[Senate Hearing 117-1005]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-1005
THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL ANTHONY J.
COTTON, USAF FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE
GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER
OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 15, 2022
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-634 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
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JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
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� Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
� John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
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C O N T E N T S
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september 15, 2022
Page
The Nomination of General Anthony J. Cotton, USAF for 1
Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander of
United States Strategic Command.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 3
Witness Statements
Cotton, General Anthony J., USAF, for Reappointment to the Grade 3
of General and to be Commander of United States Strategic
Command.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 29
Questions for the Record....................................... 49
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 55
Biographical Sketch............................................ 56
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 58
Signature Page................................................. 61
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL ANTHONY J. COTTON, USAF FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER OF UNITED STATES STRATEGIC
COMMAND
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THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 15, 2022
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:00 a.m., in
room G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters,
Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
Sullivan, Scott, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
consider the nomination of General Anthony Cotton to be the
next Commander of U.S. Strategic Command. General Cotton, thank
you for your decades of service and willingness to serve in
this important position.
I would like to welcome your wife, Marsha, who is with us
today. Welcome, Marsha. I would also like to acknowledge your
son, Russell, and daughter, Brianna, who I am sure are proudly
watching. We are grateful for their continued support of your
service. U.S. Strategic Command, or STRATCOM, is the principal
command for ensuring our Nation's nuclear deterrent is
effective, safe, and reliable.
Today, our nuclear deterrent consists of a triad of
ballistic missile submarines, heavy bombers, and land based
intercontinental missiles. This triad is the bedrock not only
of our national defense, but also the security of our allies
and partners who depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Integral to the triad as a highly secure and multilayered
nuclear command, control, and communications, or NC3 system,
which connects the President to the nuclear forces.
Successfully maintaining this nuclear deterrent is a mission
fundamental to our long term strategic competition with China
and Russia.
This mission has made especially clear throughout Russia's
assault on Ukraine. Russia has conducted out-of- cycle nuclear
exercises, issued inflammatory statements about tactical
nuclear strikes in Ukraine, and continues to threaten nuclear
power plants in the region. Vladimir Putin's behavior has been
reckless to a dangerous degree. China has also made significant
changes to its nuclear approach.
Not constrained by the New Start treaty, Beijing has built
hundreds of new ballistic missiles and intends to have a
stockpile of more than 1,000 warheads by the early 2030. In the
past two years, we have also seen China develop missile fields
in hardened silos throughout the country.
This development, along with China's development of air
delivered weapons and ballistic missile submarines in the South
China Sea, fundamentally changes the nature of Beijing's
nuclear doctrine. We need to seriously consider that we are
entering a new trilateral nuclear competition era.
The Cold War was essentially a bilateral rivalry between
the United States and the Soviet Union, and deterrence theory
and communication methods were developed based on two
competitors. Those rules now must change with the ascendancy of
China and its growing nuclear arsenal.
General Cotton, I would like to know how you would address
this new deterrence dynamic involving not one, but two near-
peer competitors. If confirmed, you will be responsible for not
only the health of our triad and the NC3 system, but the
150,000 military personnel who operate them.
STRATCOM's uniformed and civilian workforce is known to
have the highest levels of personal reliability and
professionalism. It will be your responsibility to support them
and their families and ensure our nuclear deterrent can operate
effectively around the clock. Supporting your command is the
National Nuclear Security Administration, or NNSA, which
maintains and develops our nuclear warheads.
The organization has over 40,000 technicians, engineers,
and scientists working at three design laboratories, one test
site, and four production plants. NNSA will need your support
as it experiences its highest workload since the 1980s in
managing five major warhead programs while rebuilding nuclear
infrastructure.
Finally, the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review has validated the
importance of modernizing the triad, the NC3 system, and the
supporting infrastructure at NNSA. This is the third historic
cycle of modernization since the 1960s. You will be responsible
for ensuring the United States can deliver the capabilities
needed to effectively deter our adversaries through 2070.
General, you will be undertaking enormous responsibilities, if
confirmed.
As I said earlier, the United States nuclear deterrent is
the bedrock of our national defense. Some have said that this
deterrent is never used, but that is a misconception. It is
used 365 days a year, 24 hours a day.
You will responsible for continuing to ensure that the
United States and its allies can deter not one but two near-
peer nuclear adversaries, something your predecessors did not
face. I look forward to hearing how you would prioritize and
meet each of these critical responsibilities.
Thank you again for your willingness to serve our Nation,
and I look forward to your testimony. Now let me recognize
Ranking Member Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also want to
welcome General Cotton. Thank him for his long service. General
Cotton, your predecessor appeared before this Committee several
times over the past few years warning of the growing strategic
threats that we face as a Nation.
I think we all understand that China's massive military
investments are shifting from the balance of power in the
Pacific, even as it builds the capacity to extend its reach
across the globe. Putin's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine and
his reckless threats of nuclear escalation remind us of some of
the worst days of the Cold War.
We are--effectively resisting China's and Russia's
aggression requires that we remain resolute and deal with the
world as it is, not as we would prefer it to be, which is
sometimes a mistake. I was pleased that the Administration's
Nuclear Posture Review declined the first many policy options
that would have severely damaged our Nation's deterrence.
However, the Administration's decision to discard planned
enhancements to our forces, even as China and Russia grow their
arsenals, was disappointing to say the least. Your predecessor,
along with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and other senior
officers, voiced their objection to these decisions.
On a bipartisan basis, we have taken steps to reverse those
voting choices. Moving forward, we need to accelerate the work
and the right size of our forces to meet the strategic
deterrence requirements of the coming decades.
I trust you will be an advocate for such efforts as the
next STRAT Commander. Look forward to your testimony. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. General Cotton,
you are recognized for your opening statement.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL ANTHONY J. COTTON, USAF, FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER OF UNITED STATES
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Cotton. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member
Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Committee. It is truly
an honor to appear before you today as a nominee to be the next
Commander of U.S. Strategic Command.
I am very grateful to the President, Secretary of Defense,
and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their trust
and confidence in me for this nomination. I would like to
recognize the current Commander of U.S. Strategic Command,
Admiral Charles Richard, and his wife, Lisa, for their 40 years
of selfless service to this great Nation.
Joining me today is my wife, Marsha. She has been my best
friend and biggest champion for over 33 years. A former
collegiate athlete and schoolteacher, Marsha has been a
remarkable advocate for the men and women and their families.
She is an incredible source of strength and inspiration for me
and my family.
Not with us today, but always in our hearts is our son
Russell, an intel analyst, and our daughter, Brianna, a recent
University of Michigan law school graduate. I am so proud of my
children for the path that they have taken to serve our Nation
in their own unique ways.
There are two people who are no longer with us but whose
absence I feel more strongly on days like today. That is my
mother, Amy, and my father, James. My father joined the Army
Air Corps in 1942 and fought in the Pacific theater before the
establishment of the United States Air Force, and served in
both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, prior to retiring as the
United States Air Force Chief Master Sergeant in 1974.
My mother, all five feet, two inches of her was fierce,
full of compassion, and kept her boys, the chief and I, in
line. My parents are the foundation of who I am, and I know
they are looking down upon Team Cotton with great pride.
Last, I want to thank the men and women of Air Force Global
Strike Command and U.S. Strategic Command for their continued
professionalism and dedication. Their dedication to this
mission is essential in a world where we now face two near-peer
competitors.
We must deter the pacing challenge of China and address the
acute threats presented by Russia. It is both our conventional
and nuclear capabilities, along with a crucial support from our
allies and partners, that underpins our strategic deterrence.
Our Nation's nuclear forces continue to be safe, secure,
reliable, and effective. As we bring the B-21 Raider, the
Columbia-class Ballistic Missile Submarine, Sentinel
Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Weapon System, and Long
Range Standoff Weapon online, we will continue to ensure the
credibility of deterrence for decades to come.
Underpinning all of this is our nuclear command, control,
and communication systems known as NC3. While the current
system is secure and resilient, modernization and sustainment
of this capability is just as important as the weapons system
platforms themselves. If confirmed, I will use my authorities
to ensure that NC3 systems continue to outpace the threat. We
will always build in margin. We will always have hedge.
The mission of U.S. Strategic Command is to deter
adversaries and employ force to guarantee the security of our
Nation and our allies. If confirmed, I will work with relevant
agencies across the U.S. Government and within DOD [Department
of Defense], collaborate closely with civilian leaders, and
directly with my fellow combatant commanders as we monitor the
global threats and execute operations in accordance with the
National Defense Strategy.
I commit to commanding a resilient Joint Force capable of
conducting multi-domain operations focused on deterring
aggression, and if necessary, defending this Nation. I look
forward to working with Congress and the Members of this
Committee to address the strategic challenges of this great
Nation.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members
of this Committee, it is an honor to sit before you today, and
I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. I have a
series of questions that are standard for nominees. You may
respond appropriately. Have you adhered to applicable laws and
regulations governing conflicts of interest?
General Cotton. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or take any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Cotton. No.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the Executive Branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
Committee when requested?
General Cotton. Chairman, I do.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
Committee, to give your personal views, even if your views
differ from the Administration?
General Cotton. Chairman, I do.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this Committee, it subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress, and to consult with the requester
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
General Cotton. I do.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
General Cotton. I will.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
General Cotton. I will.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefing?
General Cotton. They will be.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, General. General, the 2018
Nuclear Posture Review recommended a supplemental nuclear
system to the triad, a submarine launched cruise missile, or
SLCM, and the 2022 NPR did not pursue it. What are your views
on the sub--nuclear submarine launched missile?
General Cotton. Chairman, thank you for the question. If
confirmed, my job is to be able to present the decision maker,
the President of the United States, with a wide variety of
options to be able to meet challenges that we have seen to be
warranted due to a requirement. In this case, I would want to
be able to present the maximum amount--the maximum capabilities
that are available.
When it comes to SLCM, I must admit that I would like to be
able to do, like my predecessors before, to make an assessment
on that. If it meets--if it is able to meet that capability gap
that is there, I would like to be able to see that and assess
that so I can make my best military assessment on the specific
weapon system itself because I am not familiar with that weapon
system on the specifics of what it can do with the capabilities
to close the capability gap that we might perceive.
Chairman Reed. General, as I noted in my opening statement,
we are now facing a three way nuclear race, which alters some
of the traditional notions of deterrence based on the bipolar
world of the Cold War. If confirmed, do you believe that you
will have the sufficient forces and capability to undertake
this new and evolving mission?
General Cotton. Chairman, thanks for the question. I would
like to answer that two ways. The current force that we have
today, we are ready to execute today. What I would say is, if
confirmed, and I know this is continually happening today, is
we must evaluate what the additional risks are and what the
adversary is doing to ensure two things.
First, to evaluate to make sure that the nuclear strategy
that we have within Strategic Command can meet the objectives,
the national objectives that are presented before us. So the
first thing I would do, if confirmed, is to ensure--because
sir, the first time since 1945, the first time for us as a
Nation, we have two near-peer adversaries.
We have always put together a nuclear defense strategy that
has one nuclear power. We are going to have to roll up our
sleeves to ensure that we are doing everything we are that we
can strategy wise with Strategic Air Command--excuse me,
between STRATCOM to ensure that we are meeting the objectives
to be able to have and take care of two near peers. First time
in history that we have ever seen that.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, sir. STRATCOM is the Joint Staff
lead for ensuring the Joint Force can successfully defend and
prosecute electronic warfare, which is now referred to as
electromagnetic spectrum operations or EMSO. Russia has
successfully used EMSO in Ukraine, and China has greatly
expanded their capabilities. Can you tell us this view--your
views on this subject? If confirmed, will you ensure it
receives your full attention?
General Cotton. Thank you, Chairman. Absolutely. So if
confirmed, it is going to be a front burner item within
STRATCOM. You know, I know right now that the Executive, DOD,
EMS Superiority Strategic Implementation Plan has been laid out
in which the Commander of STRATCOM is going to be the lead and
that directs report--the direct report to the Commander of
STRATCOM.
That is something that, if confirmed, I want to be able to
dive down and do a true assessment of what is going on with
EMS. I agree, it has atrophied over the decades, and now with
two near peers, we are going to have to understand how to
attack that and how to attack it well. So it is absolutely
something that I would look into, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Tell us, Chairman. I do have three
questions. While you have addressed all three of these, it will
give us a chance to elaborate a little bit more if that is your
desire, General Cotton.
We all know how critical it is to rebuild our Nation's
nuclear deterrent, but we are still years away from fielding
any new systems. So in terms of your priorities, how important
is it that we accelerate as much of the U.S. nuclear
modernization plan as soon as possible?
General Cotton. Senator, thank you for the question. I
think about it this way. So if confirmed, I think the challenge
of Strategic Command is to ensure that we sustain legacy
systems as we transition to the modern--to our modernized
systems. That is going to be key for us.
In order to do that, it is going to take the full power of
Government to be able to pull that together, especially when we
are talking about the central weapons system and the Columbia
and all of the five that I have under my purview as a current
Joint Forces Air Component Commander working for the Commander
of STRATCOM.
So being able to do that, sir, I think a couple of the key
things are going to be required from us. We are going to need
stable, predictable, and adequate, and timely funding. My job,
if confirmed as the Commander of STRATCOM, is to ensure that we
also have stable requirements.
Because what we are going to see, and what I think is going
to be great for us with the new modernized systems, is the fact
that we are by design building in a system that we know will
last for decades because that is built into the system.
So the modularity that we will see will be able to keep
pace with the threats that we will see in the future. What we
need to do in the meantime, though, is to sustain the legacy
system that still--that is still safe, secure, and effective as
we make that transition.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. That is good and I appreciate that
very much. The--it has already been mentioned a couple of times
talking about the two peer adversaries. This is something that
we have not done before. This is new.
Even though you did already address this, you have been
asked this question even by the chairman, I would like to give
you the opportunity to expand, if you want to, on how we are
going to handle this. What is going to be different about two
adversaries?
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator. What is different is
two near peers that actually act differently. From a doctrines
perspective, we understand Russian nuclear theory and nuclear
doctrine.
Minimal deterrence was what we thought of when we talked of
China as recent as 2018. We have seen the incredible
expansiveness of what they are doing with their nuclear force,
which does not, in my opinion, reflect minimal deterrence.
They have a bona fide triad now. So we are going to have to
understand more deeply the Chinese nuclear strategy.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. All right. I appreciate that. Now,
the--while the chairman did talk about this before, I am going
to frame the question as my last question a little bit
differently, General Cotton.
A number of the senior military officers have testified to
their support of continuing the sea launched cruise missile
program, including the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commanders
of the U.S. Strategic and European Command.
Do you agree with, not--do you agree with these leaders
right now and your colleagues that we should keep this program
going? I would like to have you give--be as specific as
possible, because we all know what the program is. We all
expressed ourselves on it. So I would like to have your
thoughts on this.
General Cotton. Yes, Senator. So the Chairman, the Vice
Chairman, and the current Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
absolutely understand where they are on the endorsement of
continuing.
Senator Inhofe. That is correct.
General Cotton. From my perspective, I absolutely
understand that they are looking at the capability gap to be
able to do that. The only thing that is different between they
and I is I have yet to do an assessment on the weapons system
itself. But absolutely understand where they are on being able
to have a capability gap that is filled that they have seen. I
have seen that capability gap as well, and I endorse the fact
that we need to fill that capability gap.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. Senator Shaheen,
please.
Senator Shaheen. Good morning. Congratulations, General
Cotton, on your nomination. Thank you to you and your family
for your long service. I would like to begin by following up a
little bit on Senator Inhofe's question about the challenges
with modernization, and you talked about a dependable budget
process.
You talked about a whole-of-government cooperative effort.
What you didn't talk about is the supply chain and the
challenges with making sure we have the critical minerals, the
other requirements to modernize our nuclear arsenal.
Can you talk a little bit about what you think those
challenges are, and how you see the ability to impact that, and
what we should be thinking about as a committee?
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator, for the question.
Absolutely correct. As we are seeing the modernization programs
within the nuclear portfolio, I would venture to say that it is
probably being seen across the Department of Defense, but in
particular for the nuclear portfolio.
Even as we are seeing the industry partners do the
Herculean efforts and work in moving the programs along at a
great pace, what we are now finding is the realities of supply
chain limitations and supply chain shortfalls. We had a great
discussion and a good example--or some components that are U.S.
made components with U.S. made subcomponents that are still
taking what would be on average, maybe 10 days to source, that
are now taking up to 90 days to source.
So by definition, if you look at what we need to do in
regards to maintaining a flow and schedule to get our new
modernized systems online, you know, if you introduce that into
the flow, those delays right there cause me concern.
I think it is going to take everyone to understand how we
can close the gap on supply chain management and ensure that we
can get the supplies to the industry partners that are trying
to modernize this force.
Senator Shaheen. Are you comfortable that we have the
components that we are going to need being manufactured within
the United States, the materials that we need being produced in
the United States?
General Cotton. Ma'am, I did. Until we start to see, you
know, that kind of eat into to the schedule as being problems
with supply chain.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. There is--can you describe how
you analyze the difference between strategic deterrence and
integrated deterrence, and how you see that affecting your
role, if at all, in terms of the mission of STRATCOM?
General Cotton. Yes, ma'am. Thanks for the question. It is
integral. Integrated deterrence is a whole-of-government
opportunity. In a way I describe that is, it is--I remember
growing up and using the dime theory when I was a young
lieutenant, but it is using all instruments of power within the
Government, the United States, to afford us a deterrence factor
that makes it, so we never have to get to the day where I have
to execute the mission, if confirmed, from U.S. Strategic
Command.
Strategic deterrence to me composes more than just nuclear
deterrence. Strategic deterrence to me has a conventional and a
nuclear component to it. It is the backstop, in my opinion, to
ensure that we can deter forces when called upon.
Senator Shaheen. So does the focus on integrated deterrence
change the role that you would have, if confirmed, as the head
of STRATCOM?
General Cotton. Ma'am, I don't believe so, because I think
strategic deterrence is an integral part of the overarching
integrated deterrence that we all speak of.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. One of the--you know, as
someone who remembers the Cold War very vividly and the focus
on--the concern about nuclear annihilation and the ability to
destroy the world that way, and there was a lot of attention to
that that has dissipated over the years with some of the arms
control agreements, and but I think as we look at the war in
Ukraine and some of Vladimir Putin's statements, there is a
renewed concern about what the use of nuclear weapons would
mean.
Are there ways in which you think our Strategic Command,
our nuclear triad are helping to constrain what Vladimir Putin
does now in this war in Ukraine?
