

THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER
G. CAVOLI, USA FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COM-
MANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COM-
MAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
EUROPE

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE

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THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, USA FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

THURSDAY, MAY 26, 2022

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.

Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen, Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin, Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis, Sullivan, Scott, Hawley, and Tuberville.

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

Chairman REED. Good morning. The Committee meets today to consider the nomination of General Christopher Cavoli to be the next Commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. General, your nomination is well deserved, and I thank you for your willingness to lead in this important position. We welcome your wife, Christina, parents, Ivo and Rita, and thank your father for his distinguished service in the United States Army, your brother, Stephen, and we thank him for his distinguished service in the United States Army, and your sister-in-law, Michele, who are with us today. We thank them for their continued support of your service, and again, their own distinguished service to the Nation themselves.

Your current role as the Commanding General of U.S Army Europe and Africa has no doubt provided you with critical experience and insights which will serve you well if confirmed in this new role. Your career spans nearly 35 years with distinguished service across multiple theaters and in close collaboration with allies and partners across the globe.

Further, you have studied the challenges in Europe from numerous vantage points, including your current leadership in assisting our Ukrainian partners and reassuring our NATO allies. You have also served as Russia Director on the Joint Staff and studied these issues in academia, including earning a master's degree in Russian

and East European studies and serving as a fellow at the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies in Germany.

If confirmed, you will take command in the midst of the greatest test of the NATO alliance since World War II. The alliance has shown remarkable unity and resolve in the face of Russia's unprovoked and illegal attack on Ukraine. A formidable array of our allies have joined together and, in response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the United States and our NATO allies and partners have mobilized with impressive speed to bolster Ukrainian resolve, reinforce credible combat power along the eastern flank, and impose severe costs on Russia's elite. Putin's actions have drastically altered the European security landscape, NATO unity has been solidified, countries like Sweden and Finland have officially applied to join the alliance, and others, like Germany, are taking steps to invest greater portions of their national budgets and institutional energies to improve their military capabilities.

Ensuring the alliance is able to generate and maintain the collective force posture, operations, and investments to deter Russian aggression will be a primary responsibility for the next EUCOM Commander.

General, with NATO set to announce a new strategic concept at its summit in Madrid in June, I would like to know your views on the current plans for United States Military presence and posture in the EUCOM area of responsibility. I also hope you will share your thoughts on how the United States and our allies should begin to reassess the security environment fundamentally altered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Unlike the threat from Russia, for which there is little disagreement among our European partners as to the size and scope of the issue, our allies have a range of views on the challenges posed by China. Beijing's growing economic influence and diplomatic presence in Europe, coupled with its growing military relationship with Russia, may have serious implications for transatlantic economy and security. In 2019, the NATO allies agreed to mention China for the first time in a NATO declaration, stating that, "China's growing influence and international policies present both opportunities and challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance." The next EUCOM Commander will have to work with the inter-agency and across the alliance to address Chinese malign influence within the region. General, I hope you will share what expectations you have with regard to NATO's developing China policy and what steps can be taken to mitigate this growing threat.

Finally, as we reflect on the realities of 21st century warfare on display in Ukraine, the Committee would benefit from hearing what lessons you would bring to prepare our forces for any potential future conflict. We would also benefit from insights from your current post at United States Army Europe and Africa, particularly in areas such as military mobility, large-scale multilateral exercises, and engagements with partners and allies across the theater. I hope you will share how you would intend to use such insights if confirmed as the next EUCOM Commander.

Thank you again, General, for your continued willingness to serve, and I look forward to your testimony.

Let me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

Senator INHOFE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and General Cavoli for your willingness to continue your distinguished service to our country.

I enjoyed meeting your wife, your parents, and other family members earlier this morning, and they are with us today, and I just know how proud they are of you in the service you have given to your country.

I will note that you were born in Europe during one of your father's tours there, so it is clear that you were destined to fill this role we are discussing here today.

We are considering your nomination to lead the United States and NATO forces in Europe at a pivotal point in our history.

Russia's unprovoked, unjustified invasion of Ukraine has been a wakeup call to the free world that we need to deter Putin, not accommodate him, not appease him, as some would want to do to deter him.

But it was not a surprise to many of us here today, who also understand that protecting America's interests means supporting Ukraine's defense and working to deter further Russian aggression against NATO.

I am encouraged that Europe is now stepping up their investment in its own defense. With Finland and Sweden now seeking NATO membership in response to Putin's reckless acts, we have got to keep up this momentum to strengthen our shared security.

We have seen what happens in Ukraine when deterrence fails. That is why I have long advocated that we invest more in our own defense to ensure deterrence does not fail in even worse ways.

I do not want anyone to forget that China is supporting both what Russia is doing in Ukraine and China has long been involved in malign activity in Europe itself.

General Cavoli, you are the right man for the job during these exceptional times, and I look forward to working with you on bolstering United States security interests with our European allies and partners.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.

General Cavoli, your remarks, please.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, USA FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

General CAVOLI. Thank you, Chairman. Good morning, Chairman Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and thank you for the support that you provide to our service men and women and to their families.

I am humbled to be nominated to serve as the Commander of U.S. European Command and as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. I am grateful to President Biden, to Secretary Austin, and to General Milley for the trust and the confidence that they place in me, especially at this momentous time in Europe.

I must, of course, start by thanking the person who has made the most difference to me throughout my career, my wife and my best friend, Christina. Being a military spouse is not easy. There are routine separations, constant moves, and the tragedies of war. Christina has handled all of this with dignity and with grace. She has selflessly supported our soldiers and their families, even while raising our own two sons, Alex and Nick. I am so proud that we can share this moment together today.

I would also like to thank my sons. Alex graduated Princeton and works at a clean energy start-up company in California, and his younger brother, Nick, is studying physics at the University of California in Santa Barbara. These two have followed me all over the world, they attended three high schools each, and I could not be more proud of the young Americans that they have turned out to be.

As I talk about my family I reflect on my own life. As the Ranking Member pointed out, my dad is an Italian immigrant. He came to America and became a U.S. Army officer. I was born in a military hospital in Würzburg, Germany during the Cold War. Over the years we lived in Europe again and again. We were blessed with multiple assignments there.

For the past 4½ years I have been fortunate to command our United States Army Forces in Europe, and for the past year in Africa too. I have had the priceless opportunity to work closely with the interagency, our allies, and our partners to advance our common national security objectives.

For the last 3 years I have done so under the leadership of General Tod Wolters. I would like here to publicly thank him for his mentorship and for his leadership during that time.

I would also like to thank you, the United States Congress, and especially this Committee. Since my first tour as a general officer in Europe in 2014, the Congress has worked tirelessly to support our service men and women in our mission. The European Deterrence Initiative, which you have repeatedly authorized, has been absolutely vital to building the military readiness necessary to deter Russia and to respond in times of crisis.

In response to this crisis, the illegal and unprovoked Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States Military has deployed significant combat power on short notice. The Fifth Corps headquarters, an armored brigade combat team, withdrew prepositioned stocks, the 18th Airborne Corps headquarters with a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division, a carrier strike group, fifth-generation fighters, additional destroyers—all of this has been enabled by the European Deterrence Initiative and by the hard work of training and exercising that the EDI has enabled over the years.

If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to build on this vital work, ensuring that EUCOM remains ready to respond, along with our allies and partners, to any threat to our national security.

In Europe, the core security challenge is Russia. Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine ushers in a new era in European security. NATO is more energized and unified than I have seen in years. Our allies and partners have rushed with us to assist Ukraine to remain independent and free, and on the far side it will be up to us all to reestablish an enduring stability.

But Russia is not our only challenge. China's growing influence is also of huge concern, as are terrorism, migration, cybersecurity, and climate change. So we cannot be a one-problem alliance. We must maintain vigilance across 360 degrees, ready to respond to any and all threats.

We are in a time when unity in the alliance is of the greatest importance. Our allies will be our strength as we go forward. If confirmed, I will work closely with this Committee and will provide my best military advice with the goal of promoting our security interests and defending the principles that we have all fought so hard for over these years.

It has been an honor to serve this country for the past 35 years. If confirmed, I will be thankful for the opportunity to continue to serve alongside the brave service men and women of EUCOM and of our NATO allies.

I thank this Committee once again for your time today and for the opportunity to speak with you. I very much look forward to your questions.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, General.

There are a series of question which nominees must respond to. Please respond appropriately.

Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations governing conflicts of interest?

General CAVOLI. Yes.

Chairman REED. Have you assumed any duties or taken any actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the confirmation process?

General CAVOLI. No, sir.

Chairman REED. Exercising our legislative and oversight responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of the Congress receive testimonies, briefings, reports, records, and other information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this Committee, when requested?

General CAVOLI. I do, Chairman.

Chairman REED. Do you agree, when asked before this Committee, to give your personal views, even if your views differ from the Administration?

General CAVOLI. Yes, I do.

Chairman REED. Do you agree to provide records, documents, and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested by this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate committees of Congress and to consult with the requestor regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in providing such records?

General CAVOLI. Yes.

Chairman REED. Will you ensure that your staff applies the deadlines established by this Committee for the production of reports, records, and other information, including timely responding to hearing questions for the record?

General CAVOLI. I will, sir.

Chairman REED. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses and briefers in response to congressional request?

General CAVOLI. Yes.

Chairman REED. Will those witnesses and briefers be protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?

General CAVOLI. Yes, they will.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, General.

I think it is both significant and maybe a bit ironic that we first met in Ukraine in about 2014, when you were leading the efforts to start organized training efforts and support efforts for Ukrainian forces. I think your work then has shown itself to be extraordinarily useful today, so thank you for that.

Part of what you pointed out in your testimony is a unity among NATO and a commitment to invest seriously in defense, and that raises two questions. Your quick thoughts about how you are going to coordinate the investment of NATO countries so that everyone does not buy X and we do not have any Y, and then what should the United States do as a catalyst but also as the leading member?

General CAVOLI. Senator, if I could start with the second question first. I think the U.S.'s special role inside NATO is to point the way toward the future and to demonstrate with our actions how to go in that direction. So by deploying force we have led the way for NATO in this crisis, as an example. As we arm our own military we create a model that other nations in the alliance can emulate.

In my current role I spend a lot of time talking with the chiefs of other European armies about how we arm ourselves, how we organize ourselves, and many of them use those lessons or those examples as models for themselves. So I think inside NATO our special role is to be a model and an exemplar.

How will we coordinate the investments as we go forward? This is always a devilish thing to do. It can be very difficult. There is an initiative inside NATO right now to link plans to required structure to national commitment. General Wolters has begun that and has advanced that. It will fall to me, if I am confirmed, to complete that work, and that work will guide the capabilities and capacities that we need from various nations and in support of NATO's planning efforts.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, General. To date, NATO and communities around the world have been able to move logistics into Europe without any type of interruption. Indeed, I think there is a question of how long that might be allowed. But in a potential fight the idea of uncontested logistics is probably the first thing you throw out.

Are you preparing for a situation in this context or other context, for fighting to get your logistics forward to your troops?

General CAVOLI. We are, Senator. In United States Army Europe this is a source of significant concern as we look at our plans, especially our plans to reinforce our forces in Europe in the event of a large crisis. When we look at it we divide it from the U.S., from fort to port, and then from port to port across the Atlantic, and then from port to the point of need in Europe. Each one of those segments carries its own challenges and has different people responsible for solving those problems.

So we work in a partnership with USTRANSCOM and with the U.S. Army to get Army forces from fort to port. We work with USTRANSCOM as well as the Second Fleet and JFC Norfolk, a newly stood-up command, to control the sea lanes of the Atlantic

to go from port to port, and then I am largely responsible, with our NATO allies and related organizations such as the Joint Support and Enabling Command, recently stood up by NATO, to get folks from port to the point of need.

Each one brings different challenges. Those challenges could be the threat of kinetic strike or the threat of cyber activity, and so forth. So yes, we work very hard on that, Senator.

Chairman REED. You mentioned the issue of cyber, and I think many people are waiting for the shoe to drop, vis-à-vis the Russian cyber in this present situation. This is an open hearing, but are there any comments you would like to make about that?

General CAVOLI. Well, Senator, I think we are correct to be waiting for the other shoe to drop. There is capability and capacity that could be used, and we are being very vigilant about that, as the DoD. To go far beyond that I think we would have to go into a classified setting, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, General, and again, I think your service not only justifies this confirmation but demands it. Thank you very much.

General CAVOLI. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman REED. Senator Inhofe, please.

Senator INHOFE. Thank you. I appreciate that and I echo your comments about the background of our witness today. We have had an opportunity to discuss a number of things over the years, and we discussed the subject of the Ukraine grain shortage and the spillover effects that are there, in my office. There are three questions that come from that, that should be a part of the record that we will build today on this issue.

That is, first of all, how concerned are you by the food crisis that has resulted from Russia blocking Ukrainian grain exports to Africa? You know that I have had an interest in this for quite some time. Secondly, what will be the longer-term security effects of this, and what more should we do with our European and African allies and partners to address these problems now?

General CAVOLI. Senator, thank you. Indeed, in my role as the Commanding General of United States Army Forces in Africa this has weighed pretty heavily on our minds. The grain shortages that we are experiencing from both Russia and Ukrainian production being unable to come out of the countries in large volume or being sanctioned and not being sold are being felt on the African continent. They were felt very quickly. I was recently in Kenya, and there was significant impact there already. We know that in other countries, such as Tunisia, the prices have skyrocketed for basic foodstuffs.

So there is food insecurity in Africa that is being provoked by the shortage of grain. It is of great concern. In many cases these are countries that do not need an additional challenge, and those additional challenges we will have to help them with at some point. This will largely be a European concern because of the close connection between African security issues and European security issues.

With regard to what to do about it, there are many proposals, Senator, being batted about right now, many different ways. Some of them are very positive. We think there are about 20 million tons,

22 million tons of grain in Ukraine backed up, waiting to be pulled out. Some of the ports we are attempting to use, the Romanians have made the port of Constanta available. It only does about 90,000 tons a day. But the German Deutsche Bahn has recently stepped up. That is the German national railroad agency, and they are doing what they call a Berlin trainlift, an analogy to the Berlin airlift, to dedicate trains to pulling wheat right out of Ukraine into Western Europe. Poland has established a new border crossing regime with Germany in order to facilitate that.

So I think some efforts are taking place. Much more remains to be done, Senator.

Senator INHOFE. Good. Very good.

General Cavoli, General Wolters testified before this Committee, and it sounds almost impossible, but he said our troops' ability to deploy from the United States and be up and running in less than a week to deter further Russian aggression was made possible by the funding through the European Deterrence Initiative. This Committee spearheaded this initiative after Russia's first invasion in 2014.

Do you agree with General Wolters' assessment, and what ways have you seen the EDI enable our robust response? It is very difficult to understand that this was possible.

General CAVOLI. Senator, with EDI over the past few years the U.S. Army, in conjunction with U.S. European Command, has placed large amounts of very modern equipment, brigade combat team sets, in storage in Europe, and we have also used the funding to practice flying over and drawing that equipment on short notice. In the beginning of this crisis, when we got the order to activate and deploy the first brigade of the Third Infantry Division out of Fort Stewart, Georgia, we were able to do so very quickly. We moved all the troops in about 4 days, by aircraft, and those troops, the first of them were putting rounds downrange in less than a week, and by the end of 3 weeks every single screwdriver in the brigade has been issued and they were ready to roll anyplace.

Senator INHOFE. Yeah, and that could not have been done, it would not be possible, and a lot of people thought it was not possible, if it had not been for the preparation that you mentioned that you had the foresight to ready yourselves.

General CAVOLI. One hundred percent, sir.

Senator INHOFE. Yeah. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.

Senator Shaheen, please.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cavoli, congratulations on your nomination.

General CAVOLI. Thank you.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you for being here this morning and for your service, and welcome to your family as well.

You were kind enough to meet recently with Senator Tillis and I to talk about some NATO issues, but we also talked a little bit about, as I recall, a little bit our recent visit to the Balkans, where we were in Bosnia Herzegovina and talked with the military leadership of the EUFOR mission and NATO there about some of the challenges that are facing Bosnia and concern about whether

EUFOR is going to be reauthorized this fall when it comes up again before the U.N.

I wonder if you could, as we think about the potential for Russian meddling in the Balkans—and they have a history of doing that—and the challenges that Bosnia Herzegovina faces, can you talk about what the impact would be if the EUFOR mission is not renewed?

General CAVOLI. Senator, first of all Russian influence in the Balkans is real and it is not a positive force, in my experience, so it is something we must think about constantly. The presence of multinational forces, such as KFOR in Kosovo and EUFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina is an important part of our ability to monitor and to help control the situations there.

I do believe EUFOR has an important mandate. If EUFOR's mandate is not renewed I believe that there must be some effort that takes its place. If I am confirmed, I will look into that immediately and participate in the development of options, and I look forward to discussing it with you in the future, Senator.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I am really pleased to hear that. I think that it is very important that we work with our European partners and ensure that we do not see that mission expire and nothing replace it, so thank you very much for that.

You spoke earlier with Senator Inhofe about the challenges of getting the grain out of Ukraine that is needed in so many parts of the world. One of the biggest challenges has been the Russian really predominance in the Black Sea and the inability to dislodge them. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about how what we might do there to bolster NATO defenses in the Black Sea, what options we might have as we are looking at the challenges we face because of Russia's dominance in the Black Sea.

General CAVOLI. Yes, ma'am. For some time before the onset of this crisis, that is for a couple of years before this current crisis, we in USEUCOM had been working on strengthening the presence and the role of the U.S. and NATO in the Black Sea area. This has been something we are working on for some time.

Naval Forces Europe, for example, has been working with the Bulgarians on a maritime domain awareness system. My command, the United States Army in Europe, has been working on long-range fires with the Romanian Army and the establishment of command and control nodes that are able to handle the very high-end new equipment that Romania has been buying from us, specifically Patriot missiles, and HIMARS rocket launchers.

So we have been looking at things like that in the past, Senator, and we will continue to do those in the future, if I am confirmed.

Senator SHAHEEN. So do you think we have an adequate strategy within NATO and in the United States for the Black Sea region?

General CAVOLI. Ma'am, I think inside the U.S. we have a strategy, you know, adequate. All strategies have to be assessed, reviewed, and updated all the time. Clearly the current events in the Black Sea region are going to require us to go back and make sure that we adjust everything for the result of this conflict. I think I could say the same thing for the NATO approach, but I will have to wait, and if I am confirmed, look into exactly what NATO is planning in that regard and come back to you on that.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I look forward to that.

Finally, the Administration recently appointed retired General Wolff as the Ukraine Security Assistance Coordinator, which I think was a very positive move. Can you talk about how the relationships with General Wolff as coordinator will work as you think about your role in coordinating security with the Ukrainians?

General CAVOLI. Senator, only briefly because that is still working its way out right now. We encourage the efforts to coordinate. That is one of the difficult things in this overall collective effort. I saw Terry Wolff a couple of weeks ago in Ramstein, and we had a couple of words about it. But if I am confirmed, I look forward to working with him to make sure that all of these systems work together closely.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you. I look forward to hearing more.

General CAVOLI. Thank you, ma'am.

Senator SHAHEEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.

Senator Cotton, please.

Senator COTTON. General, congratulations on your nomination. Thank you for your career of distinguished service. Thanks to your wife, Christina, for supporting you and no doubt supporting the families of the troops you have led over the years, and thanks to your family for their service. The defense of this Nation is often a family affair.

I want to discuss the request by Finland and Sweden to join NATO. That is a political decision that will be made by the President and this Senate as well as 29 other NATO members. But NATO is foremost a military alliance, so I would like to get your professional military judgment on the implications of adding Sweden and Finland to NATO. What do you think it will do to bolster our common defense to have Sweden and Finland as members of NATO?

