    [Senate Hearing 117-1001]
    [From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

                                                         S. Hrg. 117-1001

                  THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER
                    G. CAVOLI, USA FOR REAPPOINTMENT TO
                    THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COM-
                    MANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COM-
                    MAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
                    EUROPE
    =======================================================================

                                    HEARING

                                   BEFORE THE

                          COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
                              UNITED STATES SENATE

                        ONE HUNDRED SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS

                                 SECOND SESSION

                                   __________

                                  MAY 26, 2022

                                   __________

             Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services

    [GRAPHIC NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                     Available via: http://www.govinfo.gov

                                    __________

                         U.S. GOVERNMENT PUBLISHING OFFICE
    63-567 PDF                  WASHINGTON : 2026
    =======================================================================
                         COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

    �JACK REED, Rhode Island, Chairman	JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
    �
    JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire		ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
    KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York		DEB FISCHER, Nebraska
    RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut		TOM COTTON, Arkansas
    MAZIE K. HIRONO, Hawaii			MIKE ROUNDS, South Dakota
    TIM KAINE, Virginia			JONI ERNST, Iowa
    ANGUS S. KING, Jr., Maine		THOM TILLIS, North Carolina
    ELIZABETH WARREN, Massachusetts		DAN SULLIVAN, Alaska
    GARY C. PETERS, Michigan		KEVIN CRAMER, North Dakota
    JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia		RICK SCOTT, Florida
    TAMMY DUCKWORTH, Illinois		MARSHA BLACKBURN, Tennessee
    JACKY ROSEN, Nevada			JOSH HAWLEY, Missouri
    MARK KELLY, Arizona                  	TOMMY TUBERVILLE, Alabama
    �
    �
    �		    Elizabeth L. King, Staff Director
    � 		John D. Wason, Minority Staff Director

                                      (ii)

                             C O N T E N T S
    _________________________________________________________________

                                  may 26, 2022

                                                                       Page
    The Nomination of General Christopher G. Cavoli, USA for              1
      Reappointment to the Grade of General and to be Commander,
      United States European Command and Supreme Allied Commander,
      Europe.

                               Members Statements

    Reed, Senator Jack...............................................     1

    Inhofe, Senator James M..........................................     3

                               Witness Statements

    Cavoli, General Christopher G., USA for Reappointment to the          3
      Grade of General and to be Commander, United States European
      Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe.

      Advance Policy Questions.......................................    32

      Questions for the Record.......................................    48

      Nomination Reference and Report................................    57

      Biographical Sketch............................................    58

      Committee on Armed Services Questionnaire......................    61

      Signature Page.................................................    64

                                     (iii)

                  This hearing is printed to include all available
                    information
                    requested or required to be inserted for the
                    record.

                                      (iv)

    THE NOMINATION OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, USA FOR REAPPOINTMENT
      TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER, UNITED STATES EUROPEAN
                  COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE

                                  ----------

                             THURSDAY, MAY 26, 2022

                                  United States Senate,
                                   Committee on Armed Services,
                                                        Washington, DC.
        The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m. in room
    SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Jack Reed
    (Chairman of the Committee) presiding.
        Committee Members present: Senators Reed, Shaheen,
    Gillibrand, Blumenthal, Hirono, King, Warren, Peters, Manchin,
    Rosen, Kelly, Inhofe, Fischer, Cotton, Rounds, Ernst, Tillis,
    Sullivan, Scott, Hawley, and Tuberville.

                 OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR JACK REED

        Chairman Reed. Good morning. The Committee meets today to
    consider the nomination of General Christopher Cavoli to be the
    next Commander of U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied
    Commander, Europe. General, your nomination is well deserved,
    and I thank you for your willingness to lead in this important
    position. We welcome your wife, Christina, parents, Ivo and
    Rita, and thank your father for his distinguished service in
    the United States Army, your brother, Stephen, and we thank him
    for his distinguished service in the United States Army, and
    your sister-in-law, Michele, who are with us today. We thank
    them for their continued support of your service, and again,
    their own distinguished service to the Nation themselves.
        Your current role as the Commanding General of U.S Army
    Europe and Africa has no doubt provided you with critical
    experience and insights which will serve you well if confirmed
    in this new role. Your career spans nearly 35 years with
    distinguished service across multiple theaters and in close
    collaboration with allies and partners across the globe.
        Further, you have studied the challenges in Europe from
    numerous vantage points, including your current leadership in
    assisting our Ukrainian partners and reassuring our NATO
    allies. You have also served as Russia Director on the Joint
    Staff and studied these issues in academia, including earning a
    master's degree in Russian and East European studies and
    serving as a fellow at the George C. Marshall Center for
    Security Studies in Germany.
        If confirmed, you will take command in the midst of the
    greatest test of the NATO alliance since World War II. The
    alliance has shown remarkable unity and resolve in the face of
    Russia's unprovoked and illegal attack on Ukraine. A formidable
    array of our allies have joined together and, in response to
    Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the United States and our NATO
    allies and partners have mobilized with impressive speed to
    bolster Ukrainian resolve, reinforce credible combat power
    along the eastern flank, and impose severe costs on Russia's
    elite. Putin's actions have drastically altered the European
    security landscape, NATO unity has been solidified, countries
    like Sweden and Finland have officially applied to join the
    alliance, and others, like Germany, are taking steps to invest
    greater portions of their national budgets and institutional
    energies to improve their military capabilities.
        Ensuring the alliance is able to generate and maintain the
    collective force posture, operations, and investments to deter
    Russian aggression will be a primary responsibility for the
    next EUCOM Commander.
        General, with NATO set to announce a new strategic concept
    at its summit in Madrid in June, I would like to know your
    views on the current plans for United States Military presence
    and posture in the EUCOM area of responsibility. I also hope
    you will share your thoughts on how the United States and our
    allies should begin to reassess the security environment
    fundamentally altered by Russia's invasion of Ukraine.
        Unlike the threat from Russia, for which there is little
    disagreement among our European partners as to the size and
    scope of the issue, our allies have a range of views on the
    challenges posed by China. Beijing's growing economic influence
    and diplomatic presence in Europe, coupled with its growing
    military relationship with Russia, may have serious
    implications for transatlantic economy and security. In 2019,
    the NATO allies agreed to mention China for the first time in a
    NATO declaration, stating that, ``China's growing influence and
    international policies present both opportunities and
    challenges that we need to address together as an Alliance.''
    The next EUCOM Commander will have to work with the interagency
    and across the alliance to address Chinese malign influence
    within the region. General, I hope you will share what
    expectations you have with regard to NATO's developing China
    policy and what steps can be taken to mitigate this growing
    threat.
        Finally, as we reflect on the realities of 21st century
    warfare on display in Ukraine, the Committee would benefit from
    hearing what lessons you would bring to prepare our forces for
    any potential future conflict. We would also benefit from
    insights from your current post at United States Army Europe
    and Africa, particularly in areas such as military mobility,
    large-scale multilateral exercises, and engagements with
    partners and allies across the theater. I hope you will share
    how you would intend to use such insights if confirmed as the
    next EUCOM Commander.
        Thank you again, General, for your continued willingness to
    serve, and I look forward to your testimony.
        Let me now recognize the Ranking Member, Senator Inhofe.

                  STATEMENT OF SENATOR JAMES M. INHOFE

        Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you and
    General Cavoli for your willingness to continue your
    distinguished service to our country.
        I enjoyed meeting your wife, your parents, and other family
    members earlier this morning, and they are with us today, and I
    just know how proud they are of you in the service you have
    given to your country.
        I will note that you were born in Europe during one of your
    father's tours there, so it is clear that you were destined to
    fill this role we are discussing here today.
        We are considering your nomination to lead the United
    States and NATO forces in Europe at a pivotal point in our
    history.
        Russia's unprovoked, unjustified invasion of Ukraine has
    been a wakeup call to the free world that we need to deter
    Putin, not accommodate him, not appease him, as some would want
    to do to deter him.
        But it was not a surprise to many of us here today, who
    also understand that protecting America's interests means
    supporting Ukraine's defense and working to deter further
    Russian aggression against NATO.
        I am encouraged that Europe is now stepping up their
    investment in its own defense. With Finland and Sweden now
    seeking NATO membership in response to Putin's reckless acts,
    we have got to keep up this momentum to strengthen our shared
    security.
        We have seen what happens in Ukraine when deterrence fails.
    That is why I have long advocated that we invest more in our
    own defense to ensure deterrence does not fail in even worse
    ways.
        I do not want anyone to forget that China is supporting
    both what Russia is doing in Ukraine and China has long been
    involved in malign activity in Europe itself.
        General Cavoli, you are the right man for the job during
    these exceptional times, and I look forward to working with you
    on bolstering United States security interests with our
    European allies and partners.
        Thank you. Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
        General Cavoli, your remarks, please.

          STATEMENT OF GENERAL CHRISTOPHER G. CAVOLI, USA FOR
      REAPPOINTMENT TO THE GRADE OF GENERAL AND TO BE COMMANDER,
     UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND AND SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER,
                                 EUROPE

