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**THE PRESSING THREAT OF
THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY
TO U.S. NATIONAL DEFENSE**

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THE PRESSING THREAT OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY TO U.S. NATIONAL DEFENSE

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, February 7, 2023.

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers (chairman of the committee) presiding.

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

The CHAIRMAN. Committee will come to order. Our first hearing this Congress is on the threats posed by the Chinese Communist Party and what our military needs to do to stay ahead of them. China is the most challenging national security threat America has faced in 30 years. If we fail to acknowledge that and take immediate action to deter it, the next 30 years could be devastating for our Nation.

Under President Xi, the Chinese Communist Party has nearly tripled its defense spending in the last decade alone. The PLA [People's Liberation Army] has gone from an obsolete force barely capable of defending its borders to a modern fighting force capable of winning regional conflicts. The CCP [Chinese Communist Party] now controls the largest army and navy in the world with a goal of having them fully integrated and modernized by 2027. The CCP is rapidly expanding its nuclear capability. They have doubled their number of warheads in 2 years. We estimated it would take them a decade to do that. We've also were just informed by the DOD [Department of Defense] and the CCP now has more ICBM [intercontinental ballistic missile] launchers than the United States.

The CCP is starting to outpace us on new battlefields, as well. They have leapfrogged us on hypersonic technology. They are fielding what we are still developing. They are making advances in AI [artificial intelligence] and quantum computing that we struggle to keep pace with. Finally, their rapid advances in space were one of the primary motivations for us establishing a Space Force.

The CCP is not building these new and advanced military capabilities for self defense. In recent years, the CCP has used its military to push out its borders, to threaten our allies in the region, and to gain footholds on new continents. In violation of international law, the CCP has built new and commandeered existing islands in the South China Sea where it has deployed stealth fighters, bombers, and missiles. It continues to intimidate and coerce Taiwan, most recently by surrounding the island with naval forces

and launching endless fighter sorties across its center line. In recent years, the CCP has also established a space tracking facility in South America to monitor U.S. satellites, as well as an overseas naval base miles from our own on the strategically vital Horn of Africa.

These are just a few destabilizing actions taken by the CCP. They speak nothing of the CCP's Belt and Road debt-trap diplomacy, its illegal harvesting of personal data and intellectual property, its ongoing human rights abuses, and its advanced espionage efforts, the latter of which came into full focus for all Americans last week when the Biden administration allowed a CCP spy balloon to traverse some of our Nation's most sensitive military sites. Make no mistake, that balloon was intentionally launched as a calculated show of force.

We have to stop being naive about the threat we face from China. We no longer have the luxury of time. We need to act now to get ahead of this threat. We need to make the right investments in the right capabilities to ensure our military can effectively deter and, if necessary, defeat the threat. That will be the focus of this committee this Congress.

I look forward to working with all of you on this effort, and, with that, I yield to my friend, the ranking member, Mr. Smith.

**STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED
SERVICES**

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. And thank you for making this the first hearing of this session. It is very appropriate, as the last two National Security Strategies and as just about everyone acknowledges now, China is the greatest threat that we face to our national security objectives and the biggest problem that we face as a country, and we need to figure out how to deal with that. And I think you outlined the threat quite well. I will not repeat that, except to say that, without question, in the last decade, China has decided to try to impose its will on the world and move us in a direction that takes us away from the rules-based international system that the United States and so many other nations are trying to impose.

We must, without question, meet that threat, and part of meeting that threat is also, without question, to deter it militarily, to make sure, basically, that China does not feel that they can succeed by trying to move forward their objectives through the use of their military. Certainly in Taiwan, but Taiwan is not the only place that China claims at the moment that we have to worry about whether or not they would use their military to achieve those objectives. We need to build up our military, look very carefully at what China is doing, and make sure the decisions we're making deter that threat. In fact, that is one of the challenges that I know the chairman and I see the same way. We have to have a modernized military; cliché, but we can't be fighting the last war. A number of lessons have been learned by the conflict in Ukraine and elsewhere. We need to apply those lessons and make sure that our military is modernized to meet the threats that we face today.

And part of that also, I'd be remiss if I didn't mention success for the U.S., Ukraine, and the coalition in Ukraine is crucial to that deterrence message against China. President Xi is absolutely watching what goes on there; and if President Putin is able to achieve his aims lawlessly and through the use of the military, that will only further embolden President Xi in his objectives in China.

We also have to be aware that this is not only and not even primarily a military struggle. China is trying to expand its influences, as the chairman alluded to, in a number of different ways. We need to use diplomacy and alliances to meet this threat. The U.S. will not be able to deter China on its own. We need our allies, we need our partners across the globe, and the Biden administration very much recognizes that and has done an outstanding job of building up those partnerships and alliances in a number of areas. The AUKUS agreement between Australia, Great Britain, and the U.S. has helped empower our partners there. We have developed the Quad with Japan, Australia, India, and the U.S., also to build up our strengths as partners and alliances. And, most recently, the Philippines has allowed us to enhance our military presence in partnership with them and their country, largely because they see the threat from China. They don't want that bully right above them to be able to push them around. They're looking for partnerships and alliances, as we move forward, to be able to meet that.

It is also really important to understand what our objective here is. Our objective is to have a world where China and the U.S. can coexist peacefully. I think it is a dangerous mistake if we think we are somehow going to defeat China, whatever that might mean. They are the second-largest economy in the world. They are a large and powerful nation. We need to guide them down a better path. And I want to make this statement 100 percent clear: War with China is not inevitable. It is not even likely. It is something we must all work to avoid, not to treat as an inevitability. It doesn't have to be that way. Let us use our skills, our diplomacy, and our ability to deter to avoid it.

And the last thing I want to say is, as we look at this problem, we need to be careful to separate the Chinese government from the Chinese people and certainly from the Asian people. In the last couple of years, there has been a massive increase in anti-Asian bigotry and hate in this country. The Asian-American population in the U.S. is an incredibly vital part of our country and also really rather important to the fight to set a different vision for the world than the one China lays out. Let's take on China, but let's remember to respect the Asian-American people who are so crucial to what we are doing here in this country.

With that, I look forward to the testimony. I want to welcome our witnesses, Dr. Sisson and Admiral Harris. Great to see you both back. Look forward to your testimony. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Now I'd like to take a minute to introduce our panel. First, a fellow who has had my admiration for many years is Admiral Harry Harris, former Commander of the U.S. Pacific Command, now INDOPACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command], under Presidents Obama and Trump, as well as former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea. And Dr. Melanie Sisson is a fellow with the Brookings Institute Talbott Center for Security, Strategy,

and Technology. We had Ambassador O'Brien slated to appear, but, unfortunately, he had an emergent personal matter that he could not be with us today.

So Admiral Harris, Dr. Sisson, we look forward to your testimony; and, Admiral Harris, we'll start with you.

**STATEMENT OF ADM HARRY B. HARRIS, JR., USN (RET.),
FORMER COMMANDER, U.S. INDO-PACIFIC COMMAND**

Admiral HARRIS. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, and Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members. I am honored to appear again before this committee, this time alongside the esteemed Dr. Melanie Sisson.

That your first meeting of the 118th Congress addresses the threat that the United States faces from the People's Republic of China, or PRC, sends a powerful signal to the region. I am grateful for Congress's passing of the FY23 [fiscal year 2023] National Defense Authorization Act, including the embedded Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act which increases military aid and security cooperation to that embattled island. There are very few bipartisan issues in Washington these days, but our national concern about the PRC is one of them.

The U.S. has enduring national interest in the Indo-Pacific, a region at a precarious crossroad where tangible opportunity meets significant challenge. We find ourselves again in peer competition with adversaries who are developing and deploying cutting-edge weaponry and information disorder to undermine our democracy and defeat us.

In 2018, I talked about our challenges: a rogue North Korea, a revisionist PRC, and a revanchist Russia. Over the past 5 years, the situation has worsened, in my opinion, in almost every geostrategic measure, a security environment more complex and more volatile and more dangerous than any that I've seen. We are in what I call the decisive decade.

Last fall, the current administration finally released its National Security Strategy. Though I would use the term adversary rather than competitor, the strategy recognizes that the PRC is the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order.

Now, while the U.S. has partnered well with China on several important fronts, Washington and Beijing fundamentally disagree on how to approach the international order. The PRC does not keep its word, from its treaty with the British on Hong Kong, to its human rights abuses against the Uyghurs and others, to its attempts at commercial espionage, and its quest to intimidate, isolate, and ultimately dominate Taiwan.

The PRC's aggression in the South China Sea continues unabated, despite the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration's ruling that invalidated China's ridiculous nine-dash line claim and unprecedented land reclamations. Beijing's actions are coordinated, methodical, and strategic, using its military and economic power to erode the free and open international seas.

Last week's spy balloon drama playing out on the doorstep to the Secretary of State's planned visit to Beijing typifies PRC bad behavior and disregard for international norms. That Beijing would

claim that the incursion over sovereign American airspace was innocuous and unintended beggars the imagination.

China's considerable military buildup could soon challenge the U.S. across almost every domain. Now, while some might say that PRC is already there, I am not one of them, yet. However, the PRC is making significant advances in missile systems, including hypersonics, fifth-generation fighters, a blue-water navy, and the next wave of technologies, including artificial intelligence and advanced space and cyber. Geopolitically, Beijing seeks to supplant the United States as a security partner of choice for countries not only in the Indo-Pacific but globally.

The U.S. makes it clear that we reject foreign policy based on leverage and dominance. We encourage every country to work in its own interest to protect its own sovereignty, and we must work in our own enlightened self-interest to develop our own reliable sources of rare earths, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals essential for weaponizing, independent of the PRC. Former Deputy National Security Advisor [for Strategy] Nadia Schadlow wrote last year that the PRC is "the sole source or a primary source supplier for a number of critical energetics materials." And by energetics, she is referring to those materials that are used for explosives and propellants, from bullets, to artillery, to missiles.

We find ourselves sailing into rocks and shoals, to use a nautical analogy; we must invest and innovate to right the errant course that we are on. Otherwise, the joint force will struggle to compete with the People's Liberation Army on future battlefields.

Now, I note that the current administration's fundamental understanding of the PRC is consistent with its predecessor, as my esteemed colleague knows well. The Secretary of State testified that the previous administration's tougher approach is right, that what is happening in Xinjiang is genocide and the democracy is being trampled in Hong Kong. The Secretary of Defense testified that he is focused on the threat posed by the PRC, and he promised strong support for Taiwan.

Look, Taiwan is democratic, an idea factory, and a global force for good. Just last week, the Cato Institute called Taiwan the freest country in East Asia, ahead of Japan, ahead of South Korea. I've called for ending the almost 44-year U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity in favor of strategic clarity. I also believe that we should ink a bilateral free trade agreement with Taipei as soon as possible. The new Indo-Pacific strategy calls for an environment whereby Taiwan's future is determined peacefully by its own people. What a concept. My successor at Indo-Pacific Command testified before Congress in 2021 that the PRC could invade Taiwan in 6 years. That is 2027. We ignore Admiral Davidson's warning at our peril.

The PRC's intent is crystal clear. Maya Angelou once said that when someone shows you who they are, believe them the first time. Well, Xi Jinping has showed us his intent regarding Taiwan time and time again, and shame on us if we ignore him. We must not allow the PRC to dictate America's Taiwan policy. Indeed, I am worried about the trajectory of the PRC's body politic. Former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd recently wrote that last October's 20th party congress "is an era-defining event, cementing Xi Jinping as China's paramount leader, solidifying the country's turn

to the state and away from the market and officially underscoring the primacy of Marxism-Leninism.” In other words, Deng Xiaoping is dead in more ways than one.

Mr. Chairman, while challenges to our interests in the Indo-Pacific, especially from the PRC, are real, I believe that America’s resolve is powerful and steadfast. I thank you and this committee and the whole Congress for your enduring support to INDO-PACOM, to our Armed Forces, and our diplomatic corps. Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Admiral Harris can be found in the Appendix on page 71.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral. And, Dr. Sisson, you are recognized.

STATEMENT OF DR. MELANIE W. SISSON, FOREIGN POLICY FELLOW, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION STROBE TALBOTT CENTER FOR SECURITY, STRATEGY, AND TECHNOLOGY

Dr. SISSON. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and members of the committee, thank you for inviting me here today to support your efforts to assess and to respond to the threat of the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. national defense.

Under the rule of the CCP, the People’s Republic of China is seeking to expand its influence culturally, economically, politically, and militarily. It has used illicit and illegal means to advantage its economy. It has been obstructionist in multilateral organizations and on critical transnational issues, such as climate and health. And it has not only improved the capabilities of its armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army, but also has used those forces to advance discredited territorial and resource claims and to threaten and intimidate its neighbors.

Advances in the capabilities of the PLA, together with the CCP’s longstanding interest in unification with the democratically self-governing island of Taiwan, has energized concern about China’s near-term intentions toward the island and about the role of the United States in cross-strait relations. Since 1979, the United States has adopted a constellation of official positions, together known as the One-China Policy, that allow us to acknowledge but not to accept China’s perspective that there is one China and that Taiwan is part of China.

Under the One-China Policy, the United States has developed robust unofficial relations with the government and the people of Taiwan consistent with our interest in preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. U.S. policy is guided by an interest in ensuring cross-strait disputes are resolved peacefully and in a manner that reflects the will of Taiwan’s people. This has required the United States to deter Taiwan from declaring independence and also to deter the CCP from attempting unification by force.

The 40-year success of this strategy of dual deterrence rests upon the unwillingness of the United States to provide either an unconditional commitment to Taipei that it will come to its defense militarily or an unconditional commitment to Beijing that we will not.

The U.S. national security interest in the status of Taiwan remains that the CCP and the people of Taiwan resolve the island’s political status peacefully. Dual deterrence therefore remains U.S.

strategy, reinforced by U.S. declaratory policy, which is to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by either side.

The modernization of the PLA has changed the regional military balance and significantly enough that the United States no longer can be confident that we would decisively defeat every type of PLA use of force in the Taiwan Strait. This fact, however, does not necessitate that the U.S. abandon the strategy of dual deterrence, and it doesn't mean that the United States should seek to reconstitute its prior degree of dominance.

Posturing the U.S. military to convince the CCP that the PLA could not succeed in any and every contingency over Taiwan is infeasible in the near term and likely beyond. The PLA's advances are considerable and ongoing. Geography works in its favor, and history demonstrates that it is far easier to arrive at an overconfident assessment of relative capability than it is to arrive at an accurate one.

Attempting to demonstrate superiority for all contingencies would require a commitment of forces that would inhibit the United States from behaving like the global power that it is with global interests to which its military must also attend. This posture, moreover, is not necessary for dual deterrence to extend its 40-year record of success. We can instead encourage the government of Taiwan to adopt a defense concept that forces the PLA into suboptimal strategies and increases the battle damage Beijing would have to anticipate and accept.

The CCP should also be reminded that, in addition to retaining the option on direct U.S. military engagement, U.S. military superiority in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean allows us to threaten the maritime shipping upon which China depends for access to energy, global markets, and supply chains. The inevitable damage a use of force would cause to the global economy and the imposition of sanctions and restricted access to critical inputs needed to sustain China's economic development and the quality of life of its people, moreover, would certainly compound China's losses.

The CCP should have no illusion, however, that it can inflict a first strike on the United States that prevents us from joining in the defense of Taiwan. Militarily, this will require the armed services to develop concepts of operation that maximize the effects of dispersal, mobility, and localized decision making, and to make investments in the portable and expendable assets that those concepts require: uncrewed systems that launch sensors and anti-ship missiles, for example, without the need for runways that are difficult to defend. DOD must also prioritize improving the resilience of its command, control, and communication systems against disabling electronic and cyber attacks.

These and related measures will position the United States not only to implement its strategy of dual deterrence in the Taiwan Strait but also will prepare us to detect and respond to Chinese incrementalism throughout the Western Pacific and beyond. Plentiful surveillance, resilient command and control, and small situationally aware mobile deployments are necessary for the Armed Forces to minimize opportunities for the PLA to engage in unlawful and coercive actions and to deny it gains when it does.

The U.S.-China contest is definitionally strategic. Its outcome will be determined by the respective abilities of the CCP and the government of the United States to marshal all instruments of national power and to deploy them in a comprehensive, well-executed grand strategy. It is therefore essential that Congress ensures DOD is equipped in concept and in capability to deter PLA aggression regionally and also to shape and constrain the geopolitical conditions within which the CCP pursues its objectives globally.

I look forward to discussing these important issues with you.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Sisson can be found in the Appendix on page 84.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Dr. Sisson. One of the many things I liked about Chairman Smith, when he served as Chairman Smith, was his rigorous enforcement of the 5-minute rule. I think that that is the only way we can show respect for our colleagues. So understand I will be following the mold set by Adam Smith when I tell you your time is up. But know this: it is going to apply to me and the ranking member, as well. We are going to put ourselves on a 5-minute clock.

With that, I recognize myself for a couple of questions. Recently, we've heard from military leaders that we could have a U.S. conflict with China in the near future. My question is what do we need to be doing to prepare for that, assuming that assessment is correct, that we could have a near-term conflict? Admiral, what do you think?

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, sir, for the question. My colleagues in uniform have given a couple of different timelines. Admiral Davidson, the Davidson window is 2027. I talked about it in my remarks. General Minihan just last week said 2025. I think the most important thing is less the specific date than the fact that our military is committed to defending the United States whenever an attack happens, whenever they are called upon. And I think that Admiral Aquilino, who is the current INDOPACOM commander, is doing just that. You know, he has developed this concept called see, blind, and kill. You know, see the enemy, blind the enemy, and then kill the enemy, and he is working on that with expeditious need because his requirement is really what we've said all along about the Indo-Pacific, and I am sure the other combatant commanders would say the same thing. Their job is to defend and be ready to fight tonight, not in 2025 or 2027 or 2030 or whenever those hypothetical dates are thrown out there.

The CHAIRMAN. Great. Dr. Sisson.

Dr. SISSON. Thank you. Representative, first, I would say I agree with Admiral Harris in terms of the responsibility of the services to be prepared always for those sorts of unfortunate events. What I would say in terms of among the most important things that can be done now is to reinforce our deterrent posture. I think it is harmful for us to have repeated incidents of high-level Department officials making different estimations. It suggests that we don't have a coherent view of what is happening over the strait, and that certainly is not helpful to our effort to deter the CCP.

The CHAIRMAN. Great. I am curious, what do you all think we could do to improve Taiwan's defenses that could help deter China in any kind of aggressive behavior? Admiral Harris.

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. So I was in Taiwan last week meeting with senior leadership there. I was there for 5 days. I got a chance to travel down to Kaohsiung, Taiwan, to look at the progress they are making on their Indigenous Defense Submarine, or IDS. I believe, Mr. Chairman, that there is a lot that we are doing, but there is a lot more that we could do.

The CHAIRMAN. For example?

Admiral HARRIS. For example, we could sign a free trade agreement with Taiwan. That is important not only on the economic side but also because of the example that that sets for other countries who might be considering doing trade deals with Taiwan, opening up to Taiwan, but they are waiting for cover from a country like the United States. So that is one thing we could do.

We could help them more, I believe, in training. You know, as they go from a 4-month draft, a 4-month conscripted force, to a 1-year conscripted force starting in 2024, they are going to need some help, one, in training them and, two, how to train them because this is a new thing for them. But I do believe, based on my time in Taiwan last week, that I've come away with a belief that Taiwan is both resilient and understanding of the need for their self-defense, and this is driven a little bit by the Chinese move on Hong Kong but most currently by Russia's move on Ukraine.

The CHAIRMAN. Dr. Sisson, is there anything in particular you'd like to see us do to help Taiwan be more able to deter any aggressive behavior from China?

Dr. SISSON. I think it is absolutely the case that there can be changes made to enhance the porcupine position in the defense concept. You know, those are things like investments in short-range anti-air and anti-ship defenses, naval mines, and so forth. I am sure I don't need to tell the committee those specifics.

The admiral raises the other good point that it is essential, and one of the lessons that we've absolutely learned from Ukraine, that the people of Taiwan will need to be prepared to be resilient in the event of a blockade for example, and ready to engage in any prolonged and intensive resistance to invasion and occupation. That preparation, visible preparation, can serve as a deterrent.

The CHAIRMAN. Great. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes the ranking member.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Building off of the chairman's comments, I think, you know, setting a specific date on it isn't really the point. At this point, I think China could do it right now. They have the capability. They are jockeying for position, trying to figure out how to maximize their chances for success. We obviously need to be prepared to deter that. I do worry about the inevitability comments because these words get played up in China, and then China is like, well, the U.S. is coming for us, so we may as well go for them. I think we need to be careful about that particular language.

But building off of what can be done to deter, Dr. Sisson, you mentioned the need to disperse and make our forces more mobile, and that has been a big piece of analysis of what we are doing there. I have seen the analysis. What is your assessment, both of your assessments about how we are doing on making us less of a target initially in that way, and what do you think we need to do to get there more quickly?

Dr. Sisson. I think that we are making good progress. Where I look for those advances starts with the concepts, the concepts of operations, what it is the services understand that it is they need to be doing, followed then by the investments in the capabilities they need to implement and execute on those plans.

So I think the Marine Corps is a good example of the kinds of changes that we are seeing that are moving in the right direction. And I think that that is having a positive effect, and we are starting to see that move through the Department a little bit more broadly. We need to be thinking about resilience. We need to be thinking about how we are working with AI-enabled capabilities and autonomy, including in surveillance and getting information right up to what we call the tactical edge. And I see the Department working in those directions very much.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. Admiral.

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, sir. I think that, among other things, we need to understand more fully the PRC—the Chinese surveillance capabilities and systems. Shooting down that drone and then recovering the parts over the Atlantic I think is very helpful in that regard. General VanHerck, the NORAD/NORTHCOM [North American Aerospace Defense Command/U.S. Northern Command] commander, spoke yesterday about what he called a domain gap in his ability to understand China's balloons that they've sent forward across the United States over the past several years. So that ought to concern all of us, so I think getting these parts of this balloon together and understanding their surveillance will help.

It is hard to disperse a fixed airfield, and I am speaking a little parochially since I am from the Navy. And that is why development of aircraft carriers is so important. I think that Dr. Sisson is spot-on when she talks about Dave Berger's moves to bring the U.S. Marine Corps into the 21st century. I support what he is doing, and I am excited by where he is going with it.

So those are some of the things that we could be doing and we are doing to address the threat from the PRC.

Mr. SMITH. And what about our partners in the region? Japan, in particular, has really stepped up. I think they now recognize the threat from China. Australia, to some extent, as well. What role do you see our partners in the region playing in deterring China's aggression towards Taiwan and, frankly, aggression towards many of the other neighbors, as the chairman outlined?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I'll start. I think that America's greatest asymmetric capability, our greatest asymmetric strength, is our alliance—alliances and partnerships, our whole network across the globe. Japan, as you mentioned, sir, they have clearly stepped up to the plate. Before the late Abe Shinzo was assassinated, you know, he was leading that, and I am happy and pleased to see that Foreign Minister Kishida Fumio has followed in his footsteps. They recognize that they are in a precarious position vis-a-vis China.

I think South Korea is an important ally. They realize it, as well, as does Australia, especially Australia. I mean, it was Peter Dutton, the former Minister of Defense down there, who said of course we will defend Taiwan with the United States. That is a powerful statement for a country to make when you are talking

about armed conflict with the PRC over Taiwan. He made that comment about 2 years ago.

So, I think that we cannot do it alone. We rely heavily on our allies, and that is our greatest asymmetric strength.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. I am about out of time, so I will yield back. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And Dr. Sisson and Admiral, thank you very much for being here. My appreciation of the people of China is lifelong. My father served in the Flying Tigers, the 14th Air Force, in Chengdu, Xi'an, and Kunming to liberate the people of China. I inherited his appreciation of the people of China with several meaningful visits by me and my family from Beijing to Shanghai to Hong Kong. Sadly, my hopes for a mutually beneficial relationship were misplaced, culminating with the spy balloon over my home community this weekend threatening Fort Jackson and the Savannah River nuclear laboratory. The Biden administration is blaming the military for the delay. To me this is duplicity. The responsibility of not acting sooner is the sole responsibility of President Biden.