General CAVOLI. Senator, I look forward to the accession of Finland and Sweden to the alliance from the military perspective. Each of those militaries brings quite a bit of capability and capacity to the alliance from day one. For example, Finland has a large army, well equipped, very well trained, very quickly expandable, exercised very frequently, and absolutely expert in defending the borderline that it has with Russia for these past decades, an expertise that they demonstrated in 1939, and has built on ever since.

Finland, in addition to its big army, has F-15 fighter jets and has just decided to buy 64 F-35s, so they will arrive bringing capacity and capability to the alliance.

Sweden is the same thing, a smaller army but a very capable army, and an army that is growing. My colleague, Karl Engelbrektson, has a 200 percent increase in his acquisition budget over a 5-year period. They have recently bought Patriots and are contemplating buying some other equipment. We work with them very closely. Critically, they bring a navy in the Baltic Sea, which will be of enormous military significance to the alliance.

Then if we look geographically with the accession of those two countries, the entire Black Sea, with the exception of a couple of few kilometers, will be coastline of NATO nations, which will create a very different geometry in the area, sir.

Senator COTTON. I think you mean the entire Baltic Sea, right?

General CAVOLI. I am sorry. Of course, the Baltic Sea.

Senator COTTON. Can you speak specifically about what it means for Russia's Baltic fleet to now have the northern shores of the Gulf of Finland a part of NATO, since the southern shore, Estonia, already is, and then also what it means to have Gotland, a large Swedish island, in the middle of the Baltic fleet? What does that mean to Russia's Baltic fleet and their defense planning?

General CAVOLI. Well, sir, in the most generic sense it provides a bunch of different dilemmas, almost geometric dilemmas that Russia does not have right now as they sail forth from Saint Petersburg and Kaliningrad. So it will be advantageous.

Senator COTTON. You mentioned one other key feature of geographic which is the 800-mile border that Finland has with Russia. Some might say, gosh, this exposes NATO to a lot more risk because you have this large border. It sounds like your perspective is that rather than exposing NATO to risk it exposes Russia to greater risk and complicates Russia's defense planning. Could you elaborate?

General CAVOLI. I do think that, Senator. I think that for a couple of reasons. First of all, Russia has not historically put too many ground forces on that border. It has been an economy of force theater for them because they thought they had a relationship with Finland that allowed them to do that. This allowed Russia to concentrate ground forces in other places. That possibility will now go away for Russia.

In addition to that, the Finns, as I mentioned a moment ago, are absolutely expert in defending that border. I have personally gone on a snowmobile with the Chief of the Border Guards and with the Chief of the Finnish Army down half the length of that border, and I was very impressed at their ability to defend it.

Senator COTTON. Do you think the Russian General Staff is fairly well versed in the history of the Winter War, which you alluded to, of 1939–1940?

General CAVOLI. Sir, I know they are. That Winter War is studied not just by Western armies as a model of how to beat a larger force but it is studied by the Russians as well, as an important lesson to learn from their past.

Senator COTTON. It sounds like you think that even 80 years on that the Russian General Staff might not want to put their hand on that hot stove again after they did it in the Winter War?

General CAVOLI. I would have to put myself inside their heads, Senator, but I would not want to do it if I were them.

Senator COTTON. All right. One final question. There was a report a couple of days ago in the Wall Street Journal that the Administration is considering sending special operation forces to guard the embassy in Kyiv. Can you comment on that report?

General CAVOLI. Sir, I cannot comment publicly on it, but we currently do not have any marine security detachment with the embassy in Kyiv, and with regard to special forces I think we would have to talk about it in a separate—

Senator COTTON. Okay. You answered my next question, which was going to be do we have marines at that embassy, which we have in pretty much every other embassy all around the world. In

fact, I just checked this morning. We do, in fact, have marines in Moscow yet we do not have marines guarding our embassy in Kyiv. It is their job all around the world, and I think that is because the President came out last year and publicly stated that he would never put troops in the Ukraine, and now the Administration is running around like a cat chasing its tail, trying to figure out how to let these marines do their job at that embassy, just like they are doing in Moscow, just like they are doing at five diplomatic facilities in China.

I think we should just let the marines go do their job at the embassy. This is another instance in which I am afraid the President is self-deterring in a public fashion, which is sending the wrong signal to Vladimir Putin.

You do not have to respond, but you can take it under advisement. I think the marines should be standing guard at the Kyiv embassy whenever you get confirmed.

General CAVOLI. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Cotton.

Senator Gillibrand, please.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you so much and congratulations. We are very grateful for your service.

In visiting some of our NATO allies we talked about Article 5 and when that gets triggered after a cyberattack. Do you have views about what level of cyberattack on a NATO ally would trigger an Article 5 requirement?

General CAVOLI. Senator, this, of course, is a very active debate inside the alliance. It is an active debate, I think, for most countries, in fact. That debate has been joined but it has not come to a conclusion inside NATO yet. I believe that there are various levels of cyberattack, as you point out, and at some point they become more akin to a kinetic attack than others.

One complicating thing I think we have seen in the recent past is the activity of non-state cyber actors in this same time frame as states are contemplating cyber defense. So I believe that attribution is going to continue to be one of the most important parts of any cyber policy.

Senator GILLIBRAND. With regard to Russia's cyber threats specifically to our Forces in Europe and our allies in NATO, what steps are you taking and will take, if confirmed, to ensure that our IT networks, communication channels, and weapon systems and platforms are secure and able to perform as intended in the event of a broader conflict?

General CAVOLI. Yes, ma'am. In my current role as the Commander of United States Army Europe and Africa I am responsible to provide the basic, secure backbone for EUCOM's communications, so I work with DISA and with Army Cyber and network command to do so. We have a regional cyber center at Wiesbaden. It does maintain overview of one of our networks, and I work closely with our network command to maintain defense of the others. This is something I get briefed on literally every week. I am satisfied with the level we have right now. We have to work on it constantly, though, and we do work on it constantly.

In a broader sense, Senator, if I am confirmed into the next job, the alliance is working in this direction also. So there is a NATO

Cyber Center of Excellence. We are initiating the conversations necessary to have collective policy and strategy on network defense, but I believe much more needs to be done. I look forward to looking into it and getting back to you on that.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. Last week, Finland's Parliament overwhelmingly voted to join NATO following applications by both Finland and Sweden to join the alliance. Given the extensive border that Finland shares with Russia and Finland's advance military capabilities can you describe how we can effectively integrate these two countries into the NATO umbrella?

General CAVOLI. Sure, Senator. So first of all we already practice that in the ground domain all the time, and I can speak, I think, for Cobra Harrigan and Bob Burke at United States Air Force Europe and Naval Forces Europe as well. They do this all the time in the air and maritime domains. We exercise with Finland. I have got soldiers there I believe right now. I just brought a couple of Stryker companies back out of there. We have got a parachute battalion going up there later this summer. We exercise frequently with Sweden to include on high-end air and missile defense things.

I think it will be quite easy for us to integrate them quickly. We have been integrating them in our large-scale exercises as well as our operations abroad for some years now.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Turkey obviously has expressed hesitation about admitting Finland and Sweden. How will you approach engaging your defense officials in Turkey to discuss how the addition of Finland and Sweden will strengthen the NATO alliance?

General CAVOLI. Ma'am, clearly the core of the matter is going to be a diplomatic and a policy decision on all nations' parts, so I would like to stay away from that for a moment. But at a military level we retain robust military-to-military relations with our Turkish allies, and we have done so for the past years that I have been associated with working in Europe. We conduct exercises with them, consultations with them, and the like.

Senator GILLIBRAND. But not with regard to this objection that Turkey has just articulated.

General CAVOLI. Ma'am, specifically with regard to that, that has not been a subject inside the military-to-military dialogue, at least my military-to-military dialogue with the chief of their army.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you. My time has expired. I am going to submit an additional question to the record about alignment and work with SPACECOM.

General CAVOLI. I look forward to it, ma'am.

Senator GILLIBRAND. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.

Senator Rounds, please.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, General Cavoli. First of all, thank you for your continued service to our Nation and thank you to your family for their support. I would also like to thank you for taking the time to meet with me earlier this week. You are incredibly qualified for this assignment, and I do intend to support your nomination.

General, the fiscal year 2023 budget request increases funding for the European Deterrence Initiative by about \$400 million. This initiative has been pivotal in our ability to respond as quickly as

we did in Ukraine. From your experience, can you speak to the importance of this initiative, and if confirmed, what changes would you make?

General CAVOLI. Thank you, Senator. So the European Deterrence Initiative has not just been important. It has kind of been like oxygen to us for several years now. It is the thing that allows us to do all the exercising, to build all of the infrastructure, to pre-position all of the equipment that we have been using and that you have seen us use in response to this crisis.

So since my first tour as a general officer in Europe, when the original ERI was authorized and appropriated, we have been benefitting from it. We have slowly but surely used it to put infrastructure into place where we are pre-positioning equipment, and now we exercise that equipment at a large scale with the funding that this Committee authorizes. It is absolutely vital to what we have been doing, and I think we see the benefits of it in our rapid ability to react in the past couple of months, Senator.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir. General, in your answers to the advanced policy questions you mentioned that the Joint Force must be prepared to counter threats posed by rapid technological advancements such as advanced chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear, or CBRN, threats, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, directed energy, and hypersonics. Quite a list.

Based on your experience in the EUCOM AOR, what developments are you seeing regarding those threats, particularly those pertaining to quantum computer and artificial intelligence?

General CAVOLI. Thank you for the question. The ability rapidly to process the vast amounts of information that are available now really drives our ability to discern intentions as well as to find ways to strike it. So there are a few efforts that the U.S. side has been working on with regard to artificial intelligence. We are using a couple of those in Europe right now during this crisis. They are proving very, very useful. They help us keep track of where everybody is and what they are doing, and if I could take into a classified setting with you sometime, Senator, I would be delighted to go into more detail. But it is paying big dividends for us already.

However, we are aware that our adversaries are working on the same things, so it is all the more imperative for us to continue to develop this beneficial technology.

Senator ROUNDS. Basically what you are saying is they are a pacing threat with regard to those new capabilities.

General CAVOLI. Sir, I think the NDS has it right in that regard, especially China is a pacing threat with regard to those capabilities.

Senator ROUNDS. What lessons in CBRN response have been learned from the DCRF that should be applied to the overall Joint Force?

General CAVOLI. Sir, the CBRN posture that we have across the Joint Force is being relooked right now at the departmental level as well as at the service levels, in conjunction with the combatant commands. I have had my chance to review the Army parts of it. We are updating it, first of all, with regard to what we understand the emergence of the threat to be, but secondly, with regard to our own posture and our own technologies to deal with a treat.

As you know, for many years in Afghanistan and Iraq that was not a primary concern. As we move back into contemplating large-scale operations we find it necessary to revisit that.

Senator ROUNDS. General, the SACEUR has worldwide responsibilities with respect to the planning and operation of NATO operations, NATO military operations. If confirmed, how would you view your role as the SACEUR with respect to China?

General CAVOLI. Sir, China is present in Europe, and China is going to present increasing security challenges inside Europe. My job primarily will be to make sure that our policymakers have military options insofar as they need them or choose to employ them.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, sir. My time has expired.

General CAVOLI. Thank you, Senator.

Senator ROUNDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.

Senator Warren, please.

Senator WARREN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General Cavoli, it is good to see you again. Congratulations on your nomination.

General CAVOLI. Thank you, ma'am.

Senator WARREN. Your deep expertise in European affairs makes you particularly qualified to serve in this role at this critical time. Now it is clear that Vladimir Putin never anticipated that his illegal invasion of Ukraine would unite so many countries around the world. This Committee primarily focuses on our military power, but this crisis has made clear how important it is to invest in all of our tools of influence to advance U.S. interests. Prioritizing diplomacy in coordination with our allies has obviously paid huge dividends.

Diplomatic success, however, does not happen overnight. This is the result of long, time-consuming investments. So let me start by asking, General Cavoli, do you think it is important for the United States to provide robust funding for the State Department and USAID?

General CAVOLI. I do, Senator.

Senator WARREN. Would you like to just say an extra word about that?

General CAVOLI. Absolutely. You know, so the United States, like many nations, attempts to lead with diplomacy. As you noted, for diplomacy to be effective it cannot happen at the moment it is needed. It has to be developed over years of relationship building, and that requires resources and funding.

I benefit, as an officer, when our diplomacy is robust. I benefit, as an officer, and I think we benefit as a Nation, when our diplomats are armed the way they need to be to conduct the business of the Nation.

Senator WARREN. Good. I appreciate that.

Climate change is another major security challenge that we need to work harder on. The most recent annual threat assessment found, and I want to quote it, "Climate change will increasingly exacerbate risks to U.S. national security interests," unquote. The world's dependence on fossil fuels and authoritarian petroleum and petrostates significantly undermines our interests in safety. Your response to the Committee's advanced policy questions you said that climate change, quote, "will be a critical consideration in all we do."

Can you just elaborate a little bit on that, General?

General CAVOLI. Sure, Senator. First, of course, our National Defense Strategy lays that out, so, you know, it is something that we have to consider in everything we do. But, you know, right now I am responsible for Army activities in Africa. Africa suffers from desertification. That desertification leads to intense competition for resources. Name your location, you can find it.

The grain shortage that we were discussing earlier is exacerbated by an ongoing drought in India. All of this is having an impact inside my AOR, in Africa, which will spill out possibly into other areas.

So yes, it is something I take thoughtfully and seriously. If we look at my European AOR in my current job, of course the opening of seaways in the Arctic, which has been increasing and accelerating in recent years, is changing the military geography of the High North, which is something that NATO and USEUCOM are both dealing with as well right now.

Senator WARREN. Well, I appreciate your thoughtful response here. This is a crisis that often gets overlooked when we are talking about national security, and as you rightly point out, it is deeply threatening to all of us.

There is one last area that I would like to talk about. Over the past few months, Congress has provided tens of billions of dollars in emergency spending to support the Department's response to Russia's invasion. I support that spending, but I am very concerned about the risks of waste without proper oversight.

DoD owes this Committee a backlog of several years of reports on the future years defense plan for the European Deterrence Initiative. I have spoken to both your predecessor and DoD about the importance of providing these reports. A letter I received from the Comptroller last week claims that yet another component of DoD will provide the report.

Now I am getting sick of the runaround here. DoD has not complied with the law. Not having these reports hurts oversight and planning for your command.

So General Cavoli, I understand that this is not your primary responsibility, but you will be the senior military leader overseeing this spending. So will you make sure that this Committee receives the reports that are required by law and that we will receive them this year?

General CAVOLI. I will continue to submit all the data that I am required to, ma'am. We have done that in the past, and I commit to doing that.

Senator WARREN. I appreciate that and I will hold you to that. You know, it is very likely that you and the President will come to us again with additional supplemental requests. If you want Congress to continue to approve tens of billions of dollars you need to show us how you are making sure that that money is spent responsibly.

General CAVOLI. Senator, if I could just make a comment. It is not lost on me how much money we are talking about here, and I, and we, owe it to the American taxpayer to have a thoughtful application of those funds and a full accounting of them.

Senator WARREN. I appreciate it and I look forward to the reporting.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Warren.

Senator Tillis, please.

Senator TILLIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you for the time that you spent with Senator Shaheen and I a week or so ago, and congratulations on your nomination and I look forward to supporting it, and thanks to your family.

I want to get a little bit back. You covered the landscape on Finland, I think, very well, and you also discussed Sweden. But you mentioned that increased investment that Sweden intends to make in their military, and we know that we want them to get up to the 2 percent threshold.

Can you give me some insight into the specific actions they are taking that would give you confidence that they would be there by 2028?

General CAVOLI. Yesh, well they have expressed the intention to do so. In my conversations with my colleague, Karl Engelbrektson, Major General Engelbrektson, the Chief of the Swedish Army, he is confident. He believes that they are going to get there on schedule—

Senator TILLIS. What is the—

General CAVOLI.—to 2024.

Senator TILLIS.—if you know, what would that look like? I have met with Swedish officials almost every week for the past month, and one of the comments that they made is they fully intend to do it, but they also have to be able to absorb the investment. So with respect to the added investment, what is that likely to look like in terms of ground, naval, air forces?

General CAVOLI. So Karl adopted a motto of 3–2–1, the key part of which is to go up to three brigades, which is adding an additional brigade. That is a big chunk of it right there, I believe. The second part of it is to add high-end capabilities. So the purchase of Patriot, which my command is helping them to integrate into their units right now. They bought their first battalion. It has been delivered in the past year here, and those are purchases very quickly that help us lift defense spending.

So I think the combination of expanding the size of the army and raising the technology of a couple of the things like the air and missile defense will, in the ground domain, help.

Sir, I cannot speak quite as in detail about how they will use the additional or how they will absorb the additional funding in the air and maritime domains or other domains.

Senator TILLIS. Okay. To the extent you can, though, can you talk a little bit about the advantage that Sweden brings in terms of naval presence in the Black Sea?

General CAVOLI. Sir, so Sweden has ports on the Baltic Sea and has naval forces that routinely sail in the Baltic Sea. As you know, the Gotland is sometimes referred to as the unsinkable aircraft carrier. So I think they will bring an enormous amount of surface capability to us in the Baltic Sea. They also have underwater capabilities that will help us as well.

Senator TILLIS. The funding that we approved and that I voted for, the supplemental funding for Ukraine, do you think that was a wise decision for us to send that resource to Ukraine?

General CAVOLI. Senator, I think we will put that to good use. We will put that to good use.

Senator TILLIS. Can you also speak a bit about how the food assistance and, you know, the broader scope of the bill focusing on the threat to food sources in North Africa, what would happen if we do not pay attention to that in terms of stability in areas that ISIS, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram would love to see destabilized?

General CAVOLI. Sure. Absolutely, Senator. So the groups that you just named feed on weak governance and food insecurity and corruption and poverty, just like groups like to do elsewhere in the world. Those groups have been doing fairly well in the past couple of years. They have made gains in the southwestern Sahel that we really need to keep an eye on and that our European allies need to help with. A food shortage now would just exacerbate the situation down there, Senator.

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. The last thing, Senator Shaheen and I visited Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Kosovo. I got the sense, in speaking with the leaders of those countries, that they felt like they have been kind of on the back burner in terms of our focus. What more do you think we need to do in NATO, if any, to really increase our presence and demonstrate that we are very concerned with that part of the world?

General CAVOLI. Sir, I think the first thing we can do is exercise on an increasing basis down there. As you know, the U.S. Army Europe DEFENDER exercise series focused on the Baltics last year. It had a salutary effect immediately. I could see that. We were warmly welcomed everywhere we were, and so I think as a beginning, as a first step, we need to continue that.

Senator TILLIS. Thank you. I look forward to supporting your nomination.

General CAVOLI. Thank you, Senator.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Tillis.

Senator King, please.

Senator KING. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, welcome to the Committee. Congratulations on your appointment.

General CAVOLI. Thank you.

Senator KING. I believe one of the most important books written in the 20th century was *The Guns of August*, and as you know the thesis of the book was that we stumbled into World War I by miscalculation, mistake, misunderstanding, and a complicated web of treaties in Europe that led to a world war that no one anticipated, the depth of which certainly no one wanted.

How do we communicate to the Russians the essential defensive nature of NATO? My concern is that what we view as deterrence and reassurance they could view as provocation, particularly in light of the fact that we are dealing with a country which is historically paranoid about the West. Vladimir Putin clearly thinks that there is a danger of an invasion by NATO.