        General Cavoli. Thank you, Chairman. Good morning, Chairman
    Reed, Ranking Member Inhofe, and distinguished Members of the
    Senate Armed Services Committee. Thank you for the opportunity
    to appear before you today, and thank you for the support that
    you provide to our service men and women and to their families.
        I am humbled to be nominated to serve as the Commander of
    U.S. European Command and as the Supreme Allied Commander,
    Europe. I am grateful to President Biden, to Secretary Austin,
    and to General Milley for the trust and the confidence that
    they place in me, especially at this momentous time in Europe.
        I must, of course, start by thanking the person who has
    made the most difference to me throughout my career, my wife
    and my best friend, Christina. Being a military spouse is not
    easy. There are routine separations, constant moves, and the
    tragedies of war. Christina has handled all of this with
    dignity and with grace. She has selflessly supported our
    soldiers and their families, even while raising our own two
    sons, Alex and Nick. I am so proud that we can share this
    moment together today.
        I would also like to thank my sons. Alex graduated
    Princeton and works at a clean energy start-up company in
    California, and his younger brother, Nick, is studying physics
    at the University of California in Santa Barbara. These two
    have followed me all over the world, they attended three high
    schools each, and I could not be more proud of the young
    Americans that they have turned out to be.
        As I talk about my family I reflect on my own life. As the
    Ranking Member pointed out, my dad is an Italian immigrant. He
    came to America and became a U.S. Army officer. I was born in a
    military hospital in Wurzburg, Germany during the Cold War.
    Over the years we lived in Europe again and again. We were
    blessed with multiple assignments there.
        For the past 4\1/2\ years I have been fortunate to command
    our United States Army Forces in Europe, and for the past year
    in Africa too. I have had the priceless opportunity to work
    closely with the interagency, our allies, and our partners to
    advance our common national security objectives.
        For the last 3 years I have done so under the leadership of
    General Tod Wolters. I would like here to publicly thank him
    for his mentorship and for his leadership during that time.
        I would also like to thank you, the United States Congress,
    and especially this Committee. Since my first tour as a general
    officer in Europe in 2014, the Congress has worked tirelessly
    to support our service men and women in our mission. The
    European Deterrence Initiative, which you have repeatedly
    authorized, has been absolutely vital to building the military
    readiness necessary to deter Russia and to respond in times of
    crisis.
        In response to this crisis, the illegal and unprovoked
    Russian invasion of Ukraine, the United States Military has
    deployed significant combat power on short notice. The Fifth
    Corps headquarters, an armored brigade combat team, withdrew
    prepositioned stocks, the 18th Airborne Corps headquarters with
    a brigade from the 82nd Airborne Division, a carrier strike
    group, fifth-generation fighters, additional destroyers--all of
    this has been enabled by the European Deterrence Initiative and
    by the hard work of training and exercising that the EDI has
    enabled over the years.
        If confirmed, I look forward to continuing to build on this
    vital work, ensuring that EUCOM remains ready to respond, along
    with our allies and partners, to any threat to our national
    security.
        In Europe, the core security challenge is Russia. Russia's
    unprovoked invasion of Ukraine ushers in a new era in European
    security. NATO is more energized and unified than I have seen
    in years. Our allies and partners have rushed with us to assist
    Ukraine to remain independent and free, and on the far side it
    will be up to us all to reestablish an enduring stability.
        But Russia is not our only challenge. China's growing
    influence is also of huge concern, as are terrorism, migration,
    cybersecurity, and climate change. So we cannot be a one-
    problem alliance. We must maintain vigilance across 360
    degrees, ready to respond to any and all threats.
        We are in a time when unity in the alliance is of the
    greatest importance. Our allies will be our strength as we go
    forward. If confirmed, I will work closely with this Committee
    and will provide my best military advice with the goal of
    promoting our security interests and defending the principles
    that we have all fought so hard for over these years.
        It has been an honor to serve this country for the past 35
    years. If confirmed, I will be thankful for the opportunity to
    continue to serve alongside the brave service men and women of
    EUCOM and of our NATO allies.
        I thank this Committee once again for your time today and
    for the opportunity to speak with you. I very much look forward
    to your questions.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
        There are a series of question which nominees must respond
    to. Please respond appropriately.
        Have you adhered to applicable laws and regulations
    governing conflicts of interest?
        General Cavoli. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Have you assumed any duties or taken any
    actions that would appear to presume the outcome of the
    confirmation process?
        General Cavoli. No, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Exercising our legislative and oversight
    responsibilities makes it important that this Committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of the Congress
    receive testimonies, briefings, reports, records, and other
    information from the Executive branch on a timely basis. Do you
    agree, if confirmed, to appear and testify before this
    Committee, when requested?
        General Cavoli. I do, Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree, when asked before this
    Committee, to give your personal views, even if your views
    differ from the Administration?
        General Cavoli. Yes, I do.
        Chairman Reed. Do you agree to provide records, documents,
    and electronic communications in a timely manner when requested
    by this Committee, its subcommittees, or other appropriate
    committees of Congress and to consult with the requestor
    regarding the basis for any good faith delay or denial in
    providing such records?
        General Cavoli. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will you ensure that your staff applies the
    deadlines established by this Committee for the production of
    reports, records, and other information, including timely
    responding to hearing questions for the record?
        General Cavoli. I will, sir.
        Chairman Reed. Will you cooperate in providing witnesses
    and briefers in response to congressional request?
        General Cavoli. Yes.
        Chairman Reed. Will those witnesses and briefers be
    protected from reprisal for their testimony or briefings?
        General Cavoli. Yes, they will.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General.
        I think it is both significant and maybe a bit ironic that
    we first met in Ukraine in about 2014, when you were leading
    the efforts to start organized training efforts and support
    efforts for Ukrainian forces. I think your work then has shown
    itself to be extraordinarily useful today, so thank you for
    that.
        Part of what you pointed out in your testimony is a unity
    among NATO and a commitment to invest seriously in defense, and
    that raises two questions. Your quick thoughts about how you
    are going to coordinate the investment of NATO countries so
    that everyone does not buy X and we do not have any Y, and then
    what should the United States do as a catalyst but also as the
    leading member?
        General Cavoli. Senator, if I could start with the second
    question first. I think the U.S.'s special role inside NATO is
    to point the way toward the future and to demonstrate with our
    actions how to go in that direction. So by deploying force we
    have led the way for NATO in this crisis, as an example. As we
    arm our own military we create a model that other nations in
    the alliance can emulate.
        In my current role I spend a lot of time talking with the
    chiefs of other European armies about how we arm ourselves, how
    we organize ourselves, and many of them use those lessons or
    those examples as models for themselves. So I think inside NATO
    our special role is to be a model and an exemplar.
        How will we coordinate the investments as we go forward?
    This is always a devilish thing to do. It can be very
    difficult. There is an initiative inside NATO right now to link
    plans to required structure to national commitment. General
    Wolters has begun that and has advanced that. It will fall to
    me, if I am confirmed, to complete that work, and that work
    will guide the capabilities and capacities that we need from
    various nations and in support of NATO's planning efforts.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General. To date, NATO
    and communities around the world have been able to move
    logistics into Europe without any type of interruption. Indeed,
    I think there is a question of how long that might be allowed.
    But in a potential fight the idea of uncontested logistics is
    probably the first thing you throw out.
        Are you preparing for a situation in this context or other
    context, for fighting to get your logistics forward to your
    troops?
        General Cavoli. We are, Senator. In United States Army
    Europe this is a source of significant concern as we look at
    our plans, especially our plans to reinforce our forces in
    Europe in the event of a large crisis. When we look at it we
    divide it from the U.S., from fort to port, and then from port
    to port across the Atlantic, and then from port to the point of
    need in Europe. Each one of those segments carries its own
    challenges and has different people responsible for solving
    those problems.
        So we work in a partnership with USTRANSCOM and with the
    U.S. Army to get Army forces from fort to port. We work with
    USTRANSCOM as well as the Second Fleet and JFC Norfolk, a newly
    stood-up command, to control the sea lanes of the Atlantic to
    go from port to port, and then I am largely responsible, with
    our NATO allies and related organizations such as the Joint
    Support and Enabling Command, recently stood up by NATO, to get
    folks from port to the point of need.
        Each one brings different challenges. Those challenges
    could be the threat of kinetic strike or the threat of cyber
    activity, and so forth. So yes, we work very hard on that,
    Senator.
        Chairman Reed. You mentioned the issue of cyber, and I
    think many people are waiting for the shoe to drop, vis-a-vis
    the Russian cyber in this present situation. This is an open
    hearing, but are there any comments you would like to make
    about that?
        General Cavoli. Well, Senator, I think we are correct to be
    waiting for the other shoe to drop. There is capability and
    capacity that could be used, and we are being very vigilant
    about that, as the DoD. To go far beyond that I think we would
    have to go into a classified setting, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, General, and again, I
    think your service not only justifies this confirmation but
    demands it. Thank you very much.
        General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Senator Inhofe, please.
        Senator Inhofe. Thank you. I appreciate that and I echo
    your comments about the background of our witness today. We
    have had an opportunity to discuss a number of things over the
    years, and we discussed the subject of the Ukraine grain
    shortage and the spillover effects that are there, in my
    office. There are three questions that come from that, that
    should be a part of the record that we will build today on this
    issue.
        That is, first of all, how concerned are you by the food
    crisis that has resulted from Russia blocking Ukrainian grain
    exports to Africa? You know that I have had an interest in this
    for quite some time. Secondly, what will be the longer-term
    security effects of this, and what more should we do with our
    European and African allies and partners to address these
    problems now?
        General Cavoli. Senator, thank you. Indeed, in my role as
    the Commanding General of United States Army Forces in Africa
    this has weighed pretty heavily on our minds. The grain
    shortages that we are experiencing from both Russia and
    Ukrainian production being unable to come out of the countries
    in large volume or being sanctioned and not being sold are
    being felt on the African continent. They were felt very
    quickly. I was recently in Kenya, and there was significant
    impact there already. We know that in other countries, such as
    Tunisia, the prices have skyrocketed for basic foodstuffs.
        So there is food insecurity in Africa that is being
    provoked by the shortage of grain. It is of great concern. In
    many cases these are countries that do not need an additional
    challenge, and those additional challenges we will have to help
    them with at some point. This will largely be a European
    concern because of the close connection between African
    security issues and European security issues.
        With regard to what to do about it, there are many
    proposals, Senator, being batted about right now, many
    different ways. Some of them are very positive. We think there
    are about 20 million tons, 22 million tons of grain in Ukraine
    backed up, waiting to be pulled out. Some of the ports we are
    attempting to use, the Romanians have made the port of
    Constanta available. It only does about 90,000 tons a day. But
    the German Deutsche Bahn has recently stepped up. That is the
    German national railroad agency, and they are doing what they
    call a Berlin trainlift, an analogy to the Berlin airlift, to
    dedicate trains to pulling wheat right out of Ukraine into
    Western Europe. Poland has established a new border crossing
    regime with Germany in order to facilitate that.
        So I think some efforts are taking place. Much more remains
    to be done, Senator.
        Senator Inhofe. Good. Very good.
        General Cavoli, General Wolters testified before this
    Committee, and it sounds almost impossible, but he said our
    troops' ability to deploy from the United States and be up and
    running in less than a week to deter further Russian aggression
    was made possible by the funding through the European
    Deterrence Initiative. This Committee spearheaded this
    initiative after Russia's first invasion in 2014.
        Do you agree with General Wolters' assessment, and what
    ways have you seen the EDI enable our robust response? It is
    very difficult to understand that this was possible.
        General Cavoli. Senator, with EDI over the past few years
    the U.S. Army, in conjunction with U.S. European Command, has
    placed large amounts of very modern equipment, brigade combat
    team sets, in storage in Europe, and we have also used the
    funding to practice flying over and drawing that equipment on
    short notice. In the beginning of this crisis, when we got the
    order to activate and deploy the first brigade of the Third
    Infantry Division out of Fort Stewart, Georgia, we were able to
    do so very quickly. We moved all the troops in about 4 days, by
    aircraft, and those troops, the first of them were putting
    rounds downrange in less than a week, and by the end of 3 weeks
    every single screwdriver in the brigade has been issued and
    they were ready to roll anyplace.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah, and that could not have been done, it
    would not be possible, and a lot of people thought it was not
    possible, if it had not been for the preparation that you
    mentioned that you had the foresight to ready yourselves.
        General Cavoli. One hundred percent, sir.
        Senator Inhofe. Yeah. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Inhofe.
        Senator Shaheen, please.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cavoli,
    congratulations on your nomination.
        General Cavoli. Thank you.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you for being here this morning and
    for your service, and welcome to your family as well.
        You were kind enough to meet recently with Senator Tillis
    and I to talk about some NATO issues, but we also talked a
    little bit about, as I recall, a little bit our recent visit to
    the Balkans, where we were in Bosnia Herzegovina and talked
    with the military leadership of the EUFOR mission and NATO
    there about some of the challenges that are facing Bosnia and
    concern about whether EUFOR is going to be reauthorized this
    fall when it comes up again before the U.N.
        I wonder if you could, as we think about the potential for
    Russian meddling in the Balkans--and they have a history of
    doing that--and the challenges that Bosnia Herzegovina faces,
    can you talk about what the impact would be if the EUFOR
    mission is not renewed?
        General Cavoli. Senator, first of all Russian influence in
    the Balkans is real and it is not a positive force, in my
    experience, so it is something we must think about constantly.
    The presence of multinational forces, such as KFOR in Kosovo
    and EUFOR in Bosnia Herzegovina is an important part of our
    ability to monitor and to help control the situations there.
        I do believe EUFOR has an important mandate. If EUFOR's
    mandate is not renewed I believe that there must be some effort
    that takes its place. If I am confirmed, I will look into that
    immediately and participate in the development of options, and
    I look forward to discussing it with you in the future,
    Senator.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I am really pleased to hear
    that. I think that it is very important that we work with our
    European partners and ensure that we do not see that mission
    expire and nothing replace it, so thank you very much for that.
        You spoke earlier with Senator Inhofe about the challenges
    of getting the grain out of Ukraine that is needed in so many
    parts of the world. One of the biggest challenges has been the
    Russian really predominance in the Black Sea and the inability
    to dislodge them. I wonder if you could talk a little bit about
    how what we might do there to bolster NATO defenses in the
    Black Sea, what options we might have as we are looking at the
    challenges we face because of Russia's dominance in the Black
    Sea.
        General Cavoli. Yes, ma'am. For some time before the onset
    of this crisis, that is for a couple of years before this
    current crisis, we in USEUCOM had been working on strengthening
    the presence and the role of the U.S. and NATO in the Black Sea
    area. This has been something we are working on for some time.
        Naval Forces Europe, for example, has been working with the
    Bulgarians on a maritime domain awareness system. My command,
    the United States Army in Europe, has been working on long-
    range fires with the Romanian Army and the establishment of
    command and control nodes that are able to handle the very
    high-end new equipment that Romania has been buying from us,
    specifically Patriot missiles, and HIMARS rocket launchers.
        So we have been looking at things like that in the past,
    Senator, and we will continue to do those in the future, if I
    am confirmed.
        Senator Shaheen. So do you think we have an adequate
    strategy within NATO and in the United States for the Black Sea
    region?
        General Cavoli. Ma'am, I think inside the U.S. we have a
    strategy, you know, adequate. All strategies have to be
    assessed, reviewed, and updated all the time. Clearly the
    current events in the Black Sea region are going to require us
    to go back and make sure that we adjust everything for the
    result of this conflict. I think I could say the same thing for
    the NATO approach, but I will have to wait, and if I am
    confirmed, look into exactly what NATO is planning in that
    regard and come back to you on that.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I look forward to that.
        Finally, the Administration recently appointed retired
    General Wolff as the Ukraine Security Assistance Coordinator,
    which I think was a very positive move. Can you talk about how
    the relationships with General Wolff as coordinator will work
    as you think about your role in coordinating security with the
    Ukrainians?
        General Cavoli. Senator, only briefly because that is still
    working its way out right now. We encourage the efforts to
    coordinate. That is one of the difficult things in this overall
    collective effort. I saw Terry Wolff a couple of weeks ago in
    Ramstein, and we had a couple of words about it. But if I am
    confirmed, I look forward to working with him to make sure that
    all of these systems work together closely.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I look forward to hearing more.
        General Cavoli. Thank you, ma'am.
        Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Shaheen.
        Senator Cotton, please.
        Senator Cotton. General, congratulations on your
    nomination. Thank you for your career of distinguished service.
    Thanks to your wife, Christina, for supporting you and no doubt
    supporting the families of the troops you have led over the
    years, and thanks to your family for their service. The defense
    of this Nation is often a family affair.
        I want to discuss the request by Finland and Sweden to join
    NATO. That is a political decision that will be made by the
    President and this Senate as well as 29 other NATO members. But
    NATO is foremost a military alliance, so I would like to get
    your professional military judgment on the implications of
    adding Sweden and Finland to NATO. What do you think it will do
    to bolster our common defense to have Sweden and Finland as
    members of NATO?
        General Cavoli. Senator, I look forward to the accession of
    Finland and Sweden to the alliance from the military
    perspective. Each of those militaries brings quite a bit of
    capability and capacity to the alliance from day one. For
    example, Finland has a large army, well equipped, very well
    trained, very quickly expandable, exercised very frequently,
    and absolutely expert in defending the borderline that it has
    with Russia for these past decades, an expertise that they
    demonstrated in 1939, and has built on ever since.
        Finland, in addition to its big army, has F-15 fighter jets
    and has just decided to buy 64 F-35s, so they will arrive
    bringing capacity and capability to the alliance.
        Sweden is the same thing, a smaller army but a very capable
    army, and an army that is growing. My colleague, Karl
    Engelbrektson, has a 200 percent increase in his acquisition
    budget over a 5-year period. They have recently bought Patriots
    and are contemplating buying some other equipment. We work with
    them very closely. Critically, they bring a navy in the Baltic
    Sea, which will be of enormous military significance to the
    alliance.
        Then if we look geographically with the accession of those
    two countries, the entire Black Sea, with the exception of a
    couple of few kilometers, will be coastline of NATO nations,
    which will create a very different geometry in the area, sir.
        Senator Cotton. I think you mean the entire Baltic Sea,
    right?
        General Cavoli. I am sorry. Of course, the Baltic Sea.
        Senator Cotton. Can you speak specifically about what it
    means for Russia's Baltic fleet to now have the northern shores
    of the Gulf of Finland a part of NATO, since the southern
    shore, Estonia, already is, and then also what it means to have
    Gotland, a large Swedish island, in the middle of the Baltic
    fleet? What does that mean to Russia's Baltic fleet and their
    defense planning?
        General Cavoli. Well, sir, in the most generic sense it
    provides a bunch of different dilemmas, almost geometric
    dilemmas that Russia does not have right now as they sail forth
    from Saint Petersburg and Kaliningrad. So it will be
    advantageous.
        Senator Cotton. You mentioned one other key feature of
    geographic which is the 800-mile border that Finland has with
    Russia. Some might say, gosh, this exposes NATO to a lot more
    risk because you have this large border. It sounds like your
    perspective is that rather than exposing NATO to risk it
    exposes Russia to greater risk and complicates Russia's defense
    planning. Could you elaborate?
        General Cavoli. I do think that, Senator. I think that for
    a couple of reasons. First of all, Russia has not historically
    put too many ground forces on that border. It has been an
    economy of force theater for them because they thought they had
    a relationship with Finland that allowed them to do that. This
    allowed Russia to concentrate ground forces in other places.
    That possibility will now go away for Russia.
        In addition to that, the Finns, as I mentioned a moment
    ago, are absolutely expert in defending that border. I have
    personally gone on a snowmobile with the Chief of the Border
    Guards and with the Chief of the Finnish Army down half the
    length of that border, and I was very impressed at their
    ability to defend it.
        Senator Cotton. Do you think the Russian General Staff is
    fairly well versed in the history of the Winter War, which you
    alluded to, of 1939-1940?
        General Cavoli. Sir, I know they are. That Winter War is
    studied not just by Western armies as a model of how to beat a
    larger force but it is studied by the Russians as well, as an
    important lesson to learn from their past.
        Senator Cotton. It sounds like you think that even 80 years
    on that the Russian General Staff might not want to put their
    hand on that hot stove again after they did it in the Winter
    War?
        General Cavoli. I would have to put myself inside their
    heads, Senator, but I would not want to do it if I were them.
        Senator Cotton. All right. One final question. There was a
    report a couple of days ago in the Wall Street Journal that the
    Administration is considering sending special operation forces
    to guard the embassy in Kyiv. Can you comment on that report?
        General Cavoli. Sir, I cannot comment publicly on it, but
    we currently do not have any marine security detachment with
    the embassy in Kyiv, and with regard to special forces I think
    we would have to talk about it in a separate----
        Senator Cotton. Okay. You answered my next question, which
    was going to be do we have marines at that embassy, which we
    have in pretty much every other embassy all around the world.
    In fact, I just checked this morning. We do, in fact, have
    marines in Moscow yet we do not have marines guarding our
    embassy in Kyiv. It is their job all around the world, and I
    think that is because the President came out last year and
    publicly stated that he would never put troops in the Ukraine,
    and now the Administration is running around like a cat chasing
    its tail, trying to figure out how to let these marines do
    their job at that embassy, just like they are doing in Moscow,
    just like they are doing at five diplomatic facilities in
    China.
        I think we should just let the marines go do their job at
    the embassy. This is another instance in which I am afraid the
    President is self-deterring in a public fashion, which is
    sending the wrong signal to Vladimir Putin.
        You do not have to respond, but you can take it under
    advisement. I think the marines should be standing guard at the
    Kyiv embassy whenever you get confirmed.
        General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Cotton.
        Senator Gillibrand, please.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you so much and congratulations.
    We are very grateful for your service.
        In visiting some of our NATO allies we talked about Article
    5 and when that gets triggered after a cyberattack. Do you have
    views about what level of cyberattack on a NATO ally would
    trigger an Article 5 requirement?
        General Cavoli. Senator, this, of course, is a very active
    debate inside the alliance. It is an active debate, I think,
    for most countries, in fact. That debate has been joined but it
    has not come to a conclusion inside NATO yet. I believe that
    there are various levels of cyberattack, as you point out, and
    at some point they become more akin to a kinetic attack than
    others.
        One complicating thing I think we have seen in the recent
    past is the activity of non-state cyber actors in this same
    time frame as states are contemplating cyber defense. So I
    believe that attribution is going to continue to be one of the
    most important parts of any cyber policy.
        Senator Gillibrand. With regard to Russia's cyber threats
    specifically to our Forces in Europe and our allies in NATO,
    what steps are you taking and will take, if confirmed, to
    ensure that our IT networks, communication channels, and weapon
    systems and platforms are secure and able to perform as
    intended in the event of a broader conflict?
        General Cavoli. Yes, ma'am. In my current role as the
    Commander of United States Army Europe and Africa I am
    responsible to provide the basic, secure backbone for EUCOM's
    communications, so I work with DISA and with Army Cyber and
    network command to do so. We have a regional cyber center at
    Wiesbaden. It does maintain overview of one of our networks,
    and I work closely with our network command to maintain defense
    of the others. This is something I get briefed on literally
    every week. I am satisfied with the level we have right now. We
    have to work on it constantly, though, and we do work on it
    constantly.
        In a broader sense, Senator, if I am confirmed into the
    next job, the alliance is working in this direction also. So
    there is a NATO Cyber Center of Excellence. We are initiating
    the conversations necessary to have collective policy and
    strategy on network defense, but I believe much more needs to
    be done. I look forward to looking into it and getting back to
    you on that.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. Last week, Finland's
    Parliament overwhelmingly voted to join NATO following
    applications by both Finland and Sweden to join the alliance.
    Given the extensive border that Finland shares with Russia and
    Finland's advance military capabilities can you describe how we
    can effectively integrate these two countries into the NATO
    umbrella?
        General Cavoli. Sure, Senator. So first of all we already
    practice that in the ground domain all the time, and I can
    speak, I think, for Cobra Harrigian and Bob Burke at United
    States Air Force Europe and Naval Forces Europe as well. They
    do this all the time in the air and maritime domains. We
    exercise with Finland. I have got soldiers there I believe
    right now. I just brought a couple of Stryker companies back
    out of there. We have got a parachute battalion going up there
    later this summer. We exercise frequently with Sweden to
    include on high-end air and missile defense things.
        I think it will be quite easy for us to integrate them
    quickly. We have been integrating them in our large-scale
    exercises as well as our operations abroad for some years now.
        Senator Gillibrand. Turkey obviously has expressed
    hesitation about admitting Finland and Sweden. How will you
    approach engaging your defense officials in Turkey to discuss
    how the addition of Finland and Sweden will strengthen the NATO
    alliance?
        General Cavoli. Ma'am, clearly the core of the matter is
    going to be a diplomatic and a policy decision on all nations'
    parts, so I would like to stay away from that for a moment. But
    at a military level we retain robust military-to-military
    relations with our Turkish allies, and we have done so for the
    past years that I have been associated with working in Europe.
    We conduct exercises with them, consultations with them, and
    the like.
        Senator Gillibrand. But not with regard to this objection
    that Turkey has just articulated.
        General Cavoli. Ma'am, specifically with regard to that,
    that has not been a subject inside the military-to-military
    dialogue, at least my military-to-military dialogue with the
    chief of their army.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you. My time has expired. I am
    going to submit an additional question to the record about
    alignment and work with SPACECOM.
        General Cavoli. I look forward to it, ma'am.
        Senator Gillibrand. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Gillibrand.
        Senator Rounds, please.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning,
    General Cavoli. First of all, thank you for your continued
    service to our Nation and thank you to your family for their
    support. I would also like to thank you for taking the time to
    meet with me earlier this week. You are incredibly qualified
    for this assignment, and I do intend to support your
    nomination.
        General, the fiscal year 2023 budget request increases
    funding for the European Deterrence Initiative by about $400
    million. This initiative has been pivotal in our ability to
    respond as quickly as we did in Ukraine. From your experience,
    can you speak to the importance of this initiative, and if
    confirmed, what changes would you make?
        General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator. So the European
    Deterrence Initiative has not just been important. It has kind
    of been like oxygen to us for several years now. It is the
    thing that allows us to do all the exercising, to build all of
    the infrastructure, to pre-position all of the equipment that
    we have been using and that you have seen us use in response to
    this crisis.
        So since my first tour as a general officer in Europe, when
    the original ERI was authorized and appropriated, we have been
    benefitting from it. We have slowly but surely used it to put
    infrastructure into place where we are pre-positioning
    equipment, and now we exercise that equipment at a large scale
    with the funding that this Committee authorizes. It is
    absolutely vital to what we have been doing, and I think we see
    the benefits of it in our rapid ability to react in the past
    couple of months, Senator.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. General, in your answers to
    the advanced policy questions you mentioned that the Joint
    Force must be prepared to counter threats posed by rapid
    technological advancements such as advanced chemical,
    biological, radiological, and nuclear, or CBRN, threats,
    quantum computing, artificial intelligence, robotics, directed
    energy, and hypersonics. Quite a list.
        Based on your experience in the EUCOM AOR, what
    developments are you seeing regarding those threats,
    particularly those pertaining to quantum computer and
    artificial intelligence?
        General Cavoli. Thank you for the question. The ability
    rapidly to process the vast amounts of information that are
    available now really drives our ability to discern intentions
    as well as to find ways to strike it. So there are a few
    efforts that the U.S. side has been working on with regard to
    artificial intelligence. We are using a couple of those in
    Europe right now during this crisis. They are proving very,
    very useful. They help us keep track of where everybody is and
    what they are doing, and if I could take into a classified
    setting with you sometime, Senator, I would be delighted to go
    into more detail. But it is paying big dividends for us
    already.
        However, we are aware that our adversaries are working on
    the same things, so it is all the more imperative for us to
    continue to develop this beneficial technology.
        Senator Rounds. Basically what you are saying is they are a
    pacing threat with regard to those new capabilities.
        General Cavoli. Sir, I think the NDS has it right in that
    regard, especially China is a pacing threat with regard to
    those capabilities.
        Senator Rounds. What lessons in CBRN response have been
    learned from the DCRF that should be applied to the overall
    Joint Force?
        General Cavoli. Sir, the CBRN posture that we have across
    the Joint Force is being relooked right now at the departmental
    level as well as at the service levels, in conjunction with the
    combatant commands. I have had my chance to review the Army
    parts of it. We are updating it, first of all, with regard to
    what we understand the emergence of the threat to be, but
    secondly, with regard to our own posture and our own
    technologies to deal with a treat.
        As you know, for many years in Afghanistan and Iraq that
    was not a primary concern. As we move back into contemplating
    large-scale operations we find it necessary to revisit that.
        Senator Rounds. General, the SACEUR has worldwide
    responsibilities with respect to the planning and operation of
    NATO operations, NATO military operations. If confirmed, how
    would you view your role as the SACEUR with respect to China?
        General Cavoli. Sir, China is present in Europe, and China
    is going to present increasing security challenges inside
    Europe. My job primarily will be to make sure that our
    policymakers have military options insofar as they need them or
    choose to employ them.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, sir. My time has expired.
        General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator.
        Senator Rounds. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rounds.
        Senator Warren, please.
        Senator Warren. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General
    Cavoli, it is good to see you again. Congratulations on your
    nomination.
        General Cavoli. Thank you, ma'am.
        Senator Warren. Your deep expertise in European affairs
    makes you particularly qualified to serve in this role at this
    critical time. Now it is clear that Vladimir Putin never
    anticipated that his illegal invasion of Ukraine would unite so
    many countries around the world. This Committee primarily
    focuses on our military power, but this crisis has made clear
    how important it is to invest in all of our tools of influence
    to advance U.S. interests. Prioritizing diplomacy in
    coordination with our allies has obviously paid huge dividends.
        Diplomatic success, however, does not happen overnight.
    This is the result of long, time-consuming investments. So let
    me start by asking, General Cavoli, do you think it is
    important for the United States to provide robust funding for
    the State Department and USAID?
        General Cavoli. I do, Senator.
        Senator Warren. Would you like to just say an extra word
    about that?
        General Cavoli. Absolutely. You know, so the United States,
    like many nations, attempts to lead with diplomacy. As you
    noted, for diplomacy to be effective it cannot happen at the
    moment it is needed. It has to be developed over years of
    relationship building, and that requires resources and funding.
        I benefit, as an officer, when our diplomacy is robust. I
    benefit, as an officer, and I think we benefit as a Nation,
    when our diplomats are armed the way they need to be to conduct
    the business of the Nation.
        Senator Warren. Good. I appreciate that.
        Climate change is another major security challenge that we
    need to work harder on. The most recent annual threat
    assessment found, and I want to quote it, ``Climate change will
    increasingly exacerbate risks to U.S. national security
    interests,'' unquote. The world's dependence on fossil fuels
    and authoritarian petroleum and petrostates significantly
    undermines our interests in safety. Your response to the
    Committee's advanced policy questions you said that climate
    change, quote, ``will be a critical consideration in all we
    do.''
        Can you just elaborate a little bit on that, General?
        General Cavoli. Sure, Senator. First, of course, our
    National Defense Strategy lays that out, so, you know, it is
    something that we have to consider in everything we do. But,
    you know, right now I am responsible for Army activities in
    Africa. Africa suffers from desertification. That
    desertification leads to intense competition for resources.
    Name your location, you can find it.
        The grain shortage that we were discussing earlier is
    exacerbated by an ongoing drought in India. All of this is
    having an impact inside my AOR, in Africa, which will spill out
    possibly into other areas.
        So yes, it is something I take thoughtfully and seriously.
    If we look at my European AOR in my current job, of course the
    opening of seaways in the Arctic, which has been increasing and
    accelerating in recent years, is changing the military
    geography of the High North, which is something that NATO and
    USEUCOM are both dealing with as well right now.
        Senator Warren. Well, I appreciate your thoughtful response
    here. This is a crisis that often gets overlooked when we are
    talking about national security, and as you rightly point out,
    it is deeply threatening to all of us.
        There is one last area that I would like to talk about.
    Over the past few months, Congress has provided tens of
    billions of dollars in emergency spending to support the
    Department's response to Russia's invasion. I support that
    spending, but I am very concerned about the risks of waste
    without proper oversight.
        DoD owes this Committee a backlog of several years of
    reports on the future years defense plan for the European
    Deterrence Initiative. I have spoken to both your predecessor
    and DoD about the importance of providing these reports. A
    letter I received from the Comptroller last week claims that
    yet another component of DoD will provide the report.
        Now I am getting sick of the runaround here. DoD has not
    complied with the law. Not having these reports hurts oversight
    and planning for your command.
        So General Cavoli, I understand that this is not your
    primary responsibility, but you will be the senior military
    leader overseeing this spending. So will you make sure that
    this Committee receives the reports that are required by law
    and that we will receive them this year?
        General Cavoli. I will continue to submit all the data that
    I am required to, ma'am. We have done that in the past, and I
    commit to doing that.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate that and I will hold you to
    that. You know, it is very likely that you and the President
    will come to us again with additional supplemental requests. If
    you want Congress to continue to approve tens of billions of
    dollars you need to show us how you are making sure that that
    money is spent responsibly.
        General Cavoli. Senator, if I could just make a comment. It
    is not lost on me how much money we are talking about here, and
    I, and we, owe it to the American taxpayer to have a thoughtful
    application of those funds and a full accounting of them.
        Senator Warren. I appreciate it and I look forward to the
    reporting.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Warren.
        Senator Tillis, please.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, thank you
    for the time that you spent with Senator Shaheen and I a week
    or so ago, and congratulations on your nomination and I look
    forward to supporting it, and thanks to your family.
        I want to get a little bit back. You covered the landscape
    on Finland, I think, very well, and you also discussed Sweden.
    But you mentioned that increased investment that Sweden intends
    to make in their military, and we know that we want them to get
    up to the 2 percent threshold.
        Can you give me some insight into the specific actions they
    are taking that would give you confidence that they would be
    there by 2028?
        General Cavoli. Yesh, well they have expressed the
    intention to do so. In my conversations with my colleague, Karl
    Engelbrektson, Major General Engelbrektson, the Chief of the
    Swedish Army, he is confident. He believes that they are going
    to get there on schedule----
        Senator Tillis. What is the----
        General Cavoli.--to 2024.
        Senator Tillis.--if you know, what would that look like? I
    have met with Swedish officials almost every week for the past
    month, and one of the comments that they made is they fully
    intend to do it, but they also have to be able to absorb the
    investment. So with respect to the added investment, what is
    that likely to look like in terms of ground, naval, air forces?
        General Cavoli. So Karl adopted a motto of 3-2-1, the key
    part of which is to go up to three brigades, which is adding an
    additional brigade. That is a big chunk of it right there, I
    believe. The second part of it is to add high-end capabilities.
    So the purchase of Patriot, which my command is helping them to
    integrate into their units right now. They bought their first
    battalion. It has been delivered in the past year here, and
    those are purchases very quickly that help us lift defense
    spending.
        So I think the combination of expanding the size of the
    army and raising the technology of a couple of the things like
    the air and missile defense will, in the ground domain, help.
        Sir, I cannot speak quite as in detail about how they will
    use the additional or how they will absorb the additional
    funding in the air and maritime domains or other domains.
        Senator Tillis. Okay. To the extent you can, though, can
    you talk a little bit about the advantage that Sweden brings in
    terms of naval presence in the Black Sea?
        General Cavoli. Sir, so Sweden has ports on the Baltic Sea
    and has naval forces that routinely sail in the Baltic Sea. As
