[Senate Hearing 117-1001]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
S. Hrg. 117-1001
THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER
G. CAVOLI, USA FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COM-
MANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COM-
MAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
EUROPE
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
MAY 26, 2022
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
63-567 PDF WASHINGTON : 2026
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
�JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
�
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut TOM COTTON, Arkansas
MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
TIM KAINE, Virginia JONI ERNST, Iowa
ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
GARY C. PETERS, Michigan KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia RICK SCOTT, Florida
TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
JACKY ROSEN, Nevada JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
MARK KELLY, Arizona TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
�
�
� Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
� John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
_________________________________________________________________
may 26, 2022
Page
The Nomination of General Christopher G. Cavoli, USA for 1
Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander,
United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe.
Members Statements
Reed, Senator Jack............................................... 1
Inhofe, Senator James M.......................................... 3
Witness Statements
Cavoli, General Christopher G., USA for Reappointment to the 3
Grade of General and to be Commander, United States European
Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.
Advance Policy Questions....................................... 32
Questions for the Record....................................... 48
Nomination Reference and Report................................ 57
Biographical Sketch............................................ 58
Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire...................... 61
Signature Page................................................. 64
(iii)
This hearing is printed to include all available
information
requested or required to be inserted for the
record.
(iv)
THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, USA FOR REAPPOINTMENT
TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN
COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE
----------
THURSDAY, MAY 26, 2022
United States Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
(Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
Sullivan, Scott, Hawley, and Tuberville.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED
Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
consider the nomination of General Christopher Cavoli to be the
next Commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied
Commander, Europe. General, your nomination is well deserved,
and I thank you for your willingness to lead in this important
position. We welcome your wife, Christina, parents, Ivo and
Rita, and thank your father for his distinguished service in
the United States Army, your brother, Stephen, and we thank him
for his distinguished service in the United States Army, and
your sister-in-law, Michele, who are with us today. We thank
them for their continued support of your service, and again,
their own distinguished service to the Nation themselves.
Your current role as the Commanding General of U.S Army
Europe and Africa has no doubt provided you with critical
experience and insights which will serve you well if confirmed
in this new role. Your career spans nearly 35 years with
distinguished service across multiple theaters and in close
collaboration with allies and partners across the globe.
Further, you have studied the challenges in Europe from
numerous vantage points, including your current leadership in
assisting our Ukrainian partners and reassuring our NATO
allies. You have also served as Russia Director on the Joint
Staff and studied these issues in academia, including earning a
master's degree in Russian and East European studies and
serving as a fellow at the George C. Marshall Center for
Security Studies in Germany.
If confirmed, you will take command in the midst of the
greatest test of the NATO alliance since World War II. The
alliance has shown remarkable unity and resolve in the face of
Russia's unprovoked and illegal attack on Ukraine. A formidable
array of our allies have joined together and, in response to
Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the United States and our NATO
allies and partners have mobilized with impressive speed to
bolster Ukrainian resolve, reinforce credible combat power
along the eastern flank, and impose severe costs on Russia's
elite. Putin's actions have drastically altered the European
security landscape, NATO unity has been solidified, countries
like Sweden and Finland have officially applied to join the
alliance, and others, like Germany, are taking steps to invest
greater portions of their national budgets and institutional
energies to improve their military capabilities.
Ensuring the alliance is able to generate and maintain the
collective force posture, operations, and investments to deter
Russian aggression will be a primary responsibility for the
next EUCOM Commander.
General, with NATO set to announce a new strategic concept
at its summit in Madrid in June, I would like to know your
views on the current plans for United States Military presence
and posture in the EUCOM area of responsibility. I also hope
you will share your thoughts on how the United States and our
allies should begin to reassess the security environment
fundamentally altered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
Unlike the threat from Russia, for which there is little
disagreement among our European partners as to the size and
scope of the issue, our allies have a range of views on the
challenges posed by China. Beijing's growing economic influence
and diplomatic presence in Europe, coupled with its growing
military relationship with Russia, may have serious
implications for transatlantic economy and security. In 2019,
the NATO allies agreed to mention China for the first time in a
NATO declaration, stating that, ``China's growing influence and
international policies present both opportunities and
challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.''
The next EUCOM Commander will have to work with the interagency
and across the alliance to address Chinese malign influence
within the region. General, I hope you will share what
expectations you have with regard to NATO's developing China
policy and what steps can be taken to mitigate this growing
threat.
Finally, as we reflect on the realities of 21st century
warfare on display in Ukraine, the Committee would benefit from
hearing what lessons you would bring to prepare our forces for
any potential future conflict. We would also benefit from
insights from your current post at United States Army Europe
and Africa, particularly in areas such as military mobility,
large-scale multilateral exercises, and engagements with
partners and allies across the theater. I hope you will share
how you would intend to use such insights if confirmed as the
next EUCOM Commander.
Thank you again, General, for your continued willingness to
serve, and I look forward to your testimony.
Let me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and
General Cavoli for your willingness to continue your
distinguished service to our country.
I enjoyed meeting your wife, your parents, and other family
members earlier this morning, and they are with us today, and I
just know how proud they are of you in the service you have
given to your country.
I will note that you were born in Europe during one of your
father's tours there, so it is clear that you were destined to
fill this role we are discussing here today.
We are considering your nomination to lead the United
States and NATO forces in Europe at a pivotal point in our
history.
Russia's unprovoked, unjustified invasion of Ukraine has
been a wakeup call to the free world that we need to deter
Putin, not accommodate him, not appease him, as some would want
to do to deter him.
But it was not a surprise to many of us here today, who
also understand that protecting America's interests means
supporting Ukraine's defense and working to deter further
Russian aggression against NATO.
I am encouraged that Europe is now stepping up their
investment in its own defense. With Finland and Sweden now
seeking NATO membership in response to Putin's reckless acts,
we have got to keep up this momentum to strengthen our shared
security.
We have seen what happens in Ukraine when deterrence fails.
That is why I have long advocated that we invest more in our
own defense to ensure deterrence does not fail in even worse
ways.
I do not want anyone to forget that China is supporting
both what Russia is doing in Ukraine and China has long been
involved in malign activity in Europe itself.
General Cavoli, you are the right man for the job during
these exceptional times, and I look forward to working with you
on bolstering United States security interests with our
European allies and partners.
Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
General Cavoli, your remarks, please.
STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, USA FOR
REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER,
UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
EUROPE
General Cavoli. Thank you, Chairman. Good morning, Chairman
Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the
Senate Armed Services Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
to appear before you today, and thank you for the support that
you provide to our service men and women and to their families.
I am humbled to be nominated to serve as the Commander of
U.S. European Command and as the Supreme Allied Commander,
Europe. I am grateful to President Biden, to Secretary Austin,
and to General Milley for the trust and the confidence that
they place in me, especially at this momentous time in Europe.
I must, of course, start by thanking the person who has
made the most difference to me throughout my career, my wife
and my best friend, Christina. Being a military spouse is not
easy. There are routine separations, constant moves, and the
tragedies of war. Christina has handled all of this with
dignity and with grace. She has selflessly supported our
soldiers and their families, even while raising our own two
sons, Alex and Nick. I am so proud that we can share this
moment together today.
I would also like to thank my sons. Alex graduated
Princeton and works at a clean energy start-up company in
California, and his younger brother, Nick, is studying physics
at the University of California in Santa Barbara. These two
have followed me all over the world, they attended three high
schools each, and I could not be more proud of the young
Americans that they have turned out to be.
As I talk about my family I reflect on my own life. As the
Ranking Member pointed out, my dad is an Italian immigrant. He
came to America and became a U.S. Army officer. I was born in a
military hospital in Wurzburg, Germany during the Cold War.
Over the years we lived in Europe again and again. We were
blessed with multiple assignments there.
For the past 4\1/2\ years I have been fortunate to command
our United States Army Forces in Europe, and for the past year
in Africa too. I have had the priceless opportunity to work
closely with the interagency, our allies, and our partners to
advance our common national security objectives.
For the last 3 years I have done so under the leadership of
General Tod Wolters. I would like here to publicly thank him
for his mentorship and for his leadership during that time.
I would also like to thank you, the United States Congress,
and especially this Committee. Since my first tour as a general
officer in Europe in 2014, the Congress has worked tirelessly
to support our service men and women in our mission. The
European Deterrence Initiative, which you have repeatedly
authorized, has been absolutely vital to building the military
readiness necessary to deter Russia and to respond in times of
crisis.
In response to this crisis, the illegal and unprovoked
Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States Military has
deployed significant combat power on short notice. The Fifth
Corps headquarters, an armored brigade combat team, withdrew
prepositioned stocks, the 18th Airborne Corps headquarters with
a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division, a carrier strike
group, fifth-generation fighters, additional destroyers--all of
this has been enabled by the European Deterrence Initiative and
by the hard work of training and exercising that the EDI has
enabled over the years.
If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to build on this
vital work, ensuring that EUCOM remains ready to respond, along
with our allies and partners, to any threat to our national
security.
In Europe, the core security challenge is Russia. Russia's
unprovoked invasion of Ukraine ushers in a new era in European
security. NATO is more energized and unified than I have seen
in years. Our allies and partners have rushed with us to assist
Ukraine to remain independent and free, and on the far side it
will be up to us all to reestablish an enduring stability.
But Russia is not our only challenge. China's growing
influence is also of huge concern, as are terrorism, migration,
cybersecurity, and climate change. So we cannot be a one-
problem alliance. We must maintain vigilance across 360
degrees, ready to respond to any and all threats.
We are in a time when unity in the alliance is of the
greatest importance. Our allies will be our strength as we go
forward. If confirmed, I will work closely with this Committee
and will provide my best military advice with the goal of
promoting our security interests and defending the principles
that we have all fought so hard for over these years.
It has been an honor to serve this country for the past 35
years. If confirmed, I will be thankful for the opportunity to
continue to serve alongside the brave service men and women of
EUCOM and of our NATO allies.
I thank this Committee once again for your time today and
for the opportunity to speak with you. I very much look forward
to your questions.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
There are a series of question which nominees must respond
to. Please respond appropriately.
Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
governing conflicts of interest?
General Cavoli. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
confirmation process?
General Cavoli. No, sir.
Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of the Congress
receive testimonies, briefings, reports, records, and other
information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
Committee, when requested?
General Cavoli. I do, Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
Committee, to give your personal views, even if your views
differ from the Administration?
General Cavoli. Yes, I do.
Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
by this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
committees of Congress and to consult with the requestor
regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
providing such records?
General Cavoli. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff applies the
deadlines established by this Committee for the production of
reports, records, and other information, including timely
responding to hearing questions for the record?
General Cavoli. I will, sir.
Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
and briefers in response to congressional request?
General Cavoli. Yes.
Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
General Cavoli. Yes, they will.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
I think it is both significant and maybe a bit ironic that
we first met in Ukraine in about 2014, when you were leading
the efforts to start organized training efforts and support
efforts for Ukrainian forces. I think your work then has shown
itself to be extraordinarily useful today, so thank you for
that.
Part of what you pointed out in your testimony is a unity
among NATO and a commitment to invest seriously in defense, and
that raises two questions. Your quick thoughts about how you
are going to coordinate the investment of NATO countries so
that everyone does not buy X and we do not have any Y, and then
what should the United States do as a catalyst but also as the
leading member?
General Cavoli. Senator, if I could start with the second
question first. I think the U.S.'s special role inside NATO is
to point the way toward the future and to demonstrate with our
actions how to go in that direction. So by deploying force we
have led the way for NATO in this crisis, as an example. As we
arm our own military we create a model that other nations in
the alliance can emulate.
In my current role I spend a lot of time talking with the
chiefs of other European armies about how we arm ourselves, how
we organize ourselves, and many of them use those lessons or
those examples as models for themselves. So I think inside NATO
our special role is to be a model and an exemplar.
How will we coordinate the investments as we go forward?
This is always a devilish thing to do. It can be very
difficult. There is an initiative inside NATO right now to link
plans to required structure to national commitment. General
Wolters has begun that and has advanced that. It will fall to
me, if I am confirmed, to complete that work, and that work
will guide the capabilities and capacities that we need from
various nations and in support of NATO's planning efforts.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. To date, NATO
and communities around the world have been able to move
logistics into Europe without any type of interruption. Indeed,
I think there is a question of how long that might be allowed.
But in a potential fight the idea of uncontested logistics is
probably the first thing you throw out.
Are you preparing for a situation in this context or other
context, for fighting to get your logistics forward to your
troops?
General Cavoli. We are, Senator. In United States Army
Europe this is a source of significant concern as we look at
our plans, especially our plans to reinforce our forces in
Europe in the event of a large crisis. When we look at it we
divide it from the U.S., from fort to port, and then from port
to port across the Atlantic, and then from port to the point of
need in Europe. Each one of those segments carries its own
challenges and has different people responsible for solving
those problems.
So we work in a partnership with USTRANSCOM and with the
U.S. Army to get Army forces from fort to port. We work with
USTRANSCOM as well as the Second Fleet and JFC Norfolk, a newly
stood-up command, to control the sea lanes of the Atlantic to
go from port to port, and then I am largely responsible, with
our NATO allies and related organizations such as the Joint
Support and Enabling Command, recently stood up by NATO, to get
folks from port to the point of need.
Each one brings different challenges. Those challenges
could be the threat of kinetic strike or the threat of cyber
activity, and so forth. So yes, we work very hard on that,
Senator.
Chairman Reed. You mentioned the issue of cyber, and I
think many people are waiting for the shoe to drop, vis-a-vis
the Russian cyber in this present situation. This is an open
hearing, but are there any comments you would like to make
about that?
General Cavoli. Well, Senator, I think we are correct to be
waiting for the other shoe to drop. There is capability and
capacity that could be used, and we are being very vigilant
about that, as the DoD. To go far beyond that I think we would
have to go into a classified setting, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General, and again, I
think your service not only justifies this confirmation but
demands it. Thank you very much.
General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Senator Inhofe, please.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you. I appreciate that and I echo
your comments about the background of our witness today. We
have had an opportunity to discuss a number of things over the
years, and we discussed the subject of the Ukraine grain
shortage and the spillover effects that are there, in my
office. There are three questions that come from that, that
should be a part of the record that we will build today on this
issue.
That is, first of all, how concerned are you by the food
crisis that has resulted from Russia blocking Ukrainian grain
exports to Africa? You know that I have had an interest in this
for quite some time. Secondly, what will be the longer-term
security effects of this, and what more should we do with our
European and African allies and partners to address these
problems now?
General Cavoli. Senator, thank you. Indeed, in my role as
the Commanding General of United States Army Forces in Africa
this has weighed pretty heavily on our minds. The grain
shortages that we are experiencing from both Russia and
Ukrainian production being unable to come out of the countries
in large volume or being sanctioned and not being sold are
being felt on the African continent. They were felt very
quickly. I was recently in Kenya, and there was significant
impact there already. We know that in other countries, such as
Tunisia, the prices have skyrocketed for basic foodstuffs.
So there is food insecurity in Africa that is being
provoked by the shortage of grain. It is of great concern. In
many cases these are countries that do not need an additional
challenge, and those additional challenges we will have to help
them with at some point. This will largely be a European
concern because of the close connection between African
security issues and European security issues.
With regard to what to do about it, there are many
proposals, Senator, being batted about right now, many
different ways. Some of them are very positive. We think there
are about 20 million tons, 22 million tons of grain in Ukraine
backed up, waiting to be pulled out. Some of the ports we are
attempting to use, the Romanians have made the port of
Constanta available. It only does about 90,000 tons a day. But
the German Deutsche Bahn has recently stepped up. That is the
German national railroad agency, and they are doing what they
call a Berlin trainlift, an analogy to the Berlin airlift, to
dedicate trains to pulling wheat right out of Ukraine into
Western Europe. Poland has established a new border crossing
regime with Germany in order to facilitate that.
So I think some efforts are taking place. Much more remains
to be done, Senator.
Senator Inhofe. Good. Very good.
General Cavoli, General Wolters testified before this
Committee, and it sounds almost impossible, but he said our
troops' ability to deploy from the United States and be up and
running in less than a week to deter further Russian aggression
was made possible by the funding through the European
Deterrence Initiative. This Committee spearheaded this
initiative after Russia's first invasion in 2014.
Do you agree with General Wolters' assessment, and what
ways have you seen the EDI enable our robust response? It is
very difficult to understand that this was possible.
General Cavoli. Senator, with EDI over the past few years
the U.S. Army, in conjunction with U.S. European Command, has
placed large amounts of very modern equipment, brigade combat
team sets, in storage in Europe, and we have also used the
funding to practice flying over and drawing that equipment on
short notice. In the beginning of this crisis, when we got the
order to activate and deploy the first brigade of the Third
Infantry Division out of Fort Stewart, Georgia, we were able to
do so very quickly. We moved all the troops in about 4 days, by
aircraft, and those troops, the first of them were putting
rounds downrange in less than a week, and by the end of 3 weeks
every single screwdriver in the brigade has been issued and
they were ready to roll anyplace.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah, and that could not have been done, it
would not be possible, and a lot of people thought it was not
possible, if it had not been for the preparation that you
mentioned that you had the foresight to ready yourselves.
General Cavoli. One hundred percent, sir.
Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Shaheen, please.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cavoli,
congratulations on your nomination.
General Cavoli. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you for being here this morning and
for your service, and welcome to your family as well.
You were kind enough to meet recently with Senator Tillis
and I to talk about some NATO issues, but we also talked a
little bit about, as I recall, a little bit our recent visit to
the Balkans, where we were in Bosnia Herzegovina and talked
with the military leadership of the EUFOR mission and NATO
there about some of the challenges that are facing Bosnia and
concern about whether EUFOR is going to be reauthorized this
fall when it comes up again before the U.N.
I wonder if you could, as we think about the potential for
Russian meddling in the Balkans--and they have a history of
doing that--and the challenges that Bosnia Herzegovina faces,
can you talk about what the impact would be if the EUFOR
mission is not renewed?
General Cavoli. Senator, first of all Russian influence in
the Balkans is real and it is not a positive force, in my
experience, so it is something we must think about constantly.
The presence of multinational forces, such as KFOR in Kosovo
and EUFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina is an important part of our
ability to monitor and to help control the situations there.
I do believe EUFOR has an important mandate. If EUFOR's
mandate is not renewed I believe that there must be some effort
that takes its place. If I am confirmed, I will look into that
immediately and participate in the development of options, and
I look forward to discussing it with you in the future,
Senator.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am really pleased to hear
that. I think that it is very important that we work with our
European partners and ensure that we do not see that mission
expire and nothing replace it, so thank you very much for that.
You spoke earlier with Senator Inhofe about the challenges
of getting the grain out of Ukraine that is needed in so many
parts of the world. One of the biggest challenges has been the
Russian really predominance in the Black Sea and the inability
to dislodge them. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about
how what we might do there to bolster NATO defenses in the
Black Sea, what options we might have as we are looking at the
challenges we face because of Russia's dominance in the Black
Sea.
General Cavoli. Yes, ma'am. For some time before the onset
of this crisis, that is for a couple of years before this
current crisis, we in USEUCOM had been working on strengthening
the presence and the role of the U.S. and NATO in the Black Sea
area. This has been something we are working on for some time.
