[Senate Hearing 117-1004]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-1004
THE NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL
BRADLEY C. SALTZMAN, USSF TO BE GENERAL
AND CHIEF OF SPACE OPERATIONS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
SEPTEMBER 13, 2022
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-592 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
september 13, 2022
Page
The Nomination of Lieutenant General Bradley C. Saltzman, USSF to 1
be General and Chief of Space Operations.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 2
Witness Statements
Saltzman, Lieutenant General Bradley C., USSF to be General and 3
Chief of Space Operations.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 36
Questions for the Record....................................... 69
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 78
Biographical Sketch............................................ 79
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 82
Signature Page................................................. 86
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
THE NOMINATION OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRADLEY C. SALTZMAN, USSF TO BE
GENERAL AND CHIEF OF SPACE
OPERATIONS
----------
TUESDAY, SEPTEMBER 13, 2022
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, Kaine, King, Peters, Rosen,
Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Cramer,
Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning.
The Committee meets today to consider the nomination of
Lieutenant General B. Chance Saltzman for promotion to general
and to be the next Chief of Space Operations.
General Saltzman, welcome. I thank you for your decades of
service and willingness to serve in this very important
position.
I would like to welcome your wife, Jennifer, your son,
John, and your daughter, Sarah, and while not present today let
me also acknowledge your parents, Randy and Belinda Saltzman,
who are watching from home, I am sure, and I know they are very
proud of your nomination.
Recognizing the increasing importance of the space domain
and the growing threats to our critical space assets by China
and Russia, Congress established the Space Force in the fiscal
year 2020 National Defense Authorization Act.
The first Chief of Space Operations, General Raymond, then
the commander of the U.S. Air Force Space Command, was
legislatively transferred in 2020 to be the chief. So you are
the first to be nominated and have a hearing for this position.
Given that the Space Force is only two years old, it is
still becoming institutionalized within the Department of
Defense and there are many challenges in that process.
First, the Space Force must develop its ability to train
and equip guardians. Space is a remote domain, one that is now
contested. Your guardians will have to have the ability to
integrate digital and other advanced technologies to accomplish
their mission, all underpinned by a strong STEM background.
My understanding is the Space Force is standing up a Space
Training and Readiness Command, or STARCOM. I will want to know
your views, if confirmed, at how STARCOM will train future
guardians as a warfighting force in the space domain.
Second, you will have to foster a service culture that can
succeed in the dramatically evolving space environment often
called ``New Space.'' We are witnessing an enormous surge in
the space industry with some satellite constellations that
numbered one or two dozen satellites a few years ago now having
thousands in low earth orbit, all interconnected to provide
high-speed internet anywhere on the globe.
Rockets that were once disposable are now reusable,
lowering the cost of launch to a fraction of what it used to
be. The Space Force of today and tomorrow must adapt to this
rapid change in pace of innovation and utilize it to protect
and defend our assets in space and on the ground.
The Space Force, its organization, and its guardians need
to reflect this changing environment.
Third, in response to the growing adversarial threat in
space, Congress not only created the Space Force as a
warfighting entity, it also reorganized the way we acquire
space systems, the way we formulate space policy, and the way
we fight in space with a new combatant command.
If confirmed, you will lead the Space Force in this new
national defense enterprise. I want to know what you foresee as
major issues you expect to face and how you will ensure the
Space Force can respond to them.
Most importantly, an integral part of the military service
is its new culture and its unity of mission. When the Space
Force was established, most guardians necessarily transferred
from other services and, thus, had to adapt to a new culture.
I was pleased to learn in our meeting last week that
successful recruiting efforts have ensued that soon one-third
of the Space Force will never have served in another service.
General, I am interested in how you intend to create a
unique culture with the blend of transfers and new recruits.
Thank you again for your willingness to serve our nation. I
look forward to your testimony.
Let me now recognize Ranking Member Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I would also
like to extend a welcome to the general and I appreciate the
time you spent with me giving me an idea of what you have in
your mind, and also the fact that you have your family here
today it is very meaningful to us. We appreciate that very much
because you are not going to see a lot of them in the days to
come.
Our National Defense Strategy is not shy about the scope
and scale of the threat from China and the speed of the
advances. There is no better example of that than space.
In a decade, the United States has gone from the
unquestioned leader in space to merely one of two peers in a
competition. Most people do not realize that.
There is a lot China and Russia are doing in space we
cannot talk about today but even what we can talk about in
public is very concerning.
For years, we have kept noting that everything our military
does relies on space but we never really acted like it. Worse
yet, space is no longer simply an enabler for other functions.
So we have a different environment altogether today and you
are only the second one to take on this awesome responsibility,
and we appreciate very much the effort that you are making and
the background that you bring.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
General Saltzman, you are recognized for your opening
statement.
Could you please bring the microphone as close as possible
and--thank you.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Can you hear me okay?
Chairman Reed. Yes, sir.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRADLEY C. SALTZMAN, USSF TO BE
GENERAL AND CHIEF OF SPACE OPERATIONS
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Thank you, Chairman Reed,
Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members of this Committee.
I am honored and deeply humbled by the opportunity to be with
you this morning.
I would like to begin by introducing my family. With me
today are the most important people in my life.
First, my wife, Jennifer. I am very proud to announce that
just yesterday we celebrated our 30th wedding anniversary.
Jennifer has been steadfastly by my side for this entire
military journey through 15 moves, nearly 200 overnight ICBM
alerts, countless late nights and trips away from home, and
most recently a year separated while I deployed to the Middle
East.
She has taken on all these challenges and conquered them
with a smile on her face and warmth in her heart. But her most
amazing accomplishment has been raising our two children into
the fine young adults you see here.
Our son, John, is a director of social media content for a
sports marketing firm and our daughter, Sarah, recently
completed a master's degree in public administration with a
perfect 4.0 GPA.
Jennifer and I could not be prouder of these two. They have
followed Mom and Dad all over the country and been successful
at every turn. They meet challenges head on and have always
shown maturity beyond their years, optimism, and a contagious
wit.
My home and family are my bedrock and they are, clearly, at
the center of any career success that I have enjoyed. I owe all
of that to these three, and I will be forever grateful for the
love and support they have shown and the sacrifices they have
made.
I would also like to take this opportunity to offer a
special thanks to General Jay and Mollie Raymond. The Saltzman
and Raymond families go back many years and we have benefited
greatly from their mentorship and friendship.
They are concluding 38 years of distinguished service to
our nation but these last three years have been critical to the
historic establishment of the Space Force. Their passion,
dedication, and vision have set the Space Force on a solid
foundation.
If I have the good fortune to be confirmed, Jennifer and I
will work hard to build on their successes and continue to push
the Space Force to new heights.
I would also like to express my appreciation to this
Committee for your relentless support and advocacy for our
Space Force, its guardians, and their families.
For the last two years, I have had the privilege of serving
with these guardians and I can attest that they are the finest
men and women that America has to offer. If confirmed, it will
be the honor of my life to lead them as the second Chief of
Space Operations for the United States Space Force.
Not quite three years ago Congress established the Space
Force to provide freedom of operation for the United States in,
from, and to space, to conduct space operations, and to protect
the interests of the United States in space.
In the few short years since the Space Force was
established, the number of satellites on orbit has doubled and
the global space economy is approaching half a trillion
dollars.
Space is truly a critical domain for U.S. interests so we
must be clear eyed in our understanding that our strategic
competitors have invested heavily in fielding systems capable
of disrupting, degrading, and even destroying our space
capabilities.
If confirmed, I will work to ensure that Space Force is
ready to protect these vital interests from these threats.
It is truly an honor to be nominated to serve as the Space
Force's next Chief of Space Operations. I am excited about the
opportunities ahead for the Space Force.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with this
Committee, other members of Congress, to continue to ensure the
Space Force fulfills its mission as part of America's Joint
Force.
I look forward to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Lieutenant General B. Chance
Saltzman follows:]
Prepared Statement by Lieutenant General B. Chance Saltzman
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members of this
Committee, I am honored and deeply humbled by the opportunity to be
with you this morning. Let me start by expressing my appreciation to
this Committee for your relentless support and advocacy for our Space
Force and its guardians and families. For the last two years, I have
had the privilege of serving with these guardians and I can attest that
they are the finest men and women that America has to offer. If
confirmed, it will be the honor of my life to lead them as the 2nd
Chief of Space Operations for the United States Space Force. I would
like to thank President Biden, Secretary Austin, Secretary Kendall and
Chairman Milley for this amazing opportunity.
I would also like to offer a special thanks to General Jay and
Mollie Raymond. The Saltzman and Raymond families go back many years
and we have benefitted greatly from their mentorship and friendship.
They are concluding 38 years of distinguished service to our nation,
but these last 3 years have been critical to the historic establishment
of the Space Force. Their passion, dedication and vision have set the
Space Force on a solid foundation. If I have the good fortune to be
confirmed, Jennifer and I will work hard to build on their successes
and continue to push the Space Force to new heights.
I am extremely proud to introduce the most important people in my
life . . . my family. First, my wife, Jennifer. Yesterday, we
celebrated our thirtieth wedding anniversary. She has been steadfastly
by my side for this entire military journey through 15 moves, nearly
200 overnight ICBM alerts, countless late nights and trips away from
home and most recently a year separated while I deployed to the Middle
East. She has taken on all those challenges and conquered them with a
smile on her face and warmth in her heart. But her most amazing
accomplishment was raising our two children into the fine young adults
you see here. Our son, John, a director of social media content for a
sports marketing firm in Chicago, and our daughter, Sarah, who recently
completed a Master's Degree in Public Administration and is moving to
Washington DC to begin her career. Jennifer and I could not be prouder
of these two . . . they have followed mom and dad all over the country
and been successful at every turn. They meet challenges head on and
have always shown maturity beyond their years, optimism and contagious
wit. My home and family are my bedrock and they are clearly at the
center of any career success that I've enjoyed . . . I owe all of that
to these three and I will be forever grateful for the love and support
they have shown and the sacrifices they have made.
Not quite three years ago, Congress established the United States
Space Force to provide freedom of operation for the United States in,
from, and to space; to conduct space operations; and to protect the
interests of the United States in space. In my 3 decades of service, I
have seen U.S. space capabilities expand from a few dozen exquisite
satellites to nearly 3000 satellites today underpinning our military
capability and driving the global economy. In the few short years since
the Space Force was established, the number of satellites on orbit has
doubled and the global space economy is approaching half a trillion
dollars. Space is truly a critical domain for U.S. interests, so we
must all be clear-eyed in our understanding that our strategic
competitors have invested heavily in fielding systems capable of
disrupting, degrading and even destroying our space capabilities. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure the Space Force provides the needed
support to our combatant commands to deter threats to our space
capabilities and interests, and to promote responsible behaviors in
space.
To ensure the Space Force can accomplish this important mission, we
need to be successful across three broad fronts. First, we will
continue to mature as an independent service. We must continue to
develop the Space Force into a world class organization capable of
integrating effectively into the Department of Defense, which will take
considerable effort to put the right processes with the right people in
the right places. Second, we will leverage key partnerships. We need to
build and enhance our relationships with allies and partners in order
to benefit from the expanding commercial space sector, High-Tech
industries and the expertise, advanced technologies and capabilities
they possess. Finally, we must innovate new ways to accomplish our
complex missions. We will not succeed if we assume our old habits will
be effective in the emerging security environment. We must be
innovative in everything we do from recruiting and retaining our
talented guardians, to acquiring space capabilities and training for
the contested space domain. I am convinced we have the right people
asking the right questions and doing the right things to get this done.
It is truly an honor to be nominated to serve as the Space Force's
next Chief of Space Operations. I am excited about the opportunities
ahead for the Space Force. The inspired work that General Raymond
started has set us on a path. It is a path towards advanced
capabilities, modern, resilient architectures, and innovative
approaches to meet our service missions. The heart and soul of this
vision are our amazing guardians and I am committed to making sure they
have the resources, training and equipment they need to be successful.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with this Committee and
Congress to continue to enable the United States Space Force as the
guardians of progress, innovation, and security in the space domain.
Once again, thank you for this opportunity. I look forward to your
questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Saltzman.
Before I begin the questioning, there are a series of
standard questions for nominees and you can respond.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. No.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress
receive testimony, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the executive branch on a timely basis.
Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before
this Committee when requested?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
Committee, to give your personal views even if your views
differ from the administration?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress and to consult with the requester
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies
with deadlines established by this Committee for the production
of reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional requests?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
General, in my comments I talked about the Force Design
that the Space Force must lead. The intent in Congress is to
centralize that Force Design in the Space Force, and the Senate
version of the 2022 National Defense Authorization Act deemed
the Chief of Space Operations to be the Force Design architect
for space of the armed services are no different in many ways
of how the Chief of Naval Operations is the designer of the
fleet of ships for our Navy.
The conference bill required the Secretary of Defense to
designate the Chief of Special Operations as the Force Design
architect and the August 17th letter sent to the Committee by
the Secretary does, indeed, designate the chief as the Force
Design architect except for all of the other authorities of
space residing in the armed forces in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, which are rather extensive.
Do you think this is a workable designation and follows the
intent of Congress?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, sir, I do.
I have had extensive discussions with the Secretary of the
Air Force and General Raymond, the current Chief of Space
Operations, and it is my understanding that the exemptions that
you mentioned really are not about authorities associated with
the Force Design architect and that the authorities and
responsibilities that the Secretary of Defense gave to General
Raymond as the Chief of Space Operations is sufficient to
accomplish the intent of Congress.
If confirmed, I would continue to execute those same
authorities and responsibilities so that I could take seriously
those priorities for Force Design to make the Space Force as
capable as possible.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
General Saltzman, if confirmed, your job will be to present
training and equip forces to U.S. Space Command primarily but
also you will have the duty to support other combatant commands
such as EUCOM, et cetera.
Is there any significant distinction in your mind between
your responsibilities between those two or the different
commands you will support?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. No, Senator. The
responsibilities of the Chief of Space Operations are to make
sure there are ready forces that have the flexibility, the
agility, the training, and experience necessary to support all
combatant commanders.
Of note, of course, is that U.S. Space Command has primary
responsibilities for that space area of responsibilities as
well as some key missions providing capabilities for the Joint
Force.
While over 90 percent of the Space Force capabilities are
presented to U.S. Space Command, there are critical other
capabilities--regional capabilities--that are also presented to
the other combatant commands to fulfill their missions as well.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
General Saltzman, the administration has sent a legislative
proposal to create, essentially, full and part time Space Force
military personnel in lieu of our separate Reserve and Guard
elements as in other services and this, I think, originates
because the Space Force is relatively small and the Reserve and
Guard elements would be smaller still. Do you support this
proposal?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, the most important
aspect of this is that there are critical capabilities and
expertise that currently reside in the Air Force Reserves as
well as the Air National Guard.
The primary responsibility, of course, is to make sure that
we have complete access to that experience, that expertise, and
those capabilities.
So from a readiness perspective, I can tell you as the
Chief of Operations currently that is high on my list to make
sure that we have unfettered access to those capabilities.
We are also looking at flexible and innovative ways to make
sure that we have viable and flexible career paths for our
guardians. It is important that we retain this talent for an
extended period of time to get the most out of them, and having
the ability to seamlessly and have a permeable way to move
between full time and part time capacity inside the Space
Force, we think, is a tremendous benefit to the guardians and,
ultimately, to the force to maintain that readiness.
So, if confirmed as CSO I would, certainly, welcome the
opportunity to continue to work with Members of this Committee
and other stakeholders to make sure that we get the right
organizational structure to take advantage of these
capabilities.
Chairman Reed. Thank you.
Again, one of the great challenges you have facing you is
creating a culture in the Space Force as a warfighting force,
one that is highly technical and one that innovates constantly.
We find sometimes culture is more determinative of outcomes
than a lot of other factors.
So that is something, I think, you will be working on and
we hope to work together with you. Thank you very much.
Now, let me recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Okay.
General Saltzman, let me get the two required questions out
of the way so no one else will have to do it. The two are what
worries you the most and what do you intend to do about it, and
secondly, what will be the first challenge that you go after?
Two questions.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, sir. Thank you.
The most immediate threat, in my opinion, is the pace with
which our strategic challengers, first and foremost, the
Chinese, are aggressively pursuing capabilities that can
disrupt, degrade, and ultimately even destroy our satellite
capabilities and disrupt our ground infrastructure.
They have watched how we perform Joint Force operations.
They know how critical the U.S.--how critical the U.S. space
capabilities are to the Joint Force.
They have learned from that and they recognize that it is
an asymmetric advantage of theirs to go after our space
capabilities and deny them to the Joint Force, and they have
invested heavily and demonstrated capabilities that can deny us
this.
So it is one of my earliest priorities to make sure that we
are on track to build and field effective capabilities and then
train the guardians to operate in a contested domain so that we
can counter this activity by our strategic competitors.
Senator Inhofe. Good. Thank you, General Saltzman.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Shaheen, please?
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Congratulations, General Saltzman, on your nomination.
Now, I hope that for your 30th anniversary you are doing
something other than just bringing your wife to this hearing.
[Laughter.]
Senator Shaheen. You know, the pearls are the gift for the
30th anniversary so I hope Jennifer has got that on her list.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. You are getting me in trouble,
ma'am. I appreciate that.
Senator Shaheen. Seriously, I appreciated the opportunity
to meet with you last week and I especially appreciated the
conversation that we had about the risk that is involved with
our space capabilities.
I wonder if you could speak to how important it is to have
the SBIR and STTR programs with our small businesses who are
able to assume more of that risk and what would--what your
assessment is if those programs are discontinued because we do
not get them reauthorized this year.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Thank you, Senator.
The size of the Space Force, the criticality of the
missions, means we are going to have to innovate. We are going
to have to do things differently in order to deliver the kinds
of capabilities that the nation needs to protect its Space
Force, to protect the space capabilities, and then protect the
Joint Force from our adversaries.
It is my opinion that when you are trying to innovate, when
you are trying to be creative, the best way to do that is to
open up the aperture of ideas, and I think small businesses
have a tremendous role that they can play in helping provide
some of those innovative creative capabilities that we can then
leverage to build a full spectrum response to what our
adversaries are trying to do.
I firmly believe we ought to lower the thresholds to make
it easier for small businesses to offer their capabilities for
us to take into.
Senator Shaheen. So I assume you would agree with me that
if we do not get those programs reauthorized it is going to be
a real loss in terms of the innovation that our small
businesses are providing to the space program and also to our
military?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. If confirmed, I am, certainly,
committed to any authority's responsibilities that help pull
the maximum number of innovators in to solve my problems as
possible.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Can you also talk about the risk issue in terms of our
procurement process?
I think General Hyten talked about the bureaucratic hurdles
that impede our ability to procure the capabilities we need and
as we are looking at our adversaries, particularly China, they
do not have to deal with that.
So what do you see in terms of policy changes that we
should do that would help us address the procurement issues
that we have got?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Well, we have a very
deliberate process to make sure that we are wisely using our
taxpayer dollars. You bring up an excellent point that the
urgency--the sense of urgency that our adversaries have imposed
on us require us to move quickly to develop these capabilities.
I am, certainly, committed to making sure that we
streamline our processes. Congress has helped with the
establishment of a Force Design architect in the CSO--the Chief
of Space Operations.
I think streamlining the requirements, being clear exactly
what we need, innovating to pull in as many ideas as possible
to solve those problems, will streamline our efforts and
deliver operational capability faster.
The cultural piece of this, sometimes we get focused on the
fact that we need to purposely build capability to provide
space capabilities for the nation.
Out at Space Systems Command they have adopted a mantra
about exploiting what we have, buying what we can, and only
building what we must, and I think having that open thought
process for how best to bring capabilities to bear will
actually streamline the process and make us do a better job.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I appreciate that.
During our meeting, you also talked about and you did--as
you did in your opening statement the importance of the people
in our Space Force and that they will make a difference in our
success or failure.
One of the things that I understand Space Force may be
rethinking is some of the requirements that disqualify 70
percent of young Americans from military service.
Can you speak to what we ought to be thinking about as we
are thinking about how do we get more of those Americans into
service?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. We may be a small force,
ma'am, but we require highly-skilled technical experts to be
brought in to do these important critical missions for the
Space Force.
We also have an advantage by being small that we can
consider on a case by case basis precisely the right people,
the right kinds of people with the right skill sets, the right
diversity of thought, into the Space Force to optimize our
capabilities.
By being able to consider this on a case by case basis, I
think we do not have to put blanket restrictions on types of
people, on types of qualifications, that bring you into the
Space Force.
So we have a tremendous opportunity, I think, because of
the numbers that we need to bring in to be more
individualistic, and if confirmed as CSO I would want to expand
that and actually broaden this out to as many people as
possible.
Senator Shaheen. Well, thanks very much. I look forward to
that--continuing that discussion.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Cotton, please?
Senator Cotton. General Saltzman, welcome, and
congratulations on your nomination.
I want to explore a little bit your thoughts on the
relationship between the Space Force and the National
Reconnaissance Office. You are well suited for that not only in
the Space Force but having served at the NRO.
I have heard it said by some that once any asset goes into
space it becomes strategic intelligence and, therefore, should
fall underneath the NRO, although that point of view would seem
to conflict with the mission of Space Force.
So could you explain how the Space Force should relate to
the NRO and how that should look and function?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, sir.
I learned to fly satellites in the NRO. I was an NRO ground
station commander so I speak from a personal basis from an
insider, if you will, that that mission that the NRO does--the
missions that the NRO does are critical, critical to the United
States.
But they do--there are differences in the missions that
they support, the requirements that they support, and the
customers that they support, and although there are differences
the collaboration between the two organizations is essential
for both's success.
As I mentioned earlier, Space Systems Command thinking
through how do we exploit what we have, how do we buy what we
can and build only what we must is that mantra that underpins
some of the collaboration.
We will need to look as we examine where our missions start
to overlap whether it is intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance or some of the other protect and defend
missions.
Wherever we overlap we need to evaluate what current
capabilities exist, what we need to--what we can buy
commercially and what we need to build specifically to fill the
gaps, and then not walk all over each other, to not be overly
redundant, because we cannot afford to be.
I think through this collaboration, and the NRO
relationship right now is solid and we do have good solid
collaborations. The current analysis of alternatives proves
that out.
I think we are on a good pace. I think we just need to keep
it up.
Senator Cotton. Are there any changes to the law that need
to happen to ensure that Space Force can do that?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I am not tracking any changes
that need to occur now, sir. As I get into the position, if
confirmed, I would welcome the opportunity to come back and
evaluate any changes or make any requests that need to be
modified.
Senator Cotton. You have said this morning, as have others,
that space is a warfighting domain. Most people, I think,
understand that our troops on the ground or on the seas or in
the air use our space assets to help fight war in their
domains.
But you also mean that space itself could be a warfighting
domain, correct?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I do.
Senator Cotton. Okay. So the timeless principles of war
that have stood the test of time, from Alexander to Washington
to Napoleon to Grant, would apply in space just like they apply
here on Earth, right?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I agree.
Senator Cotton. One of those principles is the priority of
the offensive. Can you talk to us a little bit about what
offensive operations in space would look like?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. When I think about space
superiority, which is kind of the phrase we use to mean that we
are going to contest that domain to make sure that we have
access to the capabilities, part of that also means that we are
going to protect the Joint Force from an adversary's ability to
use space to target them.
I think the best way to achieve this is through deterrence;
prevent a war from extending into space denying us those
capabilities. But the best way to deter is to have a resilient
capability and to have offensive and defensive capabilities
that creates a credible force. That is where you really get
your true deterrence.
Senator Cotton. All right. Thank you, General.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Gillibrand, please?
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations and congratulations to your family.
The Federal Government has struggled to recruit cyber and
digital service professionals both in the civilian and military
service. This challenge is also seen in other high-tech fields
as well.
To address this challenge, I have worked with Senator
Rounds and Senator Sasse on proposing the creation of a Cyber
and Digital Services Academy to recruit and train the next
generation of cyber professionals into the government service.
Given the highly technical nature of Space Force's work,
should Congress consider integrating Space Force cadets into
the Cyber Academy and using a potential Cyber Digital Services
and Space Academy as the service academy commissioning source
for Space Force officers and civilians?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, there is no way the
Space Force can be successful without capable cyber
professionals. We simply rely too much on our ground networks,
on the RF links that connect our satellites to our ground
nodes.
The distribution of data that is required to really meet
our goals all relies on highly capable, highly technical cyber
professionals.
So in the pursuit of finding them and training them and
continue to provide advanced training for them, I would be open
to any institutions or capabilities that can add to our
portfolio to make sure that our cyber operators are trained and
continue to be at the leading edge of technology.
If confirmed as CSO, this would be one of my priorities.
Senator Gillibrand. What do you think some of the
recruiting challenges--what do you think they will be for Space
Force and have you been able to recruit and retain the
technical workforce that you need and where are some of your
current shortfalls?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, ma'am.
We currently are not seeing the recruiting shortfalls that
some of the other services are facing. Primarily, that is
because we do not require as many in the Space Force. We have
that good fortune of being smaller so that our recruiting
numbers are lower.
But that small workforce is highly skilled, highly
technical, and so we have to reach out and find just the right
people, train them to do our specific and sometimes military-
unique missions inside the domain, which then means it is
important for us to retain them over the course of their career
so that we can continue to benefit on their gathered
experience.
That is going to be, I think, more difficult as they see
opportunities in the private sector to use the skills that we
provide them.
So, in my mind, this is about culture. This is about giving
them challenging work, respecting their inputs, and making it a
place they just want to show up to work every day to protect
the nation. That is what I am committed to if confirmed as CSO
is getting that culture right.
Senator Gillibrand. I listened very carefully to your
response to the chairman's question about the National Guard.
In your written response to advance policy questions you wrote
that you are most concerned with maintaining the readiness of
the space units in the Air National Guard.
I have heard some concerns that the training pipeline for
these Air National Guard units will be cut off, given the
transition of the active duty space missions to the Space
Force.
How will you ensure that these Air National Guard units are
able to fully execute these missions?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. As I mentioned, those
capabilities are critical to the success of the Space Force.
The way I see it, they can be organized in several different
ways. I think there is three options that are being considered.
The key is that there are pros and cons and advantages and
opportunities in each of these that are slightly different, and
so what is important is that we take the time to evaluate all
of those second and third order effects to make sure we
optimize the capabilities, optimize their long-term viability,
the training, the recruiting, the retention, of that expertise.
If confirmed as the Chief of Space Operations what I would
like to do is work with the Committee, work with the other
stakeholders, to really evaluate all of those nuances to make
sure we optimize the organizational structure.
Senator Gillibrand. But, basically, you want to use the
space units that are part of the Air National Guard as your
feeder?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I think those capabilities are
important to the success of the Space Force.
Senator Gillibrand. Understood.
I saw that the Space Force's direct commissioning program
began this spring with the Cyber Constructive Service Credit
Board in order to acquire cyber professionals.
Can you speak to what specific operational billets are
needed that this initiative to commission cyber professionals
can help fill and how has the process gone so far?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. What we are recognizing is
that to get the mid-grade officers--the 15-year technicians--it
takes 15 years to grow them if we start from scratch at the
accessions point.