    you know, the Gotland is sometimes referred to as the
    unsinkable aircraft carrier. So I think they will bring an
    enormous amount of surface capability to us in the Baltic Sea.
    They also have underwater capabilities that will help us as
    well.
        Senator Tillis. The funding that we approved and that I
    voted for, the supplemental funding for Ukraine, do you think
    that was a wise decision for us to send that resource to
    Ukraine?
        General Cavoli. Senator, I think we will put that to good
    use. We will put that to good use.
        Senator Tillis. Can you also speak a bit about how the food
    assistance and, you know, the broader scope of the bill
    focusing on the threat to food sources in North Africa, what
    would happen if we do not pay attention to that in terms of
    stability in areas that ISIS, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram would love
    to see destabilized?
        General Cavoli. Sure. Absolutely, Senator. So the groups
    that you just named feed on weak governance and food insecurity
    and corruption and poverty, just like groups like to do
    elsewhere in the world. Those groups have been doing fairly
    well in the past couple of years. They have made gains in the
    southwestern Sahel that we really need to keep an eye on and
    that our European allies need to help with. A food shortage now
    would just exacerbate the situation down there, Senator.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you. The last thing, Senator Shaheen
    and I visited Serbia, Bosnia Herzegovina, and Kosovo. I got the
    sense, in speaking with the leaders of those countries, that
    they felt like they have been kind of on the back burner in
    terms of our focus. What more do you think we need to do in
    NATO, if any, to really increase our presence and demonstrate
    that we are very concerned with that part of the world?
        General Cavoli. Sir, I think the first thing we can do is
    exercise on an increasing basis down there. As you know, the
    U.S. Army Europe DEFENDER exercise series focused on the
    Baltics last year. It had a salutary effect immediately. I
    could see that. We were warmly welcomed everyplace we were, and
    so I think as a beginning, as a first step, we need to continue
    that.
        Senator Tillis. Thank you. I look forward to supporting
    your nomination.
        General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Tillis.
        Senator King, please.
        Senator King. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, welcome to
    the Committee. Congratulations on your appointment.
        General Cavoli. Thank you.
        Senator King. I believe one of the most important books
    written in the 20th century was The Guns of August, and as you
    know the thesis of the book was that we stumbled into World War
    I by miscalculation, mistake, misunderstanding, and a
    complicated web of treaties in Europe that led to a world war
    that no one anticipated, the depth of which certainly no one
    wanted.
        How do we communicate to the Russians the essential
    defensive nature of NATO? My concern is that what we view as
    deterrence and reassurance they could view as provocation,
    particularly in light of the fact that we are dealing with a
    country which is historically paranoid about the West. Vladimir
    Putin clearly thinks that there is a danger of an invasion by
    NATO.
        Talk to me about how we diminish this substantial risk of a
    miscalculation. Vladimir Putin just made some huge
    miscalculations in Ukraine. What if he makes a similar
    miscalculation about what we are doing in Poland or Finland or
    Sweden or other NATO countries? Give me some thoughts on the
    danger of a mistake triggering a worldwide conflagration.
        General Cavoli. Senator, the danger of a mistake or a
    miscalculation looms very high in our consciousness every day
    in USEUCOM, and we have a process by which we review every
    operation, activity, or investment that we are conducting in
    order to gauge how it will be viewed by our adversaries, and by
    Russia, in particular, and then whether or not we should
    proceed with it given what our various goals are at that point.
        Yeah, it is a delicate balance, Senator, and it is a
    delicate balance because one must not shy away from activity
    that we need to do to stay strong and to make sure we outline
    our priorities of what we will defend. But it is also necessary
    not to overdo that and create a problem where a problem was
    not.
        So we work very, very hard on that, Senator, and clearly we
    have not hit that point yet.
        Senator King. Well, I want to be clear. I support the
    European Reassurance Initiative. I support what we have done in
    Ukraine and what we are doing in Poland and Eastern Europe and
    bringing new countries into NATO. I think the important thing
    here, and perhaps we talked about diplomacy a little earlier,
    is to communicate that this is defensive. I just think that is
    an important point.
        I guess my follow-up question is, do you have, as Supreme
    Commander of NATO, do you have a communication link with your
    counterpart in Russia in order to deescalate not a conflict but
    a potential conflict?
        General Cavoli. So to continue with the last point, sir,
    first, if I may, transparency, that communication, is vital. So
    in my current position when we conduct our large-scale
    exercises, such as DEFENDER, we go to the OSCE. I send officers
    to the OSCE. They outline the entire exercise, the objectives,
    the major movements, and things like that. So in addition to my
    previous answer I should add transparency, which I think we
    work very hard on.
        Senator King. Transparency to the Russians.
        General Cavoli. To the Russians and to everybody. Yeah,
    absolutely, sir. We are not hiding anything with these efforts.
        Senator King. Do you have a red phone?
        General Cavoli. The Supreme Allied Commander has a venue of
    communication with his counterpart in the Russian Federation.
        Senator King. I am sorry. You said you do have
    communication?
        General Cavoli. The Supreme Allied Commander has that.
        Senator King. Thank you. That is reassuring.
        A short question. All of us are supportive of the arms and
    the support that we have been giving to the Ukrainians, both
    humanitarian and military. Looking beyond the current conflict,
    however, there will be a huge amount of arms in this relatively
    small country. We spent 30 or 40 years chasing MANPADS that we
    gave to the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. Is there any oversight
    or accountability of where all these weapons are and where they
    might be? It worries me that not the Ukrainians but that they
    could fall into the hands of terrorists or other malefactors in
    the region.
        General Cavoli. Senator, establishing accountability over
    where all of that equipment is, is a vital task for us. It is
    challenging right now, of course, because we are not in the
    country. But as the conflict winds down or concludes that will
    be one of the things that I have to get at, especially if I am
    confirmed into the next position. I share your concern on it.
        Senator King. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator King.
        Senator Sullivan, please.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and General,
    thank you and your family.
        I very much appreciated our discussion yesterday. I believe
    you are exceptionally well qualified for this position. I would
    like you to brag a little bit, if you do not mind. Can you just
    let the Committee and the American people know some of your
    background and experiences and education as it relates to
    Russia?
        General Cavoli. Asking me to brag is the hardest question
    you could ask me, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. Go ahead. We want you to brag. I want you
    to brag. Very impressive. Russia focus, education.
        General Cavoli. Sure. I graduated from Princeton in 1987,
    where I did not look at Russia. I graduated with a degree in
    biology. I entered the Army. I immediately was stationed in
    Italy with a parachute infantry battalion. In that role we
    studied Russia closely because that was our main opponent
    during the end of the Cold War.
        As I came out of company command, sir, I became a Russian
    Foreign Area Officer. My wife and I studied Russian together at
    the Defense Language Institute for a year. Then I went to----
        Senator Sullivan. So you speak Russian?
        General Cavoli. I do. Yes, I do.
        Senator Sullivan. You have studied Russian military
    history, Russian strategy----
        General Cavoli. I also got a degree from Yale University in
    Russian and European studies.
        Senator Sullivan. You have had billets that have solely
    focused on Russia.
        General Cavoli. I have lived in Moscow for months at a
    time. I have traveled all over the former Soviet space. I have
    had fellowships at the George Marshall Center.
        Senator Sullivan. In Germany?
        General Cavoli. In Germany. I was on the Russia desk for
    the Joint Staff.
        Senator Sullivan. Russia desk for the Joint Staff?
        General Cavoli. I was, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. So that is every day getting up, focusing
    on Russia, the challenges?
        General Cavoli. Absolutely, Senator.
        Senator Sullivan. So I would say you are Vladimir Putin's
    worst nightmare and could not be more qualified than probably
    any other member of the military. So again, I want to thank you
    for your service.
        Can you clearly define--succinctly, because I have a bunch
    of questions--our top strategic goals in Ukraine?
        General Cavoli. Yes, Senator. We want Ukraine to emerge
    from this conflict independent and free. We want the NATO
    alliance to be unified and as strong as ever, and we want to do
    these things without engaging in a war with Russia.
        Senator Sullivan. Thank you. You know, there is a lot of
    discussion, you have already said, about NATO being energized,
    unified. I am a huge supporter of NATO. I was actually at NATO
    headquarters right after the invasion in February. I was a big
    supporter of EDI. I am a supporter of the Finland, Sweden
    accessions. I support a robust military. I am disappointed that
    the President once again put forward a budget that cuts defense
    spending in real dollars. I supported U.S. economic and
    military aid, since February, $54 billion.
        But I do want to say here, and hopefully some of our NATO
    allies are watching this hearing, there is grumbling on there.
    My constituents in Alaska are probably the most pro-military
    constituents, Americans in the country. But the grumbling
    relates to this question. Why is the United States spending
    more to defend Europe than Europe is spending? By that I mean,
    dating back to George W. Bush, President Obama, President
    Trump, President Biden, all of have put forward this goal of 2
    percent of defense spending as a percentage of GDP, which was
    agreed upon in the 2014 Wales summit by all members. Yet right
    now we are down to 8 members out of 30--that is actually down
    from 10 last year--who have met that goal. Very wealthy
    countries--Sweden, Canada, Germany, France have not met that
    goal. Many of them are not even close to meeting that goal.
        What can we do? Well, isn't it now or never that the NATO
    countries should meet this goal? I do not believe this is a
    sustainable situation. We are doing all we can. I fully support
    it. But my goodness, the American people are looking and
    saying, ``Where is everybody else?'' How come these countries
    cannot meet this goal that they have been agreeing to for
    decades?
        What is your sense on this? Do we have an opportunity here?
    I am working on legislation that would say within 5 years if
    NATO countries do not meet their 2 percent goal then Congress
    will not appropriate dollars for training and deployments to
    those particular countries. What do you think about something
    like that, and if you are confirmed, will you be very focused
    on assuring that these countries understand that we are a
    democracy too, and at a certain point the American people are
    going to say, ``Enough.'' Europe has to defend Europe as much
    as America has to defend Europe. What do you think of all those
    issues?
        General Cavoli. Senator, if I am confirmed I will work on
    burden-sharing as hard as I can. I am a believer in the Wales
    pledge. I am a believer not just in the 2 percent but on the 20
    and 80 part of the rule, which says that nations should spend
    at least 20 percent on modernization and acquisition. I am
    gratified right now that we hear so many positive movements in
    the alliance.
        Senator Sullivan. Yeah. Germany announcement was great.
        General Cavoli. It is really a great moment. If I am
    confirmed, a big part of my job will be to help our diplomats
    and the interagency of the United States to convert all of
    those good intentions into facts.
        Senator Sullivan. What about legislation I am working on
    right now?
        General Cavoli. Sir, if you do not mind I would rather not
    comment on legislation directly, if you do not mind, sir.
        Senator Sullivan. Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Sullivan.
        Senator Hirono, please.
        Senator Hirono. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome,
    General. Thank you for your continuing service.
        In determining fitness to serve of nominees who come before
    any of the committees on which I sit I ask the following two
    initial questions.
        Since you became a legal adult have you ever made unwanted
    requests for sexual favors or committed any verbal or physical
    harassment or assault of a sexual nature?
        General Cavoli. No, Senator.
        Senator Hirono. Have you ever faced discipline or entered
    into a settlement related to this kind of conduct?
        General Cavoli. No, ma'am.
        Senator Hirono. General, talking about burden-sharing, what
    countries are welcoming or taking in the millions of refugees
    from Ukraine?
        General Cavoli. Senator, that is an amazing story and a
    heartwarming one. As you know, early on my command was directed
    to prepare for assistance for Americans coming out but also we
    anticipated needing to help with a large number of refugees we
    anticipated. We correctly anticipated about 6 million refugees
    coming into Europe. It was unnecessary. The pp of Poland,
    Romania, Hungary, and Slovakia have opened their doors and
    opened their hearts to Ukrainian refugees.
        In fact, I have some local national employees in Poland,
    three of them, who have Ukrainian families in their homes right
    now. It has been a remarkable thing to see the societies
    mobilize to assist Ukrainians.
        Senator Hirono. I think it is an amazing and heartwarming
    story. So even as we talk about commitment, monetary commitment
    to NATO, there are many other ways that our European allies are
    stepping up regarding what is happening in Ukraine, and I think
    it is important to remember that.
        I am glad that Senator Sullivan asked you to talk about
    your background because it is indeed impressive, and I think
    you are highly, highly qualified for this position that we are
    considering you for. I feel like asking you to answer some
    questions in Russian, but that is okay. I think it is a really
    difficult language to learn, and I commend you for that kind of
    focus.
        On Sunday, a delegation of United States diplomats is set
    to travel to The Hague for talking with allies, and I am
    quoting the State Department, ``regarding our responses to
    atrocities committed in Ukraine and in other conflicts and on
    efforts to bring the perpetrators of atrocities to justice.''
        If confirmed, how will you assist the International
    Criminal Court in holding Russia accountable for the alleged
    war crimes being committed in Ukraine?
        General Cavoli. Senator, if I am confirmed I will execute
    the U.S. policy as it stands with regard to that at any given
    time. Clearly this is an issue that has been considered in our
    policymaking circles for some time, and I would have to follow
    U.S. policy.
        Senator Hirono. I think it is very important for Russia to
    be held accountable for the atrocities that they are
    committing, and, of course, this totally unprovoked war on an
    independent country.
        Last Saturday, President Biden signed a $40 billion package
    of new military and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine. This
    includes a vast array of military defensive weaponry such as
    anti-aircraft and anti-tank systems, which the Ukrainians
    urgently need to protect themselves. If confirmed, how will you
    ensure the continuing coordination of the rapid transfer of
    United States resources and weapons to Ukraine and consider the
    country's future defense needs against Russia?
        General Cavoli. Senator, if I am confirmed I will continue
    to execute the way it is being executed right now, with
    improvements and modifications as we go forward. So currently,
    at a policy level, our Nation consults with other nations on
    what they might contribute, we consult with the Ukrainians on
    what they need, and then we try to bring those together. We
    hand that to United States European Command which coordinates
    the logistics of it, and then ultimately all of the United
    States contributions come through the hands of my forces who
    are located in southeastern Poland, and they move it into the
    right locations. So I think we will continue to do it that way.
        I think the accounting of all of this is going to be of
    great importance, Senator. I think understanding where
    everything is and being able to account for the money that has
    been provided will be a very important part, if I am confirmed.
        Senator Hirono. Yes. As Senator Warren also mentioned,
    there is going to be so much money that will be needed to help
    Ukraine in the aftermath that yes, we do need to make sure that
    this money is going where it is supposed to go for the purposes
    for which we are appropriating the funds.
        Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have some other questions
    that I will submit for the record.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Hirono.
        Senator Hawley, please.
        Senator Hawley. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General, good to
    see you again. I enjoyed our conversation the other day, and
    congratulations on your nomination.
        Let me start with NATO, which is much the topic of
    conversation this morning. Of course, we may soon be asked to
    consider and vote on NATO expansion. You and I talked about
    this a little bit when we met.
        Let's start with the Wales pledge. You are familiar, of
    course, with the Wales pledge. You have talked about it, I
    know, today. Our current ambassador to NATO, Julie Smith, prior
    to her confirmation, sent me a letter in which she said, for
    the record, that it was her opinion that NATO allies should
    spend more than 2 percent of GDP on defense, in other words, to
    go beyond the Wales pledge. The Vice Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs said the same. Assistant Secretary of Defense for
    International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander also said the
    same to me, that allies should go beyond the Wales pledge.
        So let me just ask you. In your personal opinion now, is it
    time for NATO allies to move beyond the Wales pledge and
    increase defense spending above 2 percent?
        General Cavoli. Senator, I really liked the Ambassador's
    formulation on that. She has been saying 2 percent is a floor,
    not a ceiling, and I agree with that. I know all of the land
    forces chiefs in NATO. Each one of them has a list of
    requirements. The requirements would all take more than 2
    percent of GDP. So I am advocate of spending more than 2
    percent, at least 2 percent. So I agree, yeah.
        Senator Hawley. Good. Good. Thank you.
        When we talked last week you told me that you did not
    expect Finland's and Sweden's admission to NATO to result in
    United States Force requirements in Europe. I have seen since
    then reports that Sweden is requesting a greater United States
    naval presence in the Baltic Sea. I am also seeing reports the
    Pentagon plans to keep 100,000-plus troops in Europe for the
    foreseeable future.
        I just wanted to revisit this topic that you and I
    discussed in light of those reports. I mean, given this, how
    confident are you that Finland's and Sweden's accession to NATO
    would not result in United States Forces doing more in Europe
    than we are currently obligated to under our current NATO
    commitment?
        General Cavoli. So the 100,000 forces in Europe that are
    being extended, that is part of the surge that we performed
    over the last few weeks, Senator, and was not related to the
    question of Finland and Sweden joining NATO.
        I remain of the opinion, as I told you in our office call,
    that at least in the ground domain that this is not going to be
    a requirement for large, additional forces, or additional
    forces. I think exercises and occasional presence, like we do
    with any ally, will increase.
        Senator Hawley. Different basing requirements, do you
    think? I mean, will this necessitate a shift in posture by our
    forces or NATO forces?
        General Cavoli. I do not know right now, and I would point
    out that the word ``basing'' carries with it an enormous number
    of other implications that I would have to consider deeply
    before I came back to you with a firm response on basing.
        Senator Hawley. Well, since you mentioned coming back, if
    you are confirmed, would you commit to providing the Committee
    with a full account of the implications of Finland's and
    Sweden's potential accession to NATO, the implications for
    United States Forces in Europe should they accede to NATO, so
    that we can consider that as part of any debate we might soon
    have in this chamber over NATO expansion?
        General Cavoli. Senator, I would be happy to do that if I
    am confirmed.
        Senator Hawley. Great. Thank you. Still on this general
    topic, burden-sharing, you and I talked about this, with our
    NATO allies and then vis-`-vis what we need to do in the Asia
    Pacific, with regard to China. We are going to have to do a lot
    more burden-sharing with our NATO allies, is my view, in
    Europe, if we are going to focus as we need to on PACOM.
        Let me just put it to you this way. Do you think our
    European allies should assume primary responsibility for
    conventional deterrence in Europe with us, of course, the
    United States, providing extended nuclear deterrence and more
    select conventional capabilities, but Europe really focusing on
    everything else as we shift scarce resources to China? What do
    you think about that?
        General Cavoli. Senator, I think it is imperative as we
    look at the emergence of the threat of China for us to find
    ways to be able to handle the acute threat of Russia in a
    collective fashion with the alliance that allows us to do that.
    There are a number of different ways that could play out.
    Almost all of those ways include increased burden-sharing on
    the part of the alliance--on the part of other members of the
    alliance, I should say. But they also depend on what the
    security situation in Europe is like at the end of this
    conflict.
        So really, this conflict and the way it comes out is going
    to drive a lot of my answer to your question. It is just
    premature for me to talk about it.
        Senator Hawley. Here is my last question, and my time has
    expired so I will ask it and I will let you answer and yield.
    What are some of the capabilities that we currently provide in
    Europe that you think European allies could feasibly contribute
    instead, going forward?
        General Cavoli. Sir, some of the things we provide are
    heavy equipment and armor. Our allies could provide some of
    that. In many cases it should be modernized first or larger
    quantities. We provide long-range fires and logistics. We would
    encourage the development of those capabilities across the
    alliance, and then probably most importantly, increased air and
    missile defense across the alliance would be welcome
    contributions in terms of capability.
        Thank you, Senator.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Hawley.
        Senator Kaine, please. Senator Kelly. I am sorry. Excuse
    me.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am going to
    follow up on Senator Hawley's line of questioning here,
    General, and great to see you again and thank you for your
    willingness to continue to serve our Nation.
        EUCOM obviously present some unique and difficult
    challenges right now, and it is clear that the conflict in
    Ukraine is going to have a lasting impact on the future of
    European security. That is why I think it is important to
    continue to look ahead, and I appreciate the discussion we had
    in my office last week. We talked a little bit about the
    Ukrainian military needs looking forward, from equipment to
    training to structural reforms. It is clear that these things
    are going to take some time.
        I feel that if we want to deter further aggression beyond
    this conflict, from Putin or somebody else like him in the
    future, we need to start thinking about this right now. As we
    think about the future of the Ukrainian Air Force I think, you
    know, a centerpiece is not going to be the MIG-29. You know, it
    needs to be a U.S.-build or Western fighter or something like
    the F-16 might be a good option here.
        Over the last few years we have successfully sold F-16s to
    some of our partners in the Middle East, and in the state of
    Arizona the 162nd Air National Guard wing has extensive
    experience training foreign pilots. They have been doing this
    for years, and that is pretty much all they do. They are
    currently helping Slovakia, as an example, transition from
    obsolete and, as we have seen, often ineffective Soviet
    aircraft like the MIG-29 to the F-16.
        So General, can you provide your thoughts on how the United
    States and our allies can help modernize Ukraine's military to
    deter future aggression, and specifically with looking towards
    their Air Force.
        General Cavoli. Thanks, Senator. Yes. First of all, as with
    a previous question, I think that Ukraine's military
    requirements at the end of this conflict are going to depend
    largely on what the shape of the security landscape is at the
    conclusion of the conflict and what threat they face and how
    much threat they face.
        So the second thing I would say is that the aid we have
    been giving them is very important, and it is very important to
    what they are doing, but it is going to require some
    rationalization on the far side, I would say. There will
    probably need to be some homogenization of fleets, for example.
    It is hard to have five or six different types of tanks or
    Howitzer, Senator. So I think that will be something that is
    very important to do right away.
        With regard to the air domain, I think that Ukraine is
    going to have to sit down with us, examine the security
    situation they have, and sketch out a strategy for a way ahead.
    I cannot say what it would look like now, but I do look, if I
    am confirmed, to coming back and to talking to you about it in
    the future, because I think it is a critical question for them.
        Senator Kelly. Yeah, I appreciate that. There are going to
    be a lot of tough decisions. Certainly the agreement, whatever
    this final, you know, depending on how this concludes, is going
    to play a big role in what the security cooperation looks like.
        General Cavoli. It will, yes.
        Senator Kelly. What the reforming of their military looks
    like here in future years.
        Another issue we discussed was the possibility of
    permanently basing more United States troops in Eastern Europe,
    an issue that many of us have advocated for. I understand there
    are multiple factors to consider when making this sort of
    decision. So, General, what are your thoughts on the
    possibility of permanently stationing United States Forces in
    Eastern Europe, and specifically, where would you right now--
    you know, where are you starting to think about where they
    could go, and obviously, the reason is to deter future Russian
    aggression here.
        General Cavoli. Senator, so as we float additional forces
    in over the last few months, and as NATO has repostured NATO
    forces, multinational forces, over the past couple of months,
    clearly what has been happening is the center of the NATO force
    has been shifting eastward. Depending on the outcome of the
    conflict we may need to continue that for some time. We will
    have to see at the end of the conflict.
        With regard to how those guys are sourced, how are those
    soldiers sourced--permanently, rotational, unaccompanied
    tours--boy, so many things go into that, Senator. A lot of the
    questions are service equities. A lot of the questions are
    policy matters, and I will have a voice in that, I am sure, if
    I am confirmed, but there will probably be a lot of other
    considerations that go into that.
        Senator Kelly. I was recently in Poland and Germany and I
    think, you know, especially with the Poles it is going to be an
    important conversation to have. They are very interested in a
    stronger alliance and a possibility of a commitment to United
    States Forces in Poland.
        General Cavoli. We discuss it together frequently, sir,
    yeah.
        Senator Kelly. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Kelly.
        Senator Peters, please.
        Senator Peters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Cavoli,
    welcome to the Committee. Thank you for your service. I have a
    number of questions related to Ukraine but they have been
    asked, and I do not want to ask you to keep repeating answers
    to questions related to that. So I have a few other questions
    in some outside areas I would like to ask you in this time.
        General, the United States Special Operations Command
    Europe announced the basing of a new special operations
    headquarters in Albania just weeks prior to the Russian
    invasion. My question for you, sir, is in conjunction with
    SOCOM's efforts how do you see NATO and EUCOM complementing
    this increased partnership with what is really a critical ally
    in a very challenging part of Europe?
        General Cavoli. Senator, so last year we conducted a large
    portion of the DEFENDER large-scale exercise in Albania. It was
    a United States Army Europe exercise but it was augmented, and
    critically augmented, by the United States Navy and Naval
    Forces Europe and Air Forces Europe as well. It had a huge
    effect, a huge positive effect. On the back of that we have
    increased our activities with our Albanian allies fairly
    significantly. SOCEUR's addition of a base down there is an
    example of that.
        If I am confirmed as the EUCOM Commander I will continue to
    pay close attention to the levels of our presence and the
    amount of interaction we have with our allies and our partners
    in the Balkans. I think it is critically important.
        Senator Peters. Great. That is great to hear. Great to
    hear. General, to stay with the theme of partnerships, I am
    proud to represent the Michigan National Guard state
    partnerships in Latvia as well as Liberia, two programs that I
    expect you know well given your current position as Commander
    of the United States Army both in Europe and in Africa.
        Every commander I have talked to, including General
    Wolters, has praised the State Partnership Program. My question
    for you is, if confirmed as the Commander of the most powerful
    alliance in the world, how will you leverage the National Guard
    Bureau's programs to achieve your objectives?
        General Cavoli. Senator, in my current role we use and
    leverage the State Partnership Programs every day, and if I am
    confirmed you will be able to add me to the list of combatant
    commanders who love the State Partnership Program. I have a
    two-star deputy who is from the National Guard, and he liaises
    constantly with the TAGs who have state partnerships in our
    area. It is absolutely invaluable the depth of the
    relationships they have. The continuity of relationships they
    have has all been very, very important to us, in crises as well
    as in peace time.
        So it is an extremely valuable program. If I am confirmed
    as the EUCOM Commander I look forward to adding the Air Guard
    portion of that to my portfolio.
        Senator Peters. That is great. Great to hear, General.
    General Cavoli, on Sunday the leaders of Armenia and Azerbaijan
    announced a border commission as a possible step forward
    towards a peace plan in Nagorno-Karabakh. While Russia
    certainly has made it very clear to the entire world that its
    words and its commitments cannot be trusted, as a result of
    their horrific actions that we are seeing in Ukraine right now,
    but having said that they did play a role in the discussion in
    the Nagorno-Karabakh region.
        So my question for you is, if confirmed, how do you see
    EUCON and NATO influencing conditions to enable peace in the
    Nagorno-Karabakh region, given Russia's involvement in that
    area?
        General Cavoli. Yes, Senator, that is a prickly question.
    In the caucuses, in general, I have spent quite a bit of time
    down there and studied it, and dealt with our partners down
    there. Almost every issue has several different angles on it.
    The Russian angle is always one of the ones that needs to be
    considered. In any given proposal or any given situation, if I
    am confirmed, I would sit down and I would examine it very
    closely from all angles I could before coming up with my best
    recommendation. I recognize how delicate that area is and how
    many external interests are at play.
        Senator Peters. Absolutely, and while NATO enlargement
    increases the collective capacity of our defensive alliance it
    also increases some of the complexities behind maintaining a
    unified front, as I am sure you are well aware. A significant
    example can be seen by Turkey's concerns regarding Finland and
    Sweden's accession into the alliance.
        So my question for you, sir, if confirmed, you will serve
    as NATO's Supreme Allied Commander. How do you see you
    fostering an environment that continues to promote unity and
    cohesion among very unique and sometimes very different member
    nations?
        General Cavoli. Senator, I think in terms of fostering the
    right climate the first step is to remember that the military
    arm of NATO is only one part of NATO. You know, it is a
    military organization under collective civilian control.
        The second thing I would say is always to remember that
    each of those service chiefs represents a sovereign nation's
    army or a sovereign nation's military, and to treat them with
    the respect accordingly.
        Then finally, to consult with them, routinely, and to build
    consensus as I can.
        Senator Peters. Great. Thank you, General. Thank you, Mr.
    Chairman.
        General Cavoli. Thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you, Senator Peters.
        Senator Scott, please.
        Senator Scott. Thank you, Chair Reed. General, thank you
    for being here. Thank you for your service.
        General Cavoli. Hello, Senator.
        Senator Scott. Thank you the visit we had.
        As we talked, just recently I went to Europe and visited
    with American troops in Germany and Lithuania. I went to
    Germany, Poland, and Lithuania. Clearly I was impressed with
    what our troops are willing to do, and also from the
    conversation I had I was impressed with our Eastern European
    allies, what they are doing. They clearly see the threat, and
    it is important to them. But it is clear they need our support.
    They cannot do this on their own.
        There is no nation like the United States. There is no
    military that is like ours. So I think it is clear that the
    security of not only Europe but the security interest of our
    country is that we have got to stop these tyrants, like Xi and
    Putin and others, from trying to control the world.
        It does not appear that the Biden administration did
    everything they could to deter Putin because they clearly
    invaded. It seems like we did the same thing. Obama did the
    same thing back in 2014, and so it has put us in a tough
    position.
        Also, it does not appear that we are doing enough to deter
    Communist China, because they are continuing to do threats
    against Taiwan. I mean, none of us want to send men and women
    to fight, but we are going to end up that way if we do not stop
    these guys.
        So in your professional judgment, given your many years of
    military service, do you believe the United States can deter
    enemy regimes like Russia and China and Iran if we do not
    demonstrate even greater military capabilities and a very
    united political will?
        General Cavoli. Senator, I believe that all instruments of
    national power are necessary parts of deterrence, of an
    integrated deterrence posture. That includes the military. It
    includes the diplomatic, the information, the economic. I agree
    that political will is a necessary thing to demonstrate in
    order to achieve deterrence.
        Senator Scott. What does the European Command need more to
    try to deter Putin and make sure he does not win in Ukraine and
    also he does not ever invade a NATO ally?
        General Cavoli. Yes, sir. So I think the first thing, and
    the most important thing, that the European Command needs to
    continue to deter is continued unity of the alliance, continued
    political will of the alliance, which we are seeing in
    abundance right now. We need to keep that going. I think that
    is the first step.
        The second step is we need to continue support of the Armed
    Services to provide us with the capabilities that we need. So
    those are the two things I think we have there.
        Senator Scott. Do you think it makes sense to reposition
    some of our troops further to the east rather than have so much
    of it concentrated in Germany?
        General Cavoli. Sir, as you know, in response to this
    crisis we have done exactly that. The alliance has repositioned
    four battle groups forward into southeastern Europe, and many
    nations have bilaterally reinforced their forces. For example,
    we have reinforced Latvia. The U.K. has reinforced their battle
    groups in Estonia. The Germans have reinforced their battle
    group in Lithuania, and the United States has added additional
    forces into Eastern Europe as well. So I think that is exactly
    what we have done in response to this crisis, sir.
        Senator Scott. Even with Sweden and Finland not being part
    of NATO, do we have a good working relationship with their
    military?
        General Cavoli. Sir, we have very good working
    relationships with their military. We work very closely with
    the Swedish military on specific technical things but also in
    general on exercises. With the Finnish army I think I just
    brought two Stryker troops back from Finland, and a parachute
    battalion is on its way to Finland on routine exercise later
    this summer. Yes, sir, I think they will be very easy to
    integrate.
        Senator Scott. What would you like to see in addition to
    what our European allies are doing in Europe to help Ukraine?
    Anything that they should be doing that they are not doing
    today?
        General Cavoli. Sir, I think we should keep doing what we
    are doing today. As we talk more and more with our Ukrainian
    colleagues we get the opportunity to understand better and
    better what it is they need and how they plan to use it, and so
    I think we are moving in the right direction.
        I think the question of what happens on the far end to
    Ukraine, after the conflict concludes, however it will conclude
    I think is going to be a very important question for Europe as
    well as for our country.
        Senator Scott. Thanks for your service.
        General Cavoli. Sir, thank you.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Scott.
        Senator Rosen, when she gets settled, will have the floor.
        Senator Rosen. Good morning, General. Good to see you
    again. Thank you, Chairman Reed, for holding this hearing. It
    was so nice to have a great conversation with you last week. I
    am glad to see you here this morning.
        So I guess we will just get right into it. You know, I
    worry about cyber, so Russian cyber threats, and, you know, we
    were talking about that just last week, the importance of
    maintaining our collective vigilance in the face of Russian
    cyber threats. So earlier this month, CYBERCOM Commander
    General Nakasone, he did say a cyber mission force hunt forward
    team traveled to Ukraine in December to help them build
    resilience against cyberattacks, but still, unfortunately,
    Russia has launched destructive cyberattacks against Ukraine.
        So if confirmed, how will you work with CYBERCOM to enhance
    the cybersecurity capacity of Ukraine, our other European
    partners, including through the hunt forward operations?
        General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator. If I am confirmed, I
    will continue to work with General Nakasone and all of his
    components. Of course, the 16th U.S. Air Force under Tim Haugh
    currently runs cyber operations for USEUCOM and do a great job.
        I think General Nakasone's command has set up some great
    models throughout Europe in terms of defending forward, hunting
    forward, and doing it in collaboration with our partners or our
    allies. I would very much look forward to pursuing all of those
    with him. It is going to be of critical importance as we go
    forward, Senator.
        Senator Rosen. Well, that is great. You led me into my next
    question because what do you assess NATO's overall cyberspace
    capabilities in our alliances, our just readiness together to
    respond to any attacks?
        General Cavoli. I think the alliance has collectively
    begun. We have established a cyber center in Estonia, for
    example, and are working towards cyber strategies. But clearly,
    just like for all of our countries individually, there is much
    work to be done for the entire alliance collectively on this.
    If I am confirmed, it will be one of the things I turn my
    attention to first.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. I appreciate it, and I am going
    to move down a little bit to the Black Sea because Russia is
    maintaining a blockade of the Ukrainian coast. It now controls
    a number of strategy ports in the Black Sea, and Ukraine
    actually exports 70 percent of its cargo through there.
        So last month Russia said it in the second phase of its
    invasion that is going to include targeting those Ukrainian
    southern regions, potentially neighboring Moldova. So if
    confirmed, what actions would you take to mitigate those
    threats on the Black Sea, and what more can NATO be doing? What
    can you be doing together to--again, we have the coast, equip
    us there?
        General Cavoli. Senator, first I would point out that there
    are three NATO nations that border the Black Sea, that have
    shores on the Black Sea, and each has a navy. I would also
    agree that the problem of exporting, or not exporting, grain
    from Ukraine right now is an important problem, not just for
    Ukraine but for the world, and because of that for us as well.
        What I would do, if confirmed as SOCEUR or as Commander
    U.S. EUCOM is provide the military options required by our
    civilian leaders. Clearly the way we approach that would have
    to be a whole-of-government approach, which may or may not
    include a military component.
        Senator Rosen. So building on that, I know in this setting
    can you speak on anything more specifically about how we should
    be preparing in the Black Sea for this potential incursion, if
    you will?
        General Cavoli. Ma'am, I think the first thing that we have
    been doing is probably the most important and it is not in the
    Black Sea. It is establishing alternative ways to get the grain
    out. So Deutsche Bahn, the German national train company, has
    been conducting massive lifts of grain out of Ukraine right
    now, coming out through Poland and then up to the northern
    Germany ports for export. Romania has opened the port of
    Constanta for outflow, which goes through the Black Sea but not
    through a blockaded portion of the Black Sea.
        So I think it is going to be a combination of modes of
    transportation that we are going to have to use, and I look
    forward to contributing to that.
        Senator Rosen. I know I only have 20 seconds left, but I
    just want to ask a little bit about if Sweden and Finland join
    NATO what kind of security guarantees do you think we should
    provide for NATO--excuse me, for Sweden and Finland if they do
    join NATO and Article 5 protections kick in?
        General Cavoli. Ma'am, obviously the security guarantees
    and the nature of the security guarantees that we or anybody
    would provide would be a policy matter. I can state that as a
    military matter we are in a position to back up any guarantees
    across the European land mass.
        Senator Rosen. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
        Chairman Reed. Thank you very much, Senator Rosen. General,
    thank you for your testimony today, your service to the Nation,
    which is a proud family tradition. I think you have
    demonstrated quite clearly why you should be confirmed and
    continue the leadership that General Wolters has shown in
    facing this grave crisis in Ukraine.
        With that we will adjourn the hearing. Thank you, General.
        General Cavoli. Thank you, Senator.
        [Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the Committee adjourned.]

