our homeland. We will meet CCP aggression with strength, its 
deception with unflinching truth, and its attempts at 
exploitation with justice.
    We look forward to a bipartisan cooperation in this 
Congress as we all seek effective solutions to combat pervasive 
threats posed by the CCP to our homeland security.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member, my friend from Rhode 
Island, Mr. Magaziner, for his opening statement.
    [The statement of Chairman Pfluger follows:]
                  Statement of Chairman August Pfluger
                             March 9, 2023
    Good morning, and welcome to the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, 
Law Enforcement, and Intelligence's first hearing of the 118th 
Congress. I would like to thank all our witnesses for testifying today 
and welcome the Ranking Member and other Members of the subcommittee.
    Despite years of attempts by the United States to develop a 
productive, fair, and honest relationship with the People's Republic of 
China, America has been met with dishonesty and aggression.
    The PRC government, run by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), has 
deceived and manipulated us at every turn, committing espionage in our 
homeland and working to overturn the global rules-based order. The 
United States is now locked in a peer competition with the CCP in which 
the Chinese government is seeking to place itself at the top of the 
global world order while degrading America's power militarily, 
diplomatically, and economically. In recent months, the CCP has 
escalated this competition.
    On January 28th, a Chinese surveillance balloon entered U.S. 
airspace and spent the next 8 days traveling over the majority of the 
continental United States.
    While we do not know what kind of information the Chinese 
surveillance balloon was able to collect, we can be certain that the 
CCP's intention was to exploit sensitive U.S. military sites and 
critical infrastructure across the country. This Chinese surveillance 
balloon was a brazen display of espionage in the U.S. homeland, but it 
is ultimately one of many ways the CCP is working to exploit our 
vulnerabilities. Today, we must take the conversation beyond the 
balloon and discuss all the avenues the CCP is threatening U.S. 
homeland security.
    Through the CCP's aggressive national strategy of Military-Civil 
Fusion, which aims to establish the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as 
the dominant global military force by 2049, the Chinese government is 
stealing information from U.S. military and civilian targets. A 
majority of the threats China poses to U.S. homeland security are 
occurring below the threshold of traditional conflict. We need to be 
cognizant of these threats and generate multifaceted solutions to deter 
them.
    These threats are already directly affecting American citizens.
    MD Anderson Cancer Center, one of the Nation's top hospitals for 
cancer care in my home State of Texas, ousted several scientists from 
the center in 2019 who had ties to China. The scientists were flagged 
by the U.S. National Institutes of Health regarding a variety of 
threats, including data security and intellectual property loss, and 
they were ultimately investigated by the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI). This incident was by no means unique, with the CCP 
consistently targeting American research and innovation across the 
country.
    Additionally, the CCP is exploiting the open nature of American 
academia to steal vital research and development. Confucius Institutes, 
marketed as mechanisms to promote Chinese language and culture, have 
been used by the CCP to recruit American talent to support Military-
Civil Fusion, monitor Chinese nationals studying at American 
universities, and have faced allegations of visa fraud. In recent 
years, the U.S. Government has worked to close most of these Confucius 
Institutes; however, the CCP has made efforts to change the Institutes' 
names or obfuscate their influence on American universities.
    Today, I am reintroducing with Chairman Green and Congressman 
Wenstrup the ``DHS Restrictions on Confucius Institutes and Chinese 
Entities of Concern Act,'' which passed out of this committee with 
bipartisan support last Congress. This bill works to close Confucius 
Institutes, and any other programs with the same goal, operating in the 
United States. It also holds American universities accountable and 
ensures they prioritize their students' educations and right to free 
speech above partnerships with Confucius Institutes that require 
universities to censor curriculums in favor of CCP ideology.
    I appreciate the support from Chairman Green and Congressman 
Wenstrup and look forward to working with the two of them to advance 
this bill.
    In addition to threats to American IP and academic freedom, the CCP 
is targeting U.S. cybersecurity and critical infrastructure and 
undermining our economic security. Moreover, illicit fentanyl, fentanyl 
analogues, and related precursor chemicals are predominately sourced 
from the PRC and Mexico. These poisonous drugs continue to fuel the 
tragic fentanyl crisis in our homeland. I am eager to discuss these 
challenges and much more during today's hearing.
    Let me be clear to anyone who is listening at home or abroad: This 
conflict is not with individual citizens of the PRC--this conflict is 
with the CCP, an authoritarian regime that commits genocide against its 
own people, censors free speech across the globe, and aims to end 
democracy as we know it.
    This hearing is the first step of many this subcommittee and the 
greater Committee on Homeland Security intend to take to confront the 
threats stemming from the CCP that target our homeland security.
    We will meet CCP aggression with strength, its deception with 
unflinching truth, and its attempts at exploitation with justice. We 
look forward to bipartisan cooperation this Congress as we all seek 
effective solutions to combat the pervasive threats posed by the CCP to 
U.S. homeland security.

    Mr. Magaziner. Good morning. I want to thank Chairman 
Pfluger for calling this important hearing and thank our 
witnesses for coming today. I especially want to thank Dr. 
Tyler Jost from Brown University in Rhode Island for joining 
us, along with our other expert witnesses.
    It is an honor to serve as Ranking Member of this 
subcommittee, and I look forward to working with you, Mr. 
Chairman, and all Members of the subcommittee on a bipartisan 
basis to protect Americans from those who seek to threaten the 
security of the homeland.
    Make no mistake, China is the competitor with the greatest 
combination of intent and capacity to threaten U.S. global 
leadership. President Xi himself stated last year that by 2049 
he wants to ensure that China and the CCP lead the world in 
terms of composite national strength and international 
influence. This is concerning for all of us who believe deeply 
that democracy and human rights must be advanced and protected 
here in our own country and across the world. Just last year, 
FBI Director Christopher Wray sat before this committee in this 
very room and warned that the greatest long-term threat to our 
Nation's information and intellectual property and our economic 
vitality is the counterintelligence and economic espionage 
threat from China. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo has warned 
that the Chinese Communist Party is accelerating their efforts 
to fuse economic and technology policies with their military 
ambitions in ways that are forcing us, compelling us to defend 
United States businesses and workers.
    We have already seen the Chinese Communist Party threaten 
the safety and privacy of American citizens through economic 
espionage and theft of U.S. intellectual property, the theft of 
personal data of American citizens through cyber attacks, the 
recent use of a spy balloon and other methods of surveillance 
to illegally gather intelligence on American territory, and the 
build-up of military capabilities that seek to eclipse the 
United States and our democratic allies. We must recognize that 
threat posed by the CCP and take immediate action to best 
position the United States to confront China's attempts to 
undermine our national security.
    Today's hearing is an important opportunity for Members of 
this subcommittee to demonstrate that we are united in a 
bipartisan effort to defend the privacy and safety of the 
American people, to protect U.S. industries and supply chains, 
and enhance national security, all while remembering that one 
of the most important ways to counter the Chinese Communist 
Party's ambitions is to build an economy here at home that 
works for working people, so we can show the world that our 
American system of democracy and freedom is more effective in 
lifting people up than the CCP model of autocracy and 
repression.
    Democrats are committed to doing this work with our 
Republican colleagues in a spirit of collaboration. Last year, 
thanks to the leadership of President Biden, Congress passed 
the Bipartisan CHIPS Act to invest $280,000,000,000 into 
domestic semiconductor production that will enhance our 
national security, strengthen U.S. industry, create jobs, 
reduce inflation, and improve our competitiveness with China. 
The CIA has recently launched a dedicated China Mission Center 
and the State Department has launched a new Office of China 
Coordination in order to strengthen the U.S. diplomatic, 
military, and intelligence capabilities in meeting CCP threats. 
It is my hope that today's hearing will further illuminate the 
CCP's strategies to undermine our democracy, our economy, and 
way of life, and how Congress can work together to meet these 
challenges.
    As we do this work together, we must remember that the 
people of China and people of Chinese origin experience 
oppression and human rights violations at the hands of the 
authoritarian Chinese Communist Party, and anti-Asian 
harassment and discrimination is too prevalent globally and 
here at home. So I also want to be abundantly clear that we do 
not condone any anti-Chinese or anti-Asian bigotry, and we must 
condemn any acts of anti-Asian discrimination in the strongest 
possible terms. Our struggle is not with the Chinese people, 
but rather with the Chinese Communist Party that is 
increasingly hostile to democracy and human rights. The CCP 
wants nothing more than to see Americans become divided and 
prejudiced, but they will be disappointed. Instead, we will 
out-compete the CCP by ensuring that America remains a beacon 
of freedom to the world and by continuing to provide safe 
harbor to those fleeing oppression and violence. That is how we 
will strengthen our Nation and our economy.
    I look forward to hearing from today's witnesses, and I 
yield back.
    [The statement of Ranking Member Magaziner follows:]
               Statement of Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
                             March 9, 2023
    Make no mistake, China is the competitor with the greatest 
combination of intent and capacity to threaten U.S. global leadership. 
President Xi himself stated last year, that by 2049 he wants to ensure 
China and the CCP ``lead the world in terms of composite national 
strength and international influence.'' This is concerning for all of 
us who believe deeply that democracy and human rights must be advanced 
and protected here in our own country and across the world.
    Just last year, FBI Director Christopher Wray sat before this 
committee, in this very room, and warned that ``[t]he greatest long-
term threat to our Nation's information and intellectual property, and 
to our economic vitality, is the counterintelligence and economic 
espionage threat from China.''
    Director Wray is not alone in his assessment. Commerce Secretary 
Gina Raimondo has warned that the Chinese Communist Party is 
``accelerating their efforts to fuse economic and technology policies 
with their military ambitions . . . in ways that are forcing us, 
compelling us, to defend United States businesses and workers.''
    We have already seen the Chinese Communist Party threaten the 
safety and privacy of American citizens through:
   economic espionage and theft of U.S. intellectual property
   the theft of personal data of American citizens through 
        cyber attacks
   the recent use of a spy balloon and other methods of 
        surveillance to illegally gather intelligence on American 
        territory, and
   the build-up of military capabilities that seek to eclipse 
        the United States and our democratic allies.
    We must recognize the threat posed by the CCP and take immediate 
action to best-position the United States to confront China's attempts 
to undermine our National security.
    Today's hearing is an opportunity for Members of this subcommittee 
to demonstrate that we are united in a bipartisan effort to defend the 
privacy and safety of the American people, to protect U.S. industries 
and supply chains, and enhance National security--all the while 
remembering that one of the most important ways to counter the Chinese 
Communist Party's ambitions is to build an economy here at home that 
works for working people so we can show the world that our American 
system of democracy and freedom is more effective in lifting people up 
than the CCP model of autocracy and repression.
    Democrats are committed to doing this work with our Republican 
colleagues in a spirit of collaboration.
    Last year, thanks to the leadership of President Biden, Congress 
passed the bipartisan CHIPS Act, to invest $280 billion into domestic 
semiconductor production that will enhance our national security, 
strengthen U.S. industry, create jobs, reduce inflation, and improve 
our competitiveness with China.
    Under President Biden, the CIA has launched a dedicated China 
Mission Center and the State Department has launched a new Office of 
China Coordination, in order to strengthen the U.S. diplomatic, 
military, and intelligence capabilities in meeting CCP threats.
    It is my hope that today's hearing will further illuminate the 
CCP's strategies to undermine our democracy, our economy, and way of 
life--and how Congress can work together to meet these challenges.
    As we do this work together we must remember that the people of 
China and people of Chinese origin experience oppression and human 
rights violations at the hands of the authoritarian Chinese Communist 
Party, and anti-Asian harassment and discrimination is too prevalent 
globally and here at home.
    I want to be abundantly clear that we do not condone any anti-
Chinese or anti-Asian bigotry, and we must condemn any acts of anti-
Asian discrimination in the strongest possible terms. Our struggle is 
not with the Chinese people, but rather with the Chinese Communist 
Party that is increasingly hostile to democracy and human rights.
    The Chinese Communist Party wants nothing more than to see 
Americans become divided and prejudiced. But they will be disappointed. 
Instead, we will out-compete the CCP by ensuring that America remains a 
beacon of freedom to the world and by continuing to provide safe harbor 
to those fleeing oppression and violence. That is how we will 
strengthen our Nation and our economy. Let us not forget that.
    Division and rancor is the goal of the CCP. We must stand together 
and work in a bipartisan fashion to show that we stand united and 
prepared in the face of their efforts to weaken our Nation.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    Other Members of the committee are reminded that opening 
statements may be submitted for the record.
    [The statement of Honorable Goldman follows:]
                   Statement of Honorable Dan Goldman
    Thank you to our witnesses for being here. I represent New York's 
10th Congressional District, home to Chinatown communities in Manhattan 
and Brooklyn--some of the most historic and vibrant Asian communities 
in this country.
    The Chinese Communist Party and China's government pose legitimate 
threats to the United States that must be taken seriously. We cannot 
allow the CCP to invade our sovereignty with spy balloons, influence 
our elections, or threaten democracies around the world.
    At the same time, we must not forget that Asian Americans and 
immigrants who live in our communities are suffering because of the 
CCP. They suffer because the authoritarian regime in China has 
surveilled their communities here in the United States. They suffer 
because they have families in China whose lives may be at risk simply 
because they have families in America. And they suffer from hate crimes 
here in the United States that are fueled, in part, by disgusting 
political rhetoric.
    Today's hearing is an opportunity for Members to show that we are 
united in a bipartisan effort to strengthen the United States in our 
global strategic competition with the Chinese government and the 
Chinese Communist Party--not with Chinese people or Asian Americans.
    At a time when Anti-Asian hate crimes in the United States are up 
by 339 percent year over year from 2020 to 2021, and anti-Asian hate 
crimes jumped from 30 to 133 in New York City alone,\1\ it is 
imperative that Members of Congress and political leaders do not allow 
our legitimate critiques of the CCP and China's government to veer into 
anti-Asian stereotyping and prejudice that fuels hateful violence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ https://www.nbcnews.com/news/asian-america/anti-asian-hate-
crimes-increased-339-percent-nationwide-last-year-repo-rcna14282.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Like when Republicans repeatedly called COVID-19 the ``China 
virus'' or ``kung flu'', or when a Republican Member of Congress 
recently questioned the loyalty of the first Chinese American 
Congresswoman to score cheap political points.
    I was elected to Congress to serve my constituents and to stand up 
for their safety and security. The best way to counter the Chinese 
Communist Party's ambitions is to safeguard our values, our elections, 
our sovereignty, and our diversity. As Ranking Member Magaziner said, 
the CCP would like nothing more than to see the United States festering 
with anti-Asian prejudice.

    Chairman Pfluger. I am pleased to have a distinguished 
panel of witnesses before us today on this very important 
topic, and I ask that our witnesses please rise and raise their 
right hand.
    [Witnesses sworn.]
    Chairman Pfluger. Let the record reflect that the witnesses 
have answered in the affirmative. Thank you.
    I would like to now formally introduce our witnesses.
    The Honorable William Evanina dedicated his life for 32 
years to government service. In May 2020, the Senate confirmed 
him as the very first director of National Counterintelligence 
and Security Center. In this position Mr. Evanina was the head 
of counterintelligence for the entirety of the U.S. Government. 
His background in counterintelligence lends itself well today 
to our specific discussion, which will focus heavily on the 
ways of CCP espionage efforts and how they impact our homeland, 
including the theft of U.S. IP, the exploitation of academic 
research, and much more.
    Lieutenant General Joseph T. Guastella joins us from the 
Mitchell Institute, also a friend of mine in a former life as a 
fighter pilot, and he is a senior fellow at the Mitchell 
Institute for Aerospace Studies. Lieutenant General Guastella 
is a command pilot who most recently served as deputy chief of 
staff of operations at U.S. Air Force headquarters. It was his 
job to oversee air power capabilities, including the homeland 
defense mission of North American aerospace defense, or NORAD 
and NORTHCOM.
    With the foundation of his impressive background, 
Lieutenant General Guastella will be able to speak to America's 
evolving homeland security needs as it faces a challenge never 
seen before by the CCP. Given the recent shocking events, which 
I think were a wake-up call of the surveillance balloon, we are 
grateful for your service, General, and for being here today.
    The Honorable Kari Bingen joins us from the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies, or CSIS, where she is the 
director of Aerospace Security Project. Prior to this, she 
served as deputy under secretary of defense for intelligence 
and security. Her strong background in homeland security and 
defense policies will be an exceptional addition as we discuss 
the growing and changing threat landscape, including threats to 
American critical infrastructure as it pertains to the U.S. 
peer competition with China.
    I now would like to once again recognize the Ranking 
Member, gentleman from Rhode Island, Mr. Magaziner, for a brief 
introduction of the next witness.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
    I am pleased to welcome our fourth witness, Dr. Tyler Jost. 
Dr. Jost is an assistant professor of political science and 
international and public affairs at Brown University in the 
great State of Rhode Island. He is also the Watson Institute 
assistant professor of China studies and devotes his time and 
effort to improving our understanding of national security 
decision making in the People's Republic of China. Professor 
Jost also previously served as a military intelligence officer 
with assignments in Afghanistan, U.S. Cyber Command, and the 
Office of the Secretary of Defense.
    Thank you to all of our witnesses for being here today, and 
I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much. Again, thank you to 
all the witnesses for taking time here.
    I now recognize the Honorable William Evanina for an 
opening statement. We do have a timer and we will keep them 5 
minutes.
    You are recognized.

 STATEMENT OF WILLIAM R. EVANINA, FOUNDER AND CEO, THE EVANINA 
                             GROUP

    Mr. Evanina. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, 
Members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to be here with you 
today to discuss this really important topic.
    I spent 32 years of my career working for the U.S. 
Government in the FBI, the CIA, as the Chairman referenced, as 
the first Senate-confirmed director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center. But I am here before 
you today as the CEO of the Evanina Group, where I provide 
consulting services to boards of directors, CEOs, and 
executives on this exact threat we discussed today.
    Today's topic, China and the threat to the homeland, is an 
existential threat. It is the most complex, pernicious, 
aggressive strategic threat our Nation has ever faced. I 
proffer to this subcommittee that the U.S. private sector and 
academia have become the geopolitical battlespace for China. Xi 
Jinping has one goal to be the geopolitical, military, and 
economic leader of the world, period. Along with the Ministry 
of State Security, the People's Liberation Army, the United 
Front Work Department, they drive a comprehensive whole-of-
country approach to their efforts to invest, leverage, 
infiltrate, influence, and steal from every corner of the 
United States. This is a generational battle for Xi, and it 
drives through every decision. We must approach this threat 
from the Communist Party of China with the same sense of 
urgency, spending, and strategy we have done for the past two 
decades to combat terrorism.
    I would offer to the subcommittee that we are in a 
terrorism event. A slow, methodical, strategic, persistent, and 
enduring event, which requires in response, a degree of urgency 
of action. Let me be more specific. The Communist Party of 
China's capabilities and intent are second-to-none as an 
adversary. The cyber breaches, insider threats, surveillance, 
and penetrations into our critical infrastructure, of which 85 
percent is owned by the private sector, have all been widely 
reported. There is much more in the classified realm, but we 
have become numb to it as a Nation. Additionally, it is 
estimated that 80 percent of American adults have had all of 
their private data stolen by the Communist Party of China. The 
other 20 percent, just most of it.
    Layering in the Communist Party of China's crippling 
stranglehold on many aspects of our supply chain, and what 
results is a daunting vulnerability and susceptibility of 
unacceptable proportions. When we layer in the current threat 
landscape, sophisticated surveillance balloons, maritime port 
surveillance, strategic land purchases by military bases, 
terrestrial and space-based 5G threats, U.S.-based Chinese 
police stations, Huawei and TikTok, the collage begins to paint 
a very bleak mosaic. From a cybersecurity perspective, China 
possesses persistent and unending resources to penetrate our 
systems and exfiltrate our data, or sit dormant and wait, or 
plant malware on critical infrastructure for future 
hostilities. At the same time, the insider threat epidemic 
originating from the Communist Party of China has been nothing 
short of devastating to the U.S. corporate world. Additionally, 
the Communist Party of China strategically conducts malign 
influence campaigns at the State and local level with 
precision. This effort must be exposed and mitigated.
    So why does it all matter? Economic security is national 
security. Our economic global supremacy, stability, and long-
term vitality is at risk and squarely in the cross hairs of Xi 
Jinping and the Communist regime.
    In 2020 the estimated economic loss from theft of 
intellectual property and trade secrets just from the Communist 
Party of China, just from what we know in prosecutions, is 
between $300 billion and $500 billion per year. That equates to 
about $4,000 to $6,000 per year for American family of four 
after taxes. The cost is real.