General Cotton. Senator, thanks for the question. I
absolutely believe that our nuclear deterrent force held. We
did not see Russia do anything with our native--or our NATO
partners. The rhetoric may have--we may have heard the
rhetoric, but I think at the end of the day, Russia and China
both understand that we have a strong, resilient nuclear force
that is offering deterrence to ourselves and extended
deterrence to our allies.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shahee. Senator Fischer,
please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
General, for being here today. Thank you for your willingness
to continue your service to this country. I would like to
welcome your family as well.
Madam, it is nice to see you here, and I know the
sacrifices that you and your family make on behalf of this
country as well. Thank you. General Cotton, a lot of times in
this Committee and on the subcommittee of strategic forces, our
main focus is on modernization of our triad. We also try to
gain a fuller understanding of the future needs that our
military must have to provide for National Security.
We talk about things like SLCM and the need that Commanders
such as yourself will have to have to provide options to the
President when or if you are ever in that position. The more
options you can represent, the better for the security of this
country, the better for the people of this country.
But also under the duties and responsibilities of the
STRATCOM Combatant Commander, we need to look at the importance
of NC3. We have to look at the NNSA's supporting infrastructure
as well.
So, General, I think that when we talk about nuclear
modernization and we have that focus on the triad, on the
weapons systems, the warheads, we shouldn't forget, we should
not forget about NC3, the architecture, as well as the
scientific and production infrastructure of NNSA.
Can you talk about how important these elements are to the
deterrent and the modernization challenge that we are seeing in
these areas as well?
General Cotton. Senator, I would love to. You know, I will
start with NC3. I know there are Members of the Committee that
say it is the fourth of the triad, right. It is the quad. I
have heard folks say that. I call it the tapestry. In my
opening statement, you heard me discuss and talk about, it is
just as important as the platforms that we are talking about
modernizing, and that is absolutely true.
The good news is it is still a--it is a resilient system
today. What I like, having over 36 years in this business, is
the conversations that people like yourself, and others also
see it as just as important as the--as a weapon systems that we
often talk about. If confirmed, I would use my authorities.
As everyone's aware, the NEC or the NC3 enterprise center
that is located within Strategic Command and the Commander
Strategic Command having kind of oversight, delegated oversight
authorities to be able to kind of make sure that we as a
Department are looking to ensure that we are modernizing with
Next Gen technologies.
I call it NC2 over assured comms to ensure that we have the
state of the art NC3 systems that we need for not only today,
not only mid-term, but the future. That is going to be
absolutely critical for us, because I guarantee you that I want
to ensure that we always outpace our adversaries, who are also
paying attention to our NC3 systems.
Senator Fischer. STRATCOM also has significant
responsibilities for the electromagnetic spectrum operations.
Can you describe some of the challenges in this mission area,
and what STRATCOM is doing to help rebuild the force structure
and the capabilities that we need?
General Cotton. Yes, ma'am. So from my vantage point as the
Joint Forces Air Component Commander, I can only give my
vantage of what I have in the Air Force side of the house. If
confirmed, I would like to make an assessment on the entire
portfolio. But from our vantage point, I think we are a little
behind.
I don't think--I know we are behind. But the good news is,
I know that we are working to try to close the gap on us not
paying attention to EMS for decades. So if confirmed, that
would be one of the things that would be on the plate that I
would absolutely want to assess and be the greatest advocate
that I could be as the Commander of STRATCOM in ensuring that
we have the--not the not pace our adversaries but lead our
adversaries in that domain.
Senator Fischer. Thank you. I was going to ask you about
also, as critics portray our nuclear deterrence as a relic of
the Cold War, but I will send that to you in a written
question. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer. Senator Hirono,
please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome, General
Cotton and Mrs. Cotton. As part of my responsibilities on this
Committee to ensure the fitness of nominees for appointment to
senior positions within the Administration, I ask the following
two initial questions of all nominees to all of the committees
on which I serve.
Since you became a legal adult, have you ever made unwanted
requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
General Cotton. Senator, no.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
General Cotton. No, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. General, you have been asked a number of
questions about SLCM, and while some military leaders,
including Chairman Millie, have expressed their support for
SLCM, and several DOD officials, including Secretary Austin,
have expressed their opposition to the project, I share the
concerns expressed by Secretary Austin that the development of
such a low yield or tactical nuclear cruise missile is
unnecessary and could lead to a dangerous new nuclear arms
race.
The United States should be a leader in international
efforts to reduce nuclear stockpiles and prevent nuclear
proliferation, while still ensuring we maintain cutting edge
capabilities to protect our National Security. I know that you
testified that you will make your own assessment as to SLCM.
I do want to ask you though, do you agree that the United
States has a role to play in preventing a new nuclear arms
race? If so, if confirmed, will you work with the Department of
State to support the strengthening of diplomatic efforts to
prevent nuclear proliferation?
General Cotton. Senator, thank you for the question. I
think that that weaves into what we would call integrated
deterrence, right. So as we talk about integrated deterrence, I
want to take our instruments of power to ensure that we can
deter. So in regards to the question that you asked, my best
military advice would always be to be able to present the
Commander in Chief with a variety of options and capabilities.
So that is where I would be, if confirmed as the Commander
of U.S. STRATCOM, is to be able to offer as much capability and
options to the Commander in Chief. But I do understand the
question that you asked in regard to the Department of State,
and the answer is yes, as far as integrated deterrence, I think
it is key to that.
Senator Hirono. Well, I think integrated deterrence means
that we have a role to play, I would say a leading role to
play, in preventing a new nuclear arms race. Would you agree
with that?
General Cotton. I do.
Senator Hirono. So given the importance of
nonproliferation, are there other weapons or tactics that can
accomplish the same strategic objectives as the Command without
creating new nuclear weapons?
General Cotton. Ma'am, if confirmed, that is exactly what I
meant by making the assessment to understand what would be the
gap filler in the capability.
Senator Hirono. As we prepare to revamp the nuclear triad
or modernize the triad, wouldn't our efforts be better utilized
focusing on that important mission rather than diverting
resources and attention to SLCM?
General Cotton. Ma'am, you know, I appreciate the committee
and what they have done for the overarching modernization of
the nuclear portfolio writ large. Once again, I think if
confirmed, I still would like to be able to assess and analyze
how do you broaden that portfolio to provide more options for
the President of the United States.
Senator Hirono. I think one of the concerns about the SLCM
is that it is going to be a highly expensive proposition,
whereas we are very clear on the need to revamp the triad and
modernize. So the going on the higher class ballistic missile
submarine, originally said to be in service for 30 years, will
be extended by the Navy out to 42 years.
These submarines will begin to retire from the fleet as the
Columbia-class comes online to replace them in the late 2020s.
The warheads used on the submarines have also undergone life
extension programs of their own, in some cases adding an
estimate of 30 years to their service life.
What concerns you have with service life extensions as we
bridge the gap between aging and new technologies?
General Cotton. Ma'am, thank you for the question. So in
regards, with our incredible partners at NNSA who are doing
this work for us, I think the question is we need to kind of
see what aging you really see from the asset, and also does a
life extension, you know, solve the problem to get the effects
that you want from that asset.
So if confirmed, I think that is part of what I would
assess as being a member of the Nuclear Weapons Council as
well, to be able to get an assessment to see, okay, is it about
re-use or is it about new, and further. So that is something
that I would have to make an assessment on, if confirmed.
Senator Hirono. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono. Senator Cotton,
please.
Senator Cotton. General Cotton, welcome and congratulations
on your nominations and continued service. You know, we hear
the term arms race a lot, especially in the nuclear context.
Last time, I guess, we had a major arms race in which we
actually contested. The race was in the 1980s.
There aren't many Senators around who were there then. Pat
Leahy and Chuck Grassley, maybe. I bet they took different
views on it. I know what view Joe Biden took on it. He
continued to criticize Ronald Reagan for an arms race that was
going to destabilize the world, lead to a nuclear war.
Of course, it led to nothing but victory in the Cold War
without even firing a shot. Do we get to decide whether there
is an arms race or not, General Cotton, or does the enemy get a
vote on that?
General Cotton. Thank you for the question, Senator. I
would answer it this way, and it still goes back to the options
and capabilities that we should be able to provide to the
Commander in Chief. So from--my best military advice is to
provide the capability and options for the Commander in Chief,
and I would like to be able to provide the most capable options
that I can in this regard.
Senator Cotton. Yes, and that is why I said the last
contested arms race we faced was in the 1980s during the Reagan
buildup, because we have been in an arms race with China for
the last 30 years, and fortunately we haven't been
significantly contesting it and therefore China has been
winning it. In the end, whether we enter an arms race is not
really up to us. What is up to us is whether we win it or we
lose it.
If you ask me, it is much cheaper to win an arms race than
it is to lose a war. It goes especially for nuclear weapons.
General Cotton, I want to read to you a short excerpt from
Winston Churchill's Iron Curtain speech, also known as The
Sinews of Strength--A Sinews of Peace speech.
Less than, or barely six months after VJ Day in Fulton,
Missouri, Churchill says, from what I have seen of our Russian
friends and allies during the war, I am convinced there is
nothing they admire so much as strength, and there is nothing
for which they have less respect than for weakness, especially
military weakness.
Do you agree with Sir Winston that Russians have less--
there is nothing for which they have less respect than
weakness, especially military weakness?
General Cotton. Senator, I agree.
Senator Cotton. Do you think that is true of the Chinese as
well?
General Cotton. I do.
Senator Cotton. Do you think it is true of the Iranians?
General Cotton. I think of all of our adversaries.
Senator Cotton. Okay. Yes, I thought so too. He continued
then to say, for that reason, the old doctrine of a balance of
power is unsound. We cannot afford it, if we can help it, to
work on narrow margins, offering temptations to a trial of
strength. Do you agree with Sir Winston that we should not
offer temptations to a trial of strength to our adversaries by
operating on narrow margins?
General Cotton. Senator, I think that we always should--we
always should operate from a power of strength.
Senator Cotton. Those margins would narrow significantly,
given China's nuclear buildup, if China and Russia became de
facto or even de jure allies, correct?
General Cotton. Two near peer allies as opposed--or
adversaries, as opposed to one.
Senator Cotton. Okay. There has been a lot of talk over the
last year that a major ground war in Europe between two nation
states was unthinkable. Even after Russia invaded Ukraine, such
a war was unthinkable.
Obviously, Vladimir Putin thought it was quite thinkable.
Do you believe that a nuclear war is unthinkable? Not in terms
of the consequences it would have for our Nation and for the
world, but for the fact of whether it might happen. Is a
nuclear war unthinkable?
General Cotton. Senator, I think if confirmed, the role
that I would play as Commander is to make sure that those
150,000 men and women that are supporting Strategic Air
Command, every--I keep saying Strategic Air Command, forgive
me--and Strategic Command are prepared to do what some folks
might think is the unthinkable.
Senator Cotton. I think that is right. You have an unusual
and weighty job, and that I think it is your responsibility
almost every day to think what most people believe is
unthinkable and think about what a nuclear war would look like
and how it would be fought, and therefore the best way to do
what we all want, which is to deter it from happening in the
first place. So, thank you, General Cotton. Best wishes for you
in your new role.
General Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton. Senator King,
please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cotton,
welcome. I am sure you were briefed before this hearing that
the Russians again--let me try it again. I am sure you were
briefed that the chairman would ask you a series of routine
questions at the beginning and you went through and answered
them properly.
I just want to emphasize one of those questions. Do you
agree, when asked before this Committee, to give your personal
views, even if your views differ from the Administration? That
is a very important question, because we need to know what your
best military advice is, not colored by the views of the
Administration, the President. This is--I just want to
emphasize how important this question is.
You answered it properly, but I just want to have it in the
back of your head in the future, and it is going to be
difficult. It is not easy to say something that may be
unacceptable to some other part of the Pentagon or the
Administration. In looking over my notes as I make questions, I
realize that all of my questions involve changes in the
strategic posture.
You have mentioned several times we have gone from a
bipolar world to a multipolar world in terms of our
adversaries. That is a strategic change, but there are others.
Just to run down a quick list, electromagnetic spectrum and
electronic warfare.
You have you have touched upon, I realize there is
classified information here, but I hope that you will commit to
holding serious exercises on electronic warfare and notify us
of how we are doing. Because this is a new strategic challenge
that I am not sure we are adequately accounted for yet.
General Cotton. So Senator, for your first question,
absolutely, yes, my best military advice presented to the
Committee. For your second, is another absolutely, yes. We are
going to have to flesh out through exercises, as you mentioned,
to ensure we can find any blind spots and shortfalls and make
corrections as warranted and as required. So I wholeheartedly
agree with you.
Senator King. Another area of strategic change has happened
in the last four or five years, and that is hypersonics. We
thought of strategic forces as nuclear weapons and nuclear
deterrence.
Hypersonics are a new threat that are--is a strategic
threat, particularly, for example, the Chinese putting a glide
vehicle, hypersonic glide vehicle in orbit, which radically
changes things like how much time we might have to react to an
attack. Do you view hypersonics as a serious strategic
challenge?
General Cotton. Senator, I do, and I see it as a warning
challenge. I think as far as when we have a conversation, if
confirmed, I think my fellow combatant commanders, we will have
to have a discussion and understand how to give--kind of relook
missile defense, relook missile warning, understand what a
sensor layer looks like that can achieve those effects to give
time, because I need to give decision space to the decision
maker.
Senator King. Well, I think it is safe to say that the
bullet on bullet theory of missile defense is out the window
when you are talking about hypersonics. Another area is cyber.
You have talked about it.
You have indicated how important it is, particularly with
NC3. Will you commit to red teaming and pen testing and hackers
for hire to test the security of the systems that you are
developing?
I don't think you really know how secure you are until
somebody attacks you. I hope it is--I want it to be a friendly
attack.
General Cotton. Senator, if confirmed, that would be one of
the first directions I would give to the NEC.
Senator King. Thank you. Final point. Again, a new
strategic challenge or a different strategic challenge, and I
don't expect really an answer, but perhaps you could consider
this for the record, that is non-state actors with nuclear
weapons.
The deterrent theory doesn't work if you don't have a
capital city and if you don't care about dying. We have a
proliferation of nuclear weapons, and we have rogue states
developing nuclear weapons and nuclear materials.
The chances of those materials falling into the hands of a
terrorist organization, it seems to me, are increasing
gradually but steadily. I hope you will give this some thought
because it is a major strategic challenge that doesn't fit
within the ambit of what has been our historic deterrence
strategy for dealing with nuclear threats.
General Cotton. Senator, you are absolutely right, and I
will get back with you, if confirmed, and we can have further
discussions along that.
Senator King. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King. Senator Rounds,
please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning,
General Cotton. Thank you to you and to your family for your
years of service to our country, and your continued service in
the future. General Cotton, I share the perspective that the
nuclear deterrent is the foundation of our National Security.
In the past, I have asked other leaders in the nuclear
enterprise to give their views, in plain language, on the
importance of our nuclear triad so that the American--you know,
our American public, who really don't think about this on a
regular basis, can understand why we have hundreds, if not
thousands, of nuclear warheads.
Can you explain it in such a fashion as to why it is so
important to our National Security that we not only maintain,
but accelerate the investment in the modernization of this
nuclear triad?
General Cotton. Senator Rounds, thank you for the question.
I think if we were to do a perspective on talking about the
three legs of the triad in particular, and how it is the
backstop and underpins, I think if I was at a town hall
meeting, how I would describe that to a local town hall is,
think about the bedrock of a feature and what holds the rest of
your foundation up.
You know, when we have--when we are building a home, you
know, you want to make sure you have a steady, you know, steady
property to put the foundation on. For every operational plan
that the Department of Defense has, it relies on the fact that
strategic deterrence is going to hold to allow those other
missions to accomplish. If that does not happen, that is when
you see that deterrence fails.
The way that we accomplish that is through our triad of
having bombers who are recordable if warranted, having
submarines that can be used, or having ICBMs that are readily
available for the decision maker to do that.
Our adversaries understand that and know that we can hold
them at bay. That is that bedrock and foundation that is so
critically important for us and this Nation.
Senator Rounds. I think it is sometimes we think about the
fact that we have great conventional forces, but the reason why
those conventional forces can be effective is because everybody
knows that in the back, the hammer are the nuclear forces,
which have been upgraded. That is what I want to talk about
next.
With regard to our nuclear command and control systems,
they have got to be upgraded. We are in the process of doing
that now. What do you see as one of the biggest challenges or
what do you see as the biggest challenges regarding the
upgrading of our current command and control structure?
General Cotton. Thanks for the question. As I said in my
opening comments, in my opening statement, I articulated that
it is a resilient system today. I think moving forward, I see
it as a continuance. You will never close the book on a
modernization of a comm node. So as I see it, that--I don't
know if I see the challenge, but I--but what we are going to be
able to have to do is, I say move to a system using 21st
century technologies that allows us to have what I called NC3
over shared comms.
So being able to make it so I can--we can message and get
data to the warfighters in any situation. So I think that
challenge is being able to link the legacy systems with the
modernized systems.
But I am here to say that I am quite pleased in the work
that is being done with NC3 Next Gen, if you will. So the team
is really, really getting after it and I am pretty impressed on
the way forward on being able to close that challenge.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, General, and one last item that
I wanted to visit with today, and that is, if confirmed, you
will be the lead for joint electromagnetic spectrum operations.
The growth of 5G technologies continues to add additional
requests for larger parts of the band, some of which are needed
for National Security. Now, recognizing the unclassified
setting of this hearing, can you explain to this COmmittee, and
perhaps to other folks out there that are wondering why it
isn't being made more readily available, but the Pentagon and
the Department of Defense clearly is recognizing the need to
protect certain areas of the spectrum for National Security
purposes.
Can you share a little bit about the real necessity of
working in a consultative way, really, in a cooperative way
with the FCC and the NTIA in maintaining certain portions of
the spectrum for National Security purposes and how absolutely
critical it is.
General Cotton. Senator, it is incredibly critical that we
maintain and understand, and to be frank, have others
understand the necessity to protect certain bands. If
confirmed, I would want to collaborate with the FCC and others
so we can--maybe we need to message better for folks to
understand exactly what we are talking about here on the
necessity and criticality of making sure that we can protect
those bands that you mentioned.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, General. Thank you,
Mr. Chairman.
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator Rounds. Senator Kaine,
please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and General Cotton,
great to see you. I enjoyed our visit yesterday, and I think
this has been touched on by earlier Senators and their
questions, but I really was intrigued by the discussion we were
having about this multipolar nature of the threat.
So as you look at the triad, we have to always recapitalize
and have it be strong, but we have thought of the triad, both
in terms of our investment, but even in terms of our theory of
deterrence or our theory about what the triad means to our
defense. We sort of thought about it as a triad with respect to
one nuclear competitor.