        [Prepared questions submitted to General Christopher G.
    Cavoli, USA by Chairman Reed prior to the hearing with answers
    supplied follow:]
                            Questions and Responses
                           Duties and Qualifications
        Question. What is your understanding of the duties and functions of
    the Commander, United States European Command (EUCOM) and the North
    Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
    (SACEUR)?
        Answer. The Commander, United States European Command (USEUCOM)
    issues authoritative direction to subordinate commands and forces
    necessary to carry out U.S. military operations and activities
    conducted within the command's Area of Responsibility (AOR). This AOR
    includes 50 independent states in Europe and the Caucasus region. In
    addition, the commander is responsible for the health, welfare, and
    security of the approximately 103,000 servicemembers and their families
    deployed within the AOR.
        The Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) carries out roles and
    missions assigned by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and directed by
    the Military Committee (MC). SACEUR commands all NATO military
    operations, is responsible for strategic military planning, identifies
    and requests the required forces to execute Alliance missions, and
    conducts strategic engagement and partnership building. In conjunction
    with Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation (SACT), SACEUR
    executes combined and joint training and exercises and conducts
    strategic analysis to identify and prioritize NATO's capability
    shortfalls.
        Question. What background and experience do you possess that you
    believe qualify you to perform these duties?
        Answer. I have been honored to serve our Nation and our
    servicemembers and their families for 35 years. During that time, I
    have commanded at every echelon, from platoon to my current position as
    the United States Army Europe and Africa commander, serving in
    positions of leadership in combat and peacekeeping, and on operational
    deployments. In addition to specializing in Russia on the Joint Staff,
    I have served in Europe multiple times throughout my career and worked
    extensively with the interagency, policy, and intelligence communities,
    allies, partners, and with the embassy country teams throughout the
    USEUCOM area of responsibility (AOR).
        My professional service focused on Europe is mirrored by extensive
    personal experience. I was born in Wurzburg, Germany, where my father,
    an immigrant to the United States from Italy, was assigned as a United
    States Army officer. Over the course of my life, I have traveled and
    engaged extensively across Europe, and I speak French, Russian, and
    Italian.
        Complementing what I believe is a significant foundation of
    professional and personal experience, I have benefited from formal
    military education as a Eurasia-focused Foreign Area Officer. I studied
    at Yale University, where I earned a Master of Arts degree in Russian
    and East European Studies. I further expanded my understanding and
    academic study of European security as a fellow at the George C.
    Marshall Center for Security Studies, in Germany.
        These experiences, my education, and my personal study have enabled
    me to develop a clear understanding of the manner in which the military
    instrument of power supports national strategic objectives in Europe;
    the importance of building relationships across the interagency and
    with regional allies and partners; and effective command and control at
    the combatant command level.
        Question. Do you believe there are actions you need to take to
    enhance your expertise to perform the duties of Commander, EUCOM/
    SACEUR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I am ready to assume command and will take
    the necessary additional steps to refine my understanding of critical
    issues in Europe. I will consult with the USEUCOM Headquarters, Joint
    Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), interagency
    partners, allies, partners, and other key stakeholders to increase my
    knowledge of the AOR. I will also work closely with the component
    commanders and service chiefs to understand their efforts to organize,
    train, and equip the force. Although I have spent a majority of my
    professional life studying and immersed in the European security
    environment, I am a strong proponent of continuous learning.
                        major challenges and priorities
        Question. In your view, what are the major challenges you would
    confront if confirmed as the next Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR?
        Answer. The core European security challenge is Russia. Russia's
    unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine heralds a new era in
    European security. Deterring further Russian aggression, helping
    Ukraine defend its sovereignty, supporting NATO's defense of the Euro
    Atlantic area, and countering malign Russian activities and influence
    remain the most significant challenges facing USEUCOM. As the current
    crisis has demonstrated, these complex and interrelated challenges
    require coordination across United States Government Agencies,
    Combatant Commands, allies, and partners in Europe.
        Question. What plans do you have for addressing each of these
    challenges, if confirmed?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the
    USEUCOM operational environment, developing the requirements for
    credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in
    Europe.
        Question. Recognizing that challenges, anticipated and unforeseen,
    will drive your priorities to a substantial degree, if confirmed, what
    other priorities, beyond those associated with the major challenges you
    identified above, would you set for your tenure as Commander, EUCOM/
    SACEUR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will seek to counter China's growing
    influence and malign political and economic activity in Europe; and
    help our Allies and Partners deal with crisis-driven migration, violent
    extremism, cyber-attacks, and disinformation. We must orient on all of
    these challenges under the backdrop of climate change, which will be a
    critical consideration in all that we do, particularly in the High
    North.
        Question. If confirmed, what actions would you take to focus your
    Command's efforts on each of these priorities?
        Answer. Whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, whole-of-alliance
    efforts are necessary to address the priorities and challenges listed
    above. USEUCOM's continued support to these efforts is essential. It
    will be essential to provide alternatives to China's One Belt-One Road
    projects, in order to reduce Allied and Partner nations' exposure to
    coercion and the vulnerability of their critical infrastructure to PRC
    influence. The ability for the U.S., allied, and partner nation's
    ability to maintain overmatch, secure sensitive supply chain processes,
    and protect operations and technologies from malign influence is
    critical for collective security and interoperability, and requires a
    holistic approach.
        If confirmed, I look forward to fully assessing these priorities
    and challenges, building on USEUCOM's ongoing efforts.
                       technology theater infrastructure.
        Question. If confirmed, how would you work to ensure that
    Department of Defense (DOD) efforts in your AOR complement the efforts
    of civilian agencies?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure our efforts complement and
    support a whole-of-government approach by working closely with United
    States ambassadors and embassy country teams across the region to
    advance U.S. National security objectives with the Department of State
    in the lead. Close alignment of our diplomatic, economic,
    informational, intelligence, and humanitarian goals strengthen our
    efforts to secure the region.
        Question. As Commander of United States Army and Africa, what are
    you major observations about how the security architecture of Europe
    has changed since Russia built up its forces around and invaded
    Ukraine? What implications has this had on posture requirements for the
    U.S. and NATO? If confirmed, what would you prioritize to address U.S.
    security challenges post-February 24, 2022?
        Answer. In response to Russia's attack on Ukraine, the United
    States, working in conjunction with our Allies, has rapidly reinforced
    combat power in all warfighting domains across the Alliance's eastern
    flank. Both the United States and NATO have increased our forward force
    posture in order to deter further Russian aggression.
        Thus far, our collective force posture, operations, activities, and
    investments have been sufficient to deter an attack on NATO territory.
    However, Russia's actions in Ukraine and the changing landscape of NATO
    will require us to continually assess the threat and re-calibrate
    credible deterrence accordingly. The outcome of the current conflict in
    Ukraine will be decisive in calibrating the appropriate future force
    posture, operations, activities, and investments
        If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the
    USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for
    credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in
    Europe.
                           national defense strategy
        Question. The 2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS) identified China
    as the ``most consequential strategic competitor and the pacing
    challenge for the Department'' and stated that Russia poses an ``acute
    threat,'' as illustrated by its brutal and unprovoked invasion of
    Ukraine. The NDS also identifies ``[m]utually-beneficial Alliances and
    partnerships'' as ``an enduring strength for the United States.''
        What does successful implementation of the NDS look like in the
    EUCOM AOR? What are the changes, trends, and/or events that would be
    indicators of effective NDS implementation with respect to the EUCOM
    AOR and the challenges posed by Russia and China?
        Answer. Successful implementation of the 2022 NDS in the USEUCOM
    AOR requires a combat credible United States and Allied posture,
    appropriately re-calibrated in consideration of Russia's actions in
    Ukraine and the evolving security situation in Europe. The outcome of
    the current conflict in Ukraine will in large measure drive the
    appropriate future force posture, operations, activities, and
    investments. Primary indictors of effective implementation of the NDS
    would be an absence of further Russian aggression and continued wide-
    spread European support for the values and rules-based international
    order that serves as the foundation of the NATO Alliance.
        Finally, if confirmed, I will seek opportunities to fill capability
    gaps and create opportunities for the Joint Force through cooperation
    with Allies and Partners. Moreover, I will aim to align operations,
    activities, and investments within the USEUCOM AOR in a manner, which
    disciplines our approach to campaigning and preserves warfighting
    readiness for the Joint Force.
        Question. Given your experience in the EUCOM AOR, where do you see
    the greatest need for change in the Joint Force in order to adjust to
    the realities of strategic competition with Russia?
        Answer. Successful strategic competition with Russia requires a
    multi-domain, global, whole-of-government approach, appropriately re-
    calibrated in consideration of Russia's actions in Ukraine, the
    changing NATO landscape, and the evolving security situation in Europe.
    Our Joint Force must be able to deter further Russian aggression, to
    improve its ability to deploy rapidly, and to effectively interoperate
    with Allies and Partners in contested environments. Enhanced
    capabilities and capacities are needed to compete and win across
    multiple domains. Our Joint Force must be prepared to counter threats
    posed by rapid technological advancements such as advanced chemical,
    biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) threats, quantum computing,
    artificial intelligence, robotics, directed energy, and hypersonics.
        Question. The NDS identifies ``integrated deterrence,''
    ``campaigning,'' and ``actions to build enduring advantages'' as the
    primary ways by which the Department will seek to achieve its goals
    under the NDS. What do you see as EUCOM's role in each of these areas?
        Answer. If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment,
    which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization,
    operations, activities, and investments and how they can best achieve
    the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.
        Question. Given your current knowledge of EUCOM programs, do you
    believe the Command's resources and authorities are aligned in a manner
    consistent with NDS priorities and U.S. strategic objectives?
        Answer. In my current role as Commander, United States Army Europe
    and Africa, the command's resources and authorities are currently
    aligned in a manner that is consistent with the NDS priorities and
    United States strategic objectives. However, going forward, we must
    assess and re-calibrate these resources and authorities as the threat
    and the NATO landscape evolve.
        If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will
    include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization, operations,
    activities, and investments and how they can best achieve the goals as
    specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.
        Question. Given your knowledge of the security relationships with
    Allies and partners in the EUCOM AOR, what do you see as the greatest
    opportunity to build on those relationships to advance the strategic
    objectives of the NDS?
        Answer. NATO unity in the face of Russia's invasion of Ukraine has
    been inspiring. In my current role as Commander, United States Army
    Europe and Africa I have engaged extensively with my land force
    counterparts across the theater. Many of my interactions involved a
    deep discussion on Allied capability gaps and new equipment
    procurement. I believe this is the leading edge of a significant
    increase in European focus on modernization and readiness. Increases in
    Allied capability and capacity strengthen the Alliance, strengthen
    collective defense, and afford greater U.S. flexibility in achieving
    our strategic objectives.
        Question. One of the top priorities for United States European
    Command and NATO has been the military mobility initiative agreed to at
    the 2018 Brussels Summit. If confirmed, how would you address the
    threats China poses to this initiative and to European security through
    its investments and attempts to gain influence in the region?
        Answer. Countering the PRC's malign influence requires a
    coordinated, whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance approach. If
    confirmed, USEUCOM will continue to work with Allies and Partners to
    galvanize European recognition of the pacing challenge that China
    presents, to include Beijing's diplomatic support of Russia in its
    illegal war in Ukraine, and focus operations, activities, investments,
    and engagements in critical areas of this strategic competition. Most
    importantly, we should contrast the PRC's predatory activities that
    demonstrate Beijing's treatment of nations as ``clients and customers''
    with the United States' longstanding commitment to alliances,
    partnerships, and the rules-based international order.
                         european deterrence initiative
        Question. The stated objectives of the European Deterrence
    Initiative (EDI) include: enhancing the United States' deterrence
    posture, increasing the readiness and responsiveness of United States
    forces in Europe, supporting the collective defense and security of
    North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Allies, and bolstering the
    security and capacity of United States allies and partners.
        In light of Russia's illegal war in Ukraine and the continuing
    shift in the European security environment, what changes, if any, do
    you believe should be made to EDI objectives or investment priorities
    going forward?
        Answer. Sustained EDI funding remains critical to our mission in
    Europe and critical to combat credible deterrence. As an example, EDI
    has enabled us to increase our Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). In the
    current crisis, APS provided unmatched speed and flexibility in
    deploying a full Armored Brigade Combat Team to Europe, ready to fight,
    in remarkably short time. Moving forward, the sufficiency of EDI
    funding, objectives, and investment priorities must be informed by
    several factors, including the status of the current conflict in
    Ukraine; the Russian threat; future Allied contributions; and the
    global security situation.
        If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM
    operational environment, and in addition to force posture, an
    assessment of EDI funding is one of areas that I will prioritize.
        Question. As Commanding General of United States Army Europe and
    Africa, what lessons have you learned about the Army preposition stock
    sites, particularly their utility as part of the increase in United
    States troops immediately prior to and during Russia's invasion of
    Ukraine? If confirmed, how will you take this experience and apply it
    across all the requirements in European Command across all domains?
        Answer. Multi-year investments under EDI enhanced our prepositioned
    materiel and supporting infrastructure, which have proven essential in
    our ability to rapidly project power to deter Russia from invading a
    NATO Ally while also supporting Ukraine. Large Army formations were
    able to quickly flow into Europe with ease, draw materiel, and
    integrate with existing command and control structures. If confirmed, I
    foresee this strategy continuing in all domains (e.g., Air Force
    Deployable Air Base Sets (DABS), special operations forces equipment)
    because it enhances our ability to respond swiftly and decisively to
    assure our Allies and deter further Russian aggression.
        Question. In addition to funding dedicated to constructing and
    sustaining military installations in Europe, a large portion of the
    funding associated with EDI has contributed to major land exercises
    such as the Defender Series. If confirmed, will you continue to
    advocate for robust funding for exercises with our European Allies and
    partners across all domains?
        Answer. Yes. If confirmed, I will continue to advocate for robust
    funding for exercises with our European Allies and Partners across all
    domains. Fully resourcing and executing our Joint training program
    builds our readiness and interoperability in command and control,
    integrated air and missile defense, fires, and logistics. EDI-funded
    exercises build US and NATO readiness, enhance interoperability, and
    demonstrate Allied and Partner commitment to deter further Russian
    aggression.
             united states capabilities and force posture in europe
        Question. General Wolters testified before the Senate Armed
    Services Committee in April that after the Russia-Ukraine conflict,
    there will be a need to examine ``the breadth and depth of the European
    contributions, [and] be prepared to adjust the US contributions. My
    suspicion is we're going to still need more'' troops than before the
    United States buildup as a result of Russia's invasion of Ukraine. Do
    you agree?
        Answer. Assessing the outcome of this conflict and further
    consultations within NATO are warranted before drawing conclusions on
    U.S. contributions. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic
    assessment of the USEUCOM operational environment to develop the
    requirements for credible deterrence in light of the evolved security
    situation in Europe, including force posture.
        Question. Given your knowledge of and experience in the EUCOM AOR,
    what is your assessment of the current United States force posture in
    Europe? Do you believe it is sufficient to support the achievement of
    NDS priorities and U.S. strategic objectives?
        Answer. In my current role as Commander, United States Army Europe
    and Africa, the command's current force posture is aligned in a manner
    that is consistent with the NDS priorities and United States strategic
    objectives. However, our force posture going forward will in large
    measure be driven by the status of the current conflict in Ukraine; the
    Russian threat; future Allied contributions; and the global security
    situation.
        If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment, which will
    include an evaluation of the USEUCOM force posture to determine if it
    is appropriately scaled to achieve the goals as specified in the
    recently released 2022 NDS.
        Question. In your opinion, what implications does Russia's invasion
    of Ukraine have on future United States force posture in Europe? How
    should such considerations be calibrated and coordinated with NATO
    force posture decisions?
        Answer. United States long-term force posture will be dependent
    upon a consensus about the nature of the security environment,
    including the threat posed by Russia, once the current conflict
    stabilizes. Future United States posture adjustments will be informed
    by anticipated Ally contributions to NATO's new force model, while
    ensuring that we can continue to meet USEUCOM campaign objectives and
    enable U.S. global operations from the USEUCOM AOR.
        If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the
    USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for
    credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in
    Europe.
        Question. In your assessment, are there capability and/or capacity
    shortfalls in the current Joint Force that present a significant
    challenge to addressing current or future threats in the EUCOM AOR?
        Answer. Over the years, our adversaries have been closing the gaps
    on exquisite types of capabilities in areas such as artificial
    intelligence and hypersonic technology, as well as in the cyber and
    space domains. I believe we ought to continue our focus on developing
    ``best-in-class'' capabilities that address the threats of a high-end,
    multi-domain fight.
        If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the
    USEUCOM operational environment to identify critical capability and
    capacity shortfalls in the current Joint Force, as it pertains to the
    USEUCOM AOR.
        Question. In your assessment, given your experience in the EUCOM
    AOR, does the United States have sufficient air and missile defense
    capability and capacity to defend critical infrastructure, such as
    command and control locations and air bases, against cruise missile
    attack? If not, what do you perceive as the areas of highest risk?
        Answer. From my current perspective as Commander, United States
    Army Europe and Africa, USEUCOM has good Army air and missile defense
    systems. However, as the security situation and threat evolve, the
    Joint Force will have to modernize and expand air and missile defense
    capability and capacity in both systems and force structure. Integrated
    Air and Missile Defense (IAMD) is an inherently joint and combined
    requirement that demands integration of all services' air and missile
    defense capabilities in order to defend critical infrastructure.
        A key factor to monitor is the operational tempo of U.S. Army air
    defense forces, for which demand remains high.
        If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of the
    USEUCOM operational environment, including an assessment of IAMD, to
    identify and assess critical capability and capacity shortfalls in the
    current Joint Force.
        Question. How do you view the relative value of permanent versus
    rotational forces in the EUCOM AOR? How does that relative value change
    for different kinds of units/formations?
        Answer. There are clear advantages and disadvantages to each
    employment model. From my perspective as the Commander of United States
    Army Europe and Africa, permanently assigned forces are more
    operationally effective, as they remain fully oriented to the
    operational environment and can become interoperable with our Allies
    and Partners. However, I also appreciate that there are many other
    considerations that bear on this issue. Ultimately, the decision
    between permanent versus rotational forces must balance operational
    effectiveness with global demand and service considerations.
        If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the USEUCOM
    operational environment, and force posture is one of areas that I will
    prioritize, to enable a fully informed recommendation to the Chairman
    and the Secretary.
        Question. If confirmed, what specific enhancements would you make
    to United States capabilities and force posture in Europe to support
    the NDS more effectively?
        Answer. If confirmed, I intend to conduct an initial assessment,
    which will include an evaluation of the USEUCOM organization,
    operations, activities, and investments and how they can best achieve
    the goals as specified in the recently released 2022 NDS.
        Question. Some have suggested that NATO should adopt a focus on
    ``deterrence by denial,'' by positioning credible forces capable of
    threatening Russia if it seeks to act against us along NATO's eastern
    flank. What are your views on the concept of deterrence by denial?
        Answer. I agree with the strategy of deterrence by denial and I
    believe that it would be an effective strategy in deterring a Russian
    attack against NATO.
        Question. What is your understanding of the operational value of
    the four Arleigh Burke class destroyers homeported in Rota, Spain?
        Answer. United States Aegis destroyers based in Rota, Spain,
    coupled with Aegis Ashore provide the foundation of NATO's ballistic
    missile defense capability. In addition to their ballistic missile
    defense mission, they allow us to better track undersea activity, boost
    NATO's presence in the Black Sea, monitor Russia naval activities in
    the eastern Mediterranean, and provide a wide range of multi-mission
    capabilities.
        Question. The current EUCOM commander and his predecessor both
    testified in support of basing two additional destroyers in Rota, Spain
    to bolster United States naval posture and presence in Europe. Do you
    agree that two additional destroyers based in Rota would be beneficial
    in the region?
        Answer. I agree with General Scaparrotti and General Wolters. Two
    additional destroyers based in Rota would be beneficial in the region.
                                nuclear posture
        Question. In your view, what role does the U.S. strategic nuclear
    triad play in the security of the EUCOM AOR?
        Answer. Robust nuclear deterrence is critical to maintaining
    regional stability and deterring conflict and underpins integrated
    deterrence. The U.S. strategic nuclear triad--our Nation's steadfast
    commitment to provide a credible, reliable, and secure nuclear
    deterrent--is instrumental to security in the USEUCOM AOR.
        The 2022 Nuclear Posture Review, which was part of the broader
    National Defense Strategy articulated a nuclear deterrence strategy
    that ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, the fundamental role of U.S.
    nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our
    allies, and partners. The United States would only consider the use of
    nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests
    of the United States or its allies and partners.''
        Question. Do you support this strategy?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, in full, to articles 40 and 41 of the June
    14, 2021, NATO Brussels Summit Communique' and in particular ``As long
    as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance.''
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you support the forward deployment in Europe of United
    States' nuclear weapon with capabilities and infrastructure by allies?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps you would undertake to address
    the above goals with NATO allies?
        Answer. If confirmed, I would reaffirm U.S. strategic assurance
    guarantees as stated in the 2022 Nuclear Posture Review. I would also
    reinforce upcoming improvements that modernize our nuclear deterrence
    capabilities in theater and strongly reinforce our deterrence posture.
                                     russia
        Question. In your view, what are the USEUCOM and NATO activities
    most important to responding to Russian violence in Ukraine and
    deterring potential Russian aggression against NATO territory?
        Answer. From my perspective as the Commander of United States Army
    Europe and Africa, United States and NATO's response to the Russian
    invasion of Ukraine has been a remarkable whole-of-government, whole-
    of-nation, and whole-of-alliance effort. The activities that comprise
    this effort span the spectrum of diplomatic, information, military, and
    economic activities, imposing heavy costs on the Russian Federation for
    their unprovoked and illegal aggression. While all of these activities
    are crucial, I believe that NATO's immediate response, as a unified and
    combat credible alliance has been particularly critical in deterring
    further Russian aggression on NATO territory.
        Question. Are United States policies and the associated
    authorities--as applicable to the EUCOM AOR--sufficient to counter
    Russia's influence in the AOR, or are there additional measures we
    should be considering?
        Answer. In support of whole-of-government and whole-of-alliance
    efforts, USEUCOM contributes to countering Russia's malign influence in
    the AOR. It is vital that the United States and USEUCOM continue to
    share information with our Allies and Partners and work together to
    counter malign influence across the continent.
        Question. Vladimir Putin has discussed Russia's plans to develop a
    variety of new nuclear capabilities, including a new ICBM, an
    intercontinental hypersonic missile, a nuclear-powered cruise missile,
    and an undersea drone. In response to the crisis in Ukraine, Putin has
    put Russian nuclear forces on high alert and threatened ``consequences
    that you have never experienced in your history.''
        What is your assessment of Putin's capabilities and intent to
    follow through on threats to resort to the use of nuclear weapons in
    response to the Ukraine crisis?
        Answer. According to New START Treaty statements on 1 September
    2021, Russia declared 1,458 warheads on 527 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and
    heavy bombers. Russia currently has an active stockpile of up to 2,000
    warheads for non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs). These include air-
    to-surface missiles, short-range ballistic missiles, land-attack cruise
    missiles, gravity bombs, and depth charges for medium-range bombers,
    tactical bombers, and naval aviation, as well as anti-ship, anti-
    submarine, and anti-aircraft missiles and torpedoes for surface ships
    and submarines, and Russia's anti-ballistic missile system.
        Continued Russian rhetoric about the potential use of nuclear
    weapons is irresponsible and destabilizing. If confirmed, monitoring
    these indicators and warnings will remain a top priority for me.
        Question. Given recent advances in Russian attack submarine
    capability, such as the deployment of the highly capable Russian
    submarine Severodvinsk, what additional capabilities or capacity are
    most important to maintaining the United States advantage in undersea
    warfare in the EUCOM AOR?
        Answer. The Russian Federation Navy (RFN) continues to increase the
    scope and complexity of its undersea operations in the European theater
    through ongoing efforts to replace Soviet-era platforms with a number
    of new, technologically advanced multi-mission submarines that present
    a qualitative evolution in the subsurface threat. Maintaining our
    undersea advantage will require a comprehensive approach to undersea
    warfare using aircraft, surface ships, submarines, satellites,
    electromagnetic and cyber capabilities, unmanned vehicles in the air
    and water, and fixed and portable underwater sensors.
        Question. In your assessment, does EUCOM currently have a mature
    joint concept of operations and the necessary capabilities in
    sufficient capacity to mitigate the challenge of Russian A2/AD
    capabilities? If not, what additional capabilities or capacity are
    required in the EUCOM AOR to ensure United States Forces are able to
    achieve operational freedom of maneuver at decisive points?
        Answer. USEUCOM'S concept of operations to mitigate the systems
    intended to contest the operating environment is well developed and
    well-rehearsed. Capabilities to support the operations concept and
    USEUCOM's capacity continue to increase with the addition of 5th
    Generation fighter aircraft and key Army fires assets. Coupling U.S.
    capabilities with allies and partners makes this concept of operations
    stronger and more resilient.
        Question. In your view, what are Russia's strategic goals in the
    Black Sea and in the Mediterranean, regardless of how the war in
    Ukraine progresses?
        Answer. Russia seeks to dominate the Black Sea and compete
    favorably in the Mediterranean for defense, military power projection,
    and control of economic trade routes. Control of the Black Sea provides
    Russia with access to a warm water port (Sevastopol), access to the
    Mediterranean through the Turkish straights building Russian strategic
    defensive depth and allowing access to world oceans to challenge United
    States and allied operations and freedom of maneuver. Russia will
    continue building naval port infrastructure and adding Black Sea Fleet
    combatants including fielding additional long-range strike capable
    ships intended to defend southern approaches, and extend continuous
    naval rotations in the eastern Mediterranean. Russia may also seek
    diplomatic and legal agreements to restrict access and constrain Black
    Sea nations to Russian military and economic advantage.
        Question. Russia will still have the ability to threaten Ukraine,
    blockade its economy, and otherwise disrupt freedom of the commons in
    the Black Sea regardless of the outcome of the war in Ukraine. If
    confirmed, what actions would you recommend the United States and NATO
    take to mitigate Russia's threats in this body of water, and in its
    strategic connection to the Eastern Mediterranean?
        Answer. The conflict in Ukraine has only increased the strategic
    importance of the Black Sea region to Russia. Russia employs a variety
    of approaches to further their regional interests through diplomatic,
    informational, economic, and military means. If confirmed, I would
    pursue a whole-of-government, whole-of-alliance Black Sea security
    strategy, to ensure a coordinated United States/NATO approach to
    countering Russian regional interests.
                                     china
        Question. In your view, what are the EUCOM and NATO activities most
    important to mitigating the potential strategic implications of Chinese
    influence and investments across the AOR?
        Answer. Mitigating PRC influence and investments in the USEUCOM AOR
    requires a whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, whole-of-alliance
    effort. Providing United States, allied, or partnered nation
    alternatives to China's investments and loans to advance Europe's
    infrastructure can mitigate or stall China's One Belt-One Road
    projects, reduces Europe's exposure to coercion, and ensures access to
    critical infrastructure. Our collective ability to secure sensitive
    supply chain processes and protect operations and technologies is
    critical for collective security and interoperability, and requires a
    holistic approach.
        If confirmed, I will fully assess China's malign activities in
    Europe, building on USEUCOM's ongoing efforts.
        Question. As NATO seeks to revise its Strategic Concept, what role
    do you envision for the Alliance in countering the challenge from
    Chinese malign influence in the EUCOM AOR?
        Answer. More than at any time in recent years, our European Allies
    and Partners recognize the risk the PRC presents to European security
    and interests. The June of 2021 NATO heads of state communique
    described NATO's growing concern over the PRC's malign actions on the
    continent and outlined NATO's policy to protect critical
    infrastructure, strengthen resilience, maintain our technological edge,
    and address challenges to the rules-based international order.
    Beijing's response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine has only furthered
    these concerns. With NATO releasing its new strategic concept this
    summer in Madrid, I think we will continue to see the growing
    importance NATO is placing on China and additional whole-of-alliance
    efforts to counter malign PRC activities in Europe.
        If confirmed, I look forward to working with the whole-of-
    government, Allies, and Partners to assess and counter China's malign
    activities in Europe.
                             russian hybrid warfare
        Question. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee
    on March 29, 2022, General Wolters stated ``Russia employs
    unconventional tools, ranging from disinformation campaigns, malicious
    cyber activities, and the manipulation of energy markets to support
    Moscow's efforts at political subversion and economic intimidation.''
        In your assessment, does EUCOM currently have sufficient resources
    for countering Russia's cyber-enabled information operations and other
    hybrid warfare operations? If not, what additional capabilities or
    capacities are required in the EUCOM AOR to effectively counter these
    Russian hybrid operations below the level of military conflict?
        Answer. USEUCOM collaborates directly with CYBERCOM to generate
    cyberspace options to counter state and non-state malicious activities
    within the European theater. CYBERCOM, as the force provider for
    Cyberspace Operations Forces, uses persistent engagement to interact
    and compete with adversaries in cyberspace short of armed conflict. We
    know Russia invests heavily in cyber-enabled information and hybrid
    warfare operations worldwide. It is imperative that the United States
    not cede this key terrain. USEUCOM's operations in the information
    environment contribute to the Command's and the United States
    Government's overall efforts to advance United States interests in
    Europe. If confirmed, we will continue to expand our interoperability
    with our Allies and Partners, where we realize the full benefit of our
    competitive advantage over Russia.
        Question. What do you assess as key priorities for, and limitations
    on, the conduct of information operations against Russia in the EUCOM
    AOR?
        Answer. A whole-of-government methodology coupled with the
    appropriate authorities is key to conducting effective information
    operations to counter Russian malign influence. Expanding this approach
    to include the entire NATO Alliance, the European Union, and individual
    Partner nations will further increase efficacy. If confirmed, my intent
    is to ensure that USEUCOM continues its practice of close coordination
    with the Joint Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for
    Policy, and the Department of State to comply with department policy
    guidance, as well as department granted authorities and permissions.
        Question. In your assessment, how important is a whole-of-
    government approach to countering Russian hybrid warfare against the
    United States? In your assessment, can the United States be successful
    against Russian hybrid warfare if we fail to invest in non-military
    tools of national power as part of a whole-of-government approach?
        Answer. The Russian Federation has demonstrated the ability to
    utilize all of its instruments of national power to achieve their
    desired outcomes. The United States must continue to invest in critical
    tools of national power as part of a whole-of-government approach to
    counter hybrid warfare. Efforts are more effective when aligned with
    Allies and Partners. Increased alignment will increase the speed at
    which the U.S., our allies, and partners compete, allowing us to be
    proactive versus reactive. With respect to the recent Ukraine crisis,
    through close coordination among agencies and departments, the USG was
    particularly effective at establishing and maintaining a dominant
    narrative exposing Kremlin intent and mobilizing support to Ukraine's
    defense of its sovereignty. If confirmed, I look forward to working
    with the whole-of-government to assess and counter Russia's hybrid
    warfare activities in Europe.
        Question. How important is it that our campaign to counter Russian
    hybrid aggression be synchronized with the efforts of our allies and
    partners?
        Answer. It is imperative that our campaign to counter Russian
    hybrid aggression be synchronized with our allies and partners.
    USEUCOM's operations, activities, and investments in our AOR contribute
    daily to establishing and maintaining a narrative that effectively
    challenges Russia's malign activities. The demonstrated professionalism
    of our Armed Forces, our persistent presence across all domains, our
    strong Alliance and partnerships, our information and intelligence
    sharing agreements, our ongoing and unprecedented Security Force
    Assistance efforts, and our robust Joint and Combined Exercises all
    demonstrate our ironclad commitment to regional security, while
    promoting U.S. strategic interests. If confirmed, I look forward to
    working with the whole-of-government and our allies and partners to
    assess and counter Russia's hybrid warfare activities in Europe.
        Question. What is your assessment of NATO's readiness to detect,
    deter, and respond to attacks from adversaries in the cyber domain?
        Answer. NATO's cyberspace capabilities depend on the combined
    strength of its member nations. Each country in the Alliance is
    responsible for their own cyber security. In recent years, NATO has
    expanded their focus on cyber by establishing additional force
    structure and a Cyberspace Operations Center, located in Mons. In my
    current capacity as the Commander, United States Army Europe and
    Africa, I have observed that throughout the current crisis, NATO's
    cyberspace capabilities have been more closely integrated than at any
    other time.
        If confirmed, I will ensure that USEUCOM continues collaborative
    efforts with organizations such as U.S. Cyber Command and NATO's
    Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence to improve training,
    rapidly disseminate best practices, and facilitate information-sharing
    across the AOR.
            violent extremist organizations (veos) in the eucom aor
        Question. What is your understanding of the U.S. counterterrorism
    strategy as it relates to the EUCOM AOR?
        Answer. It is my understanding that USEUCOM supports a whole-of-
    government approach to counter terrorism. USEUCOM, in coordination with
    the U.S. interagency, implements the strategy by supporting and
    enabling our partners, allies and other stakeholders through
    information sharing and building partner capacity.
        Question. How would you assess the effectiveness of the U.S.
    counterterrorism strategy and associated activities in addressing the
    threat posed by violent extremist organizations? What changes, if any,
    would you recommend?
        Answer. My understanding is that threat assessments suggest
    relatively low risk for violent extremist organizations within the
    USEUCOM AOR. Moreover, I assess that in general, the U.S. military's
    largest contribution in the fight against transnational threats often
    comes in the form of information sharing and capacity-building. If
    confirmed, I would strive to grow allied and partner nation networks to
    counter the threats that promote extremist ideologies and criminal
    activities within and beyond Europe, as we defend the Homeland forward.
        Question. Within the EUCOM AOR, what do you consider the highest
    counterterrorism priorities?
        Answer. In my current capacity, the highest priority for
    counterterrorism operations is protecting the Homeland, followed by
    mitigating threats to U.S. interests and those of our allies and
    partners in the region.
        Question. What is your assessment of the threat posed by al Qaeda,
    the Islamic State, and other violent extremist organizations to the
    EUCOM AOR?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will assess the threat posed by al Qaeda,
    IS, and other VEOs in the USEUCOM AOR. Speaking in my current roll as
    Commander, United States Army Europe and Africa, I can say that a
    terrorist threat to United States Army Forces in Europe persists,
    despite a decline in attacks in the past two years. ISIS in particular
    directed multiple attacks against civilian targets and tourist
    locations in the past couple of years. The group intends to expand its
    operational networks and they continue to call on sympathizers to
    conduct attacks in Europe. Al Qaeda also intends to conduct attacks in
    the USEUCOM AOR but lacks the capability due to diminished leadership
    and resources.
        Question. What is your assessment of Russia's role in supporting
    violent extremist groups in the EUCOM AOR? What steps, if any, would
    you recommend to counter this support?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will conduct a holistic assessment of the
    USEUCOM operational environment, including an assessment of Russia's
    role in supporting violent extremist organizations or groups (VEOs).
          u.s. commitment under article 5 of the north atlantic treaty
        Question. A cornerstone of the NATO Alliance is the principle of
    collective self-defense as codified in Article 5 of the North Atlantic
    Treaty.
        In your view, how important to U.S. strategic interests is the U.S.
    commitment to its obligations under Article 5?
        Answer. The U.S. commitment to its obligations under Article 5 is
    vital to U.S. strategic interests. The National Defense Strategy
    clearly articulates the importance of strong alliances to respond to
    shared challenges. NATO is the premier alliance on the world stage, and
    Article 5 represents the enduring commitment that binds our nations
    together.
        Question. How important to being able to meet Article 5 obligations
    is follow through on Article 3 which commits allies to develop their
    ``individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack''?
        Answer. Commitment to Article 3 is essential to ensuring the
    success of Article 5 obligations. Article 3 charges independent nations
    with the responsibility to provide for their own defense as a
    precondition for collective defense.
                              nato burden sharing
        Question. At the Wales Summit in 2014, NATO allies pledged to spend
    at least 2 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense by 2024
    and to move towards spending at least 20 percent of their defense
    budget on major new equipment. Since that time, allies have made
    significant progress in increasing defense spending and investing in
    major equipment.
        Where have you seen the greatest progress on burden sharing in the
    NATO Alliance?
        Answer. As a result of Russia's illegal and unprovoked invasion of
    Ukraine we have seen our NATO Allies increase--in some cases
    dramatically increase--defense budgets, and provide large quantities of
    military equipment to Ukraine. Some nations donated the entirety of a
    specific capability in their inventory. We also witnessed the rapid
    deployment of NATO forces across a large portion of southeast Europe.
    Personally, I am most pleased by many allies' commitments to upgrade
    existing equipment. These new procurement initiatives will ensure a
    more combat credible Alliance. At the Madrid Summit in June, heads of
    state will chart the course with respect to burden sharing for the
    foreseeable future--just as the Wales Summit did in 2014. The outcomes
    of the summit will give us a better understanding of where the Alliance
    stands on burden sharing.
        Question. What is your assessment of current national plans of NATO
    allies for meeting the 2 percent of GDP defense spending goal? Are you
    concerned that certain national plans are not realistic for meeting the
    2 percent goal by 2024?
        Answer. The 2 percent goal represents a reasonable expectation of
    investment by each nation towards the collective defense of all. Last
    year was the seventh straight year of increased defense spending by
    European allies. I am, however, concerned that not all nations will
    meet their 2 percent commitment goal by 2024. On the other hand, I am
    optimistic that NATO members will remain focused on defense investments
    given the current security environment. If confirmed, I will continue
    to encourage Allied officers to advise their nations to meet the Wales
    Pledge of 2 percent.
        Question. If confirmed, what steps would you take to encourage NATO
    allies to increase their defense spending and enhance their military
    capabilities so as to enable appropriate contributions to NATO
    operations?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will continue the momentum towards Alliance
    reinforcement, readiness, and responsiveness. I will encourage allies
    who are falling short to accelerate their efforts, and deliver credible
    plans towards the 2 percent mark. We will assist political leaders by
    clearly articulating the Alliance's operational requirements. I also
    intend to inform Allied investment by continually messaging that we can
    address present and future threats only through an adapted and
    modernized Alliance--equitably sharing the responsibility. I believe
    the principal mechanism to influence Allied defense spending is
    consistent engagement, at all levels, paired with transparent dialogue.
        Question. Although the ``2 percent'' goal is important, it is also
    critical that our allies invest in, and make actual warfighting
    capability available to the Alliance at the speed of strategic and
    operational relevance.
        In your view, should the United States broaden the conversation to
    encourage allies to focus more on the attainment and refinement of
    critical capabilities vice meeting a dollar threshold?
        Answer. Yes; however, we should not allow a renewed focus on
    capabilities to dilute our commitment to a 2 percent spending floor. If
    confirmed, closing critical capability gaps within the Alliance will be
    one of my top priorities. We must work to ensure that the U.S., allies,
    and partners tie investments in capabilities and capacities to clear-
    eyed collective defense plans that address the evolved threat.
        Question. What recommendations for additional reforms should NATO
    consider to speed decision-making, improve the ability of the Alliance
    to realistically plan for contingencies, and generate forces at the
    speed of strategic and operational relevance?
        Answer. In my current role as Commander, United States Army Europe
    and Africa I am not privy to the specifics associated with internal
    NATO matters. However, the ability to plan for contingencies, and
    generate forces at the speed of relevance will be a top priority. If
    confirmed, I will make an assessment of NATO decision-making, planning,
    and force generation. Also, I would be deeply involved in the
    development of these plans and providing advice to the North Atlantic
    Committee (NAC) to improve the speed of decision making and overall
    readiness across the Alliance.
        Question. In your view, can NATO be enlarged through the addition
    of countries such as Sweden and Finland while remaining an effective
    military organization capable of making decisions and acting in a
    timely fashion?
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. If Finland and Sweden seek to join NATO, in your opinion,
    would they be a net provider or consumer of the Alliance's collective
    security?
        Answer. Finland and Sweden will both be net providers of collective
    security if they join the Alliance. Finland and Sweden are already
    capable security partners who routinely participate in the USEUCOM
    exercise program. Both countries demonstrate the values that the
    Alliance is built on and have advanced military capability and
    extremely competent leadership. If confirmed and if they are admitted,
    I look forward to welcoming both nations into the Alliance.
                    nato-russia and united states relations
        Question. What is your view on the NATO-Russia Council? Does it
    remain valid after Russia's invasion of Ukraine this year?
        Answer. The NATO-Russia Council (NCR) previously served as a forum
    to encourage dialogue with Russia. Russia, however, has broken the
    trust at the core of cooperation, and has challenged the fundamental
    principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture. In
    light of the current situation in Ukraine, the United States Government
    should reassess the utility of this mechanism. If confirmed, I will
    provide the Secretary my best military advice on U.S. participation in
    the NRC.
        Question. What do you believe are appropriate objectives for United
    States-Russia security relations?
        Answer. The principal objective for United States-Russia security
    relations should be to prevent direct military conflict. If confirmed,
    I will seek to maintain an alliance-based and credible force to serve
    as a deterrent. Carefully managed and focused dialogue with Russia,
    through the appropriate, authorized channels, will be important to
    mitigating the risk of unintended escalation.
        Question. Are there, in your view, any areas of common interest
    between the United States and Russia in the security sphere?
        Answer. Given Russia's status as a great power and significant
    player in global affairs, cooperation with Russia on areas of mutual
    interest should be a key element of global security and stability.
    These areas could include nuclear arms control, containing the
    proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, countering transnational
    threats such as terrorism and narcotics, and managing escalation in the
    space and cyber domains. Ultimately, cooperation with Russia must be
    within our core national security interests and must be accomplished in
    the spirit of transparency and reciprocity.
                           nato--european union (eu)
        Question. How would you characterize the NATO-EU relationship
    today?
        Answer. The EU is a unique and essential partner for NATO, and the
    NATO-EU relationship is stronger today than it has been in decades.
    NATO and the EU currently have 21 member countries in common. Both
    organizations agreed to 74 cooperative areas since the 2016 Warsaw
    Summit, including closer cooperation in countering hybrid threats,
    counterterrorism, information sharing, exercises, and crisis
    management. Congruent with NATO's Strategic Concept, the EU's Strategic
    Compass identifies Russia as the significant threat to peace and world
    order.
        Question. What role does the EU play in ensuring that the United
    States and our NATO allies are able to deter and, if necessary, defeat
    Russian aggression?
        Answer. The EU plays a critical role in securing the populations'
    and parliamentarians' support for national expenditures necessary to
    deter and defeat Russian aggression. Also, strengthened border security
    and surveillance efforts by the European Border and Coast Guard Agency
    (FRONTEX) provide additional early warning and situational awareness to
    our Allies and Partners in the region. Deterrence efforts are more
    impactful when EU and NATO efforts are synchronized.
        Question. What role does the EU play in countering Russian malign
    influence?
        Answer. The EU plays an important role. EU sanctions are powerful
    diplomatic and economic tools that amplify United States and NATO
    efforts to counter Russia's malign influence. Ongoing EU-NATO
    coordination regarding cyber threats and the EU's 2018 Joint Framework
    on Countering Hybrid Threats focus awareness, increases resilience and
    improves our collective response to Russian hybrid aggression.
        Question. In your opinion, is the European Union acting in a
    complementary role to NATO's security objectives, or counter to them?
    If confirmed, what more would you focus on to increase coordination
    between the two organizations?
        Answer. The EU, like NATO, is a key pillar of the European Security
    Architecture. In my opinion, the EU is acting in a complementary role
    to NATO's security objectives. EU influence on NATO Allies to
    contribute funding toward defense matters and the Alliance is critical.
    The EU views Russia as the largest security threat in Europe, and
    strategic EU documents are aligned with NATO planning efforts. I am,
    however, concerned that EU initiatives might compete with NATO
    obligations in an already constrained environment.
                             nato-led kosovo force
        Question. The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) includes approximately
    650 United States servicemembers. KFOR's mission is to assist in
    maintaining a safe and secure environment in Kosovo, consistent with
    United Nations Security Council Resolution 1244 and to support the
    development of the Kosovo Security Force (KSF).
        In your view, does KFOR remains an essential deterrent to
    instability in the Western Balkans?
        Answer. KFOR is essential for regional stability. KFOR assists in
    providing a safe and secure environment for all citizens of Kosovo. Its
    professional presence affords Kosovo and Serbia a chance to normalize
    relations through continued dialogue. The KFOR mission is a success
    story for NATO and a significant investment by the United States and
    the Alliance for over two decades. The U.S. Army's current force level
    at Camp Bondsteel is appropriate. U.S. presence in KFOR shows
    solidarity with our Allies and remains an essential deterrent in
    preventing a new crisis or conflict.
        Question. What do you see as the major challenges in the Western
    Balkans? What is EUCOM's role in addressing these challenges?
        Answer. Continuing ethnic tensions, weak institutions, and malign
    external influences are the major challenges facing the region. The
    Western Balkans is a competitive zone where the United States and
    Europe compete with Russia and China. Russia leverages its historical
    and cultural ties as well as energy to exert influence. China employs
    economic means and a corrupt environment to gain a foothold in numerous
    states to include Alliance members. EUCOM with its interagency partners
    and country teams working together can counter these threats. EUCOM
    must also continue to maximize the State Department's International
    Military Education and Training (IMET) program, a key program in
    creating shared values in the ranks of our allies and partners. If
    confirmed, I look forward to completing a thorough assessment of EUCOMs
    role in the Western Balkans.
        Question. If confirmed as Commander, EUCOM/SACEUR, what would be
    your approach to assisting the development and transition of the KSF?
        Answer. USEUCOM supports the development of the Kosovo Security
    Force (KSF) according to their agreed upon 10-year transition program.
    Conducted in close coordination with the U.S. and other NATO Allies,
    this program strives to ensure the KSF becomes a professional,
    unbiased, and effective security organization. We encourage the KSF to
    maintain a multi-ethnic, professional force responsive to all the
    citizens of Kosovo. Leveraging security cooperation programs from
    regional exercises to professional military education are key for the
    KSF's development. Last year the KSF participated for the first time in
    U.S. Army Europe's DEFENDER regional exercise. Also, security
    assistance primarily through foreign military financing (FMF) will
    provide the KSF with the equipment required to execute a variety of
    missions.
                      nato special operations headquarters
        Question. The NATO Special Operations Forces Headquarters (NSHQ)
    was created in 2007 to enhance the capabilities of, and promote
    interoperability between, the special operations forces (SOF) of NATO
    member nations.
        What role do you believe the NSHQ should play in future
    contingencies involving NATO SOF?
        Answer. Enhancing capability, capacity, and interoperability is
    NSHQ's primary focus. NSHQ should continue to develop strategic and
    operational level command and control capabilities, and also support
    Alliance efforts to integrate irregular warfare and SOF capabilities
    into counter hybrid threat plans. During a contingency, NSHQ would
    serves as an integrating headquarters, ensuring that NATO SOF units are
    properly incorporated in a manner which best leverages their unique
    capabilities.
        Question. How do you believe the NSHQ can most effectively support
    NATO SOF capabilities and interoperability?
        Answer. The NSHQ plays a vital role in the training and education
    of NATO SOF. The NSHQ can increase capability and interoperability by
    setting capability targets, ensuring synergy in command and control
    arrangements, integrating common network platforms, and assuring SOF
    presence in critical areas. By serving as the connective tissue between
    various members of NATO SOF, the NSHQ will enable more coherent
    planning and mission execution.
        Question. What do you believe are the appropriate roles for EUCOM
    and U.S. Special Operations Command in providing guidance and resources
    to the NSHQ?
        Answer. The USEUCOM Commander, as SACEUR, is the executive agent
    responsible for the NSHQ. Duties include coordinating with the
    Commander, USSOCOM to review and validate force structure requirements
    for U.S. support to the NSHQ. The Commander, USSOCOM provides military
    advice on capabilities that support allied and partner interoperability
    with U.S. Forces for areas that fall within USSOCOM responsibilities.
    USSOCOM also provides doctrine, training, and equipment standards for
    special operations, irregular warfare, and security force assistance
    capabilities. USSOCOM promotes standardization policies and procedures
    for special operations equipment, and validates NSHQ's special
    operations requirements to ensure interoperability of equipment and
    forces.
                       european phased adaptive approach
        Question. The United States is deploying the European Phased
    Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as its contribution to NATO missile defense
    capability.
        Do you believe that EPAA will provide the capability needed to
    protect United States forces in Europe and our NATO Allies against
    existing and emerging Iranian missile threats?
        Answer. Yes. The European Phased Adaptive Approach is adaptable and
    suitable to defend United States and NATO Allies in Europe against
    existing and emerging Iranian ballistic missile threats. As the United
    States national force contribution to NATO's Integrated Air and Missile
    Defense (IAMD) Standing Defense Plan, EPAA forces provide the
    foundation of NATO ballistic Missile defense (BMD). As Iran continues
    their missile development, USEUCOM, with support from the Missile
    Defense Agency, will continue to work closely with our allies to ensure
    the capabilities provided by EPAA remain effective against current and
    emerging Russian and Iranian threats.
        Question. In your opinion, is there a need to assess defense
    capabilities of the United States in Europe as well as those of NATO
    Allies and partners against a Russian ballistic missile threat?
        Answer. We must continually assess defense capabilities regarding a
    Russian ballistic missile threat--this is an iterative process. Our
    goal is to build an Integrated Air and Missile Defense (IAMD)
    architecture including United States, allied, and partner capabilities
    to defend sovereign airspace and national assets against any air or
    missile threats from outside Europe or NATO territory. In accordance
    with the Missile Defense Review (MDR), assessments conducted alongside
    our allies and partners must ensure that any such architecture is
    effective against current and future advanced air and missile threats.
    The U.S. is encouraging NATO Allies to improve their missile defense
    capabilities by investing in interceptors and sensors, expanding data
    sharing and integration, and taking other steps to counter existing and
    projected ballistic and cruise missile threats.
        Question. In light of Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 and
    other escalatory actions directed at NATO, are the United States and
    the Alliance sufficiently postured to deter Russia from threatening our
    allies beyond a hybrid or gray zone scenario, as Putin directed against
    Ukraine?
        Answer. It is essential to synchronize efforts to counter Russian
    aggression with our allies and partners. Countering multi-domain
    activities below the threshold of armed conflict requires a whole-of-
    government approach that is most effective when aligned with similar
    allied approaches. USEUCOM is expanding its online counter-propaganda
    efforts and continues to collaborate with USCYBERCOM to compete with
    Russia below the threshold of armed conflict. Additional military
    personnel specializing in information operations related disciplines
    would benefit the command in countering Russia's ``malign influence
    campaign.''
        NATO has recently made gains in detecting, deterring, and
    responding to cyber-attacks. If confirmed, I will ensure we continue to
    make this a priority. NATO maintains a Cyber Defense structure that
    protects over 100K users at approximately 60 locations. NATO's Computer
    Incident Response Capability Centre aims to prevent, detect, respond,
    and recover from cyber incidents. Furthermore, NATO has established a
    Cyberspace Operations Center to coordinate and synchronize cyberspace
    operations. In short, NATO's cyber defense capabilities and capacity
    are improving, but continuous efforts will be required to reduce
    vulnerabilities across the Alliance.
                     sexual assault prevention and response
        Question. The Department of Defense has developed comprehensive
    policies and procedures to improve the prevention of and response to
    incidents of sexual assaults, including providing appropriate resources
    and care for victims of sexual assault.
        What is your view of the steps taken to prevent and respond to
    sexual assaults in EUCOM, including assaults by and against U.S.
    civilian and contractor personnel?
        Answer. We can never be satisfied with our efforts until all sexual
    assaults cease. Sexual assault is abhorrent; it is against our values,
    and damages military readiness. Sexual assault exists along a continuum
    of harm, so we must detect and correct harmful behaviors before tragic
    incidents occur. This issue will always have my direct attention. If
    confirmed, I will work to ensure prevention and response is a top
    priority for USEUCOM.
        In my current capacity as Commander, United States Army Europe and
    Africa, I established a sexual harassment/assault response and
    prevention (SHARP) Fly Away Team to ensure a sexual assault victim
    would receive immediate care from any location within USAREUR-AF. The
    team included available Army aircraft, SHARP advocates, sexual assault
    medical forensic examiners, special victims' counsel, and
    investigators.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of EUCOM policies and
    procedures to protect victims of sexual assault from retaliation for
    reporting the assault?
        Answer. The Department of Defense and Military Services are
    continuing to develop policies and procedures that appropriately
    implement the retaliation-related notification, training, and reporting
    requirements required by the 2018 NDAA to protect those who report
    sexual assault. It is my understanding that USEUCOM is steadfast in
    protecting victims of sexual assault from retaliation. I will, however,
    review the adequacy of USEUCOM policies and procedures for protecting
    victims of sexual assault from retaliation, and the effectiveness of
    the training and implementation of such policies and procedures.
        Question. What is your view of the adequacy of the training and
    resources in place in EUCOM to investigate and respond to allegations
    of sexual assault?
        Answer. If confirmed, I will ensure the resources used to
    investigate and respond to these allegations are maintained to the
    highest standard. Criminal investigative agencies must prioritize
    sexual assault cases and thoroughly investigate all allegations of
    sexual assault. With increased training and specialization, both
    investigators and prosecutors are becoming increasingly skilled in
    dealing with these types of complex cases. In addition, I would welcome
    innovative, data-informed and public health methods that work to combat
    sexual assault.
        Question. What is your view of the willingness and ability of
    military leaders to hold servicemembers accountable for sexual
    misconduct?
        Answer. In my career, I have observed a strong willingness by
    military leaders to hold servicemembers appropriately accountable for
    sexual misconduct. We are still not where we need to be and more must
    be done. Disciplined, fit, and cohesive teams can only be built on a
    foundation of trust. Sexual misconduct destroys trust and the cohesion
    so necessary for a ready and lethal fighting force. If confirmed, I
    will remain committed to bringing to bear the resources required in the
    AOR to ensure any servicemembers responsible for sexual misconduct are
    held appropriately accountable.
        Question. What is your understanding of the adequacy of the
    resources and programs in EUCOM to provide victims of sexual assault
    the medical, psychological, and legal help they need?
        Answer. Congress has been a critical partner in helping the
    Department of Defense ensure we have a robust response system and the
    resources available for victims of sexual assault. We must constantly
    reevaluate and assess our effectiveness in ensuring victims have access
    to restorative care. Commanders play a critical role in this capacity.
        The Department of Defense provides commanders with many resources
    and programs to care for our personnel. We continually pursue the most
    effective tools to expand our ability to support victims with quality
    medical, psychological, and legal assistance. Part of my initial
    command assessment will include issues surrounding services provided to
    victims of sexual assault. If confirmed, I will ensure commanders and
    leaders at all levels within USEUCOM are personally aware of all
    available resources and actively inform their subordinates of their
    availability.
        Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
    in providing necessary support to the victims of sexual assault?
        Answer. The chain of command sets the climate and the culture of an
    organization. Commanders need to make it a priority to promote an
    atmosphere of unwavering support for victims and ensure victims who
    have made the brave decision to come forward are afforded care and
    consideration, to include preventing retaliation within the unit. This
    is a crucial step toward creating the environment we need. I
    wholeheartedly believe in the concept ``People First;'' therefore, if
    confirmed I will ensure commanders understand my priority to provide
    the best possible support to victims of sexual assault.
        Question. What is your view about the role of the chain of command
    in changing the military culture in which these sexual assaults have
    occurred?
        Answer. The chain of command is essential in instituting cultural
    change in the military. Leaders set the example for others to follow.
        Organizational culture starts at the top. I embrace the obligation
    to ensure our military culture reflects our core values and ethos. My
    commitment continues to be building disciplined, fit, cohesive teams,
    wherein everyone is treated with dignity and respect. Those who
    volunteer to serve in uniform are our Nation's sons and daughters, and
    I am absolutely determined to ensure they will serve in environments in
    which they are treated with dignity and respect.
        Question. Do you consider the current sexual assault policies and
    procedures, particularly those on restricted reporting, to be
    effective?
        Answer. Yes. This reporting option allows us to ensure survivor
    care, while also supporting any desire for privacy.
        I believe that we must continually assess all policies associated
    with sexual assault to ensure that we, as a Department, are providing
    adequate resources to the victims of sexual assault. One sexual assault
    is one too many; we must improve our efforts to prevent this terrible
    crime. The restricted reporting option is effective in getting
    survivors the care and services they need, but I would like to see more
    Restricted Reports convert to Unrestricted due to the limitation of
    actions associated with restricted reporting.
        Secretary Austin approved a four-tiered roadmap for implementing
    the Independent Review Commission's (IRC) recommendations that focuses
    on the necessary foundational investments needed to systemically
    improve accountability, prevention programs, command climate, and
    victim care and support. I am committed to implementing the
    Department's roadmap in USEUCOM, if confirmed.
        Question. What methods for monitoring overall trends and gauging
    the sufficiency of component commanders' efforts in preventing and
    responding to incidents of sexual assault do you consider appropriate
    and intend to implement if confirmed as EUCOM Commander?
        Answer. Given the threat sexual assault poses to our force, any
    legal and appropriate method for monitoring trends and continually
    assessing our efforts is worthy of consideration. Certainly, continuous
    communication with subject-matter experts, careful review of incident
    reports, collaboration with the Inspector General, and close
    examination of command climate assessments are among the methods we
    would use. If confirmed, I will work closely with subject matter
    experts on the findings and recommendations of the Independent Review
    Commission and continue to implement in accordance with Secretary
    Austin's direction.
                            congressional oversight
        Question. In order to exercise legislative and oversight
    responsibilities, it is important that this Committee, its
    subcommittees, and other appropriate committees of Congress receive
    timely testimony, briefings, reports, records--including documents and
    electronic communications, and other information from the executive
    branch.
        Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on request,
    to appear and testify before this Committee, its subcommittees, and
    other appropriate committees of Congress? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    provide this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees
    of Congress, and their respective staffs such witnesses and briefers,
    briefings, reports, records--including documents and electronic
    communications, and other information, as may be requested of you, and
    to do so in a timely manner? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    consult with this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate
    committees of Congress, and their respective staffs, regarding your
    basis for any delay or denial in providing testimony, briefings,
    reports, records--including documents and electronic communications,
    and other information requested of you? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    keep this Committee, its subcommittees, other appropriate committees of
    Congress, and their respective staffs apprised of new information that
    materially impacts the accuracy of testimony, briefings, reports,
    records--including documents and electronic communications, and other
    information you or your organization previously provided? Please answer
    yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, and on
    request, to provide this Committee and its subcommittees with records
    and other information within their oversight jurisdiction, even absent
    a formal Committee request? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    respond timely to letters to, and/or inquiries and other requests of
    you or your organization from individual Senators who are members of
    this Committee? Please answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
        Question. Do you agree, without qualification, if confirmed, to
    ensure that you and other members of your organization protect from
    retaliation any military member, federal employee, or contractor
    employee who testifies before, or communicates with this Committee, its
    subcommittees, and any other appropriate committee of Congress? Please
    answer yes or no.
        Answer. Yes.
                                     ______