Talk to me about how we diminish this substantial risk of a miscalculation. Vladimir Putin just made some huge miscalculations in Ukraine. What if he makes a similar miscalculation about what we

are doing in Poland or Finland or Sweden or other NATO countries? Give me some thoughts on the danger of a mistake triggering a worldwide conflagration.

General CAVOLI. Senator, the danger of a mistake or a miscalculation looms very high in our consciousness every day in USEUCOM, and we have a process by which we review every operation, activity, or investment that we are conducting in order to gauge how it will be viewed by our adversaries, and by Russia, in particular, and then whether or not we should proceed with it given what our various goals are at that point.

Yeah, it is a delicate balance, Senator, and it is a delicate balance because one must not shy away from activity that we need to do to stay strong and to make sure we outline our priorities of what we will defend. But it is also necessary not to overdo that and create a problem where a problem was not.

So we work very, very hard on that, Senator, and clearly we have not hit that point yet.

Senator KING. Well, I want to be clear. I support the European Reassurance Initiative. I support what we have done in Ukraine and what we are doing in Poland and Eastern Europe and bringing new countries into NATO. I think the important thing here, and perhaps we talked about diplomacy a little earlier, is to communicate that this is defensive. I just think that is an important point.

I guess my follow-up question is, do you have, as Supreme Commander of NATO, do you have a communication link with your counterpart in Russia in order to deescalate not a conflict but a potential conflict?

General CAVOLI. So to continue with the last point, sir, first, if I may, transparency, that communication, is vital. So in my current position when we conduct our large-scale exercises, such as DEFENDER, we go to the OSCE. I send officers to the OSCE. They outline the entire exercise, the objectives, the major movements, and things like that. So in addition to my previous answer I should add transparency, which I think we work very hard on.

Senator KING. Transparency to the Russians.

General CAVOLI. To the Russians and to everybody. Yeah, absolutely, sir. We are not hiding anything with these efforts.

Senator KING. Do you have a red phone?

General CAVOLI. The Supreme Allied Commander has a venue of communication with his counterpart in the Russian Federation.

Senator KING. I am sorry. You said you do have communication?

General CAVOLI. The Supreme Allied Commander has that.

Senator KING. Thank you. That is reassuring.

A short question. All of us are supportive of the arms and the support that we have been giving to the Ukrainians, both humanitarian and military. Looking beyond the current conflict, however, there will be a huge amount of arms in this relatively small country. We spent 30 or 40 years chasing MANPADS that we gave to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Is there any oversight or accountability of where all these weapons are and where they might be? It worries me that not the Ukrainians but that they could fall into the hands of terrorists or other malefactors in the region.

General CAVOLI. Senator, establishing accountability over where all of that equipment is, is a vital task for us. It is challenging

right now, of course, because we are not in the country. But as the conflict winds down or concludes that will be one of the things that I have to get at, especially if I am confirmed into the next position. I share your concern on it.

Senator KING. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator King.

Senator Sullivan, please.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General, thank you and your family.

I very much appreciated our discussion yesterday. I believe you are exceptionally well qualified for this position. I would like you to brag a little bit, if you do not mind. Can you just let the Committee and the American people know some of your background and experiences and education as it relates to Russia?

General CAVOLI. Asking me to brag is the hardest question you could ask me, Senator.

Senator SULLIVAN. Go ahead. We want you to brag. I want you to brag. Very impressive. Russia focus, education.

General CAVOLI. Sure. I graduated from Princeton in 1987, where I did not look at Russia. I graduated with a degree in biology. I entered the Army. I immediately was stationed in Italy with a parachute infantry battalion. In that role we studied Russia closely because that was our main opponent during the end of the Cold War.

As I came out of company command, sir, I became a Russian Foreign Area Officer. My wife and I studied Russian together at the Defense Language Institute for a year. Then I went to—

Senator SULLIVAN. So you speak Russian?

General CAVOLI. I do. Yes, I do.

Senator SULLIVAN. You have studied Russian military history, Russian strategy—

General CAVOLI. I also got a degree from Yale University in Russian and European studies.

Senator SULLIVAN. You have had billets that have solely focused on Russia.

General CAVOLI. I have lived in Moscow for months at a time. I have traveled all over the former Soviet space. I have had fellowships at the George Marshall Center.

Senator SULLIVAN. In Germany?

General CAVOLI. In Germany. I was on the Russia desk for the Joint Staff.

Senator SULLIVAN. Russia desk for the Joint Staff?

General CAVOLI. I was, sir.

Senator SULLIVAN. So that is every day getting up, focusing on Russia, the challenges?

General CAVOLI. Absolutely, Senator.

Senator SULLIVAN. So I would say you are Vladimir Putin's worst nightmare and could not be more qualified than probably any other member of the military. So again, I want to thank you for your service.

Can you clearly define—succinctly, because I have a bunch of questions—our top strategic goals in Ukraine?

General CAVOLI. Yes, Senator. We want Ukraine to emerge from this conflict independent and free. We want the NATO alliance to

be unified and as strong as ever, and we want to do these things without engaging in a war with Russia.

Senator SULLIVAN. Thank you. You know, there is a lot of discussion, you have already said, about NATO being energized, unified. I am a huge supporter of NATO. I was actually at NATO headquarters right after the invasion in February. I was a big supporter of EDI. I am a supporter of the Finland, Sweden accessions. I support a robust military. I am disappointed that the President once again put forward a budget that cuts defense spending in real dollars. I supported U.S. economic and military aid, since February, \$54 billion.

But I do want to say here, and hopefully some of our NATO allies are watching this hearing, there is grumbling on there. My constituents in Alaska are probably the most pro-military constituents, Americans in the country. But the grumbling relates to this question. Why is the United States spending more to defend Europe than Europe is spending? By that I mean, dating back to George W. Bush, President Obama, President Trump, President Biden, all of have put forward this goal of 2 percent of defense spending as a percentage of GDP, which was agreed upon in the 2014 Wales summit by all members. Yet right now we are down to 8 members out of 30—that is actually down from 10 last year—who have met that goal. Very wealthy countries—Sweden, Canada, Germany, France have not met that goal. Many of them are not even close to meeting that goal.

What can we do? Well, isn't it now or never that the NATO countries should meet this goal? I do not believe this is a sustainable situation. We are doing all we can. I fully support it. But my goodness, the American people are looking and saying, "Where is everybody else?" How come these countries cannot meet this goal that they have been agreeing to for decades?

What is your sense on this? Do we have an opportunity here? I am working on legislation that would say within 5 years if NATO countries do not meet their 2 percent goal then Congress will not appropriate dollars for training and deployments to those particular countries. What do you think about something like that, and if you are confirmed, will you be very focused on assuring that these countries understand that we are a democracy too, and at a certain point the American people are going to say, "Enough." Europe has to defend Europe as much as America has to defend Europe. What do you think of all those issues?

General CAVOLI. Senator, if I am confirmed I will work on burden-sharing as hard as I can. I am a believer in the Wales pledge. I am a believer not just in the 2 percent but on the 20 and 80 part of the rule, which says that nations should spend at least 20 percent on modernization and acquisition. I am gratified right now that we hear so many positive movements in the alliance.

Senator SULLIVAN. Yeah. Germany announcement was great.

General CAVOLI. It is really a great moment. If I am confirmed, a big part of my job will be to help our diplomats and the inter-agency of the United States to convert all of those good intentions into facts.

Senator SULLIVAN. What about legislation I am working on right now?

General CAVOLI. Sir, if you do not mind I would rather not comment on legislation directly, if you do not mind, sir.

Senator SULLIVAN. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan.

Senator Hirono, please.

Senator HIRONO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome, General. Thank you for your continuing service.

In determining fitness to serve of nominees who come before any of the committees on which I sit I ask the following two initial questions.

Since you became a legal adult have you ever made unwanted requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical harassment or assault of a sexual nature?

General CAVOLI. No, Senator.

Senator HIRONO. Have you ever faced discipline or entered into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?

General CAVOLI. No, ma'am.

Senator HIRONO. General, talking about burden-sharing, what countries are welcoming or taking in the millions of refugees from Ukraine?

General CAVOLI. Senator, that is an amazing story and a heartwarming one. As you know, early on my command was directed to prepare for assistance for Americans coming out but also we anticipated needing to help with a large number of refugees we anticipated. We correctly anticipated about 6 million refugees coming into Europe. It was unnecessary. The pp of Poland, Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia have opened their doors and opened their hearts to Ukrainian refugees.

In fact, I have some local national employees in Poland, three of them, who have Ukrainian families in their homes right now. It has been a remarkable thing to see the societies mobilize to assist Ukrainians.

Senator HIRONO. I think it is an amazing and heartwarming story. So even as we talk about commitment, monetary commitment to NATO, there are many other ways that our European allies are stepping up regarding what is happening in Ukraine, and I think it is important to remember that.

I am glad that Senator Sullivan asked you to talk about your background because it is indeed impressive, and I think you are highly, highly qualified for this position that we are considering you for. I feel like asking you to answer some questions in Russian, but that is okay. I think it is a really difficult language to learn, and I commend you for that kind of focus.

On Sunday, a delegation of United States diplomats is set to travel to The Hague for talking with allies, and I am quoting the State Department, "regarding our responses to atrocities committed in Ukraine and in other conflicts and on efforts to bring the perpetrators of atrocities to justice."

If confirmed, how will you assist the International Criminal Court in holding Russia accountable for the alleged war crimes being committed in Ukraine?

General CAVOLI. Senator, if I am confirmed I will execute the U.S. policy as it stands with regard to that at any given time. Clearly this is an issue that has been considered in our policy-

making circles for some time, and I would have to follow U.S. policy.

Senator HIRONO. I think it is very important for Russia to be held accountable for the atrocities that they are committing, and, of course, this totally unprovoked war on an independent country.

Last Saturday, President Biden signed a \$40 billion package of new military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. This includes a vast array of military defensive weaponry such as anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, which the Ukrainians urgently need to protect themselves. If confirmed, how will you ensure the continuing coordination of the rapid transfer of United States resources and weapons to Ukraine and consider the country's future defense needs against Russia?

General CAVOLI. Senator, if I am confirmed I will continue to execute the way it is being executed right now, with improvements and modifications as we go forward. So currently, at a policy level, our Nation consults with other nations on what they might contribute, we consult with the Ukrainians on what they need, and then we try to bring those together. We hand that to United States European Command which coordinates the logistics of it, and then ultimately all of the United States contributions come through the hands of my forces who are located in southeastern Poland, and they move it into the right locations. So I think we will continue to do it that way.

I think the accounting of all of this is going to be of great importance, Senator. I think understanding where everything is and being able to account for the money that has been provided will be a very important part, if I am confirmed.

Senator HIRONO. Yes. As Senator Warren also mentioned, there is going to be so much money that will be needed to help Ukraine in the aftermath that yes, we do need to make sure that this money is going where it is supposed to go for the purposes for which we are appropriating the funds.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have some other questions that I will submit for the record.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Hirono.

Senator Hawley, please.

Senator HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, good to see you again. I enjoyed our conversation the other day, and congratulations on your nomination.

Let me start with NATO, which is much the topic of conversation this morning. Of course, we may soon be asked to consider and vote on NATO expansion. You and I talked about this a little bit when we met.

Let's start with the Wales pledge. You are familiar, of course, with the Wales pledge. You have talked about it, I know, today. Our current ambassador to NATO, Julie Smith, prior to her confirmation, sent me a letter in which she said, for the record, that it was her opinion that NATO allies should spend more than 2 percent of GDP on defense, in other words, to go beyond the Wales pledge. The Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs said the same. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander also said the same to me, that allies should go beyond the Wales pledge.

So let me just ask you. In your personal opinion now, is it time for NATO allies to move beyond the Wales pledge and increase defense spending above 2 percent?

General CAVOLI. Senator, I really liked the Ambassador's formulation on that. She has been saying 2 percent is a floor, not a ceiling, and I agree with that. I know all of the land forces chiefs in NATO. Each one of them has a list of requirements. The requirements would all take more than 2 percent of GDP. So I am advocate of spending more than 2 percent, at least 2 percent. So I agree, yeah.

Senator HAWLEY. Good. Good. Thank you.

When we talked last week you told me that you did not expect Finland's and Sweden's admission to NATO to result in United States Force requirements in Europe. I have seen since then reports that Sweden is requesting a greater United States naval presence in the Baltic Sea. I am also seeing reports the Pentagon plans to keep 100,000-plus troops in Europe for the foreseeable future.

I just wanted to revisit this topic that you and I discussed in light of those reports. I mean, given this, how confident are you that Finland's and Sweden's accession to NATO would not result in United States Forces doing more in Europe than we are currently obligated to under our current NATO commitment?

General CAVOLI. So the 100,000 forces in Europe that are being extended, that is part of the surge that we performed over the last few weeks, Senator, and was not related to the question of Finland and Sweden joining NATO.

I remain of the opinion, as I told you in our office call, that at least in the ground domain that this is not going to be a requirement for large, additional forces, or additional forces. I think exercises and occasional presence, like we do with any ally, will increase.

Senator HAWLEY. Different basing requirements, do you think? I mean, will this necessitate a shift in posture by our forces or NATO forces?

General CAVOLI. I do not know right now, and I would point out that the word "basing" carries with it an enormous number of other implications that I would have to consider deeply before I came back to you with a firm response on basing.

Senator HAWLEY. Well, since you mentioned coming back, if you are confirmed, would you commit to providing the Committee with a full account of the implications of Finland's and Sweden's potential accession to NATO, the implications for United States Forces in Europe should they accede to NATO, so that we can consider that as part of any debate we might soon have in this chamber over NATO expansion?

General CAVOLI. Senator, I would be happy to do that if I am confirmed.

Senator HAWLEY. Great. Thank you. Still on this general topic, burden-sharing, you and I talked about this, with our NATO allies and then vis-&-vis what we need to do in the Asia Pacific, with regard to China. We are going to have to do a lot more burden-sharing with our NATO allies, is my view, in Europe, if we are going to focus as we need to on PACOM.

Let me just put it to you this way. Do you think our European allies should assume primary responsibility for conventional deterrence in Europe with us, of course, the United States, providing extended nuclear deterrence and more select conventional capabilities, but Europe really focusing on everything else as we shift scarce resources to China? What do you think about that?

General CAVOLI. Senator, I think it is imperative as we look at the emergence of the threat of China for us to find ways to be able to handle the acute threat of Russia in a collective fashion with the alliance that allows us to do that. There are a number of different ways that could play out. Almost all of those ways include increased burden-sharing on the part of the alliance—on the part of other members of the alliance, I should say. But they also depend on what the security situation in Europe is like at the end of this conflict.

So really, this conflict and the way it comes out is going to drive a lot of my answer to your question. It is just premature for me to talk about it.

Senator HAWLEY. Here is my last question, and my time has expired so I will ask it and I will let you answer and yield. What are some of the capabilities that we currently provide in Europe that you think European allies could feasibly contribute instead, going forward?

General CAVOLI. Sir, some of the things we provide are heavy equipment and armor. Our allies could provide some of that. In many cases it should be modernized first or larger quantities. We provide long-range fires and logistics. We would encourage the development of those capabilities across the alliance, and then probably most importantly, increased air and missile defense across the alliance would be welcome contributions in terms of capability.

Thank you, Senator.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Hawley.

Senator Kaine, please. Senator Kelly. I am sorry. Excuse me.

Senator KELLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to follow up on Senator Hawley's line of questioning here, General, and great to see you again and thank you for your willingness to continue to serve our Nation.

EUCOM obviously present some unique and difficult challenges right now, and it is clear that the conflict in Ukraine is going to have a lasting impact on the future of European security. That is why I think it is important to continue to look ahead, and I appreciate the discussion we had in my office last week. We talked a little bit about the Ukrainian military needs looking forward, from equipment to training to structural reforms. It is clear that these things are going to take some time.

I feel that if we want to deter further aggression beyond this conflict, from Putin or somebody else like him in the future, we need to start thinking about this right now. As we think about the future of the Ukrainian Air Force I think, you know, a centerpiece is not going to be the MIG-29. You know, it needs to be a U.S.-build or Western fighter or something like the F-16 might be a good option here.

Over the last few years we have successfully sold F-16s to some of our partners in the Middle East, and in the state of Arizona the

162nd Air National Guard wing has extensive experience training foreign pilots. They have been doing this for years, and that is pretty much all they do. They are currently helping Slovakia, as an example, transition from obsolete and, as we have seen, often ineffective Soviet aircraft like the MIG-29 to the F-16.

So General, can you provide your thoughts on how the United States and our allies can help modernize Ukraine's military to deter future aggression, and specifically with looking towards their Air Force.

General CAVOLI. Thanks, Senator. Yes. First of all, as with a previous question, I think that Ukraine's military requirements at the end of this conflict are going to depend largely on what the shape of the security landscape is at the conclusion of the conflict and what threat they face and how much threat they face.

So the second thing I would say is that the aid we have been giving them is very important, and it is very important to what they are doing, but it is going to require some rationalization on the far side, I would say. There will probably need to be some homogenization of fleets, for example. It is hard to have five or six different types of tanks or Howitzer, Senator. So I think that will be something that is very important to do right away.

With regard to the air domain, I think that Ukraine is going to have to sit down with us, examine the security situation they have, and sketch out a strategy for a way ahead. I cannot say what it would look like now, but I do look, if I am confirmed, to coming back and to talking to you about it in the future, because I think it is a critical question for them.

Senator KELLY. Yeah, I appreciate that. There are going to be a lot of tough decisions. Certainly the agreement, whatever this final, you know, depending on how this concludes, is going to play a big role in what the security cooperation looks like.

General CAVOLI. It will, yes.

Senator KELLY. What the reforming of their military looks like here in future years.

Another issue we discussed was the possibility of permanently basing more United States troops in Eastern Europe, an issue that many of us have advocated for. I understand there are multiple factors to consider when making this sort of decision. So, General, what are your thoughts on the possibility of permanently stationing United States Forces in Eastern Europe, and specifically, where would you right now—you know, where are you starting to think about where they could go, and obviously, the reason is to deter future Russian aggression here.

General CAVOLI. Senator, so as we float additional forces in over the last few months, and as NATO has repostured NATO forces, multinational forces, over the past couple of months, clearly what has been happening is the center of the NATO force has been shifting eastward. Depending on the outcome of the conflict we may need to continue that for some time. We will have to see at the end of the conflict.

With regard to how those guys are sourced, how are those soldiers sourced—permanently, rotational, unaccompanied tours—boy, so many things go into that, Senator. A lot of the questions are service equities. A lot of the questions are policy matters, and I will

have a voice in that, I am sure, if I am confirmed, but there will probably be a lot of other considerations that go into that.

Senator KELLY. I was recently in Poland and Germany and I think, you know, especially with the Poles it is going to be an important conversation to have. They are very interested in a stronger alliance and a possibility of a commitment to United States Forces in Poland.

General CAVOLI. We discuss it together frequently, sir, yeah.

Senator KELLY. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Kelly.

Senator Peters, please.

Senator PETERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cavoli, welcome to the Committee. Thank you for your service. I have a number of questions related to Ukraine but they have been asked, and I do not want to ask you to keep repeating answers to questions related to that. So I have a few other questions in some outside areas I would like to ask you in this time.

General, the United States Special Operations Command Europe announced the basing of a new special operations headquarters in Albania just weeks prior to the Russian invasion. My question for you, sir, is in conjunction with SOCOM's efforts how do you see NATO and EUCOM complementing this increased partnership with what is really a critical ally in a very challenging part of Europe?

General CAVOLI. Senator, so last year we conducted a large portion of the DEFENDER large-scale exercise in Albania. It was a United States Army Europe exercise but it was augmented, and critically augmented, by the United States Navy and Naval Forces Europe and Air Forces Europe as well. It had a huge effect, a huge positive effect. On the back of that we have increased our activities with our Albanian allies fairly significantly. SOCEUR's addition of a base down there is an example of that.