Naval Forces Europe, for example, has been working with the
Bulgarians on a maritime domain awareness system. My command,
the United States Army in Europe, has been working on long-
range fires with the Romanian Army and the establishment of
command and control nodes that are able to handle the very
high-end new equipment that Romania has been buying from us,
specifically Patriot missiles, and HIMARS rocket launchers.
So we have been looking at things like that in the past,
Senator, and we will continue to do those in the future, if I
am confirmed.
Senator Shaheen. So do you think we have an adequate
strategy within NATO and in the United States for the Black Sea
region?
General Cavoli. Ma'am, I think inside the U.S. we have a
strategy, you know, adequate. All strategies have to be
assessed, reviewed, and updated all the time. Clearly the
current events in the Black Sea region are going to require us
to go back and make sure that we adjust everything for the
result of this conflict. I think I could say the same thing for
the NATO approach, but I will have to wait, and if I am
confirmed, look into exactly what NATO is planning in that
regard and come back to you on that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I look forward to that.
Finally, the Administration recently appointed retired
General Wolff as the Ukraine Security Assistance Coordinator,
which I think was a very positive move. Can you talk about how
the relationships with General Wolff as coordinator will work
as you think about your role in coordinating security with the
Ukrainians?
General Cavoli. Senator, only briefly because that is still
working its way out right now. We encourage the efforts to
coordinate. That is one of the difficult things in this overall
collective effort. I saw Terry Wolff a couple of weeks ago in
Ramstein, and we had a couple of words about it. But if I am
confirmed, I look forward to working with him to make sure that
all of these systems work together closely.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I look forward to hearing more.
General Cavoli. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
Senator Cotton, please.
Senator Cotton. General, congratulations on your
nomination. Thank you for your career of distinguished service.
Thanks to your wife, Christina, for supporting you and no doubt
supporting the families of the troops you have led over the
years, and thanks to your family for their service. The defense
of this Nation is often a family affair.
I want to discuss the request by Finland and Sweden to join
NATO. That is a political decision that will be made by the
President and this Senate as well as 29 other NATO members. But
NATO is foremost a military alliance, so I would like to get
your professional military judgment on the implications of
adding Sweden and Finland to NATO. What do you think it will do
to bolster our common defense to have Sweden and Finland as
members of NATO?
General Cavoli. Senator, I look forward to the accession of
Finland and Sweden to the alliance from the military
perspective. Each of those militaries brings quite a bit of
capability and capacity to the alliance from day one. For
example, Finland has a large army, well equipped, very well
trained, very quickly expandable, exercised very frequently,
and absolutely expert in defending the borderline that it has
with Russia for these past decades, an expertise that they
demonstrated in 1939, and has built on ever since.
Finland, in addition to its big army, has F-15 fighter jets
and has just decided to buy 64 F-35s, so they will arrive
bringing capacity and capability to the alliance.
Sweden is the same thing, a smaller army but a very capable
army, and an army that is growing. My colleague, Karl
Engelbrektson, has a 200 percent increase in his acquisition
budget over a 5-year period. They have recently bought Patriots
and are contemplating buying some other equipment. We work with
them very closely. Critically, they bring a navy in the Baltic
Sea, which will be of enormous military significance to the
alliance.
Then if we look geographically with the accession of those
two countries, the entire Black Sea, with the exception of a
couple of few kilometers, will be coastline of NATO nations,
which will create a very different geometry in the area, sir.
Senator Cotton. I think you mean the entire Baltic Sea,
right?
General Cavoli. I am sorry. Of course, the Baltic Sea.
Senator Cotton. Can you speak specifically about what it
means for Russia's Baltic fleet to now have the northern shores
of the Gulf of Finland a part of NATO, since the southern
shore, Estonia, already is, and then also what it means to have
Gotland, a large Swedish island, in the middle of the Baltic
fleet? What does that mean to Russia's Baltic fleet and their
defense planning?
General Cavoli. Well, sir, in the most generic sense it
provides a bunch of different dilemmas, almost geometric
dilemmas that Russia does not have right now as they sail forth
from Saint Petersburg and Kaliningrad. So it will be
advantageous.
Senator Cotton. You mentioned one other key feature of
geographic which is the 800-mile border that Finland has with
Russia. Some might say, gosh, this exposes NATO to a lot more
risk because you have this large border. It sounds like your
perspective is that rather than exposing NATO to risk it
exposes Russia to greater risk and complicates Russia's defense
planning. Could you elaborate?
General Cavoli. I do think that, Senator. I think that for
a couple of reasons. First of all, Russia has not historically
put too many ground forces on that border. It has been an
economy of force theater for them because they thought they had
a relationship with Finland that allowed them to do that. This
allowed Russia to concentrate ground forces in other places.
That possibility will now go away for Russia.
In addition to that, the Finns, as I mentioned a moment
ago, are absolutely expert in defending that border. I have
personally gone on a snowmobile with the Chief of the Border
Guards and with the Chief of the Finnish Army down half the
length of that border, and I was very impressed at their
ability to defend it.
Senator Cotton. Do you think the Russian General Staff is
fairly well versed in the history of the Winter War, which you
alluded to, of 1939-1940?
General Cavoli. Sir, I know they are. That Winter War is
studied not just by Western armies as a model of how to beat a
larger force but it is studied by the Russians as well, as an
important lesson to learn from their past.
Senator Cotton. It sounds like you think that even 80 years
on that the Russian General Staff might not want to put their
hand on that hot stove again after they did it in the Winter
War?
General Cavoli. I would have to put myself inside their
heads, Senator, but I would not want to do it if I were them.
Senator Cotton. All right. One final question. There was a
report a couple of days ago in the Wall Street Journal that the
Administration is considering sending special operation forces
to guard the embassy in Kyiv. Can you comment on that report?
General Cavoli. Sir, I cannot comment publicly on it, but
we currently do not have any marine security detachment with
the embassy in Kyiv, and with regard to special forces I think
we would have to talk about it in a separate----
Senator Cotton. Okay. You answered my next question, which
was going to be do we have marines at that embassy, which we
have in pretty much every other embassy all around the world.
In fact, I just checked this morning. We do, in fact, have
marines in Moscow yet we do not have marines guarding our
embassy in Kyiv. It is their job all around the world, and I
think that is because the President came out last year and
publicly stated that he would never put troops in the Ukraine,
and now the Administration is running around like a cat chasing
its tail, trying to figure out how to let these marines do
their job at that embassy, just like they are doing in Moscow,
just like they are doing at five diplomatic facilities in
China.
I think we should just let the marines go do their job at
the embassy. This is another instance in which I am afraid the
President is self-deterring in a public fashion, which is
sending the wrong signal to Vladimir Putin.
You do not have to respond, but you can take it under
advisement. I think the marines should be standing guard at the
Kyiv embassy whenever you get confirmed.
General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
Senator Gillibrand, please.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you so much and congratulations.
We are very grateful for your service.
In visiting some of our NATO allies we talked about Article
5 and when that gets triggered after a cyberattack. Do you have
views about what level of cyberattack on a NATO ally would
trigger an Article 5 requirement?
General Cavoli. Senator, this, of course, is a very active
debate inside the alliance. It is an active debate, I think,
for most countries, in fact. That debate has been joined but it
has not come to a conclusion inside NATO yet. I believe that
there are various levels of cyberattack, as you point out, and
at some point they become more akin to a kinetic attack than
others.
One complicating thing I think we have seen in the recent
past is the activity of non-state cyber actors in this same
time frame as states are contemplating cyber defense. So I
believe that attribution is going to continue to be one of the
most important parts of any cyber policy.
Senator Gillibrand. With regard to Russia's cyber threats
specifically to our Forces in Europe and our allies in NATO,
what steps are you taking and will take, if confirmed, to
ensure that our IT networks, communication channels, and weapon
systems and platforms are secure and able to perform as
intended in the event of a broader conflict?
General Cavoli. Yes, ma'am. In my current role as the
Commander of United States Army Europe and Africa I am
responsible to provide the basic, secure backbone for EUCOM's
communications, so I work with DISA and with Army Cyber and
network command to do so. We have a regional cyber center at
Wiesbaden. It does maintain overview of one of our networks,
and I work closely with our network command to maintain defense
of the others. This is something I get briefed on literally
every week. I am satisfied with the level we have right now. We
have to work on it constantly, though, and we do work on it
constantly.
In a broader sense, Senator, if I am confirmed into the
next job, the alliance is working in this direction also. So
there is a NATO Cyber Center of Excellence. We are initiating
the conversations necessary to have collective policy and
strategy on network defense, but I believe much more needs to
be done. I look forward to looking into it and getting back to
you on that.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Last week, Finland's
Parliament overwhelmingly voted to join NATO following
applications by both Finland and Sweden to join the alliance.
Given the extensive border that Finland shares with Russia and
Finland's advance military capabilities can you describe how we
can effectively integrate these two countries into the NATO
umbrella?
General Cavoli. Sure, Senator. So first of all we already
practice that in the ground domain all the time, and I can
speak, I think, for Cobra Harrigian and Bob Burke at United
States Air Force Europe and Naval Forces Europe as well. They
do this all the time in the air and maritime domains. We
exercise with Finland. I have got soldiers there I believe
right now. I just brought a couple of Stryker companies back
out of there. We have got a parachute battalion going up there
later this summer. We exercise frequently with Sweden to
include on high-end air and missile defense things.
I think it will be quite easy for us to integrate them
quickly. We have been integrating them in our large-scale
exercises as well as our operations abroad for some years now.
Senator Gillibrand. Turkey obviously has expressed
hesitation about admitting Finland and Sweden. How will you
approach engaging your defense officials in Turkey to discuss
how the addition of Finland and Sweden will strengthen the NATO
alliance?
General Cavoli. Ma'am, clearly the core of the matter is
going to be a diplomatic and a policy decision on all nations'
parts, so I would like to stay away from that for a moment. But
at a military level we retain robust military-to-military
relations with our Turkish allies, and we have done so for the
past years that I have been associated with working in Europe.
We conduct exercises with them, consultations with them, and
the like.
Senator Gillibrand. But not with regard to this objection
that Turkey has just articulated.
General Cavoli. Ma'am, specifically with regard to that,
that has not been a subject inside the military-to-military
dialogue, at least my military-to-military dialogue with the
chief of their army.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. My time has expired. I am
going to submit an additional question to the record about
alignment and work with SPACECOM.
General Cavoli. I look forward to it, ma'am.
Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
Senator Rounds, please.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning,
General Cavoli. First of all, thank you for your continued
service to our Nation and thank you to your family for their
support. I would also like to thank you for taking the time to
meet with me earlier this week. You are incredibly qualified
for this assignment, and I do intend to support your
nomination.
General, the fiscal year 2023 budget request increases
funding for the European Deterrence Initiative by about $400
million. This initiative has been pivotal in our ability to
respond as quickly as we did in Ukraine. From your experience,
can you speak to the importance of this initiative, and if
confirmed, what changes would you make?
General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator. So the European
Deterrence Initiative has not just been important. It has kind
of been like oxygen to us for several years now. It is the
thing that allows us to do all the exercising, to build all of
the infrastructure, to pre-position all of the equipment that
we have been using and that you have seen us use in response to
this crisis.
So since my first tour as a general officer in Europe, when
the original ERI was authorized and appropriated, we have been
benefitting from it. We have slowly but surely used it to put
infrastructure into place where we are pre-positioning
equipment, and now we exercise that equipment at a large scale
with the funding that this Committee authorizes. It is
absolutely vital to what we have been doing, and I think we see
the benefits of it in our rapid ability to react in the past
couple of months, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. General, in your answers to
the advanced policy questions you mentioned that the Joint
Force must be prepared to counter threats posed by rapid
technological advancements such as advanced chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear, or CBRN, threats,
quantum computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, directed
energy, and hypersonics. Quite a list.
Based on your experience in the EUCOM AOR, what
developments are you seeing regarding those threats,
particularly those pertaining to quantum computer and
artificial intelligence?
General Cavoli. Thank you for the question. The ability
rapidly to process the vast amounts of information that are
available now really drives our ability to discern intentions
as well as to find ways to strike it. So there are a few
efforts that the U.S. side has been working on with regard to
artificial intelligence. We are using a couple of those in
Europe right now during this crisis. They are proving very,
very useful. They help us keep track of where everybody is and
what they are doing, and if I could take into a classified
setting with you sometime, Senator, I would be delighted to go
into more detail. But it is paying big dividends for us
already.
However, we are aware that our adversaries are working on
the same things, so it is all the more imperative for us to
continue to develop this beneficial technology.
Senator Rounds. Basically what you are saying is they are a
pacing threat with regard to those new capabilities.
General Cavoli. Sir, I think the NDS has it right in that
regard, especially China is a pacing threat with regard to
those capabilities.
Senator Rounds. What lessons in CBRN response have been
learned from the DCRF that should be applied to the overall
Joint Force?
General Cavoli. Sir, the CBRN posture that we have across
the Joint Force is being relooked right now at the departmental
level as well as at the service levels, in conjunction with the
combatant commands. I have had my chance to review the Army
parts of it. We are updating it, first of all, with regard to
what we understand the emergence of the threat to be, but
secondly, with regard to our own posture and our own
technologies to deal with a treat.
As you know, for many years in Afghanistan and Iraq that
was not a primary concern. As we move back into contemplating
large-scale operations we find it necessary to revisit that.
Senator Rounds. General, the SACEUR has worldwide
responsibilities with respect to the planning and operation of
NATO operations, NATO military operations. If confirmed, how
would you view your role as the SACEUR with respect to China?
General Cavoli. Sir, China is present in Europe, and China
is going to present increasing security challenges inside
Europe. My job primarily will be to make sure that our
policymakers have military options insofar as they need them or
choose to employ them.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. My time has expired.
General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
Senator Warren, please.
Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General
Cavoli, it is good to see you again. Congratulations on your
nomination.
General Cavoli. Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Warren. Your deep expertise in European affairs
makes you particularly qualified to serve in this role at this
critical time. Now it is clear that Vladimir Putin never
anticipated that his illegal invasion of Ukraine would unite so
many countries around the world. This Committee primarily
focuses on our military power, but this crisis has made clear
how important it is to invest in all of our tools of influence
to advance U.S. interests. Prioritizing diplomacy in
coordination with our allies has obviously paid huge dividends.
Diplomatic success, however, does not happen overnight.
This is the result of long, time-consuming investments. So let
me start by asking, General Cavoli, do you think it is
important for the United States to provide robust funding for
the State Department and USAID?
General Cavoli. I do, Senator.
Senator Warren. Would you like to just say an extra word
about that?
General Cavoli. Absolutely. You know, so the United States,
like many nations, attempts to lead with diplomacy. As you
noted, for diplomacy to be effective it cannot happen at the
moment it is needed. It has to be developed over years of
relationship building, and that requires resources and funding.
I benefit, as an officer, when our diplomacy is robust. I
benefit, as an officer, and I think we benefit as a Nation,
when our diplomats are armed the way they need to be to conduct
the business of the Nation.
Senator Warren. Good. I appreciate that.
Climate change is another major security challenge that we
need to work harder on. The most recent annual threat
assessment found, and I want to quote it, ``Climate change will
increasingly exacerbate risks to U.S. national security
interests,'' unquote. The world's dependence on fossil fuels
and authoritarian petroleum and petrostates significantly
undermines our interests in safety. Your response to the
Committee's advanced policy questions you said that climate
change, quote, ``will be a critical consideration in all we
do.''
Can you just elaborate a little bit on that, General?
General Cavoli. Sure, Senator. First, of course, our
National Defense Strategy lays that out, so, you know, it is
something that we have to consider in everything we do. But,
you know, right now I am responsible for Army activities in
Africa. Africa suffers from desertification. That
desertification leads to intense competition for resources.
Name your location, you can find it.
The grain shortage that we were discussing earlier is
exacerbated by an ongoing drought in India. All of this is
having an impact inside my AOR, in Africa, which will spill out
possibly into other areas.
So yes, it is something I take thoughtfully and seriously.
If we look at my European AOR in my current job, of course the
opening of seaways in the Arctic, which has been increasing and
accelerating in recent years, is changing the military
geography of the High North, which is something that NATO and
USEUCOM are both dealing with as well right now.
Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate your thoughtful response
here. This is a crisis that often gets overlooked when we are
talking about national security, and as you rightly point out,
it is deeply threatening to all of us.
There is one last area that I would like to talk about.
Over the past few months, Congress has provided tens of
billions of dollars in emergency spending to support the
Department's response to Russia's invasion. I support that
spending, but I am very concerned about the risks of waste
without proper oversight.
DoD owes this Committee a backlog of several years of
reports on the future years defense plan for the European
Deterrence Initiative. I have spoken to both your predecessor
and DoD about the importance of providing these reports. A
letter I received from the Comptroller last week claims that
yet another component of DoD will provide the report.
Now I am getting sick of the runaround here. DoD has not
complied with the law. Not having these reports hurts oversight
and planning for your command.
So General Cavoli, I understand that this is not your
primary responsibility, but you will be the senior military
leader overseeing this spending. So will you make sure that
this Committee receives the reports that are required by law
and that we will receive them this year?
General Cavoli. I will continue to submit all the data that
I am required to, ma'am. We have done that in the past, and I
commit to doing that.
Senator Warren. I appreciate that and I will hold you to
that. You know, it is very likely that you and the President
will come to us again with additional supplemental requests. If
you want Congress to continue to approve tens of billions of
dollars you need to show us how you are making sure that that
money is spent responsibly.
General Cavoli. Senator, if I could just make a comment. It
is not lost on me how much money we are talking about here, and
I, and we, owe it to the American taxpayer to have a thoughtful
application of those funds and a full accounting of them.
Senator Warren. I appreciate it and I look forward to the
reporting.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
Senator Tillis, please.
Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you
for the time that you spent with Senator Shaheen and I a week
or so ago, and congratulations on your nomination and I look
forward to supporting it, and thanks to your family.
I want to get a little bit back. You covered the landscape
on Finland, I think, very well, and you also discussed Sweden.
But you mentioned that increased investment that Sweden intends
to make in their military, and we know that we want them to get
up to the 2 percent threshold.
Can you give me some insight into the specific actions they
are taking that would give you confidence that they would be
there by 2028?
General Cavoli. Yesh, well they have expressed the
intention to do so. In my conversations with my colleague, Karl
Engelbrektson, Major General Engelbrektson, the Chief of the
Swedish Army, he is confident. He believes that they are going
to get there on schedule----
Senator Tillis. What is the----
General Cavoli.--to 2024.
Senator Tillis.--if you know, what would that look like? I
have met with Swedish officials almost every week for the past
month, and one of the comments that they made is they fully
intend to do it, but they also have to be able to absorb the
investment. So with respect to the added investment, what is
that likely to look like in terms of ground, naval, air forces?
General Cavoli. So Karl adopted a motto of 3-2-1, the key
part of which is to go up to three brigades, which is adding an
additional brigade. That is a big chunk of it right there, I
believe. The second part of it is to add high-end capabilities.
So the purchase of Patriot, which my command is helping them to
integrate into their units right now. They bought their first
battalion. It has been delivered in the past year here, and
those are purchases very quickly that help us lift defense
spending.
So I think the combination of expanding the size of the
army and raising the technology of a couple of the things like
the air and missile defense will, in the ground domain, help.