Okay, now we have two nuclear competitors, and evidence
demonstrates that they are increasingly working together. The
United States policy for decades kind of said that China and
Russia would never get too close because of a history of enmity
and different cultures and things like that. But they are
getting closer and closer every day, and often they are doing
things not only just the two of them, but with Iran, North
Korea, sometimes with Turkey.
So how should, you be confirmed, and I am confident you
will be, how will you approach this analysis of the threat,
that is not simply an analysis of the capacity of individual
adversaries, but the fact that these adversaries are
cooperating and that previous deterrence doctrines are really
built more around a bipolar world rather than multiple
competitors?
General Cotton. Senator Kaine, thank you for the for the
question. You are absolutely right, and we touched upon it
earlier. I think what is key--and it is, you know, as we
discussed, it is multiple approaches, too, because one, if
confirmed--and I know the work is being currently done within
STRATCOM because as a JFACC Commander to STRATCOM offering
input to that today.
But if confirmed, that assessment has to continue, because
when we talk about--I mean, as you said, as we talk about
nuclear doctrine, nuclear doctrine is with one near-peer
adversary. We are--and what that will drive is then that will
drive on how do we meet national objectives based on the
strategic doctrine within the confines of Strategic Command.
Then we have to then, from my best military advice,
understand what force shaping looks like in regards to how do
you meet the objectives that would be given to us from the
Commander in Chief.
That is work that has to be done, and I know it is being
done today. But if confirmed, that is one of the first things
that we will dive into where I can get a better understanding,
to your point, of what does it look like when you have two
near-peer adversaries that act differently, might work--that
might work together, might not work together, but we still need
to understand, you know, how do you execute against that
threat.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, General. Another thing we talked
about yesterday was bomber task force missions. There was just
a completion of one in SOUTHCOM with Panamanian and Ecuadorian
partners. We have also done bomber task force missions with
European allies. These are to show unity, to test
interoperability. Talk about what those missions produce for
our defense capacity.
General Cotton. Thank you for that. So bomber task force,
our bomber task forces that we currently do on behalf of our--
on behalf of COCOMS, of which I am the lead as Air Force Global
Strike Commander to present those forces to COCOMS through
STRATCOM, it has been incredible because what it shows. It
shows why we are the most powerful military on the face of the
earth, and that is because we have allies and partners.
What it shows is using conventional forces, what strategic
deterrence is all about as well. There is nothing more
gratifying than seeing an ally or a partner come up on a wing
of a B-52 that is doing an integrated mission over a COCOM
area, and seeing the PA sentiment, if you will, Senator, come
back from the adversaries on how that mission went.
So it is a win-win for ourselves, as well as our allies and
partners that participate in those missions that we are doing
constantly across the globe.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine. Senator Ernst,
please.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and thank you,
General Cotton, for being here today, as well as Marsha. Thank
you very much for joining us. I enjoyed visiting with you in
the office. We covered a lot of really great topics important
to the defense of our Nation, and just a few questions here in
this Committee.
The 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission had
determined that the United States might struggle to win or
perhaps even lose a war with China over Taiwan. This has been a
big concern of ours, especially in recent months.
Do you agree that the President must have flexible nuclear
options to prevent conventional defeat at the hands of our
adversaries in this particular scenario?
General Cotton. I do.
Senator Ernst. Okay, and I appreciate that. I know that a
number of my colleagues have already brought up having a
nuclear deterrence, theater nuclear forces in Asia. So I won't
go through that again, but I just want to state that I do think
it is important that we have those capabilities abroad,
especially in that region, considering the scenario that we
have seen through the 2018 National Defense Strategy and what
we see occurring just in the daily news.
So I just want to emphasize my support for making sure that
we have the capabilities necessary, if we should ever need
those, present in INDOPACOM. Chairman Milley and Vice Chairman
Grady also wrote in June that continued modernization and
expansion of the ground based midcourse defense system is
critical to defend the homeland from North Korean missiles. Do
you agree that we must expand?
There is a lot of talk about modernization, but do you
agree that we must expand, not merely modernize, homeland
missile defense to take--to actually make sure that we are
putting in check rogue nations like North Korea?
General Cotton. Senator, thanks for the question. You know,
I think when we talk about missile defense, especially with the
not only rogue nations, but now with two adversaries, near-peer
adversaries that have different capacities and capabilities, I
would agree that for the protection of the homeland, more
options is better than less.
Senator Ernst. Yes, more options are better, and I know
that we do receive pushback every once in a while on this idea
that we need to expand and modernize. It is extremely costly,
and just to emphasize to our fabulous American citizens that
Jim Mattis, the way he phrased this in the past is, America can
afford survival.
I think it is very important that we continue to look at
ways that we can expand and modernize. Would you also agree
that the capability to destroy hard and deeply buried targets
actually enhances our deterrence by denying that our adversary
doesn't have sanctuary from U.S. nuclear deterrence?
General Cotton. I would agree.
Senator Ernst. Yes, and can you think of examples where we
might need to look into that further?
General Cotton. Senator, thanks for the question. I think
there is opportunities for us to understand what technologies
are available that can give us potentially nuclear or
conventional, that can get after hard and deeply buried
targets. If confirmed, I would love to lead the charge and be
an advocate in understanding that and advocating for it.
Senator Ernst. Thank you for that. I appreciate it. Do you
agree that we should sustain the B83 bomb until we have a
suitable replacement?
General Cotton. I think that we need to be able to have an
opportunity to provide options, and if that is taken off the
table, then we no longer have an option to provide.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you. I do appreciate that as
well. Then of course, the President extended New Start for five
years when he assumed office. In your opinion, in your best
military opinion, are United States strategic arms constraints
prudent given China's nuclear breakout, which is--they are not
party to the treaty, and Russia's arsenal of non-strategic
nuclear weapons, which are unaccounted for by the treaty?
General Cotton. Senator, I think whatever agreement or
treaty that we could do to prevent proliferation is good, with
a caveat, that it incorporates every aspect of what the signing
agreement would be.
So what I mean by that are, you know, weapons that are
currently not seen as strategic weapons need to be added to
that calculus. So but any agreement or treaty that would
prevent proliferation across the globe, I am for.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Thank you for your answers, and I do
appreciate the opportunity to sit down with you in the office
the other day and look forward to hearing more from you. I as
well, growing up in Southwest Iowa, I also have been known to
call it Strategic Air Command, so with you. But thank you very
much for your time today, General.
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst. Senator Scott,
please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chairman Reed. General Cotton,
first, thanks for your service. Congratulations on your
nomination. Thank you for your willingness to serve. So here is
what informs most of my work here on the Committee. First, the
United States has several enemies who have no interest other
than to harm us.
They want us to be weak, independent, and without allies.
You talked about the importance of our allies. Chief among
these enemies are the Chinese Communist Party and Vladimir
Putin's regime. Second, our enemies wake up every day plotting
to harm us. They think about it all the time.
Putin's invasion, brutal murdering, raping, and pillaging
of Ukraine is, in his own words, his fight against the United
States, as though anyone really need him to hear what he is up
to. Jones Secretary, she contemplates the same thing for the
free and democratic nation of Taiwan.
Third, most countries in the world whether they actually
like us or not, they might be jealous of us, they do want
America to be powerful and capable of deterring or defeating
any aggressor who tries to turn the world into their own
dictatorship.
Most countries know that there is really only two choices,
a world where communist China, Putin, and the Ayatollah and
maybe others, are making the rules for everyone, or one with a
strong and independent United States that faces down
aggressors, helps those who help themselves, leads alliances,
and promotes state sovereignty and commerce.
So if you would agree with that, and I think most of us
would agree with those, can you explain why the United States
would not want to have the most modern and expensive nuclear
and strategic weapons we could have?
General Cotton. Senator, I do agree with that. To be frank,
I am really happy with what this Committee has done in regards
to where we are on the nuclear modernization front today. You
know, are we late to need? Yes. Are we getting after it now?
Absolutely. Are we in a position where we can ensure that we
have a portfolio that can modularize and meet the needs in the
future?
I think we do, Senator. But I agree with you, I am about
the strong and not about the weak. So as--if confirmed, that is
my position. I want to be from a position of strength, not from
a position of weakness.
Senator Scott. So would you agree we ought to accelerate
our nuclear modernization plan as much as we can?
General Cotton. Sir, if that is possible, let's do it.
Senator Scott. Yes. After your many years of experience,
you know, who are enemies are and what they want, what they are
capable of doing. You don't live in an ivory tower or academic
bubble where you can tease out theories of disarmament and hope
it all sort of goes well. So if you are confirmed, which I
believe you will be--and this is not a diplomatic role, right?
His role is not being a diplomat, your role is to be a fighter.
General Cotton. If confirmed, my role is to be a combatant
commander.
Senator Scott. Your goal is to scare the living crap out of
everybody.
General Cotton. Yes, sir.
Senator Scott. Good. Would you agree then the U.S.
President should have a variety of strategic weapons and
stockpiles so large that no enemy would even think about trying
to attack America?
General Cotton. I think we need to have a stockpile that is
credible and capable. Absolutely.
Senator Scott. Senator King brought this up earlier. I do
appreciate the more direct and honest people can be when they
are testifying. I know there is probably a lot of pressure to
do whatever an Administration, whoever the Administration is,
wants you to do.
But I do appreciate as much as you can to be direct,
because all of us are trying to make the best decisions we can,
and you are the expert. So thank you. Thanks for your service.
I am glad you are going to serve--continue to serve.
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott. Senator Rosen,
when you are ready, please.
Senator Rosen. There it is. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate that. Thank you, General Cotton, for testifying
today, for your willingness to continue to serve. I really
appreciate you, and so, of course, I hail from the great State
of Nevada. I want to talk a little bit about the Nevada
National Security site, the infrastructure upgrades, and how
important, of course, it is to our nuclear mission.
I have talked about this a lot in this Committee, that the
Nevada National Security site oversees the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, principally at our U1a facility, which is,
of course, an underground laboratory where scientists conduct
those subcritical experiments that verify the safety and
reliability of our nuclear stockpile without, and I am going to
repeat this again, without explosive testing.
U1a is undergoing major construction. That project is soon
going to hold the most weapons capable radiographic system in
the world. However, the Nevada National Security Administration
currently faces significant infrastructure delays, including at
our Nevada National Security site.
So General Cotton, as the current Commander providing two
of the three legs of the triad, can you speak about the
importance of the Stockpile Stewardship Program, and if
confirmed, how you would plan to, working with your fellow
Nuclear Weapons Council partners, in addressing the NNSA's
infrastructure modernization challenges and unfortunate delays?
Chairman Reed. Senator Rosen, thanks for the question.
There is nothing more important than the relationship that we
have with DOE, and specifically NNSA. As we talked throughout
the hearing in regards to the modernization programs, they are
interwoven--the platforms mean absolutely nothing if I don't
have the assets available for the platforms. So to your
question on infrastructure, you are absolutely--not only the
Nevada locations, but all of NNSA locations are in dire need of
upgrades in their infrastructure that dates back to Manhattan
Project times. We are living in a different world today. As I
keep saying, two near-peer adversaries, nuclear adversaries. We
are going to have to ensure that the infrastructure are
upgraded and are at the capacity and capability to meet the
needs of the warfighter. You mentioned I as only two legs. I
have modernization programs that are going to need new systems
for them. Can't do that without the credible work of the men
and women that that make up the NNSA. But they are going to
need infrastructure that will allow them to be able to do that
type of work.
Senator Rosen. Yes, and not just bringing you up to today's
standards, but really preparing them for future challenges and
innovation that we so desperately are going to need to compete.
So thank you for that, because we do have to think about the
technological end advancements.
With those advancements also come advancements from our
adversaries so that creates increased threats as well. So the
nuclear command control communication systems of the United
States, we know they are connected through a network of
communications, different data processing systems, and this
is--could possibly leave us vulnerable for cyber-attacks.
In fact, in April of 2021, the Department of Energy's
Inspector General audit concluded that cybersecurity
weaknesses, they really do persist throughout the Department's
unclassified networks, including those of the National Nuclear
Security Administration.
So recent news, we have highlighted significant efforts by
Huawei to build telecommunication structures right near our
ICBM fields that possibly interrupt our forces, our systems.
Can you talk about these potential threats, cyber threats,
maybe not directly, but even nearby where some of our critical
assets are located.
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator, for the question. So we
are really paying attention to what we are seeing as a Chinese
are taking advantage of some of the opportunities that they can
have in some locations that are near our, and in particular
some of our ICBM sites.
So we are absolutely looking into that. To your point on
cyber security, you know, as people talk about NC3, you know, I
think your point is well taken. It is also, you know, any other
support in the architecture of us, the nuclear community, like
NNSA to ensure that they are just as cyber safe as NC2 platform
would be.
So if confirmed, as part of the Nuke Weapons Council, as a
member, I think that is something that we will continually have
to have more than a discussion about but figure out how to get
to the end state in that regard.
Senator Rosen. Yes, well there is a lot of push points in
hand-offs between agencies, information between one another. I
look forward to working on that with you. Thank you. Thank you,
Mr. Chair.
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen. Senator Sullivan,
please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General
Cotton, good to see you. I enjoyed our discussion the other
day. Let me follow up on some of the topics that we talked
about. First, if confirmed, you will work closely with the U.S.
Space Force, Missile Defense Agency, Northern Command to
guarantee the security of our Nation.
As you know, Alaska has a lot of critical assets that
relate to missile defense, we are the cornerstone of missile
defense, over 100 5th generation fighters, world class training
ranges.
If confirmed, will you commit to visiting Alaska early in
your tenure to see these assets, meet with the troops that are
so critical to our homeland defense that you see in Alaska?
General Cotton. Senator, absolutely.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. You know, we had a good
discussion on basing. In May of 1992, the Strategic Air Command
was essentially stood down and many of our bomber bases around
the country, around the world were closed. We have been talking
a lot about great power competition and how we need to be ready
to confront two near-peer nuclear capable adversaries with very
large militaries.
Given this reality, how should we be approaching the basing
of our nuclear capable bomber fleet, particularly when the B-21
Raider comes online, and again, in line of some of the issues
you and I discussed the other day?
General Cotton. Senator, thank you. I think initially when
we talk about main operating bases, I am comfortable where we
are. The conversation that we had is how do you--you know, how
do we disperse forces in the future, especially with two near
peers?
In our discussion, we talked about the agile combat
employment construct that the Air Force with the Chief of
Staff, General CQ Brown, is leading across the United States
Air Force. I say it is a little different, what I call big wing
airplanes, as opposed to our fighter forces. But the construct
holds in and works as well.
I would love to be able to make sure that we have
opportunities and availability throughout the country to add
dilemma to our adversaries, if you will, on where our bomber
forces are in the future.
Senator Sullivan. Let me be a little more direct on that.
As you know, Alaska is very strategically located, and staging
options, rotational deployments, the ability to have not just
5th gen fighters but strategic global strike assets based in
Alaska that are much closer to Russia, much closer to China, as
you and I have discussed, a number of Air Force flag officers
have seen this as a strategic concept that we can take
advantage of, particularly with regard to great power
competition. Do you have any thoughts on that, General, more
specifically?
General Cotton. Well, I think the bases in Alaska act as
great staging bases for bomber deployments. I think that is the
question that you are asking.
The point of having a main operating base, if confirmed as
Commander of STRATCOM, I would like to make that assessment to
see what recommendations I would make to the service. But
today, I think as we move forward, I think having it as an
operating staging platform is critical for us.
I mean, if you recall, we talked about even, you know,
ensuring that we have right, you know, runway lengths,
etcetera, moving forward.
Senator Sullivan. Great, and I am looking forward to
working with you. I look forward to support your confirmation.
Let me talk about another topic we had the opportunity to
discuss, and that is this idea of a strategic breakout as it
relates to ICBM capability with regard to China.
The current STRATCOM Commander, Admiral Richard, called
that, the recent reports on how quickly China is developing
strategic missile capabilities, ICBM capabilities, he called it
breathtaking. In your estimation, what is the greatest concern
regarding this strategic breakout, and how should we as Armed
Services Committee be focused on helping you counter or be
ready for that very significant threat?
General Cotton. Thank you for that question. As recent as
2018, we would describe China as having a minimal deterrence,
minimal nuclear deterrence. We would have probably had a
conversation stating that it was about regional hegemony.
Today, they are building ground based ICBM silos. They have the
H-6N, nuclear capable medium bomber, that has a strategic
capable launch platform.
Senator Sullivan. Just real quick, General, not to
interrupt, but to give some context that in April of 2021,
commercial satellite imagery revealed three new nuclear missile
fields in Western China, each with approximately 120 missile
silo. So this is incredible, is it not, in terms of the size?
General Cotton. It is. It is absolutely incredible and in
such a short time, to Admiral Richard's point.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan. Senator Kelly,
are you ready? Yes.
Senator Kelly. Yes, thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, great seeing you again this week, and congratulations
on your nomination. You know, during our meeting, we briefly
discussed your priorities.
If confirmed, for your priorities for modernizing the
nuclear triad, the long range standoff weapon, we talked a
little bit about that. Our LRSO represents one leg of the triad
and replaces the aging AGM 86-B air launched cruise missile.
The Senate version of the defense bill put almost $1
billion towards continued development of the LRSO. The LRSO is
a unique component of our strategic deterrence in that it is an
escalatory weapon, in mine and others' opinions.
When our adversaries see or maybe hear that are long range
bombers are on high alert, it gives them some pause, and
tensions can be cooled without a bomber ever lifting off.
So General, can I get your thoughts on the LRSO, and can I
get your commitment, if confirmed, to the continued timely
development of this weapon as a vital and de- escalatory
component of our nuclear triad?
General Cotton. Senator Kelly, thank you for the question.
Bottom line, up front, we absolutely need LRSO. The good news
is the industry partner is doing incredible work keeping that
program on time and on schedule. I am quite pleased as the Air
Component Commander that is the lead MAJCOM, overseeing it now
and watching it, seeing what that is doing.
So to your point, for our long range standoff bomber
capability, that leg of the triad having a viable, credible
weapons system is absolutely critical. The LRSO is that viable,
critical weapon that is a de-escalatory weapon, because you are
absolutely right, if we are generating bombers, it can send a
signal before the first bomber even lifts off.
Senator Kelly. Any TRL concerns right now? Are there any
things you see that you are worried about as we go forward that
you could share here?
General Cotton. I have not. I have seen the testing that
has been--that is underway has been very promising.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General, and also during our
conversation on Monday, we briefly talked about the tanker
fleet. We have, you know, KC-135s in Phoenix. I know this is an
issue you are familiar with as the head of the Global Strike
Command.
My understanding is after talking to the team at the 161st
Aerial Refueling Wing, which is a National Guard unit, is that
unlike the KC-46, the KC-135 is not EMP hardened. I guess they
have some kind of makeshift procedures that they could use, but
it is clearly not able to handle electronic magnetic pulse that
it might be up against depending on, you know, the location and
the mission.