If we are able to take advantage of the expertise they gain
in the private sector and pull them over, we want to give them
credit so they can lead our organizations and not start at the
bottom of the organization, and so we are seeing a lot of
positive interest in that and the pilot program is going
successful so far.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Thank you for your testimony
and thank you for your service. I do hope you get to meet all
the former heads of Space Force, including Steve Carell.
[Laughter.]
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Tuberville, please?
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Congratulations, General, to you and your family. Just a
couple of questions here.
Do you believe our national security launches should remain
on U.S. soil?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Sir, assured access to space
is a national imperative. I am open to making sure that we can
put any kind of payload, any type of payload, into any of the
orbits that are required.
This will take establishing a number of launch providers, a
number of launch locations, to maintain the kind of agility and
flexibility we need to ensure that that mission continues.
So I am open to exploring all options to make that the most
flexible capability possible.
Senator Tuberville. If confirmed, what would you do to
protect the DOD and U.S. contractors from intellectual property
theft, which is a huge problem, as we know?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, Senator.
If confirmed--again, I think about this in terms of cyber
defense because a lot of times that is how they are gaining
access to our capabilities and, as I mentioned, we cannot do
anything without our cyber networks, without our cyber
professionals defending those networks.
So what I would commit to is looking at the tools they
need, the training they need, the experience they need to make
sure that they are the most capable force in defending our
intellectual property and our networks from the actions of our
adversaries.
Senator Tuberville. What would you say our percentage of
cybersecurity is in the Space Force--percentage of your people?
How much would that be? Ten, 15, 20 percent?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, I do not think I have
a specific number. We only have five officer categories and an
equal number of enlisted categories.
So all of our operators, all of our personnel, are really
focused on operations. One of those subsets is cyber. But I am
happy to take that for the record and get back with you on a
specific number.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
We have previously been told that Space Force is not
looking at any new launch requirements for Phase 3 the National
Security Space Launch program. Given Chinese developments just
this week, do you believe that we should explore in
establishing new requirements?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, it is my
understanding that we are still developing the Phase 3 of the
National Security Space Launch strategy.
We are still trying to figure out the best way to bend the
requirements, to take advantage of both the high-end
established launch service providers but also find room for
these emerging smaller launch service providers, and I think
that mix creates the kind of flexibility we need and it is
about getting the requirements set just right.
If confirmed, I would be committed to looking and working
with stakeholders to make sure we get that balance just right.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you.
You know our supply chain remains a challenge, especially
for our national security space ecosystem.
How will the Space Force address these new requirements in
future systems? Could you give me your thoughts on that?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, what we are learning
is we have to account for the supply chains--the veracity, the
robustness, of the supply chains as we go through our
acquisition process.
You cannot wait till after you decide what you are going to
buy and then figure out if the supply chain works, and I think
our Space Systems Command and the other providers in the
acquisition system have done a good job of characterizing that,
and once you characterize it effectively then you can make sure
you are defending it, making it as robust as possible, making
it flexible so it is not sensitive to problems in the supply
chain, that we have other areas to go, and, if confirmed, I
would continue to promote that.
Senator Tuberville. Thank you, General. Good luck. It is
going to be a tough job.
But thanks for being here today, you and your family. It is
it. This is quite an honor--obviously, the second head coach,
basically, of Space Force. So thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, this is National Peanut Day so that is the
reason I put all these peanuts in front of everybody from
Alabama. So thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tuberville, and
thank you for the peanuts.
Senator Hirono, please?
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for
the peanuts. We need to--energy.
General, welcome to you and your family.
To ensure the fitness of nominees for appointment to senior
positions within any of the departments I ask the following two
initial questions of all nominees in any of the Committees that
I sit on so I will ask you these initial questions.
Since you became a legal adult have you ever made unwanted
requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. No.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. No.
Senator Hirono. General, over the past several years the
regional SATCOM Support Center Pacific has experienced a
significant amount of mission growth as the armed forces have
become more reliant on satellite communications.
Unfortunately, regional SATCOM Support Center Pacific has
not seen corresponding manpower increases to handle this
additional work. With Army satellite operations set to be
consolidated under Space Force in the near future, will you
consider increases to the Space Force's manpower levels to
ensure every unit is able to keep pace with its mission
requirements?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, I think one of the
most important things that the Space Force has done since its
inception is consolidating military SATCOM--military satellite
communications--under a single service.
It gives us a lot of authorities, responsibilities, and
opportunities to do just what you are saying and that is
increase the readiness of those units so that they can provide
these critical capabilities.
So we are redesigning currently how we assess and force
present for readiness all of our units. First and foremost
amongst those are these new units that are coming across from
other services.
The short answer is if confirmed as the CSO I would take
the readiness of these units very seriously and the manpower
elements of readiness is a key concern.
Senator Hirono. That sounds like a yes.
You have been asked a number of questions from both the
chairman and Senator Gillibrand about the role of the National
Guard in Space Force, and I recently met with members of the
Hawaii Air National Guard to discuss their concerns about the
potential transition of space missions away from the Air
National Guard to the Space Force.
These men and women have committed to the space mission on
Kauai and have dedicated their time and training to building
their expertise in space electronic warfare.
However, remaining assigned to the Air Force while carrying
out Space Force missions has resulted in budget gaps and
training delays.
It is my understanding that the Space Force and Air Force
are evaluating three potential actions to resolve this issue,
including the establishment of a Space National Guard.
I think that we, in Congress, is expecting or was expecting
a report on how Space Force was going to be constituted due in
March and we do not have that report yet.
So until the decision is made as to how the Space Force is
going to be constituted, how will you ensure that such National
Guard units which, by the way, exist in a number of states--
that would be, excuse me, California, Colorado, Florida,
Hawaii, Ohio, Guam, and Alaska--how would you ensure that such
National Guard units are adequately resourced and have access
to the requisite training required to carry out their space
missions?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, Senator. I think you have
characterized that just right.
I know that this is also a concern for U.S. Space Command
and as one of the key force providers to U.S. Space Command we
were involved in those discussions where the Air Force and the
Air Guard through the Air Reserve also provide those
capabilities.
So readiness, again, is my primary concern, having access
to that expertise, and as a part of the Department of the Air
Force, if confirmed as CSO, I would be in those deliberations
to make sure that those forces are as ready as possible to meet
the combatant commanders' requirements.
Senator Hirono. If confirmed, would you agree that the
National Guard should be consulted in any decision or cost
estimate related to a creation of a Space National Guard?
Some of the concern is that creating a Space National Guard
is too expensive and, really, setting up an entire other way to
constitute the Space Force could be much, much more expensive
because you already have these units in a number of the states
that I mentioned.
So I would like your commitment that you will be consulting
with the National Guard in going forward.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, if confirmed as the
Chief of Space Operations, I commit to collaborating with the
National Guard on a host of issues, this being one.
Senator Hirono. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Hirono.
Senator Rounds, please?
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Good morning, General Saltzman, and thank you to you and
your family for your years of service.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Thank you.
Senator Rounds. I most certainly appreciated the comments
that you have made so far today and I want to approach this
from a little bit different angle.
Recognizing that we are in an unclassified environment, can
you provide your assessment on Russia and China's space
capabilities as compared to ours?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, Senator.
We are still the greatest spacefaring nation on the planet.
The Space Force's capabilities, what we can provide to the
Joint Force, are extremely capable and I still put us at the
head of the table.
Unfortunately, our adversaries are investing heavily to
close that gap and supersede us. I am worried about the pace
with which they are making those changes, China first amongst
them, but Russia also committed to investing heavily in the
kinds of capabilities that are going to disrupt, degrade, and
even destroy our on orbit capabilities.
It is that pace of change and their commitment to disabling
it that is most concerning to me, Senator.
Senator Rounds. If you take a look at the existing
capabilities, I am really curious because we have all seen what
has happened in Ukraine. Yet, if Russia has capabilities in
space that are good and, perhaps, advancing, how do we account
for their--well, their repeated failures to provide relevant
and timely information to strike Ukrainian forces on the
ground?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I am, certainly, not in a
position to comment on the Russian operational failures. I will
tell you that we have learned some lessons watching that
operation. It may be a little early to say complete lessons
learned but there are observations that are important.
For example, the use of commercial space capabilities to
augment military and national decision-making capabilities has
proven to be effective for the Ukrainians. The disaggregated
proliferated nature of some of the constellations that they are
using has shown a level of resilience to degradation attempts
that, I think, is noteworthy.
Finally, I think we see how important it is to defend our
cyber networks because those cyber networks create
vulnerabilities if attacked to actual space capabilities.
So when I look across what we are seeing in that Ukrainian
theater I see some important lessons that we should take to
heart in terms of building our Space Force design.
Senator Rounds. General, the new Advanced Battle Management
System, or ABMS, will be a critical piece of our command and
control on the battlefield and I understand the reasoning
behind moving away from J-STARS. In fact, I support moving away
from J-STARS due to the survivability issues in a contested
environment.
I am concerned that a specific alternative that has gained
support within and outside of the department might not provide
the same level of situational awareness and targeting
capabilities to our troops on the ground that the J-STARS radar
is able to provide.
Part of what we look at when we talk about the ABMS is the
broad picture but also specifically the need for an officer--a
commanding officer on the ground to rely on good, specific, and
very timely data in a close quarter battle situation.
Do I have your commitment that, if confirmed, you will
assure that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated
requirements for this system are met so that our troops on the
ground are provided the capabilities that they need to win on
the battlefield?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, one of the important
responsibilities that is given to the Chief of Space Operations
is to be the DOD integrator for joint space requirements.
It is just that kind of concern which, I think, we take
seriously by establishing that critical position, and so as we
evaluate the requirements we have to take all the perspectives
into account. That ground commander that has to make the final
decision is one of those key inputs.
So you have my commitment, if confirmed as CSO, that I will
account for all the requirement stakeholders when we make
critical decisions about whether missions should be migrated
into space or performed by other platforms and other domains.
Senator Rounds. In Ukraine, Russia, clearly, has good space
capabilities and, yet, they are not able to implement them and
to use them effectively. There is not that line of command down
to that local commander.
The last thing that we want to see when we move in to the
ABMS system is one which gives broad informational situational
awareness but is not capable of providing what we do today with
regard to J-STARS to that commander on the ground.
Would you agree with that?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I agree that closing that last
tactical mile to make sure the right decision maker has the
right information at the time and place that is operationally
relevant is important.
Senator Rounds. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rounds.
Senator Kaine, please?
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
General Saltzman, congratulations on your nomination.
I want to ask you some questions about leveraging
commercial space technology to ensure U.S. space dominance.
In the run up to the Russian invasion of Ukraine our IC
doubled its procurement of commercial satellite imagery to help
prepare and provide intel to our Ukrainian allies.
The IC was also able to leverage satellites operated by
Virginia Company HawkEye 360 to detect jamming efforts that
were being undertaken by the Russian military in the Donbas.
This is not the first time where commercial technologies
have been leveraged in effective ways but I think it is really
hitting a warp speed. In your view, how important is leveraging
innovative commercial technologies to preserve U.S. space
dominance?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. It is critically important,
Senator.
The idea--the mantra that we are using to exploit what we
have, get the most out of the systems that we have already
paid, for but then also to consider how commercial
capabilities--a broad spectrum of commercial capabilities--can
contribute directly to our mission set and, perhaps, do it more
cheaply than us building our own systems is essential.
The final element would be when there are still gaps--as we
look at our mission set if there are still gaps we might need
to consider a specific military solution--military-unique
solution to that.
But the commercial services, commercial capabilities, are
profoundly growing and we need to take advantage of it.
Senator Kaine. Let me ask you about one example of this.
Last year the Space Force approved experimentation and
prototyping for a new tactical space layer that would leverage
commercial satellite imagery to provide battle space awareness
and bolster targeting capacity.
What is the time line for the development of this capacity
so that our warfighters might be able to use satellite-based
information in real time to make battlefield decisions?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, I do not have a
specific time line. If it is okay I will take that for the
record and get the specific time line back to you. But I can
tell you it is an important capability that we consider very
seriously.
Senator Kaine. Excellent. Thank you. I will ask that for
the record.
Over to another topic, the increase in the number of
commercial space launch providers, together with a substantial
reduction in the cost of access to space and then the
proliferation of commercial constellations, could create a kind
of a traffic jam in the demand for launch services, and I
imagine that demand could play significant challenges on
Federal launch ranges such as Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral.
There are state space ports, for example, the Mid-Atlantic
space port in Wallops Island, Virginia, that are being used
significantly not only by private sector space operators but by
NASA and others.
What would--what could the potential relationship be
between Space Force and state space launch facilities be in the
future?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, assured access to
space is a national imperative, simple as that, and I believe
that having agility, having flexibility in the types of
capabilities that provide payloads to orbit to all of the
orbits is essential. That means maximizing the number of launch
providers as well as the amount of launch locations that are
available to the nation.
Currently, our capacity on our ranges meets the
governmental needs. But with the proliferation of small
satellites that is going to change rapidly and I think that the
number of launches is going to go up dramatically and we are
going to need to look at other opportunities.
We are currently engaged in an interagency process to look
at a national space port strategy and I think the capabilities
like at Wallops Island will naturally be a part of that
discussion.
Senator Kaine. Should you be confirmed, and I am confident
you will be, I would love to carry that discussion further.
Let me ask you about one other topic. This is one that I am
kind of a nerd about. My favorite government publication is
Orbital Debris Quarterly News--ODQN--that is published by NASA.
It is getting more and more important because there is
currently 4,500 active satellites in orbit. SpaceX has deployed
more than 1,700 Starlink broadband satellites into low earth
orbit, and then last year the FCC received from companies like
Amazon, ASTRO, and Boeing petitions to put as many as 38,000
more broadband satellites in low earth orbit.
Are you concerned about how the proliferation of commercial
investments could interfere or complicate national space needs
and do we need to look at international rules of the road both
about commercial use of space but also about the handling of
debris that can--a small amount of orbital debris can wreak
havoc on a super expensive satellite platform?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I am not concerned at this
point about the traffic, as you mention it. I am always
concerned about debris. We are committed to making sure that we
lead and model responsible behaviors in space and I think that
will help reduce the amount of debris associated with launch
and other kinds of operations.
Senator Kaine. Thank you very much. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Cramer, please?
Senator Cramer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and, thank you,
General.
Jennifer, good to see you and your family here. This is a
really great day, and congratulations.
I am going to--Senator Kaine brought up the issue of
commercial companies. I want to emphasize small commercial
because one of the things--you are in the innovation business
if anybody is in the innovation business, and so I am going to
ask sort of maybe three questions in one and let you just
opine, if that is okay.
So, piggybacking, again, on Senator Kaine's point, maybe
elaborate a little bit on the role of small commercial space
companies that are seeming to just going great guns, thank
goodness, and having access.
At the same time, we are coming up on October 1st at which
time as a matter of legislative policy Space Development Agency
will move over to Space Force.
One of the benefits, I think, of Space Development Agency
has been their autonomy, their independence. That has allowed
that innovation to really grow.
At the same time, I think they and Space Force and all of
us will benefit from the discipline, the oversight, and the
collective, if you will, of Space Force--the collective
opportunities, the strategies, if you will, and that is part of
why we stood up the Space Force.
At the same time--and I know there has been some talk
already of cyber--once again, the coming together of commercial
and government becomes all the more critical.
Could you just maybe elaborate a little bit on those
specific things--small SDA and its autonomy blossoming under
your jurisdiction--and then the role of cyber in all of that?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. You hit on the key principle
there and that is that innovation is going to be critical to
the success of the Space Force.
So I will start with the small businesses. One thing I can
say for certain is that with regards to ideas the more the
better, and if you can look across the broad space ecosystem
and pull in as many ideas as possible, regardless of the size
of the vendor that is promoting that idea, you are going to be
more successful at putting solid innovative ideas on the plate.
With regards to Space Development Agency, I could not agree
more. Their innovative business model, if you will, has been
very successful in the early efforts associated with missile
warning, missile tracking, space data, transport layer, et
cetera.
When they come over to the Space Force 1 October we have
already been working with them. We have been planning for
months to make that transition seamless, to make it smooth, and
we want to make sure that we do not violate that secret sauce,
which is the innovation engine of Space Development Agency.
So, if confirmed as CSO, I will be committed to making sure
that we do not lose the goodness as we bring them over. Now, we
need to integrate them and make sure they are a part of the
Force Design. That is what is going to make it an effective
force when it is finally fielded. But I do not want to lose
that innovation engine.
Nothing requires staying at the technical forefront than
cyber. It is such a fast-paced changing environment that
innovation, our ability to stay engaged with the leading edge
of technology there, is going to be essential.
One of the innovative ideas that we came up with is
something we are calling Super Coders and the idea is that we
take our guardians, especially the ones who kind of do coding
as hobbies, quite frankly, and pull them in, give them advanced
training and then put them back into the units so that our
operational units have direct connection to people that can
code and develop applications that support the mission.
That is--it is already paying off. We are seeing some new
tools being developed for how to monitor our systems and how to
do crew logging activities, for example.
Those are the kind of innovative ideas to stay on the
forefront of cyber.
Senator Cramer. Thank you.
In the last minute, let us talk a little bit about my
favorite space topic PARCS radar. As you know, the Cavalier
Space Force Station has that beautiful old gigantic piece of
concrete that watches space and missile warning, of course. It
has for several decades.
But modernization is important, and some has taken place
there already and appreciate that. We were able to put $5
million into the fiscal year '23 NDAA here in the Senate.
Hopefully, that survives.
But maybe you could just share a little bit in the closing
seconds your vision for that radar.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Sir, the missile warning
mission is a no-fail mission for us. Missile tracking is going
to be just as important with hypersonics, and what those radars
provide is not just missile warning but the space domain
awareness, and I, certainly, will not be able to do my job, if
confirmed as CSO, if I have no idea what is going on in space.
So the more data that we can collect from the sensors on
the planet the better we are going to have for space domain
awareness and I think the better we are going to be able to do
our mission.
Senator Cramer. Thank you, General. Good luck. I look
forward to supporting you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cramer.
Senator King, please?
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Are we on?
General, I have to tell you at the outset I have rarely
been as impressed with a witness' preparation and grasp of the
issues as you have demonstrated here this morning. You have
really, I think, thought deeply about a lot of these issues and
I want to start with a more conceptual question.
The conventional political position through the '80s and
'90s and, perhaps, the early part of this century was we do not
want to militarize space. My concern is that this
administration may still be holding on to that concept to some
extent and that train has left the station, has it not?
We have to react to the militarization of space that has
already taken place by our potential adversaries.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, it is one of my
primary objectives to make sure that a war does not extend into
space. That is not a good day for the United States.
I believe the best way to create a deterrent capability to
prevent that is to have a credible force that can both deny
benefits of those actions and impose costs where necessary.
That creates doubt in our adversaries' mind that it is a good
idea to start attacking capabilities in space.
Senator King. But the implication of what you just said is
that we have to have both offensive and defensive capability in
space in order to have an effective deterrent. Is that correct?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. We, certainly, need to defend
what we have and if we are going to protect the Joint Force
from what the adversaries have already put in space--their
space-enabled targeting--we are going to have to have counter
capabilities.
Senator King. I appreciate that and I hope that you will
argue that effectively in the administration because this is--
as I say, this train has actually pretty well left the station.
I wanted to follow up on a question that Senator Cotton
asked and just sort of tie it up in a bow.
General Raymond said that the joint effort--unity of effort
between the Space Force and the NRO has worked well and that
the two entities should remain separate. Is that your position?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I think because there are two
organizations it allows them to focus on different requirements
and different customer bases. The key will be to how they
collaborate where their mission sets get close, and I think it
is in that collaboration we make sure the right lanes in the
road, the right authorities, the right funding, so that we are
not overly redundant, that that is going to happen in detailed
collaboration.
Senator King. Is there a formal process by which that
collaboration is ensured? Is there--in other words, are there
monthly meetings or communication back and forth? Because you
can say collaboration but if you are not talking it is not
going to happen.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, sir. There is an
executive committee that meets routinely. Both are parties--and
members of the Space Acquisition Council and both are parties
to what we are calling the Program Integration Council, which
is even a lower level organization committee that gets together
to talk about requirements, acquisition strategies, to make
sure that we are meeting the mission requirements of both
without being overly redundant.
Senator King. Thank you. You had a lot of discussion this
morning about innovation, which is--as you suggest, is
absolutely critical to the mission of your agency, perhaps more
so than any agency in our government.
We have also talked about--Senator Cramer asked about
smaller businesses. We have had testimony before this Committee
from innovative smaller companies, particularly in Silicon
Valley, who, basically, said we have given up responding to the
Pentagon RFPs. It is just too burdensome. The process is too
lengthy, too expensive and so we are losing those suppliers.
I would hope that you might meet with--take your 20
smallest companies that you are working with, pull them
together, and have a discussion about how they feel about the
process and are there ways that that can be improved.
I am concerned that just the nature of the Pentagon
acquisition process may itself be an impediment to smaller
companies even getting into the game.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, we cannot afford to
lose those contributions. So, if confirmed as CSO, I would
definitely explore opportunities to get their feedback to make
this a better process.
Senator King. A final question about--and you have touched
on this--about culture and recruitment.
You indicated that you are not having any problem with
recruitment. I guess one measure of how you are doing is how
many Air Force Academy graduates, when they leave, want to join
the Space Force?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. More than we have slots for.
Senator King. So that is a good sign in terms of their view
of the future in this area.
I said that was the final question but I thought of another
one. A lot of your space capability--we are all--our military
is based upon, in many ways, space capability, GPS being the
best example.
Do you not believe, however, that we need to be sure that
our military has the capability to effectively deploy and act
without GPS? Because that may be the first thing to go in a
conflict?
I have heard that they are teaching celestial navigation at
Annapolis. But I want to be sure that that is the case because
we could be blinded in the first day of a conflict and we need
to have backup.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Sir, I am a military planner
at heart. Our job is to prepare for the worst case scenario. So
I agree with you, we always need to plan for contingencies for
when things go wrong or when things are not available to us.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Ernst, please?
Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you, General Saltzman, and to
your family as well for joining you here today. Congratulations
on your nomination and thank you for your service.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Thank you.
Senator Ernst. I would like to go back to the deterrence
discussion.
So the bedrock of Biden's administration--their National
Defense Strategy is a so-called integrated deterrence, and how
does this concept account for cross-domain deterrence, so
holding terrestrial targets accountable and at risk to deter
attack on U.S. space assets?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. The idea is integrated
deterrence leverages a whole of government approach to imposing
costs and denying benefits if an adversary were to think about
taking actions detrimental to U.S. interests.
So I think in that whole of government approach then on the
military side of things you look at all of the domains. If
there is a threat against a particular domain or a particular
target set then we can take asymmetric action and others to
impose costs or deny benefits, and it is the collaboration of
the Joint Force that brings power to that full set of
capabilities.
Senator Ernst. Very good, and would you support revealing
some of our space capabilities for deterrence, demonstrating to
our adversaries that we can respond effectively to their
attacks?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. You bring up an important
point about deterrence and that is if you do not know the
capabilities are there it is hard to deter specifically an
adversary if they do not know the capabilities there.
The problem is is if we think too much about revealing
capabilities that are vulnerable that we might be jeopardizing
those capabilities. If confirmed as the CSO I would welcome an
opportunity in a classified environment to talk about some of
those tradeoffs.
Senator Ernst. I would appreciate that.
Going along with that, the Biden administration had
recently announced a unilateral moratorium on certain anti-
satellite tests.
Do you believe that this self-imposed restriction will
inhibit or stop China and Russia then from conducting anti-
satellite tests?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I think it is a commitment to
not conduct destructive ASAT missile tests, which is currently
the most dangerous thing to U.S. space capabilities in the form
of what the Chinese and the Russians are doing.
So I do not know if it is going to dictate that they will
not do it. I am not hopeful of that. But I think it does show a
commitment to, hey, there are better ways to test. There are
more responsible ways, and I think by demonstrating and
modeling that behavior we do not give up much because we have
other ways to test our capabilities but we lead by saying we
are not going to intentionally create debris in space.
Senator Ernst. Okay. I can appreciate that.
However, I do not want to continue to set the United States
up by operating from a doctrine of appeasement. So I do think
it is important that we can signal to our adversaries that we
have the capabilities of destroying satellites. Maybe we do not
conduct those. But, again, maybe in a classified setting, we
can talk more about that.
How can the United States go ahead and promote or, as you
said, model the norms of conduct for space? How can we do that
and then encourage other countries to do the same? If they do
not, then how do we impose penalties on those countries or
states that are violating them?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I think as we clearly define
what it means to be responsible and professional in space
activities it will cause--put into greater relief those
activities which are not responsible, and I think by building a
coalition of like-minded spacefaring nations around a set of
responsible behaviors, again, it will create peer pressure, if
you will, for the international community to deem certain
activities professional and responsible and other activities to
be irresponsible, and that would be the focus, I think, of
those tenets.
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, General Saltzman. I
look forward to supporting your confirmation.
But probably the most important question, General Raymond
had a daughter that attended Iowa State University. Did any of
your children attend Iowa State University?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Ma'am, they are proud
graduates of the University of Missouri. M-I-Z back there.
Senator Ernst. Okay. Close enough.
[Laughter.]
Senator Ernst. Thank you very much, sir.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, ma'am.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Ernst.
Senator Kelly, please?
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, welcome. Very nice meeting you and your family.
The administration's fiscal year '23 budget request
requested a growth in Space Force end strength from 8,400 to
8,600 guardians and this Committee's version of the NDAA
supports that request.
The military's emphasis and reliance on global space
operations will demand a robust force, moving forward. But
there are concerns that budgets for the Space Force are
expected to flat line in fiscal year '27.
So what type of growth do you foresee in the Space Force
over the next five or 10 years?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Senator, I would not want to
comment on any particular numbers. Just have not had a chance
to really dig in and see what appropriate levels would be.
However, I can tell you that, in my estimation, looking at
the readiness of the force, there is substantial capabilities
in test and training infrastructure that we need to invest in.
If we have exquisite weapon systems, exquisite systems on
orbit to provide joint capabilities but our guardians and our
operators do not have the skills, the training, the experience,
they need to make the most out of those systems, then I feel
like we are not really fully combat ready, fully ready to do
those critical mission tasks.
Senator Kelly. What are some examples of those
capabilities?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. We do not have simulators that
allow our operators to practice their tactics against a
thinking adversary. Even if it is a simulated adversary, we do
not have good simulators.
We do not have ranges where they can routinely practice
their tradecraft. We do not have the ability to link multiple
units together so they can practice the coordination that is
necessary to do large force employments, if you will.
We have just been operating in a benign environment for so
long we did not need to necessarily have those kinds of
capabilities. So I think over the next few years we are going
to have to look at that and be as specific as we can but
provide that kind of training and experience to our operators.
Senator Kelly. Yeah. I mean, having the equipment and the
capability is one thing. Being able to use it is entirely
another and being able to simulate operations on a range,
operate jointly, as well. I imagine that is something that is
on the agenda.
A simulator and range, that is infrastructure. Is there any
other infrastructure capacity that you feel you need?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. We are continuing to build and
design a more resilient defendable architecture. As I
mentioned, we have operated for years in a benign domain and so
we were focused more on the capabilities of the payloads and
how long they would last on orbit, try to get the most out of
the expensive launch that put them into orbit.
