[Senate Hearing 117-1002]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-1002
THE NOMINATIONS OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL
BRYAN P. FENTON, USA TO BE GENERAL
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL
OPERATIONS COMMAND; AND LIEUTENANT
GENERAL MICHAEL E. LANGLEY, USMC TO
BE GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES AFRICA COMMAND
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JULY 21, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-568 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
=======================================================================
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
John D. Wason, Minority Staff, Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
july 21, 2022
Page
The Nominations of: Lieutenant General Bryan P. Fenton, USA to be 1
General and Commander, United States Special Operations
Command; and Lieutenant General Michael E. Langley, USMC to be
General and Commander, United States Africa Command.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 3
Witness Statements
Fenton, Lieutenant General Bryan P., USA to be General and 4
Commander, United States Special Operations Command.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 37
Questions for the Record....................................... 52
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 65
Biographical Sketch............................................ 66
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 69
Signature Page................................................. 72
Langley, Lieutenant General Michael E., USMC, to be General and 8
Commander, United States Africa Command.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 72
Questions for the Record....................................... 97
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 110
Biographical Sketch............................................ 111
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 114
Signature Page................................................. 118
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
THE NOMINATIONS OF: LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRYAN P. FENTON, USA TO BE
GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND; AND
LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL E. LANGLEY, USMC TO BE GENERAL AND
COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 21, 2022
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Kaine, King, Warren, Peters, Rosen,
Kelly, Inhofe, Wicker, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
Sullivan, Cramer, Scott, Blackburn, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
consider the nominations of Lieutenant General Bryan Fenton to
be the next Commander of U.S. Special Operations Command and
Lieutenant General Michael Langley to be the next Commander of
United States Africa Command. Thank you both for your
willingness to lead in these important positions.
General Fenton, we welcome your wife, Dawn, daughters, Nora
and Cecilia, and parents, John and Kathleen. General Langley,
we welcome your father, Willie, and thank him for his 25 years
of service in the Air Force. We welcome your mother, Ola, and
thank her for her career of service as a postal worker, and we
also welcome your sisters, Cheryl and Shannon. We are grateful
to each of your families for their continued support of your
service to the Nation.
General Fenton, if confirmed, you will take command of U.S.
Special Operations Command, or SOCOM, during an important
period of change and transformation. Because of the efforts and
sacrifice of the Special Operations community, and efforts of
the Special Operations community over the past 2 decades, the
threat from ISIS, al Qaeda, and other violent extremist groups
has been greatly diminished.
However, United States national security interests are
increasingly challenged by Chinese aggression, Russia's illegal
and immoral invasion of Ukraine, and the destabilizing
activities of both Iran and North Korea. The persistent
engagement of our Special Operations Forces with their
Ukrainian counterparts since 2014, and especially in the last
few months has yielded important lessons for how our Special
Operations personnel can be employed to support our partners
and U.S. national security objectives in the years to come.
In particular, many of these lessons apply to our efforts
to engage partners and allies in the Indo-Pacific region to
counter Chinese aggression. If confirmed, General, I expect
your experience commanding both conventional and Special
Operations Forces in the Indo- Pacific region will serve you
well as we address this pacing threat for the Defense
Department. I hope you will share how you would plan to lead
the Special Operations community to meet this challenge.
Finally, as a combatant command with service-like
responsibilities, SOCOM needs and deserves a senior civilian to
provide service secretary-like oversight and advocacy for our
Special Operations Forces. Congress has sought to empower the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low
Intensity Conflict to fulfill that mandate. General Fenton, if
confirmed, I ask for your support as the Department continues
to work to fully implement those reforms.
General Langley, if confirmed, you would lead United States
Africa Command, or AFRICOM, at a very critical time. The
security situation in East Africa has been on a downward
trajectory following the previous administration's decision to
withdraw the majority of United States Military personnel from
Somalia in December 2020. Since then, United States Forces have
been conducting periodic engagements to train and advise Somali
partners, but United States and partner efforts to disrupt and
degrade al-Shabaab have not achieved the success we need. I
hope you will share your views on the current security
situation and the best possible approach to reestablish
persistent United States Military presence with our Somali
partners.
The situation in West Africa is also increasingly fragile.
Over the past 2 years, extremist operations have expanded
across the region. While the intelligence community assesses
these regional extremist groups are not currently capable of
carrying out attacks outside the region, several have professed
their intent to do so. Given these challenges, General Langley,
I would like to know your views on what can feasibly be
accomplished with partner security forces and how we should
seek to engage as part of a whole-of-government effort.
Both SOCOM and AFRICOM will play important roles in our
long-term strategic competition with China and Russia. In the
Middle East and Central Asia, Russia continues to leverage
hybrid warfare capabilities to expand its own influence and
stymie Western security interests, and China has deepened its
economic and security ties with Iran. On the African continent
both Russia and China are looking to expand their security and
economic investments, and may seek to leverage such access to
undermine United States influence in critical regions. During
today's hearing, I hope you will both discuss your plans to
engage with partners and how we can best leverage our
competitive advantages to maintain key relationships.
Finally, issues related to civilian harm have been a focus
for the Armed Services Committee for several years. The U.S.
Military goes to great lengths to avoid civilian casualties.
When tragic errors occur on the battlefield, the United States
has an obligation to be transparent, take responsibility, and
do everything we can to learn from and prevent future mistakes.
I am encouraged by Secretary Austin's personal involvement in
these issues and the priority he has placed on them for the
Department, but more must be done. I look forward to the
forthcoming comprehensive Defense Department policy on
assessing, investigating, and responding to allegations of
civilian casualties and expect, if confirmed, that each of you
will make these issues a priority for your respective commands.
Thank you again for your service and willingness to lead in
this very challenging time, and I certainly look forward to
your testimonies.
For the benefit of my colleagues, we would like to move
these nominations as quickly as possible so we will expedite
the questions for the record. As you all realize, we are
scheduled to adjourn next week for a lengthy period of time,
and we would like to get both of these commands in place.
With that let me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator
Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to the
nominees for being with us today. They have been nominated to
oversee commands that are critical to implementing our National
Defense Strategy. Once again they are coming out.
I have always viewed Africa as critical to our national
security, which is why I pushed for the creation of AFRICOM. I
did start the AFRICOM. We did not have--Africa was a part of
three different commands at one time, and we changed that, gave
them their own command. The only thing we did not do right was
we did not get the resources in there that they needed. So
despite this, the AFRICOM has never been given the resources
that they intended to receive.
Our adversaries are not making the same mistake that we
are. I have seen it first-hand during my 168 country visits in
the African continent.
I understand that DoD is considering plans that would
further diminish support to the command, including merging
AFRICOM Special Operations component with EUCOM and cutting
manpower at the Army's component focus. Now I do not know that
this is true, but I have heard from four different sources,
unrelated, that these plans to downgrade are out there, and it
is very important that we understand this and that we get to
the bottom as to why, what needs to be done there.
So, let me be clear. I would strongly oppose any such
efforts. I would urge my colleagues to do the same. Given the
growing strategic importance of Africa to the national
security, this would be short-sighted and would be making
implementing the NDS in Africa much harder.
Now, I look to our nominees to describe to us and the
American people why it is important the United States stay
meaningfully engaged on the continent, and back it up with
necessary resources. It is long overdue right now.
So, General Langley, once you assume your role, I want you
to keep in mind the legacy of AFRICOM, what it is and how far
we have come and how much more work needs to be done.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe. For the record I
am informed that there are 2 weeks until our recess, but we are
still going to expedite this process. I think my summer
passions have aroused prematurely. Forgive me.
With that let me recognize General Fenton for your
testimony.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRYAN P. FENTON, USA TO BE
GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND
Lieutenant General Fenton. Thank you, Chairman. Good
morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished
Members of the Committee. It is an honor to appear before you
today as the nominee for the next Commander of the United
States Special Operations Command. I am very grateful to the
President, Secretary Austin, and Chairman Milley for their
trust and confidence in me for this nomination.
I would like to recognize and thank the current SOCOM
command team, General Rich Clarke and Chief Greg Smith, and
their wives, Suzanne and Tina, for their leadership of the
SOCOM force and families these past 3 years.
I am privileged today to be alongside Lieutenant General
Mike Langley, an exceptional Marine, officer, leader, and
friend. If we are confirmed I look forward to working closely
with him and his future team.
I am also joined today by several people who have been a
source of strength and inspiration for me. My wife, Dawn, my
best friend for 31 years, and every assignment we have had she
has always been a fierce advocate for the men and women of the
Joint Force and their families. As the daughter of a World War
II veteran she represents, for me, all the incredible military
families who are the strength of SOCOM and the Joint Force.
Our daughters, Nora and Cecilia. Nora is a consultant here
in D.C. and a second lieutenant in the United States Army
Reserves. Cecilia just finished her sophomore year in college,
is enrolled in Army ROTC, and is currently interning with the
FBI. I am extremely proud of them as they create their own
paths of service to this great Nation.
My parents, John and Kathleen, from Knoxville, Tennessee.
They taught me and my brother, Christopher, a life of service.
Mom was a teacher and a principal for 30 years, and Dad had a
long career at the Tennessee Valley Authority.
Finally, from Hawaii, my longtime teammate and mentor,
Retired Command Sergeant Major Joaquin J.C. Cruz.
Noncommissioned officers like CSM Cruz and CSM Craig Bishop, my
current senior enlisted advisor, represent the center of
gravity for the Joint Force and SOCOM. In my estimation, are
noncommissioned officers make us the envy of militaries around
the world.
Serving this Nation for 35 years has been the greatest
privilege of my life, much of that service, alongside the
exceptional men and women, military and civilian, of your
Special Operations Forces. Selfless, quiet professionals who
work tirelessly here and abroad to keep our Nation safe. These
men and women truly are SOF's competitive and comparative
advantage. They play a pivotal role supporting our combatant
commanders and providing this Nation with unique, asymmetric
capabilities, capabilities needed in this contested world to
confront challenges presented by strategic competitors such as
China and Russia, to counter persistent threats from terrorist
organizations and other malign actors, and if required, provide
a range of options for high-end conflict as part of the Joint
Force.
Special operations forces do this as part of an incredible
interagency team, an invaluable network of partners and allies.
As a small percentage of the Department's personnel and budget,
they provide unequal return on investment for the Nation's
defense.
SOCOM exists because of this Congress' resolve to ensure
the United States has unmatched special operations forces, and
you do. If confirmed, I will work closely with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations Low-Intensity
Conflict, the Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and this
Committee to continue recruiting, training, equipping, and
caring for these unrivaled SOF professionals and their
families. In doing so, I will always provide the President and
the Secretary of Defense with candid military advice while
being open and transparent with this Congress.
I thank this Committee once again for your time today, for
what you do for our military, SOCOM, and our Nation, and I look
forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Fenton.
Since a quorum is now present I ask the Committee to
consider the list of 3,032 pending military nominations. All of
these nominations have been before the Committee the required
length of time.
Is there a motion to favorably report this list of 3,032
pending military nominations to the Senate?
Senator Inhofe. So moved.
Chairman Reed. Is there a second?
Senator Fischer. Second.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. All in favor, say aye.
[Chorus of ayes.]
Chairman Reed. The motion carries.
[The list of nominations considered and approved by the
Committee follows:]
MILITARY NOMINATIONS PENDING WITH THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
WHICH ARE PROPOSED FOR THE COMMITTEE'S CONSIDERATION ON JULY 21, 2022.
1. MG Robert A. Rasch, Jr., USA to be lieutenant general and
Director of Hypersonics, Directed Energy, Space and Rapid Acquisition,
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition,
Logistics and Technology (Reference No. 2071)
2. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of
brigadier general (list begins with Sarah K. Albrycht) (Reference No.
2095-2)
3. In the Air Force there are 63 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Victoria D. Ables) (Reference No.
2107)
4. LTG Tony D. Bauernfeind, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Commander, Air Force Special Operations Command (Reference No. 2227)
5. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
commander (Steven D. Sideri, Jr.) (Reference No. 2241)
6. MG Donna D. Shipton, USAF to be lieutenant general and
Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (Reference No. 2277)
7. MG Andrew M. Rohling, USA to be lieutenant general and Deputy
Commanding General, US Army Europe-Africa (Reference No. 2278)
8. RADM(lh) Thomas J. Anderson, USN to be rear admiral
(Reference No. 2279)
9. MG Philip A. Garrant, USSF to be lieutenant general and
Deputy Chief of Space Operations for Strategy, Plans, Programs, and
Requirements (Reference No. 2280)
10. In the Army there are 300 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Bryan G. Adams) (Reference No. 2281)
11. In the Army there are 64 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Emer B. Bajuelos) (Reference No. 2282)
12. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Leah M. Triolo) (Reference No. 2283)
13. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of colonel
(Joseph R. Yancey) (Reference No. 2284)
14. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Tannis D. Mittelbach) (Reference No. 2285)
15. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (David M. Haynes) (Reference No. 2286)
16. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Daniel S. Rhoades) (Reference No. 2287)
17. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Stephen D. Ekblad) (Reference No. 2288)
18. In the Army there is 1 appointment to the grade of lieutenant
colonel (Scott F. Duncan) (Reference No. 2289)
19. In the Army there are 2 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Anna M. Arroyosantiago) (Reference No. 2290)
20. In the Navy Reserve there are 20 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Ruben Delpilar) (Reference No. 2291)
21. In the Navy Reserve there are 5 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Jason S. Allen) (Reference No. 2292)
22. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Louise M. Anderson) (Reference No. 2293)
23. In the Navy Reserve there are 7 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Dillion J. Ambrose) (Reference No. 2294)
24. In the Navy Reserve there are 6 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Obie A. Austin) (Reference No. 2295)
25. In the Navy Reserve there are 9 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Adam Guthrie) (Reference No. 2296)
26. In the Navy Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with James D. Bach) (Reference No. 2297)
27. In the Navy Reserve there are 3 appointments to the grade of
captain (list begins with Phillip I. Lieberman) (Reference No. 2298)
28. In the Navy there are 4 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Randell T. Buchanan) (Reference No. 2299)
29. In the Space Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (Christina N. Gillette) (Reference No. 2300)
30. In the Space Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
major (Daniel R. Hammer) (Reference No. 2301)
31. In the Air Force Reserve there are 7 appointments to the
grade of major general (list begins with Anne B. Gunter) (Reference No.
2316)
32. In the Air Force Reserve there are 13 appointments to the
grade of brigadier general (list begins with Michael P. Cruff)
(Reference No. 2317)
33. In the Army there are 23 appointments to the grade of major
general (list begins with Kevin D. Admiral) (Reference No. 2318)
34. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Judson C. Dressler) (Reference No. 2319)
35. In the Air Force there are 230 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Jimmy T. Addison) (Reference No.
2320)
36. In the Air Force there are 113 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Timothy Jay Ablay) (Reference No.
2321)
37. In the Air Force there are 590 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Daniel C. Abell) (Reference No.
2322)
38. In the Air Force there are 89 appointments to the grade of
major (list begins with Daniel C. Adams) (Reference No. 2323)
39. In the Air Force there are 27 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Michael Antoine Bradford)
(Reference No. 2324)
40. In the Air Force there are 36 appointments to the grade of
lieutenant colonel (list begins with Justin S. Atwood) (Reference No.
2325)
41. In the Air Force Reserve there are 2 appointments to the
grade of colonel (list begins with Douglas D. Demaio) (Reference No.
2326)
42. In the Air Force there is 1 appointment to the grade of major
(Keith A. Deering) (Reference No. 2327)
43. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Raymond A. Degennaro II) (Reference No. 2328)
44. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Kesler Weaver, Jr.) (Reference No. 2329)
45. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (William M. Harris, Jr.) (Reference No. 2330)
46. In the Army Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Lance M. Kunz) (Reference No. 2331)
47. In the Army there are 60 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with John T. Aasman) (Reference No. 2332)
48. In the Army there are 26 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Sara R.A. Almcrantz) (Reference No. 2333)
49. In the Army there are 60 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Shanee E. Allen) (Reference No. 2334)
50. In the Army there are 170 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Jermaine Adams) (Reference No. 2335)
51. In the Army there are 118 appointments to the grade of major
(list begins with Frances K. Alfaro) (Reference No. 2336)
52. In the Navy there are 8 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Timothy M. Flintoft) (Reference No. 2337)
53. In the Navy there are 21 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Krystal M. Bauman) (Reference No. 2338)
54. In the Navy there are 26 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Andre M. Agraviador) (Reference No. 2339)
55. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Charlotte A. Benbow) (Reference No. 2340)
56. In the Navy there are 26 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Lindsay K. Barnes) (Reference No. 2341)
57. In the Navy there are 41 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Derek J. Anastasiades) (Reference No. 2342)
58. In the Navy there are 44 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Michael A. Ammendola) (Reference No. 2343)
59. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of commander
(William R. Fleming) (Reference No. 2344)
60. In the Navy there are 6 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Alden Y. Argante) (Reference No. 2345)
61. In the Navy there are 11 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Brandon D. Carver) (Reference No. 2346)
62. In the Navy there are 13 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Eric L. Alexander) (Reference No. 2347)
63. In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Mario E. Canas) (Reference No. 2348)
64. In the Navy there are 469 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Kristin P. Acton) (Reference No. 2349)
65. In the Navy there are 14 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Jodi M.D. Biermann) (Reference No. 2350)
66. In the Navy there are 32 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Arthur D. Anderson III) (Reference No.
2351)
67. In the Navy there are 15 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with William A. Bowen III) (Reference No. 2352)
68. In the Navy there are 10 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Todd M. Anderson) (Reference No. 2353)
69. In the Navy there are 9 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Jessica B. Anderson) (Reference No. 2354)
70. In the Navy there are 25 appointments to the grade of
commander (list begins with Thomas E. Arnold) (Reference No. 2355)
71. In the Navy there are 12 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Alan Cameron) (Reference No. 2356)
72. In the Navy there are 16 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with John H. Beattie) (Reference No. 2357)
73. In the Navy there is 1 appointment to the grade of captain
(Javier Lopezmartinez) (Reference No. 2358)
74. In the Navy there are 72 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Wendy A. Arnold) (Reference No. 2359)
75. In the Navy there are 24 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Teresita Alston) (Reference No. 2360)
76. In the Navy there are 35 appointments to the grade of captain
(list begins with Clemia Anderson) (Reference No. 2361)
77. In the Navy Reserve there is 1 appointment to the grade of
captain (Christopher J. Kane) (Reference No. 2362)
78. In the Marine Corps there is 1 appointment to the grade of
colonel (Dominique B. Neal) (Reference No. 2363)
79. In the Army Reserve there are 2 appointments to the grade of
major general and below (list begins with Isaac Johnson, Jr.)
(Reference No. 2375)
_______________________________________________________________________
TOTAL: 3,032
General Langley, please, your statement.
STATEMENT OF LIEUTENANT GENERAL MICHAEL E. LANGLEY, USMC TO BE
GENERAL AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES AFRICA COMMAND
Lieutenant General Langley. Good morning, Chairman Reed,
Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of this
Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today.
It is a great honor to be the President's nominee to lead
USAFRICOM. I am grateful to the trust and confidence extended
by him, the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. I
would also like to recognize the current commander, General
Townsend, and his wife, Melissa, for their decades of selfless
service to our Nation.
As many nominees have said in testimony before me, military
families form the bedrock upon which our Joint Force readiness
stands. My family is no different. Joining me today, from Fort
Worth, Texas, are my father, Retired U.S. Air Force Master
Sergeant Willie C. Langley, and my stepmother, Ola Langley, who
I affectionally refer to as Two-Momma. My father dedicated 25
years to the defense of our Nation and my stepmother is a
retired frontline supervisor at our U.S. Post Office.
I am also accompanied by my sister, Sharon, from
Poughkeepsie, New York, and my sister, Cheryl, from Keller,
Texas.
My family is a personal example and continual
encouragement, have been a constant source of strength for me.
Without their support I would not be here today.
I would also like to take a moment to recognize my
colleague, Lieutenant Bryan Fenton and his wife, Dawn. Simply
put, there is no better choice to lead the servicemembers and
families of U.S. Special Operations Command. If confirmed, I
look forward to working with a professional of his caliber to
address the challenges and opportunities in Africa.
Now the global security environment we are witnessing today
is the most challenging I have seen throughout my 37 years. The
53 nations within USAFRICOM area of responsibility are not
immune from the systemic effects of ongoing global tensions,
and there are many additional transregional struggles unique to
the continent. These challenges cannot be solved by military
power alone. They require an integration of diplomatic efforts
from Department of State, development endeavors from USAID, and
comprehensive strategies from other allies and partners
operating in Africa. If confirmed, I will work with these
stakeholders in pursuit of common goals.
The command will continue to address the dual challenges of
strategic competition and violent extremism. The People's
Republic of China and the Russian Federation continue to expand
their access and influence across the continent.
Simultaneously, organizations such as al- Shabaab, ISIS, al
Qaeda, and JNIM expand their reach and threaten American
citizens and our interests. If confirmed, I will campaign to
address these issues and work with fellow combatant commanders
to ensure our plans are integrated across the globe.
I pledge to be forthright with this Committee in regard to
resourcing our strategies and articulate to you the attendant
risks. I am enthusiastic to engage across the whole government
to faithfully execute the policies and orders of the President
and the Secretary of Defense while being transparent with
timely, to this body and other oversight committees, regarding
the resources and posture required to do so.
Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, distinguished Members
of this Committee, it is an honor to sit before you today, and
I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Langley and
General Fenton.
Before we begin the questioning I have a series of standard
questions which nominees must address. You may respond in
unison.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I have.
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Have you assumed any duties or
taken any actions that would appear to presume the outcome of
the confirmation process?
Lieutenant General Fenton. No, Senator.
Lieutenant General Langley. No, sir.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of the Congress
receive testimonies, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
Committee, when requested?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I will, Senator.
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Do you agree, when asked before
this Committee, to give your personal views, even if your views
differ from the Administration?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Yes, Senator.
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress and to consult with the requestor
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Yes, Senator.
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff complies the
deadlines established by this Committee for the production of
reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Yes, Senator.
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional request?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Yes, Senator.
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Yes, Senator.
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Now let me proceed to
my questions.
First of all, General Langley, let me thank you for your
thoughtful opening statement, and we all concur, along with
General Fenton, that your families are probably the reason you
are here and the reason you will do a superb job in place.
Lieutenant General Langley, you have experience in Somalia
in various periods of your career. As a tactical level as young
captain you deployed in support of the peacekeeping forces in
1992, and at the operations and strategic level as the
Commander of Marine Forces Africa. As we start reintroducing
our forces into Somalia and rebuild our advisory relationships
can you give us an idea of how your experience will help inform
your views?
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, Senator. I know what is
most effective, just from my experience, whether in Afghanistan
or in capacity with the ANDSF or, as you said, Senator, all the
way back to 1992, when we went for Restore Hope and we had to
engage with multiple countries that came in to assist Somalia
at that time. It takes a whole-government approach, but at the
tactical level, to build partnership capacity resonates. There
were assurance actions that happened by our military forces and
our allies, we built capital, and it is the best thing that
will thwart the great power competition that is coming with
these false value propositions and offerings across the
continent of Africa.
I think we get it, by, with, and through, we get it with a
whole-government approach, and within the Department of Defense
we have a lot of mechanisms in which to build on that capital,
whether it be through the State Partnership Program or whether
it be through USAID doing development, or IMET programs for
educational and training of those that have like-minded and the
same values that we have here in the United States. That is
effective, Chairman, and I think it is effective today.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General Langley.
General Fenton, as I mentioned in my opening statement we
have, over the last several years, been trying to establish a
relationship where the ASD SO/LIC is the service-like Secretary
for SOCOM. We think SOCOM needs a civilian voice the same way
other elements in the Defense Department do.
What is your thought about this, and are you prepared to
work closely with the SO/LIC to accomplish this objective?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, I am prepared to work
closely with ASD SO/LIC, if confirmed in this role. The
civilian oversight and advocacy that ASD SO/LIC, in this case
Secretary Maier provides is critical, in the service-like
Secretary role a voice for, as I understand it, from my
perspective but I have seen it, for the man training and
equipment pieces of SOCOM that are so vitally important. I will
also have an opportunity to be an advocate into the Department
and to this Congress on behalf of SOCOM. It makes us a better
team, and I am committed to that relationship.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
General Langley, one of the areas you outlined in your
testimony was the Gulf of Guinea, incidents of piracy and
illegal, unregulated fishing. AFRICOM has been working closely
with the Coast Guard to build maritime security awareness. What
are your thoughts about the maritime security challenges in
Africa?
Lieutenant General Langley. Chairman, there are many, but a
lot of these issues were addressed this week. Chairman, when I
had MARFORAF in 2020 and 2021, most of my efforts from that
position was to get the Naval Infantry Leaders Conference
going. Of course, we were covered with COVID so we had to do it
virtually. But I engaged with Admiral Wade out of Senegal, and
we had to push it off, but yesterday--excuse me, two weeks
ago--they made it a reality. We had many countries there. We
had 17 African countries--excuse me, Chairman, 27. Brazil was
there and also, as we were there, we had 7 European countries.
So maritime domain, as we see China trying to encroach upon
Equatorial Guinea and all across that channel writ large, these
countries stated a vision. The Maritime Exclusion Zone, a lot
of African countries do not have the propensity to go out that
far, but I think working with other countries I think we set
the bar, and that is going to be the biggest deterrent or
assurance actions, as I mentioned, that is going to deter China
from trying to take over the west coast of the African
continent.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Thank you for your
foresight as the Marine Corps Commander in Africa. I appreciate
that very much.
Just quickly, General Fenton, I mentioned in my opening
remarks the issue of casualties. This has a particular impact
in terms of special forces operations because many times your
operators have to make instantaneous decisions with limited
information. Any sense that you have of what you can do to
improve the transparency reporting to the Department of
Defense?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Chairman, thank you for that.
First I would start with it is a moral and strategic
imperative, for your special ops forces and for our military,
to avoid civilian casualties. Currently, having incorporated
the Secretary's guidance, refined our tactics, techniques, and
procedures, Secretary Austin's guidance, we are now aligned
with and in concert with the effort inside the Department on
the Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan, and
certainly as that goes forward adding our intellectual energy
and expertise to that.
I would just end with we take it as a moral and strategic
obligation, Senator, to avoid civilian casualties and do all
that we can, even in the friction and fog of war.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much. Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As I mentioned in
my opening statement, and to both of you in my office, I
understand DoD is considering plans that would downgrade
support to AFRICOM, and they are still kind of pursuing this
and seeing the nature of this downgrade that is rumored.
Let me say again that I would strongly oppose this. AFRICOM
needs more resources, not less. So I ask both of you to
respond, if confirmed, will you both commit to assess DoD's
resourcing plans for AFRICOM and make sure that it has the
support that it needs?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, I will.
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Will you report back to this Committee on
those efforts?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, I will.
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes.
Senator Inhofe. In Western Sahara, General Langley, as I
mentioned in my office, I am deeply concerned about the plight
of the people of Western Sahara. For more than five decades the
Sahrawi people have been subjected to repeated broken promises
and vicious attacks by the Moroccan government. Morocco has
done nothing to repair the damage that they have done to the
Sahrawi people after all these years, and they have done
nothing to show they are serious about resolving the crisis.
Instead, this have misled multiple American administrations on
their willingness to negotiate, or I would say unwillingness to
negotiate, a mutually agreeable outcome to that issue.
That is why I have spoken to Senator Rounds and other
Members of this Committee on this issue and why I have pushed
DoD to look at the alternative locations for the annual African
Lion military exercise that has been hosted in Morocco
previously. I am pleased that Secretary Austin is in agreement
with me on this issue. So I would ask each one of you to
respond as to whether or not you are also in agreement.
Lieutenant General Fenton. Yes, Senator.
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. Thank you very much.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Now let me recognize Senator King, please.
Senator King. General Langley, thank you very much. I am
going to begin my questioning with an unconventional
suggestion. I would suggest that you plan before deploying,
assuming you are confirmed, to spend several hours with Senator
Inhofe. There is no member of the United States Congress who
knows as much about the people and politics of Africa as
Senator Inhofe does, and he is a wealth of knowledge and
information, and I think it would be very profitable for you to
partake of his wisdom and experience. I hope you will do so.
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, Senator.
Senator King. General Langley, I am concerned that in the
current world situation we are taking our eye off the terrorist
threat, and it is certainly extremely serious in Africa--Al-
Shabaab, Boko Haram, al Qaeda. Please share with me your
thoughts on that, because it is so easy in the time of Ukraine
and the China challenge to sort of move the focus away from
terrorism. But these people are still there, they are still
hostile to this country, and I think they are still a threat to
this country.
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, I fully concur with
that assessment. As MARFORAF, leaving there in late 2021, it
was already a concern. The atmosphere on the ground, as you
look in the east, Al-Shabaab was really starting to take
control, and Hassan was incapable of holding. As a matter of
fact, they regressed.
But the most focus we should put on is the metastasizing of
the spread across the Sahel and also into the Lake Chad region.
Other elements, Boko Haram was taken by some of the ISIS units
that spring down from North Africa, and then we have JNIM as
well.
So it is more of a problem today. That is my assessment,
but I am privy to this because in my current job, force
generation of these units, whether it be FAST teams or whether
it be the MEUs that are generated out of the east coast, we
have to address this and we have to train to those standards of
combat and violent extremist organizations.
So, sir, it is a concern, Senator, and we need to be able
to address is through a whole-government approach but also a
whole-allies approach and a partnership in these various
regions.
Senator King. I think part of your role is going to be to
continue to sound the alarm, to not allow the focus of the
Defense Department or the Administration to completely ignore
this threat, and you are going to be on the front lines of
confronting it and understanding it. So I hope you will be
noisy about the threat that you see.
Mali is an example where the military coup has sort of
opened the way for the Russians, also to some extent to
terrorist organizations. I was aware of the Chinese efforts in
various parts of Africa, but Russia is taking a very active
role as well. Isn't that correct?
Lieutenant General Langley. Sir, that is correct. The
Wagner Group, they have ill intentions. Their methods are more
a political military, but issuing weapons or selling of
weapons, it just brings on fragility, especially across fragile
countries.
So that is why we still, all the capital, we are still the
partner of choice. So if confirmed, we will re-engage. We will
reset, as General Townsend is already relooking at West Africa
at this time.
Senator King. Finally, my impression from working with
prior AFRICOM commanders is that the AFRICOM commander has an
important de facto diplomatic role in terms of dealing with
these countries, representing the United States, not in
substitution for the Department of State but in addition to. On
that line I believe one of our most valuable programs in terms
of return on investment is the military training program, the
program whereby we bring officers from other countries here and
also do training abroad. It enables us to inculcate our values,
to some extent, but also the skills and knowledge that we have
to work with these younger officers who may well turn out to be
the leaders of their countries.
Lieutenant General Langley. Absolutely, sir. I concur. I
mean, across my 37 years in the Marine Corps, and going to
various schools, from TBS to Amphibious Warfare School, all the
way to the Army War College and the Navy War College, we had
our partners there from various countries, and a lot of them,
if you do statistics, a number of them went to U.S. schools and
ended up being Chiefs of Defense or Ministries of Defense.
Senator King. Thank you, General, and General Fenton. I
look forward to working with both of you. Congratulations on
your appointments. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Let me recognize Senator Fisher, please.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you,
gentlemen, for being here with us today.
General Fenton, what do you think are the most significant
challenges to carry out counterterrorism missions in
Afghanistan and how do you think SOCOM can best approach those
challenges?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, first of all thank you
for the session the other day. I appreciated your time.
I think the challenge, as has been discussed previously
with General Kurilla in his testimony is the access into
Afghanistan. My perspective, as I shared with you, Senator,
earlier, is that is a challenge and it is harder but it is
absolutely doable there. If we think about greater issues of
over-the-horizon counterterrorism ops it is absolutely doable
for the SOCOM team.
The challenges could be based on environment, could be
based on distance, and in many ways are addressed via the
number of intelligence disciplines, partners, and allies, and
the interagency team. The SOF team is one part of addressing
that challenge, certainly along with the CENTCOM team, as we
address sensing, illuminating, and making sure that the ISIS
threat in Afghanistan does not present a challenge to the
homeland.
Senator Fischer. Would you agree with the current SOCOM
Commander, General Clarke, that without sustained CT pressure,
which I do not believe we are seeing currently, we are going to
continue to see terrorist groups that are more able to focus on
planning and preparing for external attacks?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, I would agree with
that. Aligned with the National Defense Strategy, that as China
is the pacing challenge and Russia is the acute threat, it
tells us to still account for persistent threats of
counterterrorism, VEOs, and other malign actors, Iran and North
Korea.
So my perspective is absolutely we have to keep the
pressure on, account for that--that is a threat to the
homeland--and do it via all the means we have available, should
I be confirmed, in SOCOM, with interagency partners, our whole-
of-government, and partners and allies that we have developed
during our last 20 years, and certainly will carry forward.
Senator Fischer. In light of the priorities that are laid
out in the NDS, how is SOCOM balancing its investments to
operate against near-peer competitors like China and Russia
with efforts to fulfill its global counterterrorism
requirements, and just how much risk are you willing to accept?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, in my current position
I am not sure I have the fullest insights of how SOCOM is doing
that accountability, and if confirmed, I certainly would have
that discussion with the SOCOM team, the combatant commands,
the interagency.
But I can tell you from previous experience, my time in
INDOPACOM as Special Operations Command, Pacific Commander, I
was competing in that theater with the Chinese in terms of
relationships, military engagements, and a point we were the
point, and we are, as I still understand it, the force of
choice. The SOF team is the force of choice out there --
Senator Fischer. Right.
Lieutenant General Fenton.--while the CT fight was going on
in Syria. So I think that we must account for CT, as I
mentioned, per the NDS, and we can with a whole-of- interagency
and partners and allies team, while addressing the China-Russia
challenge through the COCOMs, with asymmetric options and
multiple dilemmas for China and Russia.
Senator Fischer. With your experience in INDOPACOM I think
you would be a good resource to answer this question. Do you
anticipate the need to realign or rebalance special operation
forces to better support that region?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, if confirmed, I would
like to take a deeper look into that through the SOCOM
enterprise. My recognition, from time in INDOPACOM, 5 1/2
years, is that we were competing then while we did
counterterrorism mission, there and globally. But my sense is I
would have to look at that through the SOCOM lens.
Senator Fischer. Okay, and what capability areas do you
believe should SOCOM be able to focus its investments over the
next 3 years so that we really can increase its relevance but
also its effectiveness when we look at these near-peer
competitors, when we look at being in Indo-Pacific and
increasing our presence there while also being able to maintain
the needs we have for SOCOM across many areas, especially now
with the focus on Russia again?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, I would start with
capabilities that will enable us and advantage us in contested
environments, that I sense and I see right now will be part of
the environment as we go forward. They may look like manned and
unmanned systems, artificial intelligence, and certainly
leveraging technology to give us an advantage. But if
confirmed, I would like to look at that more fully through the
SOCOM team.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, sir.
Lieutenant General Fenton. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Fischer. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Fischer.
Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. Congratulations to both of you
and your families on your nominations, and thank you for your
willingness to continue to serve this country.
I want to start with a question for both of you because as
we have seen in Ukraine information warfare has become more and
more an aspect of modern conflict, and I think we are not doing
as good a job as we need to do in order to compete with Russia
and China in this new world.
So can you talk about what could be done to make it easier
on the ground for Special Operations Forces, for forces in
Africa, to be part of that information warfare and how you see
policymakers and the State Department, other actors in the
information warfare space being able to better coordinate with
you all as commanders to respond to the challenges that we are
seeing?
General Fenton, do you want to go first?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, thank you. Yes.
Information operations is a domain that we absolutely have to
be a part of. It is extremely key in terms of understanding an
environment, shaping an environment, amplifying voices in an
environment, and certainly taking on misinformation and
disinformation. From my experience and in my current position,
that has been key terrain for us to be a part of.
My sense, as I have experienced this through many years, is
the speed of relevance continues to be a challenge. Getting it
in a timely manner to the proper audiences, to have certainly
the intended outcomes, that would come first of mind for me.
But having limited visibility in the entirety of the SOCOM
team I would like to take that and certainly have a discussion
with the SOCOM interagency teammates and come back to you
through the Department, Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I look forward to that. General
Langley?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, I agree with my
esteemed colleague. Information, in today's characterization of
competition or even conflict, information is ubiquitous. Given
that, our adversaries are putting out malign and
disinformation, and they do that at what General Fenton said,
they do it at the speed of relevance.
Across our department we are looking at ways how we can
speed that up so commanders can have on-the-ground information
and be able to respond. When I was in CENTCOM, the CENTCOM
commander always pushed me, as a J-5 that had some of the MISO,
or the information across the networks at our disposal to
counter what the adversaries were trying to do to us, and we
had to operate at the speed of relevance. So we had to engage
the Department of Defense in trying to increase our authorities
for, as you say, Senator, the serviceman and woman on the
ground that needs that information.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, and General Langley, Senator
King talked about how often the head of AFRICOM is also a
diplomat in Africa, and especially as we look at China's
expansionist efforts across the continent of Africa where they
are making investments that are really a threat to our assets
and security there.
Can you talk about how you see AFRICOM being able to work
to use soft power to help influence what happens on the ground
in Africa, things like humanitarian relief and support for our
regional partners?