A small amount of KC-135s sit on a, you know, 24 hour a
day, 7 days a week alert for the strategic defense deterrence
mission. How concerned are you about the potential
vulnerabilities of this aging tanker?
General Cotton. Senator, thank you for the question. The
fleet holds, so I am confident that it can get us there. But I
am even more confident in what we are seeing in the KC-46 that
is being deployed. My fellow MAJCOM Commander, General Minihan,
from Air Mobility Command, I know is on top of the procurement
and deliveries of the KC- 46.
For the KC-135, its delivery--you know, it coexists with
the B-52. It was developed to tank the B-52. So it is an aging
weapon system. But, Senator, it is still meeting the
requirements to be able to get our bombers.
Senator Kelly. As we bring KC-46s online, would you agree
that KC-135 squadrons that are participating in the deterrence
mission should be given a priority to be replaced with the KC-
46?
General Cotton. Sir, if confirmed, what I would like to do
is make an assessment to kind of figure out what are the pros
and cons of what those mission sets are doing using a legacy
system as opposed to using the new modernized system.
Senator Kelly. Well, thank you, General, and thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
General Cotton. Thank you, Senator Kelly. Senator Hawley,
please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, good to
see you. I appreciated our conversation the other day. Thank
you for--I guess it was just yesterday. Thank you for making
time for me. Let's follow up, if we could, on a couple of
things we talked about.
First of all, Admiral Richard, the current STRATCOM
Commander, of course, has testified, and you and I talked about
this, that the U.S. needs to think very seriously about the
requirements for deterring two major nuclear powers at the same
time, China and Russia, of course, and you said the same thing
yesterday, which I appreciated.
Here is my question, if confirmed, would you commit to
having STRATCOM do an analysis of the nuclear force
requirements to deter both China and Russia now and into the
2030s?
General Cotton. Senator, thanks for the question, and the
answer is absolutely yes. I think that is going to be critical
for us. I called it earlier. You know, it is the strategic
doctrine within STRATCOM. Not necessarily policy.
I am talking about the strategic doctrine within STRATCOM
to ensure that we can do exactly what you asked. The other
piece of that is then the national objectives from the
President to make sure we can meet the national objectives as
well.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that. I think that
would be hugely, hugely helpful. I asked Admiral Richard
earlier this year about China's ability to engage in limited
nuclear employment and whether or not that was growing. He said
that it was, and he was very emphatic on this point.
He talked about how important it is for the United States
to maintain our own limited nuclear options if we are going to
be able to deter China in what is our pacing theater. So let me
just ask you, do you agree that we need to be concerned about
China resorting to limited nuclear employment in a conflict,
let's say, over Taiwan?
General Cotton. Senator, I think any near-peer nuclear
adversary, we have to be concerned about that.
Senator Hawley. Would you agree that having our own limited
nuclear options, whether that is low yield ICBMs or nuclear
arms, sea launched cruise missiles, that having those,
maintaining those can help us deter China's limited nuclear
use?
General Cotton. You know, as I described to the Committee,
for me, it is about being able to give options to the Commander
in Chief.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Are there other limited nuclear
options that you think that we ought to be pursuing, whether
that is in terms of additional capabilities, whether that is
about posture changes, in order to deter Chinese and Russian
limited nuclear use?
General Cotton. Senator, I think that goes along with that
study that, if confirmed, you know, taking that really deep
study to understand what that outcome and what--because what I
want is success at the end of that, so what that would look
like. So if confirmed, that would be part of that study.
Senator Hawley. Okay, very good. Fair enough. Fair enough.
You said to me yesterday, which I appreciated--I am going to
try to make sure I get you quoted correctly and then we talk
about it, if we can prevent China from crossing the Taiwan
Strait and they know that we have got a viable nuclear
deterrent, then it is possible that Beijing might not escalate
at all.
I thought that was right on the money. I agree with that
100 percent, and I just want to give you a chance to elaborate
that on that here, because it sounds to me like what you are
saying is the right approach to deterring a Chinese invasion of
Taiwan is denial, is to deny them the ability to do that at
first instance, backed up by a very credible nuclear deterrent.
So am I, do I have that right, and would you just--would
you elaborate on why you think that is the right combination?
General Cotton. Senator, I think that the whole reason that
we have the strategic deterrence that we have today and the
triad that we have today, is to ensure that our adversaries
understand that today shouldn't be the day for them. So as we
were having that conversation, that is what I meant. I think
that they would understand that if you have a credible nuclear
deterrent, it would make them think twice before engaging with
us.
Senator Hawley. It is in those two things, the conventional
denial, combined with the nuclear deterrent, those things have
to sit together. Is that fair to say? I mean, they work hand in
hand.
General Cotton. They work hand in hand. Conventional and
nuclear works hand in hand.
Senator Hawley. Yes. Let me ask you this just on the
question of our own nuclear modernization. Given the pace of
China and Russia and their modernization, if confirmed, will
you be looking for ways to accelerate our nuclear
modernization, and identify those options for Congress so that
we can work together to make sure that we push the pace like we
need to?
General Cotton. If confirmed, I would do that, Senator.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me just ask you one final
thing here in my remaining seconds. The 2018 Nuclear Posture
Review, it highlighted the importance of conventional nuclear
integration, which we were just touching on, which, of course,
is critical for strengthening conventional deterrence against
adversaries who may use nuclear force for operational or
coercive effects. Has the Department, in your view, made
sufficient progress on the conventional nuclear integration
since the 2018 NPR?
General Cotton. I think it has, because in the past we have
probably--we didn't talk about it the way we should have. I
think the integration on being able to talk about going from
conventional to nuclear as opposed to doing a pause x, if you
will, and then having that conversation. We have made leaps and
bounds in that regard.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you, General. Thanks again
for the conversation yesterday. Thanks for your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley. Senator Warren,
please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and
congratulations again on your nomination, General Cotton. So if
confirmed, you will head U.S. Strategic Command, which will
place you in charge of our nuclear weapons. I would like to
continue the conversation that we had in my office about the
importance of civilian control.
Last week, eight Former Secretaries of Defense and five
Former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff released an open
letter calling for a recommitment to principles of civilian
control, which they called, and I want to quote them here,
``the bedrock foundation of American democracy.''
The letter repeatedly emphasizes that policy decisions are
ultimately up to the President, civilian political appointees,
and Congress. So, General Cotton, can you start us out this
morning by saying a word about your views on whether policy
decisions, including ones about nuclear programs, should be
made by civilians rather than Generals?
General Cotton. Policy is made by civilians, ma'am.
Senator Warren. You are committed to that firmly?
General Cotton. I am committed to that firmly.
Senator Warren. You know, I appreciate your emphasizing
this point. It is the President's job to determine the nuclear
policy of the United States. But sometimes people who are in
the role that you have been nominated for seem to get confused
on that.
For example, your predecessor, Admiral Richard, stated
publicly that he thought the Biden Administration should adopt
the Trump Administration's nuclear policy, and then he and his
office actively lobbied Congress against cuts to the nuclear
spending programs contained in the Biden Administration's
budget, the budget the President put forward and the Secretary
of Defense came to this Committee to defend.
So, General Cotton, if confirmed, do you think it would be
appropriate for you or your office to publicly lobby against
the positions of the President and the Secretary of Defense?
General Cotton. No, ma'am, and you remember we had this
conversation. The caveat that we agreed to was, you know, but I
would always, especially for this Committee, be allowed to
offer my best military advice.
Senator Warren. And your best military advice. But policy
is done by the Generals?
General Cotton. Policy is not made by Generals.
Senator Warren. All right. Thank you. You know, we are
counting on you to give your best military advice to the
President, to the Secretary, or to Congress whenever you are
called on to do so. But it is wildly inappropriate to try to
box in the Commander in Chief on nuclear policy or to try to
undermine his budget.
Now, one of the big ways that military leaders lobby for
more spending, even when it directly contradicts the
President's priorities, is through so-called unfunded
priorities lists. These are wish lists that are required by law
but have grown to be tens of billions of dollars and are being
used by the services and the commands to game the budget
process.
I don't think they ought to exist at all. General Cotton,
do you agree that your Command's top priorities should actually
be reflected in the budget you submit rather than in an extras
list?
General Cotton. Senator, I think our requirements lists
that we present should be included and covers down, and if our
budget is short, as the Commander, my job is to ensure that I
can execute my mission with the dollars that I have been given.
Senator Warren. All right, so I want to make sure I
understand you here, because you are saying your priorities
should be in the budget and extras should be just that extras,
not your priorities. Is that right?
General Cotton. As a MAJCOM Commander today, my priorities
are in my budget.
Senator Warren. Good. I like to hear that. Look, it is no
secret that both President Biden and I want to reduce the role
of nuclear weapons in our National Security strategy. Spending
$364 billion just on nuclear weapons over the next ten years is
unaffordable.
But I think even my colleagues who disagree with me on
nuclear policy would agree that we should be asking DOD to
write budgets that reflect their actual priorities. That is
what it is I am driving for here and want to make sure that we
do. I look forward to working with you, General.
General Cotton. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Warren.
General, thank you for your testimony, for your service, and we
look forward to rapidly bringing your nomination to a
successful conclusion. Thank you very much.
General Cotton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. With that, I will adjourn the hearing.
[Whereupon, at 11:41 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to General Anthony J. Cotton,
USAF by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and
responsibilities of the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM)?
Answer. The Commander, USSTRATCOM creates plans and conducts
operations to deter strategic attacks against the U.S. and our allies;
and, should deterrence fail, restore deterrence, in concert with the
Joint Force with the goal of defeating our Nation's adversaries. The
Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigns USSTRATCOM eight specific
responsibilities: Strategic Deterrence; Nuclear Operations; Global
Strike; Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations; Missile Defense;
Analysis and Targeting; Missile Threat Assessment, and DOD NC3
Enterprise Lead. These diverse responsibilities are strategic in
nature, global in scope and intertwined with Joint Force capabilities,
the interagency process, and a whole-of-government approach.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that
qualify you to perform the duties and responsibilities of the
Commander, STRATCOM?
Answer. I began my Air Force career over 36 years ago as a
Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missile launch officer
assigned to Strategic Air Command, the predecessor to U.S. Strategic
Command. During my career, I have directly served in three of
USSTRATCOM's eight mission areas: strategic deterrence, nuclear
operations, and global strike. I also have extensive experience with
the nuclear command, control, and communications enterprise, an
essential element to performing these mission areas.
Additionally, I have commanded organizations at all levels, with
each having equities within USSTRATCOM's portfolio. I commanded both
the 341st Missile Wing and 45th Space Wing, Twentieth Air Force, and
currently serve as the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command and
the Joint Force Air Component Commander to USSTRATCOM. All of my
experiences have prepared me to address today's concerns and help work
to solve tomorrow's challenges as the next leader of USSTRATCOM.
It a privilege and an honor to serve this great Nation, and I fully
recognize the complexity of this job in light of the present and
projected global security situation.
Answer. Question. Given the lines of effort set forth in the 2022
National Defense Strategy (NDS), what other duties do you anticipate
the President or the Secretary of Defense might prescribe for you, if
confirmed?
Commander, USSTRATCOM is assigned responsibilities as currently
stipulated in the 2020 Unified Command Plan. The application of
Integrated Deterrence to advance NDS priorities requires an
increasingly robust integration between USSTRATCOM, the other Combatant
Commands and the Interagency. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the combatant commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
other senior military and civilian leaders regarding the duties
assigned to Commander, USSTRATCOM.
Question. In your view, are there other roles or responsibilities
that should be assigned to the Commander, STRATCOM?
Answer. The President's 2020 Unified Command Plan clearly
delineates the responsibilities of Commander, USSTRATCOM. If confirmed,
I will evaluate and assess the command's mission effectiveness and
provide any recommendations, as necessary, regarding USSTRATCOM roles
and responsibilities.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps you need to take
to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities of
the Commander, STRATCOM?
Answer. While I am not an expert in all USSRATCOM responsibilities,
if confirmed, I will endeavor to obtain the requisite expertise across
USSTRATCOM's full portfolio of missions. I look forward to working with
the other combatant commanders, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Secretary of Defense and other senior military and civilian
leaders to ensure mission success and that our strategic deterrent
remains safe, strong, and effective.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what would you do to ensure
that your tenure as Commander, STRATCOM, epitomizes the fundamental
requirement for civilian control of the Armed Forces embedded in the
U.S. Constitution and other laws?
Answer. Civilian control of the Armed Forces is a bedrock principle
founded in the Constitution and applicable laws, and it is the core of
the American civil-military dynamic. If confirmed, I will make it my
priority to fully support civilian leadership by providing expert
advice and an honest perspective. Additionally, I will faithfully
participate in and support the role of congressional oversight, which
is an equally important function to connect the military with the
American people's elected officials.
chain of command and relationships
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands.
Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may
direct communications to combatant commanders through the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
effective chain of command?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view, do these provisions properly effectuate
civilian control of the military? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. The chain of command originates from the President to
the Secretary of Defense, and from the Secretary to combatant command
commanders. If confirmed, I will be a committed advisor to our Nation's
senior military and civilian leaders and execute lawful orders as
directed.
Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is
appropriate for U.S. Military Forces to be under the operational
command or control of an authority other than the chain of command
established under Title 10, U.S. Code?
Answer. No, but if the President or Congress deemed such a change
appropriate, U.S. Military personnel would still be accountable to the
Title 10 chain of command and subject to the Uniform Code of Military
Justice and the Law of Armed Conflict during any operation.
Question. In your view, what factors should be considered in making
recommendations to the Secretary of Defense and the President for the
use of strategic forces and capabilities?
Answer. Factors for consideration are highly situation dependent
but will likely include, but are not limited to, the specific National
security objectives to be achieved; the consequences of employing vice
not employing strategic force; and the anticipated effects of this
action (or non-action) on the vital interests of the United States, its
allies and partners. Any such decision would only be made in accordance
with the principles of Law of Armed Conflict and via a deliberative
process involving the appropriate senior leaders across the government.
Question. The law and traditional practice establish important
relationships between the Commander, STRATCOM, and other senior
officials of the DOD and the U.S. Government. Please describe your
understanding of the relationship of the Commander, STRATCOM, to each
of the following officials:
The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Answer. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the principal
military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, the
Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense. Likewise, for
global military integration, the Chairman advises the Secretary on the
allocation and transfer of forces to address trans-regional, multi-
domain and multifunctional threats. The Chairman is the most senior
Ranking Member of the Armed Forces but does not exercise command
authority over any military forces or serve in the chain of command
between the President and Secretary of Defense and combatant
commanders. The Chairman consults with the combatant commanders, and
evaluates and assists in achieving their requirements and plans.
The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who performs such
duties as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff may prescribe, is
by law the second Ranking Member of the Armed Forces and acts for the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in his absence or disability. If
confirmed, I will work closely with the Chairman and the Vice Chairman,
keeping them informed on all matters for which I am responsible as
commander, USSTRATCOM.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment is responsible to the Secretary of Defense for all matters
pertaining to acquisition; contract administration; logistics and
materiel readiness; installations and environment; operational energy;
nuclear, chemical, and biological defense; the acquisition workforce;
and the defense industrial base. USSTRATCOM works closely with this
office to both sustain current forces and advance the current nuclear
modernization program, as well as advocate for future capabilities to
ensure a safe, secure, reliable, and effective strategic deterrent. The
Under Secretary also chairs the Nuclear Weapons Council of which the
Commander, USSTRATCOM is a member. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the Under Secretary on matters related to USSTRATCOM.
Additionally, if confirmed, I would work with the Undersecretary of
Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment in their role as the NC3
Capability Portfolio Manager and NC3 Principal Staff Assistance to
advocate and field modernized NC3 capabilities.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the
principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense for defense policy and
leads the formulation and coordination of National security policy
within the Department of Defense. The USD(P) ensures the integration of
defense policies and plans to achieve desired objectives, and is also
responsible for strengthening relationships and defense cooperation
with U.S., allies, and partners. These policies, along with other
National-level direction, guide USSTRATCOM strategic planning and
operations.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering.
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USD(R&E)) is the principal staff advisor on all research, engineering,
and technology development activities and programs in the Department.
The USD(R&E) serves as the Department's chief technology officer with
the mission of advancing technology and innovation for the armed
forces, to include advancing those capabilities supporting USSTRATCOM's
assigned mission areas.
In addition, the USD(R&E) has the oversight lead for critical
capabilities managed by defense agencies and field activities with whom
USSTRATCOM regularly interacts, including the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency, Missile Defense Agency, Defense Innovation Unit, and
the Defense Science and Innovation Board offices. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with the Under Secretary for Research and
Engineering on all matters specific to USSTRATCOM.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans,
and Capabilities.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans, and
Capabilities is the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense,
Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
on National Security and Defense Strategy and the capabilities, force,
and contingency plans necessary to implement the Defense Strategy.
The Assistant Secretary supports the Secretary and Deputy Secretary
in providing DOD with guidance to align resources, activities and
capabilities with National Security and Defense Strategy goals, which
influences USSTRATCOM's global force posture, strategic planning, and
operations. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant
Secretary on matters related to the USSTRATCOM portfolio.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy.
Answer. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Space Policy is
responsible for the overall supervision of policy for the Department of
Defense for space warfighting. Their policy portfolio encompasses the
Department's strategic capabilities for integrated deterrence: space,
nuclear weapons, cyber, missile defense, electromagnetic warfare, and
countering weapons of mass destruction. The Assistant Secretary also
serves as the Principal Cyber Advisor to the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Assistant Secretary on
matters related to integrated deterrence, nuclear weapons,
electromagnetic warfare and other missions, as appropriate, within the
USSTRATCOM portfolio.
Question. The Commander, U.S. Northern Command.
Answer. Commander, U.S. Northern Command (USNORTHCOM) is
responsible for Homeland Defense, which is closely tied to USSTRATCOM's
strategic deterrence mission. The Commander, USNORTHCOM, is also the
Commander, North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), which
conducts aerospace warning, aerospace control, and maritime warning in
the defense of North America. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the Commander, USNORTHCOM, to strengthen strategic deterrence and
assure our allies and partners.
Question. The Commander, U.S. Space Command.
Answer. Commander, U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) is responsible
for the planning and execution of global space operations as directed.
USSTRATCOM continues to support USSPACECOM's progress toward Full
Operational Capability.
USSPACECOM provides vital space resources and capabilities to
USSTRATCOM in support of its assigned missions. If confirmed, I will
continue the close collaboration with Commander, USSPACECOM, in matters
affecting both Commands, our Nation, and our allies and partners.
Question. The Commander, U.S. European Command.