Launch prices are coming down. We are doing distributed
architectures because they are more resilient. We are trying to
think about ways to disaggregate our payloads so they are not
as easy targets.
All of that is new investment in new Force Design and so it
is going to come with a transition from our legacy capabilities
to these new architectures. That will be work that we are doing
in the requirements phase and in the Force Design phase and, if
confirmed, I look forward to working with the Committee to get
that balance as we transition from legacy to the new
architecture right.
Senator Kelly. Senator King asked about recruiting and you
mentioned from the Air Force Academy you have more volunteers
to go into the Space Force than you have spots.
In the enlisted ranks, how is recruiting there?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. It is very good. Again,
despite the fact that we are looking for highly capable, highly
technical skills, we have more volunteers than we have spots to
fill. Just--again, we are lucky. We are a small force at this
point, doing a very specific mission set, and so we can
handpick and we are really getting solid volunteers.
Senator Kelly. It is one thing getting people. It is
another thing getting the right people. Have you felt the need
to do any marketing of the Space Force at this point?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Lots of people are doing
marketing for us. It is working out to our advantage.
We are also very active in going to specific universities
where there are underrepresented populations and make sure that
we are looking across the board to bring the right people in,
the right kind of diversity, the right kinds of diversity of
thought, the right backgrounds and skills, and, so far, we have
been very successful in doing that.
Senator Kelly. All right. Thank you, General.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, sir.
Senator Kelly. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Fischer, please?
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you,
General, for your willingness to step forward once again to
serve this country. My thanks to your family for their
sacrifices and service as well.
General, as you know, the Next-Gen OPIR Satellite Program
is one of the key components of our future missile warning
architecture along with the proliferating constellations of
smaller satellites operating in lower orbits.
Your predecessor, General Raymond, testified in support of
this approach before this Committee in May. But I am concerned
about discussion of alternative proposals that have not been
developed with input from the combatant commands and would,
ultimately, accept greater risk in the mission of the
department that the department itself describes as no-fail.
I hope this is something you will take a look at and ensure
that we continue to pursue a diverse architecture of
complementary constellations that meets the warfighter needs
for capacity in the schedule.
Do I have your commitment on that?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, ma'am. As you mentioned,
missile warning is a no-fail mission and bridging that
transition for new capabilities, legacy capabilities, so we
have no gaps in coverage is a high priority for me.
Senator Fischer. Thank you.
I know the Space Force is in the process of designing the
requirements for Phase 3 of the National Security Space Launch
program.
Do you see Phase 3 as being more of an evolution of Phase 2
or a revolution in terms of its structure and capabilities?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I will be honest, ma'am. I
have not really dug into the details of what that strategy
proposes. I have had some briefings in preparation for this.
I would offer there was a great deal of effort that was put
into going out across all of the stakeholders and getting as
many inputs as possible so that the strategy would at least
learn the lessons of the previous phases of National Security
Space Launch, not ignore those lessons and bring those forward
into Phase 3.
I think keeping a fair open competition to make sure as
many providers, both established launch providers as well as
emerging launch providers, was also a key element of the
strategy being devised and I think that they are on the right
path.
We will see as we get closer to the final decisions on how
that strategy plays out. But, if confirmed, I look forward to
getting inputs from all the Committee Members as well as the
other stakeholders in this--in our critical mission set for the
Space Force.
Senator Fischer. There has been some criticism of the
program, particularly its use of block buys and certified
providers. But I want you to know this Committee understands
the importance of maintaining assured access to space,
especially for the most challenging orbit.
We want to take advantage of the private sector's
innovation--you talked about that earlier--but we are talking
about unique and very expensive payloads, that if they are not
delivered perfectly it will result in capability gaps for our
warfighters.
So we understand there has to be a balanced approach to
that risk. When you say that you want to include all
stakeholders, give me examples.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Certainly, all the launch
service providers. Certainly, the people whose payloads we are
putting onto orbit. Certainly, the acquisition community has to
balance contracting requirements, cost profiling, all of the
key considerations when you put an acquisition strategy
together--a procurement strategy together--making sure that all
those variables are accounted for so that we can thread the
needle to get the balance that you just mentioned right.
There is risk to mission but there is also cost overruns
that we want to avoid. Spending too much for these required
mission sets is something that is on my mind, and so I think we
just need to pull as many of those key opinions from all the
stakeholders together to make the wise decision for the
strategy, going forward.
Senator Fischer. How do you balance the risk?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. It is a challenge because we
have to--it has to be a no-fail mission. We have to be able to
put the payloads we need into the orbits that we require. But
we need flexibility across that. So it is this balance between
mission assurance and flexibility, which is always a conundrum
for military planners.
But I think the best way to do it is just to have open
deliberate debates about what the merits are on both sides and
make sure you try to get it as close to perfect as you can.
Senator Fischer. Last question. Can you talk about how the
Space Force has made changes to deliver capabilities faster so
that it is more responsive to the needs that we face such as
restructuring of Space Systems Command and how you plan to
build on these steps to ensure our space enterprise is
responsive to both threats and technological changes?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. With the help of Congress, we
established the Force Design architect in the Chief of Space
Operations. The Joint Requirements Oversight Committee gave us
responsibility as the DOD integrator. This is allowing us to
streamline the requirements development, and if we get the
requirements just right it sets us on the right path for the
major acquisition programs.
We are also considering exploiting what we have and then
the commercial capabilities that we can buy as a complement to
those major acquisition programs that we have to build from
scratch. Through those processes, I think, we have streamlined
at least the early phases of that larger complicated
acquisition process.
Senator Fischer. When you look at these reforms what
benchmarks do you look at in order to determine success or
measure success?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. The classic acquisitions are
cost, schedule, and performance. But for me, it is about
delivering a full set, a full-throated capability, that gives
us both the mission agility to do the job, sustainability over
time.
Just because it works today in a dynamic environment
against a dynamic threat it may not work in the future, and so
I am looking at always being able to provide a capability to
the President, to the combatant commanders, that give them
flexibility in execution of their mission set.
So it is the readiness of the force to meet that broad
spectrum of anticipated threats that I am looking for as a
measure of effectiveness.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Rosen, please?
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and for holding
this hearing. I also want to thank General Saltzman for
testifying today, for your service, and for your vast knowledge
in this area.
I want to talk a little bit about our tech and cyber
challenges in space because our nation, of course, we know
facing increasingly sophisticated cybersecurity threats in
space from disruptive technologies, including the threat of
stealing data, jamming satellite signals, hijacking satellites,
and disrupting internet services.
I have kind of a multi-part question. If confirmed, how are
you going to work to keep our space-based assets like
satellites safe from cyber attacks? Who are you going to--what
other agencies interdepartmental or otherwise?
Do you need to coordinate to protect that all of government
approach on cyber that we have been trying to work on and how
are you using emerging technologies in all of this?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Thank you, Senator.
That is an important topic, and watching what happened in
Ukraine to cyber attacks that had space effects dismantled to
some degree showed that there is a large concern for just what
you are pointing out, that our cyber networks are an avenue to
disrupt and degrade our space capabilities.
So this is a critical issue for me as well. We have
organized one of our units, Delta. Delta 6 is actually
dedicated to cyber operations and specifically cyber mission
defense of Space Force systems.
We also leverage the authorities that U.S. Cyber Command
has to monitor and, if necessary, defend--actively defend in
protection of those capabilities. So those you mentioned, which
ones are the stakeholders, who are we collaborating with, U.S.
Cyber Command is at the top of that list, certainly.
But what we are doing is training our cyber operators on
our mission-unique--what we call cyber terrain. They are living
day to day inside our weapons and the networks that feed them
and make them work, and they are monitoring for malicious
actions, malicious behavior, and they are continually updating
the defenses to make sure they are as secure as possible. I am
comfortable that they are actively doing it.
Now, what I want to give them are some of the tools to do
the job better and some of the training and education that they
are going to need as this very dynamic field moves down the
road.
So I want to keep them at the forefront of that technology
to have the tools, the monitoring systems, and the ability to
defend our critical cyber networks.
Senator Rosen. Well, you must have read my mind because
that is my next question because as a former computer
programmer I am very excited to hear you talk about Super
Coders. That is very exciting to me.
But it is so important that we think about our STEM
outreach, generally, and that, like you said, Space Force
provides an opportunity to ensure our guardians, including the
Space Force unit stationed in my state at Nellis Air Force
Base, they are fully equipped to address evolving threats in
space, and I really hope this new branch of the military can
also play a role in promoting what I think are exciting STEM
career fields and helping bridge the technological gaps facing
military and industry because it is a collaboration.
It is why I am glad in 2020 the PROMOTES Act, bipartisan
legislation I introduced, it authorized DOD to provide STEM
education and training to junior ROTC students and it was
signed into law as part of the NDAA.
So we hope that gives you a good pipeline.
But considering how important it is, and you spoke a little
bit about this, how are you going to do things like the STEM to
Space Initiative and other STEM outreach programs to try to be
sure that you are really reaching out there and letting young
folks or anyone, really, know what an exciting career field
this is?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, ma'am, and thank you for
the support.
I agree that attracting the right kind of professionals
with the right kind of acumen on this STEM field of play, if
you will, is critical to our success, and so, certainly, we do
outreach. We go to--we start in grade schools. We send people
out into grade schools and high schools to talk about the
importance of space.
John Raymond is always famous for dragging our astronauts
that are Space Force guardians along with him to talk about how
exciting the space domain is and I think there is a lot of
excitement, a lot of buzz, that that creates.
We have established a university partner program whereby we
have 14 universities, maybe 15 now--it is expanding--where we
go out and try to leverage that diverse, highly technical skill
set that that people are seeking in those universities and try
to attract them into the force.
We are establishing partnerships for research to stay at
the leading edge of cyber through that same partnership program
with the universities, and I think we are seeing the benefits
of that on a day to day basis.
I agree it is a critical mission. If confirmed as CSO, I
will continue to support that.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I yield back.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Scott, if you are ready you are next in order.
Senator Scott. Thank you.
First, thanks for being here--I think this is working--and
congratulations on your nomination.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Thank you.
Senator Scott. Thanks for your service and thanks for
everybody who works with you.
Since the Space Force is relatively new and the department
is still working out its operations, can you describe the role
you have been nominated for in terms of how the Space Force
enhances the U.S. ability to deter and, if necessary, defeat
our enemies, especially Communist China--Communist China and
Russia--but also any aggressive state that seeks to use Space
Force against us or to use space against us?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, sir. Thank you for that
question.
It is an important foundational piece for the reason there
is a Space Force and I take that very seriously.
Every American benefits from the capabilities that are
inherent in space and U.S. space capabilities. Whether it is
the navigation apps on their phones, solid communications,
weather reports, digital banking access, all of these are
critical things you may not see on a day-to-day basis because
you do not see the satellites. But that space--those space
effects are critical to every American.
I think it drives the economy. It spurs technological
advancement. It, certainly, underpins the military
capabilities. We just could not live without our space
capabilities. The American way of life now is inextricably
linked to space capabilities.
So it is the Space Force that has to address the emerging
threats. China is that pacing challenge. Russia, certainly, is
a challenge. They have invested heavily in the ability to
destroy--not just disrupt or degrade but to destroy our space
capabilities, and the Space Force wakes up every single day
dedicated to protecting our vital interest in space but also
protecting the Joint Force from the adversaries' designs of
space-enabled targeting, space-enabled capabilities.
So we are committed to developing the operational
concepts--the on orbit assets, the tactics, the training--to
make sure that we can protect that capability.
Senator Scott. Let me ask a question. So what you just said
is what I believe also. I believe Communist China and Russia
are out to defeat us. Their governments--not the people, but
their governments actually do not like our way of life.
Why does the public not know that and what can you do in
your role or what should--I mean, what can you do to get people
to understand that they actually--I mean, you are trying to
prevent bad acts. That is what you do for a living.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. It is, certainly, a matter of
scale. When I talk to friends and family back home I think
there is a recognition that this--the world is not safe. I
think there is recognition that there are countries out there
that do not have the same ideas we do and that they are working
actively to try to deny us those interests.
From a space perspective, it is a little bit harder to get
support around something you do not see on a day-to-day basis,
and with the satellites a little bit out of view sometimes they
always do not make the connection that, hey, it is the
satellites that they are trying to attack and that prevents us
from doing X, Y, and Z.
So it is education. It is us getting out. It is connecting
with the public. It is connecting through speeches and academic
interactions to make sure that those connections are clear.
Senator Scott. Do you think that is part of your role?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I do.
Senator Scott. Can I ask you another question?
I assume you are going to play an active role in budgeting
and the acquisition process. So can you talk about how the
department is going to use the most of any readily available
commercial technology or products so you can be more--with the
money that we allocate to you, you are going to be more
efficient with this and get more things accomplished?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, sir.
With the help of Congress, the Chief of Space Operations
has been designated as the Force Design architect, have a
further responsibility in the joint requirements process to be
the DOD integrator.
This gives us an important leadership role in setting the
requirements and then working with the acquisition community to
make sure that we meet those requirements based on all the
capabilities that are available to us.
Space Systems Command is convinced that if we have the
ability to exploit existing capabilities that would be great.
But we also have to be able to then buy commercial
capabilities. It might be cheaper to procure what is already
available through the commercial sector and then only build
what we must.
Senator Scott. Do you feel comfortable that you are doing
that?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I do.
Senator Scott. Okay. If you find problems, I think
everybody on this Committee would like to make sure that we are
not creating roadblocks for your ability to use readily
available technology to make sure our tax dollars go further so
you can do more.
So if you would let me know and let this Committee know
where we are creating any bottlenecks and what we could do to
make it easier for you to use commercially ready available--
will you commit to doing that?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. If confirmed as CSO, it is a
top priority to make sure we get the most out of the commercial
private sector.
Senator Scott. Now, I am sure that senators from Colorado
and Alabama think they are probably the best state for Space
Force.
But, I mean, do you really believe that you are doing
enough in Florida? Do you think that if you had--you can wave a
magic wand you would just do almost everything in Florida?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. There is--sir, there is no
question that Florida has an important --
Senator Scott. Easy answer.
[Laughter.]
General Saltzman.--rich history of space support. The Space
Coast is vital to our success as a service. Now even the Guard
capability, the space electronic warfare capability they have,
vital. Florida remains an important aspect of the Space Force
capabilities.
Senator Scott. Can I ask you a question? I will ask--just
be real quick.
How is the Space Force working with not just Florida? I
know we have a--our National Guard has an interest in the Space
Force and we are doing a lot of stuff. Is that working? Are you
picking National Guards around the country that--I would like
you to do everything in Florida but I do not think that is
necessarily realistic.
But are you doing that now?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. We work with the Guard very
closely on which mission sets, what we need. If confirmed, my
responsibility would be to define those operational
requirements.
I work very close with the Guard Bureau, with the Air
National Guard, to see if there are capabilities that make
sense to go to the Guard, especially where it is maybe surge
capability or something we do not need on a day-to-day basis.
We work very closely in collaboration with them to get that
right.
Senator Scott. Thanks.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, sir.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Hawley, please?
Senator Hawley. There we go. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
General, thanks for being here.
That is enough talk about Florida. Let us talk about
Missouri.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hawley. Did I hear you say an answer or two ago
that your children were graduates of the University of
Missouri?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Can I get an M-I-Z back there?
I do not know.
[Laughter.]
Senator Hawley. All right. Awesome. There you go. I am
feeling a lot better now, Mr. Chairman.
Let me ask you about the pacing threat. You mentioned just
a second ago the pacing threat--the pacing scenario. So the
Secretary of Defense has designated China as the department's
pacing threat, PACOM as the pacing theater--the priority
theater--and then the Taiwan contingency as the pacing
contingency.
Let me just ask you, first off, do you agree with those
designations?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I do not see anybody more
dangerous, more committed to attacking U.S. interests in those
areas than the President has defined.
Senator Hawley. Very good.
Do you agree that the threat of a potential Chinese
invasion of Taiwan is something that we need to be concerned
about this decade in the 2020s, not just 2030 and beyond?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I think the observables show
that there is a clear indication that they are moving in that
direction very rapidly.
Senator Hawley. So let me ask you this then.
Would you commit to making it your top priority to ensure
that the Space Force is ready to help deter China from
aggression in PACOM, generally, and then specifically with
regard to the pacing scenario in Taiwan?
Would Space Force be ready? Would you help them get ready
to make sure we are able to deter a Chinese invasion of Taiwan?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. If confirmed as the Chief of
Space Operations, there will be no higher priority than
maintain the readiness of our force to meet all of those
contingencies, the Chinese threat first amongst them.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Thank you for that.
Let me ask you a bit more specifically, what kind of space
capabilities do you think would need to be prioritized in order
to deter a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan? I mean, walk
us through your thinking there.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I look at this, sir, from a
two-pronged approach.
We have to be able to protect the capabilities that are
enabling our Joint Force today whether it is navigation and
timing, whether it is satellite communications, the missile
warning architectures that provide indications and warning of
attack.
The structure of our Joint Force is built presuming we have
access to those space capabilities. We must preserve them. That
requires a shift to a more resilient, defendable architecture
to provide that level of mission resiliency that we need.
But it is also important to realize that the Joint Force is
under a threat umbrella by space-enabled capabilities of our
adversaries and they will not be able to meet their military
objectives if we allow the Chinese in particular to use the
space-enabled targeting capabilities that they have at their
disposal.
So in order to be a deterrent, to prevent this from going
into a war that extends into space, we will have to be
resilient and we will have to have the offense and defensive
capability necessary to create a credible deterrent force.
Senator Hawley. You mentioned resiliency several times now.
So let me just ask you, do you think that we are currently
resilient enough in space and, in particular, resilient enough
to absorb losses from China or Russia in a conflict with
either?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I think the best way to state
that is the current attacks that we are seeing are not
sufficient to take out our capabilities. We are resilient
today.
As soon as we go into a crisis contingency, I do not
believe we have designed our systems to operate in that level
of contested environment and so we need to change to a more
defendable architecture to account for the fact that space has
shifted from a benign environment to a more contested
warfighting domain.
Senator Hawley. What does a more defendable architecture
look like?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I think we can look at some of
the observations we are seeing in Ukraine, that a distributed
architecture where there are more satellites with proliferated
missions that is harder to attack. Big single satellites are
much easier to attack than a distributed proliferated
constellation of capabilities. It becomes a tougher targeting
problem.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you this.
In your personal opinion, does the United States have the
anti-satellite weapons that we need, whether that is to deter
China or Russia or, if necessary, to defeat them should
deterrence fail?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I think the best way to answer
that is for the current conditions I think we have suitable
capabilities. But I think the security situation is changing
dynamically and I would really appreciate the opportunity to
talk with you in a classified environment on the specific
details.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you, just more broadly, if you
are confirmed what steps would you take to ensure that we are
doing everything that we have got to do in order to improve our
counter space capabilities?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. If confirmed as CSO, I will
lean on the Force Design architecture role that Congress has
given to the Chief of Space Operations. We are doing Force
Design analysis.
This is rigorous data analytics that show what one
constellation against a modeled threat would do and we run
thousands of permutations to really see what the optimal
configuration is.
I am committed to continue doing that so that we can, one,
buy the systems we need and not be overly redundant or have too
little resilience in the face of the adversary.
Senator Hawley. Very good. General, thanks for being here.
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Thank you.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hawley.
General, thank you for your testimony.
Senator Sullivan, I have been told, is trying to get here
but--and that will give me an opportunity to ask one more
question, and if he is not here by the end of my question then
I will call the hearing to a close.
But this question has been sort of alluded to and, in some
cases, directly posed to you throughout the hearing. What are
the critical hardware and software gaps you see on the ground
to effectively--or in the air to effectively inhibit your
mission?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, sir.
That analysis is ongoing. But there is some initial
thoughts in terms of how do we build an architecture on the
ground that is resilient to attacks from Russia, from China,
from other malicious cyber actors, and we have not had the need
to build quite the level of resiliency or redundancy on the
ground in the past as we see necessary today.
So when I look at the software, the monitoring of those
networks, I think there are still some gaps that we need to
fill. When I think about space domain awareness and the number
of sensors worldwide that we are going to need in order to
effectively evaluate and determine what is on orbit and where
it is and what it is doing and then have the tools--the
software tools--on the ground to take all that data in and turn
that data into information and decision-quality information,
those are some near-term issues that I think we are going to
have to address from a software and a hardware standpoint.
Chairman Reed. Well, thank you very much, General. Thank
you for your service. Thank you for your very compelling
testimony today.
We look forward to your confirmation in the next--as soon
as possible, and thank your family again for the support they
have given and the service they have also given.
With that, and an indication that Senator Sullivan will not
be joining us, I will adjourn the hearing. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:07 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Bradley
C. Saltzman, USSF by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
duties
Question. Section 9082 of title 10, United States Code, describes
the duties and functions of the Chief of Space Operations of the Space
Force.
What is your understanding of the duties and responsibilities of
the Chief of Space Operations of the Space Force?
Answer. The Chief of Space Operations (CSO), acting under the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force,
prepares guardians and space forces to defend the Nation, protect its
interests, and defeat its enemies. In my appraisal, the CSO does this
through four (4) distinct functional responsibilities: 1) As a Service
Chief, the CSO is directly responsible to the Secretary of the Air
Force for the organizational health and strength of the U.S. Space
Force. 2) As a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CSO is
responsible for providing military advice through the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense, President, and
Congress. 3) As a Space Chief on the international stage, the CSO works
to enhance global partnerships with our Allies and like-minded nations
to maintain a safe, secure and stable space environment. 4) As the
Force Design Architect for Space Systems of the Armed Forces the Chief
of Space Operations, under the authority, direction, and control of the
Secretary of the Air Force, is responsible for presenting integrated
force design recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for space
systems of the Armed Forces necessary to meet identified joint
requirements and support the National Security Strategy.
Question. What background and experience, including joint duty
assignments, do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform
these duties?
Answer. My qualifications to serve as the second Chief of Space
Operations are built upon the education, training, and operational
experiences I have collected over a 31-year career focused on military
space operations. Command tours at multiple echelons have prepared me
to lead and serve guardians while four (4) staff tours at the Pentagon
have developed my understanding of DOD corporate processes and prepared
me to interact with Congress, the White House, the Office of the
Secretary of Defense leadership, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Specifically, I served as Chief of Combat Plans and Chief of Combat
Operations for the Joint Space Operations Center (now CSpOC) at
Vandenberg SFB, including leading the operations when the Chinese
conducted their Anti-Satellite (ASAT) test destroying a satellite in
2007. I served twice in the National Reconnaissance Office including
commanding the Aerospace Data Facility--Colorado ground station. My
final position in the USAF was serving as the Deputy Commander for Air
Forces Central Command and the Deputy Combined Forces Air Component
Commander where I was responsible for day-to-day management of the air
and space campaign in the Central Command area of responsibility. Most
importantly, for the last 2+ years I have served as the first Deputy
Chief of Space Operations for Operations in the U.S. Space Force where
I have had responsibility for intelligence, space and cyber operations,
logistics and sustainment, training and readiness, and nuclear matters.
In this role, I have been central to the establishment of many of the
new Service's foundational processes, policies and organizational
constructs. If confirmed, I am committed to enhancing U.S. Space Force
partnerships within the Department of the Air Force as well as with the
other services, joint staffs and OSD teammates.
Question. Do you believe that there are any steps that you need to
take to enhance your ability to perform the duties and responsibilities
of the Chief of Space Operations of the Space Force, particularly in
regard to serving as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and in
performing certain acquisition-related functions?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will continuously seek to enhance my
ability to perform the duties of the Chief of Space Operations to the
level our guardians deserve, and our Nation demands. In my current
position as a Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Operations in the
Office of the Chief of Space Operations, I am familiar with Service-
level resourcing and acquisition efforts; however, an expanded
understanding of Space Force acquisition issues will enhance my ability
to serve as CSO. If confirmed, my initial preparatory efforts will
focus on strengthening my understanding of mid- and long-term force
design and acquisition initiatives that are beyond the scope of my
current responsibilities. Through this preparation, I will work closely
with Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisitions and
Integration, Mr. Frank Calvelli, and support his efforts to transform
Department of the Air Force space acquisitions and synchronize them
across the DOD. In order to properly represent guardians across the , I
will also prioritize developing personal working relationships with the
Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the other
Service chiefs, the Combatant Commanders, and OSD leadership. Finally,
I will place a high priority on expanding my relationships with Members
of Congress and their staffs, as I believe it is vital to have mutual
trust, respect and open communications between us if we are going to
collectively ensure the effectiveness of the U.S. Space Force.
Question. If confirmed, what innovative ideas would you consider
providing to the Secretary of the Air Force for enhancing the
organization, training, and equipping of the Space Force?
Answer. If confirmed, I will recommend the Secretary of the Air
Force build on the successes of my predecessor and the rest of the
Space Force by accelerating initiatives to build a lean, agile, and
innovative Service. I believe that if these principles are
appropriately applied at the squadron level and below, we can ignite
further innovation by empowering guardians, simplifying the chain of
command, and delegating responsibility to the lowest level possible. We
should also continue to review and evaluate the career fields used to
categorize the expertise of our guardians. Because space is a remote
domain with digital and technological dependencies, space operations
cannot be separated from military intelligence, cyber operations,
engineering, and acquisition activities. Effective military operations
in space will depend on our ability to combine all of this expertise
into high-performing teams. Finally, I will present ideas to train and
educate the guardian using innovative approaches. Training for a
contested space domain offers opportunities to leverage virtual reality
training and synthetic training environments allowing guardians to
creatively assess new tactics and gain experience in future operations.
I also believe we can be innovative in how we educate our guardians by
leveraging experiences with space and other high-tech industries. If
confirmed, I plan to explore these ideas to ensure our guardians have
the best opportunities to advance their expertise and skills.
Question. What are your goals, if confirmed, for the transformation
of the Space Force to meet new and emerging threats?
Answer. If confirmed, I would have three overarching goals for the
Space Force: (1) field combat-ready forces, (2) amplify guardian talent
and expertise, and (3) partner to win. ``Field combat-ready forces''
reflects that the Space Force must field military forces--not just
systems, but personnel, equipment, and expertise--capable of
outcompeting rivals, deterring aggressors, and defeating enemies. For
Space Force forces to be combat-ready and viable, we need to empower
them to defend U.S. interests in space with capable and survivable
weapon systems, secure networks, actionable intelligence, decisive
command and control, realistic training infrastructure, and rigorous
test capacity. Neglecting any of these elements jeopardizes the ability
of space forces to accomplish their assigned missions and tasks. My
second goal will be to maximize the Space Force's ability to attract,
develop, and empower talent. The Nation benefits from a strong Space
Force, and the Space Force is strongest when guardians thrive. My third
goal recognizes that even with superlative talent and exceptional
capabilities, the Space Force will not succeed without robust joint,
coalition, interagency, commercial, and academic partnerships. If
confirmed, I will continually look for innovative ways to engage these
mission partners in a way that strengthens Space Force combat
capability and sets us up for success in the highly competitive
security environment.