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, Senator. As MARFORAF, as I
worked with the J-5 at AFRICOM, because General Townsend tasked
all the components to get together and come up with a theater
campaign plan, that put together all the efforts of the whole-
of-government approach. As USAID, as we look at the Fragility
Act of 2019 and start to implement that, as we look at Prosper
Africa, where that program, with already 17 departments and
agencies across the United States Government are willing to
help, and also to thwart some of the Belt and Road Initiatives
of the Digital 3. So all, collectively, in aggregation, those
programs will be enough to counter great power competition.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. Gentlemen, thank you for your career of
service and thank you for answering the call of duty once more.
Thank you to your families for their support over these many
years.
General Fenton, what do you see as the Special Operations
Forces' role in countering China?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, from my perspective of
5 1/2 in INDOPACOM, seeing it through the eyes of the Army
component, Special Ops component, and as they Deputy Commander
component, I would start with the role is, in concert with the
COCOMs, developing asymmetric, scalable options for the COCOMs
via our special operators' placement, access, and influence,
presenting multiple dilemmas to the Chinese, in this case, in
INDOPACOM, and also developing and strengthening the partner
and ally piece that is a comparative and competitive advantage
for this Nation.
Senator Cotton. Okay. I think probably most Americans, if
they are not familiar with the military or have not served in
it, and those who do, they think of Special Operations Forces
and what they saw in movies like Black Hawk Down or Zero Dark
Thirty. I assume that is not what it would look like, or
Special Operations' roles countering a major nation state like
China would not look like those kinds of missions. Is that
correct?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, they would look like
small teams in countries throughout the region, in concert,
certainly, with the INDOPACOM commander's direction and in
concert with Special Operations Command Pacific that speak the
language, are culturally attuned, have been aligned against
that region for many years, and actually in many ways have
grown up in the formations of those partner nations,
developing, train, advise, and assist plans, training,
advising, and assisting, presenting options both to the country
and to the INDOPACOM commander, and dilemmas for China, all the
while also being ready to present options in the event that the
Joint Force required them, full range, if there was conflict.
Senator Cotton. Right now we have a war going on between
two nation states, Russia and Ukraine. What lessons do you
think we can take away about the role of Special Operations
from that conflict?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, from my current
position these are the roles I certainly have taken away. I
think first is the investment early. In 2014, in Ukraine, the
training with the Special Operations element in concert with
the EUCOM commander's direction, train, advise, and assist,
training on resistance, training on unconventional warfare,
investments in technology that I think are now being seen in
the asymmetric, atypical way Ukraine is blunting the Russian
invasion.
The second would be the power of partners and allies. What
we see with NATO, the galvanizing of that and others that have
come in a very close way to provide, whether it be military
assistance, train, advise, and assistance, and entirety in the
world show an aggressor what the international rules-based
order will not tolerate.
Invest early, the partner of power and allies, and then I
would close, Senator, with what a combat-credible force looks
like. These forces that are there have seen combat, the forces
we have trained as SOF that are actually in Ukraine now, other
nations, they have had combat. I think it is easy for some
nations to look and just train and believe that they know what
it is to be in combat. It is one thing to practice; it is
another thing to have been in the game, and the U.S. and
partners have been in the game.
Senator Cotton. All right. Thank you. I want to ask you a
question about recruiting. I know it is not exactly in your
lane, but obviously you just talked about the health and
credibility of the force. I am very concerned about the
recruiting shortfalls in the military, in particular in the
Army, and the lowering of standards for new potential recruits.
Can you commit to within your power in this new role to not
lowering recruiting and accession standards for our Special
Operations Forces?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, the Special Operations
community comes into Special Operations for those standards.
They, in many ways, exceed and push us on those. That force has
shown incredible outcomes over the last 20 years and well
before. I can commit to you to maintain those standards, for
sure, to keep the force that has done this great work, not only
20 years but before, ready for the challenges ahead.
Senator Cotton. Good. Thank you. I think this Committee is
going to need to look into this matter. I think some of the
decisions, for example, the Army has made, you know, about
temporarily saying they were going to suspend the GED
requirement or letting people with face and neck tattoos come
in the Army when they are not letting Captain America, who is
the quarterback of his football team, that got a concussion or
got his knee torn up, but went on to play two All-State
seasons, is just absurd, and it deserves some real oversight
here.
One question for you, General Langley. Djibouti, we have a
very important base there, not just for counterterrorism
purposes but it sits at the mouth of the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait.
It is one of the key chokepoints of the world. Lo and behold,
the Chinese just opened up a base down the street. What is your
understanding of their current capabilities at that base and
why they have it there?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, they have it there
because probably in the future they want to have the ability to
be able to effect the free flow of commerce that affects our
global economy. That is a strategic chokepoint that needs to be
remain free for freedom of navigation of commerce. That is a
strategic point that we need to be really concerned about.
Senator Cotton. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Blumenthal, please.
Senator Blumenthal. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both
for your service to our country and thank you to your families
as well.
I recently visited with President Zelensky in Ukraine just
about 2 weeks ago to the day, as well as his top military
leadership. I came back convinced that Ukraine can win this
fight, and when I say ``win'' I mean push back the Russians in
their brutal, inhumane assault on the people of Ukraine. Their
fighters are fierce, relentless, and driven to win this fight,
even in taking back some of the occupied territory. To do so
they are going to have to mount an insurgency campaign
involving special operations, and their fighters really need
the kind of training that our special operators can provide.
Would you agree with me, Lieutenant General Fenton, that our
special operators have a role to play in training the Ukrainian
military in that kind of insurgent, special operations that can
be done behind the lines against the Russians?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, I would agree that that
type of training is the hallmark of your special operations
team. We were, in the 1950s, born for this type of work and
have carried it forward even during the VEO fight of the last
20 years. Unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense
missions like that are the hallmark of training that your
special ops team knows very well. It has also, since 2014 and
before the invasion, been able to deal with the Ukrainians in a
very robust way, and is doing outside now, and as we still
continue to train along with certainly the greater EUCOM team.
Senator Blumenthal. I think that training is very important
and it is being done outside the country, as you point out
quite correctly and importantly, not within Ukraine, which is
important to keep the boundaries on our involvement and the
risks that we incur there. But I hope that our role will be
increasingly robust in training those Ukrainian fighters who
can do that kind of unconventional warfare against the
Russians, because I think in the long term it will be critical,
along with our additional military aid, whether it is artillery
or air defense, and humanitarian assistance and stronger
economic sanctions.
I would like to ask you both about the Wagner Group and
other private military companies which pose a threat in Ukraine
as well as elsewhere. As you know, they are often funded by
Russian oligarchs, principally Yvgeney Prigozhin, I think has
been identified as one of them. They are responsible for some
of the atrocities that have been committed in Ukraine, perhaps
in Africa as well.
Perhaps beginning with you, General Fenton, could you
comment on the threat that these private military companies
like the Wagner Group pose to American interests?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, the Wagner Group and
groups like that, that receive certainly Russian money and
oversight and direction, proxies of the Russians, they spread
Russian aggression. They are ill-disciplined. They go into
countries, in my experience, as I have seen then, and actually
do them harm. As the Russians they are acute threats, as we
have seen them in Africa and certainly in Ukraine, ill-trained,
ill-disciplined, and frankly, in many ways, a picture of what
the Russians would like to use in their way of warfare that, as
proxies, usually ends up extremely hurtful to a country that I
have seen them in and, in many ways, an effort by the Russians
to expand their influence, that is in need of us sensing,
illuminating, and ensuring we keep our eye on.
Senator Blumenthal. Pretty vicious and brutal.
Lieutenant General Fenton. Vicious and brutal.
Senator Blumenthal. General Langley?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, the Wagner Group, they
exacerbate instability, especially with developing countries,
and they stoke conflict, and on the continent of Africa, from
my professional viewpoint, that just spells trouble for the
overall stability and security across the continent.
Senator Blumenthal. My time has expired. I thank you both
for your very informative answers. I look forward to supporting
you strongly. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Blumenthal.
Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to
both of you for your service to our country, and to your
families for their solid support as well.
General Fenton, thank you for meeting with me yesterday. I
would like to echo Senator Inhofe's concerns regarding the
potential combination of EUCOM and AFRICOM TSOCs. I do believe
that this would result in a situation where, once again,
AFRICOM would come up short at a time in which our near-peer
adversaries will be putting more assets in, and we are going to
find ourselves in a very uncomfortable position. Thank you for
your commitment to follow up on that and to let us know what
your thoughts are.
General Langley, thank you also for meeting with me and
once again for your recognition of the concerns about the lack
of assets sometimes within AFRICOM and the fact that we cannot
take our eyes off an entire continent simply because we have
refocused on near-peer competition elsewhere in the world. So I
thank you for that conversation, and I do look forward to
working with both of you.
General Langley, like Senator Inhofe I would also like to
highlight my concern for the people of the Western Sahara, in
the absence of a mutually acceptable resolution to this issue
after all of these years. While it will take a whole-of-
government approach to address the issue, AFRICOM has an
important role, particularly with regard to our military
relationships in the region. I look forward to your assessment
of this issue and continued dialogue with you.
This could be a powder keg, and with other outside
interests priming the pump, should we not get this issue
resolved, it could be another one of those hotspots that simply
does not go away, and a little bit of attention right now may
go a long way, sir.
I know that we talked about it in the office but I would
like your thoughts and commitment that you will follow up with
regard to the Western Sahara situation.
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, I will follow up on
this serious issue. I know that the Department of Defense is
looking at it. I think it is time to see if Morocco has made
any progress.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir.
General Fenton, I also share Senator King's concerns about
making sure that we retain the right balance of forces in order
to execute counterterrorism operations. We cannot assume the
risk of doing so via over-the-horizon capabilities only. What
are your thoughts on this issue and the fair balance or
recognition that the over-the-horizon capabilities, while
great, they are not a replacement for other types that we
currently have in place?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, with regard to the
balance of counterterrorism activities and the pacing challenge
of China and the acute threat of Russia, I start with the
National Defense Strategy and the guides from the Department.
The focus is China is the pacing challenge based on its growing
military capability, its economic capability, and its desires
to displace the United States in the international rules-based
order as the focus, followed by Russia as the acute threat.
In that sense, the counterterrorism mission and VEOs that
still threaten the homeland we address a number of ways. The
Special Operations team is currently very focused on that
mission while it is also competing with China and Russia. We
are part of an interagency team and whole-of-government team
that does the counterterrorism mission. I think when we add the
partners and allies in there, Senator, my sense is as we go
forward to the future we will work to an enduring, sustainable
counterterrorism posture that is sensing, illuminating, and
preventing threats to the homeland as we address China and
Russia as the primary focuses for the department.
On the over-the-horizon CT question, it is challenging,
depending on the location and geographic environment, but it is
absolutely doable. Secretary Austin has said we can sense,
illuminate, and take action--it could be a kinetic strike. It
could be a raid--anywhere in the world.
We also have, over the years, developed fusion cells and
partners that look at this effort and take action--law
enforcement action, fiscal action--to degrade and disrupt these
terror networks.
So my sense is, Senator, on the balance question, again, we
have done it, we can do it, and we must do it as we go forward
in the future, CT, like the pacing challenge of China and the
acute threat of Russia.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir, and thank you to both of
you for your service, and once again, I do look forward to
supporting both of you and your nominations. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
Senator Kaine, please.
Senator Kaine. Thank you, Mr. Chair, and to both of our
nominees my best to you. You are wonderful public servants. You
will do good work in these roles. I appreciate your sacrifice,
the sacrifice of your families.
General Fenton, I want to follow up on an item that Senator
Cotton was talking about, which was sort of recruitment. We
have had a lot of testimony in this Committee, most recently in
May from General McConville, about the recruiting challenges
faced by each of our services. There are about 32 million
Americans, age 17 to 24, today. Nine million of those meet
initial entry requirements, but less than 500,000 also meet the
academic and lifestyle criteria. So even after these reductions
the potential recruiting pool is one where the military has got
to compete with private sector and other institutions,
companies that are really hungry for good talent.
The Special Operations community has its own set of
standards. Senator Cotton was trying to get your assurance that
those would not be degraded. But I was actually more interested
in what is the current kind of recruiting issues on the Special
Operations side. Are we doing pretty well or do we have
challenges? Talk a little bit about that with the Committee if
you would.
Lieutenant General Fenton. Thank you, Senator. Thank you
for that. I will start, certainly, with the understanding that
as you have outlined our services are having a recruiting
challenge. Numbers of factors play into that, that I am sure
here you are all familiar with. If confirmed, SOCOM is a
recipient of Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine teammates, a
grateful recipient, as they come into our pipelines. What I
would like to do is, if confirmed, examine with the SOCOM team
first how are we doing in recruiting. From my current position,
Senator, and I certainly have a very mature force, we are not
having some of the challenges that I hear about. But at the
greater SOCOM level my sense is I need to understand if we are,
and frankly, if we have best business practices, things that we
have inside the formation that can assist the services, that we
could trade back and forth, as they have best business
practices as well, for all of us to help in this challenge.
We would want young men and women who want to serve and
meet the standards, either in initial recruitment and certainly
in the Special Ops community, to be here with us. If there are
things in the SOCOM enterprise, again, I am not fully informed
on all of those, and if confirmed, I would look into it, that
we are doing well, I would like to share those. If there are
things the services are doing well I certainly would like to
absorb those.
This is a team sport, about bringing in the national
treasure, the men and women of this country that want to serve
and can meet our standards to be part of our formation.
Senator Kaine. General Fenton, one thing I will encourage
you on is that SOCOM has traditionally been significantly less
diverse than the military as a whole, and that may speak to
recruiting issues in communities that have not necessarily been
connected with SOCOM, are not really aware of opportunities in
SOCOM. So there may be affirmative ways to get information out
to communities that have not traditionally been represented
that will drum up more interest and excitement about serving in
this particular branch of the military, and I would encourage
you in that way.
General Langley, I want to circle back to questions that
have been asked about sort of Russia in Africa. One of my
colleagues asked about the Wagner Group. The French are pulling
their military out of Mali, and that is going to leave a vacuum
now. Some of the French forces that are coming out of Mali will
go into Niger, where they will be able to work in tandem with
the United States, so that is not all bad for United States
Forces. But when vacuums are left and bad actors fill the
vacuums, and we are seeing that in Mali.
I am also on the Foreign Relations Committee and have been
doing a lot of work in the diplomacy surrounding Russia's war
in Ukraine. One of the things that we notice is recently, June
3rd, the African Union president, who is also the president of
Senegal, met with Vladimir Putin and then came out of the
meeting criticizing United States sanctions for creating hunger
issues in Africa. It is not U.S. sanctions that are creating
hunger issues. It is an illegal war against a country that has
been a breadbasket for African countries.
So when we see African nations adopting the Russian
disinformation line and we see groups like the Wagner Group
coming in to fill vacuums left by others it causes some
significant concern. I think it was Senator King that pointed
out that the AFRICOM commander is also a bit of a diplomat. So
I think there is significant work to be done in telling the
right story about this illegal invasion of Ukraine and sharing
how that is creating real misery and hunger in Africa, and it
pains to me African leaders sort of accepting Russian
disinformation about what is causing this kind of epidemic of
hunger in Africa rather than recognizing that this illegal
invasion is.
So, if you would, in my last--actually, I am already over
time. Maybe I should just say I would love it if you would just
really commit to being that kind of diplomat that might help
the U.S. do a better job in winning the narrative war. We do
not have to spin anybody. It is just a matter of, you know,
making the truth more persuasive than disinformation.
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, I concur, and if
confirmed, that will be my top priority, sir.
Senator Kaine. Excellent. Thank you. Thanks, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kaine.
Senator Ernst, please.
Senator Ernst. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chair. General Fenton
and General Langley, thank you very much for your service and
for the service and support of your family members as well, and
as they are closing out their time in command, my best wishes
as well to General and Suzanne Clarke and General and Melissa
Townsend.
I look forward to having a good discussion with you this
morning. We have heard a lot of interesting comments and
thoughts coming from both of you. General Langley, I will start
with you, please, sir.
Violent extremist organizations like al Qaeda and ISIS and
their offshoots are really spreading through the continent of
Africa and really making their presence known with the region.
General Townsend had said a while back that al-Shabaab is,
quote, ``the largest and most kinetically active al Qaeda
network in the world,'' end quote.
So what would be your policy towards countering and
containing these various VEO groups, and how do we protect,
then, our U.S. interests in the region?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, that is going to be my
top priority, addressing this. I concur that al-Shabaab has
increased capacity, and this is the first ranking as far as
affecting United States interests and U.S. people. They have
aspirations for external operations, transnational operations,
so that is going to be a segue into, if confirmed, I will need,
as General Townsend asked, more ISR.
ISR is an active deterrent. ISR is the commander's sense to
make sense, and it underpins all activities. So, Senator, that
is just some of the assets and collectively that we will need
to be able to deter and keep al-Shabaab from metastasizing
anymore.
Senator Ernst. Thank you, sir, and I hope as a Committee we
are able to support those needs with those resources as well.
One other area I am interested in is the substantial amount
of strategic and critical mineral reserves that are found in
the continent. How can the United States leverage our military
alliances as well as whole-of-government in the region to
access these minerals?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, I am apprised of that,
of what our competitors are trying to do, their coercive
tactics of coming in and encroaching upon the continent of
Africa for minerals or rare earth minerals such as cobalt. That
is probably going to be the oil of the future. They recognize
that, but their predatory means of getting it is going to take
a whole-government approach. It is going to have to take a
whole-alliance approach to illuminate them, and talk to our
partners, engage with our partners to assure that we are the
partner of choice and that they are being clearly exploited.
Senator Ernst. Thank you. Absolutely. We want to be that
partner of choice.
General Fenton, as well, something that we have discussed
and I have discussed with many former commanders of SOCOM is
the Preservation of the Force and Family, and I know that you
are a firm supporter of this as well. That first SOF truth,
that humans are more important than hardware, is very important
to all of us.
Sir, how will you continue to ensure the growth of the
POTFF program?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, to start, thank you for
the meting the other day. I really appreciated the opportunity
to chat, and chat about this. I will also add thank you for
your support of this program, this Committee's support of this
program. The POTFF program is an extremely important part of
the SOCOM fabric, this ability to look at our servicemembers
and their families through the physical, the psychological, the
cognitive, and the spiritual domains, and address not only the
challenges in the profession that we are in but the personal
and also the life challenges that come to each and every one of
us every day.
If confirmed, I would want to take what General Clarke and
the team have done, those 3 years, even further, certainly
through ensuring that folks in our formation understand it is
there, look at challenges that may exist with regard to access,
and maybe even understanding the metrics and the data behind
the program.
But I will offer, Senator, it is critical to this
formation. In a performance-based organization, this program is
a performance-based program that when added to the service
programs and others that wrap around it address the whole
dimension of the person. As you mentioned, human is more
important than hardware, and in my current position the history
is indicative of where I may go, if confirmed, in SOCOM. People
are the number one priority, our competitive and comparative
advantage, and that hits right at the heart of that. Thank you,
Senator.
Senator Ernst. Absolutely, and gentlemen, thank you so very
much for your time and your continuing service to our great
United States of America, and I look forward to supporting both
of you in your confirmation process.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Ernst.
Senator Peters, are you prepared?
Senator Peters. I am, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you. Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and great to see
the two of you here. Thank you for your service to our country.
General Fenton, other combatant commanders have shared with
me their concerns that training opportunities with partner
nations can suffer due to a lack of host nation training space
or high-range usage at some of our major U.S. installations.
SOCOM is fundamentally integrated with our partners, requires a
wide range of training capabilities, and often operates in
clandestine environments.
My question for you is, do you think increasing SOCOM's use
of National Guard Training Centers, many of which are well
equipped yet are currently underutilized, can improve mission
readiness for the Special Operations community as well as our
foreign partners?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, thank you for that
question, and I will start with thanking the National Guard and
the National Guard teams I have been associated with for many
years. My first Special Forces deployment was with 20th Special
Forces Group National Guard, and I have been associated with
19th and 20th Groups in the Special Ops community really ever
since. I have been with them on missions, watched the
incredible work that they do, and we are very grateful.
I would also add that during my time in INDOPACOM, in many
positions but certainly as the deputy commander, I saw the
power of the National Guard relationships in countries
throughout the region through the lens of the State Partnership
Program, extremely impactful as we watched our National Guard
teammates not only have a very strong relationship but grow up
with many of those forces, and in a way that strengthens the
bonds of partners and allies. So I am very grateful to the
entire National Guard team and to what I saw in action.
Senator, to your training area question, if confirmed, I
would like to take a deeper look into that from the SOCOM side,
to ensure that I have most fulsome answer and I am not missing
any details. But I would like to take a look at that, if
confirmed.
Senator Peters. Great. Well, I would appreciate that,
General.
General, I have another question for you. India is
certainly a very vital partner for us in maintaining a free and
open Indo-Pacific. I think it is absolutely essential that
democracies like India and the United States work together to
combat the global spread of authoritarianism emanating from
countries like China.
My question for you is, assuming you share this world view,
which I believe you do, how will that philosophy guide your
efforts to bolster SOCOM's relationship with the Indian
military?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, I do share the view
that India is an important partner. My time in INDOPACOM, under
Admiral Harris and Admiral Davidson, it was their focus, a
partnership, strengthening of bonds, not only for my time in
the Special Ops community there in Indo-Pacific but across all
the components. I had four to five visits to India and many
visits with Indian counterparts in Hawaii and throughout the
region. I think it is a critical partnership, from what I knew
then, and my sense is it still is now.
If confirmed, I would want to consult with Admiral
Aquilino, the INDOPACOM commander, and the current Special Ops
Command Pacific commander to give you a more fulsome answer to
how we go forward as the SOCOM team. But I share your view that
India is a critical partner.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, General.
General Langley, in your written response to the Committee
you identified, quote, ``backsliding democracies and weak
regimes'' as some of the most difficult challenges facing
AFRICOM. However, you also indicated that AFRICOM campaign plan
provides a sound construct to address these challenges and that
you would thoroughly assess that plan, if confirmed.
So while I understand you have not completed that
assessment--I am sure that is in process right now--I am
curious as to your initial thoughts on how the United States
can counter or respond to increases in both Chinese and Russian
investment and activity in Africa to promote both peace and
stability.
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, the revelation of the
efforts of these two competitors probably will not be revealed
for a few years. So, in parallel, we just still need to engage
with countries to stop this democratic backsliding and also
authoritative regimes going towards the autocratic side, by
still engaging with these countries, still engage to show that
our assurance actions outweigh theirs. Our value proposition is
real. Their value proposition is a farce.
So it will take a couple of years for that to show, because
you see the bright, shining objectives. That is China, in their
Belt and Road Initiatives. But in the end they just look
globally where it is failing.
I know over 40 countries across the continent of Africa
that have already signed some type of Memorandum of Agreement,
but we need to continue to engage.
Senator Peters. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Peters.
Let me recognize Senator Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chair Reed. First off, I thank
both of you for your willingness to serve. Congratulations on
your nominations and thank you for your prior service.
General Fenton, Florida is proud to be home to SOCOM. Do
you think SOCOM is adequately funded and do you think it has
sufficient personnel to take on our adversaries across the
globe wherever they are threatening or could threaten American
interests?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, in my current position
I do not know that I know the entirety of SOCOM in terms of
resource challenges, funding challenges, and I would want to
take that, if confirmed, and examine it fully with the SOCOM
team. I can comment that right now they are, around the globe,
addressing the challenge of China, Russia as the acute threat,
and certainly the persistent threats that are counterterrorism
and VEOs in Iran and North Korea.
So I know they are arrayed and as part of that team I have
experience of doing that myself. But the understanding of
enterprise-level SOCOM's resourcing challenges and manning
challenges, to the fullest extent, Senator, if confirmed, I
would like to take that and examine it more fully with the
team.
Senator Scott. If you feel like SOCOM is not adequately
funded, does not have the sufficient personnel to take on our
adversaries, will you come back to this Committee? Will you be
direct and tell us exactly what you believe?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, I will come back and
tell the Committee directly and transparently and openly what I
believe. As I examine it, if confirmed, with the SOCOM team, I
will take a look and I will absolutely report to the Secretary
and the Chairman if I saw resources or challenge gaps, and
report to the Committee through the Department.
Senator Scott. What do our adversaries think of our
abilities in SOCOM, and do you think they fear what the U.S.
can do to them if they threaten our interests around the globe?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, I would not want to put
myself in the mind of any of those adversaries and proffer for
them, but I will start with putting myself in the space of
relationships with partners and allies that I have been around
for many, many years. In my INDOPACOM experience and in my time
in Africa and certainly in the Middle East, we are, as your SOF
team, the partner of choice. We are combat credible. We build
partners and allies, and we make friends versus China makes
clients and customers. So from partners and allies we are the
force of choice, the SOF team, and by extension, that I saw in
INDOPACOM, the entire U.S. team--Army, Navy, Air Force,
Marines.
My sense is that, combined with our combat credibility--and
again, I do not want to put myself in the minds of the
adversaries, but it should cause them to pause and to know that
this team has been tested, the U.S. Military and SOF team, and
think very carefully about any moves that they would make
against our forces.
But I know what our partners and allies think, and I know
our force knows it to be a credible, disciplined, reliable, and
outcome force. As seen in action, disrupting terror for 20
years, capturing or killing iconic leaders, competing with the
Chinese and with the Russians, the SOF team has done a wide
remit that my sense is the adversaries are certainly taking
note of.
Senator Scott. Thank you. What lessons can SOCOM learn from
Russia's invasion of Ukraine and apply to a potential invasion
of Taiwan by Communist China?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, I do not know if those
lessons are instantly transferrable from Ukraine to Taiwan, but
my sense is that what we are learning from the Ukraine
experience, and from my perspective, my optic, is that the
powers of partners and allies, investing in relationships,
strengthening relationships, and then the galvanizing of what
comes together as a many-of-manys, vice the unprovoked invasion
and the horrible activities of Russia inside of Ukraine.
I think the other takeaway is asymmetric, atypical, the use
of open-source allied imagery and modern technology, small
UASs, is blunting, and has denied Putin, in many ways, his
desired objectives. I think that is an important takeaway.
Then I would add the information operations, being in the
info sphere and messaging and certainly being present to
amplify voices for good and certainly to address what Russia is
doing in that country.
Those are, I think, very important takeaways, from my
perspective, Senator, that, as I watch this that I certainly
note.
Senator Scott. Thank you. Thank you, Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Scott.
Senator Tillis, please.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank
you and your families for decades of service, and also thank
you for the time you spent with me in my office this week. It
was, I think, very helpful. I should say from the onset, as I
did earlier this week, I intend to support your confirmation.
General Fenton, let's start with you. In the context of the
recent National Defense Strategy and our current security
environment, give me an idea of what your top priorities are
going to be, once confirmed?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, thank you for that, and
thank you for the meeting this week, and thank you for your
support of all our military in your great state and certainly
at Fort Bragg. Thank you.
Senator, I would start with, in my current position my
priorities are people, compete and win and transform, and I
think specific to it, if confirmed, what I would look at in
SOCOM is human is more important than hardware, people are our
number one priority, they are our comparative and competitive
advantage. How they think in the SOF community about problems,
how they address them, and how they develop asymmetric,
atypical options is key. That, if confirmed, has been my
priority now and might be the first priority--compete and win,
being ready, SOCOM ready for the Nation, for whatever is
needed. That spans the China-Russia challenge, the
counterterrorism challenge, and certainly the persistent
threats of Iran and North Korea.
Then transformation. These are the priorities of my current
position, transforming first our personnel, how would we think
for a contested, congested environment going forward. Then
along with the technology, what type of technology, and then,
at the end, what type of organization is needed to support the
Nation as we go forward in this new environment, and with the
NDS in mind.
So I take my lead from the NDS, and in my current position
people, when transformed, are my priorities, and if confirmed,
Senator, I certainly would like to consult with the SOCOM team,
but those, I would offer, might be the starting place.
Senator Tillis. Thank you. General Langley, the prior
administration moved nearly 700 personnel out of Somalia and
redeployed them to Djibouti and Kenya. Now they rotate in on a
limited basis. It would just seem to me, you are the military
expert, but it just seems to me, one, have we increased risk
and effectiveness by doing that, by not being on the ground at
the level that we were prior to the redeployment?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, my professional
opinion, I think we have, and I say that with just one
qualifier. Back in 2014, when we went to Tranche Two out of
Helmand Province, when the Marines pulled out and we said we
were going to fly-to-advise, and 215th Corps was left to their
own devices, Senator, they regressed. Their excellence on the
battlefield regressed within a couple of months.
So I know that is just an anecdotal assessment, but fly-to-
advise or, as General Townsend says, commute to work, is
ineffective because partnership capacity will erode over time.
Senator Tillis. I agree. I think we need to be there. So I
guess the next question is, when we are competing globally for
ISR and things to remediate that, what should our priorities
be? What should Congress be focused on, moving forward to help
you be successful with your assignment?
Lieutenant General Langley. Sir, if confirmed, I would do a
risk mission, risk-to-force calculus, one, protecting the
force, and then as my esteemed colleague said, assessing the
health of the force, or taking care of our service men and
women on the ground. Then matching up with our mission and
seeing that we have all the capability and capacity necessary
to do that--personal recovery, medevac recovery, and be able to
effect rapid response forces that can go the tyranny or
distance across the continent to complete the mission.
Senator Tillis. Thank you. I guess the final question I
would have in the time remaining, I also wonder, with 700
personnel coming out of Somalia, do we have any evidence that
that is actually, as we have exited, that malign influences
from other nations, great power nations or terrorist
organizations, have kind of taken advantage to create their
presence and capacity in Somalia?
Lieutenant General Langley. Sir, I do not have a purview on
that right now, but my assumptions are that they will probably
be doing something to fill that void, just like they did in
Mali.
Senator Tillis. I think so too. Well, gentlemen, again,
congratulations to you and your family. I look forward to a
speedy confirmation. Thank you.
Lieutenant General Langley. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Tillis.
Senator Rosen is presiding and she is on her way over, and
there may be some other colleagues who join, which would give
me the opportunity to ask an additional question.
General Fenton, you have been asked several times about
what lessons we learned from Ukraine. I think one lessons is
the willingness of a country to fight, and that goes from the
top leadership down to the individual citizens, and also, as
you mentioned before, the capability of their armed forces, but
most significantly, the cadre of noncommissioned officers that
are available. Is that an assessment that you are prepared to
ask yourself special operators in each country of potential
conflict to make and evaluate and inform you?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, it would be. I would,
if confirmed, be prepared to ask for that assessment. I will
add that I echo your assessment on a country's willingness to
fight. My sense is the investment that started in the SOF
arena, I can speak to, and certainly throughout the whole of
EUCOM and EUCOM teams, in 2014, took a military that may have
been less mature with an understanding of noncommissioned
officers intent of a commander, the ability to move and
understand intent vice point-to-point orders or objectives,
came as a result of United States SOF and United States
Military connection with the Ukrainian forces.
My sense is, as well, from my perspective, Senator, is that
that starts to go through the ranks, as you know very well,
empowering and emboldening the military but also the population
with an even stronger will to fight. I agree, that is one of
the lessons learned, that investment early, a relationship with
U.S. Forces, that is now exponentially being carried on by
other forces who have been trained by us in that region as
well, has been a part of that fabric.
Chairman Reed. I think you are absolutely right. I recall I
first met General Cavoli in Lviv as we were touring the Special
Operations training of Ukrainian forces, and back in 2014, I
did not realize the incredible impact it would make on the
situation today. So thank you very much.
We have been joined by Senator Sullivan, and if he is ready
I am prepared to recognize him.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen,
congratulations.
You know, I do want to say for the Committee, for the
record, there are a lot of issues I have with the Biden
administration's national security, the President putting
forward weak defense budgets, unilaterally disarming one of our
great comparative advantages against Russia and China, which is
American energy. But I will compliment the President and his
team. They have consistently put forward exceptional officers
to serve at the highest levels of our combatant commands, and
you two gentlemen are the continuation of that. I certainly
plan on supporting your confirmations. I want to thank you and
your families for your years of dedicated service. So again, I
commend the White House on that, and it very important, and we
keep getting really strong nominees for these very important
positions.
General Fenton, I wanted to talk a little bit about the
Arctic, as you can imagine. The Army just stood up the 11th
Airborne Division, so we now have two airborne divisions in the
U.S. Army. One is in Alaska. But I will also say that when you
look at great power competition, future sources of conflict,
China, Russia, North Korea, one thing they all have in common
is the potential for serious combat in serious extreme cold
weather, Arctic, mountainous environments. I think our military
has kind of lost that capability over the years, whether it is
the Navy or the Army or the Marines, including Special Forces.
I talked to a number of our SOF components and they say
when training with foreign partners like the Finns or the
Swedes, in these environments we look like kind of the JV team
relative to them. As you know, you cannot just take a unit and
say, ``Hey, go operate in 30 below.'' It takes year of
training.
So can you talk to me about this issue, preparedness, as it
relates to great power competition, but SOF operating in the
Arctic, in mountainous terrain, in severe cold weather? You
know, my state has great training for that. I think we need to
do more of it, and I think our forces need to be ready for it,
and I do not think we are, across the board. What do you think,
General?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, first I appreciate the
discussion we had in your office the other day about this very
issue, and it made me reflect on the time I had at INDOPACOM
where we were beginning, as a team, in the Army and certainly
at the INDOPACOM greater level, to focus and to examine the
Arctic from its strategic importance, but more as you have just
pointed out, what does it mean to resource, man, train, and
equip for that?
In my current position--and I have been away from INDOPACOM
and that team for some time--I do not have all the visibility
in where they have made great strides, but I knew what was on
their minds, in terms of mobility, survivability, and certainly
conduct of missions in that very harsh environment.
I remember we used to talk about that environment compared
to the ones we might see in Europe, and our phrase was, ``If
you have seen one Arctic, you have seen one Arctic.'' The
understanding of each of those, it is a very tactile feel, I
think similar to what we have seen in our experience in deserts
and jungles.
Senator, so if confirmed, I would like to examine that
through the lens of the entire SOCOM team. This challenge of
China, Russia, global, CT, Arctic all demand a resourcing,
equipping, training, and frankly, expeditionary strategy that
would address that. But I do not know that I am fully informed,
Senator, to comment on whether we are doing it well right now.
If we are not, my sense is we can always get better. I will put
it that way.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you.
General Langley, I am going to be introducing some
legislation with Senator Whitehouse of Rhode Island here in the
next week on a very strong bill that relates to IUU fishing.
Now I know that does not sound like a core competency of the
Marine Corps or AFRICOM, but as you know, in that region, in
your AOR for AFRICOM, this issue of maritime law enforcement
program has been something we partnered with the countries in
that region. As you know, once again it China going all around
the world, not abiding by the law, going to the coasts of
Africa, the coasts of Latin America, and just ravaging their
fishing fleets. We are going to have legislation that is going
to really focus on pushing back on that, but we are going to
need the cooperation of the Coast Guard, the Navy, AFRICOM, and
others.
So can I get your commitment to work with me and others,
not just on this Committee but through the Senate, on this
important issue, that the military does play an important role
on?
Lieutenant General Langley. Absolutely, Senator. That was a
big issue at the Naval Infantry Symposium in Senegal. Maritime
Exclusion Zones for the African countries are at risk because
usually they cannot cover all of that. So working with our
Coast Guard and working with Brazil they have, in fact, their
Blue Amazon Concept that was ratified by the U.N. years ago. It
is time to put it in action.
Senator Sullivan. Great. Thank you. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Rosen, please.
Senator Rosen. Thank you, Chairman Reed, and thank you for
being here today, for your service to our country, and your
willingness to continue to serve.
I am really concerned about us preventing our captured ISIS
fighters from returning to the battlefield. So, General Fenton,
as we wait another possible Turkish military incursion into
northern Syria, we know that the Syrian Democratic Forces
guarding prisons will likely need to leave their posts for the
border in order to defend their territory. This is going to
open the door to the possible escape of captured ISIS fighters,
just as we saw play out in 2019.
So, General, given our partnership with the SDF and in the
Defeat ISIS campaign, including security training, what plans
do U.S. Special Operations Forces in Syria have to shore up
SDF-run prisons, and if confirmed, how will you ensure that
captured ISIS fighters do not ever, ever return to the
battlefield?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, thank you for that, and
we share your concern, as those fighters and the prisons and
the radicalization, all of that, when aggregated, is part of
the CT threat that comes with this Nation.
On your question about the prisons and going forward,
security in the event of other actions by actors like Turkey, I
would defer to CENTCOM and to certainly the State Department on
that, as in my current position I do not have the visibility
certainly on their actions, nor would I want to comment on them
inappropriately.
On the SOCOM going forward, if confirmed, Senator, I would
like to get with the SOCOM team to examine it, to understand it
fully, get a sense of the challenges that are in concert with
General Kurilla and the CENTCOM team, and then certainly
address it in a way that I am much more informed and certainly
ready to do.
Senator Rosen. Could you give me your opinion about last
week's strike targeting ISIS Wali of Syria and their ability to
plan and carry out an attack? Does that make it less likely?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, keeping the pressure on
networks that have a demonstrated capability in the past still
have the willingness, and to defuse and disrupt their
capability is a key part of a counterterrorism strategy. That,
in line with the National Defense Strategy, is what we need to
be doing going forward.