Answer. U.S. European Command's (USEUCOM) mission in the European
area of responsibility is to secure and defend the United States and
its allies and partners. In light of the strategic implications of the
recent Russian aggression in Ukraine, this is a vitally important and
critical endeavor. If confirmed, I will work closely with the
Commander, USEUCOM, to achieve mission success and to strengthen
strategic deterrence for our Nation and our allies and partners.
Question. The Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command.
Answer. Commander, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command's (USINDOPACOM)
mission is to secure and defend the United States and its allies, and
partners in the Indo-Pacific area of responsibility. Commander,
USINDOPACOM has a very diverse area of responsibility with a growing
number of strategic challenges, including China's rapid military
expansion. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the Commander,
USINDOPACOM, to achieve mission success and to strengthen strategic
deterrence for our Nation and our allies and partners.
Question. The Director of the Missile Defense Agency.
Answer. The Director, Missile Defense Agency deploys and maintains
an effective and robust layered missile defense system capable of
defending the United States, our allies, and deployed forces. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Director, the Joint
Staff, and the other Combat Commanders to improve missile defense
capabilities and ensure they remain effective against the developing
and increasingly complex missile threats.
Question. The Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration
Answer. By law the Department of Energy's Under Secretary for
Nuclear Security is the Administrator of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA). The Administrator's responsibilities include all
programs and activities necessary to maintain and enhance the safety,
reliability, and performance of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile.
Additionally, the Administrator serves as a principal on the Nuclear
Weapons Council and executes duties of importance to USSTRATCOM, but
remains independent of the Department of Defense's operational control.
If confirmed, I will confer regularly and work closely with the
Administrator.
major challenges
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges you would
confront if confirmed as the Commander, STRATCOM?
Answer. The challenges facing USSTRATCOM are unprecedented. For the
first time in history, the Nation will soon face the need to deter two
nuclear capable competitors who will have the capability to
unilaterally escalate a conflict to any level of violence, in any
domain, worldwide, at any time and with any instrument of national
power. The 2022 NDS directs the Department to act urgently to sustain
and strengthen deterrence, with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as
our most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge
for the Department. Russia also poses acute threats, as illustrated by
its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. This strategic
environment requires an integrated deterrence approach from the Joint
Force, working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters,
spectrum of conflict, other instruments of U.S. national power in our
network of alliances and partnerships.
I fully support modernizing our strategic nuclear deterrent
capabilities across the Triad, the supporting stockpile and
infrastructure, Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications, and our
Integrated Tactical Warning/Attack Assessment capabilities. Many of
these efforts are just-in-time with little to no margin for delay.
As the Commander of Air Force Global Strike Command, I directly
support USSTRATCOM as the Joint Force Air Component Commander by
providing two of the three legs of the Triad. I am confident USSTRATCOM
employs a highly trained and effective strategic deterrent force ready
to respond decisively if called upon.
If confirmed, I will continue existing efforts to deter nuclear
competitors and continue comprehensive assessments to validate force
readiness and the effectiveness of existing efforts to sustain the
existing force and to ensure nuclear modernization plans are realized.
Continuity and oversight of these efforts are critical to ensuring
USSTRATCOM is always postured to deter strategic attacks against the
United States, our allies and partners.
Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to be a strong advocate for our
Nation's strategic forces. I support the need to sustain and modernize
our nuclear Triad and its supporting infrastructure, along with the
continued development of current and future capabilities required to
deter strategic attack in all domains against the U.S., allies, and
partners.
Additionally, if confirmed, I will continue to lead the effort to
modernize and synchronize Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications
and the Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations. I will also work
with the Office of Secretary of Defense, Joint Staff, and other
Combatant Commands to further the development of integrated global
planning, posturing, and operations.
national defense strategy
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) puts forward an
integrated deterrence framework that incorporates the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review (MDR) under the NDS. The
priorities of the strategy are (1) defending the homeland; (2)
deterring strategic attacks against the United States, allies, and
partners; (3) deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in
conflict when necessary, prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-
Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe and (4) building a
resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.
In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the current
strategic environment, including prioritization of the most critical
and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and
its allies? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, in my view, the NDS accurately assesses the security
environment. Outcomes of the NDS reflect close coordination across the
Department, to include with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Question. In your view, does the 2022 NDS correctly specify and
prioritize DOD missions in the context of the current strategic
environment?
Answer. The NDS correctly articulates the Department's priorities
in the current strategic environment. It highlights Integrated
Deterrence as one of the Department's principal approaches to advance
these priorities--working seamlessly across warfighting domains,
theaters, the spectrum of conflict, other instruments of National
power, and our Alliances and partnerships.
Question. In your view, does the 2022 NDS specify the correct set
of capabilities by which the United States can achieve its security
objectives in the face of ongoing competition and potential conflict
with China or Russia? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest
risk?
Answer. The NDS correctly notes that the foundation for deterring
aggression requires building enduring advantages across the DOD,
defense industrial base, private sector and academia to innovate and
modernize the Joint Force to make rapid adjustments meeting the new
strategic demands.
The NDS articulates a vision for the Department to develop, design,
and manage our forces--linking our operational concepts and
capabilities to achieve strategic objectives. This requires a Joint
Force that is lethal, resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and
responsive. China and Russia continue to pose the greatest risk to our
Nation, driving the need to modernize our strategic Triad.
Question. The 2022 NDS integrates the Nuclear Posture and Missile
Defense Reviews as part of an overall ``integrated deterrence''
strategy. What would successful implementation of the 2022 NDS and its
integrated deterrence strategy look like for STRATCOM, in your view?
Answer. For USSTRATCOM, successful implementation of the 2022 NDS
will result in a shared, Department-wide approach to Integrated
Deterrence that enables the planning and execution of tailored
deterrence approaches against two nuclear capable near-peer
adversaries. This framework will also result in enhanced collaboration
with U.S. interagency partners to develop varied means of deterring
aggression alongside our allies and partners. The Department recognizes
deterring strategic attack is an enduring requirement throughout
peacetime, crisis, and conflict.
Question. In your view, are the operational concepts and STRATCOM's
plans to implement them, appropriately focused, scoped, and resourced
to counter the threats and achieve the national security objectives
identified by the NDS?
Answer. The Joint Force's current operational concepts, as well as
USSTRATCOM's plans, are appropriately focused and scoped to achieve NDS
objectives at this time. Should our adversaries shift their strategy
and/or continue to build capability and capacity, we will need to re-
evaluate the currently programmed Joint Force resources.
Question. The 2022 NDS lists ``deterring strategic attacks against
the United States, allies, and partners'' as a priority in its
Strategy. In your view what is meant by the term ``strategic''?
Answer. Strategic attack includes nuclear attack of any scale
directed against the U.S. Homeland or the territory of allies and
partners, whether on the ground, in the air, at sea, or in space. Our
strategy also accounts for existing and emerging non-nuclear threats to
include a narrow range of high consequence, strategic-level attacks.
Question. If confirmed, what changes or adjustments, if any, would
you advise the Secretary of Defense to make in the Department's
implementation of the 2022 NDS?
Answer. I have no changes to recommend at this time. If confirmed,
I will periodically review and provide any recommendations to the
Secretary regarding NDS implementation progress whenever appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, what revisions or adjustments would you
recommend the Secretary of Defense make to the 2022 NDS as a result of
changes in assumptions, policy, or other factors?
Answer. I have no changes to recommend at this time. If confirmed,
I will periodically review and provide any recommendations to the
Secretary regarding NDS implementation progress whenever appropriate.
nuclear modernization and the nuclear posture review
Question. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review states a declaratory
policy that ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of
U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States,
our allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use
of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital
interests of the United States or its allies and partners.'' This is
consistent with the long-standing views of multiple administrations.
Do you support this policy?
Answer. Yes. This policy provides a prudent approach to deterring
the range of strategic attacks in a challenging and increasingly
complex security environment.
Question. Some have argued that instead of ``extreme'' the word
``existential'' should be used to describe the circumstances. What are
your views on this wording?
Answer. I understand that the Nuclear Posture Review working group
examined numerous strategies and related declaratory policy approaches
in undertaking the 2022 NPR, including those using the term
``existential.'' The NPR determined that a policy of continued
calculated ambiguity focused on ``extreme circumstances'' was prudent
given the current security environment. I support the decision made to
select the declaratory policy described in the 2022 NPR.
Question. Given the current geopolitical situation with Russia,
China, North Korea and other rising nuclear powers would you support at
present a ``sole purpose'' or ``no first use'' declaratory policy?
Answer. No. Implementing a ``No First Use'' or ``Sole Use'' policy
would have a detrimental effect on strategic deterrence and our
extended deterrence commitments to our allies and partners. A strategy
of calculated ambiguity, which is supported by our allies, is the most
effective way to deter Russia, China, North Korea or other nuclear
armed adversaries. I understand that the 2022 NPR retains the goal of
moving toward a ``sole purpose'' declaration which will require us to
work with our allies and partners to identify concrete steps that would
allow us to do so.
Question. In your view, how well do the findings and
recommendations of the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review synchronize with the
integrated deterrence framework of the 2022 NDS?
Answer. The NPR and NDS are fully synchronized as they were
developed and published simultaneously.
Question. The 2022 NPR did not support a nuclear armed sea launched
cruise missile, however, other senior military officers, including the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the current
commanders of STRATCOM and U.S. European Command (EUCOM) have testified
that they support continued development of the system. Do you support
the continued development of a nuclear armed sea launched cruise
missile as a means to deter Russia or China?
Answer. U.S. Strategic Command must maintain a range of strategic
military options and capabilities to present to the President in the
event of a contingency. These options and capabilities must be able to
address both current and emerging threats. If confirmed, I will be able
to more fully review the range of options within our nuclear Triad and
how we can continuously improve our ability to deter and, if deterrence
fails, restore deterrence, against our nuclear adversaries. I am aware
of differing perspectives regarding the nuclear armed sea launched
cruise missile. If confirmed, I will analyze the arguments for and
against this program and will provide my best military advice to DOD
military and civilian leadership.
Question. The 2022 NPR did not support maintaining the B83 gravity
bomb to hold hard and deeply buried targets at risk. What are your
views on the B83 gravity bomb as a means to hold hard and deeply buried
targets at risk?
Answer. A comprehensive assessment of our HDBT defeat capabilities
was started following the 2018 NPR and further study was endorsed in
the 2022 NPR. This work, once concluded, can inform our decision on
HDBT defeat capabilities. If confirmed, I look forward to seeing the
results and working with DOD to address the operational concerns
created by the B83-1 retirement.
Question. What are your views on the B61-11 to hold certain classes
of hard and deeply buried targets at risk?
Answer. The B61-11 gravity bomb is effective against a very
specific subset of hard and deeply buried facilities. Retiring the B61-
11 requires addressing these targets using other means compatible with
modern delivery platforms. These means must be effective across a range
of target types and scenarios, and adaptable to meet evolving adversary
threats. If confirmed, I look forward to working with DOD to address
the operational concerns created by the B61-11 retirement.
Question. Are there other nuclear capabilities that should be
considered to signal or further deter Russia or China and their growing
nuclear arsenals?
Answer. Nuclear force structure, capacity and capability must be
continuously evaluated to ensure strategic deterrence remains credible
in support of integrated deterrence. Any identified nuclear capacity
and capability gaps should be addressed as soon as possible to provide
the Joint Force an effective military capability able to achieve
Presidential objectives and to demonstrate national resolve in response
to growing threats.
Question. Do you support reducing the alert level of the deployed
intercontinental ballistic missile force? Why or why not?
Answer. No, I do not support changing our current ICBM alert level.
The ICBM force provides the Nation with a responsive, highly reliable,
and cost effective deterrent capability which is crucial to the
effectiveness of our nuclear Triad. The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review
affirmed our ICBM alert posture is appropriate and contributes to
strategic stability. Any attempt to defeat the hardened and
geographically dispersed ICBM force requires an adversary to execute a
complex strategic attack consisting of hundreds of weapons. An alert
ICBM force reduces any incentives a potential adversary might have to
execute a disarming first strike; this cost-benefit calculus enhances
deterrence.
Question. Do you support the New START Treaty?
Answer. I support any diplomatic solution which enhances the
security of our Nation. To date, New START has contributed to bilateral
stability by limiting the offensive strategic arms it addresses. The
verification regime provides transparency by delivering tangible
information on Russia's strategic capabilities, greatly enhancing our
understanding of their force posture.
However, New START does not address Russia's large and growing
arsenal of non-accountable nuclear weapons and novel nuclear systems.
If confirmed, I would stand ready to offer my best military advice as
to these capabilities and other relevant aspects of a future agreement.
Question. Do you support continued efforts to negotiate a follow-on
treaty to New START that would include Russia and China?
Answer. I support diplomatic efforts to pursue arms control
agreements capturing the full scope of Russian and Chinese nuclear
capabilities, including their nuclear weapons and novel nuclear systems
that are not currently the subject of arms control agreement. Any such
agreements must be verifiable, enforceable, and enhance the security of
our Nation and our allies and partners.
Question. Do you believe the current program of record is
sufficient to support the full modernization of the nuclear Triad,
including delivery systems, warheads, and infrastructure?
Answer. The current program of record is the absolute minimum
USSTRATCOM requires to provide effective strategic deterrence. The 2022
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) affirms previous NPR findings that the
nuclear Triad and the associated nuclear command, control, and
communications system remain the most effective way to maintain
strategic deterrence against existing and future threats. Stable,
consistent, and on-time funding is critical both to sustain the legacy
nuclear Triad and to execute nuclear modernization programs on schedule
in order to deliver the future nuclear deterrence capabilities required
to address rapidly expanding national security threats.
Question. Do you believe the current program of record will provide
adequate capabilities to meet the challenges posed by growing Chinese
and Russian nuclear forces?
Answer. The current program of record is the absolute minimum
USSTRATCOM requires to provide effective strategic deterrence today. As
the threats from Russia and China continue to grow, we must
continuously evaluate our nuclear force structure, capacity, and
capability to ensure strategic deterrence remains credible and
effective. Any identified nuclear capacity and capability gaps should
be addressed as soon as possible to provide the Joint Force an
effective military capability able to achieve Presidential objectives
and to demonstrate national resolve in response to growing threats.
This is a point of continual reevaluation. As the world becomes
more diverse and threatening, we must continuously evaluate our nuclear
force structure, capacity, and capability to ensure strategic
deterrence remains credible. Today, with our current programs of
record, we are in a good place. We are modernizing our systems and
transitioning our nuclear forces and capabilities to ensure our
security. I believe more frequent assessments than the current 4-year
cycle will be required to ensure we can identify, mitigate, and
properly address any gaps in a timely manner, as necessary. If
confirmed, I will make a commander's assessment on the entire strategic
deterrence portfolio to ensure our requirements are sufficient to
address the threat.
Question. What are your ideas for working across the Joint Force to
mitigate the risk that all three legs of the nuclear Triad will ``age
out'' simultaneously at the end of the 2020's?
Answer. Nuclear modernization continues to be a top priority for
the Department of Defense.
The nuclear Triad has credibly deterred adversaries and assured
allies for more than 6 decades. To mitigate the simultaneous transition
risk, we must maintain and sustain our existing nuclear enterprise
until replacement systems are fully fielded. Doing this provides needed
Triad flexibility and offsets risks resulting from unanticipated issues
or emergent challenges. Where possible, we must pursue every
opportunity to accelerate modernization. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Department, the Services, and NNSA to mitigate risks
across the Triad.
Question. Specifically, do you support and intend to advocate for
the funding, development, and fielding of the Long-Range Stand-Off
weapon and the associated W80-4 warhead?
Answer. Yes, development and on-time delivery of the Long Range
Standoff (LRSO) cruise missile and its associated W80-4 warhead is
essential to maintain an effective and credible air-delivered nuclear
deterrent, especially as adversaries deploy advanced digital air-
defense systems. The current Air-Launched Cruise Missile was deployed
at the height of the cold war to evade Soviet-era analog defenses and
will be nearly 50 years old when LRSO is fielded.
Question. Do you support and intend to advocate for the funding,
development, and fielding of the Sentinel intercontinental ballistic
missile weapon system program and the associated W87-1 warhead?
Answer. Yes, I strongly support and will continue to advocate for
both the Sentinel ICBM and Mk21A/W87-1 Reentry Vehicle (RV) programs.
The Air Force continues to successfully execute the Sentinel
recapitalization program, which will provide an effective, reliable,
and low cost ICBM deterrent for decades into the future. Likewise, the
Mk21A/W87-1 program is replacing the aging Mk12A/W78 RV and will deploy
as Sentinel's second RV soon after Sentinel achieves Initial
Operational Capability.
Question. What do you believe is the greatest risk to successful
deployment of the Sentinel program?
Answer. Sentinel is the largest, most complex ICBM recapitalization
program undertaken by the Nation since the 1960's. This multifaceted
development program will challenge Air Force and industry partners in
ways not seen for a generation.
There is no margin left in our legacy Minuteman III ICBM system;
Sentinel must deliver on time to avoid any capability gaps in the land-
based leg of the Triad. Therefore, the greatest risk to the Sentinel
program would be a lack of stable, consistent, and on-time funding,
which is critical to fielding this program on schedule.
The Sentinel program has met every acquisition milestone to date,
but the program is starting to see follow-on effects from the COVID
pandemic. Supply chain issues are making it hard to get materials and
hardware on the original forecasted schedule and costs. Additionally,
we face challenges in meeting the required ramp increases in contractor
workforce and government manpower. Both the Prime contractor and the AF
are assessing these challenges and assessing impacts to the program.
Question. The Nuclear Weapons Council has laid out a schedule for
modernization of the nuclear weapons stockpile over the next 20 years.
This schedule involves multiple warhead life extension and replacement
programs, in addition to maintenance of the existing stockpile systems.
Is this schedule--and the program priorities it establishes--
appropriate in your view?
Answer. Yes, the Nuclear Weapons Council stockpile plans provide a
prioritized, long-term vision aligned with the 2022 Nuclear Posture
Review and the National Defense Strategy.
Question. Are the multiple components of the nuclear modernization
plan appropriately sequenced and scoped to meet the operational needs
of the STRATCOM commander?
Answer. Yes, the multiple components of the nuclear modernization
plan are appropriately sequenced and scoped as highlighted in National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) production planning documents
for the stockpile and Service delivery system acquisition strategies
and plans. Integrated DOD and NNSA priorities for nuclear stockpile,
infrastructure, and delivery system modernization programs will
continue to meet USSTRATCOM's current and projected operational
requirements.
While today's stockpile is safe, secure, and militarily effective,
concerns exist as many replacement programs are just-in-time or late to
need. Even though the nuclear modernization plan sequences the
components in a logical and prioritized manner, stockpile and weapon
system modernizations must execute on time to address this concern.