Question. Section 9082(d)(4) of title 10 provides that (subject to
the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air
Force), that the Chief of the Space Force shall ``exercise supervision,
consistent with the authority assigned to commanders of unified or
specified Combatant Commands under chapter 6 of this title [10], over
such of the members and organizations of the Space Force as the
Secretary determines;''
Over which members and organizations of the Space Force has the
Secretary of the Air Force directed the Chief of Space Operations to
exercise supervision and what is the scope of such supervision?
Answer. The Chief of Space Operations exercises supervision over
the Office of the Chief of Space Operations (also known as the Space
Staff) and the Space Force's Field Commands. As part of this
supervision, the CSO oversees and manages--under the authority,
direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force--Service-level
processes for designing, resourcing, developing, presenting, and
championing military space forces.
Question. If confirmed, how would you exercise meaningful
supervision of such members and organizations, while ensuring
compatibility with the authorities of the Combatant Commanders?
Answer. Title 10 clearly distinguishes the authorities of the
Combatant Commanders and the roles of Service chiefs. If confirmed, my
supervision of Space Force members assigned to Combatant Commanders
would be limited to implementing the Secretary of the Air Force's
administrative control over those forces and monitoring to ensure they
have the resources needed to execute operations directed by the
Combatant Commanders. These processes are well established within the
Department of the Air Force for assigned Air Force forces and will be
applied no differently to Space Force forces.
Question. If confirmed, what duties and responsibilities would you
assign to the Vice Chief of Staff of the Space Force?
Answer. If confirmed, I would work with Secretary Kendall to
establish appropriate duties and responsibilities for the Vice Chief of
Space Operations of the Space Force, which would include various
aspects of presiding over the Space Staff, working with the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and assisting in organizing, training, and equipping
Space Force guardians and civilian personnel to accomplish our mission.
2022 national defense strategy
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) puts forward an
integrated deterrence framework that incorporates the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) and Missile Defense Review (MDR) under the NDS. The
priorities of the strategy are (1) defending the Homeland; (2)
deterring strategic attacks against the United States, Allies, and
partners; (3) deterring aggression, while being prepared to prevail in
conflict when necessary, prioritizing the PRC challenge in the Indo-
Pacific, then the Russia challenge in Europe and (4) building a
resilient Joint Force and defense ecosystem.
In your view, does the 2022 NDS accurately assess the current
strategic environment, including prioritization of the most critical
and enduring threats to the national security of the United States and
its allies? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, the NDS accurately assesses the strategic environment
as it pertains to the space domain. The space domain will be used much
as the sea and air have been, as a way for states to project their
power in support of national interests. The NDS accurately captures the
actors who pose a threat to U.S. equities in space. Integrated
deterrence and collaborating with allies and partners around the globe
will go a long way towards mitigating those threats and heading off
emerging areas for concern before they become a risk. For a more
detailed discussion, I would welcome the opportunity to meet in a
classified session.
Question. In your view, does the 2022 NDS correctly specify and
prioritize DOD missions in the context of the current strategic
environment?
Answer. Yes, I believe that the NDS prepares us to compete, deter,
and win against a range of threats in the space domain. The NDS
inextricably links space to the international security environment by
asserting the centrality of space in defense priorities and joint
operations. The NDS calls on investment, defense, doctrine, employment
and reconstitution of space-based capabilities to assure the missions
and lethality of the Joint Force across all domains. For a more
detailed discussion, I would welcome the opportunity to meet in a
classified session.
Question. In your view, does the 2022 NDS specify the correct set
of capabilities by which the United States can achieve its security
objectives in the face of ongoing competition and potential conflict
with China and Russia? What do you perceive as the areas of greatest
risk?
Answer. Yes, the NDS is broadly supportive of the critical
capabilities that space brings to the Joint Force to address a
potential conflict with China and Russia. In my view, the greatest risk
would be to underestimate China and Russia's will and ability to
counter our space capabilities. To mitigate that risk, we must invest
in the right capabilities, design the right operational concepts and
train our guardians for this contingency now. We cannot afford to lose
the first engagement in a conflict that extends to space. If confirmed,
I would welcome the opportunity to meet in a classified session on this
important topic.
Question. In your view, how does space and the mission of the Space
Force integrate into the NDS?
Answer. The NDS specifically identifies the need for space
integration to U.S. strategic objectives and the Joint Force. These
objectives include maintaining a robust and responsible national space
enterprise, continuing the Nation's strength and leadership in space
activities, and preserving space for current and future generations.
The Space Force integrates into the traditional and complementary roles
of the Services with Combatant Commands to provide trained and equipped
forces in support of the NDS. This integration is in effect today and,
if confirmed, I plant to ensure execution of missions that preserve
national interests and the freedom of operation for the Nation in,
from, and to space. Successful implementation of the NDS would set the
conditions of continued leadership in the military space domain,
enduring military advantage in space capabilities and resilient
architectures, and a safe, secure and stable space environment for the
U.S. and its allies and partners.
Question. In light of the lines of effort set forth in the 2022
National Defense Strategy, what other military duties do you anticipate
the Secretary of Defense, or the Secretary of the Air Force would
assign to you, if confirmed?
Answer. I anticipate the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
the Air Force will encourage the expansion of collaboration with our
Allies and partners, the U.S. space industrial base, and other nations
to shape the strategic environment. This collaboration can be made
possible through the establishment and growth of tenets of responsible
behavior in space, as well as by addressing supply chain challenges,
and by developing resiliency in space architecture, workforce, and
capabilities. These actions are at the heart of building enduring
advantages. Additionally, I anticipate being assigned the task of
developing and fielding capabilities to attribute irresponsible or
aggressive behavior in space.
major challenges and priorities
Question. What is your vision for the Space Force of today? Of the
future?
Answer. If confirmed, my vision for the Space Force today, and in
the future, is for the Space Force to be the most capable, combat-ready
space force in the world. There is no question in my mind that the
Space Force meets this standard today. However, given the growing
arsenal of potential Chinese counterspace threats, maintaining that
edge will require the Space Force to diligently enhance our combat
power with more capable and survivable weapon systems, innovative
warfighting concepts, and the most talented and well-trained guardians
in the world.
Question. What is your vision for how the other armed services and
the Space Force will work with each other?
Answer. My vision for the Space Force and other Armed Services is
centered on normalization. The joint team's relationship with the Space
Force must be consistent with the relationship it has with all other
Services. The capabilities that each Service provides are seamlessly
integrated together into a synchronized unity of effort. The Space
Force can be no different. My vision, therefore, is to ensure the Space
Force has the right organizational structures, operational concepts,
equipment and training to seamlessly integrate into the Joint Force
team. If confirmed, I will work tirelessly to ensure the other armed
services account for critical space capabilities in their planning and
that the Joint Force understands the necessity of space superiority to
protect space capabilities from potential adversary attack while also
protecting the rest of the Joint Force from space-enabled attack. Space
operations is a collaborative endeavor, and guardians cannot accomplish
their missions without working in close coordination with the other
Armed Services and the Joint Force.
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you will face if confirmed to be the Chief of Space
Operations?
Answer. I consider the most significant challenge for the USSF is
staying ahead of the growing arsenal of space and counterspace weapons
by strategic competitors. I am confident guardians, along with the rest
of the Services and Joint Force, are postured to deter and, if
required, defeat these potential threats today. Maintaining this
relative advantage, however, will require the Space Force to outpace
the accelerating threat trajectory by relentlessly pursuing innovative
and decisive operational capabilities. This includes fielding resilient
and defendable architectures, preparing guardians to outcompete and
overcome these threats, and partner with joint, coalition, commercial,
and interagency partners to maximize our combat capability.
Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would build off of the foundation
established by General Raymond to ensure the Nation maintains its
relative advantage in space. The USSF's force design effort has us
moving in the right direction to acquire the capabilities we will need
to be effective. My plans are focused on ensuring our guardians have
what they need to turn these new systems into operationally effective,
combat-ready capabilities for the joint force. If confirmed, I would do
this by focusing service efforts on fielding a robust test and training
infrastructure; designing, training and implementing effective
operational concepts; optimizing the Service's ability to attract,
develop, and empower talent; and strengthening the partnerships we rely
on to succeed in the space domain.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus Space
Force efforts on addressing each of these challenges, and on what
timeline?
Answer. If confirmed, my actions will reflect my confidence that
the Space Force's trajectory established by Congress, the President,
and the civilian leadership of the DOD will outpace our potential
adversaries and preserve the U.S. advantage in space. Working under the
authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of the Air Force,
I'll organize Space Force efforts to stay on this trajectory by
establishing three (3) focus areas for my first year in the position:
fielding combat-ready forces; amplifying guardian talent and expertise;
and strengthening joint, coalition, civil, commercial, and academic
partnerships that bolster our ability to defend the Nation and defeat
its enemies. Additionally, if confirmed, I will ensure we have the
processes and collaboration venues in place for the Chief of Space
Operations to serve as the Force Design Architect for Space Systems of
the Armed Forces in time to inform fiscal year 2024 authorization and
appropriation decisions.
Question. Space has traditionally been fragmented across the DOD
and the intelligence community. The congressional intent of creating a
Space Force is to consolidate space operations of the armed services
under one service.
What is your assessment of this consolidation of other service
programs and personnel and what outstanding issues remain?
Answer. Space has been federated across a number of stakeholder
organizations because space is critical to so many mission areas and
can contribute to the success of so many different organizations. While
I do not expect this to change, consolidation of some space
capabilities into the U.S. Space Force does make sense in terms of
unity of effort and potential efficiencies. For example, the
consolidation of military satellite communication units, personnel and
capabilities will have the net effect of enhancing effectiveness and
efficiency in dynamic allocation and apportionment of high-demand, low-
density satellite communications bandwidth. As we continue to finalize
those transitions, we must ensure that associated training and
sustainment capabilities are effectively transitioned to ensure long-
term viability of the mission sets in the Space Force.
Question. What is your assessment of the integration of operations
with the intelligence community whose authorities and funding are
outlined in title 50 of the United States Code?
Answer. The intelligence community (IC) provides intelligence and
support to both policymakers and warfighters. Within the Department,
all domain military operations have well-tested processes for support,
synchronization, and integration of intelligence activities. Pertaining
to Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance operations, the USSF
and IC (particularly National Reconnaissance Office and National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency) are currently working together to
clearly delineate mission lanes, shared responsibilities, baseline
requirements and potential courses of action to optimize our
capabilities development, reduce unnecessary redundancy and meet the
vast array of customer intel requirements. Any future USSF space-based
ISR capabilities will be developed to meet joint warfighting needs
(including guardians) in concert and collaboration with capabilities
that meet these requirements from other organizations. The USSF will
focus its efforts in this area to support operational commanders and
joint warfighters in concert with Title 50 capabilities. Ideally, these
USSF capabilities will enable the IC to increase focus on national and
strategic requirements.
the joint chiefs of staff
Question. What is your assessment of the authorities of, and
process by which, members of the Joint Chiefs (other than the Chairman)
provide military advice and opinions to the President, National
Security Council, the Homeland Security Council, and civilian
leadership of the Department of Defense?
Answer. In my current capacity as Deputy Chief of Space Operations
for Operations, I sit as the USSF representative to the Operations
Deputies (OPSDEP) structure on the Joint Staff. I also oversee Space
staff processes that help prepare the CSO to serve as a member of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff. Based on these specific roles, my appraisal is
that these processes promote a thorough evaluation of the relevant
issues and ensure all viewpoints, positions, rationales and opinions
are represented to national leadership. I take seriously my role in
supporting the Best Military Advice development process. If confirmed,
I will offer my Best Military Advice to the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs, the Secretary of Defense, the President and Congress when I am
a part of the deliberative process.
Question. If confirmed, would you have any hesitation in providing
your best military advice to the President, National Security Council,
Homeland Security Council, and civilian leadership of the Department of
Defense, even when your advice and opinions might differ from those of
the Chairman or the other members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Answer. No, I would not hesitate, as I believe this is a
fundamental responsibility of a Service Chief and member of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. If confirmed, I would provide my best military advice
to the President, National Security Council, Homeland Security Council,
and civilian leadership in the Department of Defense.
functions of the space force
Question. Section 9081 of title 10, United States Code mandates
that the Space Force be organized, trained and equipped to ``(1)
provide freedom of operation for the United States in, from, and to
space; (2) conduct space operations; and (3) protect the interests of
the United States in space.''
Please describe in your own words your understanding of each of
these three functions.
Answer. ``Provide freedom of operations'' ensures that the U.S. can
continue to use the space domain in pursuit of its national interests.
This is a core responsibility of Space Force forces that endures
through peacetime, competition, crisis, and conflict. The U.S. must
have the continuous ability to safely and securely launch and operate
satellites in space in support of economic, military, and diplomatic
interests. The Space Force provides capabilities to ensure no other
nation is in a position to deny the U.S. its access to the space
domain. U.S. interests are protected by safeguarding and enhancing the
ability of U.S. commercial, civil, intelligence, and military entities
to safely and effectively access, maneuver within, and exploit the
space domain without interference.
``Conduct space operations'' is the technical specialty of our
Service. We design, build, launch, employ, integrate, maintain, and
responsibly dispose of military space capabilities. It is this
responsibility that requires the USSF to present ready forces to
Combatant Commanders. Combatant Commanders have the authority to
execute operations in pursuit of assigned missions. Generally speaking,
for the space element of these missions, it is the Space Force
guardians who conduct the space operations necessary to meet the needs
of the Combatant Commander.
``Protect the interests of the United States in space'' is the
capability development imperative of our Service. Space Force forces
must be prepared to outcompete, deter, and defeat the potential
adversaries of the U.S. in direct support of a `whole-of-government'
approach to integrated deterrence.
space as a warfighting domain
Question. Space is often described as ``congested and contested.''
Please describe your views of this statement and whether you consider
space a warfighting domain?
Answer. ``Congested'' refers to the growing number of commercial,
civil, and military actors across the globe who have a presence in the
space domain. Despite the large volume of space, there are specific
orbits and key access points that are highly desirable locations for
satellites. This creates parts of the domain where satellites tend to
congregate, and thereby create both physical congestion and congestion
in the radio frequencies they require to link back to ground stations.
This congestion must be monitored and `controlled' to the degree
necessary to ensure optimal use and safety of flight. This is one
reason why adhering to the tenets of responsible behavior in space is
important.
``Contested'' refers to the efforts our potential adversaries have
taken to deny others the ability to access, maneuver in, or exploit the
space domain. We can no longer assume that we will be able to use space
capabilities without prohibitive interference.
Yes, I consider space a warfighting domain because of specific
actions Russia and China have taken to field space weapons capable of
disrupting, degrading and even destroying our space capabilities.
Furthermore, these nations continue to prepare forces and weapons that
can project military power in, through, and from space in order to
advance their own interests and directly threaten our Joint Force.
near peer adversaries
Question. Please describe your assessment of the capabilities for
China and Russia relative to section 9081 of 10 United States Code.
Answer. For the past several decades, the U.S. Military has relied
upon technological superiority to maintain our Nation's comparative
advantage--an advantage that has been underpinned in large part by our
military space capabilities. To a certain degree, the Joint Force has
been shaped, sized and conceptualized presuming support from space-
based capabilities like ISR, GPS and military Satellite Communications.
Consequently, both China and Russia are making significant investments
to advance their capabilities, capacity, and activities to counter our
space-based advantages. I assess that they will continue to invest in
(1) counterspace systems that threaten our freedom to operate in space;
(2) expand their use of space to enable their broader military forces
in other domains; and (3) enhance the use of space-based targeting to
threaten our forces on land, air and sea. The pace at which they are
doing so is what concerns me the most. China has doubled its launches
per year during the past 10 years and has demonstrated the ability to
hold United States space capabilities at risk in every orbital regime.
Section 9081 of title 10 USC establishes the U.S. Space Force for
the express purpose of addressing these concerns. The Space Force is
organized, trained and equipped to provide freedom of operation for the
US in, from and to space; conduct space operations and protect the
interests of the US in space. In short, Section 9081 directs the US
Space Force to provide trained personnel and capabilities to counter
the aims of potential adversaries in denying us our space advantages.
force design architect
Question. Section 1064(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81) requires the Secretary of Defense to
designate within 90 days of enactment that the Chief of Space
Operations shall be the Force Design Architect for space systems of the
Armed Force. In addition, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council has
designated the Space Force as the ``integrator for joint space
requirements.''
What is your interpretation of the Force Design Architect for space
systems of the Armed Forces relative to section 9081 of 10 United
States Code, space as a warfighting domain and the abilities of near
peer adversaries? Please explain your views in detail.
Answer. The role of Force Design Architect is complementary to the
CSO's Organize, Train and Equip (OT&E) responsibilities, with a focus
on ensuring unity of effort in defining critical space capabilities for
the future joint fight. In the OT&E role, the CSO is also responsible
to assist the Secretary of the Air Force with providing trained forces
to operate future capabilities and provide full-scope operational
effects to the Joint Force, denying adversaries access to similar
services, and protecting the Joint Force from mitigating the
operational use of space by adversaries. The Force Design Architect
role helps streamline requirements development and brings together the
various space stakeholders to ensure the requirements are defined and
pursued in the most efficient and effective way possible.
Question. Do you support the Chief of Space Operations as the Force
Design Architect of the Armed Forces? Please explain your views in
detail.
Answer. Yes. CSO's roles and responsibilities as the Force Design
Architect for space systems is to evaluate Joint Force mission needs,
balancing capability, technology readiness, resiliency, and
affordability to inform the requirements development and acquisition
communities. This role will allow the CSO to enable agility in the
acquisition process (as required in the Fiscal Year 2019 NDAA) and
ensure that future capabilities are robust and resilient and continue
to provide the Joint Force with the space capabilities necessary to
win. This will enable cost-informed options to ensure good stewardship
of the Nation's resources while allowing the Department to drive
strategic partnerships and unity of effort across the National Security
Space enterprise (US acquisition organizations, the IC, DOD, allied
partners and commercial) to accelerate capability, capacity, and
resilience to augment military space capabilities.
Question. What is your interpretation of the Space Force being the
integrator for joint space requirements?
Answer. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has
designated the USSF as the integrator for DOD's Joint Space
Requirements. The Joint Integrator now has the ability to bring the
entire space community together to develop cogent space requirements.
Additionally, with this responsibility, the Space Force is able to
collect, organize and adjudicate these requirements and provide
endorsements and recommendations that help accelerate the JROC's
capabilities development processes.
Question. If confirmed, how will you coordinate the two roles
designated as the Force Design Architect and the integrator for joint
space requirements? Please explain your views with respect to the
authorities of the other armed forces and the Office of the Secretary
of Defense as outlined in the August 17, 2022, letter designating the
Chief of Space Operations as the Force Design architect for space
systems of the armed forces. Please give an unclassified example.
Answer. In essence, both of these roles allow the Space Force to
make Enterprise-wide recommendations rather than allowing capability
initiatives or requirements to work their way through the process out
of context. Because of the global nature of space, capabilities must be
designed and fielded as part of a system of systems to optimize mission
performance, reduce unnecessary redundancies and maximize resource
efficiency. If confirmed as CSO and as the Integrator for DOD's Joint
Space Requirements, I would work with the other Services and Combatant
Commands to understand their needs for space capabilities. This would
inform what architecture I would recommend as the Force Design
Architect. One of the first examples of the Force Design Architect and
the Joint Integrator role in action was the work done to redesign the
Missile Warning/Missile Tracking (MW/MT) Architecture. In collaboration
with key stakeholders and in light of emerging threat assessments,
rigorous analysis and wargaming was used to define a more resilient,
more capable and more defendable MW/MT architecture. The requirements
for the systems ensured that key customers' needs were accounted for.
The net result was a well-coordinated and synchronized set of
architecture requirements rapidly put in place, and we are on an
accelerated path to fielding the enhanced capability.
space intelligence, surveillances, and reconnaissance
Question. Many of the traditional Intelligence, Surveillances and
Reconnaissance missions for ground and air targets that are currently
performed by airborne platforms in support of a Combatant Commander's
operation are now under consideration to move to space-based platforms.
Do you believe this transition in intelligence mission from air to
space platforms is a mission of the armed forces?
Answer. Yes, I believe the myriad of intelligence collection
requirements means there is a need to utilize capabilities in all
domains. Furthermore, the Space Force, as the 18th element of the
Intelligence Community (IC), is well postured to help support this
effort. Each military Service and the Coast Guard are members of the IC
because intelligence operations in all domains are critical parts of
military operations.
Question. If confirmed, how will this mission of the Space Force be
coordinated in terms of acquisition and operations with the
intelligence community which falls under title 50 of the United States
Code?
Answer. In accordance with well-established DOD processes, Title
10-focused capabilities will provide space-based Intelligence,
Surveillance, and Reconnaissance to operational commanders and joint
warfighters at relevant speeds and in concert with Title 50
capabilities. USSF capabilities will complement IC capabilities to
continue to provide our nation a strategic advantage.
acquisition
Question. Section 9016(b)(6)(B)(i) of title 10, United States Code
states that the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space
Acquisition and Integration shall ``be responsible for and oversee all
architecture and integration with respect to the acquisition of the
space systems and programs of the armed forces, including in support of
the Chief of Space Operations under section 9082 of [title 10, United
States Code].'' In addition, section 9021 of title 10, United States
Code authorizes the duties of the Space Acquisition Council whose
purpose is to ``oversee, direct, and manage acquisition and integration
space systems and programs of the armed forces in order to ensure
integration across the national security space enterprise'' of which,
if confirmed, you will be a member.
Please describe how, if confirmed, the duties of a Force Design
Architect for space systems of the Armed Forces will integrate with
section 9016(b)(6)(B)(i) for the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Space Acquisition and Integration.
Answer. Defining operational requirements is an early and critical
step in the broader acquisition process to deliver capabilities. The
CSO has the important role of defining and advocating for the
operational requirements needed to support USSF missions. The Force
Design Architect responsibilities are an expansion of this basic
responsibility across the broader set of Armed Forces' space
requirements. This broader responsibility for Force Design will enable
unity of effort across all stakeholders and allow for accelerated
requirements development that meets the needs of the broader joint
force.
These duties will naturally integrate with the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration's
responsibilities and authorities for acquiring the systems to meet the
defined requirements. The faster and more appropriately we can tell the
acquisition community the mission needs, the faster they can build it.
For example, the new missile warning/missile track force design shaved
years off the requirements process versus the process used to generate
requirements for the predecessor program. If confirmed, I will ensure
there is robust collaboration and coordination with the ASAF for Space
Acquisition and Integration to ensure there are no seams between
requirements development and the acquisition processes needed to field
the resultant systems.
Question. Please describe, if confirmed, your role on the Space
Acquisition Council, and as required by Section 1064(b) the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2022 (P.L. 117-81) your duty
as the Force Design Architect on the Space Acquisition Council.
Answer. As a statutory member of the Space Acquisition Council
(SAC), if confirmed, I will support the congressional mandate for the
SAC to oversee, direct, and manage the acquisition and integration of
space systems and programs of the armed forces, to ensure integration
across the National Security Space enterprise. In my capacity as the
Force Design architect, if confirmed, I will utilize the SAC as a forum
to synchronize requirements with the acquisition process. As an
example, the SAC served as a forum for stakeholders to review and
approve the Missile Warning/Missile Tracking (MW/MT) requirements,
acquisition approach, and program office structure.
Question. If confirmed as Chief of Space Operations, how would you
assist the Secretary of the Air Force in the performance of certain
acquisition-related functions, while ensuring compatibility with the
duties and responsibilities of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (primarily established in
sections 3104, 9013 and 9016 of title 10, United States Code)? Please
give specific examples.
Answer. If confirmed, my primary role in supporting the Secretary
of the Air Force in performance of certain acquisition-related
functions would be to ensure the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Space Acquisition and Integration, as the Space Service Acquisition
Executive, has the operational requirements and programmed funding to
craft acquisition strategies and programs that deliver the capabilities
we need to stay ahead of our competitors. Additionally, if confirmed,
it is my responsibility to recruit, train, and develop the military
acquisition professionals that drive our capability development. Where
those inputs affect Joint or Air Force programs, if confirmed, I will
provide the same support to the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to improve each
of the three aspects of the acquisition process--requirements,
acquisition, and budgeting?
Answer. The Space Force must focus on providing inputs to the
acquisition system and the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Space Acquisition and Integration (SA&I) that enable speed and
flexibility. Ensuring we develop accurate and timely requirements is
vital to kickstart the process of delivering capabilities when we need
them. We must accelerate space acquisition to outpace our potential
adversaries and maintain our technological advantage. To that end, if
confirmed, I would support the ASAF(SA&I)'s priorities. Stable funding
and requirements are essential to program execution, the science and
technology pipeline, and delivery of capability on time and within
budget. Therefore, if confirmed, I will work hard to ensure that from
the outset funding and operational requirements are well founded and
deliberately planned so that we can maintain them throughout the life
cycle of the program.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to
ensure that requirements are realistic, technically achievable, and
prioritized?
Answer. The Space Force's role as DOD's Joint Integrator for Space
Requirements and the Force Design Architect presents an opportunity to
develop cohesive space capabilities across the DOD. The rigorous
technical analysis, wargaming and prototyping performed by the Space
Warfighting Analysis Center will be leveraged to ensure the Force
Design work is both cost-informed and shaped by what is technically
feasible. After Force Designs transition to formal requirements
documentation, the Joint Integrator role ensures the requirements are
prioritized by the gaps identified by the Joint Force. If confirmed, I
look forward to the opportunity to collaborate with Congress as we
evaluate operational requirements against these standards.
Question. If confirmed, what specific measures would you recommend
to control ``requirements creep'' in the defense acquisition system?
Answer. In my experience, `requirements creep' is the result of two
(2) main factors: 1) requirements developed without analytic rigor
making them subject to adjustment and 2) the absence of a single
unifying authority disciplining the system towards requirements
stability. The USSF's Force Design process is underpinned by Space
Warfighting Analysis Center's rigorous technical analysis, wargaming,
modeling and simulation that should allow the resultant requirements to
carry through program definition without the need to make major
modifications. Further, designation of CSO as the Force Design
Architect for space capabilities across the Armed Force and the added
role of being Joint Space Requirements Integrator provides a unifying
authority that ensure there is discipline in the requirements
development process. Finally, because this unifying authority is also
the chief programmer for the enabling budget submission, there will be
incentives to maintain stability in the programs and not let the
requirements `creep.' In collaboration with the Assistant Secretary of
the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (ASAF/SA&I), the
Space Acquisition Council will serve as the governing mechanism to
ensure we maintain requirements stability throughout the acquisition
process.
Question. If confirmed, how would you utilize your authority to
arrest the exponential escalation in cost that, in recent history, has
marked the acquisition life-cycle of Service platforms and weapons
systems?
Answer. While acquisition authorities to make these kinds of
decisions reside with the Service Acquisition Executive, the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (ASAF/
SA&I), if confirmed, I will not hesitate to collaborate with the ASAF/
SA&I and provide my best military advice related to program costs.
Furthermore, if confirmed, as I execute CSO responsibilities associated
with budget submissions, program cost will be a prime consideration for
funding levels. Therefore, if confirmed, I will work very closely with
the acquisition authorities to ensure we are spending our resources on
the programs that provide the most effective capabilities informed by
the overall cost of the program. As stewards of national defense
resources, I am committed to rigorous assessment of space capabilities
and programs.