        [Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
              Questions Submitted by Senator Kirsten E. Gillibrand
           u.s. european command and u.s. space command collaboration
        1. Senator Gillibrand. General Cavoli, your advance policy
    questions mention that U.S. European Command (EUCOM) directly
    collaborates with U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) to counter malign cyber
    activities in the EUCOM area of responsibility. Does EUCOM also have
    the same relationship with U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) to monitor the
    activity of our adversaries in space that could affect the European
    continent?
        General Cavoli. Similar to USEUCOM's relationship with CYBERCOM,
    USEUCOM maintains a strong relationship with USSPACECOM. USEUCOM
    sustains a relationship with USSPACECOM primarily through the Joint
    Integrated Space Team (JIST). The JIST is a group of USSPACECOM
    planners integrated across the USEUCOM staff to synchronize space
    planning and operations in order to monitor and deter our adversaries'
    activities in the space domain.
                                   __________
                 Questions Submitted by Senator Mazie K. Hirono
                            multi-domain task force
        2. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, the Army is experimenting with
    Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) units focused on how to synchronize
    efforts across intelligence, cyberspace, electronic warfare, and space.
    U.S. Army Pacific has a MDTF at Joint-Base Lewis McChord (in the State
    of Washington) and is looking to establish another MDTF in the Indo-
    Pacific region. As Commander of United States Army Europe and Africa,
    you advocated for the establishment of an MDTF in the European theater
    and last year, one was established in Germany. How has the Army
    benefitted from the establishment of a multi-domain task force in
    Europe?
        General Cavoli. The Army has benefitted from the establishment of a
    Multi-Domain Task Force (MDTF) in Europe in two significant ways.
    First, the 2nd MDTF provides United States Army Europe and Africa with
    capabilities and expertise in all domains under a single command in
    order to focus and synchronize long range precision effects against
    strategic and operational targets. Second, during this developmental
    period, MDTFs provide the ability to experiment with new technologies
    and war fighting techniques in the current operational environment.
    This experimentation informs the Army's capability requirements and
    future Army and Joint multi-domain operating concepts.