Sir, I cannot speak quite as in detail about how they will
use the additional or how they will absorb the additional
funding in the air and maritime domains or other domains.
Senator Tillis. Okay. To the extent you can, though, can
you talk a little bit about the advantage that Sweden brings in
terms of naval presence in the Black Sea?
General Cavoli. Sir, so Sweden has ports on the Baltic Sea
and has naval forces that routinely sail in the Baltic Sea. As
you know, the Gotland is sometimes referred to as the
unsinkable aircraft carrier. So I think they will bring an
enormous amount of surface capability to us in the Baltic Sea.
They also have underwater capabilities that will help us as
well.
Senator Tillis. The funding that we approved and that I
voted for, the supplemental funding for Ukraine, do you think
that was a wise decision for us to send that resource to
Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Senator, I think we will put that to good
use. We will put that to good use.
Senator Tillis. Can you also speak a bit about how the food
assistance and, you know, the broader scope of the bill
focusing on the threat to food sources in North Africa, what
would happen if we do not pay attention to that in terms of
stability in areas that ISIS, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram would love
to see destabilized?
General Cavoli. Sure. Absolutely, Senator. So the groups
that you just named feed on weak governance and food insecurity
and corruption and poverty, just like groups like to do
elsewhere in the world. Those groups have been doing fairly
well in the past couple of years. They have made gains in the
southwestern Sahel that we really need to keep an eye on and
that our European allies need to help with. A food shortage now
would just exacerbate the situation down there, Senator.
Senator Tillis. Thank you. The last thing, Senator Shaheen
and I visited Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Kosovo. I got the
sense, in speaking with the leaders of those countries, that
they felt like they have been kind of on the back burner in
terms of our focus. What more do you think we need to do in
NATO, if any, to really increase our presence and demonstrate
that we are very concerned with that part of the world?
General Cavoli. Sir, I think the first thing we can do is
exercise on an increasing basis down there. As you know, the
U.S. Army Europe DEFENDER exercise series focused on the
Baltics last year. It had a salutary effect immediately. I
could see that. We were warmly welcomed everyplace we were, and
so I think as a beginning, as a first step, we need to continue
that.
Senator Tillis. Thank you. I look forward to supporting
your nomination.
General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
Senator King, please.
Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, welcome to
the Committee. Congratulations on your appointment.
General Cavoli. Thank you.
Senator King. I believe one of the most important books
written in the 20th century was The Guns of August, and as you
know the thesis of the book was that we stumbled into World War
I by miscalculation, mistake, misunderstanding, and a
complicated web of treaties in Europe that led to a world war
that no one anticipated, the depth of which certainly no one
wanted.
How do we communicate to the Russians the essential
defensive nature of NATO? My concern is that what we view as
deterrence and reassurance they could view as provocation,
particularly in light of the fact that we are dealing with a
country which is historically paranoid about the West. Vladimir
Putin clearly thinks that there is a danger of an invasion by
NATO.
Talk to me about how we diminish this substantial risk of a
miscalculation. Vladimir Putin just made some huge
miscalculations in Ukraine. What if he makes a similar
miscalculation about what we are doing in Poland or Finland or
Sweden or other NATO countries? Give me some thoughts on the
danger of a mistake triggering a worldwide conflagration.
General Cavoli. Senator, the danger of a mistake or a
miscalculation looms very high in our consciousness every day
in USEUCOM, and we have a process by which we review every
operation, activity, or investment that we are conducting in
order to gauge how it will be viewed by our adversaries, and by
Russia, in particular, and then whether or not we should
proceed with it given what our various goals are at that point.
Yeah, it is a delicate balance, Senator, and it is a
delicate balance because one must not shy away from activity
that we need to do to stay strong and to make sure we outline
our priorities of what we will defend. But it is also necessary
not to overdo that and create a problem where a problem was
not.
So we work very, very hard on that, Senator, and clearly we
have not hit that point yet.
Senator King. Well, I want to be clear. I support the
European Reassurance Initiative. I support what we have done in
Ukraine and what we are doing in Poland and Eastern Europe and
bringing new countries into NATO. I think the important thing
here, and perhaps we talked about diplomacy a little earlier,
is to communicate that this is defensive. I just think that is
an important point.
I guess my follow-up question is, do you have, as Supreme
Commander of NATO, do you have a communication link with your
counterpart in Russia in order to deescalate not a conflict but
a potential conflict?
General Cavoli. So to continue with the last point, sir,
first, if I may, transparency, that communication, is vital. So
in my current position when we conduct our large-scale
exercises, such as DEFENDER, we go to the OSCE. I send officers
to the OSCE. They outline the entire exercise, the objectives,
the major movements, and things like that. So in addition to my
previous answer I should add transparency, which I think we
work very hard on.
Senator King. Transparency to the Russians.
General Cavoli. To the Russians and to everybody. Yeah,
absolutely, sir. We are not hiding anything with these efforts.
Senator King. Do you have a red phone?
General Cavoli. The Supreme Allied Commander has a venue of
communication with his counterpart in the Russian Federation.
Senator King. I am sorry. You said you do have
communication?
General Cavoli. The Supreme Allied Commander has that.
Senator King. Thank you. That is reassuring.
A short question. All of us are supportive of the arms and
the support that we have been giving to the Ukrainians, both
humanitarian and military. Looking beyond the current conflict,
however, there will be a huge amount of arms in this relatively
small country. We spent 30 or 40 years chasing MANPADS that we
gave to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Is there any oversight
or accountability of where all these weapons are and where they
might be? It worries me that not the Ukrainians but that they
could fall into the hands of terrorists or other malefactors in
the region.
General Cavoli. Senator, establishing accountability over
where all of that equipment is, is a vital task for us. It is
challenging right now, of course, because we are not in the
country. But as the conflict winds down or concludes that will
be one of the things that I have to get at, especially if I am
confirmed into the next position. I share your concern on it.
Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
Senator Sullivan, please.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General,
thank you and your family.
I very much appreciated our discussion yesterday. I believe
you are exceptionally well qualified for this position. I would
like you to brag a little bit, if you do not mind. Can you just
let the Committee and the American people know some of your
background and experiences and education as it relates to
Russia?
General Cavoli. Asking me to brag is the hardest question
you could ask me, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. Go ahead. We want you to brag. I want you
to brag. Very impressive. Russia focus, education.
General Cavoli. Sure. I graduated from Princeton in 1987,
where I did not look at Russia. I graduated with a degree in
biology. I entered the Army. I immediately was stationed in
Italy with a parachute infantry battalion. In that role we
studied Russia closely because that was our main opponent
during the end of the Cold War.
As I came out of company command, sir, I became a Russian
Foreign Area Officer. My wife and I studied Russian together at
the Defense Language Institute for a year. Then I went to----
Senator Sullivan. So you speak Russian?
General Cavoli. I do. Yes, I do.
Senator Sullivan. You have studied Russian military
history, Russian strategy----
General Cavoli. I also got a degree from Yale University in
Russian and European studies.
Senator Sullivan. You have had billets that have solely
focused on Russia.
General Cavoli. I have lived in Moscow for months at a
time. I have traveled all over the former Soviet space. I have
had fellowships at the George Marshall Center.
Senator Sullivan. In Germany?
General Cavoli. In Germany. I was on the Russia desk for
the Joint Staff.
Senator Sullivan. Russia desk for the Joint Staff?
General Cavoli. I was, sir.
Senator Sullivan. So that is every day getting up, focusing
on Russia, the challenges?
General Cavoli. Absolutely, Senator.
Senator Sullivan. So I would say you are Vladimir Putin's
worst nightmare and could not be more qualified than probably
any other member of the military. So again, I want to thank you
for your service.
Can you clearly define--succinctly, because I have a bunch
of questions--our top strategic goals in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Yes, Senator. We want Ukraine to emerge
from this conflict independent and free. We want the NATO
alliance to be unified and as strong as ever, and we want to do
these things without engaging in a war with Russia.
Senator Sullivan. Thank you. You know, there is a lot of
discussion, you have already said, about NATO being energized,
unified. I am a huge supporter of NATO. I was actually at NATO
headquarters right after the invasion in February. I was a big
supporter of EDI. I am a supporter of the Finland, Sweden
accessions. I support a robust military. I am disappointed that
the President once again put forward a budget that cuts defense
spending in real dollars. I supported U.S. economic and
military aid, since February, $54 billion.
But I do want to say here, and hopefully some of our NATO
allies are watching this hearing, there is grumbling on there.
My constituents in Alaska are probably the most pro-military
constituents, Americans in the country. But the grumbling
relates to this question. Why is the United States spending
more to defend Europe than Europe is spending? By that I mean,
dating back to George W. Bush, President Obama, President
Trump, President Biden, all of have put forward this goal of 2
percent of defense spending as a percentage of GDP, which was
agreed upon in the 2014 Wales summit by all members. Yet right
now we are down to 8 members out of 30--that is actually down
from 10 last year--who have met that goal. Very wealthy
countries--Sweden, Canada, Germany, France have not met that
goal. Many of them are not even close to meeting that goal.
What can we do? Well, isn't it now or never that the NATO
countries should meet this goal? I do not believe this is a
sustainable situation. We are doing all we can. I fully support
it. But my goodness, the American people are looking and
saying, ``Where is everybody else?'' How come these countries
cannot meet this goal that they have been agreeing to for
decades?
What is your sense on this? Do we have an opportunity here?
I am working on legislation that would say within 5 years if
NATO countries do not meet their 2 percent goal then Congress
will not appropriate dollars for training and deployments to
those particular countries. What do you think about something
like that, and if you are confirmed, will you be very focused
on assuring that these countries understand that we are a
democracy too, and at a certain point the American people are
going to say, ``Enough.'' Europe has to defend Europe as much
as America has to defend Europe. What do you think of all those
issues?
General Cavoli. Senator, if I am confirmed I will work on
burden-sharing as hard as I can. I am a believer in the Wales
pledge. I am a believer not just in the 2 percent but on the 20
and 80 part of the rule, which says that nations should spend
at least 20 percent on modernization and acquisition. I am
gratified right now that we hear so many positive movements in
the alliance.
Senator Sullivan. Yeah. Germany announcement was great.
General Cavoli. It is really a great moment. If I am
confirmed, a big part of my job will be to help our diplomats
and the interagency of the United States to convert all of
those good intentions into facts.
Senator Sullivan. What about legislation I am working on
right now?
General Cavoli. Sir, if you do not mind I would rather not
comment on legislation directly, if you do not mind, sir.
Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan.
Senator Hirono, please.
Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
General. Thank you for your continuing service.
In determining fitness to serve of nominees who come before
any of the committees on which I sit I ask the following two
initial questions.
Since you became a legal adult have you ever made unwanted
requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
General Cavoli. No, Senator.
Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
General Cavoli. No, ma'am.
Senator Hirono. General, talking about burden-sharing, what
countries are welcoming or taking in the millions of refugees
from Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Senator, that is an amazing story and a
heartwarming one. As you know, early on my command was directed
to prepare for assistance for Americans coming out but also we
anticipated needing to help with a large number of refugees we
anticipated. We correctly anticipated about 6 million refugees
coming into Europe. It was unnecessary. The pp of Poland,
Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia have opened their doors and
opened their hearts to Ukrainian refugees.
In fact, I have some local national employees in Poland,
three of them, who have Ukrainian families in their homes right
now. It has been a remarkable thing to see the societies
mobilize to assist Ukrainians.
Senator Hirono. I think it is an amazing and heartwarming
story. So even as we talk about commitment, monetary commitment
to NATO, there are many other ways that our European allies are
stepping up regarding what is happening in Ukraine, and I think
it is important to remember that.
I am glad that Senator Sullivan asked you to talk about
your background because it is indeed impressive, and I think
you are highly, highly qualified for this position that we are
considering you for. I feel like asking you to answer some
questions in Russian, but that is okay. I think it is a really
difficult language to learn, and I commend you for that kind of
focus.
On Sunday, a delegation of United States diplomats is set
to travel to The Hague for talking with allies, and I am
quoting the State Department, ``regarding our responses to
atrocities committed in Ukraine and in other conflicts and on
efforts to bring the perpetrators of atrocities to justice.''
If confirmed, how will you assist the International
Criminal Court in holding Russia accountable for the alleged
war crimes being committed in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Senator, if I am confirmed I will execute
the U.S. policy as it stands with regard to that at any given
time. Clearly this is an issue that has been considered in our
policymaking circles for some time, and I would have to follow
U.S. policy.
Senator Hirono. I think it is very important for Russia to
be held accountable for the atrocities that they are
committing, and, of course, this totally unprovoked war on an
independent country.
Last Saturday, President Biden signed a $40 billion package
of new military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. This
includes a vast array of military defensive weaponry such as
anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, which the Ukrainians
urgently need to protect themselves. If confirmed, how will you
ensure the continuing coordination of the rapid transfer of
United States resources and weapons to Ukraine and consider the
country's future defense needs against Russia?
General Cavoli. Senator, if I am confirmed I will continue
to execute the way it is being executed right now, with
improvements and modifications as we go forward. So currently,
at a policy level, our Nation consults with other nations on
what they might contribute, we consult with the Ukrainians on
what they need, and then we try to bring those together. We
hand that to United States European Command which coordinates
the logistics of it, and then ultimately all of the United
States contributions come through the hands of my forces who
are located in southeastern Poland, and they move it into the
right locations. So I think we will continue to do it that way.
I think the accounting of all of this is going to be of
great importance, Senator. I think understanding where
everything is and being able to account for the money that has
been provided will be a very important part, if I am confirmed.
Senator Hirono. Yes. As Senator Warren also mentioned,
there is going to be so much money that will be needed to help
Ukraine in the aftermath that yes, we do need to make sure that
this money is going where it is supposed to go for the purposes
for which we are appropriating the funds.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have some other questions
that I will submit for the record.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
Senator Hawley, please.
Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, good to
see you again. I enjoyed our conversation the other day, and
congratulations on your nomination.
Let me start with NATO, which is much the topic of
conversation this morning. Of course, we may soon be asked to
consider and vote on NATO expansion. You and I talked about
this a little bit when we met.
Let's start with the Wales pledge. You are familiar, of
course, with the Wales pledge. You have talked about it, I
know, today. Our current ambassador to NATO, Julie Smith, prior
to her confirmation, sent me a letter in which she said, for
the record, that it was her opinion that NATO allies should
spend more than 2 percent of GDP on defense, in other words, to
go beyond the Wales pledge. The Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs said the same. Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander also said the
same to me, that allies should go beyond the Wales pledge.
So let me just ask you. In your personal opinion now, is it
time for NATO allies to move beyond the Wales pledge and
increase defense spending above 2 percent?
General Cavoli. Senator, I really liked the Ambassador's
formulation on that. She has been saying 2 percent is a floor,
not a ceiling, and I agree with that. I know all of the land
forces chiefs in NATO. Each one of them has a list of
requirements. The requirements would all take more than 2
percent of GDP. So I am advocate of spending more than 2
percent, at least 2 percent. So I agree, yeah.
Senator Hawley. Good. Good. Thank you.
When we talked last week you told me that you did not
expect Finland's and Sweden's admission to NATO to result in
United States Force requirements in Europe. I have seen since
then reports that Sweden is requesting a greater United States
naval presence in the Baltic Sea. I am also seeing reports the
Pentagon plans to keep 100,000-plus troops in Europe for the
foreseeable future.
I just wanted to revisit this topic that you and I
discussed in light of those reports. I mean, given this, how
confident are you that Finland's and Sweden's accession to NATO
would not result in United States Forces doing more in Europe
than we are currently obligated to under our current NATO
commitment?
General Cavoli. So the 100,000 forces in Europe that are
being extended, that is part of the surge that we performed
over the last few weeks, Senator, and was not related to the
question of Finland and Sweden joining NATO.
I remain of the opinion, as I told you in our office call,
that at least in the ground domain that this is not going to be
a requirement for large, additional forces, or additional
forces. I think exercises and occasional presence, like we do
with any ally, will increase.
Senator Hawley. Different basing requirements, do you
think? I mean, will this necessitate a shift in posture by our
forces or NATO forces?
General Cavoli. I do not know right now, and I would point
out that the word ``basing'' carries with it an enormous number
of other implications that I would have to consider deeply
before I came back to you with a firm response on basing.
Senator Hawley. Well, since you mentioned coming back, if
you are confirmed, would you commit to providing the Committee
with a full account of the implications of Finland's and
Sweden's potential accession to NATO, the implications for
United States Forces in Europe should they accede to NATO, so
that we can consider that as part of any debate we might soon
have in this chamber over NATO expansion?
General Cavoli. Senator, I would be happy to do that if I
am confirmed.
Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you. Still on this general
topic, burden-sharing, you and I talked about this, with our
NATO allies and then vis-`-vis what we need to do in the Asia
Pacific, with regard to China. We are going to have to do a lot
more burden-sharing with our NATO allies, is my view, in
Europe, if we are going to focus as we need to on PACOM.
Let me just put it to you this way. Do you think our
European allies should assume primary responsibility for
conventional deterrence in Europe with us, of course, the
United States, providing extended nuclear deterrence and more
select conventional capabilities, but Europe really focusing on
everything else as we shift scarce resources to China? What do
you think about that?
General Cavoli. Senator, I think it is imperative as we
look at the emergence of the threat of China for us to find
ways to be able to handle the acute threat of Russia in a
collective fashion with the alliance that allows us to do that.
There are a number of different ways that could play out.
Almost all of those ways include increased burden-sharing on
the part of the alliance--on the part of other members of the
alliance, I should say. But they also depend on what the
security situation in Europe is like at the end of this
conflict.
So really, this conflict and the way it comes out is going
to drive a lot of my answer to your question. It is just
premature for me to talk about it.
Senator Hawley. Here is my last question, and my time has
expired so I will ask it and I will let you answer and yield.
What are some of the capabilities that we currently provide in
Europe that you think European allies could feasibly contribute
instead, going forward?
General Cavoli. Sir, some of the things we provide are
heavy equipment and armor. Our allies could provide some of
that. In many cases it should be modernized first or larger
quantities. We provide long-range fires and logistics. We would
encourage the development of those capabilities across the
alliance, and then probably most importantly, increased air and
missile defense across the alliance would be welcome
contributions in terms of capability.
Thank you, Senator.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Hawley.
Senator Kaine, please. Senator Kelly. I am sorry. Excuse
me.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
follow up on Senator Hawley's line of questioning here,
General, and great to see you again and thank you for your
willingness to continue to serve our Nation.
EUCOM obviously present some unique and difficult
challenges right now, and it is clear that the conflict in
Ukraine is going to have a lasting impact on the future of
European security. That is why I think it is important to
continue to look ahead, and I appreciate the discussion we had
in my office last week. We talked a little bit about the
Ukrainian military needs looking forward, from equipment to
training to structural reforms. It is clear that these things
are going to take some time.
I feel that if we want to deter further aggression beyond
this conflict, from Putin or somebody else like him in the
future, we need to start thinking about this right now. As we
think about the future of the Ukrainian Air Force I think, you
know, a centerpiece is not going to be the MIG-29. You know, it
needs to be a U.S.-build or Western fighter or something like
the F-16 might be a good option here.
Over the last few years we have successfully sold F-16s to
some of our partners in the Middle East, and in the state of
Arizona the 162nd Air National Guard wing has extensive
experience training foreign pilots. They have been doing this
for years, and that is pretty much all they do. They are
currently helping Slovakia, as an example, transition from
obsolete and, as we have seen, often ineffective Soviet
aircraft like the MIG-29 to the F-16.