Question. In your view, in whom should accountability for large-
scale acquisition failures and/or extraordinary cost overruns rest?
Answer. Just as successes are not the result of an individual
person or organization, failures are rarely the result of a single
individual or organization. In my estimation, large-scale failures
occur as a result of many factors coming together in unpredictable
ways. Because factors and conditions can change dynamically, the key is
to ensure effective monitoring and assessment mechanisms are in place
to enable vigilance and sensitivity to changes so that mitigation
efforts can keep programs on track. Even then, it is possible for
programs to fail to meet expectations and then tough decisions need to
be made in collaboration and with full transparency to all
stakeholders, including Congress as they execute their vital oversight
functions. If confirmed, I will support all efforts to ensure proper
program oversight is in place and that communication with all
stakeholders, including Congress, is transparent and routine. I will
also support the priority of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force
for Space Acquisition and Integration (ASAF/SA&I) to drive rigorous
program management discipline to deliver capabilities on cost and
schedule. If large-scale failures occur, I will support the Secretary
of the Air Force in understanding what led to the failure and putting
measures in place to improve our future performance.
Question. Are there other roles or responsibilities in the
acquisition process that should be assigned to the Chief of Space
Operations and the other Service Chiefs, in your view?
Answer. I believe that the current assignment of responsibilities
to the Chief of Space Operations and the Service Chiefs in supporting
the acquisition process is appropriate. If confirmed, I will focus on
establishing realistic operational requirements and stable funding to
maximize the probability of acquisition program success.
acquisition of specific space systems
Question. The Space Force executes a wide range of acquisition
efforts in space in order to support Combatant Command requirements,
synchronized with ground systems and user terminals. If confirmed,
please describe what you would consider to be the most serious issues
with the following areas:
Missile Warning, Tracking, and Space Sensing
Question. Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared Satellites
Answer. The Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared program is
designed to detect traditional ballistic missile warning signatures
primarily associated with early boost phase. If confirmed, the most
serious issue I expect to tackle is delivering missile warning
capabilities that outpace the rapidly evolving adversarial threats.
Along with our operations and acquisition teams, I remain committed to
supporting the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space
Acquisition and Integration (ASAF/SA&I) to ensure the USSF delivers the
seamless 24/7 on-demand, global, and localized coverage of infrared
events our joint warfighters demand for this no-fail mission.
Question. Proliferated constellations for missile tracking
including non-ballistic missiles
Answer. If confirmed, the most serious issue I expect to address is
the urgent need for resiliency in our space and ground architectures in
support of this emerging architecture. The USSF completed a critical
Force Design analysis last August that resulted in our request for a
pivotal mission area architecture shift from a geosynchronous and
highly elliptical force presentation to a proliferated low and medium
earth orbit design. This approach allows for resiliency and detection
of new and emerging threats, such as hypersonics.
Question. Space and Ground Weather
Answer. While we are challenged by an expanding need for consistent
access to weather data, this leads to big opportunities. One of the
biggest opportunities within the Space and Ground Weather mission area
is fostering relationships to optimize persistent warfighter
capability. If confirmed, I will collaborate with departmental, civil,
commercial, and international communities to expand access to space-
based environmental monitoring in support of our national security
imperatives.
Question. Nuclear Event detection on ground and in space
Answer. Based on my experience, the most serious issue in this
arena is maintaining our technological advantage as new threats emerge,
and as legacy systems degrade. If confirmed, I will support the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and
Integration (ASAF/SA&I) and collaborate with the broader space
community to ensure the department is postured effectively to detect
nuclear events in any domain--air, land, sea, or space--well into the
future.
Intelligence Reconnaissance, and Surveillance
Question. Air and Ground Movement Target Indicator capabilities to
support Combatant Commander requirements
Answer. Moving Target Indication (MTI) is a new mission being
considered by the Space Force. The main challenge with MTI is focusing
the target collection requirements so the systems can be fielded in a
way that provides data for decision makers and operators to ensure
target prosecution can occur in a timely manner. If confirmed, I will
leverage our experience from our Missile-Warning/Missile-Track (MW/MT)
mission area and work closely with the Department of the Air Force and
Joint team to ensure the DOD pursues an integrated solution for the
joint warfighter.
GPS
Question. GPS III, IIF
Answer. The greatest challenges to GPS are the proliferation and
threat of purposeful signal jamming. This purposeful interference
represents a significant challenge due to the negative economic and
military impacts that GPS degradation causes. Protecting Positioning,
Navigation and Timing services are critical for the nation. If
confirmed, I will support the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Space Acquisition and Integration, ASAF (SA&I), in delivering GPS III
and IIIF systems to ensure the Department delivers jam-resistant
Military-Code GPS capabilities to warfighters.
Question. Military Grade User Equipment
Answer. With respect to Military GPS User Equipment, an important
challenge is integrating GPS equipment into thousands of platforms
across the DOD. It is critical for our joint warfighters to have
resilient Positioning, Navigation and Timing in times of crisis or
conflict. If confirmed, I will continue to work across the Department
to prioritize Military GPS user equipment integration into weapon
platforms across the Services.
Question. Alternate Positioning Navigation and Timing
Answer. Countering real threats to navigation estimates in an
anticipated contested space domain is a valid concern. The Space Force
is exploring alternative space-based Positioning, Navigation, and
Timing systems to augment our GPS capabilities and improve resiliency.
If confirmed, I will help ensure alternative PNT capabilities are
explored to provide viable pathways towards resiliency for the critical
GPS enterprise.
SATCOM
Question. Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellites and their
follow-on constellation for strategic communications
Answer. The Advanced Extremely High Frequency satellite program
capability is critical to the President and the National Command
Authorities for protected strategic communications capabilities,
including globally connected operations through nuclear-related events.
A key challenge is to ensure continuous capability in this mission area
as we transition the enterprise and field follow-on capabilities. If
confirmed, I will work across the Department and this Committee to
protect against any gap in capability.
Question. Family of Advanced Beyond Line-of-Sight Terminals and
other strategic grade user terminals
Answer. A key challenge for the FAB-T capability is speed of
delivery to the diverse set of platforms that require this upgrade.
Each platform that requires the upgrade has unique constraints that
must be addressed individually as the capability continues to be
fielded. If confirmed, I will continue to work across the Department to
support this important upgrade, as well as support integration into
platforms across the Services.
Question. Protected Tactical Enterprise Service and user terminals
Answer. If confirmed, my top priority for Protected Tactical
Enterprise Service will be to maintain synchronization between space,
ground, and terminal segments to ensure Joint warfighters can fully
leverage the system for contested operations near enemy jammers.
Question. Absorbing the current fleet of the Army's Wideband Gap
Satellites (WGS) and their Replacement
Answer. The USSF (and Air Force Space Command before it) has
operated the WGS satellites for many years and has recently taken
control of the WGS payload operations. The remaining challenge will be
to transition the payload management training currently conducted by
the Army and the sustainment of the wideband satellite capability.
Planning to complete this transition is underway across the Department
of the Air Force. If confirmed, I will ensure the planning to address
this challenge enables an efficient and effective transition.
Question. Absorbing the Navy's Mobile User Objective System
satellites and their replacement
Answer. Transition of the Navy's Mobile User Objective System to
the Space Force is complete. If confirmed, I will ensure all efforts
associated with the transition of the Mobile User Objective System
continue to support Joint warfighters.
Assured Access to Space
Question. National Security Space Launch Phase II procurements
Answer. The most pressing issue for space launch is ensuring we
have an infrastructure to support the rapid expansion of commercial
launches while also ensuring we meet our high priority national
security space launches. For us to keep pace with potential threats
posed by strategic competitors our launch capacity must be optimized.
For Phase II, we must continue National Security Space Launch's mission
success track record to ensure access to space and to counter threats
posed by potential adversaries. If confirmed, I will work with this
Committee and across the Department and space enterprise to help
maintain the ability for assured access to space.
Question. National Security Space Launch Phase III procurements
Answer. I believe the most pressing issue for Phase 3 acquisition
is to maintain a vibrant market for launch service providers in order
to assure access to space, maximize competition to reduce cost, and
ensure the USSF continues to encourage a strong launch industrial base.
If confirmed, I will support efforts to set strategy for the next
acquisition phase.
Question. Tactical and Responsive Launch and replenishment of
space-based assets
Answer. If confirmed, the most critical issue I would address is
expanding the scope of tactically responsive space to ensure we
generate complete operational capabilities that respond to any on-orbit
threats on a tactically relevant timeline. We must have end-to-end
capabilities that include launch vehicles, satellites, ground systems,
operational concepts, and most importantly, the specific requirements
of the Combatant Commanders, that enable a tangible response to
potential adversary destabilizing actions in space.
Battle Management, Command and Control, and Associated Ground Systems
Question. Space Command and Control, including the Kobayshi Maru
program to replace the operating systems (SPADOC) at the Combined Space
Operations Center
Answer. A significant challenge to space command and control is the
integration and fielding of a system of systems to enable multiple
software applications to work together. If confirmed, as a member of
the Space Acquisition Council, and in coordination with the Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (ASAF/
SA&I), I will work to ensure delivery of a Space Domain Awareness
Command and Control (C2) capability that will replace the antiquated
Space Defense Operations Center currently in use. While also ensuring
that we deliver the additional needed capabilities in a way that eases
integration into our various C2 nodes. We need to recognize that no
single system or single software program or algorithm is capable of
meeting all of USSF's C2 needs. Integration of disparate capabilities
into a common platform enabling sharable data is the key to success.
Question. Sensor agnostic integration for Space Domain and
Situational Awareness, including MDA's BMC2 to meet US SPACECOM
requirements
Answer. Space Domain Awareness (SDA) is a condition achieved by the
performance of a variety of operations that require multiple software
capabilities exploiting data from a diverse set of disaggregated
sensors. Cloud-based sensor data management, common data standards and
integration protocols are the foundational elements that allow mission
software tools needed for SDA and BMC2 to have access to the data
needed for mission success. If confirmed, as a member of the Space
Acquisition Council, and in coordination with the Assistant Secretary
of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration (ASAF/SA&I), I
will work to ensure the Space Force drives towards a more integrated,
resilient, multi-source information architecture to accept, discern,
and trust data from all valid sources, while ensuring it is accessible
to, and supported by, our Joint warfighters.
Question. Integrated Tactical Warning and Attack Assessment (ITW/
AA), including the Combatant Commanders Integrated Command and Control
System (CICCS) for assured missile warning as part of the NC3 system
Answer. If confirmed, as a member of the Space Acquisition Council
and in coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Space Acquisition and Integration (ASAF/SA&I) I will collaborate to
help develop a standardized, integrated C2 system of systems across the
NC3 enterprise to meet warfighter and National Command Authority needs.
Question. Integration of Space Force systems into the Joint All
Domain Command and Control system.
Answer. Because of the nature of the USSF missions, we inherently
think in Joint and all-domain terms. Clearly the space domain is our
focus, but we cannot be successful without cyber operations in our
ground networks and the cyber mission assurance of them. Furthermore,
the USSF must understand the domains of our multiple Service users from
SATCOM receivers on the ground, at sea or in the air. We must
understand the needs of worldwide GPS users in all domains, and we must
understand the requirements for missile warning data to globally
distributed networks in all domains. The Space Force will specifically
integrate into the JADC2 concepts because the C2 capabilities will
require worldwide distribution of data, shared situational awareness,
sensor data on tactical timelines and global communication with
decentralized units. None of this is complete without space
capabilities. The Space Force's unique capabilities will be crucial
features that enable the joint force to realize the JADC2 vision. If
confirmed, as a member of the Space Acquisition Council and in
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space
Acquisition and Integration (ASAF/SA&I) I will work across the
Department and space community to ensure the Space Force's
contributions to JADC2 meet user needs and support Joint warfighter
decision-making.
Space Doman Awareness and Space Control
Question. Synchronization writ large between satellite and ground
systems
Answer. It is important that we have synchronization between
satellite and ground systems to ensure delivery of a comprehensive
operational capability that integrates effectively to accept, discern,
and fuse data from national, defense, and commercial sources and share
it across multiple security boundaries. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space
Acquisition and Integration (ASAF/SA&I) and the space acquisition
community to address challenges and deliver a Space Domain Awareness
(SDA) architecture with synchronized space and ground systems.
Procurement of Commercial Space Services
Question. Procurement of commercial satellite communications
services for other armed forces and Combatant Commands.
Answer. The rapid growth of the commercial space sector provides a
significant opportunity for the DOD to use innovative commercial
capabilities and production processes to deliver critical space
capabilities. We must evaluate each mission area to determine the risks
to achieve the balance between government and commercial capabilities.
If confirmed, I will take a balanced, risk-informed approach to adding
commercial space capabilities that leverages agility, innovation, and
value of commercial systems without compromising critical national
security missions.
recruiting, training and readiness
Question. The Space Force is a new service that is standing up a
capability to recruit, train, and present a ready military force of
guardians to the Combatant Commanders in order to support their
operational plans. Please describe your views on the following:
The ability of the Space Force to achieve enlisted and officer
recruiting goals.
Answer. Space Force has successfully met and exceeded its fiscal
year 2022 enlisted (105%) and officer (119%) recruiting and accession
goals by leveraging high interest. We are well positioned to achieve
our fiscal year 2023 goals based on a current pool of interested cadets
and civilians currently selected for entry.
Question. The current and future readiness status of the force,
including shortfalls of training guardians including the stand up of
STARCOM.
Answer. The standup of the Space Training and Readiness Command
(STARCOM) is a significant step forward in improving the training of
guardians. However, because we have operated in a relatively benign
space environment for decades, we have not fielded a sufficient test
and training infrastructure that allows our guardians to prepare
properly for a contested space domain. If confirmed, it will be one of
my top priorities to design and field an Operational Test and Training
Infrastructure that allows our guardians to innovate new tactics,
validate those tactics, train to execute the tactics and then practice
the tactics against a simulated adversary. This set of capabilities
will be essential in the USSF's ability to present combat-ready forces
to US Space Command (USSPACECOM) and other Combatant Commands and
ensure that they are ready to face an emerging spectrum of threats.
The ability to assess readiness, including range training, of
guardians in performing their mission consistent with section 117 of
title 10 of the United States Code.
Answer. Space Force's readiness reporting is based on a legacy set
of standards that was not customized for its missions and did not
adequately account for threats in the space domain. We are changing
this rapidly. If confirmed, I will continue the work of redefining our
readiness standards including training requirements, equipment
sustainment standards, exercise frequency requirements and generally
the ability of the force to meet its assigned mission sets even in the
face of a determined adversary.
support to combatant commands
Question. The relationship as a space force provider to the US
Space Command is unique compared to other Combatant Commands. Please
explain how the Space Force delineates between a presenter of forces
and their functions to the US Space Command as compared to other
Combatant Commands.
Answer. As a Service Force Provider, the USSF's number one customer
is USSPACECOM. Most space missions are conducted at a global enterprise
level by USSPACECOM and therefore, the vast majority of USSF
capabilities are appropriately presented to USSC. However, other
Combatant Commands have requirements for space expertise, activities
and space capabilities. These requirements include planning and
exercise integration expertise, regional space activities like security
cooperation activities with allies and partner nations and
establishment of networks and procedures to disseminate missile warning
data to all forces in the theater regardless of dynamically shifting
bases or disadvantage comm positions in the theater. Regional space
capabilities like counter-SATCOM capabilities to support personnel
recovery or force protection of maneuver elements may also be requested
in theater. The USSF will be postured to provide command and control
structures and ready forces to meet these requirements as well.
Question. What are the key areas in which the Space Force must
improve to provide the necessary capabilities and capacity to:
US Indo-Pacific Command
Answer. Particularly here, with China as the pacing challenge, the
USSF must be postured to provide command and control (C2) structures
and ready forces to provide space expertise, conduct space-related
activities and C2 attached space capabilities. These requirements
include planning and exercise integration expertise, security
cooperation activities to build partner capacity and establishment of
networks and procedures to disseminate critical space data to
dynamically shifting theater forces. In my view, the key improvements
will be in capacity of personnel and both organic and deployable
capabilities to meet Combatant Command needs.
Question. US European Command
Answer. With the acute Russian threat, the USSF must be postured to
provide command and control (C2) structures and ready forces to provide
space expertise, conduct space-related activities and C2 attached space
capabilities. These requirements include planning and exercise
integration expertise, security cooperation activities to build partner
capacity and establishment of networks and procedures to disseminate
critical space data to dynamically shifting theater forces. The key
improvements will be in capacity of personnel and both organic and
deployable capabilities to meet Combatant Command needs.
Question. US Central Command
Answer. With the continued Iranian and Violent Extremist
Organizations (VEO) threats, the USSF must be postured to provide
command and control (C2) structures and ready forces to provide space
expertise, conduct space-related activities and C2 attached space
capabilities. These requirements include planning and exercise
integration expertise, security cooperation activities to build partner
capacity and establishment of networks and procedures to disseminate
critical space data to dynamically shifting theater forces. The key
improvements will be in capacity of personnel and deployable
capabilities to meet Combatant Command needs.
Question. US Northern Command
Answer. With growing threats to the Homeland, the USSF must be
postured to provide command and control (C2) structures and ready
forces to provide space expertise, conduct space-related activities and
C2 attached space capabilities. These requirements include planning and
exercise integration expertise, security cooperation activities to
build partner capacity and establishment of networks and procedures to
disseminate critical space data to dynamically shifting theater forces.
The key improvements will be in capacity of personnel, situational
awareness and rapid access to assured data in support of missile
warning and missile defense to meet Combatant Command needs.
Question. US Strategic Command
Answer. With continuous need for nuclear deterrence and national
command and control and communications (NC3), the USSF must be postured
to provide command and control (C2) structures and ready forces to
provide space expertise, conduct space-related activities and C2
attached space capabilities. These requirements include planning and
exercise integration expertise, security cooperation activities to
build partner capacity and establishment of networks and procedures to
disseminate critical space data to dynamically shifting theater forces.
The key improvements will be in capacity of NC3 dynamically shifting
theater forces. The key improvements will be in capacity of NC3
dynamically shifting theater forces. The key improvements will be in
capacity of NC3 dynamically shifting theater forces. The key
improvements will be in capacity of NC3 dynamically shifting theater
forces. The key improvements will be in capacity of NC3
Question. US Transportation Command
Answer. With the need to support worldwide mobility, distribution
and sustainment of military forces, the USSF must be postured to
provide command and control (C2) structures and ready forces to provide
space expertise, conduct space-related activities and C2 attached space
capabilities. These requirements include planning and exercise
integration expertise, security cooperation activities to build partner
capacity and establishment of networks and procedures to disseminate
critical space data to dynamically shifting theater forces. The key
improvements will be in capacity of personnel, situational awareness
and rapid access to supply chains and logistics to meet Combatant
Command needs.
Question. US Southern Command
Answer. With growing investments by strategic competitors in the
southern hemisphere, the USSF must be postured to provide command and
control (C2) structures and ready forces to provide space expertise,
conduct space-related activities and C2 attached space capabilities.
These requirements include planning and exercise integration expertise,
security cooperation activities to build partner capacity and
establishment of networks and procedures to disseminate critical space
data to dynamically shifting theater forces. The key improvements will
be in capacity of personnel, situational awareness and rapid access to
assured data in support of Combatant Command needs.
Question. US Cyber Command
Answer. With growing cyber threats to space ground infrastructure,
the USSF must be postured to provide command and control (C2)
structures and ready forces to provide space-related cyber expertise,
conduct space-related cyber defense activities and C2 attached cyber
capabilities. These requirements include planning and exercise
integration expertise, security cooperation activities to build partner
capacity and establishment of networks and procedures to disseminate
critical space data to dynamically shifting theater forces. The key
improvements will be in capacity of personnel, situational awareness of
the cyber terrain of space systems and rapid access to assured data in
support of cyber defense of our space systems and to meet other
Combatant Command needs.
alliances and partnerships
Question. Mutually beneficial alliances and partnerships are
crucial to US success in competition and conflict against a great
power.
If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to build strong
international partnerships, overcome challenges to our partnerships,
and exploit opportunities in international cooperation?
Answer. I believe the foundation of international partnerships is
routine interaction to build relationships of mutual respect, trust and
thorough understanding of partners' needs and capabilities. If
confirmed, I will continue to expand the quantity and quality of
international partnerships by engaging more like-minded space-faring
nations and moving from data sharing agreements to more operations
integration, payload sharing, and even mission sharing where
appropriate.
Question. How would you characterize your familiarity with
international space leaders, forums, and processes? If confirmed, which
leaders and forums would you focus your engagement with a view to
advancing most effectively the national security interests of the Space
Force?
Answer. In my previous positions, I have had only a few engagements
with international space leaders and have only been in supporting roles
in international forums and processes. However, if confirmed, I will
rapidly seek to build on existing relationships and ensure the USSF
continues to enjoy and expand international partnerships. Early
expansion should focus on Finland and Sweden as likely new members of
NATO as well as India to counterbalance Chinese activity. These
partnerships are critical in enhancing resilience and developing a
coalition around responsible behaviors in space and therefore extremely
valuable to protecting national security interests.
Question. How will the Space Force participate within NATO and its
developing Space Capabilities?
Answer. NATO has extreme interest in expanding efforts to share
space information and integrate space capabilities into plans and
operations. In addition to continuing with the existing NATO forums,
the USSF will focus on integrating with the newly formed NATO Space
Centre. Additionally, the USSF is seeking to establish a USSF Service
Component HQ under European Command which will allow more comprehensive
integration of capabilities and effects into all NATO activities.
Question. How will the Space Force ensure that the correct levels
of information are getting to and from allies that are integral to
various missions of the Space Force?
Answer. The key to ensuring the correct levels of information are
being shared for mission success starts with transparency of
requirements and solid feedback loops with the partner nations. If
confirmed, I plan to collaborate extensively with stakeholders and
authorities needed to ensure the right information is made available to
the right people to optimize mission sharing with our international
partners. While the USSF will need to be sensitive to protecting our
most critical information, I believe there are opportunities to expand
how and with whom we share information.
norms of space behavior
Question. Actions by other nations in space have direct
consequences on the ability of the United States to execute freedom of
movement and operations both in space and on the ground for civilian
and national security means. One example includes recent destructive
anti-satellite operations in November of 2021 by Russia, whose debris
field affected the international space station causing it to maneuver
and its astronauts to seek shelter in its return capsule.
What are your views on international norms of behavior in space and
how should the Space Force be part of a whole of government approach to
negotiating and implementing such norms?
Answer. Shortly after the reckless, dangerous, and destructive
Russian direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) missile test in November
2021, US leaders such as the Vice President, Secretary of State, and
the Deputy Secretary of Defense spoke about the importance of standards
of responsible behaviors to address these types of actions. I believe
that the US, along with allies and partners must uphold international
standards and develop new standards in space. Standards help us
identify safe versus malign activities, reduce risks of misperception,
and shape perceptions regarding collective reactions and cost
imposition. We are fully engaged regarding interagency, whole-of-
government efforts on tenets of responsible behaviors in space. Our
collective ability to deter a conflict from beginning or extending into
space relies on our cooperation with allies and partners to develop
best practices and standards of behavior for responsible space
operations and then to holding violators accountable to the
international community.
cyber
Question. In May 2018, the Cyber Mission Force achieved full
operational capability. In September of the same year, DOD released its
2018 Cyber Strategy.
In your view, how well postured is the Space Force to meet the
goals outlined in the 2018 DOD Cyber Strategy? What actions will you
take, if confirmed, to remediate any gaps between Space Force capacity
and capability and Cyber Strategy goals?
Answer. The Space Force is postured to support the DOD Cyber
Strategy but will require a realignment of our cyber capabilities to
fully meet the goals and objectives of the strategy. The USSF will rely
on USCYBERCOM component cyber forces to collect intelligence and
prepare military cyber capabilities to be used in the event of crisis
or conflict and for disrupting and/or halting malicious cyber activity
at its source. However, USSF is actively strengthening the security and
resilience of networks and systems that contribute to current and
future US military advantages in the space domain. If confirmed, I am
committed to meeting the DOD cyber strategy objectives by fully
integrating cyber defense into space missions and by transforming cyber
guardians' duties from traditional base support IT functions to execute
mission assurance capabilities to secure, monitor and defend Space
Force missions. Finally, I will advocate for the necessary investments
in the tools and systems needed to fortify our space mission networks
to enhance their resiliency and defensibility.
Question. Are the size and capabilities of the Space Force
components sufficient to meet current and future cyber and information
warfare (IW) requirements?
Answer. With regards to meeting cyber and information warfare
requirements, the primary challenge is the alignment of duties for the
cyber guardians not the number of cyber guardians. Many of our cyber
guardians are needed to perform traditional base communication and IT
support functions and therefore are not available to perform the more
critical mission assurance to secure, monitor and defend USSF mission
systems. The USSF is working to contract out most of the traditional
communication and IT support functions to free up more cyber guardians
to focus on cyber defense. Once resourced to do this we will have a
better understanding of the full set of cyber defense manpower
requirements. As for future cyber and IW manpower requirements, the
USSF is investing in tools and training that will make our cyber
workforce more efficient and effective in performing their cyber
defense roles; however, with the growing number of cyber threats and
the expansion of critical networks, I believe there will be a future
need for more cyber experts in the Space Force. If confirmed, I look
forward to working with Congress on the right kinds of investments in
tools, networks, training and personnel to ensure that the USSF meets
its cyber defense needs in the most efficient way possible.
Question. What is your view on the current definition of the Cyber
Operational Forces? Are additional categories needed to support the
Space Force
Answer. The Cyber Operational Forces (COF) are made up of several
elements including the Cyber Mission Force and the Cyber Security
Service Providers (CSSP). The Cyber Mission Force is composed of 133
teams conducting offensive and defensive cyber operations and the
associated support functions under USCYBERCOM authorities. The CSSPs
are focused on network defense. Having service-retained cyber mission
defense teams, specifically not included in the DOD COF, that can focus
training and operations on the specific and unique cyber terrain of
USSF weapon system networks is also an important element of USSF cyber
defense capabilities to enable tactical command and control or weapon
systems and critical infrastructure resiliency. A combination of these
service-retained cyber mission defense capabilities with the DOD COF is
suitable and provides all the categories needed to support the Space
Force.
Question. Do you think the Space Force should be responsible for
providing teams to the Cyber Mission Force?
Answer. Since all other Services provide teams to the Cyber Mission
Force (CMF), it is reasonable for some to assume that the Space Force
should also provide teams. However, the analysis of manpower required
to standup the USSF did not include cyber manpower requirements to
provide teams to the CMF. Therefore, any requirement to support the CMF
would be new mission that would require a commensurate increase to USSF
manpower to support this new mission area.
Question. In your view, should the Space Force expand acceptable
professional qualifications for its cyber workforce to include non-
traditional professional credentialing and schooling from so-called
technology boot camps and massive online open courses (MOOCs) as an
alternative to traditional education, provided candidates meet the
necessary technical standards?