Continued stable, consistent, and on-time funding is critical to
delivering the future nuclear deterrence capabilities required to
address rapidly expanding national security threats.
Question. In your view, does the Stockpile Stewardship Program
provide the tools necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the
nuclear weapons stockpile without testing? If not, what tools are
needed?
Answer. Yes, the Stockpile Stewardship Program relies on state-of-
the-art supercomputers, large-scale scientific facilities, and
workforce expertise. NNSA advanced science and technology programs
enable the Nation to sustain the deterrent well beyond projected
lifetimes without testing. Continued support for the science,
technology and engineering base is crucial for the viability of the
Stockpile Stewardship mission.
Question. In your view, what priority should be attached to
programs to modernize and replace critical infrastructure of the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)? On what timeline
should these programs be executed, in your view?
Answer. Consistent with the NDS emphasis on building enduring
advantage, NNSA infrastructure modernization must be prioritized and
accomplished now to prevent delays in fielding required capabilities.
Question. Do you support the long-standing STRATCOM requirement for
NNSA to produce no fewer than 80 plutonium pits per year by 2030?
Answer. There is a statutory requirement for NNSA to re-establish a
credible pit production capability by 2030 (50 USC 2538a). NNSA has
notified Congress this date will not be met. USSTRATCOM supports all
ongoing efforts to realize pit production as close to 2030 as is
possible. There are three factors driving the need to establish a
capability to deliver at least 80 plutonium pits per year to the
stockpile: 1) replacement of aging pits in the stockpile; 2)
modernization of stockpile systems to enable improved margins, safety,
and security; and 3) risk mitigation to address unforeseen technical
issues in the stockpile.
Question. What do you intend to do to mitigate the risk that,
according to the NNSA's own analysis, none of the considered options
for plutonium pit production seem likely to meet the 2030 requirement?
Answer. Risk mitigation measures include evaluating options to
reuse newer legacy pits produced prior to the 1990 Rocky Flats closure.
Reuse will allow future stockpile modernization programs to continue
near-term. Additionally, expanded scientific studies are planned to
better inform on the impacts of pit aging within our primary systems.
However, reuse limits opportunities to improve modernized stockpile
systems safety, security, and effectiveness and does not address aging
issues over the long term.
stratcom readiness
Question. How would you assess STRATCOM's current readiness to
execute the 2022 NDS and STRATCOM's operational concepts and plans?
Answer. In my current position as the Joint Forces Air Component
Commander to Commander, USSTRATCOM, I can State from firsthand
experience USSTRATCOM is ready to execute its assigned
responsibilities. Within Air Force Global Strike Command, we conduct
continuous operations in accordance with operational concepts and plans
to support the National Defense Strategy. While the aging weapon
systems generate readiness challenges, USSTRATCOM remains postured to
execute its plans and conduct Joint Force operations. If confirmed, I
will assess USSTRATCOM's other mission areas to evaluate ways to
further improve its readiness to execute the 2022 NDS and USSTRATCOM's
operational concepts and plans.
Question. What is your assessment of the risk that STRATCOM has
accepted in regard to its readiness to execute operational concepts and
plans in furtherance of the 2022 NDS and the 2022 Nuclear Posture
Review?
Answer. The preponderance of risk in implementing the 2022 NDS and
NPR comes in the form of current and future risk. This risk is
mitigated via the application of the NDS concept of Integrated
Deterrence which relies on all instruments of National power to
influence an adversary's decision calculus. We must maintain the
readiness of our current fielded forces while protecting the timelines
of modernization programs of record.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address any gaps or
shortfalls in STRATCOM's ability to meet the demands placed on it by
the 2022 NDS and the operational concepts and plans that implement the
strategy especially with respect to the growing non-strategic arsenal
of Russia and the rise of China's nuclear deterrent?
Answer. In my current position as the Joint Forces Air Component
Commander to the Commander, USSTRATCOM, I have experience balancing the
sustainment of legacy systems while continuing to develop modernization
programs to meet the demands of the NDS. If confirmed, I will continue
to evaluate whether USSTRATCOM has any gaps or deficiencies in our
ability to meet those demands and develop mitigation strategies for
identified shortfalls. As the threat environment evolves, including
Russia's non-strategic arsenal and China's nuclear capabilities, we
will remain aware of any potential USSTRATCOM gaps or shortfalls.
stratcom organization and missions
Question. STRATCOM's missions have shifted substantially over the
last 5 years, with the transition of U.S. Cyber Command to a unified
combatant command, the transfer of the combatting weapons of mass
destruction mission to U.S. Special Operations Command, and the stand-
up of U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) as a Unified Combatant Command.
Do you believe that the current organization structure of STRATCOM
is the most effective means for carrying out its mission?
Answer. Yes. As Commander of the Service and Functional Component
Command for Air Forces assigned to USSTRATCOM, I am confident the
command is properly organized to successfully carry out all UCP-
assigned missions. In my Component Commander role, I have had several
discussions with ADM Richard regarding his ongoing comprehensive study
and assessment USSTRATCOM's organizational structure and processes.
This assessment is crucial to maintaining readiness today, while
enabling the Command's ability to adapt to the continually evolving
threat. If confirmed, I will continue this analysis to ensure
USSTRATCOM maintains the leading edge of strategic deterrence and
readiness.
Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider
providing to the Secretary of Defense regarding STRATCOM missions,
organization, and operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would focus upon optimizing the integration
and phasing of USSTRATCOM capabilities across all instruments of
National power. To do so, we must continue efforts across the
Department, interagency, industry, and academia to rapidly develop and
field innovative technologies for the Joint Force. Collaboration will
decrease the time it takes to prototype and field these next-generation
systems from research labs to the warfighters.
Question. What are your views in transferring STRATCOM's missile
defense mission to SPACECOM?
Answer. The Department must streamline command and control, while
removing seams from missions such as missile defense and space domain
awareness, and improving the use of high demand multi-mission sensors.
If confirmed, I look forward to continuing the close collaboration in
this mission area with Commander, USSPACECOM, in matters affecting both
Commands, our Nation, and our allies and partners.
Question. What is STRATCOM's long-term role with respect to
conventional prompt strike systems as compared to other combatant
commands such as U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) or EUCOM?
Answer. USSTRATCOM has a long-standing requirement for a highly
responsive, non-nuclear global strike capability to hold distant,
defended, and/or time-critical threats at risk without crossing the
nuclear use threshold. Conventional hypersonic strike weapons (HSWs)
directly support the USSTRATCOM's Unified Campaign Plan assigned
missions of Strategic Deterrence and Global Strike.
USSTRATCOM is preparing to command and control HSWs the day they
are fielded, and the Command is working with other Combatant Commands
to establish concepts of operations and mission execution tactics,
techniques and procedures. HSWs will bolster the overall strategic
deterrence posture by providing senior leadership and Combatant
Commands additional strike options to achieve theater and national
objectives during all stages of conflict.
Question. Do you believe STRATCOM should continue to be responsible
for electronic warfare or should it be transferred to another combatant
command or as a Chairman's Directed Activity?
Answer. Before considering moving the electromagnetic warfare (EW)
mission, USSTRATCOM needs to complete the foundational work of
organizing and operationalizing EW for the Department to ensure it
receives the proper attention that has been lacking for a considerable
period of time. To date, the Secretary of Defense directed USSTRATCOM
to stand up a 2-star led direct reporting unit responsible for raising
the readiness of the Joint Force. Much work remains to be done. If
confirmed, I will continue the efforts required to achieve
electromagnetic spectrum superiority.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself
in coordinating with the Commander, SPACECOM, to advocate for space
programs critical to missile defense, missile warning, and nuclear
capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work directly with Commander,
USSPACECOM to advocate for space capabilities supporting all
USSTRATCOM's assigned missions, including those capabilities enabling
strategic deterrence, nuclear operations (missile warning, protected
communications, and nuclear command, control, and communications),
joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, global strike, and missile
defense.
Question. STRATCOM retains responsibility for the integrity of the
Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/AA) System. Yet,
U.S. Space Command has assumed responsibility for the ground and space
sensors, the Missile Warning Center, and the Combatant Commander's
Integrated Command and Control System, which fuses the data from these
sensors.
Specifically, what would you do, if confirmed, to ensure that these
ITW/AA elements of the missile warning mission are not lost or degraded
between STRATCOM and SPACECOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work directly with Commander,
USSPACECOM to advocate for ITW/AA capabilities essential to
USSTRATCOM's strategic deterrence mission and necessary to address
evolving threats. I will also continue to monitor and ensure the
integrity of all systems through a set of processes that ensure the
resourcing, operational certification, system integration, and end-to-
end testing support the ITW/AA system.
Question. What long-term role do you see for non-traditional ITW/AA
sensors as part of a missile warning architecture?
Answer. Efforts to integrate non-traditional ITW/AA sensors are
critical to meeting the challenges posed by adversaries. Utilizing all
available real-time data provides more accurate and relevant warning
data to better characterize threats to the homeland, deployed forces,
and allies worldwide. Non-traditional ITW/AA sensors ensure combatant
commanders have the needed information to recommend the most
appropriate and proportional response to national leadership.
uclear command, control, and communications
Question. In response to a task from the Secretary of Defense in
the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, the Commander, STRATCOM, directed the
creation of the Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications Enterprise
Center, housed under the STRATCOM J6.
What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of the
NC3 Enterprise Center?
Answer. As the NC3 Enterprise Lead for the Department of Defense,
the Commander, USSTRATCOM is responsible for overseeing and managing
day-to-day operations, assessing enterprise risk, defining NC3
enterprise level requirements, and directing enterprise systems
engineering and integration. The NC3 Enterprise Center (NEC) brings a
Defense-wide view approach to NC3 while designing and developing the
next generation of NC3 Enterprise architecture over the coming decade.
Question. How will you address the inherent challenge associated
with housing a systems engineering and architecture organization within
a warfighting combatant command?
Answer. The NC3 Enterprise Lead leverages Services' engineering and
architecture expertise and associated ties already established by
former DISA Joint Systems Engineering and Integration Office. Systems
Engineering and Integration (SEI) now reports to the NC3 Enterprise
Center (NEC) and their manpower transitioned in October 2020. The NEC's
governance structure mitigates any associated challenges.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the NC3 Enterprise Center and the Military Services that procure,
operate, and maintain various NC3 systems?
Answer. Services and Combat Support Agencies (CSAs) remain
responsible for delivering the NC3 capabilities needed to execute NC2
operations. If confirmed, as NC3 Enterprise Lead, I will provide the
Services and CSAs with overarching NC3 enterprise requirements,
engineering, operations, and planning guidance to inform their systems
requirements development, resource planning, reporting and engineering.
Question. How would disagreement between STRATCOM and the Air Force
or Navy on the utility of a particular NC3 system be resolved, in your
view? How does the new organization differ from the prior Combatant
Command-Service relationship?
Answer. Under the new construct, disagreements on the utility of a
particular NC3 system will be addressed during regular engagements with
the Combat Support Agencies through venues such as quarterly Systems
Engineering Authorities Board, semi-annual operational risk management
meeting, and annual Deputy's Management Action Group sessions. These
additional forums provide multiple opportunities to address any
concerns.
Gap identification, requirements, and NC3 capability development
responsibilities previously dispersed throughout the Department have
been consolidated under the NC3 Enterprise Lead, providing a more
focused effort.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the NC3 Enterprise Center and the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition and Sustainment, given its role as the NC3 Capability
Portfolio Manager?
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment (USD (A&S)) serves as the NC3 Capability Portfolio Manager
and NC3 Principal Staff Assistant with increased responsibilities for
resources and acquisition. In this capacity, USD (A&S) supports the NC3
Enterprise Lead by executing day-to-day management of the NC3 portfolio
and advising on acquisition, mitigation options and prioritization. The
NC3 Enterprise Center's day-to-day efforts within the operations
management, enterprise requirements, and next generation divisions
provide vital data to USD (A&S) to enable programmatic risk assessment
and analysis of current and future enterprise capabilities.
Question. What is your understanding of the relationship between
the NC3 Enterprise Center and the Defense Information Systems Agency?
Answer. As a Combat Support Agency (CSA), Defense Information
Systems Agency retains program management of key NC3 infrastructure
programs, such as Defense Red Switch Network and Crisis Management
System. If confirmed, as the NC3 Enterprise Lead, I will provide the
Services and CSAs with overarching NC3 enterprise requirements,
engineering, operations, and planning guidance to inform their systems
requirements development, resource planning, reporting and engineering.
Question. What is your understanding of the continued role of the
Council on National Leadership Command, Control, and Communications
Systems as it relates to STRATCOM and the NC3 Enterprise Center?
Answer. The Council serves as the oversight and synchronization
body for the broader National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC)
Enterprise, such as Continuity of Operations (COOP)/Continuity of
Government (COG) and senior leader communications. The Council makes
prioritization decisions among competing NLCC interests. The NC3
Enterprise Lead represents and advocates for the NC3 stakeholders to
the Council.
Question. In your view, is the NC3 Enterprise Center authorized the
appropriate number of people, in the appropriate occupational
specialties and skill sets, to accomplish its mission?
Answer. Yes, the NC3 Enterprise Center, through the Joint Manpower
Validation Board process, has been authorized an appropriate number of
billets with the requisite occupational specialties and skillsets.
However, full resourcing of validated positions has yet to occur. There
are challenges to develop, recruit, and retain necessary talent in
Federal service, especially as the private sector competes for the same
skills. If confirmed, I will pursue multiple approaches to obtain the
required NC3 manpower, to include the recruitment of talent from
academia, private-public partnerships, and industry.
Question. If confirmed, how would you use your new role to advocate
for the modernization of NC3 systems?
Answer. NC3 modernization must remain a top DOD priority. If
confirmed, I will serve as both CDRUSSTRATCOM and the NC3 Enterprise
Lead. Through the authorities of these distinct but related positions,
I will work to ensure NC3 capabilities meet national objectives and
those capabilities are adequately resourced. I will also continue to
work closely with the Joint Staff, Services, and other stakeholders to
execute NC3 modernization requirements and advocate for the rapid
delivery of threat-based NC3 capabilities to enable our Triad.
Question. Do you believe the NC3 Enterprise Center should have a
limited systems acquisition capability or demonstration or validation
of concepts that normally would not be undertaken by the services?
Answer. If confirmed, I would defer on recommending changes in
assigned responsibilities until I have had the opportunity to
thoroughly evaluate and assess the command's mission effectiveness in
the context of an evolving global security environment.
Question. What is your unclassified assessment of NC3 centers for
cybersecurity of the NC3 system?
Answer. The overall cyber mission assurance of the nuclear
deterrent remains high due to a mixture of cybersecurity improvements,
the isolation of numerous systems, and redundancies within the Nuclear
Command and Control System (NCCS). However, with crucial modernization
efforts ongoing or planned for many NCCS components combined with
adversary interest into our critical nuclear systems, we must continue
to strengthen the cyber resiliency of our critical systems to ensure
the constant readiness of the Nation's nuclear deterrent.
nuclear weapons council
Question. If confirmed, you would become a member of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, together with the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff; the Under Secretaries of Defense for Policy, Acquisition and
Sustainment, and Research and Engineering; and the Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration.
If confirmed, what would be your priorities for the Nuclear Weapons
Council?
Answer. I support the Nuclear Weapons Council's (NWC) enduring
priority to maintain a safe, secure, effective, and ready nuclear
capability for the Nation. The Nation now faces a convergence of
simultaneous modernization efforts across Triad delivery platforms,
weapons, and infrastructure. If confirmed, my priority would be to
buildupon previous NWC success collaboratively with other principals to
ensure the enterprise executes programs on time, within budget
constraints, in order to sustain legacy systems and field modernized
capabilities.
Additionally, consistent with the NDS assertion that the foundation
for deterring aggression is building enduring advantage, I would
prioritize development of the necessary modern research and production
facilities and retain trained people to sustain the force. The Nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile is underpinned by a resilient and responsive
production infrastructure and robust science and technology programs.
All of these elements are critical to maintaining a safe, secure, and
effective deterrent force.
Question. In your view, what challenges does the Nuclear Weapons
Council face over the next 4 years, and what would you do to address
these challenges?
Answer. The next 4 years mark a critical juncture as we enter a
multi-decade period of increased risk to the Triad and across the
stockpile. There are comprehensive modernization requirements across
the nuclear weapons enterprise addressing aging nuclear weapons
stockpile, re-establishing critical nuclear infrastructure
capabilities, and executing Service delivery system acquisition
programs.
Consistent with the NDS assertion that the foundation for deterring
aggression is building enduring advantage, continued success is
contingent on building a robust and resilient infrastructure to include
plutonium pit production, uranium and lithium processing, and increased
non-nuclear production capabilities. Maintaining confidence in our
weapons hinges on having the necessary modern facilities and skilled
workforce to sustain the deterrent force.
If confirmed, I look forward to participating in executing these
responsibilities to ensure USSTRATCOM has a safe, secure, effective and
reliable stockpile.
STRATCOM is an integral part of the annual certification process
for the safety, security, and effectiveness of U.S. nuclear weapons.
Question. Would you recommend any changes in STRATCOM's role in the
annual certification process, or the process generally?
Answer. If confirmed, I will receive copies of annual assessments
from each of the national security laboratory Directors and inputs from
USSTRATCOM's team of experts to support the annual assessment letter.
This process has proven to be an effective tool for identifying
stockpile issues of concern. At this time, I have no recommendations
for change.
nuclear enterprise review
Question. In 2014, then-Secretary of Defense Hagel directed a
comprehensive review of the DOD nuclear enterprise in response to
adverse incidents involving U.S. nuclear forces and their senior
leadership. The report included recommendations to address management
of personnel, attend to security requirements, increase senior leader
attention, promote culture change, and numerous other concerns. The
monitoring of the implementation of corrective actions has been
transferred from OSD back to the Services. If confirmed, you will be
arguably the most visible advocate for the servicemembers responsible
for executing STRATCOM's mission.
In your view, are the Military Services maintaining appropriate
focus on implementing the corrective actions required by the Nuclear
Enterprise Review?
Answer. Yes. The Services are actively engaged in addressing the
items identified from the 2014 nuclear enterprise reviews. The
Department chartered a body comprised of members from the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, Services, Joint Staff, and Combatant Commands to
oversee completion of the corrective actions. The Service Secretaries
and Chiefs personally participate in update briefings to the Deputy
Secretary of Defense on at least an annual basis. This construct
ensures continued senior level awareness and involvement.
Question. What progress has been made to date to correct the
deficiencies identified by the Hagel review?
Answer. The Deputy Secretary of Defense-chaired Nuclear Deterrence
Enterprise Review Group tracks completion of tasks identified by
Secretary of Defense Hagel's comprehensive review. Progress has been
made in advocating for modernized nuclear forces, updating security
rules to accurately reflect modern threats and weapons system
vulnerabilities, and actively engaging nuclear enterprise professionals
at all levels to promote a positive culture necessary to field a
credible nuclear deterrent.