With that in mind, Congress, Admiral, has created the Pacific Defense Initiative in the FY21 [fiscal year 2021] National Defense Authorization Act, to modernize and enhance our presence, logistics, and maintenance capabilities, exercise program infrastructure and security cooperation in the region. What is your view on the impact of the Pacific Deterrence Initiative? What value do you believe we have in this initiative over time? We need to be building peace through strength.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, a great question, sir. I support it completely, the Pacific Defense Initiative. I wasn't good enough when I was the PACOM [U.S. Indo-Pacific Command] commander to convince all of you to buy into that. Admiral Davidson is far more eloquent than I am, and he was able to convince the right folks that that is an important thing.

INDOPACOM needs that initiative in order to have the funds to do the things that it needs to do in the far reaches of the Pacific, not only in terms of our allies like the Philippines, but especially part of America in Guam, and ballistic missile defense, which can now be funded to a better rate because of the Pacific Defense—Deterrence Initiative.

Mr. WILSON. And I am really grateful that you mentioned INDO-PACOM. It was President Trump that added "INDO" to show the appreciation and importance of India and what opportunities we have to be working with that country and how their own capabilities, they do not need to be reliant on Russian military equipment. We have an extraordinary country of 1.4 billion people who can make their own.

With that in mind, it is bipartisan that there is an understanding we are in a worldwide competition of democracies with rule of law opposed by autocracies with rule of gun. Sadly, we see war criminal Putin invade Ukraine being supported by the Chinese Communist Party, as they are also threatening Taiwan, and then

as Iran threatens Israel. With that in mind, it is so important that Ukraine achieve victory to reduce the potential of a wider war.

With that in mind, Dr. Sisson, the combination of China's desire to expand its influence, the U.S. to maintain its own influence, Taiwan's international aspiration roles in the global economy make the island status an especially contentious issue threatening Korea, Japan, all the way to Australia. It is bipartisan that the United States understands how important it is to maintain a constructive role to prevent a cross-border conflict. What can be further done to avoid a conflict?

Dr. Sisson. Representative, that is exactly right and well put. The most important thing I think that we can do conceptually right now is to remember that Taiwan is not the crucible for great power competition, that China's ambitions are strategic and they are global, as are ours, and the best thing that we can do is treat it as such.

With regards to Taiwan specifically, I believe we should maintain our policy of dual deterrence and we should do so in a manner that projects the place that we are in, which is a place where we should feel confident that we can effectively deter and calm and cohesive with all of our allies and partners in the practice of implementing that strategy.

Mr. Wilson. Indeed. I am looking with the leadership, Adam Smith, others, bipartisan, working together. And encouraging the administration, there has been a delay in providing proper defensive munitions to the people of Taiwan, and this needs to be bipartisan to indeed create an Asian porcupine so that we can have peace through strength.

Thank you. And I yield back.

The Chairman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Connecticut, Mr. Courtney.

Mr. Courtney. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you to both witnesses for your thoughtful testimony today. Admiral Harris, on September 15th, 2021, President Biden announced the new AUKUS security agreement, Australia, U.S., and U.K. [United Kingdom], which seems perfectly aligned with the comments you just made a moment ago, which are on page 5 of your testimony, that, "America's single asymmetric strength is our network of security alliances and partnerships." David Ignatius, the veteran journalist at Washington Post described AUKUS as "the most important strategic move in decades."

As someone who served as commander in Indo-Pacific, can you describe the strategic importance of AUKUS, in particular providing Australia with nuclear technology to have a nuclear-powered submarine force, as it relates to the priority of building regional partnership capacity in the Indo-Pacific?

Admiral Harris. Thanks, Congressman. AUKUS is supremely important. We are going to share the crown jewel of America's military technology—the nuclear submarine, the nuclear reactors—with another country, and that is Australia. We have not done that with any other country, except for the U.K. back in the late 1950s and into the 1960s. So here we have the two countries with that capability, the United States and the U.K., and we are going to share that with Australia. It is significant, but it is only going to

be significant over the long term if we follow through. So it is a decade-long process, you know. Some people, the CNO, Chief of Naval Operations, has said it could be 30 years before we see an Australian nuclear submarine underway in the Indian Ocean. I said that, if we put our hearts and minds to it and our resources to it—and by ours I mean ours, the United States, the U.K.'s, and Australia's—we can do this faster than that. I mean, we put a man on the moon in 8 years, and we developed a COVID [coronavirus disease] vaccine in 1 year. We can do this, but we are going to have to put our shoulders to the task.

For Australia, which has a tremendous military, for them to have the long reach of a nuclear submarine force would be dramatic. It would help us dramatically. It would change the balance of power in the Indian Ocean, and it would make Australia a blue-water navy. They are our key ally in that part of the world, and I am all for it.

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Admiral. And your comments about execution are very timely because, in about a month's time, the process that has been underway since the President's announcement is going to be going public and live. And one of the biggest questions that we have to solve as a Congress is to make sure that we knock down the barriers of export controls to share that nuclear technology, and that actually is going to be a task for this committee.

Doctor, I don't know whether you had any comments you want to add to that.

Dr. SISSON. Thank you. Yes. Just briefly, I think it is important to note that anything that improves our situational awareness in the Western Pacific and ability to operate there broadly is very good for our policy overall in the region and our interests in the region. And part of the reason for that is it is a visible demonstration to the CCP of how widespread the commitment is of its regional neighbors and beyond to certain standards and expectations of behavior. And that will limit and constrain the environment in which they are able to pursue their interests in ways that are, at a minimum, problematic and, at most, illegal and dangerous.

Mr. COURTNEY. Great. Thank you. And regarding, again, the asymmetrical advantage of regional networks, again, just in the last month, we've had two announcements about the U.S. being able to have four new bases in the Philippines, as well as now some new rotational agreements with Japan. Again, Admiral, maybe you could just describe how that sort of fits in to the discussion this morning.

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. So the Philippines is the key. I mean, they are at the point of the spear in the South China Sea. You know, it is hard to imagine a fight with the PRC without being able to use bases on the Philippines. Separately, we have a long-standing relationship with the Philippines, some of it troubled, and this, I believe, will go a long way toward making us a better ally of them. They are an ally of the United States, but we need to be an ally for them, and I think this will help in that regard also.

Sir, just back to your previous question. I can't emphasize enough how important it is to get through this export issue, export control issue, with Australia. I mean, we could have every good in-

tention in the world, but we could be bound up by our own regulation and our own regulatory policy. So whatever can be done to relax that would be—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time is expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Lamborn.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you to the witnesses for appearing today and to Chairman Rogers for organizing this timely and urgent hearing on national security threats from China. Admiral Harris, and welcome to Colorado Springs when you finally get a chance to finally retire.

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks.

Mr. LAMBORN. My top priority as chairman of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee is to accelerate our hypersonic capabilities, both offensive and defensive. Nowhere is the need for this more clear than in the Pacific. I am extremely concerned about the anemic pace with which the Department seems to be pursuing hypersonic capabilities, and I am also troubled by the current limited plan to field these systems. Most relevant for this hearing is the Navy's plan to field offensive hypersonics on the *Zumwalt* destroyer of which we only have three.

Could you discuss the strategic implications of China's hypersonic weapons for our planning and the importance you place on fielding American hypersonic capabilities as quickly as possible? And I am going to ask you to pull the microphone just a little closer to you. Thank you.

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, thanks, sir. It is good to be from Colorado, I believe. So I'll be brief with my answer because the real expert is right here, but I'll just say that we are shooting behind the Peking duck on hypersonics. China is ahead of us in that regard. We need an offensive capability, and we need a defensive capability. Imagine a missile that is flying so fast that you can't pick it up on radar, let alone shoot it down. And that is what we are up against, and we need to invest in that capability now in order to, again, right the errant course that we are on.

Mr. LAMBORN. Doctor.

Dr. SISSON. So I should also say it is good to be from Colorado. I grew up in Colorado Springs, and I come from a line of Colorado natives, in fact, so I am happy that the admiral is getting a taste of the good life there, too.

Sir, in regards to your question, I understand the interest in hypersonics and the concern about the CCP's advances in that area. My perspective is that the priority investment in terms of technology is less, from the United States perspective, should be less on those large and very exquisite kinds of platforms and capabilities. I favor much more strongly the ability, again, to disperse and be mobile and the AI-enabled technologies that support those kinds of missions.

This is not to say we shouldn't be continuing to invest in and learn from research into hypersonics and the development thereof. It is just not, to my mind, the first priority.

Mr. LAMBORN. Let me shift gears to China's breakout in nuclear forces. A former STRATCOM [U.S. Strategic Command] commander, Admiral Richard, called it breathtaking, and I agree. And, Chairman Rogers, you referred to this also, the number of launch-

ers that they have is now at or higher than the amount that the U.S. has. And I think they are also watching what is happening in Ukraine where Putin, to some degree of success, is having his threats of nuclear—of the use of nuclear weapons have an effect on some of the players there.

How do you assess that China's nuclear build-up fits into its strategy to attain what they call national rejuvenation? And this is for both of you. Thank you.

Admiral HARRIS. So I believe that their nuclear force breakout, if you will, is part and parcel of what they believe their overall intent is. You know, they want to overcome this 100 years of humiliation piece and their dream of national rejuvenation by 2049, the 100th anniversary of the modern PRC, will be enhanced by their nuclear capability.

Twenty twenty-seven, the Davidson window, if you will, that is the 100th year of the PLA, the People's Liberation Army, so that is another important milestone. And it behooves us to modernize our nuclear arsenal, as well, so that we keep up. We never want to create a situation whereby China or any other country can envision a successful first strike.

Mr. LAMBORN. Doctor.

Dr. SISSON. Thank you, Representative. I think the admiral is correct that there is a status element involved in the expansion of the PRC's nuclear capabilities. I think it is also a response to their perceptions of a more threatening international environment. I also agree with the admiral that we need to be attentive to modernization of our triad and, yet, we can be confident that we still retain vast stocks far in excess of what the CCP's ambitions suggest that they will be able to achieve in the near term.

Mr. LAMBORN. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Norcross, for 5 minutes.

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you, Chairman. As we are witnessing the invasion of Ukraine by Russia, we hear a tremendous amount of talk about red lines on both sides. The one thing that we certainly continue to have is that top-level discussion and understanding of where those red lines are and what can happen in the event that there is a breach before we go out to a more wider war.

Let's look at China right now. You have each talked about the breakout times, 2025, 2027, but the heightened awareness of what is taking place in that area of our globe. How do we avoid miscalculation at this point when our relations are not the same with China? Dr. Sisson.

Dr. SISSON. Thank you, Representative, for your concern in miscalculation. I think it is one of the most serious risks in our relationship with China right now, as evidenced by, in fact, the spy balloon incident recently. I think that the way that we can minimize those risks is to engage in as many high-level conversations with the government of the PRC as we can. I think it is a shame that Secretary Blinken's trip was canceled because we need those high-level contacts. It would have been an opportunity to discuss crisis management, for example, in addition to being able to press the CCP on their other such problematic behaviors worldwide.

Mr. NORCROSS. Admiral Harris, you've been—

Admiral HARRIS. I'll just add a little bit to what Dr. Sisson has said and emphasize that diplomats and diplomacy matter in the 21st century. It is a shame that the Secretary of State's visit was canceled or postponed. It is indicative of China's tone deaf behavior that, even on the eve of his visit, they would have this balloon travel across the United States. They claimed that it was—it's a weather balloon that went off course, yet they didn't tell us that it was going off course until we discovered it. So, I mean, it just—again, it beggars the imagination what they are saying over there.

So I do think that diplomacy matters. At the height of the Cold War, we should never forget that we maintained diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union even in those dark days of the 1960s and 1970s. So I hope that we get back on some diplomatic footing with the PRC. It is important to both countries that we do so.

Mr. NORCROSS. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Wittman, for 5 minutes.

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'd like to thank our witnesses for joining us today. As we watched this past weekend, we really shouldn't be shocked that the CCP had taken the brazen effort to fly a spy balloon over the United States. We've seen behavior by the CCP, purchase of agricultural lands, purchase of strategic lands around military bases. We look, too, at their recruiting of intellectual capacity from the United States to China. We see, too, the incredible importation of illicit fentanyl here to the United States and the havoc that it has wreaked on our communities.

This committee understands very clearly both the near-, medium-, and long-term effects of Chinese aggression.

The challenge for us is to figure out what do we do in a timely way that matches the capability and capacity that China is building right now. I believe that our force structure, as we have it today, is misaligned to the challenges that are not only in front of us but that are emerging from China.

Admiral Harris, I wanted to get your thought on critical weapon systems for the United States. In your experience in the Indo-Pacific AOR [area of responsibility] and your understanding of Beijing's strategic intent, you said in your opening statement you have seen things morphed in the past 5 years to a much, much more aggressive stance and an increased capability. Do you think the Department of Defense in their planning and budgeting is doing so in such a way that addresses the near-term threat from Beijing?

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, Congressman. I think so, to the degree that we all have to realize that, you know, the ships that we are building today, for example, are going to be around for 30 or 40 years. You know, the ships and the airplanes and the tanks and whatever that we use to fight the PRC have been extant now for a decade or longer, so these things take time to build and they take time to field and to train for it.

So we have the military that we have that we are going to use to defend America against the PRC or any other threat. We have it. Whether it could have been better, whether different ships could have been built, or whatever, it is what it is, and that is the force that we have.

That said, I am pleased with some of the improvements that I've read about. Shipbuilding in the Navy, for example, with the new frigates that are coming online, the new aircraft carriers that are coming online, and all of that. It takes a long time, and, for some reason, I couldn't understand it when I was in uniform either. It seems to take longer than it should to develop and field a new weapon system.

I do think that the most important capability that we have to get right is the nuclear deterrent. That is the first thing. It is also the most expensive thing.

Mr. WITTMAN. Admiral Harris, I think you hit the nail on the head. I think the speed of relevance is critical today. We cannot take years to develop, whether it is software or advanced weapon systems, whatever it may be. It has to be months; and, unfortunately, the history shows us recently that that is not the case. We see 2 years for the Navy to make a decision on the next-generation jamming efforts. We see 2 years to work through the F/A-18Fs production, totaling about 20 jets. You know, those things take much too long. The TR-3 upgrade for our F-35s, again, met with General Brown today, another delay. You know, we are not in the realm of where we can survive taking years to do things. It has to be done in months.

Can you give us your perspective, and you talked a little bit about it, about pacing on modernization, pacing on developing and implementing emerging technologies to counter Beijing and the things that they are doing. I said at the Reagan National Defense Forum, China starts out with a blank sheet of paper; our process to do acquisition at the Pentagon takes an 11 by 17 sheet of paper, and you have to use a microscope to read the words on it and understand the flow chart.

Admiral HARRIS. Well, we follow, and rightly so, you know, law, regulation, and policy. The PRC is able to insert themselves in the middle of our acquisition, long acquisition cycle through theft and cyber espionage. So they get a jump on us because they are not bound by our laws, regulation, and policy. I do believe that if we are serious about China, the entire country needs to—our entire country needs to move faster, as you said.

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. Very good. Dr. Sisson.

Dr. SISSON. Just quickly, Representative. I don't worry about lethality for the U.S. military right now. I worry about resilience. And so if we are going to accelerate development in any particular area, that is where I would go first.

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. [Inaudible.]

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you. This first question is actually for both and just a commentary, if you'd give it to us, in regards to our diplomatic and strategic relations with some South Pacific island nations. I led a delegation last year, as chairman of Intel and Special Operations [Subcommittee], and some of the things that we heard were, number one, that a lot of our South Pacific friends did not like the fact that we use Australia as kind of a proxy for us; and number two, that they are fearing more and more and feeling more and more Chinese exertion of power. And also if you could comment, I think it was Fiji that has really started leaning even fur-

ther towards China. Because this is also a, this is a game of space, and the closer we can get to China the more we can deter them and the further they can get to us where they can deter us. So I would love to hear what you guys are thinking or feeling about our relations down there.

Dr. SISSON. Well, I will begin, Representative, by saying that I am a strategist who studies deterrence primarily, and so I am not going to be the most sensitive observer or most nuanced analyst of the full spectrum of regional dynamics. But what I will say is it is very clear that the nations in the region are increasingly uncomfortable with China's behaviors and that they are looking to the United States and our partners and allies broadly to help them carve out the space that they need to do their primary job, which is to take care of the interests of their countries and their people.

Mr. GALLEGO. Admiral Harris, as former Ambassador to Australia, I believe; is that correct?

Admiral HARRIS. I beg your pardon?

Mr. GALLEGO. And as former Ambassador to Australia, or is it just South Korea?

Admiral HARRIS. No, I wished I was.

Mr. GALLEGO. Right. I think we nominated you.

Admiral HARRIS. I was nominated.

Mr. GALLEGO. Yes, we nominated you, but then we moved you over. I don't know if you have any—

Admiral HARRIS. I loved my time in South Korea. And at the same time, I was disappointed I didn't go to Australia.

Mr. GALLEGO. Right. So are we. But I don't know if you have any—

Admiral HARRIS. Is that diplomatic enough?

Mr. GALLEGO [continuing]. Any insight into our relations in the South Pacific.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. So where we are in the South Pacific, I believe, is an outcome of some very bad decisions that we made in the 1990s or so. For example, we made the decision to shut down the embassy in the Solomons, and we should not be surprised in 2023 or 2022 that China moved into that vacuum in a big way and inked a defense relationship with the Solomons.

You know, I was in Fiji last year, and the American Embassy in Fiji is responsible for five islands, five independent countries that the ambassador there is accredited to. That is a mistake. It is probably a budget-driven mistake that we need to fix and we are fixing. The U.S. is going to re-stand up our embassy in the Solomons, and we are going to put at least one other embassy in that area of five countries that the American Embassy in Fiji was responsible for.

Separately, but related, we are doing the same thing in Maldives. Maldives right now is covered by the ambassador and the embassy in Sri Lanka. We are standing up an independent separate embassy in the Maldives. We need to do more of this because, again, I hate to go back to what I keep saying, but diplomacy and diplomats matter. I came to that realization late in my life, but I hope to be able to influence—

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you, Admiral. And I will say, from our travels, and we went to Palau, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, we did

hear that we need to exert our diplomatic initiatives stronger in that area.

Dr. Sisson, on the topic of Taiwan, you write that you want to encourage the government of Taiwan to adopt a defensive concept that forces the PLA to suboptimal strategies. Could you describe in greater detail that defense concept you have in mind?

Dr. Sisson. I will give you as much detail as I can but caveat it by saying that it is a big question, and I would be happy to engage with you and your staff after we're done on more specifics if you want. But the basics are actually not, you know, they are not rocket surgery, right. I mean, they are things that would make it more difficult for the PLA to get its ships close to the island. There is advantages of the terrain on the island that Taiwan could certainly work with. There is long shorelines that you can take advantage of with particular kinds of munitions, and fast-attack ships, for example. So those are the sort of pointy edge of the immediate kinds of response.

But, again, you know, the defense concept really has to have at its core the resilience of the Taiwan people, which is something that they are clearly aware of and, unfortunately and painfully even more so given the events in Ukraine. So those are the combination of the kinds of elements we would want to see in a strategy for Taiwan's defense.

Mr. GALLEGO. Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chair.

The CHAIRMAN. The chairman now recognizes the gentleman from Tennessee, Dr. DesJarlais.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Thank you, Chairman. My question is for Admiral Harris. Admiral, all of us on this committee have faced questions from our constituents about the degree of U.S. involvement in Ukraine. Some of the individuals point out our own depleting stockpiles and the nearly \$20 billion backlog in arm sales to Taiwan. Many conclude that we just don't have the present capacity to maintain the level of assistance to Ukraine that we currently are seeing while remaining ready and able to deter the Chinese threat.

In your view, is this a binary choice between helping Ukraine now and preparing for Taiwan for a looming conflict with China later, or do you think we can adequately address both at the same time?

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks, Congressman. My relatives in Tennessee where I grew up have asked me that same question. I believe that we can do both. We can walk and chew gum at the same time. We are hamstrung by what we can do with Taiwan by policy, not by law, not by the Constitution, but by policy. And I think we can and should do more with them.

That said, Ukraine is the wolf closest to the sled, and we have to deal with Ukraine today. I believe that we are doing a lot with Ukraine, but I think there's more juice in that orange, if you will. You know, we have given them Stingers and Javelins and HIMARS [High Mobility Artillery Rocket System] and helicopters, and soon we are going to give them VAMPIRE [Vehicle-Agnostic Modular Palletized ISR Rocket Equipment] anti-drone systems, Patriots, and Abrams tanks, and that's what they need.

If we don't help Ukraine fight Russia today, then are we going to be asked to help Moldova when Russia attacks Moldova or

Kazakhstan or Turkmenistan or any of the other countries that are on the periphery of the former Soviet Union. The Baltics, too, but that is a different nut to crack because the Baltics are a part of NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] now.

So I do believe that we need to do as much as we can for Ukraine, and we have the capacity to help Taiwan at the same time. So it is not binary, but we have to overcome policy on the Taiwan front and not so much on the Ukraine front.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. Understand that. What role does Congress have in helping alleviate these concerns? Are there certain initiatives that you would like to see us undertake to support the industrial base and the warfighter and to help get us out of the hole that we are in right now?

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. I think the biggest thing is to pass a budget. I mean, the lack of a budget hamstring industry and prohibits the Department from doing adequate long-range planning. That is one thing.

We talked before about export controls with regard to Australia. If we don't get the export controls right, then it doesn't matter how much good intent there is in getting them a nuclear submarine capability. The export controls will bite us right in the—well, I won't say where it is going to bite us, but it is going to bite us right there if we don't get that right.

With regard to Taiwan, I have mentioned some of the things already. A free trade agreement helps Taiwan in an economic sense probably more than it helps us. But what it does do, it creates this sense that we are willing to engage in a free trade agreement with Taiwan and other countries might also be encouraged to pile on to that, which helps them in a big way.

Dr. DESJARLAIS. Okay. I want to try to get in one other question because you brought up the other countries that are threatened by Russia, and you know, it ties into Taiwan, as well. I just kind of wanted to get your opinion on your thoughts on the deterrence strategy that was adopted by the current administration in the lead-up to the invasion of Ukraine. Former Prime Minister Boris Johnson was here last week, and he reminded us, one of the biggest reasons not to let Ukraine join NATO was that Putin might invade Ukraine, and we saw how that worked out.

So if we are going to keep these type of things from happening in the future, Taiwan, you know, what happened to Ukraine, what could happen to other countries if we don't stand strong right now, what is your opinion on how we can do better next time?

Admiral HARRIS. So I have talked about it in other venues. I think this issue of strategic clarity versus strategic ambiguity is critical, and we have been well served, I will be the first to say that, by the policy of strategic ambiguity with Taiwan over the past 44 years. But I think the time for ambiguity is over. I think we have to be as clear about our intent with regard to what would happen if the PRC invades Taiwan, as the PRC is clear in its intent that it is ultimately going to seize Taiwan if need be.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time is expired. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Massachusetts, Mr. Moulton.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And thank you very much, both of you, for joining us today. Ukraine is win-

ning the war that Russia started by invading their country illegally, in part because we have assembled a remarkable coalition of allies, the best we have seen since World War II. We have provided them with extraordinary weapons and capabilities, and, of course, the Ukrainian fighting spirit is something that the world is admiring.

The problem is that all three of those factors have come to the forefront after Putin invaded. And so we have to admit that, for everything that is going well in Ukraine, deterrence failed. And I certainly agree with the chairman and ranking member that we cannot let deterrence fail in the Pacific.

So can you talk to me about how our preparations to be more resilient in the face of Chinese aggression are actually translating into deterrence? How are we showing China that these exquisite capabilities we are developing, often very much behind the scenes, are going to severely impact their ability to conduct a successful war.

Dr. SISSON. You raise the important point about preparations and also the important point about signaling and what it is that we convey and demonstrate to the CCP and how that affects their perceptions of our intentions and, therefore, are or are not deterred.

I would start by pointing out that, when we think about a strategy of deterrence, we have to begin from the presumption of failure. We have to accept that failure is likely to some greater or lesser extent; and, therefore, we have to design our strategies of deterrence with two things in mind. The first is when the strategy fails, what position does it leave the United States in; and the second is are there things that we can do to decrease the likelihood of that failure.