So General, can you provide your thoughts on how the United
States and our allies can help modernize Ukraine's military to
deter future aggression, and specifically with looking towards
their Air Force.
General Cavoli. Thanks, Senator. Yes. First of all, as with
a previous question, I think that Ukraine's military
requirements at the end of this conflict are going to depend
largely on what the shape of the security landscape is at the
conclusion of the conflict and what threat they face and how
much threat they face.
So the second thing I would say is that the aid we have
been giving them is very important, and it is very important to
what they are doing, but it is going to require some
rationalization on the far side, I would say. There will
probably need to be some homogenization of fleets, for example.
It is hard to have five or six different types of tanks or
Howitzer, Senator. So I think that will be something that is
very important to do right away.
With regard to the air domain, I think that Ukraine is
going to have to sit down with us, examine the security
situation they have, and sketch out a strategy for a way ahead.
I cannot say what it would look like now, but I do look, if I
am confirmed, to coming back and to talking to you about it in
the future, because I think it is a critical question for them.
Senator Kelly. Yeah, I appreciate that. There are going to
be a lot of tough decisions. Certainly the agreement, whatever
this final, you know, depending on how this concludes, is going
to play a big role in what the security cooperation looks like.
General Cavoli. It will, yes.
Senator Kelly. What the reforming of their military looks
like here in future years.
Another issue we discussed was the possibility of
permanently basing more United States troops in Eastern Europe,
an issue that many of us have advocated for. I understand there
are multiple factors to consider when making this sort of
decision. So, General, what are your thoughts on the
possibility of permanently stationing United States Forces in
Eastern Europe, and specifically, where would you right now--
you know, where are you starting to think about where they
could go, and obviously, the reason is to deter future Russian
aggression here.
General Cavoli. Senator, so as we float additional forces
in over the last few months, and as NATO has repostured NATO
forces, multinational forces, over the past couple of months,
clearly what has been happening is the center of the NATO force
has been shifting eastward. Depending on the outcome of the
conflict we may need to continue that for some time. We will
have to see at the end of the conflict.
With regard to how those guys are sourced, how are those
soldiers sourced--permanently, rotational, unaccompanied
tours--boy, so many things go into that, Senator. A lot of the
questions are service equities. A lot of the questions are
policy matters, and I will have a voice in that, I am sure, if
I am confirmed, but there will probably be a lot of other
considerations that go into that.
Senator Kelly. I was recently in Poland and Germany and I
think, you know, especially with the Poles it is going to be an
important conversation to have. They are very interested in a
stronger alliance and a possibility of a commitment to United
States Forces in Poland.
General Cavoli. We discuss it together frequently, sir,
yeah.
Senator Kelly. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
Senator Peters, please.
Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cavoli,
welcome to the Committee. Thank you for your service. I have a
number of questions related to Ukraine but they have been
asked, and I do not want to ask you to keep repeating answers
to questions related to that. So I have a few other questions
in some outside areas I would like to ask you in this time.
General, the United States Special Operations Command
Europe announced the basing of a new special operations
headquarters in Albania just weeks prior to the Russian
invasion. My question for you, sir, is in conjunction with
SOCOM's efforts how do you see NATO and EUCOM complementing
this increased partnership with what is really a critical ally
in a very challenging part of Europe?
General Cavoli. Senator, so last year we conducted a large
portion of the DEFENDER large-scale exercise in Albania. It was
a United States Army Europe exercise but it was augmented, and
critically augmented, by the United States Navy and Naval
Forces Europe and Air Forces Europe as well. It had a huge
effect, a huge positive effect. On the back of that we have
increased our activities with our Albanian allies fairly
significantly. SOCEUR's addition of a base down there is an
example of that.
If I am confirmed as the EUCOM Commander I will continue to
pay close attention to the levels of our presence and the
amount of interaction we have with our allies and our partners
in the Balkans. I think it is critically important.
Senator Peters. Great. That is great to hear. Great to
hear. General, to stay with the theme of partnerships, I am
proud to represent the Michigan National Guard state
partnerships in Latvia as well as Liberia, two programs that I
expect you know well given your current position as Commander
of the United States Army both in Europe and in Africa.
Every commander I have talked to, including General
Wolters, has praised the State Partnership Program. My question
for you is, if confirmed as the Commander of the most powerful
alliance in the world, how will you leverage the National Guard
Bureau's programs to achieve your objectives?
General Cavoli. Senator, in my current role we use and
leverage the State Partnership Programs every day, and if I am
confirmed you will be able to add me to the list of combatant
commanders who love the State Partnership Program. I have a
two-star deputy who is from the National Guard, and he liaises
constantly with the TAGs who have state partnerships in our
area. It is absolutely invaluable the depth of the
relationships they have. The continuity of relationships they
have has all been very, very important to us, in crises as well
as in peace time.
So it is an extremely valuable program. If I am confirmed
as the EUCOM Commander I look forward to adding the Air Guard
portion of that to my portfolio.
Senator Peters. That is great. Great to hear, General.
General Cavoli, on Sunday the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan
announced a border commission as a possible step forward
towards a peace plan in Nagorno-Karabakh. While Russia
certainly has made it very clear to the entire world that its
words and its commitments cannot be trusted, as a result of
their horrific actions that we are seeing in Ukraine right now,
but having said that they did play a role in the discussion in
the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
So my question for you is, if confirmed, how do you see
EUCON and NATO influencing conditions to enable peace in the
Nagorno-Karabakh region, given Russia's involvement in that
area?
General Cavoli. Yes, Senator, that is a prickly question.
In the caucuses, in general, I have spent quite a bit of time
down there and studied it, and dealt with our partners down
there. Almost every issue has several different angles on it.
The Russian angle is always one of the ones that needs to be
considered. In any given proposal or any given situation, if I
am confirmed, I would sit down and I would examine it very
closely from all angles I could before coming up with my best
recommendation. I recognize how delicate that area is and how
many external interests are at play.
Senator Peters. Absolutely, and while NATO enlargement
increases the collective capacity of our defensive alliance it
also increases some of the complexities behind maintaining a
unified front, as I am sure you are well aware. A significant
example can be seen by Turkey's concerns regarding Finland and
Sweden's accession into the alliance.
So my question for you, sir, if confirmed, you will serve
as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander. How do you see you
fostering an environment that continues to promote unity and
cohesion among very unique and sometimes very different member
nations?
General Cavoli. Senator, I think in terms of fostering the
right climate the first step is to remember that the military
arm of NATO is only one part of NATO. You know, it is a
military organization under collective civilian control.
The second thing I would say is always to remember that
each of those service chiefs represents a sovereign nation's
army or a sovereign nation's military, and to treat them with
the respect accordingly.
Then finally, to consult with them, routinely, and to build
consensus as I can.
Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
General Cavoli. Thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
Senator Scott, please.
Senator Scott. Thank you, Chair Reed. General, thank you
for being here. Thank you for your service.
General Cavoli. Hello, Senator.
Senator Scott. Thank you the visit we had.
As we talked, just recently I went to Europe and visited
with American troops in Germany and Lithuania. I went to
Germany, Poland, and Lithuania. Clearly I was impressed with
what our troops are willing to do, and also from the
conversation I had I was impressed with our Eastern European
allies, what they are doing. They clearly see the threat, and
it is important to them. But it is clear they need our support.
They cannot do this on their own.
There is no nation like the United States. There is no
military that is like ours. So I think it is clear that the
security of not only Europe but the security interest of our
country is that we have got to stop these tyrants, like Xi and
Putin and others, from trying to control the world.
It does not appear that the Biden administration did
everything they could to deter Putin because they clearly
invaded. It seems like we did the same thing. Obama did the
same thing back in 2014, and so it has put us in a tough
position.
Also, it does not appear that we are doing enough to deter
Communist China, because they are continuing to do threats
against Taiwan. I mean, none of us want to send men and women
to fight, but we are going to end up that way if we do not stop
these guys.
So in your professional judgment, given your many years of
military service, do you believe the United States can deter
enemy regimes like Russia and China and Iran if we do not
demonstrate even greater military capabilities and a very
united political will?
General Cavoli. Senator, I believe that all instruments of
national power are necessary parts of deterrence, of an
integrated deterrence posture. That includes the military. It
includes the diplomatic, the information, the economic. I agree
that political will is a necessary thing to demonstrate in
order to achieve deterrence.
Senator Scott. What does the European Command need more to
try to deter Putin and make sure he does not win in Ukraine and
also he does not ever invade a NATO ally?
General Cavoli. Yes, sir. So I think the first thing, and
the most important thing, that the European Command needs to
continue to deter is continued unity of the alliance, continued
political will of the alliance, which we are seeing in
abundance right now. We need to keep that going. I think that
is the first step.
The second step is we need to continue support of the Armed
Services to provide us with the capabilities that we need. So
those are the two things I think we have there.
Senator Scott. Do you think it makes sense to reposition
some of our troops further to the east rather than have so much
of it concentrated in Germany?
General Cavoli. Sir, as you know, in response to this
crisis we have done exactly that. The alliance has repositioned
four battle groups forward into southeastern Europe, and many
nations have bilaterally reinforced their forces. For example,
we have reinforced Latvia. The U.K. has reinforced their battle
groups in Estonia. The Germans have reinforced their battle
group in Lithuania, and the United States has added additional
forces into Eastern Europe as well. So I think that is exactly
what we have done in response to this crisis, sir.
Senator Scott. Even with Sweden and Finland not being part
of NATO, do we have a good working relationship with their
military?
General Cavoli. Sir, we have very good working
relationships with their military. We work very closely with
the Swedish military on specific technical things but also in
general on exercises. With the Finnish army I think I just
brought two Stryker troops back from Finland, and a parachute
battalion is on its way to Finland on routine exercise later
this summer. Yes, sir, I think they will be very easy to
integrate.
Senator Scott. What would you like to see in addition to
what our European allies are doing in Europe to help Ukraine?
Anything that they should be doing that they are not doing
today?
General Cavoli. Sir, I think we should keep doing what we
are doing today. As we talk more and more with our Ukrainian
colleagues we get the opportunity to understand better and
better what it is they need and how they plan to use it, and so
I think we are moving in the right direction.
I think the question of what happens on the far end to
Ukraine, after the conflict concludes, however it will conclude
I think is going to be a very important question for Europe as
well as for our country.
Senator Scott. Thanks for your service.
General Cavoli. Sir, thank you.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.
Senator Rosen, when she gets settled, will have the floor.
Senator Rosen. Good morning, General. Good to see you
again. Thank you, Chairman Reed, for holding this hearing. It
was so nice to have a great conversation with you last week. I
am glad to see you here this morning.
So I guess we will just get right into it. You know, I
worry about cyber, so Russian cyber threats, and, you know, we
were talking about that just last week, the importance of
maintaining our collective vigilance in the face of Russian
cyber threats. So earlier this month, CYBERCOM Commander
General Nakasone, he did say a cyber mission force hunt forward
team traveled to Ukraine in December to help them build
resilience against cyberattacks, but still, unfortunately,
Russia has launched destructive cyberattacks against Ukraine.
So if confirmed, how will you work with CYBERCOM to enhance
the cybersecurity capacity of Ukraine, our other European
partners, including through the hunt forward operations?
General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator. If I am confirmed, I
will continue to work with General Nakasone and all of his
components. Of course, the 16th U.S. Air Force under Tim Haugh
currently runs cyber operations for USEUCOM and do a great job.
I think General Nakasone's command has set up some great
models throughout Europe in terms of defending forward, hunting
forward, and doing it in collaboration with our partners or our
allies. I would very much look forward to pursuing all of those
with him. It is going to be of critical importance as we go
forward, Senator.
Senator Rosen. Well, that is great. You led me into my next
question because what do you assess NATO's overall cyberspace
capabilities in our alliances, our just readiness together to
respond to any attacks?
General Cavoli. I think the alliance has collectively
begun. We have established a cyber center in Estonia, for
example, and are working towards cyber strategies. But clearly,
just like for all of our countries individually, there is much
work to be done for the entire alliance collectively on this.
If I am confirmed, it will be one of the things I turn my
attention to first.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it, and I am going
to move down a little bit to the Black Sea because Russia is
maintaining a blockade of the Ukrainian coast. It now controls
a number of strategy ports in the Black Sea, and Ukraine
actually exports 70 percent of its cargo through there.
So last month Russia said it in the second phase of its
invasion that is going to include targeting those Ukrainian
southern regions, potentially neighboring Moldova. So if
confirmed, what actions would you take to mitigate those
threats on the Black Sea, and what more can NATO be doing? What
can you be doing together to--again, we have the coast, equip
us there?
General Cavoli. Senator, first I would point out that there
are three NATO nations that border the Black Sea, that have
shores on the Black Sea, and each has a navy. I would also
agree that the problem of exporting, or not exporting, grain
from Ukraine right now is an important problem, not just for
Ukraine but for the world, and because of that for us as well.
What I would do, if confirmed as SOCEUR or as Commander
U.S. EUCOM is provide the military options required by our
civilian leaders. Clearly the way we approach that would have
to be a whole-of-government approach, which may or may not
include a military component.
Senator Rosen. So building on that, I know in this setting
can you speak on anything more specifically about how we should
be preparing in the Black Sea for this potential incursion, if
you will?
General Cavoli. Ma'am, I think the first thing that we have
been doing is probably the most important and it is not in the
Black Sea. It is establishing alternative ways to get the grain
out. So Deutsche Bahn, the German national train company, has
been conducting massive lifts of grain out of Ukraine right
now, coming out through Poland and then up to the northern
Germany ports for export. Romania has opened the port of
Constanta for outflow, which goes through the Black Sea but not
through a blockaded portion of the Black Sea.
So I think it is going to be a combination of modes of
transportation that we are going to have to use, and I look
forward to contributing to that.
Senator Rosen. I know I only have 20 seconds left, but I
just want to ask a little bit about if Sweden and Finland join
NATO what kind of security guarantees do you think we should
provide for NATO--excuse me, for Sweden and Finland if they do
join NATO and Article 5 protections kick in?
General Cavoli. Ma'am, obviously the security guarantees
and the nature of the security guarantees that we or anybody
would provide would be a policy matter. I can state that as a
military matter we are in a position to back up any guarantees
across the European land mass.
Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. General,
thank you for your testimony today, your service to the Nation,
which is a proud family tradition. I think you have
demonstrated quite clearly why you should be confirmed and
continue the leadership that General Wolters has shown in
facing this grave crisis in Ukraine.
With that we will adjourn the hearing. Thank you, General.
General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]
[Prepared questions submitted to General Christopher G.
Cavoli, USA by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers
supplied follow:]
Questions and Responses
Duties and Qualifications
Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
the Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM) and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
(SACEUR)?
Answer. The Commander, United States European Command (USEUCOM)
issues authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces
necessary to carry out U.S. military operations and activities
conducted within the command's Area of Responsibility (AOR). This AOR
includes 50 independent states in Europe and the Caucasus region. In
addition, the commander is responsible for the health, welfare, and
security of the approximately 103,000 servicemembers and their families
deployed within the AOR.
The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) carries out roles and
missions assigned by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and directed by
the Military Committee (MC). SACEUR commands all NATO military
operations, is responsible for strategic military planning, identifies
and requests the required forces to execute Alliance missions, and
conducts strategic engagement and partnership building. In conjunction
with Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT), SACEUR
executes combined and joint training and exercises and conducts
strategic analysis to identify and prioritize NATO's capability
shortfalls.
Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
believe qualify you to perform these duties?
Answer. I have been honored to serve our Nation and our
servicemembers and their families for 35 years. During that time, I
have commanded at every echelon, from platoon to my current position as
the United States Army Europe and Africa commander, serving in
positions of leadership in combat and peacekeeping, and on operational
deployments. In addition to specializing in Russia on the Joint Staff,
I have served in Europe multiple times throughout my career and worked
extensively with the interagency, policy, and intelligence communities,
allies, partners, and with the embassy country teams throughout the
USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR).
My professional service focused on Europe is mirrored by extensive
personal experience. I was born in Wurzburg, Germany, where my father,
an immigrant to the United States from Italy, was assigned as a United
States Army officer. Over the course of my life, I have traveled and
engaged extensively across Europe, and I speak French, Russian, and
Italian.
Complementing what I believe is a significant foundation of
professional and personal experience, I have benefited from formal
military education as a Eurasia-focused Foreign Area Officer. I studied
at Yale University, where I earned a Master of Arts degree in Russian
and East European Studies. I further expanded my understanding and
academic study of European security as a fellow at the George C.
Marshall Center for Security Studies, in Germany.
These experiences, my education, and my personal study have enabled
me to develop a clear understanding of the manner in which the military
instrument of power supports national strategic objectives in Europe;
the importance of building relationships across the interagency and
with regional allies and partners; and effective command and control at
the combatant command level.
Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Commander, EUCOM/
SACEUR?
Answer. If confirmed, I am ready to assume command and will take
the necessary additional steps to refine my understanding of critical
issues in Europe. I will consult with the USEUCOM Headquarters, Joint
Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), interagency
partners, allies, partners, and other key stakeholders to increase my
knowledge of the AOR. I will also work closely with the component
commanders and service chiefs to understand their efforts to organize,
train, and equip the force. Although I have spent a majority of my
professional life studying and immersed in the European security
environment, I am a strong proponent of continuous learning.
major challenges and priorities
Question. In your view, what are the major challenges you would
confront if confirmed as the next Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?
Answer. The core European security challenge is Russia. Russia's
unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine heralds a new era in
European security. Deterring further Russian aggression, helping
Ukraine defend its sovereignty, supporting NATO's defense of the Euro
Atlantic area, and countering malign Russian activities and influence
remain the most significant challenges facing USEUCOM. As the current
crisis has demonstrated, these complex and interrelated challenges
require coordination across United States Government Agencies,
Combatant Commands, allies, and partners in Europe.
Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
challenges, if confirmed?
Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the
USEUCOM operational environment, developing the requirements for
credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in
Europe.
Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen,
will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what
other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you
identified above, would you set for your tenure as Commander, EUCOM/
SACEUR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to counter China's growing
influence and malign political and economic activity in Europe; and
help our Allies and Partners deal with crisis-driven migration, violent
extremism, cyber-attacks, and disinformation. We must orient on all of
these challenges under the backdrop of climate change, which will be a
critical consideration in all that we do, particularly in the High
North.
Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus your
Command's efforts on each of these priorities?
Answer. Whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, whole-of-alliance
efforts are necessary to address the priorities and challenges listed
above. USEUCOM's continued support to these efforts is essential. It
will be essential to provide alternatives to China's One Belt-One Road
projects, in order to reduce Allied and Partner nations' exposure to
coercion and the vulnerability of their critical infrastructure to PRC
influence. The ability for the U.S., allied, and partner nation's
ability to maintain overmatch, secure sensitive supply chain processes,
and protect operations and technologies from malign influence is
critical for collective security and interoperability, and requires a
holistic approach.
If confirmed, I look forward to fully assessing these priorities
and challenges, building on USEUCOM's ongoing efforts.
technology theater infrastructure.
Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that
Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in your AOR complement the efforts
of civilian agencies?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure our efforts complement and
support a whole-of-government approach by working closely with United
States ambassadors and embassy country teams across the region to
advance U.S. National security objectives with the Department of State
in the lead. Close alignment of our diplomatic, economic,
informational, intelligence, and humanitarian goals strengthen our
efforts to secure the region.
Question. As Commander of United States Army and Africa, what are
you major observations about how the security architecture of Europe
has changed since Russia built up its forces around and invaded
Ukraine? What implications has this had on posture requirements for the
U.S. and NATO? If confirmed, what would you prioritize to address U.S.
security challenges post-February 24, 2022?
Answer. In response to Russia's attack on Ukraine, the United
States, working in conjunction with our Allies, has rapidly reinforced
combat power in all warfighting domains across the Alliance's eastern
flank. Both the United States and NATO have increased our forward force
posture in order to deter further Russian aggression.
Thus far, our collective force posture, operations, activities, and
investments have been sufficient to deter an attack on NATO territory.
However, Russia's actions in Ukraine and the changing landscape of NATO
will require us to continually assess the threat and re-calibrate
credible deterrence accordingly. The outcome of the current conflict in
Ukraine will be decisive in calibrating the appropriate future force
posture, operations, activities, and investments
If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the
USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for
credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in
Europe.
national defense strategy
Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China
as the ``most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing
challenge for the Department'' and stated that Russia poses an ``acute
threat,'' as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine. The NDS also identifies ``[m]utually-beneficial Alliances and
partnerships'' as ``an enduring strength for the United States.''
What does successful implementation of the NDS look like in the
EUCOM AOR? What are the changes, trends, and/or events that would be
indicators of effective NDS implementation with respect to the EUCOM
AOR and the challenges posed by Russia and China?
Answer. Successful implementation of the 2022 NDS in the USEUCOM
AOR requires a combat credible United States and Allied posture,
appropriately re-calibrated in consideration of Russia's actions in
Ukraine and the evolving security situation in Europe. The outcome of
the current conflict in Ukraine will in large measure drive the
appropriate future force posture, operations, activities, and
investments. Primary indictors of effective implementation of the NDS
would be an absence of further Russian aggression and continued wide-
spread European support for the values and rules-based international
order that serves as the foundation of the NATO Alliance.
Finally, if confirmed, I will seek opportunities to fill capability
gaps and create opportunities for the Joint Force through cooperation
with Allies and Partners. Moreover, I will aim to align operations,
activities, and investments within the USEUCOM AOR in a manner, which
disciplines our approach to campaigning and preserves warfighting
readiness for the Joint Force.
Question. Given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, where do you see
the greatest need for change in the Joint Force in order to adjust to
the realities of strategic competition with Russia?
Answer. Successful strategic competition with Russia requires a
multi-domain, global, whole-of-government approach, appropriately re-
calibrated in consideration of Russia's actions in Ukraine, the
changing NATO landscape, and the evolving security situation in Europe.
Our Joint Force must be able to deter further Russian aggression, to
improve its ability to deploy rapidly, and to effectively interoperate
with Allies and Partners in contested environments. Enhanced
capabilities and capacities are needed to compete and win across
multiple domains. Our Joint Force must be prepared to counter threats
posed by rapid technological advancements such as advanced chemical,
biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats, quantum computing,
artificial intelligence, robotics, directed energy, and hypersonics.
Question. The NDS identifies ``integrated deterrence,''
``campaigning,'' and ``actions to build enduring advantages'' as the
primary ways by which the Department will seek to achieve its goals
under the NDS. What do you see as EUCOM's role in each of these areas?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment,
which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization,
operations, activities, and investments and how they can best achieve
the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.
Question. Given your current knowledge of EUCOM programs, do you
believe the Command's resources and authorities are aligned in a manner
consistent with NDS priorities and U.S. strategic objectives?
Answer. In my current role as Commander, United States Army Europe
and Africa, the command's resources and authorities are currently
aligned in a manner that is consistent with the NDS priorities and
United States strategic objectives. However, going forward, we must
assess and re-calibrate these resources and authorities as the threat
and the NATO landscape evolve.
If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will
include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization, operations,
activities, and investments and how they can best achieve the goals as
specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.
Question. Given your knowledge of the security relationships with
Allies and partners in the EUCOM AOR, what do you see as the greatest
opportunity to build on those relationships to advance the strategic
objectives of the NDS?
Answer. NATO unity in the face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine has
been inspiring. In my current role as Commander, United States Army
Europe and Africa I have engaged extensively with my land force
counterparts across the theater. Many of my interactions involved a
deep discussion on Allied capability gaps and new equipment
procurement. I believe this is the leading edge of a significant
increase in European focus on modernization and readiness. Increases in
Allied capability and capacity strengthen the Alliance, strengthen
collective defense, and afford greater U.S. flexibility in achieving
our strategic objectives.
Question. One of the top priorities for United States European
Command and NATO has been the military mobility initiative agreed to at
the 2018 Brussels Summit. If confirmed, how would you address the
threats China poses to this initiative and to European security through
its investments and attempts to gain influence in the region?
Answer. Countering the PRC's malign influence requires a
coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance approach. If
confirmed, USEUCOM will continue to work with Allies and Partners to
galvanize European recognition of the pacing challenge that China
presents, to include Beijing's diplomatic support of Russia in its
illegal war in Ukraine, and focus operations, activities, investments,
and engagements in critical areas of this strategic competition. Most
importantly, we should contrast the PRC's predatory activities that
demonstrate Beijing's treatment of nations as ``clients and customers''
with the United States' longstanding commitment to alliances,
partnerships, and the rules-based international order.
european deterrence initiative
Question. The stated objectives of the European Deterrence
Initiative (EDI) include: enhancing the United States' deterrence
posture, increasing the readiness and responsiveness of United States
forces in Europe, supporting the collective defense and security of
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, and bolstering the
security and capacity of United States allies and partners.
In light of Russia's illegal war in Ukraine and the continuing
shift in the European security environment, what changes, if any, do
you believe should be made to EDI objectives or investment priorities
going forward?
Answer. Sustained EDI funding remains critical to our mission in
Europe and critical to combat credible deterrence. As an example, EDI
has enabled us to increase our Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). In the
current crisis, APS provided unmatched speed and flexibility in
deploying a full Armored Brigade Combat Team to Europe, ready to fight,
in remarkably short time. Moving forward, the sufficiency of EDI
funding, objectives, and investment priorities must be informed by
several factors, including the status of the current conflict in
Ukraine; the Russian threat; future Allied contributions; and the
global security situation.
If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM
operational environment, and in addition to force posture, an
assessment of EDI funding is one of areas that I will prioritize.
Question. As Commanding General of United States Army Europe and
Africa, what lessons have you learned about the Army preposition stock
sites, particularly their utility as part of the increase in United
States troops immediately prior to and during Russia's invasion of
Ukraine? If confirmed, how will you take this experience and apply it
across all the requirements in European Command across all domains?
Answer. Multi-year investments under EDI enhanced our prepositioned
materiel and supporting infrastructure, which have proven essential in
our ability to rapidly project power to deter Russia from invading a
NATO Ally while also supporting Ukraine. Large Army formations were
able to quickly flow into Europe with ease, draw materiel, and
integrate with existing command and control structures. If confirmed, I
foresee this strategy continuing in all domains (e.g., Air Force
Deployable Air Base Sets (DABS), special operations forces equipment)
because it enhances our ability to respond swiftly and decisively to
assure our Allies and deter further Russian aggression.
Question. In addition to funding dedicated to constructing and
sustaining military installations in Europe, a large portion of the
funding associated with EDI has contributed to major land exercises
such as the Defender Series. If confirmed, will you continue to
advocate for robust funding for exercises with our European Allies and
partners across all domains?
Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for robust
funding for exercises with our European Allies and Partners across all
domains. Fully resourcing and executing our Joint training program
builds our readiness and interoperability in command and control,
integrated air and missile defense, fires, and logistics. EDI-funded
exercises build US and NATO readiness, enhance interoperability, and
demonstrate Allied and Partner commitment to deter further Russian
aggression.
united states capabilities and force posture in europe
Question. General Wolters testified before the Senate Armed
Services Committee in April that after the Russia-Ukraine conflict,
there will be a need to examine ``the breadth and depth of the European
contributions, [and] be prepared to adjust the US contributions. My
suspicion is we're going to still need more'' troops than before the
United States buildup as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Do
you agree?
Answer. Assessing the outcome of this conflict and further
consultations within NATO are warranted before drawing conclusions on
U.S. contributions. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic
assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment to develop the
requirements for credible deterrence in light of the evolved security
situation in Europe, including force posture.
Question. Given your knowledge of and experience in the EUCOM AOR,
what is your assessment of the current United States force posture in
Europe? Do you believe it is sufficient to support the achievement of
NDS priorities and U.S. strategic objectives?
Answer. In my current role as Commander, United States Army Europe
and Africa, the command's current force posture is aligned in a manner
that is consistent with the NDS priorities and United States strategic
objectives. However, our force posture going forward will in large
measure be driven by the status of the current conflict in Ukraine; the
Russian threat; future Allied contributions; and the global security
situation.
If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will
include an evaluation of the USEUCOM force posture to determine if it
is appropriately scaled to achieve the goals as specified in the
recently released 2022 NDS.
Question. In your opinion, what implications does Russia's invasion
of Ukraine have on future United States force posture in Europe? How
should such considerations be calibrated and coordinated with NATO
force posture decisions?
Answer. United States long-term force posture will be dependent
upon a consensus about the nature of the security environment,
including the threat posed by Russia, once the current conflict
stabilizes. Future United States posture adjustments will be informed
by anticipated Ally contributions to NATO's new force model, while
ensuring that we can continue to meet USEUCOM campaign objectives and
enable U.S. global operations from the USEUCOM AOR.
If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the
USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for
credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in
Europe.
Question. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity
shortfalls in the current Joint Force that present a significant
challenge to addressing current or future threats in the EUCOM AOR?
Answer. Over the years, our adversaries have been closing the gaps
on exquisite types of capabilities in areas such as artificial
intelligence and hypersonic technology, as well as in the cyber and
space domains. I believe we ought to continue our focus on developing
``best-in-class'' capabilities that address the threats of a high-end,
multi-domain fight.
If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the
USEUCOM operational environment to identify critical capability and
capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force, as it pertains to the
USEUCOM AOR.
Question. In your assessment, given your experience in the EUCOM
AOR, does the United States have sufficient air and missile defense
capability and capacity to defend critical infrastructure, such as
command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile
attack? If not, what do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?
Answer. From my current perspective as Commander, United States
Army Europe and Africa, USEUCOM has good Army air and missile defense
systems. However, as the security situation and threat evolve, the
Joint Force will have to modernize and expand air and missile defense
capability and capacity in both systems and force structure. Integrated
Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is an inherently joint and combined
requirement that demands integration of all services' air and missile
defense capabilities in order to defend critical infrastructure.
A key factor to monitor is the operational tempo of U.S. Army air
defense forces, for which demand remains high.
If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the
USEUCOM operational environment, including an assessment of IAMD, to
identify and assess critical capability and capacity shortfalls in the
current Joint Force.
Question. How do you view the relative value of permanent versus
rotational forces in the EUCOM AOR? How does that relative value change
for different kinds of units/formations?
Answer. There are clear advantages and disadvantages to each
employment model. From my perspective as the Commander of United States
Army Europe and Africa, permanently assigned forces are more
operationally effective, as they remain fully oriented to the
operational environment and can become interoperable with our Allies
and Partners. However, I also appreciate that there are many other
considerations that bear on this issue. Ultimately, the decision
between permanent versus rotational forces must balance operational
effectiveness with global demand and service considerations.
If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM
operational environment, and force posture is one of areas that I will
prioritize, to enable a fully informed recommendation to the Chairman
and the Secretary.
Question. If confirmed, what specific enhancements would you make
to United States capabilities and force posture in Europe to support
the NDS more effectively?
Answer. If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment,
which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization,
operations, activities, and investments and how they can best achieve
the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.
Question. Some have suggested that NATO should adopt a focus on
``deterrence by denial,'' by positioning credible forces capable of
threatening Russia if it seeks to act against us along NATO's eastern
flank. What are your views on the concept of deterrence by denial?
Answer. I agree with the strategy of deterrence by denial and I
believe that it would be an effective strategy in deterring a Russian
attack against NATO.
Question. What is your understanding of the operational value of
the four Arleigh Burke class destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain?
Answer. United States Aegis destroyers based in Rota, Spain,
coupled with Aegis Ashore provide the foundation of NATO's ballistic
missile defense capability. In addition to their ballistic missile
defense mission, they allow us to better track undersea activity, boost
NATO's presence in the Black Sea, monitor Russia naval activities in
the eastern Mediterranean, and provide a wide range of multi-mission
capabilities.
Question. The current EUCOM commander and his predecessor both
testified in support of basing two additional destroyers in Rota, Spain
to bolster United States naval posture and presence in Europe. Do you
agree that two additional destroyers based in Rota would be beneficial
in the region?
Answer. I agree with General Scaparrotti and General Wolters. Two
additional destroyers based in Rota would be beneficial in the region.
nuclear posture
Question. In your view, what role does the U.S. strategic nuclear
triad play in the security of the EUCOM AOR?
Answer. Robust nuclear deterrence is critical to maintaining
regional stability and deterring conflict and underpins integrated
deterrence. The U.S. strategic nuclear triad--our Nation's steadfast
commitment to provide a credible, reliable, and secure nuclear
deterrent--is instrumental to security in the USEUCOM AOR.
The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, which was part of the broader
National Defense Strategy articulated a nuclear deterrence strategy
that ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of U.S.
nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our
allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests
of the United States or its allies and partners.''
Question. Do you support this strategy?
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, in full, to articles 40 and 41 of the June
14, 2021, NATO Brussels Summit Communique' and in particular ``As long
as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.''
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you support the forward deployment in Europe of United
States' nuclear weapon with capabilities and infrastructure by allies?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If confirmed, what steps you would undertake to address
the above goals with NATO allies?
Answer. If confirmed, I would reaffirm U.S. strategic assurance
guarantees as stated in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. I would also
reinforce upcoming improvements that modernize our nuclear deterrence
capabilities in theater and strongly reinforce our deterrence posture.
russia
Question. In your view, what are the USEUCOM and NATO activities
most important to responding to Russian violence in Ukraine and
deterring potential Russian aggression against NATO territory?
Answer. From my perspective as the Commander of United States Army
Europe and Africa, United States and NATO's response to the Russian
invasion of Ukraine has been a remarkable whole-of-government, whole-
of-nation, and whole-of-alliance effort. The activities that comprise
this effort span the spectrum of diplomatic, information, military, and
economic activities, imposing heavy costs on the Russian Federation for
their unprovoked and illegal aggression. While all of these activities
are crucial, I believe that NATO's immediate response, as a unified and
combat credible alliance has been particularly critical in deterring
further Russian aggression on NATO territory.
Question. Are United States policies and the associated
authorities--as applicable to the EUCOM AOR--sufficient to counter
Russia's influence in the AOR, or are there additional measures we
should be considering?
Answer. In support of whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance
efforts, USEUCOM contributes to countering Russia's malign influence in
the AOR. It is vital that the United States and USEUCOM continue to
share information with our Allies and Partners and work together to
counter malign influence across the continent.
Question. Vladimir Putin has discussed Russia's plans to develop a
variety of new nuclear capabilities, including a new ICBM, an
intercontinental hypersonic missile, a nuclear-powered cruise missile,
and an undersea drone. In response to the crisis in Ukraine, Putin has
put Russian nuclear forces on high alert and threatened ``consequences
that you have never experienced in your history.''
What is your assessment of Putin's capabilities and intent to
follow through on threats to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in
response to the Ukraine crisis?
Answer. According to New START Treaty statements on 1 September
2021, Russia declared 1,458 warheads on 527 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and
heavy bombers. Russia currently has an active stockpile of up to 2,000
warheads for non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). These include air-
to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise
missiles, gravity bombs, and depth charges for medium-range bombers,
tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-
submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships
and submarines, and Russia's anti-ballistic missile system.
Continued Russian rhetoric about the potential use of nuclear
weapons is irresponsible and destabilizing. If confirmed, monitoring
these indicators and warnings will remain a top priority for me.
Question. Given recent advances in Russian attack submarine
capability, such as the deployment of the highly capable Russian
submarine Severodvinsk, what additional capabilities or capacity are
most important to maintaining the United States advantage in undersea
warfare in the EUCOM AOR?
Answer. The Russian Federation Navy (RFN) continues to increase the
scope and complexity of its undersea operations in the European theater
through ongoing efforts to replace Soviet-era platforms with a number
of new, technologically advanced multi-mission submarines that present
a qualitative evolution in the subsurface threat. Maintaining our
undersea advantage will require a comprehensive approach to undersea
warfare using aircraft, surface ships, submarines, satellites,
electromagnetic and cyber capabilities, unmanned vehicles in the air
and water, and fixed and portable underwater sensors.
Question. In your assessment, does EUCOM currently have a mature
joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in
sufficient capacity to mitigate the challenge of Russian A2/AD
capabilities? If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are
required in the EUCOM AOR to ensure United States Forces are able to
achieve operational freedom of maneuver at decisive points?
Answer. USEUCOM'S concept of operations to mitigate the systems
intended to contest the operating environment is well developed and
well-rehearsed. Capabilities to support the operations concept and
USEUCOM's capacity continue to increase with the addition of 5th
Generation fighter aircraft and key Army fires assets. Coupling U.S.
capabilities with allies and partners makes this concept of operations
stronger and more resilient.
Question. In your view, what are Russia's strategic goals in the
Black Sea and in the Mediterranean, regardless of how the war in
Ukraine progresses?
Answer. Russia seeks to dominate the Black Sea and compete
favorably in the Mediterranean for defense, military power projection,
and control of economic trade routes. Control of the Black Sea provides
Russia with access to a warm water port (Sevastopol), access to the
Mediterranean through the Turkish straights building Russian strategic
defensive depth and allowing access to world oceans to challenge United
States and allied operations and freedom of maneuver. Russia will
continue building naval port infrastructure and adding Black Sea Fleet
combatants including fielding additional long-range strike capable
ships intended to defend southern approaches, and extend continuous
naval rotations in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia may also seek
diplomatic and legal agreements to restrict access and constrain Black
Sea nations to Russian military and economic advantage.
Question. Russia will still have the ability to threaten Ukraine,
blockade its economy, and otherwise disrupt freedom of the commons in
the Black Sea regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine. If
confirmed, what actions would you recommend the United States and NATO
take to mitigate Russia's threats in this body of water, and in its
strategic connection to the Eastern Mediterranean?
Answer. The conflict in Ukraine has only increased the strategic
importance of the Black Sea region to Russia. Russia employs a variety
of approaches to further their regional interests through diplomatic,
informational, economic, and military means. If confirmed, I would
pursue a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance Black Sea security
strategy, to ensure a coordinated United States/NATO approach to
countering Russian regional interests.
china
Question. In your view, what are the EUCOM and NATO activities most
important to mitigating the potential strategic implications of Chinese
influence and investments across the AOR?