    So how do we mitigate these threats? We must create a 
robust public-private partnership with real intelligence 
sharing, while at the same time staying true to our core 
values, morals, and rule of law, which made America the 
greatest country the world has ever seen. This will take a 
whole-Nation approach. It will take time. Such approach must 
start with contextual awareness campaigns reaching a broad 
audience from every level of government to chambers of commerce 
to university campuses and from the board rooms to the business 
schools. Because the why matters. U.S. boards of directors and 
investment leaders must begin to look beyond the next fiscal 
quarter earnings and begin to think strategically about how 
their investment decisions and awareness of the long-term 
threat can impact not only their business model, but the 
economic and national interest to the United States.
    In conclusion, I investigated terror attacks after 
September 11 and led counterintelligence programs for the FBI. 
I would suggest the threat posed by China is much more 
dangerous to the longevity and sustainability of our Nation 
than any terrorist threat actor.
    Thank you. I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Evanina follows:]
                Prepared Statement of William R. Evanina
                             March 9, 2023
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and Members of the 
subcommittee--it's an honor to appear before you today. I have spent 32 
years of my adulthood working the U.S. Government. Twenty-four of which 
with the FBI, CIA, and NCSC.
    I was tremendously honored to be the first Senate-confirmed 
director of the National Counterintelligence and Security Center (NCSC) 
in May 2020.
    I am here before you today as the CEO of The Evanina Group, LLC. In 
this role, I work closely with CEOs, boards of directors, and academic 
institutions to provide a strategic approach to mitigating risk in a 
complicated global environment.
                            the china threat
    Our Nation faces a diverse, complex, and unprecedented 
sophisticated threats by nation-state actors, cyber criminals, and 
terrorist organizations.
    However, the existential threat our Nation is from the Communist 
Party of China (CCP). This threat is the most complex, pernicious, 
strategic, and aggressive our Nation has ever faced. It is an 
existential threat.
    We must first clearly understand this threat. We must also continue 
to mitigate this threat with a whole-of-society approach. We must also 
approach this comprehensive and holistic threat with the same sense of 
urgency, spending, and strategy . . . As we have done for the past two 
decades in preventing terrorism.
    I would offer to this subcommittee that we ARE in a terrorism 
event. A slow, methodical, strategic, persistent, and enduring event 
which requires a degree of urgency of action. It is clear that under Xi 
Jinping, the CCP's economic war with the United States is manifested 
itself into a terrorism framework.
    Let me be more specific. The CCP's capabilities and intent are 
second-to-none as an adversary. The cyber breaches, insider threats, 
surveillance and penetrations into our critical infrastructure have all 
been widely reported and we have become numb to these episodes, as a 
Nation. Add in the CCP's crippling stranglehold so many aspects of our 
supply chain and what results is an imbalance and vulnerability of 
unacceptable proportions. When we move to new areas of the CCP to 
include surveillance balloons, ZPMC cranes at out maritime ports, 
Huawei, and TikTok, the collage begins to paint a bleak mosaic.
    I would ask the subcommittee is it not terrorism when a hospital, 
high school, police department, college, county services, or water 
treatment facility are shut down by a cyber breach or ransomware event? 
How about a natural gas pipeline that is shut off via a malware or 
virus? How about our electrical grid or natural gas being shut off in 
the winter in the Northeast part of the United States resulting in 
millions of households, and buildings, without heat? How about our 
telecommunications infrastructure going down 1 day because Verizon and 
AT&T are hit with a cyber attack on the same day? Or, our financial 
services sector having to go off-line, for even a few hours, would 
cause significant international chaos and disruption. Are these not 
terror events? ``Terror'' must be redefined beyond our framework which 
includes loved ones dying from a kinetic event.
    It is easy to parlay all the ``would be'' and ``could be'' 
scenarios as fear-based paranoia. However, intelligence and law 
enforcement professionals, cyber professionals and international 
organizations have all seen the intent, capabilities deployed by the 
CCP. The inability or unwillingness to look behind the curtain and 
visualize this existential threat is no longer an option for anyone. 
There is no more curtain to look behind.
                          where is the threat?
    The U.S. private sector, academia, research and development 
entities, and our core fabric of ideation has become the geopolitical 
battlespace for China.
    Xi Jinping has one goal. To be the geopolitical, military, and 
economic leader in the world. Xi, along with the China's Ministry of 
State Security, People's Liberation Army, and the United Front Work 
Department, drive a comprehensive and whole of country approach to 
their efforts to invest, leverage, infiltrate, influence and steal from 
every corner of U.S. success.
    Economic security is national security. Our economic global 
supremacy, stability, and long-term vitality is not only at risk, but 
squarely in the cross hairs of Xi Jinping and the communist regime. 
This is a generational battle for Xi and the CCP, it drives their every 
decision, particularly geopolitically. How to counter and push past the 
United States is goal No. 1 for Xi and the CCP.
                     how does the threat manifest?
    Intelligence services, science & technology investments, academic 
collaboration, research partnerships, joint ventures, front companies, 
mergers and acquisitions, and outright theft via insiders and cyber 
intrusions, begin the comprehensive and strategic framework for how 
China implements their strategy.
    China continues to utilize ``non-traditional'' collectors to 
conduct a plurality of their nefarious efforts here in the United 
States due to their successful ability to hide in plain sight. The non-
traditional collectors, serving as engineers, businesspersons, 
academics, and students are shrouded in legitimate work and research, 
and oftentimes become unwitting tools for the CCP and its intelligence 
apparatus.
    China's ability to holistically obtain our Intellectual Property 
and Trade Secrets via illegal, legal, and sophisticated hybrid methods 
is like nothing we have ever witnessed. Joint ventures, creative 
investments into our Federal, State, and local pension programs, 
collaborative academic engagements, Sister City Programs, Confucius 
Institutes on Campus, Talent Recruitment Programs, investments in 
emerging technologies, and utilization of front companies continue to 
be the framework for strategically acquiring the thoughts and ideas of 
our researchers, as well as development of those ideas pre- and post-
patent application. The threat from China pertaining to academia is 
both wide, and deep. The past 6 years of indictments and prosecutions 
have highlighted the insidiousness of China's approach to obtaining 
early and advanced research as well as understanding the complexity of 
gifts and funding at U.S. colleges and universities, particularly when 
tied to Federal grants.
                     industries leading as targets
    China's priorities for obtaining U.S.-based technology and know-
how, pursuant to their publicly-available ``Made in China 25 Plan'' are 
Aerospace, Deep Sea Technology, Biotechnology, Information Technology, 
Manufacturing, Clean Energy, Electric Battery Technology, and DNA/
Genomics.
    Any CEO or board of directors leading in any of these critical 
industries must become aware of the threat posed to them and work with 
their security team and outside experts to identify risk-based 
mitigation strategies.
                   long-term consequences of ip theft
    The proverbial salt in the wound of the China's nefarious activity 
is when the CCP steals our thoughts, ideas, patents, and technology, 
and manufactures that same technology in China, and then sells it back 
to American companies and around the world. One needs to look no 
further than the American Supercomputer Corporation for just a glimpse 
of the long-term impact to economic espionage.
    Then one must factor in all the manufacturing plants which were are 
not built, and the tens of thousands of jobs which were not created 
because China, via its theft, beat the United States to the global 
market and is selling the same product and a significant reduction in 
real costs.
    Currently prescient is the passage of the CHIPS and Science Act, as 
well as the Inflation Reduction Act. Rest assured, China has already 
begun their strategic, and comprehensive, efforts to acquire (both 
legally and illegally) any and all ideation, research, and trade 
secrets emanating from the extensive funding provisions and 
technological incentives, provided by these legislative actions.
    I would offer emerging renewable energy technologies, and 
semiconductor production will be targeted most aggressively. Congress 
must lead and hold everyone accountable for assuring that 10 years from 
now Congress cannot be holding hearings and asking how China stole our 
technology, and capabilities, and are selling them back to us . . . as 
consumers.
                     corporate awareness of details
    Boards of Directors and investment leaders must begin to look 
beyond the next fiscal quarterly earnings call and begin to think 
strategically with respect to how their decisions and unawareness of 
the long-term threat impact their businesses and industries, which is 
woven with our national security, economic stability, and endurance of 
our republic.
    In 2017, the Communist Party of China issued new State laws to 
facilitate the perniciousness of their efforts to obtain data, from 
everywhere. Three specific portions of those laws should be understood, 
and be an enduring reminder to CEOs, general counsels, chief data 
officers, CIOs, and CISOs, throughout our private-sector ecosystems.
    The first is Article 7 of the People's Republic of China National 
Intelligence Law summarily stating that all business and citizens shall 
cooperate with China's intelligence services and shall protect all 
national work secrets.
    The second is Article 77 of the same National Security Law 
summarily stating that Chinese citizens and business shall provide 
anything required or requested by the Chinese government or 
intelligence services.
    The third is Article 28 of the 2016 Cybersecurity Law summarily 
stating that all network operators must provide data to, and anything 
requested by, national, military or public security authorities.
    Hence, if you are a U.S. business seeking to enter a business 
relationship with a company in, or from, China, your data will be 
obtained and provided to the MSS or PLA for their usage. This includes 
third-party data as well. The analogy is a U.S. company enters into a 
business deal or partnership with a company from another country. The 
U.S. company must provide all relevant and requested data from their 
company, as well as the partner company, to the NSA, CIA, and FBI.
                    china does not play by any rules
    China plays by their own rules. China does not conform to any 
normalized set of regulations, guidelines, norms, laws, or value-based 
agreements throughout the global economic ecosystem.
    To further the CCP's unleveled economic playing field, out of the 
15 largest companies inside China, 13 are either owned by the CCP, or 
run by the CCP. The world has seen recently what the CCP is capable of 
when one of the largest companies in the world, Alibaba, pushes back on 
state-run efforts. Additionally, many of the CCP's largest corporate 
leaders and CEO's have gone missing.
    American business leaders, and Americans in general, must 
understand that China is a Communist country run by an authoritarian 
``President'' for life. Unlike in the United States and Western 
democracies, and like Putin's Russia, there is no bifurcation between 
the government, industry, and or criminal organizations.
                                analogy
    Hence, for a prospective business deal with a company in the United 
States, the Chinese company can partner with China's intelligence 
services to assist in negotiations, vulnerabilities, and utilization of 
any already-acquired data from said U.S. company. Again, this is akin 
to a U.S.-based company calling he CIA and NSA for assistance on 
preparing a bid to merge with a company outside the United States and 
use all types of classified collection to form a proposal or use during 
negotiations.
                           data accumulation
    The willingness of China, and its intelligence services, to 
illegally, and legally, obtain DATA to drive artificial intelligence, 
research and development programs, and to facilitate their military and 
economic goals without doing the hard work to independently develop on 
their own, drives at the heart of China's unfair practices. It is 
estimated that 80 percent of American adults have had all of their 
personal data stolen by the CCP, and the other 20 percent most of their 
personal data.
    From genomics and DNA to third-party financial data stored in cloud 
services providers, to fertility to internet of things technology, the 
effort du jour is accumulation of data, and lots of it.
                          social credit score
    China continues to surprise the world by aggressively stifling 
their citizens via laws, regulations, unparalleled domestic 
surveillance, and a debilitating Social Credit Score for every citizen. 
And a conversation about what is occurring the Uyghurs is for another 
hearing. It is important to remember that Chinese nationals, here in 
the United States are continuously monitored and their actions impact 
their credit score.
                      united front work department
    China's efforts to prohibit and violate free speech inside the 
United States must be identified, exposed, and mitigated. China 
conducts such activities on Chinese nationals and on American citizens. 
Similarly, the CCP utilizes a suite of capabilities to silence critics 
here in the United States when the activity is exposed. The utilization 
of the United Front Work Department to drive false narratives in social 
media and within mainstream print and television media is consistent 
and enduring. There are numerous examples of such, however I want to 
reference just a few recent examples. The first is the Chinese Embassy 
in Washington, DC pressuring Nobel scientists to censor their speeches 
at the 2021 Noble Prize Summit. The prize winners were bullied by the 
government of China to disinvite the Dalai Lama for the award ceremony. 
The second example is Zoom executive charged for working with the 
Chinese intelligence services to disrupt Zoom calls in the United 
States commemorating Tiananmen Square. The third example is American 
actor John Cena apologizing, in Mandarin, because of the pressure 
Chinese officials placed on him, and Hollywood, because he referenced 
Taiwan as a country. The pressure being placed by China on Hollywood 
has grown to a credibility-questioning level and impacts just about 
every decision they make with respect to scripts and potential 
villains. This is referred to as ``apology diplomacy'' and has been 
publicly visible for many years when CEOs and company executives must 
apologize to Xi or the China for indiscretions with respect to 
referring to Taiwan as an independent country.
    A final example, and one that really illustrates the granularity 
and scope of the CCP and UFWP, is when the CCP forced a small Jesuit 
high school in Colorado to change language on their website to 
designate Taiwan as part of China. The CCP identified this when the 
high school applied for credentials to take part in the United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women.
                           operation fox hunt
    One of the most disturbing, and illegal, activities by the CCP on 
American soils is Operation Fox Hunt. Operation Fox Hunt is an 
international effort by the CCP to identify, locate, and attempt to 
bring back Chinese dissidents who have left China and are causing 
President Xi and the Communist Party discontent. For almost a decade 
Chinese intelligence service have been building teams to conduct 
surveillance in the United States, oftentimes falsely entering 
relationships with local law enforcement to garner information on who 
China claims are fugitives and attempt to bring them back to China. In 
January 2023, the FBI conducted a search warrant of a suspected Chinese 
police station in New York City which was furthering this effort, and 
most likely more undisclosed illegal activity.
    The willingness, ability, and success of the Communist Party of 
China to conduct such aggressive activity within the confines of 
America's borders is disturbing and unacceptable.
                           cyber capabilities
    From a cyber perspective, China has significant and unending 
resources to penetrate systems and obtain data, or sit dormant and 
wait, or to plant malware for future hostilities.
    The FBI recently unveiled details for the first time on a 2011-2013 
Chinese state-sponsored cyber campaign against U.S. oil and natural gas 
pipeline companies that was designed to hold U.S. pipeline 
infrastructure at risk.
    Additionally, in July 2021, DOJ unsealed an indictment charging 
four individuals working with China's MSS for a global cyber intrusion 
campaign targeting intellectual property and confidential business 
information, including infectious disease research. Targeted industries 
around the world included aviation, defense, education, government, 
health care, biopharmaceutical, and maritime.
    And last, in July 2021, NSA, FBI, CISA publicly released more than 
50 cyber tactics and tools used by Chinese state-sponsored hackers 
against the United States as well as mitigation steps for U.S. 
companies.
    Over the past decade we have seen CCP cyber and insider threat 
breaches and criminality to such a level I fear we are becoming numb 
when it is identified. One such event was the Equifax breach in May 
2017. As a former head of U.S. Counterintelligence, I consider this to 
be one of the CCP's greatest intelligence collection successes. More 
than 145 million Americans had all their financial data, nicely 
aggregated, to the CCP along with Equifax's business process and trade 
secrets on how they acquire and share such data. That is every American 
adult.
    Anthem lost 80 million medical records in 2015, Marriott lost 500 
million guest's records in 2014, and in 2015 OPM lost 21 million 
records to China's cyber theft. I would be remiss if I left out China's 
breach of multiple cloud service providers in which China obtained 
access to over 150 companies' data.
                             insider threat
    The insider threat epidemic originating from the CCP has been 
nothing short of devastating to the U.S. corporate world. Anyone can go 
to Department of Justice's web site and search economic espionage. The 
result is hard to swallow and quantify. And those listed cases are just 
what was identified, reported by a U.S. company, and then prosecuted. I 
will touch on the impact of economic espionage a bit later.
    In April 2021, a former scientist at Coca-Cola and Eastman Chemical 
was convicted of economic espionage & theft of trade secrets, on behalf 
of the CCP. The scientist stole trade secrets related to formulations 
for bisphenol-A-free (BPA-free) coatings for the inside of beverage 
cans. The scientist was working with a corporate partner inside China 
to monetize the stolen data utilizing the new company in China. The CCP 
had invested millions in the shadow new company in China. The stolen 
trade secrets cost U.S. companies approximately $120 million to develop 
per open-source reporting. This is one example from the dozens 
identified in the past 5 years.
                        aggregated capabilities
    When you combine the persistence of intent and capability for the 
CCP's cyber intrusion programs, with the onslaught of insiders being 
arrested, indicted, and convicted by the FBI and DOJ over the past 
decade, it creates a formidable mosaic of insurmountable levels. But it 
is not. With a comprehensive whole-of-government, and whole-of-society, 
approach of defending against China with awareness, strategy, enhanced 
defenses, practical mitigation programs, and a patriotic value-based 
return to great competition, the United States can begin change the 
course of history as I see it now.
                              supply chain
    So, what is current and next in the targeted view scope by the CCP? 
Look no further than President Biden's economic growth agenda and 
proposed Congressional legislation detailing our strategic movement in 
the next few years. Electric vehicles, battery technology, bio 
agriculture, precision medicine, and sustainable green energy. All of 
this is prime targets for penetration, and theft, by the CCP. And at 
the same time, Ford Motor Company decided to partner with Contemporary 
Amperex Technology Co. Limited (CATL). This partnership is selfish, 
creates disincentive for investors to develop battery plans here in the 
United States. Additionally, and more importantly, this partnership 
creates a critical supply chain dependency not only to the state-
sponsored CATL, but as well the CCP as a whole.
    As an analogy, China manufactures, produces, and delivers 80 
percent to the anti-biotics sold and utilized in the United States. We 
cannot afford to continue to allow China to control and/or manipulate 
our critical and emerging supply chains and potentially hold us hostage 
in the future.
           legitimate business used as intelligence gathering
    China's strategic ability to utilize legitimate business ventures 
and investment in the United States that can also serve as intelligence 
collection and monitoring vehicles is comprehensive. It also provides 
the signature mosaic of how the best capitalistic economy the world has 
ever seen can be vulnerable to adversaries who hide their capabilities 
on our soil and in plain sight. Three simple and current event examples 
I will proffer is Huawei Technologies, farmland purchases near military 
installations, and ZPMC Cranes at critical U.S. maritime and military 
shipping ports.
                            malign influence
    I would be remiss if I did not reference the strategic and 
aggressive nature in which the CCP conducts malign foreign influence in 
the United States. Unlike Russia's persistent attempts to undermine our 
democracy and sow discord, the CCP strategically, and with precision, 
conducts nefarious influence campaigns at the State and local level.
    I have referenced the influence success in Hollywood and the self-
censoring which occurs to not offend China to ensure sales of their 
product to the Chinese markets. When it comes to Taiwan, the CCP 
becomes the most aggressive. Oftentimes State and local officials agree 
to travel to Taiwan to identify or negotiate economic investment 
opportunities. The CCP will undoubtedly apply holistic pressure to the 
local officials, from overt threats to subtle promises of economic 
infusion at the city or town level. There is most likely a company or 
business located inside an official's town which is heavily influenced 
or leveraged by prior investment by the CCP. China will apply pressure 
to that U.S. company and threaten to slow down production or 
manufacturing in China if the company officials do not apply their 
respective influence on the elected leader to not travel to Taiwan. 
This State or local official, or even U.S. Congressperson, may have no 
knowledge of China's intent beneath the surface. At the same time, and 
not coincidently, an op-ed or article will appear in the local 
newspaper downplaying economic investment opportunities in Taiwan and 
championing alternative efforts in China.
                           why it all matters
    In 2020, the estimated economic loss from the theft of intellectual 
property and trade secrets, JUST from the CCP, and JUST from known and 
identified efforts, is estimated between $300 billion and $600 billion 
per year (Office of the U.S. Trade Representative). To make it more 
relevant to Americans reading this, it is approximately $4,000 to 
$6,000 per American family of four . . . after taxes.
    Additionally, in 2010 China had 1 company in the top 10 of Forbes' 
Global 2000 list. In 2020 they had 5. That is a 500 percent increase in 
one decade. Competition is great and necessary and is what made America 
the global leader we are today. However, I would proffer China's growth 
through any and all means is much less than fair competition. To 
reiterate, competition is always good, and necessary in any aspect. My 
question is . . . are we really competing? If we do not alter how we 
compete on the global ecosystem with awareness of China's methodology 
and practices, we will not be able to sustain our global position as 
the world leaders in technology, manufacturing, education, science, 
medicine, research, development, and thoughts and ideas. We must 
aggressively enhance our willingness to not only understand these 
threats and unfair practices but be willing to create a robust public 
private partnership with intelligence sharing to combat the CCP while 
at the same time staying true to the values, morals, and rule of laws 
made America the greatest country in the world. Additionally, we must 
urgently decide that breaking the stranglehold of the CCP on our vast 
supply chain must end. The United States must engage in an aggressive 
and urgent redundancy effort and begin to have alternate servicing of 
goods, products, and technologies.
                       protect what is developed
    Congress's recent passage of a bill to bolster competition and 
provide the much-needed resources to do so is a great start down this 
long road. However, we must also protect the fruits of this legislative 
labor from being stolen and siphoned out of the United States by the 
same techniques China successfully utilizes today. Otherwise, we will 
continue to conduct research and development which the CCP will obtain, 
legally, and illegally, to bolster their economic, geopolitical, and 
military goals of global dominance well into the future.