In regard to Taiwan, the fundamentals of both of those things right now are still sound. Adding capabilities, whether behind the scenes or in full public view of the CCP fundamentally won't change the nature of the dynamic where it is clear that we are not giving Beijing a free pass and we are also not giving Taipei a blank check. And so I am not concerned that we need to demonstrate capability at this point in any greater extent than we have. What we need to do is convey cohesion, we need to convey confidence that we understand what is happening in the strait, and we need to exude calm and confidence in the role that we have in preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.

Mr. MOULTON. Ambassador Harris.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, I will associate myself with everything that Dr. Sisson said. I will also add to it that the PRC is a learning machine. Xi Jinping, if nothing else, is watching and learning about what is happening in Ukraine. And I think he has got to be wondering if his army, which is trained in the Soviet model, is as bad as Russia's army appears to be, if his Navy is as weak as the Black Sea fleet appears to be. And I will just add, you know, if he had gone to my alma mater, he would have known that lesson one is don't lose your flagship. So he has got to be thinking about that, and he has got to be thinking if his generals are as bad as the Russian generals are wanted to be.

Mr. MOULTON. Thank you very much. Let me get a second question here. There is increasing evidence that China is facing a demographic and economic cliff in the coming years. If that is true, does it make it more or less likely that Xi Jinping does something rash and aggressive?

Dr. SISSON. I, unfortunately don't have a great answer to that. I have been studying the behavior of my husband for 20 years, I'm the world's foremost expert, and I still get it wrong 30 percent of the time. I think that you're right to identify that the CCP is sensitive to conditions, that this is not an inevitability because they are aware of the environment in which they operate, the resources that are at their disposal. And so we will have to pay close attention to all those conditions and go to the experts in the intelligence community for their assessment of how Xi is interpreting them.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. I think the only answer to that question is in hindsight because there are lots of folks that will weigh in on either side of that. So we are going to have to just prepare to fight tonight, to use something I said before.

The PRC is also facing a demographic cliff. You know, just this year, they have been surpassed by India as the world's most populous country. And so that is another driver behind some people who would say that the likelihood that China will attack Taiwan is sooner rather than later.

Mr. MOULTON. Well, there are a lot of differences between Russia and China, but it seems like there could be a frightening analogy here or a comparison, or a parallel, rather, between Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nebraska, General Bacon, for 5 minutes.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I can't think of a more important topic for our first hearing, so I appreciate the focus. It seems to me that deterrence in Taiwan should be one of our top national security priorities because day one of the war it is too late. And I hear a lot of talk from the administration. I don't know that I see the action, you know, that is equating to the talk that we have. We have a huge backlog of weapons that I read about. It seems to me they should be getting Harpoons, long-range air defense, anti-shipping mines, and so forth.

So my question to both of our great panelists, and thank you for being here today, are we seeing the right sense of urgency from this administration when it comes to Taiwan? Admiral Harris, you first, please.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. I don't want to get in the business of discussing this administration's view as opposed to the last administration's or any others. I will just observe that, over the course of the last 20 or 30 years, we have not done enough for Taiwan writ large across all administrations. We have not done enough, given the threats that Taiwan faces and given the fact that we have put Taiwan in this place.

We are seeing the PRC systematically attack Taiwan's foreign relations such that their list of countries that recognize them is dwindling. Of course, we led that way in the 1970s. But I think we have the right sight picture on Taiwan now. I think we have had that

now for sure from the previous administration and into this administration, as I mentioned in my remarks, Secretary Blinken and his view and Secretary Austin and his view.

There is still far more that we could do with Taiwan, and most of it is tied up not in law where you all are behind but in policy. And I think it is those policy things that, if we could get through those, then we would be in a better place and Taiwan would be in a much better place to defend itself. I mean, isn't that what we really want? We want them to fight and die for their country, not us to fight and die for their country.

Mr. BACON. I will give Dr. Sisson a chance. I just want to say we have billions and billions of dollars in backlog weapons, and there is a lot of these policy discussions but the actions are not going on that we need to see. Dr. Sisson.

Dr. SISSON. I think we do need to move with seriousness but not in a way that is overreactive. We don't want to heighten tensions by overmilitarizing the way in which that we engage with Taiwan right now. I think the admiral is correct to point out that there are any number of important other ways that we can support Taiwan in the international system that are very important to deterrence.

Mr. BACON. Okay. Thank you. I heard the same thing from the administration when it came to Ukraine, though. They didn't want to provoke Russia. So I would rather move with expediency to give Taiwan what they need to defend themselves.

And my second question is, I think we need a more holistic policy when it comes to China. There is a lot of different aspects to our policy, you know, whether it is predatory trade, the theft of our technology, the genocide with the Uyghurs, the denial of democracy in Hong Kong, the threat to Taiwan, the buying of access in our institutions in America. We need a comprehensive policy that looks at all of this.

Is it your view that we right now have a comprehensive policy with China? Admiral Harris.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, thanks. I don't think we have that comprehensive policy, but I think we are much further along now in 2023 than we have ever been. I used to talk about, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, almost every branch of the U.S. Government understood that the Soviet Union was the threat. You know, I used to joke even a park ranger, Smokey the Bear, would tell you that the Soviets were the bad guys. We didn't have that comprehensive unified view of the PRC. You know, the State Department looked at it as a negotiation; DOD looked at it as a military operation; Commerce looked at it as a trading partner; and Treasury looked at it as a lender. So we didn't have this unified view across the government, but I think now we are getting to that unified view and I think the Congress has a lot to do, has done a lot, rather, to get us in that position.

Mr. BACON. Thank you, Admiral. And with the 35 seconds left, I will turn the rest of the time to Dr. Sisson.

Dr. SISSON. Thank you. Yes, I will use it briefly to wholeheartedly agree with what the admiral has said and point out also that, in addition to the external levers and mechanisms of addressing the strategic activities of the CCP, we also are seeing much more progress looking internally and the things that we need to do do-

mestically to position the United States to be able to use all of its sources of national power. So I think we are not all the way there, but the direction of travel is good.

Mr. BACON. My thanks to you both. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Carbajal, for 5 minutes.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Dr. Sisson and Admiral Harris. Last year, the State Council Information Office of the People's Republic of China published a white paper entitled "China's Space Program: A 2021 Perspective" outlining its 5-year space strategy. The report stated the space industry is a critical element of the overall national strategy. The PRC is expanding its investment in space technology and launch capabilities.

Here at home, the United States continues to stand up our Space Force and increase our investment in space-based capabilities. As we rely more on the space domain, what PRC space capabilities do you perceive as the most advanced compared to U.S. Space Force's, and is there a platform or technology in the space domain that the United States should be more focused on as we further analyze what the PRC plans to invest in?

Dr. SISSON. Those are all very important questions, Representative, and I can only report with sadness that I am not actually a rocket scientist. I do know some and would be happy to follow up.

Broadly speaking, what I would say is that, when we think about the space domain, we have to think about resilience and we have to think about defending those systems of not just obvious physical attacks but incursions through cyber domains.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Admiral.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. Thanks for the question. I will note that, when I was in uniform, I did not support the idea of a separate space service. But since then, I have come to realize that without a separate space service we will not do what needs to be done to maintain our supremacy in space. We are challenged in space by the Russians and the Chinese, and we need to up our game, if you will. And I think the Space Force is critical to that, and I am a believer in it completely.

One of the things that I hope that we wean ourselves from is our reliance on Soviet rockets, or Russian rockets—sorry, a little Cold War slipping out there—a little on Russian rockets for our manned space programs. So I am looking forward to seeing our own rockets sending American women and men to the moon and beyond.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. My colleague, House Republicans, have started this Congress very focused on China and strategic competition with the CCP. This committee understandably focuses on the People's Liberation Army, but I think we are missing a part of this conversation and the strategic competition conversation broadly.

To truly compete with China, we must invest in ourselves and in our people to boost the economy and our American talent. Even in former President Trump's National Security Strategy, one of the main components is "promoting American prosperity" and explicitly noting the United States must preserve our lead in research and technology. How should we do that? I would argue that we must invest in the American people to ensure they have access to afford-

able higher education and have a welcoming society that attracts foreign talent to American companies.

It also requires investment in American high-tech manufacturing and ending reliance on China, like what the CHIPS [Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors] and Science Act does, which only received, if I must point out, 24 votes from my colleagues on the other side of the aisle. We must invest in domestic programs to improve our strategic competition on the global stage. It is not just about purchasing more weapons.

Dr. Sisson, what is your experience in writing about artificial intelligence and machine learning? How important is having an educated qualified workforce to conduct the research of this emerging technology?

Dr. Sisson. Well, none of those things can happen, we can't have emerging technology without a trained workforce invested in the mission and interested in undertaking the work. I think your emphasis on artificial intelligence is particularly apt when we think about the strategic competition with China. There certainly are and will continue to be military applications of artificial intelligence in the defense enterprise.

Really, when I think about the competition over artificial intelligence, it is beyond that. It is about a competition to see where the discoveries that help human health, wealth, and well-being worldwide happen and how they get distributed. And I very much would like to see the where be here and how be based on our values and principles and not those of the CCP. All of that will require, as you know, concerted investment in the sources of human talent that are the ones that innovate those technologies in the first place.

Mr. CARBAJAL. Thank you. I'm out of time. I yield back, Mr. Chair.

Mr. SCOTT [presiding]. The Chair recognizes Mr. Gaetz for 5 minutes.

Mr. GAETZ. Admiral Harris, it is great to have you back before the committee. Few people know China's capabilities like you do. When you saw this balloon traversing the continent of North America, what concerned you most?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. Thanks, Congressman. Good to see you again. Well, I mean, the most concern was what was it doing and what information is it getting and is it itself dangerous. I mean, we don't know. I mean, General VanHerck talked about the possibility that there were explosives on the balloon and all of that. General Hertling talked about whether the balloon was sent up as a ploy to see what we would do. And I think that your comments about it, in the media at least, were some of the best that I read, and that is does it give—would shooting it down give China a sort of pretext for them to do the same thing. We just don't know at the time that it happened.

Fortunately, we had time because, I mean, let's face it, it's a balloon, so we had time to think about it, to consider it, to weigh it, and I think, most importantly, perhaps not most importantly but certainly importantly, it gave China a chance to address the issue diplomatically, which they failed to do, to no surprise.

So, ultimately, the decision was made to shoot it down and did so in a way that was safe for people and property and in a way that we could collect the information. It is only in 47 feet of water.

Mr. GAETZ. In our limited time, let's bifurcate that: the danger and then the transmission of information. We have the capability to block the transmission of information from the balloon back to China, don't we?

Admiral HARRIS. We do.

Mr. GAETZ. And in this type of an environment, do you think it is probably likely that we did that?

Admiral HARRIS. I would only guess, but I think General VanHerck said that—

Mr. GAETZ. Well, you can't see any reason why we wouldn't do that.

Admiral HARRIS. Right.

Mr. GAETZ. And when it comes to the danger that the balloon poses, are you aware of capability with this type of a balloon system to berth sensors or drones or other hardware or assets?

Admiral HARRIS. I am not, but that is why it is so important to try to collect up all the pieces of this thing to understand. I mean, this thing is huge, right? The balloon itself is bigger than this room. It is 3,000 or 4,000 pounds of equipment, a couple of buses, I think, is what has been said.

Mr. GAETZ. Yes. I just wonder, like, why would the Chinese use this balloon rather than a satellite system for surveillance, and one thing that, presumably, a satellite could not do would be berth other sensors or drones. And just so that it gives Americans comfort, your testimony here is, during your time in command, you never were aware of or briefed on a capability that the Chinese had to use a balloon system like that for that type of a proliferation of other hardware or assets?

Admiral HARRIS. That's correct. And, again, that is why it is so important to collect as much of the balloon pieces that we can to understand exactly what we are dealing with.

Mr. GAETZ. And while—

Admiral HARRIS. It could very well be also that, maybe, it is just me speculating here because I am under pressure and I am liable to blurt out the truth, you know, it could very well be that maybe we have overestimated the capability of Chinese satellites in low-Earth orbit.

Mr. GAETZ. Well, and you have shared with me that we have the capability to block any transmission of information from the balloon. And while you weren't in the situation room while this decision was being made, as you join us today, you can't assess a circumstance in which we would have ever allowed information to be—

Admiral HARRIS. Right. I would think—

Mr. GAETZ. It sorts of begs the question was this a big PSYOP [psychological operation]? Was this an effort by China to see how we would react to something like this that might not have had the danger that we spoke of because you are not aware of that capability and then also didn't have an intelligence collection function, and so, you know, to others, it may have been an effort to try to

see how we would react, how we wouldn't react, and then to try to use that to inform their decision making.

In my limited time I have left with the admiral, in the broadest sense, if we had \$100 billion to dedicate to the China scenario, in which domain would that be the smartest investment?

Admiral HARRIS. It would not be in counter-balloon warfare.

Mr. GAETZ. I would agree. Would it be space, would it be cyber, or electronic warfare?

Admiral HARRIS. I think it would be cyber. I think it would be cyber and space.

Mr. GAETZ. And what dividends—if we made a \$100 billion investment in cyber, what could the American people expect regarding the enhancement to their safety?

Admiral HARRIS. I think we could be assured then that we wouldn't have intrusions, intentional or otherwise, from any number of actors, including Chinese.

Mr. GAETZ. Well, assured of no intrusions from the Chinese sounds to me like a lot better than sending \$100 billion to Ukraine, but that will be something we will assess as a team.

Thank you so much. Yield back.

Mr. SCOTT. The Chair recognizes Mr. Keating.

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Russia's illegal war with Ukraine has had enormous worldwide ramifications. In the shorter term, there has been some economic benefit to China in that regard, given their relationship. One example is the two permanent bridges they built between the borders of China and Russia to facilitate trade, and they have estimated that is, in 1 year, an increase over the last of \$190 billion there. China has also given information that their trade has increased 30 percent with Russia during this period.

So in the short run, but, in the longer run, I think this illegal war presents difficulties to China in terms of their economic strength and their overall plans. Can you comment on, you know, short-run and long-run ramifications of this war and what the U.S. can do to drive a wedge or to fill a vacuum that might be there in this time, and, importantly, how the U.S.-led coalition shapes China's decision not just militarily but economically and—

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. I will start, and I will yield to Dr. Sisson. I think that Xi Jinping is no fool and he is watching this closely, and it throws a monkeywrench into his grand plans. So he is supportive of Russia, but I don't think he is all in on Russia.

The coalition that you spoke about is key, and I believe that more and more countries who are on the fence regarding their relations with China and with Russia are seeing the reality of what Russia is all about in Ukraine, and that is forcing them to evaluate how they see their relationships with China. You know, are they going to fall in that same trap as being invaded by China at some point in the future. Are they going to yield their own sovereignty like Sri Lanka has done to Hambantota Port and others. You know, are they subject to debt diplomacy, the weaponization of debt, that the PRC has committed against any number of countries.

Mr. KEATING. Dr. Sisson.

Dr. SISSON. Yes. I think that your question comes with the right perspective built in, which is, certainly, the CCP is going to take

advantage of short-term opportunities as it can. I also will say that they probably didn't expect a need to do so, that this, I don't think, as the admiral said, was in their grand plans or something that they preferred to have happen. Now that it has, they have learned. They are taking advantage of these near-term opportunities, but they are not seeking any longer term entanglements, at least as far as I can see, and I would expect that to continue for the duration.

I would also note that my understanding is that Xi has communicated to Putin that he ought not consider the use of any kind of nuclear detonation, which is among the most important things that I can possibly think of for the CCP to have done in regards to the conflict in Ukraine.

Mr. KEATING. I couldn't agree more. I think that Xi has made his point clear not to go beyond certain red lines. And without China there as an ally, that is going to have a huge and harmful effect on Russia going forward. So I do think China plays a critical role there, not by any motivations that aren't self-serving.

But I would like to touch base, too, that coalition, as we think of the west, is always there. But we are seeing economically that extend to the Pacific, as well, Indo-Pacific, as well. So this has really, I think, facilitated relationships with a coalition of countries that really wasn't there before. Would you like to speak to that, either one?

Admiral HARRIS. Sure. I think that there are a lot of countries that are coming together because of Ukraine and separately but related because of Chinese bad behavior. So we see the AUKUS, which is a formal defense arrangement. We see the Quad, which is an informal arrangement of like-minded democracies.

Mr. KEATING. And we also see international friendshoring supply chains being established that weren't there. What you said, Admiral, the importance of export control.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. And I have talked about other countries joining the Quad, you know. The Big 10 has 14 teams, the Big 12 has 10 teams. Nothing that says the Quad has to have only four teams. So, you know, I think we should be open to that possibility.

Mr. KEATING. Yes. I think Russia's aggression is not only hurting Russia, I think it is hurting China, as well. And I yield back, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Gallagher, for 5 minutes.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Thank you. Thanks to our witnesses. Admiral Harris, good to see you again. I think the last time was in Singapore. You were wearing a Hawaiian shirt, and you reminded me that Marine was an acronym suggesting we ride in Navy equipment. I won't use the precise words you used because it is not appropriate for the hearing, but I appreciate that.

In recent years, we have heard a slew of timetables from high-level officials about a prospective PLA invasion of Taiwan in 2027, 2025, 2024. Regardless of which timetable you subscribe to, do you agree that there is an increased threat of a PLA invasion of Taiwan within the decade?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. And what I used to say when I was in uniform was the decade of danger is the 2020s, but I wouldn't nail down a specific year. Though I would also say, when Admiral Da-

vidson said that 2027 was his year, that he was privy to a lot more intelligence at the time he said it than I was. And so for whatever intelligence drove him to make that call, we should pay attention to it. There is something out there that caused him to say that 2027 was the year.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Is your sense that the balance of power has eroded against us since you left that post?

Admiral HARRIS. I think China's power has increased since 2018.

Mr. GALLAGHER. And then looking at the war in Ukraine, it seems to me there are two primary stories coming out of it. First, there is the failure of deterrence on February 24th, and, second, there is the success of the Ukrainian military in resisting Russian aggression. What lessons, if any, for Taiwan do you take from both of those, the initial failure of deterrence and then, subsequently, our security cooperation and training and equipping missions with the Ukrainians before and during the war.

Admiral HARRIS. So we got it wrong with Ukraine in terms of intelligence because we thought that the Ukraine, at least what I read, you know, how would I know, but we thought that Ukraine would fall. So we got that wrong. We got it wrong with Afghanistan, and we estimated intelligence-wise that the Afghan National Army would last longer and that the Taliban could not possibly take over their country in the short amount of time that it did. So we got that wrong.

So I am worried about our ability to do strategic intelligence. I think tactical intelligence we are unrivaled. But strategic intelligence, if we get it wrong with Ukraine, if we get it wrong with Afghanistan, then are we going to get it wrong about Taiwan and other countries? So that is an issue.

As I said, I was in Taiwan. I left Taiwan with a sense that the people of Taiwan, the Taiwanese, are resilient, understand the threat, and understand what they have to do to meet that threat. So I was pleased and optimistic when I left.

Mr. GALLAGHER. If our goal is to deter the threat, deter war, how important in your mind is it to arm Taiwan to the teeth prior to shooting starting?

Admiral HARRIS. I think it is critical. I mean, you know, that goes back to what I said before about strategic clarity. Now, there is an argument that says if we are clear, then that could precipitate an attack, just like the other issues we talked about here before. I am of the other opinion, that if we are ambiguous, that might encourage an attack because Xi Jinping has been clear from day one that he is going to take Taiwan peacefully, hopefully, but by force if necessary.

Mr. GALLAGHER. Well, I appreciate that. And I would note that clarifying strategic ambiguity has bipartisan support on this committee. It is not widespread, it is not uniformly shared, but I am hoping it is something we continue to discuss over the next 2 years on this committee, on the Select Committee on China, as well.

Quickly, I remember, I don't know if it was testimony or a think tank speech you had given about when the INF [Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces] Treaty was still in force and pointing out that China was not bound by it. And I think that laid the intellectual groundwork for us getting out of the INF Treaty. I think we

have a massive opportunity to field INF noncompliance systems that we are not taking advantage of. Do you see AUKUS as a vehicle for doing that? Is ITAR [International Traffic in Arms Regulations] still a barrier to working with the Aussies in terms of fielding longer range intermediate ground-launch missile systems?

Admiral HARRIS. So ITAR is a barrier to realizing the full potential of AUKUS, as we talked about before. I don't see the direct correlation between AUKUS and INF. I was a complete supporter of getting out of INF because it was self-limiting. Russia wasn't abiding by it, and China is not a signatory to it, so I was in favor of pulling out of it. But we haven't realized the benefits of pulling out of it, as you just stated.

Mr. GALLAGHER. I'm out of time.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New Jersey, Mr. Kim, for 5 minutes.

Mr. KIM. Yes. Thank you, Chair. Thank you so much for both of you coming here. Admiral Harris, I wanted to start with you. You mentioned this now several times, this concept of strategic clarity. So I guess I just wanted to kind of pull the thread on this and get a sense of what you are thinking here. Are you thinking about this as some type of standing AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force] that would go into effect if—in the case that China were to move on Taiwan?

Admiral HARRIS. No, I am thinking of it as a policy. Right now, our policy is strategic ambiguity. Will we define Taiwan if China attacks? I don't know. I mean, that is what strategic ambiguity is. So it keeps the option, I guess, open. I think it is too late for that now. I think we need to move to a position of strategic clarity, and I think that—

Mr. KIM. So you are saying there wouldn't be a standing AUMF. Would it be some type of treaty or security guarantee to Taiwan?

Admiral HARRIS. No. Well, it would be a security guarantee in terms of a policy. It is policy is what I am talking about. And I think it is important for—

Mr. KIM. Well, I guess I am asking here, you know, is that something that you think the Executive can set on its own or—

Admiral HARRIS. Yes.

Mr. KIM [continuing]. Or would you seek congressional, some type of congressional approval on this?

Admiral HARRIS. I am neither in the Executive or in the House. The Executive can set policy on the Executive's own but—

Mr. KIM. I am just trying to contain the magnitude of what you are asking for here. What you are asking for is a policy that would bind the United States to military conflict?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes.

Mr. KIM. Setting a red line by the executive branch without the Congress weighing in on whether or not that is actually a policy that we would seek for the American people; is that correct?

Admiral HARRIS. No, no. I am saying it is a policy change. We have a policy of strategic ambiguity, which the Congress hasn't weighed in on that one either. It is driven—

Mr. KIM. That is because they are not asking for a binding element to be able to bind us to war.

Admiral HARRIS. It is a policy change, Congressman. And I believe that there are three constituents that need to understand a policy of strategic clarity. One is the Taiwanese so they know. So if they know that, for example, that we are not going to go in, then they can then make the decision to either defend themselves or to capitulate to China. The Chinese ought to know, so they understand full well the costs of what will happen if they invade Taiwan. But most importantly, the American people need to know because it is your sons and daughters that are going to do the fighting and die, and you have the—

Mr. KIM. Well, that is why I think that it is important that they have a say in this and that it is not just set by the executive branch.

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I think they ought to know going in.

Mr. KIM. But one question here. So I get it about the strategic clarity when it comes to sending a message to China. Are you also calling for strategic clarity in terms of Taiwan—

Admiral HARRIS. Yes.

Mr. KIM [continuing]. For instance, saying that we would never support unilateral—

Admiral HARRIS. Yes.

Mr. KIM [continuing]. Independence of Taiwan?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. I mean, strategic clarity goes both ways. We should ensure that we are clear with Taiwan with regard to the question of independence and with regard to the question of defending themselves so they are not a free rider on our statement of clarity with regard—

Mr. KIM. So if they were to pursue, if Taiwan were to pursue formal independence, they would know that we would not be supportive of them—

Admiral HARRIS. That could very well be part of strategic clarity.

Mr. KIM. Let's play this out. Let's say, I thought Dr. Sisson kind of had a really interesting framework of this in saying that we should be assessing different frameworks of deterrence from that presumption of failure, you know, the idea that it could come apart. So let's presume that this falls apart. China is moving forward on Taiwan. Then we would have to come to Congress for an AUMF at that point; is that what you are asking for?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes.