Question. What are the most important tasks that remain to be done,
in your view?
Answer. We must continue to advocate for the on-time fielding of
modernized Triad forces and Nuclear Command, Control, and
Communications capabilities and require active engagement from
leadership at all levels to prevent repeating past mistakes. Doing so
ensures we have a ready force able to meet future challenges.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that attention and
focus on the morale and welfare of the servicemembers executing and
supporting STRATCOM's mission is maintained?
Answer. If confirmed, I am committed to engaging all levels of
USSTRATCOM and other elements of the nuclear enterprise from
operations, maintenance, and security personnel at the unit-level to
scientists and engineers at the National Laboratories to ensure a
sustainable and effective nuclear deterrent.
relationship with the geographic combatant commands
Question. If confirmed how should STRATCOM work with EUCOM to deter
Russia and the threat of non-strategic nuclear weapons with respect to
NATO and our European allies? How should STRATCOM work with INDOPACOM
to achieve similar objectives with regard to China and United States
Pacific allies?
Answer. USSTRATCOM should continue to work very closely with
USEUCOM and USINDOPACOM to implement the National Defense Strategy
central idea of Integrated Deterrence. If confirmed, I will maintain
the already strong relationships between the organizations at all
levels. Additionally, I will work diligently to share concepts, plans,
and operations, and advocate for the capabilities required to most
effectively enhance security of the United States and our allies and
partners.
Question. More broadly, if confirmed, how will you work with the
Commanders of both EUCOM and INDOPACOM to enable theater nuclear
planning capabilities?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to work aggressively to implement
National Defense Strategy's central idea of Integrated Deterrence. With
regards to planning, I will work closely with my fellow Combatant
Commanders to focus efforts integrating and synchronizing global plans,
including nuclear planning.
missile defense
Question. What is your understanding of the roles and
responsibilities of the STRATCOM commander related to missile defense?
Answer. The 2020 Unified Command Plan assigned a broad range of
responsibilities to USSTRATCOM which are further elaborated by
Department guidance. USSTRATCOM is currently the designated combatant
command for leading trans-regional missile defense planning, providing
operations support, and advocating for capabilities. As missile threats
around the globe continue to expand, these responsibilities will become
increasingly important.
Question. What do you believe to be the appropriate function of the
Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated Missile Defense?
Answer. The Joint Functional Component Command for Integrated
Missile Defense (JFCC IMD) leads and assesses global missile defense
planning in support of USSTRATCOM and regional Combatant Commands
(CCMDs). JFCC IMD provides subject matter expertise across the missile
defense enterprise in matters of operational support, policy, strategy,
joint training, and education.
JFCC IMD also supports advocacy for the warfighters' global missile
defense requirements through engagement and partnering with the Missile
Defense Agency, other Agencies, Services, CCMDs, and allies and
partners. I believe these functions are appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you anticipate playing in
representing the views and advocating for the needs of the Combatant
Commanders for missile defense capabilities, and how do you believe the
warfighter perspective should inform the U.S. missile defense program?
Answer. The Unified Command Plan directs Commander, USSTRATCOM, to
advocate for missile defense. USSTRATCOM accomplishes this through a
collaborative Warfighter Involvement Process, providing critical
warfighter perspective. USSTRATCOM advocates for capabilities needed to
successfully execute operational plans.
Question. The United States enjoys a measure of protection against
ballistic missile threats from rogue nations like North Korea and Iran,
but the threat from Russian and Chinese ballistic, cruise, and
hypersonic missiles against United States Forces, allies, and the U.S.
Homeland continues to grow. The 2022 Missile Defense Review (MDR)
codified existing policy on missile defense and endorsed follow-on
actions to improve U.S. capability.
What are your views on the relationship between missile defense and
nuclear deterrence?
Answer. Missile defense and nuclear deterrence are both critical
elements of Integrated Deterrence. The nuclear deterrent is
foundational to deterring strategic attack and the use of nuclear
weapons against the U.S. and our allies and partners. Missile defense
diminishes adversary confidence that a missile attack against the U.S.
or our allies or partners will be successful.
A robust, credible layered missile defense system, paired with our
conventional and nuclear forces, enhances the ability to deter
strategic attacks, deny benefits, and impose costs against any
potential adversary.
Question. If confirmed as Commander, STRATCOM, what priorities
would you recommend for U.S. missile defense capabilities for the
Homeland?
Answer. The Department must prioritize the ability to find, fix,
and track inbound ballistic, cruise, and hypersonic missiles. Deploying
responsive, persistent, resilient, and cost-effective sensor-to-shooter
capabilities, combined with a robust command and control network, is
required to address the range of emerging threats.
Question. Do you believe over the long-term that Hawaii should have
a missile defense radar capability based on the growing threat from
North Korea?
Answer. My understanding is the current programs of record
providing defense for Hawaii include capabilities such as Sea-based X-
band Radar (SBX), Long Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) and the Army/
Navy Transportable Radar Surveillance (AN/TPY-2).
If confirmed, I look forward to learning more about the specific
missile defense requirements for Hawaii, and will work with the Missile
Defense Agency and the Department to see how the current programs of
record and future space-based capabilities can best be utilized.
Question. Do you believe the current ground-based interceptor fleet
is appropriately sized to address potential ICBM threats from North
Korea and other rogue nations?
Answer. The current Ground Based Interceptors (GBI) fleet has the
capability to defend the United States from a limited threat from North
Korea and other rogue nations. If confirmed, I will support the Missile
Defense Agency, fellow Combatant Commands, and the Department to assess
and appropriately size the future GBI fleet.
Question. Do you support the deployment of the Next Generation
Interceptors (NGI) as a means to address the long-term threat posed by
North Korea?
Answer. I support the development of NGI. If confirmed, I will work
with Commander, USNORTHCOM and other stakeholders on the need for the
NGI program and other capabilities required to defend the homeland as a
means to address the long-term threat posed by North Korea.
Question. If the NGI program is demonstrated to be operationally
effective, would you support eventually replacing the current Ground
Based Interceptors with a common fleet of NGI interceptors?
Answer. The Next Generation Interceptor (NGI) is designed to
increased performance parameters and provide higher reliability,
allowing the United States to pace and stay ahead of anticipated North
Korean and rogue nation threats. If NGI performs as advertised, I would
support a Departmental decision to replace the Ground Based
Interceptors.
Question. In your view, are there additional steps that DOD could
take to improve United States and allied defenses against North Korea's
missile capabilities?
Answer. Integrated Air and Missile Defense coordination, including
the critical areas of sensing and threat tracking, plays an important
role in improving interoperability while mitigating adversary
capabilities. The Department must continue integration efforts with
regional partners and allies to increase technical interoperability,
defense burden sharing, and improve command and control for the more
efficient use of limited high-demand low-density defensive
capabilities.
Question. Do you agree that a space-based sensor layer is a
required next step to enable a wide variety of missile defense
capabilities, including improved tracking and targeting of advanced
threats?
Answer. Yes. Emerging complex missile threats, such as hypersonic
weapons, were designed to evade legacy detection systems through speed,
maneuverability, and with relatively lower signatures. A space-based
sensor layer would provide launch-to-target tracking, facilitate
detection, and support defense against hypersonic missiles.
If confirmed, I will work closely with USSPACECOM and USNORTHCOM to
track and target threats to the Nation, and with Missile Defense Agency
and Space Development Agency to advance and expand space-based sensors
and boost-phase defense capabilities. Our approach must integrate
active missile defense and advanced technologies to neutralize missile
threats.
Question. What are your views on the efficacy of space-based
interceptor capabilities?
Answer. Space-based interceptors may provide the opportunity to
engage offensive missiles when they are most vulnerable--during the
initial boost phase of flight, and before countermeasures are deployed.
If confirmed, I will engage stakeholders to continue discussions on the
cost and technical feasibility of this potential capability.
Question. What are your views on the efficacy of boost-phase
intercept systems?
Answer. Boost-phase intercept concepts have great potential, and
the Department has been exploring how to resolve the challenges
associated with threat system engagement at this point in the launch
sequence. The need for persistent space and terrestrial sensor
integration, pursuit of kill technologies like High Energy Laser/
Directed Energy, non-kinetic weapons, and the policies permitting rapid
engagement, are important to successful boost-phase intercept. If
confirmed, I will engage stakeholders in discussions to ensure a
thorough examination of these concepts.
Question. Has DOD developed and implemented operational concepts,
plans, and policies appropriate to the governance and utilization of
space-based and boost-phase intercept programs? What would you do to
address this issue, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would support the Department's efforts to
examine concepts and technologies for both space-based and boost-phase
intercept programs. Operational concepts, plans, and policies would be
developed in parallel as space-based and boost-phased intercept
programs are potentially designed and fielded.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to ensure that
any missile defense system that is deployed is both operationally
effective and cost-effective?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the Missile Defense Agency,
the Services, and Joint Staff to ensure missile defense requirements
are met through capability and utility assessments, operationally
relevant tests and evaluations, and life cycle cost estimates to enable
sustainment and meet mission plans.
electronic warfare and spectrum operations
Question. STRATCOM is the designated combatant command for
synchronizing electronic warfare, as well as for ensuring the
warfighter has adequate spectrum resources to conduct operations.
What are the major issues associated with joint electronic warfare
operations, in your view?
Answer. Assured access to, and freedom of maneuver within the
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) continues to atrophy. The Department has
taken initial steps, such as developing the EMS Superiority Strategy,
in order to gain and maintain superiority in a contested and congested
electromagnetic operational environment. Presently, joint
electromagnetic warfare is rebuilding capability and force structure,
but we need to move faster. There is still much to do to have a truly
integrated Joint Force; having unitary and dedicated Department EMS
operations governance would provide a cohesive and preferred solution.
Question. In your view, should STRATCOM be responsible for
synchronizing non-kinetic fires for the geographic combatant
commanders? If so, how should STRATCOM accomplish this mission?
Answer. No. The affected Combatant Commander and the provider of
the non-kinetic fires should have synchronization responsibilities.
Question. Do you believe the Department has adequate simulation
capability to test joint electronic warfare operations?
Answer. No. Due to the congested nature of the electromagnetic
spectrum, the ability to conduct open-air testing is constrained. There
are few ranges where advanced electromagnetic warfare testing can take
place; these locations are often forced to cease testing due to
unintended interference. These challenges impact the way the Joint
Force trains. Despite renewed emphasis and efforts to fund and fix, the
Department's simulation capability is still limited. Past Departmental
initiatives such as Electronic Warfare Infrastructure Improvement Plan
are being fielded on our test and training ranges. Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency is investigating closed-loop simulation, which
may provide the capability needed to conduct such simulations.
Question. Do you believe the Department has adequate exercise
capability to train the Joint Force electronic warfare threats and
operations?
Answer. No. As demonstrated in recent exercises, deficiencies
continue to be repeated, which range from the lack of the availability
of high-end training equipment to the infrequency of training
opportunities across the force. Training deficiencies, coupled with
shortcomings in Blue force capabilities, contribute to the force's
inability to maintain previous EMS advantages. Additionally, free-air
ranges are atrophying in both size and transmission authorization.
Alternate methods to train the force to operate in a contested and
complex EMS throughout all domains must be explored.
Question. Do you believe that DOD has adequately integrated
electronic warfare operations into its operational plans?
Answer. No. While we are making progress in advancing
electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) operations, including electromagnetic
warfare, across the Department, there is still much work to be done.
Integrating EMS into our operational plans requires understanding how
EMS operations impact all weapons and systems. Spectrum-dependent
systems are the norm now, and how these systems are employed must be
carefully planned to account for any countermeasures effect.
Question. What are the major spectrum issues facing DOD with regard
to its ability to conduct operations?
Answer. The spectrum is increasingly constrained by commercial use,
limiting the Department's ability to conduct operations against rapidly
evolving threats. Wherever possible, we must achieve a balance to
advance new virtual approaches enhancing joint electromagnetic warfare
capabilities without dependence on open-air spectrum access.
The Department is seeking solutions to provide situational
awareness across the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), and for command
and control of offensive and defensive EMS operations, training, and
testing across all domains and mission areas.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
ensure that the Department continues to have access to the spectrum
necessary to train and conduct operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I would continue to advocate on behalf of the
Department for spectrum access, including microwave, infrared, and
ultraviolet bands for training and operations.
We must consolidate departmental efforts to maintain and retain
Electromagnetic spectrum (EMS) superiority. This requires joint
collaboration on requirements for future EMS/electromagnetic warfare
capabilities. The Services should leverage and develop capabilities
that are interoperable across the Department.
Evaluating and addressing the impacts of private sector spectrum
competition is critical to DOD training and operations. Developing an
analytical capability to rapidly assess potential impacts to programs
from EMS auctions must be a priority. Additionally, we must engage with
other Federal agencies to advocate for required spectrum to ensure the
Department can operate without interference. The DOD must ensure
spectrum access to meet its EMS requirements-based needs.
EMS operations pervade every military domain, across all Joint
Functions, and throughout the entire range of military operations. We
must properly train and equip the Services and Joint Force to ensure
success.
dod senior official education and training
Question. In your view, do a sufficient number of General/Flag
officers and members of the Senior Executive Services (SES) have the
advanced training, academic degrees, and expertise in scientific and
technical disciplines needed to lead the future Joint Force and the
scientific/technical civilian workforce?
Answer. Yes. As the threat advances, the future fight will become
increasingly technologically complex using interconnected multi-domain
architectures, data-based tools, and other advanced capabilities. We
must foster the development of senior leaders with insights into the
advantages and limitations of these military technologies. If
confirmed, I will foster the development of tech-savvy senior leaders.
Question. Are the career paths for General/Flag officers and SES
with technical skills sufficient to ensure that DOD and its Components
can develop capability performance requirements that will counter
rapidly changing technological threats, execute complex acquisition
programs, and make informed investment decisions? If not, what would
you do to address this deficiency, if confirmed?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will work with the Department, Joint
Staff, and other stakeholders to ensure senior leaders continue to
receive the training, advice, and assistance they need to continue to
do so. We must continue to evolve as industry and technology evolves.
Question. In your view do current General/Flag officer and SES
assignment policies incentivize highly qualified senior leaders to
serve in scientific and technical programs? If not, what changes do you
believe are necessary to incentivize qualified senior leaders to seek
assignment to such positions and duties?
Answer. Yes. The Air Force assesses officers with STEM degrees and
then provides continual critical thinking and professional leadership
development at key increments throughout their career. This continual,
targeted development ensures we have a pool of highly qualified and
experienced military senior leaders. While we develop senior civilians
in a similar manner, we also have the added flexibility to hire some of
our SES talent based on unique STEM skills and continue to provide
executive leadership education and training courses targeted toward
strategic executive competencies. If confirmed, I will work with OSD,
Joint Staff, and other DOD stakeholders to ensure our assignment
policies continue to incentivize military and civilian executive talent
with challenging assignments, developmental opportunities, and key
recognition for their significant and lasting contributions to the
Department's mission.
Question. Are you satisfied that OSD, the Joint Staff, and the
Military Services have in place sufficient training and resources to
provide General/Flag officers and members of the SES the training,
advice, and assistance they need to ``play the ethical midfield''?
Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. Sufficient training and resources are in place to
provide senior military and civilian leaders the training, advice, and
assistance they need to ``play the ethical midfield.'' The ability to
make ethical decisions is identified as a specific Desired Leader
Attribute for leaders throughout the military and is foundational to
all Joint and Service developmental efforts.
prevention of and response to sexual assault
Question. In your view, are the policies, programs, and training
that the Department has put in place to prevent sexual assault and
respond to sexual assault when it does occur, adequate and effective?
Answer. One sexual assault is too many. If confirmed, I will
continue to support efforts to address chain of command accountability,
prevent retaliatory behavior, reduce root causes, and foster a culture
of dignity, respect, and one that is free from sexual assault and
sexual harassment.
I welcome and encourage the institutional changes that are helping
to combat sexual assault. I applaud Congress and the Secretary of
Defense's efforts to not only address enhancing accountability, but to
emphasize climate and culture change, the prevention of sexual assault,
and comprehensive and consistent victim care and support.
Question. What is your view of the role of the chain of command in
maintaining a command climate in which sexual harassment and sexual
assault are not tolerated?
Answer. The chain of command is essential in establishing the
desired climate and culture across the organization. When an
organizational culture is established, it starts at the top with not
only leading by example, but setting and communicating expectations to
leaders at all levels. This establishes a standard of accountability
that will bring forth and inspire positive change in culture to all
military units to make a better force for all servicemembers.
Building trust is foundational, and our climate must be welcoming
and inclusive where everyone feels a part of the team and is treated
with dignity and respect, no matter their role.
If confirmed, I will continue to set expectations for professional
environments free of persistent and corrosive problems like sexual
assault and harassment and require leaders at all levels to do the
same.
In order to be a prepared and ready force for the future threat
environment, our airmen, sailors, soldiers, marines, and guardians must
be in a workplace of dignity and respect. I am serious, it is vital to
the Nation that our servicemembers perform their missions in healthy
and inclusive environments, nothing else will be tolerated.
Question. If confirmed, what role will you establish for yourself
in increasing focus on the prevention of sexual harassment and sexual
assault?
Answer. Commanders must build climates where trust, respect, and
inclusion are the norm. . The recent reforms to the military justice
system strike the right balance of preserving a commander's role in
good order and discipline, while providing commanders and the
servicemembers they lead with specialized personnel outside of the
chain of command, to address accountability for sexual assault and
sexual harassment. Every Commander, starting at the top, must build
trust with airmen, soldiers, sailors, marines, guardians, and civilian
professionals. If confirmed, I will require every leader be part of a
culture that emphasizes dignity and respect. I will hold leaders
accountable allow permissive environments for behaviors that are not
consistent with the culture of dignity and respect our personnel
deserve.
Question. What is your view of the necessity of affording a victim
both restricted and unrestricted options to report a sexual assault?
Answer. I fully support both restricted and unrestricted options
for reporting sexual assault. These options allow victims to control
how they want to seek accountability and how they are afforded the
best, tailored support to help them through the trauma of sexual
assault with needed medical care, counseling, and support.
Question. What is your assessment of the Department's
implementation of protections against retaliation (including reprisal
and social ostracism) for reporting sexual assault?
Answer. No servicemember should have to fear retaliation for
reporting a sexual assault or sexual harassment.
Just recently, the Department has issued a policy aimed at
improving how we document and assist survivors, employees, witnesses,
and other people who perceive retaliation associated with sexual
assault. The Department has also started using the Defense Sexual
Assault Incident Data base to document these cases more consistently
across the Department.