If I am confirmed as the EUCOM Commander I will continue to pay close attention to the levels of our presence and the amount of interaction we have with our allies and our partners in the Balkans. I think it is critically important.

Senator PETERS. Great. That is great to hear. Great to hear. General, to stay with the theme of partnerships, I am proud to represent the Michigan National Guard state partnerships in Latvia as well as Liberia, two programs that I expect you know well given your current position as Commander of the United States Army both in Europe and in Africa.

Every commander I have talked to, including General Wolters, has praised the State Partnership Program. My question for you is, if confirmed as the Commander of the most powerful alliance in the world, how will you leverage the National Guard Bureau's programs to achieve your objectives?

General CAVOLI. Senator, in my current role we use and leverage the State Partnership Programs every day, and if I am confirmed you will be able to add me to the list of combatant commanders who love the State Partnership Program. I have a two-star deputy who is from the National Guard, and he liaises constantly with the TAGs who have state partnerships in our area. It is absolutely invaluable the depth of the relationships they have. The continuity

of relationships they have has all been very, very important to us, in crises as well as in peace time.

So it is an extremely valuable program. If I am confirmed as the EUCOM Commander I look forward to adding the Air Guard portion of that to my portfolio.

Senator PETERS. That is great. Great to hear, General. General Cavoli, on Sunday the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan announced a border commission as a possible step forward towards a peace plan in Nagorno-Karabakh. While Russia certainly has made it very clear to the entire world that its words and its commitments cannot be trusted, as a result of their horrific actions that we are seeing in Ukraine right now, but having said that they did play a role in the discussion in the Nagorno-Karabakh region.

So my question for you is, if confirmed, how do you see EUCON and NATO influencing conditions to enable peace in the Nagorno-Karabakh region, given Russia's involvement in that area?

General CAVOLI. Yes, Senator, that is a prickly question. In the caucuses, in general, I have spent quite a bit of time down there and studied it, and dealt with our partners down there. Almost every issue has several different angles on it. The Russian angle is always one of the ones that needs to be considered. In any given proposal or any given situation, if I am confirmed, I would sit down and I would examine it very closely from all angles I could before coming up with my best recommendation. I recognize how delicate that area is and how many external interests are at play.

Senator PETERS. Absolutely, and while NATO enlargement increases the collective capacity of our defensive alliance it also increases some of the complexities behind maintaining a unified front, as I am sure you are well aware. A significant example can be seen by Turkey's concerns regarding Finland and Sweden's accession into the alliance.

So my question for you, sir, if confirmed, you will serve as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander. How do you see you fostering an environment that continues to promote unity and cohesion among very unique and sometimes very different member nations?

General CAVOLI. Senator, I think in terms of fostering the right climate the first step is to remember that the military arm of NATO is only one part of NATO. You know, it is a military organization under collective civilian control.

The second thing I would say is always to remember that each of those service chiefs represents a sovereign nation's army or a sovereign nation's military, and to treat them with the respect accordingly.

Then finally, to consult with them, routinely, and to build consensus as I can.

Senator PETERS. Great. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

General CAVOLI. Thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you, Senator Peters.

Senator Scott, please.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Chair Reed. General, thank you for being here. Thank you for your service.

General CAVOLI. Hello, Senator.

Senator SCOTT. Thank you the visit we had.

As we talked, just recently I went to Europe and visited with American troops in Germany and Lithuania. I went to Germany, Poland, and Lithuania. Clearly I was impressed with what our troops are willing to do, and also from the conversation I had I was impressed with our Eastern European allies, what they are doing. They clearly see the threat, and it is important to them. But it is clear they need our support. They cannot do this on their own.

There is no nation like the United States. There is no military that is like ours. So I think it is clear that the security of not only Europe but the security interest of our country is that we have got to stop these tyrants, like Xi and Putin and others, from trying to control the world.

It does not appear that the Biden administration did everything they could to deter Putin because they clearly invaded. It seems like we did the same thing. Obama did the same thing back in 2014, and so it has put us in a tough position.

Also, it does not appear that we are doing enough to deter Communist China, because they are continuing to do threats against Taiwan. I mean, none of us want to send men and women to fight, but we are going to end up that way if we do not stop these guys.

So in your professional judgment, given your many years of military service, do you believe the United States can deter enemy regimes like Russia and China and Iran if we do not demonstrate even greater military capabilities and a very united political will?

General CAVOLI. Senator, I believe that all instruments of national power are necessary parts of deterrence, of an integrated deterrence posture. That includes the military. It includes the diplomatic, the information, the economic. I agree that political will is a necessary thing to demonstrate in order to achieve deterrence.

Senator SCOTT. What does the European Command need more to try to deter Putin and make sure he does not win in Ukraine and also he does not ever invade a NATO ally?

General CAVOLI. Yes, sir. So I think the first thing, and the most important thing, that the European Command needs to continue to deter is continued unity of the alliance, continued political will of the alliance, which we are seeing in abundance right now. We need to keep that going. I think that is the first step.

The second step is we need to continue support of the Armed Services to provide us with the capabilities that we need. So those are the two things I think we have there.

Senator SCOTT. Do you think it makes sense to reposition some of our troops further to the east rather than have so much of it concentrated in Germany?

General CAVOLI. Sir, as you know, in response to this crisis we have done exactly that. The alliance has repositioned four battle groups forward into southeastern Europe, and many nations have bilaterally reinforced their forces. For example, we have reinforced Latvia. The U.K. has reinforced their battle groups in Estonia. The Germans have reinforced their battle group in Lithuania, and the United States has added additional forces into Eastern Europe as well. So I think that is exactly what we have done in response to this crisis, sir.

Senator SCOTT. Even with Sweden and Finland not being part of NATO, do we have a good working relationship with their military?

General CAVOLI. Sir, we have very good working relationships with their military. We work very closely with the Swedish military on specific technical things but also in general on exercises. With the Finnish army I think I just brought two Stryker troops back from Finland, and a parachute battalion is on its way to Finland on routine exercise later this summer. Yes, sir, I think they will be very easy to integrate.

Senator SCOTT. What would you like to see in addition to what our European allies are doing in Europe to help Ukraine? Anything that they should be doing that they are not doing today?

General CAVOLI. Sir, I think we should keep doing what we are doing today. As we talk more and more with our Ukrainian colleagues we get the opportunity to understand better and better what it is they need and how they plan to use it, and so I think we are moving in the right direction.

I think the question of what happens on the far end to Ukraine, after the conflict concludes, however it will conclude I think is going to be a very important question for Europe as well as for our country.

Senator SCOTT. Thanks for your service.

General CAVOLI. Sir, thank you.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.

Senator Rosen, when she gets settled, will have the floor.

Senator ROSEN. Good morning, General. Good to see you again. Thank you, Chairman Reed, for holding this hearing. It was so nice to have a great conversation with you last week. I am glad to see you here this morning.

So I guess we will just get right into it. You know, I worry about cyber, so Russian cyber threats, and, you know, we were talking about that just last week, the importance of maintaining our collective vigilance in the face of Russian cyber threats. So earlier this month, CYBERCOM Commander General Nakasone, he did say a cyber mission force hunt forward team traveled to Ukraine in December to help them build resilience against cyberattacks, but still, unfortunately, Russia has launched destructive cyberattacks against Ukraine.

So if confirmed, how will you work with CYBERCOM to enhance the cybersecurity capacity of Ukraine, our other European partners, including through the hunt forward operations?

General CAVOLI. Thank you, Senator. If I am confirmed, I will continue to work with General Nakasone and all of his components. Of course, the 16th U.S. Air Force under Tim Haugh currently runs cyber operations for USEUCOM and do a great job.

I think General Nakasone's command has set up some great models throughout Europe in terms of defending forward, hunting forward, and doing it in collaboration with our partners or our allies. I would very much look forward to pursuing all of those with him. It is going to be of critical importance as we go forward, Senator.

Senator ROSEN. Well, that is great. You led me into my next question because what do you assess NATO's overall cyberspace capabilities in our alliances, our just readiness together to respond to any attacks?

General CAVOLI. I think the alliance has collectively begun. We have established a cyber center in Estonia, for example, and are working towards cyber strategies. But clearly, just like for all of our countries individually, there is much work to be done for the entire alliance collectively on this. If I am confirmed, it will be one of the things I turn my attention to first.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. I appreciate it, and I am going to move down a little bit to the Black Sea because Russia is maintaining a blockade of the Ukrainian coast. It now controls a number of strategy ports in the Black Sea, and Ukraine actually exports 70 percent of its cargo through there.

So last month Russia said it in the second phase of its invasion that is going to include targeting those Ukrainian southern regions, potentially neighboring Moldova. So if confirmed, what actions would you take to mitigate those threats on the Black Sea, and what more can NATO be doing? What can you be doing together to—again, we have the coast, equip us there?

General CAVOLI. Senator, first I would point out that there are three NATO nations that border the Black Sea, that have shores on the Black Sea, and each has a navy. I would also agree that the problem of exporting, or not exporting, grain from Ukraine right now is an important problem, not just for Ukraine but for the world, and because of that for us as well.

What I would do, if confirmed as SOCEUR or as Commander U.S. EUCOM is provide the military options required by our civilian leaders. Clearly the way we approach that would have to be a whole-of-government approach, which may or may not include a military component.

Senator ROSEN. So building on that, I know in this setting can you speak on anything more specifically about how we should be preparing in the Black Sea for this potential incursion, if you will?

General CAVOLI. Ma'am, I think the first thing that we have been doing is probably the most important and it is not in the Black Sea. It is establishing alternative ways to get the grain out. So Deutsche Bahn, the German national train company, has been conducting massive lifts of grain out of Ukraine right now, coming out through Poland and then up to the northern Germany ports for export. Romania has opened the port of Constanta for outflow, which goes through the Black Sea but not through a blockaded portion of the Black Sea.

So I think it is going to be a combination of modes of transportation that we are going to have to use, and I look forward to contributing to that.

Senator ROSEN. I know I only have 20 seconds left, but I just want to ask a little bit about if Sweden and Finland join NATO what kind of security guarantees do you think we should provide for NATO—excuse me, for Sweden and Finland if they do join NATO and Article 5 protections kick in?

General CAVOLI. Ma'am, obviously the security guarantees and the nature of the security guarantees that we or anybody would provide would be a policy matter. I can state that as a military matter we are in a position to back up any guarantees across the European land mass.

Senator ROSEN. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Chairman REED. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. General, thank you for your testimony today, your service to the Nation, which is a proud family tradition. I think you have demonstrated quite clearly why you should be confirmed and continue the leadership that General Wolters has shown in facing this grave crisis in Ukraine.

With that we will adjourn the hearing. Thank you, General.

General CAVOLI. Thank you, Senator.

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

[Prepared questions submitted to General Christopher G. Cavoli, USA by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES

DUTIES AND QUALIFICATIONS

Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of the Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR)?

Answer. The Commander, United States European Command (USEUCOM) issues authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out U.S. military operations and activities conducted within the command's Area of Responsibility (AOR). This AOR includes 50 independent states in Europe and the Caucasus region. In addition, the commander is responsible for the health, welfare, and security of the approximately 103,000 servicemembers and their families deployed within the AOR.

The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) carries out roles and missions assigned by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and directed by the Military Committee (MC). SACEUR commands all NATO military operations, is responsible for strategic military planning, identifies and requests the required forces to execute Alliance missions, and conducts strategic engagement and partnership building. In conjunction with Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT), SACEUR executes combined and joint training and exercises and conducts strategic analysis to identify and prioritize NATO's capability shortfalls.

Question. What background and experience do you possess that you believe qualify you to perform these duties?

Answer. I have been honored to serve our Nation and our servicemembers and their families for 35 years. During that time, I have commanded at every echelon, from platoon to my current position as the United States Army Europe and Africa commander, serving in positions of leadership in combat and peacekeeping, and on operational deployments. In addition to specializing in Russia on the Joint Staff, I have served in Europe multiple times throughout my career and worked extensively with the interagency, policy, and intelligence communities, allies, partners, and with the embassy country teams throughout the USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR).

My professional service focused on Europe is mirrored by extensive personal experience. I was born in Würzburg, Germany, where my father, an immigrant to the United States from Italy, was assigned as a United States Army officer. Over the course of my life, I have traveled and engaged extensively across Europe, and I speak French, Russian, and Italian.

Complementing what I believe is a significant foundation of professional and personal experience, I have benefited from formal military education as a Eurasia-focused Foreign Area Officer. I studied at Yale University, where I earned a Master of Arts degree in Russian and East European Studies. I further expanded my understanding and academic study of European security as a fellow at the George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, in Germany.

These experiences, my education, and my personal study have enabled me to develop a clear understanding of the manner in which the military instrument of power supports national strategic objectives in Europe; the importance of building relationships across the interagency and with regional allies and partners; and effective command and control at the combatant command level.

Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

Answer. If confirmed, I am ready to assume command and will take the necessary additional steps to refine my understanding of critical issues in Europe. I will con-

sult with the USEUCOM Headquarters, Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), interagency partners, allies, partners, and other key stakeholders to increase my knowledge of the AOR. I will also work closely with the component commanders and service chiefs to understand their efforts to organize, train, and equip the force. Although I have spent a majority of my professional life studying and immersed in the European security environment, I am a strong proponent of continuous learning.

MAJOR CHALLENGES AND PRIORITIES

Question. In your view, what are the major challenges you would confront if confirmed as the next Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

Answer. The core European security challenge is Russia. Russia's unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine heralds a new era in European security. Deterring further Russian aggression, helping Ukraine defend its sovereignty, supporting NATO's defense of the Euro Atlantic area, and countering malign Russian activities and influence remain the most significant challenges facing USEUCOM. As the current crisis has demonstrated, these complex and interrelated challenges require coordination across United States Government Agencies, Combatant Commands, allies, and partners in Europe.

Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these challenges, if confirmed?

Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment, developing the requirements for credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in Europe.

Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen, will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you identified above, would you set for your tenure as Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?

Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to counter China's growing influence and malign political and economic activity in Europe; and help our Allies and Partners deal with crisis-driven migration, violent extremism, cyber-attacks, and disinformation. We must orient on all of these challenges under the backdrop of climate change, which will be a critical consideration in all that we do, particularly in the High North.

Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus your Command's efforts on each of these priorities?

Answer. Whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, whole-of-alliance efforts are necessary to address the priorities and challenges listed above. USEUCOM's continued support to these efforts is essential. It will be essential to provide alternatives to China's One Belt-One Road projects, in order to reduce Allied and Partner nations' exposure to coercion and the vulnerability of their critical infrastructure to PRC influence. The ability for the U.S., allied, and partner nation's ability to maintain overmatch, secure sensitive supply chain processes, and protect operations and technologies from malign influence is critical for collective security and interoperability, and requires a holistic approach.

If confirmed, I look forward to fully assessing these priorities and challenges, building on USEUCOM's ongoing efforts.

TECHNOLOGY THEATER INFRASTRUCTURE.

Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in your AOR complement the efforts of civilian agencies?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure our efforts complement and support a whole-of-government approach by working closely with United States ambassadors and embassy country teams across the region to advance U.S. National security objectives with the Department of State in the lead. Close alignment of our diplomatic, economic, informational, intelligence, and humanitarian goals strengthen our efforts to secure the region.

Question. As Commander of United States Army and Africa, what are your major observations about how the security architecture of Europe has changed since Russia built up its forces around and invaded Ukraine? What implications has this had on posture requirements for the U.S. and NATO? If confirmed, what would you prioritize to address U.S. security challenges post-February 24, 2022?

Answer. In response to Russia's attack on Ukraine, the United States, working in conjunction with our Allies, has rapidly reinforced combat power in all warfighting domains across the Alliance's eastern flank. Both the United States and NATO have increased our forward force posture in order to deter further Russian aggression.

Thus far, our collective force posture, operations, activities, and investments have been sufficient to deter an attack on NATO territory. However, Russia's actions in Ukraine and the changing landscape of NATO will require us to continually assess the threat and re-calibrate credible deterrence accordingly. The outcome of the current conflict in Ukraine will be decisive in calibrating the appropriate future force posture, operations, activities, and investments.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in Europe.

NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY

Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China as the “most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing challenge for the Department” and stated that Russia poses an “acute threat,” as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. The NDS also identifies “[m]utually-beneficial Alliances and partnerships” as “an enduring strength for the United States.”

What does successful implementation of the NDS look like in the EUCOM AOR? What are the changes, trends, and/or events that would be indicators of effective NDS implementation with respect to the EUCOM AOR and the challenges posed by Russia and China?

Answer. Successful implementation of the 2022 NDS in the USEUCOM AOR requires a combat credible United States and Allied posture, appropriately re-calibrated in consideration of Russia's actions in Ukraine and the evolving security situation in Europe. The outcome of the current conflict in Ukraine will in large measure drive the appropriate future force posture, operations, activities, and investments. Primary indicators of effective implementation of the NDS would be an absence of further Russian aggression and continued wide-spread European support for the values and rules-based international order that serves as the foundation of the NATO Alliance.

Finally, if confirmed, I will seek opportunities to fill capability gaps and create opportunities for the Joint Force through cooperation with Allies and Partners. Moreover, I will aim to align operations, activities, and investments within the USEUCOM AOR in a manner, which disciplines our approach to campaigning and preserves warfighting readiness for the Joint Force.

Question. Given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, where do you see the greatest need for change in the Joint Force in order to adjust to the realities of strategic competition with Russia?

Answer. Successful strategic competition with Russia requires a multi-domain, global, whole-of-government approach, appropriately re-calibrated in consideration of Russia's actions in Ukraine, the changing NATO landscape, and the evolving security situation in Europe. Our Joint Force must be able to deter further Russian aggression, to improve its ability to deploy rapidly, and to effectively interoperate with Allies and Partners in contested environments. Enhanced capabilities and capacities are needed to compete and win across multiple domains. Our Joint Force must be prepared to counter threats posed by rapid technological advancements such as advanced chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, directed energy, and hypersonics.

Question. The NDS identifies “integrated deterrence,” “campaigning,” and “actions to build enduring advantages” as the primary ways by which the Department will seek to achieve its goals under the NDS. What do you see as EUCOM's role in each of these areas?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization, operations, activities, and investments and how they can best achieve the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.

Question. Given your current knowledge of EUCOM programs, do you believe the Command's resources and authorities are aligned in a manner consistent with NDS priorities and U.S. strategic objectives?

Answer. In my current role as Commander, United States Army Europe and Africa, the command's resources and authorities are currently aligned in a manner that is consistent with the NDS priorities and United States strategic objectives. However, going forward, we must assess and re-calibrate these resources and authorities as the threat and the NATO landscape evolve.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization, operations, activities, and investments and how they can best achieve the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.

Question. Given your knowledge of the security relationships with Allies and partners in the EUCOM AOR, what do you see as the greatest opportunity to build on those relationships to advance the strategic objectives of the NDS?

Answer. NATO unity in the face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been inspiring. In my current role as Commander, United States Army Europe and Africa I have engaged extensively with my land force counterparts across the theater. Many of my interactions involved a deep discussion on Allied capability gaps and new equipment procurement. I believe this is the leading edge of a significant increase in European focus on modernization and readiness. Increases in Allied capability and capacity strengthen the Alliance, strengthen collective defense, and afford greater U.S. flexibility in achieving our strategic objectives.

Question. One of the top priorities for United States European Command and NATO has been the military mobility initiative agreed to at the 2018 Brussels Summit. If confirmed, how would you address the threats China poses to this initiative and to European security through its investments and attempts to gain influence in the region?