Mr. KIM. Okay. So, honestly, it is not necessarily an automatic effort. It does not necessarily actually have the kind of clarity that is guaranteed in that way; is that correct?

Admiral HARRIS. Right, right. I mean, there is no law. I mean, the only law that we have to guide us is the Taiwan Relations Act, which says that we would support a peaceful resolution across the strait but we would oppose a forcible resolution.

Mr. KIM. Well, I just want to just point out here that I do want us to be very careful about what kind of red lines an executive branch can draw, especially when it is something that brings the full force of the United States military potentially into action and something that is, you know, this is something that I think all of us would agree is the most sacred and important duty that this body can be engaged in, and we are here to represent that voice of the American people. And I will be honest with you. When I talk

to people in my district about China, about Taiwan, they are not tracking at all what conversations are often happening in this chamber.

So if we really want to be thinking about this kind of posture and what kind of changes need to happen, I really urge us all to engage with the American people, bring them into this conversation, so we can think about what comes next.

With that, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Indiana, Mr. Banks, for 5 minutes.

Mr. BANKS. Admiral, welcome back. It is great to have you back in this hearing room. You retired 2018, so you were in uniform at least for half of the Trump Presidential term. Are you aware of any balloons that were spotted, at least in the first couple of years that President Trump was in office?

Admiral HARRIS. I am not.

Mr. BANKS. Okay. Were you surprised by how the Biden administration responded to the balloon?

Admiral HARRIS. No.

Mr. BANKS. Even in its lack of clarity to the American people about the early sightings, what it was, as it traversed our airspace?

Admiral HARRIS. I was in Taiwan at the time, so I wasn't tracking it minutely. But I wasn't surprised with the response. I think it was a good response, to be frank with you. And at the end of the day, we were able to shoot this thing down with no risk to Americans and collect the intelligence from it. Plus, we were able to understand more about what it was doing up to the point of the shutdown.

Mr. BANKS. So you would have advised the President shoot it down later, not sooner?

Admiral HARRIS. If I were in uniform, based on the information that I have now received from the media, I would have advised the President to wait until it was over water. Now, if it was a threat to the United States, if it was collecting information that could not be blocked that Representative Gaetz and I talked about, then that is a different issue, you know. If it presented an immediate threat to the United States, then it needed to be handled at the time of the threat. But I think this one is interesting because, again, it gave China a chance to exercise the diplomacy that China says that it has, but China failed to do that. So we should not be surprised by that, and I think, at the end of the day, the reality is that the Chinese were incapable of doing anything but blaming us for the balloon's demise.

Mr. BANKS. The Pentagon seemed to go out of its way to publicly inform the American people that three balloons were spotted while President Trump was in office. Were you surprised by the sort of political nature of the spokesman of the Pentagon telling us that, well, this happened under President Trump, so no big deal?

Admiral HARRIS. No, I don't think he said no big deal. And he also said that there was another one in the Biden administration. So I am not surprised by it. I didn't know about it.

Mr. BANKS. It didn't strike you as the Pentagon playing politics?

Admiral HARRIS. No. What it did strike me, though, was what General VanHerck said was, for some reason, he, as the NORAD/

NORTHCOM commander, wasn't aware of it either. So there is a disconnect there. He called it a domain gap, but there is a disconnect in our ability of the Defense Department, I guess. He is NORAD/NORTHCOM commander. There is a disconnect in our ability to understand these balloons. Henceforth, even more so the need to collect the balloon and then see the parts of it.

Mr. BANKS. Concerning, nonetheless.

Admiral HARRIS. Concerning for sure.

Mr. BANKS. Yes. Fentanyl is now the leading cause of death of Americans my age. Almost all of it is manufactured in China and pushed over our southern border with the help of the Mexican drug cartels. What can we do about it?

Admiral HARRIS. One, I think we need to pressurize China more and ensure that the world understands that China is behind the fentanyl crisis, not only in America but elsewhere. And then there is the enforcement piece at the point of entry into the United States, which is the Mexico and the cartels and all of that. But we should never give China a pass on the fact that they are behind the manufacture of this scourge across America.

Mr. BANKS. Do you believe it is a strategy on the part of the Chinese Communist Party to kill Americans?

Admiral HARRIS. No. I have never thought of it in that way. You know, I just never have.

Mr. BANKS. It doesn't strike you, though, as curious that our biggest adversary is responsible for almost all of the fentanyl that comes in, flows in—

Admiral HARRIS. I think it is concerning, sure.

Mr. BANKS [continuing]. And is obviously a national security issue.

Admiral HARRIS. It is a national security issue.

Mr. BANKS. Yeah. Thank you. I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Michigan, Ms. Slotkin, for 5 minutes.

Ms. SLOTKIN. Thank you. And thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I was walking down to this hearing, I got news of an active shooter in one of my high schools. I had a school shooting in my district almost exactly a year ago. Luckily, it was a false alarm, but I find it ironic that, in a conversation where we are going to be talking about protecting the homeland, this idea that we are not addressing school shootings in a real way in this body is at this point insane. But I will leave that.

Admiral Harris, it is good to see you again. And, you know, the balloon, I think, certainly got people's attention in the homeland. People who don't think about national security very often were, I think, fascinated by this balloon coming across our country and particularly given that it covered a lot of our country. We don't know if it was for surveillance, if it was testing our reaction, if it was a mistake. But, certainly, in the wake of the Chinese government attempting to reset the relationship, it is hard to not interpret it as something that was pretty assertive. So can you give us very quickly, you know, we have speculated about what it was meant, but, if you were in uniform watching this happen, how would you advise the President on what to do as a signal, not

shooting it down; we've talked about that, but as a signal of what the Chinese were trying to develop in the relationship?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. I think it—and good to see you again, too, by the way. Yes. The behavior of the Chinese here is the real issue. To me, as a former military guy and a poor diplomat, it is less the when we shot it down than the fact that the Chinese sent this thing across the United States on the eve of the Secretary of State's visit to China. I mean, that is just a huge issue, and it is not when we shot it down. It is China's fault, and this stuff that the Chinese Foreign Ministry is putting out, it was an errant weather balloon. I mean, they must make some pretty crappy balloons because there was an errant weather balloon over Colombia, South America, right now also. It must have come from the same batch.

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yeah. Yeah. But you agree that, again, on the eve of this summit, that it is a pretty aggressive move for them to send this balloon, whether it got off course or not, and the way that they didn't notify us, right? If it was a simple mistake, you notify other countries when you have something floating over their airspace. So it is hard to interpret that as anything other than a pretty assertive move. I have no beef with the Chinese people, but it is certainly hard to miss the sort of aggressiveness on this.

Also, on the homeland, I think a way that people have really understood the threat lately is on supply chain issues, and I come from a district, we have two auto plants that have been on again, off again for the past 18 months because we can't get a 14-cent microchip. Our economic security is connected to China, whether we like it or not. Representative Gallagher and I led a task force on defense supply chains to kind of pick up the rug and see what creepy-crawlies were under there in terms of dependencies on China by our military, which, of course, would be beyond ironic. In your time, were you at all focused or do you have any known dependencies on China that concern you for our military?

Admiral HARRIS. For sure. And I was more focused on it after I retired. I was asked to give a speech at Purdue on energetics, which is the technical term for the stuff that goes boom and bullets and weapons and rockets, missiles. And the majority of the components of energetics comes from China or is controlled by the Chinese supply chain. That is shocking.

Ms. SLOTKIN. Yes, that one we heard about, as well, in our supply chain task force, and, at one point, 90 percent of the stuff that goes boom in our weapons is sourced to China. And no one is missing the irony that, God forbid, we ever had to go to war, that they would control the supply. I think the Defense Department has tried valiantly to wean us off that, but that is a concern.

And then, last, Dr. Sisson, it is great to see you. I think, again, sometimes Taiwan and the struggle over Taiwan or the debate feels very far away. Can you very briefly explain particularly what the Taiwan Straits means to the American public? If traffic through the straits was slowed or stopped, what does that mean for every person in this room and in my district?

Dr. SISSON. Absolutely. And, first, let me say good thoughts and wishes to everyone in Michigan and particularly in the high school. You know, when you were asking about dependence, the word that

came to my mind was ocean, the fact that how much transits through the Taiwan Strait and the dependence of effectively every part of our economy on shipping. That alone is a frightening amount of dependence. So if there is a contingency over the Taiwan Strait, I think the global economy basically comes to a screeching halt.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time is expired. The Chair now recognizes another Michigander, General Bergman, for 5 minutes.

Mr. BERGMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And welcome to you both. I guess I am going to have to work—this is the first hearing here and I am going to have to work around Mr. Strong's head right in front of me to see you. So just don't move, Mr. Strong, and I won't have to move my firing position again.

Mr. Chairman, the CCP has spent time, money, and resources greatly expanding their capabilities for espionage. We all saw last week, as we've talked about here unendingly, the spy balloon carrying thousands of pounds of equipment made its way across the United States. This was not an anomaly. For years, the CCP has tried to infiltrate every facet of American life, including our telecommunications infrastructure.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to enter for the record a letter from the Competitive Carriers Association and other trade associations on the necessity of full funding to rip and replace untrustworthy equipment from our networks.

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 97.]

Mr. BERGMAN. Admiral Harris and Dr. Sisson, glad you are here. Broadband internet access is vital to ensuring the United States continues to grow technologically, economically, and I would suggest to you especially educationally. However, billions of dollars of Chinese equipment and services deemed to pose a threat to national security remain in place. While Congress has taken steps to fund the removal of this equipment from our networks, it will take time to complete.

To the panel, that would be you all, how much of a risk does Chinese-made telecommunications technology embedded in our internet infrastructure pose to our national security?

Dr. SISSON. Well, I am not able to put a risk indicator on it with any kind of confidence. I think it is certainly something, you are correct, that has received appropriate scrutiny and should continue to do so, not least because it is additional evidence that the CCP's primary objective is not to beat us in war, it is to beat us in everything else, and this is part of that and we need to be attentive to that strategic view.

Mr. BERGMAN. Thank you. Admiral.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. I will say, sir, that I think it is a risk. When I was Ambassador to Korea, we worked with the Korean government to have them not include Huawei in their 5G infrastructure, and I think that we have achieved that objective in a variety of countries around the world. We can't ever forget that the Chinese intelligence law requires Chinese companies—requires them—to provide information to the government of the PRC when asked to do so.

Mr. BERGMAN. Okay. Thank you. And going down a different road here, Admiral, the PRC maintains military ties with U.S. partners and allies such as Thailand, Philippines, Djibouti. How should the U.S. respond to counter the continuing expansion of PRC's military ties with U.S. partners and allies?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I mean, there is a number of ways we can and should do that. One is to continue to help our allies, partners, and friends. You mentioned Thailand. Thailand is a treaty ally of the United States, and they have a strong relationship with China. South Korea's only ally is the United States, but their largest trading partner is China.

So it is possible to walk and chew gum at the same time. Countries are sovereign, and they act in their own enlightened self-interest, as we should. There is nothing wrong with having a trading relationship with China. We do, too. But China is the aggressor. I view them as the adversary. The National Security Strategy views them as a competitor, and so we have work to do in that regard.

Mr. BERGMAN. Yeah. You know, and just to close that out with Djibouti because I was still involved in building Camp Lemonnier when we resurrected it into a really first-class place to deploy to. We know that we were there first, and the Chinese piggybacked on to what we were doing, and we know what our purpose is in the region. We are still not too sure what their purpose is in the region.

And I see my time is about to run out. I am going to yield back 25 seconds, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. You are all right. I don't care what anybody says about you. The Chair will now recognize the gentlelady from New Jersey, Ms. Sherrill, for 5 minutes.

Ms. SHERRILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you both for being here today to testify in this important hearing. I have a broad question about the kind of good news and bad news in the INDOPACOM, and then I will turn it over to both of you to respond.

As our National Defense Strategy states, conflict with the PRC is neither inevitable nor desirable. I think every member of this committee would agree that and share my belief that the most desirable outcome of our policy towards the PRC would be to deter them from taking aggressive actions to achieve their ambitions. But innovation and modernization are not the only tools we have. It is clear one of our main advantages is our alliances and security partnerships, and that is clear from the PRC's transparent efforts to undermine those partnerships and to use its influence and strength to coerce neighbors in the region.

Just in the past month, the Philippines announced a landmark agreement that will expand U.S. military presence there and strengthen U.S.-Philippines military cooperation, a striking contrast to our relations of even 3 years ago when the previous Filipino administration threatened to end our Visiting Forces and Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreements. In 2021, we inaugurated the AUKUS agreement, which will strengthen one of our oldest partnerships in the INDOPACOM AOR, and we are seeing Japan increase its defense spending by 50 percent.

So, Admiral Harris, Dr. Sisson, could each of you give me your views of the best next steps to build on the successes of the last 2 years in restrengthening our partnerships in the INDOPACOM AOR and, conversely, where are those major fault lines in the region? What are the overt pressure mechanisms, economic or military, that the CCP can apply to our allies and partners and what are the covert behind-the-curtain mechanisms and how can we mitigate that risk?

Thank you. And I will turn it over to both of you.

Dr. SISSON. I think that is a very good description of the big-picture view of what is happening regionally. I think that the National Defense Strategy made an important stride this cycle by including the idea of campaigning, which is not unrelated to the agreements that you've just highlighted in the Philippines, which is to say a particular kind of presence and activity on the part of our military forces to be more available and vigilant in the surrounding waters, which is important to those allies and partners and other nations in that region.

The other way and place that we can continue to create some space for these nations is through engaging with them on other sources of national power, like trade, primary among them. We have concerted diplomacy, and that should continue. And, ideally, what we will do best is listen to what they are telling us about what it is that they need and they want as they pursue, as the admiral put it, their own enlightened self-interest.

Admiral HARRIS. Thanks. I think that, as I have said before, diplomacy and diplomats matter. And the fact that we haven't had an ambassador to India in over 2 years matters to the Indians. We shouldn't be surprised if they are not as supportive of Ukraine as we would like them to be. It took us 5 years, 5 years, to put an ambassador in ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations]. Do we think that the Southeast Asian countries didn't notice that? It took us 5 years to get an ambassador to Singapore and all the good things that Singapore does for us and for the joint force. And China fills those vacuums.

You know, it took 18 months to get an ambassador to replace me. Philip Goldberg is fabulous. I mean, the Koreans certainly traded up, but they shouldn't have had to wait for 18 months to get one. It took 18 months to get Caroline Kennedy down to Australia. Australia. Eighteen months to get an ambassador to Australia, and that's on us, the United States.

And some people say it is a manifestation of the divided political landscape in Washington, but I have said that you can't criticize the United States Senate if the White House doesn't nominate people in a timely fashion.

Now, we are further along now than we have been. We are over 2 years in. But still there are holes out there that need to be filled, must be filled. It took us 3 years to get an ambassador to Ukraine, you know. And thank goodness that we had an ambassador in Russia, John Sullivan, that he agreed to stay over into this administration. He had to leave because his wife died. I'm so sorry about that. And so, right now, Russia is gapped.

So that's on us in not taking diplomacy to the level that it needs to be, which affects our relationships with these countries, whether they are with us or against us.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time is expired. The Chair now recognize the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Jackson, for 5 minutes.

Dr. JACKSON OF TEXAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to our witnesses for being here today. Thank you, Dr. Sisson and Admiral Harris. Thank you for being here.

And I will start off by saying I was a big fan of yours while I was on Active Duty, of your leadership, and thank you for your service.

My question is—and this has been hit on a little bit by some of the other members here—but I have traveled extensively during my time in the military and also during my short time here in Congress. And I am also on the Foreign Affairs Committee as well. And one of the things that I have noticed is that, no matter where you go, China is there now. It just seems like places you wouldn't expect them to be, they are having a big influence and they are slowly winning people over, because they are making them dependent on them economically and they are offering military assistance, when needed, so on and so forth.

And I know we have talked about this a little bit before, but my question for you is, with the exception of Japan and Australia, which we all agree is critical, what partner nation is a “must-have” right now that we're currently—you feel like we are overlooking; that we should spend more time in building a relationship with, you know, if things go south in this relationship?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. Thanks. I hope you are still a fan.

Dr. JACKSON OF TEXAS. Yes, sir.

Admiral HARRIS. All right. So, our treaty allies in the Indo-Pacific are critical. That is Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand. I think we are overlooking—“overlooking” is probably too strong a word—that we could do more with our relationships with Malaysia and Indonesia. They are critical, Indonesia especially. It is large, the largest Muslim nation in the world, and that relationship is very important to us. So, I think that we can focus on that and do more in that regard.

India, of course, is the key to the Indian Ocean and beyond.

Dr. JACKSON OF TEXAS. Yes, sir.

Admiral HARRIS. And I am glad our relationships with India is improving, are improving.

Dr. JACKSON OF TEXAS. Yes, sir. Well, thank you, and I appreciate it.

One of the things I heard when I traveled from a couple of different locations—you know, I was surprised to hear it more than once—and it mostly dealt with some of the South Pacific island nations, some of the smaller, not the bigger countries that we just were discussing. But one of the things I heard commonly was that these are people where the Chinese are actively courting them. They are coming in aggressively, whether it is building infrastructure, or whatever. They are building a relationship with these folks. And these are people that we have, typically, had a strong relationship with over the years.

One of the things that I heard repeatedly was that they are getting mixed messages from the United States. Being that the military will come in, the U.S. military, and they will see the strategic importance of these partners, and they will promise them things and they will pledge support to them, so on and so forth, and then the State Department will roll in behind them and they won't have the same aggressive attitudes towards supporting them that maybe the military did.

Do you see that? Was that a problem, and do you think that continues to be a problem? And what can we do to better get on the same page and instill confidence in these people that we will be there to help them?

Admiral HARRIS. So, it is a problem. It was a problem. It remains one today. It is different constituencies in the U.S. Government have different viewpoints on what is important and what is not. That is probably human nature. But it has to be driven from the top. We have to have a unified—or clarified, rather—national policy on what to do with country A or country B or country C. So that instruments of national power, whether it is the military, whether it is diplomacy, whether it is commerce, trade, money, and so on, they align up behind the national policy. And that is the only way forward, in my view.

Dr. JACKSON OF TEXAS. Yes, sir. Thank you.

My last question is—and I was also surprised to hear this when I was there—but I was wondering, when you were PACOM commander, were there conversations, because I know there are conversations now, about NATO and what is NATO's role in all of this, you know, if China moves on Taiwan? Were there conversations going on back then? Was it significant? And should we be having more conversations about that?

Admiral HARRIS. I think we should. You know, China is a global issue and not an Indo-Pacific—solely an Indo-Pacific issue. And I am probably going to travel to Italy this summer to speak to the NATO Defense College about some of these issues. We are negotiating that right now.

Dr. JACKSON OF TEXAS. Thank you, sir. I appreciate that. That is all the questions I have, sir.

I yield my time back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Ryan, for 5 minutes.

Mr. RYAN. All right. Good morning both, and thank you for being here. I guess it is afternoon now. Good afternoon.

So, I want to build on some of the themes you both talked about earlier in terms of asymmetric capabilities. And as we look at sort of ourselves versus our competitor or adversary China, my concern is that, as we continue to invest significantly in longstanding, quote-unquote, “legacy” programs, we see China being innovative and adaptive both in their acquisition and also their employment of these technologies. I won't use the “B word” that we have heard much throughout the day today, but even sort of reversion back to older technologies, employed in more creative and adaptive ways.

So, as we think, coming into this year and our conversations, how should we be thinking about how to guide our Department to-

wards more innovative strategies? You talked about, Admiral, our alliances as an asymmetric capacity. I agree, but are there other, particularly on the commercial technology or other emerging technology fronts, areas we should really focus on to enhance our asymmetric capabilities? To you both, please.

Dr. SISSON. Yeah, thank you.

I would point out, first, that what the PLA has been able to do is focus very excruciatingly closely on a particular regional concern and orient a lot of its modernization around contingencies, specifically, you know, in the Western Pacific, in its near seas, and specifically or especially, around Taiwan. Those ambitions are becoming more global, no question about it, but it is a little bit of an apples-to-an orange comparison when we think about what the U.S. military has to do and be responsible for.

I think that, right now, there is good momentum in the Department—despite all of the programs of record, sort of the tyranny of the programs of record, and how acquisition and procurement flow that way—in terms of working on data and information, and the tools that we need to work with it effectively. So Deputy Secretary of Defense Hicks I think has been giving a lot of attention to the way the Department is thinking about and organizing around data and artificial-intelligence-enabled technologies, both for the business of the Department of Defense, but also for the mission of the Department of Defense operationally. And I think that is absolutely to be encouraged by Congress with, you know, appropriate levels of oversight, interest, and investment.

Admiral HARRIS. I have nothing to add.

Mr. RYAN. The second theme that I have heard over and over, and would appreciate both your additional thoughts on, is resiliency. And I think these two questions are obviously interrelated. But specifically, within a cybersecurity and other C4I [command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence] domain, as we see, to your point, Dr. Sisson, specific focus on our capabilities in the Indo-Pacific region and being able to disrupt them, are there specific areas that we should be focused on ensuring resiliency around, both conventional and, again, more C4I-focused assets?

Dr. SISSON. So, we absolutely need to worry about resilience conventionally in all of our systems. Because, again, our deterrent posture depends on the PLA not thinking it can have a blinding, sort of knockout strike that keeps us out of a conflict, should policy-makers choose to engage in it.

The place where the cyber concern really keeps me awake at night is in the nuclear domain, nuclear command and control, and we—not just in terms of resilience of our own, but also that we don't have conversations ongoing about limitations and restrictions on what cyber tools we can and cannot deploy on each other in that domain. And that is an enormously worrisome fact that I would like to see remedied as quickly as possible, because I do like to sleep.

[Laughter.]

Mr. RYAN. I have a 1- and 3-year-old. So, I don't sleep at all.

But, Admiral Harris, anything to add there?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes. I will just agree with what Dr. Sisson said and highlight the need to invest fully into our nuclear deterrent capability, the new nuclear deterrent capability.

Mr. RYAN. Again, thank you both.

And yield back the balance of my time.

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank the gentleman.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Gimenez, for 5 minutes.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The Soviet Union, and now Russia, they have had like a first-class military, but it was a third-class economic power. And they pose a significant threat to us. China, on the other hand, is a first-class economic power with ambitions to become a first-class military. Do you consider China to be a far greater adversary than the Soviet Union ever was?

Admiral HARRIS. I do not at this point in 2023, because of the overwhelming nuclear capability that is resident in Russia. So, if you took the nuclear off the table, which you can't do, but if you took it off the table, then I would say today Russia is a third-rate military. And we are seeing that play out in Ukraine. I mean, they have lost—what—100,000 people, 12 general officers, and thousands of fighting vehicles, and the like.

But, at the end of the day, they have an enormous nuclear capability that we cannot discount. China doesn't have that capability today, but they are building to that. And we know, by the end of this decade, they will have that capability. Then, I would agree with you, I think I am agreeing with you, that China then becomes the leading threat in all domains. But today, because of the overwhelming nuclear threat, Russia predominates.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Yes, I can agree with it. But I am taking away, I am looking now at conventional forces—all right—a conventional kind of war, that China will have a much greater capacity to wage a much more effective conventional war against the United States than, say, Russia.

Admiral HARRIS. Could be. The Chinese military hasn't been tested in sustained combat operations since 1979, and that was really a skirmish with Vietnam. We have been in almost continuous combat for the last 20, 25 years. The Russians have been in combat, also, in Chechnya and Afghanistan and the like. So, theirs is a tested military and they are getting a severe test now in Ukraine.

So, the jury is still out on how good the Chinese military really is. And I think they don't know how good they are, either.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Dr. Sisson.

Dr. SISSON. I think there is, obviously, no question that China can build stuff. So, if it is a question about, do they have industrial capacity and can they build a lot of ships, and so forth, we know that the answer is yes today, and will continue to be so into the future.

The comparison with the Soviet Union I think is different to the extent that it is not just a matter, as you well know, of the industrial capacity and what the militaries can have. It is also force employment and what they can do. There is a trend towards overcon-

fidence, as it turns out, especially in autocratic forms of government, about how those two things add up.