So my sense is anywhere we can keep the pressure on ISIS,
al Qaeda, on concert with AFRICOM, al-Shabaab, we need to, to
continue to keep a capability from growing inside of
organizations that have demonstrated, and certainly have the
willingness, to attack this homeland.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I would like to move on to
security deteriorations in CENTCOM and AFRICOM AORs or areas of
responsibilities. So, Generals, based on your own experiences,
the lessons that we have learned in Afghanistan over the last
20 years and in the lead-up to its collapse, I would really
like both of your assessments on possible security
deteriorations elsewhere in CENTCOM AOR and the AFRICOM AOR,
where corruption, dependence on United States security
assistance, political fragmentation, malign foreign influences
such, as we know, Iran, Russia, China, they threaten our
security cooperation efforts. If confirmed, what would you each
do to address the challenges? General Langley, we can start
with you and move on to General Fenton, please.
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, just looking at
AFRICOM, just that AOR, and seeing how the population growth
and new ideology is starting to take root as it comes out of
North Africa, and now before you know it Boko Haram is kind of
degraded, but up pops JNIM, up pops ISIS Sahara. So it is
growing at a rapid rate. We have to be able to measure it,
resources to readiness, resources to capabilities, and if
confirmed, I would have to go back to the DoD and ask the
Secretary, and have a proof of concept and proof of principle
how to attack it. But it is going to be a whole- government
approach. We know that; we are in a support role. But there are
some intrinsic type capabilities that we must maintain--ISR,
personal recovery, medevac, and all the other programs, with
our joint exercise program, to be able to thwart the VEOs.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. General Fenton, please.
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, if confirmed, I would
start by consulting with the current CENTCOM and current
AFRICOM commanders, but I would offer that in both those
regions, violent extremist organizations are present. China is
present. Russia is present. Other malign actors are present as
well. When put together they do contribute to the instability
in those regions. My sense is that the CENTCOM command team in
the Central Command area and the AFRICOM command team are
addressing it as part of, as General Langley said, whole-of-
government efforts, and in many ways in concert with partners
and allies.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Rosen.
Senator Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thanks to both of
you for your service. Thank you for being here.
General Fenton, if I could start with you. It was good to
see you the other day. I enjoyed our conversation. One of the
things we talked about was that after 20 years of a focus on
CT, counterterrorism, SOF's number one priority now has to
shift to deterring China. Am I remembering that correctly? Does
that sound right to you?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, you are remembering
correctly that my perspective to you was aligned with the NDS,
China is a pacing challenge. The rest of the acute threat and
the persistent threats of CT, and Iran and North Korea are the
focus.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Let me ask you about the pacing
challenge and also our pacing scenario and our pacing theater,
the pacing scenario being China's threat to Taiwan. You and I
talked some about this. Admiral Davidson testified to this
Committee back in March of 2021. I am going to quote him. ``I
think the threat is manifest during this decade, in fact, in
the next years,'' and he is talking about the Chinese threat to
Taiwan. And other officials who have come before the Committee
since them, including Admiral Aquilino, Under Secretary Kaul,
Deputy Under Secretary Baker, have all agreed with that
assessment.
Do you agree with that assessment, General?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, as we discussed, in my
INDOPACOM experience, 5 1/2 years, I was presented with a
number of timelines, but they had a consistent theme. They all
grew closer, starting about 2035, 2037, and they continue to
grow closer based on China's military acceleration, its
economic and diplomatic acceleration, and the ways that they
do.
So my sense is that plus a directive from President Xi
Jinping to military to have a capability by this decade, it is
in this decade.
Senator Hawley. Very good. Very good. We need to be
concerned with this decade, of course, and beyond, but with
this decade. Thanks for that.
Given that, what are some of the unique capabilities, in
your view, including warfighting capabilities, that SOCOM can
bring to that pacing challenge, that is the Taiwan challenge?
Walk us through your thinking on that.
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, my sense is in the
INDOPACOM region, and I speak from my time there, and I will
defer to Admiral Aquilino, if confirmed, and get a holistic
assessment, but my time there I saw a number of capabilities
that SOF brought. First and foremost was placement, access, and
influence, the ability to be in a number of countries
throughout that region, training, advising, and assisting,
being partnered, real partners, partners and allies and friends
with nations in that region, that then turned into a partner
and ally, many-of-manys capability that has shown, certainly in
Ukraine, to be extremely powerful for not only the United
States but the Ukrainians, and frankly for the world, as it
fights that type of aggression.
The next thing I saw was that the exercises and the
training in that region consistently, with all the forces--
Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marines--brought a confidence to
that region and also a competence in terms of what they learned
as we trained with them, stayed with them, ate, had many
discussions, and we were just part of the fabric. All of that
developed multiple options for the COCOM team, and again I
defer, and if confirmed, I would like to check with Admiral
Aquilino and the Special Ops team, multiple options that were
helpful to the INDOPACOM team and multiple dilemmas for China.
I would also add that China, with its global presence,
that, if confirmed at SOCOM, I would like to consult with all
COCOMs to see if that is the same recipe across the globe.
Senator Hawley. Let me just pick up on that, your last
comment there about options. If you are confirmed, General,
would you prioritize developing warfighting capabilities for a
Taiwan scenario so that the President has multiple options in
order to deter China in that pacing scenario?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, what commit to today is
the SOCOM team I know is ready, with ranges of options for the
COCOM commanders, at all times. I will commit that if
confirmed, I will certainly be with the SOCOM team, examine it
closely. But my experience is the SOCOM team is ready and will
remain ready, competing, contesting, and developing a range of
options, if needed, for the Joint Force, and high-end conflict.
It does it every day.
Senator Hawley. Let me ask you this. You have been asked a
couple of times already today about balancing the continuing
counterterrorism threat and our needs there with the need to
deter China in our pacing theater. The 2018 NDS spoke about the
need for a resource-sustainable approach to counterterrorism.
The 2022 NDS echoes that.
Just give us a sense of, if you are confirmed, how you will
seek to develop and implement a resource-sustainable approach
to counterterrorism. My time is expired so I will yield back
for you to answer and then I will yield, Mr. Chairman.
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, if confirmed, I would
start by bringing to the SOCOM team my mindset, and the mindset
is that Special Operations Forces are really born for where we
are right now in this point in history. The origins of Special
Operations, from the '50s, to compete, contest, and campaign,
at that time against the USSR and communism, with language,
cultural attuneness, sped through the '60s, the '70s, the '80s,
and '90s. We only got better. The Army, Navy, Air Force, and
Marines were all added to the SOF component, and we learned how
to be a valuable and integral part of our Joint Force team at
our various training centers. My sense is that still holds.
When you take the 20 years of combat, sustained combat,
credible forces, ours, across the entire military but I speak
in my experience for SOF, that are fluent in technology,
understand networks--China and Russia have networks--how to
attack them, how to dismantle them--and the partners and allies
that have been on that journey, when you bring that all
together as we go forward in the future, I think I start there,
that SOF, in many ways, was born for this. It has the ability
to account, as part of the whole- of-government team and
interagency team, for the counterterrorism mission while
addressing the challenge of China and Russia, competing,
contesting, campaigning. In many ways, Senator, we never left.
In my INDOPACOM experience, I was doing compete-contest
with Chinese in 2016, while my teammates and partners and all
of our military were at the height of an ISIS fight in Syria,
and SOF was there as well.
So we have this in our DNA, to account for the CT, bring
value in that to the Nation in an enduring, sustainable way,
but also to be a very integral play for COCOMs and for the
Department and the whole-of-government in the campaign against
China and Russia.
Thank you, sir.
Chairman Reed. Senator Hawley, thank you. Senator
Gillibrand is here. We appreciate her presence. But I believe
that you have no questions?
Senator Gillibrand. No questions.
Chairman Reed. Senator Sullivan is recognized for one
terse, penetrating, and insightful question.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. That is
typically the way in which I ask questions.
Chairman Reed. Typical, yes, I know.
Senator Sullivan. But not always.
General Fenton, I want to dig in a little deeper on what
Senator Hawley just discussed and you and I discussed in my
office, because I think it is important to talk about it a
little bit more in depth and in public.
Again, I think your background, significant background in
the INDOPACOM theater makes you very, very qualified for this
position. You mentioned, and I think we are all recognizing the
incredible role, exceptional role that SOCOM has played post-9/
11--20 years, CT, sustained combat, as you mentioned. But
culturally there is obviously going to be a shift--less
kinetic, more strategic shaping.
How do you think the force and morale and the entire SOCOM
enterprise is going to be ready for that? Because it does seem
to me a very different approach that is likely going to be with
you as a key component of your command, particularly in the
INDOPACOM theater, recognizing China as the pacing threat, than
the way the forces have operated primarily in the Middle East,
in a much more kinetic fashion. Is SOCOM ready for that, and
how do you prepare the force to do that?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Senator, from my perspective--
and I certainly, if confirmed, would want to check in with the
entirety of the SOCOM team--but I do get to see a portion of
the SOCOM enterprise and have been in many portions of the
SOCOM enterprise. But in my experience, it is a combination of
back to our origins, what we were born to do as a SOF
enterprise. It is in our DNA, and we, in some ways, probably
had to tailor ourselves to do the exquisite CT work we have
done for 20 years. I do not think that leaves the force.
We will, through aligning with the NDS, account for a
counterterrorism mission, but we will have to continue to
address that. My sense is that that will be with us for some
time. Folks who wish to attack, who have demonstrated intent,
we need to keep them from having that capability, and that will
be addressed, and portions of the SOCOM formation may certainly
have as a primary agreement.
On top of that, the form factor of CT and CT train, advise,
and assist, is also an ability to compete and to contest, with
military relationships and partners and allies, building them
and building that trust, showing the Special Ops Force as a
force of choice, along with the U.S. Military as a force of
choice. That, in and of itself, is also an opportunity to
compete and contest.
I do know, in my own experience, much of what I was doing
at the 2016, 2017 time in INDOPACOM was competing, contesting,
and the forces arrayed that brought in incredible combat
experience and understanding and were also eager to compete and
contest in that way against China.
So, Senator, I would end with my sense is that the force
that has been built for this has it in its DNA, will be able to
account for, in formations, understanding that, the China-
Russia challenge and the CT threat, and in many ways I will
say, personally, as a Special Operations member for 30-plus
years, we welcome that challenge.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Sullivan.
Generals, thank you for your excellent testimony. I think
you appreciate the confidence that this Committee has in you,
and as I indicated previously, we are going to do our best to
expedite the confirmation process so that you can make a smooth
transition into your new commands. Again, thank you all. Thank
your families for joining you.
With that I will adjourn this hearing.
Lieutenant General Fenton. Thank you, Chairman.
Lieutenant General Langley. Thank you, Chairman.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
------
[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Bryan
P. Fenton, USA by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]
Duties and Qualifications
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM)?
Answer. I understand that as a Unified Combatant Command with
Service-like responsibilities, USSOCOM is a strategic headquarters with
the responsibility to prepare special operations forces to carry out
assigned missions. This includes responsibilities to resource,
organize, train, and equip Service and Joint Special Operations Forces
(SOF) Components. In that role, the USSOCOM commander is responsible as
a force provider to other supported Combatant Commands as outlined in
Title 10 U.S.C. Section 167--and, as directed by the President or
Secretary of Defense, the USSOCOM commander conducts operations
globally.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. I am honored and humbled to be the president's nominee for
the position of Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command. I entered
the SOF ranks in 1992, going through the Army's Special Forces
Qualification Course and earning the Special Forces tab. Since then, I
have served for over 30 years in the SOF community and conducted,
enabled, or commanded special operations on five continents at the
tactical, operational, and strategic levels. I have also served in SOF
institutional man, train, and equip roles, developing and educating
special operations forces. I have also served as the Deputy Commanding
General of USINDOPACOM, and the Deputy Commanding General for the 25th
Infantry Division. In these roles, I learned how combatant commands
employ both SOF and conventional forces in support of national
objectives.
Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Commander, USSOCOM?
Answer. I do. If confirmed, I will immediately consult with the
USSOCOM team, the Department, the interagency, and other key
stakeholders. I will also proactively seek the expertise of current and
former special operations members, USSOCOM leaders, as well as other
thought leaders in policy, business, academia--to incorporate lessons
learned from the past and better prepare USSOCOM for the future. I will
also collaborate with interagency and international partners and allies
to seek their input.
relationships
Question. Please describe your understanding of the relationship of
the Commander of USSOCOM to the following offices:
The Secretary of Defense
Answer. The Secretary of Defense is the USSOCOM Commander's
superior in the chain of command. If confirmed, I will look to the
Secretary of Defense for guidance and resources to organize, train, and
equip the most capable special operations forces to advance enduring
U.S. national interests. The USSOCOM Commander owes the Secretary of
Defense his best military advice on all SOF matters pertaining to
national security.
Question. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)
Answer. As the senior military advisor to the President and
Secretary of Defense, the Chairman is essential in reviewing and
communicating SOF capabilities and requirements to the President and
Secretary of Defense. Coordination of USSOCOM activities with the
Chairman ensures that he remains fully informed in support of his
responsibilities to provide sound and timely military advice to senior
policymakers.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) is the
principal staff assistant and advisor to the Secretary of Defense and
the Deputy Secretary of Defense for all matters on the formulation of
national security and defense policy. The USD(P) develops, coordinates,
and oversees the implementation of a wide variety of Department policy,
including matters related to planning, programming, budgeting, and
execution of special operations activities. If confirmed, I will work
closely with the USD(P) to ensure USSOCOM activities support Department
policies.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence &
Security
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence and
Security (USD(I&S)) is the principal intelligence and security advisor
to the Secretary of Defense. USD(I&S) exercises authority, direction,
and control on behalf of the Secretary of Defense over all intelligence
and security organizations within the Department, including the
National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Geospatial Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the
Defense Security Service, and the intelligence components of the
combatant commands and military services. USD(I&S) is also dual-hatted
as the Director of Defense Intelligence in the Office of the Director
of National Intelligence (DNI), and reports to the DNI in this
capacity. USD(I&S) is the Department's principal interface with the
Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the Intelligence
Community and represents the Department on intelligence and sensitive
operations at the National Security Council. If confirmed, I will work
closely with USD(I&S) to coordinate USSOCOM matters related to
intelligence and security.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition &
Sustainment
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Sustainment (USD(A&S)) serves as the DOD Senior Procurement Executive
(SPE) and the Defense Acquisition Executive (DAE) responsible for all
matters relating to the DOD Acquisition System, including system
design, development, procurement of goods and services, sustainment of
systems, and providing Department-wide policy. Pursuant to Title 10,
Section 167, the USSOCOM Special Operations Acquisition Executive
(SOAE) derives authority to conduct acquisition from the DAE. If
confirmed, I will ensure USSOCOM acquisition activities, in
coordination with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special
Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)), are executed by
the SOAE under the authorities delegated to the Command by the DAE.
Additionally, I will ensure that the Command is effectively
implementing policies and procedures for logistics, maintenance,
material readiness, and sustainment support to the warfighter.
Question. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and
Engineering
Answer. The Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering
(USD(R&E)) is responsible for overseeing the research, engineering, and
technology development activities across the DOD enterprise, and is
mandated with driving key technologies to ensure technological
superiority for the DOD. If confirmed, in coordination with ASD(SO/
LIC), I will ensure USSOCOM Science and Technology research activities
and funding are complementary to and aligned with the Department
research policy, processes, and priorities. In addition, we will assist
in the initiation and implementation of acquisition pathways that
embrace agile practices to innovate, develop, exploit, and reduce
barriers of entry for commercial technologies and non-traditional
defense partners.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC))
Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) is the principal staff assistant and civilian
advisor to the USD(P) and the Secretary of Defense on special
operations and low intensity conflict matters. The principal duty of
the ASD(SO/LIC) is the overall oversight of special operations
activities within the Department of Defense, including USSOCOM. Section
167 of Title 10 places ASD(SO/LIC) in the administrative chain of
command between the Secretary of Defense and the Commander, USSOCOM to
exercise authority, direction, and control with respect to the special
operations-peculiar administration and support of USSOCOM, including
the readiness and organization of SOF, resources and equipment, and
civilian personnel. If confirmed, I will work closely with ASD(SO/LIC)
to ensure our special operations forces are organized effectively,
highly trained, and well-equipped to seize opportunities and address
the challenges of any future operational environment.
Question. The Service Secretaries
Answer. The USSOCOM Commander's authority over the Service
components assigned is clear in the Goldwater-Nichols Act but requires
close coordination with the Service Secretaries to ensure that USSOCOM
does not intrude upon each Service Secretary's responsibilities. Close
coordination between the USSOCOM Commander, the ASD(SO/LIC), and each
of the Service Secretaries is also essential to gaining and maintaining
the Services' support to SOF as an integral part of the Joint Force.
Question. The Service Chiefs
Answer. In cooperation with the Service Chiefs, the USSOCOM
Commander will ensure the preparedness of forces to execute assigned
missions. The Service Chiefs play a critical role in the development,
promotion, and assignment of SOF personnel. The Service Chiefs are also
a source of experience and judgment that every Combatant Commander may
call upon. If confirmed, I will continue an open dialogue and
cooperative partnership with the Service Chiefs.
Question. The other combatant commanders
Answer. Successive USSOCOM Commanders have fostered an atmosphere
of teamwork and trust in their relationships with the Combatant
Commanders. These relationships have only strengthened over the years
as trans-regional threats have emerged. If confirmed, I will continue
to work closely with the other Combatant Commanders to achieve our
common objectives against trans-regional threats, Countering Violent
Extremist Organizations (CVEO), Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
(CWMD), Countering Small Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-sUAS), and Military
Information Support Operations (MISO). If confirmed, I will be
committed to providing trained and ready SOF to the Combatant
Commanders with geographic areas of responsibility to support national
and theater security objectives.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges confronting
the next Commander of USSOCOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will consult with the USSOCOM team,
Combatant Commands, ASD(SO/LIC), and the Office of the Secretary of
Defense to gain a better understanding of USSOCOM's major challenges.
From my current position, I assess three potential focus areas. The
first is talent management--recruiting, selecting, training, and
retaining the right people for special operations. Mission success
requires a diverse, innovative, inclusive, and empowered team of SOF
professionals. The second is addressing mission readiness. This
includes ensuring SOF is prepared for crisis response tasks,
maintaining a sustainable level of Countering Violent Extremist
Organizations (CVEO) while strengthening SOF's capabilities and
readiness for the other priorities outlined in the National Defense
Strategy--including campaigning and bolstering strategic deterrence
against China and Russia. The third challenge is transforming and
modernizing SOF to address the current and future operating
environments--including along technological and organizational lines of
effort to improve lethality, agility, and sustainability.
Question. If confirmed, what plans do you have for addressing these
challenges?
Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic analysis of these
focus areas against current and future operating environments, and
develop plans to ensure SOF remains a capable, ready, and resilient
force.
Question. What are the most important lessons you have learned
during your tenure in senior leadership positions in the Department of
Defense?
Answer. In my experience, four lessons stand above all others. The
first is the importance of people. Get the right people for the
enterprise, empower them, take care of them, and value them. Our people
are why we win. The second is that mission readiness is critical. Our
force must be trained and ready to solve our Nation's most complex
problems, at any time, in any environment. The third lesson is that
transformation and modernization are essential--complacency accrues
unacceptable risk to current and future mission execution. Last is the
importance of relationships--including within DOD, the interagency and
Intelligence Community, and with partners and allies.
Question. If confirmed, what priorities would you establish in
terms of issues that must be addressed by the Commander of USSOCOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize the objectives outlined in
the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy, and
others as directed by the President and Secretary of Defense. To
achieve these objectives, I will continue to prioritize people, mission
readiness, and transformation.
civilian oversight of ussocom
Question. Section 922 of the National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 2017, as amended, included modifications to the roles and
responsibilities of the ASD(SO/LIC) as well as the relationship between
the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander of USSOCOM in order for the ASD(SO/
LIC) to more effectively fulfill its ``service secretary-like''
responsibilities to provide civilian oversight of and advocacy within
DOD for USSOCOM's Service-like requirements.
What is your view of the role of the ASD(SO/LIC) in promoting
civilian control over the military?
Answer. In my view, civilian oversight and control of the military
is critically important to the Department of Defense, USSOCOM, and our
Nation. ASD(SO/LIC) exercises oversight, authority, direction, and
control with respect to the special operations-peculiar administration
and support of USSOCOM, including the readiness and organization of
SOF, resources and equipment, and civilian personnel. The role of
ASD(SO/LIC) is important for SOF civilian oversight and advocacy, and
vital for the health and readiness of U.S. Special Operations Forces.
If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to strengthen this
relationship and coordination.
Question. What is your understanding of the organizational and
administrative relationship between the ASD(SO/LIC) and the Commander
of USSOCOM?
Answer. The FY17 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), Section
922, codified the position of ASD(SO/LIC) in the administrative chain
of command between the Secretary of Defense and the Commander of
USSOCOM for Title 10 organize, train, and equip responsibilities. This
legislation recognized and strengthened the authority, direction, and
control of ASD(SO/LIC) over special operations-peculiar administrative
matters. The FY21 NDAA further reinforced the role of ASD(SO/LIC). If
confirmed, I look forward to working closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) as he
provides civilian oversight and advocacy for SOF within DOD.
Question. What is your understanding of the role of the ASD(SO/LIC)
in:
The formulation and submission of USSOCOM's annual budget request;
Answer. Pursuant to DOD Directive 5111.10, ASD(SO/LIC) performs a
budgetary role and responsibility like those of the Secretaries of the
Military Departments. In close partnership with HQ USSOCOM, ASD(SO/LIC)
provides overall supervision of the preparation and justification of
Special Operations programs and budget for Major Force Program-11 to
include review and approval of the USSOCOM annual budget request prior
to submission to the Department and Congress. If confirmed, I look
forward to being a part of this process.
Question. Approving programs of record and the acquisition of
special operations-peculiar capabilities by USSOCOM;
Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) plays an essential role in approving programs
of record and the acquisition of special operations-peculiar
capabilities by USSOCOM. ASD(SO/LIC) is a partner in the development
and approval of two key products for USSOCOM that define programs of
record: the Special Operations Command Requirements Evaluation Board
(SOCREB) and the Program Objective Memorandum (POM). The SOCREB is
USSOCOM's requirements validation board that approves all special
operations-peculiar requirements and establishes programs of record.
The POM determines the resources USSOCOM will apply to these programs
of record. If confirmed, I will work closely with the ASD(SO/LIC) on
resourcing and acquisition matters.
Question. Overseeing the organization of USSOCOM headquarters and
service components;
Answer. Sections 138 and 167 of Title 10 assign ASD(SO/LIC) the
responsibility to exercise authority, direction, and control of all
special operations-peculiar administrative matters relating to the
organization, training, and equipping of SOF--including the
organization of USSOCOM headquarters and service components.
Question. Ensuring the readiness of Special Operations Forces
(SOF); and
Answer. ASD(SO/LIC) plays a vital role in the readiness of special
operations forces. USSOCOM provides a quarterly readiness brief for the
ASD(SO/LIC) and his staff to facilitate oversight of Special Operations
readiness issues and discuss areas that warrant advocacy from the
ASD(SO/LIC). Additionally, the USSOCOM staff maintains regular contact
with the ASD(SO/LIC) on readiness issues. If confirmed, I intend to
work closely with ASD(SO/LIC) in the execution of his Service-like
responsibilities of organizing, training and equipping USSOCOM to
ensure the readiness of the force.
Question. Actions relating to the culture, ethics, and
accountability of Special Operations Forces.
Answer. Along with USSOCOM, ASD(SO/LIC) plays a critical role in
overseeing the command climate and culture within SOF to ensure
alignment with military ethics and values. Part of this oversight
involves prevention, response, and accountability for ethical issues.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with ASD(SO/LIC) to promote a
culture of ethics and accountability within USSOCOM that is critical to
maintaining SOF readiness, mission accomplishment, and the trust of our
Nation.
national defense strategy
Question. The unclassified summary of the National Defense Strategy
(NDS) states ``The Department will act urgently to sustain and
strengthen deterrence, with the People's Republic of China (PRC) as our
most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for
the Department. Russia poses acute threats, as illustrated by its
brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. We will collaborate with our
NATO Allies and partners to reinforce robust deterrence in the face of
Russian aggression. The Department will remain capable of managing
other persistent threats, including those from North Korea, Iran, and
violent extremist organizations.''
In your view, what is the role of special operations forces in:
Long-term strategic competition with and deterring aggression by
China;
Answer. In my previous experience and current role, I have seen SOF
play a key part in strategic competition and deterring aggression by
China--principally by supporting NDS priorities and Combatant Command
campaign plans addressing this challenge. Often, this involves SOF
training, advising, assisting, and building partner capacity; sensing,
illuminating, and reporting; and offering asymmetric options for
supported Combatant Commands--while posing multiple dilemmas for the
PRC.
Question. Addressing the acute threats posed by Russia;
Answer. If confirmed, I will explore this further, but in my
previous experience and current role, I have seen SOF play a key part
in strategic competition and deterring aggression by Russia--
principally by supporting NDS priorities and Combatant Command campaign
plans addressing this threat. Often, this involves SOF training,
advising, assisting, and building partner capacity; sensing,
illuminating, and reporting; and offering unique asymmetric options for
supported Combatant Commands, while posing multiple dilemmas for
Russia. Building partner capacity has been particularly valuable to our
NATO allies and other partners--USSOF's work over the past several
years in Ukraine serves as an example.
Question. Managing persistent threats from North Korea and Iran;
and
Answer. SOF play a key role in managing persistent threats from
North Korea and Iran--again, principally by supporting Combatant
Command campaign plans addressing these threats. This also involves SOF
training, advising, assisting, and building partner capacity; sensing,
illuminating, and reporting; and offering unique asymmetric options for
supported Combatant Commands and Joint Force commanders. Against the
threats of North Korea and Iran, USSOCOM's strong relationships with
allied and partner forces--and irregular warfare expertise--provide
placement, access, and capabilities, while messaging United States
conviction and minimizing the risk of unintended escalation. With
respect to North Korea and Iran, USSOF's ability to sense, illuminate,
and report on hostile gray zone activities is especially valued by
supported Combatant Commands, as is USSOCOM's role as Coordinating
Authority for CWMD.
Question. Sustaining pressure on violent extremist organizations
Answer. USSOCOM supports the Department and other Combatant
Commands as part of the whole-of-government counterterrorism strategy,
along with partners and allies. The NDS, along with the Global Campaign
Plan for VEO, provide priorities for addressing global VEO threats. SOF
resources are focused on monitoring and disrupting VEOs that have the
capability and intent to attack the U.S. Homeland. Working with like-
minded partners and allies, and leveraging current and future
technology, are critical to sustaining pressure on VEOs, now and in the
future.
Question. The NDS identifies integrated deterrence, campaigning,
and ``actions to build enduring advantages'' as the primary ways by
which the Department will seek to achieve its goals under the NDS.
What do you see as USSOCOM's role in each of these areas?
Answer. If confirmed, I will explore this topic more fully with the
USSOCOM team, but in my view, USSOCOM and SOF provide the Department
and supported Combatant Commands with asymmetric options and
capabilities that enable integrated deterrence and campaigning, and
present multiple dilemmas to our adversaries. I assess that SOF are
particularly capable in gray zone competition, and SOF provide combat
credible forces to support the Joint Force in conflict. To build
enduring advantages, SOF develop resilient networks and asymmetric
capabilities of our own, and to strengthen partners and allies.
Question. How do you intend to balance the competing requirements
of continuing global counterterrorism requirements while also
supporting the NDS-directed priority lines of effort to counter China
and Russia?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review these requirements, and make
recommendations based on the guidance provided in the NDS. That
includes addressing strategic competition and meeting Combatant Command
requirements for SOF, while preserving SOF's ability to conduct crisis
response and sustained CVEO. We must also maintain a sustainable
balance for our servicemembers and their families, and continually
modernize and transform SOF capabilities, training, and doctrine.
Question. Does USSOCOM require any additional capabilities in order
to adequately support the objectives laid out in the NDS?
Answer. If confirmed, using the NDS for guidance, and in close
coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), I will review existing requirements to
ensure SOF are capable of supporting NDS objectives in current and
future operating environments.
Question. Do you believe special operations forces are
appropriately organized and sized to meet global requirements?
Answer. If confirmed, using the NDS for guidance, and in close
coordination with ASD(SO/LIC), I will review the organization and size
of SOF to ensure that it is capable of meeting global requirements in
current and future operating environments.
special operations missions
Question. Do you believe the special operations activities
identified in section 167 of title 10, U.S. Code, remain relevant and
appropriate?
Answer. Yes, I do--more than ever.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review and provide any recommendations
to ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department of Defense.
Question. Are there special operations missions or activities that
you believe should be transferred to conventional forces or, otherwise
divested by USSOCOM, and, if so, why?
Answer. If confirmed, and using the NDS for guidance, I will review
the range and prioritization of USSOCOM missions and activities and
provide recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department of Defense.
Question. Are there any additional missions or activities that you
believe should be assigned to USSOCOM? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, and using the NDS for guidance, I will review
the range and prioritization of USSOCOM missions outlined in Section
167 of Title 10 and provide recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and the
Department.
combating terrorism
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda,
the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), and other VEOs, to the
United States Homeland, and western interests, more broadly? Which
group or groups, in your view, currently present the greatest threat to
the United States?
Answer. Per the NDS, terrorism and violent extremism comprise a
persistent threat to U.S. interests abroad and to our Homeland. ISIS
and al Qaeda have been degraded by sustained counter-terror
operations--often in close partnership with our allies and partners.
However, these and other terror groups continue efforts to target
United States personnel, our Homeland, and allied interests. More
broadly, VEOs remain a significant destabilizing force both
strategically and regionally, particularly in areas of the Middle East
and Africa.
In my view, al Qaeda and ISIS present the greatest VEO threat to
United States interests.
Question. Do you believe that current legal authorities, including
the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force, enable the
Department to carry out counterterrorism operations and activities at a
level you believe to be necessary and appropriate?
Answer. Yes, I do. If confirmed, I will continually reassess our
authorities and activities, and their impact against adaptive terrorist
threats, and make appropriate recommendations through the Department.
Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to fulfill USSOCOM's
assigned responsibilities for synchronizing global operations against
terrorist networks?
Answer. As the Coordinating Authority for global operations against
terrorist networks, USSOCOM coordinates with all combatant commands and
across the DOD to conduct strategic planning, assesses DOD execution of
the global campaign plan, and makes recommendations to the Chairman and
Secretary of Defense for improvements as appropriate. If confirmed, I
will review and seek to improve existing USSOCOM processes; consult
with DOD, Intelligence Community, and interagency stakeholders; and
provide recommendations to the Chairman and Secretary of Defense.
Question. Are there steps DOD should take to better coordinate its
efforts to combat terrorism with those of other Federal Departments and
Agencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review USSOCOM's current efforts and
make recommendations to the Department as needed. Effective
synchronization across departments and agencies is vital in the CVEO
fight. The SOF enterprise has made remarkable improvements since 2001,
and today we can point to examples like Operation GALLANT PHOENIX, a
SOF-led interagency and multinational CVEO task force created to share
intelligence, disrupt, and degrade Sunni extremist VEOs. These and
similar efforts increase joint, interagency, and multinational
coordination.
Question. What is your view of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy
and the role of USSOCOM in supporting that strategy?
Answer. USSOCOM supports the Department and other Combatant
Commands, as part of the whole-of-government counterterrorism strategy.
The NDS, along with the Global Campaign Plan for VEO, provide
priorities for addressing global VEO threats, and monitoring and
disrupting the most dangerous VEOs--those with the capability and
intent to attack the U.S. Homeland. Working with like-minded partners
and allies makes CVEO more effective.
countering weapons of mass destruction (cwmd)
Question. Under the Unified Campaign Plan, USSOCOM is tasked with
coordinating DOD's efforts on CWMDs.
Answer. That is my understanding as well.
Question. What is your understanding of USSOCOM's responsibilities
under the Unified Campaign Plan for synchronizing the Department's
efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction?
Answer. I understand that as the Department of Defense CWMD
Coordinating Authority, USSOCOM coordinates with all combatant commands
and across the DOD to conduct strategic planning, assesses DOD
execution of the CWMD campaign, and makes recommendations to the
Department for improvements as appropriate. USSOCOM is also responsible
for integrating key CWMD concepts into doctrine, informing intelligence
prioritization, and facilitating translation of strategic objectives
into operations, activities, and investments.
Question. In your assessment are there any resources, authorities,
or organizational changes needed to better execute USSOCOM's CWMD
mission?
Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of
USSOCOM's CWMD capabilities, and its role as Coordinating Authority for
CWMD, using the Unified Command Plan and the NDS as guides. If changes
are needed, I will make appropriate recommendations in close
coordination with ASD(SO/LIC) and ASD (Space), to the Chairman and
Secretary of Defense.
10 u.s.c. 127e operations
Question. Section 127e of title 10, United States Code, authorizes
the provision of support (including training, funding, and equipment)
to regular forces, irregular forces, and individuals supporting or
facilitating military operations by U.S. Special Operations Forces to
combat terrorism.
What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. In my experience, the 127e program has been an essential
tool in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The ability to organize,
develop, and train a partner force provides placement, access, and
opportunities for action not previously available. With the reduction
of forward deployed CVEO forces and bases, and increasing levels of
technical surveillance overseas, the ability to partner with local
forces is of growing importance, generating greater return on
investment and mitigating overall risk to U.S. Forces.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate
127e proposals to ensure they comply with policy guidance, are
complementary to other DOD and U.S. Government counterterrorism
efforts, and achieve their intended purpose?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review the current USSOCOM processes
used to evaluate 127e proposals, with other stakeholders as
appropriate. Evaluation factors I would consider include: NDS
priorities, COCOM priorities, a defined end-state and off-ramp plan,
clear measures of performance and effectiveness, a monitoring and
reassessment process for meeting objectives, and effective screening of
the partner force.
irregular warfare
Question. Nation states are becoming more aggressive in challenging
U.S. interests through the use of asymmetric means that often fall
below the threshold of conventional conflict, commonly referred to as
irregular warfare and ``gray zone operations.''
What is your understanding of the threat to U.S. interests posed by
adversaries in this domain of warfare?
Answer. I assess that gray zone campaigning has become a preferred
approach by adversaries, particularly China, Russia, Iran, and North
Korea. These gray zone activities seek to coerce the United States,
allies, and partners into accepting acts of aggression, and seek to
degrade U.S. advantages in technology, influence, and defensive
capabilities. These gray zone activities--which include use of Chinese
maritime militia fishing fleets, Russian private military companies,
and malicious Iranian cyber activities--threaten United States
interests.
Question. What should be the guiding principles of the Department
of Defense's strategy to counter these threats?
Answer. The current NDS considers this problem in detail, and
emphasizes the principles of integrated deterrence, campaigning,
accelerating modernization, and synchronizing DOD efforts across the
whole-of-government, warfighting domains, and the instruments of
national power--in close partnership with our allies and partners. The
Department has committed to developing, designing, building, and
managing a Joint Force with the lethality, resilience, sustainability,
survivability, agility, and responsiveness needed for campaigning.
Question. What role should Special Operations Forces have in
executing such a strategy?
Answer. I believe that U.S. Special Operations Forces were created
for just this type of strategy. In concert with geographic combatant
commands, SOF provide: resident expertise in unconventional and
irregular warfare; cultural awareness and knowledge of foreign
languages; scalable, asymmetric options in land, sea, air, space, and
cyber domains; and are well-versed in current and emerging technology.
Special operations forces are well-suited to presenting adversaries
with multiple dilemmas, and counter their activities in gray zone
competition below the level of warfare.
Question. Do you believe that Special Operations Forces have the
appropriate authorities and capabilities to operate effectively in this
domain of warfare? Please explain your answer.
Answer. If confirmed, I look forward to conducting a holistic
review of SOF's authorities and capabilities and making appropriate
recommendations through ASD(SO/LIC) to the Department.
Section 1202 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2018 authorizes the provision of support (including training,
funding, and equipment) to regular forces, irregular forces, and
individuals supporting or facilitating irregular warfare operations by
U.S. Special Operations Forces.
Question. What is your assessment of this authority?
Answer. From my experience, section 1202 is a valuable tool that
enables U.S. Special Operations by building partner capacity and
capabilities, giving the U.S. additional placement and access, thereby
generating multiple dilemmas for our adversaries and options for U.S.
Forces. 1202 authority allows USSOCOM to build irregular warfare
capability that mitigates risk to U.S. Forces while gaining placement
and access to otherwise contested or denied areas and impose costs on
adversaries. Properly implemented, 1202 allows SOF to provide a broader
range of sustainable and cost-effective irregular warfare options to
compete in the gray zone, assure allies and partners, and strengthen
deterrence.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you use to evaluate
section 1202 proposals to ensure they comply with policy guidance, are
complementary to other DOD and U.S. Government irregular warfare
efforts, and achieve their intended purpose?
Answer. If confirmed, and with relevant stakeholders, I will review
the current USSOCOM processes used to evaluate 1202 proposals.
Evaluation factors I would consider include: NDS priorities, COCOM
priorities, a well-defined end-state and off-ramp plan, clear measures
of performance and effectiveness, a monitoring and reassessment process
for meeting objectives, and effective screening of the enabled partner
force.
information operations
Question. In your view, are the Department and the broader
interagency appropriately organized to compete with state and non-state
adversaries in the information environment? If not, what
recommendations would you make?
Answer. In my view, the information environment is key terrain in
every region of the world. As the DOD Coordinating Authority for web-
based military information support operations, USSOCOM has an important
role in advancing U.S. interests and achieving information advantage.