                                closing
    In closing, I would like to thank this subcommittee, and the House 
Homeland Committee writ large, for acknowledging the significant threat 
posed by China, not only by holding this hearing, but with all the 
recent legislative actions the past year on combatting this threat as 
well as driving enhanced competition. Continuing to combat the threat 
posed by the CCP will take a whole-of-Nation approach with a mutual 
fund analogous long-term commitment. Such an approach must start with 
robust and contextual awareness campaigns. The WHY matters. Regarding 
these awareness campaigns, we must be specific and reach a broad 
audience, from every level of government to university campuses, from 
board rooms to business schools, educating on how China's actions 
impair our competitive spirit by obtaining our research and 
development, trade secrets and intellectual property, and degrading our 
ability to maintain our role as economic global leaders. I have 
provided some recommendations for this committee, the IC, the 
administration, academia, research and development, as well as CEOs and 
boards of directors in our holistic efforts to detect and deter these 
threats, as well as educate, inform, and compete.
    Our Nation needs strategic leadership now more than ever, 
particularly when we face such an existential threat from a capable 
competitor who is looking beyond competition to the global dominance.
    Last, I would like to state for the record the significant National 
security threat we face from the Communist Party of China is NOT a 
threat posed by Chinese people, as individuals. Chinese nationals, or 
any person of Chinese ethnicity here in the United States, or around 
the world, are not a threat and should NOT be racially targeted in any 
manner whatsoever. This is an issue pertaining to a communist country, 
with an autocratic dictator who is committed to human rights violations 
and stopping at nothing to achieve his goals. As a Nation, we must put 
the same effort into this threat as we did for the terrorism threat. 
The threat from China, particularly with respect to the long-term 
existential threat is hard to see and feel, but I would suggest it is 
much more dangerous to our viability as a Nation.
                            recommendations
    The holistic, and existential threat posed by the CCP is one of the 
few bipartisan agreements in the U.S. Congress today. We must take this 
opportunity to expeditiously advise, inform, and detail the threat to 
every fabric of our society, and why it matters. We must, as a Nation, 
compete at the highest level possible while at the same time understand 
why we are doing so, and what is at stake.
    1. Enhanced and aggressive real-time and actionable threat sharing 
        with private sector. Create an Economic Threat Intelligence 
        entity which delivers actionable, real-time threat information 
        to CEOs, boards of directors, State and local economic councils 
        to enable risk-based decision making on investments and 
        partnerships. The analogy would be the Financial Services ISAC. 
        This intelligence delivery mechanism should include the 
        intelligence community, FBI, and CISA and have at is core 
        constituency State and local entities at risk and utilize 
        existing vehicles such National Governors Association and the 
        Chamber of Commerce to increase threat awareness of illicit 
        activities investment risk at the State and local level.
    2. Congress must ensure U.S. Government agencies are leaning 
        aggressively forward in providing collected intelligence 
        pertaining to plans and intentions, as well as nation-state 
        activities, in software, coding, supply chain, and zero-day 
        capabilities. The U.S. Government must be more effective in 
        providing intelligence to the private sector. Enhanced 
        declassification of collected intelligence with respect to 
        threats to our economic well-being, industries, and companies 
        must be delivered at speed to impacted entities prior to the 
        threat becoming realized.
    3. Bipartisan Congressionally-led ``China Threat Road Shows'' to 
        advice and inform of the threat to CEOs, Governors, and Boards 
        of Directors in critical economic, research, and manufacturing 
        sectors.
    4. Close governance and oversight of China Competition legislation 
        with measurable outcomes and effectiveness reviews. 
        Particularly in the research and development space.
    5. Create a panel of CEOs who can conversely advise and inform 
        Congress, the IC, and U.S. Government entities on perspectives, 
        challenges, and obstacles in the investment arena and private 
        sector. Currently, there is no such venue existing. I would 
        recommend a Business Round Table type of framework. Membership 
        should be diverse and include but not limited to the following 
        sectors: Financial Services, Telecommunications, Energy, Bio 
        Pharmaceutical, Manufacturing, Aerospace, Transportation, 
        Private Equity and Venture Capital. Select key government 
        participants and encourage actionable outcomes. This entity 
        should be co-chaired by a CEO form this group.
    6. Create a domestic version of the State Department's Global 
        Engagement Center. The U.S. Government needs a ``sales and 
        marketing'' capability which can partner with U.S. business and 
        academia to guide new and emerging threat intelligence, answer 
        pertinent questions, and construct awareness campaigns against 
        the threat from the CCP and other similar issues.
    7. Establish an over-the-horizon panel to discuss, in a public 
        forum, emerging threats posed to the long-term economic well-
        being of America. The first topic should take a close look at 
        the strategic investments the CCP is making into State and 
        local pension plans, as well as the Federal Thrift Savings 
        Plan.
    8. Immediately create a Supply Chain Intelligence function which 
        can sit both in the U.S. Government, as well as outside of 
        government, to facilitate real-time intelligence sharing. This 
        entity should include members of the private sector skilled in 
        understanding our supply chain and who can expedite reacting to 
        emerging threats. This entity will also be able to provide the 
        U.S. Government cogent mitigation strategies and assistance 
        with policy formulation to protect our vulnerable supply chain 
        from persistent penetration and manipulation by China and 
        Russia.
    9. STEM must become a U.S. educational priority once again. It must 
        be funded, focused, measurable, and begin at the earliest 
        stages of the K through 12 educational tracks. It must also be 
        looked upon as a long-term project (25 years).

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Mr. Evanina.
    I now recognize General Guastella for his opening 
statement.

   STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL JOSEPH T. GUASTELLA, JR. 
         (RET.), SENIOR FELLOW, THE MITCHELL INSTITUTE

    General Guastella. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member 
Magaziner, Members of the committee, thank you for the 
opportunity to appear before you today.
    As an individual who spent over 3 decades in service to our 
Nation, I am also deeply concerned about the threats the 
Chinese Communist Party drives toward the U.S. homeland, 
especially in the military swim lane. That is why events like 
this today are so important.
    On my last assignment on active duty I was the deputy chief 
of staff for operations for the United States Air Force. Our 
job was to organize, train, and equip forces, air forces, and 
then present those forces to the combatant commanders around 
the world. That includes NORAD NORTHCOM, the command in charge 
of homeland defense. I also developed a very good understanding 
of the threats that China poses to the United States and the 
capabilities they use to achieve those those objectives.
    I would first like to highlight or begin describing the 
threat that China poses to the United States and its allies. So 
in 1991, when the United States was celebrating the end of the 
cold war, and we also were celebrating victory in Operation 
Desert Storm, China went to school on United States. They took 
note, and they started a very concerted and deliberate effort 
to modernize their military capabilities. Here we are, 3 
decades later, they have largely met that mark, and they even 
seek further progress. That's why this year, they saw even a 
significant increase in their defense spending. Their military 
now enjoys leading-edge capabilities that include long-range 
precision strike, hypersonic weapons, advanced integrated air 
defense weapons, stealthy aircraft, surface-to-air missiles, 
and electronic warfare. Several of those systems have the range 
to hold the U.S. homeland at risk. So the Chinese spy balloon, 
as was mentioned before, which garnered significant attention 
this past February, is a very loud wake-up call regarding CCP's 
global ambition.
    Unfortunately the United States is stretched thin when it 
comes to the capabilities and the capacity required to defend 
our homeland in the air domain--air and space domain. NORAD was 
originally designed to detect and defend North America from a 
catastrophic attack from the Soviet Union, later Russia. An 
additional role was added on after 9/11 to intercept, identify, 
and redirect unidentified aircraft that are approaching 
restricted areas. So the NORAD radars were optimized and tuned 
to detect aircraft that met those criteria. So balloons, until 
recently, generally did not fit in that category.
    As threats evolve, including balloons, stealth aircraft, 
UASs, unmanned aerial systems, cruise missiles, so must our 
detection and defense enterprise. This will require that we 
modernize current radars and install new sensors in emerging 
zones of vulnerability, not just over the Nation, but well 
outside our sovereign territories so we can get a heads-up that 
they are coming.
    We must invest resources in the NORAD mission. That command 
gets its aircraft from the U.S. Air Force, but the Air Force 
today is the oldest and the smallest it's ever been in history. 
We're still flying B52s that are 60 years old, tankers that are 
over 50 years old, fighters over 30 years old. Even the famed 
F22, the best air air fighter ever made, first flew in 1997.
    The homeland defense, however, doesn't start here in the 
homeland. Homeland defense starts abroad with the combatant 
commanders. The combatant commanders that have the forces that 
are capable of an offensive punch against our adversary 
countries that deters them from attacking United States. That's 
where it begins. The Air Force has to be modernized in the 
numbers necessary to meet the demands of the National Defense 
Strategy, as well as to deter threats against our homeland.
    More specifically, consider the Air Force's fighter 
inventory is too small to meet real-world demands. It's a major 
security concern, for while other services possess fighters, 
the Air Force is specifically tasked with homeland security, 
the Air Sovereignty Mission. The Air National Guard is the 
entity within the Air Force that bears a preponderance of 
homeland defense. Their mission is particularly hard-hit by the 
gap between old aircraft that are aging out of the inventory 
and a lack of new aircraft arriving to back-fill those spots on 
the ramp.
    So homeland defense also requires investment in 
modernization and command and control, resiliency ground and 
space-based sensors, data fusion, air refueling capabilities. 
Homeland defense is our highest priority mission. We need to 
start treating it that way.
    You know, and more story, you know, to share with, with the 
group here. On January 8, 2020, 11 Iranian ballistic missiles 
hit a U.S. base at Al Asad in Iraq. I was the coalition forces 
air component commander at that time. We possessed the 
intelligence about the attack was going to happen, we were able 
to detect the missiles at launch, we were able to track the 
trajectory, but when it came to shooting them down, to 
defeating the missiles, we lacked any options. Why? Because we 
did not have the capacity, the defensive capacity, due to the 
other global commitments that our Force was spread across. 
American service members had to ride out that attack and hope 
for the best. It was an appalling set of circumstances.
    Let's think what could happen against our homeland with 
threats like that.
    Adversaries like China understand these vulnerabilities. 
The United States is gradually waking up to this reality, but 
leaders have yet to seriously address the shortfall. We're 
still in a problem-admiring phase, not in a solution-
implementation phase. That has to change.
    So we have the bravest men and women in uniform. But we owe 
it to them to ensure they are prepared for the mission we ask 
them to execute. We owe it to our American citizens to ensure 
they are protected from attack. America's homeland is no longer 
a sanctuary against threats like China. We must recognize this 
new reality and aggressively close critical gaps in capacity 
and capability in the air domain.
    Thank you for allowing us to focus on this topic today, and 
I look forward to your questions.
    [The prepared statement of General Guastella follows:]
               Prepared Statement of Joseph T. Guastella
                             March 9, 2023
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, Members of the 
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. As 
an individual who spent over 3 decades in service to our Nation, I am 
deeply concerned about the threats the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
poses to the U.S. homeland. That is why events like today's hearing are 
so important.
    In my last assignment on active duty, I served as the deputy chief 
of staff for operations at Headquarters U.S. Air Force, where I was 
charged with leading the development and implementation of policy 
directly supporting global operations, force management, weather, 
training, and readiness across air, space, and cyber fields. To this 
end, I am well-versed in the threat China poses to the United States 
and the capabilities they have to manifest their objectives. It was my 
job to oversee airpower capabilities and capacity so that our combatant 
commands could respond to these challenges every day--and this included 
the homeland defense mission of North American Aerospace Defense 
Command (NORAD)/Northern Command (NORTHCOM).
    I would first like to begin by describing the threat China poses to 
the United States and its allies. In the 1991, when the United States 
was celebrating the end of the cold war and victory in Operation Desert 
Storm, China made a concerted decision to modernize their military 
capabilities as a key ingredient in empowering their ascent as a 
leading military superpower.
    Three decades later, they have largely met this mark and they seek 
further progress--that is why this year saw a marked increase in their 
defense spending. Their military now enjoys leading-edge capabilities 
that include long-range precision strike, hypersonic medium-range 
ballistic missiles, sophisticated integrated air defense system (IADS) 
comprised of stealthy fighter aircraft like the J-20 aircraft, surface-
to-air missiles (SAMS), and electronic warfare (EW) units. These 
capabilities radically complicate the operating environment for U.S. 
forces and could portend significant combat attrition, especially for 
forward-operating bases and the non-stealth portions of America's 
combat air arm which makes up a vast portion of Air Force aircraft. 
Several of these offensive systems have the range to hold U.S. 
territory at risk, affecting us right here in the homeland.
    The Chinese spy balloon, which garnered significant attention this 
past February, should serve as a wake-up call regarding the CCP's 
global ambitions. China's space-based intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance capabilities also gather information regarding the U.S. 
homeland. Nor are all these long-range systems passive threats. China's 
quest to field a ``fractional orbital bombardment system''--a long-
range missile that transits space en route to its target--are not 
capabilities designed to secure China's immediate borders. They are 
part of a strategic global strike system. The United States must take 
note.
    Unfortunately, the United States is stretched thin when it comes to 
the capabilities and capacity required to defend our homeland. NORAD 
was originally designed to detect and defend North America from a 
catastrophic attack from the Soviet Union, later Russia. An additional 
role was added after 9/11: to intercept, identify, and redirect 
unidentified aircraft heading toward restricted air space. So, the 
NORAD radars were optimized and tuned to detect aircraft that meet 
those criteria.
    Balloons--until recently--generally do not fit into that category. 
As the threat evolves, including balloons, stealth aircraft, UASs and 
cruise missiles . . . so must our detection and defense enterprise. 
This will require that we modernize current radars and install new 
radars to cover emerging zones of vulnerability, not just over our 
Nation but well outside our sovereign territory. Approaches to our 
homeland China would use are far different than those used by Russia. 
We must invest new resources in the NORAD mission. The command gets its 
aircraft from the Air Force, but our Air Force today is the oldest and 
smallest it's ever been in its history.
    The balloon intrusions should be a wake-up call to rebuild our air 
and space defenses--we are still flying B-52s over 60 years old; 
tankers over 50; and fighters over 30. Homeland defense doesn't start 
in the homeland. It starts abroad with the combatant commands having 
credible offensive punch to hold targets at risk in adversary 
countries. The Air Force needs to be modernized in the numbers 
necessary to meet the demands of our national defense strategy, and to 
deter threats against our homeland.
    More specifically, consider that the Air Force's fighter inventory 
is too small to meet real-world demand. This is a major security 
concern, for while other service branches possess fighter aircraft, the 
Air Force is specifically tasked with the homeland security air 
sovereignty mission.
    In 1991, the Air Force possessed 4,459 fighters. Today, it has 
2,221. This represents a 49 percent reduction in capacity--the majority 
of which were produced in the cold war. However, this decrease in 
volume is not matched with a drop in operational demand. Quite the 
contrary given that the Air Force has been meeting non-stop combat 
requirements since Desert Storm in 1991. As the numbers of fighters 
decreased, the workload assigned to the remaining aircraft increased. 
They are now physically worn out and must be retired. Fourteen years 
ago, a Congressional Budget Office report concluded: ``By 2009, 80 
percent of the [Air Force's fighter] aircraft had used more than 50 
percent of their originally planned service life. Clearly, the Air 
Force's fighter fleet is wearing out.''\1\ Circumstances have not 
improved over the ensuring decade, in fact, they have gotten worse. 
That is why you saw F-15C/Ds fighter aircraft withdrawn from Kadena Air 
Base in the Pacific this past year--not because the Air Force wanted to 
do this, but because the aircraft were so old they had to be retired 
and there were not enough new fighters to backfill them. Think of the 
signal that sent to China.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Congressional Budget Office (CBO), Alternatives for Modernizing 
U.S. Fighter Forces, (Washington, DC: CBO, May 2009), p. 55.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The simple reality is that Air Force has lacked funding necessary 
to procure a sufficient volume of new fighters to ensure the outflow of 
aging aircraft is matched by the inflow of newer examples. They have 
ranked third--behind the Army and Navy--in terms of Department of 
Defense funding for the past 3 decades.\2\ That manifested very real 
results. Consider that the Air Force's leading 5th generation fighter, 
the F-22, had its production terminated at less than 20--5 percent of 
the original requirement. In the 2000's, leaders outside the Air Force 
thought the era of peer conflict was over. They were wrong. Nor is this 
a one-off example, with the production ramp rate of the F-35 lagging 
dangerously behind original intentions. In 2020, the Air Force was 
supposed to have 800 F-35As in its inventory, but instead only had 
272.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \2\ David Deptula and Mark Gunzinger, Decades of Air Force 
Underfunding Threaten America's Ability to Win (Arlington, VA: Mitchell 
Institute for Aerospace Studies, 2022), p. 3.
    \3\ John A. Tirpak, ``Keeping 4th-Gen Fighters in the Game,'' Air 
Force Magazine, October 1, 2019.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Air National Guard, the entity which bears the preponderance of 
the homeland defense mission, is particularly hard-hit by gap between 
older aircraft aging out and a lack of new aircraft arriving to 
backfill their spots on the ramp. The Air National Guard tends to fly 
older fighters, so they are a fleet lead indicator for the broader Air 
Force. What happened at Kadena will be replicated throughout bases 
across America absent rapid intervention to reset the Air Force's 
fighter force.
    Homeland defense also requires investment and modernization in 
command and control, resiliency, ground and space-based sensors, data 
fusion technology, AI, and air refueling capabilities. Homeland defense 
is our highest-priority mission, we need to start treating it that way.
    We also lack sufficient capabilities and capacity to defend against 
a concerted air and missile attack at our forward bases. On January 8, 
2020, 11 Iranian ballistic missiles struck U.S. forces based at the Ayn 
al Asad military complex in Iraq. I was the Coalition Forces Air 
Component Commander at the time. Our leadership possessed intelligence 
signaling the attack would happen, we were able to detect the missiles 
being launched, and we could track their trajectory. However, when it 
came to defeating these missiles, we lacked viable options because the 
joint force lacked sufficient missile defense capacity given other 
global commitments. American service members and many allies had to 
ride out the attack and hope for the best. That was an appalling set of 
circumstances. Think if that had happened in your home town or key 
bases here in America.
    Adversaries like China understand these vulnerabilities. The United 
States is gradually waking up to this reality, but leaders have yet to 
seriously address the shortfall. Note how difficult it is to provide 
effective, sustainable solutions to Ukraine--guarding against 
everything from air strikes, drone attacks, and missile bombardment. We 
are still in a ``problem admiring'' phase, not in a ``solution 
implementation'' window. This must change.
    It is worth remembering that some of the first responders on the 
morning of 
9/11 were airmen. Two off them quickly scrambled from Andrews Air Force 
Base to intercept a hijacked airliner bound for the Nation's capital. 
We had no time to arm those F-16s because in the post-cold war era, we 
thought our homeland was safe--we had stopped sitting alert. That meant 
those airmen were prepared to sacrifice their lives to bring down that 
hijacked aircraft. The passengers on Flight 93 bravely took matters 
into their own hands before our airmen were asked to make that 
sacrifice. The point in telling this story is to highlight that we have 
the bravest men and women in uniform. But we owe it to them to ensure 
they are prepared for the mission we ask them to execute. We also owe 
it to our citizens, to ensure they are protected from attack. America's 
homeland is no longer a sanctuary. We must recognize this new reality 
and aggressively close critical gaps in capacity and capabilities for 
homeland defense. Thank you for focusing on this topic today. With 
that, I look forward to your question.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much for your opening 
statement.
    I now recognize Ms. Bingen.

   STATEMENT OF KARI A. BINGEN, DIRECTOR, AEROSPACE SECURITY 
  PROJECT AND SENIOR FELLOW, INTERNATIONAL SECURITY PROGRAM, 
         CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES

    Ms. Bingen. Thank you, Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member 
Magaziner, and distinguished Members of the subcommittee. Thank 
you for letting me appear before you today.