Answer. Countering the PRC's malign influence requires a coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance approach. If confirmed, USEUCOM will continue to work with Allies and Partners to galvanize European recognition of the pacing challenge that China presents, to include Beijing's diplomatic support of Russia in its illegal war in Ukraine, and focus operations, activities, investments, and engagements in critical areas of this strategic competition. Most importantly, we should contrast the PRC's predatory activities that demonstrate Beijing's treatment of nations as "clients and customers" with the United States' longstanding commitment to alliances, partnerships, and the rules-based international order.

EUROPEAN DETERRENCE INITIATIVE

Question. The stated objectives of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) include: enhancing the United States' deterrence posture, increasing the readiness and responsiveness of United States forces in Europe, supporting the collective defense and security of North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, and bolstering the security and capacity of United States allies and partners.

In light of Russia's illegal war in Ukraine and the continuing shift in the European security environment, what changes, if any, do you believe should be made to EDI objectives or investment priorities going forward?

Answer. Sustained EDI funding remains critical to our mission in Europe and critical to combat credible deterrence. As an example, EDI has enabled us to increase our Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). In the current crisis, APS provided unmatched speed and flexibility in deploying a full Armored Brigade Combat Team to Europe, ready to fight, in remarkably short time. Moving forward, the sufficiency of EDI funding, objectives, and investment priorities must be informed by several factors, including the status of the current conflict in Ukraine; the Russian threat; future Allied contributions; and the global security situation.

If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment, and in addition to force posture, an assessment of EDI funding is one of areas that I will prioritize.

Question. As Commanding General of United States Army Europe and Africa, what lessons have you learned about the Army preposition stock sites, particularly their utility as part of the increase in United States troops immediately prior to and during Russia's invasion of Ukraine? If confirmed, how will you take this experience and apply it across all the requirements in European Command across all domains?

Answer. Multi-year investments under EDI enhanced our prepositioned materiel and supporting infrastructure, which have proven essential in our ability to rapidly project power to deter Russia from invading a NATO Ally while also supporting Ukraine. Large Army formations were able to quickly flow into Europe with ease, draw materiel, and integrate with existing command and control structures. If confirmed, I foresee this strategy continuing in all domains (e.g., Air Force Deployable Air Base Sets (DABS), special operations forces equipment) because it enhances our ability to respond swiftly and decisively to assure our Allies and deter further Russian aggression.

Question. In addition to funding dedicated to constructing and sustaining military installations in Europe, a large portion of the funding associated with EDI has contributed to major land exercises such as the Defender Series. If confirmed, will you continue to advocate for robust funding for exercises with our European Allies and partners across all domains?

Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for robust funding for exercises with our European Allies and Partners across all domains. Fully resourcing

and executing our Joint training program builds our readiness and interoperability in command and control, integrated air and missile defense, fires, and logistics. EDI-funded exercises build US and NATO readiness, enhance interoperability, and demonstrate Allied and Partner commitment to deter further Russian aggression.

UNITED STATES CAPABILITIES AND FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE

Question. General Wolters testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee in April that after the Russia-Ukraine conflict, there will be a need to examine “the breadth and depth of the European contributions, [and] be prepared to adjust the US contributions. My suspicion is we’re going to still need more” troops than before the United States buildup as a result of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Do you agree?

Answer. Assessing the outcome of this conflict and further consultations within NATO are warranted before drawing conclusions on U.S. contributions. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in Europe, including force posture.

Question. Given your knowledge of and experience in the EUCOM AOR, what is your assessment of the current United States force posture in Europe? Do you believe it is sufficient to support the achievement of NDS priorities and U.S. strategic objectives?

Answer. In my current role as Commander, United States Army Europe and Africa, the command’s current force posture is aligned in a manner that is consistent with the NDS priorities and United States strategic objectives. However, our force posture going forward will in large measure be driven by the status of the current conflict in Ukraine; the Russian threat; future Allied contributions; and the global security situation.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM force posture to determine if it is appropriately scaled to achieve the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.

Question. In your opinion, what implications does Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have on future United States force posture in Europe? How should such considerations be calibrated and coordinated with NATO force posture decisions?

Answer. United States long-term force posture will be dependent upon a consensus about the nature of the security environment, including the threat posed by Russia, once the current conflict stabilizes. Future United States posture adjustments will be informed by anticipated Ally contributions to NATO’s new force model, while ensuring that we can continue to meet USEUCOM campaign objectives and enable U.S. global operations from the USEUCOM AOR.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in Europe.

Question. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force that present a significant challenge to addressing current or future threats in the EUCOM AOR?

Answer. Over the years, our adversaries have been closing the gaps on exquisite types of capabilities in areas such as artificial intelligence and hypersonic technology, as well as in the cyber and space domains. I believe we ought to continue our focus on developing “best-in-class” capabilities that address the threats of a high-end, multi-domain fight.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment to identify critical capability and capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force, as it pertains to the USEUCOM AOR.

Question. In your assessment, given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, does the United States have sufficient air and missile defense capability and capacity to defend critical infrastructure, such as command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile attack? If not, what do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?

Answer. From my current perspective as Commander, United States Army Europe and Africa, USEUCOM has good Army air and missile defense systems. However, as the security situation and threat evolve, the Joint Force will have to modernize and expand air and missile defense capability and capacity in both systems and force structure. Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is an inherently joint and combined requirement that demands integration of all services’ air and missile defense capabilities in order to defend critical infrastructure.

A key factor to monitor is the operational tempo of U.S. Army air defense forces, for which demand remains high.

If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment, including an assessment of IAMD, to identify and assess critical capability and capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force.

Question. How do you view the relative value of permanent versus rotational forces in the EUCOM AOR? How does that relative value change for different kinds of units/formations?

Answer. There are clear advantages and disadvantages to each employment model. From my perspective as the Commander of United States Army Europe and Africa, permanently assigned forces are more operationally effective, as they remain fully oriented to the operational environment and can become interoperable with our Allies and Partners. However, I also appreciate that there are many other considerations that bear on this issue. Ultimately, the decision between permanent versus rotational forces must balance operational effectiveness with global demand and service considerations.

If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment, and force posture is one of areas that I will prioritize, to enable a fully informed recommendation to the Chairman and the Secretary.

Question. If confirmed, what specific enhancements would you make to United States capabilities and force posture in Europe to support the NDS more effectively?

Answer. If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization, operations, activities, and investments and how they can best achieve the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.

Question. Some have suggested that NATO should adopt a focus on “deterrence by denial,” by positioning credible forces capable of threatening Russia if it seeks to act against us along NATO’s eastern flank. What are your views on the concept of deterrence by denial?

Answer. I agree with the strategy of deterrence by denial and I believe that it would be an effective strategy in deterring a Russian attack against NATO.

Question. What is your understanding of the operational value of the four Arleigh Burke class destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain?

Answer. United States Aegis destroyers based in Rota, Spain, coupled with Aegis Ashore provide the foundation of NATO’s ballistic missile defense capability. In addition to their ballistic missile defense mission, they allow us to better track undersea activity, boost NATO’s presence in the Black Sea, monitor Russia naval activities in the eastern Mediterranean, and provide a wide range of multi-mission capabilities.

Question. The current EUCOM commander and his predecessor both testified in support of basing two additional destroyers in Rota, Spain to bolster United States naval posture and presence in Europe. Do you agree that two additional destroyers based in Rota would be beneficial in the region?

Answer. I agree with General Scaparrotti and General Wolters. Two additional destroyers based in Rota would be beneficial in the region.

NUCLEAR POSTURE

Question. In your view, what role does the U.S. strategic nuclear triad play in the security of the EUCOM AOR?

Answer. Robust nuclear deterrence is critical to maintaining regional stability and deterring conflict and underpins integrated deterrence. The U.S. strategic nuclear triad—our Nation’s steadfast commitment to provide a credible, reliable, and secure nuclear deterrent—is instrumental to security in the USEUCOM AOR.

The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, which was part of the broader National Defense Strategy articulated a nuclear deterrence strategy that “as long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.”

Question. Do you support this strategy?

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, in full, to articles 40 and 41 of the June 14, 2021, NATO Brussels Summit Communiqué and in particular “As long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.”

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you support the forward deployment in Europe of United States’ nuclear weapon with capabilities and infrastructure by allies?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If confirmed, what steps you would undertake to address the above goals with NATO allies?

Answer. If confirmed, I would reaffirm U.S. strategic assurance guarantees as stated in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. I would also reinforce upcoming improvements that modernize our nuclear deterrence capabilities in theater and strongly reinforce our deterrence posture.

RUSSIA

Question. In your view, what are the USEUCOM and NATO activities most important to responding to Russian violence in Ukraine and deterring potential Russian aggression against NATO territory?

Answer. From my perspective as the Commander of United States Army Europe and Africa, United States and NATO's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine has been a remarkable whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, and whole-of-alliance effort. The activities that comprise this effort span the spectrum of diplomatic, information, military, and economic activities, imposing heavy costs on the Russian Federation for their unprovoked and illegal aggression. While all of these activities are crucial, I believe that NATO's immediate response, as a unified and combat credible alliance has been particularly critical in deterring further Russian aggression on NATO territory.

Question. Are United States policies and the associated authorities—as applicable to the EUCOM AOR—sufficient to counter Russia's influence in the AOR, or are there additional measures we should be considering?

Answer. In support of whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance efforts, USEUCOM contributes to countering Russia's malign influence in the AOR. It is vital that the United States and USEUCOM continue to share information with our Allies and Partners and work together to counter malign influence across the continent.

Question. Vladimir Putin has discussed Russia's plans to develop a variety of new nuclear capabilities, including a new ICBM, an intercontinental hypersonic missile, a nuclear-powered cruise missile, and an undersea drone. In response to the crisis in Ukraine, Putin has put Russian nuclear forces on high alert and threatened "consequences that you have never experienced in your history."

What is your assessment of Putin's capabilities and intent to follow through on threats to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in response to the Ukraine crisis?

Answer. According to New START Treaty statements on 1 September 2021, Russia declared 1,458 warheads on 527 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. Russia currently has an active stockpile of up to 2,000 warheads for non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). These include air-to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise missiles, gravity bombs, and depth charges for medium-range bombers, tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships and submarines, and Russia's anti-ballistic missile system.

Continued Russian rhetoric about the potential use of nuclear weapons is irresponsible and destabilizing. If confirmed, monitoring these indicators and warnings will remain a top priority for me.

Question. Given recent advances in Russian attack submarine capability, such as the deployment of the highly capable Russian submarine Severodvinsk, what additional capabilities or capacity are most important to maintaining the United States advantage in undersea warfare in the EUCOM AOR?

Answer. The Russian Federation Navy (RFN) continues to increase the scope and complexity of its undersea operations in the European theater through ongoing efforts to replace Soviet-era platforms with a number of new, technologically advanced multi-mission submarines that present a qualitative evolution in the subsurface threat. Maintaining our undersea advantage will require a comprehensive approach to undersea warfare using aircraft, surface ships, submarines, satellites, electromagnetic and cyber capabilities, unmanned vehicles in the air and water, and fixed and portable underwater sensors.

Question. In your assessment, does EUCOM currently have a mature joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in sufficient capacity to mitigate the challenge of Russian A2/AD capabilities? If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are required in the EUCOM AOR to ensure United States Forces are able to achieve operational freedom of maneuver at decisive points?

Answer. USEUCOM'S concept of operations to mitigate the systems intended to contest the operating environment is well developed and well-rehearsed. Capabilities to support the operations concept and USEUCOM's capacity continue to increase with the addition of 5th Generation fighter aircraft and key Army fires as-

sets. Coupling U.S. capabilities with allies and partners makes this concept of operations stronger and more resilient.

Question. In your view, what are Russia's strategic goals in the Black Sea and in the Mediterranean, regardless of how the war in Ukraine progresses?

Answer. Russia seeks to dominate the Black Sea and compete favorably in the Mediterranean for defense, military power projection, and control of economic trade routes. Control of the Black Sea provides Russia with access to a warm water port (Sevastopol), access to the Mediterranean through the Turkish straights building Russian strategic defensive depth and allowing access to world oceans to challenge United States and allied operations and freedom of maneuver. Russia will continue building naval port infrastructure and adding Black Sea Fleet combatants including fielding additional long-range strike capable ships intended to defend southern approaches, and extend continuous naval rotations in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia may also seek diplomatic and legal agreements to restrict access and constrain Black Sea nations to Russian military and economic advantage.

Question. Russia will still have the ability to threaten Ukraine, blockade its economy, and otherwise disrupt freedom of the commons in the Black Sea regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine. If confirmed, what actions would you recommend the United States and NATO take to mitigate Russia's threats in this body of water, and in its strategic connection to the Eastern Mediterranean?

Answer. The conflict in Ukraine has only increased the strategic importance of the Black Sea region to Russia. Russia employs a variety of approaches to further their regional interests through diplomatic, informational, economic, and military means. If confirmed, I would pursue a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance Black Sea security strategy, to ensure a coordinated United States/NATO approach to countering Russian regional interests.

CHINA

Question. In your view, what are the EUCOM and NATO activities most important to mitigating the potential strategic implications of Chinese influence and investments across the AOR?

Answer. Mitigating PRC influence and investments in the USEUCOM AOR requires a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, whole-of-alliance effort. Providing United States, allied, or partnered nation alternatives to China's investments and loans to advance Europe's infrastructure can mitigate or stall China's One Belt-One Road projects, reduces Europe's exposure to coercion, and ensures access to critical infrastructure. Our collective ability to secure sensitive supply chain processes and protect operations and technologies is critical for collective security and interoperability, and requires a holistic approach.

If confirmed, I will fully assess China's malign activities in Europe, building on USEUCOM's ongoing efforts.

Question. As NATO seeks to revise its Strategic Concept, what role do you envision for the Alliance in countering the challenge from Chinese malign influence in the EUCOM AOR?

Answer. More than at any time in recent years, our European Allies and Partners recognize the risk the PRC presents to European security and interests. The June of 2021 NATO heads of state communique described NATO's growing concern over the PRC's malign actions on the continent and outlined NATO's policy to protect critical infrastructure, strengthen resilience, maintain our technological edge, and address challenges to the rules-based international order. Beijing's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has only furthered these concerns. With NATO releasing its new strategic concept this summer in Madrid, I think we will continue to see the growing importance NATO is placing on China and additional whole-of-alliance efforts to counter malign PRC activities in Europe.

If confirmed, I look forward to working with the whole-of-government, Allies, and Partners to assess and counter China's malign activities in Europe.

RUSSIAN HYBRID WARFARE

Question. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2022, General Wolters stated "Russia employs unconventional tools, ranging from disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and the manipulation of energy markets to support Moscow's efforts at political subversion and economic intimidation."

In your assessment, does EUCOM currently have sufficient resources for countering Russia's cyber-enabled information operations and other hybrid warfare operations? If not, what additional capabilities or capacities are required in the EUCOM

AOR to effectively counter these Russian hybrid operations below the level of military conflict?

Answer. USEUCOM collaborates directly with CYBERCOM to generate cyberspace options to counter state and non-state malicious activities within the European theater. CYBERCOM, as the force provider for Cyberspace Operations Forces, uses persistent engagement to interact and compete with adversaries in cyberspace short of armed conflict. We know Russia invests heavily in cyber-enabled information and hybrid warfare operations worldwide. It is imperative that the United States not cede this key terrain. USEUCOM's operations in the information environment contribute to the Command's and the United States Government's overall efforts to advance United States interests in Europe. If confirmed, we will continue to expand our interoperability with our Allies and Partners, where we realize the full benefit of our competitive advantage over Russia.

Question. What do you assess as key priorities for, and limitations on, the conduct of information operations against Russia in the EUCOM AOR?

Answer. A whole-of-government methodology coupled with the appropriate authorities is key to conducting effective information operations to counter Russian malign influence. Expanding this approach to include the entire NATO Alliance, the European Union, and individual Partner nations will further increase efficacy. If confirmed, my intent is to ensure that USEUCOM continues its practice of close coordination with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the Department of State to comply with department policy guidance, as well as department granted authorities and permissions.

Question. In your assessment, how important is a whole-of-government approach to countering Russian hybrid warfare against the United States? In your assessment, can the United States be successful against Russian hybrid warfare if we fail to invest in non-military tools of national power as part of a whole-of-government approach?

Answer. The Russian Federation has demonstrated the ability to utilize all of its instruments of national power to achieve their desired outcomes. The United States must continue to invest in critical tools of national power as part of a whole-of-government approach to counter hybrid warfare. Efforts are more effective when aligned with Allies and Partners. Increased alignment will increase the speed at which the U.S., our allies, and partners compete, allowing us to be proactive versus reactive. With respect to the recent Ukraine crisis, through close coordination among agencies and departments, the USG was particularly effective at establishing and maintaining a dominant narrative exposing Kremlin intent and mobilizing support to Ukraine's defense of its sovereignty. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the whole-of-government to assess and counter Russia's hybrid warfare activities in Europe.

Question. How important is it that our campaign to counter Russian hybrid aggression be synchronized with the efforts of our allies and partners?

Answer. It is imperative that our campaign to counter Russian hybrid aggression be synchronized with our allies and partners. USEUCOM's operations, activities, and investments in our AOR contribute daily to establishing and maintaining a narrative that effectively challenges Russia's malign activities. The demonstrated professionalism of our Armed Forces, our persistent presence across all domains, our strong Alliance and partnerships, our information and intelligence sharing agreements, our ongoing and unprecedented Security Force Assistance efforts, and our robust Joint and Combined Exercises all demonstrate our ironclad commitment to regional security, while promoting U.S. strategic interests. If confirmed, I look forward to working with the whole-of-government and our allies and partners to assess and counter Russia's hybrid warfare activities in Europe.

Question. What is your assessment of NATO's readiness to detect, deter, and respond to attacks from adversaries in the cyber domain?

Answer. NATO's cyberspace capabilities depend on the combined strength of its member nations. Each country in the Alliance is responsible for their own cyber security. In recent years, NATO has expanded their focus on cyber by establishing additional force structure and a Cyberspace Operations Center, located in Mons. In my current capacity as the Commander, United States Army Europe and Africa, I have observed that throughout the current crisis, NATO's cyberspace capabilities have been more closely integrated than at any other time.

If confirmed, I will ensure that USEUCOM continues collaborative efforts with organizations such as U.S. Cyber Command and NATO's Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence to improve training, rapidly disseminate best practices, and facilitate information-sharing across the AOR.

VIOLENT EXTREMIST ORGANIZATIONS (VEOS) IN THE EUCOM AOR

Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy as it relates to the EUCOM AOR?

Answer. It is my understanding that USEUCOM supports a whole-of-government approach to counter terrorism. USEUCOM, in coordination with the U.S. inter-agency, implements the strategy by supporting and enabling our partners, allies and other stakeholders through information sharing and building partner capacity.

Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S. counterterrorism strategy and associated activities in addressing the threat posed by violent extremist organizations? What changes, if any, would you recommend?

Answer. My understanding is that threat assessments suggest relatively low risk for violent extremist organizations within the USEUCOM AOR. Moreover, I assess that in general, the U.S. military's largest contribution in the fight against transnational threats often comes in the form of information sharing and capacity-building. If confirmed, I would strive to grow allied and partner nation networks to counter the threats that promote extremist ideologies and criminal activities within and beyond Europe, as we defend the Homeland forward.

Question. Within the EUCOM AOR, what do you consider the highest counterterrorism priorities?

Answer. In my current capacity, the highest priority for counterterrorism operations is protecting the Homeland, followed by mitigating threats to U.S. interests and those of our allies and partners in the region.

Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda, the Islamic State, and other violent extremist organizations to the EUCOM AOR?

Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the threat posed by al Qaeda, IS, and other VEOs in the USEUCOM AOR. Speaking in my current roll as Commander, United States Army Europe and Africa, I can say that a terrorist threat to United States Army Forces in Europe persists, despite a decline in attacks in the past two years. ISIS in particular directed multiple attacks against civilian targets and tourist locations in the past couple of years. The group intends to expand its operational networks and they continue to call on sympathizers to conduct attacks in Europe. Al Qaeda also intends to conduct attacks in the USEUCOM AOR but lacks the capability due to diminished leadership and resources.

Question. What is your assessment of Russia's role in supporting violent extremist groups in the EUCOM AOR? What steps, if any, would you recommend to counter this support?

Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment, including an assessment of Russia's role in supporting violent extremist organizations or groups (VEOs).

U.S. COMMITMENT UNDER ARTICLE 5 OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

Question. A cornerstone of the NATO Alliance is the principle of collective self-defense as codified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty.

In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S. commitment to its obligations under Article 5?

Answer. The U.S. commitment to its obligations under Article 5 is vital to U.S. strategic interests. The National Defense Strategy clearly articulates the importance of strong alliances to respond to shared challenges. NATO is the premier alliance on the world stage, and Article 5 represents the enduring commitment that binds our nations together.

Question. How important to being able to meet Article 5 obligations is follow through on Article 3 which commits allies to develop their "individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack"?

Answer. Commitment to Article 3 is essential to ensuring the success of Article 5 obligations. Article 3 charges independent nations with the responsibility to provide for their own defense as a precondition for collective defense.

NATO BURDEN SHARING

Question. At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO allies pledged to spend at least 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense by 2024 and to move towards spending at least 20 percent of their defense budget on major new equipment. Since that time, allies have made significant progress in increasing defense spending and investing in major equipment.

Where have you seen the greatest progress on burden sharing in the NATO Alliance?

Answer. As a result of Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine we have seen our NATO Allies increase—in some cases dramatically increase—defense budgets, and provide large quantities of military equipment to Ukraine. Some nations donated the entirety of a specific capability in their inventory. We also witnessed the rapid deployment of NATO forces across a large portion of southeast Europe. Personally, I am most pleased by many allies' commitments to upgrade existing equipment. These new procurement initiatives will ensure a more combat credible Alliance. At the Madrid Summit in June, heads of state will chart the course with respect to burden sharing for the foreseeable future—just as the Wales Summit did in 2014. The outcomes of the summit will give us a better understanding of where the Alliance stands on burden sharing.

Question. What is your assessment of current national plans of NATO allies for meeting the 2 percent of GDP defense spending goal? Are you concerned that certain national plans are not realistic for meeting the 2 percent goal by 2024?

Answer. The 2 percent goal represents a reasonable expectation of investment by each nation towards the collective defense of all. Last year was the seventh straight year of increased defense spending by European allies. I am, however, concerned that not all nations will meet their 2 percent commitment goal by 2024. On the other hand, I am optimistic that NATO members will remain focused on defense investments given the current security environment. If confirmed, I will continue to encourage Allied officers to advise their nations to meet the Wales Pledge of 2 percent.

Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage NATO allies to increase their defense spending and enhance their military capabilities so as to enable appropriate contributions to NATO operations?

Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the momentum towards Alliance reinforcement, readiness, and responsiveness. I will encourage allies who are falling short to accelerate their efforts, and deliver credible plans towards the 2 percent mark. We will assist political leaders by clearly articulating the Alliance's operational requirements. I also intend to inform Allied investment by continually messaging that we can address present and future threats only through an adapted and modernized Alliance—equitably sharing the responsibility. I believe the principal mechanism to influence Allied defense spending is consistent engagement, at all levels, paired with transparent dialogue.

Question. Although the “2 percent” goal is important, it is also critical that our allies invest in, and make actual warfighting capability available to the Alliance at the speed of strategic and operational relevance.

In your view, should the United States broaden the conversation to encourage allies to focus more on the attainment and refinement of critical capabilities vice meeting a dollar threshold?

Answer. Yes; however, we should not allow a renewed focus on capabilities to dilute our commitment to a 2 percent spending floor. If confirmed, closing critical capability gaps within the Alliance will be one of my top priorities. We must work to ensure that the U.S., allies, and partners tie investments in capabilities and capacities to clear-eyed collective defense plans that address the evolved threat.

Question. What recommendations for additional reforms should NATO consider to speed decision-making, improve the ability of the Alliance to realistically plan for contingencies, and generate forces at the speed of strategic and operational relevance?

Answer. In my current role as Commander, United States Army Europe and Africa I am not privy to the specifics associated with internal NATO matters. However, the ability to plan for contingencies, and generate forces at the speed of relevance will be a top priority. If confirmed, I will make an assessment of NATO decision-making, planning, and force generation. Also, I would be deeply involved in the development of these plans and providing advice to the North Atlantic Committee (NAC) to improve the speed of decision making and overall readiness across the Alliance.

Question. In your view, can NATO be enlarged through the addition of countries such as Sweden and Finland while remaining an effective military organization capable of making decisions and acting in a timely fashion?

Answer. Yes.

Question. If Finland and Sweden seek to join NATO, in your opinion, would they be a net provider or consumer of the Alliance's collective security?

Answer. Finland and Sweden will both be net providers of collective security if they join the Alliance. Finland and Sweden are already capable security partners who routinely participate in the USEUCOM exercise program. Both countries demonstrate the values that the Alliance is built on and have advanced military capa-

bility and extremely competent leadership. If confirmed and if they are admitted, I look forward to welcoming both nations into the Alliance.

NATO—RUSSIA AND UNITED STATES RELATIONS

Question. What is your view on the NATO–Russia Council? Does it remain valid after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine this year?

Answer. The NATO–Russia Council (NRC) previously served as a forum to encourage dialogue with Russia. Russia, however, has broken the trust at the core of cooperation, and has challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture. In light of the current situation in Ukraine, the United States Government should reassess the utility of this mechanism. If confirmed, I will provide the Secretary my best military advice on U.S. participation in the NRC.

Question. What do you believe are appropriate objectives for United States–Russia security relations?

Answer. The principal objective for United States–Russia security relations should be to prevent direct military conflict. If confirmed, I will seek to maintain an alliance-based and credible force to serve as a deterrent. Carefully managed and focused dialogue with Russia, through the appropriate, authorized channels, will be important to mitigating the risk of unintended escalation.

Question. Are there, in your view, any areas of common interest between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?

Answer. Given Russia’s status as a great power and significant player in global affairs, cooperation with Russia on areas of mutual interest should be a key element of global security and stability. These areas could include nuclear arms control, containing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, countering transnational threats such as terrorism and narcotics, and managing escalation in the space and cyber domains. Ultimately, cooperation with Russia must be within our core national security interests and must be accomplished in the spirit of transparency and reciprocity.

NATO—EUROPEAN UNION (EU)

Question. How would you characterize the NATO–EU relationship today?

Answer. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO, and the NATO–EU relationship is stronger today than it has been in decades. NATO and the EU currently have 21 member countries in common. Both organizations agreed to 74 cooperative areas since the 2016 Warsaw Summit, including closer cooperation in countering hybrid threats, counterterrorism, information sharing, exercises, and crisis management. Congruent with NATO’s Strategic Concept, the EU’s Strategic Compass identifies Russia as the significant threat to peace and world order.

Question. What role does the EU play in ensuring that the United States and our NATO allies are able to deter and, if necessary, defeat Russian aggression?

Answer. The EU plays a critical role in securing the populations’ and parliamentarians’ support for national expenditures necessary to deter and defeat Russian aggression. Also, strengthened border security and surveillance efforts by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX) provide additional early warning and situational awareness to our Allies and Partners in the region. Deterrence efforts are more impactful when EU and NATO efforts are synchronized.

Question. What role does the EU play in countering Russian malign influence?

Answer. The EU plays an important role. EU sanctions are powerful diplomatic and economic tools that amplify United States and NATO efforts to counter Russia’s malign influence. Ongoing EU–NATO coordination regarding cyber threats and the EU’s 2018 Joint Framework on Countering Hybrid Threats focus awareness, increases resilience and improves our collective response to Russian hybrid aggression.

Question. In your opinion, is the European Union acting in a complementary role to NATO’s security objectives, or counter to them? If confirmed, what more would you focus on to increase coordination between the two organizations?

Answer. The EU, like NATO, is a key pillar of the European Security Architecture. In my opinion, the EU is acting in a complementary role to NATO’s security objectives. EU influence on NATO Allies to contribute funding toward defense matters and the Alliance is critical. The EU views Russia as the largest security threat in Europe, and strategic EU documents are aligned with NATO planning efforts. I am, however, concerned that EU initiatives might compete with NATO obligations in an already constrained environment.

NATO-LED KOSOVO FORCE

Question. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) includes approximately 650 United States servicemembers. KFOR's mission is to assist in maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and to support the development of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF).

In your view, does KFOR remain an essential deterrent to instability in the Western Balkans?

Answer. KFOR is essential for regional stability. KFOR assists in providing a safe and secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo. Its professional presence affords Kosovo and Serbia a chance to normalize relations through continued dialogue. The KFOR mission is a success story for NATO and a significant investment by the United States and the Alliance for over two decades. The U.S. Army's current force level at Camp Bondsteel is appropriate. U.S. presence in KFOR shows solidarity with our Allies and remains an essential deterrent in preventing a new crisis or conflict.

Question. What do you see as the major challenges in the Western Balkans? What is EUCOM's role in addressing these challenges?

Answer. Continuing ethnic tensions, weak institutions, and malign external influences are the major challenges facing the region. The Western Balkans is a competitive zone where the United States and Europe compete with Russia and China. Russia leverages its historical and cultural ties as well as energy to exert influence. China employs economic means and a corrupt environment to gain a foothold in numerous states to include Alliance members. EUCOM with its interagency partners and country teams working together can counter these threats. EUCOM must also continue to maximize the State Department's International Military Education and Training (IMET) program, a key program in creating shared values in the ranks of our allies and partners. If confirmed, I look forward to completing a thorough assessment of EUCOM's role in the Western Balkans.

Question. If confirmed as Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR, what would be your approach to assisting the development and transition of the KSF?

Answer. USEUCOM supports the development of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) according to their agreed upon 10-year transition program. Conducted in close coordination with the U.S. and other NATO Allies, this program strives to ensure the KSF becomes a professional, unbiased, and effective security organization. We encourage the KSF to maintain a multi-ethnic, professional force responsive to all the citizens of Kosovo. Leveraging security cooperation programs from regional exercises to professional military education are key for the KSF's development. Last year the KSF participated for the first time in U.S. Army Europe's DEFENDER regional exercise. Also, security assistance primarily through foreign military financing (FMF) will provide the KSF with the equipment required to execute a variety of missions.

NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS HEADQUARTERS

Question. The NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ) was created in 2007 to enhance the capabilities of, and promote interoperability between, the special operations forces (SOF) of NATO member nations.

What role do you believe the NSHQ should play in future contingencies involving NATO SOF?

Answer. Enhancing capability, capacity, and interoperability is NSHQ's primary focus. NSHQ should continue to develop strategic and operational level command and control capabilities, and also support Alliance efforts to integrate irregular warfare and SOF capabilities into counter hybrid threat plans. During a contingency, NSHQ would serve as an integrating headquarters, ensuring that NATO SOF units are properly incorporated in a manner which best leverages their unique capabilities.

Question. How do you believe the NSHQ can most effectively support NATO SOF capabilities and interoperability?

Answer. The NSHQ plays a vital role in the training and education of NATO SOF. The NSHQ can increase capability and interoperability by setting capability targets, ensuring synergy in command and control arrangements, integrating common network platforms, and assuring SOF presence in critical areas. By serving as the connective tissue between various members of NATO SOF, the NSHQ will enable more coherent planning and mission execution.

Question. What do you believe are the appropriate roles for EUCOM and U.S. Special Operations Command in providing guidance and resources to the NSHQ?

Answer. The USEUCOM Commander, as SACEUR, is the executive agent responsible for the NSHQ. Duties include coordinating with the Commander, USSOCOM to review and validate force structure requirements for U.S. support to the NSHQ.

The Commander, USSOCOM provides military advice on capabilities that support allied and partner interoperability with U.S. Forces for areas that fall within USSOCOM responsibilities. USSOCOM also provides doctrine, training, and equipment standards for special operations, irregular warfare, and security force assistance capabilities. USSOCOM promotes standardization policies and procedures for special operations equipment, and validates NSHQ's special operations requirements to ensure interoperability of equipment and forces.

EUROPEAN PHASED ADAPTIVE APPROACH

Question. The United States is deploying the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as its contribution to NATO missile defense capability.

Do you believe that EPAA will provide the capability needed to protect United States forces in Europe and our NATO Allies against existing and emerging Iranian missile threats?

Answer. Yes. The European Phased Adaptive Approach is adaptable and suitable to defend United States and NATO Allies in Europe against existing and emerging Iranian ballistic missile threats. As the United States national force contribution to NATO's Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) Standing Defense Plan, EPAA forces provide the foundation of NATO ballistic Missile defense (BMD). As Iran continues their missile development, USEUCOM, with support from the Missile Defense Agency, will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure the capabilities provided by EPAA remain effective against current and emerging Russian and Iranian threats.

Question. In your opinion, is there a need to assess defense capabilities of the United States in Europe as well as those of NATO Allies and partners against a Russian ballistic missile threat?

Answer. We must continually assess defense capabilities regarding a Russian ballistic missile threat—this is an iterative process. Our goal is to build an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) architecture including United States, allied, and partner capabilities to defend sovereign airspace and national assets against any air or missile threats from outside Europe or NATO territory. In accordance with the Missile Defense Review (MDR), assessments conducted alongside our allies and partners must ensure that any such architecture is effective against current and future advanced air and missile threats. The U.S. is encouraging NATO Allies to improve their missile defense capabilities by investing in interceptors and sensors, expanding data sharing and integration, and taking other steps to counter existing and projected ballistic and cruise missile threats.

Question. In light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and other escalatory actions directed at NATO, are the United States and the Alliance sufficiently postured to deter Russia from threatening our allies beyond a hybrid or gray zone scenario, as Putin directed against Ukraine?

Answer. It is essential to synchronize efforts to counter Russian aggression with our allies and partners. Countering multi-domain activities below the threshold of armed conflict requires a whole-of-government approach that is most effective when aligned with similar allied approaches. USEUCOM is expanding its online counter-propaganda efforts and continues to collaborate with USCYBERCOM to compete with Russia below the threshold of armed conflict. Additional military personnel specializing in information operations related disciplines would benefit the command in countering Russia's "malign influence campaign."

NATO has recently made gains in detecting, deterring, and responding to cyber-attacks. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to make this a priority. NATO maintains a Cyber Defense structure that protects over 100K users at approximately 60 locations. NATO's Computer Incident Response Capability Centre aims to prevent, detect, respond, and recover from cyber incidents. Furthermore, NATO has established a Cyberspace Operations Center to coordinate and synchronize cyberspace operations. In short, NATO's cyber defense capabilities and capacity are improving, but continuous efforts will be required to reduce vulnerabilities across the Alliance.

SEXUAL ASSAULT PREVENTION AND RESPONSE

Question. The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources and care for victims of sexual assault.

What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to sexual assaults in EUROM, including assaults by and against U.S. civilian and contractor personnel?

Answer. We can never be satisfied with our efforts until all sexual assaults cease. Sexual assault is abhorrent; it is against our values, and damages military readiness. Sexual assault exists along a continuum of harm, so we must detect and correct harmful behaviors before tragic incidents occur. This issue will always have my direct attention. If confirmed, I will work to ensure prevention and response is a top priority for USEUCOM.

In my current capacity as Commander, United States Army Europe and Africa, I established a sexual harassment/assault response and prevention (SHARP) Fly Away Team to ensure a sexual assault victim would receive immediate care from any location within USAREUR-AF. The team included available Army aircraft, SHARP advocates, sexual assault medical forensic examiners, special victims' counsel, and investigators.

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of EUCOM policies and procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation for reporting the assault?

Answer. The Department of Defense and Military Services are continuing to develop policies and procedures that appropriately implement the retaliation-related notification, training, and reporting requirements required by the 2018 NDAA to protect those who report sexual assault. It is my understanding that USEUCOM is steadfast in protecting victims of sexual assault from retaliation. I will, however, review the adequacy of USEUCOM policies and procedures for protecting victims of sexual assault from retaliation, and the effectiveness of the training and implementation of such policies and procedures.

Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and resources in place in EUCOM to investigate and respond to allegations of sexual assault?

Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the resources used to investigate and respond to these allegations are maintained to the highest standard. Criminal investigative agencies must prioritize sexual assault cases and thoroughly investigate all allegations of sexual assault. With increased training and specialization, both investigators and prosecutors are becoming increasingly skilled in dealing with these types of complex cases. In addition, I would welcome innovative, data-informed and public health methods that work to combat sexual assault.

Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of military leaders to hold servicemembers accountable for sexual misconduct?

Answer. In my career, I have observed a strong willingness by military leaders to hold servicemembers appropriately accountable for sexual misconduct. We are still not where we need to be and more must be done. Disciplined, fit, and cohesive teams can only be built on a foundation of trust. Sexual misconduct destroys trust and the cohesion so necessary for a ready and lethal fighting force. If confirmed, I will remain committed to bringing to bear the resources required in the AOR to ensure any servicemembers responsible for sexual misconduct are held appropriately accountable.

Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the resources and programs in EUCOM to provide victims of sexual assault the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?

Answer. Congress has been a critical partner in helping the Department of Defense ensure we have a robust response system and the resources available for victims of sexual assault. We must constantly reevaluate and assess our effectiveness in ensuring victims have access to restorative care. Commanders play a critical role in this capacity.

The Department of Defense provides commanders with many resources and programs to care for our personnel. We continually pursue the most effective tools to expand our ability to support victims with quality medical, psychological, and legal assistance. Part of my initial command assessment will include issues surrounding services provided to victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will ensure commanders and leaders at all levels within USEUCOM are personally aware of all available resources and actively inform their subordinates of their availability.

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?

Answer. The chain of command sets the climate and the culture of an organization. Commanders need to make it a priority to promote an atmosphere of unwavering support for victims and ensure victims who have made the brave decision to come forward are afforded care and consideration, to include preventing retaliation within the unit. This is a crucial step toward creating the environment we need. I wholeheartedly believe in the concept "People First;" therefore, if confirmed I will ensure commanders understand my priority to provide the best possible support to victims of sexual assault.

Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have occurred?

Answer. The chain of command is essential in instituting cultural change in the military. Leaders set the example for others to follow.

Organizational culture starts at the top. I embrace the obligation to ensure our military culture reflects our core values and ethos. My commitment continues to be building disciplined, fit, cohesive teams, wherein everyone is treated with dignity and respect. Those who volunteer to serve in uniform are our Nation's sons and daughters, and I am absolutely determined to ensure they will serve in environments in which they are treated with dignity and respect.

Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be effective?

Answer. Yes. This reporting option allows us to ensure survivor care, while also supporting any desire for privacy.

I believe that we must continually assess all policies associated with sexual assault to ensure that we, as a Department, are providing adequate resources to the victims of sexual assault. One sexual assault is one too many; we must improve our efforts to prevent this terrible crime. The restricted reporting option is effective in getting survivors the care and services they need, but I would like to see more Restricted Reports convert to Unrestricted due to the limitation of actions associated with restricted reporting.

Secretary Austin approved a four-tiered roadmap for implementing the Independent Review Commission's (IRC) recommendations that focuses on the necessary foundational investments needed to systemically improve accountability, prevention programs, command climate, and victim care and support. I am committed to implementing the Department's roadmap in USEUCOM, if confirmed.

Question. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate and intend to implement if confirmed as EUCOM Commander?