The other part I would highlight is that, at this moment, we also have an opportunity to work on the CCP's intent and the way that they behave in the world, that we didn't have as much of an option with in the bad old days with the Soviet Union. We still have an awful lot of agency in the relationship between the United States and China, and that is where, you know, when I look at the ways and places it could go wrong, and turn China into the single most powerful adversary that the country has ever had, that is where I start to worry. Right now, they are a pacing challenge. I agree with the DOD's assessment. And we should do things to keep it that way.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Yes. Well, I think it is emerging, though, and I can see in the future that they will probably—they could be a much more serious adversary.

One final question on energy. Could energy be a weakness for China?

Admiral HARRIS. For sure. But I think energy can be a weakness for us also.

Mr. GIMENEZ. Okay. That is great, because my follow-up question is, we have the capacity to be energy-independent, obviously, but we also have the capacity to be energy-dominant. So, could we use energy as a way to try to keep them at bay?

Admiral HARRIS. I think we can in the sense that they are going to get their energy either over land from Russia primarily or through sea lanes. So, we can dominate in the sea lanes to prevent them from getting the resources they need.

But they also have a way to pressurize us, not on energy in the fuel sense, but in rare earths and other commodities that we depend on them really for the things that we need for our own society, let alone our weapons.

Mr. GIMENEZ. My final—I know my time is up. My final thought is that that may be self-imposed on us by us.

Admiral HARRIS. For sure.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time is expired.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Jackson, for 5 minutes.

Mr. JACKSON OF NORTH CAROLINA. Thank you. And, Mr. Chair, if I may say, it is nice to meet you. It is a pleasure to serve with you. I haven't had a chance to meet you yet.

This has been incredibly informative. I have taken several pages of notes.

I would like to ask you both a question with respect to hypersonic weapons. I am going to give you my assumption, and I would like you to tell me how I am wrong.

My assumption is that, were China to gain full capability or significant capability with respect to hypersonic weapons, that that would have a strategic-level impact on us, were we not to match it with defensive capability; and that specifically, it would impact our Navy's operational range of movement. That is my very basic assumption. Am I wrong about that?

Dr. SISSON. You are not wrong that hypersonics could limit the scope of movement of the Navy, just as the current missile and rocket forces of the PLA can limit the movements of the Navy.

Mr. JACKSON OF NORTH CAROLINA. Can I follow up with you? Let's talk about the difference between the current missile capability, the level of deterrent that—the difference between the conventional missiles that exist and the hypersonic missiles that exist. My assumption has been that the hypersonic missiles pose a game-changing-level impact to the operational range of our Navy. Am I wrong? Is this an incremental difference between the existing missiles and hypersonic or is this really an exponential difference?

Dr. SISSON. From what I have seen—and I am not a hypersonics expert; again, I am a strategist who studies deterrence—I have not seen anything that suggests to me that it would make a transformative difference in our ability to operate. So, the evidence is still probably early. The investigations are ongoing. Data is still being collected and gathered, and work is ongoing. So, I will reserve final judgment. But, from what I have seen so far, I don't see it as a transformation.

Mr. JACKSON OF NORTH CAROLINA. Well, I guess we are going to have to figure that one out, because there are some people who are presenting this as a transformational risk. I don't know. You have so much more expertise on this than I do. But it does sort of stand to reason that weapons that can beat any radar and beat any existing defense mechanism would pose a new and significant threat to our carrier groups.

Dr. SISSON. What I would say to that is that there are a lot cheaper ways to overcome those kinds of defenses right now. And so, the fact of what becomes strategic is the ability to actually defeat them. Hypersonics doing it slightly faster than the traditional mechanisms at a much higher cost is what doesn't strike me as being especially transformative.

Mr. JACKSON OF NORTH CAROLINA. So, what you are saying is there is worse news than hypersonics; that there are other easier, cheaper weapons that could have game-changing impact?

Dr. SISSON. And that has long been the case. So, that part isn't the new part. The new part is that hypersonics have entered into that conversation.

Mr. JACKSON OF NORTH CAROLINA. Okay. If we knew that an invasion was 3 years out, what are the first two things that we would do? Admiral, if you would?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, if we knew that it was 3 years out, then we could probably relax some of the operational tempo of the forward-deployed units. But we don't know that, and we have to assume that they might attack tonight. And so, we have to be ready to fight tonight, as INDOPACOM says. If we knew it was going to be 3 years out, then we could invest now in some of the weapon systems that we might actually realize in 3 years; but we don't know that. And so, we find ourselves with weapon systems with longer lead times, and maybe a misapplication of investment, because we don't know.

Mr. JACKSON OF NORTH CAROLINA. Doctor.

Dr. SISSON. Well, if we knew it was 3 years out, what I would suggest is that our leaders get on a phone and start talking right

away to see if we can move them off of that 3-year estimate. You know, I think, as the admiral has pointed out, the job of the military is to be prepared to fight tonight, if needed. And that wouldn't change between now and 3 years from now. I still think that the United States has the most capable and combat-credible force in the world. If we couldn't find a negotiated solution on a 3-year time horizon, then, you know, we would be in bad shape for more than one reason, and we would have to figure out the best fight we could put forward.

Mr. JACKSON OF NORTH CAROLINA. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time is expired.

The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from South Carolina, Ms. Mace, for 5 minutes.

Ms. MACE. Thank you, Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Smith.

Admiral Harris, Dr. Sisson, thank you for being here today.

As we all know, China continues to remain a global threat. We saw the imminence of some of that aggression just here last week, even in my home State of South Carolina. The Chinese Communist Party's economic, political, social, and security policies are reinforced, as we have seen over the last 20 years, with increases in their defense spending and budget to one of the largest in the world. They are disputing the sovereignty of other nations in the East China Sea, the South China Sea, and the Line of Actual Control.

And we have seen them over the years increasingly escalate their aggression. The timelines keep moving. Some of them keep moving up, which is of great concern to our Nation. We are a country who values freedom, sovereignty, and democracy around the world, and we know that Chinese Communist Party's values directly contradict our values, especially when it comes to human rights, free speech, and some of the most basic freedoms that our Nation and other nations were founded on.

So, I just have a few questions this afternoon geared to, how do we strengthen our position and how do we deal with China's aggression? Admiral Harris and Dr. Sisson, either one of you can answer these questions.

But the CCP has undertaken a significant, long-term military modernization effort. We have seen some of those timelines move up over the years. But in what areas, in your opinion, has it made the most progress? And then, in what areas have we seen them falling behind maybe some of their publicly stated goals?

Admiral HARRIS. I will take the first stab at that.

We have seen significant improvements in their command and control, you know, in how they fight—not what they fight with, but how they fight in terms of joint warfare and how the Chinese military, the PLA, the People's Liberation Army, have reorganized in order to fight in a more joint way. Whether they can do that or not, again, they have not been tested, but they have made moves in that direction.

And equipment-wise, we have had a lengthy discussion about hypersonics. They are doing well in that. And they have improved their naval capability. They have two aircraft carriers now, building a third, and that is significant, you know. Their aircraft car-

riers in no measure can compare with an American aircraft carrier, but they are better than any other aircraft carrier in the region. So, that is not insignificant.

And then, their nuclear enterprise, they will have a massive capability in terms of warheads by 2030.

I will stop here.

Ms. MACE. Dr. Sisson.

Dr. SISSON. I think he is exactly right on all of those measures. The organization, the focus on information capabilities, cyber, command and control, surveillance, those are very important.

I would highlight, though, when we think about—you asked about sort of areas where maybe things aren't going so well. The reorganization of the PLA was significant and I think very important. We have talked a lot about the balloon today. I think the alternative hypothesis to them being clever and probing, and doing those sorts of things intentionally, and being assertive, and the timing, is that they just sort of did it poorly; that there is an embarrassment hypothesis here, right? That they just weren't as coordinated and organized about the different elements of their own national government working together.

So, I think, in addition to sort of some of the jointness concerns that the admiral mentioned, that this lack of sort of a coordinated effort, or at least the indications that it might be, are all suggestive that they have some ways to go there as well.

Ms. MACE. Yes. And that leads, Dr. Sisson, into my next question really. We have seen that, like last summer, Russia, we saw news reports, their claims to hack our most high-value weapons systems. In 2020, there were 11 Federal agencies hacked by agents aligned with Russia and China. So, how do you see China's ability in cyber to compromise U.S. capabilities militarily and elsewhere?

Dr. SISSON. So, I have no direct knowledge or insight. Those are some of the most closely guarded pieces of information—

Ms. MACE. Yes.

Dr. SISSON [continuing]. In the defense domain. So, I presume that they have a lot. I think that they have devoted a lot of time and attention to those capabilities.

Ms. MACE. Uh-hum.

Dr. SISSON. I think it continues to be sort of the Wild West in terms of all of the military domains, where we don't have a lot of good standing practices and, you know, the favored term of "guard-rails." A lot of the times, we don't exactly know what is going to happen when we release a piece of code into the wild, and probably neither do they. And so, I think that there is a lot to be concerned about in that area.

Ms. MACE. What about AI? Any thoughts on AI and China's use? We know they put out a lot of research papers about AI. The Americans—we are all really hearing the advent of that technology. I don't have very much time left. But any quick thoughts on that?

Dr. SISSON. Yes. I think the importance of AI is not only military, although that is important, but it is broadly societal, about being able to find the discoveries that bring, again, health, wealth, and well-being, and to being able to distribute them in ways that the CCP would prefer in terms of values and principles, as opposed

to us. And that is where we need to make sure that we are keeping pace.

Ms. MACE. Thank you.

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Escobar, for 5 minutes.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this timely and important conversation.

And many thanks to our witnesses for sharing your expertise and your wisdom and your knowledge with us.

This is a very timely topic. And I was taken, Dr. Sisson, by something that you mentioned in your testimony, when you said that we can “encourage the government of Taiwan to adopt a defense concept that forces the PLA into suboptimal strategies and increases the battle damage Beijing would have to anticipate and accept.” Can you elaborate a little bit more on this defense concept, please?

Dr. SISSON. Sure. So, I think it is really taking advantage of the terrain of Taiwan and the kind of work that the PLA would have to undertake, either to do an amphibious kind of invasion or even a blockade. So, there are certain kinds of defense equipment that Taiwan can integrate into its defense concept. So, you can think about naval mines and other anti-ship defenses, small attack, you know, fast-attack missile boats and those sorts of things that would really make it difficult for the PLA to move.

The other thing I think is really fundamental is preparing for a whole-of-nation defense on the part of the Taiwan people. I was actually in Taiwan the week following then-Speaker Pelosi’s visit. And, you know, the interesting element at the time in terms of the population wasn’t that the PLA’s histrionics around the island were particularly frightening. It is not as though the military activities conveyed to them information they didn’t already have. But that it was met with this sort of collective sense of, yes, we know and we are going to continue to get ready. And more of that sensibility of preparedness and national resilience, along with the material sort of preparations that would require for a blockade, much less any sort of active resistance to an invasion, that is the kind of thing we can continue very much to support the Taiwan people with.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you.

And what would you say are the obstacles that Taiwan faces in order to make this defense concept a reality?

Dr. SISSON. That is a really important question and element of it. Some of it is working with the defense forces there to change mindset, frankly, and to be willing to invest in some platforms that might not be their first choice, for any number of reasons.

I think Congress, obviously, plays an important role in terms of streamlining the relationship in terms of the weapon support that we can provide through foreign military sales, which was a very heartening inclusion in the last NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act], and those sorts of things.

I think that the other obstacle is something that Taiwan has to work with in terms of engaging beyond the United States. And if we can facilitate relationships with allies and partners and like-minded nations worldwide, I think that very much helps the Tai-

wan people's sense of confidence, stability, and is important to deterrence as well.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Great. Thank you so much.

Admiral Harris, how can we better develop and integrate cyber talent at our colleges and our universities? I mean, I have long pushed that our military better collaborate and use that talent, the brilliance that we have at our institutions of higher learning, so that we can help close some of those capability gaps between our government and that of the CCP.

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, it is a great question. Thank you for it.

I think that we already have taken steps to improve that field of study, in the sense that we have now formal relationships between the Department and at least 10, or maybe a dozen, universities that are teaching now majors, major fields of study, in cyber and cyber warfare. So, that relationship is important.

Certainly, it can, and maybe should, be expanded. But the fact that we have it at all I think recognizes the talent that is extant in the communities, that we are not receiving in the Department.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Are we moving quickly enough in that direction?

Admiral HARRIS. I don't think you can move quickly enough, but I think we are moving, and that is the important thing at this point.

Ms. ESCOBAR. Thank you both very much.

Mr. Chairman, I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Alabama, Mr. Strong, for 5 minutes.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral Harris, Dr. Sisson, this is the most informative committee hearing I have ever been in. Matter of fact, this is my first committee hearing to be in. So, I appreciate each of your time to review the threats of our homeland posed by the Chinese Communist Party.

The National Security Strategy refers to the CCP as "the most comprehensive and serious challenge to the security of the United States of America."

First, I want to briefly introduce myself to my colleagues present and those that are tuning in. My name is Dale Strong. I am a freshman Member of the 118th Congress representing Alabama's Fifth Congressional District. Prior to being elected to Congress, I served as chairman of the Madison County Commission in Huntsville, Alabama, more affectionately known as "Rocket City USA, the Propulsion Capital of the World."

Alabama's Fifth District is proud home to Redstone Arsenal and hosts many important Department of Defense equities, including Army Materiel Command, Army Space Missile Defense Command, the Missile Defense Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency's Missile and Space Intelligence Center. While Redstone employs more than 46,000 people, my district also hosts thousands of contractors in Research Park, with more than a quarter of the top 100 defense companies in the world calling north Alabama home.

I specifically want to thank my friend, now colleague, Chairman Rogers. I am proud to serve on this committee under your leadership and with each of the members thereof.

I truly believe that America's finest days are still ahead.

Admiral Harris, the FY23 NDAA called for a more robust procurement for missile defense systems for Guam. It also requires the Secretary of Defense to designate a senior DOD official to develop and deploy this system. Given your experience in the region, which DOD official do you believe would best suit—is best suited for this role?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, Congressman, thank you.

At this juncture, I think the best DOD official would be someone expert in program management, because they have got to build up Guam in a joint way with the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy differing systems, different sensor packages into a unified ability to shoot down both air-breathing cruise missiles with a 360-degree threat sector or ballistic missiles.

So, at this point, I think we need to focus on program management—probably a military officer, could come from any of the services, but more on the programmatic side. And then, a few years from now, after the system is in place, then I would think that we would want an operational officer to be in charge of it, and probably to stand up what INDOPACOM has called for, a Joint Task Force Guam.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you.

What key elements should this missile defense system for Guam contain?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I mentioned some of them. You have got to deal with the 360-degree threat arc, assuming that the threat is from China, because it doesn't have to come just from the 180 to 360. It could come all around, given China's capabilities.

It has to be able to shoot down air-breathers, cruise missiles, because you are in range of cruise missiles from the mainland of China into Guam.

And then, there is the ballistic missile threat, the medium-range ballistic missiles that will come in. So, you know, you have got to have a system that can look high and low, and then, ultimately, we are going to have to deal with the hypersonic threat that we spent some time talking about already.

So, in totality, it is a significant challenge, not an overcomeable one—I mean not one that we are going to not be able to overcome, but it is a significant challenge.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you.

We have learned that the People's Liberation Army has a habit of describing its campaign of military intimidation against Taiwan as "exercises." Recent exercises have included significant mobilization of units in mainland China, as well as nationwide movement of roll-on/roll-off ferries that would likely play a role in an actual invasion.

Do you believe these exercises negatively impact the United States ability to protect—or to predict kinetic operations?

Admiral HARRIS. Not at all. I think the exercises actually help us understand from an intelligence perspective the PRC's capabilities.

Mr. STRONG. Thank you.

And then, referring back to comments earlier related to space launch earlier, you look—just in recent days, the United Launch Alliance has received their new American-made BE-4 engine. ULA

also has shipped their Vulcan rocket to the Cape for testing. I concur with you, America is more than able to make these rockets and we shouldn't be dependent on any other country.

I yield back to the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Deluzio.

Mr. DELUZIO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, Dr. Sisson, Admiral Harris, thank you for being here. Admiral Harris, especially as a fellow Academy grad, Annapolis grad, it is nice to have you here. Appreciate getting the chance to talk with you my first hearing of this great committee.

I had the great honor of serving as a surface officer at sea. I saw deployments in the Middle East and the Pacific, seeing some of these threats you were both speaking about today. I am lucky to represent a district with a significant number of those who have also worn the uniform.

I share the concern here about the rise of China. That has, undoubtedly, become a threat to our national and economic security.

Admiral Harris, my first question is for you. You advocate changing our policy to one of "strategic clarity," as you describe it, when it comes to Taiwan and its defense. I would like you, if you would, please, to explain what strategic clarity means in layman's terms for my constituents in western Pennsylvania.

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So, for me, strategic clarity means that we are clear as a nation that we would defend Taiwan if China attacks Taiwan to forcibly reunite with them. Our current policy has been in place for 44 years. It is strategic ambiguity. So that the question of whether we would defend Taiwan or not is unanswered. I think that policy has served us well, looking back, but I think the time to change the policy is now. The PRC has been nothing but clear. They have exercised complete strategic clarity on their intent with regard to Taiwan. I think it is important, as I mentioned before, to three constituencies.

It is important for the Taiwanese to know whether we are going to defend them or not. So that, then, they can make the decision to either increase their defensive capabilities significantly or capitulate and join the Chinese, the mainland.

The second constituency is the Chinese themselves. They need to know the cost of invading Taiwan.

And the third constituency is the American people, because it is your sons and daughters that are going to do the fighting and dying if we defend Taiwan against an attack by China. We ought to know, the American people ought to know, that that is in the plans.

They knew during the Cold War that we would potentially have to fight the Soviet Union on the Fulda Gap and the GIUK [Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom] gap, and everywhere else. And they bought into that for the most part. And that question remains unexplored today because of this doctrine, this policy of strategic ambiguity.

Mr. DELUZIO. Well, Admiral, I appreciate your answer and explanation. And one piece I do agree with is that the sons and daughters of this country are the ones who bear the brunt of fighting, should it happen.

And as you—essentially, strategy clarity would have us make a firm and definitive commitment. And I would ask, if you have a sense, what would we expect that sacrifice to be in terms of dollars, in terms of human lives in this country—

Admiral HARRIS. Yes.

Mr. DELUZIO [continuing]. Should we have to rise to Taiwan's defense, as I think we would—

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, I don't have a sense of the dollar value, but the cost in human lives would be significant.

Mr. DELUZIO. Admiral, thank you.

Dr. Sisson, thank you as well for being here today.

The district I represent, western Pennsylvania, is a place like many who have been hit economically by our trade imbalance with China, by the economic competition with the People's Republic of China, and their disregard for U.S. international laws and norms. I think Washington is waking up more and more to these costs. I am pleased that the Biden administration is fighting to bring more of our manufacturing and supply chains back home.

My question, Dr. Sisson, to you is, how does this change our economic strategy to be more confronting of China's economic rise? How might that impact our military posture under the strategy of dual deterrence that I understand you think we ought to continue to support?

Dr. Sisson. Quickly, I want to actually answer your last question about the costs—

Mr. DELUZIO. Please do.

Dr. Sisson [continuing]. To be expected from any kind of militarized engagement. I think that the best estimate to be put on it is potentially catastrophic, right? If we really need to think about what it would entail, it would not be significant, it could be upwards of catastrophic, which is why I think moving off of a strategy of dual deterrence is especially dangerous, especially given that it is not necessary.

To your other question about sort of the economic relationship and how these two domains might interact, I think it accesses, again, the idea that the entirety of the relationship between the United States and China has to be wholly strategic. It has to do with a grand strategy where the United States addresses our economic interests and negotiates bad behavior with China in that domain, just as much as we do its bad behavior in the military domain. What it is going to require is a lot of good coordination.

Mr. DELUZIO. Thank you, Dr. Sisson.

Admiral, thank you as well.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentlelady from Virginia, Ms. Kiggans, for 5 minutes.

Mrs. KIGGANS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you to our witnesses for your testimony today.

As a daughter of a Green Beret who served in Vietnam, as a Navy pilot and married to a Navy pilot, and the mother of now two midshipmen, this is an issue that is super important to me. And it is just a great honor to be in the room today with you.

It is fitting that our first hearing is about the threat that is facing our country from the Chinese Communist Party. Under Xi

Jinping, China has seen a rapid military buildup, stolen valuable intellectual property, increased economic warfare, and increased aggression, including a surveillance balloon that we all saw drift across our Nation last week.

The CCP has demonstrated that it will continue to increase its influence and aggression far beyond the South China Sea. As you know, the Chinese military operates an overseas base in Djibouti. And a recent report from U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission stated that Chinese Communist Party's PLA is seeking sites for military installations in West Africa, a location that would give the Chinese military direct access to the Atlantic Ocean.

So, what, if anything, can the United States do to disincentivize nations, such as those in West Africa, from allowing the PLA to operate military installations within their countries? And are we contrasting the effort by contracting with foreign strategic ports and countries ourselves?

Admiral HARRIS. So, you know, we have to convince countries not to yield their sovereignty to China. And a case in point—I mentioned it before—is Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka. And we are seeing this weaponization of debt by the PRC against these countries.

All we can do—well, not all—but what we can do and what we must do is to ensure that we share with them the information about the ramifications of falling under this debt diplomacy that China is known for. But every country is sovereign and they make their own independent decisions, just as we do. And that's why diplomats and diplomacy matter in those countries.

Dr. SISSON. I think all of that is correct, and I would add, in addition to diplomacy, the purpose of diplomacy is to listen to what the needs and interests of those sovereign nations are. And I think we can do that without being overreactive to China's engagements in those areas. A lot of times, there are other options for those nations. China just underbids, and so wins contracts because it makes the most financial sense for the country at the time.

A lot of that is actually self-harming for China because people are getting what they pay for and finding that it is not meeting their needs and their aspirations. And that word is spreading.

And so, we can continue to provide an alternative, understanding that that alternative might not always be accepted by those nations, and that that is not always a terrible outcome in terms of the overall strategic relationship.

Mrs. KIGGANS. Along those same lines, I am just wondering about the level of confidence and trust that all countries in the world have, but especially our allies out there have. You know, we watched a chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan. We have seen our response to Russia in the Ukraine. And we even watched the response of having a surveillance balloon drift across our country.

So—and then, listening to you talk about just the slowness in filling the ambassador positions and this lack of strategic clarity we have, and, you know, diplomacy matters, and we have cancelled these diplomatic meetings. And I agree with you very much so.

So, I just wonder if you both could comment about the level of confidence that is out there from not only our NATO allies, but other allies in the region.

Admiral HARRIS. So, I will start by simply saying that I think the level of confidence in the United States is on the rise internationally, primarily, in the recent past, due to Ukraine. I think the American response, and bipartisan American response, to Ukraine surprised a lot of people. Most assuredly, it surprised Russia, and it galvanized our European and NATO allies to do more.

So, we see Germany, for example, which has increased its—or stated its intent to increase its defense budget to over 2 percent, which we have been trying to do since NATO began, and now they are doing it. And so, there is that.

And then, on the other side, is China's own bad behavior which is causing countries like Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, and others, to view China differently and to understand the kind of partner that China is. And I think that has gone a long way to moving countries away from the Chinese orbit into an orbit of free nations.

Mrs. KIGGANS. Thank you. Thank you very much.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now—I am sure I am going to butcher this name. The Chair now recognizes Ms. Tokuda from Hawaii.

How did I do?

Ms. TOKUDA. You did great.

The CHAIRMAN. All right.

Ms. TOKUDA. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Very good.

Good morning. Good afternoon, Admiral Harris, Dr. Sisson. Thank you so much for being here on our very first hearing, as an incoming freshmen.

You know, we have talked a lot about this balloon. So, I am not going to belabor the point, except to say that it was an unacceptable violation of our U.S. sovereign airspace, and I fully support the President's actions to shoot it down in a manner that did not put any U.S. lives or property at risk.

What concerns me about this incident, though, was the whirlwind of outbursts here in the United States that highlighted just how tense the political leaders of our country are when it comes to the PRC and when they are involved. As we saw this past week, we now have an environment here in the U.S. where these types of incidences, intentionally or not, trigger rushed reactions amongst our political leaders to pressure the President and our military leaders to be tough on the PRC.