If confirmed, I will review current processes to ensure USSOCOM's
military information support operations are coordinated and aligned
with military objectives and Department policy, assess how well the
Department and broader interagency are organized to compete in the
information environment, and make appropriate recommendations through
the Department.
Question. What is the appropriate role of the Department and,
specifically, Special Operations Forces in the broader information
operations and strategic communications efforts of the U.S. Government?
Answer. If confirmed, I will explore this issue more fully, but
based on my experience, special operations forces conduct information
operations in coordination with interagency and Intelligence Community
partners to support DOD and U.S. Government objectives.
Question. Do you believe that USSOCOM's military information
support capabilities can be more effectively utilized? If so, are there
doctrinal, organizational, training, or authority modifications that
you believe could make military information support capabilities more
effective?
Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of
USSOCOM's military information support capabilities. If there are
doctrinal, organizational, training or authorities-based modifications
that would improve USSOCOM's MISO capabilities, I will recommend
appropriate changes to ASD(SO/LIC), the Chairman, and the Secretary of
Defense.
Question. Are there additional military capabilities that should be
developed by the Department to more effectively compete in the
information environment?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work with the USSOCOM team, Combatant
Commands, and the Department to conduct a holistic assessment for
additional military capabilities and report back to the Department. In
my current role, I believe the nexus between SOF, Space, and Cyber
capabilities offers new possibilities for strategic competition and
integrated deterrence, and if confirmed, I look forward to exploring
this concept for use by special operations forces in the information
environment and other domains.
intelligence operations
Question. In your view, how are intelligence operations carried out
by Special Operations Forces different from those carried out by others
in the Intelligence Community?
Answer. In my experience, SOF principally conduct intelligence
operations in support of the warfighter and the Department--to achieve
national security objectives. However, special operations forces do not
do this alone; they integrate, coordinate, and deconflict these
operations with partners in the Intelligence Community and interagency,
as appropriate.
Question. If confirmed, how would you ensure that intelligence
activities carried out by Special Operations Forces are properly
coordinated with activities carried out by the Intelligence Community?
Answer. My service in USINDOPACOM, USAFRICOM, USCENTCOM, and other
regions reinforced the importance of integration, coordination, and
deconfliction with the broader Intelligence Community. If confirmed, I
will reinforce the importance of these partnerships as SOF continue to
maintain a global presence and work with the Intelligence Community to
identify and understand evolving threats. I will also evaluate the
existing coordination and oversight processes, and recommend changes to
the Department as appropriate.
civilian casualties
Question. Earlier this year, Secretary Austin released the results
of an independent study by RAND into the Department's policy,
processes, and procedures related to investigating and responding to
civilian casualty incidents and committed to issuing new Department-
level guidance on these issues within 180 days--both of which were
required by previous National Defense Authorization Acts.
In your view, what are the primary challenges for the combatant
commands in mitigating, investigating, and responding to allegations of
civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations? How would
you seek to address these challenges if confirmed as USSOCOM Commander?
Answer. We have a legal, moral, and ethical obligation to minimize,
and where possible, prevent civilian casualties during military
operations. In my experience, the Department of Defense is strongly
committed to protecting civilians, and along with Combatant Commands
have developed policies and procedures to mitigate civilian casualties
during military operations, conduct timely and thorough investigations,
and share lessons learned.
However, as evidenced by Secretary Austin's January 27, 2022
Memorandum ``Improving Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response'' there
are opportunities to improve. I look forward to the results of the
Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMRAP) and the
upcoming DOD Instruction to provide refined guidance on mitigating and
responding to civilian casualties. If confirmed, I will ensure this
guidance is implemented throughout USSOCOM; as a learning organization
we will incorporate and institutionalize these lessons learned and
refined guidance to improve our tactics, techniques and procedures to
mitigate civilian casualties.
Question. How should Department of Defense policies and procedures
be revised to more effectively support the objectives of mitigating,
investigating, and responding to allegations of civilian casualties
resulting from U.S. military operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review current and future Department
policies and, where appropriate, improve USSOCOM's processes for
mitigating, investigating, and responding to allegations of civilian
casualties resulting from U.S. military operations. This review will be
informed by the forthcoming CHMRAP and DOD Instruction on Civilian Harm
Mitigation and Response. We have a legal, moral, and ethical obligation
to minimize, and where possible, prevent civilian casualties during
armed conflict, as any and all civilian casualties are a tragedy.
Question. Do you believe the combatant commands are sufficiently
resourced for mitigating, investigating, and responding to allegations
of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will work closely with USSOCOM components,
fellow combatant commanders, and other stakeholders to assess the
resources required to mitigate, investigate, and respond to allegations
of civilian casualties resulting from U.S. military operations--and
make appropriate recommendations to the Department.
Question. When civilian casualty allegations arise, do you believe
they should be investigated by personnel sufficiently independent of
the unit or task force which conducted the strike?
Answer. When allegations of civilian casualties arise, I believe
they should always be investigated by sufficiently impartial, unbiased,
and objective investigators.
Question. How can the Department more effectively capture and share
lessons learned from civilian casualty investigations so they can be
incorporated into future operations?
Answer. Capturing and sharing lessons-learned is an important part
of DOD culture. If confirmed, I look forward to working with my fellow
combatant commanders and the Department on implementing and widely
sharing lessons learned from civilian casualty investigations--and
improving training and operations to better mitigate civilian
casualties.
ussocom acquisition authorities
Question. Section 167(e)(4) of title 10, U.S. Code, assigns to the
Commander, USSOCOM the authority to develop and acquire special
operations-peculiar equipment, and to acquire special operations-
peculiar material, supplies, and services. The Commander, USSOCOM is
advised and assisted in these matters by a command acquisition
executive.
What technology areas and capabilities do you believe should be
prioritized to enable special operations forces to most effectively
support the objectives of the NDS?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review USSOCOM's current technological
capabilities and priorities with the NDS as a guide and make
appropriate recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department.
Question. If confirmed, what criteria would you apply in validating
a determination that a particular requirement for equipment, materiel,
supplies, or services is ``special operations-peculiar''?
Answer. If confirmed, I would review USSOCOM's current processes
and procedures, and if appropriate, recommend changes through the
Department. I understand that ``special operations-peculiar'' refers to
equipment, material, supplies, and services required for special
operations missions for which there is no Service-common requirement.
These are limited to items and services initially designed for, or used
by, special operations forces until adopted for Service-common use by
one or more Military Service; modifications approved by the Commander,
USSOCOM, for application to standard items and services used by the
Military Services; and items and services approved by the Commander,
USSOCOM, as critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a
special operations mission.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to improve each
of the three aspects of the special operations-peculiar acquisition
process--requirements, acquisition, and budgeting?
Answer. If confirmed, I would do a holistic assessment of
requirements, acquisition, and budgeting aspects of USSOCOM's SO-
peculiar acquisition process, to identify what to sustain and any
improvements that may be required--in close coordination with ASD(SO/
LIC). I assess it is critical to continuously evaluate and refine
USSOCOM's acquisition system to ensure it can support the evolving
operational environment and unique SOF operational requirements. Also,
I believe it is essential that USSOCOM retain the agility and
flexibility necessary to respond rapidly to emerging battlefield
requirements.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you propose, if any, to
ensure that special operations-peculiar requirements are realistic,
technically achievable, and prioritized?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review USSOCOM's existing processes,
SOF operator feedback, and NDS priorities--in close coordination with
ASD(SO/LIC)--to ensure that special operations-peculiar requirements
are realistic, technically achievable, and appropriately prioritized.
Weaponizing innovation is both a mission requirement and a hallmark of
U.S. Special Operations Forces; SOF often serve as a pathfinder for the
Joint Force in this regard.
Question. If confirmed, how will you ensure that special operations
capabilities and requirements are integrated into overall DOD research,
development, and acquisition programs?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review current USSOCOM processes and
make changes where appropriate, while continuing to seek integration of
the developments and capabilities USSOCOM is pursuing into the broader
DOD and Joint Force. This ensures transparency, collaboration, and
acceleration of research and development.
ethics and accountability
Question. In January 2020, USSOCOM completed a Comprehensive Review
of Special Operations Forces Culture and Ethics. Among other things,
the Comprehensive Review found that ``selective implementation'' of
recommendations from four previous reviews related to the culture and
ethics of Special Operations Forces since 2011, including two such
reviews mandated by Congress, have resulted in continued challenges
related to the assessment and selection of Special Operations Forces,
leader development, and force structure and employment.
What are your views on the current culture of ethics and
accountability in U.S. Special Operations Forces?
Answer. In my over 30 years of SOF experience, the SOF culture has
been primarily one of service and quiet professionalism, with the
overwhelming majority of our servicemembers and civilian team
exhibiting the standards of ethics and accountability each and every
day. Yet, we have witnessed examples of ethical and accountability
problems--these must be addressed through leader action and example,
reinforcing a culture of service and trust, and holding people
accountable.
Question. What is you understanding of the actions required to
complete full implementation of the 16 recommendations provide by the
Comprehensive Review?
Answer. It is my understanding USSOCOM has completed 14 of the 16
recommended actions from the Comprehensive Review, and that the command
is on track to complete the remaining recommended actions by the end of
2022. If confirmed, I look forward to being part of that process.
Question. The USSOCOM Comprehensive Review found that ``a USSOCOM
culture overly focused on force employment and mission accomplishment
creates the contexts or situations allowing for misconduct and
unethical behavior to develop within the SOF enterprise.''
What role, if any, should past mission accomplishment play in
decisions relating to misconduct by Special Operations Forces?
Answer. There is no place for misconduct or unethical behavior in
our formation. Past mission accomplishment should have no bearing on
decisions relating to reporting and investigating misconduct by special
operations forces.
health of special operations forces
Question. What is your assessment of the health and readiness of
Special Operations Forces?
Answer. From my current position, I assess SOF's readiness level is
high. This level of SOF readiness--and USSOF's record of mission
success--is due in large part to the attention, resources, and
oversight provided by this Committee and Congress as a whole. Current
and future readiness is constantly evolving, and SOF leaders must
continually maintain rigorous standards, conduct challenging training,
ensure ethical behavior, and care for SOF teammates and families.
Readiness and health of the force are at the heart of all we do.
Question. If confirmed, what will be your priorities in addressing
the stress on Special Operations Forces?
Answer. If confirmed, first and foremost I will continue the
efforts of my predecessors with respect to POTFF, the Comprehensive
Review, and Service programs. Also, I will work with the Joint Staff
and combatant commands to maintain sustainable personnel and
operational tempos that provide predictability to the force and their
families. A holistic approach is key to addressing stress on the force.
Question. If confirmed, what steps will you undertake to address
suicides in Special Operations Forces?
Answer. Suicide is a tragedy that directly impacts our force and
families. If confirmed, I will continue the vital work on suicide
prevention for Special Operations Forces, including supporting POTFF
programs, de-stigmatizing mental healthcare, expanding and enhancing
routine screening, and seeking expertise from inside and outside of DOD
to give leaders the best tools to engage our people and foster
resiliency. Mental health is health. I have made, and will continue to
make, preventing suicide a top priority.
Question. What is your understanding of the USSOCOM's Preservation
of the Force and Families program?
Answer. The POTFF program is an incredible asset for the USSOCOM
team that augments Service-provided efforts.
In my current command, with people as my top priority, there is no
more important task than taking care of our force and families. The
first SOF truth is ``humans are more important than hardware,'' and our
people are why we win--they are SOF's competitive and comparative
advantage. We ask an incredible amount from servicemembers, civilians,
and families. In that light, we must do everything possible to preserve
their health, safety, and readiness--and POTFF does that.
If confirmed, I will continue USSOCOM's tremendous work in this
area and look forward to working with the Department and Congress to
ensure USSOCOM continues to promote physical, psychological, cognitive,
social, and spiritual wellness that POTFF addresses.
recruiting and retention
Question. What are the biggest challenges to retention you see in
the USSOCOM community?
Answer. In my current role, I have limited visibility on USSOCOM's
recruiting and retention challenges, but if confirmed, I will examine
this issue closely, in partnership with the Services. I anticipate some
of the challenges include competition from the civilian workforce and
lack of predictability. Command involvement in talent management,
caring for servicemembers and families, and special pays have proven
helpful to maintaining our special operations forces and meeting our
operational requirements.
Question. What steps need to be taken, in your view, to meet the
recruiting and retention goals of each of the services' SOF?
Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment with the
USSOCOM team and Services to better understand recruiting and retention
issues. This includes carefully monitoring deployment-to-dwell ratios
in accordance with Department guidance; support to family programs; and
a total wellness approach that spans the physical, psychological,
cognitive, social, and spiritual domains. The SOF community asks a
great deal of its personnel, and we owe them the same. Caring for our
team is a moral imperative that will also help us retain the
operational experience, expertise, and capability necessary for mission
success.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive
policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to
incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources
and care for victims of sexual assault.
What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to
sexual assaults in USSOCOM, including assaults by and against U.S.
civilian and contractor personnel?
Answer. We must do everything in our power to address the problem
of sexual assault in our ranks--this criminal behavior violates our
values, degrades safety and readiness, and destroys trust within our
formations. As a military officer--and an Army dad with two daughters
who have each chosen to serve this Nation--I take the issue extremely
seriously.
If confirmed--as I have done in previous commands--I will ensure
sexual assault prevention, response, and accountability remain top
priorities across the USSOCOM enterprise, and that Department policies
and programs are fully implemented. We must provide the total force
(military, civilian, and contractors) with a safe and inclusive command
climate where every member is valued, feels psychologically and
physically safe, and is treated with dignity and respect. This
important issue will always have my direct and full attention.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of USSOCOM policies and
procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation for
reporting the assault?
Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a full assessment of all
USSOCOM policies and procedures to assess and ensure we protect victims
from retaliation. We must continue to foster an environment where
victims feel empowered to come forward without fear of retaliation and
trust leadership to take appropriate actions.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources in place in USSOCOM to investigate and respond to allegations
of sexual assault?
Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a full assessment of the
training and resources available to prevent, investigate, and respond
to allegations of sexual assault, in close concert with the Services
and in line with Departmental policies.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of
military leaders to hold servicemembers accountable for sexual
misconduct?
Answer. From my experience, there is a strong willingness by DOD
and SOF leaders at every level to hold servicemembers appropriately
accountable for sexual misconduct. Accountability is leader business,
and an obligation we take seriously. Sexual misconduct degrades trust
and unit cohesion. Leaders must ensure all allegations of sexual
misconduct are fully investigated, and where appropriate, that
servicemembers are held accountable.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the
resources and programs in USSOCOM to provide victims of sexual assault
the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a full assessment of USSOCOM's
regulations and implementation of DOD policy regarding sexual assault
prevention and response. Education and training on sexual assault
prevention and response is critical--a key component of that education
is ensuring the force has a strong understanding of the resources that
are available to victims of sexual assault.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?
Answer. The chain of command plays a critical role in supporting
victims of sexual assault to ensure they receive appropriate care and
services, including medical, psychological, and legal support.
Meaningful chain of command engagement in sexual assault and sexual
harassment prevention and response helps foster an environment of trust
where victims understand they will be supported and will not be
retaliated against for reporting. If confirmed, I will ensure
commanders and command teams within USSOCOM understand my priority to
provide the best possible support to victims of sexual assault.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. The chain of command is key to establishing and changing
military culture. Present and engaged leadership sets the course for
our culture. Leaders must engage closely with our people to create and
sustain a culture where all members feel valued, physically and
psychologically safe, and are treated with dignity and respect. Through
meaningful engagement and training, leaders must also establish a
culture where it is universally understood that sexual misconduct has
no place within our force, and that perpetrators will be held
appropriately accountable. I embrace my obligation to ensure our
culture reflects our core values.
Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and
procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be
effective?
Answer. In my assessment, the current sexual assault policies and
procedures on restricted reporting are effective. Restricted reporting
is an important option that empowers victims with the ability to
receive medical care and counseling.
Question. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging
the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and
responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate
and intend to implement if confirmed as USSOCOM Commander?
Answer. If confirmed, I will examine current USSOCOM processes and
remain fully committed to eliminating the scourge of sexual assault
from our ranks--and I will ensure USSOCOM works closely with the
Military Services and the Department to maintain transparency,
consistency, and accuracy in reporting. Making informed decisions
through accurate data and trend analysis is a critical component of
preventing and responding to sexual assault. Studies--such as the
report produced by the Independent Review Commission on Sexual Assault
in the Military--provide meaningful insights and recommendations for
action that are relevant across the Services.
capabilities of special operations forces and general purpose forces
Question. What is your assessment of the mix of responsibilities
assigned to general purpose and SOF, particularly with respect to
security force assistance and building partner military capabilities?
Answer. From my experience, both SOF and general purpose forces are
capable of conducting security force assistance and building partner
military capabilities. Generally, SOF are utilized in politically
sensitive environments where a large U.S. presence is unacceptable to
the host nation or U.S. country team, while general purpose forces are
well-suited for environments where a larger U.S. Force presence is
desired and acceptable. In cases where both SOF and general purpose
forces share the mission of building partner military capability, it is
normally preferable for the U.S. Special Operations Forces to partner
directly with the host nation special operations forces, and for U.S.
general purpose forces to partner directly with the host nation's
conventional force counterparts.
special operations enabling capabilities
Question. In your view, how should the responsibility for providing
enabling capabilities for special operations missions be divided
between USSOCOM and the services?
Answer. From my experience, few SOF missions are accomplished
without non-SOF assistance. As the organization tasked with preparing
SOF to carry out assigned missions, USSOCOM is responsible--with
oversight and advocacy from ASD(SO/LIC)--for acquiring or managing SOF-
peculiar equipment, training, and budget. USSOCOM relies on the
Services to provide critical support, including personnel, logistics,
and service-common equipment, without which SOF cannot accomplish the
vast majority of its assigned missions.
Question. How would you ensure that the enabler requirements of
Special Operations Forces are appropriately communicated to and receive
support from the services?
Answer. From my experience, the Joint Staff Global Force Management
Process provides the means to communicate special operations
requirements for Service support--normally in support of Combatant
Commanders with geographic areas of responsibility. If confirmed, I
will examine this issue, and rely on the Special Operations Policy and
Oversight Council, and ASD(SO/LIC)--with his Service Secretary-like
responsibilities--to advocate on behalf of USSOCOM support requests
from the Services.
Question. Do you believe USSOCOM and the services are maintaining
adequate enabling capabilities to support special operations missions?
Answer. If confirmed, I will analyze this issue more closely. Few
SOF missions are accomplished without non-SOF assistance. In many ways,
these enablers have made possible SOF's remarkable record of mission
success in recent years. However, as the Joint Force implements the new
NDS and pivots to a more sustainable means of CVEO campaigning--with
reduced overseas footprint and bases--it will be critical to re-
evaluate enabling capabilities for special operations missions.
supported combatant command
Question. Under certain circumstances and subject to direction by
the President or Secretary of Defense, USSOCOM may operate as a
supported combatant command.
In your view, under what circumstances should USSOCOM conduct
operations as a supported combatant command?
Answer. If confirmed, I would explore this issue with the USSOCOM
team and relevant stakeholders and make recommendations to the
Department. From my understanding, USSOCOM has rarely served as a
supported combat command. Unless the President and Secretary of Defense
direct otherwise, the Combatant Commanders with geographic areas of
responsibility receive operational control of special operations forces
and capabilities.
Question. In your view, what resource, organization, and force
structure changes, if any, are required in order for USSOCOM to more
effectively conduct both supporting and supported combatant command
responsibilities?
Answer. If confirmed, and using the NDS as a guide, I will evaluate
USSOCOM's resources, organization, and force structure to determine
whether USSOCOM can effectively conduct both supporting and supported
combatant command responsibilities--and I will make appropriate
recommendations through ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department.
theater special operations commands
Question. Based on your professional military experience, how would
you characterize the benefits of a dedicated special operations
component to a geographic combatant command in providing responsive
special operations planning and capabilities in support of the
combatant command's theater campaign plan and associated requirements?
Answer. As a former Theater Special Operations Command commander in
USINDOPACOM, I recognize that these organizations are the leading edge
of SOF operations for both combatant commands with geographic areas of
responsibility, and for USSOCOM. Their work is extremely important to
integrated deterrence, campaigning, and conflict--and highly valued by
geographic combatant commanders. They are the operational end of the
USSOCOM team, responsible for planning and controlling special
operations and other SOF activities in support of their respective
combatant commands.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
women, peace and security
1. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Fenton, what specific and
measurable actions do you intend to take to implement the Women, Peace
and Security Act at U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and U.S.
Africa Command (AFRICOM), respectively, and fully integrate women into
broader national security efforts?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my experience, especially in the
Indo-Pacific, I've seen how important and impactful WPS efforts are.
Special Operations Forces (SOF) leverage WPS to better account for
human security in SOF capabilities, such as Civil Affairs, to emphasize
the human aspects of the operational environment. Gender-based
perspectives are essential for conflict prevention, mediation, and
resolution. My current understanding is the USSOCOM WPS team has
designed and supported military-to-military exchanges on WPS concepts
and women's meaningful participation in SOF planning, decisionmaking,
execution, and force development with many partner nations. If
confirmed, I will conduct a fulsome assessment of USSOCOM's current WPS
initiatives to ensure we continue to promote women's participation in
conflict resolution and other national security matters; and USSOCOM
will remain aligned with DOD WPS implementation efforts. These efforts
advance U.S. national security objectives and keep the U.S. a credible
partner of choice by providing non-escalatory ways to address national
security challenges.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
special operations command posture in the indo-pacific
2. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Fenton, one of Commander,
U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) Admiral John C. Aquilino's
priorities is to shift the balance of U.S. Forces in USINDOPACOM to a
more distributed posture across the region. What vision do you have for
Special Operations' component of this posture and their greater role in
the Indo-Pacific?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed I will consult with
Commander, USINDOPACOM, and Commander, Special Operations Command
Pacific (SOCPAC) to gain a fuller appreciation of this issue. I would
offer that, generally, special operations forces operate in small teams
that gain placement and access in land, sea, air, cyber, and space
domains; work closely with interagency teammates; and build
relationships with regional allies and partners. This facilitates a
distributed force posture across the region, and integration of Special
Operations as part of the Joint Force and USINDOPACOM Campaign Plan.
seal delivery vehicles
3. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Fenton, last year Naval
Special Forces in Hawaii began testing the new Mk 11 SEAL delivery
vehicle. If confirmed, how will you prioritize integrating SEAL teams
with technology to replace the aging Mk 8?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Given their specialized and critical
skillset in the maritime domain, I believe it is essential to ensure we
equip our SEALs with the latest advances in technology. If confirmed, I
will consult with USSOCOM and U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command teams
to ensure we correctly prioritize the integration of SEAL teams with
new technology.
diversity in special operations forces
4. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Fenton, what ideas do you
have to encourage more diversity among special forces, a historically
less diverse military community?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Diversity in Special Operations Forces
is a mission requirement, an operational imperative, and provides the
talent we need to success now and in the future. The Special Operations
mission is global, and mission success requires a diverse, innovative,
inclusive, and empowered team of SOF professionals. It is critical to
have a culture that embodies this. In my current command, I have
engaged key populations and worked to identify and remove real and
perceived barriers. If confirmed, I will ensure the formation--
particularly the leaders--listen, identify, and take action to ensure
USSOCOM has talent from a diverse set of demographic, cognitive, and
experiential backgrounds.
5. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Fenton, if confirmed, how do
you intend to ensure there are equal leadership opportunities for women
and minorities among special forces?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I firmly believe that People are SOF's
competitive and comparative advantage. A diverse population will ensure
we have the talent required for mission success. Over the last decade,
women have occupied combat roles; have completed schools such as
Ranger, Special Forces Qualification, and Special Warfare Combatant
Crewman (SWCC); and have earned leadership positions across the SOF
enterprise. However, there is still more work to do, not just for women
but also minorities. I understand that USSOCOM has increased the Women
in SOF training cadre billets within the SEAL/SWCC pipeline to set the
condition for increased candidates, as well as to establish more female
mentors in the ranks--and is also assessing this initiative for other
Service Components in the future. If confirmed, I will continue efforts
already underway at USSOCOM and explore other initiatives to ensure
equal leadership opportunities across the SOF formation. If confirmed,
I will also continue working to ensure everyone in the formation is
treated fairly, justly, and impartially.
pivot from counterterrorism to great power competition
6. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Fenton, our National Defense
Strategy focuses on great power competition as the primary threat to
our interests. How has this philosophy changed the way U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM), who has spent so much of the last decade
focused on counterterrorism, operates?
Lieutenant General Fenton. SOF were born for strategic competition.
From inception in the 1950's to today, SOF have never left this
mission, including during 20+ years of the counterterrorism fight. In
my view, USSOCOM and SOF have a primary mission to provide the
Department and supported Combatant Commands with asymmetric options and
capabilities relevant to strategic competition, while presenting
multiple dilemmas to our adversaries. SOF also support the Department
and other Combatant Commands with crisis response and CVEO
capabilities. If confirmed, and using the NDS as guidance, I will
review existing and emerging USSOCOM requirements, and ensure SOF are
prepared to conduct assigned missions.
7. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Fenton, if confirmed, how do
you intend to apply lessons from preparing Ukraine for war to our
support for Taiwan?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my current position, I have limited
visibility on this issue. If confirmed, I will review (in coordination
with U.S. European Command and Special Operations Command Europe) the
ongoing conflict in Ukraine--with the caveat that many lessons may not
be instantly transferrable to Taiwan, given differences in force
disparity, geography, and other factors--and then consult with the
USINDOPACOM and SOCPAC teams. I assess there are several important
takeaways to date, including: the power of partners and allies; the
value of technology, including in the form of information operations,
small UAS, and open-source satellite imagery; and the asymmetric impact
of a well-trained and equipped special operations force.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
china commission
8. Senator King. Lieutenant General Fenton, I believe we must
establish an unbiased and non-partisan commission to examine a grand
strategy for our approach to China, similar in intent to President
Eisenhower's Solarium Project. We need to think a truly whole-of-
government approach to create a stable international order in which
China cannot dictate regional developments. What are the `toughest
problems' outside of military imbalances?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my current position, I have limited
insight on the most recent developments with respect to the PRC. Based
on my previous experience at USINDOPACOM, I consider one of the
`toughest problems' to be the PRC's concerted effort to develop a
global network of military bases. Another would be the PRC's predatory
economic practices and use of economics for coercion.
9. Senator King. Lieutenant General Fenton, what would be the
greatest benefit this commission could deliver?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I take direction from the current NDS
and Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, which consider the
challenge of China and emphasize the importance of an integrated whole-
of-government approach. I believe timely decisionmaking and
synchronization of effects across government, across domains (land,
sea, air, information, space, cyber), across the elements of national
power, and across our network of partners and allies would be a worthy
focus for any U.S. strategic review vis-a-vis China.
10. Senator King. Lieutenant General Fenton, what would put us in
the best position to avoid the United States and China from escalating
conflict and careening into a war with China?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I will examine this issue
with the current USINDOPACOM team and other Combatant Commands. Based
on my previous service at USINDOPACOM, I believe that transparency and
open communication with the PRC are key to avoiding escalation, in
accordance with international rules and norms. U.S. military and
civilian engagement provide decisionmakers the information and time
necessary to make well-informed strategic decisions, while also
ensuring the PRC understand our actions to avoid unintended conflict.
11. Senator King. Lieutenant General Fenton, how do we leverage our
established partnerships in the area of responsibility (AOR) to counter
China's actions in the region?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I would want to discuss
this issue with the USINDOPACOM team. Based on my previous service at
USINDOPACOM, I believe that SOF play an important role in the whole-of-
government effort to strengthen regional relationships and counter
malicious PRC actions--by being the partner of choice for those in the
region. By building a robust network of partners and allies, we show
the PRC that many nations will stand together in support of free/open
ideas and a rules-based international order. These critical
partnerships often turn into training relationships, presenting
multiple dilemmas to the PRC and providing additional options for
USINDOPACOM.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
12. Senator King. Lieutenant General Fenton, do you support the
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I defer to the Office of the Secretary
of Defense on this.
expeditionary tactical operations center
13. Senator King. Lieutenant General Fenton, LtGen Langley, do you
believe your future command and service component commands could
further benefit from an expeditionary, affordable, all weather, TS/SCI
capable structures such as the MPSS?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I will assess USSOCOM's
capabilities and requirements in this area. It is my understanding that
USSOCOM has systems similar to MPSS available to its forces now, but
any capability that assists SOF's ability to operate in small,
distributed elements, while providing robust communications in austere
locations deserves consideration.
arctic
14. Senator King. Lieutenant General Fenton, what specific resource
shortfalls does your command possess that would limit your ability to
conduct exercises/operations in the High North? Please be specific to
include operations and sustainment funding for exercises, and equipment
shortfalls such as cold weather gear for servicemember or mission
specific/unique platforms.
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I will do a complete
assessment across the USSOCOM enterprise to identify any resource and
equipment shortfalls for training and operating in High-North/Arctic
environments, to ensure mission readiness for both exercises and
operations. Aligned with the NDS, we must be able to operate and
succeed in any environment/climate, including the Arctic.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
civilian harm prevention
15. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Fenton, do you agree
civilian casualties harm our credibility and fuel the very insurgencies
we are trying to defeat?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I agree. We have a moral and strategic
obligation to avoid civilian casualties--this is at the heart of who we
are as a Military and a Nation.
16. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Fenton, do you pledge to
receive quarterly briefings from the Department of Defense's (DOD)
civilian harm experts and to regularly engage with civil society
organizations?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I do.
security assistance
17. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Fenton, under title 10 USC
127e, U.S. law permits the Secretary of Defense to spend up to $100
million per year to support partners who facilitate or support
authorized U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) to combat terrorism.
According to open-source reporting, this authority has been used to
conduct operations in Somalia, Libya, Kenya, Tunisia, Cameroon, Mali,
Mauritania, and Niger--all of which have had serious concerns raised
for years in the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights
Practices. Despite these risks, 127e programs operate with little
transparency or oversight. They also appear to undergo little human
rights due diligence and are not currently vetted under the Leahy law.
What is your understanding of the due diligence that is currently
applied to these programs and does it include human rights vetting?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my experience, the 127e program has
been an essential tool in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The ability
to organize, develop, and train a partner force provides placement,
access, and opportunities for action not previously available, while
accomplishing CT objectives and minimizing risk to U.S. Forces.
For our 127e programs, successful and safe interaction with foreign
units, groups, and individuals hinges on our ability to confirm their
identities and gain insight into their backgrounds and motivations. In
that vein, and in coordination with the Department of State, our forces
conduct a thorough screening and vetting process that begins with
initial contact and carries through the duration of the program.
Additionally, Human Rights and Law of Armed Conflict principles are
integrated into all aspects of training and operations with 127e-
enabled forces.
If confirmed, should there be any credible allegation of human
rights abuse or LOAC violations, I can assure you that 127e support
would be suspended immediately and we would support a full
investigation into the allegations.
18. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Fenton, what's your
understanding of how to assess the effectiveness of the 127e program?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my experience, the 127e program has
been an essential tool in U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. The ability
to organize, develop, and train a partner force provides placement,
access, and opportunities for action not previously available, while
accomplishing CT objectives and minimizing risk to U.S. Forces. If
confirmed, I will assess the effectiveness of 127e programs using a
variety of means, including: NDS priorities, COCOM priorities, a
defined end-State and off-ramp plan, clear measures of performance and
effectiveness, a monitoring and reassessment process for meeting
objectives, and effective screening of the partner force.
19. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Fenton, will you commit to
applying human rights vetting, as required by the Leahy law, to
recipients of U.S. funding, training, and support under 127e?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I will commit to adhering to the
applicable laws and DOD policies for 127e and will ensure we follow the
well-established training program of instruction for 127e-enabled
forces which includes the law of armed conflict and human rights.
20. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Fenton, will you commit to
providing to Congress, on a regular basis, a list of ongoing and
planned security cooperation and assistance activities under 127e, and
to notify Congress of the introduction of U.S. Forces into situations
where imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the
circumstances?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I commit that USSOCOM will
continue to provide (in accordance with existing legislation, and
through ASD(SO/LIC) and the Department) an annual forecast and bi-
annual reports that describe: the supported SOF operations; the support
provided to the foreign forces; the funding expended; and an assessment
of the strategic value derived from our use of 127e authority.
Likewise, if confirmed, I commit to working closely with the
combatant commanders to ensure that SOF operational activity,
particularly where our forces are involved in hostilities, is reported
through existing mechanisms in accordance with the law and policy.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
joint all-domain training center for the east coast
21. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Fenton, I greatly
appreciated our discussion over the phone earlier this week concerning
your nomination. As I mentioned on that call, we are working on making
West Virginia more available for USSOCOM and conventional forces
training. We have parts of the State that are in great condition for
training opportunities, from subterranean complexes to austere rural
and urban environments. There is surface mine land that is possible for
transfer to DOD ownership at no cost to create a Joint All-Domain
Training Center for East Coast based units to train at a significantly
reduced cost compared to similar training they would travel to the West
Coast for. My office has been working with a J3X representative from
USSOCOM in our State, as well as the West Virginia National Guard, to
highlight what we have to offer, and I hope to have you out soon to do
a site visit. If USSOCOM Combat Mission Rehearsal Complex staff have
not briefed you on this program, can you commit to receiving that
briefing?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I look forward to being
briefed on and learning more about the proposed Joint All-Domain
Training Center. I look forward to visiting the SOF units that already
train in West Virginia.
influence operations
22. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Fenton, foreign influence
operations with disinformation campaigns are perhaps the easiest and
most inexpensive ways for our adversaries to sow confusion and spread
false narratives and conflict in our country. Bad actors like China and
Russia see our current political tribalism and it's easy for them to
take advantage of it in the information ``gray zone''. How are USSOCOM
and USAFRICOM working to counter foreign influence operations and how
can Congress assist with these efforts?
Lieutenant General Fenton. The information environment is key
terrain globally. USSOCOM provides options to compete with adversaries
in the gray zone using web-based military information support
operations, civil affairs, and cyberspace capabilities, among others,
to achieve military objectives. A whole-of-government approach to
countering foreign influence operations is critical, and SOF are well-
positioned to integrate with interagency capabilities and activities.
If confirmed, I will examine this more closely and come back to DOD
with recommendations on USSOCOM's role, how other critical DOD and
interagency partners could help with/integrate efforts in this space,
as well as how Congress could assist.
23. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Fenton, what more can
Members of Congress do to make our constituents aware and wary of
foreign influence online?
Lieutenant General Fenton. While I have limited visibility on this,
I would offer that Members of Congress could continue to prioritize
engagements on this topic with DOD and interagency experts, the
Intelligence Community, and our foreign partners. Congress provides a
valuable link between the American people and national security
challenges such as foreign influence online.
special operations command cyber efforts
24. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Fenton, I don't have to
tell you that the new National Defense Strategy is placing a great
challenge on our special operations community, which has been filling a
high demand tempo for counterterrorism operations and are now shifting
away from direct combat. This new strategy will require our special
operations personnel to engage in missions that could be considered
less satisfactory because they are different from the traditional
counterterrorism operations they have been brought up with. For
instance, less direct action and more intelligence gathering,
especially through cyber means. Do you agree with this assessment, and
how do you plan to guide USSOCOM into this new operational paradigm if
confirmed?
Lieutenant General Fenton. SOF have a proven record of adapting to
the current needs of this Nation and are equal to the task of doing so
again. In this case, it is a return to our roots, as SOF were born for
strategic competition. Our strong relationships with partner and allied
forces, and irregular warfare expertise, provide placement, access, and
capabilities; message U.S. conviction; and minimize the risk of
unintended escalation. SOF are particularly adept in gray zone
competition and provide the Department and supported Combatant Commands
with asymmetric options and capabilities that enable campaigning and
integrated deterrence, presenting multiple dilemmas to our adversaries.
Aligned with the NDS, accounting for strategic competition, CVEO,
and crisis response requirements--while modernizing SOF and preparing
to enable the Joint Force in the event of conflict--is a strategic
imperative for USSOCOM. I assess we are up for the challenge. If
confirmed, and using the NDS for guidance, I will review existing and
emerging USSOCOM requirements, make recommendations to ASD(SO/LIC) and
the Department as appropriate, and ensure SOF are prepared to conduct
assigned missions--no matter where they fall on the spectrum on
conflict.
25. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Fenton, with the higher
levels of technical proficiency required for these new mission sets,
how do you plan to ensure special forces stay on the cutting edge of
technology acquisition and training standards, especially as it relates
to cyber focused capabilities?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my current position, transformation
and technology are priorities. To be at the cutting edge of technology,
we must first ``modernize'' our people. People are SOF's competitive
and comparative advantage, and we must ensure they have the education
and training needed to stay on the cutting edge. In my experience,
special operations forces have become adept at learning, adopting, and
operationalizing cutting edge technologies--frequently in asymmetric
ways. Cyber has been, and will continue to be, a critical capability
for SOF. I am especially optimistic about the possibilities that exist
at the growing intersection of SOF, Space, and Cyber. If confirmed, I
look forward to doing a holistic assessment of all these areas across
the USSOCOM enterprise.
ridge runner
26. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Fenton, I want to bring to
your attention the annual Ridge Runner Irregular Warfare Training
Activity. Held every year in West Virginia and nearby States, this
exercise provides participating forces dynamic, real-world, and multi-
domain training with few to none administrative pauses. Past
participants have included American formations from multiple services
and representatives from ally and partner nations such as Poland. If
confirmed, and if you are unaware of Ridge Runner, can you commit to
being briefed on this valuable exercise and consider attending a future
Ridge Runner and promoting this training opportunity to allies and
partners with whom you will work?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I look forward to being
briefed on and learning more about Ridge Runner.
state partnership program
27. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Fenton, the State
Partnership Program has been a fantastic means to deepen ties between
allied and partner nations and provide valuable training to our
Guardsmen and foreign militaries. As you both know, the California
National Guard is right now providing advice, through relationship
developed in the State Partnership Program, to Ukrainian soldiers
defending their homeland against Putin's aggression. If confirmed, how
will you, in your respective positions, expand or leverage the State
Partnership Program to promote our interests in your assigned area of
responsibility or improve relations with partner nations and
militaries?