        3. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, are there any lessons you've
    learned from establishing the MDTF in Europe that you think will help
    the Army as it continues to establish new MDTFs?
        General Cavoli. Yes. While the 2nd MDTF is still building
    operational capability, we have learned that MDTFs represent a wide
    array of capabilities, which can be organized and tailored to meet
    specific theater requirements and provide options for a commander given
    the mission and operational environment. As the Army activates more
    MDTFs, these will require equipment and capabilities unique to the
    region, combined with the placement and access to meet senior commander
    requirements. Furthermore, while any one service can execute multi-
    domain operations, we must continue to build capacity and streamline
    processes to leverage the collective efforts of the Joint, Interagency,
    Intergovernmental, and Multinational enterprise.
                             russian nuclear threat
        4. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, on Monday, a 20-year diplomat
    with the Russian Foreign Ministry resigned from his position as an
    expert advisor on nuclear non-proliferation. In an open letter to
    colleagues he warned that members of Russian leadership frequently toy
    with the threat of using nuclear weapons against the West with alarming
    ``nonchalance''. This rhetoric is also being voiced with increasing
    frequency on Russian state-run television. As the Supreme Allied
    Commander, how would you advise the Biden/Harris administration if
    Vladimir Putin were to target a nuclear strike against the United
    States or our allies?
        General Cavoli. If confirmed, I would make any recommendations to
    the President regarding a nuclear attack against NATO in consultation
    with NATO Allies and the Commander of USSTRATCOM. The military advice
    would certainly depend on the circumstances of Russia's actions and our
    objectives. Russia's nuclear rhetoric is alarming, and we cannot
    dismiss the threat posed by Russia's strategic nuclear forces, nor
    should we forget their robust and growing arsenal of non-strategic
    nuclear weapons. We must ensure that the United States maintains a
    credible strategic nuclear deterrent force and that NATO endures as a
    nuclear alliance with its own credible theater nuclear deterrent,
    supported by the U.S., to ensure peace.
                      suicide prevention in armed services
        5. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, I am very concerned with the
    persistent issue of suicide among U.S. servicemembers and veterans. A
    Government Accountability Office (GAO) report issued earlier this year
    listed cultural isolation, family separations, and lack of mental
    health support among the factors that could explain why servicemembers
    overseas appear more at risk to attempt suicide than their counterparts
    in the continental United States. If confirmed, you will lead 60,000
    American servicemembers stationed thousands of miles from home. How
    will you ensure these members have immediate access to mental health
    counseling if needed, and how will you create a climate that eliminates
    stigma and encourages members to take advantage of these resources?
        General Cavoli. If confirmed, I will continue to emphasize suicide
    prevention as a central theme at USEUCOM Headquarters and across the
    components. I will align resources to senior leaders and target
    programs on suicide prevention and aftercare to ensure unit-level
    personnel services, mental health, chaplain support, and MWR services
    are readily available for United States personnel and families in
    Europe. I will expand on the various USEUCOM and component messaging
    platforms to bolster the effectiveness of how we promote, prevent,
    detect, and treat the mental health of our force through the variety of
    resources available to them, including confidential counseling services
    of military chaplains, suicide prevention hotlines, and mental health
    counselors. Outward and visible support by mental health professionals
    and those seeking care is critical in eradicating stigmas associated
    with mental health.