What this committee should be worried about is what happens in the event of a more dangerous incident, especially as PRC assets in the South China Sea and Western Pacific act more and more recklessly. We saw it just last December when a PLA military jet came within 10 feet of one of our Air Force planes.

As our relationship with the PRC grows more and more challenged, and our ability of our governments to cooperate whenever there is an incident continues to decline, how does this politicization of our relationship with the PRC, and the growing political pressure of oneupmanship, increase the risk of undesired confrontation and affect our national defense?

Dr. SISSON. I think that is a good depiction of a lot of the reaction to this particular incident. And it is a mechanism, precisely as you state, to highlight how important crisis management is and being able to have connections at the top level of governments to

make sure that these things don't spiral out of control unintentionally.

I think part of the dynamic—and hopefully, we are coming to a little bit of, you know, sort of we had this sort of very heightened awareness sort of of a sudden about the PRC and the PLA's development. And now, hopefully, we can get our bearings a little bit more. Remember that we are starting from a place of great national advantage, not just militarily, but across all other domains. And we can return ourselves to focusing not being tough on China or worrying about being soft on China, but we can really just focus on being smart on China instead. And any event that can move us back to remembering that I think would be well used.

Ms. TOKUDA. Admiral.

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. I will just say that it is important to have these connections, either mil-to-mil, government-to-government, diplomatic connections, with the PRC—arguably, more now than ever.

And again, at the height of the Cold War, we had those relations, particularly mil-to-mil, navy-to-navy, with the Soviet Union, which helped diffuse a lot of issues that we had. We don't have that to the degree that we had with regard to China, and we need to work on that.

And I think the Secretary of State's visit would have helped, and it was China's own, I guess you could call it their own goal in the sense of the balloon fiasco, which caused him to have to postpone his trip. Hopefully, it will get back on track and we will have those government-to-government relationships start anew with Beijing.

Ms. TOKUDA. Thank you. You know, just building up on that, Congress has really been playing the leading role in strengthening the U.S.-Taiwan relationship under the foundations laid out with the Taiwan Relations Act way back in 1979. Going forward, more recently, we had the Taiwan Travels Act. We have had the TAIPEI [Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative] Act just last Congress. We had the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, although I would note we need to follow that up with an appropriation, if we are to take Dr. Sisson's recommendation seriously and assist them with FMF [foreign military financing] assistance as well.

I strongly support these measures because they are appropriate responses to the PRC's unrelenting campaign to try to isolate Taiwan from the international community, and to unilaterally make the question of Taiwan's future secure in their interest.

At the same time the PRC's government has made it clear that, with the moves that they have seen from the United States, it is still committed to retaliate and use force against the United States, especially when it comes to the issue of Taiwan.

How can we continue to strengthen our relationship, on one hand, with Taiwan and deter the PRC from further military aggression against Taiwan, while at the same time preventing destabilization, if you will, of cross-strait and U.S.-China relations that heightens the risk of conflict between our two countries?

Admiral HARRIS. So, that is higher math for sure, all of that. I do think that we must not, as I mentioned in my remarks, we must not allow the PRC to dictate our policy with regard to Taiwan or

any other country. So, that is the first thing. And I think that a country like the United States, we can do both.

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on page 101.]

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time is expired.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from New York, Mr. LaLota.

Mr. LALOTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Admiral, Doctor, very good for you to be here.

Admiral, we are fellow Academy grads, too, though you graduated in the year that I was born, sir. So, appreciate you being here.

But, prior to coming to Congress, Admiral, I was a Navy ship driver; did three deployments in the Western Pacific. So, I couldn't have chosen a better witness to be at my first HASC [House Armed Services Committee] hearing, given our mutual service in the same area.

Admiral, rather than present another question about the CCP spy balloon, I was hoping that you can share with us, based on your extensive experience in the Pacific, what you think China would do if the shoe was on the other foot. Specifically, what if the United States flew an unmanned aerial vehicle over Chinese territorial waters, its land? What would they do? What would go into their decision making if the shoe was on the other foot, sir?

Admiral HARRIS. I think they have been clear about that. I think that they would shoot it down. So, the issue is, you know, it is the manned surveillance platforms that are flying in international airspace, that we recognize as international airspace, that the PRC doesn't. So, you know, we don't know what they are going to do in that regard. Hopefully, they won't take kinetic action against a Rivet Joint [RC-135V/W aircraft] or a P-8, or something like that, or a ship sailing in the Taiwan Strait, for example, or a FONOP [freedom of navigation operation] in the Spratly Islands. You know, I am hopeful and almost certain that the PRC wouldn't take kinetic action, because that would escalate to a completely different order of magnitude.

But if we were to fly a surveillance balloon, if we were to fly a weather balloon over Beijing, they would probably shoot it down, especially now.

Mr. LALOTA. And why do you suppose that is, sir?

Admiral HARRIS. Because we did.

Mr. LALOTA. And if it was weeks ago, prior to this incident, and we flew an unmanned vehicle over their territorial waters or land, what do you think their reaction would have been weeks ago?

Admiral HARRIS. Potentially different. You know, this is a little bit of tit for tat. And so, you know, they have blustered about our gall at shooting down a weather balloon that went off course that was flying over sovereign United States airspace. I mean, if it was a weather balloon that went off course, why didn't they warn us, tell us, communicate with us? "Sorry about that," you know. We do that with satellites that have fallen out of orbit. We communicate with them, they communicate with us, and, you know, we proceed on orders aside.

But here, you have this surveillance balloon flying over sovereign U.S. airspace; errantly, coincidentally, over our nuclear sites and other key military facilities. And we are supposed to believe that this is accidental? I mean, it beggars imagination how crazy that is.

Mr. LALOTA. Sticking with China's reaction to our actions, rewind the clock 20 years ago. I understand that you were associated with the P-3 and EP-3 platforms.

Admiral HARRIS. Right.

Mr. LALOTA. In April of 2001, there was an incident over the Hainan Islands, or around there, I think 70 nautical miles around it. Can you describe to us in this unclassified environment what you understood China's reaction to be then, given a similar incident, but—

Admiral HARRIS. Yes.

Mr. LALOTA [continuing]. With the distinction of that being a manned aircraft?

Admiral HARRIS. So, in a nutshell, there was an EP-3 flying a surveillance mission in the South China Sea. A Chinese surveillance jet—I mean, a countersurveillance jet flew alongside the P-3; got too close to it. You know, it was a miscalculation, an error, not an intentional collision. I mean, who would be crazy enough to, you know, fly their airplane into another in peacetime? And it impacted one of the engines on the P-3, on the EP-3, cut the jet in half. It crashed. The pilot died. And the P-3, then, had to do a crash landing, an emergency landing, on Hainan Island.

Now, was that a smart thing to do or a dumb thing to do? Well, the week before, that very squadron had flown the 7th Fleet commander to Beijing. Treated well; you know, happy to have him there, and all of that. So, the crew thought, well, yeah, we are friends with China. And so, they had an emergency, you know, a legitimate emergency. And there was a runway, the closest runway. So, they elected to crash land the EP-3 on that runway. Right decision? Wrong decision? It is not for me to say. But that is what happened.

Mr. LALOTA. Thanks for your insights, Admiral.

I yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from North Carolina, Mr. Davis, for 5 minutes.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you so much, Mr. Chair. And we appreciate you convening us today, as well as Ranking Member Smith.

And to the admiral and Dr. Sisson, thank you so much for being with us.

I want to start with a question, Admiral Harris. You noted in your testimony that China's military buildup could soon challenge the U.S. across almost every domain. My question is to you, if there is one development that they have made that concerns you the most, one single, what would that be?

Admiral HARRIS. Cyber.

Mr. DAVIS. Cyber. Okay.

And shifting to Dr. Sisson, your prior reporting states that China's capability of threatening the U.S. military command-and-control systems and the United States domestic telecommunications systems creates vulnerabilities on a scale that the United States

has not experienced since the end of the Cold War. And my question for you would be, could you prioritize what the United States should do to harden domestic infrastructure in anticipation for the most sophisticated methods of attack?

Dr. SISSON. Well, I can't give specifics about the mechanisms of doing it. I do know that precisely what you said at the end is the absolute priority: that we need to focus on resilience and hardening all of our command-and-control and information systems, both operationally for the Department of Defense, but also, domestically, here at home for our national critical infrastructure.

And I think that is a place where—that sort of gets a little bit less attention than the military domain. But we need to be attentive to the fact that the CCP could in any contingency choose to try to access another of our sources of national power, which is the hearts and minds of the American people, and impose some hardship here that we haven't had to experience for a very long time. And so, the point is that we need to work on creating that resilience and hardening the infrastructure, as you say, militarily, but also here domestically in our critical infrastructure as well.

Mr. DAVIS. Super.

And the last thing I have here is, we have covered a lot of ground today. And this is, you know, my first hearing, and I really appreciate being part of this hearing and look forward to future hearings.

How would you summarize and prioritize—I mean, we have talked a lot today—how the United States should engage in strategic competition with the Chinese Communist Party, while simultaneously reducing the risk of miscalculation and escalation that could lead to conflict?

Admiral HARRIS. So, we all hope for competition and not war. But we have to be, you know, based on my background, we have to be ready to do the latter, even as we exercise the former.

I have characterized the PRC as an adversary already. They view us as the enemy. They view us as an adversary. And to be naive, to operate in the naive hope that we are all going to be friends in the end, is dangerous. That is the most dangerous thing, and that itself leads to instability.

So, if we go in with eyes wide open, and we are willing to engage diplomatically, and they are willing to engage diplomatically, then I think we can coexist in a world of strategic competition that doesn't rise to the level of armed conflict.

Dr. SISSON. The admiral makes some very good points. We do need to be ready militarily, and yet, this is a strategic-level competition. And the best thing we can do is to remember that this is not a military competition. The military is part of it, but it is a strategic competition with a military element.

And what that means is that we get to focus on reinforcing and extending the strengths and advantages that we have long had as this country. We are not building creativity and productivity, and a vibrant economy, and appealing universities, from whole cloth. We already have those things. And we should not lose sight of that. We should have confidence in them. We should look to reinforce them wherever and however we can, and we should retain that air

of calm and confidence, as we engage in the complicated nature of the U.S.-China relationship.

Mr. DAVIS. Thank you so much.

Yield back.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman.

The Chair would like to announce that we will be making a hard stop at 1:30 for two reasons. One, votes are going to be called at 1:30, and the admiral has a plane to catch.

With that, Mr. Alford of Missouri is recognized for 5 minutes.

Mr. ALFORD. Thank you, Chairman.

Thank you, Admiral Harris, and thank you, Dr. Sisson.

I am honored to represent two very prestigious military bases in our district, that being Whiteman Air Force Base, home to the B-2 stealth bomber, and, of course, Fort Leonard Wood that trains more than 80,000 military and civilian personnel each year.

The recent Chinese surveillance balloon that flew unchecked over our U.S. airspace in my home State of Missouri, and directly over Whiteman Air Force Base, really reconfirmed what we already knew—that China is our number one national security threat. We cannot allow—we cannot allow—China to walk all over us and outpace us militarily. When we project weakness on the world stage, as the Biden administration has done, China and other adversaries will take advantage, and they are.

I am extremely, extremely concerned about the lackluster approach the Biden administration has utilized with our Armed Forces. We are not moving fast enough when it comes to ramping up our military capabilities to meet the threats of today and the future. Heck, we are more concerned about which pronouns we are going to use than we are defending our great Nation.

Currently, we have the smallest and oldest bomber force since post-World War II, and China has surpassed us with the world's largest navy. I hope—I sincerely hope—that especially after the Chinese balloon fiasco that we wake up as Americans, as a nation, to accelerate, where we can, the necessary military assets to deter China.

And now my questions to each of you. I will start with you, Admiral. Do you agree with General Minihan's assessment; will we be at war with China within 2 years?

Admiral HARRIS. No.

Mr. ALFORD. Why not?

Admiral HARRIS. As I have said before, I am less concerned about a date certain than I am of the readiness of the force to respond to any contingency that arises anytime.

So, when I was in uniform, I said that the decade of the 2020s is the decade of danger. General Minihan said 2025. I am not sure what he based that on. However, you know, he is privy to current intelligence that I am not. So, you know, it behooves us to consider that. Admiral Davidson said 2027. And I fall back to the 2020s as the decade of danger.

Mr. ALFORD. Okay. So, 2 years, 4 years, 5 years, 7 years. Are we ready?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, that is the question. I mean, I think we are. I think we can respond today to any threat from today's PLA, the People's Liberation Army. If we don't continue to invest and in-

novate, then, in 5, 6, 7, 8 years—pick a timeframe—we might not be able to compete levelly with the joint force across all domains, and that is the concern.

Mr. ALFORD. Dr. Sisson, what should we do now to effectively deter China from invading Taiwan?

Dr. SISSON. I think the good news is that our strategy of deterrence is in good standing and is working well. I think we should remember that and we should do things to reinforce it. Again, we need to reaffirm for both sides our adherence to the One-China Policy.

We need to coordinate and collaborate with Taiwan on their defense concept and getting them to be as prickly of a porcupine as they can be and ready to be prepared and resilient in the event the worst happens.

And then, internally, here in the United States, I think we need to do some planning, planning, planning. We need to have coordinated across the interagency any number of options that we could use to respond quickly and effectively, if we saw indications and warnings that we were concerned about emanating from the PLA.

Mr. ALFORD. Admiral, back to you. What should we do if China launches another balloon towards U.S. airspace?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, we need to assess it and to see what kind of balloon it is. And if it is a threat, and if we can't mitigate that threat, and it is over the United States, we have to destroy it.

Mr. ALFORD. What are the top three actions the DOD should take now to deter China from building islands in the China Sea?

Admiral HARRIS. It is too late.

Mr. ALFORD. Further islands, more islands? More power there?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, I mean, short of kinetic operations, then we would have to apply soft-power measures, including, potentially, threatening China's economic strength, strengthening them—or challenging them in the financial sectors, and things like that.

But they have already built six or seven major military bases—

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time is expired.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from California, Mr. Panetta, for 5 minutes.

Mr. PANETTA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Sisson.

And you get to choose now whether or not you go by admiral or ambassador, I guess, is that correct? For this session, I am going to call you admiral.

Admiral Harris, good to see you.

Prior to the spy balloon being floated over the United States, I think we could say that we saw a few months of what I would call detente—with the meeting in Bali between Biden and Xi and, yes, a planned Secretary of State visit to China this last weekend.

However, with that clumsy miscalculation by China and spying that we know goes on of the United States, what I think we need to be wary of is, obviously, incidents like this leading to escalation. Now, during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, after it took almost going to the brink of a nuclear war, we had agreements to contain hostility, to de-escalate. However, I am not sure if we have that right now with China.

Are there better ways to communicate? Are there better ways to mitigate these types of risks during such a crisis as we just had? Are there better guardrails that we could put in place to prevent escalation?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So, there are some guardrails, some agreements, mil-to-mil, military-to-military, with the PRC, including something called CUES [Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea], C-U-E-S, which is a navy-to-navy agreement for interactions on the high seas. So, we have some limited agreements like that.

In the case of the EP-3 crash, which we talked about before, you know, those things happen in a flash. So, there is no time for diplomacy during the conduct of the event itself. Then, diplomacy kicks in afterward to try to resolve it and mitigate it.

In the case of the balloon, I mean, we had 7 or 8 days for diplomacy to work, and China could have stepped forward at any time in that and said, "Hey, this is ours. This was a bad move. We won't do it again. Sorry about that. We'll help you bring it down," or something like that. But they did not take advantage of the window, a week window, 8 days, 7 days, to do that. So, that is on them.

And I think that the U.S. Government did reach out to the PRC and gave them ample opportunity, which is why you want to extend this thing out, stretch it out for as long as you can—until it went over water 8 days later, 9 days later, whatever it was, and they shot it down.

Mr. PANETTA. And besides the brief avenues that you mentioned, Dr. Sisson, is there anything else? Any other avenues for this type of communication?

Dr. SISSON. My view is that the U.S. Government should always pursue direct communication at the highest levels of government, especially in conditions like this. The worst-case scenario is where communication happens through military action and not through phone lines, and now, Zoom screens, I guess.

Mr. PANETTA. Okay. Moving on to my next topic, Admiral, you talked about Taiwan being the number one democracy, at least in the Pacific. And as we all know, living in a democracy, elections have consequences. And it seems like the DPP's [Democratic Progressive Party's] extended focus on China sort of failed to connect with the Taiwanese people, as evidenced by the last election. In that KMT [Kuomintang], obviously, which has a warmer relation with China, if it makes gains and actually has significant wins in the 2024 elections, what would be the consequences of our deterrence capabilities in dealing with a KMT majority?

Admiral HARRIS. Yes, so a great question.

I met with the KMT chairman last week in Taipei. I believe that, you know, it was the Cato Institute that called Taiwan the freest nation in East Asia. And I think that a definition of free and democratic is when you have a successful handover of power. And they have had several now since they became independent. They haven't been independent that long.

But I believe that we could work with the KMT. I don't think the KMT is going to roll over on China, just like I don't think the DPP is going to declare independence. They are both viable, strong par-

ties in Taiwan that have the best interests of the Taiwanese at heart, not the PRC.

Mr. PANETTA. Dr. Sisson, 20 seconds.

Dr. SISSON. I agree entirely with the admiral.

Mr. PANETTA. Outstanding.

Thanks to both of you.

I yield back. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr. Mills, for 5 minutes.

Mr. MILLS. Mr. Chairman, thank you so much.

Admiral Harris, Dr. Sisson, thank you.

You know, I hear us still talk a lot about the definitions of warfare, and I think that that is something that needs to be redefined or re-thought about. And I really appreciate Dr. Sisson's stance with regards to strategy, as well as for resilience.

You know, my whole thing is that, while the U.S. may not be at war with China, I would argue that China has long since been at war with the U.S. from an economic, a resource, and a cyber warfare perspective.

I think that we also have to identify the geopolitical alliances that have occurred with regards to Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea. You know, the entire incursion that we have seen in this war in Ukraine has a lot to do with Chairman Xi's One Road, One Belt Initiative; his desire to expand the Eurasian border; take Africa; take Oceania; recreate this maritime Silk Route, while dominating ports and railways, as we have seen with the development in Djibouti.

I think that, ultimately, what we are looking at here is a real need to defend our maritime shipping lines, because their ultimate goal will be to eliminate the U.S. dollar as a global currency, while cutting off the Western Hemisphere supply chain with the Horn of Africa, the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Black Sea. And that is why areas like Moldova, as you mentioned, are certainly key areas. It does not fall under Article 5 with NATO.

I would say, however, that one of my colleagues, Carlos Gimenez, Representative Gimenez, had talked about the importance of energy, and I agree with this. I think that if we wanted to actually go after China, we would have to look at the economic strains that we would put on them by stopping reliance, but also by understanding that the true global currency will be energy.

We are seeing where he is exploiting the strains between ourselves and the KSA [Kingdom of Saudi Arabia] with regards to OPEC [Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries] and trying to eliminate or replace the petrodollar to the petroyuan, petruble, as a way to throw us into hyperinflation.

But we are also watching Russia go ahead and start utilizing the communist agendas and push things like Chavez in Venezuela, looking at Petro in Colombia, but also the mainland Chinese in the Darien Gap, who are actually printing fentanyl.

Now, in knowing this, and knowing that we are being outpaced—we are being outpaced militarily; we are being outpaced economically—I believe that resilience/readiness is really a key here, not pronouns and DEI [diversity, equity, and inclusion], as it is being defined.

I would say, however, Admiral Harris, that one of the things you talked about was this surveillance balloon. And while I agree that it was good to go ahead and to shoot it down, I also view this as a vulnerability assessment by the Chinese in how we will react; where our actual mitigating measures will be; when we will identify, and how; at what altitudes we will identify.

And I think that allowing it to come across the United States was a huge mistake and a failure. If the idea was to shoot it down in a safe area, then we could have done that over the Pacific. And that would have been something where they had already violated our airspace.

I also noted that you said that you did not think they were printing fentanyl with the intent to kill Americans, and I disagree with that strongly. I think that this is a multi-pronged strategic attack that does not involve kinetics. And while we do need to get involved in the kinetic element for readiness, I think that the economic, resource, and cyber warfare has long been launched.

Could you please say once again what your stance is in regards to those two?

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah. So, I disagree with you, Congressman, on both. I do think that shooting it down over the Atlantic was the appropriate response. And I don't think that China is creating fentanyl with the express purpose of killing Americans.

Mr. MILLS. But you don't think that that is one of the things that they take into a factor of that? This is actually a focus now by the Americans. Yes, you have utilized the term we can walk and chew bubble gum, and I do understand that, but I have a hard time of understanding that this is just some type of an economic advantage, as opposed to something which is intentional and killing more Americans than any conflict that we are currently in.

So, with regards to the spy balloon, I will ask once more, you still feel, though, that allowing it to transverse across the entire United States, going across areas that even civilian aircrafts are not allowed to go across, was a correct approach to this incident?

Admiral HARRIS. I do, Congressman, in this instance, because of the danger that shooting it down over the United States could have presented. I mean, it was—

Mr. MILLS. But we could have shot it over the Pacific, is that not correct?

Admiral HARRIS. Only in territorial waters of the United States.

Mr. MILLS. As in when it came across around the Aleutian Chain area or as it—

Admiral HARRIS. Right. If it is in territorial waters, then it is flying over sovereign airspace.

But I don't know if—when we first detected it. I mean, according to General VanHerck, we did not detect, he did not detect, as the NORAD/NORTHCOM commander, at least four previous balloon transits of parts of the United States—Florida, Texas, Guam, and Hawaii.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time is expired.

Mr. MILLS. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Nevada, Mr. Horsford, for 5 minutes.

Mr. HORSFORD. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank you and the ranking member. I am looking forward to working with all of my colleagues, again, during this 118th Congress. And I know that this is a committee that is known for its bipartisan work, and I think that that should be evident in how we address the threats coming from the Chinese Communist Party.

I also want to thank our witnesses for testifying today. Your expertise and insight have been informative, as we consider the threat that the Chinese Communist Party plays in our national security.

I would be remiss not to mention the events that have transpired. Last week, Americans experienced a symbol of the national security challenge we in this committee have been dealing with for years—the Chinese Communist Party’s disregard for the United States sovereignty—when a surveillance balloon flew over the U.S. airspace. President Biden and Secretary Austin took decisive action to protect our national interest, while also assuring that American lives were not disrupted or harmed.

Dr. Sisson, in your September 2022 report on “Managing the Risk of a U.S.-China War,” you explained how, if the United States is to maintain a constructive role in preventing the outbreak of a cross-strait war, it will need to implement a strategy to deter Chinese aggression that is consistent with U.S. interests and capabilities. Can you expand on what that would look like, please?

Dr. SISSON. Certainly. I think we are in good standing with the way our strategy currently does that today. As you know, we have a strategy of dual deterrence across the Taiwan Strait, which makes sure that the PRC doesn’t think that it has a free pass and the Taiwan government doesn’t think that it has a blank check.

And we support that by continuing to provide adequate defense capabilities, in keeping with the Taiwan Relations Act, to the defense forces of Taiwan. We continue to make sure that the United States military is capable, combat-credible, ready, well-equipped, well-positioned to respond in the case of any indications and warnings of a contingency. And we continue to support the Taiwan people in other unofficial ways by reducing pressures on them to be isolated from the international community, and to support the resilience of the Taiwan people.

We need to continue to do all of those things, while we address China as a strategic challenge. And I am confident that we are in a good position to do that. We have an enormous number of national strengths, and we are going to continue to rely on those. We have the asset of allies and partners who are like-minded in countering PRC coercion. And these are all attributes that we should take full advantage of.

Mr. HORSFORD. Thank you.

And just to restate again, what problems do you foresee us needing to solve in order to compete with the Chinese Communist Party militarily?

Dr. SISSON. I don’t think we have problems to solve per se. I think we have areas with opportunities to enhance and to develop and to grow. I think that, as the competition continues to have highly technological elements, when we talk about resilience in terms of cyber defenses, when we talk about artificial intelligence

and its societal implications, those are areas where we are going to need to take a long, hard look at how we develop talent and how we attract talent here domestically.