    I have been fortunate to examine these issues from my time 
at a technology start-up, time at the Department of Defense, 
and then here legislatively, as a staffer on the House Armed 
Services Committee.
    Let me start by saying conflict with China is not 
inevitable. Not inevitable. However, the Chinese Communist 
Party has ambitions to become the world's leading power and has 
undertaken a broad campaign using all tools of national power 
and influence to achieve its aims. While strategic competition 
and potential military conflict with China may seem abstract to 
many Americans, the Chinese surveillance balloon was a 
tangible, visible sign that the U.S. homeland is not out of 
reach of Beijing's threats. The piracy challenge is one of both 
national and economic security. It is not only the pacing 
military threat for the United States, but also the top threat 
to U.S. technology competitiveness.
    I will discuss three areas where the CCP threat to the U.S. 
homeland is particularly acute--technology acquisition, 
critical infrastructure, and influence operations--and then 
I'll offer a few recommendations to help address these 
challenges.
    First, technology acquisition. Beijing has made it a 
national goal to acquire foreign technologies, to advance its 
economy and modernize its military. It continues to use both 
legal and illegal methods to target U.S. technologies, 
including in areas such as high-performance computing, 
biopharmaceuticals, robotics, energy, and aerospace. It targets 
the people, information businesses, and research institutions 
in the United States that underpin them. These methods include 
economic espionage, cyber data exfiltration, joint ventures, 
research partnerships, and talent recruitment programs, among 
others. My written testimony offers several specific examples 
of where the CCP has put these methods into practice. This 
matters for our defense, as our military's battlefield 
advantage has long rested on our superior technology. However, 
that is at risk as Beijing seeks to close the gap in our 
technology advantage. This matters for American businesses, as 
Mr. Evanina said, wherein $225 to $600 billion is the annual 
estimated cost to the U.S. economy from stolen intellectual 
property. CCP law and policy further bolsters these methods. 
For example, its 2017 National Intelligence Law requires 
organizations and citizens to support intelligence work and to 
keep it secret.
    Second, the CCP is targeting critical infrastructure in the 
United States. I fully anticipate that Beijing would seek to 
disrupt it, possibly through cyber attacks, especially early in 
a conflict. This could be motivated by a desire to deter U.S. 
action, affect U.S. decision making, delay the mobilization of 
U.S. forces, or affect the will of the American people. The 
government has taken some steps to share intelligence 
information on PRC campaigns to target critical infrastructure, 
such as oil and gas pipelines, and importantly, it also 
included sharing tactics and techniques and procedures used by 
the Chinese.
    Third. The U.S. homeland is within reach of the PRC's 
influence activities. Examples include TikTok, that U.S. 
intelligence officials caution can be influenced by CCP-driven 
manipulation of its algorithms. They also include Operation Fox 
Hunt, where CCP-directed individuals spy on U.S.-based pro-
democracy advocates, intimidate Chinese and Chinese-American 
students at universities, and pressure individuals in the 
United States to return to China, including by threatening 
their family members. The PRC also exerts influence through its 
Belt and Road Initiative, exporting terrestrial infrastructure, 
information and communications technologies, and other 
technology areas. This global influence directly impacts U.S. 
businesses and U.S. security interests here at home.
    One acute area of competition is in commercial 
telecommunications, including satellite broadband 
communications like SpaceX's Starlink and Amazon's Project 
Kuiper, which CSIS recently examined. Further expansion of 
Chinese telecommunications services could boost Beijing's 
presence in foreign terrestrial networks, providing the CCP 
with remote access, enabling it to surveil users, block 
internet access, and sensor information.
    I offer a few recommendations to help address these 
challenges. Expanding education and awareness. This hearing is 
very important on that regard to remind the American public 
that the threat posed by the CCP is not abstract, nor solely a 
distant military conflict that could take place across the 
Pacific. The American public and businesses need to understand 
the security and economic risks posed by the CCP and understand 
that they are a target.
    Expand intelligence threat sharing with the private sector, 
building off CISA's work to date, so companies can better 
understand their vulnerabilities and make risk-informed 
decisions regarding their protection and resiliency.
    Transform counterintelligence and security missions, 
including leveraging technology like artificial intelligence to 
help identify supply chain vulnerabilities, track foreign 
agents, and illuminate disinformation.
    Leverage technology innovation. Maintaining U.S. technology 
leadership means not just preventing the transfer of technology 
to the PRC, but also setting the conditions for our innovation 
sector to stay ahead of the competition.
    Boosting cooperation with our allies and partners, which is 
a competitive advantage and source of strength that the CCP 
does not have. Technology cooperation can be a strong feature 
of these relationships.
    Then finally, continuing to invest in a strong defense, 
including homeland defense, which is required to deter PRC 
aggression, build resiliency to attacks, and ensure that we 
have the trained people posture, intelligence, weapon systems 
and munitions to defend the United States and the American 
people.
    Thank you again for your time today, and I look forward to 
your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Ms. Bingen follows:]
                  Prepared Statement of Kari A. Bingen
                             March 9, 2023
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished 
Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 
before you today to discuss ``Countering Threats from the CCP to the 
Homeland.'' The Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
does not take policy positions, so the views represented in this 
testimony are my own and not those of my employer.
    I have the privilege of leading the Aerospace Security Project at 
the Center for Strategic and International Studies, where I examine 
these issues largely through a national security lens, drawing from my 
experiences working at a U.S. technology startup, serving in the 
Department of Defense (DoD) guiding defense intelligence and security 
activities, and supporting the House Armed Services Committee.
    Conflict with China is not inevitable, but the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) has been studying the United States, studying our way of 
war and our vulnerabilities, expanding and modernizing its military, 
using its economic influence to coerce others, and putting in place the 
pieces to ``win without fighting.'' As stated in the administration's 
2022 National Security Strategy, the People's Republic of China (PRC) 
has ambitions ``to become the world's leading power'' and to ``reshape 
the international order . . . to its benefit.''\1\ For the Department 
of Defense, the PRC is its ``pacing challenge.''\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ ``National Security Strategy,'' The White House, October 12, 
2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Biden-
Harris-Administrations-National-Security-Strategy-10.2022.pdf.
    \2\ ``National Defense Strategy of The United States of America,'' 
Department of Defense, October 27, 2022,https://media.defense.gov/2022/
Oct/27/2003103845/-1/-1/1/2022-NATIONAL-DEFENSE-STRATEGY-NPR-MDR.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Beijing has undertaken a broad campaign using all tools of national 
power and influence--diplomatic, economic, military, technological, and 
informational--to achieve its aims. While strategic competition and 
potential military conflict with China may seem abstract to many 
Americans, the Chinese surveillance balloon, shot down off the East 
Coast on February 4, 2023, was a tangible, visible signal that the U.S. 
homeland is not out of reach of Beijing's threats. It is also a 
reminder that the CCP's broad campaign for global power status and 
domination in the Indo-Pacific necessitates a focus on the U.S. 
homeland.\3\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ ``Annual Threat Assessment of the U.S. Intelligence 
Community,'' Office of the Director of National Intelligence, February, 
7, 2022, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/assessments/ATA-2022-
Unclassified-Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    I offer three areas where the CCP threat to the U.S. homeland is 
particularly acute: Technology acquisition, critical infrastructure, 
and influence operations.
                         technology acquisition
    Beijing has made it a national goal to acquire foreign technologies 
to advance its economy and modernize its military. It continues to 
comprehensively target advanced U.S. technologies, including in areas 
such as high-performance computing, biopharmaceuticals, robotics, 
energy, and aerospace. These are among ten areas that Beijing has 
explicitly identified as high priorities in its ``Made in China 2025'' 
strategic initiative to achieve technological superiority.\4\ Aerospace 
is an example where Chinese President Xi Jinping has articulated his 
``space dream'' to make China the foremost space power by 2045.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \4\ Karen M. Sutter, `` `Made in China 2025' Industrial Policies: 
Issues for Congress,'' Congressional Research Service, December 22, 
2022, 1, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10964/9.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    To acquire these technologies, Beijing uses both licit and illicit 
methods to target the people, information, businesses, and research 
institutions in the United States that underpin them. These methods 
include economic espionage, cyber data exfiltration, joint ventures, 
research partnerships, and talent recruitment programs, among 
others.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \5\ ``Foreign Economic Espionage in Cyberspace,'' National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center, 2018, https://www.dni.gov/
files/NCSC/documents/news/20180724-economic-espionage-pub.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The Director of National Intelligence's 2018 Worldwide Threat 
Assessment judged that, ``most detected Chinese cyber operations 
against U.S. private industry are focused on cleared defense 
contractors or IT and communications firms.''\6\ Over the past several 
years, U.S. Department of Justice convictions or indictments highlight 
numerous of these methods in practice. Both Chinese nationals and U.S. 
citizens have been charged with economic espionage and attempted 
acquisition of sensitive U.S. defense technology in areas such as anti-
submarine warfare, aviation, and submarine quieting technology.\7\ 
Lucrative stipends, as part of Beijing's Thousand Talents Program, were 
offered to researchers to bring their technical knowledge to China.\8\ 
Chinese real estate investors sought U.S. farmland and wind farms in 
proximity to U.S. military bases, and Chinese telecommunications 
equipment (e.g., Huawei devices) has been found near U.S. missile 
bases, all of which could be used to surveil or disrupt U.S. defense 
activities.\9\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Daniel R. Coats, ``Worldwide Threats Assessment of the US 
Intelligence Community,'' Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, Feb 13, 2018, https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/
Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA_Unclassified-SSCI.pdf.
    \7\ United States Attorney's Office, District of Massachusetts, 
``Chinese National Arrested for Conspiring to Illegally Export U.S. 
Origin Goods Used in Anti-Submarine Warfare to China,'' Department of 
Justice, June 21, 2018, https://www.justice.gov/usao-ma/pr/chinese-
national-arrested-conspiring-illegally-export-us-origin-goods-used-
anti-submarine; United States Attorney's Office, Northern District of 
New York, ``Former GE Power Engineer Sentenced for Conspiracy to Commit 
Economic Espionage,'' Department of Justice, January 3, 2023, https://
www.justice.gov/usao-ndny/pr/former-ge-power-engineer-sentenced-
conspiracy-commit-economic-espionage.
    \8\ Ellen Barry and Gina Kolata, ``China's Lavish Funds Lured U.S. 
Scientists. What Did It Get in Return?,'' The New York Times, February 
6, 2020, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/06/us/chinas-lavish-funds-
lured-us-scientists-what-did-it-get-in-return.html.
    \9\ Eamon Javers, ``Chinese Company's Purchase of North Dakota 
Farmland Raises National Security Concerns in Washington,'' CNBC, July 
1, 2022, https://www.cnbc.com/2022/07/01/chinese-purchase-of-north-
dakota-farmland-raises-national-security-concerns-in-washington.html; 
Lars Erik Schoenander and Geoffrey Cain, ``China Is Buying the Farm,'' 
The Wall Street Journal, September 8, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/
articles/the-chinese-are-buying-the-farm-north-dakota-hong-kong-land-
food-shortage-supply-chain-usda-11662666515; Lillis, Katie Bo. ``CNN 
Exclusive: FBI Investigation Determined Chinese-Made Huawei Equipment 
Could Disrupt US Nuclear Arsenal Communications.'' CNN, July 25, 2022. 
https://www.cnn.com/2022/07/23/politics/fbi-investigation-huawei-china-
defense-department-communications-nuclear/index.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    This matters for our defense, as the PRC employs methods on 
American soil to funnel U.S. technology and know-how back to Beijing to 
advance its own military capabilities while also exploiting U.S. 
military vulnerabilities. The U.S. military's battlefield advantage has 
long rested on our superior technology. But that is at risk as Beijing 
seeks to close the gap in our technology advantage and become a world-
class military power, on par with the United States, by 2049.
    This matters for American businesses. The Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence estimated in 2015 that the cost of economic 
espionage through hacking is $400 billion per year, largely 
attributable to the PRC. The Commission on the Theft of American 
Intellectual Property in 2017 estimated that the cost to the U.S. 
economy from stolen intellectual property (IP) could range from $225 to 
$600 billion annually.\10\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Chris Strohm, ``No Sign China Has Stopped Hacking U.S. 
Companies, Official Says,'' Bloomberg, November 18, 2015, https://
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-11-18/no-sign-china-has-stopped-
hacking-u-s-companies-official-says; ``Update to the Report of the 
Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property,'' The 
National Bureau of Asian Research, February 2017, https://www.nbr.org/
wp-content/uploads/pdfs/publications/IP_Commission_Report_Update.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    CCP law and policy further bolsters these methods. The CCP's 
Military-Civilian Fusion (MCF) policy blurs the distinction between 
civil/commercial sectors and military/defense industrial sectors. It 
facilitates the transfer of technology and investments from the 
commercial sector to the military. Its national intelligence law, 
passed in 2017, requires that ``all organizations and citizens shall 
support, cooperate with, and collaborate in national intelligence work 
. . . and shall protect national work secrets they are aware of.''\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \11\ Murray Scot Tanner, ``Beijing's New National Intelligence Law: 
From Defense to Offense,'' Lawfare, July 20, 2017, https://
www.lawfareblog.com/beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-
offense.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Finally, the PRC's advances in technology will undoubtedly also be 
fueled by its increase in research and development (R&D) expenditures 
and its science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) workforce, 
both of which have trendlines that are increasing in China and 
decreasing in the United States. Data from the National Science Board 
shows that, over the 2000 to 2019 period, the United States share of 
global R&D declined from 37 to 27 percent while the share by China 
increased from 5 to 22 percent.\12\ A recent study by Georgetown's 
Center for Security and Emerging Technology estimated that, by 2025, 
China's yearly STEM PhD graduates will nearly triple the number of U.S. 
graduates (in the same fields).\13\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ Amy Burke et al., ``The State of U.S. Science and Engineering 
2022'', National Science Board, January 18, 2022, https://
ncses.nsf.gov/pubs/nsb20221/u-s-and-global-research-and-development.
    \13\ Remco Zwetsloot et al., ``China is Fast Outpacing U.S. STEM 
PhD Growth,'' Center for Security and Emerging Technology, Georgetown 
University, August 2021, https://cset.georgetown.edu/publication/china-
is-fast-outpacing-u-s-stem-phd-growth/.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PRC challenge is one of both national and economic security. It 
is not only the pacing military threat for the United States, but also 
the top threat to U.S. technological competitiveness.
                        critical infrastructure
    The CCP is targeting critical infrastructure in the United States. 
I fully anticipate that--should a crisis or conflict unfold--Beijing 
would seek to disrupt the operations of critical infrastructure in the 
United States, especially early on. This could be motivated by a desire 
to deter U.S. action, affect U.S. decision making, delay the 
mobilization of U.S. forces, or affect the will of the American people.
    The DoD's annual military assessment of the PRC was stark in its 
assessment, ``China seeks to create disruptive and destructive effects 
. . . to shape decision making and disrupt military operations in the 
initial stages of a conflict by targeting and exploiting perceived 
weaknesses of militarily superior adversaries.''\14\ Both the DoD and 
intelligence community have further assessed that China could launch 
cyber attacks against critical infrastructure in the United States, 
such as oil and gas pipelines, and rail systems, that would disrupt 
service for days to weeks.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \14\ ``Military and Security Developments Involving the People's 
Republic of China 2020: Annual Report to Congress,'' U.S. Department of 
Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-
DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF.
    \15\ ``Military and Security Developments Involving the People's 
Republic of China 2020: Annual Report to Congress,'' U.S. Department of 
Defense, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-
DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.PDF; ``Annual Threat Assessment 
of the U.S. Intelligence Community,'' Office of the Director of 
National Intelligence, February 2022, https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/
documents/assessments/ATA-2022-Unclassified-Report.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The ransomware network hack of the Colonial Pipeline in May 2021, 
although not attributed to the PRC, provided a glimpse of what such 
disruptions could look like, with gas shortages, long lines at gas 
stations, and the panic buying that ensued. Similarly, the electrical 
grid failure in Texas in February 2021, also not the result of any PRC 
action, showcased the wide-spread impact of the loss of power for 
millions of Americans.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \16\ ``The Timeline and Events of the February 2021 Texas Electric 
Grid Blackouts,'' The University of Texas at Austin's Energy Institute, 
July 2021, https://energy.utexas.edu/research/ercot-blackout-2021.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The U.S. Government has taken some steps to share intelligence 
information on PRC campaigns to target critical infrastructure. 
Notably, in July 2021, the Department of Homeland Security's 
Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA) released 
information on Chinese state-sponsored cyber intrusion campaigns, 
including tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) that have been 
been employed with the aim of ``holding U.S. pipeline infrastructure at 
risk'' through physical damage to pipelines or disruption of pipeline 
operations.\17\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ ``Cybersecurity Advisory: Chinese Gas Pipeline Intrusion 
Campaign, 2011 to 2013,'' Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security 
Agency, Department of Homeland Security, July 21, 2021, https://
www.cisa.gov/news-events/cybersecurity-advisories/aa21-201a.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
                          influence activities
    The U.S. homeland is within reach of the PRC's influence 
activities. The PRC ``conducts influence operations that target media 
organizations, business, academic, cultural institutions, and policy 
communities of the United States.''\18\ As part of its ``three 
warfares'' concept, the PRC seeks to leverage psychological warfare, 
public opinion warfare, and legal warfare to influence decision makers, 
shape public narratives, spread disinformation, and advance its 
interests.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \18\ ``Military and Security Developments Involving the People's 
Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress,'' U.S. Department of 
Defense, September 4, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/
2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Examples include TikTok, with over 100 million U.S. users that U.S. 
intelligence officials caution can be influenced by CCP-driven 
manipulation of its algorithms. They also include Operation Fox Hunt, 
where CCP-directed individuals spy on U.S.-based pro-democracy 
activists, intimidate Chinese and Chinese-American students at U.S. 
universities, and pressure individuals in the United States to return 
to China, including by threatening family members.\19\ In contrast, 
Chinese state-run media characterize Fox Hunt as, ``targeting suspected 
economic criminals, many of them corrupt officials.''\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Office of Public Affairs, ``Eight Individuals Charged With 
Conspiring to Act as Illegal Agents of the People's Republic of 
China,'' Department of Justice, October 28, 2020, https://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/eight-individuals-charged-conspiring-act-
illegal-agents-people-s-republic-china.
    \20\ Cao Yin, ``Success of Fox Hunt campaign continues,'' China 
Daily, November 5, 2015, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2015-11/05/
contentx22375920.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The PRC also exerts influence through its Belt and Road Initiative 
(BRI), including its Digital Silk Road (DSR) initiative, which involves 
a strategy of exporting terrestrial infrastructure, information and 
communications technology, and other high technology areas.\21\ This 
global influence directly impacts U.S. businesses and U.S. security 
interests here at home.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Makena Young and Akhil Thadani, ``Low Orbit, High Stakes: All 
in on the LEO Broadband Competition,'' Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, December 14, 2022, https://csis-website-
prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/221214_Young_Low- 
Orbit_High- Stakes.pdf?VersionId=vH1lp3dD7VcHGRcvuF9OdzV2WJc_KG42.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One acute area of competition is in commercial satellite 
communications, which CSIS recently examined in a study on low Earth 
orbit (LEO) broadband networks.\22\ These space-based constellations, 
such as SpaceX's Starlink and Amazon's Project Kuiper, offer a 
compelling solution for bridging the digital divide, specifically for 
rural and underserved communities, as nearly 40 percent of the world's 
population, and 28 percent of rural households in America remain 
unconnected. However, with its heavy economic presence in many BRI 
countries, China is positioned to negotiate concessions for its 
telecommunications and satellite broadband services, while discouraging 
the adoption of U.S. commercial services.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \22\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Further expansion of its telecommunications services could boost 
Beijing's presence in foreign terrestrial networks. This would provide 
the CCP with remote access to route data back to Beijing (as was 
reportedly done to the African Union Headquarters, whose network 
infrastructure was built and operated by Chinese entities), grant it 
extensive surveillance and coercive powers, enable it to block internet 
access or censor information, and exert greater control over 
international data flows.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Abdi Latif Dahir, ``China `Gifted' the African Union a 
Headquarters Building and Then Allegedly Bugged It for State Secrets,'' 
Quartz, January 30, 2018, https://qz.com/africa/1192493/china-spied-on-
african-union-headquarters-for-five-years.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    While the U.S. Government has taken steps to ban Chinese 
telecommunications devices by Huawei, ZTE, and others, such high levels 
of dependence by other countries on Chinese-built and -operated digital 
infrastructure may lead to greater adoption of Chinese-crafted techno-
authoritarian norms, standards, and data-governance practices.
                            recommendations
    Below are a few recommendations that I believe can help address 
these challenges.