In addition, there is a new integrated prevention workforce that
will focus on retaliation prevention through command climate assessment
and action planning as well as other prevention activities.
We also inform individuals on what to do if they believe they are
experiencing retaliation, including informing them to go directly to
the DOD Inspector General or providing them with more information about
available help and reporting avenues from their Sexual Assault Response
Coordinator.
We will continue to analyze our climate data over time to ensure
that we are trending in the right direction where victims feel safe to
report without fear of retaliation. If confirmed, I will ensure
USSTRATCOM complies with all Department programs and directives,
beginning with leaders across USSTRATCOM's forces taking a central role
in ensuring personnel are trained on the sexual assault reporting
protections against retaliation, reprisal, and social ostracism.
Question. In your view, do military and civilian leaders in
STRATCOM have the training, authorities, and resources needed to hold
subordinate commanders and supervisors accountable for the prevention
of and response to sexual harassment and sexual assault? If not, what
additional training, authorities, or resources to you believe are
needed, and why?
Answer. We are taking action to ensure that we are fostering an
environment of dignity and respect for all personnel. Preventing sexual
assault and sexual harassment is a priority for the Department. We will
not compromise on this issue and we will not rest until we get this
right.
My assessment is that USSTRATCOM has the proper training,
authorities, and resources for prevention and response, but it is a
continual process of reviewing the data to ensure we are trending in
the right direction. Leaders and supervisors are responsible for
establishing and maintaining a professional culture and climate where
offenders are held appropriately accountable and victims get the
restorative care and support they need.
If confirmed, I will continuously evaluate whether leaders across
USSTRATCOM forces have the right tools, training, and resources, and
when necessary, assess whether those leaders are being held accountable
for their individual unit's prevention and response.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are Members of
this Committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
north korea
1. Senator Hirono. General Cotton, United States policy has long
focused on the denuclearization of North Korea. Despite United Nations
(UN) Security Council sanctions and diplomatic efforts, we've continued
to see North Korea advance its nuclear weapons and missile programs.
Recently, North Korea has increased its testing activity, and United
States military and intelligence agencies have warned that North Korea
appears to be preparing for a nuclear test. If confirmed, what will you
do to address the escalating nuclear threat from North Korea?
General Cotton. If confirmed, I will work closely with both
USINDOPACOM and United States Forces Korea commanders in order to
address the evolving threats and to strengthen strategic deterrence for
our Nation and our allies and partners. I will also ensure USSTRATCOM
is fully engaged in broader U.S. Government efforts in support of the
National Defense Strategy's integrated deterrence approach.
integrated deterrence
2. Senator Hirono. General Cotton, United States Indo-Pacific
Command's (INDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) includes Russia,
China, and North Korea, all of which possess nuclear weapons. It is
imperative that the United States Strategic Command (STRATCOM)
Commander and INDOPACOM Commander work closely together to enhance the
security of the United States and the region. If confirmed, how would
you work with INDOPACOM to achieve strategic deterrence in the region?
General Cotton. Nuclear deterrence is the backstop to strategic and
integrated deterrence. The Indo-Pacific theater demonstrates the
importance of this relationship. If confirmed, I will bolster the
already strong relationship between USSTRATCOM and USINDOPACOM. These
efforts will build upon and enhance integration of our conventional and
nuclear capabilities at all levels, from cross-Combatant Command
planning teams, to exercises, and real-world operations such as Bomber
Task Force (BTF) missions. I believe these efforts enhance our
relationships with allies and partners, and most importantly, assure
allies of our extended deterrence commitment. Finally, if confirmed, I
intend to routinely engage the Commander, USINDOPACOM to improve
coordination and guarantee the strategic deterrence mission.
australia and nuclear assurance
3. Senator Hirono. General Cotton, I've been a big supporter of the
AUKUS [Australia, United Kingdom, United States] agreement, in which
the United States and U.K. are partnering with Australia to help them
develop a nuclear-powered submarine fleet and advance other
technologies to improve each nation's security posture in the Pacific.
However, this relationship is focused on nuclear propulsion, not
nuclear weapons. Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese has
expressed his commitment to nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. If
confirmed, you will be the combatant commander responsible for nuclear
deterrence. What sentiments would you offer to demonstrate the United
States nuclear enterprises' commitment to assurance of non-nuclear
allies, such as Australia?
General Cotton. In my current position as the Commander of Air
Force Global Strike Command, we have an existing and excellent working
arrangement with Australia through Bomber Task Force Activities and
other military interoperability exercises and exchanges. Many of our
non-nuclear allies often participate when we conduct these activities
in concert with USINDOPACOM. I support both non-proliferation and our
steadfast commitment to Australia. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with Australian leaders, other Pacific allies and partners, and
USINDOPACOM to reinforce extended deterrence commitments.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
4. Senator King. General Cotton, do you support the ratification of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)?
General Cotton. From my position as the Commander of Air Force
Global Strike Command, I can attest that our military operations are
currently conducted in a manner consistent with international norms. I
recognize that many provisions of the treaty are considered customary
international law, and ratification of this agreement falls under the
constitutional purview of the Senate.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Deb Fischer
changes since the cold war
5. Senator Fischer. General Cotton, some portray nuclear deterrence
as a remnant of the Cold War; however, while many of our systems date
to that time period, is it not true that our posture, policies, and
employment strategies have been repeatedly updated to meet changing
deterrence requirements?
General Cotton. Yes, our defense posture, policies and employment
strategies have been repeatedly updated and revised to address the
evolving and increasingly complex strategic environment we face today.
If confirmed, I will provide my best military advice on policy and
strategy choices to address the ways strategic deterrence - and
integrated deterrence - must continue to develop and evolve.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
deterrence study
6. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, during your verbal testimony you
committed to directing United States Strategic Command to undertake a
study of deterrence requirements vis-a-vis China and Russia, if
confirmed. In your personal opinion, what specific questions should a
study by U.S. Strategic Command consider and address?
General Cotton. Fundamentally, deterrence is influencing an
adversary's decision-making calculus to choose restraint over
aggression. A USSTRATCOM analysis must consider Russian and Chinese key
decision factors, both individually and together, and at various points
of escalation. Specifically, the study should consider:
Russian and Chinese national interests and their will to
achieve them;
Russian and Chinese strategy and plan for success, as
well as their confidence in achieving their goals;
What Russia and China each value that must be held at
risk, as well as their pain threshold;
The appropriate integrated deterrence framework required
to address a two peer threat environment;
Evaluating the sufficiency of existing capacity and
future U.S. nuclear triad capabilities needed to sustain credible
strategic deterrence against two peer adversaries;
What capacity and capability improvements might be
required for current and planned strategic deterrent systems
This analysis should consider how China and Russia might cooperate
with one another, and how actions taken against one may have
consequences with the other. Answering these questions will be
necessary to determine how U.S. strategy should evolve.
7. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, with regard to deterrence
requirements vis-a-vis China and Russia, in your personal opinion, what
initial changes would you recommend to United States nuclear force
levels, force structure, and force posture?
General Cotton. If confirmed, I intend to assess, evaluate, and
provide an informed recommendation based on the study I described in
the previous question. Any evaluation of the strategic deterrence
portfolio must consider whether our force size and posture is
sufficient to deter adversaries, assure allies and partners, and
achieve U.S. objectives should deterrence fail.
testing
8. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, the Biden administration has
repeatedly cancelled scheduled intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM) tests. What effect could repeat cancellations have on testing
and evaluation of parts or components of the Sentinel ground based
strategic deterrent (GBSD) program? Please provide a classified
response, if necessary.
General Cotton. To date, the cancellation and delayed flight tests
have been for Minuteman III (MMIII). The DOD must ensure the
availability of critical test data for MMIII sustainment efforts, and
in turn modernization activities for Sentinel development.
In the future, the cancellation of Sentinel developmental test (DT)
launches would reduce confidence in testing and have cascading effects
to other Sentinel component, segment and system-level testing. Further,
cancellation of a scheduled DT launch impacts the ability to validate
both flight and ground system development, leading to extensive
schedule realignments.
b-21 program
9. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, are you aware of any
complications regarding the B-21 program that could delay its initial
operational capability? If so, please detail them. Please provide a
classified response, if necessary.
General Cotton. The B-21 program remains on track to deliver combat
capability within the acquisition program baseline. The lingering
effects of the COVID-19 pandemic could lead to further inefficiencies
with supply chain and workforce, and the Air Force is actively
collaborating with its suppliers to mitigate any potential impacts.
russian nuclear escalation
10. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, Putin has issued a number of
nuclear threats to deter Western intervention in Ukraine. How do you
evaluate the threat of Russia's theater nuclear escalation and how
should the United States manage this risk?
General Cotton. Russia views its nuclear forces as necessary for
maintaining deterrence and achieving its goals in a potential conflict
against the United States and NATO, and views a credible nuclear
deterrent as the ultimate guarantor of the Russian Federation. Russia
is also expanding and modernizing its large and diverse set of
nonstrategic systems, which are capable of delivering either nuclear or
conventional warheads, because Moscow believes such systems offer
options to deter adversaries, control the escalation of potential
hostilities, and counter United States and Allied troops near its
border.
I evaluate the reality of the Russian threat within the context of
integrated deterrence. Integrated deterrence enables us to work in
concert with our network of alliances and partnerships, across
warfighting domains and theaters, and utilize all instruments of
national power to achieve national objectives.
nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile (slcm-n)
11. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, will you commit to briefing
Members of this Committee your preliminary opinion regarding the SLCM-N
program within 30 days of assuming command, if confirmed?
General Cotton. Yes. However, as I stated during my testimony, I
would like the opportunity to conduct my own assessment of SLCM-N and
its capabilities before providing any recommendations.
12. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, will you commit to providing
your official recommendation to the Secretary of Defense regarding
SLCM-N on the basis of independent military advice about the potential
operational utility of the system, if confirmed?
General Cotton. Yes.
13. Senator Ernst. General Cotton, will you commit to transmitting
in unclassified form to Members of this Committee your official
recommendation to the Secretary of Defense regarding SLCM-N once
provided, if confirmed?
General Cotton. Yes.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
risk management
14. Senator Tillis. General Cotton, as we discussed, two vital
elements of successful modernization are the willingness to take risk
and accept failure. How would you assess the strategy of ``Fail Fast to
Learn Faster''? In your personal opinion, to what extent should
Congress and the Department of Defense (DOD) adopt this strategy and
why?
General Cotton. Congress and the Department of Defense should
pursue strategies that continually promote innovation and foster
revolutionary technologies that ensure strategic advantage. I believe
we can learn as much from failure as we can from success. To keep pace
with our adversaries, we need to move rapidly and, if a new technology
appears promising, acquire and field it quickly. If our experimentation
shows it is not feasible, then we ``fail fast'' and move on. I believe
Congress and DOD should adopt this strategy to the greatest extent
possible. We need to understand risk is necessary to produce
capabilities that support the National Defense Strategy goals and
priorities through 2040.
steady, stable funding
15. Senator Tillis. General Cotton, as you know, Congress has
failed to pass the National Defense Authorization Act on time in past
years and will, again, delay passage this year. Can you elaborate on
how Continuing Resolutions affect modernization and future operations?
General Cotton. Continuing resolutions (CRs) add uncertainty to
research and development, production and delivery schedules, forcing
increased levels of operational risk to meet strategic guidance. CRs
also impact people, processes, decision making, and plans for multi-
year programs, to include the ability to hire and retain qualified
individuals.
If a CR is enacted, Congress can help by immediately granting
anomalies for major DOD and National Nuclear Security Administration
programs (at a minimum) to ensure subsystem new starts for already
approved programs can commence and to keep modernization on track.
16. Senator Tillis. General Cotton, specifically, what ``new
starts'' or subsystems remain unfunded as a result of delayed DOD
funding and how is this affecting our strategic deterrence
capabilities?
General Cotton. Delayed DOD funding, as a result of continuing
resolutions (CRs), disrupts funding streams, increases costs for multi-
year programs, impacts research and development, delays contract
awards, and hinders production and delivery schedules, creating
uncertainty and waste.
Our nuclear modernization programs - delivery systems, warheads,
and infrastructure - are tightly integrated and aligned. Replacement
systems are projected to deliver just in time and any perturbation,
including a CR, has detrimental and potentially cascading effects to
USSTRATCOM's ability to provide a fully integrated system to meet
strategic deterrence objectives.
Thanks to Congressional attention and emphasis to our strategic
modernization efforts, we are not aware of any programs or ``new
starts'' that are unfunded at this time. However, requirements that
would be impacted by a CR lasting through December include, Physical
Security System - GBSD Squadrons, Minuteman Higher Authority
Communications Test System (HACTS) 2.0, and MH-139A Performance
Enhancement.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
minuteman iii
17. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, if confirmed, what would be
your best military advice regarding delaying or canceling routine tests
at the expense of the modernization of U.S. Forces?
General Cotton. If confirmed, my recommendation will be to maintain
our regularly scheduled Minuteman III (MMIII) operational test launches
as long as it remains in the operational force. The Air Force has
sufficient capacity to test both legacy and developmental platforms.
18. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, what impact does even a
small Minuteman III testing delay have on Sentinel?
General Cotton. Minuteman III operational testing has no impact on
Sentinel development. However, impacts from Minuteman III testing
delays are created by congested Western Range support assets, which
consequently impacts a rigid Sentinel developmental testing program.
19. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, if confirmed, under what
conditions would you recommend postponing or canceling a Sentinel
developmental test?
General Cotton. Developmental testing is critical to fielding the
Sentinel system on time. However, if the U.S. faced a situation where
testing could somehow undermine strategic stability, I could accept
that a Sentinel development flight test delay may be necessary, but
would recommend against cancellation.
nuclear deterrence
20. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, as the United States
evaluates the current deterrence strategy to address both of our Great
Power adversaries, what are the chief considerations that the
Department of Defense and Department of Energy should highlight when
evaluating the size and posture of the nuclear force?
General Cotton. If confirmed, I will assess and evaluate the size
and posture of the nuclear force and make any appropriate
recommendations to the Secretary as required. Any evaluation must
consider whether the force size and posture is sufficient to deter
adversaries, assure allies and partners, and achieve U.S. objectives.
21. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, if confirmed, can you commit
to reporting to this Committee on the potential capability gap Nuclear-
Armed Sea-Launched Cruise Missile (SLCM-N) may fill once you have
assessed its strategic value and capabilities?
General Cotton. Yes.
infrastructure
22. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, if confirmed, what risk
would you assume as STRATCOM Commander if recapitalization program
funding for relevant National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
infrastructure modernization is decreased, and how would this affect
your resourcing and requirements?
General Cotton. USSTRATCOM continually assesses operational risk to
ensure they are fielding the appropriate stockpile to meet national
leadership objectives, while being mindful of policy and resource
constraints. The current stockpile is safe, secure and effective, but
age and performance degradations exist. NNSA's production enterprise
has atrophied following the end of the Cold War and has been
underfunded for 3 decades. If the Nation continues to defer critical
decisions to fully address these shortfalls, significant, near-term
resource increases will be required to adequately mitigate operational
risks associated with key stockpile and infrastructure capability
shortfalls.
23. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, what is your understanding
of the condition of the supporting weapons sustainment and production
capabilities within NNSA?
General Cotton. The condition of the Nuclear Security Enterprise
must remain a priority if we hope to address weapon production
limitations and remain aligned with platform fielding. The NNSA has
identified 12 critical capability gaps that affect every component
needed for stockpile modernization. A modern stockpile, responsible
infrastructure, and robust science and technology base is vital as our
systems age beyond their useable lifetimes and the threat continues to
grow.
nuclear modernization
24. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, how can the Department
capitalize on working with the private sector to produce low-risk
technologies and advanced cyber security measures to support
modernization efforts?
General Cotton. The Department can capitalize on working with the
private sector by identifying commercial technologies to provide DOD an
operational advantage across the spectrum of conflict, leverage the
speed of their incremental changes, and identifying commercial best
practices within cybersecurity to integrate across a program's
lifecycle, to include development, procurement, and operations.
Integrating commercial best practices will result in the development of
technologically advanced, highly modular, and easily upgradeable
weapons systems which will ensure the United States' strategic forces
remain safe, secure, and relevant through the end of the century.
missile defense
25. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, active missile defense is an
essential element of strategic deterrence. What lessons can we take
from the hypersonic air-breathing weapon concept and apply them to the
conventional prompt strike (CPS) capability?
General Cotton. The Department is actively pursuing hypersonic
technology collaboration efforts across multiple programs. Hypersonic
cruise missile and boost-glide programs are sharing information across
areas with common components.
26. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, what other capabilities can
STRATCOM incorporate to build a diverse missile defense architecture?
General Cotton. An integrated network of persistent sensors able to
provide real-time detection, tracking, and targeting information is
critical for leadership situational awareness, attribution, decision
making, and response option selection. If confirmed, I will pursue
efforts to integrate terrestrial and space-based sensors with kinetic
and non-kinetic capabilities to address the increasing threats.
27. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, how can we work with Finland
and Sweden to address current CPS challenges?
General Cotton. Until Finland and Sweden officially join NATO, the
United States should work closely with them in a bilateral setting to
address their security and defense concerns. After their accession to
NATO, the United States should rely upon both bilateral and allied
mechanisms to gain even deeper perspectives from Finland and Sweden to
enhance their assurance and to more effectively deter a common
adversary.
28. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, what lessons are we taking
from Russia's implementation of hypersonics to bolster STRATCOM's
strategy?
General Cotton. Hypersonic weapons can be used to achieve
strategic, operational, or tactical effects depending on the target or
objective. The DOD is developing hypersonic strike capabilities to
address an immediate requirement for a highly responsive, long-range,
non-nuclear strike capability to address distant, defended, and time-
critical threats. If confirmed, I will ensure that USSTRATCOM is
prepared to command and control any and all assigned hypersonic
weapons.
29. Senator Blackburn. General Cotton, what challenges does
STRATCOM face with the critical sensors required to identify and track
hypersonic and ballistic missile tracking?
General Cotton. All Combatant Commands, including USSTRATCOM share
the same challenge regarding critical sensors to identify and track
hypersonic and ballistic missiles. The DOD is investing in a new space
sensor and communications strategy that is funding the development of
new intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to
provide better situational awareness and ``buy-back'' senior leader
decision space. If confirmed, I will ensure that USSTRATCOM advocates
for the quick development, deployment, and training with these new
capabilities to have a force ready to meet these challenges.
______
[The nomination reference of General Anthony J. Cotton,
USAF follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of General Anthony J. Cotton,
USAF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by General
Anthony J. Cotton, USAF in connection with his nomination
follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[TThe nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of General Anthony J. Cotton, USAF was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on September 22, 2022,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on September 29, 2022.]
[all]