And I mean that from everything from, you know, early childhood education all the way through to visa programs. And so, there are ways and places in which we can reinforce the way that our system has historically operated to be creative, generative, and highly productive.

Mr. HORSFORD. Thank you.

Before I close, Mr. Chairman, I just want to express that I think it is important for every member of this committee to use responsible language when referring to the People's Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Party. While there are valid reasons to critique the actions of the Chinese Communist Party, it is important that we do not conflate the actions of a political party and the Chinese people.

These anti-China sentiments can lead to an increase in xenophobia and racism towards the broader Asian community, which we saw during then-COVID-19 pandemic, when an increase of 339 percent anti-Asian hate crime was reported last year compared to the year before. So, as we continue our work in this Congress, we, as Members of the House, have a duty to use responsible language while also holding the Chinese Communist Party accountable.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman's time is expired.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Georgia, Mr. McCormick.

Mr. MCCORMICK. Thank you so much for sticking around for me. I really am excited to have you both here.

You mentioned earlier, Dr. Sisson, that the Marine Corps had reorganized, and I think you implied that a lot of that was with the eye towards China and the island area. Understanding the history of the Marine Corps, and being a Marine myself, and being on some MAGTFs [Marine air-ground task forces], my only concern is a lot of times we prepare for the next war, but we don't know what the next war is going to be.

Like the admiral said, we hope we don't go to war with China, and we don't expect to go to war with China. If, strategically, we have a difference between the way we prepare to deploy our weapons systems, whether we be in a proxy war where Taiwan has to defend itself against China, much the way that Ukraine did against Russia, or if we get in direct conflict, which we all agree we don't want to have, and we hope we don't have, my question is, why prepare the Marine Corps for that sort of war, when we know that almost never have we predicted the next war? Why not keep with that same fluid MAGTF model that allows us to fight any clime, any place, like the greatest fighting force that we have always been?

Dr. SISSON. So, I think you are right to note that we often get predictions about war wrong. Full stop. We predict which ones are going to happen incorrectly. We predict how they are going to go incorrectly. We predict their costs and consequences incorrectly. And so, that is all very well-taken.

My interpretation of what the Marine Corps has done in terms of its reorganization and orientation is be directly responsive to the National Defense Strategy. And so, I have a hard time faulting the Marines for that choice, given that that is the direction that they have been given.

I think the points that you make are well-raised at the strategic level, and that is a conversation to be had. But, to the extent that General Berger has been responsive to the NDS [National Defense Strategy], I have to give him high marks.

Mr. McCORMICK. Okay. Well, I will look forward to that conversation.

Admiral, likewise, in the area of our biggest concern with an ally that's—I consider them an ally—of 1.35 billion people, and a large economy, right next to China, which being India, I understand the political sensitivity of doing more tactical engagement with a country like that, but I don't understand why we don't engage more in arms sales and, actually, military exercises, and stronger economic ties with an ally that really sees the world similarly to the way we do.

Admiral HARRIS. Yeah, it is a great question. I addressed it when I was the PACOM commander. I spoke at the first three Raisina Dialogues calling for a resumption of the Quad, and all of those things.

But just because we want to exercise more with India, just because we want to sell them more military hardware, doesn't mean that the Indians want to exercise more with us or buy our military hardware.

The have some foundation—we call them foundation agreements that prohibit them from buying directly from us. And we had to overcome some of those. I didn't state that right. Not that those foundation agreements prevented them from buying from us; the foundation agreements prevented us from selling certain equipment to them; for example, communications gear, because of their rule sets. So, we overcame a lot of those, and now, we are selling a lot more military hardware to India. They have the largest C-17 fleet outside of the United States, for example. And all of that is good.

I think that there is great promise and great potential in working with a country of 1.35 billion, which is now the world's most populous country. So, it is important that we do more with India. It is important that we get an ambassador there, so that a Senate-confirmed ambassador representing the President would be in place. But we haven't had one now for over 2 years.

Mr. McCORMICK. Yes, I couldn't agree with you more. I think that is something we need to focus on.

Likewise, do we have the industrial ability to ramp up to supply, for example, Australia and India, and other allies, with the necessary equipment to fight the next war? Because, right now, I feel like, especially in our shipbuilding capacity, we are severely lacking.

Admiral HARRIS. For sure. For sure we are. Our industrial capacity is far different now than it was even 5 years ago, let alone 20 and 30 years ago. So, that is an industrial base issue that we need to get our arms around.

You know, we haven't built Stinger missiles in this country up until the Ukraine thing for 20 years, that we have built here, except for just hands full that we provided to one of our friends.

Mr. MCCORMICK. In 10 seconds, I just want to congratulate our F-22 pilots for their first kill. Carry on. Let the Marines lead the way, though. God bless. Thanks.

I yield.

The CHAIRMAN. I would tell the witnesses we saved the best for last.

[Laughter.]

My friend from the great State of Alabama, Ms. Sewell, is recognized for 5 minutes.

Ms. SEWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a new member of the House Armed Services Committee, I would like to take a point of personal privilege to say that we in the Alabama delegation are very proud of the chairman, and I look forward to working with him and the Ranking Member Smith on issues of great importance to our military.

I represent, as you know, Mr. Chairman, Alabama's Seventh Congressional District, which is the proud home of Maxwell Air Force Base and the 187th Air National Guard Fighter Wing, as well as the 117th Air National Guard Refueling Wing in Birmingham. Countless men and women in uniform that proudly serve our country are natives of our great State. And I look forward to continuing to work with you in the efforts to protect them and, also, to pursue our military capabilities.

Dr. Sisson, I wanted to ask you, I know that the CCP is trying to expand its reach and influence around the globe. They have established a foothold in Djibouti and they are pursuing transit right agreements in the South Pacific.

What tools do we have in our toolbox to strengthen our alliances around the world and discourage countries from hosting PLA bases? And could pursuing more economic engagement in the Pacific area be helpful? For example, the Biden administration is currently pursuing more engagement via the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework. Your thoughts on this?

Dr. SISSON. Yes, absolutely, I think economic engagement is an important element of the ways that we can engage with nations in the Western Pacific, but, also, as you know, rightly in other parts of the world.

You know, the CCP has taken advantage of what are truly remarkable gains in its internal development to, essentially, sell that model overseas. And they have been able to put together appealing packages, in part, because they keep the cost of their loans low, construction contracts, and so forth.

So, the thing that we can do is to continue to engage with countries around the world; listen very carefully to their interests and needs; present alternatives to the Chinese option. We can also count on those countries seeing what has happened to others who have engaged with the CCP in these ways. These construction projects that are shoddy and don't last very long, and that, ultimately don't serve the needs of the nation, that's a lesson that is not lost on others who are looking to improve their own development. So, we can continue to provide that alternative in terms of

quality and to listen and engage [with] them in areas where the quality of those relationships is really important.

Ms. SEWELL. While this is my first hearing on HASC, I served on the House Select Committee on Intelligence for 8 years prior to this. And I can tell you that cybersecurity and AI were like at the foremost of things that we were discussing, and I know that you are an expert in artificial intelligence, military application of them.

And so, how is the PLA approaching the use and integration of AI into their tactical and strategic planning? And moreover, how can we integrate emerging AI technology into our national security infrastructure, which will also ensure that there are proper checks on this novel technology?

Dr. SISSON. That is among the most important questions today, I think, not just specific to the military domain, but beyond. In the military domain, the PLA has been very focused on using AI-enabled technologies to conduct what it calls systems warfare, which is the idea that information, as it has always been in warfare, is so essential to the ability to use the forces that you have, to force deploy—force employment.

And what we need to do in response to their gains and their concepts in that domain is to create enough resilience and enough defense around our command-and-control networks, so that they can't deploy those AI-enabled tools to effect a blinding strike and, essentially, cut portions of our services off from the information that they need to effect their missions.

Ms. SEWELL. Very good.

Admiral Harris, I only have a minute. But in your testimony, you mentioned the new administrations in Korea and Japan. And my State of Alabama has close ties with both Korea and Japan. And both of our countries have benefitted by our automotive manufacturing presence in Alabama.

How can we encourage the development of deeper defense and economic ties with our allies in the Pacific region?

Admiral HARRIS. Well, one of the best ways of doing that is to encourage countries with companies that are operating in China to offshore those companies to the United States, near-shore them somewhere outside of China.

With regard to our defense relationships, they are very close between us and South Korea and us and Japan.

Ms. SEWELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady's time is expired.

I would like to thank our witnesses for this very informative hearing. You have been very helpful.

And I thank our members for their participation.

And with that, we are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 1:33 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

A P P E N D I X

FEBRUARY 7, 2023

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

FEBRUARY 7, 2023

Adm. Harry Harris, USN (Retired)
24th Commander, U.S. Pacific Command (2105-2018)
23rd U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (2018-2021)
House Armed Services Committee (HASC) Written Statement
Rayburn House Office Building, Washington D.C.

February 7, 2023

As Prepared for Delivery/Distribution

Thank you, Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Smith, and distinguished members. It's an honor for me to appear again before this committee. It's been almost 5 years since I last appeared here, at what I thought then would be my last testimony before you. Today, I'm honored to testify alongside former National Security Advisor Robert O'Brien, a strategic leader who understands well the challenges and threats that confront America in the 21st Century, and Dr. Melanie Sisson, a leading thinker on military applications of emerging technologies.

I want to start by thanking this committee. That your first hearing of the 118th Congress addresses the threat the United States faces from the People's Republic of China, or PRC, sends a powerful signal to the region. I'm also grateful for Congress' bipartisan passing of the FY 2023 National Defense Authorization Act, including the embedded Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act which increases military aid and security cooperation to that embattled island. Finally, the Congress' continued bipartisan actions to strengthen the technological backbone of the United States against the relentless challenge posed by the PRC through passage of the CHIPS and Science Act last year is significant.

I also want to thank the U.S. Naval Institute -- one of America's leading forums for debate on national security and sea power -- for supporting me logistically with this testimony.

In 2018, I underscored the fact that the United States has an enduring national interest in the Indo-Pacific. Today, more than ever, I believe America's security and economic prosperity are inextricably linked to this critical region, which remains at a precarious crossroad where tangible opportunity meets significant challenge. Here we face a security environment more complex and

volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. To go further, I believe, in 2023, we're at an inflection point in history. We're certainly not near anything resembling the end of history. Freedom, justice, and the rules-based system hang in the balance. And the scale won't tip of its own accord simply because of wishful thinking.

President Reagan once said, 'We cannot play innocents abroad in a world that's not innocent.' This statement is as true today as it was in on December 7th...through the Cold War...on 9-11...and on 2-24 when Russia invaded Ukraine. The world remains a dangerous place. The unipolar moment following the Cold War is over.

We find ourselves, again, in peer competition with adversaries who are developing and deploying cutting-edge weaponry and information disorder to undermine democracy and defeat us. North Korea is building and testing nuclear weapons, the PRC seeks regional, even global, domination, Taiwan is under siege, and Ukraine is ablaze. We are in what I call the decisive decade. I'll be a bit more provocative this morning and observe that many seemingly disparate events are converging, with Ukraine as a nexus. In my opinion, destabilization itself has a tipping point. I believe we must do all we can to avoid such a global convergence in 2023.

In 2018 I talked about the challenges facing the United States, including the perception that the U.S. is a declining power facing unrelenting challenges posed by (1) a rogue North Korea; (2) a revisionist PRC; and (3) a revanchist Russia which increasingly conducts operations and engagements throughout the Indo-Pacific, and especially, the High North, to advance its own strategic interests while undermining ours. Over the past 5 years, the situation has worsened in almost every geo-strategic measure. However, in my comments today, in keeping with the intent of this hearing, I'll focus primarily on the PRC.

I want to compliment my successors at Indo-Pacific Command -- Admirals Phil Davidson and Chris Aquilino. They've cleaned up the mess I left them, they've been unstinting in their criticisms of the PRC, and they've improved the readiness of America's Joint Force to respond when called upon.

Last fall, the current Administration finally released its National Security Strategy. Though I would use the term "adversary" rather than "competitor", this strategy recognizes that the PRC is the only competitor with both the intent and, increasingly, the capability to reshape the international order. Let me also mention former Speaker Pelosi's recent visit to Taiwan, all the brouhaha that preceded it, and China's truculent behavior that followed it. To be clear: I supported her visit before she went, and doubly so after China threatened her, Taiwan, and the United States if she went. I look forward to Speaker McCarthy's own promised trip to Taiwan, whenever his schedule permits. As this committee knows far better than me, there are very few bipartisan issues in Washington these days, but our national concern about the PRC is one of them. Michele Flournoy recently said, "There is a strong bipartisan consensus in seeing China as the pacing threat, economically, technologically, diplomatically and militarily."

To be clear, the U.S. has partnered well with China on several important fronts. But Washington and Beijing fundamentally disagree on how to approach the current international order. The PRC doesn't keep its word, from its treaty with the British on Hong Kong, to its human rights abuses against Uyghurs and others, to its attempts at commercial espionage, and its quest to intimidate, isolate, and finally dominate Taiwan.

The PRC's aggression in the South China Sea continues unabated, despite the 2016 Permanent Court of Arbitration's tribunal ruling that invalidated China's ridiculous 9-dash line claim and unprecedented land reclamation. The PRC's actions are coordinated, methodical, and strategic, using its military and economic power to erode the free and open international seas.

The spy balloon drama -- playing out on the eve of the Secretary of State's planned visit to Beijing -- is illustrative of the PRC's bad behavior and disregard for international norms. That Beijing would claim that this incursion over sovereign American airspace was innocuous and unintended beggars the imagination.

China's considerable military buildup could soon challenge the U.S. across almost every domain. While some might say the PRC is already there, I am not one of them. However, the

PRC is making significant advancements in missile systems including hypersonics, 5th generation fighters, a blue-water navy with aircraft carriers, and the next wave of military technologies including artificial intelligence and advanced space and cyber capabilities. Geopolitically, the PRC seeks to supplant the United States as the security partner of choice for countries not only in the Indo-Pacific, but globally. As I testified before the Congress when I was in uniform, I believe Beijing seeks hegemony not only in East Asia, but greater Asia and beyond. The PRC wants to set the rules for the region...indeed the world.

The United States has made it clear that we reject foreign policy based on leverage and dominance. The United States won't weaponize debt. We encourage every country to work in its own interest to protect its own sovereignty. And we must work in our own enlightened self-interest to develop our own reliable sources of critical materials, including rare earths, pharmaceuticals, and chemicals essential for weaponizing, independent of the PRC. Former Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategy Nadia Schadlow wrote last year that the PRC is "the sole source or a primary supplier for a number of critical energetics materials." By "energetics" I'm referring to those materials that are used for explosives and propellants -- from bullets, to artillery, to missiles. I was stunned to learn about our reliance on the PRC for this critical capability.

We find ourselves sailing into rocks and shoals, to use a nautical analogy, and we must invest and innovate to right the errant course we're on. If the United States does not keep pace, the Joint Force will struggle to compete with the People's Liberation Army on future battlefields.

Now, I note that the current Administration's fundamental understanding of the PRC is consistent with its predecessor...as my esteemed colleagues know well.

Consider that the Secretary of State testified that the previous Administration's tougher approach is right...that what's happening in Xinjiang is genocide...and that democracy is being trampled in Hong Kong. The Secretary of Defense testified that he's focused on the threat posed by the PRC and he promised strong support for Taiwan.

Look, Taiwan is democratic, an idea factory, and a global force for good. Just last week the CATO Institute called Taiwan the freest country in East Asia. I've called for ending the almost 44-year U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity in favor of strategic clarity. I also believe we should ink a bilateral Free Trade Agreement with Taiwan as soon as possible. The new Indo-Pacific strategy specifically supports an environment in which Taiwan's future is determined peacefully by its people. My successor at Indo-Pacific Command testified before Congress in 2021 that the PRC could invade Taiwan in 6 years. That's 2027...we ignore Admiral Davidson's warning at our peril. The PRC's intent is crystal clear. I'm reminded of something that Maya Angelou once said: "When someone shows you who they are, believe them the first time." Well, Xi Jinping has shown us his intent regarding Taiwan time and time again, and shame on us if we ignore him. We must not allow the PRC to dictate America's Taiwan policy.

Despite the economic calamity wrought by Beijing's Zero-Covid policy -- an "own goal" if there ever was one -- and the ongoing public health disaster due to Covid resurgence in China -- I'm worried about the trajectory of the PRC's body politic. As former Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd recently wrote, last October's 20th party congress is likely to be, in his words, "an era-defining event...cementing Xi Jinping as China's paramount leader...solidifying the country's turn to the state and away from the market... and officially underscoring the primacy of Marxism-Leninism."

In other words, Deng Xiaoping is dead in more ways than one. If the first era of modern Chinese politics was Mao Tse Tung's, and the second Deng Xiaoping's, the third is unquestionable Xi Jinping's.

Mr. Chairman, since I was the Ambassador to the Republic of Korea, I would be remiss if I didn't spend a few brief moments on South Korea. The new National Security Strategy emphasizes that America's single greatest asymmetric strength is our network of security alliances and partnerships. It calls for modernizing our bilateral defense treaties with Australia, Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, and Thailand while advancing our Major Defense Partnership with India.

In my opinion, the textbook case in point is the U.S.-South Korea Alliance -- which will be 70 years strong this year. Forged during a devastating conflict, it has stood the test of time. It's mind-boggling to consider how much has changed in the world in general, Northeast Asia in particular, and the Korean Peninsula especially, since 1953.

Some changes have been for the better, such as South Korea's miraculous growth into an economic and cultural powerhouse, a vibrant democracy, and a high-tech "innovation nation." Other changes have been for the worse. Why is North Korea, far away in Northeast Asia, a challenge for the entire world? The answer is simple: Kim Jong-Un's missiles point in every direction. Today, North Korea stands out as the only nation this century to test nuclear weapons. It is ruled with an iron fist, by a brutal dictator who values power over the prosperity and welfare of his own people. The North's unrelenting pursuit of nuclear weapons, the means to deliver them, and its unmitigated aggression towards the South and to the United States should concern us all.

Let me emphasize that the United States stands firmly with South Korea and is fully committed to the Alliance. This is important, because North Korea and the PRC will continuously test our resolve to seek ways to weaken our strong ties in order to divide us.

I believe KJU wants 4 things: sanctions relief, keep his nukes, split our Alliance, and dominate the peninsula. The IAEA is concerned about the trajectory of North Korea's nuclear program. The U.S. Intelligence Community assesses that KJU views nuclear weapons as the ultimate deterrent against foreign intervention. KJU declared last year that he'd be willing to employ nukes broadly in wartime.

Last September, he stated unequivocally that he'd never give up his nukes and that North Korea's status as a nuclear weapons state is irreversible. Finally, lest anyone still need convincing, at last month's Central Committee Plenum, KJU declared his intent to "exponentially increase" his country's nuclear arsenal and develop a new ICBM.

This doesn't sound to me like he's going to get rid of them anytime soon. In fact, he's telling us precisely the opposite. While we hope for diplomacy with North Korea to be successful, we

must recognize that hope alone is not a course of action. The quest for dialogue with the North must never be made at the expense of the ability to respond to threats from the North. Last year alone, the North launched almost a hundred missiles of increasing complexity. Just last month, we saw multiple drone incursions across the DMZ. Now, should we be concerned about drones in 2023? Well, when you consider the devastating impact of drone warfare on the battlefield in Ukraine, we have to ask ourselves, are drones over the DMZ simply business as usual or is it the beginnings of high-tech, unmanned, and smart warfare on the Korean Peninsula?

Clearly, this is no path towards peace. Dialogue and military readiness must go hand-in-hand. Idealism must be rooted in realism. We must not relax sanctions or reduce joint military exercises just to get North Korea to come to the negotiating table...this is a fool's errand. Ladies and gentlemen, I believe our heretofore U.S. policy goal of negotiating away North Korea's nuclear program has reached its useful end. We must up our combined game. Deterrence by appeasement is not deterrence at all.

I'm encouraged by the new administrations of President Yoon Suk-yeol in Korea and Prime Minister Fumio Kishida in Japan. Their meeting, albeit short, in New York last September was both welcome and long-overdue. I'm encouraged by President Yoon's intent to make the U.S. - South Korea Alliance the centerpiece of his foreign policy. I'm pleased that he places a primacy on defending South Korea against the threat from the North...which means a return to joint military exercises...and an emphasis on combined readiness.

Mr. Chairman, while U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific are real and enduring, and challenges to our interests equally real and daunting, I believe America's resolve is powerful and durable. I thank you, this committee, and the Congress for your enduring support to the INDOPACOM team and to our armed forces and diplomatic corps. I look forward to your questions.

Admiral Harry Harris, USN (Ret)
24th Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
Former U.S. Ambassador to South Korea

Admiral Harris served as the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea from July 2018 to January 2021.

He served 40 years in the U.S. Navy, retiring on 1 June 2018. He joined the State Department 3 days later. From May 2015 to May 2018, he commanded U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM). He is the first Asian-American to hold 4-star rank in the U.S. Navy and the first to head USINDOPACOM. He is also the first officer from the Navy's Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance community to achieve 4-stars. He previously commanded U.S. Pacific Fleet, U.S. 6th Fleet, Striking and Support Forces NATO, Joint Task Force Guantanamo, Patrol and Reconnaissance Wing 1, and Patrol Squadron 46. He participated in Operations Attain Document (Libya 1986), Desert Shield/Storm, Southern Watch, Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, Willing Spirit (Colombian hostage recovery 2008), and Odyssey Dawn (Libya 2011). A Naval Flight Officer, Harris has flown over 4400 hours, including over 400 combat hours.

From 2011 to 2013, as the Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Harris served as the direct representative of the Chairman to Secretaries of State Hillary Clinton and John Kerry. Traveling to over 80 countries with the Secretary, he participated in most of the Secretary's meetings with foreign leaders. Concurrently designated as the U.S. Roadmap Monitor for the Mid-East Peace Process (Oslo Accords), he travelled monthly to Israel to meet with Israeli and Palestinian Authority leaders to assess conditions.

His personal decorations include the State Department's Distinguished Honor Award, the CIA's Agency Seal Medal, the CIA's Ambassador's Award, and numerous DoD and Navy awards. He was awarded Japan's Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun, First Class. As part of Australia's 2018 Special Honors List, he was awarded the Order of Australia. He received the Republic of Korea's Tong-il Order of National Security Merit in 2014 and the Gwanghwa Order of Diplomatic Service Merit in 2021. He has also been decorated by France, Mongolia, the Philippines, and Singapore. Nationally recognized for his work as a champion of diversity, he was awarded the Dr. Jean Mayer Global Citizenship Award from Tufts University in 2021.

Harris was born in Japan, reared in Tennessee and Florida, and graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1978 where he was a varsity fencer. Awarded master's degrees from Harvard's Kennedy School of Government and Georgetown's School of Foreign Service, he did post-graduate studies at Oxford University and completed the Seminar 21 fellowship at MIT. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Council of American Ambassadors.

Harris' father was a career U.S. Navy veteran of World War II and the Korean War. Harris' mother was Japanese and became an American citizen in 1974. He is married to Ms. Bruni Bradley, herself a career Naval officer.

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Hearing Date: 2/7/23

Hearing Subject:

The Pressing Threat of the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. National Defense

Witness name: Harry Harris

Position/Title: Admiral, USN (Ret.); Ambassador (Ret.)