Lieutenant General Fenton. During my 5 = years at USINDOPACOM, I
saw the power of the National Guard State Partnership Program
personally, as well as through the eyes of many countries throughout
the region. Our National Guard teammates built incredibly strong,
enduring relationships via their reoccurring engagements with the same
partner forces--many times these relationships are stronger than those
of our active-duty forces. These persistent relationships strengthened
the U.S. bond with our partners and allies. If confirmed, in
coordination with the Theater Special Operations Commands and in
support of the Geographic Combatant Commanders, I will take a holistic
look to identify potential opportunities to further expand this great
program across the globe--aligned with National Defense Strategy
priorities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
pivot to great power competition
28. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Fenton, when we met last
week, we discussed the need to focus on and prepare for the very real
threat of a China-Taiwan scenario and the global economic
implications--even as we continue to support Ukraine in the face of a
Russian invasion. Earlier this week I had the opportunity, alongside
Senator Ernst, to hear from some of our operators as they returned from
Eastern Europe. Our discussion was a reminder of how effective SOF can
be in building capacity for our partners and addressing threats from
near-peer adversaries. If confirmed, I expect you will be in the seat
during a transformative time as USSOCOM continues a pivot from a
focused counterterror mission and toward long-term strategic
competition with near-peer threats. How do you see U.S. Special
Operations developing or transitioning over the next decade?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, and using the NDS for
guidance, I will review existing and emerging USSOCOM requirements,
make recommendations to the Department as appropriate, and ensure SOF
are prepared to conduct assigned missions. I offer that the right
apportionment between strategic competition, CVEO, and crisis response
requirements--while modernizing SOF and preparing to enable the Joint
Force in the event of conflict--is a strategic imperative for USSOCOM.
With respect to transition, SOF have consistently ``shapeshifted'' as
needed to solve the Nation's problems and I am confident we continue to
do so--with people and technology being at the forefront.
29. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Fenton, do you believe our
special operations forces have the necessary skills and tools to
transition over the next decade?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic
review of USSOCOM's investments in manning, training, and equipping
special operations forces--in close cooperation with ASD(SO/LIC)--to
ensure SOF have the necessary skills and tools for current and future
missions. I would offer we do have the necessary attributes right now.
We build our recruiting, assessment, selection, and training programs
around these attributes, and we layer on additional skills--so my
current assessment is that we are well postured as a force for the
challenges of the next decade.
30. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Fenton, what additional tools
do they need?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I will conduct a
comprehensive review of USSOCOM's investments in manning, training, and
equipping special operations forces--in close cooperation with ASD(SO/
LIC)--to examine SOF's current tools (e.g., education, augmented/
virtual reality, artificial intelligence) for current and future
missions, and report any additional requirements to the Department.
31. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Fenton, as we think about
challenges posed by China, what are the lessons we can apply from our
experience with Ukraine where we've seen our years of investment pay
dividends at a critical time for European security?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I assess there are several important
lessons from Ukraine that may be applicable to the pacing challenge of
China. These include: the power of partners and allies, as seen through
the galvanizing of NATO in support of Ukraine; the value of technology,
including in the form of information operations, small UAS, and open-
source satellite imagery; and the asymmetric impact of well-trained and
equipped partner forces.
brandon act
32. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Fenton, when we met last week
we discussed the Brandon Act, and I was pleased to hear you speak
favorably about the importance of mental health in the Force, and also
my legislation to protect servicemembers who experience mental health
emergencies and to reduce the stigma around reporting. I've been
working with the Defense Department since the Brandon Act's enactment
in the fiscal year 2022 and I ensured that this year's National Defense
Authorization Act (NDAA) requires an update on implementation plans and
actions. For USSOCOM, psychological health is paramount. Can you
discuss the importance of the Brandon Act within the special operations
community and how you will, if confirmed, implement this legislation?
Lieutenant General Fenton. The health and welfare of our forces and
their families is paramount. The loss of any of our servicemembers to
suicide is a tragedy that hurts to the core and makes us reflect on
what signs we may have missed. I strongly believe we must eliminate the
stigma of seeking help, while making mental health care more accessible
and reminding our force that mental health is health. Leaders must
demonstrate a commitment to ensure our servicemembers have the support,
tools, and resources necessary to seek help when they need it while
being afforded appropriate confidentiality. Communication to our
Service Members and their families can also help save lives. I believe
any legislation that increases our servicemembers' ability to ask for
and receive the help they need, could have a great impact. The Brandon
Act is important because it reinforces the importance of mental health
and provides concrete actions to ensure access to care and protection
against discrimination. If confirmed, I will continue to focus on this
critical issue, and I will do a full assessment of how USSOCOM and its
Service Components are implementing the Brandon Act.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
recruiting
33. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Fenton, how do you intend to
adapt to the current recruiting environment to generate more interest
in serving in SOF?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Our people are truly our competitive and
comparative advantage--so recruiting and retaining our incredible SOF
professionals has always been, and will continue to be, a top priority.
I also strongly believe that men and women in our joint force will
continue to want to serve in SOF, but as the Services are a critical
part of our pipeline, the recruiting challenges they currently face are
a serious concern. However, I believe the Services, along with their
SOF Service Components, have already begun adapting to the current
recruiting environment, and are collaborating on efforts to integrate
innovative changes, monetary incentives, and increased marketing to
identify and recruit highly qualified personnel. If confirmed, I will
assess how USSOCOM could assist the Services with their recruiting
efforts--to ensure SOF, and the entire joint force, will continue to
have the talent required to meet current and future challenges.
readiness
34. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Fenton, given your
experience at U.S. Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) and after
over 20 years of continuous combat, what is your assessment on the
current readiness of the special operations force?
Lieutenant General Fenton. From my current position and knowledge
of SOF writ large, I assess SOF's readiness level is high, and that SOF
achieve remarkable success on a regular basis. Readiness is constantly
evolving--we continually monitor readiness, maintain our rigorous
standards and challenging warfighter training, while caring for our
people and their families.
gray zone authorities
35. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Fenton, does USSOCOM have
all the authorities necessary to operate aggressively in the gray zone
of warfare?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic
review of USSOCOM's authorities and activities in the gray zone, and
continually reassess both authorities and activities in close
coordination with supported Combatant Commands.
36. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Fenton, does USSOCOM have
the resources necessary to train to gray zone warfare?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my current position, I do not have a
holistic view of USSOCOM training, exercises, and resources. If
confirmed, I look forward to reviewing USSOCOM's existing training
resources and providing recommendations as appropriate, in coordination
with ASD(SO/LIC). However, SOF were born for this type of warfare. SOF
core activities, such as unconventional warfare, foreign internal
defense, strategic reconnaissance, civil affairs, and military
information support operations, have been a part of SOF training and
operations since inception and continue today. As such, SOF are tailor-
made for competing in the gray zone. As adversaries advance their own
capabilities and present different challenges to our force, we must
continue to adapt training and resources to meet the demands of an
evolving operating environment.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
united states special operations command and africa command
37. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Fenton, understanding the
importance of robust transition support to our warriors as they exit
service, what are the unique needs for our special operators as they
make this transition?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Along with Service programs, tailored
programs that help our incredible SOF professionals as they transition
to civilian life are essential. From my perspective, the needs our
special operators have as they transition include: 1) the need to be
connected to performance-based organizations; 2) the desire to be
connected to performance health programs; 3) the need for access to
behavioral health providers; and 4) the need to translate their years
of service in a way private sector employers can understand.
Whether SOF needs are unique among combat-experienced forces is not
entirely clear. We do know that many SOF personnel suffer significant
injuries and are exposed to high levels of combat and other stressors
during their careers. If confirmed, I intend to assess this with the
USSOCOM Service Components and USSOCOM team.
38. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Fenton, is there a gap
between conventional forces and our special operators in this regard?
Lieutenant General Fenton. DOD transition programs are designed to
provide the maximum benefit to the greatest number of Soldiers,
Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and Guardians possible, and I appreciate the
level of support the Services provide our transitioning servicemembers.
With that in mind, SOF might not achieve maximum benefit from only
using current transition programs. We are fortunate to have multiple,
privately sponsored programs specifically for SOF personnel. If
confirmed, I will review this holistically with USSOCOM and the
Services.
39. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Fenton, would the force
benefit from some additional help tailored to their experiences?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Based on my experience, I believe that
SOF could, and do, benefit from a more tailored transition program--as
evidenced by the multiple, privately sponsored programs available to
SOF personnel. I have witnessed this personally. If confirmed, I intend
to explore this topic more deeply, to ensure we have the best programs
possible to help our servicemembers transition after their years of
dedicated service.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Thom Tillis
counter-unmanned aerial systems strategies
40. Senator Tillis. Lieutenant General Fenton, previously, General
Richard D. Clarke, Jr., USA, current Commander, USSOCOM, has testified
before this Committee about the threat that adversary unmanned aerial
systems (UAS) pose to our troops from not just violent extremists but
also capable State adversaries and their aligned paramilitary forces--
we see this in places like Iraq but also in the ongoing Russia/
Ukrainian conflict.
In USSOCOM's Fiscal Year 2023 Budget Request they identified
counter-UAS as one of their top acquisition programs for Fiscal Year
2023. Likewise, in Fiscal Year 2022 this Committee provided a
significant increase for counter-UAS (C-UAS) to support SOF deployed
capabilities. Can you speak to USSOCOM's efforts in this area, your
experience with this threat, and if confirmed, what will your
priorities be when it comes to counter-UAS?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my experience, C-UAS is becoming
increasingly important to Joint Force and SOF operations. I know that
portions of the SOF enterprise have been working closely with the
Army's Joint C-UAS Office and continue to focus on the aspects of C-UAS
that are peculiar to Special Operations, especially C-UAS in remote,
austere environments in support of small, mobile SOF units and our
partners. If confirmed, I expect C-UAS will remain one of my top
priorities, given the increasing threat from these systems to our
forces.
41. Senator Tillis. Lieutenant General Fenton, the Committee has
previously heard from USSOCOM about its innovative approach to C-UAS,
leveraging the System Integration Partner contract and its system of
systems, open architecture approach to allow for the rapid integration
of both emerging and proven technologies. In support of those efforts,
this year the Committee included report language in our NDAA regarding
software first strategies, which specifically recognizes the
Committee's support for the groundbreaking work that USSOCOM has
undertaken.
In your current and previous roles, do you believe that other
combatant commanders have seen value in USSOCOM's approach and, if
confirmed, will you commit to engaging with your counterparts to ensure
they're applying the lessons learned from the program in their areas of
responsibility?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Based on my experience, I believe
Combatant Commanders place great value on the way special operations
forces approach problem-solving in general--and USSOCOM's current
efforts in countering small UAS specifically. If confirmed, I will
continue this important work within the USSOCOM enterprise and
collaborate with rest of the Joint Force on this critical capability.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
special operations forces in the arctic
42. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Fenton, from Russia
demanding approval for ships exercising free rite of passage through
the Northern Sea Route, to China labeling themselves a ``near-Arctic
State,'' it is clear that the Arctic is now a contested region for
great power competitors. Yet despite being an Arctic Nation, our
special operations forces remain behind our European counterparts, such
as the Fins and Swedes, in operational competence, capability, and
sustainability in this domain. Will you commit to looking into the
increased training and equipping of our special operations forces here
at home, in Alaska, to enable are more proficient and sustainable SOF
footprint in the Arctic?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, yes, I will. I also commit
to returning to Alaska, having visited forces there in the past, to
better understand progress already made and the work still to be done.
special operations forces in the indo-pacific
43. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Fenton, your resume is
exceptional and your experience makes you a perfect fit to lead USSOCOM
into this new era of authoritarian aggression. Given your time as
Commander of Special Operations Command--Pacific, as well as Deputy
Commander of USINDOPACOM, what do you see as SOF's unique value
proposition in an Indo-Pacific conflict?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my view, USSOCOM and SOF provide the
Department and supported Combatant Commands (to include USINDOPACOM)
with asymmetric options and capabilities relevant to strategic
competition, while presenting multiple dilemmas to our adversaries.
Often, this involves SOF training, advising, assisting, and building
partner capacity; and sensing, illuminating, and reporting adversary
activities. In the event of an Indo-Pacific conflict, SOF provide the
Combatant Commander with many advantages, including a combat credible
force, strengthened partner forces, regional placement and access, and
a range of high-end options.
44. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Fenton, how do you believe
SOF best supports the various service strategies, such as the Marine
Corps' Stand-in Forces or the Navy's Distributed Maritime Operations?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Services and ASD(SO/LIC) to ensure interoperability and
coordination between the Services and SOF. But I would offer that SOF
placement, access, influence, and regional understanding provides
insights and awareness to all the Services and USINDOPACOM in support
of their objectives.
transition from u.s. central command to u.s. indo-pacific command
45. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Fenton, U.S. Special
Operations Forces have been the leading edge of our counterterrorism
efforts in USCENTCOM these past 20 years. As we enter into a new era of
authoritarian aggression and our geostrategic priorities shift toward
the Indo-Pacific, the concept of contested warfighting domains is
changing. With respect to USINDOPACOM, how would you characterize the
increasingly contested warfighting domains where SOF will operate?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I would characterize the current and
future operational environment--in USINDOPACOM and elsewhere--as
increasingly contested, congested, and complex across all domains (air,
land, sea, information, space, and cyber). Within USINDOPACOM, China's
military modernization has elevated the importance of a robust network
of partners and allies--and a Joint Force that is increasingly lethal,
resilient, sustainable, survivable, agile, and responsive. In my view,
SOF are well-suited to operate in this operational environment.
46. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Fenton, what advancements
by China and Russia do you find most concerning?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my view, Chinese and Russian military
modernization and expanding global influence pose increasingly complex
challenges to our national security. In addition to growing their
conventional military and strategic/nuclear capabilities, China and
Russia are expanding their use of irregular warfare tactics involving
cyber, disinformation, proxy forces, and economic coercion around the
world--on top of their desire for global military basing options.
47. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Fenton, what is SOF doing
to counter these advancements?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my current position, I do not have
complete visibility on all SOF operations and activities, but I offer
that SOF support the Combatant Command campaign plans that address
these challenges. Often, this includes sensing, illuminating, and
reporting adversary activities and disinformation as part of the whole-
of-government approach to campaigning and deterrence. SOF also build
partner capacity through training, advising, and assisting partner
forces--strengthening relationships and increasing resilience to
Russian and Chinese tactics. SOF can also create multiple dilemmas for
our adversaries and hold their capabilities or interests at risk in
multiple locations around the world--in support of Combatant Command or
DoD objectives.
irregular warfare
48. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Fenton, our authoritarian
adversaries like Russia, China and Iran have all utilized ``gray zone''
warfare to threaten stability and promulgate malign influence across
the globe. Whether information operations, cyber operations, violence
via proxies, or other methods, these are the contested domains we must
increasingly be prepared to address. What role can and should SOF play
in more aggressively operating in this domain of warfare?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I believe that SOF are built for
campaigning and operating in the gray zone. In concert with geographic
Combatant Commands, SOF provide: resident expertise in unconventional
and irregular warfare; cultural awareness and knowledge of foreign
languages; scalable, asymmetric options in land, sea, air, space,
information, and cyber domains; and are well-versed in current and
emerging technology. Special operations forces train, advise, assist,
and build partner capacity; sense, illuminate, and report adversary
activities; create multiple dilemmas for our adversaries; and produce
meaningful options and capabilities for the supported Combatant
Commander.
49. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Fenton, do you believe SOF
is appropriately postured and resourced to conduct irregular warfare,
particularly in the areas of information warfare, sabotage and
subversion, and utilizing proxy forces?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I will conduct a
comprehensive review of SOF posture and resources for irregular
warfare. But I would offer that SOF are tailor-made for this type of
warfare. SOF core activities, such as unconventional warfare, foreign
internal defense, strategic reconnaissance, civil affairs, and military
information support operations, are critical irregular warfare
activities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
preservation of the force and family
50. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Fenton, I believe
anecdotal successes must be paired with quantitative data. If
confirmed, how will you address special operations forces' (SOF) vision
and strategy lacking milestones for current preservation of the force
and family (diver) data management limitations?
Lieutenant General Fenton. I am very familiar with the POTFF
program--it has made a significant difference in my life, and the lives
of many SOF members. It has also saved lives. I am familiar with the
December 2021 GAO study recommending the alignment of data management
to POTFF objectives. If confirmed, I will continue USSOCOM's tremendous
work on POTFF, including stressing the importance of collecting and
analyzing POTFF data. These efforts will ensure the entirety of the SOF
formation has access to POTFF resources and providers, while protecting
the personal health information of our personnel, and better
understanding how and why the POTFF program produces such incredible
outcomes.
indo-pacific
51. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Fenton, how is USSOCOM
uniquely postured to bring together allies and partner nations in the
Indo-Pacific to develop regional irregular warfare capabilities?
Lieutenant General Fenton. SOF are uniquely able to build partner
capacity and strengthen relationships globally. This is readily
apparent in the Indo-Pacific. Often, this looks like small teams that
speak local languages, are culturally attuned, and operate in countries
throughout the region in support of the geographic Combatant
Commander's campaign plan. These forces develop, train, advise, and
assist partner forces in irregular warfare, while providing options for
the Combatant Commander and presenting multiple dilemmas to our
adversaries.
52. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Fenton, if confirmed,
what Chinese gray zone activities would you prioritize countering and
why?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Combatant Commands and the Department to inform and prioritize SOF
support to the Combatant Command campaign plans that address China's
global gray zone activities. In my previous experience and current
role, I have seen SOF play a key role in strategic competition and
countering these activities. This includes sensing, illuminating, and
reporting adversary activities as part of the whole-of-government
approach to deterrence and campaigning.
53. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Fenton, what Russian gray
zone activities would you prioritize countering and why?
Lieutenant General Fenton. If confirmed, I will work closely with
the Combatant Commands and Department to inform and prioritize SOF
support to the Combatant Command campaign plans that address Russian
gray zone activities. In my previous experience and current role, I
have seen SOF play a key role in strategic competition and countering
these activities. This includes sensing, illuminating, and reporting
adversary activities and disinformation as part of the whole-of-
government approach to deterrence and campaigning.
54. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Fenton, what challenges
exist for traditional counterterror (CT) operations in the Indo-
Pacific, and what is the interplay between CT and great power
competition?
Lieutenant General Fenton. In my service at USINDOPACOM, I observed
that several of our key partners in the region value U.S. expertise
in--and support to--traditional CT operations as a vital aspect of our
broader strategic partnerships. The PRC has no comparable expertise or
capabilities to offer in the CT arena. This illustrates the intrinsic
and unique value that SOF provide. In some cases, traditional CT
operations and training support the broader whole-of-government effort
to deter and counter PRC exploitation and aggression.
artificial intelligence
55. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Fenton, how can we use
artificial intelligence (AI), data management, and quantum computing
capabilities to highlight the malign activities of al-Shabaab?
Lieutenant General Fenton. Artificial intelligence (AI), data
management, and machine learning are game changing technologies for
special operations forces, as well as the broader Joint Force. AI-
enabled technologies have the potential to greatly improve SOF's
ability to sense, collect, and analyze data for intelligence and
operational purposes to counter all threat actors, including al-
Shabaab. For example, SOF are currently leveraging machine learning and
natural language processing to detect and counter adversary
misinformation/disinformation. Our ability to ingest and analyze
terabytes of data is essential to better understand and, if feasible,
take action, against an adversary. With respect to terrorist
organizations, including Al Shabaab, we have used AI and robust data
analytic capabilities to enable the U.S. and our partners/allies to:
find, arrest, and prosecute terrorist fighters in coordination with law
enforcement agencies; execute counter-threat finance actions to freeze/
intercept terrorist funding sources; prevent terrorist fighters from
moving freely across international borders; and/or leverage the
information environment to highlight malign activity and discredit
terrorist organizations and their supporters.
______
[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Bryan P.
Fenton, USA follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Bryan P.
Fenton, USA, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time
the nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
General Bryan P. Fenton, USA in connection with his nomination
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Lieutenant General Bryan P. Fenton, USA
was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on July 26, 2022,
with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2022.]
__________
[Prepared questions submitted to Lieutenant General Michael
E. Langley, USMC by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with
answers supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
Duties
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander of United States Africa Command (AFRICOM)?
Answer. My understanding of the duties and functions of the
Commander of AFRICOM are informed by both law and policy. Title 10,
U.S. Code Sec. 164 specifically covers the assignment, powers, and
duties of the Commander of a Combatant Command, and applies to all
Combatant Commands. Such commanders are responsible to the President
and to the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions
assigned to that command by the President or by the Secretary with the
approval of the President. If confirmed, by law my primary duties will
be to produce plans for the employment of the armed forces to execute
national defense strategies and respond to significant military
contingencies. I would be required to take actions, as necessary, to
deter conflict and to command United States armed forces as directed by
the Secretary and approved by the President.
If confirmed, the command functions required to perform my job
would include giving authoritative direction to subordinate commands
and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command,
including authoritative direction over all aspects of military
operations, joint training and logistics. I would be responsible for
organizing commands and forces within the command and prescribing the
chain of command to those subordinate entities. If confirmed as
Commander, AFRICOM I must employ forces necessary to carry out assigned
missions and coordinate and approve those aspects of administration and
support (including control of resources and equipment, internal
organization, and training) and discipline necessary to carry out the
missions.
These duties and functions are how Commander of AFRICOM achieves
what is specified in the President's Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance (INSSG) and forthcoming National Security Strategy
(NSS), the Secretary of Defense's National Defense Strategy (NDS) and
Defense Planning Guidance (DPG), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff's (CJCS) National Military Strategy (NMS). Classified
executive documents, such as the President's Unified Command Plan (UCP)
and Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) provide more specific direction
and duties from the Commander in Chief as to what the Commander of
AFRICOM is required to do.
Question. What qualifications, qualities, and characteristics would
you bring to the position of Commander, AFRICOM, if confirmed?
Answer. As required by Title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 661 and Sec.
664(d), I possess the appropriate joint qualifications and have
completed a full tour of duty in a joint duty assignment as a General
Officer. I have served as the Deputy Director of Operations, J-33 on
the Joint Staff and Director of Strategy, Plans, and Policy, J-5,
United States Central Command.
For thirty-seven years, it has been my honor to serve this Nation,
our talented servicemembers, and their inspirational families. During
this time, I have been fortunate to lead organizations at every level
of the Marine Corps, from an artillery guns platoon as a Second
Lieutenant to my current position. This includes nine deployments
around the globe, including deployments to combat zones.
As a General Officer, command positions include the following
service: Deputy Commanding General, II Marine Expeditionary Force
(MEF); Commanding General, 2d Marine Expeditionary Brigade; Commanding
General, Marine Forces Europe and Africa; Commanding General, Fleet
Marine Force, Atlantic; and Commander, Marine Forces Command and Marine
Forces Northern Command. Beyond my command billets, I have gained
considerable experience from senior, joint positions. The foundation
for my Joint service began with advanced education at the Senior
Service College level. Through my extensive involvement in the Joint
environment, to include Joint Staff service as Director for Strategy,
Plans, and Policy (J-5), United States Central Command; a Policy Action
Officer in the Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) and the
Iraq Desk Officer in the Joint Staff Response Cell, Operations
Directorate (J-3), and Deputy Executive Assistant to the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I bolstered my appreciation for the national
security process and the interactions between Combatant Commanders, the
Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. If
confirmed, I will always place the mission first and draw on my many
years of experience to ensure the tasks assigned to United States
Africa Command are accomplished efficiently, effectively, and
professionally.
Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
enhance your ability to perform the duties of Commander, AFRICOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will become more familiar with strategy and
plans from the Department of State and USAID, while examining AFRICOM's
plans to ensure they are aligned with the other United States
Government stakeholders. I will conduct a 90-day assessment to ensure
AFRICOM's approach remains consistent with United States laws, policy,
and strategic guidance. Furthermore, I will accomplish this by
consulting with other agencies of the Executive Branch, Combatant
Commanders, the Service Component Commanders assigned to AFRICOM,
interagency colleagues, and multinational partners. I will use this
assessment as an opportunity to ensure operational commanders have the
people, resources, and authorities necessary to execute assigned tasks
and missions.
chain of command
Question. Section 162(b) of title 10, United States Code, provides
that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary of
Defense and from the Secretary of Defense to the combatant commands.
Section 163(a) of title 10 further provides that the President may
direct communications to combatant commanders through the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Do you believe that these provisions facilitate a clear and
effective chain of command?
Answer. Yes.
Question. In your view, do these provisions enhance or degrade
civilian control of the military?
Answer. These provisions enhance civilian control of the military
by ensuring that orders and communications from the President to
Combatant Commanders must go through an individual who has been
nominated by the President and confirmed by the legislature. The
confirmation process for the Secretary of Defense and Combatant
Commanders safeguards the civilian control of the military and ensures
that the elected representatives of the people have a central and final
say on issues involving the defense of our Nation and our security
policy.
Civilian control of the military has been enshrined in American
Government since our Nation's founding. It is clearly articulated in
the Constitution, the National Security Act of 1947 (as amended in
1952), and Title 10 U.S. Code. American citizens symbolically endorse
this ideal every time they raise their right hand and swear an oath to
the Constitution upon joining the military, reenlisting in the
military, or being appointed to a new office. It is the utmost duty of
any member of our armed forces to defend our foundational ideas and
documents.
Question. Are there circumstances in which you believe it is
appropriate for U.S. Military Forces to be under the operational
command or control of an authority other than the chain of command
established under title 10, United States Code?
Answer. The President retains national command authority over U.S.
Forces. This includes the authority and responsibility for organizing,
directing, coordinating, controlling, planning employment, and
protecting military forces. The President also has the authority to
terminate U.S. participation in multinational operations.
Generally speaking, U.S. Military Forces should remain under the
operational command and control of the chain of command established
under Title 10 of the United States Code, to the best extent
practicable. There are recent historical cases that provide some
precedence for operating in Alliances. The Unified Task Force (UNITAF)
that operated in Somalia in 1992/1993 was a United States led, U.N.
sanctioned multinational force and national command was retained
through political negotiations prior to commencing operations. A more
recent example of how this challenge was approached would be Operation
Odyssey Dawn/Unified Protector in Libya (2011). Although multinational
operations in Libya were initially commanded by the United States,
command eventually transitioned to NATO. The Title 10 chain of command
was retained following the transition because United States leadership
in the Mediterranean also serve in NATO roles as well.
Nations participating in an alliance or coalition should strive to
achieve unity of effort for the operation to the maximum extent
possible, with missions, tasks, responsibilities, and authorities
clearly defined and understood by all.
relationships
Question. The law and traditional practice establish important
relationships between the Commander, AFRICOM, and other senior
officials of the DOD and the United States Government.
Please describe your understanding of the relationship of the
Commander, AFRICOM, to each of the following officials:
The Secretary of Defense
Answer. My understanding of the relationship with the Secretary of
Defense is informed by Title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 113, 162(b), and
164(b). Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of
command runs from the President to the Secretary of Defense, and from
the Secretary of Defense to the Commander of AFRICOM. If confirmed, I
would be directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of
the command to carry out missions assigned to the command. I would be
responsible for interpreting guidance from the NDS, DPG, and CPG and
implementing in within the bounds of AFRICOM's area of responsibility
in a globally integrated fashion.
Question. The Under Secretaries of Defense
Answer. My understanding of the relationship with the Under
Secretaries of Defense is informed by Title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 133-137.
These appointees are principal staff assistants and advisors to the
Secretary on all matters that pertain to their specific portfolios.
They are a valuable counsel to the Combatant Commanders, and an
integral part of the overall decision-making process within the
department.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs
Answer. My understanding of the relationship with the Assistant
Secretaries of Defense is based on their roles and responsibilities as
specified by Title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 138. The Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs is the principal advisor to
the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD(P)) and the Secretary of
Defense on international security strategy and policy on issues of
Departmental interest that relate to the nations and international
organizations of Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, their governments
and defense establishments; and for oversight of security cooperation
programs and foreign military sales programs within these regions. If
confirmed, I would ensure that the staff of AFRICOM continues to
maintain positive and proactive relationships with the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, given the
unique requirements to work by, with, and through our African partners.
Question. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict
Answer. Per Title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 138(b)(2), the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for Special Operations (SO) and Low Intensity
Conflict (LIC) is the principal civilian advisor to the Secretary of
Defense on special operations and low-intensity conflict matters and
(after the Secretary and Deputy Secretary) is the principal special
operations and low intensity conflict official within the senior
management of the Department of Defense (DOD). The ASD (SO/LIC)
oversees and advocates for Special Operations and Irregular Warfare
throughout the Department to ensure these capabilities are properly
employed in accordance with the NDS. If confirmed, I will make sure
both myself and the AFRICOM staff maintain coordination with this
office on policy issues related to special operations capabilities and
resourcing, given the propensity for special operations forces to
operate on the African continent to work by, with, and through foreign
military forces to compete below the level of armed conflict and combat
violent extremist organizations.
Question. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff
Answer. The Chairman's roles are delineated by Title 10, U.S. Code
Sec. 151-3 and Sec. 163. The Chairman is the principal military adviser
to the President, the National Security Council (NSC), the Homeland
Security Council (HSC), and the Secretary of Defense. In carrying out
his functions, duties, and responsibilities the Chairman shall consult
with and seek the advice of the Commanders of the Unified and Specified
Combatant Commands and the Service Chiefs, as necessary. The Chairman
transmits communications between the National Command Authority (NCA)
and the Commander of AFRICOM and oversees the activities of the same,
as directed by the Secretary of Defense. The Chairman is a key conduit
between a Combatant Commander, interagency organizations, and the
Service Chiefs.
The Vice Chairman's roles are specified by Title 10, U.S. Code
Sec. 151 and Sec. 154. As a full voting member of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, the Vice Chairman is a military adviser to the President, NSC,
HSC, and Secretary of Defense who may provide advice after first
informing the Secretary and the Chairman. When there is a vacancy in
the office of the Chairman or in the absence or disability of the
Chairman, the Vice Chairman acts as Chairman and performs the duties of
the Chairman until a successor is appointed or the absence or
disability ceases. The Vice Chairman serves on several councils and
boards whose decisions affect AFRICOM, including the Joint Requirements
Oversight Council (JROC), the Defense Acquisition Board, the Defense
Advisory Working Group, and the Senior Readiness Oversight Council.
Regular communication between Combatant Commanders and the Vice
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is key to ensure these boards and
councils make informed choices on matters affecting the command. If
confirmed, I will keep the Chairman informed on significant issues
regarding the command's area of operations and communicate directly
with the Chairman and Vice Chairman on a regular basis.
Question. The Secretaries of the Military Departments and Service
Chiefs
Answer. The roles of the Service Secretaries are clearly delineated
in Title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 7013, 8013, and 9013. Generally, they are
responsible for, and have the authority necessary to conduct all
affairs for their respective Departments. These affairs include the
functions of organizing, supplying, equipping, training, administering,
and maintaining their forces. They exercise administrative control
through the Service Component Commands assigned to AFRICOM.
Duties of the Service Chiefs are covered in Title 10, U.S. Code
Sec. 7033 (Chief of Staff of the Army), 8033 (Chief of Naval
Operations), 8043 (Commandant of the Marine Corps), 9033 (Chief of
Staff of the Air Force), 9082 (Chief of Space Operations), and 10502
(Chief of the National Guard Bureau). Additionally, as members of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, their roles and responsibilities are further
defined in Title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 151. The Service Chiefs are
responsible for ensuring the readiness of their Service branch. The
Service Chiefs are also members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and serve
as advisers to the President, NSC, HSC and the Secretary of Defense. If
confirmed, I would rely on the Service Chiefs to provide properly
trained and equipped forces to accomplish command's mission.
Question. Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command
Answer. The responsibilities of the Commander, U.S. Special
Operations Command (USSOCOM) are defined in Title 10, U.S. Code
Sec. 167. The Commander, United States Special Operations Command is
responsible for the administration and support of special operations
forces assigned or attached to AFRICOM. Unless directed by the
President or Secretary of Defense, however, a special operations
activity or mission shall be conducted under the command of the
Combatant Commander in whose geographic area the activity or mission is
to be conducted. If confirmed, I would maintain an exceptionally close
relationship with the Commander, USSOCOM on issues of mutual interest.
Special Operations Command Africa (SOCAF) serves as a Theater Special
Operations Command (TSOC) and is a sub-unified command of USSOCOM under
the operational control of AFRICOM.
Question. The other combatant commanders
Answer. Duties of the other Combatant Commanders are defined in
Title 10, U.S. Code Sec. 164, the UCP, the CPG, and other Departmental
guidance and directives. While each Combatant Commander may be assigned
a specific geographic area or functional responsibility, it is
imperative that they all work together. Today's strategic operating
environment is characterized by global threats that cannot be addressed
solely in one theater. Additionally, each Combatant Commander is vying
for the same resources from the Military Departments. Collaboration and
consultation between commanders is critical to assisting the Chairman
in ensuring all operations are integrated globally to execute the
National Military Strategy (NMS).
AFRICOM has close relationships with several other Combatant
Commanders, namely the Commanders of United States European Command
(USEUCOM), United States Central Command (USCENTCOM), and USSOCOM.
Shared boundaries between AFRICOM, USEUCOM, and USCENTCOM require close
coordination as military operations in one area of responsibility have
systemic impacts on the other areas. The Commander, AFRICOM has an
especially close relationship with the Commander of USEUCOM as they
share three component commands (USAREUR/AF, NAVEUR/AF, MARFOREUR/AF),
as well as forces and assets. Additionally, as the Combatant Commander
for special operations forces operating in Africa under the control of
AFRICOM, close collaboration is necessary with USSOCOM. If confirmed, I
pledge to continue to maintain the great relationships that have been
formed before me.
Question. The United States Chiefs of Mission in the AFRICOM area
of responsibility (AOR)
Answer. My understanding of the roles and responsibilities of U.S.
Chiefs of Mission is informed by Title 22, U.S. Code Sec. 3927. Upon
presenting their credentials to the host government, Chiefs of Mission
are recognized as the principal diplomatic representative of the U.S.
Government. They have the task of carrying out overarching U.S. foreign
policy goals and strategic objectives. The Chiefs of Mission have full
responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all
government executive branch employees in a given country, except those
employees under the command of a U.S. area military commander. If
confirmed, recognizing their scope of authority, HQ AFRICOM will ensure
its partner engagement complements the Ambassadors' priorities and
diplomatic mission.
Question. The U.S. Senior Defense Officials/Defense Attaches (SDO/
DATT) in the AFRICOM AOR
Answer. The roles and responsibilities of the SDO/DATT are defined
in Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 5205.75, ``DOD Operations at
U.S. Embassies.'' Unified DOD representation in U.S. embassies is
critical to the accomplishment of national security objectives. The
SDO/DATT is the Chief of Mission's principal advisor on defense issues
and the senior diplomatically accredited DOD military officer assigned
to a U.S. diplomatic mission. All DOD elements under Chief of Mission
authority are under the coordination authority of the SDO/DATT, except
for the Marine security guard detachment and naval support units. While
they do not work directly for AFRICOM, they represent the Command's
perspective on a Country Team. There is a supervisory relationship
between the Commander, AFRICOM and the SDO/DATT. This relationship
ensures they maintain close coordination on all matters as the
Command's senior representative. If confirmed, I will ensure that the
staff at AFRICOM continues to maintain positive relationships with the
SDOs/DATTs within the area of responsibility.
major challenges and opportunities
Question. What do you consider to be the most significant
challenges you will face if confirmed as Commander, AFRICOM?
Answer. If confirmed, the most significant challenge I will face as
Commander, AFRICOM, is ensuring that our Nation is able to maintain
strategic access and influence across the continent. These are being
hampered by our strategic competitors, the People's Republic of China
(PRC) and the Russian Federation. I will also be faced with backsliding
democracies and weak regimes that create favorable conditions for the
growth of terrorists and violent extremist organizations (VEOs) in
ungoverned or poorly governed spaces. These groups pose a growing
threat to the U.S., our interests, and our allies.
Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I would begin by assessing the current
AFRICOM Campaign Plan. The current campaign plan is focused on
achieving four campaign objectives: 1) Gain and Maintain Strategic
Access and Influence, 2) Disrupt VEO Threats to U.S. Interests, 3)
Respond to Crises to Protect U.S. Interests, and 4) Coordinate Action
with Allies and Partners to Achieve Shared Security Objectives. I
believe it provides a sound construct to address AFRICOMs significant
challenges. This campaign plan pursues the objectives through a whole-
of-government approach, paired with interagency stakeholders,
international allies and partners, and multi-lateral organizations, to
assist African nations in building effective governance and defense
institutions with credible and professional security forces. As such,
the AFRICOM Campaign Plan is the defense contribution to the
initiatives described in the Global Fragility Act (GFA). AFRICOM
prioritizes gaining and maintaining access in key geostrategic
locations to disrupt competitor efforts that threaten U.S. freedom of
action and to check malign activities which exploit our African
partners. This is accomplished through multinational exercises; limited
operations; senior leader engagements; security cooperation
initiatives, support of multi-lateral organizations (the United
Nations) and posture and presence agreements.
Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen,
will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what
other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you
identified above, would you set for your tenure as Commander, AFRICOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure that AFRICOM's ability to
effectively respond to requests for assistance in safeguarding American
lives, property, and interests at diplomatic facilities will remain a
high priority for AFRICOM.
Lack of access to basic requirements such as reliable sources of
food and water affect much of the African continent. This reality
hampers the ability of African Governments to be effective for their
citizens, exacerbates migration issues, and creates humanitarian
challenges. To a great extent, the ongoing crisis in Ukraine and
climate change are driving this instability. While AFRICOM and its
forces are not the right tool to solve these problems alone, working
with the whole-of-government and international institutions to address
these will be a priority.
Lastly, building upon current efforts to implement the United
States Women, Peace, and Security Act on the African continent will be
a priority if I am confirmed. The Command has been implementing WPS
through peacekeeping capacity building activities and exercises since
2014, and the population growth rates in Africa demand that governments
ensure all members of society feel empowered to provide for their
common defense.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus your
Command's efforts on each of these priorities?
Answer. If confirmed, I will prioritize my efforts to understand
the situation on the continent as quickly as possible. This involves
visiting the AOR and meeting with key U.S. diplomatic and development
partners in the Department of State and USAID to understand their
contributions to U.S. policy outlined in the Global Fragility Act. I
will also obtain assessments from subordinate Service component
commanders, and discuss regional issues with African Ministers of
Defense and Chiefs of Defense. These efforts will inform AFRICOM's
priorities and the command's support to a whole-of-government approach
to assisting our African partners. Being a resource constrained
command, this requires a careful review of priorities for the command
to ensure the scarce resources are applied to the greatest affect.
national defense strategy
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China
as the ``most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing
challenge for the Department'' and stated that Russia poses an ``acute
threat,'' as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine. The NDS also identifies ``[m]utually-beneficial Alliances and
partnerships'' as ``an enduring strength for the United States.''
What is your understanding of the 2022 National Defense Strategy
(NDS) and its implications for the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. The National Defense Strategy is focused on addressing the
erosion of U.S. deterrence across domains, theaters and the spectrum of
conflict. The strategy is centered on Integrated Deterrence to reduce a
competitor's perception of the net benefits of aggression, campaigning
to advance our well-defined, strategy-aligned priorities over time, and
Building Enduring Advantages. Consistent with the National Defense
Strategy and other strategic guidance, AFRICOM provides affordable
insurance and investment for U.S. global advantage by campaigning to
mitigate risks in Africa in order to 1) protect U.S. interests, 2)
contribute to Integrated Deterrence, and 3) prevent strategic
distraction of national command authorities and other combatant
commands.
Question. What is your understanding of United States strategic
objectives in Africa and what role do you believe AFRICOM should play
in supporting these objectives?
Answer. My understanding of United States strategic objectives in
Africa is informed by the President's 2021 Interim National Security
Strategic Guidance, the 2019 Global Fragility Act, the 2020 Strategy to
Prevent Conflict and Promote Stability, and the 2019 Prosper Africa
Presidential Initiative.
The United States strategic objectives in Africa are to defend
America forward by preventing violent extremist organizations from
coordinating attacks on the Homeland from the continent; to promote a
favorable distribution of power to deter and prevent adversaries from
directly threating the U.S. and our allies, inhibit our access to the
global commons, or dominate key regions; and to lead and sustain an
open international system, underwritten by strong democratic alliances,
partnerships, multilateral institutions, and rules.
AFRICOM supports these objectives by working by, with, and through
our African partners, other allies, and the interagency to foster a
positive security environment. In turn, this enables development
efforts by the Department of State, USAID, the international community,
as well as the private sector. Security efforts from AFRICOM also
facilitate continued access and influence across the continent, which
helps identify threats to the Homeland emanating from violent extremist
organizations and allows stakeholders to take action to address
threats. Our access and influence also allow our forces to provide a
credible and enduring alternative to PRC and Russian military forces
attempting to bring Africa within their spheres of influence.
Question. In your view, what does ``great power competition'' look
like in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. The PRC is practicing ``debt colonialism'' by enticing
impoverished nations with financing for development programs, while
structuring the deals so that the nations forfeit rights to natural
resources, or are beholden to PRC goals and objectives. The PRC can use
these actions to further subvert the existing international order by
coercing African nations to support PRC UN voting ideals. Russia
attempts to maintain plausible deniability while its for-profit Private
Military Corporations partner with authoritarian regimes to repress
marginalized populations, keep pro-Russian Governments in power, and
disrupt UN mission mandate operations.
Neither of these two competitors possess the same morals or ideals
as the United States and our partners, which makes their efforts and
objectives exceptionally one-sided when evaluating long-term benefits.
The challenge for AFRICOM and the United States is how to compete with
the PRC and Russia, knowing it is unlikely we will ever outspend them
in the AOR, nor will we support every authoritarian regime. This will
require integrated objectives, strategies, and approaches with our
interagency and international partners.
As a competitive enabler, AFRICOM is a change agent that
contributes United States competitive efforts in the AOR by supporting
the interagency, NGOs, and IGOs. While DOD plays a critical role, it is
not the primary means of competing with the PRC and Russia. If
confirmed, I will prioritize support to interagency and international
efforts to defend and strengthen the structures of the open
international system, while securing U.S.'s access, influence, and
freedom of action within the AFRICOM's area of responsibility.
Question. Are United States policies and programs, as applicable to
Africa, appropriate to ensure the United States can succeed in great
power competition in the AFRICOM AOR? Are there additional measures we
should be considering? What do you perceive as the areas of highest
risk?
Answer. While the military does not have the lead for competition
with the PRC and Russia on the African continent, AFRICOM plays a
strong supporting role. The broader effort by the United States
Government, recently enhanced through the Global Fragility Act, focuses
on addressing systemic challenges on the continent. DOD's primary
contribution to implementation of policy is the through the security
sector. The competitive idea is that by helping states address security
challenges, AFRICOM also closes off an avenue for competitors to
exploit for their own gain. As competitor behavior evolves on the
continent, AFRICOM maintains its focus on the risks posed to the
continued advancement of U.S. interests.
The Department of State, in coordination with the DOD, has a wide
range of tools it brings to bear to support both the establishment of
security and also the professional development of international
military personnel. These include the International Military Education
and Training program (IMET), which sends foreign military personnel to
the United States for training and education, and which tends to
favorably dispose them to U.S. culture and institutions. The Department
of State also processes foreign military financing, foreign military
sales, and funds peacekeeping operations. AFRICOM conducts military
exercises and other combined training with our African partners to
address specific partner requirements. However, lengthy approval
processes and restrictive end-use agreements often encourage African
partners to turn to our competitors for security assistance, thus
decreasing United States access and influence on the continent.
The area of greatest risk to succeeding in great power competition
in Africa is the erosion of United States strategic access and
influence. Authoritarian regimes are naturally attracted to our
competitors, because their value systems align. Nations that turn
towards the PRC and Russia reduce our ability to maintain access and
promote a rules based international order, and free access to economic
markets.
If confirmed, I will evaluate the tools, policies, programs, and
authorities to enhance the effectiveness of U.S. competitive efforts on
the continent. Additionally, my staff will cultivate new partnerships
to better enable African states to resist undue foreign influence.
Question. Do you believe the Command's resources and authorities
are aligned in a manner consistent with NDS priorities and U.S.
strategic objectives?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to review the Command's current
resources and authorities and their alignment to the NDS priorities and
U.S. strategic objectives. Based on what I know now, such an alignment
exists. AFRICOM activities include exercises, engagements, security
force assistance, and counter-terrorism operations, all of which are
aligned to gaining or maintain a position of advantage to contribute to
Integrated Deterrence and prevent strategic distraction of national
command authorities and combatant commanders.
Question. If confirmed, what would you do to enhance or expedite
the implementation of the NDS and U.S. strategic objectives in AFRICOM?
Answer. Over the last year, AFRICOM developed a new Theater
Strategy and modified its AFRICOM Campaign Plan and AFRICOM Campaign
Order to align with and operationalize the NDS and other strategic
guidance. If confirmed, I intend to engage with African, European, and
interagency partners to assess our implementation progress and adjust
AFRICOM priorities as needed.
Question. If confirmed, how would you seek to balance the
requirements for increased emphasis on great power competition with
China and Russia with countering violent extremism in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. While certainly not one in the same, these two challenges
are interrelated, and potential approaches to address them may be
mutually supportive. If confirmed, I will ensure AFRICOM has a balanced
approach between countering violent extremist organizations (VEO) and
competing with the PRC and Russia. Further, a burden-sharing approach
in which AFRICOM works together with partners will help deter the
growing presence of external actors, namely Russia and the PRC, and the
continued VEO threat. A stable and prosperous African continent is
increasingly important to the United States--politically, economically,
and militarily--and will become even more so in the future. Stable
countries can provide for citizens, are less prone to corruption, less
subject to predatory lending, and more amenable to full participation
in a rules-based international order and free market economic system.
Emerging and growing challenges are the attempts by competitor
nations, such as the PRC and to a lesser extent Russia, to limit or
curtail the United States's access, influence, and freedom of action
within AFRICOM's area of responsibility. In support of diplomatic and
development efforts, AFRICOM strengthens partner networks, including
bilateral and multilateral partnerships, and enhances partner
capabilities to both reduce VEOs to a level manageable by internal
African security forces and limit malign influence of non-African
powers over the long-term to assure the access and influence of the
United States and its allies.
china
Question. What is your assessment of China's strategic objectives
in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. The PRC is the pacing challenge, operating in many theaters
across the globe with hegemonic ambitions, which are characterized by
coercion and dependency. The PRC seeks to control access to markets in
Africa, and develop a network of clients and customers beholden to
their whims. The ``Belt and Road Initiative'' is the PRC's primary
foreign policy tool and relies heavily on the import of raw materials
and extractives from the African continent. In order to cement the
necessary agreements, the PRC may take actions to improve its global
image. This was recently seen during the COVID-19 pandemic, as the PRC
delivered more than 1 billion vaccine doses to Africa. The PRC also
seeks to gain African support for their initiatives and encourage
African Governments to prevent the recognition of Taiwan. These
expanding economic and diplomatic objectives are likely to lead to
increased People's Liberation Army (PLA) engagements across the
continent, as the PRC seeks to protect its investments.
Question. In what ways, if any, do their strategic objectives
conflict with U.S. strategic objectives? In what ways, if any, do they
align with those of the U.S.?
Answer. The strategic objectives of the PRC are hegemonic and seek
to alter the global balance of power to create favorable market
conditions for further PRC expansion. To achieve these ends, they seek
market domination by engaging in predatory economic practices with
fledgling African nations and exploit their natural resources and labor
for their own benefit. In pursuing these objectives, the PRC looks for
opportunities and resources, not values and ideals. Their activities
disregard partner nations' human rights records and long-term economic
viability. Their offers of security assistance to African nations are
merely to ensure the protection of their own interests and do little to
benefit the international community.
In comparison, the strategic objectives of the U.S. and our Western
allies include promoting a favorable distribution of power to ensure
equal access to the global commons. We believe that ``a rising tide
lifts all boats.'' We seek to achieve these ends through the
maintenance of a stable and open international system, underwritten by
strong democratic alliances, partnerships, multilateral institutions,
and rules. While the PRC searches for clients and customers, the U.S.
seeks partners and allies. This reality puts our two nations' long term
strategic objectives at direct odds.
There may, however, be occasions where the ways and means employed
by both the PRC and the United States are complimentary and achieve
some common short term security and stability goals common. Where the
PRC's security assistance is used by responsible governments to address
threats in a manner consistent with the rule of law, our near term
interests align. Where the PRC's economic investments are done with
transparency and are consistent with free market principles, the United
States Government should welcome competition with the PRC.
Question. In your opinion, what effect has China's engagement with
African militaries had on those militaries and on United States
security interests?
Answer. From what I have been briefed, the PRC's engagement has
marginally improved some African militaries through military equipment
sales and limited training, although endemic quality concerns probably
make any improvements short-lived. Investments in roads and
infrastructure, despite poor quality, enhance mobility. The PRC's
materiel assists African militaries' contributions to peacekeeping
operations. For example, the PRC has provided Nigeria with armed
unmanned aerial systems to improve its counterterrorism capabilities,
but the poor quality of these platforms has contributed to their
infrequent use. Low cost and short delivery timelines entice African
partners to purchase PRC equipment, but these purchases frequently do
not address the underlying military need, complicating United States
security force assistance. The PRC contributes up to 2,000 personnel to
United Nations peacekeeping operations but Beijing's deployments are
tailored towards its security interests, including gaining overseas
operational experience for its military personnel.
Question. Are United States policies and the associated
authorities--as applicable to Africa--sufficient to counter China's
influence, where needed, or are additional measures required? What role
should AFRICOM play in this regard?
Answer. From what I know given my previous experience at MARFORAF,
the current authorities extended to AFRICOM are sufficient. Given the
PRC's status as a pacing challenge, if confirmed, I will conduct a
comprehensive review to determine if those policies and authorities
remain sufficient. The role of AFRICOM is to continue to work through
the interagency to counter the PRC's influence. AFRICOM must also
integrate with the coordinating authority for Global Campaign Plan--
China (GCP-C).
Question. Do you foresee China's growing energy and resource
demands affecting security developments in Africa?
Answer. Yes. The PRC's expanded energy and resource demands in
Africa will likely be coupled with expanded Sino-African security
engagement. This could pose a challenge to U.S. access and influence in
the region.
russia
Question. What is your assessment of Russia's strategic objectives
in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. Russia is identified in our National Defense Strategy as an
acute threat, and this is evident through their continued illegal
actions in Ukraine. Their actions in the USEUCOM area of responsibility
are systematically affecting many theaters. Russia seeks to counter
Western interests and bolster influence through military/intelligence
cooperation, arms sales, and energy partnerships. They see Africa as a
vehicle through which it can weaken the West's dominance of global
governance, find partners for its vision of a multipolar world, extract
natural resources, and find economic opportunities for Russian
companies, particularly those closed off to Western markets because of
sanctions.
Question. In what ways, if any, do their strategic objectives
conflict with U.S. strategic objectives? In what ways, if any, do they
align with those of the United States?
Answer. Russia intends to undermine Western influence and access
wherever possible. AFRICOM's objective is to assist African partners in
maintaining freedom and prosperity. AFRICOM assists allies in
combatting violent extremists to protect United States and Western
interests, while improving internal security. In contrast, Russia's
assistance is focused on gaining influence to serve Moscow's needs and
its business interests. Russia's strategic objectives do not align with
those of the United States.
Russia's engagement in North Africa seeks to hold NATO's southern
flank at risk, but Moscow's presence or influence there has not risen
to a level that threatens the alliance and likely will not in the near
future with Moscow's current focus being on the war in Ukraine. Russia
presents its limited efforts in humanitarian and economic aid,
infrastructure development, and security assistance including
counterterrorism as broadly consistent with objectives shared by the
United States and Western partners; however, Moscow views these
activities primarily as tools to compete with Western influence. In
pursuit of these goals, Kremlin-linked groups such as the private
military company Wagner Group have been implicated in practices--
including human rights abuses and illicit mining--that are counter to
United States and Western values.
Question. In your opinion, what effect has Russia's engagement with
African militaries had on those militaries and on United States
security interests?
Answer. Russia provides extensive arms sales and limited training
to African militaries, specifically with former Soviet partners. They
are the largest exporter of weapons systems to Africa, although it
remains to be seen how the Ukraine crisis will affect this. Russia is a
leading supplier of military equipment to include small arms and
heavier weapons such as armor and artillery, as well as large packages
such as anti-air defense systems and naval vessels. These systems
increase host nation lethality, but are difficult to sustain and
decrease their interoperability with Western military norms and
systems. Russia's lack of robust end-user agreements and support for
authoritarian regimes undermines United States objectives in Africa.
Question. Do you view Russia's activities on the continent of
Africa as a threat or challenge to United States national security
interests? Please explain your answer.
Answer. Yes. Russia's current activities challenge United States
national security interests in the AFRICOM AOR. Russian military and
security advisers currently do not pose a direct military threat to
United States personnel, though Russia's military and security presence
across Africa poses a foreign intelligence threat. Russia's pursuit of
a persistent military presence and use of mercenaries in Libya, Central
African Republic, Mozambique, and Mali have undermined democratic norms
and have the potential to destabilize already vulnerable security
environments, disrupt UN mission mandate operations, and threaten
United States and Western progress in these regions. Over time, Russian
investments could complicate United States military and economic
access.
Question. Are United States policies, associated authorities, and
resources--as applicable to Africa--sufficient to counter Russia's
influence, where needed, or are additional measures required? What role
should AFRICOM play in this regard?
Answer. From what I know given my previous experience at MARFORAF,
the current authorities extended to AFRICOM are sufficient. Given
Russia's status as an acute threat, if confirmed, I will conduct a
comprehensive review to determine if those policies and authorities
remain sufficient. The role of AFRICOM is to continue to work through
the interagency to counter Russia's influence. AFRICOM must integrate
with the coordinating authority for Global Campaign Plan--Russia (GCP-
R) and work with partners and allies to expose Russia's activities on
the continent, ensuring Russia is held accountable.
Question. In the hybrid competition with Russia--below the level of
military conflict--do you support a whole-of-government approach to
countering Russian influence? In your view, is the interagency
effectively unified in implementing a strategy to compete with Russia
in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. Yes. I support a whole-of-government approach, and from my
time at MARFORAF I believe the interagency is unified in implementing a
strategy to compete with Russia. Given recent legislation, including
the Global Fragility Act, an opportunity exists to iteratively ensure
all executive departments have complimentary approaches based in
national strategy. Additionally, from my past experience in Central
Command, a whole-of-government approach is the most effective way to
compete with Russia and Russian backed private military contractors.
Foremost, U.S. Military activity in Africa enables diplomacy and
development, and serves a supporting role to the whole-of-government
approach. With increased diplomatic and development pressure, the
military's role is to (1) accentuate diplomatic and economic impacts
through robust messaging, key leader engagements, and other means; (2)
provide a credible deterrent, including through applications of our
irregular warfare toolkit and highlighting malign activity when
detected; and (3) continue to work with partner militaries to build
their capabilities as the partner of choice while ensuring access and
influence for the U.S. and our partners.
availability of forces
Question. AFRICOM has minimal assigned forces and, as a result, is
required to compete for forces in the global force management process.
What is your assessment of the availability and predictability of
forces and associated capabilities to support the AFRICOM Theater
Campaign Plan and other requirements in the AOR?
Answer. From my previous experience at MARFORAF, AFRICOM has very
few assigned forces and competes for forces through the Global Force
Management Allocation Process (GFMAP) each fiscal year. Violent
Extremist Organizations (VEOs) and global power strategic competitors
are active across Africa. If confirmed, I will pay close attention to
the availability and predictability of the forces allocated to continue
building capacity with our African partners, countering VEOs, limiting
and deterring strategic competitors, and protecting United States
persons, the Homeland and interests.
Question. What is your understanding of the challenges and risks to
United States security interests, if any, resulting from the lack of
assigned forces to AFRICOM?
Answer. From my current job, I have a cursory knowledge of risks in
the AFRICOM area of responsibility. My understanding of the challenges
and risks to United States security interests from a lack of assigned
forces is that VEOs and strategic competitors may gain greater access
and influence. Having the right forces in AFRICOM is key to overcoming
challenges and risk to United States security interests. AFRICOM has
few assigned and allocated forces and limited CONUS-based regionally
aligned forces to execute missions in support. If confirmed, I will
continuously monitor and communicate risk to U.S. security interests
and advocate for forces through the Global Force Management (GFM)
process.
Question. What is your assessment of the utility of the assignment
of the Army's Security Force Assistance Brigade to AFRICOM?
Answer. In my current role, I have not had the opportunity to
critically assess the utility of the assignment of the Security Force
Assistance Brigade to AFRICOM. Anecdotally, however, I believe the 2nd
Security Force Assistance Brigade is a valuable capability. Through
professional reading, I know the SFAB has conducted training throughout
the African continent, advanced partner capacity, and developed
relationships demonstrating the United States as the partner of choice.
I believe 2nd SFAB has provided AFRICOM operational successes
throughout the AOR and in turn helped to reduce strategic risk. If
confirmed, I will incorporate this into my initial assessment.
theater special operations command
Question. Special Operations Command-Africa (SOCAF) is under the
operational control of AFRICOM and employs United States Special
Operations Forces (SOF) to conduct operations, exercises, and theater
security cooperation activities.
What is your understanding of the roles and responsibilities of
SOCAF in supporting AFRICOM's theater campaign plan and associated
requirements?
Answer. In my current role, I do not have much exposure to SOCAF.
From my time as the Commander of MARFORAF, I understand that SOCAF, as
the Theater Special Operations Command, plays an important role in
executing AFRICOM's Campaign plan as operationalized through the
AFRICOM Campaign Order. SOCAF provides SOF expertise dedicated to the
security challenges and operational environment unique to the AFRICOM
area of responsibility. SOCAF supports AFRICOM across the competition
continuum, oversees the integration of SOF capabilities and advises the
CCDR, Service component commanders, and others on the proper employment
of SOF.
Question. Based on your professional military experience, how would
you characterize the benefits of a dedicated special operations
component for a geographic combatant command in supporting the
combatant command's theater campaign plan and associated requirements?
Answer. Based on my professional military experience, a dedicated
special operations component allows for singularity of focus,
development of long-term relationships, and theater-specific
operational approaches. AFRICOM requires dedicated SOF support to
effectively counter malign competitors, disrupt VEO threats, and
support key allies and partners. This also facilitates greater
integration of planning efforts amongst all components and the AFRICOM
staff.
Question. What special operations capabilities are in highest
demand by AFRICOM?
Answer. In my current capacity, I am unaware of what capabilities
are in the highest demand. From previous experience, I would surmise
that capabilities to train and build partner capability and
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) to assist partner
forces in counterterrorism operations are in highest demand.
Additionally, personnel recovery, search and rescue and casualty
evacuation assets are in likely in high demand and short supply.
Question. Which countries in the AFRICOM AOR do you believe have
the greatest need for engagement with SOF?
Answer. If confirmed, I will examine closely all the requirements
to include SOF from our partners and allies. I am confident in the plan
set forward by Special Operations Command Africa and if adjustments are
needed I will adjust as necessary. I will encourage engagement that is
driven by analysis, yet flexible enough to be adapted to the dynamic
environment in the AFRICOM area of responsibility.
violent extremist organizations (veos) in africa
Question. What is your understanding of the United States
counterterrorism strategy as it relates to the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. From my experience at MARFORAF, I know the National
Strategy for Counterterrorism stresses the use of all aspects of
National power, with a focus on non-military capabilities. The AFRICOM
Campaign Plan takes a partnered approach across allied governments in
the public and private sectors (e.g., technology, financial
institutions) to encourage counterterrorism burden-sharing, information
sharing, countering threat finance, reintegration of returning foreign
fighters, and development and promulgation of counter-narratives.
AFRICOM maintains pressure on VEO networks to create time and space for
our partners to develop enduring governmental and security
institutions.
Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S.
counterterrorism strategy and associated activities in addressing the
threat posed by violent extremist organizations?
Answer. From my experience at MARFORAF, sustained United States,
African, and allied counterterrorism pressure has significantly
weakened VEOs in North Africa, but they are now moving southward to
Sub-Saharan areas. For example, Jama'at Nusrat al Islam wal-Muslmin, or
JNIM, a terrorist network with origins in northern Mali now threatens
not just Mali but also Burkina Faso, Niger, and littoral West Africa.
Additionally, ISIS-affiliated groups are collaborating and expanding
into Mozambique, Tanzania, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo. In
Somalia, al Shabaab is re-establishing supporting ties with al Qaeda
and re-gaining ground it lost due to our persistent presence and
combined efforts with Somali security forces.
Question. What changes, if any, would you recommend to the strategy
or associated measures of effectiveness? Should efforts to prevent the
underlying causes of extremism be a component of our counterterrorism
strategy?
Answer. As noted by the Assistant Secretary of State for African
Affairs, the Honorable Molly Phee during testimony before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee on July 12th, there is a ``security problem
that requires a governance solution.'' The roots of extremism and
threats it poses to stability and United States security interests is a
complicated issue, which if confirmed, I will reassess during my review
of AFRICOM's strategy and/or associate measures of effectiveness.
Question. Within the AFRICOM AOR, what do you consider the highest
counterterrorism priorities?
Answer. Recently, I have been briefed that al Shabaab is the
largest and most kinetically active al Qaeda network in the world. They
primarily operate in East Africa. Additionally, ISIS--West Africa and
JNIM operate in the Sahel and West Africa.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda,
the Islamic State, and other violent extremist organizations operating
in Africa, to nations in the AFRICOM AOR, the United States Homeland,
and broader western interests?
Answer. Africa-based al Qaeda and ISIS affiliates may aspire to
attack the United States Homeland by virtue of their allegiance to
global jihadist movements; however, al Shabaab is the only group in
Africa that has probably planned possible attacks inside the United
States.
While al Qaeda and ISIS have suffered setbacks outside Africa,
their affiliates on the continent have expanded to pose serious threats
to African countries and United States and Western interests in Africa,
making Africa the new focal point for both groups. Al Qaeda and ISIS's
affiliates exploit under-governed regions and porous borders to
undermine stability and force our African partners to focus on short-
term operational security requirements to the detriment of long-term
development and security initiatives. Diffuse extremist networks have
also enabled and inspired attacks against Western interests in Africa
and Europe.
Al Shabaab is at the forefront of terrorist organizations in Africa
that threaten United States persons and facilities. Al Shabaab is al
Qaeda's largest, wealthiest, and most lethal global affiliate and has
publicly advocated for attacks against United States targets, including
lone-actor attacks against the United States and Westerners globally.
The group killed three United States personnel in an early 2020 complex
attack on Manda Bay Airfield in Kenya and has since increased its
cross-border attacks into the country. Al Qaeda also has a capable
affiliate in the Sahel: JNIM. During the last 3 years the group has
expanded in West Africa and improved its ability to conduct attacks in
Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.
ISIS's branches in Africa have expanded their presence and
accelerated attacks while the organization suffered territorial and
leadership losses in Iraq and Syria. With elements in at least seven
locations in AFRICOM's area of responsibility, ISIS has been able to
directly threaten United States allies and interests and buttress the
organization's reputation. These groups have been able to engender
support from ISIS core and have in turn taken on the hyper-violent
characteristics of their parent organization. Of these groups, the most
capable have been ISIS-West Africa, ISIS-Mozambique, and ISIS in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
Question. Which VEOs do you find most concerning, and why?
Answer. The most concerning VEOs in Africa are al Shabaab, JNIM,
AQIM, and ISIS-West Africa. Somalia's al Shabaab is the deadliest and
largest VEO in Africa and remains a substantial concern. The group is
firmly committed to al Qaeda and is intent on attacking United States
persons and facilities as seen in the early 2020 attack on Manda Bay
Airfield in Kenya. In December 2020, prosecutors in Manhattan charged
an accused al Shabaab aviation operative with plotting a September 11-
style attack on an American city.
Al Shabaab has increased its freedom of movement, grown its attack
capabilities and expanded its operational reach throughout central and
southern Somalia since the 2021 repositioning of United States forces
from Somalia, undermining the country's Federal Government. This has
also enabled al Shabaab to improve its posture along the Kenya-Somalia
border, increasingly threatening the neighboring country. Al Shabaab's
activity is underpinned by an annual revenue of approximately $120
million, which affords it a large surplus to fund operations, grow its
attack capabilities, provide effective governance, and expand its
overall influence.
In the Sahel, JNIM, AQIM's arm in the Sahel, has strengthened and
expanded over the past three years, spreading instability that resulted
in coups in Mali and Burkina Faso and opened the door to Russian
private military contractors. The group strikes hardened military and
government targets in Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso and is a long-term
regional threat. Over the past year, JNIM conducted attacks in several
littoral countries, including Cote d'Ivoire, Benin, and Togo, spreading
the group's influence further south. The group's kidnap-for-ransom
activities threatens local and U.S. persons in the region. Further
successes against regional governments could see JNIM achieve al
Qaeda's long-term goal of an Islamic emirate in the Sahel. JNIM relies
on guidance and support from AQIM, using AQIM's strategy of
intermarrying into local tribes to gain influence throughout
communities in the Sahel.
ISIS-West Africa, who split from Boko Haram in 2016, is the largest
and most capable ISIS affiliate outside of Iraq and Syria, threatens
the stability in one of Africa's most influential countries, Nigeria.
somalia
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United
States national security interests in Somalia?
Answer. The critical United States interest in Somalia is
preventing terrorists from using Somalia as a safe haven to threaten
the United States Homeland and United States persons and facilities in
East Africa. United States National Security interests in Somalia
remain focused on our commitment to our allies and partners in
coordinating and addressing the shared security threat presented by al
Shabaab. Our return to Somalia on a persistent basis reinforces our
leadership and partnership not only with the people and Government of
Somalia, but also with our European and Gulf state allies, and African
partners in the new African Union mission who are also working toward a
stable and peaceful Somalia. Al Shabaab will not yield easily, but if
confirmed, I will prioritize securing United States national interests
in Somalia.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
States strategy for Somalia?
Answer. In my current capacity, I have not conducted a detailed
assessment of United States strategy in Somalia. I do know that AFRICOM
is implementing a ``Concentrate and Enable'' approach to achieving
United States objectives in Somalia. They are concentrating United
States forces and efforts against al Shabaab, coordinating an
international approach to disrupting and degrading the enemy, and
enabling our partners to take an increasing share of the fight against
al Shabaab. AFRICOM continues to review and evaluate not only
contributions, but those of allies and partners as AFRICOM looks to
enable Somali partners to deepen their ownership of the whole-of-
government solutions required to return Somalia to the peaceful and
prosperous nation it once was. If confirmed, an assessment of United
States strategy for Somalia, the resources and posture required for
execution, and the attendant risks will be a top priority.
Question. What role should AFRICOM play in supporting that
strategy?
Answer. I believe that AFRICOM should continue to focus on building
Somalia Security Forces, especially the Danab, as part of United States
commitments to the 2017 London Somalia Security Conference. Building
those security forces requires working with the African Union
Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and current Somalia Security
Forces to push back al Shabaab, allowing the Government of Somalia to
build its own ability to provide for the security of its people.
Question. How would you evaluate the effectiveness of United States
efforts to counter Al Shabab to date?
Answer. From what I understand, AFRICOM's efforts over the last 18
months have been limited as we have been conducting only periodic
engagements with our Somali partners. This approach has blunted the
incremental progress we had made and has allowed al Shabaab to gain
momentum. The bottom-line is that al Shabaab now controls substantial
territory, has increased their attacks in Mogadishu and has been able
to increase their capability. However, the recent decision to re-
establish a persistent presence in Somalia is a positive step in our
efforts to counter al Shabaab. If confirmed, I will assess our
persistent presence that the President has approved to ensure it
provides an adequate force to work with our interagency partners and
international allies and partners to degrade al Shabaab and disrupt
their organization.
Question. How would you evaluate the effectiveness of the African
Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) efforts?
Answer. The African Union has recently altered its approach in
Somalia as AMISOM has ended and regional troop contributing countries
now are participants in ``ATMIS''--The African Union Transition Mission
in Somalia. ATMIS seeks to conduct operations in conjunction with
Somalia Security Forces (SSF) in order to deny al Shabaab safe havens.
These operations are intended to buy time and space for the SSF to
generate trained and ready units which will allow them to
simultaneously continue to take the fight to al Shabaab and enable
ATMIS forces to drawdown within Somalia. While AMISOM achieved some
limited, incremental gains in driving terrorist organizations out of
strategically important population centers in the past, there is more
that needs to be done to achieve lasting effects. ATMIS will be
challenged by al Shabaab's geographical gains and capabilities;
however, United States assistance in training, equipping, and advising
can help ATMIS achieve its goals and prevent al Shabaab from holding
ground and having freedom of maneuver.
Question. What is your assessment of the prospect for long-term
stability in Somalia?
Answer. I believe that long-term stability in Somalia will require
the establishment of inclusive, representative, and accountable
governance at all levels. Having taken part in Operation Restore Hope,
I know what a challenge long-term stability in Somalia is. In terms of
the prospect for long-term stability, Somalia's political leadership
has considerable work to do to meet its own timetable and goals for
revising and ratifying a permanent constitution, advancing federalism
and reconciliation efforts between the Federal Government and its
member states.
Question. What is your assessment of the effectiveness of United
States efforts to build the capacity of the Somali National Army to
date and what should the objectives of such efforts be in the near-,
mid-, and long-term?
Answer. In my current role, I have not had the opportunity to
assess the efforts to build the capacity of the Somali National Army
nor have I assessed their objectives. I do know that per the 2017
London Security Conference on Somalia, international support to
Somalia's national security architecture was agreed to and implemented
via the ``Comprehensive Approach to Security'' (CAS). For the United
States DOD, this resulted in two specific tasks. First, per the CAS,
the United States will improve the capacity of the Somali National
Army, specifically by building out the Danab Brigade--the ``Lightning''
Brigade--whose responsibilities include offensive counterterrorism
actions in the Federal Member States. Secondly we agreed to provide the
required coordination of United States and international efforts to
man, train and equip Somali National Army Forces.
I believe AFRICOM is executing both of these tasks. Concerning the
SNA and the Danab Brigade, AFRICOM uses title 10 funds and coordinates
with Department of State for title 22 funds to create combat-ready
formations that conduct offensive operations to take territory back
from al Shabaab. For the Danab, these efforts are comprehensive and
include recruiting, training, feeding, equipping, and accompanying
these critical forces. Further, AFRICOM have served as a key enabler
via our advise and assist efforts to the Somali National Army (SNA),
which have resulted in the removal of al Shabaab leaders and attack
planners. Since the United States repositioning in early 2021, al
Shabaab's advances--including expansion in Mogadishu, central Somalia,
and along the Kenya-Somalia border--have underscored the importance of
sustained United States advise and assist efforts in constraining the
group's operations. The bottom-line is that our permanent presence in
Somalia and involvement with the SNA improves our relationship with our
partner forces and increases the pace and efficiency of operations to
contain al Shabaab.
Concerning the international coordination agreed to in the CAS,
AFRICOM's role is to facilitate international coordination of the
greater SNA build. This is done through comprehensive coordination
conducted via senior leader engagements with key members of the AU, the
FGS, the EU, and critical regional partners. Further, the Military
Assistance Group to Somalia in Mogadishu works with international
partners (including the UN, EU, AU, and ATMIS) to facilitate
development of SNA forces and the coordination of operations to counter
al Shabaab.
lake chad basin and the sahel
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United
States national security interests in the Lake Chad Basin? The Sahel?
Answer. In West Africa, countering violent extremist organizations
(VEOs) is important to stabilizing the region, opening more avenues for
cooperation, and degrading our competitors' ability to exploit
relationship gaps. VEOs remain the number one security concern for many
West African countries. United States counter-VEO efforts not only
demonstrate our reliability and commitment to our partners, but also
provide an effective way in which the U.S. wins influence over
strategic competitors. JNIM is now the largest VEO in the world and the
fastest growing group globally, recording a threefold increase in the
number of attacks and fourfold increase in civilian casualties since
2017.
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
States strategy to address threats in the Lake Chad Basin and across
the Sahel?
Answer. In my current capacity, I have not had the opportunity to
do a thorough assessment of United States strategy for the Lake Chad
Basin and the Sahel. If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment in the
first 90 days. I do know that in the Lake Chad Region, the United
States strengthens security sector capacities of Chad, Niger and
Nigeria in order to enable these nations to degrade ISIS-West Africa
and Boko Haram, while assistance to Cameroon has been impacted due to
human rights violations in dealing with the Anglophone separatist
crisis. These activities are designed to provide time and space for
humanitarian assistance as well as longer term security sector and
governance reforms. The United States strategy in the LCR has
contributed to containing Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa to
northeastern Nigeria, though momentum against ISIS and Boko Haram has
recently stagnated. Countering VEO's remains a top shared goal of the
U.S. and regional partners and remains an area for increased
cooperation.
The United States strategy for the Sahel is evolving in response to
the repositioning of French counter terrorism forces from Mali to other
areas in the Sahel. Additionally, inability to provide assistance to
the coup led governments of Mali and Burkina Faso creates security
challenges. The United States continues to offer support to French
military operations, though it is still to be determined what French
operations will look like in the near term with its military withdrawal
from Mali. The United States continues providing operational and
bilateral security force assistance to two other member states of the
G5 Sahel, largely Niger, in an effort to contain the threat to Mali and
Burkina Faso.
Question. What is your understanding of AFRICOM's role in
supporting that strategy?
Answer. I believe that AFRICOM supports partner efforts to counter
threats emanating from Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa and does so
bilaterally through United States security force assistance to our
partners in Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria as well as multi-
laterally. If confirmed, I will ensure AFRICOM embraces a whole-of-
government approach and coordinates closely with the interagency to
meet our partners' humanitarian and institutional capacity building
needs to meet that strategy.