Answer. Mitigating PRC influence and investments in the USEUCOM AOR
requires a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, whole-of-alliance
effort. Providing United States, allied, or partnered nation
alternatives to China's investments and loans to advance Europe's
infrastructure can mitigate or stall China's One Belt-One Road
projects, reduces Europe's exposure to coercion, and ensures access to
critical infrastructure. Our collective ability to secure sensitive
supply chain processes and protect operations and technologies is
critical for collective security and interoperability, and requires a
holistic approach.
If confirmed, I will fully assess China's malign activities in
Europe, building on USEUCOM's ongoing efforts.
Question. As NATO seeks to revise its Strategic Concept, what role
do you envision for the Alliance in countering the challenge from
Chinese malign influence in the EUCOM AOR?
Answer. More than at any time in recent years, our European Allies
and Partners recognize the risk the PRC presents to European security
and interests. The June of 2021 NATO heads of state communique
described NATO's growing concern over the PRC's malign actions on the
continent and outlined NATO's policy to protect critical
infrastructure, strengthen resilience, maintain our technological edge,
and address challenges to the rules-based international order.
Beijing's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has only furthered
these concerns. With NATO releasing its new strategic concept this
summer in Madrid, I think we will continue to see the growing
importance NATO is placing on China and additional whole-of-alliance
efforts to counter malign PRC activities in Europe.
If confirmed, I look forward to working with the whole-of-
government, Allies, and Partners to assess and counter China's malign
activities in Europe.
russian hybrid warfare
Question. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee
on March 29, 2022, General Wolters stated ``Russia employs
unconventional tools, ranging from disinformation campaigns, malicious
cyber activities, and the manipulation of energy markets to support
Moscow's efforts at political subversion and economic intimidation.''
In your assessment, does EUCOM currently have sufficient resources
for countering Russia's cyber-enabled information operations and other
hybrid warfare operations? If not, what additional capabilities or
capacities are required in the EUCOM AOR to effectively counter these
Russian hybrid operations below the level of military conflict?
Answer. USEUCOM collaborates directly with CYBERCOM to generate
cyberspace options to counter state and non-state malicious activities
within the European theater. CYBERCOM, as the force provider for
Cyberspace Operations Forces, uses persistent engagement to interact
and compete with adversaries in cyberspace short of armed conflict. We
know Russia invests heavily in cyber-enabled information and hybrid
warfare operations worldwide. It is imperative that the United States
not cede this key terrain. USEUCOM's operations in the information
environment contribute to the Command's and the United States
Government's overall efforts to advance United States interests in
Europe. If confirmed, we will continue to expand our interoperability
with our Allies and Partners, where we realize the full benefit of our
competitive advantage over Russia.
Question. What do you assess as key priorities for, and limitations
on, the conduct of information operations against Russia in the EUCOM
AOR?
Answer. A whole-of-government methodology coupled with the
appropriate authorities is key to conducting effective information
operations to counter Russian malign influence. Expanding this approach
to include the entire NATO Alliance, the European Union, and individual
Partner nations will further increase efficacy. If confirmed, my intent
is to ensure that USEUCOM continues its practice of close coordination
with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
Policy, and the Department of State to comply with department policy
guidance, as well as department granted authorities and permissions.
Question. In your assessment, how important is a whole-of-
government approach to countering Russian hybrid warfare against the
United States? In your assessment, can the United States be successful
against Russian hybrid warfare if we fail to invest in non-military
tools of national power as part of a whole-of-government approach?
Answer. The Russian Federation has demonstrated the ability to
utilize all of its instruments of national power to achieve their
desired outcomes. The United States must continue to invest in critical
tools of national power as part of a whole-of-government approach to
counter hybrid warfare. Efforts are more effective when aligned with
Allies and Partners. Increased alignment will increase the speed at
which the U.S., our allies, and partners compete, allowing us to be
proactive versus reactive. With respect to the recent Ukraine crisis,
through close coordination among agencies and departments, the USG was
particularly effective at establishing and maintaining a dominant
narrative exposing Kremlin intent and mobilizing support to Ukraine's
defense of its sovereignty. If confirmed, I look forward to working
with the whole-of-government to assess and counter Russia's hybrid
warfare activities in Europe.
Question. How important is it that our campaign to counter Russian
hybrid aggression be synchronized with the efforts of our allies and
partners?
Answer. It is imperative that our campaign to counter Russian
hybrid aggression be synchronized with our allies and partners.
USEUCOM's operations, activities, and investments in our AOR contribute
daily to establishing and maintaining a narrative that effectively
challenges Russia's malign activities. The demonstrated professionalism
of our Armed Forces, our persistent presence across all domains, our
strong Alliance and partnerships, our information and intelligence
sharing agreements, our ongoing and unprecedented Security Force
Assistance efforts, and our robust Joint and Combined Exercises all
demonstrate our ironclad commitment to regional security, while
promoting U.S. strategic interests. If confirmed, I look forward to
working with the whole-of-government and our allies and partners to
assess and counter Russia's hybrid warfare activities in Europe.
Question. What is your assessment of NATO's readiness to detect,
deter, and respond to attacks from adversaries in the cyber domain?
Answer. NATO's cyberspace capabilities depend on the combined
strength of its member nations. Each country in the Alliance is
responsible for their own cyber security. In recent years, NATO has
expanded their focus on cyber by establishing additional force
structure and a Cyberspace Operations Center, located in Mons. In my
current capacity as the Commander, United States Army Europe and
Africa, I have observed that throughout the current crisis, NATO's
cyberspace capabilities have been more closely integrated than at any
other time.
If confirmed, I will ensure that USEUCOM continues collaborative
efforts with organizations such as U.S. Cyber Command and NATO's
Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence to improve training,
rapidly disseminate best practices, and facilitate information-sharing
across the AOR.
violent extremist organizations (veos) in the eucom aor
Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism
strategy as it relates to the EUCOM AOR?
Answer. It is my understanding that USEUCOM supports a whole-of-
government approach to counter terrorism. USEUCOM, in coordination with
the U.S. interagency, implements the strategy by supporting and
enabling our partners, allies and other stakeholders through
information sharing and building partner capacity.
Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S.
counterterrorism strategy and associated activities in addressing the
threat posed by violent extremist organizations? What changes, if any,
would you recommend?
Answer. My understanding is that threat assessments suggest
relatively low risk for violent extremist organizations within the
USEUCOM AOR. Moreover, I assess that in general, the U.S. military's
largest contribution in the fight against transnational threats often
comes in the form of information sharing and capacity-building. If
confirmed, I would strive to grow allied and partner nation networks to
counter the threats that promote extremist ideologies and criminal
activities within and beyond Europe, as we defend the Homeland forward.
Question. Within the EUCOM AOR, what do you consider the highest
counterterrorism priorities?
Answer. In my current capacity, the highest priority for
counterterrorism operations is protecting the Homeland, followed by
mitigating threats to U.S. interests and those of our allies and
partners in the region.
Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda,
the Islamic State, and other violent extremist organizations to the
EUCOM AOR?
Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the threat posed by al Qaeda,
IS, and other VEOs in the USEUCOM AOR. Speaking in my current roll as
Commander, United States Army Europe and Africa, I can say that a
terrorist threat to United States Army Forces in Europe persists,
despite a decline in attacks in the past two years. ISIS in particular
directed multiple attacks against civilian targets and tourist
locations in the past couple of years. The group intends to expand its
operational networks and they continue to call on sympathizers to
conduct attacks in Europe. Al Qaeda also intends to conduct attacks in
the USEUCOM AOR but lacks the capability due to diminished leadership
and resources.
Question. What is your assessment of Russia's role in supporting
violent extremist groups in the EUCOM AOR? What steps, if any, would
you recommend to counter this support?
Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the
USEUCOM operational environment, including an assessment of Russia's
role in supporting violent extremist organizations or groups (VEOs).
u.s. commitment under article 5 of the north atlantic treaty
Question. A cornerstone of the NATO Alliance is the principle of
collective self-defense as codified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty.
In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S.
commitment to its obligations under Article 5?
Answer. The U.S. commitment to its obligations under Article 5 is
vital to U.S. strategic interests. The National Defense Strategy
clearly articulates the importance of strong alliances to respond to
shared challenges. NATO is the premier alliance on the world stage, and
Article 5 represents the enduring commitment that binds our nations
together.
Question. How important to being able to meet Article 5 obligations
is follow through on Article 3 which commits allies to develop their
``individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack''?
Answer. Commitment to Article 3 is essential to ensuring the
success of Article 5 obligations. Article 3 charges independent nations
with the responsibility to provide for their own defense as a
precondition for collective defense.
nato burden sharing
Question. At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO allies pledged to spend
at least 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense by 2024
and to move towards spending at least 20 percent of their defense
budget on major new equipment. Since that time, allies have made
significant progress in increasing defense spending and investing in
major equipment.
Where have you seen the greatest progress on burden sharing in the
NATO Alliance?
Answer. As a result of Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of
Ukraine we have seen our NATO Allies increase--in some cases
dramatically increase--defense budgets, and provide large quantities of
military equipment to Ukraine. Some nations donated the entirety of a
specific capability in their inventory. We also witnessed the rapid
deployment of NATO forces across a large portion of southeast Europe.
Personally, I am most pleased by many allies' commitments to upgrade
existing equipment. These new procurement initiatives will ensure a
more combat credible Alliance. At the Madrid Summit in June, heads of
state will chart the course with respect to burden sharing for the
foreseeable future--just as the Wales Summit did in 2014. The outcomes
of the summit will give us a better understanding of where the Alliance
stands on burden sharing.
Question. What is your assessment of current national plans of NATO
allies for meeting the 2 percent of GDP defense spending goal? Are you
concerned that certain national plans are not realistic for meeting the
2 percent goal by 2024?
Answer. The 2 percent goal represents a reasonable expectation of
investment by each nation towards the collective defense of all. Last
year was the seventh straight year of increased defense spending by
European allies. I am, however, concerned that not all nations will
meet their 2 percent commitment goal by 2024. On the other hand, I am
optimistic that NATO members will remain focused on defense investments
given the current security environment. If confirmed, I will continue
to encourage Allied officers to advise their nations to meet the Wales
Pledge of 2 percent.
Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage NATO
allies to increase their defense spending and enhance their military
capabilities so as to enable appropriate contributions to NATO
operations?
Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the momentum towards Alliance
reinforcement, readiness, and responsiveness. I will encourage allies
who are falling short to accelerate their efforts, and deliver credible
plans towards the 2 percent mark. We will assist political leaders by
clearly articulating the Alliance's operational requirements. I also
intend to inform Allied investment by continually messaging that we can
address present and future threats only through an adapted and
modernized Alliance--equitably sharing the responsibility. I believe
the principal mechanism to influence Allied defense spending is
consistent engagement, at all levels, paired with transparent dialogue.
Question. Although the ``2 percent'' goal is important, it is also
critical that our allies invest in, and make actual warfighting
capability available to the Alliance at the speed of strategic and
operational relevance.
In your view, should the United States broaden the conversation to
encourage allies to focus more on the attainment and refinement of
critical capabilities vice meeting a dollar threshold?
Answer. Yes; however, we should not allow a renewed focus on
capabilities to dilute our commitment to a 2 percent spending floor. If
confirmed, closing critical capability gaps within the Alliance will be
one of my top priorities. We must work to ensure that the U.S., allies,
and partners tie investments in capabilities and capacities to clear-
eyed collective defense plans that address the evolved threat.
Question. What recommendations for additional reforms should NATO
consider to speed decision-making, improve the ability of the Alliance
to realistically plan for contingencies, and generate forces at the
speed of strategic and operational relevance?
Answer. In my current role as Commander, United States Army Europe
and Africa I am not privy to the specifics associated with internal
NATO matters. However, the ability to plan for contingencies, and
generate forces at the speed of relevance will be a top priority. If
confirmed, I will make an assessment of NATO decision-making, planning,
and force generation. Also, I would be deeply involved in the
development of these plans and providing advice to the North Atlantic
Committee (NAC) to improve the speed of decision making and overall
readiness across the Alliance.
Question. In your view, can NATO be enlarged through the addition
of countries such as Sweden and Finland while remaining an effective
military organization capable of making decisions and acting in a
timely fashion?
Answer. Yes.
Question. If Finland and Sweden seek to join NATO, in your opinion,
would they be a net provider or consumer of the Alliance's collective
security?
Answer. Finland and Sweden will both be net providers of collective
security if they join the Alliance. Finland and Sweden are already
capable security partners who routinely participate in the USEUCOM
exercise program. Both countries demonstrate the values that the
Alliance is built on and have advanced military capability and
extremely competent leadership. If confirmed and if they are admitted,
I look forward to welcoming both nations into the Alliance.
nato-russia and united states relations
Question. What is your view on the NATO-Russia Council? Does it
remain valid after Russia's invasion of Ukraine this year?
Answer. The NATO-Russia Council (NCR) previously served as a forum
to encourage dialogue with Russia. Russia, however, has broken the
trust at the core of cooperation, and has challenged the fundamental
principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture. In
light of the current situation in Ukraine, the United States Government
should reassess the utility of this mechanism. If confirmed, I will
provide the Secretary my best military advice on U.S. participation in
the NRC.
Question. What do you believe are appropriate objectives for United
States-Russia security relations?
Answer. The principal objective for United States-Russia security
relations should be to prevent direct military conflict. If confirmed,
I will seek to maintain an alliance-based and credible force to serve
as a deterrent. Carefully managed and focused dialogue with Russia,
through the appropriate, authorized channels, will be important to
mitigating the risk of unintended escalation.
Question. Are there, in your view, any areas of common interest
between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?
Answer. Given Russia's status as a great power and significant
player in global affairs, cooperation with Russia on areas of mutual
interest should be a key element of global security and stability.
These areas could include nuclear arms control, containing the
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, countering transnational
threats such as terrorism and narcotics, and managing escalation in the
space and cyber domains. Ultimately, cooperation with Russia must be
within our core national security interests and must be accomplished in
the spirit of transparency and reciprocity.
nato--european union (eu)
Question. How would you characterize the NATO-EU relationship
today?
Answer. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO, and the
NATO-EU relationship is stronger today than it has been in decades.
NATO and the EU currently have 21 member countries in common. Both
organizations agreed to 74 cooperative areas since the 2016 Warsaw
Summit, including closer cooperation in countering hybrid threats,
counterterrorism, information sharing, exercises, and crisis
management. Congruent with NATO's Strategic Concept, the EU's Strategic
Compass identifies Russia as the significant threat to peace and world
order.
Question. What role does the EU play in ensuring that the United
States and our NATO allies are able to deter and, if necessary, defeat
Russian aggression?
Answer. The EU plays a critical role in securing the populations'
and parliamentarians' support for national expenditures necessary to
deter and defeat Russian aggression. Also, strengthened border security
and surveillance efforts by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency
(FRONTEX) provide additional early warning and situational awareness to
our Allies and Partners in the region. Deterrence efforts are more
impactful when EU and NATO efforts are synchronized.
Question. What role does the EU play in countering Russian malign
influence?
Answer. The EU plays an important role. EU sanctions are powerful
diplomatic and economic tools that amplify United States and NATO
efforts to counter Russia's malign influence. Ongoing EU-NATO
coordination regarding cyber threats and the EU's 2018 Joint Framework
on Countering Hybrid Threats focus awareness, increases resilience and
improves our collective response to Russian hybrid aggression.
Question. In your opinion, is the European Union acting in a
complementary role to NATO's security objectives, or counter to them?
If confirmed, what more would you focus on to increase coordination
between the two organizations?
Answer. The EU, like NATO, is a key pillar of the European Security
Architecture. In my opinion, the EU is acting in a complementary role
to NATO's security objectives. EU influence on NATO Allies to
contribute funding toward defense matters and the Alliance is critical.
The EU views Russia as the largest security threat in Europe, and
strategic EU documents are aligned with NATO planning efforts. I am,
however, concerned that EU initiatives might compete with NATO
obligations in an already constrained environment.
nato-led kosovo force
Question. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) includes approximately
650 United States servicemembers. KFOR's mission is to assist in
maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, consistent with
United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and to support the
development of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF).
In your view, does KFOR remains an essential deterrent to
instability in the Western Balkans?
Answer. KFOR is essential for regional stability. KFOR assists in
providing a safe and secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo. Its
professional presence affords Kosovo and Serbia a chance to normalize
relations through continued dialogue. The KFOR mission is a success
story for NATO and a significant investment by the United States and
the Alliance for over two decades. The U.S. Army's current force level
at Camp Bondsteel is appropriate. U.S. presence in KFOR shows
solidarity with our Allies and remains an essential deterrent in
preventing a new crisis or conflict.
Question. What do you see as the major challenges in the Western
Balkans? What is EUCOM's role in addressing these challenges?
Answer. Continuing ethnic tensions, weak institutions, and malign
external influences are the major challenges facing the region. The
Western Balkans is a competitive zone where the United States and
Europe compete with Russia and China. Russia leverages its historical
and cultural ties as well as energy to exert influence. China employs
economic means and a corrupt environment to gain a foothold in numerous
states to include Alliance members. EUCOM with its interagency partners
and country teams working together can counter these threats. EUCOM
must also continue to maximize the State Department's International
Military Education and Training (IMET) program, a key program in
creating shared values in the ranks of our allies and partners. If
confirmed, I look forward to completing a thorough assessment of EUCOMs
role in the Western Balkans.
Question. If confirmed as Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR, what would be
your approach to assisting the development and transition of the KSF?
Answer. USEUCOM supports the development of the Kosovo Security
Force (KSF) according to their agreed upon 10-year transition program.
Conducted in close coordination with the U.S. and other NATO Allies,
this program strives to ensure the KSF becomes a professional,
unbiased, and effective security organization. We encourage the KSF to
maintain a multi-ethnic, professional force responsive to all the
citizens of Kosovo. Leveraging security cooperation programs from
regional exercises to professional military education are key for the
KSF's development. Last year the KSF participated for the first time in
U.S. Army Europe's DEFENDER regional exercise. Also, security
assistance primarily through foreign military financing (FMF) will
provide the KSF with the equipment required to execute a variety of
missions.
nato special operations headquarters
Question. The NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ)
was created in 2007 to enhance the capabilities of, and promote
interoperability between, the special operations forces (SOF) of NATO
member nations.
What role do you believe the NSHQ should play in future
contingencies involving NATO SOF?
Answer. Enhancing capability, capacity, and interoperability is
NSHQ's primary focus. NSHQ should continue to develop strategic and
operational level command and control capabilities, and also support
Alliance efforts to integrate irregular warfare and SOF capabilities
into counter hybrid threat plans. During a contingency, NSHQ would
serves as an integrating headquarters, ensuring that NATO SOF units are
properly incorporated in a manner which best leverages their unique
capabilities.
Question. How do you believe the NSHQ can most effectively support
NATO SOF capabilities and interoperability?
Answer. The NSHQ plays a vital role in the training and education
of NATO SOF. The NSHQ can increase capability and interoperability by
setting capability targets, ensuring synergy in command and control
arrangements, integrating common network platforms, and assuring SOF
presence in critical areas. By serving as the connective tissue between
various members of NATO SOF, the NSHQ will enable more coherent
planning and mission execution.
Question. What do you believe are the appropriate roles for EUCOM
and U.S. Special Operations Command in providing guidance and resources
to the NSHQ?