Answer. The Space Force is committed to innovative approaches in
recruiting and talent management to ensure we always have access to the
expertise needed to conduct our critical missions. Assuming candidates
meet necessary technical standards, I believe non-traditional
professional credentialing and schooling would open up the pool of
talent available to the USSF creating a broader and more diverse set of
applicants. The larger the pool of applicants, the greater the
selectivity, and the better the workforce which enhances the USSF cyber
capabilities.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to enhance Space Force
information dominance capabilities?
Answer. There are three (3) lines of effort needed to enhance USSF
information dominance capabilities. First, we must ensure our cyber
guardians are focused on their mission assurance to secure, monitor,
and defend USSF mission systems, not traditional base communications
and IT support functions. Second, cyber guardians need an operational
test and training infrastructure to allow them to innovate cyber
defense tactics, train to execute those tactics in a realistic
environment and then practice their skills against a simulated
adversary on a cyber range. Third, cyber guardians need the tools and
technology to fully map and monitor the cyber terrain associated with
USSF weapon systems. If confirmed, I will be committed to building a
ready force of cyber guardians by investing along these lines of
effort.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to improve military
cybersecurity career pathways to meet the present and future needs of
the Space Force and US Cyber Command?
Answer. Force Development is a critically important task of any
military service, but the highly technical and expert workforce
required for USSF success makes it even more critical that we ensure
all of our personnel, including cybersecurity personnel, have
meaningful career pathways in order to retain the talent we need for
success. If confirmed, one important way I intend to accomplish this is
to develop career broadening and professional development opportunities
with the commercial cyber security industry that guardians will be
expected to take advantage of at various points throughout their
career. I expect the commercial cybersecurity industry to continue to
accelerate its capabilities, techniques and technologies, therefore it
will be imperative that our cyber guardians keep pace professionally.
To this end, the USSF must develop opportunities to send our cyber
guardians into the commercial sector periodically to immerse themselves
in these capabilities and cultures in order to bring back new and
advanced expertise and ideas to protect and defend USSF cyber
infrastructure and data.
electronic warfare (ew)
Question. What is your vision for the future of Space Force EW
capabilities?
Answer. We fully realize the importance the electromagnetic
spectrum, including cyberspace, holds in warfare today, and I expect it
to grow in the future as our potential adversaries attempt to
capitalize and exploit its strengths and vulnerabilities. As seen in
the current conflict between Russia and Ukraine, Russia's disruption of
commercial satellite communications and the provider's prompt
adaptation to restore service is but one example of what we can expect
in the future, but on a far greater scale. As such, the USSF must
develop and field a diversified array of active, adaptive, and
networked electronic warfare capabilities to project power and defend
the Joint Force across the competition continuum. We must develop and
employ cutting-edge technology to expand our maneuver space and provide
the Joint Force maximum operational flexibility while denying a
potential adversary the ability to do the same. If confirmed, I will
work with Congress to ensure that USSF Force Design includes the
necessary EW capabilities to support the Joint Force.
Question. US Strategic Command is the Joint Staff lead for ensuring
the Joint Force can defend and conduct offensive EW strike operations.
How has the Space Force integrated with STRATCOM to conduct Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations including the following:
The Joint Electromagnetic Warfare Center?
The Joint Navigation Warfare Center?
The Joint Electromagnetic Readiness Center?
The Defense Information Systems Agency?
The Development of the Electromagnetic Battle Management tool?
Answer. Electromagnetic Spectrum Superiority (EMSS) is of critical
importance to the national security of the nation. To ensure
Electromagnetic Spectrum superiority, Space Force must work with other
Headquarters Department of the Air Force offices and US Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) to have an integrated approach to governance that
prioritizes EMSS through requirements, resourcing, workforce, and
operations. As the Space Force Deputy Chief Space Operations for
Operations, I stood up an Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations (EMSO)
branch within the Space Force specifically to coordinate and partner
with other Headquarters Department of the Air Force, Joint and Agency
partners on Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations topics. This branch
works to advocate for Space Force EMSO equities, to grow Space Force
EMSO capabilities, and to ensure full integration with USSTRATCOM and
other Electronic Warfare supporting Centers and Agencies. Space Force
is currently working with the Joint Electromagnetic Warfare Center on a
DOD-wide Electronic Warfare Assessment of our EW capabilities to inform
funding recommendations. Additionally, Space Force works closely with
DISA, STRATCOM, and the Air Force in various forums and working groups,
such as their working group focused on delivering the initial toolset
for the Electromagnetic Battle Management Tool. If confirmed, I will
continue to work with all stakeholders to ensure the Joint Force has
the required capabilities to maintain our competitiveness, conduct
operations, and protect our vital national interests.
spectrum
Question. Electromagnetic spectrum plays a critical role in many
DOD missions and is integrally related to electronic warfare.
In what ways does the Space Force rely on spectrum to support
warfighter requirements?
Answer. Space Force relies on spectrum for everything from
launching space vehicles, to operating those vehicles, and to providing
mission effects worldwide. Everything we do in space relies on our
ability to effectively utilize spectrum.
Question. In your view, which warfighter spectrum requirements will
be essential to competing with Russia and China on a future
battlefield?
Answer. Broad access to a diversity of commercial and military
wideband satellite capabilities will be required for warfighters on any
potential future battlefield.
In testimony before the House Armed Services Committee in February
2020, then-Secretary of Defense Esper stated that DOD is willing to
share spectrum with 5G networks in the ``Mid-Band'' (3 to 4.2
gigahertz). What Space Force systems might be affected by this
``sharing'' and how could ``sharing'' affect homeland defense, in your
view?
Answer. The DOD 5G Strategy Implementation Plan outlines how the
DOD will support research, development, testing, acquisition, and
fielding of systems incorporating new technologies that permit greater
spectrum access while preventing harmful interference to legacy
systems. DOD will develop capabilities needed for near-real-time
sharing, to enable military operations in congested spectrum
environments to ensure that DOD can continue to use its radars to sense
threats both domestically and internationally. To accomplish this, DOD
is standing up a highly controlled testing environment to better
understand 5G and radar spectrum dynamics that impact interference
between these systems. Based on interference measurements and analyses
from this testbed, dynamic spectrum utilization technologies for radar
and 5G are being developed and evaluated. Interference with these
systems could result in negative homeland defense mission impact and
overall Space Force readiness. Therefore, it is critical that an
effective sharing plan is in place to ensure that Space Force and
homeland defense systems can operate in a way to enable readiness and
mission accomplishment without interference.
Question. If DOD were required to ``vacate'' or leave the spectrum
``Mid-Band'' instead of sharing, what are the potential operational and
dollar costs to the Space Force, in your view? How long would a move to
a different area of the spectrum take, in your view?
Answer. At this point, I am not in a position to make a full
assessment. If confirmed, I will be able to assess how spectrum changes
impact Space Force both financially and operationally in support of the
National Defense Strategy. At that time, I would welcome the
opportunity to come back to the Committee to discuss this important
issue.
science, technology, and innovation
Question. US superiority in key areas of innovation is decreasing
or has disappeared, while our competitors are engaging in aggressive
military modernization and advanced weaponry development. DOD has
identified 14 critical technology areas in which investment to develop
next generation operational capabilities is imperative: biotechnology;
quantum science; future generation wireless technology (FutureG);
advanced materials; trusted artificial intelligence (AI) and autonomy;
integrated network systems-of-systems; microelectronics; space
technology; renewable energy generation and storage; advanced computing
and software; human-machine interfaces; directed energy; hypersonics;
and integrated sensing and cyber. Much of the innovation in these
technologies that could prove suitable for national defense purposes is
occurring outside of the traditional defense industry.
What do you see as the most significant challenges (e.g.,
technical, organizational, or cultural) to US development of these key
technologies?
Answer. Maintaining our technology lead over our peer competitors
is critical to USSF's continuing ability to deter conflict in space.
Pressing issues include meeting the pacing challenge. China is a very
advanced and technology-savvy competitor who is innovating at a rapid
pace, in some areas faster than we and our Allies can keep pace. We
need to identify the best opportunities and mechanisms to leverage the
tremendous commercial innovation and then we must be able to rapidly
integrate those capabilities into a resilient hybrid architecture. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with this Committee and across the
DOD to address these challenges.
Question. How is Space Force integrating and synchronizing
investments in these technologies across all Services? In your view,
how is OSD doing in helping that integration process?
Answer. There are several initiatives that assist the USSF in
integrating and synchronizing investments in key technologies. The
concept of ``One AFRL--Two Services'' (Air Force Research Lab) allows
the Space Force to integrate and synchronize with AF science and
technology activities, as well as with other Services. The Space
Acquisition Council allows us to integrate and synchronize across the
DOD and Intelligence Community. The OSD-led Space Community of Interest
is key in coordinating technology roadmaps and investments. If
confirmed, I look forward to working with this Committee and across the
DOD to address these challenges.
Question. How has the Space Force prioritized limited research and
development funding across its technology focus areas? Specifically,
where is the Space Force either increasing or decreasing focus and
funding?
Answer. The USSF is working to establish a balanced science and
technology portfolio that supports current technology needs, Space
Warfighting Analysis Center force design efforts, and longer term
technology horizon scanning. These are critical efforts as the USSF
seeks to deliver evolutionary and game changing capabilities to the
warfighter to keep us ahead of our pacing threats. Areas of increased
investment include hybrid space architecture, integrating commercial
and allied partners, artificial intelligence/machine learning, space
mobility and logistics, tactical intelligence, surveillance, and
reconnaissance, missile warning for hypersonics, multi-domain resilient
space data transport and positioning, navigation, and timing.
Question. In the Fiscal Year 2023 President's Budget Request, the
Space Force increased overall Research, Development, Test and
Evaluation (RDTE) funding from $11.5 to $15.8 billion. How would you
prioritize these budget areas in future budget requests?
Answer. Based on my experience, I am concerned about and see
critical opportunities in resiliency, especially protection and
proliferation to build toward the resilient hybrid space architecture
across all our mission areas. Additionally, it will be important for us
to assess the appropriate missions to migrate to space (e.g., Ground
Moving Target Indicator [GMTI]) to optimize mission performance in
light of emerging threats to the existing capabilities. If confirmed, I
would work to ensure the space Research, Development, Test & Evaluation
portfolio provides long-term competitive advantage, balancing the
pursuit of transformational capabilities and nearer-term incremental
improvements.
Question. One of the main objectives of the defense research
enterprise is to develop advanced technologies that will be of benefit
to the warfighter. In this regard, it is critical that advancements
quickly transition from the development phase into testing and
evaluation and ultimately into a program of record for the deployment
of capability to the warfighter.
The Air Force Research Laboratory (AFRL) is responsible for Science
and Technology (S&T) research for both the Air Force and Space Force.
They have adopted a motto of ``One lab, two services.'' In your
opinion, how is that dual-hatted relationship working for the Space
Force? Are there other labs within the Army or Navy that you also think
contribute to the Space Force mission?
Answer. It is my understanding that the ``One AFRL--Two Services''
approach is working well. The construct allows us to accomplish
significantly more science and technology innovation for the Space
Force than we would be able to accomplish with a separate space
laboratory. It provides an opportunity to leverage shared world-class
lab facilities, test assets, tools, and expertise to prepare for future
threats that require multi-disciplinary solutions. The Space Force is
also able to work with the Navy Research Lab on space technology.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that a greater
percentage of the Space research technologies being developed by AFRL
transition into programs of record for deployment to the warfighter?
How would you ensure that appropriate technologies are transitioning
more quickly into programs of record?to the warfighter? How would you
ensure that appropriate technologies are transitioning more quickly
into programs of record?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work to strengthen the relationship
between operators and researchers to ensure that the voice of operators
is heard in the development and deployment of new technologies.
Additionally, I will continue to advocate for modular, open systems
approaches, commercial as-a-service models, and investment in
foundational enterprise infrastructure that allow rapid insertion of
emerging technologies to enable the delivery of capabilities in
iterations similar to industry.
Question. What efforts is the Space Force making to identify new
technologies developed commercially by the private sector and apply
them to military and national security purposes?
Answer. The USSF, and Space Systems Command specifically, is
continuously engaged with the private sector collaborating to discover
and assess new technologies for military and national security utility.
Industry Days (and reverse Industry Days) including crosstalks,
demonstrations and sharing of modeling and simulation data have been
productive in sharing operational challenges and potential mitigation
capabilities between the government and the private sector. Commercial
space capabilities and services offer many benefits for national
security space missions and architectures. The DOD uses commercial
space services to augment government systems and missions where
practical; the opportunity to use these services and technologies will
only grow in the future. The DOD intends to serve as a reliable
customer to stimulate market segments that might not otherwise mature.
Stimulating demand in these areas strengthens the industrial and
economic base and incubates commercial capabilities that may meet
future requirements. If confirmed, I will work to identify and reduce
the barriers to leverage the best available commercial technologies to
meet warfighter requirements.
Question. In your view, what steps must DOD take to protect and
strengthen our National Security Innovation Base to ensure that
critical information is protected?
Answer. Based on my experience, a balance between collaboration
with industry and protection of critical information is needed.
Educating industry partners about threats is key, as many small
businesses may not be aware of threats. Continuing the work the USSF
has begun to build out secure facilities, which can be shared by small
companies who do not have their own, is another way to reduce the
threshold for smaller companies to contribute and thereby strengthen
the industrial base. If confirmed, I will work across the Department to
reduce barriers for small businesses, share operational challenges with
the private sector and work to quickly integrate commercial
capabilities of value to the DOD.
Question. How are you leveraging the National Technology and
Industrial Base as a means of fostering the industrial base needed for
space, as well as promoting collaboration and interoperability with key
allies?
Answer. The USSF is committed to implementing flexible terminals,
networks, and ground interfaces, establishing an infrastructure and a
management framework. This framework would allow National Technology
and Industrial Base partners to provide theNational Technology and
Industrial Base partners to provide the
technical workforce
Question. A significant challenge facing the Space Force today is a
shortage of highly skilled data scientists; computer programmers;
cyber; and other scientific, technical, and engineering talent to work
at Defense laboratories and technical centers.
In your view, what are the pros and cons of having Space Force
Active Duty military personnel trained and working as scientists,
engineers, software coders, and in other technical positions across the
Air Force's research, development, and acquisition enterprise?
Answer. Active duty personnel trained in these technical positions
offer greater insights into operational challenges, mission necessity
and tighter coupling of technical solutions to operational realities.
However, the challenges, requirements and hardships inherent in
military service coupled with financial incentives to work in the
private sector make retaining technical talent for career long service
challenging. Therefore, it is imperative that we create a mix of
personnel and employment models to ensure the USSF has access to the
talent it needs in the most operational relevant way possible. If
confirmed, I will work hard to leverage innovations in talent
management and career field progression to maximize the USSF's access
to these important technical skillsets.
Question. What are the pros and cons of employing Federal civilian
employees in these fields, and what, in your view, is the optimum force
mix of civilian, military, and contractor personnel?
Answer. The USSF has a unique force distribution, relative to other
Services, between its military and civilian personnel numbers. The
higher percentage of civilians is a direct reflection on the need to
leverage very skilled, experienced technical experts in order to
accomplish USSF missions. While it is true that both military and
civilian personnel are important to mission execution, they cannot be
treated as completely interchangeable parts of the USSF workforce. Each
cohort brings different capabilities and limitations in terms of
experience, background, motivations, perspectives, positional stability
and rotational agility. If confirmed, I will leverage all of the talent
management tools at my disposal to ensure we recruit and retain the
necessary talent and maintain an effective balance between military and
civilian personnel numbers to optimize mission performance and
workforce development and sustainability.
Question. What shortfalls (both in numbers and technical
disciplines) do you have in your technical workforce outside of the
labs and acquisition workforce, for both military and civilian
personnel?
Answer. The USSF technical workforce is currently experiencing
military shortfalls in the following disciplines: cyber operations (-
67), intelligence (-158), and space operations (-189). While these
numbers are small relative to other Services, they represent a
consequential percentage of our most critical mission areas.
Additionally, the USSF continues to experience challenges in recruiting
civilian talent within the artificial intelligence and data analytics
fields. Because of the USSF's approach to being as lean as possible,
there is very little slack in the system to absorb any shortfalls at
all. If confirmed, I look forward to working with Congress on building
some level of resiliency in our workforce numbers so that we can
mitigate severe drops in mission effectiveness in the event of small
numbers of personnel shortages.
space force military end strength
Question. The Space Force has requested an end strength of 8,600
guardians for fiscal year 2023.
Do you have any major concerns with the Space Force end strength
target? If so, what are they, and how will you address them if
confirmed?
Answer. The Space Force is focused on ensuring the authorized end-
strength of 8,600 is comprised of the right mix, to include background,
experience, and skills, so that we can effectively execute our mission
requirements. The USSF's end strength is expected to grow over the next
few years as we continue building out the necessary force to meet NDS
objectives, integrate with the Joint Force and fulfill operational
requirements of Combatant Commanders. If confirmed, I intend to review
end strength requirements to ensure we continue to balance risk in
maintaining legacy capabilities against demands of future force
requirements, as well as provide for healthy and sustainable career
progression for our guardians.
Question. What is the appropriate mix of Active, Reserve component,
and civilian employees in the Space Force? How will you review current
proposals if confirmed?
Answer. The mix of the force will be informed by a combination of
current and future requirements as well as current and future available
inventory. We expect our business processes to inspire quality
competition and innovative talent management. We will employ the best
we can afford to empower a lean and agile mission-focused force in an
accountable environment using all the human resource vehicles. In
pursuit of this vision, we must leverage all of the personnel tools at
our disposal, including military and civilian cohorts with both full-
time and part-time options. If confirmed, I will evaluate personnel
policies and talent management processes through a force readiness
lens. I will focus on implementing the policies and processes that
optimize our readiness in the most expeditious manner.
Question. What additional force shaping authorities and tools does
the Space Force need, in your view?
Answer. The authorities granted by Congress have been sufficient to
shape the size and composition of the Space Force. If confirmed, I
welcome the opportunity to work with Congress if changing conditions
require us to evaluate future force shaping authorities or tools.
space force reserve component
Question. As of now, there are no Space Force components in the
National Guard. What is your opinion on whether a Space National Guard
should be established?
Answer. The capabilities the space units in the Air National Guard
provide are critical--the Space Force cannot do its mission without
them. As a military leader, I am most concerned with maintaining the
readiness of these units in whatever organization is settled upon. We
can do that a few ways and, if confirmed, I look forward to working
with this Committee to make sure we get this important question right.
Question. In your view, does the Space Force have a role in
supporting domestic civil support missions?
Answer. Yes. Space Force capabilities like GPS, environmental
monitoring, and communication satellites are critical capabilities for
several contingencies. During emergencies, and under the direction of
the President or Secretary of Defense, Space Force forces have a role
in supporting domestic civil support missions.
Question. What is your vision for the proposed full-time/part-time
``Space Component?''
Answer. Properly implemented, the full-time/part-time ``single
component'' for the Space Force can be a powerful recruiting and
retention tool. This approach gives guardians the flexibility to pursue
interests outside of the Space Force without completely severing their
connection to the Service. However, the ability of the Service and the
members to seamlessly take advantage of this connection is complicated
under the traditional Regular/Reserve components model by an
administrative burden associated with transferring from the Regular to
Reserve components. If implemented effectively, a single component
could alleviate some of this burden and make it easier to retain high
performing guardians, then leverage them in full-time and part-time
status more seamlessly throughout their career. If confirmed, I will
work with Congress to explore the implementation of this important
legislative initiative.
space force recruiting and retention
Question. The National Defense Strategy Commission asserted
unequivocally that the most critical resource required to produce a
highly capable military is highly capable people, in the quantity
required, willing to serve. The recruitment and retention of quality
guardians--officer and enlisted, Active and Reserve Component--is vital
to the Space Force. Yet, DOD studies indicate that only about 29% of
today's youth population is eligible for military service. Further,
only a fraction of those who meet military accession standards are
interested in serving.
If confirmed, how would you ensure that the Space Force maintains
sufficiently high recruitment and retention standards?
Answer. If confirmed, step one in this process will be to maximize
the pool of acceptable candidates. We will continue to review and make
appropriate changes to our entry standard (aptitude, moral, and
medical) to ensure we are recruiting individuals that are not only
highly qualified, but ensure we are not excluding individuals based on
certain non-mission critical standards (tattoo, height/weight, etc.).
Maintaining high standards is essential to attracting, building, and
retaining a capable, competent and combat-ready force. I will ensure
recruiters have the tools necessary to attract men and women who meet
and exceed the high standards of the Department of the Air Force from
every corner of America. I will monitor retention trends and take
prudent steps to ensure we have the necessary room within our
authorized end strength to continue to recruit and access talent that
will sustain us into the future and maintain force readiness.
Question. What steps will you undertake to ensure that the Space
Force is a diverse and inclusive military service?
Answer. Establishment and sustainment of a diverse and inclusive
Space Force begins with accessions. Therefore, the Space Force has
taken active steps to modernize its outreach as well as recruiting
programs targeting diverse populations to ensure a capable force for
the future. For example, we are developing the University Partnership
Program, which includes Historical Black Colleges and Universities. We
have instituted an Applicant Pool Cycle inside our recruiting efforts
which enables us to handpick the optimal candidates over the course of
a year rather than fill our ranks on a first-come, first-served basis.
Once in the Space Force, our workforce must be continually challenged
and be provided advancement and development opportunities in order to
retain diverse talent. Therefore, if confirmed, I will routinely review
recruiting strategies and outcomes, using data to deliberately shape
future recruiting and retention efforts so that Space Force represents
the best and full breadth of diversity in America. I will also assess
workplaces of our guardians to ensure there is a culture of respect and
universal inclusion so that all members of the Space Force team know
that they are valued. I will also rigorously evaluate the developmental
and advancement opportunities for guardians to ensure we are providing
for and enhancing the capabilities of all segments of our workforce.
Question. What do you consider to be key to the Space Force's
future success in retaining the best qualified personnel for continued
service in positions of greater responsibility and leadership in the
Space Force?
Answer. I believe there are two (2) key factors primarily
associated with retaining talent in the Space Force: 1) Empowering
guardians to do meaningful work and recognizing the value of their
contribution and 2) Providing guardians with development and
advancement opportunities. If confirmed, I will work to cultivate a
Space Force culture in which guardians can fully embody our values and
who are recognized and rewarded for personifying those values in a
respectful, innovative and risk-tolerant environment. I will also work
to institute challenging and innovative developmental opportunities to
ensure guardians remain at the leading edge of their professional
expertise.
Question. What steps, if any, do you feel should be taken to ensure
that current operational requirements and tempo do not adversely impact
the overall recruiting, retention, readiness, and morale of guardians?
Answer. To retain talented guardians, we must constantly look to
maximize the quality of their service and the quality of life for them
and their families. There are inherent sacrifices associated with
military service. If confirmed, my job will be to ensure the rewards
and the quality of the experience for military members and their
families balances or outweighs the sacrifices that each will inevitably
need to make.
Question. In your view, what effect do current recruiting
standards--particularly DOD-wide criteria for tier-one recruits--have
on recruit attrition and/or future success in the Space Force?
Answer. Because of the size of the Space Force and the requisite
number of accessions needed each year, Tier 1 education standards
currently have minimal impact on the Space Force. Currently 99% of all
enlisted Space Force entries are Tier 1, far exceeding the DOD
requirement of 90%.
military compensation
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of military
compensation?
Answer. On average, servicemembers are compensated well when
compared to their counterparts in the private sector. The military
compensation system, to include cash compensation (basic pay, BAH, BAS,
Retirement, etc.) and non-cash compensation (health care, leave and
liberty, etc.), is adequate to recruit and retain the majority of the
nation's military forces and to ensure an appropriate quality of life
for military servicemembers. There are specific career fields that
require higher levels of compensation to meet retention goals, and
Congress has provided the military Services a robust package of special
and incentive pays to address those populations. It is also true that
the Space Force as a newly formed independent Armed Service does not
have a large amount of historical trending data to rely on to predict
retention trends. If confirmed, I will monitor closely all available
data and seek active feedback from the workforce to assess retention of
our critical talent.
Question. In your view, are there any unique challenges or issues
within the Space Force with respect to military compensation?
Answer. The competitive environment for talent faced by the Space
Force is significantly different, in the aggregate, than that faced by
our sister Services. We have a higher percentage of highly technical
career fields whose talent is in high demand across all sectors of
employment. As we seek to attract the quality of talent that can
succeed in these fields, we must always remember that compensations
include not only monetary compensation, but also non-monetary
incentives, culture, environment, and quality of life. The Space Force
must present a total compensation package to attract and retain the
talent we need in a highly competitive and dynamic environment. If
confirmed, I will advocate for the appropriate resources to retain
Space Force talent but also work hard to build a culture and
environment that appeals to our workforce and entices them to stay.
Question. What recommendations would you have for controlling the
rising cost of personnel?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the size, composition, and
compensation structure of the entire force in order to create a force
composed of the highest quality individuals that are properly trained
and equipped to meet our national defense goals. To maximize the
talents and potential of Space Force members, we should be considering
as many innovative ideas as possible for talent management. Alternative
approaches like grade-in-person system versus a grade-in-position
system may better enable the workforce to develop and contribute across
the Force. The key is to leverage any tool that would optimize the
investment we make in our employees allowing them to contribute to
mission achievement more broadly (avoid organizational stovepipes). In
the end, this may provide greater retention, enhanced career growth
with career variety and a deeper bench of expertise and skills to
leverage.
non-deployable servicemembers
Question. The Department has published DODI 1332.45, Retention
Determinations for Non-Deployable Servicemembers.
Do you agree that guardians who are non-deployable for more than 12
consecutive months should be subject either to separation from the
Space Force or referral into the Disability Evaluation System?
Answer. I believe every servicemember must be able to perform their
assigned missions effectively when the Nation calls. Deployability is
one aspect of readiness for the Space Force. If a servicemember is non-
deployable for 12 consecutive months, an assessment is needed to
determine if continued service is in the best interests of the Space
Force, specifically, and the military more generally. When continued
service is not in these best interests, the member should be separated
or referred into the Disability Evaluation system.
Question. DODI 1332.45 provides that the Secretaries of the
Military Departments may ``retain . . . those servicemembers whose
period of non-deployability exceeds the 12 consecutive month limit . .
. if determined to be in the best interest of the Military Service.''
In your view, under what circumstances might the retention of a
guardian who has been non-deployable for more than 12 months be ``in
the best interest of the [Space Force]''?
Answer. In my experience, there are circumstances that make someone
non-deployable but do not prevent the member from performing
operational duties in CONUS-based garrisons. Since many of the USSF's
missions are conducted as employed-in-place operations from CONUS-based
installations, it may be in the best interest of the Space Force to
retain the member because they can still perform vital missions from
Space Force bases despite not being eligible to perform duties from
deployed locations. If confirmed, I would ensure that our processes for
making these determinations take advantage of our smaller numbers
allowing more individualized consideration of factors. In the end, the
optimal answer will be the one that enhances Space Force readiness and
accounts for the health and safety of Space Force members and their
families.
Question. In your view, how should this policy be applied to
guardians with HIV or other chronic diseases? To guardians who identify
as transgender?
Answer. The health and safety of Space Force members and the impact
it has on force readiness is the primary consideration for this policy.