I believe that in the Sahel, AFRICOM leverages its key enabling ISR
capabilities and intelligence sharing in the fight against terrorism
with our French partners and the remaining G5 Sahel Joint Forces
members. Recognizing African partners' need and desire to ultimately
assume full responsibility for their sovereign defense and legitimacy,
AFRICOM focuses security cooperation operations, activities, and
investments to build military operational and defense institution
capabilities in full coordination with our diplomatic and development
agencies and our African partners. This approach aligns with the
broader international community's counterterrorism efforts to increase
security and stability in the region.
Question. Do you view the problem sets in the Lake Chad Basin and
the Sahel to be the same? If not, how do they differ and how should we
account for that in our strategies?
Answer. At first glance, no I do not. A more detailed assessment
will be necessary for my full understanding of the relationships of
these problems. The Lake Chad Basin and the Sahel problem sets differ
in the nuances of grievances between VEOs and the State and long
histories of ethnic tensions between groups. They are separated by
geographical region and ideological origin. Boko-Haram and ISIS-West
Africa operate in Northern Nigeria and around Lake Chad and both have
grievances against the Nigerian Government. This contrasts with the
Sahel, where JNIM has taken advantage of historical ethnic tensions and
exacerbated them, taking large areas of ungoverned space as operational
areas to expand VEO ideology and violence. I believe the AFRICOM
Campaign Plan and Strategy for West Africa addresses the distinct
nature of these problem sets.
Question. What is your assessment of the efforts of governments in
the region to combat VEOs, as well as other regional security and
governance challenges?
Answer. My assessment on this particular topic is informed by my
time as the Commander of MARFORAF. Security and political challenges
continue to undermine stability in the Sahel. Mali remains the
epicenter of instability and a haven for many terrorist groups to stage
and launch attacks across the region. Governments are willing to combat
VEOs and want to improve regional security. They do this unilaterally,
bilaterally (frequently with French assistance), and multilaterally
through the G5 Sahel Joint Force and the UN Mission in Mali. Yet these
countries are among the world's poorest, face severe resource
constraints, and have relatively limited military capability, making it
more difficult for them to counter VEOs. Vast and non-permissive
terrain, enduring ethnic conflict, inter-communal violence, and tense
civil-military relations also hinder efforts to extend governance
outside of major population centers.
Similarly, in the Lake Chad Region, Benin, Cameroon, Chad, Niger,
and Nigeria are largely willing to confront VEOs operating out of
Nigeria and do so through unilateral operations and the five-nation
Multinational Joint Task Force. Nigeria has faced multiple setbacks in
the last year, as ISIS-West Africa continues to confront security
forces, seize materiel--including armored vehicles, weapons, and
ammunition--and expand its operational reach. This has strained the
Nigerian military's readiness and capabilities. Multiple competing
national security priorities in each of the Lake Chad Region nations
have prevented them from focusing adequate resources to
counterterrorism operations, which has allowed VEOs freedom to operate.
Question. What do you view as the most pressing impediments to
regional efforts to address security and governance challenges?
Answer. Regional efforts to improve security and governance are
often interrupted by urgent internal crisis, whether they be caused by
VEOs, natural and man-made disasters, or displaced populations. These
events redirect the state's attention and limited resources and
distract from capacity and institution-building endeavors. Weak and
hollow state institutions struggle to reorganize and grow while
confronting constant challenges and limited resources. One of the most
pressing impediments to regional efforts, however, is corruption.
Corruption hinders development, wastes resources, and reduces public
confidence in the state.
Question. In your view, what measures should the United States
incorporate into current and future military-to-military engagements to
help avoid violence by regional police and the militaries of other
nations against civilians during operations?
Answer. I believe that the United States should continue to press
for partner compliance with long established international norms and
not hesitate to restrict security forces from receiving assistance when
there is credible evidence of gross violation of human rights by
security forces. Consistent application of these standards as a basis
for access to the benefits accrued from military-to-military
engagements with the U.S. will further legitimize these norms,
reinforce the concept of the rule of law, and act as a deterrent to
violators.
libya
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of United
States national security interests in Libya?
Answer. The United States interests are directly tied to malign
foreign actors creating instability in the central portion of North
Africa. Libya remains number one in oil reserves in Africa; however,
they are currently not working at capacity. This further strains the
international energy market. Additionally, Libya remains the access
point for Russian actions and expansion throughout the continent. The
desired objectives are a unified state, with a civilian led security
and justice apparatus, capable of providing increased local security,
who is a stable trading partner, and that is free of foreign
interference, according to the Integrated Country Strategy (ICS).
Question. What is your understanding and assessment of the United
States strategy for Libya?
Answer. In my current capacity, I have not conducted a detailed
assessment of United States strategy for Libya, but if confirmed I will
include it in my 90 day review. What I do know is that the U.S.
continues to pursue a diplomatic and political reunification process,
relying on both major parties, and their foreign sponsors, to maintain
the October 21 ceasefire in order to provide room for more engagement.
The U.S. pursues a political reunification through steady diplomatic
engagements. The U.S. works with the international community to foster
conditions that will allow for a smooth transition from interim
government to a more permanent and stable solution.
Question. What is your understanding of AFRICOM's role in
supporting the United States strategy?
Answer. I believe that AFRICOM primarily provides layered security
and at times mobility support to the Libyan External Office to
facilitate diplomatic engagements. In addition, AFRICOM meets with
elements of the Joint Military Commission to help foster relationships
that will promote reunification. AFRICOM is working to engage with
Libyan counterparts more regularly to create a greater understanding of
United States values, capabilities, and interests to offset the
negative effects of internal politics and external influence. At times,
AFRICOM has conducted unilateral Counterterrorism strikes such as the
2019 missile strikes that reduced VEO capability in Southern Libya.
Question. What role, if any, do you believe the United States
should play in helping Libya build capable security institutions?
Answer. Libya's armed forces have been severely degraded over the
course of the past 11 years. AFRICOM, working with the Interagency, is
helping shape a strategy that includes engagement with the Libyan Armed
Forces. The Libyan Armed Forces have continued to conduct
counterterrorism operations that have mitigated VEO operations in the
region. AFRICOM is focused more engagements at the GO/FO level to help
set conditions to reintegrate the East and West military factions into
a singular institution. This is AFRICOMs primary focus in support of
the ICS and national objectives.
Question. What is your assessment of the risks associated with the
paramilitary forces that continue to control large swaths of Libya?
Answer. While I have not conducted a detailed assessment of these
risks, if confirmed, I will include it in my 90 day review. I do know
that Libyan paramilitary groups rely on both regular government funding
in exchange for providing security and irregular black-market
transactions and exploitation tactics to maintain control of their
respective areas of responsibility. Libyan leaders rely on paramilitary
forces in the absence of a unified military to ensure access to
government institutions and international legitimacy, as witnessed
during the 2019 Libyan civil conflict. The prolonged reliance on Libyan
paramilitary groups augmented by various external paramilitary forces,
including Russian private military company Wagner Group, very likely
will result in persistent low-level clashes between rival groups to
increase their areas of control, influence, and funding, further
inhibiting efforts to reform the security sector.
Question. What do you view as the most significant challenges to
the efforts of the Government of National Accord (GNA) to build capable
and sustainable security institutions?
Answer. Currently there are three competing governments, or pseudo
governments, the Government of National Accord, headed by Prime
Minister Debaibah and based in Tripoli; the Government of National
Stability lead by Prime Minister Bashaga, located in Sirte; and the
Libyan National Army. Bashaga plans on reentering Tripoli by force in
the coming weeks to re-form a singular government in the West.
The challenges to the Western faction are numerous. They lack every
aspect of a force generating capability, and do not have sold
institutions to support the fielded force. Significant institutional
changes would be required, alongside trust building efforts with the
people to encourage support to the institution rather than the local
regiments.
Question. In what ways can the United States be most effective in
assisting the GNA to build capable and sustainable security
institutions?
Answer. The U.S. should continue a whole-of-government approach to
engage and capitalize on opportunities as they present themselves. The
United States should reaffirm its defense investments aimed at
addressing Russian activities in Libya to ensure uncontested control of
NATO's Southern Flank, promote unity and integration among Libyan
Forces, and ensure Russia is unable to use Libya as a hub for
illegitimate and destabilizing security operations across Africa, which
include Russia circumventing international sanctions.
building partner capacity and security assistance
Question. In your view, what should be our strategic objectives in
building the capacities of partner nations in the AFRICOM AOR through
defense security cooperation activities or other means?
Answer. I believe that AFRICOM's building partner capacity
objectives should aim to develop partner security forces that are able
to train, conduct and sustain operations against shared security
challenges while serving as champions for the protection of human
rights, and civilian control of the military. If confirmed, my aim will
be make sure we are a valued security partner throughout the continent
by supporting partners' efforts to field sustainable, accountable
security forces that possess the capability and capacity to address
their own security needs. We must do this through a whole-of-government
approach, using legislation like the Global Fragility Act as guide, to
leverage partners in the Department of State, USAID, and the Treasury
Department along with a range of allies and African partners who have
become regional security exporters.
Question. In your view, what is the appropriate balance between
efforts to build partnership capacity at the tactical and operational
levels and at the institutional and ministerial levels?
Answer. Efforts to build partner capacity must be balanced to
ensure a partner nation's ability to maintain a comprehensive approach
to matters of defense and U.S. strategic interests. The appropriate
balance between these efforts must be tailored to the specific partner
nation based on their respective capabilities, demonstrated capacities,
and their unique threat situation. Although each situation is unique,
they all benefit from engagements from the tactical to ministerial
levels. One without the other is incomplete and more likely to fail.
Question. Do you believe the ability of a partner nation to sustain
U.S.-provided equipment and capabilities should be a key factor in
determining the level and type of assistance to be provided?
Answer. Yes.
Question. How would you characterize the importance of adherence to
human rights as an objective of AFRICOM security cooperation programs
and activities?
Answer. Partner adherence to and our promotion of respect for human
rights should be core to all security cooperation programs and
activities, whether in AFRICOM or elsewhere. In this regard, we model
this behavior, and we make a deliberate effort to ensure it is an
integral part of everything we do, from training to joint exercises. If
confirmed, I will ensure every engagement with a partner nation,
regardless of topic or objective, is an opportunity to emphasize the
core values of a professional military, notably including civilian
command and control and respect for human rights and international
humanitarian law.
Question. When credible allegations of violence against civilians
by partner nation security forces arise, what should the U.S. response
be?
Answer. If confirmed, I will support a full and transparent
investigation into credible allegations of any form of violations of
human rights, the rule of law, or law of armed conflict by partner
nation security forces. If a credible investigation substantiates the
allegations, we will call on our partners to hold perpetrators
accountable via legitimate judicial processes, in addition to any
appropriate internal disciplinary actions.
multilateral exercises
Question. What is your understanding of AFRICOM's multilateral
exercises and their importance to supporting AFRICOM's theater campaign
plan and the National Defense Strategy?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review AFRICOM's multilateral
exercises program. From my time as Commander, MARFORAF, I know that
AFRICOM's Joint Exercise Program (JEP) is a vital tool in achieving
campaign objectives outlined in the AFRICOM Campaign Plan (ACP) as well
as tasks derived from the National Defense Strategy (NDS). The JEP
leverages the United States joint forces from CONUS and Europe to
conduct multinational exercises in a combined environment with our
allies and partners in the AFRICOM AOR. These exercises serve to build
force readiness, increase interoperability, and reinforce the U.S. as
the preferred partner of choice. Additionally, these exercises are
critical to maintaining Access, Basing, and Overflight (ABO) privileges
with key partners on the continent.
Question. Based on your professional military experience, what
benefits might be realized by expanding the participants and locations
of such exercises?
Answer. In my experience, the benefits of expanding the
participants and locations is important, however we must continue to be
judicious as expansion may reach a point of diminishing returns. In the
past, AFRICOM has deployed a hub and spoke strategy with many of its
exercises. This approach comes at a cost. Not only with the number of
United States forces available to deploy to work with our African
Partners, but also with the funding required to plan, coordinate, and
sustain those forces, as well as those African partners who require
funding to participate in our exercises. We have seen great results
with exercise AFRICAN LION centered out of Morocco, with spokes in
Tunisia, Senegal, and Ghana. Exercise JUSTIFIED ACCORD centers out of
Kenya with a spoke in Rwanda, with more spokes to come in coming years.
Our EXPRESS Series naval exercises hub out of a single country with
spokes across the region in the form of Maritime Operations Centers
(MOCs). AFRICOM continues to also bring African partners to participate
in exercises at the hub and/or spoke locations.
support to united nations peacekeeping missions in africa
Question. In your view, should the United States contribute
military personnel in the form of staff positions and military
observers to UN peacekeeping missions and other international peace
operations in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. My view on this matter is heavily shaped by my experience
during Operation RESTORE HOPE. In 1992-1993, as a young officer, I was
part of the peacekeeping force in Somalia, and I have direct experience
as a staff officer in this type of challenging assignment. While
anecdotally I believe that participation in UN missions increase U.S.
ability to influence allies and partners while demonstrating
international leadership, I am aware of the risks and challenges. If
confirmed, I will seek to understand both the UN missions, the
associated command relationships with U.S. personnel, as well as the
risks and benefits of providing personnel to support the mission.
Question. In your view, what are the advantages and disadvantages
of contributing military personnel to UN operations in the form of
staff positions and military observers' positions?
Answer. If confirmed, I would have to assess current UN operations
from a global perspective to identify the advantages and disadvantages
of contributing military personnel to UN operations in the form of
staff positions and military observers' positions.
crisis response capabilities
Question. What is your understanding of the crisis response
capabilities available to AFRICOM?
Answer. I am well familiar with this topic through my previous
assignments. Dedicated AFRICOM response forces, with the right
capabilities, are critical to responding to crisis and protecting
United States personnel, property, and interests. AFRICOM has multiple
allocated crisis response forces available. These forces are deployable
throughout the continent. They are capable of operating in both
permissive and uncertain environments to provide embassy security
reinforcement and/or military-assisted departure of DOS-designated
personnel. Additionally, AFRICOM can leverage USEUCOM's assigned forces
via Request for Support (RFS) to provide rapid response anti-terrorism
and security capabilities suitable for deliberate contingency
responses. Finally, assuming the Secretary of Defense directs, crisis
response capabilities based in the United States, Europe, and the
Middle East are also available to AFRICOM.
Question. Do you believe that the availability of crisis response
capabilities and the mechanism for obtaining and deploying those
capabilities are both appropriate and adequate to meet crisis response
requirements in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the availability of crisis
response capabilities. The fundamental challenge to responding to
crises in Africa appears to be two-fold: many locations have an
unstable and delicate security environment and the continent is very
large. On any given day, an event could occur that requires AFRICOM to
commit military forces to either respond to a crisis. Africa's vast
size and overall lack of an integrated logistics infrastructure make
the movement, employment, and sustainment of military forces
exceedingly difficult. If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment to
determine if additional mechanisms are necessary.
Question. In your opinion, what additional steps, if any, should be
taken to reduce the risk of attacks on U.S. embassies, consulates, and
personnel by terrorist organizations and other threats throughout
AFRICOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the current authorities and
available resources to reduce the risk of attacks on United States
embassies, consulates, and personnel by terrorist organizations and
other threats throughout AFRICOM. Reduction of risk at our embassies
requires a whole-of-government effort, recognizing that the Department
of State and the Diplomatic Security Service are the lead agencies with
Marine Security Guard Detachments, and Marine Security Augmentation
Units in support. Key capabilities to reduce risk across the AFRICOM
AOR include airborne ISR, intelligence sharing and frequent engagements
with allies and partners.
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (isr) capabilities
Question. Demand for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
capabilities of every kind has grown exponentially in recent years,
largely due to the enhanced situational awareness and targeting
capabilities they bring to our commanders. Almost all of the geographic
combatant commands have validated ISR requirements that are not being
met.
What is your understanding of the support AFRICOM is currently
receiving to respond to its ISR requirements?
Answer. There has never been a commander that would not desire more
ISR. It is a critical enabler to both sense and make sense of the
environment, and its presence serves as an active deterrent to our
adversaries. I know through recent posture statements, as well as my
previous positions that AFRICOM assesses ISR support is insufficient to
meet current requirements and has been trending worse over the past
several years. AFRICOM is seeking to increase ISR coverage and
resources to address National Defense Strategy aligned priorities and
activities on the continent, to counter Violent Extremist Organization
threats to the Homeland and to enhance understanding and U.S. access
and influence in order to respond to threats to U.S. personnel, allies
and partners, and facilities throughout the continent.
Question. Do you believe the threats emanating from the AFRICOM AOR
warrant additional resources from within DOD? If so, how do you intend
to advocate for additional ISR and other enabling assets, if confirmed?
Answer. I do believe that the threats warrant additional ISR
resources. As mentioned, ISR underpins all operations. It is a key
enabler for U.S. Forces, our allies, and our partners. I believe that
ISR platforms must be persistent, survivable, and connected. This is
what gives our forces a decisive advantage in decision making. While I
understand the need to modernize ISR for great power competitors,
legacy platforms may be sufficient in the AFRICOM area of
responsibility in the short term. If confirmed and understanding that
the Secretary of Defense has the authority for the global allocation of
ISR, I will advocate through the global force management process, and
leverage dynamic sharing of assets with fellow combatant commanders
when feasible.
maritime security
Question. Maritime security has proven to be a significant issue on
the coasts of West and East Africa.
What is your assessment of AFRICOM's ongoing maritime security
initiatives?
Answer. During my time as Commander MARFORAF, I was heavily engaged
working by, with and through a number of coastal West African nations
on maritime security initiatives. AFRICOM has been expanding the
maritime capabilities of partners through a mix of security cooperation
efforts and exercises. AFRICOM appears to be prioritizing its maritime
security efforts appropriately given current security challenges, which
I intend to reassess, if confirmed, given the evolving circumstances of
our security interests in North, West, and East Africa. If confirmed, I
will completely assess AFRICOM's ongoing maritime security initiatives.
Question. Very few African countries have the capacity to project
naval forces beyond their coastal waters. As a result, the economic
exclusion zones of many coastal African countries are exploited by a
variety of international actors.
Answer. I agree with this statement.
Question. What opportunities, if any, do you see for expanded
United States engagement on maritime security in the AFRICOM AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess what opportunities exist for
expanded United States military, interagency, partner, and allied
engagement on maritime security in the AFRICOM AOR.
From my current knowledge, Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA) is a
glaring shortfall in Africa. Most countries have little means to
actively monitor their territorial seas and exclusive economic zones
(EEZ), or to identify and target suspect vessels for interdiction.
Additional United States support to develop adequate MDA would assist
African partner efforts against illicit maritime activity.
Illegal, Unreported, Unregulated (IUU) fishing is an epidemic in
African waters, depriving Africans of an important source of protein,
detracting from regional economies and exacerbating instability. IUU
fishing is a priority for this Administration, and if confirmed, I will
assess the need for increased surface assets and Coast Guard law
enforcement detachment deployments to assist African partners in this
area.
The Yaounde and Djibouti Codes of Conduct outline the African
approach to addressing maritime security in East and West Africa
respectively. Yaounde, in particular, is not fully implemented and
represents an opportunity for AFRICOM engagement to advance
interregional cooperation and coordination.
There may also be opportunities for expanded maritime cooperation
with our Allies and partners operating in the Gulf of Guinea and Indian
Ocean. In 2021, the European Union (EU) established a Coordinated
Maritime Presence (CMP) in the Gulf of Guinea and is establishing a
similar CMP in the Indian Ocean this year. By aligning and coordinating
our efforts with the EU CMP, we can achieve complementary efforts in
maritime security.
africom health related issues
Question. Health issues are a significant concern in many African
nations and in their militaries. The United States Government's
engagement strategy in Africa includes an emphasis on health-related
issues.
To what extent should AFRICOM be involved in broader United States
Government ``health diplomacy'' and capacity building efforts in
Africa?
Answer. From my experience, I have seen that health diplomacy is
one of the U.S. Government's biggest assurance actions in becoming the
partner of choice. The DOD plays an important role in working with
partners, allies, and the whole-of-government in health diplomacy.
African militaries provide support to their nations' public health and
healthcare systems in varying degrees. Further, militaries in African
partner nations are often essential to their nations' outbreak and
crisis response capabilities. When we strengthen individual military
medical capability, we improve health systems and enhance individual,
regional, and overall capacities, with increasingly positive mil-civ
collaboration in the outbreak response area. AFRICOM should be involved
in health diplomacy and capacity building efforts in Africa to support
and further the broader United States Government's goals and missions.
Question. If confirmed, what changes, if any, would you recommend
to AFRICOM's efforts in this regard?
Answer. If confirmed, I plan to assess AFRICOM's ongoing efforts
regarding health diplomacy and capacity building and work with the
whole-of-government in order to support the broader mission in the AOR.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive
policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to
incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources
and care for victims of sexual assault.
What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to
sexual assaults in AFRICOM, including assaults by and against United
States civilian and contractor personnel?
Answer. In my role as the Commander of MARFORCOM, the second
largest Marine Corps command, I have established a command climate that
reinforces that sexual assault is a crime, is unacceptable, and will
not be tolerated. Sexual assaults are criminal acts against individuals
and they undermine unit cohesiveness and effectiveness. I have reviewed
the results of On-Site Installation Evaluations from other commands and
analyzed the revelations of those reports. I found that the findings of
these reports affirmed the actions I have taken throughout my career
and recently as the commander of MARFORCOM, prioritizing quality of
life, directly addressing some of the underlying contributing factors
that lead to sexual assault, and implementing best practices to protect
Marines and Sailors. If confirmed, I will continue to implement the
policies, practices, programs, and procedures that prevent and respond
to sexual assaults. Leaders must model the highest standards of
behavior and educate and train all personnel on DOD policies. Leaders
must reinforce a zero tolerance policy of sexual misconduct at all
levels of command as a critical step towards eradicating this issue.
They must also create and manage a culture and command climate that
prevents sexual harassment and sexual assault without question.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of AFRICOM policies and
procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation for
reporting the assault?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the adequacy of AFRICOM's
policies and procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from
retaliation for reporting the assault. In my current capacity, I know
that the DOD and the Services are following the policies set forth in
the fiscal year 2022 NDAA. This policy mandates that allegations of
retaliation by victims be investigated, tracked, and recorded by the
DOD. This policy increases the accountability placed on military
leaders and requires them to actively take action to prevent and
address retaliation against victims of sexual assault. The creation of
Special Trial Counsels that are independent from the chain of command
also lowers the risk of retaliation against victims of sexual assault.
The DOD continues to develop procedures that appropriately implement
the retaliation-related notification, training, and reporting
requirements. If confirmed, I will review AFRICOM's policies and
procedures to ensure they are consistent with recent NDAA amendments,
protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation, and ensure the
required training, culture, and command climate are established to
prevent retaliation against the reporting of sexual assault.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources in place in AFRICOM to investigate and respond to allegations
of sexual assault?
Answer. While currently unfamiliar with the training and resources
in place at AFRICOM to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual
assault, overall force trends within the DOD is something I routinely
track and am briefed on. I am familiar with the recently published
results of the 2021 On Site Installation Evaluation Report. Broadly
speaking, that report found troubling information regarding resourcing
and training. Most concerning was the pervasive misunderstanding of
what prevention actually is, how to do it and how to do it well. This
can negatively impact the accuracy of self-assessments conducted by
commands, as they ``don't know what they don't know.'' The report also
found inadequacies in prevention efforts, and noted that just because
units are in compliance with policy it does not equate to being
effective at preventing and responding.
Recognizing the pernicious impact of sexual assault on the force
and the challenges facing effective program implementation, if
confirmed, I will ensure that AFRICOM applies every necessary resource
and supplies sufficient training of the appropriate personnel to
respond to allegations of sexual assault in accordance with established
policy and regulations.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of
military leaders to hold servicemembers accountable for sexual
misconduct?
Answer. My view is that most military leaders are willing and
effortful in taking action to hold servicemembers appropriately
accountable for sexual misconduct. The reforms set forth in fiscal year
2022 NDAA mandate requirements regarding the investigation, tracking,
and reporting of sexual assault, retaliation against victims, and
sexual harassment. The fiscal year 2022 NDAA also establishes military
justice reforms, including the requirement for services to create
Special Trial Counsels, independent from the chain of command, to lead
in the prosecution and legal proceedings of these kinds of crimes. We
need the most qualified and well trained personnel handling the legal
proceedings for these kinds of crimes. These changes will serve to
empower military leaders to focus their efforts on education, training,
command climate, and culture that is geared towards preventing sexual
assaults and caring for survivors. If confirmed, I will continue to
fully implement established policies and regulations as well as get
broad input from other commands on best practices and procedures in
order to increase accountability, promote core values, and establish a
positive command climate that underpins the prevention of sexual
assault.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the
resources and programs in AFRICOM to provide victims of sexual assault
the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. If confirmed, I will review the adequacy of resources and
programs available in AFRICOM to provide victims of sexual assault the
medical, physiological and legal help they need. While reviewing the
results on the 2021 On Site Installation Evaluation Report, I was
concerned with the inadequacy of several units to effectively respond
to sexual assault in deployed environments. Given the logistical
challenges in Africa, and the propensity to employ special operations
forces and small teams to build partner capacity, I believe some of the
same trends could manifest at AFRICOM. My review would include the
availability of resources and programs available to remotely deployed
units in Africa, even in the most austere locations.
When time and distance factors make it challenging to provide the
same level of service as units in Europe receive, returning the victim
to Germany will allow greater access to these critical resources and
programs. I will conduct an assessment within the first 90 days to
determine which areas need additional focus and support.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?
Answer. In my current command, I have implemented a robust program
to support victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will conduct and
assessment on the adequacy of victim support for survivors. I will
stress the requirement to have stringent provisions necessary to
support victims of sexual assault. Additionally, I will advocate for a
similar policy to the Department of the Navy's Safe-to-Report policy
which protects victims of sexual assault from being disciplined for
minor collateral misconduct when reporting on sexual assault. The chain
of command must provide and coordinate the provision of necessary
support to victims of sexual assault. This support needs to be timely,
robust, and adequately resourced in order to realize the priority of
the health and readiness of the victim in these cases. No exceptions.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. If confirmed, preventing any instance of sexual assault and
harassment will be a top priority. Commanders are responsible for the
morale, welfare, and discipline within their commands and must
establish a positive climate and lead on the issue of sexual harassment
and sexual assault to eliminate it from our military. Military leaders
and commanders are trusted professionals who uphold DOD policies and
values. Yet, it is an insufficient standard for leaders to simply
comply with service regulations. Leaders must invest in and work hard
to build positive climates based on trust, where everyone, regardless
of rank or position and without fear of reprisal, is empowered to take
appropriate action to interrupt the ``continuum of harm,'' which can
lead to sexual assault.
Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and
procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be
effective?
Answer. Restricted reporting allows victims of sexual assault to
receive legal advice as well as medical and advocacy services without
the requirement for an investigation and without revealing their
identify or offender's identify to their command. This preserves the
victim's right to privacy and decision making while allowing them to
receive the support they require. A restricted report also allows
victims to anonymously disclose suspect information to the Catch a
Serial Offender Program to identify repeat offenders. In this program,
if other reports about the same suspect are identified, victims can
decide to change their report from restricted to unrestricted to
participate in a criminal investigation of the suspect.
The effectiveness of this kind of reporting is dependent upon what
metrics are being measured as effective or ineffective. I believe there
should be continuous study into how effective restricted reporting
policies and procedures are on the basis of safeguarding privacy,
providing necessary medical and legal care to victims, and their
contribution towards reducing sexual assaults in the military. We
should continuously strive to update policies and procedures in ways
that increase their effectiveness, especially when the effectiveness is
measured in terms of eliminating sexual assaults while increasing the
quality of care provided to victims.
Question. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging
the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and
responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate
and intend to implement if confirmed as AFRICOM Commander?
Answer. If confirmed, I will monitor trends and gauge the
sufficiency of the efforts of component commanders by evaluating and
assessing their procedures, both through personal action and through
the employment of subject matter experts and professionals in the field
of sexual assault prevention and response. I will implement and make
use of On-Site Installation Evaluations, which provide early detection
of risk and protective factors regarding sexual assault so that leaders
can take corrective actions and enhance prevention. Sexual Assault
Prevention and Response professionals are employed full time and tasked
with monitoring trends and gauging the effectiveness of prevention and
response programs through various methods including statistical
analysis and inspections of programs and procedures that scrutinize and
determine the degree to which the procedures adhere to regulations and
the degree to which they reduce sexual assaults and provide the
appropriate support to victims of sexual assault.
quality-of-life challenges in africom
Question. What unique quality-of-life challenges affect
servicemembers, civilians, and their families assigned to the AFRICOM
AOR?
Answer. From my experience as the Commander of MARFORAF, The
AFRICOM area of responsibility presents unique challenges to
servicemembers, civilians and their families assigned on the African
continent. Challenges include access to medical care, environmental
challenges, isolation from serving in remote locations, high
operational tempo, local crime, and potential armed conflict exposure.
If confirmed, I will assess to what extent those serving forward have
the support that would be available to them stateside or at other
installations abroad.
Question. If confirmed, how would you address these theater-wide
challenges to help improve the quality-of-life and retention of these
personnel and their families?
Answer. If confirmed, I will complete a thorough assessment of the
current initiatives AFRICOM employs to address quality of life and
retention. In addition, I will assess the command climate through
surveys and site visit engagements focused on the feedback from the
servicemembers and families within the AOR. Given my experience as the
Commander of MARFORAF, AFRICOM promotes quality of life initiatives for
personnel on the continent based on eligibility, threat environment and
mission requirements. These include: rest and recuperation leave,
funded environmental morale leave, MWR programs, cultural programs,
feedback solicitation, and the ``Families First'' program for deploying
families. The ``Families First'' program helps to manage family
expectations prior to deployment. Additionally AFRICOM leaders
routinely visit the deployed location, work closely with the
Ambassadors and Embassy staffs in each country, to assess the
environment, quality of life, retention rates and obtain feedback on
the climate. If confirmed, I will assess the programs and initiatives
that contribute to quality of life, and look for new and continued
impactful ways to contribute to the health and readiness of our force
and families in the AOR.
mental and behavioral health care
Question. In your view, are there sufficient and properly located
mental health assets in AFRICOM to address the mental and behavioral
health needs of the servicemembers, civilians and their families
assigned to the AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the sufficiency and location of
mental health assets in AFRICOM and I will take action to ensure the
physical and mental health and readiness of the force and their
families. First, it is my understanding that active duty personnel and
family members are pre-screened prior to assignment to ensure the
potential new assignment has the healthcare resources to address
existing healthcare needs. It is also my understanding that
servicemembers, civilians, and their families access varying levels of
mental and behavioral health care while in Africa depending on where
they are assigned. Across the continent, they may access embassy health
units, avail themselves of local providers sourced through TRICARE
services such as International SOS, and online counseling through
Military OneSource. Finally, the Defense Health Agency (DHA) plans to
award a tele-behavioral health (TBH) contract in late Fiscal Year 2022.
The DHA TBH contract will provide a source of care for active duty
servicemembers and potentially family members who may have new mental
health needs, which did not exist prior to assignment.
Question. If confirmed, what additional actions will you take to
address the mental and behavioral health needs of servicemembers,
civilians and their families in AFRICOM?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the current initiatives in
place to address the mental and behavioral health needs of
servicemembers, civilians and their families in AFRICOM and coordinate
with the Services to ensure personnel and their families are pre-
screened before assignment to ensure gaining locations can address
their existing healthcare needs. I will continue to encourage a healthy
respect for a holistic view of health and wellness, which includes
mental health. Engaged leadership, education, and accessibility of
services will remain key components. Engagement from qualified
personnel and medical professionals is paramount to achieving this
goal.
Although the Department has made great strides in reducing the
stigma associated with help-seeking behaviors, many servicemembers
remain concerned that their military career will be adversely affected
should their chain of command become aware that they are seeking mental
or behavioral health care. At the same time, the military chain of
command has a legitimate need to be aware of physical and mental health
conditions that may affect the readiness of the servicemembers under
their command.
Question. Do you have any views on how to reduce the stigma, real
or perceived, for seeking mental health care?
Answer. The best method for overcoming stigma is to continue and
encourage active, involved leadership. If confirmed, I will ensure
subordinate leaders and I support those seeking help. I will support
resources and training to foster a positive mental health culture and
ensure people seek care early. I will encourage and mandate open
discussions about mental health across every level of the organization,
ensure that leaders do not impose negative consequences against those
who seek mental health care, and I will create a culture of safety
where seeking mental health care is, as identified by the Secretary of
Defense, the same as seeking physical health care and is accepted as
such.
Question. In regards to the provision of mental and behavioral
health care, how does DOD bridge the gap between a servicemember's
desire for confidentiality and the chain of command's legitimate need
to know about matters that may affect the readiness of individual
servicemembers and the unit?
Answer. The DOD complies with the Privacy Act, and has issued DODI
6490.08 ``Command Notification Requirements to Dispel Stigma'' and DODI
6490.04 ``Mental Health Evaluations for Members of the Military
Services.'' The Department prioritizes patient confidentiality rights
while also ensuring readiness of the force. Disclosure to the commander
is only required if certain extenuating conditions exist, such as
serious risks of harm to self, others, or the mission. If disclosure is
made, then only the minimum amount of information necessary should be
provided to ensure privacy of individuals in accordance with legal
mandates.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes, I will
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes, I will
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes, I will
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes, I will
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes, I will
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are Members of
this Committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes, I will
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, Federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes, I will
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen
women, peace and security
1. Senator Shaheen. Lieutenant General Langley, what specific and
measurable actions do you intend to take to implement the Women, Peace
and Security Act at U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and United
States Africa Command (AFRICOM), respectively, and fully integrate
women into broader national security efforts?
Lieutenant General Langley. Activities conducted in compliance with
the Women, Peace, and Security Act of 2017 (WPS) are assurance actions
that must be woven into all activities throughout the planning process
and execution. Throughout my career, I have witnessed firsthand the
benefits of proactively integrating the needs and perspectives of women
in national defense. I believe that further empowering women to
contribute their talents and energies to international peace, security,
and prosperity is critical to achieving U.S. strategic goals.
From my time as the Commander of Marine Forces Africa, I know
USAFRICOM has been deliberately involving these assurance actions with
our partners and allies since 2014, before the Act was passed. I know
that the Command has released a WPS Annex to the Campaign Plan, as well
as a WPS Order to the Campaign Order. Additionally, they regularly
train Gender Focal Points on how to operationalize WPS to ensure the
staff is trained to further integrate the WPS principles. Maintaining
this momentum will be critical going forward, as the population growth
rates in Africa demand that governments ensure all members of society
feel empowered to provide for their common defense.
If confirmed, I commit to conducting a comprehensive assessment of
how USAFRICOM is implementing the Women, Peace, and Security Act in
accordance with the DOD Strategic Framework and Implementation Plan of
2020. I will be proactive in incorporating WPS initiatives in
everything we do, and would welcome a Congressional or Staff Delegation
to the headquarters during exercise and engagement planning to provide
feedback on our efforts.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
countering china and russian influence in africa
2. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Langley, China has been very
focused on investing in infrastructure and increasing their military
presence in Africa over the past decade. What recommendations do you
have to counter this growing influence?
Lieutenant General Langley. The People's Republic of China (PRC)
has hegemonic ambitions, which are characterized by coercion and
dependency. Their infrastructure investment is predatory in nature, and
targets fledgling countries with significant internal and trans-
regional challenges. These challenges cause fledgling nations to look
for any outstretched hand, and many times they find the PRC as a
reliable short term partner. In the long run, however, the predatory
nature of the PRC's lending will become a burden. Additionally, as
economic and security challenges are interwoven, it is likely that PRC
military presence will increase to secure their economic interests.
To combat this, the United States must employ a whole-of-government
approach using diplomacy, development, and defense to demonstrate to
African nations that we are the partner of choice. This approach must
also involve our partners and allies committed to a free and open
market. Together, we must develop integrated strategies to meet our
shared objectives. Increasing security and good governance will create
conditions favorable to private sector economic investment that is
fairer to our African partners and introduces a counterbalance to PRC
regional influence.
3. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Langley, do you believe it is
in the United States' best interest to seek an additional military base
besides Camp Lemmonier in Djibouti?
Lieutenant General Langley. Any recommendation on additional United
States basing options in Africa will only come as the result of a
comprehensive assessment that I will conduct, if confirmed. While
serving as the Commander of Marine Forces Africa, I became well
acquainted with the tyranny of distance on the continent. Operating in
an area of almost 12 million square miles, my crisis response forces
frequently had to make deliberate plans to extend their operational
reach to reach an objective. I do know that we have established
cooperative security locations (CSLs), which while not manned by United
States Forces, are secured by our African partners and can be turned
into temporary basing options with short notice.
If confirmed, I will conduct an assessment of U.S. basing, and the
corresponding operational reach of our forces. If new basing options
are warranted, I will work the Department of Defense (DOD) and
Department of State (DoS) to conduct policy reviews, host nation
notifications, and analyze existing access, basing, and overflight
(ABO) permissions.
4. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Langley, if confirmed, how do
you foresee your role in working with other United States agencies to
support African nations who face starvation as a result of Putin's war?