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

Individual Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the organization or entity represented:

NONE

Federal Contract or Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) or grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, received during the past 36 months and related to the subject matter of the hearing, please provide the following information:

2023

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
NONE			

2022

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
NONE			

2021

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
NONE			

2020

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
NONE			

Foreign Government Contract, Grant, or Payment Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts or grants (including subcontracts or subgrants), or payments originating from a foreign government, received during the past 36 months and related to the subject matter of the hearing, please provide the following information:

2023

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
NONE			

2022

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
NONE			

2021

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
NONE			

2020

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
NONE			

Fiduciary Relationships: If you are a fiduciary of any organization or entity that has an interest in the subject matter of the hearing, please provide the following information:

Organization or entity	Brief description of the fiduciary relationship
L3 Harris	Director, Board of Directors
Booz-Allen-Hamilton	Strategic Advisor (Non-Fiduciary)

Organization or Entity Contract, Grant or Payment Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts or grants (including subcontracts or subgrants) or payments originating from an organization or entity, whether public or private, that has a material interest in the subject matter of the hearing, received during the past 36 months, please provide the following information:

2023

Contract/grant/ payment	Entity	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
Payment	U.S. Naval Institute	1,300	Air & ground transport/hotel
2022 CONTINUED			
Payment	Univ of Denver	4,000	Speech:Indo-Pacific Threats

2022

Contract/grant/ payment	Entity	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
Payment	Jatl Bur Asian Research	500	Pres Circle; Indo-Pacific
Payment	Energetics Tech Ctr	19,550	Speech:Indo-Pacific Threats
Payment	Univ of Tennessee	4,000	Speech:Indo-Pacific Threats
Payment	Authors Guild	1500	Panel: USA v. China
Payment	RAND Corp	1000	Speech:Indo-Pacific Threats

2021

Contract/grant/ payment	Entity	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
Payment	CACI	5,000	Briefs:Indo-Pac opportunity
Payment	Asia Group	1,000	Podcast: Indo-Pac Threats
Payment	Leading Authorities Inc	25,000	Speech:Indo-Pacific Threats

2020

Contract/grant/ payment	Entity	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
N/A			

Testimony of Dr. Melanie W. Sisson before the House Armed Services Committee at the hearing titled: “The Pressing Threat of the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. National Defense”

07 February 2023

Under the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is seeking to expand its influence culturally, economically, politically, and militarily. It has used illicit and illegal means to advantage its economy, it has been obstructionist in multilateral organizations and on critical transnational issues such as climate and health, and it has not only improved the capabilities of its armed forces, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), but also has used those forces to advance discredited territorial and resource claims and to threaten and intimidate its neighbors.

Advances in the capabilities of the PLA, together with the CCP’s longstanding interest in unification with the democratically self-governing island of Taiwan, has energized concern about China’s near-term intentions toward the island and about the role of the United States in cross-Strait relations. Since 1979 the United States has adopted a constellation of official positions, together known as the “One-China Policy”, that allow us to acknowledge but not to accept China’s perspective that there is one China, and that Taiwan is part of China. Under the One-China policy the United States has developed robust unofficial relations with the government and people of Taiwan, consistent with our interest in preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait.¹

U.S. policy is guided by an interest in ensuring cross-Strait disputes are resolved peacefully and in a manner that reflects the will of Taiwan’s people. This has required the United States to deter Taiwan from declaring independence, and also to deter the CCP from attempting unification by force. The 40-year success of this strategy of dual deterrence rests upon the unwillingness of the United States to provide either an unconditional commitment to Taipei that it will come to its defense militarily, or an unconditional commitment to Beijing that it will not.²

The U.S. national security interest in the status of Taiwan today remains that the CCP and the people of Taiwan resolve the island’s political status peacefully.³ Dual deterrence therefore remains the U.S. strategy, reinforced by U.S. declaratory policy, which is to “oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by either side”.⁴

¹ Lawrence, Susan V., and Caitlin Campbell, “Taiwan: Political and Security Issues”, Congressional Research Service, January 10, 2023: <https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF10275/64>

² Bush, Richard, “A One-China policy primer”, Brookings, March 2017: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/a-one-china-policy-primer/>

³ Blanchette, Jude and Ryan Hass, “The Taiwan Long Game: Why the Best Solution Is No Solution”, *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2023: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/china/taiwan-long-game-best-solution-jude-blanchette-ryan-hass>

⁴ Gangitano, Alex, “Biden tells Xi ‘One China’ policy toward Taiwan has not changed”, *The Hill*, 11/14/2022: <https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/3734233-biden-tells-xi-one-china-policy-toward-taiwan-has-not-changed/>

The modernization of the PLA has changed the regional military balance significantly enough that the United States no longer can be confident that it would decisively defeat every type of PLA use of force in the Taiwan Strait.⁵ This fact, however, does not necessitate that the U.S. abandon its strategy of dual deterrence, and it does not mean that the United States should seek to reconstitute its prior degree of dominance.

Posturing the U.S. military to convince the CCP that the PLA could not succeed in any and every contingency over Taiwan is infeasible in the near term, and likely beyond. The PLA's advances are considerable and ongoing, geography works in its favor, and history demonstrates that it is far easier to arrive at an overconfident assessment of relative capability than it is to arrive at an accurate one. Attempting to demonstrate superiority for all contingencies would require a commitment of forces that would inhibit the United States from behaving like the global power that it is, with global interests to which its military must also attend. This posture, moreover, is not necessary for dual deterrence to extend its 40-year record of success.⁶

We can instead encourage the government of Taiwan to adopt a defense concept that forces the PLA into suboptimal strategies and increases the battle damage Beijing would have to anticipate and accept. The CCP should also be reminded that in addition to retaining the option of direct U.S. military engagement, U.S. military superiority in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean allows us to threaten the maritime shipping upon which China depends for access to energy, global markets, and supply chains. The inevitable damage a use of force would cause to the global economy, and the imposition of sanctions and restricted access to critical inputs needed to sustain China's economic development and the quality of life of its people, moreover, would certainly compound China's losses.

The CCP should have no illusion, however, that it can inflict a first strike on the United States that prevents us from joining in the defense of Taiwan. Militarily, this will require the Armed Services to develop concepts of operation that maximize the effects of dispersal, mobility, and localized decisionmaking and to make investments in the portable and expendable assets that those concepts require - uncrewed systems that launch sensors and anti-ship missiles without the need for runways that are difficult to defend, for example. DoD must also prioritize improving the resilience of its command, control, and communication systems against disabling electronic and cyber attacks.

These and related measures will position the United States not only to implement its strategy of dual deterrence in the Taiwan Strait, but also will prepare it to detect and respond to Chinese incrementalism throughout the Western Pacific and beyond. Plentiful surveillance, resilient command and control, and small, situationally aware, mobile deployments are necessary for the armed forces to minimize opportunities for the PLA to engage in unlawful and coercive actions, and to deny it gains when it does.

⁵ "Military and Security Developments Involving the People's Republic of China", U.S. Department of Defense, 2022: <https://media.defense.gov/2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELOPMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF>; O'Hanlon, Michael, "Can China take Taiwan? Why no one really knows", Brookings, August 2022: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/can-china-take-taiwan-why-no-one-really-knows/>

⁶ Sisson, Melanie W., "Taiwan and the dangerous illogic of deterrence by denial", Brookings, May 2022: <https://www.brookings.edu/research/taiwan-and-the-dangerous-illogic-of-deterrence-by-denial/>

The U.S.-China contest is definitionally strategic: its outcome will be determined by the respective abilities of the CCP and the government of the United States to marshal all instruments of national power and to deploy them in a comprehensive, well-executed grand strategy. It is therefore essential that Congress ensures DoD is equipped in concept and in capability to deter PLA aggression regionally, and to shape and constrain the geopolitical conditions within which the CCP pursues its objectives globally.

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	Senior Fellow and Director, Stimson Center Defense Strategy and Planning Program	2018-2020
	Manager of Information Strategy, Mental Health Center of Denver	2015-2018
	Senior National Security Project Associate, RAND Corporation	2005-2014
	Presidential Management Fellow, Federal Bureau of Investigation	2003-2005
EDUCATION	PhD, Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder (International Relations, Political Theory)	2013
	MA, Political Science, University of Colorado at Boulder	2009
	MIA, Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs (Security Studies)	2003
	BA, Tufts University (International Relations)	1999
SELECT PUBLICATIONS	<p>“Artificial Intelligence, Geopolitics, and the US-China Relationship”, in <i>Bundeswehr of the Future</i>, Konrad-Adenauer Foundation, Forthcoming</p> <p>There is a lot to like in the 2022 National Defense Strategy, Brookings, <i>Order from Chaos</i>, November 18, 2022</p> <p>Managing the risks of U.S.-China war: Implementing a strategy of integrated deterrence, with Michael E. O’Hanlon and Caitlin Talmadge, Brookings Global China, September 23, 2022</p> <p>Succeeding in the AI competition with China: A Strategy for Action, with colleagues, Brookings Global China, September 30, 2022</p> <p>Taiwan and the dangerous illogic of deterrence by denial, Brookings, May 5, 2022.</p>	

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Why can't the Pentagon buy the cutting-edge technology it needs?

Brookings, *TechStream*, February 23, 2022

Anticipating the Effects of Emerging Technologies on Nuclear Deterrence,

Invited Perspective, Strategic Multilayer Assessment, NSI, November, 2021

"War is Interested in You: Balancing the Promise and Peril of High-Tech Deterrence", Brookings, *Order from Chaos*, September 10, 2021

"A Strategy for Competition", The Next Defense Strategy Series, Center for a New American Security, 2020

"The Militarization of Artificial Intelligence", with Jennifer Spindle, Paul Scharre, and Vadim Kozyulin, The Stanley Center for Peace and Security, 2020

Military Coercion and US Foreign Policy: Using the Armed Forces Short of War, with James A. Siebens and Barry M. Blechman, Eds., (Routledge), 2020

"It's Time to Rethink NATO's Deterrent Strategy", War on the Rocks, 2019

"Amazon in Crystal City: Threat and Opportunity for the Defense Department", War on the Rocks, 2018

" Mattis is Poisoning the Well on Women in Combat", The Hill, 2018

"NATO Isn't Cheap – and It's Still Worth the Price", The National Interest, 2018

"Review: 'A Recent History of al-Qa'ida'", H-Diplo, ISSF Article Review 35, 2015

"U.S. Overseas Military Presence: What are the Strategic Choices?", with Lynn E. Davis, Stacie L. Pettyjohn, Stephen M. Worman, and Michael J. McNerney, MG-1211-AF, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), 2012

"A Strategic Planning Approach: Defining Alternative Counterterrorism Strategies as an Illustration", with Lynn E. Davis, Occasional Paper 242, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), 2009

Exploring Terrorist Targeting Preferences, with Martin C. Libicki and Peter Chalk, MG-483, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), 2007

Breaching the Fortress Wall: Understanding Terrorist Efforts to Overcome Defensive Technologies, with Jackson, Brian A., et al, MG-481, (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), 2007

"The FBI's Second-Class Citizens," Op-ed contributor, Washington Post, Saturday December 31, 2005, p. A19, 2005

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U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES**

INSTRUCTION TO WITNESSES: Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5), of the Rules of the House of Representatives for the 118th Congress requires nongovernmental witnesses appearing before House committees to include in their written statements a curriculum vitae and a disclosure of the amount and source of any federal contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants), and contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants), or payments originating with a foreign government, received during the past 36 months either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness and related to the subject matter of the hearing. Rule 11, clause 2(g)(5) also requires nongovernmental witnesses to disclose whether they are a fiduciary (including, but not limited to, a director, officer, advisor, or resident agent) of any organization or entity that has an interest in the subject matter of the hearing. As a matter of committee policy, the House Committee on Armed Services further requires nongovernmental witnesses to disclose the amount and source of any contracts or grants (including subcontracts and subgrants), or payments originating with any organization or entity, whether public or private, that has a material interest in the subject matter of the hearing, received during the past 36 months either by the witness or by an entity represented by the witness. Please note that a copy of these statements, with appropriate redactions to protect the witness’s personal privacy (including home address and phone number), will be made publicly available in electronic form 24 hours before the witness appears to the extent practicable, but not later than one day after the witness’s appearance before the committee. Witnesses may list additional grants, contracts, or payments on additional sheets, if necessary. Please complete this form electronically.

February 7, 2023

Hearing Date: _____

Hearing Subject:

The Pressing Threat of the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. National Defense

Witness name: Melanie W. Sisson

Position/Title: Fellow, Brookings Institution

Capacity in which appearing: (check one)

- Individual Representative

If appearing in a representative capacity, name of the organization or entity represented:

Federal Contract or Grant Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts (including subcontracts) or grants (including subgrants) with the federal government, received during the past 36 months and related to the subject matter of the hearing, please provide the following information:

2023

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
None			

2022

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
None			

2021

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
None			

2020

Federal grant/ contract	Federal agency	Dollar value	Subject of contract or grant
None			

Foreign Government Contract, Grant, or Payment Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts or grants (including subcontracts or subgrants), or payments originating from a foreign government, received during the past 36 months and related to the subject matter of the hearing, please provide the following information:

2023

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
None			

2022

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
None			

2021

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
None			

2020

Foreign contract/ payment	Foreign government	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
None			

Fiduciary Relationships: If you are a fiduciary of any organization or entity that has an interest in the subject matter of the hearing, please provide the following information:

Organization or entity	Brief description of the fiduciary relationship
None	

Organization or Entity Contract, Grant or Payment Information: If you or the entity you represent before the Committee on Armed Services has contracts or grants (including subcontracts or subgrants) or payments originating from an organization or entity, whether public or private, that has a material interest in the subject matter of the hearing, received during the past 36 months, please provide the following information:

2023

Contract/grant/ payment	Entity	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
None			

2022

Contract/grant/ payment	Entity	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
None			

2021


Contract/grant/ payment	Entity	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
None			

2020

Contract/grant/ payment	Entity	Dollar value	Subject of contract, grant, or payment
None			

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

FEBRUARY 7, 2023



February 7, 2023

The Honorable Mike Rogers
Chair
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
2216 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

The Honorable Adam Smith
Ranking Member
Committee on Armed Services
U.S. House of Representatives
2216 Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, DC 20515

Dear Chairman Rogers and Ranking Member Smith:

On behalf of the undersigned organizations representing the United States’ information and communications industry, we respectfully submit this Letter for the Record for today’s House Armed Services Committee’s hearing “The Pressing Threat of the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. National Defense.” The events of the past week demonstrate that this hearing is timely and critical. Americans are rightly concerned about their safety and security from any entity deemed a threat to our national security. Yet throughout the U.S., untrusted Chinese equipment remains imbedded in our nation’s communications networks. A key element in securing America’s leadership and independence from influence or interference from the Chinese Communist Party is a fully funded Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Reimbursement Program (Program) at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC).

In 2020, Congress created the Program to fund the removal of Chinese equipment and services deemed to pose a national security risk from U.S. telecommunications networks and the replacement of that equipment with equipment and services from trusted vendors. At the direction and advice of Congress and the FCC, carriers began the “rip and replace” process of removing such equipment before the Program was underway, with the understanding that they would be fully reimbursed. However, many are now stranded mid-effort.

The Program is significantly underfunded. Congress provided approximately \$1.9 billion to fund the program in late 2020, but there is an approximately \$3.08 billion shortfall based on approved applications from the FCC. The FCC allocated funding proportionately, providing approximately 40% of needed funds to each applicant. Recent bipartisan Congressional efforts to fully fund the Program have not yet succeeded. This Congressionally-mandated national security imperative depends on fully and immediately funding the Program. Carriers cannot complete the job without full funding. They have

been largely prohibited from servicing or upgrading their networks for years, increasing chances for network degradation or even failure, and leaving their communities behind as technology evolves to 5G and beyond. Failure to fully fund the Program means that untrusted equipment is still in service today, including some near military bases, airports, and other areas of strategic importance. Furthermore, because the FCC's timeline to complete this work began in July 2022, the window is closing on this high-priority and accelerated Program.

Failure to fully and immediately fund the Program will mean that carriers cannot entirely remove and replace untrusted equipment. In addition to unmitigated security threats, another consequence could be carriers completely shuttering their networks due to the inability to fund their projects. This would threaten the availability of advanced communications across the country, *particularly in rural America and military facilities*, where ubiquitous connectivity challenges already abound.

All carriers participating in the Program urgently want to complete the transition to secure and trusted networks. They take national security very seriously and are working to rapidly and completely remove equipment determined to pose a security threat from American networks. While the United States has taken a leadership position internationally about the risks of untrusted communications networks equipment and services from companies connected to the Chinese government, work remains to eliminate that risk in our own heartland.

The FCC cannot provide additional resources for this Program – only Congress can provide funding to resolve the shortfall. Every day that passes without addressing this national security threat is another day that American networks remain at risk. Congress must immediately prioritize this national security emergency and fully fund the Program.

Sincerely,

Competitive Carriers Association
Information Technology Industry Council (ITI)
NATE: The Communications Infrastructure Contractors Association
NTCA – The Rural Broadband Association
Rural Wireless Association
Telecommunications Industry Association
USTelecom – The Broadband Association
Wireless Infrastructure Association
WTA — Advocates for Rural Broadband

cc:

The Honorable Cathy McMorris Rodgers, Chair, House Committee on Energy & Commerce
The Honorable Frank Pallone, Jr., Ranking Member, House Committee on Energy & Commerce

**WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING**

FEBRUARY 7, 2023

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TOKUDA

Admiral HARRIS. As I said in my testimony in response to this question before time expired, we must not allow the PRC to dictate our policy regarding Taiwan, or any other country for that matter. Diplomacy and diplomats matter . . . but diplomacy must be backed by military power when dealing with naked aggression by countries like the PRC and Russia. The U.S. can, indeed, walk and chew gum at the same time. We deter the PRC and support Taiwan by (1) ensuring we have the military strength to defeat the PRC if it comes to war; (2) helping Taiwan to the full extent of the law—the Taiwan Relations Act—with arms sales, bilateral all-domain exercises, and support in the international arena; (3) enacting as quickly as possible a bilateral free trade agreement with Taipei; and (4) adopting a policy of strategic clarity by rejecting our current 4-decades long policy of strategic ambiguity when it comes to the question of whether we'd defend Taiwan militarily if the PRC attacked Taiwan in order to forcibly compel reunification with the mainland. We should be clear to the PRC of our intent so they understand the cost of war against the U.S.; we should be clear to Taiwan so that the Taiwanese can make a truly informed decisions about their future; and we should be clear to the American people. In 2023, ambiguity serves none of these constituencies. [See page 54.]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING

FEBRUARY 7, 2023

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GALLAGHER

Mr. GALLAGHER. In recent weeks, we've heard encouraging reports from Japan and the Philippines about their receptivity to hosting new U.S. bases, particularly in the Ryukyus and Luzon. With both the Army and Marine Corps developing new CONOPS like MDTFs and MLRs that utilize ground-launched fires, just how important to deterrence is it to take advantage of these new opportunities and incorporate additional forces forward in the First Island Chain before the shooting starts?

Admiral HARRIS. This is extremely important for 3 reasons:

1. Strategically, Tokyo's and Manila's receptivity to hosting new U.S. footprints in their countries highlights their commitment to their alliances with the U.S. This is especially important for the Philippines due to the fraught relationship between the U.S. and the Duterte administration, despite our treaty alliance with Manila.

2. Strategically, their receptivity to hosting new U.S. footprints in their countries underscores the concern they have with increasing Chinese aggression in the region, especially in view of their own territorial issues with the PRC. Xi Jinping's ongoing outreach to Vladimir Putin is a slap in the face to the International Criminal Court's warrant for the arrest of Putin on war crimes charges, and underscores what a poor international partner the PRC is.

3. Tactically, building additional facilities in the Philippines and Japan increases the staging points and resulting threat vectors and dilemmas that the PRC will have to deal with if we go to blows with Beijing.

Mr. GALLAGHER. As a combatant commander, how important was Red Hill to your ability to keep your forces fueled and operating, particularly in a protracted conflict?

In your judgement, do how can we replace its fuel storage capacity and what would be the impact if we can't do so quickly?

As an operational commander, would you see a benefit to defueling Red Hill but keeping it "in stasis" where if need be, in the event of a conflict, it could be utilized to resupply the fleet?

Admiral HARRIS. As COMUSPACOM and, before that, COMPACFLT, Red Hill was critical to my operational flexibility since there was no alternative at the time. I do believe, however, that there could have been (and are) acceptable operational alternatives if the Navy was (and is) willing to resource them. While I'm not happy that leaks/spills caused DOD and the Navy to make the decision to close Red Hill and move to other solutions, I am glad that the decision was made to close Red Hill and move to other solutions. To the question of "how", while I believe there are acceptable commercial solutions in the near term, including mobile solutions, to add to extant facilities, I defer to DLA expertise on this. Operationally, putting all our eggs in one basket makes far less sense today than it did 80 years ago, in 1940, when construction of Red Hill first began, especially given precision and deeply penetrating 21st Century weapons. For the longer term, the U.S. must look to staging forward, hardened, and defended logistics sites along the Second Island Chain. This will require a whole-of-government effort, to include negotiating basing rights, building the facilities, acquiring the manpower to operate the facilities, building the infrastructure to defend the facilities, and addressing the environmental issues. After all, at the end of the day, we don't want to simply replicate a "Red Hill Forward" with all the problems we had with "Red Hill 1.0". Regarding keeping Red Hill "in stasis", while it would give the INDOPACOM and PACFLT commanders options, the issue remains that if Red Hill is defueled today, and then refueled again at some point in the future, we will have to deal with the leak issues all over again, and maybe much worse. I'm certainly not a civil or structural engineer, but I believe there might be an issue of "internal collapse" or weakening of the tanks' walls if there is no fuel or other liquid to exert outward pressure on the walls to keep them intact over a long period of "in stasis". This will have to be studied, of course, if we're going to consider this course of action. But, again, I defer to experts on this issue.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BERGMAN

Mr. BERGMAN. The PRC has a significant influence operation currently in place within U.S. think tanks, academic institutions, and other prominent policy institutions that favorably shape and achieve the PRC's goals. Agreements made by Brookings with foreign governments put the think tank's independent research in serious question. For example, the memorandum of understanding with Qatar that the Brookings Doha Center would "engage with regular consultation" and provide an "agenda for programs that will be developed by the Center" indicate the level of influence and control foreign entities have over institutions such as Brookings. Did Brookings Institution have a similar agreement for the John L. Thornton China Center with the Chinese government, the CCP, or any affiliated entity? How do we ensure Think Tanks such as Brookings maintain independent research in the future when such memorandum of understandings with Qatar jeopardize the public's perception of so-called independent research?

Dr. SISSON. As indicated in my disclosure form, while I am a Fellow at the Brookings Institution, I provided testimony before the Committee representing my individual views based on my own scholarship and do not speak on behalf of the Institution. In an effort to be responsive to your question, Brookings leadership has provided the following information:

Brookings personnel have long been subject to research independence and integrity policies, which contain requirements for research independence, nonpartisanship, and avoidance of plagiarism, research misconduct, and conflicts of interest. These policies serve to protect the integrity and objectivity of Brookings's scholarship and operations. Brookings's policies also require vetting and disclosure of funding relationships. For decades, the institution has voluntarily published a list of donors and other financial information in its annual report. Annual reports dating back to 2004 can be found on Brookings's website: <https://www.brookings.edu/about-us/annual-report/>.

The John L. Thornton China Center is part of Brookings's Foreign Policy research program, and its activities are governed by the policies described above. The Center does not have, and to the best of our knowledge has never had, any funding agreements with the Chinese Government, the CCP, or entities that are known by Brookings to be controlled by or otherwise acting on behalf of the Chinese government or the CCP. Nor to the best of our knowledge has Brookings ever had any agreement which gives the Chinese government, the CCP or any related entities influence or control over Brookings research.

Mr. BERGMAN. Are you aware that the Brookings Institution has accepted millions from Chinese sources, including from the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), a Hong Kong-based nonprofit. According to Foreign Policy Magazine, "CUSEF is a registered foreign agent bankrolled by a high-ranking Chinese government official with close ties to a sprawling Chinese Communist Party." Did Brookings disclose its funding from CUSEF and other entities tied to the Chinese government in its policy papers and op-eds, as well as during its briefings on Capitol Hill and with the Administration?

Dr. SISSON. As indicated in my disclosure form, while I am a Fellow at the Brookings Institution, I provided testimony before the Committee representing my individual views based on my own scholarship and do not speak on behalf of the Institution. In an effort to be responsive to your question, Brookings leadership has provided the following information:

For decades, the institution has voluntarily published information about its finances and a list of donors in its annual report. With respect to the China-United States Exchange Foundation (CUSEF), Brookings received a total of \$612,000 in support from CUSEF between 2008 and 2016. Brookings has not received funding from CUSEF since April 2016. Brookings voluntarily disclosed CUSEF's financial support in its annual report in every year it received CUSEF support as well as in publications directly supported by CUSEF funding.