   Expand education and awareness.--This hearing is an 
        important way to educate the American public that the threat 
        posed by the CCP is not an abstract notion nor solely a distant 
        military conflict that could take place across the Pacific. The 
        American public and businesses need to understand the security 
        and economic risks presented by the CCP and understand that 
        they are a target of CCP influence and operations. Clearly, the 
        U.S. homeland is not out of reach of Beijing's threats, with 
        PRC malign activities and operations occurring here every day, 
        below the level of armed conflict. The FBI now opens two new 
        counterintelligence investigations nearly every day.\24\ Should 
        deterrence fail, the CCP is likely to ensure that the conflict 
        is not contained in the Indo-Pacific but that it is felt in the 
        United States, particularly through disruptions of critical 
        infrastructure and influence campaigns.\25\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Remarks by FBI Director Christopher Wray at the Ronald Reagan 
Presidential Library and Museum, January 31, 2022, Simi Valley, CA, 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/director-wray-addresses-threats-posed-
to-the-us-by-china-020122.
    \25\ ``Military and Security Developments Involving the People's 
Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress,'' U.S. Department of 
Defense, September 4, 2020, https://media.defense.gov/2020/Sep/01/
2002488689/-1/-1/1/2020-DOD-CHINA-MILITARY-POWER-REPORT-FINAL.pdf.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Deepen threat sharing with the private sector.--Building off 
        CISA's work to-date, further expand threat intelligence sharing 
        with the private sector. Encourage the downgrading of 
        intelligence and provide security read-ons for business leaders 
        across critical infrastructure sectors, e.g., energy, water, 
        and financial services. Examples like the 2021 CISA advisory on 
        oil and gas pipeline cyber threats, where specific TTPs 
        attributable to Chinese state actors were shared, enable 
        companies to better understand their vulnerabilities, the 
        sophistication of adversary threats, and to make risk-informed 
        decisions regarding protection and resiliency measures.
   Transform counterintelligence (CI) and security missions.--
        CI and security missions have traditionally involved manual, 
        labor-intensive processes, from espionage casework to 
        background investigations for security clearances to defense 
        industry site visits for inspections. The scale of the CCP 
        threat, the various methods it uses for acquiring technology, 
        and the sheer volume of data that could be tapped into, 
        necessitate adapting the tradecraft for these challenges. This 
        includes incorporating new technologies, approaches to, and 
        additional resources for the mission. For example, how can big 
        data and artificial intelligence/machine learning (AI/ML) help 
        identify supply chain vulnerabilities, monitor abnormal cyber 
        activities, track foreign agents, and illuminate 
        disinformation? How can CI analysts work with technology start-
        ups, on relevant business time lines, to prevent investment 
        deals that involve adversarial capital?
   Leverage technology innovation.--Maintaining U.S. 
        technological leadership means not just preventing the transfer 
        of technology to the PRC, but also setting the conditions for 
        our innovation sector to prosper and to stay ahead of the 
        competition. We are in a period of rapid technological change, 
        with the commercial sector leading in many areas of 
        technological innovation. The Government should seek greater 
        adoption and integration of commercial technologies to support 
        mission needs, taking advantage of their speed, agility, and 
        the private capital being invested in them.
   Boost cooperation with allies and partners.--Our alliances 
        and partnerships are a competitive advantage and source of 
        strength that the CCP does not have. In order to lessen this 
        advantage, China is actively trying to divide and weaken U.S. 
        alliances and partnerships.\26\ Our technology is soft power 
        for the United States, and technology cooperation can be a 
        strong feature of these relationships while also bolstering our 
        private-sector innovation base. But increasing cooperation will 
        require revisiting U.S. technology control policies. We need to 
        strike the right balance between protecting our sensitive 
        technology, recognizing Beijing's extensive efforts to steal 
        it, and enabling American companies to be the partner of choice 
        for our allies and partners.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ Seth G. Jones, ``Empty Bins in a Wartime Environment: The 
Challenge to the U.S. Defense Industrial Base,'' Center for Strategic 
and International Studies, January 23, 2023, https://www.csis.org/
analysis/empty-bins-wartime-environment-challenge-us-defense-
industrial-base.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
   Continue investing in a strong defense.--Continued 
        investment in a strong defense is required to deter PRC 
        aggression, build resiliency to attack, and ensure we have the 
        trained people, posture, intelligence, weapon systems, and 
        munitions to defend the United States and the American people.
    Thank you again for your time today and I look forward to your 
questions.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Ms. Bingen.
    The Chair now recognizes Dr. Jost for his opening 
statement.

    STATEMENT OF TYLER JOST, PH.D., ASSISTANT PROFESSOR OF 
 POLITICAL SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS, BROWN 
                           UNIVERSITY

    Mr. Jost. Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and 
distinguished Members of the subcommittee, thank you for the 
opportunity to testify today. It is really an honor to be with 
you.
    My testimony is given as a scholar of Chinese foreign 
policy, and I emphasize this for two reasons. First, my role in 
academia is one of a researcher, not an administrator, and my 
testimony is not on behalf of or directly or indirectly 
associated with my employer. Second, as a former intelligence 
officer in the U.S. military, I am well aware that some of the 
most detailed reporting on topics as sensitive as homeland 
security remained classified. And as such, the testimony I am 
best positioned to offer pertains to the scholarly conclusions 
that can be drawn based upon publicly-available research.
    My remarks today will focus on two areas. No. 1, the 
broader strategic context through which China's overseas 
intelligence collection and information campaigns should be 
viewed, and No. 2, what the publicly-available research to date 
can tell us about the scope and effectiveness of those 
campaigns.
    The competition between the United States and China 
represents one of the defining international challenges of this 
century. But in my view, at the center of this critical problem 
rests two issues that most divide Washington and Beijing, the 
future of Taiwan and perceptions that the other side poses an 
existential threat to the stability of the domestic regime. 
Thus, while it is important to seriously evaluate the threats 
to the homeland posed by China, you should not distract 
attention from the issues that are likely to define the future 
of the global competition at their root.
    China's overseas activities that emerge from this 
contemporary strategic context can be loosely divided into two 
categories. The first focuses on China's intelligence 
collection, which is well-documented. The recent incident in 
which a Chinese high-altitude balloon traversed American 
airspace illustrates in vivid fashion that China is willing to 
assume risks in order to gather data against American targets. 
In parallel to intelligence collection, China engages in 
operations to disseminate information to foreign audiences. To 
date, the bulk of these activities are aimed at shaping global 
public opinion. In simplest terms, China presents foreign 
citizens with information with a hope that it will shape the 
target's attitudes and perhaps their behavior. These efforts to 
shape foreign public opinion through party propaganda are real, 
and their scope is broad. But there are a few comparatively few 
studies that apply validated research methods for estimating 
the causal effect that exposure to such messages have on 
foreign audiences. In addition, trends in the global public 
opinion should provide some comfort. If one judges the 
effectiveness of China's public diplomacy campaign based solely 
on China's approval rating in foreign countries, the effort 
has, at least to date, been a failure.
    Finally, what evidence we do have suggests there are 
several reasons why these operations might actually prove to be 
less effective than some of us might fear. By emphasizing gaps 
in public knowledge, I am not suggesting that we can dismiss 
potential threats that China poses to the U.S. homeland. The 
fact that China has demonstrated its intent to engage in both 
intelligence collection and efforts to shape foreign public 
opinion, coupled with the competitive nature of the bilateral 
relationship broadly, is sufficient cause for serious 
attention. Rather, my hope is that emphasizing what we do and 
do not yet know can illuminate policy recommendations which are 
detailed in my written testimony.
    Allow me to briefly summarize them here.
    First, the U.S. Government should devote resources toward 
publicly-available research that fills in gaps in our knowledge 
regarding China's activities abroad.
    Second, the U.S. Government should use diplomatic channels 
to reestablish opportunities for American researchers to better 
understand the Chinese political system and do so in ways that 
they feel protected from potential exploitation and detainment 
by the Chinese authorities.
    Third, the U.S. Government needs to better disclose its 
understanding of the threats that China poses to homeland 
security. Specifically, it needs to provide citizens with more 
data about the different risks that American citizens assume 
when they use foreign technologies.
    Thank you very much for your time, and I look forward to 
answering your questions.
    [The prepared statement of Mr. Jost follows:]
                    Prepared Statement of Tyler Jost
                             March 9, 2023
    Chairman Pfluger, Ranking Member Magaziner, and distinguished 
Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify 
before the Subcommittee on Counterterrorism, Law Enforcement, and 
Intelligence. My remarks today will focus on two areas: (1) The broader 
strategic context through which China's overseas intelligence 
collection and information campaigns should be viewed; and (2) what the 
currently available evidence can tell us about the scope and 
effectiveness of these campaigns.
    My testimony today is given as a scholar of Chinese foreign policy 
and U.S.-China relations. I emphasize this for two reasons. First, my 
role in academia is one of a researcher, rather than an administrator. 
My testimony is not on behalf of or directly or indirectly associated 
with my employer. Second, as former intelligence officer in the U.S. 
military, I am well aware that some of the most detailed reporting on a 
topic as sensitive as homeland security remains classified. As such, 
the testimony I am best positioned to offer pertains to the scholarly 
conclusions that can be drawn based on publicly-available research.
    To summarize, my assessment regarding China's threat to the U.S. 
homeland is three-fold. First, it is clear that China is interested in 
using its capabilities to gather information and promote narratives 
that are consistent with its interests. Second, publicly-available 
research provides inconclusive evidence regarding the effectiveness of 
China's operations, particularly those aimed at shaping global public 
opinion. Third, the U.S. Government should consider devoting more 
resources toward research that can more precisely and conclusively 
assess the level of threat posed by China's activities in the United 
States. The absence of authoritative and publicly-available evidence 
does not necessarily confirm the ineffectiveness of China's actions, 
but leaves observers without a clear picture of how to rank the 
severity of these threats in comparison to other aspects of American 
foreign policy toward China, such as the emerging bilateral security 
competition and the possibility of future military conflict.
            the context of u.s.-china strategic competition
    The competition between the United States and China represents one 
of the defining international challenges of this century. In my view, 
the central problem of the U.S.-China relationship continues to be how 
to manage the two issues that most divide Washington and Beijing.
    The first is that the United States and China have potentially 
irreconcilable differences over Taiwan. These differences have been 
effectively managed for decades, but both sides are increasingly 
apprehensive about the ability to maintain the status quo. There is 
healthy debate among scholars as to what is driving recent 
apprehensions. Some emphasize changes to the balance of power.\1\ 
Others emphasize the difficulties of credible assurance, which might 
cause Beijing to feel it has no choice but to take military action.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \1\ Heginbotham, Eric, et al. The US-China Military Scorecard: 
Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996-2017. Santa 
Monica: Rand Corporation, 2015; Kastner, Scott L. ``Is the Taiwan 
Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the prospects for armed conflict 
between China and Taiwan.'' International Security 40.3 (2015): 54-92.
    \2\ Blanchette, Jude and Ryan Hass. ``The Taiwan Long Game: Why the 
Best Solution Is No Solution.'' Foreign Affairs. 102.1 (2023): 102-114; 
Weiss, Jessica Chen. ``The U.S. Should Deter--Not Provoke--Beijing over 
Taiwan.'' The Washington Post. February 20, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These dynamics are primed to put the United States in a difficult 
position. If the United States hopes to deter future military action 
against Taiwan, it will need to do one of the following: (1) Match 
Chinese capabilities in the region to keep the costs of conflict 
prohibitively high; (2) reassure Beijing that the United States and 
Taiwan will not change the status quo, assuming that such concerns are 
central to Beijing's decision making; or (3) some combination of the 
two. If the United States does not manage this aspect of the bilateral 
relationship effectively, deterrence may fail. The consequences of such 
a conflict would be devastating, not only in terms of the human and 
economic costs imparted on both sides, but also in terms of the 
reputational toll to the credibility of American strategic judgment if 
it fails to win. The stakes of successfully navigating this issue could 
not be higher.
    The second issue is that the United States and China eye each 
other's domestic institutions with suspicion. Chinese decision makers 
think about national security as the security of the regime.\3\ From 
the perspective of Beijing's leaders, one of the most formative events 
in the country's history was the collapse of communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe, followed by the Soviet Union, which demonstrated the 
possibility of a similar fate for the Chinese Communist Party.\4\ 
Beijing views some, although not all, of the global rules and norms 
that emerged after the cold war as threats to the regime's stability, 
particularly those regarding the effectiveness and appropriateness of 
democratic institutions.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \3\ Weiss, Jessica Chen. ``A World Safe for Autocracy?'' Foreign 
Affairs 98.4 (2019): 92-108; Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. ``Internal 
Security & Grand Strategy: China's Approach to National Security Under 
Xi Jinping.'' Statement before the US-China Economic and Security 
Review Commission, Hearing on US-China Relations at the Chinese 
Communist Party's Centennial (2021).
    \4\ Sarotte, Mary Elise. ``China's Fear of Contagion: Tiananmen 
Square and the Power of the European Example.'' International Security 
37.2 (2012): 156-182; Gewirtz, Julian. Never Turn Back: China and the 
Forbidden History of the 1980's. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
2022.
    \5\ Johnston, Alastair Iain. ``China in a World of Orders: 
Rethinking Compliance and Challenge in Beijing's International 
Relations.'' International Security 44.2 (2019): 9-60.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Thus, while it is important to seriously evaluate the threats that 
China poses to the homeland, these inquiries should not distract 
attention from the issues that are likely to be central in the global 
competition--and will greatly shape whether the two sides end up in 
what could be the most costly and dangerous conflict between two major 
powers since 1945.
                         ccp activities abroad
    It is helpful to view China's activities toward the U.S. homeland 
in this context. Like many countries, China seeks to gain advantages 
over states with whom it has differences in order to improve its 
bargaining power. The more intelligence that China is able to collect 
regarding foreign military capabilities, for instance, the more they 
might be able to emulate those capabilities within their own military 
portfolio, with an eye toward bargaining hard for the two priority 
issues discussed above.
    China's overseas activities that emerge from this strategic context 
can be loosely divided into two categories. The first focuses on 
intelligence collection. The second focuses on information 
distribution. It is important to distinguish these two areas, because 
each is quite different in terms of the nature, scope, and potential to 
impart costs on the United States.
Intelligence Collection
    In terms of intelligence collection, it is well-documented that 
China is gathering data in order to improve its military capacity, 
provide insight into U.S. decision-making processes, and potentially 
gain a tactical advantage over the United States in the event of a 
future conflict. The recent incident in which a Chinese high-altitude 
balloon traversed American airspace illustrates in vivid fashion that 
China is willing to assume risks in order to gather data against U.S. 
targets.
    The fact that this event occurred shortly before Secretary of State 
Anthony Blinken's planned diplomatic visit to China is noteworthy. If 
recent reporting from the U.S. Department of Defense stating that Xi 
Jinping was unaware of the timing of this particular mission is true, 
it suggests that Beijing may have delegated decision making regarding 
tactical execution of these operations to bureaucratic stakeholders who 
had limited understanding of how the disclosure of such an intelligence 
mission could shape China's other strategic priorities.\6\ Such a 
posture could imply that Beijing has a high level of risk tolerance in 
its intelligence collection.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \6\ Eric Schmitt and Zach Montague. ``Balloon Crisis Highlighted a 
Split in China's Leadership, Pentagon Official Says,'' The New York 
Times, February 17, 2023.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    There are equally concerning aspects the security of personal data. 
Investigations into Chinese intelligence have long noted Beijing's 
interest in collecting data on foreign citizens, demonstrated by the 
2015 Office of Personnel Management data breach and the 2017 cyber 
espionage operation against Equifax.\7\ These events, coupled with the 
technical realities of digital technologies, illustrate that Government 
communications and the privacy of American citizens may both 
potentially be compromised through the use of foreign hardware and 
software.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \7\ David E. Sanger and Julie Hirschfeld Davis. ``Hacking Linked to 
China Exposes Millions of U.S. Workers,'' The New York Times, June 4, 
2015; Katie Benner. ``U.S. Charges Chinese Military Officers in 2017 
Equifax Hacking,'' The New York Times, May 7, 2020.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    It seems more than plausible that China's defense espionage 
campaign has contributed to its ability to develop more advanced 
military technologies, which could shape its ability to fight and win a 
war in the Asia-Pacific region.\8\ There is less publicly-available 
reporting to document whether these intelligence operations, which have 
been successful at the collection phase, have also been effective in 
advancing Beijing's broader diplomatic, economic, and security goals 
beyond defense production.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \8\ Department of Defense. Report on Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People's Republic of China, 2022, 147, 153.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Simply collecting data, particularly in large quantities, is 
insufficient to help decision makers achieve their goals.\9\ I am 
unaware of any publicly-available study that has been able to document 
such a connection in the recent past. Recognizing this gap in our 
understanding is important, not only because it should drive the United 
States' own intelligence collection priorities, but also because we 
should recognize the challenges Beijing will face in effectively 
managing such large amounts of data.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \9\ Wohlstetter, Roberta. Pearl Harbor: Warning and Decision. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1962.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Shaping Global Public Opinion
    In parallel to intelligence collection, China engages in operations 
to disseminate information to foreign audiences. To date, the bulk of 
these activities are aimed at shaping global public opinion.\10\ In 
simplest terms, China presents foreign citizens with information with 
the hope that it will shape the target's attitudes and, possibly, 
behavior. Perhaps the most concerning facet of these activities 
occurred last fall, when Meta and Google each reported that China-based 
groups had disseminated political content prior to the 2022 midterm 
elections.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \10\ Diamond, Larry, and Orville Schell, eds. Chinese Influence and 
American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance. Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 2018; Brazys, Samuel, and Alexander Dukalskis. 
``China's Message Machine.'' Journal of Democracy 31.4 (2020): 59-73.
    \11\ Kurlantzick, Joshua. ``China's Growing Attempts to Influence 
U.S. Politics.'' Council on Foreign Relations, October 31, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The idea of information control and propaganda is deeply embedded 
in the Chinese Communist Party's institutions--and it is easy to see 
how this would naturally spill over into efforts to shape public 
opinion abroad.\12\ They also tie into the second core issue motivating 
the bilateral competition: China's concern about regime survival and 
the threat that a lack of international status might have on the 
Party's continued ability to rule. Furthermore, it is plausible that 
China genuinely believes that the rest of the world misunderstands it--
and that these misunderstandings can be rectified through methods 
similar to those it employs at home.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \12\ King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. ``How 
Censorship in China Allows Government Criticism But Silences Collective 
Expression.'' American Political Science Review 107.2 (2013): 326-343; 
Roberts, Margaret E. Censored: Distraction and Diversion Inside China's 
Great Firewall. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    These efforts to shape foreign public opinion through party 
propaganda are real and their scope broad. It is estimated that China 
spends approximately $8 billion on public diplomacy efforts alone.\13\ 
To date, however, there is limited publicly-available research 
documenting whether China's operations to shape foreign attitudes have 
been effective. For example, China Global Television Network (CGTN), a 
broadcasting company affiliated with the Chinese state, is actively 
disseminating China's public messaging world-wide.\14\ But there are 
few studies that apply validated research methods for estimating the 
causal effect of exposure to such messages on public opinion.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \13\ Martin, Peter. China's Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf 
Warrior Diplomacy. New York: Oxford University Press, 2021, 213.
    \14\ Diamond and Schell 2018, 103.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    The available evidence suggests several reasons why these 
operations might actually prove to be less effective than we might 
fear. Broadly, efforts to shape foreign public opinion do not always 
work out the way that states hope. Some research suggests, for example, 
that salient components of China's public diplomacy initiatives do not 
improve foreign attitudes toward China.\15\ Scholars at Yale University 
have found that Twitter messaging by Chinese diplomats were only able 
to positively shape perceptions of China when the message was framed in 
positive terms. When Chinese diplomats instead resorted to nationalist 
messages, often termed ``Wolf Warrior'' diplomacy, Twitter messages 
instead had a negative effect on foreign public opinion.\16\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \15\ Green-Riley, Naima. How States Win Friends and Influence 
People Overseas: The Micro-Foundations of U.S. and Chinese Public 
Diplomacy (PhD Thesis). Harvard Department of Government.
    \16\ Mattingly, Daniel C., and James Sundquist. ``When Does Public 
Diplomacy Work? Evidence from China's `Wolf Warrior' Diplomats.'' 