Lieutenant General Langley. The Russian Federation's unjust and
illegal war in Ukraine has exacerbated existing food insecurity
challenges in Africa. Following my confirmation hearing, the United
Nations (U.N.) brokered an agreement between Russian and Ukraine to
resume grain shipments to Africa. This is a welcome occurrence,
especially for the 15 African nations that import more than 50 percent
of their wheat from Ukraine and Russia. It will not, however,
completely solve the food crises on the continent. Other underlying
contributing factors such as drought, civil wars, political
uncertainty, conflict, and terrorism have prevented governments and
international aid organizations from reaching the most at risk
population.
If confirmed, I pledge to work with USAID, the lead Federal Agency
responsible for international humanitarian assistance and disaster
response. I will seek advice from the USAID Development Advisors and
Humanitarian Advisors resident on the USAFRICOM staff, and incorporate
international aid organizations into our planning efforts where it is
warranted.
illegal fishing
5. Senator Hirono. Lieutenant General Langley, on June 27, 2002,
President Biden released a National Security Memorandum directing U.S.
Government agencies to work with international partners to combat
illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing and associated labor
abuses. Much of this occurs off the coast of Africa. How do you intend
to work with partner nations to police against this practice?
Lieutenant General Langley. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated
(IUU) fishing threatens the sustainability of fish stocks, deprives
African people of both food and livelihoods, and robs developing
nations of a source of income. While not unique to Africa, it affects
many of the nations on the continent: 38 of the 53 nations in the
USAFRICOM area of responsibility have coastal borders.
If confirmed, I would consult with the Commander, Naval Forces
Africa and other interagency and law enforcement partners to identify
the resources, capabilities, and authorities necessary to work with our
African partners who want to mitigate the adverse effects of IUU
fishing. I would assess the existing USAFRICOM campaign plan and its
embedded maritime exercises to ensure consistency with President
Biden's recently signed National Security Memorandum, and more
aggressively enlist the cooperation of international partners to
develop African capability and capacity.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Angus S. King, Jr.
china commission
6. Senator King. Lieutenant General Langley, I have discussed the
``debt-trap diplomacy'' or ``debt colonialism'' of China's involvement
in in Africa. I believe we must establish an unbiased and non-partisan
commission to examine a grand strategy for our approach to China,
similar in intent to President Eisenhower's Solarium Project. We need
to think of a truly whole-of-government approach to create a stable
international order in which China cannot dictate regional
developments. What are the `toughest problems' outside of military
imbalances?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, I concur with your assessment
that successfully countering China will require an overarching grand
strategy that addresses the underlying questions of why, how, and for
what purposes the United States should employ its national power,
including defense. If such a commission was formed, I would encourage
the analysis of international trade policies, U.S. industrial base
capability and capacity, energy and raw material consumption, climate
change, socio-economic challenges, and the budget distribution of the
interagency.
7. Senator King. Lieutenant General Langley, in order to avoid the
United States trying to ``spend our way out of conflict,'' how can we
specifically counter China's major activities in AFRICOM?
Lieutenant General Langley. I believe close alignment with our
European and African partners is critical to ensuring resource
alignment to our strategies in Africa. These partners have a vested
interest in deterring destabilizing actors, countering PRC access and
influence, and increasing good governance practices on the continent.
Where we may come up short in resourcing, our partners may be able to
offset. If confirmed, I will comprehensively assess the programs,
resources, and capabilities being brought to bear across the defense,
diplomacy, and development enterprises to counter the PRC's influence.
8. Senator King. Lieutenant General Langley, what would be the
greatest benefit this commission could deliver?
Lieutenant General Langley. If such a commission was formed, it
could potentially develop a grand strategy for approaching the growing
challenges posed by the PRC and provide a conduit for other
stakeholders in the international community to ``plug in'' to United
States strategy.
9. Senator King. Lieutenant General Langley, what would put us in
the best position to avoid the United States and China from escalating
conflict and careening into a war with China?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, I firmly believe that a robust
dialogue with the international community and diplomatic efforts with
the PRC represent the best methods to exert pressure with minimal
escalatory risk. All diplomatic efforts must be synchronized across the
entire government, complement policies that encourage private sector
involvement, and be backstopped by a combat credible force that
aggressively campaigns to mitigate risk and provide the National
Command Authority with flexible deterrent options.
10. Senator King. Lieutenant General Langley, how do you plan to
leverage and incorporate the interagency resources to slow Russia's
influence in the AOR?
Lieutenant General Langley. I support a whole-of-government
approach, and from my time at Marine Forces Africa, I believe the
interagency must be unified in the strategy to compete with Russia.
Given recent legislation, including the Global Fragility Act, an
opportunity exists to iteratively ensure all executive departments have
complimentary approaches based in national strategy. Foremost, United
States military activity in Africa enables diplomacy and development,
and serves a supporting role to the whole-of-government approach. With
increased diplomatic and development pressure, the military's role is
to (1) accentuate diplomatic and economic impacts through robust
messaging, key leader engagements, and other means; (2) provide a
credible deterrent, including through applications of our irregular
warfare toolkit and highlighting malign activity when detected; and (3)
continue to work with partner militaries to build their capabilities as
the partner of choice while ensuring access and influence for the U.S.
and our partners.
united nations convention on the law of the sea
11. Senator King. Lieutenant General Langley, do you support the
ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS)?
Lieutenant General Langley. It is my understanding that UNCLOS
defines the rights and responsibilities of nations in their use of the
world's oceans. It establishes guidelines for businesses, the
environment, and management of marine natural resources while also
covering dispute resolution. Ratification of UNCLOS could help resolve
territorial disputes, encourage private investment in resource
extraction from the deep seabed, and signal that the U.S. is openly
committing to backing an international rules based regime. There could
be negative aspects to ratification, which are related to sovereignty
and compromising legal positions. If confirmed, I will follow the law
and policies developed by the President and the Congress.
expeditionary tactical operations center
12. Senator King. Lieutenant General Langley, the shift to a more
scalable, lethal, and mobile combat elements such as the Marine
Littoral Regiment and Multi-domain Task Force is critical to the
countering the dynamic threats in your area of responsibility. Maine
small businesses are the direct contributor in this sector and are
concurrently providing critical capabilities to the warfighter. The
Modular Panelized Shelter System (MPSS) is one system of note and is
currently employed by United States Northern Command (NORTHCOM) in
Alaska, EUCOM in Italy, and AFRICOM headquarters. Will you commit to
examining the effectiveness and reporting on the benefits from
utilizing MPSS in AFRICOM?
Lieutenant General Langley. I am committed to examining any and all
capabilities that can enable, enhance, and simplify the Command and
Control of forces entrusted to AFRICOM. I commit to learning about the
Modular Panelized Shelter System (MPSS), examining it to determine if
it meets mission needs and requirements in USAFRICOM, and reporting
back to this Committee through the Department of Defense.
13. Senator King. Lieutenant General Langley, do you believe your
future command and service component commands could further benefit
from an expeditionary, affordable, all weather, TS/SCI capable
structures such as the MPSS?
Lieutenant General Langley. I am committed to examining any and all
capabilities that can enable, enhance, and simplify the Command and
Control of forces entrusted to AFRICOM. I commit to learning about the
Modular Panelized Shelter System (MPSS), examining it to determine if
it meets mission needs and requirements in USAFRICOM, and reporting
back to this Committee through the Department of Defense.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Elizabeth Warren
civilian harm prevention
14. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Langley, do you agree
civilian casualties harm our credibility and fuel the very insurgencies
we are trying to defeat?
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes. The U.S. has a moral obligation to
avoid civilian casualties, and we are beholden to the laws of armed
conflict. The protection of civilians is fundamentally consistent with
U.S. national interests and values.
15. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Langley, United States
Africa Command (AFRICOM) provides a quarterly report updating the
public on the status of all reports of civilian casualties. What
benefits do you see in regular, public reporting of civilian casualties
and what other steps would you take to increase transparency?
Lieutenant General Langley. Regular, public reporting of civilian
casualties increases transparency with the American populace and the
international community, while enabling oversight of military activity
by the legislature. If confirmed, I will continue USAFRICOM's quarterly
updates and will work to identify other methods that enable the public
to report civilian casualty allegations.
16. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Langley, do you both pledge
to receive quarterly briefings from the Department of Defense's (DOD)
civilian harm experts and to regularly engage with civil society
organizations?
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes. I know USAFRICOM is willing to
have deliberate and meaningful conversations with any organization that
is committed to protecting innocent civilians. If confirmed, I will
continue this practice.
17. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Langley, in light of the
recent RAND reporting illustrating systemic failures in United States
civilian harm investigations, how do you plan to incorporate these
lessons learned into AFRICOM's civilian harm investigations and amends?
Lieutenant General Langley. If confirmed, I will ensure the
USAFRICOM staff deliberately integrates all applicable lessons learned
from this particular report, and any other civilian casualty related
investigation into the Command's policies, instructions, education, and
training exercises.
18. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Langley, how do you plan to
apply these lessons to joint operations with partners in AFRICOM's area
of responsibility?
Lieutenant General Langley. While serving as the Commander, Marine
Forces Africa, I saw how USAFRICOM integrated civilian casualty
scenarios into its joint and coalition exercises to reinforce the
operational and strategic importance of mitigating civilian harm. These
training scenarios enabled the development and refinement of U.S.
civilian risk mitigation strategies, as well as those of our partners.
If confirmed, I will continue this methodology and maintain open
communications with nongovernmental organizations to further knowledge
and application of civilian protection on the African continent. I will
also ensure USAFRICOM shares this knowledge with other CCMDs and
agencies through the monthly Civilian Casualty working group organized
by the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy (USD-P).
19. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Langley, in Mozambique and
Cameroon, governments and non-state actors alike continue to target
civilians with violence. How do you think AFRICOM should be refraining
from supporting operations (directly or indirectly) that are leading to
civilian harm in these and other countries?
Lieutenant General Langley. The U.S. has a moral obligation to
avoid civilian casualties, and we are beholden to the laws of armed
conflict. The protection of civilians is fundamentally consistent with
U.S. national interests and values. If confirmed, I would engage at the
Ministerial level and encourage Mozambique and Cameroon to comply with
their obligations under the law of armed conflict and international
treaties regarding the protection of civilians. If I become aware that
a nation is failing to comply with international obligations, I will
ensure USAFRICOM reports this as required and abides by U.S. legal
restrictions on providing training, equipment, and other assistance.
somalia
20. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Langley, what do you
understand to be the scope and impact of civilian harm caused by United
States Forces in Somalia over the past decade?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, over the past decade, my
deliberate focus on the African continent was during my tenure as the
Commander of Marine Forces Africa from 2020-2021. From my
understanding, USAFRICOM's operations in Somalia are in support of the
DOS and United States foreign policy objectives to prevent the use of
Somalia as a safe haven for international terrorism and alleviate the
humanitarian crisis caused by years of conflict. Every civilian
casualty is a personal tragedy, but I am unfamiliar with the scope and
impact on the entire population. I do believe that we have a moral
obligation to prevent civilian harm, and that it is anathema to our
overall goals. If confirmed, I will conduct a robust assessment of
civilian harm in Somalia over the past decade to understand its scope
and impact on the broader population.
21. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Langley, what experience do
you have dealing with civilian harm caused by United States Forces, and
what measures do you intend to put in place to minimize and respond to
civilian harm with the expanded mission in Somalia?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, I am familiar with civilian
harm unintentionally caused by United States forces and our partners
from my time as an advisor in Afghanistan and as the USCENTCOM J-5. As
our strategy to counter VEOs in Somalia evolves, terrorist groups may
intentionally operate in close proximity to civilian populations as a
form of protection against United States and partner capabilities. To
address this concern, USAFRICOM, along with partner forces must conduct
detailed and deliberate planning to reduce, as much as possible, the
risk for civilian harm during military operations.
22. Senator Warren. Lieutenant General Langley, while AFRICOM has
admitted to killing 5 civilians and injuring 11 others in 5 separate
strikes in Somalia since 2019, so far, those injured and relatives of
the victims have not received redress or ``ex gratia payments''. Both
the House and Senate National Defense Authorization Act extend the
Department of Defense's authority to make these payments. Do you plan
to begin to provide for ex gratia payments in Somalia?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, I appreciate the authorities
and resources provided by the Congress to provide ``ex gratia
payments'' to families of those civilians unintentionally harmed as a
result of U.S. military actions. If confirmed, to better understand the
challenges, I would first inquire as to why past payments have not been
made. In consultation with DoS, I would then examine host nation
policies and guidance for disbursement of these payments. Where the
payments should be made, I would direct the USAFRICOM staff to act
accordingly. I would also seek other viable options to provide redress
to those injured and the relatives of victims as a result of U.S.
Military operations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joe Manchin III
adequate resourcing
23. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Langley, I know you are
well aware of the Global Force Management process, the method in which
the Department of Defense distributes operational forces to meet the
demands of competing combatant commander requirements. With the shift
in our National Defense Strategy to great power competition, I'm
concerned that this shift may be used as an excuse to further
deprioritize areas of responsibility like Africa and South America.
However, we both know China is well and truly active in both of these
areas because they know their currency and influence will go further in
these nations. If confirmed, how do you plan to ensure your combatant
command is adequately resourced and staffed?
Lieutenant General Langley. As the current commander of Marine
Corps Forces Command, I command all USMC Service retained forces and am
well involved in the Global Force Management process for the Service.
Because the rest of the Fleet Marine Forces are generally assigned to
USINDOPACOM, I regularly experience the challenge of demand versus
supply for the remaining forces under my control.
I agree with your premise. While the PRC is the pacing challenge,
that does not mean they solely operate in the greater Indo-Pacific
region. Their ability to compete in other geographic areas, such as
Africa, has been shown through their ``One Belt, One Road'' initiative.
If confirmed, I pledge to advocate through the Global Force Management
process to gain access to allocated forces to counter PRC influence. I
will also work diligently with other partners and allies to address
overall gaps in capability or capacity.
As the current commander has done, I would generate comprehensive
risk statements for the Secretary and Chairman, and include them with
the annual Global Force Management Allocation Plan. Lastly, I pledge to
be transparent and forthright with this Congress about our strategies
in Africa, the resources required to execute such strategies, and the
attendant risks if not resourced appropriately.
24. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Langley, as a marine you're
undoubtedly used to succeeding with less, how do you believe your
previous experiences with inadequate resourcing and staffing will
benefit you in this new role?
Lieutenant General Langley. As former Secretary Mattis was fond of
saying, ``There is nothing new under the sun.'' Resourcing challenges
for military strategies have existed as long as there have been
militaries, and will likely continue into the future. It is incumbent
on leaders responsible for developing strategies to continuously assess
the ends, ways, means, and risk to ensure they're in balance. When
they're not, an adjustment to the strategy must be made or additional
risk must be accepted.
Furthermore, a Commander must use all of his or her skill,
knowledge, experience, creativity, and judgement when both developing
and implementing strategies. In many cases, this means ruthless
prioritization of tasks to ensure alignment with resources. It also
occasionally means going back to the well to try to find more
resources, when appropriate.
Over the past 37 years, I've honed these skills. I know that a
continuous assessment process is vital, and if confirmed, will ensure
our staff is rigorous in its approach. I also know how to articulate
risk to senior leaders, and how to develop imaginative ways to employ
the resources at hand.
influence operations
25. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Langley, foreign influence
operations with disinformation campaigns are perhaps the easiest and
most inexpensive ways for our adversaries to sow confusion and spread
false narratives and conflict in our country. Bad actors like China and
Russia see our current political tribalism and it's easy for them to
take advantage of it in the information ``gray zone''. How are SOCOM
and AFRICOM working to counter foreign influence operations and how can
Congress assist with these efforts?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, given my current position, I
can only offer anecdotal assessments. Foreign influence,
disinformation, and misinformation are frequently used tools of our
strategic adversaries. While the United States values truth and
transparency with our African partners, the PRC and the Russian
Federation do not. They will use these tactics to bring African nations
into their sphere of influence.
Countering these efforts requires a whole-of-government approach,
whereby all sectors of U.S. Government project truthful information via
active Public Affairs and Military Information Support Operations
(MISO) initiatives, augmented by senior leader engagements (including
Congressional Delegations). By supporting these activities, USAFRICOM
highlights disinformation, counters it with accurate details of PRC and
Russian malign influence, and helps reinforce positive narratives.
If confirmed, I would conduct a detailed assessment of both funding
and authorities given to USAFRICOM by this Congress. I believe a robust
information capability is required going forward.
26. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Langley, what more can
Members of Congress do to make our constituents aware and wary of
foreign influence online?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, I believe that in the
USAFRICOM area of responsibility, it is critical to highlight to our
partners when they are receiving disinformation or misinformation from
our adversaries. I also believe that countering false narratives with
truth and honesty while appealing to reason is the best method for
allowing people to make the best decisions possible.
To the extent that I can, as the Commander of USAFRICOM, I would
actively seek out PRC and Russian influence operations within my area
of responsibility. Within my authorities, this would include
highlighting Russian ``troll farms'' seeking to influence the American
public via social media. I would work with the Commander of USCYBERCOM
and interagency partners to determine the best methods to discover and
prevent these actions. When found, and pursuant to the appropriate
authorities, I would make public our findings and encourage U.S.
leaders to highlight these occurrences as well.
special operations command cyber efforts
27. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Langley, as you know the
North Africa Response Force is a composite formation from the Army and
the Marine Corps manned and equipped to provide crisis response to
throughout the AFRICOM area of responsibility. This is the latest
iteration of various crisis response forces which served both United
States European Command (EUCOM) and AFRICOM, notably Special Purpose
Marine Air-Ground Task Force Crisis Response Africa. The current
laydown of the North Africa Response Force is concerning; the ground
and aviation combat elements are not collocated complicating training
opportunities and planning efforts. Can you briefly summarize to the
Committee any recent activities conducted by the North Africa Response
Force and how you think the force might be better tailored or
positioned to meet the demands of your area of operations?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, I am acquainted with the
challenges facing the North Africa Response Force (NARF), both from my
time at MARFORAF as well as in my current role as one of the force
providers for the formation. I agree that the basing, operational
reach, and logistics are not optimal for crisis response on the
continent. I believe the current construct is overly complicated and
introduces unnecessary risk-to-mission. I imagine the current Commander
would have the same concerns.
From the force generation perspective, the inability of the
rotational, CONUS based aviation element to conduct pre-deployment
training with the permanently assigned OCONUS based ground elements
introduces additional risk-to-force.
While I am unfamiliar of any recent activities conducted by the
NARF, if confirmed, I would pledge to examine the force posture and
sourcing of the organization and advocate for any changes required to
both the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense. I will also be
transparent with this Congress regarding the attendant risks to crisis
response on the continent.
ridge runner
28. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Langley, I want to bring to
your attention the annual Ridge Runner Irregular Warfare Training
Activity. Held every year in West Virginia and nearby States, this
exercise provides participating forces dynamic, real-world, and multi-
domain training with few to none administrative pauses. Past
participants have included American formations from multiple services
and representatives from ally and partner nations such as Poland. If
confirmed, and if you are unaware of Ridge Runner, can you commit to
being briefed on this valuable exercise and consider attending a future
Ridge Runner and promoting this training opportunity to allies and
partners with whom you will work?
Lieutenant General Langley. Senator, while currently unfamiliar
with the Ridge Runner Irregular Warfare Training Activity, it sounds
like a worthwhile endeavor. I would commit to being briefed on this
exercise, and if applicable, see how it could possibly be used by the
Services during force generation prior to deployment to USAFRICOM. I
would also assess the USAFRICOM campaign plan to determine if it would
be appropriate to incorporate some of our partners and allies.
state partnership program
29. Senator Manchin. Lieutenant General Langley, the State
Partnership Program has been a fantastic means to deepen ties between
allied and partner nations and provide valuable training to our
Guardsmen and foreign militaries. As you both know, the California
National Guard is right now providing advice, through relationship
developed in the State Partnership Program, to Ukrainian soldiers
defending their homeland against Putin's aggression. If confirmed, how
will you, in your respective positions, expand or leverage the State
Partnership Program to promote our interests in your assigned area of
responsibility or improve relations with partner nations and
militaries?
Lieutenant General Langley. The State Partnership Program (SPP) is
one of USAFRICOM's most valuable ways to promote security, stability,
and build partner capacity. If confirmed, I would work with the Chief
of the National Guard Bureau and OSD to leverage SPP in Africa and see
if there are opportunities to expand partnerships on the continent. I
would also direct the command to continue working with State Adjutant
Generals and advocate for the National Guard to have sufficient funding
to support this vital program. The long term partnerships provide
stability and predictability for our partners, which enhances the
capability assessment process and builds trust.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Kelly
chinese investment in africa
30. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Langley, in his fiscal year
2023 posture statement, General Stephen J. Townsend, USA, current
Commander, AFRICOM, listed various threats to stability on the African
continent. In particular, he focused on China's heavy investment in
Africa as its ``second continent'' and predicted that by 2030, Chinese
military facilities and technical collection sites in Africa will allow
Beijing to project power eastward into the Middle East and Indo-Pacific
Theaters and west into the Atlantic. Do you share your predecessor's
concerns about Chinese investments in Africa and how would you seek to
address them?
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, I share General Townsend's
concerns about PRC investments in Africa. While PRC economic investment
is not a challenge that can be solved using United States Military
means alone, I believe USAFRICOM can play an important role. The
command's ability to serve as a synchronizer for a whole-of-government
approach to competing with the PRC makes it a valuable tool for the
United States Government. If confirmed, I would conduct a comprehensive
review of the USAFRICOM campaign plan, to determine if there are
additional military measures we could take to synchronize our actions
with those of the interagency and our partners and allies.
31. Senator Kelly. Lieutenant General Langley, I believe we need to
do more to end U.S. reliance on resources from unfriendly nations.
That's why I introduced the REEShore Act with Senator Cotton to bolster
our national defense stockpiles of critical minerals, and limit use of
China-based materials--which was incorporated into the defense
authorization bill this year. We also need to look beyond China's
borders. Considering that Africa's untapped energy deposits include one
third of the world's mineral reserves and rare earth metals, how will
you address Chinese investment in Africa, particularly as it pertains
to rare earth metals?
Lieutenant General Langley. While PRC economic investment in Africa
is not a challenge that can be solved using United States military
means alone, I believe USAFRICOM can plan an important role. The
command could support the Department of State, Department of Energy,
Department of the Treasury, and the United States Trade Representative
to mitigate the negative impact of the PRC's attempts to extract rare
earth minerals from Africa. This would involve building and enhancing
our bilateral and multilateral relationships with African nations to
ensure they view the United States as the partner of choice.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Tom Cotton
chinese influence
32. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Langley, China is working to
establish a base in Equatorial Guinea, providing it an Atlantic base.
Do you agree with General Townsend that this is the number one global
power competition concern?
Lieutenant General Langley. Yes, I concur with General Townsend's
statement during the recent posture hearing that maintaining U.S.
strategic access and influence is his number one challenge. Any PRC
permanent military presence on Africa's Atlantic coast would be a
worrying development and further challenge both homeland defense and
maritime operations in the Atlantic. This underscores the PRC's desire
to horizontally escalate competition across the globe. While they
remain the pacing challenge in accordance with the National Defense
Strategy, we should not be myopically focused on their actions in the
Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I pledge to work with the coordinating
authority for Global Campaign Plan--China to provide support to the
plan within the USAFRICOM area of responsibility.
counterterrorism
33. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Langley, what is your
current assessment of al-Shabaab's presence in activities in Somalia?
Lieutenant General Langley. If confirmed, I will complete a
thorough review of all threats in the USAFRICOM area of responsibility,
including al-Shabaab and other VEOs. My assessment, however, is that
al-Shabaab has increased its freedom of movement, grown its attack
capabilities, and expanded its reach since our forces repositioned out
of Somalia in 2021. I believe it is increasingly likely to threaten
other nations in the region, as evidenced by its attack near Ethiopia
this past weekend. It is able to conduct complex, coordinated attacks
throughout Somalia, and is capable of conducting assassinations against
government and military personnel with little warning.
Al Shabaab's activities are underpinned by significant annual
revenue that helps it fund operations, build capabilities, provide
effective governance in the regions it controls, and expand influence.
The group is al Qaeda's largest, wealthiest, and most lethal global
affiliate and is at the forefront of terrorist organizations in Africa
that threaten United States persons and facilities.
34. Senator Cotton. Lieutenant General Langley, aside from
returning some Forces to Somalia, is over-the-horizon counterterrorism
working elsewhere in Africa?
Lieutenant General Langley. If confirmed, I will conduct a detailed
assessment of current operations in the USAFRICOM area of
responsibility to determine if over-the-horizon counterterrorism
operations are being conducted elsewhere, and whether or not they are
effective. I pledge to be forthright with both the Department of
Defense and this Congress regarding this issue.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator M. Michael Rounds
african defense attache posts
35. Senator Rounds. Lieutenant General Langley, various African
countries, with no United States military presence, lack defense
attache posts. In an era of great power competition and expanding
presence on the continent by Russia and the People's Republic of China,
what is the feasibility and desirability of increasing our African
defense attache posts?
Lieutenant General Langley. Based on my time as the Commander of
Marine Forces Africa, my understanding is that the Defense Attache
Offices (DAO) and Offices of Security Cooperation (OSC) are minimally
manned across the African continent. If confirmed, I will conduct a
detailed assessment of these posts, as relationships are critical to
building capability and capacity. Generally speaking, I would seek
increased DAO postings from the DOD to expand our ability to engage
with our African partners and provide additional insight into how
United States strategy to counter PRC influence is being received in
the host nations.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Joni K. Ernst
united states special operations command and africa command
36. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Langley, understanding the
importance of robust transition support to our warriors as they exit
service, what are the unique needs for our special operators as they
make this transition?
Lieutenant General Langley. A positive transformation when leaving
the Service will help us live up to the responsibility of returning
better citizens to the Nation. As such, every servicemember who
transitions deserves support as they exit service. If confirmed, I will
engage with the Commander, Special Operations Command--Africa, as well
as the other component commanders, to see if there any programs or
additional resources they believe are necessary to meet the needs of
the force.
37. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Langley, is there a gap
between conventional forces and our special operators in this regard?
Lieutenant General Langley. My anecdotal assessment, based on my
experience with conventional forces, is that the Services do a
significant amount to help transitioning servicemembers. I know the
Marine Corps continually assesses the efficacy of our programs, and
changes them to more adequately suit our servicemember's needs. I am
generally unfamiliar with how the other Services, or members assigned
to USSOCOM, receive transition assistance. If confirmed, I commit to
directing the USAFRICOM Director of Personnel to identify any gaps
present in which I would have the authority to address, and further
allocate the necessary resources to address the gaps.
38. Senator Ernst. Lieutenant General Langley, would the force
benefit from some additional help tailored to their experiences?
Lieutenant General Langley. I agree with the Special Operations
truth that ``Humans are more important than hardware.'' This is true
not only in the Special Operations community, but for our force writ
large. Therefore, I would welcome any investment this Congress deems
appropriate to support the Services in assisting in returning our
members to civilian life.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing
39. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Langley, AFRICOM has a
very active campaign plan to combat illicit trafficking and improve
maritime security, and its efforts against illegal, unreported and
unregulated (IUU) fishing are particularly notable. For example, in
March and April of this year, through the Africa Maritime Law
Enforcement Program, United States Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard
elements partnered with Gulf of Guinea countries to interdict IUU
fishing vessels and drug traffickers. These types of partnerships can
serve as a model for other combatant commands and augment AFRICOM's
security sector lines of effort. If confirmed, will you commit to
continuing these efforts to improve maritime security and combat IUU
fishing in the AFRICOM AOR?
Lieutenant General Langley. Illegal, unreported, and unregulated
(IUU) fishing threatens the sustainability of fish stocks, deprives
African people of both food and livelihoods, and robs developing
nations of a source of income. While not unique to Africa, it affects
many of the nations on the continent: 38 of the 53 nations in the
USAFRICOM area of responsibility have coastal borders.
If confirmed, I would consult with the Commander, Naval Forces
Africa and other interagency and law enforcement partners to identify
the resources, capabilities, and authorities necessary to work with our
African partners who want to mitigate the adverse effects of IUU
fishing. I would assess the existing USAFRICOM campaign plan, and its
embedded maritime exercises, to ensure consistency with President
Biden's recently signed National Security Memorandum, and more
aggressively enlist the cooperation of international partners to
develop African capability and capacity.
chinese belt and road initiative in united states africa command
40. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Langley, back in 2008,
China and the Democratic Republic of the Congo reached a $6.2 billion
infrastructure-for-mining deal, in which China committed $3.2 billion
in investments for a copper/cobalt mine and another $3 billion worth of
infrastructure projects, all paid for by mining revenue. According to
Bloomberg, more than a decade later, less than a third of the
infrastructure funding has been dispersed, and the mining project has
only received about three-quarters of the promised investment. This
deal is emblematic of the predatory nature of China's Belt and Road
Initiative projects all over the continent. In your assessment, how do
these predatory initiatives affect the overall security picture in the
AFRICOM AOR?
Lieutenant General Langley. The PRC has hegemonic ambitions, which
are characterized by coercion and dependency. Their infrastructure
investment is predatory in nature, and targets fledgling countries with
significant internal and trans-regional challenges. These challenges
cause the fledgling nations to look for any outstretched hand, and many
times they find the PRC as a reliable short term partner. In the long
run, however, the predatory nature of the PRC's lending will become a
burden. Additionally, as economic and security challenges are
interwoven, it is likely that PRC military presence will increase to
secure their economic interests.
To combat this, the United States must employ a whole-of-government
approach using diplomacy, development, and defense to demonstrate to
African nations that we are the partner of choice. This approach must
also involve the members of the international community committed to a
free and open market. Together, we must develop integrated strategies
to meet our shared objectives. Increasing security and good governance
will create conditions favorable to private sector economic investment
that is fairer to our African partners and introduces a counterbalance
to PRC regional influence.
41. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Langley, in conjunction
with the State Department, how will you work to ensure the United
States remains the partner of choice in Africa?
Lieutenant General Langley. If confirmed, I will ensure that
strategies implemented by USAFRICOM take into account the unique and
synergistic capabilities of diplomacy, development, and defense. I see
these efforts as the three legs of a stool upon which United States
strategy in Africa rests. I would partner with African nations,
ensuring respect and dignity, while enhancing interoperability to
achieve shared objectives. I will continue to support DoS goals on the
continent which include economic cooperation and development; youth
engagement; health cooperation; environmental issues; and security,
peace, and stability.
approvals and authorities
42. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Langley, in testimony
submitted to this Committee (advance policy questions), you state
``[t]he area of greatest risk to succeeding in great power competition
in Africa is the erosion of United States strategic access and
influence,'' and write, ``lengthy approval processes and restrictive
end-use agreements often encourage African partners to turn to our
competitors for security assistance, thus decreasing United States
access and influence on the continent.'' How do you plan to address
this area of concern?
Lieutenant General Langley. If confirmed, I would use the
experience, skill, knowledge, judgement, and creativity learned
throughout my career to make USAFRICOM strategy capable of operating at
the speed of relevance to out-cycle our competitors. I would make the
USAFRICOM staff work across the departments and interagency to
streamline processes to allow for more responsive security assistance.
I would appreciate any efforts to make 10 U.S.C. Sec. 333 more agile,
flexible and responsive so that it better addresses immediate and
exigent requirements in the current operational environment.
43. Senator Sullivan. Lieutenant General Langley, do you have the
authorities you need to adequately compete with our authoritarian
adversaries on the continent?
Lieutenant General Langley. If confirmed, I need to validate my
understanding of existing authorities and assess whether there are any
gaps that prevent AFRICOM from adequately competing with authoritarian
adversaries.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
wagner group
44. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Langley, how is the
Wagner Group's malign capabilities in Africa impacting AFRICOM's access
and placement on the continent?
Lieutenant General Langley. Russian malign activities complicate
USAFRICOM's access and placement in Africa by destabilizing regional
governments and discouraging relationships with the United States and
its Allies. Russia targets states with weak governance and endemic
insecurity, encouraging authoritarian governance and corruption.
Russian actors work to increase their influence and isolate African
states from Western political, economic, and military partnerships and
improve receptivity to formal engagement with the Kremlin.
Effective Russian information operations hinder partnerships with
African governments and also obfuscate the exploitative, repressive,
and violent activities of Russian actors. I would also offer a more
recent example: Wagner's presence and malign influence exacerbated
tensions between France and Mali, ultimately causing the departure of
France's counterterrorism forces and decreasing the ability conduct
collaborative counterterrorism missions. Finally, longstanding
military-to-military relationships with Russia make it difficult for
African governments to enact military reforms and pursue new security
partnerships.
45. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Langley, how do Russian
proxies make it more difficult for us to prosecute a counterterror
campaign?
Lieutenant General Langley. The Kremlin and its proxies, such as
Wagner, operate with disregard for both the law of war and
international human rights law. They frequently conduct indiscriminate
violence during military operations, which alienate local populations
and create grievances with their governments. This increased tension
between local populations and national governments, creates recruitment
opportunities for of terrorist groups. Instead of reducing VEO
prevalence in Africa, it fosters it. By supplanting Western security
partnerships with African states, Russia can restrict or remove United
States access, with the most recent example being the withdrawal of
French and European forces from Mali.
46. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Langley, if confirmed,
what would be your first action to counter Wagner?
Lieutenant General Langley. If confirmed, I would look for
opportunities to disrupt Wagner's ongoing operations by working with
both allies and African partners to deny Wagner's access to airspace,
ports, and border crossings. Further, I would explore ways to speed up
security assistance to African partners so they do not have to turn to
Russian alternatives.
47. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Langley, what would
SOCOM's role be in countering Wagner in AFRICOM?
Lieutenant General Langley. If confirmed, I would conduct a
detailed assessment of Special Operations Command--Africa (SOCAF)
activities within the area of responsibility. Generally speaking, I see
USSOCOM's role as continuing to develop and employ fully capable
Special Operations Forces to conduct operations and activities in
support of AFRICOM's theater strategy and our national strategic
directives.
USSOCOM is a decisive element of AFRICOM initiatives involving
civil affairs, counter terrorism, humanitarian assistance, foreign
internal defense, hostage rescue and recovery, military information
support operations, security force assistance, special reconnaissance
and preparation of the environment mission sets.
USSOCOM's empowered, globally networked, partnered and integrated
SOF professionals are core contributions to AFRICOM's ability to
monitor and respond to Wagner's destabilization efforts across the
multi-domain spectrum.
somalia
48. Senator Blackburn. Lieutenant General Langley, how will full
reinstatement of United States presence on the ground in Somalia
enhance our intelligence capabilities and oversight capacity?
Lieutenant General Langley. The return to Somalia will likely
enhance intelligence capabilities in the fight against al-Shabaab,
improve force protection for troops on the ground, and provide
intelligence on our strategic competitors' activities in the region.
Having additional intelligence gathering activities physically in
Somalia will provide a more agile and responsive early warning
mechanism for threats to United States persons, interests, and
partners. Their proximity to the fight allows for near immediate
support, as they will no longer have to travel great distances to
contribute to the effort. Additionally, co-location with partner forces
enables AFRICOM to maintain relationships that reinforce adherence to
the rule of law and afford opportunity to counter malign foreign
influence.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
chinese presence in africa
49. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Langley, I understand China
is establishing military presence on the West Coast of Africa. What
would be the implications of Chinese access to the Atlantic Ocean,
especially for Homeland defense?
Lieutenant General Langley. I concur with General Townsend's
statement during the recent posture hearing that maintaining U.S.
strategic access and influence is his number one challenge. Any PRC
permanent military presence on Africa's Atlantic coast would be a
worrying development and further challenge both homeland defense and
maritime operations in the Atlantic. From a strictly military
perspective, a PRC naval base on the Atlantic coast of Africa could
enable persistent power projection by the People's Liberation Army--
Navy (PLAN). This power projection could stretch from the Cape of Good
Hope to the Straits of Gibraltar. Given the PRC port at Doraleh in
Djibouti, additional basing on the West Coast of Africa would put PRC
military capabilities astride key maritime lines of communication,
required for the world's economic activities. This underscores the
PRC's desire to horizontally escalate competition across the globe.
While they remain the pacing challenge in accordance with the
National Defense Strategy, we should not be myopically focused on their
actions in the Indo-Pacific. If confirmed, I pledge to work with the
coordinating authority for Global Campaign Plan--China to provide
support to the plan within the USAFRICOM area of responsibility.
50. Senator Hawley. Lieutenant General Langley, what are some
opportunities you see for our European allies to do more to address
security challenges in Africa?
Lieutenant General Langley. It's my sense that our European allies
are apprised of the security concerns emanating from Africa and many
are engaged in activities to protect their southern flank. While
assigned as Commander, Marine Forces Africa, I witnessed how AFRICOM
worked by, with, and through these European allies and partners on a
daily basis. If confirmed, I would support NATO's increased cooperation
and collaboration on the continent, under the framework of the
Mediterranean Dialogue. As numerous European allies have contributed
both troops and equipment to United Nations missions across the
continent, I would encourage their long-term engagement. If confirmed,
I would engage with these European allies and partners to see if there
are other opportunities for them to contribute.
______
[The nomination reference of Lieutenant General Michael E.
Langley, USMC follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of Lieutenant General Michael E.
Langley, USMC, which was transmitted to the Committee at the
time the nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by Lieutenant
General Michael E. Langley, USMC in connection with his
nomination follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of Lieutenant General Michael E. Langley,
USMC was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on July 26,
2022, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.
The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on August 1, 2022.]
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