Answer. The USEUCOM Commander, as SACEUR, is the executive agent
responsible for the NSHQ. Duties include coordinating with the
Commander, USSOCOM to review and validate force structure requirements
for U.S. support to the NSHQ. The Commander, USSOCOM provides military
advice on capabilities that support allied and partner interoperability
with U.S. Forces for areas that fall within USSOCOM responsibilities.
USSOCOM also provides doctrine, training, and equipment standards for
special operations, irregular warfare, and security force assistance
capabilities. USSOCOM promotes standardization policies and procedures
for special operations equipment, and validates NSHQ's special
operations requirements to ensure interoperability of equipment and
forces.
european phased adaptive approach
Question. The United States is deploying the European Phased
Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as its contribution to NATO missile defense
capability.
Do you believe that EPAA will provide the capability needed to
protect United States forces in Europe and our NATO Allies against
existing and emerging Iranian missile threats?
Answer. Yes. The European Phased Adaptive Approach is adaptable and
suitable to defend United States and NATO Allies in Europe against
existing and emerging Iranian ballistic missile threats. As the United
States national force contribution to NATO's Integrated Air and Missile
Defense (IAMD) Standing Defense Plan, EPAA forces provide the
foundation of NATO ballistic Missile defense (BMD). As Iran continues
their missile development, USEUCOM, with support from the Missile
Defense Agency, will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure
the capabilities provided by EPAA remain effective against current and
emerging Russian and Iranian threats.
Question. In your opinion, is there a need to assess defense
capabilities of the United States in Europe as well as those of NATO
Allies and partners against a Russian ballistic missile threat?
Answer. We must continually assess defense capabilities regarding a
Russian ballistic missile threat--this is an iterative process. Our
goal is to build an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
architecture including United States, allied, and partner capabilities
to defend sovereign airspace and national assets against any air or
missile threats from outside Europe or NATO territory. In accordance
with the Missile Defense Review (MDR), assessments conducted alongside
our allies and partners must ensure that any such architecture is
effective against current and future advanced air and missile threats.
The U.S. is encouraging NATO Allies to improve their missile defense
capabilities by investing in interceptors and sensors, expanding data
sharing and integration, and taking other steps to counter existing and
projected ballistic and cruise missile threats.
Question. In light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and
other escalatory actions directed at NATO, are the United States and
the Alliance sufficiently postured to deter Russia from threatening our
allies beyond a hybrid or gray zone scenario, as Putin directed against
Ukraine?
Answer. It is essential to synchronize efforts to counter Russian
aggression with our allies and partners. Countering multi-domain
activities below the threshold of armed conflict requires a whole-of-
government approach that is most effective when aligned with similar
allied approaches. USEUCOM is expanding its online counter-propaganda
efforts and continues to collaborate with USCYBERCOM to compete with
Russia below the threshold of armed conflict. Additional military
personnel specializing in information operations related disciplines
would benefit the command in countering Russia's ``malign influence
campaign.''
NATO has recently made gains in detecting, deterring, and
responding to cyber-attacks. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to
make this a priority. NATO maintains a Cyber Defense structure that
protects over 100K users at approximately 60 locations. NATO's Computer
Incident Response Capability Centre aims to prevent, detect, respond,
and recover from cyber incidents. Furthermore, NATO has established a
Cyberspace Operations Center to coordinate and synchronize cyberspace
operations. In short, NATO's cyber defense capabilities and capacity
are improving, but continuous efforts will be required to reduce
vulnerabilities across the Alliance.
sexual assault prevention and response
Question. The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive
policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to
incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources
and care for victims of sexual assault.
What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to
sexual assaults in EUCOM, including assaults by and against U.S.
civilian and contractor personnel?
Answer. We can never be satisfied with our efforts until all sexual
assaults cease. Sexual assault is abhorrent; it is against our values,
and damages military readiness. Sexual assault exists along a continuum
of harm, so we must detect and correct harmful behaviors before tragic
incidents occur. This issue will always have my direct attention. If
confirmed, I will work to ensure prevention and response is a top
priority for USEUCOM.
In my current capacity as Commander, United States Army Europe and
Africa, I established a sexual harassment/assault response and
prevention (SHARP) Fly Away Team to ensure a sexual assault victim
would receive immediate care from any location within USAREUR-AF. The
team included available Army aircraft, SHARP advocates, sexual assault
medical forensic examiners, special victims' counsel, and
investigators.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of EUCOM policies and
procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation for
reporting the assault?
Answer. The Department of Defense and Military Services are
continuing to develop policies and procedures that appropriately
implement the retaliation-related notification, training, and reporting
requirements required by the 2018 NDAA to protect those who report
sexual assault. It is my understanding that USEUCOM is steadfast in
protecting victims of sexual assault from retaliation. I will, however,
review the adequacy of USEUCOM policies and procedures for protecting
victims of sexual assault from retaliation, and the effectiveness of
the training and implementation of such policies and procedures.
Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
resources in place in EUCOM to investigate and respond to allegations
of sexual assault?
Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the resources used to
investigate and respond to these allegations are maintained to the
highest standard. Criminal investigative agencies must prioritize
sexual assault cases and thoroughly investigate all allegations of
sexual assault. With increased training and specialization, both
investigators and prosecutors are becoming increasingly skilled in
dealing with these types of complex cases. In addition, I would welcome
innovative, data-informed and public health methods that work to combat
sexual assault.
Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of
military leaders to hold servicemembers accountable for sexual
misconduct?
Answer. In my career, I have observed a strong willingness by
military leaders to hold servicemembers appropriately accountable for
sexual misconduct. We are still not where we need to be and more must
be done. Disciplined, fit, and cohesive teams can only be built on a
foundation of trust. Sexual misconduct destroys trust and the cohesion
so necessary for a ready and lethal fighting force. If confirmed, I
will remain committed to bringing to bear the resources required in the
AOR to ensure any servicemembers responsible for sexual misconduct are
held appropriately accountable.
Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the
resources and programs in EUCOM to provide victims of sexual assault
the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
Answer. Congress has been a critical partner in helping the
Department of Defense ensure we have a robust response system and the
resources available for victims of sexual assault. We must constantly
reevaluate and assess our effectiveness in ensuring victims have access
to restorative care. Commanders play a critical role in this capacity.
The Department of Defense provides commanders with many resources
and programs to care for our personnel. We continually pursue the most
effective tools to expand our ability to support victims with quality
medical, psychological, and legal assistance. Part of my initial
command assessment will include issues surrounding services provided to
victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will ensure commanders and
leaders at all levels within USEUCOM are personally aware of all
available resources and actively inform their subordinates of their
availability.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?
Answer. The chain of command sets the climate and the culture of an
organization. Commanders need to make it a priority to promote an
atmosphere of unwavering support for victims and ensure victims who
have made the brave decision to come forward are afforded care and
consideration, to include preventing retaliation within the unit. This
is a crucial step toward creating the environment we need. I
wholeheartedly believe in the concept ``People First;'' therefore, if
confirmed I will ensure commanders understand my priority to provide
the best possible support to victims of sexual assault.
Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
occurred?
Answer. The chain of command is essential in instituting cultural
change in the military. Leaders set the example for others to follow.
Organizational culture starts at the top. I embrace the obligation
to ensure our military culture reflects our core values and ethos. My
commitment continues to be building disciplined, fit, cohesive teams,
wherein everyone is treated with dignity and respect. Those who
volunteer to serve in uniform are our Nation's sons and daughters, and
I am absolutely determined to ensure they will serve in environments in
which they are treated with dignity and respect.
Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and
procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be
effective?
Answer. Yes. This reporting option allows us to ensure survivor
care, while also supporting any desire for privacy.
I believe that we must continually assess all policies associated
with sexual assault to ensure that we, as a Department, are providing
adequate resources to the victims of sexual assault. One sexual assault
is one too many; we must improve our efforts to prevent this terrible
crime. The restricted reporting option is effective in getting
survivors the care and services they need, but I would like to see more
Restricted Reports convert to Unrestricted due to the limitation of
actions associated with restricted reporting.
Secretary Austin approved a four-tiered roadmap for implementing
the Independent Review Commission's (IRC) recommendations that focuses
on the necessary foundational investments needed to systemically
improve accountability, prevention programs, command climate, and
victim care and support. I am committed to implementing the
Department's roadmap in USEUCOM, if confirmed.
Question. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging
the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and
responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate
and intend to implement if confirmed as EUCOM Commander?
Answer. Given the threat sexual assault poses to our force, any
legal and appropriate method for monitoring trends and continually
assessing our efforts is worthy of consideration. Certainly, continuous
communication with subject-matter experts, careful review of incident
reports, collaboration with the Inspector General, and close
examination of command climate assessments are among the methods we
would use. If confirmed, I will work closely with subject matter
experts on the findings and recommendations of the Independent Review
Commission and continue to implement in accordance with Secretary
Austin's direction.
congressional oversight
Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its
subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
electronic communications, and other information from the executive
branch.
Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and
other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records
and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
this Committee? Please answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its
subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
answer yes or no.
Answer. Yes.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
u.s. european command and u.s. space command collaboration
1. Senator Gillibrand. General Cavoli, your advance policy
questions mention that U.S. European Command (EUCOM) directly
collaborates with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to counter malign cyber
activities in the EUCOM area of responsibility. Does EUCOM also have
the same relationship with U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) to monitor the
activity of our adversaries in space that could affect the European
continent?
General Cavoli. Similar to USEUCOM's relationship with CYBERCOM,
USEUCOM maintains a strong relationship with USSPACECOM. USEUCOM
sustains a relationship with USSPACECOM primarily through the Joint
Integrated Space Team (JIST). The JIST is a group of USSPACECOM
planners integrated across the USEUCOM staff to synchronize space
planning and operations in order to monitor and deter our adversaries'
activities in the space domain.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
multi-domain task force
2. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, the Army is experimenting with
Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) units focused on how to synchronize
efforts across intelligence, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and space.
U.S. Army Pacific has a MDTF at Joint-Base Lewis McChord (in the State
of Washington) and is looking to establish another MDTF in the Indo-
Pacific region. As Commander of United States Army Europe and Africa,
you advocated for the establishment of an MDTF in the European theater
and last year, one was established in Germany. How has the Army
benefitted from the establishment of a multi-domain task force in
Europe?
General Cavoli. The Army has benefitted from the establishment of a
Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) in Europe in two significant ways.
First, the 2nd MDTF provides United States Army Europe and Africa with
capabilities and expertise in all domains under a single command in
order to focus and synchronize long range precision effects against
strategic and operational targets. Second, during this developmental
period, MDTFs provide the ability to experiment with new technologies
and war fighting techniques in the current operational environment.
This experimentation informs the Army's capability requirements and
future Army and Joint multi-domain operating concepts.
3. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, are there any lessons you've
learned from establishing the MDTF in Europe that you think will help
the Army as it continues to establish new MDTFs?
General Cavoli. Yes. While the 2nd MDTF is still building
operational capability, we have learned that MDTFs represent a wide
array of capabilities, which can be organized and tailored to meet
specific theater requirements and provide options for a commander given
the mission and operational environment. As the Army activates more
MDTFs, these will require equipment and capabilities unique to the
region, combined with the placement and access to meet senior commander
requirements. Furthermore, while any one service can execute multi-
domain operations, we must continue to build capacity and streamline
processes to leverage the collective efforts of the Joint, Interagency,
Intergovernmental, and Multinational enterprise.
russian nuclear threat
4. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, on Monday, a 20-year diplomat
with the Russian Foreign Ministry resigned from his position as an
expert advisor on nuclear non-proliferation. In an open letter to
colleagues he warned that members of Russian leadership frequently toy
with the threat of using nuclear weapons against the West with alarming
``nonchalance''. This rhetoric is also being voiced with increasing
frequency on Russian state-run television. As the Supreme Allied
Commander, how would you advise the Biden/Harris administration if
Vladimir Putin were to target a nuclear strike against the United
States or our allies?
General Cavoli. If confirmed, I would make any recommendations to
the President regarding a nuclear attack against NATO in consultation
with NATO Allies and the Commander of USSTRATCOM. The military advice
would certainly depend on the circumstances of Russia's actions and our
objectives. Russia's nuclear rhetoric is alarming, and we cannot
dismiss the threat posed by Russia's strategic nuclear forces, nor
should we forget their robust and growing arsenal of non-strategic
nuclear weapons. We must ensure that the United States maintains a
credible strategic nuclear deterrent force and that NATO endures as a
nuclear alliance with its own credible theater nuclear deterrent,
supported by the U.S., to ensure peace.
suicide prevention in armed services
5. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, I am very concerned with the
persistent issue of suicide among U.S. servicemembers and veterans. A
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report issued earlier this year
listed cultural isolation, family separations, and lack of mental
health support among the factors that could explain why servicemembers
overseas appear more at risk to attempt suicide than their counterparts
in the continental United States. If confirmed, you will lead 60,000
American servicemembers stationed thousands of miles from home. How
will you ensure these members have immediate access to mental health
counseling if needed, and how will you create a climate that eliminates
stigma and encourages members to take advantage of these resources?
General Cavoli. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize suicide
prevention as a central theme at USEUCOM Headquarters and across the
components. I will align resources to senior leaders and target
programs on suicide prevention and aftercare to ensure unit-level
personnel services, mental health, chaplain support, and MWR services
are readily available for United States personnel and families in
Europe. I will expand on the various USEUCOM and component messaging
platforms to bolster the effectiveness of how we promote, prevent,
detect, and treat the mental health of our force through the variety of
resources available to them, including confidential counseling services
of military chaplains, suicide prevention hotlines, and mental health
counselors. Outward and visible support by mental health professionals
and those seeking care is critical in eradicating stigmas associated
with mental health.
6. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, how will you prioritize what the
Department of Defense (DOD) can do to ensure mental health is treated
as part of the holistic health of each servicemember?
General Cavoli. Just as a servicemember's health is the foundation
of their military readiness, their mental health is the glue that holds
the foundation together. If confirmed, I will use every leadership and
communication tool at my disposal to ensure that U.S. servicemembers,
veterans, civilians, and family members within the USEUCOM AOR feel
connected with, supported by, and respected by every echelon of the
military and the broader support community. I will continue to partner
with the Defense Health Agency to ensure access to mental health
counselling and to ensure that staffing levels keep pace with
servicemember needs across Europe. We will eliminate barriers to mental
health care through education, understanding, empowerment, and
promotion of positive mental wellbeing as a readiness imperative.
7. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, in your opinion, what single
improvement can best address the ongoing issue of servicemember and
veteran suicides?
General Cavoli. Suicide is best prevented by strong leaders who
take an active interest in every one of their people. This means
ensuring each servicemember has a strong support network in place and
ensuring that they are a member of a team that looks out for one
another. When a person is in the early stages of difficulty it is
incumbent upon our leaders to take an interest in that person and to
guide them to the resources that they need. If confirmed, I will strive
to ensure that any stigma associated with seeking care for mental
health is erased from the command.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
ukrainian grain
8. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, there is a growing concern
about how grain shortages will contribute to regional instability
across the Middle East and Africa. Based on your interactions with
African counterparts, what is your assessment of the continent's
vulnerability to social and economic disruption stemming from decreased
Ukrainian grain exports?
General Cavoli. Food scarcity is an endemic problem across most of
Africa and many parts of the Middle East. Africa and several nations in
the Middle East will face additional social and economic disruption
stemming from decreased Ukrainian grain and vegetable oil exports. The
Port of Odesa is a major hub for the UN World Food Programme
distribution, with 36 countries importing more than 50 percent of their
grain from that region. Increasing food insecurity pressures are highly
likely to exacerbate existing social and economic vulnerabilities,
which could have severe consequences in many vulnerable nations.
nato defense spending
9. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, the 2014 Wales Summit pledge
of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense spending is a
critical requirement for NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
countries to meet. However, just meeting the spending threshold is not
enough. The increased defense spending must be done so smartly and in a
manner that maximizes allied contributions of capabilities and
expertise. In your experience as Commander of United States Army Europe
and Africa, how has the increased spending of our allies maximized
their comparative contributions of capabilities and expertise to NATO
defense?
General Cavoli. As a result of Russia's illegal and unprovoked
invasion of Ukraine, we have seen our NATO Allies increase--in some
cases dramatically increase--defense budgets, and provide large
quantities of military equipment to Ukraine. Increased Allied defense
spending enhances deterrence and defense of the Alliance across all
domains with the provision of relevant capabilities, such as modernized
vehicles, air defense, rocket artillery, and other critical systems. We
have already witnessed increased Allied contributions to the Battle
Groups on the Eastern Flank, as well as the Standing NATO Maritime
Groups, and enhanced air policing. The increased spending over time
will strengthen capabilities across the Alliance and help bolster
exercise participation, improving interoperability and readiness.
10. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, with NATO allies divesting
themselves of less capable Soviet origin weapon systems and older
Western-designed systems, what is your assessment of NATO military
modernization in the next few years?
General Cavoli. NATO Allies continue to provide large quantities of
military equipment to Ukraine. The divestment of less capable Soviet
weapon systems and legacy Western-designed systems may contribute to
capability gaps. Assuming continued increased defense spending, this
will present allies with the opportunity to modernize their forces in
critical areas within respective national capacities, and close
interoperability gaps by replacing Soviet weapon systems, ammunition,
and repair parts with NATO interoperable equipment.
11. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, what are NATO militaries
focusing on and how will it complement our capabilities?
General Cavoli. Given the changing security environment, in the
near-term, NATO militaries are focused on supporting Ukraine and
deterring further Russian aggression. Across the mid- to long-term,
NATO militaries are increasingly interested in developing and
contributing to areas that bolster the Alliance's readiness to respond
to threats from any direction in a 360-degree approach. Current
priorities in this approach include integrated air and missile defense,
theater anti-submarine warfare, long-range fires, intelligence
surveillance and reconnaissance, and command and control capabilities
to complement collective defense.
arctic
12. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, as the Commander of EUCOM,
one of your priorities will be to maintain a credible Arctic deterrence
to ensure that growing competition in the region does not lead to
conflict. As you are aware, the Army will be rebranding United States
Army Alaska as the 11th Airborne Division, with an operational focus on
the Artic. Could you speak to the impact this would have on our
Nation's ability to effectively operate and deter authoritarian
aggression in the Arctic?
General Cavoli. The Arctic is a region of both competition and
cooperation. Capable and ready forces, equipped, trained, and sustained
to operate in the Arctic are important to maintaining effective
deterrence. Arctic competence does not come quickly; therefore, it will
take time to season the operator, not just to survive in the Arctic
region, but to thrive, and if necessary prevail in the Arctic's
unforgiving environment. The Army's designation of forces with an
operational focus on the Artic, such as the 11th Airborne Division, is
a first step towards this end.
13. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, how would the accession of
Finland and Sweden to NATO change the security picture in the Arctic?