        6. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, how will you prioritize what the
    Department of Defense (DOD) can do to ensure mental health is treated
    as part of the holistic health of each servicemember?
        General Cavoli. Just as a servicemember's health is the foundation
    of their military readiness, their mental health is the glue that holds
    the foundation together. If confirmed, I will use every leadership and
    communication tool at my disposal to ensure that U.S. servicemembers,
    veterans, civilians, and family members within the USEUCOM AOR feel
    connected with, supported by, and respected by every echelon of the
    military and the broader support community. I will continue to partner
    with the Defense Health Agency to ensure access to mental health
    counselling and to ensure that staffing levels keep pace with
    servicemember needs across Europe. We will eliminate barriers to mental
    health care through education, understanding, empowerment, and
    promotion of positive mental wellbeing as a readiness imperative.

        7. Senator Hirono. General Cavoli, in your opinion, what single
    improvement can best address the ongoing issue of servicemember and
    veteran suicides?
        General Cavoli. Suicide is best prevented by strong leaders who
    take an active interest in every one of their people. This means
    ensuring each servicemember has a strong support network in place and
    ensuring that they are a member of a team that looks out for one
    another. When a person is in the early stages of difficulty it is
    incumbent upon our leaders to take an interest in that person and to
    guide them to the resources that they need. If confirmed, I will strive
    to ensure that any stigma associated with seeking care for mental
    health is erased from the command.
                                   __________
                  Questions Submitted by Senator Dan Sullivan
                                ukrainian grain
        8. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, there is a growing concern
    about how grain shortages will contribute to regional instability
    across the Middle East and Africa. Based on your interactions with
    African counterparts, what is your assessment of the continent's
    vulnerability to social and economic disruption stemming from decreased
    Ukrainian grain exports?
        General Cavoli. Food scarcity is an endemic problem across most of
    Africa and many parts of the Middle East. Africa and several nations in
    the Middle East will face additional social and economic disruption
    stemming from decreased Ukrainian grain and vegetable oil exports. The
    Port of Odesa is a major hub for the UN World Food Programme
    distribution, with 36 countries importing more than 50 percent of their
    grain from that region. Increasing food insecurity pressures are highly
    likely to exacerbate existing social and economic vulnerabilities,
    which could have severe consequences in many vulnerable nations.
                             nato defense spending
        9. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, the 2014 Wales Summit pledge
    of 2 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) on defense spending is a
    critical requirement for NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
    countries to meet. However, just meeting the spending threshold is not
    enough. The increased defense spending must be done so smartly and in a
    manner that maximizes allied contributions of capabilities and
    expertise. In your experience as Commander of United States Army Europe
    and Africa, how has the increased spending of our allies maximized
    their comparative contributions of capabilities and expertise to NATO
    defense?
        General Cavoli. As a result of Russia's illegal and unprovoked
    invasion of Ukraine, we have seen our NATO Allies increase--in some
    cases dramatically increase--defense budgets, and provide large
    quantities of military equipment to Ukraine. Increased Allied defense
    spending enhances deterrence and defense of the Alliance across all
    domains with the provision of relevant capabilities, such as modernized
    vehicles, air defense, rocket artillery, and other critical systems. We
    have already witnessed increased Allied contributions to the Battle
    Groups on the Eastern Flank, as well as the Standing NATO Maritime
    Groups, and enhanced air policing. The increased spending over time
    will strengthen capabilities across the Alliance and help bolster
    exercise participation, improving interoperability and readiness.

        10. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, with NATO allies divesting
    themselves of less capable Soviet origin weapon systems and older
    Western-designed systems, what is your assessment of NATO military
    modernization in the next few years?
        General Cavoli. NATO Allies continue to provide large quantities of
    military equipment to Ukraine. The divestment of less capable Soviet
    weapon systems and legacy Western-designed systems may contribute to
    capability gaps. Assuming continued increased defense spending, this
    will present allies with the opportunity to modernize their forces in
    critical areas within respective national capacities, and close
    interoperability gaps by replacing Soviet weapon systems, ammunition,
    and repair parts with NATO interoperable equipment.

        11. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, what are NATO militaries
    focusing on and how will it complement our capabilities?
        General Cavoli. Given the changing security environment, in the
    near-term, NATO militaries are focused on supporting Ukraine and
    deterring further Russian aggression. Across the mid- to long-term,
    NATO militaries are increasingly interested in developing and
    contributing to areas that bolster the Alliance's readiness to respond
    to threats from any direction in a 360-degree approach. Current
    priorities in this approach include integrated air and missile defense,
    theater anti-submarine warfare, long-range fires, intelligence
    surveillance and reconnaissance, and command and control capabilities
    to complement collective defense.
                                     arctic
        12. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, as the Commander of EUCOM,
    one of your priorities will be to maintain a credible Arctic deterrence
    to ensure that growing competition in the region does not lead to
    conflict. As you are aware, the Army will be rebranding United States
    Army Alaska as the 11th Airborne Division, with an operational focus on
    the Artic. Could you speak to the impact this would have on our
    Nation's ability to effectively operate and deter authoritarian
    aggression in the Arctic?
        General Cavoli. The Arctic is a region of both competition and
    cooperation. Capable and ready forces, equipped, trained, and sustained
    to operate in the Arctic are important to maintaining effective
    deterrence. Arctic competence does not come quickly; therefore, it will
    take time to season the operator, not just to survive in the Arctic
    region, but to thrive, and if necessary prevail in the Arctic's
    unforgiving environment. The Army's designation of forces with an
    operational focus on the Artic, such as the 11th Airborne Division, is
    a first step towards this end.