If confirmed, it will be my responsibility to weigh these factors and
make recommendations to the Secretary of the Air Force related to the
readiness impact any policy decision could have.
Question. Has the Space Force established any class or group of
personnel deemed ``deployable with limitations,'' such that the class
or group is exempt from the 12-month non-deployable retention
determination requirement?
Answer. The Space Force is challenging traditional deployment
availability limitations that are based on scenarios where most
personnel deploy to forward and/or austere locations. Where these
limitations can be adjusted in the context of a Force postured against
a greater proportion of deployed-in-place requirements, it opens the
potential for talented guardians to be mission effective who would
otherwise be deployment ineligible or even disqualified from service.
In the interim, the Space Force follows the deployment readiness
requirements established in DOD and DAF guidance.
Question. In your view, what percentage of guardians can be non-
deployable at any given time without adversely affecting the readiness
of the force to execute the NDS and associated operational plans?
Answer. Today the Space Force actively manages deployment
availability by assigning guardians Deployment Availability Codes when
they have deployment limitations. Those codes help commanders identify
risks and, in some cases, disqualifying factors that prevent guardians
from performing certain missions. As the Space Force re-assesses what
risks and factors are acceptable in deployed-in-place missions (i.e.,
that would not be disqualifying), the Space Force has the opportunity
to weigh the advantages these guardians offer by bringing other
desirable qualities (such as specialized skills), without the
constraints that would limit military members deploying to forward and/
or austere locations.
military quality of life
Question. The Committee remains concerned about the sustainment of
key quality of life programs for military families, such as family
advocacy and parenting skills programs; childcare; spouse education and
employment support; health care; and morale, welfare and recreation
(MWR) services.
If confirmed, what quality of life and MWR programs would you
consider a priority? How will the Space Force work with the Air Force
and other military services to ensure MWR support for guardians and
their families?
Answer. Military family readiness and quality of life are critical
to recruiting and retaining the force required to meet current and
emerging threats. The range of quality of life (QOL) and MWR programs
are all a priority if we are to meet the needs of our guardians'
families and thus not impact servicemember's readiness and
availability. From my experience, while there are many programs that
are important in supporting our guardians and their families, the
highest priority QOL issues are related to housing, medical care and
childcare. Because the Space Force was established intentionally
without organic support capabilities, we rely heavily on the Air Force
to provide much of the supporting structure that takes care of our
families. If confirmed as CSO, it will be my role to partner with the
AF to ensure we take care of all our families (particularly in these
high priority areas), and the guardians can expect me to be a demanding
customer of the AF to ensure we get the support we need.
family readiness and support
Question. What do you consider to be the most important family
readiness issues for guardians and their families?
Answer. Personal (and family) resiliency in a demanding and often
stressful military environment is one of the most critical family
readiness issues for guardians and their families. Military life can be
inherently difficult and family readiness issues encompass various
aspects of well-being for guardians and their families. Priorities for
family-readiness issues must include opportunities for increasing
resilience to encourage and sustain wellbeing and helping families
overcome the adversities associated with military life. Development of
the requisite skills needed to increase and promote resilience is a key
priority for addressing the issue. Furthermore, easy access to child
and medical care and suitable, safe and affordable housing are
important factors in promoting family well-being. If confirmed, I will
support programs that address these primary considerations for quality
of life and reinforce a strong Space Force community and focus on those
that build and sustain resilient families.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that the family
readiness issues you identified are properly addressed and adequately
resourced?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to conduct frequent visits to the
field to see and hear for myself from the people most affected by our
quality of life decisions. The relatively small size of the Space Force
provides an opportunity to have a higher degree of senior leader
interaction and engagement. Therefore, I will leverage formal and
informal feedback mechanisms and collect as much information as
possible to assess for myself the effectiveness and suitability of the
programs we establish or need to establish. If confirmed, I will work
hard to receive honest, comprehensive and constructive feedback
directly from the field and then connect these inputs directly to
resourcing decisions and monitor outcomes utilizing all available
methods and information.
Question. In your view, what role do non-medical counseling
services provided by DOD Military Family Life Counselors have in
promoting the readiness of the force and family?
Answer. Because personal resiliency and well-being is a very
individual condition, the quality and quantity and variety of services
are important. It is hard to predict which services will provide the
best support to an individual. Because personal well-being is linked to
force readiness, I think leaders have a responsibility to provide as
many options as possible to optimize the effectiveness of the programs
to the greatest number of individuals. Happier and healthier personnel
are inherently more capable and ready to perform their missions.
Question. The Committee often hears that Active Duty families have
difficulty obtaining childcare on base and that there are thousands of
military families on waitlists to receive care.
If confirmed, what specifically would you do to provide Space Force
families with accessible, high-quality childcare, at an appropriate
cost?
Answer. Available, affordable, and quality childcare services allow
guardians to focus on and execute the Space Force's mission. Before
making any specific recommendations, a more in-depth evaluation of the
issue is required to ensure the right solution is brought forth for
guardian's accessibility to high-quality childcare at an appropriate
cost. The evaluation includes assessing the current state of program
operations (including analysis of wait times for access to care and
program financial models, and staffing and facility requirements),
identification of facilitators and barriers contributing to childcare
successes and challenges, and development and execution of a plan of
action to ensure guardians' childcare needs are met, they receive
quality childcare, and it is delivered at an appropriate cost. If
confirmed, I will work closely with my Department counterparts to
ensure garrison childcare programs are well staffed and operating to
maximize existing childcare spaces, utilize all available community
based childcare options, and smartly invest in facilities to expand the
number of childcare spaces where needed.
Question. How would you ensure that childcare services for Space
Force families are properly resourced?
Answer. Step 1 is to collect information to fully understand the
capabilities, challenges and opportunities related to this important
family readiness issue. Step 2 would be to partner with the Air Force,
who provides this support to the Space Force, to determine the
appropriate way ahead. Space Force is already establishing and
fostering a partnership with HQ USAF/A1S. If confirmed, I would
advocate to ensure the Department of the Air Force continues to
recognize and support the critical need to provide available,
affordable and quality childcare services for Air and Space families.
support for military families with special needs
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that a guardian with a
special needs family member is relocated only to a new duty station at
which the medical and educational services required by that family
member are available?
Answer. The Department of the Air Force (DAF) has made significant
strides in its multi-year transformation of the Exceptional Family
Member Program (EFMP) with the most recent focus on Family Member
Travel Screening and Centralized Medical Screening. If confirmed, I
would continue to support DAF EFMP transformation efforts,
implementation of EFMP standardization requirements identified in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2021, and
continually solicit feedback from guardians and their families to
ensure that the permanent change of station (PCS) process was efficient
and that all required services were available at the new duty location.
Question. If confirmed, what tools would you use to encourage
guardians to enroll in the exceptional family member program (EFMP)?
Answer. If confirmed, I would use all avenues available to me--
leadership at every level, messaging and social media platforms--
educating guardians and their families on the benefits of enrollment in
the program and the support it provides throughout the military
lifecycle is critical to enrollment and the success of the program.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself
in ensuring that Military Housing Privatization Initiative partners and
military commanders consider the needs of servicemembers with an
exceptional family member in making assignments to privatized military
housing?
Answer. A strong and healthy home life underpins a ready Force. If
confirmed, I would continue to be a strong advocate for the needs of
our guardians and their families. I will work with key agencies across
the Department of the Air Force, who provide this support to the Space
Force, to address the unique requirements of families enrolled in the
Exceptional Family Member Program (EFMP).
domestic violence and child abuse in military families
Question. What is your understanding of the extent of domestic
violence and child abuse in the Department of the Air Force, and if
confirmed, what actions would you take to address these issues within
the Space Force?
Answer. Crimes of domestic violence and child abuse run counter to
our Space Force culture and core values and cannot be tolerated.
Domestic violence and child abuse must be addressed to ensure victims
are given the resources and support they need, and abusers are held
accountable. My understanding is the Department is engaged in multiple
efforts to improve available resources and communication of those
resources to domestic violence victims, while simultaneously improving
education on domestic violence prevention to guardians throughout the
entire Space Force. Additionally, the Department of the Air Force (DAF)
is committed to holding abusers appropriately accountable through their
chains of command pursuant to the Uniform Code of Military Justice.
Additionally, it's my understanding that by the end of 2023,
disposition of domestic violence and child sex abuse offenses will fall
under the exclusive jurisdiction of Office of Special Trial Counsel
(OSTC). In the interim, OSTC has begun phased implementation, to
include Special Trial Counsel input on commanders' disposition
decisions for these offenses. Until the OSTC effective date, the DAF
will continue to provide principled legal counsel to commanders
exercising disposition authority over these offenses. If confirmed, I
will support these initiatives and any others that help protect our
guardians and their families.
Question. In your view, what more can the Department do to prevent
child abuse and domestic and intimate partner violence?
Answer. We must continue to collaborate with agencies inside and
outside the Department of the Air Force to ensure that airmen and
guardians live a life free from family violence. The Prevention
Workforce will integrate primary prevention efforts with the goal of
reducing risk factors shared across multiple forms of violence and
increasing efficiency in the installation prevention system. We will
continue to press forward with institutionalizing and implementing
prevention at all levels while engaging key stakeholders to find
innovative and promising approaches.
Question. Do you believe that the Air Force Department's Family
Advocacy Program strikes the right balance between healing families and
holding individuals accountable for acts of domestic violence and child
abuse?
Answer. Domestic violence and child abuse must be addressed to
ensure that individuals and families get the resources needed to heal
from the abuse. The Family Advocacy Program is primarily focused on
ensuring families are provided with the appropriate support resources.
Our military justice system operates within a careful balance between
the interests of the government, the rights of the accused, and the
respect for the dignity of victims. We need to be focused on all
aspects of this issue. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to place
an emphasis on supporting families through the Family Advocacy Program
and holding offenders appropriately accountable under the Uniform Code
of Military Justice. Additionally, it is my understanding that by the
end of 2023, disposition of domestic violence and child sex abuse
offenses will fall under the exclusive jurisdiction of Office of
Special Trial Counsel (OSTC). In the interim, OSTC has begun phased
implementation, to include Special Trial Counsel input on commanders'
disposition decisions for these offenses. Until the OSTC effective
date, the Department of the Air Force will continue to provide
principled legal counsel to commanders exercising disposition authority
over these offenses. If confirmed, I will support these initiatives and
any others that help protect our guardians and their families.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. Despite significant efforts by the Military Services to
enhance their response to sexual assaults, including measures to care
for victims and hold assailants accountable, prevalence surveys
continue to show increases in sexual assault and unwanted sexual
conduct, primarily for female servicemembers aged 17 to 24, similar to
findings of the prevalence of sexual harassment and assault at the
Military Service Academies.
What is your view of the role of the Space Force chain of command
in maintaining a command climate in which sexual harassment and sexual
assault are not tolerated?
Answer. This issue is important for the Department as any instance
of sexual assault or sexual harassment is unacceptable and must not be
tolerated. It betrays the trust of our guardians, it negatively impacts
readiness and as a parent myself, I believe military leaders have an
obligation to protect America's sons and daughters who have chosen to
serve their country. Because I am committed to the health and safety of
our guardians, you will not find a better partner working with Congress
on this issue because I believe there will always be more that leaders
can do to protect our guardians.
Question. If confirmed, what specific role and tasks would you
establish for yourself in the Space Force's program of preventing and
responding to sexual harassment and sexual assault?
Answer. If confirmed I will continue to emphasize the importance of
Commanders' and other leaders' roles in ensuring that the climate and
culture within their units are free of sexual harassment and sexual
assault. Leaders set the tone for their units by their words and
actions. If confirmed, I will also play an active role in reviewing
incidents of sexual assault and harassment and will ensure that
programs designed to prevent them from happening are properly
resourced.
Question. In your view, are the policies, programs, and training
that the Space Force has put in place to prevent sexual assault and to
respond to sexual assault when it does occur adequate and effective?
Answer. Because any instance of sexual assault is too many, the
policies, programs and training that are in place are continuously
being evaluated and improved to reduce the occurrence and ensure if
sexual assault occurs, the response and support are adequate and
effective.
Question. Are Space Force policies for addressing retaliation and
reprisal--most notably, social ostracism and reputation damage--for
reporting sexual assault adequate in your view?
Answer. At this time DAF policy for addressing retaliation and
reprisal encompasses the USSF and is moving in the right direction with
implementing protections against retaliation. I am supportive of these
efforts. If confirmed, I will use data to inform future changes and
efforts to reinforce protections against retaliation and social
ostracism.
Question. What is your assessment of the adequacy of Air Force
resources and programs to provide victims of sexual assault the
medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. The policies, programs and training that are in place are
continuously evaluated and improved to ensure if sexual assault occurs,
the response and support are adequate and effective to facilitate
healing. This is an important issue and the health and safety of
guardians, and their families are a top priority so there is always
more we can do to protect them.
suicide prevention
Question. The number of suicides in each of the Services continues
to concern the Committee.
If confirmed, specifically what would you do to maintain a strong
focus on preventing suicides in the Space Force, including their family
members?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the USSF continues to actively
participate in the Department of the Air Force (DAF) effort to ensure
we maintain our focus on prevention of suicides. DOD and DAF are
working several initiatives in this area to include DAF's time-based
prevention and expanding the Prevention Workforce initiative.
Question. If confirmed, specifically what more would you do to
enhance the reporting and tracking of suicide among family members and
dependents of guardians?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the USSF will continue to align
with the Department of the Air Force's efforts to increase reporting
and tracking of deaths by suicides among our family members and
dependents.
audit
Question. Why is it important for the Department of the Air Force
to achieve a clean audit opinion?
Answer. Achieving a clean audit opinion demonstrates the Department
of the Air Force's ability to accurately and comprehensively account
for the dollars we spend to perform our mission. The audit is driving
necessary changes to improve the way we equip and pay airmen and
guardians, protect our IT systems and data, and optimize our budget and
spend cycles. Data consolidation efforts, motivated by the audit, are
arming decision-makers with real time Department-wide views and
advanced data analytic capabilities that support efficiencies and
sustain improvements. Continuing to engage in a financial statement
audit and prioritizing the big rocks identified during that annual
process, will empower the DAF to innovate, accelerate, and transform
how we do business for years to come.
space force general officer (go) authorizations
Question. What is the appropriate number of General Officers in the
Space Force, and why?
Answer. I am sensitive to Congressional concerns regarding excess
growth in leadership and believe resources should be prioritized to
focus on combat capability. Today we are supporting and executing the
Space Force missions successfully with 21 full-time general officers.
This number represents a lean approach to leadership across our
headquarters staff, three (3) Field Commands, our largest launch Delta,
and several other key positions across the DOD. However, it is my
personal opinion that although currently working, this number is not
sustainable in that the capacity in each grade is not sufficient to
sustain the two (2) four-star positions as the Service Chief and Vice
that are necessary to effectively lead the service. Furthermore, there
are key areas where senior ranking leadership is required for proper
Space Force integration across DOD, on the Joint Staff and inside the
Combatant Commands but we lack the capacity to participate at the
expected grade levels. If confirmed, I look forward to working with
Congress to determine the appropriate number of General Officers that
allows for effective integration and career sustainment of key
leadership positions while limiting any unnecessary growth in the size
of the Space Force.
Question. How have Space Force GOs been affected by the layering of
post-government employment constraints, including the enactment of
section 1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (P.L. 114-328)--applicable only to DOD?
Answer. All officers that transferred to the Space Force accepted a
two-year service commitment, so we are only now experiencing our first
general officer retirements. As such, the extent of impact of section
1045 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2017 on
the USSF remains unknown. It is our hope and desire to have legal and
ethical access to retired servicemembers of all grades in an advisory
and mentoring fashion without delay.
Question. In your view, does the Space Force have sufficient
training and resources in place to provide its GOs with the training,
advice, and assistance they need to avoid and address conflicts of
interest, comply with travel regulations, and ensure that government
resources--including employee time--are used only for official
purposes? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. All newly promoted general officers within the Space
Force receive mandatory ethics training which covers conflicts of
interest and a variety of other topics such as proper utilization and
oversight of resources. Refresher training is provided, and financial
reporting is required on an annual basis.
adverse and reportable information
Question. Incidents of misconduct or substandard performance, and
the findings of Inspectors General and command-directed investigations
are documented in various ways in each of the Military Services.
Procedures for reviewing and forwarding adverse and reportable
information for consideration in the promotion selection process,
including consideration by the Senate where applicable, are set forth
in title 10, United States Code, and in DOD Instruction 1320.4.
How is the Space Force ensuring compliance with the requirements of
law and regulation regarding the investigation and review of adverse
and reportable information in the context of both GO and below-GO
promotion selection processes?
Answer. The Department of the Air Force's (DAF's) Inspector General
and Office of Special Investigations serve both the Air Force and the
Space Force. The Space Force utilizes the DAF's investigation, review
and personal processes to consistently support the requirements of law
and regulations regarding the investigation and review of adverse and
reportable information related to promotion selection.
Question. Do you believe current procedures and practices
applicable to the Space Force concerning the review of records of
officers pending the President's nomination for promotion or assignment
are sufficient to enable fully-informed decisions by the Secretary of
the Air Force, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary
of Defense, and the President?
Answer. Yes, I do. The Space Force leverages the existing and
effective Department of the Air Force's (DAF's) processes to support
the promotion and assignment recommendation process.
Question. In your view, are these procedures and practices fair to
the individual military officers proceeding through the promotion or
assignment process? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes, I believe the procedures and practices of the
promotion and assignment processes are fair. They ensure rigorous
adherence to all associated laws, policies and guidance and are
generally conducted in a timely manner.
joint officer management
Question. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2017 (P.L. 114-328) modified the Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) system
established by the Goldwater-Nichols Act in two significant ways.
First, it broadened the statutory definition of ``joint matters'' to
expand the types of positions for which an officer can receive joint
duty credit. Further, it reduced from three years to two the minimum
tour length required for joint duty credit.
What is your assessment of the effectiveness of the fiscal year
2017 modifications to the JQO system?
Answer. I believe the modification maintains the effectiveness of
the JQO system while maximizing the flexibility that is inherently
needed in the system to ensure the right officer is matched to the
right position in the right timeframe. Furthermore, my experience tells
me that the US military has become so ``joint'' that there are many
Service responsibilities that are inherently and significantly joint in
character and responsibility. Therefore, it is logical that the ``joint
matters'' definition be expanded.
Question. In your view, are the requirements associated with
becoming a JQO, and the link between attaining joint qualification and
eligibility for promotion to general and flag officer rank, consistent
with the operational and professional demands of Space Force officers?
Answer. The USSF should not be treated differently with regard to
qualifications and eligibilities associated with joint duties. However,
the USSF is not yet fully integrated into Joint staffs and commands in
the right quantities and ranks. This is partly because we do not have
enough personnel to perform service responsibilities and many joint
responsibilities. However, I believe there is also work to be done
inside the Joint organizations to create a sufficient demand single for
appropriate levels of USSF support so that the Service can respond to
the request rather than trying to drive integration from the outside
in.
Question. In your view, what additional modifications, if any, to
JQO prerequisites are necessary to ensure that Space Force officers are
able to attain both meaningful joint and Space Force-specific
leadership experience and adequate professional development?
Answer. Space Force officers are already well postured to take on
joint leadership positions. With very few junior grade exceptions, USSF
officers all were commissioned in another Service and learned other
domains before transitioning into the USSF. This makes many of them
perfectly suited for joint duty and leadership. On the other hand, most
non-USSF Joint officers have very little experience with space
operations. Joint PME should include far more space training, as this
is a critical domain with critical missions to the Joint Force. If
confirmed, I will work with my Joint and Service counterparts to
enhance space expertise outside the USSF ranks.
professional military education
Question. The 2018 NDS asserts that Professional Military Education
(PME) has stagnated--that it focuses on the accomplishment of mandatory
credit at the expense of lethality and ingenuity.
What is your vision for PME in the Space Force?
Answer. Like all other Services, USSF PME will abide by educational
requirements established for Joint Professional Military Education.
Second, USSF PME will provide opportunities for the other Services to
send personnel to become educated in depth on space domain,
capabilities and culture. Finally, USSF PME will explore and leverage
non-traditional educational venues to expand perspectives and
experiences. USSF will explore Education with Industry and Academic and
Inter-agency Fellowships to maximize the diversity of viewpoints that
Space Force personnel bring to problem solving.
Question. In your judgement, what is the most significant
shortcoming of today's PME system?
Answer. The richness of the in-residence experience is limited to
only a small percentage of personnel in the Services. It is my hope
that due to the smaller number of guardians in the Space Force we can
expand in-residence PME options to a much larger percentage of
guardians. The expansion of developmental opportunities leads to
greater pools of candidates for senior positions of responsibility and
ultimately to a more capable force.
Question. Do you believe that PME today creates adequate joint
leaders? Why or why not?
Answer. In conjunction with the experiences acquired in joint
assignments, Joint PME helps create adequate joint leaders. The most
significant educational shortfall is the relatively small amount of
space-based curriculum provided to non-USSF personnel. Additionally,
the USSF will need to secure more joint duty assignments for its
personnel to maximize the number of candidates for joint leadership
positions.
Question. If confirmed, what specific actions would you take to
develop a Space Force PME system to ensure that it fosters the
education and development of a cadre of strategic thinkers and planners
with the intellectual acumen, military leadership proficiency, and
sound judgment to lead the Joint Force in a globally integrated, multi-
domain fight?
Answer. The most important action is to create and leverage non-
traditional educational opportunities for guardians to immerse
themselves in the space industry, commercial tech sector, civil space
agencies, foreign institutions, think tanks and similar mind expansion
environments. Diversity of thought is key to driving innovation and is
fostered by external experiences that move USSF members outside their
normal comfort zones and teach them to think differently about the
challenges we face.
Question. What changes or reform would you recommend to the PME
system to ensure that tomorrow's leaders have the tools necessary to
ensure the Space Force is able to meet the national defense objectives
of the future?
Answer. Not knowing precisely where tomorrow's leaders will come
from, the most important change is to expand PME capacity to provide
professional development opportunities to the greatest number of
guardians possible. Education of a maximum number of junior members is
the hedge against not knowing who the CSO will be 20 years from now.
Then ensure that our development opportunities focus on lasting skills
like critical thinking, logic and reasoning and communication . .
nswer. there is no shelf life to these skills, and they will inevitably
help the CSO of 2050 in ways that specific tech details of today may
not.
officer personnel management system reforms
Question. The John S. McCain National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2019 (P.L. 115-232) contained several provisions to
modernize the officer personnel management system. These reforms were
designed to align officer career management with the priorities
outlined in the 2018 NDS.
How is the Space Force implementing these authorities today and to
what effect?
Answer. The new authorities granted by the National Defense
Authorization Act of Fiscal Year 2019 have given the Space Force more
flexibility to better manage the officer corps. We appreciate continued
Congressional support. It is imperative we continue to develop and
modernize our talent management tools to build the force we need for a
future high-end fight. If confirmed, I will ensure the Space Force is
working hard to modernize personnel management practices and policies
to reflect best practices in talent management.
Question. In your view, does the Space Force need any additional
authorities to modernize the management of military personnel?
Answer. We appreciate the authorities Congress has granted the
Space Force and DOD. We will work to maximize the use of currently
available authorities, but our work will require expanded authorities
to transition more easily between full and part-time employment. There
will be a need for new authorities to support our proposed human
capital structure--the Space Component. The space component will
leverage permeability and flexibility between full and part-time
service of current and former military as well as with other Services.
With the significant number of recent Inter-Service Transfers to the
Space Force, we are reviewing options to make this more efficient for
the losing and gaining Service. If confirmed, I will look into any
additional authorities the Space Force may need in the future and will
work with Congress to develop these authorities.
space force civilian personnel workforce
Question. In your judgment, what is the biggest challenge facing
the Space Force in effectively and efficiently managing its civilian
workforce, and how would you address that challenge, if confirmed?
Answer. The biggest challenge is ensuring a sustainable work force
with the right skill set. To maintain a civilian workforce to operate
effectively within the Space Domain we must provide our employees
growth opportunities to foster excitement and engagement. We must
ensure they are provided opportunities to work on meaningful projects
and be collectively part of the USSF force as a multiplier and critical
aspect. If confirmed, I will work to ensure their development and
training are an effective part of our civilian workforce strategy.
Question. How would you assess the adequacy of compensation and
benefits for Department of Space Force civilian employees, the morale
of the civilian workforce, and the Department's ability to recruit and
retain the very best talent for civilian service?
Answer. It is my understanding that there are concerns about the
adequacy of existing levels of compensation to recruit and retain top
talent in highly technical fields particularly in areas of the country
with higher costs of living. The current morale of the civilian
workforce is facing challenges in balancing the building of the force
while developing its identity as guardians. If confirmed, I would
welcome the opportunity to work with Congress on developing strategies
and securing the resources needed to retain our talented civilian
workforce.
Question. How will the Space Force build and sustain requisite
capacity and capability in its civilian workforce to meet national
defense requirements over the next decade?
Answer. We need significant emphasis on forecasting future
skillsets needed to meet nation defense requirements. If confirmed, I
am committed to supporting the analysis of our future workforce
skillset.
Question. In your view, how can DOD and its Components better
utilize telework, and other alternative work arrangements, while
maintaining supervisory and employee accountability for high quality
performance and the appropriate use of official time?
Answer. High quality performance is achieved through clear
supervisory and employee communications and engagement, there are
technology enhancements needed to capitalize this for a robust telework
or alternate work arrangement. If confirmed, I am committed to
exploring innovations that enable flexible work environments while
maintain high levels of productivity and high quality work.
Question. One long-standing special civilian personnel management
program is the DOD Civilian Acquisition Workforce Personnel
Demonstration Project (commonly known as AcqDemo). Originally
implemented in 1999, AcqDemo provides tremendous flexibility in the
compensation, hiring, and overall management of the DOD acquisition
workforce. AcqDemo has been deemed a success by the Department and by
the employees it covers, yet almost 20 years later, it remains a
``temporary'' authority.
In your view, are there sound reasons for transitioning AcqDemo to
a permanent program?
Answer. Yes, I believe the successes shown in simplifying and
streamlining the hiring processes while maintaining Merit System
Principles warrants consideration for permanency. But I also believe
that our experiences in implementing AcqDemo also allow us to offer
suggestions for improvements in pay scales, promotion opportunities,
etc. If confirmed, I will collaborate with the personnel teams in the
DAF to explore ways to improve this program.
Question. In your view, could the AcqDemo system be applied
successfully--as it currently stands, or with modifications--to other
civilian personnel functional communities?
Answer. Yes, there are several streamlined practices and
authorities that could be applied across multiple functional
communities. The benefits of such ``demo programs'' merit expansion
across wider populations. But I also believe that our experiences in
implementing AcqDemo allow us to offer suggestions for improvements in
pay scales, promotion opportunities, etc. If confirmed, I will
collaborate with the personnel teams in the DAF to explore ways to
improve this program.
sexual harassment in the civilian workforce
Question. In responding to the inaugural DOD Civilian Employee
Workplace and Gender Relations survey administered in 2016, 14.2
percent of female DOD employees and 5.1 percent of males indicated that
they had experienced sexual harassment or gender discrimination by
``someone at work'' in the 12 months prior to completing the survey.