General Cavoli. The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO would
be a positive step for the security situation of both the Arctic and
Baltic regions. Sweden and Finland both have experienced and
professional militaries, capable of immediately increasing NATO
capabilities, especially in Arctic zones. Their experience in the
Arctic and Baltic regions will increase NATO's ability to detect and
deter any regional aggression. Additionally, Finnish and Swedish
accession to NATO would increase the Alliance's political strength in
Europe and the transatlantic area. Both countries will help facilitate
deeper coordination between the EU and NATO. With the accession of
Finland and Sweden to NATO, seven of the eight Arctic Council members
would also be NATO members.
marine corps
14. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, under Force Design 2030, the
Marine Corps is developing new operating concepts like Expeditionary
Advanced Base Operations and Stand In Forces. It is divesting of
several legacy systems, including all of its tanks and most of its
cannon artillery, replacing them with rocket artillery, loitering
munitions, and several types of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Among
the new capabilities the Marine Corps will field is mobile anti-ship
missiles. As the EUCOM Commander, you would potentially employ Marine
Corps units your area of responsibility (AOR). As a potential combatant
commander, what is your assessment of the capabilities the Marine Corps
is adding and the concepts it is developing?
General Cavoli. The USEUCOM area of operation contains critical
littoral terrain and key sea-lines of communication. The marines' new
force design can enable the Marine Corps to operate alongside allies
and partners providing sea-control for allies, sea-denial for Russian
forces, and contribute to the overall defense of Europe's maritime and
littoral domain.
ukraine
15. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, is it your assessment that
loitering munitions, anti-ship missiles, and proliferated UAS are being
used effectively in combat in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Yes. Ukraine's Armed Forces have used loitering
munitions and armed UAS in combat to find, fix, and eliminate Russian
forces. Prior to Russia's invasion, Ukraine possessed an armed UAS
capability, which has contributed to their ability to absorb and
effectively integrate new UAS systems. As expected with the integration
of any new system, some manageable friction points have arisen
concerning loitering munitions. The Ukrainians are overcoming those
challenges in a dynamic combat environment. Regarding anti-ship
missiles, Ukraine used its own domestically produced anti-ship missile
to sink the cruiser Moskva on 12-13 April and has used a variety of
other systems including UAS to conduct successful anti-ship attacks.
16. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, are the United States Forces
that would be under your command in EUCOM postured, equipped, and
trained to fight on a battlefield like that which exists in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. Yes. The United States Forces in USEUCOM,
reinforced by CONUS-based troops and alongside NATO forces, are
prepared to defend the Alliance against Russian aggression.
energy independence
17. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, this past March, current
Supreme Allied Commander, General Tod Wolters, testified before this
Committee, that ``Russia employs unconventional tools, ranging from
disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and manipulation
of energy markets to support Moscow's efforts at political subversion
and economic intimidation.'' Do you agree with General Wolters that
Russian manipulation of energy markets is a significant security
concern?
General Cavoli. Yes.
18. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, do you agree that United
States and allied energy independence is necessary to withstand the
economic and political coercion of authoritarians like Vladimir Putin?
General Cavoli. Yes. Reducing United States and Allied energy
dependencies will reduce the leverage, influence, and coercive energy
practices of authoritarians such as President Putin. If confirmed, I
will continue to support our lead Federal agencies (State, Energy, and
USAID) on European energy security and independence efforts in
collaboration with NATO Allies and Partners.
19. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, since 2005, the United States
has had the largest decline (1,423 million metric tons) in carbon
emissions of any country in the world. China on the other hand, has had
the largest increase (3,801 million metric tons) in carbon emissions
during that same period. Iran and Saudi Arabia were number three and
four respectively behind China in terms of the largest increases in
carbon emissions. Given these emission trends and Russia's exploitation
of European energy dependence, in your personal opinion, do you believe
it makes sense to limit the production of American energy?
General Cavoli. It is necessary to find a balance between carbon
emission goals and ensuring United States, Allied, and European energy
security and independence through a mix of solutions. If confirmed, I
will ensure that USEUCOM remains committed to supporting DoD and U.S.
goals in this area.
20. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, as of just last year, Russia
supplied more than half the natural gas and about a third of all the
oil that Germany burned to heat homes, power factories and fuel cars,
buses and trucks. As the European Union (EU) weighed bans on Russian
energy imports in the wake of the illegal invasion of Ukraine,
Germany's finance minister, Christian Lindner, stated, ``[i]t was a
mistake that Germany became so heavily dependent on energy imports from
Russia.'' Do you agree with Germany's finance minister?
General Cavoli. I agree that Germany had become too dependent on
energy imports from Russia.
21. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, with global energy prices
dramatically higher since the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, do
you believe that we should do all we can to supply our allies with
American energy to limit Russia's instruments of diplomatic coercion?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM stands with the whole-of-government, as
well as our European and NATO Allies and Partners in our response to
Russia's coercive use of energy to influence politics in Europe. The
United States Government supports energy policies that provide
responsible, adequate, reliable, and secure energy supplies at a
reasonable cost. If confirmed, I will ensure that USEUCOM remains
committed to United States policy initiatives to counter Russian
diplomatic coercion across all areas, including energy security.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
european deterrence initiative
22. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, if confirmed, how do you
intend to rethink and shape the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
moving forward?
General Cavoli. The stated objective of the European Deterrence
Initiative (EDI) is to enhance the United States' deterrence posture,
increase the readiness and responsiveness of United States Forces in
Europe, support the collective defense and security of NATO Allies, and
bolster the security and capacity of United States allies and partners.
EDI has been vital to building the military readiness necessary to
deter Russia and to respond in time of crisis. It remains critical to
our mission. If confirmed, I will assess our EDI initiatives to
determine the best way to maximize the use of this funding to support
the stated objectives.
23. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, what shortfalls have you
identified in the EDI's inability to deter Russian aggression in Europe
effectively?
General Cavoli. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has enabled us
to increase our Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). In the current crisis,
APS provided unmatched speed and flexibility in deploying a full
Armored Brigade Combat Team to Europe, ready to fight, in remarkably
short time. Moving forward, the sufficiency of EDI funding, objectives,
and investment priorities must be informed by several factors,
including: the status of the current conflict in Ukraine; the Russian
threat; future Allied contributions; and the global security situation.
If confirmed, my initial assessment will identify any capability
shortfalls that may require additional EDI funding.
ukraine
24. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, how can we work with our
European allies and partners to disincentivize Beijing's support of
Russia?
General Cavoli. Western unity in the face of Russia's unprovoked
invasion of Ukraine has been critically important, and Beijing has
taken notice. Given the importance of Western markets to China in
comparison to China-Russia trade, a unified West signals that attempts
to support Russia or help Russia circumvent sanctions will result in
adverse, whole-of-government, international repercussions.
Additionally, we must continue to signal that Chinese statements
condemning NATO in support of Russia, or implicitly supporting Russia,
will only bring NATO closer together.
25. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, have you seen any indication
of sensitive information sharing by Chinese drone-maker DJI to Russian
Forces in Ukraine?
General Cavoli. No, I have not seen any indication of sensitive
information sharing by DJI to Russian Forces in Ukraine.
telecommunication infrastructure
26. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, what countries seem most
receptive and least receptive to warnings of China's malign intentions?
General Cavoli. Since 2020, Europe has become increasingly aware of
the risks associated with Chinese investment and activity and has
become less tolerant of China's aggressive diplomacy. The UK, in
particular, has grown increasing wary of the challenges China presents
since the unification of Hong Kong. Additionally, Lithuania recently
demonstrated strong resolve in the face of Chinese malign influence by
withdrawing from the 17+1 framework. Countries dependent on foreign
investment and with weak regulatory frameworks seem the least receptive
to warnings of China's malign intentions. Conversely, countries that
are less reliant on external investment seem most receptive to warnings
of China's malign intentions.
27. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, how does EUCOM's concept of
operations need to change to account for Chinese electronic warfare and
cyber capabilities?
General Cavoli. USEUCOM conducts regular assessments of Chinese
influence in Europe. USEUCOM is fully engaged with Joint
Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations and Joint Cyber Operations,
leveraging staff expertise and supporting organizations to ensure the
command is equipped, trained, and ready to operate against a pacing
adversary who continues to expand their global influence. USEUCOM works
directly with USCYBERCOM, USSPACECOM, and USSTRATCOM to ensure
coordination across cyber, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum to
further develop capabilities to counter Chinese and Russian threats. If
confirmed, I will ensure that USEUCOM continues to provide a strong
demand signal on the intelligence community to understand China's use
and employment of electronic warfare and cyber capabilities in the
European Theater, the targets of these capabilities, and the intent
behind their use. Additionally, USEUCOM will maintain a close
collaboration with USINDOPACOM.
finland and sweden joining nato
28. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, what has been your
understanding of President Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey's opposition
regarding Finland and Sweden potentially joining NATO?
General Cavoli. Turkey has expressed concern over Finland and
Sweden's perceived support of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), but
Finland and Sweden are in continuing talks with Turkey. While this is a
challenge, I am optimistic that Turkey, Finland, and Sweden, in
collaboration with NATO, will be able to work through this in a spirit
of cooperation.
__________
Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
wales pledge
29. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, you testified, ``I know all of
the land forces chiefs in NATO. Each one of them has a list of
requirements. The requirements would all take more than 2 percent of
GDP.'' In your personal opinion, if more than 2 percent of GDP is
required to meet allied land forces' requirements--not to mention their
air, naval, and other forces' requirements--would you agree that 2
percent is no longer an adequate defense spending minimum for NATO
allies?
General Cavoli. I believe that in order to meet collective defense
requirements, allies will have to spend at least 2 percent of GDP, as
agreed to at the 2014 Wales Summit. If confirmed, I intend to encourage
allies to invest the necessary funds to meet Article 3 obligations and
field the capabilities required for collective defense.
30. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, you testified, ``So I am an
advocate of spending more than 2 percent, at least 2 percent.'' To
clarify, in your personal opinion, is it enough for NATO allies to
spend 2 percent of GDP on defense--as implied by ``at least''--or
should they in fact be spending more than 2 percent of GDP on defense?
General Cavoli. Given the new security environment, it is my
personal opinion that allies will have to spend more than 2 percent of
GDP. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, many allies are moving in
this direction.
31. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, I asked Vice Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady if he agreed that our
NATO allies should be increasing defense spending beyond 2 percent of
GDP. He responded, ``Yes.'' In your personal opinion, do you agree with
Admiral Grady?
General Cavoli. Yes.
32. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, I asked Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander if she
agreed that ``it is time for our NATO allies to move beyond the Wales
Pledge and commit to increase defense spending above 2 percent.'' She
responded, ``Yes.'' In your personal opinion, do you agree with Dr.
Wallander?
General Cavoli. Yes.
33. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, is it
fair to say that it would significantly help efforts to bolster
deterrence in Europe--and reduce operational risk to United States
Forces in the European theater--if our NATO allies raise defense
spending above 2 percent?
General Cavoli. Yes.
simultaneity demands
34. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, as you and I discussed, the
Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) testified that the joint force would be
``seriously challenged'' to fight and win wars against China and Russia
at the same time. This assessment is reflected in the force planning
constructs in the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies. In your
professional military judgment, do you agree with the CNO's assessment?
General Cavoli. I concur with the assessments of the CNO and the
2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).
35. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your professional military
judgment, what would it mean for EUCOM if United States Forces were
drawn into a conflict against China, or if the United States was forced
to withhold forces from Europe to deter or defeat Chinese opportunistic
aggression?
General Cavoli. A whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, and whole-
of-alliance effort would be necessary to address a crisis or conflict
with China. If confirmed as the USEUCOM Commander I would stand ready
to support USINDOPACOM. NATO is a major asymmetric advantage that has
supported the U.S. during past conflicts, and I am confident the
Alliance would adapt to mitigate risk associated with U.S. global
requirements.
36. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your professional military
judgment, what specific capabilities do United States Forces currently
provide in Europe that European allies could feasibly contribute
instead?
General Cavoli. The United States supports our allies across the
European theater with a variety of forces across all domains, ranging
from airborne assets, to maritime vessels, to ground forces. Many of
those U.S. Forces provide capabilities that exist within our allies'
military force structure to varying degrees. Fighter aircraft, airborne
ISR platforms, cruisers, destroyers, and ground maneuver forces are a
few of the specific capabilities that our European allies could
contribute to a crisis or conflict involving the NATO Alliance.
united states force posture in europe
37. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, the United States has deployed
tens of thousands of additional forces to Europe since the beginning of
the war in Ukraine. In your personal opinion, how long should the
United States keep these additional forces in Europe, and under what
conditions should the United States withdraw them from the European
theater?
General Cavoli. The situation on the ground in Ukraine, Allied
contributions, and the evolution of the Russian threat must dictate our
future actions and force posture. I anticipate that the force presence
in the USEUCOM AOR will remain at current levels at least through the
cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. Ultimately, it is important to
consider an Alliance approach and coordinate our posture levels closely
with NATO. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of
the USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for
credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in
Europe.
38. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, former Assistant Secretary of
State for European and Eurasian Affairs Wess Mitchell recently wrote:
``The U.S. should also make better use of the large number of troops we
have stationed in Western Europe by moving them east. The Stryker
Brigade recently shifted from Germany to Romania should make its
permanent home there, and the 173rd Airborne sent from Italy to Norway
should make Norway its new home.'' Do you agree that we should move
these units farther to the east, rather than keeping them in central
Europe? Why or why not?
General Cavoli. The forward stationing of United States and Allied
forces in Eastern Europe involves multiple, complex strategic and
operational considerations. At the strategic level, these include
maintaining Alliance cohesion and strategic stability while
contributing to an improvement in NATO's overall defensive posture.
Operational factors include the systems, infrastructure, and facilities
to preserve the warfighting readiness and mobility of United States
Forces, as demonstrated in the response to Russia's invasion of
Ukraine. Finally, relocating units within Europe is not the only
approach to enhancing United States and NATO posture in Eastern Europe.
Persistent presence in Eastern Europe can also be achieved through
rotational deployments, exercises, and other means. Moving forward, we
must preserve the ability to remain agile and quickly reinforce areas
across Europe.
39. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, Dr. Mitchell also wrote, ``The
U.S. also has an inventory of weapons that it is in the process of
decommissioning that could be given or sold to frontline NATO states,
such as the F-15, F-16, and A-10 aircraft.'' Would frontline NATO
states be able to make good use of aircraft, such as those listed by
Dr. Mitchell, which the United States is currently in the process of
decommissioning?
General Cavoli. If confirmed, I will work with United States Air
Forces in Europe, the United States Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the
OSD to determine the appropriate distribution of divested U.S.
aircraft. The U.S. Government has established procedures for allies and
partners to request Excess Defense Articles. We continue to work
closely with allies and partners to facilitate their requests.
nato enlargement
40. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, you testified, ``I remain of
the opinion, as I told you in our office call, that at least in the
ground domain that [Finland and Sweden's prospective NATO accession] is
not going to be a requirement for large additional forces or additional
forces.'' How confident are you that Finland and Sweden's admission to
NATO would not result in requirements for additional United States
ground forces in Europe, and what gives you that level of confidence?
General Cavoli. While additional exercises and other engagements
are likely to grow, I am confident that the admission of Finland and
Sweden to NATO would not result in additional ground force basing
requirements in Europe. I am confident in this assessment because both
Finland and Sweden would bring very capable land forces into the
Alliance. Finland maintains a large standing Army and the largest tube-
artillery force in Europe. Sweden maintains a smaller, extremely
professional land force. Both nations bring capability and capacity to
NATO, and will bolster the Alliance's defenses, particularly in the
Baltic Sea and High North.
41. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, you testified, ``I think
exercises and occasional presence like we do with any ally will
increase.'' Can you elaborate on what you meant by ``exercises and
occasional presence . . . will increase''?
General Cavoli. The United States and other NATO nations hold
regular exercises throughout Europe. While Finland and Sweden already
take part in many NATO-led exercises, I anticipate both nations will
participate in additional NATO exercises throughout Europe, and host
additional NATO exercises. Sweden is hosting BALTOPS22 (an annual NATO
exercise focused in the Baltic Sea on anti-submarine warfare, mine
countermeasures, and amphibious missions) from 5-17 June, which is an
example of an increased exercise presence from the U.S. and other NATO
Allies.
42. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, do
you believe Ukraine should be admitted to NATO?
General Cavoli. All sovereign states have the right to choose their
own security arrangements, and NATO has an open door policy; however,
NATO has provisions that prevent countries with significant border
disputes from joining the Alliance. The President has made clear that
the United States will continue to support Ukraine in its efforts to
advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. If confirmed, I will evaluate
the considerations associated with Ukraine's accession to NATO, in
order to provide the best possible military advice to policy makers.
43. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, do
you believe Georgia should be admitted to NATO?
General Cavoli. All sovereign states have the right to choose their
own security arrangements, and NATO has an open door policy; however,
NATO has provisions that prevent countries with significant border
disputes from joining the Alliance. If confirmed, I will evaluate the
considerations associated with Georgia's accession to NATO, in order to
provide the best possible military advice to policy makers.
strategic prioritization
44. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, do
you agree with Secretary Austin's designation of China as DOD's pacing
threat and the Indo-Pacific as its priority theater?
General Cavoli. Yes.
45. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, if the Indo-Pacific is DOD's
priority theater, in your personal opinion, would you agree that Europe
is necessarily a lower-priority theater?
General Cavoli. I agree with the NDS characterization of China as
our pacing threat and its designation of USINDOPACOM as our priority
theater. However, current events show that there may be periods where
areas outside the Indo-Pacific region rise in priority.
46. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, Vice Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady wrote for the record that DOD
needs to do less in lower-priority theaters so it can focus more of its
scarce resources on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, barring a
significant increase in the defense budget. Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander--whose
portfolio includes Europe--agreed. In your personal opinion, do you
agree with the Vice Chairman's and Dr. Wallander's assessments that DOD
must do less in lower-priority theaters?
General Cavoli. I believe that DOD must focus its resources on
priority theaters.
47. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your professional military
judgment, do you believe the Russian threat to NATO is greater today
than it was prior to its invasion of Ukraine, given significant
degradation of its military manpower, equipment, and other capabilities
during the conflict?
General Cavoli. I believe that it is premature to draw significant
conclusions about the potential degradation of Russia's conventional
forces; the war is still going on and is undecided. Russia remains the
most significant threat to NATO for the near- to long-term due to its
significant remaining arsenal, including nuclear weapons. Additionally,
Russia's cyber, space, and information capabilities remain unaffected
by the war in Ukraine and represent an enduring threat to the United
States and our NATO Allies.
nuclear forces
48. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in March 2022, General Wolters
supported retention of the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile
program because it ``exacerbates the challenge for potential enemies
against us.'' Do you agree with General Wolters?
General Cavoli. Yes.
49. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, how would strengthening
conventional-nuclear integration support conventional deterrence in
Europe?
General Cavoli. A robust conventional-nuclear integration (CNI)
capability provides USEUCOM and NATO with a means to complicate our
adversaries' perceived benefit from pursuing nuclear escalation within
a theater conflict. Our adversaries must know that engaging in a
conflict with NATO is not worth the costs and will not result in
successfully achieving their objectives. Our readiness to counter their
nuclear threats provides credible deterrence across the entire spectrum
of conflict.
______
[The nomination reference of General Christopher G. Cavoli,
USA follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The biographical sketch of General Christopher G. Cavoli,
USA, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
nomination was referred, follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
military officers nominated by the President to positions
requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
form that details the biographical, financial, and other
information of the nominee. The form executed by General
Christopher G. Cavoli, USA in connection with his nomination
follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
are contained in the committee's executive files.]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
______
[The nomination of General Christopher G. Cavoli, USA was
reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 15, 2022, with
the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 23, 2022.]
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