        13. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, how would the accession of
    Finland and Sweden to NATO change the security picture in the Arctic?
        General Cavoli. The accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO would
    be a positive step for the security situation of both the Arctic and
    Baltic regions. Sweden and Finland both have experienced and
    professional militaries, capable of immediately increasing NATO
    capabilities, especially in Arctic zones. Their experience in the
    Arctic and Baltic regions will increase NATO's ability to detect and
    deter any regional aggression. Additionally, Finnish and Swedish
    accession to NATO would increase the Alliance's political strength in
    Europe and the transatlantic area. Both countries will help facilitate
    deeper coordination between the EU and NATO. With the accession of
    Finland and Sweden to NATO, seven of the eight Arctic Council members
    would also be NATO members.
                                  marine corps
        14. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, under Force Design 2030, the
    Marine Corps is developing new operating concepts like Expeditionary
    Advanced Base Operations and Stand In Forces. It is divesting of
    several legacy systems, including all of its tanks and most of its
    cannon artillery, replacing them with rocket artillery, loitering
    munitions, and several types of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS). Among
    the new capabilities the Marine Corps will field is mobile anti-ship
    missiles. As the EUCOM Commander, you would potentially employ Marine
    Corps units your area of responsibility (AOR). As a potential combatant
    commander, what is your assessment of the capabilities the Marine Corps
    is adding and the concepts it is developing?
        General Cavoli. The USEUCOM area of operation contains critical
    littoral terrain and key sea-lines of communication. The marines' new
    force design can enable the Marine Corps to operate alongside allies
    and partners providing sea-control for allies, sea-denial for Russian
    forces, and contribute to the overall defense of Europe's maritime and
    littoral domain.
                                    ukraine
        15. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, is it your assessment that
    loitering munitions, anti-ship missiles, and proliferated UAS are being
    used effectively in combat in Ukraine?
        General Cavoli. Yes. Ukraine's Armed Forces have used loitering
    munitions and armed UAS in combat to find, fix, and eliminate Russian
    forces. Prior to Russia's invasion, Ukraine possessed an armed UAS
    capability, which has contributed to their ability to absorb and
    effectively integrate new UAS systems. As expected with the integration
    of any new system, some manageable friction points have arisen
    concerning loitering munitions. The Ukrainians are overcoming those
    challenges in a dynamic combat environment. Regarding anti-ship
    missiles, Ukraine used its own domestically produced anti-ship missile
    to sink the cruiser Moskva on 12-13 April and has used a variety of
    other systems including UAS to conduct successful anti-ship attacks.

        16. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, are the United States Forces
    that would be under your command in EUCOM postured, equipped, and
    trained to fight on a battlefield like that which exists in Ukraine?
        General Cavoli. Yes. The United States Forces in USEUCOM,
    reinforced by CONUS-based troops and alongside NATO forces, are
    prepared to defend the Alliance against Russian aggression.
                              energy independence
        17. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, this past March, current
    Supreme Allied Commander, General Tod Wolters, testified before this
    Committee, that ``Russia employs unconventional tools, ranging from
    disinformation campaigns, malicious cyber activities, and manipulation
    of energy markets to support Moscow's efforts at political subversion
    and economic intimidation.'' Do you agree with General Wolters that
    Russian manipulation of energy markets is a significant security
    concern?
        General Cavoli. Yes.

        18. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, do you agree that United
    States and allied energy independence is necessary to withstand the
    economic and political coercion of authoritarians like Vladimir Putin?
        General Cavoli. Yes. Reducing United States and Allied energy
    dependencies will reduce the leverage, influence, and coercive energy
    practices of authoritarians such as President Putin. If confirmed, I
    will continue to support our lead Federal agencies (State, Energy, and
    USAID) on European energy security and independence efforts in
    collaboration with NATO Allies and Partners.

        19. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, since 2005, the United States
    has had the largest decline (1,423 million metric tons) in carbon
    emissions of any country in the world. China on the other hand, has had
    the largest increase (3,801 million metric tons) in carbon emissions
    during that same period. Iran and Saudi Arabia were number three and
    four respectively behind China in terms of the largest increases in
    carbon emissions. Given these emission trends and Russia's exploitation
    of European energy dependence, in your personal opinion, do you believe
    it makes sense to limit the production of American energy?
        General Cavoli. It is necessary to find a balance between carbon
    emission goals and ensuring United States, Allied, and European energy
    security and independence through a mix of solutions. If confirmed, I
    will ensure that USEUCOM remains committed to supporting DoD and U.S.
    goals in this area.

        20. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, as of just last year, Russia
    supplied more than half the natural gas and about a third of all the
    oil that Germany burned to heat homes, power factories and fuel cars,
    buses and trucks. As the European Union (EU) weighed bans on Russian
    energy imports in the wake of the illegal invasion of Ukraine,
    Germany's finance minister, Christian Lindner, stated, ``[i]t was a
    mistake that Germany became so heavily dependent on energy imports from
    Russia.'' Do you agree with Germany's finance minister?
        General Cavoli. I agree that Germany had become too dependent on
    energy imports from Russia.

        21. Senator Sullivan. General Cavoli, with global energy prices
    dramatically higher since the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine, do
    you believe that we should do all we can to supply our allies with
    American energy to limit Russia's instruments of diplomatic coercion?
        General Cavoli. USEUCOM stands with the whole-of-government, as
    well as our European and NATO Allies and Partners in our response to
    Russia's coercive use of energy to influence politics in Europe. The
    United States Government supports energy policies that provide
    responsible, adequate, reliable, and secure energy supplies at a
    reasonable cost. If confirmed, I will ensure that USEUCOM remains
    committed to United States policy initiatives to counter Russian
    diplomatic coercion across all areas, including energy security.
                                   __________
                Questions Submitted by Senator Marsha Blackburn
                         european deterrence initiative
        22. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, if confirmed, how do you
    intend to rethink and shape the European Deterrence Initiative (EDI)
    moving forward?
        General Cavoli. The stated objective of the European Deterrence
    Initiative (EDI) is to enhance the United States' deterrence posture,
    increase the readiness and responsiveness of United States Forces in
    Europe, support the collective defense and security of NATO Allies, and
    bolster the security and capacity of United States allies and partners.
    EDI has been vital to building the military readiness necessary to
    deter Russia and to respond in time of crisis. It remains critical to
    our mission. If confirmed, I will assess our EDI initiatives to
    determine the best way to maximize the use of this funding to support
    the stated objectives.

        23. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, what shortfalls have you
    identified in the EDI's inability to deter Russian aggression in Europe
    effectively?
        General Cavoli. European Deterrence Initiative (EDI) has enabled us
    to increase our Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS). In the current crisis,
    APS provided unmatched speed and flexibility in deploying a full
    Armored Brigade Combat Team to Europe, ready to fight, in remarkably
    short time. Moving forward, the sufficiency of EDI funding, objectives,
    and investment priorities must be informed by several factors,
    including: the status of the current conflict in Ukraine; the Russian
    threat; future Allied contributions; and the global security situation.
    If confirmed, my initial assessment will identify any capability
    shortfalls that may require additional EDI funding.
                                    ukraine
        24. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, how can we work with our
    European allies and partners to disincentivize Beijing's support of
    Russia?
        General Cavoli. Western unity in the face of Russia's unprovoked
    invasion of Ukraine has been critically important, and Beijing has
    taken notice. Given the importance of Western markets to China in
    comparison to China-Russia trade, a unified West signals that attempts
    to support Russia or help Russia circumvent sanctions will result in
    adverse, whole-of-government, international repercussions.
    Additionally, we must continue to signal that Chinese statements
    condemning NATO in support of Russia, or implicitly supporting Russia,
    will only bring NATO closer together.

        25. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, have you seen any indication
    of sensitive information sharing by Chinese drone-maker DJI to Russian
    Forces in Ukraine?
        General Cavoli. No, I have not seen any indication of sensitive
    information sharing by DJI to Russian Forces in Ukraine.
                        telecommunication infrastructure
        26. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, what countries seem most
    receptive and least receptive to warnings of China's malign intentions?
        General Cavoli. Since 2020, Europe has become increasingly aware of
    the risks associated with Chinese investment and activity and has
    become less tolerant of China's aggressive diplomacy. The UK, in
    particular, has grown increasing wary of the challenges China presents
    since the unification of Hong Kong. Additionally, Lithuania recently
    demonstrated strong resolve in the face of Chinese malign influence by
    withdrawing from the 17+1 framework. Countries dependent on foreign
    investment and with weak regulatory frameworks seem the least receptive
    to warnings of China's malign intentions. Conversely, countries that
    are less reliant on external investment seem most receptive to warnings
    of China's malign intentions.

        27. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, how does EUCOM's concept of
    operations need to change to account for Chinese electronic warfare and
    cyber capabilities?
        General Cavoli. USEUCOM conducts regular assessments of Chinese
    influence in Europe. USEUCOM is fully engaged with Joint
    Electromagnetic Spectrum Operations and Joint Cyber Operations,
    leveraging staff expertise and supporting organizations to ensure the
    command is equipped, trained, and ready to operate against a pacing
    adversary who continues to expand their global influence. USEUCOM works
    directly with USCYBERCOM, USSPACECOM, and USSTRATCOM to ensure
    coordination across cyber, space, and the electromagnetic spectrum to
    further develop capabilities to counter Chinese and Russian threats. If
    confirmed, I will ensure that USEUCOM continues to provide a strong
    demand signal on the intelligence community to understand China's use
    and employment of electronic warfare and cyber capabilities in the
    European Theater, the targets of these capabilities, and the intent
    behind their use. Additionally, USEUCOM will maintain a close
    collaboration with USINDOPACOM.
                        finland and sweden joining nato
        28. Senator Blackburn. General Cavoli, what has been your
    understanding of President Tayyip Erdogan of Turkey's opposition
    regarding Finland and Sweden potentially joining NATO?
        General Cavoli. Turkey has expressed concern over Finland and
    Sweden's perceived support of the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party), but
    Finland and Sweden are in continuing talks with Turkey. While this is a
    challenge, I am optimistic that Turkey, Finland, and Sweden, in
    collaboration with NATO, will be able to work through this in a spirit
    of cooperation.
                                   __________
                   Questions Submitted by Senator Josh Hawley
                                  wales pledge
        29. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, you testified, ``I know all of
    the land forces chiefs in NATO. Each one of them has a list of
    requirements. The requirements would all take more than 2 percent of
    GDP.'' In your personal opinion, if more than 2 percent of GDP is
    required to meet allied land forces' requirements--not to mention their
    air, naval, and other forces' requirements--would you agree that 2
    percent is no longer an adequate defense spending minimum for NATO
    allies?
        General Cavoli. I believe that in order to meet collective defense
    requirements, allies will have to spend at least 2 percent of GDP, as
    agreed to at the 2014 Wales Summit. If confirmed, I intend to encourage
    allies to invest the necessary funds to meet Article 3 obligations and
    field the capabilities required for collective defense.

        30. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, you testified, ``So I am an
    advocate of spending more than 2 percent, at least 2 percent.'' To
    clarify, in your personal opinion, is it enough for NATO allies to
    spend 2 percent of GDP on defense--as implied by ``at least''--or
    should they in fact be spending more than 2 percent of GDP on defense?
        General Cavoli. Given the new security environment, it is my
    personal opinion that allies will have to spend more than 2 percent of
    GDP. Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, many allies are moving in
    this direction.

        31. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, I asked Vice Chairman of the
    Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady if he agreed that our
    NATO allies should be increasing defense spending beyond 2 percent of
    GDP. He responded, ``Yes.'' In your personal opinion, do you agree with
    Admiral Grady?
        General Cavoli. Yes.

        32. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, I asked Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander if she
    agreed that ``it is time for our NATO allies to move beyond the Wales
    Pledge and commit to increase defense spending above 2 percent.'' She
    responded, ``Yes.'' In your personal opinion, do you agree with Dr.
    Wallander?
        General Cavoli. Yes.

        33. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, is it
    fair to say that it would significantly help efforts to bolster
    deterrence in Europe--and reduce operational risk to United States
    Forces in the European theater--if our NATO allies raise defense
    spending above 2 percent?
        General Cavoli. Yes.
                              simultaneity demands
        34. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, as you and I discussed, the
    Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) testified that the joint force would be
    ``seriously challenged'' to fight and win wars against China and Russia
    at the same time. This assessment is reflected in the force planning
    constructs in the 2018 and 2022 National Defense Strategies. In your
    professional military judgment, do you agree with the CNO's assessment?
        General Cavoli. I concur with the assessments of the CNO and the
    2022 National Defense Strategy (NDS).

        35. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your professional military
    judgment, what would it mean for EUCOM if United States Forces were
    drawn into a conflict against China, or if the United States was forced
    to withhold forces from Europe to deter or defeat Chinese opportunistic
    aggression?
        General Cavoli. A whole-of-government, whole-of-nation, and whole-
    of-alliance effort would be necessary to address a crisis or conflict
    with China. If confirmed as the USEUCOM Commander I would stand ready
    to support USINDOPACOM. NATO is a major asymmetric advantage that has
    supported the U.S. during past conflicts, and I am confident the
    Alliance would adapt to mitigate risk associated with U.S. global
    requirements.

        36. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your professional military
    judgment, what specific capabilities do United States Forces currently
    provide in Europe that European allies could feasibly contribute
    instead?
        General Cavoli. The United States supports our allies across the
    European theater with a variety of forces across all domains, ranging
    from airborne assets, to maritime vessels, to ground forces. Many of
    those U.S. Forces provide capabilities that exist within our allies'
    military force structure to varying degrees. Fighter aircraft, airborne
    ISR platforms, cruisers, destroyers, and ground maneuver forces are a
    few of the specific capabilities that our European allies could
    contribute to a crisis or conflict involving the NATO Alliance.
                     united states force posture in europe
        37. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, the United States has deployed
    tens of thousands of additional forces to Europe since the beginning of
    the war in Ukraine. In your personal opinion, how long should the
    United States keep these additional forces in Europe, and under what
    conditions should the United States withdraw them from the European
    theater?
        General Cavoli. The situation on the ground in Ukraine, Allied
    contributions, and the evolution of the Russian threat must dictate our
    future actions and force posture. I anticipate that the force presence
    in the USEUCOM AOR will remain at current levels at least through the
    cessation of hostilities in Ukraine. Ultimately, it is important to
    consider an Alliance approach and coordinate our posture levels closely
    with NATO. If confirmed, I intend to conduct a holistic assessment of
    the USEUCOM operational environment to develop the requirements for
    credible deterrence in light of the evolved security situation in
    Europe.

        38. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, former Assistant Secretary of
    State for European and Eurasian Affairs Wess Mitchell recently wrote:
    ``The U.S. should also make better use of the large number of troops we
    have stationed in Western Europe by moving them east. The Stryker
    Brigade recently shifted from Germany to Romania should make its
    permanent home there, and the 173rd Airborne sent from Italy to Norway
    should make Norway its new home.'' Do you agree that we should move
    these units farther to the east, rather than keeping them in central
    Europe? Why or why not?
        General Cavoli. The forward stationing of United States and Allied
    forces in Eastern Europe involves multiple, complex strategic and
    operational considerations. At the strategic level, these include
    maintaining Alliance cohesion and strategic stability while
    contributing to an improvement in NATO's overall defensive posture.
    Operational factors include the systems, infrastructure, and facilities
    to preserve the warfighting readiness and mobility of United States
    Forces, as demonstrated in the response to Russia's invasion of
    Ukraine. Finally, relocating units within Europe is not the only
    approach to enhancing United States and NATO posture in Eastern Europe.
    Persistent presence in Eastern Europe can also be achieved through
    rotational deployments, exercises, and other means. Moving forward, we
    must preserve the ability to remain agile and quickly reinforce areas
    across Europe.

        39. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, Dr. Mitchell also wrote, ``The
    U.S. also has an inventory of weapons that it is in the process of
    decommissioning that could be given or sold to frontline NATO states,
    such as the F-15, F-16, and A-10 aircraft.'' Would frontline NATO
    states be able to make good use of aircraft, such as those listed by
    Dr. Mitchell, which the United States is currently in the process of
    decommissioning?
        General Cavoli. If confirmed, I will work with United States Air
    Forces in Europe, the United States Air Force, the Joint Staff, and the
    OSD to determine the appropriate distribution of divested U.S.
    aircraft. The U.S. Government has established procedures for allies and
    partners to request Excess Defense Articles. We continue to work
    closely with allies and partners to facilitate their requests.
                                nato enlargement
        40. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, you testified, ``I remain of
    the opinion, as I told you in our office call, that at least in the
    ground domain that [Finland and Sweden's prospective NATO accession] is
    not going to be a requirement for large additional forces or additional
    forces.'' How confident are you that Finland and Sweden's admission to
    NATO would not result in requirements for additional United States
    ground forces in Europe, and what gives you that level of confidence?
        General Cavoli. While additional exercises and other engagements
    are likely to grow, I am confident that the admission of Finland and
    Sweden to NATO would not result in additional ground force basing
    requirements in Europe. I am confident in this assessment because both
    Finland and Sweden would bring very capable land forces into the
    Alliance. Finland maintains a large standing Army and the largest tube-
    artillery force in Europe. Sweden maintains a smaller, extremely
    professional land force. Both nations bring capability and capacity to
    NATO, and will bolster the Alliance's defenses, particularly in the
    Baltic Sea and High North.

        41. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, you testified, ``I think
    exercises and occasional presence like we do with any ally will
    increase.'' Can you elaborate on what you meant by ``exercises and
    occasional presence . . . will increase''?
        General Cavoli. The United States and other NATO nations hold
    regular exercises throughout Europe. While Finland and Sweden already
    take part in many NATO-led exercises, I anticipate both nations will
    participate in additional NATO exercises throughout Europe, and host
    additional NATO exercises. Sweden is hosting BALTOPS22 (an annual NATO
    exercise focused in the Baltic Sea on anti-submarine warfare, mine
    countermeasures, and amphibious missions) from 5-17 June, which is an
    example of an increased exercise presence from the U.S. and other NATO
    Allies.

        42. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, do
    you believe Ukraine should be admitted to NATO?
        General Cavoli. All sovereign states have the right to choose their
    own security arrangements, and NATO has an open door policy; however,
    NATO has provisions that prevent countries with significant border
    disputes from joining the Alliance. The President has made clear that
    the United States will continue to support Ukraine in its efforts to
    advance its Euro-Atlantic aspirations. If confirmed, I will evaluate
    the considerations associated with Ukraine's accession to NATO, in
    order to provide the best possible military advice to policy makers.

        43. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, do
    you believe Georgia should be admitted to NATO?
        General Cavoli. All sovereign states have the right to choose their
    own security arrangements, and NATO has an open door policy; however,
    NATO has provisions that prevent countries with significant border
    disputes from joining the Alliance. If confirmed, I will evaluate the
    considerations associated with Georgia's accession to NATO, in order to
    provide the best possible military advice to policy makers.
                            strategic prioritization
        44. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your personal opinion, do
    you agree with Secretary Austin's designation of China as DOD's pacing
    threat and the Indo-Pacific as its priority theater?
        General Cavoli. Yes.

        45. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, if the Indo-Pacific is DOD's
    priority theater, in your personal opinion, would you agree that Europe
    is necessarily a lower-priority theater?
        General Cavoli. I agree with the NDS characterization of China as
    our pacing threat and its designation of USINDOPACOM as our priority
    theater. However, current events show that there may be periods where
    areas outside the Indo-Pacific region rise in priority.

        46. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, Vice Chairman of the Joint
    Chiefs of Staff Admiral Christopher Grady wrote for the record that DOD
    needs to do less in lower-priority theaters so it can focus more of its
    scarce resources on deterring China in the Indo-Pacific, barring a
    significant increase in the defense budget. Assistant Secretary of
    Defense for International Security Affairs Celeste Wallander--whose
    portfolio includes Europe--agreed. In your personal opinion, do you
    agree with the Vice Chairman's and Dr. Wallander's assessments that DOD
    must do less in lower-priority theaters?
        General Cavoli. I believe that DOD must focus its resources on
    priority theaters.

        47. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in your professional military
    judgment, do you believe the Russian threat to NATO is greater today
    than it was prior to its invasion of Ukraine, given significant
    degradation of its military manpower, equipment, and other capabilities
    during the conflict?
        General Cavoli. I believe that it is premature to draw significant
    conclusions about the potential degradation of Russia's conventional
    forces; the war is still going on and is undecided. Russia remains the
    most significant threat to NATO for the near- to long-term due to its
    significant remaining arsenal, including nuclear weapons. Additionally,
    Russia's cyber, space, and information capabilities remain unaffected
    by the war in Ukraine and represent an enduring threat to the United
    States and our NATO Allies.
                                 nuclear forces
        48. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, in March 2022, General Wolters
    supported retention of the nuclear-armed sea-launched cruise missile
    program because it ``exacerbates the challenge for potential enemies
    against us.'' Do you agree with General Wolters?
        General Cavoli. Yes.

        49. Senator Hawley. General Cavoli, how would strengthening
    conventional-nuclear integration support conventional deterrence in
    Europe?
        General Cavoli. A robust conventional-nuclear integration (CNI)
    capability provides USEUCOM and NATO with a means to complicate our
    adversaries' perceived benefit from pursuing nuclear escalation within
    a theater conflict. Our adversaries must know that engaging in a
    conflict with NATO is not worth the costs and will not result in
    successfully achieving their objectives. Our readiness to counter their
    nuclear threats provides credible deterrence across the entire spectrum
    of conflict.
                                     ______

        [The nomination reference of General Christopher G. Cavoli,
    USA follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The biographical sketch of General Christopher G. Cavoli,
    USA, which was transmitted to the Committee at the time the
    nomination was referred, follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The Committee on Armed Services requires certain senior
    military officers nominated by the President to positions
    requiring the advice and consent of the Senate to complete a
    form that details the biographical, financial, and other
    information of the nominee. The form executed by General
    Christopher G. Cavoli, USA in connection with his nomination
    follows:]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nominee responded to Parts B-E of the committee
    questionnaire. The text of the questionnaire is set forth in
    the Appendix to this volume. The nominee's answers to Parts B-E
    are contained in the committee's executive files.]

        [GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]

                                     ______

        [The nomination of General Christopher G. Cavoli, USA was
    reported to the Senate by Chairman Reed on June 15, 2022, with
    the recommendation that the nomination be confirmed. The
    nomination was confirmed by the Senate on June 23, 2022.]

                                  [all]