In your view, is civilian workforce harassment prevention and
response training across the Space Force adequate and useful to
employees?
Answer. Because a single instance of sexual harassment is too many,
the policies, programs and training that are in place are continuously
evaluated and improved to reduce the occurrence, and ensure if sexual
harassment occurs, the response and support are adequate and effective.
Question. Does the Space Force's method for responding to
complaints of sexual harassment or discrimination in the civilian
workforce provide appropriate care and services for victims?
Answer. Yes. The policies, programs and training that are in place
are continuously evaluated and improved to ensure if sexual harassment
or discrimination occurs, the response and support are adequate and
effective to provide appropriate care and services for the victim.
Question. If confirmed, what role would you establish for yourself
in preventing and responding to sexual harassment in the Space Force
civilian workforce?
Answer. This issue is important for the Department, as any instance
of sexual harassment is unacceptable and must not be tolerated. If
confirmed, I will continue to emphasize the importance of Commanders'
and other leaders' roles to ensure that the climate and culture within
their units are free of sexual harassment. Leaders set the tone for
their units by their words and actions. If confirmed, I will also play
an active role in reviewing incidents of sexual harassment and will
ensure programs designed to prevent it are properly resourced.
congressional oversight
In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it
is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other
appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information from the executive branch.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and
when asked before this Committee, its subcommittees, or other
appropriate committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if
those views differ from the position of the Administration? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are Members of
this Committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
responsive space launch
1. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Saltzman, what opportunities
exist to increase our work with allies on responsive space launch?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Responsive space launch is a critical
enabler of ``responsive space.'' Responsive space encompasses not just
launch, but spacecraft development, operations, ground networks, and
data distribution as well. I therefore see great opportunity to partner
with allies in space launch as the responsive space mission continues
to expand and mature. If confirmed, I will commit to look for these
additional opportunities to engage with our allies in each of the
facets of responsive space, including launch.
2. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Saltzman, based upon your
operational experience, does this collaboration offer operational
advantages to our military forces?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes. The U.S. is unequivocally
stronger when we collaborate with allies and partners. Combining and
coordinating our warfighting capabilities enhances our collective
ability to deter conflict and increases flexibility for Combatant
Commanders should deterrence fail. Robust responsive space launch
options demonstrate our ability to deliver a tangible response to
potential adversary destabilizing actions in space and respond to on-
orbit threats on tactically relevant timelines.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tim Kaine
space force tactical space layer
3. Senator Kaine. Lieutenant General Saltzman, last year the Space
Force approved the experimentation and prototyping for a new Tactical
Space Layer that would leverage commercial satellite imagery to improve
battlespace awareness and bolster targeting capability for soldiers on
the ground. What is the timeline for when this capability--warfighters
being able to use satellite-derived images for targeting solutions--
could come to fruition?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. The experimentation and prototyping
you reference is ongoing. Through AFRL's Project Turol, which is a
Joint Capability Technology Demonstration, is expected to complete in
fiscal year 2024, Hybrid Architecture Demo (HAD), and Global Unifying
Environment (GLUE), we are piecing together commercial imagery to
provide Electro-Optical and Radar data in real time and using these
capabilities during exercises to evaluate utility and refine
requirements. While there is not a precise timeline, we expect these
developing capabilities will inform requirements that will flow to the
National Reconnaissance Office for further utilization of commercial
imagery and space-based moving target indicator (MTI) programs. USSF
remains actively committed to pursuing real time information to enable
enhanced, precise battlefield decisions.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
4. Senator King. Lieutenant General Saltzman, do you support the
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Although the United States is not a
party to the UNCLOS, portions are consistent with customary
international law concerning maritime navigation and overflight rights.
I defer to the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, on
the question of whether or not the U.S. should ratify UNCLOS.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Jacky Rosen
next-generation space systems
5. Senator Rosen. Lieutenant General Saltzman, both Russia and
China are rapidly investing in, developing, and fielding technologies
to threaten how we support U.S. decisionmakers and our Joint Force
servicemembers from space. These advancing threats significantly impact
how we deter conflict and project force as a Nation. In the face of
these threats, we must not remain stuck in old ways of thinking about
our national defense space systems. In your future role in organizing,
training, and equipping the Space Force, can you describe your plan to
develop flexible, responsive, reusable, and multi-domain systems?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. If confirmed, I will utilize the Space
Warfighting Analysis Center to build out force designs, and work with
the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and
Integration (SAF/SQ) to ensure our future systems are flexible,
resilient, and integrated with other domains to the maximum extent
possible. The Space Acquisition Council, of which CSO is a member and
SAF/SQ chairs, serves as a key forum to consider these important
factors in development and certification of future architectures.
Furthermore, with the responsibility to serve as the DOD Integrator for
Joint Space Requirements and if confirmed, I will ensure that
requirements for operational systems are defined to optimize
flexibility, responsiveness, reusability and operate effectively across
multiple domains.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
responsive launch
6. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Saltzman, as Chief of Space
Operations, your mission, if confirmed, is to organize, train, and
equip the combatant commander to be ready for any and all contingencies
and threats we might face in the space domain. You have a deep
background in ensuring the operational preparedness of our military,
including our space capabilities. Are we prepared for a crisis with a
peer competitor where we need to quickly replace, reconstitute or
augment space assets, and what capabilities do we need to put in place
to ensure we can do so rapidly and effectively?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. The U.S. is still the greatest space
faring nation on the planet. The Space Force's capabilities underpin
the combat capability of the Joint Force. The threats we see from our
adversaries today are not sufficient to eliminate this advantage.
However, I do not believe we have designed our current systems to
operate in a conflict. The pace at which competitors are investing to
close our advantage and deliver capabilities that can disrupt, degrade,
and destroy our space systems is worrying.
The Space Force wakes up every single day dedicated to protecting
the Joint Force and our vital interests in space. We are committed to
developing the operational concepts, the on-orbit assets, the tactics,
and the training necessary to remain the preeminent space nation. As I
stated in the Hearing, the USSF must be guided by the idea of ``exploit
what we have, buy what we can, and only build what we must.'' As we
draw on the entirety of the emerging space industrial base, we need to
change to a more defendable architecture where more satellites with
proliferated missions can complicate adversary targeting. Furthermore,
maximizing the number of launch providers and locations that can
flexibly deliver any payload to any orbit will be an essential part of
augmenting and reconstituting capability in a conflict. If confirmed, I
will be committed to optimizing this vital mission.
over-classification of capabilities
7. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Saltzman, if confirmed, will
you commit to me to take a hard look at whether the Space Force
requires as many special access programs as it has, and that you or
your staff will come back and brief the Committee on some programs
you're willing to move to a less compartmented classification?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, if confirmed, I commit to
evaluating the classification of the Space Force portfolio to ensure
our security posture is appropriate and sharing that with the Congress.
integration with commercial industry
8. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Saltzman, one bright spot
I've recently learned about is Space Command's Commercial Integration
Cell. This initiative brings industry and military together to quickly
share information on potential threats. Where could the Space Force
implement such an arrangement?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. If confirmed, I will work with the
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and
Integration to identify and reduce the barriers to leveraging the best
available commercial technologies and services to meet warfighter
requirements, and to pursue opportunities to implement innovative
efforts such as U.S. Space Command's Commercial Integration Cell. An
example of a mission area in which there is a growing sector of the
commercial market that provides data and services is the private Space
Domain Awareness (SDA) sensor networks. These SDA services augment the
DOD's global space surveillance network and improve our ability to
track potential threats and enhance spaceflight safety. If confirmed, I
will explore opportunities to expand the contribution of commercial
capabilities.
defense department budget practices
9. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Saltzman, the Department of
the Air Force routinely bemoans the so-called ``pass-through'' money
that it claims distorts the size of its annual budget. Given that
you've spent time in some organizations that receive pass-through
money, what is your opinion on this arrangement?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Pass-through dollars fund activities
outside the Department of the Air Force (DAF) and are not for DAF
requirements. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the
Committee to further discuss this issue in a classified setting.
10. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Saltzman, should the Air
Force continue to be the conduit for this funding, or should it be
moved elsewhere within the Department of Defense?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. If confirmed, I would welcome the
opportunity to work with Congress and other stakeholders to improve the
budgetary processes related to pass-through.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mike Rounds
advanced battle management system
11. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Saltzman, during your
confirmation hearing, I asked for your commitment that, if confirmed,
you will make sure that the Joint Requirements Oversight Council
validated requirements, for the Advanced Battle Management system, are
met, so that our troops on the ground are provided the capabilities
they need to win on the battlefield.
General, you provided a thoughtful response, but you did not give
me your commitment. Can you do so in response to this question for the
record?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Supporting the joint force (including
troops on the ground) and ensuring they have the capabilities they need
to win on the battlefield is a critical responsibility that, if
confirmed as CSO, I will take seriously. If confirmed, you have my
commitment that I will support efforts to meet the requirements
validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
countering chinese attack
12. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Saltzman, a Chinese attack
on Taiwan is the most stressing scenario for the joint force, in which
the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is likely to suppress United States
space-based communication and reconnaissance capabilities. If
confirmed, would you prioritize this scenario in Space Force capability
development?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes. If confirmed, the pacing
challenge from the People's Republic of China (just like the scenario
you mention) will remain central to Force Design efforts and our
overall capability development.
space architecture
13. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Saltzman, how can the
Department partner with commercial space industry to develop a more
distributed space architecture that is resilient to attack?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Integrating commercial capabilities
into our space ecosystem results in a more diverse and proliferated
architecture which increases resilience to attack. If confirmed, I will
work with the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space
Acquisition and Integration to identify and reduce the barriers to
leveraging the best available commercial technologies to meet the
warfighter requirements by: 1) communicating more effectively with
industry regarding our requirements; 2) addressing existing policies
and processes that may hinder our ability to leverage commercial
capabilities; and 3) developing a culture with the requisite skills and
training to work in greater partnership with commercial companies who
may be unfamiliar with the government's acquisition process.
space national guard
14. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Saltzman, will you commit to
briefing this Committee, if confirmed, about the administrative
requirements and associated costs of establishing a Space National
Guard?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes. The capabilities the space units
in the Air National Guard provide are critical; the Space Force cannot
do its mission without them. As a military leader, I am most concerned
with maintaining the readiness of these units in whatever organization
is settled upon. We can do that a few ways and, if confirmed, I look
forward to working with this Committee to make sure we get this
important question right.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
space force investments
15. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Saltzman, as you are
aware, Alaska is home to a significant amount of our Nation's missile
defense assets and infrastructure, from Ground-Based Interceptors at
Ft. Greely to the new Long-Range Discrimination Radar (LRDR) at Clear
Space Force Station. What additional investments must the Space Force
make to ensure our missile defense capabilities keep pace with evolving
ballistic and cruise missile threats?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. The USSF remains committed to making
the necessary investments in the appropriate combination of space-and
ground-based capabilities to outpace evolving threats posed by
adversary ballistic and cruise missiles. To accomplish this outcome for
delivering a resilient and integrated missile defense architecture, it
is important that we continue to invest in the end-to-end data networks
that connect our sensors in real time to our command centers and
operators. If confirmed, I look forward to working with this Committee
as we develop and field missile defense capabilities, infrastructure,
and data processing solutions needed to outpace evolving threats.
16. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Saltzman, you called
China's hypersonic glide vehicle tested last July, ``a very forward-
edge technology capability''. As our adversaries continue to advance
their hypersonic capabilities, what additional investments must the
Space Force make to detect and address this emerging threat?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. China's recent Fractional Orbital
Bombardment System (FOBS) demonstration with advanced hypersonic
capabilities showcases their will and ability to increase strategic
risk to the national security of the United States. The most pressing
issue with hypersonic weapons is our ability to close the ``kill
chain'' in operationally relevant timelines. If confirmed, I will work
closely with Congress, and applicable agencies across the Department of
Defense, and Intelligence Community to leverage the Space Warfighting
Analysis Center's threat-informed force designs to inform investment
opportunities to deliver rapid, resilient, flexible, and viable multi-
domain response options to national-level decisionmakers and the joint
force.
resilient space architecture
17. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Saltzman, in your prepared
testimony discussing Space Force support to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command
(INDOPACOM), you wrote, ``the [Space Force] must be postured to provide
command and control (C2) structures and ready forces to provide space
expertise, conduct space-related activities and C2 attached space
capacities.'' In a conflict with the United States, China will likely
attempt to degrade our space-based capabilities. How is the Space Force
building resiliency into its force architecture to ensure the Joint
Force can command and control U.S. Forces in the event of conflict?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. China will seek to negate our
advantage in space-based command and control systems through various
means. The USSF is currently evaluating multi-pronged resiliency
efforts through the proliferation of C2 systems, defense of these
systems and their networks, and efforts to establish rapid
reconstitution capabilities in our launch enterprise. The Future Force
Design is building in the ability to support the Army, Navy, Marines,
and Air Force's highly distributed C2 structures by enabling resilient,
multi-path communications between the command and control points, data
fusion locations, and common operator picture synchronization. The
Space Force is also developing resilient communication paths and
distributed processing for C2 of space based platforms. These efforts
complicate the adversary's calculus as they attempt to attack what have
historically been operational liabilities.
18. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Saltzman, from 2026 and
beyond, the Department of Defense (DOD) expects to be moving toward
more resilient space architectures. Within this same period, DOD will
also be procuring space launch missions within the 3d phase of the
National Security Space Launch program. In the interest of providing
more responsive and resilient space access, how should the Phase 3
launch acquisition strategy differ from that of Phase 2?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Responsive, resilient, and assured
access to space is critical to our national defense now more than ever.
While National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Phase 2 marked the
transition from legacy vehicles, NSSL Phase 3 must go further to enable
the USSF's continued pivot to address potential future threats. The
Phase 3 strategy must not only meet our warfighter requirements but
also optimally exploit ongoing advancements in the U.S.'s ever-growing
commercial launch market. If confirmed, I will work with Assistant
Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and Integration, to
ensure NSSL Phase 3 is focused to provide resilient and responsive
space access while fostering opportunities for established and emerging
launch service provider competitors.
19. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Saltzman, DOD must factor
``launch and space access requirements'' into the design of new
resilient space architectures to ensure both the lowest cost and most
resilient posture overall. In your view, how specifically should DOD
accomplish this?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. The growth in the commercial sector
coupled with the phased approach of the National Security Space Launch
(NSSL) program will provide responsive, reliable, and resilient launch
capability that ensures unfettered space access. To maximize on-orbit
capability, National Security Space (NSS) payloads are delivered
through a combination of heavy lift capabilities and are complemented
by small satellite launches that maximize responsiveness to potential
adversarial threats and our own joint warfighter needs. Multi-Mission
Manifests or Launch Vehicle Ridesharing is another means to maximize
our on-orbit capabilities. In addition, the potential for on-orbit
sustainment may significantly reduce costs for launch and payload
development.
cobra dane
20. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Saltzman, the Space Force
owns and operates the COBRA DANE radar at Eareckson Air Station at the
far western end of the Aleutian Island chain. This radar detects
ballistic missile and space launches and tracks objects and debris in
space. Given its geographical location, extreme weather conditions
present significant challenges for infrastructure sustainment. Can you
explain how the Space Force is approaching long-term sustainment of
COBRA DANE and supporting infrastructure?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. The Space Force is looking at multiple
options with respect to COBRA DANE to address potential risks to its
mission, to include vulnerabilities, aging infrastructure, and
technology that dates back to the 1970's. Options range from sustaining
COBRA DANE for multiple years to replacement capabilities. As a
priority, the USSF is pursuing modernization and resiliency of its
missile warning and missile tracking architecture to address current
and emerging missile threats to the United States and our allies.
21. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Saltzman, how will this
long-term approach ensure our missile defense system does not suffer
any coverage gaps that would occur if weather-related events impact
radar operations?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. The capabilities provided from our
space assets are critical to U.S. interests and we cannot afford lapses
in these missions, especially to those providing missile warning and
missile defense information to combatant commanders from ground and
space-based systems. If confirmed, as the designated Force Design
Architect of space capabilities for the Armed Forces, it will be my job
to ensure USSF has the right capabilities to defend our Nation that
keep pace with manmade and environmental threats.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Kevin Cramer
foreign supply chain
22. Senator Cramer. Lieutenant General Saltzman, the United States
leads the world in space exploration, research, commercial use, and
launch technology and capability. We are well aware of China's
determination to dominate the space domain by advancing its space
program, capturing important sectors of the global commercial space
industry and investing in the U.S. defense industrial base. I am
concerned that Chinese exploitation of technology, components, and
suppliers threatens our well-earned position of leadership, and our
reliable access to and utilization of space. How will you work to
protect America's preeminence in space?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. The U.S. Space Force remains committed
to delivering resilient, offensive, and defensive space capabilities to
deter and prevent a future conflict from extending into space and to
protect America's leadership in space. I share your concern regarding
the threats we face and, if confirmed, I will work with the Assistant
Secretary for Space Acquisition and Integration and other stakeholders
on measures to prevent potential adversaries from exploiting
technology, components, and suppliers that threaten our space
capabilities.
23. Senator Cramer. Lieutenant General Saltzman, how are we
ensuring U.S. national security is not compromised and threatened by
foreign adversaries?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. We seek to address competition by
enhancing our own capabilities, streamlining our acquisition processes,
fostering a healthy U.S. industrial base, and strengthening
collaboration and cooperation with our allies and partners.
Specifically, guardians will be trained for the potential future high-
end fight, within an enhanced range environment, and be equipped with
resilient, defendable, disaggregated, distributed, and proliferated
systems that are selected via rigorous, threat-informed analysis.
Ultimately, our force design architecture will build a combat-credible,
and thereby deterrent, force that provides a competitive advantage to
stay ahead of pacing challenges.
24. Senator Cramer. Lieutenant General Saltzman, will the
Department of Defense commit to issuing a study to review the defense
industrial base supply chain and investors?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. If confirmed, I will work with
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Space Acquisition and
Integration to review the defense industrial base supply chain and
investors and develop performance measures which can be provided to DOD
for consideration in mitigating risk with the overall objective of
improving the health of the defense industrial base.
25. Senator Cramer. Lieutenant General Saltzman, is there anything
in place to stop or hold United States companies accountable for taking
Chinese investment and succumbing to Chinese influence?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I share your concern regarding
investment and influence from potential adversaries and, if confirmed,
I will work with the Assistant Secretary for Space Acquisition and
Integration and other stakeholders and agencies to take all appropriate
measures to limit such influence.
foreign launchers
26. Senator Cramer. Lieutenant General Saltzman, foreign launch
companies, who are subsidized by their governments, continually attempt
to enter the U.S. national security launch market, becoming certified
to launch U.S. national security missions from foreign soil. This
presents both an economic and national security risk to the United
States. Allied nations operate ``national launch programs'' and do not
reciprocate with launches to U.S. launch companies, therefore eroding
the U.S. launch market. Furthermore, launching critical U.S. assets
from foreign soil could present unnecessary risk to our national
security given the limited oversight the U.S. Government has over
foreign companies once the payload is loaded onto the foreign provider.
Given the United States is the only nation in the world to operate a
commercial launch enterprise, and the fact that U.S. launch providers
can meet the demand of DOD missions, why would DOD support foreign
launch providers over the current supply of U.S. launch providers?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Today the U.S. launch industrial base
is the envy of the world and I believe we must build and enhance our
relationships with allies and partners to ensure it remains as such.
Specifically, we can benefit from our partnerships through the
expanding commercial space sector, high-tech industries and the
expertise, advanced technologies, and capabilities they possess. I also
believe the risk posture and calculus on how to launch DOD national
security payloads must equitably reflect the importance and criticality
of the mission at hand. The National Security Space Launch (NSSL) Phase
II contract ended our reliance on the Russian RD-180 engines for Atlas
V launch vehicles, per the 2015 congressional mandate. Subsequent NSSL
phases should seek to balance, bolster and solidify our national and
commercial launch enterprise. If confirmed, I will work with the
Assistant Secretary for Space Acquisition and Integration to maximize
competition to reduce cost and ensure the U.S. Space Force continues to
encourage a strong U.S. launch industrial base.
27. Senator Cramer. Lieutenant General Saltzman, do you believe
this is an attempt by foreign governments to get a foot hold in the
U.S. national security launch industry?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Potential adversaries use rules,
regulations, or procedures through legitimate business practices to
create opportunities for foreign entities to access the DOD Supply
Chain, to include foreign investment into the U.S. space launch
industry. There is a body of evidence to suggest that many U.S. space
launch companies have foreign investors, foreign key management
personnel, or foreign affiliations. The Department of the Air Force
continues to grapple with understanding what level of access or
intellectual property transfer occurs because of these foreign ties.
The presence of foreign ownership, control, or influence in these space
companies, whether direct or indirect, that affect the management or
operations of a company, coupled with our understanding of how
potential adversaries' access and collect information give us reason to
believe that foreign governments are probably using space companies to
both glean insight into DAF critical and emerging technologies and
potentially access critical DOD supply chains.
28. Senator Cramer. Lieutenant General Saltzman, does the United
States maintain launch oversight of foreign launch companies today?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. My understanding is we only provide
oversight and mission assurance over U.S.-based launch service
providers (LSPs) because we only use U.S.-based LSPs to launch our
national security payloads. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with this Committee, the Assistant Secretary for Space Acquisition and
Integration and other stakeholders to help maintain the ability for
assured access to space, enhance our relationship with allies and
partners, and outpace threats by near-peer competitors.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
space national guard
29. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Saltzman, in your advance
policy questions, you stated that you are most concerned with
maintaining the readiness of the Air National Guard units in whatever
organizational structure is settled upon. If confirmed, what do you
think are the most effective and efficient ways to address this issue?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. The U.S. Space Force relies on Air
National Guard space units to provide ready, critical capabilities and
expertise. I can assure you it is high on my list to make sure we have
unfettered access to those capabilities, and how they are organized is
central to ensuring that readiness. If confirmed, I will actively
engage on this topic within the Defense Department to make sure those
forces are organized appropriately such that they are as ready as
possible to meet combatant commanders' requirements. I commit to
working with the National Guard Bureau on this and a host of other
issues and opportunities.
arnold engineering development complex
30. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Saltzman, Arnold
Engineering Development Complex (AEDC) is integral to the testing
enterprise and will provide invaluable expertise for the National Space
Test and Training Range Complex. If confirmed, how do you foresee
utilizing AEDC to streamline developmental and operational testing?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I recognize the many important
aerospace contributions that Arnold Engineering Development Complex
(AEDC) has made to our Nation and look to leverage the expertise at the
AEDC to help the Space Force field survivable and resilient space
systems that provide game-changing space capabilities to counter the
potential threat for our joint warfighters and allies. The Space Force
actively works with AEDC to support test and evaluation activities and
development of space capabilities. STARCOM has a close relationship
with the space test squadron at AEDC and the two exchange personnel on
a regular basis. We foresee a continued, strong relationship between
the Space Force and AEDC.
31. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Saltzman, if confirmed,
what innovative contributions will you bring to defeating the
hypersonic threats from Beijing and Moscow?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. In my opinion, China's recent
demonstration of a hypersonic capability represents the most
destabilizing act we've seen in some time. In essence, they
successfully deployed a space to ground weapon with unlimited range
that can approach targets from unlimited directions. The USSF is taking
this potential threat very seriously as we are investing heavily in
missile warning and tracking capabilities that enable us to detect,
track and warn against these hypersonic threats. Furthermore, we are
investing in data transport capabilities that securely enable us to
rapidly get this warning to decisionmakers in a timely manner. If
confirmed, I would also welcome the opportunity to followup on specific
details in a classified session to discuss the potential threats posed
by both China and Russia.
university collaborations
32. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Saltzman, Vanderbilt
University and the University of Tennessee's Space Institute perform
pioneer research to develop the next generation of space expertise.
What are unexploited opportunities in university collaborations for
critical cyber and electronic research and development?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. At this point, I have not been in a
position to make a detailed assessment. If confirmed, I will be in a
position and I will commit to evaluating those and other potential
opportunities to address critical USSF needs for cyber and electronic
R&D.
33. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Saltzman, are we
cultivating space talent through clear educational pipelines, and how
can Space Force be a better partner to universities working to do so?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. Yes, the USSF, via both the University
Partnership Program (UPP) and the University Consortium (UC),
cultivates diverse STEM and space talent for future employment in the
USSF. UPP Aims to establish strategic partnerships with some of the
Nation's top universities that possess high academic standards and
nationally ranked STEM degree programs. UPP objectives include
developing a highly competent and diverse workforce; advancing
strategic focus areas and pursuing critical S&T topics significant to
the USSF; generating workforce development and advancing academic
degree opportunities for guardians; and recruiting and developing a
diverse officer, enlisted and civilian workforce with a focus on STEM
and space disciplines through scholarships, internships, and mentorship
programs. The purpose of the UC is to connect universities to DOD space
research and transition opportunities to USSF, represent opportunities
for universities to contribute to USSF's S&T priorities, communicate
problem focus areas to space consortium members, and foster
collaboration between universities, government, and industry.
nuclear operations
34. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Saltzman, nuclear
propulsion holds the potential for significant advantages in efficiency
compared to traditional technologies. What challenges currently exist
for conventional technologies like solar-powered systems?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. If confirmed, I look forward to
reviewing the findings of an on-going Air Force Research Lab study to
evaluate the potential utility of nuclear power and propulsion which
aims to identify mission applications where this emerging technology
may be attractive over the life of a system. Traditional known
challenges in technologies include size, weight, power, resiliency,
cost, and manufacturability. Space nuclear propulsion systems may
provide unique advantages for spacecraft and missions, such as
providing higher power levels for spacecraft propulsion or payload
operation, which has to be balanced with items like cost, handling
constraints, and technical maturity.
35. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Saltzman, how would you
characterize the current relationship between Space Force and Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) regarding nuclear operations?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. DARPA and the Space Force have had a
good working relationship related to Space S&T--some examples include
work in concept definition, contracting support, providing Government
Furnished Equipment (GFE), and providing technical expertise to help
inform DARPA's efforts to transition capabilities. If confirmed, I look
forward to further strengthening this relationship to pursue and
transition innovative space science and technology.
modernization
36. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Saltzman, if confirmed,
how do you see your role in working with the private sector and
commercial industries to bolster the defense of civil-military
satellites?
Lieutenant General Saltzman. I am keenly aware of multiple places
within the Space Force's architecture where we are relying on
capability many decades old. While these systems have served us well
against the threats of the past and we continue to extract maximum
utility at present, I fully agree that this is an insufficient posture
to enable our pivot to the potential threats of tomorrow. If confirmed,
in my role as the Force Design Architect for Space Systems, I commit to
working with this Committee and stakeholders across the Space
enterprise--to include governmental, private sector and commercial--to
ensure we have the requirements, plans, and resources necessary to
develop and field resilient architectures.
______
[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Bradley C.
Saltzman, USSF follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Bradley C.
Saltzman, USSF, which was transmitted to the Committee at the
time the nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
General Bradley C. Saltzman, USSF in connection with his
nomination follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Lieutenant General Bradley C. Saltzman,
USSF was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on September
22, 2022, with the recommendation that the nomination be
confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on
September 29, 2022.]
[all]