Answer. Given the threat sexual assault poses to our force, any legal and appropriate method for monitoring trends and continually assessing our efforts is worthy of consideration. Certainly, continuous communication with subject-matter experts, careful review of incident reports, collaboration with the Inspector General, and close examination of command climate assessments are among the methods we would use. If confirmed, I will work closely with subject matter experts on the findings and recommendations of the Independent Review Commission and continue to implement in accordance with Secretary Austin's direction.

CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive timely testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch.

Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information

within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please answer yes or no.

Answer. Yes.

[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND

U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND AND U.S. SPACE COMMAND COLLABORATION

1. Senator GILLIBRAND. General Cavoli, your advance policy questions mention that U.S. European Command (EUCOM) directly collaborates with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to counter malign cyber activities in the EUCOM area of responsibility. Does EUCOM also have the same relationship with U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) to monitor the activity of our adversaries in space that could affect the European continent?

General CAVOLI. Similar to USEUCOM's relationship with CYBERCOM, USEUCOM maintains a strong relationship with USSPACECOM. USEUCOM sustains a relationship with USSPACECOM primarily through the Joint Integrated Space Team (JIST). The JIST is a group of USSPACECOM planners integrated across the USEUCOM staff to synchronize space planning and operations in order to monitor and deter our adversaries' activities in the space domain.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MAZIE K. HIRONO

MULTI-DOMAIN TASK FORCE

2. Senator HIRONO. General Cavoli, the Army is experimenting with Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) units focused on how to synchronize efforts across intelligence, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and space. U.S. Army Pacific has a MDTF at Joint-Base Lewis McChord (in the State of Washington) and is looking to establish another MDTF in the Indo-Pacific region. As Commander of United States Army Europe and Africa, you advocated for the establishment of an MDTF in the European theater and last year, one was established in Germany. How has the Army benefitted from the establishment of a multi-domain task force in Europe?

General CAVOLI. The Army has benefitted from the establishment of a Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) in Europe in two significant ways. First, the 2nd MDTF provides United States Army Europe and Africa with capabilities and expertise in all domains under a single command in order to focus and synchronize long range precision effects against strategic and operational targets. Second, during this developmental period, MDTFs provide the ability to experiment with new technologies and war fighting techniques in the current operational environment. This experimentation informs the Army's capability requirements and future Army and Joint multi-domain operating concepts.

3. Senator HIRONO. General Cavoli, are there any lessons you've learned from establishing the MDTF in Europe that you think will help the Army as it continues to establish new MDTFs?

General CAVOLI. Yes. While the 2nd MDTF is still building operational capability, we have learned that MDTFs represent a wide array of capabilities, which can be organized and tailored to meet specific theater requirements and provide options for a commander given the mission and operational environment. As the Army activates more MDTFs, these will require equipment and capabilities unique to the region, combined with the placement and access to meet senior commander requirements. Furthermore, while any one service can execute multi-domain operations, we must continue to build capacity and streamline processes to leverage the collective efforts of the Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational enterprise.

RUSSIAN NUCLEAR THREAT

4. Senator HIRONO. General Cavoli, on Monday, a 20-year diplomat with the Russian Foreign Ministry resigned from his position as an expert advisor on nuclear non-proliferation. In an open letter to colleagues he warned that members of Russian leadership frequently toy with the threat of using nuclear weapons against the West with alarming “nonchalance”. This rhetoric is also being voiced with increasing frequency on Russian state-run television. As the Supreme Allied Commander, how would you advise the Biden/Harris administration if Vladimir Putin were to target a nuclear strike against the United States or our allies?

General CAVOLI. If confirmed, I would make any recommendations to the President regarding a nuclear attack against NATO in consultation with NATO Allies and the Commander of USSTRATCOM. The military advice would certainly depend on the circumstances of Russia’s actions and our objectives. Russia’s nuclear rhetoric is alarming, and we cannot dismiss the threat posed by Russia’s strategic nuclear forces, nor should we forget their robust and growing arsenal of non-strategic nuclear weapons. We must ensure that the United States maintains a credible strategic nuclear deterrent force and that NATO endures as a nuclear alliance with its own credible theater nuclear deterrent, supported by the U.S., to ensure peace.

SUICIDE PREVENTION IN ARMED SERVICES

5. Senator HIRONO. General Cavoli, I am very concerned with the persistent issue of suicide among U.S. servicemembers and veterans. A Government Accountability Office (GAO) report issued earlier this year listed cultural isolation, family separations, and lack of mental health support among the factors that could explain why servicemembers overseas appear more at risk to attempt suicide than their counterparts in the continental United States. If confirmed, you will lead 60,000 American servicemembers stationed thousands of miles from home. How will you ensure these members have immediate access to mental health counseling if needed, and how will you create a climate that eliminates stigma and encourages members to take advantage of these resources?

General CAVOLI. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize suicide prevention as a central theme at USEUCOM Headquarters and across the components. I will align resources to senior leaders and target programs on suicide prevention and aftercare to ensure unit-level personnel services, mental health, chaplain support, and MWR services are readily available for United States personnel and families in Europe. I will expand on the various USEUCOM and component messaging platforms to bolster the effectiveness of how we promote, prevent, detect, and treat the mental health of our force through the variety of resources available to them, including confidential counseling services of military chaplains, suicide prevention hotlines, and mental health counselors. Outward and visible support by mental health professionals and those seeking care is critical in eradicating stigmas associated with mental health.

6. Senator HIRONO. General Cavoli, how will you prioritize what the Department of Defense (DOD) can do to ensure mental health is treated as part of the holistic health of each servicemember?

General CAVOLI. Just as a servicemember’s health is the foundation of their military readiness, their mental health is the glue that holds the foundation together. If confirmed, I will use every leadership and communication tool at my disposal to ensure that U.S. servicemembers, veterans, civilians, and family members within the USEUCOM AOR feel connected with, supported by, and respected by every echelon of the military and the broader support community. I will continue to partner with the Defense Health Agency to ensure access to mental health counseling and to ensure that staffing levels keep pace with servicemember needs across Europe. We will eliminate barriers to mental health care through education, understanding, empowerment, and promotion of positive mental wellbeing as a readiness imperative.

7. Senator HIRONO. General Cavoli, in your opinion, what single improvement can best address the ongoing issue of servicemember and veteran suicides?

General CAVOLI. Suicide is best prevented by strong leaders who take an active interest in every one of their people. This means ensuring each servicemember has a strong support network in place and ensuring that they are a member of a team that looks out for one another. When a person is in the early stages of difficulty it is incumbent upon our leaders to take an interest in that person and to guide

them to the resources that they need. If confirmed, I will strive to ensure that any stigma associated with seeking care for mental health is erased from the command.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR DAN SULLIVAN

UKRAINIAN GRAIN

8. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, there is a growing concern about how grain shortages will contribute to regional instability across the Middle East and Africa. Based on your interactions with African counterparts, what is your assessment of the continent's vulnerability to social and economic disruption stemming from decreased Ukrainian grain exports?

General CAVOLI. Food scarcity is an endemic problem across most of Africa and many parts of the Middle East. Africa and several nations in the Middle East will face additional social and economic disruption stemming from decreased Ukrainian grain and vegetable oil exports. The Port of Odesa is a major hub for the UN World Food Programme distribution, with 36 countries importing more than 50 percent of their grain from that region. Increasing food insecurity pressures are highly likely to exacerbate existing social and economic vulnerabilities, which could have severe consequences in many vulnerable nations.

NATO DEFENSE SPENDING

9. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, the 2014 Wales Summit pledge of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense spending is a critical requirement for NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] countries to meet. However, just meeting the spending threshold is not enough. The increased defense spending must be done so smartly and in a manner that maximizes allied contributions of capabilities and expertise. In your experience as Commander of United States Army Europe and Africa, how has the increased spending of our allies maximized their comparative contributions of capabilities and expertise to NATO defense?

General CAVOLI. As a result of Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, we have seen our NATO Allies increase—in some cases dramatically increase—defense budgets, and provide large quantities of military equipment to Ukraine. Increased Allied defense spending enhances deterrence and defense of the Alliance across all domains with the provision of relevant capabilities, such as modernized vehicles, air defense, rocket artillery, and other critical systems. We have already witnessed increased Allied contributions to the Battle Groups on the Eastern Flank, as well as the Standing NATO Maritime Groups, and enhanced air policing. The increased spending over time will strengthen capabilities across the Alliance and help bolster exercise participation, improving interoperability and readiness.

10. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, with NATO allies divesting themselves of less capable Soviet origin weapon systems and older Western-designed systems, what is your assessment of NATO military modernization in the next few years?

General CAVOLI. NATO Allies continue to provide large quantities of military equipment to Ukraine. The divestment of less capable Soviet weapon systems and legacy Western-designed systems may contribute to capability gaps. Assuming continued increased defense spending, this will present allies with the opportunity to modernize their forces in critical areas within respective national capacities, and close interoperability gaps by replacing Soviet weapon systems, ammunition, and repair parts with NATO interoperable equipment.

11. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, what are NATO militaries focusing on and how will it complement our capabilities?

General CAVOLI. Given the changing security environment, in the near-term, NATO militaries are focused on supporting Ukraine and deterring further Russian aggression. Across the mid- to long-term, NATO militaries are increasingly interested in developing and contributing to areas that bolster the Alliance's readiness to respond to threats from any direction in a 360-degree approach. Current priorities in this approach include integrated air and missile defense, theater anti-submarine warfare, long-range fires, intelligence surveillance and reconnaissance, and command and control capabilities to complement collective defense.

ARCTIC

12. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, as the Commander of EUCOM, one of your priorities will be to maintain a credible Arctic deterrence to ensure that growing

competition in the region does not lead to conflict. As you are aware, the Army will be rebranding United States Army Alaska as the 11th Airborne Division, with an operational focus on the Arctic. Could you speak to the impact this would have on our Nation's ability to effectively operate and deter authoritarian aggression in the Arctic?

General CAVOLI. The Arctic is a region of both competition and cooperation. Capable and ready forces, equipped, trained, and sustained to operate in the Arctic are important to maintaining effective deterrence. Arctic competence does not come quickly; therefore, it will take time to season the operator, not just to survive in the Arctic region, but to thrive, and if necessary prevail in the Arctic's unforgiving environment. The Army's designation of forces with an operational focus on the Arctic, such as the 11th Airborne Division, is a first step towards this end.

13. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, how would the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO change the security picture in the Arctic?

General CAVOLI. The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO would be a positive step for the security situation of both the Arctic and Baltic regions. Sweden and Finland both have experienced and professional militaries, capable of immediately increasing NATO capabilities, especially in Arctic zones. Their experience in the Arctic and Baltic regions will increase NATO's ability to detect and deter any regional aggression. Additionally, Finnish and Swedish accession to NATO would increase the Alliance's political strength in Europe and the transatlantic area. Both countries will help facilitate deeper coordination between the EU and NATO. With the accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, seven of the eight Arctic Council members would also be NATO members.

MARINE CORPS

14. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, under Force Design 2030, the Marine Corps is developing new operating concepts like Expeditionary Advanced Base Operations and Stand In Forces. It is divesting of several legacy systems, including all of its tanks and most of its cannon artillery, replacing them with rocket artillery, loitering munitions, and several types of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Among the new capabilities the Marine Corps will field is mobile anti-ship missiles. As the EUCOM Commander, you would potentially employ Marine Corps units your area of responsibility (AOR). As a potential combatant commander, what is your assessment of the capabilities the Marine Corps is adding and the concepts it is developing?

General CAVOLI. The USEUCOM area of operation contains critical littoral terrain and key sea-lines of communication. The marines' new force design can enable the Marine Corps to operate alongside allies and partners providing sea-control for allies, sea-denial for Russian forces, and contribute to the overall defense of Europe's maritime and littoral domain.

UKRAINE

15. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, is it your assessment that loitering munitions, anti-ship missiles, and proliferated UAS are being used effectively in combat in Ukraine?

General CAVOLI. Yes. Ukraine's Armed Forces have used loitering munitions and armed UAS in combat to find, fix, and eliminate Russian forces. Prior to Russia's invasion, Ukraine possessed an armed UAS capability, which has contributed to their ability to absorb and effectively integrate new UAS systems. As expected with the integration of any new system, some manageable friction points have arisen concerning loitering munitions. The Ukrainians are overcoming those challenges in a dynamic combat environment. Regarding anti-ship missiles, Ukraine used its own domestically produced anti-ship missile to sink the cruiser Moskva on 12-13 April and has used a variety of other systems including UAS to conduct successful anti-ship attacks.

16. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, are the United States Forces that would be under your command in EUCOM postured, equipped, and trained to fight on a battlefield like that which exists in Ukraine?

General CAVOLI. Yes. The United States Forces in USEUCOM, reinforced by CONUS-based troops and alongside NATO forces, are prepared to defend the Alliance against Russian aggression.

ENERGY INDEPENDENCE

17. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, this past March, current Supreme Allied Commander, General Tod Wolters, testified before this Committee, that “Russia employs unconventional tools, ranging from disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and manipulation of energy markets to support Moscow’s efforts at political subversion and economic intimidation.” Do you agree with General Wolters that Russian manipulation of energy markets is a significant security concern?

General CAVOLI. Yes.

18. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, do you agree that United States and allied energy independence is necessary to withstand the economic and political coercion of authoritarians like Vladimir Putin?

General CAVOLI. Yes. Reducing United States and Allied energy dependencies will reduce the leverage, influence, and coercive energy practices of authoritarians such as President Putin. If confirmed, I will continue to support our lead Federal agencies (State, Energy, and USAID) on European energy security and independence efforts in collaboration with NATO Allies and Partners.

19. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, since 2005, the United States has had the largest decline (1,423 million metric tons) in carbon emissions of any country in the world. China on the other hand, has had the largest increase (3,801 million metric tons) in carbon emissions during that same period. Iran and Saudi Arabia were number three and four respectively behind China in terms of the largest increases in carbon emissions. Given these emission trends and Russia’s exploitation of European energy dependence, in your personal opinion, do you believe it makes sense to limit the production of American energy?

General CAVOLI. It is necessary to find a balance between carbon emission goals and ensuring United States, Allied, and European energy security and independence through a mix of solutions. If confirmed, I will ensure that USEUCOM remains committed to supporting DoD and U.S. goals in this area.

20. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, as of just last year, Russia supplied more than half the natural gas and about a third of all the oil that Germany burned to heat homes, power factories and fuel cars, buses and trucks. As the European Union (EU) weighed bans on Russian energy imports in the wake of the illegal invasion of Ukraine, Germany’s finance minister, Christian Lindner, stated, “[i]t was a mistake that Germany became so heavily dependent on energy imports from Russia.” Do you agree with Germany’s finance minister?

General CAVOLI. I agree that Germany had become too dependent on energy imports from Russia.

21. Senator SULLIVAN. General Cavoli, with global energy prices dramatically higher since the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, do you believe that we should do all we can to supply our allies with American energy to limit Russia’s instruments of diplomatic coercion?

General CAVOLI. USEUCOM stands with the whole-of-government, as well as our European and NATO Allies and Partners in our response to Russia’s coercive use of energy to influence politics in Europe. The United States Government supports energy policies that provide responsible, adequate, reliable, and secure energy supplies at a reasonable cost. If confirmed, I will ensure that USEUCOM remains committed to United States policy initiatives to counter Russian diplomatic coercion across all areas, including energy security.

 QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR MARSHA BLACKBURN

EUROPEAN DETERRENCE INITIATIVE

22. Senator BLACKBURN. General Cavoli, if confirmed, how do you intend to rethink and shape the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) moving forward?

General CAVOLI. The stated objective of the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) is to enhance the United States’ deterrence posture, increase the readiness and responsiveness of United States Forces in Europe, support the collective defense and security of NATO Allies, and bolster the security and capacity of United States allies and partners. EDI has been vital to building the military readiness necessary to deter Russia and to respond in time of crisis. It remains critical to our mission. If confirmed, I will assess our EDI initiatives to determine the best way to maximize the use of this funding to support the stated objectives.

23. Senator BLACKBURN. General Cavoli, what shortfalls have you identified in the EDI's inability to deter Russian aggression in Europe effectively?

General CAVOLI. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has enabled us to increase our Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). In the current crisis, APS provided unmatched speed and flexibility in deploying a full Armored Brigade Combat Team to Europe, ready to fight, in remarkably short time. Moving forward, the sufficiency of EDI funding, objectives, and investment priorities must be informed by several factors, including: the status of the current conflict in Ukraine; the Russian threat; future Allied contributions; and the global security situation. If confirmed, my initial assessment will identify any capability shortfalls that may require additional EDI funding.

UKRAINE

24. Senator BLACKBURN. General Cavoli, how can we work with our European allies and partners to disincentivize Beijing's support of Russia?

General CAVOLI. Western unity in the face of Russia's unprovoked invasion of Ukraine has been critically important, and Beijing has taken notice. Given the importance of Western markets to China in comparison to China-Russia trade, a unified West signals that attempts to support Russia or help Russia circumvent sanctions will result in adverse, whole-of-government, international repercussions. Additionally, we must continue to signal that Chinese statements condemning NATO in support of Russia, or implicitly supporting Russia, will only bring NATO closer together.

25. Senator BLACKBURN. General Cavoli, have you seen any indication of sensitive information sharing by Chinese drone-maker DJI to Russian Forces in Ukraine?

General CAVOLI. No, I have not seen any indication of sensitive information sharing by DJI to Russian Forces in Ukraine.

TELECOMMUNICATION INFRASTRUCTURE

26. Senator BLACKBURN. General Cavoli, what countries seem most receptive and least receptive to warnings of China's malign intentions?

General CAVOLI. Since 2020, Europe has become increasingly aware of the risks associated with Chinese investment and activity and has become less tolerant of China's aggressive diplomacy. The UK, in particular, has grown increasingly wary of the challenges China presents since the unification of Hong Kong. Additionally, Lithuania recently demonstrated strong resolve in the face of Chinese malign influence by withdrawing from the 17+1 framework. Countries dependent on foreign investment and with weak regulatory frameworks seem the least receptive to warnings of China's malign intentions. Conversely, countries that are less reliant on external investment seem most receptive to warnings of China's malign intentions.

27. Senator BLACKBURN. General Cavoli, how does EUCOM's concept of operations need to change to account for Chinese electronic warfare and cyber capabilities?

General CAVOLI. USEUCOM conducts regular assessments of Chinese influence in Europe. USEUCOM is fully engaged with Joint Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations and Joint Cyber Operations, leveraging staff expertise and supporting organizations to ensure the command is equipped, trained, and ready to operate against a pacing adversary who continues to expand their global influence. USEUCOM works directly with USCYBERCOM, USSPACECOM, and USSTRATCOM to ensure coordination across cyber, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum to further develop capabilities to counter Chinese and Russian threats. If confirmed, I will ensure that USEUCOM continues to provide a strong demand signal on the intelligence community to understand China's use and employment of electronic warfare and cyber capabilities in the European Theater, the targets of these capabilities, and the intent behind their use. Additionally, USEUCOM will maintain a close collaboration with USINDOPACOM.

FINLAND AND SWEDEN JOINING NATO

28. Senator BLACKBURN. General Cavoli, what has been your understanding of President Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey's opposition regarding Finland and Sweden potentially joining NATO?

General CAVOLI. Turkey has expressed concern over Finland and Sweden's perceived support of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), but Finland and Sweden are in continuing talks with Turkey. While this is a challenge, I am optimistic that Tur-

key, Finland, and Sweden, in collaboration with NATO, will be able to work through this in a spirit of cooperation.