Political Science Research and Methods (2022).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Some of the best available evidence on the domestic effects of 
China's propaganda also suggests that such messages do not necessarily 
operate as one might think. Several experimental studies have found 
that propaganda inside China can backfire, causing Chinese citizens to 
adopt less favorable views toward the government.\17\ It is worth 
noting, however, that these studies have also found that Chinese 
propaganda is effective in signaling the strength of the state. That 
is, propaganda does not always change political attitudes, but it does 
remind citizens of the CCP's ability to coerce. Other studies suggest 
that Chinese domestic propaganda can be effective when it is able to 
emotionally resonate with its citizens, such as through nationalistic 
narratives recounting past wars in a positive light.\18\ However, it is 
not yet clear that these same methods can be effectively applied in 
foreign countries.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \17\ Huang, Haifeng. ``Propaganda as Signaling.'' Comparative 
Politics 47.4 (2015); Huang, Haifeng. ``The Pathology of Hard 
Propaganda.'' The Journal of Politics 80.3 (2018): 1034-1038.
    \18\ Mattingly, Daniel C., and Elaine Yao. ``How Soft Propaganda 
Persuades.'' Comparative Political Studies 55.9 (2022): 1569-1594.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    One possible reason that Chinese propaganda could fail to sway 
global public opinion as intended is that foreign audiences may ascribe 
malign intentions to foreign governments, especially China. Research 
suggests that the ability to sway political attitudes depends in part 
on whether a target audience believes that what social scientists term 
the ``cue-giver'' (in this case China) has the audience's best 
interests at heart.\19\ To illustrate this point in more familiar 
terms, consider how an American voter may be more likely to update 
their political attitudes when they receive a message from a co-
partisan than when they receive one from a member of another party. 
There is an intuitive logic behind this: people make general judgments 
about who they deem trustworthy (e.g., one who shares the same basic 
political values) and then prioritize messages from these sources as 
they wade through the vast amounts of information to which they are 
exposed in daily life.\20\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \19\ Lupia, Arthur, Mathew D. McCubbins, and Lupia Arthur. The 
Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need to Know? New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
    \20\ Druckman, James N. ``On the Limits of Framing Effects: Who Can 
Frame?'' The Journal of Politics 63.4 (2001): 1041-1066.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Applying this intuition to China's public messaging campaigns would 
suggest that American citizens may be predisposed to severely discount 
or even completely discard messages received from Chinese propaganda 
outlets, provided that their baseline trust of such sources is low and 
they are able to accurately identify the creator of the content. Some 
studies of public diplomacy in other country contexts, usually focusing 
on the ability of American officials to shape global public opinion, 
are congruent with this conclusion.\21\ Other experimental studies find 
a similar effect with regard to American perceptions of foreign public 
diplomacy as well.\22\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \21\ Goldsmith, Benjamin E., and Yusaku Horiuchi. ``Spinning the 
Globe? US Public Diplomacy and Foreign Public Opinion.'' The Journal of 
Politics 71.3 (2009): 863-875.
    \22\ Rhee, Kasey, Charles Crabtree, and Yusaku Horiuchi. 
``Perceived Motives of Public Diplomacy Influence Foreign Public 
Opinion.'' Political Behavior (2023).
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    In addition, trends in global public opinion should provide some 
comfort. If one judges the effectiveness of China's public diplomacy 
campaign based solely on China's approval rating in foreign countries, 
the effort has been a catastrophic failure. This is true not only in 
the United States, but in Japan, Australia, South Korea, and much of 
Europe as well. Across these countries, China is less well-trusted 
today that it was 10 years ago. China may be attempting to win hearts 
and minds globally, but they have not succeeded in many contexts.\23\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \23\ Silver, Laura, Christine Huang and Laura Clancy. ``How Global 
Public Opinion of China Has Shifted in the Xi Era.'' Pew Research 
Center, September 28, 2022.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    If China's public diplomacy campaign has backfired (i.e., the 
effect of the program has been in the opposite direction than Beijing 
intended), it would be unsurprising not only for the reasons cited 
above, but also because China has often miscalculated in its foreign 
policy decision making. For example, one scholar at the University of 
Southern California has shown that China's attempts to use economic 
statecraft to advance its relationships with other countries are often 
ineffective, particularly when the target state is a democracy.\24\ 
Several of China's international security crises, ranging from the 1969 
Sino-Soviet Border Conflict to the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, failed to 
achieve many of the strategic objectives toward which Beijing's use of 
force was aimed.\25\ In short, Beijing's ability to get what it wants 
in world politics is far from unchecked.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \24\ Wong, Audrye. ``How Not to Win Allies and Influence 
Geopolitics: China's Self-Defeating Economic Statecraft,'' Foreign 
Affairs. 100.3 (2021), 44-53.
    \25\ Jost, Tyler. ``Authoritarian Advisers: Institutional Origins 
of Miscalculation in China's International Security Crises,'' 
International Security, forthcoming.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Three points of caution are merited with regard to these data. 
First, the aggregate relationship between a more active public 
diplomacy campaign and less favorable public opinion toward China is 
confounded by other events, particularly the COVID-19 pandemic. This 
implies that China could be able to shape public opinion abroad more 
effectively as the pandemic ends. Second, while the decline in public 
opinion toward China is well-documented in developed countries, these 
polls often do not include countries from the Global South, which may 
be a priority for Chinese decision makers. Third, none of the research 
discussed above addresses the possibility that China could use fake on-
line profiles to hide the source of China's messaging from foreign 
audiences.
                         policy recommendations
    By emphasizing gaps in public knowledge, I am not suggesting that 
we can dismiss the potential threats that China poses to the U.S. 
homeland. The fact that China has demonstrated its intent to engage in 
both intelligence collection and efforts to shape foreign public 
opinion, coupled with the competitive nature of the bilateral 
relationship, is sufficient cause for serious attention. Rather, my 
hope is that emphasizing what we do and do not yet know can illuminate 
recommendations for policy.
    1. Fund Social Science Research on the Topic.--The U.S. Government 
        should devote resources toward publicly-accessible research 
        that fills gaps in our knowledge regarding China's activities 
        abroad. The social sciences are in the early stages of 
        understanding whether and how new types of social media, 
        sometimes employed by foreign actors, can shape public opinion. 
        It is worth emphasizing again that existing research is 
        insufficient to determine how costly these new technologies 
        will be to the U.S. homeland. Yet, U.S. policy makers should be 
        open to the possibility that better research on the topic 
        would, for example, lead to the conclusion that China's 
        capacity to shape American public opinion is low--and the 
        broader conclusion that U.S. efforts might be better directed 
        toward other parts of the competitive relationship.
    2. Protect U.S. Researchers in China.--The U.S. Government should 
        work to ensure that American scholars who choose to conduct 
        field research in China are protected.\26\ Our ability to 
        answer many of the most pressing questions regarding the future 
        of the competition between the United States and China is 
        increasingly limited by restrictions on American scholars by 
        the Chinese government. The U.S. Government should use 
        diplomatic channels to reestablish opportunities for American 
        researchers to study the Chinese political system while feeling 
        protected from potential exploitation and detainment by Chinese 
        authorities.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    \26\ For an overview, see Greitens, Sheena Chestnut, and Rory 
Truex. ``Repressive Experiences Among China Scholars: New Evidence from 
Survey Data.'' The China Quarterly 242 (2020): 349-375.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    3. Build Evidence-Based Public Awareness.--The U.S. Government 
        needs to explain the threats that China poses the privacy of 
        their data to the American public. Specifically, it needs to 
        provide more detailed explanations of the different risks that 
        American citizens assume when they use foreign and domestic 
        technologies. This may seem obvious to individuals who have 
        served in government, but the social appeal of these 
        technologies will raise the burden of proof for U.S. policy 
        makers to convince American citizens.

    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you, Dr. Jost.
    Members will now be recognized in order of seniority, 
alternating between Republican and Democrat for 5 minutes of 
questioning. It is my hope today that we will be able to go 
through maybe two rounds of questioning.
    The Chair now recognizes myself for 5 minutes of 
questioning.
    I think what we heard there is just an incredible breadth 
of knowledge and experience about what the Chinese Communist 
Party has been doing, you know, for several decades; what they 
are currently doing; and the threats that, as that wake-up call 
moment happened several weeks ago with the Chinese surveillance 
balloon, that it is incumbent upon us to really start 
uncovering these threats and focusing on them. Quite honestly, 
from what we have heard from this panel--thank you for all of 
your opening statements--we could have several hearings on the 
individual subjects. But appreciate the time here.
    I will start with Mr. Evanina.
    When you look at the ownership of property in the United 
States and we go back, PRC-based ownership of U.S. farmland in 
the last 20 years has jumped from about $81 million in 2010 to 
$1.9 billion at the end of 2021. Moreover, I think it is widely 
reported that a lot of the PRC or PRC-linked ownership is 
adjacent to very sensitive facilities, government facilities, 
military facilities in the United States. Can you provide 
insight as to why that is, what the goal is, and what they are 
doing with those lands?
    Mr. Evanina. Thanks for the question, Mr. Chairman.
    I'm going to try really hard to stay in the unclassified 
realm here, but it's a comprehensive strategic plan that goes 
back about a decade to the CCP's plans and intentions and 
incorporates multifaceted intelligence apparatus, both the MSS 
and the PLA. It starts what I would call and phrase outside the 
fence line of DoD facilities. That began with the Huawei cell 
tower capabilities, tracking and being able to monitor not only 
trip movements, but weapon silos and other areas, the strategic 
purchases of businesses outside of not only military bases but 
military residential areas, the influence of the Chinese to be 
able to do software and malware manipulation, penetration on 
electrical grids and power stations outside of the military 
bases.
    I think the next aspect is exactly what you referenced, 
right? What is the next thing that the Communist Party of China 
and Russia, for that matter, are looking to exploit outside the 
fence line of U.S. military bases? That includes land 
purchases. I think when you look at all the land that not only 
the Chinese Communist Party and their proxies have purchased, 
you are going to find a strategic military base and/or 
subterrestrial things in the ground as well as energy issues to 
the military base. Also we look at the balloon we just saw, 
very similar trajectory to those areas. So it's a comprehensive 
strategic plan that you see from the Communist Party of China.
    Chairman Pfluger. Do you think there was coordination 
between--staying in the unclassified--I mean the lands that the 
balloon flew over, purchases that we have seen, I mean could 
there be coordination either now or in the future?
    Mr. Evanina. Absolutely. There's nothing done by the 
Communist Party of China that does not have strategic entity or 
coordination. I think we'll see in the future, if it's 
declassified, what some of the things the balloon was 
surveilling and or potentially doing more surveillance too.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
    General Guastella, thanks for the testimony. You know, the 
threats that you mentioned that you are very worried about and 
concerned about, I mean what keeps you up at night on the air 
power threats and what needs to happen resource-wise, 
specifically here or at NORTHCOM in order to identify, deter, 
detect, and defeat?
    General Guastella. Thank you, Chairman.
    What keeps me up at night is the age and the capabilities 
of our existing air and space forces.
    You know, for 20 years we have been engaged in the very 
land-centric campaigns in the Middle East. We have been doing 
counterinsurgency, counter-violent extremists, 
counterterrorism, all important for our Nation. But during that 
20 years, we did not invest in air and space forces to the 
extent we needed to. So we are left with that old fleet that I 
described before. You know, a 30-year-old fighter can do fine 
providing close air support in Iraq or Afghanistan against a 
low-end threat, but it is not going to survive very well 
against--and it is not going to survive in China fight and 
moreso it doesn't deter China. So we have to realize the 
investment that is needed in the air and space domain has been 
neglected and we have to get after it for the exact reasons 
that's been described by our expert panelists on China.
    That's what keeps me up at night.
    Chairman Pfluger. When you look at the threats that are 
being posed, hypersonics, the ranges that are increasing, the 
ability to reach out and touch us, how important is NORAD, the 
joint air power enterprise to the defense of our homeland?
    General Guastella. You know, NORAD, the National Defense 
Strategy, two of them now in a row, have said that homeland 
defense is the No. 1 priority. Problem is we haven't resourced 
it to that extent that our words say. The commanders of the 
NORAD have asked for modernization of radars for years now and 
have not gotten it. That would have helped us detect those 
balloons sooner. Then the aging fighters. You know, almost 
every major metropolitan city in America is defended by our 
National Guard fighters that are getting older and older. They 
don't have the capabilities, the radars that they need not only 
for the balloons, but the radars they need for the real threat, 
which would be a cruise missile attack against our homeland.
    So that is what concerns me.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you.
    My time has expired. I yield back.
    I now recognize the Ranking Member.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you, Chairman.
    It is clear that the Chinese Communist Party is taking a 
whole-of-government approach to advancing its ambitions at the 
expense of U.S. and democratic interests, and therefore we must 
take a whole-of-government approach to meeting that threat. So 
that covers homeland security, defense, commerce, State 
Department, et cetera.
    So I want to focus on the homeland realm. Dr. Jost, can you 
expand on the methods that the CCP is using to influence public 
opinion both here at home in the United States and globally, 
and what more we could be doing to measure their efforts and to 
mitigate their success?
    Mr. Jost. Sure. Thank you very much for the question.
    The bulk to date of China's influence operations, both in 
the United States and abroad, are focused on what you might say 
are winning friends and influencing people. Right. This is 
coming directly from Xi Jinping, who has directed the Party's 
apparatus that has deep roots in propaganda to leverage those 
capabilities in order to tell China's story well to the world. 
It is interesting to think about the ways in which China's 
institutions domestically are sort-of naturally positioned to 
make that transition from a domestic-based propaganda machine 
to an international one. If one thinks from the perspective of 
the Chinese Communist Party, from their perspective domestic 
propaganda has worked thus far in keeping the CCP in power. 
Those capabilities and organizations exist, and it is easy to 
see how they would assume that those same types of propaganda 
would work in foreign audiences.
    To date, however, as I emphasized in my written testimony, 
we don't necessarily have the best evidence to judge whether or 
not these propaganda efforts outside of Chinese borders have 
been effective. As I mentioned in the opening statement, we do 
know that global public opinion toward China, particularly in 
the United States and the countries with whom we share closest 
interests, has declined substantially in the past few years, 
which would actually suggest that from a certain perspective, 
the propaganda doesn't necessarily work as well as the CCP 
would hope.
    That being said, there is a multitude of things that are 
confounding that relationship of course. Like the fact that 
there has been a global pandemic, the fact that it could be 
working in certain areas and not others. Certain framings that 
the Chinese Communist Party and its diplomats use are more 
effective than others. That is one of the reasons why I think 
there needs to be more research on this matter and something 
the U.S. Government can certainly help with.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
    Mr. Evanina, in your written testimony on the threat of 
corporate espionage and the theft of intellectual property, you 
recommended the creation of an economic threat intelligence 
agency to assist U.S. companies in protecting themselves 
against corporate espionage. Can you expand on how that should 
be structured to be most effective if we were to do it?
    Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    I recommended an entity similar to the FS-ISAC that is 
specifically geared toward the economic awareness and 
understanding of IP and trade secret theft and emerging of not 
only the thought process but the ideation, but also the law 
that governs our patent processes and our IP theft around the 
world and to mirror what the Communist Party are doing around 
the world and then educate our American businesses, the general 
counsels, the people that do law for them, outside counsel, to 
understand what it looks like when you are about to be stolen 
and robbed of IP theft and to be able to provide that real-time 
actual intelligence from the intelligence community, DHS, and 
Commerce and Treasury to businesses who are not only at risk, 
but in the process. Because once it happens, it's too late, the 
data's already gone. The Government needs to be more forward-
leaning and left of boom.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you.
    I found that very interesting. So perhaps as a follow-up, 
after this hearing, you can send us some recommendations in 
more detail about where it should be housed, how it should be 
staffed, which agencies should be involved? Because I think 
that is a very interesting recommendation.
    Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Magaziner. I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. 
D'Esposito.
    Mr. D'Esposito Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all.
    So dozens of demonstrators protested outside of a building 
in New York City's Chinatown last month. The building, which is 
owned by the Chang Le Association, operates what they call a 
service station, and that they are accused of operating a CCP 
police station that allegedly conducts surveillance and 
intimidates CCP descendants and activists. Like the recent 
incident with the Chinese surveillance balloon, this station 
could be the latest CCP action that violates U.S. sovereignty 
and poses a threat to national security. It has been reported 
that there is over 100 of these offices around the world.
    Mr. Evanina, please describe your concerns surrounding this 
potential CCP police station in terms of counterintelligence 
threats and the safety of Americans.
    Mr. Evanina. Thank you, Congressman.
    I think when you look at that specific issue in New York 
City and the subsequent search by Department of Justice and 
FBI, which is a high threshold to obtain, it's a manifestation 
of the strategic plan of the Communist Party of China to not 
only influence, manipulate their own diaspora here in the 
United States, but provide an intimidation factor. I would say 
that this issue in New York and the search of that domestic 
police station is in part and partnership with their Operation 
Fox Hunt that my colleague Ms. Bingen talked about, which is an 
international program, but very, very aggressive in the United 
States, to surveil and try to rendition Chinese diaspora here 
who are anti-Xi regime. They have been very successful at it. 
The fact that this happens on our American soil to me, is 
unacceptable.
    Mr. D'Esposito I agree.
    So it is been reported that there is over 100 throughout 
the world. Do we know how many are actually on U.S. soil?
    Mr. Evanina. I do not, but I'm pretty confident our law 
enforcement, both at the State, local, and Federal level, are 
pretty aware of that.
    Mr. D'Esposito Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
    I now recognize my good friend, the gentleman from 
California, Mr. Correa.
    Mr. Correa. Mr. Chairman from Texas, thank you very much.
    I have been sitting in this committee for a number of 
years. Cyber, big issue continues to be a big issue. A number 
of testimonies ago, we heard that Russians have essentially 
penetrated most of our infrastructure, just like we penetrated 
most of their infrastructure. So we have a stand-off, so to 
speak. Action by either side is too expensive, so to speak, in 
terms of the damage. Now we have a situation internationally, a 
geopolitical realignment, where Russia and China are beginning 
to work much more collaboratively.
    My question, common thought, first of all, Mr. Evanina, how 
do you see this, given that China's foreign minister recently 
said, essentially warned us of conflict and confrontation in 
the United States? How do you see this evolution in terms of 
multiplier effect of a threat on the United States, Russia and 
China working together? How real is that? What is the potential 
for the future of continued collaboration to really challenge 
the United States in ways we have not envisioned in the past?
    Thank you.
    Mr. Evanina. Mr. Congressman, I concur with your statement, 
and I think it is a very concerning issue when two nation-
states who don't like each other are emerging against one 
common enemy, the United States.
    Geopolitically, diplomatically----
    Mr. Correa. You are saying that enemy of an enemy is my 
friend? Is that the situation?
    Mr. Evanina. I wasn't going to say that, but it--better you 
said it. Yes, correct. I think when you look at I will stick in 
my lane here from--you mentioned the Russians' penetration to 
our systems, both IT and OT, SCADA, ICS systems here in the 
United States, probably predates the Communist Party of China, 
but I'm pretty confident the Communist Party of China has 
either duplicated those penetrations or ridden along those. I 
think the sharing of the intelligence services between Vladimir 
Putin and Russia and the Communist Party is probably the most 
problematic for me as what they see, because that's the most 
invisible part of that threat.
    Mr. Correa. I think that right now we still have an edge 
when it comes to cyber. Two or 3 years, maybe.
    So I often think of defense, a good offense is the best 
defense you can have. So, if I may, what would you recommend 
moving forward would it be the best way to counter these 
unprecedented challenges that a country has?
    Mr. Evanina. Congressman, I think you make a good point, 
and it's probably important that we reiterate the fact that as 
much as what you're hearing here is depressing, demoralizing, 
and it is a legitimate threat to our Nation, we must pause and 
remember that we have the most amazing military and 
intelligence and law enforcement capabilities the world has 
ever seen. The women and men of DoD and the intelligence 
community are phenomenal. Our capabilities are second-to-none 
in cyber, military apparatus, and intelligence. So Americans 
should go to sleep at night, be thankful of the fact that 
offensively, we've never seen anything better than we can do. 
Unfortunately, it's not public.
    Mr. Correa. Today. Today.
    Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Correa. Please continue. Didn't mean interrupt you.
    Anybody else have comments, thoughts on my questions? 
Ma'am?
    Ms. Bingen. Congressman, if I might build off of that on 
cyber. When I look at the homeland, so much of our commerce and 
activity rights on commercial infrastructure, and building off 
of Mr. Evanina's point earlier, it's very important that the 
government figure out how to share threat intelligence 
information with the private sector with those oil, gas 
pipeline, energy, financial services sectors----
    Mr. Correa. In real time.