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOSH HAWLEY

WALES PLEDGE

29. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, you testified, “I know all of the land forces chiefs in NATO. Each one of them has a list of requirements. The requirements would all take more than 2 percent of GDP.” In your personal opinion, if more than 2 percent of GDP is required to meet allied land forces’ requirements—not to mention their air, naval, and other forces’ requirements—would you agree that 2 percent is no longer an adequate defense spending minimum for NATO allies?

General CAVOLI. I believe that in order to meet collective defense requirements, allies will have to spend at least 2 percent of GDP, as agreed to at the 2014 Wales Summit. If confirmed, I intend to encourage allies to invest the necessary funds to meet Article 3 obligations and field the capabilities required for collective defense.

30. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, you testified, “So I am an advocate of spending more than 2 percent, at least 2 percent.” To clarify, in your personal opinion, is it enough for NATO allies to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense—as implied by “at least”—or should they in fact be spending more than 2 percent of GDP on defense?

General CAVOLI. Given the new security environment, it is my personal opinion that allies will have to spend more than 2 percent of GDP. Following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, many allies are moving in this direction.

31. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, I asked Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady if he agreed that our NATO allies should be increasing defense spending beyond 2 percent of GDP. He responded, “Yes.” In your personal opinion, do you agree with Admiral Grady?

General CAVOLI. Yes.

32. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, I asked Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander if she agreed that “it is time for our NATO allies to move beyond the Wales Pledge and commit to increase defense spending above 2 percent.” She responded, “Yes.” In your personal opinion, do you agree with Dr. Wallander?

General CAVOLI. Yes.

33. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, is it fair to say that it would significantly help efforts to bolster deterrence in Europe—and reduce operational risk to United States Forces in the European theater—if our NATO allies raise defense spending above 2 percent?

General CAVOLI. Yes.

SIMULTANEITY DEMANDS

34. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, as you and I discussed, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) testified that the joint force would be “seriously challenged” to fight and win wars against China and Russia at the same time. This assessment is reflected in the force planning constructs in the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies. In your professional military judgment, do you agree with the CNO’s assessment?

General CAVOLI. I concur with the assessments of the CNO and the 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).

35. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, in your professional military judgment, what would it mean for EUCOM if United States Forces were drawn into a conflict against China, or if the United States was forced to withhold forces from Europe to deter or defeat Chinese opportunistic aggression?

General CAVOLI. A whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, and whole-of-alliance effort would be necessary to address a crisis or conflict with China. If confirmed as the USEUCOM Commander I would stand ready to support USINDOPACOM. NATO is a major asymmetric advantage that has supported the U.S. during past conflicts, and I am confident the Alliance would adapt to mitigate risk associated with U.S. global requirements.

36. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, in your professional military judgment, what specific capabilities do United States Forces currently provide in Europe that European allies could feasibly contribute instead?

General CAVOLI. The United States supports our allies across the European theater with a variety of forces across all domains, ranging from airborne assets, to maritime vessels, to ground forces. Many of those U.S. Forces provide capabilities that exist within our allies' military force structure to varying degrees. Fighter aircraft, airborne ISR platforms, cruisers, destroyers, and ground maneuver forces are a few of the specific capabilities that our European allies could contribute to a crisis or conflict involving the NATO Alliance.

UNITED STATES FORCE POSTURE IN EUROPE

37. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, the United States has deployed tens of thousands of additional forces to Europe since the beginning of the war in Ukraine. In your personal opinion, how long should the United States keep these additional forces in Europe, and under what conditions should the United States withdraw them from the European theater?

General CAVOLI. The situation on the ground in Ukraine, Allied contributions, and the evolution of the Russian threat must dictate our future actions and force posture. I anticipate that the force presence in the USEUCOM AOR will remain at current levels at least through the cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. Ultimately, it is important to consider an Alliance approach and coordinate our posture levels closely with NATO. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in Europe.

38. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, former Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs Wess Mitchell recently wrote: "The U.S. should also make better use of the large number of troops we have stationed in Western Europe by moving them east. The Stryker Brigade recently shifted from Germany to Romania should make its permanent home there, and the 173rd Airborne sent from Italy to Norway should make Norway its new home." Do you agree that we should move these units farther to the east, rather than keeping them in central Europe? Why or why not?

General CAVOLI. The forward stationing of United States and Allied forces in Eastern Europe involves multiple, complex strategic and operational considerations. At the strategic level, these include maintaining Alliance cohesion and strategic stability while contributing to an improvement in NATO's overall defensive posture. Operational factors include the systems, infrastructure, and facilities to preserve the warfighting readiness and mobility of United States Forces, as demonstrated in the response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Finally, relocating units within Europe is not the only approach to enhancing United States and NATO posture in Eastern Europe. Persistent presence in Eastern Europe can also be achieved through rotational deployments, exercises, and other means. Moving forward, we must preserve the ability to remain agile and quickly reinforce areas across Europe.

39. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, Dr. Mitchell also wrote, "The U.S. also has an inventory of weapons that it is in the process of decommissioning that could be given or sold to frontline NATO states, such as the F-15, F-16, and A-10 aircraft." Would frontline NATO states be able to make good use of aircraft, such as those listed by Dr. Mitchell, which the United States is currently in the process of decommissioning?

General CAVOLI. If confirmed, I will work with United States Air Forces in Europe, the United States Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the OSD to determine the appropriate distribution of divested U.S. aircraft. The U.S. Government has established procedures for allies and partners to request Excess Defense Articles. We continue to work closely with allies and partners to facilitate their requests.

NATO ENLARGEMENT

40. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, you testified, "I remain of the opinion, as I told you in our office call, that at least in the ground domain that [Finland and Sweden's prospective NATO accession] is not going to be a requirement for large additional forces or additional forces." How confident are you that Finland and Sweden's admission to NATO would not result in requirements for additional United States ground forces in Europe, and what gives you that level of confidence?

General CAVOLI. While additional exercises and other engagements are likely to grow, I am confident that the admission of Finland and Sweden to NATO would not

result in additional ground force basing requirements in Europe. I am confident in this assessment because both Finland and Sweden would bring very capable land forces into the Alliance. Finland maintains a large standing Army and the largest tube-artillery force in Europe. Sweden maintains a smaller, extremely professional land force. Both nations bring capability and capacity to NATO, and will bolster the Alliance's defenses, particularly in the Baltic Sea and High North.

41. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, you testified, "I think exercises and occasional presence like we do with any ally will increase." Can you elaborate on what you meant by "exercises and occasional presence . . . will increase"?

General CAVOLI. The United States and other NATO nations hold regular exercises throughout Europe. While Finland and Sweden already take part in many NATO-led exercises, I anticipate both nations will participate in additional NATO exercises throughout Europe, and host additional NATO exercises. Sweden is hosting BALTOPS22 (an annual NATO exercise focused in the Baltic Sea on anti-submarine warfare, mine countermeasures, and amphibious missions) from 5–17 June, which is an example of an increased exercise presence from the U.S. and other NATO Allies.

42. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, do you believe Ukraine should be admitted to NATO?

General CAVOLI. All sovereign states have the right to choose their own security arrangements, and NATO has an open door policy; however, NATO has provisions that prevent countries with significant border disputes from joining the Alliance. The President has made clear that the United States will continue to support Ukraine in its efforts to advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. If confirmed, I will evaluate the considerations associated with Ukraine's accession to NATO, in order to provide the best possible military advice to policy makers.

43. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, do you believe Georgia should be admitted to NATO?

General CAVOLI. All sovereign states have the right to choose their own security arrangements, and NATO has an open door policy; however, NATO has provisions that prevent countries with significant border disputes from joining the Alliance. If confirmed, I will evaluate the considerations associated with Georgia's accession to NATO, in order to provide the best possible military advice to policy makers.

STRATEGIC PRIORITIZATION

44. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, do you agree with Secretary Austin's designation of China as DOD's pacing threat and the Indo-Pacific as its priority theater?

General CAVOLI. Yes.

45. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, if the Indo-Pacific is DOD's priority theater, in your personal opinion, would you agree that Europe is necessarily a lower-priority theater?

General CAVOLI. I agree with the NDS characterization of China as our pacing threat and its designation of USINDOPACOM as our priority theater. However, current events show that there may be periods where areas outside the Indo-Pacific region rise in priority.

46. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady wrote for the record that DOD needs to do less in lower-priority theaters so it can focus more of its scarce resources on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, barring a significant increase in the defense budget. Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander—whose portfolio includes Europe—agreed. In your personal opinion, do you agree with the Vice Chairman's and Dr. Wallander's assessments that DOD must do less in lower-priority theaters?

General CAVOLI. I believe that DOD must focus its resources on priority theaters.

47. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, in your professional military judgment, do you believe the Russian threat to NATO is greater today than it was prior to its invasion of Ukraine, given significant degradation of its military manpower, equipment, and other capabilities during the conflict?

General CAVOLI. I believe that it is premature to draw significant conclusions about the potential degradation of Russia's conventional forces; the war is still going

on and is undecided. Russia remains the most significant threat to NATO for the near- to long-term due to its significant remaining arsenal, including nuclear weapons. Additionally, Russia's cyber, space, and information capabilities remain unaffected by the war in Ukraine and represent an enduring threat to the United States and our NATO Allies.

NUCLEAR FORCES

48. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, in March 2022, General Wolters supported retention of the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile program because it “exacerbates the challenge for potential enemies against us.” Do you agree with General Wolters?

General CAVOLI. Yes.

49. Senator HAWLEY. General Cavoli, how would strengthening conventional-nuclear integration support conventional deterrence in Europe?

General CAVOLI. A robust conventional-nuclear integration (CNI) capability provides USEUCOM and NATO with a means to complicate our adversaries' perceived benefit from pursuing nuclear escalation within a theater conflict. Our adversaries must know that engaging in a conflict with NATO is not worth the costs and will not result in successfully achieving their objectives. Our readiness to counter their nuclear threats provides credible deterrence across the entire spectrum of conflict.

[The nomination reference of General Christopher G. Cavoli, USA follows:]

NOMINATION REFERENCE AND REPORT

PN2049

AS IN EXECUTIVE SESSION,
SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES,
May 3, 2022.

Ordered, That the following nomination be referred to the Committee on Armed Services:

The following named officer for appointment in the United States Army to the grade indicated while assigned to a position of importance and responsibility under title 10, U.S.C., section 601:

To Be General

Gen. Christopher G. Cavoli, 7949

_____, 2022.
(Date)

Reported by Mr. Reed _____
(Signature)

with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed.

☐ The nominee has agreed to respond to requests to appear and testify before any duly constituted committee of the Senate.

[The biographical sketch of General Christopher G. Cavoli, USA, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the nomination was referred, follows:]



United States Army

General CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI

**Commanding General
United States Army Europe-Africa
Unit 29351 Box 96
APO AE 09014
Since: October 2020**



SOURCE OF COMMISSIONED SERVICE ROTC

EDUCATIONAL DEGREES

Princeton University – BS – Biology
Yale University – MA – Russian Studies

MILITARY SCHOOLS ATTENDED

Infantry Officer Basic Course
Armor Officer Advanced Course
United States Army Command and General Staff College
Senior Service College Fellowship - George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies
Joint and Combined Warfighting School

FOREIGN LANGUAGE(S) French, Russian, Italian

<u>PROMOTIONS</u>	<u>DATE OF APPOINTMENT</u>
2LT	27 May 87
1LT	18 Oct 89
CPT	1 May 92
MAJ	1 Oct 98
LTC	1 Sep 03
COL	1 Oct 08
BG	2 Jun 14
MG	2 Mar 17
LTG	18 Jan 18
GEN	1 Oct 20

FROM TO ASSIGNMENT

Oct 20	Present	Commanding General, United States Army Europe-Africa, Germany
Jan 18	Sep 20	Commanding General, United States Army Europe, Germany
Aug 16	Jan 18	Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division, Schofield Barracks, Hawaii
Jul 14	Jul 16	Commanding General, Joint Multinational Training Command, United States Army Europe, Germany
Aug 13	Jun 14	Deputy Commanding General (Operations), 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina
Jan 13	Aug 13	Director, Coordination Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC
Aug 12	Jan 13	Fellow, Strategic Studies Group, Office of the Chief of Staff, United States Army, Washington, DC
Jun 11	Jul 12	Deputy Commander, Regional Command-West, International Security Assistance Force,

			OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan
Apr 11	Jun 11		Student, Joint and Combined Warfighting School, Joint Forces Staff College, Norfolk, Virginia
Jul 09	Apr 11		Commander, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas
Aug 08	Jun 09		Army War College Fellow, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, Germany
Jul 07	Jul 08		Professor/Deputy Course Director, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, Germany
May 05	Jun 07		Commander, 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 3d Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York and OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan
Jun 04	May 05		Senior Military Fellow, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Apr 03	Jun 04		Deputy Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Jun 01	Apr 03		Political Military Planner (Russia), Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, Joint Staff, Washington, DC
Apr 00	May 01		Operations Officer, 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 1st Brigade Combat Team, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York
Jul 99	Apr 00		Chief, Future Operations, G-3, 10th Mountain Division (Light), Fort Drum, New York and OPERATION JOINT FORGE, Bosnia
May 98	Jun 99		Student, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Jul 97	May 98		Senior Fellow/Foreign Area Officer, Eurasia, George C. Marshall Center for Security Studies, Germany
Dec 95	Jun 97		Student, Yale University, New Haven, Connecticut
Sep 94	Dec 95		Student, Defense Language Institute, Monterey, California
Jan 93	Sep 94		Commander, B Company, 5th Ranger Training Battalion, Camp Frank D. Merrill, Georgia
Jul 92	Jan 93		Assistant Operations Officer, 5th Ranger Training Battalion, Camp Frank D. Merrill, Georgia
Dec 91	Jun 92		Student, Armor Officer Advanced Course, United States Army Armor School, Fort Knox, Kentucky
Aug 90	Dec 91		Operations Air Officer, 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry Regiment (Airborne), United States Army Southern European Task Force, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Italy and OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, Iraq
Sep 89	Aug 90		Operations Liaison Officer, later Anti-Armor Platoon Leader, Combat Support Company, 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry Regiment (Airborne), United States Army Southern European Task Force, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Italy
Feb 88	Sep 89		Platoon Leader, later Executive Officer, B Company, 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry Regiment (Airborne), United States Army Southern European Task Force, United States Army Europe and Seventh Army, Italy

SUMMARY OF JOINT ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Senior Military Fellow, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Jun 04 - May 05	Lieutenant Colonel
Deputy Executive Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Apr 03 - Jun 04	Lieutenant Colonel
Political Military Planner (Russia), Strategic Plans and Policy Directorate, J-5, Joint Staff, Washington, DC	Jun 01 - Apr 03	Major

SUMMARY OF OPERATIONAL ASSIGNMENTS

	<u>DATE</u>	<u>GRADE</u>
Deputy Commander, Regional Command-West, International Security Assistance Force, OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan	Jun 11 - Jul 12	Colonel
Commander, 1st Battalion, 32d Infantry Regiment, 10th Mountain Division (Light), OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM, Afghanistan	Mar 06 - Jun 07	Lieutenant Colonel
Chief, Future Operations, G-3, 10th Mountain Division (Light), OPERATION JOINT FORGE, Bosnia	Jul 99 - Mar 00	Major
Operations Air Officer, 3d Battalion, 325th Infantry Regiment	Apr 91 - Aug 91	First Lieutenant

(Airborne), United States Army Southern European Task Force, and
OPERATION PROVIDE COMFORT, Iraq

US DECORATIONS AND BADGES

Distinguished Service Medal
Defense Superior Service Medal
Legion of Merit (with 2 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
Bronze Star Medal (with 1 Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
Defense Meritorious Service Medal
Meritorious Service Medal (with 4 Bronze Oak Leaf Clusters)
Joint Service Commendation Medal (with 1 Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Commendation Medal (with 1 Bronze Oak Leaf Cluster)
Army Achievement Medal
Combat Infantryman Badge
Expert Infantryman Badge
Master Parachutist Badge
Ranger Tab
Pathfinder Badge
Office of the Secretary of Defense Identification Badge
Joint Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge
Army Staff Identification Badge

[The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior military officers nominated by the President to positions requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a form that details the biographical, financial, and other information of the nominee. The form executed by General Christopher G. Cavoli, USA in connection with his nomination follows:]

117th CONGRESS, 2021 -- 2022
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
ROOM SR-228
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510-6050

SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE QUESTIONNAIRE
INFORMATION REQUESTED OF NOMINEES
FOR CERTAIN SENIOR MILITARY POSITIONS

INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NOMINEE: Answer all questions and provide all requested information. If more space is needed, attach an additional sheet of paper to the Questionnaire and cite the part of the Questionnaire and the question number (e.g., A-9, B-4) to which the continuation of your answer applies. Unless otherwise required, an answer of "yes", "no", or "not applicable" is appropriate.

QUESTIONNAIRE, PART A

NOTE: Information furnished in this part of the Questionnaire will be made available in Committee offices for public inspection prior to the hearing, if any, and will be entered in the hearing record, also available to the public.

BIOGRAPHICAL INFORMATION TO BE MADE PUBLIC

1. Name (Include any former names you have used): Christopher G. Cavoli
2. Position to which nominated: Commander, United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe
3. Date of nomination:
4. Government experience (List any advisory, consultative, honorary, and other part-time service or positions with Federal, State, or local governments, other than those listed in the service record extract provided to the Committee by the applicable agency/department/board): None
5. Business relationships (List all positions currently held as an officer, director, trustee, partner, proprietor, agent, representative, or consultant of any corporation, firm, partnership, or other business enterprise, and of any educational or other institution): None

6. Memberships (List all memberships and offices that you currently hold, as well as any memberships and offices you have previously held, in professional, fraternal, scholarly, civic, business, charitable, and other organizations):

Member, Association of the US Army (professional organization)
 Member, Ivy Club, Princeton NJ (fraternal organization)
 Member, 25th Infantry Division Association (professional organization)

7. Honors and awards (List all scholarships, fellowships, honorary degrees, honorary society memberships, and any other special recognition received for outstanding service or achievements, in addition to those listed in the service record extract and biographical provided to the Committee by the agency or department):

4-year undergraduate ROTC scholarship, Princeton University, 1983-1987
 The Honorable Order of St. Barbara (US Army Field Artillery)
 The Honorable Order of St. Maurice (US Army Infantry)
 Honorary Doctorate, University of Maryland Global Campus

COMMITMENTS IN FURTHERANCE OF CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT

NOTE: In order to exercise their legislative and oversight responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress timely receive testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information from the executive branch. A simple “yes” or “no” response is appropriate.

8. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and other appropriate Committees of Congress?
 Yes.
9. Do you agree, if confirmed, and when asked before this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate Committees of Congress to give your personal views, even if those views differ from the position of the Administration?
 Yes.
10. Do you agree, if confirmed, to provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and to do so timely? Yes.
11. Do you agree, if confirmed, to consult with this Committee, its subcommittees,

other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information requested of you? Yes.

12. Do you agree, if confirmed, to keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate Committees of Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports, records—including documents and electronic communications, and other information you or your organization previously provided? Yes.
13. Do you agree, if confirmed, and on request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent a formal Committee request? Yes.
14. Do you agree, if confirmed, to respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of this Committee? Yes.
15. Do you agree, if confirmed, to ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Yes.

[The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E are contained in the committee's executive files.]

SIGNATURE AND DATE

I hereby state that I have read and signed Parts A and B of the foregoing Senate Armed Services Committee Questionnaire, and that the information provided therein, and in any document appended thereto, is, to the best of my knowledge and belief, current, accurate, and complete.



Christopher G. Cavoli
General, United States Army

This 19th day of November, 2021

[The nomination of General Christopher G. Cavoli, USA was reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 15, 2022, with the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 23, 2022.]