    Ms. Bingen. In real time. That's the key. If you're a 
business, you hear this top-level talk. But what is 
particularly valuable is figuring out a way to provide security 
read-ins to some of these business leaders, bring them into the 
tent, but also share specific tactic, techniques, procedures 
with them. It's one thing to hear about this general Chinese 
threat, it's another thing to hear, here are the tactics that 
they're using to go after you. Then you realize, holy crap, 
that's what is been happening in my network. Now, let me work 
with you to take some preventative measures.
    Mr. Correa. Thirty seconds--anybody else?
    The Chair, I yield. Thank you very much.
    Oh, please.
    Mr. Evanina. Just amplifying, Ms. Bingen, I would I would 
point to your question, sir, to the incredible success our 
Intelligence and Defense Department has had with Ukraine and 
preventing Russian cyber capabilities, not only in Ukraine and 
Europe and here in the United States as a category for us being 
ahead of others in the cyber space.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you for ending on a good, positive note.
    Mr. Chair. I yield.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
    The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Arizona, former 
Navy Seal, Mr. Crane.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. Thank 
you guys for attending today. We appreciate it.
    You know, it is not often up here that, you know, me and my 
colleagues on the other side of the aisle can agree upon 
something. So it is great to be in agreement on the threat that 
China is.
    Obviously, the American people are watching and they are 
very concerned when they see spy balloons flying over the 
United States, farmland being bought up near--you know, farms, 
fentanyl all coming across our Southern Border--we know, you 
know, where the origin of a lot of that comes from--theft of 
intellectual property, covering up the origins of COVID, 
Chinese police stations in some of our cities.
    My first question is for you, Mr. Evanina. Did I pronounce 
that correctly? Sir, do you know what elite capture is?
    Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Crane. Can you for the panel, and for maybe some of 
those watching, can you describe what elite capture is, please?
    Mr. Evanina. Congressman, I can.
    I would probably refer to some of the more better-informed 
experts here on that panel for that particular definition.
    Mr. Crane. OK. Is there anybody want to take a stab at it? 
Sir? Am I correct that you are an expert in 
counterintelligence, right?
    Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir.
    Mr. Crane. So can you just give me a really broad--doesn't 
have to be super specific. What is elite capture?
    Mr. Evanina. Yes, I think when you look at the capabilities 
and intent of our adversaries and our ability to be proactive 
and make an affirmative effort to capture telecommunications to 
humans, to technology in or at the battlefield or in the gray 
space, provides us the best venue or avenue for potential to 
win.
    Mr. Crane. OK. can you give me some examples of how that is 
often done, how that is carried out?
    Mr. Evanina. Sure. Well, first of all, I would say a lot of 
it's done with authorities that are granted to both NSA and the 
FBI overseas. Section 702, our abilities to capture 
telecommunications conversations to foreign adversaries, both 
the foreign-born, but are also overseas. That gives us leads 
and intentions on nefarious activities, both terrorism and 
counterintelligence espionage of those actors overseas that 
are, as Ms. Bingen said, riding on commercial capabilities that 
are around the world. That capability allows the United States 
to be able to pre-identify and do threaten warning to actors 
here in the United States, both from a systems data and people 
perspective.
    Mr. Crane. Would you say that it is accurate that foreign 
states and actors often try and compromise and corrupt leaders 
and officials within our own government? Would you say that 
that is a form of elite capture?
    Mr. Evanina. I would. It's done quite regularly for 
decades.
    Mr. Crane. Would you say that it is often true that family 
members are often used in these types of efforts to corrupt 
foreign leaders, officials?
    Mr. Evanina. Congressman, for the past decade, I have spent 
my time in three different organizations advising and informing 
Americans, Members of Congress about the threat to them as a 
person. It always starts with family members' utilization of 
mobile telephones.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you.
    Sir, are you also aware of some of the reported business 
dealings of Hunter Biden with individuals linked to the Chinese 
Communist Party?
    Mr. Evanina. Only what I have seen in public reporting, 
sir.
    Mr. Crane. What did you think of the reporting that you 
read, sir?
    Mr. Evanina. I'm not sure I could actually opine of what I 
have read in public reporting, but I could say that the TTPs, 
of which foreign entities are utilized against Americans and 
family members, is tried and true and very predictable and 
reportable.
    Mr. Crane. Let me ask you a follow-on to that, sir. Did you 
find the reports--whether you believe them or not--did you find 
those reports concerning? Just with all of your knowledge in 
this space and how you have seen this type of thing play out in 
the past?
    Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir. I think when you look at what's been 
reported publicly about the potential tactics and techniques 
that were displayed publicly about the potential for 
penetration to a family member of the United States President 
is something that most intelligent services try to do 
regularly.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you. I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
    We will now proceed to second round of questions, and if we 
have other Members that had previous commitments that show up, 
then we will yield that initial question to them.
    The Chair now recognizes myself for an additional round of 
5 minutes of questions.
    Ms. Bingen, thank you for your expertise and your testimony 
today. I would like to focus on that critical infrastructure 
piece and on what you said that the CCP is targeting critical 
infrastructure and that you fully anticipate that should a 
crisis--hopefully one does not happen--but should one happen 
and unfold, that Beijing would seek to disrupt the operations 
of critical infrastructure.
    Then I was very intrigued by your discussion on sharing 
information with local State partners, law enforcement and 
otherwise. From the Colonial incident to now, have we as a 
Federal Government, and specifically within the Department of 
Homeland Security, can you give us your opinion of how we are 
sharing information? If that is effective and if our critical 
infrastructure, private partners--because most of that is owned 
by private industry,--are they ready for what is next should 
that Colonial incident happen again?
    Ms. Bingen. Chairman, thank you for that question. I think 
the Colonial incident, though not attributable to China, as the 
Government has come out and said, highlights the catastrophic 
impacts that can occur as a result of a potential attack 
against cybercritical infrastructure.
    Your point is exactly right. From everything that I have 
seen previously, I would anticipate that as a crisis or 
conflict builds, that the CCP would seek to target critical 
infrastructure early on. There's a first mover advantage here, 
I would say, in terms of the kind of tools that they would seek 
to use to delay or to deter us or to potentially delay us.
    On the point of information hearing, I think the success 
that I would point to is the summer of 2021. I thought CISA did 
a very good job bringing in oil and gas operators and providing 
very specific detail on the CCP cyber intrusion campaign, what 
specifically they were targeting, but equally important, how 
they were doing it, so the tactics, techniques, and procedures. 
But that is one sector. There are several different critical 
infrastructure sectors, and I think there's some very good 
intelligence information that the community has that they could 
provide, whether it be to financial services, the electrical 
grids, et cetera.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much.
    I will turn to General Guastella. What is the impact of 8 
days transit of a balloon, a surveillance balloon, you know, 
when we look at the fact that it transited and then, you know, 
got to the Atlantic Ocean before it was eventually shot down? 
What kind of message is that sending? What is the impact 
strategically?
    General Guastella. It's a significant wake-up call, like we 
discussed before, that an air vehicle could traverse American 
airspace for that long and be afforded the opportunity to 
collect that much information. You know, a balloon is up there 
around 12 miles up, satellites are 350 miles. So it's down in 
close or it hangs out for a long time. The potential for 
collection is significant. So, ideally, the thing would have 
been taken down prior to hitting U.S. airspace. But like I 
said, they exploited the scene. I don't think that'll happen 
again. We have to talk to Government officials about it. But we 
don't know until we fully exploit what was flown over, what 
they could have gotten, or what they got. But to me, it is a 
very grave violation of our sovereignty.
    Chairman Pfluger. Does something like that embolden the CCP 
and reduce our deterrence? Then what do we have to do to claw 
that back if it does?
    General Guastella. Absolutely anytime an authoritarian 
regime does something of that nature and we don't do anything 
about it, they will say, what can I get away with next? So we 
have to close this gap. We also have to demonstrate credible 
capability that we can affect them in some way of our choosing. 
I think that's important for us not only have the capability, 
but the will to do so. That's how you deal with the regime of 
that nature.
    Chairman Pfluger. Mr. Evanina, let's turn to the precursors 
that China produces that are then used in the production of 
fentanyl and the connection between the cartels that are, you 
know, taking these products that they are making fentanyl and 
then eventually getting it into the United States. Can you 
kind-of talk to your opinion as a former intelligence expert on 
that flow, what the CCP and the cartels are doing to work 
together, collude, and produce a very deadly substance?
    Mr. Evanina. Mr. Chairman, this is a very important topic, 
not only for this conversation, for our Nation. I think the 
recent reporting is that over 100,000 people have died in the 
last year, 12-15 months from fentanyl overdose. That's multiple 
times what happened on 9/11, right? So for our Nation to not 
look at fentanyl as a national epidemic that stems from a 
nation-state threat actor is probably unacceptable and we have 
to be more vigilant in what we do. We can map the production of 
the precursors from China to Mexico, to the drug gangs, to the 
American soil. It's clear and I know our intelligence and 
military apparatus are working hard to disrupt that, but it 
takes more than that to disrupt. There has to be a preemptive 
effort to put China on notice that this process of killing 
Americans must stop, and we have to look at it as a terrorism 
event.
    Chairman Pfluger. Thank you very much.
    My time has expired.
    The Chair yields back and now recognizes the Ranking 
Member, Mr. Magaziner.
    Mr. Magaziner. Thank you very much.
    Dr. Jost, in your testimony, you wrote that while the 
evidence shows that Chinese propaganda efforts in the United 
States and in other aligned countries do not show evidence of 
much success yet, we do not have as much data in the global 
south, in the emerging markets. We know that China is making 
big investments in many of these emerging countries for 
strategic reasons. I think that is very important for our work 
here in Congress because there is always a perennial debate on 
the level of foreign aid that we provide to those same nations.
    So can you just expand a little bit on why this topic is 
important and what the tie is to the homeland security of the 
United States?
    Mr. Evanina. Thank you, sir.
    So when one thinks about how propaganda works, we have to 
think about why a target audience would ever believe it. If I 
were to come in here and read a bit of Chinese Communist 
propaganda--obviously I would not, but if I were, folks in this 
room would discount that bit of information pretty 
significantly. The reason is that they know it is propaganda. 
So the effectiveness of such an information or influence 
campaign rests upon the ability of targets to be able to 
understand that what political scientists would--the cue giver, 
the actor who is giving the information, doesn't have their 
best interests at heart. So that's component No. 1.
    Component No. 2 is some baseline level of distrust of that 
target state.
    So what we don't know, I think, is in countries outside of 
the United States and countries that the United States shares 
very close relationships with, is that baseline level of 
mistrust that is present in most of the U.S. public, present in 
those other countries, which would then cause the targets in 
those countries to discount the cue or discount the bit of 
propaganda.
    Mr. Magaziner. Yes. Thank you. I think especially when we 
look at things like access to rare earth minerals that are 
critical to our economy and other factors, those relationships 
with the global south are important. China certainly 
understands that and we must understand it as well.
    Question for Dr. Jost or anyone, you know, Chairman Pfluger 
and I both in our opening statements were clear that our 
adversary here is not the Chinese people, it is an 
authoritarian and anti-democratic regime that is becoming 
increasingly aggressive. On the topic of anti-Asian hate 
globally, would you agree--and Dr. Jost, but anyone else can 
weigh in as well, that it is important that we combat anti-
Asian hate in all of its forms for a range of reasons, but 
including the fact that we do not want to give the Chinese 
Communist Party ammunition to fuel their propaganda both in 
China and here at home?
    Mr. Jost. Thank you, Ranking Member.
    Yes, absolutely. Anti-Asian racism has absolutely no place 
in American society. I think we can all agree on that. I think 
we can also all agree that the reasons why that is unacceptable 
in the United States are orthogonal to whether or not the 
Chinese Communist Party is able to exploit it, just as you 
said.
    That being said, it is true that Chinese diplomats and the 
Chinese state do call attention to these trends. So, for 
example, there is an annual report that the Chinese state 
issues on human rights in the United States, which often times 
calls out these types of events, both broadly in terms of race 
and specifically on anti-Asian racial issues.
    Mr. Evanina. I would double down and amplify Doctor--
statement here. As I had in my written statement, this is 
clearly not about the Chinese citizens, both in China or in the 
United States. This is an issue of Xi and the Communist Party 
regime and their intelligence services and their strategy. 
Clear. But, however, that makes it very difficult, and not only 
to the Doctor's point. I think we have to be very, very clear 
to say this all the time, this is not about Chinese citizens. 
But most importantly, the United Front Work Department will use 
that against us at every single point. So it's a double-edged 
sword. The more that we don't say it, the more the Communist 
regime and the United Front Work Department will use it against 
us when we don't say it. Omission is denial that it's real.
    Mr. Magaziner. I will just close by saying I think this is 
yet another reason why it is important that this committee and 
this Congress focus on combating the rise of racially-motivated 
extremism here in the homeland as well.
    I thank you all very much again for your testimony.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentlemen yields.
    I now recognize Mr. D'Esposito.
    Mr. D'Esposito Thank you, Chairman.
    In your capacity as the director of the National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center, you estimated that the 
theft of intellectual property by the PRC cost America as much 
as $500 billion--with a B--a year. Can you just describe the 
impact this theft has on the everyday American, like people 
back in my district and on Long Island?
    Mr. Evanina. Congressman, I think to make this succinct, as 
I mentioned in my oral remarks, the real impact is about $4,000 
to $6,000 per American family after taxes. It's a real cost to 
an American homeowner family member.
    Mr. D'Esposito I am sorry, can you just say that number 
again? I apologize.
    Mr. Evanina. Between $4,000 and $6,000 per year per 
American family of four after taxes is what that $500 billion 
of intellectual property theft equals. Those are known cases. 
That's not a guesstimate.
    Secondarily, I'll proffer the subcommittee, those aren't 
the real costs. The real costs for all that IP theft, ideation 
theft, manufacturing theft, results in the Communist Party of 
China building that same capability overseas, getting it to 
patent and global markets before we do, and then selling it 
back to the American people, the American public and 
corporations. Then multiple CEOs have said to me, Bill, it's 
not just the dollar value of our product that's been stolen, 
it's the manufacturing plants that aren't built in the United 
States and it is the tens of thousands of jobs that are not 
created here in the United States because we lost that patent 
ideation technology to the Communist Party of China, who went 
to global market first.
    Mr. D'Esposito What are some ways that the U.S. Government 
is working to identify counterintelligence issues that 
threatened American IP?
    Mr. Evanina. Well, I think there was a robust agenda 
probably starting in 2015 and 2016. Here I'd have to commend 
the efforts of Senator Burr, Senator Rubio, and Senator Warner 
and Sissy to have what I would call the Chinese roadshows. We 
went out around the country and briefed thousands of CEOs of 
industries about this threat and from different sectors 
financial services, energy, private equity, venture capital, 
telecommunications, to make sure that they understood what they 
were doing has a direct impact on national interests and 
national security. I think that Members of Congress, both in 
the House and Senate, should have a robust capability to go 
back to their home districts and document these threats to the 
chambers of commerce, to where you live, and to economic 
development corporations and to small businesses so they could 
identify nefarious capability early and often to prevent it 
before it happens.
    Mr. D'Esposito Thank you, sir. Thank you for your service.
    Chairman, I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
    I now recognize the gentleman from California, Mr. Correa.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    I wanted to focus a little bit on our backyard south of the 
border. Had a chance to go to El Salvador a few years ago and 
learned that China was looking to acquire, purchase 80 percent 
of their coast and really build a deep water port in that area. 
Today I am really bothered that world's largest oil reserves in 
Venezuela are essentially in a government of Venezuela that it 
has very close ties to Russia and to China. This is our 
backyard. It is my understanding we still have a good brand 
south of the border. Most countries, Colombia included, and 
others, still like the brand of America--the American dreams, 
so to speak.
    Again thinking about best defense being a good offense, 
what do we do to make sure that we keep our backyard, our 
backyard, secure, and not have these kinds of advances by other 
countries?
    Mr. Evanina. I'll start, Congressman. I think there's some 
great answers on the panel as well.
    I think when you look at South America specifically, we 
could look--as my colleagues mentioned, subsequent to 9/11, we 
concentrated on counterterrorism and we missed the boat of the 
influence of both Russia and China on South America. That 
influence comes with a price because they provide critical 
infrastructure for free, they provide mobile phones to citizens 
of South American countries for free. Specifically, the Chinese 
invest a lot of money in South America to have them beholden to 
their interests as well as Russia did historically. I think we 
probably--and this is getting more in the policy lane--have to 
be more aggressive and offensive with our brand and our 
capabilities and our investment in South America to help us in 
the long run.
    Mr. Correa. We make the best medicines in the world, best 
COVID vaccine, we are essentially breadbasket of the world. How 
can you use those assets to really project our presence in the 
backyard?
    Thoughts, Lieutenant General.
    General Guastella. Sir, it's a fantastic question and it's 
absolutely a concern.
    Chinese investment in countries around the world, 
especially when we're absent, allows inroads for them to 
develop relationships, not just buy what is immediately there, 
but also leads to future investments and other things. It comes 
as a detriment to the United States. You know, like I said, 
homeland defense doesn't start in the homeland, it starts 
overseas, not only with a credible capability that we need to 
have, but also with our allies and partners. So if we become 
isolationist, if we cede that terrain to the Chinese, we're 
going to pay a price militarily.
    When Chinese military comes into countries, it allows them 
to start to train with the Chinese, develop a relationship with 
the Chinese, and it results in an inability for us to leverage 
them the way we should. So it is a very significant thing for 
us and we need to look at that.
    One last point, and that's in arms sales. A lot of times we 
don't sell things to countries because we have issues with the 
country, which is understandable, but sometimes they're going 
to buy it anyway. When that happens, it's the choice between 
them buying Chinese or buying American, sometimes we need to 
think, hey, maybe it's worth it. Should buy American.
    Mr. Correa. General, I am going to challenge you here. Did 
you use the word absence? Our absence? Did you say that?
    General Guastella. I may have. Absence or less----
    Mr. Correa. Are you saying we are not doing our job of 
here? Going overseas, visiting people, being diplomats, as 
Members of Congress? Do we need to do more of that?
    General Guastella. Sir, I think you're doing a great job.
    Mr. Correa. No, that is not the answer I am looking for, 
sir. You just said something and I want to make sure all of our 
Members of Congress understand exactly--that is a great point. 
I want you to back it because we do need to show our faces 
around the world. We need to do that. General, I want to thank 
you for that comment.
    General Guastella. You're absolutely right. We do need to 
show our faces around the world. Our military does a lot of 
international engagement, Mil to Mil. We need that same 
engagement at other levels of government. Our state does that. 
But getting out and seeing and understanding from those allied 
and partner perspectives--you know, the one big advantage the 
United States has militarily is that we have a lot of friends 
out there that China doesn't enjoy that same thing. We're going 
to lose those friends if we don't get out there and engage, 
because those friends allow us to base from their countries, 
they'll support us, they'll back us up in international forums. 
It happens if we engage them.
    Mr. Correa. Thank you, sir.
    Chairman, I yield.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
    I will now recognize my good friend and national security 
expert, somebody who has spent 20-plus years in the U.S. Navy, 
Mr. Gonzalez from Texas.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you, Chairman.
    I want to associate my comments with my good friend Lou 
Correa. Him and I took a trip to Central America. We went to 
Guatemala, we went to Honduras and went to El Salvador. One of 
the, I guess, surprising things that I wasn't aware of is no 
Members of Congress had visited that area in 3 years. So to the 
point, yes, there is a military aspect of it, but there is also 
a diplomatic. We would like to see the State Department do 
more.
    But up here in Congress in a bipartisan manner, we need to 
be doing more in our own backyard. I know many of us on this 
committee are committed to doing just that.
    My first question is for you, General. I just got back from 
a trip from Taiwan, it is the second trip to Taiwan in the past 
14 months. I spent 20 years in the military, as my good friend 
August Pfluger pointed out, our Chairman pointed out, I know 
what war looks like. We are at war. I mean, this is a war, 
maybe a cold war, but this is a war with China, with the 
People's Republic of China, every single day are invading 
Taiwan via their cyber space. Not only that, but the question I 
have for you is in particular, your expertise is in air. I 
spent 5 years as an air crewman flying against China. I know 
exactly when they come out and they intercept our aircraft. 
They are doing that every single day. There is a danger in 
that, right? Because everything is fine until there is an 
accident, a spark, if you will, that turns a cold war into a 
hot war.
    Can you speak just to some of the dangers in which playing 
this game of chicken brings up in particular to Taiwan?
    General Guastella. Absolutely. China has demonstrated 
significant aggression in the air by penetrating Taiwanese 
airspace, and it is a violation of Taiwan's sovereignty. Also, 
when they're in the air, their professionalism is nonexistent. 
They will ``dust us off'', if you will. In one case, we had a 
collision, mid-air collision from one of their aircraft in a 
Navy P-3. That is the nature of how they do business.
    So what we can't do is watch them and let them get away 
with behavior like that and not do something back and not be 
there with Taiwan, not be present, not be out there, and make 
them respect us the way they are driving fear into the Taiwan 
ease with their aggression.
    Mr. Gonzalez. Thank you for that.
    My next question for you, Ms. Bingen, is turning over to 
cyber space. This is what war looks like. That is the first 
aspect of it. In cyber space, there are no boundaries, there 
are no borders. We are all in on this together, and you can't 
go it alone. You need to have allies. I put together a bill, 
the U.S. Taiwan Advanced Research Act, that essentially creates 
a closer relationship in the cyber space with our allies. Can 
you just speak to that? As far as how can the United States 
grow our relationships with others that, let's say, are not 
traditional relationships? Yes, we have our five eyes and we 
have got those relationships that have had for a long time, but 
other places like Taiwan, what are your thoughts on growing 
that, in particular in the cyber space?
    Ms. Bingen. Well, Congressman, first, if I can go back to 
your Taiwan point, and thank you very much for visiting. I had 
the chance to go there in January as well. On Taiwan, if I can 
say, the arming is incredibly important, giving them a greater 
defensive capability. It includes not just the tangible weapon 
systems, but the training that goes along with it. I think 
there's much more capacity there for increased training 
opportunities with our forces.
    The other point that you raised on Taiwan is every day they 
are in this cognitive disinformation war with China, with the 
CCP. So that the more that we can do to help them and highlight 
or create transparency around those disinformation campaigns is 
important.
    On the cyber front, you're absolutely right on the allies. 
You know, these are areas, and this ties back into China's Belt 
and Road Initiative. They are doing a lot to try to get their 
infrastructure and make others more dependent on them. Where 
that leads to is other countries--not only their ability to 
surveil and steal data, but also they're advancing their techno 
authoritarian norms and standards. So I think that there are 
things we can do on the international front, threat sharing, 
but also building norms much more akin to how we see the world 
and how we want the internet to be operated, data to be 
protected than the Chinese model.
    Mr. Gonzalez. I think it is very clear to point out that 
the People's Republic of China are the aggressor. You know, I 
spent 5 years in Iraq and Afghanistan, Chairman Pfluger has 
also been at war. I think it is safe to say we don't want war. 
We want to prevent a war. Part of that is showing that we are 
going to stand firm with our allies to prevent those.
    Thank you, Chairman.
    I yield back.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentleman yields.
    The Chair now recognizes the general lady from Nevada, Ms. 
Titus.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
    Before I ask my specific question, I would like to say that 
I agree too with Mr. Correa, and it also was brought up by our 
last speaker that we need to do more. We don't do more by 
cutting the small foreign aid budget that we have in place now, 
we do more by investing more. You mentioned Belt and Road. You 
know, China is investing all across Africa, they are building 
ports in Lima, they just bailed out Sri Lanka. You know, that 
is what we are up against. If we walk away, that is not going 
to be helpful in these difficult areas.
    But I want to ask you the question, we just heard this week 
about China saying that there is a potential conflict or 
confrontation if we don't put on the brakes. Now, I wonder just 
what that means for us. Is it an existential threat? Is it 
saber-rattling? Is it nuclear war? What does that mean? How 
should we be gauging that? What should we be doing in response 
besides shoring up Taiwan or trying to make these investments 
that seem to be fairly difficult to get people to support? 
Anybody?
    Mr. Evanina. So I'll start.
    Ms. Titus. OK.
    Mr. Evanina. I would say the narrative to the recent 
statement by the Chinese minister is a false narrative that we 
need to put on the brakes. We should start asking them to 
minimize their aggression, right. Not only here in the United 
States but with our allies and friends around the world. I 
think they're really great at putting us in the bucket as being 
the aggressors. As we've heard from our distinguished 
Congressman and Congresswoman, that's not the case, right. I 
think we, as the United States, diplomatically have to do a 
better job, a more effective job of making sure the world knows 
that they are the aggressors, because I think their narrative--
and they have a great propaganda program, as we heard, and they 
will use that to show us as the aggressors.
    Ms. Titus. General, how would you compare the threat by 
China to the threat internally, our homeland threat by domestic 
terrorists compared to China? If we are looking at where our 
priorities should be?
    General Guastella. Well, ma'am, the threat to the United 
States from China is the most grave threat we have faced in our 
lifetime, certainly since the cold war. The reason why is we 
have an economic superpower that's stealing our technology, 
that's leaping ahead on weapons that can strike us right here 
in the homeland or deny our objectives overseas in defense of 
Taiwan. If we let them continue at this pace, and we don't 
answer that, we will find ourselves in a very uncomfortable 
position as Americans, which is watching U.S. service members 
lose fights.
    So, to me, the existential threat posed by China and--the 
CCP is absolutely the largest threat to the United States. We 
have to realize it. They are approaching us at any seam they 
can find, any way in. The balloon was a seam that they 
exploited. There's 100 other seams that's been discussed here. 
I think it's time that we wake up. It's a Sputnik moment for us 
here, and I think we need to realize that as an American 
society.
    Ms. Titus. Just continuing with this down the panel, how 
about the CHIPS Act? We often hear that China is not the enemy, 
they are the competitor. Has this helped in any way to deal 
with the problem that we are now making chips at home instead 
of being so dependent on them economically?
    Ms. Bingen. One aspect on the CHIPS Act that I would like 
to highlight is really the national security piece to it. When 
we look at was that 80-plus percent of the world's chips, 
including everything that we use from commercial to our weapon 
systems, are manufactured within the First Island Chain. We've 
talked also here about the military threat. We and the Taiwan 
semiconductor facility, we need to look at building greater 
resiliency in our industrial bases and our manufacturing 
capacities. So that for me was a big benefit of CHIPS Act.
    Ms. Titus. Would you like to add to this conversation?
    Mr. Jost. Sure. Thank you, Congresswoman.
    To go back to your original question about the pathways by 
which we would be most likely to see Chinese aggression, it is 
my view that the most likely avenue would be over a Taiwan 
scenario. If one thinks about how to deter that, there are two 
primary things in place that the United States has in our 
strategy. The first is a credible reassurance to Beijing that 
the status quo will not change, because if Beijing thinks that 
it is backed into a corner and has to choose either losing 
Taiwan or launching a very risky and even low-probability-win 
war, it's quite possible one can imagine them choosing the 
latter. So that credible reassurance portion is important.
    The other portion of deterrence, which relates to the CHIPS 
Act, is the change in the balance of power. So another way in 
which deterrence could fail is if over time shifts toward 
Beijing's favor in the probability that they would win a 
conflict would prompt them to act, even though the cost of the 
risk would be high. That's why it's so important to ensure that 
the U.S. defense industrial base, through things like the CHIPS 
Act, is closely protected.
    Ms. Titus. I can't see a clock. Is my time up?
    Well, just real quickly, is there anything specific we need 
to do next, like building off of the CHIPS Act other than going 
on CODELs to Central America?
    Mr. Evanina. Congressman, if I may just amplify the great 
comments here.
    I think on the CHIPS and Science Act, two things need to 
occur. More of that type of legislation that really partners 
our U.S. Government legislative body funding with U.S. 
corporate sector. No. 2, the CHIPS and Science Act must be 
protected now from ideation to development of new technologies. 
If we don't protect it, you're going to be hearing hearings in 
5 years saying how did all the technology from CHIPS and 
Science Act gets stolen and in the hand of the Chinese?
    So two things can be true.
    Ms. Titus. Thank you.
    Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
    Chairman Pfluger. The gentlelady's time has expired.
    The Chair now recognizes for the final question, Mr. Crane.
    Mr. Crane. General, this question is for you.
    A second ago you were talking about how you were concerned 
about the age of the fleet, is that correct? Then also you were 
talking about how China continues to steal our intellectual 
property. Is that correct as well? How do we stop that, 
General?
    General Guastella. Well, the theft of intellectual property 
is something that probably goes beyond what I can comment on. 
But step No. 1 is realizing that it's happening and ensuring 
not only the prime contractors, but the subcontractors that 
develop our defense systems have the appropriate resiliency in 
hardening. The best way for us to counter China is to invest. 
You know, the investments the Department of Defense has made 
for the last 20 years to fight the wars we've been in are not 
necessarily the investments that are going to make us 
successful against dealing with a peer competitor like China. 
So it's important that we transform our investment to the areas 
that most concerns them, which is our ability to hold targets 
at risk in their homeland and our ability to deny them their 
objectives visa vis Taiwan. So we can deter them through 
punishment and we can also deter them through denial. That 
happens by investment in the Department, in the domains that 
are most critical facing a peer competitor, aerospace.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you, General.
    My next question is for Mr. Evanina.
    A moment ago, you were raving about the capabilities and 
dominance of the U.S. Intelligence Agency. I think that 
probably everybody up here would agree how impressive our 
intelligence agencies are and have been over the years. My 
question for you, sir, is are you aware of the lack of trust in 
our intelligence agencies by U.S. citizens?
    Mr. Evanina. Congressman, yes, I am, and it's a concerning 
issue.
    Mr. Crane. Yes. You are aware that there is a select 
committee on the weaponization of the Federal Government up 
here right now?
    Mr. Evanina. Yes, sir, I'm aware of that.
    Mr. Crane. You know, I represent some amazing people in 
Arizona, rural Arizona. They love this country. One of the most 
patriotic districts in Arizona. I myself am a Navy Seal. I 
joined the Navy after 9/11 and I served for 13 years. I love 
this country. I want our intelligence agencies to be strong. I 
think they need to be strong for good reason. But I am going to 
tell you right now, sir, when when we when we read years after 
the fact that, you know, 50 former national intelligence folks, 
several heads of the CIA claim that the Hunter Biden laptop is 
Russian disinformation, only to find out years later what we 
all knew, that it wasn't, that is alarming to a lot of 
Americans, and it makes us lose trust in our intelligence 
agencies.
    For me, when I look at a guy like you that has done 
everything that you have done, as intelligent as you are, I 
know that has got to piss you off. If there are 50 former Navy 
Seals out there lying to the American people and I found out 
about it, that would piss me off because it undermines the 
community that I hold so dear. I am sure you probably have a 
very similar endearment to your community. Am I correct in 
assuming that?
    Mr. Evanina. You're correct, sir.
    Mr. Crane. What do you think we do about that, sir? How do 
you think we regain the trust with the American people and our 
intelligence agency?
    Mr. Evanina. Congressman, I think you bring up a very valid 
point that not only reaches the current events of today with 
our intelligence and law enforcement community, but also 
impacts the recruiting of future generations of women and men 
who want to serve in the U.S. Government intelligence and 
military apparatus. I think that is the core element.
    I think two things have to happen. No. 1, there has to be 
complete transparency of things that happened in the past. But 
more importantly, with the great things that women and men are 
doing, we have to be more proactive in getting out to your 
district and other districts at the local level.
    Secondarily, there has to be some transparency of what's 
real and what's not real with the narrative reporting that we 
have seen in the media. I think that's the obligation of law 
enforcement intelligence agencies to be forthwith of 
declassification and transparency of what's going on.
    Mr. Crane. Real quick, Mr. Evanina, if it seemed like I was 
coming after you today, I apologize for that. It is nothing 
personal at all. I love this country, and I am tired of losing 
faith and trust in the institutions and the organizations that 
as a little kid I had aspired to and I upheld. I know I am 
speaking for a lot of Americans when I say that, brother. OK.
    Last question I have real quick is for Ms. Bingen.
    You said that war with China was not certain. Can you 
expound on that a little bit? Please tell us all how, in your 
opinion, we can avoid war with China.
    Thank you.
    Ms. Bingen. Absolutely, Congressman.
    I want to say that the cause isn't lost, and there are 
things that we as a Nation can proactively do. So, for example, 
continuing to invest in a strong defense, ensuring our forces 
are ready, is a signal and a deterrent. Making sure that we 
invest in resilience, resilient networks so that if the CCP 
decides to launch an attack, it will have a less effect on our 
networks and our infrastructure. Superior technology. A former 
secretary of defense I worked for would always say, we never 
want to send our sons and daughters into a fair fight. With the 
technology theft happening, we are very much at risk of sending 
our sons and daughters into a fair fight. So superior 
technology and agility in terms of how we use that technology. 
Then ensuring that we have a network of allies and partners. 
This is a weakness that the CCP has that we have. Sir, with all 
of your service, you know that we fight in coalitions, and it 
is important to make sure that our allies are with us and 
partners are with us and not with China.
    Mr. Crane. Thank you.
    I yield back.
    Mr. Goldman. All right. So we have some logistical changes 
here. The Chairman had to step out. So I am going to ask 
unanimous consent for Ms. Jackson Lee to be recognized for 5 
minutes.
    Mr. Magaziner. We are in trouble now.
    Mr. Goldman. We are both freshmen, so bear with us.
    Mr. Magaziner. Yes, all right.
    Mr. Goldman. Unanimous consent for Ms. Jackson Lee to be 
recognized.
    Mr. Magaziner. I recognize Ms. Jackson Lee.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Well, to both of the Chairman and the 
Ranking Member, I am very pleased to be able to join you. From 
my perspective, you are two distinguished Members of Congress. 
Thank you for your service, thank you for your military 
service.
    Before I start, I think because we are in Homeland Security 
allow me just to put on the record that to be able to compete 
with China, I think it is extremely important that we assert 
our democratic values, our values, the strength of our values, 
our competitiveness. Maybe we will have an opportunity to get 
the answer to why I believe it is public now, all of the 
personal data of so many Washingtonians, Members of Congress, 
House and Senate have been breached. I don't believe that we 
have had any determination of who breached it, but we certainly 
want to be on top of those elements, be they commercial or be 
they a foreign country, from exposing private data of members 
of the House and Senate who have the responsibility of 
governing this Nation. I wanted to put that on the committee's 
record because I am incensed about it and hope that we will 
have some involvement ultimately in assessing that situation.
    But this is a very important hearing, and I want to begin 
by raising this question. I will have a second question, and I 
think, gentlemen, I will be finished. But I want to raise the 
question, Dr. Jost, you have described the evolution of the 
Chinese Communist Party's thinking when it comes to China's 
role around the world. We know that in recent years, the CCP 
has set its aims at developing China-centered and -controlled 
global infrastructure, transportation, trade, and production 
networks. They tolerate no diversity when they go into 
countries. It is China, China, China. They don't even use the 
indigenous people. China is competing with the United States in 
a global competition over government values. We have to win the 
world over by saying that our values of trade and otherwise are 
much better than theirs.
    So how successful are China's efforts? What actions can the 
Federal Government take to out compete the Chinese Communist 
Party? Frankly, I think we are a nicer, but I also think that 
if you interact with us, you will have the benefits of 
investment in your own country, and you will have the benefits 
of long-term recovery.
    Many of you know that we passed the CHIPS and Science Act--
close to my heart as a former member of the Science Committee--
which invests $280,000,000,000 to increase domestic 
semiconductor production. I am excited about that. Some of that 
may even come to Texas.
    Unfortunately not these gentlemen here, I don't think--that 
90 percent of our friends on the other side of the aisle did 
not vote for it, but I know that they are probably working with 
it in their districts.
    So, Dr. Jost, would you share that with me? I would love to 
have Ms. Bingen to answer that question as well.
    Dr. Jost, would you please?
    Mr. Jost. Thank you, Congresswoman. These are really 
excellent questions and I thank you for them.
    So you raised the issue of difference in government values, 
and I agree, although I should note that we do have some common 
interests, if not common values. China and the United States 
both want to see their populations live prosperous lives, for 
example, and both sides want to see the world address some of 
the challenges of global climate change.
    That being said, it is very true that the two countries 
have stark differences in the way they see the relationship 
between state and society. The protections that we have in the 
United States by which citizens enjoy civil liberties and can 
organize against the state in order to keep its power in check 
are simply not present there. It is true that China, 
indiscriminately, or without considering the types of behaviors 
that the target regime or the target state is conducting, will 
invest in it. You mentioned the Belt and Road initiative. This 
is certainly one of the keystone portions of China's efforts.
    I do agree that the nature of the regime in that target 
country is quite important. We do have some research that 
suggests that economic statecraft that China uses, for example, 
is less effective when the target country is democratic. 
There's an intuitive logic there, of course, because if 
individuals, just like in the United States, can mobilize 
against their government, if they are in collusion with the 
Chinese Communist Party for illicit gain, they can hold them 
accountable. So I think that is a mechanism by which we can 
indirectly shape China's ability to use the Belt and Road in 
the way that you are describing.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Ms. Bingen.
    Ms. Bingen. Congressman, if I can add, you mentioned it 
exactly right. China has a playbook that they are using with 
the Belt and Road. We've seen it. The ports and 5G are 
examples. The ports where they go into countries. Djibouti is a 
great example where they go in, they operate the commercial 
port, they kick out the locals, they build up military 
infrastructure, and then it's a greater threat to the region 
and to our national security interest. So we see that happening 
across the globe.
    We as a government--we say formally--but the government 
needs to figure out how do they bring all their different tools 
of national power to the table to provide alternatives. Some of 
the areas we have been talking about today are on the 
technology front. I have a space background. I would offer as 
an example, our commercial space innovation sector right now is 
phenomenal. We are using our space technologies, our data, in 
ways well beyond national security, understanding the climate 
mapping, countering illegal fishing. This is soft power for 
Americans and for our companies. So ways that we can leverage 
some of these newer technologies while clearly protecting and 
ensuring that they don't fall into the hands of the CCP, but 
working with our allies and partners across the globe who want 
to work with us in these areas, figuring out ways to get that 
kind of information to them. Opening up markets for our 
businesses so they are not just relying on U.S. Government is 
also important.
    Ms. Jackson Lee. Let me thank you all so very much. I think 
it has been established that the Belt and Road technology, or 
approach, is a danger to the framework of democracy of this 
Nation. We need to use that power of our values and, of course, 
of our technology. I like commercial space just because I am a 
NASA aficionado and space exploration is crucial. Dr. Jost, 
thank you for that framework that we can utilize.
    This is an important hearing, and I thank you, gentlemen 
for yielding, and I yield back to the Chairman.
    Mr. Goldman. Thank you, Ms. Jackson Lee.
    I want us to thank the witnesses for their valuable 
testimony and Members for their questions today. I also want to 
thank the Members of the subcommittee. We may have some 
additional questions for the witnesses and we would ask the 
witnesses to respond to these in writing. Pursuant to committee 
rule VII(D), the hearing record will be open for 10 days.
    Without objection, this subcommittee stands adjourned.
    [Whereupon, at 10:44 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



                            A P P E N D I X

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   Question for William R. Evanina From Ranking Member Seth Magaziner
    Question. Can you expand on your recommendation for the creation of 
an Economic Threat Intelligence entity, to combat corporate espionage 
and the theft of IP? What need would such an entity address and how 
should it be structured (e.g., what agencies should be involved and how 
it should be staffed) to be most effective?
    Answer. Response was not received at the time of publication.
          Question for Tyler Jost From Hon. Daniel S. Goldman
    Question. Dr. Jost, in your written testimony, you mention that the 
Chinese government ``is interested in using its capabilities to . . . 
promote narratives that are consistent with its interests'' and that 
``propaganda is deeply embedded in the Chinese Communist Party's 
institutions.'' How does anti-Asian hate crime in the United States and 
some of our political leaders regularly trafficking in xenophobic and 
racist rhetoric strengthen the CCP's propaganda efforts around the 
world?
    Answer. China's global messaging campaigns routinely draw attention 
to racism, including anti-Asian racism, in the United States. One 
illustration of this is found in reports published by China's State 
Council Information Office on ``human rights violations'' in the United 
States. The version of this document released in February 2022, for 
example, cited anti-Asian hate crimes in the United States as evidence 
of ``deeply entrenched racism in the United States'' that was 
``spreading along with the novel coronavirus.''
    The goal of such messages is presumably to deflect criticism of 
China's own human rights record by shaping global public opinion toward 
the United States, particularly toward the sincerity of American 
commitment to human rights.
    While we know that such criticisms are commonly featured in China's 
global messaging campaigns, there is comparatively little scholarly 
research that directly evaluates their effectiveness in terms of 
shaping global public opinion. To my knowledge, there have been no 
peer-reviewed studies to date that have systematically evaluated 
whether China's efforts to call attention to xenophobia and racism in 
the Unites States achieves the Chinese Communist Party's goal of 
shaping global attitudes. Congress might consider funding future 
academic research that is able to more definitely measure the effects 
of China's overseas propaganda.
    Please do not hesitate to contact me if I can be of further 
assistance.